

inheritances, and gifts; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

Also, memorial of the Legislature of the State of Maryland, relative to ratifying the proposed amendment to the Constitution of the United States relating to the terms of office of the President of the United States; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

Also, memorial of the Legislature of the State of Maryland, relative to urging the Congress of the United States to distribute tax burdens more equitably; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

Also, memorial of the Legislature of the State of Massachusetts, memorializing the President and the Congress of the United States urging enactment of legislation to curb war profiteering; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

Also, memorial of the Legislature of the State of Montana, relative to the Indians of the State of Montana, relating to all existing Federal laws which discriminate against such Indians, etc.; to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

Also, memorial of the Legislature of the State of Nevada, memorializing the President and the Congress of the United States to provide sufficient funds to carry on an effective program in the 1952 fiscal year to combat the threat of the halogeton weed to the West's livestock industry; to the Committee on Appropriations.

Also, memorial of the Legislature of the State of New Mexico, relating to old-age assistance, aid to the blind, and aid to dependent children; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

Also, memorial of the Legislature of the State of New Mexico, requesting recognition of United States Highway No. 85 as a defense highway and officially declare it to be Pan-American Central Highway; to the Committee on Public Works.

Also, memorial of the Legislature of the State of Washington, relative to requesting enactment of legislation to extend the time within which Indian tribes may file claims before the Indian Claims Commission for a period of at least 2 years from August 13, 1951; to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

Also, memorial of the Legislature of the State of Washington, memorializing the President and the Congress of the United States to take such action as is necessary to provide for statehood for the present Territory of Alaska and the present Territory of Hawaii; to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

Also, memorial of the Legislature of the State of Wisconsin, relative to requesting the enactment of such legislation as may be necessary to effectuate the development of the proposed Mississippi River Parkway; to the Committee on Public Works.

Also, memorial of the Legislature of the Territory of Hawaii, relative to requesting the Congress of the United States to enact legislation providing for segregation, care, maintenance, and treatment of persons afflicted with Hansen's disease; to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

Also, memorial of the Legislature of the Territory of Hawaii, relative to residents of the Territory of Hawaii serving in the Armed Forces and exempting them from all Federal taxes becoming due while in the service; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

PRIVATE BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS

Under clause 1 of rule XXII, private bills and resolutions were introduced and severally referred as follows:

By Mr. ADDONIZIO:

H. R. 3471. A bill for the relief of Severio Tavella; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

H. R. 3472. A bill to recognize the public service of, and extend certain benefits to,

Oscar Bitchman; to the Committee on Armed Services.

By Mr. CHELF:

H. R. 3473. A bill for the relief of Valentina Askold; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. JOHNSON:

H. R. 3474. A bill for the relief of Mrs. Yuen Shee; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. McCARTHY:

H. R. 3475. A bill for the relief of George Lahood;

H. R. 3476. A bill for the relief of Anastazia Bolek; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. MULTER:

H. R. 3477. A bill for the relief of David Mordka Borenstajn, Itta Borenstajn nee Schipper, and Fella Borenstajn; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. O'TOOLE:

H. R. 3478. A bill for the relief of Avelino Rodriguez Pego; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

H. R. 3479. A bill for the relief of Alfredo M. Gerardo; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

PETITIONS, ETC.

Under clause 1 of rule XXII, petitions and papers were laid on the Clerk's desk and referred as follows:

167. By Mr. GOODWIN: Resolution of Malden (Mass.) mayor and city council opposing any proposed bill for the levying of a tax on State and municipal bonds; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

168. By Mr. GRAHAM: Petition of 39 members of the congregation of the First Reformed Presbyterian Church of Beaver Falls, Pa., opposing the passage of a universal military training bill that does not include the recommendations of the President's Advisory Commission on Universal Training calling for limitation of the opportunities for the purchase by trainees of any alcoholic beverages, including beer, through (a) prohibiting the sale thereof to them on any military, naval, or other camp reservation, or in any post exchange, ship's store, or canteen, (b) declaring "off limits" to trainees all taverns, taprooms, and similar facilities whose principal business is selling alcoholic beverages; to the Committee on Armed Services.

169. Also, petition of 54 members of the Geneva Reformed Presbyterian Church of Beaver Falls, Pa., urging that no measure for universal military training be passed that does not include the recommendations of the President's Advisory Commission on UMT calling for limitation of the opportunities for the purchase by trainees of any alcoholic beverage, including beer, through (a) prohibiting the sale thereof to them on any military, naval, or other camp reservation, or in any post exchange, ship's store, or canteen, (b) declaring "off limits" to trainees all taverns, taprooms, and similar facilities whose principal business is selling alcoholic beverages; to the Committee on Armed Services.

170. Also, petition of 33 members of the College Hill United Presbyterian Church of Beaver Falls, Pa., that no measure for universal military training be passed that does not include the recommendations of the President's Advisory Commission on UMT calling for limitation of the opportunities for the purchase by trainees of any alcoholic beverage including beer, through (a) prohibiting the sale thereof to them on any military, naval, or other camp reservation, or in any post exchange, ship's store, or canteen, (b) declaring "off limits" to trainees all taverns, taprooms, and similar facilities whose principal business is selling alcoholic beverages; to the Committee on Armed Services.

171. By Mr. SMITH of Wisconsin: Resolution of the Lithuanian Americans of Kenosha, Wis., reaffirming their loyalty to the principles of American democracy, pledge of

wholehearted support of the administration in its efforts to resist the Communist forces of aggression, and to achieve an international peace founded on principles of freedom and justice; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

172. Resolution of the Kenosha County Dental Society reaffirming faith in the American, voluntary way to safeguard the Nation's health and insure against the costs of illness and unequivocally oppose any form of national compulsory health insurance as a dangerous step toward complete acceptance of a planned, socialistic economy; to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

173. By the SPEAKER: Petition of Miss Ruth E. Sherburne, clerk, First Congregational Church, Amherst, Mass., relative to the famine which threatens thousands of the people of India; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

174. Also, petition of M. L. Meyer, secretary, Business Men's Association of the East North Side, Pittsburgh, Pa., relative to going on record in favor of a 17-percent annual pay increase for postal employees; to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service.

175. Also, petition of C. Yohner, secretary, VFWA, Local No. 100, Pittsburgh, Pa., relative to going on record in favor of a 17-percent annual pay increase for postal employees; to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service.

176. Also, petition of E. M. Reynolds, secretary, Allegheny Aerie No. 827 FOE, Pittsburgh, Pa., relative to going on record in favor of a 17-percent annual pay increase for postal employees; to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service.

177. Also, petition of R. J. Maur, secretary, Allegheny Lodge No. 339, BPOE, N. S., Pittsburgh, Pa., relative to going on record in favor of a 17-percent annual pay increase for postal employees; to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service.

178. Also, petition of James Burnham, Bombay, India, relative to the famine threatening millions in Bihar; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

179. By Mr. FORAND: Resolution of the General Assembly of the State of Rhode Island memorializing Congress in respect to the drastic change in the delineation of the purport of the Italian Peace Treaty, thereby removing the barrier to the size of the armed forces Italy may maintain for the later defense of Western Europe, approved March 15, 1951; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

180. Also, resolution of the City Council of the City of Providence memorializing the Members of the Congress of the United States of America from the State of Rhode Island to urge passage of such legislation as would permit the active participation of Italy in the program for defense against aggression; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

SENATE

TUESDAY, APRIL 3, 1951

(Legislative day of Monday, March 26, 1951)

The Senate met at 12 o'clock meridian, on the expiration of the recess.

The Chaplain, Rev. Frederick Brown Harris, D. D., offered the following prayer:

Eternal God, we thank Thee for this shrine of the Nation's faith where, facing vast human issues committed to our hands, relying on a strength and a wisdom not our own, we come humbly to confess: In God we trust. In all the perplexities of these confused days may

we not lose our perspective; may we prove worthy of the high trusteeship of power and of opportunity which Thou hast committed to us.

May this Nation under God be purged of its own failures to practice genuine democracy. Make a chastened and disciplined America the pioneer of a better world for ourselves and for all peoples, a world of justice and righteousness, of security and freedom and with ample space for the development of personality. May our starry banner be ever the symbol of the beatitude of patriotism pure and undefiled: "Blessed is the nation whose God is the Lord." In the Name that is above every name. Amen.

THE JOURNAL

On request of Mr. McFARLAND, and by unanimous consent, the reading of the Journal of the proceedings of Monday, April 2, 1951, was dispensed with.

MESSAGES FROM THE PRESIDENT

Messages in writing from the President of the United States submitting nominations were communicated to the Senate by Mr. Miller, one of his secretaries.

MESSAGE FROM THE HOUSE

A message from the House of Representatives, by Mr. Maurer, one of its reading clerks, announced that the House had passed the following bills in which it requested the concurrence of the Senate:

H. R. 304. An act to provide for a study of the mental and physical sequelae of malnutrition and starvation suffered by prisoners of war and civilian internees during World War II;

H. R. 315. An act to liberalize the service pension laws relating to veterans of the War With Spain, the Philippine Insurrection, or the Boxer Rebellion, and their dependents;

H. R. 2119. An act to amend sections 544 and 546 of title 28, United States Code;

H. R. 2394. An act to amend the act of April 29, 1941, to authorize the waiving of the requirement of performance and payment bonds in connection with certain Coast Guard contracts; and

H. R. 3040. An act to authorize the Secretary of Agriculture to convey certain lands in Ogden, Utah, to the Ogden Chamber of Commerce.

COMMITTEE SERVICE

Mr. McFARLAND. Mr. President, I send to the desk an order providing for assignments to committees, and request that it be read.

The order was read, as follows:

Ordered, That the Senator from Louisiana [Mr. LONG] be excused from further service as a member of the Committee on Banking and Currency, and that he be assigned to service on the Committee on Armed Services; that the Senator from Connecticut [Mr. BENTON] be excused from further service as a member of the Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments, and that he be assigned to service on the Committee on Banking and Currency; that the senior Senator from Kentucky [Mr. CLEMENTS] be excused from further service as a member of the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service and that he be assigned to service on the Committee on Public Works; and that the junior Senator from Kentucky [Mr. UNDERWOOD] be assigned to service on the Committees on Expenditures in the Executive Departments and Post Office and Civil Service.

Mr. McFARLAND. Mr. President, I ask that the order be agreed to.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Is there objection?

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, on February 1, 1951, the junior Senator from Connecticut [Mr. BENTON] in a speech on the floor of the Senate drew upon his imagination with reference to the junior Senator from Wisconsin [Mr. McCARTHY], and implied that the Senator from Wisconsin had been assigned to the Committee on Appropriations by the Republican committee on committees; not by seniority but by favoritism and influence. I remember very distinctly the speech that was made.

In reply to the remarks of the Senator from Connecticut, the senior Senator from Minnesota [Mr. THYE] and I stated that the appointment to the Committee on Appropriations of the Senator from Wisconsin was based solely on his seniority rights.

I am happy to know that the Democratic steering committee at this late date has honored the junior Senator from Connecticut by assigning him to a major committee, namely the Committee on Banking and Currency. I hope his assignment to that committee, like that of the Senator from Wisconsin, was based on his seniority rights. I wish him well in his service on the committee.

I have no objection.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Without objection, the order is entered.

TRANSACTION OF ROUTINE BUSINESS

By unanimous consent, the following routine business was transacted:

EXECUTIVE COMMUNICATIONS, ETC.

The VICE PRESIDENT laid before the Senate the following letters, which were referred as indicated:

CONTROL OF EXPORTATION AND IMPORTATION OF ARMS AND IMPLEMENTS OF WAR

A letter from the Secretary of State, transmitting a draft of proposed legislation to control the exportation and importation of arms, ammunition, and implements of war, and related items, and for other purposes (with accompanying papers); to the Committee on Foreign Relations.

AUDIT REPORT ON GOVERNMENT SERVICES, INC.

A letter from the Comptroller General of the United States, transmitting, pursuant to law, a short form report on the audit of Government Services, Inc., for the fiscal year ended December 31, 1950 (with an accompanying report); to the Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments.

REPORT ON DISPOSAL TO PRIVATE INDUSTRY OF GOVERNMENT-OWNED RUBBER-PRODUCING FACILITIES

A letter from the Chairman of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, reporting, pursuant to law, on the disposal to private industry of Government-owned rubber-producing facilities, for the period since the Korean invasion; to the Committee on Armed Services.

REPORT ON GOVERNMENT-OWNED TIN SMELTER AT TEXAS CITY, TEX., AND PROGRAM FOR PURCHASE AND SALE OF TIN METAL

A letter from the Chairman of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, transmitting, pursuant to law, a report on the Government-

owned tin smelter at Texas City, Tex., and the program for the purchase and sale of tin metal in the United States, dated December 31, 1950 (with an accompanying report); to the Committee on Armed Services.

DISPOSITION OF EXECUTIVE PAPERS

A letter from the Acting Archivist of the United States, transmitting, pursuant to law, a list of papers and documents on the files of several departments and agencies of the Government which are not needed in the conduct of business and have no permanent value or historical interest, and requesting action looking to their disposition (with accompanying papers); to a Joint Select Committee on the Disposition of Papers in the Executive Departments.

The VICE PRESIDENT appointed Mr. JOHNSTON of South Carolina and Mr. LANGER members of the committee on the part of the Senate.

REPORT OF GIRL SCOUTS OF AMERICA

A letter from the president and national executive director of the Girl Scouts of the United States of America, transmitting, pursuant to law, the first annual report of the Girl Scouts for the year ended December 31, 1950 (with accompanying papers); to the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare.

PETITIONS AND MEMORIALS

Petitions, etc., were laid before the Senate, or presented, and referred as indicated:

By the VICE PRESIDENT:

A resolution of the Senate of the State of Montana; to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs:

"Senate Memorial 1

"Memorial of the senate of the State of Montana memorializing the Congress of the United States to prohibit the further expenditure of public funds to construct, maintain and operate transmission lines to be used in the exportation of public power from the Hungry Horse Dam project in Flathead County, Mont., beyond the exterior boundaries of the State of Montana, unless and until the State of Montana wherein said power is being or is to be produced and the United States shall provide therefor pursuant to interstate compact or compacts

"Whereas the Secretary of the Interior of the United States has been authorized by the Congress to construct, operate and maintain what is known as the Hungry Horse Dam (including facilities for generating electric energy), on the South Fork of the Flathead River, Flathead County, Montana, for the purposes of irrigation, reclamation, controlling floods, improving navigation, regulating the flow of the South Fork of the Flathead River, for the generation of electric energy, and for other beneficial uses primarily in the State of Montana, but also in downstream areas; and

"Whereas in various agencies of the United States Government there are, and may be in the future, plans for the construction of public power transmission lines designed to carry public power generated at said dam beyond the boundaries of the State of Montana; and

"Whereas agencies of the Federal Government involved have not heretofore consulted with the State of Montana, or any agency thereof concerning such an exportation of this very valuable natural resource; and

"Whereas the unrestricted exportation of public power from said Hungry Horse Dam beyond the boundaries of the State of Montana would do irreparable damage to the economy of the State of Montana, for the reason that neighboring areas are unable to

reciprocate because they have no resources, power or otherwise, to exchange; and

"Whereas the unrestricted exportation of public power beyond the boundaries of the State of Montana, from the said Hungry Horse Dam, for sale at the same price as power consumed within the State, will result in charging the Hungry Horse project in the State of Montana with a portion of the cost of making said power available to neighboring areas with no corresponding benefit accruing to the State of Montana; and

"Whereas on other public power projects, such as the Boulder Canyon project on the main stream of the Colorado River at Boulder Canyon, and the act of Congress creating the same included in its terms provisions for the retention of public power by the area in which the power is generated: Now, therefore, be it

"Resolved, That the senate of the thirty-second legislative assembly of the State of Montana of 1951, now in session, do most earnestly request the Congress of the United States to amend the act of the Congress authorizing the construction, operation and maintenance of said Hungry Horse Dam, to prohibit the further expenditure of public funds to construct, maintain and operate transmission lines to be used in the exportation of public power beyond the exterior boundaries of the State of Montana, unless and until the State of Montana and the United States shall provide therefor, pursuant to interstate compact or compacts; be it further

"Resolved, That copies of this memorial be transmitted by the secretary of state of the State of Montana, to the Senate and House of Representatives of the Congress of the United States, and to United States Senators JAMES E. MURRAY and ZALES N. ECTON and Representatives MIKE MANSFIELD and WESLEY A. D'EWART, the Senators and Representatives respectively in Congress from the State of Montana."

Three joint resolutions of the Legislature of the State of Montana; to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs:

"House Joint Memorial 5

"Memorial to the Congress of the United States of America; to the Honorable United States Senators ZALES N. ECTON and JAMES E. MURRAY, and to the Honorable Representatives in Congress WESLEY A. D'EWART and MIKE MANSFIELD, and to the Honorable Oscar L. Chapman, Secretary of the Interior, requesting that the Eighty-second Congress introduce and pass an act eliminating all present discriminatory laws pertaining to Indians, transfer to the State of Montana and its subdivisions certain enumerated activities and transfer funds for the purposes of expediting these activities

"Whereas the American Indians of Montana are now subjected to various discriminatory laws and practices administered by the Bureau of Indian Affairs, under which our first Americans are denied rights enjoyed by their fellow citizens of other races; and

"Whereas the continuance of such discriminations is inconsistent with American ideals of democracy, freedom, and equality; and

"Whereas the Indians of Montana have pleaded in vain with the Bureau of Indian Affairs for the ending of such discriminations: Now, therefore, be it

"Resolved by the House of Representatives of the State of Montana (the senate concurring), That we respectfully urge that the Congress of the United States eliminate, at least with respect to the Indians of this State, all existing Federal laws which dis-

criminate against such Indians, namely, the Indian liquor laws, the laws prohibiting Indians from making long-term leases of their lands, and the laws prohibiting Indian tribes from spending their own funds as they see fit, and we specifically recommend as a step in the right direction the prompt enactment of all Indian legislation in the House of Representatives of the Eighty-second Congress of the United States; be it further

"Resolved, That the Secretary of the Interior is respectfully urged to see that promises made by the past four Commissioners of Indian Affairs are actually carried out and that controls which hinder the right of Indian citizens to spend their own money, to lease their own lands, to hire their own attorneys, and to run their own businesses should be promptly eliminated; be it further

"Resolved, That we urge the Congress and the Secretary of the Interior, in their respective fields of jurisdiction, to turn over to the State of Montana and its subdivisions any of the following activities which, in the opinion of the Indian tribes concerned, can best be handled under agreements with the appropriate State authorities: (1) Education, (2) the administration of law and order (without prejudice to existing Indian rights), (3) the management of reservation hospitals and health services, (4) the maintenance of reservation roads, (5) resource management and agricultural extension work; be it further

"Resolved, That the Congress is respectfully requested to authorize the transfer to the appropriate State, local, or tribal authorities of funds for any of the foregoing purposes, not in excess of the average funds appropriated for such purposes during the past 5 years, whenever agreements satisfactory to the tribes concerned and to the appropriate State agencies have been concluded; be it further

"Resolved, That copies of this memorial be forwarded by the secretary of state of the State of Montana to the Congress of the United States; the Honorable Oscar L. Chapman, Secretary of the Interior; the Honorable Senators Zales N. Ecton and James E. Murray, Senators from the State of Montana; the Honorable Wesley D'Ewart, Congressman from the Second Congressional District; and the Honorable Mike Mansfield, Congressman from the First Congressional District; and to each of the Indian tribes of the State of Montana.

"CRY J. ARMSTRONG,
"Speaker of the House.

"PAUL CANNON,
"President of the Senate.

"Approved February 28, 1951.

"JOHN W. BONNER,
"Governor."

"House Joint Memorial 6

"Joint memorial of the House of Representatives and the Senate of the State of Montana; to the Congress of the United States; to the Honorable United States Senators, ZALES N. ECTON and JAMES E. MURRAY; and to the Honorable Representatives in Congress, WESLEY A. D'EWART and MIKE MANSFIELD; relating to suspension of annual representation work on unpatented mining claims for holders of such claims who have been or may be called into military service

"Whereas the owner of an unpatented lode or placer mining claim located upon the public domain of the United States within the State of Montana is required to perform annual representation work or make improvements thereon under the mining laws of the United States in order to prevent the forfeiture of such claim; and

"Whereas many Montana persons owning such claims have been, or may be called into the Federal service as members of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, or Coast Guard of the United States of America, or as officers of the public health detailed by proper authority for duty with either the Army or Navy, or as members of the Red Cross on active duty with the armed services of the United States, or in training or being educated under the supervision of the United States preliminary to induction into the military service thereof; and

"Whereas such persons, while so engaged will be unable to perform such annual representation work or make the required improvements on such claims to conform to said laws, or such performance may work unnecessary hardship upon them while so engaged: Now, therefore, be it

"Resolved by the Thirty-second Legislative Assembly of Montana of 1951 now in session (the house of representatives and senate concurring), That we do most earnestly pray that the Congress of the United States suspend the requirements that such owners perform such annual work or make such improvements until the year beginning July 1 following their discharge or release from the respective services aforesaid; be it further

"Resolved, That copies of this memorial be transmitted by the secretary of the State of Montana to the Senate and House of Representatives of the Congress of the United States, and to the Senators and Representatives in Congress from the State of Montana.

"CRY J. ARMSTRONG,

"Speaker of the House.

"PAUL CANNON,

"President of the Senate.

"Approved February 28, 1951.

"JOHN W. BONNER, Governor."

"Senate Joint Memorial 7

"Joint memorial of the Senate and House of Representatives of the State of Montana, to the Congress of the United States, United States Senators JAMES E. MURRAY and ZALES N. ECTON, and Representatives MIKE MANSFIELD and WESLEY A. D'EWART, all of Washington, D. C., requesting the enactment of legislation, allowing for and directing the annual payment of grants by the United States Government to the State of Montana for the use and benefit of the several counties of Montana in lieu of taxes on lands owned by the United States Government in the State of Montana

"Whereas in Montana there is in excess of 39 percent of our landed area which is owned by the Government of the United States, so held by it in proprietary or trustee capacity for Indian reservations, forest reserves, wildlife refuges, grazing lands, military reservations, and numerous other governmental purposes and objects, none of which lands pay taxes to the State of Montana or the counties therein, nor contribute equitable amounts in lieu of taxes to the school districts, counties and State Government, all of which furnish services to such lands and their occupants; and

"Whereas such areas are increasing, and the taxation burdens upon sparsely settled communities of our State are becoming more serious; and

"Whereas these areas should bear some part of the tax burden comparable to that imposed on lands of our own taxpayers; and

"Whereas there has been and will be introduced in the Congress of the United States acts under which the Government of the United States will pay to the several States of the United States for the benefit of counties wherein Government-held lands are lo-

cated, grants in lieu of taxes upon these lands: Now, therefore, be it

"Resolved, by the Thirty-second Legislative Assembly of the State of Montana (senate and house of representatives concurring), That we respectfully urge the enactment of legislation by the Congress of the United States providing for the evaluation of property owned or held by the United States Government and providing for payments or grants to the State of Montana for the use and benefit of the counties wherein Government-held lands are located, in lieu of taxes upon these lands; and be it further

"Resolved, That copies of this memorial be submitted by the secretary of state of Montana to the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States Congress and to Senators JAMES E. MURRAY and ZALES N. ECTON and Representatives MIKE MANSFIELD and WESLEY A. D'EWART.

"PAUL CANNON,

"President of the Senate.

"ORY J. ARMSTRONG,

"Speaker of the House.

"Approved February 28, 1951.

"JOHN W. BONNER, Governor."

Three joint resolutions of the Legislature of the State of Montana; to the Committee on Public Works:

"Senate Joint Memorial 10

"Joint memorial of the Senate and House of Representatives of the State of Montana memorializing the Congress of the United States to prohibit the further expenditure of public funds to construct, maintain, and operate transmission lines to be used in the exportation of public power beyond the States, the area or any part of which lie within the Missouri River Basin unless and until the States wherein said power is being or is to be produced and the United States shall provide therefor, pursuant to interstate compact or compacts

"Whereas in various agencies of the United States there are and may be in the future plans for the construction of public power transmission lines designed to carry public power generated within the basin of the Missouri River and its tributaries to points beyond said basin; and

"Whereas surveys and acquisition of rights-of-way for the purpose of transporting power from public power projects located in the Missouri River are being made in the States of the Missouri River Basin; and

"Whereas agencies of the Federal Government involved have not heretofore consulted said States or any agency thereof concerning such an exportation of this very valuable natural resource; and

"Whereas executives and agencies of the Federal Government are currently proclaiming that there exists a serious power shortage in the Missouri River Basin, thereby admitting that there is no power available for export purposes; and

"Whereas the unrestricted exportation of public power beyond the States, the area or any part of which lie within the Missouri River Basin would do irreparable damage to the economy of the basin for the reason that neighboring areas are unable to reciprocate because they have no resource, power or otherwise, to exchange; and

"Whereas the unrestricted exportation of public power beyond the States, the area or any part of which lie within the Missouri River Basin for sale at the same price as power consumed within the basin will result in charging the basin with a portion of the cost of making said power available to neighboring areas with no corresponding benefit accruing to the States within the basin: Now, therefore, be it

"Resolved, That the Thirty-second Legislative Assembly of the State of Montana of

1951, now in session (the senate and house of representatives concurring) do most earnestly request the Congress of the United States to prohibit the further expenditure of public funds to construct, maintain, and operate transmission lines to be used in the exportation of public power beyond the States, the area or any part of which lie within the Missouri River Basin unless and until the States wherein said power is being or is to be produced and the United States shall provide therefor, pursuant to interstate compact or compacts; be it further

"Resolved, That copies of this memorial be transmitted by the secretary of the State of Montana to the Senate and House of Representatives of the Congress of the United States, to the Senators and Representatives in the Congress from the State of Montana, and to the legislatures and governors of all the States lying within the Missouri River Basin.

"PAUL CANNON,

"President of the Senate.

"ORY J. ARMSTRONG,

"Speaker of the House.

"Approved February 28, 1951.

"JOHN W. BONNER, Governor."

"Senate Joint Memorial 8

"Joint memorial of the Senate and House of Representatives of the State of Montana memorializing the Congress of the United States to prohibit the further expenditure of public funds to construct, maintain, and operate transmission lines to be used in the exportation of public power beyond the States, the area or any part of which lie within the Columbia River Basin unless and until the States wherein said power is being or is to be produced and the United States shall provide therefor, pursuant to interstate compact or compacts

"Whereas Bonneville Power Administration, and the United States Bureau of Reclamation are currently planning the construction of public power-transmission lines designed to carry public power generated within the basin of the Columbia River and its tributaries to points beyond said basin; and

"Whereas Bonneville Power Administration is currently surveying and acquiring rights-of-way for such a transmission line across central Oregon for the purpose of transporting power from public power projects located in the States of Montana, Idaho, Washington, and Oregon, to the State of California; and

"Whereas said agencies of the Federal Government have not heretofore consulted said States or any agencies thereof concerning such an exportation of this very valuable natural resource; and

"Whereas all of the executives and all of the agencies of the Federal Government, including the two mentioned above, are currently proclaiming that there exists a serious power shortage in the Columbia River Basin thereby admitting that there is no power available for export purposes; and

"Whereas the unrestricted exportation of public power beyond the States, the area or any part of which lie within the Columbia Basin would do irreparable damage to the economy of the basin for the reason that neighboring areas are unable to reciprocate because they have no resource, power or otherwise, to exchange; and

"Whereas the unrestricted exportation of public power beyond the States, the area or any part of which lie within the Columbia Basin for sale at the same price as power consumed within the basin will result in charging the basin with a portion of the

cost of making said power available to neighboring areas with no corresponding benefit accruing to the States within the basin: Now, therefore, be it

"Resolved, That the Thirty-second Legislative Assembly of Montana of 1951, now in session (the senate and house of representatives concurring), do most earnestly request the Congress of the United States to prohibit the further expenditure of public funds to construct, maintain, and operate transmission lines to be used in the exportation of public power beyond the exterior boundaries of the States, the area or any part of which lie within the Columbia River Basin unless and until the States wherein said power is being or is to be produced and the United States shall provide therefor, pursuant to interstate compact or compacts; be it further

"Resolved, That copies of this memorial be transmitted by the secretary of the State of Montana, to the Senate and House of Representatives of the Congress of the United States, to the Senators and Representatives in the Congress from the State of Montana, and to the legislatures and governors of all of the States lying within the Columbia River Basin.

"PAUL CANNON,

"President of the Senate.

"ORY J. ARMSTRONG,

"Speaker of the House.

"Approved February 28, 1951.

"JOHN W. BONNER, Governor."

"Senate Joint Memorial 6

"Joint memorial of the Senate and the House of Representatives of the State of Montana to the Congress of the United States and to the Honorable JAMES E. MURRAY and ZALES N. ECTON, United States Senators from Montana, and to the Honorable MIKE MANSFIELD and WESLEY A. D'EWART, Representatives in Congress from Montana, requesting that the Congress of the United States, in providing funds for planning and construction of the Libby Dam and other similar Federal projects in Montana that may be approved, make provision for replacing tax-income losses and for payments in lieu of taxes to local and State governments; for adequate roads to replace those destroyed, and for Federal participation in providing adequate school facilities, policing, and relief to unemployed during the period of planning and construction

"Whereas the President of the United States has requested Congress to appropriate \$200,000 for planning the previously approved Libby Dam on the Kootenai River in Lincoln County, Mont., preliminary to appropriations for construction of this project of the Army Corps of Engineers; and

"Whereas the citizens of Lincoln County neither requested nor generally desire that this dam be constructed, and will be faced with serious economic and social problems due to loss of taxable private property, the disruption of transportation systems, and increased school, policing, and relief costs; but will share little of the benefits of the project, which will largely be derived by downstream areas and the Nation at large; and

"Whereas the pattern developed for public sharing of indirect and incident costs of this project may set a precedent for future similar projects in Montana: Now, therefore, be it

"Resolved, That the Thirty-second Legislative Assembly of Montana of 1951 now in session (the senate and house of representatives concurring) do most earnestly request

that the Congress of the United States, in providing appropriations for the planning and construction of the Libby Dam and other similar Federal projects in Montana in the future, provide that the United States Government or its agency entrusted with planning and construction shall—

"1. Provide continuing adequate payments to replace tax-income losses to county and State governments resulting from the removal or decrease of property valuations on the tax rolls.

"2. Provide continuing payments in lieu of taxes to county and State governments equal to the tax revenue that would have been derived from the same project under private ownership.

"3. Require that highways and roads in the flowage area be replaced by new transportation facilities on the basis of services-in-kind rather than roads-in-kind; thus in most cases providing roads on each side of the reservoir to replace the services previously provided both sides of a valley by a single road in the valley floor.

"4. Provide ample school facilities during the planning and construction period for children of Government personnel and construction workers not previously resident in the area.

"5. Bear the additional cost occasioned by the project of policing temporary towns and adjacent areas during the construction period.

"6. Share the cost of necessary relief provided for unemployed persons and their families during slack periods of construction and for excess workers attracted to the area; be it further

"Resolved, That copies of this memorial be transmitted by the secretary of the State of Montana to the Senate and House of Representatives of the Congress of the United States and to the Senators and Representatives in Congress from the State of Montana.

"PAUL CANNON,

"President of the Senate.

"ORY J. ARMSTRONG,

"Speaker of the House.

"Approved February 28, 1951.

"JOHN W. BONNER, Governor."

A resolution of the Assembly of the Legislature of the State of California; to the Committee on Finance:

"House Resolution 87

"Resolution relative to memorializing the Congress of the United States regarding the Social Security Administration under the Federal Security Agency

"Whereas employees making contributions under the old-age and survivors insurance system of the Social Security Act are uncertain of their status and of the amounts contributed by their employers; and

"Whereas persons applying for benefits have found, in some cases, that neglect in turning in funds on the part of some employers has made it difficult and at times impossible to straighten out their records so that they could establish their eligibility to obtain old-age benefit payments under the Federal social-security law; and

"Whereas the intent and purpose of our Social Security Act will be more clearly expressed by advising the employee annually of his status thereunder: Now, therefore, be it

"Resolved by the Assembly of the State of California, That the Assembly of the State of California hereby memorializes the Congress of the United States to investigate and consider the feasibility of taking action which will require the Social Security Administration under the Federal Security Agency to furnish employees making contributions for

old-age and survivors insurance with an annual statement of their status and of the amount paid into the fund by their employers; and be it further

"Resolved, That the chief clerk of the assembly is directed to transmit copies of this resolution to the President and Vice President of the United States, to the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and to each Senator and Representative from California in the Congress of the United States."

A joint resolution of the Legislature of the State of Maryland; to the Committee on Foreign Relations:

"House Joint Resolution 4

"House joint resolution to clarify the position of the State of Maryland with regard to the participation by the United States in a world organization and to repeal Joint Resolution 1 of 1943 and Joint Resolution 26 of 1949

"Whereas there are conflicting opinions as to Maryland's position with regard to the participation of the United States in a world government; and

"Whereas the consideration of this matter and other matters pertaining to international relations is a prerogative of the Federal Government and not of the General Assembly of Maryland; and

"Whereas the United Nations was established for the purpose of bringing about international cooperation in dealing with world problems: Now, therefore, be it

"Resolved by the General Assembly of Maryland, That it is the sense of the general assembly that it should be a fundamental objective of the foreign policy of the United States to support and strengthen the United Nations through our Federal Government; and be it further

"Resolved, That the General Assembly of Maryland hereby repeals Joint Resolution 1 of 1943 and Joint Resolution 26 of 1949; and be it further

"Resolved, That copies of this resolution be forwarded, under the great seal of Maryland, by the secretary of state to the President of the United States, the President of the United States Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and each member of the Maryland delegation in the Congress."

A joint resolution of the Legislature of the State of Maryland; to the Committee on the Judiciary:

"House Joint Resolution 2

"Joint resolution ratifying the proposed amendment to the Constitution of the United States, limiting the number of terms and the length of time during which any person may hold the office of President of the United States.

"Whereas, at the first session of the Eightieth Congress of the United States of America, it was resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled (two-thirds of each House concurring therein), that the following article be proposed as an amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which when ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several States shall be valid to all intents and purposes as part of the Constitution of the United States, viz:

"ARTICLE —

"SECTION 1. No person shall be elected to the office of the President more than twice and no person who has held the office of President, or acted as President, for more than 2 years of a term to which some other person was elected President shall be elected to the office of the President more than once. But this article shall not apply

to any person holding the office of President when this article was proposed by the Congress, and shall not prevent any person who may be holding the office of President, or acting as President, during the term within which this article becomes operative from holding the office of President or acting as President during the remainder of such term.

"Sec. 2. This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been ratified as an amendment to the Constitution by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several States within 7 years from the date of its submission to the States by the Congress: Now, therefore, be it

"Resolved by the General Assembly of Maryland, That the foregoing amendment to the Constitution of the United States be and the same is hereby ratified to all intents and purposes as a part of the Constitution of the United States; and be it further

"Resolved, That the Governor of the State of Maryland be and he is hereby requested to forward to the Secretary of State of the United States, to the Presiding Officer of the United States Senate, and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives of the United States, authentic copies of this joint resolution, under the great seal of the State of Maryland."

A joint resolution of the Legislature of the State of Nevada; to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs:

"Senate Joint Resolution 6

"Joint resolution memorializing Congress to appropriate sufficient funds to combat the noxious halogeton weed in the Western States

"Whereas the livestock industry of Nevada is second to none in its importance to the economic welfare of this State; and

"Whereas at this critical time of international emergency every stockman is being urged to increase production in view of the probability that food will be at a premium and demands for beef and wool will be greater; and

"Whereas the noxious halogeton weed, known to grow on public domain lands in Nevada, has proved costly to sheep and cattle growers of the West, poisoning 1,300 sheep in one instance in a Western State; and

"Whereas the President of the United States has not requested in his 1952 budget as presented to the Congress of the United States, any funds to combat this threat to the livestock industry, and more particularly, has not requested moneys whereby the Department of Agriculture and the Department of Interior could carry on jointly an oil-spray program and a reseeding campaign; and

"Whereas local stockmen and county officials are being asked to contribute private funds to carry on this program on land of which the Federal Government is the landlord owner: Now, therefore, be it

"Resolved by the Senate and Assembly of the State of Nevada (jointly), That the President of the United States and the Congress of the United States be memorialized to provide sufficient funds to carry on an effective program in the 1952 fiscal year to combat this threat to the West's livestock industry; and be it further

"Resolved, That duly certified copies of these resolutions be transmitted by the secretary of the state to the President of the United States, to the Presiding Officer of the United States Senate, to the Speaker of the House of Representatives, to each of the United States Senators from Nevada, and to the Nevada Representative in Congress, to the Secretary of Interior, to the Secretary of Agriculture, and to the Director of the Bureau of the Budget."

An act of the Legislature of the State of New Jersey; to the Committee on Armed Services:

"An act concerning interstate civil defense and ratifying on behalf of the State of New Jersey a compact therefor

"Be it enacted by the Senate and General Assembly of the State of New Jersey:

"1. The legislature of this State hereby ratifies a compact on behalf of the State of New Jersey with any other State legally joining therein in the form substantially as follows:

"INTERSTATE CIVIL DEFENSE AND DISASTER COMPACT

"The contracting States solemnly agree:

"ARTICLE I

"The purpose of this compact is to provide mutual aid among the States in meeting any emergency or disaster from enemy attack or other cause (natural or otherwise), including sabotage and subversive acts and direct attacks by bombs, shellfire, and atomic, radiological, chemical, bacteriological means, and other weapons. The prompt, full, and effective utilization of the resources of the respective States, including such resources as may be available from the United States Government or any other source, are essential to the safety, care, and welfare of the people thereof in the event of enemy action or other emergency, and any other resources, including personnel, equipment, or supplies, shall be incorporated into a plan or plans of mutual aid to be developed among the civil defense agencies or similar bodies of the States that are parties hereto. The directors of civil defense of all party States shall constitute a committee to formulate plans and take all necessary steps for the implementation of this compact.

"ARTICLE II

"It shall be the duty of each party State to formulate civil-defense plans and programs for application within such State. There shall be frequent consultation between the representatives of the States and with the United States Government and the free exchange of information and plans, including inventories of any materials and equipment available for civil defense. In carrying out such civil-defense plans and programs the party States shall so far as possible provide and follow uniform standards, practices, and rules and regulations including—

"(a) Insignia, arm bands, and any other distinctive articles to designate and distinguish the different civil-defense services;

"(b) Black-outs and practice black-outs, air raid drills, mobilization of civil-defense forces, and other tests and exercises;

"(c) Warnings and signals for drills or attacks and the mechanical devices to be used in connection therewith;

"(d) The effective screening or extinguishing of all lights and lighting devices and appliances;

"(e) Shutting off water mains, gas mains, electric power connections, and the suspension of all other utility services;

"(f) All materials or equipment used or to be used for civil-defense purposes in order to assure that such materials and equipment will be easily and freely interchangeable when used in or by any other party State;

"(g) The conduct of civilians and the movement and cessation of movement of pedestrians and vehicular traffic, prior, during, and subsequent to drills or attacks;

"(h) The safety of public meetings or gatherings; and

"(i) Mobile support units.

"ARTICLE III

"Any party State requested to render mutual aid shall take such action as is neces-

sary to provide and make available the resources covered by this compact in accordance with the terms hereof; *Provided*, That it is understood that the State rendering aid may withhold resources to the extent necessary to provide reasonable protection for such State. Each party State shall extend to the civil defense forces of any other party State, while operating within its State limits under the terms and conditions of this compact, the same powers (except that of arrest unless specifically authorized by the receiving State), duties, rights, privileges, and immunities as if they were performing their duties in the State in which normally employed or rendering services. Civil defense forces will continue under the command and control of their regular leaders but the organizational units will come under the operational control of the civil defense authorities of the State receiving assistance.

"ARTICLE IV

"Whenever any person holds a license, certificate, or other permit issued by any State evidencing the meeting of qualifications for professional, mechanical, or other skills, such person may render aid involving such skill in any party State to meet an emergency or disaster and such State shall give due recognition to such license, certificate, or other permit as if issued in the State in which aid is rendered.

"ARTICLE V

"No party State or its officers or employees rendering aid in another State pursuant to this compact shall be liable on account of any act or omission in good faith on the part of such forces while so engaged, or on account of the maintenance or use of any equipment or supplies in connection therewith.

"ARTICLE VI

"Inasmuch as it is probable that the pattern and detail of the machinery for mutual aid among two or more States may differ from that appropriate among other States party hereto, this instrument contains elements of a broad base common to all States, and nothing herein contained shall preclude any State from entering into supplementary agreements with another State or States. Such supplementary agreements may comprehend, but shall not be limited to, provisions for evacuation and reception of injured and other persons, and the exchange of medical, fire, police, public utility, reconnaissance, welfare, transportation and communications personnel, equipment, and supplies.

"ARTICLE VII

"Each party State shall provide for the payment of compensation and death benefits to injured members of the civil defense forces of that State and the representatives of deceased members of such forces in case such members sustain injuries or are killed while rendering aid pursuant to this compact, in the same manner and on the same terms as if the injury or death were sustained within such State.

"ARTICLE VIII

"Any party State rendering aid in another State pursuant to this compact shall be reimbursed by the party State receiving such aid for any loss or damage to, or expense incurred in the operation of any equipment answering a request for aid, and for the cost incurred in connection with such requests; *Provided*, That any aiding party State may assume in whole or in part such loss, damage, expense, or other cost, or may loan such equipment or donate such services to the receiving party State without charge or cost; *And provided further*, That any two or more party States may enter into supplementary agreements establishing a differ-

ent allocation of costs as among those States. The United States Government may relieve the party State receiving aid from any liability and reimburse the party State supplying civil defense forces for the compensation paid to and the transportation, subsistence, and maintenance expenses of such forces during the time of the rendition of such aid or assistance outside the State and may also pay fair and reasonable compensation for the use or utilization of the supplies, materials, equipment, or facilities so utilized or consumed.

"ARTICLE IX

"Plans for the orderly evacuation and reception of the civilian population as the result of an emergency or disaster shall be worked out from time to time between representatives of the party States and the various local civil-defense areas thereof. Such plans shall include the manner of transporting such evacuees, the number of evacuees to be received in different areas, the manner in which food, clothing, housing, and medical care will be provided, the registration of the evacuees, the providing of facilities for the notification of relatives or friends, and the forwarding of such evacuees to other areas or the bringing in of additional materials, supplies, and all other relevant factors. Such plans shall provide that the party State receiving evacuees shall be reimbursed generally for the out-of-pocket expenses incurred in receiving and caring for such evacuees, for expenditures for transportation, food, clothing, medicines, and medical care and like items. Such expenditures shall be reimbursed by the party State of which the evacuees are residents, or by the United States Government under plans approved by it. After the termination of the emergency or disaster the party State of which the evacuees are resident shall assume the responsibility for the ultimate support or repatriation of such evacuees.

"ARTICLE X

"This compact shall be available to any State, Territory or possession of the United States, and the District of Columbia. The term "State" may also include any neighboring foreign country or province or State thereof.

"ARTICLE XI

"The committee established pursuant to article I of this compact may request the Civil Defense Agency of the United States Government to act as an informational and coordinating body under this compact, and representatives of such agency of the United States Government may attend meetings of such committee.

"ARTICLE XII

"This compact shall become operative immediately upon its ratification by any State as between it and any other State or States so ratifying and shall be subject to approval by Congress unless prior congressional approval has been given. Duly authenticated copies of this compact and of such supplementary agreements as may be entered into shall, at the time of their approval, be deposited with each of the party States and with the Civil Defense Agency and other appropriate agencies of the United States Government.

"ARTICLE XIII

"This compact shall continue in force and remain binding on each party State until the legislature or the governor of such party State takes action to withdraw therefrom. Such action shall not be effective until 30 days after notice thereof has been sent by the governor of the party State desiring to withdraw to the governors of all other party States.

"ARTICLE XIV

"This compact shall be construed to effectuate the purposes stated in article I hereof. If any provision of this compact is declared unconstitutional, or the applicability thereof to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the constitutionality of the remainder of this compact and the applicability thereof to other persons and circumstances shall not be affected thereby."

"2. Duly authenticated copies of this act shall, upon its approval, be transmitted to the governor of each State, to the President of the Senate of the United States, to the Speaker of the United States House of Representatives, to the Federal Civil Defense Administration, to the Secretary of State of the United States, and to the Council of State Governments."

"3. Nothing contained in this act shall be construed as limiting, directly or indirectly, the power of the governor to enter into interstate compacts or other agreements, relating to civil defense in an emergency, or impairing in any respect the force and effect thereof."

"4. This act shall take effect immediately."

A joint resolution of the Legislature of the State of North Carolina; to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce:

"Resolution 27

"Joint resolution memorializing the Congress of the United States to establish and maintain an airport at the Kill Devil Hill National Monument in Dare County, N. C."

"Whereas from a point near the base of Kill Devil Hill, on top of which the Wright memorial shaft now stands, man was first winged aloft in a heavier than air machine through the mechanical genius and dauntless resolution of the brothers, Wilbur and Orville Wright; and

"Whereas this flight, which was achieved by Orville Wright on December 17, 1903, is commemorated by Kill Devil National Monument; and

"Whereas there is now no airport or airfield being operated at or near the site of the said Wright memorial shaft; and

"Whereas said monument is situated on the North Carolina banks in an area rich in history and legend; and

"Whereas it is only a few miles from Roanoke Island, site of Sir Walter Raleigh's ill-fated settlement of 1587 where Virginia Dare was born, first child of English parentage in the New World: Now, therefore, be it

"Resolved by the house of representatives (the senate concurring):

"SECTION 1. That the Congress of the United States is hereby requested to enact the necessary legislation to cause an airport or airfield to be established and maintained at or near the Kill Devil Hill National Monument in Dare County, N. C."

"SEC. 2. That copies of this resolution be sent by the secretary of state to the President of the United States Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and the Senators and Representatives who compose North Carolina's congressional delegation."

"SEC. 3. That this resolution shall be in full force and effect from and after its adoption."

A joint resolution of the Legislature of the State of Washington; to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs:

"House Joint Memorial 8

"To the Honorable Harry S. Truman, President of the United States, and the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress Assembled:

"We, your memorialists, the Senate and House of Representatives of the State of

Washington, in legislative session assembled, most respectfully represent and petition as follows:

"Whereas the Congress passed H. R. 4497, an act creating the Indian Claims Commission, under the terms of which all Indian tribes were given 5 years from August 13, 1946, the date the President signed the bill, in which to file their claims against the Government; and

"Whereas said time will expire on August 13, 1951; and

"Whereas many Indian tribes will not be able to file their claims within that time due to their lack of understanding of the terms of the bill and due to the fact that the Indian department has been slow in approving contracts between Indian tribes and their attorneys, and if said time is not extended many tribes who might have meritorious claims against the Government will be deprived of their day in court; and

"Whereas Washington has a large Indian population within its boundaries and is vitally interested in the Indian people and believes it would be to the best interest not only to its Indian citizens of Washington, but throughout the Nation, that said time be extended; and

"Whereas the third meeting of the Governors' Interstate Council on Indian Affairs, composed of representatives from 16 States having Indian population, passed a resolution on the 7th day of December 1950 pointing out that due to the inability of many tribes to employ counsel and the failure of the Indian Bureau to approve contracts between tribes and their attorneys promptly, that approximately one-half the tribes of the United States have been thus far unable to complete the preliminary work preparatory to filing their lawsuits, and that it will be physically impossible for many tribes to complete their arrangements before the deadline, August 13, 1951: Now, therefore, be it

"Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the State of Washington in legislative session assembled, That we respectfully petition the Congress of the United States to speedily enact legislation to extend the time within which Indian tribes may file claims before the Indian Claims Commission for a period of at least 2 years from August 13, 1951; and be it further

"Resolved, That copies of this memorial be immediately transmitted to the Honorable Harry S. Truman, President of the United States, and to the President of the United States Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives of the United States, the Honorable Secretary of the Interior, the Honorable Commissioners of Indian Affairs, and to each Member of Congress from the State of Washington.

"Passed the house February 23, 1951.

*"CHARLES W. HODDE,
"Speaker of the House."*

"Passed the senate March 6, 1951.

*"VICTOR A. MEYERS,
"President of the Senate."*

A concurrent resolution of the Legislature of the Territory of Hawaii; to the Committee on Finance:

"Senate Concurrent Resolution 16

"Whereas the Territory of Hawaii has always responded with unexcelled patriotism to the Nation's call for defenders, as even now the men of Hawaii, in the performance of their highest duties as American citizens, are suffering and dying in Korea; and

"Whereas such devotion to and sacrifices for the Nation's cause become even more marked and heroic when it is remembered that the people of Hawaii, although called upon to assume all the duties and responsibilities of citizenship, are denied the corresponding rights and privileges; and

"Whereas, so long as Hawaii is denied statehood, its people remain second-class citizens, are denied a voice in the selection of the President, are denied a vote in the Congress, are subjected to taxation without representation, are governed by officials they have not elected, are denied a voice in the amendment of the Constitution, and are subjected to unequal treatment; and

"Whereas, in view of the devoted service and gallant sacrifices of the residents of Hawaii in the Armed Forces, it is only just and proper that they be relieved of some of their burdens: Now, therefore, be it

"Resolved by the Senate of the Twenty-sixth Legislature of the Territory of Hawaii (the house of representatives concurring), That the Congress of the United States of America be, and it hereby is respectfully requested to enact legislation granting to all residents of the Territory of Hawaii who have been residents of the Territory for not less than 1 year immediately prior to their entry into the Armed Forces exemption from all Federal taxes becoming due while such residents are serving in the Armed Forces; and be it further

"Resolved, That certified copies of this Concurrent Resolution be transmitted to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives of the Congress of the United States of America, to the Secretary of the Interior, and to the Delegate to Congress from Hawaii."

A concurrent resolution of the Legislature of the Territory of Hawaii; to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs:

"House Concurrent Resolution 25

"Concurrent resolution requesting the Congress of the United States of America to enact legislation providing financial assistance to the Territory of Hawaii for the segregation, care, maintenance, and treatment of persons afflicted or suspected of being afflicted with Hansen's disease

"Whereas the Territory of Hawaii is now bearing the entire burden of supporting, treating, and caring for persons afflicted with Hansen's disease within the said Territory, and has borne this entire expense since June 13, 1942, and has borne a major portion of such expense since the Hansen's disease program was established in Hawaii in 1865; and

"Whereas by the act of the Congress of the United States of February 3, 1917 (39 Stats. at Large 872), the United States Public Health Service was authorized to establish a Federal home for the care and treatment of all persons afflicted with Hansen's disease in the United States who should present themselves for treatment thereof and of any such persons who might be consigned thereto by the proper health authorities of any State, Territory, or the District of Columbia, and such a home was established at Carville, in the State of Louisiana, and has been maintained thereafter by the United States Public Health Service at the expense of the United States; and

"Whereas the United States Public Health Service has seldom, if ever, been called upon by the Territory of Hawaii to receive, maintain, or treat at Carville patients suffering from Hansen's disease from said Territory; and

"Whereas the expense of treating and caring for such persons has constituted and still constitutes a heavy burden upon the people of the Territory of Hawaii; and

"Whereas the Territory, by treating and caring for such persons, has saved and is saving the Government of the United States the expense of transporting them to and

treating and maintaining them at Carville; and

"Whereas the said Territory is desirous of continuing to adequately treat and care for persons afflicted with the said disease and financial assistance from Federal sources would be helpful in continuing such treatment and care; and

"Whereas the Legislature of the Territory of Hawaii is heartily in accord with the purpose which will be served by H. R. 1739, and unanimously endorses the provisions of the same: Now, therefore, be it

"Resolved by the House of Representatives of the Twenty-sixth Legislature of the Territory of Hawaii (the senate concurring). That the Congress of the United States of America be, and is hereby, respectfully requested and urged to appropriate and make available to the Board of Health of the Territory of Hawaii, annually, a sum of money for each Hansen's disease patient in Hawaiian institutions equal to the cost of providing care and subsistence for a patient in the hospital at Carville, La., and to enact a bill in substantially the following form:

"A bill authorizing an annual appropriation to provide more adequate facilities for the care and treatment of Hansen's disease in the Territory of Hawaii

"Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That, for the purpose of providing more adequate facilities for the care and treatment of Hansen's disease in the Territory of Hawaii, there is hereby authorized to be appropriated and made available to the Board of Health of the Territory of Hawaii for each fiscal year, beginning with the fiscal year ending June 30, 1951, a sum equal to the product of (1) the average annual cost of providing care and subsistence for a patient in the National Leprosarium, Carville, La., during the three preceding fiscal years, and (2) the average daily patient census of patients with Hansen's disease provided with care and subsistence within the Territory of Hawaii by the Territorial Government during such fiscal year; and be it further

"Resolved, That certified copies of this concurrent resolution be forwarded to the President of the United States, to both Houses of the Congress of the United States, to the Secretary of the Interior, and to the Delegate to Congress from Hawaii."

Resolutions of the General Court of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, relating to reducing to 63 years the age for eligibility for old-age assistance; to the Committee on Finance.

(See resolutions printed in full when presented by Mr. LODGE (for himself and Mr. SALTONSTALL) on April 2, 1951, p. 3109, CONGRESSIONAL RECORD.)

A joint resolution of the Legislature of the State of Minnesota, relating to maternity

care for wives of servicemen; to the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare.

(See joint resolution printed in full when presented by Mr. THYE on April 2, 1951, p. 3109, CONGRESSIONAL RECORD.)

A resolution adopted by the council of the city of Benicia, Calif., relating to the proposed classification of Solano County, Calif., as a critical defense area; to the Committee on Banking and Currency.

A telegram in the nature of a petition from the International Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters, New York, N. Y., signed by A. Philip Randolph, international president, praying for the enactment of legislation providing for the shipment of excess food to India; to the Committee on Foreign Relations.

The petition of Mildred Cooper, of Chicago, Ill., relating to increased retirement benefits to retired railroad employees; to the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare.

PARTICIPATION BY ITALY IN PROGRAM OF DEFENSE AGAINST AGGRESSION—RESOLUTION OF PROVIDENCE (R. I.) CITY COUNCIL

Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, on behalf of my colleague, the senior Senator from Rhode Island [Mr. GREEN] and myself, I present for appropriate reference, and ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD, a resolution adopted March 16, 1951, by the City Council of Providence, R. I., favoring the enactment of legislation to permit the active participation of Italy in the program for defense against aggression.

There being no objection, the resolution was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations, and ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

Resolution of the City Council No. 328

Whereas the 1947 Treaty of Peace between Italy and the United States of America prevents effective participation of the Italian Government in the program for adequate defense against the forces of aggression; and

Whereas the four applications of Italy for admission into the United Nations has been successfully blocked by Russian veto; and

Whereas the developments of recent years have proven detrimental to our country's leadership in world affairs because of our failure to denounce the Italian Peace Treaty; and

Whereas within the Senate of the United States of America there are Members among whom is our Senator JOHN O. PASTORE, who welcome the opportunity of scrapping the treaty of 1947 which limits the Italian nation of its means of self-defense: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, That the City Council of the City of Providence memorialize the Members of

the Congress of the United States of America from the State of Rhode Island to urge passage of such legislation as would permit the active participation of Italy in the program for defense against aggression.

ADDITIONAL REPORT OF JOINT COMMITTEE ON REDUCTION OF NONESSENTIAL FEDERAL EXPENDITURES, RELATING TO CIVILIAN EMPLOYMENT IN EXECUTIVE BRANCH

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, as chairman of the Joint Committee on Reduction of Nonesessential Federal Expenditures, I submit an additional report on civilian employment in the executive branch of the Federal Government for the month of February 1951, and in accordance with the practice of several years' standing, I request that it be printed in the body of the RECORD as a part of my remarks, together with a statement by me.

There being no objection, the report and statement were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

FEDERAL PERSONNEL IN THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH, JANUARY-FEBRUARY 1951, AND PAY, DECEMBER 1950-JANUARY 1951

NOTE WITH REFERENCE TO PERSONAL SERVICE EXPENDITURE FIGURES

It should be noted that the latest expenditure figures for personal service shown in table I of this report are for the month of January 1951 and that they are compared with personal service expenditure figures for the month of December 1950, whereas the latest employment figures covered in this report are for the month of February 1951 and are compared with the month of January 1951. This lag in personal service expenditure figures is necessary in order that actual expenditures may be reported.

(Figures in the following report are compiled from signed official personnel reports by the various agencies and departments of the Federal Government. Table I shows total personnel employed inside and outside continental United States, and pay, by agency. Table II shows personnel employed inside continental United States. Table III shows personnel employed outside continental United States. Table IV gives by agency the industrial workers employed by the Federal Government. For purposes of comparison, figures for the previous month are shown in adjoining columns.)

PERSONNEL AND PAY SUMMARY

(See table I)

According to monthly personnel reports for February 1951 submitted to the Joint Committee on Reduction of Nonesessential Federal Expenditures:

Department or agency	Civilian personnel in executive branch			Payroll (in thousands) in executive branch		
	In February numbered—	In January numbered—	Increase (+) or decrease (—)	In January was—	In December was—	Increase (+) or decrease (—)
Total.....	2,307,904	2,245,294	+62,610	\$669,575	\$662,522	+\$7,053
1. Agencies exclusive of National Military Establishment.....	1,208,226	1,198,465	+9,761	356,820	339,211	+36,391
2. National Military Establishment.....	1,099,678	1,046,829	+52,849	312,755	269,311	+43,444
Within the National Military Establishment:						
Office of the Secretary of Defense.....	2,080	2,034	+46	910	789	+121
Department of the Army.....	475,879	457,743	+18,136	127,182	108,906	+18,276
Department of the Air Force.....	217,241	199,825	+17,416	58,662	51,577	+6,985
Department of the Navy.....	404,478	387,227	+17,251	126,101	108,039	+18,062

¹ Revised on basis of later information.

TABLE I.—Consolidated table of Federal personnel inside and outside continental United States employed by the executive agencies during February 1951, and comparison with January 1951, and pay for January 1951, and comparison with December 1950

Department or agency	Pay (in thousands of dollars)				Personnel			
	December	January	Increase	Decrease	January	February	Increase	Decrease
Executive departments (except National Military Establishment):								
Agriculture.....	20,614	21,987	1,373		72,200	72,891	691	
Commerce ^{1,2}	18,590	18,820	230		57,200	58,233	1,033	
Interior.....	17,520	17,919	399		56,933	57,324	391	
Justice.....	10,220	11,482	1,262		28,814	29,241	427	
Labor.....	2,211	2,439	228		6,941	7,585	644	
Post Office.....	185,732	132,037		53,695	495,882	497,802	1,920	
State.....	7,884	8,717	833		25,819	26,363	544	
Treasury.....	27,686	30,634	2,948		87,695	89,561	1,866	
Executive Office of the President:								
White House Office.....	146	143		3	301	290		11
Bureau of the Budget.....	244	270	26		513	526	13	
Executive Mansion and Grounds.....	17	13		4	67	69	2	
National Security Council ⁴	9	10	1		19	18		1
National Security Resources Board.....	200	227	27		414	237		177
Council of Economic Advisers.....	22	25	3		40	39		1
Commission on Renovation of the Executive Mansion.....	3	4	1		10	19	9	
Emergency agencies (1950-51):								
Defense Production Administration.....		1	1		1	383	382	
Defense Transport Administration.....	16	22	6		74	125	51	
Economic Stabilization Agency.....	29	45	16		683	2,545	1,862	
Federal Civil Defense Administration.....	54	100	46		176	297	121	
Office of Defense Mobilization.....	1	9	8		39	58	19	
President's Commission on Internal Security and Individual Rights ⁵						9	9	
President's Materials Policy Commission ⁶						18	18	
Subversive Activities Control Board ⁷	9	11	2		19	19		
Postwar agencies:								
Displaced Persons Commission.....	116	121	5		337	348	11	
Economic Cooperation Administration.....	1,662	1,745	83		5,136	5,207	71	
Motor Carrier Claims Commission.....	9				15	14		1
Office of the Housing Expediter.....	883	912	29		2,474	2,491	17	
Philippine Alien Property Administration.....	3	10	7		56	57	1	
Philippine War Damage Commission.....	87	34		53	56	55		1
War Claims Commission.....	39	36		3	114	118	4	
Independent agencies:								
American Battle Monuments Commission.....	70	71	1		648	664	16	
Atomic Energy Commission.....	1,941	2,308	367		5,202	5,289	87	
Civil Aeronautics Board.....	237	269	32		561	550		11
Civil Service Commission.....	1,168	1,281	113		3,726	3,816	90	
Export-Import Bank of Washington.....	61	70	9		129	128		1
Federal Communications Commission.....	481	529	48		1,226	1,214		12
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.....	399	433	34		1,072	1,063		9
Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service.....	186	202	16		333	345	12	
Federal Power Commission.....	297	328	31		737	731		6
Federal Security Agency ⁸	9,412	10,770	1,358		35,295	34,844		451
Federal Trade Commission.....	278	304	26		624	637	13	
General Accounting Office.....	2,357	2,591	234		6,993	6,943		50
General Services Administration.....	6,814	7,952	1,138		27,417	28,103	686	
Government Printing Office.....	2,461	2,717	256		7,234	7,226		8
Housing and Home Finance Agency.....	5,101	5,142	41		14,088	14,021		67
Indian Claims Commission.....		7			11			
Interstate Commerce Commission.....	819	886	67		2,063	2,120	57	
National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics.....	2,425	2,693	268		7,509	7,645	136	
National Capital Housing Authority.....	85	33		52	327	325		2
National Capital Park and Planning Commission.....	2	2			7			
National Capital Sesqui-centennial Commission.....	13	6		7	10	10		
National Gallery of Art.....	80	90	10		323	324	1	
National Labor Relations Board.....	534	589	55		1,451	1,450		1
National Mediation Board.....	62	62			117	120	3	
National Science Foundation.....					22	19		3
Panama Canal.....	3,751	3,203		548	20,854	20,715		139
Railroad Retirement Board.....	632	695	63		2,066	2,069		27
Reconstruction Finance Corporation.....	1,429	1,548	119		3,330	3,141		189
Securities and Exchange Commission.....	450	489	39		1,056	1,052		4
Selective Service System.....	1,404	1,600	196		7,834	8,067	233	
Smithsonian Institution.....	172	188	16		575	585	10	
Soldiers' Home.....	111	155	44		735	735		
Tariff Commission.....	95	105	10		212	210		2
Tax Court of the United States.....	58	58			131	131		
Tennessee Valley Authority.....	4,125	5,278	1,153		15,548	15,877	329	
Veterans' Administration.....	51,949	56,350	4,401		186,891	185,997		894
Total, excluding National Military Establishment.....	393,211	356,820	17,970	54,361	1,198,465	1,208,226	11,729	1,968
Net change, excluding National Military Establishment.....			36,391				9,761	
National Military Establishment:								
Office of the Secretary of Defense ¹⁰	789	910	121		2,034	2,080	46	
Department of the Army:								
Inside continental United States.....	98,505	116,133	17,628		411,665	429,318	17,653	
Outside continental United States.....	10,401	11,049	648		46,078	46,561	483	
Department of the Air Force:								
Inside continental United States.....	45,640	53,298	7,658		173,819	190,721	16,902	
Outside continental United States.....	5,937	5,294		673	26,006	26,520	514	
Department of the Navy:								
Inside continental United States ¹¹	100,985	117,953	16,968		358,014	374,089	16,075	
Outside continental United States.....	7,054	8,148	1,094		29,213	30,389	1,176	
Total, National Military Establishment.....	269,311	312,755	44,117	673	1,046,829	1,099,678	52,849	
Net increase, National Military Establishment.....			42,444				52,849	
Grand total, including National Military Establishment.....	662,522	669,575	62,087	55,034	2,245,294	2,307,904	64,578	1,968
Net increase, including National Military Establishment.....			7,053				62,610	

¹ Includes temporary employees (enumerators, supervisors, and clerks) engaged in taking the Seventeenth Decennial Census as follows: January, 77; February, 50; a decrease of 27.

² Includes 2,025 employees of the National Production Authority, an increase of 700 over the January total of 1,316.

³ February figure is exclusive of 390 seamen on the rolls of the Maritime Administration and their pay.

⁴ Exclusive of personnel and pay of the Central Intelligence Agency.

⁵ New Agency established under authority of Executive Order 10207, dated Jan. 23, 1951.

⁶ New agency created by the President's letter to Mr. William S. Paley, dated Jan. 22, 1951.

⁷ New agency established by Public Law 831, 81st Cong.

⁸ Included on basis of later information.

⁹ Includes personnel and pay of Howard University and Columbia Institute for the Deaf.

¹⁰ Includes 223 employees assigned to Munitions Board Cataloging Agency and 23 employees assigned to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

¹¹ Subject to revision.

TABLE II.—Federal personnel inside continental United States employed by executive agencies during February 1951, and comparison with January 1951

Department or agency	January	February	Increase	Decrease	Department or agency	January	February	Increase	Decrease
Executive departments (except National Military Establishment):					Independent agencies—Continued				
Agriculture.....	69,904	70,582	678		General Accounting Office.....	6,993	6,943		50
Commerce ^{1 2}	53,656	54,751	1,095		General Services Administration.....	27,356	28,044	688	
Interior.....	50,602	50,912	310		Government Printing Office.....	7,234	7,326	92	
Justice.....	28,323	28,737	414		Housing and Home Finance Agency.....	13,987	13,920		67
Labor.....	6,834	7,499	665		Indian Claims Commission.....	11	11		
Post Office.....	494,045	495,957	1,912		Interstate Commerce Commission.....	2,093	2,120	27	
State.....	9,387	9,620	233		National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics.....	7,509	7,645	136	
Treasury.....	86,932	88,792	1,860		National Capital Housing Authority.....	327	325		2
Executive Office of the President:					National Capital Park and Planning Commission.....	7	7		
White House Office.....	301	290		11	National Capital Sesquicentennial Commission.....	10	10		
Bureau of the Budget.....	513	526	13		National Gallery of Art.....	323	324	1	
Executive Mansion and Grounds.....	67	69	2		National Labor Relations Board.....	1,437	1,454		3
National Security Council ³	19	18		1	National Mediation Board.....	117	120	3	
National Security Resources Board.....	414	237		177	National Science Foundation.....	22	19		3
Council of Economic Advisers.....	40	39		1	Panama Canal.....	623	625	2	
Commission on Renovation of the Executive Mansion.....	10	19	9		Railroad Retirement Board.....	2,096	2,069		27
Emergency agencies (1950-51):					Reconstruction Finance Corporation.....	3,321	3,133		188
Defense Production Administration.....	1	383	382		Securities and Exchange Commission.....	1,056	1,052		4
Defense Transport Administration.....	74	123	51		Selective Service System.....	7,593	7,827	234	
Economic Stabilization Agency.....	683	2,545	1,862		Smithsonian Institution.....	567	577	10	
Federal Civil Defense Administration.....	176	297	121		Soldiers' Home.....	735	735		
Office of Defense Mobilization.....	39	58	19		Tariff Commission.....	212	210		2
President's Commission on Internal Security and Individual Rights ⁴		9	9		Tax Court of the United States.....	131	131		
President's Materials Policy Commission ⁵		18	18		Tennessee Valley Authority.....	15,548	15,877	329	
Subversive Activities Control Board ⁶	19	19			Veterans' Administration.....	185,413	184,524		889
Postwar agencies:					Total, excluding National Military Establishment.....	1,139,280	1,148,799	11,443	1,924
Displaced Persons Commission.....	116	125	9		Net increase, excluding National Military Establishment.....			9,519	
Economic Cooperation Administration.....	1,254	1,287	33						
Motor Carrier Claims Commission.....	15	14		1	National Military Establishment:				
Office of the Housing Expediter.....	2,448	2,464	16		Office of the Secretary of Defense.....	2,033	2,080	47	
Philippine Alien Property Administration.....	2	2			Department of the Army.....	411,665	429,318	17,653	
Philippine War Damage Commission.....	39	43	4		Department of the Air Force.....	173,819	190,721	16,902	
War Claims Commission.....	101	105	4		Department of the Navy.....	358,014	374,089	16,075	
Independent agencies:					Total, National Military Establishment.....	945,531	996,208	50,677	
American Battle Monuments Commission.....	17	18	1		Net increase, National Military Establishment.....			50,677	
Atomic Energy Commission.....	5,198	5,284	86						
Civil Aeronautics Board.....	547	536		11	Grand total, including National Military Establishment.....	2,084,811	2,145,007	62,120	1,924
Civil Service Commission.....	3,723	3,813	90		Net increase, including National Military Establishment.....			60,196	
Export-Import Bank of Washington.....	128	127		1					
Federal Communications Commission.....	1,201	1,188		13					
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.....	1,072	1,063		9					
Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service.....	333	345	12						
Federal Power Commission.....	737	731		6					
Federal Security Agency ⁷	34,965	34,507		458					
Federal Trade Commission.....	624	637	13						

¹ Includes temporary employees (enumerators, supervisors, and clerks) engaged in taking the Seventeenth Decennial Census as follows: January, 77; February, 50; a decrease of 27.

² Includes 2,025 employees of the National Production Authority, an increase of 709 over the January total of 1,316.

³ February figure is exclusive of 390 seamen on the rolls of the Maritime Administration and their pay.

⁴ Exclusive of personnel and pay of the Central Intelligence Agency.

⁵ New agency established under authority of Executive Order 10207, dated Jan. 23, 1951.

⁶ New agency created by the President's letter to Mr. William S. Paley, dated Jan. 22, 1951.

⁷ New agency established by Public Law 831, 81st Cong.

⁸ Included on basis of later information.

⁹ Includes personnel and pay of Howard University and Columbia Institute for the Deaf.

¹⁰ Subject to revision.

TABLE III.—Federal personnel outside continental United States employed by the executive agencies during February 1951, and comparison with January 1951

Department or agency	January	February	Increase	Decrease	Department or agency	January	February	Increase	Decrease
Executive departments (except National Military Establishment):					Independent agencies—Continued				
Agriculture.....	2,296	2,309	13		National Labor Relations Board.....	14	16	2	
Commerce.....	3,544	3,482		62	Panama Canal.....	20,231	20,090		141
Interior.....	6,331	6,412	81		Reconstruction Finance Corporation.....	9	8		1
Justice.....	491	504	13		Selective Service System.....	241	240		1
Labor.....	107	86		21	Smithsonian Institution.....	8	8		
Post Office.....	1,837	1,845	8		Veterans' Administration.....	1,478	1,473		5
State.....	16,432	16,743	311		Total, excluding National Military Establishment.....	59,185	59,427	480	238
Treasury.....	763	769	6		Net increase, excluding National Military Establishment.....			242	
Postwar agencies:									
Displaced Persons Commission.....	221	223	2		National Military Establishment:				
Economic Cooperation Administration.....	3,902	3,920	18		Office of the Secretary of Defense.....	1			1
Office of the Housing Expediter.....	26	27	1		Department of the Army.....	46,078	46,561	483	
Philippine Alien Property Administration.....	54	55	1		Department of the Air Force.....	26,006	26,520	514	
Philippine War Damage Commission.....	17	12		5	Department of the Navy.....	29,213	30,389	1,176	
War Claims Commission.....	13	13			Total, National Military Establishment.....	101,298	103,470	2,173	1
Independent agencies:					Net increase, National Military Establishment.....			2,172	
American Battle Monuments Commission.....	631	646	15						
Atomic Energy Commission.....	4	5	1		Grand total, including National Military Establishment.....	160,483	162,897	2,653	239
Civil Aeronautics Board.....	14	14			Net increase, including National Military Establishment.....			2,414	
Civil Service Commission.....	3	3							
Export-Import Bank of Washington.....	1	1							
Federal Communications Commission.....	25	26	1						
Federal Security Agency.....	330	337	7						
General Services Administration.....	61	59		2					
Housing and Home Finance Agency.....	101	101							

TABLE IV.—Industrial employees of the Federal Government inside and outside continental United States employed by executive agencies during February 1951, and comparison with January 1951

Department or agency	January	February	Increase	Decrease	Department or agency	January	February	Increase	Decrease
Executive departments (except National Military Establishment):					National Military Establishment:				
Commerce.....	1,144	1,128	-----	16	Department of the Army:				
Interior.....	3,544	2,945	-----	599	Inside continental United States.....	225,970	235,524	9,554	-----
State.....	335	489	154	-----	Outside continental United States.....	25,838	26,191	353	-----
Treasury.....	8,622	8,696	74	-----	Department of the Air Force:				
Independent agencies:					Inside continental United States.....	98,996	108,501	9,505	-----
Atomic Energy Commission.....	122	128	6	-----	Outside continental United States.....	19,124	19,590	466	-----
General Services Administration.....	157	166	9	-----	Department of the Navy:				
Panama Canal.....	1,667	1,635	-----	32	Inside continental United States.....	243,053	253,920	10,867	-----
Tennessee Valley Authority.....	8,722	9,024	302	-----	Outside continental United States.....	22,479	23,495	1,016	-----
Total, excluding National Military Establishment.....	24,313	24,211	545	647	Total, National Military Establishment.....	635,460	667,221	31,761	-----
Net decrease, excluding National Military Establishment.....			102		Net increase, National Military Establishment.....			31,761	
					Grand total, including National Military Establishment.....	659,773	691,432	32,306	647
					Net increase, including National Military Establishment.....			31,659	

¹ Subject to revision.

TABLE V.—Federal employees assigned to mutual defense assistance program

Department or agency	Payroll (in thousands)			Civilian personnel		
	In December was—	In January was—	Increase (+) or decrease (—)	In January numbered—	In February numbered—	Increase (+) or decrease (—)
Total.....	\$7,466	\$9,248	+\$1,782	29,431	32,469	+3,038
Commerce Department.....	1	1	-----	1	-----	-1
State Department.....	106	101	-5	254	252	-2
Economic Cooperation Administration.....	9	8	-1	18	18	-----
Office of the Secretary of Defense.....	17	19	+2	44	44	-----
Department of the Army.....	6,238	734	+1,496	25,326	27,630	+2,304
Department of the Air Force.....	324	533	+209	1,319	1,293	-26
Department of the Navy.....	771	852	+81	2,469	3,232	+763

STATEMENT BY SENATOR BYRD

Civilian employment in the executive branch of the Federal Government during the 28 days of February increased 62,610, bringing the total Federal employment to 2,307,904.

The increase averaged more than 2,200 a day.

White-collar workers were added at a rate averaging more than 1,000 a day, and the increase among industrial workers was at approximately the same rate. Federal civilian employment for work overseas increased by 2,414.

Employment in the civilian agencies during February rose 9,761 to a total of 1,208,226. Civilian employment in the Military Establishment increased by 52,849 to a total of 1,099,678.

The increase in civilian agency employment averaged more than 300 a day, and in the National Military Establishment civilian employment increased at a rate averaging nearly 1,900 a day.

Major increases reported for the month by the civilian agencies included: 1,862 by Federal Civilian Defense Administration; 1,866 by Treasury Department (largely seasonal in the spring tax collection build-up); and 1,920 by Post Office Department.

All components of the Military Establishment reported increases in civilian employment as follows: 18,136 by Department of the Army; 17,251 by Department of the Navy; and 17,416 by Department of the Air Force.

These figures were revealed today in the monthly compilation of signed personnel reports submitted by Federal departments and agencies to the Joint Committee on Reduction of Nonessential Federal Expenditures.

In connection with civilian employment by the Military Establishment, which has been mounting at a rate of 1,000 a day since March 1950, the following quotations are from a paid advertisement by a local business college, March 11, in the Dayton (Ohio) Daily News:

"You are paid a good salary while preparing for typist and stenographic positions at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base."

"Qualify on civil service clerical test."

"You will be placed on Wright-Patterson Air Force base payroll and earn full pay (\$2,200 per year) while attending special intensive basic courses for stenographic and typist training (no shorthand or typing required)."

"After successful completion of this training program and after passing civil-service tests for either typist or stenographer, you will be eligible for advancement to typist (GS-2) rating at \$2,450 per year or stenographer (GS-3) rating at \$2,650."

"Length of course (stenographer) 8 weeks, * * * (typist) 6 weeks."

The following quotations are from a news story, under a three-column headline appearing in the same paper:

"The Air Force will pay for the courses with students paying only for their textbooks—between \$8 and \$10."

"In addition, while they take the course, the students will have a GS-1 civil-service rating which pays \$2,200 per year, or a little more than \$42 a week. When the course ends, they will be eligible for promotion."

The article said the Air Force would give contracts to two Dayton business colleges for such courses and that "negotiations are being conducted with approximately four other institutions within a 75-mile radius of the field for additional training."

In addition the article referred to a Wright-Patterson program for hiring 16-year-olds.

Such practices raise several questions, including:

1. The occasion and need for such extreme measures;

2. Whether the practice constitutes abuse of administrative liberties in appropriation language, granted by Congress in response to constant departmental pleas;

3. Civil-service status of such students with respect to pay rates, leave, retirement, and other emoluments;

4. Justice to other Federal, State, and local agencies, in the employment market, which do not interpret the law to allow use of their funds for such purposes;

5. Justice to private enterprise and professions which must compete with such Federal employment subsidies.

This matter has been brought to the attention of the Secretary of Defense and the Director of the Budget. General Marshall has submitted it to Secretary Finletter of the Air Force for his consideration as a situation under "administrative jurisdiction." It is understood that the matter has also come to the attention of the Civil Service Commission.

Pending further investigation, Air Force authorities have informally advised me that the language of their maintenance and operations appropriations provisions might conceivably have been interpreted to make funds available for this activity. The language in this section provides for training and instruction of military and civilian personnel of the Air Force, including tuition and related expenses. In addition, general provisions relating to the military chapter of the 1951 Appropriations Act, among other things, allow money to be spent for instruction and training, including tuition not otherwise provided for, of civilian employees.

Under continual pressure not to tie the administrative hands of the executive branch, Members of Congress on the Appropriations Committee questioned Air Force witnesses pointedly as to purposes for which money would be spent under this broad language.

With respect to civilian personnel, the Air Force witness under questioning testified that it would be used to train key civilian personnel employed in the field of research and development.

[From the Dayton (Ohio) Daily News of March 11, 1951]

YOU ARE PAID A GOOD SALARY WHILE PREPARING FOR TYPIST AND STENOGRAPHIC POSITIONS AT WRIGHT-PATTERSON AIR FORCE BASE

Qualifications: Minimum age 18 qualify on civil-service clerical test (no shorthand or typing required).

You will be placed on Wright-Patterson Air Force Base payroll and earn full pay (\$2,200 per year) while attending special intensive basic courses for stenographic and typist training at Miami-Jacobs College. Successful completion of this basic course will qualify you for advanced training at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base.

After successful completion of this training program and passing civil-service tests for either typist or stenographer, you will be eligible for advancement to typist (GS-2 rating) at \$2,450 per year or stenographer (GS-3 rating) at \$2,650 per year.

Basic stenographic training program: (a) Length of course, 8 weeks (5 days per week, 8 class periods per day), (b) subjects, shorthand, typewriting, English, and spelling.

Basic typist-training program: (a) Length of course, 6 weeks (5 days per week, 8 class periods per day), (b) subjects, typewriting, English, and spelling.

Apply now in person to Miami-Jacobs College for complete information and application for next qualifying tests. This office is open 8:30 to 4:30, Monday through Friday; 6 to 9:30 p. m. Monday and Thursday nights, and on Saturdays from 9 to 12.

MIAMI-JACOBS COLLEGE,
Dayton, Ohio.

[From the Dayton (Ohio) Daily News of March 11, 1951]

UNITED STATES TO PAY FOR TRAINING OF CLERICAL WORKERS HERE—CIVIL-SERVICE SALARIES ALSO FOR TRAINEES—BUSINESS COLLEGES TO GET CONTRACTS

An acute shortage of stenographers and clerk-typists in the Dayton area was underlined again yesterday with announcement that two Dayton business colleges will receive Air Force contracts to train them.

Civilian personnel officials at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base announced the contracts will be given to Miami-Jacobs Business College and Sinclair College.

Each institution will train 30 stenographers and 30 clerk-typists—a total of 120 persons—starting March 26. They will begin taking applications tomorrow—Miami-Jacobs at 9 a. m. and Sinclair at 10 a. m.

The Air Force will pay for the courses with the students paying only for their textbooks—between \$8 and \$10.

In addition, while they take the course, the students will have a GS-1 rating which pays \$2,200 a year, or a little more than \$42 a week. When the course ends, they will be eligible for promotion.

The colleges will give 8 weeks of training to stenographers and 6 weeks to clerk-typists. In addition, the students will receive 3 weeks of training at the air base.

Trainees will be required to sign a "moral agreement" that they will spend a minimum of 1 month on a job at the air base for each week of training they receive.

Thus, stenographers who complete the course would agree to spend 8 months in a field job and clerk-typists, 6 months.

The agreement has no teeth, said field officials, but it has worked out very well in other instances.

An earlier notice of the urgent need for such civilian workers at the field had come Thursday. Announced that day was a program to hire 16-year-olds, who are high-school graduates or who have work permits, for jobs as clerk-typists.

Age minimum for the business college program is 18. Both men and women are eligible.

As of yesterday, vacancies for 694 clerical posts were listed at the field's employment office. These included 413 clerk-typist jobs and 281 stenographic positions that could be filled immediately if the personnel were available.

Field officials said a conservative estimate was that between 800 and 900 men and women would be needed in these two clerical fields at the base between now and June 30.

This figure includes the 694 current vacancies, plus others that are expected to develop from "normal attrition" (separation from jobs for marriage and other reasons) and from new jobs created by the continuing expansion of field-office staffs.

The Miami-Jacobs and Sinclair contracts are expected to provide only a part of the needed clerical help. Therefore, said the field officials, negotiations are being conducted with approximately four other institutions within a 75-mile radius of the field for additional training.

Aptitude tests for applicants will be conducted by Civil Service officials March 19 at Miami-Jacobs and March 20 at Sinclair. The top 30 scorers at each school will be assigned by Civil Service examiners to the stenographers' course; the second highest 30 to the clerk-typist course.

**ENROLLED JOINT RESOLUTION
PRESENTED**

The Secretary of the Senate reported that on today, April 3, 1951, he presented to the President of the United States the enrolled joint resolution (S. J. Res. 40) to extend the time for the filing of certain claims under the War Claims Act of 1948.

BILLS INTRODUCED

Bills were introduced, read the first time, and, by unanimous consent, the second time, and referred as follows:

By Mr. JOHNSTON of South Carolina:

S. 1248. A bill to provide annual and sick leave for temporary employees in the field service of the Post Office Department; to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service.

By Mr. KERR:

S. 1249. A bill for the relief of Michael D. Daniel; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. SALTONSTALL:

S. 1250. A bill to exempt members of the Armed Forces from the tax on admissions when admission is free of charge; to the Committee on Finance.

By Mr. GREEN:

S. 1251. A bill for the relief of James C. White; and

S. 1252. A bill for the relief of Lino Giampedroni; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. ELLENDER (by request):

S. 1253. A bill to amend the act of April 6, 1949, so as to further define the authority of the Secretary of Agriculture to make loans to farmers and stockmen who suffer losses from production disasters, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Agriculture and Forestry.

By Mr. McMAHON:

S. 1254. A bill for the relief of Athanasios Elias Chellotis; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. NIXON:

S. 1255. A bill for the relief of Leopold Kahn, Jr.;

S. 1256. A bill for the relief of Barbara Ann Koppius; to the Committee on the Judiciary; and

S. 1257. A bill to amend the Hospital Survey and Construction Act; to the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare.

By Mr. EASTLAND:

S. 1258. A bill to authorize and direct the conveyance of a certain tract of land in the

State of Mississippi to Louie H. Emfinger; to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

By Mr. MURRAY:

S. 1259. A bill for the relief of Barbara Folan; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. RUSSELL (by request):

S. 1260. A bill to authorize the acquisition of property for the establishment of a Federal civil defense technical training school, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Armed Services.

CHANGE OF REFERENCE

On motion of Mr. ELLENDER, and by unanimous consent, the Committee on Agriculture and Forestry was discharged from the further consideration of the bill (S. 1165) amending section 25 of the Tennessee Valley Authority Act of 1933, as amended, and it was referred to the Committee on Public Works.

DEFENSE HOUSING AND COMMUNITY FACILITIES AND SERVICES ACT OF 1951—AMENDMENT

Mr. SPARKMAN submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill (S. 349) to assist the provision of housing and community facilities and services required in connection with the national defense, which was ordered to lie on the table and to be printed.

HOUSE BILLS REFERRED OR PLACED ON CALENDAR

The following bills were severally read twice by their titles, and referred, or placed on the calendar, as indicated:

H. R. 304. An act to provide for a study of the mental and physical sequelae of malnutrition and starvation suffered by prisoners of war and civilian internees during World War II; to the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare.

H. R. 315. An act to liberalize the service pensions laws relating to veterans of the war with Spain, the Philippine Insurrection, or the Boxer Rebellion, and their dependents; to the Committee on Finance.

H. R. 2119. An act to amend sections 544 and 546 of title 28, United States Code; and

H. R. 2394. An act to amend the act of April 29, 1941, to authorize the waiving of the requirement of performance and payment bonds in connection with certain Coast Guard contracts; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

H. R. 3040. An act to authorize the Secretary of Agriculture to convey certain lands in Ogden, Utah, to the Ogden Chamber of Commerce; ordered to be placed on the Calendar.

EXECUTIVE MESSAGES REFERRED

As in executive session,

The VICE PRESIDENT laid before the Senate messages from the President of the United States submitting sundry nominations, which were referred to the appropriate committees.

(For nominations this day received, see the end of Senate proceedings.)

EXECUTIVE REPORTS OF A COMMITTEE

As in executive session,

The following favorable reports of nominations were submitted:

By Mr. JOHNSTON of South Carolina, from the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service:

Eighty-six postmasters.

EXTRACTS FROM ADDRESS BY SENATOR DUFF AT ANNUAL CONVENTION, PENNSYLVANIA FEDERATION OF LABOR, YORK, PA.

[Mr. DUFF asked and obtained leave to have printed in the RECORD extracts from an address delivered by him at the annual convention of the Pennsylvania Federation of Labor at York, Pa., on March 28, 1951, which appear in the Appendix.]

EXTRACTS FROM ADDRESS BY SENATOR DUFF AT ANNUAL DINNER OF THE AMEN CORNER, PITTSBURGH, PA.

[Mr. DUFF asked and obtained leave to have printed in the RECORD extracts from an address delivered by him at the annual dinner of the Amen Corner at the William Penn Hotel, Pittsburgh, Pa., on March 31, 1951, which appear in the Appendix.]

PEACE IN THE PACIFIC—ADDRESS BY HON. JOHN FOSTER DULLES

[Mr. WILEY asked and obtained leave to have printed in the RECORD an address entitled "Peace in the Pacific," delivered by former Senator John Foster Dulles, at the fiftieth anniversary dinner of Whittier College, Los Angeles, Calif., March 31, 1951, which appears in the Appendix.]

SUPPRESSION OF THE NEWSPAPER LA PRENSA IN ARGENTINA—EDITORIAL COMMENT

[Mr. HENNINGS asked and obtained leave to have printed in the RECORD editorials regarding the suppression of the Argentine newspaper, La Prensa, published in the St. Louis Post-Dispatch and the Washington Post, which appear in the Appendix.]

ADVERTISEMENT REGARDING INVESTMENTS IN STOCKS

Mr. WILEY. Mr. President, when a particular gambler appeared before the Senate Crime Investigating Committee, I asked him about the harmful effects of gambling in breaking up homes, in causing heartache and heartbreak in countless families. The gambler replied in an answer that tried to put gambling in the same category with investing in the stock market.

This is not unusual, in that innumerable members of the gambling fraternity have on many occasions attempted to draw a cloak over their activity and liken it to totally different investments by millions of Americans in stocks and bonds. Actually, any such attempt at a comparison is, I believe, unwarranted. Investments in stocks and bonds plays a constructive role in our free-enterprise system in that capital is furnished to American industry to expand, to create jobs, to move forward the wheels of progress.

On the other hand, gambling on horses or on the roll of dice or on any other such basis performs no constructive function in society whatsoever. The return from such gambling helps build up organized narcotics sales, prostitution, extortion, and all sorts of other vices. The bettor himself cannot win; the odds are hopelessly against him. To be sure, some element of risk is involved in both gambling and in investment in the market; but there the similarity ends, and actually the science of sound investment has reached such development that individuals can, with relative confidence, invest their savings in corporations which have outstanding records of divi-

dend returns, and take a minimum of risk, subject, of course, to minimum economic fluctuations in our system.

In this connection, an advertisement was carried a few days ago by the Robert W. Baird Co., of Milwaukee, in various Wisconsin newspapers, as well as in the Investment Dealers Digest. I ask unanimous consent that the text of this advertisement be printed at this point in the body of the RECORD.

There being no objection, the advertisement was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

JUST A MINUTE, MR. SENATOR; WE'D LIKE TO TESTIFY

Testifying before the Kefauver committee of the United States Senate on March 24, 1951, a witness was asked if he knew of any homes broken by gambling.

"No more than homes broken by playing the stock market," the witness retorted.

We can't agree with the casual manner in which our business has been linked with gambling.

Not that we blame the witness exactly. It seems a lot of people are confused about what is involved in buying common stocks.

Maybe it's a hangover from the old days of uncontrolled market manipulation. Or maybe it's just because we haven't done a very good job telling our story.

Look at it this way. Suppose we take 13,368 people in Milwaukee County. All those people bet on a basketball game, with half of them picking each team. One half of the group stands to double its money—the other half to lose all it bets.

Then take another group of 13,368 people—the actual number in the county who own stock in the Wisconsin Electric Power Co. None of them expects to make a "killing"—or to suffer any significant loss.

Or for illustration, we could use Wisconsin Power & Light Co.'s 19,000 stockholders in the State. In both cases, these people have received substantial dividends on their investment.

Somehow that doesn't seem much like gambling to us.

We think that expression "playing the stock market" is unfortunate. When a man buys a share of common stock he's not buying a policy slip or a \$2 place ticket on a filly in the fifth.

He's buying a piece of an American business. He owns a share of that business—its tools, factories, everything it has. He can help elect its directors. He has an interest in everything the company does—in the profits it may earn, the dividends it may pay.

The buyer of common stocks plays an important part in the process that helped to make America great, the process that has built and is building the companies that provide millions of jobs and create billions of dollars of peacetime wealth, the process that has led to the world's highest standard of living.

Yesterday's investors supplied the money to build General Motors, Allis-Chalmers, Standard Oil, A. O. Smith.

Today's investors are supplying the money for new products, better services, greater production, and earning power.

And those investors include all kinds of people, big and little, right here in Wisconsin and all over the country. Take the 985,000 stockholders of American Telephone & Telegraph Co., for example. Nearly one-third of them hold from one to five shares. A big automobile company says that over half its stockholders own 20 shares or less.

Most of these people buy stocks for investment, for income—not for a quick profit. (Incidentally, about 9 out of 10 stocks listed on the New York Stock Exchange paid cash

dividends last year. The average return on these stocks was 6.7 percent.)

Or consider the investment practices of our great universities. Harvard, for example, employs competent and conservative men to handle its funds. Yet more than \$100,000,000 of that university's endowment is in common stocks.

A recent study of 15 representative colleges showed that the average percentage of common stocks in their endowment accounts was 48.69 percent.

Please don't misunderstand us. There can be an element of risk in buying common stocks—just as there can be in buying most anything, even bonds, mortgages, real estate.

But the risk becomes a gamble when you act without enough facts and buy on hunches and tips.

And that is where we and other reputable investment firms come into the picture. It is our business to supply investors with guidance and advice, based on all the information available and interpreted in the light of long experience.

ROBERT W. BAIRD & Co.,
Members, New York Stock Exchange.
MILWAUKEE, WIS.

CALL OF THE ROLL

Mr. McFARLAND. I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Secretary will call the roll.

The roll was called, and the following Senators answered to their names:

Alken	Gillette	Millikin
Anderson	Green	Monroney
Bennett	Hayden	Morse
Benton	Hendrickson	Mundt
Brewster	Hennings	Murray
Bricker	Hickenlooper	Neely
Eridges	Hill	Nixon
Butler, Md.	Hoey	O'Connor
Butler, Nebr.	Holland	O'Mahoney
Byrd	Ives	Pastore
Cain	Jenner	Robertson
Capehart	Johnson, Colo.	Russell
Carlson	Johnson, Tex.	Saltonstall
Case	Johnston, S. C.	Schoeppel
Chavez	Kefauver	Smathers
Clements	Kem	Smith, Maine
Connally	Kerr	Smith, N. J.
Cordon	Kilgore	Smith, N. C.
Dirksen	Knowland	Sparkman
Douglas	Langer	Stennis
Duff	Lehman	Taft
Dworshak	Lodge	Thye
Eastland	Long	Tobey
Eaton	McCarthy	Underwood
Ellender	McClellan	Watkins
Ferguson	McFarland	Welker
Flanders	McMahon	Wherry
Frear	Malone	Wiley
Fulbright	Martin	Williams
George	Maybank	Young

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. I announce that the Senator from Wyoming [Mr. HUNT] is absent on public business.

The Senator from Minnesota [Mr. HUMPHREY] is necessarily absent.

The Senator from Washington [Mr. MAGNUSON] is absent by leave of the Senate on official committee business.

The Senator from Nevada [Mr. McCARRAN] is absent by leave of the Senate on official business.

The Senator from Tennessee [Mr. McKELLAR] is absent because of illness.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I announce that the Senator from Michigan [Mr. VANDENBERG] is absent by leave of the Senate.

The VICE PRESIDENT. A quorum is present.

ASSIGNMENT OF GROUND FORCES TO DUTY IN THE EUROPEAN AREA

The Senate resumed the consideration of the resolution (S. Res. 69) approving

the action of the President of the United States in cooperating in the common defense efforts of the North Atlantic Treaty nations.

Mr. LODGE. Mr. President, I offer the amendment which I send to the desk and ask to have stated.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The amendment offered by the Senator from Massachusetts will be stated.

The CHIEF CLERK. On page 2, line 2, after the word "approves", it is proposed to insert the following: "the present plans of the President and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to send four additional divisions of ground forces to Western Europe and."

On pages 4 and 5, it is proposed to strike out all of paragraph 6, as amended.

Mr. LODGE. Mr. President, I yield myself 10 minutes.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator from Massachusetts has control of a total of 30 minutes.

Mr. LODGE. I should like to take just a few minutes of the time of the Senate, now that the night has gone by since the developments of yesterday, to canvass what I consider to be some of the implications of the action which the Senate took yesterday in adopting the McClellan amendment. I do not do so with any idea of changing that action, because I am a realist, and I know that would be impossible. But I think it is useful for Members to have the consequences of this decision in their minds today as they confront new amendments, because this resolution is a unit, and all the various parts of it relate one to the other.

Mr. President, let us imagine a practical situation which could very easily arise, and which would come squarely within the purview of the McClellan amendment. Let us imagine that all of the six American divisions have arrived in Europe. The normal thing would be for the American commander there to say he was going to set them up into two corps of three divisions each. That means that there must be two corps headquarters. When we speak of a corps headquarters it is not like the Pentagon. It is a small group of officers and men who are in the field, who have a communications system, radio, telephone, and so forth, and the staff which are able to coordinate and direct the activities of the three divisions.

To show Senators the importance of having a corps headquarters, I should like to point to the day in June 1942, when in Tobruk General Rommel captured 30,000 British troops as prisoners, and killed many others. Today the best students of the problem believe that if a British corps headquarters had been in Tobruk to coordinate the activities of the British divisions which were there, this British disaster would not have taken place. As it was, the British troops were commanded by the senior British officer present. He did not have the staff, he did not have the communications which were necessary, and a frightful British disaster ensued. That illustrates that a corps headquarters, small as it is in men, can make the difference between life and death when troops are in combat.

I understand that the average size of a corps headquarters is about 260 persons. It is very small. But it is the directing force when there is a group of three divisions.

All right. Let us assume then that the President wants to send a corps headquarters of 260 officers and men to Europe. Under the terms of the McClellan amendment he must obtain the approval of the Senate. While the Senate has many remarkable men in its membership, it is hard for me to believe that more than a mere handful of Senators can have a really thoroughgoing appreciation of what a corps headquarters is, and what it means, and those who do know about it just happen to know about it by chance, because of some previous experience which they had outside the Senate.

The first danger, therefore, is that the request for a corps headquarters would not be understood, and it would be rejected because people do not understand it, and because Senators are so busy with other things that they have not time to listen to somebody who is willing to come and tell them what it is.

So the first possibility is that the request to send this corps headquarters to Europe would be rejected. That would be very bad, because it would endanger directly the life of the American men who are in the divisions already in Europe. Bear in mind, Mr. President, that this corps headquarters cannot be sent at the last minute. When the fighting begins it has got to be there, and it has got to be in operation, and all its relationships have got to be on a practical basis. That is the first possibility—that the Senate would reject the request.

Then the second possibility is that the Senate would approve the request. Of course, that is not so bad as the first, but that is bad, nevertheless because everything we do here is done in public. We have no secrecy in this place. We have no secrecy even in places where we are supposed to have secrecy. And here on the floor, with 96 Members, we are not supposed to have secrecy. So if we approve it we will be saying to the Soviet Union, "We are sending a corps headquarters to Europe; we have decided to send this tactical unit over there," and they would be able to draw a great many useful conclusions from that. I suppose they have not adopted any legislation which requires them to tell us when they send a corps headquarters into the Russian zone of Europe. Thus, this second possibility is bad too.

And there is the third possibility, which is that the President would decide to ignore Congress. He might feel it was his duty to do so; that he would not sacrifice speed, and he would not sacrifice secrecy and thereby endanger the lives of American personnel; so he would exercise his powers and send the corps headquarters over there anyway, and ignore the Senate, flout the Senate, and disregard it completely. That might be a happy decision from the standpoint of the American military personnel abroad, but that is a very narrow view to take. That is not the right way

to work this problem out. It is not a good thing to make the Senate ridiculous and to make it appear undignified; but that is what would happen if impossible and unsound restrictions were placed on the President.

Mr. TAFT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. LODGE. I yield.

Mr. TAFT. May I suggest the fourth alternative to the Senator from Massachusetts, and that is that the Senate resolution fully covers all headquarters that may be needed to operate the four divisions, and the two divisions that are now there, under any reasonable interpretation of the amendment adopted yesterday?

Mr. LODGE. No; I am making a reasonable interpretation, and I will say to the Senator from Ohio that I have verified my statement; I am not merely taking it out of the top of my head. I verified it this morning by telephone with persons who are, I think—and I say it with all due respect—more qualified to have a judgment on military matters than even the Senator from Ohio.

This language does not cover a corps headquarters. There is no question about that.

Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. LODGE. I yield to the Senator from Vermont.

Mr. AIKEN. I should like to ask the Senator from Massachusetts as a member of the Foreign Relations Committee, why, in considering the matter of requiring the President to secure the approval of the Congress before sending troops abroad, the resolution was restricted only to a few countries of Western Europe. So far as I can see, it would not apply to any decision by the President to send unlimited numbers of troops to Iran, the Philippines, or the Dutch East Indies, or the Chinese mainland. Why was it the resolution was restricted, if there was such a deep-seated proposal involved?

Mr. LODGE. I cannot understand it. Senators talk in an impersonal tone about the occupation troops in Germany—the 112,000 men who are there, and they talk in the same tone about the American soldiers in Korea. But when it comes to sending any troops under article 3 of the North Atlantic Pact, we become emotional about it.

Mr. AIKEN. Why should this resolution be restricted to article 3 of the North Atlantic Pact? If the President should secure the approval of Congress before sending troops to France, why should he not also secure the approval of the Congress before sending troops to any other area of the world?

Mr. LODGE. I think even more so. If the logic is good when applied to the sending of troops to an international force, where they will be much more secure than they will be all by themselves, then I think we certainly ought to apply it to sending troops anywhere else in the world. The idea, Mr. President, that American soldiers are worse off in an international force than they are by themselves is a complete fallacy. There is no doubt about it that a nation is

better off in any kind of a fight when it has allies, when it is joined by people who have a common cause, so that it will not have to do all the fighting and dying by itself.

In World War I the Allies did not begin to win until they had set up an international force. One of the reasons why we were successful in World War II was that we constituted an international force, an integrated force. It was a good thing to do. Soldiers who are not being sent into an integrated force require a good deal more protection than do soldiers who are being sent into an integrated force.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The 10 minutes the Senator from Massachusetts has allotted to himself have expired.

Mr. LODGE. Mr. President, I yield myself five more minutes.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator from Massachusetts is recognized for five more minutes.

Mr. LODGE. Mr. President, I have canvassed the different possibilities. One was that the Senate would turn down the request for a corps headquarters.

The second was that the Senate would approve the request for a corps headquarters, but would serve notice to the world as to what we are doing.

The third was that the President would disregard any such attempt by the Congress, and would send notice that he would establish the corps headquarters anyway. In fact, Mr. President, I think practically any man who has served as President would have embarked on such a course. I think anyone who is likely to become President would feel that it would be his duty to take such action.

However, I do not think that is the right way to do it. I do not think we should try to impose restrictions on the strategic facts of life and impose on the President rigid requirements which would compel him to do something which would be unsound and destructive of our system.

There is a fourth possibility. It is a very unpleasant one, but it is one which we in the Senate by our action yesterday have created, namely, the possibility that if the fighting starts, our American high command, being desirous of giving our troops the best possible protection and the best possible direction, will, in the absence of an American Army corps headquarters, be compelled to assign our divisions to a foreign army corps headquarters.

If that situation were to arise, we would by our action yesterday have provided a powerful incentive for disseminating the United States Army all through the international force, instead of keeping it, as I think it should be, a unity, with its own sector and its own system of supply, its own corps commanders, its own Army commander, and its own corps and army troops. That is what we should do; but when the Senate makes it impossible, as was done by the McClellan amendment, to provide the basic direction and the basic support that are needed, we could not possibly criticize an American high commander

in time of war for assigning our divisions to a foreign corps, so that they would at least get the benefit of the other troops.

I have mentioned the corps headquarters. Of course, the same thing can be said in regard to supporting artillery and supporting engineers and reconnaissance squadrons. All of them are corps troops. They are not troops who are in the divisions; they are troops who are held out by the corps command on a mobile basis, and are saved until the fight takes definite shape and form, and then those troops are put in where they are most needed in order to decide the battle and the issue. If we did not let our divisions have corps artillery, corps engineers, corps reconnaissance squadrons and armored troops, we would be depriving the American soldier of his "Sunday punch"; that is what we would be doing. In that event, our soldiers would go into combat "bare," with only their own equipment, but with nothing extra to be thrown into the breach when such an additional force would make all the difference in the world.

Mr. President, I cannot believe that all the Senators who voted yesterday for the McClellan amendment had all these facts and all these possibilities clearly in mind. To my mind, the McClellan amendment endangers the security of our troops abroad; it endangers the security of the whole country. It tends to diminish the influence and power of the Senate. That influence and power do not rest on legalisms and technicalities, but are due to the realities of life and to the place the Senate occupies in the system of things and in the minds of the American people.

The McClellan amendment is particularly dangerous because it will make many persons wonder whether, after all, our system of government, which has lasted so many years, can meet the challenge of modern times, or whether it has been made so rigid by artificial, legalistic interpretations that it is becoming a millstone around our necks, instead of being the shield and the sword of our security, as it was intended to be, and as in its very inward spirit our system of government is.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The time of the Senator from Massachusetts has again expired.

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. LODGE. Let me inquire how much time the Senator from New Jersey wishes to have.

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. I wish to ask a few questions.

Mr. LODGE. Then, Mr. President, I yield myself three more minutes.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator from Massachusetts is recognized for three more minutes.

Mr. LODGE. I now yield to the Senator from New Jersey, to permit him to ask a question of me.

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. President, I should like to ask the Senator from Massachusetts whether by the amendment which he has offered he proposes to eliminate entirely the issue of congressional approval for anything

that is done along these lines? If the amendment of the Senator from Massachusetts is adopted, will the Congress have any part to play in determining policy from now on? I am not quite clear what the Senator means by his amendment.

I am very sympathetic with what the Senator from Massachusetts has said, because I voted against the McClellan amendment, and I think that amendment puts us in a very dangerous position. I agree with the Senator from Massachusetts as to that.

However, I am not quite clear that we would be acting in a sound way if we were to eliminate all provision for congressional approval of policy. It seems to me that is the big issue, and I believe we should determine in some way what the power of Congress is in respect to developing the policies abroad.

Mr. LODGE. Mr. President, I am perfectly clear in my own mind as to what the power of Congress should be. Congress should decide all new, long-range policies that involve new concepts, that involve the military, the economic, or the social conditions of the country. However, Congress should not seek to transform itself into an operations section of a general staff and decide whether a battalion of corps artillery should be sent here or a battalion of engineers should be sent there. The McClellan amendment attempts to impose such close supervision that it will endanger the lives of the troops and will make the Senate ridiculous.

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. I agree with the statement the Senator from Massachusetts has just made. I think the McClellan amendment does do what he has said it does.

However, I still am not clear as to how we are going to recognize the fact that Congress does have the power to determine the policy, especially in connection with article 3 of the pact which provides for an international army in Europe.

I do not take the position that the President himself should determine the pros and cons of those policies. I think our action in ratifying the North Atlantic Pact—as the Senator from Georgia [Mr. GEORGE] said yesterday—does not make that pact self-executing. I think the President has to return to the Senate to receive the Senate's policy decisions as to how the pact should be executed.

So I should like to ask this question: In connection with this matter, should we provide, as we did in the case of MAP legislation, just what the functions of the armed services should be?

Mr. LODGE. Mr. President, it seems to me that when we consider paragraphs 4 and 5 of the resolution, which provide for certification by the Joint Chiefs of Staff of everything that is sent abroad, it is plain that Congress is to be currently and accurately informed of what is happening; and then, through its power of making appropriations, Congress can completely deal with the situation in an absolute, unchallengeable smashing manner whenever it wishes to do so.

When the rule of common sense is violated, however, the Senator from New

Jersey knows as well as I do that Congress can act and will act in an absolutely final fashion; but so long as the rule of common sense is being followed I do not think Congress should monkey with detailed military decisions.

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. I am bound to say to the Senator from Massachusetts that I agree with much that he has said, but I do not think we are on the right trail if we abdicate our power of congressional approval of policy.

Mr. LODGE. How can congressional consideration and approval or disapproval be prevented at any time in the future? It cannot be prevented at all.

What is the use of including in a Senate resolution a provision that Congress shall have the power of approval, when we could not take that power away from Congress anyway, even if we wished to do so.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The time of the Senator from Massachusetts has again expired.

Mr. LODGE. Mr. President, I yield myself 5 minutes more.

Mr. FERGUSON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. LODGE. I yield.

Mr. FERGUSON. Do not the military authorities determine the size of a division and what is included in a division; and if they desire to include in a division the various corps which have been mentioned—engineers, artillery, and so forth—they might include them, even to the extent of a corps headquarters; could they not?

Mr. LODGE. No; that would be impossible to do, because a corps headquarters by its own definition is entirely outside of a division, and so are corps troops. That is their great virtue.

Mr. FERGUSON. But cannot they be put into a division?

Mr. LODGE. Oh, 2,000,000 men could be put into a division, thus changing the definition of a division, if that were desired; but I am taking the rule of reason, and I assume that the military will be honorable about the matter.

Mr. TAFT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. LODGE. I yield.

Mr. TAFT. It is true, however—and I have talked to Army officers about it—that today there are included in divisions a number of troops that Army officers now think should not be in divisions, but should be in corps. In other words, they are suggesting that we take certain troops out of divisions and put them into corps. Certainly the Army commanders have some right to exercise their own discretion, if they wish to take certain troops out of the corps and put them into divisions, and make the divisions consist of 20,000 or 25,000 men. They are the sole judges of what shall go into a division.

Mr. LODGE. Of course, these terms all have a certain elasticity, but a division has a perfectly definite meaning in military science, and "corps headquarters" has a perfectly definite meaning. While undoubtedly it is possible to expand or contract a division a little bit this way or that, yet when we start send-

ing over a corps headquarters, corps artillery, corps engineers, units of the ordnance, and the Signal Corps—all corps troops—it would be a most dishonest thing to undertake to lead Congress to believe that those were the normal components of a division because, of course, they are not.

Mr. FERGUSON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. LODGE. I yield to the Senator from Michigan.

Mr. FERGUSON. Does not the Senator mean, then, that a large number of men, more than the four divisions, was contemplated, and when the Defense Department mentioned four divisions, they did not mean four divisions, they meant four divisions plus all the various corps included in the Senator's references in the course of his remarks? How many men would that contemplate over and above the normal division?

Mr. LODGE. The language of the resolution is "four divisions of Ground Forces." That is what the McClellan amendment says, and it obviously does not include corps troops.

Mr. FERGUSON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a further question?

Mr. LODGE. I yield.

Mr. FERGUSON. Was it not a force of four divisions that General Marshall mentioned in his testimony? Did he mention anything about the various corps, and specify the number of men who were to go into the various corps supporting the division?

Mr. LODGE. Of course he did not. That is my whole point.

Mr. FERGUSON. How many men would be covered by the force he mentioned?

Mr. LODGE. My whole point is that the amendment would destroy the elasticity of the command. Without putting any kind of limitation on the Soviet Union, we would shackle ourselves and put on handcuffs, if such a provision should be added to the resolution.

Mr. FERGUSON. How many men would be covered, over and above the four divisions of which the Senator is now speaking?

Mr. LODGE. If a battalion of artillery, a battalion of engineers, and a battalion of ordnance were sent, I do not know what the number would be. I would have to look it up. I am not a military expert. I do not want the Senate to decide on troop movements. I myself do not want to have anything to say about it. I am not a military expert, and I do not think any Member of the Senate is.

Mr. CASE and Mr. SALTONSTALL addressed the Chair.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Does the Senator from Massachusetts yield; and, if so, to whom?

Mr. LODGE. I yield first to the Senator from South Dakota, after which I shall yield to my colleague.

Mr. CASE. What is meant by the language of the report on the pending resolution at page 14, which reads:

It is estimated that these four additional divisions, plus the required additional supporting troops, will increase the number of United States troops in Europe by about 100,000.

I assume that that was the committee's opinion as to the number of troops involved in the approval of the resolution.

Mr. LODGE. That, of course, draws the distinction which I am trying to make. It draws a distinction between "four divisions" and "plus the required additional supporting troops." That is exactly the point I have in mind. There are two different concepts, and by no amount of reasoning, evidently, can it be made to appear that they are the same. I now yield to my colleague the senior Senator from Massachusetts.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator's time has expired.

Mr. LODGE. I yield myself 3 more minutes.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I should like to ask my colleague a question. I voted, as he did, against the McClellan amendment. I feel as he does about it, that it would limit the Joint Chiefs of Staff too closely. Why would not the Senator's purpose be accomplished by including in paragraph 2, on page 2, the words he proposes to include, and then allowing the language on page 4, lines 19 through 24, to stand, under which the Senate is given an opportunity to pass upon future problems connected with the implementation of article 3 of the pact, but which eliminates the so-called McClellan amendment—an amendment which ties the implementation down too tightly, to four divisions? I would feel very much better about it if the Senator could see his way clear to do that, because it would permit future congressional approval.

Mr. LODGE. I should like to think that over, I may say to my colleague. If I felt that it would result in a greatly increased number of votes for my amendment, I might be tempted to accept a modification; but I do not quite sense the situation here well enough yet to know.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Will the Senator yield for one more question?

Mr. LODGE. I yield.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Admittedly lines 19 to 24, on page 4, may be open to more than one interpretation. Personally I interpret the language as I think any reasonable man would, as a new long-range policy, or as a fundamental change in policy. I believe, however, that the Congress should have an opportunity to discuss the subject. I agree with my colleague that the McClellan amendment would tie us down too tightly. I think he could accomplish what he desires to accomplish without eliminating action by Congress entirely in the future. My question to the Senator is, Would not his amendment accomplish the desired purpose—in which I join—without striking out lines 19 to 24, on page 4?

Mr. LODGE. I give the Senator a direct answer "Yes"; it would eliminate the McClellan amendment. I think the Senator is correct on that point.

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, is the time of proponents on this amendment exhausted?

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator from Massachusetts has 3 minutes remaining.

Mr. LODGE. I should like to withhold the remainder of my time, if I may.

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, the amendment has been offered; has it not?

The VICE PRESIDENT. It has.

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, it seems to me there are two propositions involved.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator from Texas has control of the time in opposition, if he wishes to exercise it.

Mr. CONNALLY. Mr. President, how much time have I remaining?

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator has 30 minutes, if he wishes to use it.

Mr. CONNALLY. I yield 3 minutes to the Senator from Nebraska.

Mr. WHERRY. I merely want to ask a question, Mr. President, or to make a parliamentary inquiry.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator will state the inquiry.

Mr. WHERRY. If I correctly understood the reading of the amendment, it involves two proposals. First, it proposes, on page 2, to amend paragraph 1 relative to the inclusion of the four divisions. Second, it proposes to strike out all of paragraph 6, as amended. I desire to ask whether the amendment proposed by the distinguished Senator from Massachusetts can be divided.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The amendment refers to two different parts of the resolution, and is divisible.

Mr. WHERRY. Then, Mr. President, I ask that it be divided, in order that the Senate may vote on each proposal separately.

Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, a parliamentary inquiry.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator will state the inquiry.

Mr. McCLELLAN. Is the amendment of the Senator from Massachusetts subject to amendment?

The VICE PRESIDENT. The first part of it would be. The second part would not be.

Mr. McCLELLAN. I offer and send to the desk an amendment to the first part of the amendment proposed by the Senator from Massachusetts.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The amendment to the amendment will be stated.

The LEGISLATIVE CLERK. At the end of line 3 it is proposed to insert the following:

But it is the sense of the Senate that no ground troops in addition to such four divisions should be sent to Western Europe in implementation of article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty without further congressional approval.

Mr. LODGE. Mr. President, a parliamentary inquiry.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator will state it.

Mr. LODGE. Am I correct in believing that the first vote will come on the amendment which the Senator from Arkansas has just offered to the first part of my amendment?

The VICE PRESIDENT. The first vote would come on the amendment offered by the Senator from Arkansas to the amendment of the Senator from Massachusetts.

Mr. LODGE. And that is an amendment proposed to the first half of my amendment; is it not?

The VICE PRESIDENT. That is correct.

Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, a parliamentary inquiry.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator will state it.

Mr. McCLELLAN. Having offered an amendment to the amendment, do I have 30 minutes in which to discuss it?

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator has 30 minutes, if he wishes to take it.

Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, may I inquire whether there is further time or the pending amendment of the Senator from Massachusetts, and whether the Senator from Texas has time remaining on it?

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator from Massachusetts has 3 minutes, but, if they desire, Senators are not required to use their time on the main amendment. Does the Senator prefer to use the time on the amendment, until the amendment to the amendment is disposed of?

Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, I yield myself such time as I may desire on the amendment which I have offered to the pending amendment.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator from Arkansas is recognized for not to exceed 30 minutes.

Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, I have never before witnessed in the Congress such a concerted effort to place all the power and control of the destiny of the Nation in the hands of one man as apparently is now being attempted by the procedures which are in process. There are those of us who favor the implementation of the Atlantic Treaty. There are those of us who conscientiously believe that the program of establishing defenses in Western Europe under the Atlantic Treaty by self-help and mutual cooperation is not only desirable but is in the interest of the security not only of Western Europe but of the United States.

It is for that reason, Mr. President, that we supported the Atlantic Pact. But if what has been suggested is the correct interpretation of the Atlantic Pact and how it was intended to be implemented when it was presented, then the proponents of it perpetrated a fraud upon the Congress and upon the people of the United States. They did not unfold this plan at that time. They did not tell the American people that they wanted to leave the implementation of the pact to the President alone. It is stated in the treaty that the Congress should implement it.

Mr. LODGE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McCLELLAN. I yield.

Mr. LODGE. I hope the Senator is not referring to me personally.

Mr. McCLELLAN. If the Senator wants to join them, it is all right with me. That is the effect and the result of it.

Mr. LODGE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield further?

Mr. McCLELLAN. I yield.

Mr. LODGE. I deny that I ever took any part in such an effort.

Mr. McCLELLAN. That is the result of it, because those who sponsored the treaty, as the testimony will reveal, gave Congress to understand that in the implementation of the treaty the President would have to come to the Congress. I say now that if it is insisted that the President of the United States alone, without the consent of Congress, can implement the North Atlantic Treaty to the extent of sending an unlimited number of American boys to potential battlefields which have not yet developed, then it constitutes a fraud on the American people. I do not want to have any part in it. I desire to point out that that is the result of it, and that character of legislation and that character of policy and procedure may do more to destroy the democracy which we are pretending and professing to defend than will any threat from across the seas.

We have a constitutional government. That is the way it was constituted. Every time it seems expedient to disregard the constitutional processes, there is always a temptation to come to do it. We want to preserve those processes. Since when cannot Congress be trusted? Who has lost confidence in this body? Those who oppose the amendment I offered are placing themselves in that position. That is what you are saying by trying to delegate away from the Congress its constitutional prerogative. I do not want Congress to shirk its responsibilities in any such fashion. To charge Congress may debate the issue is no excuse. There is less danger in Congress debating an issue than there is in conferring arbitrary power upon any President of the United States. If that had been a safe procedure, certainly the founding fathers would have said so. We would not have had any treaty ratification provisions in the Constitution. Why not let the Chief Executive do not only the negotiating, but the ratifying? Ratification carries with it the right and the responsibility of the Congress to implement the treaty. Certainly it was written in the Atlantic Treaty that the Congress should implement it.

Mr. President, this pending issue and controversy have taken on aspects which strike at the very foundation of American liberty and constitutional government. Senators can argue that we do not have time for Congress to act. Let me remind them that there has been no aggression in Western Europe of the type referred to in article 5. The steps now being taken are only precautionary. Are Senators willing to have Americans bear the whole burden? Are we to send our boys to Western Europe, irrespective of whether the countries in that area are measuring up and doing their part? Why cannot Congress take a look at the situation from time to time. Why should it not do so? What are we here for? Yet every time the administration, or someone from the State Department, comes to Congress with a program, it is said, "All we want you to do is to let us control." I do not like that idea, Mr. President.

If this is being disloyal to my country, make the most of it. I am as much interested in the lives of American boys and where they are sent and under what conditions they will fight as are my colleagues. I think I am as much interested in them as is the President of the United States or any general in the Army. I think I have just as much responsibility to try to protect their interests and their welfare and to vote my sentiments and convictions on these vital issues as has the President of the United States.

I believe that Members of Congress have some responsibility. It was intended that they should have responsibilities when this treaty was written. It so provides. Now we are asked to abdicate our responsibilities.

Mr. McMAHON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McCLELLAN. I yield.

Mr. McMAHON. Where does the North Atlantic Treaty so provide?

Mr. McCLELLAN. Where it uses the words "under constitutional processes." The Secretary of State who sent the treaty here so stated.

Mr. McMAHON. That is not my question. I asked where that is stated in the treaty.

Mr. McCLELLAN. In article 11 the treaty says that it shall be carried out under constitutional processes.

Mr. McMAHON. Does the Senator think that this body should deploy the ground troops of the United States?

Mr. McCLELLAN. This body should determine and decide the implementation of the treaty; yes.

Mr. McMAHON. In other words, the Senator believes that the United States Senate is the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the United States Government. That is what the Senator is saying. Now we can get a "Gallup poll" of the Senate.

Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, that argument of the Senator from Connecticut is ridiculous. I have said nothing about a Gallup poll, but I may say to the Senator that this question is being polled today in the hearts of American fathers and mothers. The issue is whether one man is going to send millions of American boys to foreign battlefields or whether the Congress is going to take some responsibility and exercise its constitutional duty in the process.

(Manifestations of applause in the galleries.)

Mr. HICKENLOOPER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McCLELLAN. I am glad to yield.

Mr. HICKENLOOPER. In connection with the Senator's statement that the treaty was sent to the Congress on a certain understanding and now is being interpreted differently—

Mr. McCLELLAN. Whom are we to believe? The Secretary of State said the Congress should have the right to pass on the implementation of the treaty, and now the same Secretary of State is wanting us to abdicate that responsibility. I want to keep the record straight, Mr. President. I am for implementing the treaty. I readily agree to sending four divisions, but I do not want, by any resolution adopted by the Senate or by the Congress, to say that having

done that I consent to and agree that hereafter Congress has no more to do with it; that it is simply the responsibility of the Commander in Chief.

Mr. HICKENLOOPER. If the Senator will yield so that I may ask my question, I will say that I was a member of the Committee on Foreign Relations at the time the North Atlantic Pact was submitted to the Senate. The Senator is completely right. It was sold to the Senate on the pledge of the State Department and others that Congress would implement any future program under the pact. At this time I wish to read again, so that we may have the exact words in the RECORD, what the Secretary of State said. In answer to a query by the Senator from Michigan [Mr. VANDENBERG], the Secretary of State said:

Any future military-assistance program involving Atlantic Pact countries—

That does not mean only England or France. It says "involving Atlantic Pact countries"—

Mr. McCLELLAN. We were certainly included.

Mr. HICKENLOOPER. It includes any Atlantic Pact country—

will be prepared and submitted to the Congress on the basis of recommendations which will be made by the organization to be established under article 9 of the treaty.

That is utter proof of what the Senator says.

I ask the Senator from Arkansas a further question. Is he aware that the Council to be set up under article 9 has made no recommendations whatever, and that we do not even have the recommendations of the International Council, so far as the implementation of the treaty is concerned, upon which the Secretary of State said we would act as a Congress when such recommendations were made?

Mr. WATKINS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McCLELLAN. I wish to thank the Senator from Iowa. I do not believe there is a Member of this body who will deny that at the time the treaty was ratified Congress was reassured over and over by those who negotiated and sponsored the treaty that no troops would be committed in implementation of the treaty without the consent of Congress.

Mr. President, we ought to keep the record straight. Are we to be confronted with what amounts to repudiation by the administration itself of what it represented to the Congress at the time the treaty was entered into? I say to you, Mr. President, that the time has come when the American people and the Congress should be dealt with honestly and conscientiously by this administration. They should not be deceived. Facts should not be withheld from them. No trick or artifice should be used to get Congress to do something, and then immediately afterward have it repudiated and insinuations made that those who oppose the repudiation are betraying their country. Who is betraying whom?

Mr. WATKINS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McCLELLAN. I yield.

Mr. WATKINS. I invite the Senator's attention to the fact that at the time Congress was considering the Arms Implementation Act, the purpose of which was to guard the peace and preserve the security of the world, nearly every Senator voted for the identical control which is now proposed by the Senator from Arkansas. The act provides that the President shall make agreements, but that he shall submit such agreements to Congress for approval. The act does not provide that he shall submit such agreements only to the Senate for approval, but to the entire Congress.

Mr. McCLELLAN. I thank the Senator.

Mr. WATKINS. I believe the Senator from Connecticut was one of the Senators who voted for it, as did the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, and almost every Member of the Senate. There were only a few Senators who cast their votes against it.

Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, I wish to reserve a little time to myself. I am sincere in my convictions about this issue. Every Senator is entitled to his own opinion, of course. However, let us face the facts. If we do what is requested by the administration, we are recording the fact that the whole plan was misrepresented to us at the time the treaty was ratified. I want to go along on every reasonable proposal. I am willing to go along with the resolution. I think we ought to take the action. I said so before the amendment was offered. However, we are confronted now with an issue that strikes at the very heart of American democracy. If the President can send an unlimited number of troops abroad, and Congress by its action declares it to be its policy to let the Commander in Chief do it in implementation of a treaty which clearly says it can be done only by democratic processes, we would be saying, in effect, that the will, the order, or the decree of the Commander in Chief with reference to implementing a treaty and committing American boys to an international army was a constitutional process. No one has ever made such a contention. It was not even so contended at the time the treaty was submitted, when the Senate was assured, by the same authority which is demanding the action now proposed, that the power was reserved in the Congress by the treaty itself.

Mr. President, I hope that Senators who seriously consider voting for the amendment which the Senator from Massachusetts has offered will realize what they are doing. It is nothing more than a subterfuge to try to undo what was done yesterday. Everyone knows that to be the fact. No one is being deceived by it. If that is what Senators want to do, very well; but let us understand what we are doing. It makes no difference where the little provision is placed in the bill, whether it is put in paragraph 6 or in paragraph 1. The whole purpose of the amendment of the Senator from Massachusetts is to try to do indirectly what could not be done yesterday directly. It is an attempt to repudiate the statement that it is the

sense of the Senate that congressional approval should be obtained for the sending of American troops abroad to an international army.

Mr. FERGUSON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McCLELLAN. I yield.

Mr. FERGUSON. On that very point, is it not correct to say that 49 Senators voted to do a specific thing, namely, to require congressional approval, and that a motion to reconsider was made, which was laid on the table? If the amendment of the Senator from Massachusetts were to be adopted, it would undo what was done by the 49 Senators yesterday, who represented a clear majority, and it would repudiate the laying on the table of the motion to reconsider, would it not?

Mr. McCLELLAN. That is correct. Mr. President, may I inquire how much time I have remaining?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arkansas has 15 minutes remaining. The Senator from Texas has 30 minutes remaining under his control.

Mr. CONNALLY. Mr. President, I yield 5 minutes to the Senator from Massachusetts.

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, in view of the offering of the amendment by the Senator from Arkansas to the amendment offered by the Senator from Massachusetts, I withdraw my request for a division of the Lodge amendment.

Mr. LODGE. Mr. President, the amendment I have offered is not a subterfuge. It is a frank attempt to correct a mistake. I do not deny that 49 Senators voted for the McClellan amendment yesterday. There is no question that they did. If they had not done so, I would not be here today arguing that it should be changed. I contend that in the heat of the argument some Members of the Senate were not thoroughly aware of exactly what they were doing, or of all the consequences that could flow from what they did.

I agree with a good deal of what the Senator from Arkansas has said, but he and I have been talking about two different things. I too am for the Constitution. I am passionately, strongly, and vigorously for the Constitution. I too like to be dealt with in a sincere way by the administration. Indeed I have no interest, political or otherwise, in standing up for the administration. I am merely trying to be helpful to General Eisenhower, who is trying to help us. I think we should try to help him. So far as the administration is concerned, I do not think there is anyone in this body who has put in more time, in the 1948 campaign against the political success of the administration, although I do not claim it was to very good effect.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. STENNIS in the chair). The Senate will be in order.

Mr. LODGE. I do not like tricks or artifices any more than does the Senator from Arkansas. I agree with him that we ought to be constitutional in everything we do. However, Mr. President,

I say we can be constitutional without being impractical. We can be constitutional without doing something dangerous, or something unreasonable, or something destructive. If we do not have the brains in this body to stay within the letter of the Constitution and at the same time give our boys abroad the best possible chance of survival, we are not very smart.

Mr. CASE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. LODGE. I yield.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator yields for a question.

Mr. CASE. I should like to ask the distinguished Senator from Massachusetts if it might not be possible to clarify the situation by what would be in effect a definition of what is meant by the term "four divisions." It has been my thought all the time that when we were voting on four divisions we were voting on the number of troops or the picture presented in the committee report in the sentence to which I called the Senator's attention some time ago. On page 14 of the committee report is the following statement:

It is estimated that these four additional divisions, plus the required additional supporting troops, will increase the number of United States troops in Europe by about 100,000.

If there were some way by which we could make it clear that in approving the divisions as specified in paragraph 6 we mean to include the supporting troops, possibly the difficulty might be resolved and we would not have to go through the same thing we did yesterday.

Accordingly, I suggest to the Senator language which might be used as a substitute for the amendment now pending. I would insert, at the same point where he proposes to insert his original language, on page 2, line 2, after the word "approve," the following: "sending to Europe the divisions as specified in paragraph 6, together with their appropriate supporting troops and."

Mr. LODGE. I thank the Senator from South Dakota. I would want to study the language. However, I should say offhand that it is certainly better language than is now in the resolution.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator from Massachusetts has expired.

Mr. TAFT. Mr. President, will the Senator from Texas yield 2 or 3 minutes to me?

Mr. CONNALLY. Does the Senator wish to speak for or against the amendment?

Mr. TAFT. I wish to speak against the Lodge amendment.

Mr. CONNALLY. The Senator may take as much time as he wishes.

Mr. TAFT. I shall require only about 5 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Ohio is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. TAFT. Mr. President, I wish only to point out that when General Marshall came before the committee he did not

talk about 6 divisions and supporting troops. He said:

To be specific, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have recommended to me, and I have so recommended to the President—and the President has approved—a policy with respect to our forces in Europe which looks to the maintenance by us, in Europe, of approximately six divisions of ground forces.

Further, he stated:

While this number does not appear to represent in pure fighting strength a large contribution to the immediate defensive strength of Western Europe, it does represent a small Army unit of high efficiency, and we believe a tremendous morale contribution to the effectiveness and build-up of the projected ground forces the North Atlantic Treaty nations are undertaking to develop under General Eisenhower's direction and command.

He did not mean a unit without supporting troops. When he says six divisions or four divisions he means six divisions or four divisions and what goes with them.

So far as I am concerned, I believe that the whole argument of the Senator from Massachusetts is a complete misconception of what four divisions means. It means four divisions and those things necessary to make of them an effective operating unit. That seems to me so obvious that I think the Lodge amendment ought to be defeated. I am rather sorry that the Senator from Arkansas felt it necessary to offer his amendment, because it seems to me that it is perfectly clear that what we did was to approve General Marshall's recommendation. That is what this resolution does. That recommendation did not mean a bob-tailed unit of ground troops in Europe. It meant a unit of six divisions in an efficient army.

Incidentally, there is a perfectly easy way for the administration to correct this situation if it wishes to do so, and that is to suggest a proper authorization statute for the whole Atlantic Treaty. The administration ought to do that anyway. It ought to submit a bill as it did in the case of the arms implementation act.

This program includes not only ground troops. Look at the organization which is being set up under the Atlantic Charter. I do not vouch for the report, but I was told that when General Eisenhower reached Europe he found that the State Department already had in this organization some 80 generals from various nations, who were there before he ever had anything to do with the program.

In yesterday's New York Times it is stated that there has been a dispute as to where this group shall be located. I read:

The standing group of the Atlantic Treaty Organization will be in Washington. This group is over General Eisenhower and is composed of the Chiefs of Staff of the United States, Britain, and France, whose deputies really run the group.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator will please suspend.

The Chair wishes to make a special request of those in the Chamber who are

not Members of the Senate. Kindly refrain from conversation. It is an act of discourtesy, in the first place and a display of bad manners, to be on the floor of the Senate, presumably on official business, and through the indulgence of the Senate, and to carry on conversation which distracts those who wish to hear and interrupts the speaker. Please refrain from such conversation. The Chair will ask Senators who must converse at length please to retire.

Mr. TAFT. The New York Times article continues:

General Eisenhower, commander in chief of the Atlantic pact combined forces and commander of the United States forces in Europe, will direct strategy from Paris.

Also in Paris, working on economic and financial assistance to the treaty organization's coordinated rearmament programs will be the Marshall Plan European headquarters, run by Ambassador Milton Katz, successor to Averell Harriman. He heads what is known as the Economic Cooperation Administration's Office of Special Representative, and is the main United States link with the representatives of the Marshall Plan countries in what is called the Office of European Economic Cooperation.

General Eisenhower did agree to have in Paris one North Atlantic Treaty organization committee, a financial and economic board, but all the rest of the treaty organization will, if he has his way (and nobody doubts that he will), remain in London.

This means that the main political committee of the Treaty organization (the Council of Deputies under United States Ambassador Charles M. Spofford); the principal production unit (the Defense Production Board under William R. Herod), and the main American military production coordinating staff (the Joint American Military Assistance Group under Maj. A. Franklin Kibler) will all be apart from both the Eisenhower headquarters and the Marshall plan headquarters, which has been assigned a major role in the rearmament program.

General Eisenhower has taken special interest in Atlantic Pact information organization, which is now in the process of expansion. In fact, he has arranged to go to London April 12 for a special meeting there on the information aspects of his command. Assistant Secretary of State Edward Barrett will go to London also for that meeting, and it is not impossible that General Eisenhower will agree that this information or propaganda part of the job should be attached to his headquarters.

This, however, is precisely the point that most officials of the Treaty organization have been stressing: That General Eisenhower is engaged in an international task that involves his leadership not only in military affairs but in economic, financial, political, and information matters as well.

To coordinate the activities of 12 governments in all these fields, and at the same time mesh the Marshall Plan and North Atlantic Treaty Organizations will be an extremely difficult task, even if all the officials directly concerned are operating in the same city.

The principal members of this committee and some of the best brains at General Eisenhower's disposal are Charles H. Bonesteel (production), Maj. Gen. Lowell W. Rooks (military), Burton Knapp (economic), and Theodore Achilles (political). This and the Joint American Military Assistance Group that attempts to coordinate United States military assistance with the defense production programs of the other treaty nations are the heart of the operation at the official level in London, but they are widely sepa-

rated from the Eisenhower headquarters, which depends upon the success of their operations, and vice versa.

General Eisenhower, however, did not want the political officials of the Council of Deputies too close to him in Paris.

A vast treaty organization, a new international organization, is being set up. It has all kinds of committees—economic, political, and military—all with staffs for which ultimately we are going to pay. I suggest to the administration that it ought to come to Congress with a general authorization bill. If it wishes to correct this particular situation, as to just how many troops it wants in Europe, certainly such a provision can be placed in a general authorization statute.

Mr. CONNALLY. Mr. President I yield 6 minutes to the Senator from New York [Mr. LEHMAN].

Mr. LEHMAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to insert in the RECORD a statement on the pending question by a group of distinguished Americans who have banded together in an organization known as the Committee on the Present Danger. The head of this committee is the outstanding American educator, Dr. James B. Conant, president of Harvard University. They have described their views on the question of troops for Europe, and I think those views ought to be a part of the RECORD. I ask that there also be printed the names of the members of this committee.

There being no objection, the statement and list of names were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

STATEMENT BY THE COMMITTEE ON THE PRESENT DANGER

The Senate is about to vote on a resolution concerning sending troops to Europe in support of the North Atlantic Treaty. The importance of this subject to the safety of our country can hardly be overstated.

In the hope that it may serve to clarify the issues, this committee ventures its comment.

The real question is how best to defend the United States. This is a military problem. We must look to our responsible military leaders, who must conduct our defense if war comes, to plan the strategy they will employ. It is their unanimous, professional judgment that the defense of the United States should be laid in Europe jointly with our allies under the North Atlantic Treaty; that we must contribute our fair share of the ground forces of the joint army being created under General Eisenhower; that supply of munitions and contributions of sea and air power are not enough; that flexibility as to future decisions for deployment of our troops is an imperative necessity in a future no man can predict.

There is danger that these real issues may be obscured by an unnecessary question as to the respective constitutional powers of the President and the Congress. The Constitution makes the President Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. This carries with it the powers implicit in command as to deployment of existing forces. But the Constitution also provides that it shall be the function of the Congress to raise and support armies. In addition, of course, Congress has the power over the purse.

Stationing a relatively large United States force in Europe to support the North Atlantic Treaty will involve the functions of command, of raising and supporting armies, and of making appropriations. It must be the joint responsibility of the Congress and

the Chief Executive to continue to provide the requisite forces, to pass the laws to create them and the funds to pay for them.

The press recently attributed to General Eisenhower the statement that he might as well be sent to the middle of the Atlantic Ocean unless he is to have in this task the support of the President, of the Congress, and of the public.

The true issues then are not constitutional questions, but whether this country is ready with unity to carry out the spirit as well as the letter of the North Atlantic Treaty; whether it will give its wholehearted support to General Eisenhower's mission; whether it will abide by the considered judgment of its responsible military leaders as to how best to defend the United States.

Secretary Marshall has just stated that the danger is greater now even than last November.

Accordingly this committee urges with deep conviction—

A renewed spirit of national urgency, and of unity of action in this matter between the President and the Congress.

To this end, that the Senate express—as is proposed in section 2 of the joint committee's resolution now pending before it—"that the threat to the security of the United States and our North Atlantic Treaty partners make it necessary for the United States to station abroad such units of our Armed Forces as may be necessary and appropriate to contribute our fair share of the forces needed for the joint defense of the North Atlantic area."

That it be expressed as the sense of the Senate that the Congress be consulted in advance, through its appropriate committees, as to any new long-range policy requiring the stationing of any large number of additional United States forces in Europe in support of the North Atlantic Treaty.

That assurance of such consultation be given by the President.

That the above not be done in a way which might tend to cast any uncertainty or cloud upon the power of the Commander in Chief to take instant action wherever necessary, as emergencies may arise or threaten, to deploy existing forces—a power more urgently requisite for the safety of all of us in today's world of sudden mass-destruction weapons than it has ever been before.

Committee on the Present Danger:

Julius Ochs Adler, Raymond B. Allen, Frank Altschul, Dillon Anderson, William Douglas Arant, James Phinney Baxter III, Laird Bell, Barry Bingham, Harry A. Bullis, Vannevar Bush, Will L. Clayton, James B. Conant, Robert Cutler, R. Ammi Cutter, Mrs. Dwight Davis, Harold W. Dodds, E. L. Degolyer, Charles Dollard, William J. Donovan, Goldthwaite H. Dorr, David Dubinsky, Leonard K. Firestone, Truman K. Gibson, Jr., Miss Meta Glass, Arthur J. Goldberg, Samuel Goldwyn, Edward S. Greenbaum, Paul G. Hoffman, Monte M. Lemann, William L. Marbury, Stanley Marcus, William C. Menninger, Frederick A. Middlebush, James L. Morrill, Edward R. Murrow, John Lord O'Brien, Floyd B. Odium, Robert P. Patterson, Howard C. Petersen, Daniel A. Poling, Stanley Resor, Samuel I. Rosenman, Theodore W. Schultz, Robert E. Sherwood, Edgar W. Smith, Robert G. Sproul, Robert L. Stearns, Tracy S. Voorhees, Edmund A. Walsh, S. J. W. W. Waymack, Henry M. Wriston, J. D. Zellerbach.

Mr. LEHMAN. Mr. President, the distinguished Senator from Arkansas [Mr. McCLELLAN] has sought to make it appear that the action which was proposed would place unilateral authority

in the President of the United States. Of course it does, to the extent that the constitutional power of the President in supplying troops of all kinds is very clear. But there is no doubt that the pending resolution advises the President that it is the sense of the Senate that he must consult with the appropriate committees of Congress and the military authorities of the Nation.

We have been so much preoccupied with the consideration of paragraph 6 of the resolution that I want to read again to the Senate paragraphs 3, 4 and 5, to which we all subscribe and which have exactly the same weight as paragraph 6, which, in my opinion, was unfortunately amended on motion of the Senator from Arkansas. Paragraph 3 is as follows:

3. It is the sense of the Senate that the President of the United States as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, before taking action to send units of ground troops to Europe under article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty, should consult the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, and the Armed Services Committee of the Senate and the House of Representatives, and that he should likewise consult the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe.

Paragraph 4 is as follows:

4. It is the sense of the Senate that before sending units of ground troops to Europe under article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty, the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall certify to the Secretary of Defense that in their opinion the parties to the North Atlantic Treaty are giving, and have agreed to give full, realistic force and effect to the requirement of article 3 of said treaty that "by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid" they will "maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack," specifically insofar as the creation of combat units is concerned.

Paragraph 5 is as follows:

5. The Senate herewith approves the understanding that the major contribution to the ground forces under General Eisenhower's command should be made by the European members of the North Atlantic Treaty, and that such units of United States ground forces as may be assigned to the above command shall be so assigned only after the Joint Chiefs of Staff certify to the Secretary of Defense that in their opinion such assignment is a necessary step in strengthening the security of the United States; and the certified opinions referred to in paragraphs 4 and 5 shall be transmitted by the Secretary of Defense to the President of the United States, and to the Senate Committees on Foreign Relations and Armed Services, and to the House Committees on Foreign Affairs and Armed Services as soon as they are received.

Mr. President, I have no fear that if Russia should commit an overt act against the United States it would take the Congress of the United States any substantial time to place at the disposal of the Commander in Chief and our military authorities the full strength of the United States. But even in the absence of an overt act the need for defense may be very serious and very great. What would the situation be, I ask the Senator from Arkansas, if all the conditions which I have read had been scrupulously observed and it was demonstrated to the

President, to General Eisenhower, and to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and our other military leaders—

Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. LEHMAN. I shall be glad to yield when I have finished—and it was demonstrated that it was necessary to strengthen our forces by troops that had not been authorized by the Congress. The only way action under those circumstances could be secured would be again to submit the question to Congress, again to have it made the subject of lengthy debate—and we have been debating this matter for 3 months. It would compel us again to disclose many military secrets, because the proposal could not be submitted to Congress under those circumstances without disclosing what the necessity and our plans were. There has already been too much disclosure of military secrets which give aid and comfort to our enemies.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. STENNIS). The time of the Senator from New York is exhausted.

Mr. LEHMAN. Mr. President, will the Senator from Texas yield me one more minute?

Mr. CONNALLY. I regret very much that I cannot yield the Senator any more time.

Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, I yield 5 minutes to the Senator from Virginia [Mr. ROBERTSON].

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The junior Senator from Virginia is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. ROBERTSON. Mr. President, no Member of the Senate has been more firmly committed to international cooperation than I have. I supported the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act; I supported the relief program; I supported the ECA to stem the tide of aggression; I have supported the defense program; and I shall vote to give General Marshall the four new divisions of ground troops which he said he wanted, making no limitations as to the number or deployment of Air Forces or of the Navy.

In voting for the McClellan amendment, I voted to make paragraph 6 mean what I already thought it meant, and what I understand the members of the joint committee thought it meant when they reported it. I regret that after they had reported it, when some of us felt that as a policy matter we had decided that the Congress should have a chance to express its opinion, some Senators contended that it applied only to the four divisions of ground forces to be supplied now, but not to future divisions we might send during peacetime.

I make that preliminary statement, Mr. President, because there is another phase of this matter in which I am deeply concerned, and that is this: I have previously spoken on the pending resolution expressing the belief that the Russian people do not want a shooting war with us and that if they should become involved in war with us, they would have to be pushed and kicked into it. But we are fighting a war of ideas with Russia, and losing that war. I have taken the position that we can-

not fight an idea with bombs and bullets; neither can we in that way fight a bad smell, if communism may be so characterized.

Mr. President, I wish to read a letter from a distinguished British diplomat who, in a very forceful way, expresses the views I am trying now to present. He says:

I do not consider that our side has played its hand well since the German and Japanese surrender.

I have for long felt it to be axiomatic that, if you fear a great deal of strength lest it do a great deal of harm, you do need a great deal of strength to do a great deal of good.

Joe Stalin has built up his strength; we have built down ours.

Since 1946 when it became obvious that the one-world idea—one good world—must break down on account of Russian uncooperativeness I have felt that the most important decision ahead for us was when, and in what circumstances, to rearm the Germans and the Japanese and have their assistance, if it were available, in stopping the creation of the one bad world centered in Moscow.

It may be the case that if the one good world can be brought about, there is no need for a balance of power. But if the one good world does not come about, there is no alternative to one bad world except a split world maintained in some equilibrium by a balance of power.

These basic considerations may not be very fashionable. It is, nevertheless, perilous to ignore them; and they have been ignored.

You will surely have read James McNeill Whistler's *The Gentle Art of Making Enemies*—a witty book, but an acid one—for it is a collection, made and published in his and their lifetime, of letters in which he poured scorn and derision on a number of his contemporaries—mostly art critics. It has a subtitle "as pleasingly exemplified in certain instances where the great ones of the earth have been prettily spurred on to wrath and indiscretion while overcome by an undue sense of right."

This shows an aspect of the matter which the governors and legislators of freedom-loving and democracy-practicing countries would do well to ponder. It accounts for some things that go on today; though clearly not for everything.

When one speaks of freedom, there are two aspects to be considered—national freedom, individual freedom. The question of national freedom is no longer in question; the right of national units to determine their own affairs and guide their own destinies is hardly disputed. The thing in doubt, and dispute, is the freedom of the individual within the state.

In the latter sense, there is a grand conspiracy against the free world; it is centered on Moscow and, in sharp contrast to the free democracies is already enjoying the huge advantages of an unified command and a single inspiration.

The need of the free democracies is a grand and agreed policy to meet and defeat this grand conspiracy. The progress in that direction is not very noteworthy; there may not be very much time left to achieve it. The agreement will not be very easy to reach, anyway.

You must decide your policy before you take your military dispositions.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator from Virginia has expired.

Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, I yield the Senator from Virginia one more minute.

Mr. ROBERTSON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the remainder of the letter may be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the remainder of the letter was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

Navy, armies, air forces, diplomatic activities, and so on, are the instruments of policy. It is a total illusion to suppose that if peace is the declared and genuine aim of policy, and armed hostilities nevertheless start up, it means that the military element has been called in to redress a position that has been bungled by the diplomatic element. No. It means a breakdown of policy—of the policy pursued by the central authority through its appointed instruments.

More. If the political objectives for which the war is fought are not achieved, arms may have been victorious, but the war may more so have been fought in vain. That again is the fault of policy. Maybe quite pardonable—for it is easy enough for the wisest and boldest to underestimate or misestimate the strength and direction of the convulsions into which war plunges the minds as well as the bodies of men, and of the social disintegrations that ensue. In a democracy the people—being an electorate—must share the blame for a breakdown of policy and for its results on themselves as a collectivity. In an autocracy, a police state, or a pseudo-democracy the people—not being an electorate—need not share the blame with its governors.

Where does all this take us? You will ask. I will tell you—but I must insist first on your understanding the anatomy of these issues. Hence the preceding paragraphs.

It takes us to this. We—the States that stand for the freedom of the individual, for the rule of law and not the rule of force, and against the spread of communism and the subjection of any more areas of the world's surface to the control of the oligarchy in Moscow—we must evolve a policy and design the means of making it good. The "means" includes the military forces. It would obviously be better management to decide the nature and disposition of these after the commitments under policy have been defined. In the present muddle, that would however seem a counsel of perfection.

In this connection Korea was and is a case in point. You will remember my writing to you in applause of President Truman's decision to resist with arms the aggression of the North Koreans. I still maintain that now. But had policy, before hand, accepted Korea as a military commitment? If yes—then policy had miscalculated. If no—then the troops ought not to have gone in. In saying this, I grant all the difficulties and the then obscurities of the situation. But if we are to discuss what should be done next, we must have a positive policy and defined commitments.

At the present moment you are yourself rather in favor of abandoning the Far East—temporarily. Is "temporarily" possible? Can we afford to lose all that "face"? What then about Japan? Indochina? Malaya? Not a good picture. Still, the policy-makers, if they are honest-minded, will have to weigh all that up. The thing can't be tackled piecemeal, or by "popular" slogans; or by electioneering gesticulations, maneuvers, and acrobatics; or with a press blaring out every phase of the deliberations to enemy as well as friend.

Now, Cecil Spring-Rice, when I was a member of his staff in Tehran 43 years ago taught me, among other things, that it was no use trying to box with a bad smell; you didn't get rid of a bad smell that way and you spent a lot of energy, to no purpose, while the bad smell spent no energy at all, and went on feeling fine. (Incidentally, Cecil's "bad

smell" at the time was the Imperial Russian Foreign Office.)

Isn't there a truth in this applicable to Russia and communism? What are we doing? Are we trying to keep out the Communist smell with shot and shell? Or are we challenging the Soviet Empire to armed battle?

If the latter, it is an admission that there is no other method of extinguishing the smell. I refuse to believe there is no other method; though I am willing to admit that this particular smell has some of the properties of an intoxicant, and some of the properties of mustard gas.

If the former, it's demonstrably not very practical.

There are two ways of dealing with a bad smell. (A) One is to extinguish it at its source, if you can reach the source. (B) The other is to offer the contaminated as well as the not yet contaminated nostril a sweeter and more appetizing alternative.

A good deal is being and has been done about (B); it has not so far availed very much to check the spread of the Communist religion idea (which, of course, has nothing whatever to do with methods of government in the Soviet Union), and has done nothing whatever to check the activities of the national Communist parties in democratically governed countries. And a democracy cannot resort to the persecution or disfranchisement of its citizens because of their political opinions. So (B) must, I think, be classed as a secondary weapon, and probably dependent for its success on the weakening of the central smell factory.

So we pass to (A). There seems to be a tacit and undiscussed assumption that armed force alone can extinguish the smell at its source. Let alone that the acceptance of this assumption means inevitably world war III and the democracies perhaps being jockeyed into the role of technical aggressors—I simply do not believe that the assumption is true.

The Russians are waging psychological warfare on us; I cannot believe that we can't do it on them. But are we trying? I don't know the answer to that. But I am pretty well qualified to know the potential of skillfully conducted psychological warfare.

Since 1921, or earlier, I have never stopped pointing out that the Moscow people have invented, and practiced, without intermission, a system of international hostilities that do not constitute war or involve a state of war but to which nobody has yet formed the answer. And they haven't found it yet. From 1920 to 1939 I spent 12 out of these 19 years in countries that had a common frontier with the Soviet Union. One learns something that way; and not from people who, however estimable and observant they are, are nevertheless dependent for their salary on their ability to enhance the sales value of a newspaper. During this last war I learned quite a bit about psychological warfare. Bob McClure, or Bob Sherwood, could tell you something about that. Maybe that's the formula for the answer to the smell. It ought to be tried out.

Still, it's the policy that will matter in the end.

In the field of international relationships diplomacy bears very much the same relation to policy as tactics do to strategy in military operations. This is worth remembering.

Don't underestimate your adversary. Joe Stalin has been a jump ahead pretty well every time.

Don't forget that the Russians, especially the great Russians, are the most imperialistic-minded race of all.

If we can't attach Russia's immediate neighbors to ourselves, can't we alienate them from Moscow?

Mr. ROBERTSON. I wish to summarize what was said by the writer of this letter. We need military strength, yes, and I am supporting military strength, but when it comes to a matter of policy I do not want our leaders, or the leaders of other democracies, to think that war with Russia is inevitable, or that any amount of bombs and bullets will win the war of ideas. If our objective be the survival of democratic principles we can win on the battlefield but lose our objective. And, by the same token, we can, in the name of resisting aggression, make such costly defense plans that our domestic economy is destroyed before the enemy fires a shot. In the making of such vital policy decisions the Commander in Chief should welcome the advice and consent of the Congress. As we undertake to implement the Atlantic Pact, temporarily to stop—we hope—Soviet plans for aggression, I want us to put forth more force and vigor behind a program of selling our ideas to the world and winning away from the Soviet Union the satellite countries and the people in democracies who may now be inclined to join with the Soviets in an attack upon the free countries of the world.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. STENNIS in the chair). The time of the Senator from Virginia has expired.

Mr. CONNALLY. Mr. President, I yield 8 minutes to the Senator from Oklahoma [Mr. KERR].

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oklahoma is recognized for 8 minutes.

Mr. KERR. Mr. President, I do not believe the amendment of the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. McCLELLAN] is good legislation. I believe it is based on a policy of too little and too late.

Those who support that amendment, in their efforts to protect our country, would compel our own military leaders, to come before the Senate and tell the Senate and the world—including our enemy—what the confidential plan of our military leaders are for the defense of the United States.

Then, having accomplished that monstrosity, the advocates of the McClellan amendment would put our country's military leaders into a strait-jacket; they would say to them, "These four divisions are all you may have—these, and no more," until another farce could be played out on the floor of the Senate.

The advocates of the amendment say to our allies, who are looking down the barrel of a loaded gun, "Take it or leave it; this is all of it—there ain't no more."

The advocates of the McClellan amendment say to our enemy, who even now is laughing at us, "This is all you have to beat, so far as we, the United States of America, are concerned, if you wish to conquer Western Europe, and thus remove the last land barrier between your military might and America's shores."

The advocates of the amendment say to the American people, "We, the Senate of the United States, assume the responsibility of saying how little will be used to hold beyond the ocean, to keep from your homes and firesides, the most

awful terror that has threatened civilization in a thousand years."

The advocates of the McClellan amendment say to the American people, "Four divisions are all that can be used in Europe by our commanders to protect our country and our civilization; four divisions are all that can be used there until there is opportunity for another 6 or 8 weeks of oratorical battle, of political strife to satisfy political ambition and official position."

Mr. President, in my opinion, the McClellan amendment does not do anything for our country; it does something to our country. In my opinion, the McClellan amendment does not do anything to our enemy, but it is doing something for our enemy.

By adopting the McClellan amendment, the Senate, as a part of the legislative branch of the United States Government, has also done to General Marshall and General Eisenhower and our Joint Chiefs of Staff something that the armies and submarines of imperial Germany failed to do in World War I. The advocates of the McClellan amendment have succeeded in doing to the military might of our free nation and to General Eisenhower something that the greatest military machine the world had ever seen up to that time, failed to accomplish.

The combined might of Hitler's Germany and Tojo's Japan tried to trap and shackle General Marshall and General Eisenhower and neutralize the strength entrusted to them. They failed and when they failed civilization was saved from destruction. Yes, Germany and Japan failed in that effort; and when they failed American freedom and our way of life were preserved.

But, Mr. President, where our bitter, cruel, deadly enemies failed, the Senate has succeeded, for the Senate has put the chains and the shackles of legislative restriction on General Marshall, on our Joint Chiefs of Staff, and on our Armed Forces; and then the Senate has delivered the specifications of those chains and shackles to our mortal enemy.

Mr. President, it cannot be that the Senate wishes to destroy the morale of the most important potential group of allies we have, yet that is what will be done as a result of the adoption of the McClellan amendment. What a paradox it is that on the very day when the President of France came before the House and the Senate and pledged his country's all, the Senate answered with half measures and doubts.

Mr. President, it cannot be that Senators want to lend aid and comfort to our enemies, yet that is what the Senate does by means of the adoption of the McClellan amendment.

It cannot be that Senators wish to play the fiddle of political maneuver while the last clear chance of insuring American security is burning in the fires of vanishing opportunity. Yet that is what the Senate, by adopting the McClellan amendment, may very well be doing.

Mr. President, the advocates of the McClellan amendment say, "Congress

must decide." In other words, they say that congressional pride or vanity, or whatever it is, must be satisfied.

God forbid, Mr. President. I personally believe that the advocates of the McClellan amendment seek to exercise a power they do not have. However, if they do have that power—mark these words, Mr. President—they seek to exercise it in such a way that our country may forever be lost instead of surely being saved.

Mr. President, the McClellan amendment is based on a policy of too little and too late, as I have said. The advocates of the McClellan amendment take the position that no more than four of our divisions may be used in Europe to help save more with which wars are won, and without which wars are lost, than this Nation itself has or controls. They say that four divisions, and no more, may be used, when our country is striving to avoid all-out war and is striving to achieve world peace.

The advocates of the McClellan amendment say we can do more later. When and how, Mr. President?

Will it be after the Senate has again compelled our military leaders to come before it and tell it—loud enough for our enemies to hear—how many divisions will be used and where they will be used?

Will it then be after the Senate has again spent months in bickering, in arguing and fighting for position, while our deadly foe, with no such self-imposed shackles, goes quietly and easily about the task of providing enough to defeat the meager additional force which the Senate would eventually authorize?

Mr. President, I do not believe the Senate has the authority to fashion the shackles whereby it would hog-tie our own military power and would lose the golden opportunity to gain the allies with whom we can truly hope to avoid world war, if that is possible, or to win that war if it is thrust upon us.

However, Mr. President, if we do have that power, I know of no greater tragedy that could befall our country than for that power to be used in the way provided by the present language of the resolution, including the McClellan amendment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator from Oklahoma has expired.

Mr. LODGE. Mr. President, I believe I have 4 minutes remaining.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arkansas and the Senator from Texas have control of the time on the pending amendment, which is the amendment of the Senator from Arkansas to the amendment of the Senator from Massachusetts.

Mr. LODGE. Mr. President, I have 4 minutes of my own time remaining, and I should like to speak at this time.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Very well; the Senator from Massachusetts is recognized.

Mr. LODGE. Mr. President, when I began this discussion, following the convening of the Senate today, I stated that I am a realist about this matter, and I know there is no chance whatever of changing the action already taken by the Senate on the McClellan amendment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts will suspend for a moment until the allotment of the time can be straightened out.

Does the Senator from Texas yield time to the Senator from Massachusetts?

Mr. LODGE. Mr. President, I am speaking in my own time.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Not now, for the Senator's amendment is now subject to the amendment the Senator from Arkansas has offered to it.

Mr. LODGE. Nevertheless, Mr. President, I wish to use the time which remains to me in connection with my own amendment. I believe I have 4 minutes remaining.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Very well; the Senator from Massachusetts may proceed for 4 minutes.

Mr. LODGE. Mr. President, as I started to say, when the Senate convened today and when I began this discussion, I stated that I am a realist about this matter, and I know there is no chance whatever of changing the action whereby the McClellan amendment was voted into the pending resolution. I am sure I am correct in that belief and that position.

I have offered the pending amendment in order to provide an opportunity for discussion in regard to exactly what is the significance of the McClellan amendment. Now that that discussion has been had—and I believe that discussion will be most valuable for public opinion—I withdraw my amendment.

Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, does that nullify the amendment I have offered to the amendment submitted by the Senator from Massachusetts?

Mr. KEM. Mr. President—

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator from Missouri, to propound an inquiry.

Mr. KEM. Mr. President, to the pending measure I offer the amendment which I send to the desk and ask to have stated.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment will be stated.

The LEGISLATIVE CLERK. On page 4, between lines 3 and 4, it is proposed to insert a new paragraph as follows:

5. It is the sense of the Senate that before sending units of ground troops to Europe under article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty, including the four divisions referred to in paragraph 7, the Joint Chiefs of Staff should certify to the Congress that in their opinion sufficient air strength will be available to control the air over Western Europe to the degree necessary to assure the safety and effectiveness of such ground troops.

And to renumber paragraphs 5 to 8, inclusive, as paragraphs 6 to 9, respectively.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Missouri.

Mr. KEM. Mr. President, this amendment is a very simple one. Its purpose is to assure the Congress that before any American doughboys are sent to Western Europe we shall have reason to believe that they will have adequate air protection; that is, that sufficient air strength will be available to assure the safety and effectiveness of such troops.

While the battle of Stalingrad was in progress, Josef Stalin wrote to Winston Churchill:

Even the bravest troops are helpless if they lack air protection.

It is said that the Russians will never forget Stalingrad. I think it may also be said that the Russians will never forget the meaning of air superiority. The Russians are realists. It seems to me we should be sure that we are equally realistic in approaching the problem which, as the Senator from Massachusetts has in effect said, means the very defense of the structure of our civilization. Are we doing so?

I wish to call as a witness Gen. Carl A. Spaatz, who has been called by Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower the world's greatest air strategist. In an article in the current issue of the Air Force magazine, General Spaatz says:

I must report, on the basis of evidence available, that unless we call a halt to the present trend, shift our gears, and take off in another direction, that hope is thin, indeed.

General Spaatz further says:

In our approach to the mission in Western Europe we may be betraying not only the youths we would draft for those battlefields but also the war-scarred people of Europe who once again live under the gun.

General Spaatz says we must not delude ourselves that ground divisions "will give the powers in the Kremlin a single sleepless night." He further says:

Walls-of-flesh strategy—

I hope the Senate will note that phrase, "walls-of-flesh strategy"—

is not the answer to our problems or to the problems of Western Europe. It is, in my opinion, the sure way to disaster.

The General then tells us, in language we can all understand:

If she so desires, Russia can command the air over Europe and Asia. It should become known by one and all that the ground divisions the free world hopes to muster by the end of 1952 in Western Europe, if called upon to fight, must do their fighting without the protection that comes through command of the air.

I hope that every Senator, when he votes today to approve the sending of four divisions to Western Europe at this time, will have in mind the opinion of the man whom General Eisenhower has called "the world's greatest air strategist." That opinion is, that until the end of 1952—not until the end of the present year, but until the end of the year 1952—those troops will be without the protection which comes from the air.

Consider, Mr. President, what that means to the Members of the Senate who are called upon today "to approve"—that is the language of the resolution—the sending to Europe, of four divisions, or approximately 100,000 young Americans with the certain knowledge that at least during the year 1952 those young men will be without adequate air cover. Are the mothers of America prepared to accept the risk, with the casualty rate it involves? As General Spaatz says, "Isn't this a sure way to national suicide?"

We of the Congress cannot avoid or explain away our responsibility. If we act in this matter, if we go on record as approving the sending to Europe of four ground divisions, at this time, without adequate air support, we shall be unable later to explain away our responsibility.

General Spaatz warns us that the battle for the command of the air does not begin on the battlefield. One of the places where the battle for command of the air begins is in the Congress. General Spaatz further says:

Our ability to win this battle and properly support our troops can be gaged not by looking down and counting our doughboys on the ground, but only by looking up, and counting the planes in the air.

And the General sagely remarks:

We can find little solace in the knowledge that Russia is building her jet fighter fleet with the help of and from the designs of some of the world's greatest fighter plane experts—the German scientists and technicians she obtained as booty from World War II.

The question is whether we are taking care of air production needs, whether what we are doing is adequate to give sufficient air cover to the ground troops whom it is proposed we send to Europe. I shall let General Spaatz answer again. He says that to meet the test of the Finletter Commission, which, in its report, set forth what it denominated a survival minimum, that is the minimum necessary if we are to survive, we would be required to double the number of aircraft which, it is now estimated, will be produced for the Air Force this year.

General Spaatz gives us another test. He says:

To meet the requirement of the 95-group program—

Which, I believe, was referred to by General Vandenberg in his testimony before the committees.

To meet the requirement of the 95-group program, more than triple the estimated number of aircraft to be produced for the Air Force would be required this year.

Then General Spaatz says:

To meet the requirements of air battle with Russia—that is another story.

Mr. President, that is the story with which we are concerned today if we send our young men abroad with the full knowledge, as Stalin learned at Stalingrad, that we will be helpless without air protection.

General Spaatz further pointed out:

The airpower odds we have created and continue to create against the ground forces being built up for the defense of Western Europe are nothing short of appalling. From the best available published figure, it can be concluded that in numbers of front-line modern aircraft available for the air battle over Western Europe today—

Mr. President, I ask that every Senator present attend to this figure—

Russia holds at least a 10-to-1 margin.

Then he says:

And on the basis of our present production tempo, even if we assume no increase in Russia's current air strength (an implau-

sible assumption used only to emphasize our own position), it can likewise be concluded that the free world will still be on the short end of at least a 5-to-1 margin in Western Europe at the end of 1952.

Mr. BREWSTER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. KEM. I yield to the Senator from Maine.

Mr. BREWSTER. I should like to have the Senator again read the 10-to-1 ratio. I did not understand the first words in connection with it.

Mr. KEM. The 10-to-1 ratio represents the number of front-line modern aircraft available for an air battle over Western Europe today.

Mr. BREWSTER. It does not relate to the question of strategic bombing, long-range bombing. I take it that "front line" means combat aircraft.

Mr. KEM. Yes; aircraft which would be available to give protection to troops on the ground in Western Europe, the four divisions which it is proposed we send there.

Mr. BREWSTER. I gather that what the Senator is indicating is that our troops would in one respect be very much like the Chinese troops in Korea, where they have no air protection.

Mr. KEM. Yes. I shall deal with them later in the language of military experts. I am glad the Senator has brought that out. I think I failed to indicate clearly what General Spaatz had in mind.

I continue the quotation from General Spaatz:

Let us think for the moment of only the front-line odds, of what it means to be outnumbered 10 to 1 or 5 or even 2 to 1 (as Russia was outnumbered at Stalingrad) in a struggle for command of the air. Think of what it might mean to our troops down below, to the tide of battle in Western Europe, to the whole war effort of the free world.

Dealing now with the very pertinent question which the Senator from Maine has raised, the war in Korea has taught us that the forces which control the air above them enjoy enormous advantage over their enemies. Our Air Force, practically unopposed in Korea, has saved the United Nations from disaster.

General Spaatz tells us:

In Korea, where we enjoy air superiority at Russia's discretion—

At Russia's discretion—

our casualties number some 60,000 against hundreds of thousands of enemy casualties, and we now know that 47 percent of these enemy casualties have been attributed directly to air power.

Mr. President, let me interpolate to say that I am informed that the figure 47 percent does not come from Air Force sources; it comes from General MacArthur's headquarters in Tokyo and is based on actual field surveys on the battlefield.

I continue quoting from General Spaatz:

Thus, in a situation where air superiority is not ours, we must be prepared to think of the enemy's casualty rate in Korea as our casualty rate in Western Europe, and perhaps magnified somewhat. We must consider whether the countries of Europe, already torn by the ravages of a recent war, are

capable of accepting such casualties. And we must consider whether the mothers of America are prepared to accept them.

Mr. BREWSTER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. KEM. I yield.

Mr. BREWSTER. In that connection, the figures which were brought to my attention for the first time yesterday show that in Korea, up to the present time, there have been more than 1,000,000 casualties covering two sides, a quarter of a million on our side of the line, and approaching 750,000 on the other side. And this in a police action. What would be the results in what might be called a war?

Mr. KEM. I tremble to think what the results would be in even a little war. I think the Senator from Maine has brought out what, as I understand, all military authorities agree on, namely, the fact that the United Nations forces have been able to recover the initiative is entirely due to the command of the air. The Red air force is known to possess approximately 20,000 combat planes, a goodly portion of which are modern jet fighters, the equal of our own. Unless our troops in Europe have sufficient air support to neutralize the air above them, they will be destroyed.

When the British intervened in Greece in the spring of 1941, the Royal Air Force was hopelessly outnumbered by the Luftwaffe. Many Tommies never saw an RAF plane in the air. The Luftwaffe simply followed the RAF planes back to their landing fields and destroyed them on the ground. If war should come in Europe our air forces in Germany doubt that they could fly more than one mission before our planes would be destroyed by the Red air force. Yet we talk about sending four divisions of troops to Europe without any more air protection than that. Mr. President, it seems to me to be utter folly; it seems to me to be unthinkable that sane Members of Congress will sit here under those circumstances and in view of that evidence and vote solemnly to approve sending young men of America abroad to submit themselves to such chances and risks.

Mr. President, here is an interesting thing about numerical superiority in the air:

Numerical superiority in the air gives a geometrical advantage to the side with the most planes.

In other words, if there are five Russian planes to one Allied plane, the five Russian planes will concentrate on one. On the other hand, a single Allied plane must distribute its fire among the five Russian planes. In other words, the disadvantage is a 5-to-1 ratio. Yet we are told to send our young men to Europe under such circumstances.

For some reason or other, and I do not know exactly why, this air picture has never been made clear in what has been called the great debate. Proponents of the program for Europe have conveniently ignored the subject of air power. It has been mentioned on the floor of the Senate, but, so far as I know—and I have read the Record with

some care and have been in constant attendance on the debate—the proponents of sending four divisions to Europe have never attempted to answer the question what they are going to do about air cover. Yet all responsible military commanders know that command of the air is the first priority of modern warfare. Air superiority, as a prerequisite to all military action on land or sea, is inherent in the operational doctrine of all our Armed Forces.

I am told that there are now in the hands of our troops in Korea certain field manuals which are signed by General Marshall and General Eisenhower, and which plainly set forth that air superiority, as a requisite to all military action on land or sea, is inherent in the operational doctrine of our Armed Forces.

Yet Members of the Senate are asked to approve the sending of four divisions of ground troops to Western Europe, without any knowledge of whether air cover is to be present, and with all the evidence pointing to the fact that it will not be present. Indeed, Mr. President, we have the statement of the man who has been called by General Eisenhower the world's greatest air strategist to the effect that it will not be present.

(At this point Mr. KEM yielded to Mr. HENDRICKSON, who requested unanimous consent to change his vote cast yesterday on the so-called Lehman amendment, and debate ensued, all of which appears in the RECORD following the yea-and-nay vote on Mr. KEM's amendment.)

Mr. KEM. Mr. President, our generals in the Pentagon want to commit us to strategy as out of date and as unrealistic as was that of the French generals before the last war who gambled and lost on the Maginot line. As Gen. Bonner Fellers said:

We are risking our national security on a Maginot line on wheels.

Russia has such numerical air superiority that even if we were to hold the Rhine the Red air force could wipe out Europe's industrial and population centers in a matter of days. We are told on good authority that to neutralize the Red air force would require not less than 10,000 and preferably 20,000 combat planes under Allied command. Where are these planes to come from? What will be the cost? Are we justified in sending troops to Europe to face certain disaster unless they have adequate air support?

This is a matter for the Congress and American people to decide.

Questions on adequate support for the four divisions have been raised heretofore on the Senate floor. No attempt has been made to answer them. I want the RECORD to show that I invite the attention of the acting majority leader to the fact that he has 30 minutes in which to answer the facts and figures which I have presented, to answer the statements I have quoted from General Spaatz, who is said by General Eisenhower to be the greatest air strategist, and to tell the Senate and the American people what the answer of those who

propose to send ground troops to Europe is to the question of air cover.

Mr. MARTIN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. KEM. Yes.

Mr. MARTIN. Mr. President, I have been very greatly interested in the discussion of the distinguished Senator from Missouri. I am fully in accord with the purposes of his amendment. I should like to ask him one question. As I understand, the General Staff contemplates sending to Europe four divisions. In the tables of organization of the American Army, divisions have certain supporting troops, which are drawn from a corps or army. Does not the distinguished Senator from Missouri feel that Congress ought to have some knowledge as to whether the four divisions would be backed up with proper supporting troops, such as heavy tanks, heavy artillery, engineers with heavy equipment, communications troops, medical troops, and troops of similar character?

Mr. KEM. I agree with the Senator. If I did not agree with him I would hesitate to contradict him, because we all have such a profound respect for the judgment and military service of the distinguished soldier from Pennsylvania.

Mr. MARTIN. The Senator is very kind. Will the Senator yield further?

Mr. KEM. I am glad to yield.

Mr. MARTIN. The Senator has made a very kind comment, and I thank him. Congress represents the people of the United States. We, the people, will fight the war. It is our sons who will be the casualties. It is a part of the duty of Congress to see to it that proper forces are sent to Europe, when it is decided that they should be sent to Europe or any other part of the world. That means a proper Air Force. It means proper supporting troops. It means proper support from the Navy. It means a full, rounded-out outfit which is a self-contained fighting unit in which the men would have the greatest possible opportunity to return to their homes. Is that not correct?

Mr. KEM. I think it is absolutely correct. I should like to ask the distinguished Senator from Pennsylvania if the whole theory of warfare has not changed with the advent of air power?

Mr. MARTIN. Of course what the distinguished Senator from Missouri says is correct. War has been speeded up in the last generation. Motorization and air power have speeded up war. That means that we spread out over a great deal more territory. Many of us may have become alarmed over a division covering too large a front in Korea. However, it can do it with motorization and with proper air support. But I feel that it is the duty of the Congress representing the people, as we do, to see that a properly coordinated force goes to Europe or to any other place. When it gets on the field, then its operations become a military matter.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time of the proponents of the amendment has expired.

The Senator from Connecticut is recognized.

Mr. FERGUSON. Mr. President, will the Senator from Connecticut yield sufficient time to me so that I may ask a question of the Senator from Missouri [Mr. KEM]?

Mr. McMAHON. I yield 2 minutes to the Senator from Michigan.

Mr. FERGUSON. I simply desire sufficient time to make an inquiry on the interpretation of the amendment on page 4, lines 3 and 4, as to whether or not it is a condition precedent to the sending of the troops, or whether it is merely advice that it is the sense of the Senate that there should be sufficient air power.

Mr. KEM. I will say to the Senator from Michigan—and I am sure that he knows the answer to his question—that the entire resolution is purely a matter of advice and admonition to the President, as an expression of the sense of the Senate. This is some additional advice which we are giving him, to the effect that we do not want ground troops sent to Europe without adequate air coverage.

Mr. FERGUSON. Does the Senator feel that it would be a violation of the sense of the Senate by the military if they were to send troops to Europe without having sufficient air power there at the time? That is what I am trying to get at.

Mr. KEM. I do not think we could tie them to such an expression in the resolution. However, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are asked to certify to the Congress that in their opinion there is sufficient air coverage. If we do that, that is about all I think we can be expected to do.

Mr. FERGUSON. But if such certificate were not made prior to the sending of the troops, would the Senator feel that there was a violation of the sense of the Senate?

Mr. KEM. If the troops had already been sent, certificates should be made or the troops should be brought back. I do not believe that any American boy should be asked to serve in Europe on the ground without adequate air coverage.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator from Michigan has expired.

Mr. McMAHON. Mr. President, I yield myself 2 minutes.

The amendment offered by the distinguished Senator from Missouri is a natural extension, I believe, of what I shall call the McClellan doctrine. In other words, the Senate is now going to resolve itself into a committee to call upon the Joint Chiefs of Staff for specific advice as to air strength. I call attention to the language of the amendment:

The Joint Chiefs of Staff should certify to the Congress that in their opinion sufficient air strength will be available to control the air over Western Europe to the degree necessary to assure the safety and effectiveness of such ground troops.

Probably the proponents of the amendment would like to have us underwrite a guarantee that such troops will suffer no casualties.

I was just saying to the Senator from Texas [Mr. CONNALLY], who left the Chamber to go to luncheon, that we need only one more amendment, and that is to provide how many destroyers, ships of

the line, and aircraft carriers should be sent into North Atlantic Treaty waters.

Mr. KEM. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. McMAHON. Not at this time. We have covered the ground troops. Now we are considering the question of air power. If only we can all become admirals, we can wrap the whole thing up.

Mr. KEM. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McMAHON. I yield.

Mr. KEM. I should like to ask the Senator if he does not appreciate the difference between the President sending air forces to Europe, under his own command, or sending naval forces of the United States to the North Atlantic under his own command, and, on the other hand, the commitment of American troops to become a part of an international integrated army, under the command of General Eisenhower now, and his successor, whenever his successor comes along.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has exhausted his time.

Mr. McMAHON. I yield myself another minute, to answer the question.

I do not admit any difference at all. I invite the Senator's attention to the report of the Committee on Foreign Relations at the time the North Atlantic Treaty was reported to the Senate. I quote what the Foreign Relations Committee said at the time the treaty was reported to the Senate. There has been a great deal of talk about misrepresentation. I quote from page 19 of the committee report:

The treaty in no way affects the basic division of authority between the President and the Congress, as defined in the Constitution. In no way does it alter the constitutional relationship between them. In particular, it does not increase, decrease, or change the power of the President, as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, or impair the full authority of Congress to declare war.

That is from the report of the Committee on Foreign Relations, Executive Report No. 8, Eighty-first Congress, first session, on the North Atlantic Treaty. I am quoting from page 19 of the committee report, which interprets article 11, which, of course, as Senators know, begins:

This treaty shall be ratified and its provisions carried out by the parties in accordance with their respective constitutional processes.

Then it goes on to say what I have read, to the effect that the treaty in no way affects the basic division of authority.

Mr. FERGUSON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McMAHON. Not at this time.

If Senators feel that under the Constitution the Senate not only has the right, but the power, in the matter of deployment of troops, then, of course such right was not affected by the provisions of the treaty. If, on the other hand, Senators believe that the President, as Commander in Chief, has the right and the power to assign troops, then it is the contention of the Senator from Connect-

icut that the treaty did not in any way enlarge or decrease that power.

I appreciate the fact that at the time the treaty was under discussion the Secretary of State, in answer to the Senator from Iowa, stated as I recollect the question and answer, that it was not the intention to send troops to Western Europe without congressional approval. I believe that is a fair paraphrase of the question and the answer. At that time there was no intention, of course, to send any troops. At that time everyone was thinking of military assistance which was even then pushing on the heels of the treaty, and such assistance was held up, as it had to be until the Senate ratified the treaty. Matériel was what we were thinking about at that time.

I can anticipate the Senator from Michigan, because I listened to him in debate when he asked the other day:

Is it the Senator's position that we have to approve of the sending of matériel but not of the sending of the troops?

At that time we were taking money out of the Treasury of the United States with which to buy munitions and to appropriate for munitions to send to a number of foreign countries; but that is not the situation we face today.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has used the time he had allowed himself.

Mr. McMAHON. I yield myself five more minutes.

Mr. FERGUSON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. McMAHON. Yes.

Mr. FERGUSON. The question was not as anticipated by the Senator from Connecticut. I felt that the Senator realized that the question which I raised should be answered, but I do not think it has been answered.

I am sure the Senator is familiar with the decision in the case of Missouri against Holland, in which the Supreme Court said that a treaty could alter the law. After the Migratory Bird law was decided to be unconstitutional, a treaty was made with Canada, and the court then held, that, by virtue of the treaty, the law in question became perfectly legal and constitutional. Because of the way in which the Court has interpreted the Constitution and treaties as the supreme law of the land, the remarks of the Members of the Foreign Relations Committee of course have no binding effect; they do not alter the effect of the treaty with respect to constitutional processes, and so forth.

Mr. McMAHON. I agree with what the Senator has said, but I call his attention to the fact that article 11 of the treaty provides:

This treaty shall be ratified and its provisions carried out by the parties in accordance with their respective constitutional processes.

What do the words "respective constitutional processes" mean? I believe they mean that the President of the United States, whoever he may be, has the right as Commander in Chief, to implement the treaty. The Senator from Michigan does not agree with me.

Mr. FERGUSON. No, for the reason I shall state, if the Senator will yield to me further.

Mr. McMAHON. I yield.

Mr. FERGUSON. When the treaty was under discussion on the Senate floor, the Senator from Texas [Mr. CONNALLY], who was in charge of the treaty, gave an interpretation of "constitutional processes," as did my distinguished colleague [Mr. VANDENBERG], the ranking minority member of the committee. According to their statements, as well as the remarks of the Secretary of State, it was the general understanding that the words "constitutional processes," as was also forcefully contended on the floor of the Senate yesterday by the distinguished Senator from Georgia [Mr. GEORGE], meant that Congress was to implement the treaty, not only as to arms, which was done, but as to men. Is that not a fact?

Mr. McMAHON. No, I do not think so. The Senator from Connecticut has not had a chance to refer to his former remarks, but I am frank to say that when I voted for the treaty it was not on the basis of the chance remarks, the studied and studious and well worthwhile remarks of the Senator from Georgia, the Senator from Texas, or the Senator from Michigan, but I voted for the treaty on the basis of what it said, and what the committee report said.

In the opinion of the Senator from Connecticut, "constitutional processes" does not mean that the Congress must approve. As the report stated, by the use of the words "constitutional processes" the Commander in Chief, the President of the United States, did not have his basic authority changed at all, nor was the division of authority changed.

Mr. FERGUSON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for another question?

Mr. McMAHON. Yes.

Mr. FERGUSON. Why should the words "constitutional processes" have been used, if the President alone could perform those functions? The only one who would have any constitutional functions to perform, aside from the Congress, would be the President. If the President alone could function, it was unnecessary to use the words "constitutional processes." Is that not true?

Mr. McMAHON. No; I cannot follow the Senator in his interpretation.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair calls the attention of the Senator to the fact that the time he allotted to himself has expired. He has seven more minutes under his control.

Mr. McMAHON. I should like to continue, Mr. President.

Mr. KEM. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McMAHON. I shall be glad to yield to the Senator from Missouri in a moment.

I should like again to call the attention of Senators, and particularly the attention of the Senator from Michigan, to the following language, which I have not heard stressed in the debate:

The treaty in no way affects the basic division of authority between the President and the Congress as defined in the Consti-

tution. In no way does it alter the constitutional relationship between them. In particular, it does not increase, decrease, or change the power of the President as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces or impair the full authority of Congress to declare war.

Mr. KEM. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McMAHON. I yield.

Mr. KEM. I should like to ask the Senator from Connecticut whether the mothers of Connecticut are willing that their sons be sent to Europe to serve on the ground without adequate air protection?

Mr. McMAHON. I have not taken a poll, Mr. President, of the mothers of the State of Connecticut as to whether or not, or under what conditions, they are willing to have their sons serve in the Armed Forces of the United States. I dare say I know my people of Connecticut as well as most Senators know the people of their own States. I have found in Connecticut, among not only the mothers, but the fathers and the sons and daughters of my State, a great determination that the United States of America shall continue to survive, and I believe that the mothers of the State of Connecticut are willing to have their sons serve in the Armed Forces of the United States to advance this great cause. That is the answer I give to the Senator from Missouri.

Mr. KEM. Will the Senator yield for another question?

Mr. McMAHON. I yield.

Mr. KEM. I should like to ask the Senator from Connecticut whether he thinks it is a condition precedent to saving America that the young men of America be sent to Western Europe to serve there on the ground without adequate air protection?

Mr. McMAHON. I am willing to abide by the judgment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to whom the Congress gave the authority in 1949 to advise the President of the United States. I know what General Bradley has testified. I know what General Eisenhower has testified. I know what General Vandenberg has testified. I know what every military leader who has been tried and trusted in the combat and fires of world war has testified.

Mr. KEM. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. McMAHON. I ask the Senator to wait a minute. He has asked me a question, and I will answer it in my own way.

Mr. KEM. I beg the Senator's pardon. As soon as he has finished, I should like to ask him another question.

Mr. McMAHON. The Senator from Missouri will know when I have finished.

I should like to say that so far as I am concerned, I am not going to substitute my judgment for the judgment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in regard to the deployment of the ground or the naval or the air forces of the United States, nor shall I beseech them to invade the land mass of China.

Mr. KEM. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. HOL- LAND in the chair). Does the Senator

from Connecticut yield to the Senator from Missouri?

Mr. McMAHON. I yield.

Mr. KEM. I should like to ask the Senator whether he feels that General Spaatz made a considerable contribution to the safety of America during World War II.

Mr. McMAHON. I have a high regard for General Spaatz. I think he is a fine soldier, a fine American, and a fine patriot.

Mr. KEM. Does the Senator have any respect or regard for the very solemn advice General Spaatz has given to the American people and, I may say, to the Senate of the United States on this occasion?

Mr. McMAHON. Mr. President, I would certainly take counsel with anything General Spaatz had to say about air power. In fact, I was one of 14 Senators who about a year ago voted to increase the Air Force of the United States to 70 or 72 groups. I do not recollect—although I may be in error about this—that the Senator from Missouri joined in that small company of 14 Senators.

Mr. KEM. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for another question?

Mr. McMAHON. Does the Senator from Missouri wish to correct me on that statement?

Mr. KEM. I do not recall the vote the Senator has in mind—

Mr. McMAHON. I recall it very well.

Mr. KEM. I voted for the 70-group Air Force; and I have supported the appropriations for the Air Force ever since I have been a Member of this body, and I shall continue to do so.

Mr. McMAHON. I suggest that we look up the vote on the 70-group Air Force.

Mr. KEM. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for another question?

Mr. McMAHON. I yield.

Mr. KEM. I should like to ask the Senator whether he understood the quotation I read from General Spaatz, to the effect that the odds against the forces of the free world in terms of front-line planes today are 10 to 1; and if our present plans are carried out, by the end of 1952 the odds against the forces of the free world in the air in Western Europe will be not less than 5 to 1.

Mr. McMAHON. If that be true, it fills me with a great sadness, and makes me all the more regretful that the Senator from Missouri did not assist—as I do not think he did—the 14 Senators I have mentioned to provide a larger Air Force a year ago.

Mr. TAFT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McMAHON. I yield.

Mr. TAFT. Let me state what the circumstances were in regard to the 70-group Air Force. The Senate voted for it. Then the Senate voted for it a second time. The conferees on the part of the Senate stood up for it, against the conferees on the part of the House. Finally the entire delegation visited the President. He said, "Even if you put provision for the 70-group Air Force in the bill, I will not use the money."

So finally the Senate, in order that there might be an appropriation bill,

yielded to the House; and there were 14 Senators who voted against the conference report. Those who voted against the conference report were in no way maintaining their position in favor of a 70-group Air Force.

Mr. McMAHON. I think they were. I think that if those 14 Senators had been joined by a majority of the Senate, we would have brought about such a situation that the issue would have been settled; and I do not believe the Senator from Ohio would absolve the Senate or himself for yielding to the President in that instance, if he said what the Senator has stated he said.

Mr. LEHMAN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McMAHON. I yield.

Mr. LEHMAN. As I read the amendment offered by the Senator from Missouri, it is as follows:

It is the sense of the Senate that before sending units of ground troops to Europe under article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty, including the four divisions referred to in paragraph 7, the Joint Chiefs of Staff should certify to the Congress that in their opinion sufficient air strength will be available to control the air over Western Europe to the degree necessary to assure the safety and effectiveness of such ground troops.

I ask the Senator from Connecticut whether he thinks this amendment is a clear demonstration of the absurdity of what we are trying to do in the Senate in an effort to control the actions of the military in preparing and being ready to fight. How can anyone certify that there is sufficient air strength, sufficient fire power, sufficient bazookas, sufficient hand grenades, to assure the safety and effectiveness of ground troops or any other troops in time of war?

Mr. KEM. Mr. President, the Senator from New York has totally misread my amendment. My amendment does not provide for any such thing.

If the Senator will yield—

Mr. McMAHON. Mr. President, I refuse to yield.

Mr. LEHMAN. Mr. President, let me say that the text of the amendment which I read just now is the copy of the amendment of the Senator from Missouri which was sent to me from the desk.

Mr. KEM. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McMAHON. Mr. President, I refuse to yield for the moment.

Mr. KEM. Will the Senator yield in order that I may correct the Record?

Mr. McMAHON. Mr. President, I refuse to yield for the moment. I shall yield in a moment.

I should like to say to the Senator from New York that perhaps he was not here when I began to speak about the pending amendment. The Senator from New York has truly described what the situation is. In more or less of a jest, I suggested that I now was looking for a Senator to join me in offering an amendment whereby we could say how many naval vessels should be sent into North Atlantic waters, and how many paratroopers, how many guns, and of what caliber, should be sent to Western Europe.

Of course the Senator appreciates the application of the principle of *reductio ad absurdum*, which is exactly what we have reached in connection with this measure.

If the Senator from Missouri will be patient, I shall yield to him whenever I have the time.

Mr. KEM. Mr. President, I appreciate the courtesy—I will say the usual and uniform courtesy of the Senator from Connecticut.

Let me say to the Senator from New York that if I heard him correctly, he failed to read the words "in their opinion," which words are contained in the amendment I have offered.

In order to correct him, I should like to refer to the amendment, which, in part, reads as follows:

The Joint Chiefs of Staff should certify to the Congress that in their opinion sufficient air strength will be available to control the air over Western Europe to the degree necessary to assure the safety and effectiveness of such ground troops.

Mr. President, I see no absurdity, so far as the amendment is concerned. The Senator from Connecticut has said something about the principle of *reductio ad absurdum*. I should like to say to the very learned Senator that I see no absurdity whatever in asking the Chiefs of Staff, who are trained in that business, to certify that in their opinion there is adequate air support before our ground troops are sent to Western Europe.

Mr. LEHMAN. Mr. President—
Mr. CAIN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. McMAHON. Mr. President, I yield first to the Senator from New York, to permit him to comment on the statement just made by the Senator from Missouri.

Mr. LEHMAN. Mr. President, let me say to the senior Senator from Missouri that when I read his amendment a few moments ago, I read from a typewritten copy of the amendment which was given to me by the clerk, and which has been on the desk.

Mr. KEM. Does the Senator from New York find in the amendment the words "in their opinion"?

Mr. LEHMAN. I read the amendment exactly as it is written, verbatim.

Mr. KEM. Does the Senator from New York find in the amendment the words "in their opinion"?

Mr. LEHMAN. Yes, and I read the words "in their opinion sufficient air strength," and so forth.

Mr. KEM. Does the Senator from New York see any absurdity whatever in asking the Joint Chiefs of Staff to certify whether in their opinion there is sufficient air force to assure the safety and effectiveness of the ground troops who are being sent to Europe?

Mr. LEHMAN. How can anyone give such a certification? How can anyone tell whether we have sufficient air power, sufficient fire power, sufficient naval power, sufficient power of any kind?

Mr. KEM. They can give their professional opinion on the subject.

Mr. LEHMAN. How can anyone certify that we have sufficient power of any

sort to protect our soldiers and our sailors in warfare?

Mr. KEM. The Senator from New York is a banker, and he has given his professional opinion as to the validity of securities and the soundness of securities and the strength of securities. Does the Senator from New York see any absurdity in asking a professional soldier to give his opinion on a problem of this kind?

Mr. LEHMAN. Mr. President, let me correct one statement the Senator from Missouri made. I was very proud to be a banker, but I retired from banking 25 years ago, in order to devote myself to public work. But I also know something of military affairs, because I was on the General Staff in World War I, and I am able to state, and I think every soldier will agree with me, that it is an absurdity to expect anyone to give assurance—the words are "to certify"—that we have sufficient air power to assure the safety and effectiveness of such ground troops.

Mr. KEM. The Senator is again misreading. I am sure the Senator is not doing it with malice or with intention, but it is the second time he has misread the amendment offered by the Senator from Missouri. The amendment reads that "the Joint Chiefs of Staff should certify that in their opinion" adequate air cover would be present.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair advises the Senator from Connecticut that he has but two additional minutes left, before all time will have expired.

Mr. McMAHON. I yield a half minute to the Senator from Washington [Mr. CAIN], for the purpose of asking me a question.

Mr. CAIN. I should like to ask two questions, if the time permits. Have I correctly understood the distinguished Senator from Connecticut to say that in his considered judgment the Chief Executive of the United States has sufficient power within his own authority to implement the Atlantic Pact as he may see fit?

Mr. McMAHON. The answer is "Yes," subject of course, to budgetary restrictions and approval by the Appropriations Committee. I do not know what the Senate will do.

Mr. CAIN. I thank the Senator. My second question: Does the distinguished Senator from Connecticut see anything in the pending resolution which, if adopted, would become binding in any way, shape, or form with respect to any right which the President of the United States may think he now has?

Mr. McMAHON. Legally, the answer to that, I believe, is "No."

Mr. CAIN. I thank the Senator.

Mr. McMAHON. However, as I pointed out yesterday, this must of course be a joint endeavor. I would say to the Senator from Washington, I believe that the fullest kind of collaboration between the Congress and the President is essential and necessary. I am not trying to advance the proposition that the President of the United States should

proceed on his own authority, and, without consultation and particularly without consulting the Congress, should do as he pleases. I believe that the practicalities of the situation in which we find ourselves demand that he consult the Congress. But, speaking as a lawyer, speaking with such wisdom, little though it be, as I am endowed with, and basing my statement on the studies I have made of the Constitution, I believe conscientiously that the President of the United States, as Commander in Chief, was given by the founding fathers in the Constitution certain powers which were not limited by the North Atlantic Treaty, with respect to the deployment of troops. I have entire respect for those who hold a contrary view.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time has expired. The question is on agreeing to the amendment offered by the Senator from Missouri [Mr. KEM].

Mr. KEM. I ask for the yeas and nays.

The yeas and nays were not ordered.

Mr. McMAHON. I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The absence of a quorum is suggested. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk called the roll, and the following Senators answered to their names:

Aiken	Gillette	Monroney
Anderson	Green	Morse
Bennett	Hayden	Mundt
Benton	Hendrickson	Murray
Brewster	Hennings	Neely
Bricker	Hickenlooper	Nixon
Bridges	Hill	O'Connor
Butler, Md.	Hoey	O'Mahoney
Butler, Nebr.	Holland	Pastore
Byrd	Ives	Robertson
Cain	Jenner	Russell
Capehart	Johnson, Colo.	Saltonstall
Carlson	Johnson, Tex.	Schoeppel
Case	Johnston, S. C.	Smathers
Chavez	Kem	Smith, Maine
Clements	Kerr	Smith, N. J.
Connally	Kilgore	Smith, N. C.
Cordon	Knowland	Sparkman
Dirksen	Langer	Stennis
Douglas	Lehman	Taft
Duff	Lodge	Thye
Dworshak	Long	Underwood
Eastland	McCarthy	Watkins
Eaton	McClellan	Welker
Ellender	McFarland	Wherry
Ferguson	McMahon	Wiley
Flanders	Malone	Williams
Frear	Martin	Young
Fulbright	Maybank	
George	Millikin	

The PRESIDING OFFICER. A quorum is present. The question is on agreeing to the amendment offered by the Senator from Missouri [Mr. KEM].

Mr. LEHMAN. A parliamentary inquiry.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator will state it.

Mr. LEHMAN. In view of the fact that the amendment is not in printed form and has not been distributed among Senators, I ask that it be read to the Members of the Senate so that they may know what they are voting on.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will state the amendment offered by the Senator from Missouri.

The LEGISLATIVE CLERK. On page 4, between lines 3 and 4, it is proposed to insert a new paragraph, as follows:

5. It is the sense of the Senate that before sending units of ground troops to Europe

under article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty, including the four divisions referred to in paragraph 7, the Joint Chiefs of Staff should certify to the Congress that in their opinion sufficient air strength will be available to control the air over Western Europe to the degree necessary to secure the safety and effectiveness of such ground troops.

Renumber paragraphs 5 to 8, inclusive, as paragraphs 6 to 9, respectively.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment offered by the senior Senator from Missouri [Mr. KEM].

Mr. KEM and other Senators asked for the yeas and nays.

The yeas and nays were ordered, and the legislative clerk called the roll.

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. I announce that the Senator from Wyoming [Mr. HUNT] is absent on public business.

The Senator from Minnesota [Mr. HUMPHREY] is necessarily absent.

The Senator from Tennessee [Mr. KEFAUVER] is unavoidably detained on official business.

The Senator from Washington [Mr. MAGNUSON] is absent by leave of the Senate on official committee business.

The Senator from Nevada [Mr. McCARRAN] is absent by leave of the Senate on official business.

The Senator from Tennessee [Mr. MCKELLAR] is absent because of illness.

I announce further that, if present and voting, the Senator from Wyoming [Mr. HUNT], the Senator from Minnesota [Mr. HUMPHREY], the Senator from Washington [Mr. MAGNUSON], and the Senators from Tennessee [Mr. KEFAUVER] and Mr. MCKELLAR would vote "nay."

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I announce that the Senator from Michigan [Mr. VANDENBERG] is absent by leave of the Senate.

The Senator from New Hampshire [Mr. TOBEY] is detained on official business.

The result was announced—yeas 24, nays 64, as follows:

YEAS—24

Bennett	Dirksen	Martin
Brewster	Dworshak	Mundt
Bricker	Eaton	Schoeppel
Butler, Md.	Hickenlooper	Taft
Butler, Nebr.	Jenner	Watkins
Capehart	Kem	Welker
Carlson	Langer	Wherry
Case	Malone	Young

NAYS—64

Aiken	Hendrickson	Morse
Anderson	Hennings	Murray
Benton	Hill	Neely
Bridges	Hoey	Nixon
Byrd	Holland	O'Connor
Cain	Ives	O'Mahoney
Chavez	Johnson, Colo.	Pastore
Clements	Johnson, Tex.	Robertson
Connally	Johnston, S. C.	Russell
Cordon	Kerr	Saltonstall
Douglas	Kilgore	Smathers
Duff	Knowland	Smith, Maine
Eastland	Lehman	Smith, N. J.
Ellender	Lodge	Smith, N. C.
Ferguson	Long	Sparkman
Flanders	McCarthy	Stennis
Frear	McClellan	Thye
Fulbright	McFarland	Underwood
George	McMahon	Wiley
Gillette	Maybank	Williams
Green	Millikin	
Hayden	Monroney	

NOT VOTING—8

Humphrey	McCarran	Tobey
Hunt	McKellar	Vandenberg
Kefauver	Magnuson	

So Mr. KEM's amendment was rejected.

CHANGE OF VOTE ON LEHMAN AMENDMENT

During the delivery of Mr. KEM's speech,

Mr. HENDRICKSON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. KEM. I yield to the Senator from New Jersey for an insertion.

Mr. HENDRICKSON. Mr. President, yesterday, when the vote was taken on the so-called Lehman amendment I had been off the floor and returned to the floor rather hurriedly. I was then engaged in conference with the distinguished Senator from Maine [Mr. SMITH] and I did not realize the import and effect of the amendment. I cast my vote in the affirmative. My affirmative vote was completely inconsistent with my vote on every other amendment that had been voted on. I had twice voted in favor of the McClellan amendment, and my short address on the subject was dedicated to the fact that we should have complete congressional approval on the pending issue. Under the circumstances, Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that my vote be changed in the Record.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Jersey asks unanimous consent that the Record be changed with reference to his vote of yesterday on the so-called Lehman amendment.

Mr. McMAHON. Mr. President, reserving the right to object, I am sorry I did not understand the Senator's statement as to how he had voted on the amendment, although it would not make much difference.

Mr. HENDRICKSON. I voted in the affirmative.

Mr. McMAHON. The Senator voted in favor of the Lehman amendment?

Mr. HENDRICKSON. Yes.

Mr. McMAHON. The Senator now wishes to change his vote?

Mr. HENDRICKSON. Yes. I want my record to be completely consistent with my brief address on the issue.

Mr. McMAHON. Mr. President, a parliamentary inquiry.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator will state it.

Mr. McMAHON. Mr. President, I am not disposed in any way to object to the request of the Senator from New Jersey. I realize that such a request can be made by the Senator from New Jersey. I should like to have a ruling by the Chair as to what the practice has been in situations of this kind.

Mr. KEM. Mr. President, a parliamentary inquiry.

Mr. McMAHON. I have a parliamentary inquiry pending.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator will state his parliamentary inquiry.

Mr. KEM. I should like to ask if the time taken on this discussion will be taken out of my time.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time will be taken out of the time allotted to the Senator from Missouri.

Mr. KEM. Mr. President, I ask that the debate be discontinued. I had no idea that the Senator was making that kind of request.

Mr. HENDRICKSON. I am sorry. I withdraw my request.

Mr. KEM. I did not understand that the Senator would open up a controversial subject. I understood he wanted me to yield to him so he might make an insertion in the Record.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Jersey was within his rights to make the unanimous-consent request.

Mr. KEM. Mr. President, I ask that the Senator renew his request at the end of my remarks.

Mr. HENDRICKSON. Mr. President, I have withdrawn my request and will renew it at the end of the Senator's remarks.

Mr. HENDRICKSON subsequently said: Mr. President, I now renew my unanimous-consent request.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Jersey asks unanimous consent that he be permitted to change his vote, as of yesterday, on the so-called Lehman amendment.

Mr. McMAHON. Mr. President, I shall not object, but I think it should appear plainly in the Record that the changing of the vote of the Senator from New Jersey will not and cannot affect the result of the vote on that amendment. In the event that a Senator desired to change his vote, and by so changing he would change the result, then I think it would not and should not be permitted. So with that explanation, the Senator from Connecticut offers no objection.

Mr. HENDRICKSON. I thank the Senator.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the request of the Senator from New Jersey?

Mr. LANGER. Mr. President, reserving the right to object, I propound a parliamentary inquiry, as to whether or not, under the rules, the Senator from New Jersey can change his vote.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair advises the Senator that the Senator from New Jersey is within the rules in making a unanimous-consent request; however, it will require unanimous consent.

Mr. LANGER. The senior Senator from North Dakota propounds a further parliamentary inquiry. Can the Senator change a vote which he cast a week ago, a month ago, a year ago, 2 years ago, or 5 years? How far back can he go?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The only statute of limitations which the Chair knows anything about is the Eighty-second Congress. He could not go beyond that.

Mr. LANGER. I should like to have a ruling from the Chair, because I cast a vote some 7 years ago that I would like to change. [Laughter in the galleries.]

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The occupants of the galleries will please be in order.

The Chair rules that that is a hypothetical question, and is not before the Chair for decision.

Mr. LANGER. Mr. President, I have no objection.

Mr. HENDRICKSON. Mr. President, I thank the Senator. I should like to say, speaking for myself, that I would not come before the Senate and ask unanimous consent to change a vote which had not currently occurred.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the unanimous-consent request of the Senator from New Jersey? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered.

ASSIGNMENT OF GROUND FORCES TO DUTY IN THE EUROPEAN AREA

The Senate resumed the consideration of the resolution (S. Res. 99) approving the action of the President of the United States in cooperating in the common-defense efforts of the North Atlantic Treaty nations.

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President, I offer the amendment which I send to the desk and ask to have stated.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Secretary will state the amendment offered by the Senator from Wisconsin.

The CHIEF CLERK. On page 5, it is proposed to strike out the period at the end of line 8, and to insert in lieu thereof a semicolon, and after line 6, to insert a new paragraph, as follows:

It is the sense of the Senate that an adequate defense against the present Communist threat to world peace requires the combined effort and cooperation not only of the North Atlantic Treaty nations but also of other peoples of the world whose survival depends upon their capacities, individually or with the help of others, to resist Communist aggression, and accordingly that existing plans for the defense of Europe should be immediately revised so as to provide for utilization of the military and other resources of Western Germany, Spain, Turkey, and Greece.

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President—
Mr. McFARLAND. Mr. President, will the Senator yield so that I may make an announcement?

Mr. McCARTHY. I yield.

Mr. McFARLAND. I wish to announce that the Senate will hold an evening session if consideration of the resolution is not finished this afternoon.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The majority leader announces that, if necessary, a night session will be held.

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, will the Senator from Wisconsin yield without losing time?

Mr. McCARTHY. With that understanding, I am glad to yield.

Mr. WHERRY. I should like to inquire of the distinguished majority leader whether his announcement includes the concurrent resolution.

Mr. McFARLAND. It means that unless consideration of both resolutions is concluded we shall have an evening session. I do not say that we shall not be able to finish consideration this afternoon. I hope we shall be able to do so and avoid a night session.

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President, I had originally planned to call up my amendment lettered "G." I discussed the subjection with the parliamentarian, and he was of the opinion that paragraphs (b) and (c), dealing with Nationalist China and Japan, might be con-

sidered as not germane to the pending resolution. For that reason I desire to make it very clear that I am not abandoning paragraphs (b) and (c), but I shall not ask for their consideration at this time because of the parliamentary rules.

Mr. President, sometime ago General Eisenhower, whom I greatly respect, appeared before a joint gathering of the two Houses of Congress. We discovered at that time that even though he had been invited to visit Spain and discuss with the people of Spain the defense of Europe, he was not allowed to do so. We heard him say that he did not feel he could use the manpower of Western Germany until the political issues involved had been settled. He, of course, has no control over such political issues. It seems to follow as night follows day that it is completely impossible to defend Europe if we build our defense around a closed corporation of the Atlantic Pact nations and refuse to use two great untapped wells of anti-Communist manpower, the manpower of Spain and the manpower of Western Germany.

As I watch plans for the defense of Europe go forward, I cannot help recalling a situation, almost analogous to the present one, which existed in the East a few years ago. At that time the American people and Congress were being assured that we were doing everything humanly possible to save the East from communism. After China had fallen to communism we found that the man principally responsible for the planning of the disaster referred to it as the dawning of a new day. The State Department's top adviser for the defense of Asia said that the problem was how to let China fall without making it look as if we had pushed it. I am reading from the Sunday Compass for July 17, 1949:

Such a policy never succeeds completely, and critics have done their best to make the public believe that the United States did push Chiang and the Kuomintang over the cliff.

Korea is another chapter in the same unhappy story.

It should be borne in mind that this was said before the invasion of South Korea.

The thing to do, therefore, is to let South Korea fall—but not to let it look as though we pushed it. Hence the recommendation of a parting grant of \$150,000,000.

The same policy of "letting them fall but don't let it look as though we pushed them" is being planned in Europe.

My amendment would advise the President that the Senate is aware of the situation, that the Senate feels we should not dump our manpower into a bottomless pit of death and slavery, and that we should make plans for an intelligent defense of Europe.

Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McCARTHY. I am glad to yield.

Mr. AIKEN. I am glad to hear the Senator from Wisconsin add "to the fullest extent possible." It seems to me that his amendment would provide for the utilization of the military and other resources of Western Germany, Spain,

Turkey, and Greece. In the case of Western Germany particularly, if there were wholesale opposition to defending themselves, we might be worse off in the end than if we did not have their support. I assume the Senator means to the fullest extent feasible, as well as possible.

Mr. McCARTHY. The Senator is correct.

Mr. CAIN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. McCARTHY. Yes.

Mr. CAIN. A good many of us understand that the North Atlantic Treaty was designed and created in order to protect and build up the defense of the North Atlantic Treaty community. Can the Senator tell us why it should be desirable and necessary for some of the nations within the North Atlantic community to assume the responsibility for defending and protecting all the North Atlantic community?

Mr. McCARTHY. I heartily agree with the Senator from Washington that it does not make any sense. There is no reason why the nations of the North Atlantic Pact should assume the full responsibility. There is no reason why Spain and Germany should not be allowed to take part in the fight against international communism. What is more important, I think, is that it is militarily impossible to defend Europe without using all of the manpower and resources of those two militantly anti-Communist areas.

Mr. CAIN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield further?

Mr. McCARTHY. I yield.

Mr. CAIN. I ask the distinguished Senator from Wisconsin what, in his opinion, are the desirable features about Portugal, when Spain, which covers three-fourths of the Iberian Peninsula, of which Portugal is the other fourth, is excluded from joining in the intended defense establishment for all of Western Europe, or the North Atlantic community?

Mr. McCARTHY. I think it is completely impossible to defend Portugal without using the aid of Spain. I believe Portugal has a population of about 8,000,000. Portugal certainly is important, and it is important that we use all the available resources and the manpower of Portugal also.

Mr. CAIN. The Senator seems to feel that much of the importance of Portugal is being offset and disregarded by failing to include the willing manpower and resources of Spain within our defense force.

Mr. McCARTHY. There is no question about it.

Mr. CAIN. It is thought by a great many persons that as of this time there is probably a greater determination to resist an aggressor and a greater potential of collective security outside the North Atlantic Pact than there is in it. I wonder if the Senator from Wisconsin has in his possession figures which would indicate to the Senate the total approximate manpower strength of the excluded European nations, such as Turkey, Spain, Greece, and the other nations to whom the Senator has made reference.

Mr. McCARTHY. I shall be glad to give the Senator the figures. The population of Western Germany, according to the Library of Congress, is roughly 50,000,000. Eastern Germany, of course, over which we have no control, and which has its so-called people's army, built up under the Communists, has a population of approximately eighteen and a half million. The population of Spain is slightly under 30,000,000. Turkey has a population of 20,000,000, and Greece has a population of 7,000,000.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McCARTHY. I am glad to yield.

Mr. KNOWLAND. The Senator may be interested to know that in the February 18 issue of the New York American there appeared an Associated Press dispatch to which some reference was made during the hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services, sitting jointly.

While there was some reluctance in the public session to discuss official figures, I believe that the figures which are shown here are approximately correct, though they may not be correct to the last number. Those figures, which at least were not challenged, indicated that Turkey had in her armed forces 675,000; Greece, 146,000; Yugoslavia, 500,000; and Spain, 422,000, or a total among other anti-Soviet nations of 1,743,000.

Would the Senator mind my giving the comparable figures for the present signatories to the North Atlantic Pact, so that we may see what a material addition this number would make? The same source indicates that at that time Norway had approximately 35,000; Denmark, 10,000; the United Kingdom, 375,000; the Netherlands, 175,000; Belgium, 85,000; Italy, 250,000; France, 500,000; and Portugal, 65,000.

So it is indicated that the addition of the manpower of other nations which might be enlisted in the defense of the free Western World against Communist aggression would amount to a material increase of 1,743,000.

Mr. McCARTHY. I certainly thank the Senator for that information. While I have not discussed this question with General Eisenhower or anyone close to him, it would seem that General Eisenhower, who has been charged with the defense of Europe, certainly should welcome some expression from the Senate so as to make sure that his hands will not be tied in Europe, as MacArthur's hands have been tied in the East.

Mr. CASE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield on that point?

Mr. McCARTHY. I yield.

Mr. CASE. It seems to me that the statement by General Eisenhower when he addressed the Members of the two Houses at the Congressional Library a few weeks ago directly invited an expression on this subject. I have his remarks before me. It will be remembered that he suggested that until the political leaders, the diplomats, and the statesmen find the proper answer, it is not for a soldier to delve too deeply. I have always interpreted that as a suggestion to the Senate, or to those who make policy,

to solve the problem, because he indicated that he thought there should be an eventual earned equality on the part of Western Germany. I think the Senator's amendment is very well designed to give Western Germany the opportunity to earn that equality which is necessary for the attainment of guaranteed peace in Western Europe.

While I am on my feet I should like to say that in view of the modification of the amendment of the Senator from Wisconsin, which addresses itself directly to the European problem, I shall not later call up my amendment, which was directed specifically toward the problem of Germany itself. I think the Senator's amendment is sufficiently broad to accomplish the purpose of my amendment, and I hope it will be adopted.

Mr. McCARTHY. I thank the Senator.

Mr. CAIN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McCARTHY. I yield.

Mr. CAIN. I think the distinguished Senator from Wisconsin is completely aware of the fact that during the hearings before the joint committee on the general question of the defense of Western Europe every single military authority, without exception—and there were at least a score of them, as I recall—stated that the sooner the Atlantic Pact Corporation, if we care to call it that, took advantage of and had made available to it the resources of the nations to which the Senator has just made reference, that much sooner would the security of Western Europe become an established fact. The Senator is aware of that testimony, is he not?

Mr. McCARTHY. I am.

Mr. CAIN. Can the Senator from Wisconsin tell us why, in the face of such testimony, we find that very little is being done to bring those nations within the collective security effort in Western Europe?

Mr. McCARTHY. I may say in answer to that question that I think it is being deliberately done. I weigh my words well when I say that; my answer is not given merely on the spur of the moment because of the Senator's question. It is being done by the same men who planned disaster for us in China. We have the old Yalta crowd planning the phony defense of Europe—the same crowd which planned disaster for us in China. I cannot believe that they are so unintelligent as not to realize what they are doing. There is no reason on God's earth why they should continue to maintain that only American boys can fight and die in the struggle against communism.

We simply do not have the manpower to win against international communism. However, I strongly feel that if we will make use of the resources of all our allies and potential allies, there is no doubt about the outcome of this fight.

Take, for example, Western Europe. As the Senator and I well know, the war potential of a nation is to a great extent measured by its capacity to produce steel. The anti-Communist countries of

Europe have a steel-producing capacity of about 65,000,000 tons a year; Russia, 35,000,000 tons; and the United States about 100,000,000 tons, which means that the anti-Communist countries have a steel-producing capacity of 165 to 35, if we will make use of it.

We know also that while we are long on the weapons of war we are short on manpower. Our allies are short on the weapons of war, and long on manpower. If we combine the two, we will win this fight.

Mr. CAIN. Mr. President, will the Senator be kind enough to yield for another question?

Mr. McCARTHY. I shall be glad to yield. First let me say further, in answer to the Senator's question, that we find the top adviser of our State Department, the man who has been the confidant of two Presidents, the man who was called upon to give the roving ambassador—before he started to rove—secret instructions as to what to do, saying, "What we will do is to make a grant of \$150,000,000 where we know it will not do any good. We are doing this, however, so that it will not appear that we are pushing our allies into the arms of communism."

His pals are already doing the planning for Europe. That is the key to what they are doing—"Let them fall, but don't let it appear that we are pushing them."

In Korea it was \$150,000,000. In Europe it will be the lives of 150,000 American boys.

Mr. CAIN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McCARTHY. I yield.

Mr. CAIN. Does the Senator from Wisconsin share the considered conviction held by the junior Senator from Washington, that today there would be no likelihood of war in Western Europe, and there would probably be little discussion about war, and there would presumably be almost no need for America to contribute forces to the Atlantic Pact army, if all the anti-Communist nations in Europe, or all the nations which are determined to resist the so-called Communist aggressor from the East, were joined together in a truly collective security effort?

Mr. McCARTHY. I agree with the Senator wholeheartedly.

Mr. BREWSTER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McCARTHY. I yield.

Mr. BREWSTER. I ask the Senator if his attention has been called to a quotation from the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs in the British Parliament, Mr. Ernest Davies, who, according to a report in the New York Times, stated on the floor of Parliament, when the issue which we are considering today was under discussion:

England is able to defend Western Europe without the assistance of Spain.

If that is correct, does the Senator from Wisconsin know or does anybody else know whether our State Department has inquired of them on what that statement is predicated; how many divisions of American troops they are counting upon to take the place of Spanish

troops they say they do not need or desire; and what are the implications of that observation in so authoritative a manner by the Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs, who was acting Secretary at the time of the illness of his distinguished chief; and why America must be called upon for so much aid if England is able to take care of the problem without the assistance of Spain, the only nation in the world that has purged itself of communism?

Mr. McCARTHY. I certainly think that is an excellent question, one which obviously will remain unanswered by our State Department.

Mr. CAIN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McCARTHY. I yield.

Mr. CAIN. May I ask the Senator from Wisconsin what his answer is going to be when a few minutes from now it is said by those who will oppose his amendment, that though his idea is good, though it would serve the best interests of America in the future to include the excluded European nations, now is not the time nor is this the place to consider the question? How is the Senator going to answer that declaration?

Mr. McCARTHY. I might say that there can be no better time or place than here and now. I might say further that I will never vote to send one single American boy to Europe if we are going to send him there to take part in a phony defense of Europe. I think Europe is extremely important to this country. I think it must be held. I think all we need to do is to read the public pronouncements of the Communist Party and we will know that its two next major objectives are to get control of Europe and Japan. That is what it must do before it can conquer the United States. But I think it is senseless to pour American manpower into a bottomless pit of death and slavery unless we build a defense which can have some hope of success. If we continue doing as we are doing today we will not be making effective use of the manpower that is available from Spain, simply because the State Department does not like the Spaniards, because they have fought communism too long, and because the State Department does not want to have the help of the manpower of Western Germany. I think that is a disastrous position to take.

Mr. MILLIKIN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McCARTHY. I yield.

Mr. MILLIKIN. I cannot accept the latter part of the Senator's thesis. I can accept the part of his thesis that we should have the help of anti-Communist nations, should have the help of all those nations he has specified.

I should like to invite the Senator's attention to the fact that Spain has not yet offered any of her forces for the purposes mentioned, nor has Western Germany. Therefore I most respectfully suggest that appropriate language be put in the amendment, so that it might not appear that an immediate request for the impossible is being urged. For

example, if it were said "existing plans for the defense of Europe should be revised so as to provide for utilization, as soon as feasible," or something of that kind, I believe the Senator's amendment will be improved, and I believe he might find support for it from some who will not accept the theory that implementing the North Atlantic Pact the way we are doing it is a plot against this country.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. McCARTHY. First let me answer the Senator from Colorado.

Mr. President, I now amend the amendment in conformity with the suggestion of the Senator from Colorado, so it will now read:

Existing plans for the defense of Europe should be immediately revised so as to provide, as soon as feasible, for the utilization of the military and other resources—

And so forth.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. McCARTHY. I am glad to yield to the Senator from Massachusetts.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. The Senator from Colorado and I are, I believe, working along the same line. I wonder if it would not improve the amendment if the Senator from Wisconsin—and I say this most respectfully—would make the following change in the last three lines: First, leave out the word "existing" and say:

Plans for the defense of Europe should be revised, as soon as practicable, to provide for the utilization of the resources of Western Germany, Spain, Turkey, and Greece.

Thereby leaving out the reference to the military, which is a problem in Western Germany, as we know, making no reference to the problem the Senator from Colorado so aptly discussed, and deleting the word "existing," which really does not mean anything.

Mr. McCARTHY. I have no objection to making that change.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. So the amendment will read somewhat as follows:

Plans for the defense of Europe should be revised, as soon as practicable, to provide for the utilization of resources of Western Europe, Spain, Turkey, and Greece.

I hope that will be a helpful suggestion.

Mr. McCARTHY. May I ask the Senator from Colorado if that language would meet with his approval, and answer the objection he has?

Mr. MILLIKIN. I am sorry I missed a part of the discussion.

Mr. McCARTHY. Will the Senator from Massachusetts repeat his suggestion?

Mr. MILLIKIN. I understand the latter part of the amendment would read, under the proposal made by the distinguished senior Senator from Massachusetts, as follows:

(a) Plans for the defense of Europe should be revised, as soon as practicable, to provide for the utilization of the resources of Western Germany, Spain, Turkey, and Greece.

I would have no objection to that.

Mr. McCARTHY. That suggested change is agreeable to me.

Mr. McMAHON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McCARTHY. I yield.

Mr. McMAHON. Since the Senator from Wisconsin has said that we require the combined efforts and cooperation not only of the North Atlantic Treaty nations but also of all other peoples of the world, I will ask the Senator from Colorado, the Senator from Wisconsin, and the Senator from Massachusetts, instead of specifying certain countries, would it not be better to make the provision wider by saying:

And, accordingly, that the bringing of the military and other resources of the free world into the common defense of Western Europe should be vigorously explored.

That would cover every free country of the world. It would cover the Latin American countries and cover the four countries the Senator has specified.

Mr. McCARTHY. I think that is a good suggestion, except for the fact that the State Department would have to interpret that language, and the State Department has repeatedly stated that they cannot utilize the resources of Spain, because Spain is not a peace-loving nation. They can very easily say that Western Germany and Spain, for example, are not part of the free world. Otherwise, I think it is an excellent suggestion. I think it would be an excellent suggestion if any one of the Members of the Senate were interpreting that language. But I have no confidence at all in the manner in which the crowd over in the State Department will interpret anything like that.

Let me answer the statement made by the Senator from Colorado a moment ago about a plot. Of course our men will be just as dead whether as the result of incompetence or treachery as they would be as the result of a plot. We do know that China was lost as the result of a plot. We know that Hiss was at Yalta. We know he was an agent of the Kremlin. He, Gromyko, and a man named Jebb drafted the treaty. We know that Arthur Bliss Lane, as he read it, said "As I read over this document I cannot believe my eyes. Every line speaks an absolute surrender to Stalin."

So we know how we lost China as the result of treason. We know that we have had some 57,000 casualties in Korea because of a plot against this Nation. We know that the selfsame crowd is doing the planning for the alleged defense of Western Europe.

As I say, no matter whether it is the result of treachery or incompetence, the men who die on the streets of Berlin and Paris will be just as dead.

Now I am glad to yield. I yield first to the Senator from Colorado, and then I shall yield to the Senator from Minnesota.

Mr. MILLIKIN. Mr. President, I suggest that whatever the motive may be, it is perfectly clear that as long as we are combating aggressive communism, we should take our strength wherever we can find it; and it is not necessary in accepting that theory at the same time to accept the Senator's theory as to a plot—a theory which I do not ac-

cept. However, I do accept the other part of the Senator's program.

After the word "Greece"—I believe it will be useful to specify other countries—I think we could well add the words "and other nations opposing aggressive Russian communism."

We might want Yugoslavia to come in before we get through.

Mr. McCARTHY. I think that is an excellent suggestion.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The time of the Senator from Wisconsin has expired.

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President, I ask that I may have 30 seconds more, in order to finish my remarks.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Is there objection? The Chair hears none, and the Senator from Wisconsin is recognized for 30 seconds more.

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President, I think that an addition along the line of the suggestion made by the Senator from Connecticut might well be made, following the word "Greece," at the end of the amendment. I would not wish to substitute the words he has suggested for the actual naming of the Pacific nations outside the North Atlantic Pact.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The question is on agreeing to the amendment of the Senator from Wisconsin [Mr. McCARTHY].

Thirty minutes' time is available to the opposition, under the control of the Senator from Texas [Mr. CONNALLY].

Mr. McMAHON. Mr. President, the Senator from Texas has asked me to represent him for a few minutes.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Very well; the Senator from Connecticut is recognized.

Mr. McMAHON. Mr. President, I think the pending amendment can be much improved by following the suggestions which have been made by the Senator from Massachusetts and the Senator from Colorado.

Let me say to the Senator from Wisconsin that I have a recollection of hearing General Eisenhower testify on the question of Western Germany. I observe that the Senator from Wisconsin [Mr. WILEY] nods his head in agreement with the statement I have just made. That statement was made by General Eisenhower in executive session. I am not sure whether that testimony has been made public. I observe that the Senator from Wisconsin indicates that it has not been published. Am I correct about that?

Mr. WILEY. I think so.

Mr. LEHMAN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. McMAHON. I yield.

Mr. LEHMAN. Is it not a fact that at the time when General Eisenhower spoke to the two Houses of Congress at the Congressional Library, he made the same statement?

Mr. WELKER. Yes.

Mr. McMAHON. I do not recall that; but I shall accept the recollection of the Senator from New York, which is joined in by that of the acting minority leader, that General Eisenhower made the statement. I remember that he did say at the executive session that he did not want in his command any unwilling

soldiers. I believe it was his wish then to have all the support he could get, but that he wished to have it on the basis that it would be willing support.

Mr. MILLIKIN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McMAHON. I yield.

Mr. MILLIKIN. Aside from the matter of testimony at executive sessions, I think it is a matter of general public notoriety that Western Germany has not offered to furnish troops under the North Atlantic Pact, and I think it is also a matter of public notoriety that Spain has not offered to furnish troops for the Atlantic Pact.

My idea is that it would be well for us to permit the addition of Spanish troops or the troops of any other nation that opposes aggressive Russian communism, and that we should permit such troops to be provided as soon as it is feasible to do so.

Mr. McMAHON. I thank the Senator. Would not the Senator think his objective would be accomplished by stating at the end of the amendment suggested by the Senator from Wisconsin [Mr. McCARTHY], in place of subdivision (a), and following the words "and accordingly that," the following:

(a) The bringing of the military and other resources of the free world into the common defense of Western Europe should be vigorously explored.

Mr. MILLIKIN. Mr. President, I could not accept that. I am not the sponsor of the amendment.

Mr. McMAHON. I realize that; but is that suggestion in accordance with the views of the Senator from Colorado?

Mr. MILLIKIN. No; it is not in accordance with my views, because no one can define "the free world."

Mr. McMAHON. Will the Senator from Colorado suggest some wording which would meet with his approval?

Mr. MILLIKIN. I would suggest adding, after the word "Greece," at the end of the amendment, the words "and other nations opposing aggressive Russian communism."

Mr. McMAHON. Let me inquire whether the Senator from Wisconsin heard the suggestion just made by the Senator from Colorado?

Mr. McCARTHY. Yes; and I think it is a good suggestion. Do I correctly understand that the Senator merely has in mind adding, after the word "Greece," the words which have just been stated? Is that correct?

Mr. McMAHON. Let me inquire whether the Senator from Colorado means to include Western Germany and Spain, in view of what has been said by various Senators during the recent colloquy.

Mr. MILLIKIN. I would include the countries which have been mentioned specifically because there is great public interest as to why those countries are not contributing to the Atlantic Pact. I think we should let those nations know that we are interested, when it becomes feasible, in having the military implementations which they can give to the North Atlantic Pact.

Mr. McMAHON. I take it that the Senator is agreeable to the wording I

have proposed—in other words, that that possibility “should be vigorously explored,” rather than to include the words “the existing plans should be revised.”

Mr. MILLIKIN. No; I do not agree to that language, because it is too soft.

Mr. McMAHON. Then I should like to point out that we would be saying that the plans should be immediately revised. We have 11 partners in the North Atlantic Pact, and we have to sit down with them and devise a common defense plan for Europe. For the Senate to take the position that it admits, here and now, that the plans should be revised so that these specific countries can be included, I think perhaps would be a mistake. I do not think we should take that position at this time.

As the Senator from Colorado has pointed out, Western Germany and Spain have not up to this moment given any public notification of their willingness to aid in this effort; and it would seem to me that perhaps the matter could be settled on a better basis for the common defense if we did not certify as to the necessity of getting their cooperation before an exploration is made of the possibilities involved in the situation.

Mr. MILLIKIN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McMAHON. I yield.

Mr. MILLIKIN. I would not require that the existing plans be immediately revised, because we do not have it within our power to revise them immediately. My suggestion in regard to the words “as soon as practicable” or “as soon as feasible” goes both to the revision of the plans and to the supplying of the armed forces.

Mr. THYE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McMAHON. I shall yield in a moment.

Do I correctly understand that the Senator's suggestion is to insert the words “should be immediately revised as soon as practicable”?

Mr. MILLIKIN. Of course, the words “immediately revised” would be omitted, and the words “as soon as practicable” would be included.

Mr. McMAHON. Very well.

Mr. President, I yield now to the Senator from Minnesota.

Mr. THYE. Mr. President, I should like to ask the Senator from Connecticut whether he would agree that it would be desirable to have Spain, Western Germany, Turkey, and Greece among the nations of Western Europe under the Atlantic Pact as soon as that could be achieved or as soon as it could be brought about?

Mr. McMAHON. My answer to the Senator from Minnesota is the same as the one General Eisenhower gave, which was, as I remember it, substantially this: That he would welcome every unit of manpower, he would welcome all the strength he could get in his combined command; but he took the position that he did not want any unwilling soldiers under his command.

Mr. THYE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield further?

Mr. McMAHON. I yield.

Mr. THYE. I believe the revised amendment—the amendment originally

submitted by the Senator from Wisconsin [Mr. McCARTHY], and as now perfected—will offer the countries mentioned the privilege of participating; the door will be open; and all we shall have to do in the future, if the resolution is adopted in this form, will be to work to create an atmosphere whereby those nations will participate willingly and will be good soldiers. However, at the present time the door is closed, and they cannot enter, no matter what their desires may be.

Mr. MILLIKIN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator from Connecticut yield to the Senator from Colorado?

Mr. McMAHON. I yield.

Mr. MILLIKIN. I am not sponsoring this amendment, and I do not want anything to indicate that I am, but I believe if we had (a) read as follows—

Mr. McMAHON. I am not sponsoring it, either, but we are trying to work it out.

Mr. MILLIKIN. I should like if possible to get it in such shape that it could be accepted by those who do not accept the full theory of the Senator from Wisconsin. For example, if it were to read:

(a) as soon as feasible, existing plans for the defense of Europe should be revised for the utilization of the military and other resources of Western Germany, Spain, Turkey, and Greece—

I think there was certain other language.

Mr. McMAHON. Yugoslavia was suggested.

Mr. MILLIKIN. I did not mean “Yugoslavia” but “and other nations opposed to aggressive Russian communism.”

Mr. LEHMAN. Is it not a fact that General Eisenhower has expressed very definite doubts as to the wisdom of including Western Germany?

Mr. MILLIKIN. The word “feasibility” takes care of that.

Mr. LEHMAN. Aside from that, I am wondering what the United States can do to control the actions of other nations who are members of the North Atlantic Pact.

Mr. MILLIKIN. If we cannot control them, it is not feasible. I am deliberately leaving room to accommodate the feasibilities of the situation.

If the other members of the North Atlantic Pact find the nations referred to or other nations unacceptable as partners in the enterprise, it is not feasible to take them in. That is why I included the word “feasible.”

Mr. LEHMAN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for another question?

Mr. MILLIKIN. I yield.

Mr. LEHMAN. I wonder whether the Senator does not believe that it would be wiser strategy and more desirable in other ways if we were to wait until Western Germany and Spain ask for admittance instead of our bringing moral or other pressure on them?

Mr. MILLIKIN. I do not think so, I may say to the distinguished Senator, because this does not exert pressure. It is simply a reminder and an admonition, which I believe is close to the hearts of our people, to add this additional

strength to the North Atlantic Pact, as soon as feasible.

Mr. LEHMAN. The thought I had was that while it is possible, in time, that Western Germany might become of considerable military value to us; I believe we would be in a stronger position if we were to wait until they asked to be accepted, rather than to accept them as partially unwilling and possible unuseful partners in the enterprise. From what General Eisenhower has said, I am quite certain that that was the fear which was in his mind. I do not recall his exact words, but their intent was that he does not want any unwilling partners under his command. I am simply afraid that if this amendment were adopted, we would be in a weaker position than if we waited until Germany and Spain asked to be admitted into the partnership of the Atlantic nations.

Mr. MILLIKIN. Personally, I may say to the Senator, I believe it would be a mistake to twist the arm of Western Germany too much. At the same time, I do not think there is the slightest doubt that our people would like to have the uncoerced assistance of Western Germany. Many authorities are to be found who will say that if we do not get her assistance, an adequate defense of Western Europe is impossible. But passing that, certainly the statement of an objective, couched in terms such as have been suggested, should not offend Western Germany, and I do not think it would offend any other nation unless it should be Communist Russia.

Mr. McMAHON. Mr. President, I should like to quote from General Eisenhower's testimony, given before the committee, under questioning by the Senator from Virginia [Mr. BYRD]. From page 21 of the hearings, I read:

Senator BYRD. And will they permit us to arm the Germans, which will be on their borders, insofar as Eastern Germany is concerned, without preventing that arming by making an invasion? Do you think they will permit us to arm the Germans in any effective way, right at their very doorsteps? They fear the Germans—you know that—much more than they fear the Belgians.

General EISENHOWER. I would say this, to start with: There is no hope as of today to start arming the Germans. There is a tremendous political platform to be established before this could come about.

I think here is the one thing that we can remember: that if Germany is given the right to struggle toward a political equality with other nations in the world, at the same time they must assume certain political and national responsibilities. Among those are the establishment of police, constabulary, border guards, and so on. I see no chance of Russia making a legitimate excuse for an attack out of those people gradually doing that sort of thing.

What I am concerned with at the moment, though, is marshaling the forces that belong to the free countries farther west, because I don't see how that particular German question can be settled for quite a while.

I agree wholeheartedly with General Eisenhower's testimony; but, as the amendment has been modified, it would seem to me to be without much harmony. That is about the best I am able to say for it. In the absence of the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, I would accept the amendment.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. McMAHON. I yield.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Will the Senator please read the amendment in the form in which he accepts it?

Mr. McMAHON. It would read:

Accordingly that—

(a) as soon as feasible—

The Senator from Colorado will kindly correct me—

(a) as soon as feasible plans for the defense of Europe should be—

Mr. MILLIKIN. Revised.

Mr. McMAHON. Yes—

revised so as to provide for utilization of the military and other resources of Western Germany, Spain, Turkey, Greece, Yugoslavia—

Mr. MILLIKIN. No, Yugoslavia should not be included.

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President, the Senator from Washington suggested that Yugoslavia be included, and I had no objection to so doing. It is covered in "all other nations."

Mr. MILLIKIN. I think it might be stirring up an unnecessary number of hornets' nests if it were included.

Mr. McCARTHY. Let us omit it.

Mr. McMAHON. I may call the Senator's attention to the fact that I cannot see what the hornet's nests would be since we appropriated \$37,000,000 in December to aid that country in resisting Communist aggression; and of course, it is in line with getting everyone in that we can.

Mr. MILLIKIN. I would omit Yugoslavia, if I were sponsoring the amendment, because it adds an unnecessary burden to securing support for the amendment.

Mr. LEHMAN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. McMAHON. I yield.

Mr. LEHMAN. Obviously we want to utilize the combined efforts of all countries who are prodemocratic, who love freedom, and who are opposed to communism; but I cannot see the value or soundness of mentioning simply Western Germany, Spain, Turkey, and Greece. We are not mentioning other countries which could be of great assistance to us—for example, Venezuela, Brazil, and Mexico.

Mr. THYE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. LEHMAN. I decline to yield.

Mr. THYE. Does the Senator imply that they are members of the North Atlantic Pact?

Mr. LEHMAN. I should like to complete my statement. I desire to offer a suggestion. Venezuela, Brazil, and Mexico are countries which were of great assistance to us, and therefore I wonder whether it would not be a solution to the problem to amend subparagraph (a) so as to read:

Existing plans for the defense of Europe should be immediately revised so as to provide for utilization when practicable, of the military and other resources of other countries not now in the Atlantic Pact—

Without mentioning any of them by name. That would include the entire gamut.

Mr. McMAHON. It would, of course, meet with the approval of the Senator from Connecticut, because it would seem to carry out the preamble, wherein the Senator from Wisconsin says:

Adequate defense against the present Communist threat to world peace requires—

What? Not Western Germany, Spain, Turkey, and Greece, but—

requires the combined effort and cooperation not only of the North Atlantic Treaty nations but also of other peoples of the world whose survival depends upon their capacities, individually or with the help of others, to resist Communist aggression.

Accordingly, if the Senator wishes to present it as a modification of the amendment, I will support him.

Mr. LEHMAN. I want to make it clear that I have taken out the word "immediately" and have substituted the words "when practicable."

Mr. McMAHON. Will the Senator read it again?

Mr. LEHMAN. Of course, I do not know how the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee may feel about it, but my suggestion would be to change the wording to read as follows:

Existing plans for the defense of Europe should be revised so as to provide for the military and other resources of other countries not now in the Atlantic Pact.

Mr. McMAHON. That would seem to me to be better phraseology than that which the Senator from Wisconsin has proposed in his amendment.

Mr. MILLIKIN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McMAHON. I yield.

Mr. MILLIKIN. I would not advise the distinguished Senator from Wisconsin to accept an amendment of that kind, because the people of the United States want to know why we are not using the forces of Western Germany, Spain, Greece, and Turkey. Therefore, there is a definite reason for including those specific countries.

Mr. McMAHON. The Senator himself has told us today about the people of Western Germany and Spain when he said they had offered to furnish their troops to the support of the North Atlantic Pact nations.

Mr. MILLIKIN. They have not offered, but we hope they will. If they do, we will take them in as soon as feasible.

Mr. McMAHON. And we will take everyone else that wants to come in.

Mr. MILLIKIN. Every country that is opposed to aggressive Communist aggression.

Mr. McMAHON. That includes the lesser. It seems to me the Senator from New York has covered the matter.

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McMAHON. I yield.

Mr. McCARTHY. May I read paragraph 8 as modified:

Accordingly that plans for the defense of Europe should be revised as soon as feasible to provide for utilization, on a voluntary basis, of the military and other resources of Western Germany, Spain, Turkey and Greece, and all other nations and peoples opposed to aggressive communism.

Mr. LEHMAN. I would not want to mention countries. I would say "utilization of the military and other resources of all other countries," which would include the nations which the Senator from Wisconsin has named.

Mr. McCARTHY. I think it is necessary to name the particular countries.

Mr. LEHMAN. If we are genuinely anxious to strengthen ourselves, I would make the amendment as strong as possible and not limit it to those four countries, two of which have not shown the slightest indication now or at any other time, so far as I know, of joining the family of nations fighting against Russian aggression in a military way.

Mr. McMAHON. Mr. President, I yield 1 minute to the Senator from Wisconsin.

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President, I have no pride of authorship in connection with this amendment. I am trying to get it into the best shape possible. The Senator from Colorado suggested that instead of referring to peoples opposed to communism it refer to all other nations not now included in the North Atlantic Pact.

I should like to ask what the Senator from Colorado thinks about this language.

Mr. MILLIKIN. There are many nations that have a very remote relationship to the North Atlantic Pact areas that we did not intend to be included in the North Atlantic Pact.

Mr. McMAHON. Mr. President, I would say, in answer to the Senator from Colorado, that no matter how remote—and I think the Senator from Wisconsin will agree with me on this, if he does not agree with me on anything else—practically every nation is going to be in it if war starts.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment of the Senator from Wisconsin [Mr. McCARTHY] as modified.

Mr. McMAHON. Has the Senator omitted the word "immediately"?

Mr. McCARTHY. It has been omitted.

Mr. LONG. Mr. President, do I correctly understand the amendment to mean that it would include Asiatic nations, South African nations, or South American nations, or Indonesia?

Mr. McCARTHY. It would mean to use the resources of every nation to fight communism, realizing that it is not a regional fight, but a world-wide fight, and that the outcome in Korea can affect the outcome in Europe, and that the outcome in Europe will affect the outcome in Asia. I strongly feel that if any South American country or any Asiatic country wants to contribute to the defense of Europe, and if General Eisenhower can utilize their help, any military resources that our Supreme Commander feels he can utilize in the defense of Europe should be so utilized. I am most concerned with the manpower of Western Germany and Spain, but I am aware that there are other sources.

Mr. LONG. The people of Norway and Denmark may be very reluctant to agree to any sort of an arrangement whereby they would go to war if Burma

or India were attacked by Russia, because, to them, they are not associated with the North Atlantic area. It might tend to weaken the Senator's case, insofar as Spain, Turkey, Greece, and Yugoslavia are concerned.

Mr. McCARTHY. I am not talking about taking any European troops to defend Siam or Indochina. I am referring to the defense of Western Europe and giving General Eisenhower the power to use all available resources to defend Western Europe. The nations particularly in question are Western Germany, Spain, Turkey, and Greece. If, however, Sweden, which is not in the Atlantic Pact at the present time says, "We will give you 50,000 troops and so much ammunition," there is no reason why they should not be utilized.

Mr. LONG. It occurs to me, however, that nations which are in the North Atlantic area may have a great deal of difficulty in agreeing that they should go to war if nations far from the North Atlantic area are involved.

Mr. McCARTHY. That is not anticipated in this amendment. I am sure that nothing in the wording of it would indicate that.

Mr. CASE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question? It was a little difficult to hear the final form of the amendment.

Mr. McMAHON. I yield 2 minutes to the Senator from Wisconsin so that he may answer the Senator from South Dakota.

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President, may ask that the clerk read the amendment as modified?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will state the amendment as modified.

The LEGISLATIVE CLERK. On page 5, it is proposed to strike out the period at the end of line 8 and insert in lieu thereof a semicolon, and after line 8 insert a new paragraph as follows:

8. It is the sense of the Senate that an adequate defense against the present Communist threat to world peace requires the combined effort and cooperation not only of the North Atlantic Treaty nations, but also of other peoples of the world whose survival depends upon their capacities, individually or with the help of others, to resist Communist aggression, and accordingly that plans for the defense of Europe should be revised as soon as feasible to provide for utilization on a voluntary basis of the military and other resources of Western Germany, Spain, Turkey, and Greece, and all other nations opposed to aggressive communism.

Mr. CASE. May I ask the distinguished Senator from Wisconsin whether it is implied in any degree that all the nations that might be embraced in the term "all other nations" would in any sense be given an invitation to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization?

Mr. McCARTHY. I do not think we can do anything to force the Atlantic Treaty nations to take in new members, as any one of the 12 nations can veto the admission of a proposed new member. My thought is that we use the Atlantic Pact nations and the additional

nations cooperatively, regardless of whether they are in the pact or not.

Mr. CASE. Nor does the Senator from South Dakota think we can force the other members of the organization to take in any other countries. It should be remembered that whenever we move in that direction the North Atlantic Treaty is not merely a defensive alliance or merely an offensive alliance, but it is both an offensive and a defensive alliance. The members of the North Atlantic Pact have pledged themselves to go to the rescue of any member who is attacked. So it should be perfectly clear that this is a voluntary proposal, and it is not intended to be an invitation necessarily for all nations to join the North Atlantic Pact.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired. All time for debate on the amendment has expired.

Mr. LONG. Mr. President, the amendment has been amended and modified many times. Should not some additional time be made available? The amendment has been modified many times.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. It does not appear to the present occupant of the chair that any time for debate on the amendment remains.

Mr. LONG. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to ask one further question.

Mr. WHERRY. I will not object, provided the Senator states how much time he intends to take.

Mr. LONG. Not more than 5 minutes.

Mr. LEHMAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to speak for 2 minutes.

Mr. WHERRY. I object. I think we should vote on the amendment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the unanimous-consent request of the Senator from Louisiana?

Mr. WHERRY. I do not object to an additional allowance of 5 minutes, if the Senators wish to distribute the time among themselves. However, if it is to be a matter of granting 5 minutes to one Senator and 5 minutes to another Senator, it would unnecessarily drag out the debate, and would destroy the whole purpose of entering into the agreement.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?

Mr. WHERRY. I do not object to granting five additional minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair hears no objection, and five additional minutes are granted, to be controlled by the Senator from Connecticut.

Mr. McMAHON. Mr. President, I yield 3 minutes to the Senator from Louisiana.

Mr. LONG. Mr. President, we have heard several Senators state that we would not want to feel that we had committed American troops to be sent to any place in the world where trouble might break out. It seems to me the question is whether we are willing to take into the North Atlantic Pact any nation anywhere in the world which is opposed to Communist aggression. It would seem to the junior Senator from Louisiana that we should be very careful about where we are extending our commit-

ments. Many nations could be of help to us, but usually when fighting breaks out, in the long run the United States is called upon to do a tremendous share of the fighting. Therefore, it would seem to me that we should be a little careful before we say that we are willing to take into the North Atlantic Pact every nation which is opposed to communism.

Mr. McCARTHY. Let me say to the Senator that I propose that we not build the defense of Europe around the closed corporation of the Atlantic Pact, but that we use not only the Atlantic Pact nations, but also use the available military resources of other nations. As I have said, I am thinking specifically of Western Germany, Spain, Turkey, and Greece. Yugoslavia also can give us a great deal of help. I am not proposing at this time that we take any other nations into the pact. We, acting alone, have no power to do so, even though it would be very desirable to do so.

Mr. CASE. Mr. President, will the Senator from Louisiana yield for a question?

Mr. LONG. I yield.

Mr. CASE. The reason behind the suggestion I made was that a moral obligation may be involved. We should keep in mind the provisions of article 5 of the North Atlantic Pact, which provides that an armed attack against one nation in the pact is an attack against all of the nations.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator from Louisiana has expired.

Mr. McMAHON. Mr. President, I yield the remainder of the time to the Senator from New York.

Mr. LEHMAN. Mr. President, it seems to me the proposal has not been well-thought-out. Nothing can come of it, it seems to me. We have not even had a request from the nations which have been mentioned, or the consent of the Atlantic Pact nations. We hear mention of Western Germany, Turkey, Spain, and Greece. No mention is made of Sweden or Switzerland. Such nations might be of even greater assistance to us than the other nations. We do not even hear mention of Yugoslavia, which is recommended as a possible ally in the report of the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services. No mention is made of any Latin-American countries, which could be of great help to us, in the same way in which Brazil was of help to us in the last war.

I think it would be unwise to adopt the amendment. I do not believe its implications have been carefully thought out. I do not think we know how our allies in the Atlantic Pact feel about it. Therefore, Mr. President, if the amendment is pressed I shall vote against it.

Mr. MILLIKIN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired. All time for debate has expired.

Mr. McMAHON. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The roll was called, and the following Senators answered to their names:

Aiken	Gillette	Millikin
Anderson	Green	Monroney
Bennett	Hayden	Morse
Benton	Hendrickson	Mundt
Brewster	Hennings	Murray
Bricker	Hickenlooper	Neely
Bridges	Hill	Nixon
Butler, Md.	Hoey	O'Connor
Butler, Nebr.	Holland	O'Mahoney
Byrd	Ives	Pastore
Cain	Jenner	Robertson
Capehart	Johnson, Colo.	Russell
Carlson	Johnson, Tex.	Saltonstall
Case	Johnson, S. C.	Schoeppel
Chavez	Kefauver	Smathers
Clements	Kem	Smith, Maine
Connally	Kerr	Smith, N. J.
Cordon	Kilgore	Smith, N. C.
Dirksen	Knowland	Sparkman
Douglas	Langer	Stennis
Duff	Lehman	Taft
Dworshak	Lodge	Thye
Eastland	Long	Tobey
Eaton	McCarthy	Underwood
Ellender	McClellan	Watkins
Ferguson	McFarland	Welker
Flanders	McMahon	Wherry
Frear	Malone	Wiley
Fulbright	Martin	Williams
George	Maybank	Young

The PRESIDING OFFICER. A quorum is present.

The question is on agreeing to the amendment, as modified by the Senator from Wisconsin [Mr. McCARTHY].

Mr. CASE. Mr. President, I offer an amendment to the McCarthy amendment, which I send to the desk and ask to have stated.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment to the amendment will be stated.

The LEGISLATIVE CLERK. After the name "Greece", it is proposed to insert a period and strike out the remainder of the sentence.

Mr. CASE. Mr. President, I do not intend to use the 30 minutes to which I am entitled; but at least we ought to know what we are asked to do in so broad an amendment as this.

Personally, I am entirely in sympathy with the proposal to try to bring the resources of Western Germany, Spain, Greece, and Turkey into association with the nations of the North Atlantic Treaty. No one can fail to realize that if the Russians were to move into Western Germany today we would be in an all-out shooting war there. We are the occupying power. So long as we are carrying on the aid program with the other nations mentioned, it is obvious that if they were attacked we would be in a war.

But it cannot be overlooked that if we should use the words "all other nations opposed to aggressive communism," we would place ourselves in the position of soliciting and receiving aid from them, and there would be a moral commitment which would be reciprocal under the terms of the North Atlantic Treaty. I realize that the language proposed does not say that the other nations will be invited to come into the pact, but we ought to recall that articles 5 and 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty provide. I should like to read them to refresh our memories, including my own, at this time.

Mr. HICKENLOOPER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. CASE. I yield.

Mr. HICKENLOOPER. I inquire what is the Senator's amendment?

Mr. CASE. The amendment which I offered would place a period after the name "Greece," and strike out in the amendment of the Senator from Wisconsin the remainder of the language which reads "and all other nations opposed to aggressive communism."

It seems to me that that suggestion means that we would be inviting countries throughout the world to tender us aid, with the moral reciprocal commitment that they would be entitled to the protection which the North Atlantic Treaty affords to its member nations.

Mr. HICKENLOOPER. Mr. President, will the Senator further yield?

Mr. CASE. Before I yield further, let me read articles 5 and 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty.

Mr. HICKENLOOPER. It is my understanding that now there is a period after the name "Greece", and that nothing more follows.

Mr. CASE. The amendment has been greatly modified since it was written in the form in which it appears in the print which the Senator has on his desk.

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President, I am willing to accept the amendment.

Mr. CASE. For the RECORD, I should like to read at this time articles 5 and 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty. The first paragraph of article 5 reads as follows:

The parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all; and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the party or parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

I now wish to read article 6 immediately, so that we can see how far it goes in interpreting the language as to the countries which might be attacked. Article 6 reads as follows:

For the purpose of article 5 an armed attack on one or more of the parties is deemed to include an armed attack on the territory of any of the parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian departments of France, on the occupation forces of any party in Europe, on the islands under the jurisdiction of any party in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer or on the vessels or aircraft in this area of any of the parties.

I recognize that the amendment does not say that the other nations from which we might receive aid would become parties to the North Atlantic Treaty. We could not make them parties to it if we wanted to do so, because that would require unanimous consent of all the members. But certainly there is some implication that if those countries are attacked—and I admit that if there is an attack on Western Germany we are going to be involved—we would be placed in the position of accepting a reciprocal moral commitment.

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. CASE. I yield.

Mr. McCARTHY. I sincerely hope that the four named countries, if they receive military aid from us, will assume

the obligations which the members of the pact have assumed. I hope that Western Germany, Spain, Turkey, and Greece will consider an attack upon any of the other nations as an attack against them. In other words, it must be a two-way street.

Mr. CASE. That is exactly the point. It should be a two-way street; and so far as those nations are concerned, I think it would be a two-way street. But I do not want the Senate to accept the possible attacks or involvements which might come from the various foreign policies of other countries which might tender to us a little aid and then say, "We are attacked. Come to our aid."

Mr. KNOWLAND. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. CASE. I yield.

Mr. KNOWLAND. I think there is a considerable point being made by the Senator from South Dakota. I merely wish to suggest, however, that I do not interpret the language of the amendment of the Senator from Wisconsin quite so broadly as the Senator from South Dakota apparently does. I think it is limited to the North Atlantic area. I do not believe that it would extend to South America, or Asia, or Africa, outside the Algerian departments of France, which are mentioned in the North Atlantic Pact.

I merely wish to point out to the Senator that I think there would be some considerable advantage, for instance, if Sweden should decide that she wanted to go into the North Atlantic alliance, because she occupies a very strategic area in that part of the world.

I think it would be highly desirable if the Swiss should finally decide that in world war III there would be no neutrals, and that if the free world went down it would be highly unlikely that Switzerland would be able to maintain herself as an island in a Communist sea of territory.

If the Senator will permit me, we come next to the question of Yugoslavia. I believe there is great question as to whether or not the North Atlantic nations could sit quietly by if the Soviet Union and its satellites should move against Yugoslavia, not because we have any obligation in Yugoslavia per se, but because if Yugoslavia should be overwhelmed, a Communist wedge would be driven between Italy and the North Atlantic countries on the one hand, and peoples in whom we are greatly interested—Greece and Turkey—on the other hand. Probably the conquest of both Greece and Turkey would be made easier if that should happen.

I do not want the Yugoslavs to feel that they have any guaranty unless they are willing to assume some obligations themselves. Otherwise, they would be getting what in effect would be a free ride. They would get the protection of the free world, without any obligation on their part to come to the aid of the free world if the other nations should be attacked.

Mr. CASE. Mr. President, what the Senator from California has said is very much in point. I may say that the amendment which I sent to the desk was written very hurriedly, because I

recognized the situation, and knew that if I was to get any time to explain what I thought was a possible danger, I had to act immediately.

My own feeling is that the best way to handle the situation would be for the Senator from Wisconsin, if he felt so disposed, instead of accepting the amendment which I suggested, simply to ask permission to modify his amendment by striking out the single word "all," which would make it read "and other nations opposed to aggressive communism." I would have no objection to the modification, and would then be happy to withdraw my amendment. That would then leave it possible for Switzerland or Sweden to make some contribution and feel welcome, and would be in line with the suggestion of the Senator from California.

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President, a point of order.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. GEORGE in the chair). The Senator will state it.

Mr. McCARTHY. In view of the fact that I have modified my amendment in accordance with the suggestion of the Senator from South Dakota, is there any time left for debate?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. There is an hour on the modified amendment, under the unanimous-consent agreement.

The question is on agreeing to the amendment, as modified. The amendment, as modified, will be stated.

The LEGISLATIVE CLERK. On page 5 it is proposed to strike out the period at the end of line 8 and insert in lieu thereof a semicolon and after line 8 insert a new paragraph as follows:

8. It is the sense of the Senate that an adequate defense against the present Communist threat to world peace requires the combined effort and cooperation not only of the North Atlantic Treaty nations but also of other peoples of the world whose survival depends upon their capacities, individually or with the help of others, to resist Communist aggression, and accordingly that plans for the defense of Europe should be revised as soon as possible so as to provide for utilization on a voluntary basis of the military and other resources of Western Germany, Spain, Turkey, and Greece.

Mr. RUSSELL. Mr. President, I desire to amend the amendment, by striking the word "requires" in the second line of the proposed so-called eighth resolve, and insert the language "make it desirable to utilize." I propose that those words be inserted in place of the word "requires."

Mr. President, if I understand correctly, the amendment proposed by the Senator from Wisconsin states that—

It is the sense of the Senate that an adequate defense against the present Communist threat to world peace requires the combined effort and cooperation not only of the North Atlantic Treaty nations but also of other peoples of the world whose survival depends upon their capacities, individually or with the help of others, to resist Communist aggression.

Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. RUSSELL. Yes.

Mr. AIKEN. Does the Senator interpret this language to carry with it, on the part of the United States, any obligation to any nation which voluntarily offers to give assistance in combating Communist aggression in any part of the world?

Mr. RUSSELL. I certainly think that is a very clear implication to be drawn from the amendment.

Mr. AIKEN. Would not that imply that the United States should immediately come to the assistance of Nationalist China?

Mr. RUSSELL. I do not know that it would, as the amendment has finally been amended by the last five or six revisions, but it would have up to the last revision.

Mr. AIKEN. Is it not well to have this pretty plain before we proffer our military strength for war possibly on the Chinese mainland?

Mr. RUSSELL. If the Senator will forgive me and let me proceed for about five minutes I will yield him five minutes in his own right, in which he may address himself to the question.

Mr. President, I am opposed to the amendment for several reasons. In the first place, I have been greatly disturbed by the spirit of defeatism which has been manifest in this country due to so many pronouncements made by so many people in high places as to the overwhelming might of Russia. Russia is powerful enough for us to gird up our loins for any eventuality, without undertaking to frighten the people of this Nation by exaggerated statements as to her strength. The amendment states that it requires the combined efforts of all the nations on the earth, wherever they may be, to provide an adequate defense against Communist aggression. I want all the help we can possibly summon in any hour of emergency, indeed in this very hour, but I am not willing, Mr. President, to take the position that the United States cannot stand without all of the nations of the earth that are not at present encompassed behind the iron curtain.

We can, of course, greatly add to the sacrifices we may be compelled to make, Mr. President by failing to secure allies. I sometimes think the things we do here might greatly increase the sacrifices we would be compelled to make if we should be drawn into a war with Russia, which God forbid. But I for one would never be willing to assert that the United States is helpless to defend itself. I want all the help we can get. But I shall never take the position that it is required that we will have to do anything that is necessary to get all the other nations of the earth on our side. That is the primary reason for offering the amendment.

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. RUSSELL. I yield.

Mr. McCARTHY. Am I to understand that the Senator's amendment merely changes a word in the second line of the preamble; that it strikes out the word "requires" and inserts other language?

Mr. RUSSELL. Yes; to insert "makes it desirable to utilize."

Mr. McCARTHY. I have no objection to that.

Mr. RUSSELL. I appreciate the Senator accepting that language. I think it improves the amendment greatly.

It so happened that during the hearings—and the record will bear it out—I stressed with every witness who came before the committee while I was present as to the desirability of inducing Turkey, of including Spain, indeed, getting forces even from Yugoslavia, from Greece, from any source whatever, that might enable us to strengthen our side, get more allies to stand with us, if it is necessary to do so, to repel Communist aggression. I should like to have them with us.

In recent years I have somewhat changed some of my philosophy, Mr. President. There was a time when I suppose I was as much of an isolationist as ever served in this body. I had a distrust of people whom I did not completely understand. But I have changed my views. I have decided that it is wise for the United States to make sacrifices, indeed, great sacrifices, to enable us to mobilize all the manpower and all the resources of the world that can possibly be associated with us in order to reduce the sacrifices of American resources and American manhood and American blood in the event war should come again.

I insisted in questioning General Bradley, General Eisenhower, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Defense, that plans should be made for the utilization of the manpower that is available in Spain, in Western Germany, in Turkey, in Greece, in Sweden, and in all nations that might have something to contribute in the event the great tide of Communist aggression should turn loose upon the free people of the earth.

Mr. President, as strongly as I believe in using all the means at our command and as strongly as I believe in associating on a fair and reasonable basis with the peoples who would join with us in this effort—and that belief is borne out by this record of the hearings of the committee—I seriously question the wisdom of adopting to this resolution a catch-all amendment of the nature of the pending one.

We started out to deal with the North Atlantic Treaty and the implementation of that treaty. We have gone rather far afield, for we now have reached out to the four corners of the earth. Well, I believe we returned from some of the corners a few minutes ago when the amendment was again modified by striking out all after the word "Greece." However, Mr. President, here on the floor of the Senate we cannot handle an amendment of this nature without incurring obligations and without building up troubles which we cannot possibly see at this moment.

I have not had as complete faith in the State Department as have some persons I know of, although my distrust of the State Department has not been as great as has been that of some other persons. However, I do know that we in the Senate cannot write a treaty here on the floor of the Senate. After the Senate says that in all events we should

have these nations in a compact with us, what will the Senate say when it is confronted with a treaty which places an unfair financial burden upon the Government of the United States in connection with the arming of some of these nations?

Mr. President, I am one of those who have sought to have the nations who would fight with us make contributions of their own to the common cause, in the belief that if a man puts something of his own into a given project, if he puts his heart and his soul and his energies into that project, he will fight harder for it.

Mr. BREWSTER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. RUSSELL. If I have the time, I yield.

Mr. BREWSTER. Mr. President, I feel sure that the Senator from Georgia would not question the propriety of having the Senate make suggestions in regard to procedures of this character, inasmuch as the North Atlantic Pact itself had its origin in the suggestion of the Senate that it would be desirable to make some such arrangement. Does not the Senator from Georgia feel that certainly the further implementation of those arrangements would be equally within the purview and the propriety of senatorial suggestions?

Mr. RUSSELL. No, I do not feel this is the proper way to raise the issue here.

Mr. BREWSTER. Did not the Senator from Georgia vote for the North Atlantic proposal?

Mr. RUSSELL. I did.

Mr. BREWSTER. Did not the Senator from Georgia vote for the original resolution on that subject?

Mr. RUSSELL. I did. I am not questioning the propriety of offering this amendment. I do question the wisdom of adopting it as a part of this resolution.

Mr. BREWSTER. The Senator from Georgia has said that the Senate cannot write a treaty on the floor of the Senate. That is true; but certainly we in the Senate can suggest to the administration that it would be wise for the administration to develop arrangements of this character, the details later to be reported. That is precisely what we did in the case of the North Atlantic Pact. At that time we proposed this method of procedure, and it was accepted by the administration.

Mr. RUSSELL. Perhaps the Senator from Maine is correct as to that point. However, I think there is a great deal of difference between implementing a treaty which has been ratified and our saying that the treaty requires these nations to be associated with the United States in order that our country shall be able to defend itself.

I doubt the wisdom of our saying such a thing in this resolution. I have not challenged the propriety of offering the amendment, no matter how remote it may be from the issue before us. Of course, we have already made a catch-all of the resolution. This amendment would have us go to extreme limits in bringing in collateral matters and issues not involved in the treaty.

I object to bringing in all these collateral matters, which I say have no place

in a resolution designed to implement a treaty which already has been approved and ratified.

Mr. BREWSTER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield further?

Mr. RUSSELL. I yield.

Mr. BREWSTER. I was entirely in accord with the Senator's suggestion as to the changing of words, because one of the most regrettable aspects of this entire situation has been the constant reiteration that we cannot live without Europe. I recognize the importance of Europe; but when some persons go to the extreme of saying that without Europe we are lost, I wish to say that I have never admitted that as an American, and I think the Senator from Georgia has joined in taking that position. So I think the suggested change in the language is most appropriate.

Mr. RUSSELL. I thank the Senator. I am glad to be associated with the free nations of Europe in this compact, but if we are compelled to do so, we can undertake our own defense.

Mr. President, I wish to say that in voting against this amendment, I do not make any change of position on my part as to the desirability of working through regular channels, including all proper diplomatic and legislative methods, in obtaining assistance anywhere in the world where assistance may be available; but I do not like to tell the State Department or the administration to make plans for the defense of Western Europe and provide for the utilization of the resources of the nations named in the revised amendment, without knowing some of the terms of the compact which may be made. I do not propose, even impliedly, to commit myself in advance to support any treaty which might be made. I take that position all the more readily because in some cases we in the Senate have not scrutinized treaties as carefully as we should have.

Mr. McFARLAND. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. RUSSELL. I yield.

Mr. McFARLAND. Is it not true that the resolution to which reference has been made, which resolution possibly led to the formation of the North Atlantic Pact, was first referred to a committee, and the committee gave careful consideration to every phase of the matter under consideration; but that resolution did not involve the dangers which are involved by including a catch-all amendment, the results of which we might not be able to comprehend at this late hour?

Mr. RUSSELL. I am sure the majority leader correctly states the facts. Mr. President, of course there are other nations with whom it might be desirable for us to have more intimate relations; but the nations mentioned in the pending amendment are not the only ones which might be placed in that category.

The fact that Yugoslavia was inserted in the amendment, and then taken out, and the fact that the words "all other countries" were added to the amendment, and then those words were taken out of it, show, as I see it, the folly of undertaking by means of a resolution implementing an existing treaty to embrace a great many other nations in the same general philosophy of the treaty

without knowing anything about the details of the arrangements which might be made in the future.

As far back as 1947, I advocated permitting Western Germany to rearm; I believe it was in 1947 that it became apparent that Russia was training a military force in East Germany. I am now in favor of permitting Western Germany to rearm.

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. RUSSELL. I yield.

Mr. McCARTHY. Will the Senator agree that if we do not use the manpower of Spain and Germany—whatever manpower is available there—and if war does come to Europe, many more American boys will die because we have failed to utilize that manpower? Will the Senator also agree that, as of now, General Eisenhower has no authority whatsoever even to negotiate with Spain for the use of her manpower; and he told the Senate and the House of Representatives, at the meeting at the Library of Congress, that until the politicians settle the problems of Western Germany, he cannot utilize the manpower of Western Germany? Does the Senator from Georgia agree as to that?

Mr. RUSSELL. No, I am not sure that I am aware of all that is included in the Senator's second statement, the one in regard to General Eisenhower. I do not challenge the correctness of the statement the Senator has made, but I simply cannot bear witness to its correctness. Any additional help in carrying the burden of defense will be welcome but it must be secured in the proper fashion.

Mr. President, I wish to say that the committee report—largely due to my insistence, although in using the word "largely," perhaps I should apologize to the distinguished chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee; but I am sure that my insistence had something to do with it—goes very fully into the desirability of utilizing the resources and the power of these nations. I believe in that policy; but I think we have gone too far afield now; and, for that reason, I shall vote against the amendment on this resolution.

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. RUSSELL. I yield.

Mr. WHERRY. Do I correctly understand that the Senator from Georgia will oppose the amendment if the modification—which I believe he has accepted as being desirable—is included in the amendment?

Mr. RUSSELL. Yes. I do not intend to bring extraneous matters into the resolution dealing with the North Atlantic Pact.

Mr. WHERRY. I distinctly remember that the distinguished Senator propounded questions to various witnesses at the hearings. Of course I attended the sessions there.

Mr. RUSSELL. That is correct.

Mr. WHERRY. That occurred on one occasion in the midst of colloquy with Governor Dewey.

Mr. RUSSELL. The Senator is correct. Not only did I propound questions

to Governor Dewey—although for the moment I had forgotten about questioning Governor Dewey—but, as I stated a few minutes ago, I propounded questions to General Eisenhower, to General Marshall, and to the Secretary of State. In fact, I think I propounded questions to all of the witnesses there, including the distinguished Senator from Ohio [Mr. TART] insisting upon the desirability of some arrangements whereby Turkey, Spain, Greece, and Western Germany might be brought into plans for the defense of the free world.

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield further?

Mr. RUSSELL. I yield.

Mr. WHERRY. I should like to quote one or two paragraphs of the colloquy appearing on pages 534 and 535 of the hearings before the two committees, sitting jointly on Senate Concurrent Resolution 8. After the Senator from Georgia had asked Governor Dewey relative to associating ourselves with Spain in the defense of Western Europe, Governor Dewey replied, "I believe it should be at the earliest possible moment, sir." He continued at length, and finally the Senator from Georgia asked:

In other words, if we can go to bed with Dictator Stalin to defeat Hitler, we should not be too particular about the company of lesser dictators in the present situation.

Governor Dewey replied:

When my country is in peril, I am not too fussy about the people who will defeat the enemy, sir.

The Senator from Georgia replied:

Thank you for that statement.

The chairman then asked:

Of course you realize there will have to be certain diplomatic arrangements made?

To which Governor Dewey replied:

I recognize the difficulty. I am not criticizing our failure to achieve it. I should like to see it pursued as rapidly as possible.

The Senator from Georgia then asked:

We should pursue every diplomatic effort available?

Mr. RUSSELL. That is correct, of course. Those were my words.

Mr. WHERRY. If the word "desirable" is in the amendment, then what I should like to ask my distinguished colleague and friend is, Does that not carry out exactly the statement made by the Senator from Georgia in response to the statement of Governor Dewey, about carrying out whatever diplomatic relations are available as speedily as possible?

Mr. RUSSELL. I see a great deal of difference between this amendment being offered as a separate proposition, and as being attached to a resolution to implement the existing treaty, of which these nations are not parties. I think it has no place whatever here. If the Senator offers it as a separate proposition as a matter of encouragement, and to insist that the executive branch of the Government pursue every avenue to utilize the resources and manpower of Spain, Turkey, and Greece—and I shall not even exclude Yugoslavia—I should be very happy to support it. But

I do not propose in connection with this resolution to implement the North Atlantic Treaty to support an amendment which has been drawn so hastily, and which has been revised so often, and which has nothing to do with the North Atlantic Treaty except to confuse the plans for defense.

Mr. WHERRY. I agree that the proper place to write a treaty is in committee. But this is simply a suggestion to the State Department, that, if desirable, something be done. We are expressing ourselves. It is in the nature of expressing a pious hope on the part of the Senate of the United States, an indication that in our judgment it is desirable that we associate ourselves with certain countries. Implementation by treaties would come afterward. But I think the analogy drawn between this proposal and the action taken in the North Atlantic Treaty, brought to the attention of the distinguished Senator, indicates that this is the identical way in which the matter was handled previously, as a suggestion on the part of the Senate.

Mr. RUSSELL. Oh, no.

Mr. WHERRY. The Senator will admit that it is germane. We attempted to accomplish the same thing in the ECA program, in connection with the prohibition against supplying strategic materials.

Mr. RUSSELL. I have raised no point of germaneness.

Mr. WHERRY. No, but I say it is germane.

Mr. RUSSELL. I have grave doubts as to that. It relates to nations which are not members of the North Atlantic Treaty organization. But let us concede it is germane. It raises questions which must be passed upon by all of the pact signatories. The United States cannot act unilaterally in bringing new states into the North Atlantic defense forces. The amendment has nothing to do with the implementation of the existing treaty now under consideration.

Mr. WHERRY. But I desired to call the Senator's attention to the statement of Governor Dewey, "I should like to see it pursued as rapidly as possible," and to the suggestion of the Senator from Georgia, in reply thereto, "We should pursue every diplomatic effort available?"

Mr. RUSSELL. Those are my words.

Mr. WHERRY. This is one way of implementing the North Atlantic Treaty, by pursuing every diplomatic effort available in an effort to get other countries to associate themselves with the present members of the North Atlantic organization.

Mr. RUSSELL. No, I do not agree with the Senator from Nebraska at all. This amendment does not say anything about bringing them into a treaty. It says, "You must revise your defense plans for Europe to bring in these additional states." General Eisenhower is drawing plans for the defense of Europe now, based on the cooperation of people whom we know are with us, and this amendment states it is the sense of the Senate that he ought to revise the defense plan to include certain other nations, without any provision in the resolution even for making sure that the

other nations are willing to come into the plan.

Mr. WHERRY. The preceding paragraph covers that.

Mr. RUSSELL. We have heard a great deal about the fact that Germany now is not willing to come in; but this says, "You must revise your plans for the defense of Europe, to provide for the utilization of the men and resources of west Germany." Western Germany appears to be reluctant about coming in.

Mr. WHERRY. The Senator wants to be fair.

Mr. RUSSELL. I always try to be.

Mr. WHERRY. It is merely a suggestion.

Mr. RUSSELL. I read the language from the resolution.

Mr. WHERRY. But it is merely a suggestion. There is nothing mandatory about it. It merely represents a desire on the part of the Senate that this project be accomplished. The treaty would have to be implemented according to its own processes.

Mr. RUSSELL. The entire resolution represents the sense of the Senate. The discussion of it has been characterized by a great deal of heat, furor, and determination as to the splitting of hairs, the crossing of "t's" and the dotting of "i's." I certainly do not think I am getting so far afield, in saying that in my judgment the adoption of this amendment would be even more half-baked than some of the other arguments I have heard.

Mr. WHERRY. This would carry out exactly the statement made by the distinguished Senator in answer to Governor Dewey, in the committee hearing.

Mr. RUSSELL. The sole reason I took the floor was to explain why I was not supporting this amendment, that I have been as strongly in favor of bringing these nations in as anyone, but that I am not in favor of bringing them in as a catch-all, on a resolution to implement the North Atlantic Treaty. It should be offered as an independent resolution. Its adoption as an amendment to this resolution will only confuse the issue and clutter up the entire implementation of the pact.

Mr. TOBEY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. RUSSELL. I yield to the Senator from New Hampshire.

Mr. TOBEY. It may not be of any import, but I point out to the distinguished Senator from Georgia, whose reputation for fairness is not excelled by any man in this room—

Mr. RUSSELL. I thank the Senator. Mr. TOBEY. Or his ability, either—

Mr. RUSSELL. I thank the Senator again.

Mr. TOBEY. I point out that the statement read by the Senator from Nebraska committed the Senator from Georgia, in his colloquy with Mr. Dewey, to the diplomatic resources of these nations. Is that correct?

Mr. RUSSELL. The Senator is correct, and I urged it, not only when Mr. Dewey was a witness, but when the Secretary of State was a witness. I examined him very vigorously—as vigorously as I could, expressing my opinion that he should exercise every diplomatic

channel available to associate these nations named in this resolution with us in the common cause of resisting communism. But that is quite different from saying it is the sense of the Senate, of which I am a part—that defense plans of Atlantic Pact forces should be revised to admit the nations named in the amendment.

It is not my "sense" that I want all defense plans against aggression changed or held in abeyance until we have a new arrangement based on the association of Spain, and Western Germany, when we do not even know whether they would come in. I think Eisenhower should proceed with his plans based on his present forces. He can revise them later when and if we can work out an agreement with these other nations.

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. RUSSELL. I yield.

Mr. WHERRY. In view of the statement just made by the distinguished Senator from New Hampshire and by the Senator from Georgia, I ask unanimous consent, if the Senator will permit, that the entire colloquy between Governor Dewey and the Senator from Georgia, in the committee hearings to which reference has been made, be inserted in the RECORD at the point where I said I felt that the answer given by the Senator from Georgia, asking for the association of the United States with these countries, covered the question which is now involved in this resolution.

Mr. RUSSELL. I shall be happy to agree to that, and, if the Senator wishes to flatter me further, I should be glad to have him put, at the conclusion of my remarks, the questions I asked of these other witnesses, because I am very strongly in favor of pursuing every proper recourse to associate these people with us in resisting Communist aggression. I am not willing to delay defense preparations on the part of the Atlantic Nations forces.

Mr. WHERRY. The record speaks for itself.

(The excerpt from the hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services of the United States Senate, appears in the RECORD, as exhibit 1, at the conclusion of Mr. RUSSELL's remarks.)

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. RUSSELL. I yield.

Mr. McCARTHY. Does the Senator agree with me that State Department plans, as of today, do not include the use of troops from Western Germany and Spain, and that what we are saying here today is, "Gentlemen, we do not like those plans. Instead of using American boys in Europe, change your plans and use the people of Western Germany and Spain." I am sure the Senator will agree with me that, as of the present moment, General Eisenhower has no power whatever to make use of the available manpower and military resources of Spain or Western Germany. All we are saying, I may say to the Senator from Georgia, with the tremendous respect I have for his intellect,

is that I cannot understand his not appreciating the desirability of this proposal. There is a total of about 1,700,000 men, the only great well of truly anti-Communist manpower in Europe, and our State Department, for some unknown reason, says, "We cannot use them." They said, "General Eisenhower, you cannot use them." We are saying to them, "Gentlemen, change your plans, and let some of those young men die as well as letting American boys die."

Mr. RUSSELL. I think I am as strongly in favor of utilizing these nations as is the Senator from Wisconsin. I have not been so critical of the State Department in certain respects as has the Senator, but I will be equally critical of them for any negligence of which they may have been guilty in not including these nations, if they will come, in any plans for the defense of free Europe.

But I do know that in implementing a treaty we cannot bring into the plan nations which are not signatories of the pact, unless the other signers are willing, in the first instance. I think the State Department, as I have stated in talking to Governor Dewey and other witnesses, should pursue every diplomatic channel to see that these nations are brought in as soon as they can be. I also recall that General Eisenhower in testifying did not think it was proper to bring in any units of Germany at this juncture. He said he wanted no unwilling soldiers in any army which he commanded. I have his statement here. He said:

I am not even going to mention my several conversations in Germany, and for a very specific reason. I personally think that there has to be a political platform achieved and an understanding reached that will contemplate an eventual and earned equality on the part of that nation before we should start to talk about including units of Germans in any kind of an army. I, certainly, for one commander, want no unwilling contingent, no soldiers serving in the pattern of the Hessians who served in our Revolutionary War, serving in any army I command. Therefore, until the political leaders, the diplomats, and the statesmen find the proper answer, it is not for a soldier to delve in too deeply.

Mr. President, I did not rise to debate this amendment. I rose to explain the reasons why I shall vote against it if a record vote is had upon it. I have what I think is a very consistent record of urging every proper means of bringing the nations mentioned in the resolution into a common defense plan. But the amendment has no proper place in the pending resolution.

Mr. McFARLAND. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. RUSSELL. I yield.

Mr. McFARLAND. I commend the Senator for the presentation he has made. I think it is sufficient to reject this amendment.

Mr. GILLETTE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. RUSSELL. I yield.

Mr. GILLETTE. The Senator a short time ago very properly referred to the impossibility of amending the treaty on the floor of the Senate, and invited attention, of course, to the provision of the amendment, that existing plans for the

defense of Europe should be immediately revised.

We are trying to implement, according to our constitutional process, article 3 of the Atlantic Pact, article 10 of which provides as follows:

The parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European state in a position to further the principles of this treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this treaty. Any state so invited may become a party to the treaty by depositing its instrument of accession with the Government of the United States of America. The Government of the United States of America will inform each of the parties of the deposit of each such instrument of accession.

The method is prescribed, is it not?

Mr. RUSSELL. The Senator has correctly stated the procedure necessary to incorporate new members of the pact. The Senate cannot do it.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator from Georgia has expired.

EXHIBIT 1

SPAIN AND NATO

Senator RUSSELL. You mentioned one matter about which I am very much concerned. I feel very strongly that we should use every possible resource and ally that is available to us in this movement to resist Communist aggression. I should like for you to state your views as to whether or not Spain should be included in the defense of Western Europe.

Governor DEWEY. I believe it should be at the earliest possible moment, sir. I should like to say also that that answer would apply to Yugoslavia, and I should like to see Greece and Turkey brought into the North Atlantic Treaty at the earliest possible moment consistent with the diplomatic problems involved.

Senator RUSSELL. In other words, if we can go to bed with Dictator Stalin to defeat Hitler, we should not be too particular about the company of lesser dictators in the present situation.

Governor DEWEY. When my country is in peril, I am not too fussy about the people who will defeat the enemy, sir.

Senator RUSSELL. Thank you for that statement.

That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course you realize there will have to be certain diplomatic arrangements made?

Governor DEWEY. I recognize the difficulty. I am not criticizing our failure to achieve it. I should like to see it pursued as rapidly as possible.

Senator RUSSELL. We should pursue every diplomatic effort available?

Governor DEWEY. Yes, sir; I recognize also there are certain political forces in the center of Europe, and in France, in Italy, and in Britain which make it difficult to bring about the things that I should like to see done with the speed that I should like to see. But I believe that we should move with all possible speed and I believe we are providing enough aid to Europe so that they should be reminded of it as we persuade them to go along.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that all?

Senator RUSSELL. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Spain has a great military background over the past many, many years; is not that true?

Governor DEWEY. Yes, sir.

Mr. IVES. Mr. President, I offer an amendment to the amendment of the Senator from Wisconsin. Before the words "Western Germany" I would insert the words "at least." I do this because I do not think that if we are going

to do anything of this nature it should be confined solely to the four nations which are named. That does not mean that it should include every nation, as has been proposed, but I certainly think it should not be restricted to four nations.

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. IVES. I yield.

Mr. McCARTHY. I am concerned principally with the fact that as of now our commander cannot use the manpower of Spain and Germany, two great wells of anti-Communist manpower.

If Sweden, for example, which is not a member of the pact, has some help it wants to offer General Eisenhower, he should be able to use that help also. So I would not have any objection to the modification suggested by the Senator, and I shall be glad to accept it.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Wisconsin has no further time, he having accepted the amendment.

The question is on agreeing to the amendment of the Senator from Wisconsin [Mr. McCARTHY], as modified.

Mr. LANGER and other Senators asked for the yeas and nays.

The yeas and nays were ordered, and the legislative clerk called the roll.

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. I announce that the Senator from Wyoming [Mr. HUNT] is absent on official business.

The Senator from Minnesota [Mr. HUMPHREY] is necessarily absent.

The Senator from Washington [Mr. MAGNUSON] is absent by leave of the Senate on official committee business.

The Senator from Nevada [Mr. McCARRAN] is absent by leave of the Senate on official business.

The Senator from Tennessee [Mr. McKELLAR] is absent because of illness.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I announce that the Senator from Michigan [Mr. VANDENBERG] is absent by leave of the Senate.

The Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. DUFF] is detained on official business.

The result was announced—yeas 44, nays 45, as follows:

YEAS—44

Bennett	Eaton	Mundt
Brewster	Ferguson	Nixon
Bricker	Flanders	Saltonstall
Bridges	Hendrickson	Schoeppel
Butler, Md.	Hickenlooper	Smith, Maine
Butler, Nebr.	Ives	Smith, N. J.
Cain	Jenner	Taft
Capehart	Knowland	Thye
Carlson	Langer	Watkins
Case	Lodge	Welker
Chavez	McCarthy	Wherry
Cordon	Malone	Wiley
Dirksen	Martin	Williams
Dworschak	Millikin	Young
Eastland	Morse	

NAYS—45

Alken	Green	Kilgore
Anderson	Hayden	Lehman
Benton	Hennings	Long
Byrd	Hill	McClellan
Clements	Hoey	McFarland
Connally	Holland	McMahon
Douglas	Johnson, Colo.	Maybank
Ellender	Johnson, Tex.	Monroney
Frear	Johnston, S. C.	Murray
Fulbright	Kefauver	Neely
George	Kerr	O'Connor
Gillette		O'Mahoney

Pastore	Smathers	Stennis
Robertson	Smith, N. C.	Tobey
Russell	Sparkman	Underwood

NOT VOTING—8

Duff	McCarran	Vandenberg
Humphrey	McKellar	
Hunt	Magnuson	

So Mr. McCARTHY's amendment, as modified, was rejected.

Mr. BRICKER. Mr. President, on behalf of the senior Senator from Oregon [Mr. CORDON], the senior Senator from Utah [Mr. WATKINS] and myself, I move to refer Senate Resolution 99 approving the action of the President of the United States in cooperating in the common defense efforts of the North Atlantic Treaty nations, as amended, to the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services, jointly, with instructions to report back to the Senate forthwith a bill or joint resolution embodying, insofar as possible, the identical language of the resolution, with only such technical modifications in the language thereof as may be necessary.

Mr. President, I think that the vote which we are about to take on the Senate resolution, and later on the concurrent resolution, is as important as any vote which we shall ever be called upon to cast in the Senate. The amendment offered by the Senator from Wisconsin forcibly brings to our attention the seriousness of the situation.

The resolution states:

It is the sense of the Senate that—
The Senate approves the action of the President of the United States—
It is the belief of the Senate—
It is the sense of the Senate—
The Senate herewith approves—
It is the sense of the Senate—

My opinion is that it is the duty of the Senate to legislate on a matter so important as this, and not to express a hope, a sense, a pious resolution, a request, or a ratification of something which the President has done, in my judgment, contrary to the law and power which is granted to him under the Constitution and by statute.

Mr. HICKENLOOPER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. BRICKER. I yield.

Mr. HICKENLOOPER. I should like to say to the Senator from Ohio that I am in thorough accord with his views that there should be either a joint resolution or a bill. I favored such a course consistently in the deliberations of the committees sitting jointly in considering the subject. I thought it was the only way in which the Congress of the United States could discharge its responsibilities. If constitutional processes are to be followed and if the responsibilities of the elected Members of Congress are to be discharged completely, it is my opinion that either a joint resolution, which is acted upon by both branches of Government, the legislative and the executive, or a bill, both having the force and effect of law, should be passed by Congress.

I think it is essential that that be done in the solidification of unity and public opinion in this country, and for the reassurance of our allies.

I commend the Senator from Ohio for his action. I want him to know that I

supported this very proposal in the committee meeting. I supported it in connection with a concurrent resolution, and in connection with the simple Senate resolution. I think there is only one sound solution to this problem, and that is the motion which the Senator now makes.

Mr. BRICKER. I thank the Senator from Iowa for his contribution. I know that in the committee he supported a joint resolution. In fact, the vote in the committee, as I remember, was 12 to 11 against a joint resolution and in favor of a concurrent resolution.

Mr. HICKENLOOPER. The vote was 13 to 11. I have checked it.

Mr. BRICKER. There was a margin of only 2 votes in favor of the measure as presented to the Senate. We have tried in every way under the sun to get the import of these two resolutions now before the Senate into such form that it would ultimately have the force and effect of law, and express the real will of the Congress in a statutory enactment, so that the people of the country, the President of the United States, and the other nations of the world might know what we are doing in the Congress.

Mr. MALONE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. BRICKER. I shall be glad to yield in a moment. Earlier today the leader of the minority [Mr. WHERRY] attempted by unanimous consent to have these resolutions put into the form of a bill or a joint resolution which would mean something. That effort was defeated. Then he tried to accomplish it by motion, and that motion was held by the Chair to be out of order.

There is no other way that we can get an actual, legal determination on the part of the Senate, except by the motion which I have made, which will express the real intent. Our expression should be something more than a request, a wish, a hope, or a pious resolution adopted by the Senate. I have searched the rules. I have searched the law. I have reviewed the Constitution; and I have come to the conclusion that neither a simple Senate resolution nor a concurrent resolution can be used in a situation of this kind, which affects international relations, which affects the conduct of the Army, and which affects the relationship of the President of the United States to the Congress and the division of powers as set forth in the Constitution.

In my judgment this resolution is a sham. It is a fraud. It is a hoax on the American people to adopt a concurrent or simple Senate resolution. The people expect us to do something positive. We are receiving mail day by day asking us, "What are you going to do about sending troops to Europe? What are you going to do, Senator, about this measure that is before the Congress?" The people think that we have something to say about the question. But if we adopt such a resolution as this, it will have no more effect than if we were to write a letter to the President of the United States and say, "This is our desire."

I can understand only a very few reasons why a Senator would not be willing

to stand up and be counted on the question of a law enacted by the Congress, which would have some force and effect. The President of the United States says that we have no power in the premises, and that it is none of our business; that he is going to do the job himself, without any consideration of what the Congress wants or what the Congress does. That may be the reason why some Members of the Senate are willing to go along with a simple or concurrent resolution.

The second reason—and I dislike to think that there is any Member of the Senate who would be actuated by such a reason—is that a Senator might wish to duck his responsibility under the Constitution of the United States to stand up and be counted in connection with a measure which means something to the American people, and in the law. If we vote for the pending resolution we can say that we had nothing to do with this question. When our constituents write us we shall have to say that we voted for a concurrent resolution, which means nothing, and that we have turned this problem over to the President of the United States. We shall have to admit that, if we have any constitutional obligation, we have avoided it; we have stepped aside and turned the job over to the President of the United States.

Mr. President, judging from the letters which I have received from my constituents in Ohio and from citizens all over the United States, the people do not want the President of the United States alone to determine this issue. There is a loss of confidence in the President of the United States because of his past actions. The people do not want to have the Congress abandon its responsibility, abdicate its duty, and turn it over to the President of the United States.

I now yield to the Senator from Nevada.

Mr. MALONE. I should like to ask the distinguished Senator from Ohio if, in fact, the President has not already said that it is none of the business of the Senate or of the House?

Mr. BRICKER. The President has said time and again, "This is my job, and I am going to do it." Whether he believes that or whether he is trying to vindicate his position with respect to Korea, I do not know. He has never said.

Mr. MALONE. Mr. President, will the Senator further yield?

Mr. BRICKER. I yield.

Mr. MALONE. If he has said that, is it not entirely clear that unless he is directed by a congressional act, or by some measure by which he will be bound, that he will send the troops?

Mr. BRICKER. We should act by means of a bill or joint resolution, which the President must either sign or veto.

Mr. MALONE. If such an act is not passed, is it not a foregone conclusion that the President will pay no attention to a resolution?

Mr. BRICKER. He never has done so, and he does not have to under the law. This resolution does not mean anything.

He does not have to obey it. He does not have to do anything that we request. This resolution is simply a request, and he can ignore it if he chooses to do so.

Mr. MALONE. Did he not in effect say that it was none of our business?

Mr. BRICKER. That was the President's statement at the time this question came up. There would have been no resolution at all had it not been for the suspending resolution introduced by the minority leader [Mr. WHERRY]. No doubt by this time the troops would have been on the way to Europe if we had let the President get away with it. Perhaps they are now. I do not know.

Mr. MALONE. In the opinion of the distinguished Senator from Ohio, does this resolution in any way bind the President of the United States to do anything?

Mr. BRICKER. It does not bind anyone to do anything.

Mr. President, I yield 10 minutes to the Senator from Oregon [Mr. CORDON].

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator from Oregon is recognized for 10 minutes.

Mr. CORDON. Mr. President, I rise to support the motion to recommit the resolution. We have been debating this matter not from the standpoint of law but from the standpoint of a pious hope. We have appeared not in the role of legislators but of mendicants or supplicants at the door of the Chief Executive. Either we have the power to do this thing and the responsibility to do it or we have not. Let us determine that question once and for all. We are saying in the pending resolution what we believe, what we hope, and what we desire, but there is no word of command. Let us substitute command for supplication.

Mr. President, not only has criticism been made on the floor of the Senate of the power of the Congress to act in the premises, but the question has been raised as to the judgment of the Congress in this matter. Time after time the statement has been made here that the Congress does not know enough to pass judgment on this question. If that be the case, perhaps we should adopt a resolution which says, in substance, that it is the sense of the Senate of the United States that it does not have sense enough to act in the premises.

Under the terms of the Atlantic Pact, as it was explained and proposed upon this floor, it is the duty of the Congress by law to implement its provisions. This is the time and place to do that. I for one feel that we cannot escape that responsibility.

The junior Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. LODGE] has stated that it might well be necessary that more than four divisions of ground troops be sent to Europe, in order that four divisions of ground troops in Europe might be effective. He has stated that we might need corps headquarters, that we might need this command, that command, and the other command.

Mr. President, the time to determine that question is when we write the law, with command. If four divisions as such are inadequate, when this subject goes back to the committees, let them report back to us the proper language, with the proper descriptive words. Let us have

then before us the mature judgment of the military experts as to what is needed in implementing an international army in preparation for aggression, if aggression comes. I for one would like to vote then for such a force in Europe as is adequate for the purpose. I should like to vote for such a force with the knowledge that its complement in Europe will be produced by Europe. Then we will have something that I can understand, something that we all can understand. We cannot have it by this silly, idle, futile, and useless expression of hopes and fears and approval. Here we have the opportunity to do the thing the people expect us to do, that it is our responsibility to do, and, Mr. President, I feel that every Member of the Senate today owes it to his constituents to take action in terms of law.

Mr. MALONE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. CORDON. I have only a few minutes. I hope the Senator will ask for time later.

We do not know what will follow the sending of four divisions to Europe. We do not know what other plans may be in the making. We do not know the extent to which the American Nation will be called upon, not to go along with self-help and mutual help, but to carry the whole load. We ought to know it. The American people are entitled to know it. The boys who are going to be conscripted into Europe for defense have a right to know what they will have to do. They should know that they are not to carry the load of the world if there be aggression. There is only one thing to do, that is to maintain in the Congress its control of this operation. We can do it here, Mr. President. There is no reason in God's wide world why a plan cannot be brought in by the committees that will be specific, that will carry out the command of the Congress as to its conclusion, and the prohibition by the Congress that it cannot be exceeded until the Congress itself, as the representative of the people, has agreed to the change.

Mr. MALONE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. CORDON. I yield.

Mr. MALONE. I should like to ask the distinguished Senator from Oregon if there has ever been any doubt that we were going to send troops to Europe as the final objective, from the time the Senator from Michigan [Mr. VANDENBERG] submitted the Vandenberg resolutions asking the President to enter into treaties, pacts, and agreements for the "progressive development of regional and other collective arrangements." Has there ever been any doubt as to what was the final objective, in the minds of the administration since the Vandenberg resolutions were submitted on June 11, 1948?

Mr. CORDON. There has never been any expression of any view other than that the Congress would implement the treaty by law. Mr. President, it is the duty of Congress to do so.

I yield any unexpired time to the Senator from Ohio [Mr. BRICKER].

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator from Oregon used 7 minutes.

Mr. BRICKER. Mr. President, may I ask if the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, or the majority leader, desires to proceed at this time?

Mr. LODGE. Mr. President, will the Senator from Texas yield me time to oppose the motion?

Mr. CONNALLY. I yield 5 minutes to the Senator from Massachusetts.

Mr. LODGE. Mr. President, I think that, broadly speaking, it would be better if we had had a joint resolution. I introduced one originally, not on legal grounds, because, as I keep insisting, this is a strategic question essentially, but because we can get national unity better with something to which the Senate and the House has taken part and which the President has signed. That was a long time ago.

Now things have reached the point where I believe we would make a great mistake if we were to recommit the resolution to the two committees on any terms whatever.

Let me say that I do not stand here holding a brief for the President. As I said earlier today, I was one of those who did everything I could in 1948 to thwart his political ambitions, and I do not consider that is what is at stake here. I think if we want to do this on personal and individual terms, we should do it in terms of whether we have confidence in General Eisenhower, whether we have confidence in the men whose strategic brains and military ability enabled us to win World War II, and whose advice was very much respected at the time, but for some reason it seems now that some of us do not want to take it.

General Eisenhower said yesterday, when he assumed command of the Army in Europe, that any delay in congressional action on defense measures would delay the whole preparation of defense of Western Europe:

Anything done which would indicate reluctance on the part of any country to get into this pool of cold water would delay the whole preparation of defense.

That is what he said yesterday.

In the hearings before the committee he said:

Now, because this job is so difficult, there is no question that you gentlemen can ask me that I won't attempt to answer if I think I have any opinion or any fact that is worth expressing. The need for complete information by all is clear. When we stop to think of what I must do and what my staff must do with respect to 11 other countries.

And listen to this, Mr. President:

If we are divided behind on basic principle, it would be fatal and would be hopeless, and you might as well assign me to the middle of the Atlantic as to Europe.

Then he said later, speaking in answer to the Senator from New Jersey [Mr. SMITH]:

Senator SMITH, I believe that unless there is, generally speaking, a community of understanding, a unanimity of understanding of what we must do, and a determination to do it, this thing is hopeless. I believe it thoroughly.

Mr. President, I think that if we recommit the resolution we are, in effect, saying: "General Eisenhower, come

home." I think that if we recommit the resolution we will be giving notice to the nations of Europe that we are no longer interested in the alliance of free peoples against communism, as this alliance is expressed in the North Atlantic Pact.

Mr. President, that is a gruesome responsibility. There is no use in being under any illusion.

Mr. BRICKER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. LODGE. I yield.

Mr. BRICKER. Does not the Senator realize that under the motion which the Senator from Ohio submitted a moment ago it would not take 15 minutes for the committee to change this measure and make it into a joint resolution instead of a concurrent or a Senate resolution?

Mr. LODGE. I wish I could agree with my able friend from Ohio, but knowing the committees as I do—

Mr. BRICKER. We have already had the measures prepared and presented to us, and it is a very simple matter to make a joint resolution out of a simple resolution.

Mr. LODGE. If the Senator knew as much about the situation inside those two committees as I do, he would realize that if the matter ever gets back into those two committees it will never come out, and there will be the most incredible deadlock that can be imagined.

Mr. BRICKER. Does the Senator mean to say that under direction of the Senate of the United States the committees would not report immediately the resolution, as amended, as a joint resolution?

Mr. LODGE. I mean that precisely. That is exactly what happened in the case of the Wherry resolution. The Wherry resolution told us to report by February 2. We did not do so.

Mr. BRICKER. That is not the fault of the Senate. That is the fault of the committee.

Mr. LODGE. I am not saying whose fault it is. I am saying what is going to happen. If the resolution is recommitted to the committees the Senate will be telling General Eisenhower "Come home." We will be saying to the world, "We do not care any more about the Atlantic Pact, or the alliance of free people in the struggle against communism."

Mr. President, I sometimes wonder what goes through our minds here. There is a saying that Congress either goes crazy or goes fishing. It seems to be hard for us to maintain a steady support of long-range military and foreign policy.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The time of the Senator from Massachusetts has expired.

Mr. LODGE. I ask the Senator from Texas if he will give me two more minutes.

Mr. CONNALLY. I am sorry. I can give the Senator but 1 minute.

Mr. LODGE. Very well.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator from Massachusetts is recognized for 1 minute.

Mr. LODGE. Last autumn, at the time of the Korean aggression, there was an outcry because we were not mobiliz-

ing enough. Members of Congress were demanding, "Why do we not call out the National Guard?" But now we have trouble adopting a resolution approving four divisions. Why this tremendous change in attitude? Has the world situation changed, or has our way of looking at it changed? In the autumn we were surprised at communistic imperialism. Now we have gotten used to it. But the menace of communistic imperialism is just as real as it ever was.

The resolution is not perfect, as I have already indicated. It is a compromise. There are things in it I do not like. But in the interest of our own self-defense we should not recommit it. We should adopt it by a large majority.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Does either the Senator from Texas or the Senator from Ohio desire to use time at this point?

Mr. McFARLAND. Mr. President—

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, will the Senator yield 5 minutes to me?

Mr. CONNALLY. First, Mr. President, I yield to the Senator from Arizona.

The VICE PRESIDENT. How much time does the Senator from Texas yield to the Senator from Arizona?

Mr. CONNALLY. I yield 10 minutes to the Senator from Arizona.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Very well; the Senator from Arizona is recognized for 10 minutes.

Mr. McFARLAND. Mr. President, I am unalterably and unequivocally opposed to the motion to recommit the pending resolution to committees, with or without instructions. In my opinion such action would be misconstrued and misunderstood all over the world, and could have the most tragic consequences for us and for the world.

Frankly—and I say this reluctantly, but with all sincerity—recommitment of this resolution at this time would be hailed as a victory for the Kremlin in its policies of isolating the United States from the rest of the world. I suggest that it would bring dismay to our friends, and would permit our enemies to shout, "We told you so."

Mr. President, if we voted to recommit the resolution, we would ignore the long and patient consideration given this problem for many weeks by 26 of the most eminent Members of this body, both Republicans and Democrats. The resolution was reported unanimously to the Senate.

I venture the assertion that those who propose recommitment—however wise, however well-intentioned, however well-informed, and however confident of their own judgments—do not and cannot know the facts as well as do the distinguished members of the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services who heard the testimony of the many expert witnesses who appeared before them.

Regardless of whether we approve or disapprove the language of the Senate resolution reported by these two committees, all of us recognize that the eminent members of these committees have reached substantial agreement on the vital necessity of sending troops to Europe.

After hearing many important witnesses, including the top leaders of our Armed Forces, those Senators have given eloquent recognition to the fact—and I quote from the report—that—

The free nations of Europe are vital centers of civilization, and their subjugation by totalitarian forces would weaken and endanger the defensive capacity of the United States and the other free nations.

The members of these two great committees have declared, in both of the resolutions they have reported, that—

The threat to the security of the United States and our North Atlantic Treaty partners makes it necessary for the United States to station abroad such units of our Armed Forces as may be necessary and appropriate to contribute our fair share of the forces needed for the joint defense of the North Atlantic area.

Let us keep these two points clearly in mind.

Let us keep before us the knowledge that the defense of Western Europe is vital to the defense of the United States. Let us remind ourselves, over and over again, that the threat to our national security is so great that we must send some of our troops abroad for the protection of the United States.

I do not think anyone can correctly deny that America would be in terrible danger if the Communist armies conquered Western Europe.

I do not think anyone can correctly deny that such a conquest would make the forces of communism immensely stronger, and the forces of freedom very much weaker.

I do not think anyone can correctly deny that the leaders of Soviet communism may launch an attack on the Atlantic nations at any time. We have pledged ourselves to fight beside these nations if such an attack should come. Even those who oppose sending troops to Europe, or those who advocate limiting the number to be sent, state emphatically that we must join in the defense of the Atlantic nations in the event of actual warfare.

I have always been certain of the President's constitutional authority to send troops to Europe; but I have also urged the Senate, from the very beginning, to adopt a resolution approving this policy, so that we would have a united front and would not be quibbling over questions of authority, when the important thing was to show the world that we were united and determined to stand with the free nations against aggression. I wanted the Senate to have the opportunity of demonstrating to the commissars in the Kremlin that we are firm in our purpose of strengthening the free world to prevent Communist conquest.

Some of the debate has revolved around ambiguities in paragraph 6. That paragraph has been amended. It is not satisfactory to me now; it was not satisfactory to me in the beginning. I think the amendment which was added to it will be misunderstood by the nations on the other side of the ocean. However, Mr. President, we would be further misunderstood if we recommended the resolution. We cannot afford to take such a chance at this time.

Certainly, at this late date, after many weeks of debate, to send the resolution back to committee would be a direct slap at General Eisenhower and the great work he is doing in Europe. It would be a slap at our allies; it would be a vote of no confidence in our historic friend, France, whose Chief Magistrate we heard yesterday in a moving and compelling address.

Mr. President, we do not have all the time in the world to act upon this question. This is a crucial year in the history of mankind, and we may be approaching the most dangerous months of this critical year—the spring and summer months when war or peace may hang in a very delicate balance.

If we bogged down now, if we declared that all our weeks of high debate had led us to a dead end, if we voted to throw this resolution back into a joint committee for more weeks of arguments, we would be taking a fearful gamble with the safety of our country and the security of the free world.

If we took any such step, we would gravely weaken and threaten the last best hope of mankind—the democratic way of life. We would arouse a feeling of disgust in the hearts of many millions of people around the globe. We would encourage those who mock and scoff at representative government.

If the Senate recommitted this resolution, men all over the world would ask themselves: "Is that the way democracy works? Are the Senators of the United States unable to make a decision after all these weeks of arguing? Is the defense of the free world to wait while the Senators try to find new arguments?"

Mr. President, we cannot afford to postpone any longer our decision on this issue. We have explored it thoroughly. We have debated it from every angle.

Let us act upon this matter now, one way or another. Let us meet the issue squarely. We cannot evade it by attempting to start over again in new committee hearings. We do not have the time for that. The world will not wait.

Let us remember that the decision to send American troops to Europe—to serve under General Eisenhower—was made by the best military brains in America. It was not a political decision. It was not a decision made overnight by the Chief Executive in the White House, although the final responsibility rests upon him.

The decision came from the urgent recommendations of men who led Americans to victory after victory in World War II—General Marshall, General Eisenhower, General Bradley, Admiral Sherman, General Vandenberg. Surely, everyone will agree that Members of the Senate do not know more about military strategy and the defense of America than do these men who have devoted their lives to becoming experts in military science. I believe the records of history show that our generals and our admirals proved their brilliance and their skill in the most severe test of all—the test of battle.

In my humble opinion—and it is not my opinion alone, but is the opinion of many keen observers—we are greatly

blessed at this hour because we have such great men heading our Armed Forces. I rely upon such men as George Marshall, Omar Bradley, Dwight Eisenhower, and Douglas MacArthur. I have confidence in their judgment and integrity, and I am glad we have a President who heeds their advice.

I believe the President has shown many signs of his desire to cooperate with Congress. Close cooperation between the Congress and the President in this dark hour of history is essential for our survival. The lives and welfare of all Americans are at stake in this crisis. We must not jeopardize the safety of America by engaging in bitter quarrels over the relative powers of the executive and legislative branches of our Government.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. UNDERWOOD in the chair). The time of the Senator from Arizona has expired.

Mr. McFARLAND. Mr. President, will the Senator from Texas yield two more minutes to me?

Mr. CONNALLY. Mr. President, I yield to the Senator from Arizona all of the time remaining to me, which I believe is 2 minutes.

Mr. McFARLAND. Mr. President, I shall try not to use that much time.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Very well; the Senator from Arizona is recognized for two more minutes.

Mr. McFARLAND. Mr. President, with good will on both sides, we can take the big steps all of us regard as vital for the defense of the free world. But if we take this question of troops for Europe as a pretext for an angry struggle, we may open the gates for the Red hordes of communism and may bring about the downfall of America in a world enslaved.

While some politics has, of course, been injected into this issue, it is a pleasure for me to note that our differences have not followed party lines. The fact that when all is said and done, we have risen above partisan politics, in our efforts to meet the emergency, speaks well for democracy and for the strength of our convictions.

I have deep confidence in the patriotism and integrity of every Senator and every Member of the House of Representatives. I know we are going to act upon this vital question in the true spirit of Americanism, placing the welfare of our country and the welfare of the free world above all other considerations.

I hope the motion to recommit will be overwhelmingly rejected.

Mr. President, we cannot afford to take the chance of recommitting the resolution. We must act, and act now. It would be worse than ever, to attempt to now improve the language by sending it back, because that action would be misunderstood by the Atlantic Pact nations. Their safety is involved. Our safety is involved. The safety of the world is involved. The peace of the world is involved. I hope that this motion will be defeated.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to place in the RECORD at this point an editorial entitled "A Damaging Amendment," from the New York Times

of this morning. Would that I had time to read it.

Mr. CONNALLY. Mr. President, I will give the Senator time to read it.

Mr. McFARLAND. Then, Mr. President, I shall read it:

The adoption by the Senate yesterday of the McClellan amendment to the Troops-for-Europe resolution will be a serious setback for the administration if it remains in the final version of this measure.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator's time has expired.

Mr. TOBEY. I ask unanimous consent that the Senator be given one minute more.

Mr. BRICKER. I object to that. Let them use their own time.

Mr. WHERRY. It is out of the time of the Senator from Texas.

Mr. CONNALLY. I give the Senator one more minute.

Mr. McFARLAND. I thank the Senator. The editorial continues:

The amendment declares it to be the sense of the Senate that not more than four American divisions shall be sent to Western Europe in implementation of the North Atlantic Treaty "without further congressional approval." The inclusion of this amendment in the resolution would confront the President with a situation in which he would have to choose either to ignore "the sense of the Senate" or to come back to Congress for additional approval whenever he believed that sound public policy required this country to augment its forces in Europe.

The amendment is an unwarranted and highly questionable attempt on the part of the Senate to trespass on the proper domain of the Executive. It handicaps the Executive in his direction of the Nation's foreign policy and casts doubt on the purposes of Congress. We hope that the amendment will be stricken from the resolution when the Senate resumes debate today. The shift of a few votes would do it.

Mr. President, unfortunately we do not have the votes to strike the amendment which the New York Times so eloquently dismisses.

Mr. BRICKER. Mr. President, I yield 5 minutes to my colleague, the Senator from Ohio [Mr. TAFT].

Mr. TAFT. Mr. President, it seems the argument, that Europe is not going to understand the parliamentary problems of the United States Senate, is the poorest argument against a motion I have ever heard. The House of Representatives frequently amends bills by motion to recommit to the committee with instructions to report back. That is all this is. The parliamentary rules of the Senate do not permit us by amendment to convert a concurrent resolution into a joint resolution. This is the only way that result can be accomplished. The committee considered this question, and they only voted down a joint resolution by a vote of 13 to 11. The Senator now says in effect that, because Europe is not going to understand the parliamentary procedures of the United States Senate, if we should do it in this form, it is going to upset Europe, and that General Eisenhower will be asked to resign.

Mr. McFARLAND. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. TAFT. I am sorry, I have not the time. The motion proposes to recommit

the resolution with instructions that the committees forthwith report back to the Senate a bill or joint resolution embodying as far as possible the identical language of such resolution, as amended, with only such technical modifications in the language thereof as may be necessary. In other words, it will be necessary to change "Senate," "Congress," and a few other words, to make it serve as a joint resolution. The committees can meet. The committees can report back this evening, so far as that is concerned. We can remain here while the committees meet, and wait until they report, if that is desirable. It is simply a parliamentary method of amending a concurrent resolution to make of it a joint resolution.

So far as the actual procedure is concerned, the pledges given by the State Department do not relate to a concurrent resolution, which I think is better than nothing. It is a declaration of the Senate as to what Senators think. But on July 11, the Senator from Michigan [Mr. VANDENBERG], quoting the State Department, said:

I have the following answer from the Department, and with the indulgence of the Senator from New Jersey, if he will permit me, I should like to read it:

"Any future military-assistance programs involving Atlantic Pact countries will be prepared and submitted to the Congress on the basis of recommendations which will be made by the organization to be established under article 9 of the treaty."

That did not mean a submission to Congress for its advice, or to have a concurrent resolution adopted. It meant the submission to Congress of an authorization bill. That is what the State Department promised. If we are relying upon their statement, if we are acting now for that purpose, it seems to me that there is required a joint resolution rather than a concurrent resolution, a definite legal enactment by the Senate instead of simply a declaration of the Senate's opinion.

The Senate's opinion, I am glad to have. I am glad to have it in as emphatic a form as it is now, with the amendment of the Senator from Arkansas; but certainly what we are entitled to, and what Congress ought to enact, is not a concurrent resolution expressing the opinion of Congress, but an actual legal authorization of this project, within the limitations which the Congress has seen fit to impose upon it.

Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, I rise to a parliamentary inquiry, which I hope will not be charged to the time of anyone.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator from Vermont will state his inquiry.

Mr. AIKEN. If the motion of the Senator from Ohio [Mr. BRICKER] is agreed to by the Senate the resolution will be recommitted with instructions to the committees to report forthwith a joint resolution. Will such joint resolution then be treated on the floor of the Senate as a new resolution? Will it be subject to unrestricted debate? Will it be subject to amendments, as a new bill would be, or as a new joint resolution would be?

The VICE PRESIDENT. If the motion is agreed to and the committee reports a joint resolution, it will come back to the Senate and will be taken up ab initio, as any other resolution or bill, and the unanimous consent agreement under which we are operating now would have no effect.

Mr. AIKEN. That answers my question. It confirms my belief.

Mr. TAFT. I should like to ask my colleague, the Senator from Ohio [Mr. BRICKER], if he sees any reason why we should not immediately enter into a unanimous consent agreement, with the same limitations as the present one? I take it the Senator is at least willing to support such an effort.

Mr. BRICKER. I should be very glad to do so. In fact, I think it is the way the matter should be handled; that is, to ask unanimous consent that the committee report back, and that the unanimous consent agreement apply, with 1 hour of debate on each side of the measure.

Mr. FERGUSON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. BRICKER. How much time does the Senator desire?

Mr. FERGUSON. Three minutes.

Mr. BRICKER. I yield the Senator 3 minutes.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator from Michigan is recognized for 3 minutes.

Mr. FERGUSON. Mr. President, it has been stated today on the floor of the Senate that we, in this Chamber, must conduct ourselves so that people in other lands cannot fail to understand us. I realize that there are many people who do not understand that we have a representative republic in the United States, nor the processes through which it works. But it is in defense of that republic that we should speak and that we should act. We should tell the people of the world, as well as the people of this country, that we will defend that republic on the floor of the Senate and on the floor of the House as well as on the battlefield. That is why we are now debating this important question, which goes to the root meanings of our republican form of government. I for one am not hesitant to defend its principles and its security abroad, but I insist first that we must defend its principles at home, within the walls of this Chamber.

Yesterday's critical vote on the McClellan amendment made one fact abundantly clear. It is the opinion of the Senate that further implementation of the Atlantic Pact is a function of Congress. That is an all-important assertion of adherence to constitutional process.

Unfortunately, it remains meaningless so long as it is embodied in a form which has no constitutional meaning or legal effect. It is a mere pious declaration.

The entire story was succinctly stated in a subheading in this morning's New York Times. In bold print we read there of yesterday's action, as follows:

NO FORCE OF LAW IN IT

In other words, when they disagree with what the Senate of the United

States has done, they come forth with a headline emphasizing the fact that the Senate action has no force of law. Why can we not make it have force of law, by passing a joint resolution?

Mr. President, if we are actually to assert the constitutional issues which were represented in yesterday's vote, we must now vote to recommit this resolution with instructions to report back forthwith a joint resolution which will have real constitutional meaning and legal effect.

I have previously stated that the constitutional issue is primary, and supercedes the policy question of how the North Atlantic Pact shall be implemented in terms of manpower and material. What is involved is the cardinal principle of constitutional controls, which make up the system of checks and balances which is the greatest guarantor of our liberties.

The pact itself conceived an assertion of constitutional processes. Current interpretations of the pact left no doubt that constitutional processes meant implementation under congressional authority. When the same words were used in the United Nations Charter, they were interpreted to mean that it was Congress which had to implement that charter with the furnishing of arms and materials.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The time of the Senator from Michigan has expired.

Mr. FERGUSON. Mr. President, I should like to have half a minute.

Mr. BRICKER. I yield half a minute to the Senator from Michigan.

Mr. FERGUSON. Mr. President, that authority can be asserted only in an act with legal effect. A pious petition to the President which is all the present resolution amounts to, does not discharge our responsibility.

It would be a sham and a deception if we were to leave our assertion of proper congressional function in its present form. A joint resolution is the proper form to give our expression meaning. Anything short of that is hypocrisy, and, in final analysis, a violation of the principle which was asserted yesterday.

Mr. President, the pending motion to recommit does not mean a delay. I realize that some Senators, like myself, want to implement the pact in proper form but may be concerned about the possible delay involved in putting our expression in proper constitutional form.

A joint resolution can be reported to the Senate forthwith, and I am sure the Senate will then limit its debate in order that it may operate promptly but in a legal, constitutional way.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The time of the Senator has expired.

Mr. BRICKER. Mr. President, I yield the remainder of my time to the Senator from Utah [Mr. WATKINS].

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator from Utah is recognized for 4 minutes. The Senator from Ohio has yielded his remaining time, which is 4 minutes.

Mr. WATKINS. Mr. President, the majority leader said the world will not wait. I ask the majority leader what the world has been doing for nearly 2 years since we ratified and approved the At-

lantic Pact. In the face of the great dangers which have been confronting us, why has its implementation been put off all this time and suddenly has become a great emergency?

Mr. President, the principles here involved are greater than—

Mr. McFARLAND. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. WATKINS. I have only 4 minutes.

The principles involved are greater than any American, no matter how distinguished he may be. I yield to no one in my admiration of General Eisenhower and General Marshall. The question is, Will the United States do its duty?

Its duty under the Constitution is to provide the armies to implement the pact. The United Nations provided for an international army. The majority leader, the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, and nearly every Senator who was a member of this body in 1945, voted to implement that international force by passing a joint resolution or an act. The President of the United States joined in. This is what he said under those circumstances.

During the debate in the Senate upon the matter of the Senate's giving its advice and consent to the Charter of the United Nations, the question arose as to the method to be followed in obtaining approval of the special agreements with the Security Council referred to in article 43 of the charter. It was stated by many Senators that this might be done in the United States, either by treaty or by approval of a majority of both Houses of Congress. It was also stated that the initiative in this matter rested with the President, and that it was most important to know before action was taken on the charter which course was to be pursued.

When any such agreement or agreements are negotiated, it will be my purpose to ask the Congress by appropriate legislation to approve them.

The Congress acted and approved the United Nations Charter, and in 1945 it passed the Participation Act.

In 1949 there was another instrument which attempted to establish an international army. We were told repeatedly that it would be implemented according to our constitutional processes, by an act of Congress. Immediately thereafter there was an implementation with respect to armaments. There was a limitation. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, the President of the United States, and the generals were interested in armaments. Yet that authorization act had a limitation in it. It was limited by the amount of cash that was appropriated or authorized. The generals could not go beyond the amount fixed. That certainly was a military matter—

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator's time has expired.

Mr. WATKINS. Mr. President, the motion should be agreed to.

Mr. CONNALLY. Mr. President, if the motion to recommit should prevail, which I hope it will not, we must go all over what we have been doing for more than 2 months. The work began in committee on February 1. Senators have heard the debate on the floor of the Senate. Do they want more of the same? Do they want another dose?

Mr. President, the Senate ought to know its own mind. It has expressed its mind. We have before us a resolution and an accompanying concurrent resolution for action by the Senate. Some Senators say, "I have thought of something which I did not think of previously, and I want another bite at the cherry." Are we to call that a constitutional process?

I personally did not believe it was wise or necessary to have this resolution. I was content in the joint meeting of the committees, as was the Senator from Georgia [Mr. RUSSELL], to present a resolution which, in substance, is the resolution now before the Senate. It is a resolution which recognizes and approves the sending of four divisions to Western Europe and the appointment of General Eisenhower.

Mr. President, what are our objectives with regard to these matters? We are not simply sending a group of soldiers to Western Europe. We are trying to protect the interests of the United States and its people. We believe the best way to do it is to make strong the people of Western Germany and of Europe.

Therefore by sending the divisions to Western Europe we would encourage those nations to build up their strength. We would actually add to their strength. We would encourage them and stimulate them to exert themselves to their utmost. In that light we are planning and devising systems of protecting the United States against Communist attack from the Red hordes.

Oh, Mr. President, it is wholly useless to send the resolution back to the committees. The Senators who are urging that it be recommitted have had their day in court. They have been here. They have been vocal. They have been waving the flag. They have been talking about constitutional processes, and all the other processes that they have cared to invoke. It is absolutely foolish and useless and beside the question to recommit the resolution to the committees. I say to the Senators: "You have chewed on this bone until you have got all the meat off it." I ask the Senators: "Do you want to send it back and then chew on it again just because it is a bone? Do you want to go back and chew on it some more?"

Mr. President, we have already used up 2 months. We have used up two solid months. The committees get tired after a while. The Senate does not seem to get tired, if Senators can get some fetish or some old mouth-pulling phrase about "implementing the North Atlantic Treaty" or about "constitutional processes."

Mr. President, some reference has been made to what I said when I gave expression to some ideas with regard to the North Atlantic Treaty. I have a statement before me which I ask to have printed, not as a part of my speech, but as a statement in connection with my remarks.

There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

Mr. President, during the debate of the past few weeks there have been many references to what are called assurances or

commitments which I am supposed to have given during consideration of the North Atlantic Treaty. It has been charged that I then asserted, in effect, that no troops would be sent to Europe in implementation of the North Atlantic Treaty without congressional approval. It has also been charged that the senior Senator from Michigan [Mr. VANDENBERG] gave similar assurances to the Senate and that the Secretary of State clearly indicated that no troops were to be sent to Europe in implementation of the treaty without congressional approval.

While I cannot speak for the absent senior Senator from Michigan on this matter or tell you what may have been on the mind of Mr. Acheson in commenting on the implementation of the treaty, I do want to set the record clear as to exactly what I said and what I had in mind.

On July 21, 1949, the day the Senate approved the North Atlantic Treaty, I stated that under article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty:

"We are not specifically obligated to furnish anything. There is nothing in the treaty that says we shall give them tanks or bombs or arms."

I added that if in our honest judgment it later turned out that consideration should be given to supplying arms, then it would be for the people of the United States, through the Congress, to determine whether it was desirable or suitable, under article 3, to give or to furnish them arms.

It is this statement, apparently, which has been construed to mean that I promised that if additional American troops were to be sent to Europe, congressional approval would be obtained. That is not the case. I was talking about and thinking about arms and war materials and specifically referred to "tanks or bombs or arms." I was not thinking and did not refer to American troops.

The fact is, of course, that I and most of my colleagues had in mind the administration proposal to supply certain military equipment to our Atlantic Pact allies. It is hindsight which now makes many of my colleagues read the word "troops" into article 3.

It is true that during hearings on the North Atlantic Pact several pointed questions were raised as to whether or not it was contemplated sending masses of American troops to Western Europe to implement the pact, and the answer we always got was clear and unequivocal. There were no plans then to send additional American troops to Europe. However, for my part when we were talking about implementing article 3 as well as other parts of the treaty by constitutional processes, I had in mind the projected proposals for sending military equipment to our allies. I did not have in mind the matter of dispatching troops.

I might add that if someone had asked me in 1949 whether Congress would have had to approve any plan of the President to send American troops to Western Europe in connection with giving effect to article 3, I should undoubtedly have replied in the negative. Article 9 of the treaty made it clear that the treaty was to be implemented in accordance with constitutional processes. The report of the committee on the treaty states that this article "does not increase, decrease, or change the power of the President as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces or impair the full authority of Congress to declare war." To me that means that if the President had authority to send American troops abroad prior to the Atlantic Pact, then the treaty did not take that constitutional power away from the President.

I should like to add, however, that regardless of the question of constitutional authority, I believe it would be most helpful for the President to have the full backing of the Congress in this important enterprise. For

that reason I intend to support the resolutions which are now before us.

Mr. CONNALLY. The statement sets forth very clearly what I had to say. I made the point that the treaty itself did not require the furnishing of anything. It did not. It was simply a general obligation, after we had joined to build up our strength and purpose, for unity, in resisting communism. The details were left for future consideration. Therefore, it was perfectly correct to say that the treaty did not require any particular action. Later on the question of arms was considered. At no time in those preliminary meetings was the question of troops even mentioned. It was left to the future. It was left to the patriotism and judgment and good will of those who were to act together. I was thinking about arms and war materials, and specifically referred to tanks, bombs, or arms. I was not thinking and did not refer to American troops. The fact is that I and most of my colleagues had in mind the administration proposal to supply certain military equipment to our Atlantic Pact allies. It is hindsight which now makes many of my colleagues read the word "troops" into article 3.

Mr. WATKINS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. CONNALLY. If it is a short one.

Mr. WATKINS. It is. Did not the Senator assure me and the Senate, when I offered my reservation with reference to troops, that it was all taken care of in article 11; and is that not the reason why many Senators who voted in favor of ratification would have voted otherwise, except for the assurance of the Senator from Texas?

Mr. CONNALLY. That referred to article 5, not to the other article.

Mr. WATKINS. My reservation was—

Mr. CONNALLY. Just a minute please. I have not yielded to the Senator again. I yielded to him once. I decline to yield further. Mr. President, it is true that the resolution expresses the views of the Senate and the hopes of the Senate. That is all the authority we have. That is all we can do. We cannot pass a law. Senators admit it. We cannot change the Constitution by a resolution of the Senate. We cannot amend the solemn foundation of our constitutional system. All we can do is to express the sense of the Senate—or the nonsense of the Senate, probably. That is all we can do. I very much hope—

The VICE PRESIDENT. The time of the Senator has expired.

Mr. CONNALLY. I hope very much that the Senate will reject the motion.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator's time has expired. All time for debate has expired.

Mr. CAIN and Mr. McMAHON addressed the Chair.

The VICE PRESIDENT. For what purpose does the Senator from Connecticut rise?

Mr. McMAHON. I rise to amend the instructions in the motion to refer the resolution by striking out the word "forthwith" and inserting in lieu thereof the words "on April 4, 1951."

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator's amendment is in order.

Mr. McMAHON. I think it will be recognized that the offer is in the nature of a strategem in order to gain more time, and I accordingly offer to the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations additional time, if he feels that he had not concluded his statement.

Mr. CONNALLY. I do not wish to take all the time.

Mr. McMAHON. I should like to yield, I will say, 3 minutes to the Senator from Texas so that he may answer questions.

Mr. CONNALLY. I do not care to answer any questions.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator from Connecticut controls 30 minutes. Under the unanimous-consent agreement the Senator from Texas controls 30 minutes.

Mr. CONNALLY. I have 30 minutes?

The VICE PRESIDENT. That is correct.

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, a parliamentary inquiry.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator will state it.

Mr. WHERRY. What has happened to the unexpired time of the distinguished Senator from Texas, in opposition to the motion?

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator's time was exhausted.

Mr. WHERRY. I thank the Chair.

Mr. WATKINS. Mr. President, a parliamentary inquiry.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator will state it.

Mr. WATKINS. Who controls the time of the opposition on the motion of the Senator from Connecticut?

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator from Texas controls the time of the opposition, under the unanimous-consent agreement.

Mr. WATKINS. Do I understand that the Senator from Texas controls the time on both sides of the motion?

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator from Texas controls the time in opposition. The Senator from Connecticut controls the time in favor of his amendment.

Mr. WATKINS. I understood the motion was the motion of the Senator from Ohio [Mr. BRICKER], the Senator from Oregon [Mr. CORDON], and myself.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator from Connecticut has moved to amend the motion of the Senator from Ohio [Mr. BRICKER] with regard to the instructions contained in the motion.

Mr. BRICKER. Mr. President, a parliamentary inquiry.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator will state it.

Mr. BRICKER. Is not the time for debate in opposition to the amendment offered by the Senator from Connecticut in the control of the Senator from Ohio?

The VICE PRESIDENT. Under the unanimous-consent agreement it would not seem so. The Chair did not make the agreement. The Chair is only attempting to interpret the agreement. Under the agreement the chairman of the committee seems to be entitled to control the time in opposition.

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, a parliamentary inquiry.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator will state it.

Mr. WHERRY. Does not the unanimous-consent agreement provide, with respect to time on amendments, that the distinguished Senator from Texas [Mr. CONNALLY] shall have control of the opposition? I understand that a motion may not be an amendment, but certainly the Senator who makes the motion should have control of the time.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The same language is used in the unanimous-consent agreement with regard to an amendment or a motion.

Mr. McMAHON. Mr. President, I yield 2 minutes to the Senator from New Mexico.

Mr. ANDERSON. Mr. President, I wish only to call attention to the fact that the Senate has spent a long, long time on this resolution. The committee has spent an even longer time. If it is now recommitted to the committee and is reported in a different form, as I understand, under the ruling of the Chair, it will come back to the Senate as an absolutely new measure, and debate on it can last for many more weeks. Under those circumstances we would do ourselves great injustice by sending the resolution back to the committee.

It seems to me that if we are to spend a long time discussing a new resolution we have wasted a great deal of time on the resolution which is now pending. It may be said, of course, that it might be possible to obtain a unanimous-consent agreement. However, there are Senators who do not like some of the amendments made to the resolution. Those Senators, of course, would naturally want to open up the entire question again.

I did not vote for the amendment of the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. McCLELLAN]. I voted against it at every opportunity, but by democratic processes it was adopted, and I would vote for the resolution containing it. If a new measure containing that provision were to come back to the Senate, I know that the Senator from Arkansas would recognize my right to discuss it and debate it with him all over again. I have no desire to do that. I think the time of the Senate would be badly wasted if we went back into these questions again and again.

I express the hope that the resolution will not be recommitted and brought back, for us to discuss over and over again questions upon which we have spent days and upon which the committee has spent weeks.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Mr. President, a parliamentary inquiry.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator will state it.

Mr. KNOWLAND. While I do not intend to support the motion of the Senator from Ohio, I wonder if it would not be possible, under the present parliamentary situation, by unanimous consent or otherwise, to get the Senator from Texas to assign his time to the Senator from Ohio [Mr. BRICKER] so that the time on both sides would not be controlled by one side of this question;

In common fairness, it seems to me that the Senator from Texas should assign his time to the Senator from Ohio. I am supporting the position of the Senator from Texas, but it seems to me that all the time should not be controlled on one side of this question.

Mr. CONNALLY. Mr. President, let me say to the Senator that I do not propose to give the Senator from Ohio all my time. I will give him some time. I did not make the unanimous-consent agreement. The Senate made it. Under that agreement the Chair has ruled that the time belongs to me.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Mr. President, a further parliamentary inquiry.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator will state it.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Is it not a parliamentary fact that if that is the position taken by the Senator from Texas, some other Senator could then move to substitute the date April 3, April 7, or any date clear through the calendar to the April 30? I think we will save time if there is a fair distribution of time.

Mr. CONNALLY. I am willing to give the Senator from Ohio half of my time.

The VICE PRESIDENT. One of those amendments might be in the third degree, which would not be in order.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President—

Mr. McMAHON. I yield 4 minutes to the Senator from Massachusetts.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator from Massachusetts is recognized for 4 minutes.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, I hope that the motion to recommit will not prevail.

The implementation of article 3 of the North Atlantic Pact with troops is not a constitutional question. It is essentially a question of policy. If it were a constitutional question, then the sending of sea and air forces would be involved. But the sending of ground forces is the only consideration that troubles us. We cannot separate ground forces from those of sea and air and have a constitutional question at issue.

Therefore, it becomes a question of policy. In establishing a new policy—and the sending of ground forces to Europe in implementation of the North Atlantic Treaty is essentially a new policy upon which our country is embarking—it becomes of the utmost importance to have our people understand what we are doing and why we are doing it, and obtain their support in the establishment of the new policy. There can be no effective leadership under our system of government without public understanding and confidence.

Let us be frank. We know that the war in Korea is unpopular with millions of our people. It is not at all clear to everyone what our objectives are. We know that the people of our country are divided as to the advisability of our having sent troops there in the first place; they do not know why they are now prevented from fighting a clean-up war, which means, in reality, bombing across the Manchurian border with all its ominous implications; they are divided on the question of the crossing of the thirty-eighth parallel. Those of our peo-

ple who have close relatives in Korea want them to be brought home. That war was started by an Executive order. Congress had no part in the decision.

I mentioned Korea in this discussion because there, too, it has been the undertaking of a new policy—fighting under the flag of the United Nations—and the support of the people is vital when their sons are fighting and being killed far from home.

Now we plan to send upwards of 100,000 boys—our boys—into Europe to implement article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty. They are to go to give military assistance and furnish moral and psychological support to the troops provided by the other members of the North Atlantic Treaty. Whether this is an advisable method of building up the security and defense of our country is admittedly a calculated risk. Personally, I believe in taking that calculated risk. But I think it is essential, if it is to be a calculated risk that is to become a successful one, to have the full support of the greatest possible number of our people. This is a policy of sending troops into an international army, under an international commander, when there has as yet been no specific act of military aggression committed in Europe. This is a new method of making us secure here in the United States. It must have popular support to be successful.

For these reasons, I prefer a joint resolution, one which puts Congress and the President shoulder to shoulder behind the establishment of this policy. But a joint resolution has been defeated in our committee. A Senate resolution and a concurrent resolution are before us.

I believe that these resolutions should be adopted in order that we may place the approval of the elected representatives of our people behind the Chief Executive—the Commander in Chief of our Armed Forces—in this new policy.

I believe it far more important, at this time, to register congressional approval of this policy than to be overly concerned, at the risk of further dangerous delay, with disputes over wording and punctuation. Let us declare clearly that the sense of the Senate is that the voice of the people shall be heard, through the Congress, on this vital issue. Let us show, through the approval of Congress, that we are behind General Eisenhower in the tough undertaking of uniting the forces of the North Atlantic Treaty nations into an effective army.

We cannot live alone and aloof in the United States, surrounded by countries dominated by tyranny. We need friends, as they need us. If they are willing to risk their young manhood and prove to us that they intend to live up to their agreements, then I believe we must shoulder the risk with them. That essentially is the basis of the new policy of sending men as well as equipment to implement article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty.

But again I say that such a policy, in order to be successful, requires the full force and effect of a united public opinion behind it. Psychologically, we hope that the sending of our troops to Europe will stimulate greater morale and confi-

dence of ultimate success in our neighbors in Europe. Psychologically, therefore, it is mighty important for them to know that this is the act not alone of the administration, but becomes the act of the administration supported by the approval of Congress.

I hope that both Resolution 99 and Concurrent Resolution 18 will pass. I repeat, there can be no effective leadership under our form of government without public understanding and confidence.

Mr. KEM. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I yield.

Mr. KEM. The Senator from Massachusetts referred in his statement to approval by Congress. Does he feel that the adoption by the Senate of Senate Resolution 99 would constitute an approval by Congress?

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I believe that it is an expression of public approval, insofar as Senators are representatives of the people of their States.

Mr. McMAHON. Mr. President, I yield 4 minutes to the Senator from New Jersey [Mr. SMITH].

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator from New Jersey is recognized for 4 minutes.

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Before I take the 4 minutes I wish to say I feel it only fair and right, as all the time is controlled on the negative side of the issue, that the Senator from Ohio [Mr. BRICKER] should have some time. I should prefer not to take any time unless the Senator from Ohio receives the same amount of time to reply to my remarks.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator from New Jersey has 4 minutes to use in any way he sees fit. He cannot occupy some time in the way he has suggested, and then say he will begin to use his 4 minutes.

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. I simply tried to do what seemed to me to be fair. I shall proceed, Mr. President, and assume that a fair adjustment can be made.

I believe a great deal of this discussion arises from misapprehension. In the first place I was one of the strongest proponents of a joint resolution in the committee. I was one of those who voted for the reporting of a joint resolution. That proposal was defeated. But we did finally report the resolutions which are before the Senate. I feel very strongly that it would be a critical mistake to recommit the resolutions with the proposed instructions. I think that would cause an interminable delay. In my opinion, the situation abroad is very critical, and we need to show our support for and approval of the proposal to send the four divisions to Western Europe.

Mr. President, let me say that another point disturbs me in the argument of the distinguished Senator from Ohio [Mr. BRICKER]. He seems to imply that in some way Congress can pass a law which will affect the President's constitutional powers; that unless we enact a law we will accomplish nothing. My point is that there is nothing we can do in the way of a joint resolution or a concurrent resolution or a simple resolution or any

other measure that can affect fundamentally whatever the constitutional powers of the President may be. Even though some of us in the committees felt there should be a joint resolution reported, because we thought it was the correct method of procedure, we felt there was no way we could affect the President's powers one way or the other, and therefore there was no reason to labor that point if we could obtain an expression of the sense of the Senate.

Mr. President, the Wherry resolution is a simple Senate resolution. It provides:

That is the sense of the Senate—

And so forth. In the Senate resolution we went beyond that and insisted that it contain words bringing the Congress into the picture. One of the big battles in the committees took place on that point. I supported that procedure strongly. I also strongly supported the position for congressional approval. That was finally agreed to by a vote in the committee. We then felt we had presented to the Senate the feeling of the committees that at least there should be congressional participation, that there should be congressional approval of future assignments of troops, that there should be specific approval of assignments of the four divisions.

My own judgment is, as I said before, that there should be a joint resolution, but I think it would be fatal to the whole situation to recommit the resolution. We should pass an organic act, like the military defense assistance act, which was legislation passed by the Congress, and in such an act we should cover not only the ground troops, which was the only subject of the debate we had in the committee, but should cover also the Navy and the Air Force and whatever else may be needed to implement the treaty.

Mr. President, I should be happy to help in drawing an organic act to cover the whole issue involved in the implementation of the treaty, and not merely the question of ground forces, which was the only issue raised by the Wherry resolution, a Senate resolution which simply undertook to express the sense of the Senate.

In the committees we had the feeling that all we could do was to report the resolutions in their present form. They express what we believe to be a correct procedure, and what we believe to be the proper limitations. I sincerely hope the Senate will not recommit the resolutions, because to do so would only cause delay, confusion, and, I am sure, embarrassment in the situation General Eisenhower is facing abroad.

Mr. CASE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield to me for a question?

The VICE PRESIDENT. The time of the Senator from New Jersey has expired.

Mr. McMAHON. Does the Senator from Texas [Mr. CONNALLY] wish to allocate some time?

Mr. CONNALLY. Does the Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. SALTONSTALL] desire more time?

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I do not wish to have any more time.

Mr. CONNALLY. I have no disposition to award any time.

Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, I should like to have 2 minutes.

Mr. CONNALLY. Very well, I yield 2 minutes to the Senator from Arkansas.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator from Arkansas is recognized for 2 minutes.

Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, I wish to make only one observation. I am probably the one who is responsible for the amendment having been adopted which some Senators condemn. At least I submitted the amendment. I submitted it because of my own convictions, without conferring with or consulting with anyone. I still maintain and insist that that amendment defends and preserves a constitutional principle of the American democracy.

Mr. President, my submission of that amendment, my support of it, and my urging its adoption was not with any idea of obstructing or preventing the Senate from expressing its will, its judgment, and the sense of the Senate for the record. I wanted it to do just that.

Mr. President, the proposal to recommit will not result in accomplishing anything except to wipe out what we have done in the Senate.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The time of the Senator from Arkansas has expired.

Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield me one more minute?

Mr. CONNALLY. Yes.

Mr. McCLELLAN. Recommittal of the resolution will result in wiping out what we have already done in the Senate. We have now made the desire of the Senate a matter of record, and if we adopt the resolution that action will have been preserved.

If the resolution is recommitted, and a joint resolution is reported, if it then should be passed we know it would meet with a veto. Then we would have absolutely nothing. So let us proceed with what we have. A joint resolution, if passed, could not be passed over a Presidential veto. We now have the sense of the Senate contained in the resolution, and I dare say it should have influence on the future direction of this program. Let us retain what we have. Let us proceed and adopt the resolution. If the resolution is adopted, there is nothing to prevent the committees reporting to the Senate a joint resolution, and we then can, if we wish to do so, undertake to pass a law, instead of merely expressing the will of this body and of the House of Representatives that a certain procedure should be followed.

Mr. CONNALLY. Mr. President, I yield 1 minute to the Senator from New York [Mr. LEHMAN].

Mr. LEHMAN. Mr. President, to recommit the resolution would be to surrender unconditionally to the forces of defeatism and delay. Beware, my fellow Senators, of the danger of hearing at a future time the tragic charge of "too little and too late."

There is no reason to recommit. We need no further consideration at this time. We cannot afford the extravagant luxury of a day's additional unnecessary delay.

Mr. President, I hope with all my heart that the motion to recommit will be overwhelmingly defeated.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The question is on the amendment offered by the Senator from Connecticut [Mr. McMAHON] to the motion of the Senator from Ohio [Mr. BRICKER].

Mr. McMAHON. Mr. President, is there any intention on the part of the opposition to take any time?

Mr. CAIN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McMAHON. I yield.

Mr. CAIN. There are some Members on this side of the aisle who expect to speak briefly to the pending question.

Mr. McMAHON. The pending question is the amendment of the Senator from Connecticut to the motion of the Senator from Ohio [Mr. BRICKER]. I have distributed a good deal of the time under my control, and before I go any further with it I should like to know what is going to happen on the other side of the aisle.

Mr. CAIN. The Senator from Washington can speak only for himself. He knows he will use approximately 10 minutes of time. Other Senators have given evidence that they desire to speak, and other amendments will be offered to accommodate their wishes.

Mr. McMAHON. Mr. President, I shall take a few minutes under the unanimous-consent agreement which is allotted to me on my amendment.

Mr. President, we voted on a constitutional issue yesterday, but we also voted on a question of grave national policy. The Senator from Texas [Mr. CONNALLY] said that this issue has been before the Senate for 60 days. As a matter of fact it has been before the Senate for 85 days. The resolution of the Senator from Nebraska [Mr. WHERRY] was submitted on January 8. So we have been at it for 85 days.

Mr. President, Napoleon, after escaping from Elba, raised his forces, marched on Dijon and Paris, and was defeated at Waterloo, in just 85 days. In 30 days all of France was conquered and overrun in World War II. In less than half a day the fleet at Pearl Harbor ceased to be a fighting force of the United States. In the flash of an eye, Mr. President, at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, great cities ceased to be, for all practical purposes.

So, Mr. President, when we set into operation or attempt to set into operation a system by which we anticipate that we shall debate for a period of 85 or 90 days what shall be done in the interest of the security of the United States, we are indeed gambling with destiny. The mighty force that has gathered in the Kremlin, operating with a board of directors of 11 men, in entire and complete secrecy, may well strike us as we were struck at Pearl Harbor. But, Mr. President, under the procedures we have adopted, it will be very difficult for us to build our defenses in such a way as to be able to anticipate a strike of that kind.

As I said earlier today, it was only in 1949 that we in this Chamber voted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff the power to advise the National Security Council and

the President of the United States in regard to the military measures to be adopted for the defense of the security of our people. Make you no mistake, Mr. President: By what we have done here and by what is sought to be done by means of the motion to recommit—which motion, if adopted, would be only to compound the injury—we would repeal the authority we gave in 1949, and we would make the Joint Chiefs of Staff the military advisers of the Congress of the United States.

Mr. President, Athens adopted some such system, and Athens ceased to be.

Mr. President, yesterday, in Paris, Gromyko made an attack on the Atlantic Treaty. I believe that treaty is the greatest instrument that has ever been drawn in the way of a military alliance for the purpose of keeping the peace. It has annoyed the Russians beyond all expression; and now Gromyko seeks to put it on the agenda in Paris, for discussion, claiming that this alliance is at the source of the unrest in the world.

So, Mr. President, it is significant that the North Atlantic Treaty and its purpose were attacked yesterday in Paris by Gromyko; and it is sad to note that the treaty, in its operations, has been attacked on the floor of the United States Senate, on the same day, and also today.

The Senator from New York has said he hopes we shall not be "too little and too late." I know that in statements which are being made outside this Chamber, some persons are ascribing to what is being done here, motives which I do not impute to any honorable Member—and all the Members of the Senate are honorable—but, Mr. President, I say that certain of those who will enter a national convention, seeking the nomination of their party, could well bear upon their banners the emblem "too little and too late," in view of what has been sought to be done here and in view of what is now sought to be done here to even greater effect and extent, by means of the motion to recommit.

Mr. President, the chips are down in the world. There is involved the question of survival. Those who think we can abandon our allies, those who think we can give away resources to the extent of the resources which are contained in Western Europe, those who think we can give less than our full measure of devotion and less than our full measure of service and less than our full measure of support to our allies and can watch with equanimity such dissipation and disappearance of their resources and strength, and still maintain the safety of our country, are indulging in dreams which can only bring great sadness and despair to the world.

Mr. President, I shall vote, reluctantly, for the resolution. I shall vote against the motion to recommit the resolution, because I do not wish to see in the headlines throughout the world the statement that we in the Senate have rejected the proposal to send four of our divisions to prime the pump of the defenses of Western Europe.

Furthermore, Mr. President, I hope that as the days go on, and as the true

nature of the threat is better understood, even among those in this Chamber, we shall find fewer attempts and less desire, in the face of this terrible peril, to compromise what I believe is the policy which alone can save us; and by that I mean the promotion of the strength and unity of the free world.

Mr. President, something has been said about lack of confidence in the President of the United States as being one of the causes for the vote which was taken yesterday on the so-called McClellan amendment. I would not have written some of the letters the President of the United States has written. I would have said some things when he did not say some things. I would not have said some things when he has said them. However, Mr. President, I can read the record and I can show the Senate, beginning with the Greek and Turkish policy, and carrying on with Marshall-plan aid and the North Atlantic Pact and its implementation, that there has been in the White House a man who has had the "guts" to stand up to the threat we face and to mobilize the free world against it. I am proud that I have had the opportunity to support him. Mr. President, when the verdict of history is written, it will be written upon that record. I pay tribute to the courage our President has had in the great things he has done and the great things for which he has stood.

Mr. CHAVEZ. Mr. President—

The VICE PRESIDENT. Does the Senator from Connecticut yield to the Senator from New Mexico?

Mr. McMAHON. I yield.

Mr. CHAVEZ. Mr. President, I wish to ask a question of the distinguished Senator from Connecticut; that is my purpose in rising at this time.

First, let me say that I agree fully with what the Senator from Connecticut has said in regard to the President of the United States. Let me ask the Senator whether he feels that there may be some Members of this body who disagree with the Senator from Connecticut, but who take seriously to heart and conscience the oath they took at the time when they became Members of the Senate of the United States, namely:

I solemnly swear that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same;—

Of course, the reference there is to the Constitution of the United States—

that I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter: so help me God.

Mr. President, I ask the Senator from Connecticut, without in any way impugning the sincerity of purpose of the President of the United States, although there might be some Senators among the

96—
Mr. McMAHON. Mr. President, I cannot yield for a speech.

Mr. CHAVEZ. The Senator from Connecticut does not have to yield for a speech. Let me ask whether he believes in the Constitution.

Mr. McMAHON. Yes, I believe in the Constitution.

Mr. CHAVEZ. Very well.

Mr. McMAHON. The Constitution says that the President shall be the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States.

Mr. CHAVEZ. Mr. President—

Mr. McMAHON. I decline to yield.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator from Connecticut declines to yield. The time of the Senator from Connecticut has expired.

Mr. CONNALLY. I yield three more minutes to the Senator from Connecticut.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator from Connecticut is recognized for 3 minutes more.

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a parliamentary inquiry?

The VICE PRESIDENT. Does the Senator from Connecticut yield for a parliamentary inquiry.

Mr. McMAHON. I yield for that purpose.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator from Nebraska will state the inquiry.

Mr. WHERRY. I think we ought to be fair about this, and that at least, if the distinguished Senator from Texas is to control the time of the opposition, the time ought to be employed by a Senator speaking in opposition, not by a proponent. It is a complete violation of the unanimous-consent agreement to have the proponent of an amendment given more than 30 minutes.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Chair has undertaken to interpret the unanimous-consent agreement as it was made.

Mr. WHERRY. The opposition is to have 30 minutes.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Chair cannot control the question of the distribution of time, when it is allotted by the Senator who has control of it.

Mr. McMAHON. Mr. President, I merely want to conclude.

Mr. WHERRY. I desire to be absolutely fair. I want the Senator to have his 3 minutes, but I am now raising this question: If we are to continue with all the other amendments, are we proceeding with this one, when another amendment is offered, if the distinguished Senator from Texas, the chairman of the committee, who has control of the time of the opposition, awards it to a proponent, it will be a violation of the unanimous-consent agreement, and will be not a faithful adherence to that agreement. I do not see how it is possible for anyone to interpret it so as to permit time of the opponents to be used by proponents.

Mr. McMAHON. Mr. President, I do not want to encroach upon the time of any Senator. I simply desire to have time in which to conclude.

I accord to the Senator the right to his views, but it is my belief that we are not serving the Constitution when we attempt to constitute the Senate of the United States an advisory arm of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, for to do so, will, in practical effect, lead to debate of plans which should be kept secret, but which,

under a procedure of the kind proposed, will be divulged to the Kremlin.

Ah, the Communists could not do better if they had a spy planted in the secret war plans room of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Those plans would be brought up here, to be debated before the world. Constitutional? The founding fathers knew better than to do that.

We do not challenge the right of the President as Commander in Chief to deploy the naval forces and the air forces, yes, we even acknowledge his right to deploy ground forces anywhere in the world—except where they are now needed most in Western Europe.

The Senate will regret its decision to set itself up as a general staff. There may be generals and admirals here. I have not heard from them. I am certain, however, that we have some presidential candidate here, and they have not helped their cause this day.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The question is on agreeing to the amendment of the Senator from Connecticut to the motion of the Senator from Ohio.

The amendment was rejected.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The question now is on the motion of the Senator from Ohio.

Mr. CAIN. Mr. President, I have an amendment on the desk, which I ask to have taken up and considered.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Secretary will state the amendment.

The LEGISLATIVE CLERK. On line 5, after the word "Senate", it is proposed to strike out "forthwith" and insert "not later than three session days after this date."

Mr. CAIN. Mr. President, the able senior Senator from Connecticut has given the Senate of the United States his personal evaluation and estimate of the intelligence and attainments in general of the President of the United States. I found his evaluation interesting, though in large part I disagreed totally with it. But I think something ought to be said about the President of the United States, and that it ought to be said now. If that American, in mid-September 1950 had recommended to the Congress of the United States that authority be given him to deploy four American divisions abroad, in peacetime, to become a part of General Eisenhower's international army, rather than to have stated to the world and to this country, as he did, that he needed no help or authority of any kind from the Congress of the United States, the pending Senate resolution would not now be before the Senate, for the basic question would have been cleared away, and the four divisions would in all probability have been authorized literally months ago.

To have those who would resist the motion made by the Senator from Ohio rise on the floor of the Senate and say that time is being wasted, when the only important time consumed has resulted from a lack of wisdom and common sense and of understanding on the part of the Chief Executive of this country, leads me to say that we all want to get this discussion over and done with; but there are those who feel strongly in support of the motion to recommit, who in-

sist upon saying why they think the best interests of their country and of the free world will be served in the future by the passage of either a joint resolution or a bill, to be signed by the President, rather than through the adoption of a simple resolution of the Senate or a concurrent resolution of the Congress, which are mere expressions of opinion and can never become the law of the land.

America is being told, and has been told for many days, by certain very distinguished Members of this body, that those Senators, among them the Senator from Washington, who insist that the President be first authorized by the Congress before undertaking the implementation of the Atlantic Treaty, are interfering with the President's constitutional powers as Commander in Chief.

Every Senator, without exception, who has risen to oppose the motion made by the Senator from Ohio, has said that those who support the motion wish to take from the President some of his authority. I deny it. There is, from my point of view, not a word of truth in such an allegation. We are not undertaking to restrict or curtail any legitimate right of the President. Is it not important, for a change, to emphasize the word legitimate? We are not undertaking to restrict or curtail any legitimate right possessed by our Chief Executive. We do not seek to instruct him how he may employ American forces under an American command, in protecting America's national interests overseas. We have not said that the President does not have authority to maintain occupational forces in Germany, a thing which he clearly has the right to do. We are not trying to tell the President that he may not deploy American military personnel, to protect American lives and property located outside continental United States. This, to my mind, the President has a clear right to do. What we seek to tell the President of the United States, and this is the last and only chance we shall have of doing it, is that he, the President, shall not decide for himself, as an individual, a policy question which will affect the welfare and security of not only the present generation but of future generations of Americans. We are trying to tell our President that the Congress of the United States must reach a verdict, as a jury must reach a verdict, upon the question of whether American forces are to be committed to an international army in peace time, in order to fulfill America's obligation under the North Atlantic Treaty.

We are advising the President, and we seek to inform the Nation, that the North Atlantic Treaty is not self-implementing, as a number of Senators have been asking us to believe in recent days. We are pointing out that if a man's word means anything, this reflection ought to be important to the President and to every American who thinks, the President ought to recall that his spokesman—no Senator yet has risen to deny it—stated during the extended debate on the North Atlantic Treaty that the Treaty was not self-implementing. We are suggesting, also, that if the assurances which we thought were seriously

given and true, were actually glibly and readily given, and are now to be dismissed, ignored, and bypassed, in this country have graver concern for the future welfare and downright integrity of the individual American than we have ever previously had in this Nation.

If Congress should decide that a positive decision is in our Nation's interest, then, to my mind, the Chief Executive can deploy our American forces anywhere he thinks best in his role as Commander in Chief. But, if the Congress—and it is not likely, but it is a matter of principle so far as a number of us are concerned—should decide that our Nation's welfare would best be served by assisting Europe in ways other than committing American forces to Europe in peacetime, then the President of the United States, whether he likes it or whether he does not like it, as an individual, should be required—and I use that word advisedly—to observe and obey the will of the American people as expressed by the Congress of the United States, the spokesmen for the American people.

Mr. CHAVEZ. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. CAIN. May I say only this to my very good friend from New Mexico, that I shall have concluded in 5 minutes, at the end of which time, should he care to ask me one or more questions, I shall very much like to have an opportunity to answer.

In my considered view, if the President of the United States is permitted to do as he wishes, then I conceive that the Congress, of which I am a part—and I am very proud to be a Member of this body—no longer speaks for the people of America and that it will have but very little future use for existence.

If the resolution now pending is not recommitted, but if it is approved, I do not want anyone to believe that the Senate or the Congress has authorized the President to commit American forces to General Eisenhower's peacetime international army. I want only for the people to know what the truth and the facts are and let them then reach their own decision. The Senate resolution is nothing more, nor can it be, no matter how strongly worded, than an expression of an opinion. It does not have the force of law, and it cannot be binding on the President of the United States. It merely approves what the President intends to do, anyway, and it expresses the hope that the President will seek congressional approval before he decides to assign additional American forces to the Atlantic Pact army of the future.

As a result of the passage of the Senate resolution, the President can do after its passage no more nor less than he could do before its passage, which is precisely as he wants it. The only way in which the President of the United States can be authorized to undertake any given course of action is through a joint resolution or a bill. I think this Congress would have given the President, last September or shortly thereafter, the authority he required if he had recommended that limited American forces be

committed to an international peacetime army.

Either a joint resolution or a bill, one or the other of which we now seek to bring before the Senate, requires the President's signature before it can become what is very important, or what used to be important in America, the law of the land. Unfortunately, too few Americans understand the differences between a bill and our several types of resolutions. Tragically, too many Americans will think Congress has exercised its responsibility and imposed its will on the President of the United States if Congress passes either the meaningless simple resolution which is now pending or the meaningless concurrent resolution which is on the Senate Calendar.

What any President can do once he can do again. If the President of the United States can at this time implement the North Atlantic Treaty on his own initiative, I know of no reason why the President should seek authority in the future from any source in order to do the very same thing again.

Mr. President, the crime of the past several decades, to my mind, at least, is that free and democratic nations have been destroyed around the globe. This has happened because the legislative process has been renounced by men who are frightened, by men who are scared of things they do not understand, by men who do not have any faith in themselves or in the people whom they represent. The legislative process has been renounced in favor of creating indispensable men and all-powerful executive governments. I think this liquidation of the legislative process is going on in America today in front of our own eyes.

If our President—and I call him our President, to whom I seek to be of assistance so long as he has the monumental responsibility and obligation of his high office—if our President requires only his own authority to commit our sons to an international command in peacetime, can the Members of the Senate and can any American tell me, or think of anything that such a President would not be able to undertake in the future, within his own authority?

For the good of what I conceive the needs of my country now and in the future to be, I pray, as a citizen, first, as the junior Senator from Washington, second, that the motion presented by the distinguished Senator from Ohio to recommit this simple Senate resolution will be agreed to, in order that we can then offer America something which is sound, decent, honest, and legal.

I now yield to the Senator from New Mexico, who asked me to yield some minutes ago.

Mr. CHAVEZ. Mr. President, if the Senator from Washington has sufficient time to answer my question, I wish he would. First, I should like to make a brief observation. I was sworn in as a member of this body in 1935. In all seriousness I took my oath of office to support the Constitution. I still believe in the law of the land. I do not in any way deprecate what anyone else may be doing to support and cooperate with the

President of the United States, who is a personal friend of mine. I shall cooperate with him to the extreme. I am willing to go the limit. But I still believe in the law of the land and in the Constitution of the United States. If that is a mistake, it is a mistake in my interpretation of what I think is my duty.

I should like to ask this question of the Senator from Washington: Much has been said here as to the unity which is desired. Does not the Senator from Washington, or any other Senator, think it would be possible to obtain that unity which is so much desired if Congress should participate in carrying out the functions of Government, including the supplying of forces for national defense?

Mr. CAIN. The Senator from Washington thinks it is unfortunate that the Senate of the United States for the most part is so far removed from those Americans who are commonly referred to as the people. The Senator from Washington has recently had an opportunity to travel among the people in his own northwest country, and if he came away with any one conviction it is that the people in our country want and would demand, if they had a way so to do, or the machinery with which to do it, that the Congress of the United States lay down the policy as to whether young and older Americans should be committed in support of an international peacetime army.

I trust I have answered the Senator's question.

Mr. CHAVEZ. The President of the United States—and I do not refer to the present occupant as such, but rather, I am talking about the office of the President of the United States—is the Commander in Chief. Of what is he the Commander in Chief?

Mr. CAIN. Of the Armed Forces of the United States, as created by the Constitution of the United States.

Mr. CHAVEZ. Under the provisions of the Constitution of the United States does the Senator from Washington feel, because the Constitution says we have to appreciate and realize that the President is the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, that we have to do anything that pleases the U. N. or the Atlantic Charter in that respect?

Mr. CAIN. The function of the Congress of the United States is to lay down the policy which guides the President in the conduct of his responsibility as the Commander in Chief of the American Armed Forces. Period.

Mr. CHAVEZ. I hope the Senator will appreciate the fact that with me it is not a political matter.

Mr. CAIN. I can thoroughly understand that.

Mr. CHAVEZ. With me it is strictly whether it hurts or not. I took an oath of office. The President of the United States at the moment is a personal friend of mine. However, I believe in law and in the Constitution. I believe that under my oath of office it is the senior Senator from New Mexico who must decide whether I am carrying out the purposes of that oath.

Mr. CAIN. I understand. The Senator from New Mexico and the Senator from Washington are in complete agreement with reference to what the senior Senator from New Mexico has so recently stated. Mr. President, may I ask how much time is available to me?

The VICE PRESIDENT. Twelve minutes.

Mr. CAIN. I suggest that an equal division of the time would be fair. I yield 6 minutes to the Senator from Nebraska.

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, on this motion the distinguished Senator from Massachusetts made a rather forceful statement about the urgency of telling General Eisenhower exactly what the position of Congress would be. What is the position of the Senator? As usual, he says that we must not delay. He says we must not delay another moment. He says we must not recommit the resolution to the committee, that delay would mean that General Eisenhower would come home.

General Eisenhower was pretty fair about the conditions. When he returned from Europe he made several statements, and I heard them. I invite the attention of the Senate to the statement he made on February 8. It was in answer to a question asked by the distinguished Senator from New Jersey [Mr. SMITH]. The Senator asked General Eisenhower:

Senator SMITH of New Jersey. I have one or two questions I would like to ask the general.

The first is this, General: We used to think that to be successful with the program we have been discussing it was most important that we need a strong public opinion supporting it throughout the country—a feeling by the people that they know what it is all about and that they approve it.

General EISENHOWER, Senator SMITH, I believe that unless there is, generally speaking, a community of understanding, a unanimity of understanding of what we must do, and a determination to do it, this thing is hopeless. I believe it thoroughly. I believe the facts must be laid before the American people in great clarity, even at the risk here and there of violating some security. I think we must do it without belligerence, without bombastic presentations. We must just get the facts before them, because in the long run only public opinion can win wars and only public opinion can preserve the peace. I couldn't agree with you more.

That was the answer which the General gave to the Senator from New Jersey. The Senator from New Jersey then said:

I am glad to hear you say that. It seems to me that that is the answer to the questions raised on the constitutional authority of either the President or the Congress. It seems to me that, if we want public opinion behind it, the people of this country will want to feel that their Congress is advised and that Congress in general approves of the program that is adopted. I think, if the question is put to constitutional authorities, it is academic. We must have public opinion, and we can't have it unless the Congress knows and the Congress in general approves of the program.

A statement could not be clearer than that. The General said that even at the expense of some security we must have the American people behind what

we are doing. How are we to get the American people behind it? It must be brought about by a joint resolution. The Congress of the United States includes the Senate and the House of Representatives. I believe the House of Representatives is closer to the people, and, therefore, I think it speaks more effectively for them than does the Senate. The President should join in the responsibility, and he should be glad to do so. As this whole program is unfolded, when the House hears it, and when the Senate hears it, it goes to the President, and he has the opportunity of joining in the responsibility. I am sure he will do so.

I believe that procedure should be followed, because I am sure that is what the American people would want. In my opinion that is the course which should be followed. The resolution submitted by the junior Senator from Nebraska expressed the sense of the Senate that the Congress make the determination, not that the Senate make it. I discussed the matter with the senior Senator from New Jersey, and he knows my feelings about it.

Mr. President, I say to you now, and I say to the Senate, that the American people want to know all the facts in the case, instead of having them known only to the Members of the Senate, before they take another dose, if we are going to talk about doses. We must get the backing of the people of the country. General Eisenhower is correct when he said that we must have the people behind what is done. There should be no delay in educating them. They should be advised of their responsibilities. They should know what is to be done when we start to move the troops to the Western European countries. They should know that they are committing themselves to land warfare.

Believe me, Mr. President, the fathers and mothers are anxious to know. The mail I have received proves that they want to know. The answer to the charge of "delay, delay, delay," is given by General Eisenhower himself. It is answered by the distinguished Senator from New Jersey, who said we must make it indubitably clear that we have the support of the American people.

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. WHERRY. I do not believe I have the time to yield; I am very sorry. If I have some time to yield, I shall be glad to yield later.

There is another point I wish to make, if I may. I am of the opinion that every country in Europe would like to see this question settled by constitutional processes. They want to know that it is not only the administration that is behind what we are doing. They want to know that the Congress of the United States, representing the people of the United States, are solidly behind what we do, and that it is not just one man who is determining our national defense policy.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator's time has expired.

Mr. WHERRY. Could I have one more minute?

Mr. CAIN. Indeed, the Senator may have another minute.

Mr. WHERRY. Two minutes?

Mr. CAIN. No; 1 minute.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator is recognized for 1 minute.

Mr. WHERRY. I am sorry I cannot have more time. In the future, before I agree to a unanimous-consent request, I shall go into it in some detail. I want to cooperate with my distinguished colleagues, but when we come to a discussion of important questions such as the one now pending we should not be limited to 4 or 5 minutes. The life of the Republic is at stake.

While I cannot answer all the arguments which have been made, I wish again to refer to what the distinguished Senator from Texas said when we approved the North Atlantic Treaty. I wish to call attention to page 3014 of the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD of last Friday. I ask unanimous consent that his statement appearing on page 3014 be printed in the RECORD at this point.

There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

Mr. WHERRY. Let me remind you of the assurance given by the senior Senator from Texas [Mr. CONNALLY], chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, as spoken in July 1949, when the treaty was before the Senate for ratification.

His words will bear repeating again and again. They beat in the hearts of patriotic Americans.

This is what the senior Senator from Texas said:

"The obligations are plainly set forth in the treaty, and to the Congress itself must be remitted the matter of whatever we furnish under article 3 or under other articles of the treaty. I am willing to trust the Congress. Congress is where the Constitution puts the responsibility, and that is where we shall put it."

That was the senior Senator from Texas speaking when he pleaded for ratification of the treaty.

His words carried great weight with the Senate. And, with his words ringing in their ears, Senators voted for ratification of the treaty. They had a right to take his assurance. It is the customary way.

On the floor of the Senate yesterday the junior Senator from Ohio [Mr. BRICKER] said that he and other Senators had voted for ratification of the North Atlantic Treaty based upon such assurances. He said that if they had known then what they know now, they would not have cast their votes in favor of ratification of the North Atlantic Pact. That is how serious it is. It is a question of keeping faith. It is a public moral obligation. Faith should be kept. Notice that the senior Senator from Texas said "the Congress." He did not say this high level policy would be relegated to committees, creatures of the Senate, or be exercised by them in a labyrinth of reports by chiefs of staff of the military, or that this national defense policy would be determined by a fraction of the Senate.

"The Congress," said the senior Senator from Texas.

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, the Senator from Texas said that regardless of article 3, or other articles of the treaty, Congress shall implement the treaty. Today he says he did not say that. Mr. President, how much time have I remaining?

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator's time has expired.

Mr. CAIN. Mr. President, I have been saving an extra minute for the Senator from Nebraska.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator is recognized for another minute.

Mr. WHERRY. We also heard what the Secretary of State said. If we cannot believe those who give us the assurance that Congress will implement the treaty, how much faith can we put in the administration?

I should think they would be the first who would want to insist that the Congress implement the treaty, and not that the President of the United States should implement it. That is what the American people think. That is what the boys in the service think. They are so confused that they want to know what they are fighting for. Let Congress implement the treaty, and perhaps they will know. It will not be like the case of another great agreement, like the agreement reached at Tehran, Potsdam, or Yalta. We have had the secret agreements, but if the consideration of the matter now before the Senate takes another day or two so that what we are doing may be clarified, it will be in the interest of the American people, and unless they are behind the program, it will be difficult for General Eisenhower to win any war.

Mr. McFARLAND. Mr. President, will the Senator from Washington yield, with the understanding that he will not lose the floor?

Mr. CAIN. With that understanding, I yield.

Mr. McFARLAND. Mr. President, I understand complaint has been made on the floor of the Senate that the time on the other side of the motion of the Senator from Connecticut should have been in the control of the opposition. I do not like to have any misunderstanding as to the division of time; we do not proceed in that way. The Senator from Utah [Mr. WATKINS] has stated that he desires 20 minutes and, for the reason I have stated, I ask unanimous consent that he be allowed 20 minutes and that it not be charged to anyone.

Mr. DWORSHAK. Mr. President, I object.

Mr. CAIN. Mr. President—

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator from Washington has 4 minutes.

Mr. CAIN. Mr. President, I yield the remaining 4 minutes of my time to the junior Senator from Nevada [Mr. MALONE].

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator from Nevada is recognized for 4 minutes.

CONGRESS ABROGATED CONSTITUTIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

Mr. MALONE. Mr. President, on the 21st day of March the junior Senator from Nevada said:

Senate Resolution 99 is the usual type of vague and inconclusive statement of the congressional viewpoint. Legally, it means nothing, although the Congress is actually passing upon a historical affair, namely, upon the question of Presidential power. This was indicated by General Eisenhower when he addressed a joint meeting of the Congress.

The general has already invited the Congress to visit him at his permanent headquarters in Europe. These headquarters were established before the good general addressed the joint meeting of the House and the Senate upon his return from Europe. We are asked to approve something that is already a fact.

THE VANDENBERG RESOLUTIONS

Mr. President, the start of this whole controversy was the Vandenberg resolutions on June 11, 1948. Never in the history of this Nation until June 11, 1948, did the Senate become a party to the treaty-making power of the President until such treaty was presented to the Senate.

ADVANCE EXECUTIVE COMMITMENTS

For 4 years we have faced a condition—a commitment by the President or by an improvident State Department on every important question it made in advance of its submission to the Senate.

OBJECTIVE OF VANDENBERG RESOLUTIONS

Mr. President, the Vandenberg resolutions, presented on June 11, 1948, asked the President of the United States to make a separate treaty, a pact—several such pacts in fact, if you please.

At that time the junior Senator from Nevada debated the question with the Senator from Michigan [Mr. VANDENBERG] and said that if we asked for such a pact we were morally bound to accept it when it came to the floor of the Senate regardless of its provisions. It later developed that we were morally bound. We did enter into the pact.

The next thing was to implement the pact with arms. With the advent of the treaty—the Atlantic Pact—it was, of course, a foregone conclusion that we would arm Europe.

The fourth move, then, was the question of men to defend Europe. All this came out in the debate with the Senator from Michigan [Mr. VANDENBERG] at the time. There never has been any question that the entire program was in the mind of the State Department at the time the Vandenberg resolutions reached the floor of the Senate on June 11, 1948, as indicated by the following statement in the debate on the Vandenberg resolutions by the junior Senator from Nevada on June 11, 1948:

I am not contending that such a treaty made subsequent to the passage of the resolutions would not have to be ratified by this body, but I also believe that there is, through these resolutions, an implied approval of any such treaty which may be made, and that this action could well be the first step in relinquishing the policy which has long been established through the Constitution of the United States. This is the first step, just as we took the first step in violation of the Constitution by appropriating money for foreign nations for any purpose over a long period of years, through small appropriations in the beginning. Finally we reached the point where the appropriations for foreign nations closely approached, and even surpassed, what ordinarily would constitute an entire year's appropriations for the expenses of this Government. It required some time to establish this precedent, but it was finally established, and is not now questioned.

In my humble opinion, this is the first step toward breaking down the independence of

the Senate of the executive department, and the constitutional provision that the Senate review any such treaty before final approval.

We shall be taking this step without having any idea whatever of what is in the mind of the President or the State Department as to the kind of treaty that will be presented to us later, but in effect we are directing them to make it without such knowledge.

It is my opinion, Mr. President, that we have moved far through the United Nations, but we must still keep an independent attitude in the Senate of the United States to discuss all of the evidence when any treaty is offered, and independently ratify it or turn it down. When once ratified, of course, we are ready to accept our obligation.

It is the back-door approach or the cellar-window entry into an entangling alliance without proper consideration. It is done with sugar-coating, with candied icing on it. We are told it is done in solemn keeping with the provisions of the United Nations Charter which the Senate has already ratified.

At the time this part of the Charter was adopted, it was generally believed—and there was no other explanation ever given—that regional agreements would apply only to nations in close proximity one to another, or to nations in the same hemisphere. The only one ever mentioned at San Francisco in which the United States would participate was the Chapultepec agreement for the security of the Western Hemisphere.

I am not opposing such treaties, but I am calling the attention of this body to the fact that it should ratify such treaties only after full debate and understanding.

There is a grave constitutional question at issue in the consideration of this resolution. It is whether the President and the Senate have the constitutional power to carry the United States into a military pact that calls on the United States to enter a foreign war without Congress actually passing a resolution of war. Under the language of the United Nations Charter, each member of a regional agreement must go to the defense of any other member attacked by an aggressor. Thus, with the United States in such an agreement, the President might well order the Army, Navy, and Air Force into action instantly upon an appeal for help from a fellow-signatory who might declare he was being attacked by an aggressor. Congress then would be faced with a fait accompli with the Armed Forces of the United States actually at war without Congress having passed a resolution of war.

Mr. President, I want to say at this point that there is even now a well-defined rumor—it is a little more than a rumor, because many industrialists have been contacted—to the effect that we are about to propose another scheme whereby we shall revive the lend-lease principle of furnishing free of charge arms, munitions, and supplies to the other nations in the United Nations.

These resolutions could well front for the next suggestion in that direction.

Mr. President, I am not opposing such treaties—but I am suggesting that this body should go slow in any advance approval for the reasons I have outlined. Each treaty should stand upon its own feet when it is submitted to this body.

THE ATLANTIC PACT (TREATY) PROVISIONS

Mr. President, we are in a war, according to the Atlantic Pact, whenever any member of the Atlantic Pact nations gets into trouble, whether it is in the

defense of their colonial possessions or for some other reason.

We are leading the American people into a world-wide defense of a European policy, not a United States policy. The policy and program have been laid down by Europe from the beginning. We are following along with the defense of European possessions—in defense of the colonial slavery system in the Far East—the Mediterranean areas, and in Africa.

CONSTITUTIONAL POWER OF CONGRESS

Mr. President, is it not about time that the Congress regain the constitutional power—the responsibility reposed in the legislative branch by the Constitution. They include the raising of armies, the disposition of the armies, the regulation of foreign commerce, and other enumerated powers.

CONGRESS AND THE REGULATION OF THE NATIONAL ECONOMY

Mr. President, in the Senate Committee on Finance at this moment we are seriously considering extending for an additional 3 years the President's control of foreign commerce, under the 1934 Trade Agreements Act, which means the regulation of the national economy. The President has the constitutional responsibility to decide foreign policy.

Mr. President, the Congress could regain its constitutional responsibility to regulate the national economy through the simple expedient of allowing the 1934 Trade Agreements Act to expire on June 12 of this year.

The Constitution clearly places the responsibility for the regulation of the national economy in the legislative branch through the regulation of foreign commerce.

The Congress transferred the responsibility to regulate the national economy to the executive branch through the 1934 Trade Agreements Act, which coupled with the constitutional responsibility to fix foreign policy, tied the national economy to the foreign policy.

Congress should again separate the fixing of the foreign policy by the executive branch from the regulation of foreign commerce—national economy—by allowing the 1934 Trade Agreements Act to expire on June 12, 1951.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator's time has expired.

Mr. CAIN. A parliamentary inquiry.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator will state it.

Mr. CAIN. If I am so permitted, I should like to withdraw my amendment.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator from Washington withdraws his amendment.

Mr. KEM. Mr. President, I move that the motion of the Senator from Ohio [Mr. BRICKER] be amended by adding at the end thereof the words "in accordance with the provisions of Senate Joint Resolution 56, now pending before the Committees on Foreign Relations and Armed Services, jointly."

Mr. President, I yield to the Senator from Utah [Mr. WATKINS] such time as may be necessary for him to present his views.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator from Utah is recognized for not to exceed 30 minutes.

Mr. WATKINS. Mr. President, the senior Senator from Utah comes from a part of the United States where the people have a profound belief in the Constitution. I have been taught from my infancy that the framers of the Constitution of the United States were men inspired by God, and that that great instrument was raised up and perfected to make possible a nation such as the one of which we are so proud, whose people can have the great freedoms which other nations of the world envy, but have never been able to approach. So when I assume the position I have taken on the matter now under discussion, I have taken it seriously and earnestly, and I believe representing the wishes of at least a majority of the people of my State.

Mr. President, I am not taking snap judgment on what I believe the views of the people of Utah to be on the pending question. I took it on myself to send out a questionnaire to more than 29,000 voters of the State of Utah. The names represented all types of occupations—business, labor, farmers, housewives, school teachers, professional people of all kinds, businessmen, managers, including also many public officials of the State of Utah.

A number of questions were put before them with respect to the problem we now are considering. One of the questions was, "Do you believe that the President of the United States should have the right to send troops to Europe, and do you believe he should have the right to send an unlimited number without the consent and authorization of Congress?"

As I recall, only 155 took the position that the President had the power in and of himself to take such action. More than 1,400 took the position that the President did not have such power. I believe that was a fair cross section. I think that, speaking here tonight, I am representing the overwhelming majority of the people of my State. If I have figured correctly, that was a ratio of about 9 to 1 against the President's position and against the position assumed by those who support his contention.

Mr. President, the remark was made here tonight by one of my distinguished colleagues that it looks as if it is going to be a case of "too little and too late"; that during this debate, occupying 85 days or 87 days, while we have been considering this extremely important matter, action has been delayed, and it is probably thought by some that all this time will have been wasted, and that what is done will be "too little and too late." Let me point out that the North Atlantic Treaty was ratified by the Senate in 1949—I remember it was on July 21—and soon thereafter was approved by the other nations, and went into effect. What had been done by the administration in implementing that pact from that day until the time the Senator from Nebraska [Mr. WHERRY] submitted his

resolution, which was referred to the two committees?

What was the occasion for delay during all that time? Was there not an emergency? Were we not faced with the challenge of communism and Russia at that time as we are today? Did not the events of Korea happen along in June of 1950? What was done immediately thereafter for many months to implement the North Atlantic Treaty? "Too little and too late" may be a correct statement, but it cannot be late to those who are moving today so that we will follow the laws and the Constitution of the United States.

Mr. President, let the blame be placed where it squarely and honestly belongs—on the administration. To me it has been almost impossible to understand why, after adopting that treaty as the program for the defense of the free nations, of Western Europe and the European area, all the intervening time has been permitted to elapse without action. It is true a bill to implement the treaty by arms was introduced and passed; but no effort was made to implement the treaty by furnishing troops to garrison Western Europe or to prepare for defense. It seems to me under those circumstances it comes with very poor grace for anyone now to say that those who are asking that the question be debated are stopping action when there is probably such grave peril as to endanger the Republic itself.

Mr. President, we have had some precedents for what is being done now. I call attention to the United Nations Charter, which itself provided for an international force to protect the security and the peace of the free nations of the earth. Some 43 countries were parties to that great pact. Distinguished gentlemen, some of whom are even arguing here today, and have argued on this floor at other times, have already a record of implementing that instrument with armed forces. When that instrument was drafted it provided in article 3 how it should be implemented. It was provided that agreements should be negotiated between the United Nations Security Council and the member nations for the implementation of the charter by a great police force, an international army that was to protect the peace of the world. It was not merely a matter of ground troops. It had reference to air, sea, and land forces. They went to work to work out a plan to take care of that situation.

When the charter came before the Senate for ratification there was a discussion as to the question of powers as between the Congress and the President of the United States, but that was resolved by the President of the United States and the leaders of that day by promptly introducing the 1945 United Nations Participation Act, which was approved by the President of the United States. He had previously, as I pointed out a little while ago, sent a letter approving that method of procedure. So when the measure came before the Congress it was passed as the legal method, within the Constitution of the United

States, of implementing article 43 of the charter, which contained the words "these agreements shall be ratified or shall be approved according to the constitutional processes of the various members parties."

What did the Participation Act provide? It has not been referred to very much in this debate, but it ought to be.

After the previous provisions had authorized the appointment of our ambassadors and our representatives on the United Nations Security Council and to the Assembly, section 6 of the Participation Act, then went into the matter of how the agreements for implementing the international army should be taken care of, and this is what it provided:

The President is authorized to negotiate a special agreement or agreements with the Security Council which shall be subject to the approval of the Congress by appropriate act or joint resolution—

Not as we are proceeding now, not as the committees did for 87 days, as I understand, while this matter was being debated, but by appropriate bill or joint resolution—

providing for the numbers and types of armed forces, their degree of readiness and general location, and the nature of facilities and assistance, including rights of passage, to be made available to the Security Council on its call for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security in accordance with article 43 of said charter.

I want the Members of the Senate to note—those who have been talking about the Senate and the House trying to be Chiefs of Staff and trying to determine military strategy—that at that time, after a very careful preparation and very careful discussion, not only with the Members of the Congress and the President, but with the Chiefs of Staff, who were then engaged in the war, and who included many of our military men of today, the participation act provided that the agreement should contain "the numbers and types of armed forces, their degree of readiness and general location, and the nature of facilities and assistance, including rights of passage, to be made available to the Security Council on its call for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security in accordance with article 43 of said charter."

There was the pattern. The Senator from Texas, the distinguished chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee approved that. The Senator from Colorado [Mr. MILLIKIN] went before the committee when it was considering the subject, and asked whether that was the method which would be pursued.

He was told it was. That was the announcement made at that time. When the measure came to the Senate it was passed, and became the law.

Who were the men who went on record favoring the action then taken as the method of implementing the charter by an international force? Some of them are presently in the Senate. One was the distinguished Vice President, then the Senator from Kentucky. Others were the Senator from Nebraska [Mr. BUTLER], the Senator from Virginia [Mr. BYRD], the Senator from New Mex-

ico [Mr. CHAVEZ], the Senator from Texas [Mr. CONNALLY], the Senator from Mississippi [Mr. EASTLAND], the Senator from Louisiana [Mr. ELLENDER], the Senator from Michigan [Mr. FERGUSON], the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. FULBRIGHT], the Senator from Rhode Island [Mr. GREEN], the Senator from Iowa [Mr. HICKENLOOPER], the Senator from Alabama [Mr. HILL], the Senator from North Carolina [Mr. HOEY], the Senator from Colorado [Mr. JOHNSON], the Senator from South Carolina [Mr. JOHNSTON], the Senator from West Virginia [Mr. KILGORE], the Senator from California [Mr. KNOWLAND], the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. McCLELLAN], the Senator from Tennessee [Mr. McKELLEN], the Senator from Connecticut [Mr. McMAHON], the Senator from Washington [Mr. MAGNUSON], the Senator from South Carolina [Mr. MAYBANK], the Senator from Georgia [Mr. RUSSELL], the Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. SALTONSTALL], the Senator from New Jersey [Mr. SMITH], the Senator from Michigan [Mr. VANDENBERG], the Senator from Wisconsin [Mr. WILEY], and the Senator from North Dakota [Mr. YOUNG].

Sixty-five Senators voted in favor of the act. Only seven voted against it.

If the President of the United States had sent a message to the Congress saying, "We would like by an act of Congress to implement the North Atlantic Pact, not only on the question of arms and armament but with respect to armed forces, because a situation has now arisen so that we need them"—and he suggested that method of procedure—is there any question that there would have been an almost ready acquiescence to consider the matter? He could have proceeded and negotiated his agreements. He would not have needed to have spelled out the matter in complete detail. He could have given us the over-all figures. He could have given us some kind of limitation. He could have presented that to the Congress.

Mr. President, I voted against ratification of the North Atlantic Pact because those who sponsored it would not accept the reservations I proposed, which would have protected the rights we now have in mind. Had my reservations been accepted, there would not have been any argument on that score.

A week ago today I introduced a joint resolution which I think is constructive. It is along the line of what should have been done, and I think it is along the line of what we shall have to do yet if we are to take care of the situation which will confront us when there is a desire to have the United States send more than four divisions to Europe. The joint resolution provides for implementation of the North Atlantic Treaty. This is the joint resolution—a measure to be passed by both the House and the Senate, Mr. President:

That the President is authorized to negotiate a special agreement or agreements with the parties to the North Atlantic Treaty, which shall be subject to the approval of the Congress by appropriate act or joint resolution, providing for the numbers and types of armed forces, and their degree of readiness and general location, to be made available by the United States for the pur-

poses of such treaty; and no armed forces in addition to the armed forces provided for in such special agreement or agreements shall be made available by the United States for such purposes.

Mr. President, that is almost the exact language of section 6 of the act of 1945 which authorized our participation in the international army provided for the United Nations.

That is the type of measure to which I think we have been committed. Those on the other side of this issue have stood for that type of measure. It was in their program; and all the Members of the Senate whose names I have mentioned voted for it.

Mr. President, in 1949 another international agreement was presented to the Congress and to the people. After debate, in which it was said that the Congress would fully implement the provisions of that pact, as provided in article 11 of the pact, the Congress approved it. Later the administration asked for an implementation on the arms side.

Much has been said to the effect that the Congress does not have the ability or the knowledge to do the things that the Joint Chiefs of Staff or our other military commanders should do. However, Mr. President, no one in the Senate raised that question when it came to the question of furnishing the arms, the ships, the tanks, the guns, and the other things needed for our allies overseas. No Member of the Senate then objected when the Congress had before it the act specifically stating the amount of money to be used for that purpose. No Member of the Senate claimed then that by that act we were taking away the powers of the Joint Chiefs of Staff or the powers of our other military leaders.

We passed that measure. The very Senators who now are contending that the President alone can do that are the Senators who voted for that act at that time; and on that occasion they did not make any reservations whatsoever.

Mr. President, we still have a duty to perform. The pending Senate resolution and the concurrent resolution which will follow it may be adopted by the—Mr. President—

Mr. BREWSTER. Mr. President, I believe I shall move that we take a recess for 5 minutes.

Mr. WATKINS. Mr. President, I wish to finish this sentence.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. McMAHON in the chair). Does the Senator from Utah think he should proceed?

Mr. WATKINS. I am temporarily distressed.

Mr. BREWSTER. Mr. President, perhaps we should take a recess for 5 minutes.

Mr. KEM. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The Chief Clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. BREWSTER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the suggestion of the absence of a quorum may be withdrawn, and that the order for the calling of the roll may be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered.

Mrs. SMITH of Maine. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may make a statement for 30 seconds.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? The Chair hears none, and the Senator from Maine is recognized for 30 seconds.

Mrs. SMITH of Maine. Mr. President, I have just learned that unanimous consent has been granted the distinguished junior Senator from New Jersey [Mr. HENDRICKSON] to permit him to change his vote yesterday on the Lehman amendment from "yea" to "nay." Since at the time of that vote the Senator from New Jersey and I were conferring on committee business, and since he was under an erroneous impression in regard to that vote, and since I, also, was under an erroneous impression regarding it, caused by the same circumstances, I, too, ask unanimous consent to have my vote of yesterday on the Lehman amendment changed from "yea" to "nay." This change will not change the result of the vote.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the change will be made, since it will not affect the result of the vote.

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, a parliamentary inquiry.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator will state it.

Mr. WHERRY. Does unexpired time remain for either side on the pending question? Is the Chair advised that there are other Senators who wish to speak on the pending question if any unexpired time remains?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair is advised by the Parliamentarian that the Senator from Missouri has 13 minutes remaining and the Senator from Texas has 30 minutes available to him.

Mr. KEM. Mr. President, I yield the remainder of my time to the Senator from Ohio [Mr. BRICKER].

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Ohio is recognized for 13 minutes.

Mr. BRICKER. Mr. President, I shall speak very briefly on this matter, but I think that, after all the ranging over the field and diversion from the subject matter and real essence of the pending motion, we ought to recur a little bit to the purpose of it and discuss the fundamental question which it involves. It seems to me that very little consideration has been given to what the Constitution is, and yet there has been a great deal of talk about the Constitution during the debate.

The only reference to the President in the Constitution, in connection with the Army and the Navy, is that he shall be the Commander in Chief. I think we may well go back to the debates in the Constitutional Convention which brought about the designation of the President as the Commander in Chief. We shall find that the purpose in so doing was to put the Army and the Navy in civilian control, so that there would not be a soldier in command as Commander in Chief of the Army and the

Navy, but that an elected representative of the people should always be Commander in Chief.

What power was the Congress given? The provision has often been read and referred to here, yet we seem to get entirely away from it. It is provided in the Constitution that Congress shall have power "to declare war, grant letters of marque and reprisal, and make rules concerning captures on land and water." It deals with war. The Congress has power "to raise and support armies, but no appropriation of money to that use shall be for a longer term than 2 years"—a very definite implication that control of the Army should be constantly in the hands of the Congress, with a limitation on appropriations of 2 years.

The Congress has power "to provide and maintain a Navy; to make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces." I emphasize that, Mr. President.

The Constitution then proceeds to give the President certain limited power in regard to the militia. Certainly the Congress has power to make rules and regulations in regard to the conduct of the Army and the utilization of troops. The power of the Commander in Chief becomes supreme only in time of war, after war is declared by the Congress of the United States.

Much has been said today on the other side of the aisle about national unity. It has been suggested that those of us who want this resolution sent back to the committees and desire to have passed a bill or a joint resolution—a measure which would mean something positive, are breaking up national unity. I should think that those who would most want the Congress to take positive legal action in this matter would be Senators on the other side, who at this time are trying to implement the Atlantic Pact, through the measure now before the Senate, a simple resolution.

If the President can send troops abroad now, he can bring them back next year. The very men who are today on the floor of the Senate saying that the President has this power ought to be the very ones to protect the power of the Congress against the day when the one man will change his mind, and, with it, the destiny of the people of the United States, without their having a voice or a vote in the decision. So those who want national unity ought to insist that Congress take legal action to support the President of the United States, so that one individual shall not be the supreme authority.

We have also been accused of delay. It is said that delay will handicap General Eisenhower, and that our allies will not understand what is going on if we do not act immediately. From the beginning that has been the plea of those who believe in the totalitarian authority of the President of the United States.

There need be no delay in carrying out the motion which I have made, in which motion I have been joined by the Senator from Oregon and the Senator from Utah, because the motion within itself directs the committees forthwith to re-

turn in the form of a joint resolution the same resolution we are now considering. I, for one, would be glad to consent to a unanimous-consent request that consideration of the joint resolution when reported to the Senate be proceeded with under the unanimous-consent agreement heretofore entered into.

I am interested vitally in determining whether the power to send American boys into an international integrated army at this time resides in the President or in the Congress of the United States; and it becomes more important when we realize that in this branch of the Congress we have recently passed a universal military training bill. Whether it will be passed in the other branch of the Congress I do not know; but if it should be passed there, it would give the President of the United States 1,000,000 boys a year. If he has sole authority over the Army and the Navy as Commander in Chief, he could do as he well pleased with the boys called up under the draft or under universal military training. That ought to be kept in the hands of the Congress of the United States. That more directly and in a more widespread manner represents the sentiment and the interests of the people of this country.

As I have said, I am interested, vitally interested, in that. The most important question we have had to pass upon during this session, even more important than any action taken in the last Congress, is the question whether, under the Constitution of the United States, the President has the sole power, or whether the Congress has the authority, as the Constitution has always been interpreted, and a clear reading of the language employed by the founding fathers definitely indicates.

Mr. President, that is an important question, but it is far more important that we remember the oath we took, as was so dramatically presented a moment ago by the Senator from New Mexico, to abide by the Constitution of the United States, and to protect the liberties of the people of America. Once the President of the United States has the power, which he here seeks, to determine foreign policy without in any way, shape, or form, referring the matter to the Congress of the United States, the only further step that could possibly be taken would be his taking complete control of domestic policy. By that time we would be well on the way to an authoritarian-totalitarian government, imposed upon us in the name of defeating the same kind of philosophy across the ocean.

Mr. President, it is a very serious matter we are considering tonight, and any delay which will bring about a proper conclusion on the part of the Congress of the United States of this very vital issue is well worth while. It will pay dividends in the liberties of the American people. It will pay dividends in the preserved power of the Congress of the United States in the years that are to come, the broad policy-making power of the Government. Only by proper checks and balances on power as among the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of the Government, can the

preservation of the liberties of the American people be maintained.

Mr. President, I call upon my colleagues in the Senate to support the motion to recommit the resolution to the committees, the committees to make of it a bill or a joint resolution, so that the American people may know who is responsible for the foreign policy of the United States.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the motion of the Senator from Ohio.

Mr. WHERRY and other Senators asked for the yeas and nays.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Missouri is recognized.

Mr. McFARLAND. I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Missouri, who was on his feet seeking recognition, was recognized.

Mr. KEM. Mr. President, I withdraw the amendment to the motion which I previously offered.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator, under the rules, cannot withdraw his amendment at this time, the yeas and nays having already been ordered thereon.

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the yeas and nays be rescinded, and that the Senator from Missouri [Mr. KEM] be permitted to withdraw his amendment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered. The amendment is withdrawn.

Mr. McFARLAND. Mr. President, has all the time for debate expired?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. It has.

Mr. McFARLAND. I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk called the roll, and the following Senators answered to their names:

Alken	Gillette	Millikin
Anderson	Green	Monroney
Bennett	Hayden	Morse
Benton	Hendrickson	Mundt
Brewster	Hennings	Murray
Bricker	Hickenlooper	Neely
Butler, Md.	Hill	Nixon
Butler, Nebr.	Hoey	O'Connor
Byrd	Holland	O'Mahoney
Cain	Ives	Pastore
Capehart	Jenner	Robertson
Carlson	Johnson, Colo.	Russell
Case	Johnson, Tex.	Saltonstall
Chavez	Johnson, S. C.	Schoeppel
Clements	Kefauver	Smathers
Connally	Kerr	Smith, Maine
Cordon	Kilgore	Smith, N. J.
Dirksen	Knowland	Sparkman
Douglas	Langer	Stennis
Duff	Lehman	Taft
Dworshak	Lodge	Thye
Eastland	Long	Underwood
Eaton	McClellan	Watkins
Ellender	McFarland	Welker
Ferguson	McMahon	Wherry
Flanders	Malone	Wiley
Frear	Martin	Williams
Fulbright	Maybank	Young
George		

The PRESIDING OFFICER. A quorum is present. The question is on agreeing to the motion of the Senator from Ohio [Mr. BRICKER] to recommit Senate Resolution 99. The yeas and nays have

been ordered, and the clerk will call the roll.

The Chief Clerk called the roll.

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. I announce that the Senator from Minnesota [Mr. HUMPHREY] is necessarily absent.

The Senator from Wyoming [Mr. HUNT] is absent on official business.

The Senator from Washington [Mr. MAGNUSON] is absent by leave of the Senate on official committee business.

The Senator from Nevada [Mr. McCARRAN] is absent by leave of the Senate on official business.

The Senator from Tennessee [Mr. McKELLAR] is absent because of illness.

If present and voting, the Senator from Minnesota [Mr. HUMPHREY], the Senator from Wyoming [Mr. HUNT], the Senator from Washington [Mr. MAGNUSON], and the Senator from Tennessee [Mr. McKELLAR] would vote "nay."

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I announce that the Senator from Michigan [Mr. VANDENBERG] is absent by leave of the Senate.

The Senator from Wisconsin [Mr. McCARTHY], who is necessarily absent, is paired with the Senator from New Hampshire [Mr. TOBEY], who is absent on official business. If present and voting, the Senator from Wisconsin would vote "yea," and the Senator from New Hampshire would vote "nay."

The Senator from New Hampshire [Mr. BRIDGES] is detained on official business.

The result was announced—yeas 31, nays 56, as follows:

YEAS—31

Bennett	Dworshak	Millikin
Brewster	Eaton	Mundt
Bricker	Ferguson	Schoeppel
Butler, Md.	Hendrickson	Taft
Butler, Nebr.	Hickenlooper	Watkins
Cain	Jenner	Welker
Capehart	Johnson, Colo.	Wherry
Carlson	Kem	Williams
Case	Langer	Young
Cordon	Malone	
Dirksen	Martin	

NAYS—56

Aiken	Hill	Murray
Anderson	Hoey	Neely
Benton	Holland	Nixon
Byrd	Ives	O'Connor
Chavez	Johnson, Tex.	O'Mahoney
Clements	Johnston, S. C.	Pastore
Connally	Kefauver	Robertson
Douglas	Kerr	Russell
Duff	Kilgore	Saltonstall
Eastland	Knowland	Smathers
Ellender	Lehman	Smith, Maine
Flanders	Lodge	Smith, N. J.
Frear	Long	Smith, N. C.
Fulbright	McClellan	Sparkman
George	McFarland	Stennis
Gillette	McMahon	Thye
Green	Maybank	Underwood
Hayden	Monroney	Wiley
Hennings	Morse	

NOT VOTING—9

Bridges	McCarran	Magnuson
Humphrey	McCarthy	Tobey
Hunt	McKellar	Vandenberg

So the motion to recommit was not agreed to.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The question is on agreeing to the resolution, as amended.

Mr. MUNDT. Mr. President, I offer an amendment.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Secretary will state the amendment.

The LEGISLATIVE CLERK. On page 4, line 25, and on page 5, lines 1 and 2, it

is proposed to strike out the words "and the Senate hereby approves the present plans of the President and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to send four additional divisions of ground forces to Western Europe" and substitute in their place the words "and it is the sense of the Senate that the present plans of the President and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to send four additional divisions of ground forces to Western Europe in implementation of article III of the North Atlantic Treaty should be submitted to Congress in the form of a Senate joint resolution."

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator from South Dakota is recognized for 30 minutes.

Mr. MUNDT. Mr. President, virtually all the argument which has been arrayed this evening against the motion to recommit has been based on a concept which I believe to be false.

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, may we have order? We cannot hear what the distinguished Senator is saying.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senate will be in order.

Mr. McFARLAND. Mr. President, will the distinguished Senator from South Dakota yield for a moment, with the understanding he will not thereby jeopardize his rights to the floor?

Mr. MUNDT. With that understanding, I am glad to yield.

Mr. McFARLAND. May I ask how many amendments will be offered to the resolution?

Mr. WHERRY. There are three more amendments.

Mr. CAPEHART. Four amendments, including the one offered by the Senator from South Dakota.

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, while I wish to expedite the work of the Senate and cooperate with the distinguished majority leader, there is also before us the question of debate on the resolution itself.

Mr. McFARLAND. If three amendments are to be offered to the resolution, I believe we should dispose of at least one more, or we will not conclude consideration of the resolution tomorrow.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator from South Dakota is recognized for 30 minutes. He may wish to use 30 minutes, or he may desire to yield some of the time.

Senators who are compelled to leave the Chamber will do so in order. Senators who are compelled to converse will please retire from the Chamber.

Mr. MUNDT. Mr. President, Senate Resolution 99 must be considered, in its closing stages, not only from the standpoint of its position with regard to the constitutional responsibilities and authorities of the United States Senate, but also from the standpoint of the record which was written into the archives of history at the time the Atlantic Treaty was ratified. When that ratification was before us, we all recall we were repeatedly assured it would be implemented only by congressional action and approval. Virtually all the argument which was made in opposition to the motion of the distinguished Senator from Ohio [Mr. BRICKER], to recommit the resolution,

was made by speakers who used a very strange and unusual prelude to their opposition to the proposal made by the Senator from Ohio. Almost without exception every speaker opposing the effort to recommit the resolution began by saying in effect, "This resolution is not the way I would have had it. Had I worked my will upon it in the committee or on the floor of the Senate I would have written it in an entirely different form. But since it is here in this form I now am going to oppose the motion to recommit, and I am urging that we adopt the resolution in its present form, because I am afraid."

Look at the things of which they were afraid, Mr. President. One Senator was afraid that he was going to be misunderstood by someone reading the newspapers in Europe—misunderstood about the parliamentary procedure in which we engage on the floor of the United States Senate. Another Senator said he was afraid that he was going to be misunderstood by his constituents at home, because they would not understand that a motion to recommit was simply a parliamentary device for effectuating an immediate and important amendment.

A third Senator was afraid of being misunderstood by General Eisenhower. A fourth Senator was afraid of being misunderstood at the other end of Pennsylvania Avenue.

Mr. President, it seems to me that if are going to legislate under that kind of fear psychosis, we certainly are going to proceed to riddle and sabotage the American Constitution in a mighty strange climate and a most bizarre environment.

I think it is about time for the United States Senate to cease being afraid of its shadow and cease being afraid of everyone who dares to criticize it.

As I have listened to some Senators in this debate, it has seemed to me that some of our colleagues are afraid of almost every activity in which a Senator engages except walking up to the pay window to collect his salary on the first of the month. Senators are afraid to stand by the Constitution. They are afraid to trust their committees. They are afraid to trust their colleagues. They are afraid to trust the House. They are afraid to trust themselves. So day after day and week after week we have been debating a resolution of the Senate called Senate Resolution 99; and every Senator knows in his heart that it does not make one iota of difference whether it is adopted or not. It does not add anything to the President's power. It does not detract anything from the President's power. It is simply an expression of a pious wish—it has no legislative significance, value, or authority whatsoever.

Mr. THYE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MUNDT. I yield.

Mr. THYE. The distinguished Senator from South Dakota, a long-time acquaintance of mine, refers to the fears of Senators. I merely wish to let the Senator from South Dakota know that personally I am not afraid either of the

remarks he has made against those of us serving here as his colleagues in the Senate; or am I afraid of the legislative measure to which we have been giving consideration today. I merely wish to place that statement in the record.

Mr. MUNDT. I am delighted to have the Senator place himself on record. I have no objection to that.

Mr. BRICKER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MUNDT. I yield.

Mr. BRICKER. Does the Senator agree with me that there is no reason for anyone to be afraid of this resolution, because it does not amount to anything?

Mr. MUNDT. It does not amount to a thing in the world; and the one thing each of us has left as a responsibility as individual Senators is to tell the country clearly and bluntly that what has been widely heralded as the big debate should more properly have been heralded as the big deception. We are here deciding nothing of significance at all.

Mr. CAIN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MUNDT. I am happy to yield.

Mr. CAIN. In one of the newspapers of this morning the Senator from Washington read a headline which went something like this: "Senate places curb on administration's desire to commit American forces to Europe," or words to that effect. What has the Senate actually done by way of placing any kind of limitation or restriction of any character on the Executive's determination to commit American forces without reference to the Congress of the United States?

Mr. MUNDT. Not a thing. Our obligation to the constituents whom we respectively serve is to make that point clear. It seems to me that there could be nothing which would do greater violence to confidence in this country than to allow this measure to be adopted with the understanding back home that the United States Senate had worked its will in any way, in the slightest degree; that it had curbed any of the executive authority, either assumed or constitutional, because, as a matter of fact, as I shall show from the language of the resolution itself, if the Senate adopts Senate Resolution 99, it will completely vacate its authority from the standpoint not alone of the movement of troops into an international command, but also largely from the standpoint of shaping future foreign policy in the United States.

When Senators later rise and protest let it be recorded that on this vote, on the 3d day of April 1951, by our vote—if we approve this resolution—we signed over to the Executive or to General Eisenhower, or to an international commander from France, Italy, or somewhere else, the authority which we swore to uphold when we swore to uphold the Constitution of the United States. We shall have by our action or inaction delegated our constitutional authorities to others.

If we are to vote to approve the resolution, it would have been much better had it worked out so that we could have

voted for it on the first day of April, because if there ever was an April fool joke perpetrated on the people, it is the attempt to make them believe that the United States Senate is legislating when we are simply petitioning the king, as supplicants, that he pay attention to some of the pious phrases we are writing into this utterly innocuous resolution. This resolution is but a petition to the President pleading with him to give some credence to our wishes.

Mr. CAIN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MUNDT. I yield.

Mr. CAIN. It seems to me that the distinguished Senator from South Dakota shares the sorrow which presently surrounds the junior Senator from Washington because of the latter's belief that if and when the pending simple Senate resolution is adopted, too many Americans will have been led to believe that the United States Senate has exercised some measure of control and authority over the question of whether in peacetime American forces shall be committed to an international command in Europe in support of America's obligation under the North Atlantic Treaty.

Mr. MUNDT. Precisely. Operating in the atmosphere of fear which I have mentioned, for various reasons Senators have run away from their position of responsibility as upholders of the Constitution. If the country realizes or understands that we have vacated our authority, it will know where to look for recourse and relief. But should we let the sham and the pretext go abroad that the United States Senate by amending or adopting this simple resolution is working its will through legislation, that to me will be the most serious travesty of all.

Mr. CAIN. I thank the Senator for his answer, and I invite the attention of every thoughtful American to it.

Mr. MUNDT. I will say to the distinguished Senator from Washington that I listened with rapt attention to his very masterful speech of a few minutes ago. I wish to associate myself completely with what he had to say. When this debate began, I expected to vote to approve sending four divisions of troops to Europe with suitable safeguards and by constitutional process, but I am not going to vote for sending a single American boy to Europe by the fictions in this resolution and in violation of the constitutional process. I refuse to be a party to this legislative deception. I believe that the insistence of the White House that this be done without any constitutional access to the Congress of the United States, or any constitutional approval, is a distinct contribution to disunity in this country. It is a stubborn disservice both to our security and our unity of purpose.

Mr. DWORSHAK. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MUNDT. I yield.

Mr. DWORSHAK. Is it not also true that approval of Senate Resolution 99 not only is a deception and a fraud perpetrated on the American people, but likewise is deceptive and illusory so far

as our allies in Western Europe are concerned, because the resolution does not have the strength of law?

Thus we are deceiving our allies as well as the people of the United States.

Mr. MUNDT. The Senator is exactly correct, and I am sure the old Bible students in the Senate, of whom there are many, will recall that the Good Book has something to say about houses which are built on shifting sand. And certainly if there ever was an attempt to erect an international policy on a false premise and a false foundation, it is this attempt to ram through the Senate by extra-constitutional methods legislation which could have been put through by constitutional methods without, I dare say, as many as 20 or 30 Senators voting in opposition to that kind of constitutional authorization.

Mr. President, to highlight the extremes to which the administration has been willing to go in the gross art of deception, let me call attention with a lexicographer's care to some of the trick language in Senate Resolution 99. We can discard the whereases, because the whereases are the stump speech of any legislation, and have no binding effect on anybody in any bill. Then we come to the resolve provisions.

1. The Senate approves the action of the President of the United States—

That is something definite and specific—in approving the appointment of General Eisenhower and in placing the Armed Forces of the United States which are now in Europe, under his command. I dare say not a single Senator would vote against that. The fact is that General Eisenhower is a splendid commander, who can do a fine job of commanding the troops we have in Europe. That is as far as paragraph No. 1 goes.

In paragraph No. 2 we get into the fine art of clairvoyance—

2. It is the belief of the Senate—

And so forth. No one is interested in what we believe in or do not believe in. They are interested in whether we have enough conviction to pass a law implementing our beliefs. They are interested in knowing whether we have enough conviction so we are willing to legislate according to constitutional processes. But for some of us to pontificate about what the rest of us believe in seems to me as futile as it is to consult ladies or gentlemen engaged downtown in reading tea leaves, or in giving clairvoyant readings for \$3 a prophecy.

The third paragraph fairly puts us into harmony with the legislative procedure in which we find ourselves. It says:

3. It is the sense of the Senate that the President of the United States—

Do such and such.

Paragraph 4 says:

4. It is the sense of the Senate that before sending units of ground troops to Europe—

And so forth. In paragraph 5 we go back and approve something again, but what do we approve? We approve the understanding which at the last report

was in world-wide rivalry with "The Thing" that the musicians write about from the standpoint of being the No. 1 mystery in America. Nobody knows what the understanding is. Nobody has put it in the Record. Nobody has spelled it out. Nobody has read it. Nobody here has seen it.

We, a once proud coordinate body of the Government, are asked to approve "the understanding," but we do not know what it is; we approve "the understanding" but we do not know who made it; we do not know who signed it. We do not know what is in it, but we approve it. So that puts us back into clairvoyance again.

Then we come to paragraph No. 6:

6. It is the sense of the Senate—

That we do something else.

And paragraph No. 7:

It is the sense of the Senate—

Mr. President, can any Member of our body imagine the once sturdy Senators who sat in our seats, like Clay, Calhoun, Daniel Webster, and the senior Bob La Follette, arguing for 3 weeks about whether or not they could summon enough courage to request the Executive to consider, if he would please, some opinion that they dared to have on some matter of vital importance to the security of this country or to our international policy? Can Senators imagine those sturdy Senators of bygone days engaging in what passes for "the great debate" about what the sense of the Senate should be, without measuring up to their sworn oaths as Senators to legislate and vote for or against a measure written in conformity with constitutional processes?

Mr. President, Senate Resolution 99 reminds me of nothing quite as much as the various memorials that all Members of the Senate have on occasion gotten from State legislatures. We have all received them. We have filed them for appropriate action. Senators know what the action is.

There is usually just one short step between the hand of the Senator and the receptacle known as the waste basket. That step is to appear on the pages of the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD in proud print, that the legislature of such and such a State has memorialized Congress to do so and so. That is a perfectly legitimate function, and all our respective legislatures spend a great deal of time memorializing Congress, and we place the memorials in the Record. But I dare say the destiny of the human race has never been affected very much by the memorials adopted by the legislature of any State of any Senator present here tonight.

Mr. President, what we are doing in Senate Resolution 99 is to memorialize the President, as Senators. The United States Senate now, acting as a State legislature would, is memorializing the President "please to pay attention to something which we think we have agreed upon in substance."

Mr. BRICKER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. SPARKMAN in the chair). Does the Sen-

ator from South Dakota yield to the Senator from Ohio?

Mr. MUNDT. I yield.

Mr. BRICKER. I do not think this body can be compared fairly with a State legislature, because a State legislature does not have power to act in such a case as this, while we have the authority to act and are avoiding the responsibility.

Mr. MUNDT. That is true. The only way a State legislature can express its will to Washington is to memorialize us on a subject. The Senate is resorting to a technique beneath the ordinary authority of its activity, because it lacks the courage to stand up and face the issue with a joint resolution or a bill, or to act in accordance with constitutional procedure. So, instead, we timidly attempt in Senate Resolution 99 to memorialize the President.

Mr. KEM. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. MUNDT. I yield.

Mr. KEM. The resolution refers to "constitutional processes" or "constitutional procedure." Is it possible that it is the constitutional right of petition which the Senate is exercising?

Mr. MUNDT. Precisely that, and only that, as it seems to me. Some of our Members seem to be controlled in their thinking by the Pentagon or by the State Department or by the White House, and seem happy if they can retain for the United States Senate the power of petition. That is all we even attempt in Senate Resolution 99. That is our "constitutional process." That is what we are doing. We are petitioning the White House "please to consider some of the things on which we find ourselves in comparative agreement."

I submit that the adoption of Senate Resolution 99 is going to result in its coming back to plague every Member of this body who votes for it, because by voting for it Senators push this body, this legislative body, toward the level of importance of the British Parliament prior to the year 1215, because long before old King John was compelled to affix his seal to the Magna Carta in 1215 that English parliamentary body exercised the power of petition, and from the day when they compelled King John to affix the seal of state to the Magna Carta Anglo-Saxon legislative bodies have had the authority to legislate instead of to petition.

It may be that this day of April 1951 marks the beginning of the end of that constitutional process, because the United States, for some reason or other, is afraid that someone will misinterpret what it does; is afraid that 30 minutes' delay is going to change the course of history, delay in order to recommit, and bring back from the committee yet tonight a joint resolution forthwith; afraid what the critics in the press are going to say, or what someone in the State Department is going to say, or what the White House may say, or what someone on the other side of the sea may say.

Mr. President, acting under the whip-lash of fear has deprived many people in this world of their freedom. I doubt very much whether we are going to go very far in defeating Red Russia with

a red budget, or if we are going to get very far in restoring the freedom of foreign individuals against their rulers if in this country we sacrifice the authority that we, the people, have by permitting those who would rule us to ignore constitutional concepts and procedures of our Government.

Mr. President, this art of deception has gone even further. Let me read carefully now here in the quiet of the evening on the floor of the Senate what the architects of this "appeal to the king" put in it. I read to the Senate paragraph 6 of Senate Resolution 99. I think by comparison the English barons who wrote the text of the Magna Carta in their appeal to that ancient English king had more courage and did the job better and certainly with greater lucidity than does paragraph 6.

Let me read the paragraph:

It is the sense of the Senate that, in the interests of sound constitutional processes—

That sounds good for home consumption—

in the interests of sound constitutional processes, and of national unity and understanding, congressional approval should be obtained of any policy requiring the assignment of American troops abroad when such assignment is in implementation of article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty.

So far so good. There is a stump speech. Constituents, please read and close your eyes and go no further. That sounds good when placed in a speech back home.

What comes next? In order to have these sound constitutional processes and to bring about congressional approval, it says:

And the Senate hereby approves—

Now, nobody has risen up to this late hour in the debate to say that the United States Senate is the Congress; that we alone can provide or deny congressional approval. But Senate Resolution 99 would so provide.

It is my complaint that the Senate is surrendering its former importance and is reducing itself below the level of a respectable State legislature. Certainly the Senate is not trying to attain a new significance by moving over and assimilating the House of Representatives and attempting to call itself a unicameral body or congress. But after making the proud boast that we should do this by "sound constitutional processes" and that "congressional approval should be secured," in the next sentence Senate Resolution 99 drops all that by saying "and the Senate hereby approves the present plans," thus throwing into the ashcan the so-called congressional approval, and making this measure the most conspicuous piece of mutual self-contradiction that I have seen in a long, long time.

Mr. BRICKER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. SPARKMAN in the chair). Does the Senator from South Dakota yield to the Senator from Ohio?

Mr. MUNDT. I am glad to yield.

Mr. BRICKER. The Senator referred to the portion of the sixth para-

graph of Senate resolution 99 which states that—

It is the sense of the Senate that, in the interests of sound constitutional processes—

And so forth. Is there any constitutional process known as a Senate resolution or a Senate concurrent resolution?

Mr. MUNDT. None that I know of. I think perhaps we could say that both a Senate resolution and a Senate concurrent resolution are within the purview of the Constitution; but there is no way by which a binding law can be written by either of those devices.

Mr. BRICKER. That is the point to which I am referring, namely, that the only type of legislation authorized or referred to in the Constitution of the United States is legislation passed by both Houses of Congress, and sent to the President of the United States, for his approval or veto, and returned to the Congress in case of veto, for a possible overriding of the veto. Nothing else can have the force and effect of law.

Mr. MUNDT. Precisely.

Entirely apart from that, and looking at this resolution with the greatest possible amount of charity, and giving the benefit of every possible doubt to the committees which conceived this measure, I say that I wish someone would have sufficient linguistic facility to explain how either House of Congress acting alone can do anything that will have the force and effect of law or that can even provide what might be considered congressional approval.

In order to have such force and effect, the least that can be used is a concurrent resolution.

Mr. President, I think the all-time prize and the all-enduring orchid for legislative legerdemain should be awarded these committees, for if any of our committees ever started out with one thing, and wound up with something else, it is these committees.

It is the purpose of my amendment to have the Senate save its self-respect, at least as a grammarian, if not as a constitutionalist, by saying something that we mean, in that simple sentence.

Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MUNDT. I yield.

Mr. McCLELLAN. Is the Senator discussing his amendment that is printed and is at the desk?

Mr. MUNDT. I am, beginning on pages 4 and 5 of the Senate resolution.

Mr. McCLELLAN. It is the Senator's amendment A?

Mr. MUNDT. Yes; my amendment A.

Mr. McCLELLAN. I call the Senator's attention to the last line of his amendment, in which he uses the words "in the form of a Senate joint resolution."

Mr. MUNDT. Yes.

Mr. McCLELLAN. Since the motion to recommit the resolution and have the committees report a joint resolution has failed, would not the Senator wish to make his amendment conform to the language of the pending resolution, by modifying the last line of his amendment so as to have it state "in the form of a Senate concurrent resolution"?

Mr. MUNDT. Let me inquire of the Senator from Arkansas, who has contributed the most important amendment which has been adopted in the course of the debate, and whose counsel I very seriously covet for myself, whether, from the standpoint of sending the four divisions and the use of the divisions asked for to the extent that is intended, he has in mind, in connection with that language, a Senate joint resolution or a Senate concurrent resolution.

Mr. McCLELLAN. I have in mind a Senate concurrent resolution, because we have already passed on the question of a Senate joint resolution. It strikes me that if the Senator from South Dakota intends to contribute anything by means of his amendment and by having it adopted, if the Senator would change the last line of his amendment to read, "in the form of a Senate concurrent resolution," certainly a Senate concurrent resolution does not undertake to speak for only one branch of the Congress, but would put the entire Congress on the record as approving this proposal.

Mr. MUNDT. That is correct. While I would have hoped that the amendment of the Senator from Arkansas would have brought before us a Senate joint resolution, I am willing to concede that if in connection with the future consideration of the sending abroad of more of our divisions, we are to act by way of a Senate concurrent resolution, then there is no particular reason why we should not use the same formula in connection with the sending of the first four divisions, even though personally I think it should all be done by either a bill or a joint resolution.

Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield further?

Mr. MUNDT. I yield.

Mr. McCLELLAN. I am not opposed to a joint resolution, and I have said that probably it is the best way by which to express the will of the Congress. I am not necessarily disagreeing with that procedure; but I am trying to be practical about the matter. We are not going to be able to have that kind of procedure adopted. Even if we attempted it, we would not succeed with it.

The approach by way of a Senate concurrent resolution is the best approach we can make to this matter, and the most emphatic way left to the Congress to deal with it, as I view the situation, and to make the will of Congress and its sense and its judgment known not only to the President but to the country.

So I urge the Senator from South Dakota to consider modifying his amendment so as to have it state, in the last line, "a Senate concurrent resolution," rather than "a Senate joint resolution."

Mr. MUNDT. Mr. President, it seems to me that looking at this matter as a realist, although I personally would be very unhappy to have the provision read "a Senate concurrent resolution," nevertheless I feel that if we can reach the subject matter in such a way as to bring the language into complete harmony with that of the McClellan amendment dealing with the sending of subsequent divisions, we shall at least have made good sense and honest diction out of

what is written in paragraph 6 of the resolution, on page 4, where mention is made of congressional approval, for then it will have provided for at least congressional approval by both Houses of Congress.

Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield at this point?

Mr. MUNDT. I yield.

Mr. McCLELLAN. A concurrent resolution does carry with it congressional approval. It may not have the force of law in saying that it is the sense of the Congress that the President should submit the proposal for congressional approval, but certainly a concurrent resolution carries with it congressional approval.

Mr. MUNDT. Yes; it does do that. It does not have the force of law, but it is half a step, at least, in the right direction. It would clearly serve a stern warning to any President not to ignore Congress. Although we would like to take perhaps a step and a half in the right direction, yet if we take half a step in the right direction, we shall have started the Congress moving on the right course.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator from South Dakota has expired.

Mr. MUNDT. Mr. President, I modify my amendment in conformity with the suggestion just made—

Mr. CONNALLY. Mr. President, has not the Senator's time expired?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Yes; but the Senator from South Dakota is now modifying his amendment.

Will the Senator from South Dakota state the manner in which he seeks to modify his amendment?

Mr. MUNDT. Mr. President, I modify my amendment in conformity with the suggestion of the Senator from Arkansas, so that the last line of my amendment will read "submitted to Congress in the form of a Senate concurrent resolution."

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The modification will be made.

Mr. CONNALLY. Mr. President, what the Senator has stated is already in the Senate concurrent resolution which is before us now.

Mr. MUNDT. By my modification I have changed the last line of my amendment, so as to make it read "a Senate concurrent resolution."

Mr. CONNALLY. The Senator makes that modification, but he has not changed the language of the concurrent resolution.

Mr. President, I do not care to discuss this amendment and I do not care to yield any time on it.

This question has already been passed upon by the Senate in connection with the motion to recommit, which has been rejected. Now to go back and go all over that ground again seems to me to be very unwise.

Therefore, I make the point of the absence of a quorum; and I reserve the remainder of my time.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The absence of a quorum has been suggested, and the clerk will call the roll.

The Chief Clerk called the roll, and the following Senators answered to their names:

Alken	Hayden	Monroney
Anderson	Hendrickson	Morse
Bennett	Hennings	Mundt
Benton	Hickenlooper	Murray
Brewster	Hill	Nixon
Bricker	Hoey	O'Connor
Butler, Md.	Holland	O'Mahoney
Butler, Nebr.	Ives	Pastore
Cain	Jenner	Robertson
Capehart	Johnson, Tex.	Russell
Carlson	Johnston, S. C.	Saltonstall
Case	Kefauver	Schoeppel
Clements	Kerr	Smathers
Connally	Kilgore	Smith, Maine
Cordon	Knowland	Smith, N. J.
Dirksen	Langer	Smith, N. C.
Douglas	Lehman	Sparkman
Dworschak	Lodge	Stennis
Eaton	Long	Taft
Ellender	McClellan	Thye
Ferguson	McFarland	Underwood
Flanders	McMahon	Watkins
Frear	Malone	Welker
Fulbright	Martin	Wherry
George	Maybank	Wiley
Gillette	Millikin	Williams
Green		Young

The PRESIDING OFFICER. A quorum is present. The Senator from Texas.

Mr. CONNALLY. Mr. President, I may say to Senators who were not here a while ago that the pending amendment is one offered by the Senator from South Dakota [Mr. MUNDT]. It is the same as the one which was involved in the motion to recommit, and which was rejected by the Senate overwhelmingly. I very much hope that Senators will not vote for the amendment, but will vote it down; after which, the plan is to recess until tomorrow. I hope Senators will vote "nay" on the amendment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on the amendment offered by the Senator from South Dakota.

Mr. TAFT. I ask for the yeas and nays.

The yeas and nays were ordered, and the Chief Clerk called the roll.

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. I announce that the Senator from Virginia [Mr. BYRD], the Senator from New Mexico [Mr. CHAVEZ], the Senator from Mississippi [Mr. EASTLAND], the Senator from Colorado [Mr. JOHNSON], the Senator from Minnesota [Mr. HUMPHREY], and the Senator from West Virginia [Mr. NEELY] are necessarily absent.

The Senator from Wyoming [Mr. HUNT] is absent on official business.

The Senator from Washington [Mr. MAGNUSON] is absent by leave of the Senate on official committee business.

The Senator from Nevada [Mr. McCARRAN] is absent by leave of the Senate on official business.

The Senator from Tennessee [Mr. McKELLAR] is absent because of illness.

If present and voting, the Senator from Mississippi [Mr. EASTLAND], the Senator from Minnesota [Mr. HUMPHREY], the Senator from Wyoming [Mr. HUNT], the Senator from Washington [Mr. MAGNUSON], the Senator from Tennessee [Mr. McKELLAR] and the Senator from West Virginia [Mr. NEELY] would vote "nay."

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I announce that the Senator from Michigan [Mr. VANDENBERG] is absent by leave of the Senate.

The Senator from Wisconsin [Mr. McCARTHY], who is necessarily absent, is paired with the Senator from New Hampshire [Mr. TOBEY], who is absent on official business. If present and voting, the Senator from Wisconsin would vote "yea," and the Senator from New Hampshire would vote "nay."

The Senator from New Hampshire [Mr. BRIDGES] is detained on official business.

The Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. DUFF] is detained on official business, and, if present, would vote "nay."

The result was announced—yeas 29, nays 52, as follows:

YEAS—29

Bennett	Dworschak	Millikin
Brewster	Eaton	Mundt
Bricker	Hendrickson	Schoeppel
Butler, Md.	Hickenlooper	Taft
Butler, Nebr.	Jenner	Watkins
Cain	Kerr	Welker
Capehart	Langer	Wherry
Carlson	McClellan	Williams
Case	Malone	Young
Cordon	Martin	

NAYS—52

Alken	Hoey	Nixon
Anderson	Holland	O'Connor
Benton	Ives	O'Mahoney
Clements	Johnson, Tex.	Pastore
Connally	Johnson, S. C.	Robertson
Dirksen	Kefauver	Russell
Douglas	Kerr	Saltonstall
Ellender	Kilgore	Smathers
Ferguson	Knowland	Smith, Maine
Flanders	Lehman	Smith, N. J.
Frear	Lodge	Smith, N. C.
Fulbright	Long	Sparkman
George	McFarland	Stennis
Gillette	McMahon	Thye
Green	Maybank	Underwood
Hayden	Monroney	Wiley
Hennings	Morse	
Hill	Murray	

NOT VOTING—15

Bridges	Humphrey	McKellar
Byrd	Hunt	Magnuson
Chavez	Johnson, Colo.	Neely
Duff	McCarran	Tobey
Eastland	McCarthy	Vandenberg

So Mr. MUNDT's amendment was rejected.

Mr. MCFARLAND. Mr. President, I have consulted with the distinguished chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations [Mr. CONNALLY] and it seems desirable, inasmuch as the hour is growing late, to recess until tomorrow.

I therefore ask unanimous consent that the provision in the unanimous-consent agreement with respect to continuous session be vacated, that the remainder of the unanimous-consent agreement be retained intact, and that the Senate stand in recess until 12 o'clock noon tomorrow.

Mr. WHERRY. I desire to comply with the wishes of the distinguished majority leader, but now that unanimous consent is asked to vacate the part of the agreement referring to continuous session and to recess until tomorrow, I am wondering whether in the event a motion were made or an amendment were offered, the Senator who made the motion or offered the amendment might have control of 30 minutes, and that the opposition to the motion or amendment, whether on this side of the aisle or on the other side, might have control of the time

of the opposition. I believe that would be fair, and that was the intention of the majority leader when he made the original request for the unanimous-consent agreement.

I wonder if we could clarify the unanimous-consent agreement to the extent that hereafter, regardless of who makes a motion or offers an amendment, or an amendment to a motion, the proponent shall have control of 30 minutes, and that the opposition, as in the case of the motion offered by the Senator from Ohio [Mr. BRICKER], shall have control of the opposition time.

Mr. MCFARLAND. I have no objection to modifying the unanimous-consent agreement so to provide that if a motion or amendment is offered and the Senator from Texas [Mr. CONNALLY] is in favor of it, the Senator from Nebraska shall be in control of the time of the opposition.

Mr. WHERRY. I shall be very glad to accept it on that basis. In that way the opposition will be assured of having 30 minutes.

Mr. THYE. Mr. President, a parliamentary inquiry.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator will state it.

Mr. THYE. Did I understand the majority leader to say that if the Senator from Texas is in favor of a motion or amendment the minority leader would be in control of the time?

Mr. MCFARLAND. No.

Mr. LODGE. Does it mean that the Senator who moves an amendment would no longer have control over his 30 minutes?

Mr. MCFARLAND. No. The Senator who moved an amendment would have 30 minutes. The Senator who made a motion would have 30 minutes. The Senator from Texas would have 30 minutes, unless he were in favor of the motion. If he were in favor of an amendment or motion the Senator from Nebraska would have the time in opposition.

Mr. WHERRY. I think I understand the majority leader. It would mean that the proponent of an amendment would have 30 minutes. If the distinguished chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations were in favor of the amendment he would not ask for the time in opposition. The time of the opposition to the amendment certainly ought to be in the control of a Senator who is not in favor of the amendment. Therefore I am asking for control of the time of the opposition.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is the Chair to understand that the Senator from Nebraska would always be in favor of an amendment?

Mr. WHERRY. No; I merely want to control the time of the opposition. I shall be glad to do so.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the unanimous-consent request of the Senator from Arizona, as modified?

Mr. LONG. Mr. President, reserving the right to object, may I ask the distinguished majority leader why it is necessary that we recess at this time?

We have only two more amendments to consider. We could dispose of them and get through with the pending business. It is too late now for Senators to do anything but go home and go to bed. Why can we not proceed with the pending resolution and dispose of it, so that the country will know what is happening?

Mr. MCFARLAND. I thought that going home and going to bed was all Senators ever did anyway. The senior Senator from Texas [Mr. CONNALLY] is in charge of the resolution, and the Senate ought to adhere to the wishes of the chairman of the committee. The responsibility rests with the chairman, not with the majority leader. There is a considerable difference between voting and being in charge of legislation. I do not know how many amendments may be offered. Three hands were raised earlier when I asked how many would be offered. If the three amendments were considered, it would mean that we would be here until 12 o'clock on the amendments. Then we would have two more hours on the resolution itself. That would bring us to 2 o'clock in the morning. That is why the distinguished chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations wants to have the Senate recess at this time.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Is there objection to the request of the Senator from Arizona, as modified?

Mr. WHERRY. As modified.

Mr. MCFARLAND. I made the modification. It is a part of the original request.

Mr. WHERRY. I wanted to be certain about it.

RECESS

The VICE PRESIDENT. Is there objection to the request of the Senator from Arizona? The Chair hears none; and the Senate stands in recess until 12 o'clock noon, tomorrow.

Thereupon (at 9 o'clock and 7 minutes p. m.) the Senate took a recess until tomorrow, Wednesday, April 4, 1951, at 12 o'clock meridian.

NOMINATIONS

Executive nominations received by the Senate April 3 (legislative day of March 26), 1951:

UNITED STATES MARSHAL

James M. Roche, of Connecticut, to be United States marshal for the district of Connecticut, vice Bernard Fitch, retired.

APPOINTMENTS IN THE NAVY

The following-named midshipmen (Aviation) to be ensigns in the Navy:

David E. Allison	Robert B. Kelley
Robert C. Baker	Carl A. Leighner
David L. Bratton	John B. Leverton
Gerald R. Brown	Arthur R. Maddox
Raymond J. Brucks	John E. Minardi
William R. Bryant	Russell L. Moffitt
George R. Ferguson	Peter M. Moriarty
Vernon L. Fitch	William B. Nevius
Thomas A. Francis	John F. O'Connell
Norman E. Gaar	James H. Richter
Jack L. Gentry	Neal L. Scheidler
James R. Hanson	Myron M. Thayer
William E. Holden	Thomas J. Wickham
Thomas G. Kampmann	

The following-named (Naval Reserve Officers Training Corps) to be ensigns in the Navy:

Thomas R. Abernathy	Lloyd D. Beatty
John Abraham	Stanley L. Beck
Henry W. Abts III	Stephen D. Beck
Morgan R. Adams, Jr.	Thomas E. Behringer
William J. Adams	James P. Benbow
William R. Adams, Jr.	John B. Benear
David L. Adler	Roger W. Benedict
George J. Agule, Jr.	Jerome V. Bennett
Andre V. Ajemian	Walter D. Bennett
Seth E. Aldridge, Jr.	Irving G. Berg
Arnold O. Allen	Edwin A. Berger
David P. Allen	Walter G. Berghahn
William P. Allen	Sidney G. Bergman
Lester L. Alley	John W. Bethel
Cecil J. Allison, Jr.	Robert F. Betts
William B. Allmon	Donald A. Bewkes
Richard H. Alsager	George H. Bickley V
Leonard E. Alsop	James E. Biechler
Thomas L. Altshuler	Clifford M. Billingslea, Jr.
Carl L. Anderson	Robert S. Bills
Charles L. R. Anderson	Arthur W. Bingham III
Elbert L. Anderson	Kenneth R. Bingman
George H. Anderson	Harvey E. Bishop, Jr.
John H. Anderson	Arnold A. Bitterman
Kenneth N. Anderson	Arnvid N. Bjorke
Leonard J. Anderson, Jr.	Donald S. Blair, Jr.
Richard A. Anderson	Richard M. Bland
Robert E. Anderson	Daniel W. Blaylock
William J. Anderson, III	Berrien B. Blemker
William R. Anderson	William M. Bloxham
Herbert G. Angle, Jr.	Andrew W. Bluemle
Willits Ansel	Charles D. Bobo
David V. Anthony	David D. Bockman
George A. Appleby	Walter H. Bockwoldt
Charles H. Armitage	Russell L. Boggs
James A. Asay	Norbert T. Bold
Homer L. Ash	Floyd L. Bolton
Albert J. Ashurst	James Booher
Edgar M. Ashworth, Jr.	Duncan W. Booth
Paul A. Asmus	Russell H. Booth, Jr.
Leroy E. Ater, Jr.	Dean C. Borden
William H. Attebury	John K. Borgaard
Orval L. Aulse	Charles L. Borie IV
Frederick L. Austin, Jr.	Robert R. Bottimore, Jr.
Lloyd M. Ayer	James E. Boyce
Willis W. Babb	David T. Boyd
Lester E. Bach	Joseph M. Boyd, Jr.
Douglas F. Bachem	Marion S. Boyd, Jr.
John M. Backer	Richard C. Boyle
Williams C. Bagot	Thomas J. Bradshaw, Jr.
Harold R. Bailey	Gerald D. Bridges
William R. Bailey	Richard D. Bridgman
Alfred W. Baker	Josiah M. Briggs, Jr.
Clovis M. Baker	William G. Briggs
Harold A. Baker	Edward A. Broadwell
James G. Baker	William A. Brobst
William F. Balaz	Robert C. Brogan
Robert P. Balderson	George G. Brooks
George L. Ball	Phillips A. Brooks
Irving F. Ball	Arnold B. Brown, Jr.
Charles R. Ballard	Herman T. Brown, Jr.
Charles A. Barbee	John R. Brown
William L. Barclay III	Peter G. Brown
Robert M. Barlow	Ray W. Brown
John H. Barnard	Robert D. Brown, Jr.
Wallace R. Barnes	Paul B. Bruggeman
Howard J. Barnett	Robert J. Brumley
Patrick J. Barrett	Billy "B" Bryant
Roger F. Barrett	Joseph F. Bryant
Gerald Barton	Richard P. Buchman, Jr.
John E. Bass, Jr.	George F. Buckley
Edward J. Battersby	Edward J. Buja
Gerald G. Battle	Marvin D. Bukowitz
Paul E. Baumgardner	Donald D. Burbank
William F. Baxter	Ronald E. Burbank
Charles R. Bayless	Thomas F. Burbank
Albert C. Beall	Norman W. Burch
Herman M. Beam	Arthur J. Burke
Robert W. Beard	Joseph A. Burlew
James K. Beates	Herbert J. Burrows
Donald A. Beattie	Harold L. Burstyn
	Herbert O. Burton

- Joseph H. Busch, Jr.
Bernard B. Butcher
Paul R. Byrd
Henry S. Byrne
Patrick R. Caine
Earl L. Caldwell, Jr.
William P. Caldwell
Elsworth L. Calhoun
William S. Call
Thomas D. Callahan
Alan S. Calnan
William T. Calton
Paul D. Camp
Neil V. Campbell
Thomas E. Campbell
Robert F. Campion, Jr.
Robert E. Cannon
Albert L. Cappelen, Jr.
John G. Capps, Jr.
George P. Carden
Marshall B. Carden, Jr.
James H. Carlson
Richard A. Carlson
William R. Carlton
George R. Carmichael, Jr.
Edward J. Carney
John N. Carpenter
Edwin B. Carpenter
Harry E. Carpenter
Thomas W. Carroll
Philip L. Carter, Jr.
James C. Case
Donald L. Caskey
Roger L. Cason
Richard R. Cassafer
Frederic C. Caswell, Jr.
Bruce M. Causey, Jr.
James W. Cayanus
Michael P. Cericola
Robert E. Chachere
Dale A. Chadwick
John Chamberlain
Robert J. Chamberlain
William A. Chambers
Howard G. Chapin
Samuel L. Chesser
Donald J. Childers
Ralph E. Chilton
Donald A. Christenson
Adrian V. Clark
Harold B. Clark
Robert M. Clary
Lorimer Clayton, Jr.
Guy C. Clifford
Douglas S. Close
William A. Coale
William J. Cobb
Sidney A. Cochran, Jr.
Barry G. Cohen
James D. Cohoon
Edward E. Colby
Forrest D. Colegrove, Jr.
Alfred N. Coleman III
William O. Coleman, Jr.
Herbert F. Colenda
Andrew McG. Collins
Charles H. Collins
Myron W. Collins
Robert J. Collins, Jr.
Joseph F. Comella
Edward J. Condon
Freeman J. Condon, Jr.
William A. Confield
Robert S. Congleton
Byron J. Connell, Jr.
Paul B. Coogan
William E. Cooney
Lawrence T. Cooper
Howard R. Corbett, Jr.
Corbet M. Cornelison
Winston W. Cornelius
Robert P. Cornick
Edward H. Cornish, Jr.
William J. Costa
Patrick E. Costello
John LeG. Cotton
Daniel F. Coughlin, Jr.
George P. Coulter
Dennis J. Craig
Stanford T. Crapo II
Don E. Crawley
Fulton H. Creech, Jr.
William R. Cress
William F. Crimmins, Jr.
Robert M. Cronholm
Robert C. Cross
Wiley E. Cross
William H. Crosson III
Edwin G. Croswell
William L. Crull III
Arthur Z. Crum
Wright W. Crummett, Jr.
Donald C. Cumming
Benjamin H. Cunningham
Thomas P. Curran
Thomas P. Curry
John W. Curtis
Robinson Cushman
Joseph D. Cusick
Edmund I. Dahl
Francis J. Daigle
George R. Dallimore
Benny J. Damiani, Jr.
John M. Daniel, Jr.
Clement H. Darby
Roderick J. Darling
Dean D. Daugherty
Richard B. Davey
Thomas E. Davey
Robert L. Davidson
Irvin H. Davis
Jay K. Davis
Robert G. Davis, Jr.
Robert H. Davis, Jr.
Lloyd F. Day
Thomas E. Day, Jr.
Kenneth LaV. Dean
Theodore E. Deane
James W. Deardorff
Albert J. DeBartolo
William S. Debnam
Stephen Decatur
David W. DeCook
Reed E. Deemer
John P. DeFavero
Charles H. Delk
Lyle E. Deniston
John C. Dennis
Joseph H. DeNoon
Newell E. DePuy, Jr.
Harley R. Derleth
Thomas A. DeVeau
John J. Deyak
Albert M. Dickson, Jr.
Edward T. DiCorcia
Percy McN. Dillon, Jr.
John F. DiSorbo
Robert G. Dixon
Robert L. Dodd
James J. Doherty
John D. Donnelly
James P. Dording
Charles T. Dorman
Lionel A. Dorsay
Erman R. Dotson, Jr.
Roger E. Doty
David L. Downs
George O. Drafs
Lambert R. Dralle
Robert K. Drowing
Edward C. Driscoll
Sam N. Driver
Robert E. Drucken-
miller
Rodman F. Duane
Gazell M. DuBois
Theodore M. Du-
charme, Jr.
Louis P. Duemler
William H. Dum-
baugh, Jr.
Frank G. Dunham, Jr.
Richard M. Dunham
Robert J. Dunn
Francis X. Dunne
David A. Durfee
Charles Duttweiler
John S. Duvall IV
Laurence A. Dwyer
Crawford A. Easterling
Donald D. Eddy
Harold E. Eden
Hobart J. Edmonds, Jr.
William B. Edwards
Joseph E. Eger
Philip E. Ehrhardt
Burt N. Eichkorn
John H. Eichstedt
Karl R. Ekman
James S. Elfelt
Charles P. Elmore
William P. Emerson
Leland H. Emery, Jr.
Benny F. Enfinger
Harry J. Englehart
John D. Ensign II
Donald P. Erb
John L. Ergle
Robert P. Erickson
James K. Ericson
Lewis H. Esler, Jr.
Charles R. Esser
Carl F. Evans
John J. Evans
Willard E. Evans
James Everett, Jr.
Stanley J. Ewanowski
Edward N. Fadeley
Thomas R. Fadell
Albert D. Falther, Jr.
Peter A. Farmer
Rob R. Farnham
Dale H. Feazell
Glenn M. Feit
Eugene J. Feldhausen
Richard F. Ferris
William G. Fick, Jr.
Charles L. Fischer, Jr.
Gorman L. Fisher
Peter S. Fithian
James J. Fitzgerald
Joseph G. Fitzgibbons, Jr.
William M. Foley
Arthur C. Folli
Robert J. Forsyth
Robert R. Fossum
Jerald D. Foster
Robert W. Foster
John R. Fowler
Charles D. Fox III
Edward J. Fox, Jr.
Paul F. Fox
Edward L. Frame
Daniel L. Francescon, Jr.
Terry W. Francis
Richard H. Frank, Jr.
Morris A. M. Franks
Douglas F. Fraser
Charles L. Frazier
Richard P. Fredericks
Peter J. Fredrickson
Robert M. Freebor-
ough
Warren R. Freeman
Harry LeR. Fremd
William L. French
Henry G. Fricke
Joseph F. Friend
Charles C. Frost
James W. Fry
William C. Fuellhart, Jr.
Allen E. Fuhs
Jack R. Fuller
Newton R. Fuller
William H. Funk-
houser
Howard W. Gaines
Kendall K. Gaines
Robert B. Gaither
Searcy G. Galing
Thomas E. Gallagher
Lowell E. Gallaway
Roger E. Galliher
James F. Gallo
Richard W. Galphin, Jr.
Charles H. Garner
John Garofalos
Charles I. Garrett, Jr.
Hugh L. Garvin
Donald L. Gaut
Richard C. Gavalis
Robert E. Gebhardt
William R. Gehlert
Eugene D. Geiger
David E. Gensheimer
John R. Gentry
John W. Gergel
Raoul H. Gersten
Gary D. Ghostley
Donald Gibble
James G. Gibson
Brewster J. Gifford
James M. Gifford
Alton K. Gilbert
David D. Gilboe
Benjamin Gillig
George R. Gilmore
William G. Gilmore
Wendell L. Gladish
Richard "D" Gloor
Kenneth R. Gnos
James T. Godfrey
Ralph W. Goers
Daniel H. Goetz
Elmer M. Goldman
Irwin Goldstein
William Gombash, Jr.
Robert L. Goodell
Arthur W. Gottschalk, Jr.
Ralph J. Goulds
Richard Z. Graham
John T. Grant
Walter K. Grant, Jr.
Alexander Grasberg
Thomas E. Graves
David M. Greason
Richard S. Greeley
Leeland V. Green
Robert E. Green
Robert L. Green
Thomas D. Green, Jr.
Francis E. Greene
Frank F. Greene
William E. Gretler
Richard G. Grey
James H. Griesmer
Thomas F. Griffith
DeWitt C. Griffin, Jr.
Jack R. Griffin
Richard N. Griffin
Arthur R. Grimm, Jr.
William S. Grimm
Thomas W. Grossman
George H. Grover III
Roy R. Grundy
Thaddeus R. Gum-
kowski
Roger A. Gurthet
George W. Gust
Martin J. Haest
Frank J. Hahn
Henry R. Hahn
William E. Haley
Paul P. Hall
Frederick H. Hallett
Frank K. Halwax
James E. Hamilton, Jr.
Richard J. Hamlin
Joseph F. Hammele
Robert B. Hammer
Ronald H. Hammers-
hoy
James E. Hampton
Charles T. Hand
John A. Handley
William J. Handy
Jack W. Hannah
Richard G. Hannah
Edward S. Hanrahan
Allen E. Hansen
David F. Hansen
Donald H. Hansen
Merle C. Hansen
Alfred L. Harbage, Jr.
Samuel J. Harbo, Jr.
Henry D. Harford
Charles G. Harnden
James H. Harnden
Boyd E. Harper, Jr.
Lorren G. Harper
John W. Harrison
Donald F. Hart
George N. Hart
Walter H. Hart
William D. Hart
Donald D. Hartell
John T. Hartley, Jr.
Harry L. Hartman
Roger L. Hartman
Walter H. Harwell, Jr.
Donald P. Haskell
George L. Hatchett
Albert R. Haugerud
George T. Houghland
Donald R. Hawkins
Glenn M. Hayden
Kendall P. Hayes
Murray L. Hayes
Richard S. Hayes, Jr.
Robert B. Hayman
Gerald D. Hearn
William H. Heathcote
Earl G. Heberer, Jr.
Robert B. Heffron
Glenn R. Heidebreder
Richard P. Heintz
Edward W. Heinzerling
Earle G. Helton
Gordon D. Henderson
Richard D. Henderson
Frank L. Hendler
William G. Hendrick
Paul L. Henkels
Roger T. Henry
Marshall D. Henshaw, Jr.
Robert H. Heon
Robert J. Herbert
Herschel H. Herdy, Jr.
Charles F. Hering III
John W. Hernandez, Jr.
Bernard H. Herschel
Jacob R. Hester
Leo A. Hibson, Jr.
John W. Hicks, Jr.
Henry M. Hieronimus
John V. Higgins
Roger J. Hilarides
Karl R. Hinrichs
Alton J. Hitchner, Jr.
Harold W. Hobbs, Jr.
Herbert W. Hobson
John Wallace Hobson
Bernard Hoddeson
Robert W. Hoede-
maker
Edmund C. Hoepfner, Jr.
Harold R. Hofener
James P. Hoffman
Carl K. Hoffmann II
Hilliard B. Holbrook II
Edward R. Holler
Byron S. Hollinshead, Jr.
Henry E. Holt
Burton E. Holthus
Wayne M. Hood
Frederick W. Hopkins
Robert F. Horstmann
James M. House
William E. Howard
Richard B. Howe
Rogers G. Howell
James M. Hoylman, Jr.
Henry A. Huber
Wesley D. Hudgens
John A. Hudson
Robert B. Huffman
Andrew A. Hughes, Jr.
Robert M. Hughes
Charles W. Hunter
Robert J. Hurley
Louis Huszar, Jr.
Robert R. Ingram
Charles R. Irby
Burt M. Isaacson
Donald B. Jackson
Howard L. Jackson
Donovan W. Jacobs
Karl R. Jacobson
Robert C. Jagel
Edward C. Jahn
Thomas R. Jaworow-
ski
Randall E. Jaycox, Jr.
Norman L. Jenkins
Robert W. Jensen
William S. Jett III
Robert E. Jobin
Allen B. Johnson
Benjamin A. Johnson
Darrell L. Johnson, Jr.
Edwin R. Johnson
Frederick W. Johnson, Jr.
Grant L. Johnson
Jeremy E. Johnson
Robert M. Johnson
Thomas R. Johnson
Bayard W. Johnston
Charles F. Johnston
William A. Johnston
Richard S. Jonas
Arthur W. Jones
Carol W. Jones
Charles A. Jones
Kay D. Jones
Ray P. Jones
James McL. Jordan
Edwin G. Joselyn
Donald E. Jubb
Richard Kahn
Arthur Kalish
William G. Katzen-
meyer
Frederick H. Kaufman
Irving Kayton
Robert S. Kearns
Bernard L. Keating
David J. Keeney
John S. Keister
John A. Kelahan
Lloyd F. Keleher
Edward E. Keller, Jr.
Kenneth C. Keller
Thomas N. Kelley
Jackson W. Kendall, Jr.
John M. Kenefick
Nevin Kennedy III
Robert L. Kenning
William P. Kenyon
William B. Kerner
Jacob D. Kertz
Richard C. F. Kerwath
Vernon G. Kidd
Harold E. Kieler
Leo R. Kiley, Jr.
James H. Killebrew, Jr.
Edward V. Killeen
Ralph T. King, Jr.
Rufus M. King
Terry D. King
Allen M. Kinghorn
Willet B. Kiplinger
David P. Kirchner
Philip W. Kitchen
Philip E. Klein
Warren L. Klugman
Thomas E. Knab
William L. Kocher
Herman J. Koehler III
John R. Koerwer
John A. Kohler
Edwin E. Kolatorowicz
Bertil R. Koller
Nicholas Koluch
Frederick J. Kond-
zeila

Richard S. Koonce, Jr.	Hugh H. McCreery	Robert P. Meye	James F. O'Rourke, Jr.	John B. Remion, Jr.	Burton Shamsky
Doyle D. Koone	Howard W. McCune	Don A. Meyer	Melrose B. O'Rourke	Joseph L. Reynolds	Thomas L. Shanahan
Samuel E. Krikorian, Jr.	John E. McDermott	Theodore K. Michel	Harry A. Orr, Jr.	Roy S. Reynolds	James R. Sharpe
John W. Kruse, Jr.	James L. McDowell	Richard F. Middendorf	Leigh B. Middleditch	John Rheinstein	Bernard C. Shea
Robert Kuberek, Jr.	Richard V. McDowell	Leigh B. Middleditch, Jr.	John Milandin, Jr.	Merritt N. Rhoad, Jr.	Edward J. Shea
Edwin A. Kuhn	Alexander S. McDill, Jr.	John Milandin, Jr.	Elmer LeR. Millage	Donald E. Rhoades	Peter S. Shearer
Lon R. Kump	Fred R. McElheney	Albert E. Miller III	Albert E. Miller III	Charles E. Rhyne	Clayton V. H. Shepard
Jack R. Kuzia, Jr.	Charles A. McElroy, Jr.	Carl M. Miller	George L. Otis, Jr.	John V. Rich, Jr.	Charles R. Shepardson
William K. Kyle	William J. McElroy	George W. Miller	William F. Owens	Donald E. Richard	Gregory T. Sheridan
Thomas Laco	John T. McEnery	James R. Miller	Allan V. Palmer	Edward T. Richards, Jr.	John G. Sherman
Derwin T. Lamb	Armand L. McGarry	John T. Milligan, Jr.	John P. Papuga	Lee O. Richards, Jr.	James L. Shive
Marvin R. Lamborg	Edward F. McGehrin, Jr.	Roy M. Moe	Richard S. Parker	Robert LeR. Richardson	Robert M. Shiver
James R. Lancaster	John R. McGonigle	Thomas P. Moffitt	Vernon D. Patch	Donald E. Richeda	Robert M. Shores, Jr.
Emil E. Landefeld	Jack R. McGregor	Jerald G. Molleston	Andrew B. Patterson	Garland J. Ridgley	Jack L. Short
Thomas B. Lane	John J. McKenna	John M. Molsberry	Donald E. Pauly	David L. Righthouse	Bertram Shrine, Jr.
William R. Laney	Thomas W. McKenney	Joseph Monaco	David L. Pease	Alexander W. Rilling	Kenneth S. Shull
Howard R. Larsen	Richard DeL. McKeon	Henry Moncure, Jr.	Edwin C. Peck	Allan W. Robbins	Joseph Shulsinger
Richard J. Larsen	Robert B. McKersie	Pendleton R. Montague	Frank S. Peddle, Jr.	Samuel R. Roberts	Howard E. Shute
Robert A. Lasley	William M. McKinney	Harold T. Moore	John G. Peebles	Myron Robins	Harold F. Sigmon
Edmund C. Lasswell	Leo A. McLaughlin	Henry J. Moore II	Philip L. Peeler	Gray S. Robinson	Robert T. Silkett
Robert M. Latas	William C. McLaughlin	William P. Moore	Russell A. Pejouhy, Jr.	Joseph M. Robinson	Robert C. Silver
John G. Lauff	James L. McLay	Willmot H. Moore	Robert D. Pendl	Robert B. Robinson	Edgar H. Simmons
Clifton E. R. Lawson	James H. McManus, Jr.	Madieros Mooshagian	Werner J. Perltz, Jr.	Clinton E. Roche	Milton R. Simonds
Donald Lawson	Harry K. McMillan	Teo J. Morellato	Charlie A. Perry	Thomas C. Roche, Jr.	John E. Simpson
Kenneth L. Lawson	James B. McNallen	George A. Morledge	Clarence DeW. Peterson	Nevin LaV. Rockwell	Richard A. Singley
Thomas D. Lebbey, Jr.	William A. McNally	Edward LeR. Morrell	Jimmie G. Peterson	Jerry R. Rockwood	Paul L. Skolaut
Edward C. LeBeau	Sheridan J. McNamara	Donald R. Morris	Norman A. Peterson	Calvin B. Rogers	Owen K. Skousen
Peter L. LeCount	Earl DeF. McNaught	James P. Morris	Richard E. Peterson	Edward F. Rogers	Harry L. Skone
Maurice Leenay	John P. McQuillin	Robert V. Morse	Thomas H. Peterson	Richard J. Rogers	David L. Slusher
James E. Lehan	Daniel D. McRae	James W. Mortland	Melvin F. Pfingsten	Robert G. Rogers, Jr.	Bob L. Smith
Gary C. Leighty	Robert M. McWade	Robert W. Moser	Robert D. Phelps	Roy E. Rohrabach	Carl A. Smith, Jr.
George W. Lemen	Albert W. MacBeth	Frank S. Most	William E. Phillips	Robert P. Rogers	David D. Smith
James F. Lennox	Richard B. Macfie	Richard N. Motsinger	Raymond A. Pigozzi	Roy E. Rohrabach	Harvey LeR. Smith
Herbert L. Leonard, Jr.	Herbert C. MacGregor	Richard L. Motter	Daniel Piraino	Roy P. Roman	James D. Smith
Franklin "J" Lesh	Robert P. Mack	George W. Mueller	Robert J. Plache	Jerry H. Rose	Richard K. Smith
Lewis M. Levenson	William B. MacLachlan	Frank E. Muellner	David TenE. Plimier	Rollin G. Rose	Robert G. Smith
Frederic H. Levien	John F. MacNeill	James Mullin	Arthur E. Plov	Arthur H. Rosen	Wilbur E. Smith
Allan G. Lewis	James M. Mahan	Albert H. Mumma	Asa S. Porter	John E. Rosenberger	William F. Smith
James R. Lewis	Lee Maice, Jr.	Ralph L. Muros	Bruce W. Porter	Robert H. Rosendale	Donald M. Snell
Thomas B. Lewis	John C. Malady	Charles H. Murphy	William P. Porter	George W. Rosenthal	Lawrence W. Snively, Jr.
Willard G. Libby	Francis H. Maloney, Jr.	Edward D. Murphy, Jr.	Roy A. Povell	John D. Rosenthal	Stanley W. Ross, Jr.
John L. Light	Darrel L. Mangas	William D. Murphy, Jr.	Richard R. Powelson	Jerome R. Rosso	Edmund L. Sochoo
William J. Lindblad	Donald S. Manion	Glenn R. Murray, Jr.	Theodore J. Prahinski	Charles J. Roth, Jr.	Jack L. Sparks
Charles P. Lindgren	John H. Marble	Robert W. Murray	William H. Pressly, Jr.	Ernst Rothschild	Oscar Spad, Jr.
Richard B. Lindner, Jr.	Bill A. Marion	William E. Murray	John A. Pritzlaff	Willard C. Rowe	William H. Spencer
John D. Lindsay	George M. Markey, Jr.	Charles J. Muto	Donald K. Proctor	Edgar C. Rowland, Jr.	Carl E. Sperry
Roland N. Lindstrom	Lionel Markusfeld	Austin S. Myers, Jr.	Alfred E. Pruitt	Charles B. Ruckdeschel, Jr.	Howard D. Spivak
Jack "H" Linge, Jr.	George D. Marseille	Clark G. Myers	David M. Pugh	William R. Rugg	Harry P. Spuehler
Basil L. Livas	Clifford L. Marshall	Ralph T. Myers	Richard C. Pugh	Jack E. Russ	Marvin R. Stafford
James L. Lloyd	James R. Marshall	William B. Myers	Robert H. Purdy	Edward A. Saffel	Robert E. Stake
Ralph A. Loh	David B. Marsland	Robert O. Nagle	John G. Putnam, Jr.	Robert D. Safford	Alfred K. Stallings
Richard E. Lohrey	Donald C. Martin	Lyle V. Nash	Justin L. Quackenbush	William P. Safranek	David Standley
Clarence S. Long, Jr.	William J. Martz	Adolph M. Nattel	James B. Quinn	Stanley C. Sager	Walter R. Stellwagen
Thomas F. Long, Jr.	Peter J. Masella	Gordon A. Neal	Carson R. Rackley	Richard J. Sahulka	Wilbur N. Steltzer, Jr.
William J. Longhi	William VanH. Mason	James Neihelsel	Grant N. Radford	Benno W. Salewski	William W. Stempel
Durmond K. M. Look	Kenneth E. Masters	Clinton D. Nelson	Robert M. Raison	Charles H. Samuelson	James C. Stephenson
Levis J. Louviere, Jr.	William G. Mathers	James W. Ness	Robert J. Rasmussen	Walter W. Sapp	Lawrence J. Steskal
Robert P. Lovett	Herbert J. Mathews	Karl Neugebauer	Richard W. Rauch	George T. Sargent, Jr.	Henry L. Stewart, Jr.
Paul V. Lovette, Jr.	Raymond Matousek	Earl R. Newell	Thomas G. Rauen-zahn	Kenneth D. Sasseen	James P. Stewart
Beverly J. Lowe	Philip Matter II	Raymond F. Newell, Jr.	James W. Raulston, Jr.	Joseph A. Savoca	Robert C. Stewart
George N. Lowe	Donald H. Maurer	Jefferson F. Newton	William J. Rawley, Jr.	John Savoy	Donald A. Still
Donald E. Lowery	Richard B. Maxson	Charles E. Nicholas	Arllies D. Ray	Erhard Schaefer	James D. Stocker, Jr.
Alvin Lowi, Jr.	James R. Maxwell III	Richard E. Nickeson	Robert P. Ray	David A. Schaeffer	Donald E. Stocking
Caleb L. Lucas	Porter E. May	Robert B. Niemann	Maurice Rdesinski	Wayne A. Schafer	Charles J. Stockman, Jr.
Arthur Luine	Walter W. Mayer	Charles H. Noble, Jr.	Patrick H. Reagan	Carl F. Scherb	James G. Stoddart
Thomas E. Lukas	Donald J. Maynard	Patrick A. Noonan	Sigmund M. Redelsheimer	Fred L. Schindler	Page V. T. Stodder
Joseph T. Lukens	John R. Mays III	Harlan E. Northcott	Franklin B. Redfield, Jr.	Jay A. Schlackler	Leonard A. Stoehr
William R. Luney	Rodney F. Mead	Charles A. Northend	Robert E. Redfield, Jr.	Richard R. Schleiger	Jeff H. Stone
Arthur G. Lusk	Bruce A. Meade	George H. Norton	John G. Reed	Adolph J. Schlinger III	Edwin "J" Story
Ray M. Lutz	Ronald N. Meader	Russell L. Noyes, Jr.	Ralph J. Reeder	John R. Schmertz, Jr.	Ronald H. Stovner
Alexander S. Lyman	Roy E. Meador	William E. Nyce	Daniel M. Reedy	Harold F. Schmidt	Norman A. Strand
James J. Lyon	C. H. Meadowcroft, Jr.	Arthur J. Oberg	Glen M. Reem II	James J. Schmitt	Arthur F. Strandberg, Jr.
Robert L. McAlexander	Edward Meagher	Henry J. O'Brien	Joseph L. Regan	Charles D. Schmulbach	George B. Shrawbridge
Walter L. McArthur	Gene F. Medcalf	Richard A. O'Brien	Jack R. Reid	Harry J. Schoettle	John R. Strawmire
William F. McAuliffe	Robert B. Meeks, Jr.	William T. O'Brien	Thorburn Reid III	Kenneth F. Schuba	Don A. Strehler
William J. McBurney	Harvey J. Meltzer	Raymond F. O'Connor	William F. Reid	James T. Scott	Charles W. Streightiff
Kenneth E. McCabe	Leland E. Mench	Robert L. O'Donnell	Kevin P. Reilly	Robert P. Scott, Jr.	George G. Stella
James P. McCallister	Robert J. Mercer	Richard E. Ody	Robert M. Reiss	John D. Scull	Luther W. Strickler II
LuVerne F. McCallister	Milton C. Merion	Jack F. O'Hara	Clayton B. Reitmeyer	Donald L. Segur	Paul E. Strohm
Frank J. McCarthy	Edward J. Merrilees	Scott C. Olin		Arnold Seidon	Donald B. Strong
Samuel W. McCleskey, Jr.	Glen C. Merritt	Glenn A. Oliver		Henry J. Selfors	John S. Stump
Walter R. McCormack	Karl W. Meschke	Thomas R. Olmhausen		Oliver J. Semmes III	Daniel P. Sullivan
Matthew A. McCormick		Ralph D. Olsen		Herbert W. Severns	Donald F. Sullivan
		Alexius B. Olson		Charles R. Sexauer	Edward L. Sullivan
		William E. O'Malley, Jr.		Gerald P. Shabe	David L. Summers
		Eugene O'Rourke		Robert J. Shader	Alexander Surko, Jr.
				Robert A. Shaid	Roland H. Swain, Jr.

Robert S. Swikart
 Arthur J. Tallet
 Gene E. Tallmadge
 Alvin Taub
 Charles McK. Taylor
 Harold M. Taylor
 Kirk S. Taylor
 Donald W. Temby
 Robert M. Terry
 John R. Teuschl
 Bruce W. Tharp
 Gerald E. Thomas
 Richard T. Thomas
 Pitt G. Thome
 David A. Thompson
 Raymond C. Thompson
 Robert M. Thompson
 Bertil Thoren
 Raymond H. Thornton, Jr.
 Robert R. Thornton
 Milton F. Thrasher II
 John R. Timberlake
 Ralph W. Tobias
 Glenn A. Tomlinson
 Schuyler W. Tompson, Jr.
 Henry W. Toren, Jr.
 LeRoy C. Tozzer
 William H. Trafzer
 Charles Traub III
 Lewis N. Travis
 Charles W. Treat
 Arthur G. Tressler
 Robert M. Tucker, Jr.
 George P. Turci
 Clyde T. Turner, Jr.
 Robert R. Turner
 Elton G. Turnipseed, Jr.
 George E. Twining
 William A. Ulmark
 Eugene A. Ulrich
 Walter Ulrich, Jr.
 Alfred A. Umberger
 Jack L. Underwood
 John M. Updegraph, Jr.
 Richard H. VanMeter
 Matthew H. VanOrder
 Richard J. Veenstra
 Frank H. Veith, Jr.
 David C. Venable
 Joseph F. Vercellotti
 Harold W. VonReaden, Jr.
 Edwin H. Vrieze III
 Harold G. Wachenfeld
 Robert C. Waddel
 Donald R. Wade
 Donald R. Wageck
 William E. Wagle
 William F. Wagner
 David M. Wakelee
 Benjamin S. Walker
 Charles B. Walker
 Frank A. Walker, Jr.
 Joe A. Wall
 Charles J. Wallace
 Andrew J. Walsh
 Eugene J. Walsh
 Warren A. Wanamaker
 Joseph T. Warkoczewski
 David D. Warriner
 Leroy Washenfelder
 Rodney T. Waters
 Clarence L. Watson
 Donald A. Watson
 Thomas W. Watson
 Donald T. Watters
 James H. Wear
 Earl J. Weaver
 John L. Weaver
 James R. Webb
 James E. Webster

Robert H. Weeks
 Benjamin F. Weems
 Thomas G. Wellepp, Jr.
 Bennett Weinbaum
 William E. Welch
 Robert F. Wellner
 Robert F. Wentworth
 Walter B. Wentz
 John R. Werner
 Charles E. Werts, Jr.
 Robin A. Westbrook
 Robert H. Westerfield
 John R. Wettroth
 William P. Whallon, Jr.
 Peter B. Wheeler
 Walter Whetstone III
 Jerome V. Whisler
 Gordon W. Whitaker
 Douglas C. White
 John E. White
 John K. White
 Richard L. White
 Kenneth R. Whitehouse
 Frederick H. Whittemore
 William A. Whittemore
 Richard A. Wilita
 Edward A. Wilde, Jr.
 Homer W. Wile
 Miles R. Wilkerson
 Edwin S. Wilkins
 Robert C. Wilkins
 Alfred J. Williams
 Charles D. Williams
 Charles K. Williams
 Gerald P. Williams
 Gordon D. Williams
 James H. Williams
 Richard S. Williams
 Robert G. Williams
 Joseph W. Williamson, Jr.
 Lee F. Williamson
 Francis R. Willis
 John H. Willis, Jr.
 Raymond E. Willis, Jr.
 Donald S. Willis
 William B. Wilmer VI
 Charles B. Wilson
 Harold H. Wilson
 Herbert E. Wilson, Jr.
 Joseph R. Wilson
 Sheldon R. Wilson
 Warren R. Wilson
 William E. Wilson, Jr.
 William R. Wilson
 Paul F. Winkles
 Robert E. Wishon
 Lester H. Wittenberg
 William E. Witzell
 Donald C. O. Wobser
 William M. Wolff, Jr.
 David W. Wolgast
 Carr W. Wright, Jr.
 Howard R. Wright
 Irving V. Wright
 Philip H. Wright
 Ralph M. Wright
 Richard L. Wright
 Robert M. Wunderlich
 David C. Wylie
 Franz S. Yeomans
 Bruce C. Young
 Joe R. Young, Jr.
 Robert E. Young
 Benny A. Younglove
 Dean R. Youngman
 James E. Yourison
 David A. Zeller, Jr.
 Kenneth V. Zerda
 John C. Ziemba
 Jay W. Zink
 Robert L. Zwart

The following-named (Naval Reserve Officers Training Corps) to be ensigns in the Supply Corps of the Navy:

Alfred E. Abbey Richard G. Birmingham
 Thomas K. Armitage

Bruce E. Browning
 Howard M. Camfield
 Allen F. Chapman
 Laurence E. Clark
 Robert E. Clemency
 Richard L. Covey
 John F. Curran, Jr.
 Jack R. Day
 John P. Doney
 James E. Dowdey
 John H. Dunlevy
 Anthony T. Ellis, Jr.
 Phillip A. Finnegan
 Paul W. Floyd, Jr.
 John R. Forbes
 Robert McC. Freeburg
 Duane E. Gale
 Claude G. Gillette, Jr.
 Lewis V. Girard
 Howard M. Grant
 Edgar F. Greer
 Samuel H. Guymon
 Joseph L. Hannah
 Richard H. Hedrich
 Theodore R. Hender-shot
 Richard A. Herrle
 Kenneth E. Hill
 Richard S. Howell
 John H. Ingle, Jr.
 Alexander Jackson
 Donald C. Johnson
 Jack G. Johnson
 David L. Kick
 John R. Kilman
 Gerald H. King
 Calvin B. Koonce
 John B. Lewis
 Kay E. Lewis
 James I. McArthur
 Quintin E. Marlow
 Richard "J" Mawhorter
 Jack R. Meister
 Francis H. Holmes (civilian college graduate) to be a lieutenant commander in the Medical Corps of the Navy.
 Earl R. Williams (civilian college graduate) to be a lieutenant (junior grade) in the Medical Corps of the Navy, in lieu of lieutenant (junior grade) in the Dental Corps of the Navy, as previously nominated and confirmed.

The following-named (civilian college graduate) for temporary or permanent appointment to the grade and corps indicated:

The following-named for temporary appointment:
 LIEUTENANT COMMANDER, DENTAL CORPS
 Eugene C. Walter
 The following-named for permanent appointment:
 LIEUTENANT, DENTAL CORPS
 Eugene C. Walter

The following-named to be ensigns in the Nurse Corps of the Navy:
 Eugenia M. Barnard
 Lucy C. Vigil
 Mary T. Henen
 Ruth Williams
 Jeanne F. Moriarty

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

TUESDAY, APRIL 3, 1951

The House met at 12 o'clock noon.

The Chaplain, Rev. Bernard Braskamp, D. D., offered the following prayer:

O Thou who art the companion and counselor of all mankind, we rejoice that in our times of doubt and uncertainty and greatest need we may unburden ourselves to Thy listening ear and understanding heart.

We humbly confess that we are often afraid to look into the future for it appears so dark and full of mystery. Help us to see the rainbow promise of Thy grace and go forth with a grateful acknowledgment that hitherto Thou hast blessed us and with a continuing faith that in all our days Thy presence will be our joy and strength.

Grant that in communion with Thee we may have those gracious experiences which always come to all who truly pray. May we also find poise and peace for our restless spirits, enlightenment for our confused and troubled minds, guidance in the midst of disturbing circumstances, and inspiration and hope for our noblest plans and purposes.

In Christ's name we offer our prayer. Amen.

The Journal of the proceedings of yesterday was read and approved.

PRIVATE CALENDAR

The SPEAKER. There being only four bills on the Private Calendar today, that calendar will not be called, if there is no objection.

There was no objection.

ELECTION TO COMMITTEE ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE

Mr. DOUGHTON. Mr. Speaker, I offer a resolution (H. Res. 176) and ask for its immediate consideration.

The Clerk read as follows:

Resolved, That MORGAN M. MOULDER, of Missouri, be, and he is hereby, elected a member of the standing Committee of the House of Representatives on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

The resolution was agreed to.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

CALENDAR WEDNESDAY

Mr. PRIEST. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the business in order on Calendar Wednesday of this week may be dispensed with.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Tennessee?

There was no objection.

1951 AMENDMENTS TO THE UNIVERSAL MILITARY TRAINING AND SERVICE ACT

Mr. SMITH of Virginia. Mr. Speaker, I call up House Resolution 171 and ask for its immediate consideration.

The Clerk read the resolution, as follows:

Resolved, That upon the adoption of this resolution it shall be in order to move that the House resolve itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill (S. 1) to provide for the common defense and security of the United States by authorizing universal military training and service, and for other purposes, and all points of order against said bill are hereby waived. That after general debate, which shall be confined to the bill and continue not to exceed 4 days, to be equally divided and controlled by the chairman and ranking minority member of the Committee on Armed Services, the bill shall be read for amendment under the 5-minute rule. It shall be in order to consider without the intervention of any point of order the substitute amendment recommended by the Committee on Armed Services now in the bill, and such substitute for the purpose of amendment shall be consid-