[Congressional Bills 119th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. Res. 212 Introduced in Senate (IS)]
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119th CONGRESS
1st Session
S. RES. 212
Affirming the acceptable outcome of any nuclear deal between the United
States and the Islamic Republic of Iran, and for other purposes.
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
May 8, 2025
Mr. Graham (for himself, Mr. Cotton, and Mrs. Britt) submitted the
following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign
Relations
_______________________________________________________________________
RESOLUTION
Affirming the acceptable outcome of any nuclear deal between the United
States and the Islamic Republic of Iran, and for other purposes.
Whereas the acceptable outcome of any negotiations between the United States and
the Islamic Republic of Iran related to Iran's nuclear program is--
(1) the complete dismantlement and destruction of its entire nuclear
program; and then
(2) an Agreement for Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation (commonly known as a
``123 Agreement'') between the United States and the Islamic Republic of
Iran, pursuant to section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C.
2153) that also requires the Islamic Republic of Iran to adopt the
International Atomic Energy Agency's (referred to in this preamble as the
``IAEA'') additional protocols for the verification of nuclear safeguards
and forgo domestic uranium enrichment, the reprocessing of spent fuel, and
the development or possession of any enrichment or reprocessing
infrastructure or capacity;
Whereas the complete dismantlement and destruction of the Islamic Republic of
Iran's nuclear program should include, at a minimum--
(1) disclosing and dismantling all of the Islamic Republic of Iran's
nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons programs, including the removal
of any previously enriched uranium;
(2) allowing international inspectors unconditional access to monitor
and verify compliance, including allowing short-notice inspections of all
buildings in all of its nuclear sites by the IAEA;
(3) providing information to the IAEA about all parts of its nuclear
fuel-cycle;
(4) allowing the IAEA to freely collect environmental samples at
locations beyond the stated sites whenever the IAEA deems such collection
is necessary;
(5) providing the IAEA the right to monitor communications by receiving
unimpeded access to all satellite systems and other forms of
telecommunications;
(6) providing designated IAEA inspectors of all nationalities valid
visas and unimpeded entry into the Islamic Republic of Iran;
(7) providing information on any research and development activities
relating to the Islamic Republic of Iran's nuclear program;
(8) providing the IAEA with information about the manufacturing and
export of sensitive nuclear-related technologies;
(9) permitting the establishment of IAEA verification mechanisms at
manufacturing and export-import locations; and
(10) signing and ratifying an Additional Protocol as part of its
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement;
Whereas more than 20 countries have a peaceful nuclear power capability without
the ability to domestically enrich uranium or reprocess spent fuel;
Whereas in August 2002, the Islamic Republic of Iran's secret nuclear program
was revealed, including the existence of a fuel enrichment plant in
Natanz, Iran and the heavy-water plant in Arak, Iran;
Whereas on April 11, 2006, the Islamic Republic of Iran announced that it had
enriched uranium for the first time to a level close to 3.5 percent at
the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant in Natanz, Iran;
Whereas on May 31, 2021, it was reported that the Islamic Republic of Iran
failed to provide any explanation for the uranium remnants found at
undeclared sites in Iran, and such an explanation had not been provided
as of the date of the enactment of this Resolution;
Whereas on May 30, 2022, the IAEA reported that the Islamic Republic of Iran had
achieved a stockpile of 43.3 kilograms (95.5 pounds) of 60 percent
highly enriched uranium, which is roughly enough material to construct a
nuclear weapon;
Whereas on February 27, 2023, the IAEA reported that the Islamic Republic of
Iran had enriched uranium to 83.7 percent, which is just short of the 90
percent threshold for weapons-grade fissile material;
Whereas on September 16, 2023, the IAEA reported that the Islamic Republic of
Iran banned the activities of nearly \1/3\ of the IAEA's most
experienced nuclear inspectors in Iran, a decision that, according to
IAEA Director-General Rafael Grossi, harmed the IAEA's ability to
monitor Iran's nuclear program;
Whereas, on December 28, 2023, the Governments of the United States, France,
Germany, and the United Kingdom jointly declared, ``The production of
high-enriched uranium by Iran has no credible civilian justification'';
Whereas, on July 23, 2024, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence
published an assessment, in accordance with the Iran Nuclear Weapons
Capability and Terrorism Monitoring Act of 2022 (22 U.S.C. 8701 note;
Public Law 117-263), which stated, the Islamic Republic of Iran has
``undertaken activities that better position it to produce a nuclear
device, if it chooses to do so'';
Whereas, on November 15, 2024, the IAEA reported that the Islamic Republic of
Iran has continued to expand its enrichment facilities and install
additional advanced centrifuges, including at the Natanz Nuclear
Facility, where there are 15 cascades of advanced centrifuges, and the
Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant, where there are advanced preparations for
the expansion of the facility;
Whereas, on February 26, 2025, the IAEA reported that the Islamic Republic of
Iran has between 5 and 7 metric tons of enriched uranium, and had
increased its total stockpile of 60 percent highly enriched uranium to
274.8 kilograms (605.83 pounds), which, if further enriched, could be
sufficient to produce 6 nuclear weapons;
Whereas, on April 7, 2025, the Prime Minister of Israel, Benjamin Netanyahu,
stated that the United States and Israel are ``both united in the goal
that Iran does not ever get nuclear weapons. If it can be done
diplomatically, ... I think that would be a good thing. But whatever
happens, we have to make sure that Iran does not have nuclear weapons'';
Whereas, on April 7, 2025, President of the United States Donald Trump echoed
that position, stating, ``You know, it's not a complicated formula. Iran
cannot have a nuclear weapon. That's all there is.'';
Whereas, on April 8, 2025, the Islamic Republic of Iran rejected the
dismantlement of its nuclear program, stating, ``Trump wants a new deal:
end Iran's regional influence, dismantle its nuclear program, and halt
its missile work. These are unacceptable to Tehran. Our nuclear program
cannot be dismantled''; and
Whereas the United States must never allow the Islamic Republic of Iran to
obtain a nuclear weapons capability that threatens the United States or
its allies or partners; Now, therefore, be it
Resolved, That the Senate--
(1) commends the Trump administration for engaging in
direct talks with the Islamic Republic of Iran regarding its
nuclear program;
(2) recognizes the Islamic Republic of Iran's decades of
cheating, the regime's barbaric nature, and its open commitment
to destroying the State of Israel must be addressed in any
negotiations; and
(3) affirms support for--
(A) the complete dismantlement and destruction of
the Islamic Republic of Iran's entire nuclear program;
and then
(B) an Agreement for Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation
(commonly known as a ``123 Agreement'') between the
United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran,
pursuant to section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of
1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153) that also requires the Islamic
Republic of Iran--
(i) to adopt the IAEA additional protocols
for verification of nuclear safeguards; and
(ii) to forgo domestic uranium enrichment,
the reprocessing of spent fuel, and the
development or possession of any enrichment or
reprocessing infrastructure or capacity.
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