"He (President Johnson) complained that during the preceding week the only story to receive significant treatment from the news media was the lighting of the President's Christmas tree. He laid down a law that each member of the group was to produce a 'page one' story every day to describe the administration's accomplishments. He said that he had checked the budget and found that the government was spending a billion dollars on 'people like you.' In departing, he warned: 'We are not going to be paying you on space rates, but we'll be judging you that way.'"

The best hope Ladd sees for insuring accurate and responsible information to Congress and the people from the executive branch of government is a partnership between the people ("who can vigorously and angrily express their disapproval when the government is caught in a lie or when the truth is withheld") and the news media ("if they will be more attentive to their independent watch-dog role.")

But fundamentally the responsibility is that of the citizens: "In the last analysis, the solution for correcting the ills of democracy is more democracy. Those who say nothing can be done are clearly wrong."

[From the Omaha (Nebr.) World-Herald, Mar. 3, 1968]

A STUDY IN DEPTH OF THE CREDIBILITY GAP

("Crisis in Credibility" by Bruce Ladd, (New American Library, 247 pages, $5.50.))

("Kennedy and Johnson" by Evelyn Lincoln (Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 207 pages, $4.95.))

Hugh Sidey, the White House correspondent of Time, speaking in Omaha recently, characterized President Johnson as a "devious, vain and mean man." The President, he added, sometimes sees things as he wants them to be, not as they actually are. This, Sidey said, is one reason many Americans have come to distrust the President's words.

Both Bruce Ladd, in his thoroughly documented study of the "credibility gap," and Mrs. Lincoln, in a further memoir, support that estimate of the President in particular and the United States Government in general.

Ladd's credentials are excellent. He has been a newspaperman, press secretary to Senator Charles H. Percy of Illinois, assistant to Representative Donald Rumsfeld of Illinois, and is a lecturer at the Washington Journalism Center. Mrs. Lincoln, of course, was John F. Kennedy's personal secretary for many years.

So far as I know, Ladd's is the first study in depth of our Government's "news management" and, Ladd says, "outright lying." His method is to take the official statements of our leaders on a given subject and then contrast them with their later statements and with departmental announcements, and confirmed news reports that show beyond question that the original intent was to mislead the American people.

Ladd plays no favorites. He is as punishing and uncompromising with President Eisenhower on the U-2 spy plane as he is with President Kennedy on the Bay of Pigs fiasco and President Johnson on the Dominican brouhaha and Vietnam. None of it is pretty and most of it is appalling. After pondering this study you may well be in the uncomfortable position of refusing to believe anything any Federal official from the President on down says about anything.

It would be an injustice to Ladd's closely reasoned study to attempt an analysis in the space available here, but I hope you will take my word for it that his book is worth reading. It has drive and substance and, in a Presidential election year, it has, it seems to me, great importance.

Mrs. Lincoln's book is of a different kidney entirely. It is readable but woefully slight. Indeed, I suspect it is made up of what was left over in notes and memories from her fine "My Twelve Years With John F. Kennedy" of 1965.

Its only importance is the light it casts on Lyndon Johnson as Vice-Presidential candidate and Vice-President under JFK. It examines in some detail President Johnson's vanity, the dodges he employed in wanting to seem close to President Kennedy, his humorous attempts to share Kennedy's plane after repeated rebuffs, his total failure as legislative leader during the "rump" Congress and his almost ludicrous attempts to make it look like Kennedy had begged him to be his running mate in 1962.

The only real revelation in Mrs. Lincoln's book is her statement that Kennedy had decided to discard Johnson in 1964. Robert Kennedy denied this the other day. With "Crisis in Credibility" still fresh in my mind, I'll string along with Mrs. Lincoln.

Retirement of Fred W. Dumschott

HON. JOSEPH D. TYDINGS

OF MARYLAND

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

Wednesday, April 17, 1968

Mr. TYDINGS. Mr. President, citizens of Chestertown, Md., and associates of Washington College recently honored a distinguished Marylander for his 45 years of devoted service to college and community.

Fred W. "Dutch" Dumschott is this distinguished citizen, who is retiring as business manager and treasurer of Washington College.

The Kent County News recently published an editorial in tribute to Mr. Dumschott. I ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

THE OLD, THE NEW

The testimonial dinner for Fred W. "Dutch" Dumschott, for more than 45 years of devoted service to Washington College and the community of Chestertown, takes on added significance—last Saturady, his request for retirement in June, was granted by the Board of Visitors and Governors of Washington College.

Fortunately, for the College, at least, his retirement will not be complete. He is relinquishing the burdens of business manager and treasurer but will continue in an advisory capacity as vice president for finance and retain his position as secretary to the governing board.

For fear of encroaching upon the program with which he will be feted on April 6, no attempt will be made to chronicle here the many and varied services "Dutch" has contributed to the community, above and beyond his duties at the College. Retiring by nature—certainly not a publicity-seeker—many of his noteworthy services have gone unnoticed by the public at large.

There is a bright side, though. The curtailment of his activities at the College will enable him, it is hoped, to give even more time to community affairs.

Mr. Dumschott had the pleasure on Saturday of hearing his recommendation for his successor as business manager and treasurer at the College accepted. Taking over those duties will be the present bursar, Robert C. Simmonds. He will carry with him the best wishes of all who have an interest in the College with the prime hope that he will do as well in the positions as his predecessor over the past quarter of a century.

The "Pueblo"—How Long, Mr. President?

HON. WILLIAM J. SCHERLE

OF IOWA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, April 17, 1968

Mr. SCHERLE. Mr. Speaker, this is the 86th day the U.S.S. *Pueblo* and her crew have been in North Korean hands.

SENATE—*Thursday, April 18, 1968*

(Legislative day of Wednesday, April 17, 1968)

The Senate met at 10 o'clock a.m., on the expiration of the recess, and was called to order by the President pro tempore.

Rev. Edward B. Lewis, D.D., pastor, Capitol Hill Methodist Church, Washington, D.C., offered the following prayer:

Eternal Father, we come to Thee who art the true guide of all who put their trust in Thee. We need the faith that we are truly in Thy gracious keeping. Guide us as we daily come to the crossroads of good and evil. Help us in our choosing. Provide us with direction into paths of right, truth, and love.

Give to the President, and all worthy leaders, understanding in dealing with present crises. Inspire them with calmness and self-control. Direct them in their thinking as they endure stress and strain. Open their hearts to know that Thy love is equal to their deepest needs. Give them strength that matches their heaviest burden. Enlarge their vision in receiving divine light for the darkest valley of decision. May they quietly rest in the knowledge of the Psalmist that *God is our refuge and strength, a very present help in time of trouble.*

So may this world, O Lord, find new confidence and peace. We pray in the name of the Prince of Peace. Amen.

THE JOURNAL

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Journal of the proceedings of Wednesday, April 17, 1968, be approved.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

ORDER OF BUSINESS

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, if the distinguished Senator from Maine will allow me to proceed for 1 minute, before she is recognized under the order of yesterday, I would appreciate it.

AUTHENTICATED U.S. GOVERNMENT INFORMATION GPO

LEGISLATIVE PROGRAM

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, for the information of the Senate, I wish to state again that there may very well be votes every day for the remainder of this week; that it is the intention of the leadership to try to move legislation as efficiently and as expeditiously as possible; and that it is not the intention of the leadership to go out of its way to try to comply with the particular wishes of individual Members so far as legislation is concerned. Legislation comes first. I simply want the membership to again be aware of that fact.

Mr. President, it was thought that after the completion of action on the pending measure, it would be possible to take up the safe streets and omnibus crime bill. Unfortunately, that matter once again has been delayed in the committee. My understanding is that the difficulty lies in the matter of gun legislation. I would urge the Committee on the Judiciary to meet at the earliest possible opportunity to report this bill. If there are any differences, they can be settled on the floor; because I am quite sure that amendments in that category will be offered when the matter is up for discussion before the Senate.

However, until that measure is reported, it is the intention to follow the pending bill with H.R. 14940, an act to amend the Arms Control and Disarmament Act; then H.R. 10477, an act to amend chapter 37 of title 38 of the United States Code to liberalize the guarantee entitlement and reasonable value requirement for home loans and for other purposes; and then will be considered S. 1401, a bill to amend title I of the Land and Water Conservation Fund Act of 1965, and for other purposes.

Of necessity some flexibility is, of course, retained in this announcement; but I wanted to put the Senate on notice that there will be votes and there will be business.

Finally, I hope very much that matters of prime import will be reported by the committees as expeditiously as possible, and I would appreciate all Senators being here and ready to vote from now on out.

ORDER OF BUSINESS

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Under the previous order, the Chair recognizes the Senator from Maine [Mrs. SMITH].

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will the Senator yield, without losing the right to the floor?

Mrs. SMITH. I yield.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. BARTLETT in the chair). The clerk will call the roll.

The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

AUTHORIZATION FOR MILITARY PROCUREMENT, 1969

The Senate resumed the consideration of the bill (S. 3293) to authorize appropriations during the fiscal year 1969 for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, and tracked combat vehicles, research, development, test, and evaluation for the Armed Forces, and to prescribe the authorized personnel strength of the Selected Reserve of each Reserve component of the Armed Forces, and for other purposes.

Mrs. SMITH. Mr. President, the product of any parliamentary body or unit is rarely exactly what any member of that body would recommend if the member had the power to make the decisions wholly in accordance with his own views. I support the pending authorization bill although it contains some authorizations about which I have reservations and it does not contain some programs I should like to see included.

Perhaps my greatest concern about the bill is that it contemplates production and deployment of an antiballistic missile defense system that is intended to protect the United States against a ballistic missile attack from Red China or other nations, but not the Soviet Union. If it were practical to deploy a system that would defend against an attack of the kind the Soviet Union could launch, I would enthusiastically support it. But when the United States is relying upon the certainty of devastating retaliation in order to deter an attack from the Soviet Union, it makes little sense to me to deploy a ballistic missile defense system against Red China, which could have over the next 10 years, at least, only a small part of the destructive power that the Soviet Union now possesses. One observer referred to this system as being an "anti-Republican missile defense system." I do not like to think that the executive branch would waste the $5 to $6 billion that the installation of this system will cost merely to avoid a response on the merits to charges that the United States is without ballistic missile defense. I still hope that there may be a reconsideration of this decision before a substantial part of the $5 to $6 billion is committed.

My own opinion is that it would be preferable not to reduce the research and development authorization by $240 million. In saying this I well know that not all the research and development program is productive. In fact, from the information I have, I strongly suspect that the Department has overdone and is overdoing the practice of contracting for its thinking. The justification material supporting the request for some of the studies and analyses is not overpowering in its persuasion. One wonders whether all these reports and analyses are read by any official with the authority to execute any changes they recommend.

But even with this reservation, I still think it is of surpassing importance for our military departments and defense agencies to maintain a vigorous research and development program. I must say that the results of the research and development efforts funded by the Department of Defense over the last few years have seemed disproportionately small in relation to the cost. Yet I continue to believe that our military preparedness depends so heavily on the investment in research and development that I am reluctant to risk the consequences of inadequate funding.

Another program for which I have little enthusiasm is the one for the construction of as many as 30 fast deployment logistic ships. Last year I strongly favored the committee's action in disapproving the authorization for this class of vessels because I was unconvinced of the need and because I thought that if the ships are to be constructed existing shipbuilding capacity should be improved and used instead of the Department's subsidizing the construction of new shipbuilding facilities through this program. My position on the FDL's is in part a reflection of my belief that the defense doctrine and programs for the past few years have been excessively preoccupied with creating forces to fight a conventional ground war. It has seemed to me that the United States is severely disadvantaged in trying to supply troops for conventional wars all over the globe. I should prefer to see the emphasis placed on air and sea power, areas in which our technological superiority might be brought to bear.

Again this year the former Secretary of Defense took great pride in pointing out his reduction of more than $21 billion in the new obligational authority requested by the military departments and the defense agencies. These reductions were made all right, but no one should deceive himself that they were possible because of management genius or superior wisdom. The reductions were made possible largely by stretchouts, cutbacks, and cancellations. One of many examples I could cite is that this year the nuclear-powered attack carrier for the Navy is not being fully funded, as has been the practice over the last two decades. Instead, the pending bill contains the second downpayment on the carrier, with the major part of the funding postponed until next year. As time goes by I fear that much of the claimed economy and efficiency in the operation of the Department of Defense will prove to be merely deferrals and postponements or charges to future years.

The new Secretary of Defense has my good wishes and sympathy. He has my sympathy because of the heritage bequeathed to him by his predecessor. It is a heritage of cost effectiveness that has produced some tragedies that are now haunting this Nation and will haunt it even more in the years ahead.

Let me list but a few of those tragedies.

RESERVES

Pentagon policies on the Reserve since mid-December 1964 have resulted in undermining and weakening the Reserve. The attempt to push the illegal proposed merger of the Reserve and National Guard—without legislation—down the throat of the Congress fortunately was blocked by the efforts of such leaders as

the acting chairman of this committee and Representatives HÉBERT and RIVERS in the House of Representatives. Had the proposed plan gone through, the Army Reserve would have ceased to exist as an organization having any units since all units would have been assigned to the Army National Guard. Even though the Congress fortunately blocked this tragic proposal, the proposal nevertheless not only undermined the morale of the Reserve but put the Reserve organization and training in disastrous limbo for far too long. The harmful results still linger.

Not only did Congress prevent the merger, but permanent legislation was enacted as a part of H.R. 2 to preclude any future merger since the Army Reserve must consist in part of units organized to serve as such. Title IV of the bill now before the Senate represents the first response to the mandate set forth in H.R. 2 or Public Law 90–168 with a system provided for by permanent law under which the Congress through the authorizing committees will annually review and authorize the strengths of the Selected Reserve of each of our Reserve components.

TFX–F–111

This is the only genuinely new weapon system instituted in the past 7 years—all others, Minuteman II, Poseidon, Mirv, and so forth, are product improvements at best and not new weapons systems as such. Iron-handed insistence upon a single aircraft to perform the incompatible missions of the Air Force for a supersonic, on-the-deck attack bomber—nuclear—and of the Navy for a highly maneuverable but long loitering fighter for defense of the fleet, resulted in the F–111B for the Navy which they did not want and could not use but were forced to accept under the threat of taking the F–111B or getting nothing. It was up to the Congress to scrub the whole Navy project after spending millions upon millions on an abortive program.

A–11 (YF–12A, F–12, SR 71)

Millions were spent on the F–12 development until it was, in effect, canceled this year in the Air Force having failed to request further authorization of $50 million in fiscal year 1969 to keep the project going. The former Secretary of Defense refused to release funds for purposes specified by Congress on the F–12, and thus we lost 2 years in preparing ourselves to meet the vital need of the advanced interceptor. DOD made the decision for a $28-million request to begin to rebuild 238 F–106's even though the Air Force wanted to continue with the F–12. Total cost of rebuilding the already 10-year-old F–106's would approximate $500 million. Again, Congress had to step in to protect the Air Force from itself by refusing to authorize the initial increment of funds for the F–106 project.

B–70

The three airframes actually manufactured on the B–70 were produced at a cost estimated at roughly $1.3 billion—for which we have not received an operationally effective weapon system in return. Yet, the late John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson in the 1960 campaign attacked President Eisenhower for impounding funds for the B–70.

ABM

We are now proceeding on a $5 to $6 billion ABM program that is intended to protect the United States against a missile attack from Red China or other nations, but not the Soviet Union. When the United States is relying upon the certainty of devastating retaliation in order to deter an attack from the Soviet Union, it makes little sense to deploy a ballistic missile defense system against Red China, which could have over the next 10 years, at least, only a small part of the destructive power that the Soviet Union now possesses. There are strong possibilities, if not probabilities, that by the time this so-called thin defense against Red China is completed it will have become obsolete because of the rapidly rate of development of change in the state of the art. This program has strong characteristics of being only a sop to those who have insisted on a full-scale ABM system.

SUBMARINES

Under the cost effectiveness theory, key people making key decisions in the Pentagon rationalize that it is better to build a greater number of slower and more easily detected—louder—submarines than to build faster and quieter submarines because since the slower and louder submarines cost less we can get more of them for the same price as fewer of the faster and quieter submarines. Meanwhile Russia places emphasis on development of the faster and quieter submarines to outclass and outperform ours.

DYNASOAR-MOL

Dynasoar was to have been the next step beyond the reaches of the X–15. It was canceled with the claim that the Manned Orbital Laboratory replaced it. This was a sop to the Air Force on its loss of the Dynasoar program. But now money is being wasted by the duplication of the separate programs on the Air Force and NASA in the field of the MOL.

SKYBOLT

It seems that political considerations motivated the cancellation of this standoff, air-launched ballistic missile, rather than any problems, as it was alleged, in technical feasibility or lax management of the then Douglas Aircraft Co. It was feared that, if developed, we would be dutybound to furnish it to the British for their V-Bomber force and probably lose permissive action link control over the nuclear warheads. We gave them the design for the Polaris submarines instead. A great deal of money was invested in this program and it appeared, just before cancellation, that we would profit immeasurably by it. Now we have gone to the Sram instead—a short range air-to-surface missile that does not follow the difficult-to-defend-against ballistic trajectory.

M–16

This is a national scandal in many respects other than the fact that it jammed frequently. Despite the award of contracts to Colt Firearms of several hundred thousand rifles, the Government had to pay Colt $4.5 million to purchase the rights to start a second source.

SHORTAGES

On the matter of shortages, both of major end items—tanks, trucks, helicopters, and so forth—major assemblies—engines, transmission, and so forth—and repair parts, we find a number of reasons for not having adequate quantities on hand. The cost-effectiveness inventory management was basically premised upon peacetime usage and attrition rates that had no relevancy whatsoever to losses and rapid wearout in the wartime environment and climate of Vietnam. As a consequence, the already depleted bins of parts were quickly exhausted and we became nationally out of stock on many important and critical items and parts.

On weapons systems which were in production, the cost effectiveness theme reduced the amount of concurrent spares that are normally procured, frequently by about one-half, so that NORS—not operationally ready supplies—rates of aircraft rose drastically and unacceptably as did the EDP—equipment deadlined for parts—rates of other equipment. Moreover, its insistence that the war end at the time the last bullet is fired and the last can of beans devoured to avoid any surplus, has the services virtually living from hand to mouth. Were it not for the Korean war surpluses, we would have been even worse off than we were in fighting the Vietnam war at least until the production lines began to catch up with the demands.

From the standpoint of national objectives, it is not only clear that we have shortages in unacceptable magnitudes but it is equally clear that had the wasted money been devoted to curing them, our position would be much better and the operationally ready status of the equipment the forces do have would be much improved.

We are, as a result, stretched terribly thin. The equipment status of the Reserves called to active duty is deplorable in terms of what they are authorized to have and the Active Army, with its own glaring shortages, will be hard pressed at best, and probably will never be able to equip them adequately. The naval squadron in California that was called to active duty at the time of the *Pueblo* is equipped with A–4A's—an antique aircraft—many of which for various reasons can not operate from carriers and which the Navy can not use in Vietnam because of its terribly inferior performance. Consequently, we have men training to become combat ready in an aircraft that cannot be permitted to enter combat. If these aviators are even to be used, they will have to transition and retrain in a different aircraft.

The *Pueblo* incident was proof of how poorly prepared we are to respond to some small contingency much less one of a larger scale. Certainly, it would not be surprising to witness a miscalculated eruption in Korea, and on the basis of indicated shortages and equipment, coupled with very little by way of a cushioning reserve of forces at home, we would be in the worst sort of position to respond.

Such is the heritage of an administration that on the one hand overextended our military commitments around the world and on the other hand sacrificed on the altar of cost effectiveness the necessary military strength to back up those commitments.

In closing, I wish to commend the acting chairman of the committee, the Senator from Mississippi, for his diligence and his courtesy during the consideration of this bill. In addition, I want to extend my personal thanks to the members of the committee staff, especially to William H. Darden, the committee chief of staff, without whose excellent work, advice and assistance we could not have completed action on this important bill.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, will the Senator from Maine yield to me briefly?

Mrs. SMITH. I am glad to yield to the Senator from Mississippi.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I point with pride to the presentation just made and the contents of the speech by the Senator from Maine [Mrs. SMITH]. It shows her very fine knowledge of the major parts of the bill and weapons systems. Her consistent application to the subject matter brings that about. Beyond that, however, the Senator has an independent judgment about these major points. She is consistent in support for our men in uniform. That means a great deal to the committee, to the Senate, to the Congress, and to the Nation.

This is not a new practice with her. She has done it over the years. Now, as ranking minority member of the committee, if I may add, her work, her service, and her contributions are outstanding and represent great strength.

Again I want to thank her for her very fine work in connection with the bill, as well as for her very fine remarks of important substance.

Mrs. SMITH. I should like to thank the distinguished acting chairman of the committee, my able colleague from Mississippi [Mr. STENNIS].

I know of no one whose highly complimentary words mean more to me than the Senator from Mississippi.

ORDER OF BUSINESS

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

THE SEARCH FOR A SITE FOR VIETNAM PEACE NEGOTIATIONS

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to insert in the RECORD an editorial from today's Washington Post, entitled "The Search for a Site."

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

THE SEARCH FOR A SITE

Disagreement on the site for the first diplomatic contacts with North Vietnam has now reached a point where it seems unlikely that the principals can extricate themselves from an awkward stalemate without some external help.

The sites that each side would prefer seem to become instantly a sort of mirror-image of the views of the other. Nothing is more certain than that any cities we suggest will look like an Hanoi blacklist. And our attitude toward their proposals must seem to them quite as perverse, however reasonable our objections seem to Americans.

This is precisely the sort of impasse that the United Nations ought to be able to remove, but the relations between the U.N. and North Vietnam preclude what would otherwise be a perfectly feasible and natural solution—that is, a site picked by the U.N.

A search for an alternative source leads logically to the co-chairmen of the Geneva Conference of 1954, that is, to Great Britain and the Soviet Union. In direct consultation these two powers ought to be able to agree on a site that the United States and its allies and the North Vietnamese ought to be able to accept.

The proposal has its defects, of course. The Soviet Union as an ally and supplier of North Vietnam certainly is no unprejudiced neutral, and could not be accepted as such by the United States. And the Chinese, who have to be considered by the North Vietnamese, no doubt would not embrace the Soviet Union as an impartial referee. Great Britain, from an American point of view, has the defect of a country so anxious to secure a peace that it might be uncritical of some defects that we would perceive in any proposed site. From a North Vietnamese point of view, it is, of course a non-Communist country.

So this would not be a perfect tribunal to fix upon a site, but a perfect tribunal does not seem to be available in this divided world. And the cochairmen, after all, would not be under the necessity of arbitrating the substantive issues of the war, but only under the burden of finding a place to hold preliminary discussions within a narrow compass.

The skilled diplomats of these two countries both well understand the site requirements. They do not seem beyond human ingenuity. What is required is a city to which the diplomats and experts and press of both countries can be assured access and with which they can be guaranteed communication. This does not seem a task beyond the genius of diplomacy. Nor does the risk of error seem to be so great that neither side can afford to make some concession in point of perfect convenience and facility. It is even possible that sites that have been viewed as undesirable because of existing shortcomings might be made more acceptable by explicit provisions to remove self-evident defects.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

AUTHORIZATION FOR MILITARY PROCUREMENT, 1969

The Senate resumed the consideration of the bill (S. 3293) to authorize appropriations during the fiscal year 1969 for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, and tracked combat vehicles, research, development, test, and evaluation for the Armed Forces, and to prescribe the authorized personnel strength of the Selected Reserve of each Reserve component of the Armed Forces, and for other purposes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Pursuant to the previous order, the Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. CLARK] is recognized for not to exceed 2 hours and 15 minutes.

AMENDMENTS NOS. 697 AND 698

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, I send to the desk for printing two amendments. I shall have a third amendment a little later in the day, which I shall also ask to have printed.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendments will be received and printed, and will lie on the table.

Mr. CLARK. The Senator from Mississippi and I have had a friendly discussion about appropriate procedures for consideration of this bill, and the purpose of my present comment is to state our informal agreement that one or more of these amendments will be called up tomorrow for rollcall votes; that we will have extensive argument and colloquy this morning with respect to the substance of the amendments; and I have agreed with the Senator from Mississippi that we could have a vote on the amendments and on passage of the bill prior to 2 o'clock tomorrow. This is to suit his convenience tomorrow, since he has been very kind to suit my convenience today; but Senators should be aware that, subject to something unforeseen, that is the procedure we hope to follow.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield to me just a moment on that point?

Mr. CLARK. Yes, indeed.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I do not wish to create a situation here where we will have nothing to do this afternoon on the bill. With reference to his amendments, I ask the Senator from Pennsylvania this: Could not the Senator take up one or more—at least one—of his amendments between now and his time of departure at 1 o'clock?

Mr. CLARK. And have a vote on them?

Mr. STENNIS. Yes.

Mr. CLARK. I do not see how that would be possible, because, without attempting in any way to string out action on this bill, I remind the Senator that it is a most important bill, calling for the authorization of $22 billion, and I do not believe we should rush such matters through. I should like to have on the desks of all Senators tomorrow when the Senate convenes an explanation of these amendments.

As I said earlier to the Senator, if he wishes to go on limited time tomorrow, I shall be content to do that, but I cannot—if the Senator from Mississippi will excuse the phrase, and I know he will—agree to a shotgun approach to matters as important as this, without other Senators present to hear us, without their understanding what the amendments are, and without the amendments being printed.

Mr. STENNIS. Yes.

Mr. CLARK. But I know the Senator will indulge me and take my comments in good part when I say that the committee report was not available to me until I returned to Washington yesterday morning. I have been sweating over it ever since. I have not even had time to look at the record of the hearings, which was not prepared for Senate inspection until yesterday morning.

Mr. STENNIS. Yes.

Mr. CLARK. And I do not think, I say with all deference to my good friend, that

it is an unreasonable request to permit other Senators to consider the debate we shall have today before voting on the matter.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, if the Senator will yield at that point, I am certainly not attempting to rush the Senator from Pennsylvania or any other Senator. I want all Senators to have full time and opportunity to develop any matters they wish. But in view of the fact that those of us who are charged with responsibility for the bill are agreeing to pass the matter over this afternoon so that the Senator from Pennsylvania may leave the city, to suit his convenience, I thought perhaps the Senator, in turn, could submit one of these amendments today. If he could, I felt he would. But the Senator has said that he does not think he can.

It is understood, then, that tomorrow the matter will be handled, as far as the Senator from Pennsylvania is concerned—I know he cannot speak for everyone, nor can I—in such a way that consideration of such amendments as he sees fit to call up will be concluded and we may have a vote on final passage at 2 o'clock?

Mr. CLARK. Yes. That is on the further assumption that we will not come in any earlier than 10 tomorrow morning, because I have to get back from western Pennsylvania.

Mr. STENNIS. Yes. Well, I should think that 10 o'clock would be a reasonable time to convene; but I do not know what the majority leader may say about the matter. The Senator from Pennsylvania and I are just binding ourselves, now, in trying to arrive at an agreement on this matter. I know that the Senator cannot speak for others, and neither can I.

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, in view of what the Senator from Mississippi says, let me say to the distinguished acting majority leader, if I may have his attention for a moment, that my view has been that this bill is of such great importance that it ought to be subjected to intensive scrutiny and debate. My great preference would be to have the vote on my amendments and on the bill come on Monday, and I would be here tomorrow to complete whatever argument was necessary. But the Senator from Mississippi, for reasons I understand, although I do not agree with them, wishes to rush the bill through. He wanted to vote yesterday, he wants to vote today, he wants to vote tomorrow.

I like to indulge my friend from Mississippi. I point out that we had, with the help of the Senator from Mississippi, a debate on a civil rights bill which lasted the better part of a month. When I brought the poverty bill to the floor of the Senate last year, which contained only one-tenth of the amount which this bill contains, we were held up on the floor for the better part of 10 days. I frankly cannot understand why all military measures have to be rushed through day before yesterday.

Mr. STENNIS. If the Senator will yield, I do not think the Senator has any cause to keep repeating his statement about trying to rush this thing through. I have repeatedly said I want every Senator to have a full chance to develop any points he wishes. It is just a matter of trying to accommodate the Senator from Pennsylvania. I have plenty of time. I can be here today, tomorrow, Saturday, and Monday. It is the Senator from Pennsylvania who wishes to leave the floor and tend to other important matters. They are important, and I am in sympathy with him, and trying to accommodate him.

Mr. CLARK. I thank the Senator. May I point out, however, that I am in far less a hurry than my friend from Mississippi. I should like to see this bill debated all next week. There is $22 billion in it; it is very important. But in order to indulge the Senator from Mississippi, who wants to get this bill through quickly, and does not want to be detained in Washington, but wishes to vote by 2 o'clock tomorrow, I am willing to yield to his importunities, though I would much rather have it put over until Monday or Tuesday.

Mr. STENNIS. We have that understanding, I believe.

Mr. CLARK. I am prepared, however, to meet my commitment.

Mr. STENNIS. I thank the Senator.

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, I would like to make a brief preliminary statement and then ask my friend the Senator from Mississippi to explain some of the matters which are involved in the pending bill.

First, in my judgment the United States today is in a critical condition with respect to the soundness and validity of the dollar. We know that there has been a rush on gold, that the price of $35 an ounce for gold is under serious attack in the London gold market, that the central bankers, in a state of grave concern, have met in Stockholm and, in effect, put some Scotch tape on a bleeding wound, a wound which, if it is not stanched with adequate medication and antibiotics and a real cure of the underlying reasons for the weakness of the dollar, could result in absolute disaster.

I believe that maintaining the integrity of the dollar is the most important problem which confronts the American people today. It is clear to me—and here I am in accord with what might be called conventional economy—that to save the dollar we will have to bring the receipts and disbursements of the Federal Government far closer into balance than they are today.

There are various ways of doing that. And the Senate made an extremely timid start in that direction last week when it passed a measure which called for a cut in Federal expenditures from $186 billion to $180 billion. At the same time the Senate passed a 10-percent surtax.

That measure has gone to the House where, it is widely predicted, it will find a cool reception. However, even if that measure were to be passed, I would hazard the guess that we will not bring our Federal expenses anywhere nearly close enough into balance to assure the soundness of the dollar.

Let me say a word as to what would happen if we were to go off the gold exchange standard, if we were to refuse to sell gold at $35 an ounce. The confidence of the international community in the validity of the dollar would be destroyed.

I do not think the American people are anywhere nearly aware of the dangers which presently confront us, for unquestionably the pound sterling would be the first currency to have to be devalued again. And competent economists tell us that might occur as early as June of this year. In my opinion, it is certain to occur within a year unless the United States takes steps to re-create confidence in the dollar.

In this event—and I cannot stress this too much—the savings, the pension plans, and the social security benefits of every member of the American public would be cut at least in half, and probably more.

The social security benefits received will be sufficient to buy only one-half or less than one half of the amount they buy today. The pensions which our retired workers receive will be sufficient to buy only half or less than half of what they buy today.

Individuals who are living on invested capital, particularly if it is in bonds and bond interest, will find their incomes cut in half or more.

Mr. President, this could be a catastrophe, and we must not permit it to happen.

Without regard to the niceties of international finance, I have become convinced that the only way to restore confidence in the dollar is to cut back on our expenditures very drastically—indeed, possibly to the tune of as much as $20 billion in the coming fiscal year.

We must also, in all likelihood—although, with respect to this my position is more ambivalent—have some kind of a tax increase.

I, personally, would prefer to see, first, tax reforms which, if brought to the floor by the Finance Committee with a sound report, would increase our revenue by the amount of money necessary, taken together with cuts in expenditures, to restore confidence in the dollar.

My second preference would be for an excess profits tax which would take some of the swollen profits out of the military-industrial complex which is fattening on the economy and would again give us, with the appropriate exemptions, the extra revenues which, taken together with a cut in expenditures, would be sufficient to restore confidence in the dollar.

I hope to have an opportunity later this year to vote for tax reform, to vote for an excess profits tax, and, if worst comes to worst and a majority of the Senate is unwilling to go along with my views in this regard, I would reluctantly vote for some other kind of meat-ax taxation approach such as an across-the-board surtax charge, because I am so convinced that the dollar is in deadly peril.

I turn now to the expenditure side. I know that, while the legislation we passed the other day called for a cut in appropriations from $186 billion to $180 billion, nonetheless we ought to be able to cut a lot more money than that out of the present budget in order to save the dollar.

Where should those cuts come from? This country has undertaken programs at home and abroad which will have to be curtailed if we are going to save the dollar.

We are faced with a frightening prob-

lem of priorities. We are embarked on Great Society programs, which I strongly support—the so-called war on poverty, Federal aid to education, air pollution control legislation, water pollution control legislation, health legislation, welfare legislation, legislation which a very large number of the American people are entitled to and strongly desire.

These programs have already been cut back by Executive action to an extent which I believe to be very unwise.

Last year Congress failed to give the poverty program, in its appropriations, anything like what was needed.

We are short-changing all of the domestic programs in the desperate effort to cut expenditures for essential matters in order to help save the dollar.

The other side of the coin is that we have today a projected military budget of some $79-plus billion. It will be well over $80 billion after the supplemental comes in, if it is passed, which calls for a further expenditure of $4, $5, or $6 billion for the war in Vietnam.

When I am faced with the priorities of cutting back the military budget, the space budget, the supersonic transport, and various other areas of expenditure which, to my way of thinking, are swollen, are excessive, and are not needed by any sensible concept of national security or national defense, and when I believe, as I do, that we should put our first priority on the dollar and our second priority on keeping alive at a reasonable level our domestic programs, then I come to the conclusion—and I may say that it is not a reluctant conclusion—that we should make substantial cuts in this military budget. This is the first chance we have had to do it, on the first authorization bill which has come before us.

As the committee report indicates, the bill calls for authorizing appropriations during fiscal 1969 for major procurement; research, development, test, and evaluation by the Department of Defense; continuing the authority for merging military assistance financing for South Vietnam and other free world forces there, Laos, and Thailand, with the funding of the Department of Defense; and then some relatively minor authorizations of personnel strength for fiscal 1969. The bill carries a total expenditure of $22,001,788,830.

If either of my first two amendments were to be adopted—I shall discuss them in considerable length later—that amount would be cut by roughly 10 percent. So that the total amount authorized would not exceed the amount appropriated in each of the various categories covered by this bill in 1969. In other words, roughly $2 billion would be cut out of the authorization.

My third amendment takes a somewhat different approach, but arrives in the end at a comparable, although somewhat more modest result. Perhaps we could telescope the two amendments and make a saving of closer to $4 billion. But I am not naive enough to think that the Senate is going to be prepared to make that big a cut.

Mr. President (Mr. MONTOYA in the chair), the Senate at the moment, in my judgment, is somewhat in the situation of the young lady who said, "Mother, may I go out to swim?" "Yes, my darling daughter. Hang your clothes on a hickory limb, but don't go near the water."

The water is cold; the water is rough. The water is the swollen wave of military appropriations which has become sacred in the Senate. I believe the time has come when we should hang our clothes on a hickory limb and perhaps put on an attractive and fetching bikini and dive into the water and cut these swollen requests for military appropriations until we make enough savings to save the dollar, without having to cut back our domestic program. So my third amendment would take a functional approach.

I would propose that we eliminate expenditures or authorization for the anti-ballistic-missile system, a system which practically every competent scientific and military expert knows is worthless—absolutely worthless, as a deterrent to the Soviet Union. This has been stated by former Secretary of Defense McNamara. It has never been denied by anybody who knows what he is talking about. The Russian anti-ballistic-missile system is no good, and ours will be no good, either. Secretary McNamara was absolutely correct when he said that the way to overcome the Moscow, or the "Tallinn," ineffective Russian ballistic-missile system is to increase our offensive capacity so that we can swamp these ineffective systems with our missiles, if it needs to be done.

In that regard, I put no faith whatever in the theory—to me, ridiculous—that in order to protect against a ballistic-missile attack by China, we ought to create an anti-ballistic-missile system which is no good against Russia.

I rely for my comments on the statement of former Secretary of Defense McNamara which, if Senators are interested, appears on page 115 of the hearings.

On page 129 of the hearings, former Secretary McNamara states the fiscal year 1969 budget request for ABM is $1,232,000,000. Of that sum, there is $655.7 million in the present bill, exclusive of the funds needed for research to try to develop a genuinely workable system—if this can ever be done—which I would not favor striking.

Then I would propose to strike the authorization for the so-called manned orbiting laboratory, a proposal of dubious value, one which, in my judgment, in view of current world conditions, is not justified. This would result in a saving of $600 million, and is referred to—briefly, to be sure—on page 21 of the committee report.

The third place where I would save is in connection with the so-called FDL's, or fast deployment logistic ships, which would cost $183.6 million, as appears from the report, at page 16. These are the so-called fast deployment logistic ships about which such a fuss was made last year. There was then—and I hope there still is—considerable opposition to them.

The total of these savings would be $1,439,300,000. This is somewhat less than the saving of approximately $2 billion which would be realized under my other amendments.

Mr. President, the pending bill calls for the authorization of some $22 billion out of a total military budget which, if we add the proposed supplemental increases due to the President's desire to accelerate the Vietnamese program, will be well over $80 billion, and will leave some $58 billion to be dealt with in subsequent bills. I would hope that we could find the same savings in those bills which I suggest in this one, and that perhaps another $5.8 billion, or perhaps as much as $6 billion, could be saved from these—I repeat—swollen military expenditures. So that we would have achieved a total saving of close to $8 billion, or roughtly 10 percent—a little less than 10 percent—of the total budgetary requests for the military for this year.

Mr. President, in very brief outline that is the thesis which I propose to put before the Senate for a vote tomorrow.

Now, with the permission of my friend from Mississippi I shall ask him some questions about the report, and when we finish our colloquy, if time remains, and I hope it will, I shall have some further argument to make in support of my position.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, will the Senator indulge me for just a moment?

Mr. CLARK. Yes, indeed.

Mr BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, will the Senator yield to me briefly for two unanimous-consent requests?

Mr. CLARK. I am happy to yield to the Senator from West Virginia.

COMMITTEE MEETINGS DURING SENATE SESSION

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Subcommittee on Business and Commerce of the Committee on the District of Columbia be authorized to meet during the session of the Senate today.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Subcommittee on Government Research of the Committee on Government Operations be authorized to meet during the session of the Senate today.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

AUTHORIZATION FOR MILITARY PROCUREMENT, 1969

The Senate resumed the consideration of the bill (S. 3293) to authorize appropriations during the fiscal year 1969 for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, and tracked combat vehicles, research, development, test, and evaluation for the Armed Forces, and to prescribe the authorized personnel strength of the Selected Reserve of each Reserve component of the Armed Forces, and for other purposes.

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, I ask my friend the Senator from Mississippi [Mr. STENNIS] to turn to the table on page 2 of the committee report. I call his attention to the "Procurement" heading, which is at the top of that table, on the left, and the subheading "Aircraft" and then, the further subheading "Army."

I note that the request for Army aircraft procurement, as reported by the committee, is for $735,447,000, which is a cut of roughly $20 million in the amount that was appropriated last year.

Mr. President, I ask the Senator to turn to page 6 of the report where under the heading "Procurement—Aircraft—Army," the statement is made that:

This authorization would permit the procurement of 1,304 aircraft, of which only 39 would be of the fixed-wing type. The rest are helicopters.

The further statement is made that:

Of this authorization, $259 million would be applied to costs other than those directly attributable to the purchase of aircraft.

I ask the Senator, How many Army aircraft, divided into the fixed-wing type and helicopters, were appropriated for in fiscal 1968?

Mr. STENNIS. Answering very quickly, based upon the figures showing the sums allowed in 1968, the numbers were approximately the same. The amount of funds was a little more, as the Senator has said. Prices have gone up some, as a general proposition, I am sure, but they will be almost the same.

Mr. CLARK. How long does it take, roughly, for the process of authorization, appropriation, procurement, testing, and delivery, between the time an authorization bill is approved and the actual aircraft are ready for use?

Mr. STENNIS. Most of the items to which the Senator has referred covers helicopters, and the time is roughly 18 months. By comparison, it is a simple process. A fixed-wing plane of the complicated type would take 2 to 3 years, depending on how involved it is.

Mr. CLARK. I notice that only 39 aircraft are of the fixed-wing type.

Mr. STENNIS. Yes.

Mr. CLARK. Would they take 2 to 3 years?

Mr. STENNIS. No, I think not. Most of those are small Army planes, which are partly for communication, partly for transportation, and partly for observation, for example, for the artillery. Some could be delivered in about 18 months.

Mr. CLARK. Back in the dear dead days beyond recall, when I was a member of the Air Force, we used to call them reconnaissance planes or artillery spotter planes.

Mr. STENNIS. Yes, they are relatively small and simple, without complications.

Mr. CLARK. Of course, to a very large extent the helicopter has taken over many of those functions, has it not?

Mr. STENNIS. Yes, a great deal, and particularly in the war in Vietnam, where the attrition has been great with helicopters. They are our chief means of transportation of men, materials, supplies, including hospital supplies, and men who are wounded.

Mr. CLARK. Evacuation of the wounded?

Mr. STENNIS. Yes, that is one of the most important functions it has.

Mr. CLARK. I had the opportunity to use that type transportation in Vietnam about 3 months ago. I was very much impressed with two things: First, how helicopters can go almost anywhere; and second, how terribly vulnerable they are to antiaircraft fire.

Am I correct, in view of what the Senator has said, that the Army aircraft authorized by the bill could not likely be in service until almost the end of 1969?

Mr. STENNIS. Yes, that is approximately correct. Of course, there is a pipeline now running from previous appropriations that will continue to put helicopters over in Vietnam to replace the ones that are lost.

Mr. CLARK. We all hope and pray, and I am sure the Senator shares this hope although he may be more skeptical than I, that we are going to stop the shooting in Vietnam in the near future.

Mr. STENNIS. I hope so, but we cannot assume that. It would be a great mistake to make that assumption.

Mr. CLARK. I could not agree more. The way negotiations are going now I am getting more skeptical every day, although I think if we have the will we could arrange a cease-fire with honor and stop the shooting and killing of our boys in Vietnam long before the end of 1969.

What information can the Senator give us with respect to the number of helicopters and other Army aircraft which have been lost during the last year and, therefore, presumably should be replaced as long as the fighting in Vietnam continues?

Mr. STENNIS. We have that in our records, and I would be glad to inform the Senator. However, it may be that that information is classified and we would have to give it to the Senator on that basis. It is many. It is many. I can tell the Senator that.

Mr. CLARK. Is it as many as 1,309?

Mr. STENNIS. Does the Senator mean 1 year?

Mr. CLARK. Yes.

Mr. STENNIS. No; it is not that heavy in 1 year.

There have been many losses and wearouts, as the Senator knows. There is a "hurry up" to try to replace some of them.

Mr. CLARK. They are being taken care of in the pipeline.

Mr. STENNIS. That is right. They cannot be taken care of out of the bill for immediate needs, as the Senator has said.

Mr. CLARK. So that I would hope—and I am sure the Senator would, too—the shooting and the killing of American boys, and the shooting down of our helicopters and fixed wing aircraft with the Army would stop long before the end of 1969. I agree with the Senator that we have to play it safe and not take any chances.

I would ask the Senator this question: If a cease-fire were arranged in Vietnam in the next 18 months we would not need these helicopters, would we; unless we went off into another adventure somewhere else in the world in order to keep the helicopters flying and the stars on all our generals, to fight a war somewhere else? The Senator does not believe that, does he?

Mr. STENNIS. I certainly hope not. If we should achieve a cease-fire, some of the aircraft and helicopters would be needed to replace borrowed equipment and to raise units throughout the services to their full allowance. But I would hope there might be some procurement reductions and cancellations of orders.

Mr. CLARK. What is going on now is what might be called a cannibalization; is it not?

Mr. STENNIS. Yes; that is true. It has happened not only with helicopters but also with many other items.

Mr. CLARK. It happened all during World War II; did it not?

Mr. STENNIS. Yes.

Mr. CLARK. And during the Korean war as well?

Mr. STENNIS. That is correct.

Mr. CLARK. It always happens.

Mr. STENNIS. That is true.

Mr. CLARK. So what we do is take the aircraft and the other hardware from the strategic reserves and divisions which are back home, and push them out into the war zone and they will be filled up.

Mr. STENNIS. Filled up later, yes. That would be the procedure, those two steps.

Mr. CLARK. I invite the Senator's attention to the subheading on page 7, Navy, where the statement appears that the authorization of appropriation for the procurement of Navy and Marine Corps aircraft is $2,556,988,000 and the fiscal year program recommended by the committee involves procurement of 704 aircraft of which the Navy has available for funding $115 million.

My first question to the Senator comes from naivete on my part: Why is it so much expensive to procure 704 Navy aircraft than it is to procure 1,304 Army aircraft?

Mr. STENNIS. Well, Army aircraft, as I remarked a moment ago, are relatively simple, without the complicated electronics and other sophisticated items which go into a high performance machine equipped with all kinds of offensive and defensive armament and equipment. A great many of the Navy planes fly from carriers, of course.

Mr. CLARK. I was going to ask my friend, what percentage of them fly from carriers? I was under the impression that carrier-based aviation was practically the sole naval aircraft weapon and that all fixed base aircraft were either Army, some Marine, or Air Force.

Mr. STENNIS. In the Navy alone, a great part of it is carrier aircraft but this category includes Navy and Marine Corps aircraft. Marine Corps units have their own aircraft with them. They have all kinds of tactical aircraft.

Mr. CLARK. There is no strategic air arm in the Marine Corps, of course.

Mr. STENNIS. No.

Mr. CLARK. That is Air Force.

Mr. STENNIS. That is correct.

Mr. CLARK. Turning to the table on page 2, let me ask my good friend his justification for the increase of roughly $240 million in recommendations of the committee for Navy and Marine Corps aircraft over the amount appropriated for 1968, which was $2,315,900,000, as compared to a recommended figure for the coming fiscal year of $2,556,988,000.

Why do we have to spend that extra money? Why can we not get by with what we appropriated last year?

Mr. STENNIS. The Senator's questtion deals with a figure in there for Navy or Marine Corps for procurement of aircraft. This year it is in the neighborhood of $200 million more.

Mr. CLARK. It is $240 million.

Mr. STENNIS. Yes; $240,000,000. That is correct.

Mr. CLARK. My question is, why?

Mr. STENNIS. I am sure that, numerically, there are just more planes involved.

There is always a gradual replacement of one model with a better one, and more of the expensive ones are coming into production. We could list the types and quantities to be procured.

Mr. CLARK. Well, let me put this question to the Senator——

Mr. STENNIS. As a plane is developed and gets into production, as the Senator knows, the number being placed into the fleet, as we say, increases each year until it peaks and then is completed.

Mr. CLARK. Let me ask my friend this: The bill calls for the procurement of 704 aircraft for Navy and Marine Corps. How many did we procure in last year's bill?

Mr. STENNIS. We would have to supply that for the RECORD. I am sure it is a somewhat lesser figure. I feel that it is. Some of the difference, though, is due to increased cost of the items.

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent, with respect to the number of aircraft authorized to be procured by the Navy and Marine Corps in fiscal 1968, when the information is available, that the figure may appear at this point in the colloquy.

Mr. STENNIS. We will supply that figure for the RECORD sometime during the day.

Mr. CLARK. I thank the Senator.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection it is so ordered.

The figures, subsequently supplied, are as follows:

The number of Navy and Marine Corps aircraft authorized to be procured in 1968 was 680.

Mr. CLARK. With respect to these more sophisticated aircraft, how long, on the average, is it between the time an authorization bill is passed for Navy and Marine Corps procurement and the actual delivery on the line of the aircraft ready for combat?

Mr. STENNIS. That is usually from 2 to 3 years. Now, preceding those 2 to 3 years, however, research and development has been carried on.

Mr. CLARK. We will get to research and development, a little later. This is straight procurement.

Mr. STENNIS. Production; that is right—2 to 3 years.

Mr. CLARK. My understanding is that 704 aircraft would not be likely to be ready for combat prior to April of 1970, and might not be ready for combat until April 1971.

Mr. STENNIS. Well, those models that are already actually in production and coming off assembly lines will be continuing to flow right on. But 1970 would be 2 years from now. I think it is possible that some of them would be in before then.

Mr. CLARK. The Senator has said there was a pipeline, and presumably the same cannibalization will take place in the Marine Corps and Navy; you fill up the voids and you are getting aircraft all the time.

Mr. STENNIS. That is right.

Mr. CLARK. But the money proposed to be authorized in this bill for the Marine Corps and Navy, for 704 aircraft, will not result in a plane ready for combat for 2 or 3 years; is that correct?

Mr. STENNIS. Generally speaking, that is correct.

Mr. CLARK. I would suggest to my good friend from Mississippi that the gold crisis is not going to wait 2 or 3 years; I would suggest to him that the problems of our cities are not going to wait 2 or 3 years; that one can have a measured hope that long before 2 or 3 years have passed, the shooting in Vietnam will have stopped and that, as a matter of calculated risk, in view of the threat to the dollar and in view of the threat in our cities and in our rural slums also, it would be wise—this I urge on my friend from Mississippi—to cut back the authorization for the Navy and Marine Corps procurement to the figure appropriated last year. If things get worse, we can come back for more; but we cannot wait if we are going to save the dollar and our domestic programs. We have to save money. I suggest this is the place, because, with respect to Army aircraft, we find the bill is authorizing far less than last year.

I would have hoped, in view of the Nation's economy, realizing the strains which our economy and our budget and our monetary system are under, considering the riots we had in Washington last week and the week before, the committee would have looked with favor upon cutting this amount back to the amount appropriated last year. I would like my friend from Mississippi to tell me why he could not have done that.

Mr. STENNIS. There is some logic in what the Senator has said and it is well to think in terms in which the Senator has thought; but we just cannot afford, at this stage, to take that chance.

Mr. CLARK. May I say to my friend that we cannot afford not to take the chance. This is a matter of judgment.

Mr. STENNIS. The point is, there will be an opportunity to stop all of this if it is not needed; but if we take it out and it then develops that it is needed, there will not be time then to produce the aircraft, because that time will have been lost and these planes will still be in the blueprints, and we cannot fight with blueprints. But the control continues in the hands of the Congress.

On the very point the Senator mentioned, if things get better, we can cut the appropriation amount; or if they go on and they do not get better and we appropriate the full amount, then, of course the Executive has control of the expenditure of the money, and he could cut back in actual orders and in accordance with the need. But if that did not occur, the Congress would still have control in that it could reduce or rescind appropriations. We would still have control to impose expenditure limitations on unobligated balances. The contracts that are made have saving clauses of that kind in them. Of course, there may be some liquidation charges or penalties. But Congress would still have control of this entire matter if things got better. We hope they are going to be better. If they get worse, we will not have lost the time.

Mr. CLARK. We will not have the time if the dollar goes down the drain. We will not have the time if we have civil war in the United States. These are all questions of judgment, on which the Senator and I do not see eye to eye.

Mr. STENNIS. Yes. Well, I have deference for my friend, too.

Mr. CLARK. We get along pretty well together.

Let me ask this question. If we were to cut $240 million out of this authorization request for Navy and Marine Corps aviation—and I ask my friend's bright and able staff assistant to check me on this—how many fewer aircraft would be procured? My rough figures indicate the cost is about $300 million per aircraft. That cannot be right.

Mr. STENNIS. No.

Mr. CLARK. How many fewer aircraft would have to be procured?

Mr. STENNIS. The cost of the different aircraft would vary a great deal.

Mr. CLARK. Yes, but on the average, assuming a wise decision were made not only by the Armed Services Committee but by the Executive.

Mr. STENNIS. The Senator is taking out approximately 10 percent of the money.

Mr. CLARK. That is right.

Mr. STENNIS. It would be just as accurate an estimate as I could make to say the Senator would be taking out 10 percent of the aircraft.

Mr. CLARK. I understand this is very rough, but 630 aircraft would be procured instead of 704?

Mr. STENNIS. Yes.

Mr. CLARK. I suggest to my friend that this would not be an unmitigated disaster; that for aircraft that are not going to be ready for combat for 2 or 3 years, we would be well within the level of commonsense if we cut back this authorization, and consequently the appropriation, to the amount appropriated last year.

I may say I have dwelt on this matter at greater length than I shall have to with respect to the other items, in order to make my point.

Mr. STENNIS. The Senator has made his point very well. These figures are not just picked out of the air, as the Senator knows. They are worked on by the different military departments in the Department of Defense, on the basis of need and anticipated need and production schedules, as well as possible attrition. Attrition has run high during the war. If the war lets up, it will run lower. Then there are production line schedules to be considered. All those go into the calculation.

All of that is reviewed by the Department of Defense at the top level. As we said yesterday, out of the entire program, they took out $21.7 billion. The Department of Defense did that.

Mr. CLARK. Out of what?

Mr. STENNIS. Out of the original proposals that went in from all the services to begin with. So the point I am trying to make is that this has all been screened.

Mr. CLARK. The Senator and I are not children in that regard. We have been through a couple of wars. We know we are always going to have to cut back the requests of the generals and the admirals in order to have a figure we may live with.

Mr. STENNIS. In other words, we

have not given them everything they asked for.

Mr. CLARK. Of course not. If we gave them everything they wanted, there would not be anything left for senatorial salaries.

I would like to ask the Senator this question. In view of the comment throughout the report, where reference is made to the Department of Defense requirements, it is a fact, is it not, that all the requests of the Department of Defense are screened both by the Bureau of the Budget and the President before the authorization ever comes down to the Congress?

Mr. STENNIS. Yes, that is true.

Mr. CLARK. Does the Senator happen to know to what extent, if at all, the Bureau of the Budget and/or the President cutback on the requests which the Secretary of Defense submitted for this bill?

Mr. STENNIS. No, I do not have the figure on that.

I think the way it works is that the Secretary of Defense and the Budget Director have a conference, perhaps with the President, and they talk about these large figures, and reach some kind of an agreement, as they have to, with the President.

After that is done tentatively, then the Department of Defense request is adjusted, in keeping with the President's final figure. I think that is about the way it happens.

Mr. CLARK. So, to paraphrase a bit, the Secretary of Defense and probably the Joint Chiefs of Staff go up to the White House?

Mr. STENNIS. Yes.

Mr. CLARK. And talk with the Director of the Bureau of the Budget and probably the President, and he says, "No, boys, you cannot have that much; all you can have is x billion dollars."

Mr. STENNIS. Yes.

Mr. CLARK. So they go back to the Pentagon and say, "Boys, we have taken a licking, cut it back about that much."

Mr. STENNIS. Yes.

Mr. CLARK. I know that is the way it works with the Labor Department and other departments of the Government with which I have some familiarity. I assume the same thing is true over at the Department of Defense.

Mr. STENNIS. While not attempting to speak for the President, or anything of that kind, I am sure this program goes back and forth many times before the President finally decides on a figure. He does it after being advised.

Mr. CLARK. And every now and then, the Armed Services Committee cuts it just a little bit more, does it not? But not much.

Mr. STENNIS. We went over this. I do not wish to make a personal allusion, but we have gotten into some of these programs at times, and cut them very substantially, particularly the missile program.

Mr. CLARK. I know the Senator has done that.

Mr. STENNIS. A competent person has estimated that the Senate Armed Services Committee, several years ago, made certain reductions the cumulative impact of which, for a few years, on two or three defense missiles, saved $2 billion. I have that statement in a memorandum from Mr. McNamara. It happened before he came here.

Mr. CLARK. I congratulate the Senator.

Mr. STENNIS. I just mention that in passing.

Mr. CLARK. I call the Senator's attention to the item of aircraft procurement for the Air Force. I note that the committee granted the full amount requested by the Department of Defense and approved by the President.

Mr. STENNIS. Yes.

Mr. CLARK. And that this is a cutback of some 280-odd million dollars under the amount appropriated for fiscal 1968.

What I cannot understand is why the Department of Defense, the President, and the committee were willing to cut some $280 million out of the Air Force, and were unwilling to cut the same amount out of the Navy and the Marine Corps, where, indeed, the Department of Defense and the President asked for stepped up authorizations for the coming fiscal year.

My confusion is caused by the fact that everything we read in the newspapers indicates we have been sustaining very heavy losses of aircraft in combat over North Vietnam, from very sophisticated antiaircraft fire. I would have thought if there was any one branch of the service which needed to be beefed up in terms of aircraft procurement, it would be the Air Force and not the Navy. Could the Senator enlighten me on that?

Mr. STENNIS. Perhaps so, to a degree. Of course, a lot of the planes that have been lost have been Navy planes, flying from carriers, as the Senator knows.

Mr. CLARK. Yes. But I suspect an equal number if not more of very expensive planes of the Air Force have also been lost.

Mr. STENNIS. That is true. There are several factors involved. One thing that has not been mentioned here is the matter of spare parts. That is a judgment question itself, as to how many spare parts to provide for in ordering these planes.

There is also the question of the state of the development and production of the planes, how long they have been coming into production, and what is the peak year. These planes that are coming into the fleet, or into the Air Force, have a peak year of cost; and a year where two or three new models happen to peak all in the same year, it runs the bill up. Perhaps the next year only one, or perhaps none, will peak into production, so the cost will go down.

Factors of that kind enter here. There has been a big loss, but in spite of that, they did not have to have quite as much money. I have got it as near as I could come to it. It will vary on the basis of those factors from year to year.

Mr. CLARK. The Senator will understand that I imply no criticism of the action of the committee.

Mr. STENNIS. I understand.

Mr. CLARK. With respect to either Army aircraft or Air Force aircraft.

Mr. STENNIS. Yes.

Mr. CLARK. My criticism is solely confined to the Navy and Marine aircraft.

I turn now to the subheading "Missiles."

Mr. STENNIS. Yes.

Mr. CLARK. As to the Army missiles, the committee goes along with the White House and the Bureau of the Budget in requesting $956 million for Army missiles, as opposed to an appropriation for 1968 of $759 million, or almost $200 million less.

I ask the Senator if he can give us the justification for that rather significant percentage increase, a rather large amount of money. Why do we need more Army missiles now than we did last year?

Mr. STENNIS. A great many of these items, and much of this cost, represents surface-to-surface missiles.

Mr. CLARK. Has that not always been true?

Mr. STENNIS. The Army, as the Senator knows, also has this ground-to-air defensive missile.

Mr. CLARK. In other words, antiaircraft?

Mr. STENNIS. The Hercules, the Hawk, and all of that group come under the Army.

But really, the big cost here is going into this new program that the Senator mentioned, the anti-ballistic-missile system. That is an Army matter also.

Mr. CLARK. The Senator will agree, will he not, that for the foreseeable future, we do not need any more antiaircraft missiles in this country? North Vietnam has no air force, China has no air force, and the possibility of a bombing attack from the Soviet Union is minimal, though they could shoot missiles at us, of course.

Mr. STENNIS. Yes. There is a replacement cost there, of course, every year I am not strong on that item myself, but we do have replacements, which constitute a big item. The increase here is attributable to this anti-missile-missile system.

Mr. CLARK. How much of that $956 million is going for this—if the Senator will excuse the term—abortive ABM system, which in my opinion is no good?

Mr. STENNIS. $342.7 million.

Mr. CLARK. That is interesting.

Mr. STENNIS. Nearly $343 million, in this part of the bill.

Mr. CLARK. How much of that is for Army missiles?

Mr. STENNIS. All of that comes under the Army. The Army has charge of that program.

Mr. CLARK. I see. So roughly a third of the authorization requested is for the ABM?

Mr. STENNIS. Roughly, that is correct.

Mr. CLARK. So if it were not for that, if that item were to be stricken, the committee would have recommended a significantly smaller amount for Army missiles than was spent last year?

Mr. STENNIS. Yes.

There would be a reduction if the program were disapproved. There would be a reduction of approximately $343 million, subject to this reservation. There might be some penalty for canceling out of those contracts. The Senator understands how that works?

Mr. CLARK. Yes, I do. What is the timelag between the passage of the

authorization bill and the delivery of the missile on the site, for use?

Mr. STENNIS. This item is now in the stage of what they call preproduction money: tooling up and getting ready; not actual production, but preproduction. So it would be 3 or 4 years, or perhaps even 5 years. We are really just getting into this one.

Mr. CLARK. So if we were able to come to an agreement with the Soviet Union, or if, in their infinite wisdom, our defense chiefs and the President were to conclude that the expenditure of money for an anti-ballistic-missile system is unwise and unsound, then this money would have been wasted, would it not?

Mr. STENNIS. Yes. It would have been spent without carrying forward the full program. It is directed though, as the Senator will recall, against the Chinese threat.

Mr. CLARK. Yes. The Senator will note that the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD does not catch a smile of some skepticism.

Let me go back to procurement of Air Force aircraft and ask the Senator whether the time necessary to deliver on the firing line an Air Force aircraft is not at least as long as it is with respect to the Navy and Marine Corps, and probably longer.

Mr. STENNIS. The Senator is correct.

Mr. CLARK. So, instead of escalation, the Army gets out quicker, the Navy and Marine Corps next, and the Air Force last, and the timelag increases as we go down that line.

Mr. STENNIS. The Air Force and the Navy should be roughly the same.

Mr. CLARK. I ask my friend, the Senator from Mississippi, to refer to the item on Navy missiles where the committee cut back, but only slightly, the DOD request and now asks us to authorize $848,212,000 for Navy missiles as opposed to a figure of $623,200,000 for the fiscal year 1968.

I ask the Senator first to advise me whether the very heavy item in there is for Polaris and Poseidon missiles for use on submarines.

Mr. STENNIS. The Senator is correct.

Mr. CLARK. Why has it been considered necessary to step up to the tune of $225 million the procurement of these Navy missiles?

Mr. STENNIS. The new missile involved there is the Poseidon. That is the more advanced missile. It is coming into heavy production, and that is the explanation for stepping up these figures. It is a heavy year.

Mr. CLARK. Within the limits of security, can the Senator tell me how those Navy missiles are broken down between various categories? It may be that the information is contained in the report. I do not know whether it is or not.

Mr. STENNIS. I have a chart here. However, the chart is classified. I could show it to the Senator, and I would be glad to do so.

The Senator has already mentioned the Poseidon and the Polaris missiles. The Senator mentioned two of the important ones.

I will be glad to let the Senator see the chart, and then as far as it is possible to do so, I will discuss the matter with the Senator.

Mr. CLARK. No, I do not care to see it.

Mr. STENNIS. If I may answer further, in the committee report we gave the names of these missiles, but we did not give the amounts involved. That is what is confidential—the dollar figure as to each. However, the Senator has hit the nail on the head.

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, I ask unanamious consent that a portion of the committee report, beginning on page 12 under the subheading "Navy," and running down to the end of the first paragraph on page 14, which is under the subheading "Marine Corps," and deals with Marine Corps missile procurement may be printed at this point in the RECORD so that Senators may see just what kind of missiles we have in mind procuring.

There being no objection, the excerpt was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

NAVY

The bill would authorize appropriations for the procurement of missiles for the Navy and Marine Corps in the amount of $848,212,000. The Marine Corps missiles that are included in this authorization are only the air-launched type.

In addiiton to the specific missiles that will be listed below, appropriations based on this authorization would fund the modification of missiles already procured, the purchase of spares and repair parts, the financing of industrial capacity, and the testing of machinery and equipment.

A listing of the missile programs requiring funding with this authorization follows.

Polaris/Poseidon.
Sparrow III.
Sidewinder.
Phoenix.
Shrike/Standard Arm.
Standard Missile—medium range.
Standard Missile—extended range.
Subroc.
Aerial targets.

Each of the systems listed above is described briefly below.

Polaris/Poseidon

The procurement of Polaris missiles to support the planned 41 submarine program has been completed. A part of this authorization is requested for such items as test equipment, missile containers, and operational engineering support.

31 of the 41 Polaris submarines will be refitted with the Poseidon, a new generation ballistic missile. Its larger size will permit increased payloads, or longer ranges, or both.

Sparrow III

This missile provides the F-4 aircraft with an all-weather air superiority capability. Some of the 1969 authorization will be used to procure a version modified to incorporate improvements needed as a result of combat experience in Vietnam. Other procurement of this missile is for systems using the sea-based version.

Sidewinder

The other primary air-to-air weapon that is used by the Navy, the Marines, and the Air Force, the Sidewinder, has accounted for the destruction of more than 41 Mig aircraft over North Vietnam.

Phoenix

This missile that was intended for use with the airborne missile control system in the F-111B aircraft will be installed on the VFX-1 that is discussed elsewhere in this report.

The Phoenix missile is designed to have a range and a capability greatly exceeding those of any air-to-air missile in use today.

Shrike/Standard Arm

Shrike is the antiradiation missile now operational in Southeast Asia with Navy and Air Force air units. Its purpose is to destroy enemy radar installations. Standard Arm is the designation of the second generation of this missile that is now being developed under Navy contract.

Standard

These missiles are being procured to replace Tartar and Terrier missiles. The medium range model will replace Tartar as the antiaircraft armament aboard guided missile cruisers and destroyers. The extended range version will replace Terrier aboard carriers, cruisers, and missile frigates. With minor changes to shipboard equipment, both versions are compatible with the weapons control systems of the ships on which they will be used.

Subroc

This is a missile that will deliver a nuclear depth bomb from a submerged submarine to destroy high performance submarines of an enemy. Additional missiles will be procured in 1969.

Aerial targets

A variety of aerial targets will be procured to provide realistic training and to use in evaluating the performance of our missiles.

MARINE CORPS

The bill provides $13,500,000 in authorization of appropriations for Marine Corps missile procurement. These funds would be used to modernize Hawk missiles, to replace Hawk rocket motors that have become unserviceable, to procure ground equipment and components, and to purchase replenishment spares.

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, I ask the Senator whether, within the limits of security, he can give us some sort of explanation as to what the Phoenix missile is on which some emphasis seems to be placed.

Mr. STENNIS. The Phoenix missile is a defense missile for the fleet and carriers.

Mr. CLARK. In the very rough sense, is this an antiaircraft missile?

Mr. STENNIS. The Senator is correct. It is an air-to-air missile.

Mr. CLARK. So, it is effective only against an enemy who has an air force of some power.

Mr. STENNIS. The Senator is correct.

Mr. CLARK. Therefore, it would be useless in Vietnam, and it would be useless against China.

Mr. STENNIS. It is designed to protect the fleet at sea, and particularly a carrier.

Mr. CLARK. From whom?

Mr. STENNIS. From air attack.

Mr. CLARK. By whom?

Mr. STENNIS. The Senator knows our friends are not going to attack us. This missile is considered to be very highly important. Its development has been satisfactory. It was to have gone on the F-111B, which is stricken out of the pending bill. However, the replacement for that aircraft will carry the missile to which the Senator refers.

Mr. CLARK. Let me put it this way. The Phoenix missile and all antiaircraft naval missiles are of use only against an enemy which has an air force capable of attacking our Navy at sea. And that means that it is no good against China. It is no good against North Vietnam. It is no good against Latin American countries or African countries or any of the Asian countries or Arab

countries. It would only be good against Russia in the event the Russian fleet and Russian air force takes to the high seas to attack our Navy. Is that a fair statement?

Mr. STENNIS. It is effective against any air force that might attack us, whether that aircraft is land based, carrier based, or based under any other circumstances.

The Phoenix missile, if it develops, as I understand it, to its expectations, would have the capacity to be used in defense against missiles fired at the ship.

Mr. CLARK. Is it an antiballistic missile?

Mr. STENNIS. No; not as that word is ordinarily used. However, the Phoenix missile will have the capacity to cope with missiles fired at the ship.

Mr. CLARK. This is very interesting. I hope the engineers and the other experts in the Navy Department have satisfied the committee than an antimissile missile of this kind has some utility.

The committee has far greater expertise in that regard than I. However, how long does it take from the passage of an authorization bill until the time the missile is installed on a naval vessel?

Mr. STENNIS. That depends on a great many factors. It may take several years. Some of the time spent is purely due to research and the gradual development and the engineering. Then a determination is made as to whether it is useful. It then goes into production.

The total number of years varies according to the missile; but from 1 to 3 years would cover the time, as a general proposition. I think that some of the missiles have taken longer than 3 years.

Mr. CLARK. I thank the Senator.

Mr. STENNIS. They are not all successful, either.

Mr. CLARK. I fully understand.

I would suggest to the Senator that the committee might well have agreed to confirm the authorization for Navy missiles to the amount appropriated last year, $623,200,000, without incurring any significant risk to our national security. I do not expect the Senator from Mississippi to agree; I merely make the statement as expressing my own point of view.

I shall not stop to discuss the Marine Corps missiles, because actually the committee has cut back significantly on that item.

However, I invite the Senator's attention to the amount for Air Force missiles, on page 2. I know that the committee went along with the request of the Department of Defense for $1,768,000,000 of authorization as compared with $1,340,000,000 for last year. I ask the Senator if he can give a justification for stepping up the amount of that authorization by some $428 million.

Mr. STENNIS. The Senator will recall that the Air Force missile account carries the ICBM's, which includes the Minuteman. This is one of the peak years for the Minuteman III, which is the more advanced model, having a difference in the warhead. That is the major item of increase there.

Let me emphasize again, as I did in the beginning, that these variances from year to year are not like the approving of the number of employees that some department had last year or the number of grants that were made. It is necessary to consider a military program as it develops. I know the Senator understands that. But as a general proposition, that explains the variances in the figures.

Mr. CLARK. I am sure that is true. But I would say to the Senator that, unless I am wrong about the priority for saving the dollar and about the priority in connection with our domestic environment and racial conditions and the other important areas at home in which we are in serious trouble, I would think we could slow down very significantly, at least to the extent I have indicated, which is only 10 percent of the total of the procurement figures which the Senator and I have been discussing.

Mr. STENNIS. I believe the Senator has made some good comments. The only flaw is that we are still at war. We all have hope for peace, as the Senator expressed so eloquently at the beginning of his remarks. But at this stage I believe we would make a great mistake to assume the prospect of early peace.

Mr. CLARK. I say to the Senator that we are presently protected by the pipeline for, in most categories, 2 to 3 years. These aircraft and missiles cannot be on the firing line for anywhere from 18 months to 3 or 4 years, or a longer time. In the meantime, we are not going to wait on the dollar or on the riots in the cities.

The way the Senate of the United States is organized—I am not sure that I could come up with a better arrangement—is that the Committee on Armed Services comes in with the first priority for our defense system—and they should. That is what they are there for. And I come in with the Labor Committee's first priority for our domestic programs—education, the war on poverty, and the like. And the Senate, in the end, as a whole has to arbitrate this.

The reason why I am engaging in this extended discussion with the Senator is that the Senate has backed away from its obligation to arbitrate for years. We have said, "You can't touch the military appropriation. It is sacred. You can't take supplies away from our boys who are defending the flag."

To me, that is the most specious argument that could be made by a hundred extremely intelligent men. That is not the issue—of course we must safeguard our troops. But we have a duty to weigh these priorities.

I honor the Senator from Mississippi for the position he takes, which I believe is the proper position for him to take. But I have a responsibility, too, Mr. President; and my responsibility is very different from that of the Senator from Mississippi.

I do not wish to delay the Senator too long on this matter. Perhaps we can speed this up.

Mr. STENNIS. I believe the Senator has some good questions, and I am willing to answer them so far as I can.

Mr. CLARK. I would suggest, in order to expedite matters somewhat, that we turn now to page 2 of the report and that the Senator discuss why the committee increased the missile authorization for the Air Force by $10 million—$13 million over the amount recommended by the Bureau of the Budget, and put in a total increase over what was appropriated last year of some $428 million. I would be happy if the Senator could explain this rather heavy increase over last year's appropriations and a perceptible increase over what the executive branch requested.

Mr. STENNIS. The bill includes the same amount of money as was requested, which is above the sum of last year, as the Senator has said.

Mr. CLARK. I made a mistake. I was looking one line too far down. I believe we did cover the matter of Air Force missile procurement.

I misspoke myself. I ask the Senator now to turn to "Naval Vessels: Navy." The facts I erroneously stated a moment ago as applicable to Air Force missiles should have been applied to "Naval Vessels: Navy." We find an increase in what the Defense Department requested of some $13 million and an increase over appropriations last year of some $400,280,000. All this I am reading from the table on page 2 of the committee report.

Mr. STENNIS. In round figures, the amount appropriated last year was $1.3 billion, and the amount in this bill, in round figures, is $1.725 billion. I understand that the Senator's question is with reference to that difference.

Mr. CLARK. The Senator is correct.

Mr. STENNIS. The committee put in $13.5 million extra for improving a submarine, which is coming up in the 1970 program for its main financing. There are some long leadtime items in the 1969 program—this bill—and we increased that modest amount. It has to do with what I will call a more advanced submarine, but it was done on excellent proof.

Another item involving an increase is with respect to the FDL ships, to which the Senator alluded this morning. That pertains to the Army, the transportation of Army equipment and supplies—a ready means to move not so much the men as the equipment and materiel.

That is the other prong of the air transportation for the Army, and that would be the sea transportation or airlift, sealift. They complement each other, and this is just the first increment. The sealift portion was delayed before, and I believe we lost some time on it. Perhaps the Senator will desire to discuss that matter in more detail later.

However, the largest item in this increase pertains really to a new escort ship system, new destroyers. In later years we will be coming up to the frigates, and the question about some of them being nuclear powered. The Senator is familiar in a general way with that feature. That is the most expensive item in this Navy increase.

Mr. CLARK. Without violating security, this involves the conversion of naval surface vessels and submarines to atomic energy power.

Mr. STENNIS. Not exactly. In this bill is a new class of destroyer.

The Senator is familiar with the role of destroyers. It is a highly important role. There are five of those vessels. Money is provided here for five of those new class destroyers.

There is another part of this same program where we get into the frigates. There is no procurement money for those

vessels in the bill, but the frigate is a part of the research and development program.

Mr. CLARK. Can the Senator tell me, in general terms, the timelag between the passage of an authorization bill and the time when these ships are equipped, in the water, and ready for service?

Mr. STENNIS. Two to 4 years, on procurement. I understand the Senator's question deals with procurement.

Mr. CLARK. I am including complete procurement so that the hardware is ready for service.

Mr. STENNIS. The time is 2 to 4 years.

Mr. CLARK. So it would be 1970 or 1971 in April before any of these vessels were ready for national security purposes.

Mr. STENNIS. Approximately 2 years; yes.

Mr. CLARK. I suggest to my friend, in view of the current world situation, the status of our economy, and the status of gold, that these are expenditures which well could be postponed, if not entirely eliminated in connection with those that are over what was appropriated for 1968.

I shall skip the tracked combat vehicles. Perhaps I should not skip that item because I do wish to commend the committee for cutting the amount from the amount appropriated last year.

Mr. STENNIS. To comment on the Senator's question, it is always a question of judgment with respect to the type protection a vessel should have. However, there can be no argument that we need some type. They must have protection. A carrier at sea is a sitting duck, sitting alone there with all of that gasoline and ammunition. It has to be protected.

Mr. CLARK. All I can say to my friend, and I do not expect to convince him, is, from whose attack are you protecting? We are not protecting from attack by the Chinese or North Vietnamese. We do not need to go over that argument again.

The only way I can see would be if we need protection against the Russian Air Force and Navy, and that would only take place if we were engaged in an offensive operation off the coast of Russia.

I am going to have to cut this presentation short. I would like to direct attention to "Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation" which appears in the table on page 2 of the report. I would like to call attention to the total which shows that the total appropriated for fiscal 1968 is $7,092,600,000, whereas the amount reported by the committee, which would in fact make a 3-percent cut in the request of the Department of Defense, is, nonetheless, almost $800 million more than the amount appropriated last year, or $7,875,476,000. I would suggest to the Senator that this is one area where we could certainly cut back to the amount appropriated last year unless there are facts the Senator could reveal as to the reason for this very large increase. Let us not underestimate the significance of these huge military research and development expenditures in the American economy as a whole. The end result is to limit, and strictly limit, the amount of research and development otherwise available for domestic programs. If the military skims off the cream of the brains of America into military research and development, what will be left for peaceful research? Does it make sense to use all our brains to develop lethal instruments which, if they are ever used, would completely destroy civilization?

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I comment on that statement in this way. An $8 billion package for research and development for one department of the Government is a big order and it did not go unattended by the committee.

Frankly, in the beginning I looked at that figure and thought in terms of the possibility of a 10-percent reduction. That was my individual start. Other Senators had other figures in mind. The Senator from Maine [Mrs. SMITH] spoke earlier this morning, and her opinion was that there should not be any reduction.

I am illustrating the across-the-board differences of opinion.

Mr. CLARK. I regret the Senator's view did not prevail in the committee. I think he was on sound ground.

Mr. STENNIS. After hearing the proof I was glad to agree to the figure on which the committee got together.

I wish to read one sentence from a fine statement on the subject that attracted the attention of all of us, by Dr. Foster, who is the Department of Defense Director of Research and Development. He said:

> In summary, then, in fiscal year 1968 we submitted an R.D.T. & E. program of $7,523 million. This year we are asking for $8,031 million. Of the difference of $508 million, more than half, or $294 million, is accounted for by the financing factors I just discussed and does not represent growth of the R.&D. effort.

Mr. CLARK. What are the financing factors?

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, to make the picture complete, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD an excerpt from the testimony of Dr. Foster which appears in the printed hearings, beginning on page 420 and ending on page 421.

There being no objection, the excerpt was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

> A particularly complicated fiscal topic is the year end carryover. In recent years, the Congress has expressed concern over the unobligated year end balances of R.D.T. & E. funds. You will recall that last year, in an attempt to reduce the year end unobligated balances, the DOD requested new obligational authority of $250 million less than the total obligational authority necessary to support the fiscal year 1968 R.D.T. & E. program. Congress accepted the $250 million recoupment goal proposed in the budget and added $98.5 million to that goal.
>
> Since the original $250 million was proposed a year ago, the trend toward increasing year end unobligated carryover was reversed. The unobligated carryover, rather than increasing, actually decreased—from $1,414 million going into fiscal year 1967, to $1,003 million going into fiscal year 1968. We now estimate that the downward trend will continue so that the unobligated carryover at the end of 1968 will be about $863 million. The end unobligated balance includes all the funds in the procurement and contracting process or "pipeline" at the end of a fiscal year and corresponds to working capital. The $863 million represents about 6 weeks' working capital on an $8,000 million program. If achievable, this amount is near the minimum needed to avoid interruption of contracting procedures at the beginning of a fiscal year that, in turn, would lead to an undesirable increase in contract peaking at the end of fiscal year.
>
> As a consequence, we estimate $140 million of the difference in our requests for fiscal year 1968 and fiscal year 1969 is due to our no longer being able to draw on the year end carryover balance to add to current year obligational authority. An additional $154 million of the difference results from redefinition of activities. That is, items that previously appeared in other appropriation accounts are being moved to the R.D.T. & E. appropriations.
>
> In summary, then, in fiscal year 1968 we submitted an R.D.T. & E. program of $7,523 million. This year we are asking for $8,031 million. Of the difference of $508 million, more than half, or $294 million, is accounted for by the financing factors I just discussed and does not represent growth of the R. & D. effort.
>
> This completes my brief review of the R. & D. highlights. I would now like to present selected parts of my detailed statement.

Mr. STENNIS. That is the best statement to which I could refer the Senator.

Mr. CLARK. I have no further questions at the moment to ask the Senator from Mississippi. I do wish to make a brief statement on my own, in accordance with the agreement entered into earlier. I must depart for another important engagement.

I have been furnished a book entitled "The Weapons Culture," written by Ralph E. Lapp, which I believe should be read by every Senator. The subtitle of the book is "How the Tyranny of Weapons Technology Has Taken Over Our Society, Dominated Our Economy, and Warped Our Sense of Values."

Dr. Lapp's association with the nuclear community goes back to 1943, when he was an associate physicist with the Manhattan project. Since then he has served with the Argonne Laboratory in Chicago, as consulting scientist at the Bikini bomb tests in 1946, adviser to the War Department General Staff, Executive Director of the Research and Development Board, head of the Nuclear Physics Branch of the Office of Naval Research, and, since 1950, as consulting physicist of the Nuclear Science Service.

To my way of thinking, he makes a decisive and thoroughly convincing attack on the way in which the military-industrial complex has taken over the country to the extent that it currently threatens our form of democratic society. I shall have more to say about the book tomorrow.

I call particular attention to the chart which appears in the book on page 202 entitled "Federal Expenditures for National Defense and Research and Development, 1940–1968." I call attention to the fact that the Federal expenditures for research and development beginning with 1950 were significantly less than $1 billion, that at the end of the Korean war they were less than $6 billion, and that today the curve is still going upwards, with a figure of $15 billion for fiscal 1968.

I invite attention also to the fact that total Federal expenditures for national defense in 1948 were in the neighborhood of $12 billion. At the time of the Korean war, it peaked to something less than $50 billion. Then it declined somewhat until today, in fiscal 1969, we are asked to authorize and appropriate a

total of in excess of $80 billion for national defense expenditures, a figure which, in my judgment, is utterly unjustifiable in light of the other critical problems which confront this country.

Inasmuch as we have pared our defense authorizations and expenditures in the past, we should be able to cut back to the peak reached at the time of the Korean war in 1952 when the national security appropriations or national defense appropriations—call them what we will—were in the neighborhood of $50 billion, which would be $30 billion less than we are asked to expend this year.

Mr. President, under the arrangement hitherto entered into, I yield the floor.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I thank the Senator for his remarks and if he will yield to me I think he has asked some very good questions, indeed.

Mr. CLARK. I thank my friend from Mississippi for his constant courtesy.

Mr. STENNIS. I hope that the Senator would not leave the Chamber immediately so that I may have an opportunity to see him.

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. HART. Mr. President, I should like to have the floor for a brief moment.

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, I withdraw my request for the call of the quorum and am glad to yield to the Senator from Michigan.

Mr. President, I have already yielded the floor.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that, notwithstanding the previous order, the distinguished Senator from Michigan [Mr. HART] may be recognized for 5 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered.

Mr. HART. Mr. President, late yesterday, I was compelled to leave the Chamber in order to attend an adjourned subcommittee meeting. I had conferred with the Senator from Mississippi [Mr. STENNIS] who replied to the concern I voiced late yesterday, when I noted that the amount recommended for research and development for 1969 was an increase of $782 million over the amount currently being spent, to read the hearings, beginning on page 420. I acknowledged to him that those of us not on the committee or on the Appropriations Committee had an awful problem fighting our way through the military hardware when it added up to billions of dollars, and that we were reluctant to plunge in, particularly when our men are now under fire in Vietnam, in order to cut back on military authorization; but, it seemed to me that research was the area least likely to affect a man under fire.

Inasmuch as the committee had stated as one of its purposes to make sure that the effort to improve our balance of payments and narrow our deficit would impose some burden on the defense budget, and specifically that the research and development program should bear its share of the reduction, it seemed to me, under those circumstances, we could very well question the wisdom of increasing by many hundreds of millions of dollars our investment in research.

As I stated, the able Senator from Mississippi referred me to the record of the hearings, beginning on page 420. As promised, I read them this morning, and return to the floor to make the suggestion that as I read that record, the witness who was testifying, Dr. Foster, explained that there were two important items which really should not be charged as increased research and development over this year's level; namely, one in the amount of $154 million which reflects items that heretofore were carried in other appropriation accounts and, two, in the amount of $140 million, the increase the result of our termination of the carryover of balances which heretofore had been a factor.

I say "all right" to those two items, or at least I say perhaps they should not fairly be charged as raw dollar increases recommended. They total $294 million. When we deduct the $294 million from the figure of $782,876,000 which is the research and development increase, the resulting figure is $508,876,000. This more fairly, I think, could be said to be a raw dollar increase for research and development.

My feeling now is that if the Department of Defense is to be assigned some responsibility, and is willing to bear a fair share and if we are to spread the expenditure reductions that everyone makes a speech about seeking to achieve, this is an area that we should concentrate on.

As the committee stated:

> The research and development program must bear its share of reduction.

I would hope very much that the Senate can eliminate that $508,876,000 before we finally act on the appropriation.

I acknowledge, as I did when I spoke yesterday, that this is an area where, when we plunge into it, lacking the background and experience of the Senator from Mississippi [Mr. STENNIS] and others on the committee, we find ourselves in deep trouble.

One of the problems is that when I went to that record and read it, I found on some of the pages, such intriguing information as this:

> We have initiated this aggressive R. & D. program and expect to field in Vietnam the first version of this, a prototype model, [deleted].

Or:

> We have [deleted] of them on order, and the [deleted] will be available [deleted].

Or:

> Senator STENNIS. You will be going into this with others. Will you turn quickly to the last sentence of the first paragraph.
> [Deleted.]

That is the problem we are confronted with. It is no one's fault. I suspect that the one-half billion dollar reduction, from this aspect of the budget, will not affect adversely the security of our Nation, the extent of its fiscal responsibility, or will contribute to our strength or even enhance it.

Therefore, if no other Senator does, I shall offer an amendment to effect such a reduction.

Mr. STENNIS. I thank the Senator very much for his comments. As always, he is not given to idle talk. He talks about a highly important subject. Let me comment to show that this is a difficult matter to be categorical on.

Two years ago, when this same subject of research and development was up, I remember the Senator from Mississippi proposed a reduction, at the markup and before the markup, and wound up by not getting it reduced one dollar—not one. As I said to the Senator from Pennsylvania, the amount of $8 billion this year is a large amount of money. I was still interested in the subject, and had in mind proposing a 10-percent reduction. But, frankly, after getting into all of the justification, I may say to the Senator, I changed my mind to a considerable degree. One reason is that there is not really much of an increase, actually. There is a difference in fiscal arrangements. Last year they were required to use $348 million of unobligated balance——

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair would like to advise that the 5 minutes allotted the Senator from Michigan have expired.

Mr. HART. Mr. President, if no other Senator wishes to speak, why does the Senator from Mississippi not take some more time?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair will recognize the Senator from Mississippi.

Mr. STENNIS. So my suggestion was considerably less than a 10-percent reduction. We finally agreed to 3 percent.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I am about to propound a unanimous-consent request.

ORDER FOR RECESS TO 10 A.M. TOMORROW

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that when the Senate completes its business today, it stand in recess until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

ORDER FOR RECOGNITION OF SENATOR CLARK TOMORROW

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that immediately following the prayer and the disposition of the Journal on tomorrow, if there be such disposition, the distinguished senior Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. CLARK] be recognized.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

AUTHORIZATION FOR MILITARY PROCUREMENT, 1969

The Senate resumed the consideration of the bill (S. 3293) to authorize appropriations during the fiscal year 1969 for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, and tracked combat vehicles, research, development, test, and evaluation for the Armed Forces, and to prescribe the authorized personnel strength of the Selected Reserve of each Reserve com-

ponent of the Armed Forces, and for other purposes.

UNANIMOUS-CONSENT AGREEMENT

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the time on each of the amendments offered by the senior Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. CLARK] be limited to 1 hour, the time to be equally divided between the distinguished senior Senator from Pennsylvania and the distinguished Senator from Mississippi [Mr. STENNIS]. It is my understanding, in making this request, that Senator CLARK has three amendments.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that final passage of the bill which the Senate is presently debating take place no later than 2:30 p.m. tomorrow, notwithstanding rule XII.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. HART. Mr. President, perhaps I should have reserved the right to object to that request, but I think my inquiry will satisfy me. As I indicated a moment ago, it would be my intention to offer an amendment seeking to reduce by $508 million the research and development figure. I understand that the intention is to act finally on the bill not later than 2:30 tomorrow.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Yes.

Mr. HART. And that time had been set aside for some amendments to be offered by Senator Clark.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Yes; 1 hour on each of his three amendments.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may be permitted to suggest the absence of a quorum without regard to the previous order.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The clerk will call the roll.

The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I ask further unanimous consent that time on all other amendments be limited to 30 minutes, the time to be equally divided by the mover of the amendment and the distinguished Senator from Mississippi, or whomever he may designate.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(This unanimous-consent agreement was subsequently modified.)

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

EXCESSIVE MILITARY EXPENDITURES WEAKEN NATIONAL SECURITY

Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, several Senators have wisely raised some serious questions relevant to the $7.9 billion included in this legislation for military research and development. I share their concern.

It is, of course, important that we not interfere with the procurement and research efforts related to the ability of our men in Vietnam to defend themselves. That is an engagement in which we are already involved—although as Senators know I disagree with the policies that have so heavily involved American troops in Vietnamese affairs.

I am inclined to believe, however, that there is somewhat less urgency about research and exploratory development that would be used in future conflicts which we are doing our best to prevent by diplomatic means.

As I understand it the basic justification that has been offered for the $450 million in the basic research category—conducted primarily by universities and laboratories—is that it is important to have a stable level of support and to avoid sharp year to year fluctuations. Presumably the alternative is for these institutions to lose some of their military research orientation. In light of the premium we are placing on research today, I see little reason to fear that our scientific capabilities will decline if these defense projects are reduced or channeled through other sources. I have yet to be persuaded that the Nation's research manpower and facilities could not be quickly mobilized in case of an emergency requiring them for military purposes.

Since this $450 million is devoted to basic research, I am also wondering whether we have any means of determining whether the American taxpayer is receiving a fair return on his investment in this area.

In his statement to the Armed Services Committee hearings on this bill, Secretary McNamara noted on page 224 of the hearings that:

> We cannot, as a general rule, prescribe specific goals, milestones, and time schedules for them (research and exploratory development). We can and do establish general goals and a framework of priorities in the various scientific areas. Accordingly, we try to manage these two categories of R & D on a 'level of effort' basis. Decisions about specific tasks and projects in this area, as you can readily understand, are virtually impossible to make from a central vantage point and we must, therefore, depend upon our R & D managers to cull out the less promising efforts so that the prescribed level of resources is concentrated on the most promising.

This statement indicates to me, first, that much of the basic research and exploratory development—accounting for a combined total of $1.43 billion in the proposed authorization bill—is not even directed toward a specific defense related problem. Beyond this, we are told that it is impossible to evaluate from a centralized viewpoint whether specific projects, more than 12,000 underway in the exploratory development field alone at the present time, are likely to make a worthwhile contribution to our security.

Secretary McNamara expanded on this topic somewhat by noting, on the same page of the hearing record, that he has "never been convinced that we are getting full value from this $1 billion a year effort." He went on, however, to recommend an amount approximately equal to that originally requested for fiscal year 1968.

In view of these revelations, I think it is entirely appropriate to insist on more careful scrutiny of these projects, particularly at a time when we are involved in a Government-wide effort to reduce expenditures and to restore confidence in the dollar. Excessive military expenditures that strain our economy and bleed off resources needed for other purposes actually weaken rather than strengthen our Nation's power and influence in the world.

I recognize that we are confronted with a unique difficulty, as legislators, in examining this portion of the Defense Department budget, since much of the information is labeled "classified."

This obstacle should not, however, prevent an analysis of what portion of our total past expenditures in the categories of research and exploratory development have been fruitful, or have lead to operational weapons and strategies. My own studies have convinced me that there is substantial room for reduction in this area, and that more stringent restrictions against useless or low priority research and exploration should be employed.

I consequently urge adoption of the amendment offered by Senator HART.

ORDER FOR TRANSACTION OF ROUTINE MORNING BUSINESS AND TIME LIMITATION ON STATEMENTS

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate now proceed to transact routine morning business until such time as Senator TOWER is ready to proceed with his speech.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that statements made during the transaction of routine morning business be limited to 3 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

EXECUTIVE COMMUNICATIONS, ETC.

The PRESIDING OFFICER laid before the Senate the following letters, which were referred as indicated:

REPORT ON PROJECTS PROPOSED TO BE UNDERTAKEN FOR THE ARMY RESERVE

A letter from the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Properties and Installations), transmitting, pursuant to law, a report on projects proposed to be undertaken for the Army Reserve (with an accompanying report); to the Committee on Armed Services.

PROPOSED USE OF APPROPRIATED FUNDS TO SUPPORT ARMY, AIR FORCE, NAVY, AND MARINE CORPS EXCHANGES

A letter from the Under Secretary of the Air Force, transmitting a draft of proposed legislation to amend title 10, United States Code, to authorize the use of appropriated funds to support Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps exchanges in certain situations (with an accompanying paper); to the Committee on Armed Services.

REPORT OF OFFICE OF CIVIL DEFENSE

A letter from the Acting Director, Office of Civil Defense, reporting, pursuant to law, on property acquisitions of emergency supplies and equipment for the quarter ended March 31, 1968; to the Committee on Armed Services.

PROPOSED LEGISLATION PROHIBITING EXTORTION IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

A letter from the Assistant to the Commissioner, Executive Office, Government of the District of Columbia, transmitting a draft of proposed legislation to prohibit extortion by means of telephone, telegraph, radio, oral or written message, or otherwise, in the District of Columbia (with an accompanying paper); to the Committee on the District of Columbia.

A letter from the Comptroller General of the United States, transmitting, pursuant to law, a report of the review of procurement of lunar module radars, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, dated April 17, 1968 (with an accompanying report); to the Committee on Government Operations.

REPORTS OF COMPTROLLER GENERAL

A letter from the Comptroller General of the United States, transmitting, pursuant to law, a report on the review of internal auditing and related activities, Post Office Department, dated April 12, 1968 (with an accompanying report); to the Committee on Government Operations.

REPORT OF COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATION OF TRAINING PROGRAMS

A letter from the Acting Secretary, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, transmitting, pursuant to law, a report on a study of the administration of training programs of the Department, dated March 1968 (with an accompanying report); to the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare.

PETITIONS AND MEMORIALS

Petitions, etc., were laid before the Senate, or presented, and referred as indicated:

By the PRESIDING OFFICER:

Two resolutions of the Legislature of the Territory of Guam; to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs:

"RESOLUTION No. 256

"Resolution relative to respectfully petitioning the Congress of the United States to incorporate the territory of Guam into the American Union so that it will lose its present unincorporated status which status is anamalous and unjustified in view of the rapid progress made on Guam since its cession by Spain

"Whereas, over the years a series of Supreme Court cases and administrative actions by Federal officials, apparently with the concurrence of the United States Congress, has built up a distinction between incorporated and unincorporated territories of the United States, the former being supposedly inchoate states while the latter are mere possessions usually insular, that are not considered incorporated into the Union; and

"Whereas, this practice apparently has no constitutional support in that the United States Constitution is silent on any distinctions between territories, and in addition insults the inhabitants of an unincorporated territory since one of the stated reasons for the distinction is that the people of an unincorporated territory are supposedly more backward and unsophisticated than their fellow American citizens and that therefore the full panoply of American law and custom should not be forced upon them; and

"Whereas, believing that there should be no distinction made between the territories of the United States and that all U.S. citizens should receive the full benefits of such citizenship by being subject to the same Constitution and laws as their fellow citizens, and finding the present day particularly appropriate to bringing this opprobrious distinction between territories to the attention of the United States Congress since the territory of Guam is on the front line in the war in Vietnam, where twenty-six of her young men have made the supreme sacrifice, the highest per capita loss of life of any American community, and even greater in total number than that of several states, which sacrifice demonstrates again, just as did the loyalty of residents of enemy-occupied Guam during the Second World War, that no more patriotic or devoted American citizens exist than the people of Guam who fully merit treatment as first class citizens of the United States, it is the consensus of the Legislature that the territory of Guam should be fully incorporated into the American Union; now therefore be it

"Resolved, that the Ninth Guam Legislature does hereby on behalf of the people of Guam respectfully request and petition the Congress of the United States to take whatever steps are necessary to incorporate Guam into the American Union as an incorporated territory, its present status of being considered unincorporated being highly objectionable and distasteful to the people of Guam whose principal political goal is ever closer bonds with the United States at large and ever greater political rights, consonant with the American tradition of self-government; and be it further

"Resolved, that the Speaker certify to and the Legislative Secretary attest the adoption hereof and that copies of the same be thereafter transmitted to the President of the Senate, to the Speaker of the House, to the Chairman of the Interior and Insular Affairs Committees, Senate and House, to Guam's Washington Representative, and to the Governor of Guam.

"Duly and regularly adopted on the 11th day of January 1968.

"J. C. ARRIOLA,
"Speaker.

"F. T. RAMIREZ,
"Legislative Secretary."

"RESOLUTION No. 408

"Resolution relative to expressing on behalf of the people of Guam the gratitude and appreciation of all inhabitants of the territory to the United States Congress for the visits to Guam in January of 1968 of delegations from both the United States House of Representatives and the United States Senate

"Whereas, in January of 1968, the territory of Guam was doubtly fortunate in receiving delegations from both the United States House of Representatives and United States Senate, one being led by the Honorable Hugh L. Carey of New York, Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Territories, and the other by the Honorable Quentin N. Burdick of North Dakota, Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Territories; and

"Whereas, these delegations in their tours of the island and reception of views from local political, commercial, and civic groups displayed a remarkable knowledge of the local scene and of local problems, a warm sympathy for and an obvious desire to assist in solving these problems, and a remarkable willingness to make whatever effort was necessary to hear every voice seeking assistance, examine every project needing attention, and absorb all information pertinent to Guam's problems; and

"Whereas, the people of the territory of Guam were thus shocked and chagrined to read criticism of these visits in the national press, the charge that such hardworking delegations were on some sort of pleasure cruise in the romantic South Pacific being so flagrantly inaccurate and unfair as to cause the people of Guam to question the motives of persons making such charges, or if not their motives, at least their willingness to check the facts before making scandalous accusations; and

"Whereas, the people of Guam know that this is an election year in the United States and that the members of the Congress running for reelection will garner no votes in Guam; the people of Guam further are aware of the distance the Congressional delegations had to travel in coming to Guam and the lack of facilities, if not in Guam, at least in the neighboring islands visited by these delegations; the people of Guam are further aware that in view of the remarkable generosity shown to the inhabitants of Guam by the United States Congress since the Second World War, a record of generosity to a small and distant island being unmatched anywhere else in the world, no claim can be made that the territory has been neglected by Congress and thus there exists no right to demand that the leaders of the Congress visit the territory and examine its problems first hand; now therefore be it

"Resolved, that the Ninth Guam Legislature does hereby on behalf of the people of Guam extend to the Congress of the United States the warm appreciation and deep gratitude of all the inhabitants of Guam for the trips made to Guam during January of 1968 by official delegations of the United States Senate and of the United States House of Representatives; and be it further

"Resolved, that although the Legislature of Guam cannot officially speak for the people or districts of the United States Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, it does wish to make clear that it and the people of Guam know how grateful the inhabitants of the Trust Territory are for the extensive and lengthy travel, under extremely arduous conditions, that was undertaken by these Congressional delegations throughout the Trust Territory prior to their arrival in Guam, the conditions under which these visiting delegations toured the scattered and neglected islands being such as to call for utmost dedication and real self-sacrifice on the part of each member of the Congressional parties, the people of Guam knowing that no other Congressional trip made to any other part of the world at any other time being more tiring or more difficult, all of which makes the people of Guam particularly regret the utterly false charges circulated in the American press as to the nature of these trips and especially appreciate the unflagging interest the Congressional visitors took in Guam's problems even after the exhausting tours they had made of the Trust Territory prior to their arrival in Guam; and be it further

"Resolved, that the Speaker certify to and the Legislative Secretary attest the adoption hereof and that copies of the same be thereafter transmitted to the Honorable Hubert Humphrey, President of the U.S. Senate, to the Honorable John McCormack, Speaker of the House of Representatives, to the Honorable Henry Jackson, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, to the Honorable Wayne Aspinall, Chairman of the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, to the Honorable Hugh L. Carey, to the Honorable Thomas S. Foley, to the Honorable Richard C. White, to the Honorable Patsy T. Mink, to the Honorable Lloyd Meeds, to the Honorable Laurence J. Burton, to the Honorable Theodore R. Kupferman, to the Honorable James A. McClure, to Senator Quentin N. Burdick, to Senator Lee Metcalf, to Senator Frank E. Moss, and to the Governor of Guam.

"Duly and regularly adopted on the 2nd day of February 1968.

"J. C. ARRIOLA,
"*Speaker.*
"F. T. RAMIREZ,
"*Legislative Secretary.*"

A concurrent resolution of the Legislature of the State of Hawaii; to the Committee on the Judiciary:

"HOUSE CONCURRENT RESOLUTION 39

"Whereas, centuries ago, an irrepressible band of the oppressed and the downtrodden of Europe crossed the oceans in search of a land where they could live in freedom, and thrive in dignity and order, under a system that would guarantee their fundamental rights;

"Whereas, these immigrants landed on a vast, virgin continent and in the pursuit of their dream, with pick and plow, with hammer and axe, made out of that wilderness the most prosperous and powerful nation in the world;

"Whereas, this epic was last repeated at the turn of this century when immigrants from Asia and the Pacific came to help develop, out of an isolated group of lava rock, America's shining bridge between East and West and its 50th State—Hawaii;

"Whereas, knowing that its strength lies in its mixture of races, and never losing sight of the innate Godliness in humanity, the United States of America has always raised its torch of Liberty and called upon all nations to "Give me your tired, your poor, your huddled masses yearning to breathe free, the wretched refuse of your teeming shore. Send these, the homeless, tempest-tost to me, I lift my lamp beside the golden door!";

"Whereas, with the openness and complete lack of provincialism in Hawaiian Society, and in the words of Governor John A. Burns, we in turn say, "The open sea, the open sky, the open doorway, open arms and open hearts—these are the symbols of our Hawaiian heritage . . . We welcome all visitors to our Island home . . . to see the examples of racial brotherhood . . . to share in our burdens and our sorrows, as well as our delights and our pleasures. We welcome you! *E komo mai!* Come in! The house is yours!"

"Whereas, the latest manifestation of this benevolent American spirit was the liberalization of the immigration laws with the passage of the Act of October 3, 1965, which abolished restrictions based on race, sex, nationality, place of birth or residence, and ends the national origins quota system effective June 30, 1968;

"Whereas, with this relaxation of immigration restrictions and the latent desire in the hearts of millions of peoples throughout the world to come to this fabled land of ours, we shall again see a new wave of dynamic progress with the infusion of new blood, new skills, new talents, to an already vigorous society;

"Whereas, it is important, if we are to preserve our greatness and our strength and thus remain true to our heritage and traditions that this population change maintain the uniqueness of our cosmopolitan character by regenerating its broad representations of peoples and cultures from the East as well as the West; now therefore,

"Be it resolved by the House of Representatives of the Fourth Legislature of the State of Hawaii, Budget Session of 1968, the Senate concurring, that the U.S. Department of Justice, make studies for the encouragement of such immigration into Hawaii as would continue the broad representation in this State of the peoples and cultures of East and West; and

"Be it further resolved that duly certified copies of this resolution be transmitted to the President of the United States of America, the President of the U.S. Senate, the Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives, U.S. Senator Hiram L. Fong, U.S. Senator Daniel K. Inouye, US. Congressman Spark M. Matsunaga, U.S. Congresswoman Patsy Mink, and the U.S. Department of Justice.

"TADAO BEPPU,
"*Speaker, House of Representatives.*
"SHIGETO KANEMOTO,
"*Clerk, House of Representatives.*
"JOHN J. HULTEN,
"*President of the Senate.*
"SEICHI HIRAI,
"*Clerk of the Senate.*"

A resolution adopted by the executive committee of the Greater Philadelphia Chamber of Commerce, Philadelphia, Pa., praying for the enactment of legislation to remedy the international monetary situation; to the Committee on Finance.

A resolution adopted by the Westchester County Board of Supervisors, White Plains, N.Y., praying for the enactment of legislation in the area of housing for the poor; ordered to lie on the table.

EXECUTIVE REPORTS OF A COMMITTEE

As in executive session,

The following favorable reports of nominations were submitted:

By Mr. FULBRIGHT, from the Committee on Foreign Relations.

Robert Sargent Shriver, Jr., of Illinois, to be Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to France;

Edward Clark, of Texas, to be Executive Director of the Inter-American Development Bank;

George C. McGhee, of Texas, to be Ambassador at Large; and

Henry Cabot Lodge, of Massachusetts, to be Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to the Federal Republic of Germany.

BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS INTRODUCED

Bills and joint resolutions were introduced, read the first time, and, by unanimous consent, the second time, and referred as follows:

By Mr. CLARK:

S. 3339. A bill for the relief of Pasqualino Corrado;

S. 3340. A bill for the relief of Umberto D'Amario;

S. 3341. A bill for the relief of Enrico Gagliardi; and

S. 3342. A bill for the relief of Salvatore Butto; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. HOLLAND (for himself and Mr. SMATHERS):

S. 3343. A bill to designate certain lands in the Pelican Island National Wildlife Refuge, Indian River County, Fla., as wilderness; to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

By Mr. CLARK:

S. 3344. A bill for the relief of Kwong Sui Chu; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. McGEE:

S. 3345. A bill for the relief of T. Sgt. James W. Alderman, U.S. Air Force; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. BREWSTER:

S. 3346. A bill for the relief of Hamilton H. M. Ma and Cheung Chun Fat; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. SPARKMAN:

S.J. Res. 160. Joint resolution to amend the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to authorize an investigation of the effect on the securities markets of the operation of institutional investors; to the Committee on Banking and Currency.

(See the remarks of Mr. SPARKMAN when he introduced the above joint resolution, which appear under a separate heading.)

By Mr. RIBICOFF:

S.J. Res. 161. Joint resolution to authorize the President to issue a proclamation designating the day immediately following Thanksgiving Day in each year as "National Family Day"; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

(See the remarks of Mr. RIBICOFF when he introduced the above joint resolution, which appear under a separate heading.)

SENATE JOINT RESOLUTION 161—INTRODUCTION OF JOINT RESOLUTION DESIGNATING THE DAY AFTER THANKSGIVING AS "NATIONAL FAMILY DAY"

Mr. RIBICOFF. Mr. President, Thanksgiving Day is that traditional time in America when families are rejoined for the purpose of giving thanks to God for the blessings which have come to them. Further, the day after Thanksgiving is rapidly becoming a "day off" for most Americans and Thanksgiving weekend is becoming a 4-day holiday for an increasing number of our citizens. There could be no more appropriate time, therefore, than the day following Thanksgiving for the creation of a new national holiday—a day reminding us of our family loyalties and ties, the integration of family life in America, and the fact that the family is the basic strength of our or any free and orderly society.

Therefore, I introduce, for appropriate reference, a joint resolution designating the day after Thanksgiving "National Family Day."

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The joint resolution will be received and appropriately referred.

The joint resolution (S.J. Res. 161) to authorize the President to issue a proclamation designating the day immediately following Thanksgiving Day in each year as "National Family Day," introduced by Mr. RIBICOFF, was received, read twice by its title, and referred to the Committee on the Judiciary.

ADDITIONAL COSPONSORS OF BILL

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that, at its next printing, the names of the Senator from Utah [Mr. BENNETT], the Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. BROOKE], the Senator from Michigan [Mr. GRIFFIN], the Senator from Oregon [Mr. HATFIELD], and the Senator from Iowa [Mr. MILLER] be added as cosponsors of the bill (S. 3322) to establish an Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation and a Joint Committee of Congress on Program Analysis and Evaluation.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

RESOLUTIONS

TO PRINT ADDITIONAL COPIES OF HEARINGS ENTITLED "RIOTS, CIVIL AND CRIMINAL DISORDERS"

Mr. McCLELLAN submitted the following resolution (S. Res. 277); which was referred to the Committee on Rules and Administration:

S. RES. 277

Resolved, That there be printed for the use of the Committee on Government Operations one thousand additional copies of part

5 of the hearings before its Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations during the Ninetieth Congress, second session, entitled "Riots, Civil and Criminal Disorders."

SENATE RESOLUTION 278—SUBMISSION OF RESOLUTION RELATING TO COMPENSATION FOR UTAH SHEEP RANCHERS

Mr. BENNETT. Mr. President, I submit, for appropriate reference, a resolution directing the Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry to conduct an investigation and determine the amount of damages which should be awarded to Utah ranchers and sheep owners who suffered extensive losses as a result of nerve gas testing conducted by the U.S. Army at or near Dugway Proving Grounds, Utah, on approximately March 13, 1968.

I am sure that most of my colleagues have read the newspaper accounts that over 5,000 sheep have died in an area known as Skull Valley, Utah, and that many more sheep are sick and will either die or have to be destroyed. These sheep started to die soon after the Army conducted an aerial test near Dugway, Utah, in which a persistent chemical nerve agent was discharged at a low altitude from spray tanks attached to a high speed aircraft.

As soon as I became aware of these tests and the adverse effects which they apparently had on sheep grazing in the Skull Valley area, I called upon the Department of the Army for a full explanation and on March 25, 1968, Brig. Gen. William W. Stone, Office, Director Research and Laboratories, U.S. Army Materiel Command, met with me and other members of the Utah congressional delegation. General Stone submitted a written statement and answered questions raised at the meeting held in my office. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to insert at this point in the RECORD a copy of General Stone's statement.

There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

STATEMENT BY BRIG. GEN. WILLIAM W. STONE

Gentlemen, we are here today to answer the specific questions that you have raised concerning the recent death of sheep near Dugway Proving Ground. After covering these questions I would like to present to you our current knowledge of what has happened. As you will see we do not yet know whether or not Dugway tests were responsible for the death of the sheep.

The agent with which we are working is a persistent nerve agent.

I imagine several of you have seen the editorial that appeared in the Deseret News on 23 March. Within its objective review of the situation it quoted a 1959 House Committee report which states very well the importance of the work that is being done:

"The best immediate guarantee the U.S. can possess to insure that CBR is not used anywhere against the Free World is to have a strong capability in this field too."

Moving now to your specific questions:

1. *Purpose of Test:* The Dugway test of 13 March 1968, was part of an operational test and evaluation program for an aircraft chemical spray system. The test was the third one of a series of three. A persistent chemical nerve agent was sprayed from tanks. The spray mission was flown by a high performance aircraft at low level. The objectives of the program were completely routine tests applied in all material research development activities. One objective of such tests is verifying operating instructions and safety procedures.

2. *Who was Flying the Aircraft:* An Air Force pilot.

3. *Name of Person in Charge of Test:* Colonel James H. Watts the Commanding Officer of Dugway Proving Ground, was in charge of the test.

4. *Type of Aircraft Used:* A high performance aircraft.

5. *Speed, Altitude and Direction of Aircraft:* The speed of the aircraft cannot be released. The altitude was 150 feet above the ground. Heading 315° true.

6. *Name of Agent Used:* A persistent chemical nerve agent.

7. *Known Effects of Agents on Sheep, Other Animals and Man:* The agent in question has been studied extensively in many types of animals and a great deal is known about its effect on humans. There is meager information available concerning its effects on sheep. During the past week tests thave been conducted at Dugway Proving Ground in which the compound was fed in varying amounts to a control group of sheep. The signs exhibited by sheep in these tests were similar to those seen in other animal species which have been studied.

8. *Has agent been used before in test:* For more than ten years the agent used has been released at Dugway literally hundreds of times. A large number of these trials have been spray trials using aircraft.

The largest single spray program was a World War II effort involving mustard in which tons were released from spray tanks very similar mechanically to the tanks used in this test.

Spray testing with non-persistent nerve agents was initiated in 1953. Over a period of years in excess of 100 spray trials were successfully conducted. There were accidental field crew exposures on occasion. None of these incidents were serious but they did cause redefined safety requirements, increasing the safety factors associated with testing.

The point is that the persistent agent involved in these tests was nonvolatile. The persistent agent is characteristically much less volatile. These tests are discussed further under question 14 below.

9. *Amount of agent:* 320 gallons were released. The pressure involved in release was approximately 6.5 psi.

10. *What checks were made on position of aircraft. Ground observation, radar, instruments or known landmarks.* The flight pattern to be flown was fully discussed with the pilot and radio communications were maintained between the pilot and test officer throughout the flight. Established procedure followed on this trial was to mark the flight line with burning smoke pots placed approximately ½ mile off the grid. Two dry runs were made prior to the agent dissemination run to insure that the pilot was familiar with the area and flying at the proper altitude. This was verified by ground observers backed by photo crews observing the runs through their instruments. After the dry runs were made to ascertain that the proper flight pattern and countdown to release had been established, the pilot was informed to come in on the dissemination run. During this run, data were collected which can establish position of the aircraft at any point on the dissemination run to one meter accuracy from information obtained with three Contraves Photo Cine-theodolites placed at positions surveyed to first order accuracy (1 in 100,000). The pilot monitored altitude and air speed with reference to flight instruments and flew the desired flight path with reference to the smoke and ground landmarks.

11. *Weather conditions at time of test.* Scattered low and middle clouds with a high thin overcast was observed for the time of function at near Granite Peak and at Wig Mountain. Low scattered clouds were observed for the spray trial over the Salt Flats. A weak front was in the area. Frontal passage was not well defined. The low pressure area associated with the front during the morning hours had remained stationary and was centered in east-central Nevada by late afternoon.

12. *Land conditions at time of test.* The ground condition was dry on all the grids at test time. The valleys and the lower elevations in the mountains were also dry. There was some snow cover at the higher elevations in the mountains.

13. *Winds aloft, direction, velocity, and gusts at time of test.* The winds aloft from the surface to 2300 feet were generally southwest, 5 to 25 miles per hour, with gusts to about 35 miles per hour. The observed data in the target area are as follows:

Height (feet)	Wind direction (degrees)	Speed (miles per hour)
6	209	14.2
100	214	22.7
150	210	19.4
250	218	20.8
480	208	16.6
1,030	211	23.9
2,290	238	20.0

14. *Have aircraft tests been conducted before and, if so, what were the results?* As noted above, the answer is yes. Aircraft spray is a particularly effective way of employing chemicals whether the chemical be a smoke screen, a riot control agent, or a lethal chemical. Dugway's largest spray programs were the mustard programs of World War II. Nerve agents have been tested in aircraft spray systems extensively, beginning in 1953 and continuing at the present time.

Such tests follow a strict procedure. First, trials are conducted using non-toxic materials with physical characteristics similar to the agent later to be tested at Dugway. This is done to evaluate system performance. The critical factor is the size of the droplets produced, since a droplet falls at a rate depending on its mass. The non-toxic material is used in trial runs to define the safe operational limits for the agent trials. To give some examples, on one of Dugway's spray programs in 1961, eight simulant trials were conducted and completely evaluated before running the two agent releases that completed that particular program. Two months of analysis separated the simulant trials from the spray missions using the actual agent. In another program, seven simulant trials preceded the three agent missions. Again, several weeks of study intervened. On the first major nerve agent spray evaluation conducted in 1962, 21 simulant trials preceded three agent missions. The point being that rather elaborate evaluations are routinely conducted before authorization to fly a toxic spray mission is granted. The current program is noteworthy in that respect.

Preliminary trials included one test with water-filled tanks and seven tests with a simulant. Two single tank trials and one two-tank trial had been conducted with simulants before the first agent trial was conducted.

The results of these trials fill voluminous test reports and in line with the present problem, to date there has been no evidence that toxic clouds ever escaped the confines of the proving ground. It is worth noting that the inhabited area lying nearest to Dugway's testing sites houses the wives and children of the scientists conducting Dugway's tests. That fact provides an insight into Dugway's safety policy that might be overlooked in a detailed review of volumes of test reports.

16. *Safeguards used to avoid human contact with agent at Dugway.* The spray tanks used on the subject test were factory filled, sealed and delivered to Dugway in approved shipping containers with technical escort and were free of contamination. Handling of the tanks prior to test was performed in normal work clothing. For the handling of those test

items that are filled with toxic agents at Dugway, more extensive protective measures are normal. These include the wearing of butyl rubber clothing, boots, gloves, gas masks, and head hoods. When personnel are operating in grid areas which are contaminated, the same complete protective clothing is worn. All equipment (including vehicles) used on our contaminated grids is considered to be permanently contaminated and is kept in the test area. Access to this area is controlled by a security guard. Personnel are logged in and out so their location is known. During the conduct of an operation an assigned safety officer identifies and controls the location of all test personnel through radio and direct contact. He assures that all personnel are in safe positions with respect to toxic cloud travel, i.e., safe downwind distances and upwind locations.

Gentlemen, up to this point we have given you the best answers we have to the sixteen specific questions you asked. With your permission I would like now to present on a summary chart the situation as we now see it. In the open sheep symbols we show the location of the sheep herds which have been affected. The losses range from essentially the entire herds at White Rock and the Hatch herd here to about 100 sheep at Hatch Ranch and 10 sheep in a herd in Rush Valley. We do not know how many sheep have actually died; however, we should get a good count as the burial operation proceeds. This operation should start today, Monday.

The solid sheep symbols show the location of large herds which are completely unaffected. Also in the northern part of Skull Valley there are other small herds unaffected. The blocks show the general areas in which we have taken samples. In these areas we have taken, and are still taking hundreds of samples of soil, water, snow, and vegetation looking for traces of the agent we were testing. Outside the general area of the test grid itself, we have found no traces whatsoever of our agent. This is a typical finding and much like what we see in our normal safety surveys which we do routinely, although at a much smaller scale, as part of our safety program.

In the areas where the largest sheep kills have occurred we and others have found some depression of the cholinesterase level in both live and dead sheep and also in some cattle. This observation is to be expected in any animal or human exposed to an organophosphorus compound. Compounds of this type also include a number of insecticides. Here too we do not at this point have any evidence that insecticides have been used in the affected area.

We and the state and Federal Public Health authorities are taking great care to insure that there is no hazard to humans. There are about 55 individuals living in Skull Valley. Twenty-two of them work at Dugway Proving Ground and we have already collected and analyzed their blood. The cholinesterase levels were within normal limits. Fortunately we know a great deal more about the effects of this agent of humans than we do about its effects on sheep. We can therefore conclude with that these individuals were not exposed to an organophosphorous poison which may have caused the sheep deaths.

The public health authorities have started to take blood samples from the remaining residents of Skull Valley. Their data should be available in the next day or two. Dept. of Agriculture, other public health authorities along with ourselves are continuing to collect as wide a variety of types of samples as possible and to have them analyzed in as many ways as possible trying to determine the answer to our first big question, "What caused the death of the sheep and how did it get there?"

In our view this question has not been answered. Although there is increasing evidence that an anti-cholinesterase material is involved, we do not, to my knowledge, have any evidence to tell us the actual chemical compound or to help us pinpoint the source and how it got to the sheep and not humans or to the other animals.

We fully recognize, with this occurring right on our doorstep and probably involving a chemical similar to materials we have been testing that we are highly suspect. To nail down the truth in this matter we are doing our best to get into the problem all the talents available in the Federal and State governments. The cooperation we have received from Governor Calvin Rampton of Utah, his Commission of Livestock, Mr. D. R. Waldron; the Director of the State Board of Health; Dr. C. D. Thompson and their staffs have been outstanding as has the representation and experts that have come in from the U.S. Publice Health Service and the U.S. Department of Agriculture. We have made available to these individuals all the information we have and better cooperation between all concerned could not be sought.

In summary, gentlemen, although we already have a mass of information, the picture is not clear. We and many others are working literally day and night until we find the answer to what happened. My present instructions are to stay with this problem until there is an answer. Consequently, I am going back to Dugway tonight. Gentlemen, thank you for your time.

Mr. BENNETT. Mr. President, since the meeting on March 25, I have been in daily contact with General Stone and other officials in the Army, the Department of Agriculture, the Public Health Service, and Utah State personnel who have been involved in trying to solve the mystery of the death of these sheep in Utah. I have also talked and met with the sheep owners and ranchers, veterinarians, and other health officials.

A point has been reached in the investigation apparently where all other factors except the Army's nerve agent have been eliminated as possible cause for the death of the sheep. In this regard I would like to insert at this point in the RECORD a letter received on April 1, 1968, from the Secretary of Agriculture which states in part:

Our scientists are of the opinion the problem is probably not caused by a bacterial or viral infection, poisonous plants or by pesticides.

There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE,
Washington, D.C., April 1, 1968.

Hon. WALLACE F. BENNETT,
U.S. Senate.

DEAR SENATOR BENNETT: This refers to your letter of March 20, 1968. The Department of Agriculture shares your concern over the death of the sheep in Utah.

Department scientists have been on the scene since Sunday, March 17, observing the sheep, performing autopsies, and collecting specimens for laboratory analysis. We have not determined the cause of the deaths; however, through their tests and observation of the area, our scientists are of the opinion the problem is probably not caused by a bacterial or viral infection, poisonous plants, or by pesticides.

Our efforts, in cooperation with the military and local authorities, are continuing, and we shall immediately inform you when the cause is determined.

Sincerely yours,

ORVILLE L. FREEMAN.

Mr. BENNETT. Mr. President, the Army has admitted both privately and publicly that they are the "prime suspect," and that laboratory tests conducted on sheep have resulted in similar symptoms and death of the animals involved. Separate tests have been conducted by the Department of Agriculture in its laboratories at Ames, Iowa, and by the Public Health Service's Bureau of Disease Prevention and Environmental Control at its clinical testing center in Atlanta, Ga. From my conversations with Army officials, I feel confident that they feel a responsibility to meet their obligation to the ranchers involved, once liability is determined and the amount of the damages are finally resolved.

There are several very valid reasons why I believe this resolution should be referred to the Committee on Agriculture and Forestry. The most obvious of course is that the primary loss involves the loss of over 5,000 sheep and the members of the Agriculture Committee are the most experienced in investigating problems relating to farming or ranching. Additional factors which the committee should examine and which logically come within the purview of the Agriculture Committee are:

First, damage due to contamination of the range foilage which may or may not be permanent;

Second, decrease in the market value of the range fee land and BLM leases;

Third, loss of profit resulting from inability to use the range for grazing of sheep and/or cattle for whatever period use is deprived;

Fourth, added expense involved in caring for afflicted sheep, if any, which recover;

Fifth, loss of profits due to reduced sales of meat products; and

Sixth, genetic damage to the survivors and their offspring.

Mr. President, I have just received from the Department of Defense a status report on investigation of sheep deaths in Utah. I ask unanimous consent that this report be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the report was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

STATUS REPORT ON INVESTIGATION OF SHEEP DEATHS IN UTAH

Brigadier General William W. Stone, Jr., Office of Research and Laboratories, Army Materiel Command, has completed the initial phase of the Army's investigation into the cause of the deaths of the sheep in the Skull Valley area of Utah. His report is now undergoing technical review by scientists and staff officers in the Department of the Army.

This investigation was conducted at Dugway Proving Ground, and in Skull Valley and Rush Valley by technical teams from the Proving Ground, Edgewood Arsenal, U.S. Public Health Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture and Utah State Departments of Health and Agriculture. These teams operated independently but in a highly cooperative manner, exchanging all information obtained.

The Army investigations are continuing and its findings to date have not been conclusive as to the specific cause for the death of the sheep. The evidence pointing to Army involvement is as follows:

a. Symptoms of an unknown sickness were reported as appearing on 14 March 1968 in the sheep at White Rock in Skull Valley, close to the eastern border of Dugway Proving Ground, and 27 miles east of the test site. By 15 March 1968 large numbers of sheep started dying at White Rock and in other

herds of sheep further to the east in Skull Valley. The highest death rate was among the sheep at White Rock. The deaths in sheep occurred following a spray trial of a persistent chemical nerve agent from a high performance aircraft on 13 March 1968 at Dugway Proving Ground.

b. Although there was a wind from the south-southwest at the time of the 13 March 1968 test, the wind shifted about two hours later and blew from the west. It can be postulated that any very small particles of agent remaining airborne could have been transported into the areas in Skull Valley and Rush Valley where sheep were later affected.

c. There were scattered cumulus clouds in the general area at the time of the test and scattered rain showers developed during the early evening. One of these rain showers could have washed this airborne agent out of the air deposited it on vegetation and the ground.

d. Cholinesterase depression in the blood of affected Skull Valley sheep points toward exposure to an organophosphorus compound. Many common pesticides, the nerve agents, and some noxious plant can cause this depression. Cholinesterase depression in the blood is the most sensitive indication of exposure to nerve agents or pesticides. This depression occurs at exposure levels well below those where there are visible or otherwise noticeable symptoms.

e. Although symptoms of the affected sheep differed initially from those expected from past laboratory experience with other animals, continued feeding experiments with the agent have essentially reproduced the later symptoms found in the sick Skull Valley sheep.

f. The total report indicates an extremely wide variety of possibilities as to what caused the sheep deaths; these have been explored and eliminated. There is no current evidence that the cause of death is to be found among poison plants, pesticides, or bacterial or viral infections.

g. Since 20 March 1968, several hundred samples of water, soil, snow, vegetation, and wool from Skull and Rush Valleys have been analyzed looking for evidence that the agent had escaped from the Proving Ground; all these samples were negative. Recognizing that something had in fact killed the sheep and that it could have been the agent, a few very large samples of vegetation were collected by Dugway Proving Ground scientists from the White Rock area to obtain increased sensitivity. By 10 April 1968 this difficult analysis had proceeded in the Proving Ground laboratories and elsewhere to the point where it was considered possible that traces of a nerve agent or a similar organic compound were present in two extracts of samples collected in the White Rock area. Although there are still confirmatory tests to be completed in several laboratories on these and other samples, this is an indication that the agent could be present in an area where sheep died. Intensive collection of additional large samples in other areas where sheep died is now going forward. Confirmatory laboratory findings are also being sought from large samples sent to Edgewood Arsenal and the National Communicable Disease Center.

Since that date the National Communicable Disease Center, Atlanta, Georgia, reports that their scientists have now isolated traces of an identical organophosphorus compound in snow, water and grass, and in the blood, liver and stomach contents of dead sheep in Skull Valley. It can be concluded that these compounds are related to the nerve agent samples provided by Dugway Proving Ground. Tests conducted to date at the Department of Agriculture Laboratories at Ames, Iowa, have not confirmed these findings.

Although the foregoing evidence points to the Army's involvement in the death of the sheep it is also clear that there are many questions still unanswered and which should be the subject of continuing investigation. For example:

a. Why have sheep been affected seriously with no effect on humans whatsoever and only a slight cholinesterase depression in cattle and perhaps horses. The rodent population density before and after the test is unchanged. Apparently the sheep were affected by eating contaminated vegetation. However, to obtain the sheep deaths observed, from the small amount of agent that current data indicate could have gotten to Skull and Rush Valleys as a result of the 13 March test, the sheep by some as yet unknown mechanism must have become highly sensitized to the agent. The opinion that the deaths were caused by a combination of factors, of which the agent was only one, has been orally expressed by many of the investigators, Army and otherwise.

b. As long as the possibility exists that the Army may have been involved, the existing safety procedures at the Dugway Proving Ground laboratories need to be reviewed by an unbiased group. In this regard the Department of the Army has proposed the formation of a Federal Inter-Agency Committee to conduct such a review. This proposal suggests the participation of representatives of the U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Department of the Army, Fish and Wildlife Service, Department of the Interior, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Utah State Division of Health, Utah State Department of Agriculture, National Aeronautics and Space Administration and representatives from private agencies with special capabilities. This proposal is currently under consideration by the Department of Defense.

There is no evidence of any hazard to humans in the area.

Mr. BENNETT. Mr. President, I ask that my resolution be referred to the Committee on Agriculture and Forestry and that because of the urgency of this matter that immediate action be taken to complete the investigation and report back to the Senate the findings of the committee.

Mr. President, I want to be assured that every possible safeguard has been taken to prevent further mishaps of this type, and that appropriate safety measures will be followed in conducting any future chemical warfare testing at Dugway Proving Grounds, Utah.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The resolution will be received and appropriately referred; and, under the rule, the resolution will be printed in the RECORD.

The resolution (S. Res. 278) was referred to the Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, as follows:

S. RES. 278

Resolved, That the Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, or any duly authorized subcommittee thereof, is authorized under section 134(a) and 136 of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, as amended, and in accordance with its jurisdiction specified by rule XXV of the Standing Rules of the Senate, to make a full and complete study and investigation of the death of sheep in the area of Dugway Proving Grounds, Utah, during March 1968, for the purpose of determining—

(1) whether the death of such sheep was caused by activities of the Government or any department or agency thereof;

(2) whether such activities (i) have resulted or may be expected to result in any other loss of, or damage to livestock or crops, including any products thereof, or to any other property or interests therein, or (ii) have endangered or may be expected to endanger the health of individuals, including consumers of any such products; and

(3) the persons or organizations legally or equitably entitled to compensation for any such loss or damage and the amount which should be paid to each such person or organization.

SEC. 2. The Committee shall report to the Senate at the earliest practicable date the results of its study and investigation, together with its recommendations for any necessary legislation.

AUTHORIZATION FOR MILITARY PROCUREMENT, 1969 — AMENDMENTS

AMENDMENTS NOS. 697 AND 698

Mr. CLARK submitted two amendments, intended to be proposed by him, to the bill (S. 3293) to authorize appropriations during the fiscal year 1969 for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, and tracked combat vehicles, research, development, test, and evaluation for the Armed Forces, and to prescribe the authorized personnel strength of the Selected Reserve of each Reserve component of the Armed Forces, and for other purposes, which were ordered to lie on the table and to be printed.

(See reference to the above amendments when submitted by Mr. CLARK, which appears under a separate heading.)

AMENDMENT NO. 699

Mr. JAVITS proposed an amendment to Senate bill 3293, supra, which was ordered to be printed.

(See reference to the above amendment when proposed by Mr. JAVITS, which appears under a separate heading.)

AMENDMENT NO. 700

Mr. CLARK submitted amendments, intended to be proposed by him, to Senate bill 3293, supra, which were ordered to lie on the table and to be printed.

ANNOUNCEMENT OF HEARINGS— U.N. PEACEKEEPING RESOLUTION

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, on behalf of Senator CHURCH, chairman, Subcommittee on International Organization Affairs, of the Committee on Foreign Relations, I wish to announce the rescheduling of public hearings on Senate Concurrent Resolution 47, which relates to the establishment of a United Nations Peacekeeping Force.

This resolution was introduced by Senator CLARK on October 10, 1967, and to date has 21 cosponsors.

Parties interested in testifying on this resolution, who have not already done so, are requested to get in touch with the chief clerk of the Committee on Foreign Relations, Mr. Arthur Kuhl, as soon as possible.

On May 1, it is planned to hear non-Government witnesses, including panels on peacekeeping. On May 2, the U.S. Representative to the United Nations, Ambassador Goldberg; the Honorable Paul C. Warnke, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs; and a ranking official from the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency will be the principal witnesses.

All hearings will take place in room 4221, New Senate Office Building at 10 a.m.

DR. RUFUS PEARSON, CAPITOL PHYSICIAN

Mr. McGEE. Mr. President, we are all acquainted with our doctor in the U.S. Capitol, Dr. Rufus Pearson. Indeed, his services have kept many of us going at times when we just had to keep going. A speech in praise of his ministrations is scarcely needed in these Halls—or across the Capitol, in the House, either. But it pleased me, as I am sure it pleased other Members of Congress, to see Dr. Pearson accorded recognition in the April 14 issue of Parade, the Sunday supplement of the Washington Post. I ask unanimous consent that the article, written by John G. Rogers, be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

YES, THERE IS A DOCTOR IN THE HOUSE AND SENATE

(By John G. Rogers)

WASHINGTON, D.C.—"The Man Mountain of Congress" has lost his title. Robert Everett, 6 feet 3 and 363 pounds, a Democrat from Tennessee, was recently ordered into the Naval Medical Center at Bethesda, Md., and put on a starvation diet for 26 days. In that period, about 25 percent of him faded away—exactly 93 pounds. And when he emerged weighing a scant 270, he not only felt better and looked better but he had earned the enthusiastic praise of Dr. Rufus Pearson, the physician who directed the massive melt-away.

Dr. Pearson is no stranger to the overweight problem. His job is attending physician to the United States Capitol, and, in addition, he's personal doctor to more than 350 members of Congress. And, it's a fact of life that by and large, our senators and representatives are just too fat. In addition, they're markedly plagued by generally poor physical condition and nervous tension.

"The real solution of their problem," says Dr. Pearson, a tall, soft-speaking, 53-year-old Georgian, "is preventive medicine. We have to get the congressmen interested in losing weight and whipping themselves into shape. Right now we're trying to get them into a physical fitness program that's used in N.A.S.A., a kind of program of progressive efficiency in athletics. At our gym in the Rayburn Building we have treadmills, rowing machines, pulleys, punching bags and so on but we've simply got to get more men interested in using them. We want to tone up the condition of the congressmen."

Dr. Pearson wishes that every congressman would be as weight-conscious as Everett. "I suppose I've been on 15 different diets in my life," says Everett. "And every time I slipped off. But this time I think I'm going to make it. In fact, I have to because I've developed diabetes. I never before had the encouragement and interest of a doctor like Dr. Pearson. He's just great, real devoted like an old-fashioned country doctor. He sees me every week and if I'm held up in some subcommittee meeting, he'll practically come and pull me out for my regular check."

Specifically, Dr. Pearson is a heart specialist—he once studied at Harvard University Medical School under famed Dr. Paul Dudley White—but few U.S. general practitioners have the varied daily experience that confronts him and his two assistants. In addition to the members of Congress, he's depended upon by hundreds of Capitol doormen, police, attendants, pages, waiters, waitresses and congressional employees. And, then throw in the up-to-14,000-a-day visitors who throng the Capitol, causing emergencies that range from simple fainting to complex heart attack. But the congressmen are his basic concern and he adjusts his schedule to their needs.

ALWAYS AVAILABLE

"Obviously," says Dr. Pearson, "a congressman has very little time to get off the floor or tear himself away from the heavy load of work. So, I'm here all hours. In a way, though, I'm working for the taxpayers. It costs the government a good many millions of dollars every year to maintain the Congress so we have quite a substantial investment to protect."

One veteran congressman gives a vivid impression of Dr. Pearson:

"He's like the doctor assigned to a professional football team. His job is to keep us patched up and in the game until it's over. I mean, if I'm managing an important bill on the floor and it's coming down to a vote, and suddenly I get a temperature, I don't want to go to the hospital or be ordered to bed. I want something to keep me on my feet even if it's high-powered pills during the day and sleeping pills at night."

Dr. Pearson is distressed when he finds the lawmakers, especially the older ones, driving themselves too hard:

"I do have lots of pressure cases. In fact, there's a big reason for pressure that comes in an election year, starting around February and the symptoms getting more acute as the election draws near. In those emergencies I do what I can in the man's best medical interests—and they do hate to go to the hospital, you know—and I explain the risks and they have to take it from there. You can't force medicine or treatment on a man."

A few congressmen—they win high marks from Dr. Pearson—actually improve their health in Washington because they recognize the rigors of their lives and make sure that they exercise every day. Rep. Fred Schwengel (R., Iowa) is great for push-ups and standing on his head. Sen. William Proxmire (D., Wis.) runs nine miles from home to the Capitol and back. Sen. Strom Thurmond (R., S.C.) lifts weights in his office. Rep. Bob Mathias (R., Calif.), Olympic games decathlon winner in 1948 and 1952, fights the sedentary life. He walks constantly, never uses the Capitol subway or escalators, and keeps an exercising device under the couch in his inner office. It's a wood and metal tension device originally developed for submarine sailors to keep fit in their cramped quarters. Mathias uses it every day and finds it just the thing to keep congressional fat away.

But, always Dr. Pearson and his patients must be sharply aware of the politician's occupational hazard—the dinner table. Says Rep. Elford Cederberg (R., Mich.):

"Politics is eating and eating is politics. To look at my February schedule, you'd think Abraham Lincoln was born nine times. I had to go to nine Lincoln Day banquets in two weeks. And the trouble is, the food is good. You go to a farm bureau meeting and those women turn out some of the best cooking in the country. You've got to eat it."

Dr. Pearson arrived at his Capitol post by way of the Navy. A native of Atlanta, he attended the University of Florida and Emory University. After four years in the Navy and five years of private practice in Jacksonville, Fla., he was recalled for the Korean War in 1950. Then he became chief of cardiology at the Naval Medical Center. In that role he came to know Dr. George W. Calver, the original attending physician to the United States Capitol, appointed by Congress in 1928 after a member had collapsed and died on the House floor. He also came to know many senators and representatives who were treated at the Naval Medical Center and when Dr. Calver retired in 1966, Dr. Pearson was tapped for his job. At the same time, the Navy promoted him to the rank of rear admiral.

Through his familiarity with the Naval Medical Center, and also with the Walter Reed Army Medical Center here, he's able to call in some of the best specialists in the country when his congressional patients need them.

Dr. Pearson was himself in that role of specialist when, after Lyndon B. Johnson's 1955 heart attack, the then Texas senator came to him for a checkup. He showed a laminated wallet-size copy of his cardiogram to the doctor who found it of great help in understanding his patient's condition, especially should he suffer another attack. Now, all of Dr. Pearson's heart patients carry such cardiograms so that they get faster, better attention if they have trouble.

Because he's been close to so many influential officials on a personal basis, Dr. Pearson has picked up many a tidbit of political and government information. But, he's as tactful as he is pleasant. Whatever he knows he keeps to himself. Nor will he give away any anecdotes about the congressmen—men whose long hours, frequent travels, ambitions and pressures from constituents often smite them with ills that disappear when their congressional days are over.

Dr. Pearson is married to the former Emily Timmerman and they have two children, Virginia, who was a Peace Corps nurse in the Dominican Republic for two years, and Navy Lieutenant Rufus III, a Naval Academy graduate.

When he can escape the office, the doctor is often found shooting golf in the 80's at the Columbia Country Club. And he's always fully prepared for an interruption when the call goes out: "Is there a doctor in the House—or Senate?"

A SECOND LOOK AT U.S. AGRICULTURE AND WORLD FOOD NEEDS

Mr. HRUSKA. Mr. President, recurringly over the past several years there have arisen new calls for massive increases in U.S. food production in order to feed the hungry populations of the world.

Generally, these demands are based on an understandable humanitarian principle. The argument usually runs to the effect that it is a relatively simple matter for American agriculture, with its tremendous potential for productivity, to provide millions of bushels of grain and other foods to relieve human suffering abroad.

Unhappily, that problem is not that simple, nor is the solution.

One of the most thoughtful and analytical discussions of this critical matter came last fall at a symposium at Morningside College, in Sioux City, Iowa, and was delivered by the able chancellor of the University of Nebraska, Dr. Clifford M. Hardin.

Chancellor Hardin translates the whole question of the role of American agriculture in helping to meet world food needs into the hard terms of reality. He points out that if this country is to undertake a greatly expanded food-aid program, we must assume an additional cost to the taxpayers of $10 to $15 billion a year by 1970 and $20 to $25 billion by 1980.

American farmers, he maintains, have a right to expect to be paid for their increased production, just as any other manufacturer must be.

Moreover, such payments must have two features. The first is a fair price in dollars, not the grossly subparity prices which have been suffered by the farmer far too long. The chancellor believes that such fairness would embrace, say $2 for

wheat, $1.50 for corn, $1.40 for sorghum, and $3 for soybeans. The second feature would be an assurance of the program and these prices—suitably adjusted for purchasing power of the dollar—for a period of 10 to 15 years or longer. Both of these requirements would be necessary to induce farmers to make additional investments in land and machinery, and make increased purchases of seed, fertilizer, and so forth, to expand output.

Unless these assurances by price and duration thereof come about, this warning from Mr. Hardin would be relevant:

> If American agriculture tooled up for such a production effort, and then had to cut back because of a taxpayers' revolt or because of more self-sufficiency in recipient countries, the adjustment problems with 50 percent excess capacity would be much greater than after World War II when we had excess production of 6 to 8 percent.

I further suggest that the cost of any such program should decidedly not be included in the appropriation act for Agriculture, nor should it be in that Department's budget. It would be a foreign aid program, or a tool for peace, or relief of hunger and suffering. But just because the substance for achieving those programs comes from the farm does not make it a part of the budget of the farmer. The American manufacturer has for some 20 years supplied articles for similar programs, but the expense thereof is charged to sources other than the producers of such articles.

Mr. President, because too little attention has been paid to this practical, commonsense approach to the problems of feeding a hungry world, I ask unanimous consent that Dr. Hardin's paper be printed in the RECORD. I recommend it to Senators.

There being no objection, the address was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

MIDWEST AGRICULTURE AND WORLD FOOD NEEDS [1]

(By Dr. Clifford M. Hardin, chancellor, University of Nebraska, Lincoln, Nebr.)

The estimates prepared by our agronomists and economists show that grain production in the 12 North Central States could be increased by a third to a half by 1970, and it might be doubled by 1980. These estimates are based upon the application of known technology and "near future" research results rather than upon spectacular yield increasing break-throughs. Our agronomists indicate also that the yield estimates may be conservative, particularly for 1980. Three other basic assumptions were used in these projections: (1) prices to farmers about 50% higher than this year; (2) no restrictions on acreage planted or quantities marketed; and (3) a foreign aid program sufficiently funded to move overseas all production above domestic needs.

A recent report on the world food situation, published by the Economic Research Service [2] of USDA, concludes: (1) that the capacity of the advanced nations to expand grain output will increase to 1980; and (2) that under any of the possible agricultural development rates in food-deficit nations (ranging from a continuation of recent historical trends to rapid improvement) the world of 1980 will have a grain productive capacity exceeding that needed to meet world food demands, including food aid. Thus, there is no question about the ability of the fertile agricultural regions of the temperate zone to expand food production. Rather, the question is how can this capacity be used most effectively in the next few years to meet world food needs while providing reasonable returns to farmers for the resources they use in production.

The land-grant universities have a responsibility of helping to inform the people of their respective states not only of the opportunities but also the problems involved in the war on hunger. They also have an obligation to point out to farmers and to the general public the consequences of alternative private and public policies and action programs which we may consider in solving the world population/food problem. There are opportunities for Midwestern farmers and agribusinesses in the years ahead if the war on hunger is to be won; there are also possibly serious pitfalls which must be avoided in the development of sound policies and programs.

1966 was the year when Americans generally awoke from the complacency of abundance and discovered the world food crisis. Grain stocks had been sharply reduced in the United States and Canada following two years of drought in India and poor 1965 harvests in Western Europe, Russia, and Red China. U.S. grain prices in August 1966 reached the highest levels in 15 years.

The temptation was great in such a situation to "turn American agriculture loose" to feed the world; the pressures were also great. This approach appeals to all of us as humanitarians desiring to alleviate hunger and misery wherever it occurs in the world. It is attractive to farmers; they could improve their incomes and feel also that they were participating in a humanitarian program. To agribusinesses it would mean increased sales of fertilizer, seeds, pesticides, machinery, and other production inputs, and more farm products to transport, store, handle, and process.

Let us look briefly at the effects of a greatly expanded food-aid program. In doing so, we must assume that the U.S. taxpayers would be willing to pay an additional $10–$15 billion a year for such a program by 1970 and $20–$25 billion by 1980. We might contrast this with the $2.5–$3.0 billion now being appropriated annually by the Congress for foreign economic and military aid. American farmers can and will expand production in response to price, patriotism, and people's needs; but they must be paid just as any other manufacturer must be. Such payment would have to come primarily from federal funds if the products are to go to hungry people who, in most instances, lack purchasing power to buy what they need through regular commercial channels of international trade.

With prices of, say $2.00 for wheat, $1.50 for corn, $1.40 for grain sorghum, and $3.00 for soybeans assured for a period of 10–15 years or longer and with appropriate adjustments for price level change, farmers would without question make additional investments in land and machinery and would increase their purchases of seed, fertilizer, etc. to expand output. Land prices would rise rapidly as farmers and other investors bid for land to enlarge farm units; some would lose out in this intensely competitive struggle. Grain production would certainly increase. Net farm incomes would improve because all production over our domestic needs would be moved abroad at these assured prices. If American agriculture tooled up for such a production effort and then had to cut back because of a taxpayers' revolt or because of more self-sufficiency in recipient countries, the adjustment problems with 50% excess capacity would be much greater than after World War II when we had excess production of 6–8%.

Economic and political problems in recipient countries might be aggravated if we attempt to increase food aid through concessional sales and gifts. Facilities for transporting, handling, and distributing more U.S. food could be provided in part by mass infusions of capital from this and other advanced nations. But not all food-deficit nations wish to become dependent upon us for food supplies, and some present recipients are even resentful of this political and economic lever. Their farmers object to imports of free or low-cost grains which depress the prices of their products. They view our accumulation of rupees and other soft currencies as potential interference in their economies.

The recent report of the President's Panel on the World Food Supply points out that ". . . expansion of concessional sales over an indefinite period is not in the best interest of either donor or recipient nation" and that "recipient nations may use such imports as a crutch to avoid the consequences of unchecked population growth, an unproductive agriculture, and irresponsibility in accelerating economic growth."

The United States cannot afford to ignore the impacts of its export policies upon other free-world nations. The economies of Canada and Australia, for example, are much more dependent upon agricultural exports than is our own. Furthermore, other advanced nations also are sharing in the task of providing food and technical assistance to the less developed countries and should be encouraged to participate to a greater extent.

We didn't call for all-out farm production in 1967 but we took some steps in that direction. Wheat allotments were increased by 30% and farmers were encouraged to plant more corn, grain sorghum, and soybeans. The response of American farmers to the hope of continued higher prices and to USDA encouragement through program changes was to produce record grain crops in 1967; wheat, 1.6 billion bushels; corn, 4.7 billion bushels; grain sorghum, 789 million bushels; and soybeans, 994 million bushels.

Prices received by Nebraska farmers in September 1967 were 9% below August 1966 due to lower prices for grains and meat animals; for U.S. farmers the decline was 7%. Our exports of wheat and feed grains are down this year from the high level of 1965–66 because of better crops in most of the other grain-producing areas, including India. Soybean exports are off because of increasing competition from Russian sunflower seed oil in the important European market. Wheat allotments have been reduced for 1968, and changes in next year's feed grain program will probably be designed to reduce plantings of corn, grain sorghum, and soybeans by perhaps 10%. This shows that the millenium has not yet arrived for Midwest agriculture.

Recent studies of the world/population food problem emphasize the role of food aid from advanced nations to buy time for the poor nations to control their populations, to improve their own agriculture, and to develop their economies to generate purchasing power to buy food if they can't become self-sufficient.

In the extension of the Food-for-Freedom Program (PL 480) last year, our government officially tied food aid to sound self-help development programs in recipient nations. If this approach is to be successful, it will require expanded capital investment here and abroad to produce the inputs needed to increase food production in the less developed nations. The war on hunger will be won not just on the fertile farms of the Midwest but also on the Ganges Plain of India. It will call for more human resources from the advanced nations to the less advanced nations to do applied agricultural research *in those countries*, to help develop agricultural education or extension methods

[1] Presented at a symposium, "Midwest Farmers in a Hungry World," at Morningside College, Sioux City, Iowa, October 19, 1967.

[2] Foreign Agricultural Economic Report No. 35, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Washington, D.C., 1967.

adapted to those countries, to assist in creating an economic, social, and political environment conducive to progress, and to train people of those countries to carry on these programs with less assistance after 5, 10, or 25 years. Hopefully, the need for food aid and technical assistance will begin to decline as this century ends. The dollar export sales of our farm products should expand moderately as incomes rise in these developing nations.

This task is proving to be more difficult, more complex, and more long-lasting than we imagined when PL 480 was enacted in 1954. In many nations an entirely new institutional structure must be built before economic development can proceed. This is the challenge—this is the opportunity for farmers, agribusinesses, researchers, educators, public officials, and citizens generally.

The National Advisory Commission on Food and Fiber concluded—as have other studies—that the world food problem cannot be solved simply by more food production from this and other developed countries. Population growth in the rest of the world is too rapid. Food population balance can be restored only by: (1) increasing their ability to produce food, and (2) reducing the propensity of their people to reproduce.

The Commission also recommended that food aid be available for emergencies and as a transitional measure to assist these countries with definite plans for economic development. These should be fully coordinated with long-run technical assistance programs to minimize risk of retarding agricultural development.

As an executive officer of a land-grant university, I wish, in closing, to re-emphasize the urgent need for a long-range commitment by our government to a program for training an international service corps of agricultural research and extension specialists devoted to agricultural development.

CONGESTION AT NATIONAL AIRPORT

Mr. SPONG. Mr. President, today's Washington Post contains an editorial entitled "Nightmare at National." The editorial discusses a recent proposal to enlarge Washington National Airport in order to accommodate jumbojets and airbuses.

Any further congestion at this already overcrowded airport would be intolerable, particular in view of the availability of Dulles International Airport, a facility located to serve a substantial segment of the permanent and transient population of the Washington metropolitan area.

I ask unanimous consent that the editorial be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

NIGHTMARE AT NATIONAL

An airport is more than just a place at which airplanes can land, and it is long past time for the airlines to begin to act as if they recognize this. Yet, some airline proposed in a recent secret meeting that National Airport be expanded so that it could accommodate the next generation of jets, ignoring all the facts of airport life except convenience. The idea is so out of keeping with what ought to happen to National that if the other airlines do not squelch it promptly the Federal Aviation Administration must.

The thought of the 490-passenger jumbojets and the 250-passenger airbuses lumbering over residential areas, plopping onto a ledge of concrete built out into the Potomac River, and disgorging hordes of people into an already overcrowded area can best be described as a nightmare. The only reason for such an idea ever surfacing is that some airlines don't want to face up to the fact that the future of air travel here is inevitably linked to Dulles Airport. The sooner that fact is accepted the quicker solutions can be found to the problems that flow from it.

Instead of proposing to increase the noise level over the Potomac and the congestion at an airport where congestion is already a major problem, the airlines ought to be talking about speeding up and reducing the cost of transportation between Dulles and downtown, setting up helicopter service, building a downtown terminal to handle the passenger flow establishing suburban terminals to spread the passenger load, and selling the relative convenience of Dulles when it is compared to airports in other major cities. But airlines have not been noted for their ingenuity in solving the problems of passengers. Indeed, one of the outrageous proposals thrown out at a recent airline meeting was to eliminate the mobile lounges at Dulles and, like all the other major airports, require that passengers scamper down miles of corridors to reach their airplanes.

Someday, perhaps, airlines will begin to think of passengers as people, not pack animals, and of airports as important factors in an urban community, not just isolated stage coach stops. When that happens, it may occur to them that airports ought to be friendly neighbors, concerned about the total impact they make on life in a city.

WOULD HONOR REPRESENTATIVE FRANCES P. BOLTON

Mrs. SMITH. Mr. President, in response to a communication from Mr. N. R. Calvo, commissioner of the American Legion, Cleveland, Ohio, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD an editorial entitled "Would Honor FRANCES P. BOLTON," published in the Cleveland Plain Dealer of Friday, April 12, 1968.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

WOULD HONOR FRANCES P. BOLTON

Piscataway Park—the newly preserved acreage in Maryland—is a good name for Indians. But wouldn't this land be better named and more familiar to the American public if it were titled differently. This is the view from Mt. Vernon; the vista that George Washington loved. This is the land that was not developed industrially through the efforts of Rep. Frances P. Bolton.

As vice regent of the Mt. Vernon Ladies Association of the Union, Rep. Bolton worked for years to save this view. She used her own funds to buy the farms along the Maryland shore of the Potomac to keep them from conversion to sewer plants, oil tank farms and other commercial uses. It has been recognized throughout the nation what she has done to perpetuate our first president and his estate. We are grateful for what Rep. Bolton has done for George Washington, for all of us, and for all the people throughout the nation.

In consideration and recognition of all her efforts and as a further tribute, a more appropriate name for this land might be "Bolton Park." This designation would also honor not only her name but that of her late husband Chester, who gave 20 years of service to Ohio as state senator and to the nation as representative in Congress from the 22d District. The park itself or some feature of its should be named for her—it is the least we could do to show our appreciation.

N. R. CALVO.

CLEVELAND.

REDUCTION OF RAILROAD PASSENGER SERVICE

Mr. McGEE. Mr. President, a subject of great interest and concern to me and to many other Senators is the matter of declining railroad passenger service across this country. Again tomorrow, as we did once this month already, we in Wyoming are entering the lists in an effort to save some trains. This time it happens to be trains five and six of the Union Pacific. The last hearings held by the Interstate Commerce Commission involved that railroad's trains Nos. 17 and 18, the streamliners known as the Portland Rose.

Mr. President, we in Wyoming happen to believe, deep down in our boots as it were, that there are plentiful reasons for saving these trains which once provided the main means of long-distance travel. One factor in the increasing number of train discontinuances is the matter of the transportation of the U.S. mail. One cause frequently cited for the proposed passenger service discontinuances is the loss of a considerable amount of postal revenue, which makes the passenger service unprofitable. This is a contention that must be carefully considered. It is a fact, of course, that much of the mail previously transported by railroad passenger trains has been diverted to other forms of transportation.

We have several different stories we can choose to believe to explain the situation, but the matter has never been resolved to any degree of satisfaction. We are told that many postal service changes were necessitated because the railroad altered schedules or dropped trains. And we are told the trains were dropped because of the loss of postal revenue.

In any event, it is clear that a considerable amount of revenue is still going to the Union Pacific for mail hauled on freight trains and is credited to its freight service. If the transfer of this income to freight service has been undertaken voluntarily or with the company's approval, I, for one, do not believe it should be used as a justification for discontinuing the passenger trains that formerly hauled the mail.

Indeed, there are many ramifications to this problem and it would appear that it would be wise if we were to endeavor to maintain the status quo with reference to passenger transportation on our railroads pending a more thorough investigation of the problem in light of the immense public interest involved.

Mr. President, I have been talking, where I have been specific, about the operations of the Union Pacific. It traverses my State from one end to the other. It is proposing at this time to discontinue trains to which we have very real attachment in Wyoming. But these are not the only trains to be chopped from the American scene. The problem is a national one, as we all know. Mr. Russell Baker of the New York Times recently wrote a column about the California Zephyr, one of the Burlington Line's famed trains. I ask unanimous consent that the column be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

OBSERVER: SAVE THE ZEPHYR

(By Russell Baker)

SAN FRANCISCO, March 23.—The California Zephyr, which ought to be preserved as one of America's most precious unnatural resources, is probably going to die. It's a pity. The great transcontinental passenger trains like the Zephyr gave Americans the opportunity to see the grandeur of their continent at close range, but they also gave us something more important—a sense of identity with the country's mythic past.

Thundering across the prairie at night in a flash of silver, white tablecloths and crystal gleaming at the dining car windows, they gave the people of lonely towns a sense of the wealth and power and romance of America and stirred among small boys the restless American's dream of faraway places.

A DIFFERENT ERA

For the passenger, swaying in his Pullman bed, hearing the whistle pierce the night, the hiss of brakes, the clang of metal doors as the train paused to take aboard voyagers, there was the compelling memory of the age when strong men bound the continent together with bands of steel. And the traveler was reminded that his was a country built on a lot of blood, bad whisky and much pain.

All this will be lost to us very soon now. There are organizations to conserve a few of our natural wonders—forests, canyons, rivers—but nothing to save our man-made resources from the hard law of economic necessity. Economic necessity kills them all in the end—the small town, the family farm, Main Street, Broadway, the tent circus, the ocean liner. It seems to be a law of American life that whatever enriches us anywhere except in the wallet inevitably becomes uneconomic.

In the case of the Zephyr this is hard to understand. There is, of course, the national lust for speed. The jets fly coast-to-coast in five hours, while the Zephyr takes 51½ hours merely to go from Chicago to San Francisco, and if its transportation you want, 500 miles per hour is better than fifty.

But what about people who want to travel? Transportation exists to service freight; travel, on the other hand, is not merely movement, but movement which results in enrichment of the spirit.

The Zephyr was designed to serve travelers, and the United States not only needs it to lure European travelers here but also to keep its own people from taking more dollars off to Europe.

Scheduled to give its passengers daylight views of some of the world's most spectacular scenery, it crosses the Continental Divide on the second day out of Chicago, snakes through the Rocky Mountain peaks, then runs along the bed of the Colorado River through a fantasy of canyons and gorges until at dusk it comes down into the prehistoric red desert of eastern Utah and roars through the purple sunset toward Salt Lake City.

Next morning it enters the Feather River Canyon through the California Sierra, and for three hours shows the traveler an America more beautiful than is ever dreamt of at 30,000 feet with seat belts fastened, shades drawn and Charlton Heston on the movie screen. Then, into the lush green California valleys, with snow peaks for walls and grass as green as April, oranges on the trees, white blossoms on the orchards.

The traveler arrives at San Francisco refreshed by the lesson that America is still a great deal bigger than five hours wide, and—nowadays especially—that alone is worth the price of the trip.

It would be good if the Zephyr and a few of the other remaining transcontinental expresses could be saved. Not artifically as museum pieces. We cannot have clipper ships and stagecoaches in the twentieth century without making them into phony tourist traps, and it is better to have them dead.

The trains, however, might continue to serve a need for years to come, with a little business imagination, salesmanship and Government vision. They are not likely to get the benefit of any of these things. In the Zephyr's cars, notices are already posted of hearings before the I.C.C. on petitions to discontinue service, and the Zephyr is probably going to die.

Now is probably the last moment for us to do something important for the children who will be grandparents in the not so distant twenty-first century.

TIME IS RUNNING OUT

A few years ago the country was still full of people who could boast that they had seen Buffalo Bill when they were children, and they were proud of the sense of identity it gave them with the American past. Now time is running out on the train, as it ran out on the Wild West. There is not much time left to get a boy aboard so that some day, deep in the slick, efficient depths of the twenty-first century, when he is gray and full of years, he can tell his grandchildren, "I once traveled all the way across America by train."

If the grandchildren are the sort who find such boasts a bore, we shall have lost something truly precious. But they will surely not be. They will be moved to sense themselves in touch with someone rooted, however dimly, in America's mythic past.

OUTRAGEOUS WASTE OF TAXPAYERS' MONEY FOR CIVIL DEFENSE SHELTER PROGRAM

Mr. YOUNG of Ohio. Mr. President, the Secretary of Commerce and top officials in the Commerce Department are guilty of the utter waste of $8 million of taxpayers' money. It is astonishing that millions of propaganda letters and home survey questionnaires relative to proposed unneeded civil defense as a part of civil defense against that threatened nuclear attack, have been sent out by the Bureau of the Census acting as agent for civil defense officials in the Department of Defense. Many of these civil defense officials bearing high-sounding titles were former Army colonels whose ratings were so low and records so lackluster following 20 years in the Army that they finally found a haven in civil defense sinecures in positions such as staff director, Shelter Research Division; staff director, Systems Evaluation Division; deputy assistant directors for plans and for training and education, and so forth, ad infinitum.

Now, under the direction of Deputy Director of Civil Defense for Special Activities, Jane Hanna, whose salary approximates $26,000, and Hubert Schon, so-called Deputy Director for Civil Defense for Operations with a like salary, they come forth with a scheme to squander this huge sum of taxpayers' money with a home survey questionnaire, so-called, ridiculous in its concept and outrageous in its execution.

The Soviet Union is the only nation in the world with capability to fire intercontinental ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads toward any targets in the United States. It is well known that the Soviet Union now threatens no aggression whatsoever, even to any countries close to it in Western Europe. It is a have nation; no longer a have-not nation. The leaders of the Kremlin with their policies have been veering toward capitalism for lo these many years. Since the death of Stalin the policies of the Kremlin leaders for more than 10 years have been centered on raising the standard of living of their own people. For example, they have set a goal to produce within the Russian homeland 600,000 automobiles during the present year. They are building roads and apartments, and in recent years offer no threat whatever to any nation anywhere in the world, aside from some border clashes with the other gigantic Communist nation, China, which has a common border with the Soviet Union for 6,500 miles. Some of this border territory has been in dispute for years.

The Soviet Union has withdrawn in recent years more than 100,000 men of its armed forces from East Germany, and these divisions were then assigned to stations in the Asiatic area of the Soviet Union; in some instances at the border of Outer Mongolia. Not only has there been a breakup and wide schism between the Soviet Union and Red Chinese, but the differences of opinion and insults on the part of Peking government leaders have been loud and clear and directly denunciatory of the Soviet Union. In no other country of Eastern Europe, except for East Germany, are there armed forces of the Soviet Union stationed. Nationalist Communist countries of Eastern Europe including Yugoslavia, Hungary, Rumania, and Czechoslovakia are entirely independent of the Soviet Union. They are not Soviet satellites.

Our nuclear superiority and missile power exceed that of the Soviet Union probably by a ratio of more than 3 to 1. It is stupendous folly for the civil defense officials in the Department of Defense to urge nuclear fallout shelter protection for our citizens, and to spend taxpayers' money to propagandize that effort. Here is an unfortunate and outrageous waste of public money simply to enable some bureaucrats in the civil defense division, Department of Defense, to continue feeding at the public trough. Civil defense officials and employees are the most useless and unnecessary employees in the Federal Government. They enjoy high salaries for devising propaganda and sending messages to each other when not out on golf courses or trying to think up circulars to mail out by the millions of copies to State and city civil defense officials and to citizens generally. In our entire governmental bureaucracy no employees are paid so much for doing so little. This has been and is an indefensible waste of millions of dollars. Let them explain to the American people reasons for these shelters? What aggressor nation threatens us with a nuclear attack? Is it Communist China involved in an internal convulsion and embroiled in bitterly hostile controversies with the Soviet Union? Albania?

Those responsible for this home study questionnaire such as that mailed, for

example, to "Family at 5160 Manning Place NW., Washington" and similarly addressed bags of these envelopes are guilty of reprehensible conduct squandering $8 million.

The persons who thought of and planned and executed this scheme deserve the most severe condemnation of thoughtful citizens everywhere.

THE PROMISE OF AMERICA

Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, I think that a statement entitled "Our Dedication To Reaffirm the Promise of America" is a fine example of the expressed willingness of citizens to accept responsibility to help resolve one of the major issues of our day.

I am pleased to ask unanimous consent that the statement be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

OUR DEDICATION TO REAFFIRM THE PROMISE OF AMERICA

We, the faculty and administrators of Waldo Junior High School in Salem, Oregon, believe that the President's Commission on Civil Disorders has done a service for all the citizens within the boundaries of our land. We commend the efforts made by the committee to secure a thorough, unbiased, nonpartisan report of the many contributing factors responsible for the riots which took place in some of our large cities last summer.

We, as educators and leaders, are ready and willing to extend our entire co-operation and creativity toward implementing the work of the committee:

1. By *wholeheartedly supporting all legislators regardless of party* affiliation who design and support measures which will correct and improve the inequalities that exist in our society today;

2. By putting forth maximum effort to insure equality for each child under our supervision;

3. By insuring the best possible race relations within the school between teachers and students of all races;

4. By improving attitudes toward all ethnic groups and providing opportunities for every child to participate in school and extracurricular activities;

5. By dedicating ourselves, outside the classroom, to active participation as individuals and in organizations designed to improve the social, economic and physical well-being of disadvantaged people among all races;

6. By supporting law enforcement agencies in dealing with personal injuries, rioting, looting and burning of personal and public property.

We can no longer afford to indulge ourselves in making excuses for the serious discrepancies which exist among the citizens of our country. We are aware that many dedicated Americans say we cannot afford a program which will provide jobs, education and decent housing for the many millions of people within our country, and still meet present needs in Vietnam. We say we dare not fail to provide opportunities for these people. Not only will we burden ourselves with a financial obligation impossible to conceive in providing equipment and man power for preventing future disorders, but we will also reap a harvest of hatred, bitterness, heartbreak and misery of such magnitude that it will leave a scar on the soul of our nation so deep it may be impossible for future generations to heal.

Dated the 20th day of March, 1968.

Billie Houghton, Barbara B. Smith, Susan Petersen, Linda Wells, Lenore Gangware, Philip McHarness, Clyde Weir, Melba Niemela, Sylvia Mulkey, Fred L. Hargand, Gaye Stewart, Lydia Graham, Peter G. Tveit, James R. Watson, Ruth Weyer, Robert R. Wood, R. L. Huddleston, Stanley L. Kerzel, Robert A. Staples, Ira Goddard, Gladys Burch, Karl Thelen, Ruth Coleman, Janee Speight.

Sumner Bentson, Robert A. MacMillan, Rita Hathaway, Edith Sather, Anita Norton, Lorraine Paulick, Anne Smedley, Henry W. Landis, Charles Stengel, John Hansen, Loren E. Thornton, Mary Jean Ness, Claudia Huntsinger, Robert W. Stewart, Judith Wood Kent, E. E. Creecy, Gordon G. Goheen, Bonnie Mangum, Robert H. Donovan, Robert H. Dow, Phyllis Miles, Charles Peter, Joanne Sandhu.

MYTHS OF KOREA TRUCE TALKS

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, an interesting article entitled "Facts Dispute Myths of Korea Truce Talks," written by Bernard Gwertzman, was published in the Washington Evening Star of April 16. There have meen myths aplenty during the course of our involvement in Vietnam; we need none left over from the Korean war. Mr. Gwertzman's article helps to lay to rest a number of the myths about negotiations to end the Korean war.

Separation of fact from fiction has been a seemingly impossible task in Vietnam. I hope that no one will permit the fictions of the Korean war to serve as an emotional obstacle to initiating negotiations to bring peace in Vietnam.

I ask unanimous consent that Mr. Gwertzman's article be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

FACTS DISPUTE MYTHS OF KOREA TRUCE TALKS

(By Bernard Gwertzman)

The possibility of negotiations toward ending the war in Vietnam has caused American officials to turn to the history of the lengthy Korean War negotiations to separate fact from myth about what happens when the United States deals with Asian Communists.

Over the years, several "myths" about the Korean War have become accepted by many Americans as the truth. But memos now being circulated at the White House, State Department and Pentagon are aimed at dispelling these half-truths and outright falsities.

For instance, the most persistent story is that the United States suffered more casualties in Korea after talks started than it did in the months before. This "fact" is used by critics of negotiations to demonstrate the perfidity of Communists and to warn of the dangers of lengthy talks.

The truth, according to official Defense Department figures, is that United States casualties were greater in the 11 months before talks began than they were in the two years after. And many of the post-talks casualties were incurred during a major allied offensive.

From June 25, 1950, the day the war started, until July 13, 1951, the United States lost 20,929 killed and 53,784 wounded in Korean fighting.

From July 13, 1951—three days after the talks started—to July 27, 1953, the day the armistice was signed, there were 12,700 dead and 49,500 wounded.

A major misunderstanding has been caused by the length of the Korean talks. Some assert that the length proves the Communists' lack of good faith in such sessions.

The central reason for the lengthy talks, however, was the decision by the United States to press for the voluntary repatriation of prisoners of war rather than the conventional repatriation en masse.

After 10 months of negotiations, the two sides had agreed on all points except the prisoner issue. That question was to drag on for an additional 15 months.

In a sense, it can be said that the United States suffered extensive battlefield casualties to give the 50,000 prisoners who refused repatriation to North Korea or China the right to live in freedom.

The Vietnam war does not offer the same problem since there are so few prisoners.

Another point, often misunderstood, is a belief that the U.N. forces deliberately "held their hand" during the period of the talks, allowing the Communists to inflict casualties on the U.N. troops.

ALLIES TOOK THE OFFENSIVE

This is only partly true. What happened was that the initial talks that began at Kaesong broke down over the summer, and while the Communists were stalling on returning to the conference table at a more neutral site—Panmunjom—the allies took the offensive in October 1951, and inflicted on the Communist the highest casualties for any month in the last two years of the war—and gained valuable defensive terrain as well.

But those operations cost the U.N. Command—the U.S., Korea and other allies—40,000 casualties. As a result, the "dominating element in making military decisions" for the rest of the war "was the estimated cost in personnel losses," Walter G. Hermes, the official U.S. Army historian writes in his book, "Truce Tent and Fighting Front."

By November 1951 the U.N. forces adopted the strategy of "active defense" and several suggested offensives were vetoed because of heavy anticipated losses.

Some observers believe this was a mistake, but Hermes writes that "whether or not sustained ground pressure would have persuaded the enemy to come to terms sooner is an academic matter . . . Human life was one of the Communists' most abundant resources and was freely used during most of the war."

POSTURING AT OPENING

President Johnson, in turning down the North Vietnamese proposal to hold talks at Warsaw, Poland, is said to have compared going to Warsaw, a Communist capital, with the initial Korean talks held behind Communist lines at Kaesong.

Adm. C. Turner Joy, who was the chief U.S. negotiator in Korea, has written how on the first day of talks at Kaesong, his convoy was forced to fly white flags and was escorted to the site of the talks by Communist vehicles, so that in photos the Communists could appear as victors.

Lt. Gen. Nam Il of the North Korean army also took the seat facing south—a sign of victory—and gave Joy a smaller chair as well. But after U.S. protests, these problems were cleared up.

The main difficulty with Kaesong was a series of incidents—some caused by the Communists, others dreamed up by them or caused by U.S. or South Korean incursions into the "neutral zone."

PANMUNJOM SELECTED

Eventually, to avoid future incidents, the U.S. side proposed Panmunjom and both sides agreed to be responsible for its security.

The main lesson taught by the lengthy negotiations was the insight into Communist negotiating tactics. Initially, the U.N. side thought the talks would be over quickly. But the Communists showed great patience in not yielding on an issue—and the U.N. side more than matched the Communists.

Adm. Arleigh Burke, one of the negotiators, has written:

"It is essential, of course, in dealing with these people that you have no personal feelings whatsoever. Emotion can never affect a conference at all. The only possible way of winning, in such a conference, as this, is by coldly calculating every move and every statement and exercising the maximum amount of patience, calmness and stamina."

TESTIMONY OF FORMER SENATOR PAUL H. DOUGLAS BEFORE SENATE SUBCOMMITTEE ON HOUSING

Mr. MONDALE. Mr. President, on March 21, the Subcommittee on Housing and Urban Affairs was privileged to hear Hon. Paul H. Douglas testify on housing legislation. Former Senator Douglas is one of the most qualified persons in this country to discuss housing legislation by virtue of his long experience on the Housing Subcommittee and his legislative contribution to our housing and urban programs. In addition, he is presently serving as the Chairman of the President's Commission on Urban Problems, and he and the Commission have traveled throughout the country to hear from local officials and residents on the success of our present programs. I know that Senators are anxiously awaiting the finding of this Commission.

Mr. President, I do not think I am alone when I say that the testimony of Senator Douglas is some of the best ever presented to the subcommittee. It outlines the present problems involved in the operation of our housing programs and then offers constructive solutions to meet these problems. I was especially concerned with the statements regarding the need to develop a large Federal program to encourage the use of new technologies in the housing construction field. I think that this is one of the finest proposals to come before Congress in a long time. If we are to develop large-scale programs to house our low-income families we must have technological breakthroughs. In the past, however, we have been passive in our efforts and hoped that the breakthrough would somehow emerge without governmental assistance. The Douglas proposal, on the other hand, offers a dynamic means to encourage this necessary experimentation.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the testimony of former Senator Douglas be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the testimony was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

TESTIMONY OF PAUL H. DOUGLAS BEFORE SENATE SUBCOMMITTEE ON HOUSING OF BANKING AND CURRENCY COMMITTEE, MARCH 21, 1968

Chairman Sparkman and members of the committee, I wish to thank you for the honor which you have paid me in inviting me to testify so that I appear before you not at my own request but at yours. I appreciate that fact. Let me also say immediately that while I am supporting the main thrust of President Johnson's housing program, I had absolutely no part in its preparation. I therefore have no pride of authorship to defend. Similarly, while I have been acting as Chairman of the Presidential Commission on Urban Problems, that Commission has, I think, properly decided not to issue any interim reports or recommendations. I therefore speak only for myself, but with their permission, and having endured me for 18 years you can discount what I have to say to the degree which you may desire.

During this last year, however, I have visited with other members of the Commission some 19 cities where we have held over 40 days of hearings, consulted with hundreds of experts on building codes, housing codes, zoning, taxes, and subdivision and development standards. We have visited the slums and the ghettos, examined public housing, 221(d)(3), and urban renewal projects, and looked at new methods and technologies for building. In addition, we have studied the huge volume of reports, books and articles which have poured from the press.

Because of my non-participation in the Housing Message I cannot and should not attempt to discuss the minutiae of the measures which are before you. With your indulgence, therefore, I shall try instead to outline the general principles which lead me to support the main features of the program.

1. *My first point is that in my judgment we should plan to build at least 2.0 to 2.2 million housing units a year, or over 500,000 to 700,000 more than our average for the last five years.* While we have made general progress in the field of housing during the last 19 years by building at a faster rate than that at which new families have been formed, there is still great need. In 1950 the Census listed 20 million housing units or 45 percent of the total as being either substandard or overcrowded. By 1960, this official figure had been reduced to 15 million and today it may be between 12 and 13 millions. The Census figures are not too reliable and there is a good deal of evidence that the improvement largely came in the introduction of sanitary facilities on farms and in relatively small towns. Even if we take 12½ million units as the figure for unsatisfactory housing, about 50 million people would be involved. We cannot wait for the slow march of time to deal with this deficiency. We should remember also that building virtually stopped from 1929 to 1946 and that there will be a delayed retirement of the pre-1929 and pre-1900 units during the next third of a century. New York City alone has 40,800 structures containing 335,000 units and housing about one million people—structures built before the 1901 building code went into effect. A large proportion of these, particularly on the Island of Manhattan, should never have been built. They are now over two-thirds of a century old and by the end of the century they will be over a hundred years old. Many were built in the 1880's and 1890's for the immigrant tide and, although their walls are sound, they should have been rehabilitated or replaced before now.

We should also frankly face the fact that we will need an appreciably increased volume of home construction in the next 15 or 20 years. In the first place, unless destroyed by nuclear war the population is probably going to increase appreciably. One should be chary about these prophecies since 40 years ago the demographers estimated that our population would hit a plateau of 167 million by about this time and then remain constant or slightly decline. However, we reached 200 million last fall and we are increasing at a natural growth rate of slightly over 2 million a year plus 300,000 to 400,000 new immigrants. The Census has now come out with no less than four projected estimates of total population in 1990,[1] ranging from about 256 to 300 million. Projected to the year 2000, this would have a range from something around 280 to over 340 million. I tend to favor the lower figure because of the great recent reduction in the crude birth and net fertility rates. But I would not object strenuously if one fixed the most probable figure at 300 million.[2] We shall therefore have to take care of from 80 to 100 million more people in the next third of a century, or as many as we have added during the last 50 years. Assuming that the 4 member family will continue to be the standard, this will require in itself the construction of from 20 to 25 million housing units or an average annual rate of 700 to 800 thousands units merely to take care of the numerical growth rate. At least we should start out at that rate and only revise it if the growth rate is altered.

But this is only the beginning. We will also need to replace housing which will normally wear out, to eliminate the existing excessive stock of substandard dwellings, and to provide for the added demand created by the net migration from the country and the small towns to the metropolitan areas. We should realize that of the 46 million housing units which were extant in 1950, all but a relatively small minority had been built before 1929, since the depression and the war had largely stopped home building. We have therefore a very large stock of housing which is now over 40 years old and a considerable volume that is from two-thirds to three-quarters of a century old. Where the structure is still sound, these buildings need not be scrapped. I know of houses in New England which are over 200 years old and are still not only adequate but also charming. With American life what it is, however, I would not expect the future life of most American housing to exceed a hundred years and possibly it would be as low as 75 years. The pre-1900 housing units should therefore be expected largely to disappear and to do so rather rapidly between now and the year 2000, while the 1900-1929 units will also begin to phase out during this period. While it is difficult to make an estimate, I would guess that not far from 15 to 20 million units will need to be retired during the next third of a century alone, or an average annual rate of from 500 to 600 thousand.

Then there is the internal migration of people. From 1940 to 1966, the total farm population decreased from 30.5 million to 11.6 million. This was an absolute decrease of 19 million people and of somewhere between 4 and 5 million households. Despite the valiant efforts of the mobile homes industry, these folks, unlike the snails, did not bear their houses on their backs. New housing had to be constructed for them in their new locations while the old deserted houses fell into ruins, as is visible to everyone who drives through the countryside. Those who left the small towns for the cities and suburbs experienced much the same needs. To the degree that they merely replaced families which moved out, they could take over the housing being vacated by oldsters. But to the degree that they represented a net addition, new units had to be constructed for them. This has concentrated the need, as expressed by the market, during the last 20 years in the suburbs of the stand-

[1] See Statistical Abstract, 1967, p. 4, 8–9.

[2] I favored this figure myself before the continued reduction in the birth rate of last year. Thus the crude birth rate fell from between 24 and 25 to the thousand in the late 50's to 18.5 in 1966 and 17.9 in 1967. In 1955, the death rate was 9.3 and in 1960, 9.5. It remained relatively constant at this figure and was 9.5 in 1966. This gave a gross fertility rate of 0.9 percent. The net immigration for the 7 years 1960–66 came to an average of approximately 360 thousand a year or about 0.2 percent. The total growth in 1966 was 2.1 million instead of the 3.0 million of 1961.

ard metropolitan statistical areas whose population has increased more rapidly than any other group. The Census shows a quite extraordinary rate of mobility. In 1966, out of 188 million people, 12.7 million or approximately 7 percent, were living in a different county than that in which they resided in the preceding year. In 1960, approximately 30 percent were living in a different house in the same county as in 1955 while 19 percent lived in a different county. On the whole, it would seem that an allowance for internal migration of 10 million units in the next third of a century would not be excessive. This would average out at about 300,000 units a year.

There are also two minor factors which need to be noted before we come to the replacement of substandard and grossly overcrowded units. These are:

(1) The need to allow a vacancy factor on the increased annual volume of housing of from 750,000 to 800,000 units. The generally agreed on rates are 1½ percent for single family homes and 5 percent for apartments. This would give a probable combined total of 3 percent or about 20,000 to 25,000 units a year.

(2) The fact is that new standards of housing including, but by no means limited to the electrical and mechanical systems needed for air conditioning, will make an added volume of housing obsolete, even if structurally viable, and will lead to its retirement. The same factor will operate in the demand for a greater degree of privacy and protection against noise. This estimate will vary but I will roughly guess that 2½ million will be placed in this category or an average of 75,000 a year. This would raise the yearly total needed to 1,650,000.

We now come to the substandard and overcrowded units which we need to remove from the market and replace with better and more decent housing. The 1960 Census listed the substandard units which should be removed at 11.4 million units and the crowded households in standard units at 4.0 million. The number of the former by now has probably been reduced to somewhere between 9 and 10 million units. One's estimate of the annual addition needed depends on the rate at which we decide to remove these units. If we were to wait until the end of the century to get rid of them, this would mean an added annual volume of approximately 300,000 a year and move the total yearly needs to 1,950,000. If the decision should be to do it in 12 years or by 1980, this would mean an additional annual increment of 750,000 and an annual total of 2.4 million. If we do it in a decade, then the annual addition would be 900,000 and the total annual units needed would be around 2.55 or 2.6 million. Although I have not seen HUD's work sheets on this question, I suspect that their figures roughly agree with mine and account for the President's call for 2.6 million a year for 10 years or 26 million for the decade.

If this volume could be reached and if the country would really carry through with it, I would agree. But I would like to remind you that the average annual volume during the last six years has been 1,450,000[3] and that this goal would call for an annual increase of 1,150,000 more units than this or about 80 percent, more than we have been turning out. I doubt if we could or would keep up that pace. I therefore choose an admittedly more modest goal of replacing the substandard units in 20 years. This would mean adding 450,000 units a year and bring the total to 2.2 million. This I think is supportable although it is slightly above 50% more than we have been building in the last six years and 65% more than last year. At the very least we should build 2.0 millions a year or slightly more than 500,000 above our past six year average.

I therefore came out at a somewhat more conservative figure than the Administration—although this depends largely on a matter of judgment as to how fast we can and should move.

2. *The people who need the added housing are the poor an dthe lower middle income group who at present cannot afford to pay for decent housing.* The poor can be defined according to the rigorous standards set by Mollie Orshansky and the Social Security Administration as urban—families of 4 who have to live on less than $3300 a year. There are about 30 million of these folk in the country or a little less than 16 percent. This is also about the average for the central cities of the standard metropolitan statistical areas[4] where they number approximately 10 million. Another 8 percent are on the fringes of poverty or have an annual gross income of $3300 up to $4400 or $4500 a year. About 5 million will be in this group in the central cities. Then another 25% will be in the lower economic middle class from about $4500 to a little less than $7000 (i.e., the economy budget plus 50%). This will include 15 million more of the urban disadvantaged.

A few years ago the poverty ratio was only 10% in the suburbs. This would have given a total of 6 million poor and another 3 million of the near poor and not far from 10 million of the lower economic middle class. Consolidating these figures for the two thirds of the population or 130 million who live in the 231 standard metropolitan statistical areas we get very roughly.

1. The poor (under $3335) = 16 million: (a) Cities = 10 million, (b) The suburbs = 6 million.

2. The near poor = 9 million ($3335–$4500): (a) Cities = 6 million, (b) Suburbs = 3 million.

3. The lower economic middle class ($4500–$6800) = 33 million: (a) Cities = 16 million, (b) Suburbs = 17 million.

If we say that the poor and near poor should not under any circumstances pay more than 25% of their income for rent, and preferably nor more than 20% we get the following *maximum amounts* which these groups can pay.

1. The metropolitan poor—maximum $335 = 16 million: Rent, 25% (yearly $840, monthly $70); rent, 20% (yearly $680, monthly $57).

2. The metropolitan near poor—maximum—$4400 = 9 million: Rent, 25% (yearly $1100, monthly 92); rent, 20% (yearly $880, monthly $73).

3. The lower economic middle class—$4500–$6800 = 33 million: Rent, 20% (yearly $1360, monthly $115); rent, 16% (yearly $1080, monthly $90).

I think these rough figures will show that the poor cannot afford to rent decent housing in the metropolitan areas. And the near poor will have great difficulty in doing so. This will also be extremely difficult for the lower economic middle class.

It should be noted that half of the poor are abjectly poor—a total of 8 million with incomes under $2200 and with a maximum monthly rental they could afford of $45.00.

If it is difficult for the poor to rent existing housing, it will be even more difficult (1) for them to finance new housing or (2) for private enterprise to build new housing to rent to them. Taking the maximum housing cost which can be privately financed as 2½ times the yearly income, none of the poor can afford more than an $8,500.00 unit. Nor can any of the near poor afford more than an $11,250.00 unit. The lower economic middle class cannot afford more than $17,000.

It should be realized that these amounts are all that those at the very top could afford. The entire group below the upper limit could afford less. Thus the eight percent of the abjectly poor could not afford to pay more than $5500 per unit; the remaining eight percent of the poor could afford more than $5500, but less than $8500. The eight percent near poor could afford to pay between $8500 and $11,250 per unit, etc. But that would be all.

I think it is obvious that the 16 million poor cannot be properly housed *at present costs* without receiving outside subsidies of one form or another—and that this is particularly true of the abjectly poor. Similarly, the near poor will need appreciable subsidies while the lower sections of the lower middle income class will need some help at *present costs* if they are to be housed decently. Like the President, I favor tackling this problem, but I would favor eliminating it over 22 years instead of in 10 to 12 years. I therefore suggest that the 500,000 units a year to eliminate substandard housing be directly geared for the poor, the near poor and the lower middle class. With a total of 10 or 11 million units we can provide decent housing for 40 to 44 million people. This should take care of the 25 million who are now farthest down and for at least half of the lower middle economic class. The back of the problem would be broken. If we continue to make progress in reducing the number of the poor and near poor, the total can be scaled down by abbreviating the number of years, but we can start at this pace. I suggest that of the half million units a year, about a yearly total of 300,000 of these, or 6.6 million altogether be built for the poor and that 200,000 a year, or 4.4 million altogether be built for the lower middle income class.

3. *I think we can adopt a mixture of plans, similar to those the President has suggested.* I suggest that we provide about 30 percent of the amount in public housing which needs to be speeded up. Here we get a complete subsidization of interest and also lower local tax charges. This program should be primarily for the poor but we can strive to effect as great an economic and racial mixture as possible.

Building in the future should be conducted as far as possible on scattered sites. Opportunity should be afforded for families to stay on in their apartments or houses by paying more than maximum rent as their income rises. Opportunity should also be given to purchase possibly through the condominium or cooperative method.

4. *I believe that about 25 percent of the total can be financed by rent supplements with the government picking up that portion of the cost which the individual family cannot pay.*

Another 20 or 25 percent can be met through the various forms of 221(d)(3) with help given to the sponsors as the President recommends.

An added 20 to 25 percent can be helped to purchase individual homes.

5. *The administration has chosen the most effective way of getting a large volume of annual construction at a minimum of annual expense, namely, by subsidizing the interest rate.* Thus, in public housing where all of the interest rate is subsidized, a 4 percent interest rate would normally lead to the construction of 25 times as great a volume of housing construction. Here a $400,000 annual payment would lead to $10 million worth of housing. The total payment would, however, of course lead to the cumulative assumption of the interest.

In the case of rent supplements, the rent is subsidized. In the case of the 221(d)(3) and home purchase programs the interest rate is to be subsidized down to one percent depending on the income of the individual family. There are real questions as to whether the lowest income groups should be encouraged to buy private homes if they have to pay for the amortization of the mortgage debt on their property. If they have to

[3] Economic Indicators, February, 1968, p. 20. This does not however include mobile homes.

[4] I.e., cities of over 50,000 population which probably now include some 63 or 64 millions of people.

sell their houses after a few years, their thin equities are likely to be wiped out. These will be dollars which they cannot afford to lose and to accumulate which they will have had to make great sacrifices.

Now, Mr. Chairman, let me turn to the question of "What to do and how to do it." All of us are thoroughly familiar with the problems we face. But the answers are more difficult. I would like to make some constructive suggestions about how we might get the job done.

First of all, of course, Congress must authorize and provide the funds for programs to do the job whether the job is to be done in 12 years or in two decades as I have suggested. But funds and authority are not enough and alone will not get the job done.

One of the most crucial problems and past deterrents to building houses for low income Americans is the problem of sites to build on. Time and again when one complains at the slowness of the public housing or moderate income programs, the problem of sites is given as a major roadbock.

There are many more sites than people imagine. There is a lot more land on which to build than is generally understood. The facts are that in the 228 SMSA's there are 38.4 million parcels of taxable realty of which 7.2 million parcels or 19 percent are vacant lots.

It may be pointed out that SMSA's include not only central cities but suburban areas as well and that this is not a true measure of the number of vacant lots in central cities. That is true, but the facts are that in 119 of the 130 cities over 100,000, there are 11 million parcels of which 1.3 million or 11.6 percent are in vacant lots. It may surprise some to know that the figure for New York City is 8.1 percent, 11.0 percent for Chicago, and 9.4 percent for Los Angeles. When we add to this the number of sites on which there are dilapidated buildings, many of which are owned by the cities as a result of the default in taxes, the number of sites is greatly swelled.

By using scattered sites and by building non-institutional types of public housing, these vacant lots could supply much of the need for sites for public housing and moderate income housing in our central cities.

Second, there is a large amount of government owned land on which housing can be built. The President has begun this by proposing the National Training School site for a new town in town here in the District of Columbia. This program can be greatly expanded as a source of sites. I should add a warning, however, that such sites not end up as sites for luxury housing but that we make certain that a considerable proportion of low and moderate income housing to meet our most desperate housing needs is built on them.

Third, there are large numbers of VA and FHA foreclosures each year. Some of these could be leased by public housing authorities to house those public housing families who were "upwardly mobile," as the phrase goes.

In fiscal 1967 there were 21,217 VA claims (tantamount to foreclosure) and in calendar 1967 about 53,000 FHA foreclosures of which 44,062 units were sales housing and 8,886 units were in 67 projects. Some of these could be used.

Fourth, there are urban renewal sites. The latest figures I have are that less than half of all the urban renewal sites have been committed, that is to say that there are commitments to build specific buildings on them. Not all of these sites would be appropriate for public or moderate income housing. But in view of the crisis in our cities, I believe that a re-examination of the existing sites should be made to see if a great many more of them cannot be used for public housing and for moderate income housing. The vast empty acreage I have seen in Cleveland and Detroit, to name only two cities, makes me believe that this is so.

Under Urban Renewal approximately 400,000 units have been demolished. By definition, most of these were units where low income citizens lived. The number of units planned, under construction or completed in Urban Renewal areas is approximately 200,000 or one half the number demolished.

Only about 20,000 public housing units have been located on urban renewal sites, or one-twentieth of the number of units destroyed and one-tenth of the units planned, under construction, or completed on Urban Renewal sites.

Some specific instances may be helpful. In Detroit since 1956, according to the Riot Commission, 8,000 housing units have been demolished by Urban Renewal. Only 758 units of low or moderate income housing under Federal programs have been built in that period. Very few, if any, of these are on Urban Renewal sites.

In New Haven since 1952, 6,500 units have been destroyed by Urban Renewal and highways. These have been replaced, according to the Riot Commission, by only 951 units, about evenly divided between public housing and the moderate income program.

In Newark, the figures are 12,000 units destroyed since 1959 by Urban Renewal and highways. There, 3,760 units of public housing and moderate income housing have been built, according to the Riot Commission figures.

I commend the Urban Renewal Agency for instituting a new policy of giving priority in the future to low income housing needs. But, this is prospective, as it normally takes over four years from the time a plan is submitted until the first spade of dirt is dug on new projects. Implementation of this policy is a very long time away. I think there should be a review of existing sites and some urgency put behind using some of them for our low income housing needs now.

Finally, the suburbs must be opened up for low income housing. The Civil Rights bill just passed by the Senate is, of course, a minimum. But other things must be done. Let me suggest a few.

While it is a complex problem, I think we should consider means of amending State enabling acts to allow central city housing authorities to lease housing in the suburbs and perhaps to build on scattered sites. There would have to be limitations so that the central city would not merely shift its problems to some one else. These might include a limit on the proportion of their public housing which could be leased in the suburbs, a limit on the amount to go to any one place, and some means of providing the localities with the funds for the additional costs for community services which accompany the building of any public or moderate income, or for that matter, private housing. This would allow for some reasonable dispersal of public and moderate income housing. The central cities cannot bear the entire burden alone.

State action could help in this matter too. New York is now proposing that the powers of the State be exercised to allow for wider dispersion.

In addition, it may be necessary for the Federal Government to build directly if all other means fail.

These, then, are ways to overcome the problem of sites. I think it can be done and that there is far more land available than people often imagine.

In addition to providing an adequate number of sites, a real effort must be made to reduce costs. What we want to do is to make it possible for a larger number of Americans to be able to rent or buy their own housing through the private market mechanism. Further, we want to reduce the amount of the subsidies which are necessary to provide decent housing in a suitable living environment for those with incomes so low that they are unable to do so for themselves.

Ordinarily it costs two and one half times one's income to sustain the purchase of a house. A family with a $7,000 per year income could afford a $17,500 house. While millions of Americans now live in housing which originally cost less than that amount, it now costs about that much to produce a new house either privately or under public housing.

If we could reduce the costs by $2,500, we would make it possible for all those Americans in the band of income from $6,000 to $7,000 to afford their own housing and to buy it on the private market. In addition, we would reduce the amount of subsidies necessary to be paid out as we would reduce the upper income ceiling for subsidies.

One of the main problems we face is that while numerous prototypes of new techniques in housing have been produced, almost none of them has been mass produced because of the limitations imposed by codes and zoning and the capital funds needed to get off the ground. Time and again our Commission has asked for good cost data only to find out that it is not available because only a prototype or demonstration model has been produced.

In order to remedy this problem I want to make the following suggestion. I think we should take one or two conventional methods of building—wood or bricks or both—plus about five new methods of building—concrete, plastics, the Dallas stack sack method, to name a few—and provide a means of testing these to see if we cannot get a major reduction in costs.

We could build them on government land in order to avoid the problems of codes and zoning. I propose that we build a thousand units of each type per year for five years, or from 25,000 to 35,000 units in all. Cost systems should be set up and detailed cost records kept. This would answer the question of whether and how costs can be reduced through the use of new techniques. The results would then be available to be applied on a mass scale throughout the country.

Cost reductions, however, should not be limited merely to the construction itself. Land costs, financing costs, closing costs, legal and other professional fees, union and code restrictions, to name some of them, are often as important as construction costs. The fact is that we may get a significant lowering of costs through small decreases in the numerous kinds of costs which are involved in building housing. We should not throw out any possible reduction.

Recently I visited the National Homes Corporation in Lafayette, Indiana which builds prefabricated houses. I think that there are distinct advantages of pre-fabrication over ordinary construction if it can be organized and applied on a mass scale.

First, there can be a reduction in man hours through the use of large scale production and mechanization.

Second, industrial rather than craft union rates would apply. Less skill would be required on the assembly line than on the site where the bulk of the work is now done.

Third, work inside the factory would be independent of the weather and not as now interrupted by snow, rain, or extreme cold.

Fourth, materials could be bought in large quantities and hence at lower prices.

Fifth, there is a saving in time of construction and thus a reduction in the cost of interim financing.

Sixth, there is a savings on vandalism and breakage during construction, which is a more important item than ordinarily known.

Seventh, there are savings to be made on engineers and other professional fees. The engineers and others are salaried employees and the cost per unit of such fees would be reduced.

Eighth, builders fees and markups would be lowered as the volume increases.

Ninth, there are almost no extras which add to the cost of almost any independently built house.

Tenth, there is virtually no lost time due to lack of materials.

Finally, prefab construction generally requires less maintenance, fewer repairs, less painting, etc., so that long term costs are reduced.

Specialization depends on the extent of the market. If the present deterrent of codes and zoning can be eliminated so that housing can be mass produced and sold, I believe that considerable savings in costs can be made. This is one of the major jobs which our Commission has before it and which we are working at diligently.

DR. MARTIN LUTHER KING: THE SOUL OF HUMANITY

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, the American dream has been with us since our beginning as a people. It has comforted us in our dark hours and prodded us in our comfortable ones. It is the American contribution to the soul of humanity. This dream is that every man can be free, with his opportunity limited only by his ability and the strength or his will and that government exists to achieve that dream.

It is ironic that in our own time the man who had this dream upon his lips, the man who moved the hearts of men throughout the world and called America to implement this dream, was black.

Martin Luther King, Jr., was a member of the only group who came to these shores against their will. Snatched from their ancestral home by Arab slave traders, carried in Yankee Clippers to work on Southern soil, this country greeted them with discrimination and exploitation.

This was Dr. King's history. But he became neither bitter nor beaten. Instead he called America back to its vision, back to its soul.

Mr. President, the human rights treaties are international expressions of the American dream. I urge the Senate to ratify the Conventions on Racial Discrimination and the Political Rights of Women. By such a course we hasten the day when all men shall be "free at last."

A QUARTER CENTURY OF CIVIL RIGHTS LEGISLATION

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President, the Worker Protection-Fair Housing Act is now the law of the land, and I am proud of the role I played in its enactment.

In the past quarter century, I have sponsored or cosponsored more legislation to advance civil rights than on any other one subject.

The following is a list of those proposals:

IN 1967 AND 1968, 90TH CONGRESS

S. 989, eliminates discrimination in selection of Federal juries.

S. 990, establishes a U.S. Committee on Human Rights.

S. 1026, Civil Rights Act of 1967.

S. 1358, The Fair Housing Act of 1967.

S. 1359, extends the Civil Rights Commission.

S. 1362, protects against interference with certain rights.

S. 1592, The National Home Ownership Foundation Act.

S. 2388, amendment No. 371 to Equal Opportunity Act.

S. 2938, extends Manpower Development and Training Act of 1962.

S. 2979, establishes a Commission on Negro History and Culture.

S. 3249, National Manpower Bill.

H.R. 2516, amendment No. 524 to Worker Protection-Fair Housing Bill.

IN 1965 AND 1966, 89TH CONGRESS

S. 1497, civil rights protection, unlawful official violence.

S. 1517, voter registration rights.

S. 1564, Voting Rights Act of 1965.

S. 1654, increased criminal penalties against those who interfere with the exercising of civil rights.

S. 2548, prohibits transmission of material which defames racial or religious groups.

S. 2846, makes it a Federal offense to take unlawful violence against civil rights workers.

S. 2923, provides for fair jury selection under the Civil Rights Protection Act of 1966.

S. 3101, establishes a U.S. Commission on Human Rights.

S. 3296, assures nondiscrimination in public education, other areas.

S. 3451, provides adequate housing credit in areas of civil disorder.

H.R. 14765, amendment to Civil Rights Bill.

IN 1963 AND 1964, 88TH CONGRESS

H.R. 7152, amendment to Civil Rights Bill.

Senate Resolution 118, housing, loans without discrimination.

S. 1732, public accommodations.

S. 1731, administration civil rights proposal.

S.1693, U.S. citizens rights.

S. 1591, prohibits discrimination in furnishing facilities for business under State licenses.

S. 1590, public schools.

S. 1219, make Civil Rights Commission permanent.

S. 1218, hospitalization.

S. 1217, accommodations at hotels.

S. 1216, Federal assistance law enforcement.

S. 1215, criminal civil remedies.

S. 1214, voting.

S. 1213, housing.

S. 1212, prohibits discrimination in employment in Washington, D.C.

S. 1211, equal employment opportunity.

S. 1210, discrimination in employment.

S. 1209, school desegregation.

S. 1117, extends Civil Rights Commission.

S. 773, prohibits racial discrimination in interstate employment.

S. 772, public school desegregation.

S. 666, protects citizens right to vote.

IN 1961 AND 1962, 87TH CONGRESS

Senate Resolution 313, loans without discrimination.

S. 2983, prevents exclusion of members of minority groups from jury service, 1957, title III.

S. 2981, Commission on Equal Employment Opportunity, prohibits discrimination by labor unions.

S. 2980, desegregation of public schools.

S. 2979, protects voting rights.

S. 478, prohibits poll tax in Federal elections.

S. 479, establishes a Commission on Equal Job Opportunity.

S. 480, prohibits literacy requirements for voting.

S. 481, authorizes the Attorney General to bring civil injunctive proceedings to safeguard rights.

S. 482, guarantees the rights provided by the 14th amendment.

S. 483, extends indefinitely the Civil Rights Commission.

S. 484, assists the State and local government to meet cost of school desegregation.

S. 1253, discrimination in public conveyances.

S. 1254, protects against bodily attack.

S. 1255, amends existing civil rights statutes.

S. 1256, Federal Anti-Lynching Act.

S. 1257, Indefinite extension of Civil Rights Commission.

S. 1258, Federal Equality of Opportunity in Employment Act.

S. 1259, Federal Anti-Poll Tax Act.

Senate Resolution 5, amends cloture rule of Senate.

Senate Joint Resolution 58, poll tax.

Five amendments (to H.R. 7371) on Civil rights.

IN 1959 AND 1960, 86TH CONGRESS

S. 435, Civil Rights Commission.

S. 456, amends Civil Rights Act of 1957.

S. 942, establishes a Commission on Equal Job Opportunity.

S. 960, similar to S. 456.

S. 2868, poll tax.

S. 3001, provides enforcement of civil rights.

S. 3821, strengths civil rights.

S. 3823, amends Civil Rights Act of 1960.

S. 3829, enforcement of civil rights.

IN 1957, 85TH CONGRESS (HOUSE)

H.R. 1254, further secures and protects the civil rights of persons within the United States.

H.R. 3088, similar to H.R. 1254.

IN 1956, 84TH CONGRESS (HOUSE)

H.R. 10349, establishes a bipartisan Commission on Civil Rights in the executive branch of the Government.

H.R. 10426, provides means of further securing and protecting the right to vote.

H.R. 10428, strengthens the civil rights statutes.

I also supported civil rights measures from the 77th through the 83d Congress, including my testimony on FEPC before the House Education and Labor Committee in 1943.

I am especially proud of an editorial published in the Philadelphia Tribune of November 19, 1946, when I was a Member of the House, which said:

Congressman Hugh Scott, who was in Congress prior to joining the U.S. Navy, has an excellent record on FEPC legislation. His record is exceptionally good, since he has comparatively few colored voters in his district. It is a matter of principle with him and not smart politics simply to get votes.

LAWS MUST BE ENFORCED

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, a very fine editorial was published in the Wheeling, W. Va., News Register on April 15, 1968.

Entitled "Laws Must Be Enforced," the editorial pointed out that there is no excuse for open defiance of law for "the laws of the land must be upheld or we shall all be destroyed."

I ask unanimous consent that the editorial be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

LAWS MUST BE ENFORCED

Each time there is an outbreak of civil disorder in one of our cities it is followed by loud complaints that authorities used unnecessary force in quelling the violence.

At week's end last week such accusations were being heard from cities where serious rioting erupted after the slaying of Dr. Martin Luther King. There may be an occasional abuse of authority but judging by all we have read and viewed on television, the most recent wave of destruction was handled with remarkable restraint on the part of police. In fact in some instances police and federal troops stood by and watched while looters pillaged stores in broad daylight.

It is hoped that the passivity of authorities during these recent orgies of vandalism and

violence does not encourage the criminal element to try their hand again. Make no mistake about it—those persons who participated in the lawlessness were criminals. The mob violence and stealing seemed too light-hearted to be in response to the death of Dr. King. According to the reporters on the scene most of the looters, far from appearing angry or mournful at the news from Memphis, seemed to be having a good time.

Many appeared intent on accumulating valuable goods. They marched out of the stores carrying stolen television sets, lamps, household goods and clothing. With little regard for the policemen, some of the looters sat down on the sidewalks and tried on new shoes or a jacket that had been boldly pilfered from a store. In other areas young hoodlums carrying their loot taunted police daring that they shoot them.

Under such trying circumstances—including arson, rock throwing and sniping—it is amazing that the lawmen were able to keep their cool. It had better not happen again. Because of the immediacy of Dr. King's violent death, authorities probably were moved to hold back but this is not to say that another outbreak of lawlessness will not bring more decisive action by the police. In those cities where the police have adopted a "get tough" policy there has been a lessening of violence. As Drew Pearson noted recently, Atlanta, Ga., under the tough Police Chief Herbert Jenkins, had no riots during the latest outbreak around the country. Twenty years ago Chief Jenkins began integrating the Atlanta police force. But if looting or rioting start, they are under strict orders to stand in front of any broken window with a shotgun and shoot looters.

It has become apparent that there are irresponsible individuals among us, willing and eager to take advantage of the opportunities provided by unsettled times. They seize upon any excuse to mask their criminal behavior. They care not about another's life or property. With them the police have no alternative other than to respond in accordance with the law. Criminals, whether white or black, cannot be allowed to run free—stealing, burning and killing. They must be apprehended and brought to justice and if they resist arrest police must use whatever force is needed to subdue them. The laws of the land must be upheld or we shall all be destroyed.

A CATHOLIC BISHOP SPEAKS OUT ON VIETNAM

Mr. HARTKE. Mr. President, the Most Reverend John J. Dougherty, S.S.D., who is president of Seton Hall University, recently gave a frank, forceful, and important address at a Convocation for Peace held at St. John's University.

Bishop Dougherty took as his topic "Grounds for Dissent." In the course of his remarks he expressed the belief, in which many Americans join him, that "Our policy in Vietnam is the major roadblock on the way to world peace."

Further, speaking of the concern of one "who has deliberated and prayed on the greatest international crisis in American history and has come to a judgment," Bishop Dougherty went on to give the reasons for his position. He said:

> The issue facing this Nation is not whether we can support a program of guns abroad and butter at home, but whether the poor and the hungry at home and abroad can wait for their bread and butter until we have finished with the business of guns in Vietnam.

The bishop also, in the course of his address, put a heavy emphasis where I believe it firmly belongs—on the compelling moral and religious reasons which demand change on our policy in order to secure that goal of the ancient prophets, social justice which is an outgrowth of the demand that we must "exercise love in its social dimensions."

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the address to which I refer may appear in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD.

There being no objection, the address was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

GROUNDS FOR DISSENT

(Address given by the Most Reverend John J. Dougherty, S.S.D., President, Seton Hall University, at the Convocation for Peace, St. John University, March 27, 1968)

My fellow Americans, what am I doing here? By what right do I come and by what authority do I speak? I am here because I was invited and I accepted. I am exercising my right as an American citizen, and I speak for myself on my own authority. The value and weight of what I have to say should be measured not by who I am, or who sent me, or whom I represent, but by substance and merit of my argument.

I am here in the cause of peace. By peace I mean what Pope John meant in *pacem in terris* when he said, "(Peace) is an order founded on truth, built according to justice, verified and integrated by charity and put into practice in freedom." It is my conviction that this Nation, the richest and most powerful Nation on earth, founded on the principle that all men are created equal, upon the Constitution and the Bill of Rights, has, in human history's gravest hour, greater responsibilities for world peace than any other nation and that it should lead mankind toward that goal without delay. It is my judgment that this Nation cannot rise to that responsibility as long as it continues a policy of more of the same in Vietnam. Our present policy in Vietnam is the major roadblock on the way to world peace.

We who are assembled here tonight are not alone in our deep and anxious longing for peace. It is a longing shared by the bulk of mankind. It is not disagreement about the goal that divides the American people, but disagreement about the means.

I speak to you as a generalist, not as a specialist. I am not an expert on military affairs nor a political scientist. Whatever professional competency I have is in religion and humane values. My specialized professional education was in biblical history and languages. My stand on Vietnam rests on my adult experience of the American way of life, my contact with totalitarian governments in Europe, my graduate education in schools in England, Europe and the Middle East, my reading on civilizations of Southeast Asia and on contemporary affairs. I speak to you as this citizen with this experience who has deliberated and prayed on the greatest international crisis in American history and has come to a judgment. That judgment you know, my endorsement of negotiation now! What you and others have a right to know are the reasons for my endorsement.

The first reason is the conviction that American democracy as a way of life cannot long endure without the rational discourse and free debate of its citizens on issues of national policy. Democracy is "the government of the people, for the people, by the people." It is also in the words of James Reston "the flexible and courageous use of cooperative intelligence." I submit that the cooperative intelligence of this Nation cannot prudently exclude, safely ignore, nor foolishly disdain the judgments of men like George Kennan, Clark Kerr, General Gavin, Eugene McCarthy and thousands of others from management and labor, the professions, the universities and the churches. To ignore in policy decisions affecting the destiny of our Nation and mankind the wealth of intelligence, the breadth of experience, the sincerity and detachment from personal gain of so many thinking Americans is, I believe, a disservice to the Nation and the ideals for which it stands. To question their patriotism is an exercise of small minds.

The second reason is that world peace and human welfare are indivisible. In the words of Pope Paul, "Development is the new word for peace." The issue facing this Nation is not whether we can support a program of guns abroad and butter at home, but whether the poor and the hungry at home and abroad can wait for their bread and butter until we have finished with the business of guns in Vietnam. The proof that this is more than rhetoric is powerfully demonstrated by the comparative conduct of Congress regarding foreign aid and the military budget.

Pope Paul, in his encyclical *On the Development of Peoples*, describes the world situation in these terms: "Today no one can be ignorant any longer of the fact that in whole continents countless men and women are ravished by hunger, countless numbers of children are undernourished, so that many of them die in infancy, while the physical growth and mental development of many others are retarded and as a result whole regions are condemned to the most depressing despondency." Can whole continents of men and women wait while we pour ten times as much money into Vietnam as we let trickle into foreign aid? Can countless undernourished children wait? Can the depressed, the despondent and the hopeless at home and abroad wait? How long? will the pressing domestic problem of civil, social, and economic rights of all the citizens bide its time and sit patiently and quietly by while reports of national and local commissions on race problems wait for action? To get on with the works of peace we must begin at once and in earnest programs of aid and development. We cannot begin in earnest at home and abroad the works of peace while the major attention of our Government, the energies and resources of our country are engaged in an ambiguous and uncertain military enterprise. It is true that stalemate does not become a proud and mighty nation as does unequivocal victory, but America has another war to fight, the fight against hunger and poverty and illiteracy. We have another and greater victory to achieve, the victory for world justice and peace, and it is a victory that will demand the resources, the energies, the generosity and the nobility of our people. In that struggle we can hope to close the ranks of Americans in unity, to win back our friends abroad, and be blessed by the present and future generations of less fortunate lands whom we have helped to feed, clothe, house and educate.

The third reason is my personal commitment to the Christian ideology and my perception of the demands of that commitment. This perception is based on more than a gentleman's acquaintance with the fundamental book of the Judeo-Christian tradition and spirit, the Bible. I spent four years in graduate biblical studies and taught for twenty-one years. From Amos and Hosea to Jesus and Paul, a span of some seven hundred years, the prophetic theme stands out in bold relief, namely, that authentic religion and social justice are inseparable. In every time and in every place men pass judgment on religion, on the temple and the church. There are standards and tests by which we are judged. Personal moral behavior is one of them; service to the poor, the sick and the troubled is another. These tests were valid in times past and are valid in our own time, but they are not enough, especially for our youth. Youth today measures churchmen by their social concerns and involvements, by

their posture on civil rights, social justice, war and peace. They look for church leadership in these issues and when they find it they follow. They have an instinct for the authentic. Every believing Christian and Jew is aware that love is the fulfillment of the law, but are we not accustomed to interpret it in terms of person to person? We are friendly with our white neighbors, kind to our colored maids, benevolent toward our employees. But Christian love, I contend, is also social, and our times demand that we exercise love in its social dimensions. Social love is impossible without social justice.

Furthermore I contend that a person who is serious about social love and motivated by it will seriously consider the strategy by which social justice can be realistically achieved. He will evaluate the social structures and the political power that hinder it or help it and give his personal support to persons and programs according to his judgment. He will work to bring about such changes in structures and power that he judges necessary for the achievement of justice and peace, not by violence but by the democratic process. In support of this position I quote the Second Vatican Council: "Govermnent officials . . . are greatly dependent on public opinion and feeling . . . consequently, there is above all a pressing and present need for a renewed education of attitudes and for new inspiration of public opinion." It is my hope that these words of mine will be a modest contribution to a renewed education of attitudes towards justice and peace and a small spark of new inspiration to a mounting public opinion for peace.

Need I add that these words are spoken with animosity towards none, without disaffection for those who differ, without insensitivity to the barbarisms of the Vietcong, and with love and loyalty to our fighting men. They are offered as a contribution to the rational discourse and free debate, the process out of which America was born, on which it was nourished and on which it grew to its present size and power. It stands at the top of the world and all the world waits and watches to see if America will match its political, economic and military strength with its moral fortitude, which is the ultimate test of greatness.

LEGACY

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, the Moorefield Examiner, published at Moorefield, W. Va., published a noteworthy editorial recently about riots and the cause of civil rights in this country.

I ask unanimous consent that the editorial, written by Ralph Fisher, be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

LEGACY

We are simply appalled at the wanton looting and senseless destruction in the metropolitan areas of our nation. The assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., whose life was devoted to teaching non-violence, was the alleged excuse for burning and looting. It was only an excuse to steal.

The cause of the twenty million American negroes seeking equality is receiving mortal wounds from the nigger element of the negro population. Whatever so-called conscience the nation was developing for the negro cause is being wiped out by the criminal element of that race.

Equally appalling to us is that vivid scene on tv of a policeman standing meekly watching scores of looters packing all they could carry out of a store. A uniformed officer of the law calmly watching a felony being committed. At any other period in the history of our nation a looter would be shot. Perhaps the law officer was acting under orders. That is even more incomprehensible to us. What must be the feeling of a National Guardsman called out to a riot with uncontrolled burning and looting under orders not to have ammunition in his gun? We had a feeling of utter revulsion hearing three young looters over a nationwide tv hookup saying, "Yeah baby, we're gonna burn all summer!"

What on earth is our nation coming to when this kind of stuff is tolerated?

In Dr. King's own words: "I have a dream that my four little children will one day live in a nation where they will not be judged by the color of their skin but by the content of their character."

The character displayed by those blacks who set more than 700 fires in our nation's capital, more than 500 fires in Baltimore, more than 200 in Pittsburgh is hardly a character reference for the country's 20 million negroes. And Dr. King's four little children will carry that legacy with them for at least another generation. The hate and distrust the negroes complain of is certainly being crystalized in millions of white Americans who were sympathetic prior to the wanton burnings and looting of the past two weeks. The millions of law abiding negro Americans will suffer from the acts of a relatively small percentage of their race.

The cry of "police brutality" is childish compared with the lives endangered by the hundreds of millions of dollars worth of property damage caused by incendiarism, of firemen hampered by snipers, and the chaos and suffering resulting from lawlessness.

It is simply beyond our comprehension and the only thing that could tie that feeling would be for Dr. King's resurrection on Easter morn.

SARGENT SHRIVER OUR NEXT AMBASSADOR TO FRANCE

Mr. PELL. Mr. President, as a longtime friend of France and one who recognizes that Franco-American friendship has survived many crises and frictions in the past, just I as I am confident that we will survive the present cool phase in our relations; and because of the importance of the continuation and revitalization of the friendship between our two nations, I am particularly delighted that Sargent Shriver has been selected as our next Ambassador to the Quai d'Orsay. Both by temperment and experience, he is ideally suited for this job.

I have always believed that the real job of the diplomat is to persuade, and if ever there was a persuader extraordinaire, it is Sargent Shriver, a fact of which all of us in the Congress are aware.

He also has a sensitivity and awareness of the whole man and whole society that will be well appreciated in France.

I believe our country is singularly fortunate in having Sargent Shriver as Ambassador to Paris and am very glad to wholeheartedly support his nomination to this post.

Moreover, with his lovely and remarkably able wife, he will be able to give his mission strength and verve that will be well nigh unique in diplomacy. Actually, diplomacy is one of the few fields where a wife can help and share and make more successful the mission of her husband.

MARVIN WATSON: AN EXCELLENT APPOINTMENT

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, President Johnson has made an excellent choice in naming W. Marvin Watson as the new Postmaster General. His selection is in the President's tradition of outstanding Cabinet appointments.

Mr. Watson brings to his new post vast executive experience, both in and out of Government. He brings 4 years of service at the President's right arm, and an intense dedication to public service.

The Post Office Department is one of the Nation's largest enterprises—but it will be in competent, sure hands.

Marvin Watson will fulfill the confidence his President—and his Nation—are putting in him.

AUTHORIZATION FOR MILITARY PROCUREMENT, 1969

The Senate resumed the consideration of the bill (S. 3293) to authorize appropriations during the fiscal year 1969 for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, and tracked combat vehicles, research, development, test, and evaluation for the Armed Forces, and to prescribe the authorized personnel strength of the Selected Reserve of each Reserve component of the Armed Forces, and for other purposes.

ORDER OF BUSINESS

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order of yesterday which provided for the recognition of the distinguished Senator from Texas [Mr. TOWER] at this time be temporarily suspended; that the distinguished Senator from South Carolina [Mr. THURMOND] be recognized at this time to speak no longer than 25 minutes; and that thereafter the previous order for recognition of Senator TOWER again be effective.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the request of the Senator from West Virginia? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I wish to commend the distinguished Senator from Mississippi for his comprehensive presentation of the Armed Services Committee's action, and also the able and distinguished Senator from Maine [Mrs. SMITH] for her magnificent work, on the appropriations for military procurement, research and development, and Reserve strength. I also reaffirm and support his comment that the recommendations of the committee were determined only after careful consideration and deliberation.

The committee considered in depth the many items that comprise this $22 billion package and recommends it for passage by the Senate. As a member of the Armed Services Committee, I concur with this action and believe that the authorization this year takes on special importance. In this regard I should like to add a few remarks about the need for armed strength in the world today, as well as the desperate need for leaders in government who are willing to use military force when it is necessary.

A study of history reveals that it is essential for a nation to protect itself from covetous rivals. This is particularly true for a great nation like the United States that is happily endowed with a great share of the world's blessings. History is filled with examples of dictators whose driving ambition was to conquer neighboring nations and to extend their borders. The more notable ones of the past were Alexander the Great, Julius Caesar, Genghis Khan, Napoleon, and Hitler. Today we have the Central Committee of the Communist Party in the Kremlin.

It is to defend against Soviet ambitions and the Communist threat to our security that I have long advocated the maintenance of strong armed forces and a progressive research and development program that will keep this Nation ahead in the technology of new weapons. This is one of the most important duties of the Congress, and our very survival depends on it.

Before I make some specific remarks about the details of this year's authorization, I should like to remind my colleagues here in the Senate of a matter of transcending importance: This is our national will to use military force.

Our military strength is no better than its leadership, and it has been the leadership of the present administration that established the policies and directed the employment of our Armed Forces during the past 8 years.

This was a period, Mr. President, that began with the Bay of Pigs and ended with the *Pueblo*.

This was a period that was marked by the arrogant assumption of the military responsibilities of the Congress by the Department of Defense.

This was a period in which the wishes of the Congress in such matters as nuclear propulsion, manned bomber forces, and antimissile defenses were ignored.

This was a period in which unskilled amateurs—civilians in the higher levels of the administration, and particularly those in the Department of Defense—took over the direction of strategy and tactics of our military forces.

This was the period that saw the scandal of the TFX, the disgraceful attempt to muzzle our military men, and the policy of gradual escalation of the war in Vietnam.

Above all, this was a period that will be remembered as the era in which the United States let her superiority in nuclear strategic weapons slip away.

What are the results of these policies? What have the American people gained from this massive expenditure of funds for defense procurement year after year?

Never in the proud history of our country has American prestige been so low.

The management of the war in Vietnam has been mishandled by civilian amateurs, and the fruits of this civilian mismanagement are bitter. In addition to mounting casualty lists—last week the total number of Americans killed in Vietnam reached more than 21,000; in fact, I have seen some figures as high as 24,000—we have lost face throughout the world, and some of our stanchest allies are beginning to doubt our sense of purpose. Moreover, despite recent steps to call up some Reserves, we must admit that this country is still not geared to conduct a major war.

The policy of gradual escalation that we so unwisely followed in Vietnam is like a bottomless pit. It is contrary to good military practice, it is costly, it is indecisive. It gives the initiative to the enemy.

It is quite popular to call those of us who advocate strong policies "war mongers." It is not war mongering to insist on the best leadership for the youth of our country who are serving in the Armed Forces. It is not war mongering to demand tactics that save lives. On the other hand it is a tragic mistake to get our military men involved in untenable situations in which they incur high casualties and not give them the leadership, tactics, or freedom to win.

I ask, what good does it do to contribute the majority of our national income to the maintenance of forces that we are afraid to use? We are a great strong Nation, whose retribution to insult and aggression should strike fear into the hearts of any aggressor anywhere in the world. Yet we are like a giant with an Achilles heel. The weakness lies in our leadership, which revels in self-pity and glorifies in exhibitions of unnecessary restraint.

These are the men who have made the United States appear ridiculous in the eyes of the world, the men who are unwilling to uphold the honor and dignity of our flag, who participate in no-win wars, and who permit the capture of a Navy ship on the high seas without immediate retaliation and forceful recovery.

We hear a lot about credibility today. I say that our military strength is not a credible deterrent so long as we are afraid to use it properly. For too many years we have been overly obsessed with the fear of the world censure and the reactions of other nations to our initiatives. Because of this fear-oriented philosophy we are bogged down in a war that is draining away our life's blood. In other areas our military resources are stretched thin, and because of our growing reputation for being a paper tiger, these forces are exposed unnecessarily to aggression and insult.

Recently the country was fortunate enough to witness the departure from public service of one man who must share a great deal of the responsibility for our present plight—former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara. However, the departure of the leader did not necessarily mean the discontinuance of his policies. McNamara left behind over 40 deputies, and it was apparent during the recent committee hearings on this bill now before you, that his whiz kids, and not the Joint Chiefs of Staff, are still making the decisions. They are still resisting the will of Congress by elaborate studies and are practicing what has been called "paralysis by analysis."

Let me cite a few examples of this attitude that prevails today in the Pentagon.

The Senator from Mississippi told us yesterday of the committee's decision to disapprove further authorization of the Navy's F-111B program, and the decision to fund the development of a replacement aircraft called the VFX. Included in the $296.9 million recommended by the committee for this program is about $30 million for contract definition. During the hearings several of us questioned the need for contract definition, on the grounds that so much study had gone into the F-111B and that the replacement aircraft would be primarily a lighter version of the plane that was discontinued. What we really feared was that the Department of Defense will use contract definition as a means to draw out paper studies and thwart the will of Congress by unnecessary delay.

We note on page 3 of the committee report, third paragraph from the bottom, the committee's expression of that fear:

> Unless the Department of Defense and the Department of the Navy act promptly to expedite contract definition of the new aircraft and contract award for its development and procurement, the 18 to 24 months' difference in the availability of this aircraft and that of its predecessor will be lengthened. The committee urges that this action be accelerated to the greatest degree that is consistent with prudent management.

Here is one place where I differ from the committee action. Instead of "urging" the Department of Defense and the Department of the Navy to get on with the development of the VFX, I would demand it. Further, I would insist on monthly progress reports, in order to prevent the Department of Defense from stalling on this important project. Why would they stall? Because they still feel morally obligated to continue with the F-111B, even though this program has been proved inadequate.

Another area that disturbs me is that of nuclear submarine construction. We note on page 5 of the report that the committee has provided $13.5 million in additional construction and $4 million in additional development authorization in order that one of the two submarines planned for construction in the fiscal year 1970 program may incorporate new higher performance characteristics. There is also an additional $16.4 million provided as authorization for improved submarines after 1970.

I know from personal discussion with Vice Admiral Rickover the urgent need to seek an improved submarine of new design in order for the United States to maintain its technical lead over the growing Soviet submarine force. I also know from that conversation that Admiral Rickover has grave doubts that the Department of Defense will take advantage of the committee's action and actually move ahead with the recommended improvements. In other words, this is another area in which the Defense Department whiz kids would like to delay action by further study. Despite the admiral's strong support, despite the expressed will of the Senate Armed Services Committee, despite the will of the entire Senate, the Department of Defense can, as it has done in the past, delay this crucial program.

This is another issue, I submit, in which the Senate should insist on compliance with its recommendations and require the Department of Defense to make periodic reports of progress.

The next item that I wish to bring to your attention deals with the defense of our country against nuclear attack. I have already expressed my disappointment and disagreement with the Department decision to deploy the thin, Chinese-oriented Sentinel antiballistic missile defense system. I have also reminded my colleagues of the dangerous trend in our overall strategic weapon comparison with the Soviet Union. Some of the Senate will remember that I pointed out that, in terms of total megatonnage delivery capability—not the number of launchers in place—the Soviets have made tremendous strides in competition with the United States.

In achieving this increase in delivery capability, the Soviets made their greatest advance in missile technology. Although they followed the United States in the early 1950's and concentrated first on air-dropped nuclear weapons, they have now moved to acquire a wide range of delivery systems. Soviet nuclear delivery vehicles now include all known means—aircraft, missiles, submarines and artillery. They have the capability of orbiting satellites with nuclear weapons as well.

The Soviets are shifting from liquid propulsion to solid propellants in its strategic missile designs—similar to the solid propellant technology in our own Polaris, Poseidon, and Minuteman programs. Their entire missile inventory has progressed rapidly to include a wide variety of types of missiles. In addition to intercontinental ballistic missiles—ICBM's—they have medium and intermediate range ballistic missiles and submarine-launched cruise and ballistic missiles which they can use to supplement the ICBM's in a strategic attack role.

They have equipped their long-range bombers with air-to-surface missiles as standoff weapons to circumvent our defenses. It is quite evident from intelligence reports that the Soviets plan to maintain a large bomber force as a hedge against failures in their missile systems. This is one of the reasons why the Soviets have made such spectacular gains in total megatonnage delivery. They have retained large numbers of long-range manned bombers while we reduced our own inventory. Furthermore, there is every reason to believe that Communist China will have a smaller, but similar capability in a few years.

In my opinion, we cannot afford to leave an open door to bomber attack. It is extremely important for the United States to continue with its advanced interceptor program. Only yesterday I visited one of our interceptor installations in the western part of the country.

In this regard, the Senate Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee is currently holding hearings on strategic weapon delivery systems and capabilities of the United States. Integral to these hearings, we expect to study in detail the threat posed by the various Soviet capabilities. I feel certain that one of the conclusions from this investigation will be that we need an improved interceptor for our antibomber defense program.

This brings me to one recommendation of the Senate Committee on Armed Services, regarding the authorization now before us, for the disapproval of $28 million requested by the Department of the Air Force to modernize the F–106 aircraft and to provide an improved air-to-air missile.

The need for procuring and deploying an advanced interceptor aircraft has been recognized by the Senate before. In the fiscal year 1967 Department of Defense authorization request we authorized $55 million "for the procurement of, or for maintaining a production capability for, the F–12 aircraft." Our action was designed to provide our Armed Forces with the advanced interceptor needed for the immediate future. The procurement of this interceptor had been recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff based upon their evaluation of the air-breathing threat of the future. Unfortunately, former Secretary McNamara refused to release the funds for the purposes specified by Congress, and we have, for all practical purposes, lost 2 years in preparing ourselves to meet this most vital need. We cannot afford to lose any more time.

In view of these considerations, I believe that the Senate Armed Services Committee should study the entire air interceptor program in more depth and examine the various options that the Air Force can offer. In other words, I recommend that the deletion of the $28 million stand, but I urge the Senate to recognize the importance of the air interceptor problem and to expect a further recommendation from the Armed Services Committee if its study should, as I anticipate, indicate the need for additional funding action.

In conclusion, Mr. President, I repeat my earlier recommendation for approval of the authorization for the total amount of $22,001,788,830 as reported to the Senate by the able acting chairman of the Armed Services Committee. At the same time, I urge that the leadership of the country adopt a policy of using our military force to better advantage. In doing so, I am not advocating that the United States become an international bully. I am just asking that we remove the chains from the military Samson that we have built, that we return the direction of military operations to our military commanders, and allow them to use military force effectively, quickly, and precisely when the need for its use is indicated.

Furthermore, I am pleased to note that Congress has reassumed some of the responsibilities for defense that it had abdicated to the executive branch during the past 8 years. I urge that this assumption of responsibilities continue and expand. In particular, I urge my colleagues to keep a watchful eye on the Deputy Directors of the Department of Defense, who have proven by their actions in the past that they know how to circumvent the will of Congress.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senator from Texas [Mr. TOWER], who is now about to be recognized, may yield to me briefly for a short quorum call, without the time being charged against him.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

GRADUALISM

Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, I am very pleased to serve on the Republican Party's task force on national security and to have had a part in the deliberations of many men more expert than I which led to publication of a policy statement on gradualism.

Our Nation's current peace efforts are fully supported by me and by all other members of the task force on national security. Our discussion of gradualism is not a criticism of current and continual peace efforts. It is, instead, a critique of the past, worldwide defense policies of the administration which have indecisively prolonged Vietnam hostilities for many years, seriously strained our national defense posture, disheartened our allies, and raised danger signals for the future.

I believe gradualism—which forewarns the enemy of our intentions and guarantees him sanctuaries and periodic pauses—has not prevented war; it has encouraged war. Gradualism actually gives the enemy an incentive to attack free nations, and their vessels, by assuring him we will not act decisively to counter him.

As the consequence of gradualism, our Nation is inexorably pulled ever deeper into a Communist-created quagmire until our own stakes in the battle are far greater than we intended.

It is the danger for the future which is the most important message of the gradualism paper. Recent history shows the sad result of past gradualism; our future will be one of turmoil, trouble, and retreat unless the incredibility of gradualism is replaced by credible American deterrents to aggression and violence.

This administration's quagmire policy must be ended by the responsible leadership of a Republican administration which understands what peace demands. Only in this way can future Vietnams be avoided.

I ask unanimous consent, therefore, Mr. President, that the text of the paper "Gradualism—Fuel of Wars" be printed at this point in the RECORD for the information and study of Members of the Senate and of all interested and concerned Americans. I ask also that membership lists of the Republican coordinating committee and task force on national security be printed.

There being no objection, the items were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

GRADUALISM—FUEL OF WARS

(Adopted by the Republican coordinating committee, March 19, 1968; presented by the task force on national security)

(OVERALL COMMENT.—This position paper is concerned with the basic military policies developed by the government of the United States over more than seven years; and should not be interpreted in terms of a specific event or time frame.)

INTRODUCTION

Peace is poorly served by those who shrink from the steps necessary to ensure it.

For almost a quarter century—ever since the explosions at Hiroshima and Nagasaki—the world has been tormented by the realization that the human race has at last achieved the capability of self-destruction through nuclear war. This dread menace has profoundly influenced the strategic policies of the United States and given rise to two sharply differing approaches to our security requirements.

The first—a cardinal feature of the Eisenhower years—was to ensure peace through an unmistakable determination to protect the vital interests of the United States anywhere in the world. This determination was made plainly evident to all through Administration policies, capabilities, statements and deeds. It was a policy of flexible deterrence through credible firmness—a policy retaining initiative and freedom of action in American hands. There was no apology for strength. There was no mistaking the sternness of the national will.

And America stayed at peace.

A military power strong enough to maintain the peace must follow four principles as old as warfare and diplomacy: It must maintain a force strong enough to meet any challenge; it must be prepared to crush all threats to the peace with force if required; it must clearly convince those who would disturb the peace that force will be used against them; and, once force is brought into play, it must be applied to the fullest extent the situation may demand.

Beginning in 1961 two related doctrines began to evolve and in succeeding years have radically altered our nation's defense planning. One is a basic revision of an earlier concept known as "flexible response." The other was a singular stratagem called "gradualism." Flexible response, in the current thinking, does not mean, as it has historically meant, the capability to respond to a variety of threats with applicable and sufficient force to crush it. It has come to designate instead a deliberate policy of reaction which induces stalemate. Though separate doctrines, conceptually they have the same effect—to de-emphasize our strength, leash our power, and replace our superiority with "parity," all in the euphoric hope that through such demonstrations of peaceful purpose and restraint, America would entice her sworn enemies away from aggression and subversion and into the pathways of peace.

However well intended, these departures have been tragic for America. Prudent firmness was displaced by extreme caution, then hesitancy, then indecisiveness. Unchallengeable power was eroded by the factor appearance of wavering will. Our tested guardians of peace—manifest strength and determination—have lost credibility throughout the world.

And so, two doctrines—the revised "flexible response" and "gradualism"—have grievously disserved the United States. They have fostered aggression. They have prolonged and escalated a war, undermined our alliances, divided the nation and stripped our reserves to the bone. As doctrines of response, not of initiative, they have created a world-wide crisis of confidence in United States deterrence. In place of peace they have spawned the very evils they were conceived to banish—war and escalation of war.

FLEXIBLE RESPONSE

"Flexible response," a traditional military concept, is neither complex nor objectionable. It prescribes the maintenance of military forces capable of containing all levels of aggression from guerrilla actions to unlimited war. For many years the armed forces of the United States adhered to this doctrine.

In very recent years a deadly new definition has been introduced transforming "flexible response" from an instrument for peace into a trigger of wars. As revised by the present Administration, "flexible response" means to an aggressor that his military excursions will initially encounter only comparable force. Thus war is invited as aggressors measure attractive options—freedom to choose the time, the place and the means of doing battle, all with an acceptable risk. Assured that America's crushing forces will be dribbled into battle, the military marauder is encouraged to believe that even a protracted conflict will be pursued on his terms.

It is this new application of "flexible response" that is conveyed when the expression appears in this paper.

GRADUALISM

As the new version of "flexible response" invites war, so "gradualism" escalates war once begun.

Ironically, gradualism—designed to prevent intensification of war—does the very opposite by preventing timely use of force against aggression. While "flexible response" blunts our first reactions, gradualism assures the aggressor that our subsequent reactions will also be cautiously phased to prevent over-application of force. Skillfully and patiently applied, the process can hardly fail to nourish a skirmish into a major war.

Moreover, after each carefully restrained escalation, gradualism dictates a "pause." This ingenuous stratagem is in effect a one-sided military recess during which the enemy is importuned to recalculate his risks and contritely review his indiscretions as his own depredations continue. The "pause," occurring when the aggressor's force has been at least temporarily stalemated by our military effort, actually enables the enemy to recoup his strength at his most vulnerable moment. Thus rejuvenated by successive pauses, the struggle continues and intensifies.

America's laboratory for testing the gradualism experiment has been Vietnam. There it has failed—it has prolonged and escalated the war.

It has permitted North Vietnam to acquire the weapons, supplies and training from the Soviet Union and Communist China needed to maintain and expand its war-making capability and to withstand punishing attacks. It has preserved the sanctuaries in which the Communists can safely regroup and reinforce. It has long delayed interdiction of the flow of supplies to the South. It has denied our own military the strength and decisiveness the circumstances have required.

So completely has the Administration applied this policy of gradualism that tactical military decisions have been often made by civilians 9,000 miles away in Washington.

Even advance warnings to the enemy of U.S. steps to augment her forces or otherwise strengthen her military position have characterized gradualism in Vietnam. The professed object of this surprising tactic has been to prevent "over-reaction" by the enemy or his allies. One result, however, is clear: the enemy has been allowed to phase his buildup with our own.

Thus, gradualism has salvaged the enemy's warmaking capacity, enabling the tiny nation of North Vietnam to develop a major capability to sustain aggression in the South and to obtain massive assistance from the Soviet Union and Red China to off-set U.S. pressure from land, sea and air. America's overwhelming power has been fended off, not by the enemy, but by our own hand.

We have escalated, through gradualism, a minor engagement into our fourth largest war.

The shackling of our Air Force and Naval air power in Vietnam affords us a striking exhibition of gradualism in action.

In our system it is axiomatic that the highest civilian level of government must establish broad policies to govern the general direction in which our nation is to move. An obsession with preventing escalation of the air war in Vietnam, however, has led the Administration to transfer approval of attacks on specific targets from field commanders and even the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the President himself. Operational decisions reached far away in Washington have prevented some attacks altogether and in other instances have been so delayed as to forfeit precious military advantage. Certain targets unanimously recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff two years ago have but recently been placed on the approved lists.

During this long interval between target recommendations and approval, the enemy vastly strengthened his ability to withstand U.S. pressure from the air. He scattered his targets. Many of his vital operations were moved underground. With Soviet assistance he multiplied his air defenses. In the 18 months prior to August 1967, the number of anti-aircraft guns deployed in North Vietnam increased more than 250 percent. Surface-to-air missile (SA-2) sites more than doubled. Radar early warning capability tripled, and radar fire-control capability increased at an even faster rate.[1] U.S. losses in pilots and equipment soared.[2]

Surveying this appalling sequence, the Military Preparedness Subcommittee of the United States Senate reported on August 31, 1967:

"It is not our intention to point a finger or to second guess those who determine this policy, but the cold fact is that *this policy has not done the job and it has been contrary to military judgment.*" (Emphasis added.)

A similar sequence has marked the prosecution of the ground actions of this solicitously directed war. As in the application of air power, "too little too late" has been the pattern dictated by gradualism, with consequent terrible cost to us and the stricken people of Vietnam. For many months, the military leadership vainly pressed the Administration for a substantial increase of ground forces for Vietnam. Again, in the long interval that elapsed before his recommendations were approved, the enemy gained time to increase his own strength.

Gradualism has restrained us from applying enough pressure, in adequate time, to convince the enemy of the futility of his effort. Restraints imposed, not by the enemy, but by ourselves, have made it possible for him to carry forward an aggression with a growing expectation of at least partial success.

This conduct of our efforts in Vietnam has been bitterly disappointing both militarily and politically and has imposed immense costs upon the American people. The war has

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[1] Report and Hearings on the "Air War Against North Vietnam" by the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, Aug. 1967.

[2] Ibid, "The North Vietnamese air defense environment overall, including anti-aircraft fire, surface-to-air missiles and Mig aircraft over the heavily defended targets in North Vietnam, has been described as the most deadly that the world has ever seen. The massive air defenses have exacted a heavy toll of American aircraft and pilots. More than 660 planes have been shot down over North Vietnam."

already caused over 100,000 U.S. casualties, consumed some $50 billions of dollars, gravely impaired our international relationships, and sharply divided the American people. Continued adherence to this doctrine promises not only more disappointments, but also an escalating risk of world war.

NATO APPLICATION

The newly revised doctrine of "flexible response" is not regional in scope. Its injury to our nation's vital interests has been world-wide.

Announcement of adoption by NATO of the Administration's version of "flexible response" was made as recently as December 1967, but U.S. acceptance of this doctrine in the early Sixties left NATO no alternative.

Now, Soviet Communism in Eastern Europe can reasonably conclude from U.S. and NATO policy that military response to a thrust from the East would be initially opposed only with commensurate force. For NATO, however, conventional response to a major conventional military thrust would be unrealistic. NATO military strategists are acutely aware of this. The huge conventional forces of East European Communism, coupled with the political realities of the region, suggest that the new doctrine of "flexible response" may gravely menace all of Europe.

Before this basic strategic revision, the NATO security design had given full consideration to conventional responses to acts of aggression short of major war. However, it was universally recognized and stressed that this capability had severe limitations. For the enemy who pushed the alliance beyond these limits, such force as necessary would be swiftly applied. That this force might not materialize was never contemplated. Because it was known to all that the NATO nations had not only the capability but also the will to repel aggression, peace was preserved.

The doctrine of "flexible response" as now incorporated into NATO planning would seem to dictate initial reliance on conventional defense—a doctrine conceding the loss of forward areas early in any conflict. Then, with enemy forces occupying allied territory, our own military options would become critically restricted. Expecting an enemy to desist following his initial success is at best a deadly gamble, and at worst inviting defeat. For the new "flexible response" to become credible for Western Europe, a major increase of conventional forces would be required—an increase so great as to be economically and politically impracticable. We view the incorporation of this new doctrine into NATO security planning as a new "open door" policy—for Soviet Communism.

Shortly after this new doctrine was enunciated, former Chancellor Adenauer expressed concern that it would weaken NATO and cause fragmentation of the alliance. His assessment has since been borne out.

Thus, in but a brief span of years the new defense doctrine "flexible response" has gravely weakened the West's long-established objective of presenting any aggressor in Europe with unacceptable risks.

PREMISES REEXAMINED

In contrast to the Administration's premises, we are convinced that these judgments must underpin America's security policy:

(1) Our defense posture must confront an enemy with a clearly unacceptable risk; otherwise it invites political opportunism and aggression.

(2) Our policies in the course of a conflict must not allow an enemy to control the level and nature of the U.S. military response, or allow him to disengage at will; otherwise they invite a continuing escalation of the conflict.

(3) Our policies must not publicly proclaim that America will withhold any element of her might to prevent or repel aggression; otherwise they strip this nation of those military and diplomatic options indispensable to the attainment of her national goals, the success of her foreign policies, and her influence for peace.

SUMMARY

These criticisms of the current doctrines in no way diminish our concern for safeguarding against irresponsibility in the use of military force. In a world of nuclear peril application of direct military force must always be a last resort. Rather, we are convinced that an intensive reexamination of this country's national security policies is long overdue. A re-appraisal of our strategic policies for countering aggression has become critical in the light of our mismanagement of the Vietnam conflict and the thrust of events elsewhere in the world.

It is recognized that certain types of conflict are not susceptible to solution by military power alone. This paper cannot properly be read as embracing the proposition that a military solution to the situation in Vietnam should have been undertaken at its inception 6 years ago. It should also be noted that the paper does not attempt in any way to treat the exceedingly complicated military-diplomatic issue of whether or not this war, having been so grievously mismanaged, can now reach a military solution lacking very major escalations evidently not now contemplated by the Administration.

There is urgent need to establish a credibility with the world at large—indeed, with our own people—that the U.S. does have the determination, and does have the will, to use its strength to restore and keep the peace.

The Administration's beguiling formulation for these new doctrines of "flexible response" and "gradualism" conceals a perilous unrealism. Offered in the name of prudence and humanitarianism, in application these doctrines are breeders of war and killers of men.

The concept that the United States must maintain a measure of military flexibility to counter varying forms of aggression is unchallengeably valid, but it is unrealistic to apply equal emphasis at each level of a conflict spectrum.

We require policies leading to a more efficient and effective military posture which will encourage new weaponry and new strategies by enhancing our total fighting capabilities and their deterrent effect.

Once this nation resorts to arms to stem aggression, force should be applied quickly and decisively to bring the conflict swiftly to an end. The longer a conflict is indulged, the greater the likelihood of its escalation and expansion and the greater its casualties and destruction. *And, once America is committed to military action, we must no longer merely respond; we must achieve and maintain the initiative.*

In view of the current tensions and instability of world affairs, America can little afford to forearm potential aggressors with the assurance that she is unlikely to use any element of her power against them. *Where our vital interests are at stake, meddlers and brigands must know that the risks they face are unacceptable.*

Looking to the future, there remains a probability of conflicts in other parts of the world. Communism is still enamored of fomenting "wars of national liberation." Communist forces are actively probing in the Middle East, Africa and South America, as well as Asia, undermining the established orders and relentlessly striving to extend their influence. The thrust of their effort is still to weaken U.S. and Free World positions in international affairs. Many areas under increasing pressure in recent months are vital to the interests of the United States and the West, as well as to indigenous forces of freedom.

America has neither the aspiration nor the resources to serve as policeman of the world. *Yet, realities of geography, ideology, and international politics dictate that this nation's vital interests project far beyond her shores. We must maintain these interests, and we must defend them. Policies and a posture which unmistakably show this nation's determination to protect these interests will discourage nibbling aggression and reduce the number of U.S. physical involvements.* Such policies, and such a posture, do not exist today.

CONCLUSION

The doctrines of "flexible response" and "gradualism" as developed by this Administration expose this nation and the world to intolerable, largely avoidable risks. They impose terrible costs in lives and resources. They are incompatible with the security of the United States and perilous to world peace.

Our country should announce at the highest level the resumption of a national security policy that the size of our response to aggression will be our own decision tailored to each situation as it arises. A potential enemy will be denied the assurance he has appeared to have under the "gradualism" policy of a moderate and limited price in response to aggression. At the same time, we will continue to have the leeway to make our response as moderate or as potent as we consider appropriate.

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EX-OFFICIO MEMBERS

Robert C. Hill, U.S. Ambassador to Mexico, 1957–61.

Maurice H. Stans, Director of the Bureau of the Budget, 1958–61.

Anthony J. Jurich, Secretary to the Task Force.

AUTHORIZATION FOR MILITARY PROCUREMENT, 1969

The Senate resumed the consideration of the bill (S. 3293) to authorize appropriations during the fiscal year 1969 for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, and tracked combat vehicles, research, development, test, and evaluation for the Armed Forces, and to prescribe the authorized personnel strength of the Selected Reserve of each Reserve component of the Armed Forces, and for other purposes.

Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, I want to take this occasion to join those who have already commended the Senator from Mississippi for the masterful job he did as a substitute for our beloved chairman, the senior Senator from Georgia [Mr. RUSSELL], in the direction of this year's Department of Defense authorization bill, the first major bill from the committee this year.

A very thorough explanation as to what is provided in this $22 billion authorization bill has been given by the able Senator from Mississippi. I do not wish to repeat what has been said. However, there is one committee recommendation which I believe requires discussion because of the vital issue involved; that is, the recommendation to disapprove the $28 million requested for new interceptor aircraft. These funds would have been used as a step toward the modernization of our air defense forces. The total program would have involved improvement of F–106 interceptors and the development of new warning and control systems. The improvements for the F–106 would have provided new missile and fire control systems. The committee has recommended disapproval of this request for the reasons stated in the committee report.

Among the most important problems facing this country is the extent and nature of the threat posed to our security by the bomber forces of Russia, China, and possibly other countries.

According to the statement by the Secretary of Defense before our Armed Services Committee this year, the Soviets have a force of approximately 155 heavy intercontinental bombers. What the Secretary did not point out as specifically as he might have is that the Soviets also have a force of air-refuelable medium bombers—900 Badgers and Blinders—giving them a total strategic bomber force of 1,100 aircraft versus about 690–700 of our strategic bombers. This represents a reversal of our former numerical preponderance in manned bombers, and poses a threat to the United States which is largely overlooked because the spotlight has been focused on the ICBM threat.

Data concerning the Soviet strategic bomber force was published in a document released by the House Armed Services Committee last July entitled "The Changing Strategic Military Balance" and is of special interest. The source figures for the Soviet bomber forces were taken from "The Military Balance" published by the prestigious Institute for Strategic Studies. The Soviet strategic bomber force is described as being composed of:

Nine hundred Badgers, a twin-turbojet subsonic medium bomber similar to the former U.S. B–47 and equipped for in-flight refueling. The Badger has a bombload capacity of 20,000 pounds and some versions carry the Kipper standoff nuclear missile, with a range of 450 miles. The Badgers have been operational since 1955 and are expected to be replaced by the Blinder which has supersonic capability and a bombload capacity of 12,000 pounds.

The Blinder became operational in 1962 and carries a Kitchen air-to-surface missile. A few Blinders are included in the above estimate of the Badger force.

In addition to the Badgers and Blinders there are about 100 Bisons. This four-engine turbojet bomber is comparable to our long-range B–52 and has been operational since 1956. It has a bombload capacity of 20,000 pounds.

Finally, it is estimated that there are 100 Bears. This is a huge four-engine turboprop bomber with a range of 7,800 miles. Its commercial version, the TU–114, is the largest operational aircraft in the world. A Bear-type aircraft flies a weekly nonstop flight from Moscow to Havana transporting passengers and freight. First operational in 1956, the Bear has a bombload capacity of over 40,000 pounds and carries a Kangaroo standoff missile.

Some of these data may vary slightly with the classified official National Intelligence Estimate, but I believe it generally is reliable and accurate. It is clear that the threat posed by this bomber force is both real and substantial. We cannot afford to ignore it and to direct our attention solely to developing an effective antimissile defense.

We would be guilty of gross error to conclude that an enemy attack upon our Nation would be limited to a missile attack. We should not delude ourselves for 1 minute that an enemy foolish enough to attack us would be so naive as not to use every bomber at his disposal, either as part of the initial strike force or as a second strike wave.

The Soviets have maintained their interest in bombers despite our failure to move ahead with the development of an advance bomber. According to the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, General McConnell, the Soviets are continuing production of heavy bombers and supersonic medium bombers—the Blinders—are entering operational service in substantial numbers. Recently, we have learned of simulated strike missions which the Russians have flown in the vicinity of Newfoundland and Alaska. These missions, which tested our detection systems, clearly reveal the intention of the Soviets to maintain bomber forces in a state of combat readiness.

To meet the bomber threat, the Air Force has developed a concept for an improved air defense system capable of destroying the enemy's bombers before they approach within striking range of the target areas. This system would include an improved interceptor, an airborne warning and control system, and an over-the-horizon radar.

I believe the AWACS system would improve the effectiveness of all interceptor forces. It would involve a long-endurance aircraft, highly survivable, and capable of quick reaction and rapid deployment to positions around and well beyond the boundaries of our Nation. Its mobility would make AWACS virtually immune to destruction by ICBM attack.

The over-the-horizon radars would work in conjunction with and complement the AWACS systems and the advanced interceptor. These radars would have the ability to detect targets from the earth's surface to the ionosphere at great ranges from our coastlines. We would be in a position to provide a bomber holdback line that would deny

an enemy the opportunity to gain the advantage of tactical surprise.

There is no question but that an effective air defense system can make an important contribution in limiting damage to the United States in the event of a nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union. It is difficult to discuss this matter in detail on the floor of the Senate because so much of the material is classified. However, it is accurate to state that a substantial percentage of Soviet megatonnage could be delivered by Soviet bombers in the absence of an adequate air defense and that millions of American lives could be forfeited by a failure to provide a defense against the bomber threat.

The Russians now think their missiles will work—but they can be certain their bombers will work if we fail to defend against them.

It is with some misgiving, therefore, that I note the committee's disapproval of the $28 million requested for F–106 modification, with no substitute funds provided for any alternative development. I hope that we will not indefinitely delay modernization of our air defense system. The former Secretary of Defense studied and studied the problem to exhaustion and then even he finally concluded that we could not afford to delay much longer on this issue.

This need for procuring and deploying an advanced interceptor aircraft has already been considered by the Senate in recent years. In our action on the fiscal year 1967 Department of Defense authorization request we authorized $55 million "for the procurement of, or for maintaining a production capability for, the F–12 aircraft." Our action was designed to provide our Armed Forces with the advanced interceptor needed for the immediate future.

The procurement of this interceptor had been recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff based upon their evaluation of the air-breathing threat of the future. Unfortunately, the former Secretary of Defense refused to release the funds for the purposes specified by the Congress and we have, for all practical purposes, lost 2 years in preparing ourselves to meet this most vital need.

I understand that studies have been made within the Defense Department as to possible mixes of aircraft which could be utilized in the air defense role. Perhaps the F–12 aircraft should be part of the air defense fleet—supplemented perhaps by F–106's, F–4's, or some other aircraft. It is a matter of some urgency that these studies be shared with Congress and that a decision be made soon on our air defense.

I know that the Preparedness Subcommittee, under the direction of the Senator from Mississippi, is devoting itself to a study of strategic aircraft needs. I hope that both that subcommittee and the full Armed Services Committee can receive prompt and further reports and suggestions from the Air Force about ways in which we can meet the bomber threat.

It was unfortunate, but understandable, that Congress should be disposed to delay decisions so long as the Secretary of Defense and the military departments disagreed strongly on aircraft procurements. We have seen one example in the case of the F–111B. Of course, I hope that the new Secretary of Defense will—and I believe he already has begun to—establish more effective cooperation with the services.

Nevertheless, if no decision can be reached inside the Pentagon, then Congress, itself, must take the initiative in national defense. I hope the Pentagon will be asked to advise the Armed Services Committee soon on an agreeable program for a new interceptor.

I am not particularly concerned about what interceptor we choose. I am concerned that we get the most effective one we can possibly develop at the time and in the numbers we deem necessary to meet the threat.

These decisions obviously require additional hearings and deliberations, and I shall be pleased to cooperate with the Senator from Mississippi in such deliberations at an early date.

ORDER OF BUSINESS

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. CANNON in the chair). The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senator from Alabama [Mr. SPARKMAN] may be recognized for 10 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered.

SENATE JOINT RESOLUTION 160—INTRODUCTION OF JOINT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION TO MAKE A STUDY OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS AND THE EFFECT OF THEIR SALES AND PURCHASES ON THE NATION'S SECURITIES MARKET

Mr. SPARKMAN. Mr. President, since 1959 holdings of financial institutions—banks, insurance companies, mutual funds, employee pension and welfare funds, foundations, and college endowments—in securities listed on the New York Stock Exchange have nearly doubled. In 1959 institutional investors owned securities valued at $53 billion. By 1966 this figure had increased to $101 billion and financial institutions held approximately one-third of the outstanding securities listed on the exchange.

This rapid increase raises many questions concerning the impact of the institutional investor on our Nation's securities markets.

Traditionally, securities transactions have been of limited size—emanating from large numbers of investors. Recently, however, institutional buying and selling of large blocks of stocks has dramatically increased. For example, on the New York Stock Exchange transactions in blocks of over 10,000 shares has tripled since 1964. In the third quarter of last year there were 1,735 transactions on the exchange involving lots of 10,000 or more shares compared to 900 such transactions in the third quarter of 1966. Such transactions could if executed at or about the same time, cause severe fluctuations in the price of individual stocks and lessen the liquidity of the market.

The growth of institutional investment also raises questions as to the relationships and potential conflicts of interest between the institution holding large blocks of a company's stock and the company's management.

Another area of particular concern has been the marked rise in the short-term trading of securities by some institutional investors. Since 1965 mutual funds have increased their portfolio turnover rate from 21 to 33.5 percent. Some performance funds specifically stress short-term trading and their transactions may well be detrimental to the orderly functions of our securities market.

Robert Haack, president of the New York Stock Exchange, in a recent speech discussed the impact of the institutional investor on our Nation's securities markets. Mr. Haack recommended that a comprehensive government-industry study of these problems be undertaken as soon as possible.

The SEC in its report last December—Report of the Securities and Exchange Commission on the Public Policy Implications of Investment Company Growth, 89th Congress, second session, House of Representatives, Report No. 2337—also expressed increased concern regarding the implications of institutional investor growth. The report said:

> While the nation's securities markets on the whole have responded well to the changes wrought by increased institutional investor participation, there are increasing signs of strain on the mechanisms of the auction markets. In a number of instances, the sudden and simultaneous appearance of sell orders for large blocks of the same security has resulted in a marked drop in its price. In a few instances, the strain on the auction market caused a temporary suspension of trading in the security involved. In some instances, the selling pressures appear to have been accentuated—perhaps unduly so—because of the manner in which the orders were executed.
>
> There is a lack of reliable and comprehensive data concerning the securities holdings and trading activities of other institutional investors. For example, even though noninsured pension funds own more corporate stock than mutual funds do, there is no information generally available—even on an annual basis—as to the size of the pension funds' holdings of specific securities. Pension funds are regulated under the Welfare and Pension Fund Disclosure Act of 1958, which is administered by the Department of Labor. Closing the informational gap with respect to pension fund holdings and holdings of other institutional investors through amendments to existing Federal regulatory statutes and through other appropriate means is an indispensable preliminary step to adequate analysis to the problems raised by the institutionalization of the securities markets.

When testifying before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce regarding the mutual fund bill, SEC Chairman Manuel F. Cohen ex-

pressed again his interest in seeing a comprehensive study undertaken.

I have also recently received correspondence between Mr. Haack and Chairman Cohen which supports the need for such a study. This correspondence stresses the fact that the New York Stock Exchange, the American Stock Exchange, the Association of Stock Exchange Firms, the Investment Company Institute, and the National Association of Securities Dealers all agree that such a study is needed. The entire securities industry is willing to cooperate with the Securities and Exchange Commission, through the vehicle of an advisory committee, to bring about a cooperative endeavor in this area. I wholeheartedly endorse this suggestion and I am sure that the Securities and Exchange Commission and all those concerned with the role of the institutional investor will, before this study is initiated, combine their talents to form the Advisory Committee. In this manner, the experiences and talents of all those concerned can be brought to focus on this most important problem.

Mr. President, I now ask unanimous consent that the correspondence to which I have referred be included in the RECORD, so that all Members of this body may have the benefit of the views of both the Securities and Exchange Commission and the securities industry.

There being no objection, the correspondence was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION,
Washington, D.C., February 14, 1968.

Mr. ROBERT W. HAACK,
President, New York Stock Exchange,
New York, N.Y.

DEAR BOB: There seem to be a number of misconceptions concerning the study of the impact and role of institutions in the securities markets which Congressman Moss and Keith have proposed and which the Commission supports. I thought it would be helpful to set down in some detail precisely what we do, and what we do not, have in mind.

First and foremost, I wish to make clear that this is to be an economic study, not an investigation. It is intended to produce information concerning basic economic trends that will be helpful to the Commission, to the self-regulatory agencies, to the industry, and to everyone else concerned with the role of institutions in the securities markets; it is not intended to produce disciplinary proceedings or other enforcement actions against any firms, persons or institutions. Nor would it be used to conduct investigations for any such purpose.

Among the questions to which the proposed study might direct its attention are the following: Has the growth of institutional investors encouraged the flow of equity financing? Or has it merely substituted institutional for individual investment? Will the supply of equity securities balance the increasing demand from institutional investors? Has the total volume of stock trading increased by more than what one might expect in the absence of large institutional investment? If so, has the increased trading tended to increase the liquidity of markets or has it had the opposite result? Is the increase in trading concentrated in certain types of institutions, or is it typical of all categories of institutional investors?

What impact on stock price trends should one expect from growing participation of institutional investors, given their longer-term investment horizons and the possibilities available to them of averaging risks? Has any such trend actually developed? What effect has it had on the investment objectives of individual investors? What changes are occurring in the relationships among individual investors, institutional investors, and the corporate issuers and their managements? These are representative of the important economic issues worthy of study.

Most prior studies made by the Commission pursuant to Congressional direction were initiated because Congress was concerned about the possibility that serious malpractices existed in some area or that existing regulatory controls were inadequate. Such studies, therefore, necessarily focused upon determining the extent and nature of improper practices which might exist and upon determining whether or not regulatory objectives were being evaded or controls were otherwise ineffective. The purpose of the present study, by contrast, will be to obtain more information about, and better understanding of, an economic phenomenon—"institutional investing"—and to determine its impact upon individual investors, the corporate issuers, the securities firms, and the public capital markets.

Institutionalization of investment is probably the most significant phenomenon in the securities markets today. It is a dramatic and developing process, concerning which all of us should be informed as promptly, as currently, and as continuously as possible. There is little doubt as to the need for such study or the potential dangers if one is not undertaken promptly.

A question has, however, been raised whether the Commission is the appropriate body to undertake this study. In my view, the Commission is the logical organization to shoulder this responsibility, and possibly the only one that can meet all of the necessary criteria.

First, the Commission is the agency established by the Congress specifically for the purpose of conducting studies of this nature. We already have a statutory obligation to keep abreast of developments in the securities markets and to report our conclusions to the Congress whenever we become aware of matters which should be brought to its attention, whether or not legislation is proposed.

Second, the study necessarily must go beyond the mere collection of statistics and similar data. We have authority to obtain, and experience in obtaining, data concerning existing and developing practices of the different, and frequently competing, institutions, as well as information concerning the nature and dimensions of any problems which flow from them. The Commission can also assure, when and to the extent appropriate, confidential treatment of information furnished for the purposes of the study.

Third, in order to assure the usefulness and effectiveness of the study, it should be under the direction of any agency which has not merely an academic interest in the operation of the securities markets, but a long-term responsibility for the health and well-being of those markets. An *ad hoc* committee composed of representatives of the various interested groups and put together solely for the purpose of conducting a single study would not have this long-term responsibility, and would also have much more difficulty in developing the cohesion and centralized direction necessary to the successful conduct of the study.

Fourth, the study might develop information and raise questions of significance under the anti-trust laws, with which only the Commission would be in a position to deal effectively.

The first step in the preparation of the study would be to convene a meeting of representatives of the Commission, of other interested Government agencies (such as the Federal Reserve Board), of the self-regulatory bodies, of industry groups, and distinguished economists, to consider the nature and dimensions of the study, the types of information most urgently needed, and the most effective ways of obtaining and analyzing that information. It is essential that the Commission have the benefit of the thinking of a group of this nature, not only in planning this study, but in advising the Commission on a continuing basis of new developments which should be taken into account in the Commission's work. I contemplate that this group would join us in the creation of an advisory committee, representative of the various interests concerned, which would meet regularly with the study staff and with the Commission during and after the completion of the study, and that it would have an active role in shaping the scope and conduct of the study. This would mean that, as information is gathered, it would be made available promptly to the advisory committee so that they will be in a position to offer informed judgments to the Commission.

To staff the study group, which would operate outside the regular framework of the Commission organization, but remain subject to continuing and close Commission oversight, I contemplate that we would recruit outstanding people from industry, from universities, and from other agencies of the government. The Commission would welcome suggestions and the assistance of all industry groups in recruiting the best persons available. We would also assign to the study members of the Commission's staff who have a special familiarity with the technical operation of, and current trends in, the various securities markets, or who are now and have been working on economic issues to be considered in the study. Certain of the issues to be explored could be made the object of studies by distinguished economists not employed directly by the study staff. Every effort would be made to seek out persons of such stature and independence as to insure the objectivity of viewpoint and result of the study. In any event, arrangements would be made so that those in charge of the study would have direct and immediate access to the Commission, the Advisory Committee and leading economists in the nation.

I anticipate that when the study staff has developed its tentative report, it would be made available to the Advisory Committee and to the Commission. I would hope that the Commission and the Advisory Committee would agree on all points. Should some differences develop, however, the committee or any member of it would have full opportunity, and such assistance as the study staff can provide, to spell out (in the final report) any differences and the reasons therefor.

As you know, we have submitted to Chairman Moss, at his request, a proposed budget, for use in connection with further action on the resolution which he and Mr. Keith introduced in the last session of the Congress. That budget was prepared on the assumption that the Commission would be required to do all of the work involved in gathering and analyzing the necessary information. To the extent that portions of the work would be done by outside economists under special arrangements, the budget would be revised. To the extent that self-regulatory agencies, industry groups and others may be able to assist the Commission in the gathering or processing of this information—and I want to make clear again that we welcome, and indeed solicit, such assistance and cooperation—the demands on the Commission's time and manpower, and correspondingly upon the appropriation required, would of course be reduced.

I hope that the foregoing will put to rest any concern that may have arisen regarding the purpose and scope of the proposed study. If any further information would be useful, please let me know.

Sincerely,

MANUEL F. COHEN,
Chairman.

NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE,
New York, N.Y., March 12, 1698.

Hon. JOHN SPARKMAN,
Chairman, Committee on Banking and Currency, New Senate Office Building, Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR SPARKMAN: The purpose of this letter is to convey to you and the other members of the Committee for your consideration the views of various organizations in the securities industry on a proposed study of institutional activity. These views are shared by the New York Stock Exchange, American Stock Exchange, Association of Stock Exchange Firms, Investment Bankers Association of America, Investment Company Institute and National Association of Securities Dealers.

We have had extensive conversations with the Securities and Exchange Commission and in particular with Chairman Cohen on the basic approach to the study, its scope, and organization. With Chairman Cohen's permission, I am attaching hereto his most recent letter which outlines the views of the Securities and Exchange Commission on the general purpose of the study, the specific questions to be investigated, the research organization to be assembled, the role of the Advisory Committee, and plans to encourage the publication of different viewpoints should they develop. Chairman Cohen's recommendations accord with our view of the project. What we both have in mind is a basic economic study not an investigation. Its purpose would be to analyze the economic process and future implications of rising institutional participation in the equity markets. The study would not be intended to produce or become the vehicle for disciplinary proceedings or other enforcement actions.

I should like to stress the active role to be played by the Advisory Committee which, I hope, would be a small, representative group, and therefore not hampered by unwieldy size. We would suggest also that the Commission seek the advice and counsel of the Advisory Committee in the selection of a Staff Director. By so doing, the Commission could hope to select the most capable person available with a broad background in the areas to be studied.

Hopefully, any resolution passed by the Congress will specify many of the thoughts outlined here and in Chairman Cohen's letter. It may also be desirable to make both a part of the legislative record.

Please let me know if I can clarify any of the suggestions offered here for consideration by the Committee on Banking and Currency or if I can be of service to you in any other way.

Sincerely,

ROBERT W. HAACK.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Mr. President, I, too, am concerned about the impact of the institutional investor not only in the securities market but in other aspects of our economy as well. Billions of dollars are controlled by institutional investors of all types, insurance companies, commercial banks, mutual funds, and others.

Accordingly, I am today introducing a joint resolution which provides for such a study to be conducted under the jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange Commission and I am confident that the information obtained will strengthen and provide for continuing public confidence in our Nation's securities markets.

I would also hope that the industries affected will work together and cooperate with the Securities and Exchange Commission toward developing the kind of complete study that is needed in this area. I will certainly cooperate in this endeavor, as I am sure the other members of the Banking and Currency Committee will join with me in offering their help and assistance.

Finally, I would like to stress the fact that this resolution is not intended to be a substitute for, or a prerequisite to, the legislative proposals set forth in S. 1659, the proposed Investment Company Amendments Act. S. 1659 contains the recommendations of the Securities and Exchange Commission's report on "Public Policy Implications of Investment Company Growth" on which the Banking and Currency Committee has completed its hearings. This joint resolution is intended to be a separate measure which will enable us to look further into the problems arising from the increasing influence of institutional investors on our Nation's securities markets.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the joint resolution be printed in the RECORD.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The joint resolution will be received and appropriately referred; and, without objection, the joint resolution will be printed in the RECORD, as requested.

The joint resolution (S.J. Res. 160) to amend the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to authorize an investigation of the effect on the securities markets of the operation of institutional investors, introduced by Mr. SPARKMAN, was received, read twice by its title, referred to the Committee on Banking and Currency, and ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

S.J. RES. 160

Whereas there has been a very significant increase in the amount of securities held and traded by institutional investors both in absolute terms and in relation to other types of investors; and

Whereas such an increase may have an impact upon the maintenance of fair and orderly securities markets, upon the issuers of securities traded in such markets and upon the interests of investors and the public interest: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That section 19 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 is amended by adding at the end thereof the following:

"(e) The Commission is authorized and directed to make a study and investigation of the purchase, sale and holding of securities by institutional investors of all types including, but not limited to, banks, insurance companies, mutual funds, employee pension and welfare funds, foundation and college endowments, in order to determine the effect of such purchases, a sales and holdings upon the maintenance of fair and orderly securities markets and upon the stability of such markets, both in general and for individual securities, and upon the interests of the issuers of such securities and upon the interests of the public so that the Congress may determine what measures, if any, may be necessary and appropriate in the public interest and for the protection of investors. The Commission shall report to the Congress on or before December 31, 1969, the results of its study and investigation, together with its recommendations, including such recommendations for legislation as it deems advisable. For the purposes of the study and investigation authorized by this subsection the Commission shall have all the power and authority which it would have if such investigation were being conducted pursuant to section 21 of this Act. The Commission is authorized to appoint, without regard to the provisions of title 5, United States Code, governing appointments in the competitive service, and to pay, without regard to the provision of chapter 51 and subchapter III of chapter 53 of such title relating to classification and General Schedule pay rates, such personnel as the Commission deems advisable to carry out the study and investigation authorized by this subsection, but no such rate shall exceed the per annum rate in effect for a GS-18." To carry out such study and investigation there is hereby authorized to be appropriated the sum of $825,000.

"In connection with such study, the Commission shall consult with representatives of various classes of institutional investors, members of the securities industry, representatives of other government agencies, and other interested persons, and with an Advisory Committee which shall be established by the Commission for the purpose of advising and consulting with the Commission on a regular basis on such matters."

AUTHORIZATION FOR MILITARY PROCUREMENT, 1969

The Senate resumed the consideration of the bill (S. 3293) to authorize appropriations during the fiscal year 1969 for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, and tracked combat vehicles, research, development, test, and evaluation for the Armed Forces, and to prescribe the authorized personnel strength of the Selected Reserve of each Reserve component of the Armed Forces, and for other purposes.

MODIFIED UNANIMOUS-CONSENT AGREEMENT

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, referring to my previous consent request granted, that all time on all amendments, with the exception of the three Clark amendments, be limited to 30 minutes, the time to be equally divided, I ask unanimous consent that that order be effective immediately.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent, further, that on the question of final passage of said bill, debate shall be limited to 4 hours, to be equally divided and controlled, respectively, by the majority and minority leaders, or whomever they may designate; provided, that the said leaders, or either of them, may, from the time under their control on the passage of the bill, allot additional time to any Senator during the consideration of any amendment, motion, or appeal.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the distinguished Senator from New York [Mr. JAVITS] may be recognized tomorrow on an amendment which he will offer, and that the time be limited to 30 minutes, that time to be equally divided between the Senator from New York [Mr. JAVITS] and the Senator from Mississippi [Mr. STENNIS].

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, reserving the right to object—and I shall not object—will the Senator make as a part of his unanimous-consent request that I may bring up my amendment immediately after completion of action on the amendments of the Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. CLARK]?

I am not disposed to object to unanimous-consent requests, but we had better be careful that we do not block Senators on this one, or we could block them all. The difficulty is that the agreement expires by 2:30 p.m. Therefore, if a Senator has not completed his debate by 2:30, he is cut off. I do not think any Senator intended that. If we are stuck with this one, then we will be mighty sure we are not going to be stuck hereafter. That is why I suggested to the Senator what I did.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, my thought, in making the request as I did, was that I would be protecting the Senator from New York, because I am not positive the Senator from Pennsylvania intends to bring his three amendments up in orderly succession, one right after the other. It was my thought that if a hiatus developed in bringing up his amendments, the Senator from New York would have a half hour. I am sure the Senator from New York will not have any problem.

Mr. JAVITS. Do I understand that I will have a half hour on my amendment, equally divided, and that then it will be submitted to a vote, whether it comes before or after 2:30? Otherwise my rights may be cut off. I may be stuck on this one, but I will be mighty well sure I am protected hereafter. I wonder if we can have an understanding on this matter?

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Would the Senator be willing to come in at 9:30 in the morning and take up his amendment?

Mr. JAVITS. The difficulty with that is that no Senator comes in at 9:30 and there will be only a corporal's guard here to listen. I do not think that is fair to me. I do not think we ought to be strangled quite this way. Therefore, I would appreciate it if the leadership would provide as I have suggested. I am not going to make a fuss about this one. I cannot. But Senators are not helpless around here. If we can have half an hour on this amendment, I can come in at 10, and I will take the half hour whenever it can be arranged, but I do not want to be cut off from having time to debate or having a vote on my amendment.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. I am sure the Senator does not imply that the Senator from West Virginia or any other member of the leadership is attempting to cut the Senator off. I feel positive the Senator will be accommodated. I would merely like to have the unanimous-consent request acted on affirmatively so that he will be assured of 30 minutes on his amendment tomorrow. He can speak this afternoon, under general debate, as much as he wishes. I hope the Senator will not object. I assure him that I and the leadership will do everything we possibly can to see that he will get his one-half hour within the time framework on tomorrow. If it does not work out, I am sure the leadership will bend over backward to see that the Senator will get his vote, and that we will close up action on the bill as soon after the time of 2:30, which has been agreed upon, as possible. We set the time of 2:30 only to accommodate the Senator from Mississippi [Mr. STENNIS], who needs to get away tomorrow.

Mr. JAVITS. I will accept the leadership's assurances on that score.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the unanimous-consent request? Without objection, it is so ordered.

The modified unanimous-consent agreement reduced to writing is as follows:

Ordered, That effective immediately, during the further consideration of the bill (S. 3293) to authorize appropriations during the fiscal year 1969 for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, and tracked combat vehicles, research, development, test, and evaluation for the Armed Forces and to prescribe the authorized personnel strength of the Selected Reserve of each Reserve component of the Armed Forces, and for other purposes, debate on any amendment (except three amendments to be offered by the Senator from Pennsylvania, Mr. Clark, on which there shall be one hour each), motion, or appeal, except a motion to lay on the table, shall be limited to one-half hour, to be equally divided and controlled by the mover of any such amendment or motion and the Senator from Mississippi, Mr. Stennis: *Provided,* That after the disposition of the Journal on April 19, 1968, the Senator from Pennsylvania, Mr. Clark, shall be first recognized.

Ordered further, That on the question of the final passage of the said bill debate shall be limited to four hours, to be equally divided and controlled, respectively, by the majority and minority leaders or Senators designated by them: *Provided,* That the said leaders, or either of them, may, from the time under their control on the passage of the said bill, allot additional time to any Senator during the consideration of any amendment, motion, or appeal.

Ordered further, That a vote shall be taken on final passage of the bill not later than 2:30 p.m., Friday, April 19, 1968.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, will the Senator from West Virginia yield me a little time on general debate?

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. How much time does the Senator desire?

Mr. JAVITS. Ten minutes.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. I yield 10 minutes to the Senator from New York.

AMENDMENT NO. 699

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the amendment which I shall propose tomorrow be printed in the RECORD at this point.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment will be printed and will lie on the table; and, without objection, the amendment will be printed in the RECORD.

Mr. JAVITS' amendment (No. 699) is as follows:

On page 4, line 7, insert after "SEC. 301" the following: "(a)"; and on page 4, line 16, at the end thereof, insert the following:

"(b) Insofar as practicable, the Secretary of Defense shall take into account as a favorable factor in awarding contracts for procurement under this Act the undertaking by a contractor submitting a bid to employ a substantial number of unemployed or low-income persons in carrying out the contract, and shall otherwise encourage employers performing work on contracts made pursuant to this section to train and employ such persons in carrying out such contracts."

Mr. JAVITS. The wording of my amendment itself is practically the argument. It would be added to the bill at page 4, line 16, as a new subsection, which means that it follows the authorizations for appropriations on procurement as well as on research, development, testing, and evaluation. It reads as follows:

Insofar as practicable, the Secretary of Defense shall take into account as a favorable factor in awarding contracts for procurement under this Act the undertaking by a contractor submitting a bid to employ a substantial number of unemployed or low-income persons in carrying out the contract, and shall otherwise encourage employers performing work on contracts made pursuant to this section to train and employ such persons in carrying out such contracts.

The purpose of this amendment, Mr. President, is to induce the Secretary of Defense to focus effort on the situations of the hard-core unemployed in the slums and ghettos of the country. The President is coming to us for a multibillion-dollar program toward that end. The bill and the law relating to the Office of Economic Opportunity carry material provisions on that score.

Here is $22 billion worth of Government procurement, all of which will be contracted for with private business and which could have a major social impact. At the very least, Mr. President, we ought to have an expression of intent that, everything else being equal, this procurement should make a maximum impact on reducing hard-core unemployment.

It is to be noted that the amendment does not make it mandatory. It says "insofar as practicable." I point out that there are provisions of the Defense Appropriations Act—notably section 608, which deals with small business—which, generally speaking, seek to set a climate to somewhat the same effect.

I point that out because it is important to note that we are not trying to pass a new type of program as to directing military procurement, but that we have actually heretofore made such provisions with respect to those appropriations.

Mr. President, as part of the legislative history—and I say this as the proponent of the amendment—it will be understood, of course, that the words "insofar as practicable" mean what they say. The Secretary of Defense will, of course, have to take into consideration many other things with respect to production, efficiency, quality, delivery on time, national security, and many other aspects which go into the making of a defense contract.

But insofar as practicable, he should consider it a favorable factor, in awarding these contracts, that an effort is being made to alleviate the problem of the hard-core unemployed. As this becomes, Mr. President, an objective of our national policy, as the administration is seeking to have us appropriate quite a large sum of money in order to make it possible—something in the area of several billion dollars—it seems to me we ought to take this opportunity to bring the Secretary of Defense and this kind of procurement in consonance with that effort, which is all that the amendment seeks to do. It is really a sense-of-Congress concept, but does set a criterion for the Secretary of Defense.

Mr. President, I have to state parenthetically also that the amendment, which I hope the Senator from Mississippi will study overnight, represents an effort to implement what is becoming now

an established policy in our Government, to do everything we can to help with the problem of the urban and rural poverty areas, consistent with other objectives in the area of defense—and I have named those—that we must, and quite properly, serve.

Finally, Mr. President, this is not a matter of a hypothetical situation. It is a very practical situation. The Republic Aviation Corp., with headquarters in my home State of New York, is at this time bidding upon various items of Government business, and making the point, in that regard, that it can utilize, train, and employ over 2,000 of these hard-core unemployed. I think that is an interesting sidelight on the situation, because it indicates that, again, business is interested, that it is willing to undertake a role and a responsibility in respect to this very critical matter for the country, and that other business concerns can be similarly induced if their attention is directed to the matter. What better way is there to direct their attention to it, considering the intensity of the competitiveness of bids for the size of procurement which is covered by the authorization in this bill, than to make a favorable factor of what is a national necessity?

I hope very much, Mr. President, that the matter will have the careful consideration of the Senator from Mississippi, that other Senators will also read the amendment and consider carefully this fundamental effort to buttress the national policy which is very clearly indicated by the action Congress has already taken, by the report of the President's Commission on Civil Disorders, and by the activity of the National Alliance of Businessmen, headed by Henry Ford, of the Urban Coalition, and of many movements in the most authoritative quarters in the American business and governmental community.

I hope very much, Mr. President, that the Senate may consider favorably this amendment, which only practices what we are now preaching with respect to this very difficult situation. I shall pursue the matter further tomorrow, Mr. President, and I hope very much that Senators will take an interest in what could be an important contribution to meeting the very critical situation the country faces with regard to the crisis in the cities.

I thank the Senator from West Virginia for his cooperation.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, acting on behalf of both the majority and minority leaders, I yield 20 minutes to the distinguished Senator from Tennessee [Mr. GORE], with the time to be equally charged against both sides under general debate.

OUR FUTURE FOREIGN POLICY IN VIETNAM

Mr. GORE. Mr. President, we have come to an awakening, a sad reckoning in Vietnam. With the ebullience of a new nation possessing seemingly limitless power, we have enjoyed the assumption in the past that American military might, being enforced by American economic strength and moral force, could achieve anything America set out to do. We are learning a bitter lesson in Vietnam for the first time—the lesson that we are not any more able than other immensely powerful countries in the past to do all that we may wish. Power, we have learned, has its limits and its paradoxes, and both confront us in Vietnam.

But what if we continue to insist that we can and must succeed at any price? That South Vietnam will and shall eventually be an independent pro-Western country, free from subversion from within and free from attack from without? Shall we continue to destroy the country in order to achieve this manner of success? If so, would this be enough? Would we be compelled to invade North Vietnam, Laos, or Cambodia? Or even to use nuclear weapons? Will we slip further from the quagmire of South Vietnam into larger and deeper swamps—first in Laos or Cambodia, then into North Vietnam and eventually into a war with China?

I hold it eminently in our national interest, as I have said before, to recognize that we have stumbled into a morass in Vietnam, and to decide—to decide definitely and irrevocably—to negotiate ourselves out of it, to negotiate disengagement from Vietnam—not from Asia, but from Vietnam, honorably and honestly, which means in my opinion on condition that Vietnam be neutralized. We must do this because we are destroying the country we profess to be saving. We are destroying our relations with most other countries. We are destroying any basis for cooperation with the two other major powers on which the future of world peace depends—the Soviet Union and China. And, the further tragedy is that we are also in danger of destroying ourselves.

I say that we are in danger of destroying ourselves not only because we are ruining our relationships with the other nations which inhabit this rapidly shrinking globe; not only because we are diverting resources so critically needed to preserve the American way of life in America in the face of the widening breach between the rich and the poor in America; not only because we are squandering this Nation's resources including the most precious resource of all which is the lives of our young men; but also because we risk transforming the American dream into an American nightmare.

When a man loses his reason for being, he loses his soul. The same can be said of nations. Our Nation has had a soul. The world has honored us for it. We have been the symbol of many admirable qualities for all mankind—liberty and justice, tolerance, restraint and wisdom; idealism and altruism. We are surely not perfect, and often we have not practiced what we have preached, but we have remained generally true to our principles, which means that we have remained true to ourselves.

We now face the prospect of losing our position of moral leadership in even the free world. We have become obsessed and driven—not by idealism but by fear, not by righteousness but by self-righteousness. Our crusade against communism has led us close to becoming a symbol in much of the world not of liberty but of domination; not of justice but of partiality; not of tolerance but of bigotry; not of restraint but of rashness; not of wisdom but of folly; not of idealism but of thoughtlessness; not of altruisim but of self-interest. Will we continue to be regarded as a protector and defender of men and nations, or as a destroyer?

These are strong words, I know. But they are words that can be read often—not only abroad but here at home—and words that can be heard often—not only abroad but at home. And these are the words of nightmares and not of dreams.

These deep and disturbing convictions have impelled me to strong dissent from past administration policy in Vietnam. Perhaps it will be understandable, then, that I have long urged a reappraisal of policy in Vietnam. It was with enormous satisfaction that a reassessment finally came, that a deescalation program has been indicated. I must express regret that it came only after the costly Tet offensive in Vietnam, the attack upon the value of the U.S. dollar, and after deep division and trouble within the United States, but these make a change of policy even more welcome.

President Johnson acted magnanimously in placing the unity of the country and the quest for peace above all things else. In this way, he vastly strengthened his power to negotiate a peaceful settlement in Vietnam.

By this dramatic move, President Johnson not only vastly strengthened his own potential for leadership toward a peaceful settlement, but he succeeded in eliciting from the North Vietnamese government a direct response which we must hope and pray will be but the first step toward a cessation of the mad human slaughter.

Moreover, the President may have afforded to the North Vietnamese the most propitious circumstance that they have had, or may again have in the foreseeable future, for a mutually honorable settlement of the Vietnam war. For a U.S. political leader who is free from the political inhibitions inherent in a political candidacy has greater facility for negotiation, has greater latitude to make the concessions and compromises that must be made and accepted in order to achieve a settlement. And this is particularly true of a leader who has achieved such a status by his own voluntary sacrifice of a natural political ambition.

I have no way of knowing that North Vietnam will view the present opportunity as fortuitous. I surely hope so. In any event, I prefer to be optimistic that negotiations are to ensue. Even so, we should steel ourselves for exasperating delays, propaganda ploys and seemingly interminable bickering. These are customary tactics of Communist powers. They appear to be making a three-phase approach—contacts, talks, and then, perhaps, negotiation. So there is no cause yet for great optimism. There is movement, though, and that is a welcomed development.

Now negotiation is not necessarily an end in itself. If negotiations are to be held, there must be some goals of nego-

tiation. There must, of course, be agreement upon the place for negotiators to meet, an agreement upon the parties who are to be participants in the negotiation, and a clear recognition by both sides of the principal points of controversy.

In our own case, we must decide upon the goals of negotiation—what to negotiate about.

Implicit in the many statements of President Johnson and Secretary Rusk is that our national interest requires a Western bastion in Southeast Asia to contain China and to insure that China's domination does not extend over all Asia. Hanoi, on the other hand, with the support of both China and Russia, seeks a Southeast Asia devoid of Western influence and, in particular, a Vietnam unified under the control of Ho Chi Minh. This is what the struggle is all about. Behind the facade of Communist propaganda about United States imperialism, and behind our own slogans about freedom, self-determination, and independence, this is the central issue.

If there is to be a settlement there must be a compromise of these antagonistic goals.

If we are willing to continue to pay the price in terms of military pressure and in terms of further erosion of our world position, there is no way that the North Vietnamese can achieve their objective. We have the might, if we decide on the use of ultimate force, to render North Vietnam utterly uninhabitable. Surely this would not be doubted even by Ho Chi Minh. It is surely not doubted by nuclear experts in either Russia or China.

But U.S. policy must neither be measured in these terms nor considered separate and apart from our policy in all of Southeast Asia, or apart from our global problems. If there is to be an enduring political settlement it must eventually be a settlement to which all concerned will subscribe or agree.

No lasting settlement or accommodation can be achieved if negotiations are conducted only among major powers with the thought that the terms upon which the major powers agree can be imposed upon Southeast Asia without regard to the wishes of the people there. In my view, if negotiations are to produce lasting benefit, they must eventually involve discussions at multiple levels.

If negotiations are held under any conditions short of total destruction of the Vietcong, it would seem that there will have to be negotiations between the Saigon regime and the National Liberation Front.

Negotiations will also be required between South Vietnam and North Vietnam for the purpose of resolving whether and under what circumstances the reunification of Vietnam is to become a fact or whether there are to be two permanent sovereign nations.

Negotiations will be required on what may be called the Southeast Asia level including participation by Vietnam—North and South—Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, and Burma for the purpose of determining what will be the relationship among these countries and resolving such conflicts as may arise, and at an all-Asian level to give those other nations who have helped our sons with their sons—Korea, Australia, New Zealand, and the Philippines—a voice.

Negotiations between major world powers will be required if there is to be an accommodation with respect to major power interest in Southeast Asia. Without such an accommodation there could be no lasting stability in this area of the world.

And finally, there should be negotiations at the United Nations level to invoke the seal of world opinion on the overall settlement.

But the first goal of even the "talk" phase should be a cease fire.

There is widespread applause for President Johnson's willingness to negotiate a settlement. In this applause I have joined and do now join with enthusiasm. Nevertheless, a willingness to negotiate is not, as I have said, necessarily a policy. It could be only a favorable attitude. While the administration has stated its willingness to negotiate without conditions, it has not made clear, at least publicly, the kind of Vietnam it envisions when negotiations have been completed, other than in such rhetorical phrases as "independent," "free," responsive to "self-determination"—phrases which, under the circumstances, may be not only oversimplifications but misleading as well.

Now here I would like to raise the question of national interest. Does our "vital national interest" depend upon a particular type of government in South Vietnam; upon a pro-Western regime in South Vietnam; upon a South Vietnam independent of North Vietnam, allied against or with North Vietnam, or unified with North Vietnam? I think the answer to these questions must be a resounding "no." I challenge the validity of the position that somehow the United States was in mortal peril, is now in mortal peril, or will ever be in mortal peril, as a result of what occurs or what situation exists in South Vietnam.

Surely it is in our interest to have a peaceful world. Surely it is in our interest to have a less militant brand of Russian communism. Surely it is in our interest to have a China which will give up its desire to dominate Asia. Surely it is in our interest to have a government in South Vietnam friendly to the United States.

But having said that, I have said nothing really. These statements are virtual tautologies.

We do have real and vital national interests—and these we must defend with whatever force is required. In such a case, the requirement is its own justification. But our vital interests must be more precisely defined than they have been in Vietnam. They cannot encompass all countries, freedom everywhere, vague commitments to every country no matter how remote, how small, how backward, or where located. And, so far as I am concerned, they do not justify a major war against China at this time.

Above all, in defining our interests, we must balance capabilities with desires.

It seems clear to me—it has for some time—that our real national interests lie in our present and future relations with the two other great powers in this world, the Soviet Union and China. What is the war in Vietnam doing to this fundamental national interest, to our relations with these two great powers?

Some believe that the war is bringing China and the Soviet Union closer together. The more sophisticated opinion is that the ideological differences between these two countries are so great that even an attack on a fellow Communist country has not been able to heal the breach—at least not yet, although I must say we seem to be working hard at it. But, unquestionably, the war in Vietnam is worsening our relations with both the Soviet Union and Communist China and, I might add, with most of the rest of the world.

Once we know what we ought to do and what we want to do, I, for one, believe our country has sufficient genius to find an honorable conclusion to this bloody war.

If, as I contend, our national interests—and even our existence—are tied to the future of our relations with the Soviet Union and with Communist China, the question we must ask ourselves is how Vietnam is affecting these relations. As I have said, I believe that the war is causing our relations with both of these countries to deteriorate. We complain about, and fear, China's militancy as we once complained about, and feared, Russia's militancy. Yet Vietnam provides China with a target enabling Chinese leadership to be even more militant and obliging the Soviets to compete in a contest that can only do us harm. What is that contest in which China now challenges Russia? It is the great game of anti-Americanism.

Is it in our long-term national interest to facilitate this, to encourage this, to make it possible?

The war in Vietnam is reversing and endangering a trend in Soviet-American relations, a hopeful trend in terms of our future security and in terms of world stability. While our relations with the Soviet Union were by no means perfect before the war in Vietnam became largely an American war, the situation had certainly improved.

We and they are the world's two leading nuclear powers. More than any other countries, we therefore have a basic common interest in avoiding a nuclear war, or a war which might become nuclear, for any nuclear war might destroy us both. It is paradoxical to reflect that these two countries, which were literally at each other's throats 20 years ago, now have a common interest—indeed a vital interest in every sense of the word—in preserving peace. What deeper mutuality of interest is there that the avoidance of nuclear war by the two nations bound to suffer greatest destruction in a nuclear holocaust?

This common interest has produced tangible results. The first, and most important result, is that there has been no war involving the United States and the Soviet Union in direct hostilities. There have been close escapes—far too close for comfort—in Berlin, in Korea, in Cuba, and now in Vietnam. But peace—peace in the sense of an absence of a war involving the armed forces of these two countries—has been preserved. And at the same time, there has been a gradual

movement toward mutual accommodation, with agreements reached on a partial test ban treaty, an outer space agreement, the draft of a nonproliferation agreement, a consular convention and many executive agreements on various commercial, cultural, and other matters. American citizens visit the Soviet Union and their citizens visit here. We exchange publications and cultural performances and our leaders meet to talk. While they do not agree on every subject they are able to communicate frankly and rapidly.

I do not mean to deny that many fundamental, serious—and even dangerous—problems remain. Even if the war in Vietnam ended tomorrow, there is a basic ideological hostility between ourselves and the Soviets that would undoubtedly persist for years to come and would inhibit the relationship between our two countries. The burden of past grievances—of broken promises and hostile actions—is indeed heavy. But the trend of events—the sweep of history—has been in the right direction between the United States and Russia. If there were to be as much progress in Soviet-American relations in the next 20 years, or half as much progress in our relations with China, the future would look brighter indeed.

But as long as the war in Vietnam continues, the chances for such an improvement—for continuing this hopeful trend—grow ever dimmer.

So, I believe we are not defending but damaging our national interests in Vietnam. Despite official disclaimers, we are bogged down in a land war in Asia fighting not Chinese but Vietnamese armed with Soviet and Chinese equipment; dissipating that most precious national resource of all—American lives—as well as hard-earned American money; damaging our relations with most nations in the world and in particular with the two other most powerful countries in the world; and risking the danger that they will be dragged into the quagmire with us and cause a wider war—perhaps the war which will be the final holocaust. We are not, as a high State Department official contended last fall, "maintaining the balance of power," but upsetting it.

I believe, therefore, that we should now be willing to negotiate with the following objectives in mind: First, a cease fire should be effectuated not only between the North Vietnamese and the United States and her allies, but this should include the Vietcong, too. Then, we should insist that an international presence be maintained in South Vietnam to insure that there is no blood bath after our disengagement—and we should also offer asylum to those South Vietnamese who have been so active in opposing the Vietcong that they would surely suffer. This presence should initially include American forces. Third, we should insist that the form of government of South Vietnam—and a reunified Vietnam that would follow—should be determined by the Vietnamese themselves under internationally supervised elections, as under the Geneva formula. Fourth, we should insist that a reunified Vietnam should undertake obligations, the observance of which could be enforced, not to aline itself with any other country and not interfere, either directly or indirectly, in the affairs of Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and Burma.

I would, of course, like to see South Vietnam and every other country happy, free, and prosperous. The benefits of freedom and democracy are many and precious; I wish that all men could enjoy them, although I am not sure that all people place the same value upon the tenets of our beliefs that we do. In any event, it seems to me that the choices for us, for the South Vietnamese, for the North Vietnamese, for the Chinese, and for the Russians, are not the narrow choices between freedom, on the one hand, and slavery, on the other, or, to state it another way, between imperialism, on the one hand, and a socialist people's republic, on the other. When viewed in the long run, I think the most that we can hope for, and I am not sure that it is not the most for which we should hope, is a nonalined autonomy for South Vietnam or possibly such a status for a unified Vietnam.

Our country is in travail. It affords us little comfort that other nations in their times have faced agonizing reappraisal—France in Vietnam and in Algeria; Great Britain in India, in Rhodesia and, indeed, in North America; Belgium in the Congo. That other countries have found formulas and a manner to extricate themselves from impossible, intolerable external situations without suffering political convulsion at home seems not to help us at all.

Our leaders and our people are determined and proud. They would find humiliation, if not a sense of defeat, in the admission and the acceptance of failure to achieve proclaimed goals of peace, freedom, and democracy in South Vietnam.

And, yet, we are forced by circumstances to measure this disagreeable possibility alongside the possibly disastrous consequence of still more destructive policies of wider war which military leaders have represented as necessary for the achievement of a military victory.

In this distraught situation, the national interest requires all of our people, leaders as well as non-leaders, whatever the consequences, to guard their vanities, to suppress their ambitions, and to take and support such action as appear in the long term best interest of our country.

Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. HOLLINGS in the chair). Without objection, it is so ordered.

AUTHORIZATION FOR MILITARY PROCUREMENT, 1969

The Senate resumed the consideration of the bill (S. 3293) to authorize appropriations during the fiscal year 1969 for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, and tracked combat vehicles, research, development, test, and evaluation for the Armed Forces, and to prescribe the authorized personnel strength of the Selected Reserve of each Reserve component of the Armed Forces, and for other purposes.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I yield 2 minutes to the Senator from Virginia [Mr. BYRD], and I act on behalf of the majority and minority leaders in asking unanimous consent that the time not be charged to either side.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. BYRD of Virginia. I thank the Senator from West Virginia.

PROPOSED EXPANSION OF TRAFFIC AT WASHINGTON NATIONAL AIRPORT

Mr. BYRD of Virginia. Mr. President, it is clear to most individuals that Washington National Airport can no longer safely and conveniently accommodate the bulk of the air traffic of this area. It was built to serve 4 million passengers, but last year nearly 10 million travelers—2½ times the number envisaged—used its facilities.

The resulting congestion, both on the ground and in the air, has become a serious problem. Travelers can still get to the airport from Washington in about 10 to 15 minutes, but they are met with long delays and inconveniences once they get there.

Residents on both sides of the Potomac are subjected to the noise and pollution and safety hazard of jets flying over their neighborhoods.

This situation has troubled me for several years. I feel it is imperative that some of the flights now using National be diverted to other area airports.

It was with some dismay, therefore, that I read of the proposal to expand business at National by opening the airport to the so-called jumbo jets and airbuses, the largest of which can carry as many as 490 passengers. Their introduction at National could well double the number of passengers using the airport in the space of a few years.

Mr. President, I believe Washington National Airport has a definite and important place in the transportation complex of this area. But I do not believe it is in the public interest to go on expanding this facility without limit. This airport long ago passed its point of optimum use, and the introduction of larger jets can only lead to larger congestion and to greater safety hazards.

Congress made it quite clear in 1962 that it did not want this to happen. That is why it appropriated $110 million for the construction of Dulles International Airport. Dulles was meant to be the Washington area's second major jet airport, and I say the need is here now for making better use of it and for giving the taxpayers of this country something for their investment.

I commend the Federal Aviation Administration and its Director, Gen. Wil-

liam McKee, for standing firm against pressures to expand the use of already overcrowded National. I wholeheartedly support that position.

I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD, following my remarks, an editorial published in the Washington Post of April 18, 1968, entitled "Nightmare at National."

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

NIGHTMARE AT NATIONAL

An airport is more than just a place at which airplanes can land, and it is long past time for the airlines to begin to act as if they recognize this. Yet, some airline proposed in a recent secret meeting that National Airport be expanded so that it could accommodate the next generation of jets, ignoring all the facts of airport life except convenience. The idea is so out of keeping with what ought to happen to National that if the other airlines do not squelch it promptly the Federal Aviation Administration must.

The thought of the 490-passenger jumbo-jets and the 250-passenger airbuses lumbering over residential areas, plopping onto a ledge of concrete built out into the Potomac River, and disgorging hordes of people into an already overcrowded area can best be described as a nightmare. The only reason for such an idea ever surfacing is that some airlines don't want to face up to the fact that the future of air travel here is inevitably linked to Dulles Airport. The sooner that fact is accepted, the quicker solutions can be found to the problems that flow from it.

Instead of proposing to increase the noise level over the Potomac and the congestion at an airport where congestion is already a major problem, the airlines ought to be talking about speeding up and reducing the cost of transportation between Dulles and downtown, setting up helicopter service, building a downtown terminal to handle the passenger flow, establishing suburban terminals to spread the passenger load, and selling the relative convenience of Dulles when it is compared to airports in other major cities. But airlines have not been noted for their ingenuity in solving the problems of passengers. Indeed, one of the outrageous proposals thrown out at a recent airline meeting was to eliminate the mobile lounges at Dulles and, like all the other major airports, require that passengers scamper down miles of corridors to reach their airplanes.

Someday, perhaps, airlines will begin to think of passengers as people, not pack animals, and of airports as important factors in an urban community, not just isolated stage coach stops. When that happens, it may occur to them that airports ought to be friendly neighbors, concerned about the total impact they make on life in a city.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum and I ask unanimous consent that the time be charged equally to both sides under the agreement.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The clerk will call the roll.

The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, acting on behalf of both majority and minority leaders, I yield 5 minutes to the distinguished Senator from Arkansas [Mr. FULBRIGHT], with the time to be equally divided under general debate.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered.

NEGOTIATIONS WITH NORTH VIETNAM

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, two reporters for the Los Angeles Times, Mr. David Kraslow and Mr. Stuart H. Loory, have written a series of articles describing efforts to begin negotiations with North Vietnam for a halt to hostilities. These articles, which are to be elaborated in a book to be published by Random House this spring, are a fine example of contemporary history.

Without the benefit of access to secret documents and by relying solely upon the techniques of careful reporters, these gentlemen have reconstructed several of the most interesting efforts since 1965 to begin negotiations with Hanoi. Until such time as the secret records of these diplomatic maneuvers become available, the Kraslow-Loory accounts will serve a useful purpose in understanding the complications in the conduct of our foreign policy and some of its weaknesses.

Unfortunately, only one of this series of articles has, to the best of my knowledge, appeared in the Washington press. Perhaps is is fortunate. I am sure that if the articles were read in full in the executive branch of this Government, and studied carefully by the press corps of Washington, a great many embarrassing questions would be raised—questions not unrelated to the current difficulties we seem to be having in arranging a site for contacts with Hanoi.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have these six articles, which have been widely printed throughout the United States, printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the articles were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Los Angeles Times, Apr. 3, 1968]

THE SEARCH FOR PEACE—I

(By David Kraslow and Stuart H. Loory)

WASHINGTON, April 3—Two unheralded Frenchmen—one a microbiologist, the other an old friend of Ho Chi Minh—arrived last July 21 in Hanoi in the unusual and secret role of emissaries of the United States Government.

Their presence in the capital of North Vietnam was unknown to the world at that time, and has been unreported until this moment.

Yet it was their mission that initiated a new phase of diplomacy in the Johnson administration's secret search for peace in Vietnam over the past three years. The culmination came in Hanoi's dramatic announcement Wednesday that it was willing to talk with American negotiators.

A month after their visit to Hanoi, the Frenchmen—working with Prof. Henry A. Kissinger of Harvard University—delivered to North Vietnam the first version of an American peace proposal that was more conciliatory than any made before.

President Johnson, announcing a partial halt in the bombing of North Vietnam Sunday, alluded vaguely to the proposal they carried when he said:

"Tonight, I renew the offer I made last August."

Behind that little noticed sentence was the secret work of Kissinger, a mystery man in Vietnam diplomacy; Dr. Herbert Marcovich, 47, a University of Paris microbiologist, and Raymond Aubrac, 53, a director of the Food and Agricultural Organization, a United Nations agency based in Rome.

Their channel, which involved a meeting with President Ho Chi Minh, functioned in this fashion:

Kissinger, 44, a Government consultant on national security matters for the past 17 years, was the administration's link to the Frenchmen.

Marcovich linked Kissinger to Aubrac.

Aubrac, who had befriended Ho in Paris more than 20 years ago, completed the chain from the White House to the presidential palace in Hanoi.

It was more out of necessity than choice that the United States resorted to these intermediaries to transmit a major peace offer.

The channel was used because, contrary to what administration officials have often said, direct communication with Hanoi has been—more often than not—a problem.

In fact, the Kissinger-Frenchmen channel came into being because direct contact with Hanoi on the subject of peace negotiations was not then possible. Such contact between U.S. and North Vietnamese diplomats was ended in Moscow on Feb. 15, 1967, following a series of seven secret meetings in 36 days.

Le Trang, deputy chief of the North Vietnamese mission in Moscow, told John C. Guthrie, his American counterpart, on that day that no more direct contacts would be permitted until the United States unconditionally halted the bombing of North Vietnam. American officials have since tried many times, without success, to re-establish direct contact.

That is why Hanoi's statement Wednesday is so significant. It marks the end of a 14-month freeze on face-to-face peace talks.

The new peace offer—which came to be known as the San Antonio formula—transmitted to North Vietnam via Kissinger and the Frenchmen last summer was delivered again to Hanoi this past January by a ranking Romanian official.

Sources—who asked that the Romanian's identity not be disclosed—said he agreed to carry the message for the United States not knowing what had transpired last summer.

The State Department felt, according to one informed official, that the Romanian might be able to do a more convincing selling job if he thought he had something new.

It may be, however, that the January message contained even further concessions by the United States than the terms of the message delivered in August.

Neither message has been made public, but both are within the framework of a flexible American plan for achieving negotiations. The plan, developed in the fall of 1966, is known to only a few men within Washington's national security bureaucracy as "Phase A–Phase B."

Under Phase A the United States would halt the bombing of North Vietnam. To all the world it would appear as if the United States had done this unilaterally. Actually, Phase A would not take effect until there had been a secret agreement on Phase B—a mutual de-escalation of the ground war, with the United States again making the first move.

The Phase A–Phase B plan, in some variations, even contemplated agreement on public statements to be made by each government.

The limited bombing halt announced as a unilateral gesture by the President Sunday suggests a modification of the Phase A–Phase B plan.

The August message sent through the Frenchmen represented a sharp pull-back from a position the President had taken in

a letter to Ho Chi Minh the previous February, which may have resulted in Hanoi's closing of the Moscow channel.

The President told Ho he would stop the bombing of North Vietnam after Ho stopped infiltration into South Vietnam. In short, he demanded that Ho make the first de-escalatory move. Privately, American officials later conceded the letter could have been taken as an ultimatum.

During the spring and early summer of 1967, the administration searched for ways to renew the secret dialogue with the enemy. This set the stage for the channel that ran from Washington through Cambridge, Mass., Paris, and Rome to Hanoi.

Kissinger and the Frenchmen became a high-priority channel to Hanoi when American officials were belatedly realizing the Johnson administration might have misread the military and diplomatic situation the previous winter. Efforts that winter to get negotiations started in London and Warsaw, as well as Moscow, all collapsed.

American officials began to wonder later if a moderate proposal—such as the San Antonio formula—would have made any difference if it had been offered to Hanoi.

"We began to think that Hanoi really wanted to talk in February," one official said.

How the Frenchmen channel originated is unclear. In any case, Kissinger discussed it with Ambassador-at-Large W. Averell Harriman, whom the President asked in 1966 to take charge of the search for peace, and other officials.

Kissinger is an expert on nuclear strategy and foreign policy and head of Harvard's defense studies program. It has been hardly noticed, but since 1965 he has been intimately involved in Vietnam policy, advising on internal political matters in South Vietnam and the American pacification effort there.

He also has been secretly immersed in the search for peace, largely as an adviser. He has access to the sensitive peace file in Secretary of State Dean Rusk's office.

Marcovich is a member of the governing board of the Pugwash Conferences, the meetings begun during the height of the cold war by Cleveland industrialist Cyrus Eaton to foster better East-West relations.

Kissinger and Marcovich had met previously, but they became well acquainted at the September, 1966, Pugwash Conference at Sopot, Poland. They talked about Vietnam.

It was at Sopot, perhaps, that Kissinger learned of the connections Marcovich's friend Aubrac had with Ho Chi Minh. He probably learned, too, that Aubrac was deeply troubled by the Vietnam war.

Aubrac is an engineer and administrator who was an underground leader in France during World War II and who twice escaped from the Nazis. He met Ho Chi Minh in Paris in 1946 when Ho came to negotiate his country's independence from France.

Ho stayed at Aubrac's suburban villa. He took his meals with the Aubrac family and had long talks with Aubrac. When Mrs. Aubrac gave birth to a daughter, Elizabeth, during that period, Ho went to her hospital bedside bearing toys and flowers. Ho Chi Minh became known as Elizabeth Aubrac's godfather.

Aubrac and Ho lost touch when France and the Viet Minh went to war. Kissinger and Marcovich learned that if his old, interrupted friendship could help in bringing peace, Aubrac was willing to try.

In July, the Frenchmen were briefed on the American position by Kissinger, who also instructed them on what to look for in replies.

Aubrac and Marcovich attracted no public notice as they flew to Phnom Penh, Cambodia, on July 21 and then, aboard the International Control Commission plane, to Hanoi.

They spent four days in Hanoi. Aubrac went to the presidential palace for a talk with his old house guest. He carefully noted Ho's views on restoring peace in Vietnam.

On July 25, the two Frenchmen went out to Hanoi's Gialam Airport, a Mig base as well as commercial field that has been spared American bombing so that missions like theirs would not be impeded, and caught the ICC flight to Cambodia. They returned to their homes.

Early in August, Kissinger went to France to debrief Marcovich, and then made his report to the State Department.

"Aubrac and Marcovich brought back something that sounded interesting," one official said. "It was worth following up."

Precisely what they brought back is not known, but the administration decided it wanted the Frenchmen to return to Hanoi with a formal American proposal. The two were willing, but this time Hanoi, inexplicably, turned down their visa applications. The suggestion apparently was made that if they simply wanted to deliver a message, it could be done through the North Vietnamese mission in Paris.

Kissinger returned to France with a message dated Aug. 25, apparently to conform with an appointment Marcovich had arranged with Mai Van Bo, Hanoi's senior representative in the non-Communist world and head of the Paris mission.

Aubrac flew up from Rome. On Aug. 25, he and Marcovich handed the American proposal to Mai Van Bo. It is believed the cabled relay from Bo arrived in Hanoi on Aug. 26.

The first public hint that the United States had scrapped its hard-line demand of the previous winter came at the United Nations on Sept. 21, 1967.

Ambassador Arthur Goldberg, opening the annual general assembly debate, said "the United States would be glad to consider and discuss any proposal that would lead promptly to productive discussions that might bring peace to the area."

His speech, drafted with the help of the White House and the State Department, did little to still the chorus of criticism that met United States bombing policy at the U.N. last fall. In the debate, only four countries—Australia, New Zealand, Thailand and Nationalist China—approved the bombing of north Vietnam. In contrast, 45 countries, including such allies as Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands and Norway, called for an end to the bombing.

Goldberg only hinted at an American proposal. Mr. Johnson stated the basic principle of the August offer in a speech at San Antonio on Sept. 29. He said:

"The United States is willing to stop all aerial and naval bombardment of North Vietnam when this will lead promptly to productive discussions. We, of course, assume that while discussions proceed, North Vietnam would not take advantage of the bombing cessation or limitation."

Though more conciliatory than any offer that far, the San Antonio formula, reserved Mr. Johnson's right to determine what might be productive and whether the North Vietnamese might be taking advantage of the bombing cessation.

The President's plan was denounced in Hanoi on Oct. 3 and Oct. 19 as a "faked desire for peace" and "sheer deception." On Oct. 20, Wilfred Burchett, the Australian leftist journalist who specializes in covering stories in Communist countries normally off limits to other Western correspondents, wrote that Hanoi would not negotiate the terms of a bombing halt. "Hanoi is in no mood for concessions or bargaining," he wrote in an article for the Associated Press.

Burchett's article, based on interviews with North Vietnam's premier Pham Van Dong and foreign minister Nguyen Duy Trinh, was taken as a rejection of the San Antonio formula.

He also noted that North Vietnam's leaders simply did not trust President Johnson, saying:

"Because of experiences in certain earlier private and secret moves . . . there has been deep skepticism about any public statements or private feelers coming through diplomatic and other channels. . . . I know of no leader who believes President Johnson is sincere in stating that he really wants to end the war on terms that would leave the Vietnamese free to settle their own affairs or that he does not intend to keep a permanent United States military presence in South Vietnam."

On Nov. 27, Harriman, on one of his many wide-ranging trips around the world, stopped in Bucharest to confer with Romanian officials who had recently returned from Hanoi. Publicly, little resulted from Harriman's talks. They could have, however, set the stage for the Romanian involvement in January.

On Dec. 29, Trinh made the second of his one-word concessions that have marked changes in North Vietnamese policy.

On January 28, 1967, he had said talks "could" result from an unconditional halt in the bombing. In the December statement he said they "will" result.

Rusk took it as a "new formulation" but put stress on unanswered questions still remaining such as: How soon after the bombing halt would talks begin? What would Hanoi agree to talk about? Would Hanoi stall at the conference table while taking military advantage of a bombing cessation?

After the Trinh statement, the United States put a ban on the bombing of Hanoi that lasted throughout most of January.

As well as repeating the August offer made through Aubrac and Marcovich, the Romanian presumably sought answers for Rusk's questions.

In his State of the Union message on Jan. 17, the President eased the San Antonio formula a bit when he changed the word "productive" to "serious" and administration officials explained that meant the North Vietnamese only had to be sincere in seeking peace.

On Jan. 25, after the Romanian delivered the message to Hanoi, defense secretary Clark Clifford testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee. He revealed a more precise definition of the San Antonio formula, saying the North Vietnamese could continue "normal" infiltration of men and supplies into the South after a bombing halt takes place.

Neither Clifford nor anyone else in the administration defined "normal" infiltration but that definition certainly could not be stretched to include the effort mounted by the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese during the explosive Tet offensive which started Jan. 31.

While enemy troops wreaked havoc in the big cities of South Vietnam, there were indications of a willingness to talk. The enemy appeared to be whipsawing the Johnson administration with the allurement of peace and an escalated war at once—a tactic that had been used in the past by Mr. Johnson.

Despite the denunciatory blasts both sides leveled at each other, they continued to give ground grudgingly as the Kissinger-Aubrac-Marcovich intermediary channel gave way to the climactic announcements by Hanoi and Mr. Johnson Wednesday. Once again the stage was set for direct contacts. They have been rare in the past and like that between Trang and Guthrie in Moscow last year, they all failed.

Ambassador Henry A. Byroade and Vu Huu Binh, the North Vietnamese Consul General in Burma, had beer-and-peace talk sessions in Rangoon during the 37-day bombing pause that ended Jan. 31, 1966. The United States and North Vietnam exchanged secret messages through Byroade and Binh during that period.

Also in 1966, Ambassador Foy D. Kohler in Moscow, after much effort, finally arranged a

meeting with Le Trang at the North Vietnamese Embassy. It was a stiffly formal and fruitless three-hour conference. Kohler was rebuffed in his attempt to follow up that meeting.

(American and North Vietnamese diplomats met in Vientiane, Laos, last month, but only to arrange the release of three North Vietnamese sailors held by the United States. This was in return for the release of three American pilots by Hanoi in February.)

The United States would prefer to deal directly with the enemy, but it has found itself compelled to seek an end to the ever-enlarging war through one or more layers of intermediaries. It is, at best, a chancy undertaking. There can be and have been serious misunderstandings.

Washington and Hanoi can communicate directly—through speeches and statements and press conferences as they did Wednesday. But peace is not usually found in broad daylight.

Intermediaries do have one distinct advantage. As a senior State Department official put it: "Foreign diplomats, newsmen, private travelers can move around without attracting attention. And they can say things that are deniable later by either side if problems arise."

"Some intermediaries we are quite happy with," he continued. "Some we encourage and push along, but some are a cross to bear and we just have to deal with them. The people who are encouraged are given a good briefing. You tell them what to look for, but you never know whether they know enough to report accurately."

Kissinger and his Frenchmen were no cross to bear. They reported accurately.

The message to Hanoi through Kissinger and the Frenchmen, it now appears, was sent in the hope that if an opportunity for peace talks had been lost in London and Moscow the previous February, it could be recovered. It seemed for a long while that it couldn't.

One informed critic of the administration's Vietnam policy said of the August message: "It was too late. Hanoi just didn't believe us."

That source felt Hanoi didn't believe the Johnson administration because of what occurred behind the scenes in London and Moscow the previous February. That will be explored in the next article.

[From the Los Angeles Times, Apr. 4, 1968]

PEACE SEARCH—II

(By David Kraslow and Stuart H. Loory)

WASHINGTON.—With the White House dictating the moves on the trans-Atlantic cable, British Prime Minister Harold Wilson switched and toughened a Vietnam peace proposal he had, just hours before, given to Soviet Premier Alexei N. Kosygin last year.

The switch forced by President Johnson occurred in London during the evening hours of Feb. 10, 1967. It deeply embarrassed Wilson and may have confused Kosygin and President Ho Chi Minh of North Vietnam.

Some informed critics of Mr. Johnson's Vietnam policies feel the London switch, along with a personal letter the President had sent Ho two days before, possibly ruined a promising opportunity for negotiations 14 months before this week's breakthrough.

The switching in peace terms came at the climax of a week-long effort by Wilson and Kosygin to end the war in Vietnam.

While their talks were under way, the United States was secretly dealing with the North Vietnamese in face-to-face contacts in Moscow.

Shortly before the White House dictated the peace message change to Wilson, a draft of the President's letter to Ho was toughened and delivered through the Moscow channel. American officials later conceded privately that the substituted terms in the letter could be read as an ultimatum.

Wilson, who thought he was being kept fully informed by Washington during his talks with Kosygin, was not given the text of the letter.

To guard against any misunderstandings in the London meetings, which began on Feb. 6 the Johnson administration dispatched Chester L. Cooper, an expert in Vietnam diplomacy, to brief Wilson on the American position and to monitor the talks with Kosygin.

Since Great Britain and the Soviet Union were cochairmen of the 1954 Geneva conference that partitioned Vietnam originally, any talks they might have on the Southeast Asian war were considered of extreme importance by the Johnson administration.

Unnoticed, Cooper left Washington on Feb. 2, the day the President told the world at a press conference that "just almost any step" by North Vietnam could bring surcease from American bombing.

Cooper had seen the Feb. 2 draft of the President's letter and knew what had been transpiring in Moscow in the secret talks between John Guthrie, deputy chief of the American Embassy, and Le Trank, his North Vietnamese counterpart.

Cooper took with him to London the latest version of an American negotiating scenario secretly designated phase A-phase B. It was a flexible plan for de-escalating the war in such a manner that neither the United States nor North Vietnam would lose either face or military advantage.

Phase A-Phase B was no peace plan as such. It was more a plan to cool off the war in the hope that once that was accomplished serious negotiations involving the interests of all combatants—the Saigon regime and the National Liberation Front (including the Viet Cong), as well as the U.S. and North Vietnam—would result.

Phase A involved the cessation of American bombing of North Vietnam. It would only take effect, however, after Washington and Hanoi had secretly agreed on Phase B—an act of de-escalation of the ground war by both sides. The United States would move first in Phase B as well.

The indication is that under the plan Cooper took to London, North Vietnam would be permitted to continue resupplying its forces in the South.

Most important, however, was the time lag between the two phases. One source said the plan Cooper presented to Wilson provided for a time spread of about three weeks between A and B. Another said the spread was several days, perhaps a week.

Wilson and Kosygin began their Vietnam talks on the day of the Soviet Premier's arrival—Feb. 6, two days before the truce in Vietnam for the Tet lunar new year was to begin.

Wilson laid out the A–B scheme, with Kosygin understanding that Wilson was fully authorized to speak for Lyndon Johnson. Kosygin reiterated the line North Vietnam had taken on Jan. 28 when foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh said peace talks "could" begin once the U.S. unconditionally stopped its bombing.

But whereas Trinh had been conditional on this point, Kosygin reportedly told Wilson in private that talks "would" follow a bombing halt.

Kosygin insisted Trinh's public gesture was enough to get talks started. Once they began, he said, all else would fall into place.

Both Wilson and Kosygin knew that U.S.-North Vietnamese contacts had begun in Moscow on Jan. 10, but how much, they knew of the substance of those talks is unclear.

Wilson and Kosygin were seeking to arrange a quick halt to the fighting. Guthrie, however, in a series of meetings was spreading what one official described as a "whole smorgasbord" of possible approaches to a long-range settlement.

Wilson, speaking for the U.S. and Kosygin, presumably speaking for North Vietnam, held fast to their positions through the week. Kosygin, nevertheless, impressed both the Americans and the British privy to the talks with his forthrightness and his apparently sincere efforts to find peace.

On Thursday, Feb. 9, Kosygin again echoed the Trinh statement in an internationally televised press conference which the President watched at the White House.

The White House reacted quickly: "Mr. Kosygin commented on the military action the United States should take but made no mention of the military action the other side should take."

At a press conference that afternoon, Secretary of State Dean Rusk deplored the "systematic campaign by the Communist side" to bring about an American bombing halt without corresponding military action by Hanoi.

Rusk called on North Vietnam to recognize the need for "elementary reciprocity."

What Rusk termed "elementary reciprocity" on Feb. 9 and what the President had termed "just almost any step" on Feb. 2 was put somewhat differently in the secret letter from Mr. Johnson to Ho delivered in Moscow on Feb. 8.

The President's letter said: "I am prepared to order a cessation of bombing against your country and the stopping of further augmentation of U.S. forces in South Vietnam as soon as I am assured that infiltration into South Vietnam by land and by sea has stopped."

Under the phase A–phase B plan that Wilson had, on America's behalf, been presenting to Kosygin, the United States would make the first act of deescalation. The Johnson letter turned this around and demanded North Vietnam move first to end all infiltration before the bombing ended.

Wilson did not learn of the change in the President's letter to Ho making the turnaround. On Friday, Feb. 10, Kosygin asked for the first time in the week that Wilson put into writing the American proposal he had been giving orally.

The Soviet leader was leaving shortly after 11 a.m. for a train tour of Scotland. He appeared eager to transmit the proposal to Moscow before departure.

After Kosygin had left 10 Downing St., where he had lunched, according to London sources Wilson and Cooper drafted a memorandum.

A copy was cabled to Washington, where it was received simultaneously in the White House Situation Room and the State Department Operations Center.

Wilson put the message in his inside coat pocket and went off to a 5:30 reception at the Soviet Embassy, where he spent 90 minutes. During the reception, Kosygin took Wilson into an anteroom and asked him if he had the message.

If there was anything wrong with the message, Wilson thought, he would have heard from Washington by then. He hadn't. He gave Kosygin the message and returned to 10 Downing St.

At about 10:15 p.m., London time, (4:15 p.m. in Washington), when Kosygin left the Embassy for the 10 to 20-minute ride to Euston railroad station, transatlantic chaos set in. The President and others, having read the cabled memo from Downing St., became alarmed when they realized the inconsistency between it and the letter to Ho Chi Minh.

Rusk and Presidential Assistant Walt W. Rostow were summoned to the situation room. While Rostow contacted Wilson, the men in the room were drafting a new paragraph to substitute for the unacceptable section in the Wilson message to Kosygin.

Wilson, the man in the White House decided, allowed too much time between the phase A bombing halt and the phase B de-escalation by North Vietnam. Their substitute telescoped the phases, according to one

source, to make their proposed implementation virtually simultaneous and thus placing the memo to Kosygin more in accord with the letter to Ho.

The substitute paragraph was dictated to 10 Downing Street. It was now approaching 11 p.m. in London. Wilson dispatched one of his aides with orders to hand it personally to Kosygin at Euston Station.

The aide raced through London in his car. He dashed through the doorway of Euston Station, down the stairs, through the crowds and finally, out of breath, to platform number one. He barely made it.

If Kosygin was startled or irritated—or amused—when the aide to the Queen's Prime Minister explained, there is no record of it.

But at 10 Downing Street, it was said, "the British were embarrassed." Wilson had dealt with Kosygin in good faith. Now he found himself in a predicament. He was being forced to admit, in effect, that he had misrepresented the American position to Kosygin.

The British were not alone in their feelings. Americans were ashamed as well. "Everybody who knew was embarrassed. It shouldn't have happened," according to one source.

How had Wilson taken the embarrassment?

"He took it like a man," one who knew reported. The Prime Minister never revealed his hurt publicly.

A combination of explanations has been offered by officials for the hardening of the U.S. position in February, 1967.

The President, the officials explained, was becoming increasingly concerned with intelligence reports from American pilots suggesting a large resupply effort by North Vietnamese forces during Tet.

Three times during the London meeting, Wilson was asked by Washington to caution Kosygin that the North Vietnamese buildup would impede efforts to begin talks. The third time Wilson was asked to urge Kosygin to try to put a "damper on the flow."

The President was also understood to have been distressed by the massive publicity given the London talks and feared that Wilson, by nature an optimist, might somehow soften the American terms.

Under Wilson's urgings, the Johnson administration did agree to extend the pause in the bombing of North Vietnam from the end of the Tet truce on February 11. As the hours beyond the ending of the truce in the ground war went on and the bombing did not resume, hopes were raised. Wilson kept trying for an agreement despite his embarrassment of two days before. He met Kosygin February 12, the day after the truce ended and then he rushed off to Kosygin's hotel suite at 1 a.m., February 13, apparently after a post-midnight conversation with the White House.

At that meeting Wilson reportedly informed Kosygin the American bombing would be resumed later in the day. One source suggested he also presented, with White House approval, a modification of the offer contained in the switched message.

Later in the day, Kosygin left London. Washington had received no reply to the President's letter from Ho but the North Vietnamese leader had written a bitter letter to the Pope that was taken as an answer. Shortly after Kosygin's plane touched down in Moscow, the bombing resumed. Wilson's efforts collapsed.

On February 15, Le Trang handed Guthrie Ho's vitriolic reply and told him North Vietnam was shutting off any further direct contact. A long period of a diplomatic freeze and an enlarging war set in.

Wilson publicly blamed the failure of the London talks on North Vietnam, but privately most British officials—and some American officials—felt the resumption of bombing had been precipitous. Other sources suggest that the President's tough demand to Ho and the sudden changing of a peace proposal in London were not conducive to good bargaining, and might have been more basic causes for the failure.

Seven months later, on September 21, George Brown went to a private luncheon while in New York for the United Nations General Assembly. The luncheon at the prestigious Council on Foreign Relations was attended by some 15 persons, including U.N. Ambassador Arthur Goldberg.

It was a relaxed affair. Brown had a few drinks. The talk turned to Vietnam and then to the Wilson-Kosygin meetings of the previous February.

Suddenly Brown was saying that the problem in London that week has been a switch in the American position. (One guest at the luncheon thought Brown used the term "hardening" rather than "switched.")

Then Brown caught himself. He shouldn't have said that, he remarked. He asked the guests please not to repeat it.

In the months following the collapse of the Wilson-Kosygin attempt and Hanoi's closing of the Moscow channel, some American officials began to wonder whether the administration had not miscalculated in February.

[From the Los Angeles Times, April 4, 1968]

PEACE SEARCH—III

(By David Kraslow and Stuart H. Loory)

WASHINGTON.—In the huge American national security bureaucracy, Saturday, Dec. 3, 1966, was a quiet time in the secret search for peace in Vietnam.

Behind the scenes at the State Department, functionaries were making important preparations for the possible opening three days hence of a meeting between North Vietnamese and American negotiators in Warsaw but the activity was all technical.

Would anything come of it? No one knew.

Either way, it was exciting. Five months of arduous negotiations in Saigon were coming to fruition.

But there was nothing a policy-maker could do that Saturday to help things along. That morning, a Senior National Security official picked up his daily newspaper and read:

"U.S. bombs site 5 miles from Hanoi—raids are closest to Red's capital since last June."

"Oh my God," the official muttered. "We lost control."

He read the story that told of raids by carrier-based fighter-bombers the day before on a truck depot five miles south of Hanoi and of North Vietnamese charges that the planes had attacked a populated area inside the capital city itself.

He was one of a handful of men in Washington who knew of a State Department file on a peace initiative named "Marigold" containing:

A cable on the forthcoming meeting in Warsaw . . . others from Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge on just completed secret negotiations in Saigon . . . information on Giovanni D'Orlandi and Janusz Lewandowski . . . a memorandum on an elegant luncheon in Rome . . . reports on trips to Hanoi.

How might the bombing reported to the American people that morning affect all this?

"Oh my God. We lost control."

The official's shock stemmed from knowledge that a foreign capital had been bombed, and President Johnson and his top civilian lieutenants had forgotten the raids had been authorized several weeks earlier.

The idea for Marigold had been developed by D'Orlandi, the 50-year-old Italian Ambassador to Saigon and Janusz Lewandowski, who, at 35, had just arrived in Vietnam in the spring of 1966 to head the Polish mission to the International Control Commission.

The Italian and the Pole decided that all attempts thus far to settle the war had been erroneously based on schemes to scale down the fighting slowly. They thought this could not work as long as neither side had presented any detailed picture of just what they would gain from the war.

They wanted to conduct a "diplomatic exercise in style" in which the combatants, through intermediaries, could express their views on the "least unacceptable" permanent settlement in Vietnam. In short, they were thinking of a text-book approach to the problem—the kind the suave, soft-speaking D'Orlandi might discuss with his classes of American graduate students at the University of Bologna where he taught part-time before he went to Saigon.

After D'Orlandi and Lewandowski worked out the idea between themselves, the Italian diplomat went to Lodge with the proposal. They met on June 29, 1966. Ironically, it was the day the United States bombed the Hanoi area for the first time. The raids were so sensitive that President Johnson, back in Washington, stayed up all night awaiting results and even went to pray for their success in a Catholic church.

Lodge relayed the D'Orlandi proposal to Washington and was given permission to participate. On July 9 he went to D'Orlandi's apartment on the fifth floor at 135 Durong Pasteur in Saigon for the first meeting with the Italian and Lewandowski.

D'Orlandi's apartment was admirably suited for a secret meeting. It was next door to the headquarters of Gen. William C. Westmoreland and in a building where other Americans lived. Lodge could go to the area and into the building without attracting attention. The apartment had become known as a haven for deposed Saigon government officials escaping retribution in successive coups and was thus, by tacit agreement of those who might need it next, left free of eavesdropping devices.

The meetings of the three diplomats developed into "drink-in-hand, feet-up bull sessions," an official said. At the first session, the European diplomats asked Lodge only two questions:

1—Did the Johnson administration view the war as part of a wider conflict or as one limited to Vietnam?

2—Would the Americans dismantle their bases and leave Vietnam after a settlement?

Rather than answer casually, Lodge decided to consult Washington. At a second meeting on July 24, he reported to his colleagues in Saigon that the United States truly saw the conflict as one limited to protecting South Vietnam and that American military forces would certainly be withdrawn after the war was over.

After that Lodge dropped out of the discussions. D'Orlandi and the young, ambitious Lewandowski continued to meet. Meanwhile the war grew hotter. South Vietnamese Premier Nguyen Cao Ky even talked of invading North Vietnam—talk the State Department disavowed.

In October, Mr. Johnson brought all of South Vietnam's allies together for a conference at Manila. A declaration resulted declaring the allies would withdraw their forces from South Vietnam 6 months after "the other side withdraws its forces to the north, ceases infiltration and the level of violence thus subsidies."

Though tough in substance, the Manila proposal contained visions of the prosperity that could come to Southeast Asia after the fighting stopped and was widely greeted as conciliatory.

Mr. Johnson sent his roving peace ambassador, W. Averell Harriman, around the world to explain the Manila declaration to leaders of neutral and friendly nations. Harriman stopped in Rome and was feted November 2 at a lavish luncheon in a villa on a hillside overlooking the Tiber River.

D'Orlandi, home for consultations with Foreign Minister Amintore Fanfani and for medical treatment, spoke to Harriman and Harriman's deputy, Chester L. Cooper, about the promise of the Saigon meetings.

The Italian told them peace possibilities

in Saigon were more alive than anyone in the Johnson administration realized.

At one point, D'Orlandi and Harriman went to a corner of the room and huddled intently. Fanfani, noting the tete-a-tete, turned to a colleague, smiled and said:

"I don't know what they're talking about and I don't want to know. But I hope it works out."

D'Orlandi had told the Americans that his colleague Lewandowski would soon be making another of his regular trips to Hanoi as a member of the ICC. That organization, by then moribund, had originally been established to police the 1954 Geneva conference peace arrangement. Now it was only an empty shell.

The Italian urged the Americans to supply Lewandowski with a detailed rundown of the American position that he could present in Hanoi.

From the time Harriman and Cooper arrived back in Washington after hearing D'Orlandi's presentation, Marigold became an active peace initiative of the United States Government and no longer just a "diplomatic exercise."

Lodge met in Saigon with Lewandowski and D'Orlandi, who had returned from his post in Rome on Nov. 14. D'Orlandi learned the Pole would leave the next day for Hanoi and wanted an indication of American thinking. Lodge cabled Washington. By return cable he was given a "talking paper" outlining the American long-range aims in South Vietnam.

There was another meeting in D'Orlandi's apartment the day Lewandowski left. Lodge spoke for a long time. Lewandowski took careful notes and then departed.

Meanwhile, back in Washington, where information is power, the national security bureaucracy reacted according to a well-tested rule of thumb:

The more serious any undertaking, the fewer number of people who should know it. Before the mid-November meetings in Saigon, there were perhaps 40 officials in Washington who knew of Marigold.

According to one official, this is what happened when Marigold's new promise developed in mid-November:

"The President woke up one morning, picked up the telephone and put the Lodge-Lewandowski business on a Nodis/Marigold basis with an order to cut the squad. He said he wanted to know the names of everyone who knew about it."

In an era when secret-keeping has become an important tool of Government, the President's order meant work for Benjamin H. Read, 42, the Executive Secretary of the State Department and its chief secret-keeper.

Read's tools are a little-known hierarchy of security classifications—"no distribution" (Nodis), "exclusive distribution" (Exdis) and "limited distribution" (Limdis)—that go above the statutory "top secret" classification. Items marked "Nodis" or "Exdis" are handled in the State Department only by Read or one assistant and the men cleared to read them.

Within "Nodis" there can be even a more sensitive and exclusive category marked by a code name for each individual operation. Thus Marigold was the code for a peace initiative that could be seen only by specific men on the Marigold list in Read's office.

It was William P. Bundy, the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, who picked the names of flowers as the codes for peace initiatives. Considering the symbolic meaning of flowers for the peace movement, the irony was exquisite.

After he "cut the squad," no more than 10 men out of the thousands in the Department of State saw Marigold information. That fact would, in a few weeks, become critical.

On the day Lewandowski left for Hanoi, the President, Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Walt W. Rostow, the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, approved, for the first time in almost five months, the bombing of targets in the Hanoi area requested by the military.

Their approval, transmitted through the chain of command, meant the targets could be struck on the first day with favorable weather conditions. At this point, there was no reason to believe they would interfere with the still tentative Marigold initiative. No serious negotiation sessions were yet in the offing.

In Hanoi, Lewandowski was repeating Lodge's presentation to North Vietnamese leaders. He had reduced the American position to what would come to be known as the ten points and reportedly received a favorable reaction.

Lewandowski returned to Saigon Nov. 29. A meeting with Lodge and D'Orlandi was arranged for Dec. 1 at which the Pole presented the ten points. They covered the American position on North Vietnam's famous "Four Points," the meaning of the Manila Declaration, withdrawal of North Vietnamese troops from the south, a bombing cessation and ceasefire, principles of governmental organization after peace come to the south, the holding of free elections and the problem of troop re-supply by both sides between a ceasefire and final settlement.

Although this was the American position, the actual wording was Lewandowski's. Lodge said he would have to cable the ten points to Washington for study. American officials later labeled the document a hopeless "mishmash" of language. Polish sources say the document used American wording to a great extent.

On Friday, Dec. 2, Lodge, who had received instructions from Washington, met Lewandowski and D'Orlandi again to say that despite needed clarification in the points, the United States would accept them as the basis for further discussion. Lewandowski suggested the United States appoint a negotiator to meet a North Vietnamese representative in Warsaw as early as Tuesday, Dec. 6.

At about the same time, the monsoon weather broke over North Vietnam. Through breaks in the thunderstorms, mist, fog and low hanging clouds, American bombers struck the Hanoi area for the first time since June 29.

Once again Lodge said he would have to consult Washington. Once again the meeting adjourned.

On Saturday, Dec. 3, the day after the raids, Lodge met Lewandowski and D'Orlandi to deliver an answer. Warsaw on Dec. 6 would be just fine, he said.

Lewandowski complained that a repetition of the Dec. 2 raid on Hanoi might hurt. Lodge replied that the raids had been long planned, that they could not be canceled without compromising the secrecy that was so important to the initiative and that there had been no coordination between the diplomacy and the raids. He asked Lewandowski to make that clear to Hanoi.

The Pole appeared to understand.

D'Orlandi poured a round of Scotch whisky for each man and they drank a toast to their work.

"I thought I had done something worthwhile in my life," Lodge told an associate several months later.

[From the Los Angeles Times, Apr. 5, 1968]

PEACE SEARCH—IV

(By David Kraslow and Stuart H. Long)

WASHINGTON.—The Johnson administration's penchant for secrecy caused a breakdown in coordination that damaged, in December, 1966, what many regarded as one of the most promising of the Vietnam peace initiatives.

President Johnson and his closest advisers overlooked the scheduling of bombing raids at a critical time. The information necessary to prevent a breakdown was kept from those officials in a better position than their preoccupied superiors to coordinate diplomacy with military action.

As a result, Hanoi was bombed just a day before American Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge agreed with a Polish diplomat, Jausz-Lewandowski, to arrange a North Vietnamese-United States meeting in Warsaw only three days hence, on Tuesday, Dec. 6, 1966.

On Dec. 4, 1966, a day after Lewandowski warned Lodge about the possible harmful effects of the bombing and Lodge explained the raid away, the bombers struck Hanoi again.

This breakdown may be explained by examining the organization of the national security bureaucracy in Washington. Just who selects each of those bomb targets—each truck depot, rail yard, anti-aircraft emplacement, road junction, power plant, airfield, shipyard or dock in the northern part of North Vietnam? Who decides what marching orders to give the diplomats?

Who decides which men in government should know what the generals and admirals are doing or what the diplomats are doing or both?

The answer to all those questions is the President of the United States.

"The only place important decisions are made here in Washington is in the mind of Lyndon Johnson," one official said. "And that could happen anytime—at 4 o'clock in the morning, at lunch, in the bathtub."

To understand the meaning of this for the Marigold peace initiative to establish talks in Warsaw, consider that the "Vietnam working group" in the State Department, the organization originally established as a special task force to oversee the growing American involvement in the war, has grown virtually powerless.

The ten-man group, which was conceived as a kind of "country desk" staffed by experts with all the facts and figures at their command, has become in large part a speaker's bureau and public relations agency for the Johnson administration. In addition, the group functions as a service organization, preparing the memoranda and analyses requested by superiors.

Its members say they are well informed about the war. "We are kept ignorant of a very small amount of information—an infinitesimal amount of the total flow of traffic," one group member said.

The infinitesimal amount missing was precisely the information that counted in Marigold. It related to the serious peace moves and it prevented the group from coordinating—or even suggesting coordination of—the military effort with the peace effort.

When Marigold reached a critical stage, the Vietnam working group—those involved full-time in the day-to-day problems of the war and the efforts to settle it—were cut from the list of officials entitled to Marigold information.

That act prevented the working group from raising a danger flag on bomb targeting in the Hanoi area late in 1966.

On top of the experts in the working group, the State Department has superimposed layers of supervisors and has buttressed the structure with organizations outside the normal chain of command.

As a result, one official observed:

"The State Department is organized atrociously to handle the Vietnam war. The difficulty arises from the fact that in the last two or three years the Vietnam desk has been moving successively further and further to the top of the Government. Now the chief of the desk is Lyndon B. Johnson, the chief of the desk in the Defense Department is Robert S. McNamara, and the chief of the desk in the State Department is Dean Rusk

(Since that official spoke, Clark Clifford has succeeded McNamara.)

"The problem with this is that each one of these men has much more to do than worry only about Vietnam. Despite the fact that they are running the war and seeking the peace, you have to go all the way down to the deputy assistant secretary level until you find someone working only on Vietnam."

At the same time the President and his lieutenants operate the Vietnam desk, this official noted, they must also worry about such things as riots in urban ghettos, middle east war, a North Korean ship seizure or a gold crisis. Such matters have at times rendered the Vietnam war a secondary problem for them.

The device the Johnson Administration worked out for coordinating the Vietnam war efforts is the "Tuesday Lunch," named because it convenes usually—but not always—every Tuesday at 1 p.m. in the White House family dining room.

To the extent that the President shares decision-making at all, he does much of it at the Tuesday Lunch with the Secretaries of Defense and State, Walt W. Rostow, his special assistant for national security affairs, and press secretary George Christian. Occasionally, Gen. Earle G. Wheeler, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; CIA Director Richard Helms, and others sit in.

The Tuesday Lunch group, using a four-part check list, approved, before the bombing cut-back announced by the President on March 31, all strategic targets in North Vietnam. In doing so, they weighed the possible military gain from an attack against three factors: 1) the danger of American airplane and pilot loss, 2) the risk of North Vietnamese civilian casualties and 3) the risk of widening the war by bringing in China or the Soviet Union.

At the Tuesday Lunch, Mr. Johnson and his advisers worked over the targets, each listed on a separate sheet of paper, like teachers grading examination papers.

In grading those papers and approving targets, they accounted for every apparent contingency. Except one. Once the targets were put on the strike list, none of the officials who selected them—that is, none of the Tuesday Lunch group members—took responsibility for watching the exact time when a particular target was to be struck.

Depending on the weather and operational capabilities of squadrons on Navy aircraft carriers and air bases in the Thailand jungles, that could be anywhere from a few hours to days or even weeks after the authorization.

There was a fail-safe mechanism to allow for coordination of military actions with diplomacy. But, in December, 1966, it had fallen into disuse.

The Hanoi targets struck Dec. 2 and 4 were authorized at a Nov. 15 Tuesday Lunch, when there was no immediate prospect of a direct peace negotiation. A day before each of the bombings, the field commanders sent cables through the chain of command from Saigon to Pacific Headquarters in Honolulu to Washington advising of air raids upcoming in the next 24 hours.

State Department liaison men in Honolulu and at the Pentagon as well as military liaison men in the State Department, who studied those cables, knew nothing of the Marigold Initiative. Thus they raised no red flags.

The only man who would have known of the delicate diplomacy under way and also had regular access to the target information was Benjamin H. Read, the Executive Secretary of the State Department. All sensitive cable traffic going into or leaving the building in Foggy Bottom crosses his desk.

He cannot possibly read it all, however, and the target cables had become routine matter over a two-year period. Hardly anyone paid attention to them.

The men in the Vietnam working group would have spotted the possible harmful effects of an unusual raid on Hanoi at the same time a meeting was being arranged, but they no longer knew what was happening with Marigold.

Some high officials realize the problems inherent in this organization. One said:

"The Tuesday lunch is a terrible way to achieve effective coordination. The problem is that all the people making the decisions at the lunch know the least about Vietnam. Wheeler knows most, McNamara is next and Helms is third. I'm a believer in bureaucracy, in adequately staffing a decision. The people who have the information should participate in the decisions."

Because of all the other duties of the Tuesday lunch group members, they could not devote a lot of time to the mechanics and techniques of developing peace initiatives. That was handled, under order from President Johnson, by Ambassador W. Averell Harriman and his small staff.

"They were in charge of dreaming up scenarios, dreaming up ideas, chasing will-of-the-wisps, pushing cajoling," one official said.

Though grand in concept, Harriman's office had almost no power. "On the one hand you had a carefully organized military machine," one official said. "On the other, there was Harriman with no real mandate. I'd say there was a slight imbalance there."

"Realistically," another official said, "the Secretary of State just has to be in charge of all diplomacy. That responsibility can't be transferred to someone like Harriman."

The imbalance and the coordination breakdown resulting in the Dec. 2 and 4 raids inspired a greater degree of alertness in the State Department. Officials began checking the daily bombing lists.

On the weekend of Dec. 3–4, however, their more immediate concern was getting ready for the impending Warsaw Marigold meeting.

[From the Los Angeles Times]

THE SEARCH FOR PEACE—V

(By David Kraslow and Stuart H. Loory)

WASHINGTON.—Near midnight on Saturday, Dec. 3, 1966, the United States Marine guard at the American Embassy in Warsaw picked up the telephone and called Ambassador John A. Gronouski at home. There was a flash telegram coming in marked, "Nodis (no distribution)".

That meant only the ambassador himself could read it.

Gronouski, who had been asleep, dressed and hurried to the embassy. The telegram was still running when he arrived. It spilled relentlessly out of the teletype machine. The message ran all night and through much of Sunday. Gronouski worked all weekend reading it.

The seemingly endless telegram was a verbatim record of the marigold peace initiative undertaken by Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge in Saigon with the Italian Ambassador, Giovanni D'Orlandi, and Janusz Lewandowski, chief of the Polish mission to the International Control Commission.

Those three had agreed the time was right for a face-to-face United States-North Vietnamese meeting. Lewandowski, on Dec. 3, suggested they could start as early as Dec. 6 in Warsaw. The United States had agreed.

Gronouski, Washington decided, would do the talking. Now the telegram was instructing him to make the preliminary arrangements with Polish Foreign Minister Adam Rapacki. The long telegram would familiarize Gronouski with every detail of the five-month-long negotiation involving Lodge, Lewandowski and D'Orlandi on the complicated marigold plan, so that he could talk intelligently with the North Vietnamese.

The whole prospect excited Gronouski. He was eager about playing a role in the settlement of the war.

On Monday, Dec. 5, Gronouski after studying the marigold record for 30 hours in his office, stopping only for an occasional catnap and something to eat, went to see Rapacki for the first time. He had gone to make arrangements for what he thought would be the next day's meeting with the North Vietnamese.

Rapacki told him there would be no meeting. He was vague on the reasons but did mention, in a low-keyed "fatherly" sort of way, that the bombings around Hanoi on Dec. 2 and 4 could damage the initiative. Gronouski knew not only of the bombings but also of some enemy mortar raids on Saigon's Thansonn Hut airport over the weekend. He replied that those attacks could hurt as well.

Gronouski also mentioned the status of the "ten points," which Lodge had agreed could be the basis for direct discussions, needed clarification.

The United States considered the points only "topic headings" and "agenda items." As one official said, "we still don't know to what degree we had to subscribe to the language of the ten points . . . We had to make certain that our attendance at a meeting did not create the misunderstanding that we accepted their language."

From various accounts of the Gronouski-Rapacki meeting, it appears that some misunderstanding did develop over the type of clarification the United States wanted. Gronouski wanted only clarification of the status of the points from the Poles. He wanted to clarify the meaning of each point that is discuss them—with the North Vietnamese directly.

From Dec. 5 to Dec. 13, Gronouski and Rapacki met daily. Each time Gronouski pleaded for a meeting with the North Vietnamese. Each time there was a confused discussion involving the harmful effects of bombing Hanoi and the nature of the clarification the United States sought.

Gronouski's frustration rose. He was hopeful the meeting could be arranged. In fact, he later admitted to associates in Washington he may have been guilty of "wishful thinking." At one point he made a special trip to the foreign ministry to urge Rapacki that talks begin "that afternoon, that night, at 3 A.M. in the morning." The talks with the North Vietnamese always seemed imminent but they never materialized.

Meanwhile, back in the United States, the continued bombing of Hanoi was reconsidered. Several in the State Department thought the raids should be discontinued.

Some felt it would harm the initiative. Others felt the initiative might not succeed anyhow but when it failed the enemy could blame the raids for the failure.

What one official described as "grumblings and murmurings" about the raids developed into a secret debate among President Johnson's advisers.

Nicholas Katzenbach, Undersecretary of State; Benjamin H. Read, the Executive Secretary of the State Department; Ambassador W. Averell Harriman, the man in charge of peace seeking, and Chester L. Cooper, his deputy, all opposed continued bombing of Hanoi while Marigold was alive.

The President decided in favor of continuing the raids. Secretary of State Dean Rusk, who was then touring the Far East, agreed with this decision. So did Walt W. Rostow, the President's special assistant for National Security Affairs, civilian officials in the Defense Department and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Rusk gave his agreement even though D'Orlandi warned him about the bad effects the bombings might have on Marigold during a talk in Saigon on Dec. 9, Rusk replied to the Italian that Rapacki seemed to be doing some foot-dragging in arranging the meetings. D'Orlandi reportedly agreed that the Poles were acting in an inexplicable way.

On Dec. 13 American bombers struck the Hanoi area for the third time that month, and on the following day they struck again. Gronouski's immediate reaction was despair. He felt the raids should not have happened.

He was not surprised when Rapacki called him in on Dec. 15 and told him that because of the raids of the previous two days the North Vietnamese had withdrawn from the initiative. Rapacki was clearly angry at the United States.

Gronouski cabled news of the collapse—and the reasons given for it—to Washington. He then set about trying to revive Marigold. Despite what Rapacki said, Gronouski thought this would be possible.

On Dec. 21 Gronouski and the State Department agreed that he should return to Washington for a quick consultation on Marigold. Gronouski flew all night, arriving in Washington at 6 P.M. on the evening of Dec. 22. He spent 24 hours in conferences and finally, on Dec 23, President Johnson decided to create a bomb-free zone with a 10-mile radius around the center of Hanoi to show American sincerity in wanting to talk

Once again Gronouski flew all night back to Warsaw. He arrived after dark on Christmas Eve and met Rapacki at 7 P.M. in the foreign ministry. Rapacki appeared pleased with the American gesture.

On Dec. 27 Gronouski received a call from the Polish Foreign Ministry. "Was that statute miles or nautical miles?" He checked with Washington and learned it was nautical miles. The call gave him hope.

On Dec. 30, Rapacki summoned the American to the foreign ministry and told him once again the North Vietnamese definitely would not talk and that the Polish Government was withdrawing completely from the initiative. Gronouski thought he heard a note of sympathy for the United States in Rapacki's voice.

In the months that followed, the State Department conducted a postmortem on its conduct of the Marigold initiative and decided it had done nothing wrong. The only dissent came from some officials who felt the bombings of Hanoi should not have occurred. Disagreement on this major point, of course, meant disagreement on whether any blame for collapse of Marigold could be ascribed to the United States.

Some high officials concluded the Poles had exceeded their authority and had promised a face-to-face meeting when the North Vietnamese really had not given them authorization to make such a promise. Still later, two high officials privately placed blame for the collapse on articles by Harrison Salisbury, the assistant managing editor of the New York Times. He became the first correspondent for a large, respectable American newspaper to visit Hanoi. His stories created a furor in the United States.

They documented, for the first time by an American, charges that civilian areas had been bombed by United States planes, however, accidentally that might have occurred.

"After Harrison Salisbury's copy, they (the North Vietnamese) copped out," one official said. "They realized they had a pretty good thing going and could use American public opinion to get a better deal. We never did for Hitler's Germany what we did for Hanoi."

The official did not mention that Salisbury's first report, on Christmas Day, 1966, did not appear until 10 days after Rapacki told Gronouski that American bombings had destroyed the peace initiative.

[From the Los Angeles Times, Apr. 8, 1968]

PEACE SEARCH—VI

(By David Kraslow and Stuart H. Loory)

WASHINGTON.—On Jan. 16, 1966, Jerzy Michalowski, a high official in the Polish Foreign Ministry, returned to Warsaw from a secret 18-day visit to Hanoi.

He had been on a peace mission at the urging of the United States Government.

One of the first foreigners to see him after his return was George Clutton, the British Ambassador. Clutton casually asked the Pole how the trip had gone.

Michalowski, in a manner that was at once cryptic and revealing, answered:

"Goddam those Chinese."

The Pole was one of the actors in a gala peace-seeking production mounted in December, 1965, by Lyndon B. Johnson that was intended as much to show the world the President wanted peace as it was to obtain it. The gala went into the Vietnam war records under the name, "37-Day Bombing Pause."

In it, American diplomats skittered hither and yon around the globe, urging leaders in friendly and not-so-friendly capitals to urge Hanoi to negotiate. Michalowski's trip had been an outgrowth of a plea made in Warsaw by Ambassador W. Averell Harriman, the United States's old soldier of diplomacy.

Hanoi's rejection of the Michalowski overture and the Pole's stated reason for it illustrate the complexities involved in peace-seeking. Not only does Ho Chi Minh's attitudes and those of the other North Vietnamese leaders have to be considered but so do those of the South Vietnam National Liberation Front, Peking, Moscow and, on the allied side, the Saigon Government and the other governments which sent troops into South Vietnam.

If the Chinese were a complicating factor in the search for peace in 1966, a miscalculation by the Johnson administration was the complication a year earlier—before the bombing of North Vietnam even began.

United Nations Secretary General U Thant had received North Vietnamese agreement to attend a meeting with American negotiators. With Adlai Stevenson's encouragement, Thant in January, 1965, had even arranged a site for the talks—Rangoon. On Jan. 30, Stevenson was compelled to tell Thant the United States would not attend the meeting.

As a few officials in the White House and State Department then knew and now acknowledge, the very idea of negotiations was "anathema" to the President and his top advisers during that period.

The administration felt that a settlement satisfactory to the United States could not then be achieved. The Saigon Government was in a shambles. The military situation was worsening. The President and his chief advisers concluded that the United States would have to correct the military imbalance before it could consider talks. To bargain with Hanoi in January, 1965, would mean bargaining from a position of weakness.

With the Thant initiative rebuffed, plans for the bombing of North Vietnam were advanced.

The United States began bombing the North on Feb. 7, 1965, ignoring Soviet Premier Alexei N. Kosygin's presence in Hanoi. Kosygin and the Soviet Government made its anger at the embarrassment plain.

Those first raids were said to be in retaliation for Viet Cong attacks on American installations in South Vietnam. But already the President had all but decided on a regular program of bombing in the North.

McGeorge Bundy, then the President's special assistant for national security affairs, among others, advised the President that a relatively short period of steady bombing would not only arrest the deteriorating situation but also would avoid the need for sending American combat troops to South Vietnam.

Of the two choices—American troops to fight in Asia or American bombing of North Vietnam—bombing was far more palatable to the American public.

Sources then on the White House staff now talk of Bundy's "Three-Month Plan." Bundy, it is said, felt that after three months of sustained bombing Hanoi would be ready to make significant concessions.

The bombing, it was felt, would be something the United States could agree to stop doing in return for concessions by North Vietnam.

It didn't work.

In May, 1965, the United States did stop the bombing for five days in an effort to test the three-month thesis. Secretary of State Dean Rusk asked North Vietnam for significant reductions in the fighting if it wished the bombing pause to continue. Hanoi, receiving aid from Peking and Moscow, wasn't interested. It contemptuously returned American messages in Moscow and, through the British, in Hanoi.

"We miscalculated," one former White House official said. "The bombing did not improve our position."

Proven right were those few in the administration who feared the bombing would lead quickly to an escalation of the war by both sides and the very result the President had sought to avoid—the sending of combat troops to South Vietnam.

They felt this would inevitably occur unless talks could be arranged quickly in the early stages of American bombing. Their advice was not followed.

With the failure of the short air war theory, third parties—professional and amateur diplomats—intervened to help in finding a settlement.

One of them was Prof. Giorgio LaPira, the former mayor of Florence, Italy.

LaPira is a modern day Savonarola, a Catholic aesthete whose political philosophy is based on making the Sermon on the Mount come true. He lives in cell-like quarters at the Monastery of San Marco in downtown Florence, the same monastery Savonarola headed and lived in when, during eight years of the Renaissance, he railed against the moral degradation of Italy and the simony of the "false popes" in Rome.

Savonarola was martyred at the stake in 1498. LaPira, after long service as mayor of Florence after World War II and working an anti-Communist economic and social miracle, was martyred at the ballot box in 1965.

As he had tried unsuccessfully to help settle the Arab-Israeli dispute and the French-Algerian war, he attempted to mediate the Vietnam war. He went to visit Ho Chi Minh in November, 1965, thinking he had, through Italian Foreign Minister Amintore Fanfani, a mandate from Lyndon Johnson. He brought back a message that Ho would talk without first demanding the withdrawal of American troops. There also was a suggestion that any bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong would destroy the possibility for talks.

If there was ever anything important about the initiative, it was negated after 1) Secretary of State Dean Rusk proposed complicating terms to Fanfani 2) The initiative became public knowledge through no fault of the administration and 3) the United States bombed the Haiphong area for the first time.

The failure of the Italian initiative was followed by the efforts of others to mediate the war. Most notably, after the 37-day pause, the Canadians summoned out of retirement one of their ablest Asian hands, 71-year-old Chester Ronning. With Washington's approval, Canada dispatched Ronning on two peace missions to Hanoi.

A week after Ronning returned from his second trip to Hanoi in June, 1966, the U.S. bombed the Hanoi area for the first time. This was done despite a Canadian plea that escalation of the air war would not only embarrass the Canadian Government but also would destroy the new and potentially useful channel Ronning had opened to Hanoi. Ronning hasn't been back to Hanoi since that bombing.

Ironically, the Marigold peace initiative was born in Saigon on the day Hanoi was

bombed. It was to die a controversial death in Warsaw six months later while bombs were dropped once more in the Hanoi area. The area had been untouched in the interim.

The death of Marigold was soon followed, in early 1967, by the episodes of the switched secret peace message in London during the talks between British Prime Minister Harold Wilson and Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin, and the secret toughening of a letter from President Johnson to Ho Chi Minh.

Some present and former officials feel that the Thant initiative of 1964–65 was the most important missed opportunity for a compromise political settlement.

"When you think of what came later," one former official said, "You realize how important that opportunity was."

His point was not any certainty that a satisfactory settlement would have resulted then from talks, but that the effort to find out wasn't made.

Other informed sources feel there were other opportunities at various stages of the burgeoning war.

The stories of the Marigold initiative and the Wilson-Kosygin talks, for instance, suggest carelessness by the Johnson administration, about possible negotiating opportunities. Certainly, according to officials deeply involved in both instances, the coordination within the administration was something less than outstanding.

The record—private and public—of Vietnam diplomacy in the past three years suggests missed opportunities by the Johnson administration to secure, if not peace, at least negotiations; if not negotiations, at least talks; if not talks, at least a propaganda advantage over the enemy which would have improved this nation's standing in the world community.

Now the United States and North Vietnam are on threshhold of direct talks that show more promise than anything that has happened so far in the three year search for peace. One who studies the record may feel compelled to ask: Can the United States achieve a more satisfactory settlement in Vietnam today than might have been obtainable a year or more ago?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Now, Mr. President, in connection with those articles, and as a matter of record because I think they are pertinent to them, I also ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD a compilation of public statements made by the President of the United States and the Secretary of State with regard to the question of meeting for the purposes of negotiations.

There being no objection, the compilation was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

READINESS TO TALK

THE PRESIDENT

"As I have said in every part of the Union, I am ready to go anywhere at anytime, and meet with anyone whenever there is promise of progress toward an honorable peace." (President Johnson's statement on Vietnam, as issued by the White House. *Washington Post*, March 26, 1965.)

"We will go anywhere, discuss any subject, listen to any point of view in the interests of a peaceful solution. . . . However, the bombing is not an end in itself. Its purpose is to bring us closer to the day of peace. And whenever it will serve the interests of peace to do so, we will end it." (Additional appropriations to meet mounting military requirements in Vietnam: Message from the President, May 4, 1965.)

"For months we have waited for a sign—a signal—a whisper—that our offer of unconditional discussions had fallen on receptive ears. But not a sound has been heard. Not a signal has been sighted. Still we hope for a response. Still we are anxious for peace." (President's statement in signing the $700 million Vietnam appropriations. *Washington Post* May 8, 1965.)

"I have stated publicly, and many times, again and again. America's willingness to begin unconditional discussions with any government at any place at any time." (President's news conference. *Washington Post* July 29, 1965.)

"We will meet at any conference table. We will discuss any proposals—4 points or 14 or 40—and we will consider the views of any group." (President addressing joint session of Congress, January 12, 1966.)

"As to the site of the bilateral discussions I propose, there are several possibilities. We could, for example, have our representatives meet in Moscow where contacts have already occurred. They could meet in some other country such as Burma. You may have other arrangements or sites in mind, and I would try to meet your suggestions." (Letter from President Johnson to Ho Chi Minh, February 8, 1967.)

"We are prepared to talk at any time and place, in any forum, with the object of bringing peace to Vietnam; . . ." (Letter from President Johnson to His Holiness the Pope, February 8, 1966.)

"I do want to repeat to you this afternoon—and through you to the people of America—the essentials now, lest there be any doubts.

"United States representatives are ready at any time for discussions of the Vietnam problem or any related matter, with any government or governments, if there is any reason to believe that these discussions will in any way seriously advance the cause of peace.

"We are prepared to go more than halfway and to use any avenue possible to encourage such discussions. And we have done that at every opportunity." (Remarks of the President at a joint session of the Tennessee State Legislature, March 15, 1967.)

"I want to negotiate. I want a political solution. I want more than any human being in all the world to see the killing stopped, but I just can't negotiate with myself." And he added, "Maybe someday, somehow, sometime, somewhere, someone will want to sit at a table and talk instead of kill, discuss instead of fight, reason instead of murder, and when they do, I will be the first to come to that table, wherever it is." (President Johnson addressing American Physical Society banquet at the Sheraton-Park Hotel, Washington, D.C., *Washington Post*, April 27, 1967.)

"The United States position is that we are ready to meet with them any time to discuss arrangements for bringing the war to an end on an equitable and just basis. We have never been able to get them or any of their friends to bring them to a conference table." (President's news conference, *Washington Post*, July 19, 1967.)

"I am ready to talk with Ho Chi Minh, and other chiefs of state concerned, tomorrow. I am ready to have Secretary Rusk meet with their Foreign Minister tomorrow. I am ready to send a trusted representative of America to any spot on this earth to talk in public or private with a spokesman of Hanoi." (Remarks of President Johnson to the National Legislative Conference at San Antonio, Texas, September 29, 1967.)

SECRETARY OF STATE

"We are prepared to sit down at the table and talk if someone is prepared to come to the table and talk with us. But thus far we have no one at the table."

". . . We are prepared for informal, private, discreet, preliminary discussions. But the difficulty is that the other side keeps hanging up the phone. It is hard to get anybody to the table to talk." (Secretary Rusk on CBS's Face the Nation, March 20, 1966.)

"But the problem is discussion with Hanoi. And after all that is said and done and after all the personalities of the world have gone into it and governments and groups of governments and private travelers and parliamentary groups and everybody else—after all is said and done, no one has been able to produce the warm body of a North Vietnamese at a particular place at a particular time for me to talk to—nobody."

"Now, I realize that the photographers in Washington tell me I look like the neighborhood bartender, but I assure you that I'm not the village idiot; and we would not be doing our job if we were not following up day and night every clue, every allusion, every hint through any channel anywhere that would help open this thing up to a peaceful settlement." (Secretary Rusk answering questions at National Foreign Policy Conference of Educators, June 19, 1967.)

"We have stated many times that we are ready to negotiate at once without conditions. Since the other side has imposed conditions, such as stopping the bombing, we have said we will negotiate about the conditions themselves. . . . But no one has been able to produce anyone from the other side with whom to talk—either without conditions or about conditions." (Replies by Secretary Rusk to questions submitted by Daniel Viklund, Dagens Nyheter, Stockholm. State Dept. press release July 1, 1967.)

"When people say 'Negotiate now' they should know that the President would meet with Ho Chi Minh and other chiefs of state concerned tomorrow—and that I would depart today for any mutually convenient spot if I could meet a representative of North Vietnam with whom I could discuss peace in Southeast Asia." (Secretary Rusk's news conference of October 12, 1967.)

"You remember the old saying that what you do speaks so loud I can't hear what you say. Now we can't be indifferent to these actions on the ground and think that these have no consequences from a political point of view. So they know where we live. Everything that we've said, our 14 points, 28 proposals to which we've said yes and to which they've said no, the San Antonio formula, all these things remain there on the table for anyone who is interested in moving toward peace. They're all there. But they know where we live and we'd be glad to hear from them sometime at their convenience when they decide that they want to move toward peace." (Secretary Rusk on Meet the Press, February 4, 1968.)

"As you know, Hanoi continues to refuse to come to the negotiating table even though they could do so without any prior commitment whatsoever. They have also refused to engage in any kind of dialog about the possibility of peace talks. But the door remains open, and we hope that at one point or another they will see fit to walk through it." (Address by Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker before the Overseas Press Club of New York, November 17, 1967.)

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I use one illustration of the nature of the statements, from President Johnson's letter of February 8, 1967, addressed to Ho Chi Minh, as follows:

As to the site of the bilateral discussions I propose, there are several possibilities. We could, for example, have our representatives meet in Moscow where contacts have already occurred. They could meet in some other country such as Burma. You may have other arrangements or sites in mind, and I would try to meet your suggestions.

Mr. President, I mention this only because I would think that Moscow is no more neutral than Warsaw.

There are a number of other cases, many well known to Senators, which I shall not take the trouble to read.

VIETNAM

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, one of the tragic aspects of the war in Vietnam is the manner in which senior officials responsible for American policy have deluded themselves into thinking that each decision to take the next step would turn the corner and bring victory in sight. Instead of resulting in a march to victory, those steps have brought a steady descent into a quagmire.

The delusions of the decisionmaking process on Vietnam policy are reviewed most perceptively by James C. Thomson in an article published in the April 1968 issue of the Atlantic magazine, entitled "How Could Vietnam Happen?".

The author points to the false sense of confidence, irrelevant semantics, and wishful thinking which preoccupied his colleagues while he was an adviser in the White House and the Department of State from 1961 to 1966.

Bureaucratic detachment from the gross realities of the war was illustrated by this incident related by Mr. Thomson in the article:

In Washington the semantics of the military muted the reality of war for the civilian policymakers. In quiet, air-conditioned, thick-carpeted rooms, such terms as "systematic pressure," and even "body count" seemed to breed a sort of games-theory detachment. Most memorable to me was a moment in the late 1964 target planning when the question under discussion was how heavy our bombing should be, and how extensive our strafing at some midpoint in the projected pattern of systematic pressure. An Assistant Secretary of State resolved the point in the following words: "It seems to me that our orchestration should be mainly violins, but with periodic touches of brass."

There is much to be learned by both the executive branch and the Congress from the process by which this country became involved so deeply in this war. I hope that the lessons have been well learned.

I ask unanimous consent to have Mr. Thomson's article printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

HOW COULD VIETNAM HAPPEN?—AN AUTOPSY

(By James C. Thomson, Jr.)

(NOTE.—From the beginning of John Kennedy's Administration into this fifth year of Lyndon Johnson's presidency, substantially the same small group of men have presided over the destiny of the United States. In that time they have carried the country from a limited involvement in Vietnam into a war that is brutal, probably unwinnable, and, to an increasingly body of opinion, calamitous and immoral. How could it happen? Many in government or close to it will read the following article with the shock of recognition. Those less familiar with the processes of power can read it with assurance that the author had a firsthand opportunity to watch the slide down the slippery slope during five years (1961–1966) of service in the White House and Department of State. Mr. Thomson is an East Asia specialist and an assistant professor of history at Harvard.)

As a case study in the making of foreign policy, the Vietnam War will fascinate historians and social scientists for many decades to come. One question that will certainly be asked: How did men of superior ability, sound training, and high ideals—American policy-makers of the 1960s—create such costly and divisive policy?

As one who watched the decision-making process in Washington from 1961 to 1966 under Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, I can suggest a preliminary answer. I can do so by briefly listing some of the factors that seemed to me to shape our Vietnam policy during my years as an East Asia specialist at the State Department and the White House. I shall deal largely with Washington as I saw or sensed it, and not with Saigon, where I have spent but a scant three days, in the entourage of the Vice President, or with other decision centers, the capitals of interested parties. Nor will I deal with other important parts of the record: Vietnam's history prior to 1961, for instance, or the overall course of America's relations with Vietnam.

Yet a first and central ingredient in these years of Vietnam decisions does involve history. The ingredient was *the legacy of the 1950s*—by which I mean the so-called "loss of China," the Korean War, and the Far East policy of Secretary of State Dulles.

This legacy had an institutional by-product for the Kennedy Administration: in 1961 the U.S. government's East Asian establishment was undoubtedly the most rigid and doctrinaire of Washington's regional divisions in foreign affairs. This was especially true at the Department of State, where the incoming Administration found the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs the hardest nut to crack. It was a bureau that had been purged of its best Chinese expertise, and of farsighted, dispassionate men, as a result of McCarthyism. Its members were generally committed to one policy line: the close containment and isolation of mainland China, the harassment of "neutralist" nations which sought to avoid alignment with either Washington or Peking, and the maintenance of a network of alliances with anti-Communist client states or China's periphery.

Another aspect of the legacy was the special vulnerability and sensitivity of the new Democratic Administration on Far East policy issues. The memory of the McCarthy era was still very sharp, and Kennedy's margin of victory was too thin. The 1960 Offshore Islands TV debate between Kennedy and Nixon had shown the President-elect the perils of "fresh thinking." The Administration was inherently leery of moving too fast on Asia. As a result, the Far East Bureau (now the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs) was the last one to be overhauled. Not until Averell Harriman was brought in as an Assistant Sercetary in December, 1961, were significant personnel changes attempted, and it took Harriman several months to make a deep imprint on the Bureau because of his necessary preoccupation with the Laos settlement. Once he did so, there was virtually no effort to bring back the purged or exiled East Asia experts.

There were other important by-products of this "legacy of the fifties":

The new Administration inherited and somewhat shared *a general perception of China-on-the-march*—a sense of China's vastness, its numbers, its belligerence; a revived sense, perhaps, of the Golden Horde. This was a perception fed by Chinese intervention in the Korean War (an intervention actually based on appallingly bad communications and mutual miscalculation on the part of Washington and Peking; but the careful unraveling of that tragedy, which scholars have accomplished, had not yet become part of the conventional wisdom).

The new Administration inherited and briefly accepted a *monolithic conception of the Communist bloc*. Despite much earlier predictions and reports by outside analysts, policy-makers did not begin to accept the reality and possible finality of the Sino-Soviet split until the first weeks of 1962. The inevitable corrosive impact of competing nationalisms on Communism was largely ignored.

The new Administration inherited and to some extent shared *the "domino theory" about Asia*. This theory resulted from profound ignorance of Asian history and hence ignorance of the radical differences among Asian nations and societies. It resulted from a blindness to the power and resilience of Asian nationalisms. (It may also have resulted from a subconsicous sense that, since "all Asians look alike," all Asian nations will act alike.) As a theory, the domino fallacy was not merely inaccurate but also insulting to Asian nations; yet it has continued to this day to beguile men who should know better.

Finally, the legacy of the fifties was apparently compounded by an uneasy sense of a worldwide Communist challenge to the new Administration after the Bay of Pigs fiasco. A first manifestation was the President's traumatic Vienna meeting with Khrushchev in June, 1961; then came the Berlin crisis of the summer. All this created an atmosphere in which President Kennedy undoubtedly felt under special pressure to show his nation's mettle in Vietnam—if the Vietnamese, unlike the people of Laos, were willing to fight.

In general, the legacy of the fifties shaped such early moves of the new Administration as the decisions to maintain a high-visibility SEATO (by sending the Secretary of State himself instead of some underling to its first meeting in 1961), to back away from diplomatic recognition of Mongolia in the summer of 1961, and most important, to expand U.S. military assistance to South Vietnam that winter on the basis of the much more tentative Eisenhower commitment. It should be added that the increased commitment to Vietnam was also fueled by a new breed of military strategists and academic social scientists (some of whom had entered the new Administration) who had developed theories of counterguerrilla warfare and were eager to see them put to the test. To some, "counterinsurgency" seemed a new panacea for coping with the world's instability.

So much for the legacy and the history. Any new Administration inherits both complicated problems and simplistic views of the world. But surely among the policy-makers of the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations there were men who would warn of the dangers of an open-ended commitment to the Vietnam quagmire?

This raises a central question, at the heart of the policy process: Where were the experts, the doubters, and the dissenters? Were they there at all, and if so, what happened to them?

The answer is complex but instructive.

In the first place, the American government was sorely *lacking in real Vietnam or Indochina expertise*. Originally treated as an adjunct of Embassy Paris, our Saigon embassy and the Vietnam Desk at State were largely staffed from 1954 onward by French-speaking Foreign Service personnel of narrowly European experience. Such diplomats were even more closely restricted than the normal embassy officer—by cast of mind as well as language—to contacts with Vietnam's French-speaking urban elites. For instance, Foreign Service linguists in Portugal are able to speak with the peasantry if they get out of Lisbon and choose to do so; not so the French speakers of Embassy Saigon.

In addition, the *shadow of the "loss of China"* distorted Vietnam reporting. Career officers in the Department, and especially those in the field, had not forgotten the fate of their World War II colleagues who wrote in frankness from China and were later pilloried by Senate committees for critical comments on the Chinese Nationalists. Candid reporting on the strengths of the Viet Cong and the weaknesses of the Diem government was inhibited by the memory. It was also inhibited by some higher officials, notably Ambassador Nolting in Saigon, who refused to sign off on such cables.

In due course, to be sure, some Vietnam

talent was discovered or developed. But a recurrent and increasingly important factor in the decisionmaking process was *the banishment of real expertise*. Here the underlying cause was the "closed politics" of policy-making as issues become hot: the more sensitive the issue, and the higher it rises in the bureaucracy, the more completely the experts are excluded while the harassed senior generalists take over (that is, the Secretaries, Undersecretaries, and Presidential Assistants). The frantic skimming of briefing papers in the back seats of limousines is no substitute for the presence of specialists; furthermore, in times of crisis such papers are deemed "too sensitive" even for review by the specialists. Another underlying cause of this banishment, as Vietnam became more critical, was the replacement of the experts, who were generally and increasingly pessimistic, by men described as "can-do guys," loyal and energetic fixers unsoured by expertise. In early 1965, when I confided my growing policy doubts to an older colleague on the NSC staff, he assured me that the smartest thing both of us could do was to "steer clear of the whole Vietnam mess"; the gentleman in question had the misfortune to be a "can-do guy," however, and is now highly placed in Vietnam, under orders to solve the mess.

Despite the banishment of the experts, internal doubters and dissenters did indeed appear and persist. Yet as I watched the process, such men were effectively neutralized by a subtle dynamic: *the domestication of dissenters*. Such "domestication" arose out of a twofold clubbish need: on the one hand, the dissenter's desire to stay aboard; and on the other hand, the nondissenter's conscience. Simply stated, dissent, when recognized, was made to feel at home. On the lowest possible scale of importance, I must confess my own considerable sense of dignity and acceptance (both vital) when my senior White House employer would refer to me as his "favorite dove." Far more significant was the case of the former Undersecretary of State, George Ball. Once Mr. Ball began to express doubts, he was warmly institutionalized: he was encouraged to become the inhouse devil's advocate on Vietnam. The upshot was inevitable: the process of escalation allowed for periodic requests to Mr. Ball to speak his piece; Ball felt good, I assume (he had fought for righteousness); the others felt good (they had given a full hearing to the dovish option); and there was minimal unpleasantness. The club remained intact; and it is of course possible that matters would have gotten worse faster if Mr. Ball had kept silent, or left before his final departure in the fall of 1966. There was also, of course, the case of the last institutionalized doubter, Bill Moyers. The President is said to have greeted his arrival at meetings with an affectionate: "Well, here comes Mr. Stop-the-Bombing . . ." Here again the dynamics of domesticated dissent sustained the relationship for a while.

A related point—and crucial, I suppose, to government at all times—was *the "effectiveness" trap*, the trap that keeps men from speaking out, as clearly or often as they might, within the government. And it is the trap that keeps men from resigning in protest and airing their dissent outside the government. The most important asset that a man brings to bureaucratic life is his "effectiveness," a mysterious combination of training, style, and connections. The most ominous complaint that can be whispered of a bureaucrat is: "I'm afraid Charlie's beginning to lose his effectiveness." To preserve your effectiveness, you must decide where and when to fight the mainstream of policy; the opportunities range from pillow talk with your wife, to private drinks with your friends, to meetings with the Secretary of State or the President. The inclination to remain silent or to acquiesce in the presence of the great men—to live to fight another day, to give on this issue so that you can be "effective" on later issues—is overwhelming.

Nor is it the tendency of youth alone; some of our most senior officials, men of wealth and fame, whose place in history is secure, have remained silent lest their connection with power be terminated. As for the disinclination to resign in protest: while not necessarily a Washington or even American specialty, it seems more true of a government in which ministers have no parliamentary backbench to which to retreat. In the absence of such a refuge, it is easy to rationalize the decision to stay aboard. By doing so, one may be able to prevent a few bad things from happening and perhaps even make a few good things happen. To exit is to lose even those marginal chances for "effectiveness."

Another factor must be noted: as the Vietnam controversy escalated at home, there developed *a preoccupation with Vietnam public relations as opposed to Vietnam policy-making*. And here ironically, internal doubters and dissenters were heavily employed. For such men, by virtue of their own doubts, were often deemed best able to "massage" the doubting intelligentsia. My senior East Asia colleague at the White House, a brilliant and humane doubter who had dealt with Indochina since 1954, spent three quarters of his working days on Vietnam public relations: drafting presidential responses to letters from important critics, writing conciliatory language for presidential speeches, and meeting quite interminably with delegations of outraged Quakers, clergymen, academics, and housewives. His regular callers were the late A. J. Muste and Norman Thomas; mine were members of the Women's Strike for Peace. Our orders from above: keep them off the backs of busy policy-makers (who usually happened to be nondoubters). Incidentally, my most discouraging assignment in the realm of public relations was the preparation of a White House pamphlet entitled *Why Vietnam*, in September, 1965; in a gesture toward my conscience, I fought—and lost—a battle to have the title followed by a question mark.

Through a variety of procedures, both institutional and personal, doubt, dissent, and expertise were effectively neutralized in the making of policy. But what can be said of the men "in charge"? It is patently absurd to suggest that they produced such tragedy by intention and calculation. But it is neither absurd nor difficult to discern certain forces at work that caused decent and honorable men to do great harm.

Here I would stress the parament role of *executive fatigue*. No factor seems to me more crucial and underrated in the making of foreign policy. The physical and emotional toll of executive responsibility in State, the Pentagon, the White House, and other executive agencies is enormous; that toll is of course compounded by extended service. Many of today's Vietnam policy makers have been on the job for from four to seven years. Complaints may be few, and physical health may remain unimpaired, though emotional health is far harder to gauge. But what is most seriously eroded in the deadening process of fatigue is freshness of thought, imagination, a sense of possibility, a sense of priorities and perspective—those rare assets of a new Administration in its first year or two of office. The tired policy-maker becomes a prisoner of his own narrowed view of the world and his own clichéed rhetoric. He becomes irritable and defensive—short on sleep, short on family ties, short on patience. Such men make bad policy and then compound it. They have neither the time nor the temperament for new ideas or preventive diplomacy.

Below the level of the fatigued executives in the making of Vietnam policy was a widespread phenomenon: *the curator mentality* in the Department of State. By this I mean the collective inertia produced by the bureaucrat's view of his job. At State, the average "desk officer" inherits from his predecessor our policy toward Country X; he regards it as his function to keep that policy intact—under glass, untampered with, and dusted—so that he may pass it on in two to four years to his successor. And such curatorial service generally merits promotion within the system. (Maintain the status quo, and you will stay out of trouble.) In some circumstances, the inertia bred by such an outlook can act as a brake against rash innovation. But on many issues, this inertia sustains the momentum of bad policy and unwise commitments—momentum that might otherwise have been resisted within the ranks. Clearly, Vietnam is such an issue.

To fatigue and inertia must be added the factor of internal confusion. Even among the "architects" of our Vietnam commitment, there has been persistent *confusion as to what type of war we were fighting* and, as a direct consequence, *confusion as to how to end that war*. (The "credibility gap" is, in part, a reflection of such internal confusion.) Was it, for instance, a civil war, in which case counterinsurgency might suffice? Or was it a war of international aggression? (This might invoke SEATO or UN commitment.) Who was the aggressor—and the "real enemy"? The Viet Cong? Hanoi? Peking? Moscow? International Communism? Or maybe "Asian Communism"? Differing enemies dictated differing strategies and tactics. And confused throughout, in like fashion, was the question of American objectives; your objectives depended on whom you were fighting and why. I shall not forget my assignment from an Assistant Secretary of State in March, 1964: to draft a speech for Secretary McNamara which would, *inter alia*, once and for all dispose of the canard that the Vietnam conflict was a civil war. "But in some ways, of course," I mused, "it *is* a civil war." "Don't play word games with me!" snapped the Assistant Secretary.

Similiar confusion beset the concept of "negotiations"—anathema to much of official Washington from 1961 to 1965. Not until April, 1965, did "unconditional discussions" become respectable, via a presidential speech; even then the Secretary of State stressed privately to newsmen that nothing had changed, since "discussions" were by no means the same as "negotiations." Months later that issue was resolved. But it took even longer to obtain a fragile internal agreement that negotiations might include the Viet Cong as something other than an appendage to Hanoi's delegation. Given such confusion as to the whos and whys of our Vietnam commitment, it is not surprising, as Theodore Draper has written, that policy-makers find it so difficult to agree on how to end the war.

Of course, one force—a constant in the vortex of commitment—was that of *wishful thinking*. I partook of it myself at many times. I did so especially during Washington's struggle with Diem in the autumn of 1963 when some of us at State believed that for once, in dealing with a difficult client state, the U.S. government could use the leverage of our economic and military assistance to make good things happen, instead of being led around by the nose by men like Chiang Kai-shek and Syngman Rhee (and, in that particular instance, by Diem). If we could prove that point, I thought, and move into a new day, with or without Diem, then, Vietnam was well worth the effort. Later came the wishful thinking of the air-strike planners in the late autumn of 1964; there were those who actually thought that after six weeks of air strikes, the North Vietnamese would come crawling to us to ask for peace talks. And what, someone asked in one of the meetings of the time, if they don't? The answer was that we would bomb for another four weeks, and that would do the trick. And

a few weeks later came one instance of wishful thinking that was symptomatic of good men misled: in January, 1965, I encountered one of the very highest figures in the Administration at a dinner, drew him aside, and told him of my worries about the air-strike option. He told me that I really shouldn't worry; it was his conviction that before any such plans could be put into effect, a neutralist government would come to power in Saigon that would politely invite us out. And finally, there was the recurrent wishful thinking that sustained many of us through the trying months of 1965–1966 after the air strikes had begun: that surely, somehow, one way or another, we would "be in a conference in six months," and the escalatory spiral would be suspended. The basis of our hope: "It simply can't go on."

As a further influence on policy-makers I would cite the factor of *bureaucratic detachment*. By this I mean what at best might be termed the professional callousness of the surgeon (and indeed, medical lingo—the "surgical strike" for instance—seemed to crop up in the euphemisms of the times). In Washington the seminatics of the military muted the reality of war for the civilian policy-makers. In quiet, air-conditioned, thick-carpeted rooms, such terms as "systematic pressure," "armed reconnaissance," "targets of opportunity," and even "body count" seemed to breed a sort of games-theory detachment. Most memorable to me was a moment in the late 1964 target planning when the question under discussion was how heavy our bombing should be, and how extensive our strafing, at some midpoint in the projected pattern of systematic presssure. An Assistant Secretary of State resolved the point in the following words: "It seems to me that our orchestration should be mainly violins, but with periodic touches of brass." Perhaps the biggest shock of my return to Cambridge, Massachusetts, was the realization that the young men, the flesh and blood I taught and saw on these university streets, were potentially some of the numbers on the charts of those faraway planners. In a curious sense, Cambridge is closer to this war than Washington.

There is an unprovable factor that relates to bureaucratic detachment: the ingredient of *crytoracism*. I do not mean to imply any conscious contempt for Asian loss of life on the part of Washington officials. But I do mean to imply that bureaucratic detachment may well be compounded by a traditional Western sense that there are so many Asians, after all; that Asians have a fatalism about life and a disregard for its loss; that they are cruel and barbaric to their own people; and that they are very different from us (and all look alike?). And I *do* mean to imply that the upshot of such subliminal views is a subliminal question whether Asians, and particularly Asian peasants, and most particularly Asian Communists, are really people—like you and me. To put the matter another way: would we have pursued quite such policies—and quite such military tactics—if the Vietnamese were white?

It is impossible to write of Vietnam decision-making without writing about language. Throughout the conflict, words have been of paramount importance. I refer here to the impact of *rhetorical escalation* and to the *problem of oversell*. In an important sense, Vietnam has become of crucial significance to us *because we have said that it is of crucial significance*. (The issue obviously relates to the public relations preoccupation described earlier.)

The key here is domestic politics: the need to sell the American people, press, and Congress on support for an unpopular and costly war in which the objectives themselves have been in flux. To sell means to persuade, and to persuade means rhetoric. As the difficulties and costs have mounted, so has the definition of the stakes. This is not to say that rhetorical escalation is an orderly process; executive prose is the product of many writers, and some concepts—North Vietnamese infiltration, America's "national honor," Red China as the chief enemy—have entered the rhetoric only gradually and even sporadically. But there is an upward spiral nonetheless. And once you have *said* that the American Experiment itself stands or falls on the Vietnam outcome, you have thereby created a national stake far beyond any earlier stakes.

Crucial throughout the process of Vietnam decision-making was a conviction among many policy-makers: that Vietnam posed a *fundamental test of America's national will*. Time and again I was told by men reared in the tradition of Henry L. Stimson that all we needed was the will, and we would then prevail. Implicit in such a view, it seemed to me, was a curious assumption that Asians lacked will, or at least that in a contest between Asian and Anglo-Saxon wills, the non-Asians must prevail. A corollary to the persistent belief in will was a *fascination with power* and an awe in face of the power America possessed as no nation or civilization ever before. Those who doubted our role in Vietnam were said to shrink from the burdens of power, the obligations of power, the uses of power, the responsibility of power. By implication, such men were soft-headed and effete.

Finally, no discussion of the factors and forces at work on Vietnam policy-makers can ignore the central fact of *human ego investment*. Men who have participated in a decision develop a stake in that decision. As they participate in further, related decisions, their stake increases. It might have been possible to dissuade a man of strong self-confidence at an early stage of the ladder of decision; but it is infinitely harder at later stages since a change of mind there usually involves implicit or explicit repudiation of a chain of previous decisions.

To put it bluntly: at the heart of the Vietnam calamity is a group of able, dedicated men who have been regularly and repeatedly wrong—and whose standing with their contemporaries, and more important, with history, depends, as they see it, on being proven right. These are not men who can be asked to extricate themselves from error.

The various ingredients I have cited in the making of Vietnam policy have created a variety of results, most of them fairly obvious. Here are some that seem to me most central:

Throughout the conflict, there has been *persistent and repeated miscalculation* by virtually all the actors, in high echelons and low, whether dove, hawk, or something else. To cite one simple example among many: in late 1964 and early 1965, some peace-seeking planners at State who strongly opposed the projected bombing of the North urged that, instead, American ground forces be sent to South Vietnam; this would, they said, increase our bargaining leverage against the North—our "chips"—and would give us something to negotiate about (the withdrawal of our forces) at an early peace conference. Simultaneously, the air-strike option was urged by many in the military who were dead set against American participation in "another land war in Asia"; they were joined by other civilian peace-seekers who wanted to bomb Hanoi into early negotiations. By late 1965, we had ended up with the worst of all worlds: ineffective and costly air strikes against the North, spiraling ground forces in the South and no negotiations in sight.

Throughout the conflict as well, there has been *a steady give-in to pressures for a military solution* and only minimal and sporadic efforts at a diplomatic and political solution. In part this resulted from the confusion (earlier cited) among the civilians—confusion regarding objectives and strategy. And in part this resulted from the self-enlarging nature of military investment. Once air strikes and particularly ground forces were introduced, our investment itself had transformed the original stakes. More air power was needed to protect the ground forces; and then more ground forces to protect the ground forces. And needless to say, the military mind develops its own momentum in the absence of clear guidelines from the civilians. Once asked to save South Vietnam, rather than to "advise" it, the American military could not but press for escalation. In addition, sad to report, assorted military constituencies, once involved in Vietnam, have had a series of cases to prove: for instance, the utility not only of air power (the Air Force) but of supercarrier-based air power (the Navy). Also, Vietnam policy has suffered from one ironic byproduct of Secretary McNamara's establishment of civilian control at the Pentagon: in the face of such control, interservice rivalry has given way to a united front among the military—reflected in the new but recurrent phenomenon of JCS unanimity. In conjunction with traditional congressional allies (mostly Southern senators and representatives) such a united front would pose a formidable problem for any President.

Throughout the conflict, there have been *missed opportunities, large and small, to disengage ourselves from Vietnam on increasingly unpleasant but still acceptable terms*. Of the many moments from 1961 onward, I shall cite only one, the last and most important opportunity that was lost: in the summer of 1964 the President instructed his chief advisers to prepare for him as wide a range of Vietnam options as possible for postelection consideration and decision. He explicitly asked that all options be laid out. What happened next was, in effect, Lyndon Johnson's slow-motion Bay of Pigs. For the advisers so effectively converged on one single option—juxtaposed against two other, phony options (in effect, blowing up the world, or scuttle-and-run)—that the President was confronted with unanimity for bombing the North from all his trusted counselors. Had he been more confident in foreign affairs, had he been deeply informed on Vietnam and Southeast Asia, and had he raised some hard questions that unanimity had submerged, this President could have used the largest electoral mandate in history to de-escalate in Vietnam, in the clear expectation that at the worst a neutralist government would come to power in Saigon and politely invite us out. Today, many lives and dollars later, such an alternative has become an elusive and infinitely more expensive possibility.

In the course of these years, another result of Vietnam decision-making has been *the abuse and distortion of history*. Vietnamese, Southeast Asian, and Far Eastern history has been rewritten by our policy-makers, and their spokesmen, to conform with the alleged necessity of our presence in Vietnam. Highly dubious analogies from our experience elsewhere—the "Munich" sell-out and "containment" from Europe, the Malayan insurgency and the Korean War from Asia—have been imported in order to justify our actions. And more recent events have been fitted to the Procrustean bed of in Indonesia in 1965–1966 has been ascribed to our Vietnam presence; and virtually all progress in the Pacific region—the rise of regionalism, new forms of cooperation, and mounting growth rates—has been similarly explained. The Indonesian allegation is undoubtedly false (I tried to prove it, during six months of careful investigation at the White House, and had to confess failure); the regional allegation is patently unprovable in either direction (except, of course, for the clear fact that the economies of both Japan and Korea have profited enormously from our Vietnam-related procurement in these countries; but that is a costly and highly dubious form of foreign aid).

There is a final result of Vietnam policy I would cite that holds potential danger for the future of American foreign policy: *the rise of a new breed of American ideologues who see Vietnam as the ultimate test of their doctrine.* I have in mind those men in Washington who have given a new life to the missionary impulse in American foreign relations: who believe that this nation, in this era, has received a threefold endowment that can transform the world. As they see it, that endowment is composed of, first, our unsurpassed military might; second, our clear technological supremacy; and third, our allegedly invincible benevolence (our "altruism," our affluence, our lack of territorial aspirations). Together, it is argued, this threefold endowment provides us with the opportunity and the obligation to ease the nations of the earth toward modernization and stability: toward a full-fledged *Pax Americana Technocratica.* In reaching toward this goal, Vietnam is viewed as the last and crucial test. Once we have succeeded there, the road ahead is clear. In a sense, these men are our counterpart to the visionaries of Communism's radical left: they are technocracy's own Maoists. They do not govern Washington today. But their doctrine rides high.

Long before I went into government, I was told a story about Henry L. Stimson that seemed to me pertinent during the years that I watched the Vietnam tragedy unfold—and participated in that tragedy. It seems to me more pertinent than ever as we move toward the election of 1968.

In his waning years Stimson was asked by an anxious questioner, "Mr. Secretary, how on earth can we ever bring peace to the world?" Stimson is said to have answered: "You begin by bringing to Washington a small handful of able men who believe that the achievement of peace is possible.

"You work them to the bone until they no longer believe that it is possible.

"And then you throw them out—and bring in a new bunch who believe that it is possible."

AUTHORIZATION FOR MILITARY PROCUREMENT, 1969

The Senate resumed the consideration of the bill (S. 3293) to authorize appropriations during the fiscal year 1969 for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, and tracked combat vehicles, research, development, test, and evaluation for the Armed Forces, and to prescribe the authorized personnel strength of the Selected Reserve of each Reserve component of the Armed Forces, and for other purposes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator from Arkansas has expired.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, acting on behalf of both the majority and minority leaders, I yield 10 additional minutes under general debate to the distinguished Senator from Arkansas [Mr. FULBRIGHT], and ask that the time be charged equally to both sides.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I was particularly interested in having the attention of the distinguished Senator from Mississippi [Mr. STENNIS], the Senator in charge of the bill, because I want to make a brief statement and then refer to a few specific items.

By way of background, I raised this question of the control of research funds of the Department of Defense with the Director of the Budget one day in the Committee on Finance. I received a very unsatisfactory reply, more or less to the effect that the Bureau of the Budget did not examine the program of research which the Department of Defense engages in. The Director could not say anything about it.

I wish to make, first, a few brief remarks and then invite the attention of the Senator from Mississippi to a few examples and put a list of certain research projects into the RECORD.

Mr. President, in the report accompanying S. 3293, $659,400,000 is earmarked for military science research. If the Department of Defense follows past practices, almost $8,000,000 of this amount will be spent on research projects dealing with foreign policy, and $16,000,000 will be spent abroad in over 45 countries. I do not mean to imply that I am against Federal support for scientific studies. I have, however, serious reservations about the role assumed by the Department of Defense in areas which would seem to have little to do with military responsibilities.

The uproar over Project Camelot and its subsequent termination in August 1964, gave a clear indication of the political ramifications of such sponsorship. Recent criticisms by public officials in Japan and Sweden over American military contracts with academic institutions in those countries suggest that it might be wiser for agencies other than the Department of Defense to sponsor such programs, if, indeed, they are really needed and are justified at all.

But, assuming they are justified—which I do not grant—they should not be under the sponsorship of a military department, especially in a foreign university. That is the point I wish to make. That has been the complaint received from the countries I have mentioned.

Mr. President, I would like to ask the distinguished Senator from Mississippi whether he is aware of the nature of some of this research. One study which cost $78,000 was concerned with "Social Process Underlying Military Planning for Stability in Africa." Another, costing $285,000 is on "Himalayan Border Studies." These studies are carried out by university-affiliated organizations, industrial firms, and a few organizations such as the Hudson Institute which has an enormous number of them, apparently set up specifically for the purpose of receiving money from the Department of Defense to conduct some of these so-called research projects.

Does the Senator from Mississippi know that one such study recommends that large numbers of American troops be stationed abroad for the next decade?

That is the so-called Pax Americana study about which I have been carrying on lengthy correspondence with the Department of Defense. I have been seeking to get an official copy of the unclassified version from them. A curious thing about this study is that it has been released unofficially by the contractor and declassified. But when I asked for it from the Department of Defense with their imprimatur, they say it is classified.

I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD a letter I addressed to Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford on April 8, 1968, to which I have not yet received an answer.

There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

APRIL 8, 1968.

Hon. CLARK CLIFFORD,
Secretary of Defense,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Last October 13, at the request of a member of the Senate, I asked Secretary McNamara for a copy of a study entitled *"Pax Americana"* prepared under contract with the Department of Defense.

On October 26, 1967, a copy of that study, classified secret, was sent to me by Mr. Stempler. His letter noted that the study was prepared by Douglas Aircraft Company for the Department of the Army and that its title had been changed to "Strategic Alignments and Military Objectives."

On November 8, 1967, I wrote to Mr. Stempler asking for additional information about the study and for the Defense Department's views as to the desirability of having it declassified.

On November 18, Assistant Secretary Warnke wrote me stating that the Department of Defense believes "the report should remain classified. Though much of the material in the report was derived from unclassified sources, the study should be classified due to the foreign policy sensitivity of the material when attribution is made to the U.S. Army."

On November 29, 1967, I wrote to Mr. Warnke and asked that consideration be given again to the desirability of declassifying the study and suggesting some means of avoiding attribution to the U.S. Army. I also noted that declassification would be consistent with the terms of P.L. 90–23, which prohibits the withholding of government information from the public and also consistent with recent Department of Defense policy not to sponsor classified research with universities.

On December 14, 1967, Mr. Warnke expressed again the Department of Defense position that "the study should remain classified secret," noting that the decision was in accord with P. L. 90–23 and Executive Orders issued thereunder.

I was content to let the subject rest at that point, I wrote to the interested Senator stating that a secret copy of the study was available for his use in the Committee offices, but that I had been unsuccessful in my efforts to have the Department of Defense declassify it.

Much to my surprise I discovered some months later that during the entire time the Department of Defense and I had been corresponding about the declassification of the study, there was in existence an unclassified version, complete in all details except for a new cover and a new title—"Projected World Patterns—1985." A number of copies of this unclassified version have been circulated outside the Department of Defense.

In early March, therefore, I asked the staff of the Committee, discreetly and with no fanfare, to obtain from the Department of Defense a copy of the declassified version of the original "Pax Americana" study. A copy was promised on March 5 and again on March 11. It still has not be received.

I have gone to length in recounting this situation because I believe you will agree that at best this is a classic example of confusion; at worst, it constitutes a deliberate attempt to apply classification standards to a congressional committee which the Department of Defense was not willing to apply even to the public.

Under these circumstances, I now formally

request that a copy of the unclassified version of this study be made available to the Committee immediately. I also ask that I be given in writing a full account of the preparation of the study, the use to which the study has been put, and a full explanation of why the Department of Defense refused to declassify the study at the request of this Committee while copies with the SECRET label removed were circulating among non-governmental persons.

Sincerely yours,

J. W. FULBRIGHT,
Chairman.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. It is a most curious situation. I think the Department of Defense evidences a certain degree of embarrassment in its reluctance to make public a study under its own sponsorship called Pax Americana. One thing they do not like, I take it, is the name.

The Senator from Mississippi has many things to look after. I cannot believe that he is aware of all of these research projects. It would be a monumental undertaking to read them. I doubt seriously that anyone reads all of them. They may read some of them. I doubt seriously that anybody could, and certainly I would not expect the Senator from Mississippi to, read them all. I am not suggesting that he, with his responsibilities, should read them. What I am trying to do is bring to his attention what I think has become a proliferating practice of dispensing money to innumerable institutions primarily, I think, to gain support of a different kind, not purely in the military field, but support from the institutions as such for the overall policies of the Government.

These are clearly matters which should concern officials outside the Department of Defense, but such recommendations made under military sponsorship help to place representatives of the armed services in a role more suitable for others.

Mr. President, I wish to insert in the RECORD at this point statistics on foreign research carried out by the Department of Defense in 1966 and 1968; research projects on foreign policy matters financed by the Department of Defense during fiscal year 1967; and a list of social science studies on foreign affairs sponsored by the Department of Defense during fiscal years 1965 and 1967. I think an examination of some of these topics would be most useful and revealing to those responsible for approving the research and development budget of the Department of Defense.

There being no objection, the statistics were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

OBLIGATIONS FOR FOREIGN RESEARCH—DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FISCAL YEARS 1966-68

[In thousands of dollars]

Agency	Fiscal year 1966	Fiscal year 1967	Fiscal year 1968
Army	2,939	2,450	2,454
Navy	1,239	1,895	[1] 7,323
Air Force	5,534	4,934	[1] 5,914
ARPA	1,374	853	860
DASA	250	17	
Department of Defense	11,336	10,149	16,551

[1] These include $7,600,000 of excess foreign currency authorization (Public Law 480) included in fiscal year 1968 budget request.

DEFENSE RESEARCH PERFORMED IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES (CONTRACTS AND GRANTS)

Country	Funds	Number of units
Argentina	177,000	14
Australia	445,000	19
Austria	372,000	30
Barbados	22,000	1
Belgium	364,000	21
Bermuda	5,000	2
Bolivia	177,000	2
Brazil	277,000	19
Chile	191,000	13
Canada	2,685,000	91
Colombia	13,000	2
Congo	26,000	1
Denmark	120,000	12
Ecuador	21,000	1
Ireland	158,000	18
Ethiopia	10,000	1
Finland	13,000	1
France	830,000	29
Ghana	4,000	1
Greece	18,000	4
Guatemala	50,000	1
Germany	1,148,000	68
India	15,000	1
Israel	1,154,000	58
Italy	872,000	72
Lebanon	4,000	1
Japan	436,000	57
Kenya	11,000	1
Malaya	136,000	1
Mexico	13,000	3
Holland	252,000	15
Norway	459,000	19
New Zealand	66,000	5
Peru	339,000	15
Philippines	40,000	3
Puerto Rico	553,000	8
Canal Zone	49,000	1
Spain	88,000	8
Sweden	672,000	40
Switzerland	158,000	14
Thailand	98,000	6
Taiwan	42,000	5
Union of South Africa	187,000	3
Uganda	(1)	1
United Kingdom	2,800,000	199
Uruguay	88,000	8
Venezuela	134,000	8
Total	15,801,000	903

[1] No funding information available.

Research projects on foreign policy matters financed by the Department of Defense, fiscal year 1967 funding

ARMY

[In thousands of dollars]

American Institutes of Research: Research on relationships between U.S. troops and indigenous populations in developing countries — 200

H. R. B. Singer Co.: Research on the social science aspects of American military commanders' control of goods brought into a developing country — 70

Rowland & Co., Inc.: Preparation of a case book on the Republic of Korea's reserve divisions' civic action program — 70

George Washington University, Human Resources Research Office (HumRRO): The Language and Area Training Division of HumRRO, approximately 14 percent of the total HumRRO program — 500

American University, Center for Research in Social Systems (CRESS):

Work Unit I, preparation of U.S. military personnel for assignments in developing nations: Impact of counterinsurgency advisory activities on the career orientation of Army officers — 58

Work Unit II, overseas military posts and policies; their influences on military operations: Mechanisms for improving relations between Americans and local nationals overseas — 47

Research projects on foreign policy matters financed by the Department of Defense, fiscal year 1967 funding—Continued

American University, etc.—Continued

[In thousands of dollars]

Work Unit III, U.S. Defense operations in military assistance civic action, and psychological operations; social factors relevant to military civic action doctrine: Intercultural communications, characteristics of Communist societies relevant to U.S. military interest — 417

Work Unit IV, indigenous military forces of developing nations; changing roles of the military in the contemporary world — 105

Work Unit V, Methodologies for defense research on foreign cultures. Development of analytic models of social process, techniques for use of experts in foreign area information — 177

Work Unit VI, U.S. defense operations in unconventional welfare and counterinsurgency, internal security, strategic and tactical factors underlying military counterinsurgency operations, nonmilitary effects of physical force by counterinsurgency military units in phase I low-intensity warfare, the operational code of the Communists in Vietnam. World patterns of civil violence — 284

Work Unit VII, Social processes underlying military planning for stability, African groups relevant to U.S. military decisionmaking — 78

Work Unit VIII, Cultural Information Analysis Center — 750

Total (figures do not add up to equal total due to rounding) — 1,915

NAVY

Mental Research Institute (Weakland): Content Analysis of Communist Chinese mass communications — 21

Western Behavioral Science Institute (Raser): Simulated politico-military decisionmaking — 32

San Francisco State College (Terrien): Changing size of military organizations — 1

Stanford University (North): Threat perception in inter-nation conflict — 26

Duke University (Back): Group structure, communication, and stress — 1

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (Lerner): Power and deterrence — 3

Matrix Corp. (Campbell): Marine pacification training — 30

AIR FORCE

University of Denver (Drabek): Theory and method in the study of organizational stress — 22

Ohio State University (Haas): Simulation of organizational behavior under crisis or disaster stress — 47

Systems Development Corp. (Rome): Executive decisionmaking under stress and crisis — 48

Washington State University (Day): Supervision style and productivity — 6

Cornell University (Williams): Experimental study of development of consensus — 20

Stanford Research Institute (Vollmer): Criteria for the design of new forms of organization — 45

Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society, Inc. (Little): Social research and military management — 40

Bureau of Social Science Research (Biderman): Aerospace power and behavioral knowledge — 99

Research projects on foreign policy matters financed by the Department of Defense, fiscal year 1967 funding—Continued

AIR FORCE—continued

Harvard University (Inkeles): Measuring social change in developing nations ---- 33
University of Maryland (McGinnies): Comparative study of normative behavior: Japanese and American youth ---- 34
Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society, Inc. (Perlmutter): Political functions of military elites: North Africa and Near East ---- 40
Hebrew University, Israel (Eisenstadt): Comparative studies in modernization and effects on military planning ---- 49
Harvard University (Lindbeck): Military implications of change in Communist China ---- 106

DEFENSE AGENCIES/ADVANCED RESEARCH PROJECTS AGENCY

System Development Corp. (Shure): On-line studies of bargaining behavior ---- 256
Educational Testing Services (Kogan): Risk-taking and negotiation ---- 36
MIT (Frey): Comparative research on behavioral change ---- 800
University of California (Rose and and Hitchcock): Himalayan border studies ---- 285
Princeton University (Gurr): Genesis of civil violence ---- 39
American University of Beirut (Yorkey): Language research, Lebanon ---- 50
U.S. Army Behavioral Sciences Research Laboratory (Helme): Qualification testing, Iran ---- 100
Association for Administrative Research (Nguyen Van Bong): Vietnamese vocabulary ---- 53
General Research Corp. (Bavelas): Evaluation of group interview technique ---- 75
George Washington University, Human Relations Research Office (Armilla): Advisor-advisee study, Thailand ---- 55
Human Sciences Research Inc. (Alberts): Population movements as factor in insurgency ---- 260
Human Sciences Research Inc. (Alberts): Rural value systems, RVN ---- 164
Pan American Health Organization (Ruderman): Measuring the impact of health activities on communities ---- 30
RAND Corp. (Schubert): Problem analysis ---- 760
RAND Corp. (Goure): Vietcong motivation and morale ---- 754
Simulmatics Corp. (Pool): Chieu Hoi study ---- 18
Simulmatics Corp. (Pool): Problem analysis, RVN ---- 320
Simulmatics Corp. (Worchel): South Vietnamese Regional and Popular Force units ---- 349

SOCIAL SCIENCE STUDIES ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS SPONSORED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DURING FISCAL YEARS 1965–67

Social Processes Underlying Military Planning for Stability, Center for Research in Social Systems: FY 66: $36,000. FY 67: $63,000.

U.S. Defense Operations in Military Assistance, Civic Action, and Psychological Operations, Center for Research in Social Systems: FY 66: $454,000. FY 67: $332,000.

Roles of Military Establishments in Developing Nations (Role), Center for Research in Social Systems: Role I (FY 65): $3,000. Role V (FY 65): $3,000. Role VI (FY 65): $3,000. Role VII (FY 65): $33,000. Role VII (FY 65): $17,000. (Title changed to "Changing Roles of the Military in the Contemporary World") FY 66: $176,000. FY 67: $124,559.

Indigenous Military Forces of Developing Nations Center for Research in Social Systems: FY 66: $157,000. FY 67: $124,000.

Study of Military Resistance to Communist Underground Movements (Underground), Center for Research in Social Systems: FY 65: $71,000. FY 66: $58,000.

U.S. Defense Operations in Unconventional Warfare and Counterinsurgency, Center for Research in Social Systems: FY 66: $245,000. FY 67: $228,000.

Comparative Analyses of Some Strategic Factors in Counterinsurgency Operations (Numismatics), Center for Research in Social Systems: FY 65: $67,000. FY 66: $80,000.

Country Operations Information Requirements (Require), Special Operations Research Office: FY 65: $49,000.

Camelot (Feasibility Study of Internal War Potential), Special Operations Research Office: FY 65: Terminated.

Internal (Revolutionary) Wars as Instruments and Processes of Socio-Political Change (Revolt), Special Operations Research Office: Revolt II (FY 65): $17,000. Revolt VI (FY 65): $17,000. Revolt VII (FY 65): $33,000.

Great World Issues of 1980, Associates for International Research, Incorporated: FY 66: $49,782.

Africa and U.S. National Security, Atlantic Research Corporation: FY 67: $2,493.

Soviet Military Aid as a Reflection of Soviet Objectives 1956–1967, Atlantic Research Corporation: FY 68: $19,995.

United States-Communist Chinese Politico-Military Interactions, Bendix Corporation: FY 67: $92,124.

Nature of Sublimited War, Bendix Corporation: FY 66: $89,300.

Implication of Comparative National Development for Military Planning, University of California, Berkeley: FY 66: $95,972.

The Politics of Modernization—Implications for Military Planning, University of California, Berkeley: FY 66: $98,191.

The Future of Deterrence in U.S. Strategy, University of California, Los Angeles: FY 67: $74,665.

Political Development and Modernization in Islamic Countries—Military Planning, University of Chicago: FY 64: $64,140.

Military Implications of Change—Communist China, Harvard University: FY 67: $104,282.

Strategic Analysis of Extra-legal Internal Political Conflict, Harvard University: FY 67: $97,947.

National Strategic Concepts and the Changing Nature of Modern War, Historical Evaluation and Research Organization: FY 67: $7,208.

Analysis of the Strategic Environment, Hudson Institute: FY 66: $90,000.

War Termination Conditions and Techniques, Hudson Institute: FY 67: $83,521.

Alternative Political and Strategic Environments for Air Force Systems in the Period 1975–1985, Hudson Institute: FY 68: $99,526.

Strategic Factors Affecting the Threat or Use of Force, Hudson Institute: FY 66: $222,000, FY 67: $222,000.

Future Role of Military Alliances, Johns Hopkins University: FY 66: $71,207.

Precepts of Power and Deterrence, Massachusetts Institute of Technology: FY 66: $37,500.

Porter-International Self-Help Study, Porter-International Company: FY 66: $252,949.

An Analytic Study of U.S. National Security Issues for Educational and Research Purposes, Hudson Institute: FY 68: $130,000.

Social Bases of Stable Political Systems, Princeton University: FY 66: $232,300.

Strategic Implications of the Use of Bacteriological and Chemical Warfare, Research Analysis Corporation: FY 65: $68,400.

Employment of Military Units in Show-Of-Force Operations, Research Analysis Corporation: FY 65: $35,000 FY 66: $38,000.

Assistance Programs and Military Effectiveness, Research Analysis Corporation: FY 66: $154,000.

Strategic Analysis of Internal Conflicts, Research Analysis Corporation: FY 66, $77,000.

Interdisciplinary Study of Social Change, Rice University: FY 67: $440,000.

Problems Posed by Conflicting Views Concerning Nuclear Weapons, Stanford Research Institute: FY 66: $10,359.

Briefing on Interaction between U.S. and USSR Military Postures Programs and Strategies and the Use of such Interaction to Mold Soviet Military Behavior, Stanford Research Institute: FY 67: $3,751.

Internation Conflict, Stanford University: FY 65: $75,958.

Problems of U.S. Defense Policy in a World of Nuclear Proliferation, Bendix Corporaton: FY 65: $89,994.

1980 and the Balance of Power in the Pacific, Johns Hopkins University: FY 66: $71,785.

Projected International Patterns, General Electric (TEMPO): FY 66: $172,425.

Long Range Planning Through a Systematic Approach to Area Military Studies, Stanford Research Institute: FY 67: $93,800.

Stability as a Goal of National Strategic Planning, Peppedine Research Institute: FY 67: $77,858.

U.S. Strategic Alternatives and Access Problems, Westinghouse Electric Corporation: FY 67: $184,519.

Strategic Analyses Studies, Research Analysis Corporation: FY 65: $1,000,000. FY 66: $599,135. FY 67: $976.204.

"Strategic Analysis of Communist China".
"Strategic Analysis of Southeast Asia".
"Strategic Analysis of Latin America".
"Strategic Analysis of Near East and South Asia".
"Strategic Analysis of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe".
"Strategic Analysis of North Africa".
"Strategic Analysis of Sub-Saharan Africa".
"Strategic Analysis of Western Europe".
"Military Assistance Concepts".

Long Range Environmental Studies, Douglas Aircraft Corporation; Booz-Allen Applied Research, Incorporated; A. D. Little Associates; Battelle Memorial Institute: FY 67: $414,100.

Project RAND Studies, RAND Corporation: FY 66: $865,000. FY 67: $956,000.

"Sino-Soviet Economic Potential."
"Soviet Foreign and Military Policy."
"Soviet Foreign Policy Toward Latin America."
"Strategy and Tactics of Chinese Foreign and Military Policy."
"Political Context of Japanese Rearmament."
"Role of the Military in Indonesia."
"British Military Policy."
"The Future of NATO."
"Strategic Concepts and Doctrines."
"Use of Force in Underdeveloped Areas."

RAND Work for International Security Affairs, RAND Corporation: FY 66: $1,200,000. FY 67: $1,200,000.

"Viet Cong Motivation and Morale."
"Security Problems of Asia and the Pacific."
"Economic and Military Assistance Problems and Programs."
"Force Posture Implications of Alternative Pacific Policies."
"Insurgent Forces Study."
"U.S. Military Assistance to India and Pakistan."
"Special NATO Study."
"NATO's Southeast Flank."
"Security Policy Studies of NATO and Europe."
"Security Policy Studies of Latin America."
"Nuclear Proliferation."
"Military Problems in Thailand and Laos."
"Support Systems for Guerrilla and Limited Warfare."
"Studies of Cuba."
"NATO Military Policy."

"Communism in Italy and France."

"Economic Problems of Trade and Develpment."

"Politics and Economic Growth in India."

"The Quemoy Crisis."

"French Policy Toward the Algerian Revolution."

"NATO's Northern Flank."

Institute for Defense Analyses Work for International Security Affairs, Institute for Defense Analyses: FY 66: $400,000. FY 67: $400,000.

"Mandarin" (Communist China).

"Carpathia" (Eastern Europe).

Problems for U.S. Political-Military Policy in the Next Decade in (1) European Defense and (2) Nuclear Proliferation, Hudson Institute: FY 65: $247,427.

Symposium on Nuclear China: Trends and Prospects, U.S. Navy Ordnance Test Station, China Lake, California: FY 65: $15,000.

Symposium on International Peacekeeping, Brookings Institute: FY 66: $10,000.

Project Diffusion, Browne and Shaw Research Corporation: FY 66: $64,429.

Proliferation Study—Middle East, Harvard University: FY 66: $32,408.

Project Detect, Bendix Corporation: FY 66: $169,892.

The United States and the Western Europe of the 1970's, Ohio State University: FY 66: $17,250.

International Control Commission in Southeast Asia and Implications for Arms Control and Disarmament, Mrs. Anita Lauve Nutt: FY 64: $16,800.

Strengthening International Peacekeeping, Browne and Shaw Research Corporation: FY 67: $85,569.

Role of Communist Chinese External Trade as an Instrument for Acquiring Foreign Technology, Browne and Shaw Research Corporation: FY 67; $52,417.

Project Diffusion Follow-on, Browne and Shaw Research Corporation: FY 67: $37,036.

Project Upgrade, Bendix Corporation: FY 68: $177,000.

Strengthening International Peacekeeping, Hudson Institute: FY 68: $35,000.

Greater Stability and Tranquility Among the Old Nations, Hudson Institute: FY 68: $10,000.

Rainbow Scenarios, Bendix Corporation; Technical Operations Incorporated; Hudson Institute: FY 66: $55,000. FY 67: $175,404.

Japanese Seminar, Hudson Institute: FY 66: $28,686.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I call the attention of the junior Senator from Mississippi to pages 512 and 513 of the hearings on the pending bill, S. 3293. On those pages, Dr. John Foster describes the work of the Institute for Defense Analyses. That institute is to receive roughly $11 million for 1969.

During the February 1968 hearings of the Committee on Foreign Relations on the Gulf of Tonkin incidents of 1964, the committee asked the Department of Defense to make available to it a "Command and Control Study" which the Institute of Defense Analyses had done for the Department of Defense. That study was apparently a complete and careful review of the Tonkin incident. The Secretary of Defense flatly refused to make the study available. Although, I may say, the chairman of the Armed Services Committee, in my presence, had told the then Acting Secretary of Defense, Mr. Nitze, that he should make available all relevant documents, in this instance they refused to make it available.

The Secretary of Defense in refusing this study done by the Institute of Defense Analyses, said it was done on the basis of inadequate information. He said he had not read it. He said that General Wheeler had not read it fully. He said that it was an internal paper of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I refer to pages 76 and 77 of the Tonkin hearings, in which this exchange took place.

I ask the junior Senator from Mississippi is it not true that the president of the Institute for Defense Analyses is Gen. Maxwell Taylor?

Mr. STENNIS. The Senator is correct.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I read into the RECORD members of the IDA Board of Trustees—page 513—and note that this is a very distinguished group.

I will mention here only Mr. William Burden, chairman, public trustee; Mr. Robert Baker, public trustee; Mr. Alfred Gruenther, public trustee; Mr. Grayson Kirk, of Columbia University; Mr. Garrison Norton, public trustee; Mr. Robert Goheen, of Princeton University; Mr. Charles Spofford, public trustee; Mr. Herbert York, public trustee.

These names are included in the hearings with the rest of them.

Could the Senator from Mississippi tell me whether this board of trustees has access to the Tonkin command and control study which was denied to the Committee on Foreign Relations? Does he know that?

Mr. STENNIS. Frankly, I do not know that.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I yield 10 minutes to the Senator from Arkansas under the same conditions as before.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Could the Senator from Mississippi tell me whether all of the studies of the Institute for Defense Analyses are available to members of the board of trustees such as Robert Goheen, president of Princeton University, or President Grayson Kirk, of Columbia University?

Mr. STENNIS. No; I am not advised on that. I just do not know.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I am not too surprised. As I say, I am certainly not directing this as a personal criticism of the Senator from Mississippi and implying that he should know all these things.

Mr. STENNIS. I understand. The Senator is making his record on it.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. The point I wish to make, Mr. President, is that public funds are spent for research purposes, but that the results of that research are not made available to the public unless such results seem to serve the purpose of those administering the programs. Furthermore, the practice of the administration in associating distinguished individuals with projects under which they cannot exercise reasonable control means that their names are being used for propaganda purposes, which I have outlined.

The board of trustees I have mentioned is composed of some of the most distinguished people in the country. While I have not asked them—I think it would not be entirely proper for me to go about asking them—I am almost certain that they have not read or heard of the study mentioned, which was paid for with public moneys, and which the Defense Department refused to make available to the Foreign Relations Committee, even though the chairman of the Armed Services Committee had told Mr. Nitze, in my presence, that all relevant documents should be made available to the committee.

Certainly, the study by the IDA—Institute of Defense Analyses—on the Tonkin incidents is relevant to our review of the Tonkin incidents. This is the reason, I may say to the Senator from Mississippi, why I raised this point. I think it is outrageous that this very large amount of money is being spent in all sorts of places, and then the results of the studies are denied if they do not suit their purposes. This is not research at all. This is spending enormous amounts of money to gather information to support administrative theory, and if the study does not support their preconceived notions of what our foreign policy should be, the study is buried and hidden from the relevant committee.

I assume the Senator does not approve of this kind of practice, assuming that what I have said is accurate.

Mr. STENNIS. The Senator is correct. I do not approve of it.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I have asked that this information be placed in the RECORD, but I want to call the attention of the Senator to some of these items. There are a number of pages. There are such studies as "Great World Issues of 1980." That is a very broad subject. The contract goes to the Associates for International Research, Inc. For fiscal year 1966 $49,782 was spent.

This is a very interesting one: "Nature of Sublimated War," $89,300.

I am not going to read all of them. They continue. The Hudson Institute is a very special pet. I believe Herman Kahn is the leader or director of it, one of the men who believe that one of the solutions for all our ills is nuclear warfare, if I understand some of the statements attributed to him. He is considered an expert in the use of nuclear war. I think he was the one who defined the difference between tactical nuclear weapons and strategic nuclear weapons, a difference which I have not been able to understand.

The Hudson Institute gets—I shall not read them all—$83,000 for one, $99,000 for another, $222,000 for another, and so on.

The Porter International Self-Help Studies—self-help is a very admirable thing, is it not? It can be applicable almost anywhere. Porter International is given $250,000 to make a study on the social bases of stable political systems. That is an interesting one, for Princeton. The fact that Princeton's President Goheen is a consultant, I am sure, is utterly irrelevant; but this is an interesting item: Princeton University, $232,000, for a study called Social Bases of Stable has to making war, to the military department of this Government. I must confess that it looks very far fetched Political Systems.

I really wonder what relevance that for the Defense Department to be studying "social bases." This may very well be a proper study for the New School

of Social Research, but I really do not think it is proper for the Department of Defense.

Here is another one to which I direct the Senator's attention: "Interdisciplinary Study of Social Change."

Does it strike the Senator, offhand, that the interdisciplinary study of social change should be a responsibility of the Defense Department?

Mr. STENNIS. Well, I think not.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. For that study, the Department would pay $440,000 out of these funds we are talking about here.

There are many others very much like it. Rand, of course, is another one with enormous amounts. The Rand Corp., in 1966, received $865,000 in one group, $956,000 in another, $1,200,000 in another, and so on—all very large amounts.

Here is one that I think surely some historian must already have studied: "The French Policy Toward the Algerian Revolution."

Honestly, I do not think that is particularly appropriate to the present problems of the Department of Defense. I wish they understood the Algerian revolution better. I wish the State Department did. But that is beside the point. I do not see why the Defense Department should pay the kind of money it proposes on that kind of subject.

There is one here: "Economic Problems of Trade and Development," which is a perfectly legitimate subject, but what has it got to do with the Defense Department, and why are the Joint Chiefs engaging their interests in trade policies, in the economic problems and trade and development?

Here is another one: "Politics and Economic Growth in India." Why would the Defense Department be conducting a study on politics and economic growth in India? And so on. These are very large amounts.

I notice a rather small one which is interesting: they had a little symposium on international peacekeeping. If we are going to have international peacekeeping, should it be the function of the Department of Defense or that of Mr. Foster's Agency—the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency? Following our consideration of this bill, we will have before us one of $17 million for the Disarmament Agency. They have a similar group of studies.

I might state to the Senator that the Committee on Foreign Relations, of which I have the honor to be a member, looked at some of these items and cut what was called external research. We cut it; I am sure there will be a big play to restore it all, but we cut almost 30 percent from what the House of Representatives had allowed them. The House had also cut it somewhat.

I really think there is a momentum developing in these research projects; the universities are hard up for money, and because the Defense Department has so much money, provided in just such bills as we have here, the Pentagon feels it is doing a public service just to find an excuse to give a little money to a university.

Of course, I am for universities, and like to give a lot of money to universities; but I feel this is a very unwise way to do it, and results in a lot of lost motion and a lot of projects which have no particular significance.

The reason I am making this presentation, as I say, is not to criticize the Senator from Mississippi, but only to suggest that his committee take a much closer look at this program, because I think there is room for saving millions of dollars on these research projects, and in addition to that, saving us from embarrassment, such as resulted in Sweden, where they complained about our trying to subvert their university by giving these big grants for research projects—the same sort of attack that developed as to Camelot, as the Senator remembers, in South America.

Therefore, I think it has an adverse political effect to pursue such policies, and I hope that the Senator will look into these matters.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I want first to say to the Senator from Arkansas that I think he has rendered a real public service, and especially a service to the Senate, by bringing in a detailed analysis of these items, as he has done in his presentation of the facts.

As to the figures the Senator mentions, we did not make a detailed analysis and evaluation of these reports and studies item by item. Frankly, I am not familiar with them except in a general way. About Camelot, and I think one other the Senator mentioned, I did know something.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Pax Americana?

Mr. STENNIS. Yes, that was it. On this general subject matter, we took these research figures—even though we had complete testimony on the program, we had the boards of trustees listed, and I think the Senator from Missouri was the one who did some questioning on the subject—but we took the total request and wrestled with the idea of what items, if any, could be specifically reduced.

We handled it as a more or less across-the-board figure, in the final analysis, a percentage reduction, which amounts to $240 million. But based on the information we did have, we thought much of the reduction should be applied to these behavioral and social sciences. We had a heading on that very subject; and some of the items the Senator has mentioned come under that category. Those were the ones that we intended to put up front for consideration of reductions or elimination. We had a subject matter presentation.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, acting on behalf of both leaders, I yield 5 additional minutes under general debate, and ask that it be equally divided.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. STENNIS. I thank the Senator. So in a general way, we recommended a very careful examination of all these projects, and that the application of this reduction, if it is sustained, be applied rather liberally in this field.

As to the behavioral and social sciences, frankly, I am unable to speak more definitely than that. I do call attention, however, to the fact that for all the items in that category, the total amount involved is $14 million. We have recommended a reduction of $240 million for the whole area of research and development. So there is plenty of room there to move in on these projects the Senator has outlined. I think they will have to be scrutinized.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. The committee does not require that reductions be allocated to these particular items?

Mr. STENNIS. No, we do not require it.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I would recommend that further scrutiny be given to these items. I really think the matter has got out of hand. I notice here two different studies—one of them in the amount of $754,000—on Vietcong motivation and morale.

I know that it is a matter of great mystery as to why the Vietcong fight so well, but I really do not think we ought to spend $754,000 to find out. I think we could find out without spending anything. But there are two different studies on that subject.

By the way, here is one I overlooked a moment ago: "Himalayan Border Studies."

I have a letter in my files from a professor in California who is a distinguished scholar in this field of the Himalayas, and he did not know, when he accepted this particular assignment, that it was being paid for by the military.

When he found it out, he resigned. He wrote me a letter about how he thought the injection of the Defense Department into this area of study was prejudicing the carrying on of what, to him, were important studies, but he would not do so under the auspices of the Defense Department. He thought such intrusion would prevent the carrying on of legitimate, scholarly studies in this field.

I think that something could be done. As I have already stated, the Budget Bureau does not undertake to look at this program. Now if we ask for $100,000 for rice research, or $50,000 for the study of a project on the White River—which I did recently—the Budget Bureau goes over that with a fine-tooth comb and assigns two or three people to look at it and, so often, they turn it down. However, when we have this kind of Defense Department research, a project involving several hundreds of millions of dollars, they do not have the time to look at it. And, as far as I know, no one looks at it with the exception of Dr. Foster, who is in charge of distributing the money.

I hope that a way can be found by which to bring this matter under control, not only for the sake of economy but also for the sake of our foreign relations.

Mr. STENNIS. The House Appropriations Committee has made some reductions in appropriations for studies and analyses. The Senator may wish to give us further suggestions.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. If that is true, I can guarantee that a lot of them will not be accomplished at all, if they are public funds.

Mr. STENNIS. The House Appropriations Committee every year makes some effort in this field. And I think last year they specifically reduced quite a few of them. I expect to call to their attention the Senator's speech of today.

On this subject matter, as a whole, I largely agree with the philosophy of the Senator, although there may be additional facts that would explain why some of these reports may be considered useful.

Mr. HART. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield.

Mr. HART. Mr. President, I advise the Senator from Arkansas, whom I have listened to with delight, as usual, that as soon as the opportunity presents itself, I am going to offer an amendment that will have the effect of reducing research and development authorization back to this year's level.

I cannot guarantee that it will eliminate all of the new squadron leader's manuals that the Senator was talking about, but it will have a constructive effect. It is about the only thing that Congress can do. To do less would be a mistake.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Does the Senator mean that the pending bill carries an increase in this area for behavioral and social sciences?

Mr. HART. No. I mean for research and development, which includes some of these esoteric pursuits.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Is there any way to be more specific? Could the Senator from Mississippi, as agreeable as he is, cut this down, and, in conference, have some staff member take a look at these items and begin to make progress on their control?

I would like to see study on the research matter that I have mentioned go further than an amendment. I would like to see if we could not begin to get this matter under control. I think it has a very negative and bad effect. Not only does it not produce anything of value, but it is also affirmatively bad to go around messing in a foreign university and studying the civilian life of foreigners and what motivates them and so on, and especially under the auspices of the Defense Department.

It gives the impression that our country has become 100 percent militaristic, which I know is not so. I do not want it to become so, and nobody else here wants that to happen, either. However, it is a very bad foreign relations gesture to allow it to continue.

Perhaps the Senator will consider some move here that will force this subject into conference so that a study can be made of it.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, to get at the Senator's problem, that would be far more than an across-the-board reduction, as proposed by the Senator from Michigan.

Mr. President, for legislative history, I refer now to the tabulation set forth on page 506 of the Senate committee hearings wherein Dr. Foster set forth a tabulation showing the expenditure of $47.8 million for fiscal year 1969 for studies and analyses of various kinds. However, that does not include some space studies and one category of technical studies.

I think that is a little broader than the category here on behavioral and social sciences. However, I refer the Senator to that tabulation and I also refer to the subject I have just mentioned and express the very strong and positive position of the committee that certainly reductions in that field were intended to be included in the 3 percent, or $240 million.

I consider that to be the softest spot in all the research and development program, although I did not have intimate, personal knowledge about it.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I appreciate the attitude of the Senator. I am sure that if he does have the time, he will do so. I do not criticize him, because these things are away-out subjects and do not seem to be very immediately important, but they have a way of growing and growing until they finally add up to very substantial amounts as well as to an intervention in foreign countries.

Mr. STENNIS. Policy questions become involved very rapidly.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. They do. I am suggesting that this is important. This is not the first time that I have taken the opportunity to bring up matters that have sort of boiled up in me. We had the same thing arise in the matter of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. I think it is time to call a halt to this procedure.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I thank the Senator very much for his contribution on the subject.

Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the time be equally charged to both sides.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered.

The clerk will call the roll.

The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. HART. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. SPONG in the chair). Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. HART. Mr. President, I send to the desk an amendment and ask that it be stated.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment will be stated.

The assistant legislative clerk read the amendment, as follows:

On page 4, between lines 5 and 6, insert a new section as follows:

"SEC. 204. Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions of this title, the aggregate amount authorized to be appropriated by this title shall not exceed $7,366,600,000."

Mr. HART. Mr. President, on this amendment I would hope very much that we could record ourselves on the RECORD, and I ask for the yeas and nays.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. HART. I yield.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Could the Senator from Michigan inform the Senate as to how the budget request for research and development in this particular proposal compares with the amount asked for last year?

Mr. HART. Last year we appropriated the sum of $7,092,600,000. This year the committee reports and recommends an increase to $7,875,476,000. This represents an increase of $782,876,000.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Is any of this amount being used in the field of population control?

Mr. HART. The size of the Hart family demonstrates clearly that I am not an expert on this subject.

I do not know whether an analysis of the problem of population control is contained in all these documents which reflect the area of research that the Defense Department has undertaken. The documents to which I refer are the five books which are sitting on my desk at this moment. They are publications describing some of our Federal research—some 1,600 pages in all. The "Research Resources 1966" of the Air Force alone has some 540 pages, not counting appendices. In view of the discussion in which the Senator from Arkansas and the Senator from Mississippi just engaged, it would be surprising if the Defense Department did not have a very detailed study underway with respect to birth control.

Mr. MANSFIELD. It would be surprising if they did, because if that is true—and I have been informed to that effect, and I would hope the debate to bring out the truth—I do not know what the Defense Department, of all agencies, is doing in the field of birth control when we have the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare charged with responsibilities in that field.

Mr. HART. The comment of the Senator from Montana is timely and very helpful. I was surprised to hear from the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. FULBRIGHT], the wide, varying, nondefense areas in which the DOD now is doing research. The amendment I offer will not cut back the research level—perhaps it should. But at least we should say "don't buy more."

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. HART. I yield.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator from Montana was not in the Chamber a moment ago. I did not read the entire list, but if the Senator from Montana will look quickly at the list of the research projects carried on by the Defense Department, which I put into the RECORD, he will find research projects that would much more properly be carried on by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, by the Disarmament Agency, by the State Department—by practically every department. The Defense Department has blanketed the field in any kind of research, primarily because they have the money. I have a list several pages long of all types of research, most of which have no relevance to military affairs at all.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I thank the Senator. I had those questions in mind, and I wanted to bring them in during the course of the debate.

Mr. HART. It could not have been done at a more timely moment.

Mr. President, I indicated to the able majority leader that the increase recommended by the committee for research was in excess of three-quarters of a billion dollars—$782 million.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, may we have order, so that we can hear?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senate will be in order.

Mr. HART. However, the amendment I have offered, which is pending, would reduce that amount not to the appropriation level of this year but, rather, to a figure of $7,366,600,000. That is to reflect the two figures which the Senator from Mississippi, when I discussed this matter with him yesterday, cited as not fairly to be assigned as an increase to research and development this year. He referred me to the hearing record of the committee at pages 421 and 422. There the witness was Dr. John Foster who is the Director of Research. Dr. Foster explained that $140 million was due to the fact that no longer were they able to draw on yearend carryover balances, and an additional $154 million resulted from redefinition of activities—that is, they now charge to research items which earlier had been charged to other accounts.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. HART. I yield.

Mr. STENNIS. We did not hear what the Senator said as to the effect of his amendment in figures in this respect: The Senate committee recommends a reduction of $240 million, and the Senator proposes now an additional reduction, beyond that which the committee recommended, of $500 million. Is that correct?

Mr. HART. In part. The Senator from Michigan recommends a reduction of $508 million. The Senate committee recommended an increase over this year's appropriation of $780 million plus. The Senate committee reduced the sum requested by the Department in the figure that the Senator from Mississippi cited.

But what I suggest we do is this: Here we have a proposal to authorize $22-odd billion. All of us are pledged to reduce the level of Federal expenditures. In its report, the committee states:

> Another reason for the committee recommendation is its awareness that the Senate has voted to reduce expenditures in fiscal year 1969 by $6 billion and to invite recommendations for reduction of appropriations by $10 billion in fiscal year 1969. As a part of a Government-wide program to reduce expenditures, narrow our fiscal deficit, improve our balance of payments, and restore confidence in the dollar, the committee knows that some of these reductions must be effected within the Department of Defense and that the research and development program must bear its share of the reduction.

All right, that is fine. How much is that Defense Department spending in research this year? Let us authorize the same amount for next year, and we will not even have reduced them. But at least let us not increase it. Why pick on the research rather than hardware?

As is the case with respect to more than 80 other Senators, I am not a member of the committee. We are all sensitive, when we fuss with the Military Establishment, aware that none of us wants to do that which would weaken our defense or jeopardize our security. But we are equally aware that our dollar and budget problems affect our security, too. We realize that this is one of the largest authorizations we will be asked to make. So I suggest that the place for the ignorant—and I plead myself entitled, unhappily, to that label when it comes to plowing through $22 billion odd of hardware in this time permitted here—to suggest the reduction is in the area of research.

I doubt that anyone would suggest that the life of any man in South Vietnam will be in jeopardy if we say to the Defense Department next year, "Spend the same amount for research you have spent this year, but don't ask us for $500 million more." That is the long and short of the plea and of my amendments.

The Senator from Arkansas recited some of the seemingly unrelated—militarily unrelated—studies that are included in this figure, the research now being conducted.

I have here on the desk summaries—not documents—of the research projects in which the Defense Department is now engaged. I believe we might have to increase the force level of the Armed Forces to be sure that each of this list of research projects be reviewed and the reports read in a 12-month period.

Mr. President, interestingly, there is a breakdown showing the way the Federal research dollar is spent. I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD a chart which shows distribution of Federal obligations for research and development for the fiscal year 1967. It demonstrates dramatically that the Department of Defense receives the bulk of money for research effort in our country.

There being no objection, the chart was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

Distribution of Federal obligations for research and development, fiscal year 1967 (estimate)

BY PERFORMER, $16.5 BILLION	Percent
Industrial firms	61
Federal Government	21
Universities and colleges	9
FCRC administration by universities	4
Other nonprofit institutions	4
Other	1
BY AGENCY, $16.5 BILLION	
DOD	48
NASA	30
AEC	8
HEW	7
Other	7

Mr. HART. Mr. President, the universities are toward the rear of the parade. Industrial firms get 61 percent. That does not condemn the situation, but it suggests that academicians will not be set back by our effort to maintain the present level of research money and not increase it. And it is clear that research for "people problems" also is at the end of the line. Eighty-six percent of the $16½ billion research goes to Defense, Space, and Atomic Energy. HEW gets 7 percent and "other" gets the remaining 7 percent.

I believe this amendment would give us the opportunity to do what the committee report suggests should be the effort of each of us; namely, to insure that we do reduce Government expenditures and that we look to the Department of Defense as one place to share that reduction. The research and development program should carry its share.

The amendment I offer is an effort to hold research at the existing level. The speeches about economy are interesting and crowd pleasing. Now we have a chance to practice what we preach.

Mr. President, I hope the Senate agrees to the amendment.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I yield myself 5 minutes.

I wish to state, with emphasis, that we are talking about $8 billion for research, development, test, and evaluation. However, over $3 billion of that money is for what we call operational systems; that is, continued development of weapons and systems already approved for deployment. This is really weapons development; it is not actually research. There are weapons already developed so far that have been approved and that are going to be produced and deployed. Therefore, we are talking about a $5 billion program at the most. A great deal of that amount includes engineering, and expenses of operating test ranges and installations, items of that kind.

Apparently the request this year for research was about $850 million more than last year. That difference is made up as follows. I shall move rather rapidly. Three hundred and fifty million dollars of last years program the Committee on Appropriations required to be funded from unobligated balances. They do not have that carryover this year. In other words, there is no cushion or pad of that kind this year.

One hundred and fifty-four million dollars of the $850 million is accounted for in items moved from shipbuilding and other accounts over to research and development. That is an accounting difference.

About $35 million of the amount is required for salary increases we passed last year.

That accounts for about $540 million of the alleged $850 million increase. On top of that, the committee recommendation is that we reduce the amount $240 million. So, there, in round numbers is $780 million accounted for as compared with last year, out of the $850 million, which is not an increase after all.

We also have an inflationary estimate in here. No one knows exactly how to figure that, the equivalent of the rise in the cost of living. That figure would be 2 or 3 percent, which would be another $240 million. That is not a firm figure, but it is worth considering.

How are we going to get at this $5 billion in round numbers? Much of this includes nothing for Vietnam, unless that situation lasted 6, 7, 8, or 10 years more. Development of modern weapons requires a long period of time. The Air Force version of the TFX, the F-111A, that was recently deployed to Southeast

Asia, was started in development in 1962 or 1963.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may proceed for 2 additional minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question there?

Mr. STENNIS. I wish to save time, but I yield briefly.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator mentioned the TFX.

Mr. STENNIS. Yes.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Because of the interest of my colleague from Arkansas, I have been very much interested in that subject.

Mr. STENNIS. I know.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Can the Senator tell us how much they spent to develop the TFX, which is now to be dropped?

Mr. STENNIS. The only one that went into operation was the Air Force version. I did not want to bring up the TFX.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. But the Senator did bring up the TFX, and it is very interesting as an illustration of where this money goes.

Mr. STENNIS. Then, there is the Navy version of the TFX.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I saw in the newspaper that the TFX development was already about $4.5 billion, and it is a very unsatisfactory plane. Not only did the Navy reject it, but also the Air Force lost two of the six planes in a week.

Mr. STENNIS. I cannot yield to the Senator to argue the TFX matter now. The Senator can do that on his time.

My point is that not all this is for anything immediate in the Vietnam War. It is for future years. There are submarines in here that are for years in advance. There are a number of items in that category.

Mr. President, how can we safely disapprove much of the program that competent officials say is important to our future defense.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may proceed for 1 additional minute.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, we finally reached agreement. The recommendations in committee were not the same. Some Senators did not want to reduce the figure at all and some Senators wanted to go to a higher percentage. We put this figure at 3 percent reduction, which we think is safe. We are going to follow it up to see that it is applied properly; and we suggest that next year Senators not wait until the bill is on the floor to tell us about research projects concerning birth control, or any other projects. Give us the opportunity to consider your suggestions and criticisms in the committee.

Mrs. SMITH. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that we may proceed for 5 additional minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I yield to the Senator from Maine.

Mrs. SMITH. Mr. President, I have listened with interest to the discussion, as I have to the testimony that has come before our Committee on Armed Services.

I agree that all of the research and development program is not productive. In fact, I strongly suspect that the Department has overdone, even to the extent of overdoing the practice of contracting for its thinking.

Like other Senators, I have not been impressed by the justification material provided in support of the request.

As I said this morning I even wonder whether all of the reports and analyses are read by any official with the authority to execute any of the changes they recommend.

On the other hand, to approve the amendment before us, in my opinion, is not the way to make the changes that the advocates have in mind.

I hope very much that before the vote on the amendment the Senate will give serious consideration to supporting the committee. The committee has already made every effort to cut as far as it feels they can cut without doing damage to the program.

I continue to believe that military preparedness depends so heavily on research and development in future years that I am reluctant, and most reluctant, to risk the consequences of the cut being proposed.

Therefore, I hope that the committee's position will be upheld by the Senate.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?

Mr. DOMINICK. Mr. President, will the Senator yield to me for 3 minutes?

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I yield 3 minutes to the Senator from Colorado, who is a member of the committee.

Mr. DOMINICK. I take this opportunity to say what I said to our distinguished acting chairman, that I sympathize with the intent and the idea as expressed in the amendment and as expressed by the Senator from Arkansas and the Senator from Montana.

The problem is, with all the work we were doing to eliminate the F-111B, trying to get the EA-6B for the Navy, and trying to do something on submarines, we have not had the time in committee to go into the detailed list of research projects which are going on and which perhaps might legitimately be knocked out of the authorization bill.

This is an area, I think and expect, that the Appropriations Subcommittee would get into, when it comes before that subcommittee. All we are doing here is dealing with an authorization bill, as the distinguished Senator from Maine [Mrs. SMITH] has said so well.

It would seem to me, therefore, that although the intent is shared by a great many of us, perhaps this is not the place to exercise the scalpel on a research program. We should wait until we get it before the Appropriations Subcommittee and then have this evidence presented to justify it at that time.

Personally, I think that we could do a great deal in the way of reductions, just as I think there is a great deal that should be done. The pending bill is a reduction from what has been requested. It is, in fact, more than it looks, because we do not have any carryover from previous years' funds and have accomplished a great deal in terms of armament which I think will be fruitful for the future of this country.

Again I congratulate the chairman and the acting chairman for the great work they have done in this field.

Mr. HART. Mr. President, I yield myself 2 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan is recognized for 2 minutes.

Mr. HART. Mr. President, we must understand what is meant when it is said the committee has reduced the figure 3 percent. What we are saying, as to the Department of Defense, is that what they asked has been reduced by 3 percent; but what the committee would authorize is better than three-quarters of a billion dollars more than DOD now has for research. Making allowance for all the bookkeeping adjustments, it is still one-half billion dollars more than Defense now has for research.

The effect of the pending amendment would be to cut it back to where it now is. If we cannot trim the military authorization in the research area, I fear we delude ourselves by suggesting it will be easier to trim it when the appropriation bill is reported.

Now is the time to say that our success and survival as a country will not be jeopardized by holding the Defense Department to its current level of spending for research. We ought not add another volume to these books which summarize Defense research programs—whether for birth control, as Senator MANSFIELD challenged, or tension among hottentots as cited by Senator FULBRIGHT.

Surely we ought not authorize increasing by more than half a billion dollars the defense spending for research. Let us hold it to current level. That is what adoption of my amendment will accomplish.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President a parliamentary inquiry.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Mississippi will state it.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, may I inquire how much time remains to the opposition?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Mississippi has 3 minutes remaining and the Senator from Michigan has 4 minutes remaining.

Mr. STENNIS. If anyone desires to speak in opposition to the amendment, I am glad to yield him time.

If not, Mr. President, I yield myself 2 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Mississippi is recognized for 2 minutes.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, the Senator from Arkansas has raised some points about a number of studies. For those who might have heard him but did not hear my attempt to answer him, let me repeat that I think the figures on the items he mentioned in that category

total only $14 million. But even if that is not broad enough to cover all, there is another table to which I have referred where some are listed, but the total there, including some studies on space and technical subjects, is only $47 million.

The committee intended, and I emphasize, that in applying the reduction we recommend of $240 million the Department should review some of these studies, analyses, and reports on subjects apparently without immediate Defense relevance and accomplish a good part of the reduction here.

With all deference to the Senator from Michigan, let us not say the committee is not recommending reductions.

What were we considering in the bill? The budget request, of course. We were not considering last year's request, or the request of the year before that, but the budget request.

We developed all these other facts and decided it was safe to make this reduction, which I hope the Senate will sustain.

Mr. President, I yield back the remainder of my time.

Mr. HART. Mr. President, I yield back the remainder of my time.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time on the amendment has now been yielded back.

The question is on agreeing to the amendment of the Senator from Michigan [Mr. HART]. On this question the yeas and nays have been ordered, and the clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk called the roll.

Mr. MANSFIELD (after having voted in the affirmative). Mr. President, on this vote I have a pair with the distinguished Senator from Georgia [Mr. RUSSELL]. If he were present and voting, he would vote "nay." If I were permitted to vote, I would vote "yea." Therefore, I withdraw my vote.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. I announce that the Senator from New Mexico [Mr. ANDERSON], the Senator from Indiana [Mr. BAYH], the Senator from Nevada [Mr. BIBLE], the Senator from Washington [Mr. JACKSON], the Senator from North Carolina [Mr. JORDAN], the Senator from Missouri [Mr. LONG], the Senator from Oklahoma [Mr. MONRONEY], the Senator from Oregon [Mr. MORSE], and the Senator from West Virginia [Mr. RANDOLPH] are absent on official business.

I also announce that the Senator from North Dakota [Mr. BURDICK], the Senator from Idaho [Mr. CHURCH], the Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. CLARK], the Senator from Connecticut [Mr. DODD], the Senator from Mississippi [Mr. EASTLAND], the Senator from North Carolina [Mr. ERVIN], the Senator from Tennessee [Mr. GORE], the Senator from Oklahoma [Mr. HARRIS], the Senator from Alabama [Mr. HILL], the Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. KENNEDY], the Senator from New York [Mr. KENNEDY], the Senator from Ohio [Mr. LAUSCHE], the Senator from Louisiana [Mr. LONG], the Senator from Washington [Mr. MAGNUSON], the Senator from Minnesota [Mr. MCCARTHY], the Senator from Montana [Mr. METCALF], the Senator from Connecticut [Mr. RIBICOFF], the Senator from Georgia [Mr. RUSSELL], and the Senator from Florida [Mr. SMATHERS] are necessarily absent.

I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. KENNEDY], the Senator from Montana [Mr. METCALF], the Senator from Indiana [Mr. BAYH], and the Senator from North Dakota [Mr. BURDICK] would each vote "yea."

On this vote, the Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. CLARK] is paired with the Senator from California [Mr. KUCHEL]. If present and voting, the Senator from Pennsylvania would vote "yea," and the Senator from California would vote "nay."

On this vote, the Senator from West Virginia [Mr. RANDOLPH] is paired with the Senator from Connecticut [Mr. DODD]. If present and voting, the Senator from West Virginia would vote "yea," and the Senator from Connecticut would vote "nay."

On this vote, the Senator from Oregon [Mr. MORSE] is paired with the Senator from Washington [Mr. MAGNUSON]. If present and voting, the Senator from Oregon would vote "yea," and the Senator from Washington would vote "nay."

On this vote, the Senator from New York [Mr. KENNEDY] is paired with the Senator from Washington [Mr. JACKSON]. If present and voting, the Senator from New York would vote "yea," and the Senator from Washington would vote "nay."

On this vote, the Senator from Oklahoma [Mr. MONRONEY] is paired with the Senator from Connecticut [Mr. RIBICOFF]. If present and voting, the Senator from Oklahoma would vote "yea," and the Senator from Connecticut would vote "nay."

Mr. YOUNG of North Dakota. I announce that the Senator from Colorado [Mr. ALLOTT] is absent on official business.

The Senator from Tennessee [Mr. BAKER], the Senator from New Jersey [Mr. CASE], the Senator from New Hampshire [Mr. COTTON], the Senator from Nebraska [Mr. CURTIS], the Senator from Illinois [Mr. DIRKSEN], the Senator from Arizona [Mr. FANNIN], the Senator from Wyoming [Mr. HANSEN], the Senators from California [Mr. KUCHEL and Mr. MURPHY], the Senator from Iowa [Mr. MILLER], the Senator from Kentucky [Mr. MORTON], and the Senator from Kansas [Mr. PEARSON] are necessarily absent.

If present and voting, the Senator from Colorado [Mr. ALLOTT], the Senator from Nebraska [Mr. CURTIS], the Senator from Illinois [Mr. DIRKSEN], the Senator from Arizona [Mr. FANNIN], the Senator from California [Mr. MURPHY], the Senator from Iowa [Mr. MILLER], and the Senator from Kansas [Mr. PEARSON] would each vote "nay."

On this vote, the Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. CLARK] is paired with the Senator from California [Mr. KUCHEL]. If present and voting, the Senator from Pennsylvania would vote "yea," and the Senator from California would vote "nay."

The result was announced—yeas 28, nays 30, as follows:

[No. 109 Leg.]

YEAS—28

Aiken	Holland	Prouty
Bartlett	Javits	Proxmire
Brooke	McGee	Spong
Byrd, W. Va.	McGovern	Tydings
Ellender	Mondale	Williams, N.J.
Fulbright	Moss	Williams, Del.
Gruening	Muskie	Yarborough
Hart	Nelson	Young, Ohio
Hartke	Pastore	
Hatfield	Pell	

NAYS—30

Bennett	Hayden	Percy
Boggs	Hickenlooper	Scott
Brewster	Hollings	Smith
Byrd, Va.	Hruska	Sparkman
Cannon	Inouye	Stennis
Carlson	Jordan, Idaho	Symington
Cooper	McClellan	Talmadge
Dominick	McIntyre	Thurmond
Fong	Montoya	Tower
Griffin	Mundt	Young, N. Dak.

PRESENT AND GIVING A LIVE PAIR, AS PREVIOUSLY RECORDED—1

Mr. Mansfield, for.

NOT VOTING—41

Allott	Ervin	Magnuson
Anderson	Fannin	McCarthy
Baker	Gore	Metcalf
Bayh	Hansen	Miller
Bible	Harris	Monroney
Burdick	Hill	Morse
Case	Jackson	Morton
Church	Jordan, N.C.	Murphy
Clark	Kennedy, Mass.	Pearson
Cotton	Kennedy, N.Y.	Randolph
Curtis	Kuchel	Ribicoff
Dirksen	Lausche	Russell
Dodd	Long, Mo.	Smathers
Eastland	Long, La.	

So Mr. HART's amendment was rejected.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill is open to further amendment.

Mr. NELSON. Mr. President, I send to the desk an amendment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment will be stated.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to read the amendment.

Mr. NELSON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that further reading of the amendment be waived. I will explain it.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The amendment of Mr. NELSON is as follows:

On page 2, line 10, strike out "$956,140,000" and insert in lieu thereof "$613,440,000."

Mr. NELSON. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays on this amendment.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, may I ask that the Senate be in order, so that the Senator can be heard? I ask that the Chair actively maintain order.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senate will be in order. Attachés will retire to the rear of the Chamber. The doorkeepers and the Sergeant at Arms will maintain order. Senators will return to their seats, and the Senate will be in order.

The Senator from Wisconsin may proceed.

Mr. NELSON. Mr. President, I have discussed this amendment with the Senator from Mississippi [Mr. STENNIS]. It is perfectly satisfactory with me, if it is with the Senator from Mississippi, that

debate on the amendment be limited to 30 minutes, 15 minutes to each side.

Mr. STENNIS. That has already been agreed to.

Mr. NELSON. I thank the Senator.

Mr. President, this amendment deals only with the thin missile system, or the Sentinel ABM system, and would delete $342,700,000 from the missile procurement authorization.

Of that $342,700,000, $6,300,000 is for the procurement of long leadtime components of the Spartan missile, and $199,200,000 is for the ground support equipment and $137,200,000 for production base support.

The anti-ballistic-missile system which has been approved by the committee for deployment consists of two missiles, the Spartan long range intercept missile and the Sprint terminal intercept missile, plus various search and tracking radar, and ground equipment.

The $342,700,000 would be deleted from the $956,140,000 request for authorization of appropriations for the procurement of Army missiles.

As I have stated, this relates only to the so-called thin missile system, the Sentinel missile system, and would eliminate the appropriations for the production base support and the procurement of those missiles. In other words, very simply stated, it would call a halt to the establishment of the so-called thin missile system.

The price tag on this proposal is now $5 billion. As we all know, it will be higher. We are told it is aimed against China missiles only. It is conceded by everyone that at best it would be effective against a crude, unsophisticated delivery system. On February 2 of this year, Defense Secretary McNamara testified before the Armed Services Committee that this was a Chinese oriented system. When Senator DOMINICK asked, "If a Soviet missile should come within that particular defense system you could hande that one?" Secretary McNamara replied:

> If it were only one missile, yes. However, if it were the size attack the Soviets are capable of mounting today, the answer is "No."

In a speech a few months ago on September 18, 1967, the Defense Secretary said:

> Our strategic offensive forces are immense. All of these flexible and highly reliable forces are equipped with devices that insure their penetration of Soviet defenses.

Mr. McNamara said further:

> None of the [ABM] systems at the present or foreseeable state of the art would provide an impenetrable shield over the United States. There is clearly no point . . . in spending $40 billion if it is not going to buy us any significant improvement in our security. Every ABM system that is now feasible involves firing defensive missiles at incoming offensive warheads in an effort to destroy them. But what many commentators on this issue overlook is that any such system can rather obviously be defeated by an enemy simply sending more offensive warheads, or dummy warheads, than there are defense missiles capable of disposing of them.

He reminded his audience that the United States has "already initiated offensive weapons programs costing several billions in order to offset the small present Soviet ABM deployments.

Secretary McNamara pointed out that four distinguished scientific advisers to three Presidents—Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson—"have unanimously recommended against the deployment of an ABM system designed to protect our population against a Soviet attack." He went on to say:

> We have the power not only to destroy completely China's entire nuclear offensive forces, but to devastate her society as well.

He went on to elaborate on the folly of spending "$4 billion, $40 billion, or $400 billion—and at the end of all the spending, and at the end of all deployment, and at the end of all the effort, to be relatively at the same point of balance on the security scale that we are now."

So, nevertheless, we are now in the treadmill process of spending $5 billion on a system that may not work at all and, at best, could have some brief, some transitory value until China slightly refined its delivery system, which everyone concedes they can easily do—and certainly will.

What incredible manner of logic is this? We can, as Mr. McNamara put it, totally destroy "China's entire nuclear offensive forces" and "devastate her society as well," but, he says, we should install this system because "one can conceive conditions under which China might miscalculate."

I respectfully suggest to Mr. McNamara that the fertile human mind can conceive of almost any condition it wants to. With that assumption, any proposition can be logically supported.

It is, I think, a weird process of reasoning that causes us to spend $5 billion on a system of doubtful and certainly temporary value on the belief that China might be insane enough sometime to attack us knowing it would result in devastation for their whole society.

We cannot even wait to conclude our first round of folly in Vietnam before launching into a second round of folly in a nuclear missile race.

In 1965, when we intervened in Vietnam with a military ground troop commitment, it was argued, among other things, that it was a necessary move to contain China. High State Department, including the Secretary of State and other officials, used the same argument to justify each stage of the escalation. Now we are there with over a half million troops and draining our Treasury at the rate of $25 billion a year in an enterprise we wish we had never undertaken in the first place.

China has not a single troop in the war, but somehow we are supposed to be containing China by fighting the Vietnamese.

Now, again, under the guise of defending ourselves against the same enemy, China, we are launching a little "thin missile system" which, like the Vietnam war, will balloon into a big thing—and, like Vietnam, 5 years from now we will all be saying, how in heaven's name did we ever get trapped into this? Well, it is not easy, but it can and will be done if we work at it hard enough.

I think the truth of the matter is, this is not an anti-Chinese system at all, but the first step in construction of a major heavy ABM system. Of course, many of the proponents—I emphasize this—of the thin system do not intend that result any more than they intended a big war in Vietnam, but that, nevertheless, will be the result.

The signposts along the route we are traveling are clear and we can read them down that route as far as the eye can see—they read: We escalate; they escalate; we escalate; and so forth, until we reach the end of the line, wherever that may be. As Mr. McNamara put it, we could spend $4 billion, $40 billion, or $400 billion on an ABM system and at the end be relatively at the same point of balance on the security scale that we are now.

In commenting on the futility of it all, Dr. Jerome Wiesner, science adviser to the President, said:

> Defense against thermonuclear attack is impossible.

Dr. Ralph Lapp stated:

> I believe that for every wrinkle you introduce into defense there are 10 more wrinkles that can be introduced in the power of the offense.

I am aware that the Joint Chiefs and the military hierarchy favor the heavy ABM just as they favored intervention in Vietnam, and we who oppose it will be told now, as we were then, that we are wrong and the military knows what is best. And, again, 5 years from now, if we are still around, we will have the doubtful honor of pointing to our sad mistake—and we will be told then, as now, to quit talking about the past—that is history—let us talk about the future. And so mankind goes down his merry road to disaster.

There is, of course, no doubt that this authorization will pass. This is an election year and we all know that the two biggest words in the English language are "national defense," "national defense." If you just shout them loud enough you are in the clear—you win and your opponent loses. It is just plain unpatriotic to question any appropriation for national defense. Defense against what? It does not matter what, or where, or how, or whether it makes any rational sense at all—just utter the magic words and you are in the clear.

We know that the military-industrial complex favors this appropriation; we know that Congress supports it; I assume that the public does, too. But I do not and I will not vote for it. I cannot in good conscience vote for a program that will launch us into a spiraling missile escalation which has no end and no purpose either. If that is bad politics, at least it is good sense and that is something worthwhile nowadays. For my part, I would rather leave here with my conscience than stay here without it.

In conclusion, may I say, how much better it would be if we just poured this money into our troubled cities for programs to right what is wrong in America. Lest we do that soon, we may not have a worthwhile society left here in America for the ABM to defend.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed at this point in the

RECORD an article entitled "Experts See 'Thin' ABM Vulnerable," published in the Washington Post of Sunday, March 3, 1968; an article entitled "Defense: The Missile Nobody Needs," written by William E. Jackson, Jr., and published in the New Republic of October 28, 1967; and an article entitled "Anti-Ballistic-Missile Systems," written by Richard L. Garwin and Hans A. Bethe, and published in the Scientific American of March 1968.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Washington Post, Mar. 3, 1968]

EXPERTS SEE "THIN" ABM VULNERABLE

The Chinese will be able to build missiles that will penetrate the so-called "light" ABM system the United States intends to construct, according to statements by two groups of American scientists.

An article in the March issue of Scientific American by Richard L. Garwin and Hans A. Bethe, both long associated with the development of American nuclear weapons, argues that the proposed system "will add little, if anything, to the influences that should restrain China indefinitely from an attack on the U.S."

The two scientists argue that the Chinese can surmount the American system, "whose characteristics and capabilities have been well publicized." Their article discusses this possibility in considerable technical detail.

Bethe is a Nobel Prize winning physicist. Garwin, a Columbia University physicist, was recently reported to have gone to South Vietnam, a report setting off rumors that nuclear weapons were being deployed there. But Pentagon officials later said he went instead to Thailand.

The Federation of American Scientists, in a statement, called the ABM system "irresponsible on fiscal grounds" and "pointless on military grounds." The Federation statement said that "the basic technical fact is that this system can be easily neutralized by the Chinese by using relatively simple and cheap penetration aids or by developing different means of weapons delivery."

Both the Garwin-Bethe article and the FAS statement express fear that the "light" ABM system, approved last September by Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara, will not stop there. Both believe there will be great pressure to expand the system into one designed to protect against Soviet ICBMs at a cost of $40 billion or more.

The FAS statement is also critical of incoming Defense Secretary Clark M. Clifford's statement that he will seek "clear-cut nuclear superiority" over the Soviet Union. The statement said that "at today's level of weaponry there can be no such thing."

[From the New Republic, Oct. 28, 1967]

DEFENSE: THE MISSILE NOBODY NEEDS

(By William E. Jackson, Jr.[1])

The lead note ("Mad Momentum") in *The New Republic* of October 14 is on solid ground in suggesting that the official strategic reasoning for our decision to deploy a light anti-ballistic missile system is veneer; the decision is mainly understandable in terms of domestic politics. It is unfortunate that in some quarters praise for Secretary McNamara's restraint in opposing an extensive anti-Soviet ABM system has resulted in uncritical approval of the "Chinese oriented" ABM. For the Defense Secretary's argument for the latter is full of holes.

Testifying before the House Armed Services Committee last March 1967, Mr. McNamara estimated that "a significant Red Chinese nuclear threat to the continental United States will not develop before the mid-1970's." He went on to state that *"with respect to protection of the United States against possible Red Chinese nuclear attack, the lead time required for China to develop a significant ICBM force is greater than that required for deployment of our defense—therefore the Chinese threat in itself would not dictate the production of an ABM system at this time."* McNamara even said that "it is not clear that we need an ABM defense against China." These statements were made in connection with the fiscal year 1968 budget presentation and the same line was reiterated by McNamara and his assistant for systems analysis well into the summer. Why then did the Administration change its mind in September and opt, "on marginal grounds," for an anti-Chinese ABM system? Was the switch due to a more threatening attitude on the part of China? Was the decision due to revised intelligence estimates of China's progress in nuclear weapons and delivery systems? A recent report by the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy (entitled "Impact of Chinese Communist Nuclear Weapons Progress on United States National Security") and statements by McNamara for the past year are in accord: Communist China will probably achieve some operating ICBM's with nuclear warhead, by the early 1970's. But if there has been in fact a faster-than-expected pace in Chinese weapon programs (to which the Secretary of Defense does not wish to draw attention) *it is indeed remarkable that the United States, which seems satisfied that its deterrent is effective against the Soviet Union, should be so concerned about its ineffectiveness against a power whose resources are miniscule by comparison.*

One is led to one of two conclusions. Either the Secretary of Defense and his advisers do not believe in the deterrence concept ("the cornerstone of our strategic policy") as applied to the Chinese, or the new ABM system is basically, in effect, anti-Soviet. If "for as far ahead as we can foresee" with respect to China we will have "an overwhelming first-strike capability" (McNamara's words used in the sense that he means them: the ability to substantially eliminate the attack nation's retaliatory second-strike forces), then there is no real need for an anti-Chinese ABM system—unless it is believed that deterrence might not work against the Chinese. If deterrence is expected to work against the Chinese, then the thin ABM system must be seen, primarily, as a means of strengthening our defense and offense against the Soviets.

In San Francisco last month, McNamara described China thus: "Despite the shrill and raucous propaganda directed at her own people that 'the atomic bomb is a paper tiger', there is ample evidence that China well appreciates the destructive power of nuclear weapons. China has been cautious to avoid any action that might end in a nuclear clash with the United States—however wild her words—and understandably so." But, after declaring that the United States has "the power not only to destroy completely her entire nuclear offensive forces, but to devastate her society as well," the Secretary of Defense went on to state that "one can conceive conditions under which China might miscalculate" and irrationally commit suicide by attempting a nuclear attack on the United States or our allies. (McNamara has since defined the "conceivable conditions" in a *Life* interview: "We can visualize a situation of tension between Red China and the U.S., brought about by some aggressive move by the Chinese. In that atmosphere, *it is conceivable that someone in their government would predict that the U.S. was going to launch nuclear weapons to destroy their small and highly vulnerable missile force on the ground.* Under those circumstances, some in China might be tempted to recommend that they preempt—that they launch ahead of time, because otherwise they would not be able to launch at all." Italics added.) Therefore, concluded the Defense Secretary, "there are marginal grounds for concluding that a light deployment of U.S. ABM's against this possibility is prudent."

But just how much security would an ABM system provide against a suicidal Communist China determined to inflict harm? Curiously, Secretary McNamara devoted a great deal of space to discussing US moves and Soviet countermoves in an arms race (over four-fifths of his September 18 speech was devoted to the Soviet threat and to a dialogue with the Russians), but did not discuss the "action-reaction phenomenon" in terms of Chinese reactions to US actions. The Chinese could decide to emphasize (or to build some) weapons against which ballistic missile defenses would be ineffective. If they should become deranged (the clear implication of the Secretary's reasoning) and choose to ignore our overwhelming retaliatory capability, they could send submarines with cruise-type missiles or nuclear-tipped torpedoes and launch attacks against our port installations and coastal cities—an attack with which an ABM system could not cope. (A missile submarine force would give them both a regional and an intercontinental capability less vulnerable to preemptive attack than first-generation "soft" ICBM's.) They could kill several million Americans before we destroyed them. If an ICBM attack against our cities is assumed, an area ABM defense could hold down casualties to small numbers. But another kind of surprise attack could do great harm. There is no absolute security against a deranged enemy.

There is, of course, another possible purpose for a US ABM system. It could serve to *marginally* strengthen our nuclear threat capability against the Chinese, and thereby give us more flexibility in possible future military interventions in Asia deemed to be in our national interest. (The role of our strategic nuclear forces is not as "intrinsically limited" as the Secretary would have us believe.)

It is in this light that Secretary McNamara's listing of another "advantage" of the anti-ballistic missile should be read: "It would provide an additional indication to Asians that we intend to deter China from nuclear blackmail. . . ." He is saying that once the Chinese are able to threaten the United States—that is, make us pay a price for coming to the aid of our allies—then an ABM system will be relevant to preventing Chinese "nuclear blackmail" against her neighbors and to permitting US intervention in Asia. Spartan long-range missiles in the ABM system could provide protection for our cities against Chinese *ICBM* threats into the 1980's. Their most harmful (to us) means of committing suicide would be stymied. We would have an option against the Chinese that we no longer hold against the Russians; the former couldn't touch us with ICBM's for approximately a decade and a half.

(To admit this advantage, however, is not to accept McNamara's speculation that China's "basic motivation in developing a strategic nuclear capability is an attempt to provide a basis for threatening her neighbors." Her motivation may be the same as ours: to achieve greater power and security in an uncertain world.)

An ABM system cannot serve to protect India or Japan or Vietnam from Chinese threats in the next five years or so. The Chinese already have (according to McNamara in his congressional testimony) some bombers which can carry nuclear weapons for several hundred miles. The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy recently stated its belief that the Chinese have completed de-

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[1] Mr. Jackson has worked in the International Division of the Bureau of the Budget and as research assistant at Columbia University's Institute of War and Peace Studies.

velopment of a medium-range ballistic missile. With this growing regional capability, the Chinese can strike at American bases in East Asia and threaten the cities of our Asian friends. This capability does strengthen the barriers against US military intervention in Asia. Existing deterrent forces had better work against this capability; an ABM system will have no relevance to it for five years.

Alternatively, if it is assumed that the Chinese are as "rational" as the other nuclear powers, the US decision to deploy a light ABM system can be seen—strategically—as an anti-Soviet action. There is no danger of the Chinese having either a first-strike or a second-strike capability (the ability to absorb a nuclear attack and still have enough bombers and missiles to inflict unacceptable damage on the attacking country) against us in the foreseeable future. But the Soviets do have an "actual and credible" second-strike capability against the United States. McNamara listed as a "concurrent benefit" of a Chinese-oriented ABM deployment the "further defense of our Minuteman sites against Soviet attack." This is rubric under which to hide a basically anti-Soviet action. An ABM system, as a supplement to the upgrading of our strategic offensive forces, can strengthen our military posture relative to theirs or at least enable us to hold our present position of superiority. On September 18 McNamara defined the present ratio of US nuclear superiority over the Soviets: "By using the realistic measurement of the number of warheads available, *capable of being reliably delivered with accuracy and effectiveness on the appropriate targets* in the United States or Soviet Union, I can tell you that the United States currently possesses a superiority over the Soviet Union of *at least three or four to one*. Furthermore, we will maintain a superiority—by these same realistic criteria—over the Soviet Union for as far ahead in the future as we can realistically plan." (Italics added.)

The short-range Sprint missiles in the ABM complexes will not be placed around our cities, but will be deployed around ICBM bases and radar installations to protect our second-strike capability against Soviet attack. Both the Sprint and the long-range Spartan missiles can provide the foundation for an extensive anti-Soviet ABM deployment. (Or they could blunt an attack from a decimated Soviet retaliatory force if the US decided it was necessary—the "worst plausible case"?—to preempt and launch our offensive nuclear forces at Soviet missiles, bombers and submarines.) It should, therefore, come as no surprise if the Soviets interpret our light ABM deployment as primarily a means of limiting damage by Soviet strategic forces. Mr. McNamara is using the ChiCom bugaboo to justify proceeding with an ABM system, while hedging US ability to more than match changes in Soviet strategic forces. Perhaps he is warning the Soviet Union that, if they go on with their ABM deployment, so will we—even against our better judgment. Given our "credible deterrent," it is an "incredible action."

The Joint Chiefs have not lost the argument for an extensive anti-Soviet ABM system; they have won a favorable compromise.

More alarming than the ABM decision is the radical improvement in our strategic offensive forces that is programmed for the near future. Examples: Minuteman III's, Poseidon missiles, MIRV's. In reacting to the steady increase in the *numbers* of Soviet ICBM's and their limited ABM deployment, it would appear that the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs are not only rejecting strategic parity but are determined to edge nearer to a first-strike capability. The Soviets will certainly react to the scheduled improvements.

The final reason given by McNamara for the light ABM system is that it "would add protection of our population against the improbable but possible accidental launch of an intercontinental missile by any of the nuclear powers." Here, I can see some real (as opposed to imagined) need for an ABM network. We have been lucky so far. To the public's knowledge, the United States has not had to respond to an accidental launching of a nuclear weapon in our direction. On the other hand, an ABM system composed of 20 or so different batteries will add several more layers to the electronic and human controls which are bound to fail at some point. In a perceptive Tann cartoon, two Pentagon generals are pictured pondering over the design of a missile, and one is saying to the other: "Now, let's get this straight—is this the missile we send up to get the missile they sent up to get our missile we sent up to get theirs, or is this the one we send after the one they send up to get ours?" Atomic fallout could occur over our cities with one mistake.

The alleged cost of the light ABM system is subject to question. McNamara's estimate for an "austere ABM defense" against the Chinese was $3.5 billion in March. Six months later it is $5 billion (excluding $500 million for operational costs and $500 million for continuing research per year), based on "preliminary estimates." Does anyone really believe these figures? The Secretary of Defense himself has admitted (before the House Armed Services Committee on March 2) that initial estimates for such weapons systems "may be understated by 50 to 100 percent." Of course, the lower the public estimate in the beginning, the more attractive these weapon systems are to all concerned. (McNamara on September 18 made an astonishingly out of character statement: "If we could build and deploy a genuinely impenetrable shield over the United States, we would be willing to spend not $40 billion, but *any reasonable multiple of that amount* that was necessary." Italics added.)

Finally, Secretary McNamara's September 18 statement is weak and neglectful in its reasoning about the international implications of the ABM decision. He offers the sop that an anti-Chinese ABM system "would provide an additional indication to Asians that we intend to deter China from nuclear blackmail, and thus would contribute toward our goal of discouraging nuclear weapon proliferation among the present nonnuclear countries." But this is a pipe dream. Our deployment of an ABM system may simply encourage the NATO countries toward efforts to buttress deterrence through the development (or purchase) of their own ballistic missile defenses. And what is to keep India and other Asian countries from wanting their own missile defenses, especially if China decides to concentrate on a visible regional deterrent (based on medium-range missiles and bombers) instead of ICBM's?

In a brilliant treatise against the approaching decision to build an ABM, J. I. Coffey argued last spring (in *Foreign Affairs*) that, in addition to throwing a wrench into nonproliferation negotiations, a U.S. decision in favor of deployment would adversely affect the quest for arms control because: (1) Some European countries, seeing both sides deploy ABM's, may again be concerned lest Europe become a battleground for the nuclear giants and grow more determined in their desire to develop national or regional nuclear deterrents; (2) ABM deployment will necessitate a complete reorientation of the U.S. proposal for a freeze on strategic forces (because of the "action-reaction phenomenon") and will militate against further cutbacks in the production of fissionable materials because of the requirement for hundreds or thousands of nuclear-tipped missiles; (3) The desire for greater information concerning warhead effects will make it difficult for both the United States and the Soviet Union to give up the underground testing of nuclear weapons; and (4) At some stage in the expenditure of billions of dollars, one side or the other might feel compelled to try out the operational effectiveness of its long-range anti-missile missiles against incoming warheads. The latter would mean the abrogation of the nuclear test ban. All of these undesirable reactions are within the realm of probability once an ABM race is under way.

My main purpose here has been to challenge the strategic reasoning of the Secretary of Defense. But attention must be drawn to the domestic forces that influenced the shape and the timing of the decision. Indeed, *the entire strategic case* vis-à-vis *China seems to be the post hoc rationale of a decision compelled by domestic political pressures.* The ABM decision can be seen—in the poisonous political climate induced by the war in Vietnam—as one more gesture to the knee-jerk hawks in the Congress (Senator Russell hailed the ABM decision as "the best news the American people have had in years."), and simultaneously as an effort to rob the Republicans of an issue in the 1968 election. McNamara predicted on March 2 that the Chinese might conduct either a space or a long-range ballistic missile launching before the end of 1967. The Administration was demonstrating political "deterrence" in announcing the ABM decision before the Chinese act.

Certain basic political and economic forces have been let loose by this decision. In restrained terms, the Secretary of Defense has warned us of pressures "from many directions to produce and deploy the weapon out of all proportion to the prudent level required." McNamara was more specific in describing the political pressures in his congressional testimony of last March: "Even before the [ABM] systems became operational, pressures would mount for their expansion at a cost of still additional billions. The unprotected, or relatively unprotected, areas of the United States would claim that their tax dollars were being diverted to protect New York and Washington while they were left naked." As for the economic pressure, it has been estimated by Frederic Collins ("$30 Billion for Whom?" in *The New Republic* of March 11, 1967) that the prime contractors and subcontractors for the components of an ABM system have at least 300 plants and one million employees spread through 42 states (represented by 84 senators) and 172 congressional districts!

The weapons donnybrook has not been prevented; rather, the gates have been opened. Evidently strategic analysis can be prostituted by political pressures.

[From the Scientific American, March 1968]

ANTI-BALLISTIC-MISSILE SYSTEMS

(By Richard L. Garwin and Hans A. Bethe)

(The U.S. is now building a "light" ABM system. The authors argue that offensive tactics and cheap penetration aids could nullify the effectiveness of this system and any other visualized so far.)

Last September, Secretary of Defense McNamara announced that the U.S. would build "a relatively light and reliable Chinese-oriented ABM system." With this statement he apparently ended a long and complex debate on the merits of any kind of anti-ballistic-missile system in an age of intercontinental ballistic missiles carrying multimegaton thermonuclear warheads. Secretary McNamara added that the U.S. would "begin actual production of such a system at the end of this year," meaning the end of 1967.

As two physicists who have been concerned for many years with the development and deployment of modern nuclear weapons we wish to offer some comments on this important matter. On examining the capabilities of ABM systems of various types, and on

considering the stratagems available to a determined enemy who sought to nullify the effectiveness of such a system, we have come to the conclusion that the "light" system described by Secretary McNamara will add little, if anything, to the influences that should restrain China indefinitely from an attack on the U.S. First among these factors is China's certain knowledge that, in McNamara's words, "we have the power not only to destroy completely her entire nuclear offensive forces but to devastate her society as well."

An even more pertinent argument against the proposed ABM system, in our view, is that it will nourish the illusion that an effective defense against ballistic missiles is possible and will lead almost inevitably to demands that the light system, the estimated cost of which exceeds $5 billion, he expanded into a heavy system that could cost upward of $40 billion. The folly of undertaking to build such a system was vigorously stated by Secretary McNamara. "It is important to understand," he said, "that none of the [ABM] systems at the present or foreseeable state of the art would provide an impenetrable shield over the United States. . . . Let me make it very clear that the [cost] in itself is not the problem: the penetrability of the proposed shield is the problem."

In our view the penetrability of the light, Chinese-oriented shield is also a problem. It does not seem credible to us that, even if the Chinese succumbed to the "insane and suicidal" impulse to launch a nuclear attack on the U.S. within the next decade, they would also be foolish enough to have built complex and expensive missiles and nuclear warheads peculiarly vulnerable to the light ABM system now presumably under construction (a system whose characteristics and capabilities have been well publicized). In the area of strategic weapons a common understanding of the major elements and technical possibilities is essential to an informed and reasoned choice by the people, through their government, of a proper course of action. In this article we shall outline in general terms, using nonsecret information, the techniques an enemy could employ at no great cost to reduce the effectiveness of an ABM system even more elaborate than the one the Chinese will face. First, however, let us describe that system.

Known as the Sentinel system, it will provide for long-range interception by Spartan antimissile missiles and short-range interception by Sprint antimissile missiles. Both types of missile will be armed with thermonuclear warheads for the purpose of destroying or inactivating the attacker's thermonuclear weapons, which will be borne through the atmosphere and to their targets by reentry vehicles (RV's). The Spartan missiles, whose range is a few hundred kilometers, will be fired when an attacker's reentry vehicles are first detected rising above the horizon by perimeter acquisition radar (PAR).

If the attacker is using his available propulsion to deliver maximum payload, his reentry vehicles will follow a normal minimum-energy trajectory, and they will first be sighted by one of the PAR's when they are about 4,000 kilometers, or about 10 minutes, away [*see illustration on page 26*]. If the attacker chooses to launch his rockets with less than maximum payload, he can put them either in a lofted trajectory or in a depressed one. The lofted trajectory has certain advantages against a terminal defense system. The most extreme example of a depressed trajectory is the path followed by a low-orbit satellite. On such a trajectory a reentry vehicle could remain below an altitude of 160 kilometers and would not be visible to the horizon-search radar until it was some 1,400 kilometers, or about three minutes, away. This is FOBS: the fractional-orbit bombardment system, which allows intercontinental ballistic missiles to deliver perhaps 50 to 75 percent of their normal payload.

In the Sentinel system Spartans will be launched when PAR has sighted an incoming missile; they will be capable of intercepting the missile at a distance of several hundred kilometers. To provide a light shield for the entire U.S. about half a dozen PAR units will be deployed along the northern border of the country to detect missiles approaching from the general direction of the North Pole [*see illustration at left*]. Each PAR will be linked to several "farms" of long-range Spartan missiles, which can be hundreds of kilometers away. Next to each Spartan farm will be a farm of Sprint missiles together with missile-site radar (MSR), whose function is to help guide both the Spartans and the shorter-range Sprints to their targets. The task of the Sprints is to provide terminal protection for the important Spartans and MSR's. The PAR's will also be protected by Sprints and thus will require MSR's nearby.

Whereas the Spartans are expected to intercept an enemy missile well above the upper atmosphere, the Sprints are designed to be effective within the atmosphere, at altitudes below 35 kilometers. The explosion of an ABM missile's thermonuclear warhead will produce a huge flux of X rays, neutrons and other particles, and within the atmosphere a powerful blast wave as well. We shall describe later how X rays, particles and blast can incapacitate a reentry vehicle.

Before we consider in detail the capabilities and limitations of ABM systems, one of us (Garwin) will briefly summarize the present strategic position of the U.S. The primary fact is that the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. can annihilate each other as viable civilizations within a day and perhaps within an hour. Each can at will inflict on the other more than 120 million immediate deaths, to which must be added deaths that will be caused by fire, fallout, disease and starvation. In addition more than 75 percent of the productive capacity of each country would be destroyed, regardless of who strikes first. At present, therefore, each of the two countries has an assured destruction capability with respect to the other. It is usually assumed that a nation faced with the assured destruction of 30 percent of its population and productive capacity will be deterred from destroying another nation, no matter how serious the grievance. Assured destruction is therefore not a very flexible political or military tool. It serves only to preserve a nation from complete destruction. More conventional military forces are needed to fill the more conventional military role.

Assured destruction was not possible until the advent of thermonuclear weapons in the middle 1950's. At first, when one had to depend on aircraft to deliver such weapons, destruction was not really assured because a strategic air force is subject to surprise attack, to problems of command and control and to attrition by the air defenses of the other side. All of this was changed by the development of the intercontinental ballistic missile and also, although to a lesser extent, by modifications of our B-52 force that would enable it to penetrate enemy defenses at low altitude. There is no doubt today that the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. have achieved mutual assured destruction.

The U.S. has 1,000 Minuteman missiles in hardened "silos" and 54 much larger Titan II missiles. In addition we have 656 Polaris missiles in 41 submarines and nearly 700 long-range bombers. The Minuteman alone could survive a surprise attack and achieve assured destruction of the attacker. In his recent annual report the Secretary of Defense estimated that as of October, 1967, the U.S.S.R. had some 720 intercontinental ballistic missiles, about 30 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (excluding many that are airborne rather than ballistic) and about 155 long-range bombers. This force provides assured destruction of the U.S.

Secretary McNamara has also stated that U.S. forces can deliver more than 2,000 thermonuclear weapons with an average yield of one megaton, and that fewer than 400 such weapons would be needed for assured destruction of a third of the U.S.S.R.'s population and three-fourths of its industry. The U.S.S.R. would need somewhat fewer weapons to achieve the same results against the U.S.

It is worth remembering that intercontinental missiles and nuclear weapons are not the only means of mass destruction. They are, however, among the most reliable, as they were even when they were first made in 1940's and 1950's. One might build a strategic force somewhat differently today, but the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. have no incentive for doing so. In fact, the chief virtue of assured destruction may be that it removes the need to race—there is no reward for getting ahead. One really should not worry too much about new means for delivering nuclear weapons (such as bombs in orbit or fractional-orbit systems) or about advances in chemical or biological warfare. A single thermonuclear assured-destruction force can deter such novel kinds of attack as well.

Now, as Secretary McNamara stated in his September speech, our defense experts reckoned conservatively six to 10 years ago, when our present strategic-force levels were planned. The result is that we have right now many more missiles than we need for assured destruction of the U.S.S.R. If war comes, therefore, the U.S. will use the excess force in a "damage-limiting" role, which means firing the excess at those elements of the Russian strategic force that would do the most damage to the U.S. Inasmuch as the U.S.S.R. has achieved the level of assured destruction, this action will not preserve the U.S., but it should reduce the damage, perhaps sparing a small city here or there or reducing somewhat the forces the U.S.S.R. can use against our allies. To the extent that this damage-limiting use of our forces reduces the damage done to the U.S.S.R. it may slightly reduce the deterrent effect resulting from assured destruction. It must be clear that only surplus forces will be used in this way. It should be said, however, that the exact level of casualties and industrial damage required to destroy a nation as a viable society has been the subject of surprisingly little research or even argument.

One can conceive of three threats to the present rather comforting situation of mutual assured destruction. The first would be an effective counterforce system: a system that would enable the U.S. (or the U.S.S.R.) to incapacitate the other side's strategic forces before they could be used. The second would be an effective ballistic-missile defense combined with an effective antiaircraft system. The third would be a transition from a bipolar world, in which the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. alone possess overwhelming power, to a multipolar world including, for instance, China. Such threats are of course more worrisome in combination than individually.

American and Russian defense planners are constantly evaluating less-than-perfect intelligence to see if any or all of these threats are developing. For purposes of discussion let us ask what responses a White side might make to various moves made by a Black side. Assume that Black has threatened to negate White's capability of assured destruction by doing one of the following things: (1) it has procured more intercontinental missiles, (2) it has installed some missile defense or (3) it has built up a large operational force of missiles each of which can attack several targets, using "multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles" (MIRV's).

White's goal is to maintain assured destruction. He is now worried that Black may

be able to reduce to a dangerous level the number of White warheads that will reach their target. White's simplest response to all three threats—but not necessarily the most effective or the cheapest—is to provide himself with more launch vehicles. In addition, in order to meet the first and third threats White will try to make his launchers more difficult to destroy by one or more of the following means: by making them mobile (for example by placing them in submarines or on railroad cars), by further hardening their permanent sites or by defending them with an ABM system.

Another possibility that is less often discussed would be for White to arrange to fire the bulk of his warheads on "evaluation of threat." In other words, White could fire his land-based ballistic missiles when some fraction of them had already been destroyed by enemy warheads, or when a overwhelming attack is about to destroy them. To implement such a capability responsibly requires excellent communications, and the decision to fire would have to be made within minutes, leading to the execution of a prearranged firing plan. As a complete alternative to hardening and mobility, this fire-now-or-never capability would lead to tension and even, in the event of an accident, to catastrophe. Still, as a supplemental capability to ease fears of effective counterforce action, it may have some merit.

White's response to the second threat—an increase in Black's ABM defenses—might be limited to deploying more launchers, with the simple goal of saturating and exhausting Black's defenses. But White would also want to consider the cost and effectiveness of the following: penetration aids, concentrating on undefended or lightly defended targets, maneuvering reentry vehicles or multiple reentry vehicles. The last refers to several reentry vehicles carried by the same missile; the defense would have to destroy all of them to avoid damage. Finally, White could reopen the question of whether he should seek assured destruction solely by means of missiles. For example, he might reexamine the effectiveness of low-altitude bombers or he might turn his attention to chemical or biological weapons. It does not much matter how assured destruction is achieved. The important thing, as Secretary McNamara has emphasized, is that the other side find it credible. ("The point is that a potential aggressor must himself believe that our assured destruction capability is in fact actual, and that our will to use it in retaliation to an attack is in fact unwavering.")

It is clear that White has many options, and that he will choose those that are most reliable or those that are cheapest for a given level of assured destruction. Although relative costs do depend on the level of destruction required, the important technical conclusion is that for conventional levels of assured destruction it is considerably cheaper for White to provide more offensive capability than it is for Black to defend his people and industry against a concerted strike.

As an aside, it might be mentioned that scientists newly engaged in the evaluation of military systems often have trouble grasping that large systems of the type created by or for the military are divided quite rigidly into several chronological stages, namely, in reverse order: operation, deployment, development and research. An operational system is not threatened by a system that is still in development; the threat is not real until the new system is in fact deployed, shaken down and fully operative. This is particularly true for an ABM system, which is obliged to operate against large numbers of relatively independent intercontinental ballistic missiles. It is equally true, however, for counterforce reentry vehicles, which can be ignored unless they are built by the hundreds or thousands. The same goes for MIRV's, a development of the multiple reentry vehicle in which each reentry vehicle is independently directed to a separate target. One must distinguish clearly between the *possibility* of development and the development itself, and similarly between development and actual operation. One must refrain from attributing to a specific defense system, such as Sentinel, those capabilities that *might* be obtained by further development of a different system.

It follows that the Sentinel light ABM system, to be built now and to be operational in the early 1970's against a possible Chinese intercontinental ballistic missile threat, will have to reckon with a missile force unlike either the Russian or the American force, both of which were, after all, built when there was no ballistic-missile defense. The Chinese will probably build even their first operational intercontinental ballistic missiles so that they will have a chance to penetrate. Moreover, we believe it is well within China's capabilities to do a good job at this without intensive testing or tremendous sacrifice in payload.

Temporarily leaving aside penetration aids, there are two pure strategies for attack against a ballistic-missile defense. The first is an all-warhead attack in which one uses large booster rockets to transport many small (that is, fractional-megaton) warheads. These warheads are separated at some instant between the time the missile leaves the atmosphere and the time of reentry. The warheads from one missile can all be directed against the same large target (such as a city); these multiple reentry vehicles (MRV's) are purely a penetration aid. Alternatively each of the reentry vehicles can be given an independent boost to a different target, thus making them into MIRV's. MIRV is not a penetration aid but is rather a counterforce weapon: if each of the reentry vehicles has very high accuracy, then it is conceivable that each of them may destroy an enemy missile silo. The Titan II liquid-fuel rocket, designed more than 10 years ago, could carry 20 or more thermonuclear weapons. If these were employed simply as MRV's, the 54 Titans could provide more than 1,000 reentry vehicles for the defense to deal with.

Since the Spartan interceptors will each cost $1 million to $2 million, including their thermonuclear warheads, it is reasonable to believe theremonuclear warheads can be delivered for less than it will cost the defender to intercept them. The attacker can make a further relative saving by concentrating his strike so that most of the interceptors, all bought and paid for, have nothing to shoot at. This is a high-reliability penetration strategy open to any country that can afford to spend a reasonable fraction of the amount its opponent can spend for defense.

The second pure strategy for attack against an ABM defense is to precede the actual attack with an all-decoy attack or to mix real warheads with decoys. This can be achieved rather cheaply by firing large rockets from unhardened sites to send light, unguided decoys more or less in the direction of plausible city targets. If the ABM defense is an area defense like the Sentinel system, it must fire against these threatening objects at very long range before they reenter the atmosphere, where because of their lightness they would behave differently from real warheads. Several hundred to several thousand such decoys launched by a few large vehicles could readily exhaust a Sentinel-like system. The attack with real warheads would then follow.

The key point is that since the putative Chinese intercontinental-ballistic-missile force is still in the early research and development stage, it can and will be designed to deal with the Sentinel system, whose interceptors and sensors are nearing production and are rather well publicized. It is much easier to design a missile force to counter a defense that is already being deployed than to design one for any of the possible defense systems that might or might not be deployed sometime in the future.

One of us (Bethe) will now describe (1) the physical mechanisms by which an ABM missile can destroy or damage an incoming warhead and (2) some of the penetration aids available to an attacker who is determined to have his warheads reach their targets.

Much study has been given to the possibility of using conventional explosives rather than a thermonuclear explosive in the warhead of a defensive missile. The answer is that the "kill" radius of a conventional explosive is much too small to be practical in a likely tactical engagement. We shall consider here only the more important effects of the defensive thermonuclear weapon: the emission of neutrons, the emission of X-rays and, when the weapon is exploded in the atmosphere, blast.

Neutrons have the ability to penetrate matter of any kind. Those released by defensive weapons could penetrate the heat shield and outer jacket of an offensive warhead and enter the fissile material itself, causing the atoms to fission and generating large amounts of heat. If sufficient heat is generated, the fissile material will melt and lose its carefully designed shape. Thereafter it can no longer be detonated.

The kill radius for neutrons depends on the design of the offensive weapon and the yield, or energy release, of the defensive weapon. The miss distance, or distance of closest approach between the defensive and the offensive missiles, can be made small enough to achieve a kill by the neutron mechanism. This is particularly true if the defensive missile and radar have high performance and the interception is made no more than a few tens of kilometers from the ABM launch site. The neutron-kill mechanism is therefore practical for the short-range defense of a city or other important target. It is highly desirable that the yield of the defensive warhead be kept low to minimize the effects of blast and heat on the city being defended.

The attacker can, of course, attempt to shield the fissile material in the offensive warhead from neutron damage, but the mass of shielding needed is substantial. Witness the massive shield required to keep neutrons from escaping from nuclear reactors. The size of the reentry vehicle will enable the defense to make a rough estimate of the amount of shielding that can be carried and thus to estimate the intensity of neutrons required to melt the warhead's fissile material.

Let us consider next the effect of X-rays. These rays carry off most of the energy emitted by nuclear weapons, especially those in the megaton range. If sufficient X-ray energy falls on a reentry vehicle, it will cause the surface layer of the vehicle's heat shield to evaporate. This in itself may not be too damaging, but the vapor leaves the surface at high velocity in a very brief time and the recoil sets up a powerful shock wave in the heat shield. The shock may destroy the heat shield material or the underlying structure.

X rays are particularly effective above the upper atmosphere, where they can travel to their target without being absorbed by air molecules. The defense can therefore use megaton weapons without endangering the population below; it is protected by the intervening atmosphere. The kill radius can then be many kilometers. This reduces the accuracy required of the defensive missile and allows successful interception at ranges of hundreds of kilometers from the ABM launch site. Thus X rays make possible an area defense and provide the key to the Sentinel system.

On the other hand, the reentry vehicle can be hardened against X-ray damage to a considerable extent. And in general the defender

will not know if the vehicle has been damaged until it reenters the atmosphere. If it has been severely damaged, it may break up or burn up. If this does not happen, however, the defender is helpless unless he has also constructed an effective terminal, or short-range, defense system.

The third kill mechanism—blast—can operate only in the atmosphere and requires little comment. Ordinarly when an offensive warhead reenters the atmosphere it is decelerated by a force that, at maximum, is on the order of 100 g. (One g is the acceleration due to the earth's gravity). The increased atmospheric density reached within a shock wave from a nuclear explosion in air can produce a deceleration several times greater. But just as one can shield against neutrons and X rays one can shield against blast by designing the reentry vehicle to have great structural strength. Moreover, the defense, not knowing the detailed design of the reentry vehicle, has little way of knowing if it has destroyed a given vehicle by blast until the warhead either goes off or fails to do so.

The main difficulty for the defense is the fact that in all probability the offensive reentry vehicle will not arrive as a single object that can be tracked and fired on but will be accompanied by many other objects deliberately placed there by the offense. These objects come under the heading of penetration aids. We shall discuss only a few of the many types of such aids. They include fragments of the booster rockets, decoys, fine metal wires called chaff, electronic countermeasures and blackout mechanisms of several kinds.

The last stage of the booster that has propelled the offensive missile may disintegrate into fragments or it can be fragmented deliberately. Some of the pieces will have a radar cross section comparable to or larger than the cross section of the reentry vehicle itself. The defensive radar therefore has the task of discriminating between a mass of debris and the warhead. Although various means of discrimination are effective to some extent, radar and data processing must be specifically set up for this purpose. In any case the radar must deal with tens of objects for each genuine target, and this imposes considerable complexity on the system.

There is, of course, an easy way to discriminate among such objects: let the whole swarm reenter the atmosphere. The lighter booster fragments will soon be slowed down, whereas the heavier reentry vehicle will continue to fall with essentially undiminished speed. If a swarm of objects is allowed to reenter, however, one must abandon the concept of area defense and construct a terminal defense system. If a nation insists on retaining a pure area defense, it must be prepared to shoot at every threatening object. Not only is this extremely costly but also it can quickly exhaust the supply of antimissile missiles.

Instead of relying on the accidental targets provided by booster fragments, the offense will almost certainly want to employ decoys that closely imitate the radar reflectivity of the reentry vehicle. One cheap and simple decoy is a balloon with the same shape as the reentry vehicle. It can be made of thin plastic covered with metal in the form of foil, strips or wire mesh. A considerable number of such balloons can be carried uninflated by a single offensive missile and released when the missile has risen above the atmosphere.

The chief difficulty with balloons is putting them on a "credible" trajectory, that is, a trajectory aimed at a city of some other plausible target. Nonetheless, if the defending force employs an area defense and really seeks to protect the entire country, it must try to intercept every suspicious object, including balloon decoys. The defense may, however, decide not to shoot at incoming objects that seem to be directed against nonvital targets; thus it may choose to limit possible damage to the country rather than to avoid all damage. The offense could then take the option of directing live warheads against points on the outskirts of cities, where a nuclear explosion would still produce radioactivity and possibly severe fallout over densely populated regions. Worse, the possibility that reentry vehicles can be built to maneuver makes it dangerous to ignore objects even 100 kilometers off target.

Balloon decoys, even more than booster fragments, will be rapidly slowed by the atmosphere and will tend to burn up when they reenter it. Here again a terminal ABM system has a far better chance than an area defense system to discriminate between decoys and warheads. One possibility for an area system is "active" discrimination. If a defensive nuclear missile is exploded somewhere in the cloud of balloon decoys traveling with a reentry vehicle, the balloons will either be destroyed by radiation from the explosion or will be blown far off course. The reentry vehicle presumably will survive. If the remaining set of objects is examined by radar, the reentry vehicle may stand out clearly. It can then be killed by a second interceptor shot. Such a shoot-look-shoot tactic may be effective, but it obviously places severe demands on the ABM missiles and the radar tracking system. Moreover, it can be countered by the use of small, dense decoys within the balloon swarms.

Moreover, it may be possible to develop decoys that are as resistant to X rays as the reentry vehicle and also are simple and compact. Their radar reflectivity could be made to simulate that of a reentry vehicle over a wide range of frequencies. The decoys could also be made to reenter the atmosphere—at least down to a fairly low altitude—in a way that closely mimicked an actual reentry vehicle. The design of such decoys, however, would require considerable experimentation and development.

Another way to confuse the defensive radar is to scatter the fine metal wires of chaff. If such wires are cut to about half the wavelength of the defensive radar, each wire will act as a reflecting dipole with a radar cross section approximately equal to the wavelength squared divided by 2π. The actual length of the wires is not critical; a wire of a given length is also effective against radar of shorter wavelength. Assuming that the radar wavelength is one meter and that one-mil copper wire is cut to half-meter lengths, one can easily calculate that 100 million chaff wires will weigh only 200 kilograms (440 pounds).

The chaff wires could be dispersed over a large volume of space, the chaff could be so dense and provide such large radar reflection that the reentry vehicle could not be seen against the background noise. The defense would then not know where in the large reflecting cloud the reentry vehicle is concealed. The defense would be induced to spend several interceptors to cover the entire cloud, with no certainty, even so, that the hidden reentry vehicle will be killed. How much of the chaff would survive the defensive nuclear explosion is another difficult question. The main problem for the attacker is to develop a way to disperse chaff more or less uniformly.

An active alternative to the use of chaff is to equip some decoys with electronic devices that generate radio noise at frequencies selected to jam the defensive radar. There are many variations on such electronic countermeasures, among them the use of jammers on the reentry vehicles themselves.

The last of the penetration aids that will be mentioned here is the radar blackout caused by the large number of free electrons released by a nuclear explosion. These electrons, except for a few, are removed from atoms of molecules of air, which thereby become ions. There are two main causes for the formation of ions, the fireball of the explosion, which produces ions because of its high temperature, and the radioactive debris of the explosion, which releases beta rays (high-energy electrons) that ionize the air they traverse. The second mechanism is important only at high altitude.

The electrons in an ionized cloud of gas have the property of bending and absorbing electromagnetic waves, particularly those of low frequency. Attenuation can reach such high values that the defensive radar is prevented from seeing any object behind the ionized cloud (unlike chaff, which confuses the radar only at the chaff range and not beyond).

Blackout is a severe problem for an area defense designed to intercept missiles above the upper atmosphere. The problem is aggravated because area-defense radar is likely to employ low-frequency (long) waves, which are the most suitable for detecting enemy missiles at long range. In some recent popular articles long-wave radar has been hailed as the cure for the problems of the ABM missile. It is not. Even though it increases the capability of the radar in some ways, it makes the system more vulnerable to blackout.

Blackout can be caused in two ways: by the defensive nuclear explosions themselves and by deliberate explosions set off at high altitude by the attacker. Although the former are unavoidable, the defense has the choice of setting them off at altitudes and in locations that will cause the minimum blackout of its radar. The offense can sacrifice a few early missiles to cause blackout at strategic locations. In what follows we shall assume for purposes of discussion that the radar wavelength is one meter. Translation to other wavelengths is not difficult.

In order to totally reflect the one-meter waves from our hypothetical radar it is necessary for the attacker to create an ionized cloud containing 10^9 electrons per cubic centimeter. Much smaller electron densities, however, will suffice for considerable attenuation. For the benefit of technically minded readers, the equation for attenuation in decibels per kilometer is

$$\alpha=\frac{4.34}{3\times10^8}\,\frac{\omega_p^2}{\omega^2+\gamma_e^2}\gamma_e$$

Here ω_p is the plasma frequency for the given electron density, ω is the radar frequency in radians per second and γ_e is the frequency of collisions of an electron with atoms of air. At normal temperatures this frequency γ_e is the number 2×10^{11} multiplied by the density of the air (ρ) compared with sea-level density (ρ_o), or $\gamma_e=2\times10^{11}\,\rho/\rho_o$. At altitudes above 30 kilometers, where an area-defense system will have to make most of its interceptions, the density of air is less than .01 of the density at sea level. Under these conditions the electron collision frequency γ_e is less than the value of $\omega=(2\pi\times3\times10^8)$ and therefore can be neglected in the denominator of the equation. Using that equation, we can then specify the number of electrons, N_e, needed to attenuate one-meter radar waves by a factor of more than one decibel per kilometer: $N_e>350\rho_o/\rho$. At an altitude of 30 kilometers, ρ_o/ρ is about 100, N_e is about 3×10^4, and at 60 kilometers N_e is still only about 3×10^6. Thus the electron densities needed for the substantial attenuation of a radar signal are well under the 10^9 electrons per cubic centimeter required for total reflection. The ionized cloud created by the fireball of a nuclear explosion is typically 10 kilometers thick; if the attenuation is one decibel per kilometer, such a cloud would produce a total attenuation of 10 decibels. This implies a tenfold reduction of the outgoing radar signal and another tenfold reduction of the reflected signal, which amounts to effective blackout.

The temperature of the fireball created by a nuclear explosion in the atmosphere is initially hundreds of thousands of degrees centigrade. It quickly cools by radiation to about 5,000 degrees C. Thereafter cooling is produced primarily by the cold air entrained by the fireball as it rises slowly through the atmosphere, a process that takes several minutes.

When air is heated to 5,000 degrees C., it is strongly ionized. To produce a radar attenuation of one decibel per kilometer at an altitude of 90 kilometers the fireball temperature need be only 3,000 degrees, and at 50 kilometers a temperature of 2,000 degrees will suffice. Ionization may be enhanced by the presence in the fireball of iron, uranium and other metals, which are normally present in the debris of nuclear explosion.

The size of the fireball can easily be estimated. Its diameter is about one kilometer for a one-megaton explosion at sea level. For other altitudes and yields there is a simple scaling law: the fireball diameter is equal to $(Y\rho_0/\rho)^{1/3}$, where Y is the yield in megatons. Thus a fireball one kilometer in diameter can be produced at an altitude of 30 kilometers (where $\rho_0/\rho=100$) by an explosion of only 10 kilotons. At an altitude of 50 kilometers (where $\rho_0/\rho=1{,}000$), a one-megaton explosion will produce a fireball 10 kilometers in diameter. At still higher altitudes matters become complicated because the density of the atmosphere falls off so sharply and the mechanism of heating the atmosphere changes. Nevertheless, fireballs of very large diameter can be expected when megaton weapons are exploded above 100 kilometers. These could well black out areas of the sky measured in thousands of square kilometers.

For explosions at very high altitudes (between 100 and 200 kilometers) other phenomena become significant. Collisions between electrons and air molecules are now unimportant. The condition for blackout is simply that there be more than 10^9 electrons per cubic centimeter.

At the same time very little mass of air is available to cool the fireball. If the air is at first fully ionized by the explosion, the air molecules will be dissociated into atoms. The atomic ions combine very slowly with electrons. When the density is low enough, as it is at high altitude, the recombination can take place only by radiation. The radiative recombination constant (call it C_R) is about 10^{12} cubic centimeter per second. When the initial electron density is well above 10^9 per cubic centimeter, the number of electrons remaining after time t is roughly equal to $1/C_R t$. Thus if the initial electron density is 10^{12} per cubic centimeter, the density will remain above 10^9 for 1,000 seconds, or some 17 minutes. The conclusion is that nuclear explosions at very high altitude can produce long-lasting blackouts over large areas.

The second of the two mechanisms for producing an ionized cloud, the beta rays issuing from the radioactive debris of a nuclear explosions, can be even more effective than the fireball mechanism. If the debris is at high altitude, the beta rays will follow the lines of force in the earth's magnetic field, with about half of the beta rays going immediately down into the atmosphere and the other half traveling out into space before returning earthward. These beta rays have an average energy of about 500,000 electron volts, and when they strike the atmosphere, they ionize air molecules. Beta rays of average energy penetrate to an altitude of about 60 kilometers; some of the more energetic rays go down to about 50 kilometers. At these levels, then, a high-altitude explosion will give rise to sustained ionization as long as the debris of the explosion stays in the vicinity.

One can show that blackout will occur if $y \times t^{-1.2} > 10^{-2}$, where t is the time after the explosion in seconds and y is the fission yield deposited per unit horizontal area of the debris cloud, measured in tons of TNT equivalent per square kilometer. The factor $t^{-1.2}$ expresses the rate of decay of the radioactive debris. If the attacker wishes to cause a blackout lasting five minutes ($t=300$), he can achieve it with a debris level y equal to 10 tons of fission yield per square kilometer. This could be attained by spreading one megaton of fission products over a circular area about 400 kilometers in diameter at an altitude of, say, 60 kilometers. Very little could be seen by an area-defense radar attempting to look out from under such a blackout disk. Whether or not such a disk could actually be produced is another question. Terminal defense would not, of course, be greatly disturbed by a beta ray blackout.

The foregoing discussion has concentrated mainly on the penetration aids that can be devised against an area-defense system. By this we do not mean to suggest that a terminal-defense system can be effective, and we certainly do not wish to imply that we favor the development and deployment of such a system.

Terminal defense has a vulnerability all its own. Since it defends only a small area, it can easily be bypassed. Suppose that the 20 largest American cities were provided with terminal defense. It would be easy for an enemy to attack the 21st largest city and as many other undefended cities as he chose. Although the population per target would be less than if the largest cities were attacked, casualties would still be heavy. Alternatively the offense could concentrate on just a few of the 20 largest cities and exhaust their supply of antimissile missiles, which could readily be done by the use of multiple warheads even without decoys.

It was pointed out by Charles M. Herzfeld in *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* a few years ago that a judicious employment of ABM defenses could equalize the risks of living in cities of various sizes. Suppose New York, with a population of about 10 million, were defended well enough to require 50 enemy warheads to penetrate the defenses, plus a few more to destroy the city. If cities of 200,000 inhabitants were left undefended, it would be equally "attractive" for an enemy to attack New York and penetrate its defenses as to attack an undefended city.

Even if such a "logical" pattern of ABM defense were to be seriously proposed, it is hard to believe that people in the undefended cities would accept their statistical security. To satisfy everyone would require a terminal system of enormous extent. The highest cost estimate made in public discussions, $50 billion, cannot be far wrong.

Although such a massive system would afford some protection against the U.S.S.R.'s present armament, it is virtually certain that the Russians would react to the deployment of the system. It would be easy for them to increase the number of their offensive warheads and thereby raise the level of expected damage back to the one now estimated. In his recent forecast of defense needs for the next five years, Secretary McNamara estimated the relative cost of ABM defenses and the cost of countermeasures that the offense can take. He finds invariably that the offense, by spending considerably less money than the defense, can restore casualties and destruction to the original level before defenses were installed. Since the offense is likely to be "conservative," it is our belief that the actual casualty figures in a nuclear exchange, after both sides had deployed ABM systems and simultaneously increased offensive forces, would be worse than these estimates suggest.

Any such massive escalation of offensive and defensive armaments could hardly be accomplished in a democracy without strong social and psychological effects. The nation would think more of war, prepare more for war, hate the potential enemy and thereby make war more likely. The policy of both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. in the past decade has been to reduce tensions to provide more understanding, and to devise weapon systems that make war less likely. It seems to us that this should remain our policy.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I yield myself 5 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Mississippi is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, this is a serious subject that could have grave consequences. It will be of great concern to the people of this Nation if, at this stage, the Senate should see fit by a majority vote on the floor to stop the production of this antiballistic missile system.

No one has a complete answer. No system is perfect. No one can guarantee the success of any system. However, over a period of many years I have attended many of the gravest and most serious conferences on this very subject. I was slow to become convinced that the scientists had something that could cope with the problem.

I held out until I became convinced. However, my conviction is now on the positive side. I am convinced that we have to go on and prepare this defense.

I wish more Senators could have heard briefings about the capacity of Communist China at this time in this very field. Their potential already is a thousand miles, and that will be extended, of course.

Two years ago, the Department of Defense did not recommend that the system be started, but the Joint Chiefs did.

Senator RUSSELL, on the floor of this Chamber, asked the Senate to approve extra authorization for this system, and the Senate did so. The money was not used that year. Last year the committee recommended, and the Senate approved, additional authorization to start deploying this system. This year judgments and opinions have solidified, not only of the Joint Chiefs of Staff but also of the civilian heads of the Defense Department, and our committee had considered this matter.

This limited system could be a building block, and any advantage that we develop in this system can be converted and used against Russia. In other words, we could build one for use against Russia and take advantage of the building blocks that we are putting down now for the Red China antiballistic missile system. So far as science can make this antimissile missile system effective, we could use this limited system later in a more concentrated system if changed circumstances should make practical the deployment of a defense against the kind of attack the Russians could launch.

Even if deployed in its present form, this system would at least save some lives if Russia should attack us and we were not to have a system designed primarily against their missile. It would save some lives even in that event. So if that ghastly event occurred this investment would not be a loss. Who can put a value on such a saving?

In all sincerity, I suggest that it would be dangerous at this stage to take the body and root of this system and throw it out.

One year the Senate had a secret session. The Senator from South Carolina proposed that we deploy a system then, and I voted against the proposal at that session. That was years ago. But this development has come a long, long way. I wish the Senator from Georgia—he is detained on another matter—could be present and state in his fine way how he evaluates this situation.

Mr. President, how much time do I have remaining?

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. BYRD of Virginia in the chair). The Senator has 30 seconds remaining of the 5 minutes.

Mr. STENNIS. I yield myself 1 additional minute, and then I will yield 5 minutes to the Senator from South Carolina.

Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, we are now considering one of the most important issues before this country. If we move forward in this field, without adequate information and debate, we will have approved, by our action, and I believe indefinitely, the ABM system. I wish we could have a closed session such as the one we had several years ago at the request of the Senator from South Carolina [Mr. THURMOND], concerning the Nike X, or at least full, open debate so that we could know more about this matter.

I should like to ask a question of the distinguished Senator from Mississippi.

I note that approximately $730 million was appropriated for Nike X for fiscal year 1960. Of that amount, $309 million was for deployment and, from fiscal year 1967, $153 million for deployment—a total of $462 million for deployment. Can the Senator separate research and development from deployment? Was there sufficient information in this field, through research and development, to have approved a total of $462 million for deployment of a weapon about which we do not yet know very much—whether it is practicable, whether it will promote security, and its ultimate cost?

Mr. STENNIS. I did not believe that any appreciable amount was for that purpose; $342.7 million is for procurement.

Mr. COOPER. I am reading from the committee report.

Mr. STENNIS. $342.7 million is the figure I have in mind, and it is at a stage of development. In the scientists' and the engineers' terms, they cannot differentiate these sums.

Mr. COOPER. On page 7 of the committee report it is categorically stated that $309 million of the 1968 appropriation would be for the initial deployment of the Nike X system.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired.

Mr. STENNIS. I yield 1 minute to the Senator.

Mr. COOPER. The report states that $309 million is for the initial deployment of the Nike X and that $153 million is left from last year for deployment. It is a total of more than $400 million for deployment of a system about which it is not yet known, as I understand, whether it is practicable, whether separate components are workable, whether they meet the purposes of the antiballistic missile system. These questions are pertinent even upon the assumption that such a system is needed, as we face the same issues as we consider authorization and appropriations for the fiscal year 1969.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, this is the figure in the 1968 appropriation bill. I believe we will need time to confer. Page 7 of our committee report does not carry it.

Mr. President, I yield 5 minutes to the Senator from South Carolina.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, the Sentinel defense being installed to defend against Chinese ICBM's consists of Spartan and Sprint missile systems, controlled by high-resolution radar and computer complexes. Fortunately, the component parts for these systems are in advanced stages of development, and the time interval between the "go ahead" and actual installation is much less than it might have been. For this blessing we can thank Congress and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who for years have been recommending development of the ABM. Let me give a brief account of their stuggle with the Department of Defense:

In the mid-1950's: Each year Congress provided funds for research and development.

In 1963: At the first secret session of the Senate since World War II, Senators were briefed on our strategic posture and were warned that the Soviets had a prototype ABM system. The Senate Committee on Armed Services added an amendment to the annual procurement bill, authorizing the appropriation of $196 million to begin the procurement of ABM parts. At the instigation of the administration, this amendment was rejected on a rollcall vote, 58 to 16.

In 1966: At the insistence of the Senate Committee on Armed Services, Congress approved $167.9 million for ABM procurement. Secretary McNamara had not asked for these funds and did not use them.

In November 1966: McNamara finally announced that the Soviets had begun deployment of an ABM system around Moscow.

In January 1967: President Johnson stated that no deployment of a U.S. ABM system would be made until completion of the arms control negotiations with Russia. Secretary McNamara's military posture report to Congress contained a lengthy argument against deployment of a complete, Russian-oriented ABM system. He stated that it would be a wasteful, ineffective system and that it would disturb the strategic balance. Two days later, Gen. Earle Wheeler, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, disagreed with the Secretary of Defense, and recommended "a measure of defense" for the country.

In 1967: Congress approved the following amounts for the fiscal year 1968 military budget:

	Millions
ABM procurement	$297.6
ABM R. & D.	421.3
ABM construction	64.0

On June 17, 1967, Red China detonated its first hydrogen bomb. Public pressure for immediate installation of ABM defense mounted.

On September 18, 1967, Secretary McNamara announced the decision to deploy a "thin" ABM defense system—the Sentinel—oriented against the Communist Chinese threat that would exist by the mid-1970's. He justified this step on the grounds that the Chinese might "miscalculate," but failed to admit that the most dangerous threat to our security would be a similar miscalculation by the Soviet Union.

What we must realize is that the Soviet danger is the major threat and it must be faced resolutely. The Sentinel system is only the beginning, and is but a step in the right direction. It is time to listen to the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the more defense-minded Members of Congress. For our future peace and security, our ABM defenses should be expanded.

Mr. President, the amount that is moved to be stricken today is a total of $342,700,000. It strikes $6.3 million for long leadtime components. It takes a long time to develop these components and to begin moving. It strikes $199.2 million for ground support equipment. It strikes $137.2 million for production base support. These items total $342.7 million.

The amount now provided in the bill is only to comply with the minimum requirements recommended by the President and the Secretary of Defense for the thin defense system against China. We know that China is building an intercontinental ballistic missile system. We know that the Soviet Union already has the ICBM. We also know that the Soviet Union has an antiballistic missile system.

Are we to remain exposed, with China building an ICBM system and with Russia already having an ICBM system and an antiballistic missile system? We will be completely exposed unless we go forward and build this system.

With China building an ICBM, with Russia already in possession of an ICBM, and Russia also having an ABM, we would be completely exposed unless we go forward and deploy our own ABM defense.

I remind the Senate that this is a defensive weapon and not an offensive weapon. It is designed purely to defend the people of America in the event the Soviets or the Chinese initiate nuclear attack to destroy the people and the cities of America. Something has been said about this money being better spent in the cities of America. There will be no cities on which to spend the money if the missiles from Russia and China are ever launched against us. The Joint Chiefs of Staff unanimously recommend the ABM; the military experts say it is essential.

I hope the Senate will reject the amendment.

Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield to me?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Mississippi has 1 minute remaining on the amendment.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, on behalf of the distinguished majority leader, who is not in the Chamber at the moment, I yield 3 additional minutes on the bill to the Senator.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Rhode Island is recognized.

Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, this matter of building an antiballistic missile system has been a problem of serious concern to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, of which I am chairman. I wish to say to Senators that until we reach that day when we dismantle every nuclear and thermonuclear weapon in the arsenals of the world and assure ourselves that there is no nuclear and thermonuclear power to destroy everything that man has created since the beginning of time, I think we have to give serious thought to our defense posture against a surprise nuclear attack.

The argument which is constantly made is that we do not have concise and complete answers. That is true. When we attempted the hydrogen bomb there was resistance. I might add that the father of the hydrogen bomb is Edward Teller, who has cautioned us repeatedly that the time has come for us to build an antiballistic-missile system, not only against China but also against Russia. He is one of the most eminent experts in this field that I know of.

When we attempted to build a hydrogen bomb there was resistance. It was said that we do not need that kind of weapon. We only achieved primacy because we built it before the Russians built it. Now, the Chinese have achieved a thermonuclear explosion, which the French have not yet achieved.

Mr. President, this idea that they will not dare use it could be wishful thinking. The decision to build this system is not a frivolous gesture. It is not an attempt to waste and throw away American taxpayers' dollars. It is an attempt to save American human life in case of a surprise attack.

When we tried to build the *Nautilus* submarine few people would listen to Admiral Rickover. Finally, we discovered the Russians had a very eminent fleet of nuclear submarines.

When we tried to nuclearize our aircraft carriers there was such a resistance, and yet, the *Enterprise* proved its worth in the Gulf of Tonkin. The *Bainbridge* and the *Long Beach*, two nuclear ships, proved their worth.

Now, all we are saying is, Let us get started. If we do not begin this at some point, we will never achieve a satisfactory result. I say that the time has come when we have to begin to think in terms of defense. The entire American military nuclear posture is predicated upon the thought, position, and policy that we have to lose millions and millions of American lives before we retaliate. Our position is only retaliatory. America will never be the aggressor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I yield the Senator 5 additional minutes on the bill.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is recognized for 5 additional minutes.

Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, the Russians and the Chinese know that. Can we say the same about them? We have been trying to internationalize control of nuclear weapons since the time of the Baruch plan in 1947. We have not achieved it yet. We talk and we talk. We have made some steps. We were able to get the nuclear test ban treaty in 1963 and now we have the nonproliferation treaty. However, these are small steps.

Therefore, I say that until we reach the day when we dismantle every hydrogen bomb and atom bomb in this world, let us begin a defense system because the Russians have already done it.

Mr. President, if Senators wish to get caught short, just agree to this amendment today and wait another year and then, maybe another year, until it is too late to do what needs to be done.

Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, will the President yield for a question?

Mr. PASTORE. I am glad to yield to the Senator from Vermont.

Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, I wish to make this comment with respect to what the Senator from Rhode Island has said.

In my opinion, and I believe the Senator from Rhode Island will agree to a certain extent, at least, the most damaging aspect of our defense has been the resistance of the Department of Defense to the development of an atomic Navy, which has done more—even with what we now have—to prevent world war III than any other part of our Defense Establishment.

It is almost inconceivable to me that the Department of Defense should be so intent on protecting us against an attack from another country—and, of course, that is their business to do so—and at the same time insist on continuing an oil-burning Navy when a nuclear Navy would run circles around other ships in our Navy.

I know the Senator from Rhode Island takes this matter as much to heart as I. It is almost inconceivable that there would be resistance by the Secretary of Defense to the development of real protection against world war III.

Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, I wish to conclude with one further observation. About 4 or 5 years ago I visited Livermore, Calif. I was shown pictures of ballistic missiles which were marched around in the May Day parade in Moscow. That same man who showed the pictures and who demonstrated concern to me, came here as an adviser to the President, and he was against the system. Talk about being brainwashed.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?

Mr. NELSON. Mr. President, I wish to make one point clear. There was some question about whether or not there was any research money eliminated by this amendment. The answer is "No."

I yield the remainder of my time to the Senator from South Dakota.

Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, I realize there is very little time remaining. However, I wish to make one point in support of the amendment. In 1959, when the Army was urging the Nike-Zeus antiballistic-missile system, Secretary McNamara later testified before the committee that if that system had been built at an estimated cost of $13 billion to $14 billion, practically all of it would have had to be thrown out and replaced even before it became operational. It would have been outmoded before there was any feasible chance to use the system. It is my judgment, based on the studies I have been able to make of the proposal now before the Senate, that the same fate awaits the so-called China-oriented system, that long before it can be deployed, it will be obsolete—if in fact it ever had any useful function to perform.

I think it is a scheme that is wasteful, ineffective, and will invite another round in the nuclear race.

The long-range impact of taking the step proposed here, to me, will enhance the danger to our country and the danger of international conflict rather than increase our security.

The assumption that we buy additional defense and security for the United States merely by piling on more and more weapons seems to me an assumption that holds little logic. All experience is against it. The time has come for us to begin moving in another direction, recognizing that there are other and more fundamental sources of American power and influence in the world.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment of the Senator from Wisconsin [Mr. NELSON]. On this question, the yeas and nays have been ordered, and the clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk called the roll.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. I announce that the Senator from New Mexico [Mr. ANDERSON], the Senator from Indiana [Mr. BAYH], the Senator from Nevada [Mr. BIBLE], the Senator from Washington [Mr. JACKSON], the Senator from North Carolina [Mr. JORDAN], the Senator from Missouri [Mr. LONG], the Senator from Oklahoma [Mr. MONRONEY], the Senator from Oregon [Mr. MORSE], and the Senator from West Virginia [Mr. RANDOLPH] are absent on official business.

I also announce that the Senator from North Dakota [Mr. BURDICK], the Senator from Idaho [Mr. CHURCH], the Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. CLARK], the Senator from Connecticut [Mr. DODD], the Senator from Mississippi [Mr. EASTLAND], the Senator from North Carolina [Mr. ERVIN], the Senator from Tennessee [Mr. GORE], the Senator from Oklahoma [Mr. HARRIS], the Senator from Alabama [Mr. HILL], the Senator from South Carolina [Mr. HOLLINGS], the Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. KENNEDY], the Senator from New York [Mr. KENNEDY], the Senator from Ohio [Mr. LAUSCHE], the Senator from Louisiana [Mr. LONG], the Senator from Washington [Mr. MAGNUSON], the Senator from Minnesota [Mr. McCARTHY], the Senator from Montana [Mr. METCALF], the Senator from Minnesota [Mr. MONDALE], the Senator from Connecticut [Mr. RIBICOFF], and the Senator from Florida [Mr. SMATHERS] are necessarily absent.

I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator from North Carolina [Mr. ERVIN], would vote "nay."

On this vote, the Senator from Montana [Mr. METCALF] is paired with the Senator from Oklahoma [Mr. MONRONEY]. If present and voting, the Senator from Montana would vote "yea," and

the Senator from Oklahoma would vote "nay."

On this vote, the Senator from Minnesota [Mr. MONDALE] is paired with the Senator from Washington [Mr. MAGNUSON]. If present and voting the Senator from Minnesota would vote "yea," and the Senator from Washington would vote "nay."

On this vote, the Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. KENNEDY] is paired with the Senator from Connecticut [Mr. DODD]. If present and voting, the Senator from Massachusetts would vote "yea," and the Senator from Connecticut would vote "nay."

On this vote, the Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. CLARK] is paired with the Senator from South Carolina [Mr. HOLLINGS]. If present and voting, the Senator from Pennsylvania would vote "yea," and the Senator from South Carolina would vote "nay."

On this vote, the Senator from Oregon [Mr. MORSE] is paired with the Senator from West Virginia [Mr. RANDOLPH]. If present and voting, the Senator from Oregon would vote "yea," and the Senator from West Virginia would vote "nay."

On this vote, the Senator from New York [Mr. KENNEDY] is paired with the Senator from Washington [Mr. JACKSON]. If present and voting, the Senator from New York would vote "yea," and the Senator from Washington would vote "nay."

On this vote, the Senator from Indiana [Mr. BAYH] is paired with the Senator from Connecticut [Mr. RIBICOFF]. If present and voting the Senator from Indiana would vote "yea," and the Senator from Connecticut would vote "nay."

Mr. YOUNG of North Dakota. I announce that the Senator from Colorado [Mr. ALLOTT] is absent on official business.

The Senator from Tennessee [Mr. BAKER], the Senator from New Jersey [Mr. CASE], the Senator from New Hampshire [Mr. COTTON], the Senator from Nebraska [Mr. CURTIS], the Senator from Illinois [Mr. DIRKSEN], the Senator from Arizona [Mr. FANNIN], the Senator from Wyoming [Mr. HANSEN], the Senators from California [Mr. KUCHEL and Mr. MURPHY], the Senator from Iowa [Mr. MILLER], the Senator from Kentucky [Mr. MORTON], and the Senator from Kansas [Mr. PEARSON] are necessarily absent.

If present and voting, the Senator from Colorado [Mr. ALLOTT], the Senator from Nebraska [Mr. CURTIS], the Senator from Illinois [Mr. DIRKSEN], the Senator from Arizona [Mr. FANNIN], the Senators from California [Mr. KUCHEL and Mr. MURPHY], the Senator from Iowa [Mr. MILLER], and the Senator from Kansas [Mr. PEARSON] would each vote "nay."

The result was announced—yeas 17, nays 41, as follows:

[No. 110 Leg.]

YEAS—17

Bartlett	Hatfield	Smith
Brooke	Inouye	Symington
Fulbright	Mansfield	Tydings
Gruening	McGovern	Williams, N.J.
Hart	Nelson	Young, Ohio
Hartke	Proxmire	

NAYS—41

Aiken	Hickenlooper	Percy
Bennett	Holland	Prouty
Boggs	Hruska	Russell
Brewster	Javits	Scott
Byrd, Va.	Jordan, Idaho	Sparkman
Byrd, W. Va.	McClellan	Spong
Cannon	McGee	Stennis
Carlson	McIntyre	Talmadge
Cooper	Montoya	Thurmond
Dominick	Moss	Tower
Ellender	Mundt	Williams, Del.
Fong	Muskie	Yarborough
Griffin	Pastore	Young, N. Dak.
Hayden	Pell	

NOT VOTING—42

Allott	Ervin	Long, La.
Anderson	Fannin	Magnuson
Baker	Gore	McCarthy
Bayh	Hansen	Metcalf
Bible	Harris	Miller
Burdick	Hill	Mondale
Case	Hollings	Monroney
Church	Jackson	Morse
Clark	Jordan, N.C.	Morton
Cotton	Kennedy, Mass.	Murphy
Curtis	Kennedy, N.Y.	Pearson
Dirksen	Kuchel	Randolph
Dodd	Lausche	Ribicoff
Eastland	Long, Mo.	Smathers

So Mr. NELSON's amendment was rejected.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Kentucky [Mr. COOPER] is recognized.

Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, I send to the desk an amendment, and ask to have it reported.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment offered by the Senator from Kentucky will be stated.

The legislative clerk read the amendment, as follows:

On page 4, between lines 16 and 17, insert a new section as follows:

"SEC. 302. None of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act may be expended for the deployment of any anti-ballistic missile system until such time as the Secretary of Defense has certified to the Congress in writing that research has proven that an antiballisitc missile system is practicable and that the cost of such a system can be determined with reasonable accuracy."

Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays on my amendment.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, I yield myself 10 minutes.

Mr. President, if I may have the attention of the Senate, I will make my argument as quickly as possible.

I have offered this amendment—to continue the important debate on the question of the deployment of an anti-ballistic-missile system. Every one of us is deeply concerned about the security of our country. I do not doubt that any Member would undertake any sacrifice, either in personal actions or supporting appropriations, to assure the security of our country. We are deeply indebted to the Armed Services Committee for its faithful work throughout the years. But we are dealing with a very difficult and far-reaching problem, about which, frankly, I do not believe there has been sufficient debate, and an actual discussion by the Congress.

I have studied the anti-ballistic-missile system in as much detail as I could. I have read the speeches of Secretary McNamara and his testimony and have heard testimony of many experts. There are conflicting views in this country as to the value of the system, as to its cost, and whether or not such a defensive system would be as effective as the improvement of our offensive ballistic missile system.

As I understand it, a limited system to defend against a Communist Chinese threat is estimated to cost $5 billion. It will probably cost more. If a complete system could be established, one that was believed to be adequate against the Soviet Union, it would cost, at a minimum, $40 billion. Many believe it would cost $70 billion to $100 billion.

A few moments ago, in a colloquy with Senator STENNIS I asked questions but, in the short time available, it was not possible to have an adequate discussion. My first question was, Is it possible to separate research and development of the weapons from actual physical deployment? According to the report of the committee, on the authorization for fiscal year 1969 and the explanation given on the floor yesterday by the Senator from Mississippi [Mr. STENNIS], who is managing the bill, $313 million would be provided for development and $342.7 million for procurement and operational deployment. In the answers that I have been able to secure about these sums $342 million could be used for the actual deployment of the system.

My amendment is not a very restrictive one. I did not vote for the amendment of the Senator from Wisconsin, Senator NELSON, for I want to know if the system can be proved to be practicable in the event that the Soviet Union will not take any steps to resume the establishment of such a system. But I do not want to vote for the spending of billions of dollars toward the physical deployment of such a system including installation to protect silos, which would be to that extent, the initiation of a defensive system against the Soviet Union, unless there is adequate research providing at least reasonable assurance that such a system would be practicable and best for our security.

My amendment provides that no part of the funds authorized under this bill would be used toward the deployment of the system, until the Secretary of Defense certifies to the Congress that it has been proven, by research, that the system is practicable and that the cost can be reasonably estimated.

As I said, it is not a very restrictive amendment. On the other hand, it is a strong amendment in that it would assure, every year, an opportunity for the Armed Services Committee and the Appropriations Committee and the Congress as a whole to ask the question: Has research proved that this system will work, and that it would be practical? What kind of research and development has been done. Are we continuing to commit ourselves to a system which may not work at all, which may not be as valuable to our security as the improvement of our existing offensive system? Does it stand in the way of an agreement with the Soviet Union on this problem?

There is no assurance of arriving at an agreement with the Soviet Union on this matter, but the other points I have made are, I believe, of great importance.

So I would urge that the amendment be adopted as a minimum to insure the continued investigation by the Congress of the value of such a system, to give us an opportunity to examine the question every year, and to impose upon the Department of Defense the condition that it must not ask for the deployment of a system until it is certain that it will work.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I yield myself 5 minutes.

Mr. President, with great deference to the Senator, the term "deployment" is not used in the bill before us.

The military construction bill that will come later, which will have to do with the actual missile sites, will provide $263 million for construction. That certainly would be a deployment. But the $342 million in the bill before us today is for procurement. That is to make the missiles, to pay for them. So, while I do not wish to be technical about it, that is the issue that the Senator presents, as I understand it, and what he wants to get at.

Mr. President, if I understand the committee system in the Senate and the House of Representatives, both as to the Armed Services Committees and the Committees on Appropriations, what the Senator proposes in his amendment is exactly what the officials who ask for money have to do when they come in to support the requests that are in the budget. Not only do they, in effect, have to certify, but they have to withstand cross examination as to the workability, the reliability, and the usability of every piece of hardware that they have requested.

If I understand the terms correctly, so far as the meaning is concerned, I would not particularly object to the amendment, but I do believe that it would be a far better practice, custom, and precedent to rely upon the system that we have, of developing this information in the committees before which the representatives of the departments and agency must justify the matters which they request. Every year, there is a bite to be taken by the authorization committees of the Senate and of the House and by the Appropriations Committees of the Senate and of the House. That is one of the great things about the system.

In this case, it must come up in the authorization bill, also, for the actual sites themselves. Later will come the military construction authorization. So we have a double justification all the way around. The Department of Defense and the President of the United States have to make the request, and their representatives have to testify.

So I am afraid that here we would just be running a false line, the purposes of which have already been served, and, with deference, I do not see what the amendment would accomplish.

The issue, though—and I think we voted on it just a few minutes ago—is not simply the question of stopping the development of the system, but concerns the missiles themselves. We have voted that we are not going to stop procurement. I believe, with great deference to the Senator, that the earlier vote was the controlling one, and that we would be entirely safe, therefore, to leave off something that could be confusing.

Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, how much time do I have remaining?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 8 minutes remaining.

Mr. COOPER. I yield 5 minutes to the Senator from Missouri.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, I voted for the previous amendment on the ABM, as presented by the distinguished Senator from Wisconsin.

In listening to testimony before the committee, it was never clear to me why it was not necessary to have an antiballistic-missile system to protect us against the Soviet Union's developments in this field, but it was necessary to have one that protected us against the very limited Chinese developments. Frankly, that just did not make sense to me.

I decided, after listening to the testimony, that a large part of the reason why we were turning down a $30 billion system in favor of a $5 billion system was $25 billion, and just could not follow the position taken by the Department of Defense. I concluded that if it was not necessary for this country to defend itself against a ballistic missile attack from the Soviet Union, it was not in the Nation's interest to spend billions on defense against a possible future danger—something the Chinese will probably develop in years to come. If the arguments against developing an ABM to protect us from the Soviet Union are sound, in my opinion, the arguments for developing a system to protect us against the Chinese are unsound.

For these reasons I will vote for the amendment offered by the distinguished Senator from Kentucky.

Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, I yield 3 minutes to the Senator from Illinois.

Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, I support the amendment of the distinguished Senator from Kentucky. I do so because, as a procurement officer for the U.S. Navy 23 years ago, in Washington, I saw billions of dollars wasted by rushing into production in time of war on items that we were not ready for production, when the design had not been frozen. I have seen millions of dollars wasted by myself and other manufacturers, in our anxiety to get into production on a system that really was not proven.

As we consider the authorization for military procurement, research and development, and authorized personnel strength of the Selected Reserves, I think we have not only the responsibility to determine what is essential for the defense of our Nation, but also the responsibility to authorize only what is really necessary and desirable, at a time when so much needs to be done to improve the quality of life for many millions of Americans, and when the dollar can only be further weakened by extravagance.

Mr. President, we cannot afford to squander our resources. Let us have what we must have, but let us do without that which we can safely do without. In this regard, some Senators have noted that there are serious questions about the wisdom or necessity of expenditures for ABM defense. I believe that those who oppose the entire concept of ABM defense have raised important points, but I feel it is essential that we not permit our technological know-how to fall far behind that of another nation in significant weaponry such as this. I think that ABM research and development should and must continue.

However, I do question whether manufacture and deployment of ABM missiles in this coming fiscal year is practicable or desirable. It would be imprudent to manufacture and deploy, on a wide scale, any unproved system. We have had experience, in recent years, with hasty manufacture and deployment. We can certainly remember the M–16 rifle, which was sent to the field after inadequate trial, and experienced questionable performance in what trials it had. We can remember the TFX, which was sent to the field after inadequate trial, and inadequate performance in what trials it had. In both cases, the M–16 and the TFX, the early combat results were scandalous.

We must learn from these experiences. We must not hasten an unproved system into manufacture and deployment. If the Defense Department had listened to some of our congressional committees before on some of these designs, and had not rushed into production, we would have saved millions of dollars and many lives, and certainly would not have been hasty in what we were doing.

I think that pressure to get into a system before it is proven is the case in this situation. As I understand it, all the Senator from Kentucky is asking for is a certification by the Secretary of Defense as to the provability of the system, and its practicability. I think the amendment, therefore, is in the spirit of what our committees are attempting to do, by cautionary restraint, in order to authorize what is needed and necessary, but not to rush into production simply because of popular pressure for a system that is not yet, in my judgment, proven.

I therefore support the Senator's amendment.

Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, how much time do I have remaining?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Kentucky has 3 minutes remaining.

Mr. COOPER. I yield 1 minute to the Senator from Wisconsin.

Mr. NELSON. Mr. President, I rise to support the amendment of the Senator from Kentucky. I should like to make one point: I think the most dramatic result of the debate here this afternoon is that, for the first time, it has been stated by distinguished leaders of the Senate, the Senator from Mississippi and the Senator from Rhode Island, that these are really the foundation blocks; the beginning of the heavy ABM system.

When Secretary McNamara testified before the committee this year, he stated that this is just an anti-Chinese missile system; that there is no conceivable technology to justify building the $40 billion system. However, the speeches on the floor by the Senator from Mississippi and the Senator from Rhode Island tell us clearly now that a dramatic decision has been made to start the beginning of

an irreversible trend all the way to the heavy system. I think the public ought to know it. I think Congress ought to know it.

I have been reading the testimony and literature for the last 2 days. This is the first time I have heard anyone say that it was anything other than an anti-China system.

If we go all the way in this tremendous escalation that the distinguished scientists and former Secretary of Defense McNamara have argued against, we ought to have the pending bill on the floor under consideration for another week, and not settle it here in 1 day.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, will the Senator from Maine yield me a minute or two on the bill?

Mrs. SMITH. Mr. President, I will be very glad to do so. I yield to the Senator from New York whatever time he desires on the bill.

Mr. JAVITS. Two minutes will be adequate.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New York is recognized for 2 minutes.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I shall support the pending amendment, in part because of the parallel with the experience we had with the TFX. I sat on the Subcommittee on Investigations throughout the TFX controversy, and I had the very deep feeling that we ought not lynch people, ex post facto, so to speak, for a mistake in judgment, even though their misjudgment proved to be a costly matter.

I wish that, before we embarked on such an all-encompassing program as the TFX, we had understood the power of the purse, and its meaning, better than we did when we were committed to spend billions of dollars. We might have seen the error sooner, if not prevented it altogether, if we had had the benefit of a full airing of the merits and feasibilities of the matter under consideration.

The amendment of Senator COOPER is an effort to use the power of the purse intelligently—to turn the use of the enormous technical apparatus which the Defense Department has for the evaluation of matters of this kind to the service of the Congress in its deliberation, and not just leave that great reservoir of skill to its all too often task of "justifying" a decision of the administration.

We should put them to the hardest kind of proof that we can subject them to before Congress itself because this is a matter which bears on the most vital and sophisticated aspects of high strategy. Let us not repeat the mistakes of Vietnam—of leaping before we looked, and of edging by stages into what turned out to be the most costly strategic blunder of this century.

The most ardent advocates of the Sentinel, or "thin ABM" system, it seems to me, are those who really want a full-blown, "heavy," anti-Soviet ABM system. Moreover, they are often also the stanchest advocates of maintaining blindly at all cost a two-to-one "nuclear supremacy" over the U.S.S.R., even though many of the most advanced and sophisticated strategic thinkers in the Nation reject this approach as not only simplistic but actually dangerous, as well as meaningless in the sense of providing any real security to the Nation. I am not sure just what the right answer is to these grave and highly sophisticated questions. But we cannot, as Senators, just accept somebody's word on this, even though that person may be the most honorable and distinguished of men. These are matters which ought to be given the fullest deliberation by the entire Senate, and they should be brought to the attention of the Senate as a great matter to be considered in the round and not just piecemeal and in terms of specific pieces of military hardware to be procured.

From that point of view and in view of the delicacy of the problem of the thin anti-ballistic-missile system, the problem of what it may lead to, the agitation for a heavier system, which seems unwise, possible advances of the "art" which could lessen the validity of Secretary McNamara's theory in his famous San Francisco speech, in terms of new missile penetration power, and so forth—for all of these reasons, I believe the Senator from Kentucky [Mr. COOPER] has provided us with a wise and intelligent precaution.

I shall support the amendment of the Senator from Kentucky.

I thank the Senator from Maine very much for yielding to me.

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield me 1 minute?

Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, I yield 1 minute to the Senator from Pennsylvania.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Pennsylvania is recognized for 1 minute.

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President, I have no long speech to make.

I support the amendment.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I yield 5 minutes to the Senator from South Carolina.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have recommended a full anti-ballistic-missile system. That is the system to protect us against nuclear attack from the Soviet Union.

The system the administration is recommending is a thin system which will only protect us against nuclear attack from Red China.

I think it is a mistake that the administration did not go further. However, this is better than nothing. This will help us to get on the way toward the full ABM system recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

This system is practical. It has already been tested. I have called the office of General Betts, Chief of the Army Research and Development, since the debate began.

There have been 11 successful intercepts of ICBM's by the Nike-Zeus installation on the island of Kwajalein. The percentage of hits is classified, but I can assure you that it is impressive.

So, the ABM has been proven to be successful.

This is not something new that is untried. This fight has been going on for years. It started in about 1957. The Army has been trying to get the full system every year since then. As I said, the Sentinel is not a full system, but it is certainly better than nothing. We cannot afford not to go forward.

The Sentinel ABM system has been developed over the years. The first system was the Nike-Ajax to shoot down planes. The next was the Nike-Hercules to shoot down planes. The next was the Nike-Zeus to intercept missiles from the enemy. Then next was the Nike X to intercept missiles from the enemy.

We now have the Sentinel which is most highly developed and complex. It will also undergo actual tests on the Pacific Missile Range.

The Sentinel system is composed of the Spartan missile which goes for 300 miles or more, and the Sprint missile, which goes to about 100,000 feet. The Sentinel system is composed of those two. So, if we miss with the Spartan, then we can get the missile with the Sprint when it approaches the target.

This is not a new system. It has been improved for years and years. The administration has finally seen the light and recommended deployment of the system. However, they are not going all the way yet.

Nevertheless, this is better than nothing. We cannot afford to wait. We must remember that the Soviets have a system developed already.

We must go forward. We cannot afford to postpone this matter.

If nuclear missiles hit America, they will destroy hundreds of millions of dollars worth of property and take millions of lives. For the sake of a few million dollars, we cannot afford to jeopardize the lives and property of the people of America.

I hope that the Senate will reject the amendment.

Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, a statement has been made that the Sentinel ABM system is already successful and that 11 of 14 test firings of the system have been successful.

I would draw the attention of my colleagues to the statement of Gen. Harold K. Johnson, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, before the Committee on Armed Services on February 16, 1968.

General Johnson testified about the readiness of the Sentinel system's five components, as follows:

First. Spartan missile: Component testing completed; first firing scheduled.

Second. Sprint missile: 15 firings as of mid-December 1967; no evaluation of testing given.

Third. Perimeter acquisition radar: In design stage.

Fourth. Missile site radar: Checkout expected by the end of this year.

Fifth. Data processing equipment: Design and fabrication on schedule.

Therefore, according to General Johnson in his testimony, the Sentinel system has never been tested as a unit and only one of its five major components has been tested.

I submit this to amplify and correct the RECORD and support Senator COOPER's amendment.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I think this is an important matter. To a degree it is an attack on the committee

system. It would be a reflection on the system, in my view.

What the amendment requires of the Secretary is the very thing I said is done in the committee over and over again. We require the best justification available from all sources.

We are not rushing this matter. It has been under experimentation in research and development since about 1956 or 1957, somewhere in there. It has taken a gradual upward course.

Responsible officials say now that it is workable and is usable and is practical.

I do not know of anyone that is trying to rush it. This is an effort to make it available. If this becomes part of the law of the land, construction of the sites must be approved in the military construction bill. A separate measure will be concerned with construction of the missile launchers and radars. The Department proposes to use existing bases and Government-owned land to the maximum degree it can.

What I said about the building-block system is not a commitment to an antiballistic-missile system to defend against the Soviets. I merely said that if facts cause us to take such a step, we could still utilize what we are doing on the anti-Red China system.

Those are the issues. I hope that we can keep this authorization free of a certification requirement and that the committees will proceed and have recommendations to make in the future.

ABM SCHEME WASTEFUL, DANGEROUS AND INEFFECTIVE

Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, according to Senator STENNIS' explanation of this bill yesterday, it includes a total of $984 million for development and deployment of a ballistic-missile defense system. Of that amount $343 million is for procurement, $313 million is for Sentinel development, $165 million is for advanced development work on new tactical approaches to ballistic-missile defense, and $103 million for the Defender program being conducted by the Advance Research Project Agency.

As I recall, the original estimate of the cost of deploying the so-called thin ABM was $5 billion. I am wondering whether all of the $984 million to be authorized for fiscal year 1969 is included in that $5 billion estimate, and whether the original calculations of the cost of this system are proving to be accurate in light of experience. This is something all Senators should know before proceeding on this authorization.

The President and the Secretary of Defense last year wisely resisted the considerable pressure to deploy a Soviet-oriented ABM, and it seems to me that their logic is irrefutable. As Secretary McNamara pointed out:

> It is a virtual certainty that the Soviets will act to maintain their deterrent which casts such grave doubts on the advisability of our deploying the NIKE-X system for the protection of our cities against the kind of heavy, sophisticated missile attack they could launch in the 1970s. In all probability, all we would accomplish would be to increase greatly both their defense expenditures and ours without any gain in real security to either side.

It is clear that any attempt on our part to provide a defense system against a Soviet missile attack would be countered by an increase in the Soviet ICBM force sufficient to maintain their assured-destruction capability, and that such an increase would be well within their technical and financial resources.

The essential fact to be recognized is that an effective ABM deployment against the Soviet Union is an impossibility, and if existential proof of this is desired we need only examine our own response to the limited ABM deployment that has been taking place in the Soviet Union. We are moving to increase our destructive capabilities to render that ABM useless.

In this connection it is also significant that during the hearings on S. 3293 in January, Secretary McNamara firmed up earlier intelligence community beliefs that the so-called "Tallinn" defensive deployment in the Soviet Union has no significant ABM capability, and that the Galosh system around Moscow is consequently the only work being done in this area. Moreover, while the Galosh deployment has proceeded at a moderate pace, no effort has been made during the past year to expand it or to extend it to other cities.

Military leaders in both the United States and the Soviet Union were exerting substantial pressure for ABM deployment early in the 1960's. We decided against the Nike-Zeus, but the pro-ABM forces in Moscow apparently won at least a partial victory. It seems quite probable to me, however, that the Soviets are now reassessing that decision, in light of the fact that its net effect was a futile waste of resources, both theirs and ours.

I can conceive of no justification for us to follow a mistaken and wasteful policy simply because the Soviet Union made a wrong decision at the beginning of the decade.

In January of last year, Secretary McNamara testified before Defense Appropriations hearings that, had we produced and deployed the Nike-Zeus system proposed by the Army in 1959—at an estimated cost of $13 to $14 billion, most of it would have had to be torn out and replaced, almost before it became operational, by the new missiles and radars of the Nike-X system. Turning to the so-called "thin" deployment now, is it not possible or probable that the same fate awaits the Sentinel system, and that it will occur prior to the mid-1970's when the Chinese are expected to have a small number of primitive ICBM's capable of attacking the United States?

The estimates that I have seen indicate that the Sentinel deployment, consisting primarily of long-range area defense Spartan missiles, could hold Chinese damage potential to low levels into the mid-1970's. Beyond that point it is estimated that the China-oriented ABM system, assuming nothing has occurred to diminish China's determination to establish its own nuclear missile force, will have reached a degree of sophistication which will, as in the case of the Soviet Union, render our ABM system useless. It is expected, for example, that multiple warhead devices and dummy rockets could easily evade the relatively low Spartan interceptor, which operates outside of the atmosphere where it is impossible to distinguish between incoming objects to determine which carries a warhead, or even which is a missile.

I have been advised, however, that we are somewhat optimistic in even predicting that the "thin" system will protect us for a decade, since that estimate does not take into account the likelihood that the Chinese will, in response to our ABM deployment, accelerate their ICBM development program and increase the amount of resources applied to it. It is probable that the period in which we could hold U.S. deaths to under 1 million is not 10 years but 6 or less.

What we are discussing, therefore, is whether it is prudent for the United States to invest many billions of dollars on an ABM system that is going to become totally obsolete within a relatively few years, on the assumption that during that brief period our ability to virtually obliterate China after any strike they could launch is an insufficient deterrent to Chinese nuclear aggression.

But the question goes beyond this. We have to note that the Spartan cannot protect against missiles launched from low-flying aircraft or from submarines, and many strategists believe that if the Chinese were foolish enough to commit suicide they would be much more likely to use this approach than to launch ICBM's.

We must also question whether, in the hopes of providing a marginal increase to our security from a fatal miscalculation on the part of the Chinese, we are not also stimulating a larger threat by encouraging the Soviet Union to deploy more offensive missiles to overcome what they conceive to be a potential reduction in their capabilities caused by our ABM. Most certainly our "thin" system is touching off the same kind of debate in the Soviet Union as we are experiencing as a result of their Galosh deployment. As current disputes over our "overkill" ability also indicate, they are likely to respond by deploying missiles going beyond what would be required to offset our ABM. We, in turn, will be drawn into another round of nuclear expansionism.

Mr. President, I am convinced that it is 20th century mythology to assert that the proposed China oriented ABM encompasses any degree of added protection and security for the American people. Its aim is to defend against a strike that only madmen, willing to accept the inevitable destruction of their own country and its people, would launch, and it cannot even do that with any measure of success. If it has any value in that respect it is more than offset by its invitation to expansion of the nuclear arms race at heightened risks and costs to both sides.

The need for deletion of this item is especially great in view of the intense budgetary pressures that are being applied throughout the Federal Government. I cannot see how we can justify pouring more millions into this project, when we are telling schoolchildren that we have to cutback millions on library materials and education, when we are advising farmers and small businessmen that economy requires cutbacks in their programs, and when we are deferring job training efforts to help people lift themselves out of despair because there just are not enough funds.

I urge the adoption of the pending amendment.

Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, how much time remains?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Kentucky is out of time.

The Senator from Mississippi has 6 minutes remaining.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I am glad to yield 2 minutes to the Senator from Kentucky.

Mr. COOPER. I thank the Senator for his courtesy.

The Senator, with his usual courtesy, did not say the amendment attacks the committee system, but he suggests that it might have that effect. I do not intend that purpose at all. Its purpose is just the opposite. One purpose of the amendment is to impose upon the Department of Defense the obligation to assure Congress that its research and development does prove that the system is practicable—practicable in operation, practicable for the defense of this country—and that it would provide us each year a new appraisal of the system.

I voted against the amendment of the Senator from Wisconsin [Mr. NELSON] because I am not ready to say, in my own mind and conscience, that we should not approve such a system to save lives and for security. I have studied the matter. There is a great contrariety of opinion as to the system's value, its cost, and its effect upon the increase of armament, and the armaments race. I want to do all that I can to secure this country. But I also want to be assured, as I believe most of us do, that we have full and accurate information from the Department of Defense every year—a willingness upon its part, and on the part of the Secretary of Defense, to report that it is practicable not in its technical operation but in its contribution to the overall defense and security of this country, before we engage in a $5 million program which will lead to a $70 billion to $100 billion operation.

Above all we need debate now, every year to determine whether such a system is the best measure we can take for our security, or will it create new dangers.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished Senator from Colorado.

Mr. DOMINICK. Mr. President, I have been listening to the debate. I shall not take long.

Some of the difficulty with the amendment seems apparent to me when we consider the cost of advancing the TFX. In effect, the Secretary of Defense certified the need for the TFX and the overall cost, and he was not right on either point. The Committee on Armed Services has just taken action in order to cut out the F-111B after we spent literally hundreds of millions of dollars in the development of it, based on his recommendation.

There are many other instances in the committee report before us in which the committee has acted in opposition to the Defense Department on particular recommendations. It strikes me that we would be putting the cart before the horse, particularly in light of the history of the TFX and other items that I could mention but will not at this time, for us at this point to say that any action which the committee is going to take or Congress is going to take must be based on the certification of the Defense Department.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I yield back the remainder of my time.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. All remaining time on the amendment has been yielded back.

The question is on agreeing to the amendment of the Senator from Kentucky. On this question, the yeas and nays have been ordered, and the clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk called the roll.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. I announce that the Senator from New Mexico [Mr. ANDERSON], the Senator from Indiana [Mr. BAYH], the Senator from Nevada [Mr. BIBLE], the Senator from Washington [Mr. JACKSON], the Senator from North Carolina [Mr. JORDAN], the Senator from Missouri [Mr. LONG], the Senator from Oklahoma [Mr. MONRONEY], the Senator from Oregon [Mr. MORSE], and the Senator from West Virginia [Mr. RANDOLPH] are absent on official business.

I also announce that the Senator from North Dakota [Mr. BURDICK], the Senator from Idaho [Mr. CHURCH], the Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. CLARK], the Senator from Connecticut [Mr. DODD], the Senator from Mississippi [Mr. EASTLAND], the Senator from North Carolina [Mr. ERVIN], the Senator from Tennessee [Mr. GORE], the Senator from Oklahoma [Mr. HARRIS], the Senator from Alabama [Mr. HILL], the Senator from South Carolina [Mr. HOLLINGS], the Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. KENNEDY], the Senator from New York [Mr. KENNEDY], the Senator from Ohio [Mr. LAUSCHE], the Senator from Louisiana [Mr. LONG], the Senator from Washington [Mr. MAGNUSON], the Senator from Minnesota [Mr. MCCARTHY], the Senator from Montana [Mr. METCALF], and the Senator from Florida [Mr. SMATHERS], are necessarily absent.

I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator from North Carolina [Mr. ERVIN], would vote "nay."

On this vote the Senator from Indiana [Mr. BAYH] is paired with the Senator from Washington [Mr. MAGNUSON]. If present and voting, the Senator from Indiana would vote "yea," and the Senator from Washington would vote "nay."

On this vote, the Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. CLARK] is paired with the Senator from Connecticut [Mr. DODD]. If present and voting, the Senator from Pennsylvania would vote "yea," and the Senator from Connecticut would vote "nay."

On this vote, the Senator from New York [Mr. KENNEDY] is paired with the Senator from South Carolina [Mr. HOLLINGS]. If present and voting, the Senator from New York would vote "yea," and the Senator from South Carolina would vote "nay."

On this vote, the Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. KENNEDY] is paired with the Senator from Washington [Mr. JACKSON]. If present and voting, the Senator from Massachusetts would vote "yea," and the Senator from Washington would vote "nay."

On this vote, the Senator from Montana [Mr. METCALF] is paired with the Senator from Oklahoma [Mr. MONRONEY]. If present and voting, the Senator from Montana would vote "yea," and the Senator from Oklahoma would vote "nay."

On this vote, the Senator from Oregon [Mr. MORSE] is paired with the Senator from West Virginia [Mr. RANDOLPH]. If present and voting, the Senator from Oregon would vote "yea," and the Senator from West Virginia would vote "nay."

Mr. HICKENLOOPER. I announce that the Senator from Colorado [Mr. ALLOTT] is absent on official business.

The Senator from Tennessee [Mr. BAKER], the Senator from New Jersey [Mr. CASE], the Senator from New Hampshire [Mr. COTTON], the Senator from Nebraska [Mr. CURTIS], the Senator from Illinois [Mr. DIRKSEN], the Senator from Arizona [Mr. FANNIN], the Senator from Wyoming [Mr. HANSEN], the Senators from California [Mr. KUCHEL and Mr. MURPHY], the Senator from Iowa [Mr. MILLER], the Senator from Kentucky [Mr. MORTON], and the Senator from Kansas [Mr. PEARSON] are necessarily absent.

The Senator from North Dakota [Mr. YOUNG] is detained on official business.

If present and voting, the Senator from Colorado [Mr. ALLOTT], the Senator from Nebraska [Mr. CURTIS], the Senator from Illinois [Mr. DIRKSEN], the Senator from Arizona [Mr. FANNIN], the Senators from California [Mr. KUCHEL and Mr. MURPHY], the Senator from Iowa [Mr. MILLER], and the Senator from Kansas [Mr. PEARSON] would each vote "nay."

The result was announced—yeas 28, nays 31, as follows:

[No. 111 Leg.]

YEAS—28

Aiken	Inouye	Prouty
Bartlett	Javits	Proxmire
Boggs	Jordan, Idaho	Scott
Brooke	Mansfield	Symington
Cooper	McGovern	Tydings
Fulbright	Mondale	Williams, N.J.
Gruening	Moss	Williams, Del.
Hart	Nelson	Young, Ohio
Hartke	Pell	
Hatfield	Percy	

NAYS—31

Bennett	Hickenlooper	Russell
Brewster	Holland	Smith
Byrd, Va.	Hruska	Sparkman
Byrd, W. Va.	McClellan	Spong
Cannon	McGee	Stennis
Carlson	McIntyre	Talmadge
Dominick	Montoya	Thurmond
Ellender	Mundt	Tower
Fong	Muskie	Yarborough
Griffin	Pastore	
Hayden	Ribicoff	

NOT VOTING—41

Allott	Ervin	Long, La.
Anderson	Fannin	Magnuson
Baker	Gore	McCarthy
Bayh	Hansen	Metcalf
Bible	Harris	Miller
Burdick	Hill	Monroney
Case	Hollings	Morse
Church	Jackson	Morton
Clark	Jordan, N.C.	Murphy
Cotton	Kennedy, Mass.	Pearson
Curtis	Kennedy, N.Y.	Randolph
Dirksen	Kuchel	Smathers
Dodd	Lausche	Young, N. Dak.
Eastland	Long, Mo.	

So Mr. COOPER's amendment was rejected.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the amendment was rejected.

Mr. THURMOND. I move to lay that motion on the table.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I yield myself 5 minutes on the bill.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. WILLIAMS of New Jersey in the chair). The Senator from West Virginia is recognized.

TRIBUTES TO SENATOR PASTORE ON HIS RETURN TO THE SENATE

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, someone has said that character is that quality which draws a man toward God and draws other men toward him.

One of the Members of the Senate who is most respected by all of his colleagues as a man of the highest character, integrity, and honor is the senior Senator from Rhode Island [Mr. PASTORE]. We admire, respect, and love him.

Recently, we were all greatly concerned, therefore, when the Senator from Rhode Island was forced, because of illness, to be away from the Senate.

During the period of his convalescence, he kept in touch with the work of the Senate through his faithful staff, and we, in turn, were kept advised of his progress.

We were so glad, therefore, to see Senator PASTORE return to his desk in the Senate Chamber on yesterday.

As is so typical of him, he immediately joined in the floor debate yesterday, and again today, in his customary colorful, vigorous, and effective way.

It is good to welcome the return of our genial and able colleague. We have missed his scintillating wit and his wise counsel. We are gratified to see him back and thankful that his recovery appears so complete. I think that we all must feel better in seeing that he looks so well.

The Senator from Rhode Island [Mr. PASTORE] is one of the most remarkable men ever to serve in this body. A man of deep compassion, unusual intellect, broad vision, and rock-ribbed integrity—JOHN PASTORE is a great Senator, a Christian gentleman, and a great American.

May God favor him and bless him with good health and many more years of useful service to the Senate and to the Nation.

I take great pleasure in expressing my own personal good wishes to the Senator from Rhode Island and to his devoted wife and family.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I join in the sentiments expressed in the remarks of the Senator from West Virginia. I do not know that I have ever seen anyone come back to the floor of the Senate after the absence of an illness, or for any other reason, and be so warmly received and with so much genuine rejoicing in this Chamber, than the return of Senator PASTORE on yesterday.

Today, again, he is back with us and made a very fine contribution to debate, in his usual fine fashion and splendid way.

The Senator from West Virginia has rendered a great service to the Senate by expressing his fine sentiments about JOHN PASTORE.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I, too, would like to join with all Senators in expressing my great pleasure that JOHN PASTORE is back on the job.

He is an extremely valuable Senator, as well as a great friend. He is one of the most warmhearted people in this body.

It is therefore a personal delight to me to welcome him back to the Senate.

Mrs. SMITH. Mr. President, I, too, join all Senators in extending a warm welcome to Senator JOHN PASTORE, of Rhode Island.

We are all so pleased to have him back and looking so well.

Mr. BYRD of Virginia. Mr. President, I associate myself with all the remarks which have been made about the return to the Senate of the great Senator from Rhode Island [Mr. PASTORE]. We are so pleased that he is back at work in the Senate. He is one of the ablest and finest men with whom I have had the opportunity to associate.

I feel that the Senate, today and yesterday, is a better place because JOHN PASTORE of Rhode Island is back among us.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Virginia [Mr. BYRD] for his very gracious remarks.

Mr. PELL. Mr. President, once again, I associate myself with the remarks of the Senator from West Virginia [Mr. BYRD] and all other Senators who have welcomed back my own good friend and senior colleague [Mr. PASTORE].

I have already expressed myself yesterday, but wish to take advantage of this opportunity to once again say welcome back and all best wishes to my distinguished colleague.

Mr. HOLLINGS. Mr. President, it is with great pleasure that I note the recent return of my good friend and colleague, Senator PASTORE, of Rhode Island.

Unfortunately, Senator PASTORE's recent illness prevented him from being present to see some 10 years of effort on his part culminated in the passage of the textile trade measure. Senator PASTORE has been the leader in this field. He began back in 1958 with the Pastore subcommittee which held hearings proving conclusively the damage being done to the American textile industry and to the jobs of American textile workers by low-wage textile imports. Since that time Senator PASTORE has remained in the vanguard of the movement to save the jobs of 2 million textile workers.

He has worked on every level in the Congress and in the executive branch to secure a reasonable remedy. He was instrumental in the planning and implementation of the long-term textile arrangement.

Since I have been in the Senate he has been my counselor concerning how best to secure the enactment of a legislative remedy for the American textile industry.

Of course, this is only one area of Senator PASTORE's concern. His leadership on the Commerce Committee which I am privileged to serve with him, has resulted in a significant upgrading and growth in the educational broadcasting field. Additionally, his keen mind and excellent judgment have provided needed improvements in every legislative area during my stay here.

I am pleased to have this opportunity to welcome back a great Senator and a great American.

Mr. TYDINGS. Mr. President, for several months the Senate has been deprived by illness of one of its most able and vital Members. We have sorely missed the senior Senator from Rhode Island whose brilliance, leadership, ingenuity, and eloquence in debate have inspired his colleagues, dismayed opponents, and delighted galleries here for 17 years.

It is, therefore, a special pleasure to note today that our distinguished colleague, Senator JOHN PASTORE, has returned, and graces the Senate once again with his characteristic energy and good humor. We welcome him with affection and want him to know that in his absence we had ample cause to recognize anew how valuable is his presence here—not only to the people of Rhode Island whom he so devotedly represents, but to his colleagues and to all of the American people.

Mr. YOUNG of Ohio. Mr. President, I, too, desire to manifest my affection and express my admiration for our distinguished colleague, JOHN PASTORE. The great State of Rhode Island may be the smallest State in the Union, but no Senator of the United States stands higher in the affection and admiration of his colleagues than does the senior Senator from Rhode Island. I associate myself with the congratulatory remarks of other Senators who have welcomed him back.

Yesterday, I rejoiced to see Senator JOHN PASTORE in the Chamber for the first time following 3 months of confinement in a hospital and in his home due to serious illness and felt very happy to observe that he is now enjoying exceptionally good health. Also to learn that his physicians have reported that he has completely recovered.

We are so happy to have him back, and to know that he will be active in the Senate for many years to come on behalf of the citizens of his State and for all Americans of the other 49 States.

Mr. McINTYRE. Mr. President, New England and the United States are both better represented on the floor of the Senate today with the return of our colleague, Senator JOHN PASTORE, to action.

It is difficult to imagine a Senate debate on textiles, or atomic energy or regional affairs or appropriations or practically any topic without the leadership of the dynamic Senator from Rhode Island.

I do want to express my own personal delight with Senator PASTORE's return to good health and full participation in our work.

Mr. MONDALE. Mr. President, I should like to take this opportunity to join those welcoming the distinguished Senator from Rhode Island [Mr. PASTORE] back to his duties in the Senate

after his recent illness. We have missed his leadership and energy sorely.

He has been an effective fighter for social and racial justice, for equal educational opportunity for all Americans, for elimination of poverty and disease. His voice and vote on the Urban Affairs Subcommittee of the Appropriations Committee will be tremendously important to the success of our efforts to meet the challenges and problems of our cities.

We are happy to have him back.

Mr. YARBOROUGH. Mr. President, it is a great pleasure for me to join with my colleagues in the Senate, in welcoming back our colleague, the senior Senator from Rhode Island, JOHN PASTORE, hale and hearty again.

We all see him in debates. We know his dynamic capabilities on the floor of the Senate. We know that he is not excelled by anyone else among us in capability for floor debate, but not all in this body have had the privilege of serving with him on a committee.

It seems to me that it is in committee work that we learn our fellow Senators best.

It has been my privilege to serve on a committee with JOHN PASTORE since I first came to the Senate in 1957. From that date until January 8, 1965, I was a member of the Commerce Committee where JOHN PASTORE was chairman of the Subcommittee on Communications and a very active member of many other subcommittees, being versed in the law and economics of transportation.

Since January 8, 1965, I have served with him on the Committee on Appropriations where he serves on seven important subcommittees and is chairman of the Subcommittee on Deficiencies and Supplementals.

JOHN PASTORE is a Senator who does his homework. He comes to committee meetings.

His diligence and attendance at subcommittee meetings, full committee meetings and hearings, as well as to the vital executive markup sessions is outstanding. He does not wait until the markup to do his work. His searching inquiry at the hearings prepare him for informed participation in the markup sessions. He is what is known as a Senator's Senator, because he carries his full part of the load in every aspect of Senate life—in the committee hearings, in the committee markup sessions, in the report of his committee on the floor, in debate in support of his committee's action on the floor, and in general work on general legislation affecting all of the people of this country, whether it be from his or other committees.

During the weeks of enforced absence due to illness, the Senate has sorely missed him. It has been quieter, duller, less inspiring than in the days of his dynamic contributions.

We welcome JOHN PASTORE back because his voice here is a strength not only for Rhode Island; it is a strength for the people of the United States of America.

Welcome home, JOHN.

Mr. HART. Mr. President, to have Senator PASTORE back adds something vital to the Senate and to each of us who are permitted to serve here with him. I wish that I could put into words the vitality which he brings; courage, grace, style, and decency—these are but some of the clear attributes which mark him.

This Senate and our country are blessed that JOHN PASTORE is back at his desk. I join in the enthusiastic welcome which his colleagues are voicing.

Mr. MOSS. Mr. President, what a welcome and happy occasion to welcome back to the Senate Chamber our esteemed and able colleague, Senator PASTORE from Rhode Island.

I join with my fellow Senators in saying that we have missed his eloquence and his decisive leadership.

We are glad that he is restored in health and is with us once again.

Mr. HARTKE. Mr. President, it is indeed a pleasure for me personally, and a welcome event for the Senate as a whole, to have Senator PASTORE back among us following his illness and hospitalization. Not only as a colleague in the Senate as a whole, but as a member also of the Subcommittee on Communications of the Senate Commerce Committee, which Senator PASTORE so ably chairs, I welcome his return.

His long service, his vigorous leadership in several areas of responsibility, and his well-known prowess as a fluent, forceful, and convincing debater on the floor of the Senate are qualities for which he has been missed in his absence and which, by the same token, I am delighted to have restored to us once more.

AUTHORIZATION FOR MILITARY PROCUREMENT, 1969

The Senate resumed the consideration of the bill (S. 3293) to authorize appropriations during the fiscal year 1969 for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, and tracked combat vehicles, research, development, test, and evaluation for the Armed Forces, and to prescribe the authorized personnel strength of the Selected Reserve of each Reserve component of the Armed Forces, and for other purposes.

Mr. JAVITS. If the Senator from West Virginia will yield to me, I have told the leadership about this matter, that I may make my amendment the pending business overnight. If the Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. CLARK] wishes to speak, of course, I am glad to step aside. However, he is not in the Chamber at the moment and I am not sure as to plans for his amendment or when he would want to bring it up. Is that agreeable to the Senator from West Virginia?

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. It is agreeable, and with that understanding I am happy to yield to the Senator from New York.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I call up my amendment now at the desk and ask that it be stated.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment will be stated.

The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

On page 4, line 7, insert after "SEC. 301" the following: "(a)"; and on page 4, line 16, at the end thereof, insert the following:

"(b) Insofar as practicable, the Secretary of Defense shall take into account as a favorable factor in awarding contracts for procurement under this Act the undertaking by a contractor submitting a bid to employ a substantial number of unemployed or low-income persons in carrying out the contract, and shall otherwise encourage employers performing work on contracts made pursuant to this section to train and employ such persons in carrying out such contracts."

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN GERMANY ON THE ODER-NEISSE FRONTIER

Mr. PELL. Mr. President, two more signs of realism and commonsense have recently emerged from Germany on the Oder-Neisse debate that has been conducted during the past 10 years. The first sign was when a distinguished group of Catholic laymen—in a statement similar to one issued by a group of Protestant laymen of several years ago—urged the recognition of the Oder-Neisse line as the final frontier with Poland. The memorandum issued by the group states that the recognition of the Oder-Neisse as the frontier with Poland is essential to reconciliation between the two countries. The second and even more dramatic development was the announcement on March 18 by Foreign Minister Brandt urging his party to support in principle the idea of recognizing the Oder-Neisse as the frontier between Germany and Poland.

I welcome these signs of movement, Mr. President, for I firmly believe that realism offers the best basis for a foreign policy and the only solid basis of relations between states. There is no doubt in my mind that the Polish Communist regime, along with the other Communist Parties in Eastern Europe, uses the unstable frontier question as an excuse to excite the anti-German feelings simmering in Poland. By eliminating this unnecessary irritant, the Federal Republic will erode some of the ground from under the Communist Warsaw Pact structure and will do so at a time when the situation in Eastern Europe is changing dramatically.

One reason West Germany does not exercise political weight commensurate with its economic power can be laid directly to its inability to come to grips with the problem of delineating a fixed frontier with her eastern neighbor. This rigid position in the past has gained the Federal Republic nothing, while it has severely limited her room for maneuver with the countries of Eastern Europe. Furthermore, it has also considerably weakened its position in diplomatic confrontations with her European allies.

At a time when all of Eastern Europe is in a state of turmoil and ferment, the Federal Republic should free itself of the shackles of an outdated policy which will allow it to play the useful role that is its potential in that area. By so doing, West Germany will not only be doing itself a favor, but it will be rendering a service to all of the Western allies.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that two editorials on this subject—one from the Providence Journal and the other from the Newport Daily News—be printed in the RECORD, together with an excerpt from Foreign Minister Brandt's speech of March 18.

There being no objection, the material

was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Providence (R.I.) Journal, Mar. 20, 1968]

THE GERMAN PROBLEM

West German Foreign Minister Willy Brandt's suggestion that his country recognize the Oder-Neisse line between East Germany and Poland was a hopeful and encouraging sign that a final solution to the "German problem" may be on the horizon. Mr. Brandt's suggestion, of course, does not commit the coalition government, but it breaks the taboo that has marked West German political life since the formation of the Republic.

In the early years, the pressures were great against conceding that the land occupied by the Poles was anything but a temporary arrangement. For one thing, there were large numbers of refugees from the East living in West Germany, and it was dangerous for a German politician to offend them. Moreover, the world-wide cold war was focussed on Central Europe, and the rigid anti-communism of Chancellor Konrad Adenauer set the tone for West German political life.

Lately, these pressures have not been so strong, but no German politician has had the courage to admit that postwar events have solidified the line of the Oder and Neisse Rivers into a permanent political boundary between Poland and Germany. Mr. Brandt's speech to a Social Democratic Party conference changes all that.

The question now is whether the movement toward acceptance of political reality in Germany will accelerate. This is far from certain: just a week ago, Chancellor Kurt Keisinger, who is the head of the Christian Democratic Union, said the Polish border cannot be recognized until a peace treaty is signed.

If, however, the coalition can be swung into line with Mr. Brandt's thinking, then progress in easing tensions in the area is a very real hope. Furthermore, such a situation could well bring about a further weakening of Russia's hegemony over East-Central Europe, especially East Germany.

East Germany has remained the anchor of the Russian position in Central Europe since the war. More than any other satellite, she remains a Russian puppet, with her government and her economy completely subservient to Moscow. One reason for this, is deep seated Russian fear with respect to Germany. Despite the obvious fact that West Germany is no match for Russia militarily, it is still true that Russia suffered enormously from Germany in the Second World War.

But if it becomes plain that West Germany does not harbor revanchist sentiments about the territory in what is now western Poland, then Moscow probably will be more inclined to permit East Germany a freer rein. This move, along with the increasing evidence of independent thinking and action by regimes in Romania, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary, would be a welcome development.

[From the Newport (R.I.) Daily News, Mar. 27, 1968]

THE ODER-NEISSE LINE

Since the time when the victorious World War II anti-Hitler allies awarded Poland territory west of the Oder and Neisse rivers to compensate for territory taken by the Soviet Union on the east, no West German government has recognized the line as more than a temporary embarrassment.

Foreign Minister Willy Brandt, speaking not for the government but for the Social Democratic party, of which he is chairman, broke a 19-year taboo when he called for recognition of Germany's eastern border with Poland at the Oder and Neisse. The week before, Chancellor Kurt Keisinger, head of the Christian Democratic Union, declared that West Germany could not officially recognize Poland's western border until the signing of a German peace treaty.

EXCERPTS FROM SPEECH BY SPD CHAIRMAN WILLY BRANDT, MARCH 18, 1968

We know that recognition of the Oder-Neisse Line would not even lead to establishment of diplomatic relations with Poland today. That is a fact. It is also a fact that 40 percent of the people who live in these territories already were born there. Nobody is so misguided as to think of any new resettlements.

It is a further fact that the German people particularly want and need reconciliation with Poland. They want and need it, although they do not know when German reunification will take place under a peace treaty. . . . This leads to recognition for, that is to say, respect of the Oder-Neisse Line, until this question can be settled in a peace treaty. This also means that existing European frontiers may not be changed by force, and that the Federal Republic is prepared to commit itself to agreements to this effect. All peoples should be able to live in the certain conviction that frontiers will no longer be changed against their will.

SEA GRANT COLLEGE FUNDING

Mr. PELL. Mr. President, as the sponsor of the Sea Grant College and Program Act of 1966, I have a deep interest in the continued progress and development of that program. Given adequate funding, the sea grant program promises to make a substantial contribution in strengthening this country's ability to exploit more fully and wisely the resources of the sea.

I am delighted, therefore, at the recent proposal by the senior Senator from the State of Washington to provide long-range financing of the sea grant program on a sound and appropriate basis.

The proposal of the Senator from Washington [Mr. MAGNUSON] embodied in S. 3144, would earmark a portion of the Federal Government revenues from Outer Continental Shelf mineral leases for marine research and for the sea grant program. Up to $25 million would be earmarked for marine exploration and mapping and $25 million for the sea grant program. Congress would maintain control of expenditures through the normal annual appropriation process.

Mr. President, I think that the proposal is singularly appropriate. It would be most fitting to reinvest in our national oceanologic programs a portion of the wealth now being extracted from the oceans.

I would point out also that S. 3144 would earmark for these programs not all, but only a modest portion, of the revenues from the Outer Continental Shelf.

When I introduced the sea grant college and program bill in 1965, I proposed then that the program be financed entirely from Continental Shelf revenues. I was persuaded, however, that this approach would not be suitable for the initial funding of a new program. The enthusiastic reception accorded the sea grant program since its enactment by Congress clearly indicates, I think, that the program now merits the funding that would be provided by S. 3144.

Mr. President, the leadership of the senior Senator from Washington [Mr. MAGNUSON] in oceanology is well known to all of us. His proposal for funding of the sea grant college program is but the most recent of his many outstanding contributions in this field. I heartily endorse the proposal.

BREAKWATER TO PROTECT HARBOR AT BRISTOL, R.I.—RESOLUTION OF GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF RHODE ISLAND

Mr. PELL. Mr. President, on behalf of my senior colleague, Senator PASTORE, and myself, I would like to call to the attention of the Senate a resolution of the General Assembly of the State of Rhode Island urging appropriate action by the Congress for construction of a breakwater to protect the harbor at Bristol, R.I.

I have taken a personal interest in this project because of the great need for protection of the waterfront and the substantial commercial and recreational fishing and boating facilities in the Bristol Harbor. I might add that the rapid expansion of recreational boating in Narragansett Bay will continue to increase the requirements for the kind of safe harbor this breakwater would provide.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the full text of the resolution of the Rhode Island General Assembly be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the resolution was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

H. 1720

A resolution memorializing the Members of the United States Senate and House of Representatives from the State of Rhode Island to make every effort to see that action is taken to build a breakwater in Bristol Harbor in the town of Bristol, Rhode Island

Whereas, Bristol, Rhode Island has suffered tremendous amounts of damage from past hurricanes, wave and tide action to its industry, business, railroad property, government property, and yachting facilities; and

Whereas, A public hearing was held on this proposal on December 11, 1957, by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers; and

Whereas, Thereupon surveys and plans for this breakwater were made by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers in 1958; now therefore, be it

Resolved, That the members of the United States senate and house of representatives from the state of Rhode Island are respectfully requested to take proper action to have such breakwater constructed as soon as possible in Bristol harbor in said town of Bristol, Rhode Island; and be it further

Resolved, that the secretary of state be and hereby is authorized to transmit duly certified copies of this resolution to the Rhode Island delegation in congress.

Attest:

AUGUST P. LA FRANCE,
Secretary of State.

RECESS TO 10 A.M. TOMORROW

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, if there be no further business to come before the Senate, I move, in accordance with the previous order, that the Senate stand in recess until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning.

The motion was agreed to; and (at 5 o'clock and 32 minutes p.m.) the Senate took a recess until tomorrow, Friday, April 19, 1968, at 10 a.m.

EXTENSIONS OF REMARKS

What I Owe America as a Citizen

HON. THADDEUS J. DULSKI

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, April 17, 1968

Mr. DULSKI. Mr. Speaker, each year for the past 39 years in my home area of Buffalo, N.Y., an Americanism essay contest has been conducted among students of public and private schools.

Twelve winners were chosen in this year's contest on the topic, "What I Owe America as a Citizen."

The contest is conducted by the Buffalo, N.Y., Evening News and the Erie County American Legion and Auxiliary.

There are 300 schools in the county which participate in the contest, and more than 90,000 students in the sixth through the 12th grades submitted entries.

The winners received a 6-day trip to the Nation's Capital over the Easter holiday, where a special bus took them to the scenic and historic points of interest.

This is a fitting prize for winners of an Americanism essay contest: An opportunity to see their Government and the Capital area close up.

Accompanying the winners were Mr. and Mrs. Joseph E. Porcella, 230 Sanders Road, Buffalo, members of Kensington Post American Legion and Auxiliary; and Mr. David E. Peugeot, promotion editor of the Buffalo Evening News.

Following are the texts of the winning essays:

WHAT I OWE AMERICA AS A CITIZEN

FIRST WINNING ESSAY

(By Marie O'Dierno, 13, 1570 Seneca Street, Buffalo, N.Y., sixth-grade pupil of School 26, winner of the girls division of the Buffalo public elementary school classification; Agnes T. Sullivan, teacher)

America, I owe you my love, loyalty and respect because you have made me a citizen of a free country.

You have given me freedom of speech, press, and religion, and the right to choose my life work. This means I may say what I want, as long as it does not harm others, read what I want of the many books published, go to any church I wish, and work at whatever I choose. Your government has made laws to protect me, and I intend to follow them. I realize that if I am not alert, enemies could take my rights away from me.

I owe it to you to be prepared for the future. I am one of the citizens of tomorrow. I may become a teacher, lawyer, newspaper writer, Congresswoman or even the President of the United States. My classmates and I realize you need the help of every one of us. We are the ones who are going to take care of America. We must get ready now.

At home I am learning to be a good citizen by respecting the rights of each one in my family, sharing in the work with them, and being thankful to God who gave me such wonderful parents.

As a citizen in school, I owe it to you to take advantage of all the opportunities to learn. I will try to read intelligently so that I may understand your government and your laws. I will use my knowledge to help others. You will need educated citizens.

In my community I will join organizations and take part in activities that teach me how to get along with others in my "City of Good Neighbors."

America, I will do my best to help keep you strong, beautiful and free.

SECOND WINNING ESSAY

(By Sophia Pelysko, 17, 750 Glenwood Avenue, Buffalo, N.Y., senior at East High School, winner of girls division of the Buffalo public high school classification; Joseph P. Palermo, teacher)

As a citizen of the United States, I am endowed with many rights and liberties. I have the right to practice my religion, voice my thoughts, and elect my government leaders. But along with these rights, as with all privileges, come responsibilities.

A democratic government is not a one-way street; I, as a responsible citizen, must give as well as take.

First and foremost, I must give loyalty. For our nation to function, the people must be behind her, willing to sacrifice and work for her survival and progress. And in this day of Vietnam, draft-card burnings, and foreign anti-Americanism, I feel our country needs support more than ever. The world is hurling challenges at us everyday. To meet and overcome these challenges, we must face them together, a people unified and dedicated to one cause.

I also owe America a capable, dependable, well-run government. To achieve this, intelligent and educated voting is a paramount necessity. All must strive to elect the best man for the job, and then we must comply with the legislation he passes. No nation can exist if it is forever undermined by those who break its laws. An efficient government must have obedience from its citizens if it is to remain efficent.

And most importantly, I owe America faith—faith that she is in the right, faith in her leaders, faith in her future.

As we live from day to day, work in our businesses, learn in our schools, relax in parks and beaches, we should always believe that if we live hard enough, work hard enough, and learn hard enough, America's future, our future, will remain prosperous and secure. So to America we must devote our entire energies; for America we must endeavor to use our energies for what is good and what is right. Maybe by giving all we have, we may begin to repay the tremendous debt which we, you and I, owe her.

THIRD WINNING ESSAY

(By Robert Fraser, 11, 41 Edison Street, Buffalo, N.Y., sixth-grade pupil of School 70, winner of boys division of the Buffalo public elementary school classification; Margaret A. Songin, teacher)

I am not an American citizen and have been in the United States only three years. However, I am already aware of the great debt I owe to my new land. I know that I owe America my love and dedication through hard work.

The love I owe America can be expressed in many ways—by speaking well of it, by obeying its laws, respecting its representatives, and conserving its natural resources. A boy of my age can do all these things easily.

I am not called on to go to Vietnam to die for my adopted country to prove my love, but I am called on to show my love through daily actions at home, at school and in the playground. Setting a good example for the younger children, I show that I care. This "care" is an expression of my love for America.

It is hard work that has made this country great. Hard work wrote the Constitution and fought the Revolutionary War. Hard work built cities and factories. Hard work is what our forefathers gave unselfishly. It is the foundation on which our country grew.

I know that I am not expected to build a bridge or a skyscraper at my age but I am expected to work hard at school, and at home. Studying diligently, doing my homework, being a responsible Safety Patrol, obeying school rules, and accepting responsibility are things I owe America now. It takes hard work to measure up to these responsibilities, but I know I can do it.

Soon I will give up my Scottish citizenship and become an "American." I can see myself boasting to the judge, "During the next 85 years I will fully repay the debt of love and hard work I owe my newly-adopted land."

FOURTH WINNING ESSAY

(By Kenneth Johnson, 17, 214 South Division Street, Buffalo, N.Y., senior at Eastern High School, winner of boys division of the Buffalo public high school classification; Beatrice K. Hickey, teacher)

As an American citizen I owe my country my allegiance and my patriotism. In a sense I owe America my life. To be an American is to be free, to live in a land where there has been much strife to make it free.

As a citizen I owe America my mind, which is to be dedicated to the advancement of my country in the direction of democracy and away from the enemy of all true Americans, communism.

As an American citizen I owe my body to the cause of American freedom. It is to be counted along with the many true Americans who fight side by side for the cause which Americans have so valiantly fought for in past years and shall continue to fight for as long as this cause is threatened. I owe America a military obligation and I am proud to fulfill it.

I owe America my heart; a heart which believes in everything America stands for; a heart which, every time when I pledge my allegiance to the flag, believes to the fullest extent every word of it—a heart sympathetic to the American way and some ways not so American.

I owe America myself as a whole, to do with me what I can best be used for whether it be for defense or advancement. I am to aid my country in any way possible to the best of my ability without hesitation whenever the time arises.

I owe America practically everything as a free American citizen. I am a true American and I am willing to pay all debts I owe to my country.

FIFTH WINNING ESSAY

(By Cynthia L. Michaels, 18, 125 Ellen Drive, Cheektowaga, N.Y., senior at Maryvale High School, Cheektowaga, winner of girls' division of the Erie County public high school classification; Elizabeth S. O'Neil, teacher)

I am an American citizen. I share her ideals. I have inherited her freedom, and I believe in her promises; so must I accept my citizenship and the responsibility which defines it.

I owe America all that I am . . . my discontent and my pride . . . my will to question and my desire to understand . . . my character . . . my honor . . . my need to accept what is right and to reject what is not . . . my responsibility for education . . . my respect for my own freedom and the freedom of others . . . my courage . . . my endless faith in American democracy . . . my idealism and optimism.

I owe America all that I am . . . every evidence of nobility . . . every evidence of dignity . . . my whole self . . . to do all things to the best of my ability . . . to respect the laws and obey them . . . to par-

ticipate actively in the heritage I am bound to and to set example for my impatient generation.

I owe America my voice . . . to disagree when there is need of change; my ideas . . . the products of my individuality and creativity; my initiative . . . to build new foundations for a better society.

I owe America concern for the future . . . the future of herself and the future of all men. I owe America the courage to stand before destiny and to sacrifice what I must to make tomorrow beautiful in the American image . . . more hopeful . . . more peaceful.

America will go on always . . . fighting against evil and fighting for what she believes. America will go on always . . . to be a leader, forever against time. Yet, her massiveness of determination . . . her power of conviction and her power of action will somehow lose their meaningful purpose . . . if I singly and unafraid, do not go forth as others have gone . . . making my way among the hundreds of millions . . . accepting my responsibilities . . . because I am an American. I am an inheritor . . . bound securely in the national spirit. I am an inheritor of a great, democratic freedom. I am an American citizen, and I owe America all that I am . . . all that I am capable of.

SIXTH WINNING ESSAY

(By Lydia Gherghetta, 13, 64 Lehigh Avenue, Lackawanna, N.Y., eighth-grade pupil of Lincoln Junior High School, Lackawanna, winner of the girl's division of the Erie County public junior high school classification; Raymond C. Burke, principal)

Our American way of life is built on the worth and dignity of every individual and on the capacity of the common people to govern themselves in peaceful and co-operative effort. As loyal citizens, we must put country ahead of self, not in short outbursts of emotion, but in the tranquil and steady dedication of a lifetime. It is far easier to cite these principles than to live up to them.

There are heavy everyday obligations of responsible citizens. We must be proud of the heritage that has been carved out of history and passed along for us to nourish and to protect; we must be alert to any hint of either aggression or subversion that threatens to wrest or wear away our rights and those of others; we must be resolute in our refusal to compromise our fundamental freedoms for some fleeting promise or some easy answer; we must be informed on the meaningful issues of the day, that we may exercise our precious voting rights with discretion; we must be outraged at any injustice that dilutes the basic concept of the equality of all men.

Our relationships with others must be truthful, for truth is the cornerstone of democracy. We must be involved in our government at all levels, making our voices heard on the vital issues that will shape America's destiny.

When sacrifice is called for, we must sacrifice, sure in the knowledge that the good of the nation far transcends any individual wants.

Above all, as good citizens we must be moral in all our deeds and judgments, for without morality any triumph is a hollow, meaningless thing. Man must cherish his past achievements and seek to improve the institutions which will inevitably lead to his greater future accomplishments.

SEVENTH WINNING ESSAY

(By Patrick D. Reilly, 17, 360 Hinds Avenue, Tonawanda, N.Y., senior at Tonawanda Senior High School, winner of the boys' division of the Erie County public high school classification; Mrs. Dorothy O. Homeyer, teacher)

America is not merely a nation; it is an idea; a hope; perhaps, a miracle. To ask what I owe America is to ask what I owe the principles on which it was founded. America is a complex nation with a complex people; yet its principles are simple.

Freedom is the rule in America, not the exception. I worship where I please, vote for whom I please (when of age), and do what I please (as long as it does not infringe on other's freedoms). These freedoms have been sustained through countless crisies, and I owe America my efforts to preserve these freedoms.

Hope may be an often used word; yet it is something unique in America. Our nation's peoples are not stagnated by oppression or by a corrupt aristocracy. We strive for improvement. Wealth, fame, and happiness are our goals. We search for something better, not only for ourselves, but for all of mankind. Tomorrow awaits, and with it a bright future. Every American has his hopes, and for this I owe America my best efforts for its betterment.

Finally, self-respect is instilled into every American. He is not a number; he is not a servant; he is a man. He is an independent, hard working human being who faces adversity with his fists clenched. An American works hard and strives for a better life, and he can look upon his life with pride. He may have succeeded, he may have failed. No matter what, America gave him a chance, and he worked to succeed. I owe America my efforts to preserve this chance so that others may try to succeed.

Thus, I owe America my efforts, not only to sustain, but also to improve the concepts upon which it was built.

EIGHTH WINNING ESSAY

(By Kevin R. Graham, 13, 39 St. Boniface Road, Cheektowaga, N.Y., eighth-grade pupil of Cheektowaga Central Junior High School, winner of the boys' division of the Erie County public junior high school classification; Florence R. Legierski, teacher)

I am a citizen of the United States of America; therefore, I owe this country my allegiance and loyalty. At all times I will honor and respect the American flag and the heritage which is mine as an American. This country was founded on a basis of liberty and justice for all of its citizens. By learning and practicing fair play, honesty, and morality, I am on my way to becoming a better citizen.

As a student, I owe it to America to get a good education. If I do my best and am honest in all my dealings with my teachers and fellow students, I am doing my part. By studying and understanding what America is, and what it stands for, I will be able to vote intelligently when I become of age.

As an American citizen, I owe this country my interest in her policies, both foreign and domestic, for a well-informed citizen is the hope of America.

I owe my country my fervent patriotism as a way of my life, and I must show it each day, particularly during these troubled times, for I, too, must soon rise to accept unhesitatingly the call of challenge to defend my country against her ever-vigilant enemies.

America is not only its people, but its land. It is a beautiful country and it is my duty to keep it that way. I must not dirty its highways with trash, pollute its air and waters with filth, nor waste its natural resources.

I believe good citizenship comes from practice and training. Therefore, if I am a good citizen in my school, in my neighborhood, and in my city, I will someday be a citizen America can be proud of.

NINTH WINNING ESSAY

(By Susan Schwab, 15, 1304 Brighton Road, Tonawanda, N.Y., sophomore at Mt. St. Mary Academy, Kenmore, winner of the private and parochial high school classification; Sister Mary Helen, teacher)

I am an American, not because I did anything to deserve this privilege, not because I did anything to make our nation free, but because I had handed down to me a hard-won heritage of liberty. For this, I owe my country a great deal: I must practice true Americanism every day of my life.

To do this, I must love my country with all my heart, obey its laws, honor its flag, revere its great heroes, and strive day in and day out to make it the best, the most just, and the most free nation in the world.

And while I must respect our leaders, I must never lose sight of my privilege to express my opinions, because disservice to patriotism involves not dissent, but irresponsible dissent. Tearing up draft cards, defiance of law, lending deliberate moral support to our enemies—these acts or gestures are irresponsibly damaging. But constructive opposition evolving from thoughtful reasoning and suggesting plausible alternatives, is imaginative loyalty to our highest national principles.

As the world grows smaller and we become aware of other nations, religions, and ways of life, prejudices tend to arise from our ignorance. My duty as an American is not only to respect the different ideas of men, but also to remember that, despite their superficial differences, all men are brothers.

I must try to understand ideologies other than my own, and be alert to the needs of my neighbors, whether they live across the street or across the ocean. Vigilance is the price of liberty; and understanding, the key necessary to unlock the door of prejudice.

Maintaining freedom puts upon me an obligation not known to the serf or subject of a dictator. To preserve freedom, I must be tolerant and alert. A democracy endures only because its citizens protect human rights and respect the individual. Here, in America, we possess unlimited wealth of all types, and the liberty to make use of it. What I do with it is up to me. These are the obligations I have as a young citizen.

TENTH WINNING ESSAY

(By Sally Schwab, 14, 1304 Brighton Road, Tonawanda, N.Y., eighth-grade pupil of St. Amelia School, town of Tonawanda, winner of the girls' division of the private and parochial elementary school classification; Sister Mary Patrick, teacher)

America is a land of freedom and rights. I am an American—not because I did anything to deserve this privilege, but because I was fortunate enough to be born in this land, which endowed me with a heritage of liberties.

What normal human being taking pause for even a moment or two and contrasting our way of life with its protections and promises, with the conditions existing in any other country in the world, would not say from the depths of his soul, "Thank you, America!"

As a citizen, it is my responsibility to protect this hard-won legacy and use every privilege it offers.

I am only thirteen so my duties are not too extensive. Voting, serving in the armed forces, and paying taxes are important obligations I will assume later in life; however, I do have present responsibilities.

Foremost of these is a serious attitude toward school. I must keep climbing the educational ladder that I may meet the challenge confronting the world on all fronts—scholastic, scentific, economic, military.

I must be well informed of the laws of my country and respect them. A large part of my adaptability to respecting authority develops from my family environment; therefore it is my duty to contribute to a harmonious home-life.

I must be tolerant and understanding to those whose color, creed, or nationality is different from mine. And I must pray and ask God to guide our leaders in making the right decisions in today's frightening challenges.

As a young citizen, these are the obligations I must fulfill to repay my country for my birthright, and if I am to honorably wear the intangible badge of Americanism, I must work hard at them every day.

ELEVENTH WINNING ESSAY

(By Michael Jozwiak, 16, 55 Surrey Run, Williamsville, N.Y., junior at Canisius High School, Buffalo, winner of the private and parochial high school classification; James T. Palisano, teacher)

Today, one hears more talk about dispute and protest than about American patriotism. However, these controversies and demonstrations are, perhaps, the best examples of patriotism as it should be in America.

One may think that he owes America complete belief and trust in her lawmakers and in her other public officials and therefore, complete support of her domestic and foreign policy. But, on the contrary, he owes belief and trust not to government officials, but to the system of government itself, as set up in the Constitution and gradually built up through years of judicial decisions and tradition.

He owes America not his blind support, but his thoughtful, constructive criticism, his earnest dissent when he believes that the government is in the wrong, his heartfelt interest for the preservation of the ideals set forth in the Declaration of Independence. No one can deny that this type of support has made America great. No one can deny the important effects of letters to representatives, of public support in election campaigns, of public petitions and demonstrations.

Let it be remembered, however, that one does not owe America dissension in a disrespectful, ungrateful spirit, whether it be meant for the common good or for personal vengeance against the present establishment; for one must never forget that he has many rights to be thankful for in a world in which tyranny is common and that he, as part of a democratic society, must respect the opinion of the majority as the governing opinion. Above all, it should be remembered that flouting the law in expressing one's own views can never lead to a better society, only to anarchy.

Thus, it is easy to see how peaceful demonstrators are patriots. Those who protest the accelerating draft and the expanding Vietnam conflict for unselfish reasons are, like many dying in Vietnam, exhibiting love for their country on the highest level, although in a different manner. How would less thoughtful Americans be made to think if it were not for the stimulating effect of the diverse opinions expressed by those who know what they owe America?

TWELFTH WINNING ESSAY

(By David Carlson, 13, 8430 Wehrle Drive, Williamsville, N.Y., eighth-grade pupil of Nativity of the Blessed Virgin Mary School, Williamsville, winner of the boys' division of the private and parochial elementary school classification; Sister M. Ann Therese, teacher)

I owe America many things because America has helped me in various ways since I was born. First, I owe America loyalty because a country gets its strength from the loyalty of its citizens, my full support in times of crisis as well as in times of peace. I must defend my country, whether by fighting and if necessary making the supreme sacrifice; or perhaps just by taking an interest in my country's problems. I must try to help obliterate slums, civil rights disputes, illegal use of drugs, and other forms of civil disobedience.

I also owe my country respect; for its laws and its officials. I must also abide by the laws since they were made for my own protection as well as the rest of the people.

Through my God-given talents and with the best in education, both academic and technical, I will give to my country the benefits of this knowledge.

I owe my country the wise use of the privileges given to me by the "Bill of Rights." I am given the "Freedom of Religion" and I owe it to my country to use this priceless privilege to worship God as I see fit. I am given the "Freedom of Speech" and I owe it to my country to voice my opinions about many of the things which influence my life.

I am given the "Right to Vote" and I owe it to my country to vote and elect the men who will govern this country wisely. My debt to my country will only be paid as I live my life as a good citizen. I believe that I will cherish this trust and pay my obligations to my country in thought, word, and deed.

AID-Sponsored Foreign Business Undercuts Domestic Industry by Imports

HON. VANCE HARTKE

OF INDIANA

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

Thursday, April 18, 1968

Mr. HARTKE. Mr. President, the Chicago Tribune of April 4 contained an interview between the economist and writer, Eliot Janeway, and Mr. Basil S. Turner, chairman of the board of electronics firm, CTS Corp. Mr. Turner very recently returned from a trip to the Orient, and in the interview makes some interesting remarks concerning what he found in Formosa in particular, where in joint ventures with Formosans using AID funds, Japan "not only is elbowing us out of foreign markets, but is doing it with our money and at our risk. The Japanese are using the aid we are giving Formosa as an export cover for themselves."

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the article, entitled "Formosan Economy Gets Big U.S. Boost," may appear in the Extensions of Remarks.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

FORMOSAN ECONOMY GETS BIG U.S. BOOST

(By Eliot Janeway)

NEW YORK, April 3.—Henry H. Fowler, secretary of the treasury, last week expressed concern over America's trade performance. But, in view of the advantages which America's foreign economic policies continue to spot our most aggressive competitors, it's little wonder that American exports are lagging behind the competitive parade, and that American imports are continuing to rise.

CTS is an old, established, progressive American entry in the international electronic stakes. Its chairman, Basil S. Turner, has just returned from a trip to the orient. His findings illuminate the apparent mystery of America's failure to deal, as other industrial powers would if they could, from strength.

JANEWAY: What is going on in Formosa now, industrially and financially?

TURNER: There is a great hustling and bustling in industrial activity and growth. During the last 18 years, since the Communist regime took over in China, America has given Formosa a tremendous amount of financial assistance. This influx of American dollars has resulted in a somewhat weird juxtaposition of modern industrial technology and traditional 17th and 18th century habits and customs. The automobile and the water-buffalo drawn cart vie with each other as modes of transportation. American aid has tended to superimpose 20th century technological changes on a society perhaps faster than the society can absorb them.

IMPRESSED WITH CENTER

JANEWAY: Where did you find the influences of American aid most evident?

TURNER: I was particularly impressed with the free port industrial center which has been built at Kaohsiung to encourage industry from all over the world to locate in this low labor-cost area. I understand that the development of this very modern industrial park and related buildings was instituted and financed with American funds, with practically no cost to the Chinese government. Approximately 115 enterprises are located in this area, with Japanese companies predominating. Direct labor and overhead costs are much lower in Japan than here, but they're even lower in Formosa.

JANEWAY: Tell me about some of your visits to industrial plants.

TURNER: In one particular plant, watt-hour electric meters, which are used for measuring consumer use of electric power, were being manufactured under aid financing for export to, of all places, *Viet Nam*. Another facility I visited was manufacturing power transformers, a process which requires a good deal of sophisticated know-how. The company representatives said that this was a joint venture with a Japanese company. On further inquiry, I was told that the transformers were being manufactured for export to Brazil and not for use in Formosa. Brazil, of course, has experienced rather substantial devaluation of her currency during the past two years.

Nevertheless, this enterprise, I learned, was being funded by the American government thru our foreign assistance program to Brazil. It seems that Japan not only is elbowing us out of foreign markets, but is doing it with our money and at our risk. The Japanese are using the aid we are giving Formosa as an export cover for themselves.

AFFECTS ELECTRONICS INDUSTRY

JANEWAY: How does all this affect the American electronics industry, of which your own company is a part?

TURNER: It is becoming increasingly difficult for the domestic electronic component manufacturer and consumer product manufacturer to compete with foreign imports. Accordingly, some American companies now are manufacturing their products in lower labor-rate areas off-shore and importing them into this country. Of course, exporting our American-made products also is difficult. It is our technology that we have to rely on to blaze our export trail. Other countries generally copy the product; and when they catch up with our technology, it is necessary for us to move on with new technological changes. We now have the leadership in technology, but we must be able to continue to improve our products and bring out new and better ones. Technological advance requires a long period of research and development which cannot be quickly turned on and off.

JANEWAY: You are saying that once your product gets standardized elsewhere, you lose the export potential because of the higher prices at which you must sell.

TURNER: We are losing orders now to the far east area. Japan is aggressively pursuing the electronic markets, especially for radios, television receivers, hi-fi, and stereo equipment. It seems that countries which are benefiting from our subsidies, to which we are selling our raw materials and giving our know-how, and from which we are buying, are somehow getting all the rewards. A day of reckoning may be overdue.

The "Pueblo"—How Long, Mr. President?

HON. WILLIAM J. SCHERLE

OF IOWA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, April 18, 1968

Mr. SCHERLE. Mr. Speaker, this is the 87th day the U.S.S. *Pueblo* and her crew have been in North Korean hands.

Intergovernmental Relationships in a Changing Society—Address by Hon. John W. Macy, Jr., Chairman, U.S. Civil Service Commission

HON. EDMUND S. MUSKIE

OF MAINE

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

Thursday, April 18, 1968

Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, one of the Nation's leading spokesmen in the field of intergovernmental relations and public administration is Chairman John W. Macy, Jr., of the U.S. Civil Service Commission.

Chairman Macy recently delivered a timely and provocative address to the National Conference on Public Administration of the American Society for Public Administration held in Boston. In this speech he outlined the challenges facing public administrators today and warned them that "the American people are weighing the evidence of our performance and are measuring our capacity to deliver in response to human needs." He then went on to spell out how public administrators could respond to these challenges of citizens expectation and how they could help open up new avenues of job opportunities for the disadvantaged.

Mr. President, I was impressed and encouraged by Mr. Macy's remarks. I ask unanimous consent that his fine speech be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the speech was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONSHIPS IN A CHANGING SOCIETY—THAT DURABLE AND DELICATE BALANCE

(Address by Chairman John W. Macy, Jr., U.S. Civil Service Commission, before the 1968 National Conference on Public Administration of the American Society for Public Administration at the Sheraton-Boston Hotel, Boston, Mass., March 27, 1968)

Public administration is on trial today. In every public jurisdiction the American people are weighing the evidence of our performance and are measuring our capacity to deliver in response to public need.

President Johnson described our day as "a time of testing for our Nation." This test must be taken and passed by the public administrator who faces the current array of public problems demanding administrative solutions. Our capabilities will be scored as we are tested day to day in new and changing programs designed to raise the quality of life for all Americans.

The theme for this conference, and for all conclaves where public administrators gather, must be: new responses in administration to fulfill citizen expectation of public action.

How can this profession mobilize and develop to meet the test and to assure a favorable verdict?

We are not unfamiliar with problems. Not that all problems are new and revolutionary—though some clearly are and must be so attacked. Public administrators have faced many of them. In fact, some of these *same* problems have been faced before. But in their present magnitude, their implications for the future, their orientation toward emotional responses, and their interrelationships, the problems of today are unprecedented.

At the same time, our resources are limited, and time is pressing in upon us. We must quickly change some of the conditions which have come so close to overwhelming our cities. We must accelerate change in the desired direction, without all of the financial power we might wish behind the accelerator. We must utilize the newest and the best techniques of managerial decision-making in every arena of public activity.

This demand for administrative miracles calls for a higher order of cooperation among governmental jurisdictions than we have ever achieved before. What we have cited as desirable patterns of collaboration in the past now are urgently needed in action. We must stop just talking about the ecumenical movement in administration. We must make it a living reality.

And government alone, with all its elements, will not be enough to solve our human problems. We must devise means for the constructive involvement of the private sector—business and industry, labor and education, foundations and voluntary organizations. The total genius of our pluralistic society must be brought to bear on the solution of our basic social problems.

REVOLUTION OF RELATIONSHIPS

It was only two years ago, at this Society's Arden House Conference, that one of your speakers had this to say—

"We have little more than glimpsed the beginnings of the revolution in intergovernmental relationships that is ahead of us. Although grant-in-aid and other forms of intergovernmental dependency have become well established, the new programs of the Great Society call even more for direct participation in national programs by local governments, and in some cases by local nongovernmental organizations. An equally, if not more striking difference is one of focus: the *problem* is the target, and all agencies that have something material to contribute to its solution must converge upon it."

I remember that passage well, because I was the speaker—and I hope you have enough forgiveness in your heart to forgive me for quoting myself. You see this is one of the risks we all run in inviting veteran administrators for repeat performances.

But the revolution I forecast has not progressed as smoothly as we might wish. Grant-in-aid programs have indeed become well established. They now number around 220. Of the 21 principal departments and agencies of the Federal Government, 16 of them administer programs of this type.

With some overlapping, we have 50 different programs of aid to general education; 57 programs for vocational and job training; 35 for housing; more than 20 involved in transportation; 27 for utilities and services; 62 for community facilities; 32 for land use; and 28 for cultural and recreational facilities.

Grant-in-aid programs have been described as the most important vehicle of intergovernmental relations. Their growth is perhaps the best testament to their acceptance by the vast majority of the American people. It is their *administration* that has raised so many problems.

Senator Edmund S. Muskie, of Maine, whose studies in the field of intergovernmental relations are known to all of you, has pointed out: "The administration of this multitude of programs has severely taxed the resources of all levels of government. And the proliferation of Federal grants has put the spotlight on the Federal system—that durable but delicate balance of jurisdictions and powers that has evolved throughout our history."

LEGISLATION CAN HELP

That durable and delicate balance has been under a considerable amount of pressure from time to time in the past. But never more than in recent years. Legislation alone never accomplished anything. Legislation is the charter for action forged from popular demand and consent. Legislation is a challenge to activate public policy. The job of administration is to plan, focus, and apply the action for the fulfillment of the challenge and the response to the charter.

Again and again in recent years, special study groups and advisory commissions have identified deficiencies in public management as contributing causes in the growth of public problems. The reports of these groups should become required reading for public administrators. They constitute the assessment offered by the thoughtful critics of the roles we play on the public stage. The recent report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, the Kerner Report, spotlighted one difficulty in our modern administrative task. Said the report: "The new social development legislation has put great strain upon . . . administrative practices at all levels of government. It has loaded new work on Federal departments. It has required planning and administrative capacity rarely seen in statehouses, county courthouses, and city halls."

The development of planning and administrative capacity in the statehouses, courthouses, city halls, and Federal offices has been a prime objective of this Society since its founding. Obviously our efforts must be extended if we are to provide the talent necessary to deal effectively with the difficulties cited in the Kerner report. Raising the quality of administrative and professional personnel in all these jurisdictions must be a primary and combined objective. Means exist for extended action in this area, but they can be magnified through the enactment of the legislative provisions contained in the Education for the Public Service and Intergovernmental Manpower Acts presented by President Johnson in his Quality of Government Message last year. These bills were drawn from significant contributions made by Senator Muskie's Subcommittee on Intergovernmental Relations, the Committee for Economic Development, and the Municipal Manpower Commission.

The proposals in these bills are designed to improve and strengthen the preparation and development of personnel for service at all levels. I include the Federal level, for the Federal civil service would gain through exchanges of personnel with other jurisdictions, and through the increased flexibility of training arrangements possible under this proposed legislation.

The provisions of these bills would permit the construction of new relationships between the several levels of government and the university community in the interest of raising the standards of public service performance. They would permit the development of new additional programs, both preservice and post-entry, to overcome critical shortages in talent. They would permit inservice training programs with joint participation by local, State, and Federal personnel. They would permit joint recruiting and examining for public employment. They would permit mutual assistance arrangements for improvements in personnel administration. They would permit the joint development of modern personnel systems based on merit principles.

The Intergovernmental Manpower Act passed the Senate and is currently in hearings before the special House Subcommittee on Education. The Education for the Public Service Act is being presented at hearings in both Houses.

INTERGOVERNMENTAL COOPERATION

A third piece of proposed legislation, the Intergovernmental Cooperation Act, was reintroduced in the Senate in January 1967. The sentences I quoted to you earlier, from Senator Muskie, were taken from his speech reintroducing this bill. This proposal was designed to foster the fullest cooperation and coordination of activities between the levels of government.

It would provide for more uniform administration of Federal grant funds to the States, and improve the scheduling of fund transferrals so States could budget more effectively. It would establish a coordinated intergovernmental urban assistance policy. A new provision added in the current legislation would further improve the management of grant-in-aid programs: it would authorize the President to consolidate individual grants within broad functional areas, subject to Congressional veto.

The timeliness of this legislation is clearly indicated by another quotation from the Kerner report: "There is a clear and compelling requirement for better coordination of federally-funded programs, particularly those designed to benefit residents of the inner city."

The Intergovernmental Cooperation Act would help to alleviate such situations as the surrounding Federal grants for community water supplies and sewage-treatment facilities. Five different agencies of Government are presently involved in administering such grants.

The proposed law would also provide for more uniform assistance to those forced to relocate as the result of the acquisition of real property for Federal and federally-aided public improvement programs.

This legislation is badly needed, and I hope all three of the bills will be passed by the Congress. They would provide administrators with many of the tools needed to build an administrative mechanism able to cope with the pervasive problems of today—problems which do not respect political boundaries.

Pending the passage of the legislation, however, arrangements should be made within existing authority to meet these objectives. The recommendations flowing from the Society's Arden House Conference in 1966 have not been fully exploited. The areas of potential action within the bounds of administrative discretion are large and have not been explored as productively as possible up to this time.

A NEW MANAGEMENT PHILOSOPHY

As form follows function, so do programs respond to problems. Programs breed new outlooks on the part of those managers who must administer them. These outlooks have broadened the management philosophy of the public executive beyond the narrow perimeter of his immediate substantive responsibility. A new management philosophy is coming to maturity in the Federal service to encompass this broader outlook. It is a philosophy that recognizes that a Federal executive needs to view his responsibilities as being broader than his agency mission. It is a philosophy that supports an increasing involvement by the executive in interagency and intergovernmental relationships. It is a philosophy that prompts participation by the executive in joint community ventures calling for a pooling of leadership to assure fruitful social results. A broad view is essential among all public executives if public programs are to be synthesized for the greatest possible effectiveness.

FOCUS ON JOBS

The necessity for a closer interplay of jurisdictions—to get on with public administration's mission on the most critical fronts—impinges always on problems of the disadvantaged and of the cities.

The President has said that a primary essential in meeting these domestic challenges is more jobs . . . that the time has come when we must get to those who are last in line—the hard-core unemployed. His objective is to find jobs for 500,000 of these persons within the next three years.

In respect to jobs, the President has called upon the innovative resources of American business and industry to help carry the load. And in so doing, he has pointed out that the disadvantaged people of this country make up a potential market of enormous size.

The National Alliance of Businessmen, headed by Henry Ford the 2nd, has gone to work with enthusiasm on this program. The effort is to get private industry to make jobs available for which the disadvantaged can qualify—or to train them, if necessary, with a commitment to hire. For such training, the Government will negotiate contracts with individual companies to reimburse training costs, and thus protect them from loss.

As Secretary of Labor Willard Wirtz says: "Jobs are the live ammunition in the war on poverty" * * * and he adds that it's up to business and industry to pass the ammunition.

In a special report on business and the urban crisis, *Business Week* reports that businesses trying to "pass the ammunition" have found that "hiring and training the people at the bottom of the ghetto barrel is a lot tougher than it sounds."

The hard-core unemployed are unschooled, unskilled, unmotivated. To turn them into productive workers, business must help them overcome handicaps that bar them from good jobs: culturally impoverished lives, grossly deficient education, poor health, fear of failure, and discrimination. Society has turned its back on these people so firmly that even when discrimination ends, the victims refuse to believe it.

The principal surprise reported by *Business Week* is that the hardcore unemployed are retarded so *far*. Not mentally, but educationally. Many companies had to start by teaching basic reading, writing, and arithmetic before they could even start on job skills.

The information gaps are often amazing. One trainee had attended three years of high school. He was told to drill a series of holes a foot apart. "What's a foot?" he asked.

Another was given a job requiring measurement with a ruler. The trainee admitted he didn't know how to use it.

In Government offices employing disadvantaged youth as part of the President's Youth Opportunity Campaign, we have found youngsters who were unfamiliar with the operation of a dial telephone, who did not know how to look up a name in an alphabetical list, and who did not know how to go about cashing a check. Simple things, all of them—inconsequential. But think how strange and uncomfortable the modern world of work would be to you, if you had never learned these everyday operations!

Another discovery made by industry is that training, by itself, does little good. But training with a *job* at the end of it—that's a different matter! *Business Week* notes that "the key to effective training is a job at the end of the training cycle."

Like Government, business has found that job restructuring is one key to the situation. Industry has found that lower-level jobs with lower requirements lead to charges that the company is lowering employment standards. Many companies find it necessary to emphasize to their employees that the filling of lower-level jobs with lower requirements does not mean a lowering of standards.

In Goverment we have found that opening of lower-level jobs for those with lower-level skills serves to support and protect the standards of the usual entrance grades. Standards are supported, not eroded.

Opening of lower-level jobs through job restructuring helps to concentrate the higher-level duties when the lower-level duties are stripped out. Again, the original job is strengthened, not weakened. Any change of the original job is in the direction of upgrading, not downgrading.

WILL IT WORK?

Although we don't yet know all the answers, some of the early results are encouraging. An auto company executive put it this way: "Some of the inner-city people we hired are working out better than the walk-ins." In Philadelphia a department store manager who hired eight Negro girls as trainees commented: "In the past we hired Negroes because we felt we had to. Now we feel these girls deserve to be hired on their own merits."

"On their own merits!" That is the key. In Government we have had a policy of equal opportunity for a long time. But we have made new, more active, more direct efforts to attract, train, and hire the disadvantaged in recent years—and our effort has consistently been to do this in ways which would not compromise the merit system.

Let me make the statement a little stronger. Not only do we strive not to *compromise* the merit system—but, in the long run, to improve it. Like industry, we went searching for the disadvantaged because it was our duty as a responsible employer. We began to see that they deserve to be hired on their own *merit*. And that is the name of the system.

Creative capitalism and creative Federalism are by no means mutually exclusive. In fact, they thrive together if given mutual confidence and respect. To make an impression on the great problems that loom ahead requires a delicate balance of powerful forces.

And that brings us full circle to what I said in the beginning. Public administrators are on trial, but so are managers in business and manufacturing, and so indeed is our entire system of free enterprise and free men.

Intergovernmental relationships and the partnership with industry both basically demand the same thing: that we concentrate on the *problem*, the job to be done, and that we develop ways of attacking it *together*. If such combined effort can be joined under talented administrative leadership, we can truly convert today's problems into tomorrow's opportunities.

Without delay, let us move ahead to pass the test.

A People's Captive Nations Committee in the House of Representatives

HON. EDWARD J. DERWINSKI

OF ILLINOIS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, April 18, 1968

Mr. DERWINSKI. Mr. Speaker, this July 14-20 will be the 10th observance of Captive Nations Week. Since 1959, when Congress passed the Captive Nations Week resolution—Public Law 86-90—the week's tradition has been perpetuated by the National Captive Nations Committee in Washington, D.C. The annual observance to the week has forcefully underscored the fact that, despite interparty and intraparty feuds and superficial changes in the Red Empire, the captive nations and peoples themselves still are very much in the bondage of captivity. It has also advanced the vital need for a Special House Committee on the Captive Nations, and this need is clearly emphasized by the mass arrests and also russification in Ukraine and in other captive non-Russian nations in the Soviet Union. Secretary of State Dean Rusk has opposed the formation of this committee.

The new book on "The Vulnerable Rus-

sians" provides an authoritative background on the efforts made for such a people's committee on the captive nations. It also explains in detail why a special House committee is necessary. Authored by Dr. Lev Dobriansky, of Georgetown University, the book makes for easy reading, is unusually revealing in many areas, and exceptionally documented throughout. With broad perspective, it shows the role such a committee would play in this age of psycho-political warfare and analyzes carefully Rusk's desk view of the U.S.S.R.

"The Vulnerable Russians" is now available at the Georgetown University bookstore, White Gravenor, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C. However, some excerpts from the book will give the reader an indication of the novel nature of the work.

The excerpts follow:

EXCERPTS FROM "THE VULNERABLE RUSSIANS"

RUSK'S DUSK VIEW OF THE U.S.S.R.

"Moscow and Petersburg succumbed easily to Bolshevism . . . There must have been something in the Great Russian tradition that provided more food for Bolshevism than the soil of the rest of the Empire . . ."

—George Fedetov

In the light of all that has been discussed so far, these next three chapters might well be grouped under a supertitle "How Not To Beat the Russians." Three substantial pieces of evidence are elaborated upon to show this. Doubtless, there are many others. But these representative pieces are adequate for our purposes of comparison and contrast, of sensible evaluation and judgment.

The first piece of evidence is the Rusk letters. These letters reveal unmistakably the rather dusk and feeble view held by the Secretary of State toward our chief adversary. They measure well the intellectual and psycho-political lag we spoke of before.

* * * * *

Since the letters sent by Secretary Rusk to the Rules Committee in the House of Representatives have stirred up this widespread interest, it can be safely held that in time much more will be written and said about them. They are prominently indicative of the type of thinking we find on the highest levels. The letters deal with the subject of captive nations, and all Americans who are absorbed in this subject will assess the Administration's position in the light of these communications. These significant letters are also related to the subject we have just discussed, the Special House Committee on the Captive Nations.

* * * * *

In this strategy of delay and postponement the third maneuver led to the first Rusk letter. The maneuver called for an opinion on the project by the Department of State. It had been generally known that the Department looked upon the special committee proposal with a jaundiced eye, but in the interest of delay and postponement this step was urged. A counter-motion was offered and carried to have a departmental representative in person before the Rules Committee. This never came to pass. Instead, the Secretary of State chose to respond to the committee's invitation by way of a letter.

* * * * *

Rusk's open missive

Dated August 22, 1961 and addressed to the Honorable Howard W. Smith, the letter reads as follows:

* * * * *

"As the United States Government seeks to deal with the threat posed by recent Soviet actions concerning Berlin, it is of utmost importance that we approach any consultations with our allies or negotiations with the Soviet Union in an atmosphere which best lends itself to an acceptable settlement. In this context, I believe the establishment of such a committee at this time would likely be a source of contention and might be taken as a pretext for actions by the Soviet Union which would interfere with the resolution of the present crisis concerning Berlin.

* * * * *

"The President and I have both expressed the conviction that a final settlement of the problem of Berlin, of Germany and of Central Europe must take into account the right of self-determination of the peoples concerned. However, the United States Government's position is weakened by any action which confuses the rights of formerly independent peoples or nations with the status of areas, such as the Ukraine, Armenia or Georgia, which are traditional parts of the Soviet Union. Reference to these latter areas places the United States Government in the undesirable position of seeming to advocate the dismemberment of an historical state. * * *"

* * * * *

At this juncture, in all probability the reader can quickly discern for himself the dusk points of this first Rusk letter. With the Berlin crisis under way the Secretary expressed concern over the prospect that Moscow would not react favorably toward the creation of a special committee. This would be true in any circumstances. After all, the prime objective of such a committee has been to fix the spotlight of world attention on Soviet Russian imperialism and colonialism. It becomes rather tiring to witness our country berated throughout the world, including Viet Nam, for "American imperialism," while the worst imperio-colonialist power in modern history, Soviet Russia (an imperialist within the USSR itself), is saved from righteous indignation because of protracted ignorance, as demonstrated by this Rusk missive. Also, it is strange, to say the least, that even in the pursuit of facts and truth for popular enlightenment within the United States itself, we have to predicate our supposedly sovereign actions on the feeling of colonialist Moscow.

Second, the Secretary's allegation that both governmental and private sources have long been studying this subject in the manner advocated by the original H. Res. 211 is simply not in accord with fact. As indicated earlier, he was publicly challenged to produce any comprehensive study on Soviet Russian economic colonialism with the USSR. To this day he has avoided the challenge. The fact is that there is no such study. The same can be said for other fundamental topics bearing on the captive nations.

In addition, his allegation misses one of the basic arguments for a special committee in this regard. And this is the need of a thorough, systematic study of every captive nation for popular consumption and understanding both here and abroad. What impact on the thought and consciousness of the average American, be he worker or student, have the intermittently written and oftentimes unknown studies of a few specialists had? It would seem that the State Department is fearful of having methodic fact-finding studies on the captive nations brought to the attention of the American people.

* * * * *

In this one statement the Secretary reveals a number of things. The well-substantiated independence drives of Ukraine, Armenia and Georgia, not to mention other non-Russian nations in the USSR, are apparently of no importance to State's policy planners. Furthermore, on the face of this statement, we have the ridiculous notion expressed that the Soviet Union, which has been barely in existence for forty-five years, is "an historical state." If, logically, we give the Secretary the benefit of doubt on this statement, so that the USSR is properly viewed as a continuation of the Tsarist Russian Empire, his difficulty becomes compounded. On this ground what he is in effect saying is that the Russian Empire in its present primary guise as the USSR must not be dismembered. Perhaps one shouldn't be too hard on the Secretary when an acclaimed world historian, Arnold Toynbee, also thinks the USSR is "Russia" and even goes so far on an emotional tangent to say "Americans are the only Western imperialists left, except for the Portuguese." Is it any wonder that Moscow can rely on its deceptive peaceful coexistence program?

* * * * *

The Stevenson interlude

Now, in terms of time sequence, it is most revealing that soon after the fantastic contents of Rusk's first letter had been made public, our Ambassador to the United Nations, Adlai E. Stevenson, released a memorandum to Delegations in the U.N. which in every respect was unique and unprecedented. As we have noted in other contexts, this memo, dated November 25, 1961, bore heavily on Moscow's imperio-colonialism and cited fact after fact about this system in the Soviet Union itself. In short, the contents of the Stevenson communication have also stood in sharp contradiction to the notions expressed in the first Rusk letter.

* * * * *

The Stevenson memo was truly a most welcome one. On record, it is the best yet given by any of our Ambassadors to the United Nations. However, how does one account for the obvious discrepancies of thought and conception existing between Stevenson's memo and Rusk's first letter. If anything, they show a lack of unity in expressions of U.S. foreign policy toward the U.S.S.R. Regardless of the causal explanations, they certainly substantiate further the rational basis of a people's committee on the captive nations.

* * * * *

Here, too, a careful reading of this letter shows that every new communication sent by State to the Rules Committee has only afforded more evidence and ammunition for the proponents of a Special Committee on the Captive Nations. One, the false notion that the captive non-Russian nations in the USSR are merely "minority peoples of the U.S.S.R." again suggests a poor level of knowledge and understanding with respect to these nations. Stevenson's letter-memo validly recognizes them as nations with statehoods destroyed by imperialist Soviet Russia; Rusk sees them as "minority peoples," kin members to a given "nation" and "country" but in the minority.

* * * * *

What is amazing, too, in this Maginot Cold War of ours is the extent to which we accommodate the avowed Muscovite enemy by our fallacious commissions or pusillanimous omissions. We are supposed to be winning the minds and hearts of all peoples and nations in the cause of freedom and our own survival. Yet one finds colonialist Moscow rarely, if ever, employing the fictitious term "minority peoples" with reference to the non-Russian nations in the USSR. But our Department of State, as though seeking not to befriend the nations immediately bordering our enemy, falls short of recognizing their nationhood, not to mention their nominal statehood. Remember, only a few years ago State's house organ *Soviet Affairs Notes* claimed that "the term 'Ukraine' is itself a modern political rather than a historical term. It was invented in the nineteenth century by nationalists seeking to detach the southwestern borderlands of Russia from the Tsarist Empire." Fantastic, isn't this, when for centuries the term has been in general

use. If all this isn't an irony and perhaps more that deserves investigation, one cannot find anything comparable to it.

* * * * *

From all this it should be quite evident that the State Department fears the work and operations of a people's committee, a Special House Committee on the Captive Nations. It fears the factual findings of such a committee, which would throw light on the limitations and fictions of the Department's research and other branches as concerns the USSR. It also fears a closer congressional check on its policy-thinking and policy-making with regard to the USSR. Above all, it seems to fear the impact such a committee would have on the American people. The dusky Rusk letters certainly are the evidence of all this and more.

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Maneuvers ad nauseam

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This desperate maneuver couldn't work for several good reasons. First, one needn't play up the fact that the State Department showed a most cooperative attitude toward the "unexpected" decision of this subcommittee by sending Assistant Secretary Foy Kohler to be the first witness. We recall that in response to the Rules Committee's invitation only letters were seen fit. The reasons are more solid than this. One is that the reports of this subcommittee could in no way match the aims, objectives and envisioned work of a special committee. A conglomeration of haphazardly requested testimonies is no substitute for detailed, documented studies of each captive nation. In addition, a subcommittee on Europe could scarcely concern itself with captive nations in Central and Eastern Asia and Latin America. Its purpose obviously negates the aggregative concept of captive nations. And one could hardly expect any results in terms of aggregative data covering vital religious, cultural, military, economic and political subjects.

* * * * *

* * * The operations and output of this makeshift sub-subcommittee in the subcommittee on Europe have been a sorry response to the calls for freedom in the Red Empire. Nowhere, for example, is there any serious thought given to Moscow's Pan-Slavist policy, one which both Marx and Engels recognized over a century ago. Yet this is standard policy as can be gleaned from the following. Stalin "spoke very little or not at all about Parties, Communism, Marxism, but very much about the Slavs, about the ties between the Russians and the south Slavs . . ."

Lawlessness, Riots, and Devastation

HON. JOHN G. TOWER

OF TEXAS

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

Thursday, April 18, 1968

Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, all America continues to be concerned about the lawlessness and riots that have brought devastation to many of the Nation's cities.

It has been brought to my attention that Mr. Larry Laufer, a senior high school student in Kilgore, Tex., has written an essay on the subject. I ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the essay was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

CHOICE IS LEFT TO INDIVIDUAL

(EDITOR'S NOTE.—The following essay was written by senior Larry Laufer as fulfillment of an English IV assignment. The Mirror believes that the author's excellent treatment of such a timely subject warrants publication so that students and faculty alike may ponder his views.)

Today, one can scarcely read the newspapers or watch the news without learning of riots, demonstrations and draft-card burnings in scattered points of the country. Many feel civil disobedience is merely a valid exercise of free speech. Others, however, fear it as the precursor of anarchy.

In order to effectively discuss this subject, it is imperative that two important terms be defined. Civil disobedience is the selective disobeying of laws which one feels are unjust and cannot be followed in good conscience. Anarchy is the absence of law or the absence of respect for the laws which are in existence. Anarchy is also the ultimate tyranny, for when it occurs, no rights are sacred.

Should one servilely submit to unjust laws so that domestic tranquility will be maintained at all cost? The answer is decidedly no. There are two courses of action that an individual may follow when evil ordinances exist. In a free and open society, there are always channels by which change can be brought about.

In the United States one may turn to Congress, the courts and the constitutional amendment. One who claims that existing conditions are not changed for the better in America must either be blind or at least highly narrow-minded.

Within the last 15 years the massive system of school segregation has been struck down by the courts, the traditional poll tax has been abolished by constitutional amendment and programs for the relief and rehabilitation of the poor have been established by Congressional decree. In other words, the American system of reform is not dormant or disabled, but it is very much alive, very much in action.

A serious question remains: What if the channels of change are non-existent because the government is dictatorial or the public, itself, is corrupted and evil? The only answer can be that the individual must either submit to injustice, or he must work toward the overthrowing of the government or the destruction of the society itself. The Nuremburg War Trials of 1945 established that treason is acceptable when the ruling clique of the country is deranged in character.

The point which is advocated here, therefore, is that there is no middle ground. One cannot be partially law-abiding. The individual must either accept the law while trying to change it, or if the levers of power are frozen (a condition not existing in the U.S.), he must make war on his community.

When neither course is taken, then only prolonged violence and anarchy, the supreme injustice, results.

To Defy the Law Is To Invite Violence

HON. EDWARD J. DERWINSKI

OF ILLINOIS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, April 18, 1968

Mr. DERWINSKI. Mr. Speaker, on Monday, April 8, the column by David Lawrence carried in the Washington Star was one of the few articles of that period that did not take the form of an emotional eulogy of the late Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. Since a degree of objectivity has returned, I insert this column into the RECORD since it does merit very special attention:

TO DEFY LAW IS TO INVITE VIOLENCE

(By David Lawrence)

"News" is sometimes defined as a timely report of the unusual. Almost all of the speeches in the U.S. Senate on Friday eulogized and rightly extolled the conscientious purposes of the Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. in organizing and leading "demonstrations" and "marches" for civil rights.

But an address which made some pointed criticism of King was delivered by Senator Robert C. Byrd, D-W. Va. It went unreported except for two or three sentences in press dispatches.

Yet what Byrd said turned out to be singularly prophetic of the disorders and riots during the weekend that swept more than 20 cities across the country with loss of life and many millions of dollars in damage to owners of private property.

The Congressional Record prints the full text of Byrd's 15-minute speech to the Senate. It follows:

"I rise today to express a great sorrow at what happened yesterday in Memphis. It need not have happened, and it should not have happened. For to take the life of a human being, except in self-defense or in the defense of others, is an awful thing to comprehend. Life comes to man, not of himself, and once it is taken away it cannot be returned again. Yet, since Cain slew his brother Abel, man has continued to violate God's law and take that which he cannot restore.

"Daily, everywhere, in every city and hamlet, men die at the hands of other men. Here in the capital of the nation, women are made widows, and children are made orphans, because human life is taken by the gunman or the knife wielder. And only when the victim is an individual of rank, or station or title or broad reputation, does the nation mourn.

"Yet, one life is just as precious as is any other, and death's sorrow is just as real to the loved ones of the policeman or the fireman or the young secretary whose life has been cruelly and brutally snatched away as it is to the home of the famous or the great.

"The commandment says, 'Thou shalt not kill,' but man defies and violates God's law daily throughout the land, and man violated God's law yesterday in Memphis.

"If we would only learn to cherish and live according to God's commandments and the laws of the land, ours would be a better country and a greater country and many a home would be spared of grief.

"I was not an admirer of Dr. Martin Luther King, but I regret the tragedy that befell him and I feel sorrow for his family. I was shocked but I was not surprised at what happened, because of the tension that existed in Memphis. Now it has happened, and it is a tragic thing. I fear that bad matters may only be made worse, that old hatreds may be rekindled, new hatreds may be born, more blood may be spilled, and more lives may be taken.

"Why cannot our people revere and respect and obey the laws of the country which gave most of us birth and which we all should love?

"There is a lesson to be drawn from what happened in Memphis and from what has been happening with increasing intensity throughout the nation in recent years. That is, that mass protests, mass demonstrations, and mass marches and the like—whether labeled nonviolent or otherwise—can only serve to encourage unrest and disorder, and to provoke violence and bloodshed.

"And, in the end, those who advocate such methods often become, themselves, the victims of the forces they themselves set in motion.

"This, in a manner, is what happened to Dr. King. He usually spoke of nonviolence.

Yet, violence all too often attended his actions. And, at the last, he himself met a violent end.

"There are those who will believe that his death in Memphis was for a just cause. Yet, even in fighting for a just cause, one must pursue his course with reason, with due regard for the public welfare and good order, and with due respect for the law.

"Dr. King must have known that, rioting having erupted from last weeks' attempted march in Memphis, there was, in its wake, such an atmosphere of tension as to make his presence in that city dangerous to himself and to others, at least for the time being. He must have known that the situation was volatile, and that passions had become greatly inflamed.

"Yet regrettably, he persisted in his course, continued to exhort his followers to renew the march next week, and told the cheering audiences that a federal court injunction would be ignored. 'We're not going to let any injunction turn us around,' he said.

"No man can determine for himself whether or not a court injunction is legal or illegal, constitutional or unconstitutional. To do so would be to take the law unto one's own hands.

"Justice Frankfurter said, 'If one man can be allowed to determine for himself what is law, every man can. That means first chaos, then tyranny.'

"One cannot preach nonviolence and, at the same time, advocate defiance of the law, whether it be a court order, a municipal ordinance, or a state or federal statute. For to defy the law is to invite violence, especially in a tense atmosphere involving many hundreds or thousands of people. To invite violence is to endanger one's own life. And one cannot live dangerously always.

"Paul said, in his Epistle to the Romans, 'Let every soul be subject unto the higher powers.'

"He said, in his Epistle to Titus: 'Put them in mind to be subject to principalities and powers, to obey magistrates, to be ready to do every good work.'

"And he said, in his second Epistle to the Thessalonians, 'Now, we command you, brethren, in the name of our Lord Jesus Christ, that ye withdraw yourselves from every brother that walketh disorderly.'

"Thus, we are exhorted to obey the law and to respect authority, and those who refuse to do this cause serious risks to themselves and to others.

"The words of proverbs are as true today as they were in the day of King Solomon, who is thought to have written them: 'Whoso keepeth the law is a wise son; but he that is a companion of riotous men shameth his father.'

"Dr. King's profession was that of a minister. But no man is required to be a member of the clergy to be able to read and understand these simple passages from the scriptures, and all men would profit from obedience thereto.

"This is an hour of great emotion throughout the land, and it is an hour of shame and remorse and sorrow.

"But it should also be a time for sober reflection by all citizens.

"And out of this moment should come a spirit of rededication to the principles of equal justice for every man, whatever his race, and a reawakening of respect for law and order on the part of every man, whatever his race.

"Neither men nor mobs can continue to create disorder and disregard the laws and disrupt the orderly functioning of government at any level, without shaking the very foundations of our society, tearing our country asunder, and destroying themselves in the end.

"We must, if we are to avoid disaster, strive to live in peace, work together in harmony, seek redress for our grievances through legal processes and strive always for the preservation of good order.

"This, I hope, will be the lesson we will all draw from the tragic events of recent days in Memphis.

"As I have already said, this is a time of deep emotion. We may have on our hands a highly inflammable situation in which passions will determine events of the day. What I am saying may not be considered entirely in keeping with the views being expressed by many, and may be misinterpreted by some, but I feel constrained to make this call to reason—in the hope that the reactions of our people may be influenced by careful thought of what is needed to steer the nation through this confused and troubled period."

Ralph K. Rahn

HON. G. ELLIOTT HAGAN

OF GEORGIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, April 18, 1968

Mr. HAGAN. Mr. Speaker, I have lost a good and dear friend—the passing of Ralph K. Rahn was sadly noted in Effingham County and the First District of Georgia. Ralph was an outstanding individual, unique in his simplicity and genuine in his humility. But perhaps his most distinguishing characteristic was his unswerving loyalty and devotion to his friends. And I had the great privilege of being counted among his friends.

Ralph Rahn came "into my corner" early in my political career, and he remained one of my most steadfast supporters and friends throughout the ensuing years—he was content to support his Congressman—and never exacted any promises nor demanded any favors for himself. And he understood when an unusually busy schedule kept me from getting by to see him as often as I would have liked. They often told me down there: "If Ralph Rahn is for you, you have no worries in Effingham County."

Ralph Rahn, the politician, epitomized the kind of politics that has held this great country of ours together; individual citizens backing people they believe in. I am sure that Ralph did not wholeheartedly approve of every action of mine, but he used to tell me that he did approve of my sincerity, so I never heard any complaints from him.

On those occasions when Ralph did ask some favor, it was always for the good people of Effingham County, never for himself. He was a completely unselfish man, who thought always of others. His passing is lightened somewhat when I think back over the innumerable people he helped and he never refused a worthy individual, be he rich or poor, black or white. His many friends will tell you that a man about to lose his farm did not have too much trouble getting a helping hand from Ralph Rahn, and the many youngsters he helped through school have gone on to responsible and productive adulthood.

Although he had a heart as big as all outdoors, you would never hear about it from Ralph Rahn.

As a child in Sunday school, I well remember being taught that Jesus "went about doing good" and if, indeed, He does choose from among us to help Him "going about doing good," Ralph Rahn was certainly an excellent choice.

I have been blessed with an abundance of good friends during my lifetime, but men like Ralph are so rare as to leave an aching void by their passing.

I will miss Ralph Rahn and I will cherish our friendship always.

"Mr. Vermont"

HON. WINSTON L. PROUTY

OF VERMONT

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

Thursday, April 18, 1968

Mr. PROUTY. Mr. President, on April 16, the Burlington Free Press published an eloquent tribute to W. Arthur Simpson who is regarded by all Vermonters as "Mr. Vermont."

Written by Representative George J. Kingston, Jr., of Northfield, the letter to the editor provides an interesting insight into the character and greatness of Arthur Simpson and an impressive review of why he is held in such high esteem and affection by all who know him.

Although the author is of different political persuasion he has commented with great insight on what I consider to be the best legacy any man could possibly leave Vermonters for all time.

Arthur Simpson has served his State tirelessly and extraordinarily well through generations of unmatched progress in which he played a major role. He has been stanchly dedicated to his Vermont heritage and to its people whom he loves so well, and he has brought great vigor and inspiration to the legislature.

His awards, his honors, are so many that I shall not list them here. Suffice it to say that we are very proud of this fine man who, in addition to his many accomplishments, has one essential of greatness: He is a warm, an understanding, and a down-to-earth man.

I ask unanimous consent that the article be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

NORTHFIELD, VT.

PRAISE FOR "MR. VERMONT"

The old saying, "Politics makes strange bedfellows", contains more truth than poetry.

I feel compelled to write this letter to pay tribute to a very fine Vermonter named W. Arthur Simpson. Having served three regular sessions and a few special sessions with Mr. Simpson, I can hold back no longer. This gentleman represents to me everything that is wholesome about Vermont. He is as solid as the rock that is quarried in the hills of Barre. Even though his legs appeared to weaken this last session, his heart and his mind were, if anything, stronger.

His voting record will prove that he was for progress, but in moderation. He supported many pieces of legislation which affected the areas of education and beautification of Vermont. Because I shared his concern for spending and bonding, we are considered now to be out-of-step. However, my business experience would not allow me to act differently. We continued to keep in

focus the size of our little state with 410,000 people.

It was a pleasure to see this past legislature honor Mr. Simpson in a way that his name will always be remembered. A revolving fund has been set up to insure that he will be a sponsor of a deserving student in the "Youth of Tomorrow" program. This program will continue throughout the years during regular legislative sessions.

He and many others would like to preserve Vermont for our youth as we have known and loved it. We must fight to keep it from being such an expensive place in which only the idle rich can live.

In summary, this fine gentleman is a symbol to me of the rock placed here in Vermont before man arrived. It is a rock not to be duplicated in any other state and which we all like and respect because of its soundness, quality, and unbreakable character.

GEORGE J. KINGSTON, Jr.

Peace Talks—No Quick Decision

HON. STROM THURMOND

OF SOUTH CAROLINA

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

Thursday, April 18, 1968

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, the Evening Herald of Rock Hill, S.C., contains an editorial entitled "Peace Talks—No Quick Decision." In this discerning discussion of negotiations with the enemy, the editor points out the dangers of optimism.

From the standpoint of the North Vietnamese, everything that has transpired thus far is to their advantage. The bombing has been reduced, the ports of North Vietnam are still open, and the supplies are still transported over the railroad lines from Red China.

The editorial reminds us that the peace talks in Korea dragged on for 2 years while the Communists tried to gain every advantage. The editorial predicts that the negotiations for peace in Vietnam will be long and drawn out and that because of this there is a need for as much patience and alertness as was needed during the military campaign.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the editorial be printed in the Extensions of Remarks.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

IN OUR OPINION: PEACE TALKS—NO QUICK DECISION

The signs that Hanoi is willing to sit down and talk—about anything—are hopeful. But the troubles in Asia, including the war in Vietnam, are far from over. The most optimistic attitude must be that there is still a long way to go, and many dangers still ahead.

Most Americans, and our international allies, may be inclined to put too much stock in the early responses from Hanoi. We have wearied of the war, become so pessimistic, that any sign that the shooting might be ended is seized upon, with perhaps more hope than should normally be expected. The talks being arranged could come to nothing. We must be prepared, as a nation, for that possibility.

From Hanoi's standpoint, certainly an all-out end to the bombing would be an advantage—whether or not talks ever moved beyond that stage. Presumably, Washington is willing to risk another military buildup, on the long-range possibilities for some sort of peace.

A cease-fire would be of even more advantage to the Communists, allowing them to replenish their forces, resupply them, and prepare new fortifications. It is doubtful that Hanoi has ever really been convinced we would not invade the North. And it is against all the weight of history and our experiences with the Communists to expect they will forego their long-range aim of domination of South Vietnam. If the Communists engage in meaningful talks, it will be because they are convinced a military takeover is barred to them. But they would likely scheme for a better chance later, or for another route to their prime objective.

In this connection, it is appropriate to recall the peace talks in Korea. They dragged on for two years, while the Communists sparred for an advantage, before the cease fire was agreed upon. In fact, we lost more men after the negotiations started than before.

An appearance of peace—or the hope of peace—would be better than all-out fighting. But it appears unrealistic to expect any agreement from Ho Chi Minh which would halt Communist efforts until after the November elections. So, talks will require as much patience, and as much alertness, as the military campaign.

Elvis J. Stahr, President of Indiana University, Supports Networks for Progress in Higher Education Bill

HON. JOHN BRADEMAS

OF INDIANA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, April 18, 1968

Mr. BRADEMAS. Mr. Speaker, the House Education and Labor Committee is considering a proposed amendment to the Higher Education Act of 1965 known as the Networks for Knowledge Act. This bill would provide incentives for institutions of higher education to share with each other educational resources such as faculty, laboratory facilities, and computer facilities.

A number of prominent educators have expressed their support of this legislation, including Elvis J. Stahr, president of Indiana University, Bloomington, Ind.

Mr. Speaker, I insert in the RECORD at this point a telegram that I recently received from President Stahr in support of Networks for Knowledge:

BLOOMINGTON, IND., *March 20, 1968.*

Hon. JOHN BRADEMAS,
House Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

Reference title IX, H.R. 5067, Networks for Knowledge Act of 1968. Indiana Higher Education Telecommunications System has anticipated desirability and economic and educational wisdom in sharing educational resources (including medical education resources) within Indiana, across State lines, and between public and private institutions. Need here is for help in exploring, experimenting, and initiating sharing arrangements and devices of many varieties as well as for enhancement of telecommunications systems already in being. Indiana Conference of Higher Education has consortia for sharing now and is organizing to utilize Indiana Telecommunications System. Urge your support for the legislation.

ELVIS J. STAHR,
President, Indiana University.

Youth and the "Establishment": Russia Also Has its "Irreverent Young"

HON. VANCE HARTKE

OF INDIANA

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

Thursday, April 18, 1968

Mr. HARTKE. Mr. President, Russia, too, has its impatient youth. In a recent article appearing in the Chicago Sun-Times, Charles Bartlett makes the comparison of the "impatient" Soviet youth with our own young people. Both in Russia and in the United States, he says:

The establishments in both countries are faced with a new factor, which is a total lack of patience with the prospect of gradual progress toward a greater good.

The radical demands for change in Russia are being met with a heavy-handed opposition by the establishment. Here, there is the democratic opportunity to bring out the issues and debate even in dissent on the merits of the subject. The parallel is interesting, but the methods of adjustment of "the establishment" to its youth rebellion in the two different societies can hardly be the same.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Mr. Bartlett's article, from the April 15 Chicago Sun-Times, may appear in the Extensions of Remarks.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

A LIKE PROBLEM IN RUSSIA, UNITED STATES

(By Charles Bartlett)

WASHINGTON.—Some perspective on America's social dilemma can be gained from a look at the Soviet Union, where concern with a mood that is restless and rebellious has provoked the government into showing its mailed fist.

Startling echoes of an unmourned era were heard in Moscow last week as Pravda solemnly proclaimed that the Communist have not outlived their need for "iron discipline." The Central Committee of the Communist Party announced it is tightening ideological control over literature and art in order to fortify the patriotism of the Soviet people.

It is not clear yet how repressive the clampdown will become, but it is apparent that this is a reluctant and potentially risky reversal of the liberalizing process, a resort to authoritarianism by leaders unable to conceive any more imaginative way of coping with the tensions of the generation gap.

The justification for this policy is the most blatant mark of its sterility. The disruptions in the Communist society—at home and in Czechoslovakia—are attributed falsely by the leaders to subversion by bourgeois ideologists.

"Anti-Soviet organizations and services of every kind, set up by the imperialists, seek our morally unstable, weak and politically immature people," Chairman Leonid I. Brezhnev said recently.

In the same simplistic spirit in which Americans like to blame agitation at home on communism, Brezhnev and his colleagues are setting the stage to treat dissent as a capitalist export and dissenters as pawns of the enemy who must be punished.

Brezhnev can avow that "the inviolable unity of the Soviet people" is worth the sacrifice of liberty, but as he looks at the rush in Czechoslovakia to shed all forms of repression, he must wonder how long he can

make the avowal stick, how long a strong people will tolerate new restraints at a time when old ones are being thrown off around the world.

Just as the United States underestimated the velocity of its racial problem, the Soviets seem to have misgauged the urgency of their need to compromise with the postwar generation.

Nikita S. Khrushchev fenced with the young and ridiculed their "passenger mentality," a symptom of weariness with hearing of their elders' sacrifices. From the start, it was a generation that found criticism of the excesses under Stalin more compelling than praise of the revolution. It was a generation with a gathering determination to test the system.

Older Soviets must regard the task of bending the irreverent young to their tenets with the same puzzlement which troubles the American establishment in contemplating the riot-prone young in the black ghettos. The establishments in both countries are faced with a new factor, which is a total lack of patience with the prospect of gradual progress toward a greater good.

The establishments in both countries are confronted with a volatile young who have learned—in the case of Russia—how to inflict serious damage upon the Soviets resisting their impatience. Smuggling hostile articles into print abroad is scarcely more difficult than lighting slum fires.

The total suppression of either activity is virtually impossible and an authoritarian crackdown cannot be a final answer in either case. It is possible to shoot looters and jail provocative writers, but those reactions are more likely to inflame than to squash the resentments which the crimes reflect.

This nation has an alternative which the Soviet Union lacks. It can bring out the issues and debate the merits of the dissent. It can pursue Maryland Gov. Spiro Agnew's initiative in pressing responsible Negroes to stand publicly with or against those who promote riots.

But the Soviets appear to have only their iron hand. The showdown period that looms will test how both societies absorb the thrust of radical demands for change.

The Tragic Saga of the Molly Maguires

HON. JOSEPH S. CLARK

OF PENNSYLVANIA

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

Thursday, April 18, 1968

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, the tragic saga of the Molly Maguires, a century ago, has much in common with what is happening in the battle for civil rights today. In the mining town of Eckley, Pa., on May 6, Paramount Pictures will begin to film the story of a band of misbegotten Irish immigrant miners who formed a secret society to protest against brutal working conditions, low pay, wretched housing, and social discrimination. Although their cause was just, their methods to gain some measure of economic freedom were not, and their protest erupted into violence, beatings, and murder. By 1877, 13 members of the Molly Maguires had been hanged and the society destroyed. From this tragedy grew seeds of rightful protest, and from it and similar incidents labor unions were finally organized in this country.

I salute Producer Director Martin Bitt and his stars, Sean Connery, Richard Harris, and Samantha Eggar, as they begin to film this important and meaning segment of America's past.

Vietcong Victory "Preview" Terrible

HON. EDWARD J. DERWINSKI

OF ILLINOIS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, April 18, 1968

Mr. DERWINSKI. Mr. Speaker, an article which appeared in the April 5 edition of the New World, the official newspaper of the Catholic Archdiocese of Chicago, by Rev. Patrick O'Connor who is a veteran observer of the Vietnam scene dramatically tells of Vietcong terrorist activities. I suggest that the vocal forces in the country who seem oblivious to the viciousness and immorality of Vietcong activities clearly read Father O'Connor's article:

IN HUE, VIETNAM: VIETCONG VICTORY "PREVIEW" TERRIBLE

(By Patrick O'Connor, Society of St. Columban)

HUE, VIETNAM.—This city has had a 25-day preview of what would happen if the National Liberation front (Viet Cong) were victorious in South Vietnam.

The 25-day experience began when the communists launched their attack here Jan. 31. First they occupied most of the city, then less and less of it, until they were driven out Feb. 24.

One can now piece the preview together. Here are some features of it:

1. The character of the movement.

The Hanoi regime, represented by its troops and political cadres, was the dominant element in the "liberation" forces. The North Vietnamese soldiers, recognizable in any event by their accent, made no attempt to disguise themselves.

Some of them told the dates of their departure from the North. They showed pictures of Ho Chi Minh, chairman of the Communist (Lao Dong, "Workers") party and president of the "Democratic Republic" in the North.

In indoctrination courses they gave to the people—priests and seminarians included—in the junior seminary, the first point stressed was that Ho Chi Minh is to be accepted as the only legal ruler of all Vietnam.

Boasting that victory was already theirs, North Vietnamese soldiers here scoffed at the U.S. bombing of targets in the North. "The American bombs hit only trees," they said.

In typical communist style they called their unit commander "Comrade (Dong chi) So-and-so." (The Chinese Communists use the same word, pronouncing it "Tung Tzu.")

Radio Hanoi gave lengthy, if inaccurate, reports of the fighting in Hue. A listener to the powerful Peking radio heard an announcer, speaking Vietnamese, giving coded instructions to troops.

Neither the North Vietnamese troops nor their local comrades in Hue would permit themselves to be called communists or Viet Cong (Vietnamese communists).

They called themselves the Giai Phong, Liberation forces. It is not time yet to unveil the explicit communist program for South Vietnam. To do so now would stiffen the resistance.

2. The methods.

Here in Hue the communist troops and their political cadres applied a policy of sheer terrorism and ruthless elimination of all past and possible future opposition. Systematically in cold blood, they murdered all the members of the police and security forces they could find.

They murdered officials of the local administration and people who refused to cooperate with them. They bought lists of people to be liquidated. They sought out persons who worked for the Americans—excluding of course, those who had served as their agents.

They took away hundreds of men and youths, probably to put them through the communist sieve, to indoctrinate them and force those of military age to fight for them.

A young Catholic, a daily Mass server, in his early 20s, was one of those picked out, apparently as a likely Viet Cong soldier. His body was found later. Presumably he had refused to "volunteer."

A 17-year-old Catholic lad who ventured back into the Phu Cam area to see what might remain of the family home was picked up by the Viet Cong and has not been seen since.

The communists murdered persons who were pointed out to them by vengeful neighbors.

At least 14 collective graves containing bodies of the communists' victims have been found in and around Hue. All the bodies had their hands tied behind their backs.

The executioners economized in their use of bullets. They lined up scores of victims, bound, in front of open trenches and hit them on the back of the head with rifle butts so that they fell unconscious into the trench, to be buried alive.

On the political side, the communists here quickly created a "Front of National Democratic and Peace Alliance," which called on all the people, especially students, to join in an armed uprising.

This appeal—which brought no response—was broadcast by Radio Hanoi, quoting the "Liberation Press agency," on Feb. 1.

On Feb. 15 Liberation radio announced that an emergency national salvation congress, convened by the alliance, had set up a "People's Revolutionary committee."

The man named as head of the alliance and committee was Dr. Le van Hao, a French-educated professor of ethnology in Hue and Saigon universities. He had been prominent in the Buddhist-led Struggle movement in Hue in 1966 and had edited its publication.

This Front in Hue was one of 10 or 12 such groups formed in South Vietnam during the Communist Tet offensive to serve as interim committees which would "negotiate" with the Liberation front to form a government. None of them had any popular backing.

The Communists took care to make no general frontal attack on the Catholic Church in Hue. It was too soon for that, too. But they killed four French priests in cold blood and abducted two Vietnamese priests, two seminarians (but not from the seminary, as at first reported) and five brothers.

They took advantage of Church buildings to fire from them or beside them. After they had left the junior seminary, they fired a rocket into it. It was from the Catholic parish of Phu Cam that they abducted the largest number of men and youths taken from any one place.

3. The reaction of the people.

A European resident of Hue said: "The people showed great fear when the communists were coming. They tried by every means to hide from them.

"It was altogether different when the Americans were coming. The people were looking out eagerly for them. The greatest setback the communists received in their first onrush was the failure of the people to rise in support of them."

"The proportion of communists in Hue is very small," he added, "much smaller than in France."

SENATE—*Friday, April 19, 1968*

(Legislative day of Wednesday, April 17, 1968)

The Senate met at 10 a.m., on the expiration of the recess, and was called to order by Hon. JOSEPH M. MONTOYA, a Senator from the State of New Mexico.

Rev. Edward B. Lewis, D.D., pastor, Capitol Hill Methodist Church, Washington, D.C., offered the following prayer:

O God, we bless Thee for the life that Thou hast given us. Breathe even through these leaders' lives the breath of hope and peace. We thank Thee for the Nation of which we are a part. Lead through the life of this Nation to ways of solution and rebuilding of fallen foundations of understanding and principle in man's humanity to man.

We beseech Thee to hasten the day when sin's fierce wars shall cease. Help us to build a new and better world in which goodness, honesty, truth, justice, peace, and good will shall prevail. Grant that we may use the rich gifts of our life, not for selfish living, but as an opportunity to serve. In the name of Jesus Christ, our Lord. Amen.

DESIGNATION OF ACTING PRESIDENT PRO TEMPORE

The legislative clerk read the following letter:

U.S. SENATE,
PRESIDENT PRO TEMPORE,
Washington, D.C., April 19, 1968.

To the Senate:

Being temporarily absent from the Senate, I appoint Hon. JOSEPH M. MONTOYA, a Senator from the State of New Mexico, to perform the duties of the Chair during my absence.

CARL HAYDEN,
President pro tempore.

Mr. MONTOYA thereupon took the chair as Acting President pro tempore.

THE JOURNAL

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Journal of the proceedings of Thursday, April 18, 1968, be approved.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

ORDER OF BUSINESS

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Under the previous unanimous-consent agreement, the Senator from Pennsylvania was to be recognized at this time.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I had thought that we unraveled that matter last night. I am perfectly willing to follow Senator CLARK.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Senator CLARK is not in the Chamber.

Mr. President, before the time of the Senator from New York commences, I would like to yield myself 1 minute on the bill, with his concurrence.

Mr. JAVITS. Of course.

THE CHOICE OF A SITE FOR PEACE NEGOTIATIONS

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, yesterday the Secretary of State announced that there were 15 sites at which we would agree to establish contacts with Hanoi. In this connection, Mr. Rusk issued a formal statement to the press, the text of which I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD at the conclusion of my remarks.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered. (See exhibit 1.)

Mr. MANSFIELD. May I say, incidentally, that copies of this statement were sent to the members of the Committee on Foreign Relations last evening.

On an earlier date, Hanoi indicated a preference for two sites, Phnom Penh in Cambodia and Warsaw in Poland.

It would be my hope that there would not be a prolonged quibbling while Vietnam burns. Many days have elapsed since the President sought to move the situation toward peace. Many additional lives have been lost in the interim. The longer the delay continues, the more difficult it may well become to find a "mutually agreeable" place, in the words of Hanoi, in which to meet. Indeed, it is quite possible that the catalytic effect of the President's renunciation of a second term and an offer to discuss prospects for negotiations may well be nullified with the passage of time.

It would be inexcusable if this great initiative by the President on behalf of this Nation and world peace were to be wasted over a secondary matter.

The place of the first meeting is, in my opinion, quite unimportant. The first meeting will be merely for the purpose of establishing contacts. Indeed, I would assume that one of its primary purposes would have to do with selecting a permanent conference site where the next steps would take place.

As I view the possible procedure, it would be, first, preliminary contact; second, a conference; and third, negotiations. The place for the first contact is not important; the timing is, and I would not like to see time run out even before the preliminaries begin.

EXHIBIT 1

[A press release from the Department of State, Apr. 18, 1968]

STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE

As we have said repeatedly, we are ready to enter into contacts and negotiations to end the war in Viet-Nam—without further delay. Our concern is to save lives—to serve the cause of humanity, not to make propaganda.

On March 31, the President ordered a limitation of the bombing of North Viet-Nam, and announced that our representatives were prepared to meet with those of North Viet-Nam "at Geneva or any other suitable place—just as soon as Hanoi agrees to a conference."

Hanoi responded by proposing Phnom Penh, in Cambodia, as "an appropriate location." A public statement of the North Vietnamese Foreign Minister said that "the place of contact may be Phnom Penh or another place to be mutualy agreed upon." I emphasize "or another place to be mutually agreed upon."

Obviously, negotiations must take place in a setting fair to both sides—fair in terms of communications, fair in terms of access by the world's press, fair in the very atmosphere surrounding the talks. We would not recommend sites such as Washington, Seoul, or Canberra—and we could not accept sites such as Hanoi, Peking, or Moscow. But there is no shortage of places where each side could find good communications and an atmosphere conducive to serious negotiations.

We have proposed four countries in Asia, which we are inclined to believe is the proper region for discussions of peace in that area. We have proposed Laos, Burma, Indonesia, and India. In Europe, we have suggested Switzerland. These five countries do not exhaust the list of possibilities. If their Governments are willing, we are prepared to meet as soon as our representatives, Ambassador Harriman and Ambassador Vance, can get to Ceylon, Japan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Nepal, or Malaysia.

If the other side prefers a European site, we are ready to meet them in Italy, Belgium, Finland, or Austria.

Some of these sites are being proposed by third parties.

Any one of these fifteen suggested locations would, in our opinion, offer an atmosphere conducive to serious negotiations.

It has been eighteen days since the President ordered our planes to restrict their bombardment of North Viet-Nam. It has been fifteen days since the President acknowledged Hanoi's response to his offer of talks.

Our restraint was meant to inspire discussions about ending this war—not to provide an excuse for propaganda warfare while the battle raged on.

It is time for a serious and responsive answer from Hanoi. The world is waiting—with growing concern—for such an answer. The American people, in whose name this restraint and offer of talks were made by the President, have a right to expect such an answer promptly.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield myself 1 additional minute on the bill.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, the Senator from Montana has just spoken words of great importance to the country. I, too, as other Senators, have been very sharply questioned by the press, especially inasmuch as I have disagreed on occasion with the administration's handling of Vietnam as to the matter of jockeying or discussion about the sites.

I have said—and I value highly the authoritative statement just made by the Senator from Montana—that notwithstanding my differences with the administration on Vietnam, one must nonetheless give the President the benefit of the doubt on a matter of such delicacy; and we must assume that there is a good reason for what is taking place about the sites. But that reason must have a terminal point, and the Senator from Montana has very appropriately called that terminal point as of now—roughly now—and I hope very much