H. R. 1468. A bill for the relief of Selim Salloum, also known as Robert Salloum; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. MILLER of California:

H. R. 1469. A bill for the relief of Rosario Garcia Jimeno; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

H. R. 1470. A bill for the relief of Mrs. Julia Adele Vence; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

H. R. 1471. A bill for the relief of Shizuko Yabe; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. MORANO:

H. R. 1472. A bill for the relief of Stanislas d'Erceville; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. MULTER:

H. R. 1473. A bill for the relief of Caroline M. Newmark and Melville Moritz; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. O'TOOLE:

H. R. 1474. A bill for the relief of Ester Mittleman Mehr; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. POULSON:

H. R. 1475. A bill for the relief of Elena Erbez; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. QUINN:

H. R. 1476. A bill for the relief of Mrs. Maria Kopf; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. RADWAN:

H. R. 1477. A bill for the relief of Linda Azar Karam Batrouny; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. RIBICOFF:

H. R. 1478. A bill for the relief of Humayag Dildilian and his family; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

H. R. 1479. A bill for the relief of Joseph Bernstein; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

H. R. 1480. A bill for the relief of Dr. Hsiang-Tung Chang; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

H. R. 1481. A bill for the relief of Maria Smeriglia and Irene Smeriglia; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. RIBICOFF (by request):

H. R. 1482. A bill for the relief of Maddalena Tornusciolo; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. HARDIE SCOTT:

H. R. 1483. A bill for the relief of Michel H. Frank, Bessie Frank, and Herbert Frank; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

H. R. 1484. A bill for the relief of Aikaterini Skoufalos; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. SCUDDER:

H. R. 1485. A bill for the relief of R. E. Agee and Margaret E. Agee; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

H. R. 1486. A bill for the relief of Maria Geertruide Mulders; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

H. R. 1487. A bill for the relief of the Sonoma County Farmers' Mutual Fire Insurance Co.; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

H. R. 1488. A bill for the relief of Mrs. Olga Mills; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. THOMAS:

H. R. 1489. A bill for the relief of the Duncan Coffee Co.; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. WOLVERTON:

H. R. 1490. A bill for the relief of Henryk Kramarski; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. ZABLOCKI:

H. R. 1491. A bill for the relief of Brother John Muniak; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

PETITIONS, ETC.

Under clause 1 of rule XXII, petitions and papers were laid on the Clerk's desk and referred as follows:

6. By Mr. MACHROWICZ: Petition of the American Legion, department executive committee, Lansing, Mich., supporting the principles of the universal military training program; to the Committee on Armed Services.

7. By Mr. SMITH of Wisconsin: Resolution of the Kenosha Chamber of Commerce, Kenosha, Wis., to reaffirm faith in the American voluntary way to safeguard the Nation's health and insure against the costs of illness and unequivocally oppose any form of national compulsory health insurance as a dangerous step toward complete acceptance of a planned socialistic economy; to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

8. Also, resolution by the Kenosha Retail Council, Kenosha, Wis., to reaffirm faith in the American voluntary way to safeguard the Nation's health and insure against the costs of illness and unequivocally oppose any form of national compulsory health insurance as a dangerous step toward complete acceptance of a planned socialistic economy; to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

9. Also, resolution of the auxiliary to the Kenosha County Medical Society to reaffirm faith in the American voluntary way to safeguard the Nation's health and insure against the costs of illness and unequivocally oppose any form of national compulsory health insurance as a dangerous step toward complete acceptance of a planned socialistic economy; to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

SENATE

MONDAY, JANUARY 15, 1951

(Legislative day of Monday, January 8, 1951)

The Senate met at 12 o'clock meridian, on the expiration of the recess.

The Chaplain, Rev. Frederick Brown Harris, D. D., offered the following prayer:

Our Father, who revealest Thyself in all that is pure and true and lovely, we beseech Thee to help us make our hearts and minds the fitting audience chambers for Thy presence. Help us in all things to be masters of ourselves that we may be the servants of all. In meeting grave issues growing out of what is wrong with the world, reveal to us what is wrong with ourselves. Make us vividly conscious that we cannot meet and conquer hatred and rampant selfish aggression abroad with material weapons only; but that our own hearts must be the homes of love and purity and honesty if we are to be Thy instruments for the transforming of the world. In these times of tension and strain, keep us calm in temper, clear in mind, sound of heart, in spite of ingratitude, meanness, or even treachery. In these crucial and creative days, enable Thy servants here, in posts of high public office, to perform faithfully and well what Thou dost require, even to do justly, to love mercy and to walk humbly with Thee, our God. In the dear Redeemer's name. Amen.

THE JOURNAL

On request of Mr. MCFARLAND, and by unanimous consent, the reading of the Journal of the proceedings of Thursday, January 11, 1951, was dispensed with.

MESSAGES FROM THE PRESIDENT

Messages in writing from the President of the United States were communicated to the Senate by Mr. Miller, one of his secretaries.

LEAVE OF ABSENCE

On request of Mr. WHERRY, and by unanimous consent, Mr. KEM was excused from attendance on the sessions of the Senate during this week.

COMMITTEE MEETING DURING SENATE SESSIONS

On request of Mr. JOHNSON of Texas, and by unanimous consent, the Subcommittee on Preparedness of the Armed Services Committee was authorized to meet during sessions of the Senate for the remainder of the week.

CALL OF THE ROLL

Mr. MCFARLAND. I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Secretary will call the roll.

The roll was called, and the following Senators answered to their names:

Aiken	Green	Millikin
Anderson	Hayden	Monroney
Bennett	Hendrickson	Morse
Benton	Hennings	Mundt
Brewster	Hickenlooper	Murray
Bricker	Hill	Neely
Bridges	Holland	Nixon
Butler, Md.	Humphrey	O'Conor
Butler, Nebr.	Hunt	O'Mahoney
Carlson	Ives	Pastore
Case	Jenner	Robertson
Chapman	Johnson, Colo.	Russell
Chavez	Johnson, Tex.	Saltonstall
Clements	Johnston, S. C.	Schoeppel
Connally	Kefauver	Smathers
Cordon	Kerr	Smith, Maine
Dirksen	Kilgore	Smith, N. J.
Douglas	Knowland	Smith, N. C.
Dworshak	Langer	Stennis
Eastland	Lehman	Taft
Ecton	Lodge	Thye
Ellender	Long	Watkins
Ferguson	McCarran	Welker
Flanders	McClellan	Wherry
Frear	McFarland	Wiley
Fulbright	McKellar	Young
George	McMahon	Williams
Gillette	Martin	

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. I announce that the Senator from North Carolina [Mr. HOEY] and the Senator from Washington [Mr. MAGNUSON] are absent on public business.

The Senator from South Carolina [Mr. MAYBANK] is absent because of illness.

The Senator from Alabama [Mr. SPARKMAN] is necessarily absent.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I announce that the Senator from Washington [Mr. CAIN], the Senator from Missouri [Mr. KEM], and the Senator from Michigan [Mr. VANDENBERG] are absent by leave of the Senate.

The Senator from Indiana [Mr. CAPEHART] and the Senator from Nevada [Mr. MALONE] are absent on official business.

The Senator from Wisconsin [Mr. MCCARTHY] is absent because of a death in his family.

The Senator from New Hampshire [Mr. TOBEY] is necessarily absent in order to attend the funeral of a friend.

The VICE PRESIDENT. A quorum is present.

AWARD OF CONGRESSIONAL MEDALS OF HONOR TO AMERICAN SOLDIERS IN THE KOREAN CAMPAIGN

Mr. LODGE. Mr. President, on Wednesday, January 9, 1951, there occurred at the White House a deeply

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moving ceremony. The President of the United States conferred the Congressional Medal of Honor on five heroic men of the United States Army who died, or who are missing in action, in Korea.

The names of the men to whose relatives the Medal of Honor was awarded are Pfc Melvin L. Brown, Mahaffey, Pa.; Sgt. (1c) Charles W. Turner, Boston, Mass.; Master Sgt. Travis E. Watkins, Gladewater, Tex.; First Lt. Frederick F. Henry, Clinton, Okla.; Maj. Gen. William F. Dean, Berkeley, Calif.

Theirs is the courage which enables a nation to survive the worst dangers. We in the Senate should acknowledge our debt of gratitude to these brave men by spreading the story of their heroism onto the pages of our RECORD.

I ask unanimous consent that this statement, together with the complete official texts of the five citations, be printed in the body of the RECORD, as close as possible to the front page of the RECORD.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Is there objection?

There being no objection, the citations were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

PENNSYLVANIA SOLDIER AWARDED MEDAL OF HONOR FOR SINGLE-HANDED DEFENSE OF POSITION

Twenty-year-old Pfc Melvin L. Brown, of Mahaffey, Pa., has been given the Nation's highest award, the Medal of Honor, for single-handedly defending a position, atop a 50-foot wall, against repeated attacks while his platoon was securing Hill 755 (the Walled City), near Kasan, Korea, on September 4, 1950, the Department of the Army announced today.

The medal will be presented to Private Brown's father by President Truman in a White House ceremony at 11:30 a. m., January 9.

Private Brown is currently listed as missing in action in Korea.

The youthful soldier, son of Mr. and Mrs. Edward D. Brown, also of Mahaffey, expended all of his rifle ammunition, then his hand grenades; and finally, though wounded, he resorted to his entrenching tool, a small shovel, to beat back attacks on his precarious perch. His action delayed the enemy troops, and enabled his platoon to repel them.

In addition to Private Brown's mother, those attending the ceremony will include his three sisters, Mrs. Evelyn Dickey, Clearfield, Pa.; Mrs. Dorothy Pease, Mahaffey; and Mrs. Beatrice Seger, of Glen Campbell, Pa.; and a brother, Pvt. Calvin W. Brown, First School Company, Atlanta General Depot, Atlanta, Ga., now at the home of his parents.

Several of Private Brown's comrades, who witnessed his lone battle on the wall, signed a joint statement describing the action as follows:

"During an attack on his platoon's perimeter of defense, whose mission was to secure Hill 755 (the Walled City), Private (first class) Brown took his position on a retaining wall approximately 50 feet high.

"Enemy superior in number started climbing the wall just as Private (first class) Brown's last round of ammunition was expended, and he was wounded by enemy fire.

"Realizing the vital necessity for holding, and without concern for his personal safety, though wounded and without his rifle, Private (first class) Brown continued to throw his few remaining hand grenades into the enemy, causing several casualties with each grenade.

"When his supply of grenades was exhausted, his comrades from nearby fox holes commenced throwing hand grenades toward his position. On several occasions, the grenades were thrown short of his position. When this would occur, Private (first class) Brown would leave his position and retrieve the grenades, exposing himself to enemy rifle and machine-gun fire.

"However, the enemy continued their climb, and Private (first class) Brown, taking his entrenching tool from his pack, waited until the enemy, one by one, peered over the wall, delivering each a skull-crushing blow across the top of his head.

"Private (first class) Brown's conspicuous performance in knocking from 10 to 12 enemy troops from the wall and his outstanding personal bravery served as an inspiration to his comrades, delayed the attack, and enabled his platoon to repel the enemy.

"Private (first class) Brown was seriously injured during this action, and has not been heard from since this attack.

"His courage and devotion to duty reflects the highest credit upon himself and the military service."

Private (first class) Brown entered the Army at Erie, Pa., on October 27, 1948.

The Medal of Honor citation follows:

"Private Brown, Company D, Eighth Engineer Combat Battalion, distinguished himself by conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity above and beyond the call of duty in action against an enemy on September 4, 1950, near Kasan, Korea. While his platoon was securing hill 755 (the Walled City), the enemy, using heavy automatic weapons and small arms, counterattacked. Taking a position on a 50-foot-high wall he delivered heavy rifle fire on the enemy. His ammunition was soon expended, and although wounded, he remained at his post and threw his few grenades into the attackers causing many casualties. When his supply of grenades was exhausted his comrades from nearby fox holes tossed others to him and he left his position, braving a hail of fire, to retrieve and throw them at the enemy. The attackers continued to assault his position and Private Brown weaponless, drew his intrenching tool from his pack and calmly waited until they, one by one, peered over the wall, delivering each a crushing blow upon the head. Knocking 10 or 12 enemy from the wall his daring action so inspired his platoon that they repelled the attack and held their position. Private Brown's extraordinary heroism, gallantry, and intrepidity reflects the highest credit upon himself and was in keeping with the honored traditions of the military service."

ARMY AWARDS MEDAL OF HONOR TO SECOND INFANTRY DIVISION SERGEANT

Sgt. (1c) Charles W. Turner, 157 Huntington Avenue, Boston, Mass., who died from wounds received near Yongsan, Korea, on September 1, 1950, while directing his reconnaissance platoon's fire against a larger enemy force from an exposed position in a tank turret, has been awarded the Medal of Honor posthumously, the Department of the Army announced today.

Sergeant Turner's heroism was responsible for a successful defense by the Second Infantry Division platoon of its position from which it withdrew only when the ammunition supply ran low. He remained in an exposed vantage point for approximately 20 minutes under heavy enemy fire before he was fatally wounded.

The medal will be presented to his mother, Mrs. Hazel O. Turner, of the Boston address, by President Truman in a White House ceremony at 11:30 a. m., January 9, 1951. Also attending the presentation will be a brother, Harry H. Turner, and sister, Mrs. Jaqueline Xavier, both also of 157 Huntington Avenue, Boston.

The action which won the Nation's highest award for Sergeant Turner, an Army veteran of World War II who was taken prisoner by the Germans, was described by his platoon leader, First Lt. Ralph Decker, Jr., 1518 Jewell, Topeka, Kans.:

"On the morning of September 1, 1950, at about 5:30 o'clock, my platoon was attacked by a superior enemy force estimated at 150 to 200 men.

"Sergeant Turner, who was the scout squad leader, after checking his men in their positions and seeing that the main force of the attack was not toward his position, but further around to the left, exposed himself to the enemy fire for approximately 100 yards while making his way from his position to the platoon sergeant's tank to determine the situation and get instructions.

"Upon arriving at the platoon sergeant's tank, which was the keypoint of the platoon defense, and which was receiving the main enemy effort, Sergeant Turner immediately mounted to the exposed deck of the tank and manned the .50 caliber machine gun.

"Though under fire from several enemy automatic weapons and a number of riflemen, Sergeant Turner remained in this exposed position under increasingly heavy fire, firing the machine gun and directing the tank gun even though four men were wounded and one killed in his immediate vicinity, and the turret of the tank itself was struck by more than 50 bullets, 3 of which actually struck the mount of the gun he was manning.

"Sergeant Turner retained his exposed position for approximately 20 minutes before he was shot off; firing his gun, directing the tank fire, and shouting high-spirited encouragement to the other men in the position.

"On two occasions he called my attention to a threatened enemy penetration of the position, enabling me to move personnel to repulse them.

"Sergeant Turner's example of great courage and heroism and his jocular encouragement to the men around him undoubtedly was responsible for the splendid defense put up by the platoon, during which more than 50 enemy were killed, and the successful withdrawal when the ammunition supply ran out."

Sergeant Turner, who was 29 years old at the time of his death, enlisted in the National Guard on June 6, 1939, and entered active Federal service with the One Hundred and Ninety-first Tank Battalion on February 3, 1941. He served with the battalion in the Naples-Foggia and Central Europe campaigns until being taken prisoner by the Germans on November 19, 1943. He remained a prisoner of war until May 8, 1945, when he was returned to United States control.

Following is the Medal of Honor citation:

"Sergeant Turner, Second Reconnaissance Company, Second Infantry Division, distinguished himself by conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity above and beyond the call of duty in action against the enemy near Yongsan, Korea. On September 1, 1950, a large enemy force launched a mortar and automatic weapon supported assault against his platoon. Sergeant Turner, a section leader, quickly organized his unit for defense and then observed that the attack was directed at the tank section 100 yards away. Leaving his secured section he dashed through a hail of fire to the threatened position and mounting a tank, manned the exposed turret machine gun. Disregarding the intense enemy fire he calmly held this position delivering deadly accurate fire and pointing out targets for the tank's 75-millimeter gun. His action resulted in the destruction of seven enemy machine-gun nests. Although severely wounded, he remained at the gun shouting encouragement to his comrades. During the action the tank received over 50 direct hits; the periscopes and antenna were shot away and three rounds hit the machine-gun

mount. Despite this fire, he remained at his post until a burst of enemy fire cost him his life. This intrepid and heroic performance enabled the platoon to withdraw and later launch an attack which routed the enemy. Sergeant Turner's valor and example reflect the highest credit upon himself and are in keeping with the esteemed traditions of the Army of the United States."

ARMY MASTER SERGEANT AWARDED MEDAL OF HONOR POSTHUMOUSLY

Master Sgt. Travis E. Watkins, Gladewater, Tex., who displayed "cheerfulness, fortitude, and unflinching acceptance of fate's decree * * * during 4 days and nights of hell," has been posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor for conspicuous gallantry that led to his death near Yongsan, Korea, on September 3, 1950, the Department of the Army announced today.

The award of the Nation's highest honor to the Second Infantry Division soldier came as a result of action in which Sergeant Watkins took command of a beleaguered group of 30 men and directed a defense which repelled continuous, fanatical enemy assaults. At one time, he left the security of his defense position to kill five enemy soldiers in order to replenish his own ammunition and weapon supply. Later he killed six more to erase an enemy machine-gun nest.

The medal will be presented to the widow, Mrs. Maidie S. Watkins, 215 Gay Avenue, Gladewater, Tex., by President Truman in a White House ceremony at 11:30 a. m., January 9. Also attending the ceremony will be his mother, Mrs. Auzie M. Carter, and his stepfather, Marshall R. Carter, both of Odessa, Tex.; a brother, Sgt. Tris T. Watkins, assigned to Hunter Air Force Base at Savannah, Ga.; and his mother-in-law, Mrs. Alma Barnett, of Gladewater, Tex.

Another brother, Master Sgt. Truman R. Watkins, who has been serving in the Far East command, is scheduled to arrive at McChord Air Force Base, Wash., today so that he may attend the ceremony on Tuesday.

An account of Sergeant Watkins' heroic action was related in a joint statement by Master Sgt. Grover L. Bozarth, of 501 Franklin Street, Austin, Tex., and Sgt. (1c) Ralph G. Lillard, of 226 Vancouver Avenue, Tacoma, Wash., who participated in the dramatic events which began at daybreak last August 31.

"It became apparent," they said, "that the fighting was far to the rear, and the men's spirit was adversely affected. Sergeant Watkins, sensing this feeling became very active on the perimeter. He constantly exposed himself to heavy enemy fire as he moved from foxhole to foxhole encouraging and cheering the men.

"By the morning of September 2, the need for hand grenades became very critical. At about 9 a. m., Sergeant Watkins killed two North Koreans about 50 yards outside the northeast edge of the perimeter. Alone, he left the perimeter to retrieve the North Koreans' grenades and weapons.

"When he was about 20 yards from the bodies, three more North Koreans jumped to their feet and opened fire on him. Sergeant Watkins killed the three of them and calmly gathered weapons, ammunition, and insignia of all five. This action, witnessed by the men on the perimeter, was a great boost to their morale.

"At about 10 o'clock the same morning, a group of six North Koreans gained a protected spot about 25 feet from a machine-gun position and were throwing hand grenades into the position making it untenable.

"Sergeant Watkins, although previously wounded in the head, rose from his fox hole to engage the enemy with rifle fire. He was immediately subjected to steady and heavy enemy machine-gun fire, and was hit in the left side, breaking or severing his backbone.

"He never faltered, and completely disregarding his wounds, continued his fire until all six North Koreans were killed and the threat to the perimeter was eliminated. He then collapsed into his fox hole.

"Although paralyzed from the waist down, Sergeant Watkins never lost courage. As he lay in his fox hole for the next 2 days, he could be heard by his comrades shouting, 'Hang on fellows. Help will be here in a short time. Now kill one for me.'

"He refused all rations, telling his buddies that he didn't deserve them because he couldn't fight.

"When it became apparent that the help wasn't going to arrive, he ordered his men to attempt to return to friendly lines. When the position was abandoned, he refused to burden the men because of his helpless condition.

"When last seen, he was wearing a smile and was wishing the survivors the best of luck on their way out.

"His cheerfulness, fortitude, and unflinching acceptance of fate's decree was a predominant influence in the magnificent defense of the gallant band who held the observation post for 4 days and nights of hell."

Sergeant Watkins, who was 29 years old at the time of his death, attended grammar and high school at Turnertown, Tex. He enlisted in the Army on June 6, 1939, at Dallas, Tex., and served in the Pacific theater during World War II. He was awarded the Bronze Star for exemplary conduct in ground combat against the enemy during the Guadalcanal campaign.

The Medal of Honor citation follows:

"Sergeant Watkins, Company H, Ninth Infantry Regiment, distinguished himself by conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity above and beyond the call of duty in action against an enemy near Yongsan, Korea, from August 31 through September 3, 1950. When an overwhelming enemy force broke through and isolated 30 men of his unit he took command, established a perimeter defense and directed action which repelled continuous, fanatical enemy assaults. With his group completely surrounded and cut off, he moved from fox hole to fox hole exposing himself to enemy fire, giving instructions and offering encouragement to his men. Later when the need for ammunition and grenades became critical he shot two enemy soldiers 50 yards outside the perimeter and went out alone for their ammunition and weapons. As he picked up their weapons he was attacked by three others and wounded. Returning their fire he killed all three and gathering up the weapons of the five enemy dead returned to his amazed comrades. During a later assault, six enemy soldiers gained a defiladed spot and began to throw grenades into the perimeter making it untenable. Realizing the desperate situation and disregarding his wound he rose from his fox hole to engage them with rifle fire. Although immediately hit by a burst from an enemy machine gun he continued to fire until he had killed the grenade throwers. With this threat eliminated he collapsed and despite being paralyzed from the waist down, encouraged his men to hold on. He refused all food saving it for his comrades and when it became apparent that help would not arrive in time to hold the position ordered his men to escape to friendly lines. Refusing evacuation as his hopeless condition would burden his comrades he remained in his position and cheerfully wished them luck. Through his aggressive leadership and intrepid actions, this small force destroyed nearly 500 of the enemy before abandoning their position."

OKLAHOMA ARMY LIEUTENANT AWARDED MEDAL OF HONOR

First Lt. Frederick F. Henry, Clinton, Okla., who is officially listed as missing in action in Korea, has been awarded the Medal of Honor for sacrificing himself to cover a withdrawal of his platoon in action near Am-Dong, Korea, September 1, 1950, the Department of the Army announced today.

The medal will be presented by President Truman in a White House ceremony, at 11 a. m., January 9, 1951, to Mrs. Lavon P. Henry, 1045 Harvard, Salt Lake City, Utah, the hero's wife.

A graphic description of the action which won the Medal of Honor for Lieutenant Henry was given by Sgt. (then Corp.) Richard A. Siman, 7222 Oxford Avenue, Philadelphia, Pa., a member of his platoon who was sharing the officer's foxhole when the action started.

"A bunch of North Koreans attacked our position," Sergeant Siman said. "Lieutenant Henry jumped up out of the hole and started running down the line telling his men to stay in place and keep firing.

"He came back a few minutes later and I saw he was wounded in the shoulder. He seemed to be in great pain.

"We fought the enemy for a long time, and it seemed as if we were stopping them. Lieutenant Henry tried to call battalion on the phone, but the line was out. He said he wasn't sure if the rest of the outfit was completely ready so we had to stay put.

"There were bullets and shells falling all around. Our ammunition was running low.

"Lieutenant Henry sent me out after the guns and ammunition of the wounded. When I came back, he put them in the hole with him and told the men to start withdrawing, and he would cover us.

"We started back, and Lieutenant Henry stayed by himself. He seemed to be firing everything at once.

"I didn't see Lieutenant Henry after that."

The action in Korea was not the first time Lieutenant Henry, who is 33 years old, has served in a hero's role. Entering active duty as an enlisted man in 1935, he won a combat promotion to second lieutenant in the Pacific theater on February 12, 1945. He holds the Asiatic Pacific theater ribbon with two bronze stars for New Guinea and Luzon, the Philippines Liberation ribbon with bronze star, and the Bronze Star Medal with an oak leaf cluster.

Attending the White House ceremony, besides his wife, will be two children, Frederick F. Henry, Jr., 3 years old, and Sharon M. Henry, 14 months old; his father and mother, Mr. and Mrs. James P. Henry, Riverview, Apartment 11, Stockton, Calif., and a sister-in-law, Mrs. Janna Henry, 1025 Acosta, Salinas, Calif.

Following is the Medal of Honor citation:

"Lieutenant Henry, Company F, Thirty-eighth Infantry Regiment, distinguished himself by conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity above and beyond call of duty in action on September 1, 1950, in the vicinity of Am-Dong, Korea. His platoon was holding a strategic ridge near the town when they were attacked by a superior enemy force, supported by heavy mortar and artillery fire. Seeing his platoon disorganized by this fanatical assault he left his fox hole and moving along the line ordered his men to stay in place and keep firing. Encouraged by this heroic action the platoon re-formed a defense line and rained devastating fire on the enemy, checking his advance. Enemy fire had knocked out all communications and Lieutenant Henry was unable to determine whether or not the main line of resistance was alerted to this heavy attack. On his own initiative, although severely wounded, he decided to hold his position as long as possible and ordered the wounded evacuated and their weapons and ammunition brought to him. Establishing a one-man defensive position he ordered the platoon's withdrawal and, despite his wound and with complete disregard for himself, remained behind to cover the movement. When last seen he was single-handedly firing all available weapons

so effectively that he caused an estimated 50 enemy casualties. His ammunition was soon expended and his position overrun, but this intrepid action saved the platoon and halted the enemy's advance until the main line of resistance was prepared to throw back the attack. Lieutenant Henry's outstanding gallantry and noble self-sacrifice, above and beyond the call of duty, reflects the highest honor upon him and was in keeping with the esteemed traditions of the Army of the United States."

PRESIDENT TO PRESENT MEDAL OF HONOR AWARDED GENERAL DEAN TO MRS. DEAN

A detailed summary of the events leading to the disappearance in Korea at 1:30 a. m. on July 21, 1950, of Maj. Gen. William F. Dean, heroic commander of the 24th Infantry Division, was released today by the Department of the Army as the Nation prepared to bestow its highest award, the Medal of Honor, on the missing military leader.

The medal, which was awarded to General Dean because of his "examples of excessive gallantry committed always at the threatened portions of his front lines," will be presented to his wife, Mrs. Mildred D. Dean, 251 Etna Street, Berkeley, Calif., by President Truman in a White House ceremony at 11:30 a. m. January 9, 1951.

Also attending the ceremony will be the general's mother, Mrs. Elizabeth Dean, and his daughter, Mrs. June Williams, both of Berkeley, and a son, Cadet William F. Dean, Jr., a student at the United States Military Academy.

The events prior to General Dean's disappearance were recorded by Brig. Gen. Pearson Menoher, assistant commander of the Twenty-fourth Infantry Division. His summation follows:

"In order to fully develop General Dean's actions during July 19–21, 1950, it is desired to present here all available background material, some of it gained by observation, most of it by personal discussion with General Dean.

"General Dean fully realized that his division could not alone stem the North Korean Army. He did believe that we could considerably delay the enemy at Taejon since it was the strategic key to any advance on the Taegu-Pusan main line of communications in this portion of South Korea, and the enemy would not attempt any farther advance south until he captured this city. He had hoped to hold Taejon until reinforcements could arrive; if this were not possible he intended to inflict the heaviest of casualties upon the enemy. Throughout the delaying action he commanded from July 2 until July 21, when he was reported missing, he repeatedly stated, 'My God, we must hold them; I don't want to have to fight for every mile of this ground again.'

"Thus it was that when our Kum River line was broken and we withdrew to the vicinity of Taejon he knew that the enemy would soon attack here and in a strength greatly outnumbering us. On July 18, 1950, he ordered the Twenty-fourth Infantry Division Advance CP to move to Okchon, 12 miles southeast of Taejon. He kept with him in Taejon a minimum staff consisting of several officers and enlisted drivers.

"All day July 19, 1950, the enemy bombarded our positions north of Taejon in the vicinity of the air strip in preparation for their attack. General Dean stated this artillery barrage was greater than any he had seen in any single day during his 7 months of combat in Europe, 1944–45.

"Despite this artillery he made numerous trips to the front lines to see for himself what the enemy was doing or could be expected to do. On one of these trips he went out in front of our lines to direct the fire of an American tank against approaching enemy. Even though artillery and small arms fire was falling in this area, he stood outside the tank and directed its fire with marked effect.

"On another occasion he visited an advance CP where incoming artillery was particularly heavy and ate lunch in the mess even though other officers deemed it more appropriate to remain in their fox holes.

"Late that afternoon General Dean returned to his division forward CP at Okchon. I insisted that he should remain at his own CP and that if he wanted a general officer with the regimental combat team in Taejon he should send me there. He declined, stating that he wanted to be there himself, that he would be all right and would see me later. He returned to Taejon around 1800.

"Around daylight July 20, 1950, the enemy launched a coordinated attack, probably consisting of two divisions, against Taejon. Our forces, an understrength regimental combat team, were greatly outnumbered. The first evidence of this attack was the appearance of several enemy tanks within Taejon at approximately 0530. General Dean quickly organized bazooka crews and took off in pursuit. During this hunt he spotted a disabled enemy tank in a field on the western edge of Taejon. He directed the fire of a 75 millimeter recoilless rifle against this tank but after firing four rounds without a hit, he started crawling toward the tank with a hand grenade, intending to hurl it into an open hatch.

"While crawling toward the tank he was pinned down by enemy small arms fire; at the same time two other enemy tanks appeared to cover the withdrawal of this disabled vehicle. In getting away he evacuated an abandoned American jeep. He hurriedly rounded up several bazooka teams and returned to knock out the three enemy tanks; however, by this time the tanks had headed away from Taejon and the bazooka crews firing at a range of 200 yards were unable to hit them.

"At approximately 1130 while eating lunch at the Thirty-fourth Infantry CP in Taejon another enemy tank rolled past. Again General Dean secured bazooka teams and started another chase. Upon spotting the tank down a side street he placed one bazooka team on this street to prevent its escape and with the other team he proceeded down a street to the rear and paralleling the tank to gain undetected a good firing position nearer the tank.

"Trying to find such a position in the upstairs of one building a sniper fired on him twice, both shots narrowly missing his head. Unperturbed he had a rifleman return the sniper's fire, the third round hitting and apparently killing the sniper. After several more tries he found a position upstairs in a building from which he could look down directly on top of the tank. He then had the bazooka team fire three rounds into the tank, killing the crew, and setting the tank afire.

"Between these tank hunts, General Dean made frequent trips to our front lines despite heavy enemy fire, and always returned to the Thirty-fourth Infantry CP with targets for our air cover. He minutely directed these air strikes to insure that our own troops were not hit. Had he not made these personal reconnaissances the air strikes would not have been possible.

"Around 1530 to 1630 it was obvious that all our positions were being overrun. General Dean then formed a convoy of all available vehicles left in the town and ordered a withdrawal. Asked if he wanted to proceed with the lead elements, he declined stating to the effect he wanted to see everybody else safely out of town. He proceeded with the last vehicles.

"The column first ran into enemy small arms fire in the southwest edge of Taejon. In its procession for the next 3½ to 4 miles the column with few exceptions was constantly under enemy small arms and mortar fire.

"At the edge of Taejon six or seven soldiers on foot asked for a ride. He stopped, put the men aboard and told his driver to proceed down the road to a covered position where he would join them on foot. On three other occasions he stopped his jeep while under fire to clear the road of disabled or driverless vehicles. Each time he found operable vehicles, he assigned a driver, and placed all wounded men in the vicinity aboard.

"At one point a truck received a direct hit from an enemy mortar round; the truck had run off the road into a ditch and 10 to 15 of our dead lay in the middle of the road. General Dean ordered his driver to slow down and veer off, even though it looked as if they would run off the road.

"About 4 miles out of Taejon, the motor convoy was completely stopped by knocked-out vehicles. General Dean gathered all the men in his vicinity, leading them to temporary concealment in a nearby bean field. After dark he led his group to nearby hills. He helped carry a wounded man up the hill which was very steep and 'rough-going' for an able man on his own feet. He left his group here, stating he and his aide-de-camp were going back down the hill to round up additional stragglers and wounded.

"While on this mission General Dean and his aide became separated around 0130, 21 July 1950. Neither in the darkness that night nor after daylight the following morning could he be found. This is the last eyewitness account of General Dean available at this time.

"It is more than evident that in all his actions against the enemy he was fearless, aggressive, and that he proceeded with utter disregard for his own life. His numerous appearances on the fighting front under fire immeasurably boosted the morale of his troops. Throughout it all he remained calm and cheerful, a difficult task for a normal man under such adverse conditions.

"His intrepid leadership and outstanding valor uphold the highest tradition of the military service. On behalf of the men serving with him at the time of these related incidents, I am proud to recommend General Dean for the award of the Medal of Honor."

In his recommendation that General Dean be awarded the Medal of Honor, General Douglas MacArthur, as Commander in Chief, Far East Command, wrote:

"It is with great pride and warmest personal admiration that I recommend the award of the Medal of Honor to Maj. Gen. William F. Dean. The dauntless courage and the selflessness demonstrated by General Dean bespeak the noble character of our brave men who are fighting for a unified cause under the flag of the United Nations."

The late Gen. Walton H. Walker, former Commander of the Eighth Army, who was killed in a jeep accident on December 23, 1950, before his death wrote the following:

"I consider it a privilege to approve a recommendation for the award of the Medal of Honor to this gallant and intrepid general officer. Never in the annals of military history has a general officer written a saga that can compare with this."

Following is the Medal of Honor citation:

"General Dean, Commanding General, Twenty-fourth Infantry Division, distinguished himself by conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the repeated risk of his life, above and beyond the call of duty in Taejon, Korea, on 20 and 21 July 1950. In command of a unit suddenly relieved from occupation duties in Japan and as yet untried in combat; faced with a ruthless and determined enemy, highly trained and overwhelmingly superior in numbers; he felt it his duty to take action which to a man of his military experience and knowledge was clearly apt to result in his death. He personally and alone attacked an enemy tank while armed only with a hand grenade. He also directed the fire of his own tanks from an exposed position with neither cover nor concealment while under observed artillery and small arms fire. When the town of

Taejon was finally overrun he refused to insure his own safety by leaving with the leading elements but remained behind organizing his retreating forces, directing stragglers, and was last seen assisting the wounded to a place of safety. These actions indicate that General Dean felt it necessary to sustain the courage and resolution of his troops by examples of excessive gallantry committed always at the threatened portions of his front lines. The magnificent response of his unit to this willing and cheerful sacrifice, made with full knowledge of its certain cost, is history. The success of this phase of the campaign is in large measure due to General Dean's heroic leadership, courageous and loyal devotion to his men, and his complete disregard for personal safety."

MEMORIAL SERVICES FOR THE LATE HENRY L. STIMSON

Mr. MARTIN. Mr. President, next Sunday afternoon, January 21, at 5 p. m., at the National Presbyterian Church, Connecticut Avenue at N Street NW., memorial services will be held in commemoration of the life, character, and public service of the late Henry L. Stimson. Speakers will be Gen. George C. Marshall and the Reverend Dr. Albert J. McCartney. I have been asked to announce that Members of Congress are invited to attend.

TRANSACTION OF ROUTINE BUSINESS

Mr. McFARLAND. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Senators be permitted, without debate, to transact routine business, such as the introduction of bills and to place matters in the RECORD.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Without objection, it is so ordered.

EXECUTIVE COMMUNICATIONS, ETC.

The VICE PRESIDENT laid before the Senate the following letters, which were referred as indicated:

REPORT ON ACTIVITIES OF LIGNITE RESEARCH LABORATORY, GRAND FORKS, N. DAK.

A letter from the Secretary of the Interior, reporting, pursuant to law, on the activities of, expenditures by, and donations to the Lignite Research Laboratory, Grand Forks, N. Dak.; to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

REPORT ON TORT CLAIMS PAID BY DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR

A letter from the Assistant Secretary of the Interior, transmitting, pursuant to law, a report on all tort claims paid by the Department, for the fiscal year 1950 (with an accompanying report); to the Committee on the Judiciary.

PETITION, ETC., FROM CITIZENS OF SAMOA

A letter from the Secretary of the Navy, transmitting, pursuant to law, five documents consisting of a petition, resolution, etc., presented by a group of Samoans (with accompanying papers); to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

REPORT ON LEASES OF REAL PROPERTY ENTERED INTO BY NAVY DEPARTMENT

A letter from the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, transmitting, pursuant to law, a report on leases entered into by the Department of the Navy for the period July 1, 1950, through December 31, 1950 (with an accompanying report); to the Committee on Armed Services.

PARKING OF VEHICLES ON CERTAIN GOVERNMENT PROPERTY FOR POSTAL PURPOSES

A letter from the Postmaster General, transmitting a draft of proposed legislation to prohibit the parking of vehicles upon any property owned by the United States for postal purposes (with an accompanying paper); to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service.

PETITION

The VICE PRESIDENT laid before the Senate a resolution adopted by the International Anglers and Casters Association, relating to the issuance of a national license for fishing, and so forth, which was referred to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

PLIGHT OF TRANSYLVANIA SAXONS—RESOLUTION OF STEUBEN SOCIETY OF AMERICA, NEW YORK

Mr. LANGER. Mr. President, in connection with the magnificent fight put up by the Germans in Western Germany against communism, I present for appropriate reference, and ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD, a resolution adopted by the Steuben Society of America, in New York, requesting an investigation and study of the plight of the Transylvania Saxons.

There being no objection, the resolution was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations and ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

RESOLUTION OF THE STEUBEN SOCIETY OF AMERICA

Whereas the American people subscribe to the fundamental principle of the protection of human rights, and to the practice of charity and good will; and

Whereas we have heretofore subscribed to the principles enunciated in the Atlantic Charter abhoring the practice of territorial self-aggrandizement and advocating self-determination and the pursuit of the four freedoms in all countries everywhere; and

Whereas the Saxon people of Transylvania, Rumania, have by reason of the failures and shortcomings of American representatives at Yalta, Tehran, and Potsdam, been caused, unnecessarily, by reason of their German ethnic origin, to suffer and endure diabolic hardships, and to live in the shadow of Draconic laws unexperienced in 800 years of Transylvania-Saxon history; and

Whereas the policy heretofore pursued of "to the victor belong the spoils," reinforced by the spirit of vindictiveness and vengeance, has confronted these oppressed people with only a dark and hopeless future,

Now, therefore, the Steuben Society of America in the interests of American honor and prestige, does hereby advocate and request the creation of a duly authorized Government commission, under the jurisdiction of the Congress of the United States to investigate and study the plight of the Transylvania Saxons, and report its recommendations to the end that said conditions affecting the fate and destiny of these people may, in the interests of fairness and justice, be alleviated and remedied.

Respectfully submitted.

THEO. H. HOFFMANN,
National Chairman.

THE HARWOOD CASE—AID FOR AGRICULTURAL INTERESTS—RESOLUTION OF NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF COMMISSIONERS, SOUTH CAROLINA

Mr. JOHNSTON of South Carolina. Mr. President, in conference with the Commissioner of Agriculture for my State of South Carolina, the Honorable J. Roy Jones requested my assistance in obtaining aid for the agricultural interests of the Nation.

Commissioner Jones is chairman of the Transportation Committee of the National Association of Commissioners, Secretaries and Directors of Agriculture. This organization at its last annual meeting unanimously approved a resolution that I would like to obtain permission for insertion in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD.

The action requested in the resolution should be forthcoming and a favorable decision is expected but, irrespective of the decision made, it should be released immediately.

I ask unanimous consent that the resolution be appropriately referred and printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the resolution was referred to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, and ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

RESOLUTION I: REGARDING HARWOOD CASE

Whereas the Interstate Commerce Commission in June 1948 reopened the Harwood case and at the same time instituted a general investigation for the determination of exempted agricultural commodities; and

Whereas the commissioners of agriculture of various States testified at the Commission's hearings in Washington, D. C., in November 1948, and in Atlanta, Ga., in January 1949, emphasizing the vital importance of exempt truck transportation in the marketing of agricultural commodities; and

Whereas the examiner assigned to the case rendered his report and submitted findings in these proceedings in July 1949, wherein he recommended a reversal of the Commission's prior decision in the Harwood case and classified as exempt commodities a great number of agricultural commodities previously held nonexempt by the Commission; and

Whereas oral argument in these proceedings was heard by the entire Commission in December 1949; and

Whereas the Commission has taken no further action in this litigation, notwithstanding the importance of the outcome to the agricultural community, and continues to render decisions under its previously restrictive interpretations: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, That this association request the Interstate Commerce Commission to render its decision in this matter without further delay, adopting the report of the examiner.

CLEAR CHANNEL—RESOLUTION OF THE AMERICAN FARM BUREAU FEDERATION, DALLAS, TEX.

Mr. WILLIAMS. Mr. President, I present for appropriate reference and ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD a resolution adopted at the annual convention of the American Farm Bureau Federation at Dallas, Tex., in opposition to any reduction, by international treaty or otherwise, in the number of clear channel stations.

There being no objection, the resolution was referred to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, and ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

CLEAR CHANNEL RESOLUTION OF THE AMERICAN FARM BUREAU FEDERATION

News and information are of increasing importance to everyone. Many rural people depend upon clear channel radio broadcasting for news, weather reports, and agricultural information. We therefore firmly oppose any reduction, by international treaty or otherwise, in the number of clear channel stations or any interruption of the extent of their service. The American Farm Bureau Federation urges that permission be given to these stations to increase their power to

allow for complete coverage to all areas in their respective territories.

Passed December 14, 1950, at the annual convention of the American Farm Bureau Federation at Dallas, Tex.

REPORT OF SELECT COMMITTEE ON SMALL BUSINESS (S. REPT. NO. 2)

Mr. McFARLAND (for Mr. SPARKMAN), from the Select Committee on Small Business, submitted, pursuant to Senate Resolution 58, Eighty-first Congress, the annual report of the Select Committee on Small Business, which was ordered to be printed, with illustrations.

REPORT ON ACTIVITIES OF COMMITTEE ON EXPENDITURES IN EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS, EIGHTY-FIRST CONGRESS (S. REPT. NO. 1)

Mr. McCLELLAN submitted, pursuant to law, a report on the activities of the Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments during the Eighty-first Congress, which was ordered to be printed.

WIRE TAPPING IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA—MINORITY VIEWS

Mr. HENDRICKSON. Mr. President, on behalf of the Senator from Maine [Mrs. SMITH], the Senator from Idaho [Mr. DWORSHAK], the Senator from California [Mr. NIXON], the Senator from Delaware [Mr. WILLIAMS], and the Senator from Wisconsin [Mr. McCARTHY], and myself, members of the Committee on the District of Columbia, I submit minority views on wire tapping in the District of Columbia, and ask unanimous consent that they be printed as part 2 of Report No. 2700, Eighty-first Congress, second session.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The minority views will be received, and, without objection, printed as requested by the Senator from New Jersey.

REPORTS OF COMMITTEES ON PERSONNEL AND FUNDS

Pursuant to Senate Resolution 123, Eightieth Congress, first session, the following reports were received by the Secretary of the Senate:

JANUARY 9, 1951.

REPORT OF COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

To the SECRETARY OF THE SENATE:

The above-mentioned committee, pursuant to Senate Resolution 123, Eightieth Congress, first session, submits the following report showing the name, profession, and total salary of each person employed by it and its subcommittees for the period from July 1, 1950, to December 31, 1950, together with the funds available to and expended by it and its subcommittees:

Name and profession	Rate of gross annual salary	Total salary received
Francis O. Wilcox, chief of staff	$10,846.00	$5,422.98
Thorsten V. Kalijarvi, staff associate	10,846.00	5,422.98
Carl M. Marcy, staff associate	10,846.00	5,422.98
C. C. O'Day, clerk	9,351.40	4,675.68
Pat M. Holt, associate clerk	9,019.59	4,509.78
Emmett M. O'Grady, assistant clerk	5,110.31	2,555.10
Isabel M. Smith, assistant clerk (to Nov. 13, 1950)	4,588.89	1,695.30
Morella R. Hansen, assistant clerk	4,588.89	2,294.40

Funds authorized or appropriated for committee expenditure during 81st Cong	30,000.00
Amount expended during 81st Cong	17,330.84
Balance unexpended Dec. 31, 1950	12,669.16

TOM CONNALLY,
Chairman.

JANUARY 15, 1951.

REPORT OF SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (UNDER AUTHORIZATION OF S. RES. 231 AND S. RES. 237)

To the SECRETARY OF THE SENATE:

The above-mentioned committee, pursuant to Senate Resolution 123, Eightieth Congress, first session, submits the following report showing the name, profession, and total salary of each person employed by it and its subcommittees for the period from July 1, 1950, to December 31, 1950, together with the funds available to and expended by it and its subcommittees:

Name and profession	Rate of gross annual salary	Total salary received
Martha W. Hix, assistant clerk (to Aug. 31, 1950)	$3,806.78	$605.49
Helen S. Karpowicz, assistant clerk (to Aug. 25, 1950)	3,806.78	676.74

Funds authorized or appropriated for committee expenditure during 81st Cong	$35,000.00
Amount expended during 81st Cong	27,407.11
Balance unexpended	7,592.89

TOM CONNALLY,
Chairman.

JANUARY 11, 1951.

REPORT OF COMMITTEE ON BANKING AND CURRENCY

To the SECRETARY OF THE SENATE:

The above-mentioned committee, pursuant to Senate Resolution 123, Eightieth Congress, first session, submits the following report showing the name, profession, and total salary of each person employed by it and its subcommittees for the period from July 1, 1950, to December 31, 1950, together with the funds available to and expended by it and its subcommittees:

Name and profession	Rate of gross annual salary	Total salary received
A. Lee Parsons, chief clerk	$10,846.00	$5,423.00
Joseph P. McMurray, staff director	10,846.00	5,423.00
William F. McKenna, counsel [1]	10,846.00	1,355.74
Robert D. L'Heureux, counsel	10,846.00	5,423.00
Thomas H. Daniel, counsel	10,846.00	5,423.00
Raimond Bowles, assistant clerk	10,846.00	5,423.00
Charles A. Young, counsel [2]	10,846.00	3,163.40
Eunice V. Avery, clerical assistant	5,892.43	2,946.22
Henrietta S. Chase, clerical assistant	4,849.61	2,424.80
Pauline C. Beam, clerical assistant	4,415.10	2,207.55
Caro M. Pugh, clerical assistant	4,415.10	2,207.55

[1] Nov. 16 through Dec. 31.
[2] Aug. 1 through Nov. 15.

Funds authorized or appropriated for committee expenditure during 81st Cong	$35,000.00
Jan. 1, 1949, through June 30, 1950 (already reported)	23,387.69
Amount expended July 1 through Dec. 31, 1950	7,028.05
Balance unexpended	4,584.26

BURNET R. MAYBANK,
Chairman.

JANUARY 11, 1951.

REPORT OF COMMITTEE ON BANKING AND CURRENCY

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SMALL BUSINESS (OPERATING UNDER AUTHORITY OF S. RES. 218)

To the SECRETARY OF THE SENATE:

The above-mentioned committee, pursuant to Senate Resolution 123, Eightieth Congress, first session, submits the following report showing the name, profession, and total salary of each person employed by it and its subcommittees for the period from July 1, 1950, to December 31, 1950, together with the funds available to and expended by it and its subcommittees:

Name and profession	Rate of gross annual salary	Total salary received
John L. Douglas, investigator	$7,858.27	$3,929.17
William C. Stewart, Jr., investigator	7,858.27	3,929.17
Carter E. Talman, financial adviser	7,858.27	3,929.17
Sarah I. Harley, clerical assistant	4,067.49	2,033.79
Ann Livingston, clerical assistant [1]	3,632.97	1,513.70
Floyd A. Carpenter, consultant [2]	30.12	30.12
Raymond H. Plockelman, consultant [2]	30.12	271.14

[1] From Aug. 1.
[2] Per diem.

Funds authorized or appropriated for committee expenditure during 81st Cong	$60,000.00
May 6, 1949, through June 30, 1950 (reported)	39,353.35
Amount expended July 1, 1950, through December 31, 1950	15,773.20
Balance unexpended	4,873.45

BURNET R. MAYBANK,
Chairman.

JANUARY 5, 1951.

REPORT OF COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

To the SECRETARY OF THE SENATE:

The above-mentioned committee, pursuant to Senate Resolution 123, Eightieth Congress, first session, submits the following report showing the name, profession, and total salary of each person employed by it and its subcommittees for the period from July 1, 1950, to December 31, 1950, together with the funds available to and expended by it and its subcommittees:

Name and profession	Rate of gross annual salary	Total salary received
J. G. Sourwine, professional staff member	$10,846.00	$5,422.98
Maurice W. Covert, professional staff member	10,846.00	5,256.72
J. Carlisle Ruddy, professional staff member	10,846.00	5,318.91
Robert B. Young, professional staff member	10,846.00	5,298.18
George S. Green, professional staff member	10,846.00	5,256.72
John H. Mathews, professional staff member	10,846.00	5,256.72
Joseph H. Davis, chief clerk	10,846.00	5,318.91
Wayne H. Smithey, assistant chief clerk	10,846.00	5,090.79
Mildred E. Canon, clerical assistant	5,892.43	2,946.18
Miriam O. Fox, clerical assistant	5,892.43	2,946.18
Mary Rogers, clerical assistant	5,892.43	2,946.18
H. Joan Sheaff, clerical assistant	5,892.43	2,924.46
Orrin E. Creesy, clerical assistant	5,892.43	2,642.04
Patience E. Dion, clerical assistant	5,892.43	2,924.46
Barbara E. Duborg, clerical assistant	5,892.43	2,924.46

Funds authorized or appropriated for committee expenditure during 81st Cong	$30,000.00
Amount expended during 81st Cong	24,748.73
Balance unexpended	5,251.27

PAT McCARRAN,
Chairman.

JANUARY 3, 1951.

REPORT OF COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY (MAKING INVESTIGATIONS UNDER S. RES. 228, AGREED TO FEBRUARY 27, 1950)

To the SECRETARY OF THE SENATE:

The above-mentioned committee, pursuant to Senate Resolution 123, Eightieth Congress, first session, submits the following report showing the name, profession, and total salary of each person employed by it and its subcommittees for the period from July 1, 1950, to December 31, 1950, together with the funds available to and expended by it and its subcommittees:

Name and profession	Rate of gross annual salary	Total salary received
Arens, Richard, staff director	$10,846.00	$5,422.98
Blair, Drury H., staff member	8,024.17	4,012.08
Dales, Patricia A., stenographer	5,023.41	641.87
Davis, Dorothy A., stenographer	5,023.41	2,511.66
Haaser, Stephen G., stenographer	4,415.10	1,839.60
Heckman, Elizabeth R., stenographer	5,023.41	2,511.66
Himes, George H., typist	2,048.97	700.03
Johnson, Ethel L., staff member	7,609.41	3,804.66
Krocak, Lucille, stenographer	3,024.66	1,319.06
McCloskey, Mary J., stenographer	5,023.41	1,911.65
Massey, Guy M., staff member	8,024.17	4,012.08
Mesmer, Fred M., staff member	8,024.17	4,012.08
Morrill, Mary E., stenographer	5,023.41	851.17
Pence, Marjorie W., stenographer	5,023.41	2,511.66
Robinson, Mary L., stenographer	5,023.41	2,511.66
Schroeder, Frank W., investigator	8,024.17	4,012.08
Webster, William H., stenographer	4,936.51	2,446.50

(This figure: Balance of funds under S. Res. 228 July 1, 1950.)

Funds authorized or appropriated for committee expenditure	$53,391.49
Amount expended	45,148.02
Balance unexpended	8,243.47

PAT MCCARRAN,
Chairman.

JANUARY 15, 1951.

REPORT OF COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE AND FORESTRY

To the SECRETARY OF THE SENATE:

The above-mentioned committee, pursuant to Senate Resolution 123, Eightieth Congress, first session, submits the following report showing the name, profession, and total salary of each person employed by it and its subcommittees for the period from July 1, 1950, to December 31, 1950, together with the funds available to and expended by it and its subcommittees:

Name and profession	Rate of gross annual salary	Total salary received
Joycette K. Jones, chief clerk	$7,775.31	$3,887.64
James M. Kendall, assistant chief clerk	6,674.55	3,337.26

Funds authorized or appropriated for committee expenditure	$10,000.00
Amount expended	6,718.02
Balance unexpended	3,281.98

ALLEN J. ELLENDER,
Chairman.

JANUARY 15, 1951.

REPORT OF COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE AND FORESTRY

SUBCOMMITTEE ON UTILIZATION OF FARM CROPS (PURSUANT TO S. RES. 36, 81ST CONG., AS AMENDED)

To the SECRETARY OF THE SENATE:

The above-mentioned committee, pursuant to Senate Resolution 123, Eightieth Congress, first session, submits the following report showing the name, profession, and total salary of each person employed by it and its subcommittees for the period from July 1, 1950, to December 31, 1950, together with the funds available to and expended by it and its subcommittees:

Name and profession	Rate of gross annual salary	Total salary received
Paul E. Hadlick, counsel	$10,846.00	$5,422.98
Albert J. Wolken, investigator	7,858.27	3,929.10
D. Porter Waring, marketing specialist [1]	7,609.41	3,043.73
Barbara Cunningham, assistant clerk [2]	3,372.27	1,067.87

[1] Service began Aug. 7, 1950.
[2] Service began Sept. 7, 1950.

Funds authorized or appropriated for committee expenditure	$50,000.00
Amount expended	29,327.59
Balance unexpended	20,672.41

ALLEN J. ELLENDER,
Chairman.

JANUARY 15, 1951.

REPORT OF COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE AND FORESTRY

SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE MEANS OF STIMULATING SURPLUS AGRICULTURAL COMMODITY EXPORTS (PURSUANT TO S. RES. 173, 81ST CONG.)

To the SECRETARY OF THE SENATE:

The above-mentioned committee, pursuant to Senate Resolution 123, Eightieth Congress, first session, submits the following report showing the name, profession, and total salary of each person employed by it and its subcommittees for the period from July 1, 1950, to December 31, 1950, together with the funds available to and expended by it and its subcommittees:

Name and profession	Rate of gross annual salary	Total salary received
Rollis S. Nelson, investigator	$7,858.27	$3,929.10

Funds authorized or appropriated for committee expenditure	$25,000.00
Amount expended	9,513.91
Balance unexpended	15,486.09

ALLEN J. ELLENDER,
Chairman.

JANUARY 2, 1951.

REPORT OF COMMITTEE ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE

To the SECRETARY OF THE SENATE:

The above-mentioned committee, pursuant to Senate Resolution 123, Eightieth Congress, first session, submits the following report showing the name, profession, and total salary of each person employed by it and its subcommittees for the period from July 1, 1950, to December 31, 1950, together with the funds available to and expended by it and its subcommittees:

Name and profession	Rate of gross annual salary	Total salary received
Earl B. Wixcey, clerk [1]	$10,846.00	$5,151.83
Paul Badger, clerk [2]	10,846.00	271.14
Philip R. Rodgers, assistant clerk	10,846.00	5,422.98
Vivien Harman, clerical assistant	5,718.63	2,859.30
Crawford C. Heerlein, clerical assistant	5,284.12	2,642.04
Helen King, clerical assistant	4,502.00	2,250.96
Paul Sample, clerical assistant	5,284.12	2,642.04
Marguerite Yost, clerical assistant	3,719.87	1,859.88
Elaine F. Hatch, professional staff member	7,775.31	3,887.64
Herman Lazarus, professional staff member	10,846.00	5,422.98
William G. Reidy, professional staff member	10,846.00	5,422.98
Thomas E. Shroyer, professional staff member	10,846.00	5,422.98
Melvin W. Sneed, professional staff member	10,846.00	5,422.98

[1] Resigned Dec. 21, 1950.
[2] Appointed Dec. 22, 1950.

Funds authorized or appropriated for committee expenditure: Jan. 1, 1949, to Dec. 31, 1950	$20,000.00
Amount expended:	
Jan. 1 to June 30, 1949	7,406.74
July 1 to Dec. 31, 1949	3,879.67
Jan. 1 to June 30, 1950	2,384.66
July 1 to Dec. 31, 1950	2,222.60
Total	15,893.67
Balance unexpended	4,106.33

ELBERT D. THOMAS,
Chairman.

JANUARY 3, 1951.

REPORT OF COMMITTEE ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON HEALTH

To the SECRETARY OF THE SENATE:

The above-mentioned committee, pursuant to Senate Resolution 123, Eightieth Congress, first session, submits the following report showing the name, profession, and total salary of each person employed by it and its subcommittees for the period from July 1, 1950, to December 31, 1950, together with the funds available to and expended by it and its subcommittees:

Name and profession	Rate of gross annual salary	Total salary received
Dean A. Clark, director, appointed June 29, 1950	[1] $25	$1,506.36
Morris Pike, assistant director, appointed July 18, 1950	[1] 25	1,205.10
Elling Aannested, assistant director, appointed Aug. 24, 1950	6,660	3,964.19
Edward Caygill, research assistant, appointed Sept. 25, 1950	3,780	1,577.85
Maurice Feuerlicht, research assistant, appointed Sept. 25, 1950	3,780	1,577.85
Ben H. Ervin, research assistant, appointed July 3, 1950	3,060	2,366.84
John M. Lexcen, clerk, appointed June 27, 1950	3,780	2,989.62
Mary Jane Del Balzo, secretary, appointed June 2, 1950	2,520	2,077.14
Harriet Gilfoyle, secretary, appointed Aug. 30, 1950	2,520	1,384.76

[1] Per day.

Funds authorized or appropriated for committee expenditure during 81st Cong	$37,800.00
Amount expended during 81st Cong	20,273.59
Balance unexpended	17,526.41

ELBERT D. THOMAS,
Chairman.

JANUARY 15, 1951.

REPORT OF COMMITTEE ON RULES AND ADMINISTRATION

To the SECRETARY OF THE SENATE:

The above-mentioned committee, pursuant to Senate Resolution 123, Eightieth Congress, first session, submits the following report showing the name, profession, and total salary of each person employed by it and its subcommittees for the period from July 1, 1950, to December 31, 1950, together with the funds available to and expended by it and its subcommittees:

Name and profession	Rate of gross annual salary	Total salary received
Darrell St. Claire, chief clerk	$10,846.00	$5,423.02
Russell C. King, assistant clerk and counsel	7,775.31	3,887.64
James L. Harrison, professional clerk	10,846.00	5,423.02
B. Floye Gavin, clerk (research)	5,457.92	2,729.04
Catherine L. Guyon, clerk (research)	5,457.92	2,729.04
Ruth P. Noon, clerk (secretary)	3,806.78	1,903.40

Funds authorized or appropriated for committee expenditure	$10,000.00
Amount expended (Jan. 1, 1949, to Dec. 31, 1950)	927.63
Balance unexpended (Dec. 31, 1950) to be returned to the contingent fund of the U. S. Senate	9,072.37

CARL HAYDEN,
Chairman.

JANUARY 8, 1951.

REPORT OF COMMITTEE ON THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

To the SECRETARY OF THE SENATE:

The above-mentioned committee, pursuant to Senate Resolution 123, Eightieth Congress, first session, submits the following report showing the name, profession, and total salary of each person employed by it and its subcommittees for the period from June 30, 1950, to December 31, 1950, together with the

funds available to and expended by it and its subcommittees:

Name and profession	Rate of gross annual salary	Total salary received
Robert H. Mollohan, chief clerk, from Aug. 11	$10,846.00	$4,217.87
Gerhard P. Van Arkel, professional staff member	10,846.00	5,422.98
J. George Stewart, professional staff member	10,846.00	5,422.98
William P. Gulledge, assistant chief clerk	7,022.16	3,511.08
Anna H. Monat, clerical assistant	5,197.21	2,598.60
Margaret Hampton, clerical assistant, to Oct. 16	5,197.21	1,530.28
Ruth Bryant, clerical assistant	4,849.61	2,424.78
Vivian Lynn, clerical assistant	4,415.10	2,207.52
Martin Fay, professional staff member, Aug. 30 to Oct. 3	7,858.27	742.15

Funds authorized or appropriated for committee expenditure during 81st Cong	$10,000.00
Amount expended	4,954.50
Balance unexpended	5,045.50

MATTHEW M. NEELY,
Chairman.

BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS INTRODUCED

Bills and joint resolutions were introduced, read the first time, and, by unanimous consent, the second time, and referred as follows:

By Mr. LODGE (by request):

S. 447. A bill to extend the time during which a course must be commenced in order to obtain certain veteran's education and training benefits; to the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare.

By Mr. SCHOEPPEL:

S. 448. A bill to confer jurisdiction on the Court of Claims to hear, determine, and render judgment upon a certain claim of the Board of County Commissioners of Sedgwick County, Kans.; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. BUTLER of Nebraska (for himself and Mr. THYE):

S. 449. A bill to amend the Tariff Act of 1930 to provide for the free importation of twine used for baling hay, straw, and other fodder and bedding material; to the Committee on Finance.

By Mr. YOUNG:

S. 450. A bill to encourage expanded production of needed agricultural commodities; to the Committee on Agriculture and Forestry.

S. 451. A bill for the relief of James McGillic and Blossom McGillic; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. YOUNG (for himself and Mr. GILLETTE):

S. 452. A bill to amend the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act by requiring the labeling of bread or rolls; to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

By Mr. YOUNG (for himself and Mr. LANGER):

S. 453. A bill to provide for the designation of the Heart-Butte Dam and Reservoir project in Morton County, N. Dak., as the Tschida Reservoir and Dam; to the Committee on Public Works.

By Mr. LANGER:

S. 454. A bill to amend the act of July 6, 1945, as amended, so as to reduce the number of grades for the various positions under such act, and for other purposes;

S. 455. A bill to amend the act of June 27, 1944, Public Law 359, and to preserve the equities of permanent classified civil-service employees of the United States; and

S. 456. A bill to amend the Civil Service Retirement Act of May 29, 1930, as amended, so as to exempt from taxation annuities of retired employees; to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service.

By Mr. WHERRY (for Mr. CAIN):

S. 457. A bill for the relief of Edwin and Bradford Ripley; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

S. 458. A bill providing for the issuance of a patent in fee to Marie James Wilson; to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

By Mr. McCARRAN:

S. 459. A bill to amend section 215 of title 18, United States Code, to prohibit officers or employees of the United States from accepting payments for appointment or retention of a person in office or employment under the United States; and

S. 460. A bill for the relief of Dr. Bryant David Virmani; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. WILEY:

S. 461. A bill for the relief of Maria Maykemper and Henry Maykemper; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. LONG:

S. 462. A bill for the relief of Rosita Anita Navarro and Ramona Alicia Navarro;

S. 463. A bill for the relief of Alice de Bony de Lavergne;

S. 464. A bill for the relief of Willard Cheek and Louise Cheek; and

S. 465. A bill for the relief of Oswald A. Drica-Minieris; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. RUSSELL (by request):

S. 466. A bill to authorize and direct the Administrator of General Services to transfer to the Department of the Army certain property in St. Louis, Mo.; to the Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments.

By Mr. THYE:

S. 467. A bill to authorize the exchange of wildlife refuge lands within the State of Minnesota; to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

S. 468. A bill for the relief of Kaljo Raid;

S. 469. A bill for the relief of Valdeko Kangro;

S. 470. A bill for the relief of Sister Bertha Pfeiffer and Sister Elzbieta Zabinska; and

S. 471. A bill for the relief of Ai Mei Yu and Ai Mei Chen; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. HOLLAND:

S. 472. A bill for the relief of Antonino Firetto; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. McMAHON:

S. 473. A bill for the relief of Joseph Bernstein; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. BREWSTER:

S. 474. A bill to provide for nautical education in the Territories, to facilitate nautical education in the States and Territories, and for other purposes;

S. 475. A bill to amend the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, as amended, with respect to local enforcement of safety regulations of civil aviation, and for other purposes;

S. 476. A bill to encourage the development of a safe United States flag international air-transportation system properly adapted to the present and future needs of foreign commerce of the United States, of the postal service, and of the national defense, and to meet certain of the obligations incumbent upon the United States by virtue of its membership in the International Civil Aviation Organization by providing for the transfer, establishment, operation, administration, and maintenance of airport and airway property located outside the continental United States, for the training of foreign nationals in aviation activities, and for other purposes;

S. 477. A bill to provide for the development of civil transport aircraft adaptable for auxiliary military service, and for other purposes;

S. 478. A bill to authorize the United States Maritime Commission to provide for the development of lighter-than-air rigid airships for commercial use;

S. 479. A bill to provide for coordination of aviation policy, and for other purposes;

S. 480. A bill to amend the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, as amended, to provide for the regulation of interstate contract carriers by air, and for other purposes;

S. 481. A bill to promote interstate and foreign commerce and strengthen the national defense by providing for transport aircraft adaptable for both commercial and military service, and for other purposes; and

S. 482. A bill to amend the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, as amended, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Interstate and foreign Commerce.

By Mr. YOUNG:

S. J. Res. 13. Joint resolution to change the name of the reservoir to be formed above Garrison Dam and known as Garrison Reservoir or Garrison Lake to Lake Thompson; to the Committee on Public Works.

(Mr. EASTLAND introduced Senate Joint Resolution 14, to provide for the withdrawal of the United States from the United Nations if Communist China is admitted to membership therein, which was ordered to lie on the table, and appears under a separate heading.)

(Mr. EASTLAND also introduced Senate Joint Resolution 15, to provide for use of the Armed Forces of the United States in defense of Formosa, which was ordered to lie on the table, and appears under a separate heading.)

By Mr. BREWSTER:

S. J. Res. 16. Joint resolution to establish a Joint Congressional Committee on Aviation Policy, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

WITHDRAWAL OF UNITED STATES FROM UNITED NATIONS — USE OF ARMED FORCES TO PROTECT THE ISLAND OF FORMOSA

Mr. EASTLAND. Mr. President, I introduce two joint resolutions and request that they lie on the table.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The joint resolutions will be received and lie on the table as requested.

The joint resolutions introduced by Mr. EASTLAND were read twice by their titles and ordered to lie on the table, as follows:

S. J. Res. 14. Joint resolution to provide for withdrawal of the United States from the United Nations if Communist China is admitted to membership therein; and

S. J. Res. 15. Joint resolution to provide for use of the Armed Forces of the United States in defense of Formosa.

Mr. EASTLAND. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to make a short statement at this time, explanatory of the two joint resolutions.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Is there objection? The Chair hears none, and the Senator from Mississippi may proceed.

Mr. EASTLAND. Mr. President, I have this day introduced two joint resolutions, the first of which provides that the United States shall withdraw from the United Nations if Communist China is admitted thereto, and the second provides that the armed services of the United States protect the island of Formosa from conquest or occupation by any Communist state or power.

I have introduced these joint resolutions because of the new policy of the State Department, which means surrender to Communist China.

Mr. President, at a later date I shall speak at length on these joint resolutions. I have introduced them, however, because I do not believe these great

questions, which mean life or death to the United States, should be decided by back-door deals by officials in the State Department in whom the American people have no confidence.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, if the Senator from Mississippi will yield, let me ask if he will be willing to have the joint resolutions read so that we may know what he is talking about?

Mr. EASTLAND. I have just obtained unanimous consent to explain them, and am doing so at this time.

Mr. President, I have reluctantly reached the conclusion that the State Department as now constituted cannot protect the welfare of the United States. The under-the-table deal at Lake Success on last Saturday was the last straw.

Formosa is necessary for the defense of the United States, and is today one of the great bulwarks of power against the spread of Communist aggression. It appears that our State Department is willing to surrender this island and sacrifice the last great anti-Communist army in the Orient.

Mr. President, what are we thinking of? What is behind these decisions? They must be properly aired and the American people must know and pass judgment on those who would promulgate such a program. If Formosa is surrendered, the very least that can be said is that the task of the United States in the defense of Japan and the Philippines will be weakened and our defense line in the Pacific breached. It would take thousands of American lives to regain what would be lost by this surrender. To admit Communist China into the United Nations and surrender Formosa to the aggressor, whose hands drip with the blood of thousands of American boys, is an insult to the dead and would be a betrayal of the United States.

Communist China today is a bigger aggressor than the Soviet Union because Communist China has resorted to armed warfare for the purpose of aggression. In addition, she wages war against the United Nations itself. To admit her to membership in an organization to preserve the peace would certainly destroy any chance of future effectiveness of this organization, and its continued existence would stand out as a mockery and a fraud upon the highest aspirations of mankind.

Mr. President, this country, in all probability, cannot survive further blunders; and the American Congress must act to protect the Nation. The few remarks that I desire to make at this time are based primarily on the power of Congress under the Constitution of the United States to direct our armed services to protect Formosa from attack. Some people will conscientiously say that the Congress has no such power, but that this power rests in the hands of the President of the United States because he is the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the country and is charged wtih the conduct of our foreign policy.

With this argument, I entirely disagree. The Congress of the United States under the Constitution has the sole power to direct the Armed Forces of the United States to make war upon any given country. This is all that a declaration of war means. Congress lays down the policy, while the President, as the Commander in Chief, determines how, when, and where the Armed Forces shall attack. This means that in the case of Formosa the Congress has the sole power to say when military measures shall be resorted to for the protection of any area; and the President, as the Commander in Chief, acting in furtherance of this policy, determines how, when, and where action is necessary to protect the area in question.

The sole power to declare war carries with it all incidental powers; and inasmuch as the Congress possesses the sole power to declare war, it necessarily follows that Congress has the power to direct the defense of any area.

There is no doubt that the Congress has the power, under the Constitution of the United States, to direct the armed services of the United States to attack any country. If we have the power to direct attack, we certainly have the power to direct the armed defense of any area.

COMMISSION ON DISLOYALTY AND SECURITY

Mr. LODGE. Mr. President, I am today resubmitting a resolution which I offered at the second session of the Eighty-first Congress establishing a commission to ascertain the facts with respect to disloyalty in the State Department and security of the Department against foreign penetration. The commission is to be bipartisan, highly trained, and wholly independent of the executive.

In the struggle for existence in which the United States is engaged, the State Department is in the front line of our defense. It is thus essential that confidence in the State Department be definitely restored once and for all.

Confidence cannot be achieved by investigation of the executive by the Executive.

Confidence cannot be achieved by Congress undertaking an investigation which it has neither the time nor the training nor the facilities to perform.

But confidence can be restored by an investigation which is independent of the Executive, which is created by and responsible to Congress and which is conducted by highly qualified persons.

Such an investigation will result in cleaning out the unfit and in ending any unjustified suspicion of the many fine men and women who work in the State Department.

This legislation was first recommended in the individual report which I filed as a member of the subcommittee of the Foreign Relations Committee on disloyalty charges in the second session of the Eighty-first Congress.

I ask unanimous consent to print in the RECORD at this point excerpts from this report which bear on this matter together with the full text of the resolution. I hope that it may be promptly considered and acted upon so that the commission can be speedily appointed and go to work.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The resolution will be received and appropriately referred, and, without objection, the excerpts and the text of the resolution will be printed in the body of the RECORD.

The resolution (S. Res. 27) submitted by Mr. LODGE was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations, as follows:

Resolved, That (a) with a view to ascertaining the facts with respect to disloyalty on the part of employees of the Department of State and security of the Department against foreign penetration and taking appropriate action with respect thereto, there is hereby established a bipartisan senatorial commission to be known as the Commission on Disloyalty and Security (in this resolution referred to as the "Commission") to be composed of eight members appointed as follows:

(1) Two members who are Senators, one from each of the two major political parties, to be appointed by the President of the Senate;

(2) Three members from private life to be appointed by the President of the Senate upon the recommendation of the majority leader of the Senate;

(3) Three members from private life to be appointed by the President of the Senate upon the recommendation of the minority leader of the Senate.

(b) The six members of the Commission who are not Members of the Senate shall be comprised of persons who as a result of training, experience, and attainments are exceptionally qualified to ascertain the facts with respect to the matters referred to in subsection (a) and to make recommendations with respect thereto.

(c) All appointees to the Commission shall be confirmed by the Senate.

(d) The persons recommended by the majority leader of the Senate shall be approved by a majority vote of the Senators of the majority conference, and the persons recommended by the minority leader of the Senate shall be approved by a majority vote of the Senators of the minority conference.

(e) Any vacancy in the Commission shall not affect its powers, but shall be filled in the same manner in which the original appointment was made.

(f) The Commission shall elect a Chairman and a Vice Chairman from among its members.

(g) Five members of the Commission shall constitute a quorum.

SEC. 2. (a) Members of the Senate who are members of the Commission shall serve without compensation in addition to that received for their services as Senators; but they shall be reimbursed for travel, subsistence, and other necessary expenses incurred by them in the performance of the duties vested in the Commission.

(b) The members from private life shall each receive $50 per diem when engaged in the performance of duties vested in the Commission, plus reimbursement for travel, subsistence, and other necessary expenses incurred by them in the performance of such duties.

SEC. 3. For the purposes of this resolution, the Commission, or any duly authorized subcommittee thereof, is authorized (1) to appoint and fix the compensation of such experts, consultants, and clerical and stenographic assistants as it deems necessary and advisable, but the compensation so fixed shall not exceed the compensation prescribed under the Classification Act of 1949, for comparable duties; and (2) to hold such hearings; to sit and act at such times and places; to require by subpena or otherwise the attendance of such witnesses and the production of such books, papers, and documents; to administer such oaths, to take such testimony; to have such printing and binding done; and to make such expenditures as it deems advisable. The cost of stenographic services in reporting hearings shall not be in excess of 25 cents per 100 words. Subpenas shall be issued under the signature

of the Chairman or any member of the Commission designated by him and shall be served by any person designated by the Chairman or any such member.

SEC. 4. (a) The Commission shall study and investigate fully charges of disloyalty on the part of persons who have been or are now employed by the Department of State. All proceedings of the Commission shall be conducted in secret.

(b) Upon concluding its study and investigation, the Commission shall make a public announcement of its findings no later than 6 months after the enactment of this resolution, and shall make a report thereon to the Senate with such recommendations as it deems advisable. Such report may be made to the Secretary of the Senate if the Senate is not in session. Upon the submission of such report the Commission shall cease to exist.

SEC. 5. The expenses of the Commission under this resolution, which shall not exceed $——, shall be paid from the contingent fund of the Senate upon vouchers signed by the Chairman.

The excerpts presented by Mr. LODGE are as follows:

BIPARTISAN, TRAINED, INDEPENDENT COMMISSION

An important element of strength in our system of government is that our checks and balances give us as a people the opportunity to criticize ourselves. In a dictatorship, the dictator is free to do whatever he wants—and this includes freedom to make irretrievable mistakes. It has been said that if Hitler had had an independent body like Congress to criticize and challenge his decisions that some of his worst blunders would have been avoided and that he might have won the war. It is certainly true that in this country the existence of a Congress, independent of the Executive and able to make a check at the top level of policy decision without regard to the administrative chain of command, is as complete a theoretical—and in most instances practical—protection against error as the people could have.

When this general truth is applied to the specific subject of this investigation—the existence of disloyalty in the State Department—it becomes immediately obvious that the unique asset which a congressional committee has—that of being independent of the Executive—is, under our present way to doing things, accompanied by the following very serious draw-backs:

1. There is primarily the matter of time. To accomplish fully an investigation of this kind the members of a congressional committee clearly lack enough time because of the fact that they have a great many other pressing public duties.

2. They also are not men who have the technical expertness which is required to make a study of this sort.

3. The tools which a congressional committee has—which are essentially the tools of publicity and development of facts for the use of public opinion—are precisely the implements which cannot be used effectively when it comes to tracking down disloyal persons in the Government departments. This requires long, patient detective work which is obviously something which no congressional committee is in a position to do.

4. Finally, the setting up of a congressional committee on a majority-minority basis inescapably introduces political considerations into a subject where they very definitely have no place whatever.

The result of all these draw-backs became plain during the course of the 1950 investigation, which had a number of unfortunate results, including the besmirching of the reputations of innocent persons, the hampering of the work of the Government investigative agencies, the impairment of the position of the United States before the world, and an unjust reflection on all of the happily numerous excellent men and women who work in the State Department, with the resulting discouragement to other excellent men and women from going to work for the State Department. This was a loss to the country as a whole.

It must, therefore, be obvious that it would be highly desirable if an investigation could take place which would be a completely independent audit of the Executive and yet was not encumbered by these very serious drawbacks.

The other protection which the American people have against foreign penetration of their foreign policy is in the executive branch, where the security personnel of the State Department, the loyalty boards of the State Department, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation work together to protect the public interests. Unlike Members of Congress, these persons have the time to do the work, they have the technical expertness which is required, and they possess all of the tools which are needed to do the job. They have detectives and listening devices and all the rest of the paraphernalia. The shortcoming is that they are under the Executive, and it is a basic American instinct that it is not human nature to expect an impartial audit of the Executive by the Executive any more than it would be human nature to expect an impartial audit of the Congress by the Congress.

This must bring one to the obvious conclusion that the desirable goal would be an official group of persons who had the time and the technical expertness and the tools to do the job—who were as proficient in their way as the FBI is in its way—and who were, at the same time, as independent of the Executive as is the Congress.

I believe that the concern over this question of disloyalty has risen to such a point that a quicker result and a greater amount of public confidence would be achieved by a simple Senate resolution which would set up a bipartisan commission of 8 persons, 2 of whom would be Senators, 3 of whom would be appointed by the Vice President upon the recommendation of the majority leader, and 3 of whom would be appointed by the Vice President upon the recommendation of the minority leader. The minority leader's selections would have to be approved by a majority vote of the conference of minority Senators, and the majority leader's selections would have to be approved by a majority vote of the Senators of the majority conference. All members would require confirmation by the entire Senate.

The six nonsenatorial persons would be chosen because of their qualifications to pass on a subject of this kind. They are instructed under the terms of this bill to conduct all their proceedings in secret, making a public announcement of their findings at the end, at a date which will be well after the forthcoming election. They would have the power of subpena and completely adequate funds.

This resolution is confined to the Senate because it is here that the original investigation began and ran its course, because the Senate has a unique interest in foreign relations, and because to confine it to the Senate will save a great deal of time. This bill adopts some of the following time-tested features of the bill which set up the Hoover Commission, to wit: The nomination of two Senators to the Commission to provide liaison with Congress and the composition of the Commission with equal representation from both parties.

A Senate resolution can obviously be passed more rapidly than legislation which requires the concurrence of the House and of the Executive. The congressional character of this bill and the fact that it is entirely bipartisan should insure that whatever results were announced would command the maximum amount of public confidence from precisely those elements of public opinion which now lack confidence the most. One of the purposes of such a study must obviously be to provide a clean way to end this business. It will never end at all, cleanly or otherwise, if the practice of having the majority party investigate the majority continues to hold sway. Nor would satisfactory results be obtained if the minority investigated the majority. The investigation must be nonpolitical.

Past history indicates that Congress, when it acts through investigating committees, aften acts incompetently and frequently fails in its important task of compelling disclosures. Congress delayed a long time before it finally decided to employ competent people to do its legislative drafting. There was another long delay before Congress decided to set up its own corps of experts on internal revenue taxation and the other expert staffs without which Congress could not function at all today. This process of evolution should continue. We have delayed far too long in the business of setting up congressional investigations on a modern and practical basis. Where foreign governments, proceeding in secret with trained men have achieved prompt results in rooting out espionage, we, with our circus-like proceedings, have bagged only a corporal's guard. Clearly our system is faulty. The setting up of an efficient and independent investigative procedure is long overdue.

EX OFFICIO MEMBERSHIP ON COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS OF MEMBERS OF JOINT COMMITTEE ON ATOMIC ENERGY

Mr. BRICKER submitted the following resolution (S. Res. 28), which was referred to the Committee on Rules and Administration:

Resolved, That the table contained in subparagraph 6 (a) of rule XVI of the Standing Rules of the Senate is amended by adding at the end thereof the following:

"Senate Members of Joint Committee on Atomic Energy	"Development and Utilization of Atomic Energy"

ADDITIONAL TRANS-ATLANTIC PASSENGER SERVICE AT LOWER COST

Mr. BREWSTER submitted the following resolution (S. Res. 29), which was referred to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce:

Whereas travel by United States residents contributes to the creation of vitally needed dollar exchange in European countries; and

Whereas lack of adequate trans-Atlantic passenger service during the summer season at rates within the reach of the middle-income market is limiting the extent of such travel: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, That the Civil Aeronautics Board and the United States Maritime Commission are requested (1) to explore every available means of providing additional trans-Atlantic passenger service at lower cost, including maximum utilization of existing service under special low-fare arrangements, charters, and group contracts, and (2) if they find their existing authority inadequate to facilitate and encourage such low-cost transportation, to recommend to the Senate such legislation as may be necessary to enable them to accomplish such objective.

RELIEF FOR FISHING INDUSTRY OF THE UNITED STATES

Mr. BREWSTER submitted the following resolution (S. Res. 30), which was referred to the Committee on Finance:

Whereas the fishing industry is an important part of the economy of the United States; and

Whereas the growing population of the Nation emphasizes the increasing future importance of fish as a food; and

Whereas the men and equipment of the fishing fleets and the shore workers engaged in the preparation of the catches, and the food resource thereby made available, have been demonstrated in two world wars to be necessary to the national defense; and

Whereas operations of much of the fishing industry have been seriously curtailed by reason of steadily growing imports of fish and fishery products, particularly of fresh and frozen groundfish fillets, and there is reason to believe that similar conditions are imminent in the tuna industry on the Pacific coast; and

Whereas if the present trend is permitted to continue, the fishing industry will, within a short time, be so impaired as to force out of business a major portion of the fishing fleet of the United States and force out of employment a major portion of the workmen employed in various phases of the industry; and

Whereas the domestic fishing industry has already been adversely affected and is further seriously threatened by the consistently increasing importations of fish and fishery products into the United States; and

Whereas the imported fish are caught by workmen whose wage scale and standard of living are far below those of Americans in like occupations; and

Whereas, notwithstanding the resulting lower cost of fish in their primary foreign market, the finally processed product is sold to the American housewife at the same price as the domestic fish; and

Whereas representatives of the fishing industry and others from many parts of the United States recently appeared before the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries of the House of Representatives and attested to the facts hereinbefore stated; and

Whereas the foregoing indicates the need for an immediate study and investigation of the cause and effect of a situation that will, if not corrected, result in the serious impairment of the oldest and one of the most important food-producing industries in the United States: Therefore be it

Resolved, That the Secretary of the Interior be, and he hereby is, requested to cause an immediate study to be made of—

(1) the differences in the costs of domestic production of fresh and frozen fish, especially groundfish fillets, and the costs of foreign production of similar fish; and

(2) the effect on the domestic fishing industry of increasing imports of fresh and frozen fish, especially groundfish fillets, into the United States,

and, with the advice of, and in coordination with, the Department of State, the Department of Agriculture, the United States Tariff Commission, the Bureau of Customs of the Department of the Treasury, and other appropriate executive departments and independent agencies of the Government to recommend means by which the United States fishing industry may survive and be saved harmless against the inroads of foreign-caught and foreign-processed fish; and that, because of the urgency of the situation, he be and hereby is requested to make his report and recommendation to the Senate within 30 days after the adoption of this resolution.

EXTENSION OF AUTHORITY FOR INVESTIGATION OF RELATIONSHIP OF UNITED STATES WITH INDIANS

Mr. O'MAHONEY, from the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, reported an original resolution (S. Res. 32), which, under the rule, was referred to the Committee on Rules and Administration, as follows:

Resolved, That the authority of the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, or any duly authorized subcommittee thereof, under Senate Resolution 292, Eighty-first Congress, agreed to July 13, 1950 (to investigate the relations of the United States with the Indians and Indian tribes), is hereby continued through June 30, 1951.

CONTINUATION OF AUTHORITY FOR INVESTIGATION OF FUEL RESERVES AND FORMULATION OF FUEL POLICY

Mr. O'MAHONEY, from the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, reported an original resolution (S. Res. 33), which, under the rule, was referred to the Committee on Rules and Administration, as follows:

Resolved, That the authority of the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, or any duly authorized subcommittee thereof, under Senate Resolution 239, Eighty-first Congress, agreed to August 15, 1950, and as further extended by Senate Resolution 374, agreed to December 21, 1950 (providing for a study and investigation of the fuel reserves and to formulate a fuel policy of the United States), is hereby continued through June 30, 1951.

EXECUTIVE MESSAGES REFERRED

As in executive session,

The VICE PRESIDENT laid before the Senate messages from the President of the United States submitting sundry nominations, which were referred to the appropriate committees.

(For nominations this day received, see the end of Senate proceedings.)

PREPAREDNESS AGAINST COMMUNISM

[Mr. LODGE asked and obtained leave to have printed in the RECORD a summation of statements by him dealing with measures pertaining to preparedness against communism, compiled by his administrative assistant, which appear in the Appendix.]

VITAL SERVICE OF GRASS-ROOTS PRESS—LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT TO GEORGE H. BECHTEL

[Mr. HOLLAND asked and obtained leave to have printed in the RECORD a letter on the subject of the vital service of the grass-roots press, written by President Truman to George H. Bechtel, editor of the Publishers' Auxiliary, and an article regarding the same, written by Walter A. Shead, Washington correspondent, published in the Publishers' Auxiliary, of December 30, 1950, which appear in the Appendix.]

INAUGURAL ADDRESS BY GOV. EDWARD F. ARN, OF KANSAS

[Mr. SCHOEPPEL asked and obtained leave to have printed in the RECORD the inaugural address delivered by the new Governor of Kansas, Edward F. Arn, on January 8, 1951, which appears in the Appendix.]

ADDRESS BY GOVERNOR JORDAN TO THE THIRTY-FIRST SESSION OF THE LEGISLATURE OF IDAHO

[Mr. WELKER asked and obtained leave to have printed in the RECORD the inaugural address delivered by Gov. Len B. Jordan to the Legislature of Idaho, at the convening of the thirty-first session of the legislature on January 9, 1951, which appears in the Appendix.]

AMERICAN TRADE UNION COUNCIL FOR HISTADRUT—ADDRESS BY WILLIAM GREEN

[Mr. IVES asked and obtained leave to have printed in the RECORD an address delivered by William Green, president of the American Federation of Labor, at a testimonial dinner in his honor given by the American Trade Union Council for Histadrut, on January 11, 1951, at the Hotel Waldorf-Astoria, New York City, which appears in the Appendix.]

FEDERAL MANPOWER AUTHORITY — STATEMENT BY THE REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

[Mr. IVES asked and obtained leave to have printed in the RECORD a statement issued on December 15, 1950, by the board of regents of the University of the State of New York, recommending the establishment of a Federal Manpower Authority, which appears in the Appendix.]

THE AMERICAN LEGION HAS A JOB TO DO—ADDRESS BY O. D. FREEMAN

[Mr. JOHNSTON of South Carolina asked and obtained leave to have printed in the RECORD an address entitled "The American Legion Has a Job To Do," delivered by O. D. Freeman, State commander of the American Legion of South Carolina, at Loris, S. C., January 8, 1951, which appears in the Appendix.]

THE PHILOSOPHY OF WILSON AND THE WORLD OF TODAY—ADDRESS BY SHANE MACCARTHY

[Mr. KEFAUVER asked and obtained leave to have printed in the RECORD an address delivered by Shane MacCarthy, at the Wilson Day dinner celebration before the Knox County Democratic Women's Club, at Knoxville, Tenn., December 28, 1950, which appears in the Appendix.]

CHAPMAN UNJUSTLY ATTACKED—ARTICLE FROM THE TENNESSEE VALLEY PUBLIC POWER ASSOCIATION NEWS

[Mr. KEFAUVER asked and obtained leave to have printed in the RECORD an article entitled "Chapman Unjustly Attacked," published in the December 1950 issue of the Tennessee Valley Public Power Association News, which appears in the Appendix.]

WORK OF THE TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY—SUMMARY FROM THE CHATTANOOGA TIMES

[Mr. KEFAUVER asked and obtained leave to have printed in the RECORD an article entitled "Report on TVA," published in the Chattanooga (Tenn.) Times of December 31, 1950, which appears in the Appendix.]

GROWING NEW ENGLAND INDUSTRIAL ECONOMY—ARTICLE BY DUDLEY HARMON

[Mr. SALTONSTALL asked and obtained leave to have printed in the RECORD an article entitled "Growing New England Industrial Economy," written by Dudley Harmon, executive vice president, the New England Council, and published in the Washington Post of January 6, 1951, which appears in the Appendix.]

SLEIGH RIDING—ARTICLE BY JOHN GOULD

[Mr. KERR asked and obtained leave to have printed in the RECORD an article entitled, "Oh What Fun It Wasn't," written by John Gould and published in the Christian Science Monitor of January 4, 1951, which appears in the Appendix.]

ACHESON'S FATAL POLICY—EDITORIAL FROM THE PORTLAND (MAINE) EVENING EXPRESS

[Mr. BREWSTER asked and obtained leave to have printed in the RECORD an editorial entitled, "Acheson's Fatal Policy," published in the Portland (Maine) Evening Express of January 12, 1951, which appears in the Appendix.]

THE PLACE OF AGRICULTURE IN AMERICAN ECONOMY—ADDRESS BY SENATOR ELLENDER

[Mr. ELLENDER asked and obtained leave to have printed in the RECORD an address by him in New Orleans, La., January 11, 1951, before the Members' Council of the New Orleans Association of Commerce and the Southern Farm Forum, which appears in the Appendix.]

VISITORS TO THE SENATE FROM MORAL REARMAMENT ASSEMBLY

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to say a brief word of welcome to some distinguished visitors who are with us today.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Without objection, the Senator may proceed.

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. President, I invite the attention of the Senate to a group of distinguished visitors who are seated in the gallery today. They come from the Moral Re-Armament Assembly, which has been in session at the Shoreham Hotel here in Washington and has included 1,500 delegates from 25 countries. Among them are military, political, industrial and labor leaders from the danger areas of Europe and Asia. They bring evidence of an ideological force for democracy that is seeking to bring an answer to communism in those areas. Among them also are men who, up to a few months ago, were leaders of the Communist Party in western Germany and who are now fighting on the democratic side.

Mr. President, along with our military and economic strategy America more than ever needs to develop ideological strength if we are to win what is primarily a struggle for the minds of men and women. It is not enough for us to expose the weaknesses and evils of those who threaten our way of life and even our existence. We as a people must live and proclaim the inspired experience of our democracy based on moral standards in which alone can freedom survive and flourish. Freedom under God is the big issue in the world today.

Mr. President, these men and women of all races and all creeds, and of widely varying views on life, come together in one common purpose. They are making a distinct contribution to the cause to which I refer. They merit our attention and support.

Mr. HILL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to proceed for 1 minute along the line of the remarks which the Senator from New Jersey has just made.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Without objection, the Senator may proceed.

Mr. HILL. I am gratified that my good friend, the distinguished Senator from New Jersey, has spoken as he has. I wish to associate myself with his remarks. I have long felt that the world needed the consuming fire of a great spiritual revival to dispel the evils of materialism and selfishness.

In the Moral Re-Armament movement we have an idea. Ideas are more powerful than bullets or bombs. The Moral Re-Armament movement proclaims an idea for the marshaling and building of the spiritual forces of the world to bring understanding to men and peace to the world. The world today, confused and confounded, is groping for light. The Moral Re-Armament movement holds aloft a great light for the world's guidance. It would lift the world to Him who taught us to pray, and who came to save the world. In His name and with His power, in the faith of our fathers, we can remove mountains, subdue kingdoms, and bring peace to this troubled world.

I rejoice with the distinguished Senator from New Jersey that we have with us, as the guests of the Senate today, so many of the leaders and representatives of the Moral Re-Armament movement.

Mr. MARTIN. Mr. President, I should like to be associated with the distinguished Senator from New Jersey [Mr. SMITH] and the distinguished Senator from Alabama [Mr. HILL] concerning our visitors in the galleries today. Later in the week, on the anniversary of the birthday of Benjamin Franklin, I shall discuss his life as it relates to peace and the securing of peace in the world. I believe spiritual rearmament or moral rearmament in the world will bring peace rather than material armament alone.

Mr. WILEY. Mr. President, we hear so much nowadays with relation to what is wrong with the world. I want to say a few words on the subject of what is right with the world.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Is there objection to the Senator from Wisconsin addressing the Senate at this time? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered.

Mr. WILEY. One of the fine things that is right about the world is the MRA movement. It has been my privilege to attend a number of meetings of that movement in the city of Washington. As those of us who have attended those meetings know, there came from all over the world representatives of labor, representatives of management, representatives of various creeds and religions. They met here in a great convention. One of the things that is right with the world is that they not only talked but they brought men and women here who previously had been literally at each others' throats, in warfare between labor and management, between communism and the Western idea; and these men, as well as women, rose in the meeting here in Washington and in plain unvarnished language told how the moral law, the law of life, the law of compassion, the law of mutual understanding, worked. It eradicated hate, brought about understanding and the desire to work together for the common good.

Now here is an organization that not only talks but breathes into the people who come in contact with it a new spirit. If there is anything the world needs it is the spirit of being willing to sit down and talk one's problems over, understand the other fellow's viewpoint, and learn not to hate him because he differs with you.

Mr. President, I heard some very dramatic utterances at the meetings. I heard former Communists from the Ruhr rise and tell how they hated the people who managed their concerns, 30,000 men were employed in some of them. However, they not only were able to sit down together and discuss their problems with management, but they got to understand each other's viewpoints. The result was that communism went out the window in the minds and souls of the Communists, and they accepted this higher ideology. Strikes were averted, production increased, harmony and understanding resulted.

That is one of the big things that is right with the world, Mr. President, and I am happy to join with my colleagues who have spoken to welcome this group to the Senate. Its members come from afar, from the Far East, and from almost all the lands of Europe—Germany, France, Italy, Switzerland, the Netherlands, England, Scotland, Ireland, Scandinavia. Mind you, some of them are senators in their own countries, and they are here as our guests. So, Mr. President, with your consent, let me ask that they rise; and in view of the tremendous work they are doing to stabilize the thinking and the living of the people of the world, I wish to ask my associates to "give them a hand."

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator from Wisconsin asks unanimous consent that the guests to whom he refers may rise in the gallery, in order that they may be identified. Is there objection? The Chair hears none.

[The guests referred to rose from their seats in the gallery, Senators applauding.]

THE RECONSTRUCTION FINANCE CORPORATION

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may proceed for 30 seconds to make a comment regarding a passage of the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD which stands in need of correction. I refer to the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD for last Friday, January 12, on page 195, at which appear remarks by Representative SUTTON, in the House of Representatives.

In his speech, reference is made to the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. One passage of his speech leaves the impression that the report of the RFC subcommittee will bear out Representative SUTTON's charge that several thousand dollars have been accepted by the officials of RFC in bribes to procure loans.

The report of the subcommittee on the RFC has not yet been prepared, and at the present time no one knows what it will say. However, no charges of bribery will be made in the report because no instances of bribery have been found in the subcommittee's study.

The subcommittee on the RFC will issue its report as soon as it can reasonably do so; and I do not wish to anticipate what it will say, any more than I would endorse the anticipations that others might express.

Not knowing what information may be in Representative SUTTON's possession, I wish not to be placed in the position of supplying an interpretation of his comments. The confidential material supplied to the subcommittee, including executive hearings, has not been made available to Representative SUTTON or anyone else.

NEWS RELATING TO SUPPOSED EXPLOSION OF AN ATOMIC BOMB BY THE RUSSIANS IN SEPTEMBER 1949

Mr. BUTLER of Nebraska. Mr. President, in a recent issue of the Washington Post a syndicated columnist reported that our scientists are apparently convinced that the Russians exploded an atomic bomb in September 1949. The article further states the present production rate of the Russian's atomic weapons, and forecast a stockpile of more than 100 mobs in the Russians' hands within 2 years.

To my knowledge we in the United States have guarded very secretly our atomic development. We have not made public any details on our rate of production or upon our technical developments.

I have written a letter to the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission asking him if he can tell me whether the information which appeared in the recent column is an accurate report. I have also asked for his comments as to whether making a public statement on Russian production may, in his opinion, jeopardize intelligence sources which may be able to develop accurate information about Russian activities.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the letter I wrote to Mr. Dean may be printed at this point in the body of the RECORD.

There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

JANUARY 13, 1951.

Hon. GORDON DEAN,
Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission,
Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. DEAN: In a recent article printed in the Washington Post, December 31, 1950, statements were made to the effect that our scientists have concluded, by appropriate research, that the Russians exploded an atomic bomb in central Siberia in September 1949. The article went on to state, and I quote:

"Subsequently secret intelligence confirmed the findings made in September 1949. The highest intelligence sources now agree, moreover, that current Soviet bomb output is at the rate of about two a month, and at the end of the coming year will rise to five or more a month. Thus, as of now, the officially estimated Soviet stockpile is about 24 bombs; it will be nearly 50 bombs in another 12 months; and in 2 years, it will be well over 100 bombs. The military significance of this timetable does not need to be underlined."

There has been much discussion about the status of Russian atomic enterprise. We must certainly appreciate that Russia is making every effort to develop atomic weapons, yet I have not heretofore seen any public declaration as to specific development.

I would like to ascertain whether, according to your records, the information stated in this newspaper article is valid. If it is valid, I believe our secret intelligence sources may be jeopardized by making this information public.

Your comments on this matter will be much appreciated.

Sincerely yours,

HUGH BUTLER,
United States Senator, Nebraska.

DISTRIBUTION OF SURPLUS MATERIAL FROM THE WHITE HOUSE

Mr. MARTIN. Mr. President, many of my colleagues have spoken to me concerning the plan of distribution of the surplus material from the renovation of the White House.

In order to save the time of the Senate, I should like to call attention to a statement made on the floor of the House last Friday by a distinguished Member of the House, the Honorable LOUIS C. RABAUT, of Michigan, which is found on page 191 of the RECORD of January 12.

In a few days we will have on exhibit pieces of this material for the aid of Senators.

SOME OF THE IMPLICATIONS OF AMERICAN SUPPORT OF THE LATEST CEASE-FIRE PROPOSAL AT LAKE SUCCESS

Mr. KNOWLAND. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the body of the RECORD a letter I addressed to the Honorable Dean Rusk, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, on last Friday, January 12, relative to some of the implications of the vote cast by the United States delegate at the UN on the most recent cease-fire proposal.

There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

JANUARY 12, 1951.

Hon. DEAN RUSK,
Department of State,
Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: A considerable number of us in the Senate have been quite concerned over the implications of the American support of the latest cease-fire proposal at Lake Success. As I understand the situation from reading the press dispatches, this latest proposal does not require the Chinese Communists to either get out of all of Korea or even to get back north of the thirty-eighth parallel before they participate in the conference. In addition, as I understand it, the nations which definitely will participate in the conference on the settlement of far eastern questions are the Soviet Union, Communist China, Great Britain, and the United States. This looks like a "packed jury." Great Britain has not only recognized Communist China but has consistently thrown obstacles in the way of having the United Nations declare Communist China the aggressor that she is.

They voted in June to declare the movement of North Koreans across the thirty-eighth parallel as aggression and joined in the appeal to the nations of the world to help resist this overt action. Now 2½ months after the Chinese Communists cross the frontier at the Yalu River, Great Britain and some of her other Commonwealth associates have resisted designating Communist China as an aggressor.

This seems to me to be a policy of condemning aggression if committed by a small nation and condoning it if committed by a large nation that has had a measure of success. Very simply this is a doctrine of "might makes right."

In the New York Times of today there is an article by Walter Sullivan, one paragraph of which states: "One of the key points discussed by delegations afterward was the possible outcome of talks between the great powers, including Communist China, on Formosa. Sir Benegal indicated that, in India's view, if today's proposal was carried out faithfully Formosa would be turned over to China."

Since Formosa is now a part of the Republic of China and the Government under President Chiang Kai-shek now has its temporary capital on the island, it is obvious that the representative of the Government of India had reference to the turning of Formosa over to the China which his Government recognizes as the legal Government of China, that is, the Communist regime.

Who does the representative of India expect to be the one to do the job of disarming 500,000 troops of the Republic of China? Certainly the other members of the United Nations which to date have placed fewer troops in Korea to resist Communist aggression on that Republic than the United States has to date suffered casualties are not "the mice that can bell the cat."

It is my strong belief that the more than 9,000,000 people of Free China now on the island of Formosa will bitterly resist being trussed up and delivered into the hands of a Communist tyranny. It is also my strong belief that the more than 500,000 men constituting the army, navy, and air force of Formosa will bitterly resist any attempt to take them into Communist slavery. They know, as we all must know, that the delivery of this island into the hands of the Communists will result in one of the greatest blood baths in history.

For that reason I believe that, with or without help from the free world, the armed forces and the people of Free China on Formosa will resist from the air, from the sea, on the beaches and in the mountains any effort to deliver them over to the Communists.

Nor will the free people of China agree to place their liberty in the hands of the United Nations as a defense force while they disarm themselves. They have seen that, with the exception of the United States of America, all of the rest of the members of the United Nations combined have not sent to Korea for the purpose of resisting Communist aggression against that Republic, as many troops as the Republic of China offered to send—33,000—within a few days of the plea for help. They cannot be expected, nor can any other free nation of the world, put its confidence now in either the military capacity or the moral leadership of the United Nations to resist Communist aggression. It would be helpful if the State Department could give a little clearer explanation as to why our representative, Mr. Austin, voted in favor of this latest proposal.

Sincerely yours,

WILLIAM F. KNOWLAND.

A VOTE FOR BLACKMAIL—EDITORIAL FROM THE WASHINGTON DAILY NEWS

Mr. KNOWLAND. Mr. President, also I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the body of the RECORD an editorial entitled "A Vote for Blackmail," published in the Washington Daily News of today.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

A VOTE FOR BLACKMAIL

The United Nations now stands ready to reward aggression by offering to give Formosa and China's seat in the UN to the Chinese Reds in return for a cease-fire order in Korea.

The old League of Nations had some sordid chapters in its brief history because of its cowardly retreats from aggression in Manchuria and Ethiopia. But it merely looked the other way without condoning aggression by paying it tribute.

The latest UN act is one of infamy.

The UN cannot long survive this base betrayal of the very purpose for which it was created. The memory of every soldier who has died in Korea fighting under its flag will rise to haunt it. The day Red China is seated in the Security Council this country should walk out. That much is due our honored dead.

No nation can have any faith in the idea of collective security as it is adminstered by

the UN, because if it will sell out one government, it will sell out others. Indeed, if the Reds accept the bribe which has been offered them, what more can the organization be considered than a catspaw for aggression?

CHINA'S BETRAYAL

Protesting against the betrayal of Nationalist China, which is a member of the organization, its delegate, Dr. T. F. Tsiang, said that Formosa was being treated as though it were a No Man's Land.

Actually, he said, Formosa is the home of "Free China," defended by an army of a half million men, the largest single unit of power against Communist imperialist aggression in the Far East. The proposed peace talks with the Reds, he added, pose only one question: "How do you want Formosa, rare, medium, or well done?"

That is not funny.

The lives of 7,500,000 people, including permanent residents of the island and the refugees from the mainland, will be in jeopardy if Formosa is handed over to the mercies of the Peiping Reds. Many of these people on Formosa have been branded as war criminals for no other reason than that they have opposed communism.

Thus we treat our friends—the first government to offer its assistance when we took up arms in South Korea. And we are doing this at the urging of India, which proclaimed its neutrality in that crucial hour.

VOICE OF FREE ASIA

How will the free nations of Asia react to this perfidious act by the great powers? That question was answered on the floor of the United Nations by Gen. Carlos P. Romulo, of the Philippines.

"How far can the United Nations keep retreating from established, sound moral positions without courting final disaster?" he asked.

"A retreat in the course of battle is understandable and sometimes inevitable, but a retreat from right principles while a battle is being waged for those principles cannot be justified on any ground whatever.

"My country knows the nameless terror and agony of war as few countries around this table do. Therefore we understand the anxious desire of many delegates to exhaust every possibility of avoiding a general war. But we also know there is at least one thing that is worse than war itself, and that is the degrading enslavement that would surely follow an abject surrender before the threats of a fanatic and implacable aggressor."

The United Nations was saying to Peiping, he charged, "You may stop hitting and killing my boys so that we can discuss how to reward you with the gift of Formosa and a seat in the United Nations."

General Romulo warned the United Nations it would lose its reason for being if it resorted to appeasement in this situation.

"We have heard moving appeals to the free nations of the world to close ranks," he said. "But such appeals cannot be met by an admission of weakness and abject surrender. The march of Communist aggression cannot be arrested by a policy of moral retreat and surrender."

Indeed, doesn't the betrayal of Nationalist China and Korea put every free nation on notice that its best hope lies in making peace with Moscow on the best terms it can?

OUR SORRY ROLE

Where did the United States stand when the roll was called on this unhappy occasion?

Ours was a craven "Me, too" vote.

Warren R. Austin, the American delegate, supported the proposal to buy off the Reds, explaining that he did so in the interest of "unity." Afterward, it was explained that Mr. Austin did not expect the Reds to accept the proposition, and then he would be free to revive his resolution condemning them as aggressors. Would he add as a second count of his indictment their refusal to accept a bribe?

We assume Mr. Austin was carrying out orders of Secretary of State Dean Acheson.

Nothing less than immediate resignation of both men could in any way relieve this country of even a small part of the embarrassment caused by the indefensible position our Government has taken.

The administration first lost the initiative in the UN by failing to press for forthright action against Red China, then joined Britain and the other appeasement advocates in offering to pay blackmail.

That act is a virtual admission that the whole Korean undertaking was a miscalculation, and that Red China was right and the United States was wrong. The appeasement offer to which our UN spokesman consented cannot be appraised on any other basis.

We don't believe Congress or the American people will buy any part of it. They cannot forget the case of—

PRIVATE (FIRST CLASS) BROWN

Who hasn't been seen since September 4.

That day Pfc Melvin Brown, of Mahaffey, Pa., stood atop a 50-foot wall at Kasan, Korea, and beat back the enemy single-handed, while his platoon regrouped to repel the attackers.

Private (first class) Brown fired his rifle until he ran out of ammunition.

Private (first class) Brown hurled grenades until he ran out of grenades.

They still kept coming up that wall.

Private (first class) Brown wasn't a man to let a little thing like no ammunition thwart him. He took his entrenching shovel and bashed those Reds over the head as they came up, delivering skull crushers with his shovel to a dozen of them.

Last week at the White House President Truman presented a Congressional Medal of Honor to the father of Private (first class) Brown.

"Outstanding personal bravery * * *" the citation reads.

And a good solid American brand of personal bravery that Private (first class) Brown delivered atop that lonesome wall in Korea. * * *

Private (first class) Brown was in a position where he had to call a spade a weapon.

Countless hordes of Chinese Reds have swept down on the Private (first class) Browns in Korea.

Our leaders and allies are not in the position they put Private (first class) Brown in, but they should be statesmen enough to call a spade a spade.

JOINT CHIEFS NOT CONSULTED—ARTICLE BY DAVID LAWRENCE

Mr. KNOWLAND. Mr. President, I further ask unanimous consent to have printed in the body of the RECORD an article entitled "Joint Chiefs Not Consulted," written by David Lawrence, and published in today's Washington Star.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

JOINT CHIEFS NOT CONSULTED

(By David Lawrence)

The United States Joint Chiefs of Staff were not consulted before instructions were sent by the State Department here to Ambassador Warren Austin to vote for the United Nations resolution proposing to Red China a cease fire in Korea. This means that neither General MacArthur nor General Ridgway nor anybody else in the United Nations' forces was consulted as to the effect of the proposal on morale of the troops or as to the desirability of a cease-fire step at this time.

Whether all this was by accident or design has not been revealed. It could be that the State Department did not wish to embarrass the military by asking it to concur when the position of our forces in Korea is so unfavorable. To have asked the military might have posed the dilemma in which an affirmative answer could mean an unwillingness to keep on fighting while a negative answer might be construed as blocking the Department of State's policies.

This indifference to the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff creates nevertheless a belief that high-level policy is rather loosely made in the American Government today.

There is considerable anxiety here in military circles about the possible consequences of the American support for the cease-fire proposal. It would not occasion much surprise if Red China accepts the United Nations plan. In fact if the Chinese Communist leaders have any sense left at all and are really not trying to enlarge the area of the conflict they will grab the United Nations proposal. It gives them a rare opportunity to confuse their opponents.

The mere fact that Russia voted against the resolution in the United Nations does not mean, as some reports have surmised, that it is doomed to be rejected by the Peiping government. The strategy might well have been planned for the Red Chinese to accept the plan in the face of ostensible opposition from the Russians as this would tend to foster the impression that the Red Chinese authorities in their diplomacy are truly independent of Moscow.

The advantages to the Red Chinese in favor of accepting the cease-fire plan are that they get what amounts to recognition in a future international conference, and they are also promised an opportunity to sit down with a commission from the United Nations and trade and negotiate about Formosa, and admission to the United Nations.

This does not necessarily signify that the American Government is ready to support a change in its Formosa policy or in its attitude toward admission of Red China. But it does raise this issue: If the other nations of the commission outvote America the United States will be in the position of seeming to wish to resume hostilities and wage war unless it makes important concessions to Red China. This is a severe handicap to America in the negotiations.

Anxiety over what the American Government has done by its support of the cease-fire proposal extends beyond military circles here. Privately, many Members of Congress are even more worried about it. They think the United States has been entrapped and that America will find herself outmaneuvered the moment a cease fire is accepted.

To all those who exhibit concern—and some of the Members of Congress have been in communication with Ambassador Austin about it—word has come back not to worry because the cease-fire resolution isn't going to be accepted by Red China anyway.

So the situation comes down to this: Many influential persons in Washington are hoping the cease-fire proposal will be turned down but they fear it will not be and that the American people may come to feel that the sacrifices made in Korea have been of no avail despite the 40,000 casualties. Trouble is then seen ahead for our rearmament program in Congress.

If, on the other hand, the cease fire is turned down by Red China and fighting continues, the situation cannot be less grave even if our troops are withdrawn or forced out of Korea. If that contingency arises, it would seem that the whole case will turn on whether the United Nations has branded the Communist Chinese as aggressors. Once branded that way, some other steps will have to be taken by members of the United Nations to punish Red China.

If the United Nations refuses to vote for a resolution branding Communist China as an aggressor, the stock of the United Nations will go down to zero with American public

opinion. It will become necessary then for the United States to decide for itself whether or what military measures shall be taken on its own to blockade China, including Hong Kong, and to carry on an air bombardment until Red China makes amends for her aggression in Korea. Conversely, the demand to do nothing more and keep our troops from both Asia and Europe will grow immeasurably stronger in Congress.

FACTS OF THE KOREAN WAR IGNORED—ARTICLE BY CONSTANTINE BROWN

Mr. KNOWLAND. I further ask, Mr. President, that in connection with the various matters I have just requested to have inserted in the RECORD, there be inserted at this point in the body of the RECORD, an article entitled, "Facts of the Korean War Ignored," written by Constantine Brown and published in the Washington Evening Star of today.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

FACTS OF KOREAN WAR IGNORED

(By Constantine Brown)

There are many in this country and on the other side of the Atlantic who apparently want to deceive themselves, for they refuse to recognize the stark fact that the unprovoked attack by the Chinese armies on the United Nations forces in Korea was an act of war.

Because there has been no formal declaration of hostilities they refuse to accept the fact that we are now at war. They overlook the fact that dictators do not declare wars, they wage them.

In this light the attempts of the British and Commonwealth Prime Ministers to negotiate a surrender by the UN to the Chinese appear ludicrous. The representatives of these powers stated last Friday that they would welcome any feasible arrangement for a frank exchange of views with Prime Minister Stalin and Mao Tze-tung.

They added that "We should, in the name of common humanity, make a supreme effort to see clearly into each other's hearts and minds."

We have failed to restore peace in Korea. Moscow took advantage of the effort of the UN members to live up to the principles of their Charter. By unleashing the Chinese Communists at a time when the North Korean aggressors had been soundly beaten, Russia wantonly launched world war III.

We have lost lives and men in that campaign. But the set back suffered by our forces is nowhere as great as that suffered by the British in 1940, when they were compelled to evacuate France at Dunkerque. Nor is our position nearly as bad as that we faced in 1942, when the Japanese captured the Philippines and the large American force which was stuck there.

Not a cry was raised in England during and after Dunkerque demanding that Prime Minister Churchill seek a "frank exchange of views" with Hitler and Mussolini and make a supreme effort to see into their hearts and minds. The British and Americans knew only too well what they contained. And Stalin and Mao are no better than their predecessors.

The French, who refused to continue the fight from Africa, were labeled traitors to the common cause. Yet the treaty between France and Britain was no more binding than the United Nations Charter.

Nobody suggested that President Roosevelt sit down and have a heart-to-heart talk with Emperor Hirohito after the American and Philippines Armies were defeated by the Japanese. Any such suggestion then would have been an act of treason.

The fact that in both these instances there had been a formal declaration of war on the part of the democratic nations against the aggressors does not change the present picture in the least. In those days the democratic nations had the manhood to answer totalitarian aggression with formal war.

The democracies, which claim to be determined to oppose aggressive Communist imperialism, do not seem to have the same strength today. At the present moment British diplomacy is striving to persuade the American Government to accept the cease-fire proposal sponsored by the Asiatic and Arab countries, even if it means, in fact, a surrender to the Chinese Communists.

Until a week ago the administration in Washington was determined to accept no such solution, unless the Chinese withdrew their forces from Korea. But under the continuous hammering of the British and Indian Governments, it appears that there has been a weakening of this stand insofar as American diplomats here and at Lake Success are concerned. They are leaning toward acceptance of these proposals in a form sufficiently modified to save the face of the American Government.

DENIAL BY SENATOR TAFT OF STATEMENT ATTRIBUTED TO HIM BY TIME MAGAZINE

Mr. TAFT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may proceed for 1 minute, in order to make a denial of a statement in the nature of an alleged quotation appearing in Time magazine. It will not take me longer than 1 minute.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator from Ohio is recognized.

Mr. TAFT. Mr. President, Time magazine, in its latest issue, that of January 15, 1951, in dealing with my speech of last Friday, said:

> But the most obvious flaw in the whole Taft position was his hopeful prophecy that Russia would not attack the United States. It justified a look at his record as a military prophet. In February 1941 TAFT predicted with equal certainty: "It is simply fantastic to suppose there is danger of an attack on the United States by Japan."

In the first place, I did not make any prophecy; I merely pointed out that that was one of the considerations on which we must proceed. In the second place, I never made any such statement, at any time, as is here put in quotation marks opposite my name.

This particular allegation was first made in the CIO in the 1944 campaign. I denied it then. It appeared in John Gunther's book in 1946 or 1947, and I denied it then. It was published as part of an article entitled "The Record of ROBERT A. TAFT," in the CIO pamphlet which was gotten out in the recent campaign. I denied it then. All that would have been necessary was for them to ask me whether the statement was true. There is no reported statement of that kind to be found anywhere. One man, a political opponent, claims he heard me say it in 1941. I did not say it, because I did not believe it. I always took the position as to the Far East that I thought Secretary Stimson's policy might very easily provoke an attack by Japan, and that I hoped he would get away with the kind of bluff we were making toward Japan. But I thought that we could not be certain, and I did not know whether or not it was likely to produce an attack.

In any event, this particular statement has been repeated so often that I should like to put on record in the Senate the fact that it is absolutely untrue.

ALASKAN STATEHOOD

Mr. RUSSELL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the body of the RECORD a telegram I have received from Anchorage, Alaska, and my answer thereto, and to make a 1 minute clarifying statement.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Without objection, the Senator from Georgia is recognized for a 1-minute clarifying statement.

Mr. RUSSELL. Mr. President, in the course of the debate on the Alaskan statehood bill, I stated on the floor of the Senate that I was opposed to statehood for Alaska and Hawaii at this time, because, in view of the critical situation in world affairs, these areas might be first attacked. I did not believe that Alaska should have statehood now, as it might adversely affect the defense of Alaska. I pointed out that it was found necessary to place Hawaii under military law during World War II and that if Hawaii had been a State it would have raised a serious question of the rights of a State.

My statement that I was not prepared to defend States' rights in the case of Alaska at this time has been twisted—I think deliberately—to make it appear that I was unwilling to defend Alaska from foreign aggression. My entire argument was that Alaska and Hawaii could both be better defended from the impending dangers if they remained as Territories. This telegram from the Young Democratic Club of Alaska, and my answer thereto, should clear up that matter, and I therefore ask that these two telegrams be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the telegrams were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

ANCHORAGE, ALASKA, *January 11, 1951.*

Hon. Senator RICHARD RUSSELL, of Georgia,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.:

Young Democratic Club of Alaska unanimously and vehemently protest your stand jeopardizing entire Pacific northwestern America in assuming United States not obligated to defend Alaska, we demand immediate retraction your statement for congressional records.

YOUNG DEMOCRATIC CLUB OF ALASKA,
ZEBE HARRIS, *President.*

JANUARY 11, 1951.

ZEBE HARRIS,
President, Young Democratic Club of Alaska, Anchorage, Alaska:

Retel. I have always sought to defend the constitutional and political rights of the sovereign States against the encroachments of Federal power. I also fully recognize the constitutional obligation of the Federal Government to protect the States and Territories and all of its citizens from foreign aggression. The fact that you and the members of your organization do not understand the distinction between these two principles should explain the doubt existing in the minds of many Members of Congress as to the wisdom of admitting Alaska to statehood at this time. I am happy to assure you that I shall insist upon the defense of the Territory and people of Alaska against any foreign foe exactly to the same extent that I insist upon the defense of any State of the Union and its people. I have never held or expressed any other view.

RICHARD B. RUSSELL.

CHARLES D. WATKINS—TRIBUTE BY SENATOR CAIN

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, on behalf of the Senator from Washington [Mr. CAIN], I ask unanimous consent that there may be placed in the RECORD a statement by him in the nature of a eulogy regarding a retiring newspaper correspondent, Mr. Charles D. Watkins.

There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

STATEMENT BY SENATOR CAIN

For the past 13 years the people of the great Northwest, including those living in my State of Washington, have been kept abreast of the activities of their Senators and Congressmen through the news stories as presented by the able correspondents in the press galleries. All do their job of reporting ably and objectively.

Among these men and women of whom I speak, is a correspondent who has served us from the Northwest and our constituencies, with undeviating faithfulness to the tenets laid down through the years by his profession. He has never allowed his personal emotions or opinions to influence his writings. His loyalty to his employer and to his profession has never been questioned. He has never been known to sacrifice his integrity in furtherance of his career. His kindness and wisdom have saved many of us from grievous error. His advice when, and only when, requested, has been readily, wisely, and freely given.

In the 4 years during which the junior Senator from the State of Washington has served in the Capitol, he has come to depend on Mr. Charles D. Watkins, Associated Press correspondent for the Northwest for the past 13 years, as a valued friend. Last Saturday marked a milestone long anticipated, no doubt, by "Doc" Watkins, but one that we, whom he has served so well, deeply regret. Last Saturday "Doc" retired as an Associated Press correspondent after 40 years as a newspaper writer. The junior Senator from Washington joins with the hundreds of "Doc's" friends in the Congress, among his coworkers, and his thousands of readers, in wishing him Godspeed, and in expressing to him our deep feeling of thankfulness that we have had the privilege of knowing and associating with him, an able newsman, an invaluable friend, and a gentleman.

AMERICAN ECONOMY—STATEMENTS BY SENATOR HUMPHREY

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD some remarks which I had intended to make today together with a statement I issued on November 2, 1950, calling for a more energetic anti-inflation program.

There being no objection, the remarks and statement were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

The American economy is being crippled by inflation, and I rise to protest the inertia and lack of decisiveness on the part of the administration which has allowed the cost of living to rise to unprecedented heights.

The issue of inflation is one which transcends political partisanship. It is one which affects the welfare and the security of every American family, and cannot be ignored.

I have had an opportunity over the week end to study in detail the economic report of the President and the report of the President's Council of Economic Advisers. I am constrained to say that seldom have I seen such cogent, forceful, and eloquent economic analysis end with such disappointing and flat conclusions.

Now is the time to impose immediate and rigid price controls. I called for such controls as early as July 20, following the Korean crisis. I repeated that request on July 23, urging a roll-back of prices to June 25. On August 7 I presented an eight-point program to curb inflation. Finally, on November 2, after spending 3 months visiting and talking with the people of my State, my conviction was reaffirmed that immediate action was necessary, and I called for a temporary price stop of from 4 to 6 months until such time as indirect controls could be made more effective.

Today, with the specter of an inadequate tax program and with inadequate price controls, I repeat with all the urgency at my command that our Nation's welfare and our Nation's security call for action now without any further delay.

The American people cannot understand the confusion and inexplicable lack of an anti-inflation program from Washington. I, for one, agree with the American people that the delay is inexcusable. I do not know for certain who is to blame, and do not care much. I have been told, however, in a private conversation with a member of the Federal Reserve Board that the Federal Reserve Board is itself one of the bottlenecks in achieving an effective anti-inflation program.

Furthermore, the differences of opinion between our Director of Price Stabilization and our Director of Economic Stabilization have also seriously damaged our economy. The fact that those differences have become public is deplorable. I simply cannot understand the shortsightedness which allows the word of a possible price freeze to reach the public before the price freeze is imposed. Every time word of such a possible plan reaches the public, industrial and consumer prices rise, and the American consumer takes it on the chin.

This lack of an anti-inflation program will also have very serious repercussions in the field of labor-management relations. We cannot expect labor-management peace or effective wage stabilization controls while the cost of living goes up. The working men and women, the pensioner, the white-collar worker, and the American farmer are the victims of this Washington ivory-tower attitude.

I warn the American Congress that unless we act to halt inflation now, we will be faced with serious industrial strife.

I, for one, am prepared to call for congressional action and investigation in the next few days if some relief is not provided.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR HUMPHREY CALLING FOR MORE ENERGETIC ANTI-INFLATION PROGRAM, NOVEMBER 2, 1950

America today faces a serious economic crisis. We are emerging from the Korean action with military victory for the United Nations and for our own Armed Forces. Korea has taught us the lesson that our Nation must be geared to a long-range and ever constant defense alertness. This will call for an annual output of anywhere from $350,000,000,000 to $500,000,000,000 by 1955, depending upon international developments.

Our Korean experience has taught us one other lesson. We have learned that our national economy is so much of an interrelated unit that irresponsibility by any of us has immediate and serious repercussions for all of us. In the 2 months following the Korean invasion, for example, from June 15 to August 15 of this year, retail home furnishings prices increased more than 2 percent. Retail food prices are today 2.7 percent above the June 15 level. Manufacturers' prices are today 8 percent above the pre-Korean level, and are rising steadily. As a result of these and other price developments with which the American housewife is thoroughly familiar, we are today facing a severe inflationary crisis.

This price burden is particularly great because of the fact that we are moving into an inflationary spiral from an already too-high price level. From 1944, the wartime peak, to the first half of 1950 the average weekly buying power of the wage earner fell more than 7 percent.

The problem we face is not only one of upward movement of prices, but also one of an inflationary psychology. Businessmen are acting on the assumption that their costs will be higher and are setting their prices accordingly. Consumers are acting on the same premise. In spite of the fact, that the production of civilian goods is still extremely high, shortages exist. Automobiles have been produced at the weekly rate of 175,000 or more since early June, but they do not appear too plentiful; steel is being produced at the highest rate in our history, but mills are sold out; refrigerators, washing machines, and other consumer durable goods are being produced in vast quantities, but immediate delivery is nevertheless rare.

Nor are future prospects any brighter for the American consumer. Continued upward pressures are evident throughout our economy. The normal seasonal pattern of declining meat prices which usually affects the market at this time every year, will soon be at an end. In fact, processor, distributor, and retail prices have been out of line with the normal seasonal price decline of wholesale agricultural commodities. The relatively stable seasonal process in livestock, meats, and grains has not been passed on to the consumer, who today pays higher prices for meats and breads. By the spring of 1951 we will be faced with further sharp increase in food prices unless immediate and positive action is taken.

The retail market will also be further affected by the current rises in industrial prices. Tin, rubber, copper, burlap, and lubricating oils are continuing to show rises. Smaller producers have recently raised prices on some steel products from $3 per ton to $12 per ton. Since Korea, the prices of textiles have risen 19 percent, chemical 14 percent, and building materials 10 percent. No single important group of commodities has failed to advance. The general index of primary market prices is 5 percent higher than it has ever been before. On the commodity exchanges, industrial materials traded on organized markets are averaging one-third above the pre-Korean level, with some commodities like rubber and tallow more than doubling in price.

Furthermore, many retailers are today being billed for "reorder" merchandise at higher prices and are passing those added costs on to the consumer, even for items already in stock. Many producers and distributors, fearful of future price controls, have increased their prices for no valid reason and with no justification other than a desire for increased profits and a desire to keep their prices higher under any control regulations which may be forthcoming.

To the American consumer, therefore, the picture is one of high prices, continued high prices, and an outlook of still higher prices. By the spring of 1951, not only will food prices be higher unless curtailed, but there will also be sharp increases in apparel and house furnishings where manufacturers' prices have already increased.

As early as July 20, I pointed to the dangers faced by our economy as a result of the Korean crisis, and asked for the abandonment of business-as-usual attitudes and practices. I said "unchecked inflation can be as disastrous as invasion" and I urged that those "who raise prices to take advantage of a critical international situation are guilty of undermining the strength and productivity of our country." "I called for an immediate excess-profits tax, for measures necessary to regulate prices," and for "an adequate distribution of goods and services."

Again, on July 23, I urged the Congress to act "immediately to halt rising prices and irresponsible profiteering now taking place at the expense of the American people.

High prices, I said, were founded on no basis of economic fact. I urged that prices be rolled back to June 25.

On August 7 I presented an eight-point program to curb inflation, calling for the authority to impose price ceilings, priorities and production controls, the allocation of resources, manpower allocation, rent control, tax increases, wage controls, and rationing where necessary.

It is today time to begin imposing these controls without further delay.

The administration has so far moved cautiously to meet the problem of growing inflation. It plans to depend on indirect controls for the long economic pull we face. This is consistent with the administration's desire to preserve free enterprise in our economy. It is also consistent with the understanding that the crisis we face today is different from the crisis we faced after Pearl Harbor. We had then an immediate goal in mind and prepared for a well-defined all-out military effort. An analogy fits the situation. If one Olympic athlete enters a 3-mile marathon and another the 100-yard dash, they both need to make an all-out effort. If the short-distance runner runs the first hundred yards in 9 seconds, he will probably win his race; but if the long-distance runner races the first hundred yards in 9 seconds, he will tire quickly and end his long-distance marathon last and not first. We must adjust our all-out effort to the nature of the race.

As part of its program to prevent inflation, our Government has depended a great deal upon credit controls. Governors of the Federal Reserve System in August, as a first step, required Federal Reserve banks in leading cities to raise the discount rate from 1½ percent to 1¾ percent and thus make loans more expensive.

In early September the Federal Reserve Board of Governors recreated the wartime device known as regulation W, designed to discourage installment buying and thus hamper consumers from using future income to purchase scarce goods. This regulation did not prove tough enough. The total consumer credit outstanding at the end of August was nearly $21,000,000,000, more than twice as much as there was in either 1941 or 1948. Most of this was installment credit, charge accounts, and loans.

The result of the new regulation was that down payments have been increased to 25 percent on television sets, radios, and other major durables, instead of 15 percent. Balances are to be paid in 15 months instead of 18 months. Credit regulations were tightened a few weeks ago on automobiles and other goods, running as low as $50.

Real estate construction credit has also been regulated by the new credit controls. To buy a house now, higher down payments are needed. The American consumer, therefore, cannot borrow as much today as he once could. Less new money will therefore be created which will help prevent inflation.

There is no question but that severe credit controls can be effective, but they take time. They also have certain inherent defects, particularly as they apply to items such as housing. They penalize lower income groups and they therefore ration commodities not on the basis of need but on the basis of available cash.

Credit controls in housing, therefore, must be accompanied by immediate rent control. I therefore plan to urge the Congress to reimpose rent controls, not only on old housing units where there are shortages, but also on new units. Housing credits will create strong pressure for increased rents, and rent control is essential to protect tenants. Under the new credit regulations, instead of 1,200,000 new houses being built in 1951, only 800,000 will be built.

Credit controls must also be supplemented by a steep progressive tax structure. An equitable excess profits tax must be enacted when the Congress reconvenes in a few weeks. From the 1944 wartime profit peak of ten billion eight hundred million after taxes, corporate profits further increased to twenty billion nine hundred million after taxes in 1948. During the first half of 1950, corporate profits after taxes were at the annual rate of nineteen billion seven hundred million. By the end of this year and as a result of wartime profits, corporate profits after taxes may reach $23,000,000,000.

There is no justification for excess profits in wartime. Equality of sacrifice, basic good sense and our economic needs demand an excess-profits tax. It is also necessary that existing loopholes in our tax laws be closed. In September of this year, I led a fight on the floor of the Senate to eliminate the inequities and special provisions in our tax laws which now take the form of privileged treatment to owners of oil wells and those in the higher income groups who can take advantage of capital gains treatment. These and other abuses must be eliminated and I plan to increase my efforts in that direction.

There is still room for additional credit controls. One of the plans being discussed in Washington is to require member banks of the Federal Reserve System to increase their reserves still further which could hold back from the flow of money in our economy about $2,500,000,000. A further tightening of installment credit is possible if necessary. We remember that during the war, buyers had a 12-month limit to complete payment instead of the present 15. Charge accounts may be brought under control also.

The President under the Defense Production Act of 1950 has appointed an Economic Stabilization Administrator, Mr. Alan Valentine. The Department of Labor has begun a detailed study of our manpower needs and resources. The Department of Commerce has already instituted some priority allocations, and the Department of Interior has the responsibility over our natural resources. The Department of Agriculture is now developing a farm program to meet our defense needs. The National Security Resources Board is studying further plans for tooling up our resources to meet the economic problems we face.

A more dynamic and immediate program is vital however.

1. A price administrator should be appointed immediately so that we can begin an administrative tooling up period for whatever price-controls may be required to protect the American economy.

2. A wage stabilization board should begin operations to relate wages and demands for wage increases to our over-all economic needs.

3. Industry committees should promptly be appointed to establish direct controls. All segments of industry, small business and big business, should be represented on the committee.

4. Congress should reimpose and strengthen our rent-control laws as soon as it reconvenes, not only on old housing units but on new units as well. Authority to establish controls on decontrolled units should be granted.

5. An excess profits tax should be enacted, retroactive to July 1, 1950; tax loopholes should be eliminated; and the inequitable tax reductions passed by the Eightieth Congress should be repealed. We must place our economy on a pay-as-you-go basis as much as possible. The Congress when it reconvenes should begin raising an additional ten to fifteen billion dollars necessary to achieve that end.

6. Congress should act to correct the defects in existing legislation, provide subsidy authority where roll-backs are required in order to stabilize the cost of living and thus allow consumer food prices to be directly controlled if necessary.

7. Congress should provide the authority to regulate trading in futures on the commodity exchange market. It is grossly unfair to ask consumers to deprive themselves of essentials and at the same time allow and encourage speculative purchasing on the commodity market.

8. Credit restrictions should be imposed on commercial construction mortgage credit similar to the credit restrictions now in effect on residential construction. This is both equitable and economically necessary.

9. Our consumer-credit restrictions should be under constant scrutiny to determine whether they are operating equitably and also whether they are sufficient to keep inflation under control.

10. We are faced with a problem of expanding bank credit which encourages inventory accumulation and futures buying. The reserve requirements should be increased and the open market operations of the Federal Reserve System should be directed to restricting the extension of commercial-bank credit.

11. Controls over special-problem commodities should be imposed immediately. In particular, these controls should apply to certain import commodities, such as rubber, wool, burlap, tin, and chemicals, and the United States should begin negotiating with exporting nations in regard to those commodities and their prices.

12. Finally and urgently, pending the effectiveness and the application of the above controls, a "price stop" should be instituted which would provide a temporary price ceiling to last from 4 to 6 months. In the absence of an effective tax program, some form of direct price control is essential. The hard fact is that it may be 6 months before indirect controls can become fully effective. A full program of indirect controls cannot be developed quickly and it will be some months before a new tax bill goes into effect. I urge, therefore, that in the period between now and the time indirect controls take hold, general temporary controls be established. By then we should be administratively prepared to undertake any further, new, or more selective controls which may be called for.

This proposal is not intended as a price freeze or a strait-jacket for industry. It is rather a means of stabilizing prices. During the period of this temporary—and I emphasize temporary—"stop," the price administrator would be authorized and directed to grant exemptions where the public interest would not suffer or where such exemptions are necessary for defense purposes. My essential objective is to prevent runaway inflation until such time as indirect controls, which all of us prefer, are made fully effective.

Increased prices and inflation not only operate to the disadvantage of the consumer and the general public, but also severely affect the operations of our defense effort and the Federal budget. Increased prices for materials basic to our defense operations mean drastically increased Government expenditures and high taxes to meet those expenditures.

An example of the effect of price increases can be seen from the following facts:

Prices on some rockets are increased so we can now buy only 870 rockets for the same amount that would have bought 1,000 before Korea; walkie-talkie radio set prices have increased so the money that would buy 1,000 before Korea will now buy only 660; 770 bazookas can now be bought for the pre-Korean price of 1,000; 870 1-ton trailers cost the same as 1,000 did before Korea; 770 rifles for the pre-Korean price of 1,000. In aircraft procurement price increases have cost our Government $360,000,000, or the equivalent of 750 F-86's. In 1944, at the height of the war, we would have equipped an infantry division for $14,500,000; now the cost is $74,000,000. We could then equip

an armored division for $30,000,000; today the cost is $199,000,000.

To impose temporary controls now will save the American taxpayer and the American consumer untold millions of dollars.

COMMITTEE SERVICE

Mr. McFARLAND. Mr. President, if the routine business has been finished, I desire to make a brief statement regarding assignments to committees, and I should like to have the committee assignments made, so that the Senate may transact business.

In that connection, let me say that we are willing to have a session tomorrow and the next day and the next day, if necessary, in order that all Senators who wish to make speeches may do so, but of course they cannot all speak at the same time. I hope that Senators will not try to obtain recognition until we can dispose of the assignments to the committees. I send to the desk, in behalf of the majority, the committee assignments approved by the majority.

Mr. DOUGLAS. Mr. President——

The VICE PRESIDENT. A large number of Senators have indicated their desire to address the Senate, but the question of committee assignments is a privileged matter, and the Chair thinks it would take precedence over speeches.

As Senators know, the present occupant of the Chair, since he has been presiding over the Senate, has tried not to make commitments in advance as to whom he would recognize on the floor, for the obvious reason that the rule requires the recognition of the first Senator who addresses the Chair. In many cases, where more than one Senator addresses the Chair, it is sometimes impossible to tell who first addressed the Chair; but the Chair will recognize Senators in as orderly a way as possible, though of course we all understand that it is possible to recognize but one Senator at a time. The present occupant of the Chair has found that when he commits himself in advance to recognize some Senator a day or two ahead, or on some future date, he nearly always gets into trouble about it, because matters arise when that day comes which make it impossible to fulfill the promise. So the Chair can only do his best as situations arise. But this report is a privileged matter, and is entitled to consideration.

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, is it the desire of the Presiding Officer that the two lists be read in this connection?

The VICE PRESIDENT. It is the opinion of the Chair that that should be done.

Mr. WHERRY. In behalf of the minority, I send to the desk the minority list of committee assignments. I wish to inform the Chair, however, that at the conclusion of the reading of the lists, and before the order is agreed to, I should like to make one or perhaps several motions in regard to the names appearing on the lists.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The clerk will read the assignments to committees on behalf of the majority and the minority.

The legislative clerk read as follows:

Ordered, That the following shall constitute the standing committees of the Senate of the Eighty-second Congress:

On Agriculture and Forestry: Messrs. Ellender, chairman, Hoey, Johnston of South Carolina, Holland, Anderson, Eastland, Humphrey, Aiken, Young, Thye, Kem, Hickenlooper, and Mundt.

On Appropriations: Messrs. McKellar, chairman, Hayden, Russell, McCarran, O'Mahoney, Chavez, Maybank, Ellender, Hill, Kilgore, McClellan, Bridges, Ferguson, Wherry, Cordon, Saltonstall, Young, Knowland, Thye, Ecton, and McCarthy.

On Armed Services: Messrs. Russell, chairman, Byrd, Chapman, Johnson of Texas, Kefauver, Hunt, Stennis, Bridges, Saltonstall, Morse, Knowland, Cain, and Flanders.

On Banking and Currency: Messrs. Maybank, chairman, Fulbright, Robertson, Sparkman, Frear, Douglas, Long, Capehart, Bricker, Ives, Schoeppel, Dirksen, and Bennett.

On the District of Columbia: Messrs. Neely, chairman, Johnston of South Carolina, Kefauver, Hunt, Pastore, Clements, Smith of North Carolina, Case, Butler of Maryland, Welker, Bennett, and Vandenberg.

On Expenditures in the Executive Departments: Messrs. McClelland, chairman, Hoey, O'Conor, Humphrey, Benton, Robertson, Monroney, McCarthy, Mundt, Mrs. Smith of Maine, Schoeppel, Dworshak, and Nixon.

On Finance: Messrs. George, chairman, Connally, Byrd, Johnson of Colorado, Hoey, Kerr, Frear, Millikin, Taft, Butler of Nebraska, Brewster, Martin, and Williams.

On Foreign Relations: Messrs. Connally, chairman, George, Green, McMahon, Fulbright, Sparkman, Gillette, Vandenberg, Wiley, Smith of New Jersey, Hickenlooper, Lodge, and Tobey.

On Interior and Insular Affairs: Messrs. O'Mahoney, chairman, Murray, McFarland, Anderson, Lehman, Long, Smathers, Butler of Nebraska, Millikin, Cordon, Ecton, Malone, and Watkins.

On Interstate and Foreign Commerce: Messrs. Johnson of Colorado, chairman, McFarland, Magnuson, McMahon, O'Conor, Johnson of Texas, Hunt, Tobey, Brewster, Capehart, Bricker, Williams, and Kem.

On the Judiciary: Messrs. McCarran, chairman, Kilgore, Eastland, Magnuson, O'Conor, Kefauver, Smith of North Carolina, Wiley, Langer, Ferguson, Jenner, Watkins, and Hendrickson.

On Labor and Public Welfare: Messrs. Murray, chairman, Hill, Neely, Douglas, Humphrey, Lehman, Pastore, Taft, Aiken, Smith of New Jersey, Morse, Ives, and Nixon.

On Post Office and Civil Service: Messrs. Johnston of South Carolina, chairman, McKellar, Neely, Pastore, Clements, Monroney, Smathers, Langer, Carlson, Dirksen, Welker, and Butler of Maryland.

On Public Works, Messrs, Chavez, chairman, McClellan, Holland, Stennis, Chapman, Kerr, Hennings, Cain, Martin, Malone, Dworshak, Carlson, and Case.

On Rules and Administration: Messrs. Hayden, chairman, Green, Gillette, Benton, Clements, Monroney, Hennings, Wherry, Lodge, Jenner, Hendrickson, Flanders, and Mrs. Smith of Maine.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The question is on agreeing to the order providing for committee assignments.

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, I intend to make a motion which has to do with increasing the number of members of committees. In order to cooperate fully with the majority leader, who is anxious to get the Senate organized, I ask unanimous consent that if any debate is involved in the discussion of the motion, which I am sure will not take long if it is confined to the motion, it be upon the motion itself, which has to do with increased committee membership.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator from Nebraska asks unanimous consent that if any debate takes place on the resolution, it be confined to the resolution.

Mr. DOUGLAS. I object.

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that in the debate each Senator be limited to 15 minutes.

Mr. DOUGLAS. I object.

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, that forces the Senator from Nebraska to make his motion.

I desire to say to the distinguished majority leader and also to the President of the Senate that it is not the intention of the minority leader to delay the organization of the Senate. What I have to say can be said in 15 minutes, and we can proceed with the orderly reorganization of the Senate without any difficulty. I was asking for cooperation in doing that very thing. On this side we have done our level best voluntarily to comply with the assignments to committees. The last thing we can do, in order to satisfy those Members who are not pleased with their assignments, is to make one more effort. I had hoped that this could be done in an orderly way, and for that reason I have made the unanimous-consent requests.

In the absence of such cooperation, I send to the desk a motion and ask that it be read and that the Senate proceed to consider it.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Secretary will read the motion of the Senator from Nebraska.

The CHIEF CLERK. It is proposed, in the paragraph designating the members of the Committee on Appropriations, to insert after the word "appropriations" a comma and the words "to consist during the Eighty-second Congress of 23 Senators."

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, there has been no time in our national life when greater responsibilities have been placed upon the committees of Congress.

All are involved in a maze of legislation, which must be studied, not only within its own scope, but as to how it serves the purposes of our national policy in all its ramifications.

Our Nation is fighting a hot war in Korea and a cold war in every other corner of the globe.

There is before the Congress a budget the size of which has not been paralleled in our history, short of an all-out war.

The internal security of our country is dependent upon the strong position the Congress takes in forthcoming months to improve legislation. A jungle of immigration and naturalization laws exists, which must be brought into line with the needs of our national security.

Problems of finance and taxation are mounting daily.

A period of controls and regimentation is upon us, wherein the very principles of our national economic structure will be jeopardized, unless the most judicious

consideration is given to legislation affecting it.

The weight and burden of our national and international affairs falls upon Foreign Relations, Armed Services, Judiciary, Appropriations, Finance, Banking and Currency, and those committees which we count as major, according to the necessities of the times.

Mr. President, I offer as a prime example the Committee on Appropriations, of which I am a member. Prior to the enactment of the Reorganization Act that committee had an authorized membership of 25.

The Reorganization Act—and let me say that I was here when it was passed and I took part in the debate—as it came to the floor of the Senate, proposed an across-the-board number of 13 members for each committee, regardless of the nature of the committee or of the extent of its workload. My friend, the senior Senator from Tennessee [Mr. McKELLAR], chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee at that time, and still its honored chairman, opposed this unreasonable and impractical reduction in the membership of the Senate Appropriations Committee.

I refer to the colloquy on this point in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD of June 7, 1946, volume 92, part 5, page 6451:

Mr. McKELLAR. I wish to point out some very important provisions of the bill. Take for example, the Appropriations Committee of the Senate. That committee consists of 24 members at the present time, and I believe it is authorized to have 25 members. If the membership of that committee were reduced to 13 the committee would not be able to do its work.

To which Senator La Follette, the Senate sponsor of the Reorganization Act, later replied:

I am prepared to increase the membership of the Appropriations Committee from 13 to 21.

A membership of 21 for the Appropriations Committee was finally approved after the able chairman of the committee showed it was a physical impossibility to do the work of the committee with a membership of 13 Senators.

This establishes the fact, Mr. President, that the determination of the Joint Committee on the Reorganization of Congress to recommend an arbitrary, over-all figure of 13 members for each committee was not infallible.

The Congress recognized, in making the exception for the Appropriations Committee, that the work of a major committee may require a greater number of members than 13.

I point out further that in 1946, when the Reorganization Act was passed, it was hoped that we were heading into a peacetime economy. The budget which the Appropriations Committee had to consider at that time was $33,000,000,000.

That is when the workload, according to the distinguished Senator from Tennessee, was so heavy that he remonstrated and said that 13 members could not do the work. Twenty-one members was the number agreed upon, but I am sure that if he had had his way we would have gone back to a membership of 25.

There are now 10 major subcommittees of the Senate Appropriations Committee. The committee is very well and properly organized. We have a very distinguished chairman. However, it is necessary for 10 subcommittees, organized within the Committee on Appropriations, to handle the work which comes to the committee in connection with appropriations. Each member of the Committee on Appropriations is assigned to at least four subcommittees, and, in some cases, Senators serve on five subcommittees. For example, the junior Senator from Nebraska is the ranking minority member on the Subcommittee on Appropriations for Interior and Insular Affairs. He sits also on four other subcommittees to help consider the work that comes before the committee.

Moreover, new sections of the consolidated appropriation, such as the foreign-aid programs, are considered by the full committee, which constitutes, in a sense, an eleventh subcommittee. There have been occasions in the schedule of subcommittee hearings during the past 6 years—and I have no objection, because it is impossible to do the work otherwise—when a Senator received notices to appear at three subcommittee meetings at the same time. Obviously a choice had to be made as to which meeting the Senator would attend, or he could give a few disjointed minutes to each one.

With this situation in mind, Mr. President, the Appropriations Committee today is faced with the prospect of a consolidated appropriation measure which may reach a total of at least $81,000,000,000, instead of $33,000,000,000, as in 1946, when the committee had a membership of 25.

The expansion from a $33,000,000,000 budget in 1946 to the possibility of $81,000,000,000 in 1951 is not nearly so illustrative of the vastly increased work of the Appropriations Committee, as are the expanding numbers of individual items on the budget which must be studied and passed upon by the committee.

Literally thousands of budget items support the complicated structure of our Federal Government, which, in the past decade, has become like the dragon's teeth in the fable. For every expense we try to eliminate, two new ones spring up in its place.

The Appropriations Committee will face this year's prospects with the same number of members apportioned to it as in 1946, and with four less members than it had when working on World War II appropriations.

Certainly this is true of many of the other major committees. The chairman of the Judiciary Committee, the senior Senator from Nevada [Mr. McCARRAN], made the statement the other day in the Committee on Rules and Administration, and I believe he also made it on the floor, that more than 50 percent of the legislation which comes to the floor of the Senate is reported by the Judiciary Committee. If that is not a correct statement, I should like to have the distinguished Senator from Nevada correct me.

Mr. McCARRAN. Mr. President, I wish to say that the workload of the Committee on the Judiciary during the two sessions of the Eighty-first Congress consisted of 40.9 percent of all bills and resolutions introduced in the Senate, 52.7 percent of all House bills and resolutions received from the House, and 44.1 percent of all bills and resolutions irrespective of their origin. Would the Senator permit me to insert at the conclusion of his address, or at this time, a statement which I had intended to make today setting forth in detail the work of the Committee on the Judiciary?

Mr. WHERRY. I deeply appreciate the aid of the distinguished Senator from Nevada, and I ask unanimous consent that the statement of the Senator from Nevada may be inserted in the RECORD at the conclusion of my remarks.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(The statement of Mr. McCARRAN appears at the conclusion of Mr. WHERRY's speech.)

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, getting back to the purposes of the Reorganization Act, we have a distinguished Member of the Senate who, when he was a Member of the House, managed the reorganization bill in the House, when former Senator La Follette managed it in the Senate. As I heard it explained, the prime purpose of the Joint Committee on the Reorganization of Congress was to arrange the functions of the legislative branch so as more effectively to carry out its responsibilities under the Constitution.

Instead of having scattered authority among 81 committees of both Houses of Congress, it was intended to have a more compact formation and a clearer identification of the work area of each committee. That was its prime purpose.

In the recommendations of the joint committee, it is quite clear that an objective of the Reorganization Act was to strengthen and consolidate committee functions, rather than to limit the individual committee in any way.

Referring to the section on committee structure and operation, the joint committee's report states:

Your committee believes that no adequate improvement in the organization of Congress can be undertaken or effected unless Congress first recognizes its present obsolete and overlapping committee structure. This is the first and most important test of whether Congress is willing to strengthen itself and its organization to carry the tremendous workload that present-day governmental problems place upon it.

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. WHERRY. I yield for a question.

Mr. HOLLAND. Did the Senator from Nebraska, in outlining the duties of the membership of the Committee on Appropriations, include a reference to the

ex officio members of the Committee on Appropriations?

Mr. WHERRY. No; I did not. I should like to go into detail with respect to that subject. The Senator from Florida has made a very good point. There are six subcommittees of the Committee on Appropriations to which ex officio members are appointed by other committees. They sit with the members of the Committee on Appropriations in considering appropriations affecting subjects within the jurisdiction of their committees. For example, if the Committee on Appropriations were considering appropriations for the armed services, three members of the Armed Services Committee would sit with the Committee on Appropriations. The same is true with respect to other ex officio members of the committee.

It goes to show—and perhaps the Senator from Florida mentioned it for that purpose—that the Appropriations Committee requires more members than the number now allotted to it. The ex officio members help tremendously in furnishing advice from their committees—and I do not know what we would do without them—but in order that the workload may be more evenly distributed, more members should be assigned to the Committee on Appropriations.

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a further question?

Mr. WHERRY. I am glad to yield.

Mr. HOLLAND. It is true, is it not, that the original terms of the Reorganization Act provided for ex officio members from six standing committees, three in number from each committee, to have full voting power on the appropriations dealing with their particular field?

Mr. WHERRY. I suggest to the Senator that the appointment of ex officio members was provided for prior to the Reorganization Act, and that it neither increased nor decreased the number of ex officio members.

Mr. HOLLAND. Does not the Senator also think that, in addition to the help given by those three members from each of the six standing committees, to serve with full power as members of the Appropriations Committee in their respective fields, the provision of the Reorganization Act which requires that at least one of the three ex officio members in each field shall be assigned to the conference committee is likewise designed to help members of the Appropriations Committee carry the burden upon that committee?

Mr. WHERRY. I agree with the Senator. I think that is a very good point. I thank the Senator.

Mr. McKELLAR. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. WHERRY. I yield for a question.

Mr. McKELLAR. The Senator is mistaken in stating that this practice began with the Reorganization Act. I believe that the original act authorizing the appointment of the ex officio members was passed in 1923. The Reorganization Act merely continued that plan. Of course, after the consolidation of the appropriation bills, there was some reason for such members not being appointed. But if we are to return to the departmental method of dealing with appropriations, it seems to me that it will be even more essential to continue the ex officio members. I hope the Senator's motion does not propose to interfere with such a plan.

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, I did not go into the question of ex officio members, because I did not think it was involved in the motion which I am about to make. The Senator from Florida raised the question, and I stated that the Reorganization Act also continued the appointment of the ex officio members. In answer to the Senator from Florida I stated that such a practice had been followed prior to the Reorganization Act. The practice was simply carried through.

Mr. McKELLAR. That is true.

Mr. WHERRY. However, I think there was one difference. Under the Reorganization Act the ex officio members had a vote, while under the old practice they did not have a vote. Is not that true?

Mr. McKELLAR. They had a vote under both systems.

Mr. WHERRY. I was not sure about that; but that point was raised.

Mr. President, there are those members who believe strongly, and sincerely, I am sure, that any attempt to correct inequities under the Reorganization Act is tampering with the act to its ultimate destruction. I have heard that statement made. I know that those who make it are sincere. They have a right to their own opinion. But let me remind the Senators that it never was the intention of those who drafted the act that they were drafting a perfect piece of legislation, or that it was above amendment or further change.

Let me quote further from the report by the joint committee, page 2, section I, paragraph 3:

> We feel there is nothing sacrosanct in the present arrangement of our committees. A study of the committee system of both Houses reveals that since the First Congress the committees have undergone many realinements and changes as conditions demanded. As the "workshop of Congress," the committee structure more than any other arm of the legislative branch, needs frequent modernization to bring its efficiency up to the requirements of the day.

That language was in the report of the joint committee when the reorganization proposal was brought to the attention of the Senate; and the bill was passed with the assurance that from time to time the committees could be modernized, with respect to number, and other committees could be established. In that category come the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy and certain other committees.

Mr. President, there is also nothing sacrosanct about the rule-changing privileges of the United States Senate. Those changes embodied in the Reorganization Act were enacted—and I quote from title I, paragraph (b), of the act:

> With full recognition of the constitutional right of either House to change such rules—at any time, in the same manner, and to the same extent as in the case of any other rule of such House.

Time after time, by unanimous consent, both the Senate and the House completely override their rules for a particular purpose, to expedite the work of the particular body. I hope the distinguished majority leader will continue that practice—

> With full recognition of the constitutional right of either House to change such rules—at any time—

Today, tomorrow, next week, or next year—

> in the same manner, and to the same extent as in the case of any other rule of such House.

The Reorganization Act of 1946 established 15 standing committees in the Senate—in place of the former 33.

The relative importance of those committees is governed as much by the primary powers which the Constitution vests in the National Legislature as it is by the shift and increase in our legislative responsibilties.

Aside from the varying workload between committees—which may be numerically as great in a lesser committee as in a major committee—there are certain committees which the members themselves look upon as offering less opportunity for service. Senators have decided that question for themselves. The Reorganization Act itself takes cognizance of the fact that the Committee on the District of Columbia and the Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments are not as demanding in service as are other standing committees.

Personally I believe that the Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments is a very important committee. I should like to serve upon it. Nevertheless, the Reorganization Act itself recognizes the fact that certain committees are not as demanding as others.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. WHERRY. I yield.

Mr. MORSE. Does not the Senator feel that there has been a little too much emphasis, in the discussion by some Senators, with regard to whether or not a particular committee is more demanding than other committees? Each committee takes all the time a Senator can possibly devote to it. The question is whether or not the totality of work of a given committee requires more Members to do the job of that committee, in comparison with the totality of work of another committee.

Mr. WHERRY. Answering the distinguished Senator's question, I agree. I shall cover that point a little later. I shall be through in a few minutes. However, the point is pertinent here, and I agree with the Senator.

Mr. LANGER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. WHERRY. I yield.

Mr. LANGER. I represent on the Appropriations Committee the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service. I have been perfectly amazed at the length of time required for the consideration of the appropriations for that single department. I agree with the distinguished Senator from Nebraska that the membership of the Appropriations Committee ought to be increased, perhaps even beyond the point he has suggested.

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, I am not myself classifying the committees. I am simply stating how Senators themselves have classified them. I agree with the Senator from Oregon that a Senator may serve an apprenticeship on the Committee on Rules and Administration, or on the Committee on the District of Columbia, or the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service. There is plenty of work to do. So far as that is concerned, the committees are worked to death.

As I said, the Reorganization Act itself really takes recognition of the fact that the Committee on the District of Columbia and the Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments are not as demanding of service as are other Senate committees. In amending rule XXV of the Senate, section 102, subparagraph (F) (4) provides that—

> Each Senator shall serve on two standing committees and no more; except that Senators of the majority party who are members of the Committee on the District of Columbia or of the Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments may serve on three standing committees and no more.

To these two lesser committees—and the classification is not my own—might also be added the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service and the Committee on Rules and Administration, of which I am the ranking minority member. I say, some would so classify them, but I am not doing so.

That leaves eleven, let us say, more strategic committees, for which membership applications greatly exceed the possibility of gratifying them under present membership limitations, and under the prevailing seniority system.

It is my opinion—and the junior Senator from Nebraska has served on lesser committees as well as on two of the most important—that service on a less important committee can be of tremendous benefit to the individual member and to the Senate, if the necessary and demanding job is well done.

However, I have the greatest sympathy with Senators on this side of the aisle at least, who are not pleased with appointments to the lesser committees, unless they can have a position on one of the so-called major committees.

The minority assignments to the Committee on the District of Columbia, which are about to be made, constitute a perfect example of this situation. Prior to the time when, by telegram, the minority policy committee was able to get the Senator from Michigan [Mr. VANDENBERG] to change from one committee assignment to membership on the Committee on the District of Columbia, all six of the members of the Committee on the District of Columbia were new members who had come to the Senate this year. With the change I have just mentioned, five of the six are new Senators, but all six minority members of the Committee on the District of Columbia are newly assigned to the committee, whether or not it happened to be one upon which they had selected to serve.

Of course, Mr. President, it is my opinion that an apprenticeship can be served as well on the Committee on the District of Columbia, as on other committees, so far as concerns the amount of time and effort that may be expended.

But it is perfectly natural that when a Senator is forced to serve on a committee, not of his own selection—whether major or minor—that Senator will make an effort to get off the committee as soon as possible.

Although a Senator may at times be "bumped" from a major committee, the main turn-over of service lies in the four so-called lesser committees, where there is a constant shifting of membership, and definite loss of experience in handling the work of those committees.

Continuity of service is of great value, if good legislation is to result.

Very often a Senator has found himself off of one committee and back on it again, in a period of 2 or 4 years, losing in the meantime a very valuable continuity of experience in the preparation of legislation.

How much better it would be, Mr. President, if a Member could have, to a greater degree, the selection of committees for which he asked, and for work on which he is specially qualified, or on which his work will be of greater value to the Senate.

I am heartily in favor of limiting the number of committees to which a Senator may be appointed, as the Reorganization Act now provides, but I am equally opposed to the restrictions upon membership, within the 15 committees, to the exclusion of manpower and talent, which the Senate so desperately needs at this very moment.

Mr. President, my purpose is only constructive, it is to expedite the work of the Senate. I serve on the Committee on Rules and Administration with the distinguished chairman of that committee, the Senator from Arizona [Mr. HAYDEN]. He knows as well as I do that the purpose of the measures acted on by that committee is constructive and that such measures should receive consideration of this body. They have no ulterior motive behind them. I happen to be a member of a major committee and of a minor committee. I was satisfied to give up membership on a major committee in order to make place for another Senator. It was the Committee on the Judiciary, and the change took place 4 years ago. The Senator appointed in my place has been a very valuable member of the Judiciary Committee. It illustrates how the solution of the problem can sometimes be reached. I think the time has come now when we should take steps adequately to distribute the workload.

These are times, Mr. President, when a Member of the United States Senate is entitled to feel that he needs to exert his very best efforts in the most effective manner possible.

These are times when it behooves the Senate to make it possible to utilize every ounce of its strength and talent, in the heavy responsibilities it faces, and to spread the workload in those committees which are more heavily burdened with defense legislation.

There is no attempt in anything I have to say, to evaluate one Senator's services above another, or to say where one Senator should be of more value than another. We are all needed to the fullest extent of our abilities.

My purpose is to recognize and to bring to some solution, the problem that some Senators are unduly burdened with the work of the Senate, while others feel that they are twiddling their thumbs while Rome burns.

Within the past 2 weeks, since the opening of the Eighty-second Congress, there have been at least four conferences, and other less formal discussions, between members of the majority and the minority, to try to work out a solution to this problem, on a voluntary basis. I think I am correct in that statement. I appreciate indeed the work the majority did in trying to help solve this problem.

By that I mean, the majority and minority could agree that membership on certain committees be increased, and membership on certain others be decreased.

I do not know that the membership of the lesser committees should be decreased, but I am certain that the membership of some committees should be increased; and if the only way to obtain an increase of membership on the 11 or 12 major committees is to decrease membership on the lesser committees, I think the time has arrived when that should be done.

On a voluntary basis, of course, it would take unanimous consent to make such changes on a temporary basis at least. It was the hope of the junior Senator from Nebraska, as ranking minority member on the Rules and Administration Committee, that some solution such as that suggested could be worked out.

Unfortunately the effort has failed, in spite of the fact that members from both sides of the aisle worked earnestly and sincerely to accomplish this purpose. I want to pay them tribute for that.

The Senate might have been able to accomplish by voluntary agreement, what has already been accomplished by the House in the past few days.

On January 12, Representative McCORMACK offered a resolution (H. Res. 60) for immediate consideration by the House, which was agreed to, without objection.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that House Resolution 60, which I have designated as exhibit A, be printed in the RECORD at this point.

There being no objection, the resolution, marked "Exhibit A," was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

EXHIBIT A

COMPOSITION OF VARIOUS COMMITTEES

Resolved, That during the Eighty-second Congress the Committee on Agriculture shall be composed of 30 members;

The Committee on Appropriations shall be composed of 50 members;

The Committee on Armed Services shall be composed of 35 members;

The Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments shall be composed of 27 members;

The Committee on Foreign Affairs shall be composed of 27 members;

The Committee on House Administration shall be composed of 23 members;

The Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce shall be composed of 30 members;

The Committee on the Judiciary shall be composed of 29 members;

The Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries shall be composed of 27 members;

The Committee on Post Office and Civil Service shall be composed of 23 members;

The Committee on Public Lands shall be composed of 27 members; and

The Committee on Veterans' Affairs shall be composed of 23 members.

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, the House has already recognized the necessity for strengthening its major committees, with increased memberships to meet the pressures of the times.

The House has recognized that it has manpower that should be utilized where it will have the greatest advantage and afford the greatest relief to hard-pressed committees.

Five Members have been added to the House Committee on Appropriations. The House had previously added two positions to that committee in the Eighty-first Congress, increasing the membership then from 43 to 45. Now, in the Eighty-second Congress, the House Committee on Appropriations will have 50 members.

The House resolution has increased the House Committee on Agriculture by three members; the Armed Services Committee by two members; the Foreign Relations Committee by two members; the Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee by three members; and the Judiciary Committee by two members. Increases in membership were also given to the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries; to the Committee on Public Lands; and to the Committee on Expenditures in Executive Departments.

At the same time, the House resolution cuts back membership on the House Committee on Administration; on the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service; and on the Committee on Veterans' Affairs, which is a separate committee in the House.

The House has done, on a voluntary basis, exactly what the junior Senator from Nebraska had hoped might be done in the Senate.

Mr. President, at this moment we are faced with the assignment of Senators to committees for the duration of the Eighty-second Congress. Lacking a voluntary action, such as that taken by the House, in the form a resolution to which there was unanimous agreement, there is only one way remaining to improve the situation in time to be of some use and service in the Eighty-second Congress.

Of course, there is the means of amending the Reorganization Act. That is an approach with which I am in fundamental accord, and I have prepared a resolution which I submit to accomplish that purpose.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The resolution will be received and appropriately referred.

The resolution (S. Res. 31) was referred to the Committee on Rules and Administration, as follows:

Resolved, That (1) paragraph (b) of section 1 of rule XXV of the Standing Rules of the Senate, relating to the Committee on Appropriations, is amended by striking out "twenty-one" and inserting in lieu thereof "twenty-three."

(2) Paragraph (f) of such section, relating to the Committee on the District of Columbia, is amended by striking out "thirteen" and inserting in lieu thereof "eleven."

(3) Paragraph (g) of such section, relating to the Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments, is amended by striking out "thirteen" and inserting in lieu thereof "eleven."

(4) Paragraph (i) of such section, relating to the Committee on Foreign Relations, is amended by striking out "thirteen" and inserting in lieu thereof "fifteen."

(5) Paragraph (k) of such section, relating to the Committee on the Judiciary, is amended by striking out "thirteen" and inserting in lieu thereof "fifteen."

(6) Paragraph (o) of such section, relating to the Committee on Rules and Administration, is amended by striking out "thirteen" and inserting in lieu thereof "eleven."

Mr. WHERRY. I hope that the distinguished chairman of the Committee on Rules and Administration will assign it to a subcommittee; and after the hearings which I hope will be had, I trust we shall subsequently receive from the Committee on Rules and Administration a proposal for a change which will be of service to the Congress in 1952. Such a further step will be necessary, because the motion I am making today does not provide for a permanent change.

As I have said, the resolution will take time.

The only way that I see to be of immediate service to the Eighty-second Congress in this respect and to adjust the situation, at least to the degree now possible, is to amend the pending order so as to provide for an increased membership of at least one major committee for the duration of the Eighty-second Congress.

If that motion prevails, I intend to follow it with corresponding motions to decrease the membership of at least one other committee. In other words, there would be no increases in the membership of other committees; but instead of having 13 members on the Committee on the District of Columbia, for instance, there might be 11, inasmuch as the proposed change of membership of the Appropriations Committee would be from 21, as of the present time, to 23.

This effort is being made on my part, with the sincere purpose of increasing the efficiency of the Senate and of providing the broadest possible use, on a temporary basis, at least—because the resolution would apply only to the Eighty-second Congress—of the talents of Senate Members.

It would have been most helpful and encouraging to the combined efforts of this great body, and in the interests of greater unanimity and cooperation in the work of the Senate, if the distinguished majority leader, the junior Senator from Arizona [Mr. McFARLAND] had chosen to offer, for voluntary action by the Senate, a resolution which would have made the necessary additions to the memberships of the major committees, and reductions in certain others. I should like to have seen him do so, because if there ever was a time when a gesture which would provide unanimity on the part of all Members of the Senate was needed, it is now.

It would have been wonderful if the Senate could have done that voluntarily, by means of unanimous consent; and I know that the minority would have "hailed the chief" as a great and outstanding majority leader if that could have been accomplished. However, the distinguished majority leader, in his wisdom, and we have to acknowledge that as majority leader he has to thresh out these things—did not see fit to do so.

So, Mr. President, at this time I have made the motion. It affects only the Eighty-second Congress, and does not propose a permanent amendment of the rule. A permanent amendment should be made by means of a proposal reported by the Committee on Rules and Administration itself. However, the present motion is one to increase by two members the membership of the Appropriations Committee in the Eighty-second Congress.

As I have stated, I do not wish to say anything about the qualifications of other Senators; but I desire to say to the majority that if we submit for membership on the Appropriations Committee the names of an additional Senator or two, we would suggest the names of Senators who have had many years of experience in the making of appropriations in the House of Representatives. Why should we wait? Why make those members serve an apprenticeship on the Committee on the District of Columbia, which, in terms of workload, does not compare with the Appropriations Committee, and make them wait for years before they, who have had years of service on the Appropriations Committee in the House of Representatives, can give their talents and their ability to the Senate committee which will handle appropriations in the Eighty-second Congress.

Mr. President, I take this step in an effort to be constructive, and in good faith. I should like to have the motion voted on as soon as possible. If the motion is defeated—and I say this to be fair to the majority leader—no more motions will be offered by me.

After the majority leader answers the argument I have made, if he cares to do so, why can we not vote on this one motion, and then organize the Senate? Then those who wish to speak on foreign policy matters can be recognized in the order in which they address the Chair.

(The statement by Senator McCARRAN, which, on request of Mr. WHERRY was ordered to be printed in the RECORD following his speech is as follows:)

STATEMENT BY SENATOR McCARRAN

From time to time I have reported to the Senate concerning the work of the Committee on the Judiciary, of which I have the honor to be chairman.

I have done this not only because I have felt the Senate was entitled to such periodic reports but also because I have wanted my colleagues to have an understanding of the volume of work which the Committee on the Judiciary is required to do.

Nothing that I have said in connection with previous reports of this nature, and nothing I say today, is intended or should be taken as a complaint in any sense of the word. It is my pleasure to have associated with me on the Judiciary Committee some of the ablest and most hard-working Members of the Senate. As a committee, we have the assistance of a very fine and hard-working committee staff, and the Senate, in its wisdom, has in the past made provision for

increased staff assistance for the Committee on the Judiciary.

When Congress enacted the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, it was anticipated that the work of the Committee on the Judiciary, in some categories, would decline and eventually taper off. Two important categories with regard to which this expectation was entertained were private immigration bills and private claims bills. As I think my colleagues realize, the expectation was not borne out with respect to either of these categories of bills. On the contrary, there has been an increase in the number of bills in each category in each session of the Congress since 1946.

There is, I believe, still some hope of an eventual decline in the number of private claims bills; but the decline has not set in and is not likely to be evidenced during the session which has just begun.

I am hopeful that the omnibus immigration and naturalization bill, which is one of the major projects in which the Judiciary Committee is now engaged, will include provisions which may help in reducing the number of private immigration bills in the future; but that reduction also, if accomplished, will not come during the present session of the Congress.

It seems quite certain, therefore, that the Committee on the Judiciary, in order to discharge properly its duties and responsibilities, will have to ask the Senate to provide additional assistance in this Congress to at least the same degree in which it has been provided in the past; and if the Senate sees fit to impose new and additional duties upon the Judiciary Committee, further provision will then have to be made for staff assistance in connection with such duties. But I want the Senate to know that the additional assistance which has been provided for the Committee on the Judiciary has been well employed, and is aiding the committee to produce as the Senate has a right to expect.

Here, then, is a statistical report on the work of the Judiciary Committee during the Eighty-first Congress:

"SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE WORK AND WORKLOAD, EIGHTY-FIRST CONGRESS, FIRST AND SECOND SESSIONS

"The workload of the Senate Judiciary Committee during the two sessions of the Eighty-first Congress, consisted of 40.9 percent of all Senate bills and resolutions introduced; 52.7 percent of all House bills and resolutions presented in the Senate; 44.1 percent of all bills and resolutions irrespective of origin.

"Not only has the Judiciary Committee received a far larger share of the Senate's total workload than any other standing committee of the Senate; it has also performed a larger share of all committee work than any other committee. Of 2,701 written reports filed in the Senate by all committees, the Judiciary Committee has filed 1,417, which represents 52.4 percent.

"The total of reports filed to the Senate does not give the whole picture of committee activity, because committee consideration of many bills resulted in adverse action and indefinite postponement. Furthermore, the committee has handled and disposed of more than 4,716 individual immigration cases, involving suspension of deportation. Each immigration case is equivalent to a bill.

"During both sessions of the Eighty-first Congress, the Judiciary Committee has received 2,039 Senate bills and resolutions and 959 House bills and resolutions, making a total of 2,998 bills and resolutions.

"As of the close of the Eighty-first Congress, the committee had disposed of 1,659 Senate bills and resolutions and 917 House bills and resolutions, or a total of 2,576 bills and resolutions.

"Of the bills thus disposed of 276 were general bills other than claims or immigration, 938 were private relief bills, 1,274 were private immigration bills, 31 were general claims bills, and 57 were general immigration bills.

"Committee approval was granted to 647 Senate bills and resolutions and 783 House bills and resolutions, or a total of 1,430 bills and resolutions of both Houses.

"(It will be noted that written reports were filed by the committee with respect to all but 13 of the 1,430 bills and resolutions approved.)

"Of the bills and resolutions acted upon favorably 149 were general bills other than claims or immigration, 574 were private relief bills, 674 were private immigration bills, 20 were general claims bills, and 13 were general immigration bills.

"Bills indefinitely postponed by the committee included 1,012 Senate bills and resolutions, 134 House bills and resolutions, or a total of 1,146 bills and resolutions of both Houses.

"Of the bills thus acted upon unfavorably 127 were general bills other than claims or immigration, 364 were private relief bills, 600 were private immigration bills, 44 were general immigration bills, and 11 were general claims bills.

"Measures pending before the committee at the close of the Eighty-first Congress included 380 Senate bills and resolutions and 42 House bills and resolutions, or a total of 422 bills and resolutions of both Houses.

"Of these bills 102 are general bills other than immigration and claims, 96 are private relief bills, 209 are private immigration bills, 7 are general claims bills, and 8 are general immigration bills.

"Committee action, in most cases, must await reports from interested departments and agencies in the executive branch. When the Eighty-first Congress adjourned sine die, the number of bills and resolutions pending before the committee, with respect to which reports had been requested, but not received, was 225, of which 29 were general bills other than claims or immigration, 36 were private relief bills, and 160 were private immigration bills.

"Thus it will be seen that out of the 2,998 bills and resolutions referred to the committee, the number of cases in which the committee has not acted but in which the committee either had received the reports or deemed reports unnecessary, totaled only 197, of which 73 were general bills other than claims or immigration, 60 were private relief bills, 49 were private immigration bills, 7 were general claims bills, and 8 were general immigration bills.

"It will be noted the committee disposed of 917 House bills and resolutions out of 959 such measures referred to it, leaving only 42 House bills and resolutions pending. This means the committee took action on 95.6 percent of all House measures received.

"In comparison, out of 2,039 Senate bills and resolutions referred to it, the committee acted upon 1,659, leaving 380 Senate bills and resolutions pending. This means that although the committee had to "start from scratch" in all such cases, action was taken on 81.3 percent of all Senate measures received.

"(In this connection it should be noted the committee received 58 Senate bills and 5 House bills subsequent to the reconvening of the Congress on November 27, 1950.)

"Suspension of deportation by the Attorney General, under authority delegated by the Congress, are reported to the Congress in groups; but in the committee, each such individual case requires separate investigation, appraisal, and action. At the beginning of the first session of the Eighty-first Congress, there were pending in the committee 1,501 cases of suspension of deportation, to which were added 6,037 additional cases submitted during the Eighty-first Congress, making a total of 7,538 cases, of which 4,716 were approved, 59 were rejected, and 10 were withdrawn by the Attorney General; leaving 2,753 cases in process.

"During the Eighty-first Congress, the committee received 264 executive nominations, of which 117 were Federal judges, 61 were United States district attorneys, 60 were United States marshals, 1 was Attorney General of the United States, 1 was Assistant Solicitor General, 5 were Assistant Attorneys General, 1 was Commissioner of Patents, 4 were members of the Displaced Persons Commission, 4 were members of the War Claims Commission, 5 were members of the Motor Carrier Claims Commission, and 5 were members of the Subversive Activities Control Board.

"Nominations not acted upon totaled only 11, all of which were received in committee between November 27 and December 21, 1950.

"During the Eighty-first Congress, the committee and its subcommittees conducted 190 hearings, which involved 330 separate hearing sessions. The records of these hearings total 36,991 folios."

Mr. McFARLAND. Mr. President, I wish to call the attention of the Senate to the title of the Reorganization Act, namely, "To provide for increased efficiency in the legislative branch of the Government."

The Joint Committee on Reorganization of the legislative branch spent many months in studying this problem. They heard expert witnesses, had the benefit of thorough studies, and took much evidence. They carefully considered all the questions the distinguished junior Senator from Nebraska has pointed out.

Mr. President, each of the committees is supposed to be a major committee. Some persons may differ as to that view; some Senators may not think that the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, for instance, is so important. However, the distinguished senior Senator from North Dakota [Mr. LANGER] believes it is a very important committee, and he has often referred to the work done by that committee and to the workload it has.

Another committee which might be mentioned in this connection is the Committee on Rules and Administration. If we are going to change the rules of the Senate by action taken on the floor of the Senate, without referring such matters to the Committee on Rules and Administration, we might as well do away with that committee. As chairman of the committee, we have my colleague, the senior Senator from Arizona [Mr. HAYDEN], a distinguished Senator who has served many years in this body. No one is more familiar with the workings of the Senate than he.

We have as the ranking minority member of that committee my distinguished friend, the minority leader, the junior Senator from Nebraska [Mr. WHERRY]. I concede that he knows a great deal about the workings of the United States Senate and about how it should be organized.

Furthermore, each one of the other members of the Committee on Rules and Administration is qualified to pass upon these very important problems. I call attention to the fact that recently a new member has been added to that committee, in accordance with the list recently submitted, namely, the distinguished junior Senator from Oklahoma [Mr.

MONRONEY], who in the House of Representatives handled the Legislative Reorganization Act prior to its passage.

Mr. President, at this time I do not wish to discuss the merits of the motion, because I feel that the Committee on Rules and Administration should carefully consider all the arguments which have been made by the distinguished minority leader; and then, after carefully considering all of them and also carefully considering others which may be made and evidence which may be introduced, it should make its report to this body.

I contend that this motion is an attempt, without changing the rule, to amend rule XXV, which provides the number of members of the respective committees.

Therefore, Mr. President, I make a point of order against——

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, is the Senator going to make the point of order at once?

Mr. McFARLAND. Yes.

Mr. McKELLAR. Mr. President, will the Senator yield to me for a moment, to permit me to make a statement at this time?

Mr. McFARLAND. I yield to the Senator from Tennessee for a moment, if I may do so without losing the floor. I ask unanimous consent that I may do so without losing the floor.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. McKELLAR. Mr. President, if this motion is directed at the committee, of which I happen to be chairman, I wish to say that of course I desire to get along with the junior Senator from Nebraska. He is on the committee, and is a very valuable member of it, and I always like to agree with him whenever I can. However, the Appropriations Committee now has 21 regular members and, in addition, 18 ex officio members, each of whom has a part in the deliberations of the committee. If my mathematics is correct, 21 and 18 make 39. In other words, there are 39 members of the committee, which is more than one-third of the membership of the Senate. In my judgment, it would make the committee too large.

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McFARLAND. I ask unanimous consent that I may yield to the Senator from Nebraska, for the purpose of his addressing a question to the Senator from Tennessee, without losing my right to the floor.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. WHERRY. The distinguished chairman of the committee agrees with me, does he not, that prior to the passage of the Legislative Reorganization Act, there was the same number of ex officio members of the committee, and that, therefore, there was no increase in the number of ex officio members?

Mr. McKELLAR. That is correct. Let me say that I think the present procedure a very fine method of handling appropriations, but a better way would be to go back to the old plan of handling appropriations through subcommittees on the War Department, the Navy Department, and the various other departments. I hope and pray that we may return to that system, instead of having an enormous committee consisting of 39 members.

Mr. WHERRY. It would not be 39, would it?

Mr. McKELLAR. It would be 39. Twenty-one and eighteen make thirty-nine. There are 18 ex officio members. Six times three is 18. Therefore, if we were to agree to the motion of my able friend across the aisle, we would increase our committee by how many? How many would the Senator increase it?

Mr. WHERRY. By two.

Mr. McKELLAR. That would make 41 members. That is certainly a very unwieldy number. The Senator will agree with me that, with the exception of one, that exception being myself, the Appropriations Committee as now constituted is one of the best committees of the Senate. The committee has worked with remarkable skill and ability, even under the system of a unified or consolidated appropriation bill, which entirely upset all the experience which had preceded it, and disregarded the customary methods of handling appropriations. Even so, the committee has worked well, even though there has been an immense amount of work. I hope and pray that we may not change the practice at this particular time. I agree with the majority leader that it would be better to have the matter go to the Committee on Rules and Administration, and let that committee report later, if it should desire to do so. The change should not be made now. Let the present procedure continue at least until we get back to the nonunified scheme of handling appropriation bills.

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for another question?

Mr. McKELLAR. I yield, with the same understanding.

Mr. WHERRY. Is it not a fact that the distinguished Senator from Tennessee, as chairman of the Appropriations Committee, had served with the same number of ex officio members on six subcommittees—making a total of 18—prior to the passage of the Legislative Reorganization Act, when there were 25 members of the Appropriations Committee?

Mr. McKELLAR. I do not remember how many there were.

Mr. WHERRY. The Senator's statement was that there were 25 active members of the Senate Appropriations Committee, prior to the passage of the Legislative Reorganization Act, together with six subcommittees being served by three ex officio members each. Therefore, to go from 21 to 23 would still be 2 short of what the distinguished Senator had as a committee prior to the passage of the Legislative Reorganization Act, at a time when the budget was only $33,000,000,000 instead of $81,000,000,000, as may be today.

Mr. McKELLAR. My good friend is mistaken about the situation. Let me explain it to him.

Mr. WHERRY. Very well.

Mr. McKELLAR. What the Legislative Reorganization Act provided for was a return to 13 members. I opposed that.

Mr. WHERRY. How many were on the committee—25?

Mr. McKELLAR. I do not think there were 25. Twenty-five were authorized.

Mr. WHERRY. That is correct.

Mr. McKELLAR. I do not know that there were that many serving.

Mr. WHERRY. But there was an authorized membership of 25.

Mr. McKELLAR. That is correct. We finally agreed on 21, which was an excellent decision. It has worked well. Why change a situation which has worked well? The present practice has worked splendidly, and I may say that is largely due to the fine staff which serves the committee. It has worked very well, so why change it? We might just as well include the entire membership of the Senate, the entire 96 Senators, on the Appropriations Committee. Incidentally, we may come to that, if we start the practice suggested.

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for one more question?

Mr. McKELLAR. In a moment. Let us stand by what has worked well. I have been a member of the committee I think for more than a quarter of a century, or about that long, and I may say that the greatest test which has ever been made of our method of handling appropriations was when our friends in the House sent us the unified appropriation bill. It was a severe test of the efficient working of our committee. The committee met the test. It did everything that could be done. Senators from both sides of the aisle did everything in the world they could to make the plan a success; but it was not a success. Now, when we are returning to the practice of considering the separate deparments in the handling of appropriation bills, as we probably shall, why not take the method which has been tried and has been found to be successful and effective in every way? Why should we experiment with 41 members, or nearly one-half of the membership of the Senate, on one committee?

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for one more question?

Mr. McKELLAR. In a moment. Let me appeal to my friend, let us not in this haphazard way change the committee at this time. I appeal to the Senator as my friend. I appeal to him as a legislator. I appeal to him as a good Republican. [Laughter.] I appeal to him in every way. He is a good Republican. As a good Democrat, to a good Republican, I ask whether the Senator will not withdraw his motion, and allow us to employ the method and to use the plan which has been so successful in the past.

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for one more question?

Mr. McKELLAR. I yield, with the same understanding.

Mr. WHERRY. Does the Senator remember that on June 7, 1946, he made this observation on the floor of the Senate, when the Legislative Reorganization Act was reported to the Senate,

and when the Appropriations Committee was reduced from 25 members to 13? The Senator said:

> I wish to point out some very important provisions of the bill. Take for example the Appropriations Committee of the Senate.

That committee was then handling a budget of $33,000,000,000. The Senator continued:

> The committee consists of 24 members at the present time, and I believe it is authorized to have 25. If the membership of that committee were reduced to 13, the committee would not be able to do its work.

I am making the same argument the Senator made at that time, but instead of suggesting 25 members, I am suggesting 23. The Senator felt that certainly there should be a committee of 25, but subsequently there was agreement with the distinguished Senator from Tennessee to reduce the membership from 25 to 21.

Mr. McKELLAR. We agreed to that. It worked well. Why change it now on the floor of the Senate without the matter going to a committee? In my opinion, it ought not to be changed. I have the greatest respect, admiration, and esteem for my good friend from Nebraska. He works with me on the committee.

Mr. WHERRY. I work with a good Democrat.

Mr. McKELLAR. He is one of the most valuable members we have on the committee. I ask him not to revolutionize the committee at this time.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator from Arizona has the floor.

Mr. McKELLAR. Will the Senator from Arizona yield for a moment further.

Mr. McFARLAND. I yield.

Mr. McKELLAR. The committee has lost a member. I am very sorry it has lost one. There are still 21 members of the committee, but the Democrats have lost one.

Mr. WHERRY. Why did the Democrats lose one?

Mr. McKELLAR. Because of the elections on November 7; that is why. When the people speak, they come ahead of any of us. The Republican vacancies have been filled. The place of former Senator Gurney has been filled by our Republican friends. The Senator from Minnesota [Mr. THYE] and the Senator from Wisconsin [Mr. McCARTHY] have been selected as members of the committee. The Republicans have three new members of the committee. They are taking care of their friends. They have an opportunity, so far as the Appropriations Committee is concerned, of placing three new members on it, while the Democrats have lost a member of the committee.

Under those circumstances, Mr. President, I appeal to the Senate. I have appealed to my friend from Nebraska and he does not seem to be yielding, so I appeal to the Members of the Senate to leave the committee as it is. We try in that committee to work out problems along practical lines, irrespective of party or faction.

Mr. McFARLAND. Mr. President, I think the colloquy has clearly demonstrated that the rules of the Senate should not be amended in this manner. So I make the point of order which I previously stated.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Does the Senator wish to argue the point of order?

Mr. McFARLAND. No, Mr. President.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Does the Senator from Nebraska wish to argue it?

Mr. WHERRY. No; I do not. If there is any way in which we can get the opinion of the Chair, I shall promise, on this side, not to exceed 10 minutes in getting the matter out of the way and getting the Senate organized.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Chair is ready to rule on the point of order.

Prior to the passage of the Reorganization Act, there was one very definite rule of the Senate in regard to the number of members of each committee. There was no rule at all as to how many committees a Senator might be a member of. In order to distribute the membership on major committees as widely as possible among the Members of the Senate, the Reorganization Act provided that no Senator should be a member of more than two major committees, except that members of the majority might be on one or two additional committees which were named. It also provided for the number of members of each committee. The Reorganization Act, however, provides that each House may determine its own rules; in other words, that each House may amend its rules as it may see fit in regard to members of the committees or the number of major committees of which a Senator may be a member.

The Chair is not concerned personally as to whether there shall be 21 or 23 members of the Appropriations Committee. However, inasmuch as it is a rule of the Senate that the committee shall be composed of 21 members, the Chair is of the opinion that in order to increase the number of members of that committee, the rule must be changed. In other words, if the Senate places 23 Senators on that committee, in the view of the Chair it would be a violation of rule XXV which provides that 21 members shall constitute the membership of the Appropriations Committee.

The rule provides the method by which it may be amended, and the Chair feels that until the rule is amended authorizing an increase in the membership of the Committee on Appropriations from 21 to 23, it is not in order to increase the number from 21 to 23.

The same logic would apply to any other committee. If a resolution or an amendment were offered to make the Committee on Finance a commmittee of 15 Senators instead of 13, the Chair would feel that in order for that to be done the rule fixing 13 members as the number would have to be changed. The rule provides how it may be done.

Therefore, the Chair is of the opinion that the motion is not in order, and the point of order is sustained.

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, that forces the junior Senator from Nebraska to take an appeal from the decision of the Chair. I do not want to debate it at length. I desire to raise only two points, and then I shall be willing to have a vote on the appeal, which would be the same thing, really, as a vote on the motion. I do this with a great deal of reluctance, because I do not, at the beginning of the session, want to take exception to a ruling of the Chair. I have great affection for the Vice President, as he knows, but I have no other way to get a vote on the increased membership of committees than to prosecute the question as far as I can from a parliamentary point of view.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Chair fully understands that.

The Chair meant to make a further observation, if the Senator from Nebraska will permit. If the Senate can increase the number of members of a committee merely by an amendment to a resolution, it can by a similar process increase the number of major committees of which a Senator can be a member. Therefore, without amending the rules in an orderly way, the Senate could complete the organization of a committee by an amendment of this sort.

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, I would not want the RECORD to show that the Senator from Nebraska was doing this with any ulterior motive in mind, or that I am trying to gain the end result of a change in the rule only for the purpose of satisfying the desire of the Senator from Nebraska by using parliamentary procedure unfairly. All the Senate would be doing would be to vote on increasing the membership of the Committee on Appropriations for the Eighty-second Congress by two members, and decreasing, if this motion should be adopted, the membership of the Committee on the District of Columbia by two members. This would make the membership of the Committee on Appropriations 23, and the membership of the Committee on the District of Columbia 11.

The distinguished Senator from Tennessee has made a strong appeal that the Senator from Nebraska join with him. Let me say there is not a Member of the Senate for whom I have a higher regard than I have for the chairman of the Appropriations Committee. In most instances, even without the flattering remarks he made about the Senator from Nebraska, I go along with his judgment and requests. But I submit that the distinguished Senator from Tennessee, before the Reorganization Act was passed, rose on the floor of the Senate and used the very arguments which I am now using, not only to preserve the membership of the Appropriations Committee at 25, but not to pass the Reorganization Act if it provided for an Appropriations Committee of 13 members. Former Senator La Follette met with the distinguished Senator and a compromise was made on 21 members.

Mr. HAYDEN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. WHERRY. I yield.

Mr. HAYDEN. But the compromise was made in the enactment of the law.

Mr. WHERRY. I agree with that statement.

Mr. HAYDEN. It was not an effort to change the law by a simple resolution in the Senate, when the proper way to change it is by an amendment to the rule.

Mr. WHERRY. The way to do it is the way which I have attempted to do it, namely, to offer a resolution and ask that it be referred to the Committee on Rules and Administration. I hope that before this session is concluded the Senator will join with me in reporting a rule which will correct the situation. I agree with the Senator that so far as the permanent rules are concerned, that is the way to correct the situation.

The distinguished chairman of the Committee on Rules and Administration will also agree with me that title I of the Reorganization Act provides that, with full recognition of its constitutional right, either House may change its rules at any time it desires to do so. Is that not correct?

Mr. HAYDEN. The way to change a rule is to do it through the Committee on Rules and Administration.

Mr. WHERRY. But title I of the act provides that even though the way to make a permanent change is through the committee, the Senate can change a rule at any time it wants to do so. It can do it now if it wants to do so. The Senator from Arizona knows that many times he has asked for unanimous consent, as probably most of us have done, to change a rule of the Senate, and unanimous consent was given and the change was made for a particular purpose. That is different from asking for a permanent change. I have made such an approach also. However, it will not help the situation at the present time.

If the Eighty-second Congress is to get the benefit of the services of new Senators, who are eager to help the Senate do its work, we should amend the rule and increase the membership of the Committee on Appropriations. It can be done by taking the two additional members from the Committee on the District of Columbia. We have the right to do it.

I disagree with the ruling of the Presiding Officer. Title I of the Reorganization Act fully recognizes the right of the Senate to change its rules at any time it wishes to do so. I am not asking for a permanent change in the rule at this time. I am asking only that the change be made for the Eighty-second Congress. I ask that the membership of the Appropriations Committee be increased to 23 members. So far as the junior Senator from Nebraska is concerned the Senate can vote on the appeal from the Chair whenever the majority leader is ready to do so.

Mr. McFARLAND. Mr. President, I am willing to have the Senate vote on the appeal from the ruling of the Chair. I hope that the ruling of the Chair will be sustained. However, before doing so I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The clerk will call the roll.

The roll was called, and the following Senators answered to their names:

Aiken	Chapman	Ferguson
Anderson	Chavez	Flanders
Bennett	Clements	Frear
Benton	Connally	Fulbright
Brewster	Cordon	George
Bricker	Dirksen	Gillette
Bridges	Douglas	Green
Butler, Md.	Dworshak	Hayden
Butler, Nebr.	Eastland	Hendrickson
Carlson	Ecton	Hennings
Case	Ellender	Hill
Holland	McClellan	Saltonstall
Humphrey	McFarland	Schoeppel
Hunt	McKellar	Smathers
Ives	McMahon	Smith, Maine
Jenner	Martin	Smith, N. J.
Johnson, Colo.	Millikin	Smith, N. C.
Johnson, Tex.	Monroney	Stennis
Johnston, S. C.	Morse	Taft
Kefauver	Mundt	Thye
Kerr	Murray	Watkins
Kilgore	Neely	Welker
Knowland	Nixon	Wherry
Langer	O'Conor	Wiley
Lehman	O'Mahoney	Williams
Lodge	Pastore	Young
Long	Robertson	
McCarran	Russell	

The VICE PRESIDENT. A quorum is present.

The question is, Shall the decision of the Chair stand as the judgment of the Senate?

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays.

The yeas and nays were ordered, and the legislative clerk called the roll.

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. I announce that the Senator from Virginia [Mr. BYRD] is absent on official business.

The Senator from North Carolina [Mr. HOEY] and the Senator from Washington [Mr. MAGNUSON] are absent on public business.

The Senator from South Carolina [Mr. MAYBANK] is absent because of illness.

The Senator from Alabama [Mr. SPARKMAN] is necessarily absent.

The Senator from North Carolina [Mr. HOEY] is paired on this vote with the Senator from Missouri [Mr. KEM]. If present and voting the Senator from North Carolina would vote "yea," and the Senator from Missouri would vote "nay."

The Senator from South Carolina [Mr. MAYBANK] is paired on this vote with the Senator from New Hampshire [Mr. TOBEY]. If present and voting, the Senator from South Carolina would vote "yea," and the Senator from New Hampshire would vote "nay."

If present and voting, the Senator from Washington [Mr. MAGNUSON], and the Senator from Alabama [Mr. SPARKMAN] would vote "yea."

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I announce that the Senator from Washington [Mr. CAIN], the Senator from Missouri [Mr. KEM], and the Senator from Michigan [Mr. VANDENBERG] are absent by leave of the Senate.

On this vote the Senator from Missouri [Mr. KEM] is paired with the Senator from North Carolina [Mr. HOEY]. If present and voting, the Senator from Missouri would vote "nay" and the Senator from North Carolina would vote "yea."

The Senator from Indiana [Mr. CAPEHART] and the Senator from Nevada [Mr. MALONE] are absent on official business.

The Senator from Wisconsin [Mr. McCARTHY] is absent because of a death in his family.

The Senator from New Hampshire [Mr. TOBEY] who is necessarily absent in order to attend the funeral of a friend is paired with the Senator from South Carolina [Mr. MAYBANK]. If present and voting, the Senator from New Hampshire would vote "nay" and the Senator from South Carolina would vote "yea."

The Senator from Iowa [Mr. HICKENLOOPER] is detained on official business.

The result was announced—yeas 44, nays 38, as follows:

YEAS—44

Anderson	Hennings	McFarland
Benton	Hill	McKellar
Chapman	Holland	McMahon
Chavez	Humphrey	Monroney
Clements	Hunt	Murray
Connally	Johnson, Colo.	Neely
Douglas	Johnson, Tex.	O'Conor
Eastland	Johnston, S. C.	O'Mahoney
Ellender	Kefauver	Pastore
Frear	Kerr	Robertson
Fulbright	Kilgore	Russell
George	Lehman	Smathers
Gillette	Long	Smith, N. C.
Green	McCarran	Stennis
Hayden	McClellan	

NAYS—38

Aiken	Ferguson	Saltonstall
Bennett	Flanders	Schoeppel
Brewster	Hendrickson	Smith, Maine
Bricker	Ives	Smith, N. J.
Bridges	Jenner	Taft
Butler, Md.	Knowland	Thye
Butler, Nebr.	Langer	Watkins
Carlson	Lodge	Welker
Case	Martin	Wherry
Cordon	Millikin	Wiley
Dirksen	Morse	Williams
Dworshak	Mundt	Young
Ecton	Nixon	

NOT VOTING—13

Byrd	Kem	Sparkman
Cain	McCarthy	Tobey
Capehart	Magnuson	Vandenberg
Hickenlooper	Malone	
Hoey	Maybank	

So the decision of the Chair was sustained as the judgment of the Senate.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The question now is on agreeing to the order making the committee assignments.

The order was agreed to.

ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT (H. DOC. NO. 30)

The VICE PRESIDENT laid before the Senate the following message from the President of the United States, which was read, and, with the accompanying report, referred to the Joint Committee on the Economic Report:

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, D. C., January 12, 1951.

The honorable the PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE,

The honorable the SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.

SIRS: I am presenting herewith my Economic Report to the Congress, as required under the Employment Act of 1946.

In preparing this report, I have had the advice and assistance of the Council of Economic Advisers, members of the Cabinet, and heads of independent agencies.

Together with this report, I am transmitting a report, the Annual Economic Review: January 1951, prepared for me by the Council of Economic Advisers in accordance with section 4 (c) (2) of the Employment Act of 1946.

Respectfully,

HARRY S. TRUMAN.

THE BUDGET (H. DOC. NO. 17)

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Chair lays before the Senate the budget message of the President, which, he is informed, has been read in the House of Representatives, and therefore there is no need that it be read for publication again in the Senate. The message from the President and the budget will be re-

ferred to the Committee on Appropriations.

(For message from the President, see pp. 271–288, CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, House proceedings of today.)

THE PRESIDENT'S BUDGET—STATEMENT BY SENATOR BYRD

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the body of the RECORD a statement I have prepared commenting on the budget for expenditures in 1951 submitted to the Congress today by the President of the United States.

There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

STATEMENT BY SENATOR BYRD

Only a week ago the President appeared before Congress and said: "It (the Government) must practice rigid economy in its nondefense activities. Many of the things we would normally do must be curtailed or postponed."

The applause for this section of the State of the Union address was greater than for any other statement, indicating Congress accepted this policy in good faith.

Yet, today he has submitted to Congress a budget which has actually increased nondefense spending to the highest level in the history of the Nation—whether in peace or in war.

Not only has he, in the time of our greatest crisis, failed to keep his pledge for a rigid reduction in nondefense spending, but the President renews his advocacy of the socialistic measures known as the Fair Deal.

He calls for an increase in taxation of from $16,000,000,000 to $20,000,000,000 annually and still proposes to continue wasteful domestic spending which has added billions to the public debt.

He asks citizens to make deep sacrifices in their daily living, yet he declines to make political sacrifices by curtailment or suspension of measures for the distribution of public funds for nonessential purposes.

In my experience of 18 years, considering the perils that confront our Nation, this message represents the very height of fiscal irresponsibility.

Unity and the sacrifices necessary to save our country must be a two-way street—they must come from the Government as well as from the citizens.

On page M41 of the budget message he renews his support of the Brannan plan, which, if adopted, will add billions to Federal expenditures and disrupt the processes of agricultural production. It is true that he asks for no appropriation at this time for the Brannan plan but, should the principle of the Brannan plan be adopted, huge appropriations will necesarily follow.

On page M54 he advocates a specific appropriation of $300,000,000 for Federal aid to public schools which will open up a pandora box of Federal spending the extent of which no one can foretell.

On page M52 he recommends the so-called socialized medicine plan, with provisions for funds through new taxes which obviously will be inadequate. The adoption of the principle of this plan will be followed by vast expenditures.

On page M30 he recommends establishment of the Fair Employment Practices Commission, which, if established, will not only be costly but will result in Federal interference with every man's business.

My statement today will deal with the domestic, civilian nondefense expenditures only.

The President recommends a total of $9,800,000,000 for domestic civilian purposes, as compared with estimated expenditures of $8,400,000,000 in the current year, an actual expenditure of $9,700,000,000 in 1950, $6,100,000,000 in 1948, and $3,600,000,000 in 1946.

In fiscal 1946, beginning July 1, 1945, we were partly at war, with conditions similar to those confronting us today, and the President now proposes to spend for domestic civilian expenditures nearly three times as much as in fiscal 1946.

To this statement I attach explanatory notes.

Within a day or so I will present to Congress an itemized statement of the reductions and increases made in the President's budget, as compared with previous expenditures, and will submit detailed plans as to how these expenditures could be reduced, in accordance with my letter to the President under date of December 22.

Expenditure budget comparisons

[In billions]

Expenditure categories	Actual, 1948 [1]	Actual, 1950	Estimate, 1951	President's requests, 1952
1. Domestic-civilian [2] (exclusive of stockpile, NACA, Selective Service, merchant marine, Coast Guard, Alaska, Panama, Atomic Energy)	$6.1	$9.7	$8.4	$9.8
2. Foreign assistance (military and economic)	4.6	4.6	4.7	7.5
3. Defense (including military, stockpile, NACA, Selective Service, merchant marine, Coast Guard, Alaska, Panama, Atomic Energy)	11.6	13.4	22.6	43.4
4. Veterans	6.6	6.6	5.7	4.9
5. Interest, claims, etc.	5.2	5.8	5.7	5.9
6. Legislative and Judicial	.1	.1	.1	.1
Total	34.2	40.2	47.2	71.6

[1] Fiscal year 1948 is included in this table because it comes most nearly representing the post World War II peacetime era and peacetime prosperity.

[2] See table below.

Domestic-civilian expenditures by major categories

NOTE.—The following table breaks down item 1 above.

[In millions]

Domestic-civilian increases and decreases	Actual, 1946 [1]	Actual, 1950	Estimate, 1951	President's requests, 1952
1. Social welfare, health, and security	$1,085	$2,213	$2,520	$2,625
2. Housing and community development	−180	261	409	−102
3. Education and general research	88	114	143	483
4. Agriculture and agricultural resources	701	2,784	986	1,429
5. Natural resources (exclusive of atomic energy)	257	1,004	1,301	1,244
6. Transportation (exclusive of Merchant Marine, Coast Guard, Panama, and Alaska)	413	1,752	1,426	1,073
7. Finance, commerce, and industry	102	227	368	1,524
8. Labor	192	263	212	225
9. General government (exclusive of interest, refunds, claims)	933	1,037	1,082	1,228
Total	3,591	9,655	8,437	9,834

[1] Fiscal year 1946 is used because we were in a semiwar economy at that time as well as now. Then we were descending from the wartime requirements, now we are ascending in these aspects. At that time we still had controls such as those under OPA and we were negotiating to cancel contracts. Now we are building up control agencies and making loans to business for defense production.

NOTES

In connection with the preceding tables and the President's budget message in general, it may be noted:

1. The President requests $71,600,000,000 in expenditures, and $55,100,000,000 in revenue. Deficit $16,500,000,000.

2. He says the budget must be balanced and that he will submit requests for additional taxes at a later date.

3. The President requests $7,500,000,000 in foreign assistance (military and economic aid together) as compared with estimated expenditures of $4,700,000,000 this year and actual expenditures of $4,600,000,000 in 1950, $4,600,000,000 in 1948, and $1,400,000,000 in 1946.

4. The President requests $43,400,000,000 for defense including military, stockpile, NACA, Selective Service, merchant marine, Coast Guard, Alaska, Panama, and atomic energy. This figure is compared with an estimate of $22,600,000,000 for these items this year, $13,400,000,000 actual expenditures in 1950, $10,600,000,000 in 1948, and $45,400,000,000 in 1946.

5. The President requested $4,900,000,000 for veterans as compared with $5,700,000,000 estimated for this year, $6,600,000,000 in 1950, $6,600,000,000 in 1948, and $4,400,000,000 in 1946.

6. The President requested $5,900,000,000 for interest, claims, etc., as compared with an estimated $5,700,000,000 this year, and actual $5,800,000,000 in 1950, $5,200,000,000 in 1948, and $4,800,000,000 in 1946.

7. The budget includes all of the Fair Deal proposals; the Brannan plan, FEPC, $290,000,000 for federalized education in secondary schools, socialized housing, and socialized medicine, with its $275,000,000 in new taxes for this purpose.

8. The most constructive field of reduction was not only virtually untouched but in fact it was increased; namely, grants-in-aid to States. These grants to States were increased from an estimated $2,500,000,000 this year to $3,000,000,000 next year. In these perilous times when the Federal Government is forced to arm the Nation and has undertaken to prop up half the world economically and militarily, the least the States can do is to pay their own bills. I had hoped indeed that the President would come out for basic legislation declaring a moratorium on most of these payments, but there is no mention of such a proposal.

9. Civilian public-works requests in the 1952 budget total $3,400,000,000 as compared with $2,900,000,000 this year and $2,000,000,000 last year.

10. Despite expanded coverage of the social-security system, public-assistance grants would be increased. The whole social welfare, health, and security category would be increased by $105,000,000. Exclusive of the railroad retirement fund the increase in this category would total $57,000,000. Virtually none of it could be justified for the national defense.

11. The President includes at least $3,000,000,000 for civilian defense, including more than $1,000,000,000 for business loans, and a

great many projects which are wide open for boondoggle exploitation by Federal agencies, State and local agencies, and fly-by-night business outfits, all of which are trying to get into the defense act.

12. The President says 40 percent of the items in the budget have been reduced but at the same time there are 304 increased items in the budget.

13. For the first time since the foreign-assistance programs were inaugurated, the defense and economic programs are consolidated in such a manner as to make it impossible to determine how much is proposed for each.

CONSTRUCTION AT MILITARY AND NAVAL INSTALLATIONS—MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT (H. DOC. NO. 42)

The VICE PRESIDENT laid before the Senate a message from the President of the United States, which was read and referred to the Committee on Armed Services.

(For President's message, see today's proceedings of the House of Representatives on pp. 288–289.)

FOREIGN POLICY

Mr. DOUGLAS. Mr. President, in relatively quiet periods those of us who are not members of the Foreign Relations Committee seldom speak on the floor of the Senate about foreign policy. At such times we are content to leave the discussion of these issues to those who in committee have pulled the laboring oar.

But when great storms arise and the helmsmen have to make crucial decisions about the future course of action, when the safety and peace of our country and of the world are at stake, then such matters become the proper concern of us all. It was probably such considerations as these which led the Senator from Ohio [Mr. TAFT] to open the debate 10 days ago, and which has caused certain other Senators who are not members of the committee, including the Senator from California [Mr. KNOWLAND], to make their contributions. In the light of these precedents, I hope my colleagues will not think me forward if I rise to discuss the same set of concerns.

I. THE NEED FOR DECISION

Mr. President, along with others I am grateful to the eminent former President of the United States, Mr. Hoover, and to the senior Senator from Ohio [Mr. TAFT] for raising the great issues of what should be America's commitments in the world and the precise military responsibilities which we should assume.

I should also like to compliment both Mr. Hoover and the Senator from Ohio, if I may, for speaking directly and clearly to the issues which they have raised and for their refusal to indulge in any personal attacks. The Senator from Ohio, it is true, made some rather stringent criticisms of the President of the United States and his past actions; but those criticisms were directed toward the President's exercise of his powers, rather than to the person of the Chief Executive.

We are further in debt to the Senator from Ohio for the fact that he chose to launch this debate in the proper forum of the United States Senate, rather than to make himself merely one of a series of prominent citizens relying upon the air waves as a medium for settling a great constitutional and political issue. By his determined forehandedness, he has set in train a Senate debate which in my judgment was both inevitable and proper. He has raised the issues which are at stake, in terms which should call forth a clear-cut decision by the Senate, and possibly by the House of Representatives.

PRESIDENTIAL POWER TO SEND TROOPS ABROAD

Mr. President, I believe that the President of the United States has the constitutional power to send additional troops to Europe; but I also believe that the issue as to whether it is wise for him to send them is so important that it is desirable and indeed necessary to debate it here in the United States Senate, and for us to reach fairly quickly a definite decision.

Mr. MILLIKIN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. HOLLAND in the chair). Does the Senator from Illinois yield to the Senator from Colorado?

Mr. DOUGLAS. I prefer not to yield during the course of my main address, or at least not until I have finished with my attempted refutation of the position of the Senator from Ohio. I do this, not to shut off discussion, but merely in order that I may have a chance to develop my argument in some detail.

Mr. MILLIKIN. I did not rise to engage in debate, but merely because I seek information. I wondered whether the Senator meant that the President of the United States has the power under his implied powers as Chief Executive or as Commander in Chief, or whether the President has the powers under the United Nations Charter or under the North Atlantic Pact.

Mr. DOUGLAS. I say to my good friend, the distinguished junior Senator from Colorado, that this will become manifest during the course of my remarks.

Let us start with the first point, namely, the constitutional powers of the President. A few days after American forces first went into action in Korea, I tried to review in the Senate the legislative history of the Constitutional Convention of 1787 with regard to the use of armed force. It is alleged—and I believe the Senator from Ohio so alleges—that since the Constitution in article I, section 8, gives solely to the Congress the power to declare war, the use of armed force by the President without congressional assent is consequently a violation of these powers, and hence a violation of the Constitution.

The true meaning of this provision, namely, to declare war, will be made much clearer, however, if we draw upon the notes which James Madison took of the debates of the Constitutional Convention, and if we trace the legislative history of the phrase, "to declare war." If we do this, we find that when the so-called Committee on Detail submitted its draft on August 6, 1787, it gave to Congress, not the right to declare, but, instead, the broader right to make war. Mr. Pinckney of South Carolina opened debate on this clause on August 17 by saying that he opposed vesting this power in the Legislature. "Its proceedings," he declared, "were too slow."

After further discussion by Mr. Butler of South Carolina, James Madison of Virginia and Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts both moved to strike out the verb "to make" and to substitute the verb "to declare." This was for the purpose, as Madison wrote in his Notes, of "leaving to the Executive the power to repel sudden attacks." The language we thus find in article I, section 8, was then accepted by a vote of seven States to two, with one State not participating, and three absent.

It is clear, then, that the Convention did not want to tie our country's hands by requiring congressional assent for all employment of armed force. It is obvious, instead, that, as Madison said, they wanted to leave to the President the power to use force to "repel sudden attacks," even though he was not specifically authorized to do so by Congress.

Even in later days, when the speed with which Congress could assemble constantly increased, Presidents continued to use our Armed Forces by executive direction against the forces and persons of other countries. Such action has indeed been taken on over a hundred occasions. Reference to those acts was made by the senior Senator from Texas [Mr. CONNALLY], in his address last week. Last July 5 (CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, p. 9648), I cited 15 important instances dating from 1798 to 1919, and including Jefferson's attack on the Barbary pirates, Polk's use of troops prior to the Mexican War, and Wilson's occupation of Vera Cruz. I shall not again burden the RECORD with them at this point.

Not only have Presidents exercised their constitutional powers as Commanders in Chief of the Nation's Armed Forces without specific declarations by Congress, but in the past they have specifically proclaimed their right to do so, and have recorded their assertions of this right. Thus, ex-President William Howard Taft, for example, wrote in his book, Our Chief Magistrate and His Power, as follows:

> The President is the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy, and the militia when called into the service of the United States. Under this, he can order the Army and the Navy anywhere he will, if the appropriations furnish the means of transportation * * * (p. 99).
>
> It is only in the case of a war of our aggression against a foreign country that the power of Congress must be affirmatively asserted to establish its legal existence (p. 95).

Mr. MILLIKIN. Mr. President, does the Senator mind yielding at this point?

Mr. DOUGLAS. I prefer not to yield.

Mr. MILLIKIN. There is considerable noise in the Chamber, and I wish to hear the Senator. Will he please read again the last sentence?

Mr. DOUGLAS. Certainly.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The point made by the Senator from Colorado is well taken, and the Chair asks all Senators to maintain order.

Mr. DOUGLAS. Mr. President, I repeat the quotation:

> It is only in the case of a war of our aggression against a foreign country that

the power of Congress must be affirmatively asserted to establish its legal existence.

Mr. TAFT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? Would the Senator mind inserting, in the first quotation, and following the sentence:

Under this, he can order the Army and the Navy anywhere he will, if the appropriations furnish the means of transportation—

The following words:

Of course, the instrumentality which this power furnishes gives the President an opportunity to do things which involve consequences that it would be quite beyond his power under the Constitution directly to effect.

Mr. DOUGLAS. Certainly.

Mr. TAFT. I think that should be added to the first quotation, because I think it is a substantial modification of it, and makes a substantial distinction between the right of the President to do something and his power as a fundamental consideration in this instance.

Mr. DOUGLAS. If the distinguished Senator from Ohio will be patient, he will find that is a distinction which I shall make in a few minutes.

What I have quoted was the opinion of President Taft; and, while I do not want to start an internecine war within the Taft family, I am sure the Senator from Ohio joins with me and the Nation in the high opinion which we hold of William Howard Taft as a constitutional authority on the legal power of the President, for amongst many other claims to distinction he was certainly the only man in our history who was both President and Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.

In fact, we could not find a more precise distinction between the constitutional powers of the President and those of the Congress than President Taft's words:

If the appropriations furnish the means of transportation.

Mr. BREWSTER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. DOUGLAS. Mr. President, I prefer not to yield for a question, because I am trying to develop my points step by step.

Mr. BREWSTER. I ask the Senator to yield for an interpolation.

Mr. DOUGLAS. Yes, I yield; provided I do not lose my right to the floor, and provided the interpolation is of reasonable length.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. BREWSTER. The Senator from Illinois may be interested to know that on a distinguished occasion the present Senator from Ohio and the Senator from Maine wrote an article in the Harvard Law Review, pronouncing William Howard Taft as utterly wrong on a great constitutional question, and ultimately the Supreme Court unanimously decided that the Senator from Ohio and the Senator from Maine were correct.

Mr. DOUGLAS. Both confession and assertion are good for the soul, but it so happens that this address by President Taft, which I have quoted, was delivered at Columbia University in 1915 or 1916, and, therefore, was subsequent to the learned opinion handed down by the learned Senator from Ohio and the Senator from Maine, when they were students at Harvard Law School.

The appropriations to dispatch additional troops to Europe are in the process of being asked of this session of the Congress. If the President, however, chose to dispatch those troops today, and had unobligated appropriations to the Military Establishment with which to carry out the job, he would have the constitutional right to do so.

The Senator from Ohio was at great pains in his address on this floor to assert that the vote by which the Senate in 1949 ratified the Atlantic Pact instrument did not give the President the legal authority to dispatch troops to France, and that only the technicality of our occupation status in Germany gave the President the right to send additional forces to that country. Without going into details of the argument, which seems to involve the question whether agreements under the North Atlantic Treaty are not subject to the requirements of section 6 of the United Nations Participation Act of 1945, I will say that the Senator from Ohio can make out a strong case.

But the Senator is not correct, may I say, in believing that the President needed any authority from the Atlantic Pact instrument or the United Nations Act of 1945 to send troops to France, Germany, England, Korea, China, or, in the words of William Howard Taft, "anywhere he will." For that power was already given to him by the Constitution, which is prior to all the statute laws of the country.

QUESTION OF WHERE TROOPS ARE SENT SHOULD BE DEBATED

Nevertheless, Mr. President, I believe that the question as to where the United States is to send its forces and the terms under which they shall be sent, is so important, and that public opinion on the question is sufficiently divided to make it highly desirable to have that issue debated and decided on the floor of the United States Senate, and not merely discussed over the air by prominent citizens and officials in the executive branch. In particular we need to come to a decision on the principles of the Brussels agreement. The national interest, indeed, requires that a clear decision on the issue be reached by Congress in some express way. The constitutional powers of the Government are shared powers, and the issue is too important and the dangers to our survival too great, in my judgment, for the Executive to act without positive approval of Congress.

I am, of course, aware that the two positions which I have just been expressing run parallel and, on a strictly logical plane, do not meet. The President, in my view, could commit troops to Western Europe or elsewhere and then merely say to the Congress: "There you are; now to the Congress belongs the awesome responsibility of refusing to provide money and supplies to those American forces." That would be facing Congress with an accomplished fact. But I hope and believe that the President will not do that. The President said last Thursday that he would consult with congressional leaders before committing troops to Europe. But that is not enough, as I shall discuss at a later point in my remarks.

I am also fully aware of the fact that in the matter of sending troops to Europe or of not sending them, we are not starting from scratch. The composition of a joint defense force for the countries of the Atlantic Pact has been under discussion among the 11 nations for over a year. More than that, it was on last September 9 that the President of the United States declared that on the basis of recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, concurred in by the Secretaries of State and Defense, he had that day "approved substantial increases in the strength of the United States forces to be stationed in Western Europe in the interest of the defense of that area." I am not aware that any formal objection was made on the floor of the Senate to this proposal.

The agreement or understanding which was apparently concluded in Brussels in December was presumably in harmony with the President's prior statement. So the idea of our taking part in the collective defense of Europe is not novel.

But this program is being challenged more vigorously now than ever before. This has been partly caused by our defeat in Korea and by the consequent fear that if we go into Europe, we will get ourselves involved in another and more costly Korea. It has been partly caused by the well-justified feeling, which feeling I share, that the European countries have not been of great help to us or to the United Nations in repelling Communist aggression in Korea. We have apparently furnished about seven-eighths of the ground troops. But however caused, this feeling is real and we should face it.

If we can keep essential unity among ourselves and among the democratic peoples of the world, we can defeat Russian communism. In the interest of internal unity, I believe we should submit the Brussels Pact to debate and to decision and that we should not invoke the constitutional powers of the President as an excuse for the Senate not to deal with it. The constitutional argument which I have made thus far is directed to the fact that the President has acted within his constitutional powers and should not be criticized on this score for what he has done in Korea or at Brussels.

Mr. FERGUSON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. DOUGLAS. I may say to the Senator from Michigan that, when he was not in the Chamber, I said that in the interest of developing a connected argument, I did not feel that I could yield for questions.

Mr. FERGUSON. Will the Senator merely allow the Senator from Michigan to make one remark?

Mr. DOUGLAS. I again stop briefly.

Mr. FERGUSON. It would be helpful if the Senator would state whether the Brussels agreement to which he refers is the one of December 1950.

Mr. DOUGLAS. It is.

Mr. FERGUSON. Will the Senator tell us the terms, in order that we may be able better to follow his argument?

Mr. DOUGLAS. I shall develop that as we go along, but I agree that, in the interest of national unity, we should now hold these powers in abeyance for a few weeks, and not send ground troops to Europe until we and the country reach a considered decision.

SECRETARY ACHESON'S PLEDGE REGARDING USE OF TROOPS UNDER THE ATLANTIC PACT

This, in my judgment, is all the more necessary in view of the virtual pledge which was given by Secretary Acheson on April 27, 1949, when the North Atlantic Pact was up for ratification. For in reply to the following question from Senator HICKENLOOPER, "Are we going to be expected to send substantial numbers of troops over there as a more or less permanent contribution to the development of those countries' capacity to resist?" Secretary Acheson replied, "The answer to that question, Senator, is a clear and absolute 'No'." (Hearings on the North Atlantic treaty, before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 81st Cong., 1st sess., p. 47.)

Now I am quite ready to believe that Mr. Acheson gave this pledge in good faith, but that it later developed that the North Atlantic countries would not rearm adequately unless we gave them a pledge that our troops would fight beside them if they resisted and would actually be on hand if and when the trouble started. That is, they wanted to be protected at the time of the initial assault, and not merely rescued after they had been captured.

The aggressions of the Communist satellites in Korea also radically changed the picture. These developments, I believe, led to the Brussels agreement. But the Brussels agreement was negotiated under the North Atlantic treaty. It could not have been negotiated, had not the North Atlantic treaty been ratified. The Senate ratified that treaty after a categorical pledge had been given by the Secretary of State that it was not even expected that we would send a substantial number of troops to Western Europe prior to actual attack. Since that pledge was at least one of the considerations which led many Senators to vote for it, it would not be proper, in my judgment, for the administration now to try to put the agreement into effect by purely Executive action upon the narrow grounds of its constitutional powers. For to do so would violate the explicit pledge given by the Secretary to the Senate when we had the power of refusing to ratify the treaty under which the Brussels agreement was later negotiated. It would be the path of honor instead for the administration to submit the question of approving the Brussels agreement to at least the Senate and possibly the House, and for us on our side to act quickly and not to delay the matter by interminable additional hearings or by what is known outside the Senate as a filibuster.

Mr. TAFT. Mr. President, I wonder whether the Senator will yield that I might add, perhaps, somewhat to that point, in connection with the report of the committee?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator from Illinois yield to the Senator from Ohio?

Mr. DOUGLAS. I yield for a short space of time.

Mr. TAFT. I am sorry I cannot enter into debate with the Senator, because I have to leave for New York in about 15 minutes, but I should like at this point, because it seems to me to be appropriate, to read what the Foreign Relations Committee said when it reported the North Atlantic Pact:

> The treaty in no way affects the basic division of authority between the President and the Congress as defined in the Constitution. In no way does it alter the constitutional relationship between them. In particular, it does not increase, decrease, or change the power of the President as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces or impair the full authority of Congress to declare war.
>
> * * * * *
>
> It has been questioned whether a treaty subordinating action to the constitutional processes of 12 democratic nations offers sufficient certainty and immediacy of action effectively to deter aggression. The committee is convinced that it does. The expression of the will of a whole people offers far more certainty than any commitment by a dictator. The action of the democracies in the past great war is concrete evidence of their ability to act with the necessary speed in the event of an emergency.

Of course, the impression given to the Senate was that the President could not execute the treaty without action by the Congress. If this is to be done, it should be done as the expression of the will of a whole people and not merely as a commitment by a dictator.

Mr. DOUGLAS. Mr. President, I hope and believe that the administration will submit this question to the Congress soon, and I hope that the majority leadership will present such a resolution approving the Brussels agreement at an appropriate time. But I wish to serve notice that if this is not done by the leadership in the very near future, I will offer such a resolution myself. Then in good spirits let us accept the results and close our ranks against a common foe.

Perhaps there are detailed schedules and arrangements for troop disposition in the Brussels agreement which cannot be revealed for obvious security and tactical reasons. Then at least the general outline and principles of American troop participation which it calls for should, to the fullest extent that they can be divulged, be embodied in the resolution submitted to the Senate and the House.

There is one final note of caution, however, which I should add on these procedural questions. It is not only important that we decide, but also that we should decide quickly. If the Senate should get bogged down in long drawn out hearings and then in a filibuster, the need for action would justify the President using his constitutional powers and sending the first installment of troops overseas. In other words, since the safety of the country is at stake and since time is of the essence, if the Senate and Congress will not decide, then the President will have to act.

POSITIVE APPROVAL PREFERABLE TO THE NEGATIVE RESOLUTION

I may say that this is why I prefer a resolution drawn in an affirmative form, approving the Brussels agreement, to the resolution submitted by the junior Senator from Nebraska [Mr. WHERRY] in a negative form, declaring that the President should not send troops overseas unless and until the consent of the Congress has been obtained. Under the resolution of the junior Senator from Nebraska, a vacuum in time would be created during which no troops could be moved overseas. No action could be taken until affirmative consent was given by the Congress that such troops could be sent.

That would mean that it would be possible for some groups in the Senate to filibuster to prolong the discussion, and possibly the whole question of security would be sidetracked. Therefore, I think the form which I suggest, namely, a resolution approving the sending of troops overseas, is much more in the national interest than would be a negative resolution of the type submitted by the Senator from Nebraska.

Mr. FERGUSON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. DOUGLAS. For a brief question.

Mr. FERGUSON. Having left his script for the moment, I should like to ask him to explain to the Senate what the Brussels agreement is, and to what it commits us.

Mr. DOUGLAS. I have not read it, and I doubt if any Senator has read it for I believe its actual text has not been released, but I have newspaper reports of some of its probable sailent features which in due course of time will go into the RECORD.

WE NEED TO MAKE A BASIC POLICY DECISION

Mr. President, I, therefore, welcome this debate. I am confident that it will result in reaffirming the principle of collective security. But the debate, if we carry it out quickly and in good temper, will be a gain to the country. It will clear the air and the minds of all of us. It will remove any charge of bad faith that might be leveled at the administration because of Mr. Acheson's pledge. It will enable us to weigh the relative merits and dangers of the Brussels agreement and some of the other issues which are pressing for decision and then allow us to decide. Let us weigh the relative values of the different alternatives and decide. Then in good spirits I hope we may accept the results. Certainly I can pledge that if the decision goes against my particular point of view I will abide willingly and in good temper by the verdict of the majority.

II. THE BRUSSELS AGREEMENT AND THE THREE MAIN POINTS OF VIEW

Where then do we begin? We begin, Mr. President, with the fact that all responsible parties to the debate, both within and without the Congress, appear to be agreed on the basic ends which we seek, namely, to protect our country from Communist aggression. The differences are merely on means and methods, namely, when, at what points, how, and with whom we should prepare to defend our-

selves. The fact that our ends are the same and that we disagree only on means should take all bitterness out of this debate and enable us to discuss the issues as friends and brothers.

It is true that there are still some who hold that the immediate danger of Communist aggression is highly speculative or nonexistent. The Senator from Ohio [Mr. TAFT], for example, stated that it was not clear that the Russians contemplate a military conquest of the world.

I read from his remarks on page 65 of the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD of January 5, 1951:

> In the first place, I believe they know it is impossible. It would take them at least a hundred years to get across the seas.

The Senator from Ohio apparently believes the Communists do not even contemplate military aggression with their own troops against Western Europe, but that they would move into West Germany with the Communist troops from East Germany, and possibly from Poland and Czechoslovakia as well.

Mr. TAFT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. DOUGLAS. I yield.

Mr. TAFT. What I said was that there was, to my mind, no conclusive evidence of the fact that the Russians were going to attack. Further down I said there was a much greater possibility that they would, or something of that sort. I said I thought the chances were probably in favor of Russia not attacking, but certainly I did not venture to predict what they would do. I do not know what they will do. I think the chances are against attacking, but I certainly said that if there is a much greater possibility of its being done, we must take action against them.

Mr. DOUGLAS. If the Senator had been willing to trust me a moment or two longer, he would have seen that I had a qualifying phrase about his views. I can assure him that I am trying to be completely fair.

I was going to say that the Senator from Ohio, despite these reservations, agrees with virtually all Americans, except Communists, fellow travelers, and honest pacifists, that—

> There is a greater possibility of a destructive war against our liberty than we have ever faced in the past.

So I did not mean to do the Senator wrong. If he had only waited for another sentence it would have been manifest that I was quoting his complete position.

The general debate which has arisen, therefore, is over the means and methods of averting such a war and of preparing to win it when and if it comes. If narrowed still further, the immediate question is whether we shall approve or disapprove the Brussels agreement.

There appear to be three main groups with conflicting views on these issues of the proper and wise means to use. The first group believes that we should not go through with our part of the Brussels agreement. The other two groups both believe that we should carry through with the Brussels agreement, but differ in regard to the degree of active interest which we should take in the affairs of Asia.

I think there will be no objection if I say that the first position is the Hoover position of protecting the United States and its outposts only.

1. THE TAFT-HOOVER POSITION: "PROTECT THE UNITED STATES AND OUTPOSTS ONLY"

First, there are those of the Taft-Hoover, or the "protect the United States and outposts only," school of thought who would confine our present efforts to the defense of America, but who would not use land armies importantly in that undertaking. I do not mean by this that there are not important differences in the views of the Senator from Ohio and those of former President Hoover. Mr. Hoover would apparently not take any real steps to defend the continents of either Asia or Europe, but would instead use island air bases, including Britain, primarily as a protective screen for the United States. The Senator from Ohio would use such bases, and many more of them than Mr. Hoover suggests, not only for this purpose but also for retaliatory and deterrent bombing over the continents of Asia and Europe themselves.

Both, however, see it as unwise and impractical to use American land forces on foreign soil to any appreciable extent, and certainly the general drift of their argument is against our committing more American ground troops upon either the continent of Europe or Asia. This group will, therefore, be opposed—unless they are convinced by the logic of this debate—to our furnishing 8 or 10 divisions for the defense of continental Europe as is reported to have been provided under the Brussels agreement.

2. THE "PROTECT EUROPE BUT NOT ASIA" POSITION

The second group, representing the "protect Europe but not Asia" position, believes that we should join in the defense of Western Europe and carry out the Brussels agreement. But this is about as far as they would go. They would slight any defense of Asia and would tend to confine our efforts to the defense of Western Europe. For Western Europe, it is said, is the vital seat of power and the only permanent head for the Russia serpent, which has its coils in so many satellite states of Europe and Asia.

These same persons would restrict our binding military commitments in the Pacific area to those outposts of our sea approaches—Japan, Okinawa, the other Ryukyus, Formosa, the Philippines, the small islands of the Pacific, New Zealand, and the subcontinent of Australia.

This group is supported by many in the councils of the executive government and by a number of able publicists. These men hold the view, of which the British are the strongest exponents, that the Communist timetable is geared for the next 3 years to picking up soft spots—and, incidentally, raw materials—in Asia, thus affording a considerable amount of time in which the west may vastly improve Europe's defenses. This school of thought sincerely believes that anything which diverts America's interests from the vital European theater merely serves the interests of Russian aggression. The advocates of this point of view are, therefore, more or less willing to let the continent of Asia go. They are resigned to this because they believe that we and Western Europe do not have the strength to defend both Asia and Western Europe and that if we are to protect the latter, we must abandon the former.

BRITAIN SEEMS TO AGREE WITH HOOVER'S POLICY

While this comparison may shock our British friends, it is nevertheless true that their reluctance to back us up in the Far East is very similar to Mr. Hoover's reluctance to back them up in Europe. The British are at present, therefore, largely isolationist in their attitudes toward the Far East. They apparently do not want to use any more of their strength to help defend the principle of collective security in areas such as Korea and China where their own national and material interests are not directly involved, although they probably would feel very differently were Malaya, Singapore, and India to be directly and immediately threatened. While I want to make it clear that I shall try to keep the term "isolationist" out of this debate in my remarks, if the British regard Mr. Hoover and the Senator from Ohio [Mr. TAFT] as isolationists, so far as Europe is concerned, they should not object if others regard them as isolationists in the matter of Asia, or at least the Far East.

This isolationism is the most charitable explanation of why the British early recognized the Chinese Communists; why, after the open and barefaced aggression by these Chinese Communists, they are still opposed to having the United Nations brand them as such; why they are opposed to having the United Nations or ourselves invoke economic sanctions against the Chinese Communists; and why they want the Chinese Communists seated in the United Nations itself. The British attitude is probably stiffened by the large profits which their traders are making from handling the huge volume of trade with Communist China through Hong Kong.

According to a report from Hong Kong which appeared in the New York Times January 3, section C, page 52, Hong Kong in the first 11 months of this year had 35 percent more trade than it had during the preceding 12 months. It had $1,150,000,000—American money—of trade. On a monthly rate this was 42 percent above the preceding year. And yet 1949 had previously been the year of greatest trade in the history of the port. In other words, the traders of Hong Kong have been making enormous profits out of supplying the Chinese Communists, and they are therefore strengthening the Chinese forces which are shooting down our troops and, indeed, British troops in Korea. I hope the British people will wake up to what is happening for I do not think they will approve of it.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Mr. President, will the Senator from Illinois yield for a question, on my promise that I shall not take more than a minute? I think it is timely to ask the question at this point in his address.

Mr. DOUGLAS. I shall be glad to yield for an interjection.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Does not the Senator from Illinois, who is making a very able address—and I wish the full membership of the Senate could be present to hear it—agree that the policy of doing business with Communist China is on a par with what was done by businessmen, both British and American, who were shipping scrap iron and oil to the Japanese war lords prior to Pearl Harbor, and that commercial dealings with blood money in support of a potential aggressor may have the same disastrous effects upon the peace and the security of the world which resulted from the dealings with the Japanese war lords in scrap iron and oil prior to December 7, 1941?

Mr. DOUGLAS. I thank the Senator from California for his observation. I agree with him. I hold in my hand a clipping from the New York Times of December 16. According to this dispatch written by Henry R. Lieberman from Hong Kong and appearing on page C 3, the British merchants in Hong Kong are opposing the United States ban on exports to Red China and to Hong Kong, saying it is a vicious blockade. The British colony in Hong Kong, at least, wants to continue this obviously profitable trade, even though at the time this dispatch was written the Chinese Communist armies were in the field attacking our men and others in the UN forces. I want to make clear, however, that this is not the sole reason for British action. It is merely one strand but a powerful one. British diplomats, elements of left-wing labor and the Hong Kong traders with their influence in the city of London are all at work to favor Red China. The British view of military strategy is, therefore, intensified by their short-run economic interests, although the same is not true of those Americans who follow the same line. They have no such economic interest.

3. THE "PROTECT FREEDOM EVERYWHERE WE CAN" POSITION

Third. There is finally a third school, to which I belong, which believes that the United States must strive to help put down aggression everywhere; provided, however, first, that other nations will adequately join us in the attempt; and second, that the places in which the aggression occurs, or threatens to occur, are accessible to our forces. I would call this the "Protect Freedom Everywhere We Can" position. It would be impracticable and unwise, for example, for us to try to resist Communist aggression in Tibet. But if joined by other nations in an equality of sacrifice, we believe that it is vital to resist Communist aggression not only in Western Europe, but also in Indochina, in Malaya, in Indonesia, in North Africa, in the Near East—yes, in India too.

We favor this because we believe that peace is indivisible, and because we believe that if aggression, particularly of the concerted Communist type, is allowed to succeed, it will build up the strength of the aggressors and encourage them to further aggression. We believe that it is better to check aggression in its early stages before it has gathered great headway, rather than merely deal with it later when, in full armor and swollen strength, it attacks us where the material and territorial interests necessary for our security are directly at stake.

We do not believe in this policy in order to be aggressive ourselves, nor from any desire to throw our weight around. We believe in it because we want the reign of law to triumph and want all men and nations to be able to live relatively free from the fear of attack, and hence be able to enjoy freedom and justice and to cultivate the arts of peace. We would like to have the United States, as the strongest Nation in the world, continue to take the lead in these efforts, although we have no desire to dictate to anyone, even in these worthwhile pursuits. For we believe that the ultimate safety of the United States lies in having a secure world and that our own safety, like that of other nations, is involved in the maintenance of peace everywhere.

Mr. MILLIKIN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. DOUGLAS. I will yield for an interjection, but not for a question.

Mr. MILLIKIN. Will the Senator repeat the conditions which he attaches?

Mr. DOUGLAS. First, that other nations will adequately join us in our attempts to stop aggression. Second, that the places in which the aggression occurs, or threatens to occur, are accessible to our forces.

In the much-quoted words of John Donne, we believe that—

> No man is an island unto himself. Every man is a piece of the continent, a part of the main.

Mr. President, let us consider the substance of these views. I hope I shall be able to state fairly the arguments for each and to pass a balanced judgment upon them. In all this discussion, we should remember that while the approval of the Brussels agreement or understanding is in the immediate foreground; in the background lies the question of our whole foreign policy and the proper programs for our military and economic defense.

III. THE TAFT-HOOVER PROGRAM OF "PROTECT THE UNITED STATES AND OUTPOSTS ONLY"

I shall try to state the so-called Taft-Hoover program to protect the United States and outposts only, and I shall try to state it as clearly and as strongly as I can.

The Taft-Hoover program, as I see it, rests upon the following four pillars as arguments. I may say that I merely wish to state their contentions. I do not agree with them. Nevertheless, I believe they should be stated concisely and vigorously.

Mr. MILLIKIN. Mr. President, before the Senator goes into the discussion, will he yield for a question, not for the purpose of debate, but for the purpose of developing information?

Mr. DOUGLAS. Yes; provided it is not too long.

Mr. MILLIKIN. I notice numerous references to the Brussels agreement. I also believe I heard the Senator say that we do not have the Brussels agreement before us.

Mr. DOUGLAS. That is true.

Mr. MILLIKIN. I should like to have the Senator's opinion as to what is in the Brussels agreement, and the relation of General Eisenhower's visit to the Brussels agreement. I do not see how we can relate these things if we do not know what they mean.

Mr. DOUGLAS. I do not wish to tantalize the very able Senator from Colorado excessively on this point. I may say that I shall come to that question later. We have all read the newspapers. We all have a rough idea of what is probably in the Brussels agreement. When I come to discuss the military situation I shall make explicit what the newspapers have to say, so far as the probable total number of divisions is concerned, and so far as target dates and American participation are concerned.

Mr. MILLIKIN. May I ask the distinguished Senator whether he knows whether either our Committee on Armed Services or our Committee on Foreign Relations has been advised of the contents of the Brussels agreement?

Mr. DOUGLAS. I am not a member of either of those committees. Therefore, of course, I do not know. But we all read the newspapers, and we have probably a fairly accurate idea of what that agreement is. Furthermore, we are all very certain that the Brussels agreement will provide for our furnishing further troops to the joint defense of Europe. While we may not know the precise number of troops called for, the principle of sending more troops is the real issue at stake.

Mr. President, let me state the four arguments, as I see them, behind the Taft-Hoover program.

First. The first argument runs to this effect: The countries of Western Europe, they say, will not cooperate fully or adequately in building a joint army capable of holding a military line against the Russians. The assumption here seem to be that Europe is so war-weary and so undermined by Communist strength and propaganda that it will not have the resolution to arm itself adequately or to resist. Even with the addition of 10 divisions or even 1,500,000 American troops, the total European forces, according to the Senator from Ohio, would not be enough to check the huge and well-organized Communist armies coming from the east. To commit any appreciable number of American troops to the continent would, therefore, according to him, and to others, be to invite their virtually certain destruction. It is implied that our troops would be either annihilated or captured, while less temperate exponents of this point of view have said that the very blood of those American boys would be upon the hands of those who sent them overseas.

Second. The second argument, as I see it, is that according to the Senator from Ohio, in order to fulfill our admitted commitments under the North Atlantic Pact and the military-aid program, however mistaken such agreements originally were, we should concentrate our support in the form of sea and air power. Without risking any appreciable number of ground troops, we should furnish a well-equipped air force to bomb the advancing Communist armies in the event war is declared. Then if the Communists took Western Europe by force, our airplanes could be used to destroy the steel and iron plants and in fact the whole industrial potential of that area, as well as targets in Russia.

Third. The third argument seems to be that the sending of additional American troops to Europe might provoke a Russian attack and hence hasten rather than delay war. "We should not," Mr. TAFT says, "be a military aggressor or give the impression of military aggression or incite a war which might otherwise never occur"—CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, January 5, 1951, page 61. The Senator from Ohio says that he does "not believe we shall be so welcome in Europe tomorrow, if war ever occurs"—CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, January 5, 1951, page 64—and that we would be less popular there if we were the "main instigators" of war, presumably by drawing a defense line in Western Europe and thus provoking Russia to attack.

Fourth. The fourth argument is that the giving military aid to Western Europe, including the use of ground troops, would involve us in such terrific expense that, according to the Senator from Ohio, there would be a yearly deficit of at least $20,000,000,000. This would mean inflation, the imposition of controls and an inevitable loss of what the Senator, calls "liberty at home." The Senator from Ohio believes his own program could be carried through with 3,000,000 men under arms, with a military budget of forty billions and a total budget of sixty-five billions. This sum, he believes, is about the most which can be raised by taxation and hence the most that can be spent without inflation and all its terrible results.

IV. A REFUTATION OF THE TAFT-HOOVER "PROTECT THE UNITED STATES AND OUTPOSTS ONLY" POSITION

I want to consider the relative soundness of these four main pillars upon which the conclusions of Messrs. TAFT and Hoover so largely rest and which have led them and their followers to regret the further commitments of troops contained in the Brussels agreement or understanding. I shall consider each of these objections in order and then I shall show some of the positive advantages of the Brussels agreement.

Mr. KERR. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a point of information with reference to the Brussels agreement and its commitments? Would I be correct in assuming that the Senator is speaking of the Brussels agreement as synonymous in terms with the North Atlantic Pact?

Mr. DOUGLAS. No. I have been waiting to develop this point, but inasmuch as the same question arises over and over, I may say that I have before me a number of copies of the New York Times, including the issues of Wednesday, January 3, and Sunday, December 24 and so on. The statement of reputable correspondents on several occasions is that it is believed that the Brussels agreement calls for a total strength in Western Europe of approximately 55 divisions; that it is probable that the American contribution is to be 10 divisions—possibly 8, but probably 10—and that the target date at which this maximum strength is to be reached, which was originally 1953, may possibly have been shoved forward to the end of 1952.

The Brussels agreement has not been given to the public. I do not know what its precise contents are. I have no inside sources of information, all I know is what I read in the newspapers. I do not know whether any Member of the Senate knows more. But we do know that the correspondents of one of the most reliable newspapers in the United States, competent correspondents, have stated that these are the general terms. I have never heard a denial from the State Department that these are not the terms.

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a point of information?

Mr. DOUGLAS. I am assuming that the statements which we have seen in the press represent approximately the facts, although, so far as I am concerned the real issue is not so much how many troops shall we send, but shall we send further troops.

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator from Illinois yield to the Senator from New Jersey?

Mr. DOUGLAS. I have again and again stated that in order to preserve continuity in my remarks I did not wish to yield for extended questioning.

Mr. MILLIKIN. Mr. President, let me aid the Senator——

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Jersey was recognized by the Chair.

Mr. DOUGLAS. I yield to the Senator from New Jersey.

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. I should like to say to the distinguished Senator from Illinois that the Senator from New Jersey, at a hearing of the Foreign Relations Committee, asked the very question which is raised here. I asked what, if anything, were the agreements at Brussels. I was told that there were no fixed agreements, but that whatever there was was top secret, and that even the Senator from New Jersey, as a member of the Foreign Relations Committee, could not get any information whatever on the subject. I think my colleagues on that committee will bear out that statement. We were told that no comment of any kind should be made because of the danger of leakage to the press.

I am very much concerned about the statement that there is some agreement, because certainly the Foreign Relations Committee should know about it if it exists.

Mr. DOUGLAS. I read from the New York Times of Wednesday, January 3. If it is in the New York Times, I take it that it is available to everyone, and cannot be classified as secret. Does the Senator from New Jersey agree with me in that statement?

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. All the Senator from New Jersey can say is that if the New York Times has this information and members of the Foreign Relations Committee cannot get it because it is top secret that is something that we ought to know about. It is a very important disclosure.

Mr. DOUGLAS. I do not know how the New York Times got this information. I merely say that to the best of my knowledge it is a responsible newspaper.

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. I merely say, as a member of the Foreign Relations Committee, that we were told that it was such a top secret that we could not even be trusted with it.

Mr. DOUGLAS. I take it the Senator from New Jersey reads the New York Times. I wonder if he noticed the article in the issue of Wednesday, Januard 3, section C, on page 47——

Mr. MILLIKIN. Mr. President——

Mr. DOUGLAS. Would it be regarded as top secret if I were to place it in the RECORD?

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. I certainly think not. I am interested in what the New York Times got that members of the Foreign Relations Committee could not get.

Mr. MILLIKIN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. DOUGLAS. Let me ask the chairman of the Armed Services Committee [Mr. RUSSELL] if I would be violating any rules of security if I were to place in the RECORD a quotation from the New York Times on the nature of the Brussels agreement.

Mr. RUSSELL. Mr. President, I may say to the distinguished Senator from Illinois that this is merely an individual opinion. I am not undertaking to express the opinion of the Armed Services Committee, because we have had no meeting on this subject. However, it would not be a violation of any security regulation of which I have any knowledge to place any newspaper article in the RECORD.

Mr. DOUGLAS. I thank the Senator from Georgia. With the reassurance that I shall neither be subject to court martial as a Reserve officer nor expelled from membership in the United States Senate, I should like to place this passage in the RECORD.

Mr. LEHMAN rose.

Mr. DOUGLAS. Will the Senator from New York allow me a little time?

At the moment of his arrival General Eisenhower's total force probably will not

number more than eight effective divisions; two United States, two British with a third due soon, three French plus one Belgian. With this General Eisenhower must face for at least a year an estimated 175 combat Russian divisions. However, by the end of 1952—if the Atlantic alliance powers translate their paper plans into armed troops—General Eisenhower should be able to count on upwards of 55 Allied divisions in Europe—with 20 more pledged for the year following.

This is from a rather extended article analyzing and summarizing the results of the Brussels Conference by Benjamin Welles of the Times staff. And there have been other similar references.

Mr. LEHMAN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. DOUGLAS. I yield.

Mr. LEHMAN. Am I to understand that the Senator from Illinois now proposes that the Brussels agreement be submitted to the entire Senate in all its details, and that until it is ratified by the Senate it would not become effective?

Mr. DOUGLAS. Oh, no. I am proposing that it be submitted in its main outlines and principles to the Senate; that the general gist be submitted for discussion and approval, but that in the meantime it shall be operative. I am agreeing that the President has the constitutional power to act, and that no constitutional vacuum, so to speak, exists.

Mr. LEHMAN. Mr. President, may I ask one other question?

Mr. DOUGLAS. Yes.

Mr. LEHMAN. Simply to clarify my own thinking. It is not quite clear to me how, if an agreement is submitted to the Senate for its consideration and ratification——

Mr. DOUGLAS. "Approval," I think, is a better word than "ratification."

Mr. LEHMAN. "Approval." I should have used that term. It is not clear to me how the President can then proceed to operate under the agreement, if, on the one hand, he submits an agreement to the Senate for its approval and then by action of a small body of men——

Mr. DOUGLAS. The Senate of the United States.

Mr. LEHMAN. It is rejected. I do not see how the President can then proceed without virtually defying and flouting the Congress of the United States.

Mr. DOUGLAS. That is quite true. If it is submitted to the Senate, and the Senate votes it down, while the President could still have the constitutional power to act, I do not think he would have the moral right to act unless subsequent developments made it absolutely imperative.

Mr. LEHMAN. What would happen if the Senate took no action whatsoever; if there was a filibuster?

Mr. DOUGLAS. If the Senate did not act, then the President would have the moral, as well as the constitutional, right to act. In other words, it is important that there should be a right to act, and if the Senate does not take advantage of its opportunity and decide, then the President should decide and act as Commander in Chief of our Armed Forces.

Mr. MILLIKIN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. DOUGLAS. I listen to the siren from Colorado. He is a very attractive siren. I know unless I stuff wax in my ears or lash myself to the mast he is likely to lead me onto the rocks. However, I shall take that chance and yield for a slight observation, but not for a question.

Mr. MILLIKIN. So that we may get rid of the confusion of the nondisclosed Brussels agreement, I wonder whether we may assume that when the distinguished Senator contrasts these various views which have been offered, he himself is speaking in terms of sending ground troops over, say of the order of 8 or 10 divisions.

Mr. DOUGLAS. Yes, that is correct.

Mr. MILLIKIN. That will clarify the debate completely so far as getting the Senator's viewpoint of these various proposals is concerned.

Mr. DOUGLAS. Yes; and on the other hand the essence of the Taft-Hoover proposal is that we should not send further ground troops.

Mr. MILLIKIN. The Senator is explaining the essence of various proposals by others. I want to know what the Senator is proposing.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. DOUGLAS. I yield for an observation, not for a question.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I desire to clarify one point about the agreement. I have not read all the article from the New York Times. I do not think it is quite right to leave the impression, which is left, unless there is something else in the article that says there was a formal agreement at Brussels. I believe that article—the one which I read—leaves the impression that there were no more than tentative discussions as to plans; that there was no agreement. From what little discussion I have heard that is, I believe, a more accurate way to describe it than to leave the impression that there was a formal agreement arrived at in Brussels. My own view is that I think there were only discussions as to perhaps the proper way to proceed.

Mr. DOUGLAS. It is pretty hard to determine when flesh and tissue turn into cartilage, and cartilage into bone, and so on, and so on. The degrees of solidification are difficult to map out. But I read again from the New York Times, this time from the issue of Sunday, December 24, and for the benefit of the Senator from Michigan and others I will say it is in section 4 E, page 1, the second column, near the bottom:

The contemplated Atlantic army would by no means equal Russia's—

And notice this—

(One estimate puts the theoretical western figure at 55 divisions.)

In addition, it may be worth while to note that in the Atlantic Council's communique from Brussels on December 19, which appears in the New York Times for December 20, on page C 11, the following is stated:

The North Atlantic Council, acting on the recommendations of its defense committee, today completed arrangements initiated in September last for the establishment in Europe of an integrated force under a centralized control and command. This force is to be composed of contingents contributed by the participating governments.

And 3 days later the report of the Secretary of State, Mr. Acheson, as reported on page C 3 of the Times for December 23, included the following:

The important thing now in the future is action. At Brussels we did several things. We took recommendations which had come from the meetings immediately preceding in London and acted on those recommendations. They had to do with the creation of the united, unified, integrated army which is to provide for the defense of Europe.

The papers which came to us laid out the structure of that army, how it should be composed, of what troops, where should the troops come from, how should it be organized, what was its command structure which would give that army its direction, and how should the supreme commander be selected and appointed. All of those matters were dealt with in the papers that came to us, and all of those matters were acted upon.

The structure was agreed upon and the force was created.

From all of these reports it seems reasonable to conclude that agreements of substance were concluded.

1. WILL WESTERN EUROPE COOPERATE?

Now to return to the refutation of the Taft-Hoover contentions, the first pillar in the Taft-Hoover argument is their insistence that the morale of western Europe is so bad and its military strength so weak that it is foolhardy to endanger the lives of American troops by putting them beside the Europeans.

One strand in this argument is the widely held assumption that England, France, and the other European nations are shirking the job of rearmament. It is this belief, namely, that France and other European nations are shirking the job of rearmament, which lies behind the contention that, if we help western Europe with ground forces to the degree which we apparently promised at Brussels, we will be bearing far too much of the load. It was this feeling which apparently prompted Mr. Hoover to say that "before we land another man or another dollar on their shores" the European nations must supply "organized and equipped combat divisions in such huge numbers as would erect a sure dam against the Red flood."

A. DO WE HAVE AN EQUALITY OF SACRIFICE?

What then is the truth behind these assumptions which the advocates of the Taft-Hoover policy make hourly that Europe is not doing its share to protect itself?

Somewhat to my own surprise, I must confess, I find that even before the increases reported to have been decided upon at Brussels are added, the defense efforts of the western European nations are largely comparable to our own. Anyone who will look into the facts, Mr.

President, will discover that the picture that has been painted of our promising aid to people who will not help themselves is not an accurate picture at all.

What has helped to create the mistaken impression has been the superficial comparison of the total number of men we in the United States have under arms with the total number which a given European country such as France, Britain, or Holland has in its armed forces, and the absolute amounts which we spend for armaments compared with the total sums being expended by a given government. When, for example, it is found that we have more than three times as many in our Armed Forces as France and are spending 10 times as much on armament as Great Britain, the average person almost immediately forms the conclusion that these countries are lying down on the job. But what this snap judgment ignores is the fact that our population is more than three times as great as that of France—almost four times—while our national income is approximately six times that of the United Kingdom.

To use absolute figures to determine the relative degree of sacrifice as between countries is, therefore, absolutely fallacious. For we would not expect a middle-sized man to bear the same load as a giant or a poor man to contribute as much to the armed services as a millionaire. We, therefore, should use the relative degree of sacrifice rather than the absolute amount of sacrifice to find out how the various countries in the North Atlantic alliance compare with each other. In other words, we should not compare the total number of men under arms in the various countries, but the number per 1,000 population, or better still, if the figures were available, the number per 1,000 males between the ages of 18 and 45. And similarly we should not compare the total amounts spent for military purposes, but instead the percentages which these military expenditures form of the national income in the various countries.

But up to now, it has not been possible to find such comparisons as these upon which, in a sense, a large part of the argument actually turns.

I, therefore, have been trying for a considerable period of time to get the facts on these all important questions and have studied official publications and all other available sources. As a result, I think I am now able to present for the first time a series of these comparisons which should go a long way toward settling the question.

LET US COMPARE OUR EFFORTS WITH THOSE OF WESTERN EUROPE

Mr. President, at this point, I ask unanimous consent to incorporate in the RECORD as a part of my remarks table I comparing for this year and the year just ended the number of men in the Armed Forces per 1,000 population in the United States and the principal western European countries. I have put the same figures on the chart on the easel at the side of the room.

There being no objection, the table was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

TABLE I.—*Numbers in armed forces per 1,000 population, North Atlantic treaty countries, except Canada*

Country	Population (millions)	Total armed forces	Number in armed forces per thousand of population
United States	[1] 152.3	[2] 2,106,633	14
		[3] 2,771,121	18
United Kingdom	[4] 50.6	[5] 820,600	16
		[6] 899,900	18
France	[7] 41.6	[8] 656,136	16
		[9] 739,317	18
Italy	[7] 46.0	[10] 300,000	6.5
Norway, Netherlands, Belgium, Luxemburg, Denmark, Portugal	[7] 35.2	[11] 350,000	10

[1] As of Jan. 1, 1951, Washington Star, Jan. 1, 1951, p. 1.
[2] Total armed strength under regular defense appropriations for 1951 and first supplemental appropriation of 1951.
[3] Total anticipated armed strength on June 30, 1951, under second supplemental appropriation bill of 1951. For source of this and preceding note see U. S. House of Representatives, hearings on second supplemental appropriation bill for 1951, pt. 1, p. 42.
[4] Mid-1950, UN Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, Dec. 1950.
[5] As of Mar. 1950, including auxiliaries and territorials.
[6] Anticipated end total by Mar. 1951, under supplementary estimates for current fiscal year, New York Times, Dec. 6, 1950, p. 24.
[7] Mid-1949, UN Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, Dec. 1950.
[8] As of Dec. 31, 1950, New York Herald Tribune, Jan. 1, 1951, p. 4.
[9] According to provisional budgets adopted for January and February 1951, New York Herald Tribune, Jan. 1, 1951, p. 4.
[10] This is the figure set by the Peace Treaty as the upper limit for Italian armed forces including the Carabinieri. Present forces are under treaty strength.
[11] Estimated. The actual number would probably be between 300,000 and 400,000.

Mr. DOUGLAS. I may say that if any Senators wish to follow the argument in detail, I can have copies of the tables, and indeed, of my whole speech furnished to any Senators so they can follow the figures.

NUMBER OF MEN IN ARMED SERVICES PER 1,000 POPULATION

Table I, Mr. President, shows that the number of men per 1,000 of population in the Armed Forces of the United States for 1950 was 14 per thousand; for the United Kingdom, 16; for France, 16; for Italy, which has treaty restrictions on its forces, that is, a ceiling fixed by treaty, 6.5; and then I have pieced together the best estimates I can obtain in regard to Norway, Denmark, Luxemburg, Portugal, Holland, and Belgium, and I have lumped them together. I believe they have in their armed forces somewhere between 300,000 and 400,000, in total, and I have given the figure 350,000 as the most probable one. So for the Atlantic Pact countries in Scandinavia, the Low Countries, and Portugal, the figure is approximately 10 men in the armed services per 1,000 population.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. DOUGLAS. I yield.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Has the Senator included in the calculation the number in the Reserves?

Mr. DOUGLAS. No, I have not; I have included only the actual number in the field.

Mr. HUMPHREY. The Senator from Illinois has not taken into consideration the universal military training program in those countries, has he?

Mr. DOUGLAS. I have not; that is correct; nor have I included in the calculation the number of men who have now passed out of the active armed forces in those countries.

So, Mr. President, we see that England and France had in their armed forces a larger number of men per thousand of population than the United States had, based on a total number of approximately 2,750,000.

Comparing anticipated strengths as of some date in the first half of 1951, Mr. President, we find, for the United States, 18 men per thousand in the armed forces; for the United Kingdom, 18; and for France, 18. Therefore it will be seen that this is a precise equality. Italy's figures remain restricted under treaty, and I do not have comparable 1951 figures for the smaller Atlantic Pact nations.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. DOUGLAS. I am glad to yield.

Mr. HUMPHREY. I believe that in yesterday's Washington Star, if I am not mistaken, in the editorial section there was a special report, published by one of its contributing editors or one of its staff members, setting forth what the new developments were in the defense strength of the North Atlantic countries. I wonder whether the Senator from Illinois will include that report.

Mr. DOUGLAS. Yes, I have pieced out some material, and in a few moments I shall include it.

Mr. HUMPHREY. I thank the Senator.

Mr. DOUGLAS. In view of the fact, Mr. President, that I strongly criticized the small degree of sacrifice which other members of the United Nations, particularly Great Britain, have made so far as the war in Korea is concerned, it is only simple justice, and I am very happy to do so, to assert, that the principal Western European nations have, up to this time, gone step by step with us in at least mobilizing their total forces against the common danger. I think the figures I have cited are of enormous significance for this debate—perhaps more significant than my own remarks about the feasibility of committing United States troops to the defense of Europe, for our troops, Mr. President, will not carry a major share of the burden that must be borne.

Following out the query of the Senator from Minnesota, let me say, Mr. President, that the first table I have presented does not include figures on the strength of the organized reserves in the various countries. If these are included, France, with its compulsory military service and its approximately 1.5 million in reserve divisions, makes a still better showing, for its ratio of organized military strength is then approximately

50 per 1,000 population, as compared to our 20 per 1,000. On this basis, the French are doing twice as much as we are. It should not be forgotten that they and the British have had universal military training—not merely selective service—for some years, whereas we have not yet adopted it.

I think I should say that the French reserves are organized into divisions. It is not certain how fully equipped these are, and there may have been some slackening in combat efficiency. So I do not wish to overstretch the reserve strength which lies in the million and one-half French reserve troops; but they are there, and in some degree they are ready to take the field.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. DOUGLAS. Inasmuch as I have been declining to yield to other Senators for questions, I yield to the Senator from Minnesota only for an observation.

Mr. HUMPHREY. I should like to make the observation that recent evidence indicates that most of the North Atlantic Pact countries are extending the period of their compulsory service and universal military training.

Mr. DOUGLAS. Yes; I shall make that point in a moment.

Mr. HUMPHREY. I shall read ahead, then, in the Senator's prepared remarks.

Mr. DOUGLAS. The Senator from Minnesota is always so alert that the point he makes is one which in simple logic should follow.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair believes he should announce that the Chair has no . ,ht to recognize a Senator who is yielded to by another Senator, in order to permit the making of an observation only, unless unanimous consent for that purpose is given; and from this time forth the Chair will insist that unanimous consent must be obtained before a Senator may yield to another Senator to make an observation.

Mr. MILLIKIN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question which will help the consecutiveness of his argument?

Mr. DOUGLAS. Provided it does not take too long, and provided it does not lead me too far astray, and provided further, that it does not establish a precedent in regard to future yieldings.

Mr. MILLIKIN. I should like to ask the distinguished Senator how many divisions France has uncommitted and how many divisions the United Kingdom has uncommitted—divisions which would be available for action in Western Europe at the present time if there were need for action?

Mr. DOUGLAS. I do not know; but I read from the January 3 edition of the New York Times in which it was stated that at the moment of his arrival, General Eisenhower's total forces probably will not number more than eight effective divisions: two United States; two British, with a third due soon; three French; plus one Belgian.

Now let me continue with my presentation. Would the Senator from Coloradio think me impolite if I were to ask to be permitted to continue, in order to develop the full force of my argument?

Mr. MILLIKIN. I would never consider the Senator from Illinois impolite.

In speaking of the contributions of France and of the United Kingdom, which have been mentioned by the senior Senator from Illinois, and in connection with which he read from the New York Times, let me ask a question: Both of these nations are committed to actions against communism at the present time, are they not?

Mr. DOUGLAS. The divisions which I mentioned are on the continent of Europe, and therefore those forces will be available.

Mr. MILLIKIN. I mean that of the armies committed, France has strength in Indochina, and it is committed; and the United Kingdom has committed divisions.

Mr. DOUGLAS. The United Kingdom has committed two divisions in Malaya, I believe.

Mr. MILLIKIN. The United Kingdom has stationed divisions at other places in the world.

Mr. DOUGLAS. The Senator from Colorado adds further strength to my argument that France and England are now, although not in the same degree, participating in this world-wide struggle. But the divisions they are to furnish in Europe are in addition to those now in service in other areas.

Mr. MILLIKIN. The Senator from Illinois makes the mistake of thinking that I am trying to weaken his argument. However, that is not the case.

Mr. DOUGLAS. Then I am delighted, for the Senator from Colorado is a very formidable antagonist; and now that I know he is in my camp, my spirits bound up. [Laughter.]

Mr. MILLIKIN. Mr. President, if the distinguished Senator from Illinois does not completely obscure his argument by strict insistence upon consecutiveness, he may find an ally in his camp.

Mr. DOUGLAS. I am delighted.

Mr. MILLIKIN. I am trying to develop that these charts do not reach the end point of what is available for action in Western Europe if there is need.

Mr. DOUGLAS. No; but the chart shows the relative contributions of the various countries. As a matter of fact, if and when we commit 10 divisions or so to Western Europe, that will not be all we have. We will have some more in Asia and Japan and some more at home.

Mr. MILLIKIN. I think that is very interesting, but not decisive.

Mr. DOUGLAS. Mr. President, in view of the fact that last year the French had in their army more men per thousand of population than we had in ours, I could, indeed, pardon an ex-President of France—although I would not agree with him—if he were to go on the airways to proclaim that France would not contribute another man or another franc until America had matched them with an equality of service. I hasten to say that I hope no ex-President of France would do so, for I do not think it would be correct for such a statement to be made. However, I could understand it if an ex-President of France were to make such a statement, and it might be just as sound for him to do so as for another ex-President to say that not another man or another dollar should be contributed on our part until France had matched us.

Mr. MILLIKIN. To go into the matter of statements by ex-Presidents is dangerous.

Mr. DOUGLAS. This ex-President of France is nameless; he could be one of a number.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield, to permit me to throw a little light on the question I raised a moment ago, before we pass beyond that point?

Mr. DOUGLAS. Yes.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. In the New York Times of January 5, I have noted a question put to General Eisenhower, as follows:

> Question. At the last meeting of the North Atlantic Defense Ministers they announced that they had reached an agreement on what each nation should contribute in types and numbers.

This is the answer by General Eisenhower:

> Answer. I simply shall have to plead ignorance. I am not dodging the question. I know nothing about it, and I don't see how—until someone in a relative position of authority can dig into it—how it could be fixed beyond peradventure of change.

I think General Eisenhower certainly must have known if there had been an actual agreement.

Mr. DOUGLAS. The principle was established. There were undoubtedly some understandings, and with the high record for accuracy of the New York Times, I believe that it is not too far from the truth. If General Eisenhower stated that final agreements on details were not reached, I am confident that also is true.

Let us remember also that under the Brussels plan, according to reports, the French, British, and all the smaller countries have pledged themselves materially to increase their armed forces. The proportions for all countries are going to rise, but I have not been able to obtain the figures. The Senator from Arkansas says the proportions have not yet been agreed upon, but I am confident they will show a substantial equality of sacrifice on the part of the other members of the pact. I hope that the terms of the Brussels agreement will provide for a substantial increase in the relative contributions which the smaller countries, such as Belgium, Holland, Canada, and other nations, will make to the common defense. All too frequently there is a tendency on the part of the small countries to take a free ride upon the strength of the large countries and to depend for their protection upon the strength of the large nations, but since this is a common battle, they should make their own contributions as well, and these should approach an equality with the three big powers. Belgium and Holland, for example, should rise nearer to the level of France.

OTHER FACTORS INDICATING WESTERN EUROPE IS INCREASING HER STRENGTH

I now come to a further point, namely, what is in the works for these other countries. I have gone over the foreign press and periodicals, and have pieced

together what I think is happening in the other nations.

The Belgian Parliament, for example, is considering an increase in military service from 12 to 24 months. There should be an increase of about 50 percent in military forces by the end of 1951. The military budget is being substantially increased.

Luxemburg, a country large enough to have an ambassador from us—or is she but a minister—is considering increases in both military forces and defense budget.

Denmark has increased its military budget more than 50 percent and is planning a sizable increase in armed forces by the end of next year. It is considering increasing military service from 12 to 18 months.

France is undertaking a rapid build-up of forces, despite the heavy drain caused by operations in Indochina.

This I think is not classified, but I believe is in the newspapers. They have announced a new 20-division program, of which 5 will be created and equipped in 1951. The period of military service has been increased from 12 to 18 months.

The Italian forces are limited to the present level by the peace treaty. Italy is improving the quality of her troops and undertaking large military production. That country now conscripts for 12 months and is planning an increase to 15 months.

The Dutch picture is complicated by the planned reduction after the Indonesian war ended. Both military forces and the defense budget were reduced then and have not yet been substantially increased. However, they are raising, according to my understanding, another division next year. Military service is now 12 months, and they are considering an increase to 18 months.

The Norwegians are undertaking an immediate increase in forces and conscript for 10 to 12 months. So far they have not announced an increased budget or increased the period of military service, but are considering an increase in military service to 18 months.

The United Kingdom has announced an increased strength next year of about 100,000. It is my impression, though I may not be able to verify it, that they have since said that their strength would go up by 200,000. In fact the wire services today carry a story of substantial British increases reported to General Eisenhower. She has increased military service from 18 to 24 months and has urged other Atlantic Pact countries to do likewise. She is also undertaking a very large production program which should provide the bulk of equipment for her own forces.

All this bears out the statement on this point which the President made in his state of the Union speech on last Monday.

Mr. President, I am not contending that all the other countries are doing everything they should; I am not contending that any of them is doing everything it should. I do not think we are doing all we should. I merely say that on a comparative basis the European countries are marching along with us, and that they cannot be disregarded, and cannot be said to be shirking their duty. That is all I say on this point, Mr. President.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator from Illinois yield to the Senator from Minnesota?

Mr. DOUGLAS. I yield, provided I do not establish a dangerous precedent.

Mr. HUMPHREY. I believe my question will be very germane. Was not the military preparedness of some of the North Atlantic Pact countries diminished or weakened by reason of the fact that many of them came out of World War II practically destroyed, immobilized, after having been under the occupation of German armies?

Mr. DOUGLAS. That is correct.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Is it not also a fact that they had no equipment or manpower organized into divisional strength, or military power?

Mr. DOUGLAS. The Senator from Minnesota is correct. The European countries, including France and England, as well as Italy, bore the direct burden of the war. As we all know, they have been in an extremely bad condition, with plants destroyed, people starving, and industry in difficulties. They are building up slowly. They are getting on their feet now, but, in view of the burdens they have sustained and the losses they have suffered, I do not think we should condemn them, particularly in view of the efforts which they have made.

Mr. HUMPHREY. May I ask the Senator a further question?

Mr. DOUGLAS. I yield.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Is it not true that most of these countries, such as Belgium, Holland, Norway, Denmark, Luxemburg, and even France, were without military forces even as late as 1946, in terms of a real, organized strength?

Mr. DOUGLAS. That is correct. Their strength was broken through the war, and they did not have a wartime basis of strength upon which to build in peacetime. They had to start to build up their armies again from scratch.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield further?

Mr. DOUGLAS. I yield.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Is it not true that one of the requirements of the Marshall plan of economic assistance was that the Marshall-plan funds were to be used for domestic economic peacetime development, not for the military potential?

Mr. DOUGLAS. The Senator is correct. We were hoping that the world would be at peace, and our purpose was to build up Europe so that the countries might enjoy the fruits of increased production, and not have it siphoned off into war.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, if the Senator will permit me at that point, I should like to say that I saw an article recently——

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator from Illinois yield to the Senator from Arkansas?

Mr. DOUGLAS. I yield for a brief observation.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator may yield only for a question.

Mr. DOUGLAS. I ask unanimous consent that I may be permitted to yield for a brief observation, without losing the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered. The Senator from Arkansas.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I merely wished to say that I read in the press recently certain itemized statements regarding refunds we had required from certain European countries, when some of the materials had been diverted to military purposes. The theory was that it was partly by way of propaganda and partly for other reasons that we were extending Marshall-plan aid for the purpose of building up the strength of those countries.

PERCENTAGE OF GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT DEVOTED TO DEFENSE

Mr. DOUGLAS. Again, Mr. President, if we look at the question of equality of sacrifice in the total defense effort from the point of view not of men but of relative expenditures—dollars, not men—we find no great disparity between what the British and French have been demanding of their people and what we have been demanding of ours.

At this point in the RECORD, Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to insert table II which compares the percentage of gross national product devoted to defense in the United States with the principal countries of Western Europe.

There being no objection, the table was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

TABLE II.—*Percentage of gross national product devoted to national defense—United States, United Kingdom, France, and Italy*

Country	Defense budget (millions)		Percent of gross national product	
	Present rate	1951 rate	Present rate	1951 rate
United Kingdom	2,380	3,108	6.4	8.0
France	1,640	2,451	7.3	9.7
Italy	595	915	4.5	6.4
United States	[1] 25,000	(2)	8.7	(2)

[1] Estimated present annual rate. Appropriations have totaled about $47.7 billion which would be 16.7 percent of the gross national product, but we are not spending as fast as we appropriate.

[2] Not available.

Source: Statistical office of the United Nations—National and per capita incomes, 70 countries 1949; various newspapers; Department of State.

Mr MILLIKIN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a brief observation?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Illinois may yield for a question only.

Mr. DOUGLAS. I ask unanimous consent that I may be permitted to yield for a very brief observation.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered.

Mr. MILLIKIN. I should like to suggest that the degree of peril should also have some relationship to the degree of preparedness.

Mr. DOUGLAS. Oh, certainly; but, if the Senator will permit me to show these figures——

Mr. MILLIKIN. I am coming back.

Mr. DOUGLAS. I thought the Senator was going to be like Captain Shotover in Bernard Shaw's Heartbreak House, who would always ask questions and then go out the door before anyone could answer them.

Mr. MILLIKIN. No; I never get on a bicycle.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Illinois.

Mr. DOUGLAS. Table II which I have incorporated in the RECORD shows the defense budget of the United Kingdom, France, Italy, and the United States, and the percentage relationship of that budget to the gross national product of those countries. The gross national product, though it is a substantially accurate figure, is somewhat higher than national income, since it includes such items as interest on the national debt and payments to veterans, for which no current services are being given, and does not deduct anything for depreciation.

At the present rate, the percentage of gross national product devoted to national defense in the United States is 8.7; in the United Kingdom, 6.4; in France, 7.3; and in Italy, 4.5. The disparities between those three countries except for Italy, which is limited by the peace treaty, and our own country at the present rate of expenditures are therefore significantly small. This is shown graphically by the chart which I have here placed on this easel.

I may say that I took the American figure at the present rate of $25,000,000,000 a year.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a brief observation?

Mr. DOUGLAS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may yield for a brief observation by the Senator from Minnesota.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. HUMPHREY. I believe my observation will throw some light upon the proposition stated by the Senator from Illinois. I understand the figures named are percentages of the gross national product at the present rate.

Mr. DOUGLAS. That is correct.

Mr. HUMPHREY. I think it should be made clear that the national product itself was not too large. The British have been living under a program of austerity. The American people have been enjoying a relatively high standard of living. The average workingman in England has been suffering from low wages and high prices. A man who is receiving only $800 a year would be paying the lion's share, but if we take such a percentage from a man who receives $10,000 a year, it is merely spending money. These percentages are more of a sacrifice in terms of the national product than is the percentage of 8.7 in the United States.

Mr. DOUGLAS. The Senator from Minnesota moves so quickly that I no sooner mention a point than he draws a logical conclusion with reference to it.

Mr. HUMPHREY. I am moved by the Senator's argument. I have a sensitiveness to the logic which he is putting forth.

Mr. DOUGLAS. Until we get a chance to study the President's budget message which came here only an hour or two ago, we are not, of course, able to project a rate for the United States, but I think the rate projected for Britain, France, and Italy is of the greatest significance, in view of the effort it reveals.

I have spent a little time in trying to study the budgets for 1951 for those nations. In brief, they show that the British rate will rise from 6.4 to 8 percent of the gross national product, while the French rate will go up from 7.3 to 9.7, or virtually 10 percent. Even the Italian rate will increase to 6.4 percent. These figures show that the European countries are buckling down to the task—and the budgets were presented before the Brussels conference, I think—and that France, whose willingness to sacrifice has been so disparaged, has, on a comparative basis, probably been doing the best of all.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a clarifying inquiry?

Mr. DOUGLAS. I yield.

Mr. KNOWLAND. I wonder if the charts which the able Senator has presented show the total expenditures and projected expenditures for the several countries out of their own funds, or whether the rate of expenditure includes expenditures from the arms-implementation aid for which they are getting United States funds.

Mr. DOUGLAS. They come from their appropriations, and, therefore, would not include military equipment directly furnished by this country. Cash contributions from this country probably are included but I do not have any record of their amount.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Let me ask one additional question for clarification. Of course, the Senator, in pointing out the various considerations, all of which are properly brought before the Congress of the United States, I am sure, would not lose sight of the fact that the cost of fitting and equipping a division in France, Britain, or Belgium, is nowhere near comparable to the cost of equipping a division in the United States.

Mr. DOUGLAS. I shall point that out in a few moments. It strengthens the point I am trying to make, that their contributions will be greater than is indicated by the budget itself.

Mr. KNOWLAND. But, by the same token, for the same amount of money they would be getting more divisions proportionately than we would get.

Mr. DOUGLAS. These comparisons are in proportion to income, not total amounts of money.

Mr. FERGUSON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. DOUGLAS. I have not had the opportunity to examine the French budget in the detail which I should have liked to examine it. There may be some padding of military expenditures in the current French budget. I am told that in previous years military expenditures in France have sometimes been concealed in civilian expenditures. There is a possibility that this year the French may have concealed some civilian expenditures in the military budget, and that, therefore, the figures for next year may somewhat exaggerate the French effort. I want to put that in as a clarification. Nevertheless, it is probable that these inclusions are not grossly significant in amount. The evidence does indicate that the French, on the whole, have been doing quite well.

Mr. FERGUSON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. DOUGLAS. I yield.

Mr. FERGUSON. That was exactly what I was going to ask.

Mr. DOUGLAS. I thought from the gleam in the eye of the Senator from Michigan that that was what he was going to ask, and that therefore I should make the point before he did. I was, however, going to make it anyway.

Mr. FERGUSON. The Senator has the correct analysis of the gleam.

PERCENTAGE OF PER CAPITA INCOME DEVOTED TO DEFENSE

Mr. DOUGLAS. Given our enormous per capita income, Mr. President, and the after effects of World War II in Europe, it is perhaps unfair to compare the United States, British, French, and Italian defense efforts in terms of amounts spent per capita. In table III which I shall insert, I have done just that, but I then made a second comparison in the same table of the percentage of per capita income spent for defense purposes.

I ask unanimous consent to insert at this point in my remarks table III, which compares the United States with the principal Western European countries on the basis of percentage of per capita income devoted to defense.

There being no objection, the table was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

TABLE III.—*Percentage of per capita income spent for defense purposes—United States, United Kingdom, France, and Italy*

Country	Population (millions) [1]	Defense budget (Millions of United States dollars) [2]		Per capita expenditure for defense (United States dollars)		Per capita income (United States dollars) [3]	Percentage of per capita income spent for defense	
		Present rate	1951 rate	Present rate	1951 rate		Present	1951
United Kingdom	50.6	2,380	3,108	47	61	773	6	8
France	41.6	1,640	2,451	39	59	482	8	12
Italy	46.3	595	915	13	20	235	5½	8½
United States	152.3	[4] 25,000	([5])	164	([5])	1,453	11	([5])

[1] For population references see notes 1, 2, and 3 of table I.
[2] Source: Department of State and various newspapers.
[3] Statistical Office of the United Nations, pp. 14-17.
[4] See note 1 of table II.
[5] Not available.

Mr. DOUGLAS. Mr. President, at first glance, it would seem that the United States is contributing much more on a per capita basis than the other countries. However, when we consider the much lower per capita income of these countries compared to that of the United States, we get a very different picture. When we compare the percentage of per capita income spent for defense, we find that now, the United Kingdom spends 6 percent; France, 8 percent; Italy, 5½ percent; and the United States, 11 percent. In 1951, the rate will be United Kingdom, 8 percent; France, 12 percent; and Italy, 8½ percent. I do not have the 1951 figures for the United States. Thus, by comparing the percentages of per capita income spent for defense, we find the figures even closer.

Furthermore, it is much more difficult for a country with a small per capita income to spend the same percentage for defense as a country like the United States, with a high per capita income. Or, conversely, with a high income a country can spend more with no greater sacrifice. It can spend a larger percentage for defense with no greater sacrifice, possibly with less sacrifice, than can a poorer nation. It is this principle which lies behind our use of the graduated income tax for individuals. I am not saying that Western Europe is contributing more than we are. But I do say that the difference is not nearly as great as is commonly believed.

THE MILITARY DOLLAR GOES FARTHER IN WESTERN EUROPE

There is yet another factor to which the Senator from California referred, which makes the European sacrifice greater than it seems to be even on the basis of relative money figures. This is the fact that a considerable portion of our military expenditures goes to provide a relatively high scale of pay and of comforts for our troops in comparison with those enjoyed by the European soldier whose pay is insignificant and whose comforts are meager.

This means that there is a greater sacrifice per European soldier and his family, which does not show up in the money figures, than is the case with us. I hasten to add that, of course, I approve of the American system, since we certainly should not discriminate against the soldier in favor of the stay-at-home. But this fact should make us realize more vividly the nature of the real sacrifices which the peoples of the European countries are already making. This point is further strengthened when we remember that the cost of producing the same machine gun, cannon, shell, airplane, or ship is much greater in the United States than abroad and that they consequently can buy more defense with less money than we.

So, Mr. President, whatever one can say about the lack of sacrifice by the European countries in Korea, and we should recall that they are, of course, heavily committed in Indochina and Malaya, in Western Europe we are decidedly not offering to defend nations which have refused to meet their own military commitments. They are doing pretty well. I do not think this debate should therefore proceed on an assumption which facts show to be completely unwarranted.

I have said some rather bitter things this afternoon which I think, nevertheless, are true, although in saying them, it should be remembered that the nations are heavily charged with many burdens. I think that in the long run the fact that all the nations of the world have contributed only about 20,000 troops to back up the United Nations in Korea in comparison with our approximately 140,000 is something which the people of Great Britain and France will ultimately regret when they have learned the truth. But whatever we may say about their failure to support the United Nations action in Korea, they are doing fairly well so far as their total contribution to their own defense is concerned.

So much for the first fallacy in the argument of the Senator from Ohio [Mr. TAFT].

B. THE SHARE OF WESTERN EUROPE UNDER THE BRUSSELS AGREEMENT

A second fallacy in the Senator's assumption that Europe lacks a willingness to resist is revealed by the relative proportions of the future European army which, according to the best unofficial estimates, are to be contributed by us and by the other countries.

According to press reports, and as repeated on the floor of the Senate, it is estimated that the Brussels Agreement calls for a total ground force by the end of 1953, or somewhat earlier, of about 55 combat divisions. On the basis of the repeated and responsible press speculations as to the agreed ratios of troop contributions, apparently only 10 of these divisions are to be furnished by us while Western Europe is to supply the balance, with the question of Western Germany's participation still to be worked out. Instead of the United States being expected to furnish the major portion of the Western European army, as so many believe, if these reports are even reasonably accurate, we are obligated in fact to furnish a little less than a fifth, or about 18 percent of the total. Even if it is impossible to get the West Germans to contribute the quota desired of them, the American share on the basis of the lower ratio estimates of 3½ to 1 would still be only two-ninths, or 22 percent of the total.

When we take into consideration the supply troops and reserve components which France and England would undoubtedly furnish and the relatively greater dangers which the civilian populations of Western Europe would experience, it should become crystal clear that the overwhelming proportion of the military burden of the hardships will still be borne by the Western Europeans. This is only proper, because they are the ones who stand to lose most from conquest by the Communists. But it also happens to be not only proper, I will say to the Senator from Colorado, but apparently also true that they will have the main burden.

C. WILL 10 UNITED STATES DIVISIONS DO ANY GOOD?

The third strand in the first argument of the Senator from Ohio [Mr. TAFT], that Western Europe will not cooperate, is indicated by his query on the floor of the Senate as to what good 10 divisions will do, and by his still more extraordinary statement that even a million and a half of our men would not be enough to save Europe. Of course, his position is partially based on the assumption that the Western European nations are shirking their job and that they will not contribute enough under the Brussels agreement. I think I have shown that these assumptions are contrary to the fact.

Here again the Senator from Ohio, for all his ability—and it is great—misses the real point most grievously. No one contends that 10 divisions by themselves could stop the Communist armies. Perhaps even a million and a half men could not do so, although it is possible that they might, if we furnished them with adequate equipment and fire power. But the 10 American divisions, as we have shown, would merely be additions or increments to a European force which would be from four to five times larger. Moreover, the American forces would be the vital increment which would to a great extent create the willingness of Western Europeans to enlarge their armies. For Western Europe is largely in the following position: They have been doing about as well as we in arming, but they do not want to make the extra effort or to take the risk of attack unless we contribute our share of the added effort and unless we stand along with them. If we add 8 more divisions to our existing 2 in Western Germany, the European nations will add from 28 to 36 more. If we refuse, they will probably not add any and may indeed throw in the sponge.

What we should really take into account, therefore, is not the 10 divisions which we furnish, but the added 28 to 36 which they will call forth. Ten divisions will not be able to hold the Communists, but 55 will have a good chance of doing so. Anyone who has ever tried to raise money for a charity or a college knows the evocative power of the contingent gift. When a man says "I will give a million, provided others will give three million," he imparts hope to the fund raisers and makes it easier for others to give. For they know that their gifts will carry with them a portion of the contingent gift, and hence provide a sum greater than that which they directly furnish.

It is by this principle that Tolstoi and Lloyd Douglas explain the miracle of the loaves and fishes. For in their version, nearly everyone who went out into the desert with Jesus had bread and fish in their pockets, but did not want to take their lunch out to eat, lest others ask them for a share. But our Saviour, by sharing what he had with the needy, made them somewhat ashamed of themselves, so the multitude took out what they had and shared it. And when they had done this, there was more than enough for all.

There is a direct moral in this story which followers of Senator TAFT would do well to ponder. Nor is any such venture of faith required of us as that which our Saviour made. For the response of

our allies will not be conjectural but contractual. If we put up 8 more divisions, they will put up from 28 to 36 more.

2. WILL AIR AND SEA POWER AID TO WESTERN EUROPE BE ENOUGH?

Now may I take up the second main argument of the Senator from Ohio, namely, that we will be making an ample contribution toward the defense of Europe by using our air and sea power and virtually that alone without land forces.

The experience of World War II and the experience of Korea, Mr. President, have surely taught us that air attacks will not stop land armies. I am not overlooking the point made here on the floor by the Senator from California [Mr. KNOWLAND], that in Korea our air forces were prohibited from attacking the major sources of Communist supplies behind the Manchurian border. But neither did they deter the continued advances on the Korean Peninsula itself of Communist infantry possessed of superior numbers and willing to take huge losses, even though almost throughout the entire Korean campaign we had the mastery of the air and could bomb both the front line and the enemy bases in northern Korea.

In World War II we found that air attacks as a deterrent to enemy troop advances were feasible only in opening up a temporary beachhead or permitting a limited withdrawal. And even in these cases how many times did not the Army and the Marines find that an area that was alleged by the Air Force to have been cleared by our air operations bristled when the troops arrived, with not only the infantry, but the artillery and in some cases the tanks of the enemy. Those who fought at Tarawa, Pelelieu, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa know to the full the bitter truth of this statement.

But would not the atomic bomb and the still more powerful H-bomb prevent the Russians and their satellites from conquering Western Europe? I would state that I do not believe that the use of the atomic bomb on Russian troops before they engaged the troops of our western allies would by itself deter the Red Army from overrunning the continent. Moreover, if the A-bomb were dropped upon the Communist armies when they were closely locked in combat with the western Europeans, it might do almost as much harm to our allies as to our enemies.

But is the H-bomb, which Mr. W. L. Laurence estimates may possibly destroy everything within an area of 300 square miles, a sure defense against land armies? All I can say is that I understand it is still a gamble as to whether the H-bomb will actually go off and that, even if it does, its military effect is still uncertain. It is, therefore, foolish to put our trust in something which may never materialize.

Mr. McMAHON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. DOUGLAS. I am glad to yield to the Senator from Connecticut.

Mr. McMAHON. I should like to say that although it may still be a gamble, as the Senator from Illinois says, whether the H-bomb would actually go off, if it were to go off its military effect would not be uncertain. I say to the Senator that if it did go off its military effect would be very certain indeed.

Mr. DOUGLAS. But it might destroy as many of our troops as it would destroy enemy troops if it went off while the troops were closely locked in combat.

Mr. McMAHON. It would not be dropped at that point of combat.

Mr. DOUGLAS. The only conclusion we can draw from all this is that our air power by itself will not stop the Communist troops from moving to the English Channel. An adequate supply of ground troops will be needed to do that. Infantry and artillery are still needed, as Korea has shown, and all the scientific push-buttons and military gadgets have not made them obsolete.

What the proposal of the Senator from Ohio in effect amounts to is, therefore, that we should reconcile ourselves to letting the Communists take over Western Europe. Indeed, when I pressed him on this point in the debate on January 5, with the candor which makes us all admire him even when we disagree with him, he replied that such in effect would be the consequences.

But Mr. TAFT apparently believes that even though the continent of Europe were to fall, we would still be able to retain Britain as an air base from which we could launch retaliatory attacks and destroy the heavy industry of Europe in order to prevent its being used by the Russians.

Two comments are sufficient on this latter point. In the first place, island bases, whether relied upon as a protective screen or as a place from which to harass the European and Asiatic continents, cannot be held for long in the days of robot bombs, guided missiles, and so on. In the Second World War we learned how to use antiaircraft fire against the V-1. It was, however, powerless against the V-2 even in 1944, and their captive German scientists have no doubt helped the Russians vastly improve the V-2 model. Unless the source of the enemy's missiles can be pushed back by ground action, an island base on the periphery of a continent already lost is, therefore, the constant object of attrition. If the continent of Europe falls, then England, only 20 miles across the channel, despite all its heroism, can either be neutralized or forced to give up. We will then lose the very island bases upon which Mr. Hoover and the Senator from Ohio so greatly depend.

HOW NOT TO WIN FRIENDS AND INFLUENCE PEOPLE

The Europeans, moreover, as the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. FULBRIGHT] has pointed out, cannot be thrilled with joy by the fact that the Senator from Ohio first offers them aerial aid which he admits will be ineffective and then promises them that after this has failed, he will destroy their industrial plant and possibly their cities by attacks from the air. This is hardly the way to win friends and influence people and, in fact, almost no better way than this could be devised to develop anti-American and pro-Russian sentiment on the continent of Europe.

Now suppose we were to adopt the policy of the Senator from Ohio of refusing to support Western Europe with ground troops and offering air and sea power only. It would, in effect, withdraw our strength from continental Western Europe and create a power vacuum which the Communists would inevitably fill. For, while we do not at present have a large force of ground troops there, the potential of further American ground forces plus our possession of the atom bomb has been the force which has heretofore filled the vacuum. It has at once kept the Russians at bay and the anti-Communist governments in power.

The freedom-loving peoples of Western Europe would certainly feel that they had been abandoned if after having assurances of our help, we were suddenly to deny it.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. DOUGLAS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to yield for an observation.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. HUMPHREY. I should like to bring to the Senator's attention what is fairly well known in postwar history, namely, that if American forces had not been in Austria—for one example, Vienna—on repeated occasions the Russians would have moved in and taken over the entire country. I think that is the thesis which the Senator is advancing here.

Mr. DOUGLAS. Yes.

Mr. HUMPHREY. All we have to do is to leave a vacuum, and Mr. Stalin has plenty of force ready to move into the vacuum. We found that out in the Berlin area, and in every other place where our occupation forces were located.

It seems to me that rather than try to project an argument into the future, as the Senator from Ohio is trying to do, the wise thing to do would be to observe what is going on in the world now. I suggest to the Senator from Ohio that he check into the political and military history which centers around Austria. Time after time there has occurred the very thing which the Senator from Illinois has pointed out.

Mr. DOUGLAS. I hope the observation of the Senator from Minnesota may be conveyed to the Senator from Ohio.

Faced with the prospect of a long-drawn-out war, many western Europeans might feel it to their advantage to join wholeheartedly with Russia, and willingly produce for and fight with them against us because of this abandonment.

Pro-American governments would fall on all sides, and the Communists would seize power as they did in Czechoslovakia. We remember Czechoslovakia as one of our best friends in Europe. But once the Communists seized power, suppressed free speech and free press, and purged the anti-Communists, Czechoslovakia became our enemy and will now, if called upon, fight against us. I am not sure the people of Czechoslovakia will like this, but their rulers will compel it.

We cannot consider this problem by itself. In the first place, the two possibilities of having Western Europe fight

or not fight the Communists are not the only ones. We should also consider the possibility of Europe fighting against us. There are strong Communist elements in these countries and when they are coupled with the neutralists, appeasers, and those who would become disgruntled with our refusal to help defend Western Europe, the ranks of the Communist armies might be further filled and the productive might of Western Europe might be willingly turned against us.

HOW TO WIN FRIENDS AND INFLUENCE PEOPLE

But what if we show a genuine desire to cooperate on terms of equal sacrifice with the countries of Western Europe? We would be telling them, "We will help to defend you at once. We will not wait until you are conquered, but will do everything in our power to prevent you from being conquered and do it immediately. We will fight with you, side by side. If we are ultimately pushed off the Continent we will regroup our joint forces and fight on from England. If we are pushed out of England, we will again regroup and fight on from America. We will never give up. We will never let you down. And we mean it. For we consider your security as our security."

What kind of a response would this get? Of course the Communists might say it would be an act of war. But to freedom-loving people it would be hope; and this hope would be the rallying focus about which all the anti-Communist forces of the world could unite and stop the Russian onslaught.

Suppose after a hard struggle, we were ultimately pushed out of Europe. The people there—knowing that we had honorably fought for their defense and knowing that we would never give up, would certainly be encouraged to go underground and to form as effective resistence units as possible. Their cooperation with the Communists would take place only at gun-point. But if we abandon Western Europe, do not be surprised if they more compliantly fight and produce against us.

We simply must recognize this foreign and military policy problem for what it is—it is a problem of survival. I have great faith in American fighting men and American productive capacity. But if we decide on a policy of abandoning Europe, we should face the consequence of having nearly the whole world against us. Perhaps we could ultimately win such a war—perhaps not. But one thing is certain. If war does come, it would be far better to have the manpower and productive might of Western Europe on our side. Even though the Russians might ultimately take it over, we would still have most of the people on our side. To the degree that resistance is possible in a police state and on a lost continent, Russia would be weakened by the opposition of the people. But if we abandon them, the people might well be against us.

Even were we to win the final war, with the people of all of continental Europe against us, it would take years longer, sap our strength and cause the loss of hundreds of thousands more lives than if we had the cooperation of Europe.

We cannot and should not attempt to pull in our forces, abandon our allies, and try to fight the Communist world alone. It would be a great mistake, and it could very well lose a war.

3. WILL SENDING UNITED STATES TROOPS TO WESTERN EUROPE PROVOKE RUSSIA TO WAR?

Then, Mr. President, we are told that committing American troops to the land defense of Europe would stimulate the Russians to attack. That argument virtually says you should maintain yourself in a position of permanent inferiority lest you offend someone who is stronger. The end result is always to put yourselves at the mercy of the strong, whereas I believe that nothing in recent American foreign policy has been so clearly correct as the view that one must build up areas of strength from which to negotiate. The trouble has been that while we have talked about this, we have not built up the military strength required to defend the areas which we have so blithely talked about. It is not enough to have young men in tweed suits on Foggy Bottom write memoranda about "areas of strength." It is necessary to have men in khaki who will make this talk come true.

Mr. LANGER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. DOUGLAS. The Senator from North Dakota well knows that there is no Member of the Senate whom I like more than I do him. I should very much like to yield for a question, provided it does not take too long.

Mr. LANGER. It is a very simple question. If we have not built up the necessary strength, whose fault is it?

Mr. DOUGLAS. It is our fault. A part of the fault lies right here in Congress.

Mr. LANGER. Whose fault is it, that of the Democrats or the Republicans?

Mr. DOUGLAS. Both. It is the fault of the administration, the Democrats, and the Republicans. I must confess that I think I have some share of the guilt myself. I think the Senator from North Dakota may have a little share of the guilt.

Mr. LANGER. Is it not true that the Democrats have been in charge of the Government ever since 1932? The distinguished Senator from Minnesota [Mr. HUMPHREY] mentioned the Berlin airlift. Whose fault was it that the Russians had all the land surrounding Berlin? He mentioned Austria, and particularly Vienna. Whose fault was it that all around Vienna the Russians had full and absolute control? Whose fault was it that American blood was shed to take the northern part of Austria? When the distinguished Senator from New Jersey [Mr. HENDRICKSON] was High Commissioner over there, whose fault was it that he received an order to surrender all that territory to Joe Stalin?

As I understand the situation now, the distinguished Senator from Illinois is going all over the world. If we do not whip the enemy in Germany we will whip him in Austria. If we do not whip him there, we will attack him in Russia.

Mr. DOUGLAS. I did not say that.

Mr. LANGER. If we do not win there, we are going to defend India. If we do not win there, we are going into China.

Mr. DOUGLAS. I did not say that, either. The Senator from North Dakota is letting his imagination carry him away.

Mr. LANGER. Did not my distinguished friend say a moment ago that no matter where the enemy was, we would fight him there?

Mr. DOUGLAS. In my judgment, we should resist Communist aggression everywhere with two provisos: First, that the places are militarily accessible; second, that other countries help us in adequate numbers.

Mr. LANGER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a further question?

Mr. DOUGLAS. Mr. President, I am torn between my affection for my dear friend and my desire to finish my speech before midnight.

Mr. LANGER. I should like to ask the Senator just one more question.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator from Illinois yield to the Senator from North Dakota for a question?

Mr. DOUGLAS. I yield for one more question.

Mr. LANGER. I want my distinguished friend to tell me where all the young men—and old men—are to come from to defend countries all over the world. We have not got them in this country.

Mr. DOUGLAS. They should come from the free world as a whole. Of course, we cannot resist Communist aggression all over the world by ourselves without help. Other non-Communist countries should share the burden. But what I do say is that if we can encourage such help by our own willingness to resist aggression, it would be far better than letting the Communists take over the whole world, even excepting the Western Hemisphere. For, if we do not resist this aggression now, I say that we will be alone, without allies, to face the Communists. I would rather the young men—and the old men—had allies with them if we have to fight Russia than for them to face Russia alone.

It could only have been an injudicious and hasty remark of the senior Senator from Ohio after his formal address of January 5 when he said during a colloquy that the United States, to the people of Europe, might appear the main instigators of war, presumably by drawing a defense line on the European continent and thus provoking Russian aggression. I hope that statement does not reflect the considered opinion of the Senator from Ohio, and I feel sure it does not. I think that was a hasty statement which he injudiciously made. I hope very much that it does not reflect his considered opinion. Without his intending it, I think it has already done a great deal of harm and will do more unless corrected. For the only implication the average man could draw from his statement "if we are the main instigators of the war" is that we would be the instigators if we sent men and arms to Europe. This statement can be used against

us in Europe even though it will not be so.

Mr. President, at this late day it can hardly be true either in Europe or America that we must still debate what power appears to be the main instigator of world war III, if that war should come upon us. There are plenty of issues which do need debate, as my own remarks today explicitly assume. But this is certainly not one. We have but to examine the record, Mr. President, to see whether Russia or the United States has been the more vigorous seeker of peace.

WHO HAS BEEN THE MORE VIGOROUS SEEKER OF PEACE, THE UNITED STATES OR RUSSIA?

I should like to touch very briefly on the history of the 5½ years between World War II and the Korean War. After World War II we disarmed from a military strength of 13,000,000 men to 1,500,000 with a scant 12 divisions prior to the Korean attack. Russia probably did not cut its total force by more than one-half and now has 175 divisions, which, as compared with our somewhat larger tables of organization, would probably be the equivalent of 135 to 140 American divisions.

We offered to share the secret of atomic energy with the whole world, including Russia and to denature our atomic bombs, provided only that there should be an adequate international inspection to which we ourselves would be subject, to prevent any country from making atomic bombs. Russia refused to agree to this international inspection.

We sought, through the United Nations, to create a pooled force to resist aggression. Russia failed to cooperate. Russia has hamstrung the United Nations by using the veto no less than 44 times, even prior to the Korean crisis.

Mr. LANGER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield to me for a question?

Mr. DOUGLAS. I must say now to my dear friend from North Dakota that I cannot.

Mr. LANGER. Just one question.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. KERR in the chair). The Senator from Illinois says he cannot yield.

Mr. DOUGLAS. The Senator from North Dakota said he would ask me to yield for just one more question a while ago, and I yielded to him. But that apparently——

Mr. LANGER. The distinguished Senator from Ilinois is now condemning the veto power. Who is to blame for the veto power being in existence if not America and England

Mr. DOUGLAS. Is the Senator saying we should not have the veto power in the United Nations?

Mr. LANGER. Certainly I said that the veto power should not be included in the Charter. I followed the lead of the Prime Minister of Australia who wanted to carry out the principle of the Atlantic Charter.

Mr. DOUGLAS. I thought it was the fear of the Senator from North Dakota and other Senators like himself which made the State Department feel that no treaty which deprived the United States of the veto power could be ratified on the floor of the Senate. I had thought that the Senator from North Dakota, whom I love, is one of the men who throughout has argued that there should be no abolition of the veto power.

Mr. LANGER. I thank the Senator from Ilinois. If he will read my speech, when I voted against the adoption of the UN Charter, he will find that I said I voted against the United Nations Charter, among other reasons, because it contained the veto power. Other Senators compared the situation to that when the Thirteen Colonies were organized into the United States. If the veto power had been in the Constitution, does the Senator from Illinois suppose that, for example, South Carolina would have joined the Union with New York having the veto power over South Carolina?

Mr. DOUGLAS. I am delighted to know that the vote of the Senator from North Dakota, which was one of the two votes, I believe, cast against the United Nations—was because the UN was not powerful enough.

Mr. LANGER. That is right.

Mr. DOUGLAS. The general fear was that if the veto power was abolished most Senators would feel that the UN had been given too much power. Apparently the arguments now are that it was "either too hot or too cold, either too young or too old." The fear of surrendering too much sovereignty to this new organization was substantial, and I had always felt that this was the reason for inserting the veto clause.

Mr. LANGER. Oh, no, Mr. President. I will say to my dear friend that the situation at that time was that we had 13,000,000 men.

Mr. President, will the Senator yield to me?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Dakota is out of order.

Mr. LANGER. We had 13,000,000 men under arms at that time.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Illinois has the floor.

Mr. DOUGLAS. Yes; I would rather not yield to my distinguished friend at this time. I should like to develop my speech.

Looking further at the record, we have helped to organize international agencies to enhance the arts of peace, such as WHO, FAO, the International Bank, the International Monetary Fund, UNESCO, and others. Russia has refused to join any one of them. We have sought to negotiate treaties for Italy, Austria, Germany, and Japan. After nearly 2 years of wrangling, we finally got a treaty with Italy, but Russia has stopped all others.

Russia refused to join in the pledge of Secretary Byrnes for first a 20-year, and then a 40-year joint occupation of a united Germany. This would have allowed the people of both East and West Germany to live together and at the same time would have offered Russia protection from the fear of a German attack which she felt was real.

We have stripped ourselves of our colonial empire by freeing the Philippines and giving up any rights to intervene in Cuba.

Russia acted in direct violation of the Yalta agreement. The trouble was not so much in the European features of the Yalta agreement as in the violation of the Yalta agreement by Russia.

Mr. LANGER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. DOUGLAS. No, I prefer not to yield at this time. Russia did not permit free elections in Poland, Bulgaria, or Rumania, and applied covert military pressure upon Hungary and Czechoslovakia to make them go Communist.

We offered ECA aid to all of Europe, including Russia and her satellites. Russia not only refused to come in herself, but also prevented her European satellites from coming in.

Russia kept troops in Persia in 1946, violating a previous pledge, and threatened Turkey. She conducted border warfare against Greece in 1946 and 1947, and in 1948 she suspended our land transportation to Berlin.

In the face of this record, I cannot see how anyone could ever say that we would be the "main instigator" of a war by sending troops to Europe as a defensive measure. Were we to mass 10,000,000 men over there, the charge might conceivably be made. Senator TAFT says that 10 divisions could not deter Russia conquering Europe, and I say it will be of tremendous help. But it can obviously be helpful only for defense, and in no sense could such a force be considered enough to wage an aggressive war against Russia. No one proposes an invasion of the land mass of Russia. Certainly I do not propose it.

WE HAVE EVERY REASON TO FEAR RUSSIAN AGGRESSION

But we are now in January 1951. A totalitarian power which most of us have long believed was committed by its very nature to a garrison state threatening expansion, has now committed its largest satellite, China, to the risk of a general war. Acting through the United Nations we prevented Russian aggression in Iran, in the Dardanelles and in Greece. Acting with our British and French allies, we prevented the Russian seizure of Berlin.

Wherever we showed strength to resist Communist aggression the Russians backed down.

Last June 24, however, the forces of world communism, solidly backed by Russia, committed armed military aggression across the whole of a national frontier. Korea, Mr. President, is all too grim and bloody a fact, as is known to many American families. If war comes, it will have been instigated by Russia, not by us. And we should not by an injudicious use of words, such as the Senator from Ohio's [Mr. TAFT'S] statement implying that we would be the main instigators of a war if we sent additional troops to Western Europe, give the Russians a propaganda weapon which, though untrue, can be and is being used against us.

In his speech of January 8 before the National Press Club, the Senator from Ohio laughed at the reputed statement of one of our military officers that it would be easier to get 10 American divisions out of Europe if war came than to get 2 out. That he says, is a poor reason for sending the additional eight.

Mr. President, if we send 10 United States divisions to Europe, or send there the million and a half United States troops the Senator at one point mentions, we shall not send them to get them out again if war comes. We shall send them to help hold a line beyond the Rhine—not upon it, as the Senator from Ohio fears, and to hold it along with four times as many Europeans—until reinforcements from all the North Atlantic countries arrive. But we shall not, of course, agree to hold such line with only American troops, and I know of no one who advocates such a policy.

SHALL WE WAIT FOR ENGRAVED INVITATIONS FROM A UNANIMOUS EUROPE?

The Senator from Ohio says, however, that even the participation of American troops in a western European land defense would no doubt spur Russia to attack, because Russia would believe that the project had been undertaken upon American initiative. I think that is a very neat logical box, since our great power would truly appear to give us the initiative in any joint venture with Britain, France, the Low Countries and the other European nations, regardless of whether or not they had taken the initiative in extending the formal invitation. I doubt that any engraved invitation from Western Europe would take the onus of American initiative off the project, either to the Russians or to ourselves.

I must confess that I agree with the Senator from Ohio that we should only help to defend these nations which will help themselves, and that we should have their invitation so to do, but I am at a loss as to why, in his address, he constantly emphasized the importance of formal invitations for our aid. The enemy we face, I am afraid, does not regard us the more kindly because we place our strength only where we are formally invited to place it. Our good intentions may save us with many peoples—though I am inclined to doubt the fact—but they will never save us from the ruthless men who have marked us out as their natural enemies.

Our very existence, to say nothing of the mobilization of our forces on which all of us agree, can be said to be provocative to the Russians. I do not see how the promise to send 10 divisions to Europe when we have them to send will increase the degree of that provocation. As I shall attempt to show later in my remarks, such a promise may in fact provoke the rulers of the Kremlin to a more sober understanding of their true position.

NOT BEING WILLING TO SEND TROOPS TO WESTERN EUROPE WOULD BE MORE LIKELY TO CAUSE A RUSSIAN ATTACK

Moreover, the evident belief of the Senator from Ohio that we should not strengthen Europe lest we provoke the Russians to attack is equivalent to saying that the weak must not strengthen themselves relative to the strong lest the strong should take alarm. But this condemns the weak to continue in a state of inferiority to the strong and means that they exist only on the sufferance of the powerful. This is not a very safe source of protection when we are dealing with Communist Russia. It is far better for us and our allies to win this protection by our own efforts. Our combined armed strength will be a greater deterrent to Russian aggression than any feeling of pity or any qualms of conscience which may develop inside the breasts of the members of the politboro. For I have never known the Russians to spare anyone because they were weak.

On the contrary, I think history shows that weakness, not strength, provokes aggression and is much more likely to lead to war. Where have the Communist gains been made, Mr. President? They have been made in the weak Baltic and Balkan countries and in Czechoslovakia which had no hope of our aid. They have been made in a weak and divided China which we did not think we could defend, and as the Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. LODGE] has pointed out, they now seem to be making gains in Korea from which we originally withdrew our troops.

The danger confronting us is a totalitarian Communist danger. The record of their gains, Mr. President, gives conclusive proof that it is the weak and not the strong who are in danger, and if there is any hope for peace with Russia, we will find it in strength.

4. WILL THE COSTS OF SENDING ADEQUATE TROOPS TO WESTERN EUROPE BE TOO HIGH?

The fourth and final objection which Senator TAFT makes against accepting the Brussels agreement is that it will cost too much. I shall deal later and in some detail with this contention. Let it be enough to say here that the Senator from Ohio would tailor our security to fit his conception of proper military costs instead of adjusting our military costs to conform to the needs of true security.

What, then, shall we say of the argument of the Senator from Ohio as a whole? Simply this—never have I seen so plausible a set of contentions based upon so many false premises. I say this with sorrow mixed with sympathetic affection.

V. THE POSITIVE ARGUMENT FOR THE BRUSSELS AGREEMENT

Mr. President, thus far in the argument I have dealt with two negatives and two positives with respect to our policy in Europe. I must agree with the Senator from Ohio [Mr. TAFT] and many other Senators in so far as the two negatives are concerned. We are not legally bound to furnish more troops than we already have for the joint defense of the Atlantic Pact countries, and we are not morally bound so to do. On one of the positives the Senator from Ohio agrees with me; namely, that we are bound to furnish arms aid to the signatories of the Atlantic Pact instrument. The other positive, of course, is that our self-interest demands that we help the Europeans in the land, sea, and air defense of the European continent; and that is the organic kernel of this entire debate so far as the Brussels agreement and the defense of Western Europe are concerned.

At this point in my remarks, Mr. President, I should like to have done with the negatives. I shall deal with the positive argument for Congressional approval of the principle of the Brussels agreement; namely, the sending of more troops to Western Europe. Beside the great positive factor of our national self-interest, I should like briefly to array another, the moral climate shared by the peoples of Europe and America. I shall not hang back if some legalistic critic transmutes "moral climate" into "moral responsibility."

Mr. President, it was the vacuum left between Russia and the United States after World War II which most powerfully affected developments in our foreign policy, and made us pour billions of our substance into Western Europe. It was the desire to transfer to the nations of Western Europe both power and the responsibility which goes with power, which led us to embrace the Marshall program. Had the nations of that area been unrelated to us in everything save their abhorrence of the totalitarian police state, I believe the Congress would yet have approved the European recovery program.

But the significant point, Mr. President, is that despite the existence of sizable Communist parties in some of the European countries, none but the most fatuous American critics doubted our kinship with those peoples. Dealing with the peoples of Western Europe, Mr. President, we are dealing with those who taught Jefferson and Madison and other early Americans about the democratic experiment, and were taught by them in turn.

WESTERN CIVILIZATION ITSELF IS AT STAKE

But the issue is even broader than the survival of any political philosophy, even one which can call out so bravely what there is of good in man. Western civilization itself is at stake, and the democratic form of government is but one element in that great complex. The peoples of Western Europe and America are the heirs of the most dynamic tradition the world has ever seen. There are men in other regions of the earth just as brave, just as thoughtful, as are those of the West, and I am mindful of the great—in some instances, the unique—contributions of the culture of the East. But, Mr. President, it is in the West, it is among the heirs of a civilization cradled in the Mediterranean and nurtured in the northern fastnesses of Europe, that the dignity, the worth, and the rights of the individual man have been most strongly asserted. To the peoples of the West, life is dear, and it ought not to be sold for something that is not dear.

Animated by this conviction, the people of the United States wield a power greater even than their great resources could by themselves command. They could look the world over for allies more alert to the power of this faith than our partners in the Atlantic Pact and the Brussels agreement. By the same token it is not only our great economic power which turns European eyes toward these shores. Even the very presence of their American brothers in the joint force of the Brussels nations, the fact that American divisions stood on European soil for this express purpose, conceivably could end whatever hesitancies the Europeans

have thus far shown toward their own commitments. The Senator from Texas [Mr. CONNALLY] and the junior Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. LODGE] made a significant contribution, I think, when they reminded us that men are more tangible than diplomatic instruments.

All I am saying, Mr. President, is that it was not only the precise conditions left by World War II, not only our self-interest in keeping Western Europe from going the way of Czechoslovakia, which caused the Congress to embrace the Marshall plan. It was a marriage between members of a common society, wedded to common ideals, moved by common hopes—and common fears.

The Atlantic Pact, and the consequent agreement at Brussels, shows the same recognition. The seed of the pact, the resolution honored by the name of the Senator from Michigan [Mr. VANDENBERG], was quite properly an expression of American self-interest. The principles of the Brussels agreement deserve the sanction of Congress for that paramount reason. But, Mr. President, if the danger of imminent war is great—and I think it is—the Brussels nations are a magnet to draw to a common task and a common victory precisely those men who have the most to live for, the most to die for, of all men on the face of the earth. Those are good men to have beside you when the battle for survival is joined, Mr. President. Mr. President, on this floor I have criticized very strenuously British foreign policy, but no one can criticize the heroism of the British soldier under fire. No one can criticize the bravery of the French soldier under fire. They are good men to have with us.

CONGRESS SHOULD PLACE ITS STAMP OF APPROVAL ON THE PRINCIPLES OF THE BRUSSELS AGREEMENT

So much for the moral imperative, Mr. President, and I do not apologize for touching on it briefly, since I firmly believe it is a definite quantity in the arsenal which the Communists will challenge at their peril.

Mr. LANGER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. DOUGLAS. No; I regret to say that I cannot yield.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Illinois declines to yield.

Mr. DOUGLAS. I am asking that Congress, as the immediate representatives of the people, stamp its formal approval on the sending of more troops to Western Europe as is embodied in the agreement made at Brussels. The people will rightly ask what more tangible assets are represented in the force General Eisenhower has been sent to command.

In the course of my remarks on the views of those who would leave the land defenses of Europe to the Europeans, I analyzed the scale of armed men and monies by which the Brussels nations intend to defend themselves. I pointed out that equality of sacrifice is an approximate fact, and that the military increment of the 225,000,000 people of Western Europe will match, on a per capita basis, the military increment of our own 150,000,000. The most positive argument for the Brussels agreement is the willingness of the Europeans to help themselves.

UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE SHOULD BUILD UP THEIR STRENGTH TOGETHER

This principle can and, in my judgment, should be carried out in the process by which the ultimate goals are obtained as well as merely in those goals themselves. Stated briefly, it was probably agreed at Brussels, according to the estimates to which I have referred, that in the 3 years we would add eight divisions to our European forces, while the Western European countries added from 28 to 36. Our ratio of the respective increments would, therefore, be as 1 to 3½ or 1 to 4½. It would seem wise therefore, for a timetable to be prepared under which at stated intervals the Europeans would add three and one-half or four and one-half divisions and we would thus add one. This would prevent our bearing too large a share of the load at any one time. It would also give an incentive for the Europeans to meet their schedules since they would obtain the added protection of an American division for each three and one-half or four and one-half which they put into service; but only when they added three and one-half or four and one-half divisions. If this is not already included in the Brussels agreement, it should quickly be made a part of the compact although, for security reasons, the precise scheduling of these additions of course should not be published.

THE STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF WESTERN EUROPE

I have also discussed before this point in my remarks the strategic importance of the European continent to the military defense of the United States. But the area is strategically vital not only to our defense. It is also vital to the war-making potential of any power, be it friend or enemy. Let us consider steel, in terms of world production in 1950. At this point, Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to insert as part of my remarks table IV, showing the estimates of the two trade journals, Iron Age and Steel, for the steel-producing countries of the world.

Mr. LANGER. Mr. President, reserving the right to object, may I see the schedule?

Mr. DOUGLAS. Mr. President, I have a feeling that a very clever parliamentary trick is about to be played upon me now. I know that the Senator from North Dakota will not object to the insertion of this table in the text. However, since he does object——

Mr. LANGER. I am not objecting; I am reserving the right to object. I simply wish to see what the Senator wishes to place in the RECORD.

Mr. DOUGLAS. Inasmuch as the Senator from North Dakota reserves the right to object to my inserting the table, I withdraw it.

Mr. LANGER. I am very sorry the Senator does so.

Mr. DOUGLAS. I hope that at a later time the heart of the Senator from North Dakota will be sufficiently melted so that he will permit the table to be placed in the RECORD.

Mr. DOUGLAS subsequently said: Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to insert table IV in its proper place.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The table is as follows:

TABLE IV.—*World production of steel ingots and steel for casting, 1950*

[In thousands of net tons]

	Iron Age estimate	Steel estimate
World total	197,154	203,200
United States	96,954	96,500
United Kingdom	18,078	18,000
Western Germany	13,101	14,700
France	9,108	9,600
Belgium	3,863	4,150
Luxemburg	2,560	2,700
Italy	2,503	2,500
Saar	1,925	2,050
Sweden	1,071	1,600
Austria	1,017	1,000
Spain	904	900
Netherlands	----------	450
Japan	4,970	5,000
India	1,525	1,500
Canada	3,270	3,350
Mexico	390	350
Brazil	798	800
Australia	1,519	1,400
Union of South Africa	849	800
U. S. S. R.	26,500	27,000
Czechoslovakia	2,850	3,000
Poland	2,525	2,750
Hungary	875	1,000
Rumania	----------	550
Yugoslavia	----------	550
Western Germany, France, Belgium, Luxemburg, and the Saar	30,557	33,200
Same, plus Italy, Sweden, Austria, Spain, and the Netherlands	36,052	39,650
All continental Western Europe plus United Kingdom	54,130	57,650
All continental Western Europe plus United Kingdom and United States	151,084	154,150
Western World, all above, plus Japan, India, Canada, Mexico, Brazil, Australia, and Union of South Africa	164,405	167,350
U. S. S. R. and satellite countries (Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, Rumania)	32,750	34,850

Sources: Iron Age, Jan. 4, 1951; Steel, Jan. 1, 1951.

Mr. DOUGLAS. Mr. President, I can say that the figures included in the table, which I hope to be able to place in the RECORD, show that in 1950 the United States produced 96,500,000 tons of steel ingots and steel for casting. Russia and its European satellites produced 34,900,000 tons. Western Europe, including Britain, actually produced 57,700,000 and its capacity was approximately 65,000,000. Moreover, Mr. President, if the United States, Western Europe, Canada, Mexico, Australia, and South Africa but stand together, they control 159,400,000 net tons of steel production, of which 154,000,000 is in the United States and Western Europe.

If, as Mr. Hoover proposes, we desert Western Germany, France, Belgium, Luxemburg and the Saar, we have lost 33,200,000 tons. If we join Mr. Hoover in pulling out of the rest of Europe to the Atlantic, we lose a total of 40,000,000. If Britain falls, as it very possibly will if Europe is lost, there will go another 18,000,000.

I am aware that the Senator from Ohio [Mr. TAFT] says we could stand on the Rhine with our air power and deny Western Europe's steel to Russia by bombing the Ruhr. I think our national defense would be much better served by standing somewhere east of the Ruhr, in the first place.

I do not see, in the second place, how we can obtain from the Europeans the European and African bases necessary to bomb the Ruhr or anywhere else in Eu-

rope after having left them to their own resources in the matter of troops on the ground. Since steel is the strongest material component in our defense and the base of all other industry, we should not lightly give it up to the enemy or accept its destruction at our own hands. We in the free nations need that 65,000,000 tons of steel a year on our side.

THE BRUSSELS AGREEMENT WILL ADVANCE COLLECTIVE SECURITY

Mr. President, I think we are in the familiar position in which men so often find themselves. I hope it is not trite to say that if there were no Brussels agreement, we should have to invent one. That is precisely why I think it so important that the Congress express its approval or disapproval of the main features of that instrument. Always with the proviso that the Europeans continue to help themselves, and at an accelerating rate, the Brussels agreement—more properly the Atlantic Pact behind it—is the most convincing single and immediate pledge of the principle of collective security.

Mr. President, I hope the Senator from North Dakota will not desert me.

Mr. LANGER. I am going to return.

Mr. DOUGLAS. I thank the Senator. It is the principle of collective security which I am really seeking to advance, and that not only in Europe. But the debate was initiated over Europe and over the agreement made at Brussels. General Eisenhower is even now surveying the definite prospects for putting into effect the agreement made or the understandings arrived at by diplomatic officials at Brussels. We must know what the attitude of Congress is toward the principle of collective security in Europe, or the people will not know how to judge the fruits of the Eisenhower mission.

Every argument that comes to my mind convinces me that to reaffirm our common security with that of Europe is vital to our survival as a free nation. There is, Mr. President, poetic justice in the fact that it was the civilization of Europe in turn which helped to teach us the value of freedom. In portraying some of the dangers involved in such a program as this, we should paint not only the sunny side, but also the dangers, which are real.

Let us frankly face the fact that the allied armies which are to be raised under the Brussels agreement may be overpowered and defeated. We may be driven into the sea. Our losses may be heavy. No one can take this possibility lightly. Everyone who cares for human life must consider it. But what Senator TAFT and Mr. Hoover seem to insist upon is that we should not use land troops on the continent unless we are certain to win. Thus Mr. Hoover says that he would not give Europe another man or another dollar until it had erected "A sure dam against the Red flood." Mr. TAFT says he would not agree in advance to use land troops unless we were, quoting his exact words—CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, January 5, page 58—"almost certain of success."

But what these gentlemen overlook is the fact that if we do not help, Europe and Asia will likely fall. It will be a certainty then that we will have to face the Communist world alone. We will then be in the greatest danger of all and our ultimate losses will be even more terrible.

In order to protect ourselves against such a calamity, is it not wise to take some chances in the effort to avert it? If we only try to resist the Communists when it is a sure thing that we will win, the Communists will conquer the world.

Mr. LANGER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. DOUGLAS. No, I prefer not to yield just now.

Then the only sure thing will be either the destruction or the vital crippling of America itself. This is not the kind of certainty which Mr. Hoover, Senator TAFT, or any of us desire.

VI. WHAT ABOUT ASIA?

Mr. President, thus far I have attempted to state the case I have against the Taft-Hoover approach to the issue of our proper strategy and to defend the Brussels agreement, or the Brussels understanding, as it has been reported. I disagree, somewhat less exhaustively, with what I have described as the second school of thought on the subject—namely, the "protect Europe but not Asia" school which asks us to restrict our major commitments to Europe. But I nevertheless disagree with it.

Mr. President, it is not because I underestimate the vital importance of Europe that I disagree with those who, like the British, would largely restrict our commitments to that area. I go the whole way with them as to the vital importance of Europe. But on the other side of the world, they do not go the whole way with us. The American defenders of this idea would defend Japan, Formosa, the Ryukyus, the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand, I am sure. But that is about as far as they would go.

However, this school seems to feel that the combined forces of Western Europe and the United States cannot be spread thin and that, even together, we do not have the strength to protect free Asia as well. Asia, according to them, is not industrially developed, and the Communists would not gain too greatly by taking it over.

THE DANGER OF LOSING SOUTHEAST ASIA AND INDIA

With this I firmly disagree. While it is true that Asia is not a greatly developed industrial area, southeast Asia is the major source of at least two very vital war materials, namely, tin and rubber, as well as a vast reservoir of manpower. Its loss would endanger India, which is one of our major sources of manganese.

Indochina is now in grave danger of falling to the Communists. Not only is there a strong internal Communist movement, but a Chinese Communist army is poised at their gates and is ready to strike. If this happens, Burma, Thailand, Malay, and Indonesia will be sitting ducks and will fall very quickly. Ceylon will then be in great danger. India, already facing the Russian Communists from the northwest through a thin strip of Afghanistan, will find herself suddenly faced with terrific pressure from the east in a Communist-held southeast Asia. To the west of India are only the weak, semineutral, feudal countries of Afghanistan, Iran, and Saudi Arabia.

Now vast masses of people in India live a submarginal existence, and India in 1949 imported over three-quarters of a million tons of rice from southeastern Asia—350,000 tons from Thailand and over 400,000 tons from Burma. I am told that India's minimum grain requirements are 6,000,000 tons more than her current crops. She still gets a very important part of her food supply from this area. If the Communists get Indochina, Burma, and Thailand, they hold the "rice bowl" of the Orient. One of their biggest problems at the moment is securing adequate food for their Asiatic fighting forces, so the Communists will be vastly strengthened if they take over southeast Asia.

Meanwhile, India, having great supplies of rice cut off, would be weakened internally. The hunger, disease, and unrest upon which the Communists thrive would flourish. Sitting in the jaws of a nutcracker with Russia as one jaw, a Communist-held southeast Asia as the other jaw, weakened internally by lack of food, facing an enemy greatly strengthened by access to an abundant food supply for its fighting forces, India, whether Prime Minister Nehru recognizes it or not, will surely fall.

With India gone, the countries of the Middle East, lacking our help, or even the threat—as against Communist aggressors—of our help, will also go to the Communists. Then Africa, and so on.

IF WE LOSE SOUTHEAST ASIA, WE LOSE 95 PERCENT OF OUR NATURAL RUBBER

Meanwhile, how does all this affect us? In the first place we would lose practically all of our sources of natural rubber. Malaya, Indonesia, Thailand, Ceylon, and Indochina produced 1,497,000 long tons of natural rubber in the first 11 months of 1950. This is nearly 90 percent of the world total. From this area the United States alone imported 700,000 tons during the same period which accounted for 95 percent of our total rubber supplies.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to insert at this point in the RECORD a table giving the break-down on rubber production and United States imports of rubber.

There being no objection, the table was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

TABLE V.—*Major sources of natural rubber*

[Figures are for first 11 months of 1950]

Country	Production (long tons)	United States imports (long tons)
Malaya	628,000	332,000
Indonesia	630,000	194,000
Thailand	100,000	97,000
Ceylon	101,500	59,000
Indochina	38,000	19,000
Total for Southeast Asia	1,497,500	701,000
Other [1]	172,500	35,000
World totals	1,670,000	736,000

[1] Primarily Liberia, Belgian Congo, and other parts of Africa. Some from the Philippines and South America. Brazil produces only 400 tons which is not enough for her own consumption.

Source: Department of Commerce.

Mr. DOUGLAS. Virtually all this natural rubber will be lost. We can use synthetics for passenger automobile tires, but we must have natural rubber for bomber tires, heavy truck tires, and many other uses.

I regret to say that the Munitions Board, in charge of the stockpiling, lagged woefully behind in their acquisitions of rubber as has been reported by Senator JOHNSON's preparedness subcommittee—Senate Document 230, page 18. I desire to pay tribute to the junior Senator from Texas for the magnificent work he has done in showing the inadequacy of the efforts of the Munitions Board and the defense officials in accumulating a sufficient stockpile of strategic raw materials. This, despite the fact that Congress had made adequate appropriations for stockpiling purposes.

We can exist for some time, perhaps, on what we have by severe curtailment of rubber for civilian uses. We did so during World War II. But if we follow the Taft-Hoover program, or even the "protect Europe but not Asia" school of thought on foreign policy and abandon Asia, we shall be at a terrific disadvantage if war comes, especially if the war is a long one, which it very likely will be if the Communists control all of Asia.

LOSS OF SOUTHEAST ASIA WOULD CAUSE US TO LOSE TWO-THIRDS OF OUR TIN SUPPLY

We would also find ourselves virtually hamstrung with respect to tin. Asia accounts for nearly two-thirds of the world production of tin-content ore, or 99,000 metric tons out of a world total of 162,000 metric tons. Of this 99,000 tons, China, which is already lost, accounts for only 4,000 tons. Ninety-five thousand tons come from Southeast Asia which is the immediate danger spot. This is made up as follows:

TABLE VI—*Sources of tin content ore in Southeast Asia*

	Metric tons
Malaya	55,000
Indonesia	30,000
Thailand	8,000
Burma	2,000
Total	95,000

Mr. LANGER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. DOUGLAS. I regret to say to my dear friend——

Mr. LANGER. On the question of tin, I want to show where much of the tin is. It is in South America.

Mr. DOUGLAS. If the Senator will wait a minute; after completing one sentence, I will yield.

Another 23,000 tons comes from Nigeria and the Belgian Congo, both in Africa, which will be in danger if all of Asia falls. Our only worthwhile source of supply which will be left if we lose southeast Asia is Bolivia with only 34,000 tons. And even in peacetime, the United States alone consumes 60,000 tons annually.

Mr. LANGER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator from Illinois yield to the Senator from North Dakota for a question?

Mr. DOUGLAS. It is only because I am so fond of the Senator that against my better judgment and against my best interests, I yield for one brief question.

Mr. LANGER. With reference to the purchase of tin, is it not true that we have spent billions of dollars all over the world and that the Democratic administration has not developed tin in South America, where the supply is greater than in any other area in the world?

Mr. DOUGLAS. Is this a rhetorical statement?

Mr. LANGER. It is a question. Is it not true?

Mr. DOUGLAS. I do not know how much money has been spent for developing tin in South America. I might say that such a program could very well have taken place under the Point 4 program which more Republicans than Democrats opposed. However, this question of foreign policy seems to me to be far too grave to make into a partisan issue. I hope the Senator from North Dakota will join me in an endeavor to keep this from happening.

Again I regret to say that the Munitions Board allowed themselves to fall behind, in this case, in the stockpiling of tin. Mr. Hubert Howard, former chairman of the Munitions Board, reported that, as of December 31, 1949, there were stocked 60,713 long tons of tin, including 22,500 tons held by the RFC which is permitted to sell its holdings to industry—reported in Armed Force, May 13, 1950. This left a net frozen tonnage as of that date of only 38,000 long tons for strategic use against a background of an essential civilian and military demand under peacetime conditions of 60,000 tons annually. This should give us some idea of how far behind we are so far as stockpiling is concerned.

Of course we can severely curtail civilian goods which use tin as we did in World War II. But how long can we fight a war without more tin? Five years, perhaps. But what if the war lasts 10 years or even longer? Can we afford to take that chance by allowing southeast Asia to fall to the Communists?

THE DANGER OF LOSING MANPOWER AND STRATEGIC MATERIALS

We used to get a large portion of our manganese requirements from Russia. Russia has largely cut this off, and we are getting 552,000 metric tons of manganese annually from India. But if we do nothing India will go to the Communists, so we will have lost that. We also get 655,000 tons from the Union of South Africa and 331,000 tons from the Gold Coast in Africa. But these supplies are not safe, either. It takes 14 pounds of manganese for every ton of steel. Can we afford to let this vital ingredient to the heart of our war-making defense capacity go by the Boards? I do not think so.

Then, if we lose Southeast Asia and India we will very likely lose the Middle East. This region has vast reserves of precious oil. Oil is the lifeblood of modern armed forces, and losing these reserves would weaken us and give great strength to the Communists.

Mr. President, if the Senator from North Dakota does not object, I ask unanimous consent to insert at this point in my remarks table VII, which will give an idea of what we would lose in oil reserves if we should lose the Middle East.

There being no objection, the table was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

TABLE VII.—*Estimated petroleum reserves—Major producing areas, as of Jan. 1, 1950*

Area and country	Estimated reserves	Percent world reserves
	Barrels	
U. S. S. R. and satellites	4,800,000,000	6.24
Europe (outside the iron curtain)	209,950,000	.27
Far East	1,570,000,000	1.99
Middle East and Africa	33,115,500,000	42.31
South America	10,548,000,000	13.47
North America	27,961,800,000	35.72
Total world reserves	78,280,250,000	100.00

Source: Based on figures given in DeGolyer and MacNaughton, Twentieth Century Petroleum Statistics (1950), p. 1.

Mr. DOUGLAS. Mr. President, as we can see by this table, the Middle East has 42⅓ percent of the world oil reserves. Russia and her satellites already have 6¼ percent so, if the Communists take over the Middle East, they will control nearly one-half of the world's oil reserves. We cannot afford to let this happen.

There are other strategic materials to consider. I am no expert in geopolitics, but when I consider what we lose in terms of manpower and vital materials—not to mention the destruction of cultures and of nations and of freedom—by letting the Communists take all of Asia, frankly I am alarmed. I simply do not think we can take the chance.

While we would be denied access to these materials and manpower, Russia would be integrating them and strengthening herself.

The problem is not one merely of economic survival. The problem is one of political survival—the survival of freedom. And if we are to survive, we need the people and the war-making materials of that part of Asia which is still free. If protecting free Asia as well as Europe would spread our forces too thin, then by all means let us build up our joint forces so that they will be sufficient. Let us not allow our weakness to dominate our policy. Let us instead develop adequate strength to support a policy which is wise. That means trying to prevent the Communists from taking over Asia and keeping it instead in the hands of free native governments.

Furthermore, Mr. President, I think all parties to this debate agree that the islands of Japan should be not only defended with the aid of American forces, but should be rearmed in the common effort against Communist aggression. I should like to inquire how the 80,000,000 people of Japan can successfully live, to say nothing of maintaining large armed forces, unless there is at least part of a friendly Asia which is left open to Japanese trade. The policy of surrendering Asia but defending Japan would require vast permanent subsidies from the United States going far beyond the military assistance program to which we are com-

mitted. I do not say that we may not be forced to embrace such a policy, or that our occupation policy has not already embraced it in part. I do say that we should strive to prevent the conditions which would force such a policy upon us.

TO PROTECT SOUTHEAST ASIA, WE NEED NOT GET BOGGED DOWN IN A LAND WAR WITH RED CHINA

Mr. President, our military capacities and the strategic position we now confront will, of course, not permit us to deploy huge land armies on the continent of Asia. We can use air and sea power in the defense of most of Southeast Asia. With adequate help from other nations, we can also use some land forces in the defense of all Southeast Asia, Japan, the Philippines, Australia, and India. Our Navy can both help defend Formosa, as it is now doing, and blockade the Chinese ports.

In committing ourselves to aid in the defense of Europe, Mr. President, we should not adopt a policy of totally neglecting the importance of the continent of Asia. That is the point at which I disagree with what I have called the second group debating the means of our defense, those who would largely restrict our efforts to Europe. That is also the point, Mr. President, at which I would like to suggest to our British friends that they should not become European isolationists while deploring the views of those in America who are isolationists toward Europe. In fact, it is their isolationism toward Asia which directly helps to strengthen American isolationism toward Europe. If they would only help us more in Asia, it would become more possible for us to help them more in Europe.

If there is one message which the English now in this city can carry back to their country, it is this: How can they ask us to defend them in Europe if they do not make their contributions to the defense of Asia?

Mr. LANGER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. DOUGLAS. I cannot yield at this time.

Russian domination of the Eurasian land mass, Mr. President, would leave us no place to base the air and sea defense of the Belgian Congo, the Gold Coast, or any other vital spot in Africa, including Suez. We should lose valuable resources of uranium, cobalt, and other materials. To the loss of India's half a million metric tons of manganese, we would have to add the loss of 655,000 tons from the Union of South Africa and 331,000 tons from the Gold Coast. How the Senator from Ohio thinks we can defend Africa once we have lost Europe and probably Asia as well is beyond me. Frankly, I think Africa would be almost impossible to hold if we lost all of Asia and the Middle East, even if we did manage to hold Europe itself.

VII. WHAT WOULD BE THE FATE OF AMERICA IN A COMMUNIST-CONTROLLED WORLD?

Mr. President, I have tried to demonstrate that we must adopt a foreign policy of resisting Russian aggression everywhere we can. We must adopt this policy for our own security as well as for that of the other free and independent nations of the world. I should like to emphasize, however, that we are not the only ones who should take this stand. Every nation with a stake in freedom and independence should do the same. Is it not apparent that unless we help, the Communists could now sweep over all of Europe, Asia, the Middle East, and Africa? Since this might be done, and I believe it is possible, our answer should not be a quavering retreat and abandonment of our allies. The answer, Mr. President, lies in building up our combined strength to meet this challenge.

For, Mr. President, what would happen if the Communists came to dominate the rest of the world? Can we believe that the Communists, with their record of aggression would sit still indefinitely? Of course not.

Our weakness and abandonment of allies would provide the Russians with an engraved invitation to take over the world except for us. In view of the Communist doctrine that they will not be safe until the whole world is Communist, it is inevitable that they would move. And they would immediately take over what Sir Halford Mackinder has called the World Island, all of Europe, Asia, and Africa.

What kind of a world would we live in then, Mr. President?

In the first place, we would be alone with our major allies gone. We would be sitting in the jaws of the greatest military nutcracker ever to exist in the history of the world; between a Communist Asia on the one hand and a Communist Europe and Africa on the other.

The loss of Europe, Asia, and Africa would bring an irresistible drive toward isolationism in the United States and the consequent erection of a garrison state. The effort to build an unconquerable bastion while surrounded by a Communist world would bring in its train the suppression of many of our precious liberties. We probably could not avoid the realities of the police state, however we might avoid the name.

COMMUNISTS' RESOURCES WOULD BE OVERWHELMING

As I have pointed out, we would be cut off from extremely important strategic materials. We would have lost two-thirds of our source of tin, virtually all of our sources of rubber and manganese, and vast quantities of oil. The Communists would have steel resources equal to ours. Our capacity to defend ourselves would be so weakened that we would be at a great disadvantage. Communists would have their own productive might combined with that of Europe and Japan. They would have a virtual monopoly of many strategic materials which they would deny to us and use against us. Their supply of manpower for their armed forces and productive capacity would be limitless. Let us look at this manpower situation for a moment.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent at this point in my remarks to insert table VIII, which shows how the manpower of the non-Communist world will deteriorate as the Communists take over the various countries.

There being no objection, the table was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

TABLE VIII.—*The location of the world's population and how it will be changed if the Communists gradually take over selected areas*

[All figures in millions. Figures rounded and do not add up to totals]

	1948 population	The changing line-up	
		Communist	Non-Communist
World (present)	2,350.8	[1] 749.6	1,601.2
If we lose Western Europe (excluding United Kingdom)	246.3	995.9	1,354.8
Plus—			
United Kingdom	50.5	1,046.4	1,304.3
Southeast Asia	145.2	1,191.7	1,159.0
India (includes Ceylon, Nepal, and Pakistan)	430.9	1,622.6	728.1
Middle East	89.6	1,712.3	638.4
Africa	193.7	1,906.1	444.7
Far East (includes 20.200.0 in South Korea)	130.4	2,036.5	314.2

[1] Based on world situation in June 1950.

Primary Source: Statistical Office of the UN Population and Vital Statistics Reports, series A, No. 12.

Mr. LANGER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. DOUGLAS. I prefer not to yield. I shall be glad to have a private conversation with the Senator after I have concluded.

Table VIII shows that the present division of the world's population is 750 million under Communist control and 1.6 billion in non-Communist countries. So the present ratio is better than 2 to 1 in our favor. But if we lose Western Europe the division will be nearly 1 billion Communist to 1.4 billion non-Communist, so the ratio in our favor will drop to less than 1½ to 1. Then if we lose the United Kingdom, we lose another 46 million which will be picked up by the Communists.

The ratio will shift to favor the Communists if we then lost Southeast Asia with the Communists controlling countries with a combined population of 1.2 billion, while the non-Communist will have only 1.16 billion. If we then lose India, the Communist ratio will jump to nearly 2½ to 1.

After this, if the Communists take over the Middle East, Africa and the rest of the Far East, they will control the whole World Island of Asia, Africa and Europe along with peripheral areas such as Japan and England. If they control Europe, Asia and Africa, they will hold control of 2,036,500,000 people while we in the free nations will have only 314,300,000. Russia would outnumber us almost 7 to 1.

RUSSIA MIGHT CONQUER US AND RULE THE WORLD

Were this manpower combined with the productive capacity and strategic materials of Europe, Asia, and Africa, it would be extremely difficult for us to survive. I do not say it would be impossible. I merely say it would be difficult to survive. War would finally come to us on our own soil when we would be stripped

of allies by our abandoning them. Russia might well take us over and rule the world.

It is this picture, Mr. President, which causes me to reject both the Taft-Hoover approach and the program of those who would restrict our efforts almost wholly to Europe. I believe we should strive to marshal as many people and countries as possible to resist Russian aggression, and, to the extent of our resources, help them to resist if they will help themselves.

VIII. WHAT SHOULD WE DO AT HOME?

Mr. President, we heard the President of the United States repeat on January 8 that the Government's immediate goal is a mobilization of 3,500,000 men, with the maintenance of further sources of manpower in the National Guard and Reserves. By the testimony of General Marshall and Mrs. Rosenberg 2 days later, it appeared then that the target for July 1 of this year is 3,200,000 men under arms.

That figure has since been raised to about three and one-half million men. This would be at the rate of approximately 23 men under arms per 1,000 population. Presumably, our industrial mobilization is being geared to equip 3,500,000 men under arms some time in the summer of 1951, to carry out an increased program of military aid to our allies, and to build the added plant capacity which would be necessary in a general war. The President, for example, tells us that such capacity, when constructed, would be adequate to produce 50,000 planes and 35,000 tanks a year, if that became necessary.

THREE AND ONE-HALF MILLION MEN NOT ENOUGH

I believe that the final target of 3,500,000 men under arms within 8 to 9 months is too low, and that the timetable for reaching it is too slow. We need not only to raise our goals, but to speed up the process of reaching them. I do not know the assumptions about the world crisis on which our military leaders have erected their target of 3,500,000 men. They are, however, obviously not the assumptions to which I have been addressing myself in these remarks.

My assumptions, moreover, were clearly not those held by the North Atlantic ministers at the Brussels Conference. According to press reports, it was agreed there that the joint defense force on the European Continent should be built up to an estimated total of 55 divisions of which we were to furnish 10, by the end of 1953. Does this assume that the Russian danger will not really come upon us until 1954, and that we have therefore 3 years in which to get ready? I can see no basis for any such assumption. Indeed, in view of what is happening in Korea today, and was happening there when the Brussels Conference met, this idea seems not so much an assumption as a delusion. We cannot safely operate on the assumption that the Russians will not move in 1953, in 1952, or even in the next 6 months.

WE HAVE ONLY SEEN THE FIN OF THE SHARK

Mr. President, the manifestation of Communist aggression in Korea during these last 6 months is but the showing of the fin of the shark above the water. It is but a fraction of the striking power of the man-eater which lies beneath the surface. Day before yesterday, it was Czechoslovakia; yesterday it was China; today it is Korea. What will it be tomorrow?

WHERE WILL THE COMMUNISTS STRIKE NEXT?

I would say to my British friends that Hong Kong lies deep within the very jaws of Communist China. They may close at any moment. And when they do and that profitable colony is swallowed, I wonder if the British diplomats will still look as kindly upon the Chinese Reds as they do now. When Hong Kong falls I wonder if the British foreign office will still refuse to brand the Chinese Communists as aggressors, whether they will work to place them on the Security Council, even though this would reward successful aggression with a seat on the Council which was designed to prevent aggression. I doubt it. And perhaps the British diplomats need just such a jolt as this to bring them to their senses, although I, for one, shall be sorry to see the occasion for it occur.

Perhaps it will be Indochina, on whose borders a Communist army now rests. It may be Iran, where a Russian move would have overwhelming tactical advantages.

It may be free Berlin, which is deep within Communist East Germany, and which latest reports indicate may even now be facing another cruel blockade. It may be a surge westward into free Germany by East German Communists, just as the North Korean Communists moved southward last June. It may be that Bulgaria, Rumania, and Hungary will attack Yugoslavia. It may even be an attack by airborne Russian divisions across the narrow Bering straits into the vast and empty spaces of Alaska, there to establish air bases from which the continental United States could be attacked.

These are no chimeras, Mr. President. They are not nightmares conjured up to frighten the American people. They are real possibilities. They are consistent with expressed Communist intentions, with the actions of the Communists since 1945, and with the realities of military power.

Mr. President, the bell is tolling in Korea. It is tolling for the British in Hong Kong, Malaya, and Singapore, even though the British may not know it. The bell is tolling for India, even though Nehru may not know it. The bell is tolling, and the people of Asia and of Europe should listen to its warning. The bell is tolling not merely for the people who are being attacked in Korea, but it is tolling for free men everywhere. To me the danger is real.

(At this point Mr. DOUGLAS yielded to Mr. MCCARRAN and other Senators and debate ensued as to the order of speakers, which, on request of Mr. DOUGLAS and by unanimous consent, was ordered to be printed at the conclusion of the speech of Mr. DOUGLAS.)

Mr. DOUGLAS. Mr. President, I do not think I am an alarmist and certainly I do not want to be one. And I have no access to military intelligence reports. But the danger to me is real and present. I believe our security and that of the world itself is at stake. The disparity is too great between our military strength with a present total of not more than 16 to 18 divisions, as compared with Russia's 175, her satellites with their 60 divisions, and the Chinese Communists with probably at least 125 more. I think we do not have a moment to lose.

WE NEED AT LEAST 6,000,000 MEN UNDER ARMS BY DECEMBER 1

Mr. President, I suggest that we should have 6,000,000 men under arms by next December 1, and that we should have 4,250,000 of this number under arms by the 1st of July. This is approximately three-fourths of a million more than the President's most recent plan calls for by July and two and a half million more than his schedule by the time snow flies next winter. To do this, we should take men into the service at an average rate of approximately 340,000 a month, or nearly the top rate reached in World War II, but with a somewhat lower rate for the first 6 months and a somewhat higher rate for the last four.

On this schedule, by December of this year, when we should have reached the 6,000,000 mark, of which perhaps 4,000,000 will be in the ground forces, we should have activated approximately 55 combat divisions, though we cannot do that if the armed services cling to their present wasteful ratio of overhead to combat troops.

Mr. President, the armed services waste manpower more than any other group in this country. They are top heavy with supply troops and administrative troops. They get the smallest amount of fire power per 100,000 men of any army in the world, for only about 23 percent of the army consists of combat troops. There is great need for our Army to improve its position and to cut down the wasteful overhead. If it does not do so, it will not be making the full contribution to this country which I know it wants to make.

Some of these units should be National Guard divisions which are already in a fair state of readiness; some should be formed from men who have recently finished their basic training, stiffened up by cadres of experienced soldiers, while I hope that at least five would be Marine divisions. Despite the opposition of the general staff of the Army, the Marine Corps has earned by its record the right to exist as a combat organization. The Army is trying to prevent the Marine Corps from being a combat organization, and trying to prevent the Marine Corps from growing. At the same time it is providing for a vast expansion in the Army. I repeat, I believe that the Marine Corps has earned by its record the right to exist as a combat organization.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. DOUGLAS. I yield.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Is it not true that only about 22,000 out of each 100,000 in our Army are combat troops?

Mr. DOUGLAS. I believe that is true; and I think, in that 22,000, the head-

quarters units inside a division are regarded as combat troops. In other words, the overhead inside a division is counted as combat troops, although we know that in practice that frequently is not true.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Is it not estimated that the Chinese have about 80,000 out of 100,000 as combat troops?

Mr. DOUGLAS. I think that is true. The Army must change its policy, and I hope the Armed Services Committee rides herd on the General Staff to see that they diminish this overhead.

But, it is not only necessary to assemble men and to form divisions. It is also necessary to equip them. Here also the responsible administrative and military authorities give every evidence of having been dilatory, even in working toward the goal of 3,500,000 men, or before that, of 2,700,000. Congress has appropriated enormous sums for military purposes. Last September we passed a supplementary appropriation bill of $17,000,000,000 for rearmament over and above the large sums provided for 1950–51 in the general appropriation bill. In December we added a further twenty billions. What use has been made of these moneys, Mr. President?

The official statistics of the Governmen tell a surprising story. According to the daily Treasury statement for January 3, total expenditures of the Department of Defense for the 6 months up to January 2, 1951, were seven billion nine hundred million as compared to seven billion two hundren million during the comparable period of the year before. This was an increase of only seven hundred millions, or 9 percent in the expenditures of the Department of Defense. Yet the military situation is certainly more than 9 percent more serious than it was a year ago. It is, indeed, several times as serious.

After making full allowances for the fact that expenditures actually made do not include contracts let for which payments have not yet been made, it nevertheless seems clear that we have been dragging our feet in the provision of matériel as well as in the assembling of men.

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. DOUGLAS. I would prefer not to. I shall finish very shortly, and when I finish the Senator can ask any question he wishes.

Mr. WHERRY. My proposed question deals with the subject the Senator is discussing.

Mr. DOUGLAS. I understand, but when I have concluded, the Senator can ask the question.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Illinois declines to yield.

Mr. DOUGLAS. Moreover, we see little tangible evidence in industry as yet of any real transference from civilian to defense orders.

ARGUMENTS AGAINST A 6,000,000-MAN FORCE REFUTED

I want to emphasize, Mr. President, that I realize the basic differences between an assumption of our international position that would lead to an armed force of 3,500,000 and one which would lead to a force of 6,000,000. And before passing a verdict, let us consider what rejoinders could be offered to the charge of undue delay which I have made.

First, may I say that some of the arguments for a slow rate of rearmament are mutually contradictory. Thus, it is argued that we cannot induct troops more rapidly because we do not have enough facilities to equip and train them, while it is sometimes said that we do not need to order more equipment because we do not have the troops ready to use it. These two arguments, when advanced separately, may appear strong, but when taken together they are obviously self-defeating.

The new argument, the new defense of this position, I understand, is that we do not have enough shipping. Yet, certainly, at the end of the last war the seas abounded with ships which were under the control of the Government.

The plain answer is that we should speed up both the training of men and the provision of equipment, and that if we do the first, the military will then be forced to do the latter, namely, provide the equipment for the men. It is not necessary for training camps to be equipped with officers' clubs, swimming pools, golf courses, post exchanges, and steam heat before troops can be moved into them. It is better to train our young men now, than to wait until we can afford them the comforts of middle-class homes, particularly in view of the fact that the whole world may meanwhile catch on fire. There are many unused army camps in the South and Southwest where troops can be trained this winter and spring, even though a considerable proportion may have to live under tents. And if this appears to be too rigorous—and there are complaints from constituents about it—it is well for us to remember that many of the men in the line in Korea do not even have tents.

So far as weapons are concerned, there should be no shortage of rifles and carbines in view of the enormous numbers which were used during the last war. If there are still not enough to go around, it should be remembered that a considerable part of basic military training—close-order drill, extended order, physical conditioning, military discipline—can be carried through without rifles. If we use speed, the needed weapons could certainly be ready by the time the men were assigned to their service schools and rifle companies and then later formed into divisions.

Mr. President, it is better to do needed acts imperfectly than not to do them because we may not have facilities to do them perfectly. That is the inner meaning of the malapropism, "Whatever is worth doing at all is worth doing badly." Discomforts and difficulties should not be allowed to stand in the way of training a large number of our men. We may be in the process of subjecting 18-year-olds to universal training of some kind, but whatever kind it proves to be, it will not be peacetime training, for there is no peace.

WILL A 6,000,000-MAN FORCE COST TOO MUCH?

A second objection to such an increase in our rearmament goals is that it will cost too much, or more than we want it to cost. That is why the Senator from Ohio objected to a force of 4,500,000 or 3,500,000 men.

There is no doubt that the costs will be high. I estimate a probable average cost of $10,000 per man per annum. To equip and support a force of 6,000,000 men will cost approximately $60,000,000,000 a year or $46,000,000,000 more than the direct military costs for the year 1949–50. This is on the basis of an average of $10,000 per man per year. This is the best estimate I can make based on World War II costs and the increase in prices since then. Senator TAFT's figure seems to be an average of $13,000 per man per year. Since we will be fortunate if we can reduce nonmilitary cost by six billions to a total of twenty billions, this would mean total national expenditures of at least eighty billions of dollars, or approximately 32 percent of the net national income of 250 billions of dollars. I am using the more conservative figure of net national income rather than that for gross national product, which probably amounts to between two hundred and ninety and three hundred billions. I am doing this because the figure for gross national product, first, includes transfer payments such as interest on the public debt and allowances to veterans which do not add to the real flow of goods and services; second, apparently includes payments to men in the armed services; and, third, does not include allowances for the depreciation of buildings, machinery, and equipment. Only after these charges have been met does net income, properly speaking, begin.

When some twenty-two billions which are spent by State and local governments for such services as schools, roads, fire, and police protection, and care of the unfortunate are added to a Federal budget of $80,000,000,000, we reach a total of slightly above one hundred billions to be spent by Government. That is about 40 percent of the net national income.

This would be a severe and, in many ways, a frightening burden. It would certainly require a reduction in the general standard of living, and I think business, labor, agriculture, and the consumer should all be warned that such a reduction is probably coming. Unless Congress and the country met the challenge effectively by taxing, such a diversion of our national income to defense would also lead to borrowing from banks, to the creation of check-book money, and hence to inflation with all its hardships and injustices.

THE PROBLEM OF POPULAR OPINION

These admitted facts have led to a new argument on the part of those who oppose stepping up the rate of American mobilization in the crisis. In Russia, it is said, people cannot object to a heavy military program since, living under a dictatorship as they do, they find their wishes ineffective. But in a democracy such as ours, the desires of the people will ultimately be followed. If a political party is bold enough to impose a heavy burden which is not immediately needed, it is argued that this party will soon be swept from power and another

group pledged to a milder policy of armament will soon take office in its stead. Neither the Government nor the people—it is said—would be able to stay the course, and ultimately we would be forced back upon a much lower level of armament.

Therefore, it is argued by our military leaders we should not overstrain the economic and spiritual resources of our people, but rather should fix our pace at a rate which can be maintained both in terms of manpower and in terms of expense. If war actually were to come, or immediately threaten, it would then be easier for us—so it is said—to increase our forces above the 3,500,000 mark, than it would be if we had once been more intensively armed and then had been compelled by public opinion to fall back.

Such an argument is indeed weighty and deserves to be carefully considered. It rests, however, on the basic assumption that the Russian Communists will not start a war for several years, and that we should prepare for a long, slow pull rather than for sudden danger. It is of course possible that this may be so. But it is extremely dangerous to assume that it is.

The State Department has gone for some time on the theory that Russia would not be ready for war for some years. Events in Korea have certainly shaken this assumption. The fact that Russia gave the signal to its satellites for open aggression would seem to indicate that Russia is willing to risk general war and that Russia will strike again unless we speedily rearm. For we must face the fact that our efforts in Korea, which I believe to have been thoroughly justified, have nevertheless depleted our reserve strength to an alarming degree. Most of our combat troops have been committed in Korea, and the margin left to resist elsewhere has been cut to a relatively small figure.

CAN WE MEET THE CHALLENGE?

In World War II it took from 18 to 24 months to get a division ready for combat. We cannot begin to start too quickly. The danger is that we shall be too slow, and if the blow should fall, many of the consequent losses would be irretrievable. It will not do for us to say then that we would have been ready had the Russians only postponed their attack for another 2 or 3 years!

The generals of the Pentagon, like the Senator from Ohio [Mr. TAFT], seem to be obsessed by the fear of what would happen if the Communists were not to attack. If we have a large army, they say, and Russia does not take the aggressive, then our forces would be all dressed up but would have no place to go. The morale of the troops, says the Senator from Ohio, will suffer as it did before Pearl Harbor. But I will confess I am more worried by another query. Suppose we slowly build up an army of only 3,500,000 men and the Russians do attack? What would happen then? I submit that the results would be far more harmful to us in this case than if we were to have some idle divisions. Would it not be better to be caught long rather than to be caught short?

As for the ability of the American spirit to stand the burden of such heavy armament—if that is, indeed, to be our necessary choice—I do not believe we should underestimate either the priceless worth of liberty or the American willingness to sacrifice in its pursuit. If there has been any reluctance to date, has it not proceeded in large part from the fact that the dangers we all have felt about us have not been fully explained, that no stirring call to action in the face of those dangers has been sounded, and that the trumpet has not given a clear sound? I have faith that if the issues can be presented to to the people of this country they will resist all temptations to give up our security for greater ease and comfort.

This is not blind faith. It is borne out by our record in the past, and there is no reason to suppose that the American character has weakened. If the Russians make such a supposition, they do so at their peril.

THE MATERIAL SACRIFICES WE MUST MAKE

Mr. President, while we should recognize the reality of the material sacrifices which we must make, we should not, in my opinion, overestimate them. The program proposed calls, as I have said, for an added military expenditure of $45,000,000,000 above 1949–50 expenditures, and for 4,500,000 more men than we had under arms then, and for 3,500,000 more than we now have. The added burden of $45,000,000,000 is approximately one-sixth of our national income. While this burden is heavy, it can be borne. This is shown by the following facts:

An increase by 10 percent in the average length of the working week from 40 to 44 hours should increase national output by about 7½ percent, or approximately $19,000,000,000. This would be two-fifths of the added costs which I have outlined. A raising of the work week to 48 hours should send up output by about 15 percent, or by nearly the extra amount needed.

Let us assume that half of the added costs were borne by an increase in hours worked and in output, and half by a reduction in the standard of living, or a cut of about 8 percent. Since the average real income per capita is now about 40 percent higher than it was in 1929 (i. e., or 140, relative to 1929's 100), this would mean a reduction of between 11 and 12 points. This would still leave average real income per person close to 30 percent above what it was in 1929. And it is worth remembering that the 1929 level was thought only 20 years ago to be an almost idyllic high-water mark.

Furthermore, if war does not come, we can maintain a 6,000,000-man force and still ultimately cut back our losses in living standards by increasing productive efficiency. Meanwhile, we would be much better prepared. The task is not too difficult, therefore, if we have the will to survive, but it requires a clear realization of the dangers, and a determined readiness to prevent them.

A program of rearmament of this nature does call for heavy sacrifices; that fact should not be overlooked. But the gains in security, freedom, and in justice will outweigh them.

IX. WHAT WE SHOULD IMMEDIATELY DO ABROAD

Hitherto, I have discussed in general terms the need for us to resist Communist aggression wherever it occurs, provided that the area in question is accessible and that other countries join us in adequate strength. I have emphasized that this principle should apply to Asia as well as to Europe. I have tried to argue that we should do this, not in order to be international busy-bodies, nor to waste our blood and resources abroad, but because our own safety depends upon keeping Western Europe and as much of Asia as possible non-Communist. It is now time to narrow our sights and to try to indicate what are some of the more immediate steps which should be taken to carry out such a general decision.

When one does this, he should do it with due humility, and without the slightest touch of cockiness. None of us knows all the answers. All of us make mistakes. The decisions are grave, involving as they do, the fortunes and the very lives of hundreds of millions of people. With a due sense of the errors of the human mind, and the errors of my own mind, in particular, I should like to suggest the following:

First. Approve the principles of the Brussels agreement by congressional action, subject to a time-table under which each division of American troops sent abroad must be matched by a given number of European divisions, in a ratio of either 3½ to 1 or 4½ to 1, and speed up the terminal date at which we reach the maximum strength, so that it will not be the end of 1953 or even the end of 1952, but, if possible, the middle of 1952.

Second. Continue to urge the United Nations to recognize the plain fact that Red China has committed aggression, and work for a blockade of the Chinese coast. If the other nations refuse to act, frankly recognize that the United Nations has failed as an instrument to resist aggression, as the League of Nations failed over Manchuria and Ethiopia in the 1930's. In this event, while still keeping the United Nations as a forum, place no reliance on it as a source of immediate protection and build up our security, instead, through alliances or union alongside or outside of it. I regret that this seems to be necessary, but it is Russia's fault and not ours. In any event, prevent aggression from being rewarded, and hence do not permit Red China to be seated as a member of the United Nations. Let us use the veto to prevent this should it become necessary.

Institute a naval blockade of China to shut off supplies and force China to deplete Russia's resources. Bomb isolated Chinese supply dumps and power plants in Korea, although not the civilian population. Mr. President, I do not wish to see the civilian population of China bombed, because if we were to do so and if we killed large numbers of Chinese people, that would not only cause tremendous hardship to the individuals, but it would be likely to inflame all of Asia against us, and the Russians would try to turn the war into a race

war of the yellow man against the white, which we must not permit to happen. For the struggle is not that, Mr. President, but a common effort of men of all colors to resist the aggression of the Communist states so that all may develop freely.

Third. Make no deal in Korea in order to get out. Try to resist as long as possible. If we leave, let it be an honorable withdrawal under gunfire because of overwhelming odds. To withdraw otherwise would shake the confidence of non-Communists and anti-Communists everywhere, and would enormously strengthen the forces of communism.

Fourth. Try to promote democracy, land reform, and an increase in production and living standards in all non-Communist countries, especially those threatened by Communist aggression. Do this not only for itself, but also so that the poor of these countries have something more to defend than is now the case, and hence may oppose communism more vigorously. Let us do this especially on the Malay Peninsula, in India, where I hope we give or sell supplies of food, to the Middle East, and, yes, in Italy itself.

Let us range ourselves, not as white imperialists trying to take over those countries, but as a body of nations trying to resist aggression, so that the new nationalisms which are developing in Asia—the new nationalisms which at this time are trying to develop the freedoms we developed in the American Revolution—may come to fruition and may extend the benefits of a fuller life to all their people and so that they may have a chance to be free from the imperialism of Soviet Russia and of Communist China.

Fifth. Be ready to help with naval and air power if the Communists strike in Indochina, the Malay Peninsula, or the Near East. Get Great Britain and France to make the preponderant contributions to the necessary land forces in order to compensate for their relative failure to help in the Korean struggle.

Sixth. Try to get as good allies as we can, but have no squeamishness from now on about taking associates whose records may be somewhat soiled. Our civilization has the right to survive. It is infinitely superior to that of Russian communism. If we wait until we have perfect allies, we shall be very lonely.

No one who sits as a spectator on the sidelines has the right to complain if we, battling for our survival and for the survival of the free world, of necessity take imperfect allies who are willing to help. Therefore, let us try to bring Franco, Tito, and Chiang Kai-shek in on our side. They are not democrats, but they are anti-Communists. While they do not stand for freedom themselves, in resisting totalitarian communism they will be helping to protect our freedom. Try to help the constructive forces in Chiang Kai-shek's administration, and use his and our resources for a common end.

These leaders have at least one and one-half million troops available. These can be very helpful in checking the aggressive onrush of the police state. Their sins can be forgiven, and they can stand beside us in the battle. If spectators complain that we are not associating with the best people, let us remind them that the struggle is for survival, and that a defeat because of failure to use available non-Communist forces may not be as virtuous as they assume. Moreover, those who sit in the icy seats of the scornful and decline to take part in the struggle, when freedom is at stake, may not be so virtuous as they assume. Let them remember that we took Joe Stalin as an ally in the last war, and that these men, to put it mildly, cannot be worse than he.

Take pains to make the reasons for this action plain to the working people of Great Britain, France, and the West and to the free people in the East, and make it clear that in accepting the aid of dictators we do not subscribe to their antidemocratic ideas but instead are actively promoting the democratic faith. We may not support their form of government, I certainly do not support their form of government, but we do support their stand against communism and we will join them in resisting Communist aggression wholeheartedly.

Seventh. Serve notice upon Russia and the world that the next act of aggression by a Communist satellite will be regarded by us as an aggressive move by Russia which will be punished by us to the full extent of our power. We have been extraordinarily forebearing with the Russians as the recital of the last five and one-half years of history has indicated. We have treated the invasion of South Korea by the North Korean Communists and the aggressive war started in Korea by the Chinese Communists as isolated and independent acts. We know, however, that both of these aggressions were started at Russian prompting and have proceeded under Russian dictation.

The Russians would like to bleed us white by a series of such moves by satellites for which they will then deny responsibility. If we and the rest of the world allow ourselves to be sucked in by this, it will be fatal. Instead of fighting off only the tentacles of the octopus, let us recognize that these tentacles are directed by a central intelligence. Let us serve notice, therefore, that at the next act of aggression by a satellite, we will reserve the right to strike at the eye of the octopus itself. This is much more likely to be a deterrent than a stimulant to aggression.

Eighth. Although the hopes for settlement are but slender, keep open the avenues for honorable negotiation, and strive, without let-up in the mobilization of our defenses, for peace without any surrender of freedom or justice.

Ninth. Let us tell the nations of the world our aims and intentions. They are honorable and we should make them known. Modesty is becoming in the case of individuals, but as a nation we must get across our ideas to the peoples of the world.

Police states are historically more effective at propaganda than democracies in the short run, although the ideas of democracy have survived over the years because they are superior. But we now face a very grave short run proposition which may very well turn out to be a long-run proposition. We should not preach the "big lie," as do the Communists. We need only preach the truth, but we must preach it well. For we need the people of the world on our side, and we have much more to offer than the Communists.

X. CONCLUSION

Mr. President, let us determine that our civilization is not to fall and that the icecap of the police state shall not descend upon either us or Western culture. If that were to happen, then the liberties which we take for granted, as the air we breathe, would disappear; men could be arrested in the middle of the night without a warrant, taken to stations of the secret police, and kept there without having the right of habeas corpus; they could be sentenced without trial, condemned to death, or condemned to being worked to death in a prison camp. The icecap of tyranny would descend over the world, and with that would go control over the schools, the radio and the churches. Those who hate war and think perhaps that it is not worth while to resist would be submerged and their very children would be taken away from them.

It would be hundreds of years, perhaps many centuries, before that icecap would melt. During that time the western civilization of which we are proud, would largely disappear. Mr. President, I think that is a far worse thing to happen to the world than physical death itself.

Civilizations such as Greece and Rome have fallen in the past, and most profound students of history believe that they fell because men lost faith in themselves and failed to meet new challenges. To Gilbert Murray, the cause of the failure of Greece and Rome was that the Greeks and the Romans lost their nerve. To Dean Inge, the failure of civilizations was caused by "resignation," which he said was "the disease from which civilizations die." Arnold Toynbee, in his recent great work on history, says that civilizations fail because of "insufficient response" to "stimulus"; and the gloomy German, Spengler, had the same version, that civilizations fall because the inner faith of a civilization wears itself out. The Communists believe that this is what will happen to us. They think the stream of history flows with them.

It lies within our power to prove them right or to prove them wrong. If we have faith in the essence of our society, namely, respect for the individual and a deep desire to improve human life, and if we translate such a faith into acts, we will survive. If we do not, we are likely to fall.

We have not sought world leadership. It has been thrust upon us by time and the mysterious workings of history. It would be far more comfortable for us all if it had never come. But it has. We cannot escape it. Whatever we as a nation do, will probably be determining.

By withdrawing, we can allow the police state to take over Europe, Asia, and virtually all of the world. If this

happens, we shall be hemmed in, and our own survival will be more doubtful. For such a confession of weakness would be contagious and would prevent the free world from rallying in unity. There would be a general rush of men and countries to save themselves. The result, in my judgment, would be disaster. War of course, would be a certainty.

But if weakness is contagious, so also is courage and determination. If we really resolve to resist aggressive communism, others will rally more fully to the cause and will join with us. We may not get the support of many whom we would like to have on our side. We will get the aid of others whom in calmer times we would not wish to have. But the free world will ultimately group around us. And this non-Communist world, if it will only unite, still holds the preponderance of power. It has over twice the population of the Communist world. It has many times the industrial strength of the Communists. For the moment, it is weak in military strength at its very center. But we can repair this.

Freedom can win if we and all the free peoples are united. Such determined unity can perhaps still deter the aggressors from going further and give us peace. It is confessedly a slim hope, but it is the only hope for peace.

Even if—God forbid—open struggle comes, if we are determined to preserve the faith by which we live, we can rebuild much of the damage done and free ourselves and others from the fear of tyranny. In the words of Lincoln which are as appropriate for this crisis as for that of 90 years ago, "We can nobly win or meanly lose the last, best hope of man on earth." Let us resolve to win. Let us have faith and in that faith let us act.

ORDER OF SPEAKERS IN THE DEBATE

During the delivery of the speech of Mr. DOUGLAS,

Mr. McCARRAN. Mr. President, would the Senator from Illinois yield so that I may have an understanding? I know the Senator from Illinois has not concluded his speech.

Mr. DOUGLAS. I am near the end. I shall be glad to yield with the understanding that I do not lose my right to the floor.

Mr. McCARRAN. The Senator from Illinois gained the floor under an understanding between him and myself that he should have the floor. As a result I withdrew my effort to get the floor. I know that the Senator from Oregon [Mr. MORSE] is next on a list of speakers which is before the Presiding Officer. Undoubtedly debate will probably continue until nearly 8 o'clock this evening. I wonder if we could have an understanding that on reconvening tomorrow the Senator from Nevada will be recognized to make an address, with the Senator from Oklahoma [Mr. KERR], the present Presiding Officer, to follow.

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, no unanimous-consent request has been proposed, as I understand.

Mr. McCARRAN. No; no such request has been made.

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, will the Senator from Illinois yield without prejudicing his right to the floor?

Mr. DOUGLAS. I am happy to yield provided I do not lose the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. WHERRY. I should like to state that it was my hope at least to make an explanatory statement with reference to my resolution. Earlier in the day, of course, I understood that the organization of the Senate had to be effected. Therefore it was impossible to take up the resolution at that time. I notice that the names of approximately six Senators are on the list of Senators who are to follow the Senator from Nevada. Of course no announcement has been made that we shall have a session tomorrow. I wonder if the distinguished Senator from Nevada would permit the junior Senator from Nebraska to make a brief statement on the resolution he has submitted.

Mr. McCARRAN. I may say to the Senator from Nebraska that the Senator from Nevada has been attempting to get the floor since Thursday of last week. I have tried to accommodate other Senators who desired the floor. Finally I again yielded today. Whether I had any right to yield is another question, but I did yield under whatever right I had to do so.

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, will the distinguished Senator yield for another inquiry, without losing the floor?

Mr. DOUGLAS. I yield provided I do not lose the floor.

Mr. WHERRY. I wonder if the distinguished Senator from Nevada recalls that I, too, tried to obtain the floor last Thursday.

Mr. McCARRAN. I think that is correct.

Mr. WHERRY. I attempted to work out, before the session was over, some understanding under which we might proceed. The majority leader persuaded me to wait until Monday, with the statement that possibly an arrangement could be made at that time.

Mr. President, I always like to accommodate Senators in the orderly procedure of debate. However, I wonder if the distinguished Senator from Nevada would modify his suggestion so as to permit the junior Senator from Nebraska to have at least 45 minutes tomorrow. Then the Senator from Nevada could proceed, followed by the Senator from Oklahoma [Mr. KERR]. I think that request is not unreasonable.

Mr. McCARRAN. Mr. President, I should like to assist the Senator from Nebraska in every way possible. I have yielded to a number of Senators. My speech will probably require not more than 40 minutes, and then I shall be through with the particular subject I have in mind. So far as yielding to the Senator from Nebraska is concerned, or consenting that he may have the first 45 minutes tomorrow, I certainly would have no objection. However, this situation arises by reason of the practice of farming out time. Such practice has been opposed right along by the Vice President of the United States. When he was majority leader he opposed the farming out of time in advance. But the question has again arisen, and time has been farmed out. There is a list before the Presiding Officer, and time has been farmed out. It is not right. It is not in accordance with the spirit of the rules of this body.

I am not criticizing the Senator from Illinois. He took his chances. He and I were taking our chances earlier in the day. I yielded to him whatever chance I had, because I wanted him to go ahead. What I wanted to do was to make progress. When I went to the desk today to find out why I was not to be recognized, I was told that the Vice President thought I had made my speech on Thursday, which I had not. If he thinks tomorrow that I have made my speech today, I shall be out tomorrow.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Illinois has yielded to the Senator from Nevada for an observation.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield to me?

Mr. McCARRAN. The Senator from Illinois has the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator from Nevada wish to make a unanimous-consent request?

Mr. McCARRAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that tomorrow, provided the Senator from Oregon [Mr. MORSE] has an opportunity to make his speech this evening, after the morning hour the Senator from Nebraska shall have 45 minutes on the subject of Senate Resolution No. 8, and that following that the senior Senator from Nevada may have the floor, to be followed by the senior Senator from Oklahoma [Mr. KERR].

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, I should like to know where the junior Senator from Minnesota is to be sandwiched in. I have been waiting for an opportunity to obtain the floor. I thoroughly enjoy the opportunity of listening to my distinguished friend from the great State of Illinois. However, I have a few remarks to make which have something to do with the state of the Union. I shall be compelled to object to the unanimous-consent request unless I hear the name of Mr. HUMPHREY from the State of Minnesota read from the list which has been projected.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, will the Senator from Illinois yield to me with the understanding that he shall not lose the floor?

Mr. DOUGLAS. I yield with that understanding.

Mr. MORSE. I should like to suggest to my good friend from Minnesota that it is always a matter of great inspiration to me to see him on the floor of the Senate. If he will remain with me tonight, I assure him that I will remain until he finishes his remarks tonight.

Mr. McCARRAN. Mr. President, the practice of farming out time is leading to the condition with which we are confronted. I knew that I could not be

heard for several hours, because the Senator from Illinois would have the floor. He now has the floor. Therefore, I absented myself from the Chamber, as did other Senators. If we had been trying to obtain recognition, we would have been in the Chamber, where we should be, as a matter of fact.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. DOUGLAS. I promise the Senator from Nevada that I shall be present in the Chamber when he makes his speech tomorrow.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator from Illinois yield to the Senator from Minnesota?

Mr. DOUGLAS. Provided I do not lose the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. There is a unanimous-consent request before the Senate.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, I should like to put in a plug for the competitive system on the floor of the Senate. I am perfectly willing to take my chances of recognition, and to remain here to listen to these remarkable addresses and keep up with the business of the Senate. I am of the mind that the list which reposes on the Presiding Officer's desk provides an easy opportunity for some Senators to return to their offices and catch up with their correspondence. I believe in the rugged life, and in individual enterprise, so I am compelled to object.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Objection is heard.

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield so that I may propound a question to the acting majority leader?

Mr. DOUGLAS. I will not yield.

Mr. WHERRY. Will the Senator yield if he may do so without losing the floor?

Mr. DOUGLAS. I shall finish my speech very shortly. I do not wish to seem abrupt to the Senator from Nebraska. I yield, provided he will make his question brief.

Mr. WHERRY. I thank the Senator for yielding. The question is very brief. I simply wish to ask the acting majority leader whether he knows if there is to be a session of the Senate tomorrow. I think the answer to that question will help many Senators out of this difficulty.

Mr. McMAHON. Mr. President, as I understand it, it is the intention of the majority leader to have a session of the Senate tomorrow. If I had my way now, the Senate would remain in session.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The acting majority leader has stated that there will be a session of the Senate tomorrow.

Mr. McMAHON. From the size of the list, there seem to be a great many speeches in prospect. We should remain and listen to them.

I wish to associate myself with the views expressed by the Senator from Nevada [Mr. McCARRAN] and the Senator from Minnesota [Mr. HUMPHREY], that the practice of having a list ought to go out the window. We ought to revert to the practice of being present and being recognized when we have something to say.

Mr. McMAHON. Mr. President, I express my gratitude to the Senator from Illinois for yielding to me.

Mr. DOUGLAS. Mr. President, I ask that all this colloquy appear at the conclusion of my remarks.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection the colloquy and remarks referred to will be printed in the RECORD at the conclusion of the remarks of the Senator from Illinois.

After the conclusion of the speech of Mr. DOUGLAS,

THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES

Mr. MORSE obtained the floor.

Mr. McMAHON. Mr. President, will the Senator from Oregon yield to me for 30 seconds so that I may make a comment on the speech of the Senator from Illinois?

Mr. MORSE. I should like to accommodate my good friend from Connecticut, but I know I shall have to disappoint a number of Senators who will want me to yield, and I hope the Senator from Connecticut will accept my apology for not yielding. I have advised the minority leader and other Senators that I shall not yield. I am going to proceed, without interruption, to make this speech. I think it would be most unfair of me to start yielding at this late hour, if for no other reason than that of consideration for the members of the staff of the Senate and for Senators, at this late hour, with a speech of the length of that which I am about to make. I feel that decency and courtesy call upon me to make the speech without yielding for any purpose whatsoever.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oregon declines to yield.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, we are now engaged in the United States in the first round of an historic debate on foreign policy, the outcome of which will have tremendous and far-reaching consequences not only for us in the Western Hemisphere but for the entire world. Some 2 weeks ago the distinguished ex-President of the United States, Mr. Herbert Hoover, made a major speech, in which he suggested that this continent should be made a "Gibraltar of western civilization" and that we in the United States should refrain from committing ground forces in the continent of Europe, but instead should rely upon the Air Force and the Navy and the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans for our defense against communism.

On January 5 the distinguished senior Senator from Ohio [Mr. TAFT] made his first major speech on foreign policy in this session of Congress. In the course of that speech the Senator from Ohio said:

> We must not assume obligations by treaty or otherwise which require any extensive use of American land forces. In the first place, we should be willing to assist with sea and air forces any island nations which desire our help. Among those islands are Japan, Formosa, the Philippines, Indonesia, Australia, and New Zealand; on the Atlantic side, Great Britain, of course.

Later on in the speech the Senator from Ohio stated:

> The power of great sea and air forces is not necessarily limited to island nations. The policy I suggest certainly would not abandon to Communist conquest the continental nations. In the first place, we may give economic assistance to many such nations providing they really want that assistance. We can give arms as we are bound to do under the Atlantic Pact, and as we are now doing in Indochina, in Greece, and in Turkey.

Then later he said:

> The greatest question of policy before the country and before this Congress, however, relates to our undertakings in Europe. Under the general principles I have laid down, I would say that we had better commit no American troops to the European Continent at this time.

I desire to repeat that sentence, Mr. President, because it is one on which I shall dwell somewhat later in my speech. The Senator from Ohio said:

> Under the general principles I have laid down, I would say that we had better commit no American troops to the European continent at this time. Some modification is required in that theory because, first, we are now occupying Germany with the obligations growing out of the Second World War, and second, we have made certain promises under the Atlantic Pact, which we are bound to carry out.
>
> It might be well, first, to consider just what our obligations are under the Atlantic Pact. One thing seems certain. There is no legal obligation to send American land soldiers to Europe.

A careful study of Senator TAFT's January 5 speech, as well as his subsequent speech before the National Press Club, shows that the thinking of the senior Senator from Ohio is still very fluid on the issue of committing American land troops to Europe under the North Atlantic Pact. As one reads parts of his speeches, it would appear that the Senator from Ohio is opposed to any implementation of the North Atlantic Pact with additional American troops; but when one has just about reached that conclusion, then he reads in the speech of January 5 the following comments:

> If these nations really do desire to build up their own arms, and do so with our assistance, which we are obligated to give, and if the time comes when they see the need of and demand a coordinated defense, and if it appears at that time that that defense has a reasonable chance of success, I should not object to committing some limited number of American divisions to work with them in the general spirit of the Atlantic Pact. Such a program, however, never ought to be a key point in our over-all military strategy. And the initiative should be theirs and not ours.

By taking the Senator's speech of January 5 and his speech before the National Press Club and weighing them in their entirety, it would seem to be a fair interpretation that the Senator from Ohio does not favor entering into any agreement, at this time, to commit any additional American troops at this time, as a part of the implementation of the North Atlantic Pact. Rather, the Senator from Ohio seems to favor a reliance primarily upon our Air Force and Navy for the protection of our security at home.

He also seems to rely upon the bombing power of our Air Force for crippling

or destroying the striking power of a Russian Army if it seeks to occupy Western Europe. However, here again one cannot be exactly sure just what are the proposals of military strategy of the Senator from Ohio, because the conclusions in his two speeches do not seem to have jelled into any consistent set of foreign policy principles. The speeches contain paragraphs which seem to be on again, off again in regard to the North Atlantic Pact or any obligations we in the United States may have to help implement it with some additional military manpower.

Likewise, the two speeches seem to leave the distinguished Senator from Ohio suspended or fluttering in midair, not quite certain whether he will light on the perch of preparation for a land war in Europe, because of the possibility of Russia taking Europe by force if the Atlantic Pact is not strong enough to prevent it, or whether he will land on the perch of not preparing for a land war in Europe, because of the theory that implementing the North Atlantic Pact with land armies might incite the Soviet leaders into an aggressive attack against Western Europe.

Convenient as it may be for a speaker to fluctuate to all sides of an issue, it is very disconcerting and confusing to those who try to weigh and evaluate the premises and principles of any program or policy set forth in such a speech. I believe it is fair to say that the two recent speeches of the Senator from Ohio are subject to the interpretation that he does not believe we should implement the North Atlantic Pact with any additional American military manpower—at least not until our allies in the North Atlantic Pact have raised enough divisions of ground troops to indicate that a checking of Russian aggression in Western Europe could be greatly aided by ground troops—and that in the meantime the Senator from Ohio would rely primarily upon naval and air power for defense against Russian aggression.

It seems to me that the Senator from Ohio does not give sufficient weight to the negative psychological reactions in Western Europe induced by many of the policies he advocates in his two historic speeches. We Americans need to face the fact that our allies in Western Europe are not filled with enthusiasm and rejoicing when they hear of various leaders in the United States proposing to surround them with the protection of a perimeter of bombing bases so that American air power will be able to liberate them in case Russia decides upon a military conquest of Western Europe.

Such talk is bound to cause them to hesitate in developing their defense plans, because such talk does not offer them very much by way of a choice. Such talk seems to leave them in the middle, with Soviet totalitarianism on the one side and American bombing pulverization on the other. Such talk in our country tends to increase the propaganda in those countries for working out the best appeasement program possible with Russia.

I say, Mr. President, most respectfully, that our best defense at home is to cooperate with our allies in the North Atlantic Pact for an adequate defense in Western Europe through a cooperative, military-aid, mutual defense program involving land, sea, and air forces. Such a program not only would serve clear notice to Russia that there would be no time lag as far as the participation of the United States in a war with Russia is concerned, if she should start a military conquest of Western Europe, but it would also put us in the strongest possible defense position from the first hour of that war, because it would give us the best assurance of maximum Allied preparedness in Europe.

I would urge that the people of the United States carefully evaluate the clear import of the foreign policies proposed by ex-President Hoover and the Senator from Ohio [Mr. TAFT]. It seems to me that they are premised upon the idea that this continent can survive if we withdraw unto ourselves alone and let our allies in Europe go down if necessary, if they do not do exactly what we wish them to do in the matter of implementing the North Atlantic Pact.

However, I wish to make clear that although I disagree with the distinguished Senator from Ohio [Mr. TAFT] in respect to a great many of his premises, as well as the conclusions which he draws therefrom, nevertheless, I think that in his address to the Senate on January 5 he performed a notable service to the Nation.

Striking through the controversies which have centered about our national policy during recent months—improperly directed all too often against personalities—the Senator from Ohio cleared the air and focused attention where it should be—on the issues themselves. At a moment of great world crisis, which threatens American security, he has initiated in the Congress a necessary and highly important debate on the critical question of what policy we should pursue and how best we may carry it through to success. In his able address, the Senator from Ohio gave a splendid demonstration of the proper role of the minority party in a democracy—that of objective debate of the foreign policy in the interests of the safety of the Nation.

No one can, and no one will, I am sure, dispute the two chief aims of our policy as defined by the eminent Senator from Ohio; namely, that the principal purpose of the foreign policy of the United States is to maintain the liberty of our people; and that, after liberty, peace must be the goal of our policy and of our leaders.

The Senator also stated a fundamental truth and a guiding principle when he continued:

> Certainly when policies have been determined, unity in execution is highly desirable, and in the preparation for and the conduct of war it is essential.

The formulation of our foreign policy is, of course, the prime responsibility of the President, with the aid of the Secretary of State and other officers of the executive branch of Government. But Congress participates in the determination of policy, and it is unquestionably necessary that our Nation's policy shall have the support of the Congress and the people.

Therefore, it is a healthy circumstance to have a public debate on aspects of our policy which may be under dispute. I am confident that the conduct of this debate in a nonpartisan spirit can lead to a meeting of minds enabling us to press on with the execution of our policy with that unity which the Senator from Ohio has himself asserted is a necessity.

In this connection I found it most encouraging that, whereas the Senator from Ohio, on January 5, expressed an apparently unalterable opposition to sending more than a token number of American troops to Europe for the implementation of the Atlantic Pact, he subsequently stated that his opposition was not unalterable.

On January 7, during the radio broadcast of Meet the Press, the Senator from Ohio was asked:

> Suppose Eisenhower comes back and says we have to do this thing that you are against and Congress debates it and decides that is what we shall do, you will oppose it? After it has gone through that constitutional process will you acquiesce in that decision?

The Senator from Ohio responded:

> Oh, yes; I would accept it. I voted against the Atlantic Pact and I am willing to accept the obligations of the Atlantic Pact.

In short, I gather that the Senator's position is that he believes we should not commit more than token troops as a part of an international army in Europe under the Atlantic Pact, but that if a majority of Congress thinks otherwise, he will go along with that decision.

Meanwhile, it appears that the Senator is strongly opposed to committing our troops abroad in an Atlantic defense for the following reasons:

First, he sees no convincing evidence that Russia intends to start a war with us. He points out that Russia knows that we are obligated and will enter the war if any Atlantic Pact nation is attacked.

Second, he believes that the effort to build up an Atlantic Pact army capable of checking a Russian invasion must also be large enough to wage aggressive war against Russia, and the attempt to build up that army would probably incite Russia into beginning a war.

Third, the Senator from Ohio believes that the responsibility for the defense of Western Europe rests largely with the nations of Europe.

And finally, he appears to believe that in the event of war in Europe, we could attain mastery of the sea and the air, safeguarding our own country, while aiding Europe primarily by air and sea support.

Mr. President, I must take issue on every one of the points which I believe the Senator from Ohio has set forth in his speeches.

First. According to my sights, it is folly to base our actions on speculation about what the Soviet dictators may or may not do.

Second. No one has proposed an Atlantic Pact army large enough to invade Russia. On the contrary, speaking now as a member of the Committee on Armed Services, it is my understanding that the objective of the North Atlantic Pact is to build up among the members of the North Atlantic Pact a common defense

in Europe which would be sufficient to check Russia from taking over Europe. That is quite different from suggesting that there is any contemplation to build up an armed force which would be adequate to invade Russia.

Third. The defense of Europe may be the responsibility of Europe, but it also happens to be vital to our own safety.

Mr. President, I repeat that the defense of Europe may be the responsibility of Europe, but it also happens to be vital to our own safety.

Finally, if the last war taught any lesson at all, it taught that mastery of the sea and air can be won only after years of struggle, when the enemy has been reduced to the verge of collapse, and that, furthermore, the successful defense of Europe requires all the air support, all the sea support, and all the ground support we can throw into battle in case of an invasion of Europe.

I suggest, therefore, that rather than speculate on what the Russians may or may not do, and try to shape our policy accordingly, we must fix our minds on one cardinal fact, and act accordingly. That fact is that the defense of Western Europe and the defense of the United States cannot be differentiated; they are one and the same thing, at least in the early stages of world war III, if it comes.

I would expect the Senator from Ohio to pause before taking the role of prophet and minimizing the danger of a war being started against us by Russia. I should think that he would uncomfortably remember that he said, only 2 months before Pearl Harbor:

> I believe that if we choose to defend the United States on the line of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, it is so impossible for Hitler or anyone else to attack us that there will not even be an attempt to make such an attack.

Mr. President, as my documentation for the quotation from the speech of the Senator from Ohio, I refer to the Appendix of the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, volume 87, part 13, at page A4363. I read as follows:

> Mr. TOBEY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to insert in the Appendix of the RECORD the address delivered by the able senior Senator from Ohio [Mr. TAFT] to the Ohio Federation of Republican Women's Organizations on September 22, 1941.
>
> There being no objection, the address was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

From page A4365, column 1, I read the following excerpt from the speech of the Senator from Ohio:

> I believe that if we choose to defend the United States on the line of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans it is so impossible for Hitler or anyone else to attack us that there will not even be an attempt to make such an attack.

It is a rather interesting speech. If I felt time permitted I would dwell at some length upon the speech of September 22, 1941. I wish to call attention to two more sentences in it. The Senator from Ohio continued, in his speech of September 22, 1941, to say:

> We have the largest Navy in the world. We have unlimited ability to increase our shipbuilding capacity. The President's argument that the total shipbuilding capacity of Europe is greater than ours is utterly unsound, because ours can be increased indefinitely, and our ability to manufacture steel and other ship materials is greater than all of Europe combined. Furthermore, we will have several years' start on our two-ocean Navy, and Hitler could never catch up with us. It would not be easy for him to organize the productive capacity of Europe. How is he going to get any enthusiastic cooperation from the shipbuilding labor in a dozen countries whose people he is oppressing with an alien dictatorship?

Mr. President, I have no doubt as to how Russia would get that cooperation if she proceeded to take over Europe and impose her slave labor policies on Western Europe, as she has on other countries in Europe which have become her satellites. The only choice she gives them is, "Proceed to produce for Soviet Russia or be shot." That is the police-state method. That is the slave state method.

I am not one of those who hold the view that a conquest of Europe by Russia would make it impossible for Russia to get the production out of Europe that Russia would need in order to carry on a long whittling war against the United States, because when she gives those people only the choice of working or being shot, the instinct of self-preservation will cause most men, as we all know from the success she has had with production in the satellite countries she now has enslaved, to work, even for Communist Russia.

There are some other theories in the speech of the Senator from Ohio of September 22, 1941, which are identical with the views which he expressed on January 5, including that section of the speech entitled "The President Has No Legal or Constitutional Right To Enter Upon a Naval War With Germany." As I was scanning that speech this afternoon on the floor of the Senate, I thought that it was rather interesting to read the following statement in the speech of the Senator from Ohio of September 22, 1941:

> The war policy has never been thought through. It seems to me impossible to bring a war with Germany to a successful conclusion except after many years of destructive warfare. Vast expenditures of money and men will exhaust this country as they are exhausting the world. In the end we may crush Hitler, but in the process of doing so we are likely to set up a complete dictatorship in this country from which we may never return to American democracy as we have known it.

Our experience shows how wrong he was then. Thank God, we did crush Hitler. Thank God, Mr. President, that in World War II we rid the world of one dictator who sought to enslave freedom, and we kept our freedom. I am satisfied that if Russia continues down the road of aggression against freedom again freemen everywhere will rise up, as they did in World War II, and take a stand on the side of freedom. I am satisfied that once again, although at terrible cost, we would crush totalitarianism and preserve freedom, no matter how high the cost.

In my judgment, the prophecy of September 22, 1941, of the senior Senator from Ohio was as unsound then as his prophecy of January 5 and January 7 of this year in regard to foreign policy.

I thought it would be interesting to cite this comment from the speech of September 22, 1941, which the Senator from Ohio made with respect to a great commentator. He said:

> Of course, it is being said now that there will be no expeditionary force. Mr. Walter Lippmann is now advocating the policy of a naval war while we reduce the Army. But just as the President advanced from peace to lease-lend, and from lease-lend to a shooting naval war, the adoption of a naval war policy, after a few months of stalemate, is bound to lead, Lippmann or no Lippmann, to another American expeditionary force.

I take the time to quote from that interesting speech of September 22, 1941, inserted in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD of September 25, 1941, by the Senator from New Hampshire [Mr. TOBEY], not in a spirit of personal criticism of the Senator from Ohio, but in a spirit of sincere, friendly disagreement with him as to the underlying thesis of foreign policy set forth in the speech of September 22, 1941, which I think in many respects is similar to the theory of foreign policy set forth in his two historic speeches of January 5 and January 7 of this year.

I suggest, Mr. President, that elementary common sense should tell us that we have to be prepared for the fact that Russia may move into Europe any day from now on, whenever it suits her convenience, and that we must not lose time or momentum in developing adequate defenses here in America and in common with our allies in Europe. I do not venture to predict anything. I merely say that the danger is grave and that we must proceed to take proper precautions.

As for relying almost exclusively on air and sea power, while regarding the defense of Europe merely as the responsibility of the European nations, we cannot do better than to harken to the wise words of Cordell Hull on October 26, 1940, when he warned the American people in circumstances most similar to those of today:

> Should the would-be conquerors gain control of other continents they would next concentrate on perfecting their control of the seas, of the air over the seas, and of the world's economy; they might then be able with ships and with planes to strike at the communication lines, the commerce, and the life of this hemisphere; and ultimately we might find ourselves compelled to fight on our own soil, under our own skies, in defense of our independence and our very lives.

I think that great Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, enunciated in that statement words of such deep and significant meaning that all Americans should ponder them anew.

If we have any question about the paramount importance of guaranteeing that Western Europe shall not be permitted to fall into Russian hands, we have only to recall the last war. Surely we cannot have forgotten already the cost in lives and machines and the agony of effort required to defeat the industrial potential of western Europe when the Nazis used it to sustain their military operations. Let us reflect today that it took the combined, all-out power of Russia, the United States, Great Britain,

and many other nations to defeat it. Let us therefore reflect what it would mean to our security today if that Western European industrial potential were to be added to that of Russia and aimed against us.

The Senator from Ohio noted that "there is sufficient evidence of a determined plan to communize the entire world, which can be clearly outlined from the writings of Lenin and Stalin just as Hitler's intention could be found in Mein Kampf." He noted that we are now, in fact, engaged in a world-wide battle with Communist imperialism. But then he disclaimed any convincing evidence that Russia intends to start a war with us, and stated to the contrary that "I believe they are still thinking in terms of a slow but steady advance by the methods which they have used up to this time. Those methods are dangerous enough." Indeed, Mr. President, they are dangerous enough, but they are not so dangerous as a war against Europe and against us would be.

I fear that this minimizing of the Russian threat has disheartened the free nations and given aid and comfort to those who would destroy us. The Senator has seemed to endorse the pious Soviet claims of their abhorrence of war and their devotion to peace. He has seemed to support the Russian allegations of warmongering on our part. The Daily Worker, the mouthpiece in the United States of the Kremlin, in a front-page editorial, under date of January 8, entitled "Senator TAFT's Valuable Confessions," used the Senator's remarks as proof of the truth of Russian propaganda, as branding President Truman as the enemy of peace, and as exposing our policy of peace as the Big Lie. Pravda has been having a field day with the Senator's thesis that Russia is not likely to start a war. The entire Communist propaganda machine is capitalizing on this statement to lull the world into a false sense of security and to divide the free nations.

Though some of our political spokesmen may have unwittingly furnished ammunition to the Communist propaganda machine by their words, we can soon correct that circumstance by our deeds. We cannot allow our allies in Western Europe to think that we are going to fail to join with them in building up a common defense in whatever fashion, in whatever magnitude, we jointly agree is essential. We cannot afford to encourage the Communist dictators to think that there is the remotest possibility that we will waver in our determination to resist Russian aggression in Europe. We cannot afford to let them doubt for a minute that we are going through with this job of building an Atlantic force which can prevent the conquest of Europe by the Red army.

In the long run, it is obvious that there is only one means of putting a final halt to Russian imperialistic expansion, whether that expansion is by subversion and infiltration, or by armed assault—and that is by bringing the organized economic, moral, and military strength of the free world to a point where it cannot be challenged by the aggregate forces of the Communists. We must therefore proceed with the building of that defensive force. We must build it primarily in the North Atlantic community where men and machines are in a conclusive superiority in our favor.

Our goals are obvious. They are to prevent a world war if possible, and to win it if it is forced upon us.

But as for the military strategy we should pursue and the way in which we should go about this task of mobilizing our own strength and linking it with that of our allies in a common defense, I submit that these are questions so vast and weighty that they are beyond the power of any one man to answer. No man is wise enough to master all the potentialities and actualities and to prescribe what we should develop in the way of air, sea, and land forces, and the kind and degree of support which we should provide to our allies under the Atlantic Pact.

On this point, the junior Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. LODGE] spoke with great cogency—it seems to me—when he said on January 11 on this floor:

> It is hard to understand how the Members of the House and Senate, even making due allowances for their fine qualities, can possibly attempt to function as the operations section of a general staff and decide where and how and in what amount troops, ships, and planes should be sent to foreign lands.

There is only one acceptable, reliable basis for such enormous decisions. Our decisions must be arrived at by the process of consultation between the executive branch, our military leaders, and the leaders of both parties in Congress. As far as is practicable, we must draw upon the best brains throughout the Nation, for, when all is said and done, in the great task of administering a democracy there are no substitutes for brains. I think in this great crisis we must call upon the brains of America in every field of endeavor to make their maximum contribution to the security and the defense and the safety of our great Republic. So I say, so far as is practicable, we must draw upon the best brains throughout the Nation—the scientists, industrialists, labor leaders, farm leaders, and all the rest. In short, we must draw upon every particle of expert knowledge, intelligence, and professional skill at our command.

I submit that this is the only way in which to determine what we shall do toward implementing the Atlantic Pact.

Incidentally, I would like to say that I can see no grounds whatsoever for questioning the President's constitutional authority to send United States troops abroad. However, in the case of the implementation of the Atlantic Pact, it is clearly desirable, I agree, that the Congress be consulted in advance of proposed commitments, in the interest of national unity.

I digress from my manuscript long enough to say, Mr. President, that I think the President of the United States has a great opportunity for leadership in connection with the entire issue involving the sending of troops to Europe. In my opinion, the President of the United States should do more than consult and advise with the leaders of Congress and the other leaders of our great country. I think the President of the United States should sit down with those leaders, put all the facts and problems on the table, and work out with them, in the interest of unity, for which he pleaded in his great address at the joint session of the Congress the other day, a program for implementing the North Atlantic Pact around which there can be the maximum possible amount of agreement among us in carrying out the clear obligations of that treaty.

I believe it is a mistake, Mr. President, for the Chief Executive of this land to take any narrow technical position from the standpoint of his constitutional powers and say, "I will stand on those powers alone." I do not question under our Constitution the power of the Commander in Chief in time of great national emergency to take the steps necessary to protect the security of the Nation. But I want to plead with him this afternoon, Mr. President, to recognize that in an hour of crisis it is true that unity is of tremendous importance to security. I would that he would make clear to the Congress and to the other leaders in our country that he intends to work out, in conference and in exchange of ideas, a program involving the implementation of the North Atlantic Pact, including the question of the use of American ground forces.

Speaking of unity, I applaud the President's call for unity in his state of the Union message, and I applaud the immediate endorsement by the Senator from Michigan [Mr. VANDENBERG] of that call for unity. I particularly welcome the statement of the Senator from Ohio [Mr. TAFT] to the National Press Club that he is "quite prepared to sit down with the President of the United States, or anybody else on the majority side, and try to work out a program which could command the unanimous and consistent support of the people of the United States."

I would in good spirit remind the Senator from Ohio, however, that under the organization of the Congress, the formulation of official policy is done through the official committees of the Congress having jurisdiction over the subject matters with which their existence is concerned. I sincerely hope that the Senator from Ohio will be willing to sit down and confer, and consult, and discuss these questions of foreign policy, always keeping in mind, however, that he does not speak individually for the Senate of the United States or for my party, but only as one Member of the Senate of the United States and as one member of my party, and that the formalization of policy must necessarily, insofar as the Senate is concerned, go through the channels of the appropriate standing committee of the Senate, which in respect to foreign policy happens to be the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate, and in respect to my party happens to be, in the last analysis, so far as our Senate organization is concerned, the Republican conference.

I pray that all of us will respond to the stirring invitation of the majority lead-

er, the Senator from Arizona [Mr. McFARLAND] when he said:

I am asking that my colleagues stand together, unite, make clear by their every action and their every word that all of us have a single overriding objective—the good of the Nation and the peace of the world.

I think, Mr. President, this is the spirit in which we must determine our policies and actions from here on out.

One most ill-considered statement by the Senator from Ohio was that of January 5, when he said, with respect to Communist China:

We might as well have a declared war.

Surely the Senator from Ohio cannot have forgotten that our action in Korea is part of the United Nations action against aggression, and is nothing more than that; and surely the Senator cannot have realized the extreme gravity of his suggestion.

This gravity becomes clear when we recall the terms of a joint resolution of Congress declaring war, as for instance the joint resolution of Congress on December 8, 1941, when war was thrust upon the United States and we were forced to take action in our own defense. I shall read that resolution because I would call to the attention of the Senate and of the American people what it means to declare war. That joint resolution of war reads, as follows:

Resolved, etc., That the state of war between the United States and the Imperial Government of Japan which has been thrust upon the United States is hereby formally declared; and the President is hereby authorized and directed to employ the entire naval and military forces of the United States and the resources of the Government to carry on war against the Imperial Government of Japan; and, to bring the conflict to a successful termination, all of the resources of the country are hereby pledged by the Congress of the United States.

Mr. President, the consequences of a declaration of a state of war are clear from the terms of the resolution. With its approval by the President, we start down a road from which there is no turning back. We pledge all our human and material resources to winning the war. We will fight until one of the parties capitulates or until there is a negotiated peace.

Is that what the Senator from Ohio would have us undertake against Communist China? I do not think it is. I do not think he took proper thought before uttering those words. During these precarious times I think we must be very careful to avoid such ill-considered statements.

It is my belief that we should do everything possible to prevent war from spreading in the Far East; but here, again, I say that the determination of our strategy and tactics in the Korean crisis must also, and solely, be determined on the basis of consultation and agreement between the executive branch, our military leaders, and the leaders of both parties in Congress.

As I said in a major speech which I made on foreign policy during the last week of the last session of the Congress, I happen to be one who believes, on the basis of at least such information as has been made available to me to date as a member of the Armed Services Committee, that we should not permit ourselves to become sucked into a war in China. I believe that is exactly what Stalin would like to see us do, because I think he knows that the great danger to us is that if we were to become involved in a war with China, we could not win it, because even though we were to win the military victories of such a war—at the great sacrifice that I am sure we would find they would cost us—we still would lose the war, in the last analysis, because to conquer China would be to occupy her, and to occupy her over the years would bankrupt us. That is why I said in that speech—and I repeat it today—that at least on the basis of the information made available to date, I think we should be careful not to become involved in a war within China, but we should establish the strongest possible blockade and embargo against China; we should make perfectly clear to China that we consider her to be an aggressor against the peace and that we recognize her to be a stooge and a tool of Russia, which, after all, is the power behind the hot war that China in a very real sense in some segments of Asia is presently carrying on.

Mr. President, the Chinese question is one concerning which I think we should delay taking any course of action which might fall within the suggestion of the Senator from Ohio of a procedure which might as well amount to a declaration of war.

For a long time to come, in my belief, the Atlantic Pact and its implementation must figure as a cardinal factor in the defense of freedom. I also believe that we must continue to do everything in our power to strengthen and support the United Nations.

I think that it is going much too far to say that we have to write off the United Nations as powerless to put a brake on aggression.

The frantic efforts of the Soviet Union to escape the censure of the United Nations and the determined efforts of the Chinese Communists to bludgeon their way into membership, attest the importance which the Communist states ascribe to the United Nations. The United Nations has demonstrated the very real power of the mobilized opinion of the world, and has proved that this power can both check aggression and halt warfare, as we saw in Indonesia, Palestine, and India. This power of mobilized opinion, even with the backing of military force, has so far failed in Korea, but that does not at all mean that justice will not yet be won for the Korean people and that the United Nations will not be due the credit for that victory of justice.

The United Nations has introduced a new factor in world affairs—a means of solving problems otherwise insoluble. It offers the means for solving by international cooperation world problems which cannot be solved by the separate action of nations. It affords the possibility of curing the conditions of human ignorance, want, and misery, which furnish the seeds of war and offer communism its opportunity to victimize people too confused and too weak to resist. We should be short-sighted indeed not to recognize that the United Nations is indispensable to the defense of freedom and to the ultimate establishment of a decent and orderly world.

It is true that the United Nations was established on the assumption of the collaboration of the great powers, and that the Soviet Union has betrayed its promise of collaboration. But the Soviet Union has by no means been able to prevent the growth of the power and influence of the United Nations.

The decline in the effectiveness of the Security Council has been matched by an increase in the power of the General Assembly, where the voice of all nations is heard. The General Assembly may have only the authority to recommend, but the member nations have the power to act on those recommendations. That is of vital importance.

The United Nations obviously can be no stronger than its members and their ability and determination to support its steps against aggression. It is incumbent on the United States to give that support; it is equally incumbent on all the other free member nations to give that support. I am one of those who believe that this collective support will be given.

I wish to set forth the following 10 suggestions which I think should be heeded in the crisis which confronts our Nation:

First. The danger that the Soviet Communists will resort to war to advance their imperialistic aims is of the utmost gravity and reality. There is no doubt whatsoever that Communist imperialism is out to spread over the world—over Europe and Asia by indirect aggression if possible, ultimately, I think, by war if necessary. If the Communists were to get the men and machines of those areas working for them, they could produce all types of guns, tanks, planes, and ships in tremendous quantities. They would have bases much closer to the United States from which to launch all-out atomic attacks as their stockpile of weapons increased. They would be in a much better position to strike at us than they are now. With airpower operating from European bases, and snorkel submarines operating off our coasts, they would pose a threat to our very existence as a free nation. That is why I think that the issue of America's survival is before us in the years immediately ahead.

Second. The problem of apportioning our economic aid and military manpower and matériel among Europe, Asia, and the United States is immensely complicated. No one man is wise enough to answer this question. No one man is wise enough to say hold Japan and Formosa, and let the rest go. No one man is wise enough to say use air and sea power but not land forces. The only proper basis for answering such questions is through consultation between the executive branch of the Government, military leaders, civilian experts, and the congressional leaders of

both parties. This task should be approached with humility and in a nonpartisan spirit.

Third. Domestically, we must make an all-out effort to improve our military posture. The way to do this must be determined by consultation and agreement by our leaders in the executive and legislative branches of the Government. We must mobilize our economic and military resources into a coordinated working team, with every American citizen devoting his full effort and interest to the success of our mobilization effort. It is only by an all-out national effort that we can build up the war-making strength which will make clear to Russia that she has everything to lose and nothing to gain with a continuation of her aggression against freedom and her threat to peace. Such a program means sacrifice, spelled with capital letters, sacrifice for each one of us; but it also means freedom. It also means that each one of us must grasp the meaning of the struggle—that each one of us has an obligation to preserve the spiritual, moral, and cultural values of civilization against the onslaught of those who would destroy them.

Fourth. As for our international cooperation, I believe that it is essential that we continue to give the fullest possible support to the United Nations and that we do everything that we need to do to assure the effective implementation of the Atlantic Pact. The United Nations Charter and the Atlantic Pact are a part of the law of the land. We should continue to meet our obligations under these two treaties. These treaties are not, of course, a one-way street. We expect to fulfill our responsibilities, but we expect other nations to do the same.

Fifth. Our goal is peace. In all our defense effort, let it never be forgotten by the people of this and other countries that we want peace and will only depart from it if our liberty and lives are threatened. That is why I list our goal of peace as the fifth suggestion I would have the American people emphasize in their thinking on the problems involved in this international crisis.

Sixth. We must be aware of our national purpose. What we are really trying to do is to defend our liberties and to assure that they shall not be replaced by the tyranny and terror of a Communist regime.

Seventh. In order to preserve our liberties, every American citizen must do his duty. Our circumstance is not unlike the colonial days when the early settlers took their stations in the blockhouse when danger threatened from without. All of us today must be alert against those who would commit treason against our purpose. There are thousands of Communists in our midst today who are ready to stick a dagger in our back at a word from Moscow. As I have said many times, and now repeat, we need to remember that Soviet Russia never moves from the outside in against a nation until she is ready to move from the inside of that nation out to meet her forces coming from without.

Eighth. The need for unity applies to management and labor. We must have cooperation in keeping the great workshop of America at full production. We cannot afford the luxury of strikes or of employer intransigence.

Ninth. There are three great means of getting the public behind our national effort and of sustaining their morale through the long period of effort ahead. Our press, radio, television, and movies have a great opportunity to keep the public informed and alert. Private organizations and universities have the same opportunity. And the churches of the land, perhaps above all, have the opportunity to keep us dedicated to our high moral purpose and to inspire us to a rededication to the spiritual values of democracy unknown in Communist dictatorships.

Every institution of enlightenment in North America, including the church, lodge, press, radio—every group where free men gather—should join forces in the struggle for peace. We cannot win the peace by wishing for it, nor by blaming the politicians because we do not have it, nor by adopting the fatalistic attitude that war is inevitable, nor by placing all the blame on our enemies in the war now gripping the world.

But while we must not abandon the struggle for peace nor go to the other extreme of adopting a fatalistic attitude that all-out war is inevitable, the freedom-loving nations must nevertheless build up their strength to the end that the dictators in the Kremlin may be persuaded to the view, before all-out war engulfs us, that Communist aggression must stop.

Tenth. There is no need to be panicky in America. The American people will proceed with courage, determination, and faith that, if we do these things, we shall successfully defend our liberties and our Nation against the menace of Communist imperialism.

The struggle for peace, which is the major crisis of our generation, is a struggle for men's minds rather than for their emotions. It is a struggle for human decency rather than for human debauchery. It involves an appeal to reason. Peace can be won and maintained only if we can convince freedom-loving people elsewhere in the world that rules of reason, procedures of international justice, relinquishment of many selfish interests must be substituted in the thinking of people everywhere for the emotional nationalism that still dominates the world in spite of all our laudatory efforts to set up a system of international justice through law by way of the United Nations.

The Senator from Ohio is entirely right in his contention that it is unwise ever to admit that war is inevitable. But it is even more unwise to insist that it will not happen because we do not want it to happen or because there is no conclusive proof, to the particular satisfaction of any Senator, that the nation we fear does not intend to wage war on us. Russia may seek other, cheaper, and less risky means of destroying us, as it successfully did in the Balkan states, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. It may, as a temporary device, when other methods fail, employ the troops of satellites as the spearhead of conquest. It may concentrate at first, as Stalin has in fact been doing, on nearer and easier victims. But we would be closing our eyes to the enormous perils we face and the entire free world faces if we failed to recognize that we are not only an intended victim of Soviet aggression, but indeed its absolutely inevitable target. Our very strength makes us such a target. If Russia can knock us out, the rest of the world would fall like a ripe apple in her outstretched hand. If she fails to do so and as long as she does, she is certain to have the uneasy feeling that she may some day have to disgorge all the ill-gotten gains that she has acquired during these last years.

The Senator from Ohio says the purpose of our foreign policy must principally be the maintenance of the liberty of our people not "to reform the entire world or spread sweetness and light and economic prosperity to peoples who have lived and worked out their own salvation for centuries, according to their customs, and to the best of their ability." That is so.

But it is precisely because we prize our liberty and want to preserve it that it is so essential that we rally around a common banner with all other nations and people who want to be free and who, like ourselves, are willing to fight to maintain their freedom, if necessary.

The Senator from Ohio admits that the Russian leaders have set forth in their writing sufficient evidence of a determined plan to communize the world.

He declares, and there can be no doubt about it, that it has sought to attain this objective through propaganda and infiltration and, latterly, through the use of satellite troops to attack countries. But he sees no conclusive evidence that the Russians expect to start a war with the United States.

It is difficult to see—

He says—

> how the Russians today could reasonably entertain the hope that they can conquer the world by military action. * * * I believe they are still thinking in terms of a slow but steady advance by the methods which they have used up to this time.

The logic of events, the dynamics of the Russian drive for world mastery, do not support this hopeful view of the Senator from Ohio. The very fact that when propaganda and infiltration failed to achieve the Soviet objective in Korea, as they did fail, thanks to our efforts and the efforts of the UN, and Russia pushed her North Korean satellite into a military campaign which clearly involved the risk of a general war, suggests that when necessary, Russia will risk war to accomplish her aims. She is far more likely to do so if the risks are slight, if her would-be victims are weak and divided among themselves, than if they are strong and united.

Why did Russia keep up an incessant propaganda barrage against our aid to Greece and Turkey, against the Marshall plan, against western union, against the North Atlantic Pact, against the establishment of the Bonn Republic in West Germany, and against every other measure we and other free nations have taken during these last years to build a barrier of strong, economically

stable states in the path of Russian aggression?

The Ohio Senator says he thought at the time and thinks still that the Atlantic Pact was a tremendous mistake, that it helps create the greatest probability of war. "The Atlantic Pact," he says, "could at least be interpreted as an aggressive move." This is what the Russians themselves have been saying in season and out and in every language in which the Voice of Moscow broadcasts its lying propaganda. But was our aid to Greece and Turkey, the economic assistance we gave to the war-stricken nations of Western Europe—and had offered to Soviet Russia and her satellites as well—could they, too, be interpreted as aggressive moves? To believe that is to believe that any move is aggressive which Moscow says is aggressive.

The fact is that Moscow opposed these moves not because of any legitimate fears for its security but because the stronger the free world becomes the less likely those nations are to become victims of Communist propaganda, Communist infiltration, and Communist subversion. It is no coincidence that the peak of Communist strength in France, Italy, and elsewhere in Western Europe occurred when they were at the low ebb of their economies and that the internal menace of communism began to fade when recovery got underway, recovery which the Marshall plan did much to foster in Western Europe.

And, externally, it is also no coincidence that the period of greatest spread of Russian Communist imperialism occurred in the years after the war, when the nations of Western Europe were still bleeding from the terrible wounds they received during the war and we were in the midst of that headlong flight into unilateral disarmament which began for us as soon as the formal fighting had ended. It is no coincidence either that this expansion of the area of Communist imperialism occurred at a time when there was no unity of aim and purpose among the free nations, particularly between this country and its present allies.

Two things were responsible for the maintenance of that precarious peace we enjoyed during those years. The first was that Russia did not have to fight to spread her domination over the large area that between 1944 and 1948 came under her control. Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, Albania, the Baltic States, Poland, were taken over from within without a struggle.

Mr. President, ever since that time they have been working under a police-state system of slave labor, and the most reliable information we seem to be able to gather is that they are producing at a rate higher than that at which they produced before World War II, which is some evidence of how effective the police-state method of slave labor can become when people are given the choice of either working or being shot.

The second obstacle was our exclusive possession until 1949 of the atomic bomb. The atomic bomb may not have been the only deterrent that held back the masters of the Kremlin; they may have gambled on that economic collapse which the Kremlin's soothsayers consulting the crystal ball of Karl Marx and Nikolai Lenin have already insisted was both inevitable and imminent. But the atomic bomb was certainly a deterrent, and a powerful one, in preventing Russia from going to extremes.

I digress long enough to repeat what I said in colloquy with the distinguished Senator from Ohio on the floor of the Senate on January 5, that in my opinion our superiority in the stock piling of atomic bombs is probably the prime deterrent against Russian aggression upon Europe. When the Senator from Ohio raises the question as to whether or not implementing the North Atlantic Pact at this time may incite Russia to militarily move against Europe now, I can only answer that I do not know for a certainty. However, I can also answer that it is my sober judgment that so long as we have a superiority in stockpiling of atomic bombs Russia will not take the risk. We will not have such superiority indefinitely. That is why I think it is so important that we take advantage of the precious time which is now available to us, to implement the North Atlantic Pact, so that under a mutual defense program we will have a combined land force, air force, and navy available to the free nation members of the North Atlantic Pact to check Russia, if at a time she has a larger stockpile of atomic bombs she should decide to move her forces over Europe.

Again I say today, as I said on January 5, that the best military advice I have been able to obtain as a member of the Committee on Armed Services, from the top military experts of our Military Establishment, is that the North Atlantic Pact can be implemented by a mutual common defense program, so as successfully to check a Russian advance across Europe. I think we should take advantage of the precious time which is allowed us by our superiority of our atomic stockpile at the present time to carry out what I consider to be our clear obligations under the North Atlantic Pact by joining with the free nations who are members of it in building up the mutual defense program, which our military experts tell us offers us the best hope of checking the conquest of Europe by Soviet Russia. Therefore, I believe that the atomic bomb is still a deterrent, but a steadily diminishing one. The time may not be far distant when it will cease being a deterrent at all, when Russia will possess a stockpile of atomic armaments great enough to destroy our quantitative superiority as, previously, she succeeded in destroying our monopoly of the bomb.

What, then, should we do in the meantime? Should we sit idly by hugging to our bosom the vain hope that if we become strong within our borders the tides of aggression that threaten to sweep across Asia and Europe will bypass us? Or should we seek with the help and cooperation of other, and even more imperiled, nations than ours, to establish a continuation of power that would give the Russian aggressors pause?

We helped establish the United Nations in the hope that it would serve as an instrument with which to maintain peace. But let us not forget that we never dared and never did entrust our security to the protection of the United Nations alone. The United Nations was to be a peace instrument for the future; there was never, since its foundation in 1945, any assurance that it could serve its intended purpose immediately. It was the recognized weakness of the United Nations, certainly no discovery of this moment, that prompted us to seek, within the provisions of the Charter and in line with the Charter's principles and purposes other means of bolstering the peace and our security and the security of the free world. That is why we negotiated and concluded the Rio Pact. That is why we negotiated and concluded the North Atlantic Pact.

By the latter agreement, to which the Senate gave its overwhelming consent, we formally linked our fate with the fate of nations who, in many instances, had twice been associated with us in two world wars. These wars had had their origin in Europe. Both times we had been the aloof spectators of the struggle for power that had led to devastating conflict; we had stood by while aggressors rampaged, doing nothing to deter them, only ultimately and inevitably to be drawn into the conflicts these aggressors had provoked. Is there any assurance that the third time we will be any more successful in staying out of a conflict arising on that continent? There is, in fact, far less likelihood of that now than there was in 1914 or in 1939. Indeed, in addition to all other compelling factors that link our fate with the nations of Western Europe, we are now bound, as we were not then, by a legal commitment to intervene if they are attacked.

The Senator from Ohio [Mr. TAFT] not only admits this but, let it be said to his credit, insists on this. Though he opposed the Atlantic Pact at the time it was made and regards it as a dangerous development, he recognizes that because of it an attack by Russia on any of the European nations that signed the pact would be treated by this country as an attack on us. He says:

> We have clearly notified them—the Russians—that any attack in Europe upon the members of the Atlantic Pact means a third world war, and we are obligated to enter such a war under the terms of the Atlantic Pact.

But in that case, I ask, does not common sense dictate that, as a Nation eager to avoid war, we do all we can to build up the strength of our partners and reinforce the alliance in every way we can, so as to make sure that the aggressor will not be tempted by Europe's weakness to seek new territorial gains?

In view of the history of these last 37 years, it would seem to be silly to say that we have no direct stake in Europe's peace, for Europe's peace is ours; or in Europe's security, for Europe's security is part and parcel of our own. The defense of Western Europe is no ill-considered act of idealism on our part, no expression of charity, no move on our part to interfere in the activities of other nations.

The defense of Western Europe is our concern precisely because our first consideration must be, as the Senator from Ohio insists it is, the defense of America.

Nor is it our concern merely for reasons that are found written indelibly on the pages of history or because of the legal commitments we have made. There is also the overriding fact that if Europe is lost to Russia, our position, already as grave as any we have ever found ourselves in since we became a Nation, would become perilous in the extreme.

The free world today possesses a vast potential preponderance of power over the slave world of Russia and her satellites. All the tests that one can apply—comparative steel production, electric power output, production of coal and cotton and essential raw materials, the possession of technical skills, and so forth, all prove that contention. Taking the free world as a whole, its population, too, is greater than that of the slave world. But this potential strength has no meaning if the free world is divided and it would turn into an active inferiority, so far as we are concerned, were Russia to take possession of the mines and smelters and factories of West Germany and France and the Benelux states.

The one area in which the west is clearly inferior is in the military sphere, and it is precisely here where the greatest danger arises to the pease and freedom and security of the free world.

It was this fact, among others, which led the nations of Western Europe, together with the United States and Canada, to join in the North Atlantic Pact. Since Western Europe was only beginning its economic recovery, the corollary of that pact was the military assistance program. The rearmament of Western Europe, under that program as originally envisaged, was to be a slow-paced affair. We thought we had time. We assumed that while Russia would indefinitely continue to wage her cold war, she would stop at the point of military aggression. Events in Korea beginning last June proved us wrong. They proved that, if other means failed—and throughout the world other means were failing—Russia would use force. The Korean assault development was an alarm bell. It awakened us to the peril we were in, the peril the world faces. It was an alarm bell to other nations, too, although their response was not, in all instances, as rapid and as far reaching as many of us felt their perilous situation demanded.

This time lag between our reaction to the Soviet menace and the reaction of our allies is unfortunate. The sooner it is overcome the stronger and more secure the free world will be. Yet we would be flying in the face of facts to assume, as many are apparently doing, that the nations of Western Europe are doing nothing in their own defense. That simply is not true. They have been laggard in this regard, as we have been; they have not done as much as they should; nor have we. But they have not been sitting by with hands folded, fatalistically awaiting the attack from the east by Russia's hordes. They have begun to build up their armed strength and with our encouragement and assistance, yes, with our prodding, will do more.

Jules Moch, the tough Minister of War of the French Republic, announced recently that by the end of 1951 France will have an armed force in excess of 50 divisions of between 23,000 and 24,000 men each, which means between 1,150,000 and 1,200,000 soldiers.

On the basis of population then, France's force 11 months from now will be comparable in size to a 4,500,000-man American force. This is larger by a third than our own present rearmament plans now contemplate. It may not be large enough. But since even we, with our vastly greater industrial establishment, are fearful of imposing a regime of total mobilization on our economy for fear of what it may do to that economy, so the French and other West Europeans are fearful and with even more reason, since an overburdened economy might give the large Communist element in their midst precisely the talking point they need.

There must be an increased rearmament effort throughout the North Atlantic area. But there is every reason why everything should be done to cushion the seriously weakening effect rearmament may have on the standards of living of those countries, countries only just recovering from the last war.

In the meantime, we cannot afford to stand idly by and take the complacent attitude that Western Europe's rearmament and military strength is Europe's own concern and none of our business. It is our business—for we are all in this together. As Ben Franklin said on another but not dissimilar occasion in the past, "Either we hang together or we shall certainly hang separately."

I am no military expert and do not profess to know exactly how much rearmament is needed to hold the Russian hordes at bay; or what specific forms that rearmament effort should take. I do not know how many troops, how many planes, how many tanks, how many ships, are needed to secure the peace. In this matter, I trust the judgment of the real experts. If we are to fight a common war—and the same holds for the effort which we all pray will be successful to build up sufficient strength so we can avoid a war—it makes no difference where our strength is deployed. If it will do more good to deploy part of it in Europe rather than keep it here at home in the defeatist belief that Europe is lost anyway, then by all means, that strength or the necessary part of it should be deployed in Europe.

When I say it makes no difference where our strength is deployed, I hasten to add that I think the decision as to where it should be deployed should be left to the military experts, because from the standpoint of their military strategy it of course makes a great deal of difference. I believe we must put them in a position so that they will have the power and the authority to deploy it where they can best check the advance of Russian aggression against freedom.

It seems to me there is all the more reason for doing so if, by this practical example of our readiness to combat aggression should an agression be launched against the west, we inspire West European nations to do more than they have been doing for the common defense of all of us.

As Eisenhower said to the French and British people over the radio the other day, "There is power in our union—and resourcefulness on sea, land, and air. Aroused and unified, there is nothing which the nations of the Atlantic community cannot achieve."

I say, Mr. President, that I believe Eisenhower is right in that if we will stand together as united, free peoples, members of the North Atlantic family, we can make perfectly clear to Russia that she does have everything to lose by a continuation of an aggressive course of action against freedom. I think it plain that each and every one of us must recognize the fact that the hour in which we live is one of the darkest and most critical in the history of the Western Hemisphere. We must, therefore, keep calm, keep our heads clear, and keep our courage strong. This is no time for emotional, hysterical reaction. It is a time which calls for facing resolutely the ugly reality of Soviet aggression against freedom.

We must make clear to Russia and Communist China, through the procedures of the United Nations, that we stand ready to negotiate an honorable peace without appeasement, and that we are firmly determined to resist, along with our allies in the United Nations and through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, a continuation of Communist aggression whether by direct assault or through the subterfuge of satellite attacks.

The people of the United States and freedom-loving peoples elsewhere must demonstrate to the other peoples of the world that we intend to practice our democratic principles, that we intend to put into practice the spiritual meanings of democracy, that we intend to translate into action our faith in the dignity of the individual, and that we intend to establish in the century of struggle ahead a system of international justice through law under which conflicts between nations can be settled through the processes of adjudication rather than through a resort to arms.

Whether or not mankind in the next century attains peace through a system of international justice by law depends in no small measure upon what we do in this session of Congress. If we keep faith with our allies in the North Atlantic Pact and if they in turn keep faith with us to the end that a mutuality of strong Allied defense confronts the Soviet leaders, I think time will be in our favor and on the side of peace.

If, on the other hand, we show weakness now by way of division among us over the defense of Europe now, I fear that time may prove to be on the side of war.

Granted that the risk of war is very great in this dark hour no matter which course of action we may follow in Europe; nevertheless, it seems clear to me that our greatest strength is to be found in standing with our allies in defense of principles of human liberty which we know to be right.

ATLANTIC UNION

Mr. KEFAUVER. Mr. President, when General Eisenhower arrived in Europe, he said:

> Aroused and united, there is nothing which the nations of the Atlantic community cannot achieve.

President Truman, in his state of the Union address, said:

> The heart of our common defense is the North Atlantic community.

The distinguished Senator from Oregon [Mr. MORSE], who just preceded me, stated in very forceful terms the necessity of having unity and of standing together with our democratic allies of the North Atlantic under some system of law.

All of us undoubtedly agree with these sentiments. The lessons of history teach us that if the people of the democratic nations stand together and are willing to work for their freedom, no dictator, however ruthless he may be, would dare upset the peace and stability of the world.

In an effort to bring about a closer working together and unity among the people of the world who believe in freedom, I am pleased again to submit a concurrent resolution proposing the Atlantic Union.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may send to the desk a concurrent resolution, submitted by me, for myself, the Senator from Washington [Mr. CAIN], the senior Senator from Vermont [Mr. AIKEN], the Senator from Kansas [Mr. CARLSON], the Senator from Montana [Mr. ECTON], the junior Senator from Vermont [Mr. FLANDERS], the junior Senator from Arkansas [Mr. FULBRIGHT], the Senator from Georgia [Mr. GEORGE], the Senator from Iowa [Mr. GILLETTE], the Senator from New Jersey [Mr. HENDRICKSON], the Senator from Missouri [Mr. HENNINGS], the senior Senator from Alabama [Mr. HILL], the junior Senator from Minnesota [Mr. HUMPHREY], the junior Senator from Wyoming [Mr. HUNT], the Senator from Colorado [Mr. JOHNSON], the senior Senator from West Virginia [Mr. KILGORE], the Senator from New York [Mr. LEHMAN], the Senator from Louisiana [Mr. LONG], the Senator from South Carolina [Mr. MAYBANK], the senior Senator from Arkansas [Mr. MCCLELLAN], the Senator from Montana [Mr. MURRAY], the junior Senator from West Virginia [Mr. NEELY], the Senator from California [Mr. NIXON], the senior Senator from Wyoming [Mr. O'MAHONEY], the junior Senator from Alabama [Mr. SPARKMAN], the senior Senator from Minnesota [Mr. THYE], and the Senator from North Dakota [Mr. YOUNG].

There being no objection, the concurrent resolution (S. Con Res. 4), submitted by Mr. KEFAUVER (for himself, Mr. AIKEN, Mr. CAIN, Mr. CARLSON, Mr. ECTON, Mr. FLANDERS, Mr. FULBRIGHT, Mr. GEORGE, Mr. GILLETTE, Mr. HENDRICKSON, Mr. HENNINGS, Mr. HILL, Mr. HUMPHREY, Mr. HUNT, Mr. JOHNSON of Colorado, Mr. KILGORE, Mr. LEHMAN, Mr. LONG, Mr. MAYBANK, Mr. MCCLELLAN, Mr. MURRAY, Mr. NEELY, Mr. NIXON, Mr. O'MAHONEY, Mr. SPARKMAN, Mr. THYE, and Mr. YOUNG) was received and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations, as follows:

> Whereas the parties to the North Atlantic Treaty have declared themselves "determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage, and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law," and "resolved to unite their efforts for collective defense and for the preservation of peace and security"; and
>
> Whereas they have agreed in article 2 of that treaty to "contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being" and to "seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies" and to "encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them"; and
>
> Whereas the principles on which our American freedom is founded are those of federal union, which were applied for the first time in history in the United States Constitution; and
>
> Whereas our Federal Convention of 1787 worked out these principles of union as a means of safeguarding the individual liberty and common heritage of the people of 13 sovereign States, strengthening their free institutions, uniting their defensive efforts, encouraging their economic collaboration, and severally attaining the aims that the democracies of the North Atlantic have set for themselves in the aforesaid treaty; and
>
> Whereas these federal union principles have succeeded impressively in advancing such aims in the United States, Canada, Switzerland, and wherever other free peoples have applied them; and
>
> Whereas the United States, together with the other signatories to the treaty, has promised to bring about a better understanding of these federal principles and has, as their most extensive practitioner and greatest beneficiary, a unique moral obligation to make this contribution to peace; and
>
> Whereas the United States and the other six democracies which sponsored the treaty have, by their success in drafting it and extending it to others, established a precedent for united action toward the attainment of these aims, and the creation of a free and lasting union: Now, therefore, be it
>
> *Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring)*, That the President is requested to invite the democracies which sponsored the North Atlantic Treaty to name delegates, representing their principal political parties, to meet this year with delegates of the United States in a Federal Convention to explore how far their peoples, and the peoples of such other democracies as the convention may invite to send delegates, can apply among them, within the framework of the United Nations, the principles of free federal union.

Mr. KEFAUVER. Mr. President, in connection with the agreement by the Senator from Wyoming [Mr. O'MAHONEY] to join as a sponsor of the concurrent resolution I desire to say that he feels, as do many of us, that more stress should be put on economic aspects of Atlantic union, and that at an appropriate time he expects to offer an amendment to stress the economic aspects. He has asked that I make that explanation, which I am pleased to do.

An identical measure (S. Con. Res. 57) was submitted on July 26, 1949, on behalf of 20 Senators.

Our own resolution aims to back up General Eisenhower by calling a convention to begin creating the Atlantic Union.

It is General Eisenhower's task to organize a powerful Atlantic army. Yet there is no effective Atlantic civil power to which he can report now—nothing but the 12-headed Atlantic Council, which has power only to recommend.

The solution of this problem is our own responsibility. The Atlantic Union resolution would have us tackle this problem at once.

Since that time impressive progress toward Atlantic Union has been made, but it has not been nearly enough. Our fellow citizens are organizing behind it through the Atlantic Union Committee, whose president is Justice Owen J. Roberts, and whose vice presidents are Will L. Clayton and Robert P. Patterson. The committee now has 112 chapters in 42 States. Organization is proceeding in Canada, Britain, France, the Netherlands, and Belgium. In June the Canadian Senate, in which the Government has an overwhelming majority, passed, with only one negative vote, an Atlantic Union resolution almost the same as ours.

This resolution is plain and direct. It is not a plea for world government; it is a means of setting in motion the machinery to attain once again the ideal of peace and freedom as a primary object of free people in the Atlantic community. It is investigative only; it commits us to nothing except to look at a prospective method for real peace.

This is what the Atlantic Union Resolution does, and this is all it does: It requests the President to call a convention of the sponsors of the North Atlantic Pact, and any other free countries the group wishes to invite, to explore together the extent to which they might apply among themselves, within the framework of the United Nations organization, the principles of American federation.

A resolution identical to this gained the support of more than 90 Senators and Representatives of both parties in the Eighty-first Congress. Many distinguished Americans testified in support of it in hearings before the Senate and House Committees on foreign relations.

A Gallup poll showed that 64 percent of Americans favor "a closer relationship or union" among Atlantic Pact countries.

Today the picture is undoubtedly gloomy. But we can have much hope because I know that we sincerely believe that there is no problem that man cannot solve if he looks squarely at it and does several things: First, if he clearly and calmly analyzes the nature of the problem; second, if he settles on a course of action adequate to meet the problem; and Third, if he pursues that course with persistence, determination and the faith that what is right deserves his every ounce of energy.

I see the present problem like this. The Soviet Union is bent on world conquest. Her weapons are propaganda and brute force. Her success has been phenomenal. Already she has reduced

11 countries to the rank of satellite, not counting the crumbling Korea. Without putting a single Russian on the firing line, the Kremlin has become master of an area stretching from the Elbe to the Pacific—15,000,000,000 square miles of it—one-third of the earth. It contains over 700,000,000 people. But still the Soviet prowls for plunder and conquest. A dozen areas tempt her next move.

In a world increasingly engulfed by the Red tide, it is up to the people who love and value freedom, both for themselves and for others, to cope with both these Soviet tactics. The present regime in Russia is rooted in revolution and is using revolutionary methods. To face this threat, we must bring to bear something more than the customary and ordinary. The situation is extraordinary.

The Atlantic democracies have already taken some steps to meet this growing threat: The Truman doctrine, Marshall plan, Western Union, and now the Atlantic Pact. All these steps showed recognition of the need for concerted effort. But they were only piecemeal steps and have not provided an over-all solution to the problem.

The Atlantic Union Resolution proposes that we begin now to see if we cannot improve upon our first essay, the Atlantic alliance. This resolution proposes that we invite the other six sponsors of the North Atlantic Treaty—Canada, Britain, France, Belgium, The Netherlands and Luxemburg—to meet in a Federal convention with our delegates and begin now to explore, at least, whether we cannot work out a constitution of government which will give all free nations the power that there is in our own Union of 48 States.

Some fear that to call the proposed Atlantic Federal Convention now would interfere with the efforts the Government is already making to meet the emergency. Let me stress that this convention is not a substitute for any of the existing machinery, whether that of the Atlantic Pact, the United Nations, or any other.

The convention would merely explore whether a still stronger solution than the Atlantic Pact could not be found on Federal Union lines, at least for the democracies that sponsored the pact. It would explore only whether such a union could be made—to quote the resolution itself—"within the framework of the United Nations" for the purpose not of replacing but of strengthening that organization.

Let us wait no longer for another Pearl Harbor, Dunkerque, or Verdun to unite us. Let us begin now to back General Eisenhower with all the power there is in union.

The fact is that the Kremlin's forces are united politically, militarily, and economically in one huge mass of power. The democracies are divided. The Soviet empire has one foreign policy, and is under one command ready to move quickly at its will. The democracies have 12 foreign policies, 12 heads of command. They cannot function as a unit.

As matters are going now, unless we take steps toward effective union for our own defense, we are confronted with a growing neutrality on the part of the nations of Western Europe.

In the thirties, Hitler rubbed his hands to see neutralism in the United States delivering Western Europe to him. Today Stalin gloats over the spectacle of neutralism rising in Western Europe. This anxious European desire to keep out of war by being neutral is now causing some Americans (who forget they fell for the same delusion themselves a dozen years ago) to say in effect: "To the devil with you. You're no good. You are not worth helping. We'll go it alone."

Nor is this ever-developing split between the United States and its European allies the only division among them that Stalin is gloating over now.

Stalin knows how deeply divided the French and British are over European Union and the Schuman plan. Stalin knows how little real agreement there is, despite all the outward show—between the United States and France on the issue of how to rearm Germany. How can he help but know how divided we and Britain are in the Far East, with one ally recognizing Red China diplomatically and the other refusing such recognition and insisting that Red China be recognized now only as an aggressor?

Do you suppose that Stalin is blind to the fact that the Atlantic Community is shot through with the divisions which the principle of unlimited national sovereignty has always produced?

The problem then boils down to this: How can the Atlantic democracies—for they are the ones to which the rest of the still independent world looks for security against Kremlin grabbing—how can they achieve a unity comparable to, or even surpassing, that of the Communist bloc? The bitter question of today is how can we avert war; or, if it comes, how can we win it,

Undoubtedly, unity in the Atlantic Community is an absolute necessity in this crisis. Its unity is necessary for the future of free men everywhere. Actually the policy of the United States and Western Europe has been to move toward more integration and union since 1947—militarily, economically, and politically. We moved through the Marshall plan, Western Union, the Council of Europe, the Schuman plan, and the Atlantic pact.

When the North Atlantic Council was set up, it spanned the Atlantic. The Council is composed of the foreign ministers of the pact countries who meet periodically. Now that General Eisenhower has been appointed supreme commander of the Atlantic forces and a Defense Production Board is being set up, many people believe that the ultimate, and the necessary, in unity has been achieved. This is not correct, in my opinion.

Take a look at the machinery of the NATO, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. What kind of unity does it permit? Is there a single command that can move with decision? Not really. General Eisenhower is the supreme commander. But he is responsible to the standing group of the NATO and this group is responsible to the defense committee which, in its turn, is responsible to the Atlantic Council. Therefore, at the very minimum, the general has 12 bosses. Likewise, the projected head of the North Atlantic Defense Production Board will be hedged around with bosses. This is hardly a set-up for quick, decisive action, such as the Soviet Union can set in motion.

The resolution, as I said, merely calls for an exploratory convention. It would commit us to nothing. Whatever came out of the convention would have to be referred back to the voters of each participating nation for ratification. This country cannot be committed without the say-so of its citizens.

It is well to be reminded that we are challenged by a government based on revolution and using revolutionary methods. We must defeat it with revolutionary methods of our own. Our Government, too, is based on revolution, the most inspiring and the least bloody revolution the world has known, the American Revolution, that combined the ideals of liberty and union.

The great difference is that the Communist revolution is based upon dictatorship and a denial of freedom. The American revolutionary method, which this resolution seeks to extend, is based upon freedom and a recognition of an individual's worth. It is to a limited extent based upon the same revolutionary idea which brought the representatives of the Thirteen Colonies together in 1787 out of which developed the greatest political and economic federation the world has ever known.

No propaganda could have the electrifying, hope-inspiring effect on freemen everywhere as that which would result from the prompt passage by Congress of the Atlantic Union resolution.

I do not think it would take too long to get the federation under way, if we determined to enter such a union. After all, the Constitution of the United States—which had no precedent—was written in about 100 days and ratified in 16 months. That was an age when communication was largely by word of mouth and voting devices very unwieldy.

Merely convoking the convention would electrify the whole free world. We remember how the whole West perked up when the Marshall plan was announced even though it was not implemented for some time. When the Atlantic Treaty was signed, it inspired immediate confidence.

Should the Union be actually started, the West will feel for the first time that it is a unit; there will no longer be doubts of who will come to whose support in times of peril. The whole community will be rejuvenated—revitalized—supremely confident of its powers to maintain its own way of life. The Soviet would be far less likely to risk war for she would know that she would have to take on the whole union if she did. Gone would be her chance of keeping us divided, of picking us off one by one.

The delegates to the federal convention will have to work out many problems by compromise, just as we did in the American federal convention, but I believe that any final union would be

largely patterned after our own. The union should have limited powers, I think, dealing only with those affairs which concern the welfare of the uniting peoples as a whole. We have failed utterly to establish peace and freedom using the traditional methods of diplomacy which developed in nineteenth-century Europe; it is time we turn back to the method of federation which was created here in America and which has proven so successful.

We have great confidence in the ability of General Eisenhower to organize a powerful Atlantic army, but we cannot wait until he stalks among freezing, hungry men in some new Valley Forge before recognizing that treaties and alliances cannot be adequate substitutes for government by law.

The task of General Eisenhower is to organize militarily the Atlantic army. He has not the authority to institute a plan by which the Atlantic community can govern its basic foreign and defense policy. This authority rests with the people, and it is the responsibility of civilians—of us and our colleagues in other Atlantic democracies—to stage the setting in which the free people may determine whether they wish to apply a different method than we are now applying in this crisis.

Already, voices are calling for a streamlining of the machinery. Just the other day the Washington Post said:

> There ought to be no further delay in clearing the channels and providing machinery to obtain quick political decisions.

In other words, it is high time to stop trying to achieve integration in a piecemeal, patchwork manner. Let's take the bull by the horns and do what has to be done. Let us give the Atlantic community real unity. We can do this by forming an Atlantic union. We will be following the same pattern by which the diverse States of this Country built a cohesion and force that made it the most prosperous, liberty-loving, forceful country in the world. Our original Thirteen States, you will remember, accomplished little by diplomatic negotiation, but, once they united and set up a Federal Government, military and economic integration were quickly completed and our vast future lay before us for the taking. It can happen again.

There is no reason to fear that the calling of the convention proposed in this resolution might interfere with the efforts we are already making to meet this emergency. In no wise would this convention seek to substitute for existing and operating diplomatic machinery—be it that of the Atlantic Pact, the United Nations, or any other. We would merely investigate the possibility of finding a stronger situation of strength in federation by law than we have in alliance by treaty.

Industrially, 80 percent of the world's production is accomplished in the Atlantic community. Next to the United States, Western Europe is the most important center of industry in the world. Bound to us in federal union, this rich area would be in no more danger of falling to communism. In minerals alone, the Atlantic union would be virtually self-sufficient in the 15 most important ones. The United States by itself has only six of them.

Looking at the industrial capacity of the Atlantic union, any potential aggressor would have to take into serious consideration this tremendous productive might translated into military power. The Economic Cooperation Administration says that the productive power of Western Europe can be made to equal our own. Productive power determines military power.

The union of 400,000,000 people would mean an expanding market. In these days of specialization and mass production, such an expanded market can only mean increased prosperity and higher living standards for the whole community.

From the defense standpoint, the unified Atlantic community would have the vast advantages of unified command, unified forces, standardization of weapons avoidance of wasteful duplication, and a pooling of specialized skills and aptitudes. Its bases would be widely dispersed and so would its industrial areas and vital points, making it infinitely more difficult for a potential enemy to win a rapid war by surprise attack.

There would be 1 foreign policy for the whole community—instead of the 12 it now has under the Atlantic Pact. With only one policy, it would fortify itself against the Soviet technique of divide and conquer—of always trying to drive a wedge between the democracies and capitalizing on their differences. Differing policies make for dissension and suspicion among the democracies—as is happening now on recognition of Red China, relations with Spain, on branding Red China as the aggressor in Korea.

A true union of the democracies would make for peace. Such a combination of resources, productive capacity, and defense forces would create an entity of such vast power that it could not be defeated in war. Hence, a potential aggressor would hesitate about starting something he could not finish. The Union would place a predominance of power on the side of the people who respect law, order, and freedom. Such a combination would put real strength behind the principles of the United Nations. It would provide the armed backing the United States is now unable to create. A decision of the United Nations would then have far more meaning than it has today. There would be no conflict between an Atlantic federation and the United Nations. The purpose of the United Nations is to attain peace. That purpose would be strengthened by Atlantic Union. The Union would be for peaceful purposes and not a federation for aggression. But if war were forced upon the free people, they would indeed have real and united strength for their own defense. We should, of course, continue to support and to endeavor to strengthen the United Nations in the hope that the time may come when all nations through it would be willing to settle their differences. The passage of this resolution would be a great step in bringing the United Nations toward the dream all have for it.

By forming an Atlantic Union, we would bring together peoples with a common heritage and common viewpoint. The whole Atlantic community is characterized by its love of freedom. We Americans love our freedom so much that we have many times placed it even before peace. We must not forget that free men everywhere are the major assets of free men anywhere and to keep our hard-won freedom, we must defend freedom elsewhere. We can best do this by banding together in union.

Forming an Atlantic Union will also enable the Atlantic community to effectively help the underdeveloped countries of the world. Instead of the United States having a rather inadequate point 4 program and the British Commonwealth a Colombo plan, wouldn't it make for efficiency to have the plans combined into one substantial, coordinated program? The democracies could then translate the meaning of democracy into better living conditions. This would effectively meet communism's false promises and make for political stability in backward areas now threatened by the Soviet.

The remaining independent nations of Asia have always depended upon the Atlantic democracies for most of their trade. If the Atlantic democracies form a union, these Asiatic nations will derive tremendous economic benefits from increased trade as well as better prospects for peace.

The union, of course, would not be a static thing. As other nations qualified for entrance—and I think the qualification should be experience and success in self-government because it is essential that the union remain democratic—the union would grow, just as our Union grew. And as this democratic society grew, the likelihood of wars would become less and less.

The Atlantic Union resolution applies directly to the present emergency. The convention could move immediately toward the establishment of a single department of Atlantic defense and foreign policy. As a Rhode Island newspaper recently said:

> If the situation is serious enough for a common army, it is serious enough for a common political command.

We simply cannot risk any longer the differences of opinion on foreign policy which make the democracies misinterpret each other's intentions.

All the features of Atlantic Union do not have to be worked out simultaneously. Under crisis conditions, the first things to take up would be those having to do with Atlantic security—defense and foreign policy. Calling the convention would not mean discontinuing any of the measures now at work for our defense; it would help them and speed them and promote their success.

If I may repeat myself, man is never helpless if he comes to grips with a problem, chooses a course of action, and pursues it energetically.

To my mind, the Atlantic Union plan is realistic and attainable. If anything can avert war, Atlantic federation can. But if even it fails, at least the free world will be in the strongest position to win.

Communism fills the air with dynamic noise. Let the democratic peoples accept that challenge, and show that freemen can work out their destiny and put their ideas on the march again for the benefit of all mankind.

We warned the Eighty-first Congress that we were proceeding too slowly and too incompletely. We urged this investigation in the brief period when gunfire was not being heard. It would have been better to have begun in the comparative calm of two whole years ago. Perhaps we would not be mobilizing for the conflict today if our warning had been heeded.

We lost time while we marked time. We can no longer afford the luxury of killing time, because time will kill us if we do. Korea came quicker than we thought. Another Verdun, another Dunkirk, another Pearl Harbor may come tomorrow.

The Chief Executive extolled us to "stand together with all men everywhere who believe in human liberty."

The way to achieve is to try. The way to stand together is to try to get together. The way to get together is to meet. The free people remaining are ready. The time remaining is short. These look to America that refused to lead before. If there is to be a meeting, we shall have to call it.

It is our move, Mr. President.

BLUEPRINT FOR VICTORY

Mr. BRIDGES. Mr. President, we of the Eighty-second Congress have convened at the beginning of the second half of the twentieth century. America has faced peril at many times in her history, but never since the dark days of Valley Forge has America faced such a desperate fight to survive as a free nation.

America is fighting world war III, today—now. Make no mistake. Not one of America's leaders has dared tell the people this simple truth—a truth so evident that the people can see it for themselves.

Dictators do not declare war. Dictators wage war. At this very hour the free world is fighting a war with Communist Russia, a war far more deadly than any in the recorded history of mankind.

It is not a formal war, fought according to the rules of a chivalry long dead. This is modern, twentieth-century war, an insidious war, a war in which deceit, trickery, subversion, propaganda, and double-dealing are as much the weapons as are tanks, planes, and warships.

World war III began before World War II was ended. For seven long years we have lost the battles of world war III. But it took some 45,000 American casualties of the conflict in Korea to make the American people realize this is a real war.

There is a deadly parallel between the world today and the world of 1940. In that year the dictator was Hitler, and his tyranny was called fascism or nazism. Hitler wheeled his divisions into position in Western Europe, and confronted the free nations which had burrowed into the Maginot line. While the free nations hoped there would be no war, Hitler proceeded, by conquest and deceitful diplomacy, to reduce Eastern Europe. While the Allies fought a phony war, Hitler proceeded to make secure his eastern front.

In 1951, on a global scale, we find a similar situation. The Communists have arrayed their divisions in Europe and in the Middle East. The free nations quaver in the face of this threat. Meanwhile, in Asia, the Kremlin is attempting to reduce and secure its eastern front.

Let us be coldly objective. In this stage of world war III, there are five major fronts. The active shooting front is in Korea. The cold fronts are in the Middle East and Europe. There is the home front in America. Finally, there is the front behind the iron curtain. There is a Communist objective in each of these fronts. The Soviets must achieve victory on each if they are to achieve their objective for the conquest of the world.

In Asia the Red imperialists seek to gain the objectives of unlimited manpower and raw materials, with a secondary purpose of bleeding America's strength.

In the Middle East the objective is that primary essential of modern warfare—oil.

In Europe the objective is industrial potential and know-how. In America their purpose is to raise false issues, to weaken, to divide, to disrupt. Behind the iron curtain they seek to destroy opposition, and by lies to frighten their people into hating America.

Much has been said in recent weeks of the great debate facing the Eighty-second Congress. It is implied that the issue is our foreign policy. The issue, I submit, is not foreign policy. When a nation engages in war its foreign policy is replaced by its strategic concept of how to gain the victory. Our debate is not with regard to policy. The issue is one of strategy. It is not how to prevent war. It is how to win that war.

It is time the administration and the Congress faced squarely this issue. How many battles must we lose before we realize we are fighting a grim, bloody, no-holds-barred war to the finish with Communist Russia?

This is an hour for new beginnings.

America needs a government which will begin anew by throwing off indecision, inaction, quibbling, and side issues.

There are forms of human slavery which man had better die opposing than submit to. The most degrading of these is Soviet communism. Twice in this century the productive force, the physical courage, and the moral will of America have been the decisive factors in saving the world from an endless night of slavery.

But the vice of tyranny is that it ever forgets and it never learns.

It is time we let Soviet Russia know that America will never surrender freedom. Let the Communists ponder well on this. Other dictators have mistaken our will, have miscalculated our intent.

Let Josef Stalin and his Politburo understand this: Since they are determined to rule the world, since they persist in subjugating free peoples, they will inevitably encounter the unconquerable will of America.

Let the Kremlin think on these words, words which diplomatic niceties preclude: Since they are bent on war and conquest, they shall have it. They shall have it with all the strength this Nation can summon—with every freeman who will fight against slavery for his birthright of freedom.

Historically and up to this hour of new beginning, all nations which have wanted peace have found America ever willing to have peace—honorable peace, peace with freedom and justice. The choice has been made not by us, but by the Kremlin.

On this we all agree: They will not take away our freedom.

Today America faces a crisis which demands unity. We are being asked to rally to the support of men and policies which have failed. In all fairness, is it possible to build unity on failure, on incompetence, on expediency? Any Senator has only to read his mail to know there has been a real, a serious—yes, a critical—deterioration in the public's confidence in its leadership.

The very essence of government is to foresee the future.

Even the most naive citizen is aware of the succession of failures on the part of the administration to foresee the future which has brought about the shooting phase of a global war. There is no need to recite this record. It is too well known. The time for bitterness and recrimination is past.

We must compose our differences, and we must agree not on a policy to prevent war, but a strategy to win war.

Today I offer a blueprint for victory. This is a positive program, a constructive approach. I readily concede that those who support it must break with the thinking of the past. In a traditionally American way they must boldly plan for the world of today and tomorrow.

The people must understand an accomplished fact: The United States has been committed to a continuing policy of collective security.

I believe America must stand by her commitments. I believe America must take the leadership in making collective security effective.

It is vital that we have a global strategy grounded on the basic concept that America is the hard core of the free world's strength. We must conserve that strength and must budget its use. It is essential that America does not dissipate its strength in indecisive incidents in the four corners of the globe. American power must be brought to bear on the key fronts.

In a broad sense, as I have indicated, this war will be fought on five fronts. While it is not our intention to lose on any of these fronts, it is clear that America alone cannot overcome the enemy except on the home front.

It is also clear that America can very largely furnish four of the five components of victory. Our Nation has productive capacity equal to that of the rest of the world, we have air power we have sea power, and we have the atomic bomb in quantity. We lack the manpower to fight land wars single handed. We must husband our strength for use to the free

world's greatest advantage in the five-front war.

The problem, then, is the issue of our global strategy. We have three original choices.

We can continue by inaction and indecision to lose this war in large and small incidents, while refusing to admit we are engaged in all-out conflict.

Or we can draw lines on maps, erect imaginary walls, establish perimeters, and let the initiative remain with the enemy.

Or we can adopt the course I advocate. We can recognize that this is total war, that each day Russia delays the shooting on the fronts in Europe and the Mid-east gives us that much longer to increase our strength and marshal the forces of freedom; that our ultimate victory is to be won by harassing the dictators on the three fronts in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East, while driving a wedge between the Communist rulers and their common people—those miserable human slaves who yearn for peace and freedom just as we do.

This is not the so-called preventive war. Such argument is specious. If we admit the truth that we are already in war, that free peoples, including American soldiers, are fighting and dying, and have been for many months, this muddle will suddenly come into sharp focus. We are in war. We cannot fight to prevent this war. We must fight to win this war.

Above all else, let us forthrightly admit the great fallacy of our past policy. We have patiently and persistently tried to negotiate with Stalin and his criminal conspirators. We have failed. By now we should realize that the Soviet imperialists are the incarnation of willful evil. We cannot negotiate with Stalin. We had as well try to treat with Satan.

If there remains a place for policy, let it be this: Let us ever hold out to the slave peoples the hope for peace and freedom with but one condition—the condition that they purge themselves of their Communist leaders bent on the conquest of mankind, in order to join with us.

I offer a blueprint for victory:

First. The peoples of all the free world must assure themselves of competent leadership. American responsibility probably is greatest, for our leaders must inspire all nations. It is imperative that President Truman call new men to his executive department, men capable of restoring the confidence and regaining the support of the American people.

Second. America's crying need is military manpower, combat troops. We must raise the ratio of fighting men to the total already in uniform. We must enact a universal military service and training act

Third. We need more modern weapons now—guns, tanks, planes, ships. This means all-out industrial mobilization and round-the-clock production.

Fourth. Over-all ceilings should have been placed on prices, wages, and allocations of materials months ago.

Fifth. The North American continent is the hard core of freedom's strength. It is urgent that we protect America with a modern radar screen in depth, correlated with the most modern interceptor aircraft on full combat alert.

Sixth. Civilian restraints must be matched by government austerity. The frills of bureaucracy must be ruthlessly stripped away. Hand-outs must be abolished. Nonessential spending must be stopped.

Seventh. Only after governmental economies are a fact, should the Congress have the gall to ask the American citizen to pay additional taxes; and then the tax program should be fair, equitable, and aimed at encouraging free enterprise.

Eighth. Any program for victory must be predicated on a loyal, competent, vigorous American State Department. I demand that this administration rid the State Department of the architects of disaster, the termites, and the muddled incompetents whose thinking has led us from victory to disaster, to war, in five short years.

Ninth. We must encourage and assist anti-Communist movements throughout the world, especially those movements operating behind the iron curtain.

Tenth. We should take immediate steps to protect the security of our combat forces against the senseless advertising the troop movements and dispositions, the type and quantity of our military equipment, and the location of new defense installations.

Eleventh. We must budget our military and economic assistance to free nations on the basis of their demonstrated will to fight communism. America cannot be expected to guarantee the freedom of nations which coddle Communists and trade with the enemy.

Twelfth. The confusion of military strategy by displomatic policy in Asia is ridiculous. We must realistically face the fact that we are at war with Russian communism in Asia. The administration must give General MacArthur the authority to fight a military war. This means bombing enemy supply lines and supply bases; accepting the help of Nationalist China; assisting, with matériel and naval support, the Nationalist invasion of the mainland, through the establishment of numerous beachhead perimeters. If the administration cannot obtain authority from the United Nations or if the administration is unwilling to grant such authority, America's land army should be withdrawn from the fight in Korea which diplomacy renders hopeless.

Thirteenth. We have at last returned our Ambassador to Madrid. Now let us be consistent: Let us invite Spain with her anti-Communist army to join our war.

Fourteenth. We should create an American Foreign Legion of anti-Communists—with or without the consent of governments which call on us to defend them against Russian aggression.

Fifteenth. We must immediately sign with Japan a peace treaty which will permit that country to arm for its own defense and to exploit its production potential in the cause of the free nations.

Sixteenth. We must exert the utmost economic pressure on communism, through a blockade of Red China and the imposition of sanctions against trade of any military significance between the free world and the slave world.

Seventeenth. We must recognize that United Nations' failures are the result of strong Communist obstruction and weak American leadership. The United Nations can survive as the instrument of collective security if we insist that cooperation become a two-way street for free nations. Obviously, Communist nations should be thrown out of the United Nations if the very name of this organization is to have any meaning.

Eighteenth. We must recall the dependents of all servicemen, as well as civilians with nonofficial status, from the war fronts. They must not be permitted to become hostages of the slave nations in the event of all-out attack.

Nineteenth. The administration should vigorously use every law on the books until we achieve absolute control of the Communist conspirators in America.

Twentieth. Let us put an end to the diplomatic farce. We should immediately outlaw international communism by severing diplomatic relations with Soviet Russia and her puppets. When the slave peoples cast out their Kremlin masters, we can welcome them back to the family of nations. Until that day, we have enough home-bred spies without importing them from Russia.

Mr. President, I hope my words today will penetrate the iron curtain, so that the Politburo will know Americans have taken off their gloves.

I hope my words will help rekindle the will for freedom among the nations of all the earth.

I hope I have made it plain that America will fight with her bare fists until this war is won, so that peace with justice will come at last to all mankind.

RECESS

Mr. McFARLAND. I move that the Senate stand in recess until 12 o'clock noon tomorrow.

The motion was agreed to; and (at 7 o'clock and 40 minutes p. m.) the Senate took a recess until tomorrow, Tuesday, January 16, 1951, at 12 o'clock meridian.

NOMINATIONS

Executive nominations received by the Senate Monday, January 15 (legislative day of January 8), 1951.

UNITED NATIONS

Mrs. Anna Eleanor Roosevelt, of New York, to be the representative of the United States of America on the Human Rights Commission of the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations for a term of 3 years. (Reappointment.)

George P. Baker, of Massachusetts, to be the representative of the United States of America on the Transport and Communications Commission of the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations for a term of 3 years. (Reappointment.)

DIPLOMATIC AND FOREIGN SERVICE

Irving Florman, of New York, to be Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the United States of America to Bolivia, to which office he was appointed during the recess of the Senate.

John D. Erwin, of Tennessee, to be Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the United States of America to Honduras.

Monnett B. Davis, of Colorado, a Foreign Service officer of the class of career minister, now Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Panama, to be Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the United States of America to Israel.

Horatio Mooers, of Maine, now a foreign service officer of class three and a secretary in the diplomatic service, to be also a consul general of the United States of America.

William N. Fraleigh, of New Jersey, now a foreign service officer of class four and a secretary in the diplomatic service, to be also a consul of the United States of America.

Charles H. Whitaker, of Rhode Island, now a foreign service officer of class 5 and a secretary in the diplomatic service, to be also a consul of the United States of America.

The following-named foreign service staff officers to be consuls of the United States of America:

Henry F. Arnold, of New Jersey.
Arthur G. Lund, of Utah.
Reed P. Robinson, of Colorado.
Girvan Teall, of New York.

The following-named foreign service reserve officers to be secretaries in the diplomatic service of the United States of America:

Jack C. McDermott, of Texas.
Forney A. Rankin, of North Carolina.
Charles A. Thomson, of Maryland.

DIRECTOR FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

Thomas D. Cabot, of Massachusetts, to be Director for International Security Affairs.

FEDERAL CIVIL DEFENSE ADMINISTRATOR

Millard F. Caldwell, Jr., of Florida, to be Federal Civil Defense Administrator.

COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE

Edgar P. Caffrey, of Reno, Nev., to be collector of internal revenue for the district of Nevada, in place of Robert L. Douglass, resigned.

UNITED STATES PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE

The following-named candidates for appointment in the Regular Corps of the Public Health Service:

To be senior assistant scientists (equivalent to the Army rank of captain), effective date of acceptance

Albert Schrage
Charles R. Maxwell

To be senior assistant veterinarians (equivalent to the Army rank of captain), effective date of acceptance

Robert E. Kissling
Arthur H. Wolff

IN THE COAST GUARD

The following-named persons to be captains in the United States Coast Guard:

Dwight H. Dexter	Herbert F. Walsh
Lewis H. Shackelford	William W. Storey
Edward W. Holtz	Edwin J. Roland

The following-named persons to be commanders in the United States Coast Guard:

Christian R. Couser	Russell W. Thresher
Willard L. Jones	William E. Schweizer
Robert N. Williams	

The following-named persons to be lieutenant commanders in the United States Coast Guard:

George F. Erwin	Hamlett I. Allen
Wilfred Pantzer	Michael J. Hoosick
Walter G. Davis	David H. Douglas
Martin Lentz, Jr.	Theron H. Gato

The following-named persons to be lieutenants in the United States Coast Guard:

Edwin W. Coleman	Raymond J. Evans
Robert S. Capp	Scott P. Berryman
Leslie F. Cool	Willis G. Partridge
John D. Roberts	

The following-named person to be a lieutenant (junior grade) in the United States Coast Guard:

Nelson W. Allen.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

MONDAY, JANUARY 15, 1951

The House met at 12 o'clock noon.

The Chaplain, Rev. Bernard Braskamp, D. D., offered the following prayer:

Almighty God, in whom alone we can find our strength and hope, inspire us now with an earnest longing to lead humanity out of its desperate plight and moral agony into the glorious splendor of a new day.

Grant that we may have a greater faith in Thee and in the spiritual resources which Thou hast placed at our disposal, as we accept the challenge of this high calling. Give us courage as we strive to bring to fulfillment the vision of a social order wherein dwelleth righteousness and peace.

We pray that we may never lose heart or allow our hopes to change to doubt and despair. Help us to open widely the windows of our souls that we may see the dawning of that day when love and friendship, good will, and brotherhood shall take their rightful place in the life of all mankind.

Hear us in the name of the Prince of Peace. Amen.

The Journal of the proceedings of Friday, January 12, 1951, was read and approved.

MESSAGES FROM THE PRESIDENT

Sundry messages in writing from the President of the United States were communicated to the House by Mr. Hawks, one of his secretaries.

PERMISSION TO ADDRESS THE HOUSE

Mr. KEARNS. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend my remarks.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Pennsylvania?

There was no objection.

LOWERING VOTING AGE TO 18

Mr. KEARNS. Mr. Speaker, now that Defense Secretary Marshall has asked for the drafting of our 18-year-olds, as an educator, it seems only reasonable to me that if these boys are old enough to fight they are old enough to vote and have a say as to what is going on in government.

The advances made in the study of current affairs in the high schools throughout the Nation today, especially in the classes in problems of democracy, have properly enlightened the youth of our country and no doubt this study has trained them sufficiently to make them intelligent voters.

If the Defense Department insists on the drafting of our 18-year-old boys, I urge the States to enact legislation that will make it possible for these young men to vote, or it may require a constitutional amendment. I repeat, if they can fight, they can vote.

PROPOSED FEDERAL SALES TAX

Mr. BAILEY. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend my remarks.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from West Virginia?

There was no objection.

Mr. BAILEY. Mr. Speaker, I am deeply concerned over the position taken by some administration leaders, as well as prominent Members of Congress, on the proposal to impose a Federal sales tax as a means of raising revenue for financing our national-defense program or to balance our national budget.

I want to protest this invasion of a field of taxation already preempted by the States and their subdivisions. My colleagues should know that in a vast majority of the States, this source of revenue is earmarked for the support of public education in the form of State aid to equalize educational opportunities.

My own State of West Virginia not only levies a 2-percent consumer sales tax that is designated for schools, but it levies in addition a gross sales tax which includes a manufacturer's excise tax which is a major source of State revenue.

The National Government has for more than 30 years operated largely in the field of personal and corporate incomes. Many States have kept out of this field of taxation for this reason. At the beginning of World War II, the State of West Virginia repealed its State income laws so as to leave this field of taxation to the Federal Government.

My State receives annually in excess of $46,000,000 from the source of revenue which the Federal Government now proposes to invade by this legislation. The imposition of a Federal super sales tax on top of this would be confiscatory.

I want also to advise my collegaues that this kind of tax would rest mostly on the shoulders of those least able to pay. Twenty-eight percent of our American families have annual incomes of less than $2,000 a year. Unless the proposed legislation would exempt articles of food and clothing we would only add more misery to their already subnormal existence.

No one should be misled by the term "manufacturer's excise tax." Since this excise tax would be figured as a part of the cost of production, it would in the end be paid by the consumer.

In recent years, many of the Nation's larger municipalities have entered the field of consumer's sales tax in order to meet their budget for ordinary operation expenses. I am advised that New York City would be unable to finance current needs were it not for their sales-tax revenue. What is true in New York City would be true throughout the Nation and far too many millions of our population would be unfairly affected in that they would be forced to pay double taxes while many other millions of our people would escape. This inequality in taxation cannot be justified.

I voted against the proposal in the Eighty-first Congress to impose a sales

tax in the District of Columbia. I did this not that I was opposed to the District getting this added revenue, but on the ground that it would set a precedent for the imposition of a national sales tax. Little did I think, only a few months ago, that this move on the part of those most able to pay would come so soon.

THE LATE HONORABLE CHARLES A. KENNEDY

Mr. MARTIN of Iowa. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to address the House for 1 minute.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Iowa?

There was no objection.

Mr. MARTIN of Iowa. Mr. Speaker, I have the sad mission to announce that Hon. Charles A. Kennedy passed away January 10. Mr. Kennedy had the honor of representing the First Congressional District of Iowa in the Sixtieth to Sixty-sixth Congresses inclusive from 1907 to 1921. He served with great distinction as chairman of the Committee on Rivers and Harbors in the Sixty-sixth Congress and he served also as chairman of the Mileage Committee in the Sixty-first Congress.

Mr. Kennedy was born in Montrose, Lee County, Iowa, March 24, 1869, and he lived in Montrose his entire lifetime. He served as mayor of Montrose from 1890 to 1895 and as a member of the Iowa State House of Representatives in the thirtieth and thirty-first general assemblies.

At the end of the Sixty-sixth Congress Mr. Kennedy retired from public life voluntarily and was not a candidate for renomination. However, he continued his keen interest in public affairs to the end of his life and he was a grand counselor to all men of the district who took active part in public affairs. He was especially interested in getting young men into active roles in public affairs and I have found his counsel and his judgment extremely helpful to me throughout my own entire public life.

I have just looked through the Congressional Directory and I find that only seven Members of the House of Representatives today served during the period of Mr. Kennedy's membership in the House of Representatives. I have always enjoyed hearing from them of the high regard in which Mr. Kennedy was held by all who served with him.

MILITARY FORCES

Mr. EDWIN ARTHUR HALL. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to address the House for 1 minute.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from New York?

There was no objection.

Mr. EDWIN ARTHUR HALL. Mr. Speaker, the debate over the feasibility of war in Korea is increasing in tempo everytime we hear another adverse report from that unhappy land.

In order to accurately determine public opinion on this vital question the Binghamton Press, in my home city, a Gannett newspaper, is conducting an interesting poll.

I am placing the latest findings by the Press on this poll in the Appendix of the RECORD, and I am sure they will be of interest to everybody as they are to me.

It is apparent that the Korean War is an unpopular one if a sampling of feeling in our section means anything. Whatever my personal slant on strategy or methods in combating world communism, I can assure the House that the sentiment of people in the Triple Cities, as expressed in the Press survey, will carry a tremendous weight with me in making the necessary decisions as to our procedure in this session of Congress.

It is also significant to note that feeling among Press readers concerning the shipment of American troops to Europe is pretty one-sided, in the negative.

As for me, I believe we ought to make sure that every American soldier or sailor who leaves these shores should be equipped with the finest, most modern weapons that it is within the power of the Congress to provide.

My stand in this regard goes back to August 1945 upon the cessation of hostilities in World War II.

At that time I deplored the wholesale mustering out of millions of our fighting men and pointed out that dismantling our Armed Forces and allowing them to fold up could only end in eventual disaster.

Five years later, when the crucial test came in Korea, my observation was proved right.

Let us cloak our boys with the proper fighting gear before we send them anywhere to defend us.

SPECIAL ORDERS GRANTED

Mr. CRAWFORD asked and was given permission to address the House today for 10 minutes, following any special orders heretofore entered.

Mr. DEMPSEY asked and was given permission to address the House for 10 minutes on Wednesday next, following the legislative business of the day and any special orders heretofore entered.

Mr. YORTY asked and was given permission to address the House for 10 minutes today, following any other special orders heretofore entered.

EXTRAORDINARY POWERS REQUESTED BY GOVERNOR DEWEY

Mr. CELLER. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend my remarks.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from New York?

There was no objection.

Mr. CELLER. Mr. Speaker, the Governor of our State, Governor Dewey, has asked for almost unprecedented powers during this so-called emergency. The powers that he asks for are almost fantastic and unbelievable. He would arrogate unto himself all judicial, legislative, and executive functions in the State of New York. He would not wait until there was an actual war or an invasion. He wants those powers now. A legislature would go berserk if it would grant any governor such powers. They would be an unwarranted interference with Federal authority and run athwart the jurisdiction of the Office of Defense Mobilization, the National Production Authority, the Economic Stabilization Agency, the National Defense Manpower Authority, the Civil Defense Administration. The Governor wants to conscript labor and confiscate property. He wants to ration foods and services. He wants to allocate scarce materials and grant priorities. He wants to do everything that was done during the war by Federal authority, but he wants authority to do it now.

His regulations which could be issued without restraint would have the effect of law and violations thereof would incur severe penalties, including jail.

Governor Dewey might honestly believe such authority should reside in him. But even hell is paved with good intentions. Such grant of power would offend against the Federal Constitution and the New York State Constitution.

He and a figurehead defense council of 23, he would in the main appoint, could supersede all mayors, county commissioners, and local officers. The latter might well resign. While he supposedly would work and confer with this council, it would be his own personal agency. He could act without this council if it were, for example, not practical to have it assemble. While this council would include members of his cabinet, as it were, they are all his political henchmen. Disobedience to Dewey orders could mean dismissal as far as all nonelective State officials are concerned.

So adverse and hostile was the reception accorded Dewey's proposals that even he was forced to pause. He asked a 30-day waiting period.

I do not relish setting up Dewey as a sort of satrap. His ideas should be banished to limbo.

ARMING WESTERN GERMANY

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend my remarks.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Oklahoma?

There was no objection.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Speaker, on last Friday I inserted in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD an Associated Press article, under date of December 24, 1950, Hannover, Germany, which will be found at page 185 of last Friday's RECORD, stating, among other things, this:

> A magazine's poll of its German readers showed today that a large majority opposes West German rearmament.
>
> On the question of whether Western Germany should join the North Atlantic Defense Pact, 81.5 percent said "No."

If we attempt to arm Germany with that kind of a set-up will it not result in a dangerous and unwise policy? As a matter of fact, will it not become, and is it not, in fact, an impossibility to accomplish this policy? I ask your consideration of this question.

The SPEAKER. The time of the gentleman has expired.

COMMUNISM IN THE UNITED STATES

Mr. WOOD of Georgia. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to address the House for 1 minute and to include in my

remarks a treatise on communism prepared by a high-school class of Chestatee High School, located in the congressional district I serve.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Georgia?

There was no objection.

Mr. WOOD of Georgia. Mr. Speaker, the Committee on Un-American Activities several years ago prepared for publication and release a series of educational publications entitled "One Hundred Things You Should Know About Communism." These pamphlets deal with communism in the United States of America, government, labor, education, and religion. Hundreds of thousands of these publications have been distributed throughout the United States. The value of these publications as an educational document is demonstrated by the fact that the school system of Harlan County, Ky., had adopted the series of One Hundred Things You Should Know About Communism as a text in sociology and other classes.

Prof. Elbert C. Harris, principal of the Chestatee High School, Gainesville, Ga., has adopted these publications for study by a class in communism. Professor Harris has submitted to me a paper prepared by the students of the Chestatee High School after studying communism for only 4½ months.

Mr. Speaker, every Member of the House who reads this paper on communism should be deeply gratified by the part he has played in making this document available in order that people might learn the true aims, purposes, and operations of communism. A nation possessing knowledge of this international conspiracy cannot be duped by the propaganda of the Communist Party.

I feel a sense of deep personal pride in being permitted to represent such splendid, upstanding American citizens as compose this fine class in this rural high school in Georgia.

COMMUNISM

Communism is a system by which a comparatively small group of people is trying to rule the whole world. Today it is a world force which governs millions of the human race, and threatens the safety of the democratic, Christian nations of the world. It is seeking to gain control of education, religion, labor, government, and the whole thinking process of humanity from the cradle to the grave either by legal or illegal methods. Conspiracy and iron force are the basic tools of communism, and it works both inside and outside the law and constitution of the nation of which it seeks to gain control.

In Communist-controlled countries the party operates the government, industries, schools, hospitals, labor, homes, and the work and play of the people from birth till death. The party enjoys the profits of the countries controlled and the enslaved peoples pay the bills.

Christian living, under communism, is horribly punished. Belief in God is outlawed. God and Christian living are marked as enemies, and Communists attack them with all the force they possess, because they know God, Christianity, democracy, and communism can never exist side by side; and when they do not dominate by force, they seek to dominate by deception and corruption from within just as they do in government, education, labor, and in general throughout the entire life of the nation. They know communism can never completely control the mind and the body, which is their aim, so long as people have an abiding faith in God. This is why they so persistently persecute the churches, belief in God, and all forms of Christianity. The only hope for religious training under communism is that parents teach their children at home in secrecy.

Since all property belongs to the government in Communist-controlled countries, there is no private initiative. Laborers are compelled to work where they are told, when they are told, how they are told, and at whatever wage the government designates, and this without question. Complete subordination is demanded and obtained. No one is free. No labor union, even, can be free. They deal with the future of your job, your security, the conditions under which you work, union membership, if any, and one's whole life which makes it impossible to live the life of a free citizen.

In the field of education the child is no longer free under Communist domination. Children are forced to attend schools of Communist selection which are completely dominated and controlled by them and in which the teachers are continually watched by their spies. In these schools the children are taught the nonexistence of God. The children are taken early in life, put into uniform with a hammer and sickle flag in one hand and a gun in the other, and sent forth to conquer the whole world for the Red flag of Russia. They are taught to spy upon their parents at home and to report to the authorities any breach of Communist doctrine.

The child comes from these schools and colleges with anything except a mind of his own. He is trained, but not educated. He only knows to obey unquestionably and to solve only the problems handed him, and to consider it a heinous crime to even think for himself. He is only a child-man of communism when his training—not education—is completed.

Should communism take over in the United States today, the education which American boys and girls are receiving would stop immediately and Communist training begin, training to do a particular thing and do it well without any consideration for the ideals of the individual whatever.

Communists consider themselves actually at war with every individual and every nation that does not take its orders from Moscow, and the United States of America is no exception. The leopard never changes his spots. Our country today is being attacked from within and without. Communism has already made its inroads into key Government positions, the Army, the Navy, diplomatic corps, the Treasury, and other capital point of Government to say nothing of its inroads into labor unions, schools, churches, and other patriotic organizations.

We are apparently asleep as individuals to the danger which America is facing in this crucial hour of Communist deception and intrigue. Every citizen owes it to himself, his country, and his God to awake and acquaint himself with the minutest details of his danger. None of us is safe so long as Communists and communism lurk in even the remotest corners of this Nation.

Let us, as true Americans, wake up, individually, inform ourselves and others of the danger we are facing, arm ourselves with knowledge, equip ourselves with zeal and determination, and fight communism in all its forms; and wherever found, until the last vestige of its curse is forever erased from this good land of freedom.

(Prepared by the class studying communism in Chestatee High School, Forsyth County, Route 1, Gainesville, Ga., January 8, 1951.)

SPECIAL ORDERS GRANTED

Mr. CANNON. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to address the House for 30 minutes today, after the legislative business of the day and any special orders heretofore entered, and I further ask that my remarks may follow the reading of the President's message on the budget.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Missouri?

There was no objection.

Mr. FLOOD asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 hour on Wednesday following the legislative business of the day and any special orders heretofore entered.

POWER OF PRESIDENT TO SEND TROOPS ABROAD

Mr. FLOOD. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend my remarks.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Pennsylvania?

There was no objection.

Mr. FLOOD. Mr. Speaker, once again there arises in the House of Representatives concern with the constitutional problem of the implied powers of the Executive. The obvious expression of this concern is the Coudert resolution. This analogous situation arises, however, when the means to this end devised by the gentleman from New York begs another constitutional question having to do with the power of Congress to forbid the ordering of the Armed Forces overseas.

I do not object to the House concerning itself with foreign policy. I think the increasing interest shown by the House in such matters is one of the healthiest developments in the Congress in the last 25 years. As a matter of fact, I have always been a leading advocate of the right of the House to act on treaties—that treaties be ratified by a single majority of both Houses of Congress.

Section 8, article I of the Constitution is, of course, the basis for the existence of the legislative weapon in all controversy with the Executive of this nature—"the power of the purse" and clearly is with reference to the resolution in question for there also is to be found the power of Congress to raise and maintain troops.

I take it for granted that no one seriously contends that, as the law now stands, the President does not have the power to send troops out of the country, in certain cases.

The House has time and again stated its willingness to listen to the advice of the Chiefs of the Armed Forces on all matters of troop disposition for the national defense. I believe the Executive has done so and will do so. That being the case, the Executive would hardly act under implied power unless after the advice of the Defense Chiefs in the interest of the national security, and if that is so, very few Members of Congress would care to superimpose their contrary opinion. Why then, other than for

academic reasons, select this hour for a vitriolic and tumultuous debate as to "which comes first, the chicken or the egg."

In view of the long series of precedents of the implied power of the President with reference to the dispatch of troops to foreign soil, the Coudert resolution amounts to a request for a vote of lack of confidence in the Executive during a period of grave national emergency—and if that is the purpose—I challenge the gentleman to unmask his attack and introduce a resolution which asks such a vote and let that issue be met head-on.

It is clear that the resolution is an attempt to give legislative voice to certain of the arguments of Mr. Hoover's recent statement on foreign policy. Consequently, this resolution could be the vehicle for a full dress debate in the House on foreign policy rather than that of violent constitutional and jurisdictional issues between the legislative and the executive, but that is a forlorn hope if one recalls the history of such debates down through the pages of our history.

There is no basis for the assumption that in advance of aggression the President would not ask the approval of Congress to send additional troops to Europe.

In the face of world events there is no margin for error. All doubts must be resolved against the creation of a constitutional crisis at this time.

Soviet imperialism, which seeks the enslavement of the whole world, could be granted no more precious boon than the adoption of a policy by this Congress which would paralyze American armed strength outside the United States, reduce our foreign policy to a tragic absurdity and deliver the remains of the free world into the ravenous maws of Moscow.

The mere suggestion that the American giant be bound hand and foot at an hour when the fate of this Nation and the democratic world hangs in the balance is illustrative of the crisis of faith that afflicts us in so many quarters. Allowing for the very best intentions of the authors of such proposals, and knowing full well their patriotism, nevertheless the stern fact remains that the course advocated by the Coudert resolution and similar legislative proposals in this House, would deliver victory to the Soviets by default. Such a course would shame the name of America down through the ages and would represent the abnegation of everything this Republic holds dear and valid.

What makes such a proposal all the more disserviceable to the United States is that it comes at an hour when our democratic friends in far parts of the world, under the menacing shadows of aggressive communism, are looking to us for moral support, material assistance, and visible signs that the champion of the free world, America, will not abandon them to vicious appetites of Russian expansionism.

At this very hour what is needed more than anything else is firm and eloquent reaffirmation on our part that all of the resources of the United States, moral, physical, and spiritual, will be found totally in this fight for survival—and it is nothing but a fight for survival for Soviet imperialism is insatiable and is a victim of its own dynamism.

Under direct authority of the Constitution the President is charged with the responsibility of the conduct of foreign policy. Certainly this duty and responsibility would become a nullity if he were not permitted, in the national interest, to implement such policies by forces adequate to enforce them.

Down through our history there is precedent after precedent for the Chief Executive acting quickly and directly in committing our Armed Forces to action in the national interest. In this connection, Edward S. Corwin, the recognized expert in this field, in his volume The President: Office and Powers, dealing with the Presidency from 1787 to 1948 has this to say on this subject:

> But the President may also make himself the direct administrator of the international rights and duties of the United States, or of what are adjudged by him to be such, without awaiting action either by the treaty-making power or by Congress, or by the courts.

One President after another has availed himself of his prerogative.

Upward of 140 separate instances of such direct Presidential action are cited in James Grafton Rogers' volume entitled "World Politics and the Constitution." They start with the undeclared naval war with France from 1798 to 1800, down through Caribbean engagements from 1814 to 1825, including the Barbary wars, various landing of marines in numbers in many countries, military encounters with Mexico, naval demonstrations of Commodore Perry against Japan, military action against China in 1854, again in 1855 and 1856, numerous actions against South American countries, incidents in Korea in 1871, and again in 1888, and so on down to the action taken in connection with the Philippine Insurrection in 1899–1901.

During the first three decades of the twentieth century at least a score of such direct military engagements were taken in the protection of American interests in the international field by direct authority vested in the Presidential office. Similarly in the years from 1940 through 1941 this country undertook a series of vital steps, geared to foreign policy and in the national interest, upon Presidential initiative, including the exchange of destroyers for British bases, the United States occupation of Greenland, the occupation of Iceland. Not the least of such steps was the Presidential order to the Navy to patrol ship lanes to Europe in an effort to check the Nazi submarine menace.

The record in this respect is clear and beyond question. It behooves us in the face of the perils which confront our security to remember this record and not reduce our chances for survival to academic considerations which certainly are weak reeds to lean upon when the Soviets possess the apparent capabilities to ravage our homeland with scientific agents of warfare.

Let it be noted that all actions taken in regard to commitment of our Armed Forces abroad are not done abritrarily or capriciously but only after the most serious and profound consideration and upon the advice of our military and congressional leaders and in consultation with the State Department.

The prime objective of Soviet diplomacy at this moment is to drive a wedge into the unity of America and her allies. At one fell swoop the activation of the philosophy of the Coudert resolution would accomplish this and the Kremlin would be saved any further trouble. The free world would fall apart to await isolation and devouring, piece by piece.

What is incomprehensible to me is that in this day of undeclared war, when science has annihilated time and space, when atomic warfare in all its fury can be launched without warning in the middle of the night, is that responsible citizens would advocate a policy which must perforce assent to a degree of destruction that might well be fatal before our Nation could take steps to begin its fight for life.

No, our good judgment must not be swallowed up in the quicksand of fear. We must not be rigid or unimaginative and helpless before menacing forces. This crisis, created by Soviet imperialism, cannot be postponed by equivocation. It cannot be solved by wishful thinking.

Shall we, America, the font of liberty, truly the "home of the brave," run away from the struggle where the forces of history are being brought together? No, this is the road to national disgrace and ruin. It would be the crime of the centuries for America in this hour of great decision to be craven and cowardly.

GOVERNOR DEWEY'S PROPOSAL

Mr. HOFFMAN of Michigan. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend my remarks.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Michigan?

There was no objection.

Mr. HOFFMAN of Michigan. Mr. Speaker, every once in a while the Members are greatly shocked. That was my condition this morning when the gentleman from New York [Mr. CELLER] made that terrific attack upon Governor Dewey.

If I understood what the gentleman from New York [Mr. CELLER] was saying, it was that Governor Dewey of New York was asking for dictatorial power to do in the State of New York the very things which the gentleman from New York [Mr. CELLER] has over the years insisted should be entrusted, first to the then President Roosevelt; later, to President Truman.

A grant of arbitrary power equal to that possessed by a dictator carried no terror to the heart of the gentleman from New York [Mr. CELLER] if that power was granted to a Democratic President, to an internationalist, to a so-called liberal, or one socialistically inclined.

One uninformed, listening to the gentleman from New York [Mr. CELLER] a few moments ago, would be terrified by the picture of what might happen if, perchance, similar powers were granted to

a Republican Governor in the gentleman's home State of New York.

The gentleman is frightened, he is terrified, at the mere thought that a governor of one of the 48 States—a so-called Republican—and I use that word advisedly—should even venture to ask for powers within his home State equal to those which the gentleman has insisted must be granted to a President—provided he is a so-called Democrat—and again I use that term advisedly—if the Republic is to be saved.

When a New Dealer, packaged under the label "Democrat" or an internationalist, whether that label be Democrat or Republican—asks for support for a blank check, either on the Treasury or for authority, the gentleman from New York [Mr. CELLER], in his support is as busy as a hen in a dust heap—if you know what I mean.

But let one who is a conservative, a nationalist, make a request for a little bit of either and the gentleman throws a fit.

For myself, I am not in favor of giving blank checks to anyone.

The old Constitution with its three checks on absolute power in any one branch of the Government is still my guide.

ENLISTMENT OF GERMANS AND JAPANESE IN UNITED STATES ARMY

Mr. POAGE. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend my remarks.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Texas?

There was no objection.

Mr. POAGE. Mr. Speaker, last week I introduced legislation authorizing the enlistment of Germans and Japanese in the United States Army. I want to make it perfectly clear that I said in "the Army of the United States," not in the army of the United Nations or of any other nation, but our own Army.

From day to day I want to call attention to some of the numerous and varied reasons for such enlistments. Today I direct your attention particularly to the need of manpower in the labor field of this country. I have just come from a meeting that has been discussing the shortage of agricultural labor. It is generally recognized that we cannot expect to make and harvest a crop as large as seems desirable for 1951 without additional supplies of farm labor. Instead of expecting more farm labor this year it seems clear that we shall have less. Not only are the armed services reducing our farm labor supply, defense industries are going to take more and more of the supply of labor that remains on the farm.

Shortages of labor are going to break out in every field of endeavor in the United States during the coming year, and all of us realize that. We all know that we will be short of labor in our field and in our factories and we know that the products of these fields and factories are absolutely essential to our military effort. Why are we overlooking the fact that our present policy of allowing none but 100 percent physically perfect specimens of young American manhood to serve in our Armed Forces is going in the long run to leave these very forces without adequate supplies.

At best we are going to have to take enough of our American boys. Why should we not at least allow the citizens of Germany and of Japan to have a part in defending their particular sections of the world? We do not have to give them American citizenship or promise them the kind of benefits we extend to American boys. We need only to give them the opportunity to eat American army food and wear American army clothing. A place in the American Army is still a better job than is available to millions of Germans and millions of Japanese, and every German and Japanese who enlists in our Army reduces by one our need to take an American boy out of production either on a farm or in a factory.

The advantages of such enlistments are obvious. What serious objection can be offered?

SPECIAL ORDER GRANTED

Mr. TABER asked and was given permission to address the House for 5 minutes today, following the legislative program and any special orders heretofore entered.

SOUVENIRS OF THE WHITE HOUSE

Mrs. BOLTON. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend my remarks.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentlewoman from Ohio?

There was no objection.

Mrs. BOLTON. Mr. Speaker, out in the lobby there is a card on which are placed samples of souvenirs that may be had of the White House. As will be recalled, about a year ago I mentioned the fact there would be some 800,000 pieces of the gutted White House available for our constituents if they desired them. I have been advised that our colleague the distinguished gentleman from Michigan [Mr. RABAUT] made announcement of this on Friday last and that his remarks appear in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD of that day.

WE SHOULD BRING OUR BOYS HOME FROM KOREA, STAY OUT OF EUROPE, GET OUT OF THE SO-CALLED UNITED NATIONS, BUILD UP OUR OWN DEFENSES, AND STRENGTHEN OUR OWN COUNTRY TO WHERE NO OTHER NATION WILL DARE ATTACK US

Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend my remarks.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Mississippi?

There was no objection.

Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Speaker, at the risk of being called an isolationist by those wild-eyed internationalists who seem to be bent on dragging our country to destruction, I feel it my duty as a Member of this Congress to express my honest convictions relative to the grave problems with which we are now confronted.

First. We should bring our boys home from Korea. They never should have been sent there in the first place. There was no law for it; Congress had not declared war.

I am not in favor of permitting the President of the United States to send our boys all over the world to fight the other fellow's wars, especially when war has not been declared by the Congress of the United States, as the Constitution requires.

Second. I am in favor of getting out of Europe and staying out of Europe.

Third. I am also for getting out of the so-called United Nations, which has proved to be a farce, a fraud, and a failure.

It has attempted to interfere with our internal affairs, subordinate the American people to the domination of foreign powers, and has declared wars, or emergencies, for us to fight and pay for, while the very countries, whose representatives have so voted, have not turned their hands to help.

We have already suffered more casualties in Korea than we suffered in the Revolutionary War, the War of 1812, the war with Mexico, and the Spanish-American War, all combined, and the chances are that if we do not get out of there, we will lose a million men before it is over, and accomplish nothing.

Let us get out of Asia, bring our boys home, stay out of Europe, build up our own defenses, including the strongest Air Force on earth with an ample supply of atomic bombs, with such radar and naval facilities as are necessary to protect this continent, and to enforce the Monore Doctrine, then communism in Europe will collapse of its own weight.

In that way, we can develop the strongest country on earth, and lead the world by precept and example into a new day of peace, progress, and prosperity.

But, we cannot do it by bribery, with money taken from the pockets of the overburdened taxpayers of America, nor can we force the rest of the world to it with a bayonet.

We have just gone through one war which untold millions of people have already called the most useless war in history. Our boys won the fight, and then the powers that be turned the victory over to the worst enemy civilization has ever known.

If we continue to follow this course, I fear that our country will not survive.

But we can survive and lead the world by following the course which I have suggested.

Let us build up our own country, let us build up our own strength, let us build up our own Nation, then communism in Europe will fall of its own weight and we can protect our country and pass it down to posterity.

The SPEAKER. The time of the gentleman from Mississippi has expired.

ADJOURNMENT UNTIL WEDNESDAY

Mr. McCORMACK. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that when the House adjourns today it adjourn to meet on Wednesday next.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Massachusetts?

There was no objection.

COMPOSITION OF COMMITTEE ON POST OFFICE AND CIVIL SERVICE

Mr. McCORMACK. Mr. Speaker, I offer a resolution (H. Res. 67) and ask for its immediate consideration.

The Clerk read as follows:

Resolved, That during the Eighty-second Congress the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service shall be composed of 24 members.

The resolution was agreed to.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

COMPOSITION OF VARIOUS STANDING COMMITTEES

Mr. MARTIN of Massachusetts. Mr. Speaker, I offer a resolution (H. Res. 68) and ask for its immediate consideration.

The Clerk read as follows:

Resolved, That the following-named Members be, and they are hereby elected members of the following standing committees of the House of Representatives:

Committee on Agriculture: Clifford R. Hope, Kansas; August H. Andresen, Minnesota; Reid F. Murray, Wisconsin; Edwin Arthur Hall, New York; William S. Hill, Colorado; Charles B. Hoeven, Iowa; Sid Simpson, Illinois; Ernest K. Bramblett, California; Paul B. Dague, Pennsylvania; Ralph Harvey, Indiana; Harold O. Lovre, South Dakota; Page Belcher, Oklahoma; Harold C. Ostertag, New York; Joseph R. Farrington, Hawaii.

Committee on Appropriations: Glenn R. Davis, Wisconsin; Benjamin F. James, Pennsylvania; Gerald R. Ford, Jr., Michigan; Fred E. Busbey, Illinois; George B. Schwabe, Oklahoma.

Committee on Armed Services: Paul Cunningham, Iowa; William H. Bates, Massachusetts; William E. Hess, Ohio.

Committee on Banking and Currency: Jesse P. Wolcott, Michigan; Ralph A. Gamble, New York; Henry O. Talle, Iowa; Clarence E. Kilburn, New York; Albert M. Cole, Kansas; Merlin Hull, Wisconsin; Hardie Scott, Pennsylvania; Donald W. Nicholson, Massachusetts; Gordon L. McDonough, California; William B. Widnall, New Jersey; Howard H. Buffett, Nebraska; Jackson E. Betts, Ohio.

Committee on District of Columbia: Sid Simpson, Illinois; J. Glenn Beall, Maryland; Joseph P. O'Hara, Minnesota; Henry O. Talle, Iowa; A. L. Miller, Nebraska; James C. Auchincloss, New Jersey; John J. Allen, Jr., California; Carroll D. Kearns, Pennsylvania; Edward L. Sittler, Jr., Pennsylvania.

Committee on Education and Labor: Samuel K. McConnell, Jr., Pennsylvania, Ralph W. Gwinn, New York; Walter E. Brehm, Ohio; Wint Smith, Kansas; Carroll D. Kearns, Pennsylvania; Thruston Ballard Morton, Kentucky; Thomas H. Werdel, California; Harold H. Velde, Illinois; Charles E. Potter, Michigan; Richard B. Vail, Illinois; E. Y. Berry, South Dakota.

Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments; Clare E. Hoffman, Michigan; R. Walter Riehlman, New York; Cecil M. Harden, Indiana; George H. Bender, Ohio; Charles B. Brownson, Indiana; Thomas B. Curtis, Missouri; William E. Miller, New York; Marguerite Stitt Church, Illinois; George Meader, Michigan; William E. McVey, Illinois; Alvin R. Bush, Pennsylvania.

Committee on Foreign Affairs: Charles A. Eaton, New Jersey; Robert B. Chipperfield, Illinois; John M. Vorys, Ohio; Frances P. Bolton, Ohio; Lawrence H. Smith, Wisconsin; Chester E. Merrow, New Hampshire; Walter H. Judd, Minnesota; James G. Fulton, Pennsylvania; Jacob K. Javits, New York; Donald L. Jackson, California; Christian A. Herter, Massachusetts; B. Carroll Reece, Tennessee.

Committee on House Administration: Karl M. LeCompte, Iowa; C. W. (Runt) Bishop, Illinois; Charles A. Halleck, Indiana; Albert P. Morano, Connecticut; Edmund P. Radwan, New York; William K. Van Pelt, Wisconsin; Edward L. Sittler, Jr., Pennsylvania.

Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce; Charles A. Wolverton, New Jersey; Carl Hinshaw, California; Leonard W. Hall, New York; Joseph P. O'Hara, Minnesota; Wilson D. Gillette, Pennsylvania; Robert Hale, Maine; James I. Dolliver, Iowa; John W. Heselton, Massachusetts; Hugh D. Scott, Jr., Pennsylvania; John B. Bennett, Michigan; Richard W. Hoffman, Illinois; J. Edgar Chenoweth, Colorado; John V. Beamer, Indiana.

Committee on the Judiciary: Chauncey W. Reed, Illinois; Louis E. Graham, Pennsylvania; Frank Fellows, Maine; Clifford P. Case, New Jersey; Kenneth B. Keating, New York; William M. McCulloch, Ohio; J. Caleb Boggs, Delaware; Angier L. Goodwin, Massachusetts; Edgar Jonas, Illinois; Ruth Thompson, Michigan; Patrick J. Hillings, California; Shepard J. Crumpacker, Indiana.

Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries: Alvin F. Weichel, Ohio; T. Millet Hand, New Jersey; Thor C. Tollefson, Washington; John J. Allen, Jr., California; Edward T. Miller, Maryland; Charles P. Nelson, Maine; John C. Butler, New York; Horace Seely-Brown, Jr., Connecticut; Charles J. Kersten, Wisconsin; Albert C. Vaughn, Pennsylvania; Timothy P. Sheehan, Illinois; Walter M. Mumma, Pennsylvania.

Committee on Post Office and Civil Service: Edward H. Rees, Kansas; Harold C. Hagen, Minnesota; Robert J. Corbett, Pennsylvania; Katharine St. George, New York; Antoni N. Sadlak, Connecticut; Usher L. Burdick, North Dakota; Gardner R. Withrow, Wisconsin; H. R. Gross, Iowa; James S. Golden, Kentucky; William R. Williams, New York; O. K. Armstrong, Missouri.

Committee on Public Lands: Fred L. Crawford, Michigan; Dean P. Taylor, New York; A. L. Miller, Nebraska; Wesley A. D'Ewart, Montana; Norris Poulson, California; John P. Saylor, Pennsylvania; Edward H. Jenison, Illinois; Fred G. Aandahl, North Dakota; William H. Harrison, Wyoming; J. Ernest Wharton, New York; Hamar H. Budge, Idaho; Frank T. Bow, Ohio; Joseph R. Farrington, Hawaii.

Committee on Public Works: George A. Dondero, Michigan; Homer D. Angell, Oregon; J. Harry McGregor, Ohio; James C. Auchincloss, New Jersey; J. Glenn Beall, Maryland; Russell V. Mack, Washington; Charles W. Vursell, Illinois; Hubert B. Scudder, California; Myron V. George, Kansas; William G. Bray, Indiana; Howard H. Baker, Tennessee; John T. Wood, Idaho.

Committee on Rules: Leo E. Allen, Illinois; Clarence J. Brown, Ohio; Harris Ellsworth, Oregon; Henry J. Latham, New York.

Committee on Un-American Activities: Harold H. Velde, Illinois; Bernard W. (Pat) Kearney, New York; Donald L. Jackson, California; Charles E. Potter, Michigan.

Committee on Veterans' Affairs: Edith Nourse Rogers, Massachusetts; Bernard W. (Pat) Kearney, New York; Alvin E. O'Konski, Wisconsin; James P. S. Devereaux, Maryland; William H. Ayres, Ohio; E. Ross Adair, Indiana; Allan Oakley Hunter, California; William L. Springer, Illinois; Winston L. Prouty, Vermont; Harmar D. Denny, Jr., Pennsylvania.

The resolution was agreed to.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

BUDGET, 1952—MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES (H. DOC. NO. 17)

The SPEAKER laid before the House the following message from the President of the United States, which was read, and, together with the accompanying papers, referred to the Committee on Appropriations and ordered to be printed:

To the Congress of the United States:

I transmit herewith my recommendations for the budget of the United States Government for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1952.

This is a budget for our national security in a period of grave danger.

It calls for expenditures of 71.6 billion dollars in the fiscal year 1952—a total 78 percent above expenditures for the year which ended last June 30. That increase is one measure of the vast new responsibilities thrust upon the American people by the Communist assaults upon freedom in Asia and the threats to freedom in other parts of the world.

BUDGET TOTALS

[Fiscal years. In billions]

	1950 actual	1951 estimated	1952 estimated
Receipts (excluding proposed new tax legislation)	$37.0	$44.5	$55.1
Expeditures	40.1	47.2	71.6
Deficit	−3.1	−2.7	−16.5

The new emphasis on military preparedness reflects the necessities of the world situation today. It reflects no shift of purpose. Our purpose remains to secure and strengthen peace. We are determined to seek peace by every honorable means—mindful of our responsibility to ourselves, to our friends and allies, and to humanity everywhere to spare the world the tragedy of another world war. We are likewise determined to spare ourselves and the world the even deeper tragedy of the surrender of justice and freedom.

Another system—powerful in resources, hostile in intent, and ruthless in method—is seeking the destruction of all the values we would preserve. That system is under the mastery of men unrestrained by considerations of responsibility to their people and guided by twisted dogma. They can be restrained only if defensive strength is arrayed against them. Our best hope now is to build our strength to the point necessary to bring them to caution, if not to wisdom. We are compelled to make the creation of strength a paramount aim.

In our drive to build up our defenses, we and the countries associated with us have a twofold goal—first, military forces strong enough to provide a powerful deterrent to those who may be contemplating new aggression; second, readiness for immediate mobilization of all our power if that becomes necessary.

This Budget reflects our determination.

First, it incorporates our expenditures for military purposes—to build swiftly an active force of highly trained men, equipped with the most modern weapons, and supported by ready reserves of men, supplies, and equipment.

Second, it includes our expenditures to help other threatened nations rebuild their strength and to participate with them in a program of mutual aid and common defense.

Third, it embodies our Government programs for the expansion of productive capacity and the concentration of needed capacity on defense

requirements—at the expense where necessary of normal civilian purposes.

Fourth, it contains expenditures for programs which will maintain and develop our national strength over the long run, keeping in mind that the present emergency may be of long duration and we must therefore be prepared for crises in the more distant as well as in the immediate future.

Fifth, it reflects reductions in other expenditures, in order to divert a maximum of resources to the overriding requirements of national security.

As a sixth budgetary measure, I shall shortly recommend an increase in tax revenues in the conviction that we must attain a balanced budget to provide a sound financial basis for what may be an extended period of very high defense expenditures.

CONTENTS OF THE BUDGET

The accompanying comparative table shows projected expenditures for the major programs or functions of the Government for the fiscal year 1952, revised estimates for the current year, and actual expenditures for the year which ended last June 30. Estimated appropriations and other new obligational authority for 1952 are also shown. Differences between obligational authority and expenditures are accounted for by the fact that obligational authority granted in one fiscal year may be spent in part in subsequent fiscal years.

The table covers expenditures from general and special funds of the Treasury, plus net expenditures of wholly owned Government corporations. The estimates include requirements under proposed as well as existing legislation. Expenditures from trust funds are excluded from this table, but operations of the major trust funds are discussed in subsequent sections of the Budget Message.

BUDGET EXPENDITURES AND AUTHORIZATIONS BY MAJOR FUNCTIONS

[Fiscal years. In millions]

Function	Expenditures			Recommended new obligational authority for 1952 [1]
	1950 actual	1951 estimated	1952 estimated	
Military services	$12,303	$20,994	$41,421	$60,971
International security and foreign relations	4,803	4,726	7,461	10,956
Finance, commerce, and industry	227	368	1,524	1,568
Labor	263	212	215	225
Transportation and communication	1,752	1,970	1,685	1,414
Natural resources	1,554	2,117	2,519	2,111
Agriculture and agricultural resources	2,784	986	1,429	1,483
Housing and community development	261	409	[2] −102	1,018
Education and general research	114	143	483	468
Social security, welfare, and health	2,213	2,520	2,625	2,552
Veterans' services and benefits	6,627	5,746	4,911	4,426
General government	1,108	1,252	1,351	1,140
Interest	5,817	5,722	5,897	5,897
Reserve for contingencies	-------	45	175	200
Adjustment to daily Treasury statement	+330	-------	-------	-------
Total	40,156	47,210	71,594	94,429

[1] This column excludes 4,075 million dollars of recommended appropriations to liquidate prior year contract authorizations.

[2] Excess of receipts over expenditures.

The requirements of national security are reflected in every major function of the Budget. The entire Government is being redirected to meet the compelling demands of national security, and each functional category includes activities which support, directly or indirectly, the defense effort.

The two largest categories—military services and international security and foreign relations—are devoted in their entirety to the broad objectives of national security. The military services category includes the costs of the Armed Forces and certain additional programs closely related to the military, particularly the stockpiling of strategic and critical materials and the activities of the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics. Under the international security and foreign relations heading are the costs of weapons provided to our North Atlantic Treaty allies and to other free nations, as well as expenditures for economic assistance and for the expanded international information program.

The military and international categories account for expenditures of 41.4 and 7.5 billion dollars, respectively, in the fiscal year 1952. Together they total 48.9 billions, or nearly 69 percent of the total Budget.

This total is an increase of 90 percent over the 25.7 billion dollars estimated as expenditures for these purposes during the current year—accounted for almost wholly by the great expansion of the military procurement program.

Our military requirements are of several kinds. We must maintain and supply our forces fighting in Korea. We must provide modern equipment for the expansion of our Army, Navy, and Air Force to the present combined goal of nearly three and a half million men. We must provide equipment for training purposes and for the civilian components not on active duty. We must provide military items to our allies as an essential part of our own defense. We must build a production base and matériel reserves against the contingency of full-scale war.

These demands do not press evenly on all sectors of defense production. In some areas, large supplies of military items remain from the recent war and reduce the need for new large-scale production. Our reserve naval fleet, for example, is an asset which reduces sharply the need for mass construction of new warships. In some cases, the record-breaking military production of the war years has left us with reserves of productive capacity. In other cases present capacity is far from adequate. The economic mobilization program will therefore be selective in character—in some areas, an all-out drive, with extensive conversion of civilian capacity; in other areas, a comparatively small expansion of present production rates.

At the same time that we sharply increase our own military production, Canada and the Western European nations with whom we are allied under the North Atlantic Treaty will be making comparable efforts. Nations outside the North Atlantic organization, including our neighbors in Latin America, are also making important contributions to the common security. Our international programs recognize that this Nation's own security is directly related to the security and defensive strength of our allies and that equipment and materials supplied to help arm their forces or to support their military production are, in fact, additions to our own defensive strength.

Figures shown in this Budget for both the military and the international security programs may be subject to substantial adjustment as the defense program progresses. Detailed estimates of new obligational authority for these categories are not included in the Budget at this time, in order to permit more thorough programing of specific requirements. Actual expenditures will depend on how rapidly we are able to produce the military items for which funds are made available.

A defense program of the size now being undertaken must be suported by a strong and expanding economic base. Five major categories of Federal programs contribute directly to this economic base. These are: (1) finance, commerce, and industry; (2) labor; (3) transportation and communication; (4) natural resources; and (5) agriculture and agricultural resources. Together these categories make up 7.4 billion dollars of expenditures in the fiscal year 1952, or 10 percent of the Budget.

This total compares to 5.7 billion dollars estimated as expenditures for these purposes in the current fiscal year. The increase reflects primarily our programs to expand private production facilities through Federal action, to administer economic controls, and to add capacity for atomic energy activities.

Four other categories of Budget expenditures include programs which contribute to national strength through protecting and improving the health, education, and well-being of the individuals and families who make up the Nation. These classifications are: (1) housing and community development; (2) education and general research; (3) social security, welfare, and health; and (4) veterans' services and benefits.

These four categories account for a total of 7.9 billion dollars, or 11 percent of Budget expenditures in the fiscal year 1952. This represents a reduction of nearly a billion dollars from the current year's anticipated expenditures. If it were not for the major new programs of civil defense and defense housing, community facilities, and services, the total reduction would be even greater.

The general operations of Government—including the legislative and judicial branches and such general activities of the executive branch as tax collection, civil-service retirement payments, and central supply, records, and buildings services—amount to 1.4 billion dollars, or 2 percent of the 1952 Budget. Apart from the expected costs of dispersal of Government agencies, this group of expenditures is also scheduled to decline from the 1951 level.

Interest payments will amount to an estimated 5.9 billion dollars in the fiscal year 1952, or 8 percent of the total Budget.

In order that our resources can be diverted to meet the demands of national security, strict economy in nondefense spending is required. Such a policy is incorporated in this Budget. For example, the only major new public works projects included in the Budget are those directly necessary to the defense effort. Construction on many public works projects now under way has been substantially curtailed. Many other activities are being contracted. Expenditures for the maintenance of Government property have been held to a minimum consistent with protection of Government investments. Cost increases, such as the rise that has already taken place in the prices of what the Government buys, are in many instances being absorbed by the agencies through compensating economies. Increases have been allowed where increasing work loads must be met or where further accumulation of backlogs of work cannot be tolerated, but only to the extent that the work cannot be taken care of through increased efficiency or reductions in service standards.

MANAGEMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT'S PROGRAM

Direction of the Nation's security program in this critical period will require the highest degree of administrative effectiveness in the Federal Government. Concerted efforts are being made to strengthen the organization and management of the executive branch for the extraordinarily difficult tasks that lie ahead. During the coming period, we must be able to make quickly such changes in the assignment of governmental functions as are needed to carry out national security programs. Under the Defense Production Act, I have by Executive order created the Office of Defense Mobilization, the Defense Production Administration, the Economic Stabilization Agency, and other emergency agencies with extensive delegation of authority. However, authority under that act covers only a part of the range of defense functions. During World Wars I and II the President was given emergency reorganization powers. These powers were extensively used to keep Government organization continuously in line with mobilization needs. Such authority for temporary changes is needed in the current emergency and should be one of the early measures considered by the Congress.

In addition to concentrating on the organization and management of the defense program, I shall continue to emphasize throughout the Government the management improvement program, instituted in 1949 to achieve greater efficiency in all Federal activities.

The last Congress took many important legislative actions aimed at improving governmental administration. Other actions are, however, still required. Some of these measures I shall incorporate in reorganization plans to be submitted to the Congress under the Reorganization Act of 1949. Others require legislation, including such important matters as improvements in the civil-service system and in the administration of the postal service.

The actions in the field of organization and management which we have taken in the past years have increased the ability of the Government to deal with a major defense effort. We must continue to make progress in this field.

PAYING THE COSTS OF DEFENSE

When the American people resolved to undertake the defense program now under way, they accepted also the necessity for the increases in their taxes that the new level of expenditures requires. National security in the present world can be attained only with direct and heavy cost to each one of us.

High taxes are indispensable to our successful mobilization. They are required to preserve confidence in the integrity of the Government's finances, to distribute the heavy financial costs of defense fairly among all the people, to reduce excessive demand for raw materials and industrial products required for national defense, and to choke off inflationary pressures. We cannot as a nation buy a defense establishment of the size that is now being constructed and still as individuals expect to spend our money to the same degree as before for normal peacetime purposes. Unless positive action is taken on the tax front, our defense effort will be in continuous jeopardy.

The tax legislation passed last year substantially increased our revenues. The Revenue Act of 1950, approved within 3 months after the invasion of the Republic of Korea, increased income taxes on individuals and corporations and closed some loopholes in the income tax laws. The corporation excess profits tax, passed in the final week of the Eighty-first Congress, also increased our revenues while at the same time placing the higher levies upon those businesses which can best afford to pay increased taxes.

In spite of these new tax measures, a deficit of 16.5 billion dollars is estimated for the fiscal year 1952 if no further tax legislation is enacted. At this time, sound public finance and fiscal policy require that we balance the Budget. I shall shortly transmit to the Congress recommendations for new revenue legislation.

Even a balanced budget will not of itself serve to keep our economy stable during a period of rapidly rising defense expenditures. The full amount of inflationary pressure is not measured by the budget deficit alone, since this reflects only payments actually made. The Department of Defense alone will have been granted for the fiscal years 1951 and 1952 an estimated 112 billion dollars of obligational authority for its military functions, and additional amounts will have been made available for foreign military-aid programs. Bidding for manpower and materials, which pushes prices upward, begins as soon as procurement contracts to be paid from these authorizations are signed, even though expenditures may not take place for a year or more. Other positive stabilization measures, including allocations, and credit, price and wage controls, are essential to offset the inflationary pressures which are not reflected in the single figure of the budget deficit.

The following table provides a breakdown of anticipated budget receipts during the fiscal year 1952, based on existing legislation, compared with actual receipts during the fiscal year 1950 and revised estimated receipts for the current year.

BUDGET RECEIPTS

[Fiscal years. In millions]

Source	1950 actual	1951 estimated	1952 estimated
Direct taxes on individuals:			
Individual income taxes	$17,409	$21,599	$26,025
Estate and gift taxes	706	710	755
Direct taxes on corporations:			
Income and excess profits taxes	10,854	13,560	20,000
Excises	7,597	8,240	8,222
Customs	423	600	620
Employment taxes:			
Federal Insurance Contributions Act	2,106	2,960	3,823
Federal Unemployment Tax Act	226	239	263
Railroad Retirement Tax Act	551	565	613
Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act	9	10	10
Miscellaneous receipts	1,430	1,325	1,333
Deduct:			
Appropriation to social security trust fund	−2,106	−2,960	−3,823
Refunds of receipts	−2,160	−2,336	−2,703
Budget receipts	37,045	44,512	55,138

NOTE.—Includes only receipts under existing legislation.

Under existing legislation, including the recently enacted tax measures budget receipts for the fiscal year 1952 are estimated at 55.1 billion dollars. This is 10.6 billion dollars higher than the estimate for the current year. Receipts from direct taxes on corporations show the greatest increase, 6.4 billion dollars over corresponding receipts for the current fiscal year. The combined effects of the Revenue Act of 1950, the Excess Profits Tax Act, and peak levels of corporate profits are reflected in this estimate. Direct taxes on individuals increase 4.4 billion dollars as a result of the high levels of income anticipated and a full year of operation under the Revenue Act of 1950. Although the collections from certain excise taxes will decline as production of some manufactured goods is affected by shortages of materials, receipts from other exises and all other major sources will increase.

BORROWING AND PUBLIC DEBT

At the beginning of the current fiscal year the public debt stood at 257.4 billion dollars. The debt will rise to approximately 260 billion dollars by June 30, 1951, as a reflection of the financing of the budget deficit for the current fiscal year. The amount of the increase in debt beyond June 30, 1951, depends upon the extent to which the projected deficit for the fiscal year 1952 is reduced through the enactment of additional tax legislation.

PROGRAMS

The following sections outline in more detail the character and extent of the programs which are to be financed from

this Budget. Further detailed descriptions of the programs of the Government, as well as certain special analyses covering public works, grants to State and local governments, investment and operating expenditures, and Federal credit programs, are included elsewhere in the Budget.

MILITARY SERVICES

The free nations of the world will continue to seek settlement of international disagreements peaceably and honorably within the framework of the United Nations—but they will rebuild their defenses rapidly. The communist attacks in Korea have served notice upon us all that the Soviet rulers are willing to risk the peace of the world to carry out their ambitions.

In response to the grave common peril, the free world is now moving forward, with increasing speed, determination, and unity, to build powerful defenses. This mutual effort is required both to deter further communist aggression and to insure that we shall emerge victorious if war is thrust upon us.

This Nation, as the strongest member of the free world, must provide the leadership in this great undertaking by developing its own military forces and, at the same time, assisting the other free nations on a large scale, in order to quickly achieve adequate mutual defenses.

The recommended program for building our own military strength is discussed in this section. The program for assisting other free nations in developing their strength is discussed under international security and foreign relations.

Department of Defense.—One year ago, I proposed a military program for the fiscal year 1951 based on active forces totaling about 1.5 million men and women, in a state of relative readiness, and backed by a moderate rate of military production and a substantial level of research and development.

The communist attacks in Korea and the imminent possibility of further attacks elsewhere have already caused us to quadruple the budget for the Department of Defense. To the initial enactment of 13.3 billion dollars in new obligational authority for the fiscal year 1951, including nearly a billion dollars of prior year authorizations made available, the Congress has in the past 6 months added 28.7 billion dollars. In this Budget I am tentatively including an additional 10 billion dollars of obligational authority. This will make a total of 52 billion dollars for the fiscal year 1951.

Because of the extensive planning involved, I am not submitting detailed 1952 estimates for the Department of Defense at this time. The Budget includes, however, an over-all estimate of 60 billion dollars, which is expected to be the approximate total of new obligational authority requested this spring for the fiscal year 1952.

The expenditure estimates for the military functions of the Department of Defense are also tentative. At the present time expenditures of 20 billion dollars are estimated for the fiscal year 1951 and 40 billion dollars for 1952.

MILITARY SERVICES

[Fiscal years. In millions]

Program or agency	Expenditures			Recommended new obligational authority for 1952 [1]
	1950 actual	1951 estimated	1952 estimated	
Department of Defense—military functions	$11,889	$20,000	$40,000	$60,000
Activities supporting military services:				
Stockpiling of strategic and critical materials	438	900	1,300	820
Selective Service System:				
Present program	9	37		
Proposed legislation			45	50
National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics	54	62	78	68
Reconstruction Finance Corporation (net receipts)	−107	−40	−43	
Other	20	35	41	33
Total	12,303	20,994	41,421	60,971

[1] This column excludes 2,702 million dollars of recommended appropriations to liquidate prior year contract authority.

The increased funds for fiscal years 1951 and 1952 will serve four major interrelated purposes. First, they will support the current increase in the strength of our active forces; second, they will finance the military production program designed to produce rapidly the modern equipment needed to supply our forces; third, they will provide reserves of equipment for still larger United States forces should these become necessary; and, fourth, they will help us to develop the production capacity of the country to the point where we could move rapidly to full mobilization should the need arise.

Six months ago our active military forces numbered less than one and a half million men and women. They have already been increased by about a million and this Budget includes funds to reach and maintain our present goal of nearly a million more.

We also have now available for rapid mobilization more than two million men and women in the National Guard and the Reserves of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. The Budget provides funds to increase the strength and degree of readiness of these Reserve organizations.

While the exact size and disposition of our active forces by units and geographic location must be kept secret in times like the present, in general we are increasing rapidly the number of active units. In the Army, we have called to active duty several National Guard divisions and reactivated certain regular divisions. We shall soon have a force more than twice as strong as our pre-Korea Army. In the Navy, by continuing to reactivate ships from the "moth-ball" fleet, we shall soon raise the active fleet to a strength more than 50 percent above that of a year ago. This Budget provides for maintaining two full Marine divisions plus additional separate units. In the Air Force, we are expanding the structure from 48 to 84 air wings; these will be rapidly brought up to full strength in trained men, and additional wings will be added.

The expansion of the active forces is reflected in the Budget not only in larger total amounts for pay and allowances, but also in increased funds for housing, training, and maintaining such forces.

We are now establishing training centers, bases, and camps for the enlarged forces. Furthermore, in order to prepare for the possibility of further mobilization, we shall be opening facilities with sufficient capacity to handle larger active forces than our immediate goals require. This Budget will provide, therefore, for a considerable increase in military public works expenditures—primarily to expand and improve troop training centers and air bases.

By far the largest part of the funds requested for the military services will be used to procure modern equipment. We have large stocks of some types of equipment, such as rifles and naval ships, which need only to be taken from storage and, in some cases, modernized. But in many other types, such as planes, tanks, electronic equipment, recoilless weapons, and rockets, we need to put into rapid production new models incorporating basic improvements that have been made since the end of World War II. This means a major production effort in order to obtain the best and most modern equipment for our enlarged active forces and for large reserve stocks.

This effort will require prompt and accurate planning and scheduling of military procurement and production in order to anticipate and forestall potential bottlenecks in materials, manpower, or facilities. For example, schedules must be laid out for producing the many complicated components of modern military airplanes, such as jet engines and electronic fire-control equipment, so that the components can be brought together as smoothly and efficiently as possible into finished aircraft. Some delays and frictions will inevitably occur in a production program as large and urgent as that upon which we are now embarked. But the experience and teamwork of military and civilian officials, of private businessmen and workers, will produce results very rapidly.

At the same time that the output of military equipment is stepped up, a base is being developed for moving to full-scale mobilization if the need should arise. For this reason, military orders are being spread among suppliers, instead of being concentrated in a few large firms. Production lines will be set up and manufacturers will be made familiar with our production needs over and above the immediate necessities of our present procurement plans. In this way, military production can be increased still further on short notice if that becomes necessary.

For example, we expect to develop an aircraft industry that will be capable of turning out 50,000 planes in a year, even though we will not be actually procuring that many. These planes, on the average, will be approximately 50 percent heavier than those used in World War II. Similarly, we shall organize to produce 35,000 tanks in a year, although we are not ordering that many now. This means, of course, planning for the readiness of basic materials, manpower, and

components, as well as final assembly lines.

The process of putting military equipment into production will not stop or retard our research and development work. On the contrary, we shall increase our efforts to maintain superiority in all kinds of weapons and equipment. Expenditures for the military research and development program will amount to nearly a billion dollars in the current fiscal year. The developmental work and the production program will be planned so that our troops will be supplied with the best weapons in the world.

Stockpiling.—If full mobilization becomes necessary, larger quantities of scarce materials such as copper, chromium, cobalt, and nickel will be required immediately. Many of these scarce materials are not produced in the United States, and others cannot be produced at a rate sufficient to meet all-out military needs. We are consequently acquiring and storing large reserve stocks of these materials.

This program will be expanded and developed in accordance with our total defense needs. The controls which have been established over the use of certain of these materials will assist us in meeting our stockpile requirements. We are also participating in the development of international controls. In addition, vigorous steps are being taken, by ourselves and our allies, to expand the production of strategic and critical materials both at home and abroad.

A total of 2.9 billion dollars of new obligational authority has been made available for the stockpile program during the current fiscal year and I am requesting an additional 820 million dollars of obligational authority for fiscal year 1952. Expenditures for fiscal year 1951 are estimated at 900 million dollars and for fiscal year 1952 at 1.3 billion dollars. These estimates must be considered tentative since the stockpiling program is constantly changing in response to new developments in both requirements and supply.

Selective service.—To provide the personnel needed for the expansion and maintenance of our military strength it will be necessary to rely heavily upon continued inductions through the Selective Service System. I shall therefore shortly request the Congress to enact the necessary legislation.

National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics.—The basic and applied research of the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics is an essential part of our total military research program for maintaining and increasing our lead in the design of military aircraft. The spending authority recommended for this agency will provide for substantial expansion during fiscal year 1952.

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND FOREIGN RELATIONS

The combined strength of the free world, in people, in industrial capacity, and in natural resources, greatly exceeds that of the Soviet Union and its satellites. This great strength must be mobilized and organized. Most of all, it must be united in purpose. The Soviet rulers are doing their best to split apart the free nations. If the free world let that happen, we would be handing the Soviet Union a victory without a struggle.

The Soviet rulers since the last war have been devoting a very large percentage of their resources to building military forces greatly in excess of any justifiable defense requirements. If these forces should be unleashed and succeed in conquering western Europe, the Soviet rulers would more than double the industrial power now in their hands. If the Communist forces should seize other major areas of the world, the Soviet rulers would control vastly increased reservoirs of manpower and raw materials. In either case they would win new strategic bases for further aggression. The key to United States security is to join in building the free world's defenses.

In the joint effort, the citizens of other free countries, like our own citizens, will be making personal sacrifices. Each free nation must make the largest contribution it can to the mutual defense. This Nation has greater industrial strength than the rest of the free world combined, and must therefore provide assistance on a large scale to other nations working with us in the joint defense drive. This assistance will permit the other free nations to accelerate the efforts they are already making with their own resources and their own energies.

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND FOREIGN RELATIONS

[Fiscal years. In millions]

Program or agency	Expenditures			Recommended new obligational authority for 1952 [1]
	1950 actual	1951 estimated	1952 estimated	
Military and economic assistance (present programs, and proposed legislation)	$4,572	$4,466	$7,112	[2] $10,664
Conduct of foreign affairs:				
Overseas information and education	34	57	166	115
Participation in international organizations	55	53	35	32
Other State Department activities	142	150	148	145
Total	4,803	4,726	7,461	[2] 10,956

[1] This column excludes 47 million dollars of recommended appropriations to liquidate prior year contract authority.

[2] Includes 1 billion dollars in new lending authority for the Export-Import Bank.

I estimate that expenditures of 7.5 billion dollars will be required for all of our international programs in the fiscal year 1952. This total will be 2.7 billion dollars more than the expenditure for international programs in each of the fiscal years 1951 and 1950. In 1952, the great preponderance of total expenditures for military and economic aid will go directly for the rapid build-up of mutual defense forces. More than one-half of total expenditures will be for procurement of military equipment to be shipped from this country to our allies. I shall request appropriations of 9.7 billion dollars for these mutual security programs, in addition to an increase of 1 billion dollars now requested in the lending ceiling of the Export-Import Bank. Actual expenditures by the Bank, in the fiscal year 1952 will, of course, be only a fraction of the increase in lending authority.

The complete request for appropriations will be presented to the Congress as soon as remaining details of the program are worked out.

In general, our assistance programs will continue to take two forms—provision of military equipment and provision of economic assistance. But the balance between these two forms of aid will shift very sharply, and will differ according to the strategic, political, and economic situation in each free world area requiring assistance.

Military and economic assistance to Europe.—The heart of our foreign policy in Europe is the North Atlantic Treaty, which was ratified by the Senate on July 21, 1949. Like all international undertakings which endure, this treaty is founded upon mutual interest. Americans know that the survival of this Nation would be gravely imperiled if the free peoples and industrial power of Western Europe were to fall under Communist subjugation. Correspondingly, the majority of Europeans are fully aware of the interdependence of their security and ours. Over the coming months, the nations of Western Europe will be calling up increasing numbers of their young men for military service. They will be diverting their resources to production of military weapons. They will be imposing additional controls on their civilian economies, particularly on civilian consumption. They will be joining with us, through the joint staff organizations which already exist, in standardizing equipment and training and in strategic and tactical planning. They are placing major elements of their forces under the unified command of the Supreme Headquarters of the Allied Powers in Europe.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is now a going concern. It is backed by an impressive reservoir of skilled people and industrial power. It includes not only the military potential of this country and Canada, but also the combined strength of the nine European members of the North Atlantic Treaty—Great Britain, France, Italy, Belgium, Holland, Luxembourg, Norway, Denmark, and Portugal. These nine nations alone number altogether 175 million people, or almost as many as the Soviet Union. Iceland is also a full participant. Greece and Turkey, which within the past few years have proved their steadfastness under the threat of aggression, are closely associated with the mutual effort.

The power of all these nations, pursuing a common course under the United Nations, is being directed to the creation of highly trained and well equipped forces-in-being, and a much large mobilization base. The combined European and American forces will serve as a powerful deterrent to communist aggression in Europe. There is genuine hope, moreover, that arrangements can soon be completed for German participation in the common defense.

In order to reach the required level of combined strength in the shortest possible time, it will be necessary for the United States to give our European

partners considerable assistance. The bulk of this assistance will be in the form of military equipment and supplies. We and our allies are determined that the mutual defense forces shall be equipped with modern and effective weapons. Although the European countries are undertaking to convert a substantial portion of their industries to arms production, they cannot by themselves produce rapidly enough all the complex and expensive weapons needed to arm their forces. Our tremendously productive economy must turn out many of the weapons needed to arm the European forces.

To achieve the rapid increase in European defenses that is necessary, our program of economic aid to Europe must, with a few exceptions—notably the aid program in Austria—be directed to support of the European military build-up, rather than to promoting further general economic expansion. The progress made to date under the recovery program is standing us and the entire free world in good stead in the present situation. In most European countries industry is now producing at well above prewar peaks, and this enlarged industrial strength can in substantial part be converted to military production. Moreover, the improved lot of the ordinary citizen, made possible in part by the European recovery program, has resulted in a higher degree of political cohesion and a firmer resolve to defend democracy and free institutions against aggression.

Western Europe's requirements for economic aid to support her program for building defensive forces arise directly from the disparity between her requirements for essential imports from the dollar area and her ability to earn dollars. In order to move ahead rapidly with defense plans, European countries will require materials and equipment of certain types which they can obtain only from the United States. These supplies include items essential directly in their armament factories, materials for essential consumer goods, foodstuffs, and materials for their most vital export industries. But because these countries will be diverting to rearmament a large proportion of the resources which would otherwise be engaged in producing for export, they cannot for the time being obtain, without help from us, all the dollars needed to pay for these essential dollar imports.

Much remains to be done in the mutual effort to achieve rapid strengthening of European defenses. In general, the commitments made by the European countries to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization have not been large enough up to this time. But these countries share the deep new sense of urgency which recent events have given us, and these difficulties will be rapidly overcome. It must be clearly understood that the military and economic aid which I am recommending to assist European nations to rearm will be conditioned upon their carrying out their full responsibilities for building the defensive strength of the North Atlantic Treaty community. The entire free world is in grave peril. This peril can only be surmounted by arduous joint efforts, in which each nation carries out to the full its allotted responsibilities.

Assistance to other areas of the free world.—The heightened communist pressures in Asia, the Near East, and other non-European areas require that we accelerate our exsiting programs of military assistance, which now provide military equipment to certain countries which can use it effectively and are faced by internal and external communist pressures. However, in comparison with our assistance to Europe, which will be predominantly in the form of military equipment, our total program of assistance to the non-European areas of the free world must place proportionately more emphasis upon building security through helping the people and governments of these areas to solve pressing economic problems.

To varying degrees, in different parts of the non-European free world, the crucial problem in resistance to communism is the attitudes and aspirations of the people. In some of these areas, millions of people live in desperate conditions of poverty, insecurity, ill health, and illiteracy. To them communism may appear as a possible escape from unendurable conditions of life. These people must be given real faith in their future within the free world through concrete evidence that their age-old problems have been recognized and that effective steps are being taken to solve them.

In many of these countries the governments are increasingly aware of the real problem presented by the low living standards of their people and are taking such steps as they can to deal with this problem. But many of these governments do not yet have adequate numbers of trained administrators and technical and professional personnel, and lack the capital funds necessary to carry out critical developmental projects. The United States cannot close the gap between reality and aspirations with generalized economic aid, especially in the present period of extreme pressure on our economy. What we can do is to work with these people and their governments to help them solve their problems. By making available to them knowledge and skills to supplement their own, together with modest amounts of loan capital and assistance grants, we can help these governments to bring tangible benefits to their people, and achieve an increase in the unity and resource strength of the free world.

In certain other non-European areas many of the countries have more experienced governments and a better start toward economic development. In these instances, economic and technical assistance can make an important contribution by breaking economic bottlenecks. Often the necessary projects in these areas are suitable for financing through loans.

We do not propose to assist countries where the governments are not sincerely trying to improve the economic conditions of their people. Our economic and technical assistance will be granted only where it is asked for by national governments which adopt in good faith the policies necessary to make the aid effective, and to make full use of their own resources.

Our total program of economic assistance to non-European areas of the free world will make a major contribution to increasing productivity in agricultural, industrial, and extractive industries. Part of the increased output must go directly to improving living standards and public services. Another part, including raw materials and particularly strategic materials needed for the mutual defense of the free world, can be traded with the more industrialized nations for capital goods needed for further economic development.

In Asia, we are now supplying military equipment to certain nations faced by communist threats against their independence. We are also providing economic assistance to help meet urgent problems in various parts of Southeast Asia, including Indonesia, Indo-China, Burma, Thailand, and Formosa, and a developmental program in the Philippines is being inaugurated. Both military and economic aid may have to be extended to additional Asian countries, and certain present programs will have to be accelerated. In addition, we are continuing our economic assistance to Japan, which is progressing steadily toward self-support.

In the crucial Near East, we are providing military assistance, loan capital, and technical assistance. We are continuing our support of the United Nations effort to reintegrate the refugees from Palestine. Our assistance to the Near East nations is essential to build up their strength against Communist pressures.

In Africa, developmental and technical assistance programs are being carried out in the overseas territories of the Western European countries, in large part through the use of European recovery program counterpart funds. These programs, by improving living standards, will help to curb the growth of communist pressures and will bring about expanded output of vitally needed strategic materials.

In the Western Hemisphere we are joined with our Latin-American neighbors in a mutual effort to strengthen our combined defenses and to build increased economic strength. The balanced economic development of Latin America has been, and continues to be, an essential objective of American foreign policy. This policy is being supported by the public lending agencies which are providing capital for essential projects for which private financing is not available. The activities of the Institute of Inter-American Affairs in the field of technical cooperation are a demonstration of the practical value of the Point IV concept. It is essential that our lending and technical assistance activities be continued, with a special concentration of effort on projects to develop further the economic base of the Latin-American countries and to facilitate and expand the production of strategic materials vital to the free world in this emergency period.

In many of these areas, extremely important contributions to the total effort are being made by American private capital and nonprofit institutions.

The technical assistance program, administered in part by United Nations agencies, is gaining momentum in many areas, and through small expenditures is making an important contribution to productivity.

A steady outflow of loan capital for critical projects is being maintained by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the Export-Import Bank. The increased need for undertakings to expand output of defense materials adds to the importance of the functions of the Export-Import Bank at this time. The Bank now has only about 500 million dollars of uncommitted lending authority. I recommend that the lending authority of the Bank be increased at this time by 1 billion dollars.

Our total program of assistance to non-European areas of the free world is making a major contribution to the ability of these areas to withstand internal and external communist pressures. The recommendations to be sent to the Congress will in part represent a continuation of these going programs, modified to take account of physical limitations of supply in this country, the increased dollar earnings of some of the areas, and the general sharpening of communist pressures.

Conduct of foreign affairs.—Effective conduct of our foreign relations takes on increasing importance in the critical world situation. The rôle of the diplomatic forces of the Government is of highest importance in organizing and making effective the mutual defense program. The need for a continuous flow of political and economic intelligence and the heightened tempo of activity in all aspects of international relations places a heavy burden upon the existing facilities of the Government.

This Government in cooperation with others is now organizing international machinery for dealing with world shortages of materials. In order to insure that scarce materials are used in the manner which will best serve the common defense, application of controls over international movements of certain commodities will be required. A substantial proportion of world trade will continue, however, through normal markets. In order to carry forward our long run policy of developing among the free nations workable trade patterns and a greater volume of world trade, I urge the Congress to extend the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act.

Through the international information and education program, we are carrying to the rest of the world the truth about our own objectives, and exposing the evil objectives of the communist conspiracy. During the fiscal year 1951, I requested, and Congress approved, a considerable expansion in this activity, including construction of additional overseas radio broadcast facilities in the United States and abroad. I intend to request from the Congress an additional appropriation of 100 million dollars for this purpose during the current fiscal year. The expanded program will result in expenditures of 57 million dollars in fiscal year 1951 and 166 million dollars in fiscal year 1952.

In order that our political, economic, and military efforts may have their maximum effect, our purposes and objectives must be made clear to all. We must promote understanding and unity among the free peoples of the world and instill hope in the hearts and minds of those who have already fallen victim to aggression. Truth is on the side of the free nations of the world. We must make full use of this advantage.

FINANCE, COMMERCE, AND INDUSTRY

In the modern world, more than ever, military strength depends on economic strength. Since World War II, the Government's programs have been directed toward achieving a strong and growing economy. The strength of our economy is now one of our greatest assets in deterring communist imperialism and in enabling us to meet military emergencies.

In the last 6 months, we have moved rapidly both to meet immediate defense requirements and to expand our capacity to produce airplanes, tanks, and other defense necessities. This has meant action by private initiative and by Government along a broad economic front. We are reopening all our reserve synthetic rubber plants. A substantial increase in steel and aluminum capacity is already well under way, and we will soon take measures to increase production of other key materials. Freight car production is being sharply increased. Expansion of both private and public power capacity is being accelerated. Mineral resources are being explored and developed both at home and abroad.

FINANCE, COMMERCE, AND INDUSTRY

[Fiscal years. In millions]

Program or agency	Expenditures			Recommended new obligational authority for 1952
	1950 actual	1951 estimated	1952 estimated	
Defense production and economic stabilization:				
Expansion of production (net):				
Present programs	-------	$200	$400	-------
Proposed legislation	-------	-------	700	$1,200
Allocations, price and wage controls:				
Present programs	-------	36	3	330
Proposed legislation	-------	-------	273	
Rent control:				
Present program	$22	13	1	
Proposed legislation	-------	-------	23	
Export control:				
Present program	4	3	(1)	
Proposed legislation	-------	-------	4	
Business loans and guaranties: Reconstruction Finance Corporation (net expenditures)	166	26	90	-------
Business promotion and regulation:				
Department of Commerce	26	19	17	17
Antimonopoly programs	8	8	8	8
Other	6	6	6	6
Promotion and regulation of financial institutions:				
Reconstruction Finance Corporation (net receipts)	−12	−10	−8	-------
Other (mainly Securities and Exchange Commission)	7	7	7	7
Total	227	368	1,524	1,568

[1] Less than one-half million dollars.

The broad authority provided under the Defense Production Act has been a major factor both in increasing the output of defense equipment and materials and in guarding against inflation and disruption of our economy. While expenditures under this authority help to finance defense-supporting programs in other functional categories, they are all shown under the finance, commerce, and industry category of the Budget. They comprise over 90 percent of the 1.5 billion dollars in expenditures estimated for this category in the fiscal year 1952.

Major provisions of the Defense Production Act expire next June 30. It is already clear that they should be not only extended but broadened in several important respects. After the Director of Defense Mobilization completes his review of the legislation that is needed, I shall transmit specific recommendations to the Congress.

Expansion of production.—The most immediate and direct stimulants to defense production are the procurement contracts of the armed services. The Department of Defense is spreading contracts among as many contractors as practicable in order to develop the broad industrial base necessary for rapid mobilization. Where necessary, financial assistance is provided through advance payments and through Federal guaranties of private loans to defense contractors and subcontractors. In addition, the Department of Defense is constructing additional plants and facilities to produce military items not ordinarily produced by private firms for the civilian market.

Rapid expansion in output of defense equipment and supplies also depends on an adequate supply of raw materials and components. To encourage private businessmen to expand capacity in these areas, the tax laws now permit the portion of new investment attributable to defense requirements to be written off in 5 years for income tax purposes. Where the need is greater than private lenders can finance or the risk more than they can properly take, the Government is making direct loans or participating with private lenders. In other cases, the Government is entering into long-term procurement contracts, or is purchasing and installing Government-owned equipment in defense plants. Even with these liberal incentives, however, private enterprise cannot be expected to construct certain urgently needed, specialized productive facilities. For this reason, new legislation should include additional authority to construct Government-owned plants and facilities.

Production and distribution controls.—In order to build our defenses rapidly and efficiently, we must resort to direct governmental allocation to assure the proper use of our industrial facilities and materials. This means reimposing many of the production and distribution controls which were so successfully employed in the recent war years. Already steps have been taken to prevent excessive inventories, to cut back the amounts of critical materials going into nondefense uses, and to limit the production

of certain nondefense goods using critical materials.

These controls must be augmented to keep pace with our rising production program. When the full impact of defense procurement is felt this spring and in the fiscal year 1952, even more comprehensive controls over the use of materials will become essential.

Price and wage controls.—While expansion in productive capacity will eventually mean a larger total output, its immediate effect is to add to inflationary pressures by absorbing manpower and materials which otherwise could be used to produce consumer goods. Vigorous use of credit controls and increased taxes, together with voluntary restraint by business and labor, have made it possible until recently to avoid direct controls over prices or wages.

At the present time, we are beginning to impose price and wage controls. Extension of such controls now appears inescapable. To administer such controls, as well as to promote effective voluntary cooperation, price and wage specialists are being recruited and offices are being opened in various cities as rapidly as they can be manned.

Rent control.—The developments in our defense program clearly require a further extension of rent control. Excessive rent increases will inevitably occur in many decontrolled communities where military installations are reopened or defense production expanded. The Congress has already recognized the changed situation by providing a temporary extension of controls beyond December 31, 1950, for all cases where communities have not taken affirmative decontrol action. I am recommending a further extension of rent control authority with provision for recontrol where necessary to protect tenants in defense areas against exorbitant rent increases.

Export controls.—Continuation of export controls is necessary to prevent undue drain from our economy of materials necessary for defense and essential civilian consumption and to make sure that the supplies made available for export make the maximum contribution to our international security objectives. These controls also help to prevent inflationary price increases. I recommend that export control authority be extended beyond the present expiration date of June 30, 1951.

Business loans and guarantees.—As part of the realinement of credit programs last summer, the Reconstruction Finance Corporation sharply curtailed nondefense loans involving substantial amounts of materials and other resources important for defense requirements. Within these limits, loans to small business production have been emphasized.

Under this policy, new loan authorizations this year have been reduced to less than half the level for the same period last year. Net expenditures for the fiscal year 1952 are estimated to decline by 76 million dollars from the fiscal year 1950. Estimated net expenditures for the fiscal year 1951 are even lower, but this reflects repayment last September of the 92-million-dollar Kaiser Steel Company loan.

The Corporation will continue to make loans for defense purposes, wherever borrowers are unable to obtain adequate credit elsewhere on reasonable terms but can meet the usual credit standards under the Corporation's statutory authority. Only if borrowers cannot qualify for loans under these standards are they eligible for loans from Defense Production Act funds.

LABOR

A sustained defense program calls for a highly productive and mobile working force—well-trained, with skills fully utilized, and with good working conditions and labor relations. Mobilizing our strength requires changes in the numbers, location, and use of workers. We must make the most effective use of the technical ability, energy, and resourcefulness which have always characterized America at work.

Already, as defense production begins to rise, shortages of skilled workers such as machinists, tool and die makers, and draftsmen are occurring. Although there are still more than 2 million unemployed, in most of the 150 major labor market areas the number of idle workers has been decreasing, and in more than a third of the areas unemployment has practically disappeared.

In the next few months, nearly a million more men and women will be called into the Armed Forces. At the same time, more workers will be needed for defense industries. This means that hundreds of thousands of new workers—primarily women, but also older men and physically handicapped persons—must join the working force and that many people already employed must move to more essential activities.

To assure full utilization of manpower, we must quickly train new workers. We must increase our efforts to avoid losses of production caused by accidents, disputes, or poor working conditions. Production will be scheduled, materials allocated, and new plants located with careful consideration of labor supply. Where migration cannot be avoided, the Federal Government will assist localities to the extent necessary in getting adequate housing and other community facilities and services.

Although the Federal Government can assist in many ways, solving our manpower problems calls primarily for initiative and cooperation by management and labor. Agreements on seniority and welfare provisions will be needed to facilitate transfers of workers to essential activities. Training, upgrading, and other improvements in manpower utilization must be accomplished in the plant and the community. Labor-management committees are being set up in major labor market areas to promote all possible voluntary adjustments.

Because existing Federal labor programs are being redirected, most expenditures for defense activities in the manpower field will be made under regular appropriations. For additional defense activities which may become necessary, Defense Production Act funds will be used. Total expenditures under regular appropriations for the fiscal year 1952 are estimated at 215 million dollars. Three-fourths of this total is for grants-in-aid to pay all costs of administering the Federal-State system of public employment offices and unemployment insurance.

LABOR

[Fiscal years. In millions]

Program or agency	Expenditures			Recommended new obligational authority for 1952
	1950 actual	1951 estimated	1952 estimated	
Placement and unemployment insurance activities:				
Department of Labor	$214	$165	$165	$175
Railroad Retirement Board	13	7	10	10
Labor standards and training:				
Department of Labor	11	14	14	14
Department of the Interior: Mine safety	4	4	4	4
Labor relations	13	13	13	13
Labor information, statistics, and general administration	8	9	9	9
Total	263	212	215	225

Placement and unemployment insurance activities.—The State employment services will have greatly increased responsibilities for recruitment, transfer, and placement of workers for defense industry and for our basic civilian economy. To minimize labor pirating and unnecessary migration, I urge that employers hire through their local employment services to the greatest extent possible. The employment services will try to place local workers, including women, older workers minority groups, and the physically handicapped, before recruiting from other areas. I also urge industry to use each individual's skill to the utmost and to adopt hiring specifications which do not exaggerate the strength and skills required.

In contrast to the expansion in employment service activities, the work of handling unemployment insurance claims will decrease because of high employment stimulated by defense production.

Labor standards and training.—In recent years, Federal programs of on-the-job training have emphasized the promotion of better apprenticeship standards. At the end of the fiscal year 1950, registered training programs employed 215,000 apprentices. A drive to increase the number of apprentices in key defense industries such as machine tools, metal working, and aircraft manufacture is now being launched. Further, a program to encourage on-the-job training of production workers and supervisors is being started with funds allocated to the Department of Labor.

World War II experience indicates that unless we intensify our preventive efforts, accidents will increase during a period of defense build-up, because of new kinds of production and new workers. To prevent loss of workers and loss of production, Defense Production Act funds will be used to help States plan special industrial safety campaigns and to train industrial supervisors and State safety inspectors.

To produce enough for defense, we must use wisely all our available labor

resources. Even less than in other times can we now afford to discriminate in employment against the millions of workers in our labor force who are members of minority groups. Following the Federal experience with a Committee on Fair Employment Practice in World War II, eight States and a number of cities have established successful regulatory commissions to deal with employment practices. I again recommend that the Congress enact legislation to establish a Federal Fair Employment Practice Commission to prevent discrimination in interstate industries.

Labor relations.—Prompt handling of disputes in the sensitive field of labor relations is imperative if we are to avoid interruptions in defense production. A 25-percent increase is being recommended in the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service's mediation staff to enable it to act in any dispute affecting defense production.

Trust accounts and unemployment insurance legislation.—The receipts from payroll taxes on employers and the benefit payments for unemployment insurance go into and come out of the State and railroad accounts of the unemployment trust fund and are not included in Budget totals. For the fiscal years 1949 and 1950, unemployment insurance benefit payments exceeded the tax collections because of the temporary rise in unemployment. This year and next, the reserves in the trust fund will build up as unemployment continues to drop.

UNEMPLOYMENT TRUST FUND

[Fiscal years. In millions]

Item	1950 actual	1951 estimated	1952 estimated
Receipts:			
Deposits by States and railroad unemployment taxes	$1,113	$1,215	$1,296
Interest	167	175	183
Payments:			
State and railroad unemployment withdrawals	−2,013	−962	−715
Net accumulation	−733	428	764
Balance in fund at close of year	7,425	7,853	8,617

In this high employment period, we should take steps to bring the self-supporting unemployment insurance system up to date. After the Congress enacts improved Federal standards, time will be required for the States to bring their laws into conformity. Recommendations are now before the Congress to raise benefits, which now average less than a third of previously earned weekly wages, and to extend coverage, which has not kept up with that of other social insurance programs. The revision of unemployment insurance should also repeal last year's amendment which places a premium on court litigation as a means of determining claims for benefits.

TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATION

Our transportation and communication systems, already handling a high level of traffic, must be prepared for the even greater loads that would result from the full impact of mobilization.

New freight cars, ore boats, and other equipment recently ordered by the carriers will increase their capacity for meeting these larger needs. Equally important, however, will be the steps that must be taken to obtain the maximum utilization of existing capacity. Such action depends principally upon the cooperative efforts of carriers and shippers, but the Federal Government will provide leadership for these efforts and, where necessary, will impose controls to assure that all appropriate conservation measures are put into effect.

The Government must also continue to carry out its responsibilities for regulating the economic and safety aspects of transport and communication, for providing basic facilities and services, and for furnishing necessary financial aid. Federal programs have contributed to the growth of well-developed transport and communication systems; they must now assist these systems to adjust to the new demands placed upon them.

To carry out its many responsibilities in these fields, the Government will spend an estimated 1.7 billion dollars in the fiscal year 1952, or 285 million dollars less than in the fiscal year 1951. This expenditure decline depends, however, upon legislation which I am recommending to increase postal rates and thereby reduce the postal deficit.

TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATION

[Fiscal years. In millions]

Program or agency	Expenditures			Recommended new obligational authority for 1952 [1]
	1950 actual	1951 estimated	1952 estimated	
Promotion of merchant marine: Maritime Administration and other	$100	$190	$354	$57
Provision of navigation aids and facilities:				
Panama Canal and Panama Canal Company	8	18	8	-------
Corps of Engineers:				
Present programs	190	193	202	221
Proposed legislation: St. Lawrence project	-------	-------	15	20
Coast Guard	149	189	200	197
Promotion of aviation: Civil Aeronautics Administration	159	182	199	166
Provision of highways:				
Bureau of Public Roads	472	466	468	[2] 524
Alaska roads (Interior), and other	25	30	28	17
Regulation of transportation	16	15	15	16
Other services to transportation:				
Reconstruction Finance Corporation	−11	−3	−5	-------
Coast and Geodetic Survey	12	11	12	12
Alaska Railroad	32	40	22	17
Postal service (deficit):				
Present programs	593	632	521	521
Proposed legislation: Postal rate increase	-------	-------	−361	−361
Regulation of communication	7	7	7	7
Total	1,752	1,970	1,685	1,414

[1] This column excludes 748 million dollars of recommended appropriations to liquidate prior year contract authorizations.

[2] Includes 500 million dollars in obligational authority already provided by Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1950.

Merchant marine.—Recent experience demonstrates again the large shipping demands imposed by an overseas military operation. To transport and supply our troops in Korea, more than 150 vessels of the Maritime Administration reserve fleet have been placed in operation to augment the merchant ships already operating in the Pacific and those which could be transferred from other areas. Our ability to meet rapidly this emergency need can be credited largely to the Government's long-range programs for supporting an active merchant marine and for preserving the surplus vessels of World War II.

Substantial assistance to our active merchant fleet is now provided through direct subsidies, tax benefits, long-term construction loans at low interest rates, and various other aids. Most important among these measures are the construction and operating subsidies, designed to offset lower foreign costs on essential trade routes. In fundamental scope and concept, this subsidy program continues to provide the most workable means for assuring an adequate base of vessels and shipyards, labor and management, for possible future expansion.

We are, however, supplementing this program with certain emergency measures, directed toward specific mobilization needs. Funds appropriated a few days ago will permit an immediate start on the construction of new and faster cargo ships better able to avoid attack by modern submarines. The desirable level of construction in future years is now under study. As a further measure, the Secretary of Commerce is establishing a National Shipping Authority within the Maritime Administration to handle existing functions related to shipping operations and to serve as the nucleus for future expansion of operations if circumstances require. Among other functions, this Authority will be prepared to provide marine war-risk insurance for private operators, should the need arise.

Navigation aids and facilities.—The defense program has attached a new and special urgency to the construction of the St. Lawrence seaway and power project. Besides the large amounts of additional electric power which the project would make available, it would also provide economical and safe access, through the seaway, to the large deposits of iron ore in Labrador and Quebec. As expanding requirements for steel bring us closer to the depletion of our high-grade domestic ore reserves, the importance of these nearby deposits will correspondingly increase. Construction of the St. Lawrence project should be started at the earliest possible date, and I urge the Congress to authorize this program without delay.

The river and harbor program of the Corps of Engineers includes three other new power development projects, with estimated expenditures of 28 million dollars in the fiscal year 1952. These projects are discussed below under natural resources. Except for these and other projects involving power generation, construction and maintenance in this program have been substantially curtailed.

In addition to its normal functions of promoting the safety of life at sea and enforcing the maritime laws, the Coast Guard has recently been assigned responsibility for protecting our ports against sabotage. In the fiscal year 1952, the port security program will account for 23 million dollars of the total Coast

Guard expenditures of 200 million dollars.

Aviation.—Facilities and services provided by the Civil Aeronautics Administration are essential for the safe operation of both civil and military aircraft. The present program for modernizing the Federal airways system has been expressly designed to meet the common needs of both groups, and the new facilities now being installed will permit the efficient handling of increased military traffic in the present emergency.

Some adjustments in aviation programs are being made in order to meet special military needs. Air navigation services in the Pacific have been expanded because of the airlift to Korea. The air traffic control system, normally concerned only with safety in flight, is now taking on the new function of identifying and controlling civil aircraft movements as a part of our air defense.

In keeping with the general public works policy of this Budget, construction of new facilities in the fiscal year 1952 will be limited to those projects which are most closely related to national security, or to civilian needs of an urgent nature. The same standards will be applied to grants for State and local airport construction.

In addition to the nearly 200 million dollars that will be spent in 1952 for aviation facilities and services, the Government will spend a substantial amount in subsidies to the airlines through mail payments. Federal financial assistance has been a major factor in the industry's rapid growth, and should be continued to the extent necessary for the sound development of civil aviation. The method of paying this subsidy should be changed, however, in order to provide the public with full information as to its cost. At present, the airline subsidy is merged with compensation for the cost of handling mail and included in postal expenditures. These two elements should be separated, and the subsidy portion paid by the Civil Aeronautics Board from funds appropriated specifically for that purpose. I again urge the Congress to enact legislation providing for this separation.

Highways.—Partly as a result of reduced construction and maintenance during World War II, our highway system is not yet fully prepared to handle the current peak levels of motor traffic. While long-range improvement is needed in all classes of roads, we must concentrate in the present emergency upon overcoming those road deficiencies which are most serious from the standpoint of national defense or essential civilian traffic.

The impact of defense traffic will be especially heavy upon the National System of Interstate Highways, a limited network of roads selected because of their special importance to both peacetime and defense needs. Substantial relocation and reconstruction are required in order to provide the width, strength, and other characteristics needed to handle anticipated traffic. In reviewing State and local requests for Federal aid, the Bureau of Public Roads will give primary emphasis to projects on this system, and to the principal urban roads which connect with it.

Construction will be started in the fiscal year 1951 on a small number of access roads immediately required to serve defense installations. As additional factories and military camps are activated for the defense program, the need for new or improved access roads will correspondingly increase. So far as possible, these and other emergency needs should be met by diversion of funds from roads of less urgency.

Postal service.—On the basis of existing postal rates, the postal deficit for the fiscal year 1952 is estimated at 521 million dollars. This actually represents a higher level than that shown for 1951, since the 1951 estimate of 632 million dollars includes a nonrecurring expenditure of 152 million dollars, for retroactive adjustment of railway mail rates. No allowance is made in these estimates for possible future increases in mail transportation rates which may result from regulatory proceedings now pending before the Interstate Commerce Commission and the Civil Aeronautics Board.

The Postmaster General is taking many steps to reduce the cost of postal operations. Significant economies have already been realized through recent reductions in service. Experiments in the mechanized sorting of mail are being conducted. A streamlined money-order system will be established by July 1951. These and other similar measures will permit reductions in postal expenditures, some of which will be realized in the fiscal year 1952. At best, however, the total potential savings from improved efficiency are relatively small in relation to the present size of the postal deficit.

Since the end of the war, the productivity of postal employees per man-hour worked has increased by over 10 percent, and the steps now being taken will permit further gains in the future. Despite this improved productivity, however, the average cost per postal transaction has increased by nearly 60 percent during the same period, mainly as a result of employee pay raises and transportation rate increases. In the absence of adequate postal rate increases, the average revenue per transaction has increased by less than 10 percent. The resulting deficit of over one-half billion dollars would be unsound at any time, but it is especially untimely in a period when the Federal Budget must sustain extremely heavy defense expenditures. I therefore repeat, most emphatically, my many previous recommendations for rate legislation which will bring postal revenues into line with present costs, reducing the deficit to the costs of handling Government mail and other costs which are not properly chargeable to the general users of the postal service.

NATURAL RESOURCES

The economic and military strength of this country is dependent upon the availability and wise use of our basic natural resources. These resources, while extensive, are not unlimited. Our land, forest, water, mineral, power, atomic, and other resources made a vital contribution toward winning World War II and are now called upon to support the present military expansion. The Federal Government has a large responsibility for assuring the use of these resources to maximum advantage.

Our natural resources programs are being modified in order to make the greatest immediate contribution to our national security. In some cases, it is necessary to postpone desirable long-range developments in order to accomplish urgent immediate objectives. Maintenance and rehabilitation on all programs are limited to those expenditures necessary to prevent deterioration of the vitally important resources which are basic to our continued economic expansion. The resource programs of the various agencies emphasize the development of Alaska for economic security and national defense.

Expenditures for natural resources are estimated at 2.5 billion dollars for fiscal year 1952, half of which will be spent on the atomic energy program. Other large expenditures are those for flood control and reclamation, including hydroelectric power generation, and for the Tennessee Valley Authority program.

Estimated expenditures for the fiscal year 1952 exceed those for 1951 by over 400 million dollars. This net expansion reflects increases of 459 million dollars for atomic energy and 65 million dollars for the Tennessee Valley Authority, a combined decrease of 141 million dollars for the flood control and reclamation programs, and small changes for other programs.

NATURAL RESOURCES

[Fiscal years. In millions]

Program or agency	Expenditures			Recommended new obligational authority for 1952 [1]
	1950 actual	1951 estimated	1952 estimated	
Atomic energy: Atomic Energy Commission	$550	$818	$1,277	$870
Land and water resources:				
Corps of Engineers: Flood control	438	469	412	404
Department of the Interior:				
Bureau of Reclamation	298	349	259	257
Hells Canyon project (proposed legislation)	-------	-------	6	8
Power transmission (Bonneville, Southwestern, and Southeastern Power Administrations)	36	54	65	63
Indian land resources	26	41	25	22
Bureau of Land Management and other (Interior)	10	9	9	10
Tennessee Valley Authority (net)	19	171	236	249
International Boundary and Water Commission, and other	4	7	14	17
Forest resources:				
Forest Service and other Agriculture	75	86	93	92
Department of the Interior	3	2	4	5
Mineral resources: Bureau of Mines and other (Interior)	34	29	33	36
General resources surveys: Geological Survey	16	18	22	23
Fish and wildlife resources: Fish and Wildlife Service and other	23	28	31	30
Recreational use of resources: National Park Service	22	36	33	25
Total	1,554	2,117	2,519	2,111

[1] This column excludes 370 million dollars of recommended appropriations to liquidate prior year contract authorizations.

Atomic energy.—At the same time that we are actively pursuing industrial and other peacetime applications of atomic energy, present world developments demand intensification of the national security aspects of the program. The very substantial increases appropriated for the atomic energy program in fiscal year 1951 will provide for enlargement of production capacity for atomic materials and weapons. A portion of the funds recommended for 1952 provides for certain construction projects under this expansion program.

The Budget recommends increases also for the procurement and processing of raw materials, the production in existing plants of fissionable materials and weapons, and the investigation and development of new and improved weapons. The 1952 funds also allow for continuing development of new designs of nuclear reactors, including those for the production of fissionable material, the generation of power, and the propulsion of ships and aircraft. The Atomic Energy Commission will continue its vigorous program in basic and applied research in the physical sciences and in biology and medicine.

Land and water resources.—A year ago I appointed a Water Resources Policy Commission to recommend policies to guide Federal participation in the development, conservation, and use of water resources. This Commission has now submitted the first volume of its report and will submit two additional volumes. The Commission's report will be reviewed to determine what administrative actions and legislative recommendations may be needed to improve the Government's water and related land-use programs.

Although long-range improvement of our river basins is essential for the continued economic strength of the country, in the fiscal year 1952 we must emphasize those aspects of the programs which primarily support the national defense. Immediately after the first attack in Korea, all Government agencies were directed to review their programs and to adjust them to meet urgent needs. Many of the river basin projects contribute to defense as well as civilian industrial requirements through providing low-cost electric power in shortage areas. These projects are being pushed forward. Other projects, though desirable from a long-range standpoint, are being curtailed or deferred. As a result of these actions, combined expenditures required in the fiscal year 1952 for continuation of projects of the Bureau of Reclamation and the Corps of Engineers now under way—involving dams, power facilities, canals, channels, and levees—are estimated to decrease by nearly 150 million dollars from the 1951 level.

Following a careful review of power requirements for the defense program, seven new projects, all of which will provide substantial power benefits, are included in this budget. These new projects, together with the installation of additional power units in projects already under way and the related facilities required to transmit the power, are estimated to cost in total 1.5 billion dollars and to provide 3.9 million kilowatts of installed capacity. The projects are Hells Canyon, The Dalles and Ice Harbor in the Columbia Basin, Old Hickory on the Cumberland River, a steam plant in the Tennessee Valley, Gavins Point on the Missouri River, and the St. Lawrence seaway and power project. These seven are the only new projects recommended for the river-basin programs. Four of them are in the river and harbor program, and funds for them are included in the transportation category.

The new projects together with projects completed or under way by the Bureau of Reclamation, Corps of Engineers, and Tennessee Valley Authority will provide ultimate capacity of 20 million kilowatts. Funds recommended in 1952 for the Bonneville, Southwestern, and Southeastern Power Administrations, Bureau of Reclamation, and Tennessee Valley Authority will provide properly scheduled facilities to transmit power to principal load centers.

I am also including funds in this Budget to plan for the urgently needed redevelopment of Niagara power facilities made possible by the recent treaty with Canada.

Following the Flood Control Act of 1950, I directed the Federal agencies concerned to work together on preparation of a comprehensive plan for development of the resources of the Arkansas, White, and Red River Basins and the New England-New York area. The Budget for 1952 provides funds to continue the surveys.

Mineral and other resource programs.—During and since World War II, the Bureau of Mines and the Geological Survey have concentrated upon research on the adequacy of mineral resources, the discovery of new resources, and means for improved development, conservation, and use of existing reserves. All of these activities have a clear defense significance and budget increases are recommended to accelerate them.

Funds for the management, protection, and development of other resources are at somewhat lower levels than would be desirable for good conservation practice. Increases are recommended for supervision and sale of timber resources and construction of access roads to increase the cut of timber, and for range improvement and fish and wildlife development to add to the supply of food and other essential products. Because of their importance to planning for defense projects, increases are also recommended for topographic mapping and water resources investigations. Programs for the management and development of national park areas and resources of Indian lands, and for other services to Indians have been held to the 1951 level or below.

To insure effective use of their lands, the Indians are in need of credit facilities. I recommend legislation which would augment the loan fund authorized in 1934 in an amount sufficient to meet the demands for credit over the next 5 to 10 years. Such legislation is preferable to a piecemeal approach of providing credit for selected tribes through individual bills.

AGRICULTURE AND AGRICULTURAL RESOURCES

During the period of concentration upon defense expansion, our Federal agricultural programs must serve one central purpose—the maintenance of our capacity to produce abundant quantities of food and fiber to meet our own needs and critical needs of friendly countries. Government farm programs now in effect make up, in general, the kinds of activities needed for the defense period. Some of these programs are being redirected to provide a greater contribution to the defense effort, as for example the production of fibers required for clothing and equipment for the Armed Forces.

American agriculture today is in a strong financial condition. The high postwar demand for agricultural products has maintained farm production and income at high levels. Gross farm income in the calendar year 1950, although below the peak level of 1948, was approximately three times as high as in 1940, and will show a further increase in 1951.

AGRICULTURE AND AGRICULTURAL RESOURCES

[Fiscal years. In millions]

Program or agency	Expenditures			Recommended new obligational authority for 1952
	1950 actual	1951 estimated	1952 estimated	
Stabilization of farm prices and farm income:				
Commodity Credit Corporation—price support, supply, and purchase programs (net)	$1,606	[1]—$296	$238	$427
Removal of surplus agricultural commodities	96	92	75	[2] 73
International Wheat Agreement (Commodity Credit Corporation)	76	117	115	77
Sugar Act	60	61	70	72
Federal crop insurance and other	7	8	6	8
Financing farm ownership and operation	146	157	141	163
Financing rural electrification and rural telephones	294	312	269	118
Agricultural land and water resources:				
Conservation and use (including administrative expense accounts)	275	309	304	310
Soil Conservation Service and flood control	61	65	63	64
Research, and other agricultural services	163	161	148	171
Total	2,784	986	1,429	1,483

[1] Excess of receipts over expenditures.
[2] Excludes $77 million of this permanent appropriation recommended to be made available for reimbursement to the Commodity Credit Corporation for the 1950 costs of the International Wheat Agreement.

With this outlook for agricultural prices and farm income, total Federal expenditures for agriculture and agricultural resources are expected to decline from 2.8 billion dollars in the fiscal year 1950 to 1 billion dollars in 1951 and to 1.4 billion dollars in 1952. Most of the change in agricultural expenditures from 1950 to 1952 is due to decreased

expenditures for agricultural price supports.

Stabilization of farm prices and farm income.—Expenditures of the Commodity Credit Corporation for price-support purposes have declined greatly since mid-1950 because of the rise in farm prices and the short cotton crop. During the fiscal year 1951, it is now estimated that the Corporation will realize net receipts of 296 million dollars compared with net outlays in 1950 of 1.6 billion dollars. Receipts from sales of nearly 3.5 million bales of cotton acquired from the 1948 crop will alone more than offset other expenditures for price support.

Present estimates of production, consumption, and exports of 1951 crops indicate that net expenditures for price support will be 238 million dollars in the fiscal year 1952. While commodity inventories are currently proving to be valuable in meeting increasing needs for foods and fibers, losses have occurred in the disposal of a number of perishable commodities, and further losses are expected to occur in 1952. To avoid the unnecessary accumulation and loss on perishable agricultural commodities, legislation is needed to permit direct payments to producers in lieu of market price supports through Government purchases. This would allow excess perishable commodities to move into consumption and would make our price support provisions more compatible with our international trade policy. To help the Commodity Credit Corporation dispose of its existing surpluses, it should be authorized to pay transportation and repackaging costs on surplus commodities distributed to public and private welfare organizations.

In addition to Commodity Credit Corporation price support expenditures, a permanent appropriation, equal to 30 percent of customs duties, is available for removal from the market of surplus agricultural commodities, mainly perishables. With increasing demands for farm commodities, the total amount of this fund will not be necessary for this purpose in the fiscal year 1952. Accordingly, I recommend that 77 million dollars of the permanent appropriation be used to reimburse the Commodity Credit Corporation for costs of the International Wheat Agreement in the fiscal year 1950.

Under the International Wheat Agreement, the United States guarantees the export of a certain quantity of wheat at the maximum price of $1.80 per bushel during the 4 years of the Agreement. The loss arising from the difference between this agreed-upon price and the higher domestic price of wheat is met from Corporation funds, with reimbursement later from appropriated funds. Because of an increase in export quotas and higher domestic wheat prices, expenditures for the Wheat Agreement are estimated to rise to 117 million dollars in the fiscal year 1951 and 115 million in 1952.

Expenditures under the Sugar Act of 1948 will increase in the fiscal year 1952 because of the larger volume of domestic sugar production in 1950 and 1951, and the provision in the law for mandatory payments to sugar producers.

Financing farm ownership and operation.—The loan programs supervised by the Farm Credit Administration will, in the defense period, facilitate farm operations and encourage farm ownership. These loan programs are largely financed by borrowing in the open market, and only the supervisory expenses of the Farm Credit Administration and changes in net investment of Government capital in the supervised banks and other corporations are included in Budget totals.

The loan activities of the Farmers' Home Administration, which also assist farm operations, are financed by funds borrowed from the Treasury. These activities are expected to remain at approximately the same level in the fiscal year 1952, with a decrease in farm ownership loans offset in part by some expansion in production and subsistence loans to meet the needs of reclamation settlers and low-income farmers for essential operating credit not available from other credit sources. The disaster loan program is expected to decline in 1952 below the abnormal levels required in 1950 and 1951.

Financing rural electrification and rural telephones.—By June 30, 1950, approximately 86 percent of all farms were electrified, compared with 48 percent in 1945. Last year, a new program to extend and improve rural telephone systems was begun. Although under normal conditions it would be desirable to continue the rapid progress on rural electrification and the provision of adequate rural telephones, shortages of metals, particularly aluminum and copper, and of electronic equipment, make it necessary to proceed more slowly with both the electrification and telephone programs. I recommend that the Rural Electrification Administration new loan authorization be reduced from the 297 million dollars available in 1951 to 109 million dollars in 1952. Expenditures will decline by a smaller amount because of the backlog of loans committed but not yet advanced. The reduction in new loan authorization will permit improvement and expansion of existing distribution capacity where essential, but will require some curtailment of loans for new facilities.

Conservation.—Efforts to promote conservation and development of agricultural land and water resources are aided by the Department of Agriculture through the technical advice and assistance of the Soil Conservation Service, the flood control program, and the conservation payments program. Although some phases of these programs may in future years need to be expanded to maintain and improve our soil resources, the higher priority which must now be given to defense programs requires in the 1952 Budget a policy of no expansion of present conservation programs. I, therefore, recommend that funds for flood control and the Soil Conservation Service be held at the present level and that the advance authorization for the conservation and use program in the 1952 crop year, which will largely determine expenditures in the fiscal year 1953, be continued at the 1951 crop-year level of 285 million dollars.

Research and other agricultural services.—An appropriation of 171 million dollars is recommended for the continuing basic services for agriculture, including research on crop varieties, livestock and poultry, and the production and marketing of farm products; control and eradication of insects and plant and animal diseases; meat inspection; payments to States for experiment stations and cooperative extension work; and general overhead expenses of the Department of Agriculture. This amount also includes 33 million dollars to reimburse the Commodity Credit Corporation for 1950 expenses of the program to eradicate foot-and-mouth disease in Mexico. Although there are many worth-while research and service programs which it would be desirable to expand under more normal conditions, I recommend at this time that they be held at or below their 1951 level. Finally, I recommend legislation to enable the Commodity Exchange Authority to control speculative trading and to strengthen its regulation of commodity exchanges.

HOUSING AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT

In the years since World War II, we have made a good start toward achieving adequate housing and community facilities for our people. In the last 12 months over 1,350,000 new housing units were produced, a third above the previous record level. About half of this new housing was financed with mortgages insured or guaranteed by Federal agencies. Under the comprehensive legislation enacted by the Eighty-first Congress, the Federal Government has begun to aid in clearing slums and redeveloping our cities; to assist local housing authorities in providing adequate housing for low-income groups; to promote better farm housing; and to conduct or sponsor the basic research needed to realize the full potentialities of the construction industry.

Continuance of the high level of housing construction achieved in 1950, while entirely desirable in normal times, would use materials and manpower now needed to meet defense requirements. Accordingly, to help the defense program go ahead full speed and to reduce inflationary pressures on construction costs, it has been necessary to take measures to reduce residential construction this year by more than a third, to a level of about 850,000 units annually.

HOUSING AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT

[Fiscal years. In millions]

Program or agency	Net expenditures or net receipts (—)			Recommended new obligational authority for 1952 [1]
	1950 actual	1951 estimated	1952 estimated	
Defense housing, community facilities and services (proposed legislation)	-------	-------	$100	$150
Civil defense:				
Federal Civil Defense Administration	-------	$10	265	450
Reconstruction Finance Corporation	-------	5	65	-------
Aids to private housing (present programs):				
Housing and Home Finance Agency:				
Federal National Mortgage Association	$579	189	−530	-------
Federal Housing Administration [2]	−30	−6	−5	-------
Home Owners' Loan Corporation	−242	−80	(3)	-------
Other	5	7	−11	-------
Veterans' Administration: Direct loans	-------	73	−5	-------
Department of Agriculture: Farm housing	12	28	23	23
Reconstruction Finance Corporation	−25	−40	−20	-------
Other housing and community development programs:				
Housing and Home Finance Agency:				
Public housing programs	−37	158	−138	28
Loans to educational institutions	-------	1	36	-------
Slum clearance and urban redevelopment	(3)	10	65	[4] 350
Advance planning loans and other	4	32	15	5
Reconstruction Finance Corporation	−6	14	24	-------
Other (mainly Interior)	1	8	14	12
Total	261	409	−102	1,018

[1] This column excludes 5 million dollars of recommended appropriations to liquidate prior year contract authorizations.

[2] Excludes net receipts of mutual mortgage insurance fund, now shown under trust accounts.

[3] Less than one-half million dollars.

[4] Represents obligational authority already provided by Housing Act of 1949.

To meet defense needs, four major revisions have been made in our housing and community development programs. First, comprehensive limitations have been imposed on all types of credit to finance new housing construction, as well as on all Government-guaranteed credit to finance purchase of existing homes. Second, in both existing and proposed new programs, we are giving top priority to military and defense-related housing and community facilities. Third, subject only to defense priorities, we are giving special emphasis to housing for lower-income groups in accordance with the general objectives of national housing policy. Fourth, we are rapidly organizing under newly enacted legislation to meet the civil defense requirements of the Nation.

Most of the existing Federal programs are financed by authorizations already made by the Congress in basic statutes. Partly because of the sharp curtailments in programs, only a small part of those authorizations will be spent in the fiscal year 1952. Moreover, sales of mortgages purchased by the Government in earlier years and collections on loans will cause a substantial excess of receipts over new expenditures for several going programs. Therefore, despite increased expenditures for civil defense and for the proposed new defense-supporting legislation, the housing and community development category as a whole in the fiscal year 1952 will realize estimated net receipts of 102 million dollars.

Defense housing, community facilities and services.—As the defense effort accelerates, additional housing and community facilities and services in many key areas will undoubtedly be required to take care of the influx of defense workers and military personnel. We shall continue to place primary reliance on the initiative of private builders and local communities to provide the new construction and services required. To reinforce and supplement this initiative, I am recommending several basic changes in legislation to meet specific defense needs for housing, community facilities and services.

The expansion in the defense program makes more urgent the provision of an adequate supply of rental housing. Military installations and defense plants will find it difficult to meet their expanding manpower requirements if adequate housing is not available at reasonable rents. For this reason, despite the cutbacks in total construction, it is essential to increase new private rental housing in defense areas. The legislation which I am proposing will provide more liberal insurance for loans financing construction of a limited number of rental units in these areas. In addition, it will extend the temporary program for insurance of military housing loans beyond the present expiration date of June 30, 1951, and will include similar insurance for mortgages to finance rental housing near installations of the Atomic Energy Commission.

The adaptability of prefabricated housing to defense housing requirements makes it imperative that present producers of proven efficiency be able to obtain adequate financing for their operations—especially for the distribution of such housing. The proposed legislation will help meet the special financing problems of this industry.

In some areas where the most rapid expansion in military or defense-related activities will occur, local communities and private builders cannot be expected—even with these new aids—to meet all the emergency requirements for housing and community essentials. This problem will be particularly acute where large installations are located in small communities or isolated areas. To prevent delays in recruitment and to assure a reasonably stable labor supply in such areas, the Federal Government should have authority, as in World War II, to construct housing units and to make loans and grants for community facilities and services. This authority should be limited to meeting defense needs and even then should be available only when these needs could not otherwise be met. Accordingly the proposed legislation would authorize direct Federal construction of defense housing and provision of Federal funds for community facilities and services. For these purposes, as well as for the necessary extension and expansion of defense-related private housing aids, the Budget includes estimated appropriations of 150 million dollars.

Civil defense.—With modern methods of warfare our Nation could be subjected to a sudden, devastating enemy attack. The military services have responsibility for warding off attack, but effective civil defense can sharply reduce the injuries, loss of life, and destruction of homes and factories that otherwise might occur.

Under legislation just enacted, the Federal Civil Defense Administration will provide equal matching grants to States for the construction of shelters and other protective facilities in critical target areas. These grants account for the larger part of the expenditures projected for this program in the fiscal year 1952. The Administration will also begin building a national reserve of supplies and equipment. In addition, the Reconstruction Finance Corporation will make loans to public authorities for public works which can serve both as shelters and for other community purposes, when the Administrator certifies that there is a civil defense necessity for such projects.

Aid to private housing.—The record levels of private housing construction in recent years have been stimulated in large part by widespread and generous Federal credit aids—mainly Federal insurance or guarantees of private mortgage loans and Federal purchases to support the market for these mortgages. By reducing the liberality of these aids, it has been possible to cut back housing construction in recent months wtihout imposing direct controls.

Federal National Mortgage Association.—Changes in law and administrative policy governing the Federal National Mortgage Association have sharply curtailed new purchases of mortgages (except those covered by earlier commitments) and have helped to stimulate an increasing volume of sales of mortgages previously purchased. As the large backlog of old commitments is gradually drawn down, the net expenditures of this program will continue to decline. In the fiscal year 1952 net receipts of 530 million dollars are expected, primarily from the accelerated sales program. By that time, we plan to return this secondary mortgage market largely to a stand-by status and to place a substantial part of the unused mortgage purchase authority in reserve for possible future emergency requirements.

Federal Housing Administration.—The higher down payments and other limitations placed on housing credit have caused a sharp decline in applications for mortgage insurance under existing Federal Housing Administration programs. Nevertheless, in 1952, roughly one-half the total new housing produced, as well as purchases of nearly 200,000 existing homes, will probably be financed with the aid of Federal mortgage insurance. From the standpoint of the Federal Budget, these programs will continue to show net receipts, since the estimated premium income

will exceed administrative expenses and probable losses.

Home Owners' Loan Corporation.—The Home Owners' Loan Corporation will be liquidated before the close of the current fiscal year. All of the Federal investment of more than 3.7 billion dollars made during the depression years of the 1930's will be repaid in full and in addition the earned surplus of 14 million dollars will be paid to the Treasury. These payments will successfully complete one of the largest emergency financing operations of the depression years.

Direct veterans loans.—Under the Housing Act of 1950, the Administrator of Veterans' Affairs was given temporary authority to make a maximum of 150 million dollars in direct housing loans to veterans in areas where, even with the support of the secondary market, adequate financing is not obtainable. Experience to date indicates only a limited need for such loans, which private lenders should be able to provide. Accordingly, I do not recommend the extension of this program beyond the current fiscal year.

Farm housing.—As part of the general limitation of new housing construction, new loans for farm housing in the fiscal year 1952 will be held to less than a third of the 75 million dollars authorized in the basic statute.

Public housing programs.—In the fiscal year 1952, construction of an estimated 75,000 new units will be started under the low-rent public housing program, well below the annual level of 135,000 units authorized by the Housing Act of 1949. These units will serve two major purposes. They will not only help meet the long-neglected housing needs of low-income families, but will also make an important contribution to defense housing requirements. To make sure that the full defense potentialities are realized, the Public Housing Administration, to the maximum extent feasible, will give preference to projects serving defense areas and will require local housing authorities to give military personnel and defense workers preference as tenants.

During the current year, the initial construction is being financed largely through temporary Federal loans. In 1952 and later years, however, both the initial construction and the permanent capital investment in the local projects will be largely financed by obligations issued by the local housing authorities to private investors on the security of the annual Federal contributions. In the fiscal year 1952, collections and private refinancing of earlier loans will cause substantial net receipts. Federal expenditures for annual contributions to help pay rentals of low-income tenants will increase moderately, but in the case of projects occupied by defense workers the income of the occupants will be sufficient to make Federal contributions unnecessary to help pay their rents.

Loans to educational institutions.—Soon after the aggression in Korea last summer, authorizations under this program were suspended to permit reappraisal of college housing needs. On the basis of this reappraisal, a maximum of 40 million dollars out of the 300 million dollars authorized by the Housing Act of 1950 has been provided, to be used only for college housing directly contributing to defense. No other loans will be made under this program until the outlook for college enrollment shows a clear need for such housing.

Slum clearance and urban redevelopment.—The long-range program for clearance of slums and redevelopment of the major urban areas, for both private and public use, is still in its early stages. Commitments for planning advances have been issued to 70 cities.

Because of the great importance of encouraging orderly development of our cities—and the small amounts of manpower and other resources involved in the early years—steady progress should continue in the planning stage of this program. Local authorities also may acquire sites, but will not demolish existing buildings or otherwise redevelop areas unless the redevelopment is consistent with defense requirements. Under this basic policy, net expenditures of $65,000,000 are anticipated for the fiscal year 1952—primarily for planning advances and temporary loans for acquisition of sites. This contrasts with the additional $350,000,000 in authority which becomes available in 1952 under the basic statute.

Advance planning loans.—Advances to State and local governments for public works planning have been suspended except when the projects involve defense-related or essential civilian requirements. While in a normal peacetime economy this program makes a major contribution to economic stability, it does not now appear advisable to extend it beyond the present expiration next October.

EDUCATION AND GENERAL RESEARCH

The challenge of communist imperialism requires the full potential of all our people—their initiative, their knowledge, their skills, and their ideals. These qualities have given this Nation world leadership in science and industry. Education and research are vital to the maintenance of this leadership.

The highly developed technology of the Nation requires an educated people equipped to operate this productive system efficiently. Likewise, it requires continuing basic research and the practical application of new knowledge and new techniques. Yet we start our defense effort with an educational system which fails to provide adequate educational opportunities for all our people, and with a lack of balance in the Nation's research activities.

The Federal Government took a major step last year toward achieving a better balance in research through the creation of the National Science Foundation, but urgently needed general legislation in the field of education was not enacted. This Budget includes provision for grants to the States for the operating expenses of elementary and secondary schools to assist in improving educational opportunities for our children. This proposal accounts for more than half of the total estimate of $483,000,000 of expenditures for education and general research in the fiscal year 1952, and for most of the estimated increase over 1951.

In addition to programs included in this total, many Federal agencies carry on specialized education and research activities which are included under other categories, such as veterans' services and benefits, military services, and agriculture.

EDUCATION AND GENERAL RESEARCH

[Fiscal years. In millions]

Program or agency	Expenditures			Recommended new obligational authority for 1952 [1]
	1950 actual	1951 estimated	1952 estimated	
Promotion of education:				
Office of Education:				
General aid for operating expenses, elementary and secondary schools (proposed legislation)	-------	-------	$290	$300
Vocational education	$27	$27	27	27
Education of children on Federal property and in emergency areas	-------	39	106	78
Other programs	14	8	8	9
Educational aid to special groups	5	7	8	5
Library and museum services	9	11	12	12
General purpose research:				
National Science Foundation	-------	(2)	2	10
National Bureau of Standards	9	12	11	8
Seventeenth decennial census (Commerce)	42	32	10	9
Other (mainly Census Bureau)	8	7	8	10
Total	114	143	483	468

[1] This column excludes 29 million dollars of recommended appropriations to liquidate prior year contract authorizations.

[2] Less than one-half million dollars.

Promotion of education.—Strong elementary and secondary education systems throughout the country are vital to national strength and to the improvement of individual opportunity. Although educational opportunities are excellent in some parts of the country, children and youth in too many of our communities still do not receive adequate education. Inequalities exist primarily because of differences in the financial resources of the States and localities.

The Nation as a whole suffers from these inequalities. The results are demonstrated most sharply in times like the present. The military services even find it necessary to teach some inductees reading and writing before they can begin combat training. From the standpoint of national security alone, as well as the enlargement of opportunities for the individual, the Nation needs to see that every youth acquires the fundamental education and training which are essential to effective service, whether in the Armed Forces, in industry, or on the farm. I therefore urge the Congress to authorize Federal financial assistance to help the States provide a level of elementary and secondary education that will meet the minimum needs of the Nation. The Budget includes a tentative appropriation estimate of 300 million dollars for this purpose.

To help meet one particular educational problem, laws were enacted last year to make a single agency—the Federal Security Agency—responsible for giving financial assistance to schools or, if necessary, establishing schools for the education of children living on Federal property or in areas especially affected by Federal activities. Previously a variety of arrangements existed, and some of these children were denied free public education. The Budget includes expenditures of 106 million dollars in the fiscal year 1952 for buildings and current operating expenses under these new laws.

In view of the present necessity to provide training for defense production, a part of the appropriations for the general purpose of vocational education and training should be used for the training of workers for defense and essential civilian production. This Budget provides for the designation of 10 million dollars of the proposed vocational education appropriation for the fiscal year 1952 for this purpose.

Last year I recommended a program of aid to college students to help equalize educational opportunities. The proposal is omitted from this Budget pending reconsideration of the kind of program that will best fit into Selective Service policies and general manpower requirements.

Science Foundation.—The National Science Foundation, established by law last year, is now organized and planning its program. The limited funds available to it in the current fiscal year will not permit the Foundation to proceed beyond initial preparations. An appropriation request for the fiscal year 1952 will be submitted this spring to enable the Foundation to initiate the important work of formulating a national policy for basic research, stimulating such research, and training scientific personnel.

SOCIAL SECURITY, WELFARE, AND HEALTH

Last year the Congress enacted important improvements in our social security program. Coverage under old-age and survivors insurance was extended to some 10 million additional workers. Eligibility requirements were relaxed for older people, so that many more will qualify for retirement annuities in the near future. The level of benefits was raised substantially and the taxable wage base was increased moderately, to make the benefits and the taxes more commensurate with earnings.

In taking this step, the Congress clearly decided that social insurance, rather than public assistance, is to be the primary vehicle for providing social security in this country. This accords fully with our American tradition of self-reliance. In the future, the great majority of American families will obtain, through their own and their employers' contributions, a considerable degree of insurance protection against poverty arising from the old age or death of the wage earner.

In spite of these far-reaching improvements, however, the Nation's social insurance program still does not measure up to the full needs or aspirations of the American people; nor has it by any means achieved the scope of protection that our economy can afford and should give. Millions of people, including self-employed farmers, many domestic and agricultural workers, many public employees, and members of the Armed Forces, still are not under social insurance. Our aim should be to establish for all employed people a minimum protection that each person takes with him wherever he works. Pension and insurance plans for special groups should supplement social security benefits, as industry pensions already do for several million workers. Moreover, we need to fill important gaps in our social insurance system by providing protection on a prepaid basis against the costs of medical care and the loss of family income in cases of disability. These measures will help to provide that material security which is essential to a vigorous democracy and a highly productive labor force.

All Federal programs of social security, welfare, and health are estimated to require expenditures of 2.6 billion dollars in the fiscal year 1952, an increase of 105 million dollars over the current year. Three-fourths of the expenditures are for public assistance, for accident compensation payments, and for the transfer of railroad payroll tax receipts to the railroad retirement trust account. The amounts of these expenditures are all determined by statutory requirements. The remaining one-fourth provides for all the public health activities of the Government, for aid to various special groups, and for the Federal Bureau of Investigation and other crime control and correction services.

SOCIAL SECURITY, WELFARE, AND HEALTH

[Fiscal years. In millions]

Program or agency	Expenditures			Recommended new obligational authority for 1952 [1]
	1950 actual	1951 estimated	1952 estimated	
Public assistance: Federal Security Agency	$1,125	$1,282	$1,302	$1,302
Aid to special groups:				
Vocational rehabilitation (Federal Security Agency)	26	22	24	24
School lunch (Agriculture)	83	83	83	83
Indian welfare and other (Interior)	29	41	43	44
Other (Federal Security Agency)	1	1	1	1
Retirement and dependents' insurance:				
Railroad Retirement Board	583	598	646	646
Federal Security Agency and other	9	7	7	7
Promotion of public health: Federal Security Agency and other:				
Present programs	242	349	350	268
Proposed legislation:				
Aid to medical education	-------	-------	25	30
Local health services	-------	-------	5	5
Crime control and correction: Department of Justice and other	91	107	106	109
Accident compensation: Department of Labor	24	30	33	33
Total	2,213	2,520	2,625	2,552

[1] This column excludes 141 million dollars of recommended appropriations to liquidate prior year contract authorizations.

Public assistance.—The same legislation which extended coverage of old-age and survivors insurance also made changes in the Federal-State public assistance program. It authorized Federal grants for assistance to totally and permanently disabled persons, extended the aid for dependent children to include a relative who takes care of such children, and provided for Federal sharing of payments made by the States to hospitals and doctors furnishing medical care for persons receiving public assistance.

With many more persons eligible now or in the near future for old-age and survivors insurance benefits, and with the increased employment opportunities of the defense economy, public assistance should conform more nearly to its intended purpose of filling gaps in social insurance. Thus, increases in expenditures resulting from the new public assistance legislation are expected to be largely offset by decreases resulting from a reduction in the number of children and old people on the public assistance rolls. The estimated expenditures of 1.3 billion dollars for public assistance in the fiscal year 1952 exceeds by 20 million dollars the amount for the current year.

Aid to special groups.—The present Federal-State program for rehabilitation of the disabled will return 65,000 persons to productive work this year. This program should be expanded. Bringing these people into the ranks of the gainfully employed, besides improving their economic self-reliance, adds to our national productive capacity.

Railroad Retirement Board.—Expenditures shown for the Railroad Retirement Board represent principally a bookkeeping transfer of payroll taxes, collected from railroad workers and companies, to the railroad retirement trust account, where they are added to the reserve against future benefit payments. The estimate for the fiscal year 1952 also includes a 33-million-dollar payment by the United States to the trust account for the cost of military service credits for railroad workers. Increased railroad payrolls expected in 1952 are responsible for a rise of 48 million dollars in the estimate. I again recommend that these taxes be transferred to the fund as they are collected, rather than in advance of collection, in order to correct the present indefensible practice whereby the Federal Government pays interest on money that it advances to the fund.

Promotion of public health.—If we are to meet successfully the challenge that confronts this Nation, we can less than ever afford to waste the good health of our people. But the present emergency makes even more difficult the maintenance of good health.

Our chronic shortage of doctors, dentists, and nurses will be aggravated as more of them are called into the Armed Forces. Therefore, we need, more than ever, prompt enactment of legislation that will help to increase enrollment in medical and related schools, by assisting them to meet their costs of instruction and to construct additional facilities

where needed. Scholarships should be provided to attract larger enrollments in nursing schools and grants should be made to States for vocational training of practical nurses. Estimated Budget expenditures in the fiscal year 1952 include 25 million dollars for this proposed program.

Many communities that will be faced with added health burdens arising from defense needs do not have adequately staffed local health departments—indeed, some communities have none at all. To help overcome this deficiency, I urge the Congress to enact legislation which will make possible more adequate Federal grants to the States for the strengthening of their local health services. The Budget includes 5 million dollars as the estimated first-year cost of this proposed legislation.

More than one-half of all Federal expenditures for the promotion of public health—estimated at 350 million dollars for the existing programs in the fiscal year 1952—consists of grants to State and local governments. These grants are available for a variety of public health programs, including general health services, hospital construction, maternal and child health, and control of certain specific diseases such as venereal disease, tuberculosis, cancer, mental illness, and heart disease.

Federal expenditures for hospital construction grants are estimated at 136 million dollars, about 4 million dollars less than in the current year. Federal expenditures for other existing programs of grants to States are estimated at 72 million dollars, a slight increase over 1951, due entirely to the expanded grants for maternal and child welfare services provided by the recent amendments to the Social Security Act. The principal direct Federal programs are the research and hospital activities of the Public Health Service.

Trust funds.—The three major retirement systems administered by the Government are the old-age and survivors insurance, railroad retirement, and Federal employee retirement and disability programs. Benefit disbursements are made directly from trust accounts and are not included in Budget expenditures. Receipts of the trust funds are mainly employer and employee payroll contributions. In the case of the railroad retirement system, these receipts are included in total Budget receipts and are transferred to the trust account as a Budget expenditure. The Government contributes as an employer to the Federal employee retirement funds and, for those Federal workers who are not covered by these special programs, to the old-age and survivors insurance system. These contributions appear as Budget expenditures. Payroll contributions received from other employers and from workers for old-age and survivors insurance are transferred directly to the trust fund and are not included in total Budget receipts. Accumulated assets in the three major trust funds now total 20 billion dollars; the money is invested in Government securities and the interest earned is added to the principal of each trust fund.

Receipts and expenditures under the proposed medical care insurance program would be handled through a trust account, paralleling the procedures for old-age and survivors insurance. A period of preparation will be required to set up the health insurance system. I am proposing that in the meantime a small payroll tax of one-fourth of 1 percent each on employees and employers be levied to provide for initial expenses.

SOCIAL SECURITY, WELFARE, AND HEALTH

(Major trust funds)

[Fiscal years. In millions]

Fund and item	1950 actual	1951 estimated	1952 estimated
Federal old-age and survivors insurance trust fund:			
Receipts:			
Transfer of employment taxes	$2,106	$2,960	$3,823
Interest and other	257	299	313
Transfer from Budget accounts		4	4
Payments of benefits and administrative expenses	−783	−1,674	−2,177
Net accumulation	1,584	1,589	1,963
Balance in fund at close of year	12,885	14,474	16,437
Railroad retirement fund:			
Receipts:			
Transfers from Budget accounts	583	598	646
Interest on investments	62	70	75
Payments of benefits, salaries, and expenses	−304	−329	−350
Net accumulation	341	339	371
Balance in fund at close of year	2,064	2,403	2,774
Federal employees' retirement funds:			
Receipts:			
Employee contributions	359	327	311
Transfers from Budget accounts and other	305	305	325
Interest	144	161	175
Payments of annuities and refunds, and expenses	−268	−287	−312
Net accumulation	540	506	499
Balance in fund at close of year	3,860	4,366	4,865
Medical care insurance trust fund (proposed legislation):			
Receipts from payroll contributions			275
Payment for initial expenses			−35
Net accumulation			240
Balance in fund at close of year			240

VETERANS' SERVICES AND BENEFITS

In the fiscal year 1952 expenditures for veterans' services and benefits will be under 5 billion dollars for the first time in 6 years. This results from a further decline in requirements for the readjustment of veterans of World War II.

During the coming years, because we shall need to maintain larger Armed Forces, virtually all our able-bodied young men may be required to serve their country in its military forces. Before many years, nearly all the population may be veterans or the dependents of veterans.

This means a profound change in the social and economic import of Government programs which affect veterans. It requires a clear recognition that many of the needs of our veterans and their dependents can be met best through the general programs serving the whole population. Therefore, in legislation directed particularly to the problems of servicemen and their dependents, we should provide only for those special and unique needs which arise directly from military service. We should meet their other needs through general programs of the Government.

VETERANS' SERVICES AND BENEFITS

[Fiscal years. In millions]

Program or agency	Expenditures 1950 actual	Expenditures 1951 estimated	Expenditures 1952 estimated	Recommended new obligational authority for 1952 [1]
Readjustment benefits:				
Education and training	$2,596	$2,159	$1,414	$1,117
Loan guarantees	61	105	110	94
Unemployment and self-employment allowances	141	18	10	
Other	76	79	45	24
Compensation and pensions	2,223	2,198	2,223	2,223
Insurance	480	95	74	73
Hospitals and medical care:				
Current expenses	605	601	650	659
Hospital construction	159	212	155	
Other services and administration (mainly Veterans Administration)	286	279	230	236
Total	6,627	5,746	4,911	4,426

[1] This column excludes 28 million dollars of recommended appropriations to liquidate prior year contract authorizations.

Readjustment benefits.—A decline of nearly 800 million dollars in expenditures for veterans' readjustment, to 1.6 billion dollars estimated for the fiscal year 1952, will result almost entirely from reduced enrollments for education and training.

Under the Servicemen's Readjustment Act, eligible veterans are required to initiate their courses of training by July 25, 1951. Accordingly, with the program drawing to a close, the enrollment in institutional, on-the-job, and farm-training courses in the fiscal year 1952 is expected to average about 1 million, a decline of some 600,000 from 1951. By the end of the fiscal year 1952 more than 7,500,000 veterans will have received education and training under this program at a cost of 13.9 billion dollars.

Other expenditures for readjustment benefits cover guarantees of veterans' loans, unemployment allowances, tuition and supplies for the training of disabled veterans, and Government grants to certain seriously disabled veterans. Government expenditures for the loan guarantees in the fiscal year 1952 are estimated at 110 million dollars, largely for a gratuity of 1 year's interest on the guaranteed portion of each loan. By the end of the fiscal year 1952 over 3 million veterans will have borrowed 18 billion dollars in Government-guaranteed loans for homes, farms, and businesses.

The Eighty-first Congress enacted legislation to meet the special rehabilitation needs of disabled veterans injured in Korea. By renewing the program of vocational rehabilitation which was in

effect during and after World War II for disabled veterans, and by providing medical treatment, hospital services, and monthly compensation, the Government is assisting our disabled veterans to return to a self-reliant and productive role as civilians.

Broader problems of policy arise when we consider the readjustment needs of nondisabled veterans. In preparing to meet their needs, we naturally think first of the combat veterans of the Korean fighting, but we must remember that during the coming years the lives of nearly all our young men also may be interrupted for service to their country. When the time comes that these future veterans can be discharged, we must be sure that they will be able to readjust rapidly to normal civilian pursuits.

The provision of education benefits, vocational training, loan guarantees, and unemployment allowances to World War II veterans represented a new and more positive approach to the veterans' readjustment problem than the pensions and bonuses previously provided. There is ample evidence that the "GI bill" has benefited the Nation as well as millions of veterans, despite abuses which impaired the readjustment of some veterans and added to the cost of the whole program.

Any future program should not only avoid past mistakes but should also be fitted to our changed economic and military outlook. The readjustment needs of the men in the Armed Forces now and in the future are likely to be quite different from the needs of World War II veterans. The requirements of future veterans will depend on how long our young men serve, what they do while in military service, and their ages and family responsibilities at time of discharge. The need for special programs for veterans will depend also on how many of our young men serve, the job opportunities open to them afterward, and the types of services available to them under governmental programs for the population as a whole. When all these factors are considered, it is clear that an extension of the "GI bill," without material changes, would perpetuate provisions not suited to changed conditions. It could result in excessive expenditure of public funds and still fail to accomplish the objective of helping the veteran to readjust.

The full assessment of these complicated problems requires careful study in order that we may adopt the best policies for future Government programs affecting veterans. In that assessment, we need to take careful account of our own national experience over the last 6 years and the requirements imposed by our changed military and economic needs.

Compensation and pensions.—It is estimated that payments for compensation and pensions will total more than 2.2 billion dollars in the fiscal year 1952, and will be made to an average of 3,168,000 individuals and families. This is an increase over the current year of 113,000 in the average number of cases, and of 25 million dollars in expenditures. Of the compensation cases, which result from service-connected disabilities or deaths, 82 percent relate to military service during or after World War II. Of the pension recipients, 7 percent are veterans or the dependents of veterans of World War II.

The total of 2.2 billion dollars for 1952 includes 1.5 billion dollars in compensation payments, covering an average of 345,000 families of deceased veterans and 2,010,000 veterans with service-connected disabilities. Also included is 80 million dollars for subsistence allowances to service-disabled veterans in the vocational rehabilitation program, a decrease of 56 million dollars below the 1951 level. Pension payments will be made in an estimated 812,000 non-service-connected cases. The total of 605 million dollars for these pension payments is 75 million dollars higher than in the current year.

Insurance.—Government liabilities for life insurance programs for servicemen and veterans are mainly for the costs of administration and for payments on account of deaths traceable to the extra hazards of military service.

In view of the Korean hostilities and the current enlargement of the Armed Forces, there is pressing need for new legislation to assure financial protection to the families of servicemen. The present national service life insurance program does not meet this need. Because it is optional, the protection is not carried by some servicemen and is held in less than adequate amounts by others. The system is complex and costly and absorbs excessive manpower, especially when the Armed Forces are large and manpower scarce.

It would be more equitable, and over the last decade it would have been more economical, to provide a free and automatic $10,000 indemnity to the survivors of all who die while in military service, and to establish a special new system of voluntary insurance open only to veterans whose insurability at standard rates has been impaired by military service. I recommend that this Congress now enact such legislation and extend its benefits to the dependents of those servicemen who have died while on active duty since June 27, 1950, if they did not have a like amount of servicemen's insurance protection.

Hospitals and medical care.—Expenses for hospital and medical care are estimated at 650 million dollars in the fiscal year 1952, 49 million more than in the current year. The average number of patients in hospitals and homes is estimated at 138,000, an increase of 5,000 over the current year. Approximately two-thirds of present patients are being treated for non-service-connected disabilities.

The presently approved construction program of 766 million dollars, to provide 36,500 new hospital and domicilary beds, will be four-fifths completed by the end of the fiscal year 1952. Obligational authority already available is more than adequate to complete the program.

Trust funds.—About 6.5 million life insurance policies are now outstanding under two trust funds operated for servicemen and veterans. One is for the Government life insurance program established for servicemen in World War I; the other is for national service life insurance, its World War II counterpart.

VETERANS' LIFE-INSURANCE FUNDS

(*Trust funds*)

[Fiscal years. In millions]

Item	1950 actual	1951 estimated	1952 estimated
Receipts:			
Transfers from general and special accounts	$475	$90	$68
Interest on investments	249	210	204
Premiums and other	440	490	514
Total	1,164	790	786
Expenditures:			
Dividends to policyholders	2,687	334	546
Benefits and other	414	478	505
Total	3,101	812	1,051
Net withdrawal	−1,937	−22	−265
Balance in funds at close of year	6,692	6,670	6,405

Expenditures from these trust funds are expected to exceed receipts by 265 million dollars, because dividends estimated at 546 million dollars will be paid to policyholders in the fiscal year 1952. During the fiscal years 1950 and 1951 dividends which had accumulated over an extended period were paid from these funds, so that the trust fund expenditures in those two years exceeded receipts by 2 billion dollars. At the end of the fiscal year 1952, the Government securities and cash held by the funds will still exceed 6.4 billion dollars.

GENERAL GOVERNMENT

Expenditures for general government in the fiscal year 1952 are estimated at 1.4 billion dollars, an increase of 99 million dollars over the current year. This total includes 164 million dollars for the dispersal of governmental facilities.

GENERAL GOVERNMENT

[Fiscal years. In millions]

Program or agency	Expenditures			Recommended new obligational authority for 1952 [1]
	1950 actual	1951 estimated	1952 estimated	
Dispersal of Government facilities (proposed legislation)	-------	$6	$164	--------
Federal financial management:				
Bureau of Internal Revenue	$227	248	254	$256
Customs collection, debt management, and other (mainly Treasury)	129	139	134	139
General Accounting Office	35	33	31	32
Other central services:				
Central property and records management (mainly General Services Administration)	118	139	164	145
Civil Service Commission	16	18	20	20
Legal services (Justice)	8	9	10	11
Government Printing Office	9	10	11	19

[1] This column excludes 5 million dollars of recommended appropriations to liquidate prior year contract authorizations.

GENERAL GOVERNMENT—Continued

[Fiscal years. In millions]

Program or agency	Expenditures			Recommended new obligational authority for 1952 [1]
	1950 actual	1951 estimated	1952 estimated	
Government payment toward civilian employees' general retirement system	$302	$305	$320	$320
Legislative functions	40	43	48	39
Judicial functions	24	31	25	25
Executive direction and management	7	12	8	7
Other general government:				
Immigration control (Justice)	31	33	36	37
Public building construction (General Services Administration)	9	38	9	-------
Weather Bureau	24	25	26	27
Claims and relief acts (Treasury)	71	96	50	-------
Other	58	67	41	63
Total	1,108	1,252	1,351	1,140

[1] This column excludes 5 million dollars of recommended appropriations to liquidate prior year contract authorizations.

Dispersal of Government facilities.—The acceleration of the defense effort requires additional Government buildings to accommodate the increased number of Federal employees in the District of Columbia. From the viewpoint of security, the new buildings should not be located in the central area of the District of Columbia but should be located within commuting distance and sufficiently removed from each other to assure continuity of operations in the event of air attack. Long-range planning goals for the Capital area also call for dispersal of Government buildings. I therefore urge the Congress to provide the necessary authority and funds to begin promptly a program for the dispersal of Government offices now located in the District of Columbia.

As distinct from dispersal, functions will be decentralized to locations outside the vicinity of the District of Columbia only in those instances where the functions involved can be permanently located at further distances without significant loss of efficiency.

Federal financial management.—New tax legislation has created additional problems of tax collection. The increase in the estimate for the Bureau of Internal Revenue will permit continued strengthening of audit and enforcement activities to try to insure that every person pays his full and fair share of taxes.

Present customs law imposes unnecessary difficulties upon the Nation's importers and hampers the conduct of international trade. I therefore urge the Congress to enact legislation to simplify customs procedures along the lines of recommendations previously transmitted.

Central property and records management.—When the General Services Administration was established in 1949, the Federal Government inaugurated a Government-wide effort to improve real and personal property management, including procurement, warehousing, traffic, utilities, and records management. In the last few months, special emphasis has been given to measures to eliminate every nonessential requirement for supplies and equipment; to set inventory ceilings at minimum levels in each agency and make any excess stocks available to other agencies; to screen thoroughly all surplus property declarations before making sales to the public; and to reduce the volume of records so as to release scarce office space and equipment.

Payments on Federal real estate.—As an outcome of conferences with State and local government officials, a proposal will shortly be transmitted to the Congress for a general plan to reduce the effects of Federal real estate acquisitions on State and local government finances. Payments to State and local governments would not generally begin until the second year after enactment of this measure.

Civilian employees retirement.—The Budget includes 320 million dollars for the annual Government contribution to enable the civil-service retirement and disability fund to cover its currently accruing obligations. Federal employees covered by the system are required by law to contribute 6 percent of their salaries toward future benefits. The Government contribution, designed to cover the remaining cost of benefits, amounts to approximately 2.6 percent of the payrolls of covered employees plus interest on the Government's liability to the fund for deficiencies in previous contributions.

INTEREST

The interest payments made by the Federal Government arise primarily from the huge additions made to the Federal debt in World War II. All interest payments are financed by permanent indefinite appropriations and therefore do not require annual Congressional action.

INTEREST

[Fiscal years. In millions]

Item	Expenditures			Obligational authority (permanent indefinite)
	1950 actual	1951 estimated	1952 estimated	
Interest on the public debt	[1] $5,720	$5,625	$5,800	$5,800
Interest on refunds	93	90	92	92
Interest on uninvested trust funds	4	7	5	5
Total	5,817	5,722	5,897	5,897

[1] Includes 225 million dollars in nonrecurring payments resulting from a shift in reporting methods.

Interest on the public debt.—Interest payments on the public debt are estimated at 5.8 billion dollars for the fiscal year 1952, continuing the gradual increase of recent years. This increase is the product of a great number of factors, relating not only to the amount of Federal securities outstanding, but also to the composition of the debt by type of security and the interest rate structure of the debt.

About one-third of the increase in interest for the fiscal year 1952 is accounted for by the continued expansion of special issues to Government trust funds at rates of interest higher than the average on the public debt as a whole.

Second, the current increase in public debt is also reflected in higher interest expenditures.

A third important factor is the accrual of interest on savings bonds. These accruals are continuing to increase as the large volume of World War II savings bonds gets closer to maturity. Interest on savings bonds alone accounts for a little more than one-fourth of the total interest on the public debt. Most of this interest is received by individuals and is a reflection of the widespread distribution of the public debt at the present time.

Interest on refunds.—On most refunds of receipts interest is paid because the Federal Government has had temporary use of the funds. Most of the refunds result from overpayment of taxes. The interest rate paid on tax refunds, like that collected on tax deficiencies, is considerably higher than the average rate paid on the public debt.

I have presented a Budget to meet our country's needs in a period of danger.

We are building the military and economic strength which alone has meaning to the men who control world communism. This is the only realistic road to a world peace based on justice and individual freedom.

For the third time in this century we as Americans must subordinate our peacetime goals to what is required for the survival of the Nation. Our national objectives in the coming months demand unity of purpose among us and a spirit of dedication on the part of everyone. Our young men will devote more years to military service. All of us will work longer and harder than we have worked before. We will pay much heavier taxes. We must defer, in many cases, new governmental programs to enrich our national life and contribute to our individual and family welfare. But in return we will get something precious—strength to meet and overcome the barbaric threat of communism in whatever manner it confronts us.

We in this Nation have always, in time of national emergency, risen with unity and vigor to the defense of our free institutions and way of life. We are responding now. We go forward with faith and confidence to meet and win the tests ahead.

HARRY S. TRUMAN.

JANUARY 15, 1951.

CERTAIN CONSTRUCTION AT MILITARY AND NAVAL INSTALLATIONS—MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES (H. DOC. NO. 42)

The SPEAKER laid before the House the following message from the President of the United States, which was read, and, together with the accompanying papers, referred to the Committee on Armed Services, and ordered to be printed:

To the Congress of the United States:

On January sixth, I approved H. R. 9893, Eighty-first Congress, an act "To authorize certain construction at mili-

tary and naval installations, and for other purposes."

The installations which will be provided under this act are urgently needed by the military services. I approved H. R. 9893 for that reason. However, one provision of this legislation, section 407, will have unfortunate results, which may not have been foreseen by the Congress. I recommend that this section be repealed as soon as possible.

Section 407 reads as follows:

Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force may not grant or transfer to another Government department or agency other than a military department or to any other party any land or buildings of a permanent nature, or any interests in such property, except equipment no longer serviceable and except easements, leases, or permits deemed to be in the public interest, which shall have been acquired, constructed, or installed pursuant to the provisions of this or any previous act except as authorized by an act of Congress enacted subsequent to the date of enactment of this act.

This section, if permitted to stand, may seriously impede our mobilization effort by causing unnecessary and unwarranted delay in the transfer for other governmental uses of property excess to the needs of the military departments. The Atomic Energy Commission, for example, is not a military department. In time of emergency, transfers of Army, Navy, or Air Force property to enable that Commission to carry out its responsibilities should not have to be handled by separate enactments of the Congress.

By the same token, the military departments should not be delayed, as this section would delay them, in effecting exchanges of property with private owners. To illustrate, section 407 would prevent the Air Force from extending a runway at an air base by exchanging a portion of the air base lands for private lands contiguous to it needed for the runway extension. I am sure no such restriction was intended by the Congress.

There are contained in the Federal Property and Services Act of 1949, provisions which were enacted for the specific purpose of making possible the most efficient utilization of excess military property, including fixtures. In my judgment, section 407 repeals these provisions by implication. Furthermore, this section would appear to circumvent the provisions of that same act which charge the Administrator of General Services with the duties and responsibilities to promote maximum utilization of excess property among Government agencies. I cannot believe that it was the intent of the Congress to bring about this effect, or that the Congress will wish section 407 to stand in the way of immediate administrative action for transfer of property vital to the conduct of programs assigned to defense agencies other than the military departments.

Finally, it seems to me unwise at a time when the Congress will be fully concerned with matters of greatest national importance, to go through the process of reviewing in detail, transaction by transaction, the sale or disposition to the general public of such few pieces of property as may be determined to be surplus to the needs of the Government as a whole. It seems to me inevitable that there would be delay in handling such matters with a resulting expensive administrative burden upon agencies of the Department of Defense for maintaining and protecting such property until congressional action has been completed.

For these reasons, therefore, I urge the Congress to repeal section 407 of this act at its earliest opportunity.

HARRY S. TRUMAN.

THE WHITE HOUSE, *January 15, 1951.*

SPECIAL ORDER GRANTED

Mr. SUTTON asked and was given permission to address the House for 30 minutes on Thursday next, following the legislative program and any special orders heretofore entered.

The SPEAKER. Under previous order of the House, the gentleman from Oklahoma [Mr. STEED] is recognized for 10 minutes.

EFFECTS OF IMPORTS ON AMERICAN EMPLOYMENT

Mr. STEED. Mr. Speaker, during the Eighty-first Congress I had the honor of serving as chairman of a subcommittee of the House Committee on Education and Labor to study the effects of imports on American employment. The hearings this subcommittee conducted are being printed and soon will be available to the Congress.

While most of the difficulties that some 17 American industries were facing because of unfavorable import conditions imposed on our country through reciprocal trade agreements have been temporarily eased because of the new rearmament program, our hearings show conclusively that the same ills will return to plague these American industries as soon as the present emergency passes.

Since the Congress will be called upon this session to consider again the reciprocal trade program, I commend these hearings to the Members who desire more factual information on just what far-reaching authority is granted and how the careless use of this authority can and does frequently undermine whole industries in this country.

These hearings contain considerable information about how we have permitted reciprocal trade agreements to benefit nations behind the iron curtain and to harm American factories and workers. I hope the Congress will provide the safeguards in the new reciprocal trade legislation that we need to avoid these abuses in the future.

But we now find another entirely new field of danger in the field of export and imports on the American scene. It is to this new danger that I desire to address my remarks today. I consider this new threat so serious that it should command the close attention of every Member of this Congress.

Within the past 2 years, two agreements have been made by various member nations of the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization, better known as UNESCO, which provides for the free flow of certain specified materials among the signatory nations.

The first of the two agreements relates to visual and auditory materials on which the existing duties would be eliminated under certain conditions. The materials that would be affected are films, filmstrips, and microfilms, sound recordings, glass slides, models, wall charts, maps, and posters.

Any one of the contracting States would be permitted, if it should so elect, to impose regulations upon the importer to the material to insure that it shall only be exhibited or used for non-profit-making purposes. There is, however, nothing mandatory about this provision. It is wholly permissive in character.

This agreement was opened for signature at Lake Success, N. Y., July 15, 1949, and has been signed by 18 countries and ratified by 4. It will go into effect upon ratification by 10 countries. It was signed by the United States and was submitted to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on August 22, 1950, by the Department of State.

The second of these two UNESCO agreements provides for the free importation of educational, scientific, and cultural materials. Among these are printed books, newspapers and periodicals, catalogs, manuscript music, maps, and certain engineering and architectural plans; scientific instruments or apparatus, intended exclusively for educational purposes or pure scientific research, provided that no instruments or apparatus of equivalent value are manufactured in the importing country.

This second agreement was completed in Florence, Italy, at the fifth session of the general UNESCO conference in June 1950, and was opened for signature by the member countries at Lake Success on November 22, 1950. Nineteen countries have signed the agreement but none has ratified it. It will go into effect when 10 States have ratified the agreement.

Article XII of this agreement provides that the parties to it shall take all the necessary measures for its fully effective operation within 6 months after the date on which it goes into effect. This means, of course, that any conflicting laws on the statute books must be set aside and positive action taken to implement the agreement.

Here are two agreements ranging in age from 6 months to a year and a half, that are virtually unknown to the American public; and their existence is perhaps news to most Members of the House of Representatives; yet they embody provisions which would rob the House of its joint constitutional authority as one of the two Houses of Congress, to impose duties and to regulate commerce with foreign nations.

Ratification of the two treaties by the Senate would remove the items and materials subject to the agreements from the dutiable list or otherwise provide for their free importation. This end could not be accomplished under the regular legislative procedure without initiation of legislation by the House. Article I, section 7, of the Constitution provides that "All bills for raising revenue shall

originate in the House of Representatives."

Not only does the Constitution—article VI—provide that treaties made under the authority of the United States shall be the supreme law of the land, thus requiring that existing laws in conflict with provisions of a treaty be repealed; but article XII of the second UNESCO agreement, cited above, provides specifically that the parties shall take all the necessary measures for its fully effective operation within 6 months after the date on which it goes into effect.

This is to say, the United States must not only modify its law to conform to the agreement, it must set aside the constitutional process—and must do so within 6 months. This represents a method of amending the Constitution without submitting the proposed amendment to the 48 States in the Union. The Senate thus becomes the supreme arbiter of how the Constitution may be amended by particular proposals arising outside of the legislative channels.

No public hearings were held preceding the two UNESCO agreements. There was a minimum of publicity. The meetings in which the agreements were drafted and revised were held in Europe. No elected representative of the American people participated in the meetings. Although the subject of import tariffs is a highly technical subject, the agreements were not drawn by tariff experts. No interested parties were given an opportunity to express their views or to provide practical information.

How many persons know the names, much less the background and training, of the UNESCO personnel whom we are asked to vest with powers to set aside the laws of our Congress and the provisions of our Constitution? Who knows how many Americans are represented in UNESCO? Can anyone name them?

If UNESCO has the power to make agreements that will permit the free importation of printed material, scientific apparatus, and other educational scientific and cultural materials, what is to prevent FAO from making agreements that will permit the free importation of food and agricultural products? Or the World Health Organization from agreeing to the free importation of pharmaceuticals and medicinal products? Or some other present or future subsidiary of the United Nations from abolishing the tariff on other groups of products? And if agreements can be made to abolish the tariff, why cannot the same principles be extended to other fields of agreement which would repeal domestic laws in other fields or amend our Constitution in other respects?

The provisions of the two UNESCO agreements, one of which is before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the second of which no doubt will come before the committee, are so far reaching in their implications that they should be examined and studied in the greatest detail—not so much for the substantive contents of these particular agreements as for the impact they may produce, as precedents, upon the powers of Congress and upon our Constitution.

Mrs. BOLTON. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. STEED. I yield to the gentlewoman from Ohio.

Mrs. BOLTON. I want to thank the gentleman very much for bringing this up. There seems to be a very real danger of our failing to recognize the implications of the California decision of last year. You will recall that the Federal court held that under our Constitution a treaty superseded the law of the land. Is it not true that we should be particularly careful in any of these agreements we enter into? I am happy that the gentleman has emphasized this point at this time.

Mr. STEED. May I say that the purposes designed here are very desirable, but there is a much better way to achieve them than through these trick treaties they bring in here.

Mrs. BOLTON. I think it is exceedingly good that the gentleman is emphasizing this so thoroughly.

Mr. COX. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. STEED. I yield to the gentleman from Georgia.

Mr. COX. The gentleman has made a statement which I am convinced Members should examine with great care.

Mr. STEED. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. SMITH of Wisconsin. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. STEED. I yield.

Mr. SMITH of Wisconsin. I want to compliment the gentleman on making a very good Republican speech.

Mr. STEED. I do not think the Republicans have a right to say that for a man to stand up for what he thinks is good constitutional procedure is solely the province of the Republicans.

RADIO CHAIN MONOPOLIES STRANGULATE OUR ONLY DEFENSE MASS COMMUNICATION SYSTEM

Mr. SHEPPARD. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to extend my remarks at this point in the RECORD.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from California?

There was no objection.

Mr. SHEPPARD. Mr. Speaker, it has been forcibly brought to my attention that radio broadcasting stations are steadily closing up throughout important communities of our country. Only recently WOPT, located in Oswego, N. Y., the terminus of the vital barge canal and Lake Ontario, was forced to cease operation and surrender its license to the FCC because of the inability of the radio station to sustain further losses in its operation. This radio station was the only radio station located in this vital waterway community.

Further investigation made by me at the Federal Communications Commission disclosed these startling facts to be true. In 1947, 365 AM broadcasting stations operated in the red; in 1948, 581 AM radio broadcasting stations operated in the red; and in 1949, the latest report available at the FCC, showed that the startling total of 686 radio broadcasting stations were operating in the red. These figures are only for AM stations, and do not include the newer FM or television stations. The radio public being served by these stations have invested millions of dollars in radio receivers and there is at least one receiver in almost every home in our land. In light of the serious war situation which now faces us, it is imperative that each and every one of our radio broadcasting stations maintain radio service to the public.

A careful study of the problem shows that more money is being spent each year by the advertisers over the radio broadcasting medium, but still each year more stations close their doors and more stations are operating in the red, which soon will force them to close their doors. Further investigation shows that at this time, subsidies are not necessary to prevent the collapse of radio broadcasting facilities in many communities of our country.

Investigation does show, however, that many radio stations are being restrained from doing business with the advertisers which support the industry, by certain unlawful and monopolistic practices of the four major radio network chains operating in this country. This restraint is in direct violation of the intent of Congress as outlined in the legislative history of the Communications Act of 1934.

It has been brought to my attention that certain radio stations owned and controlled by the four major radio network monopolies have been restraining the broadcast of many important and high-grade radio programs under the intentional misinterpretation of section 325 (a) of the Communications Act of 1934.

By such restraint, these network monopolies have prevented millions of people from hearing these high-quality programs and they have prevented millions of dollars of revenue from reaching the various network affiliated, independent, both AM and FM, radio broadcasting stations, by the act of deliberately restraining trade between these stations and the numerous national radio sponsors and advertisers of the country.

A careful legislative history study of the act conclusively discloses that it was the intent of this Congress, in formulating the act that rebroadcasting of radio programs should be permitted where permission for the rebroadcast was obtained by a radio station from the person who paid large sums of money to prepare and produce these radio programs, and it was also the intent of this congressional body that the networks in no way should exert monopolistic influences or restrain trade within the radio-broadcasting industry.

Some years past certain labor organizations attempted to restrain the broadcasting of radio programs and this Congress acted quickly and decisively in preventing such restraint by enacting legislation which amended the Communications Act by inserting section 506 in the act, which section was entitled "Coercive Practices Affecting Broadcasting." This section came under the penal provisions of the act and carried severe fines and imprisonment for those who willfully violated the section.

It is even more important that this Congress act quickly and decisively, at the time when the radio industry in a

large measure faces strangulation by the network monopolies, particularly when in view of the serious war situation, that each and every radio broadcasting station be allowed to continue operating without monopolistic restraint and in a free market, in order that the economic structure of each station will be on a sound footing, thereby allowing these stations to continue serving their vital and important role in the present serious defense emergency.

It is after a serious and thorough investigation into this very important medium of mass public communication that I offer the following radio legislation to correct a very urgent situation.

You will note that I have introduced two bills, one, H. R. 10, a simple solution to the rebroadcast rule which will give immediate economic relief to the hundreds of radio broadcasting stations in the country.

The other bill, H. R. 73:

First. Prevents radio networks from falling into the hands of aliens;

Second. Calls for the licensing and regulation of the radio networks, directly by the FCC, in a similar manner to the licensing and regulation of the individual radio stations by the FCC for the past 23 years;

Third. Considerably reduces the regulation of individual radio stations by the FCC, by regulating the networks direct and relieving all network affiliated stations of the responsibility for the violation of the network rules of the FCC by the networks;

Fourth. Prevents radio network monopolies from controlling the radio broadcasting industry and the very economic heart of the individual radio stations of this country.

In light of the fact, that radio stations are closing their doors; that the FCC reports indicate that last year 686 radio broadcasting stations were operating at a loss; that the FCC has no legislation by which it can license and regulate the radio network monopolies; that the FCC cannot at present investigate and prevent the radio networks from being owned and controlled by aliens; I urgently request that this Congress take immediate steps to correct these serious situations as one of the musts of this state of emergency and total mobilization, for the protection of our way of life and our country's only real mass form of communication in the event of attack by an enemy.

Radio broadcasting is not only a must in every community during disaster, but it is a must in the general mobilization of our country.

The enactment of these two bills, first, will insure the immediate strengthening of our mass communication medium without the need of Government subsidization; second, will prevent the control of the radio networks from falling into the hands of aliens; third, will for the first time in radio history lessen the regulation of the individual radio stations licensed by the FCC; fourth, it will allow free and unrestricted commerce within the economic framework of the broadcasting industry; and fifth, it will allow the American public to hear many of the high quality radio programs which are now not heard by them.

Is this Congress cognizant of the fact that there is no legislation whatsoever to prevent the ownership and control of the radio networks by aliens, which networks control most of the programs broadcast over all of the major radio stations of our country?

This most serious situation, in this critical time of total mobilization and defense, calls for immediate action by our body.

AVAILABILITY OF COPIES OF THE PRESIDENT'S BUDGET MESSAGE

Mr. VORYS. Mr. Speaker, a parliamentary inquiry.

The SPEAKER. The gentleman will state it.

Mr. VORYS. How can Members of Congress obtain copies of the President's budget message? I have just been informed that copies will not be sent up from the Printing Office until 3 o'clock, and then maybe we can get them. I understand copies have been circulated to the press but, as is usual with Presidential messages, Members of Congress cannot obtain them. I happen to get things better in my mind through my eyes than through my ears. While I have sat here and tried to absorb this message, I should like to get a look at it. My inquiry is, when may Members of Congress be permitted to have copies of the budget message?

The SPEAKER. If the gentleman has information that they will be at the document room at 3 o'clock, they will be available then. They will be available to every Member as soon as they come from the Printing Office and are placed in the document room.

Mr. VORYS. Will they be delivered, or will we have to go get them?

The SPEAKER. The Chair does not know that they will be delivered. We will not have a session of the House tomorrow, so they will not be delivered to Members on the floor.

Mr. VORYS. My inquiry, then, turns into a request. May I ask our great Speaker if he can make it possible for Members who want to see the budget to get it without running around, and can he see that in the future Presidential messages are made available to Members at the time they are made available to the press and the public?

The SPEAKER. The gentleman has hardly stated a parliamentary inquiry. He can send a page to the document room for a copy as soon as copies are made available.

Mr. PHILLIPS. Mr. Speaker, a parliamentary inquiry.

The SPEAKER. The gentleman will state it.

Mr. PHILLIPS. On that same question, Mr. Speaker, does that apply to the members of the Committee on Appropriations only? Where do we go to get our copies? Do we go to the document room?

The SPEAKER. All Members of the House are on the same footing, regardless of what committee they serve on.

Mr. PHILLIPS. I think the point which the gentleman from Ohio seemed to raise, is that while Members of Congress may be on the same footing with each other we would like also to be on the same footing with people outside the Congress who receive copies of the message before we do.

The SPEAKER. The Chair might agree with the gentleman on that.

Under previous order of the House, the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. SMITH] is recognized for 30 minutes.

OUR FOREIGN POLICY

Mr. SMITH of Wisconsin. Mr. Speaker, I come into the well of the House today with a heavy heart. My heart is heavy, not solely because our policies have failed to bring a just and lasting peace but heavy, because our leaders have sunk to a new low in an unholy effort to save face when confronted with diplomatic and military defeats. Mr. Speaker, they have within the last 36 hours embraced the principles of a Munich appeasement. On last Saturday, through the United Nations Truce Committee, our Government joined with other countries, in asking Red China to cease fire while its delegates could talk about a peace plan for Korea. This is abject surrender to appeasement. As a Member of this Congress, I am ashamed. For what purpose have our men in Korea died; for what purpose have our men in Korea suffered? Was it to appease aggressors in Asia and in Europe? My colleagues, what are you and I going to say to the wives, the mothers, and fathers of these men when they ask us: "What did our husbands and sons die for?" We had better prepare to answer that question.

Mr. Speaker, for a year or more the President has been telling the world how we hate the aggressors and dictators and how we love the free peoples everywhere. Indeed our love is so great that we will protect them at any cost, anywhere, at any time. Yet on last Saturday the President just brushed those promises under the rug when this Nation, under his leadership, forgot all about the free people of South Korea. Their representatives were not even invited to the meeting where their rights were being considered. And now if the cease-fire order is agreed to, the United States has promised to sit down with the Reds and consider the questions of Formosa and the admission of Chinese Communists to the United Nations. What a travesty on the simple principles of justice and fair dealing as our people understand them. Here is unqualified unadulterated appeasement in capital letters. Here again is another Yalta and Poland where appeasement motivated the principal actors. God help these United States under this kind of leadership.

Mr. Speaker, people all over this country are demanding a change in Truman's foreign policies. From my own congressional district, 95 percent of the letters received on this subject are violently opposed. Never in the years of my service in this body have my constituents been so bitter in their denunciation of our present leadership in foreign affairs. They demand that Secretary Acheson be fired; they ask for the impeachment of the President.

We cannot say, Mr. Speaker, that the people are not justified in the criticism they make today. They had a right to expect peace after a great military victory. That was the promise made to them; that was what our sons and daughters died for in 1941–45. They also had the right, Mr. Speaker, to expect capable leadership during the war to the end that when the war was over this country would be in a position to capitalize on its victory. Yet, while our military forces were fighting their hearts out on the battle fronts and while our farmers and workers in our industrial plants worked long hours to help our fighting men, the politicians were bargaining away the principles that were to make a just and lasting peace possible. Tehran, Yalta, and Potsdam sealed the fate of the Christian world and today we face the Asiatic hordes of godless communism in a life-and-death struggle. We have temporized, we have repudiated the moral basis for our entry into World War II. We are today reaping the whirlwind. Another war is about to impose the garrison state upon us and with it the loss of our liberties and freedom.

People are bewildered; they are confused and Members of Congress cannot stand dumb and inert and place the responsibility upon the President alone. What to do, that is the question. It was Lincoln in his famous Springfield speech, when confronted with a critical situation said:

> If we could first know where we are and whither we are tending, we could better judge what to do and how to do it.

Mr. Speaker, most people in this country know where we are. It is not a pleasant thought but our foreign policies have led us to the brink of another global war which calls for the sacrifice of human lives and the loss of billions of dollars. Since last June our young men have been giving their lives in a full-fledged war in Korea without congressional assent. All over the world, our policy has been to meet the thrust of communism. In Greece and Turkey, Yugoslavia, Western Europe, and Asia, the Truman doctrine to contain communism has been invoked. This has called for prolific spending of American dollars in the hope that our dollars would buy friendship. It has failed because we find in the United Nations a deep resentment and unfriendliness toward us. Those nations that have benefited most from our largess find they cannot go along with us now because of a conflict in their own national interests. So today we stand without friends in Western Europe, contrary to our hopes.

Soon, Mr. Speaker, we shall consider a plan for universal military service, the drafting of 18-year-old boys, and an acceleration of our industrial organization in the making of material for war. Attention is now focused on Western Europe and it seems that it is this administration's policy to send 50 or more divisions to defend countries in Europe whose people have no will to fight for their own freedom. This can only mean a commitment to engage mass armies on the continent. This will be a tragic mistake.

Mr. Speaker, the sad fact at this moment is that in two world wars this country was the principal force that upset the balance of power in the world. Prior to World War I and the last war, Russia was successfully contained by Germany and Japan. Now those bars are down permitting her to dominate one-third of the world's population. On its face there is no combination of free peoples, who are willing to fight, which can match the manpower and numerical strength of Russia and China. That is what we are up against today, Mr. Speaker.

If we are to engage the Russians, reinforced by the Chinese, in ground combat, we are hopelessly outnumbered. The lessons of Korea are sufficiently clear, Mr. Speaker, to convince even the rankest amateur, that the problem of fighting the Red army will be worse than fighting the Red Chinese in Korea. But as I have already intimated, the White House and the Pentagon have decided we must fight Russia in Europe with a great preponderance of the odds against us. At least that is the situation as I see it.

Mr. Speaker, there never was justification for the unauthorized war in Korea. When the North Koreans struck last June 25, there were only a few hundred American soldiers there and they were not equipped to fight. When the President, a few days later, ordered our men to fight it was murder, nothing less. The terrible nightmare of Korea haunts all of our people today. Our soldiers should come out of Korea; they have no business there after the main elements of our troops had been withdrawn.

Korea was untenable with China and Manchuria in the hands of the Communists, thanks to the support by Truman, Acheson, Marshall, Lattimore, Service, and others in behalf of the Red agrarian reformers. It was General Marshall who said that Korea was untenable under the circumstances I have mentioned. It was General Helmick who testified that in case of attack that "any troops that we have there would suffer another Bataan." Is this what we can expect at Pusan? God forbid, but it can happen. It was General Timberman who testified: "If we left troops in Korea, I do not think anyone would suggest we enter into combat with the Korean forces." How, then, did we enter into combat with them? General Timberman was asked as to our national security and how it was affected in Korea. He said it was not and then volunteered in part, "besides we might get into trouble later on, after we are in there militarily, which would be unfortunate." The general has, in view of the present situation in Korea, proved to be a prophet. I wonder if he was called to confer with the President when it was decided to fight the North Koreans? Generals Timberman and Hamilton and Admiral Woolridge all testified it would be unwise to keep troops in Korea. But all this sound advice was ignored by the President and the Secretary of State, Mr. Speaker, just as they ignored the recommendations of General Wedemeyer and our own colleague, Mr. Judd; and China went down. Korea is next. We cannot hold that peninsula against the overwhelming forces of Russian and Chinese Communist forces. It is the duty of the President to withdraw our troops from Korea so they may not suffer a Bataan or a Dunkerque. This is what our people are demanding.

The question now, Mr. Speaker, is what to do. In view of our desperate situation it is not unkind or unfair to suggest that our foreign policies for the past 5 years have failed. We need to make a new start. The hit-and-miss, day-by-day policy is inadequate for these times. We must have a long-range over-all policy to succeed against communism.

Mr. Speaker, I want to ally myself with Joseph P. Kennedy, Herbert Hoover, and Senator Taft in the suggestions they have made toward a new approach in United States foreign policy. Not all perhaps but some of all three suggestions are possible. The issue is pretty well drawn between these men on the one hand and Truman, Dulles, and Dewey on the other.

Since our entry into World War I in 1917, Mr. Speaker, Democrats have contended that our national security from the military standpoint rested in some other continent. We have been told that if we must fight, let us do it in some other country. That same argument was used in 1939–40 before World War II. We hear it again as another war is about to start. It is a fallacious argument as we discover that people overseas do not want their countries overrun in another war. There is no will to fight.

I have already alluded to the dangers inherent in a land war against the Russians and Chinese. Russia could strike with a thousand divisions were she to need them. Our 50 divisions in Europe and the reinforcements which we plan to rush there will, without a question, be sacrificed as expendable. We must lead from strength, through the air and on the sea, if we are to be successful. We are superior in these arms and we must use them. Day and night they can attack strategic bases in Russia from outside Europe and Asia. What we need is a strategy based on air power as the primary striking force. I do not pose as a military strategist but there are obvious basic considerations that must be clear to the most casual observer of events today.

Mr. Speaker, in all of the testimony that I have listened to as a member of the Foreign Affairs Committee, no one has ever suggested that we make an accurate survey of our national resources before starting on a dangerous venture such as we face today. This seems like a fundamental proposition to me, yet when it is suggested to Government witnesses as a starting point it is considered of no consequence and wholly irrelevant.

Is there anybody in the executive department or in Congress who can say with some degree of certainty that our resources are sufficient to justify great spending and fighting abroad and still more spending at home in support of an-

other war? If not, why not? One man has well said:

> Let us have a competent survey of our resources before it is too late. After appraising what we have in manpower, minerals, agriculture, electric power, and other resources, then we should ask what it is most important to defend.

He then goes on to say that most of us will agree:

> (1) The United States; (2) North America; and (3) South America.

Then he suggests that we consider what resources we have left over after taking care of these three.

> Our need then—

He continues—

> is for a survey committee, a competent group weighted with industrialists who have budgeted expertly for their own companies and faced bankruptcy as a penalty for error.

Mr. Speaker, it is futile to talk about promoting unity behind a policy that has failed. Our people have lost confidence in Mr. Acheson and they question the ability of the President to match his wits with Stalin. They will not unite behind a policy that insists upon an unauthorized and useless war in Korea. They will not unite behind a plan to send thousands of young men to Europe who can in no way successfully resist the Russian juggernaut when it starts to roll. There can be no unity behind a program to organize a land army of American boys to fight for nations who have no will to defend themselves. Wes Gallagher, AP foreign correspondent, in a recent dispatch said:

> A large part of Europe hasn't the will to defend itself. On a grand scale, General Eisenhower is in the position of a football coach trying to instill the will to win in his team.

Is it unreasonable, Mr. Speaker, for the people in Britain and France to abhor the very real possibility of engaging in another war on their own soil? I think it is understandable. But I ask in all sincerity, is it our responsibility to needle them into action? I do not think so.

Mr. Speaker, in all humility I respectfully suggest a constructive program of action behind which a great majority of our people can unite:

First. The President should establish a Civilian Advisory Committee on National Defense with authority to investigate, counsel, and advise with him on all matters pertinent to our own security.

Second. The confidence of the people must be restored. This calls for the resignation of Secretary Acheson and all his policy makers in the State Department who are responsible for present policies.

Third. Order our troops out of Korea and establish a defensive perimeter from the Aleutians through Japan and south to Australia. On this line establish strong air and sea bases.

Fourth. Use the oriental technique of smuggling to undermine the Red Chinese in China. It can be done with American dollars and the help of the Nationalist Government on Formosa.

Fifth. Establish strong air and sea bases outside of continental Europe and in Alaska and Canada. Use Spain, its manpower and strategic position on the continent of Europe.

Sixth. Serve notice on Russia and Communist China that any aggressive move against a free nation will compel us to bomb important areas in those countries.

Seventh. Demand that the United Nations act to declare Chinese Communists as aggressors in Korea. Failure to respond would result in withdrawal of the United States from the United Nations organization.

Eighth. Uncertainty and indecision in official quarters has created an air of confusion and hysteria. If war is a possibility, then full mobilization is necessary—now.

Ninth. Write treaties of peace with Germany and Japan immediately.

Mr. O'HARA. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SMITH of Wisconsin. I yield to the gentleman from Minnesota.

Mr. O'HARA. I read in the morning paper that General Collins, Chief of Staff, announced that they were sending fresh troops into Korea. It may be that the gentleman has some information that he cannot disclose or some that he may be able to disclose. But, let me ask the gentleman this question: Assuming that we had a complete military victory in Korea, if you were to disregard the cost in human lives, what would it actually gain us? Would it not be something temporary in the way of a military victory, because I would assume that you would always have the threat of another horde of Chinese Communists coming over the border. Does the gentleman agree with me on that point?

Mr. SMITH of Wisconsin. Yes; I think the gentleman is right. So long as the mainland of Asia, which is China proper and Manchuria, is held by the Chinese Communists, any victory we achieve in Korea now is purely temporary.

Mr. O'HARA. Does the gentleman think that Congress should have something to say about the Korean War as well as the matter of sending troops to Europe?

Mr. SMITH of Wisconsin. I take the position, as I have said in my remarks, that Congress should have been consulted before we ever moved into Korea, because it is a war and not police action.

Mr. O'HARA. It is true we have not been consulted, but does not the gentleman think it is the responsibility of Congress to begin to exercise some judgment on Korea also?

Mr. SMITH of Wisconsin. I do not think there is any doubt about it. I think this Congress, when it is called upon to consider appropriations for this venture, should look very closely on all requests that come through, for it follows that, once we appropriate, we approve whatever action that has been taken. Its legality thereafter cannot be questioned.

Mr. CRAWFORD. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SMITH of Wisconsin. I yield to the gentleman from Michigan.

Mr. CRAWFORD. I should like to ask the gentleman one or two questions on one or two points he made. If the so-called intelligentsia of the Western European countries continue to so deeply feel that this American polyglot is kind of a semisavage, still Indian territory setup, and that they do not propose to accept our leadership, and that therefore they will not go along with the proposition of letting Europe be a fourth battlefield for our protection within a period of 40 years, on what grounds can we hope to make progress with them?

I say, if the so-called intelligentsia of Europe continue to maintain the position they have maintained, that they do not propose to accept our leadership militarily or otherwise, they do not propose to accept United States culture, because they substantially look upon us as pretty much of a bunch of savages yet, how are we going to make much progress over there whether we send 25 divisions or 100 divisions or 1,000 divisions? Will the gentleman give us the benefit of his comment on that point?

Mr. SMITH of Wisconsin. That is a pretty big order. If the so-called intelligentsia continue to run the affairs of Europe, I do not see that there is much hope for us or for them, either.

Mr. HOFFMAN of Michigan. If the gentleman will yield, I think what my colleague from Michigan [Mr. CRAWFORD] means, if you boil it down, is, just how are you going to make those folks over there take something they do not want?

Mr. SMITH of Wisconsin. They have been ready to take our money for a long time.

Mr. CRAWFORD. May I go a step further: We have an economic and financial concept here that was put down for the benefit of the 48 countries that came together, and by that I mean our 48 States. We run our show for the benefit of those 48 States, I mean politically, economically, financially, from a tariff standpoint, from an international trade standpoint, and all that goes with it. Here sit the prime ministers of those 48 countries, those 48 States. But Europe thinks of 48 countries. We sit here and think of something, we think of something on that plane, on that thesis, on that basis. How are you going to get the high intelligentsia of Europe, of France, of Belgium, of Spain, or of Luxemburg, to think as we do? We send General Eisenhower over there and they say, "What are you over here for, to impose the American philosophy on us? We do not want your enterprise system, we do not want your banking system, we do not want your political system. What are you doing over here? Why come over here and interfere with us all the time?" They are constantly afraid that we are going to try to shove our philosophy as related to these 48 States down their throats. That is why we do not have any friends in Europe today. I do not think we will have any friends of consequence as long as we go out here on the ground that we are God

Almighty and that we set ourselves up to lead the world and save the world.

Mr. SMITH of Wisconsin. I thank the gentleman for his observation. I agree with him.

Mr. CHIPERFIELD. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SMITH of Wisconsin. I yield to the gentleman from Illinois.

Mr. CHIPERFIELD. I just want to congratulate the gentleman from Wisconsin on making a great speech.

Mr. SMITH of Wisconsin. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. MACK of Washington. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SMITH of Wisconsin. I yield.

Mr. MACK of Washington. The columnists and commentators are referring to the discussion of our foreign policy as the great debate. If it is the great debate, the gentleman from Wisconsin has made an outstanding contribution to the discussion. I agree with a great deal of his speech because in it he said that Acheson ought to be dismissed and that we ought to get our troops out of Korea, with both of which propositions I agree.

I believe that there is more appeasement of Russia than the gentleman has mentioned. In the year 1949 the nations of Western Europe shipped to Russia and her satellites more than $1,000,000,000 worth of goods. Of that $1,000,000,000 worth of goods more than one-fifth, or more than $200,000,000 worth, from France, Britain, and Belgium, consisted of steel, iron, copper, lead, zinc, rubber, tin, ball bearings, and, yes, barbed wire. Does not the gentleman believe that this trade is going on between Great Britain, France, and Belgium, and Russia, the selling of war supplies to the enemy we are urging our people to fight, is an appeasement of Russia?

Mr. SMITH of Wisconsin. Absolutely. I referred to the fact that they are today, at this very moment, appeasing Communist Russia and the Communist Chinese.

Yesterday's newspaper carried a report that wherever rubber is produced, the British are selling it to the Chinese Communists. They are selling them all they can possibly produce. That is a highly inconsistent position to take, when the free nations assert they are against communism.

Mr. MACK of Washington. Is it not also a fact that the United States is buying vast quantities of goods, mostly luxury items, such as furs, crab meat, and caviar from the Russians, and supplying the Russians with dollars with which they are paying for the war goods that they are buying from Britain, France, Belguim, and other nations of Western Europe?

Mr. SMITH of Wisconsin. That is correct.

Mr. JENSEN. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SMITH of Wisconsin. I yield.

Mr. JENSEN. I compliment the gentleman for his very able speech. I am in substantial agreement with everything the gentleman has said. Does not the gentleman feel that we are in this thing all over the world because of the fact that we have in power today in this Government of ours a group of people who believe to a great degree in the socialistic way of doing things and because of that we have given aid and comfort to socialism and to too great a degree to the communistic philosophy of government? In fact, we have many people in high places in Government today who, I am sure the gentleman will agree, have communistic leanings. That is being nice to them.

What can we expect in this international situation when we have here in America the philosophy, to a great degree, of the people who claim are our enemies. How can we be effective in trying to show the rest of the world that we really believe in peace and freedom and democracy?

Mr. SMITH of Wisconsin. Of course, the answer is obvious—you just cannot do it.

SPECIAL ORDER GRANTED

Mr. BUTLER asked and was given permission to address the House for 15 minutes on Wednesday next, following the legislative program and any special orders heretofore entered.

LETTER FROM A SOLDIER WITH A LEGITIMATE GRIPE

Mr. JENSEN. Mr. Speaker, with the permission of the gentlemen who have special orders, I ask unanimous consent to address the House for 1 minute at this time and revise and extend my remarks.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. MORRIS). If that is agreeable to the gentlemen having special orders, and if there is no objection, the gentleman may proceed.

There was no objection.

Mr. JENSEN. Mr. Speaker, we have heard a great deal about the criminal waste of money which Congress has appropriated for national defense and so forth. We understand that 82 percent of the billions Congress has appropriated for National defense since VJ-day has been spent for housekeeping and only 18 percent for armaments. I have just received a letter from a soldier in one of our training camps, which is good proof of what has been going on in this respect, hence today we have men training for war with little to train with. I will read the letter from this soldier. It is as follows:

DEAR SIR: I know you are a very busy man so I will try to make this as short as possible. They say a soldier is always griping, but having been in the Army only 4 months I couldn't swear as to the truth of that statement, but I do believe we, down here, have a few legitimate gripes.

I'm in a tank battalion in the Forty-fifth Infantry Division. There is only one tank battalion in the whole division. We at full strength are supposed to have 22 tanks in our company. We have three worn out M-4's in our company, so you can imagine how good our training can be with so many men trying to train on so few a number of tanks plus their being worn out so their operating efficiency is at a minimum. I fully realize our country is in a bad way as far as armed strength is concerned but it only makes common sense that if you are going to train a soldier you should at least give him something to train with. We cannot possibly become fully trained when we have such a lack of equipment and training aids as to make practical work impossible.

At the end of our inadequate day's training we have the happy thought of sleeping in a cold barracks.

I'm sure if you could but visit this camp you would see that these are not gripes but bare facts.

I fully realize that this letter, if it does any good, won't help me, but it may help some of the men who will be following in my footsteps.

Mr. Speaker, I have omitted the soldier's name and camp for obvious reasons. I thank him for bringing this serious matter to my attention. I now direct it to the attention of Congress and especially to the Armed Services Committee of Congress for proper action.

SPECIAL ORDER GRANTED

Mr. HOFFMAN of Michigan asked and was given permission to address the House for 10 minutes on Thursday next, following the legislative business of the day and any other special orders heretofore entered.

GOVERNING BY EAR

Mr. VORYS. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to address the House for 1 minute and to extend my remarks.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Ohio?

There was no objection.

Mr. VORYS. Mr. Speaker, the Truman administration is not only playing by ear, but apparently expects Congress and the people to do it, too.

Here in the House we cannot get a copy of the budget message, so that we can see it while it is being submitted to the House. Apparently we are supposed to play the budget by ear. This morning a constituent called and asked for the details of the building freeze that was announced today, but effective last Saturday night. I was informed in the NPA office that, although the Executive order is in force now, I could not get a copy of it this morning; also, that relief from the freeze would be by application for a license, but the form of application was not available, as it had not been thought up yet.

Here we go again. Government by press release, oral statements, telephone information. Our forefathers sought a government of laws, not of men. We are getting more and more government by men, not of laws, and we cannot even see the words, the orders, that are to govern us.

We are all supposed to play by ear. I am opposed to it.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. MORRIS). Under previous order of the House, the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. HOFFMAN] is recognized for 10 minutes.

OUR FOREIGN POLICY

Mr. HOFFMAN of Michigan. Mr. Speaker, all of the Republicans from the Midwest I think will agree wholeheartedly with what the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. SMITH] said in his sound, constructive, and timely talk. The Midwest is in accord with what the gentleman said about the President and Secretary of State Acheson—I am wondering what the opinion of the gentleman from

Wisconsin [Mr. SMITH] is on this proposition:

In my judgment, the Republicans have been just a little lukewarm, to put it charitably and kindly, toward the New Deal during the last 5 or 6 years, and also in that they have not made the fight they should have made against what the gentleman told us was coming. Have we been an active, constructive, aggressive opposition party?

What have you got to say about that, if you desire to comment? If you do not, we will just let it drift along, and I will say it for you.

There is no question about it. We have not. We have set back and let those fellows like Acheson and Hiss follow a policy which deep down in our hearts we knew was going to be ruinous. We ought to do a little sitting in sackcloth and ashes, and then get up and go at them, instead of drifting along as we have been doing. Over the years, dazed by their eloquence, befuddled by their bipartisanship, frightened by their false charges of lack of loyalty.

Mr. O'HARA. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HOFFMAN of Michigan. Yes; I yield.

Mr. O'HARA. I certainly want to say to the gentleman from Michigan that he is not one who has sat back and drifted along.

Mr. HOFFMAN of Michigan. Oh, yes, I have at times. There have been a great many times when I was not as great a nuisance to my colleagues as I should have been, and I am sorry for it, because, while I respect and admire my colleagues and want their good will, after all, my duty to my country comes first. I wish I had made it hotter for them than I have. Some say I have talked too much. In fact I have not said enough. At least I never was able to prod them into concerted effective action.

The gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. SMITH] said one thing with which I cannot agree. I do not think he, on further deliberation, will agree with it either. I am sorry. That is on point 7 of his program. If I understood him correctly, he said we should oppose admission of the Red Chinese to the United Nations. I think what the gentleman should have said was that we should let the United Nations go hang, and get out of there ourselves, if the rest of the folks want to take the Reds in. What is the use going along with an international organization which has been doing as the gentleman demonstrated, appeasing these Communists? Playing England's game?

I am warning the gentleman that his talk today, tomorrow, by the international, New Deal, Red radio commentators, columnists, editorialists, and their smear artists is going to be branded as cowardly appeasement; they will say that we should stand up and fight; no matter what the chances of success, no matter what the cost. They are going to say that we are cowards or that we lack the courage to fight, when the fact is the gentleman is exhibiting outstanding courage in opposing them when they insist upon the sacrifice of our American youth, perhaps in Europe, as they have been sacrificed in Korea, to no purpose. I have watched the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. SMITH] for the last 10 years here in Congress, and I do not recall a single occasion when he has failed, as a member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, to point out our danger and to warn our people of what was coming. I regret, as I am sure he does, that his predictions have been so accurate. He told the Congress. It would not listen. Now the people are paying. But all the advice he has given has been disregarded, and we have gone along, following the Achesons and the Trumans, until today we are in a situation where now we must determine whether we are to destroy the security of the Republic by sending our resources and our men abroad until we have nothing left.

From the bottom of my heart I want to thank the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. SMITH] for what he has said today for the clear over-all picture that he has given us of the situation in which we are now. I wish the Congress had followed his advice in the past.

Again from the bottom of my heart may I express the hope that my Republican colleagues will have the courage for once at least to take a stand and to think first of this country and express their thinking and their convictions through their votes here in the House in this next session. But again we are being squeezed here in the House because these appropriation bills are coming up. I would not vote one single cent to send our men across if it were not for the fact that we cannot desert those who are there and if we vote against appropriation bills we will be told, "You will not even vote to arm the men who are over there; you will not even vote to sustain those who are fighting now in this battle." So you see where we are. I wish there was some way by which we could curb the President in his stubborn, disastrous program of sending all our men abroad. I hope that a way may be found whereby we can separate, as the gentleman from New York [Mr. TABER], said, we can separate those appropriations which are needed to protect our own interests from those which are to be in furtherance of this program of internationalism.

Mr. JENSEN. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HOFFMAN of Michigan. I yield.

Mr. JENSEN. The first thing we shall have to do then will be to do away with the one-package appropriation bill.

Mr. HOFFMAN of Michigan. I am all for that, too.

Mr. JENSEN. Then we will have an opportunity to vote on domestic matters, on civilian matters and on military matters separately.

Mr. HOFFMAN of Michigan. With that I agree. What the gentleman means is so that Mr. Truman will be forced to do a little sacrificing on the domestic program and on Federal employee appropriations. That is what the gentleman is getting at.

Mr. JENSEN. Exactly. But we will not have a chance unless we can vote on each departmental appropriation bill separately.

Mr. HOFFMAN of Michigan. All right. I am with you on that. We might go one step further and support the gentleman in the other body who said we all should pay an income tax on the expense item which is now tax exempt. How do you like that?

Again, in behalf of my constituents, I thank the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. SMITH] for his clear, courageous, helpful talk.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under the previous order of the House, the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. CRAWFORD] is recognized for 10 minutes.

SYNTHETIC AND NATURAL RUBBER

Mr. CRAWFORD. Mr. Speaker, the subject I wish to discuss is rubber, synthetic and natural rubber for the use of our military forces and civilian population. It may be well to review just for a moment the fact that during World War II the taxpayers of this country provided about $750,000,000 for the purpose of building a group of synthetic rubber producing plants in the United States so that we might protect ourselves insofar as rubber is required in every phase of our life. The capacity of those mills amounted to about 900,000 tons of synthetic rubber per annum, or that was what the production was brought up to during World War II. When we went into the conflict we had a few thousand tons of natural rubber on hand. The rubber-producing areas were controlled by the British, Dutch, and French combinations, trusts, you might call them. We either had to go into the production of synthetic rubber or shut down our transportation system.

After World War II was over, theoretically the question came up of disposing of those synthetic rubber plants to private industry. Many of us in both the House and the Senate protested against that disposal and felt that a certain number of those plants should be kept in production and that some of them should be kept in a stand-by position, that we should continue the production of synthetic rubber to the extent of about 275,000 tons per annum. So now we are down to the present emergency and some of us from this body and the other body, led by the whip of the other body, the gentleman from Texas, I believe it is now, have brought many of those plants back into production and we are again moving up toward the 900,000 tons of synthetic rubber production per annum. That will relieve our momentary situation and if we can get a few thousand tons of natural rubber into the country that will give us another lift.

Then we should go one step farther, and that is the real point I want to make today. When will the United States begin to produce natural rubber on a substantial scale? We have the land area, we have the climate, we have carried out sufficient experiments in the Southwest to know that we can do it. There is now a movement on foot to produce a great many thousand pounds of guayule rubber-plant seed.

The Munitions Board has added guayule seed and seedlings to the list of strategic and critical materials. I know that efforts have been afoot to have this done for at least 2 years. However, it took the combined efforts of the entire

Preparedness Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee to make the administration see the light and open the way to grow natural rubber in the United States in case our supplies from the Far East are reduced or shut off.

The final action in this matter by the Munitions Board was taken under its new chairman, John D. Small, who had been with the War Production Board and the Civilian Production Administration during World War II and the reconversion period immediately thereafter. It is apparent that this gentleman takes full cognizance of the fact so well expressed by Mr. Bernard Baruch in 1943 which closes with the statement, "Thus the rubber situation gives rise to our most critical problem."

Again with some strenuous urging by our former colleague now the junior Senator from Texas, Mr. LYNDON JOHNSON, we are endeavoring to produce as rapidly as possible every pound of synthetic rubber that our war-built synthetic producing plants are capable of turning out.

Gentlemen, synthetic rubber is good but it cannot take the place of natural rubber in all products as yet. We must have a substantial percentage, probably around 30 percent or more, natural rubber to support all-out synthetic-rubber consumption.

When it comes time for the House to act on that proposition, I hope that the necessary authorization and appropriation will be made for the production of this seed so that later on we can produce the plants and extract the raw rubber from those plants, thereby supplementing the synthetic rubber which we will produce in our synthetic plants.

If you will study the tonnage and poundage of rubber that is required for a military truck, for a military fighting machine that flies, or for your automobiles and trucks, and every other kind of implement or gadget which we use in military operation and which contains more or less rubber, you will find we simply have to have that rubber or we do not move. The railroads of this country are utterly incapable of carrying the tonnage which is necessary for peacetime and wartime production. That means we have to substantially rely on trucks to move the goods and the people. That means you must have enough natural rubber to go into truck tires in order to enable those trucks to travel at very high speed on the highways with extremely heavy loads on each axle. It further means that you have to put natural rubber in these truck tires. You do not have to have natural rubber in the automobile tires we use for touring purposes. A few weeks ago I took a set of tires off of my Buick automobile, strictly synthetic rubber, which I had driven over 35,000 miles. These casings are now being used by my boy on his so-called tin lizzy which he drives to school. He will probably put another 5,000 miles on those casings. They were made of synthetic rubber. But we do not have to carry heavy loads; we do not have to drive 75 miles an hour in our touring cars; but with trucks averaging 40 to 45 or 50 miles an hour on these long hauls, carrying from 10 to 30 tons of weight, they must have natural rubber in those tires.

There is no assurance that anybody can give that is worth a nickel that ships will clear from far-eastern ports—that is, the Dutch Malay Straits—with natural rubber from now on. I understand that the American military officials have ordered all of the American rubber-producing companies in the Far East to get out of that area such rubber as they have ready for shipment without any further delay. It is reasonable to assume that if hostilities break out on a big scale the ocean channels will be closed in that part of the area and what natural rubber we may have on hand at that moment and have moving that has cleared the submarine area will be about the only natural rubber we will have for some time.

So these statements I have made are strictly in the interest of getting more natural rubber for the use of our people.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under previous order of the House the gentleman from California [Mr. YORTY] is recognized for 10 minutes.

FOREIGN POLICY

Mr. YORTY. Mr. Speaker, this Congress is engaged in what has been termed "The Great Debate." It was launched by a former President and almost every day since some member of the Republican Party has emphatically displayed the wide diversity of opinion existing among leaders or spokesmen of that party. There is, in a sense, no debate at all. Instead we are hearing a series of political speeches made with a view toward 1952, at a time and in a manner likely to further confuse our own people and our allies. We are compelled under the circumstances to be curious as to just what policy or whose policy the Republicans are recommending and to wonder why they do not hold a caucus, settle their wide differences, adopt a definite policy, and then present that policy in an orderly way instead of using a sort of Tower of Babel approach. How can we adopt a bipartisan foreign policy that will give us the unity circumstances require while the Republican leaders are recommending many different policies and each one implies that adoption of a policy other than his own will not be bipartisan enough to enlist his support and acquiescence. Is there any one spokesman who can clearly state the present Republican policy in foreign affairs? Is it the isolationism of the former President, the semi-isolationism of the Senator from Ohio, the militance of the titular head of the party, the boldness of the Senator from California, or the positive approach espoused by Mr. Dulles or Mr. Stassen? Is it the policy of the Republican Party that we leave Korea, which seems to be the view of the Senator from Ohio, or that we stay in accordance with the view of the Senator from New Hampshire whom the Republicans have recently placed on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee?

No, Mr. Speaker, we are not witnessing a debate. We are witnessing a seminar. The theory of isolationism might have provided material for a debate in another era long past, but inexorable fact has exploded the theory completely although it creeps up as a sort of infantile emotional desire for an easy way out when we find ourselves perplexed by the heavy burden or responsibility fate places upon us. Having twice within a few decades been forced to liberate Europeans from evil, predatory conquerors, both for their sake and our own, we dare not allow our yearning for tranquillity to hypnotize us into thinking that we need not meet the menace until all the rest of the free world has been shackled and enslaved.

No matter how much we dislike the prospect, we all know almost instinctively that when the fatal hour strikes we will not stand idly by and watch the decent people of the world ruthlessly ravaged. If we squarely face this fact now, the frustration stemming from indecision will dissipate and we will begin to act like the proud, courageous people which we are capable of being. Surely a just God would never confront us with an evil challenge without also giving us the strength to meet it, provided we are willing to carry our cross and accept necessary sacrifices until freedom arises again wherever it has been trammeled. Have we lost faith in God or the justice of our cause? How can we doubt that we will ultimately win this struggle, the outcome of which will vitally affect the lives of our own children and the generations following after them? We have no intelligent alternative. Our choice is made. We must lead the forces of freedom and we must and we will win. If the lustful war lords choose to expand the war they are waging against us they will ultimately learn that the demoralizing theory of the dialectics of materialism is erroneous—that the free will exercised in accordance with conscience gives man strength and control over his own destiny within the limits prescribed by the laws of the universe; that freemen inspired by the love of liberty will never cease fighting fiercely against any force that threatens to degrade them, to destroy their individual dignity or their right to experience a relatively short span of life on this whirling sphere free from arbitrary and tyrannical restraint.

If we face the facts, we can remove from the area of debate any question of our firm resolve to stand side by side with our fellow men to block the path of the aggressor. Our assignment in the struggle then becomes primarily a matter of military decision to be based upon the capabilities and capacities of the units making up the total available forces. We can trust our military leaders to see that our Armed Forces carry no more than their fair share of the burden and that they are deployed in a manner best calculated to deter or defeat aggression, provided we leave to them the military decisions which they are singularly qualified to make.

Political policies must, of course, be determined by Congress. In order to unify the Nation, the executive branch should be extremely careful to avoid overstepping its rightful constitutional authority. For instance, if the North Atlantic Pact leaves any reasonable doubt as to the

right of the President to deploy air, ground, or naval forces in Europe, that doubt should be cleared up at once in cooperation with the Congress. We can ill afford to allow such an important matter to become the cause of interminable controversy.

It seems hollow to me to argue that the President would have the power of deployment in the event of war, but not now, when in fact we are already at war. What are we fighting in Korea if not one phase of the battle for Asia? It took General MacArthur's brilliant defeat of the North Korean puppets to unmask for even the most reluctant nonbelievers the solidarity of the Kremlin's forces of whatever race or nationality, and their willingness to resort to war to achieve their evil ends. It is evident that the Kremlin conquerors, as part of their world-wide plot, intend to drive all western influence out of Asia and to enslave the peoples of the entire continent. The conclusive proof of their world-wide designs is in plain view for all who are willing to see.

Twelve years ago, as chairman of the California State Committee on Un-American Activities, I came to the conclusion that the Kremlin was bent on world conquest. I have never had reason to doubt this, except for a brief interval after the war when I dared hope that their policy was shifting somewhat. There is not a country where their stealthy and cunning advance agents are not directing groups of native traitors. Everywhere they are spreading vicious propaganda, working to confuse and frighten their intended victims.

We all know that some of our allied nations were internally undermined almost to the point of collapse before we gave them sufficient help to enable courageous leaders to unite majorities determined to remain free. At this time, we must use great care lest our actions demoralize or discourage people living in the ominous presence of powerful, threatening armies. In their struggle to prepare their defenses, they must be assured of our unwavering support.

Irresponsible statements made here are certain to be fully utilized by the Kremlin's propagandists.

Mr. Speaker, we all recognize the fact that no man's judgment is any better than the information upon which it is based. Right now, we would all have more confidence in our judgment if we knew we understood the true facts. For military reasons, it is obvious we cannot be advised in advance of plans like the Inchon landing, which brought victory over the North Koreans from the brink of apparent defeat.

I find many phases of the war in Korea puzzling. Having served in the Air Forces and having been subjected to bombing, I am amazed that any army can sustain an offensive with no air support, against a well-equipped opponent possessing full control of the air. We may ask just what are we now trying to accomplish in Korea? It would have strategic value as a beach head on the continent, if we were prepared to vigorously expand and extend it, but we are not even permitting our Air Force to support our infantry by bombing enemy supply depots outside of Korea. Under such circumstances we are fighting under most disadvantageous conditions. Korea has proved that we will fight. It has also proved, beyond further doubt, that the Communists under the Kremlin are one unit, and that they will fight where the advantage is in their favor. Korea has roused us from our lethargy. It has started us on the road to the preparedness which is our only hope for security. For this, our people have paid an awesome price. Surely no deceptive peace overtures will again lull us back to sleep and cause us to slacken our defense efforts. Surely we can disengage our divisions in Korea and still continue to build our strength to where we will not need to worry about loss of face, consider seating another cynical aggressor in the United Nations, or handing over a strategically located island, which is a vital link in our outer defense chain.

It seems obvious that, whether or not we can hold on in Korea, we certainly cannot consider leaving the same divisions there indefinitely. Yet no one seems inclined to send fresh divisions to relieve them. If we are not going to, or cannot, relieve them, we surely should get them out now. They have brought honor to themselves and their flag. They can depart with their heads high. This is only the first round. We need not listen to the defeatists among us who are ready to throw in the sponge and write off all of Europe without even a fight, because Korea has proved a bitter experience. They argue that, because we are not fully prepared now, any effort to get strong will cause the Kremlin's forces to attack before we are ready. This is actually arguing that we should resign ourselves and our children to a life of abject fear. Such defeatism is unworthy of a great nation. If the Kremlin were confident of its ability to succeed, I think it would attack Europe and the Middle East at once. Only the Kremlin knows its own weaknesses. Ours are pointed out daily.

Historically, I am told, Russian armies have stockpiled heavily before hostilities. This would be more important now with their factories and supply lines vulnerable to air attacks. It may very well be that we can use our superior industrial power to reach a security level of preparedness before the Kremlin feels able to risk full scale hostilities. At any rate, we have no choice. It is our only hope for avoiding full scale war. We must, in this Congress and throughout this Nation, conduct ourselves with such resolution that the oppressed everywhere will take heart and dare to hope that if they strive faithfully, God will point the way to a better day. Ours is a tremendous responsibility. Like our forefathers, we will pledge our lives, our fortunes and our sacred honor—we will not let freedom perish from the earth.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under previous order of the House, the gentleman from New York [Mr. TABER] is recognized for 5 minutes.

THE PRESIDENT'S BUDGET

Mr. TABER. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that in the printing of my remarks the table which I have prepared and which is part of my statement may appear in tabular form.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from New York?

There was no objection.

Mr. TABER. Mr. Speaker, so that it may be easy to understand, I have prepared a little table that shows what the President's budget does:

Carry-over from 1950	$13,000,000,000
Appropriation for 1951	88,668,000,000
	101,668,000,000
Estimated expenditures, 1951	47,210,000,000
Carry-over to 1952	54,458,000,000
1952 estimates, net	94,429,000,000
	148,887,000,000
Estimated expenditures	71,594,000,000
Balance to be spent after 1952	77,293,000,000

The estimates for civilian activities have very generally been increased, although there are some minor exceptions. Items are included for very large amounts for medical aid and for aid to education. It is very evident that there is lots of work for the Appropriations Committee, and that the opportunities for cuts and savings were never better.

The military item estimated request is $62,000,000,000 for 1952, with $10,000,000,000 remaing to be asked in 1951. Never before, even in wartime, have we failed to have a budget for military expenditures submitted when the Congress met. The budget for 1952 contains no detail for the committee to work with. I assume it will come later.

HON. HOMER D. ANGELL

The SPEAKER laid before the House the following communication, which was read by the Clerk:

PORTLAND, OREG., *January 12, 1951.*

The Honorable SAM RAYBURN,
Speaker, House of Representatives,
United States, Washington, D. C.

SIR: In accordance with your designation of me, pursuant to House Resolution 49, Eighty-second Congress, adopted by the House of Representatives, to administer the oath of office to Representative-elect HOMER D. ANGELL, of the Third District of Oregon, I hereby report that on the 12th day of January, 1951, at Portland, State of Oregon, I administered the oath of office to Mr. ANGELL, form prescribed by section 1757 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, being the form of oath administered to Members of the House of Representatives, to which Mr. ANGELL subscribed.

Respectfully,

JAMES ALGER FEE,
Chief Judge, United States District Court for the District of Oregon.

Mr. KEATING. Mr. Speaker, I offer a resolution (H. Res. 69), which I send to the Clerk's desk, and ask for its immediate consideration.

The Clerk read as follows:

Whereas HOMER D. ANGELL, a Representative from the State of Oregon from the Third District thereof, has been unable to appear in person to be sworn as a Member of this House, but has sworn to and subscribed to the oath of office before Hon. James A. Fee, United States district judge for the district of Oregon, authorized by resolution

of this House to administer the oath, and the said oath of office has been presented in his behalf to the House, and there being no contest or question as to his election: Therefore be it

Resolved, That the said oath be accepted and received by the House as the oath of office of the said HOMER D. ANGELL as a Member of this House.

The resolution was agreed to.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

SPECIAL ORDER GRANTED

Mr. HARVEY asked and was given permission to address the House for 15 minutes on Thursday next, following the legislative business of the day and any other special orders heretofore entered.

THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION

Mr. BENNETT of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to address the House for 30 minutes at this time.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Florida?

There was no objection.

Mr. BENNETT of Florida. Mr. Speaker, we have heard a great many speeches today and in the immediate past about the international situation and about what we should do for mobilization and bringing both political parties together in greater harmony. Some of the Members of this House have tried to answer some of these questions, or have at least asked preliminary questions which might give us the answers to the basic questions more thoroughly than we have such answers at the present time.

I have here a statement which was drawn up, with the cooperation of both Republicans and Democrats, with the idea of trying to bring to a head some of the things beneficial to our country. A great majority who participated in this work have the feeling that this is a good statement and expressed at least our ideas. It is as follows:

To assist in the defense of our country we join together to state our opinions on matters which we feel require immediate action by Congress.

We feel that we need more information on the degree of self-help being experienced in Europe to resist Soviet imperialism, our specific foreign policies in the areas of the world in greatest danger, the requirements of military and economic aid in those areas, the priorities of strategic importance among those areas, the ability of the United States to respond to financial and military programs which are required to assist our allies in the present circumstances, what domestic services now rendered by our Government can be eliminated or curtailed during the present emergency as a means of giving our country the additional strength required by the international situation, and what can be done to utilize more fully America's manpower in tasks which face this country.

In order to secure this information we are sponsoring two resolutions which have been introduced today. One would direct the Committee on Foreign Affairs to ascertain and report on specified matters relative to international affairs and the other would establish a select committee to report on functions of the Federal Government which can be eliminated or severely curtailed in the present emergency and also upon manpower problems of the Federal Government.

The first of these resolutions is specific but the resolution on the select committee is necessarily general in nature, as the committee is expected to develop places for curtailment which may not be obvious to the average Congressman.

We believe that the request of the President for rigid economy in these times will be accomplished by the standing committees of the House with whatever assistance they can secure from other agencies. However, the resolution introduced today is primarily concerned with curtailing or postponing nondefense activties. Illustrations of places where economies could be effected by great reductions or curtailment of activities when not connected with defense are in such programs as the following: Housing, agriculture, harbor development, reclamation, roads, public printing, Government public relations, etc.

We hope that the committee can develop more efficient utilization of Government manpower. For instance, we recommend that the work week of Federal employees be increased commensurate with the mobilization effort (as it should also be in private enterprise), and that vacations be standardized throughout Government service on a basis comparable with private enterprise. The increased working days would provide Government workers with increased income and would lessen the requirements for additional Government personnel to meet the present emergency.

The two resolutions which have been mentioned do not cover all aspects of the defense effort required in the present emergency. There are other matters related to mobilization which have been omitted because they are in active consideration by committees in he House at the present time. For example, we believe that the danger of world war is imminent and, having accepted such premise, that our present national effort is not sufficient; that substantially all of the National Guard should be immediately mobilized and that industrial mobilization should be speeded up so that necessary arms and equipment can be furnished such units; that all able-bodied military personnel now involved in "housekeeping" duties in desk, recruiting, and training positions should be reassigned and replaced by those less fit physically; that serious consideration should be given to the establishment of a foreign legion in which recruits from all over the world would be enlisted and to permitting the Japanese and Germans to rearm for their own defense and as bulwarks against the spread of communistic aggression; that deferments for gifted students in American colleges should be available only for students pursuing courses of practical value to the defense efforts; that there should be fewer rejections in the selective service; that wage and price controls should be imposed without delay; that, in order to pay for the needed outlays and to assist in combatting inflation, despite such savings as can be made, it is essential that taxes be very substantially increased or substantial new sources of taxation developed.

Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to insert at this point of my remarks a resolution which I wish to read.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Florida?

There was no objection.

Mr. BENNETT of Florida. The resolution on elimination of nondefense expenditures reads as follows:

Resolution Creating a Select Committee to Conduct An Investigation and Study of the Activities of the Government During the Existing National Emergency

Resolved, That there is hereby created a select committee to be composed of 11 Members of the House of Representatives to be appointed by the Speaker, one of whom he shall designate as chairman. Any vacancy occurring in the membership of the committee shall be filled in the same manner in which the original appointment was made.

The committee is authorized and directed to conduct a full and complete investigation and study of (1) all activities of the Government, to determine which activities, not essential to the national defense, should be terminated or curtailed during the existing national emergency, and to determine ways of performing more efficiently and economically other activities of the Government, and (2) manpower problems of the Government to determine ways of more effectively utilizing such manpower.

The committee is authorized to coordinate its activities with other committees of the House so as to evade duplication of effort and shall report to the House (or to the Clerk of the House if the House is not in session) as soon as practicable during the present Congress the results of its investigation and study, together with such recommendations as it deems advisable.

For the purpose of carrying out this resolution the committee, or any subcommittee thereof authorized by the committee to hold hearings, is authorized to sit and act during the present Congress at such times and places within or outside the United States, whether the House is in session, has recessed, or has adjourned, to hold such hearings, and to require, by subpena or otherwise, the attendance and testimony of such witnesses and the production of such books, records, correspondence, memoranda, papers, and documents, as it deems necessary. Subpenas may be issued under the signature of the chairman of the committee or any member of the committee designated by him, and may be served by any person designated by such chairman or member.

From now on my remarks are going to be my own entirely, although they will have a bearing upon what I have already said of our joint efforts.

It is the thought of these Congressmen who gathered together to study this particular situation that there are many fields of Government activity and service which could be eliminated entirely. We do not see any particular reason, for instance, why there should be any public relations work done in various branches of the Government, as for example in the Veterans' Administration and particularly in the branches of the armed services when everybody is being called by Selective Service anyway. There seems to be very little reason for recruiting work of that kind at this time. Every Congressman receives many publications to distribute amongst his constituents. That is a very fine thing in ordinary times, but the expense of sending them out and the expense of compiling them seems to us to be inconsistent with the defense needs of our country.

I represent a district which has flood control and harbor projects. There are many like me. Some of those projects probably come within the scope of the national defense effort but we all know that tremendous sums of money could be saved by the elimination of some of those projects during this crucial time whenever the particular projects are not connected with the national defense efforts. If that policy could be established and rigidly carried out, I am sure we would all cooperate, for then we could say that we had done the best we could,

consistent with a policy of defense priorities. Another field, that of agriculture, seems to be one where great reductions in costs can be effected and portions of the programs eliminated for the purpose of this emergency. If we eliminated the Federal finances which were not necessary to the national defense, hundreds of millions of dollars could be saved. Another field where immense savings could be made is that of public roads. Good roads are very important, of course, for the development of our country, but we know that much of what is being done today could be eliminated or curtailed for the time being at least.

We have pointed out some improvements which could be made in the field of working hours, and they should be carried out in this time of national emergency. They would help in problems which face the Post Office and Civil Service Committee right now. At the present time there are great inequities between the various branches of our Federal Government. Some people receive a 4-weeks vacation, some receive 2; some receive different benefits from others in practically the same fields.

Before I close my remarks I would like to say a word about this very important resolution on foreign affairs, which has been introduced. It deals with finding out the facts with regard to our international situation so that we will have more facts to go on and less talk. It seems to me we should be getting together in order to work out the proper solutions that we can find. There should be less talk about disunity, there should be less talk about criticizing any particular person. After all, this Congress has the power to do everything which we desire to do if we will just take the initiative. We should not be talking about politics in times like these and we should not be making our speeches for the purpose of getting votes back home or for the purpose of doing anything except to try to strengthen our country. It is for that purpose that these young men got together in an effort to bring forth these two resolutions and the statement included in the first part of my remarks.

There undoubtedly are imperfections in them. They may not be well founded in some respects; however, we have done the very best we could. Perhaps some of the information called for cannot be made available to the general public, perhaps cannot be made available to the Congress as a whole, but the committees should study these things so that we may have a better foundation upon which to build our future strength.

Mr. REES of Kansas. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BENNETT of Florida. I yield to the gentleman from Kansas.

Mr. REES of Kansas. I want to commend the distinguished gentleman from Florida upon his forthright statement and for his effort to cut civilian expenses as far as that may be done. I join with him in his suggestion and in his proposal that all expenditures of Government outside of the military be cut to the bone and that no expenditures be approved except those that are absolutely necessary to carry on the work of these agencies and funds that are required to carry on the defense program.

I also want to commend the gentleman for his views in respect to the use of personnel in our Government. We should not have more personnel in any of our agencies than is absolutely necessary. The expenditures for our civilian agencies should be made in the light of absolute need and for such funds as are required to carry on the defense program.

Mr. BENNETT of Florida. I thank the gentleman for his comments and I would like to commend him on the resolution he has introduced to bring about savings with reference to the work of the Hoover Commission, and having such a commission made a permanent matter. I heard his speech the other day, and it was a very splendid one. His resolution is a good one.

I do not think the proposals made in the resolution I introduced overlap those of the gentleman from Kansas. I think the proposals supplement each other. The gentleman's effort is to cut out unnecessary and wasteful expenditure in Government which to a certain extent may overlap this, but the primary objective of this resolution is to cut out services now rendered by the Government in this present emergency when such services are unnecessary in our effort to give our country greater strength.

Mr. REES of Kansas. They can be worked out together.

Mr. POTTER. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BENNETT of Florida. I yield to the gentleman from Michigan.

Mr. POTTER. I wish to compliment the gentleman on his very fine statement. I think the Congress and the people should know that the distinguished gentleman from Florida was the moving spirit and the moving force which brought about this very fine statement. I hope through the action he has taken that we will have a speeding up of effort in our mobilization program.

Mr. BENNETT of Florida. I thank the gentleman. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to include as a part of my remarks a resolution with regard to foreign affairs.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Florida?

There was no objection.

The resolution referred to on foreign affairs is as follows:

Whereas in order to successfully implement our foreign policy, it is imperative that the Government have the confidence and support of the citizens of the United States; and

Whereas reverses suffered by the United Nations in Korea and the imminent danger of another world war, have caused the people of this country to become vitally concerned as to whether or not the foreign policy being pursued by the United States is one that will insure the security of our country and our democratic form of government, and lead to a lasting peace; and

Whereas since the end of World War II Congress has ratified the United Nations Charter, committing the United States to collective security measures; the North Atlantic Pact, committing the United States to the mutual defense of the member nations; and did in 1949 pass the foreign military aid bill to implement the North Atlantic Pact; and

Whereas resultant actions taken by the United States in furtherance of the aims and objectives of the United Nations and under the North Atlantic Pact have been the subject of acrimonious attack by many citizens, including some Members of this body; and

Whereas the Congress is concerned with effecting a clarification of our foreign policies and the reasons therefore, including, but not limited to, those involving Europe, the Middle East, and Asia; and

Whereas the criticism, if untrue, directed toward various members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization for not making a comparable effort with the United States in the defense of Western Europe is harmful to a unified defense against communism; and

Whereas the Soviets have been conducting an increasingly bitter propaganda campaign against the United States, thereby necessitating an increased effort on our part to inform the peoples of the world that our cause is the preservation of peace, freedom, and justice: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, That the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives is forthwith directed to investigate and report to the House of Representatives, at the earliest practicable date, specific findings of fact and recommendations concerning the following:

1. Whether or not the North Atlantic Pact signatories are making a military and economic effort comparable with that of the United States to defend Western Europe against Soviet imperialism, and whether or not there exists throughout Western Europe, including Western Germany, a determined will to resist vigorously any attack.

2. Our specific foreign policies in Western Europe, the Mediterranean area, the Middle, Near, and Far East, together with an estimate of the military and economic aid required to fully implement such policies.

3. The areas in the world which are of such strategic importance that their subjugation by Russia would seriously impair the ability of the United States to defend itself, together with an analysis of the relative priority that should be accorded such area.

4. Whether or not the United States is conducting an adequate program to convince the peoples of the world, both within and without the Soviet sphere of influence, that our cause is the preservation of peace, freedom, and justice.

Mr. BENNETT of Florida. Mr. Speaker, may I say in conclusion that perhaps some things which I have said may not meet with the entire approval of all of the membership of the group of Congressmen I mentioned, but these young men have worked together in an effort to bring out the things that have been brought out. Some of the suggestions made in my speech, which was unprepared, may not represent everything I have in mind, but all of the young men who worked together on this are young men who put their country ahead of their reputation, ahead of their own personal desires, and we are trying to make an effort to give whatever impetus we can to strengthening our country.

INDUSTRIAL MOBILIZATION

Mr. LANTAFF. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to address the House for 1 minute, to revise and extend my remarks, and include a resolution.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Florida?

There was no objection.

Mr. LANTAFF. Mr. Speaker, today, the American people are being called upon to make great sacrifices to defend our cherished freedom. Thousands of our young men have given their lives in Korea to stop Communist aggression, and in furtherance of our policy, and that of the United Nations, to preserve peace, freedom, and justice for the liberty-loving peoples of the world. Many more of our young men will be called to arms in order to adequately prepare our country for a global conflict that may be precipitated at any time by Russia. The citizens of the United States will be called upon this year to pay higher taxes and to make numerous other sacrifices for the defense of America, and to implement our foreign policy.

We, in Congress, if we are to have the confidence of the people must ourselves have a deep conviction that the policies to which we commit our country will insure the security of America and a lasting peace. We, ourselves, must have confidence in our foreign policy. The acrimonious debate in Congress is indicative of the fact that there are widely divergent opinions throughout the country which must be harmonized into a unified effort.

Our policy, in general, has been to create situations of strength throughout the world to enable the free peoples everywhere to resist communism. In pursuing such a policy will we so weaken our domestic economy that we are unable to fully protect ourselves? How much military and economic aid will be required to fully and effectively implement our policy of making all countries strong outside the Soviet orbit? If the Soviets instigate a series of Korea incidents around the Soviet periphery tomorrow, as they are fully capable of doing, we will be confronted with numerous decisions which cannot possibly be made intelligently without a thorough analysis of many factors.

How much military and economic effort would be required of us to successfully resist the subjugation of Yugoslavia through a Soviet-directed attack by the satellites? How much military and economic aid would be required to insure that the rubber supply of Malaya does not fall to the Communists through a Viet Minh offensive, supported by the Chinese Communists? Would the loss of the Malay States or of Jugoslavia seriously impair our ability to defend ourselves? Is it wiser to scatter our strength throughout the world or should our energies be directed to the full support of strategic areas, in order of their priority, which are necessary to the preservation of our freedom?

All of these questions and many more are running through my mind and I am sure they are running through the minds of many of our citizens.

In the hope of obtaining these answers and to insure the confidence and support of all citizens of the United States in our foreign policy, I introduced, this morning, the following resolution:

Whereas in order to successfully implement our foreign policy, it is imperative that the Government have the confidence and support of the citizens of the United States; and

Whereas reverses suffered by the United Nations in Korea, and the imminent danger of another world war, have caused the people of this country to become vitally concerned as to whether or not the foreign policy being pursued by the United States is one that will insure the security of our country and our democratic form of government, and lead to a lasting peace; and

Whereas since the end of World War II, Congress has ratified the United Nations Charter, committing the United States to collective security measures; the North Atlantic Pact, committing the United States to the mutual defense of the member nations; and did in 1949 pass the foreign military aid bill to implement the North Atlantic Pact; and

Whereas resultant actions taken by the United States in furtherance of the aims and objectives of the United Nations and under the North Atlantic Pact have been the subject of acrimonious attack by many citizens, including some Members of this body; and

Whereas the Congress is concerned with effecting a clarification of our foreign policies and the reasons therefore, including, but not limited to, those involving Europe, the Middle East, and Asia; and

Whereas the criticism, if untrue, directed toward various members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization for not making a comparable effort with the United States in the defense of Western Europe is harmful to a unified defense against communism; and

Whereas the Soviets have been conducting an increasingly bitter propaganda campaign against the United States, thereby necessitating an increased effort on our part to inform the peoples of the world that our cause is the preservation of peace, freedom and justice: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, That the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives is forthwith directed to investigate and report to the House of Representatives, at the earliest practicable date, specific findings of fact and recommendations concerning the following:

1. Whether or not the North Atlantic Pact signatories are making a military and economic effort comparable with that of the United States to defend Western Europe against Soviet imperialism, and whether or not there exists throughout Western Europe, including Western Germany, a determined will to resist vigorously any attack.

2. Our specific foreign policies in Western Europe, the Mediterranean area, the Middle, Near, and Far East together with an estimate of the military and economic aid required to fully implement such policies.

3. The areas in the world which are of such strategic importance that their subjugation by Russia would seriously impair the ability of the United States to defend itself, together with an analysis of the relative priority that should be accorded such area.

4. Whether or not the United States is conducting an adequate program to convince the peoples of the world, both within and without the Soviet sphere of influence, that our cause is the preservation of peace, freedom, and justice.

With this information before us, I feel sure that all of us, as sincere Americans, seeking to preserve peace, will make sound decisions that will have the confidence of all our people.

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

Mr. WIGGLESWORTH asked and was given permission to extend his remarks and include a newspaper article.

Mr. DEANE asked and was given permission to extend his remarks and include a prayer by Hon. BROOKS HAYS.

Mr. MILLER of Nebraska asked and was given permission to extend his remarks.

Mr. MERROW asked and was given permission to extend his remarks and include an editorial from the New York Times.

Mr. GROSS asked and was given permission to extend his remarks and include an editorial from the Waterloo (Iowa) Daily Courier.

Mr. SCHWABE asked and was given permission to extend his remarks in two instances, in each instance to include extraneous matter.

Mr. BROWN of Ohio asked and was given permission to extend his own remarks.

Mr. FELLOWS asked and was given permission to extend his remarks and include a statement appearing in the New York Herald Tribune by Hon. FREDERIC COUDERT, JR., of New York.

Mr. CLEVENGER asked and was given permission to extend his remarks and include an obituary note.

Mr. BRAY asked and was given permission to extend his remarks and include a statement.

Mr. DAVIS of Wisconsin asked and was given permission to extend his remarks and include a newspaper article.

Mr. KERSTEN of Wisconsin asked and was given permission to extend his remarks and include an article.

Mr. REES of Kansas asked and was given permission to extend his remarks and include a newspaper article.

Mr. CANFIELD asked and was given permission to extend his remarks in two instances, in each to include newspaper material.

Mr. ALLEN of Illinois asked and was given permission to extend his remarks and include the resolution passed by the Rockford (Ill.) Chamber of Commerce.

Mr. HÉBERT asked and was given permission to extend his remarks and include several editorials by the distinguished editor of the New Orleans States, William H. Fitzpatrick.

Mr. CELLER asked and was given permission to extend his remarks in three instances.

Mr. HAYS of Arkansas asked and was given permission to extend his remarks in two instances; in one to include an editorial from the Christian Science Monitor, and in the other some observations of the happy relationship now existing between this Republic and the Republic of Mexico.

Mr. FLOOD asked and was given permission to extend his remarks in four instances, in one to include a resolution of the Polish National Alliance, in one to include a letter from a man in Pennsylvania, and in the others to include newspaper editorials.

Mr. KEATING asked and was given permission to extend his remarks in two instances and in each to include editorials.

Mr. ROGERS of Florida asked and was given permission to extend his remarks and include extraneous matter.

Mr. HOFFMAN of Michigan asked and was given permission to extend his remarks and include a newspaper editorial, and to extend in the Appendix of the RECORD an article which exceeds the limit and is estimated by the Public Printer to cost $218.68.

Mr. McCORMACK asked and was given permission to extend his remarks in two instances and include in one a letter and in the other an editorial; and further to extend his remarks and include an address by Commissioner Henry D. Smyth, of the United States Atomic Energy Commission, notwithstanding the fact that it will exceed two pages of the RECORD and is estimated by the Public Printer to cost $246.

Mr. O'HARA asked and was given permission to extend his remarks and include a letter from a constituent.

Mr. McDONOUGH asked and was given permission to extend his remarks and include an article.

Mr. MILLER of California asked and was given permission to extend his remarks and include a speech.

Mr. VURSELL asked and was given permission to extend his remarks.

Mr. VAN ZANDT (at the request of Mr. KEATING) was given permission to extend his remarks and include an address.

Mr. SHAFER asked and was given permission to extend his remarks in the Appendix of the RECORD in two instances.

ADJOURNMENT

Mr. STEED. Mr. Speaker, I move that the House do now adjourn.

The motion was agreed to; accordingly (at 2 o'clock and 28 minutes p. m.) the House, under its previous order, adjourned until Wednesday, January 17, 1951, at 12 o'clock noon.

EXECUTIVE COMMUNICATIONS, ETC.

Under clause 2 of rule XXIV, executive communications were taken from the Speaker's table and referred as follows:

76. A letter from the Comptroller General of the United States, transmitting a report on the audit of Federal Prison Industries, Inc., for the fiscal year ended June 30, 1950 (H. Doc. No. 41); to the Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments and ordered to be printed.

77. A letter from the President, Board of Commissioners of the District of Columbia, transmitting the report of civil defense activities and expenditures authorized under Public Law 686, approved August 11, 1950 (District of Columbia Civil Defense Act), pursuant to section 6 of said Public Law 686, Eighty-first Congress; to the Committee on the District of Columbia.

78. A letter from the Chairman, Federal Communications Commission, transmitting a proposed amendment of section 410 of the Communications Act; to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

79. A letter from the Chairman, Federal Communications Commission, transmitting a proposed amendment entitled "Amendment to section 4 (g) of the Communications Act which would authorize the Commission to expend funds in connection with its radio monitoring services; to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

80. A letter from the Chairman, National Mediation Board, transmitting the Sixteenth Annual Report to Congress of the National Mediation Board, including the report of the National Railroad Adjustment Board; to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

REPORTS OF COMMITTEES ON PUBLIC BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS

Under clause 2 of rule XIII, reports of committees were delivered to the Clerk for printing and reference to the proper calendar, as follows:

Mr. DOUGHTON: Committee on Ways and Means. House Joint Resolution 73. Joint resolution amending chapter 26 of the Internal Revenue Code; without amendment (Rept. No. 2). Referred to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union.

Mr. DOUGHTON: Committee on Ways and Means. H. R. 1012. A bill to permit educational, religious, or charitable institutions to import textile machines and parts thereof for instructional purposes; without amendment (Rept. No. 3). Referred to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union.

Mr. KING: Committee on Ways and Means. H. R. 136. A bill allowing the consumer of gasoline to deduct, for income-tax purposes, State taxes on gasoline imposed on the wholesaler and passed on to the consumer; with amendment (Rept. No. 4). Referred to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union.

Mr. KING: Committee on Ways and Means. H. R. 137. A bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code, as amended, and the Federal Alcohol Administration Act, as amended; with amendment (Rept. No. 5). Referred to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union.

PUBLIC BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS

Under clause 3 of rule XXII, public bills and resolutions were introduced and severally referred, as follows:

By Mr. H. CARL ANDERSEN:

H. R. 1492. A bill to include in section 16 of the act of June 18, 1934 (48 Stat. 984), the Mdewakanton and Wahpekute Sioux Indians of the State of Minnesota; to the Committee on Public Lands.

By Mr. BARTLETT:

H. R. 1493. A bill to provide for the admission of Alaska into the Union; to the Committee on Public Lands.

By Mr. CELLER:

H. R. 1494. A bill to increase the salaries of judges of the United States; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. EDWIN ARTHUR HALL:

H. R. 1495. A bill to raise revenue for the national defense by regulating contributions which further the election to the House of Representatives of all candidates in primary elections; to the Committee on House Administration.

By Mr. HERLONG:

H. R. 1496. A bill authorizing the President of the United States to issue a proclamation designating 1951 as Audubon Centennial Year; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. KLEIN:

H. R. 1497. A bill to repeal section 342 (h) of the Nationality Act of 1940; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. McMILLAN:

H. R. 1498. A bill to provide compensation for duty voluntarily performed on their days off by officers and members of the Metropolitan Police force, the United States Park Police force, and the White House Police force; to the Committee on the District of Columbia.

By Mr. MORTON:

H. R. 1499. A bill to amend the act approved August 4, 1919, as amended, providing additional aid for the American Printing House for the Blind; to the Committee on Education and Labor.

By Mr. MURDOCK:

H. R. 1500. A bill authorizing the construction, operation, and maintenance of a dam and incidental works in the main stream of the Colorado River at Bridge Canyon, together with certain appurtenant dams and canals, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Public Lands.

By Mr. PATTEN:

H. R. 1501. A bill authorizing the construction, operation, and maintenance of a dam and incidental works in the main stream of the Colorado River at Bridge Canyon, together with certain appurtenant dams and canals, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Public Lands.

H. R. 1502. A bill relating to amounts made available for grants for hospital construction for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1951, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Appropriations.

H. R. 1503. A bill to authorize and direct the Secretary of the Interior to study the respective tribes, bands, and groups of Indians under his jurisdiction to determine their qualifications to manage their own affairs without supervision and control by the Federal Government; to the Committee on Public Lands.

H. R. 1504. A bill to provide for the common defense by establishing a universal training program, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Armed Services.

H. R. 1505. A bill to extend certain benefits now provided by law for veterans of World War II to personnel on active service with the Armed Forces of the United States of America during the military, naval, and air operations in Korea or other places while serving under the flag of the United States of America and the United Nations, or under the flag of the United States of America alone, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Veterans' Affairs.

H. R. 1506. A bill authorizing appropriations for the construction, operation, and maintenance of the western land boundary fence project, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

By Mr. RAMSAY:

H. R. 1507. A bill to amend Public Law 359, chapter 287, Seventy-eighth Congress, second session; to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service.

By Mr. SCUDDER:

H. R. 1508. A bill conferring jurisdiction on the United States District Court for the Northern District of California to hear, determine, and render judgment upon certain claims of the State of California; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. WITHROW:

H. R. 1509. A bill to amend Public Law 106, Seventy-ninth Congress, with regard to compensation for overtime and holiday employment; to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service.

By Mr. YORTY:

H. R. 1510. A bill to provide for the admission of Alaska into the Union; to the Committee on Public Lands.

By Mr. BENTSEN:

H. R. 1511. A bill granting the consent of Congress to the Mid Valley Bridge Co., Hidalgo, Tex., its successors and assigns, to construct, maintain, and operate a bridge across the Rio Grande; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

By Mr. BATTLE:

H. R. 1512. A bill to exempt admissions to certain charitable entertainments from the Federal admission tax; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

H. R. 1513. A bill to provide that overages in postal clerks' accounts may offset shortages; to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service.

H. R. 1514. A bill to amend the Federal Trade Commission Act with respect to the advertising of alcoholic beverages; to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

H. R. 1515. A bill to provide free mailing privileges for patients in or at veterans' hospitals; to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service.

H. R. 1516. A bill to relieve postmasters and other paying employees of the postal service from accountability for wrong payment of money orders in certain cases, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service.

H. R. 1517. A bill to authorize the Public Printer to furnish copies of the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD to the Department of State for distribution to all United States missions abroad; to the Committee on House Administration.

H. R. 1518. A bill providing for the continuance of compensation or pension payments and a subsistence allowance for certain children of deceased veterans of World War I or II during education or training; to the Committee on Veterans' Affairs.

H. R. 1519. A bill to make the educational benefits of the Servicemen's Readjustment Act of 1944 available to the children of persons who died in active service or who died as a result of wounds received in World War II; to the Committee on Veterans' Affairs.

H. R. 1520. A bill for the creation of the Foreign Affairs Advisory Commission; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

By Mr. BECKWORTH:

H. R. 1521. A bill to provide for the training of civilian aircraft pilots, technicians, and mechanics, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

By Mr. BOGGS of Louisiana:

H. R. 1522. A bill to amend sections 174, 200, 200a, and 200b of title 21, United States Code; section 2557 (b), title 26, United States Code; and section 2596, title 26, United States Code, to provide minimum and maximum penalties upon conviction of violation of the act of May 26, 1922, as amended; the act of December 17, 1914, as amended; and the act of August 2, 1937, as amended; and for other purposes; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

H. R. 1523. A bill to confirm and establish the titles of the States to lands and resources in and beneath navigable waters within State boundaries and to provide for the use and control of said lands and resources; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

H. R. 1524. A bill to amend the Railroad Retirement Act of 1937 to make employees eligible for annuities after 30 years of service, regardless of age, and to make widows eligible for annuities, regardless of age; to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

H. R. 1525. A bill to direct the Secretary of the Army to establish a national cemetery in the southern portion of Louisiana; to the Committee on Public Lands.

H. R. 1526. A bill to provide additional benefits with respect to optional retirement of persons serving in the Coast Guard who served in the former Lighthouse Service; to the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries.

H. R. 1527. A bill to amend the Civil Service Retirement Act of May 29, 1930, as amended, to provide certain retirement benefits for civilian marine inspectors, officers in charge, and marine inspection officers of the United States Coast Guard; to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service.

H. R. 1528. A bill to amend the act entitled "An act to create the Inland Waterways Corporation for the purpose of carrying out the mandate and purpose of Congress as expressed in sections 201 and 500 of the Transportation Act, and for other purposes," approved June 3, 1924, as amended; to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

H. R. 1529. A bill to provide for cancellation of certain unenforceable judgments on the records of the United States district courts; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

H. R. 1530. A bill to provide that the Legislative Reference Service shall compile and make available the voting records of the Members of Congress; to the Committee on House Administration.

H. R. 1531. A bill to provide for payment to certain retired members of the Naval and Marine Corps Reserve of a lump sum equal to their retirement pay for the period during which they remained in an inactive status without pay; to the Committee on Armed Services.

H. R. 1532. A bill to provide dispensary treatment and hospitalization in Army and Navy hospitals for retired enlisted personnel of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard; to the Committee on Armed Services.

By Mr. BREHM:

H. R. 1533. A bill to allow an income-tax exemption for any child who is supported by the taxpayer and who is a member of his household; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. COOPER:

H. R. 1534. A bill to amend the act entitled "An act for the control of floods on the Mississippi River and its tributaries, and for other purposes," approved May 15, 1928; to the Committee on Public Works.

By Mr. DOUGHTON:

H. R. 1535. A bill to amend certain administrative provisions of the Tariff Act of 1930 and related laws, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. HAGEN:

H. R. 1536. A bill to amend the Career Compensation Act of 1949 to provide the maximum retirement pay for certain retired enlisted men for the period from July 1, 1942, through June 30, 1946; to the Committee on Armed Services.

H. R. 1537. A bill to equalize the rates of compensation payable for wartime and peacetime service-connected disabilities; to the Committee on Veterans' Affairs.

H. R. 1538. A bill to declare that the United States holds certain lands in trust for the Minnesota Chippewa Tribe; to the Committee on Public Lands.

H. R. 1539. A bill to provide retirement annuities for retired fourth-class postmasters with 30 years of service; to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service.

H. R. 1540. A bill to provide a cost-of-living pay bonus for officers and employees of the United States; to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service.

H. R. 1541. A bill to provide for a manufacturers' excise tax on jewelry in lieu of the retailers' excise tax on jewelry; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

H. R. 1542. A bill to exempt from income tax so much of any Christmas bonus paid to an employee as does not exceed $100; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

H. R. 1543. A bill to exempt from income taxation the interest on certain United States savings bonds; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

H. R. 1544. A bill to amend the Selective Service Act of 1948 to require that at least one member of each local board and each appeal board shall be a veteran; to the Committee on Armed Services.

By Mr. HOLIFIELD:

H. R. 1545. A bill to amend the Reorganization Act of 1949; to the Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments.

By Mr. LESINSKI:

H. R. 1546. A bill to provide a cost-of-living pay bonus for officers and employees of the United States; to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service.

By Mr. McCORMACK:

H. R. 1547. A bill to authorize the incorporation of Army and Navy Legion of Valor of United States of America; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. O'KONSKI:

H. R. 1548. A bill to declare that the United States holds certain lands in trust for the Bad River Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians of the State of Wisconsin; to the Committee on Public Lands.

H. R. 1549. A bill to declare that the United States holds certain lands in trust for the Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians of the State of Wisconsin; to the Committee on Public Lands.

H. R. 1550. A bill to amend the act of August 30, 1935 (49 Stat. 1049), authorizing the Chippewa Indians of Wisconsin to submit claims to the Court of Claims; to the Committee on Public Lands.

H. R. 1551. A bill to confer civil and criminal jurisdiction on the State of Wisconsin in certain cases involving Indians; to the Committee on Public Lands.

By Mr. PRESTON:

H. R. 1552. A bill to provide for the preparation, printing, and distribution of a list of all persons who died at any time after May 26, 1941, and before December 31, 1946, while serving on active duty with the Armed Forces of the United States; to the Committee on Armed Services.

By Mr. RANKIN (by request):

H. R. 1553. A bill to provide hospital care for certain veterans residing in the Republic of the Philippines; to the Committee on Veterans' Affairs.

By Mr. SMITH of Mississippi:

H. R. 1554. A bill to provide free postage for members of the Armed Forces of the United States; to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service.

By Mr. TOLLEFSON:

H. R. 1555. A bill to encourage the prevention of water pollution by allowing amounts paid for industrial waste treatment works or disposal facilities to be amortized at an accelerated rate for income-tax purposes; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. SASSCER:

H. R. 1599. A bill to provide for a commission to determine the need for coordinated regional planning and action in the metropolitan area of the District of Columbia with respect to tax legislation and other matters, and for other purposes; to the Committee on the District of Columbia.

By Mr. KLEIN:

H. J. Res. 103. Joint resolution proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States, extending the right to vote to citizens 18 years of age or older; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. LIND:

H. J. Res. 104. Joint resolution proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States relative to equal rights for men and women; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. MACHROWICZ:

H. J. Res. 105. Joint resolution to extend for 1 year the issuance of visas authorized by section 3 of the Displaced Persons Act of 1948, as amended; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mrs. ROGERS of Massachusetts:

H. J. Res. 106. Joint resolution authorizing the President to issue posthumously to the late George Smith Patton, Jr., a lieutenant general, Army of the United States, a commission as a five-star general; to the Committee on Armed Services.

By Mr. BATTLE:

H. J. Res. 107. Joint resolution to authorize the issuance of a stamp commemorative of Dr. William Crawford Gorgas, of Alabama, who achieved national distinction in the field of preventive medicine by conquering yellow fever, thus making possible the building of the Panama Canal; to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service.

By Mr. BOGGS of Louisiana:

H. J. Res. 108. Joint resolution providing for recognition and endorsement of the International Trade Fair and Inter-American Cultural and Trade Center in New Orleans, La.; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

H. J. Res. 109. Joint resolution proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States providing for the election of President and Vice President; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. MACK of Washington:

H. J. Res. 110. Joint resolution to provide for a suitable and adequate system of timber access roads to and in the forests of the United States; to the Committee on Agriculture.

By Mr. BOGGS of Louisiana:

H. Con. Res. 26. Concurrent resolution inviting the democracies which sponsored the North Atlantic Treaty to name delegates to a federal convention; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

My Br. WALTER:

H. Con. Res. 27. Concurrent resolution inviting the democracies which sponsored the North Atlantic Treaty to name delegates to a federal convention; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

By Mr. MANSFIELD:

H. Con. Res. 28. Concurrent resolution inviting the democracies which sponsored the North Atlantic Treaty to name delegates to a federal convention; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

By Mr. DAVIS of Tennessee:

H. Con. Res. 29. Concurrent resolution inviting the democracies which sponsored the North Atlantic Treaty to name delegates to a federal convention; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

By Mr. HERTER:

H. Con. Res. 30. Concurrent resolution inviting the democracies which sponsored the North Atlantic Treaty to name delegates to a federal convention; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

By Mr. HALE:

H. Con. Res. 31. Concurrent resolution inviting the democracies which sponsored the North Atlantic Treaty to name delegates to a federal convention; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

By Mr. JUDD:

H. Con. Res. 32. Concurrent resolution inviting the countries which sponsored the North Atlantic Treaty to name delegates to a federal convention; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

By Mr. MILLER of California:

H. Con. Res. 33. Concurrent resolution inviting the countries which sponsored the North Atlantic Treaty to name delegates to a federal convention; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

By Mr. BATTLE:

H. Con. Res. 34. Concurrent resolution for the establishment of a United Nations Police Authority; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

H. Con. Res. 35. Concurrent resolution inviting the countries which sponsored the North Atlantic Treaty to name delegates to a federal convention; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

H. Con. Res. 36. Concurrent resolution to call a conference for the revision and strengthening of the United Nations Charter; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

H. Res. 70. Resolution favoring an increased educational program by the United States in combating communism in foreign countries; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

By Mr. BENNETT of Florida:

H. Res. 71. Resolution creating a select committee to conduct an investigation and study of the activities of the Government during the existing national emergency; to the Committee on Rules.

By Mr. LANTAFF:

H. Res. 72. Resolution concerning the foreign policy of the United States; to the Committee on Rules.

PRIVATE BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS

Under clause 1 of rule XXII, private bills and resolutions were introduced and severally referred as follows:

By Mr. ANDERSON of California:

H. R. 1556. A bill for the relief of John C. Schoch; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. AUGUST H. ANDRESEN:

H. R. 1557. A bill for the relief of Sister Edeltrudis Sailer; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. BARTLETT:

H. R. 1558. A bill to authorize the sale of certain public land in Alaska to Victory Bible Camp Ground, Inc.; to the Committee on Public Lands.

By Mr. BATES of Kentucky:

H. R. 1559. A bill for the relief of Edmon Burgher; to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service.

By Mr. BATTLE:

H. R. 1560. A bill for the relief of Frederick P. Fulmer; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

H. R. 1561. A bill to continue in full force and effect patent No. 1,861,647; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

H. R. 1562. A bill for the relief of the estate of Shirley Hendrick; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

H. R. 1563. A bill for the relief of Thomas I. Ward; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

H. R. 1564. A bill for the relief of Arthur Koestler; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. BOGGS of Louisiana:

H. R. 1565. A bill for the relief of Martin M. Sorensen; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

H. R. 1566. A bill for the relief of A. J. Crozat, Jr.; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

H. R. 1567. A bill for the relief of Mrs. Florence Trapolin; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mrs. CHURCH:

H. R. 1568. A bill for the relief of George Postma; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

H. R. 1569. A bill for the relief of L. D. Trabert; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. FLOOD:

H. R. 1570. A bill for the relief of Silvestro Napoleon Ramos Canizal; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

H. R. 1571. A bill for the relief of Antonio Novoa y Guerrero; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

H. R. 1572. A bill for the relief of Albino Anta Y. Alvarez; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

H. R. 1573. A bill for the relief of Manuel Bello Y. Llanez; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. FURCOLO:

H. R. 1574. A bill for the relief of Ettore Penna; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. HELLER:

H. R. 1575. A bill for the relief of Oscar Neumann, Mrs. Magdalena Neumann, and Judith Gabrielle Neumann; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. HERLONG:

H. R. 1576. A bill for the relief of Jan Josef Wieckowski and his wife and daughter; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. KERSTEN of Wisconsin:

H. R. 1577. A bill for the relief of Victor Tenaglia; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. LIND:

H. R. 1578. A bill for the relief of Heinz Langerhans; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. McCARTHY:

H. R. 1579. A bill for the relief of Angelita Haberer; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. McCORMACK:

H. R. 1580. A bill for the relief of the Overseas Navigation Corp.; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

H. R. 1581. A bill for the relief of Thomas G. Fabinyi; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

H. R. 1582. A bill for the relief of Warner Fahrenhold; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

H. R. 1583. A bill for the relief of Francis A. Gunn; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

H. R. 1584. A bill for the relief of Edward Woolf; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

H. R. 1585. A bill for the relief of the Marden Construction Co., Inc.; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

H. R. 1586. A bill for the relief of Chester E. Locke; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

H. R. 1587. A bill for the relief of Dr. F. Homburger; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

H. R. 1588. A bill for the relief of Joseph Saganich; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. MILLER of Nebraska:

H. R. 1589. A bill for the relief of Richard Gregory Rundle and Baliquette Adele Rundle; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. PHILLIPS:

H. R. 1590. A bill for the reimbursement of the S. A. Healy Co.; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. POULSON:

H. R. 1591. A bill for the relief of Sante Martinoli, Mrs. Giuditta Martinoli, and Maurizio Martinoli; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. PRESTON:

H. R. 1592. A bill for the relief of Evans County, Ga.; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

H. R. 1593. A bill for the relief of Charles E. Maulden; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

H. R. 1594. A bill for the relief of Earl L. Doss; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. SADLAK:

H. R. 1595. A bill for the relief of Tadeusz Majewski; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. TOLLEFSON:

H. R. 1596. A bill for the relief of N. H. Kelley, Bernice Kelley, Clyde D. Farquhar, and Gladys Farquhar; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

H. R. 1597. A bill for the relief of George H. Wadsworth and Pearl Wadsworth; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. WILSON of Texas:

H. R. 1598. A bill for the relief of Hanoh Sarapanovschi; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

PETITIONS, ETC.

Under clause 1 of rule XXII,

10. Mr. KING presented a petition of Southwest Women's Republican Club of Los Angeles, to make the handbook entitled, "Health Services and Special Weapons Defense," available to the public free of charge, which was referred to the Committee on House Administration.