[Pages H1828-H1830]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE PREVENTION ACT

Mr. MAST. Madam Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the
bill (H.R. 1486) to impose sanctions with respect to economic or
industrial espionage by foreign adversarial companies, and for other
purposes, as amended.
The Clerk read the title of the bill.
The text of the bill is as follows:

H.R. 1486

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the ``Economic Espionage
Prevention Act''.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

Congress finds the following:
(1) On March 14, 2024, the Department of State notified
Congress of the following:
(A) People's Republic of China exports of semiconductors to
Russia have increased substantially since Russia's full-scale
invasion of Ukraine.
(B) In the second half of 2023, China exported between
$25,000,000 and $50,000,000 in additional semiconductors to
Russia every month relative to pre-invasion levels.
(C) During the same period, China also exported between
$50,000,000 and $100,000,000 in additional exports to Russia
every month to known transshipment hubs.
(D) These exports include both Chinese and United States-
branded semiconductors (integrated circuits), according to
analysis of commercially available trade data by the Bureau
of Industry and Security of the Department of Commerce, and
are almost certainly supporting Russia's military
capabilities based on Ukrainian analysis of recovered Russian
weapons.
(E) Because of the prevalence of United States
manufacturing equipment in global semiconductor supply
chains, nearly all chips produced worldwide, including in the
People's Republic of China, are subject to United States
export controls if destined for Russia or Belarus.
(F) All advanced semiconductors described on the Commerce
Control List have been subject to a license requirement if
destined to an entity in Russia since its further invasion of
Ukraine.
(2) On April 3, 2024, Deputy Secretary of State, Kurt
Campbell, said ``I think we have assessed, over the course of
the last couple of months that Russia has almost completely
reconstituted militarily. And after the initial setbacks on
the battlefield delivered to them by a brave and hearty group
in Ukraine, with the support of China in particular, dual use
capabilities and a variety of other efforts, industrial and
commercial, Russia has retooled and now poses a threat to
Ukraine . . . But not just to Ukraine, its new found
capabilities pose a longer term challenge to stability in
Europe and threatens NATO allies.''.

SEC. 3. REPORT.

(a) In General.--Not later than 90 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in
coordination with the heads of relevant Federal departments
and agencies, as appropriate, shall submit to the appropriate
congressional committees, a written report that contains the
following:
(1) An analysis and description of the extent to which any
foreign person who is a citizen of the People's Republic of
China or an entity organized under the laws of the People's
Republic of China, or any foreign person or entity controlled
by or operating at the direction of the Government of the
People's Republic of China--
(A) is knowingly a material source of critical components
necessary for the manufacture of weapons, vehicles, and other
military equipment by the defense industrial base of the
Russian Federation;
(B) has knowingly delivered critical components to or
entered into any agreement relating to the sale or delivery
of critical components with any entity operating in the
defense or intelligence sectors of the Government of the
Russian Federation;
(C) has knowingly delivered critical components to or
entered into any agreement relating to the sale or delivery
of critical components with any country or entity with which
the defense or intelligence sectors of the Government of
Russian Federation are cooperating in support of Russia's war
against Ukraine; or
(D) has knowingly delivered critical components to or
entered into any agreement relating to the sale or delivery
of critical components with a foreign person that knowingly
and directly provides these components to the defense or
intelligence sectors of the Government of the Russian
Federation.
(2) The extent to which--
(A) any foreign person that is a citizen of the People's
Republic of China or an entity organized under the laws of
the People's Republic of China has knowingly engaged, on or
after the date of the enactment of this Act, in transactions
with a person that is part of, or operates on behalf of, the
defense or intelligence sectors of the Government of the
Russian Federation;
(B) any foreign person identified pursuant to subparagraph
(A) has engaged in transactions which would constitute a
significant transaction with persons that have been
sanctioned for being part of, or operating on behalf of, the
defense or intelligence sectors of the Government of the
Russian Federation; or
(C) any foreign person identified pursuant to subparagraph
(A) has been subjected to sanctions imposed pursuant to
sections 231 and 235 of the Countering America's Adversaries
Through Sanctions Act (22 U.S.C. 9525 and 9529).
(b) Form and Availability.--
(1) Form.--The report required by subsection (a) shall be
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified
annex.
(2) Availability.--The unclassified portion of the report
required by subsection (a) may also be made available to the
public.

SEC. 4. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO ECONOMIC OR
INDUSTRIAL ESPIONAGE BY FOREIGN ADVERSARY
ENTITIES.

(a) In General.--On and after the date that is 30 days
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President
(a) may impose the sanctions described in subsection (c)
against any of the foreign persons described in subsection
(b).
(b) Foreign Persons Described.--A foreign person is
described in this subsection if the President determines on
or after the date of the enactment of this Act that the
person is a foreign adversary entity that knowingly engages
in--
(1) economic or industrial espionage with respect to trade
secrets or proprietary information owned by United States
persons;
(2) the provision of material support or services to a
foreign adversaries' military, intelligence, or other
national security entities; or
(3) the violation of United States export control laws.
(c) Sanctions Described.--The sanctions that may be imposed
with respect to a foreign person under subsection (b) are the
following:
(1) Property blocking.--The exercise of all powers granted
to the President by the International Emergency Economic
Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) to the extent necessary
to block and prohibit all transactions in property and
interests in property of the foreign person if such property
and interests in property are in the United States, come
within the United States, or are or come within the
possession or control of a United States person.
(2) Ineligibility for visas, admission, or parole.--
(A) Visas, admission, or parole.--An alien described in
subsection (b) is--
(i) inadmissible to the United States;
(ii) ineligible to receive a visa or other documentation to
enter the United States; and
(iii) otherwise ineligible to be admitted or paroled into
the United States or to receive any other benefit under the
Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq.).
(B) Current visas revoked.--
(i) In general.--An alien described in subsection (b) is
subject to revocation of any visa or other entry
documentation regardless of when the visa or other entry
documentation is or was issued.
(ii) Immediate effect.--A revocation under clause (i) shall
take effect immediately and automatically cancel any other

[[Page H1829]]

valid visa or entry documentation that is in the alien's
possession.
(d) Exceptions.--
(1) Exception for intelligence activities.--Sanctions under
this section shall not apply to any activity subject to the
reporting requirements under title V of the National Security
Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3091 et seq.) or any authorized
intelligence activities of the United States.
(2) Exception to comply with international obligations.--
Sanctions under subsection (c)(2) shall not apply with
respect to the admission of an alien if admitting or paroling
the alien into the United States is necessary to permit the
United States to comply with--
(A) the Agreement regarding the Headquarters of the United
Nations, signed at Lake Success June 26, 1947, and entered
into force November 21, 1947, between the United Nations and
the United States; or
(B) other applicable international obligations.
(3) Exception to carry out or assist law enforcement
activities.--Sanctions under subsection (c)(2) shall not
apply with respect to an alien if admitting or paroling the
alien into the United States is necessary to carry out or
assist law enforcement activity in the United States.
(e) Waiver.--The President may waive the application of
sanctions under this section with respect to a foreign person
for renewable periods of not more than 180 days each if the
President determines and submits to the appropriate
congressional committees a report that contains a
determination of the President that such a waiver is in the
national security interests of the United States.
(f) Implementation; Penalties.--
(1) Implementation.--The President may exercise the
authorities provided to the President under sections 203 and
205 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50
U.S.C. 1702 and 1704) to the extent necessary to carry out
this section.
(2) Penalties.--A person that violates, attempts to
violate, conspires to violate, or causes a violation of
subsection (a) or any regulation, license, or order issued to
carry out that subsection shall be subject to the penalties
set forth in subsections (b) and (c) of section 206 of the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1705)
to the same extent as a person that commits an unlawful act
described in subsection (a) of that section.
(3) Procedures and guidelines for sanctions.--The President
shall establish procedures and guidelines for the
implementation and enforcement of sanctions imposed under
this section.
(4) Annual report.--
(A) Unless the exception in subparagraph (B) applies, not
later than one year after the date of the enactment of this
Act, and for each of the 5 years thereafter, the President
shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a
report on any notable developments regarding economic or
industrial espionage activities by foreign persons.
(B) The President shall not be required to submit the
annual report described by subparagraph (A) if the President
has imposed sanctions as authorized under this section within
the previous calendar year.
(g) Rule of Construction.--For purposes of this section, a
transaction shall not be construed to include participation
in an international standards-setting body or the activities
of such a body.

SEC. 5. IMPORTATION OF GOODS EXCEPTION.

(a) In General.--The authorities and requirements to impose
sanctions under this Act shall not include the authority or a
requirement to impose sanctions on the importation of goods.
(b) Good Defined.--In this section, the term ``good'' means
any article, natural or manmade substance, material, supply,
or manufactured product, including inspection and test
equipment, and excluding technical data.

SEC. 6. DEFINITIONS.

In this Act:
(1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives; and
(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.
(2) Economic or industrial espionage.--The term ``economic
or industrial espionage'' has the meaning given that term in
section 1637(d) of the Carl Levin and Howard P. ``Buck''
McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2015.
(3) Foreign person.--The term ``foreign person'' means any
person that is not a United States person.
(4) Knowingly.--The term ``knowingly'', with respect to
conduct, a circumstance, or a result, means that a person has
actual knowledge, or should have known, of the conduct, the
circumstance, or the result.
(5) Own, proprietary information, and trade secret.--The
terms ``own'', ``proprietary information'', and ``trade
secret'' have the meanings given those terms in section
1637(d) of the Carl Levin and Howard P. ``Buck'' McKeon
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 (50
U.S.C. 1708(d)).
(6) Person.--The term ``person'' means an individual or
entity.
(7) United states person.--The term ``United States
person'' means--
(A) a United States citizen or an alien lawfully admitted
for permanent residence to the United States; or
(B) an entity organized under the laws of the United States
or any jurisdiction within the United States, including a
foreign branch of such an entity.
(8) Foreign adversary.--The term ``foreign adversary''
means the countries listed in section 7.4 of title 15, Code
of Federal Regulations.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from
Florida (Mr. Mast) and the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Olszewski) each
will control 20 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Florida.

General Leave

Mr. MAST. Madam Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may
have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks and
include extraneous material on this measure.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the
gentleman from Florida?
There was no objection.
Mr. MAST. Madam Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Madam Speaker, I rise in support for H.R. 1486, the Economic
Espionage Prevention Act, introduced by my colleague from Georgia (Mr.
McCormick).
The Chinese Communist Party is working to undermine America's
interests around the world and is the global supplier of America's
adversaries.
As President Trump and his administration are working tirelessly to
finally bring an end to the war in Ukraine, the CCP continues to stoke
global chaos by providing massive amounts of industrial and economic
support to Russia.
In fact, our State Department assessed that in the second half of
2023 alone, China supported the transfer of nearly $300 million worth
of semiconductors to Russia, including for use in missiles and drones.
The CCP's actions are blatant violations of U.S. export controls and
detrimental to our ongoing peace efforts. China's economic and
industrial support for Russia is a critical lifeline for the Russian
military.
This is why it is critical that Congress pass the Economic Espionage
Prevention Act. This bill would provide important sanction authorities
for cutting off the CCP's illegal and industrial supply chains to
America's adversaries. Enhancing U.S. export control enforcement with
economic sanctions will help shut down China's massive support for
Russia's defense industrial base.
This bill also enhances Congress' visibility into this illicit supply
chain by requiring the State Department to issue a report identifying
these individuals and entities that are supporting the Russian defense
industrial base.
The CCP is relentlessly undermining President Trump's efforts to
bring an end to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The Chinese companies
illegally supplying Russia in violation of U.S. export controls must be
subjected to the full weight of our sanctions regime. The bill ensures
that the CCP and the world understand that supplying America's
adversaries comes with a very severe cost.
Madam Speaker, I urge my colleagues to support this important bill,
and I reserve the balance of my time.

House of Representatives,

Committee on the Judiciary,

Washington, DC, May 1, 2025.
Hon. Brian Mast,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
Dear Chairman Mast: I write regarding H.R. 1486, the
Economic Espionage Prevention Act. Provisions of this bill
fall within the Judiciary Committee's Rule X jurisdiction,
and I appreciate that you consulted with us on those
provisions. The Judiciary Committee agrees that it shall be
discharged from further consideration of the bill so that it
may proceed expeditiously to the House floor.
The Committee takes this action with the understanding that
forgoing further consideration of this measure does not in
any way alter the Committee's jurisdiction or waive any
future jurisdictional claim over these provisions or their
subject matter. We also reserve the right to seek appointment
of an appropriate number of conferees in the event of a
conference with the Senate involving this measure or similar
legislation.
I ask that you please insert this letter in the
Congressional Record during consideration of H.R. 1486 on the
House floor. I appreciate the cooperative manner in which our
committees have worked on this matter, and I look forward to
working collaboratively in

[[Page H1830]]

the future on matters of shared jurisdiction. Thank you for
your attention to this matter.
Sincerely,
Jim Jordan,
Chairman.
____

House of Representatives,

Committee on Foreign Affairs,

Washington, DC, May 1, 2025.
Hon. Jim Jordan,
Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
Dear Chairman Jordan: Thank you for consulting with the
Committee on Foreign Affairs and agreeing to be discharged
from further consideration of H.R. 1486, the Economic
Espionage Prevention Act, so that the measure may proceed
expeditiously to the House floor.
I agree that your forgoing further action on this measure
does not in any way diminish or alter the jurisdiction of
your committee or prejudice its jurisdictional prerogatives
on this measure or similar legislation in the future. I would
support your effort to seek appointments of any appropriate
number of conferees from your committee to any House-Senate
conference of this legislation.
I will submit the exchange of letters to be published in
the Congressional Record. I appreciate your cooperation
regarding this legislation and look forward to continuing to
work together on matters of shared jurisdiction during this
Congress.
Sincerely,
Brian J. Mast,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs.

Mr. OLSZEWSKI. Madam Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may
consume.
Madam Speaker, I rise in support of H.R. 1486. This is legislation
that authorizes sanctions against any person or entity that provides
material support for Russia's military and industrial defense base.
We know that Russia uses missiles, drones, planes, and rocket
launchers to wreak havoc on Ukrainian cities and citizens. They do this
to overthrow the government, to end democracy in Ukraine, and to seize
Ukrainian territory to reconstitute a new Soviet Union, or at least a
Soviet-like sphere of influence.
Ukrainians have bravely stood up to this unprovoked, unlawful
aggression. The Ukrainian military has bravely fought back against the
much larger Russian military and has repelled this invasion for years.
The United States and its partners and allies have been critical to the
defense of Ukraine, and Congress has been instrumental in the support
we have provided.
As Russia continues to suffer heavy losses and economic hardship from
waging this illegal invasion, it has turned to China and even Iran and
North Korea for support. We absolutely should be bolstering sanctions
not just on Russia's warmongering but also on its enablers.
China has played a crucial role in supporting Russia. Though they
have not provided overt military support, they are continuing to
provide dual-use goods, like industrial tools and semiconductors.
At a minimum, given its tendencies to appease Russia rather than
pressure it, the Trump administration must maintain the current posture
of deterrence with the existing tools it already has. The better
approach is for this administration to also use the additional tools
offered by this legislation to deter further PRC shipments of dual-use
goods to Russia.
Madam Speaker, I appreciate Representative McCormick and Chairman
Mast for negotiating further changes to this bill last week. I
appreciate the bipartisan spirit that went into this legislation and
for the work that both Ranking Member Meeks and his team have done on
this legislation.
Madam Speaker, I encourage my colleagues to join in supporting this
measure, and I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. MAST. Madam Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from
Georgia (Mr. McCormick), the sponsor of this legislation.
Mr. McCORMICK. Madam Speaker, I thank Chairman Mast and the minority
party for supporting this bill.
Since illegally invading Ukraine, the Russian Federation has become
reliant on the People's Republic of China for its supply of
semiconductors and other critical dual-use technologies. The State
Department notified Congress last year that the PRC exports of
semiconductors significantly increased in 2023 compared to pre-invasion
levels.
These semiconductors are critical key aspects to the Russian war
effort, including economic and electronic warfare, command and control,
and targeting. These components allow Russia to terrorize Ukrainian
civilians with ballistic missile strikes, as well.
The prevalence of U.S. manufacturing equipment in global
semiconductor production means nearly all are subject to U.S. export
controls if destined for Russia or Belarus.
My bill seeks to reduce Russia's access to these semiconductors by
authorizing sanctions on any foreign adversaries that materially
support Russia's military and intelligence services, violate U.S.
export laws, and steal U.S. intellectual property.
It further requires a report on whether China is providing
significant support to Russia's military and updates existing law to
provide greater flexibility to pursue sanctions against China and other
foreign adversaries if they violate these export controls.
The PRC may publicly claim that they do not provide material support
to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, but their continued supply of dual-
use technology clearly shows otherwise.
Cutting off the supply of semiconductors will seriously hamper the
Russian war effort and show the world that we will not allow our
adversaries to work together to destroy sovereign nations and undermine
the international system.
Madam Speaker, I urge my colleagues to support H.R. 1486.
Mr. OLSZEWSKI. Madam Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time
for the purpose of closing.
Madam Speaker, H.R. 1486 will authorize sanctions on any person or
entity that supports Russia's military and defense industrial base.
Russia expected to take Kyiv in a matter of days, but it has now been
years as brave Ukrainians continue to defend their country and their
sovereignty against Russia's illegal invasion.
Madam Speaker, I thank my colleague, Representative McCormick, and
others for their work on this, as Russia has now had to turn to other
nations for material support to continue that invasion, which is why
Congress must not only continue our support of Ukraine but also
authorize sanctions on those enabling Russia's war.
This is an important bill, and I am proud to support it. I hope we
can put forward other legislation like this, including a few bills
sponsored by Ranking Member Meeks that have passed with bipartisan
support in the past.
Madam Speaker, I urge my colleagues to support this legislation, and
I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. MAST. Madam Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.
Madam Speaker, in closing, I again thank Representative McCormick for
his bill, as well as Select Committee on the CCP Chairman Moolenaar and
Representatives Baumgartner and Lawler for their work to bring this
bill to the floor to ensure that we finally end China's support for
Russia's defense industrial base.
It is a great piece of legislation, and I urge all Members to support
H.R. 1486.
Madam Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the
gentleman from Florida (Mr. Mast) that the House suspend the rules and
pass the bill, H.R. 1486, as amended.
The question was taken; and (two-thirds being in the affirmative) the
rules were suspended and the bill, as amended, was passed.
A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

____________________