[Congressional Bills 119th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 2684 Reported in Senate (RS)]

<DOC>





                                                       Calendar No. 242
119th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                S. 2684

 To support countries in Latin America and the Caribbean that maintain 
 official diplomatic relations with Taiwan, to counter efforts by the 
   People's Republic of China to coerce or pressure governments into 
 breaking such ties, to deepen coordination with Taiwan on diplomatic, 
development, and economic engagement in the Western Hemisphere, and for 
                            other purposes.


_______________________________________________________________________


                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                           September 2, 2025

Mr. Merkley (for himself, Mr. Curtis, Mr. Kaine, Mr. Ricketts, and Mr. 
    Bennet) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and 
             referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

                            October 30, 2025

                Reported by Mr. Risch, with an amendment
 [Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert the part printed 
                               in italic]

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL


 
 To support countries in Latin America and the Caribbean that maintain 
 official diplomatic relations with Taiwan, to counter efforts by the 
   People's Republic of China to coerce or pressure governments into 
 breaking such ties, to deepen coordination with Taiwan on diplomatic, 
development, and economic engagement in the Western Hemisphere, and for 
                            other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

<DELETED>SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    This Act may be cited as the ``United States-Taiwan 
Partnership in the Americas Act''.</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 2. FINDINGS.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    Congress finds the following:</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) Taiwan is a democratic partner of the United 
        States, and countries that maintain ties with Taiwan often 
        share our Nation's commitment to transparency, good governance, 
        and human rights.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) The People's Republic of China has pressured 
        Taiwan's remaining 7 diplomatic allies in Latin America and the 
        Caribbean to sever diplomatic relations with Taiwan by 
        leveraging opaque development deals and backroom 
        pressure.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) The United States has an interest in ensuring 
        countries in Latin America and the Caribbean can make sovereign 
        foreign policy decisions free from coercion or financial 
        manipulation by the People's Republic of China.</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF POLICY.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    It is the policy of the United States--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) to support countries in Latin America and the 
        Caribbean that maintain diplomatic relations with 
        Taiwan;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) to counter efforts by the People's Republic of 
        China to coerce or pressure governments in the region into 
        breaking diplomatic ties with Taiwan; and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) to deepen coordination with Taiwan on its 
        development and economic engagement in the Western 
        Hemisphere.</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 4. MONITORING THE ECONOMIC INFLUENCE OF THE PEOPLE'S 
              REPUBLIC OF CHINA.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    (a) Infrastructure Influence Risk Mechanism.--The 
Secretary of State shall establish a mechanism to track and respond to 
infrastructure and development projects by the People's Republic of 
China in countries that maintain diplomatic relations with 
Taiwan.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (b) Functions.--The mechanism required under subsection 
(a) shall--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) identify projects referred to in such 
        subsection that carry strategic risks or involve non-
        transparent financing;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) coordinate appropriate United States 
        diplomatic or technical responses to such projects; 
        and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) share relevant information with Congress and 
        with United States allies.</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 5. REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    (a) Semiannual Status Report.--The Secretary of State 
shall submit semiannual status reports to the Committee on Foreign 
Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the 
House of Representatives regarding governments in Latin America that 
have taken steps to discontinue diplomatic relations with 
Taiwan.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (b) Diplomatic Engagement Plan.--If the Secretary of State 
determines that a government in a country referred to in subsection (a) 
is taking steps to terminate diplomatic relations with Taiwan, the 
Secretary, not later than 30 days after such determination, shall 
submit a report to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and 
the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives that 
includes a detailed plan to support the maintenance of official 
diplomatic relations between such government and Taiwan.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (c) Annual Report.--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the 
        date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for 
        the following 5 years, the Secretary of State shall submit a 
        report to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and 
        the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 
        Representatives that includes--</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) an assessment of the goals, 
                investments, and interests of the People's Republic of 
                China in Latin America and the Caribbean that maintain 
                diplomatic relations with Taiwan;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) an overview of the pressure tactics 
                and influence campaigns carried out by the People' s 
                Republic of China in countries in Latin America and the 
                Caribbean that maintain diplomatic relations with 
                Taiwan; and</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (C) the actions taken by the Department of 
                State during the most recent 12-month period to 
                implement this Act by--</DELETED>
                        <DELETED>    (i) supporting Taiwan's diplomatic 
                        partners in Latin America and the Caribbean; 
                        and</DELETED>
                        <DELETED>    (ii) countering the efforts of the 
                        People's Republic of China to isolate Taiwan 
                        from its Latin American and Caribbean 
                        allies.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) Form.--Each report required under paragraph 
        (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a 
        classified annex.</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 6. TAIWAN-AMERICAS STRATEGIC COORDINATION.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    The Secretary of State should take steps to expand United 
States coordination with countries in Latin America and the Caribbean 
with respect to Taiwan by--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) coordinating joint programming and technical 
        cooperation with United States allies;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) aligning public diplomacy efforts; 
        and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) encouraging collaboration between United 
        States embassies and Taiwan's representative offices in Latin 
        America and the Caribbean.</DELETED>

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``United States - Taiwan Partnership 
in the Americas Act''.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

    Congress finds the following:
            (1) Taiwan is a democratic partner of the United States, 
        and countries that maintain ties with Taiwan often share our 
        Nation's commitment to transparency, good governance, and human 
        rights.
            (2) The People's Republic of China has pressured Taiwan's 
        remaining 7 diplomatic allies in Latin America and the 
        Caribbean to sever diplomatic relations with Taiwan by 
        leveraging opaque development deals and backroom pressure.
            (3) The United States has an interest in ensuring countries 
        in Latin America and the Caribbean can make sovereign foreign 
        policy decisions free from coercion or financial manipulation 
        by the People's Republic of China.

SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF POLICY.

    It is the policy of the United States--
            (1) to support countries in Latin America and the Caribbean 
        that maintain diplomatic relations with Taiwan;
            (2) to counter efforts by the People's Republic of China to 
        coerce or pressure governments in the region into breaking 
        diplomatic ties with Taiwan; and
            (3) to deepen coordination with Taiwan on its development 
        and economic engagement in the Western Hemisphere.

SEC. 4. MONITORING THE ECONOMIC INFLUENCE OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF 
              CHINA.

    (a) Infrastructure Influence Risk Mechanism.--The Secretary of 
State shall establish a mechanism to track and respond to 
infrastructure and development projects by the People's Republic of 
China in countries that maintain diplomatic relations with Taiwan.
    (b) Functions.--The mechanism required under subsection (a) shall--
            (1) identify projects referred to in such subsection that 
        carry strategic risks or involve non-transparent financing;
            (2) coordinate appropriate United States diplomatic or 
        technical responses to such projects; and
            (3) share relevant information with Congress and with 
        United States allies.

SEC. 5. REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.

    (a) Semiannual Status Report.--The Secretary of State shall submit 
semiannual status reports to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 
Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 
Representatives regarding governments in Latin America that have taken 
steps to discontinue diplomatic relations with Taiwan.
    (b) Diplomatic Engagement Plan.--If the Secretary of State 
determines that a government in a country referred to in subsection (a) 
is taking steps to terminate diplomatic relations with Taiwan, the 
Secretary, not later than 30 days after such determination, shall 
submit a report to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and 
the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives that 
includes a detailed plan to support the maintenance of official 
diplomatic relations between such government and Taiwan.
    (c) Annual Report.--
            (1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
        the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for the 
        following 5 years, the Secretary of State shall submit a report 
        to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the 
        Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives 
        that includes--
                    (A) an assessment of the goals, investments, and 
                interests of the People's Republic of China in Latin 
                America and the Caribbean that maintain diplomatic 
                relations with Taiwan;
                    (B) an overview of the pressure tactics and 
                influence campaigns carried out by the People' s 
                Republic of China in countries in Latin America and the 
                Caribbean that maintain diplomatic relations with 
                Taiwan; and
                    (C) the actions taken by the Department of State 
                during the most recent 12-month period to implement 
                this Act by--
                            (i) supporting Taiwan's diplomatic partners 
                        in Latin America and the Caribbean; and
                            (ii) countering the efforts of the People's 
                        Republic of China to isolate Taiwan from its 
                        Latin American and Caribbean allies.
            (2) Form.--Each report required under paragraph (1) shall 
        be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified 
        annex.

SEC. 6. TAIWAN-AMERICAS STRATEGIC COORDINATION.

    The Secretary of State should take steps to expand United States 
coordination with countries in Latin America and the Caribbean with 
respect to Taiwan by--
            (1) coordinating joint programming and technical 
        cooperation with United States allies;
            (2) aligning public diplomacy efforts; and
            (3) encouraging collaboration between United States 
        embassies and Taiwan's representative offices in Latin America 
        and the Caribbean.

SEC. 7. BRIEFING ON EFFORTS TO SUPPORT TAIWAN'S RESPONSE TO MALIGN 
              INFLUENCE OPERATIONS.

    (a) In General.--Not later than 60 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the 
heads of relevant Federal departments and agencies, shall brief the 
appropriate congressional committees by--
            (1) describing existing United States efforts supporting 
        the Taiwan government's efforts in countering the malign 
        influence operations of the Government of the People's Republic 
        of China and the Chinese Communist Party; and
            (2) providing recommendations, developed in coordination 
        with the heads of relevant Federal agencies and international 
        partners, for identifying, and providing targeted assistance to 
        address, remaining vulnerabilities in the Taiwan government's 
        efforts to counter such malign influence operations.
    (b) Briefing Elements.--The briefing required under subsection 
(a)(1) shall include the response of the United States to the People's 
Republic of China malign influence campaigns and cyber-intrusions 
targeting Taiwan, including--
            (1) United States assistance in building the capacity of 
        Taiwanese officials, media entities, and private-sector 
        entities to document and expose propaganda and malign foreign 
        influence supported by the Government of the People's Republic 
        of China, the Chinese Communist Party, or affiliated entities;
            (2) United States assistance to the Taiwan government's 
        efforts to develop a whole-of-government strategy to respond to 
        malign influence operations, including election interference;
            (3) exchanges and other technical assistance through which 
        the United States has collaborated with Taiwan to strengthen 
        Taiwan's legal system's ability to respond to malign influence 
        operations; and
            (4) the extent to which like-minded governments have 
        collaborated with the Taiwan government on ways to address 
        malign influence operations supported by the Government of the 
        People's Republic of China and the Chinese Communist Party.
    (c) Definitions.--In this section:
            (1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term 
        ``appropriate congressional committees'' means the Committee on 
        Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign 
        Affairs of the House of Representatives.
            (2) Malign influence operations.--The term ``malign 
        influence operations'' means the coordinated and often 
        concealed application of media manipulation, economic coercion, 
        cyber-intrusions, targeted investments, and academic censorship 
        that is intended--
                    (A)(i) to corrupt businesses and political and 
                nongovernmental institutions;
                    (ii) to interfere in democratic elections; and
                    (iii) to encourage self-censorship of views at odds 
                with those of the Government of the People's Republic 
                of China or the Chinese Communist Party;
                    (B) to foster attitudes, behavior, decisions, or 
                outcomes in Taiwan and elsewhere that support the 
                interests of the Government of the People's Republic of 
                China or the Chinese Communist Party; or
                    (C) to undermine the administrative activities or 
                daily operations of the Taiwan government.

SEC. 8. BRIEFING ON DETERRENCE IN THE TAIWAN STRAIT.

    Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, 
the Secretary of State, in coordination with the heads of relevant 
Federal departments and agencies, shall brief the Committee on Foreign 
Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the 
House of Representatives by providing--
            (1) an assessment of the military posture of Taiwan and the 
        United States as it specifically pertains to the deterrence of 
        military conflict and conflict readiness in the Taiwan Strait; 
        and
            (2) an analysis of whether current Taiwan and United States 
        policies sufficiently deter the People's Republic of China's 
        efforts to determine the future of Taiwan by other than 
        peaceful means, taking into account the changing military 
        balance in the Taiwan Strait.
                                                       Calendar No. 242

119th CONGRESS

  1st Session

                                S. 2684

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 To support countries in Latin America and the Caribbean that maintain 
 official diplomatic relations with Taiwan, to counter efforts by the 
   People's Republic of China to coerce or pressure governments into 
 breaking such ties, to deepen coordination with Taiwan on diplomatic, 
development, and economic engagement in the Western Hemisphere, and for 
                            other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                            October 30, 2025

                       Reported with an amendment