[Pages S5236-S5237]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

  SA 3461. Ms. ROSEN (for herself and Mr. Curtis) submitted an 
amendment intended to be proposed by her to the bill S. 2296, to 
authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2026 for military activities 
of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for 
defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe military 
personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and for other purposes; which 
was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:

       At the end of title XII, add the following:

      Subtitle F--Taiwan Undersea Cable Resilience Initiative Act

     SEC. 1271. SHORT TITLE.

       This subtitle may be cited as the ``Taiwan Undersea Cable 
     Resilience Initiative Act''.

     SEC. 1272. FINDINGS.

       Congress finds the following:
       (1) Undersea communication cables (in this subtitle 
     referred to as ``undersea cables'') are critical 
     infrastructure essential for global communication, commerce, 
     and national security, particularly for Taiwan, whose 
     economic and security stability relies heavily on undersea 
     cable connectivity.
       (2) The Government of the People's Republic of China has 
     increasingly used gray zone tactics to undermine the security 
     and sovereignty of Taiwan, including suspected sabotage of 
     undersea cables in and around Taiwan, such as the incidents 
     involving the severing of cables around the Matsu Islands of 
     Taiwan and other key regions in 2023 and 2025.
       (3) Undersea cables are a primary target in the strategy of 
     the Government of the People's Republic of China to cripple 
     the communication capabilities of Taiwan in the event of a 
     military conflict, as part of broader hybrid warfare tactics. 
     Disruption of undersea cables would significantly impact the 
     ability of Taiwan to communicate both domestically and 
     internationally, leading to a breakdown in military, 
     economic, and social functions.
       (4) The vulnerability of Taiwan to attacks on undersea 
     cables has been compounded by an increasing number of foreign 
     vessels suspected of involvement in sabotage, including 
     Chinese-linked vessels, which are perceived as direct threats 
     to Taiwan's critical infrastructure.
       (5) The ability of the Government of the People's Republic 
     of China to disrupt or sever undersea cables is a critical 
     element of its military strategy aimed at softening Taiwan's 
     defenses and isolating Taiwan from international support in 
     the event of an invasion or military confrontation.
       (6) Recent activities by foreign adversaries, particularly 
     the People's Republic of China, have increased the risk of 
     sabotage and disruption to undersea cables serving Taiwan and 
     other nations. Notably, in February 2023, the Matsu Islands 
     of Taiwan experienced major internet disruptions due to two 
     undersea cables being severed, with suspicions pointing 
     toward deliberate external interference. Furthermore, in 
     January 2025, Chunghwa Telecom reported damage to an 
     international undersea cable and identified a ``suspicious 
     vessel''--the Chinese-linked cargo ship Shunxin39--near the 
     affected area. The Coast Guard of Taiwan has indicated 
     concerns that that vessel may have been involved in 
     deliberately cutting the cable. In a subsequent incident, 
     Taiwan seized the Togo-flagged Hong Tai 58, suspected of 
     deliberately severing an undersea cable. The Coast Guard of 
     Taiwan acknowledged the possibility of China's involvement as 
     part of a ``grey area intrusion''.
       (7) Since 2023, there have been at least 11 cases of damage 
     to undersea cables around Taiwan and a similar number in the 
     Baltic Sea, with authorities in Taiwan and Europe suspecting 
     Chinese and Russian involvement in several incidents, 
     although some damages have been attributed to natural causes. 
     Those incidents highlight the vulnerability of those critical 
     systems to gray zone tactics and the difficulty of proving 
     sabotage or holding perpetrators accountable.
       (8) The sabotage of undersea cables constitutes gray zone 
     tactics designed to destabilize and undermine international 
     security without direct military confrontation.
       (9) Several regional mechanisms have been established to 
     bolster the security of undersea cables, including the Nordic 
     Warden initiative for maritime domain awareness and the Quad 
     Partnership for Cable Connectivity and Resilience, aimed at 
     enhancing the security and resilience of undersea cables in 
     the Indo-Pacific.
       (10) To counter the threats described in this section and 
     safeguard the resilience of Taiwan, it is imperative for the 
     United States and its allies to take decisive action to 
     bolster Taiwan's defenses for undersea cables and foster 
     international cooperation to protect those critical assets.

     SEC. 1273. TAIWAN UNDERSEA CABLE RESILIENCE INITIATIVE.

       (a) Establishment.--Not later than 360 days after the date 
     of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in 
     coordination with the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of 
     Homeland Security, the Commandant of the Coast Guard, and 
     such other heads of agencies as the Secretary of State 
     considers relevant, shall establish an initiative to be known 
     as the ``Taiwan Undersea Cable Resilience Initiative'' (in 
     this section referred to as the ``Initiative'').
       (b) Priority.--The Initiative shall prioritize the 
     protection and resilience of undersea cables near Taiwan, 
     with a focus on countering threats from the People's Republic 
     of China to the critical infrastructure of Taiwan.
       (c) Key Focus Areas.--
       (1) Advanced monitoring and detection capabilities.--In 
     carrying out the Initiative, the Secretary of State, in 
     coordination with the Secretary of Homeland Security and the 
     Secretary of Defense, shall develop and deploy advanced 
     undersea cable monitoring systems for Taiwan capable of 
     detecting disruptions or potential sabotage in real-time, 
     including by informing Taiwan, as appropriate, of early 
     warnings from global intelligence networks.
       (2) Rapid response protocols.--In carrying out the 
     Initiative, the Secretary of State shall--
       (A) establish rapid response protocols for repairing 
     severed undersea cables or mitigating disruptions; and
       (B) work with allies of the United States to help Taiwan 
     develop the logistical capacity to respond quickly to attacks 
     on undersea cables and minimize downtime.
       (3) Enhancing maritime domain awareness.--In carrying out 
     the Initiative--

[[Page S5237]]

       (A) the Secretary of the Navy and the Commandant of the 
     Coast Guard, in collaboration with the Coast Guard of Taiwan 
     and regional allies, shall enhance maritime domain awareness 
     around Taiwan, focusing on the detection of suspicious 
     vessels or activities near critical undersea cable routes; 
     and
       (B) the Commandant of the Coast Guard shall assist in joint 
     patrols and surveillance, particularly in the Taiwan Strait 
     and surrounding maritime zones, to monitor potential threats 
     and prevent sabotage.
       (4) International frameworks for protection.--
       (A) In general.--In carrying out the Initiative, the 
     Secretary of State shall seek to establish cooperative 
     frameworks with regional allies and global partners to 
     protect the undersea cable networks near Taiwan.
       (B) Elements.--The frameworks established under 
     subparagraph (A) shall provide for participation by the 
     United States in joint drills, intelligence-sharing 
     platforms, and collaborative surveillance operations to 
     enhance collective security against sabotage.
       (5) Taiwan-specific cable hardening.--In carrying out the 
     Initiative, the Secretary of State shall encourage and 
     support the hardening of critical undersea cables near 
     Taiwan, including reinforcing cables, improving burial 
     depths, and using more resilient materials to reduce 
     vulnerability to natural disasters and deliberate 
     interference.

     SEC. 1274. COUNTERING CHINA'S GRAY ZONE TACTICS.

       (a) Working With Partners To Counter Chinese Sabotage.--The 
     President shall work with Taiwan and like-minded 
     international partners to implement strategies that directly 
     counter the use by the Government of the People's Republic of 
     China of undersea cable sabotage as part of its gray zone 
     warfare, including by increasing diplomatic pressure on that 
     Government to adhere to international norms regarding the 
     protection of undersea infrastructure.
       (b) Raising Awareness.--The President shall work with 
     Taiwan to raise global awareness of the risks posed by 
     interference by the Government of the People's Republic of 
     China in undersea cables, including through public diplomacy 
     efforts, information sharing, and international forums that 
     address gray zone tactics and the protection of critical 
     infrastructure.

     SEC. 1275. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO SABOTAGE 
                   OF UNDERSEA CABLES.

       (a) In General.--The President shall impose the sanctions 
     described in subsection (b) with respect to any person of the 
     People's Republic of China that the President determines is 
     responsible for or complicit in damaging undersea cables 
     critical to the national security of Taiwan.
       (b) Sanctions Described.--The sanctions described in this 
     subsection are the following:
       (1) Blocking of property.--The President shall exercise all 
     of the powers granted by the International Emergency Economic 
     Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) to the extent necessary 
     to block and prohibit all transactions in all property and 
     interests in property of a person described in subsection 
     (a), if such property and interests in property are in the 
     United States, come within the United States, or are or come 
     within the possession or control of a United States person.
       (2) Ineligibility for visas, admission, or parole.--
       (A) Visas, admission, or parole.--An alien described in 
     subsection (a) shall be--
       (i) inadmissible to the United States;
       (ii) ineligible to receive a visa or other documentation to 
     enter the United States; and
       (iii) otherwise ineligible to be admitted or paroled into 
     the United States or to receive any other benefit under the 
     Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq.).
       (B) Current visas revoked.--
       (i) In general.--The visa or other entry documentation of 
     an alien described in subsection (a) shall be revoked, 
     regardless of when such visa or other entry documentation is 
     or was issued.
       (ii) Immediate effect.--A revocation under clause (i) 
     shall--

       (I) take effect immediately; and
       (II) automatically cancel any other valid visa or entry 
     documentation that is in the possession of the alien.

       (c) Implementation; Penalties.--
       (1) Implementation.--The President may exercise all 
     authorities provided under sections 203 and 205 of the 
     International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702 
     and 1704) to carry out this section.
       (2) Penalties.--A person that violates, attempts to 
     violate, conspires to violate, or causes a violation of this 
     section or any regulation, license, or order issued to carry 
     out this section shall be subject to the penalties set forth 
     in subsections (b) and (c) of section 206 of the 
     International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1705) 
     to the same extent as a person that commits an unlawful act 
     described in subsection (a) of that section.
       (d) Exceptions.--
       (1) Exception for intelligence activities.--This section 
     shall not apply with respect to activities subject to the 
     reporting requirements under title V of the National Security 
     Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3091 et seq.) or any authorized 
     intelligence activities of the United States.
       (2) Exception to comply with international agreements.--
     Sanctions under subsection (b)(2) shall not apply with 
     respect to the admission of an alien to the United States if 
     such admission is necessary to comply with the obligations of 
     the United States under the Agreement regarding the 
     Headquarters of the United Nations, signed at Lake Success on 
     June 26, 1947, and entered into force on November 21, 1947, 
     between the United Nations and the United States, or the 
     Convention on Consular Relations, done at Vienna on April 24, 
     1963, and entered into force on March 19, 1967, or other 
     international obligations of the United States.
       (3) Exception relating to importation of goods.--
       (A) In general.--The authorities and requirements to impose 
     sanctions under this section shall not include the authority 
     or requirement to impose sanctions on the importation of 
     goods.
       (B) Good defined.--In this paragraph, the term ``good'' 
     means any article, natural or manmade substance, material, 
     supply or manufactured product, including inspection and test 
     equipment, and excluding technical data.
       (e) Definitions.--In this section:
       (1) Admission; admitted; alien.--The terms ``admission'', 
     ``admitted'', and ``alien'' have the meanings given those 
     terms in section 101 of the Immigration and Nationality Act 
     (8 U.S.C. 1101).
       (2) Person of the people's republic of china.--The term 
     ``person of the People's Republic of China'' means--
       (A) an individual who is a citizen or national of the 
     People's Republic of China; and
       (B) an entity owned or controlled by the Government of the 
     People's Republic of China, organized under the laws of the 
     People's Republic of China, or otherwise subject to the 
     jurisdiction of the Government of the People's Republic of 
     China.
       (3) United states person.--The term ``United States 
     person'' means--
       (A) any United States citizen or an alien lawfully admitted 
     for permanent residence to the United States;
       (B) an entity organized under the laws of the United States 
     or of any jurisdiction within the United States, including 
     any foreign branch of such an entity; or
       (C) any person in the United States.

     SEC. 1276. SEMIANNUAL REPORT.

       Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of 
     this Act, and every 180 days thereafter, the President shall 
     submit to Congress a report detailing--
       (1) any incidents of interference in undersea cables near 
     Taiwan; and
       (2) any actions taken in response to such incidents.
                                 ______