munity of travel agents, I frankly stated that I, as an individual, could not presume to make any promises or take a position until I had a consensus of your officers.

I conferred with your officers—obtained their frank expressions as to the desirability of such an undertaking—and made a careful and detailed study of all the pros and cons.

We had as a strong warning the dismal record of failures of the past and woeful consequences of permitting the existence of a vacuum which served as an invitation for sterile, self-serving bureaucrats.

The organization of a functioning worldwide body calls for greatness—the placing of the common good above personal ambitions and salaried sinecures.

It demands comprehension of local and regional problems; of dedication to the highest and most worthwhile objectives.

We recognize that the demand for an international organization does exist.

The time for effective action is now if we are to realize the promise of the future.

As a result of this decision, ASTA—on October 15—sent letters to 45 national and regional organizations of travel agents inviting them to attend a meeting early in 1964 to consider the organization of a World Body of Travel Agents.

Each letter was accompanied by a questionnaire soliciting their preferences as to the time and location of such a meeting.

To assure that no such group would be overlooked, ASTA requested that the recipients of the invitation suggest names of other bodies which should be present.

Because of the recency of the invitation, it is impossible—on this occasion—to report the number of acceptances; however, all indications are that there will be widespread response.

This is a formidable task which ASTA has undertaken.

It requires limitless patience and a comprehensive catalog of talents and skills far beyond the capabilities of any one individual.

Fortunately for our purpose and assuring success, ASTA is the repository of such qualifications.

To serve as ASTA's World Body Advisory Committee, ASTA has called upon its elder statesmen—its veterans who not only are wise in experience but animated by understanding and dedicated to the welfare of all.

This is a committee which will include five of our past presidents: R. F. Kerr, R. W. Hemphill, T. J. Donovan, Dr. L. C. Tombs, and Newell Grinnell.

For the information of our more recent members I need but highlight their services to obtain your enthusiastic support for this committee.

Dick Kerr's experience has been worldwide. English born, he began his travel career with Thoms Cook & Sons. During World War II, he performed acclaimed services as San Francisco's representative of the Australian Government. He is owner of Kerr Travel Service, in Beverly Hills, Calif.

Bert Hemphill is known as the most widely traveled man of this generation. He served in the Navy during World War I and in the Air Transport Command in World War II. Through his visits to more than 190 countries and territories he has a firsthand knowledge of regional and local problems. He has kept in intimate touch with these through Hemphill Travel Service, Inc., of Los Angeles, which specializes in unusual travel.

Tom Donovan, president of Cartan Travel Bureau, Chicago, possesses an almost unequaled knowledge of international travel problems with specialization in the successful operation of escorted tours. His legal background will prove of great value.

Dr. Tombs, president of Guy Tombs, Ltd., Montreal, not only has the distinction of having been a member of ASTA's board of directors when we last met in Mexico City, 14 years ago, but has served almost for the same period as Consul General for Finland in Montreal. He long has been dedicated to the idea of an international body and his services as general chairman of the first ASTA World Congress in Paris in 1951 were outstanding.

Newell Grinnell has a detailed knowledge of international affairs through his continuing experience in solving the problems of ASTA members in their relations with hotels everywhere. As president of Kalbfleisch Travel Agency of Rochester he is an acknowledged expert on a wide range of problems.

Thus you can see we have chosen well.

We recognize that we have presented them with a task formidable in complexity and difficult of successful conclusion because of the myriad of national and international problems.

Their task is compounded by the existing rivalries and jealousies.

We recognize that the path will be long and complex.

ASTA has only one point upon which it is adamant. The world body must be a democratic institution with one vote for each national association which adheres to the charter when and if it is adopted.

ASTA was faced with an inescapable decision in agreeing to the insistent worldwide demand for order and cooperation in the travel agency industry—made even more important by the complexities of a growing international tourism in which our own Nation is participating.

There must be an end to the present chaos.

There must be a code of ethics to which all reputable and responsible travel agents shall not only subscribe but adhere.

Only through such a functioning world body can the problems and the contributions of the travel agent receive the serious consideration which his services warrant.

Animated by a consciousness of the importance of our undertaking, ASTA shall exert every effort to reach this goal.

SENATE

TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 5, 1963

(Legislative day of Tuesday, October 22, 1963)

The Senate met at 12 o'clock meridian, on the expiration of the recess, and was called to order by Hon. LEE METCALF, a Senator from the State of Montana.

The Chaplain, Rev. Frederick Brown Harris, D.D., offered the following prayer:

O God, who commandest the morning: At this noontide altar we commit into Thy hands our wills and our work, in calm confidence that Thou art in the shadows, and behind them, working out Thy purposes for mankind, Thy children.

Day by day set our feet on the shining path of righteous duty and selfless service.

In these days wherein the souls of men who seek the right and follow truth are sorely tried, when so much is demanded of those who would serve the present age, grant to the Members of this body of governance strength and grace that they may prove worthy of every trust the Nation has committed to their hands, as on the anvil of momentous issues there slowly is hammered into shape the new and better world that is to be when Thy will is done and Thy kingdom comes.

In the Redeemer's name we ask it. Amen.

DESIGNATION OF ACTING PRESIDENT PRO TEMPORE

The legislative clerk read the following letter:

U.S. SENATE,
PRESIDENT PRO TEMPORE,
Washington, D.C., November 5, 1963.

To the Senate:

Being temporarily absent from the Senate, I appoint Hon. LEE METCALF, a Senator from the State of Montana, to perform the duties of the Chair during my absence.

CARL HAYDEN,
President pro tempore.

Mr. METCALF thereupon took the chair as Acting President pro tempore.

THE JOURNAL

On request of Mr. MANSFIELD, and by unanimous consent, the reading of the Journal of the proceedings of Monday, November 4, 1963, was dispensed with.

MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT

A message in writing from the President of the United States submitting nominations was communicated to the Senate by Mr. Miller, one of his secretaries.

EXECUTIVE MESSAGE REFERRED

As in executive session,

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore laid before the Senate a message from the President of the United States submitting sundry nominations, which was referred to the Committee on Armed Services.

(For nominations this day received, see the end of Senate proceedings.)

MESSAGE FROM THE HOUSE

A message from the House of Representatives, by Mr. Hackney, one of its reading clerks, announced that the House had passed the following bills and joint resolution, in which it requested the concurrence of the Senate:

H.R. 1414. An act for the relief of Jan and Anna Smal (nee Dworzanski);

H.R. 1887. An act for the relief of Yon Ok Kim, Chang In Wu, and Jung Yol Sohn;

H.R. 3368. An act to authorize the Administrator of General Services to convey by quitclaim deed a parcel of land to the Lexington Park Volunteer Fire Department, Inc.;

H.R. 3735. An act to set aside certain lands in Montana for the Indians of the Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Reservation, Mont.;

H.R. 4801. An act to amend subsection 506 (d) of the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949, as amended, regarding certification of facts based upon transferred records;

H.R. 4862. An act for the relief of Tricia Kim;

H.R. 6975. An act for the relief of Giuseppe Maida, his wife, Caterina Maida, and their children, Antonio and Vittoria Maida;

H.R. 7268. An act for the relief of Mrs. Ingrid Gudrun Schroder Brown; and

AUTHENTICATED U.S. GOVERNMENT INFORMATION GPO

H.J. Res. 778. Joint resolution to provide for participation by the Government of the United States in the Hague Conference on Private International Law and the International (Rome) Institute for the Unification of Private Law, and authorizing appropriations therefor.

HOUSE BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTION REFERRED

The following bills and joint resolution were severally read twice by their titles and referred as indicated:

H.R. 1414. An act for the relief of Jan and Anna Smal (nee Dworzanski);

H.R. 1887. An act for the relief of Yon Ok Kim, Chang In Wu, and Jung Yol Sohn;

H.R. 4862. An act for the relief of Tricia Kim;

H.R. 6975. An act for the relief of Giuseppe Maida. his wife, Caterina Maida, and their children, Antonio, and Vittoria Maida; and

H.R. 7268. An act for the relief of Mrs. Ingrid Gudrun Schroeder Brown; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

H.R. 3368. An act to authorize the Administrator of General Services to convey by quitclaim deed a parcel of land to the Lexington Park Volunteer Fire Department, Inc.; and

H.R. 4801. An act to amend subsection 506 (d) of the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949, as amended, regarding certification of facts based upon transferred records; to the Committee on Government Operations.

H.R. 3735. An act to set aside certain lands in Montana for the Indians of the Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Reservation, Mont.; to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

H.J. Res. 778. Joint resolution to provide for participation by the Government of the United States in the Hague Conference on Private International Law and the International (Rome) Institute for the Unification of Private Law, and authorizing appropriations therefor; to the Committee on Foreign Relations.

TRANSACTION OF ROUTINE BUSINESS

On request of Mr. MANSFIELD, and by unanimous consent, it was ordered that there be a morning hour, with statements limited to 3 minutes.

COMMITTEE MEETING DURING SENATE SESSION

On request of Mr. MANSFIELD, and by unanimous consent, the Committee on the District of Columbia was authorized to meet during the session of the Senate today.

THE CALENDAR

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, after clearing this matter with the interested Senators, I wish to call up at this time, if I may, a number of calendar measures to which there is no objection, beginning with Calendar No. 600, Senate bill 2228. The last of the group involves a time limitation. I would suggest that—the Senate concurring—we consider these calendar measures in sequence, beginning with Calendar No. 600.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered; and the clerk will proceed to call these calendar measures.

ANNUAL MEETING DATE FOR NATIONAL BANKS

The bill (S. 2228) to change the requirements for the annual meeting date for national banks was considered, ordered to be engrossed for a third reading, was read the third time, and passed, as follows:

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the first sentence of section 5145 of the Revised Statutes (12 U.S.C. 71) is amended by striking out all after the semicolon and inserting in lieu thereof "and afterward at meetings to be held on such day of each year as is specified therefor in the bylaws."

SEC. 2. The first sentence of section 5149 of the Revised Statutes (12 U.S.C. 75) is amended by striking out "articles of association" and inserting in lieu thereof "bylaws".

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD an excerpt from the report (No. 622), explaining the purposes of the bill.

There being no objection, the excerpt was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

The Committee on Banking and Currency, to whom was referred the bill (S. 2228) to change the requirements for the annual meeting date for national banks, having considered the same, report favorably thereon without amendment and recommend that the bill do pass.

Under sections 5145 and 5149 of the Revised Statutes (12 U.S.C. 71 and 75) annual meetings of national banks must be held on such day in January of each year as is specified therefor in the articles of association. S. 2228 would amend these sections so as to authorize national banks to hold meetings on any date in the year which may be specified in the bank's bylaws.

The statutory requirement that national banks hold their annual meetings in January has been found inconvenient, because the first few weeks of the year are the busiest from the standpoint of the internal operations of the banks. This requirement is undesirable, because it is frequently not possible to provide annual reports and other appropriate information about a bank's activities during the preceding year so as to give adequate and timely notice to stockholders before a January annual meeting; for example, it is in many cases impossible to furnish annual reports for the preceding year at the time proxies are solicited for annual meetings. It is also inconvenient and unnecessary to require that the date for the annual meeting be specified in the articles of association.

The usual rule is to permit corporations to meet at any time in the year, as specified in their bylaws (Fletcher, Cycl. Corps. (permanent edition), sec. 2001).

The Comptroller of the Currency's Advisory Committee on Banking, in its report entitled "National Banks and the Future," submitted September 17, 1962, pointed out the difficulties arising from the requirement that annual meetings of national banks be held in January. It was suggested that national banks might be permitted to meet at any time during the first 3 months of the year, or, in accordance with usual corporate practice, at any time during the year, and the Advisory Committee recommended the former.

The problem came to the attention of the Committee on Banking and Currency in the course of hearings on S. 1642, 88th Congress, the Securities and Exchange Commission's 1963 legislative proposals. During these hearings the Comptroller of the Currency expressed his disagreement with the statutory requirement that national banks must hold their annual meetings in January and indicated that an amendment to this requirement was being prepared (hearings on S. 1642, 88th Cong., 1st sess., p. 177).

The proposal was transmitted to the Congress by the Secretary of the Treasury on October 2, 1963. A copy of the Secretary of the Treasury's letter is printed at the end of this report.

The American Bankers Association has advised the committee that it supports S. 2228. A copy of a letter from Mr. Walter A. Schlechte, president of the National Bank Division of the American Bankers Association, expressing its support for the bill, is printed at the end of this report.

ANNUITIES OF WIDOWS OF SUPREME COURT JUSTICES

The Senate proceeded to consider the bill (S. 1686) to amend section 375 of title 28 of the United States Code, relating to the annuities of widows of Supreme Court Justices, which had been reported from the Committee on the Judiciary with an amendment after line 7, to insert a new section, as follows:

SEC. 2. The amendment made by this Act shall take effect with respect to annuity payments made beginning with the first month beginning after the date of enactment of this Act.

So as to make the bill read:

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That section 375 of title 28 of the United States Code, as amended, is amended by striking out "the Act of January 14, 1937 (50 Stat. 923, chapter 3)," and inserting in lieu thereof: "subsection (e) of the Act of August 25, 1958 (72 Stat. 838),".

SEC. 2. The amendment made by this Act shall take effect with respect to annuity payments made beginning with the first month beginning after the date of enactment of this Act.

The amendment was agreed to.

The bill was ordered to be engrossed for a third reading, was read the third time, and passed.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD an excerpt from the report (No. 623), explaining the purposes of the bill.

There being no objection, the excerpt was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

AMENDMENT

Add section 2 to the bill, as follows:

"SEC. 2. The amendment made by this act shall take effect with respect to annuity payments made beginning with the first month beginning after the date of enactment of this act."

PURPOSE OF AMENDMENT

The bill, as introduced, creates a doubt as to the time the annuities accrue. The amendment provides that the annuities operate prospectively only.

PURPOSE

The purpose of the bill, as amended, is to increase the annuities of widows of Supreme Court Justices from $5,000 to $10,000 per annum, payable monthly.

STATEMENT

The Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts declines to comment on the bill in that it "is of primary concern to the Justices of the Supreme Court."

Individually, all the Justices of the Supreme Court favor the bill.

On January 14, 1937, a private bill was passed creating a pension of $5,000 per annum for the widow of a President of the United States (S. 591, 75th Cong., 1st sess., Private Law No. 1).

Nine years ago, in 1954, pensions were created for the widows of Supreme Court Justices payable at the rate of presidential widows (S. 591 supra); namely, $5,000 per annum.

In 1958, by general law, the pensions of presidential widows were increased from $5,000 to $10,000. Because of a quirk in the method of creating these pensions, the widows of Supreme Court Justices were not included in the increase. As a result these widows must live on an amount which was determined in 1937.

It is the feeling of this committee that inadvertently an injustice has been done and that the amount of the pensions for Supreme Court widows is not adequate. In view of the foregoing, the committee recommends favorable enactment.

BILL PASSED OVER

The bill (S. 689) for the relief of Lila Everts Weber was announced as next in order.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Over.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The bill will be passed over.

INCREASE IN AUTHORIZED CAPITAL STOCK OF THE INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT

The bill (H.R. 7405) to amend the Bretton Woods Agreements Act to authorize the U.S. Governor of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development to vote for an increase in the Bank's authorized capital was considered, ordered to a third reading, read the third time, and passed.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD an excerpt from the report (No. 625), explaining the purposes of the bill.

There being no objection, the excerpt was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

PURPOSE

The bill would add a new section at the end of the Bretton Woods Agreements Act. This would authorize the U.S. Governor of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (usually known as the World Bank) to vote for a $1 billion increase in the capital stock of the Bank, as recommended by the Bank's Executive Directors to its Board of Governors in a report of November 1962. The increase in capital stock is required to permit new member countries of the Bank to subscribe, and to enable present members to increase their subscriptions when appropriate. No authorization or appropriation of funds is involved in H.R. 7405, since the United States would not subscribe to any portion of the increase in stock.

BACKGROUND

The World Bank a year and a half ago had 75 members; the membership figure has now reached 101. At the same time, only $13 million of capital stock remains of the Bank's $21 billion total of authorized stock. This remaining margin is inadequate to permit any one of the four newest member countries to complete the process of joining the Bank, even though they have deposited funds on account toward their subscriptions. Another pending membership application, involving a $33 million subscription, will soon exacerbate the problem. Moreover, a further issue of considerably larger financial dimensions has arisen: several existing members have requested increases in their current subscriptions. As a result of these factors, there are now requirements for almost $600 million in capital stock beyond the existing authorization.

To meet this problem, a draft resolution is now pending before the Board of Governors of the Bank. It provides for an increase of $1 billion in the capital stock of the Bank, and for automatic waiver of each member's right to a proportionate share of the increase in the absence of notice to the contrary before the beginning of 1964. H.R. 7405 would authorize the U.S. Governor of the Bank (Secretary of the Treasury Dillon) to vote for this resolution. Such authority is required from the Congress—even though the United States would not subscribe to any part of the increase—by the provisions of section 5 of the Bretton Woods Agreements Act (59 Stat. 514; U.S.C. 286c). An exact precedent for the current proposed legislation is afforded by Public Law 86-48, approved June 17, 1959 (73 Stat. 80).

As of this date, nearly 80 of the Bank's member countries, representing about two-thirds of the total voting power in the Bank, have voted in favor of the proposal; no negative vote has been cast. Under the Bank's articles of agreement, the proposed increase cannot become effective without favorable action by members having 75 percent of the total votes. Since the United States has approximately 27 percent of the total voting power, action by this country would be both necessary and conclusive.

COMMITTEE ACTION

At an open hearing conducted by the Committee on Foreign Relations on October 29, 1963, the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for International Affairs, John C. Bullitt, testified in support of the proposed legislation and strongly urged favorable action.

While committee members are quite familiar with the successful activities of the World Bank, Assistant Secretary Bullitt took the occasion to bring the record up to date. He noted that, through September of this year, the Bank had made 361 loans totaling almost $7.5 billion in 67 countries since operations began in June 1946. Over $2.3 billion loaned by the Bank has been repaid to it or sold to other investors. Payments due have been made on schedule, and there have been no defaults; Bank special and supplemental reserves now total over $800 million. Emphasis was given to the Bank's highly useful actions in sending missions to assist less-developed member countries with their economic development planning, and in training officials from those countries to meet development problems. It should be further noted that private capital is brought directly into Bank operations through the flotation of securities to raise lending resources. In connection with the U.S. balance-of-payments problem, it is worthy of attention that the Bank in recent years has primarily raised funds in foreign capital markets.

In considering H.R. 7405, committee members reiterated their confidence in the Bank and their appreciation for its fine record. They received with pleasure the testimony that the proposed legislation involves no expenditure whatsoever on the part of the United States. In effect, the bill permits other free-world nations to put funds into international economic development at no cost to this country.

The committee, with no dissenting votes, ordered the bill reported favorably without amendment.

PRINTING OF ADDITIONAL COPIES OF CIVIL RIGHTS HEARINGS

The concurrent resolution (H. Con. Res. 223) to provide for the printing of 3,000 additional copies of civil rights hearings was considered and agreed to.

ANNUAL REPORTS UNDER RECONSTRUCTION FINANCE CORPORATION LIQUIDATION ACT

The bill (S. 1241) to require annual reports instead of quarterly reports under the Reconstruction Finance Corporation Liquidation Act was considered, ordered to be engrossed for a third reading, read the third time, and passed, as follows:

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That section 106(b) of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation Liquidation Act (67 Stat. 230) be amended by striking out the word "quarterly" and inserting in lieu thereof "annual".

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD an excerpt from the report (No. 628), explaining the purposes of the bill.

There being no objection, the excerpt was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

The Committee on Banking and Currency, to whom was referred the bill (S. 1241) to require annual reports instead of quarterly reports under the Reconstruction Finance Corporation Liquidation Act, having considered the same, report favorably thereon without amendment and recommend that the bill do pass.

The Reconstruction Finance Corporation Liquidation Act requires liquidating agencies to report quarterly on their activities under that act (except for the Small Business Administration, which was authorized by the Small Business Act Amendments of 1961 to file annual reports of its activities under the Reconstruction Finance Corporation Liquidation Act). S. 1241 would authorize the liquidating agencies to file annual reports of their activities under the act.

Section 106(b) of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation Liquidation Act (67 Stat. 230; 15 U.S.C. 609n) required the Secretary of the Treasury to make quarterly reports to the Congress setting forth the progress of his liquidation of the assets and winding up of the affairs of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1954 (68 Stat. 1280; 5 U.S.C. 133z-15) transferred to the Export-Import Bank of Washington, the Small Business Administration, and the Federal National Mortgage Association such liquidation functions with respect to certain assets. Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1957 (71 Stat. 647, 5 U.S.C.; 133z-15) effected further transfers of functions under the Reconstruction Finance Corporation Act and the Reconstruction Finance Corporation Liquidation Act to the Housing and Home Finance Agency, the General Services Administration, the Small Business Administration, and the Secretary of the Treasury. These agencies are now carrying out the task of liquidating the remaining assets, and they report to the Congress from time to time under the Reconstruction Finance Corporation Liquidation Act.

Section 5(a)(1) of the Small Business Act Amendments of 1961 (75 Stat. 666) amended this provision with respect to the Small

Business Administration by authorizing that agency to include information about its activities under the Reconstruction Finance Corporation Liquidation Act in its annual report, in lieu of the quarterly reports required under the Reconstruction Finance Corporation Liquidation Act.

The liquidation of the remaining assets of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation has progressed to such a point that the committee considers that there is no need for quarterly reports under these activities. Accordingly, the committee recommends that the statutory requirement be amended to provide for annual reports instead of quarterly reports, as has already been done in the case of the Small Business Administration.

Reconstruction Finance Corporation

	Gross assets	Reserve	Net assets
ASSETS HELD WHEN LIQUIDATION ACT BECAME EFFECTIVE ON SEPT. 28, 1953 [1]			
Total	$1,622,100,000	$461,100,000	$1,127,300,000
ASSETS LEFT WITH RECONSTRUCTION FINANCE CORPORATION ON JUNE 30, 1957 [2]			
Total	$99,161,811	$15,758,332	$82,834,930
ASSETS REMAINING WITH THE LIQUIDATING AGENCIES ON JUNE 30, 1963			
Treasury Department	$7,500,538	$1,475,000	$6,207,603
General Services Administration	12,668,744	7,425,276	5,243,467
Small Business Administration	2,616,003	629,900	1,986,103
Export-Import Bank	3,000,000	1,750,000	1,250,000
Federal National Mortgage Association	29,960,857	14,410,226	15,550,631
Housing and Home Finance Agency	3,595,130	1,200,488	2,474,442
Total	59,341,272	26,890,890	32,712,246

[1] Final report on the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, May 6, 1959, see p. 170.
[2] Final report on the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, May 6, 1959, see p. 184.

RESTORATION OF AMOUNTS UNDER TEMPORARY UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION ACT OF 1958 AND TITLE XII, SOCIAL SECURITY ACT

The bill (H.R. 8821) to revise the provisions of law relating to the methods by which amounts made available to the States pursuant to the Temporary Unemployment Compensation Act of 1958 and title XII of the Social Security Act are to be restored to the Treasury was considered, ordered to a third reading, read the third time, and passed.

Mr. BYRD of Virginia. Mr. President, House bill 8821 deals with the schedule of repayments of certain advances made to the States for the purpose of paying unemployment compensation.

The normal Federal unemployment tax rate is 0.4 percent of an employee's wages up to $3,000. However, where advances are made to States to pay unemployment compensation, if those advances are not timely repaid, the 90-percent credit against the Federal tax for State unemployment taxes is reduced by 5 percentage points each year so that the advance is compulsorily repaid through an increase in the Federal unemployment tax. Three States, Alaska, Michigan, and Pennsylvania, have received advances which have not been repaid and the automatic reduction in the Federal credit has commenced.

In addition to these advances, 17 States received special advances to finance temporary unemployment compensation benefits under the 1958 act. These advances also are to be repaid through reduction of the Federal credit of 5 percentage points each year beginning this year—unless the State voluntarily repays the advance. Only the District of Columbia has repaid its advance.

Finally, the 1961 temporary unemployment compensation benefits were financed through an increase in the Federal tax applicable to 1962 and 1963 wages. For 1963 the additional tax rate for this purpose is 0.25 percent of wages up to $3,000.

The combination of these factors place a burden upon employers in the affected States, particularly in those States where the repayment rules apply concurrently.

H.R. 8821 relieves this burden on employers by "freezing" the credit reductions for the years 1963–67, thereby "stretching out" the period of repayment. However, it does not forgive repayment of any amount.

Under the bill reductions of credit in the case of Reed fund advances to Alaska, Michigan, and Pennsylvania will be frozen at the first 5-percentage-point step. This means the additional Federal unemployment tax for this purpose will not exceed 0.15 percent during 1963–67. Thereafter the regular reduction in the 90 percent credit of 5 percentage points each year will apply until the advance is fully repaid. Reduction in the credit to repay advances under the 1958 Temporary Unemployment Compensation Act will be frozen at the second 5-percentage-point step. Thus, the additional Federal unemployment tax for this purpose will not exceed 0.3 percent.

In lieu of repaying advances under the 1958 act through increased Federal unemployment taxes, H.R. 8821 permits States to make installment payments of their advances and thereby prevent the increased Federal tax for this purpose from applying for the year in which the installment is paid.

Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, in connection with House bill 8821, which I think was unanimously approved by the House Ways and Means Committee or Judiciary Committee and also the Finance Committee, let me state that it actually involves an extension of the payment period under the Temporary Unemployment Compensation Act of 1958. Participation by the States was voluntary, and some 16 or 19 States had to have some relief with respect to the payments, because rather substantial sums were involved. So this measure provides nothing more than an extension of what was done in 1958; and certainly there is no objection.

EXECUTIVE REPORT OF A COMMITTEE

As in executive session,

The following favorable report of a nomination was submitted:

By Mr. FULBRIGHT, from the Committee on Foreign Relations:

Douglas Henderson, of Massachusetts, a Foreign Service officer of class 2, to be Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Bolivia.

BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTION INTRODUCED

Bills and a joint resolution were introduced, read the first time, and, by unanimous consent, the second time, and referred as follows:

By Mr. SALTONSTALL:

S. 2281. A bill to clarify the components of, and to assist in the management of, the national debt and the tax structure; to the Committee on Finance.

(See the remarks of Mr. SALTONSTALL when he introduced the above bill, which appear under a separate heading.)

By Mr. ERVIN:

S. 2282. A bill for the relief of Han Chang Wong; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. HUMPHREY:

S. 2283. A bill for the relief of Melvin B. McCormick; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. HAYDEN:

S. 2284. A bill to provide for the free entry of certain articles for St. Anthony's Catholic Church of Casa Grande, Ariz.; to the Committee on Finance.

By Mr. MOSS:

S. 2285. A bill to amend the Mineral Leasing Act of February 25, 1920, in order to encourage the production of petroleum products from native asphalt, solid and semisolid bitumen, and bituminous rock; to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

By Mr. HRUSKA:

S. 2286. A bill conferring jurisdiction upon the U.S. Court of Claims to hear, determine, and render judgment upon the claim of Frank E. Lipp; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. HART (for himself, Mr. CLARK, Mr. COOPER, Mr. DOUGLAS, Mr. MORSE, and Mr. SALTONSTALL):

S.J. Res. 131. Joint resolution to authorize the President of the United States to award a medal to Dr. Gordon S. Seagrave; to the Committee on Banking and Currency.

(See the remarks of Mr. HART when he introduced the above joint resolution, which appear under a separate heading.)

MANAGEMENT OF THE NATIONAL DEBT AND THE TAX STRUCTURE

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, in the past two Congresses, I have introduced a bill to clarify the components of and to assist in the management of the

national debt and the tax structure. I have felt that the taxpayer and the Congress have an incomplete idea of the actual Federal debt. This criticism has been answered by stating that the Federal taxing power puts the entire resources of the Nation behind a Federal obligation, so that irrespective of the size of a Federal obligation, there is no question that it will be paid on time.

But I believe that good financial planning calls for an examination of the size of the Government's obligations at any one time so that preparation can be made for payment. The reporting of the statutory debt is covered in daily statements of the Treasury. Real estate liabilities for leases and other transactions are presently reported to the Senate Appropriations Committee, so although I included these in my previous bills, I am leaving it out of this bill. The reporting of the contingent liabilities of the Government, the obligations for which the public looks to the National Government as a source of strength is not now adequately reported. I have in mind the Government corporations and trust funds, the insurance and annuity obligations of the Government where the person holding an annuity or insurance commitment from the Government looks to the taxpayer in the long run as the source of strength from which the obligation will be paid. More complete reporting is desirable in these fields.

I believe that good financial planning must take all these factors into account. This is especially important in a Congress where we are considering a major change in our tax structure and in which we may take up the important question of medical care for the aged.

I have called for these reports semiannually, but perhaps annually will be sufficient. I hope very much that the Finance Committee, to whom this bill will be referred, will consider this as either a possible amendment to the pending legislation adjusting the statutory national debt or to the pending tax legislation if it does not appear feasible to report it as a bill directly to the Senate.

I ask that the bill be appropriately referred.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The bill will be received and appropriately referred.

The bill (S. 2281) to clarify the components of, and to assist in the management of, the national debt and the tax structure, introduced by Mr. SALTONSTALL, was received, read twice by its title, and referred to the Committee on Finance.

AWARD OF MEDAL TO DR. GORDON S. SEAGRAVE

Mr. HART. Mr. President, we rightly are proud of American persons industriously working throughout the world to better the living conditions of their neighbors, and at the same time providing living example of the meaning of our American freedoms. Without doubt, these persons provide us with one of our most potent weapons against communism and its tenets.

Today it is my privilege to propose appropriate recognition for an American citizen who has devoted 40 years of his life and medical talents to the peoples of southeast Asia. Meaningful dedication to the cause of better health combined with the recognition of the needs for the total man, both body and soul, has been successfully provided by this U.S. physician known to millions as the Burma surgeon, Dr. Gordon S. Seagrave.

The son of Christian missionaries, Dr. Seagrave was born in 1897 in Rangoon, Burma. He was graduated from Denison University and the Johns Hopkins School of Medicine. Upon completing his internship in the States, he, with his wife and young daughter, returned to his birthplace, Burma, to begin his life work of skillfully ministering to the Burmese people.

Situated in the remote Kamkham hills of northern Burma, about 2 miles from Communist China, Dr. Seagrave has built a complete medical center, in which approximately 10,500 outpatients and 6,000 inpatients are treated each year. Beginning with one wooden shack, his facilities, which are supported by contributions from the United States, have grown to include four hospital buildings, staff houses, a nurses' residence, a laboratory, and a storage house.

Significant in Dr. Seagrave's work has been the establishment of a difficult 4½-year course in elementary medicine, obstetrics, and nursing for Burmese young women. Upon graduation these nurses, numbering more than 700 since 1923, assist Dr. Seagrave and train village women to work in health centers located in Burma's most remote areas.

With his nurses, Dr. Seagrave took frontline duty with the Allied forces during the Second World War, marching with Gen. Joseph Stilwell and his troops through the jungle during retreat and back again during the recovery by the Allies. Throughout the world Dr. Seagrave was renowned for his outstanding service in the China-Burma-India theater. Upon return to his adopted home in Burma, however, he was personally struck with the ravages of the war—the Japanese had bombed out his prized hospital unit.

Dr. Seagrave, now 66 years of age and often ailing himself, has rebuilt his medical unit and continues his daily work of ministering to his fellow men. These many activities have raised the health standards in Burma and perhaps most significant, provide an excellent example of American dedication to freedom and concern for our less fortunate brothers.

It appears appropriate, for this reason, for us, the American people, tangibly to recognize the accomplishments of this physician and surgeon by providing a medal for him—a medal to symbolize our appreciation to him and the many others now operating in his footsteps of American humanitarian service abroad.

Today, November 5, 1964, is the 40th anniversary of the start of Dr. Seagrave's mission to Burma. On behalf of myself, Senator CLARK, Senator COOPER, Senator DOUGLAS, Senator MORSE, and Senator SALTONSTALL, I introduce for appropriate reference, a joint resolution to authorize the President of the United States to award to Dr. Seagrave, in the name of Congress, a gold medal. I ask consent that the joint resolution be held at the desk for 1 week, should other Members desire to cosponsor.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The joint resolution will be received and appropriately referred; and, without objection, the joint resolution will be held at the desk, as requested by the Senator from Michigan.

The joint resolution (S.J. Res. 131) to authorize the President of the United States to award a medal to Dr. Gordon S. Seagrave, introduced by Mr. HART (for himself and other Senators), was received, read twice by its title, and referred to the Committee on Banking and Currency.

BERLIN CRISIS AND SALE OF WHEAT TO SOVIET UNION

Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I submit, for appropriate reference, a resolution stating it to be the sense of the Senate that the administration should suspend the current negotiations for the sale of wheat to the Soviet Union until the Soviets cease their campaign of provocations and harassments on the Berlin autobahn.

The resolution also urges that, if this measure proves inadequate to bring the Soviets to their senses, the United States should ask for an emergency session of the NATO council to consider the suspension of all shipments to the Soviet Union of machine tools and other industrial equipment by the NATO nations acting in concert.

Finally, the resolution urges that, if the negotiations for the sale of wheat to the Soviet Union are pursued, the United States should make respect for the existing covenants on Berlin one of the conditions of the sale.

Mr. President, I consider it intolerable that we should be undertaking to feed and to finance the Soviet Government at the very moment when this government is engaging in the most dangerous kind of restricted military action against the United States and its allies on the autobahn to Berlin.

The situation on the autobahn is enough. Because they refuse to dismount and be counted, American soldiers have for more than 48 hours now been surrounded and immobilized in their trucks. But this situation, in my opinion, is compounded many times over if, at the very moment the Soviets engage in this crude provocative action, we sit at the conference table with them to negotiate the sale of wheat which they desperately require.

It is again compounded if, in our great anxiety to sell them this wheat, at a subsidized price, after lending them the money with which to buy it and guaranteeing the loan, we offer concession after concession, asking no concessions in return, and apparently disregarding new and deliberate acts of Soviet aggression in Berlin, in Vietnam, in Laos, and at other points. For all this, we have only ourselves to blame.

I submit the resolution because I believe the time has come to put an end to these provocative situations, which very definitely threaten the peace of the world, by using the tremendous food surpluses, and the economic and political leverage with which they endow us, in the interests of peace and freedom.

Mr. President, I ask that the resolution remain at the desk for 10 days, to enable Senators to join as cosponsors, if they so desire.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The resolution will be received and appropriately referred; and, without objection, the resolution will be printed in the RECORD, and held at the desk, as requested by the Senator from Connecticut.

The resolution (S. Res. 223) was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations, as follows:

Whereas the Soviet Union has in recent weeks subjected American and Allied convoys on the Berlin autobahn to repeated and humiliating harassments, culminating in the stoppage and encirclement of an American convoy for the past forty-eight hours; and

Whereas the present harassment and previous harassments constitute flagrant violations of solemn covenants assuring unrestricted right-of-access to Berlin to the Western Allies; and

Whereas these harassments have coincided in point of time with the current negotiations for the sale of some millions of tons of American wheat to the Soviet Union: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, That it is the sense of the Senate that the United States should suspend such negotiations so long as the Soviets continue their provocations and harassments on the Berlin autobahn; and be it further

Resolved, That if the harassments continue, despite the suspension of negotiations on the sale of wheat, the United States should ask for an emergency session of the NATO Council to consider the suspension of all shipments to the Soviet Union of machine tools and other industrial equipment by the NATO nations, acting in concert; and be it further

Resolved, That, if the negotiations for the sale of wheat to the Soviet Union are pursued, the United States Government should, as one of the conditions of the sale, seek a formula that will assure respect for existing covenants guaranteeing Western access to Berlin, and that will assure the city of Berlin and the Western Allies against any repetition of the Soviet provocations and harassments of recent weeks.

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, will the Senator from Connecticut yield?

Mr. DODD. I yield to the Senator from Alaska.

Mr. GRUENING. I have listened with much sympathy to the proposal of the distinguished Senator from Connecticut. Shortly before he came to the Chamber, I referred to this new act of Soviet aggression as a keen disappointment to those who had hoped that after the signing of the test ban treaty there would be a relaxation of tensions in the cold war, and that we might look for other acts that would indicate a departure from the declared purpose of Premier Khrushchev to "bury" us. Unfortunately, the actions in Berlin show quite the opposite.

I added that a similar situation exists in Alaska, where recently the Russians have been invading our fishing grounds, penetrating within the 3-mile limit, and have torn up the crab traps of Alaskan fishermen, traps which costs from $200 to $250 apiece, practically putting the crab fishermen out of business.

Although the United States to date has taken no effective action to stop this kind of aggressive, ruthless performance, I shall not suggest that the crab trap situation be added to the Senator's resolution, because to do so might confuse the issue. Nevertheless, it is pertinent to raise the issue at this time as another example of the Russian failure to adopt any methods which would lead to an encouragement of the belief that perhaps the cold war was becoming a little less severe.

Mr. DODD. I thank the Senator from Alaska for his statement. It is important and significant that the crab fishing industry in Alaska is so badly affected. All these incidents are related to one another. Our difficulty has been to minimize each one, taken by itself. The tendency has been to ask: What difference does it make if the Russians hold up our troops on the autobahn? What difference does it make if the Russians invade our fishing grounds? What difference does it make if the Russians do this, that, or the other? But taken together, all the incidents are a part of a planned, aggressive course of conduct against the United States and the rest of the free world.

A few days ago, when the Russians first interrupted our troop movement on the autobahn, it was said that it was the act of some overzealous Soviet officer. I said on the floor of the Senate that I did not believe it was. I do not know how anyone else who has made any effort to understand communism and the tactics of the Soviets can believe it. Russian officers do not act on their own impulses. They would have been scared to take such a chance or to attempt to do any such thing. Such orders come from the highest authority in the Kremlin. Yet we sit by like boobs and make excuses for their ruthless, inexcusable conduct toward us.

AMENDMENT OF FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1961—AMENDMENTS (AMENDMENT NO. 305)

Mr. SIMPSON submitted an amendment (No. 305), intended to be proposed by him, to the bill (H.R. 7885) to amend further the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and for other purposes, which was ordered to lie on the table and to be printed.

Mr. MORSE submitted an amendment (No. 306), intended to be proposed by him, to House bill 7885, supra, which was ordered to lie on the table and to be printed.

Mr. LAUSCHE submitted an amendment (No. 307), intended to be proposed by him, to House bill 7885, supra, which was ordered to lie on the table and to be printed.

Mr. SIMPSON submitted amendments, (No. 308), intended to be proposed by him, to House bill 7885, supra, which were ordered to lie on the table and to be printed.

FEDERAL SERVICE PROCUREMENT ACT—ADDITIONAL COSPONSORS OF BILL

Under authority of the order of the Senate of October 24, 1963, the names of Mr. ALLOTT, Mr. BYRD of Virginia, Mr. CURTIS, Mr. DIRKSEN, Mr. DOMINICK, Mr. HICKENLOOPER, Mr. HOLLAND, Mr. LAUSCHE, Mr. LONG of Missouri, Mr. MECHEM, Mr. MOSS, Mr. MUNDT, Mr. RANDOLPH, Mr. SIMPSON, Mr. SYMINGTON, and Mr. TOWER were added as additional cosponsors of the bill (S. 2254) to require the procurement of certain services by Government agencies from commercial suppliers whenever economy will result from such procurement, introduced by Mr. BENNETT on October 24, 1963.

ROLLING DICE FOR OUR SURVIVAL

Mr. SPARKMAN. Mr. President, for thousands of years brave men have given their blood and their lives in the unending struggle for freedom. Their great sacrifices multiplied mankind's passports to lands of liberty where human dignity and opportunity gave meaning to life and living.

This freedom is menaced, and for 24 years eloquent pleas and timely warnings have been sounded to alert us to our dangers. One of the most eloquent of these appeals appeared in the Washington Post on October 8, 1963, as an editorial advertisement by Mr. A. N. Spanel, founder and chairman of International Latex Corp., and presented in the public interest. It is a dramatic appeal to reason, rallying free men and their nations to resolve their differences and voluntarily unite to forge their strengths to save the earth and our way of life on it.

The article proposes a plan of action that merits most careful consideration by free world statesmen.

Mr. President, my insertion of this article in the RECORD should not be regarded as my endorsement of everything advocated in it; but the article provokes thinking, and, therefore, I ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the RECORD, in connection with my remarks.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

ROLLING DICE FOR OUR SURVIVAL

It is a time for mourning when mature nations large and small, committed to freedom, drift toward the quicksands of disunity and isolationism.

It is a time for sackcloth and ashes when free people traditionally allied, provoke each other to turn away from their sworn unity, destined in this weakness to face the merciless enemy that patiently waits for the kill. Today, the very climate of liberty is contaminated with vituperative recriminations. In an atomic age free nations stand naked, tempting nuclear conquest unless they are rooted in that unshakable unity where all their divers strengths are coordinated and ever ready. Surely, no free world leaders would want history to record that they rolled dice for our survival. Can it be, then, that wealth, power, or complacency are so blinding that the heads of states in our threatened Western civilization fail to see the myopic courses they pursue?

This planet is doomed when dominant leaders of our world act not to strengthen

their common bonds and interests, but rely more on the false hopes of some magic political transformation from the current Sino-Russia rift. They do not seem to grasp that both these dinosaurs sense that the only prey they can have at little or no cost is the weakened free world torn by fuming disunity, and the distrust of each other to such irrational levels that friend cannot be distinguished from foe. How much longer must we continue proving, "Whom the gods would destroy, they first make mad"?

SAVING OUR WAY OF LIFE

It is the time for reawakening, reappraisal, repair, and reconciliation. The time is now, or an abyss. It is the moment of truth and decision for freedom on earth and the ceaseless struggle to keep it alive. Voltaire encouraged free men to continue to hope when he said, "This is the character of truth; it is for all men, it has only to show itself to be recognized, and one cannot argue against it. A long dispute means that both parties are wrong."

Neither perpetuation of error nor face-saving, and certainly not cunning, can save or heal our ills. We must begin anew, with dignity and honor as befits great nations. For never have allied people been served by epithets, newspaper diplomacy, opportunistic politics, frenzied flag-waving or the unilateral pronouncements inspired more by might than right, in willfulness instead of cooperation.

We therefore urge upon the heads of committed free nations, initially the United States, France, England, and Germany, to call an extraordinary four-part meeting to be held within the next 4 months in Washington, Paris, London, and Bonn; thereafter in the capitals of the other committed free nations. The diversity of sites for such momentous assemblies will create new hope and confidence in the hearts of people most of whom have witnessed in bewilderment and fear the creeping disintegration of the alliance.

Let allied unity be heralded as the full purpose of this meeting; and that only mutually arrived at steps will be taken toward its achievement. Whatever else the agenda may comprise, it must include the vital matter of communication between member nations. For in political and diplomatic problems common to the nations of the free world, it is compelling upon us—and no less upon every one of our allies—to steer courses arrived at on the basis of continuous consultation. Merely to inform one another after the fact, or even to notify allies before the fact that we shall act unilaterally, is a caricature of the principle of unity. It has only led to the confused, disoriented and ineffective policies that too often characterized the free world nations individually and collectively.

CONTINUOUS CONSULTATION: MANY MINDS, SINGLE PURPOSE

The free world must promptly mobilize its aggregate strength and create disciplined agencies for consultation, not for moments of crisis and panic but on a continuing basis, especially in the formulation of common, considered foreign policy. Such consultation is only possible between free nations; it belongs in our world.

The agenda must embrace the atomic question and membership of France in the nuclear club. The hour is late and France continues to react sharply to its own and the free world's peril to every maneuver of disparagement or downgrading. The atomic problem transcends the mere making of bombs; for nuclear energy in peaceful and military uses has become the symbol and substance of strength in today's world. France had no alternative but to reach for it.

For Washington to have denied France in the past while favoring England was folly; to continue to neglect her now is to carry that folly to the point of chain reaction, politically.

ISOLATIONISM MEANS BEING ISOLATED

Unless this condition is quickly cured, unless France becomes a full partner in the alliance, the French position will continue to harden into a species of isolationism, or become isolated, with dire consequences both to herself and the free world. The ambiguity of the French role in NATO may lead to a complete alienation, again with disastrous results for the entire free world.

More than ever before, France needs a satisfying sense of belonging to the Atlantic community. More than ever before the true unity of the free world must be confirmed and fortified. And the primary responsibility rests with Washington. We have no alternative in logic, or in terms of rock bottom self-interest but to recognize that France by its own efforts and despite American indifference, now ranks as a nuclear power.

FIGURES SPEAK LOUDER THAN GENERALITIES

A simple analysis of the problem reveals that even 4 years hence the United States and Russia will probably possess 95½ percent of the world's atomic arsenal; with England, as now, 2 percent; and France 2 percent, leaving China a possible one-half percent. In short, France will attain a modest atomic vitality commensurate with her needs in the hierarchy of nations. How much better that this now be done with our generous cooperation.

It is not too late. We can still save French people of all classes from their backbreaking burden of spending additional thousands of millions of dollars in needlessly duplicating our already proved technology of controlled, nuclear fission and fusion.

Does the free world have many alternatives? Dealing with the Kremlin may be but another exercise in fanning hopes and wishful thinking; but with our Allies in wisdom united and unshakable, we might save this planet and ourselves from destruction.

In the world we cherish, our alliance even in its present disarray, has more planes of agreement than disagreement which is natural among free people. But the disunities no longer leave margin for corroding delays, least of all for self-righteousness or smugness. We have no choice but to get together; and we know no more promising start than promptly calling the urged extraordinary alliance meeting.

Freedom's cause cries for remedial action now, not tomorrow!

THE BERLIN BLOCKADE

Mr. YOUNG of Ohio. Mr. President——

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. INOUYE in the chair). The Senator from Ohio is recognized.

Mr. YOUNG of Ohio. Mr. President, an aggravating situation has developed in Berlin, which we Americans must not and will not tolerate. For the third time in less than a month, Soviet troops have blocked a U.S. Army convoy on the autobahn, the highway from West Germany to Berlin. On the other occasions, this action was looked upon by some as a misunderstanding or mistake on the part of junior Russian officers. We can no longer consider this arbitrary action to be the result of a mere misundertanding.

In light of the recent limited test ban treaty approved by both the United States and the Soviet Union, it is deeply disappointing that this opportunity for a lessening of tension may now result in the cold war becoming hotter.

Let Khrushchev make no mistake about it. We have not softened our determination to hold our ground firmly and resolutely in West Berlin and not to yield in any measure to Communist pressures and demands.

The time is past due for us to tolerate any further arbitrary action by the Russians in blocking U.S. Army convoys seeking to enter West Berlin through Soviet controlled checkpoints. We have been paying the penalty for ineptitude and failure on the part of Generals Eisenhower, Clay, and others in 1945 in failing to spell out in writing American rights to entry and exit into and from West Berlin over East German territory. At that time our generals trusted the Communists.

Soviet troops have blocked our convoys, insisting that soldiers dismount for a head count. We refused. This situation is at a stalemate. Here is further effort of Khrushchev to throw us off balance. We agreed last October that convoys with more than 30 passengers, excluding drivers and assistant drivers, would dismount to be counted. In this latest incident, only 20 of the 44 men were passengers in the 12 vehicles.

If this Communist aggression continues, tanks or heavily armed soldiers should directly precede our convoys. Let us barrel through, like Jim Brown of the Cleveland Browns does against opponents—thus demonstrating to the Soviets that they are wrong in their claim that Soviet authorities, not Allied authorities, determine convoy procedures.

This action by the Soviets has been humiliating to the United States and to the officers and men of our Armed Forces. Let us take determined and resolute action, as was done by our President last October. The Communists have no right to control Americans or to humiliate our soldiers.

The Russians are fully informed as to the number of men and vehicles in a convoy. If a show of force does not get us through, then let us use force and without delay.

Let us place some of our mechanized might ahead of our convoys and proceed without submitting to intolerable delays and stoppages. Further, I hope that our President will direct Ambassador Foy Kohler to make firm, determined and resolute representations to Khrushchev to cease these procedures "or else." Ambassador Kohler, a native of Ohio, is a fine representative of the United States. We may have confidence that he is no appeaser.

TRIBUTE TO SENATOR JORDAN OF IDAHO

Mr. SIMPSON. Mr. President, the junior Senator from Idaho [Mr. JORDAN], a gentleman for whom I have a deep personal regard, was honored last Sunday by an excellent and comprehensive story in the Chicago Tribune.

Author of the 1,500-word article, Tribune Correspondent Willard Edwards, painted a graphic picture of the struggle of the Senator from Idaho through the difficult depression days as a rancher in Idaho's Hells Canyon, his college days,

his service to the State of Idaho—where he served as Governor for the single term allowed at that time by the Idaho constitution—and followed him through important Government posts held in the early days of the Eisenhower administration.

Not only did Correspondent Edwards pay tribute to the acumen, sagacity, and intellect of my close personal friend, the Senator from Idaho [Mr. JORDAN], but he also pointed out that "the woman behind the man," the Senator's lovely wife, Grace Edgington Jordan, found time to write three popular books about her experiences in Hells Canyon while keeping a household for her husband and three fine children.

Mr. President, as a tribute to my longtime friend, the Senator from Idaho and his gracious wife, I ask unanimous consent that the Willard Edward's article from the Chicago Tribune be printed in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD at this point.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

HELLS CANYON CARRIED TO SENATE ON WINGS OF DEPRESSION—BUT JORDAN SAYS IT'S NOT WORTH STORY

(By Willard Edwards)

WASHINGTON, November 2.—Hells Canyon is an awesome gash in the earth's surface, the deepest on the North American Continent. It lies on the Idaho-Oregon boundary where the Snake River carves a tortuous course through wild country abounding in bear and cougar, coyotes, bobcats, and rattlesnakes.

To a quiet man sitting in the rear row of the U.S. Senate, this forbidding territory was a refuge for 10 years, a place where he and his family survived the depression of the thirties, emerging with clear title to a 17,000-acre sheep ranch.

There are many surprises encountered in exploring the personalities and careers of Members of the U.S. Senate. LEN B. JORDAN, Republican, of Idaho, is one of them. He talks little, dresses conservatively, could be mistaken for a smalltown banker or businessman of limited intellectual attainments.

ALMOST A HARVARD MAN

He is, in fact, a unique combination of manual and mental talents. A brilliant college student, Phi Beta Kappa and high honors, he seriously considered a fellowship at Harvard University and an academic career. Instead, he chose the outdoors, became a sheep and cattle foreman, was virtually destitute in 1933, took his wife and three children into the wilderness and wrested from it not only a living but the basis of a comfortable fortune.

He is, almost certainly, the only Member of the Senate who, in his spare hours when not supervising the rovings of 3,000 sheep on a mountain range, poured concrete and laboriously constructed improvements for a rude home in a canyon where only wild animals had previously penetrated.

He has served in the Senate only 15 months, originally by appointment to fill the vacancy left by the death of Senator Henry Dworshak, then by election in November 1962, to the remaining 4 years of the term. A former Governor of Idaho, he was the only Republican winner in the contests for Idaho's two Senate and two House seats.

PUNCTURES A-PACT CLAIMS

Unlike some other Senate newcomers, he attempted no flamboyant gestures to attract publicity. His name did not appear in the Washington press. But during the debate on the nuclear test ban treaty on September 20, the Senate was alerted to a keen new intellect in its midst when JORDAN arose to announce his position.

He was not, he noted, a member of either the Senate Foreign Relations or Armed Services Committees which had been conducting hearings on the treaties. In his study of 1,000 pages of testimony, he had decided to employ an unusual method—to take only the arguments of supporters of the pact and analyze them, ignoring the claims of its opponents.

When he had finished, puncturing the claims of the treaty advocates by quoting their own words, and announcing he would vote against the treaty, Senator CARL CURTIS, Republican, of Nebraska, was moved to a rare tribute.

"I think," CURTIS said, "that I have never heard a more reasoned speech in my 25 years in Congress. In a sense, it is unique."

MAN OF PAINFUL RETICENCE

Those who heard JORDAN speak knew what CURTIS meant. The sheep rancher had a gift for simple logic and clarity not often displayed in the Senate. He demonstrated it, even more remarkably, in an analysis this week of a complex issue—Federal versus State jurisdiction in water development. This is a subject of vital interest to the West. JORDAN stripped it down to the bare bones of comprehensibility for those to whom it had hitherto been a dull and mystifying dispute.

He is a man of almost painful reticence who was loath to talk about himself.

"Why write about me?" he asked. "My wife has the brains and beauty in this family. She's the story."

There is some substance to this contention. Grace Edgington Jordan, to whom the Senator refers without embarrassment as "my fair lady," took three children, aged 6, 3, and 7 months, into the wilderness in 1933, gave them all their schooling for 10 years, ran a household with numerous boarders, including assorted drifters, and found time to write a bestselling book about her experiences. It was called "Home Below Hell's Canyon" and is a revelation of frontier living in a modern day.

VERY SOLID MAN, TOO

Three other books have flowed from Mrs. Jordan's typewriter but it is noteworthy that her writing facility faltered in trying to describe the husband-companion of those trying years. "Six feet tall, blue-eyed, and very solid" was the best she could do.

He was born 64 years ago in Mount Pleasant, Utah, in a mountain area which has been called the Switzerland of America. His father was a county judge, his mother a schoolteacher, and he was good in his studies, being graduated from high school when he was barely 16. But it was a large family and there was no money for a college education. He worked on a ranch, then enlisted in the Army at 18 when the United States entered World War I. He was commissioned a second lieutenant of a machine-gun company but never got overseas.

Back in civilian life at 20, a football scholarship helped him work his way through the University of Oregon. He was a 175-pound halfback, "just a bread and butter guy" who could block and tackle, and run. He was also at the top of most of his classes, earned his Phi Beta Kappa key, and began to contemplate a teaching career, beginning with a fellowship at Harvard. He was saved from this fate by a distaste for indoor life.

GETS BANK'S PROPOSITION

"I loved the range," he remarked. "The confinement would have made me a poor teacher."

He began working with livestock on a ranch which stretched more than 50 miles along the Snake River. Twenty thousand sheep and 1,500 cattle roved this small empire. He became foreman, handled financial details for the owner, and was on his way to higher things when the 1929 stock market crash instigated the depression which crippled the national economy.

The livestock industry was crushed like all others. By 1932, JORDAN, now married and the father of three children, was earning $100 a month and keep. The bank, which held his small savings, failed. The future was bleak.

At this point, a Portland bank, aware of his background and experience, offered him a challenging operation. It had come into possession of sheep ranch in the shadow of Hell's Canyon. Its $50,000 investment in this property seemed doomed.

"Go in there and operate it, get our money with interest back, and the place is yours," JORDAN was told.

AWAY THEY GO WITH $20

He didn't hesitate nor did his fair lady. A sheep ranch, she opined, "was a pretty good place to batten down and ride out the depression." By river packet, with a net total of $20 in cash but fortified by a zest for adventure, the family of five made the way to their future home—so isolated that radio could not penetrate the deep gorge in which it was located.

Their actual title was to 1,000 acres but this land "controlled" a total of 17,000 acres of Government range on which their 3,000 sheep could graze. If used continuously and properly by the landowner, this range would eventually belong to the deeded land and could be transferred to a new owner if it was sold.

At the end of 10 years of backbreaking struggle, the JORDANS had paid back the bank its investment with interest. They had not only ridden out the depression but came out of it with a foundation for future prosperity. They sold the ranch and bought another. JORDAN now has other interests, including a motor company, but denied great wealth.

FOUGHT TO NAME TAFT

"I quit trying to earn a million dollars," he remarked, "when I realized I could only eat three meals a day and wear just so many suits. I didn't want to change my living habits."

In 1947, the realization came that Idaho had been good to him. The State needed roads and nobody was doing anything about it. He ran and was elected to the State legislature but suffered political defeat when he sought reelection to a second term.

He had his revenge in 1950 when, virtually unknown to the professional politicians, he ran for Governor and was elected to a 4-year term. His formula for success was simple—to meet personally every voter in a State of tremendous distances with a population of about 700,000. The system demanded constant travel by plane, train, motor, and on foot but it worked.

As head of the Idaho delegation to the Republican convention in 1952, he fought for the nomination of the late Senator Robert A. Taft of Ohio. The victorious Dwight D. Eisenhower did not hold this against JORDAN and summoned him to Washington after he completed his term as Governor. State law forbade a second term as Governor.

SERVED ON IKE GROUPS

He served as chairman of the U.S. delegation of the International Joint Commission, working out agreements with Canada on power and water projects relating to the St. Lawrence Seaway and the Columbia River Basin treaty.

He also went to Afghanistan as head of a team of engineers and economists to survey reclamation and power projects and in 1958 served on the international development advisory board which explored the economic aspects of foreign aid.

"I was rather fed up with Washington," he confessed. "But when the opportunity came to return to the Senate, my wife and I worked like the devil. Now that I'm here, I find the Senate a real challenge. I'm not disturbed by the inactivity in this session. It's just as well for the country that we haven't passed a lot of this legislation."

FISHING IN WYOMING

Mr. SIMPSON. Mr. President, for the edification of my colleagues who may be eyeing the calendar and contemplating a hunting trip to some favorite fishing hole, I should like to read a story which appeared in the Evening Star last night. The story datelined Riverton, Wyo., says, and I quote:

A new world's record for a golden trout is being claimed by Haskell H. Reed, of Riverton, who landed a 15¼-pounder from Washakie Lake in northwestern Wyoming's Wind River Mountains.

Mr. Reed hooked the large trout with a gift—a small fresh water shrimp fly given to him by a Riverton sporting goods dealer.

The trout measured more than 28 inches long and 7 inches across the middle.

The Wyoming Game and Fish Department says the listed world's record for a golden trout is an 11-pound 4-ounce fish taken from Cook's Lake in Wyoming in 1948 by C. S. Reed, Omaha, Nebr.

Be assured that the old and the new records are merely indicative of the sport fishing to be found in Wyoming waters. Two big ones are gone, but many more remain.

Wyoming is called the Equality State, but I hasten to assure my colleagues that the fishing and hunting in Wyoming are unequaled anywhere.

RETRACTION BY NAVY DEPARTMENT OF STATEMENT ABOUT KITTERY NAVAL SHIPYARD, MAINE

Mrs. SMITH. Mr. President, many weeks ago at a regular open monthly meeting of the Maine congressional delegation attended by representatives of the press as well as members of the Maine congressional delegation, the Chief of the Bureau of Ships of the Navy Department and the Assistant Chief of the Bureau of the Ships made unqualifiedly damaging characterizations of the workers at the Kittery Naval Shipyard.

They said very flatly, without qualifications and without reservations that the workers at the Kittery Naval Shipyard "just won't work." Very rightfully and very understandably, several of the unions at the shipyard immediately demanded an investigation by the Senate Permanent Investigations Subcommittee of these charges made by the two admirals. They made their demand because they wanted to have a right to defend themselves.

But then fears arose as to what an investigation by the Senate Permanent Investigations Subcommittee might do. And so all but one of the unions withdrew the demand for an investigation. After having witnessed those days of the early fifties when accused people were smeared and not given a chance to defend themselves, I supported the demands of the sole survivor of the unions for an investigation.

But the Navy Department opposed its being investigated, as did Senator members of the Kennedy administration—and to this date, no investigation has been conducted.

The end result was a continuing stigma on the workers at the Kittery Naval Shipyard with no retraction having been made of the charges of the admirals that the workers "just won't work." When recently another nuclear submarine construction award was given to the Kittery Naval Shipyard, there were serious suspicions that an award to a shipyard which had been characterized by the cognizant officers of the Navy as a shipyard of workers who "just won't work"—that such an award could not be justified if such charges were true. It cast a strong suspicion that such an award was on the basis of sheer politics and to that extent created the Kittery Naval Shipyard in the image of a "political shipyard."

This I resented very much—not only on behalf of the integrity and capability of the workers at the Kittery Naval Shipyard, but also because of the possible reflection on my own State of Maine.

So I made an issue of it with the Secretary of the Navy and demanded an unequivocal clarification of the Navy's official position on the "just won't work" charge made by the two admirals. Reluctantly, the Navy has finally admitted that the statement made by the two admirals is not true and has now repudiated that statement. In a letter dated November 4, 1963, of Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Installations and Logistics, to me, the Navy Department states that the statement of "they just won't work" is not a correct statement.

Furthermore, in that letter the Navy Department acknowledges that any criticism of the Kittery Naval Shipyard was not limited to just the workers but instead included "all levels of management and even with the Bureau of Ships." The letter concludes with commendation for all hands on the improvement of the work at the Kittery Naval Shipyard.

Mr. President, I am greatly gratified with the Navy's repudiation of the admirals' "just won't work" unjustified and unsubstantiated characterization of the workers at the Kittery Naval Shipyard—even though I had to smoke the Navy out on this. The vindication of the shipyard workers comes a little late—but better late than never and even if reluctant.

I think it is about time that the President kept the campaign promise that he made to the workers at the Kittery Naval Shipyard more than 3 years ago in 1960 when he promised that by Executive order he would take them out of the "second-class citizen" pay status under which they are handicapped and put them on an equal basis with the workers of the shipyard in his own hometown of Boston.

I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD at this point the letter of November 4, 1963, of Assistant Secretary of the Navy Kenneth E. BeLieu to me.

There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY,
Washington, D.C., November 4, 1963.

Hon. MARGARET CHASE SMITH,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

MY DEAR SENATOR: This is in reply to your letter of October 24, 1963, concerning assignment of nuclear submarine construction to the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard.

The Department of the Navy, through the Chief, Bureau of Ships, has the responsibility to provide the operating forces with quality weapons at minimum cost. The naval shipyards are a portion of the Naval Establishment involved in the production of such weapons, but certainly neither they, nor anyone else, has an inherent right to excessive cost. Yet, for some time we have been concerned over the competitive position of certain of the naval shipyards compared with private yards in the building of new ships. This has come about for several reasons, including the press of repair work and the accompanying requirements to be responsive to immediate fleet needs, some lag in improving management techniques, certain differentials in employee benefits, and an attitude in some circles that work is assigned by political pressure rather than by demonstrated performance.

Over the past few years considerable effort has been exerted, and I feel successfully, to install improved management techniques in the naval shipyards and to promote a better spirit of cost consciousness on the part of every shipyard employee.

It was just such an effort which was being made last summer at the meeting at which the situation at the Portsmouth Yard was discussed. Remarks made by Navy officials during that meeting concerned the definite need for improved performance at Portsmouth Naval Shipyard and were based on cost returns for construction work by that shipyard. In the course of the discussions, comments were made such as the one to which you refer in your letter. Unfortunately, some of these remarks, taken by themselves, have been subjected to various interpretations. Of course, "they just won't work" is not a correct statement when taken literally. Suffice to say, however, that the intent of the Navy officials at the meeting was to indicate that the productivity of the yard as a whole was below the standard desired, and that this was not the sole responsibility of the labor force but also rested to varying degrees with all levels of management and even with the Bureau of Ships for not taking earlier and perhaps less drastic remedial action. The Navy officials' intent in this instance is fully supported by the Department of the Navy. These officers have the continuing responsibility—the obligation—to alert this yard (or any other yard) to its status and to exhort personnel to improved performance.

Since this meeting, gratifying progress has most certainly been made by all personnel at the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard. It was this progress, coupled with the need to maintain a nuclear construction and related repair capability at this highly important shipyard, which justified to us the assignment of an attack nuclear submarine. The workmen in Portsmouth have turned to us with determination to bring the performance of their yard up, and improvements are still being made. It is my firm belief that performance on this latest attack nuclear submarine will demonstrate the results of this past year's emphasis on improvement. I am

also convinced that all hands at the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard recognize the challenge to their efficiency which the assignment of this ship represents.

Sincerely,

KENNETH E. BELIEU,
Assistant Secretary of the Navy,
Installations and Logistics.

PROXMIRE CALLS FOR SPACE PROGRESS WITH LESS WASTE

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, the November issue of the Nation's Business, published by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, carries an article by me entitled "Glamour Masks Waste in Space Spending."

In this article I make three general recommendations on the immense increases in spending by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration:

First. More effective safeguards against duplication, waste, and other leakages of Federal funds must be built into NASA's own procedures. As a minimum, the space agency should fully observe the letter and the spirit of the cost-cutting requirements established for the Department of Defense and other Federal agencies.

Second. Congress should arm itself with a corps of skilled investigators able to penetrate and analyze the inner workings of the space program.

Third. Private individuals and groups should apply their concern about excessive and unnecessary Government spending to the space program.

Mr. President, I am convinced that we can and should dedicate America's great resources to the magnificent challenge of space. But we should do so with far greater prudence and regard for the taxpayers' money than we have in the past.

I ask unanimous consent that this article be printed in the RECORD at this point.

There being no objection, the article was ordered printed in the RECORD, as follows:

GLAMOUR MASKS WASTE IN SPACE SPENDING—CONGRESS MUST TAKE MORE CAREFUL LOOK TO HEAD OFF UNNECESSARY COST

(By WILLIAM PROXMIRE, U.S. Senator from Wisconsin)

The tidal wave of spending on the Nation's space program—unprecedented in a peacetime program run by a peacetime agency—can quickly get out of control.

My special, urgent concern, as a U.S. Senator recently appointed to the Appropriations Committee, is that space budgets should get on a rational basis while they are still fairly near the beginning of a period of rising costs. The $2 billion per year increase can be expected to continue and accelerate.

The effort to place men on the moon will alone cost $20 billion before 1970.

(One scientist has jokingly suggested that if a way could be found to weld together 20 billion silver dollars, an astronaut could walk to the moon.)

It is a safe prediction that the real headwall on this steeply sloped mountain of expenditure still lies ahead—and has not been accounted for fully in the understandably conservative projections of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. An intelligent independent estimate for the moon probe puts it at $40 billion by 1970.

When the budget of a federally financed agency grows at the rate of $4 billion in 2 years—as has that of NASA to the current spending request for $5.7 billion—there is a special obligation to scrutinize that budget with extra care. Yet this is precisely what so far has not taken place.

The space budget has received virtually nothing but tender, loving care in Congress. The few of us who have questioned the wisdom of funneling funds into an agency at such a breakneck rate have been buried under a reproving avalanche of votes.

The consequences of this mushrooming rate of spending are predictable. The moon venture has already fallen three-quarters of a year behind schedule—not for lack of funds, but because of a serious management crisis.

Nobel Prize winning physicist Dr. Polykarp Kusch told the Senate Space Committee that the moon program is being carried out with "a certain flamboyance, a mood of haste, that is not commensurate with first-class scientific research."

He also said: "It is my belief that the present space program attempts too much too fast. There is not enough time for profound thought, for imagination to play over the demanding problems that occur."

President Kennedy's proposal at the United Nations, that this country and the Soviet Union jointly undertake lunar exploration, demands further reappraisal of where we are going and how fast.

Whatever the merits of the President's proposal, his downgrading of the competitive aspect of the moon program—a major justification for our wasteful haste up to now—strengthens the argument for a slower, more rational approach to space exploration.

The real issue is not whether we should explore space—of course we should. We should do so rapidly and competently, in the great tradition of American scientific leadership. But this does not mean that the space agency should be handed a license to spend billions of dollars unnecessarily on projects that duplicate others, are wasteful, or are nonproductive.

As has been shown over and over again, frenzied science is not good science. The legitimate and understandable desire for rapid accomplishments cannot be satisfied merely by pouring in ever-larger appropriations of dollars.

NASA has been able to route its massive spending increases through the Budget Bureau without anything like the scrutiny given the budgets of other Federal agencies. Nor has the General Accounting Office, Congress's watchdog on Federal spending, been able to stay abreast of the galloping pace of the space agency.

I applaud the suggestion, made in the minority report on the House space authorization, that there be appointed an inspector general for NASA, plus a number of congressional field inspectors to examine and report on the space program. Qualified independent supervision of a program that is growing at such a tremendous rate is absolutely essential.

Despite the absence of careful, detailed investigations, a number of examples of wasteful, duplicating, or unnecessarily lavish space program outlays have surfaced as a result of their own sheer lack of weight.

For example, a formal Air Force memorandum recently showed that NASA is planning to construct $77,671,000 in facilities that directly duplicate existing Air Force capabilities.

Among the specific examples cited are: a life sciences research facility costing $4.9 million and a space materials laboratory costing $3.6 million, both at Ames Research Center, Calif.; a central instrumentation facility, $31.5 million, at Cape Canaveral; a mission control center ($8.4 million), launch environment and antenna test facilities ($7.5 million), mission simulation and procedures training facilities ($2.2 million) and other projects (totaling over $5.6 million), all at the Manned Spacecraft Center in Houston. All these projects would duplicate existing Air Force facilities, according to the memorandum.

The field of space flight simulation has been especially prone to unnecessary duplication. A $10.6 million centrifuge for flight simulation has been approved for Houston, along with two others at other centers, despite the finding by the National Academy of Sciences that existing centrifuges and similar motion devices for research are not being fully utilized.

A bulky 530-page survey published by the National Standards Association lists literally hundreds of space simulation facilities in the United States, many of them competing and overlapping in function and purpose.

In its current budget NASA requested $131,000 to study its own public relations program. This may seem like peanuts compared to $5.7 billion—but that's just the coin for the survey. The resulting programs would probably have lapped up additional millions of dollars, and their propaganda effect would be to guarantee the easy enactment of future billions of dollars in appropriations. Fortunately, this is one item on which Congress flipped the abort switch.

NASA's budget is frequently padded with nonessential items such as $1.3 million for a fatigue research lab to replace an existing building that was "not ideally suited." Rarely does it appear that a serious effort has been made to see if a job can be done at less cost.

The agency wanted $90 million for three tacking ships for the Apollo project. Careful checking by Congress showed that the Defense Department could provide not three but five fully equipped ships for $80 million, saving a cool $10 million.

It should have been no surprise to those familiar with the space program when the General Accounting Office released a report recently showing waste of some $100 million in the moon program.

While NASA itself has been critical of the performance of industry, the agency can hardly duck the final responsibility for getting what it pays for with the taxpayers' money.

NO MAGIC IN SPACE SPENDING

What disturbs me is the "anything goes if it's for space" attitude that makes it possible for huge spending increases to win congressional approval with only a shadow of the scrutiny applied to earthbound agencies.

In this program, too, I firmly believe there should exist a strong presumption against Federal spending. Simply because the program involves glamorous orbits of the earth does not change the hard fact that every cent spent on it comes out of the pockets of U.S. taxpayers—the same, hard-pressed source for all other, competing Federal programs.

There is no magic about space spending thta converts it into private enterprise. Far from it. In relation to its rapidly growing volume, the space program is probably the most centralized Government spending program in the United States. It concentrates in the hands of a single agency full authority over an important sector of the American economy, one that is expanding with each passing month.

The economic situation created by the space program could well be described as corporate socialism. There are a large number of private corporations and companies in the aerospace industries, a disturbingly large portion of which work only on space agency contracts and subcontracts. But for all the goods and services that they produce, all the many items and products and technologies that they would normally offer for sale in a freely competitive marketplace, there is ony one buyer: the Federal Government.

It has been made clear to occasionally reluctant legislators that the economies of cer-

tain States and districts would suffer seriously if pending space projects were cut. This point was stated explicitly to the House Space Committee by NASA officials testifying against a proposed cut in the $1.2 billion Project Apollo budget request.

The House committee recommended a $120 million cut anyhow, seriously questioning whether the space agency could conceivably use all that money in 1 year. Unfortunately, a large part of the funds was restored in the House-Senate compromise signed by the President.

Members of Congress can hardly be blamed for taking an interest in contract awards running into hundreds of millions of dollars. They know full well that a range of consideration going well beyond engineering and scientific know-how enter into the decisions.

DISTRICT-BY-DISTRICT LIST

A symbol of congressional interest: NASA has now been asked to furnish a list of projects broken down geographically, which in political terms means State by State and district by district.

One leading science writer recently referred to "NASA's rather blatant pork-barrel approach on how to win friends and influence people in Congress."

Grounds for cynicism are provided when the case for locating the $130 million (official estimate; more likely total, $200 million) Manned Spacecraft Center in Houston includes the argument that this facility will stimulate a technological boom which will attract people and industries to the area in large numbers, while the more recent decision to construct a $50 million space electronics center in the Boston area is justified on the grounds that large numbers of exceptionally skilled and trained scientists already live there.

It is disturbing but undoubtedly true that the space program has come as a bonanza to those who favor big Government spending. These apostles of big Federal budgets—and there are many—see the space program as a means of taking up the slack caused by a possible future leveling off of military spending.

Space spending is also having other unfavorable effects on our economy.

With each passing month a larger percentage of our gross national product goes into research and development for the space program.

Yet it is essential for the United States to maintain an especially high pace of research oriented toward the civilian economy to maintain our traditional lead in productivity and to offset the higher wages of American labor. Otherwise we will soon be shut out of important international markets.

We cannot simply rely on the spin-off of new products or the technological fallout of space-oriented research to provide needed forward strides in fields where our industries are daily challenged by the productive capacity of other nations.

While an occasional byproduct of space or military research will have application to the civilian economy, this is not enough.

This problem would be less serious if the U.S. economy had a limitless supply of resources that could be tapped for research and development undertakings. But the fact is that, in this field in particular, the space program is in direct, sharp competition with other sectors of our economy for the use of a vital commodity, the supply of which is by no means unlimited—our unique reservoir of highly skilled, trained, and talented scientific manpower.

Each year our universities graduate some 3,000 new Ph. D.'s in science and engineering. On the basis of the space agency's own estimates of its requirements for scientific manpower in the coming years it can be predicted that by 1970 one in every four U.S. scientists will be at work on the space program. This has been described by one scientist as "a spectacular balancing act—education supported by science, science by space, and space by the man on the moon."

OTHER RESEARCH SUFFERS

By skimming off a sizable top layer of scientists each year for the foreseeable future—especially the young, able ones, freshly schooled in up-to-date methodology—the space program may well impoverish the scientific input in other vital areas of research and teaching. Schools, medical centers, industry—even other Government agencies and our Defense Establishment—are beginning to feel the pinch. Already, and we are still only in the early stages of our space effort, there are 10 times as many scientists engaged on NASA space projects as are working on heart disease, mental illness, and cancer at the mammoth research centers of the National Institutes of Health, which themselves have been criticized for overly lavish use of Federal funds.

Even a decision to locate a juicy Government plum like the proposed Electronics Research Center in Boston is received with mixed feelings, as local companies and other facilities ponder whether the new projects will compete for their top scientists.

The prestige value of space accomplishments should not be overlooked. But prestige, too, has a price tag.

Our Government information activities and many other programs contribute to it. The question is whether the investment in space should include extra billions of dollars for propaganda.

We compete with the Soviets on many fronts. By concentrating too much attention on space we run the risk of losing on others.

Despite the urgency with which the space program is viewed I do not believe the need for speed can be so great that NASA should virtually ignore competitive bidding. With all the urgency of military procurement, the Defense Department has a far better record on competitive bidding.

In addition, the Defense Department has inaugurated a cost-cutting and control program that has already saved $1 billion and is expected to realize savings of $4 billion over a 5-year period. This kind of rigorous attention to budget practices is urgently needed in our space effort.

WHO HAS RESPONSIBILITY?

Responsibility for keeping our space program lean and on target lies in three places: the space agency itself, the Congress, and the public at large.

1. More effective safeguards against duplication, waste, and other leakages of Federal funds must be built into NASA's own procedures. As a minimum, the space agency should fully observe the letter, and the spirit of the cost-cutting requirements established for the Department of Defense, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and other Federal agencies.

This includes reliance on competitive bid procedures to the greatest possible extent. It is important to act promptly, before the space program becomes encrusted with habits and ways of doing business which will make it harder, and more unpleasant, to change later on.

2. Congress must be steadily alert to its responsibility of legislative supervision. In our system of checks and balances, if Congress abandons its watchdog function, a program can quickly get cut of hand because there are few other checkreins to keep it on course. To this end Congress should arm itself with a corps of skilled investigators able to penetrate and analyze the inner workings of the space program. Such a staff should be established either within the Govenrment Accounting Office or in a separate office headed by an inspector general for space programs.

3. Most important of all, it is essential that private individuals and groups apply their concern about excessive and unnecessary Government spending to the space program. Recent attacks on pork-barrel projects helped immeasurably to alert the country to the misuse of tax dollars.

A similar alertness to signs of waste and inefficiency in the space program would go a long way to combat the "anything goes if it's for space" attitude.

There are great problems to be solved in space, great returns to those who solve them. But we risk losing a great deal—our self-respect and the respect of others—if we throw billions upon billions into the space hopper without giving careful, sober thought to the price we are paying.

CONCESSIONS MAKES SENSE IN WHEAT DEAL ACCORDING TO EXPERT

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, there is an unfortunate tendency on the part of many to regard any criticism of State Department dealing with Communist nations as demagogic, or emotional and ill-informed crackpotism.

The recent wheat deal is a case in point. Those of us who have been critical of it have been criticized as against humanity or against peace or as Red-baiting for votes.

The facts are, Mr. President, that the position which some of us in the Senate have taken that we should not agree to sell wheat to Russia without concessions to freedom has been supported by an outstanding scholar in an article appearing on the front editorial page of last Sunday's Washington Post.

Now I hasten to add that Professor Brzezinski does approve of selling wheat to Russia. But he also insists that we should exact concessions—not great concessions, perhaps, but, as he puts it:

> At the very least our negotiators could insist on a clear reciprocal understanding of the technical arrangements involved in Western access to Berlin.

The result of that concession has been driven home three times since the wheat deal has been announced—and right now as I speak an American convoy is being held up outside of West Berlin.

Professor Brzezinski added:

> Similarly we could demand that the Soviets lift their travel restrictions within Russia. Indeed, a political quid pro quo should be sought in the case of other so-called nonpolitical, technical arrangements.

Mr. President, this is exactly what certain Senators have been calling for and these are among the concessions—any one of which, in my stated view—would provide a real concession to freedom in this case.

Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski also points out that there is no question of starvation in Russia. There is no rationing. There is no plan for rationing. The wheat is mainly to be used to export to Communist satellites and to maintain the kind of chemical and machine tool production in the satellites on which the military strength of Russia depends.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that this article may be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Washington Post, Nov. 3, 1963]

POLITICS OF WHEAT DEAL GIVES UNITED STATES UPPER HAND

(By Zbigniew Brzezinski)

(NOTE.—Director of the Research Institute on Communist Affairs and professor of public law and government at Columbia University, Brzezinski is the author of "The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict," "Ideology and Power in Soviet Politics," and other books.)

It has been argued that the wheat deal with the Soviet Union is desirable on humanitarian grounds. If Russian people are starving, the United States should not stand back, said former President Truman on the radio, and he has been echoed by some clergymen and by various people of good will.

Others have suggested that the wheat deal is purely a matter of economics. The Russians need our wheat; we can use their gold. Their food needs will be met; our food surpluses will be diminished. We both gain equally.

The humanitarian argument can be dismissed quickly. First of all, there is no famine in Russia. The Soviet people are not starving, and the government has not lost all of its ability to meet a food crisis. It could certainly divert some of its resources from heavy industry to better agricultural management, and it is still capable of providing the basic staples to meet Russian needs.

Even if all the Western countries were to refuse wheat to Russia, no Russian would starve because of it. There is no doubt, however, that certain kinds of foods would be in short supply, and this would create considerable social and political difficulties for the Soviet Government.

OUTRAGEOUS APPROACH

The economic argument is more complex. The simple equation of profit and trade is deeply rooted in the American tradition, and it is not easy to convince an American that the Soviet approach to the problem is somewhat different. Yet as George Kennan has amply demonstrated in his book, "Russia and the West," the Soviet approach to the problem of trade is a highly political one.

Writing about the Soviet attitude toward the West in the very early twenties, Kennan thus projected the Soviet reasoning on the subject of trade with the West:

"We despise you. We consider that you should be swept from the earth as governments and physically destroyed as individuals. We reserve the right, in our private if not in our official capacities, to do what we can to bring this about: to revile you publicly, to do everything within our power to detach your own people from their loyalty to you and their confidence in you, to subvert your Armed Forces and to work for your downfall in favor of the Communist dictatorship.

"But since we are not strong enough to destroy you today—since an interval must unfortunately elapse before we can give you the coup de grace—we want you during this interval to trade with us. * * * An outrageous demand? Perhaps. But you will accept it nevertheless.

"You will accept it because you are not free agents, because you are slaves to your own capitalist appetites, because when profit is involved, you have no pride, no principles, no honor. In the blindness that characterizes declining and perishing classes, you will wink at our efforts to destroy you, you will compete with one another for our favor."

One may wonder, in the light of the 1962 Cuban confrontation and Khrushchev's general policy of burying us, whether this approach has changed so very fundamentally.

A NECESSARY FAILURE

To the Soviet leaders, the wheat deal is political because two very vital Soviet political interests are involved. The first is the stability of the collective agricultural system itself. Over many years, that system has failed to deliver the goods, at least insofar as the Soviet consumer is concerned. Yet to the political leadership, the collective system is essential.

A recent critical revaluation of the Stalinist drive for collectivization, published in Voprosy istorii, states quite categorically that the collectivist system was necessary in order to build socialism in the Soviet Union and for the defense of the country. Mounting consumer dissatisfaction with the inability of the present agricultural system to produce adequately might, over the long haul, force the Soviet leaders to revise the agricultural system. However, if the Soviet leadership finds other means of meeting domestic needs, i.e., imports paid for with gold, it can perpetuate the collectivist system.

Collectivization was abandoned in Poland and Yugoslavia because the leaderships had no way out. By importing wheat, the Soviet leadership sees a way out, and hence the wheat deal is necessary to Moscow in order to maintain its domestic system of collectivization.

EXPORTS POLITICAL, TOO

Secondly, the importation of wheat is necessary to the Soviet Union in order for it to meet its grain export commitments. These commitments are important to the Soviet leadership primarily for political reasons.

Last year the Soviet Union exported approximately 7.8 million tons of grain, of which wheat constituted 4.7 million tons. The list of clients shows clearly the political importance of the exports: The largest consumer was East Germany, followed successively by Czechoslovakia, Poland, Brazil, and Cuba.

The restriction that President Kennedy wishes to impose on the reexportation of American grain to these countries creates a technical impediment to such exports. The Soviet Union would not be able to ship them American wheat directly. Nonetheless, the availability of American wheat, and indeed of other Western wheat, would mean that Soviet grain itself could be exported to the countries concerned. Hence the political problem would not be resolved by the proposed restriction.

The above comments should not be construed as an argument against an American-Soviet wheat deal. They are meant to suggest, however, that this wheat deal ought to be viewed in a political perspective and that U.S. negotiators ought to seek political concessions from the Soviets in return.

Naturally, there would be no point in expecting fundamental concessions. For example, it would be illusory to expect a Soviet acknowledgement of our position in Berlin in return for our willingness to sell Russia some wheat; there is no political equivalence between these two interests. However, on a number of marginal issues, there is no reason why the United States should not insist on a quid pro quo.

For example, it would seem ironical for the United States to be enabling the Soviet Union to maintain its collectivized agriculture and its politically motivated grain exports and at the same time for this country to endure continued Soviet harassment in its access to Berlin. At the very least, our negotiators could insist on a clear reciprocal understanding of the technical arrangements involved in Western access.

Similarly, we could demand that the Soviets lift their travel restrictions within Russia. Indeed, a political quid pro quo should be sought in the case of other so-called nonpolitical, technical arrangements.

For many years, for reasons of political prestige, and also as a precedent, the Soviet Union has been very anxious to establish direct American-Soviet air links. Perhaps there is no reason to oppose such links, but it might be preferable to negotiate about them in the context of a reciprocal Soviet willingness to meet some of our political objectives.

Of course, proponents of the purely "economic" approach might say that if our position is too hard, the Soviet Union will buy the wheat somewhere else. That may be true, but the argument is not entirely convincing. If the Soviet Union could easily buy wheat elsewhere, then why does it not do so?

It either wishes to deal directly with the United States because that would strengthen the impression in the West and elsewhere of an American-Soviet detente—an impression which intensifies Western European fears concerning the American position; or, conceivably, the Soviet Union does not see other markets so readily available and the American wheat is thus of some economic importance to it as well.

One may safely assume that the Soviet Union is not anxious to buy American wheat merely in order to reduce our balance-of-payments difficulties and to alleviate our own internal agricultural problems.

Finally, it should be stated unambiguously that it would be wrong to conclude that since the wheat deal is political, the United States should have no part of it. That is fallacious and extreme. It would be a pity if we failed to use the limited leverage that this particular situation affords.

Since the Soviet Union wishes to buy wheat from us, it puts us in a favorable bargaining position. By all means, we should go ahead with the deal, but our approach should be very conscious of its essentially political character.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL AMBASSADOR OF THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC REPORTS TO THE NATIONAL PRESS CLUB

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, the military junta which overthrew the democratically elected government of Juan Bosch in the Dominican Republic 6 weeks ago, and at the same time dissolved the legislature and annulled the constitution, has now expelled Dr. Juan Cassanovas Garrido, the elected president of the senate, who, if the constitutional provisions were carried out, automatically would be the President of the Dominican Republic, the legal President, Juan Bosch, and the Vice President having previously been expelled by the junta and, therefore, not on Dominican soil. The Constitution provides that succession.

The purpose of this expulsion of Dr. Cassanovas Garrido, is to thwart any effort to return to constitutional rule, which the State Department is properly insisting upon.

It is my hope, and that, I am convinced, of all freedom lovers and believers in the democratic process both at home and in Latin America, that our Government will adhere firmly to this position and never grant either recognition or aid of any kind to the usurping junta in the Dominican Republic.

The Dominican people are bitterly resentful of the overthrow of their government which brought to them the first

breath of freedom after 31 years of tyranny, a fact which is not obscured by the now controlled press and slanted news items being released under the police state management of the usurping generals and colonels and their false facade of civilians.

Today, at the National Press Club, Enriquillo del Rosario, the Ambassador of the legal and constitutional Government of the Dominican Republic, made an address pointing out how tragic the situation is for the people of the Dominican Republic, and urging that the United States continue to insist on the return of law and order, constitutional government, and the democratic regime which was so ruthlessly overthrown.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the address by Ambassador Enriquillo del Rosario to the National Press Club be printed at this point in my remarks; together with two dispatches published in the New York Times for Thursday, October 31, 1963, entitled "Leaders Bar Policy Shift," and "Gains Seen by United States," which show that the usurping junta is not preparing to make any concession whatsoever and that the United States already sees some benefits from the policy of "no recognition" and will adhere to it.

There being no objection, the address and dispatches were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

STATEMENT OF ENRIQUILLO DEL ROSARIO, AMBASSADOR OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT OF THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC TO THE UNITED STATES, AT THE NATIONAL PRESS CLUB, NOVEMBER 5, 1963

It is now 6 weeks since the democratically elected government of the Dominican Republic was overthrown by military force. And it is important to establish very clearly at this time how the Dominican people themselves feel about the coup d'etat which terminated constitutional government in my country after only a few months' trial. It has been said that they were indifferent to this act, and that they are relatively content under the present government.

This is utterly untrue.

Never before in history have the Dominican people wanted democratic government and self-rule as deeply and as passionately as now. Being deprived of self-government by a military-dominated junta has made them even more aware than before of how precious democracy is to them. They are well aware that the illegal junta which has seized power in the Dominican Republic represents only a few wealthy men and ambitious officers, and that these people do not want any real democracy. And they are equally aware that any promises by the junta for a return to democratic government are cynical and insincere, entirely contrived to mislead people in the United States.

The Dominican people definitely want a return to constitutional government, and not in 2 years or even 6 months. They want it now. They are united in their contempt and distrust for the illegal junta. And despite the fears engendered by 32 years of living under a brutal police state, they have taken considerable risks to show their deep desire for return to democratic self-government.

Very few newspapers in the United States have given any idea of the scale and intensity of these antijunta feelings. But they are very revealing. Here is just a fraction of the evidence of what the Dominican people themselves are feeling and doing.

Over 90 percent of the professional leaders of the country have denounced the coup and are demanding a return to constitutional government. The doctors' association, the lawyers' association, the engineers' association, and the various teachers' associations have gone forcefully on record to this effect. These are obviously no radical hotheads; they are the educated, middle class, respected leaders of the country.

These professional groups have been jointed by virtually all the labor unions and civic organizations in a demand for the dissolution of the junta and a return to constitutional government. Both university and secondary school students, moreover, have made repeated demonstrations in favor of democratic self-government.

It is no exaggeration to say that 90 percent of the people of the Dominican Republic are not only indignant, but increasingly indignant, at being deprived of their democratic rights. And they are fully determined, by whatever means, to regain their liberties and the right to have a government of their choice.

In the face of the growing desire to throw the junta out, the police and military have used threats, tear gas, and even bullets against demonstrators. They have started to fill the prisons again with prodemocrats, and have outlawed the basic rights of free assembly guaranteed by the Constitution. The usurpers still have the arms, but they know that the people are united as never before against them.

The recent imprisonment and forced exile of Dr. Juan Cassasnovas Garrido shows the junta's fear of any return to legality. Dr. Cassasnovas was the President of the Senate of the legitimate Government. In the absence of the legal President and Vice President, both of whom were forcibly expelled from the country, Dr. Cassasnovas was clearly designated by the Constitution and confirmed by the legislature as the legal successor to the Presidency. But the junta, fearful of any possible rallying point for reestablishing legal government, tracked down Dr. Cassasnovas last week, captured him, beat him, imprisoned him, then forced him into exile. The same junta which is trying to dupe public opinion in the United States by saying that it wants to prepare for a return to constitutional government, cynically throws out all persons who constitutionally are designated as the country's leaders.

In the last week, nonetheless, various European governments have recognized the junta. Let me say that this contrasts sharply with the fact that the Dominican people definitely do not recognize the junta, and this is the capital point. Sovereignty resides in the people. They alone have the right to determine who shall govern them and in what framework. It is this basic democratic right which is at stake, and for which the Dominican people are fighting.

As the lawful representative of the constitutional government of my country in the United States, let me add that the people of my country will not recognize or honor any commitments or agreements entered into by the illegal government which is temporarily in power. Any loans accorded to the junta, for example, will in no way obligate the people or their legitimate government, and will be undertaken at the risk of the lenders. The Dominican people have given no authorization whatsoever to the junta to undertake any fiscal or contractual obligations in their name.

The basic situation in the Dominican Republic is very clear. The people elected the first democratic government in 36 years by an overwhelming majority in free elections. In a few months after its installation, a military coup backed by a tiny handful of wealthy businessmen overthrew the legitimate government on the spurious grounds that it was encouraging communism and had allowed the government to be infiltrated by Communists.

Yet 6 weeks later, the junta has been unable to point out any Communists in the government. This was probably no surprise to them, but they were surprised to discover how united the people are in indignation at being deprived of their basic rights of self-government. And the junta has also been surprised that the U.S. Government has not recognized and supported them. They had deluded themselves into believing that the United States has a certain fondness for military dictatorships, a delusion shared by the Communists as well.

The Communist line has been that the United States withdrawal of recognition and economic aid is sheer hypocrisy, and that the United States secretly sympathizes with the military junta and will shortly find a formula for recognizing it. And they are waiting hopefully for such recognition as the basis to start a major propaganda campaign throughout Latin America to the effect that the United States really prefers military dictatorship, which is indifferent to the misery in Latin countries, over democratic government. It is with this big lie that the Communists hope to make Cubas of all Latin America.

Ironically, the junta and the Communists are now united toward the same objective. Both want the military junta to be recognized. The junta wants it in order to perpetuate the privileges of the wealthy few. The Communists want it as a weapon to destroy not only the reactionary forces, but also the democratic ones as well.

The next few weeks will probably be critical in my country. Pressure on the State Department to find a modus vivendi with the junta will probably increase. The junta will make periodic threats of impending chaos and Communist takeover if they are not backed. And they will continue to track down, imprison and exile all democratic leaders with a constitutional right to govern.

But the key fact is that the democratic forces are in an overwhelming majority among the people of my country, and it is their wishes which must be respected, not those of the present junta, who represent no one but their own selfish interests. In this calvary of democracy in one small Caribbean country, there is still very much at stake for the entire hemisphere. Democratic forces look to the United States for moral support, and are calling for that support. And it is unthinkable that the United States should—now or later—destroy the hopes of the democratic forces in the Dominican Republic and in other Latin American countries by recognizing the antidemocratic junta. This is not an indifferent minority calling for backing. It is the great majority, passionately wanting a return to democracy, which appeals to the American people not to let them down.

[From the New York Times, Oct. 31, 1963]

LEADERS BAR POLICY SHIFT

SANTO DOMINGO, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, October 29.—The provisional Government of the Dominican Republic, operating under growing pressures of extreme rightwing civilian and military factions, has decided not to make political concessions as a price for recognition by the United States.

The present disposition of the Dominican ruling groups is to stand firm on the refusal to do anything to speed the return to the democratic process beyond the original promise of general elections more than 2 years from now.

Although the three-man civilian junta in nominal control of the country appeared to be inclined last week to allow presidential

and congressional elections perhaps before the end of 1964, it has now become clear that the powerful military-supported rightist groups would not tolerate even such a concession to win quicker recognition.

In fact, the Dominican rulers are taking the position that the country can go on indefinitely without Washington's recognition and U.S. economic aid. Both were suspended last September 24, when the military ousted President Bosch from the presidency after 7 months in office.

The Kennedy administration indicated at the time that diplomatic relations, aid under the Alliance for Progress and military assistance would remain suspended until at least a semblance of the democratic process returned to the Dominican Republic. Dr. Bosch was the Dominican Republic's first freely elected President in 36 years.

It is becoming increasingly clear that the basic alternatives for the United States is to refuse recognition indefinitely, in the hope of stimulating internal change, or to restore full relations on Dominican terms, which would imply a capitulation by the Kennedy administration.

TIES WITHOUT AID SUGGESTED

Some observers here believe, however, that the best solution would be a restoration of formal diplomatic relations, without a resumption of economic and military aid. Such a policy, these observers say, would maintain Washington's condemnation of the anti-Bosch coup, but at the same time would end what is becoming an untenable international situation.

Although the Dominican leadership has refused to make concessions as a price for recognition, its inability thus far in finding international acceptance is among the factors causing pressures from the rightist civilian and military groups that placed it in office.

The groups are also publicly finding fault with the leadership for its alleged failure to "eliminate Communists" from the administration and other sectors of national life. The reason given for the coup was that it would defend the country from communism.

Because the rightist groups' concept of what *constitutes* a Communist is extremely elastic, the Dominican leadership is increasingly faced with the choice of instituting a major purge—one that could lead to a breakdown of public administration—or finding itself replaced by a new, more responsive junta.

The leaders were criticized, in a letter published in local newspapers last week, for slowness in finding and ejecting Communists. The letter was from Dominican Independent Action, the civilian group principally responsible for pushing the military into the anti-Bosch coup.

A month after the end of the Dominican Republic's brief experiment in democracy, the country finds itself in the midst of growing confusion and dangers from both the right and the left. With rapid polarization, rightists as well as Communists and their allies are seeking to build up their forces for a showdown that many Dominicans fear may end in bloodshed.

GAINS SEEN BY UNITED STATES

WASHINGTON, October 30.—The administration believes that its refusal to recognize the de facto regimes of the Dominican Republic and Honduras is beginning to bear fruit.

The objective of this policy is to hasten the return to constitutional order in both countries.

U.S. officials reported today that the Dominican junta has indicated its willingness to negotiate the early restoration of democratic procedures.

POLITICAL SITUATION IN VIETNAM

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, almost overnight, the political situation in South Vietnam has changed, and our policy toward the new government of that country will change accordingly. The U.S. Government—both the executive branch and the Congress—has, since the severe repression of the Vietnamese students and Buddhists by the Diem government this summer, hoped for the creation of an atmosphere in South Vietnam which might regather popular support behind the war effort.

I think that the President has followed the correct course in relation to South Vietnam. Although we have favored reforms, we have left it entirely to the will of the Vietnamese to implement that reform. If they themselves had not so strongly desired the change, we would have seen no coup in South Vietnam. My one regret about the recent coup was the violent death of Diem and Nhu, and all others who fell in the fight.

It will be no easy task to reestablish a stable and effective government in South Vietnam, a government which can rally the Vietnamese people to victory over the Communist Vietcong guerrillas. However, I hope we will share in helping the leaders of the new Vietnamese Government to successfully prosecute the war against the Communists, so that the many Americans there can come home again.

The effects of our policy in South Vietnam were well summarized in an article by Warren Unna which appeared in the November 5 issue of the Washington Post. I ask unanimous consent to have this excellent article printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

BRIGHTER OUTLOOK: SAIGON COUP BOOSTS U.S. POLICY

(By Warren Unna)

The Kennedy administration's policy toward South Vietnam, despite all the cynical predictions of it being either nonexistent or negative, suddenly seems to emerge smelling like a rose.

As things stand now, South Vietnam even may lose its eligibility for becoming a whipping boy in next year's election campaign.

Last week's coup in Saigon accomplished two things:

1. South Vietnam gained a new government which now at least has a running chance of gaining the popular support needed not only to win the war against the Vietcong Communist guerrillas, but to keep the country stable enough to move forward once that war is won.

2. The United States which contributes $1.5 million a day and some 16,500 military advisers toward helping South Vietnam in its war effort, managed to stand by its principles and encourage last week's coup without "playing God" and being its instigator.

As some of the Washington pundits observed, "CIA couldn't have been behind this; it worked too well."

More concrete proof of the U.S. innocence as instigator is the fact that one of the very key State Department officials concerned with South Vietnam was out of town at the time, enrolling his children in school in the South.

The Kennedy administration's policy toward South Vietnam was not always so clean cut and decisive. Until last May, it was governed by the fear that if this country didn't coddle President Ngo Dinh Diem and his all-powerful brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu, these headstrong leaders might scuttle a war which the United States, with its interest in defending the whole of southeast Asia, was desirous of winning.

The Kennedy administration also did not want to scare off the Diem-Nhu regime's backing of a strategic hamlet program which the United States was convinced would give rural Vietnam the protection from the Vietcong and the sense of identification from a caring central government necessary to win the war.

But, according to one U.S. policymaker, May 8 became the turning point. This was the date of the first massacre of Buddhists by government troops in Hue.

From May 8 on, the Kennedy administration became increasingly aware that its old policy of placating Diem and Nhu would get nowhere. These changes followed:

Ambassador Frederick E. Nolting, Jr., who was sent to South Vietnam with explicit instructions to appease Diem in the hopes of restoring his confidence in the United States, was called home for reassignment.

Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, a big-name politician known for his bluntness, was sent out with instructions to use his head and stand up for things he believed in.

Lodge did just that. He suggested that Nhu be relieved of his duties; he openly countered Mrs. Nhu's criticism of U.S. soldiers; and he put an end to all of Nolting's obsequious visits to the palace.

President Kennedy in an extraordinary Labor Day TV interview, called for "changes in policy and perhaps with personnel"—an explicit encouragement to the Vietnamese military leaders who at that time had come to the United States asking for support if they attempted a coup.

The military leaders called off that earlier coup attempt. But the Kennedy administration, on its own, proceeded to suspend two vital economic aid programs to South Vietnam and cut off the $3 million a year the CIA had been paying special forces troops whose anti-Communist efforts Nhu had redirected against his own Buddhists.

The apparent assassination of both Diem and Nhu reportedly was not in the cards. The administration believes the coup leaders' assertion that they risked three costly hours at the height of the rebellion in holding their fire on the palace in the hope that Diem and Nhu would accept their guarantee of safe conduct out of the country.

But after the white flag was flown and the trucks wheeled into the palace to pick up Diem and Nhu the coup leaders found they had been duped and that the brothers had escaped.

Yesterday the U.S. Embassy in Saigon was instructed to convey Washington's disapproval of the brothers' deaths.

The Kennedy administration is well aware that there is no such thing as an ideal government in South Vietnam. But now at least the United States can hope for working out mutual problems with a sovereign government more representative of its people.

FUND TO HELP FINANCE EXPERT ASSISTANCE FOR INDIANS IN CASES BEFORE INDIAN CLAIMS COMMISSION

Mr. ANDERSON. Mr. President, yesterday President Kennedy signed into law H.R. 3306, which establishes a fund to help finance procurement of expert assistance for Indians in cases before the Indian Claims Commission. It is now Public Law 88-168.

This is important legislation. I was pleased to introduce the Senate companion bill which the senior Senator from Idaho joined with me in sponsoring. The legislation is urgently needed because the principal reason for the backlog of cases in the Indian Claims Commission is the fact that many Indian litigants lack the funds to prepare their cases for trial. Chief Commissioner Arthur V. Watkins, our former colleague from Utah, has been doing a fine job of trying to expedite the cases. But it has not been an easy task, and the problem of payment of expert witnesses has been a stumbling block.

The new law creates a revolving fund from which loans can be made to Indian tribes to enable them to hire expert witnesses. This should go a long way toward relieving the heavy docket of the Indian Claims Commission.

I ask unanimous consent that an editorial on this subject published in yesterday's Washington Post be printed in the RECORD at the conclusion of my remarks.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

INDIAN CLAIMS RELIEF

Congress has passed an act that should substantially relieve the bind in which many Indian tribes have found themselves in pressing their claims against the Government. Back in 1946, the Indian Claims Commission was created to hear the Indian cases—mostly claims for compensation arising from the taking of tribal lands. In many instances, however, the tribes have had no funds to prepare their cases. So the work of settling them has dragged, and no end of the task is in sight.

The problem was further complicated by the Commission's concern over the payment of many expert witnesses for the Indians on a contingent-fee basis. This meant that some advisers and expert witnesses would not be paid unless the Indians won their case. In such instances the Commission had to weigh the testimony in the light of the financial interest of the witness in the outcome.

The Indian Claims Commission laid its problem before Congress and asked for the creation of a revolving fund from which the Secretary of the Interior could make loans to the tribes for the hiring of expert researchers and witnesses. Congress has now wisely responded by authorizing an appropriation of $900,000 for this purpose. The loans will be recoverable out of any judgment that the tribes may obtain from their claims. If no judgment is obtained, the Secretary of the Interior may declare the loan unpayable. The act also forbids the Secretary in the future to approve any contract for the payment of witness fees in such cases on a contingent basis.

Both the Commission and Congress are to be commended for taking a practical and reasonable way out of what had seemed to be a troublesome impasse.

GOVERNMENT AND SCIENCE

Mr. ANDERSON. Mr. President, Dr. Paul M. Gross, chairman of the board of directors of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, recently appeared before the Subcommittee on Science, Research, and Development of the House Committee on Science and Astronautics.

In his statement, Dr. Gross made a plea for greater geographic distribution of research funds "for the purpose of building up a broader base of high quality institutions scattered throughout the land."

Dr. Gross' plea is of particular significance to the Senate because it bears directly on one of the issues which was involved in our consideration of the water resources research bill, S. 2, which the Senate has passed. It is now pending before the House Interior and Insular Affairs Committee.

The argument has been made that it is a mistake to divide Federal water research assistance funds among 50 States; that they should be concentrated on a relatively few "centers of excellence." Refuting that argument, I have contended that the land-grant colleges and universities in the 50 States have demonstrated their ability to administer research programs through their unrivaled work in the agricultural field; second, that the varying nature of water problems makes a center in each State desirable; third, that the widespread need for advice and assistance on the part of individuals, industries, communities, and governments in the water management field supports the argument for State water research centers; and, finally, that there is need to build up more centers of competence in the water research field both to do our growing load of research work and to train specialists in water problems.

Dr. Gross' well-reasoned statement on relationships between government and science merits the attention of every Member who has any concern with the matter, apart from the particular aspect I am discussing. Consequently, I ask unanimous consent to have it printed in the RECORD at the conclusion of these remarks.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the request of the Senator from New Mexico? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 1.)

Mr. ANDERSON. With special reference to the water resources research bill, I should like to call attention to three extracts from his presentation. Dr. Gross stated to the House subcommittee:

I suggest that we have reached a stage where we can do some longer range planning, and that it would now be appropriate to allot some funds specifically for research support with selection to be made strictly on grounds of quality, as has been the policy of the agencies in the past, and to allot some funds specifically for the purpose of building up a broader base of high quality institutions scattered throughout the land.

Dr. Gross continued:

I propose, therefore, that the Government's total objective in supporting science would be better served if immediate research competence were not the only criterion for the distribution of funds and if some grants for research and for the improvement of science education were to be made either on a formula basis or by selection of especially promising institutions with the intent to develop first-class institutions in parts of the country in which they do not now exist.

Dr. Gross also said:

It will be necessary frankly to recognize the desirability of placing a larger amount of the total budget into universities that have the potential of reaching top rank, but that have not yet done so, for it is in our long-run interest to have top quality universities and research laboratories widely placed throughout the country.

EXHIBIT 1

GOVERNMENT AND SCIENCE

(Statement of Dr. Paul M. Gross, chairman of the board of directors, American Association for the Advancement of Science, before the Subcommittee on Science, Research, and Development of the House of Representatives Committee on Science and Astronautics, October 22, 1963)

Mr. DADDARIO and members of the subcommittee, I appreciate the opportunity to meet with you today to discuss some of the persistent problems involved in the relations between Government and science. Earlier witnesses in these hearings, and other witnesses in legislative and appropriation hearings over the past years, have discussed a number of specific problems, such as budgetary levels; the problems and results of research in the medical sciences, in space, and in other areas; or the proper allowance for indirect expenses. Instead of following their lead, I wish today to discuss a few more general issues, for it seems to me that this subcommittee has a special opportunity to consider the underlying and more fundamental issues involved in the relations between Government and science.

When you invited the American Association for the Advancement of Science to take part in these hearings, you asked us to consider two questions: first, what are some of the most important or difficult problems involved in the relations between Government and science; and, second, how might the Association be of help in enabling the Congress to deal more effectively with issues in which science and Government interact. In taking up the first of these two questions, I should like to try to get behind the specifics of particular fields of research and particular aspects of their administrative management to consider some of the basic, persistent problems of Government-science relationships. Because these problems are fundamental and persistent, they deserve the thoughtful consideration of the subcommittee, of the Congress, and of the scientific community.

RELATIONS BETWEEN GOVERNMENT OBJECTIVES IN APPROPRIATING FUNDS FOR RESEARCH, AND UNIVERSITY OR COLLEGE OBJECTIVES IN USING THOSE FUNDS

I start with the premise that the present character and size of Federal research and development expenditures owe their initiation in large measure to ideas and concepts originating in the scientific community. The basic research supported by NIH, NSF, and other agencies is almost wholly determined by the scientists themselves, who decide what seems worth working on. The applied research and developmental programs of DOD, AEC, NASA, NIH, and other agencies have become possible as a result of work which, in the main, was initiated by scientists. As some of that work developed, it became clear that it could and should be exploited to serve military, industrial, health, and prestige goals of the Nation.

In appropriating funds for research and development, the Congress has certain objectives in mind, as have the executive agencies in submitting their research and development budgets. In submitting proposals for work that is to be funded from these appropriations, scientists and engineers on the

staffs of university, industrial, and other research laboratories also have certain objectives in mind for the work that they wish to carry out.

In the long run and in general, there is agreement between the objectives of the Government and the objectives of scientists and engineers. But the match is not always a perfect one, and the amount of agreement between the suppliers and the users of research and development funds may be greater in the long run than in the short run, and greater for some kinds of research activities than for others.

Both scientists and Government officials understand, however, that there is a strong interdependence between the Government, which depends upon industrial and educational research laboratories to conduct research, and those laboratories, which depend upon the Government for a large fraction of the necessary financial support.

Because of this interdependence, there is need for mutual understanding and sometimes need for compromise and adjustment of differences and objectives. There is also need for the kind of analysis of basic problems that this subcommittee is undertaking.

I believe that some of the specific problems could be clarified if we think of the whole area in terms of four parts:

1. First, applied research. I place this first because much the largest fraction of the total Research and Development budget is spent for the development, the testing, and the associated applied research involved in perfecting or bringing into use new equipment, new methods, and new products. A great deal of money is required to develop a new weapon system, but the objective can be foreseen with reasonable clarity, and it is thus reasonably easy to make some of the necessary decisions. Nevertheless, it is rare that such a system can be perfected without finding gaps in our fundamental scientific knowledge.

As an example, let me consider in general terms the development of a weapon system. It began to appear feasible to develop an effective antimissile when three essential components became available: radar, adequate to track a missile, very fast computers that could quickly plot the required interception course for an antimissile, and a small nuclear warhead. These were the principal necessary components, but as work on an antimissile progressed, it soon became apparent that there were large gaps in knowledge and that substantial additions to basic knowledge were necessary.

In my experience, this same kind of situation arises frequently in industry. A new development is delayed by the necessity for further research. Industry frequently solves such problems by a cut-and-try process involving the use of a large number of scientists. With a more adequate store of basic knowledge available, the objective could frequently be more quickly attained and with a more economical and efficient use of available scientific manpower.

2. The second category is basic research. In the abstract, people would agree that the purpose of supporting basic research is to strengthen the Nation's scientific competence, to gain a better understanding of the processes of nature, and to acquire new knowledge, some of which will prove to be of practical usefulness. It is in this area that the scientist finds it most difficult to explain to Congress, to the general public, and sometimes even to scientists in other fields of research, just what he is doing and why he thinks it worthwhile. It is in this area also that journalists and others find it easiest to poke fun at the whole enterprise by selecting a title which they probably do not understand and which may appear trivial or even ludicrous out of the context of technical language of the particular field concerned.

3. The third category is science education at the advanced level. This is closely allied to research, for it consists largely of a kind of research apprenticeship and is supported primarily by graduate fellowships and by research assistantships.

4. Finally, we have to deal with science education at the primary and secondary levels. At these levels, and even to a substantial degree at the collegiate level, science education, although not completely divorced from participation in research, is of course not so intimately connected with it as is science education at the advanced, graduate, and professional levels. Consequently the methods of improving science education at these two levels differs somewhat, and so do the appropriate methods of support.

A major reason for differentiating between research training at the advanced level and science education at earlier levels is the fact that the problems of segregation, religious versus secular control, and the fear of Federal Government control which cannot be avoided at the levels of general education are comparatively irrelevant in considerations of support for research and research training at the advanced level.

Some of the executive agencies—the National Institutes of Health, the National Science Foundation, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration are examples—are involved in all or several of these four kinds of activities. Because of the way in which responsibilities are assigned to committees of the Congress, several of the committees have responsibility over all or several of these four areas. I would not suggest that the four be separated by agencies—with some agencies responsible, for example, only for applied research and development and forbidden to interest themselves in basic research or science education—nor is it realistic to suggest that congressional committees have their responsibilities similarly differentiated. I would suggest, however, that in the formation of policies, and at some stages in the consideration of appropriations, we can think more clearly about government-science relations if we think separately about these four areas. If we do that, we will have clearer opportunities for reaching decisions both concerning policy and concerning operational management.

Let me suggest several advantages of such a separation. First, we could establish more firmly our policies concerning support for fundamental research. In the current budget for research and development of approximately $15 billion, 10 percent or less is devoted to basic research. A wealth of experience tells us that when money gets tight, it is this area that is most likely to suffer, for as I pointed out earlier, it is less easy to agree upon what is most worth doing. It is harder to explain why a particular study is meritorious and it is easier for an antagonistic critic to make fun of a particular investigation, the nature and purposes of which neither he nor his hearers understand, than it is to poke fun at research specifically pointed toward the achievement of a desirable military, medical, or industrial goal. Consequently, when money gets tight, it is the basic research category that is most likely to suffer.

If we differentiated more clearly between basic research, on the one hand, and applied research, development, and testing, on the other, it would, I think, be easier to agree upon the appropriate level of support that the Nation can afford. We are now spending a billion and a half dollars or less a year on basic research. I would contend that the Nation is getting its money's worth for this amount, for this is the money that we spend to renew and extend our fundamental stock of scientific knowledge.

The issue is not whether x dollars is too little or too much for science, but whether the Nation's investment in research is producing results that are desirable for the American people. For our investment in basic research we have built a reputation as a great scientific leader among nations—witness the number of Nobel Prizes that have been awarded to Americans. We have made of the United States the mecca for scientists throughout the world. We have learned much about the nature and history of the universe and our planet, about the mechanisms of cellular growth and reproduction. And basic research has been leading with increasing rapidity to applied research that has been of widespread benefit to the American people. A few examples may be quickly cited.

1. Great advances in the health of the American people have coincided with the expansion of Federal investment in medical research and public health measures.

2. The Nation's military might is a direct outgrowth of the scientific community's responsiveness to the needs of national security.

3. Civil aviation's high degree of safety stems from research that is fundamental to traffic control and navigation devices.

4. The productivity of the Nation's farms is directly related to seed and fertilizer developments that originated in the laboratory.

Finally, let me cite a single concrete example as evidence of the value of basic research. This is in part from fundamental research in radiation biology, a field with which I have some acquaintance because of my association with the Oak Ridge Institute of Nuclear Studies.

First let me give the title of an early paper published in the Journal of Economic Entomology in 1951. This was "Experiments with screw-worm flies sterilized by X-rays." If one did not live in Florida or Texas and knew nothing about screw-worm flies, this might at first glance indeed seem a subject of doubtful merit on which to spend Federal research funds. A deeper look, however, would reveal the following:

(a) Fatal wounds in cattle in Florida and Texas caused by maggots from eggs of the screw-worm fly caused losses estimated by cattlemen to aggregate at least $100 million a year.

(b) Basic research on the ecology of this insect, its flight, mating, feeding, and other habits has led to a method for eliminating its occurrence, at least in Florida.

(c) Stated simply, this consists of breeding large numbers of the fly and sterilizing the males. These, after wholesale release, mate with naturally occurring females, but only sterile eggs result.

(d) After systematic application of this quite new and novel technique of insect control in Florida for about 2 years, the insect was practically eradicated and its serious menace to the Florida livestock industry eliminated.

(e) From my general knowledge of research costs, I believe that the cost for the basic research involved did not exceed $1 million in all. The annual savings to the livestock industry of Florida alone would pay many times over not only for this but for much other basic research.

One of the advantages of treating separately the costs of basic research and the much greater costs of development is that it becomes easier to see what we are paying for. For $1.5 billion a year we get our whole basic research program, including many examples such as the one I have cited on the mating habits of the screw-worm fly. The more frequently cited figure of $15 billion a year includes the developmental costs of military, atomic energy, space, and other large programs. Scientists, the executive agencies, and Congress can defend a billion and a half dollars a year for basic research, and can point to such examples as one kind of justification. It is not so easy to justify such work or the level of expenditure if the budget is thought of as $15 billion a year,

a budget that includes a great deal of work that the country has decided is necessary but that does not belong in the basic research category.

The second advantage of a clearer separation of basic research from applied research, development, and testing would be in the clarification of our worries about duplication. Congress has very rightly been worried about the duplication of effort in the research and development sphere. Scientists equally correctly deny that there is any intentional duplication in basic research. Congress wishes to save money, and can very properly raise questions about duplication of developmental efforts in the programs of agencies that have overlapping responsibilities. But duplication of effort in basic research is a quite different matter. The scientist's own motivation, his reputation for originality, and the elaborate procedures that have been established for exchanging information about the research that is being undertaken in different laboratories, should constitute much better guarantees against unnecessary duplication than could be provided by any set of governmental regulations or congressional hearings.

Third, questions of overhead, of the kinds of reporting required, of the relative merits of grants versus contracts, and other problems of management would, I believe, be easier to agree upon if we took them up separately for basic research and for applied research and development than they have been when these have all been lumped together into an undifferentiated category.

Fourth, the Government supports science education in a variety of ways in order to have a continuing supply of people qualified in pure science and its applied fields, but there is a considerable amount of confusion in the process. For example, much of the money that is allotted for research purposes is, in fact, used for the advanced training of graduate students. I said earlier that education at this level consists largely of a research apprenticeship. A great number of the grants for basic research and many of those for applied research that are carried out in university laboratories include funds for graduate assistants. The money is usefully spent, and the training received by graduate students contributes to our future supply of scientists and engineers. But some of the issues are clouded, because money that appears in the budget for one purpose is expended for a related but nevertheless different purpose.

There are some major differences between the proper methods of support for science education at the graduate level and for science education for younger students. The budgets upon which Congress has to act include funds for both of these levels. But at no point in their consideration is there a clean separation between the two, and consequently there is never an opportunity for a clear decision as to how much money can appropriately go to each and the differences in arrangements that will most effectively foster each set of objectives.

Fifth, a clearer separation of the four areas of support that I have been discussing would make it easier to define the kinds of responsibility that can most appropriately be carried out by Congress, by the executive agencies, and by the scientists who are ultimately responsible for the research and educational activities that are being supported. The lines are not completely sharp, but I would suggest that Congress and the Office of the President have primary responsibility for deciding what the total budget shall be and how it should be divided among these four broad areas. Within the area of development, testing, and associated applied research, Congress and the Office of the President also have primary responsibility for subdividing funds, for here are involved specific national goals—for defense, for public health, for our activities in space, for industry, agriculture, and for national prestige. On the other hand, the cognizant agencies, such as the National Science Foundation or the National Institutes of Health, and their grantees have a better basis for deciding how money for basic research should be spent and how money for the advanced and graduate education of prospective scientists should be spent. Confusion, mistrust, and a considerable amount of wasted effort result when either group tries to make decisions that might better be made by the other. In his testimony a few days ago, Dr. Wiesner spoke of the great speed with which a new finding in science may alter a variety of research activities. When this happens, a great deal of time can be wasted by going through a lot of bureaucratic red-tape to secure permission to alter the direction of a study or to secure a piece of equipment the need for which was not forseen when the proposal was originally submitted. Congress and the Office of the President have great and overriding responsibilities for the health of the Nation's research and development effort. They need not and should not dilute that responsibility by attempting to exercise a kind of control in one area that is only appropriate in some other area, or by attempting to make detailed research decisions which they are not truly qualified to make. Who is responsible for what would be easier to decide if we were thinking separately about these four parts of the total research and development effort than if we try to establish rules and procedures for all of our research and development activities.

Consequently, it seems to me altogether desirable that the subcommittee take up seriously and in depth the general question of the relationships between government and science. I believe that you can take up these questions most constructively if the four areas that I have discussed are looked at one at a time to see what their problems are and how those problems can best be solved.

GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF RESEARCH FUNDS

The second general problem that I would like to discuss is closely related to the first. The problem is that of the geographic distribution of Federal research funds.

The facts are perfectly clear and are a matter of record for each agency. A few States get a great deal more money than do all the rest. In general, the States that get the most money for research are such populous States as California, Massachusetts, and New York, but even on a per capita basis the disparities among the States are tremendous. Whether the distribution is what it ought to be has been and and no doubt will continue to be subject to a good deal of argument. A considerable part of the argument has been confused and confusing because we have been trying to use the same money for objectives that in the short run are mutually contradictory. In the abstract, most people would, I believe, agree that it is desirable that research be done on a variety of problems and that the research be of as high quality as we can procure. In the abstract, I believe also that most people would agree that it would be desirable to have a larger number of research and educational institutions of high quality, and that such institutions should be located in various parts of the country instead of being concentrated in a few locations.

In practice, there has been conflict between these two objectives. The need for defense, the fear of possible attack, the desire to ameliorate or even eradicate crippling and disabling diseases, and the desire to achieve other national goals as rapidly as possible have all argued in the direction of placing research grants and contracts with those institutions that are best qualified to conduct the desired research. There are not many such institutions. Consequently there has been a pile-up of Federal research funds in a relatively small number of our best qualified universities. In order to fulfill their obligations, these universities have recruited competent scientists from other universities and colleges, and so there has been further concentration of research talent in the best institutions. From time to time, this system has been criticized and the claim advanced that research funds should be more broadly allocated among the 50 States. The concentrated distribution has often seemed necessary in the past. The urgency of attaining some of the goals we have had in mind would have made anything like an equal distribution among the 50 States a serious mistake.

But this situation has posed a dilemma for Congress, one that was illustrated—to take a single example—by the hearings of a subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives earlier this year. In reviewing the 1964 budget of the National Science Foundation, officers of the National Science Foundation were criticized several times for what members of the subcommittee considered undue concentration of NSF funds in a few States. The same hearings, however, resulted in striking out of the NSF budget the funds that had been requested for developmental grants that would have enabled NSF to assist a number of universities to attain greater research competence, and thus on merit to secure a larger proportion of funds handled through the regular grant procedures of the National Science Foundation and other agencies.

We cannot let down our guard, but I suggest that we have reached a stage where we can do some longer range planning, and that it would now be appropriate to allot some funds specifically for research support with selection to be made strictly on grounds of quality, as has been the policy of the agencies in the past, and to allot some funds specifically for the purpose of building up a broader base of high-quality institutions scattered throughout the land.

Here clearly is a matter of high policy for the Congress and the President's Office. The change of policy would recognize that there is now an overemphasis on research at the expense of teaching and an overemphasis upon short-time research goals at the expense of a broadened research competence.

When the establishment of the National Science Foundation was first being debated in Congress, consideration was given to the possibility of alloting some portion of its funds—perhaps 25 percent—among the several States on a formula basis and of allotting 75 percent strictly on the basis of merit. This proposal was killed, partly because the pork-barrel label got attached to it, but the objective is still desirable. I propose, therefore, that the Government's total objective in supporting science would be better served if immediate research competence were not the only criterion for the distribution of funds and if some grants for research and for the improvement of science education were to be made either on a formula basis or by selection of especially promising institutions with the intent to develop first-class institutions in parts of the country in which they do not now exist.

To the extent that Federal funds can be used to accomplish this purpose, it will be necessary to use a larger fraction of that money than we have been using in past years in the form of institutional grants rather than individual project grants, and it will be necessary frankly to recognize the desirability of placing a larger amount of the total budget into universities that have the potential of reaching top rank but that have not yet done so, for it is in our longrun interest to have top-quality universities and research laboratories widely placed throughout the country.

All in all, as a long-range problem, I would list the matter of arriving at a better adjustment between the immediate, short-term research goals and the long-term goal of attaining a broadened national educational and research competence as one of the most fundamental and important problems in the area of Government-science relations.

NATURE OF THE AAAS

I shall turn now to the second topic that I was asked to discuss, the nature of the American Association for the Advancement of Science and the ways in which it might help the Congress to fulfill its obligation to study and review legislative matters that are influenced by or that have an influence upon science and science education.

Just as the American Bar Association is the large, national, voluntary society of lawyers in the United States, so the American Association for the Advancement of Science is the large, national, voluntary society of scientists. The association was established 115 years ago. It now has 90,000 members. It covers all fields of science: astronomy, mathematics, physics and chemistry, the various fields of biology, agriculture, medicine, psychology, and the social sciences. While we have sections in all of these fields, provide for meetings coverings all fields, and publish papers and technical symposia in all, most of our attention is devoted to matters that concern science as a whole, that involve several different fields of science, or that deal with questions of science education. In the last 8 or 9 years, we have been devoting a good deal of time and energy to problems of science education.

We hold national and regional meetings each year. Occasionally we are responsible for international scientific congresses. And we have a number of publications dealing with science, science education, and the public understanding of science.

As a matter of general policy, we rarely take formal positions on public issues. This is not because of lack of interest, but rather because we think we can be of greater service by providing an open forum for their analysis and discussion than we could by trying to decide upon the right answer in each case. Once in a while there is an exception. For example, from 1946 to 1950 we tried very hard to persuade the Congress and the country that it would be a good thing to establish the National Science Foundation. But in general we do not try to influence legislation or national policy by taking a position on one side of an issue.

Instead, we provide a forum for debate and discussion. This is done at annual meetings. It is also done, on a continuing basis, through the weekly magazine Science which we publish. Editorials, news, and news analyses concerning pending legislation, programs, and decisions of the executive agencies, and other political, economic, and social actions and forces that have a bearing on science or upon which scientific activities have a bearing are published regularly in Science. These are very widely read in the scientific community and have a fair readership among governmental policymakers. A fast printing schedule enables Science to reach the scientific community very rapidly; the editorial staff finished writing last night or even today the news and comment material that will be printed and mailed tomorrow in this week's issue of Science.

A second way in which we have attempted to serve a useful role is through the publication of analyses of problems that arise in the interaction between science and public affairs. As an example, several years ago there was considerable interest in the possibility of establishing a Cabinet-level Department of Science or Department of Science and Technology. We collected half a dozen knowledgeable people who held different ideas about this possibility, kept them together for 3 days of intensive discussion, and as a result published in Science an analysis that did not try to give a simple yes or no answer to the question of whether there should be such a department of government, but instead laid out the issues, discussed the pros and cons, and tried to analyze the probable effects of the several proposals that were then current.

As another example, in 1952 we published a book reviewing the status of work in the various fields of science in Soviet Russia. This was before there was any general concern over a race with the Russians, and it has since become much easier to get information about what the Russians have been doing. But at the time, it served as a widely useful source book of information about Russian scientific work. More recently we have done the same thing for Communist China. In 1960 we set a group of American and Chinese-American scholars the task of reviewing all of the Chinese journals and scientific reports that were available in the United States. The amount of material for the decade of the 1950's was extensive, but since then the flow of information from Communist China has been substantially curtailed. We published the result in 1961, and it is still the best available source of information about what the Communist Chinese are doing in geophysics, medicine, and a variety of other fields.

The magazine Science and analyses such as those I have described are primarily intended for scientists. They are read by others, but in the main they reach a scientific audience. I want, therefore, to mention three ways in which we might be of more direct help to the Congress. Whether the suggestions I am going to make would be helpful is something I hope you will discuss. The extent to which we could do these or other things that you might propose is something that I would want to discuss with the association's board of directors, for there are limits on what an organization that has a limited staff and that is primarily supported by the annual dues of its members can promise to do.

Several recent bills have advocated the establishment of a group of scientific staff members or science consultants to work with Congress and its committees. If such a congressional office is established, the staff will certainly not be large enough to handle all questions by itself. Help from outside will be needed, just as you have indicated that the existing committees need help.

One possibility for us would be to serve as a source of information about advisers. It is always difficult and sometimes impossible to get advisers who are well informed about a matter and who are not involved either as recipients of Government grants or as advisers to executive agencies. But we know the scientists of the country, and perhaps as well as anyone else could arrange to get well-qualified advisers on a variety of scientific matters of concern to congressional committees.

A second possibility is through the seminar mechanism. The Committee on Science and Astronautics has its own panel of advisers that meets periodically. In a quite different fashion, we have held, jointly with the Brookings Institution, several series of seminars for an invited group of Members of the House of Representatives. Mr. DADDARIO and Mr. MOSHER, I am told, have been regular participants in those seminars. Each seminar has dealt with a specific area of research. The purpose in all cases has been educational and deliberately has not dealt with pending legislation. But if a committee wishes, we could arrange for a speaker or a panel of scientists to discuss the scientific background or the probable implications of a problem with which the committee was concerned. The discussions might be held here and constitute part of the record, or they might be held in a more informal atmosphere at our building and be off the record. The British have had considerable success, and also some problems, with a standing committee consisting in part of Members of Parliament and in part of scientists. The Parliamentary and Science Committee meets periodically to discuss matters that are to come before Parliament. I do not think that a standing committee would be the best arrangement here, but perhaps it would be useful to arrange some ad hoc joint meetings that would serve a similar purpose.

As a third possibility, it may at times be possible for us to carry out analyses or studies that would be of use. Problems of air pollution are beginning to become of general concern and have long been of concern to some local areas, notably Los Angeles. The atmosphere is one of our most precious natural resources, and we have been doing a number of things to it that may irrevocably alter its character and its value. For the past 2 years the association has had a group of physicists, chemists, economists, urban planners, and public health specialists, with the help of a small staff, conducting a study of this important problem. We will have the report ready for publication next year.

As another example, last month we published in Spanish and later this fall will publish in English a review of American experience in the handling of arid land problems. We published the Spanish version first because it constituted the U.S. contribution to the Latin American Congress on Arid Lands that was held with UNESCO assistance in Argentina last month.

Both these studies of the atmosphere and of arid lands were planned and written not with any particular legislative or congressional problem in mind, but rather as efforts to bring together the available information on an important matter of public concern. I hope that they will be widely useful. They might have been of more direct use to you had we discussed with you your interest in such matters before we started the two studies.

As an example of how such discussions in advance might be useful, I refer again to the problem of geographic distribution of Federal support for scientific research and for science education. These are questions of obvious concern to Congress. They are matters that affect the operating policies of a number of Government agencies. And they are of great importance to the educational institutions of the country.

Obviously the suggestions I have made would by no means wholly solve the problem of giving Congress the competence it seeks in handling scientific and technical problems. But if, after you and the staff have had an opportunity to consider these and other ideas, it appears that the association can be of real assistance, we will be glad to continue the discussion of directions in which we might help.

VIETNAM

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may proceed for not to exceed 6 minutes and at the conclusion of my remarks to have printed a statement I made on the Vietnam uprising on November 1.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 1.)

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, the recent events in Vietnam are tragic events. It is tragic that a leader who began by accomplishing so much that

was constructive with so little, that a Government which began with so much promise, in the end crumbled in military coup and violent death, a situation which I deeply and personally regret.

When news of these events first reached this city, it seemed to me that their primary significance to the United States was clear. They were a clarion call for a reassessment of U.S. policies with respect to Vietnam and southeast Asia. For the government which fell, up until a few months ago, had been generally regarded for years, I so felt, as indispensable in the structure of American policy in southeast Asia. We will fail to heed this call only at the risk of great danger to the future of our relations with all of Asia.

We will not serve the interests of the Nation if:

First. We regard the overthrow of the Diem government as a victory or defeat for this country. It is neither. It is more an inexorable development in the tragic postwar history of the Vietnamese people.

Second. If we reassume that the successor military-dominated regime is an automatic guarantee of a permanment improvement in the situation in Vietnam. This successor authority in Vietnam is, at this point, at best a promise of something better. But if the Korean experience is at all relevant, it is apparent that such promises can be undone in short order.

If these tragic events of the past few days are to have constructive significance for this Nation as well as for the Vietnamese people, we would be well advised to recognize that the effectiveness of our Asian policies cannot be measured by an overthrow of a government, by whether one government is "easier to work with" than another, by whether one government smiles at us and another frowns. In the last analysis, the effectiveness of our policies and their administration with respect to the Vietnamese situation and, indeed, all of southeast Asia can only be weighed in the light of these basic questions:

First. Do these policies make possible a progressive reduction in the expenditures of American lives and aid in Vietnam?

Second. Do these policies hold a valid promise of encouraging in Vietnam the growth of popularly responsible and responsive government?

Third. Do these policies contribute not only to the development of internal stability in South Vietnam but to the growth of an environment of a decent peace and a popularly based stability throughout Asia—the kind of environment which will permit the replacement of the present heavy dependence upon U.S. arms and resources with an equitable and mutual relationship between the Asian peoples and our own?

This is, indeed, an appropriate time, Mr. President, for the executive branch to reassess policies for Vietnam and southeast Asia in these terms. It may well be that few changes, if any, are required at this time. But if that is the case—if indeed the problem in Vietnam has been primarily one of an inadequate government—then, Mr. President, we should begin to see results in the period ahead. We should see:

First. A reduction in the commitment of U.S. forces and aid in Vietnam and southeast Asia;

Second. The emergence in Vietnam of a responsible and responsive civilian government attuned to the needs and reasonable aspirations of its people;

Third. An improvement in the relations of Vietnam with Cambodia and Laos;

Fourth. A growth in mutual commercial, cultural, and other friendly intercourse between the people of this Nation and the various Asian people.

These are basic tests, Mr. President, and it remains to be seen how they shall be met not only in our relations with the successor authority in Saigon but with all the nations of southeast Asia. From the point of view of this Nation, it would appear appropriate to reiterate at this time what the Senator from Rhode Island [Mr. PELL] and the Senator from Delaware [Mr. BOGGS] will recall that we stated on our return from a visit to Vietnam and southeast Asia less than a year ago:

> It must be clear to ourselves as well as to the Vietnamese where the primary responsibility lies in this situation. It must rest, as it has rested, with the Vietnamese Government and people. What further effort may be needed for the survival of the Republic of Vietnam in present circumstances must come from that source. If it is not forthcoming, the United States can reduce its commitment or abandon it entirely but there is no interest of the United States in Vietnam which would justify, in present circumstances, the conversion of the war in that country primarily into an American war, to be fought primarily with American lives. It is the frequent contention of Communist propaganda that such is already the case. It should remain the fact that the war in Vietnam is not an American war in present circumstances.

That conclusion, Mr. President, in my judgment, would apply to the successor government in Saigon no less than to its predecessor.

EXHIBIT 1

STATEMENT OF SENATOR MIKE MANSFIELD

The news of the uprising in Vietnam came as a complete surprise to me, and I am quite certain a surprise to the administration. There have been rumors, of course, for weeks that a coup d'etat was in the making, but there was nothing tangible to reinforce such an assumption up to this time.

This appears to me to be a purely Vietnamese affair which the Vietnamese should settle among themselves. As far as this Government is concerned, it is my opinion that the events of the past several hours call more than ever for a reassessment and reappraisal of our policy in South Vietnam and, for that matter, in all of southeast Asia.

One would hope that the people of South Vietnam will obtain the kind of government, out of these tragic developments, which will be responsive to their needs and responsible to them. It remains to be seen whether such a government shall emerge, and in any reappraisal of our policies this would be a factor of the utmost importance.

I have always had the highest respect for the integrity, the patriotism, and dedication of President Ngo Dinh Diem and regret deeply and personally, very much that the situation has had to come to such a pass.

Mr. PELL. Mr. President, I rise to strongly endorse the statement of the very wise Senator from Montana [Mr. MANSFIELD]. There is no Member of this body and few in the United States who know and understand that area and its people as well as he. I had the privilege of being with him on his last trip to Vietnam, and would like to underline his thought that these are days of decision for the people of Vietnam. They can make up their minds to go along the democratic path we have hoped they will follow, or they can follow the paths of other countries in the Far East, of which Korea would be an example. The Vietnamese have seen what happens when a country does not enjoy the regard or respect of her people—the people will eventually toss out the government. On the other hand, if the government enjoys the respect and regard of the people, the people embrace it and it remains in power. We hope this lesson will not be lost on the new Government of Vietnam. We also hope that Government will not lean too heavily on the United States, as our eventual goal remains not only the restoration of Vietnamese freedom from authoritarianism, no matter whether Communist or otherwise, but the reduction of our manpower and financial commitment in South Vietnam.

Mr. BOGGS. Mr. President, I was in the Chamber when the distinguished majority leader, the Senator from Montana [Mr. MANSFIELD] made what I consider to be a very comprehensive and important statement concerning the situation in Vietnam.

I recognize in the very able majority leader a man of great wisdom and a student of foreign affairs and of the southeast Asia area. I thought his statement was considerate not only of past developments in South Vietnam and the southeast Asia area, but also one looking hopefully toward the future with the best interests of freedom loving people and the people of South Vietnam and the southeast Asia area in mind.

His statement deserves the attention of all of us, and especially of our executive department, and those concerned with the problems in that part of the world.

I take this opportunity to express my support of the views and thoughts so well presented by the very able and distinguished majority leader.

GEORGE F. KENNAN'S VIEWS ON FOREIGN POLICY

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President some comments were made on the floor of this body relating to an article about Mr. George Kennan. Several articles were written. I ask unanimous consent that at the end of my remarks, an article from Look magazine of November 19, by J. Robert Moskin, be included in the RECORD.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 1.)

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I do not agree with some of the comments made by Mr. Kennan. I have regarded him, and still do, as one of the outstanding public servants of this country. I think he was, and is, uniquely qualified to comment on various aspects of our

foreign policy, particularly on that part relating to our relations with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. He was in the Foreign Service for 25 or 30 years. He was acknowledged as one of the leading experts on Russia. He spoke the language well. He was sent there as a very young man specifically to learn Russian. He was our Ambassador to Russia. He had the distinction, if one wishes to call it that, of having his recall requested by the Soviet Government for remarks he made that were considered by the Kremlin as being critical of the situation in Berlin, I believe. This was about 10 years ago.

I believe everyone acknowledges that he has wide experience and knowledge of conditions in that part of the world and of our relations there.

I regret that anyone should criticize his efforts to enlighten the American people and Members of this body about our relations with Yugoslavia specifically, or Eastern Europe generally, or with the Kremlin.

His views are deserving of great weight. I would certainly not say they were infallible, but there is no more thoughtful man or student of our relations with Eastern Europe and Russia in or out of government.

He has resigned. He has a private capacity now. He is entitled to speak as any other citizen is. The only difference is that he speaks about his special field of study from knowledge and experience that are virtually unique among all the citizens of this country.

I believe the statements he made in this article are on the whole correct. I predict that history will prove that many of the suggestions that have been made regarding our policy with respect to the Soviet Union will prove to have been wise ones.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I ask unanimous consent that I may have 1 more minute.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Several years ago Mr. Kennan became well known for an article in Foreign Affairs, written by "Mr. X"—I believe that was the pseudonym. It was considered as the origin of the policy of containment. Subsequent to that, a new policy of liberation theoretically was developed, which has not proved as effective. I think the actual state of affairs is much closer, and has been, to that of containment rather than liberation.

He also has given noted lectures on Western Europe regarding our policies in that area, which, while they have not been followed, and were roundly condemned by former Secretary Acheson, may prove in the future to have had considerable wisdom.

In any case, I for one wish to commend Mr. Kennan for taking the trouble to give the public his views. I regard him as one of the outstanding public servants of our time.

EXHIBIT 1

OUR FOREIGN POLICY IS PARALYZED

(NOTE.—Respected diplomat, Russian expert, and Pulitzer Prize historian, George F. Kennan, has quit as President Kennedy's Ambassador to Yugoslavia. Now free to speak out boldly, he warns that "overmilitarization" of our cold war thinking and fear of the "powerful influence of the right wing" are destroying our strength abroad.

(By J. Robert Moskin)

"Congress and the American people are so divided that American leadership is indecisive. It is high time we clarified our ideas, as a nation and a government, as to what we want in our contest with the Soviet Union and the rest of the Communist world: Whether we want these countries to change, to capitulate to our desires, or whether we want war. People who hold all these three points of view have influence in Washington."

This warning comes from George F. Kennan, long time expert on communism, former U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union and to Yugoslavia, and a prime architect of the Marshall plan. It is a rare event when a top-rank diplomat like Kennan, who has served 29 years in the Foreign Service, breaks loose from the establishment and speaks out on America's foreign policy failings.

Kennan, 59, has fought for his convictions against Democrats and Republicans alike. He opposed Democratic Secretary of State Dean Acheson's German policy and was once fired by Republican Secretary of State John Foster Dulles for disagreeing with his talk of the "liberation" of Eastern Europe. Now, Kennan has resigned as President Kennedy's Ambassador to Communist Yugoslavia because, he feels, the Congress and Washington bureaucracy had him hogtied and have crippled American foreign policy.

After a lifetime in diplomacy (he was sent to the Soviet Union as soon as we recognized its existence in 1933), this tall, lean, imposing man sits now in his still book-bare office at the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton, N.J., clasps and unclasps his hands, jumps up and paces the small room, peers out the window—as he struggles to say precisely what the American people should know about the state of their Nation abroad.

In essence, he holds: We are fumbling because we have not made up our minds what kind of world we want, or what our role in the world should be. The administration is zeroed in on political victory at home, enmeshed in bureaucratic redtape and buffeted by political cyclones that roar in from many directions. It sacrifices thought-out policies to pressures often inspired by "the powerful influence of the American right-wing." Kennan fears that unless we nail down what we want our foreign policy to be, we will plummet to the ground in wing-clipped futility, or plunge into the flames of war.

"If we can't devise solutions better than this, we should ask ourselves whether we belong in the big leagues," Kennan warns. Indecisiveness at the top leads to a sterility of ideas and a failure to act. As a result, he argues, our foreign policy is paralyzed. A politician, whether in the White House or the Congress, who voices new ideas or acts with firmness in foreign affairs, must always protect his political life against extremists who talk loudly, but carry a very small stick of responsibility.

Kennan sees three forces paralyzing our foreign policy. The first is the Congress, in which a few powerful men—such as some leaders of the House Ways and Means Committee—tie up foreign policy. Some have strong notions about what the Government should be doing; others fear attacks from the extremists; some speak for special interests or jealously hug their prerogatives as holders of the Nation's purse strings. There is no reason to believe Kennan says, that their views represent American opinion more accurately than the President's.

The second force is the deadening hand of Government bureaucracy. As an Ambassador, Kennan found "the great difficulty was to get opinion and authority out of Washington, especially when it cost money."

The bureaucracy cannot react to changes fast enough. "Other countries find they are protected by our own financial procedures," he says. "The ponderousness of our Government institutions works against our best interest."

The third force Kennan sees crippling our foreign policy is the self-interest of our allies. "This coalition is incapable of agreeing on any negotiated solutions except unconditional capitulation and the satisfaction of the maximum demands of each of our allies. It is easier for a coalition to agree to ask for everything but the kitchen sink, rather than take a real negotiating position.

"This worries me because there is not going to be any capitulation. Our adversaries are not that weak. If we cannot find any negotiating position, the cold war will continue, and the dangers will not decrease."

The Russians may not accept our proposals, "but unless you dangle something before them, you put no pressure on their decisionmaking."

Kennan sees no New Frontier in foreign affairs. "The Kennedy administration is not by any means a free agent in foreign policy. I can see important changes in military policy. But in foreign policy, the administration has had little latitude of action.

"Supposing these strictures did not exist and the Congress were more receptive? I believe we could usefully rethink our position on the problems of Germany and Central Europe. The same applies to the complex of problems surrounding Communist China, Taiwan, and the Japanese peace treaty. We ought to review carefully our attitude toward Gen. Charles de Gaulle and see whether, under his concepts, France could not assume more of the burden of leadership in Western Europe and protection of Western Europe against Communist pressures. There ought to be searching reexamination and clarification of our policy toward Eastern Europe. The same applies to the various neutralist countries in Asia, Africa, and Europe.

"Finally, there must be a real debate and clarification of our views on the problems of nuclear weapons. It seems dangerous to me that we should have to continue to stagger along with unresolved differences such as we have just witnessed in the debate on the test ban treaty."

To illustrate how such forces paralyze our foreign policy, Kennan explains why he resigned from the State Department: "I had no difficulty with the administration, but the actions which the Congress designed to tie the administration's hands in our economic relations with Yugoslavia—and in a way that would deny the Yugoslavs normal commercial treatment—largely paralyzed my effectiveness there. If I had greater support on the congressional side, and felt there were important possibilities for accomplishment, my decision might have been different."

Although the United States had millions of dollars in the bank in Yugoslavia, Kennan spent months getting congressional approval even to repair the Embassy fence. "The jealous and narrow ways in which these matters are handled have to be changed."

Last July 26, an earthquake destroyed the Yugoslav city of Skoplje, killing and injuring thousands. He has bitter memories: "The congressional strictures were so severe that we didnt know how we could help. The only thing I could do was give blood. No congressional committee could stop me from doing that."

Last year, the Congress directed the President to stop, as soon as practicable, normal most-favored-nation trade with any country dominated or controlled by communism. "The Yugoslavs aren't even asking aid," Kennan says. (They stopped taking military assistance from the United States in 1957.)

"They just want normal commercial treatment, and the Congress won't give it to them. That's very bad.

"I don't like to serve an administration that has been told by Congress it can't aid a country if it wishes to. I feel very strongly it is foolish to deny normal commercial intercourse to a country facing important choices between East and West * * *. I don't favor any gifts to Yugoslavia, but I think it unfortunate that we should leave the long-term financing of Yugoslavia's industrial development entirely to Russia."

Kennan found some Congressmen sympathetic toward his views on trade with Yugoslavia. They told him, "What you say is true, but I don't want to go back to my district having helped a Communist regime." Kennan charges: "This resulted in a position that gave aid and comfort to an enemy. They were interested in keeping themselves out of trouble."

He believes that much of the pressure on such Congressmen comes from the right wing. "People are terribly sensitive to the charge that they are not sufficiently anti-Communist. The right wing has had an influence—it silences its opponents and makes everyone desirous of not being criticized from this quarter. A great part of the country stands silent on this. By far the greatest part of the American press is intimidated."

He concludes: "There are tremendous issues that ought to be thoroughly debated and talked out and resolved in such a way as we can have a clear, vigorous, and consistent policy in all these fields. These issues should not be allowed to smolder and paralyze national action."

Kennan sets forth four basic questions that Americans must answer for themselves:

Do we want to destroy, or negotiate with, Communist nations? At the heart of our international confusion is the question of "whether we are determined to destroy all these Communist regimes and inevitably have war, or are we determined to take advantage of such elements of moderation as may appear in the behavior of some of them, with a view of strengthening the chances of world peace?"

Kennan states bluntly where he stands: "People who expect the capitulation of Communist power are talking about something so unrealistic that they really want war." He calls their view highly irresponsible.

Some Americans, in Kennan's view, see totalitarianism as a straitjacket in which people get locked permanently. Others recognize it as one illness of the human spirit from which societies recover.

He contrasts Khrushchev's regime with Stalin's: "I don't think it is more friendly toward us than Stalin's, but it is probably ready to go further in the direction of accommodation with us on questions of disarmament than was Stalin. The moderation of the internal terror and the greater liberality internally make it easier for us to deal with them."

Looking beyond the Khrushchev era, Kennan says, "The demand of Russian youth for knowledge about the outside world and for freedom of expression has reached a dimension such that no Russian regime will be able to frustrate it entirely."

Do we want political or military solutions for the cold war? Kennan has long felt that our thinking about the cold war has been dominated by overmilitarization. We too often believe, if we have military superiority, the Communists must meet our demands.

To Kennan, Europe is a political problem. This judgment led to his break with Secretary of State Acheson. Kennan advocated a withdrawal of both Soviet and American power from the center of Europe. Acheson, he recalls, took "violent exception" to this idea of "disengagement" and blasted it as "a timid and defeatist policy of retreat" and "the new isolationism." Kennan still disagrees with Acheson's claim that if the great powers were to withdraw, all Europe would go down on its knees. He points to the Austrians: "They didn't go down on their knees. The Finns have done nothing of the sort."

As a result of this overmilitarized thinking, Kennan believes we have mishandled postwar Germany. "Ever since 1950, when Mr. Acheson proceeded to the rearming of West Germany, I've had misgivings about it. This has been a serious handicap on our policy in Eastern Europe. All of them fear Germany and don't want to see Germany rearmed. This is one fear that is shared by the people and the regimes of Eastern Europe.

"It wouldn't have hurt the Germans to have had at least 20 years of demilitarization."

Kennan would like to see a unified but neutralized Germany possessing only weapons for defense. "None of this can be changed overnight. The West Germans are members of NATO, and we have to respect that status. I'm talking about a disposition to change some of these arrangements if, and only if, the Russians will make some compensation—only as part of a deal."

As Kennan sees it, two factors block the reunification of Germany: "We are inhibited by feeling the need of a strong U.S. military force in West Germany, even if the Russians withdraw in East Germany. They are inhibited by the disgraceful weakness of the Ulbricht regime." We should press the Russians to replace it. "They realize they are holding up a regime which has no popular support. I believe someday Russia will have to abandon East Germany and let it rejoin Germany."

Disengagement in Europe has not become American policy, but Kennan's ideas about the containment of Soviet power have greatly influenced our approach to the Soviet Union. They also triggered his being fired from the Foreign Service in 1953 by Secretary of State Dulles, or, as Emmet John Hughes has written, discourteously dismissed.

Kennan is convinced that Dulles talk of rescuing Eastern Europe damaged the United States. "Mr. Dulles liked to talk about liberation of Eastern Europe, but did nothing about it. I prefer not to talk about it. Mr. Dulles talked a line designed to appease the rightwing critics of our policy, and followed the same policy as in the past. I have felt we should not talk in a way we did not intend to act." The effect of Dulles' words was "to tighten the apron strings of the satellite governments to the Soviet Union." Kennan warns that we still have not made up our minds "whether we want Eastern Europe to evolve in our direction, or whether we want to overthrow these governments."

On what basis should we give aid to other nations? Kennan argues that economic and military aid is no checkrein to keep teetering nations from dropping into the pit of communism. "I personally am skeptical about foreign aid, especially when it is given as a condition of not going Communist. We should help those who say, 'We are going to survive whether you help us or not'—like Finland. When a country says, 'If you don't help us, we will go under,' we should get off the trolley."

Jumping off the trolley can be a tricky maneuver, as the U.S. Government was reminded recently when it reexamined its choices of action in South Vietnam. Kennan wants to take a tough look at regimes like Ngo Dinh Diem's. "We should appraise them—neither take too tragic a view of them nor underrate them. When you have regimes of this sort, they are awful fast to take advantage of your willingness to help them. You always have to be ready to get out."

If we find people unable to help themselves but still consider their area vital, Kennan adds, "then we have to be ready to take over entirely, and be ready to face the charges of colonialism—and we have to be very leery, very cautious of that."

He thinks getting out of South Vietnam is a possibility to be considered: "Let's not overdramatize the results. Let's look at it realistically. It will be bad, but not as bad as we sometimes think. Politically, I regard the Chinese as much more deeply committed against us than the Russians." However, he adds, "the Chinese Communists are not yet a substantial naval or air power. It does not bear the same military implications as Russia taking over. On the contrary, there is such a thing as overextension."

How should we react to the Soviet-Chinese split? "The Soviet-Chinese conflict represents one of those turns of events in the face of which a great nation has no excuse not to think through its policies toward the Communist world."

Kennan sees little hope of establishing relations with the Chinese Communists now. He thinks they are "much too violent, wild, emotional." Yet, he contends, "the day will come when they settle down and we can have talks with them. We should be prepared to talk to the devil himself, if he controls enough of the world to make it worth our while."

He regards recognition of Communist China as "nothing more than the opening of a channel of communication—not a reward or approval." But, he says, "I am not sure they are even prepared to treat an American representative properly. I think we might have de facto recognition, keep a chargé there as the British do, if they will treat him properly."

Of Communist China entering the U.N., he says, "I don't think they would be a very constructive member of the U.N.—any more than the Russians have been. But if a majority of members wanted them in, we would put ourselves in a misleading position by holding out against it. This too is not some kind of reward."

How can the United States rid itself of the jellylike indecision that paralyzes our foreign policy? Kennan points to three alternatives:

First, if we are not going to act as a powerful and responsible leader of the free world, we had better get out of the arena. Kennan does not advocate isolationism, but he feels that the present chaos is worse than isolation. Americans are not used to compromises and dealing with a formidable adversary in peacetime. We need, he says, either to strengthen the Executive's freedom to act in foreign affairs or quit. "We lived for more than 100 years on principles of withdrawal from the mainstream, and maybe this should be done again."

His second alternative is to modify our political system. "Our form of Government is not well suited to making decisions." The reason for this, he says, is that "power is too much fragmented in Washington, including the Congress, the Armed Forces, the FBI—all the people who decide our national actions."

Kennan suggests that we move closer to a parliamentary system. We could regard the off-year congressional elections between presidential elections as a vote of confidence on the administration's policies. If a President felt the vote showed that he was not supported in the country, he could be free to call a presidential election immediately. (To those who fear this idea, Kennan emphasizes that it would have to be made by amending the Constitution: "There's nothing treasonable about that.")

Kennan's third alternative is to mount a public debate over foreign policy so that the American people can understand the issues, make up their minds about them and reach a consensus. Out of such a debate, Kennan hopes, can come an American viewpoint—a body of instruction to the President and a body of support. "You must have

a crystallization of dominant public opinion. Our international position calls for this kind of clarification—calls urgently for it—in such a way that perhaps it is the last call. It can't come too soon."

Mr. ROBERTSON subsequently said: Mr. President, in my opinion, our former Ambassador, first, to Russia and then to Yugoslavia, Hon. George F. Kennan, is the ablest diplomat that we have developed, especially with respect to our relations with the Communists, in recent years. Before resigning from the diplomatic service to become a professor at Princeton, Mr. Kennan had spent most of his adult years with the State Department, having been sent to the Soviet Union as soon as we recognized it in 1933.

In an interesting interview in the November 19 issue of Look magazine, Ambassador Kennan had this to say about foreign aid:

I personally am skeptical about foreign aid, especially when it is given as a condition of not going Communist. We should help those who say, "We are going to survive whether you help us or not"—like Finland. When a country says, "If you don't help us, we will go under," we should get off the trolley.

With that statement I am in full sympathy and accord, as I indicated in my speech to the Senate last Friday when I quoted my letter of December 4, 1949, to Paul Hoffman, then Administrator of the Economic Cooperation Administration, in which I said that through our aid governments had been established among all of our World War Allies in Western Europe sufficiently strong to resist the pressure of minority Communist groups.

CIVIL RIGHTS LEGISLATION AND FOREIGN AID LEGISLATION

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, the press continues to print misstatements and misrepresentations in regard to the status of civil rights legislation on the floor of the Senate. The smear tactic of the press is that because the senior Senator from Oregon refuses to give unanimous consent to limit debate in the Senate on the foreign aid bill, he is in some kind of collusive conspiracy with anticivil rights forces in this country, and that we would be able to proceed to consideration of a civil rights bill in the Senate if the senior Senator from Oregon would be more cooperative with the leadership of the Senate by surrendering his right to prevent unanimous consent agreements on the foreign aid bill.

Let me say once again that if consideration of the foreign aid bill were stopped this minute, by passage of the bill, there would not be a start on civil rights legislation on the floor of the Senate, for there is no civil rights bill that any Senator has any intention of offering immediately on the floor of the Senate.

It is the understanding of the senior Senator from Oregon that the Senate is awaiting some action in the House on civil rights. The House is probably 2 and even 3 weeks away from completing action on a civil rights bill.

I grant that debate on civil rights could be started if that happened to be a part of the agenda, but it is not a part of the agenda.

Moreover, an examination of the Senate Calendar does not reveal any great list of important legislation that is awaiting action by the Senate. It is a short list. With the exception of the cold war GI bill and two or three other measures, much of it can be disposed of within a few days of debate. Seven of the bills on it have already been adopted this morning.

I ask unanimous consent to have printed at this point in the RECORD, the general orders of the Senate Calendar, which shows the bills awaiting Senate consideration.

There being no objection, the material ordered to be printed in the RECORD, is as follows:

General orders under rule VIII

Order No.	Number and author of bill	Title	Reported by
305	H.R. 4214	An act for the relief of the Stella Reorganized Schools R-I, Missouri. ($1,500).	June 27, 1963.—Mr. Eastland, Committee on the Judiciary, without amendment. (Rept. 331.)
319	S. 5 Mr. Yarborough and others.	A bill to provide readjustment assistance to veterans who serve in the Armed Forces during the induction period.	July 2, 1963.—Mr. Yarborough, Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, with amendments. (Rept. 345) (Minority views.)
449	S. 1540 Mr. Magnuson	A bill to amend the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 to provide for the regulation of rates and practices of air carriers and foreign air carriers in foreign air transportation, and for other purposes.	Aug. 28, 1963.—Mr. Monroney, Committee on Commerce, without amendment. (Rept. 473).
451	S. 1033 Mr. Magnuson	A bill to establish a uniform system of time standards and measurements for the United States and require the observance of such time standards for all purposes.	Aug. 30, 1963.—Mr. Magnuson, Committee on Commerce, with amendments. (Rept. 475.)
462	H.R. 82	An act to amend the Merchant Marine Act, 1936, in order to provide for the reimbursement of certain vessel construction expenses.	Sept. 11, 1963.—Mr. Bartlett, Committee on Commerce, without amendment. (Rept. 486.) (Minority views filed.)
483	S. Con. Res. 1 Mr. Clark and others.	Concurrent resolution to create a joint committee to study the organization and operation of the Congress and recommend improvements therein.	Sept. 19, 1963.—Mr. Hayden, Committee on Rules and Administration, with an amendment. (Rept. 504.) (Individual and supplemental views filed.)
485	S. Res. 111 Mr. Church and others.	Resolution amending Rule XXV of the Standing Rules relative to meetings of committees while the Senate is in session.	Sept. 19, 1963.—Mr. Hayden, Committee on Rules and Administration, without amendment. (Rept. 506.) (Individual views filed.)
486	S. Res. 89 Mr. Pastore and others.	Resolution providing for germaneness of debate under certain circumstances.	Sept. 19, 1963.—Mr. Hayden, Committee on Rules and Administration, with amendments. (Rept. 507.) (Individual views filed.)
502	S. 927 Mr. Magnuson.	A bill to amend title 12 of the Merchant Marine Act, 1936, in order to remove certain limitations with respect to war risk insurance issued under the provisions of such title.	Sept. 24, 1963.—Mr. Bartlett, Committee on Commerce, with an amendment. (Rept. 523.) (Individual views filed.)
546	S. 2100 Messrs. Magnuson and Jackson.	A bill to continue certain authority of the Secretary of Commerce to suspend the provisions of sec. 27 of the Merchant Marine Act, 1920 with respect to the transportation of lumber.	Oct. 17, 1963.—Mr. Magnuson, Committee on Commerce, with amendments. (Rept. 568.) (Minority views filed.)
566	H.R. 7885	An act to amend further the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and for other purposes.	Oct. 22, 1963.—Mr. Fulbright, Committee on Foreign Relations, with an amendment. (Rept. 588.)
570	S. 2265 Mr. Morse.	A bill to amend the Library Services Act in order to increase the amount of assistance under such act and to extend such assistance to nonrural areas.	Oct. 29, 1963.—Mr. Morse, Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, without amendment. (Rept. 592.) (Minority views filed.)
572	S. 1396 Mr. Fong.	A bill to consent to the institution of an original action in the Supreme Court for the adjudication of the claim of the State of Hawaii to certain land and property situated within that State.	Oct. 29, 1963.—Mr. Fong, Committee on the Judiciary, without amendment. (Rept. 594.)
			Calendar called Oct. 39, 1963
600	S. 2228 Mr. Robertson.	A bill to change the requirements for the annual meeting date for national banks.	Nov. 1, 1963.—Mr. Robertson, Committee on Banking and Currency, without amendment. (Rept. 622.)
601	S. 1686 Mr. Dirksen.	A bill to amend sec. 375 of title 28 of the United States Code, relating to the annuities of widows of Supreme Court Justices.	Nov. 1, 1963.—Mr. Dirksen, Committee on the Judiciary, with an amendment. (Rept. 623.)
602	S. 689 Messrs. Long of Missouri and Symington.	A bill for the relief of Lila Everts Weber	Nov. 1, 1963.—Mr. Long of Missouri, Committee on the Judiciary, without amendment. (Rept. 624.)
603	H.R. 7405	An act to amend the Bretton Woods Agreements Act to authorize the U.S. Governor of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development to vote for an increase in the Bank's authorized capital stock.	Nov. 1, 1963.—Mr. Fulbright, Committee on Foreign Relations, without amendment. (Rept. 625.)
604	H. Con. Res. 223	Concurrent resolution to provide for the printing of 3,000 additional copies of civil rights hearings.	Nov. 1, 1963.—Mr. Jordan of North Carolina, Committee on Rules and Administration, without amendment. (Rept. 627.)
605	S. 1241 Mr. Robertson.	A bill to require annual reports instead of quarterly reports under the Reconstruction Finance Corporation Liquidation Act.	Nov. 1, 1963.—Mr. Robertson, Committee on Banking and Currency, without amendment. (Rept. 628.)
606	H.R. 8821	An act to revise the provision of law relating to the methods by which amounts made available to the States pursuant to the Temporary Unemployment Compensation Act of 1958 and title XII of the Social Security Act are to be restored to the Treasury.	Nov. 4, 1963.—Mr. Byrd, of Virginia. Committee on Finance, without amendment. (Rept. 629).

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, therefore, once again let me say—although it never does any good to give facts to the press, because a very large segment of it is so Pravda inclined that it does not report the facts and will not print them—that those of us who are interested in full debate on the foreign aid bill are, first, not in any collusion or conspiracy with the anti-civil-rights forces in the Senate, if there are any; and, second, there is no present intention to start, in the immediate future, Senate consideration of a civil rights bill. Our refusal to give a definite commitment to debate the foreign aid bill on a time limitation bears no relationship whatever to any immediate handling of civil rights legislation.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MORSE. I yield.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I wish to reinforce what the distinguished senior Senator from Oregon has said. I point out that if it were his desire to delay any legislation, he could do so quite easily. However, every time that I have gone to him and other Senators to bring up bills on the calendar, he has been most cooperative and courteous.

I join in what he has said, and point out to Senators that so far as the calendar is concerned, it is clear at the moment that we are waiting for a bill in the civil rights field from the House, that no bill has yet been reported to the House, and therefore, we do have time.

Mr. MORSE. I thank the majority leader very much for that statement. It is typical of the majority leader. I appreciate his statement very much.

INSECURITY OF SOCIAL SECURITY

Mr. MILLER. Mr. President, on October 31 it was my pleasure to address the 45th annual meeting of the Illinois State Chamber of Commerce on the subject "Insecurity of Social Security."

All of us from time to time receive letters from people inquiring why social security taxes are as high as they are, and expressing concern over the prospect that they will become higher. Along with my speech, I included an outline setting forth various tables showing important data relative to the social security system, not the least of which is the fact that the social security system is now $320 billion unfunded, and that, of course, the prospect of a hospitalization act financed through social security taxes looms in the offing as an additional burden on the backs of Americans.

I ask unanimous consent that the text of my address, with the tables and examples, be printed in the RECORD at this point.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

INSECURITY OF SOCIAL SECURITY

(By JACK MILLER, U.S. Senator, Iowa)

Members of the Illinois State Chamber of Commerce, and guests, first let me express my appreciation for the gracious invitation to appear on the splendid program of your 45th annual meeting. It is an exceptionally well-balanced and timely program; and I am honored to appear in the company of such a distinguished and knowledgeable array of talent which you have drawn together to present the program.

Most of us take the social security system for granted. During the past 26 years, the system has been broadened and liberalized so that today nearly everyone who draws wages or a salary, or is self-employed, is in the program. It has become an accepted way of life in the United States, and few practical politicians suggest its repeal anymore.

But this does not mean that it is impractical to call attention to the state of insecurity of social security. It is a deadly practical situation which must be faced up to; and if the ill-considered and unfair King-Anderson bill has done nothing else than to focus public attention on the deplorable state of our social security system, it has served a useful purpose.

During 1961 and 1962, while we were going almost $14 billion deeper into debt, we had inflation of over $14 billion throughout the United States. This is at the rate of $7 billion a year—equal to a 10-percent income tax increase. Illinois' share of this $7 billion annual inflation was $459 million—equal to a 3.4 percent sales tax put on the backs of Illinois citizens to finance the billion-dollar deficit spending programs passed by Congress. The wholesale price index has remained stable for the past 5 years. However, the retail cost-of-living index, which is what affects 99.9 percent of our citizens, has gone up from 214.5 in January of 1961 to an alltime high of 221.3 in September. And the correlative is that the purchasing power of our dollar has fallen during this period from 46.6 cents (measured against a 1939 dollar worth 100 cents) to 45.2 cents.

All of this means that social security recipients are being steadily squeezed by a continued decline in the purchasing power of their pensions.

From table 1 (see below) in our outline, you can see how the increases in pensions enacted by Congress have been needed to preserve the purchasing power of pensioners because of the declining value of the dollar.

Since most of these pensioners do not have enough income to pay income tax, or pay very little income tax, they are naturally concerned over an even greater decline in the value of their pensions. They would receive no benefit from a tax cut; but they would severely feel a stepped up inflation if a tax cut were enacted without a cutback in spending to make room for it. Congress would sooner or later have to increase the pensions—and taxes.

These are two reasons for the insecure state of the Social Security System:

1. Millions of people have been blanketed into the program without paying more than a fraction in taxes of the cost of the benefits they are receiving. (See table II below, showing the total payments a pensioner would have made under the various acts—as against just the first year of retirement benefits he or he and his wife would receive.)

2. Congress has been increasing social security benefits and expanding the coverage without at the same time increasing social security taxes enough to meet the increased costs—on a current basis. When measured against the benefits which are going to have to be paid out to all persons presently working or retired under social security, the fund is some $320 billion short. This represents a per capita deficit of $4,679 for each and every person in the social security program today.

Incidentally, the balance in the fund was about $19 billion last June 30—down $4 billion from its high point of $23 billion in 1957.

From table 3 (see below) in your outline, you can see how the deficit has increased just since 1956. Following the 1956 act, the value of benefits and expenses for all presently covered persons in the social security system was $486 billion—$269 billion in excess of the value of the taxes these persons and their employers would pay, plus what was left in the trust fund.

Following the 1961 act, the shortage reached $321 billion. In just 4 years, the shortage legislated by Congress amounted to $52 billion.

As a class, present members of the social security system will pay an estimated 42 percent of the value of their benefits in taxes. But, as shown in table 4 (below), new entrants, along with their employers, will pay an estimated average of 167 percent of the value of the benefits they can ever hope to receive. The discrepancy is worse for many, of course, depending upon whether they are married, how few children they have, and whether or not they are self-employed. This disproportion for new entrants into the social security system will continue indefinitely into the future and will grow worse if Congress votes some more benefits under social security without increasing taxes to pay for these added benefits currently.

It is in this setting, of course, which the administration's social security-financed Hospital Insurance Act of 1963—formerly misleadingly called medicare, is to be considered. No doctor bills are covered—only limited hospital and nursing home bills. Under the proposal, some 16 million persons over 65 would immediately become eligible for benefits even though they never paid any tax money to finance them; and millions of others in the middle-age group would pay only a fraction in taxes of the value of the benefits they would receive. And this would be so whether or not any of these people could afford to pay for these benefits out of their own resources.

In other words, there would be another deficit in the social security system to be made up by higher taxes on present and future entrants into the system—along with their employers. This deficit has been variously estimated at between $25 and $60 billion, and it would be on top of the $321 billion deficit now in the social security system. The only way the deficit could be avoided would be to modify the bill to exclude benefits for those who can afford to pay for them, or partially exclude benefits for those who can afford to pay part of them, and to increase taxes enough to put the new program on a pay-as-you-go basis. Otherwise, future generations of employees and their employers will pick up the tab.

From table 5 below, you can see that two more boosts in social security taxes for employers and employees are already in the law. However, be forewarned that there may be more increases. Congressman WILBUR MILLS, of Arkansas, the chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, has introduced a bill which would raise the earnings base from $4,800 to $5,400. This bill appears to be in response to a trustee's report on social security trust funds a few months ago which indicated a long-range income deficiency of about 3 percent. The Mills bill would cut in half the 3-percent deficiency. If enacted, it would mean that the employer and employee would each pay $21.75 a year more; and self-employed persons earning $5,400 would pay $32.40 a year more.

Table 6 below indicates how, even in recent years, tax payments are falling short of funding benefit payments. Just for the 6 years shown, the shortage comes to $4.3 billion. This will level off in future years, but the long-range deficiency will still be an estimated 3 percent unless either the tax rate or the earnings base, or both, are increased.

If the administration's proposed Hospitalization Insurance Act of 1963 (the King-Anderson bill) is enacted, the earnings base would be increased to $5,200, and the rate would be increased one-fourth of 1 percent

for the employer and one-fourth of 1 percent for the employee; the rate would be increased four-tenths of 1 percent for self-employed individuals. It would mean that the employer and employee would each pay $24.50 a year more; and self-employed persons earning $5,200 would pay $42.40 a year more. Even so, as I have earlier pointed out, this would produce a deficit of between $25 and $60 billion—still further aggravating the 3-percent deficit the Mills bill is designed to partially correct.

However, let us not be so naive as to think that if the administration bill is enacted, this is where social security tax increases will stop. The limited scope of the benefits—only 90 days' hospitalization and 180 days' nursing home per benefit period, and no doctor bills—will hardly satisfy the needs of people who are met with catastrophic illness or disease, or who have large doctor bills, and who do not have the wherewithal to pay for them. As time goes on, these areas of need will be covered—for not only persons 65 and over, but for younger people as well. This will require a further boost in taxes—unless benefits to those who do have the wherewithal to meet their medicare costs are dropped from coverage. Mr. Wilbur Cohen, Assistant Secretary of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, has testified that over the next 10 years, the earnings base for social security taxes might well go from $5,200, as proposed in the administration's bill, to $9,000.

Not to be overlooked is the fact that the social security tax is a flat rate applied against gross salaries and wages. Under the administration's bill, the first $5,200 of the wages of a low-income taxpayer would be taxed exactly the same amount as the first $5,200 of the income of a high-bracket income taxpayer. This is just as regressive as having a 1-percent Federal sales tax to finance the program. In view of this fact, it is incredible to find the AFL–CIO Washington officials championing the administration's bill. These are the same people who strongly oppose sales tax increases as being "regressive." Now they come along and support a bill which calls for financing by an increase in the regressive social security tax. They reply by saying that the average worker would like to put aside a small portion of his weekly paycheck to buy social insurance, so that when he retires there will be a fund to cover his hospital and nursing home expenses. There are two answers to this: (1) the worker is already, through income taxes, putting aside a portion of his weekly paycheck to finance the Kerr-Mills program which, if amended to cure a few defects and if given a fair chance to work, will meet the needs of those who cannot afford their doctor, hospital, and nursing home expenses; (2) workers had better not be too sure about having a fund from which to pay benefits when they retire, because of the horrible unfunded liabilities that plague the social security system.

When future generations come into the hundreds of billions of dollars in debt heritage we are leaving them and begin to elect people to Congress, they are not going to be very happy. They could well cut back the benefits, scrap the program, or enact a new program financed out of general taxation—anything to get out of a program which forces them to pay far more in taxes than the value of the benefits they could ever hope to receive.

Other Federal Government trust funds are in bad shape besides the old-age and survivors insurance trust fund. Also in the social security system is the disability insurance trust fund. This is expected to go broke between 1969 and 1975 unless some changes, such as those provided in the Mills bill, are enacted. The civil service retirement system has unfunded liabilities amounting to $34 billion, and Civil Service Commission officials have warned that the retirement fund will go bankrupt between 1980 and 1990 unless some changes are made. Things are so bad that more than $4 billion in unused sick leave has been accumulated by civil service employees, and Congress has no plans to reimburse these employees for this accumulation because the retirement fund is in such jeopardy. Some administration officials and some Members of Congress would postpone the day of reckoning by simply integrating the Civil Service Retirement Fund into the Social Security System, and adding the $34 billion of unfunded liabilities onto the $320 billion in unfunded liabilities of the social security system.

If what I have said leaves you with a insecure feeling over the fiscal policies of your Federal Government in general and the social security system in particular, then I would recommend that you make known your feelings to not only those Members of Congress who have been supporting these policies, but to the White House as well. The proposed tax cut without a cutback in spending to make room for it affords a good opportunity to do this. The American people are being teased with the idea that we can have a meaningful tax cut of billions of dollars and at the same time continue to go billions of dollars deeper in debt. They should know—and especially businessmen—that you can't get something for nothing—even on the New Frontier.

TABLES AND EXAMPLES

TABLE 1.—*Showing increases in social security pensions legislated by Congress in order to enable pensioners to maintain their purchasing power in view of decline in value of the dollar*

[NOTE.—The example is a worker having a $3,000 annual income base, single at retirement, and "fully covered." The 1940 year figure is for a worker retired under the 1935 act. Other figures are for a worker retired under successive acts for years indicated]

Year	Annual pension	Purchasing power of dollar compared to 1939 dollar worth 100 cents	Real value of pension
		Cents	
1940	$499.20	99.2	$495.20
1950	870.00	57.8	502.86
1952	930.00	52.3	486.39
1954	1,062.00	51.7	549.05
1958	1,140.00	48.1	548.34
1962	(1)	45.9	523.26

[1] No change.

TABLE 2.—*Showing payments made by worker and his employer, commencing in 1937, compared with pension for just 1 year following retirement under the 1935 act and successive acts ($3,000 base)*

Year	Total payments	Annual pension (single)	Annual pension (married couple)
1940	$240.00	$499.20	$748.80
1950	870.00	870.00	1,305.60
1952	1,050.00	930.00	1,395.60
1954	1,260.00	1,062.00	1,593 60
1958	1,770 00	1,140.00	1,713.60
1962	2,467.50	1,140.00	1,713.60

NOTE.—Multiplying annual pension by life expectancies of pensioners would reveal the true disproportion between the taxes paid and the benefits received.

TABLE 3.—*Showing relation between value of taxes to be paid by present members of social security system plus what is left in trust fund and value of benefits expected to be paid to present members under recent acts*

[In billions of dollars]

	Taxes plus trust funds	Value of benefits	Unfunded liability
1956 act	217	486	269
1958 act	254	543	289
1960 act	276	587	311
1961 act	304	625	321

NOTE.—Acts of 1956, 1960, and 1961 did not increase pensions, but liberalized coverage (e.g., brought in members of Armed Forces, professional self-employed, permitted optional retirement at age 62, etc.).

TABLE 4.—*Showing relation between value of taxes to be paid by new workers coming into the Social Security system and their employers, and value of benefits to be paid to them upon retirement*

	Taxes	Benefits	Ratio of taxes to benefits
	Billions	*Billions*	*Percent*
1956 act	$563	$335	168
1958 act	641	377	170
1960 act	682	404	169
1961 act	719	431	167

TABLE 5.—*Showing how social security taxes and earnings base have grown*

Period	Maximum earnings base	Combined tax rate employer and employee	Employer tax	Employee tax	Self-employed rate	Self-employed tax
		Percent			*Percent*	
1937–49	$3,000	2	$30.00	$30.00	(1)	(1)
1950	3,000	3	45.00	45.00	(1)	(1)
1951–53	3,600	3	54.00	54.00	2¼	$81.00
1954	3,600	4	72.00	72.00	3	108.00
1955–56	4,200	4	84.00	84.00	3	126.00
1957–58	4,200	4½	94.50	94.50	3⅜	141.75
1959	4,800	5	120.00	120.00	3¾	180.00
1960–61	4,800	6	144.00	144.00	4½	216.00
1962	4,800	6¼	150.00	150.00	4.7	225.60
1963–65	4,800	7¼	174.00	174.00	5.4	259.20
1966–67	4,800	8¼	198.00	198.00	6.2	297.60
1968 and after	4,800	9¼	222.00	222.00	6.9	331.20

[1] Not covered.

TABLE 6.—*Showing how, even in recent years, tax payments are falling short of funding benefit payments (by fiscal year)*

[In millions of dollars]

Year	Tax payments	Benefit payments	Deficit
1958	7,267	7,875	608
1959	7,565	9,049	1,484
1960	9,843	10,270	427
1961	11,293	11,185	(+108)
1962	11,455	12,658	1,203
1963	13,328	13,845	517

EXAMPLES OF TAX PAYMENTS VERSUS RETIREMENT BENEFITS

1. Worker retired in 1940, wife same age. Before retirement, worker and employer had paid social security taxes for 3 years. Total tax combined—$180. Since retirement, this man and wife have been drawing benefits for 22½ years, totaling $24,973.

2. Worker who retired last January 1 after paying maximum social security tax since 1937, total combined with his employer—$2,868. Add interest at 3 percent and this contribution to the trust fund would come to $3,714. Pension from now on will bring him and his wife (same age) $32,074.

3. College graduate started working in 1962, paying maximum social security tax until retirement in year 2005. Total combined tax with employer—$18,564. Add interest at 3 percent and this contribution to the fund would come to $36,226. Pension for him and his wife (same age) would bring total of $33,664.

4. Young man gets job in 1968 and pays maximum tax from then until retirement in year 2011. Total combined tax with employer—$19,092. Add interest at 3 percent and this contribution to the trust fund would come to $37,954. Assuming this man is widower, with no dependents, and lives only 2 years after retirement, benefits would total $3,048.

THE RUSSIAN RAIDS ON ALASKAN FISHERMEN SHOULD BE STOPPED

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, a great many Americans nourished the hope that the signing of the test ban treaty with Russia and its ratification by the U.S. Senate would usher in a period of diminishing tensions in the cold war. It was hoped that other steps indicating a departure from Premier Khrushchev's announced purpose to "bury us" would follow. Unfortunately, this seems not to have been the case.

We now have the shocking situation of another blocking of a U.S. troop convoy in Berlin, actions which could not have taken place without the knowledge and approval of the Kremlin, and indeed must have been by its orders. At the same time we have another situation which concerns the people of Alaska greatly, and indeed should concern all Americans, and that is the ruthless invasion of Alaska's crab fishing grounds by Russian fishing vessels and the pulling up and destruction of American fishermen's crab traps.

The development of the Alaska king crab industry was a great pioneering achievement, attributable almost wholly to the initiative and determination of two Alaskan brothers, Howard and Lowell Wakefield. Since that time, in the last decade and a half, Alaska king crab—an entirely new marine food resource—has become a nationally known and prized delicacy. It is increasingly being marketed.

Now, the Russians are invading these king crab fishing grounds, have destroyed the traps of our American fishermen, and the United States is apparently doing nothing about it.

It is true that many of these traps are outside the 3-mile limit and therefore in international waters. Two remedies, of course, are immediately available: The first would be to extend the fishing limits for all fisheries to 12 miles, and the second—and even more pertinent—would be to extend the limits for the taking of crustacea and shellfish to the Continental Shelf, which would be a wholly proper procedure since crab and shellfish exist on the bottom of the sea. And thereafter a little display of strength and energy by our Federal Government to enforce our rights would be most helpful.

In recent weeks, in addition to the taking of the crab traps, Russian vessels have penetrated within the 3-mile limit, have taken whales there, and have apparently been indifferent to the fact that they were violating our waters.

I have urged, and repeat my request, that the President station some faster vessels in Alaskan waters in order to indicate to these Russians that they cannot continue these illegal practices with immunity. Our Coast Guard vessels are not sufficiently fast to overtake some of the Russian ships, which are modern, up to date and, of course, subsidized by the Russian Government. I hope the President and Secretary of State will realize how bitter the feeling among Alaskan fishermen is becoming and that he will send one or two destroyers up there which will help protect these resources which have been so painstakingly developed under conservation practices which the Russians do not follow. One of our fishermen, the victim of the Russian raid upon his traps, come alongside a Russian trawler recently and saw what he estimated to be about 10,000 crabs on its deck. It included female and immature crabs which are not taken under American conservation practices. Our crab fishermen, when they find either female or immature crabs in their traps or pots throw them back overboard alive. The Russians do not do that. They take everything.

I hope there will be vigor, initiative, and energy enough in our administration to meet this issue head on. Such action is now overdue.

I ask unanimous consent that two articles from the New York Times of today, one entitled "Russians' Armor Balks U.S. Convoy on the Autobahn" together with a subsequent dispatch from Washington headed "United States Files Protest," as well as an article by Lawrence E. Davies, the west coast correspondent of the New York Times, entitled "Soviet Crab Raid Haunts Alaskans: Future Russian Action Is Subject of Deep Concern," be printed at the conclusion of my remarks.

There being no objection, the articles were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the New York Times, Nov. 5, 1963]

RUSSIANS' ARMOR BALKS U.S. CONVOY ON THE AUTOBAHN—AMERICAN TRUCKS ATTEMPT TO BREAK THROUGH, BUT ARE HELD AT THIRD BARRIER—WASHINGTON WATCHFUL—SAYS DETENTION OF FORCE ON ROAD TO BERLIN IS OF "SERIOUS DIMENSIONS"

BERLIN, Tuesday, November 5.—A U.S. troop convoy was blocked by three Soviet armored personnel carriers late last night when it attempted to break through a blockade at the Marienborn checkpoint on the autobahn to West Berlin.

Soviet guards had held up the convoy of 12 vehicles and 44 men since early yesterday.

An official American announcement said the Russian action was a "flagrant violation of the Western allies unrestricted rights of access to Berlin."

The statement warned the Soviet Union that it must bear "the full responsibility for any consequences."

(In Washington, State Department officials said that the blockade had "assumed quite serious dimensions." Earlier, administration officials had appeared confident that the incident resulted from a misunderstanding by Soviet troops of American procedures and would be settled shortly.)

TRIED TO END DEADLOCK

The confrontation came after the U.S. convoy attempted to break the 15-hour deadlock at the East-West German border point and continue its trip to Berlin.

The Army said that the Russians moved three armored personnel carriers and three Army sedans across the autobahn shortly before midnight "to block any further movement of the U.S. convoy."

"An unknown number of Soviet personnel carriers have also been stationed on the right flank of the U.S. convoy" the Army statement added.

The convoy was delayed at about 9 a.m. yesterday after the Americans refused to submit to a Soviet demand that 15 soldier-passengers in 3 of the trucks get down for a head count.

The convoy commander said that the demand conflicted with Allied procedures. U.S. Army spokesmen said that the Soviet command in Berlin had been informed of these procedures, involving conditions under which troops submit to a count, and that there was no chance of a misunderstanding.

The American, British, and French commanders in Berlin met this afternoon to discuss the Soviet move. A statement said that the three generals had decided "on how to deal with the situation."

The U.S. Army later postponed for 24 hours a 3-day field exercise that was to have taken the entire American garrison to the Grunewald Forest tomorrow morning. All Allied troops in Berlin were placed on an alert.

It was reported that the U.S. Army intended to send a convoy to stand by at Marienborn near the East-West German border.

The delayed convoy consists of 12 vehicles with 44 men, of whom 20 are passengers. The Russians demanded that seven men riding in the back of one truck and four each in two others should get down to be counted.

The convey commander, 1st Lt. John Lamb, refused. Then the Soviet officer in charge, Lieutenant Colonel Spiridonov, said that it was "the Soviet and not the Allied authorities who determine convoy processing procedures."

This position was disputed by the Americans.

The troops detained at Marienborn consisted of men from Company C of the 2d

Battalion, 6th Infantry. They were returning to Berlin from a training exercise in West Germany.

Lieutenant Lamb, 25 years old, the convoy commander, is from North Augusta, S.C.

At nightfall the American vehicles remained parked at the roadside.

The Army rejected as untrue an East German charge that the convoy was obstructing civilian traffic on the East-West highway.

[From the New York Times, Nov. 5, 1963]

UNITED STATES FILES PROTEST

WASHINGTON, November 4.—The United States formally protested today against the delay by Soviet troops of an American military convoy attempting to enter West Berlin early in the day.

The convoy of 12 vehicles, carrying 20 passengers, was held up at 3 a.m. Washington time at the Marienborn checkpoint of the autobahn leading into Berlin through East Germany. It was still blocked at nightfall.

Administration officials nevertheless appeared confident that the incident resulted from a misunderstanding by Soviet troops of American procedures. They believed the issue would be settled soon without damaging East-West efforts to ease cold war tensions.

[Ranking American officials in Berlin said that there was no question of a misunderstanding since the Russians had been notified in writing of Allied procedures. The harassment was viewed there as a deliberate attempt by the Soviet command to whittle away Western rights on traffic between Berlin and West Germany.]

EARLIER CONVOY BLOCKED

A 2-day blockade of an American convoy last month was viewed at first as indicating a hardening of Soviet policy. Later, however, it was acknowledged to be the result of independent action by Russian commanders unfamiliar with regulations governing autobahn traffic.

Then, as today, the Soviet officials insisted that American troops leave their vehicles to be counted before entering the city.

American commanders have instructions not to allow their men to dismount if the convoys carry fewer than 31 passengers, not counting drivers and assistant drivers.

Secretary of State Dean Rusk expressed the administration's concern over the blocking of the convoy at a 10-minute mid-morning meeting with Georgi M. Korniyenko, counselor at the Soviet Embassy.

Mr. Rusk had previously discussed the incident with President Kennedy and Llewellyn E. Thompson, Jr., Ambassador at Large and former U.S. Ambassador to Moscow.

It was understood that a mild representation was agreed on as the first step and that it would become firmer the longer the blockade remained effective.

ENVOYS MAY MEET

In contrast to Washington's reaction to the last blockade October 11, the administration did not call for an emergency session of the four-power ambassadorial steering committee on Berlin affairs.

A high State Department source said tonight that the group, composed of representatives of Britain, France, the Soviet Union and the United States, would probably be convened tomorrow if the blockade continued.

The first protests against the blockade were made this morning by U.S. officials to Soviet commanders at the Marienborn checkpoint.

U.S. military commanders in Berlin were also ordered to protest the incident at the Soviet Army headquarters in Potsdam.

REAFFIRM WEST'S RIGHTS

The American representations were primarily intended to reaffirm Western rights of access to Berlin. They also were to remind the Soviets of procedures jointly agreed on after Soviet forces delayed the American convoy for 52 hours last month.

The Western allies notified the Soviet commanders in Berlin on October 29 that a new procedure had been established under which troops in large convoys would be dismounted for inspection.

It was stressed that this was for the "information and convenience" of the Soviet guards and that the dismounting was a matter of "courtesy" and not of Soviet rights.

[From the New York Times, Nov. 5, 1963]

SOVIET CRAB RAID HAUNTS ALASKANS—FUTURE RUSSIAN ACTION IS SUBJECT OF DEEP CONCERN

(By Lawrence E. Davies)

ANCHORAGE, ALASKA, November 3.—The Soviet Union's future policy toward Alaska's rich crab fishery is a subject of deep concern in the 49th State.

State and Federal officials, the Coast Guard, crab fishermen and communities dependent for jobs on this $12-million-a-year industry are watching every development in a delicate and potentially explosive situation.

A segment of a big Soviet fishing fleet irked Alaskan crabbers late last summer with a damaging sortie into the Kodiak area. Seven Russian trawlers, using a type of dragnet outlawed for Alaska crab fishermen, included in their "catch" Alaskan crab pots valued at from $20,000 to $25,000.

The incident brought threats of retaliation from Kodiak crabmen, along with protests to the State Department.

The crab fishermen, however, realize that under existing laws the Federal Government is unable to terminate fishing by foreign craft, Russian or Japanese, in the crab-rich waters.

PRESIDENTIAL ACTION SOUGHT

Nevertheless, a campaign continues to try to persuade the Kennedy administration to declare the Alaskan king crab a resource of the continental shelf. The shelf and many other fishing sites extend far beyond the 3-mile limit, where the Soviet fishing has been done.

State officials, including Gov. William A. Egan and Attorney General George N. Hayes, contend that all governments would respect a simple declaration by the President to that effect.

Mr. Hayes recently noted at Juneau that a 1958 Geneva convention, which provides that a nation may declare what is found on the floor of the continental shelf to be a resource of the contiguous nation, now has 21 of 22 signatures necessary to make it international law.

The bulk of the Soviet fleet of large trawlers and fish-processing vessels has now retired beyond the Aleutians. The total strength of both Russian and Japanese fleets in Alaskan waters is now estimated to be about 50 vessels. However, the Russians alone are believed to have had 180 fishing vessels in the eastern Bering Sea and North Pacific last summer.

Crab fishing is done the year-round, and the winter months are often among the most productive. Mayor Pete Deveau of Kodiak, a fisherman who operated a crab cannery for 9 years, says the crabmeat taken from December through March is prime.

There is speculation, therefore, that the Soviet fleet has retired only temporarily. The Coast Guard, under the supervision of Rear Adm. G. D. Synon, commandant of the 17th District with headquarters at Juneau, is maintaining an aerial and surface surveillance.

"We regard the Alaska fishermen as people who are entitled to our help and protection rather than as objects of our law enforcement," the admiral said in an interview. "But we still require that the law be observed under all conditions."

His comment was made against the background of reports that some Kodiak fishermen were trying to obtain war surplus weapons for their vessels.

NO WEAPONS FOUND

The law empowers the Coast Guard to board ships for enforcement of Federal marine laws. A number of the crab fishing boats have been boarded, but no illegal weapons have been found.

Ronald C. Naab, the Federal Government's fisheries management supervisor for the Alaskan region, said the Russian fleet moved through the Unimak Pass in the Aleutians and fished for Pacific perch at Portlock Bank, directly east of Kodiak, in late July. Then, in reduced numbers, it headed for Albatross Bank to the southwest about mid-August, he said.

Finally, Mr. Naab continued, seven trawlers moved into a favorite Kodiak fishing ground, Alitok Bay, "apparently for crab."

Alitok Bay is an area where Americans have been fishing for crabs for 15 years, carefully nurturing the fishery, officials say, under protective statutes. The law requires them to use crab pots and prohibits the dragging of nets along the ocean floor.

As a further conservation measure, Alaskan fishermen are required to throw back all female crabs and those male crabs that measure less than 7 inches across the body.

DAMAGE TO CRABS CITED

According to testimony at an official hearing conducted at Kodiak afterward, the Russians kept everything they swept up with nets, leaving many injured crab on the bottom.

Alaska crabmen use fishing vessels from 35 to 110 feet long. The large boats are in the minority.

The vessels set out at 1 or 2 a.m. the year round, carrying crews of two to four men depending on the size of the vessel and the distance offshore to be fished.

"Real large vessels—100 feet or more—stay right out 3 or 4 days," Mayor Deveau said. "They lay out there till they get a load. Small boats fix their pots and gear, come back into port and go back maybe the next day."

In the Kodiak area each boat is limited to 30 crab pots, steel frames with webbing around them. The pots measure about 10 feet long, 4 to 5 feet wide and 3 to 4 feet deep. They cost, complete with plastic buoys that float on the surface, $150 to $300 each. The buoys are attached by lines to the pots on the ocean floor, sometimes at depths of 900 feet.

"We use frozen herring as bait," Mayor Deveau continued. "The crabs smell it in plastic containers inside the pot and they crawl toward it through a tunnel. I've seen some big pots come up with 125 to 150 crabs in them."

A record crab, he said, weighed 26 pounds and measured more than 6 feet from the tip of one leg to another. It takes a male crab 7 or 8 years to grow to acceptable size.

The Russian trawlers, on the other hand, are equipped to stay on the fishing grounds months at a time.

The incident in which the seven Soviet vessels invaded an area where Kodiak crab fishers were numerous occurred not far in advance of North Pacific Treaty renegotiation talks held by the United States, Canada, and Japan in Tokyo.

Lowell Wakefield, who operates a processing plant at Port Wakefield 40 miles northwest of Kodiak, and who was an American adviser at the Tokyo sessions, said the Soviet fishermen might have acted "to force us to invite Russia to join in."

He suggested that in most cases where crab pots had been lost, the Soviet actions had not been deliberate. However, he told a recent meeting of the State chamber of commerce at Juneau that the situation was one

in which "all hell could break loose" unless the problem was solved.

Although Mr. Wakefield urged more international conferences, he declared:

"Foreign fishing activity in Alaska waters, at or even above present levels, is something we will have to learn to live with."

Attorney General Hayes said the testimony from 16 witnesses, including 14 fishermen, all of whom had lost gear to Russian trawlers, had convinced him that the incident "was not accidental."

"By destroying some of the gear the Russians apparently felt the Americans would pack up and go home," he declared.

Mr. Hayes and other officials asserted, however, that they did not think the maneuvers were "necessarily directed by Moscow."

Oscar Dyson, one of the witnesses, testified that he and his fishing partner were "going to find some means—what it is I don't know—of taking care of our own property in our own way."

Mr. Dyson indicated he had nothing specific in mind beyond such steps as "urging our Government to give some protection for our gear."

"Most American fishermen feel our Government in the last 10 years has taken a more or less weakened position in the fishery question," he said.

THE ATLANTIC'S FUTURE: EUROPE'S CHOICE

Mr. PELL. Mr. President, I invite the attention of my colleagues to a singularly interesting and provocative article entitled "The Atlantic's Future: Europe's Choice" by the able and thoughtful senior Senator from Idaho [Mr. CHURCH] which appears in the current November issue of Harper's magazine.

Senator CHURCH has always been a man with a fine and far-reaching intellect. More important, he has never been afraid to use it. In the changing and fast-moving world in which we live, this ability to explore and probe for openings, to seek out new policies which might be more effective and advantageous to the United States, is an excellent quality.

Our national policies must be the servants of our national interests. When policies become stultified by a changing world, then the policies must change, because we certainly cannot roll back the tide of world events, nor should we want to do so. Too often our adherence to outdated policies remind me of the man who, with considerable effort, has lost a great deal of weight. He then finds his suits do not fit him, so what does he do? Instead of buying new suits, or cutting the old suits down to his present size, he feels he must immediately regain weight in order to fill out his old suits.

Senator CHURCH points out that two sensible alternatives face Western Europe today. The European can either develop an all European multilateral nuclear deterrent, in which case there is no more need for us to remain in Europe. Or they can rely on the American nuclear deterrent, in which case they must carry more of the financial burdens, leadership and manpower responsibilities in the free world. But the Europeans must make one choice or the other.

I ask unanimous consent to insert this remarkably thoughtful article, and an article with which I find myself in general agreement, in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

THE ATLANTIC FUTURE: EUROPE'S CHOICE

(By Senator FRANK CHURCH)

(NOTE.—FRANK CHURCH, the guest in the easy chair this month, has been U.S. Senator from Idaho since 1957 and is a member of the Foreign Relations Committee. He was keynoter of the Democratic National Convention in 1960, and a military intelligence officer in World War II.)

If the partial test ban treaty is the first crack in the glacier we call the cold war, it should serve to remind us of how massive and prolonged a thaw is yet required before the danger of nuclear disaster finally melts away. In the years immediately ahead, the treaty in no sense diminishes the importance of our defensive alliances, chief among which is NATO.

Yet NATO is now drifting into a deepening crisis that our European allies seem either unwilling or unable to counteract. Everyone agrees, on both sides of the Atlantic, as to the fact that a crisis exists. Paradoxically, it is the very success of NATO in accomplishing its original objectives which has led to the present impasse.

NATO was originally established to prevent Western Europe, the heartland of our common civilization, from falling under Russian rule. For over 14 years, NATO's shield has included large numbers of American troops, whose presence in Europe has been proof of the American commitment to invoke her nuclear power, as NATO's sword, in the event of a Communist attack. American arms of both conventional and nuclear character were required to make NATO work; that is, to keep the Russians at bay while the countries of Western Europe, battered and broken in the aftermath of the war, were regaining their health and strength.

I do not believe that either the American people or the Senate of the United States, which ratified the treaty establishing NATO, regarded our entry as an arrangement for stationing American forces permanently in Europe. Firemen are welcomed into a household threatened by fire, but they are not expected to remain inside indefinitely as residents. So it ought not to be surprising—in view of the remarkable recovery in Western Europe which has occurred—that some Europeans should begin to ask, "How much longer are the Americans to stay?" or that some Americans should begin to inquire, "How much longer will we be welcome?"

We have come to the end of the era for which NATO was created. The circumstances have changed. We must remold the alliance to fit present conditions, or the crisis within it will grow. NATO cannot remain static and stay relevant; it must be transformed or abandoned; it will adapt to the new era as a useful instrument to serve the objectives we hold in common with our allies, or it will come apart from the stress of mounting internal pressures. So we must clearly identify those changes in circumstances which have rendered NATO, as originally conceived, obsolete.

To begin with, there has been a change in the relative strength and hence in the credibility, of the American nuclear deterrent. This change has taken place in three phases. In the first phase, only the United States possessed massive strike capability with nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union could oppose us with conventional land power alone. Our deterrent was believable and, therefore, effective, so long as the Soviets in fact understood that it would be used to prevent, or to punish intolerably, a march by them on the West. In the second phase, the Soviets, too, possessed weapons of mass destruction. But the ones which could reach and damage the American Continent were few in number and vulnerable to neutralization by the enormously superior and diversified nuclear weapons system which we had by then developed. While the risks to the United States had been greatly increased, there was room to suppose that we could, if necessary, obliterate Soviet power without suffering mortal damage in return. Now in the third and present phase, this assumption can no longer be made. Each nuclear giant possesses weapons sufficient in number, in diversification, in concealment, or in invulnerability, to insure that it could withstand a first strike by its adversary and thereafter inflict nearly total destruction upon him.

The consequence of this third phase is that Europeans must ask themselves—for the first time—if it is really believable that the American nation would suffer immolation in their defense. And the question is not whether we, the Americans, believe that we would do this, or whether the Europeans believe we would do it. For it is evident that a deterrent has failed if it has to be used, and it follows from this that it is only the Russian belief about the conditions under which it would be used—not our belief or that of our allies, or even the objective fact itself—which is ultimately determinative.

I know of no way to remove, absolutely, the doubts which some Europeans have raised about the answer to this question. The cornerstone of American policy has been, and remains, that the defense of the West is indivisible. Our President has recently reaffirmed, in Germany, that our forces will remain so long as they are wanted and needed; that we will put our cities to the hazard in defense of theirs. He spoke with absolute sincerity and conviction, and with the support of the American people. Still, the proposition itself is without precedent in human history. It cannot be tested or proved in advance. While it may be convincing to the Soviets, it evidently is no longer convincing to all Europeans, for, if it were, there would clearly be no need for France to pursue the effort now in progress to create, at great difficulty and expense, a separate national nuclear capability.

This brings me to the second fundamental change in circumstances which accounts for the crisis in NATO. It is that Europe now has, for the first time, the capacity to create for itself an alternative to reliance upon American power. I make a distinction here between nuclear capability of modest dimensions, useful chiefly as a means of augmenting the prestige or bargaining power of its possessor—perhaps having the potential of invoking, under some conditions, the use of American power—and a genuine nuclear deterrent, capable of massive or controlled response in a variety of strategic situations. It is the latter which free Europe now has the population, the economic base, the technological resources, and the developing political institutions to create and command, if it chooses. In most of these categories, Western Europe now surpasses the Soviet Union itself. If Europe determines that the effort is necessary or desirable, it can in due course equip itself to match the Soviet Union, bomb for bomb, rocket for rocket. It would then, of course, be free from dependence upon a nuclear deterrent provided and controlled by the United States.

The present drift in free Europe points toward the eventual development of separate national nuclear systems, even though this course represents the most unstable, costly, and inefficient method for achieving nuclear self-sufficiency. Perhaps this is inevitable, as long as Western Europe remains a loose association of wholly sovereign states. The possession of nuclear weapons cannot be separated from the sovereign power to command them, for they represent in today's

world the instruments of life or death—for the country which has them, for its adversaries, and quite probably for its allies.

What I have thus far said carries the implication that there is an inherent incompatibility in this new state of affairs between sovereignty, if that sovereignty involves possession and control of nuclear weapons, and alliance. I think this is the case, and that this single concept summarizes and explains the reasons for the crisis in NATO.

The continued expansion in Europe of nuclear capability under national control will expose the United States to intolerable risks, so long as our troops are there, and so long as we are committed to regard any attack upon our European allies as an attack upon ourselves. In these circumstances, every additional national finger upon the nuclear trigger means one more country other than the United States with power to decide what Americans will die for. While the risks involved in sharing this fateful power with a single independent European state, or with a suitable command structure representing all of Western Europe, might be acceptable, it is too much to ask that we share it with every European country stocking a nuclear arsenal of its own, each with its own sense of destiny and order of priorities.

In short, the present drift toward proliferation in the control of nuclear weapons unless it is checked, will eventually force the United States to withdraw from Europe. Time is running out on the NATO alliance. The 1960's will tell the tale.

What then of the future? How are we to reconcile the conflicting positions on control of nuclear weapons which now plague the alliance? I think we must begin by recognizing that no device or technical arrangement designed to gloss over the differences, without really changing anything, will suffice. As strongly as De Gaulle feels that France must have its own deterrent, we feel just as strongly that we must retain control over the risks to which we are exposed—so long as American forces are committed in Europe and we supply the nuclear means for meeting or preventing an attack against it. It is possible to share a master plan for programing and targeting, but the core decisions about the use of American nuclear weapons must be made by Americans.

I think there are, however, alternative solutions to the problem. The first is for Europe—not France or Germany or even Great Britain, but Western Europe—to undertake a unified effort to arm itself with a genuine nuclear-deterrent capability. To do this would require an integrated program, not merely because of the expense, but chiefly because it would be necessary to create a unified command structure with the sovereign power to invoke the use of its nuclear weapons in the defense of Western Europe. It seems to me that it would be in the interest of the United States to encourage and assist Europeans to make this effort. We could then withdraw our forces from the Continent in an orderly fashion, leaving Europe with its own defense, and both Europe and America could thus minimize the risks inherent in the proliferation of separate national defenses.

This course need not involve, as might be first supposed, a return to isolationism on the part of the United States. On the contrary, the creation of a European entity capable of assembling and commanding a unified European nuclear deterrent could contribute to a stronger partnership, spanning the Atlantic, for the defense and development of our common civilization. I say it could contribute, because partnership is illusory if one partner is in a position to dominate the others. Just as there can be no authentic European entity under the hegemony of France, so there can be no equal partnership across the Atlantic until Europe has achieved cohesion to match and balance the unified power of the United States.

In addition to this advantage, there would be others incidental to Europe's assuming full responsibility for its own defense. The American adverse balance-of-payments problem would then lend itself to ready solution. It is entirely possible, also, that the vexing problems resulting from the artificial division of Europe between East and West, which do not seem amenable to negotiations between Washington and the Kremlin, could be approached from new perspectives by Europeans negotiating with Europeans.

If the problem of attaining a sovereign, integrated European Nuclear Defense Command proves to be insuperable, and this further step toward a more perfect union among the countries of Western Europe is not taken, there is the other alternative: Let Europe forgo nuclear armament and continue, so long as the cold war makes it necessary, to rely upon the United States to furnish the nuclear deterrent against a Soviet attack upon the Continent.

From our national point of view, this alternative is to be preferred; but I think that if we Americans are to be Europe's nuclear sentinels, stationed there for indefinite duty, then we have a right to ask our allies for fairer arrangements.

Let it be understood that we are there as invited guests, not as intruders; that our presence in Europe is no longer a rescue mission, extended by the strong to the weak, but simply a division of responsibility, as between rich equals, for mutual advantage. If we furnish our nuclear deterrent for the defense of Europe, as well as our physical presence to make this deterrent convincing to the Soviets, then Europe must make fair exchanges, including at least two elements:

1. No further diffusion of nuclear arms, for this will involve intolerable risks, both to us and to Europe itself. If we are to have the responsibility for holding at bay the weapons of mass destruction which might otherwise be used to smash or blackmail our NATO allies, we must ask that they rely on us to honor that trust in our common interest, come what may.

2. Equitable financial and economic arrangements to assist us in solving our adverse balance-of-payments problem. In this connection, it is notable that our military disbursements abroad contribute five times as much to the drain on our dollar resources as do all of our foreign-aid programs. There is no good reason why the force levels of American troops quartered in Europe should not be reduced, and the difference made up by an added commitment of European troops to the NATO command. It is essential, too, that European trade barriers against American agricultural and industrial products be reduced or removed as speedily as possible. Finally, we have a right to ask that Europe assume an increased share of the cost of aiding the underdeveloped countries of the world in those needy regions of Africa, Asia, and Latin America where the struggle with communism is yet to be won.

There are heavy burdens and responsibilities, for Europeans as well as for Americans, whichever alternative is chosen. And the choice, after all, is Europe's. Either course would seem acceptable to the United States. What is not acceptable is a continuation of present trends which point toward the disintegration of the Atlantic alliance, leaving a vacuum of policy and power, with diminished security for all.

These thoughts were largely the substance of an address I delivered this June at the Evangelical Academy in Tutzing, Bavaria, before a gathering of lay leaders representing various professional, business, and labor groups. The conference was attended by numerous German political leaders, including Chancellor Adenauer and Berlin Mayor Brandt.

Although I spoke only my personal views at Tutzing, the reaction to my speech caused me to feel that the United States ought to acknowledge openly that Europeans have their choices to make.

If nuclear parity for Western Europe becomes their chosen course, then it can be realized only through the creation of a genuine European deterrent. This would be a great step toward European union, even if it had to be undertaken initially without De Gaulle. An empty chair could always be left for France to occupy eventually.

We must never forget that the most critical test of a deterrent is its credibility. A substantial nuclear retaliatory force, able to survive and strike back lethally at an aggressor—commanded by Europeans—is the most believable deterrent that can be posed against any future threat to attack Europe. Its existence would minimize the risk that the Soviets might someday mistake our intention or our will to defend Europe as our own homeland, and thus reduce the chance of war.

Further, the establishment of such a force in Europe would enable us to restore normalcy to our relationship with the continent. History has a way of abhorring anomalies. It is as unnatural for American troops and weapons to be stationed indefinitely on European soil, as it would be for French, British, or German soldiers to be permanently billeted here in the United States.

Finally, the deliberate substitution of a European nuclear force would permit the orderly withdrawal of American power from Western Europe, under conditions of our own choosing, without impairment of Europe's security or our own.

I must report, however, that German reaction seemed heavily to favor the second of the alternatives I suggested—a confining reliance on the U.S. nuclear deterrent. If other European opinion bears out the apparent German belief that Europe is not yet prepared to form a single nuclear command, it seems all the more important to me to confront the Europeans with the fact that they do have such an alternative within their reach and that this choice is theirs.

Our failure to do just this is helping to widen the gulf between the developing attitudes in Washington and the capitals of Western Europe. As James Reston recently observed in his column in the New York Times:

"The leaders in London and Bonn increasingly talk as if they were spectators rather than participants in the conflict between the giant nations.

"Britons see nothing odd in the fact that America should conscript its men to defend Europe while Britain has not only abandoned conscription but is hoping to bring its army back from Germany.

"The widely held assumption in West Europe is that Europe can be both protectionist and prosperous, self-sufficient economically and dependent on the United States militarily, and that Washington will go on putting 11 percent of its gross national product into defense and foreign aid while some of the allies are doing less than half as much proportionately.

"How this attitude of mind developed in Europe is clear enough. In the early postwar years of poverty and reconstruction, Western Europe not only came to rely on the United States but gradually accepted the idea that power in the modern world had become proportional to mass, and therefore that only gross material size (population, area, and raw materials) could be effective in world politics. There is now less evidence of poverty and unemployment anywhere in Western Europe than in many parts of the United States but this attitude persists and,

what is more disturbing, seems to be growing."

Once the Europeans realize that we are not imposing our presence upon them for purposes of our own defense, and that their continued reliance upon our nuclear power is the result of their own decision, then they will see the justice in assuming an increased burden in conventional arms, as their share of the common effort, and in helping us to solve some of our financial problems which are directly related to the cost of our presence in Europe.

Moreover, for Europeans to make this choice consciously will reduce the appeal of de Gaulle's resistance to American leadership on the Continent, and render more acceptable our insistence that other European nations must forgo separate nuclear armaments of their own.

After I had spoken at Tutzing, one of the Germans in the audience said to me, "Senator, you have made a hard speech, but an honest one. To us, this is the best evidence of real friendship."

Another said, "As I see it, you have told us we will have to pay more. I think you are right."

THE WHEAT DEAL—WHO IS CONCEDING TO WHOM?

Mr. HRUSKA. Mr. President, since President Kennedy's announcement of this Nation's willingness to sell wheat to Russia, there has been a great deal of discussion as to whether the United States should not demand appropriate political concessions in return.

A thoughtful discussion of this matter appeared in this Sunday's edition of the Washington Post in an article by Mr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, director of the Research Institute on Communist Affairs and professor of public law and government at Columbia University.

Professor Brzezinski points out that the sale of wheat to the Soviets cannot be justified on humanitarian grounds:

First of all, there is no famine in Russia. The Soviet people are not starving, and the government has not lost all of its ability to meet a food crisis. It could certainly divert some of its resources from heavy industry to better agricultural management and it is still capable of providing the basic staples to meet Russian needs.

The wheat deal, says this expert on Russian affairs, is vital to the Kremlin for two reasons:

The first is the stability of the collective agricultural system itself. Over many years, that system has failed to deliver the goods, at least so far as the Soviet consumer is concerned. Yet to the political leadership, the collective system is essential.

Secondly, the importation of wheat is necessary to the Soviet Union in order for it to meet its grain export commitments. These commitments are important to the Soviet leadership primarily for political reasons.

Thus, Mr. President, since the wheat deal is so clearly in the interests of supporting and maintaining the present Communist system, it seems particularly strange that the administration appears completely unwilling to follow the course suggested by Professor Brzezinski:

This wheat deal ought to be viewed in a political perspective and U.S. negotiators ought to seek political concessions from the Soviets in return.

The same suggestion was made last week in Lincoln, Nebr., by Dr. Galen Saylor, chairman of the University of Nebraska's Department of Secondary Education.

Dr. Saylor, who has spent considerable time in Finland, reminded the Lincoln Kiwanis Club that Russia insists on political guarantees from Finland in order that the Finns may gain trade agreements with the Soviets.

Why not turn the tables on Russia now that she needs the wheat? If she balks at our conditions, let her go elsewhere for wheat. The sale of a mere fraction of our surplus wheat is not so important as to justify a compromising, timid attitude towards international relations on our part.

It is interesting, Mr. President, that Dr. Saylor used the word "compromising," because that is exactly the word Sunday's New York Times used in its headline over a story by William M. Blair which relates that the administration is backing away from its initial insistence that the wheat be shipped to Russia in American vessels.

Mr. Blair reports that the United States has proposed to lower the rates paid to American shipowners and that the cargoes will be divided between United States and foreign-flag shipping.

Thus, Mr. President, instead of winning concessions from the Soviets, the administration is eagerly seeking to accommodate to Russian demands. It is we, not they, who are making the concessions.

Last week, speaking to a Nebraska audience about the wheat sale, I stated that Russia's principal purpose in making the purchase was to resell the wheat to other nations for a profit. Her concern, in other words, was not to relieve any hunger within her own borders, but to fulfill wheat export obligations to the Eastern Europe satellites, to Latin American nations and elsewhere. In this fashion Russia clearly intends not only to get back the $250 million she would pay to the United States for the wheat, but also to reap a profit by the transaction.

Is it not curious that with our own commodities and cooperation, the same nation which has boasted she will bury us—and which therefore compels us to expend a $1 billion a week, every week in the year, to maintain an invincible defense posture—is assured of getting a profitmaking $250 million wheat sale without giving any concessions on her own part? One could say this is a mighty poor showing for well-known Yankee shrewdness. I only hope that the Kennedy round elsewhere is more successful.

Last Friday night in my home city of Omaha, a White House spokesman attempted to reply to the portion of my remarks about Russia's use of the wheat purchased for resale to other nations. In part, he stated:

Possibly Senator HRUSKA has information the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of State, and the Department of Agriculture do not have. From the best information that could be gathered, the Russians do need wheat for internal commitments.

Mr. President, the information upon which this Senator based his statement came from the State and Agriculture Departments. Speaking in the Senate on October 2, Senator COOPER told of the joint meeting which the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the Senate Agriculture Committee held on September 30. Present in addition to the members of the committees were the Under Secretary of State George Ball, Secretary of Agriculture Orville Freeman, and Secretary of Commerce Luther Hodges. Senator COOPER attended the meeting. He told this body:

If the proposal were to relieve hunger in Russia, I have no doubt that there would be no great objection by the Congress and the people generally, because the relief of hunger wherever it may occur has been the traditional policy of our country * * *. But it is not claimed by the executive branch of our Government that the wheat is needed to relieve hunger in Russia.

And at another point in his thoughtful remarks, Senator COOPER declared:

I conclude by saying that the proposed sale of wheat may not be a major transaction. On the other hand, it would not relieve hunger in the Soviet Union. It would enable the Soviet Union to meet its trade commitments.

These conclusions were reached by the Senator from Kentucky after listening to the discussions of the Under Secretary of State, the Secretary of Agriculture, and the Secretary of Commerce. If the administration were not so averse to Cabinet meetings, perhaps the White House spokesman to whom I have referred would have learned what is generally known and accepted in the Capital and which Mr. Brzezinski put in these words in his Washington Post article:

First of all, there is no famine in Russia. The Soviet people are not starving, and the Government has not lost all of its ability to meet a food crisis.

Second, the importation of wheat is necessary to the Soviet Union in order for it to meet its grain export commitments. These commitments are important to the Soviet leadership primarily for political reasons.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD Professor Brzezinski's article from the November 3 edition of the Washington Post, an account of Dr. Saylor's speech which appeared in the November 1 edition of the Lincoln Journal, and Mr. Blair's article from the November 3 New York Times.

There being no objection, the articles were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Washington (D.C.) Post, Nov. 3, 1963]

POLICIES OF WHEAT DEAL GIVES UNITED STATES UPPER HAND

(By Zbigniew Brzezinski)

It has been argued that the wheat deal with the Soviet Union is desirable on humanitarian grounds. If Russian people are starving, the United States should not stand back, said former President Truman on the radio, and he has been echoed by some clergymen and by various people of good will.

Others have suggested that the wheat deal is purely a matter of economics. The Russians need our wheat; we can use their gold. Their food needs will be met; our food surpluses will be diminished. We both gain equally.

The humanitarian argument can be dismissed quickly. First of all, there is no

famine in Russia. The Soviet people are not starving, and the Government has not lost all of its ability to meet a food crisis. It could certainly divert some of its resources from heavy industry to better agricultural management, and it is still capable of providing the basic staples to meet Russian needs.

Even if all the Western countries were to refuse wheat to Russia, no Russian would starve because of it. There is no doubt, however, that certain kinds of foods would be in short supply, and this would create considerable social and political difficulties for the Soviet Government.

OUTRAGEOUS APPROACH

The economic argument is more complex. The simple equation of profit and trade is deeply rooted in the American tradition, and it is not easy to convince an American that the Soviet approach to the problem is somewhat different. Yet as George Kennan has amply demonstrated in his book, "Russia and the West," the Soviet approach to the problem of trade is a highly political one.

Writing about the Soviet attitude toward the West in the very early 1920's, Kennan thus projected the Soviet reasoning on the subject of trade with the West:

"We despise you. We consider that you should be swept from the earth as governments and physically destroyed as individuals. We reserve the right, in our private, if not in our official capacities, to do what we can to bring this about: to revile you publicly, to do everything within our power to detach your own people from their loyalty to you and their confidence in you, to subvert your Armed Forces and to work for your downfall in favor of the Communist dictatorship.

"But since we are not strong enough to destroy you today—since an interval must unfortunately elapse before we can give you the coup de grace—we want you during this interval to trade with us. An outrageous demand? Perhaps. But you will accept it nevertheless.

"You will accept it because you are not free agents, because you are slaves to your own capitalist appetites, because when profit is involved, you have no pride, no principles, no honor. In the blindness that characterizes declining and perishing classes, you will wink at our efforts to destroy you, you will compete with one another for our favor."

One may wonder, in the light of the 1962 Cuban confrontation and Khrushchev's general policy of "burying" us, whether this approach has changed so very fundamentally.

A NECESSARY FAILURE

To the Soviet leaders, the wheat deal is political because two very vital Soviet political interests are involved. The first is the stability of the collective agricultural system itself. Over many years, that system has failed to deliver the goods, at least insofar as the Soviet consumer is concerned. Yet to the political leadership, the collective system is essential.

A recent critical reevaluation of the Stalinist drive for collectivization, published in Voprosy istorii, state quite categorically that the collectivist system was necessary in order to build socialism in the Soviet Union and for the defense of the country. Mounting consumer dissatisfaction with the inability of the present agricultural system to produce adequately might, over the long haul, force the Soviet leaders to revise the agricultural system. However, if the Soviet leadership finds other means of meeting domestic needs; i.e., imports paid for with gold, it can perpetuate the collectivist system.

Collectivization was abandoned in Poland and Yugoslavia because the leaderships had no way out. By importing wheat, the Soviet leadership sees a way out, and hence the wheat deal is necessary to Moscow in order to maintain its domestic system of collectivization.

EXPORTS POLITICAL, TOO

Second, the importation of wheat is necessary to the Soviet Union in order for it to meet its grain export commitments. These commitments are important to the Soviet leadership primarily for political reasons.

Last year the Soviet Union exported approximately 7.8 million tons of grain, of which wheat constituted 4.7 million tons. The list of clients shows clearly the political importance of the exports: the largest consumer was East Germany, followed successively by Czechoslovakia, Poland, Brazil and Cuba.

The restriction that President Kennedy wishes to impose on the reexportation of American grain to these countries creates a technical impediment to such exports. The Soviet Union would not be able to ship them American wheat directly. Nonetheless, the availability of American wheat, and indeed of other Western wheat, would mean that Soviet grain itself could be exported to the countries concerned. Hence the political problem would not be resolved by the proposed restriction.

The above comments should not be construed as an argument against an American-Soviet wheat deal. They are meant to suggest, however, that this wheat deal ought to be viewed in a political perspective and that U.S. negotiators ought to seek political concession from the Soviets in return.

Naturally, there would be no point in expecting fundamental concessions. For example, it would be illusory to expect a Soviet acknowledgement of our position in Berlin in return for our willingness to sell Russia some wheat; there is no political equivalence between these two interests. However, on a number of marginal issues, there is no reason why the United States should not insist on a quid pro quo.

For example, it would seem ironical for the United States to be enabling the Soviet Union to maintain its collectivized agriculture and its politically motivated grain exports and at the same time for this country to endure continued Soviet harassment in its access to Berlin. At the very least, our negotiators could insist on a clear reciprocal understanding of the technical arrangements involved in Western access.

Similarly, we could demand that the Soviets lift their travel restrictions within Russia. Indeed, a political quid pro quo should be sought in the case of other so-called nonpolitical, technical arrangements.

For many years, for reasons of political prestige and also as a precedent, the Soviet Union has been very anxious to establish direct American-Soviet air links. Perhaps there is no reason to oppose such links, but it might be preferable to negotiate about them in the context of a reciprocal Soviet willingness to meet some of our political objectives.

Of course, proponents of the purely "economic" approach might say that if our position is too hard, the Soviet Union will buy the wheat somewhere else. That may be true, but the argument is not entirely convincing. If the Soviet Union could easily buy wheat elsewhere, then why does it not do so?

It either wishes to deal directly with the United States because that would strengthen the impression in the West and elsewhere of an American-Soviet detente—an impression which intensifies Western European fears concerning the American position; or, conceivably, the Soviet Union does not see other markets so readily available and the American wheat is thus of some economic importance to it as well.

One may safely assume that the Soviet Union is not anxious to buy American wheat merely in order to reduce our balance-of-payments difficulties and to alleviate our own internal agricultural problems.

Finally, it should be stated unambiguously that it would be wrong to conclude that since the wheat deal is political, the United States should have no part of it. That is fallacious and extreme. It would be a pity if we failed to use the limited leverage that this particular situation affords.

Since the Soviet Union wishes to buy wheat from us, it puts us in a favorable bargaining position. By all means, we should go ahead with the deal, but our approach should be very conscious of its essentially political character.

[From the Lincoln (Nebr.) Journal, Nov. 1, 1963]

DEMAND MORE THAN DOLLARS: TEACHER TALKS ON WHEAT SALE

A University of Nebraska professor Friday called for the United States to demand concessions besides dollars in any sale of wheat to the Soviet Union.

Dr. Galen Saylor, chairman of NU's Department of Secondary Education in Teachers College, drew from his experiences teaching in Finland last year while addressing the Lincoln Kiwanis Club.

Dr. Saylor noted Russia insists on political guarantees from Finland in order that the Finns may gain trade agreements with the Soviets.

"Why not turn the tables on Russia now that she needs wheat?" the professor asked.

"If she balks at our conditions, let her go elsewhere for wheat. The sale of a mere fraction of our surplus wheat is not so important as to justify a compromising, timid attitude toward international relations on our part."

Dr. Saylor said that American people should impose conditions leading to a lessening of international tensions as an additional basis for the wheat deal.

[From the New York (N.Y.) Times, Nov. 3, 1963]

UNITED STATES GIVES SOVIET COMPROMISE PLAN FOR WHEAT RATES—SUGGESTS PROVIDING VESSELS FOR 20 TO 30 PERCENT OF GRAIN AT A COST OF $18 A TON—RUSSIANS WEIGH OFFER—APPROVAL WILL END DEADLOCK—BULGARIA MAY PURCHASE $8 MILLION IN TOBACCO

(By William M. Blair)

WASHINGTON, November 2.—The United States has moved to break the impasse on its shipping rates that has held up sales of wheat to the Soviet Union.

A new proposal, which the Russians are understood to be considering over the weekend, would involve concessions by both sides. It includes a lowered U.S. cargo rate and a division of $250 million worth of wheat between American and foreign-flag vessels.

The sale of up to 4 million tons of wheat has been blocked because U.S. cargo schedules have been $10 to $13 or more higher than foreign charter charges for shipments to Black Sea and Baltic ports.

STIPULATION BY KENNEDY

President Kennedy stipulated that wheat sold to the Soviet Union and its satellites should be carried in American vessels, as available, supplemented by foreign ships.

It is understood that the United States is willing to provide a cargo rate of $18 a ton if 20 to 30 percent of the wheat is carried in American vessels. Payment for this amount would be in dollars or gold.

The $18-a-ton rate compares with the $21 a ton recently offered by a group of tramp-ship owners to move wheat to the Soviet Union. The tramp-ship operators, whose unscheduled vessels ply between any ports where cargo is available, recently reduced their rate by $5 from $26 a ton.

FOREIGN SHIPS TO BE USED

Presumably, the remainder of the wheat purchase, 70 to 80 percent, would be carried by foreign vessels at the world charter rate of about $12.50 a ton. This amount of wheat would be paid for through normal commercial credits of about 18 months.

The $18-a-ton figure was said to have been worked out with American tramp-ship owners, whose vessels are regarded as most suitable by wheat shippers, at an unannounced meeting earlier this week in New York. It was understood that ship representatives and officials of the Commerce Department had agreed that ships or tankers of larger capacities—16,000 to 20,000 tons—could handle nearly 720,000 tons of the wheat.

Later, it was said, one other shipping line had offered to handle 200,000 more tons. This would put the amount of wheat to go in American vessels at 920,000 tons, or about 23 percent of the projected total shipments.

A survey by shipowners and Government officials indicated that the 23 percent was about all that could be carried by the U.S.-flag ships now available.

A division of the shipment between U.S.- and foreign-flag vessels has been regarded as the most likely solution. If acceptable to the Russians, the Maritime Administration will set a guideline for U.S. shippers. In effect, the guideline would be a ceiling rate of $18 a ton.

If the rate quoted by a shipowner to a private grain trader who negotiates a sale to the Russians falls within the $18-a-ton schedule, the Maritime Administration would certify the ship as available. The Department of Commerce then could issue an export license for the sale.

There was speculation in trading circles on what concessions would be made to shipowners for meeting the $18 rate. It is known that in the first meeting here of shipowners with the Maritime Administration last week the shippers sought a 10-percent increase in rates for shipments of surplus agricultural products under foreign aid programs.

Under Federal law, 50 percent of foreign aid shipments must be made in U.S. ships. This requirement would not apply to the proposed sale of wheat to the Soviet Union because it would be made by commercial companies.

The shipowners argued that there had been no "adjustment" of foreign-aid shipment rates since 1957, and that since then their costs, including labor, had risen.

The division of the wheat shipments would also placate foreign maritime nations. Several countries have informally protested that the "American bottoms" condition laid down by President Kennedy was discriminatory and contrary to U.S. endorsement of free trade principles.

Several countries were considering a strong, concerted representation, or informal diplomatic protest, to the United States on the wheat sale. These included Britain, the Netherlands, Belgium, France, Spain, Italy, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Greece and possibly Japan. Norway was one of the first to protest.

The latest effort to reach some sort of agreement was made in a meeting at the Department of State with Sergei A. Borisov, First Deputy Trade Minister of the Soviet Union. The United States was represented by Under Secretaries George W. Ball of the State Department, Charles S. Murphy of the Department of Agriculture and Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jr., of the Department of Commerce.

It was also learned that at least six more export licenses had been filed with the Commerce Department for shipments of wheat, soybeans, tobacco, and cotton to Communist countries.

ALCOHOL SALE POSSIBLE

The Russians were also understood to be interested in buying some 300,000 tons of industrial alcohol, possibly for use in the manufacture of fertilizer. Premier Khrushchev has called on Soviet farm planners to produce more fertilizer to increase food production.

A major surprise among the pending applications was for an $8 million sale of tobacco to Bulgaria. It was said that Bulgaria, which grows tobacco, must need tobacco to keep her mills running. The application was made by the A. C. Monk Co. of Farmville, N.C.

The applications covering wheat were for 100,000 long tons of wheat for $7,600,000 by Cargill, Inc., of Minneapolis and 50,000 long tons for $4,200,000 by the Continental Grain Co. of Minneapolis. A long ton is 2,240 pounds.

The first application for cotton called for the sale of 375,000 pounds of cotton linters at $17,500 to the Soviet Union. It was filed by Reis & Co. of New York.

Export licenses already have been issued for $7,900,000 in agricultural products since the President approved such sales on October 9.

A check of licenses issued turned up a sale to East Germany of soybeans and tobacco. The total sale was $896,000. The other sales were of corn, soybeans, and soybean meal to Hungary.

THE 182D ANNIVERSARY OF ELECTION OF JOHN HANSON, OF MARYLAND, AS FIRST PRESIDENT OF UNITED STATES IN CONGRESS ASSEMBLED

Mr. BEALL. Mr. President, today is the 182d anniversary of the election of John Hanson, of Maryland, as the first President of the United States in Congress assembled. That election came under the Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union. It preceded the adoption of the Constitution of the United States and the election of George Washington as President by 7 years.

It is the restrictive words "in Congress assembled" that keeps John Hanson's name from the list of U.S. Presidents, and from the No. 1 spot in that list.

As a Member of the Continental Congress, John Hanson, of Maryland, was elected President of the Continental Congress on November 5, 1781.

John Hanson should be remembered and honored, not only as "technically" the first President of the United States, but also for his part in helping to put Maryland into the Confederation and in the early formation of our Nation.

John Hanson was born at Mulberry Grove, near Port Tobacco, Charles County, Md., on April 3, 1715. After pursuing an academic course in school and engaging in farming, he became a member of the Maryland House of Delegates. Here he served for nine terms. John Hanson was elected to the Maryland Senate in 1757 and served in the Senate until 1773. He moved to Frederick County and was quite active in pre-Revolutionary matters. He was a delegate to the General Congress in Annapolis in 1774, and was a member of the Maryland Convention of 1775 which issued the declaration known as the Association of Free Men of Maryland.

Following this, John Hanson became a Member of the Continental Congress and its President.

History credits Hanson with helping to put Maryland into the Confederation at a time when many residents of the State wanted to go it alone. It was later recognized that Maryland's teamplay in the Confederation seasoned her for the Union later on.

It was in his capacity as President of the Continental Congress that John Hanson tendered Gen. George Washington, on November 28, 1781, the thanks of the Congress for Washington's victory at Yorktown.

When John Hanson retired from public life he settled at Oxon Hill in Prince Georges County, Md. Thus John Hanson, the first President of the United States "in Congress assembled" was born, educated, worked, served his country, retired, and died in his beloved State of Maryland.

Incidentally, a grandson, Alexander Contee Hanson, served in the U.S. Senate with distinction.

In my opinion, Mr. President, it is well for us to hold on to the memory of these great men who helped form our great Nation, destined to lead the world. We remember and honor John Hanson, of Maryland.

STAY-IN-SCHOOL EFFORTS PAY OFF

Mr. BAYH. Mr. President, in this 1st session of the 88th Congress, I have attempted to identify myself with the efforts of this body to solve some of the great problems that confront our Nation's younger citizens. I have supported the Youth Employment Act, the Manpower Development Act, the Vocational Education Act, the Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Offenses Control Act, and several corollary pieces of legislation that, while not directly affecting youth, will, in the long run, greatly aid them.

All of these are good, sound programs that reflect a concern for the well-being of our Nation's most precious resource—its youth.

However, my remarks today are not to extol the virtues of any program of Washington origin. Today, I wish to call attention to what a group of aroused and dedicated citizens have done in order to insure a brighter future for the young people of Indianapolis, Ind.

All of us realize the importance of education to our Nation as a whole and to each individual. The results of inadequate educational attainment are lower earning capacity, higher rates of unemployment, dependence upon public aid and higher rejections for military service.

While this is realized, statistics still tell us that 30 to 40 percent of the pupils currently in the fifth grade will not remain in school to receive their high school diplomas. Therefore, if present trends continue, we as a nation will have 7½ to 8 million high-school dropouts in this decade.

While the Indianapolis problem is not as great as it is in larger metropolitan areas, Indianapolis women realize that unless this problem was met head-on,

it would soon assume alarming proportions.

Therefore, a stay-in-school project was initiated. Its purpose was to encourage would-be high school dropouts to continue their education. The project was sponsored by the Indianapolis News and under the skillful guidance of Mrs. Margaret Moore. Mrs. C. B. LaDine is chairman of the stay-in-school committee.

Under their direction, 107 women received dropout lists from Indianapolis public high schools. These volunteers immediately wrote letters to prospective dropouts in order to determine the cause of their failure to return to school. Person-to-person visits were then carried out. If lack of proper clothing, or money for lunches, bus tickets, or books, was the cause of leaving school, these funds or supplies were provided. Part-time jobs were found for those needing them. Remedial reading facilities were made available to slow readers.

The results—257 would-be dropouts in the Indianapolis area are in classes this very minute due to the hard work of these civic-minded women.

As I see it, there are two things of significance about this program. First, the entire project required no public funds. Local initiative and foresight supplanted the use of taxpayers' dollars. Second, the comprehensive nature of this program, coupled with the extra effort of the volunteers insured success. A careful reading of this article shows that the Indianapolis public school system, the press, the Indiana Literacy Council, private tutors, women's clubs, church groups, and sororities were well mobilized.

The wide-range causes for the dropouts demand nothing less than a comprehensive approach to the problem. This method was complemented by the many extra hours of difficult and taxing work of the 107 volunteers.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have this article reprinted in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD for the benefit of any and all who wish to help youth help themselves. I ask Members of the Senate to join me in congratulating these dedicated, hard-working women.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

STAY-IN-SCHOOL EFFORTS PAY OFF

(By Margaret Moore)

Personal counseling by volunteer women has prompted the return of 157 dropouts to Indianapolis schools.

In addition, more than 100 other youths returned to classes last week as a result of personal letters written by volunteer women, and phone conversations with dropouts.

A total of 107 women, volunteers in the News stay-in-school drive, are responsible for the success of the project. The person-to-person program required weeks of work including home visits, arrangements for clothing, lunches, bus tickets, books and fees, remedial reading, and employment.

Mrs. C. B. LaDine, president of Seventh District Federation of Clubs, is chairman of the stay-in-school committee.

The project was carried out in cooperation with Indianapolis public schools, and needs of youths were established through investigation.

The returning dropouts who had person-to-person counseling are enrolled as follows: Arlington, 2; Attucks, 58; Howe, 3; Manual, 2; Northwestern, 1; Shortridge, 6; Tech, 66; Washington, 11, and Wood, 7.

Many of the others are enrolled in evening schools at Attucks, Tech, and Washington. Some dropouts whose families moved were assisted in enrolling in Marion County schools and elsewhere in Indiana. Dropouts from Broad Ripple with whom volunteers worked returned to other schools.

One Indianapolis dropout, through help of a volunteer woman, is enrolled in New York City, and another in Germany.

Names of dropouts were listed by principals of all Indianapolis high schools and given to the News stay-in-school committee.

Personal letters were mailed by the women volunteers to all these dropouts. Enclosed in the letters were stamped, addressed return cards listing many reasons for dropping out of school—need of a job, clothing, lunches, bus tickets, books or fees, glasses, remedial reading, babysitter, advice on career, etc. Dropouts were asked to check their needs in order to return to school.

The entire project has required no public funds. Women's clubs, church groups, sororities, and other organizations have made contributions from bazaars, chili suppers, candy sales, benefit style shows, book reviews, and apron sales.

Seven organizations have chosen aid to dropouts as a year-round project.

CLOTHING PROVIDED FOR MANY

Sixty-three youths who stayed at home many days because they were ashamed of their clothes are in classes now with attractive and serviceable outfits.

Mrs. J. C. Fix, chairman, Mrs. Russell Justice, Mrs. Harvey Shawver, Mrs. Robert Udell, Eva J. Lewis, and other volunteers manned a room provided for clothes at the YWCA, 329 North Pennsylvania. More than 2,000 items of school clothes have been given by individuals and groups.

A 17-year-old who had been classed as a "slow learner" was fitted with his first pair of glasses.

"I can see for the first time since I was in the sixth grade," he told his volunteer counselor.

Arrangements for nursery school were made for the 4-year-old child of a teenage mother who wanted to return to school in order to support the little boy.

Thirty-three jobs, part-time and 40-hour week, have been obtained for returning dropouts who could not return to school without means to help themselves or needy families.

Mrs. Harold E. Rodden, employment chairman of the volunteer project, worked with personnel directors of retail stores, industries, and other firms, in placing the youths.

HELP IN READING PROVIDED

Two high school graduates, whose names inadvertently appeared on the dropout list provided by schools, were aided in obtaining college scholarships.

Twenty-one returning dropouts are receiving assistance in remedial reading by volunteer teachers headed by Dr. Margaret Fisher, president of the Indiana Literacy Council.

Inability to read was one of the chief causes of dropouts counseled by the volunteer women. Many have been placed in special classes.

"I couldn't read in the fifth grade," an 18-year-old girl told Mrs. O. U. Mutz. "And I didn't learn in the sixth or seventh. Nobody seemed to care then."

Seventy-five percent of the returning dropouts told women volunteers that lack of direction and personal counseling caused them to leave school.

Five young married women, neighbors in a five-block area, returned to evening school through help of interested women.

"We read about others going back to school," a 24-year-old mother of three said. "And we decided we couldn't wait any longer to finish high school. We want to be better able to take care of our families."

Mrs. Addison Dowling, one of the 28 volunteer women who worked last year on a pilot project in which 28 dropouts returned, has helped to rehabilitate an entire family.

"I can't fail," the teenage girl in the family told Mrs. Dowling. "Because you care so much."

Miss Belle Ramey, another former teacher who has helped with the pilot project and this year's big-scale program, went to three schools to help her three pupils register.

Mrs. David Cook, Mrs. L. R. Mottern, Mrs. Hugh Gibson, Mrs. William Weisell, Mrs. Bruce Richards, Mrs. Floyd Hughett, and other women can take credit for getting more than one youth back in school. Sara C. Ewing aided nine dropouts this fall in returning to pupil status.

STUDY TABLES ARE ARRANGED

All 107 women plan to follow through with the young people assigned to them and assist them to stay in school.

Mrs. Ernest Campbell heads a group of former teachers who have offered to tutor these young people during the year.

Twenty-nine parent groups have offered to set up study tables in their areas and keep on the lookout for potential dropouts in elementary and high schools.

Leaders of the stay-in-schol committee have been asked to speak to caseworkers of the children's division, Marion County Department of Public Welfare, Wednesday morning. Miss Helen Heady, director, said, "I'm sure the workers can help to encourage children to work harder and take more interest in school."

Camp Fire leaders of the Central Indiana Council who will meet Tuesday also have asked the volunteer stay-in-school women to speak on "Stay-in-School Pointers."

OTHER CITIES ASK INFORMATION

Requests for the pattern used by Indianapolis women are being received almost daily from across the Nation.

L. M. Livingston, principal of North Vernon High School, has asked Mrs. LaDine, Mrs. Marshall Lincoln, and Margaret Moore to speak to high school teachers and volunteer women at North Vernon on October 8.

"We hope you'll let us use your plan in Crawfordsville," Judge Howard A. Sommer of Montgomery Circuit Court, said. "We want you to come to Crawfordsville to talk with volunteers."

Mrs. David W. Martin, Fort Wayne, first vice president of the Indiana Federation of Clubs, and Mrs. Parke Jessup, Westfield, education chairman, have reports from eight counties where the Indianapolis plan is to be initiated. Club women will help to get dropouts back in school.

Congressman DONALD BRUCE, Member of the House Committee on Education, has asked leaders of the movement to testify before the committee in Washington.

Congressman WILLIAM BRAY, of Martinsville, said, "there's no parallel to the Indianapolis person-to-person plan in the United States. We could lick the national dropout problem by initiating this program through women's groups across the country."

Gov. Matthew E. Welsh has asked the Indianapolis women to make their return-to-school plan available to two State groups.

"The Indiana Legislative Advisory Commission on Dropouts and the Indiana Youth Council will welcome your assistance," he said. "I suggest you meet with both groups and help them solve the statewide problem."

Pierre Salinger, Press Secretary to President John F. Kennedy, wrote to Mrs. Lincoln from the White House this week asking for full information on the Indianapolis plan to refer to the President.

Dr. Phillip D. Gaffney, of the Education Department, Arizona State University, has requested information about the return of dropouts in Indianapolis for his classes in education.

ABILENE REPORTER-NEWS REPORTS ON TEXANS IN THE PEACE CORPS

Mr. YARBOROUGH. Mr. President, I am pleased and proud that my fellow Texans are playing such an important role in the Peace Corps, one of the greatest successes of this administration.

In order to share with my colleagues the work Texans are doing in the Peace Corps, I ask unanimous consent that the following article by Ned Curran in the Abilene (Tex.) Reporter-News be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

PEACE CORPS IS TEXAS FLAVORED

(By Ned Curran)

WASHINGTON.—Even the Peace Corps has a Texas look.

From Deputy Director Bill Moyers to a 76-year-old volunteer from Dallas, the Corps is shot through with nearly 160 Texans. And Vice President LYNDON JOHNSON is Chairman of the Peace Corps Advisory Council.

The real Peace Corps image, of course, is being formed by the volunteers of which there are a total of 5,466 overseas. Of these, 153 are Texans, ranking the State 11th in the Nation as a wellspring for Peace Corps workers.

The Texas corpsmen are scattered from Pakistan to Nigeria and represent almost as divergent areas of this home State. Their hometowns stretch from El Paso to Baytown.

Perhaps the most unusual Texan in the Corps is 76-year-old Ralph Cole of Dallas. A civil engineer before he became a volunteer, Cole is now in Pakistan doing the same kind of work. He is not above a little diplomacy either, according to a Peace Corps report.

Cole is asked continually by the Pakistanis why the United States keeps giving arms aid to India without insisting on settlement of the Kashmir border dispute between India and Pakistan. Cole's stock answer is that "they're doing it all without my permission."

In case Cole runs out of answers, the Peace Corps has at least one Texan in India to balance things out. Joe Pena of El Paso is involved in a unique enterprise with three other volunteers. They have set up their own machine tool factory in a small town and are attempting to mass-produce farm equipment.

With only a gas station job during high school as background, Joe has joined the others in setting up the miniature factory as a co-op that is fast becoming a boom in the heavily agricultural area.

EDINBURG NURSE

In the neighboring new Federation to Malaysia, Marilyn Billimek, a nurse from Edinburg, is plying her trade in a hospital. The most trouble, according to Marilyn, "to keep from spinning my wheels in trying to find workable substitutes for ordinary things like cleansing tissue and diapers."

There are two Texans in Brazil, slightly closer to home, Nelson Jacob of Goliad and John S. Alfred, of Baytown. Both are in agricultural extension work and Jacob doubles as an English teacher in a remote hamlet. Commenting on the graduation custom in his school in which the students choose their sponsor both for graduation and a dance afterwards, Jacob reported that he was picked by the "ugliest girl in the class."

Richard Moos, of Hondo, is even closer to home, in El Salvador where he is busily engaged in trying to show the natives literally how to make better hay. It seems there is no haymaking in the little country despite lush growth and long dry spells. Moos is using new grass varieties and trench silos to change all that.

"Minding the store" in Washington is a covey of Texans who operate the business end of the Corps. Moyers, who is second in command to Director Sargent Shriver, is considered one of the outstanding men in Government. At 28 he was one of the youngest Presidential appointments in history to be confirmed by the Senate.

Moyers was graduated from the University of Texas and won a Rotary International scholarship for a year's study abroad. He was information director for the Southwest Baptist Theological Seminary in Fort Worth before joining the then Senator JOHNSON'S staff in 1959.

HARDIN-SIMMONS UNIVERSITY GRADUATE

A trio of Texans help publicize the Peace Corps at home and abroad. Deputy Associate Director for Public Affairs is Lloyd Wright, of Hale Center; Phillip D. Hardberger, of O'Donnell, is communications director; and Ruth Schumm, of Dallas, is a special feature writer.

Wright, who helps direct recruiting and information and advertising, is a Hardin-Simmons graduate, president of the Hardin-Simmons University Student Council in 1952–53. He is also a former publicist for Texas Baptist organizations.

Hardberger, another Texas Baptist alumnus, is a Baylor graduate and possessor of a varied newspaper and writing background.

Miss Schumm was formerly with the Washington bureau of the Dallas Morning News and then a member of Vice President JOHNSON'S staff. She is one of Washington's best known newspaper women.

TEXAS HAS OPPORTUNITY TO REPEAL ITS POLL TAX ON NOVEMBER 9

Mr. YARBOROUGH. Mr. President, this past weekend, Saturday, November 2, I had the pleasure of speaking at an antipoll tax rally in Corpus Christi, Tex., sponsored by the league of women voters and other groups. This meeting was also addressed by the mayor of Corpus Christi and a number of other speakers.

Texas has an election on November 9, 1963, and on the ballot will be a proposed amendment to the State constitution to allow a vote for or against repeal of the poll tax as a prerequisite for voting in elections. The league of women voters has performed a distinguished public service in Texas in bringing this vital issue to public attention, and in leading the fight for repeal.

Those of us who have worked for years for abolition of the poll tax as a shackle on the voter of low income are pointing out that vast confusion will result in Texas when the Federal amendment passes, if Texas retains a poll tax on the State level.

Because there is some national interest in the outcome of Texas' November 9 election for or against repeal of the poll, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD, an excerpt from my remarks at an antipoll tax rally held in Exposition Hall in Corpus Christi, Nueces County, Tex., on November 2, 1963.

There being no objection, the excerpt was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

The poll tax is a barricade to voting. The records prove it. It is a startling fact that of the 11 States with a poll tax requirement for voting since 1920, all 11 States had the 11 worst records for low percentage of people voting in the entire United States in national elections in 1958 and again in 1960.

Let's take 1960 first. A State-by-State breakdown of voter percentages in votes cast in November 1960, for presidential electors, shows the 11 States with a poll tax history since 1920, have the worst 11 State voting records in this order, and I quote from Census Bureau figures:

North Carolina, 40th with 54.3 percent of adults voting.

Tennessee, 41st with 50.6 percent of adults voting.

Florida, 42d with 49.8 percent of adults voting.

Louisiana, 43d with 45.7 percent of adults voting.

Texas, 44th with 43.4 percent of adults voting.

Arkansas, 45th with 41.7 percent of adults voting.

Virginia, 46th with 34.4 percent of adults voting.

South Carolina, 47th with 31.5 percent of adults voting.

Georgia, 48th with 31.3 percent of adults voting.

Alabama, 49th with 31.2 percent of adults voting.

Mississippi, 50th with 25.6 percent of adults voting.

Of these 11 States, Alabama, Arkansas, Mississippi, Virginia, and Texas still have a poll tax. Of the remaining six with a poll tax history, Tennessee abolished the poll tax as a voting requirement in 1959; South Carolina in 1950; Georgia, 1945; Florida, 1937; Louisiana, 1934; North Carolina, 1920. Regardless of why an individual State may have decided to impose a poll tax, there is absolutely no question that it has served as a shackle on the potential voter, a barrier to the ballot box, a blockade on a full voter participation, and continues to do so where it is in effect.

By contrast, some of the States with higher turnout of adults voting for President in 1960 are:

Idaho with 80.6 percent of adults voting.

New Hampshire with 80.6 percent of adults voting.

Utah with 79.9 percent of adults voting.

South Dakota with 78.8 percent of adults voting.

California with 70.6 percent of adults voting.

New York with 67.6 percent of adults voting.

Back in 1958 the same 11 States with a poll tax history at sometime since 1920, still ranked as the 11 with the lowest and worst voting record. At that time there were only 48 States. The position of the 11 poll tax States changed a little, but they still had the worst voting percentage turnout of the 48 States. Here is how they ranked in the November 1958 election, in votes for U.S. Representatives:

North Carolina, 38th with 24.7 percent of the adult population voting.

Virginia, 39th with 19.8 percent.

Tennessee, 40th with 18 percent.

Florida 41st with 17.4 percent.

Texas, 42d with 14.5 percent.

Alabama, 43d with 13.2 percent.

Louisiana, 44th with 10.4 percent.

Georgia, 45th with 6.9 percent.

South Carolina, 46th with 6.4 percent.

Arkansas, 47th with 5.8 percent.

Mississippi, 48th with only 5.3 percent.

The 11 States with a poll tax history ranked the lowest, though 6 had repealed their poll taxes, some a generation ago. Once a State

suffers voter discrimination for a long period of years because of the poll tax barrier, the removal of that barrier does not result in all adults voting immediately. Years are required before the majority of adults, barred from voting by the poll tax, acquire the habit of voting after that poll tax shackle is cast off. Texas needs to cut down the poll tax bars, and to begin the job of training her people for full voter participation. History shows that it will take years of hard work by many people and organizations to rid a majority of adult Texans of the generations-old habit of not voting.

I am coauthor of the proposed amendment to the Constitution of the United States (the impending 24th amendment) which would abolish the poll tax as a requirement to vote in Federal elections for Members of Congress, the Vice President, and President. This amendment, which required ratification by three-fourths of the States before becoming a part of the Constitution, has already been ratified by 36 State legislatures. Ratification by only two more States are needed, and this amendment will be a part of the Constitution. I am confident that it will be a part of the Federal Constitution by March 1964, before the next elections in Texas and the Nation. But this amendment will apply only to Federal elections; it will not remove the poll tax requirement in elections for candidates for State or local office, for Governor or the State legislature.

If the Federal amendment is adopted and we are faced next year with the prospect of a poll tax requirement on the State level and no poll tax on the Federal level, Texas will gain a doubtful distinction; it will rank first as a State of election confusion. . .

If the Texas poll tax is not repealed on November 9, each person who wants to vote in Texas in the 1964 elections will have to qualify under two sets of qualification requirements, one in Federal elections, the other in State and county elections. There would be two separate ballots, two separate ballot boxes, two different qualified voter lists. We would have confusion confounded, and chaos at the ballot box. The failure to repeal the Texas poll tax amendment would make voting in Texas the most difficult governmental effort since Reconstruction days. It would deny democracy and promote chicanery and confusion.

It would be hard to tell who should vote and, afterwards, who won what election. We would have thousands and thousands of people going to the polls to cast a vote for their President, only to find they cannot vote for Governor. Confusion would reign.

For a straightforward election in the best traditions of the American people, the poll tax amendment should be repealed, and all voters enabled to vote for all officers with one qualification, on one ballot at one ballot box, as Texans have been accustomed to doing.

PADRE ISLAND NATIONAL SEASHORE RECREATION AREA PROMISES BOTH RECREATIONAL AND ECONOMIC BENEFITS

Mr. YARBOROUGH. Mr. President, the achievements of this administration and the 87th Congress in conservation of hundreds of miles of seashore in three new national seashore recreation areas, exceeds the record of any previous Congress in this field. Padre Island, Cape Cod, and Point Reyes were added to the national seashore heritage.

As author of the Senate bill which led to establishing of the National Seashore Recreation Area on Padre Island, off the gulf coast of Texas, last year, I have been pleased to see borne out the promise of economic benefit to my State as a result of the enactment of this bill. The primary reason for preservation of a natural resource in its primitive state is to insure its availability to the public for all time. However, the economic benefits are important, too.

One of the reasons we were enabled to pass the Padre Island bill in the Senate and House and later to win enabling legislation in Texas was the foresight and hard work of many people in Texas. A good example is Cameron County Judge Oscar C. Dancy, who worked not only in his home territory, but who came to Washington several times at his own expense to testify in hearings on the Padre Island bill.

Cameron County has also been responsible under Judge Dancy's leadership for 40 years for development of a part of Padre Island not included in the 81½ miles of national seashore area. To illustrate the economic benefits already accruing in my home State as a result of increased tourist interest in Padre Island, even though the Federal Government has only recently begun acquisition of the open beach, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD two articles: First, "Seashore Beckons Padre: National Mecca" from the Houston Chronicle of September 8, 1963; and "Padre Island's Siren Song," from Texas Game and Fish, October 1963.

There being no objection, the articles were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Houston (Tex.) Chronicle, Sept. 8, 1963]

PADRE: NATIONAL MECCA

CORPUS CHRISTI.—Confident Texans expect that 80 miles of seashore area in its natural state will soon become dotted with thousands of vacationers, sportsmen, campers, bird-watchers, and photographers. The newly authorized Padre Island National Seashore Area is destined to spark unprecedented tourist activity for the Lone Star State, especially around the Gateway City—Corpus Christi—a booming resort area in its own right.

The seashore area, to be in full swing by 1965, is expected to be a tourist magnet for the entire State. Travel spokesmen feel it will draw thousands of new visitors from all over the United States, Canada, and Mexico to the bustling resort metropolis of Corpus Christi where almost 200,000 permanent residents already welcome some 100,000 out-of-town visitors and convention delegates annually.

The Padre Island National Seashore is on the south Texas coast of the Gulf of Mexico between Corpus Christi and Brownsville. It is bounded on the west by the warm waters of Laguna Madre, with its exceptional waterfowl and fish, and on the east by the Gulf of Mexico.

The island, a 110-mile-long strip of sand that hugs the Texas gulf coast, is no more than 4 miles wide and, at the crest of one of its numerous dunes, is only a few feet high.

The National Park Service of the Department of the Interior has set aside three other public areas for seashore recreation: Cape Hatteras, N.C.; Point Reyes, Calif.; and Cape Cod, Mass.

Official interest in Padre Island as a national seashore dates back to 1934 when a survey of the Texas gulf coast was made under the emergency conservation work program. At that time the island was recommended as a national beach park. In 1940, another study was made of the Texas gulf coast, and Padre Island was recommended for national seashore status. A restudy of the island was made in 1947 and again the recommendation was for administration by the National Park Service for public use and enjoyment. The complete survey of the Atlantic and gulf coasts in 1954 and 1955 again pointed to Padre Island as a national seashore. In December 1957, National Park Service authorized a study to "detemine definitely and finally the feasibility of such a project."

Congressional legislative action begun in 1958, was climaxed when President John F. Kennedy signed the Padre seashore bill into law on September 28, 1962, almost 30 years after the first studies recommending the area. The law authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to acquire lands and waters within a described area encompassing somewhere near 237,600 acres, including a large amount of State lands.

The law provides that State and county owned lands may be acquired only with the consent of the State. To this end, the Texas legislature enacted, and the Governor approved in April 1963, legislation consenting to the acquisition and directing the school land board to convey to the United States, the State lands (except minerals) within the authorized seashore boundary. Formal transfer of the deed to Texas-owned land in the seashore area to the Federal Government was accomplished on August 23, in Austin.

Congress has appropriated $1.5 million to start immediate acquisition of private property within the seashore area.

A superintendent, a land acquisition officer and a chief park ranger, together with their clerical help will be the nucleus of the seashore staff until sufficient land has been acquired to begin development.

Early stages of development will stress facilities for picnic and camping areas, fishing piers, trailer parks, marinas, and visitor centers.

Concession stands, overnight accommodations and other private development projects are expected to be built outside the park area.

The National Park Service is expected to build roads into the seashore area from each end of the island with access spurs to the beach, campgrounds, and other visitors' facilities.

[From the Texas Game and Fish magazine, October 1963]

PADRE ISLAND'S SIREN SONG

(By Jack Galloway)

The silver shaft of waveswept sand stabs its way 117 miles down the southern Texas coastline. Honed by the endless caress of the surf, whetted by the salt breeze and tempered by the fire of a blazing summer sun, the knife-blade profile of Padre Island is cutting deeply into the hearts of vacationers from throughout the Nation.

Steeped in history and luxuriating in loveliness, the very sands themselves seem to whisper the echoes of Cabeza de Vaca, Pineda, Padre Balli, and the cannibal Karankawa Indians. But these early travelers left little of lasting note behind, save an occasional handful of Spanish coins uncovered by indefatigable beachcombers, and a historical flavor that adds its own special lure to this semitropical island playground.

Now the island is being discovered for the umpteenth time, this time by the modern day band known as tourists, and it appears likely that their mark will prove indelible. On Padre Island's southern tip, the influx of La Belle Touriste is bringing permanent and lasting change. But no one is complaining; it's a long island, with lots of room.

The responsibility for this change rests primarily on the needs of the vacationing public itself, but more directly on the operation of what is perhaps the most ambitious county park system in the entire State.

In 1954 Cameron County made south Padre Island accessible to everyone by spanning the Laguna Madre with the Queen Isabella Causeway at Port Isabel. At the same time a system of county parks was instituted on the island, which at the time contained only a few scattered fishing shacks. The beginning was timorous and inauspicious, but when the Cameron County parks got going, private development followed inevitably behind, to the point that south Padre Island now boasts luxury resort hotels and scores of private vacation homes.

This year the developmental growth has received added impetus, with three major projects for the two Cameron County parks. There is simply no predicting how far it will go.

Long before the slender island was named Padre, after a Spanish priest who was deeded the land by the King of Spain, Spanish seagoing adventurers called the long barrier reef "Isla Blanca," Spanish for "white island." The Cameron County Park Board has perpetuated the title in its initial park development on the extreme tip of South Padre Island. Isla Blanca Park now offers complete facilities for vacationers the year round, and more is in prospect.

Just completed in Isla Blanca Park is a $125,000 recreational pavilion. The multipurpose facility houses the office of the park director, as well as shuffleboard courts, volleyball equipment and other recreational provisions. It also doubles as a convention and activity center, with the capacity for accommodating 1,000 persons at open convention, or some 750 at banquet. Architecturally outstanding, the recreational pavilion will answer a long-felt need on south Texas' pleasure island. It is the frosting on an already well-sampled resort and recreation cake.

One hundred and seventeen trailer spaces are booked solid throughout the summer in the trailer park at Isla Blanca Park, with easily three-fourths of that capacity utilized the rest of the year. Complete trailer facilities are available, with running water, electricity and sewer connections. The Cameron County Park Board is planning additional trailer sites to meet the growing demand, as mobile home travel increases in popularity throughout the Nation.

Summer and winter visitors who prefer the more simple accommodations for beach vacationing enjoy the overnight shelters of Isla Blanca Park. With no glamor attempted, these facilities are the next step above camping out. The shelters contain bunk beds for four people (with additional cots available) electric hot plates and a cold-water shower. Tenants use the central bathhouse facilities of the trailer park. As nearly primitive as they are, however, the 17 overnight shelters are filled throughout the summer season.

Equally popular are the 32 open cabanas in Isla Blanca Park. Fronting on the Gulf of Mexico, the cabanas are daytime rental facilities, available until 10 p.m. for lounging, loafing, showering, barbecuing, and as a place to call home base during a day's outing at the beach.

Visitors who simply want a place to spread out their picnic lunch in the shade enjoy the picnic pavilion and the patio at the bathhouse, both just a short walk over the sand dunes to the broad expanse of open beach in Isla Blanca Park. There, also, are picnic tables, set up under colorful sunshades.

Is it a vacationer's paradise? Perhaps so and perhaps not, for so varied are the needs and tastes of our Nation's meandering pleasure seekers that one man's cup of orange pekoe might well be another's hemlock. But the Cameron County parks on South Padre Island are constantly instituting changes and planning new facilities to reach that happy state somewhere on the pekoe side, at least.

Itinerant beachgoers raised the forensic roof a few years ago when automobile traffic was closed off on the beach in Isla Blanca Park. The action cut off the cavalier joys of blasting the family lizzie through the sand to spend a day's outing living out of the car and leaving the litter for the sand crabs, seagulls and wafting breezes. But what was also accomplished was the making of probably the safest public beach on the Texas gulf coast. Parents can feel content to let the kids run and play through the sand and surf of Isla Blanca Park with their own childhood abandon. The surf and sandgoers are constantly under the protective eye of well-trained lifeguards, watching from high above the throng in candy-striped guard towers. The safety record in Isla Blanca Park is impeccable.

The park's roster of public facilities is impressive already, but it continues to grow.

Now under construction in Isla Blanca Park is the initial phase of a long-range development program. Construction on a marina and boatel near the foot of the causeway bridge in Isla Blanca Park was begun recently by a development firm. The primary construction phase will establish a marina with 30 boat slips and complete boat-handling facilities, providing immediate access to the adjacent deep waters of the Gulf of Mexico, or a quick outboard run to the favorite bay-fishing haunts of the Laguna Madre. The firm envisions ultimately as many as 400 boat slips for the marina installation.

The firm holds option on additional park land for the construction of a marineland exhibit, to be built across the street from the marina and boatel. It also plans to build an oceanographic research laboratory, from which extensive research and exploratory operations into the Gulf of Mexico can be launched.

All this in Isla Blanca Park.

But there is a second Cameron County park.

Five miles up South Padre Island from all this activity is Andy Bowie Park, named for a former county commissioner. Until this year it was undeveloped, open beach. Now Andy Bowie Park has sprouted a fishing pier that extends 500 feet into the Gulf of Mexico at one of the most choice fishing spots on the lower gulf coast. Another private enterprise venture operating under lease from the Cameron County park system, the fishing pier contains a 200-foot T-head on the end, in water 18 to 20 feet deep. At that point the ocean bottom drops abruptly, providing deep sea fishing the easy way—without sea sickness. At the entrance to the pier is a concession and bait stand, built out over the water, where the general beach-going public as well as the pier-fishing clientele can have sandwiches and what-have-you while enjoying the spendid vista of the waves rolling in below, with the unbroken and seemingly endless sweep of Padre Island stretched out beyond.

The fishing pier is the first installation in the planned overall development of Andy Bowie Park. Envisioned for the very near future is a complete tent and overnight trailer campground to be laid out with all proper facilities just across the sand dunes from the rolling Gulf of Mexico. Also in the master plan is a camp and youth activity center for the Laguna Madre side of Andy Bowie Park.

Beyond that, there is no limit.

But the rumble of the tourist herds is growing louder and louder across the horizon, and as their influx grows, more facilities are certain to be added. There are those who say that with the Padre Island National Seashore soon to occupy the middle 80 miles of the island, the southern end, immediately adjacent, as it is, to Mexico and the lush Rio Grande Valley, will someday burgeon into another Miami Beach. Others say, "Who wants it? We like our Padre Island the way it is, relaxed and peaceful."

But there remains a whopping lot of island, with room for many things.

The Cameron County Park Board is now receiving many requests from various entrepreneurs who would like to put this facility and that into the county parks. And as South Padre Island's popularity grows, so will the requests, so that the major development problem of the future is likely to be that of separating the what's-good-for-the-parks from the what's-bad, trying to keep most of the development, as it were, on the pekoe side of the tourist's cup.

CIVILIAN LEADERSHIP IN THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, more and more people are becoming concerned about the civilian leadership in the Defense Department and the evident determination of this civilian leadership to downgrade and ignore the advice and assistance of distinguished military experts on matters which are vital to our national security. I recall, Mr. President, that in 1961 I first raised the cry here in the Senate against what was popularly known as the muzzling of our military leaders by the civilian leadership in the Pentagon and also by the State Department. My efforts to present this to the public were hampered, ridiculed, and ignored as much as possible by many in the Congress, in the news media, and particularly by the civilian leadership in the Pentagon and the State Department.

Since that time, Mr. President, more and more evidence has come to the fore to the effect that our military leaders are having to take a back seat to computing machines and the civilian whiz kids who seem to make most of the decisions in the Pentagon these days through the Secretary of Defense.

A distinguished military analyst, Mr. George Fielding Eliot, has written for the American Legion magazine of November 1963, an eloquent article on the subject of "The Conflict in the Pentagon: Does the Secretary of Defense Put Housekeeping Ahead of National Security?—That's the Question."

In view of the increasing congressional concern over the muzzling and downgrading of our military leaders, I believe that the Members of the Congress would find this article to be interesting and informative reading. Therefore, I ask unanimous consent, Mr. President, to have this article printed in the RECORD at the conclusion of these remarks.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

THE CONFLICT IN THE PENTAGON

(By George Fielding Eliot)

In the early spring of 1963, the lightnings of press and congressional criticism played fiercely around the unbowed head of Robert S. McNamara, the dynamic and very tough Secretary of Defense of the United States. The occasion of this violent outburst was McNamara's decision to award the contract for a new aircraft—called TFX for tactical fighter experimental—to General Dynamics of Fort Worth, Tex., instead of the Boeing firm at Seattle, Wash.

This contract is not peanuts. It involves the production of up to 1,700 planes for the

Navy and Air Force, and the total price tag attached to it is estimated at $6 to $7 billion. It also involves 20,000 prime jobs in the period 1963-1969. So when it was disclosed that Boeing's bid had actually been somewhat lower than that of the successful General Dynamics outfit, outraged cries were heard both from the losers and from disappointed politicians such as Senator HENRY M. JACKSON, Democrat, of Washington. The latter immediately demanded a closed-door inquiry by the Senate's Permanent Investigations Subcommittee chaired by the redoubtable Senator JOHN L. MCCLELLAN, Democrat, of Arkansas, ostensibly to determine whether favoritism played any part in the decision.

Senator JACKSON hardly believed that McNamara had been influenced by favoritism. What he did think is what many other anxious Members of both Houses of Congress have been saying, openly for the most part and with increasing frequency—that McNamara is paying insufficient attention to the views of professional military men and tends to make high-level decisions of great military consequence largely on data supplied by young, fast thinking civilian analysts whose military experience is zero.

The McClellan investigation, as far as revealed, has focused on the point that in the TFX decision, McNamara set aside the repeated and unanimous recommendations of the military evaluation boards, all of which favored the Boeing offer as promising superior performance. Leaks from the investigation resulted in headlines playing up this feature, and leaks from other interested sources—some in the Pentagon itself—added to the clamor.

Similar charges of ignoring military advice had already been leveled at McNamara in regard to his refusal to go ahead with the RS-70 long-range strike plane, his cancellation of the Skybolt airborne missile, and his delay in advancing the Nike-Zeus antimissile missile from a research project to production status. Any notions that the hearings would cause the stubborn Secretary to change his decision about TFX were wrong.

Instead, he fought back with his usual vigor. "Fighting Bob is at it again," said Time, quoting McNamara's angry statement to the McClellan subcommittee that its leaks and partial releases of testimony had "needlessly undermined public confidence in the integrity and judgment of the highest officals of the Department of Defense."

McNamara had much more to say. He produced—as he generally does—carefully prepared and "quantified" answers about the merits of his decision. He had never taken his eye off his target: one plane for both Navy and Air Force, not two planes as the services both wanted. This would save up to $1 billion in production and maintenance costs and simplified spare parts inventories. Some modifications between the Navy and Air Force versions would be permitted, but General Dynamics came closer to real "commonality" (or two-service plane) than did Boeing. Boeing's design did promise better performance in some respects, but both designs satisfied the basic military requirements of the services.

The real decision turned on McNamara's judgment, reinforced by that of both service Secretaries. Their choice boiled down to this: With General Dynamics we have a relatively reliable prospect of getting a steady flow of satisfactory aircraft according to schedule; with Boeing we are less certain about timely delivery and are not even sure their lower cost estimates will not be offset by production bugs besides their less satisfactory meeting of the "commonality" requirement. So stated, this was a decision which turned less on the military qualities of the two designs that on production prospects and McNamara's favorite yardstick of cost effectiveness. It was, therefore, a decision which fell properly within the province of the civilian leadership of the Defense Department. That was the McNamara story on TFX, in substance, and he stuck to it determinedly.

A little later in the spring, he again underlined his determination to be master in his own house. The Chief of Naval Operations, Adm. George W. Anderson, and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, rugged Gen. Curtis B. LeMay, had not liked the TFX decision and had said so to the McClellan committee in vigorous language. The 2-year terms of both Chiefs expired in August. Admiral Anderson was suddenly notified that he would not be reappointed for a second term, as had been the usual custom; General LeMay was reappointed for a single year only. Press and congressional comment linked this action to McNamara's discontent with the TFX testimony of the two officers. There followed subsurface rumblings in the Navy and Air Force sections of the Pentagon. The Navy was already apprehensive about a new McNamara order that the value of the fleet as a whole must be restudied in relation to the cost of defending the fleet against air attack. The Air Force, already smarting under the RS-70 decision and the Skybolt cancellation, foresaw not only the eventual disappearance of manned aircraft as nuclear delivery systems but also a challenge to their close-support mission by the swift expansion of the Army's own aviation.

The Army has made notable gains under McNamara (with a strong assist from Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, now Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff). It rejoices in new weapons, 16 combat-ready divisions instead of 11, and a prospective increase in global mobility with the expansion of airlift.

But the Army shares with the other services the gathering anxieties as to the weight accorded to professional experience in top-level decisions. The Anderson-LeMay crackdown suggested ominously that McNamara would not tolerate any future military questioning of his judgments.

"Maybe," some military long-range thinkers in the Pentagon began to reason, "outright opposition isn't the best way of dealing with the McNamara phenomenon. He's got a hard head, and whatever impression we make is quickly offset by public admiration for his courage and the growing notion that he's doing a job that has long needed doing. Let's turn our attention to improving communications—with the Secretary himself and the whole crew of civilian analysts and researchers he sets such store by. Our real object ought to be to find a way to hitch up the McNamara drive and energy to the military values that he doesn't yet fully accept. Let's admit that analysis has some very real values and try to get the Secretary's civilian analysts to admit—as some of 'em are beginning to—that it also has its limits, beyond which judgment and military experience must be relied on."

This "creed of New Hope," as skeptics promptly dubbed it, has shown some promise, but it has not healed all the wounds, nor allayed the deep-seated misgivings, born of even deeper seated military instincts, which torment many veteran officers.

These misgivings revolve around two questions which bear directly on the security of the Nation.

1. Is the development of decisionmaking machinery which is tailored to the needs and capabilities of "a very special kind of Secretary of Defense with a most unusual array of assistants" producing a defense establishment which can be readily and smoothly taken over by Mr. McNamara's successor in office? Will not the inevitable change, when it comes, result in an interval of relative chaos which an alert enemy might well anticipate, and which (if it occurs as the result of an election) might be so predictable that hostile exploitation could be prepared in advance?

2. Have overcentralization and overcivilianization already impaired the capability of the defense establishment to react effectively and in timely fashion to any sudden emergency—especially one which might require prompt transfer of authority and responsibility to military commanders? In short, is the military being stripped of initiative which it must exercise in an emergency?

The one major crisis of the McNamara regime was the naval "quarantine" of Cuba last year to compel the withdrawal of Soviet ballistic missiles from the island. Its handling served to feed the anxieties over the destruction of military initiative. In the Cuban instance, the established system of military control was literally pushed aside in favor of a committee, largely civilian in composition and chaired by the President in person, which met daily during the crisis. It issued, through Secretary McNamara, the most detailed daily orders covering such minute points as the exact type and scope of aerial reconnaissance to be carried out each day, and just what steps should be taken to inspect each Soviet ship departing Cuba with a deckload of missiles.

The responsible operational command was the Atlantic Command under Adm. Robert L. Dennison, with which officer Mr. McNamara should normally have communicated through the Joint Chiefs of Staff by means of a directive embodying the President's orders. The details of execution should have been left in Admiral Dennison's experienced and able hands, and in those of his naval task force commanders and the ship skippers—a course far more efficient and far safer than trying to run the show from a Washington committee room practically on an hour-to-hour basis.

The consciousness that the Secretary of Defense was breathing down his neck was certainly no help to Admiral Dennison. The constant stream of minutely detailed orders—not always either responsive to a changing situation or consistent with previous instructions—was no help to the commanders who were actually dealing with the situation at sea and in the air.

It may be urged that this was a very special instance, one in which the President himself felt so deep a sense of responsibility, where the Soviet reaction was so uncertain and potentially terrible, that the tightest kind of personal Presidential grip on the controls was an inescapable requirement. But allowing for that, was it not the duty of the Secretary of Defense to protect the integrity of the military chain of command in passing on the President's orders, instead of taking personal charge himself?

"Certainly, in principle," an officer commented. "But although the principle involved has been developed from the military experience of 25 centuries, there's just no means of communicating it to McNamara so that he'll accept it. He's simply incapable of realizing that there can be times when the decision of what to do next is much better left to a three-stripe destroyer skipper standing on his bridge looking at a situation than to Bob McNamara sitting in Washington with all the miracles of modern communication at his service."

Military opinion is nearly unanimous that McNamara's basic difficulty from the first day he took office has been just this baffling inability to communicate with professional military men. He thinks fast and learns incredibly fast in terms of facts and figures, but not in terms of intangibles. He has an energy and drive which have been described as "ferocious." He is impatient with answers to question which are slow in coming or which do not seem to him sufficiently responsive or precise.

"If you can't explain your answer, you don't understand the problem," is one of

his maxims. He has not disguised his dissatisfaction with competent military associates who have given him answers drawn from the depth of their experience, but who are hard pressed at times to produce convincing, detailed, hot-off-the-griddle supporting explanations that can be mathematically "qualified."

More and more he has tended to depend on answers provided by quick-minded civilian research analysts drawn from civilian institutions such as the Rand Corp. and the Institute of Defense Analyses. These are on the whole freewheeling young men who regard the most sacred concepts of the military profession with skepticism, and what they are pleased to call the military mind with unconcealed disdain.

McNamara's favorite measuring stick for the validity of any proposal is "cost effectiveness." He thinks in terms of dollars and of figures. Ideas which don't lend themselves to those terms he regards with suspicion. Considering the enormous financial burden which today's defense requirements impose on the Nation's taxpayers, no Secretary of Defense can ignore the dollar valuation of his decisions. There are, however, troubled military men in high Pentagon assignments who believe that McNamara can hardly be induced to consider any argument which can't be evaluated in dollars and figures, that he tends to dismiss military judgment and experience as "emotion" unless it can be mathematically expressed. Also he likes fast answers—as one officer puts it, "he gives the impression he'd rather be rapid than right." But another officer admitted ruefully, "It's our own fault if we're in trouble. Our Joint Staff-Joint Chiefs of Staff system is the best and most reliable setup for fighting and winning a war that the mind of man has yet devised, as the Germans and Japanese learned to their cost. But in peacetime, without the prodding of a war, the system often moves slowly. McNamara is a man who can't wait patiently for his answers, so he sets his whiz kids digging at lower echelons for facts and figures and alternatives, and by the time a finalized JCS paper gets to his desk he already has a paper of his own drawn up by these bright youngsters with more or less advice from subordinate military people. Because it's written in the terms in which McNamara thinks himself, he may like this paper better than the JCS production. The job that we professionals have to do is to get McNamara to understand that there are limits to what theoretical analysis can do for him, that it is only an aid to human judgment and not a substitute for it."

The new Secretary took over the Defense Department on January 21, 1961, amid a barrage of press comment—to which this writer contributed—that asserted with a confidence based on past experience that a brandnew Secretary with no military experience except a wartime hitch as a statistical officer in the Air Force would certainly take a year or two to get the hang of his job and become anything like effective.

McNamara was sternly resolved to prove otherwise—and he was completely confident that he could do just that. "He didn't underestimate the size of the job," a civilian aid remarked. "He just figured that he was equal to it despite its appalling dimensions." McNamara was also aware that strong pressures had been brought to bear on the incoming President to reappoint, at least for the time being, the last of President Eisenhower's three Secretaries of Defense, Thomas S. Gates, Jr. Gates in his single year of office had displayed great ability and certainly possessed the full confidence of the military. McNamara promised himself that he would prove to President Kennedy that no mistake had been made in the final decision. He, however, can hardly have understood the handicap under which he would suffer—his lack of that "visceral understanding" of military men and their motivations which was the key to Gates' close relationship and easy communication with the services and the Joint Chiefs, as had been the case with Robert A. Lovett and James Forrestal in earlier times.

McNamara had his own view of the special interests of the services—"knocking heads together" was not his own way of putting it, but it was his concept of how to deal with service differences of viewpoint. This view started the new Secretary off with a certain distrust of military judgments as being predominantly merely pro-Army, or pro-Navy or pro-Air Force. Experience has begun to erode this distrust, but it is still not wholly eliminated. Combined with his tremendous self-confidence, this has led McNamara to insist on "finalizing" all important decisions himself. His almost incredible capacity for hard work enabled him to make good on this resolve.

The writer will not soon forget the distress with which a very senior Army officer told of McNamara's court order regarding ROAD—reorganization of Army divisions—a huge Army-wide concept that was fairly well under way when McNamara took over.

"Before this is approved," the Secretary snapped, "you are going to have to convince me of the need for every man, every weapon, every vehicle." The general simply could not believe that any one man could find time and energy to make decisions in such detail and go on doing it—"It just means that the decisions will actually be made by some half-baked civilian analyst or maybe a junior officer in the Secretary's office instead of being made by the Army staff."

But the general wasn't quite right. Robert McNamara has managed to find the time to deal personally with the ROAD decisions as with many others equally detailed. Sometimes he does make snap judgments which he sticks to stubbornly and which are not always fortunate—as when an adviser came in with a paper suggesting that in applying the somewhat flexible ROAD concept to the National Guard, an average strength of 88 company-sized units per division might be a useful rule of thumb.

"Whereupon," the adviser relates, "the trap clicked shut on me. Mac had a figure, and that was it. Now no National Guard division can have either more or less than 88 company units no matter how much better a different number might fit its mission and its local circumstances. The cardinal virtue of ROAD—organizational flexibility—is to this extent denied the National Guard because the boss just doesn't think in terms of military values which can't be fed into a computer."

Nevertheless, Secretary McNamara's decisionmaking machinery is not entirely a one-man show. It couldn't be and get the work done.

The Office of the Secretary of Defense has grown and grown as more and more people are required to feed papers, information, and computerized data into the McNamara personal-decision mill. A graphic illustration of what this may mean is presented by Col. William R. Kintner in the Naval Review—two charts contrasting the organization of the Defense Department (Gates model) on January 1, 1961, and (McNamara model) in March 1961. In both charts, the Secretary of Defense is at the top of the pyramid. There all similarity ends.

In the Gates chart, the next line below the Secretary of Defense was occupied by a civilian-military balance. On one side of the center line were the Joint Chiefs of Staff with the unified and specified commands below them (according to the established military chain of command). On the other side were two separate civilian-ruled areas, the Office of the Secretary of Defense with its Assistant Secretaries and other senior officials, and the three military departments with the service Secretaries of Army, Navy, and Air Force, in association with their Chiefs of Staff.

In the McNamara chart, the Assistant Secretary of Defense appears directly under the Secretary of Defense, above everything else, showing visually the new domination of the Secretary's immediate staff over all the remainder of the Defense Establishment. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the military departments occupy opposite ends of the third line, together with the new Defense Supply Agency. Colonel Kintner reserves judgment as to the interpretation of this chart as a guide to the future, suggesting that it might be "more charitable" to call it a "Freudian slip * * * which unconsciously reflected the inner attitude of the new defense team."

An equally graphic illustration was furnished the writer by a military friend who is not stationed in the Pentagon but has occasional reason to visit it. "Every time I get back there," he reported, "I find that the spaces occupied by various functionaries of the Office of the Secretary of Defense have spread a little farther in both directions around the E Ring. It won't be too long before the three service Secretaries and the Chiefs of Staff are all relegated to the inside offices which are doubtless considered the appropriate status-symbol of their reduced importance."

That the status of the three service Secretaries had indeed been sharply downgraded can hardly be questioned.

Nominally they still have some degree of independence, as Congress always has intended they should.

For a service Secretary to be able to command the respect and loyalty of his own service, he must be able to champion the views and objectives of that service with some effect. He must not merely be a transmission belt for carrying out the wishes of the Secretary of Defense.

McNamara's first Secretaries of the Army and the Navy (Elvis J. Stahr and John B. Connally, Jr.) have both left the Pentagon because they could not stomach the downgrading of their historic offices. Mr. Stahr has subsequently expressed anxiety lest "the leadership of the military services might become stultified and its identities and initiative lost to the Government. * * * The Department of Defense is too big to be run by only a few people, and (anyway) there just are not enough McNamaras."

Granting that Mr. McNamara has met frequently with the service Secretaries since he took office, Mr. Stahr went on to say: "The frequency of these contacts, however, led to continuous intrusion on his part in many small details of the administration of the services." Mr. Connally has been somewhat more reticent as to his experiences, though he is reported to have told a friend that he went to Washington thinking that he was to be Secretary of the Navy and left when he discovered otherwise.

Mr. McNamara also meets with the Joint Chiefs of Staff more regularly than any previous Secretary of Defense except Mr. Gates, but the difficulties of communication and of viewpoint already referred to have made these meetings far less productive than they ought to be.

Unquestionably, there has grown up a feeling of deep mutual distrust between the professional military officers on the one hand and the civilian scientists and analysts on the other. This feeling is exacerbated by the often disdainful attitude of the civilians, or occasional loss of temper by one of the military when it is demanded of him that he reduce to a mathematical formula a military value-judgment which cannot be measured in that fashion. Every civilian analyst knows that he must satisfy the standard McNamara requirement that "for every proposed expenditure, there must be a proven benefit; and for every benefit, the cost must

be measured and all possible alternatives examined to determine whether the same result can be attained by expanding existing programs or in some other less expensive way. Show me the benefit; show me the cost; and show me the proof."

Under such a system it is far easier to wash out existing projects while still in the development stage than it is to initiate new projects and keep them alive until they reach the stage of actual production of military hardware. Few indeed are the military novelties that the McNamara regime has produced so far; but its path is well marked by the tombstones of projects which have become the victims of cost effectiveness—at times against a substantial weight of military opposition.

Here is the very nub of the public question which underlies the present conflict in the Pentagon. It is a well-worn cliche to term the Department of Defense "the biggest business in the world"—but it is not a business in which the annual profit-and-loss figures are the final criteria of success or failure. Its success is measured by the degree to which it continues from year to year to conserve the safety of the Nation.

Remembering always the continued presence of formidable enemies, the constant likelihood—indeed the certainty—of future attempts at surprise (as in Korea and Cuba), how far should cost-effectiveness and business-type analyses be depended on to come up with the right answers? Acknowledging the very real value of these processes within prudent limits, is there not a point beyond which military judgment and instinct, born of experience, must be given priority? If we do have another war of even limited dimensions, it is from the military chiefs that the Nation will expect the decisions that will mean victory or defeat. A system of peacetime decisionmaking in which military judgment and initiative are consistently subordinated to financial and housekeeping considerations is hardly a system which develops a healthy interplay of initiative and responsibility between civilian and military leaders.

This is one of those rather rare situations in which compromise could provide a happy solution. The rather significant success already achieved by military officers on duty in the Pentagon in improving communications and restoring mutual confidence between military and civilian personnel at what may be called the second and third echelons of decision has already been noted. But the top level remains—and at the top level stands Robert S. McNamara with his powerful personality, and his vast—and often justified—self-confidence.

Can Secretary McNamara be brought to understand that there is a limit to the value of quantified analysis in reaching the momentous decisions which are his to make? Can he be convinced that beyond that limit he must accept the considered judgment of military professionals whose wisdom is drawn from sources foreign to his own experience?

If he can, Robert McNamara's place in history as one of our truly great Secretaries of Defense seems assured. If he cannot, the American people must walk with danger in the years that lie ahead.

OPPORTUNITIES FOR FAMILY FARM VACATIONS

Mr. HART. Mr. President, we have heard a great deal in recent years about the opportunities for family farm vacations.

A few days ago the Mason-Lake Soil Conservation District newsletter came to my desk telling of such opportunities on the Carl Eikenberry farm in Mason County, Mich.

Here is a new form of family recreation which I am convinced will become increasingly popular in the years ahead, and I commend the Mason-Lake Soil Conservation District for their leadership in supporting this new source of income for rural families.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that this newsletter article describing the Eikenberry farm be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

FARM VACATIONS IN MASON COUNTY

Vacation farming heralds a new type of income for the American farmer. It might best be thought of as a byproduct of the farm. On a vacation farm, paying guests come and live on the farm for a vacation. Pioneering in this type of farming in Mason County, is the Carl Eikenberry family. On their farm the guests live right with the family. Mrs. Eikenberry cooks the meals and the guests can observe the farming operation and chores that are being done at the time of their visit.

The Eikenberry's own a 116-acre farm. They have 55 head of dairy cattle, a 3½-acre orchard and a large family garden. After observing this farm operation one might describe it as a typical family farm. That is what makes it a good vacation farm. Many persons that live in the large cities were raised on farms. They miss the quiet restful farm life of their youth. Vacation farming allows them a chance to enjoy rural living again and also gives the vacation farmer an additional income.

Last June, Mr. Eikenberry was assisted by the Soil Conservation Service in developing a complete soil and water conservation plan for his farm. For his cropland a rotation was selected. It was based on two needs: (1) The type of crops needed for his farm operation; (2) the type of rotation that can be used safely on his fields. Other soil and water conservation practices Mr. Eikenberry will use on his cropland will be soil testing, lime and fertilizer application, cover crops, and crop residue use. He will renovate his pastureland for top production. Selective cutting will be done in his woods to improve the quality of his timber. Three wildlife areas will be improved to encourage small game and songbirds. This will be done by planting shrubbery and pines for food and cover.

In addition to seeing the regular operation of this dairy farm, the Eikenberry's have provided means for recreation and relaxation for their guests. Badminton, croquet, and horseshoes can be played on the lawn. Besides cooking the meals, Mrs. Eikenberry makes homemade butter and bakes bread for the guests. Next year they plan horseback riding and a program for butterfly collecting. A walking trail is planned for the future with the identification of trees along the way. Fourteen different kinds of trees have been found along the proposed trail.

The guests at the Eikenberry farm this summer were two families from St. Louis, one family from Pennsylvania, one family from Detroit, and a young girl from Indiana. The guests usually stay for 1 week, however, they will take them for weekends or overnight. This summer the Eikenberry's just advertised for families as guests, but next year they will accept groups of children as well as families.

"We feel that it is a good farm supplement and we thoroughly enjoyed having the guests" said Mr. Eikenberry. "We haven't traveled extensively and we find this a good source of travel experience" he added.

Mr. Eikenberry feels to be successful with vacation farming it is most important that one enjoys having people around. He also told how some of the guests enjoyed helping with farmwork. This summer the family from Detroit helped with baling the straw and hay.

The Eikenberrys belong to the Farm Vacation and Holidays, Inc. There are 202 farms in the United States that belong. Last year there were two farms from Michigan that belonged, now there are seven.

"This is a growing thing," said Mr. Eikenberry.

DISCRIMINATION AGAINST CERTAIN NATURALIZED CITIZENS

Mr. HART. Mr. President, on October 30 the Washington Post commented editorially on the change in citizenship laws which has been proposed by the distinguished junior Senator from Rhode Island, Senator PELL.

As the editorial notes, the Supreme Court presently is considering this discrimination against our naturalized citizens which requires special residency standards if they are to retain their United States citizenship.

I know that I am joined by many of our colleagues when I indicate support not only for this change but also for changes in other provisions which tend to limit the privileges and rights of U.S. citizens for those who are naturalized citizens.

The junior Senator from Rhode Island is to be commended for his leadership, pointing as he does to injustices which continue to exist in our citizenship laws. His role in support of immigration reform rightly has attracted national attention and praise. The repealer which is the subject of the editorial is but a part of the many constructive suggestions made by Senator PELL.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the editorial from the Washington Post of October 30 be printed at this point in my remarks.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

RELIC OF ISOLATIONISM

Sometime within the next few months the Supreme Court will decide whether Congress may impose on naturalized citizens penalties that may not be inflicted on native-born citizens. Meanwhile, however, Congress also has the issue before it in the form of a repealer introduced by Senator CLAIBORNE PELL. If Congress would hasten to correct this grave injustice to naturalized citizens, the difficult constitutional issue would not have to be decided.

The case which the Court has consented to hear is that of Angelika L. Schneider, who came here from Germany at the age of 4 and was naturalized while in college. Having grown up in this country, she has an attachment to it, but since 1956 she has been living in Germany with her husband, a German attorney. Under the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1940 she has forfeited her citizenship by living in her native land for more than 3 years since her naturalization.

Similarly the law provides that a naturalized citizen living abroad in any foreign land for 5 years loses his citizenship. Since Congress could not impose any such harsh penalty on a native-born citizen, there is a good deal of substance in the argument that this reduces those who are naturalized to second-class citizenship. In 1913 the Supreme Court asserted that "under our Constitution, a naturalized citizen stands on an equal foot-

ing with the native citizen in all respects save that of eligibility to the Presidency."

The present Court may or may not find this view controlling, but any conscientious legislator should be able to see that it is unreasonable punishment to deprive a citizen of his rights as an American for merely living abroad for a few years. It is said that this unreasonable provision stripped citizenship from 1,200 Americans in a recent 12-month period. Why the irrational haste to disclaim citizens who cherish their acquired allegiance to this country? Regardless of what the Court may decide, Congress ought to repeal this harsh and self-defeating relic from the isolationist years.

AUTOMATION AND THE DISINHERITED

Mr. BOGGS. Mr. President, the story of automation, its promises as well as its problems, is being covered in increasing detail by news media of our country. This emphasis is well placed. Automation, which has as companions people out of work and people in need of training, may well be the overriding economic problem to face the United States this century.

What occasions my comment today is the sobering article, "Automation and the Disinherited," which is carried in the November 5 edition of the Christian Science Monitor, a fine newspaper which consistently carries articles of worth.

It begins by quoting Richard L. Worsnop of Editorial Research Reports, who says:

There is general agreement that automation is a more serious threat to employment than was the Industrial Revolution.

It is because of the magnitude of the economic change which is accompanying automation that I have long advocated a White House conference on automation, a conference which would have local community education about automation as its most important product. Only after automation was studied at local levels would delegates meet in Washington to sift the best ideas for living with the changes of automation and for making the most of them for the good of the public as a whole. Passage of S. 185 would bring about the White House conference we need.

I mentioned that people in need of training are companions of automation, and so they are. For this reason we need greatly expanded programs of education for employment in this country.

Automation, unemployment, and training also have a vital tie-in with the need for jobs if minorities in this country are to improve their lot. In this connection I am proud to mention the position on hiring practices emphasized 2 days ago by Henry B. Du Pont, a director of the great Du Pont Co. in my State.

Mr. Du Pont said:

Our policy—and every branch of the company is aware of it—is not to discriminate against any employee or applicant for employment because of race, creed, color, national origin, or ancestry with respect to hiring, promotion, demotion, transfer, recruitment, termination, rates of pay, or other forms of compensation and selection for training.

Mr. Du Pont added:

Unfortunately our experience right here in Wilmington as well as elsewhere in the country is that only a very small percentage of Negroes are adequately prepared for the kinds of jobs that American industry will need to fill in the years ahead.

Mr. President, in the interests of spreading information about automation, and with the sincere hope that it will be carefully read by my colleagues, I ask unanimous consent that the article referred to from the Christian Science Monitor be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Christian Science Monitor, Nov. 5, 1963]

AUTOMATION AND THE DISINHERITED—TECHNOLOGY MAKES MORE JOBS, IT IS TRUE, BUT NOT ALWAYS, OR OFTEN, FOR THE PEOPLE WHO ARE DISPLACED

"There is general agreement that automation is a more serious threat to employment than was the industrial revolution." In this striking statement, Richard L. Worsnop, of Editorial Research Reports, speaks the views of some businessmen as well as of labor leaders and government authorities.

John I. Snyder, Jr., board chairman of U.S. Industries, Inc., a company that makes automatic machinery, admits, "We're using sophisticated machines to destroy jobs." His company is financing a foundation, cosponsored with the International Association of Machinists, to study problems of technological displacement.

John F. Henning, Under Secretary of Labor, estimates that 2.2 million jobs a year are eliminated in the United States by increased output per man-hour due largely to technological progress. This means that new jobs need to be found for 40,000 displaced workers a week besides new workers.

The classical contention has been that invention creates new jobs as it wipes out old ones. But as applied to automation, or "cybernetics," Mr. Snyder declares this is "a myth." And Mr. Worsnop sums up the evidence thus:

"Ideally, displaced workers should be the first to share in the benefits of automation. So far, just the opposite has been true. Workers who have managed to hold on to their jobs in automated factories find working conditions and fringe benefits improved. Many of those who have lost their jobs to machines are likely to remain unemployed, or employed only part time, for the remainder of their lives."

MINERS: FROM PAYROLLS TO DANGEROUS "DOG HOLES"

One of the regions where displacement of this sort has taken a most heavy toll is described by Homer Bigart in the New York Times. In the Cumberland Mountains of eastern Kentucky tens of thousands of idle miners, replaced by coal-cutting machines, face a winter of grinding poverty. "Three generations of living on handouts," he reports, has eroded their self-respect and "resulted in a whipped, dispirited community."

In one county even Government surplus foods are not available because the county has no funds to fetch and distribute them. Able-bodied men, barred from the relief rolls, leave their families so the women can qualify for aid to dependent children (ADC).

These, as described by A. H. Raskin in the Saturday Evening Post, are "the once-proud men whose high wages and industry-financed pensions made them the soot-smudged aristocrats of American labor only a dozen years ago." Today some of them "scratch out a perilous subsistence" in played-out pits or "dog holes" where the coal seam is too thin for effective mechanization.

All this takes place while Department of Commerce statistics show that the gross national product for the country at large has risen to an annual rate of more than $588 billion and disposable personal income is at a new high of more than $400 billion annually.

ARE AMERICANS LIVING IN TWO COMPARTMENTS?

Several months ago the traveling interviewer, Samuel Lubell, observed that while older workers in stable industries were doing well, many younger workers "have been virtually walled out * * * by seniority rights and high fringe benefits."

Does this mean that, unless steps are taken to prevent it, a situation described by Prof. Andrew Hacker, of Cornell University, is taking shape? To the American Political Science Association, September 6, Dr. Hacker said, "It may well be that two Americas are emerging, one a society protected by the corporate umbrella and the other a society whose members have failed to affiliate themselves with the dominant institutions.

If such a situation is to be avoided there will have to be some hard thinking, planning, and doing about it in the United States. There are remedies but they are not automatic. Congress and State legislatures have hardly caught up with the age of the typewriter, let alone the computer.

Some remedies are nonpolitical. For example, does all research have to be directed toward using mineral and other inorganic resources? Why not more research and development toward devising industries that can utilize relatively unskilled or semiskilled hands? Ingenuity has found use for once waste materials from bones and sawdust to cinders and bagasse; why not for surplus human resources? Industry already does vast amounts of training and retraining; but a company can afford this only where there is a prospect of use within its own organization.

Much of the need in an age of rising technology is for a spread of elementary education, then for more and better vocational education, and finally for retraining programs where an obsolete skill must be replaced by a current one.

HOPE IN EDUCATION AND REHABILITATION

This calls for more schools such as one in New Haven, Conn., described in the October Reader's Digest by Lester Velie—an elementary school that has made itself a 16-hour-a-day community center in a slum neighborhood and sparks an interest in learning among Negro families hitherto without hope.

It calls also for such initiative as has been displayed in Chicago, where the Cook County Welfare and Rehabilitation Service last year placed in jobs 12,000 persons formerly on the relief rolls. It did this by a basic literacy program and evening vocational or high school courses which welfare recipients were required to take. In addition, 5,000 relief clients were put on work projects for the city, county, or State.

The problem of idle human resources is complicated by the fact that in some States compensation is being paid to persons in fairly comfortable circumstances while in others the compensation payments have been exhausted by workers whose families are hungry and for whom the prospect of reemployment is remote if not nonexistent.

Among workers with displaced skills, such as notably the coal miners, one of two needs exists. Either new industry must be brought to them or they must be retrained and enabled to move where employment is assured. The latter course involves some kind of sustenance payments.

LABOR-INDUSTRY FUNDS ONLY PARTLY SUCCESSFUL

Automation, through its economies, does create new market demands and ultimately new jobs—but they are not generally for the same people, or even the sons and daughters of the same people, unless a great deal

of human relations engineering is introduced into the process.

Efforts of unions and industries to cushion the effect of technological change by special funds for this purpose have been only partly successful. One of the first, in the packinghouse industry, produced only 8 retrained persons out of 431 laid off. The Pacific Maritime Association, in agreement with the Longshoremen's Union, has set up a fund by which profits from greater efficiency stabilize weekly earnings and sweeten retirement pay.

Unquestionably, technological advancement can introduce new jobs as it obliterates old ones. Prof. Walter Buckingham, a labor mediator, says most of the jobs held by workers in the United States today "would not exist if it were not for technology."

Yet, to return to Mr. Snyder, this seller of automation believes that in time machines will do most of the work of humans. "People—living, breathing, feeling, and thinking people—" he says, "somehow will have to learn to do nothing in a constructive way." Many of them already have found enriching uses for the leisure.

Will machines further shorten the work week and leave even the employed with time on their hands? Will a few be busier than ever correlating the functions of the machines? And will some unhappy thousands, even millions, find themselves left out of such an economy altogether? To avoid this last possibility, the President's Committee on Labor Management Policy says, "Achievement of technological progress without sacrifice of human values requires a combination of private and Government action consonant with the principles of a free society."

The PRESIDING OFFICER. If there be no further morning business, morning business is closed.

AMENDMENT OF FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1961

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair lays before the Senate the unfinished business.

The Senate resumed the consideration of the bill (H.R. 7885) to amend further the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and for other purposes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the Holland amendment to the so-called Mansfield-Dirksen amendments to the committee amendment. The Holland amendment to the Mansfield-Dirksen amendments will be stated.

The LEGISLATIVE CLERK. On page 1, line 8, of the Mansfield-Dirksen amendments, it is proposed to strike out "1,500,000,000" and insert in lieu thereof $975,000,000".

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, on the question of agreeing to the Holland amendment to the Mansfield-Dirksen amendments, I ask for the yeas and nays.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

Mr. ELLENDER. Mr. President, I rise to support the Holland amendment to the Mansfield-Dirksen amendments, but I point out several things which may not be understood by some of the opponents of this measure. I did not hear anything said on the Senate floor about these matters.

When the authorization for the Development Loan Fund was granted in the 1961 act, under section 202 it was provided that for the first year the appropriation would be $1.2 billion, and for the 4 years following 1962 it would be at the rate of $1.5 billion.

As I understand the Holland amendment to the Mansfield-Dirksen amendments, it seeks to make the authorization for 1965 and 1966, $975 million a year. I invite the attention of Senators to the fact that if that action is taken, the $975 million, under that limitation, will not be the only amount which can be appropriated for that purpose, because the authorization bill contains the following proviso:

Provided, That any unappropriated portion of the amount authorized to be appropriated for any such fiscal year may be appropriated in any subsequent fiscal year during the above period, in addition to the amount otherwise authorized to be appropriated for such subsequent fiscal year.

I wish to call to the attention of the Senate the fact that in 1962, although there was an authorization of $1.2 billion, the amount actually appropriated was only $1,112,500,000—leaving for future appropriation $87,500,000; and during the past fiscal year, 1963, although the Senate could have appropriated for this purpose $1.5 billion, it actually appropriated only $975 million—thereby leaving the sum of $525 million which could be appropriated either this year or in fiscal year 1965 or in fiscal year 1966.

So the amounts left over from 1962 and 1963 aggregate $612,500,000. Therefore, even though the Holland amendment to the Mansfield-Dirksen amendments were to be adopted, Congress could appropriate as much as $612,500,000 over and above the $975 million contained in the Holland amendment.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will the Senator from Louisiana yield?

Mr. ELLENDER. I yield.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. There would not be any additional amount, because it is limited, by the Holland amendment, to $975 million.

Mr. ELLENDER. No; because the Holland amendment does not eliminate the proviso. The Holland amendment merely changes the figure "$1,500,000,000" to "$975,000,000"; but the proviso in section 202 still remains, and I point out that even though the Holland amendment were to be adopted, for the fiscal year 1965, Congress would have a right to provide—if the Mansfield-Dirksen amendments as thus amended were adopted—in addition to the $975 million provided for by the Holland amendment, $612,500,000. I repeat that this results from the fact that under the 1962 appropriation we had unused authorization of $87,500,000; and under the appropriation made for the fiscal year 1963, we had unused authorization in the amount of $525 million.

I wish to make it perfectly plain that although I believe the Holland amendment is a step in the right direction, nevertheless, even though that amendment to the Mansfield amendments were adopted, come next year Congress would have authority to increase the $975 million by as much as an additional $612,500,000.

I thought I would bring that point to the attention of the Senate, so Senators would know about it in advance of the vote on the Holland amendment to the Mansfield-Dirksen amendments.

THIRTY-SEVEN SENATORS HAVE SPONSORED OVER TWENTY-FIVE SUBSTANTIVE AMENDMENTS TO FOREIGN AID BILL

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, it is most surprising that the press, radio, and television, in reporting the very vital debate on foreign aid, which now has been going on in the Senate for the past 5 days, has not brought home to the American public the important fact that the debate is in great measure centered on how the program is administered and will be administered, rather than on how many dollars are to be authorized for the foreign aid program.

From reading the reports appearing in the daily press or from listening to them on the radio and television, it would seem as though the entire Senate has been engaged in a numbers game about whether the overall amount to be authorized should be $4.5 billion, $4.2 billion, $3.8 billion, or $3.5 billion.

Mr. President, with the concession made by the Mansfield amendments, thus lowering the figure to $3.8 billion, the Senate is now engaged in these long hours of debate over $300 million. However, much, much more is involved in this debate.

Those of us who are in favor of the foreign aid program are attempting to do on the floor of the Senate that which the administrators of the AID program should have done long before this—tighten up the administration and objectives of the AID program so that our foreign economic and military aid will hit the mark rather than be scattered to the four winds.

This is the story that should be told to the American people. As a matter of fact, Mr. President, it is misleading to give the people the impression that the sole issue is how much money would be authorized to be appropriated for the foreign aid program this fiscal year. Most of us are concerned also—indeed more—with program substance: how the program has been administered, what pitfalls from the past can be avoided in the future, what parts of the program should be emphasized or deemphasized, and what guidelines and principles can be laid down in the authorization bill to give congressional directive to the entire program.

We are concerned—and properly so—that whatever amount is appropriated

utimately, be it $4.5 billion or $3.5 billion, or less, it be properly, efficiently, and wisely spent. The American people should not be misled into believing that what is going on in the Senate debate is merely an argument about "how much" but that it is an argument about how effectively and wisely whatever is appropriated will be expended.

I have listened to radio and television and read the papers in vain to read or hear something which would give an impression opposite to the one that we are arguing—merely about money totals. As of the end of business on last Friday, some 50 amendments had been introduced. Well over half of these amendments do not—I repeat the word "not"—deal with how much money would be authorized. They deal with how the program should be administered.

Here are descriptions of some of these amendments:

Should the United States continue to give economic assistance to countries such as Egypt and Algeria, which are engaged in aggression against their neighbors, thereby diverting their own resources from the economic development of their countries to wage aggressive war? This issue will be solved by the adoption of amendment No. 231, sponsored by Mr. GRUENING, for himself, Mr. JAVITS, Mr. MORSE, Mr. CASE, Mr. WILLIAMS, JR., of New Jersey, Mr. RIBICOFF, Mr. YOUNG of Ohio, Mr. KEATING, Mr. MUSKIE, Mr. DOUGLAS, and Mr. DODD.

Should the United States continue to make development loans, charging interest at the rate of three-quarters of 1 percent per annum for 40 years with a 10-year grace period, thereby in effect—because the United States has to borrow money at higher interest rates to make these loans—giving a grant to the borrower nation of about 80 cents for each dollar loaned? This problem would be solved by acceptance of amendment No. 232 by Mr. GRUENING, for himself, Mr. MORSE, Mr. SIMPSON, Mr. ERVIN, Mr. MOSS, Mr. CANNON, Mr. DOMINICK, Mr. YARBOROUGH, Mr. BIBLE, and Mr. SMATHERS.

Should contracts with universities for the performance of services abroad contain the same terms and conditions as are applicable to contracts with the same universities for services within the United States so that competition for the limited numbers of qualified educators between programs at home and abroad may at least be put on an equal footing? This would be taken care of by adoption of amendment No. 234 by Mr. GRUENING for himself.

Should military assistance be continued for Latin American countries now that the Department of Defense has admitted that such arms are no longer necessary for hemispheric defense and the arms supplied by the United States have been repeatedly used to overthrow constitutionally elected governments? Amendment No. 235 by Mr. GRUENING, for himself, Mr. ERVIN, Mr. CANNON, Mr. MORSE, Mr. SMATHERS, Mr. NELSON, Mr. PROXMIRE, and Mr. MCGOVERN would take care of this wasteful and actually destructive expenditure.

Should foreign assistance be given Yugoslavia even though that nation makes no payment for property nationalized or should such foreign assistance be stopped until Yugoslavia makes acceptable payment? Amendment No. 236 by Mr. DIRKSEN seeks to resolve that question.

Should development grants for capital projects be made only if the recipient finances at least 25 percent of the cost? Amendment No. 241 by Mr. ELLENDER raises this issue.

Should military aid to African countries be limited to $25 million a year and not be available to meet internal security requirements or should there be no special restriction on how much military aid can be given to the African nations so as to permit the support of special police forces? Amendment No. 244 by Mr. ELLENDER deals with this matter.

Should any agreement between the United States and Czechslovakia relating to the settlement of claims by U.S. nationals against Czechslovakia arising out of nationalization be submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent? Amendment No. 247 by Mr. KEATING would enable the Senate to debate and pass on this issue.

Should AID be discontinued from any nation which extends its jurisdiction for fishing purposes beyond the 3-mile limit or imposes penalties or sanctions against any U.S. fishing vessel on account of its fishing in such area? Amendment No. 248 by Mr. KUCHEL for himself and Mr. ENGLE, if adopted, would prevent the arrests and fining of American tuna fishermen in international waters.

Should AID be withdrawn from any nation which does not pay its assessments in the United Nations? Amendment No. 249 by Mr. MILLER would enable the Senate to show its disapproval of those who will not pay their share.

Should Public Law 480 products which are sold to other nations for soft—local—currencies include fisheries products? Amendment No. 250 by Mr. ELLENDER would enable the Senate to hear the arguments pro and con.

Should AID be used, as it has been, to meet foreign nations' deficits or should payments be ruled out and AID used for specific projects? Amendment No. 254 by Mr. MORSE would, if adopted, stop the bailing out of governments that do not follow sound fiscal practices.

Should the AID program be revamped completely beginning June 30, 1965—a proposal the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations had under serious consideration—so that each country would be required, as a condition to receiving economic assistance, to prove that it had taken the necessary self-help measures such as land and tax reforms? Amendment No. 259 by Mr. MORSE raises a fundamental issue which should be thoroughly debated.

Should aid be withheld from countries where a military coup has overthrown a constitutionally elected government? Amendment No. 265 by Mr. MORSE would tend to stop the overthrow of legally constituted governments by military juntas.

Should aid assistance be withheld from Indonesia which is threatening aggressive war against its neighbors and when the economic situation is going from bad to worse? Amendment No. 266 by Mr. PROXMIRE, if adopted, would tend to discourage aggression and subsidizing of unstable dictatorships.

But the fact remains, Mr. President, that 37 Senators have sponsored or cosponsored amendments to the foreign aid bill. This indicates the deep feeling of the Senate that the time for reforms in the administration of the foreign aid program is at hand. The time to act is now.

We hope that in the future the press will give a little more emphasis to those amendments, and not concentrate the discussion on whether we shall spend so many dollars more or so many dollars less in toto.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment of the Senator from Florida [Mr. HOLLAND] to the Mansfield-Dirksen amendments to the committee substitute. On this question the yeas and nays have been ordered, and the clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk called the roll.

Mr. HUMPHREY. I announce that the Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. CLARK], the Senator from Mississippi [Mr. EASTLAND], the Senator from Oklahoma [Mr. EDMONDSON], the Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. KENNEDY], the Senator from Missouri [Mr. LONG], the Senator from Wyoming [Mr. MCGEE], the Senator from Michigan [Mr. MCNAMARA], the Senator from Rhode Island [Mr. PASTORE], the Senator from Mississippi [Mr. STENNIS], the Senator from Missouri [Mr. SYMINGTON], and the Senator from Tennessee [Mr. WALTERS] are absent on official business.

I also announce that the Senator from California [Mr. ENGLE] is absent because of illness.

I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. CLARK], the Senator from Mississippi [Mr. EASTLAND], the Senator from Oklahoma [Mr. EDMONDSON], the Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. KENNEDY, the Senator from Missouri [Mr. LONG], the Senator from Wyoming [Mr. MCGEE], the Senator from Michigan [Mr. MCNAMARA], the Senator from Rhode Island [Mr. PASTORE], the Senator from Mississippi [Mr. STENNIS] the Senator from Missouri [Mr. SYMINGTON], the Senator from Tennessee [Mr. WALTERS], and the Senator from California [Mr. ENGLE] would each vote "yea."

Mr. KUCHEL. I announce that the Senator from New Hampshire [Mr. COTTON], the Senator from Arizona [Mr. GOLDWATER], the Senator from Idaho [Mr. JORDAN], the Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. SCOTT], and the Senator from Texas [Mr. TOWER] are necessarily absent.

The Senator from Utah [Mr. BENNETT] and the Senator from New York [Mr. JAVITS] are absent on official business.

The Senator from New York [Mr. KEATING] is detained on official business.

If present and voting, the Senator from Utah [Mr. BENNETT], the Senator from Arizona [Mr. GOLDWATER], the Senator from Idaho [Mr. JORDAN], the Senator from New York [Mr. KEATING], the Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. SCOTT], and the Senator from Texas [Mr. TOWER] would each vote "yea."

The result was announced—yeas 80, nays 0, as follows:

[No. 206 Leg.]

YEAS—80

Aiken	Gruening	Morton
Allott	Hart	Moss
Anderson	Hartke	Mundt
Bartlett	Hayden	Muskie
Bayh	Hickenlooper	Nelson
Beall	Hill	Neuberger
Bible	Holland	Pearson
Boggs	Hruska	Pell
Brewster	Humphrey	Prouty
Burdick	Inouye	Proxmire
Byrd, Va.	Jackson	Randolph
Byrd, W. Va.	Johnston	Ribicoff
Cannon	Jordan, N.C.	Robertson
Carlson	Kuchel	Russell
Case	Lausche	Saltonstall
Church	Long, La.	Simpson
Cooper	Magnuson	Smathers
Curtis	Mansfield	Smith
Dirksen	McCarthy	Sparkman
Dodd	McClellan	Talmadge
Dominick	McGovern	Thurmond
Douglas	McIntyre	Williams, N.J.
Ellender	Mechem	Williams, Del.
Ervin	Metcalf	Yarborough
Fong	Miller	Young, N. Dak.
Fulbright	Monroney	Young, Ohio
Gore	Morse	

NAYS—0

NOT VOTING—20

Bennett	Javits	Pastore
Clark	Jordan, Idaho	Scott
Cotton	Keating	Stennis
Eastland	Kennedy	Symington
Edmondson	Long, Mo.	Tower
Engle	McGee	Walters
Goldwater	McNamara	

So Mr. HOLLAND's amendment to the Mansfield-Dirksen amendments to the committee amendment in the nature of a substitute was agreed to.

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the Senate adopted my amendment.

Mr. KUCHEL. Mr. President, I move to lay that motion on the table.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

Mr. ELLENDER. Mr. President, I call up my amendment No. 298, and ask for its consideration.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment offered by the Senator from Louisiana to the amendments proposed by Mr. MANSFIELD, for himself and other Senators, to the committee amendment in the nature of a substitute, will be stated.

The LEGISLATIVE CLERK. It is proposed, on page 1, line 7, of the amendments, to strike out "$975,000,000" and insert in lieu thereof "$900,000,000".

Mr. ELLENDER. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays on my amendment.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

MILITARY ASSISTANCE

Mr. ELLENDER. Mr. President, before proceeding with a discussion of the pending amendment to the Mansfield-Dirksen amendments, I wish to address myself to military assistance.

My amendment—No. 242—submitted on October 28 and calling for a cut of $300 million in military assistance, is included in the Mansfield-Dirksen amendments. If adopted, $1 billion will be made available for military assistance in fiscal year 1964, which amount is in accord with the House figure.

No matter who delves into and analyzes our military assistance program, be he a respected general, statistician, accountant, economist, or representative of the people in the Congress, the conclusion inevitably follows that the 1964 budget request for military assistance is about $400 million more than is needed to carry out the program.

I point out that the amendment I had submitted called for a cut of only $300 million, but I sincerely believe we could cut another $100 million from the military aid program, without affecting our security.

This is based on an analysis of the Clay Committee report, and a statistical analysis of the reductions made in this program by Congress and the executive branch over the last 10 years.

Let us first look at the views of the Presidential investigating committee headed by Gen. Lucius D. Clay, and known as the Committee To Strengthen the Security of the Free World, or the Clay Committee. This Committee made a 3-month study of our Nation's military and economic assistance programs, and made its report to the President on March 20 of this year.

The Committee's report to the President contains a number of comments and recommendations concerning our military assistance program, all of which had, and I believe still have, the approval of General Clay. I would now like to refresh the recollection of Senators by citing some of these comments and recommendations.

On page 7 of the Clay Committee report, the following appears:

> We are convinced that in several of these countries (and here the committee is referring to nations on the frontiers of the free world) indigenous forces are larger than required for their immediate mission of defense and not large enough to assume other missions. There, phased reductions of a very substantial order appear practical, after further careful examination, without unduly sacrificing immediate effectiveness. This would not only lessen the cost of military assistance but reduce related supporting economic assistance as well.

Continuing on page 8:

> There are a few other border countries whose military forces presently are of value largely for internal security purposes. Even though they belong to alliances with which we are associated, we believe the present level of support to these forces, particularly with sophisticated weapons, cannot be considered as essential to the security of the free world. In these countries, which have substantial resources of their own, significant reductions of military and economic assistance are in order.
>
> In addition, there are other countries in this border area, particularly in southeastern and western Asia, to which we provide economic assistance and, in some cases, military equipment, though they are neither allies nor members of alliances with which we are associated. We believe most of this military assistance is not essential to our own or free world security, and we cannot recommend continued supply of this equipment.

Commenting on aid to the NATO countries of Greece and Turkey, on page 9 the Committee points out that:

> On the western end of the bloc periphery Greece and Turkey are moving toward increased security and well-being. Both of these important nations, however, are still in need of military assistance and economic support, and Turkey will require both forms of assistance for some time to come. We believe that other NATO members should increase their contributions to these countries to the point where they bear a proportionate share of the burden and that the proportion of our own assistance should be reduced accordingly. Elsewhere in Europe, there is no apparent need for further military or economic assistance other than for the fulfillment of existing commitments.

For many years I have been making that very contention to my colleagues in the Senate. But somehow the military authorities have been listened to, and in practically all cases we have acceded to their wishes. Efforts to obtain assistance from our allies from the West have failed. I believe that at this date, with the heavy load we are carrying all over the world, it is shameful that the countries in Western Europe should be permitted to lag behind.

As I pointed out some time ago, in the pending bill there is an amount approximating $230 million of military assistance for the countries of Western Europe, excluding Turkey and Greece. In addition, we are furnishing millions of dollars of both economic and military assistance to Turkey and Greece, but that assistance does not appear in the justifications for Europe, but in the justifications for Asia. Why they should be separated from Europe in that way, I do not know. However, the fact remains that as to those two countries, to which a very limited amount of assistance is being given by the countries of Western Europe, we are continuing to furnish large amounts. I repeat what I said the other day, that so long as we continue to pour out our wealth and furnish those countries with all they supposedly need, no effort will be made by the countries of Western Europe to assist us with the burden.

In connection with the last quotation from the Clay Committee report, Secretary McNamara, in testifying before the House Appropriations Committee this year, stated:

> In fiscal year 1963, six NATO countries expressed their willingness to provide aid to Greece in one form or other, and under varying circumstances and conditions, to a total monetary value of approximately $15 million.

Why, Mr. President, this is a mere pittance compared to the military and economic assistance we are furnishing to Greece and Turkey. To date we have furnished in excess of $7 billion to these two countries. Is this the best we can do

in getting our more prosperous European allies to render this very necessary assistance? I do not believe the administration has really tried hard enough, and if we in Congress continue to make an inflated amount of military assistance available, I do not believe a real effort will ever be made. After all, why should our allies make aid available to Greece and Turkey if the U.S. Congress is going to fill the gaps which may be left, over and above our rightful share?

Returning to the Clay report, it is pointed out on page 18:

> The committee has examined the economic and military assistance the United States provides to certain countries in exchange for bases. In many instances, the practical cost seems excessive, particularly where the bases provide both considerable dollar income from expenditures by our personnel and substantial local employment.

The Clay Committee also looked askance at the aid we furnished to a number of countries, including those in Latin America and Africa. In this regard, on page 18 of the report, the Committee states:

> In addition to our remarks above concerning various areas, the committee wishes to note its general view that only in extraordinary circumstances should the United States provide MAP aid, including military equipment of a small arms nature, where the principal quarrel of the recipient country is with a non-Communist neighbor with which the United States also maintains friendly relations.

In this same connection, the committee on page 10 of its report stated specifically with regard to aid to the African countries:

> With regard generally to U.S. military assistance to African countries, we must bear in mind that the chief burden of helping these nations to enhance their internal security capabilities again falls logically on the former metropoles, with which most of these countries have retained police and military relationships. In some cases, small-scale and supplementary U.S. training programs and internal security assistance may be justified, and limited activity in a few countries where we maintain bases is in order. Small programs and missions should be terminated elsewhere.

I have been advocating such a propram for the past 7 or 8 years, but little, if anything, has been done. On the contrary, they have been increased—not in number of men, but in number of missions abroad.

The Clay report continues:

> We believe the problems created by military assistance programs in the African countries generally would be greater than those they would forestall or resolve.

I covered that point very thoroughly in my report to the Senate after I had visited Africa last year.

My own personal opinion about military aid to Africa is set out on page 9 of my recent report on Africa wherein I stated:

> It will be devastating to the African nations if they have to expend even a small amount of their meager revenues to support armies. It is to be hoped that none of them will endeavor to build up their armed forces for use in expanding their territories, and everything possible should be done to promote lasting peace. I am convinced that any amount of military aid to the newly independent countries will serve only to bring on chaotic conditions. Here is a most important field where the United States could play a definite, beneficial role by staying out of Africa. No military aid in any way, shape, or form should be tolerated.
>
> Although we are now supposedly giving military aid only for internal security, one does not have to look too far to find programs which started out as internal security blossoming into full-fledged military support. The question is always where to draw the line? How is internal security to be defined? When do weapons furnished for internal security become weapons to be used for external aggression?
>
> We are at present, or have been in the recent past, engaged in training paratroopers in Mali, at a cost of over $600,000. Can this be called internal security? Are paratroopers needed to maintain order?

Now, Mr. President, with the help of my staff and the staff of the Senate Appropriations Committee I have thoroughly analyzed the report of General Clay's Committee and have applied his Committee's recommendations to the President's revised 1964 budget request for military assistance. This has resulted in a determination that reductions in military assistance totaling $432,244,000 would be in consonance with the recommendations made in the Clay report. These reductions are applied to the programs in the various areas of the world, and I am confident, if made, would result in no threat to our security or the security of the nations of the free world.

The amount of military assistance requested for Europe in the President's budget is $229,356,000. Allowing the amount which we are committed to contribute to Europe, and recommended in the Clay report, a total of $78,500,000 should be authorized for this area, thus permitting a reduction of $150,856,000 in this segment of the military assistance program.

In Africa, where $24,511,000 is included in the budget estimate, the amount concurring with the recommendations by the Clay Committee would total $5,132,000, thus permitting reductions of $19,379,000.

In the Near East and south Asia, $444,726,000 has been requested in the budget. The amount covered in the recommendations of the Clay Committee total $393,287,000, thus permitting reductions of $95,439,000 in the program for this area of the world.

In addition to the reductions in these three areas, applying the Clay Committee recommendations, further reductions amounting to $166,570,000 could be made in the Far East and in the Latin American areas of the world.

Mr. President, I hold in my hand a detailed tabulation of the application of reductions recommended by the Clay Committee. Notwithstanding its lessened value because of the necessity of deletions on account of security reasons, I ask unanimous consent that it be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the table was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

Military aid

[In thousands of dollars]

Region	Revised 1964 budget request, amount [1]	Clay Committee recommendations, amount	Reductions
Europe	229,356	[2] 78,500	150,856
Africa	24,511	[3] 5,132	19,379
Near East and south Asia	444,726	[4] 349,287	95,439
Far East	671,853	[4] 584,045	87,808
Latin America	77,262	[5] 0	77,262
Administrative expenses	25,000	[6] 23,500	1,500
Nonregional	57,283	[7] 57,283	
Total	1,529,991	1,097,747	432,244
Recoupments, prior years	125,000	125,000	
Total new obligation amounts	1,404,991	972,747	

[1] Includes $125,000,000 recouped from cancellations of prior year programs.
[2] Deleted for security reasons.
[3] Includes aid for only those countries where base rights are held by United States.
[4] Deleted for security reasons.
[5] Civic action projects should be financed from economic aid program.
[6] 6-percent cut on account of reduced program.
[7] Application of recommendations not possible without thorough scrutiny of various areas involved, thus no reductions are recommended here.

Mr. ELLENDER. Mr. President, having documented why military assistance can be cut, based on the recommendations of the Clay Committee, I would now like to show why reductions in military assistance are also justified even if approached from a statistical or accounting viewpoint. In this connection, I have had my staff prepare an analysis of the military assistance estimates and appropriations for the 10-year period, fiscal year 1954 through fiscal year 1963. During this period of time, budget estimates were submitted to Congress for military assistance totaling $21,258 million. The amount actually appropriated by Congress during this same period was $16,342,400,000; thus Congress reduced the budget estimates during this decade by a total of $4,915,600,000. Surely, this record shows that Congress has made drastic reductions in this program; yet, on top of the reductions made by Congress the executive branch made even further reductions, totaling $537 million. Congress, notwithstanding its large reductions, had appropriated too much money during this period. If the reductions made by Congress and the further reductions made by the executive branch are added together, we find that the total reductions of budget estimates during this decade amounted to $5,452,600,000. That is a reduction in the budget estimates of 24.46 percent.

Thus, the reductions made in military assistance during the past decade have amounted to almost one quarter of the original budget estimates. If this same yardstick should be applied to the current budget estimate for military assistance for fiscal year 1964, a reduction of $400 million in the budget estimate would

be in order, which is an amount approximating the recommendations of the Clay Committee.

Mr. President, it is no coincidence that the reductions recommended by the Clay Committee and the amount determined by averaging congressional cuts over the past decade are identical.

I submit that $400 million of the military assistance budget request is simple fat and that it was placed in the budget as fat, with no justification for its existence.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have the analysis that was prepared by my staff printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the table was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

Analysis of military assistance estimates and appropriations for 10-year period, fiscal year 1954 through fiscal year 1963

[In millions of dollars]

Fiscal year	Budget estimate	Appropriation	Reductions				Amount available for obligation
			By Congress	By Executive [1]	Total	Percent	
1954	4,274.5	3,230.0	1,044.5	318.7	1,363.2	31.89	2,911.3
1955	1,778.3	1,192.7	585.6	175.5	761.1	42.79	1,017.2
1956	1,595.2	1,022.2	573.0	14.0	587.0	36.79	1,008.2
1957	2,925.0	2,017.5	907.5	14.2	921.7	31.51	2,003.3
1958	1,900.0	1,340.0	560.0	6.3	566.3	29.81	1,333.7
1959	1,800.0	1,515.0	285.0	----------	285.0	15.83	1,515.0
1960	1,600.0	1,300.0	300.0	----------	300.0	18.75	1,300.0
1961	2,000.0	1,800.0	200.0	8.3	208.3	10.42	1,791.7
1962	1,885.0	1,600.0	285.0	(2)	285.0	15.12	1,600.0
1963	1,500.0	1,325.0	175.0	----------	175.0	11.67	1,325.0
Total	21,258.0	16,342.4	4,915.6	537.0	5,452.6	24.46	----------

[1] Unobligated balances returned to Treasury.
[2] Less than $50,000.

Mr. ELLENDER. Mr. President, if only from the standpoint of good economics or good programing, the amount authorized for military assistance should not exceed $1 billion for fiscal year 1964. Each year the witnesses from the Pentagon, from the Secretary of Defense on down to the Administrator, endeavor to justify this program as being firm and concrete, while, in fact, it is based on guesswork. In the recent testimony before the House Appropriations Committee, when questioned by the chairman of the subcommittee which handles foreign aid about the concreteness of the military assistance program, Secretary McNamara replied, "Oh, yes indeed, no question about it," and then he proceeded to state that it was necessary to make some minor changes in the program on account of the aid that was furnished India and South Vietnam.

If these were the only changes, one would be justified in calling the military assistance program concrete and firm. But this is not the case. In fiscal year 1963, hundreds of changes were made in the military assistance program, affecting almost every country which receives military aid from us.

Unfortunately, I am not able to read into the RECORD today the many changes that were made in the military assistance program for fiscal year 1963, because they are classified, labeled "Secret." However, to give the Senate and the people of our country an indication of just how uncertain this program is, I found in an analysis presented with the justifications given to the Appropriations Committees that reprograming deletions were made in almost all the countries, aggregating $520,747,000, or almost one-third of the total program.

Furthermore, reprograming additions totaling $357,768,000 were also made in almost every country included in the military assitance program. Thus, when the combination of the reprograming deletions and the reprograming additions are added together, one finds that almost 75 percent of the program that was justified to Congress in fiscal year 1963 was changed after funds had been made available. In fact, there is no question that since this appropriation has been so overfunded for years, there has resulted much waste of funds, much laxity in programing, and much inefficiency in financial management in general, and that the program is anything but concrete and firm.

In this regard, a recent report, entitled "FAD 445," which was prepared by the Fiscal Analysis Division of the Department of Defense Comptroller's Office, shows that obligations for military assistance for the month of June 1963 alone were in excess of $442 million. Needless to say, this figure represents almost one-third of the total program for 1963, and it was all obligated in the last month of the fiscal year.

This report also shows that for fiscal year 1963 almost one-half of the total obligated during the entire year for military assistance was actually obligated during the last 3 months of the fiscal year.

Mr. President, I submit that this was done to reduce the amount of unobligated balances at the end of the fiscal year which would normally revert to the Treasury unless reappropriated by Congress. It also indicates laxity in programing and, further, that there is excess funding of the military assistance program.

I ask unanimous consent that the text of the aforementioned FAD report 445 be printed at this point in the RECORD, so that the pictorial record of obligations in the military assistance program for fiscal year 1963 will be available for everyone's perusal.

There being no objection, the table was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

Obligations—Military assistance, fiscal year 1963

[In thousands of dollars]

	Available for obligation	Obligations													Unobligated balance June 30, 1963
		July 1962	August 1962	September 1962	October 1962	November 1962	December 1962	January 1963	February 1963	March 1963	April 1963	May 1963	June 1963	Cumulative through June 30, 1963	
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE															
Military personnel	5,630	--------	465	--------	35	76	--------	--------	577	64	88	130	299	1,734	3,896
Operation and maintenance	925,696	28,616	31,324	32,341	33,025	43,041	47,874	46,698	71,653	64,270	39,644	41,001	188,846	668,333	257,363
Procurement	2,097,537	8,351	25,294	19,041	−10,114	31,788	56,163	93,425	102,203	110,617	77,331	164,440	230,293	908,832	1,188,705
Aircraft	552,716	5,473	4,986	7,685	−15,781	6,393	8,334	63,483	18,041	29,162	16,920	37,729	64,312	246,737	305,979
Missiles	423,395	2,895	1,576	4,304	1,509	2,964	11,511	5,637	20,151	30,967	20,950	42,738	34,250	179,452	243,942
Ships	217,292	195	11,708	346	1,748	5,297	4,481	708	8,402	5,751	3,367	15,891	4,628	62,522	154,771
Ordnance, vehicles and related equipment	505,607	−308	5,106	5,188	741	13,079	21,342	4,074	25,063	34,339	24,868	52,108	80,018	265,618	239,989
Electronics and communications	246,511	927	277	1,379	1,604	5,611	8,815	5,247	5,972	12,260	7,322	7,257	31,711	88,382	158,129
Other procurement	152,016	−832	1,642	139	66	−1,556	1,676	14,278	24,575	−1,862	3,903	8,718	15,374	66,121	85,895
Research, development, test, and evaluation	558	54	147	71	113	87	−46	91	21	−422	−252	117	161	142	416
Military construction	131,219	2,366	360	15,401	12,648	4,224	10,073	11,088	2,735	12,427	5,927	10,010	22,652	109,911	21,309
Undistributed	13,526	--------	−8	27	−15	−4	−639	−6	−38	277	−241	14	−23	−656	14,182
Total, Department of Defense	3,174,167	39,387	57,581	66,883	35,690	79,213	113,424	151,296	177,154	187,230	122,497	215,714	442,227	1,688,296	1,485,871

NOTE.—Amounts will not necessarily add to totals due to rounding.

Mr. ELLENDER. Mr. President, there is no question that a close scrutiny and analysis of the military assistance program, whether it be made by a general, statistician, accountant, or economist, will reveal that the military assistance revised budget estimate for fiscal year 1964 can be reduced by $400 million, as I previously stated.

I point out that both the Clay Committee and Secretary McNamara agree that a $1 billion military assistance program is adequate, and the only difference in their opinions is the precise point in time when this figure may be reached. Secretary McNamara feels that it cannot be attained before fiscal year 1968, and the Clay Committee feels that it is possible within the next couple of years. Regardless of what opinion may be the correct one, even if we are pessimistic and accept Secretary McNamara's view, if this goal is to be attained, it is absolutely essential that the authorization of new obligational authority for military assistance for fiscal year 1964 not exceed $1 billion. This is necessary because of the abnormal pipeline condition that presently exists in the military assistance program, and because of the considerable recoupments that will be made over the years because of the cancellations and changes in the program. I point out that we now have in the pipeline, unobligated, $1,500 million, as can be gleaned from the FAD Report No. 445 which I previously included in the RECORD.

Mr. President, in the interest of having a sounder military assistance program, in the interest of getting greater efficiency in the financial and other management of this program, in the interest of fiscal sanity, and in the interest of the American taxpayers, I urge Senators to vote to cut the military aid program in the way proposed by me and as called for by the so-called Mansfield-Dirksen amendments.

DEVELOPMENT LOAN FUND

Mr. President, as I stated a moment ago, I submitted an amendment to cut the Development Loan Fund from $975 million, as provided in the so-called Mansfield-Dirksen amendments, as amended, to an authorization of $900 million for development loans for the fiscal year 1964—the same amount as authorized in the bill passed by the House.

Legislation which already exists provides an authorization of $1.5 billion for each of the 5 fiscal years, 1963 through 1966, for development loans. I point out that these amounts have been modified by the Holland amendment which recently was adopted by the Senate, thus reducing the authorizations for 1965 and 1966 to an amount not to exceed $975 million.

Nevertheless, the administration, even in its wildest dreams, could not take advantage of the past generosity of Congress; and it originally requested, for the fiscal year 1964, $1,248 million. The ink on this request was hardly dry when it was revised and reduced to $1,060 million by the executive branch.

The House amended existing legislation by reducing the authorization ceiling for development loans to $900 million. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee elected to leave the authorization for development lending as it is in existing legislation—namely, $1,500 million—notwithstanding the fact that the administration has only sought $1,060 million.

Last year, when the development loan program was presented to Congress, the budget estimate totaled $1,250 million. This money was programed in the various regions of the world as follows:

Africa, $200 to $270 million; Far East, $200 to $280 million; Near East and south Asia, $850 to $950 million; for a total of $1,250 to $1,500 million.

Thus, the amount programed on the low side was $1,250 million, and on the high side $1,500 million, or an overprograming of $250 million. Of course, it is normal practice for the agency to engage in overprograming, both on the regional and country levels, and when funds are made available the program can be adjusted to fit within the available appropriations. Overprograming by about 10 percent of country loan planning figures is employed to provide guidance in terms of program priorities, while retaining flexibility regarding the screening and final approval of individual projects.

Since there is on hand a huge backlog of loan applications and since the loan approval cycle involves a lengthy process of project analysis and screening of applications, it would seem that when Congress made a considerable reduction in the budget estimate of the fiscal year 1963, every dollar Congress appropriated would have been obligated against the many loan applications allegedly on hand.

Actually, Congress appropriated $975 million for the Development Loan Fund in the fiscal year 1963, which was a reduction of $275 million in the budget estimate. But notwithstanding this cut by Congress, as of June 30, 1963, $71,400,000 of the moneys appropriated for the Development Loan Fund remained unobligated at June 30, 1963. Thus, even though the agency overprogramed for its requirements, and even though Congress made a drastic cut in the appropriation, the agency was still unable to obligate all of the funds appropriated.

I submit, Mr. President, that by making available more money than can be efficiently obligated by AID, Congress is aiding and abetting in the promotion of waste and extravagance.

I also point out that under the pending amendments offered by the Senator from Montana [Mr. MANSFIELD], for himself, the Senator from Illinois [Mr. DIRKSEN], and other Senators, a further obligation is imposed on the AID administrators; namely, to submit these programs, when they are in excess of $500,000, to the Corps of Engineers for approval. If the Corps of Engineers does a good job, it will take a much longer time in order to properly place this money for projects all over the world.

Mr. President, as I pointed out a few days ago, there is no earthly reason why we should begin—as suggested by the administrators of this program—a large aid program in Africa. Africa is a great continent. It is filled with numerous natural resources that are awaiting development. Those resources are not controlled by us. They are not in our hands. They are not in the hands of the natives in Africa. Those resources are owned and controlled by European countries—Britain, France, Portugal, Spain, and other countries of Western Europe.

As I have pointed out many times, if Africa is to blossom out and expand economically, it will be necessary that the resources in that country be utilized in order to assist the people there.

In order for the population of Africa to develop economically and make a good showing, it will be necessary that the resources of Africa be developed first for the benefit of the people there. How would that be done? By the construction of roads, schools, colleges, and the like.

The money we are now placing in Africa is money put down a rathole. It is used to maintain a few groups that are trying to remain in power. There is no question that many newly created countries there will never be successful unless they find a Santa Claus. I do not wish Uncle Sam to be that Santa Claus, for the simple reason that Africa is not within our sphere of influence.

If our dollars are to be spent in order to assist America, let us spend them where they will do us some good; namely, to the south of us. I am strongly in favor of developing South and Central America. I am glad that the AID administrators have virtually accepted the recommendations made in my report of 1958 when I returned from South and Central America.

In countries to the south of us there is a golden opportunity not only to develop resources for the benefit of the people there, in the form of roads, schools, colleges, and other facilities, but also to provide the necessary raw materials to feed our hungry mills here. As everyone knows, our iron resources are extremely limited. I understand that the Mesabi Range in Minnesota will be almost depleted in about 15 years. The remaining ore in our country grades from 25 to 30 percent iron, whereas the mines now being exploited in South and Central America produce ore in which the iron content is 68 percent. I am sure that the day will come when steel mills in the United States will not be able to compete with a concern in another country where the iron ore content is 68 percent. That is why in the past I have been in favor of developing South and Central America. They are good neighbors.

If the decision were left to me, I would try to find some way by which our own economy could be meshed with the economies of South and Central America. In the long run, it would pay us to do so.

Let us leave Africa to the Europeans, because all sorts of natural resources there—copper, gold, diamonds, uranium, and timber—are owned and controlled lock, stock, and barrel, by the Europeans. It is up to the Europeans to utilize those great resources, to develop the country and to assist the people who inhabit that great continent.

By making more money available than can be efficiently obligated by AID, Congress is aiding and abetting in the promotion of waste and extravagance, as I indicated a while ago in the case of the military aid program.

Why was the agency unable to obligate the reduced amount of money made available by Congress in fiscal year 1963? The reasons are enumerated in the justifications that have been presented to the Congress. I would like to give the Senate these reasons on a country-by-country basis, but in so many instances I am precluded from doing so because the data are classified "secret."

They are labeled secret and, of course, we cannot give that information to the American people.

However, I feel I can make the point clear by reading some of the reasons into the RECORD and deleting the name of the particular country and/or project.

1. ———: Loan applications were not received for any of the above projects, and thus the amount programed for ——— was completely eliminated from the development loan program.

In other words, we expected them to run in and put in applications as they were supposed to under the act of 1961. They did not do so. However, we had program money for them.

2. ———: Expectations for loan applications in ——— for fiscal year 1963 have not been met. In addition, AID criteria for completed loan applications have not been met for any of the applications which have not been received. Therefore, the fiscal year 1963 lending program has been substantially reduced.

3. ———: There has been a delay in receipt of the Government of ———'s financial feasibility study for the ——— airport. The anticipated loan application for the ——— road has not been received. The planned school construction loan will not be ready for final decision until fiscal year 1964 due to the absence of data from the ——— Government.

4. ———: Reductions in this country's program are due to the fact that certain elements of the program originally planned will not be ready for financing until fiscal year 1964. And yet we have provided for these countries.

5. ———: Reductions have been made for the following reasons in this country:

1. Slower than anticipated drawdown of the fiscal year 1962 loans.

2. Deferral of a completed loan to ——— pending an overall supports survey by the World Bank.

3. Increased interest of private investors in some of the industries for which development loans were contemplated.

4. Delayed completion of feasibility studies on which loan applications would be used.

I could go on, Mr. President, with reason after reason submitted in the agency's own justifications to Congress, accounting for why the Development Loan Fund could not obligate the reduced funds made available by Congress, but I feel the above illustrations make the point very clearly, and further emphasis would only burden the RECORD.

As I stated a while ago, there is a new provision in the so-called Mansfield-Dirksen amendments which would further delay these applications, since the approval of the Corps of Engineers would be required on those of large amounts.

This language is found on page 2 of the amendments, beginning on line 16:

(b) Section 611(a), which relates to completion of plans and cost estimates, is amended by inserting before the semicolon at the end of subparagraph (1) a comma and the following: "and, in any case in which such estimate of cost exceeds $500,000, until such estimate of cost and the feasibility of the project have been approved by the Corps of Engineers, United States Army, or by a reputable United States private firm of engineers".

That is a fine provision. Some of us have tried—I, particularly, tried—to put such a provision in the bill in the past, but to no avail.

There were many instances in which roads were merely surveyed from an airplane traveling over woods, or marsh, or jungle. Then it would be said, "This road in Vietnam or in some other country might cost so many millions of dollars." That was the way the situation was handled, not only in Asia, but also in South America. In the past, we have embraced many programs which were not well considered.

I remember the Rama Road. We started with the assumption that the cost of the Rama Road would be about $5 million. We have now spent in excess of $15 million and the road is not yet complete.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. ELLENDER. I yield to my colleague.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Is it not true that any engineering firm or construction firm offered the opportunity to bid on construction of a highway such as that, would insist that it have the opportunity to go onto the land itself and take test borings to see what kind of foundation was beneath the land and whether adequate materials could be found nearby, in order to reduce the cost of hauling the fill and the material, to arrive at a firm estimate of the cost of building a road of that character?

Mr. ELLENDER. There is no doubt about that. I cannot see that they could do other than what we do in our own country. The authorizing process for our projects is very long and tedious.

It cannot be done overnight. I know of some projects in our own country, including the construction of dams and even the construction of roads, which required from 5 to 10 years of study before a conclusion could be reached as to how much the project would cost and before it could be authorized by Congress. Since the money is loaned to these countries, they should be interested in seeing to it that the money is well spent. We should be adequately protected by a thorough examination of the project to see that it is feasible, and to see that it can be constructed within the estimate made. All of that should follow, in my judgment, for the program to be effective.

I cannot for the life of me see why the procedure should be any different from what we do in our own country. The fact that added conditions are to be imposed is a good thing. It will make the applicants for the loans more careful.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. ELLENDER. I yield.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Is it not true that in practice, not only in this country but also in practically all other enlightened countries, no one would undertake to build a project unless he had a firm estimate of cost?

Mr. ELLENDER. If he were responsible for the money spent, the Senator is correct.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. The only conceivable reason why a person would not obtain a firm cost estimate before undertaking a project would be that somebody else was paying for it, and therefore it would make no difference what the cost might be.

Mr. ELLENDER. The Senator is correct. That has been the difficulty in the past. That is why so much of the money has been wasted, in my judgment.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Of course, if U.S. money is to be used to pay for it, assuming that the applicant does not accept the responsibility of obtaining a firm cost estimate, I am sure the Senator would agree with me that we should assume the responsibility of seeing to it that there is a firm cost estimate.

Mr. ELLENDER. That is why in the past several years we have insisted that studies be made. The pending amendment contains the provision that I have read, which is that if a project involves in excess of $500,000, the Corps of Engineers must examine it and make a finding as to its feasibility. That is a good thing. This will inure not only to the benefit of the taxpayer, but also to the benefit of countries which will borrow the money for various projects.

Mr. President, unless the brakes are put on the development loan program and the amount authorized for 1964 is cut back to the amount authorized by the House, I fear that loans will be made to many countries that really do not qualify under the criteria that have been established for development loans, and that funds will be obligated solely for the purpose of reducing the unobligated balances without regard for the objectives to be obtained.

Mr. LAUSCHE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. ELLENDER. I yield.

Mr. LAUSCHE. The remarks of the Senator from Louisiana are directed at the amendment now before the Senate. Is that correct?

Mr. ELLENDER. Yes.

Mr. LAUSCHE. Am I correct in stating that the purpose of the amendment is to reduce the suggested authorization of $975 million to $900 million, conforming to the figure adopted by the House?

Mr. ELLENDER. The Senator is correct. That is the purpose.

I ask: Should we be making three-fourths of 1 percent loans, with a 10-year grace period and 40 years to repay, to a country whose GNP has risen 10 percent per annum over the past several years—from $734 per capita in 1959 to $853 per capita in 1962?

Should we be making these loans to a country whose gold and foreign exchange holdings have risen at a fantastic rate since 1957, from $87 million in 1957 to $498 million in 1962, an increase of almost 500 percent? Should we be making low-interest development loans to a country which has a very favorable balance of payments, while our own balance of payments continues to run a considerable deficit?

Mr. President, I believe not. But this we have done, and this we contemplate doing in fiscal year 1964 in the case of the country of Israel, solely because Congress authorizes and appropriates more money than this program needs to function soundly.

Mr. President, I submit that there is not one iota of justification to make one dollar of development "soft loan" money available to Israel. Yes, Israel is the country that has achieved a very rapid rate of economic growth. Its GNP has risen 10 percent per annum over the past several years, and it is anticipated that this growth will be maintained. Its per capita output already exceeds the levels attained by some European countries, and it is comparable to many of the industrial countries of the world.

As I just pointed out, its per capita GNP has risen from $734 in 1959 to $853 in 1962. Israel's present level of annual investment approximates 25 percent of its gross national product, which rate, I believe, is exceeded only by Japan. I might add that our own country's rate is running at about 15 percent.

Mr. President, I am not opposed to lending money to Israel, but the economic facts of life make it clear that our loans to Israel should be made only on a businesslike basis, and not through the soft money route which has been set up for aiding the truly underdeveloped countries of the world.

At this point, Mr. President, I would like the record to show how generous we have been with Israel since the country came into existence and, therefore, I request that the schedule I hold in my hand covering the status of loans we have made to Israel through December 31, 1962, be inserted in the RECORD at this point.

There being no objection, the schedule was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

Israel—Status of loan from the United States, as of Dec. 31, 1962

[Value in dollars or dollar equivalents]

Program and borrower	Purpose	Date authorized	Amount authorized	Status of loan			Interest and commissions collected	Interest rate (percent)
				Disbursed	Repaid	Outstanding		
Grand total, Israel			504,380,425	423,839,286	102,466,901	310,004,163	69,788,489	
AID			141,660,387	104,432,345	3,338,675	101,093,670	9,273,996	
Government of Israel	Project assistance	Feb. 9, 1955	15,000,000	15,000,000	122,420	14,877,580	2,694,382	4
Do	do	May 25, 1955	5,000,000	5,000,000	40,807	4,959,193	898,127	4
Do	do	June 29, 1956	10,000,000	10,000,000	15,160	9,984,840	799,800	A
Do	Commodity assistance	Apr. 29, 1957	9,993,720	9,993,720	232,463	9,761,257	794,894	A
Do	Economic development	June 25, 1958	15,000,000	15,000,000	2,177,825	12,822,175	2,829,713	5¼
Industrial Development Bank of Israel	Development bank	May 12, 1959	10,000,000	7,763,074	400,000	7,363,074	452,450	5
Government of Israel	Irrigation and agricultural	June 30, 1960	15,000,000	15,000,000	300,000	14,700,000	676,618	3½
Do	Telephone development	Feb. 20, 1961	6,000,000	5,511,082	50,000	5,461,082	99,146	3½
Do	Airport construction	May 26, 1961	666,667					3½
Industrial Development Bank	Development bank	Sept. 7, 1961	10,000,000	1,000,072		1,000,072		5
Government of Israel	Development program	Mar. 21, 1962	10,000,000	10,000,000		10,000,000	28,866	¾
Do	2d development program	Aug. 3, 1962	35,000,000	10,164,397		10,164,397		¾
Food for peace			153,795,038	130,882,228	1,810,529	117,703,484	13,758,196	
Title I, sec. 104 (g) and (d):								
Government of Israel	Project assistance	July 19, 1960	12,832,778	12,832,778		8,400,000	295,722	4
Do	do	Oct. 12, 1960	4,293,838	3,095,947		2,342,109	41,819	4
Do	do	July 14, 1961	6,422,717	5,087,942		4,104,225	42,717	4
Do	Industrial development bank	Apr. 30, 1962	5,333,333	3,333,333		3,333,333		4
Do	Project assistance	Jun. 29, 1962	13,750,000					4
Do	do	Aug. 5, 1955	7,096,520	7,096,520	146,282	6,950,238	1,284,259	A
Do	do	Apr. 6, 1956	11,740,000	11,740,000	95,244	11,644,756	1,406,285	A
Weisman Institute	Building program	Mar. 12, 1962	2,500,000	2,500,000		2,500,000	30,614	4
Government of Israel	Economic research	Dec. 17, 1962	500,000					¾
Do	Project assistance	July 31, 1956	2,498,461	2,498,461	6,348	2,492,113	249,720	A
Do	do	Aug. 23, 1956	9,342,031	9,342,031	31,002	9,311,029	746,953	A
Do	do	July 16, 1957	7,838,427	7,838,427	25,702	7,812,725	626,734	A
Do	do	Jan. 9, 1958	21,000,000	21,000,000	10,079	20,989,921	4,014,504	B
Do	do	Aug. 25, 1958	3,600,000	1,875,608		1,875,608	193,123	B
Do	do	Oct. 7, 1958	11,111,111	11,111,111	5,333	11,105,778	2,222,222	B
Do	do	Dec. 17, 1958	18,872,000	16,697,817		16,697,817	1,256,268	3½
Do	do	Aug. 3, 1959	283,000	283,000		283,000	24,762	3½
Title I, sec. 104(e), "Cooley":								
Israel Bank of Agriculture, Ltd.	Grain storage facilities	Dec. 15, 1958	1,944,983	1,962,751	196,934	1,064,166	209,817	5½
Alliance Tire & Rubber Co., Ltd.	Tire and tube plant facilities	Feb. 18, 1959	405,205	408,907	72,390	193,700	79,375	7½
Samson Tire & Rubber Co., Ltd.	do	Feb. 27, 1959	193,453	195,220	34,534	92,500	36,523	7½
Dagon Batey-Mamguroth Le Israel, Ltd.	Grain storage facilities	Mar. 10, 1959	810,409	817,813	144,667	387,500	99,404	5½
The United Saran Plastic Corp., Ltd.	Plastic products facilities	Mar. 17, 1959	26,142	26,381	4,676	12,492	4,968	7½
Silos & Warehouse Co., Ltd.	Grain storage facilities	Mar. 26, 1959	188,224	189,943	8,960	112,000	28,339	5½
Moller Textile Corp.	Textile plant facilities	Apr. 5, 1959	784,267	791,432	140,000	375,000	86,201	5½
Paradise Mattress & Couch Co., Ltd.	Mattress and furniture facilities	May 3, 1959	26,142	26,381	4,667	12,500	3,859	5½
Sonol Israel, Ltd.	Petroleum distributing facilities	May 6, 1959	575,129	580,383	102,667	275,000	78,448	5½
Mechanico, Ltd.	Rebuild auto parts facilities	June 9, 1959	99,341	100,248	17,733	47,500	11,864	5½
Suliatan, Ltd.	Soles and heels products facilities	Aug. 11, 1959	31,371	31,657	5,600	15,000	5,093	7½
Serafon Resinous Chemicals Corp., Ltd.	Plastics and chemicals facilities	do	65,356	65,953	11,723	31,200	11,305	7½
Palestine Milling & Trading Co., Ltd.	Grain storage facilities	Sept. 7, 1959	104,569	105,524	18,667	50,000	13,013	5½
Safen, Ltd.	Soft and hard board products facilities.	Oct. 26, 1959	376,448	379,887	50,400	195,000	42,029	5½
American Israeli Paper Mills, Ltd.	Paper mill facilities	Dec. 24, 1959	1,045,690	1,055,242	140,000	541,666	128,330	5½
The Ashdod Co., Ltd.	Industrial projects and constructions	Jan. 6, 1960	647,282	653,195	73,920	346,666	32,214	5½
"Dawe-Abic," Ltd.	Animal feeds and medical facilities	Jan. 8, 1960	96,726	97,610	13,011	50,050	10,307	5½
Silos & Warhouses Co., Ltd.	Grain storage facilities	Feb. 4, 1960	156,853	158,286	7,467	93,333	17,718	5½
Israel Fine Cotton Spinning, Ltd.	Cotton spin mill facilities	Feb. 7, 1960	261,422	263,811	46,667	125,000	23,219	5½
Rastrom, Ltd.	Precast concrete products facilities	Feb. 17, 1960	104,569	105,524	14,000	54,167	8,512	5½
Kadimah Chemical Corp.	Chemical plant facilities	Feb. 23, 1960	405,205	408,906	72,502	193,600	35,191	5½
Amcor, Ltd.	Compressors production facilities	Mar. 2, 1960	616,957	622,593	55,067	344,166	60,814	5½

Israel—Status of loans from the United States, as of Dec. 31, 1962—Continued

[Value in dollars or dollar equivalents]

Program and borrower	Purpose	Date authorized	Amount authorized	Status of loan			Interest and commissions collected	Interest rate (percent)
				Disbursed	Repaid	Outstanding		
Food for peace—Continued								
Title I, sec. 104(e), "Cooley"—Con.								
Haifa Silos, Ltd	Grain storage facilities	Mar. 30, 1960	423,504	427,373	37,333	236,667	30,138	5½
The United Saran Plastic Corp., Ltd.	Zinc oxide manufacturing plant	May 12, 1960	62,741	63,315	5,600	35,000	6,844	5½
Palestine Milling & Trading Co.	Grain storage facilities	July 19, 1960	52,284	52,762	4,667	29,167	4,967	5½
Samson Tire & Rubber Co., Ltd.	Tire and rubber plant facilities	Aug. 2, 1960	522,845	527,671	46,667	291,667	43,200	5½
"Rassco" Rural & Suburban Settlement Co., Ltd.	Light industry centers and cosmetic facilities.	Oct. 16, 1960	522,845	527,671	46,667	291,667	35,968	5½
Near East International Financial & Trust Co., Ltd.	Small industry facilities	Oct. 21, 1960	235,280	237,430	10,500	140,625	14,946	5½
Assamin (1954), Ltd	Plant manufacturing macaroni	Dec. 30, 1960	159,468	79,143		50,000	2,139	5½
Silos & Warehouse, Ltd	Grain storage facilities	Dec. 13, 1960	177,767	179,391	7,933	106,250	14,024	5½
"Binet" Jerusalem Chemical Industries, Ltd.	Plastic manufacturing plant facilities.	Jan. 4, 1961	33,985	34,295	1,587	20,250	2,494	5½
San Kol Chay Central Feed Mill Corp., Ltd.	Grain storage facilities	Apr. 27, 1961	784,267	791,432		500,000	34,224	5½
"Shemen" Israel Oil Industries, Ltd.	Soybean meal storage facilities	May 14, 1961	282,336					5½
Avia Hotels, Ltd	Hotel facilities	May 16, 1961	235,280	237,430		150,000	15,488	5½
Szekely-Hoffman & Co., Ltd.	Electrical control manufacturing facilities.	July 10, 1961	74,244	74,922		47,333	3,707	5½
Dan Hotel Corp	Hotel contruction	July 25, 1961	1,307,112	1,319,053	93,333	750,000	53,736	5½
"Dagon" Batey-Mamgu-roth Le-Israel.	Grain storage facilities	Dec. 11, 1961	941,121	949,718		600,000	34,076	5½
Export-Import Bank			208,925,000	188,524,713	97,317,697	91,207,009	46,756,297	
State of Israel	Agricultural production	Jan. 19, 1949	70,000,000	70,000,000	47,354,725	22,645,274	21,242,037	3½
Do	Transportation	Mar. 9, 1949	9,535,243	9,534,698	6,578,702	2,955,995	3,021,594	3½
Do	Housing materials	Mar. 16, 1949	25,000,000	25,000,000	16,836,578	8,163,421	7,721,995	3½
Do	Telecommunications equipment	Mar. 23, 1949	5,000,000	4,998,743	3,588,610	1,410,133	1,494,813	3½
Do	Port development	Sept. 7, 1949	5,464,757	5,464,757	3,670,489	1,794,267	1,536,064	3½
Do	Industrial development	Oct. 26, 1949	20,000,000	20,000,000	13,172,938	6,827,061	5,722,441	3½
Do	Water supply distribution facilities, agricultural development.	Feb. 20, 1958	24,200,000	24,200,000	3,025,007	21,174,993	4,339,125	5¼
American Israeli Paper Mills	Paper and pulp plant equipment	Oct. 8, 1958	3,000,000	3,000,000	642,857	2,357,142	483,470	5½
Mifalei Tovala, Ltd	Diesel trucks and trailers	Mar. 17, 1960	500,000	496,592	200,000	296,592	48,258	5¾
El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd	Jet aircraft—Boeing Airplane Co	Sept. 2, 1960	8,925,000	8,925,000	1,912,500	7,012,500	717,415	5¾
State of Israel	Equipment, etc., for airport	Nov. 3, 1960	1,500,000	1,066,082	75,000	991,082	15,068	5¾
Government of Israel	Port expansion program	Mar. 16, 1961	2,000,000	1,321,847		1,321,847	43,432	5¾
State of Israel—Bank of Agriculture.	Agricultural program	Apr. 13, 1961	13,000,000	7,023,738		7,023,738	158,480	5¾
State of Israel	Expansion—Palestine electric	Apr. 20, 1961	3,750,000	3,048,456		3,048,456	69,956	5¾
Do	Diesel electric locomotives—railways.	May 4, 1961	800,000	800,000		800,000	11,002	5¾
Do	Equipment for Negev. Phosphates, Ltd.	May 31, 1962	2,000,000					5¾
Government of Israel	Equipment, etc.—highway maintenance.	Sept. 13, 1962	3,450,000					5¾
El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd	Aircraft—Boeing	Aug. 24, 1961	3,650,000	3,644,800	260,291	3,384,508	131,147	5¾
Israel Petrochem Enterprises	Establishment of chemical plant	Apr. 26, 1962	7,150,000					5¾

Mr. LAUSCHE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. ELLENDER. I yield.

Mr. LAUSCHE. The Senator from Louisiana is aware of the fact that the Lausche-Mundt amendment has changed the law with respect to the interest rates that are to be charged.

Mr. ELLENDER. Yes; I am aware of that fact, but——

Mr. LAUSCHE. I believe the amendment is moving in the proper direction. Whether it has gone far enough, I am not certain; but the amendment of which I speak provides that three-fourths of 1 percent interest shall be chargeable only for the first 5 years, and thereafter the rate of interest shall be not less than 2 percent.

Mr. ELLENDER. Yes; I am familiar with that amendment. As the Senator has said, it is in the right direction. It is written in the act that the AID administration should, under no conditions, lend money, except on a businesslike basis, to countries that are able to pay or that are not underdeveloped. The purpose of development loans is to assist underdeveloped countries. That is the main purpose of the fund. We have made loans in the past to Israel and other countries, in large quantities, on a businesslike basis. For the administrator to take the soft money route by making loans to Israel on the basis of three-fourths of 1 percent interest, with a 10-year grace period is shameful, to say the least.

Mr. LAUSCHE. I concur in what the Senator from Louisiana has said. The rule which has thus far been in existence is neither reasonable nor just—namely, to make loans at an interest rate of three-fourths of 1 percent, to be repaid in 40 years, with a grace period of 10 years in which no amortization takes place. Interest was paid in the first 10 years.

I concur completely in what the Senator has said. I repeat, the amendment moves in the right direction. Whether it goes far enough, I cannot say.

Mr. ELLENDER. I agree with what the Senator from Ohio has said. In my opinion it does not go far enough, particularly with regard to loans to the countries that are capable of repaying.

As I pointed out the other day, in studying our programs abroad, I learned that efforts are being made to amend Public Law 480 in the pending bill, which I think is wrong. I believe that consideration of proposed amendments of the act should be left to the Committee on Agriculture and Forestry. In connection with Public Law 480 loans, the three-quarters of 1 percent interest requirement and the 10-year grace period has been used, in reloaning proceeds from sales. In many instances we have sold surplus commodities at world prices and lost considerable sums. In some countries we have even sold at unrealistic exchange prices, so that another 25 or 30 percent were added to our losses. To assist those people to a greater extent, we are now permitting them to borrow the proceeds from the sales at three-quarters of 1 percent, payable in 40 years, with 10 years' grace.

I am hopeful that the Senate will vote for the amendment, in which I ask that all references to Public Law 480 in the act be deleted. It is the hope of the Committee on Agriculture and Forestry to revamp Public Law 480. We expect to hold hearings on that subject next year. The time has come to amend the act. We can then take care of the situations that are sought after in the pending bill.

Mr. LAUSCHE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. ELLENDER. I yield to the Senator from Ohio.

Mr. LAUSCHE. I point out that in discussions in the Foreign Relations Committee some suggestion was made that there be a mandatory rate of 2 percent, but, following a discussion, it was determined that a floor of 2 percent should be fixed—meaning that the administrator should charge a rate of interest commensurate with the ability of the borrowing country to meet its obligation, with an interest rate of 2 percent or over.

Mr. ELLENDER. That is the way I would interpret the amendment.

I point out that in addition to loans amounting to $527 million, we have also made available to Israel economic grants totaling $352 million.

In connection with the schedule of loans I have just included in the RECORD, I would like to direct the attention of Senators to two development loans we made to Israel in March and July of 1962. They aggregate $45 million and were made on terms of 40 years repayment, with a 10-year grace period, and bearing interest at the rate of three-fourths of 1 percent. And I might reiterate that more development loans are contemplated for Israel in fiscal year 1964.

I cannot emphasize too strongly, Mr. President, that too much money was appropriated for the Development Loan Fund in fiscal year 1963, and unless Congress reduces the amount authorized in the current bill to the amount allowed by the House—or even lower, if the Senate could be persuaded to do it—the same thing is going to happen in fiscal year 1964.

As Senators know, the Agency for International Development is presently operating under a continuing resolution which permits them to obligate funds at the lowest of the following pro rata rates: First, the amount appropriated in fiscal year 1963; second, the amount contained in the budget estimate for fiscal year 1964; third, the amount allowed in the House appropriation bill; or, fourth, the amount allowed in the Senate appropriation bill.

Since we have neither a House nor Senate appropriation bill, and since the budget estimate for fiscal year 1964 is higher than the amount appropriated in 1963, the agency is currently operating at the same pro rata rate it had for fiscal year 1963. Thus, in the first quarter of fiscal year 1964, ending September 30, 1963, a flash report from the Agency for International Development covering the status of fiscal year 1964 allotments and obligations indicates that a total of $754,121,160 is available for all types of economic assistance.

Of this total amount, the Development Loan Fund has available for the first quarter of 1964 a total of $278,527,370.

And what has the agency been able to obligate out of the Development Loan Fund in this first quarter of fiscal year 1964? The answer, Mr. President, is a total of $10,600,000 actually obligated by the Development Loan Fund for the first quarter of fiscal year 1964. These data are set out in the flash fiscal report I hold in my hand, and I request that it be placed in the RECORD at this point.

There being no objection, the report was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

EXHIBIT A.—AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Flash report—Status of fiscal year 1964 allotments and obligations—Global summary by appropriation as of Sept. 30, 1963

	Appropriation		Available funds	Implementation approval documents	Amount allotted	Obligations and loans authorized current month	Cumulative obligations and loan authorization	Available balance of allotment
	Symbol	Code						
ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE								
Annual appropriation:								
Development grants	1004	454	$75,000,000	$55,137,252	$54,429,352	$11,837,207	$30,260,414	$24,168,938
International organizations and programs	1005	455	10,000,000					
Supporting assistance	1006	456	125,000,000	63,158,403	63,158,403	1,741,952	27,282,801	35,875,602
Contingency fund	1078	421	19,515,000	490,500	490,500	20,266	21,566	468,934
Surveys of investment opportunities	1008	458	300,000	221,722	221,722	102,208	174,841	46,881
Administrative expenses (sec. 637(a))	1000	423	19,500,000	18,203,000	18,203,000	4,126,801	12,965,026	5,237,974
Alliance for Progress, development grants	1010	495	33,000,000	17,211,000	17,211,000	3,155,606	9,966,809	7,244,191
Total, annual appropriations			282,315,000	154,421,877	153,713,977	20,984,040	80,671,457	73,042,520
No-year appropriation: Inter-American social and economic program	X0070	187	1,260,911	1,207,095	1,207,095	6,266	9,924	1,197,171
Subtotal			283,575,911	155,628,972	154,921,072	20,990,306	80,681,381	74,239,691
Revolving funds:								
Alliance for Progress, development loans	X4111	389	192, 17,879	41,050,000	41,050,000		41,050,000	
Development loans	X4103	253	278,527,370	12,600,000	12,600,000	1,000,000	10,600,000	2,000,000
Total, revolving funds			470,545,249	53,650,000	53,650,000	1,000,000	51,650,000	2,000,000
Grand total			754,121,160	209,278,972	208,571,072	21,990,306	132,331,381	76,239,691

Mr. ELLENDER. Mr. President, what facts must be presented to the Senate to show that it will err if it makes available $160 million more than the amount allowed by the House to the Development Loan Fund?

There is a preponderance of evidence buttressing the House allowance. In fact, the evidence justifies cuts below the amount allowed by the House. If the flash report on the status of 1964 allotments and obligations were the only evidence, it alone would be sufficient. But there is the other evidence which I have already presented to the Senate.

We must discourage the programing of development loan funds when firm applications are not on hand. We must have a loan program that is not based on expectations for loan applications. We must not appropriate funds when feasibility studies for projects are not yet available. We must not plan construction projects when the recipient government has not furnished us any data. I believe we can reach these goals if we limit the amount authorized for development loan funds to $900 million, which will be accomplished if my amendment is adopted.

I urge Senators to vote for it.

Mr. LAUSCHE. Mr. President, I commend the Senator from Louisiana for his excellent presentation of this subject. He is worthy of praise, and I extend to him that praise on the basis of his general approach to the subject.

Mr. ELLENDER. I thank the Senator.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I join the Senator from Ohio in commending the Senator from Louisiana for his very able speech, in which he has brought out what I consider to be some of the shocking facts in connection with the military aid program.

I believe the RECORD ought to be clear that in due course of time the Senator from Louisiana will be offering amendments dealing with the military aid program, in which he will seek to reduce the authorization for that part of the program. The RECORD ought to be very clear that the amendments will be offered, some by the Senator from Louisiana and some by other Senators.

Mr. LAUSCHE. Mr. President, I should like to state that I will support the amendment now pending before the Senate, offered by the Senate from Louisiana [Mr. ELLENDER].

AMENDMENT NO. 307

Mr. LAUSCHE. Mr. President, I send to the desk an amendment which, if adopted, would strike from the bill lines

8 through 17, both inclusive, on page 39, as follows:

(d) After section 253, which relates to fiscal provisions, insert the following new section:

"SEC. 254. RESTRICTIONS ON ASSISTANCE.—None of the funds made available under authority of this Act may be used to furnish assistance to any country covered by this title in which the government has come to power through the forcible overthrow of a prior government which has been chosen in free and democratic elections unless the President determines that withholding such assistance would be contrary to the national interest."

I ask that the language be stricken in conformity with my amendment, because I believe that power now resides in the executive branch of the Government. The language now in the bill would in a way press the President not to grant aid to countries like the Dominican Republic and Honduras, or any other country in the Western Hemisphere in which a constitutionally chosen government has been overthrown by the people.

We have the grave responsibility of making a decision on whether or not to recognize a revolutionary government in South Vietnam, on the one hand, while we refuse to recognize a revolutionary government in the Dominican Republic on the other hand. Both those governments were constitutionally chosen. President Bosch, of the Dominican Republic was turned out of office because of his softhanded treatment of communism. In South Vietnam, Diem was vigorous in his opposition to the Communists. It can be said that he was firm, but I believe that his firmness was partly the consequence of the circumstances which prevailed in South Vietnam.

We thus have before us a paradox: Shall we recognize a revolutionary government in South Vietnam which overthrew a government that was definitely hostile to communism? Shall we refuse to recognize the Dominican Republic revolutionary government, which overthrew a regime that was soft on communism?

The world will be looking to see what our policy is. It will want to know why we refuse to recognize the government in the Dominican Republic, when we know that it is the product of the will of the people, beginning with the man working on the farm, in the factory, in the mine, in the business house, in the professional office, and in the church. From beginning to end the purpose was to remove Bosch from the government because of his softhanded treatment of communism.

That revolutionary government has not been recognized. I fear that chaos will come into existence in the Dominican Republic. If it does, we know that the Communists move into areas where chaos exists.

By our refusal to recognize the incumbent government of the Dominican Republic, we are, in effect, telling the people of that nation that we do not approve of the new government. When we tell them that, I am afraid that we are giving aid and comfort to the Communists.

In any event, my amendment, if it is adopted, will leave the law as it is and allow the administration either to recognize or reject a revolutionary government. It will not place pressure on the administration not to recognize, in the Western Hemisphere, a revolutionary government, even though it has overthrown a positive Communist regime.

What will we do if Jagan is overthrown in British Guiana? He is a Communist. He is oriented to Moscow. He has been selected under a constitutional basis of government. But we know that he is an enemy of the United States. If the people of British Guiana overthrew Jagan and installed a government that was friendly to us and hostile to Russia, would we still refuse to recognize the new government?

Mr. DOMINICK. Mr. President, will the Senator from Ohio yield?

Mr. LAUSCHE. I yield.

Mr. DOMINICK. It seems to me that the distinguished Senator from Ohio has raised an extremely important point; namely, the conflict in policy within the Foreign Aid Act as it is presented to us by the committee. On the one hand, we say that we will give most-favored-nation treatment to countries which are at least communistic in their form of government, even though the State Department calls them independent countries—for example, Poland and Yugoslavia. We propose to give them special treatment, most-favored-nation treatment, under both the Foreign Aid Act and the Foreign Trade Act. On the other hand, there is no doubt in my mind that section 254, referred to by the distinguished Senator from Ohio, definitely refers to governments which have moved into control in Central and South America in order to prevent a Communist takeover or a giveaway of the country by an existing government.

So it seems that there is a real conflict. We say we are trying to avoid communism by providing foreign aid; yet we give most-favored-nation treatment, on the one hand, and penalize countries which are trying to prevent communism, on the other hand. I do not know how anyone can determine which way we will go if we continue under this section. Unless the Senator's amendment were adopted, many problems could be posed.

Suppose there were a change in the government of any of the underdeveloped countries which we are now assisting. Suppose Ghana, which has certainly been oriented toward the East until recently, and perhaps still is, were to change its form of government. What would we do then? Would we say we would not provide aid to the new government, even though it might be pro-Western in its attitude?

There are any number of such examples. The situation concerning Cheddi Jagan, to which the Senator from Ohio has referred, is pertinent on this particular point. The inconsistency of providing aid to the military junta which has taken over South Vietnam, but not providing aid to the Dominican Republic, is a classic example of the problem which confronts us.

Does the Senator from Ohio believe that this decision should be left wholly to the discretion of the State Department or of the AID Administration? Or should Congress establish a policy in the foreign aid program which is designed to try to prevent further Communist takeovers of portions of the free world? Should not our foreign aid program be handled on that basis?

Mr. LAUSCHE. My position is that the granting of aid to a Communist government is never in the interest of the United States. Communist governments are hostile to our life. They want our country and system of government to perish. Therefore, it cannot be said that the granting of aid to a Communist government, whether the communism is international in scope or merely national, is ever in our interest.

However, my amendment would not enter into that field. It would merely strike section 254 from the bill and leave the language as it now is. If section 254 remains in the bill, I am afraid it will mean that there is a presumption that aid should not be granted to a revolutionary government that took control in one of the nations which was a member of the Alliance for Progress.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. LAUSCHE. I yield.

Mr. SPARKMAN. The Senator may recall that there was much discussion in committee regarding this proposal. We were more or less torn between two ideas. One was to discourage military coups; the second was, at the same time, not to limit ourselves unduly in the granting of aid to countries in which new governments had been established as a result of military coups.

The Senator may recall that before the committee would agree to this provision, it was modified considerably. First, it does not apply to any country outside the Western Hemisphere; in fact, it does not apply to any country outside the Alliance for Progress. Therefore, it does not apply to British Guiana, for example, and does not apply to South Vietnam.

Mr. LAUSCHE. I am speaking of British Guiana, in the Caribbean.

Mr. SPARKMAN. So am I.

It does not apply to British Guiana, because that country is not a member of the Alliance for Progress. This provision relates only to this title. I say that in order to clear the RECORD. It could apply to any country in the Alliance for Progress. However, the committee insisted that the language be included before the committee would agree to to the section.

There is a saving clause:

Unless the President determines that withholding such assistance would be contrary to the national interest.

The RECORD should show that the President is not prohibited from acting. If he determines that the national interest will be served by so doing, he may extend aid to a government established as a result of a military coup.

Mr. LAUSCHE. I thank the Senator from Alabama.

Mr. President, I call the attention of the Senate to an article entitled, "It Depends on Who Is Getting Couped," published in the Washington Daily News of today, November 5, 1963. The mean-

ing of the title of the article is: What is the nature of the country whose government has been overthrown? The government of the Dominican Republic incumbent several weeks ago was overthrown. A new government came into control there, but our Government refused to recognize it. In Saigon, the existing government was overthrown, and the indications are that the Government of the United States will recognize the revolutionary government there. Why the difference? Why did our Government give preferential treatment to one and prejudicially discriminatory treatment to the other? That is the important question.

I now read the article:

IT DEPENDS ON WHO IS GETTING COUPED—DOMINICANS RAISE THEIR EYEBROWS OVER SAIGON

(By Hal Hendrix)

MIAMI, November 5.—From the Dominican Republic point of view, last week's bloody military coup d'etat in South Vietnam has an inconsistent twist.

"It all depends on who is getting couped and where," commented a Dominican traveler upon arrival here.

The traveler, a source close to the ruling provisional government in Santo Domingo, said it was interesting to Dominican associates that, according to news agency reports, Washington could hardly wait to extend recognition to a provisional regime in Saigon. "But almost 6 weeks have passed since the military staged a coup in Santo Domingo and we are no nearer getting U.S. recognition than we were 6 weeks ago," the source said.

STRANGE

It seems strange to Dominicans—and it must to other Latin Americans—that the United States deplored the military action in Santo Domingo but openly called for a change in Vietnam's government and thereby encouraged the Saigon coup, he said.

The visitor pointed out that Washington officials happily reported that the Vietnam military leaders who overthrew the constitutional government of President Ngo Dinh Diem—and then killed him and his brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu— were friendly toward the United States and stanchly anti-Communist.

By the same token, the Dominican noted, Dominican military leaders never have been unfriendly toward the United States and are, in fact, strongly pro-United States and anti-Communist.

Furthermore, he added, the Dominican military coup against President Juan Bosch last September 25—in which softness toward communism was an announced factor—was bloodless and government reins were turned over to a civilian triumvirate within 36 hours after the coup.

NONE KILLED

President Bosch was accompanied into exile by an army general (Antonio Imbert) at his own request and none of his government officials was killed or injured in the coup, the traveler reminded.

In Santo Domingo, the visitor said, Dominicans noted with interest news agency reports from Saigon about celebrations following the overthrow of the Diem regime.

It recently was reported in the New York press, he mentioned, that American Peace Corps representatives in the Dominican interior referred to celebrations in small villages when it was learned Sr. Bosch had been toppled.

Also, the Dominican visitor said, it should be evident now there has been no national clamor in the republic for a return of Sr. Bosch or any of his cohorts, except by remnants of his revolutionary party, the Marxist-Leninist June 14 movement and other leftist elements.

PRIDE HURT

"Obviously," the Dominicans concluded, "the Kennedy administration and its democratic advisers in Puerto Rico had their pride wounded when their man Sr. Bosch was overthrown.

"It is equally obvious that the United States is not engaged in a shooting war against the Communists in our country like it is in Vietnam.

"But, according to the Kennedy administration, the Alliance for Progress is supposed to be a weapon against communism in the Americas. Now they have cut off Alliance-for-Progress programs in the Dominican Republic.

"So you have to ask, if you are a Dominican, Is the Alliance for Progress really for the Latin people or the favored Latin governments?"

Mr. President, to repeat, from the beginning to the end the people of the Dominican Republic were apprehensive that Bosch, the poet, the romanticist, the sentimentalist, was soft on communism, and they begged him to become firm. Our State Department said to him, "You will run yourself into trouble." But he would not listen, and the people overthrew him. But our Government refused to recognize the revolutionary government there, although the indications are that probably our Government will recognize the revolutionary government in South Vietnam.

Mr. President, in my opinion, there is no difference between the two; but even if there is a difference, it is in favor of the Dominican Republic Government. If our Government recognizes one, then justice, fairness, decency, and security for our country require that our Government give recognition and grant aid to both.

DISMISSAL OF OTTO OTEPKA

Mr. DODD. Mr. President, today the State Department announced the dismissal of Otto Otepka, a senior, experienced, and extremely competent security officer, because he gave to members of the Senate Judiciary Committee information concerning irregularities and probable illegalities affecting the security of the United States.

I consider the dismissal of Mr. Otepka by the Department of State a serious challenge to responsible government and to the system of checks and balances on which it is based. It is not only a direct affront to the Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security; it is also an affront to the Senate as a whole, and is a denial of its powers as established by legislation.

The charges on which Mr. Otepka's dismissal is based boil down to the simple fact that he has testified honestly before the Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security on matters relating to security in the Department of State.

The right of Government employees to furnish information to them is established by statute. The United States Code, title 5, paragraph 652(d), reads:

(d) The right of persons employed in the civil service of the United States, either individually or collectively, to petition Congress, or any Member thereof, or to furnish information to either House of Congress or to any committee or member thereof, shall not be denied or interfered with. (As amended June 10, 1948, c. 447, 62 Stat. 345; 1949 Reorganization Plan No. 5, effective Aug. 19, 1949, 14 F.R. 5227, 63 Stat. 1067.)

The State Department, by its action in the Otepka case, has, in effect, nullified this statute and issued a warning to all Government employees that cooperation with the established committees of the Senate, if this cooperation involves testimony considered unpalatable at higher echelon, is a crime punishable by dismissal.

Mr. President, the high significance of the Otepka case cannot be overstated.

Mr. Otepka was the last old-line security officer holding a top position in the Office of Security.

He has been an employee of the U.S. Government for 27 years. He has served as Deputy Director of the Office of Security and officer in charge of evaluations. His efficiency ratings have always been "excellent." In 1958 he received the Meritorious Service Award from Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. But suddenly, for some strange reason, certain people in the Department decided that Mr. Otepka had to go.

So they began, first, to restrict his functions.

Then they installed a tap on his telephone. Although a State Department official has denied under oath that this was done, the Subcommittee on Internal Security has proof that the tap was installed.

Then they began to monitor Mr. Otepka's wastebasket.

Then they locked him out of his office and denied him access to his files, although no charge had yet been brought against him.

No one suspected of espionage or disloyalty has to my knowledge been subjected to such surveillance and humiliation.

But Mr. Otepka was not suspected of disloyalty or espionage.

He was suspected very simply of cooperating with the Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security and of providing it with information that some of his superiors found embarrassing or objectionable.

In the topsy-turvy attitude it has displayed in the Otepka case, the State Department has been chasing the policeman instead of the culprit; and the words "security violation" have come to mean not the act of turning over information to an alien power, but the act of giving information to a committee of the Senate of the United States.

I have asked for an emergency meeting of the full Senate Judiciary Committee to consider the implications of Mr. Otepka's dismissal.

I have also asked that the 10-page memorandum on the Otepka case which I personally delivered to Secretary Rusk in New York, and which was signed by all the members of the Judiciary Committee, be circulated to all the Members of the Senate.

If the dismissal of Mr. Otepka is permitted to stand, it will become impossible or exceedingly difficult to elicit any information from employees of the executive branch that bears on disloyalty,

malfeasance, conflict of interest, or other wrongdoing by their superiors.

I hope the Secretary of State will see fit to reverse the decision of the Department when this matter comes to his attention.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, will the Senator from Connecticut yield?

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. BAYH in the chair). Does the Senator from Connecticut yield to the Senator from South Carolina?

Mr. DODD. I am happy to yield to the Senator from South Carolina.

Mr. THURMOND. I wish to commend the distinguished Senator from Connecticut for bringing this information to the attention of the Senate.

Does the Senator from Connecticut feel that if this decision of the State Department stands, that it would not only nullify the law on the subject—I refer to the law which requires an employee to state truthfully to a congressional committee the facts within his knowledge about the matter concerning which he is questioned—but that it also would nullify our constitutional system of government, by tending to destroy the constitutional system of checks and balances?

Mr. DODD. Yes. The Senator was not present in the Chamber when at the opening of my remarks I said that I considered it a most serious challenge to the system of checks and balances under which our Government operates. There is nothing more precious than this system. If we are to preserve free government, it must be founded on checks and balances.

If the legislative branch cannot inquire about irregularities or illegalities in Government departments, who will inquire?

Who will question wrongdoing if the legislative branch of the Government cannot do so?

If any Government employee is barred from giving vital information to a congressional committee, Senate or House, how will we ever learn of malfeasance or wrongdoing in the Government.

If the reward for coming forward and honestly telling Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives of wrongdoing is dismissal, something terrible has happened in our country, and we had better move before it is too late.

Mr. THURMOND. I believe it was Thomas Jefferson who made a statement to the effect that no man can be trusted with power, but must be bound by the chains of the Constitution. Does the Senator construe that statement to indicate that the purpose in the relevant provisions of the Constitution was to prevent any one man or agency in the Government from becoming too powerful, and to provide that each branch of the Government should be a check on the other branches? In the instance now in question, was not the legislative branch performing its constitutional function of checking on the executive branch by calling before it a witness who was in possession of valuable information which the Congress desired?

Mr. DODD. Yes. That is exactly what happened. That is all the man did. He gave honest information.

Incidentally, I have no doubt of the truth of the testimony; and I do not believe that any member of the committee doubts the truth of it. I do not think there is any question about that.

Mr. Otepka has not been charged with giving false information. He is charged with giving the truth to a committee of the Senate. Since someone in the Department has been embarrassed, Mr. Otepka has been dismissed for doing so. I cannot think of anything worse.

I try to be temperate about these things.

The difficulty concerning this individual has been going on for some time. There is much more to the story than I have been able to reveal, but in due time I am confident that it will all be made public. I am reluctant to raise the point on the floor of the Senate. I would prefer to see the investigations and hearings go along quietly. They have all been conducted in executive sessions to protect the reputations of people and to be sure of our facts before it is all made public—if it ever is or should be.

Now we are faced with a challenge to the Senate and the House of Representatives. Next the challenge will be presented to, say, the Committee on Commerce, and then, say, to the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare.

No committee of the Senate will be safe from interference, if an employee of the Government cannot come before a committee and tell the truth about any situation prevailing in the Government. In my judgment, no more grievous threat to our system of Government has been postured before us in my recollection.

It is not merely a problem for the Committee on the Judiciary or for the subcommittee. It is a problem for the Congress and the American people. That is why I have presented the facts, as I have done this afternoon.

Mr. THURMOND. If Mr. Otepka had not told the truth to the Subcommittee on Internal Security of the Committee on the Judiciary, would he not then have been guilty of perjury?

Mr. DODD. Of course. Our witnesses have been under oath. I pointed out earlier—and again I am quite sure that the Senator from South Carolina was not present at the time—that we know the Department of State tapped Mr. Otepka's telephone, but an employee of the Department of State came to our subcommittee and, under oath, said that the telephone had not been tapped—which was an untruth. That is the man who ought to be subject to charges. When employees of the Government come before a congressional committee and either make wilfull mistatements or tell untruths under oath I believe that dismissal charges should be preferred against them. But up to the present hour the man who has been dismissed is the man who told the truth, and so far as I know, the man who told the untruth has not been moved against.

Mr. THURMOND. Does the committee have any plans to cite for perjury the man to whom the Senator referred?

Mr. DODD. I have not asked any questions about that. As I said, I asked for an emergency meeting of the Judiciary Committee so that all the implications of the situation might be fully explored and the committee might make a decision with respect to what it should do, how it should advise the Senate, and what it should report to the Senate.

Mr. THURMOND. If this becomes accepted practice, in the future will not a witness called before a committee face one of two courses: If he tells a falsehood, he is subject to being prosecuted for perjury; if he tells the truth, as Mr. Otepka did, he will subject himself to the wrath of his employers, and be in danger of dismissal?

Does that not put an employee of the Government who may be a witness in the difficult position as far as knowing which course he must take—to tell the truth and be subject to dismissal or tell a lie and be subject to being cited for perjury?

Mr. DODD. Of course it does. It is very obvious that it does.

Mr. THURMOND. Should the employees of our Government ever be placed in such a position? Should not the State Department have commended Mr. Otepka for telling the truth, and promoted him because he had the courage to tell the truth and bring those matters to our attention? Instead, the State Department is taking the position that he should be fired because he came before a duly constituted congressional subcommittee and told the truth.

Mr. DODD. Yes. I speak for myself only. I have never considered our function on the subcommittee as an adversary position.

I do not believe that we of the legislative branch should be in an adversary position with respect to the executive or the judicial branch. We are in a cooperative posture. We should be. We should be working together. I tried to conduct myself on the subcommittee in that way. I believe the other members have, too. I know they have. So we are not in a contest. We do not want to be in a contest. We want to work together. If something wrong is brought to our attention through a Government employee, we want to tell the Secretary of State, the head of whatever department is involved, or the proper officials. Then something could be done about it.

I have never believed that the subcommittee should seek large headlines in an effort to make a case against the executive department. I do not believe that is our task. There has been too much of it in the past. We are a part of the Government, too. We should be working with the other two branches. How can we do so if another branch dismisses an employee who comes before us and tells the truth about a situation in a specific department?

Mr. THURMOND. It is the duty of the subcommittee to make inquiry. That is what I understood the subcommittee did in the present instance. It made a legitimate inquiry during which the witness was cross-examined. The witness spoke the truth; and because he spoke the truth he has been fired.

Mr. DODD. That is what happened.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I deeply regret what has occurred. The Secretary of State should consider the question most carefully and reconsider the action which has been taken. He should restore this faithful employee, who has been recognized as a man of character, a man of ability, and a man of dedication, he having been the recipient of an award from the Department of State only a few years ago. There has not been the least criticism concerning his ability, his patriotism, or the manner in which he has performed his duties. Merely because he gave information in response to an inquiry of a congressional subcommittee that someone in the State Department did not like, they have acted to get rid of him.

Mr. DODD. What, if the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. McCLELLAN] were faced with this situation. The Senator has been carrying on investigations with great dignity and care for some time. In view of this fact, assuming that some situation developed in one of the executive departments as to which the Senator from Arkansas wanted to question an employee of that department, if that employee came before the Senator's committee to testify, would he be fired? The implications are grave.

Mr. THURMOND. How would the Congress ever get the needed information? How can the Government Operations Committee perform its function of making inquiries concering the operation of the Government if employees in the Government who have facts and knowledge essential to such inquiry and investigation are not allowed to speak the truth and present it to a committee of Congress?

Mr. DODD. I know of no way.

Mr. THURMOND. There is a fundamental principle, involving more than one employee. Is there not a principle involved that could lead to great trouble in the future?

Mr. DODD. That is correct.

Mr. THURMOND. Furthermore, not only could this discourage employees from volunteering information to Congress, but also it could discourage them from testifying if it was known that they were wanted to testify or that their presence would be desired. Is it not the same as virtually saying to Government employees, "Stay away from Congress. You are working for the executive branch, and you have no right to give committees of Congress information, although they ask questions and you are supposed to respond truthfully. And if you do respond truthfully, you are in danger of being dismissed"? As I understand it, that is what happened to Mr. Otepka.

Mr. LAUSCHE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. DODD. I am glad to yield.

Mr. LAUSCHE. There is another horn waiting to impale Mr. Otepka. If, when he was called, he refused to testify, he would be subject to contempt proceedings.

Mr. DODD. Yes; under certain circumstances.

Mr. LAUSCHE. If he testified under oath, and told a falsehood, he would be subject to criminal prosecution. If he testified under oath and told the truth, under this policy which has been followed, he stood to lose his job.

Thus, three horns were awaiting him, and it made no difference in which direction he moved. He was hooked.

Mr. DODD. I believe that is the situation. In fairness to the Secretary of State, who is heavily burdened with great problems, I do not feel that he has had an opportunity to obtain an intimate knowledge of the situation. I strongly feel that if the Secretary had a full opportunity to know all the facts and all the implications, we would not be faced with this situation today. I have the highest regard for the Secretary of State. He is a fair, honest, capable, and decent man in every respect.

I believe the situation has gotten out of his hands, which is understandable to me. In such a large department of Government, with all the Secretary of State has to do, these things "boil up" on him. He does not know about them, perhaps, until the last minute. It does not make the situation any less serious, but in all fairness to the Secretary I would not want it to be understood by Senators, or beyond the walls of the Chamber, that I charge in any respect that the Secretary of State is responsible for this situation. I do not believe he is. I believe it is the people under him who have misled him, or misled his Department, into this situation.

AMENDMENT OF FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1961

The Senate resumed the consideration of the bill (H.R. 7885) to amend further the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and for other purposes.

AID TO YUGOSLAVIA

Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I support the amendment of the able senior Senator from Wisconsin which calls for the elimination of aid of any kind to Communist Yugoslavia.

This resolution is particularly timely because of the effort that is now being made to reinstate favored-nation treatment for Yugoslavia and to create an image of Marshal Tito and of his regime that is completely controverted by the facts.

I have spoken many times in the past in opposition to our program of assistance to Communist nations in terms of its harmful effect on our national and international position.

I am opposed to any form of aid to the Tito regime because of its long, unbroken record of tyranny over its own people, including the mass executions at the close of World War II, the judicial murder of General Mihailovich, the imprisonment of Cardinal Stepinac, and the recent reimprisonment of Milovan Djilas.

I am opposed to it because Tito has consistently lined up with the Soviet Union on foreign policy issues, including Hungary and Cuba.

I am opposed to the extension of any form of aid to Tito because in his posture as a so-called independent Communist he has in effect served as the prime organizer of anti-Western neutralism. Among other things, he was the organizer and ideological leader of the viciously anti-Western conference of neutralist nations in Belgrade in August 1960.

These are the historic reasons for my opposition to the continued folly of aid to Tito.

There are some who will say that this is in the past, and that we must concern ourselves with the present rather than with the facts of history. My answer to those who hold this view is that there has been no break in continuity between the Tito regime of the past and the Tito regime of today. In my remarks today, I propose not to deal with the past, but with five current situations that are relevant to the question of whether we should or should not extend favored-nation treatment to Yugoslavia and assist it in other ways.

There has been far too much self-deception on the subject of Tito and Titoism. I do not say that Tito's vaunted independence of Moscow is a complete fraud; he does enjoy a degree of independence.

But when the chips are down, what is the ultimate significance of this so-called independence?

I believe this question was correctly answered by Paul Underwood in an article entitled "Tito's Neutral Road—Toward Moscow" printed in the New York Times magazine in November 1961, who said:

> Tito's basic aim in his association with the nonalined nations seems to be to form a group of Socialist-minded, essentially anti-Western supporters in preparation for Moscow's expected triumph. Such a backing might enable him to maintain a certain independence and give him continued influence even in a Soviet-dominated world.

This is my first reason for supporting the amendment offered by the distinguished Senator from Wisconsin.

My second reason for opposing aid to the Tito regime is that it is a total dictatorship which not only tyrannizes its own people, but which, at the time of Marshall Tito's visit to this country practiced blackmail against American citizens of Yugoslav origin by threatening reprisals against their relatives in Yugoslavia if they engaged in any anti-Tito demonstration.

I have in my possession a number of letters, with translations, written to people in this country by family members in Yugoslavia. The language of these letters is remarkably similar: They all warn the recipients that their relatives in Yugoslavia will suffer if they take part in "counterrevolutionary" or anti-Tito demonstrations of any kind. Let me quote one of these blackmail letters, written by a Yugoslav mother to her son in America, so that my colleagues may have a better understanding of the nature of this reputedly more benign Communist state:

> I must turn to you for very great request, and I ask you this as a mother that you do not do anything foolish during the visit of Tito to Washington and New York. You know very well that you have your old parents here who do not have much longer to live. And you know very well how unpleasant it is for us to be called to the police

headquarters every hour of the day where they threaten us and warn us of the consequences which can befall us.

You look after yourself because you are young and you know as do the others that your past is clear so don't let anyone talk you into taking the wrong path. I beg you as your mother if you love us at all or think something of us who have remained to live here that you do nothing foolish.

Be good as you were before and think a little of us, you know our nerves are weak and we have no strength for anything let alone this unpleasantness. We are already fighting to live; you know that your father and I live from a pension which is $15 a month and life is short and therefore do not cause any unpleasantness. Think also of your sister and her children. I hope that you will heed me as you did the last time and that everything will be alright.

Love,

It is interesting to note that this letter was sent to an address where the recipient had not lived for 7 months, although the mother was aware of her son's present address and had in fact sent her last several letters to this address.

The son believes that in this way his mother was signaling to him that the letter was written under duress from the secret police or else that his mother did not intend for him to receive the letter at all.

I shall be happy to provide my colleagues with translations of the other letters if they are interested.

From the scale of the letter writing and from the similarity of the letters, it is clear that what is involved here is a concerted effort by Tito's secret police to exercise pressure on Americans of Yugoslav origin or descent by compelling their relatives in Yugoslavia to write, or sign, form letters to them.

To me there could be nothing more despicable than this blatant effort to coerce and silence American citizens by threatening reprisals against innocent women and children who could in no way be responsible for the activities of their relatives in this country.

A third fact which motivates my opposition to the restoration of favored-nation treatment to Yugoslavia is the continuing effort of the Serbian Orthodox Church authorities in Yugoslavia, obviously acting with the approval and most probably at the instigation of their government, to extend their direct control over the churches of the several hundred thousand Americans of the Serbian Orthodox faith.

This is part of a larger pattern which has involved in recent years an increasing number of visits by Orthodox clergymen who have come to this country from the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Rumania, as well as Yugoslavia.

The Serbian Orthodox clergy from Yugoslavia, on their visits to this country, have made the rounds of the several score Serbian Orthodox parishes; the visiting Rumanian Orthodox clergy have made the rounds of the Rumanian Orthodox parishes; and so on.

Last July, I asked the Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security to look into this situation because I felt that there were definite security implications in this obviously concerted effort to subject American Orthodox church organizations to the control of clerical authorities who are, in turn, under the control or influence of their Communist governments.

Among other things, there is preliminary evidence which indicates that this control, to the extent that it exists, has been used to discourage criticism of the Yugoslav-Communist regime and other Communist regimes, to encourage American citizens to believe that the regimes in these countries are essentially decent and deserving of support, and to foster an artificial and unwarranted feeling of loyalty to their ancient homelands, despite the fact that they are now Communist dominated.

At the time, I pointed out that these efforts have encountered very bitter resistance from our citizens of Russian, Serbian, Bulgarian, and Rumanian origin and had already resulted or were threatening to result in open schisms.

The great majority of Americans of the Serbian Orthodox faith were aroused by these actions and, at the 10th National Church Assembly which convened this last August 6 in Libertyville, Ill., they voted to request of the Belgrade Synod that "The future relationship of this Serbian Orthodox diocese for the United States and Canada toward the Serbian Orthodox mother church in Yugoslavia shall be broadly autonomous, in which it shall be united spiritually and liturgically but not subject to any canonical-hierarchal relationship." They further voted that until the relationship between the diocese and the mother church is regulated, no decisions or orders of the Belgrade Synod would be accepted by the Serbian Orthodox churches represented at the conferences.

In taking this stand, they pointed out that the Belgrade Synod is not free since it must make its decisions in collaboration with and with the approval of the so-called Federal Commission for Religious Questions of the Federal Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia; they claimed that the continued existence of their diocese required a determined struggle against all efforts at Communist infiltration; and they declared that their attitude would be in harmony with the welfare of the United States and Canada.

I ask unanimous consent, Mr. President, to have printed at the conclusion of my remarks the complete text of the declaration of the 10th National Church Assembly of the Serbian Orthodox diocese of the United States and Canada.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 1.)

Mr. DODD. Mr. President, the decision to reject the authority of the mother church in Yugoslavia was, I know, a most difficult one for Americans of Serbian origin. The orthodox church has played a heroic role in Serbian history and the Serbian people are bound to it not only by strong ties of faith, but by ties of blood and comradeship in battle extending back through the centuries.

How difficult the decision was is attested to by the fact that they continued to accept the authority of the Belgrade Synod until it openly moved to assert direct hierarchal and physical control over them.

As for those American Serbs who have not broken with the authority of the Belgrade Synod and have accepted the bishops appointed by it, I think it should be stated emphatically that, with the possible exception of a handful, there are no Communists among them. They have been motivated not by any sympathy for the Belgrade government but by the profound attachment that all Serbs feel to their mother church.

My fourth reason for opposing the extension of any form of aid to the Communist dictatorship in Yugoslavia is the insidious anti-Western policy pushed by Marshal Tito during his recent tour of Latin America. Tito's prime argument in the several Latin American countries he visited was that blocs and alliances have now become antiquated and that the best possible course for the Latin American countries would be to pursue a policy of neutralism akin to his own. In advocating neutralism in the capitals of Latin America, Tito was indirectly assailing and undermining both the OAS and the Alliance for Progress; he was doing Khrushchev's work far more effectively than Khrushchev could do it himself.

I think it noteworthy that Tito, in his visits to the satellite countries and to the Soviet Union, has not ventured to suggest to his Communist colleagues, as he did to our friends in Latin America, that blocs and alliances serve no useful functions.

I also consider it noteworthy that in Mexico City Tito received a reception which, according to all accounts, dwarfed the receptions accorded to other foreign leaders including President Kennedy.

In building up Tito's reputation by inviting him to our own country, we directly abetted his political effort in Latin America. I am certain that it will not be long before we will rue the consequences of Tito's recent visit to the Western Hemisphere.

The fifth reason for opposing foreign aid or favored-nation treatment for Communist Yugoslavia is the damage that this policy has done to important sectors of American industry.

Last year Congress acted to deprive Yugoslavia and Poland of favored-nation treatment. To date, no action has been taken to comply with this congressional decision.

In our single-minded determination to give aid to Communist Yugoslavia, we have sometimes completely ignored the welfare of American industries and of American workers and American communities who are dependent on these industries.

I call the attention of my colleagues, in particular, to the tragic deterioration of the zinc sheet industry of this country over the past 10-year period, a deterioration that is due primarily to the favored-nation treatment accorded to Yugoslavia zinc sheet.

In 1952, the domestic American industry produced 99 percent of the zinc sheet used in this country; imports accounted for only 1 percent of consumption. By 1962, imports of zinc sheet had increased

to the point where they accounted for fully one-third of the domestic market. The larger part of the increase in the import of zinc sheet is attributable to the phenomenal rise in Yugoslav imports, from near zero in 1952 to 776 tons in 1962. Imports from Yugoslavia, in fact, now account for almost 60 percent of total imports.

This has done very grave damage to an important American industry that is not in a position to compete with the state-directed labor of Communist societies. According to the figures of the Rolled Zinc Manufacturers Association, the industry has run at a loss for 4 consecutive years, and the losses have increased with each year of operation, virtually in direct proportion to the increase of Yugoslav imports.

It is not merely the zinc sheet industry that has been affected. The production and consumption of zinc strip is several times that of zinc sheet, and this industry, too, is feeling the pinch of foreign competition, primarily Yugoslav competition, in the domestic market.

Platt Bros. & Co., of Waterbury, Conn., is one of the companies in the zinc strip and wire business. In his letter to me, Mr. Orton P. Camp of Platt Bros. & Co. said:

We have every reason to believe that the domestic zinc strip business will be ruined, as has the sheet business, if the most-favored-nation treatment to Yugoslavia is continued.

Mr. President, I am particularly concerned about this situation because busines and labor in my own State of Connecticut are suffering from it. This is just one example of the harm we are doing to our own people in our misguided effort to assist Communist regimes. I know that business and labor in other parts of the country have also been adversely affected.

I earnestly hope that the Senate will take into consideration the plight of the American zinc sheet industry and of other industries that have suffered from the favored-nation treatment accorded to Yugoslavia.

I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD an exchange of correspondence with Mr. Orton P. Camp of the Platt Bros. & Co. zinc plant in Waterbury, Conn., and of several statistical tables prepared by the Rolled Zinc Manufacturers Association; and I also ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD an excerpt from a study of "United States Aid to Yugoslavia and Poland," by Milorad M. Drachkovitch, published by the American Enterprise Institute.

There being no objection, the information was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

JULY 18, 1963.

Hon. THOMAS J. DODD,
Old Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR DODD: Thank you for your letter of July 10. I am glad to give you some statistics in connection with the Yugoslavian zinc import problem. Am enclosing the following schedules:

A. Zinc sheet produced in the United States, 1952–62.

B. Zinc sheets—imports by volume and value, 1952–62.

C. Zinc sheet imports by country of origin, 1956–62.

D. Zinc strip produced in the United States, 1959–62.

You will see from schedule C that there were no imports of zinc sheet from Yugoslavia prior to 1956 but that in 1962, the imports of sheet zinc from Yugoslavia were more than 50 percent of total imports, and total imports were 48 percent of domestic production. This means that total imports were about one-third of domestic consumption. This is a terrifically high figure. The domestic zinc sheet business has already been ruined (see the last column on schedule A).

The production and consumption of zinc strip is several times that of zinc sheets but we do not have imports statistics on zinc strip. The Bureau of Census does not maintain this information although on several occasions, our association has requested the Bureau to do so and has offered to stand the expense. We have every reason to believe that the domestic zinc strip business will be ruined as has the sheet business if the most-favored-nation treatment to Yugoslavia is continued.

It seems to me that the above figures tell the story. I hope that you will do all you can, both in your committee and in the Senate, to see that this most-favored-nation treatment to Yugoslavia is not allowed to continue. As I said in my letter of June 21, it seems to me that from a point of view of ethics and fairness and good relations with friendly nations, it is improper to continue to give most-favored-nation treatment to countries which are either communistic or communistically inclined.

Thank you again for your interest and help.

Very truly yours,

THE PLATT BROS. & CO.,
ORTON P. CAMP.

Zinc sheet produced in the United States

	Production in tons	Sales		Exports in tons	Average number of employees	Man-hours expended	Average hourly pay to employees	Approximate fringe cost per paid hour	Average total hourly labor cost	Labor cost as percent of cost of finished product	Dollars of profit (loss) on these items
		(A) Tonnage	(B) Dollars								
1952	6,930	6,864	$4,281,164	299	349	635,493	$1.71	$0.18	$1.89	21.08	$52,571
1953	6,881	6,700	4,098,844	449	334	655,710	1.81	.24	2.05	28.85	205,229
1954	6,129	6,101	3,671,196	292	320	587,668	1.85	.30	2.15	30.55	160,057
1955	6,583	6,442	4,118,618	339	320	642,008	1.90	.30	2.20	28.53	126,104
1956	5,888	6,013	4,063,219	367	315	612,658	2.03	.33	2.36	29.72	6,350
1957	4,640	4,596	3,367,451	335	276	511,653	2.11	.37	2.48	32.90	63,408
1958	4,214	4,175	3,024,755	294	259	428,353	2.21	.40	2.61	34.62	37,774
1959	3,825	3,756	2,849,939	221	245	430,992	2.26	.46	2.72	36.68	(130,826)
1960	3,356	3,276	2,575,121	224	223	380,767	2.30	.48	2.78	33.65	(251,348)
1961	2,647	2,933	2,194,504	164	188	279,641	2.36	.54	2.90	32.66	(421,886)
1962	2,699	2,752	2,026,750	172	157	279,478	2.43	.62	3.05	33.70	(357,641)

Source: Rolled Zinc Manufacturers Association.

Zinc sheets—Imports by volume and value, average value of imports in terms of cents per pound and imports as percentage of domestic production

Year	Imports (tons)	Imports (dollars)	Average foreign value of imports (cents per pound)	Imports by volume as percent of domestic production	Year	Imports (tons)	Imports (dollars)	Average foreign value of imports (cents per pound)	Imports by volume as percent of domestic production
1952	47	23,557	25.0	1	1958	823	262,324	15.9	19
1953	196	76,751	19.5	3	1959	950	310,855	16.3	25
1954	259	88,010	17.0	4	1960	904	301,667	16.6	27
1955	431	148,389	17.2	7	1961	1,177	350,200	14.9	44
1956	450	170,416	18.9	8	1962	1,298	363,916	14.0	48
1957	732	244,722	16.7	16					

Source: Imports by tons and dollar value are as reported by the Bureau of the Census, U.S. Department of Commerce Commodity Classification 6559000 except that for the years 1952 through 1958 they have been revised in accordance with the findings of the U.S. Tariff Commission in Report on Zinc Sheet—Escape Clause Investigation No. 81, dated January 1960, table 12. Other data as computed by Rolled Zinc Manufacturers Association.

Excludes quantities erroneously reported as having been entered from Canada.

Zinc sheet imports by country of origin

[In tons]

	Yugoslavia	West Germany	Belgium	Netherlands	United Kingdom		Yugoslavia	West Germany	Belgium	Netherlands	United Kingdom
1956		323	43	75		1960	411	251	92	58	5
1957	236	314	78	103		1961	769	244	67	92	5
1958	267	361	112	141	17	1962	776	271	118	111	21
1959	222	450	113	155	6						

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census.

Zinc strip produced in the United States

	Production in tons	Sales		Exports in tons	Average number of employees	Man-hours expended	Average hourly pay to employees	Approximate fringe cost per paid hour	Average total hourly labor cost	Labor cost as percent of cost of finished product	Dollars of profit (loss) on these items
		(A) Tonnage	(B) Dollars								
1959	32,364	32,221	10,773,634	1,052	242	459,716	$2.37	$0.48	$2.85	14.55	505,347
1960	30,843	30,433	10,823,882	637	228	392,573	2.44	.49	2.93	14.63	(73,197)
1961	31,902	31,890	11,028,920	761	236	407,691	2.47	.51	2.98	13.70	(98,273)
1962	33,924	34,056	11,635,416	1,016	220	405,171	2.56	.54	3.10	13.67	116,920

Source: Rolled Zinc Manufacturers Association.

TITO'S INDEPENDENT WAY OF SPREADING COMMUNISM ABROAD

During the 1962 congressional debates on foreign aid, the leading critics of administration policy toward Yugoslavia particularly stressed the role played by Tito's regime among the nonalined nations of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Several Senators expressed concern over the harm allegedly done to Western interests by Tito's tireless efforts to influence the domestic policies and foreign political orientation of countries geographically remote from Yugoslavia.

Tito identifies his type of neutralism with the victory of communism over freedom. This is what he is working to achieve, not only in Yugoslavia, but also in Asia and Africa and, it is obvious, in view of his statements, if he can do so, in South America.

Despite the heretic label affixed upon Tito by the Communist bloc, Titoism promotes Soviet interest in the third or neutral world, if not directly, then indirectly by inspiring and supporting attitudes in those countries which are detrimental to the basic interest of the West.[1]

In the international arena, by and large and on balance, Tito is working against the interests of the United States and the free world, against the interest of NATO, and in support of Soviet policies on Berlin and on other points of conflict.[2]

The granting of aid to Tito, admittedly a Communist, who has repeatedly declared that the world must be communized, is an inducement to the nations in Africa, in the Middle East and in the Far East, to follow Tito. By giving aid to Communist countries, we are encouraging all of the emerging nations to look favorably upon the Tito form of government.[3]

While we have been giving billions of dollars to Yugoslavia, Yugoslavia has been spending hundreds of millions of dollars on a foreign aid program of its own, geared to the expansion of neutralist influence in the non-Communist world. India, Indonesia, Burma, Egypt, the Sudan, Ghana, Ethiopia, and other Afro-Asian nations with neutralist leanings, have been recipients of this aid. In short, through our aid to Yugoslavia, we have, in effect, been underwriting the extension of anti-Western neutralism in the countries of Asia and Africa.[4]

The seriousness of these charges was confirmed, in a milder form to be sure, by Ambassador Kennan himself, during his aforementioned NBC-TV interview of July 1962, when he declared that "what the Yugoslavs have said to the other neutrals is often something that I haven't liked, and I don't find to be in the interest of this country."[5]

What then are the motives behind Tito's attempts to shape the views and the policies of the nonalined nations? For the answer one must first of all consult the sacred book of Titoism, the LCY's 1958 program. Two principles, according to that program, determine the world outlook of Yugoslav Communists. One is that "inexorably and in a variety of ways, humanity is moving deep into the era of socialism."[6] From this postulate stems the imperative for the LCY to educate the Yugoslav working people in the spirit of proletarian internationalism:

"In all contacts with other Communists, Socialist, progressive and anti-imperialist movements, and in all its international relations in general, the League of the Communists of Yugoslavia has upheld and will continue to uphold the great idea of proletarian socialist internationalism as its guiding principle.[7]

In the practical application of these principles, the program of the LCY actually reformulates two guidelines which go directly back to Lenin's own thesis on national and colonial questions offered to the Second Congress of the Communist International (July-August 1920). Thus Lenin's thesis that "Communist parties must aid nationalist-revolutionary liberation movements in backward countries" finds the following expression in the LCY's program:

"In certain countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, at a certain stage of the movement of society toward socialism, a positive role can be played by certain national movements of progressive orientation, movements growing out of the struggle against imperialism and capitalist monopolies."[8]

Likewise, Lenin's explanation that the capitalist phase of development in a given backward country could be skipped and immediately replaced by the Soviet system, was echoed in the LCY program:

"In the underdeveloped countries just liberated from colonial oppression, tendencies and possibilities exist for bypassing certain phases of capitalist development and immediately passing on to the construction of the economic foundations of the development of socialism."[9]

It is in the same Marxist-Leninist spirit that Edvard Kardelj, chief ideologist of Titoism, explained the meaning of "peaceful coexistence," the central tenet of Yugoslav foreign policy:

"For Yugoslav Communists the justification of the policy of coexistence is based * * * on the conviction that in the circumstances of today it will be ever more difficult for the forces of imperialism and war to break the existing coexistence, which will bring the internal contradictions and oppositions of the capitalist world to a new stage of development, that is, it will speed up the processes of disintegration of imperialism and capitalism as a system and increasingly strengthen the part played by Socialist factors, material and political."[10]

The same dialectical approach used to explain the concept of active peaceful coexistence underlies also the Yugoslav analysis of the bloc division of the world. Although in current propaganda the Yugoslav Communists criticize the existence of antagonistic military blocs as detrimental to world peace, they explain also that they do not put the Western and Soviet blocs back to back, as equally responsible for world divisions and tensions. In his report to the Seventh Congress of the LCY, Tito put the responsibility for world partition squarely on the West:

"One of the reasons for the establishment of the Atlantic Pact was the rigid and unnecessarily threatening Stalinist foreign policy, and besides that also the fact that the Western Powers had reached the conviction that through diplomatic ways they would

[1] Senator PROXMIRE, CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, vol 108, pt. 7, p. 9863.

[2]. Senator KEATING, CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, vol. 108, pt. 7, p. 9867.

[3] Senator LAUSCHE, CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, vol. 108, pt. 7, pp. 9923–9924.

[4] Senator DODD, CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, vol. 108, pt. 10, p. 12935.

[5] In his letter to the New York Times (July 6, 1962), Mr. Kennan was even more explicit: "At no time during my incumbency here have I considered Yugoslavia's influence over the other neutrals to be satisfactory from the standpoint of the concepts and purposes of our country in world affairs."

[6] Yugoslavia's Way, p. 17. "As Marxists we cannot doubt that social progress in contemporary conditions is a manifestation of the general march toward socialism." Edvard Kardelj, in an interview with the official Yugoslav News Agency, Tanjug, before his departure for Indonesia, December 1962, Review of International Affairs, Dec. 20, 1962, p. 20.

[7] Yugoslavia's Way, p. 67.

[8] Ibid., p. 60.

[9] Ibid., p. 21.

[10] Socialism and War (London: Methuen & Co., 1961), p. 66.

not be able to achieve their imperialistic goals. This pact should have served as means toward the realization of world domination and this from the position of strength. The establishment of the Atlantic Pact and the drawing of Western Germany into it have necessarily led to the establishment of the defensive Warsaw Pact of Eastern countries, as counterweight to the Atlantic Pact." [11]

Likewise, more subtly but no less significantly, Edvard Kardelj declared in his interview before leaving for Indonesia on December 6, 1962, that the bloc division of the world reflects the existence of contradictory Socialist and capitalist systems. But the social systems which change, necessarily, "by the freeing of the internal social forces in every country," should not be identified with the blocs, which are "a historically conditioned political phenomenon." [12] This distinction, at first sight rather obscure, actually contains two very important implications. One is the confirmation of the Titoist thesis that while the blocs are ad hoc, static, and strictly temporary manifestations, the present bloc division will be overcome gradually, not through a world war but through internal process leading inexorably toward socialism. The second implication suggests that Yugoslavia, although not a member of the Warsaw Pact, and indeed because of this very fact, may serve to accelerate the worldwide movement toward socialism. This was also intimated by Tito in his speech of December 29, 1962. In his address he informed his Yugoslav listeners that he had explained in Moscow how important it was that Yugoslavia enjoy a world status and reputation, particularly among the nonengaged states of Africa and Asia. That would be, in his words, "useful not only to us and to those countries but also to the progressive movement and to the whole peace-loving world." [13] This formulation, veiled in form but not in substance, points to another conclusion reached by Paul Underwood a year before Tito's speech:

"Tito's basic aim in his association with the nonalined nations seems to be to form a group of Socialist-minded, essentially anti-Western supporters in preparation for Moscow's expected triumph. Such a backing might enable him to maintain a certain independence and give him continued influence even in a Soviet-dominated world." [14]

Another element to be mentioned in this connection—which has certainly been viewed with some displeasure in Moscow, and with open hostility in Peiping—is the tendency of Titosim to export its version of Marxism-Leninism and its socioeconomic experiment as particularly suitable to the underdeveloped countries. "Skip capitalism through Titoism" is indeed the unstated but underlying slogan of LCY propaganda in the "third" part of the world. Before assessing its deeper meaning, we should turn to a brief description of this Titoist Afro-Asian (and to a lesser extent, Latin American) operation.

Titoist concern for the underdeveloped countries began to pick up momentum after Stalin's death, and has steadily increased along with the emergence of new states in Asia and Africa. Since his first and carefully prepared trip to Asia, in December 1954,[15] through several subsequent trips on both continents, and finally through the pivotal role he played at the September 1961 Belgrade Conference,[16] Tito tried to influence these new states on three planes: ideological, world political, and socioeconomic.

The LCY program has served as the main vehicle of Tito's ideological proselytism. Its dissemination has reached worldwide proportions with 26 editions, including a Spanish edition in Chile, an Indonesian in Djakarta, a Burmese in Rangoon, and an Indian in New Delhi. Yugoslavia's very smallness, Tito's reformist, revisionist, and nonalined reputation, and the more dignified and scientific outlook of the LCY's program—as compared with the cruder Soviet program, and with aggressive Chinese propaganda—have made the Yugoslav interpretation of Marxism-Leninism much more respectable among the local elites of underdeveloped countries, than the direct influence of the great Communist powers. Thus, in the words of a competent observer:

"The fitting of the Marxist formula onto the natural anticolonial reaction is the greatest service the Yugoslav regime has made to the Communist cause." [17]

Titoist influence on the world political outlook of the underdeveloped countries may be correctly assessed from two of Tito's recent addresses. One was his violent hate-the-colonialists-and-neocolonialists speech before the parliament of Ghana, on March 2, 1961, in which the West was pictured as the exclusive villain in the piece.[18] Another was his pro-Soviet and anti-Western, and particularly anti-United States, speech of September 3, at the Belgrade conference. On the one hand, he declared his unqualified support for all national revolutionary movements—from southeast Asia, through the Congo, Algeria, and Angola, to Cuba—and he appealed for the liquidation of colonialism everywhere and the right to self-determination for all former or present colonial peoples. All this was expressed in countless communiques following the meetings of Yugoslav leaders with their counterparts from other nonalined countries. But, on the other hand, Tito maintained total silence on the nature of Soviet-satellite relations and deliberately failed to mention the right of self-determination for the peoples of East-central Europe. The fact of Tito's quarrels with the Chinese, and ups-and-downs in his relations with Khrushchev, make this discrepancy between his anti-Western positions and his tacit approval of the present state of affairs in Eastern Europe less conspicuous in the eyes of his nonalined friends.[19]

The impact of Titoism on the socioeconomic life of the underdeveloped countries may be observed on two levels. One relates to the advice given by some Yugoslav writers, particularly to African leaders, to shun closer relations with Western imperialist powers which are attempting to replace political with economic domination in their second conquest of Africa.[20] Likewise, prominent Yugoslav economic experts counsel the Africans to "restrict private capitalist tendencies," [21] while the Yugoslav delegates at the United Nations have for many years drawn attention to the fact that economic development of the underdeveloped countries cannot simply be left to foreign private capital.[22]

These strictures against Western economic neocolonialism go well beyond the level of mere anti-Western attacks. They imply, at the same time, an invitation to the underdeveloped countries to transplant the Yugoslav economic model on their own soil. Thus, for example, Edvard Kardelj's visit to Cairo in December 1960 has been credited as contributing to the emerging "Arab socialism." [23] More recently, the president of the new Republic of Tanganyika, Julius Nyerere, declared in an interview with a Yugoslav correspondent that his visit to Yugoslavia and his acquaintance there with the process of industrialization and the socialization of economic activities convinced him that "one day we will introduce in practice many things you are doing now." [24]

Another aspect of the same phenomenon is the establishment of many-sided relations between Yugoslavia and the new states of Asia, Africa, and to some extent Latin America, ranging from trade to scientific and technical cooperation and to treaties on economic aid extended by Yugoslavia. This aspect of Yugoslav assistance to the economically underdeveloped countries on a bilateral basis merits particular attention, and its operation is described as follows by Yugoslav official circles:

"As the insufficiently developed countries are not in a position to pay for their imports from Yugoslavia in convertible foreign exchange, Yugoslavia has instituted an ever broader crediting policy toward these countries of late. Special arrangements have recently been concluded to this effect with Ceylon, Ethiopia, the Sudan, Indonesia, Argentina, Brazil and with many emergent African countries. These arrangements enable imports of capital goods from Yugoslavia to be paid for only when the respective investments begin yielding returns in the importing country." [25]

The scope and exact amount of aid given by Yugoslavia to various underdeveloped countries is difficult to establish, but even the following and certainly incomplete table

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[11] VII Kongres Saveza Komunista Jugoslavije, pp. 25–26.

[12] "Vice President Kardelj's Interview With Editor of Tanjug," Review of International Affairs, Dec. 20, 1962, pp. 19–20. It is interesting to note that in his speech at the Sixth Congress of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany on Jan. 16, 1963, in East Berlin, Khrushchev used the same formula as Kardelj when he declared that "the military blocs cannot be identified with the system," the first being the result of international treaties and agreements, and the latter, "an objective law of social development." For the full text of Khrushchev's speech see Soviet Booklet No. 106 (London), January 1963, p. 19.

[13] Politika, Dec. 30, 1962.

[14] "Tito's Neutral Road—Toward Moscow," the New York Times Magazine, Nov. 26, 1961, p. 129.

[15] Cf. Slobodan M. Draskovich, Tito, Moscow's Trojan Horse (Chicago: Regnery, 1957), pp. 213–217.

[16] Between 1954 and 1961 Tito made four official Afro-Asian trips: 1954–55, India and Burma; 1955–56, Ethiopia and Egypt; 1958–59, India, Indonesia, Burma, Ceylon, Ethiopia, Sudan, United Arab Republic; 1961, Ghana, Togo, Liberia, Guinea, Mali, Morocco, Tunisia, United Arab Republic.

[17] George Bailey, "They Call Themselves Neutrals," the Reporter, Sept. 28, 1961.

[18] The entire text of this speech, in English, may be found in an official Yugoslav publication entitled "President Tito's Visit to Friendly African Countries" (Belgrade, 1961), pp. 5–23.

[19] A telling example of the effects of Titoist propaganda in Latin America is the following letter from a Chilean reader to the editors of the Belgrade Review of International Affairs: "We have been accustomed to hearing that the idea of human rights is suppressed in socialist countries, but thanks to the articles in the 'Revue of International Affairs' I have realized that the opposite is true. * * *" May 5, 1962, p. 6.

[20] V. Milenkovic, "The Second Conquest of Africa," Ekonomska Politika, Feb. 25, 1961.

[21] Janez Stanovnik, "The Struggle of Two Opposite Tendencies in the Economy of Underdeveloped Countries," Nasa Stvarnost, March 1961.

[22] Yugoslav View on Assistance to Economically Underdeveloped Countries," Yugoslav Survey, July–September 1960, p. 267.

[23] "Officials of the Nasser Government are reported to feel that the Yugoslav Communists' experience in building up industry, modernizing agriculture and organizing the nation on their own pattern could be useful." The New York Times, Nov. 27, 1960.

[24] Borba, Dec. 9, 1962.

[25] "Yugoslav View on Assistance to Economically Underdeveloped Countries," Yugoslav Survey, July–September 1960, p. 273.

speaks eloquently about the efforts of overindebted Yugoslavia to become the creditor of countries thousands of miles from the Balkans:

Date of agreement	Assisted country	Amount and nature of Yugoslav assistance
Feb. 12, 1959	Ethiopia	Financial and technical assistance; offers of a nonspecified amount of Yugoslavian credits.
Jan. 21, 1960	India	$40,000,000 credits for purchasing Yugoslav capital goods.
February 1960	Morocco	$5,000,000 investment credits for the import of Yugoslav capital goods.
January 1961	Sudan	Nonspecified amount of long-term credits granted under the agreement of July 18, 1959.
Do	United Arab Republic	$20,000,000 credits for the purchase of industrial equipment and machines.
Do	Pakistan	$10,000,000 credit arrangements.
June 2, 1961	Guinea	Agreement on the elaboration of a town plan for Conakry, to be financed 50 percent by Yugoslavia. (An operational credit of $600,000 had already been granted in October of 1960, when an agreement on technical assistance was signed.)
June 1961	Mali	$10,000,000 credits earmarked for the execution of certain projects of the Malian 5-year plan.
July 1961	Indonesia	$15,000,000 credit.
Sept. 27, 1961	Morocco	$5,000,000 loan.
October 1961	Ghana	An earlier credit of $1,800,000 was increased to $3,600,000.
Oct. 28, 1961	Guinea	$5,000,000 loan.
Feb. 2, 1962	Tunisia	$6,000,000 credits for investment equipment.
Feb. 19, 1962	Ghana	$5,000,000 credits on deliveries of Yugoslav goods.
March 1962	Ethiopia	Yugoslav economic experts to help prepare the 2d 5-year plan of Ethiopia.
Apr. 18, 1962	Indonesia	$15,000,000 credits for investment equipment.
April 1962	Ghana	Nonspecified amount of credits for imports of capital equipment.
Apr. 26, 1962	do	Agreement on granting of credit facilities for the construction of a 2d naval base in Ghana.
December 1962	Indonesia	Nonspecified increase of a credit previously granted for imports of raw materials, subsidiary materials, and spare parts.
Dec. 24, 1962	Tanganyika	Purchase of some industrial plants in Yugoslavia on a nonspecified credit basis.
April 1963	Algeria	Supply, together with Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria, of the major portion of outside aid to launch Algeria's first home-grown industry for production of textiles, clothing, and leather.

Source: Yugoslav Survey, April 1960–September 1962 (10 issues); Review of International Affairs (1960–63); Thomas Philippovich, "La Yougoslavie entre l'ouest et l'est" (Paris: Les Cahiers Africains, No. 11, 1962), pp. 69–74; the New York Times (western edition), Apr. 9, 1963.

There is a last, but certainly not least important feature of these Titoist operational methods in connection with the underdeveloped countries. Hundreds of experts, engineers, teachers, and other technical and diplomatic personnel are being sent abroad, while large numbers—particularly of young Africans—are invited to study at various Yugoslav schools and universities under highly favorable financial conditions.[26] In addition, a series of Yugoslav social organizations systematically exchange delegations with African, Asian, and Latin American countries. Two of the largest such organizations, the Socialist Alliance of Working People of Yugoslavia (former Popular Front) and the Confederation of Trade Unions of Yugoslavia, have been particularly active in establishing tangible forms of cooperation with underdeveloped countries, ranging from study tours and exchanges of opinion to assistance in the training of personnel, etc. Here, for example, is an excerpt from a glowing report on rich and extensive international activities and relations of the Socialist Alliance.

"Foremost among the activities of the Socialist Alliance of Working People of Yugoslavia last year (1961) was its intensive and wide support of the liberation movements of the dependent African countries, so that 1961 may rightly be called Africa Year for the Alliance, too.

"In the course of last year alone Yugoslavia was visited by 26 delegations from various liberation movements of Africa, and by individual representatives of 18 countries. Most of these movements and parties are greatly interested in the work and development of Yugoslav organizations and sociopolitical and state development." [27]

Practically the same may be said for the international activities of the Yugoslav Confederation of Trade Unions.[28] Its president, Svetozar Vukmanovic—who is also a member of the Secretariat of the executive committee (Politbureau) of the LCY and thus the fifth highest ranking official in the party hierarchy—is particularly active in establishing close personal contacts with the trade unionists of northwestern and central Africa. Thus, after a trip to Ghana and Morocco, in October 1960, he declared in an interview that Yugoslav trade unions are highly interested in combating anti-Communist tendencies within the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions. Since the Moroccan Trade Union Federation belongs to the ICFTU, Vukmanovic emphasized, with satisfaction, his influence on Moroccan rejection of the ICFTU's anti-Communist policy.[29]

EXHIBIT 1

(DECLARATION OF THE 10TH NATIONAL CHURCH ASSEMBLY OF THE SERBIAN ORTHODOX DIOCESE OF THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA)

The 10th National Church Assembly of the Serbian Orthodox diocese of the United States of America convoked in regular session on August 6, 7, 8, 1963, at St. Sava Monastery, Libertyville, Ill., by His Grace, the Right Reverend Bishop Dionisije, and the diocesan council, sends warm greetings to all our Serbian brothers of St. Sava in this diocese and the free world, but especially in our ancient enslaved fatherland.

Because past occasions have shown that the eyes of the enslaved faithful look to this diocese as the champion of the free Serbian Orthodox Church with its glorious national traditions and determined resistance to godless communism, this assembly must, in its sacred duty, bring the following facts to their attention:

The holy synod of the Serbian Orthodox patriarchate in Belgrade forwarded to this national church assembly the decisions of the holy assembly of bishops as Nos. 21 and 21/Min. 77, No. 1725/Min. 237, and No. 1726/Min. 238, dated May 17, 1963, as well as its separate undated epistle to the faithful of this diocese in which it informed our assembly that the holy assembly of bishops had decided to abolish the Serbian Orthodox diocese for the United States of America and Canada by dividing it into three new dioceses—the middle eastern American-Canadian diocese, with its seat at Detroit, Mich.; the middle western American diocese, with its seat at Libertyville, Ill.; and the western American diocese, with its seat at Los Angeles, Calif., granting these newly created dioceses the same legal status enjoyed by the Serbian Orthodox dioceses in the Federal Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia.

The holy assembly of bishops at the same time appointed the Very Reverend Stevan Castavica, bishop of the new Middle-Eastern American-Canadian diocese; and His Grace, the Right Reverend Bishop Dionisije, bishop of the newly created Middle-Western American diocese. Simultaneously with its appointment of Bishop Dionisije, the holy assembly suspended his conduct of affairs of the new diocese; placed him under interdiction of sacerdotal duties; and announced his investigation by the ecclesiastical court because of numerous alleged accusations against him; and, finally, the assembly appointed the Very Reverend Archmandrite Dr. Firmilijan Ocokoljich, administrator of the newly created Middle-Western American diocese, and the Very Reverend Archimandrite Gregory Udicki administrator of the new Western-American diocese.

For its part, the diocesan council for this see advised the National Church Assembly that after numerous faithful had called its attention to the aforementioned decisions of the holy assembly of bishops and the holy synod in Belgrade, it convened in plenary session on June 6, 1963, and decreed as follows:

1. The Diocesan Council of the Serbian Orthodox diocese for the United States and Canada declares that it is not authorized to accept or reject the three-way division of the diocese for the United States of America and Canada into new dioceses: and for this reason the matter is referred to the National Church Assembly. For emergency reasons, this assembly is convoked for the days of August 6, 7, 8, and 9, 1963, at the Monastery of Saint Sava at Libertyville, Ill., in accordance with the rules and decisions of the last national church assembly held in September 1960. This decision is unanimously adopted.

2. Upon motion of the Reverend Aleksandar Dimitrijevich, seconded by Mr. Milos Konjevich, it has been decided to send a letter to the holy synod requesting that a synodal commission be sent as soon as possible, at the plaintiff's expense, to investigate and adjudicate the accusations against His Grace, the Bishop Dionisije—since according to the previous decision of the diocesan council, no legal changes can be made until the decision of the 10th National Church Assembly already convened. This decision is adopted by all present except for two who vote against.

[26] According to Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Jan. 12, 1963, the African students in Yugoslavia receive scholarships of 60,000 dinars a month ($80), while the scholarships for Yugoslav students amount to only 15,000 dinars ($20).

[27] "The 1961 International Activities of the Socialist Alliance of Working People of Yugoslavia," Review of International Affairs, Mar. 20, 1962, p. 19. The same report is interesting also because it stresses the improvement of relations and intensification of contacts with the corresponding sociopolitical organizations of all East European countries (with the exception of Albania) and certain Communist parties and organizations outside the Soviet bloc.

[28] "International Activities of the Yugoslav Trade Unions in 1959," Yugoslav Survey, April 1960, pp. 121–28. Also, "The Yugoslav Trade Unions' Links with Foreign Countries," ibid, January–March 1961, pp. 578–83. Also, "Yugoslav Trade Unions and the International Trade Union Movement," ibid, April–June 1962, pp. 1355–62.

[29] Borba, Oct. 30, 1960.

The diocesan council advised the holy synod of its decisions pursuant to which the investigation commission of the patriarchate, consisting of His Grace, Bishop Chrisostom, His Grace, Bishop Visarion, and the Very Reverends Mladen Mladenovich and Boza Tripkovich arrived in New York, N.Y., on June 28, 1963, where they were greeted by the consul of the Yugoslav Communist Government.

The said commission arrived at Libertyville, Ill., the See of the Bishops for the United States and Canada, His Grace Dionisije, on July 5, 1963, and tried to compel his deposition concerning the alleged offenses while at the same time refusing to divulge the identity of the plaintiffs or to provide him, for his direct response, with the copies of the complaints; alleging canonical misconduct, on which he stood accused, as is provided for by church criminal procedure. In acting thus, the Belgrade Investigation Commission not only deprived Bishop Dionisije of his fundamental rights as an individual and an American citizen to a fair trial based upon the Constitution but also made it impossible for him to prepare his defense by gathering witnesses and using other kinds of evidence.

In private conversations with the individual members of the diocesan council and with individual lay workers in the church affairs of the Serbian people in the United States and Canada, the right reverend members of the investigation commission admitted first, that they had never presented a copy of the complaints for response by His Grace, Bishop Dionisije; and secondly, that they were obliged to act this way in order to protect the plaintiffs from civil or criminal suit by Bishop Dionisije in American courts.

As a matter of fact, the investigation commission was in a hurry to perform the real and principal task for which it had come—namely, the consecration of the Very Reverend Lastavica as bishop of the newly created Middle-Eastern American-Canadian diocese. This it did on July 13, 1963, in the church of St. Elijah at Aliquippa, Pa.

On the other hand the investigation commission, together with the Association of Clergymen and the above-named administrators of the two newly created dioceses, Archimandrites Dr. Firmilijan and Gregory, took a series of measures to reinforce their positions:

1. They sought to misdirect all clergymen, churches, and school communities, by means of incomplete information or half-truths with a view to persuading these groups to sever their relations with the Serbian Orthodox Diocese for the United States and Canada and to remit their contributions, instead, to the new administrators of the nonexistent dioceses.

2. They sought to take over from the diocese and to enter into possession of the diocesan real property including the Monastery of St. Sava at Libertyville, Ill., the charity home at Shadeland, Pa., and the St. Sava Mission at Jackson, Calif., and they also sought to seize liquid assets of the diocese in various bank accounts.

3. They sought to organize a boycott of the 10th National Church Assembly and to prevent, by whatever means, the election and participation of the delegates of the individual church and school communities to it.

All of these illegal endeavors remain unsuccessful to date. Our diocese continues to perform its activities and carry on its divine mission, although with great difficulties and material and moral losses. Our clergy, our church, and school communities, as well as our national organizations, and all our faithful, although stunned at first by the violent frontal attack not only on His Grace, Bishop Dionisije, but also on the very foundations, autonomy and existence of this diocese, gathered strength and rallied the ranks of defenders of St. Sava's heritage on this continent.

The facts strongly suggest that one did not count on such resistance. The facts establish that the holy synod did not consider the views of the free faithful in the diocese of the United States of America and Canada, in accordance with the ancient aphorism: "The voice of the people is the voice of the Son of God." Instead, the holy synod, by its decision of July 1963, heedlessly put the administration of the newly created and on the paper existing dioceses into the hands of His Holiness, the Serbian and Macedonian Patriarch.

Thereafter, His Grace, Bishop Visarion, went back to Yugoslavia in order to suggest the convocation of an extraordinary session of the holy assembly of bishops. The assembly was held on July 26, 1963, and then made decision which reads as follows: "The administrators—the Archimandrites Dr. Firmilijan and Gregory—are appointed bishops for the dioceses which previously were given to them for administration."

The oral instruction was added to this decision—according to the statement of the investigation commission itself—that their consecration was to be performed as expeditiously as possible, and before this 10th Church National Assembly convened. Pursuant to this instruction, the Archimandrite Dr. Firmilijan was consecrated in the Church of St. Sava in Milwaukee, Wis., on August 1, 1963, while the consecration of the Archimandrite Gregory took place in the Church of St. Steven at Alhambra, Calif., on August 4, 1963. The objections of the faithful and their picket lines went unheeded, although these protests obviously were the cries "unaxios," which canonically make invalid the elevation of the unworthy to the high rank of bishops.

The aforementioned decisions of the holy assembly of bishops and the holy synod of the Serbian Orthodox Church in Communist Yugoslavia, as well as the above-cited events and the actions of their investigation commission and of the newly consecrated bishops, clearly demonstrated that the alleged canonical offenses of His Grace Bishop Dionisije are not the real points at issue. The real point at issue is the long and carefully planned and prepared conspiracy of the present Communist regime in Yugoslavia to take over the diocese of the United States of America and Canada as a base for the further Communist infiltration in the United States of America and Canada. The fact of this bold attempt is further proven by Tito's ambassador to Ottawa who said in Windsor, Ontario, that it is indispensable for Communist infiltration to capture at least one church and school community in this country and in Canada as well.

This National Church Assembly particularly emphasizes the fact that the Serbian Orthodox Church in Yugoslavia lives and acts under the same slavery which has enchained the entire Serbian people of Yugoslavia from the time of the takeover of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. The Communist regime confiscated almost all of the church's liquid assets and real property. At its inception, the Communist government completely forbade religious education; and while it subsequently permitted such education in theory, in practice it imposed so many attenuating conditions that such education became virtually impossible. Celebration of the greatest Christian holy days was forbidden, and students and workers were mercilessly punished for their absences on such days. The Communists have imposed severe economic sanctions and jeopardized the livelihood of all those who wed in church, who baptize their children or keep the custom of celebrating the feast day of the family patron saint—the greatest and most sacred national religious symbol of each Serbian family from the time of the conversion of the Serbs to Christianity down through the ages.

The Serbian Orthodox patriarchate, its holy assembly of bishops, and the holy synod, are not free since they make their decisions either upon the request of the Federal Commission for Religious Questions of the Federal Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia (its divisions are such commissions in each of the federal units) or in collaboration with the commission and with its prior assent. This Yugoslav commission closely corresponds to the Soviet Commission for Religions.

The Association of the Orthodox Clergy of the Federal Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia has as one of its aims "* * * to safeguard and strengthen all the achievements of the heroic partisan liberation struggle of our peoples, especially freedom, brotherhood, and equality"; i.e., to safeguard the power and dominion of the Communist Party elite of Yugoslavia. This association actually plays the part of a political commissar in all the institutions of the patriarchate.

The long resistance of the Patriarchs Gavrilo and Vikentije, whose memory will always be blessed, against the schismatic endeavors of the Communist regime to split the Serbian Orthodox patriarchate by establishing the so-called Macedonian Orthodox Church, was finally abandoned by Patriarch German. He gave up the ancient title of the Serbian patriarchs which was, "Patriarch of Serbia, Archbishop of Ipek and Metropolitan of Belgrade and Karlovci." He replaced it with the twofold title—"Serbian and Macedonian Patriarch." However, this dual role of the head of the Orthodox church in Yugoslavia is only temporary according to a recent statement of the Macedonian Metropolitan, H. E. Dositej, recently published in this country, the Metropolitan expects that the Macedonian Orthodox church will secede, definitively, from the patriarchate of Belgrade and become independent, and perhaps even autocephalic, after the election of two or three new bishops this coming autumn. The present Communist Yugoslav regime can then use this Macedonian church as a political tool to imperil the Greek part of Aegean Macedonia and the Bulgarian part of Pirine Macedonia. The Communists are promoting this essentially political schism even though an autonomous Macedonian Orthodox Church—much less an autocephalic one—has never before existed, either before or after the establishment of the Serbian Orthodox Patriarchate in 1346.

Thus, the enslaved position of the Serbian Orthodox Church in Yugoslavia demonstrates unambiguously that these decisions attributed to the Holy Assembly of Bishops and the holy synod and communicated to this 10th National Church Assembly belong to the growing category of decisions actually written in the Federal Commission for Religious Questions of the Federal Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia and signed, as a formality, by the highest anthorities of the hierarchy. With respect to these decisions, the National Church Assembly wishes to state emphatically that not one of the previous National Church Assemblies, nor the bishop of the Serbian Orthodox diocese for the United States and Canada ever requested the three-way division of the diocese at least into three new ones. On the contrary, the National Church Assemblies of 1956 and 1960 requested that the Latin American part of the diaspora of our Holy Church, be placed under the jurisdiction of the bishop of this diocese in order to keep the faithful in this portion of the world within the pale of the Mother Church.

During this present session, this National Church Assembly considered the legal status of the Serbian Orthodox diocese for the United States of America and Canada with

a view to establishing two points: First, whether this assembly was lawfully convoked and therefore legal; second, whether the aforementioned decisions of the holy assembly of bishops and the holy synod are constitutional and legal in the light of the legal status of our diocese and the provisions of its constitution, respectively.

With regard to these matters, this National Church Assembly affirms the following unchallengeable facts: (a) The status of the Serbian Orthodox diocese for the United States and Canada rests on autonomy, embodied in its constitution of 1927 and the amendments to this constitution, the last of which was approved by the holy synod in 1939, in accordance with the constitution of the Serbian Orthodox patriarchate of 1931. Our diocese's specific legal status and relationship toward the patriarchate is completely different from the status and relationship of other dioceses in Yugoslav territory. This conclusion is clearly demonstrable from the fact that the provisions of article 13 of the said constitution deal expressly wtih this diocese while article 12 deals with the status of others.

(b) Imbued with the Serbian spirit and the traditions of St. Sava, the Serbian pioneers on this continent established their places of worship in this country with the twofold desire to preserve the unity of the mother church while simultaneously safeguarding their rights to govern themselves and to enact indigenous rules and regulations, essential for the normal life and development of their religious institutions. To this end, their representatives met in the National Church Assembly of 1927, sovereignly and with all the rights of a constitutional assembly, to adopt the constitution of our diocese, which they thereafter submitted to the Holy Assembly of Bishops and the Holy Synod of the Serbian Orthodox patriarchate in Belgrade for sanction. In this way, a two-sided legal act came into being, according to article 15 of which the National Church Assembly not only became the highest legislative and regulatory body, but also the only one authorized to enact and adopt changes and amendments to the constitution of the diocese regarding its territorial jurisdiction and internal organization. Therefore, with respect to the legal process through which the constitution of our diocese came into being, any attempt to change the territorial jurisdiction or legal status which has not been adopted by the National Church Assembly as the legislative and governing body of the diocese represents not only a violation of its autonomy and indivisibility but also constitutes an indirect revocation of the entire constitution.

(c) The Serbian Orthodox diocese for the United States and Canada conformed its above-described legal status and relationship to the patriarchate in accordance with the provisions of the law on the Serbian Orthodox Church of 1930, and the constitution of the Serbian Orthodox patriarchate of 1931, respectively. Consequently, the only such constitutional provisions in church legislation enacted by the Kingdom of Yugoslavia which are obligatory to our church are those enacted before April 6, 1941, under the condition that they do not contradict the constitutional and statutory provisions of the United States of America and Canada, respectively. Furthermore, any provisions enacted by the present regime in Yugoslavia cannot be binding regardless of the fact that they may be obligatory for the Serbian Orthodox Church in the old country. For one cannot overlook the fact, as the holy assembly of bishops and the synod usually do, that the overwhelming majority of the faithful of this diocese consist of free citizens of the United States of America and Canada for whom the provisions of their own constitutions and statutes are obligatory, in the first place.

(d) By the provision of article 20 of the constitution of the diocese, it has been provided that the diocesan bishop convoke the national church assemblies "* * * into session each third year in the month of September, on the day which the bishop determines."

Thus, with respect to this 10th National Church Assembly, there is the incontestable fact that His Grace, Bishop Dionisije, in accordance with the decision of the diocesan council of February 7, and the diocesan administrative board of February 17, 1963, by his decree No. 178, dated April 17, 1963, convoking this national church assembly to be held on the days of October 15, 16, and 17, 1963. What this signifies is that this assembly was convoked before the decisions of the holy assembly of bishops and the holy synod were issued. Therefore, even if their decisions were constitutional and lawful the validity of the convocation of the national church assembly cannot be questioned.

However, because of the emergency situation created by the said decisions of the holy assembly of bishops and the holy synod and in order to avoid the grave consequences to the interests and welfare of the diocese inherent in these decisions—our diocesan council, by its decision of June 6, 1963, acted to advance the date on which the assembly was to be held. It is clear, therefore, that this decision of the plenary session of our diocesan council did not serve to convoke a new national church assembly, but simply changed the time of the previously lawfully convoked National Church Assembly.

For these reasons, this 10th national church assembly has unanimously established that it has been lawfully convoked and that it is completely legal according to the constitution of this diocese.

Regarding the above-cited decisions of the holy assembly of bishops and the holy synod, this National Church Assembly has established that, through these decisions, the constitution of this diocese was abrogated in its entirety; that they annul all the rights of the faithful of this diocese; and that they have caused the faithful of this diocese to experience the greatest offense and disgrace that can be inflicted on free men. Particularly, each Serb in the free world knows that His Grace, Bishop Dionisije, has indebted the Serbian people to him by laboring indefatigably for 23 years to advance and strengthen the Serbian Orthodox Church in the free world, by working ceaselessly for Serbian unity, and by his uncompromising struggle against communism and the bloodthirsty Ustaskis. These are the particularly compelling reasons why the holy assembly of bishops and the holy synod must assure His Grace, Bishop Dionisije, the right to an unrestricted defense against the alleged accusations, according to the spirit and the letter of the provisions of the Constitution and Church Criminal Procedure.

Taking all the above said into consideration—the 10th Diocesan National Church Assembly of the Serbian Orthodox Diocese for the United States and Canada, attended by 193 fully pledged delegates, 25 of whom are the presidents of their church and school communities and 26 of whom are clergymen, jointly representing the entire membership of 44 church and school communities from this diocese; in the presence of representatives of a great number of national, political, cultural, and charitable organizations, as well as the minority membership representatives of three additional church and school communities and representatives of the total membership of church and school communities in Europe, Africa, and South America, who attended as guests;

Desirous of preserving the unity and strength of the only Serbian Orthodox Diocese in the free world;

Convinced that the autonomous foundations of this diocese, its church and school communities and other religious institutions, which have been built up by the endeavors of delegates participating in previous national church assemblies, are indispensable to the future work and normal development of this diocese;

Fully aware of the fact that, upon the participants of this assembly, rests the difficult task of preserving the freedom, democratic institutions and rights of our fellow church members, as well as their national traditions and customs so that those beliefs and values that godless communism has sought to destroy may be brought back to the family hearth;

Considering that, in the best interests of the continued existence and undisturbed development of our diocese as a whole, and of our church and school communities as its parts, a determined struggle must be waged as a sine qua non condition, to make the Communist infiltration of our diocese impossible; and considering that this would also be in harmony with the welfare of the United States and Canada, the following resolution is unanimously adopted:

1. The assembly considers as unlawful, unconstitutional, null and void, and refuses to recognize the decisions of the holy assembly of bishops and the holy synod of the Serbian Orthodox Church, communicated to this 10th National Church Assembly, regarding the three-way division of the Serbian Orthodox diocese for the United States and Canada; the suspension and interdiction from sacerdotal duties of His Grace, the Right Reverend Bishop Dionisije, as the diocesan bishop for the United States and Canada; the nomination of three new bishops—the Very Reverend Stevan Lastavica, the Reverend Archimandrite Dr. Firmilijan Ocokoljich, and the Reverend Archimandrite Gregory Udicki;

2. The assembly emphatically demands that the holy assembly of bishops and the holy synod revoke all the above-mentioned decisions concerning our diocese, the Right Reverend Bishop Dionisije, and the appointment of the above-mentioned clergy to the newly designed bishoprics, and it further demands that the same three Bishops be withdrawn from the territory of this diocese.

3. The assembly adopts the rule that the future relationship of this Serbian Orthodox diocese for the United States of America and Canada toward the Serbian Orthodox mother church in Yugoslavia shall be broadly autonomous, in which it shall be united spiritually and liturgically but not subject to any canonical-hierarchal relationship. Such unity should connect this diocese to the mother church until full freedom of conduct and decision is restored to the Serbian Orthodox Church in Yugoslavia, which state of affairs can be expected only after liberation from the Communist yoke.

4. The assembly requests that His Holiness, Patriarch German, the assembly of bishops and the holy synod do not take any disciplinary measures against the clergymen attending this National Church Assembly who, in accordance with this assembly, do not recognize the aforementioned decisions of the holy assembly of bishops and the holy synod, since such disciplinary measures will cause further tensions and division among the faithful of this continent.

5. The assembly resolves that for the present, until the relationship between this diocese and the mother church will not be regulated, no decrees, decisions, or orders of the holy assembly of bishops and the holy synod will be accepted, since these shall not be recognized as binding for this diocese and its organs.

6. The assembly repeats the request, made in the resolutions of the National Church Assemblies of 1956 and 1960 in accordance

with the ancient customs of the Serbian Orthodox Church, that, in case of the death or incapacity of the diocesan bishop, or in case of need, it shall be authorized to elect three candidates, one of whom the holy assembly will acknowledge as diocesan bishop or auxiliary to the diocesan bishop.

7. The assembly decided to wait 60 days from the time that a copy of this resolution shall be posted by registered mail, return receipt requested, in an envelope addressed to His Holiness, for His Holiness, the Holy Assembly of Bishops, and the holy synod to accept requests 1, 2, 3, and 4 of this resolution.

If His Holiness, the Patriarch, the holy assembly of bishops, and the holy synod do not accept these requests within the said period of time, then this National Church Assembly shall look to other solutions for all questions which concern the future conduct of affairs of this Serbian Orthodox diocese for the United States and Canada.

For this purpose, today's session of the National Church Assembly is adjourned and shall continue its work on November 12, 13, and 14, 1963, at the St. Sava Monastery at Libertyville, Ill., with the same delegates and presidency. However, in case of emergency, the presidency of this National Church Assembly shall be obligated to advance the date of continuation of this National Church Assembly. In any event, the diocesan bishop, the Right Reverend Dionisije, in all the rights of his See, shall continue the unrestricted conduct of the affairs of his diocese in association with all other diocesan authorities and organs.

8. The assembly shall take due cognizance of the repeated statements of His Grace, Bishop Dionisije, that he is prepared to defend himself against any accusation which has been submitted or shall be submitted against him dealing with alleged violations in the conduct of his duties as diocesan bishop.

9. The assembly declares that it will not recognize as legal any other National Church Assembly or any diocesan authority, which shall be held or shall act on the territory of this diocese, if it has been established by the three new bishops forcibly imposed on the faithful of certain parts of this diocese.

10. The assembly pledges itself to God, to St. Sava, and to mother church and the Serbian people, that it shall do everything in its best conscience and knowledge to defend the freedom, interests, and welfare of its Serbian Orthodox diocese for the United States and Canada and through it, the welfare of the mother church, the Serbian Orthodox Church in our native country.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment of the Senator from Louisiana [Mr. ELLENDER] to the amendments offered by the Senator from Montana [Mr. MANSFIELD], for himself and other Senators, to the committee amendment in the nature of a substitute.

Mr. ELLENDER. Mr. President, have the yeas and nays been ordered?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The yeas and nays have been ordered.

Mr. ELLENDER. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. ELLENDER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The question is on agreeing to the amendment of the Senator from Louisiana to the Mansfield-Dirksen amendments to the committee amendment in the nature of a substitute. The yeas and nays have been ordered, and the clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk called the roll.

Mr. RIBICOFF (after having voted in the affirmative). Mr. President, on this vote I have a live pair with the Senator from Rhode Island [Mr. PASTORE]. If he were present and voting, he would vote "nay"; if I were at liberty to vote, I would vote "yea." I therefore withdraw my vote.

Mr. MAGNUSON (after having voted in the affirmative). Mr. President, I have a live pair with the Senator from Michigan [Mr. MCNAMARA]. If he were present and voting, he would vote "nay"; if I were at liberty to vote, I would vote "yea." I therefore withdraw my vote.

Mr. HUMPHREY. I announce that the Senator from Mississippi [Mr. EASTLAND], the Senator from Oklahoma [Mr. EDMONDSON], the Senator from Wyoming [Mr. MCGEE], the Senator from Michigan [Mr. MCNAMARA], the Senator from Rhode Island [Mr. PASTORE], the Senator from Mississippi [Mr. STENNIS], and the Senator from Tennessee [Mr. WALTERS] are absent on official business.

I also announce that the Senator from California [Mr. ENGLE] is absent because of illness.

On this vote, the Senator from Oklahoma [Mr. EDMONDSON] is paired with the Senator from Wyoming [Mr. MCGEE]. If present and voting, the Senator from Oklahoma would vote "yea," and the Senator from Wyoming would vote "nay."

I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator from Mississippi [Mr. EASTLAND], the Senator from Mississippi [Mr. STENNIS] would each vote "yea."

Mr. KUCHEL. I announce that the Senator from Vermont [Mr. PROUTY] is absent on official business.

The Senator from New Hampshire [Mr. COTTON], the Senator from Arizona [Mr. GOLDWATER], the Senator from Idaho [Mr. JORDAN], and the Senator from Texas [Mr. TOWER] are necessarily absent.

The Senator from Utah [Mr. BENNETT] and the Senator from New York [Mr. JAVITS] are absent on official business.

If present and voting, the Senator from Utah [Mr. BENNETT], the Senator from Arizona [Mr. GOLDWATER], the Senator from Idaho [Mr. JORDAN], and the Senator from Texas [Mr. TOWER] would each vote "yea."

The result was announced—yeas 40, nays 43, as follows:

[No. 207 Leg.]

YEAS—40

Allott	Ellender	Long, Mo.
Bible	Ervin	Long, La.
Brewster	Fong	McClellan
Burdick	Gruening	Mechem
Byrd, Va.	Hill	Miller
Byrd, W. Va.	Hruska	Morse
Cannon	Jackson	Mundt
Church	Johnston	Pearson
Curtis	Jordan, N.C.	Proxmire
Dominick	Lausche	Randolph
Robertson	Talmadge	Young, N. Dak.
Russell	Thurmond	Young, Ohio
Simpson	Williams, Del.	
Symington	Yarborough	

NAYS—43

Aiken	Hart	Monroney
Anderson	Hartke	Morton
Bartlett	Hayden	Moss
Bayh	Hickenlooper	Muskie
Beall	Holland	Nelson
Boggs	Humphrey	Neuberger
Carlson	Inouye	Pell
Case	Keating	Saltonstall
Clark	Kennedy	Scott
Cooper	Kuchel	Smathers
Dirksen	Mansfield	Smith
Dodd	McCarthy	Sparkman
Douglas	McGovern	Williams, N.J.
Fulbright	McIntyre	
Gore	Metcalf	

NOT VOTING—17

Bennett	Javits	Prouty
Cotton	Jordan, Idaho	Ribicoff
Eastland	Magnuson	Stennis
Edmondson	McGee	Tower
Engle	McNamara	Walters
Goldwater	Pastore	

So Mr. ELLENDER'S amendment to the Mansfield-Dirksen amendments to the committee amendment in the nature of a substitute was rejected.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the amendment was rejected.

Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, I move to lay that motion on the table.

Mr. ELLENDER. On the motion to table I ask for the yeas and nays.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

Mr. DOUGLAS. Mr. President, a parliamentary inquiry.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator will state it.

Mr. DOUGLAS. Will the Presiding Officer state the motion that is now before the Senate?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the motion to table the motion to reconsider the vote by which the amendment of the Senator from Louisiana [Mr. ELLENDER] was rejected.

On this question the yeas and nays have been ordered, and the clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk called the roll.

Mr. RIBICOFF. On this vote I have a live pair with the Senator from Rhode Island [Mr. PASTORE]. If he were present and voting, he would vote "yea"; if I were at liberty to vote, I would vote "nay." I withhold my vote.

Mr. BREWSTER. On this vote I have a live pair with the Senator from Michigan [Mr. MCNAMARA]. If he were here, he would vote "yea"; if I were at liberty to vote, I would vote "nay." I withhold my vote.

Mr. LONG of Missouri. On this vote I have a live pair with the Senator from Wyoming [Mr. MCGEE]. If he were present, he would vote "yea"; if I were at liberty to vote, I would vote "nay." I withhold my vote.

Mr. HUMPHREY. I announce that the Senator from Mississippi [Mr. EASTLAND], the Senator from Oklahoma [Mr. EDMONDSON], the Senator from Wyoming [Mr. MCGEE], the Senator from Michigan [Mr. MCNAMARA], the Senator from Rhode Island [Mr. PASTORE], the Senator from Mississippi [Mr. STENNIS], and the Senator from Tennessee [Mr. WALTERS] are absent on official business.

I also announce that the Senator from California [Mr. ENGLE] is absent because of illness.

I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator from Mississippi [Mr. EASTLAND], the Senator from Oklahoma [Mr. EDMONDSON], and the Senator from Mississippi [Mr. STENNIS], would each vote "nay."

Mr. KUCHEL. I announce that the Senators from Vermont [Mr. AIKEN and Mr. PROUTY] are absent on official business.

The Senator from New Hampshire [Mr. COTTON], the Senator from Arizona [Mr. GOLDWATER], the Senator from Idaho [Mr. JORDAN], and the Senator from Texas [Mr. TOWER] are necessarily absent.

The Senator from Utah [Mr. BENNETT] and the Senator from New York [Mr. JAVITS] are absent on official business.

If present and voting, the Senator from Utah [Mr. BENNETT], the Senator from Idaho [Mr. JORDAN], and the Senator from Texas [Mr. TOWER] would each vote "nay."

On this vote, the Senator from Vermont [Mr. AIKEN] is paired with the Senator from Arizona [Mr. GOLDWATER]. If present and voting, the Senator from Vermont would vote "yea," and the Senator from Arizona would vote "nay."

The result was announced—yeas 42, nays 39, as follows:

[No. 208 Leg.]

YEAS—42

Anderson	Hart	Metcalf
Bartlett	Hartke	Monroney
Bayh	Hayden	Morton
Beall	Hickenlooper	Moss
Boggs	Holland	Muskie
Carlson	Humphrey	Nelson
Case	Inouye	Neuberger
Clark	Keating	Pell
Cooper	Kennedy	Saltonstall
Dirksen	Kuchel	Scott
Dodd	Mansfield	Smathers
Douglas	McCarthy	Smith
Fulbright	McGovern	Sparkman
Gore	McIntyre	Williams, N.J.

NAYS—39

Allott	Hill	Pearson
Bible	Hruska	Proxmire
Burdick	Jackson	Randolph
Byrd, Va.	Johnston	Robertson
Byrd, W. Va.	Jordan, N.C.	Russell
Cannon	Lausche	Simpson
Church	Long, La.	Symington
Curtis	Magnuson	Talmadge
Dominick	McClellan	Thurmond
Ellender	Mechem	Williams, Del.
Ervin	Miller	Yarborough
Fong	Morse	Young, N. Dak.
Gruening	Mundt	Young, Ohio

NOT VOTING—19

Aiken	Goldwater	Prouty
Bennett	Javits	Ribicoff
Brewster	Jordan, Idaho	Stennis
Cotton	Long, Mo.	Tower
Eastland	McGee	Walters
Edmondson	McNamara	
Engle	Pastore	

So Mr. DIRKSEN's motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, to the Mansfield amendment, as amended, I call up my amendment No. 303. Before I ask that it be read, I wish to make two modifications in it: In line 2—in view of the adoption of the Holland amendment—the figure "$1,500,000,000" should read "$975,000,000"; in addition, on line 4, the figure "$900,000,000" should read "$950,000,000".

I ask that the amendment be modified accordingly.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment will be modified accordingly as requested.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I now ask that my amendment, as thus modified, be read.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The modified amendment will be stated.

The LEGISLATIVE CLERK. On page 1, in lines 7 to 9 of the Mansfield-Dirksen amendments, as amended, it is proposed to strike out "$975,000,000 for the fiscal year 1964, and $975,000,000 for each of the next two succeeding fiscal years," and insert in lieu thereof "and $950,000,000 for the fiscal year 1964,".

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to this amendment to the Mansfield-Dirksen amendments, as amended, to the committee amendment.

Mr. MORSE. On this question, I ask for the yeas and nays.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD a brief statement in support of my amendment and a statement prepared by the Legislative Counsel as to the effect of the amendment, and other amendments, upon the Development Loan Fund.

There being no objection, the statements were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

MORSE AMENDMENT TO THE MANSFIELD AMENDMENTS—DEVELOPMENT LOAN FUND

My amendment has the effect of reducing this year's authorization to $950 million, and repealing the existing authorization for the next 2 fiscal years.

Senators will recall that the report of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee was severely critical of the foreign aid program. It noted that it had rejected an amendment terminating all existing foreign aid programs at the close of fiscal year 1965 because it expected the administration to submit an entirely new program for fiscal year 1965.

Yet we know that there was already authorized $1.5 billion for both fiscal year 1965 and 1966. How likely is it that with an authorization of $1.5 billion already on the books, any administration would make a serious effort to revise and reduce the aid program for 1965 and 1966?

Nor would it make much difference if there were an authorization of $975 million on the books. The Senate has just made it $975 million by adopting the Holland amendment.

Leaving any authorization for 1965 and 1966 will further minimize the fainthearted appeal of the Foreign Relations Committee for submission of a foreign aid bill next year that will be as the committee put it, "revamped in major respects."

STATEMENT PREPARED BY THE LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL

EXISTING LAW OF 1961

"SEC. 202. Authorization: (a) There is hereby authorized to be appropriated to the President for the purposes of this title $1,200,000,000 for the fiscal year 1962 and $1,500,000,000 for each of the next four succeeding fiscal years, which sums shall remain available until expended: *Provided*, That any unappropriated portion of the amount authorized to be appropriated for any such fiscal year may be appropriated in any subsequent fiscal year during the above period in addition to the amount otherwise authorized to be appropriated for such subsequent fiscal year."

PENDING BILL (H.R. 7885)

The pending bill proposes no change in section 202.

MANSFIELD AMENDMENT

Inserts in the bill the following amendment to section 202:

"(b) Section 202 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, is amended by striking out 'for each of the next four succeeding fiscal years,' and inserting 'for the fiscal year 1963, $975,000,000 for the fiscal year 1964, and $1,500,000,000 for each of the next two succeeding fiscal years,'."

The effect of this amendment would be to reduce from $1,500,000,000 to $975,000,000 the authorization for 1964, and to leave unchanged the authorization ($1,500,000,000) for 1965 and 1966.

HOLLAND AMENDMENT TO MANSFIELD AMENDMENT

On line 8 of Mansfield amendment strike out "$1,500,000,000" and insert "$975,000,000".

The effect of this amendment is to reduce the authorizations for 1965 and 1966 from $1,500,000,000 to $975,000,000.

MORSE AMENDMENT TO MANSFIELD AMENDMENT

On page 1, lines 7 to 9, strike out "$975,000,000 for the fiscal year 1964, and $1,500,000,000 for each of the next two succeeding fiscal years," and insert in lieu thereof "and $950,000,000 for the fiscal year 1964."

The effect of this amendment would be to make the 1964 authorization $950,000,000 (instead of $975,000,000 as proposed by the Mansfield amendment), and eliminate entirely the authorizations for 1965 and 1966.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I can very quickly summarize my amendment to the Mansfield amendments: In my opinion the previous vote—which finally was decided after numerous changes, plus the perfectly proper work of the leadership in turning defeat into victory by getting pairs and vote changes—tells quite a story; it makes perfectly clear that the foreign aid program, in the form in which it is before the Senate, is not a popular program and that many people know and recognize the fact that it should be drastically modified; and in my opinion the people will see to it that it is modified.

The effect of my pending amendment to the Mansfield amendments is to cut $25 million from the $975 million and to make perfectly clear that the administration will have to come before the congressional committees in 1965 and 1966 tabula rasa. There will not be any continuation of the $975 million; Congress will deal with the problem as a new authorization in 1965 and 1966. My amendment repeals all authorization for development loans beyond fiscal 1964. I believe Congress should do so, for that would be psychologically beneficial and would say to the American people that we are willing to vote, for 1965 and 1966, whatever sound foreign aid program the administration at that time can prove is needed, but we are not going to give the administration any advantage by starting with a presumption in favor of an authorization of $975 million. Instead, we shall start with the blackboard erased clean, and will say to the administration, "Write on the blackboard the figures for foreign aid that you can justify. Come in with the new and revamped program for fiscal 1965 which the Foreign Relations Committee has asked for, and with

the sum you believe should be expended under it."

Mr. President, by means of this amendment to the Mansfield amendments, as amended, the Senate has an opportunity to save the taxpayers $25 million—by reducing the present figure of $975 million to $950 million—and also to guarantee that there will not be a continuation of the authorization for 1965 and 1966. Hence, foreign aid will be considered tabula rasa when the administration submits its proposed program for 1965 and 1966.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, the pending amendment of the Senator from Oregon to the Mansfield-Dirksen amendments, as amended, would reduce the authorization which has been made by means of the Holland amendment to the Mansfield amendments. The pending Morse amendment would not necessarily result in any saving this year, because the pending bill is only an authorization bill, and the appropriation has never, to my knowledge, been in the same amount as the authorization.

In view of the Senate's vote on the Ellender amendment—which called for $50 million more than the pending Morse amendment does for this fiscal year—I think the pending amendment is an example of cheese paring. Furthermore, if we must vote on every one of the various amendments which call for changes in the amount of $25 million or $50 million or less, we shall be here all winter.

In addition, the Holland amendment to the Mansfield-Dirksen amendments was agreed to unanimously only a couple of hours ago, and I thought it was perfectly acceptable to the Senate. The pending Morse amendment would strike out the Holland amendment; it would pare down the currently applicable figure in the Mansfield amendment by $25 million.

Therefore, Mr. President, I hope the Senate will reject this amendment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. KENNEDY in the chair). The question is on agreeing to the Morse amendment No. 303, as modified, to the Mansfield-Dirksen amendments, as amended, to the committee amendment.

On this question, the yeas and nays have been ordered; and the clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. DOMINICK (when his name was called). On this vote I have a pair with the senior Senator from Vermont [Mr. AIKEN]. If he were present and voting, he would vote "nay." If I were at liberty to vote, I would vote "yea." Therefore I withhold my vote.

The rollcall was concluded.

Mr. HUMPHREY. I announce that the Senator from Mississippi [Mr. EASTLAND], the Senator from Oklahoma [Mr. EDMONDSON], the Senator from Arizona [Mr. HAYDEN], the Senator from Wyoming [Mr. MCGEE], the Senator from Michigan [Mr. MCNAMARA], the Senator from Rhode Island [Mr. PASTORE], the Senator from Mississippi [Mr. STENNIS], and the Senator from Tennessee [Mr. WALTERS] are absent on official business.

I also announce that the Senator from California [Mr. ENGLE] is absent because of illness.

I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator from Arizona [Mr. HAYDEN] would vote "nay."

On this vote, the Senator from Mississippi [Mr. EASTLAND] is paired with the Senator from Wyoming [Mr. MCGEE]. If present and voting, the Senator from Mississippi would vote "yea," and the Senator from Wyoming would vote "nay."

On this vote, the Senator from Oklahoma [Mr. EDMONDSON] is paired with the Senator from Michigan [Mr. MCNAMARA]. If present and voting, the Senator from Oklahoma would vote "yea," and the Senator from Michigan would vote "nay."

On this vote, the Senator from Mississippi [Mr. STENNIS] is paired with the Senator from Rhode Island [Mr. PASTORE]. If present and voting, the Senator from Mississippi would vote "yea," and the Senator from Rhode Island would vote "nay."

Mr. KUCHEL. I announce that the Senators from Vermont [Mr. AIKEN and Mr. PROUTY] are absent on official business.

The Senator from New Hampshire [Mr. COTTON], the Senator from Arizona [Mr. GOLDWATER], the Senator from Idaho [Mr. JORDAN], and the Senator from Texas [Mr. TOWER] are necessarily absent.

The Senator from Utah [Mr. BENNETT] and the Senator from New York [Mr. JAVITS] are absent on official business.

The pair of the Senator from Vermont [Mr. AIKEN] has been previously announced.

If present and voting, the Senator from Utah [Mr. BENNETT], the Senator from Arizona [Mr. GOLDWATER], the Senator from Idaho [Mr. JORDAN], and the Senator from Texas [Mr. TOWER] would each vote "yea."

The result was announced—yeas 42, nays 40, as follows:

[No. 209 Leg.]

YEAS—42

Allott	Gruening	Proxmire
Anderson	Hruska	Randolph
Beall	Jackson	Ribicoff
Bible	Johnston	Robertson
Brewster	Jordan, N.C.	Russell
Burdick	Lausche	Scott
Byrd, Va.	Long, Mo.	Simpson
Byrd, W. Va.	Magnuson	Symington
Cannon	McClellan	Talmadge
Church	Mechem	Thurmond
Curtis	Miller	Williams, Del.
Ellender	Morse	Yarborough
Ervin	Mundt	Young, N. Dak.
Fong	Pearson	Young, Ohio

NAYS—40

Bartlett	Hickenlooper	Monroney
Bayh	Hill	Morton
Boggs	Holland	Moss
Carlson	Humphrey	Muskie
Case	Inouye	Nelson
Clark	Keating	Neuberger
Cooper	Kennedy	Pell
Dirksen	Kuchel	Saltonstall
Dodd	Long, La.	Smathers
Douglas	Mansfield	Smith
Fulbright	McCarthy	Sparkman
Gore	McGovern	Williams, N.J.
Hart	McIntyre	
Hartke	Metcalf	

NOT VOTING—18

Aiken	Dominick	Engle
Bennett	Eastland	Goldwater
Cotton	Edmondson	Hayden
Javits	McNamara	Stennis
Jordan, Idaho	Pastore	Tower
McGee	Prouty	Walters

So Mr. MORSE's amendment (No. 303), as modified, to the Mansfield-Dirksen amendments, was agreed to.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the amendment was agreed to.

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. Mr. President, I move to lay that motion on the table.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Mansfield-Dirksen amendments to the committee amendment is open to further amendment.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, I call up my amendment No. 301, and ask that it be stated.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment of the Senator from Minnesota will be stated.

The LEGISLATIVE CLERK. On page 2, in the Mansfield-Dirksen amendments, it is proposed to strike out lines 2 through 11, as follows:

(1) Strike out "for use beginning in each of the fiscal years 1963 through 1966, not to exceed $600,000,000 for each such fiscal year" and insert "for use beginning in the fiscal year 1963 not to exceed $600,000,000, for use beginning in the fiscal year 1964 not to exceed $525,000,000, and for use beginning in each of the fiscal years 1965 and 1966 not to exceed $600,000,000".

On page 38, line 13, strike out "(3)" and insert "(2)".

On page 40, lines 9 and 10, strike out "'$300,000,000' and" and "and '$175,000,000', respectively".

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, I wish to take a few moments on the amendment. This particular amendment would modify the Mansfield-Dirksen amendments cosponsored by other Senators in this manner: it would restore to the Alliance for Progress the amount recommended by the committee, which amount was reduced in the "powerhouse" amendment by $125 million. That fund would be restored to the Alliance for Progress.

The President's contingency fund, which was increased by $125 million, would be reduced by this amendment $125 million. Basically, in view of the recent action of the Senate in adopting the Morse amendment, the amendment would leave the reductions in the Development Loan Fund and the Military Assistance Fund as recommended by the Mansfield-Dirksen amendments as modified by the Morse amendment, which would be approximately $410 million, I believe, and it would restore the $125 million to the Alliance for Progress.

Mr. KEATING. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. HUMPHREY. I yield.

Mr. KEATING. Would it be fair to characterize this amendment as the "little powerhouse" amendment?

Mr. HUMPHREY. It would be fair to characterize it as a fair amendment.

Mr. KEATING. I wondered.

Mr. HUMPHREY. It is a reasonable amendment, that would keep our commitment under the Alliance for Progress. I repeat, it would leave intact all

of the reductions which have been voted. It would in no way modify the total aggregate sum of the reductions. It would merely take the sum of $125 million from the contingency fund, as recommended in the Mansfield-Dirksen amendments, and add that sum to the Alliance for Progress, so that the contingency fund amount and the Alliance for Progress amount would be as recommended by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.

Let me say to those who are strong advocates of the reduction in amounts in this program that the total amount of reduction would remain as presently voted and as pending in the Mansfield-Dirksen amendments as modified by the Morse amendment.

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. HUMPHREY. I am glad to yield.

Mr. CHURCH. Is it not true that if the cut of $125 million for the Alliance for Progress is sustained by the Senate, that will have a crippling effect upon the Alliance for Progress for the coming year. The evidence indicates that this is the only program which we can rely upon in the hope of bringing Latin America away from its long tradition of feudalism and dictatorship?

Mr. HUMPHREY. I feel that that is correct. I believe the testimony before the committee would bear that out.

Mr. CHURCH. Would not the Senator also agree that in dealing with the problems which face us in the Western Hemisphere, there is probably no more hopeful new development in the entire field of foreign aid than the Alliance for Progress, addressed to the real problems, the real seedbeds of communism in this hemisphere? If there is one part of the program that ought not to be cut, it is the Alliance for Progress.

Mr. HUMPHREY. The Senator from Idaho is eminently correct. To the advocates of reductions in this overall foreign aid program, I only add that the House made serious cuts in the Alliance for Progress—down to $450 million—which I believe really jeopardized the effort that we have already made in Latin America. Unless we restore these funds in the authorization bill, when we come from conference we will find ourselves in such a position that the investments already made in the Alliance for Progress will be jeopardized as to effectiveness.

Needless to say, we still have to go through the appropriation process, which will result in a reduced amount. I am very hopeful we will not alter the effort that was made in committee to assist the Alliance for Progress at a reasonable level. So far as the President's contingency fund is concerned, $175 million was the amount recommended by the committee, after careful examination. That is more than was used last year out of the President's contingency fund. There is an additional $300 million available to the President under the so-called military assistance, $300 million of emergency funds that can be taken from the Department of Defense appropriation. That is reimbursable under law. So this would not cripple the President. It would leave him a $475 million contingency fund. He would also have what we call flexibility with respect to a certain percentage of the total authorized and appropriated funds in each category.

Mr. ELLENDER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. HUMPHREY. I yield to the Senator from Louisiana.

Mr. ELLENDER. I am in accord with the views expressed by the Senator from Minnesota in regard to the Alliance for Progress funds. In my judgment, the amount should be left intact. My only disagreement with the Senator is that the amount of the contingency fund should be decreased to $100 million. I expect to call up my amendment No. 299, Mr. President——

Mr. HUMPHREY. Does not the Senator understand that the amendment I have offered would also reduce the contingency fund to $175 million?

Mr. ELLENDER. I understand that, but I wish to make it $100 million. I wish the Senate to listen. I wish the Senate to know that the President now has almost a billion dollars which he can transfer from one appropriation item to another, in order to take care of situations like Lebanon and other places in the world, and that of the contingency fund provided for the President last year, $100 million some odd, only $34 million was used. I have a lot of data to prove that this fund will not suffer at all if reduced to the $100 million.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Would the Senator from Louisiana withhold his amendment for just one moment? I gather, under the parliamentary situation, it would be an amendment to the amendment I have offered on behalf of myself, the Senator from South Dakota [Mr. McGOVERN], and the Senator from Massacuhsetts [Mr. KENNEDY].

To repeat quickly what I am attempting to do in this amendment, this would restore the Senate Foreign Relations Committee's original recommendation of $650 million for the Alliance for Progress, and $175 million for the contingency fund. It would not alter the total reduction recommended by the so-called Mansfield-Dirksen amendments, as now modified by the amendment of the Senator from Oregon [Mr. MORSE]. This reduction would remain the same, at about $410 million.

The Alliance for Progress program has been repeatedly given top priority by President Kennedy who has, time after time, described this area as the most critical area in the world for U.S. foreign policy.

The restoration of the committee figure would mean a final figure for the Alliance for Progress, this year, after a conference with the House and after consideration of appropriations, about the same as the final figure for last year, which was $525 million, even if we are quite optimistic in the estimate. It might even be less. The committee carefully considered the contingency fund and reduced it because $117 million of the $260 million for last year went unspent. The committee figure of $175 million is substantially higher than the total amount of $143 million spent last year.

The committee's action supports the idea that the AID agency must use this money for the program agreed to by Congress in the Alliance for Progress. I am hopeful that Senators will realize that we should support this proposal.

I shall let the Senator from Louisiana argue the merits of his case. I indicated that the amount spent last year was less than recommended for this year.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I should announce that many of us were not aware that the Senator's amendment was going to be considered next. It is a very important amendment.

As the Senator knows, I am entirely in sympathy with the overall objectives; but the amendment raises the question of the entire Alliance for Progress program; and the Alliance for Progress program, in its totality, needs to be discussed first, before we start voting on any amendment, because a series of amendments will be offered to the amendment if we cannot reach an agreement in the cloakrooms with regard to rewording the amendment.

One of the items we shall want to consider has just been mentioned, namely, military aid to Latin America; whether or not we should reduce further military aid, and add the savings to the Alliance for Progress economic aid.

Then there is the question of the contingency fund. I say most respectfully to the Senator from Minnesota that this amendment will call for such detailed discussion of so many items of the Alliance for Progress program that, if we are willing to start it now, we could not finish it tonight in time for a vote. But we will discuss it tonight, and finish discussing it tomorrow; and if we have not arrived at an adjustment of the differences with the Senator from Minnesota, we shall offer some amendments.

Mr. RUSSELL. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. HUMPHREY. I yield to the Senator from Georgia.

Mr. RUSSELL. Is there anything in the act which would prevent the President from transferring funds from the contingency fund to the Alliance for Progress?

Mr. HUMPHREY. No.

Mr. RUSSELL. The Senator has emphasized repeatedly the importance the President attaches to the Alliance for Progress program. If the President thinks that this program is so important, he can transfer funds from the contingency fund and it is not necessary to upset the amendment offered by the leadership or has the leadership abandoned this phase of their amendment?

Mr. DIRKSEN. Oh, Mr. President, if I may interrupt, the leadership has not abandoned it. The reason why Tom Scott, from the staff, sat in the conference was that we were selecting figures. Transferability is provided for. We thought this arrangement should not be disturbed.

I do not think the amendment of the Senator from Minnesota should be adopted.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, the reason I offered the amendment is that it is my understanding, with respect to funds available from the contingency fund that those funds are not permitted to be used for items which had been cut

from the authorization, but for unforeseen situations. If funds are cut back for the Alliance for Progress, we are in a sorry condition so far as contingency fund use is concerned.

I will give another reason. Many forces may be at work on the contingency fund. There may be military situations, for example, which require drawing on those funds. I have reason to believe that those who battled for the Alliance for Progress are not aware of this situation. There will be heavy demands for contingency funds if a contingency arises. If a contingency or emergency does not arise, those funds ought not to be used. I think the Senator from Georgia is aware that authorizations or programs cannot be cut back and be paid for from contingency funds.

Mr. RUSSELL. I am not aware of any law to that effect. The Appropriations Committee, when it has reduced appropriations—and it has been the subject of controversy—has been highly critical of transfers with respect to appropriations that have been reduced. But this is an authorization. This is not an appropriation bill. In the case of appropriations, the Appropriations Committee is very jealous, when it has recommeded reductions, and Congress has acted accordingly, and, despite the fact that Congress has fixed the appropriations at a certain level, funds have been transferred for that purpose. It has considered it an abuse of executive power.

But that is not true in the case of authorizations. Where we authorize $300 million, if Congress appropriates $300 million, it knows the President has certain discretion. It seems to me it would be a lack of faith in the President, if the Senator says he is so concerned about the Alliance for Progress, to say he would not use funds from the contingency fund if necessary.

Mr. HUMPHREY. It seems to me the people who have an interest in the program might think differently. A very interesting thing, in connection with the Alliance for Progress and our foreign policy relating to the Western Hemisphere, is that this is a relatively new program. It is in its third year. The first year was an organizational year. The second year we got some start. We are now in the third year of the Alliance for Progress program. It is in this period that we are talking about whether we are going to have, to some degree, freedom in the Western Hemisphere.

Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. HUMPHREY. I yield.

Mr. COOPER. Will the Senator inform me if I am correct in stating that the administration made a final request which totaled $650 million for fiscal 1964, and that $650 million would have been made available for the Alliance for Progress under the bill reported by the committee? And will the Senator tell me if this latter amount compares with an amount of $450 million which was included for the Alliance for Progress in the bill passed by the House?

Mr. HUMPHREY. Yes. The amount of $650 million was recommended by the committee. The amount acted on and recommended by the House was $450 million. The request of the administration was $650 million. The Senate committee, after considerable discussion and debate, recommended that amount to the Senate.

Mr. COOPER. The amendment of the Senator from Minnesota would add $125 million to the amount authorized in the amendment offered by the Senator from Montana and the Senator from Illinois?

Mr. HUMPHREY. It would add $125 million above the so-called Dirksen-Mansfield amendments.

Mr. COOPER. This amendment would not add anything above the amount requested to be appropriated and recommended by the administration?

Mr. HUMPHREY. No; my amendment would bring the amount to what the administration recommended and the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations recommended.

I know of no newspaper or journal in this country, regardless of its political persuasion, that has not deplored the action taken in the other body. They felt the $450 million figure was too low. We all know that when we go to conference there is give and take. The Senator from Minnesota is attempting to recommend the amount the committee recommended, and that the administration recommended, and what I consider to be the most respectable segment of the press recommends. I do not see how it could be too far wrong.

Mr. COOPER. Would the Senator's amendment add anything to the total amount of the bill?

Mr. HUMPHREY. No.

Mr. COOPER. It represents a transfer?

Mr. HUMPHREY. It represents a transfer.

Mr. COOPER. I have not been here the last 2 days. Unfortunately, I have not been able to follow the progress of the debate, particularly on the Alliance for Progress. I voted for the reductions offered by the senior Senator from Florida. I intend to support the recommendations made by the Senator from Montana and the Senator from Illinois. I have a strong feeling about supporting, to the fullest extent we can, the Alliance for Progress. We have been talking for 2 years about Cuba. The Soviet Union has established a military presence in Cuba. It is a threat to Latin America. I do think this area could provide the greatest source of danger to this country, or the greatest source of strength to the future of this country. I am going to support the amendment of the Senator from Minnesota.

Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. HUMPHREY. I yield.

Mr. DIRKSEN. So that the authentic figures may be in the RECORD—and we received these figures from the Appropriations Committee—for fiscal 1963 the Alliance for Progress had $525 million.

Mr. HUMPHREY. In appropriations.

Mr. DIRKSEN. Yes. The budget asked for $650 million for 1964. The House cut the amount by $200 million and reduced it to $450 million. The Senate committee put it all back and raised it to $650 million.

Mr. HUMPHREY. That is the administration's request.

Mr. DIRKSEN. Yes. To balance out this account we went back to the expenditure for fiscal 1963. The so-called "powerhouse" amendments contain $525 million, exactly what was appropriated for fiscal 1963. We considered that that was enough. On balance it ought to be approved. Those are the figures.

Mr. HUMPHREY. If we could be assured that we would get $525 million in appropriations for fiscal 1964, I would withdraw the amendment. The truth is that $450 million is provided in the House bill. If we have only $525 million in the Senate version, as valiant as my colleagues in the Senate will be in terms of their conference committee capability, I doubt that the House will fold up and agree to the $525 million authorization. If we have only a $525 million authorization, I am sure the Appropriations Committee will not automatically appropriate that amount of money.

I offered my amendment in the hope that the conferees on the part of the Senate would be able to come out of conference with a figure close to $525 or $550 million in authorizations. I hope more than that will come to us in the appropriations bill, in the third year of the Alliance for Progress program, when programs are now getting underway.

I have received an excellent report on this program. I hope that at least we will come out of the Appropriations Committee with the same amount that we had in fiscal 1963.

Unless we adopt an amendment that will restore it to $650 million, or an amendment similar to it, we will have no chance whatever of coming out with the full amount of money.

Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, we did not touch the so-called social trust fund.

Mr. HUMPHREY. That is correct.

Mr. DIRKSEN. That is the $200 million, for example, for the benefit of Latin America.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. $175 million.

Mr. DIRKSEN. Yes; but originally the request was for $200 million.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. The House provided for $200 million.

Mr. DIRKSEN. Yes.

Mr. HUMPHREY. I am not arguing about the other figures. As the Senator from Georgia has indicated, possibly the President would use some of the contingency fund for the Alliance for Progress. That is a part of the argument for increasing the contingency fund. All I am saying is that in light of the drastic action taken by the other body in cutting the authorization for the Alliance for Progress programs, the Senate ought at least to sustain the figure in the committee report, or close to it, so that when we go to conference on the Alliance for Progress we shall be able to come out with a little more than is offered in the Mansfield-Dirksen amendments.

I am sure the Senator from Illinois knows that I really do not like to be in this position. I do not exactly support

what the distinguished majority leader and the distinguished minority leader have attempted to do. In other respects, I believe they had to do what was done. I hope I can persuade my colleagues in the Senate to agree that the allocation to the Alliance for Progress would be a wise step to take. Apparently some shift was made, and I am not quite sure why. It seems to me that if we could agree on a better figure for this year we would be serving the cause that we all wish to support.

Mr. DIRKSEN. The situation amounts to, "You pay your money and you take your choice." In other words, shall we put the money into the contingency fund of the President, giving that added flexibility, or do we take it out of that fund and put it into the Alliance for Progress authorization?

Mr. HUMPHREY. That is correct. I also feel that inasmuch as the committee made a long and careful study of the Alliance for Progress, it would be a good idea to go along with the progress that has been made. I respect the committee's judgment with respect to the Alliance for Progress funds.

Mr. KEATING. Am I correct in saying that the Senator's amendment would add to the Alliance for Progress fund the exact amount which would be taken from the contingency fund?

Mr. HUMPHREY. That is correct.

Mr. KEATING. I should like, with the Senator's permission, to address a parliamentary inquiry to the Chair. Is the amendment divisible? It strikes out two sections.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. A motion to strike out is divisible.

Mr. KEATING. So it may be divided into two parts?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct.

Mr. MILLER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. HUMPHREY. I yield.

Mr. MILLER. I believe that the Senator from Illinois made a good point, but it seems to me that there is an underlying question of policy involved, and that is that the so-called powerhouse amendments seek to make it clear to the Alliance for Progress members that we are concerned about some of the countries that have not been performing as we feel they should, and, therefore, we are not going to approve the amount that was originally recommended by the Foreign Relations Committee, but that, instead, we will leave it up to the President to exercise his discretion as to whether they are going to go ahead with a program.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, I believe that is a valid argument. I do not deny it.

Mr. MILLER. The Senator from Minnesota has said that he has received progress reports. The Senator from Minnesota probably has much better information on this point than I. However, I too have seen some reports which indicate that of all the Latin American countries, only about 12 have come forth with the kind of programs that we have long been expecting them to propose.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Will the Senator permit me to make an observation?

Mr. MILLER. I would appreciate it very much if the Senator from Minnesota would tell us a little more about the state of these programs, because we have received reports which indicate that all is not well with respect to some of the countries.

Mr. HUMPHREY. I do not claim to be any expert on this subject, but basically there is considerable truth in what the Senator from Iowa has said with respect to the fact that a number of countries have not come forth with what we call necessary reforms.

Mr. MILLER. Not only with respect to reforms, but with respect to programs as well.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Yes; programs also. That is why the Alliance for Progress has been slow in starting. We have not only demanded feasibility studies, project by project, and economic studies, project by project, but also countrywide plans, country by country. This has compelled some of the countries to examine their human resources, their natural resources, their capital resources, and their public administration structure. We have insisted on rather high criteria. Now they are beginning to show some progress in that respect. In some countries the programs have not come along as fast as we would like to have had them come along because we have insisted upon better performance.

If we had insisted in certain other parts of the world on the same kind of performance that we are insisting upon with respect to Latin American countries, there would have been less criticism of the foreign aid program than we have had thus far. I believe we have learned a great deal as a result of our demand for better performance. Our funds in Latin America are showing much better performance on these projects.

I have had brought to my attention a report from Colombia. It is in the form of a letter, with pictures, and it deals with the city of Cucuta, Colombia.

The letter is addressed to the President of the United States, and it states:

> With the present we are enclosing some photographs, which show how the Alliance for Progress program is producing results in our city.
>
> We have been granted a loan by the Inter-American Development Bank, that is helping to finance a 10-year expansion program, designed to provide water and sewerage house connections for more than 95 percent of our 115,000 inhabitants of the city.

Their plan was designed to take care of some of the sewerage, water, and sanitation needs. I show Senators the pictures, which obviously cannot be printed in the RECORD. One picture shows the problem, and another picture shows the solution. In other words, the pictures say, "This is what we had, and this is what we are getting."

This was done after American engineers had been brought in and after economic and feasibility studies.

This is the kind of program we ought to support.

Mr. ELLENDER. Mr. President, will the Senator from Minnesota yield?

Mr. HUMPHREY. I yield to the Senator from Louisiana, who must leave the Chamber and who desires to offer his amendment now.

Mr. ELLENDER. As I stated a while ago, I am in full agreement with the position taken by the distinguished Senator from Minnesota. I do not believe, as has been stated by some Senators, that money could be transferred from the contingency fund, as such, to the Alliance for Progress. The purpose of the contingency fund is to provide for unforeseen happenings, such as at Quemoy and in Lebanon.

Mr. President, I call up my amendment No. 299 and ask that it be read.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment will be stated.

The LEGISLATIVE CLERK. On page 2 of the Mansfield-Dirksen amendments, it is proposed to strike out lines 10 and 11 and insert in lieu thereof the following:

> On page 40, line 10, strike out "$175,000,000" and insert in lieu thereof "$100,000,000".

Mr. ELLENDER. Mr. President, a parliamentary inquiry.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Louisiana will state it.

Mr. ELLENDER. As I understand, this amendment will be voted upon before the so-called Humphrey amendment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. KENNEDY in the chair). A motion to amend language proposed to be stricken out takes precedence over a motion to strike out.

Mr. HUMPHREY. It is not an amendment in the third degree?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. It is a preferential amendment.

Mr. ELLENDER. As the Senator from Minnesota has just stated, I have a previous engagement. Tomorrow I shall give my reasons why I believe my amendment should be adopted.

Mr. MILLER. Mr. President, will the Senator from Minnesota yield?

Mr. HUMPHREY. I yield.

Mr. MILLER. My only comment in response to the Senator's statement is that I recognize that the scrutiny which is being given to some of the Alliance programs is tight. That is as it should be. It does not mean that when these programs are not measuring up to our standards, especially those set forth in the Clay Committee report, we should automatically appropriate the same amount of money we did last year. I take it from the action of the House that the House has been restive because we have not been moving fast enough with the moneys appropriated originally, and that the understanding and hope that there would be a quicker movement have not been justified. That is why some of the excess funds have been built up.

Mr. HUMPHREY. One of the reasons why we have not moved so rapidly as the Senator from Iowa would have liked or the Senator from Minnesota would have liked is that there was a tooling-up job that had to be done in working with the governments. In many instances, they simply were dragging their feet for a while, in terms of some of the criteria or qualifications that had to be met according to our commitments un-

der the Act of Punta del Este. Many countries did not have the services that were necessary, such as planning officers and economists, to undertake their part of their work. That is now being done. Some progress is beginning to be made. When General Clay came before the committee, he said, speaking on the total authorization in the foreign aid bill, in response to a question from the chairman:

> Yes, sir. We believe that the authorization should be in the neighborhood of $4.2 billion or $4.3 billion.
>
> The reason we have recommended that this figure be higher than we think the appropriation need be is that we feel the full amount promised to Latin America should be authorized even though we don't really believe that there is any chance that their performance will justify it all being expended. We think that a failure to authorize the full amount for Latin America would be widely interpreted as a failure of the United States to support the Alliance for Progress.

That was General Clay's statement. In the Clay report, as I recall, special emphasis was placed upon our commitment to the Alliance for Progress and the authorization that has been requested.

Mr. MILLER. I thank the Senator from Minnesota. I have great respect for General Clay. However, with reference to the last statement the Senator read, I should say, in light of what we have been doing and in light of the clear commitments that are required under the Alliance for Progress, that if the Mansfield-Dirksen amendment stands, and the amendment of the Senator from Minnesota fails, and if Latin American nations get the idea that we are not proceeding in their support, it will be due to our own failure of information. I see no reason why this information cannot be disseminated properly, so that they will know that we are still committed to their support, and that the only reason why we are not authorizing so much money is that, frankly, we are disappointed with their poor performance in some cases—and it has been poor in some cases. In other instances, we could give quite adequate and quite proper praise.

However, I cannot accept General Clay's statement which is, in effect, that we would be doing a very poor job of public relations in getting that information across to the people of Latin America.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, will the Senator from Minnesota yield?

Mr. HUMPHREY. I yield.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Most respectfully, I say to the Senator from Minnesota that I think he is mistaken in the statement he made some time ago that the contingency fund could not be used in any place where the authorization had been reduced or the appropriation for a specific purpose had been reduced. I have checked with one of the clerks of the Committee on Appropriations, Mr. Scott, and have confirmed my memory of a good many years that the contingency fund can be used where the purposes are vaguely stated. In the Alliance for Progress, no specific item is picked out that has been eliminated by the authorization or the appropriation. The Senator's amendment restores to the full budget request the amount for the Alliance for Progress, and reduces the contingency fund by $125 million.

Mr. HUMPHREY. It is merely a shift of funds.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Yes. Based upon my experience in the Committee on Appropriations, we have already tried to stand by the contingency fund. The administration, whether it be the administration of Truman, Eisenhower, or Kennedy, has always asked to have the contingency fund at a reasonable level to allow for any emergency that might arise.

The Senator's amendment would restore the amount to the specific project, the Alliance for Progress, where it might not be used, because projects might not come up, and therefore might be cut from the contingency fund.

Therefore, I personally am opposed to the Senator's amendment for the reason, based on experience, that the contingency fund is one of the most responsible, valuable adjuncts that the administration has, even though the fund might not be entirely used.

I am sorry to have to disagree with what the Senator from Minnesota has said, but I did wish to call his attention particularly to the fact that I do not believe his statement is entirely backed up by experience, namely, that when an amount is cut back, the contingency fund cannot be used when the objective is not clearly stated.

Mr. HUMPHREY. I hope the Senator from Massachusetts is correct. Frankly, I have no desire to limit the President's contingency fund. Had I had my way about this matter, the President's contingency fund would be cut at his request, because I thoroughly agree with the Senator that the President's contingency fund in many cases serves a valuable purpose.

Let us discuss for a moment the Committee on Appropriations. Excluding the member of that committee who is speaking, let us talk about the competency of the other members. It was the considered judgment of that committee that the contingency fund should be kept at $175 million. I thought that that amount was too small. It was also the considered judgment—if not the unanimous judgment, then surely the judgment of an overwhelming majority of the members of the committee—that this fund should be $150 million. I have no desire to cut the President's contingency fund; nevertheless, I sense the temperament of the Senate to be that it is going to make some cuts. I felt that way when the bill was reported to the Senate. If that be true, I do not want my amendment to be interpreted as one that would add money to the bill. My amendment merely provides for a different allocation of the funds as proposed in the Mansfield-Dirksen-Fulbright-Sparkman-Aiken - Hickenlooper amendment. There is an honest disagreement among Senators as to how these funds should be allocated. I agree that there should be a cut in military assistance. I agree that there should be a cut in the Development Loan Fund. That amount was further reduced by the Morse amendment.

I am now asking only that the Senate be given some room for bargaining with the House Committee on Foreign Affairs when we go to conference on the Alliance for Progress.

I really believe that this is a meritorious position. I am not arguing with the judgment of other Senators as to the amounts that ought to be provided for the Alliance for Progress. If we can get $525 million, the Senator from Minnesota will be exceedingly happy. That was the total amount provided last year. Last year we had an authorization for $600 million.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, will the Senator from Minnesota yield for a further question?

Mr. HUMPHREY. I yield.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. The Senator from Minnesota is talking to a friend of the Alliance for Progress program when he talks to me.

Mr. HUMPHREY. I fully realize that; and I realize also that the same is true when I speak to the distinguished minority leader [Mr. DIRKSEN]. I said that, essentially, we are not arguing about the programs; instead, we are merely discussing ways and means to fulfill or implement them.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Yes. My point is that if we are to make cuts in line with the recent votes in the Senate—and, as the Senator from Minnesota has said, it seems to be the temper of the Senate to make some cuts in the bill as recommended by the committee—we shall be providing for a better overall situation by leaving the contingency fund larger and thus providing desirable fluidity for the administration.

I have agreed with the Senator on some of the positions he takes, but I cannot agree with him on this amendment.

Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, will the Senator from Minnesota yield for a brief question?

Mr. HUMPHREY. I yield.

Mr. DIRKSEN. In view of the procedure in the Senate thus far today, is it intended to have the Senate vote today on this amendment?

Mr. HUMPHREY. I believe not. Before the vote is taken, the Senator from Oregon will speak on the Alliance for Progress program; and in view of his knowledge of the Latin American area, his remarks will be most important. So I have no intention of pressing for a vote today on this amendment.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, will the Senator from Minnesota yield?

Mr. HUMPHREY. I yield.

Mr. MORSE. I am glad to cooperate in this connection. I did not know the Senator's amendment was to be brought up today. He knows that I wish to work with him in connection with this subject matter.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Yes, indeed.

Mr. MORSE. And other Senators also wish to work with him and collaborate

with him in this connection. However, some of our amendments are not even drafted as yet.

Furthermore, I think that at this point in the debate on the foreign aid bill we need to have whatever discussion and debate we are going to have on all aspects of the Alliance for Progress program. We cannot deal with this particular amendment without affecting the entire program, inasmuch as the Alliance goes to the very heart of the program. Therefore, in our discussions and debate tomorrow in regard to the Alliance for Progress program, we wish to outline the various proposals in regard to amendments of or modification in the Alliance for Progress program. That is why I propose that there be no vote tonight on this amendment. Furthermore, I understand—although I may be mistaken about this—that the amendment of the Senator from Louisiana [Mr. ELLENDER] has precedence over this amendment; and he has already left the Chamber, with the understanding that no further votes will be taken tonight.

Mr. HUMPHREY. The Senator from Oregon is correct; and I am very anxious to take up this matter with the Senator from Oregon and his associates, because I am sure that a package which will greatly strengthen the Alliance for Progress can be arranged. After this debate, I shall meet promptly with the Senator from Oregon to discuss this subject.

Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, will the Senator from Minnesota yield?

Mr. HUMPHREY. I yield.

Mr. McGOVERN. Would the Senator from Minnesota say the Senate was acting in accordance with a long established foreign policy if it were to demonstrate in a concrete way its special consideration of the Western Hemisphere?

Mr. HUMPHREY. I certainly would. If there is any nation which demonstrates special consideration of the Western Hemisphere, certainly it is the United States, through the U.S. Congress. I think I can say with complete accuracy and confidence that so far as the American people are concerned today about foreign aid, the one area of the program to which they seem to make an enthusiastic response is the Alliance for Progress. They want to do something constructive for this hemisphere. There are 101 reasons for that. Some say it is because of fear of Castro; but I think the more important reason is the realization that we have denied to some of our neighbors in this hemisphere the attention they justly have deserved over all these years.

Mr. McGOVERN. Furthermore, even Castro is a representative of a country in our hemisphere.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Yes.

Mr. McGOVERN. Does the Senator from Minnesota have information which he can give us in regard to the cost of our involvement in South Vietnam, as compared with the entire cost of everything we are doing in the 21 countries of Latin America?

Mr. HUMPHREY. I think last year we expended $500 million or $600 million in South Vietnam; and in this case we are talking about an authorization—not an appropriation—of $650 million or $525 million for the Alliance for Progress, although, to be sure, there is also the Social Progress Trust Fund, for which I believe the Senate recommended $175 million. But when we consider the total amount we are contemplating authorizing—it has not yet been voted—for all the republics of the Western Hemisphere, in terms of any real aid program, we find that it is only approximately $150 million more than the amount we have put into South Vietnam in 1 year.

Mr. McGOVERN. There has been some understandable impatience regarding the rate of the progress we are making in the countries to the south of us. Can the Senator from Minnesota state how long we have been involved in South Vietnam, as compared to the length of time the Alliance for Progress has been operating?

Mr. HUMPHREY. As I recall, our involvement in South Vietnam began about 1954; I refer to our direct involvement after the French were defeated.

Mr. McGOVERN. Since then we have expended well over $3 billion in that one country, whereas the Alliance for Progress has been operating for approximately 2 years in some 20 different countries. I believe the Senator from Minnesota would agree that we have not been entirely satisfied with the progress we have made in South Vietnam, although we have been involved there over a much longer period of time.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Absolutely so. Furthermore, in a few days Mr. Harriman, our Under Secretary of State, will go to a very important conference in South America—the Conference of the Inter-American Economic and Social Council, at which he, one of the highest representatives of our Government, will discuss, once again, the plans for the economic advancement of the countries of this hemisphere, region by region, country by country, area by area, and category by category. I believe it would be wise to arm Mr. Harriman with the kind of commitment for resources that will strengthen his position in that Conference, in terms of exacting from our sister republics the conditions which we believe to be necessary in order to have an effective aid program.

I repeat that because of the position taken by Congress, and, in particular, because of the position taken by the subcommittee headed by the Senator from Oregon himself, as was indicated here in the early stages of the debate on the aid bill, certain conditions and criteria for the Alliance for Progress program were established, and I believe those conditions and criteria will make that program much more viable and much more effective than any other program we have had in any other part of the world, save the Marshall plan. This is one of the reasons for the delay or for what some call the slowness of our progress. However, I point out that although we may be proceeding a little slower than we would like to, we are proceeding well. The programs which are underway can be thoroughly justified economically, socially, and politically. We have not constructed, in connection with this program, any four-lane roads that go nowhere, or luxury homes and luxury buildings that are not needed, in areas of poverty. We have been printing books, building schools, developing rural credits, engaging in land reform, helping in home building, cleaning up slums, installing water systems, and protecting the public health. I think the people of the United States find these programs most desirable and worthy of support.

Mr. McGOVERN. And those programs are not covered by any contingency fund; am I correct in that statement?

Mr. HUMPHREY. The Senator is correct. They are not.

Mr. McGOVERN. As the Senator from Louisiana [Mr. ELLENDER] said before he left, the purpose of the contingency fund, is to meet emergency conditions, usually of a military nature or something of that sort.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Exactly. I know that certain Senators feel that there are changes that need to be made in the Alliance for Progress program. With some I agree. For example, the military assistance program. I think we should get into that. The Senator from Oregon will do so. I wish him to know that I feel that the military assistance program in Latin America ought to be cut. As I told him the other day, it is my intention to support him. The Senator from Oregon feels that if cuts are to be made in some of these items, possibly we can make them at that point and in a package. I am amenable to that suggestion. I wish to talk to the Senator about it.

The amendment is now before the Senate. The amendment will give us an opportunity to talk on that aspect of the foreign aid bill.

I wish to conclude my presentation today on the question by saying that of all the items in the bill that deserve the most thoughtful consideration, it is the Alliance for Progress. It will be fully discussed by a number of Senators. That will be time well spent. Of all the items in the bill that deserve the support of Congress, it is the Alliance for Progress. I hope that we will do nothing either overtly or indirectly that will weaken our position in relation to the Alliance for Progress.

Mr. McGOVERN. The Senator from Minnesota has expressed my views exactly, including the comment he made about the desirability of reducing some of the military aid funds. When the motion to recommit the bill was made the other day by the Senator from Oregon [Mr. MORSE], I joined—and I believe others joined—in supporting the motion to recommit, not because we wanted to make drastic cuts in the foreign aid bill across the board, but because we saw in that motion an opportunity to make some selective cuts in the military field particularly, which would give us a stronger over-all program.

I am happy to be a cosponsor of the amendment offered by the Senator from Minnesota. I thank him for yielding to me.

LUMBER PROFITS

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, on September 13, 1963, I made a statement on the floor of the Senate on the lumber situation in which I discussed extensively the production and profit situation in the lumber industry. The data in support of my statement came from an analysis prepared by Dun & Bradstreet, Inc.

The National Lumber Manufacturers Association, on October 10, released a statement which contains some information which it believes is contrary to the material I used. I ask unanimous consent that the National Lumber Manufacturers Association's statement of October 10, and attachments, be printed in the RECORD at the conclusion of my remarks.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 1.)

Mr. MORSE. I note with concern that the National Lumber Manufacturers Association believes that the Dun and Bradstreet report "erroneously credits the lumber industry with greater economic achievements than it could honestly claim." I have made a further investigation, particularly regarding the contention that certain of the Dun and Bradstreet figures were unreliable and did not agree with the material published in the "Statistical Abstract of the United States" for 1963. The latter publication is characterized by NLMA as "an official U.S. Government publication of established repute."

The NLMA quotes figures from the Statistical Abstract which indicate a larger number of failures in the lumber industry than those used by Dun and Bradstreet. I ask unanimous consent that the pertinent portions of table 678 of the 1963 Statistical Abstract be printed in the RECORD at this point in my remarks.

There being no objection, the portions were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1963, p. 506]

No. 678. Industrial and commercial failures—Number and liabilities, by industry and size of liability: 1955–62

[Liabilities in thousands of dollars. Excludes Alaska and Hawaii. See footnotes 2 and 3, table 676]

Industry and size of liability	Failures				Current liabilities			
	1955	1960	1961	1962	1955	1960	1961	1962
Total	10,969	15,445	17,075	15,782	449,380	938,630	1,090,123	1,213,601
Mining and manufacturing	2,202	2,612	2,825	2,575	156,945	289,635	325,282	400,001
By industry:								
Mining—Coal, oil, misc.	55	98	103	85	5,156	19,650	16,814	48,278
Food and kindred products	165	173	182	160	14,198	31,276	26,767	23,167
Textile-mill products and apparel	506	435	467	393	25,334	36,374	40,647	36,764
Lumber and products	336	520	497	386	13,658	38,292	36,824	34,632
Paper, printing, and publishing	114	200	238	246	6,760	12,084	16,415	21,127
Chemicals and allied products	49	63	94	74	3,454	5,662	9,135	43,524
Leather and products	80	82	75	68	4,358	12,768	6,074	10,539
Stone, clay, and glass products	49	44	64	59	1,821	4,000	5,632	6,394
Iron, steel, and products	120	167	183	175	14,219	27,046	70,337	26,042
Machinery	291	289	294	351	37,278	44,682	32,372	71,229
Transportation equipment	47	133	136	130	5,327	16,854	27,332	43,526
Miscellaneous	390	408	492	448	25,382	40,929	36,933	34,779
By size of liability:								
Under $25,000	1,093	1,071	1,135	961	12,182	11,798	12,708	11,042
$25,000 to $100,000	764	941	1,062	932	36,288	46,364	52,042	44,350
$100,000 and over	345	600	628	682	108,475	231,473	260,532	344,609
Wholesale trade	1,164	1,473	1,734	1,613	57,682	107,156	158,465	126,377
By industry:								
Food and farm products	274	321	318	293	12,635	29,318	53,402	23,532
Apparel	62	46	56	53	2,176	3,513	3,038	3,204
Dry goods	54	35	43	31	4,107	1,403	2,896	1,762
Lumber, building materials, hardware	135	184	241	208	7,014	14,040	23,012	17,836
Chemicals and drugs	36	45	58	65	1,187	1,626	2,407	4,607
Motor vehicles and auto equipment	68	116	128	100	2,020	7,404	6,167	5,277
Miscellaneous	535	726	890	863	28,543	49,852	67,543	70,159
By size of liability:								
Under $25,000	632	654	740	694	7,385	7,867	8,456	7,991
$25,000 to $100,000	142	577	673	638	19,690	27,889	32,493	31,268
$100,000 and over	120	242	321	281	30,607	71,400	117,516	87,138
Retail trade	5,339	7,386	8,292	7,552	121,619	241,094	333,043	349,716
By industry:								
Food and liquor	1,053	1,059	1,151	1,078	19,556	28,557	67,604	51,200
General merchandise	193	255	304	304	5,193	12,844	15,482	29,536
Apparel and accessories	865	978	1,107	1,026	17,774	25,753	39,748	64,986
Furniture, home furnishings	719	968	1,033	853	21,072	38,782	51,581	62,776
Lumber, building materials, hardware	324	487	530	506	10,367	20,063	21,511	21,582
Automotive group	544	1,338	1,535	1,315	12,915	49,944	51,848	34,357
Eating and drinking places	956	1,426	1,593	1,456	20,330	41,589	51,278	47,137
Drug stores	128	166	204	186	2,574	5,817	6,623	5,170
Miscellaneous	557	709	835	828	11,838	17,745	27,368	32,972
By size of liability:								
Under $25,000	4,057	4,838	5,211	4,665	38,351	50,719	54,668	49,571
$25,000 to $100,000	1,101	2,164	2,513	2,418	48,197	94,846	112,957	110,762
$100,000 and over	181	384	568	469	35,071	95,529	165,418	189,383
Construction	1,404	2,607	2,752	2,703	83,179	201,369	193,005	243,535
By industry:								
General building contractors	443	1,020	1,068	1,003	39,827	110,656	94,042	133,901
Building subcontractors	880	1,419	1,520	1,498	34,485	74,177	76,685	81,370
Other contractors	81	168	164	202	8,867	16,536	22,278	28,264
By size of liability:								
Under $25,000	777	1,180	1,307	1,224	8,737	13,296	14,830	13,766
$25,000 to $100,000	462	991	1,026	1,033	21,779	48,040	51,303	50,771
$100,000 and over	165	436	419	446	52,663	140,033	126,872	178,998

[Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1963, p. 506]

No. 678. Industrial and commercial failures—Number and liabilities, by industry and size of liability: 1955–62—Continued

[Liabilities in thousands of dollars. Excludes Alaska and Hawaii. See footnotes 2 and 3, table 676]

Industry and size of liability	Failures				Current liabilities			
	1955	1960	1961	1962	1955	1960	1961	1962
Commercial service	860	1,367	1,472	1,339	29,955	99,376	80,328	93,972
By industry:								
Passenger and freight transportation	255	410	409	336	11,870	38,356	30,690	29,350
Miscellaneous public services	30	62	58	71	4,028	3,874	2,239	3,605
Hotels	41	82	97	70	5,901	23,271	23,786	20,957
Cleaning, dyeing, repairing	95	122	153	145	1,229	3,381	4,057	4,288
Laundries	50	68	77	57	1,344	2,459	2,719	4,568
Undertakers	8	7	14	5	401	172	520	248
Other personal services	61	81	105	97	536	3,583	1,872	13,923
Business and repair services	320	535	559	558	4,646	24,280	14,445	17,033
By size of liability:								
Under $25,000	638	829	888	803	5,706	8,561	9,220	8,526
$25,000 to $100,000	177	405	451	404	8,049	17,823	21,418	18,427
$100,000 and over	45	133	133	132	16,200	72,992	49,690	67,019

Source: Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., New York, N.Y., "The Failure Record Through 1961," and records.

Mr. MORSE. My colleagues will be particularly interested in the source of the data contained in table No. 678 of the Statistical Abstract. The footnote of the table shows that the source of this Government table is none other than Dun & Bradstreet itself.

The only conclusion I can draw from the statistics under consideration is this: The original Dun & Bradstreet statement which showed failures in the lumber industry declining from 194 in 1961 to 163 in 1962 apparently represents the raw data for that industry and the larger figure cited in the Statistical Abstract—with Dun & Bradstreet as the source—includes not only the lumber mills but other types of establishments manufacturing various wood products, which, of course, is not the same for comparison purposes.

It is entirely possible that profits in the lumber industry are not properly reported by various statistical surveys, both private and public, but again, the data supplied in attachment 6 by the NLMA shows that since 1960, corporate net profits after taxes as a percentage of sales after Federal income taxes in the lumber and wood products—except furniture—industry have risen by 60 percent from 1.7 to 2.7 percent. At the same time, profits for all manufacturing corporations—except newspapers—have risen approximately 5 percent, from 4.4 to 4.6 percent and profits for the primary metal and the stone, clay, and glass groups have declined.

It is true that lumber profits are substantially below levels achieved in 1949, but they are above the low point reached in 1957 and again in 1960. A politician might want to argue that the improvement in profits is a direct result of the programs of the administration now in power. I do not for 1 minute contend that the 60-percent gain in the percentage of profits this industry has enjoyed results from actions taken only by a Democratic administration. The evidence is clear, as I stated on September 13, that the industry, itself, deserves a substantial part of the credit for having worked hard to improve its production and its market. At that time, I also pointed out that the improved situation reflects action taken by the Government, both directly and indirectly, to assist the lumber industry.

There has come to my attention a report on a further Dun & Bradstreet analysis of business failures, reproduced by the Southern Lumbermen in the October 15, 1963, issue, at page 6. It is contained in an editorial entitled "Gratifying Statistics." I ask unanimous consent that this editorial be printed at this point in my remarks.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

GRATIFYING STATISTICS

The industry studies department of Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., recently issued its "Failure Record Through 1962," a statistical record of the business failures during that year, based on a comprehensive nationwide study.

This report sets forth the fact that in all lines of business in 1962 there were a total of 15,782 business failures; but a cheering note is found in the fact that this was a reduction of 8 percent from the 17,075 in 1961. Even so, the total liabilities of these failures was in excess of a billion dollars, a staggering evidence of the wear and tear of our economy.

From the lumberman's standpoint, however, there is some cheer to be derived from these sad statistics. In the table showing the failure rate per 10,000 operating concerns in the manufacturing industries, lumber manufacturing ranks close to the bottom of the list with a total of only 44 failures, as compared with 220 in transportation equipment, 212 in furniture, 194 in electric machinery, etc. In the classification of retail lines of business, dealers in lumber and building materials also made a relatively good showing—only 54 per 10,000 operating concerns, compared with 161 in children's wear, 145 in sporting goods, 105 in furniture and furnishings, etc.

The lumber business is not the most profitable business in the world; it has its ups and downs. But it should be a source of satisfaction to those engaged in it, manufacturers and retailers, that it is excelled by few industries in the country from the standpoint of substantial stability.

Mr. MORSE. The editorial concludes with the observation:

The lumber business is not the most profitable business in the world; it has its ups and downs. But it should be a source of satisfaction to those engaged in it, manufacturers and retailers, that it is excelled by few industries in the country from the standpoint of substantial stability.

I shall continue to look forward in the months that lie ahead to assisting, in every way possible, the efforts that may be undertaken to improve the profitability of the lumber industry. I hope that it will be possible to develop a better picture of the profit situation because, in my judgment, the data presently being used do not adequately reflect the problems that may be faced by various components of the forest products industry. In my judgment, the National Lumber Manufacturers Association has performed a fine service by its effort to make a detailed analysis of the profit picture in the lumber industry.

EXHIBIT 1

LUMBER INDUSTRY PROFIT RATIO LAGS BADLY AMONG MAJOR MATERIAL PRODUCERS, SAYS SPOKESMAN

WASHINGTON, D.C., October 10.—A spokesman for the lumber industry today called upon producers to continue their efforts to improve the economic position of the industry and overcome factors that kept 1962 profits to a disappointing 2.5 percent of sales. Although slightly better than the 1.9 percent figure for 1961, last year's profit picture still compared unfavorably with that of competing industries in the building-materials field, according to Mortimer B. Doyle, executive vice president of the National Lumber Manufacturers Association.

The profit level for manufacturing industries in 1962 was 4.6 percent, according to the Quarterly Financial Report for Manufacturing Corporations, published by the Federal Trade Commission and Securities and Exchange Commission. For primary metals it was 4.4 percent; for stone, clay, and glass products, 5.6 percent.

"It is fairly obvious from this comparison," said Mr. Doyle, "that the relative profit position of the lumber industry is extremely poor and that if the industry is to regain its health and improve its productive facilities, the profit ratio must be improved."

Although the dollar value of lumber and wood products sales has nearly doubled since 1949, the lumber executive pointed out, net profit in 1962, after taxes, was at the same dollar level as it was in 1949 (actually less in terms of 1949 dollars). During the same period, competitive industries achieved substantial increases in profits in proportion to sales.

"In 1962 the slight increase in single-family housing starts was reflected in a similarly slight increase in the consumption of lumber. Over the 13-year period from 1949 to 1962, however, the 25-percent increase in such construction far outstripped the 11-percent increase in lumber consumption," said Mr. Doyle.

Mr. Doyle noted, with irony, that a recent Dun & Bradstreet report erroneously credits the lumber industry with greater economic achievements that it could honestly claim. Although stating that its analysis was based

on only 75 lumber manufacturers, Dun & Bradstreet concludes that production and sales were up, along with profits, that business failures had declined, and that the overall financial condition of the industry is sound.

"We wish these figures applied to the entire industry," Mr. Doyle commented, "and we hope they will in the near future. Actually, of course, it is impossible to gage the economic condition of an industry consisting of some 33,000 companies on the basis of a mere 75. In all likelihood, it should be emphasized, the 75 companies Dun & Bradstreet surveyed are among the industry's biggest, highly integrated companies; the eight listed in the report certainly are.

"In reply to our query," said Mr. Doyle, "Dun & Bradstreet stated that its analysis of the 75 companies 'was not restricted to their lumber manufacturing operations.'"

To illustrate the unreliability of industry figures based on 75 companies, Mr. Doyle referred to the number of reported business failures. According to the Dun & Bradstreet study, failures in the lumber industry declined from 194 in 1961 to 163 in 1962. Actually, according to the Statistical Abstract of the United States for 1963, an official U.S. Government publication of established repute, failures in the lumber and wood products industries totaled 497 in 1961 and 386 in 1962.

NOTE.—Figures substantiating all statements made above are attached.

Employment—Production workers

[In thousands of workers]

Year	All manufacturing corporations (except newspapers)	Primary metal industries	Stone, clay, and glass products	Lumber and wood products (except furniture)
1949	11,790	968	443	680
1955	13,288	1,116	496	672
1957	13,189	1,118	493	588
1958	11,997	928	458	549
1959	12,596	953	494	594
1960	12,562	992	483	570
1961	12,046	914	455	535
1962	12,417	938	460	544

Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment and Earnings (monthly).

Estimated lumber production, domestic consumption, and housing units started [1]

Year	Softwood production (million board feet)	Softwood consumption (million board feet) [2]	Single-family housing starts (thousands of units)
1949	27,197	28,125	794
1955	30,293	32,830	1,194
1957	27,100	29,618	873
1958	27,379	30,293	975
1959	30,509	33,639	1,251
1960	26,672	28,974	1,009
1961	25,883	29,063	989
1962	26,615	30,507	994

[1] Subject to revision.
[2] Exports deducted.
Source: Statistics compiled by National Lumber Manufacturers Association.

Number of failures of selected industrial corporations

Year	All manufacturing corporations (except newspapers)	Primary metal industries	Stone, clay, and glass products	Lumber and wood products (except furniture)
1951	1,533	40	31	220
1955	2,202	120	49	336
1958	2,680	177	62	530
1959	2,465	136	48	503
1960	2,612	167	44	520
1961	2,825	183	64	497
1962	2,575	175	59	386

Source: Statistical Abstract of the U.S., 1963.

Net profits (after taxes)

[In millions of dollars]

Year	All manufacturing corporations (except newspapers)	Primary metal industries	Stone, clay, and glass products	Lumber and wood products (except furniture)
1949	8,711	799	311	163
1955	15,099	2,016	631	280
1957	15,438	1,864	619	121
1958	12,670	1,251	514	153
1959	16,328	1,581	685	268
1960	15,198	1,438	573	105
1961	15,311	1,290	543	114
1962	17,727	1,252	581	163
1963 [1]	9,237	763	244	95

[1] 1st half.
Source: Federal Trade Commission, Securities and Exchange Commission (Quarterly Financial Report for Manufacturing Corporations), 1949–63.

Gross sales for selected manufacturing industries

[In millions of dollars]

Year	All manufacturing corporations (except newspapers)	Primary metal industries	Stone, clay, and glass products	Lumber and wood products (except furniture)
1949	178,898	13,882	3,875	3,733
1955	278,394	26,645	7,350	5,146
1957	320,039	28,394	8,238	5,251
1958	305,281	24,238	7,599	5,462
1959	337,817	28,514	8,653	6,454
1960	345,690	27,771	8,669	6,081
1961	356,424	26,672	9,310	5,886
1962	389,404	28,256	10,422	6,639
1963 [1]	201,714	15,208	5,196	3,487

[1] 1st half.
Source: Federal Trade Commission, Securities and Exchange Commission (Quarterly Financial Report for Manufacturing Corporations), 1949–63.

Corporate net profits after taxes as a percentage of sales after Federal income taxes

Year	All manufacturing corporations (except newspapers)	Primary metal industries	Stone, clay, and glass products	Lumber and wood products (except furniture)
1949	4.9	5.8	8.0	4.4
1955	5.4	7.6	8.6	5.4
1957	4.8	6.6	7.5	2.3
1958	4.2	5.2	6.8	2.8
1959	4.8	5.5	7.9	4.2
1960	4.4	5.2	6.6	1.7
1961	4.3	4.8	5.8	1.9
1962	4.6	4.4	5.6	2.5
1963 [1]	4.6	5.0	4.7	2.7

[1] 1st half.
Source: Prepared by National Lumber Manufacturers Association from Quarterly Financial Report for Manufacturing Corporations, Federal Trade Commission, and Securities and Exchange Commission.

Average weekly earnings for employees for selected industries

[Actual dollars]

Year	All manufacturing corporations (except newspapers)	Primary metal industries	Stone, clay, and glass products	Lumber and wood products (except furniture)
1949	53.88	60.94	54.31	48.02
1955	75.70	92.51	77.00	63.99
1957	81.59	99.00	82.82	66.64
1958	82.71	101.11	84.80	69.09
1959	88.26	112.19	91.46	74.24
1960	89.72	109.59	92.97	73.71
1961	92.34	114.95	95.24	77.03
1962	96.56	119.50	98.57	78.61

Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment and Earnings (monthly).

Wholesale price indexes by selected commodities

[1957–59=100]

	1950	1955	1957	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	3 months 1963
All commodities	86.8	93.2	99.0	100.4	100.6	100.7	100.3	100.6	99.9
All construction materials	83.0	95.1	99.0	98.9	102.1	100.5	98.6	98.3	97.7
Metals and metal products	72.7	90.0	99.7	99.1	101.2	101.3	100.7	100.0	99.4
Nonmetallic mineral products	78.6	91.3	98.8	99.9	101.2	101.4	101.8	101.8	103.0
Flat glass	79.3	94.5	100.2	100.0	99.9	97.9	96.8	97.0	102.2
Concrete products	82.4	92.7	98.7	100.0	101.3	102.4	102.5	102.6	105.0
Structural clay products	71.7	89.3	98.2	99.8	102.1	103.1	103.2	103.5	94.1
Lumber and wood products	94.1	102.3	98.5	97.4	104.1	100.4	95.9	96.5	96.4
Softwood lumber	93.7	104.0	98.5	96.6	105.0	98.6	93.5	95.9	96.4

Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.

AMENDMENT OF FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1961

The Senate resumed the consideration of the bill (H.R. 7885) to amend further the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and for other purposes.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that certain material on the Alliance for Progress program be printed at this point in the RECORD so that Senators will have it available in printed form tomorrow when we discuss the Alliance for Progress program.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

TABLE I.—*Funds made available to Latin America under the auspices of the Alliance for Progress*

[Period of operation: July 1, 1961, to Feb. 28, 1963]

	Millions
(a) By AID	$747.8
(b) By Food for Peace	317.7
(c) By the Export-Import Bank	295.5
(d) By the IDB (Social Progress Trust Fund)	336.9
(e) By other sources (contingency fund, etc.)	130.7
Total	1,818.6

Sources: AID, Department of State.

TABLE II.—*Funds made available to Latin America under the auspices of the Alliance for Progress*

[Period of operation: July 1, 1961, to Feb. 28, 1963]

	Millions
Argentina	$165.0
Bolivia	65.2
Brazil	289.0
Chile	299.8
Colombia	163.8
Costa Rica	11.8
Dominican Republic	61.5
Ecuador	59.9
El Salvador	29.2
Guatemala	20.3
Haiti	13.9
Honduras	9.4
Mexico	164.9
Nicaragua	16.0
Panama	33.5
Paraguay	15.9
Peru	85.1
Uruguay	27.5
Venezuela	112.6

Source: AID, Department of State.

TABLE III.—*Foreign aid disbursements to Latin America*

ARGENTINA

[Obligations in thousands of dollars]

Development grants	Fiscal year 1962	Fiscal year 1963 estimated
Livestock improvement	585	1,000
Industrial management and productivity	62	65
Development of university curriculum	2	
Civil aviation	203	300
Agricultural schools	25	20
Science—Graduate physics	47	300
Science—Metallurgy	50	
University of Cordoba: Engineering	10	300
Public safety	1	15
Techno-economic studies: Sources of capital investment funds for industrial and resource development	25	
Statistics	10	65
Techno-economic studies: Adviser to CAFADE group	92	
Techno-economic studies: Taxes	49	
University of Cuyo: Economics	450	
Colombia University: Business administration	151	
Resources development research	84	
Technical support	179	160
Aerial photomapping		30
Industrial districts		65
Industrial vocational schools		120
Mar del Plata: Land grant college contract		200
Labor Management Institute		30
Agriculture Economic Institute		345
Housing		50
Fruit production: Rio Negro Valley		30
Techno-economic studies		5

LOAN AUTHORIZATIONS

[In thousands of dollars]

	Fiscal year 1962	Fiscal year 1963
Development loans (as of June 21, 1963):		
Nonproject	20,000	
Central housing bank		12,500
Route 12		6,700
IBRD roads		30,500
Feasibility studies		3,000
Grain storage		21,700
Self-help housing		2,000
Social progress trust fund loans (as of May 31, 1963):		
Republic of Argentina: Equipment for advanced technical education for the national universities of Argentina of an estimated cost of $10,000,000	5,000	
Banco Hipotecario Nacional: Financing the construction of housing for low-income families of an estimated cost of $60,000,000		30,000

LOAN AUTHORIZATIONS—Continued

[In thousands of dollars]

	Fiscal year 1962	Fiscal year 1963
Export-Import Bank loans (as of Apr. 30, 1963):		
Purina de Argentina S.R.L.: Machinery, equipment, and services for construction of livestock and poultry feed mill		300
Interamerican Dehydration Co., S.A. (Banco Ind. de la Rep. Argentina): Machinery, equipment, and services for alfalfa dehydrating plant		200
Siderugia Campana S.A. (SIDERCA) (Banco Ind. del Rep. del Argentina): Machinery, equipment, and services for steam electric generating plant		4,332
Servicio Electrica del Gran Buenos: Electric power IGE	579	
John Deere SAIC: Tractor-producing facilities	1,280	
Government of Argentina: Commodities-cancellation pending	50,000	

OTHER

Supporting assistance: Nonproject loan [1]		20.000

[1] Contingency fund.

BOLIVIA

[Obligations in thousands of dollars]

Development grants	Fiscal year 1962	Fiscal year 1963, estimated
Agricultural servicio, Inter-American	237	
Agricultural extension	51	
Research and technical services	207	
Agricultural demonstration centers	211	85
Agricultural engineering	20	
Supervised agricultural credit	19	
Agricultural economics	28	
Cooperative product marketing	3	100
Marketing and cooperative staff	2	
Agricultural administration	105	
YPFB procurement	7	
Minerals survey	131	180
Aftosa laboratory	50	
Industrial development	110	110
Civil aviation	42	250
Engineering and transportation advisory services	179	225
Geodetic mapping service	804	400
Labor	145	145
Health and sanitation services	40	140
Environmental sanitation	3	
Administrative support, health service	116	100
Industrial education project	5	
Rural school construction	250	200
Rural education project	202	165
Urban school construction	600	200
Administrative support	59	60
Commercial education	13	
Textbook publication	200	180
Public safety program	339	420
Government management assistance	164	450
Financial advisory services	4	
Data sampling	25	
Communications media	46	40
Engineering and feasibility studies and services	200	
Special studies	254	260
Excess surplus property	40	
Project engineering	200	
Technical support	169	320
Agricultural development		550
(Following former projects included: agricultural extension, research and technical services, marketing and cooperative staff and agricultural administration, and credit advisory staff.)		
Industrial education		9
Occupational health program		174
Support for national planning		50
Cooperative wool marketing		90
Vaccine production and disease control		50
Engineering construction units		681
Territorial labor construction		20
Self-help community water		289
Excess surplus property		50
Banco Minero		400

LOAN AUTHORIZATIONS

[In thousands of dollars]

	Fiscal year 1962	Fiscal year 1963
Development loans (as of June 21, 1963):		
El Alto Airport	1,200	
Highway maintenance	400	
Feasibility studies	6,000	
COMIBOL mine rehabilitation		5,000
Social progress trust fund loans (as of May 31, 1963):		
Corporación Boliviana de Fomento (Banco Central de Bolivia): Financing the settlement of 8,000 farm families of an estimated cost of $15,321,428		6,500
Corporación Boliviana de Fomento (Banco Central de Bolivia): Financing the construction of housing for low-income families of an estimated cost of $5,429,000		4,000

OTHER

	Fiscal year 1962	Fiscal year 1963
Supporting assistance:		
Engineering construction units	250	
Railway rehabilitation	700	
Public works	3,000	
Support for Public Law 480, title III distribution program	250	
Public Law 480:		
Title I: Bread grains, cotton, dairy products, rice, vegetable oil, and wheat flour	3,900	16,900
Title II: Bread grains, coarse grains, fats and oils, dry beans, and milk products	116	15
Title III: Beans, butter, cheese, milk, bulgur, flour, and vegetable oil	780	3,590
Title IV: Bread grains, rice, vegetable oil, and dairy products		2,500
Peace Corps (as of Apr. 30, 1963): Rural development, rural community action, public health, and university education	900	600

BRAZIL

[Obligations in thousands of dollars]

Development grants	Fiscal year 1962	Estimated, fiscal year 1963
Agricultural institutions	377	
Agricultural economics and cooperatives	97	
Agricultural research and development	338	
Agricultural advisory service	100	
Agricultural servicio	350	
Mineral and water resources identification	308	
Electrical energy management training	12	20
Industrial productivity	58	120
Railroad shop and maintenance training	4	
Air navigation aid traffic control	270	120
Meteorological training center	51	75
Labor leader training	25	250
Employment service and manpower survey	7	35
Malaria eradication	1,895	3,600
Community water supply development	292	655
Public health advisory service	52	
Promotion of health in the Brazilian northeast	170	(1)
Public health methods	46	
Occupational health	57	
Secondary industrial education	229	
Secondary industrial education servicio	85	25
Elementary education	273	510
Elementary education servicio	70	
Pernambuco alliance for progress elementary and basic education	1,000	200
Secondary education	11	
University education	1,390	250
Marine engineering and naval architecture	47	

See footnotes at end of table.

BRAZIL

[Obligations in thousands of dollars]

Development grants	Fiscal year 1962	Estimated, fiscal year 1963
Educational advisory service	76	
Public safety	596	1,295
Improvement of Government administrative practices	336	260
Housing	9	5
Peaceful uses of atomic energy	4	
Regional economic development survey	71	
Northeast regional development	23	
National planning	450	
Program support—audiovisual	93	140
Technical support	1,216	1,300
Dependent schools for construction	16	
Technical support (northeast)		1,000
Rural electrification (northeast)		40
Economic education		195
Community water supply (northeast)	2,555	640
Community health centers (northeast)	1,000	385
Industrial vocational education (northeast)		10
Agricultural education (northeast)		900
Industrial vocational education		620
Geology education		150
Agricultural education		2,620
Livestock planning production and marketing, and food distribution		4,435
Colonization and resettlement (northeast)		25
Water resources (northeast)		110
Agricultural production and marketing (northeast)		165
Fisheries (northeast)		85
Agricultural resources and extension (northeast)		140
Resources inventory (northeast)		520
Industrial development (northeast)		370
Minerals resources survey		610
Roads (northeast)		1,100
Community development (northeast)		25
Technical and scientific publications		415
Food for peace (northeast)		10
Economic and social research planning		260
Orientation in social sciences		5
Public and business administration		245
Urban community development		65
Housing (northeast)		40

[1] Separate projects.

LOAN AUTHORIZATIONS

[In thousands of dollars]

	Fiscal year 1962	Fiscal year 1963
Development loans (as of June 21, 1963):		
Nonproject (commodities imported include industrial and agricultural machinery, industrial raw materials, fuels, food, feed, and fertilizer)	74,500	
COPERB rubber production		3,400
COPEG Development Bank		4,000
Carbon black plant		2,000
Santa Cruz thermal power		15,500
Social Progress Trust Fund (as of May 31, 1963):		
Superintendencia de Aguas e Esgotos do Reconcavo (State of Bahia): Financing of water system for city of Salvador of an estimated cost of $8,127,000	4,120	
Banco do Estado da Guanabara, S.A. (State of Guanabara): Financing of water supply system of the State of Guanabara of an estimated cost of $27,883,852	12,500	
Banco do Estado da Guanabara, S.A. (State of Guanabara): Financing of sewerage system of the State of Guanabara of an estimated cost of $22,473,000	11,000	
Banco do Nordeste do Brasil, S.A. (United States of Brazil): To finance the expansion and improvement of potable water and sewerage systems in 6 cities of an estimated cost of $18,534,700	12,990	
Caixa Economica do Estado de Minas Gerais (State of Minas Gerais): To expand the agricultural credit program for low-income farmers of an estimated cost of $13,000,000	6,400	

LOAN AUTHORIZATIONS—Continued

[In thousands of dollars]

	Fiscal year 1962	Fiscal year 1963
Social Progress, etc.—Continued		
Banco do Nordeste do Brasil, S.A. (United States of Brazil): Financing of low-cost housing programs in the State of Pernambuco, Brazil, of an estimated cost of $7,058,600		3,850
Banco de Credito Agricola do Expirito Santo, S.A. (State of Expirito Santo): Financing a program of agricultural credit of an estimated cost of $3,420,800		2,000
OTHER		
Supporting assistance: Nonproject loan (emergency stopgap) [1]		25,500
Public Law 480:		
Title I: Bread grains, wheat, flour, feed grains	52,400	114,500
Title II: Bread grains, coarse grains, fat and oils, milk, dry beans	27,400	13,460
Title III: Beans, butter, cheese, milk, vinegar, cornmeal, flour, vegetable oil	6,788	18,700
Peace Corps (as of Apr. 30, 1963): Agricultural extension, Sao Francisco River Valley development, urban community development and public health education	900	700

[1] Contingency fund.

CHILE

[Obligations in thousands of dollars]

Development grants	Fiscal year 1962	Fiscal year 1963, estimated
Rural extension	348	310
Agricultural economics	26	
Fisheries development	26	25
Administrative DTICA	120	
Geology	227	135
Management association assistance program	22	
Manufacturers association cooperation program	27	
Roads development	122	
Civil aviation	104	40
Labor relations	121	125
Teachers training	48	65
Education system diagnosis	1	
Police School	12	
Public administration—Tax modernization	194	310
C.A. forest protection	200	275
Rural improvement program	627	310
Housing	182	90
Development bank—Small industry	1	
Communications media	51	
Technical support	879	400
Modernization of accounting		230
Improvement of public works administration		180
Savings and loan system		20
Primary school construction		55
Customs administration		65
Marketing		80
Industrial training		180
Office of Engineering Services		105
Medical care		195
Education systems surveys		60
Scholarship program		25
Influenza immunization		20
Pediatrics equipment		40

LOAN AUTHORIZATIONS

[In thousands of dollars]

	Fiscal year 1962	Fiscal year 1963
Development loans (as of June 21, 1963):		
Earthquake reconstruction (authorized by Public Law 86-735 under the inter-American program for social progress)	100,000	

LOAN AUTHORIZATIONS—Continued

[In thousands of dollars]

	Fiscal year 1962	Fiscal year 1963
Development loans, etc.—Continued		
Projects:		
CORFO reconstruction loans	(16,600)	
Urban paving	(1,700)	
Hospital reconstruction	(4,400)	
CORVI reconstruction loans	(12,500)	
School reconstruction—S.C.E.E	(3,300)	
Longitudinal highway	(11,900)	
State railways	(3,800)	
Sanitary works	(5,300)	
Port works	(3,000)	
River bank protection—Valdivia	(1,200)	
Reconstruction of grain storage facilities	(1,200)	
Public services building	(700)	
School construction—M.O.P	(2,600)	
Transverse roads	(16,900)	
CORVI direct construction of housing	(10,500)	
Fundacion de Viviendas	(2,900)	
Reconstruction of Ministry of Agriculture facilities	(1,500)	
CORFO, the local currency proceeds for relending for development in public and private sectors	40,000	
Program assistance		35,000
Social progress trust fund loans (as of May 31, 1963):		
Republic of Chile: Financing of potable water systems for the cities of Concepcion and Talcahuano of an estimated cost of $4,248,120	2,470	
Corporacion de Fomento de la Produccion de Chile and Corporacion de la Reforma Agraria (CORA): Financing construction of houses for low-income farmers of an estimated cost of $2,489,942	1,268	
Corporacion de Fomento de la Produccion de Chile and Corporacion de la Reforma Agraria (CORA): Agricultural credits to small farmers and agricultural cooperatives of an estimated cost of $21,770,000	10,000	
Caja Central de Ahorros y Prestamos (Government of Chile): Financing construction of houses for low-income families of an estimated cost of $7,696,800	5,000	
Promotora de Viviendas Economicas Limitada y Compania, C.P.A. (Corporacion de Formento de la Produccion or Corporacion de la Vivienda): Financing construction of houses for low-income families of an estimated cost of $7,642,857		2,000
La Universidad de Chile (Corporacion de la Produccion de Chile): Financing a program for 5 regional colleges of an estimated cost of $6,847,000		2,300
Cooperativa de Consumidores Unidos, "UNICOOP," Santiago Ltda. (Corporacion de Fomento de la Produccion de Chile and Cooperative Sodimac Ltda.): Financing the establishment of cooperative supermarkets of an estimated cost of $1,175,000		600
Export-Import Bank Loans (as of Apr. 30, 1963):		
Manufacturea Metales: Expansion of facilities	820	
Cia Minera Andina: Copper mines	45,625	
Republic of Chile: Refinancing of U.S. dollar purchases		15,000

OTHER

[In thousands of dollars]

Supporting assistance: Emergency public safety [1]		6
Public Law 480:		
Title III: Cheese, flour, milk, bulgur, cornmeal	6,637	6,775
Title IV: Bread grains, feed grains, cotton, vegetable oil, tobacco, dairy products		21,000
Peace Corps (as of Apr. 30, 1963): Urban community action, social welfare development, rural community action, rural community development, urban development, and agricultural education	1,000	200

[1] Contingency fund.

COLOMBIA

[Obligations in thousands of dollars]

Development grants	Fiscal year 1962	Fiscal year 1963, estimated
Agricultural cooperative services	150	--------
National agricultural extension	139	--------
Land settlement	127	225
Basic resources	1,420	275
Special crops development	17	60
Livestock development	67	120
Agricultural credit and co-ops	57	165
National forest resource development	33	--------
Agricultural management and planning	125	--------
Agricultural engineering and farm machinery assistance	98	40
Industrial management planning	227	--------
Pan American highway construction	26	30
Civil aviation technical assistance	137	110
Labor management relations	110	90
Health and sanitation cooperative service	75	40
Malaria eradication	150	--------
Hospital administration	25	--------
National Institute of Hygiene	46	--------
Administration of nursing services	133	55
Health education campaign	7	5
Management water supply system	20	--------
Director, Samper-Martinez Institute	28	--------
Community health	50	--------
Administration health and sanitation	120	--------
Health management and planning	--------	10
Education, cooperative service	149	1
Trade and industrial education	87	55
Vocational agriculture education	74	55
Primary education	3,689	355
Economics	261	--------
Administration, education service	71	--------
Public administration training	99	30
Business administration	9	30
Housing	42	60
Free enterprise	100	205
Miscellaneous training	37	90
Technical support	151	445

LOAN AUTHORIZATIONS

[In thousands of dollars]

	Fiscal year 1962	Fiscal year 1963
Development loans (as of June 21, 1963):		
Development program assistance: Purchase essential commodities; pesos generated to be used for: Private investment fund, $30,000,000; labor housing, $10,000,000; investment items in development budget, $20,000,000	--------	60,000
Self-help housing	--------	7,500
Feasibility studies	--------	4,000
Agricultural credit	--------	10,000
Social progress trust fund loans (as of May 31, 1963):		
Establecimiento Publico Empresas Municipales de Cali (Republic of Colombia): Financing the expansion and improvement of potable water systems of an estimated cost of $4,780,000	2,454	--------
Instituto de Credito Territorial (Republic of Colombia): Financing housing for persons of low income of an estimated cost of $29,340,000	15,200	--------
Empresas Municipales de Cucuta (Republic of Colombia): Financing the expansion and improvement of water and sewerage system of the city of Cucuta of an estimated cost of $9,161,000	5,183	--------
Instituto Nacional de Fomento Municipal (Republic of Colombia): Expansion of potable water and sewerage systems of an estimated cost of $19,312,000	--------	8,500
Export-Import Bank loans (as of April 30, 1963): Cementos del Caribe S.A.: Machinery, equipment, and services for expansion of cement capacity and installation of electric powerplant at cement plant	--------	3,360

OTHER

[In thousands of dollars]

	Fiscal year 1962	Fiscal year 1963
Supporting assistance: Emergency public safety [1]	--------	175
Public Law 480:		
Title II: Wheat, flour, milk, and grains	--------	360
Title III: Vegetable oil, beans, milk, bulgur, cornmeal, and flour	9,125	14,305
Title IV; Bread, grains, cotton, and tobacco	--------	6,700
Peace Corps (as of Apr. 30 1963): Community development, university physical education, university English teaching, cooperatives, rural community development, health, agriculture, educational television, and nurses	1,300	2,800

[1] Contingency fund.

COSTA RICA

[Obligations in thousands of dollars]

Development grants	Fiscal year 1962	Fiscal year 1963 estimated
Inter-American technical service for agricultural cooperation	91	--------
Agricultural development	368	690
Industrial development	130	165
Civil aviation assistance	27	30
Ministry of Labor assistance	9	--------
Public Health cooperative service	33	--------
Control of specific diseases	14	--------
Environmental sanitation	104	--------
Hospital improvement and development	77	--------
University of Costa Rica Medical School	125	125
Training public health	29	--------
General health administrative project	53	--------
Vocational education	245	230
Ministry of Educational Development	223	310
University of Costa Rica development	206	130
Government-wide organization and management	108	125
Planning office	--------	20
Housing and city planning	30	--------
Technical support	96	125
Public safety	--------	200
Health facilities (consolidation of hospital improvement, general health administration, control of specific diseases, and public health training)	--------	300
Sanitary engineering (incorporates part of environmental sanitation)	--------	105

LOAN AUTHORIZATIONS

[In thousands of dollars]

	Fiscal year 1962	Fiscal year 1963
Development loans (as of June 21, 1963):		
Agricultural credit	--------	5,000
INVU slum clearance	--------	2,000
ICE, electric power	--------	1,500
Social progress trust fund loans (May 31, 1963): Instituto Nacional de Vivienda y Urbanismo de Costa Rica, financing construction of houses for low-income families of an estimated cost of $16,000,000	3,500	--------
Export-Import Bank loans (as of Apr. 30, 1963): National Water S. & S. Authority, equipment etc., for water supply	4,500	--------

OTHER

Peace Corps (as of Apr. 30, 1963): Rural community action and education	400	100

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

[Obligations in thousands of dollars]

Development grants	Fiscal year 1962	Fiscal year 1963, estimated
Agricultural institutional development training	3	--------
Agricultural crops and livestock	3	--------
Manpower development and labor administration	4	87
Elementary school textbooks	627	--------
Teacher training	185	414
Public administration training	26	--------
Community development training	24	--------
Technical support costs	94	269
Agricultural development and diversification	--------	235
Agrarian reform	--------	126
Cooperatives development	--------	135
Livestock development	--------	46
Forest conservation and management	--------	160
Forest protection (civic action)	--------	100
Industrial development	--------	40
Public safety	--------	295
Dependent education	--------	51
Skilled manpower development center	--------	181
Credit union cooperatives	--------	99
Education planning and administration	--------	48
English textbooks	--------	16
Adult education	--------	60
Vocational education	--------	184
School construction (civic action)	--------	168
Government planning and administrative reform	--------	404
Road repair and construction (civic action)	--------	83

LOAN AUTHORIZATIONS

[In thousands of dollars]

	Fiscal year 1962	Fiscal year 1963
Development loans (as of June 21, 1963): National Housing Bank	--------	2,100
Social Progress Trust Fund loans (as of May 31, 1963):		
Banco Agricola (Dominican Republic): Financing a program of rural credit for low-income farmers of an estimated cost of $5,790,000	--------	3,000
Government of the Dominican Republic: Financing the construction of housing for low-income families of an estimated cost of $6,375,000	--------	3,500
Export-Import Bank loans (as of Apr. 30, 1962):		
Government of the Dominican Republic: Miscellaneous industrial purchases	6,600	--------
Corporacion Dominicana Electrical: Thermal power project	3,018	--------

OTHER

Supporting assistance:		
Nonproject loan (commodities imported include: foodstuffs, industrial raw materials, industrial and agricultural machinery and vehicles) [1]	25,000	--------
For development purposes [1]	--------	22,750
Special Economic Readjustment Fund [1]	--------	1,000
Emergency public safety) [1]	--------	175
Public Law 480:		
Title II: Milk	--------	3,100
Title III: Corn, cornmeal, flour, vegetable oil, beans, butter, cheese, milk, bulgur	826	7,450
Title IV: Rice	--------	5,000
Peace Corps (as of Apr. 30, 1963): Rural community development, secondary and normal school teachers, cooperatives, community action, rural community action, fishermen and vocational agriculture teachers, nurses, and teachers and teacher-trainers	200	1,100

[1] Contingency fund.

ECUADOR

[Obligations in thousands of dollars]

Development grants	Fiscal year 1962	Fiscal year 1963, estimated
Agricultural extension	96	
Tropical agricultural research	53	
Agronomy and soil conservation	12	
Livestock development	57	
Agricultural development	377	470
Agricultural cooperative service	160	
Agricultural administration	97	
Farm mechanization	32	
Industry development	96	300
Industry administration	50	
Civil aviation	30	15
Inter-American geodetic survey	8	
Labor advisory service	293	300
Malaria eradication	420	450
Environmental sanitation	39	85
Health facilities and control campaigns	50	15
Health education	41	
Cooperative service health and sanitation	100	
Health administration	50	
School construction	144	170
Assistance to universities	1,100	1,130
Vocational and technical education	1,129	160
Education administration	53	
Public safety	233	1,055
Contraband control	141	
Tax administration improvement	65	
School of Administration Central University	418	
Public Administration Advisor	139	180
Economic and social development planning	495	150
Aided self-help housing	91	170
Communications media	94	70
Civic action	560	
Technical support	300	400
Excess property		100
Credit union development		300

LOAN AUTHORIZATIONS

[In thousands of dollars]

	Fiscal year 1962	Fiscal year 1963
Development loans (as of June 21, 1963):		
Industrial Credit Corporation	5,000	
Roads		2,700
Feasibility studies		2,000
Administrative and fiscal reforms		1,600
Social progress trust fund loans (as of May 31, 1963):		
Banco Ecuatoriano de la Vivienda (Republic of Ecuador): Financing construction of houses for low-income families of an estimated cost of $16,415,000	10,600	
Municipalidad de Quito (Republic of Ecuador): Expansion and improvement of sewerage systems of an estimated cost of $5,015,000	3,000	
Instituto Nacional de Colonización (Republic of Ecuador): Financing a program of integration of the farmer into the national economy of an estimated cost of $5,516,000		1,880
Instituto Nacional de Colonización (Republic of Ecuador): Financing a project of settlement at Santo Domingo de los Colorados of an estimated cost of $3,935,000		2,535
Republic of Ecuador: Financing the construction and improvement of water supply and sewerage systems in 18 cities of an estimated cost of $6,224,000		5,500
Export-Import Bank loans (as of Apr. 30, 1963):		
Ministry of Development (Government of Ecuador): U.S. dairy and meat cattle breeding stock		500
Republic of Ecuador: Navigation and communicating equipment for Quito and Guayaquil Airport		793

OTHER

	Fiscal year 1962	Fiscal year 1963
Supporting assistance:		
Budget support loan [1]	8,000	7,000
Emergency public safety [1]	33	
Public Law 480:		
Title II: Bread grains, milk products, coarse grains, fats and oils	257	1,375
Title III; Beans, cornmeal, butter, cheese, milk, bulgur, vegetable oil, and flour	1,858	3,175
Title IV: Bread grains, cotton, vegetable oil, and tobacco		3,800
Peace Corps (as of Apr. 30, 1963): Community development, regional development, agricultural extension, physical education, school construction, credit union and cooperatives, and university education	800	600

[1] Contingency fund.

EL SALVADOR

[Obligations in thousands of dollars]

Development grants	Fiscal year 1962	Fiscal year 1963, estimated
Increased agricultural production	363	395
Industrial advisory services	95	145
Technical labor services	182	145
Public health centers	150	
Public health service	87	50
SCISP administration	33	
Malaria eradication		200
Remote area health		100
School construction	1,505	25
Teacher training	13	980
University education	58	50
Public safety	105	360
Public administration and economic advisory service	55	75
Economic Planning Commission	459	185
Cadastral survey	18	
Social services	39	25
Urban facilities planning	30	30
Technical support	129	185

LOAN AUTHORIZATIONS

[In thousands of dollars]

	Fiscal year 1962	Fiscal year 1963
Development loans (as of June 21, 1963):		
Airport		800
Agricultural credit		8,900
Primary school construction		2,400
Social progress trust fund loans (as of May 31, 1963):		
Banco Central de Reserva de El Salvador (Republic of El Salvador): For relending to small farmers for development of agriculture and animal husbandry of an estimated cost of $2,800,000	2,000	
Banco Central de Reserva de El Salvador (Republic of El Salvador): Financing the expansion and improvement of sewerage systems of 5 cities of an estimated cost of $1,400,000	840	
Banco Central de Reserva de El Salvador (Republic of El Salvador): Financing the expansion and improvement of potable water and sewerage systems in 34 towns of an estimated cost of $3,830,000	2,700	
Instituto de Vivienda Urbana (Republic of El Salvador): Construction of housing for families of low income of an estimated cost of $11,300,000	6,100	
Export-Import Bank loans (as of Apr. 30, 1963): Banco Central de Reserva, capital goods	6,000	

OTHER

[In thousands of dollars]

	Fiscal year 1962	Fiscal year 1963
Public Law 480:		
Title II: Bread grains, milk, fats and oils, wheat flour		2,575
Title III: Beans, butter, milk, corn, cornmeal, flour, vegetable oil	276	3,400
Title IV: Wheat, flour, dairy products	2,000	400
Peace Corps (as of Apr. 30, 1963): Agricultural extension and vocational agriculture, and rural community action	200	100

GUATEMALA

[Obligations in thousands of dollars]

Development grants	Fiscal year 1962	Fiscal year 1963, estimated
Agricultural research	80	
Agricultural mechanization	14	
Agricultural extension	310	
Agricultural diversification	1,090	390
Rubber and complementary crops development	26	
Industrial development	238	170
Health cooperative service	217	
Administration	40	
Malaria eradication	517	585
Environmental sanitation	57	
Health advisory service	24	
Education cooperative service	279	
Vocational training	56	220
Mass education	242	570
Vocational education	86	
Education administration	43	
Rural education	84	
Urban education	92	
Public safety division	77	215
Public administration	677	250
Housing program	66	7
Rural development	50	
Technical support	185	255

LOAN AUTHORIZATIONS

Development loans (as of June 21, 1963): American School		700
Social Progress Trust Fund loans (as of May 31, 1963):		
Banco de Guatemala: Financing of approximately 82 water supply and sewerage systems of an estimated cost of $5,150,000	3,500	
Banco de Guatemala: Financing of housing for low-income families of an estimated cost of $10,740,000		5,300
Republic of Guatemala: Financing a rural credit program for low-income farmers of an estimated cost of $3,500,000		2,500

OTHER

Public Law 480:		
Title II: Wheat, flour, milk, vegetable oil, cornmeal, bulgur		180
Title III: Beans, milk, bulgur, cornmeal flour, vegetable oil	651	1,380
Peace Corps (as of Apr. 30, 1963): Rural extension, rural community action and urban community action (school feeding)	900	500

HAITI

[Obligations in thousands of dollars]

Development grants	Fiscal year 1962	Fiscal year 1963, estimated
Technical support, Pote Cole	25	

OTHER

[In thousands of dollars]

	Fiscal year 1962	Fiscal year 1963
Supporting assistance:		
Technical advisory assistance to Department of Public Works	465	35
Cooperative service in public works	42	--------
Rural credit	220	10
Technical advisory assistance in agriculture	2,788	315
Cooperative service in agriculture	159	--------
Malaria eradication	943	1,340
Technical assistance: Public Health	149	100
Cooperative service: Health and Welfare	112	--------
Adult literacy	98	--------
Rural education	1,528	95
Cooperative service: Education	120	--------
Technical assistance to the Minister of Finance	89	35
HADO Central Office: Administration budget	70	--------
Communications media services	46	--------
Technical support	242	300
Jet airport construction loan	--------	2,800
Public Law 480, title III: Cornmeal, flour, vegetable oil, beans, butter, cheese, milk, bulgur	742	1,265

HONDURAS

[Obligations in thousands of dollars]

Development grants	Fiscal year 1962	Fiscal year 1963 (estimated)
Agricultural cooperative service	200	200
Human and institutional development in agriculture	176	205
Production development agriculture	141	100
Rural development	--------	70
Industry management and development	158	220
Equipment and management operation	72	--------
Consultant in civil aviation	120	--------
Training at IAGS School	3	--------
Labor and trade union leadership	46	50
Health cooperative service	33	30
Malaria eradication	418	410
Assistance to water authority	40	30
Health facilities	45	100
Health training and education	37	45
Health administration	38	40
Education cooperative service	150	150
Vocational education	106	265
General education	184	300
Aid to self-help school construction	22	630
School construction equipment and supply	500	--------
Public safety	61	135
Public administration	261	110
Technical support	85	100
Dependent schools for construction	33	--------
Engineering construction unit	--------	75

LOAN AUTHORIZATIONS

[In thousands of dollars]

Development loans (as of June 21, 1963):		
Self-help school construction (IAPSP funds) (approved in fiscal year 1962 but carried as part of fiscal year 1963 program)	--------	600
Water systems (IAPSP funds)	--------	1,050
Social progress trust fund loans (as of May 31, 1963):		
Banco Nacional de Fomento (Banco Central de Honduras): Financing a program of rural credit of an estimated cost of $3,575,000	--------	2,500
Instituto de la Vivienda (Republic of Honduras): Financing construction of housing for low-income families of an estimated cost of $1,469,000	--------	1,000
Servicio Autonomo Nacional de Acueductos y Alcantarillados (Republic of Honduras): Financing the improvement of the water supply system in the city of Tegucigalpa of an estimated cost of $2,700,000	--------	2,150

OTHER

	Fiscal year 1962	Fiscal year 1963
Supporting assistance:		
Emergency disaster relief [1]	25	--------
Tela, Union housing loan	--------	400
Public Law 480, Title III: Beans, milk, flour, vegetable oil, bulgur, and cornmeal	224	370
Peace Corps (as of Apr. 30, 1963): Health and social service and rural community action	--------	100

[1] Contingency fund.

JAMAICA

[Obligations in thousands of dollars]

Development grants	Fiscal year 1962	Fiscal year 1963 estimated
Agricultural and rural development	284	150
Industry service	59	70
Jamaica malaria eradication program	15	45
Establishment of pilot water supply system at Annotto Bay	95	--------
First phase AIWA community water supply construction program	93	100
Health planning service	54	35
Trade and industrial education	90	100
Teacher training facilities	120	--------
Low-cost housing	141	100
Technical support	99	80
Independence scholarships	--------	75
Labor training center	--------	180

LOAN AUTHORIZATIONS

[In thousands of dollars]

	Fiscal year 1962	Fiscal year 1963
Development loans (as of June 21, 1963):		
Water supply system (IAPSP funds) (approved in fiscal year 1962 but carried as part of fiscal year 1963 program)	--------	2,200
Low-cost housing (IAPSP funds)	--------	1,700
Export-Import Bank loans (as of Apr. 30, 1963): Development Finance Corporation: Subloans to private enterprise	--------	5,000

OTHER

Public Law 480: Title III: Cornmeal, flour, vegetable oil, beans, butter, cheese, milk, bulgur	832	2,090
Peace Corps (as of Apr. 30, 1963)	200	100

MEXICO

[Obligations in thousands of dollars]

Development grants	Fiscal year 1962	Fiscal year 1963, estimated
Bureau of Mines	42	--------
Geological Survey	63	--------
Industrial development	333	120
Industrial diagnostic survey	65	--------
Labor union training teams	37	2
Vocational rehabilitation	53	30
Institute of Public Administration	50	70
Technical support	62	170

LOAN AUTHORIZATIONS

[In thousands of dollars]

	Fiscal year 1962	Fiscal year 1963
Development loans (as of June 21, 1963): Supervised agricultural credit	20,000	--------

LOAN AUTHORIZATIONS—Continued

[In thousands of dollars]

	Fiscal year 1962	Fiscal year 1963
Social Progress Trust Fund loans (as of May 31, 1963):		
Nacional Financiera, S.A. (Government of Mexico): Water supply service for 12 cities in the State of Yucatan of an estimated cost of $15,280,000	9,200	--------
Nacional Financiera, S.A. (United States of Mexico): Improved use of farmlands of an estimated cost of $2,448,000	1,000	--------
Instituto Mexicano de Investigaciones Tecnologicas, A.C. (Nacional Financiera S.A.): To acquire technological equipment for experimentation and laboratory equipment of an estimated cost of $400,000	400	--------
Nacional Financiera, S.A. (United States of Mexico): Financing the improved use of land in the Lerma-Chapala-Santiago Valley of an estimated cost of $6,000,000	--------	3,000
Export-Import Bank loans (as of Apr. 30, 1963):		
Cia Fundidora de Monterrey: U.S. steel mill equipment	3,000	--------
Nacional Financiera, S.A.: Refinance U.S. purchases	90,000	--------
Altos Hornos de Mexico: Expansion, steel mill	1,850	--------
Nacional Financiera, S.A.: National Railways program	10,458	--------
Compania General de Aceptaciones, S.A.: Machinery, equipment, and services for various enterprises	--------	2,000
Nacional Financiera, S.A. (United Mexican States): Machinery, equipment, and services for construction of dairy pasteurization plants	--------	2,900

OTHER

Public Law 480:		
Title III: Beans, butter, milk, bulgur, corn, flour, cornmeal, vegetable oil	5,143	17,235
Title II: Wheat, flour, milk, corn, vegetable oil	--------	1,270

NICARAGUA

[Obligations in thousands of dollars]

Development grants	Fiscal year 1962	Fiscal year 1963, estimated
Agriculture research and extension	4	--------
Agricultural sector planning	128	180
Agriculture, forestry	19	--------
Agriculture, co-ops (rural cooperative development)	--------	65
Industrial development and management	101	140
Cartographic and physical planning	61	--------
Transportation, highways	19	--------
Civil aviation	49	10
Manpower development	28	20
Malaria eradication	316	430
Environmental sanitation	53	25
Rio Coco emergency health project	77	20
Development of health services	206	140
Establishment of administration structure and practices in Ministry of Public Health	1	--------
Vocational and industrial arts	23	--------
Elementary education	1,223	425
Ministry of Education Planning	26	--------
American-Nicaraguan School	--------	200
Public administration reform	60	110
National census	7	515
National planning office	53	85
Comprehensive physical planning	7	--------
Aided self-help housing	2	10
Cooperative service, Nicaraguan-American Technical Cooperation Organization	75	45
Administration, ONACT	35	45
Technical support	77	140

LOAN AUTHORIZATIONS

[In thousands of dollars]

	Fiscal year 1962	Fiscal year 1963
Development loans (as of June 21, 1963):		
Elementary education (IAPSP funds)	540	
Highway construction	900	
Social progress trust fund loans (as of May 31, 1963):		
Instituto Nicaragüense de la Vivienda: Construction of housing for families of low income of an estimated cost of $7,789,000	5,200	
Banco Nacional de Nicaragua: Rural credit for farmers of low income of an estimated cost of $4,033,000	2,500	

OTHER

Public Law 480: Title III: Beans, butter, cheese, milk, corn, cornmeal, flour, and vegetable oil	673	1,800

PANAMA

[Obligations in thousands of dollars]

Development grants	Fiscal year 1962	Fiscal year 1963, estimated
Agricultural research, education, and extension	153	
Crop and livestock development	72	
Agricultural economics and planning	41	
Agricultural development and production		370
Cooperative service:		
Agriculture	155	
Administration	41	
Natural resources	27	
Water resources and electric power	86	110
Assistance to Industrial Development Center	101	130
Assistance to industry development	61	
Operation and maintenance of roads	145	285
Tambo-Salud (Cocle) road survey and design	40	
Civil aviation development	47	
General engineering services	27	
Nursing education	50	
Development of intergrade health services and sanitation in rural areas		115
Aguadulce regional and Los Santos psychiatric hospitals design	35	
Cooperative service:		
Health	105	
Administration	30	
Vocational education	275	160
Teacher training	365	200
University of Panama: Teaching and research	300	
National school construction	49	280
Cooperative service: Education administration	53	
Public safety improvement	27	130
Government management and administration	53	70
National economic planning	20	110
Community development	39	
Housing development program	30	50
All other training	23	65
Technical support	149	335

LOAN AUTHORIZATIONS

[In thousands of dollars]

	Fiscal year 1962	Fiscal year 1963
Development loans (as of June 21, 1963): Water sewage systems		6,000
Social progress trust fund loans (as of May 31, 1963):		
Instituto de Vivienda y Urbanismo (Republic of Panama): Financing housing for persons of low income of an estimated cost of $10,444,917	7,600	
Instituto de Acueductos y Alcantarillados Nacionales (Republic of Panama): Financing of water supply systems for 7 cities of an estimated cost of $3,835,000	2,762	
Export-Import Bank loans (as of Apr. 30, 1963):		
Republic of Panama:		
Refuse collection equipment	420	
Highway equipment	1,580	

OTHER

	Fiscal year 1962	Fiscal year 1963
Supporting assistance:		
Aerial photography and mapping [1]	1,000	
Agricultural development and production [1]	500	
Minerals resources survey [1]	161	
Technical studies for hydroelectrical development of the Bayano River [1]	325	
Water resources and electric power [1]	284	
Assistance to industrial development center [1]	16	
Operation and maintenance of roads [1]	500	
Cocle road survey and design [1]	200	
Colon sewer system development [1]	114	
Development of intergrade health services and sanitation in rural areas [1]	950	
Aguadulce regional and Los Santos psychiatric hospitals design [1]	200	
National school construction [1]	5,000	
National economic planning [1]	150	
Housing development program [1]	500	
Public Law 480: Title III—Milk, cornmeal, flour, vegetable oil	394	900
Peace Corps (as of Apr. 30, 1963):		
Health, agricultural, and cooperative development		300

[1] Contingency fund.

PARAGUAY

[Obligations in thousands of dollars]

Development grants	Fiscal year 1962	Fiscal year 1963, estimated
Cooperative service for agriculture	163	165
Agricultural development and productivity	135	200
Agricultural education	39	25
Credit cooperatives and marketing	10	65
Forestry	26	20
Administration: Agriculture	52	50
Industrial development	5	315
Road construction and maintenance training	212	315
Roadbuilding equipment		450
Cooperative public health service	85	
Health services development	99	220
Medical and nurses education	109	275
Admin stration: Health	51	
Cooperative service: Education	17	
Vocational education	18	
Elementary teacher education	65	
Rural education development	341	675
Administration: Education	45	
Government management and organization	88	95
Economy policy, planning, and fiscal reform	41	95
Public administration school: Now National University	22	300
Communications media	73	60
Technical support	208	205

LOAN AUTHORIZATIONS

[In thousands of dollars]

Social progress trust fund loans (as of May 31, 1963): Banco Nacional de Fomento (Republic of Paraguay): Financing agricultural credit for low-income farmers, improved land use and development of agricultural marketing facilities of an estimated cost of $4,338,000		2,900

OTHER

Public Law 480:		
Title I: Wheat, flour, bread grains	5,500	5,000
Title III: Beans, milk, bulgur, cornmeal, flour, vegetable oil	988	1,490

PERU

[Obligations in thousands of dollars]

Development grants	Fiscal year 1962	Fiscal year 1963 estimated
Basic agricultural institutional development	1,341	400

PERU—Continued

[Obligations in thousands of dollars]

Development grants	Fiscal year 1962	Fiscal year 1963 (estimated)
Agricultural research	10	
Agricultural research and development	22	
Land development	29	
Livestock development	56	
Agrarian reform	640	20
Agricultural economics	15	
Agricultural credit and cooperatives	17	
Forestry development	36	
Agricultural extension	103	
Administration and General Accounting	2	
Do	2	
U.S. Bureau of Mines	24	
Industrial management	589	65
Private enterprise development	319	100
Civil aviation advisory services	52	
Transportation development	24	120
Labor development	135	260
National employment service	15	
Cooperative employment service	35	
Labor training	72	
Special advisory service	256	
Improvement and expansion of health services	57	155
Health unit operation	24	
Cooperative health and sanitation service	81	
General administration	47	
Industrial training (Peruvian Army)	100	160
Rural elementary education	70	
Improvement and expansion of higher education	9	
Basic educational reform and development program	1,205	25
Cooperative service in education	41	
General administration service	36	
Normal school education	129	
Public safety	54	535
Do	72	
Training and advisory service in public administration	924	55
Government organization and management	38	
National economic planning	529	150
Housing and urban development	326	105
Housing commission	59	
Southern Peru regional development	1,005	120
Miscellaneous training	12	
Administration project	28	
Irrigation engineer	63	
Economic planning	1	
Rural development	2	
Technical support	338	725

LOAN AUTHORIZATIONS

[In thousands of dollars]

	Fiscal year 1962	Fiscal year 1963
Development loans (as of June 21, 1963):		
Lima, water and sewage	8,600	
Feasibility studies	3,000	
Social progress trust fund loans (as of May 31, 1963):		
Republic of Peru, financing housing for persons of low income of an estimated cost of $48,700,000	22,800	
Cooperativa de Credito Central del Peru (Government of Peru), small loans to finance housing, improved land use, and potable water and sanitation of an estimated cost of $2,000,000	1,000	
Asociacion Mutual de Credito para la Vivienda "El Pueblo" (Government of Peru), construction of housing for families of low income of an estimated cost of $2,069,200	1,000	
Universidad Nacional Mayor de San Marcos (Republic of Peru), financing the installation of a department for basic sciences of an estimated cost of $3,002,000		1,500
Export-Import Bank loans (as of Apr. 30, 1963):		
The Peruvian Corp., diesel and locomotive spare parts	1,500	
Ind. Quimas Basicas, equipment to produce fertilizer, etc	508	
Fabrica Alumino Metales, equipment for aluminum fabricating	611	
Republic of Peru, water and sewer facilities	6,500	
Marcona Mining Co., expansion of iron ore facilities	6,000	
Metalurgica Pervara, metallurgical plant	1,950	

LOAN AUTHORIZATIONS—continued

[In thousands of dollars]

	Fiscal year 1962	Fiscal year 1963
Export-Import Bank, etc—Con.		
Marcona Mining Co., expansion of iron ore beneficiation program		1,250
Peruvian Corp., Ltd., diesel electric locomotive and relating parts		4,750

OTHER

Supporting assistance: Puno emergency relief loan [1]	6,000	−4,000
Public Law 480:		
Title II: Bread grains, coarse grains, fats and oils, milk	2,335	3,570
Title III: Beans, butter, milk, bulgur, cornmeal, flour, vegetable oil	2,173	14,890
Title IV: Bread grain, feed grain, vegetable oil	2,000	4,000
Peace Corps (as of Apr. 30, 1963): Indian integration, community development, health and sanitation, credit unions, urban community action, savings and loan program. Education: Art foundation; education, university education, and social development	700	1,600

[1] Contingency fund.

TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO, WEST INDIES AND EASTERN CARIBBEAN

[Obligations in thousands of dollars]

Development grants	Fiscal year 1962	Fiscal year 1963, estimated
Agriculture, general	134	120
Handicraft development	17	
Industrial management	9	
Meteorological training	22	
Road development, demonstration and training	48	
Labor training	24	10
Health education	23	
Education:		
General	142	180
Participants	92	15
Economic development and planning	51	30
Public service training forum	36	25
Housing and planning	46	20
Windward Islands, administrative services	21	
Engineering and technical services		55
Technical support	212	200

LOAN AUTHORIZATIONS

[In thousands of dollars]

	Fiscal year 1962	Fiscal year 1963
Export-Import Bank loans (as of April 30, 1963): Government of Trinidad and Tobago: Sewerage system	9,000	

OTHER

Supporting assistance:		
Rural development: St. Lucia	114	
Cocoa processing facilities: St. Lucia	35	
Water and vegetable products: Antigua	3	
Telecommunications adviser	17	45
Electrification survey and transmission line construction: Antigua	71	
Chaguaramas Road	175	2,000
Road equipment: Antigua	147	
Millet Road resurfacing: St. Lucia	90	
Road construction equipment	95	
Airport Pepi fence	121	
Hospital sewage disposal: Antigua	30	
Vocational education	27	
Industrial education: Barbados	22	

OTHER—continued

[In thousands of dollars]

	Fiscal year 1962	Fiscal year 1963
Supporting assistance—Con.		
Teacher training facilities: St. Lucia	38	
Liberal arts college: Trinidad	400	5,000
Teteron Bay facilities	580	
Engineering services	61	75
Fiscal year 1963: May 26 agreement executed between the Governments of Trinidad and Tobago and the United States for a grant of $10,000,000.[1] The local currency generated to be used for Chaguaramas Road and liberal arts college as indicated above. The balance to be used for mutually acceptable activities, such as road development, port engineering, and low-cost housing		3,000
Public Law 480:		
Title II: Coarse grains	8	45
Title III: Milk	361	545
Peace Corps (as of Apr. 30, 1963): Education, recreation, and agriculture: St. Lucia	100	(2)

[1] Contingency fund.
[2] Less than $50,000.

URUGUAY

[Obligations in thousands of dollars]

Development grants	Fiscal year 1962	Fiscal year 1963, estimated
Agricultural education and research	201	
Agricultural natural resources	2	
Assistance in developing agriculture services		1,610
Improving skills and productivity	4	240
Meteorology	4	
Monterrey Institute of Technology	4	
Public safety	3	
Assistance in development planning		190
Contract studies and training for Uruguay planning agency	3	
Assistance in public administration		1
Technical support	57	80

LOAN AUTHORIZATIONS

[In thousands of dollars]

	Fiscal year 1962	Fiscal year 1963
Development loans (as of June 21, 1963): Home construction		6,000
Social progress trust fund loans (as of May 31, 1963):		
Gobierno del Departamento de Montevideo: Financing of sanitation works of an estimated cost of $12,000,000	2,500	
Republic of Uruguay: Construction of housing for low-income families of an estimated cost of $15,301,125		8,000
Export-Import Bank loans (Apr. 30, 1963):		
Republic of Uruguay: Water supply	1,900	
St. Hermanos Uruguay: Coffee manufacturing plant	200	
Banco de la Republica Oriental del Uruguay: Various		5,000

OTHER

Public Law 480:		
Title I: Tobacco	1,900	
Title II: Grains, milk products, fats, and oils		180
Title III: Beans, milk, flour, cornmeal	285	695
Peace Corps (as of Apr. 30, 1963): Agriculture extension: Home economics		(1)

[1] Less than $50,000.

VENEZUELA

[Obligations in thousands of dollars]

Development grants	Fiscal year 1962	Fiscal year 1963, estimated
Rural improvement	9	350
Industrial development	163	
Industrial resources survey	104	
Labor program	52	
National manpower training and development		680
Hospital maintenance advisory services	9	
Hospital construction and equipment	20	
Rural health and environmental sanitation	10	
Vocational education	171	
Rural education	83	
Public safety	27	180
Government management assistance	153	370
Economic planning	45	
Housing	9	95
Technical support	206	345

LOAN AUTHORIZATIONS

[In thousands of dollars]

	Fiscal year 1962	Fiscal year 1963
Development loans (as of June 21, 1963):		
Supervised agricultural credit	10,000	
Slum clearance and low-cost housing		30,000
Social Progress Trust Fund (as of May 31, 1963):		
Banco Obrero de Venezuela (Government of Venezuela): Financing of rural housing for persons of low income through self-help system of an estimated cost of $45,950,000	12,000	
Republic of Venezuela: Financing of potable water systems for 330 towns of an estimated cost of $20,000,000	10,000	
Instituto Nacional de Obras Sanitarias (Government of Venezuela): Financing of potable water system for 55 towns of an estimated cost of $21,000,000	10,000	
Banco Obrero de Venezuela (Government of Venezuela): Construction of housing for families of low income of an estimated cost of $14,025,000	10,000	
Instituto Agrario Nacional (Government of Venezuela): Financing a program of consolidation of rural settlements of an estimated cost of $80,078,580		10,000
Universidad de Oriente, de Venezuela (Corporación Venezolana de Fomento): Financing the development of basic science and technology of an estimated cost of $2,400,000		1,000
Export-Import loans (as of Apr. 30, 1963): C.A. Venezolana de Pulpa y Papel: (Construction of pulp bleaching plant, power transformed substation and steam reduction substation)		450

OTHER

Supporting assistance: Emergency Public Safety [1]		70
Public Law 480:		
Title II: Wheat, cornmeal, flour, milk, and vegetable oil		440
Title III: Cornmeal, flour, beans, milk, bulgur, and vegetable oil	546	1,940
Title IV: Feed grains, cotton, dairy products, rice, and vegetable oil	11,400	11,500
Peace Corps (as of Apr. 30, 1963): YMCA, university education, agricultural extension, secondary school English teaching, and physical education and recreation	600	600

[1] Contingency fund.

ROCAP

[Obligations in thousands of dollars]

Development grants	Fiscal year 1962	Fiscal year 1963, estimated
Physical planning infrastructure		200
Manpower inventory and training		155
Census		365
Cadastral survey		620
Overall regional planning		105
Public administration		130
Higher education		580
Textbook production		510
Industrial productivity and management		240
Agricultural sector planning		3
Mobile rural health		1,550
Civil aviation		400
Technical support		240

LOAN AUTHORIZATIONS

[In thousands of dollars]

	Fiscal year 1962	Fiscal year 1963
Development loans (as of June 21, 1963): Central American Bank, for economic integration feasibility studies		2,500
Social progress trust fund loans (as of May 31, 1963): Universities of Costa Rica, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua (Governments of Costa Rica, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua): Financing a program of development of basic sciences of an estimated cost of $10,833,000		2,925

REGIONAL

[Obligations in thousands of dollars]

Development grants	Fiscal year 1962	Fiscal year 1963, estimated
Agriculture leadership training (farmer's union)	162	165
Aviation (Panama)	168	
Labor society development	250	
Malaria eradication (Peru)	23	
Water supply (Peru)	13	
Regional health consultant (Jamaica)	29	
Higher education (Costa Rica)	2	
Police Academy (Panama)	266	600
Public administration adviser on tax (Panama)	18	
Regional public consultant (Peru)	15	
Public administration (Peru)	23	
Regional housing (Nicaragua)	37	
Credit union training	160	
Regional Andean center (Peru)	105	40
Support of statistical work of permanent secretariat (Guatemala)	45	
Technical aids center (Mexico)	400	825
U.S. book exchange	90	80
Cooperative training (Puerto Rico)	606	
Marketing seminar (Brazil)	10	
Regional workshop (Costa Rica)	46	
Seminars and workshops	62	25
Technical consultants and audiovisual support	161	
3d country training (Mexico)	94	
Teacher training		350
Science books		250
Inter-American Institute of Agricultural Sciences		355
American Institute of Free Labor Development		1,110
Civil engineering training		200
Aided self-help housing evaluation		30
Public administration		20
Peace Corps: Community development		150
League of Women Voters: Women's leadership training		300
Housing construction statistics		160
Development of commercial standards		200
National Science Foundation: Summer Teacher Institute in Science and mathematics		400
Puerto Rico, labor statistics training		80
Water Supply: Management training		65
National Rural Electric: Co-ops		150
National Academy of Science		285
Committee for Higher Education in Latin America Academic Journals		40

REGIONAL—Continued

[Obligations in thousands of dollars]

Development grants	Fiscal year 1962	Fiscal year 1963, estimated
Inter-American Center, Loyola: Leadership for social development		20
Puerto Rico University:		
Labor relations training		80
Medical training		200
Public administration training		50
Rutgers University: Urban problems		20
Tax advisory service		30
Health statistics		50
Mexican book		40
Regional credit union development		200
IAGS: Natural resources survey		50
Urban development		160
Cooperative advisory service for organization of co-ops of Americas		345
Cooperative advisory service for individual co-ops		90
Land-grant college coordination		25
Johns Hopkins: Economics of health planning		30
Census		55
Labor administration seminar		25
Scholarship survey		20
Co-op League: To set up organization of co-ops		30
Pilot food processing survey		15
Housing advisory service		120
Advisory services: Andean Indian development		25
Child feeding		900
HOPE		1,040
OAS:		
European fellowships		610
Technical cooperation program		2,500
Information program		1,600
PAHO		2,300
Civil aviation		200
Commerce advisory committee for the Alliance for Progress		75
SEMLA (center for economic and monetary studies for Latin America)		130

BRITISH GUIANA

[Obligations in thousands of dollars]

Development grants	Fiscal year 1962	Fiscal year 1963, estimated
Shrimp and fisheries	17	10
Agriculture project	117	115
Industrial development advisory service	2	
Road development	31	55
Engineering analysis survey, Berbice River Bar	864	230
Civil aviation	5	5
Trade union seminar	21	2
Filaria control	47	40
Health service training, operation and advisory services	52	200
Vocational education	61	60
Public safety (civil police training)	3	
Public administration, local government	9	20
Town planning and community development	5	20
Government information service	4	
Technical assistance development organization	29	
Technical support	171	150
Hydropower survey		350

BRITISH HONDURAS

[Obligations in thousands of dollars]

Development grants	Fiscal year 1962	Fiscal year 1963 estimated
Agricultural development	69	10
Industrial training	17	
Education—General		25
Vocational training	77	5
Housing development	27	20
Technical support	34	40

OTHER

[In thousands of dollars]

	Fiscal year 1962	Fiscal year 1963
Peace Corps (as of Apr. 30, 1963): Primary, secondary, and vocational education	100	200

SURINAM

[Obligations in thousands of dollars]

Development grants	Fiscal year 1962	Fiscal year 1963, estimated
Agricultural and natural resources	136	120
Industry and mining	13	12
Industrial training (vocational)	21	1
Public health	122	40
Visual aids	12	
Administrative services	17	
Area development	14	
Aided self-help housing	45	
Housing		40
Cooperative service:		
Grant	75	75
Administration		15
Technical support	15	15

OTHER

[In thousands of dollars]

	Fiscal year 1962	Fiscal year 1963
Public Law 480: Title III—Cornmeal, flour, vegetable oil	61	95

YUGOSLAVIA

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed at this point in my remarks a very excellent editorial entitled "Ambivalence on Yugoslavia" published in today's issue of the New York Times.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

AMBIVALENCE ON YUGOSLAVIA

George F. Kennan's statement on his unhappy experiences as American Ambassador in Belgrade reminds us once again of the schizophrenia in this country's policy toward Yugoslavia. Since 1950, under both Democratic and Republican Presidents, the official attitude of the White House toward Yugoslavia has been one of friendship, an attitude reflected tangibly by hundreds of millions of dollars of economic and military aid as well as, most recently, by the reception of President Tito by President Kennedy in Washington.

In contrast, Congress has seemed to be tending toward a policy almost of vendetta against Yugoslavia. Last year it asked for an end to Yugoslavia's most-favored-nation status. If the President had acted on this proposal—he has successfully resisted it thus far—the result would have been a doubling or tripling of American tariffs against more than three-quarters of the commodities we buy from the Yugoslavs. Trade in both directions would have been disrupted. This year the House has already rejected President Kennedy's request for a reversal of last year's directive; unless the Senate backs him up, he will doubtless have to accede to this unwise policy in the coming months.

The Congressmen pushing for maximum enmity against Yugoslavia are engaged in a primitive anticommunism which refuses to

make distinctions or to understand subtleties, in a spirit reminiscent of the old frontiersmen's motto, "The only good Indian is a dead Indian." Presidents Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy have all understood that Yugoslav communism is a very different thing from Soviet or Chinese communism, and that Belgrade—since it broke with Moscow in 1948—has been no threat to the United States. If the Communist bloc is today in disarray, it is in no small measure related to the Yugoslav stand against Stalinist dictation.

Friendship with Yugoslavia serves American interests today as it has for over a decade. We fail to see why Congress cannot understand a policy line that has been fruitful for many years—the repudiation of which would surely drive Belgrade closer than ever to Moscow.

RECESS

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, if there is no further business to come before the Senate, I move that the Senate stand in recess until 12 o'clock noon tomorrow.

The motion was agreed to; and (at 5 o'clock and 19 minutes p.m.) the Senate took a recess until tomorrow, Wednesday, November 6, 1963, at 12 o'clock meridian.

NOMINATIONS

Executive nominations received by the Senate November 5 (legislative day of October 22), 1963:

IN THE ARMY

The following-named officers for temporary appointment in the Army of the United States to the grades indicated, under the provisions of title 10, United States Code, sections 3442 and 3447:

To be major generals

Brig. Gen. Robert Howard York, O21341, Army of the United States (colonel, U.S. Army).

Brig. Gen. Harry William Osborn Kinnard, O21990, Army of the United States (lieutenant colonel, U.S. Army).

Brig. Gen. Charles Edward Johnson, 3d, O19534, U.S. Army.

Brig. Gen. George Paul Sampson, O42926, U.S. Army.

Brig. Gen. William Carl Garrison, O30144, U.S. Army.

Brig. Gen. John Graham Zierdt, O20632, Army of the United States (colonel, U.S. Army).

To be brigadier generals

Col. Harry George Woodbury, Jr., O21432, U.S. Army.

Col. Paul Alfred Feyereisen, O39089, Army of the United States (lieutenant colonel, U.S. Army).

Col. Byron Ludwig Steger, O19661, Medical Corps, U.S. Army.

Col. Robert Mabry Williams, O21801, Army of the United States (lieutenant colonel, Judge Advocate General's Corps, U.S. Army).

Col. George Bibbs Pickett, Jr., O23932, Army of the United States (lieutenant colonel, U.S. Army).

Col. Richard George Ciccolella, O34117, Army of the United States (lieutenant colonel, U.S. Army).

Col. Charles Allen Corcoran, O31721, Army of the United States (lieutenant colonel, U.S. Army).

Col. Livingston Nelson Taylor, Jr., O21853, Army of the United States (lieutenant colonel, U.S. Army).

Col. John Keith Boles, Jr., O22025, Army of the United Sttaes (lieutenant colonel, U.S. Army).

Col. Joseph Schuyler Hardin, O23126, Army of the United States (lieutenant colonel, U.S. Army).

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 6, 1963

The House met at 12 o'clock noon.

The Chaplain, Rev. Bernard Braskamp, D.D., offered the following prayer:

James 5: 16: *The supplication of a righteous man availeth much.*

Almighty God, whose divine will is the supreme and sovereign law of the universe, we acknowledge that we are constrained by Thy love and compelled by our needs to turn to Thee in prayer because we have nowhere else to go and Thou alone canst give us peace and power.

We penitently confess that we are facing difficult tasks and heavy responsibilities which are chastening our spirits and teaching us humility and bringing our minds and hearts down from their pride and complacent self-righteousness.

Grant that we may seek Thee earnestly, beseeching Thee to give us wisdom to understand Thy will, insight to lead us when the way is dark, strength to perform our duties faithfully, and courage to sustain us in times of tragedy and tribulation.

Create within us those desires which Thou dost delight to satisfy for our conscience indicts and convicts us that we are often so self-willed and our wills are not in tune with Thine.

In the name of our blessed Lord we offer our prayers and dedicate our lives. Amen.

THE JOURNAL

The Journal of the proceedings of Monday, November 4, 1963, was read and approved.

MESSAGE FROM THE SENATE

A message from the Senate by Mr. McGown, one of its clerks, announced that the Senate had passed without amendment bills and a concurrent resolution of the House of the following titles:

H.R. 7405. An act to amend the Bretton Woods Agreements Act to authorize the U.S. Governor of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development to vote for an increase in the Bank's authorized capital stock;

H.R. 8821. An act to revise the provisions of law relating to the methods by which amounts made available to the States pursuant to the Temporary Unemployment Compensation Act of 1958 and title XII of the Social Security Act are to be restored to the Treasury; and

H. Con. Res. 223. Concurrent resolution to provide for the printing of 3,000 additional copies of civil rights hearings.

The message also announced that the Senate had passed bills of the following titles, in which the concurrence of the House is requested:

S. 1241. An act to require annual reports instead of quarterly reports under the Reconstruction Finance Corporation Liquidation Act;

S. 1686. An act to amend section 375 of title 28 of the United States Code, relating to the annuities of widows of Supreme Court Justices; and

S. 2228. An act to change the requirements for the annual meeting date for national banks.

The message also announced that the Vice President has appointed Mr. JOHNSTON and Mr. CARLSON members of the Joint Select Committee on the part of the Senate, as provided for in the act of August 5, 1939, entitled "An act to provide for the disposition of certain records of the U.S. Government," for the disposition of executive papers referred to in the report of the Archivist of the United States numbered 64–6.

VENUE IN TORT CLAIMS

The SPEAKER laid before the House the following request from the Senate:

Ordered, That the Secretary of the Senate request the House of Representatives to return to the Senate the bill (H.R. 2985) entitled "An act to amend section 1391 of title 28 of the United States Code, relating to venue generally" together with all accompanying papers.

The SPEAKER. Without objection, the request is granted.

There was no objection.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

ELECTION OF HON. JOHN F. SHELLEY AS MAYOR OF SAN FRANCISCO

Mr. MILLER of California. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to address the House for 1 minute.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from California?

There was no objection.

Mr. MILLER of California. Mr. Speaker, I know the Members of the House of Representatives will be very happy to learn that our colleague, the gentleman from California, Mr. JACK SHELLEY, has been elected mayor of the city of San Francisco. The vote was 120,000 to 81,000. In spite of the fact that JACK had to fight an uphill battle because he had none of the local newspapers with him. The vote was heavy; over 70 percent of it turned out.

FREE WORLD SHIPS CALLING ON COMMUNIST CUBA'S PORTS

Mr. ROGERS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend my remarks.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Florida?

There was no objection.

Mr. ROGERS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I have long been concerned over the number of free world ships calling on Communist Cuba's ports. I have repeat-