

By Ms. OAKAR (for herself and Ms. SCHROEDER):

H.R. 12728. A bill to amend the Coinage Act of 1965 to change the size, weight, and design of the 1-dollar coin, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs.

By Mr. PEPPER:

H.R. 12729. A bill to amend title XIX of the Social Security Act to permit one or more county governments in a State to provide for additional medical assistance under the State's Medicaid plan; to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

By Mr. WILGREN (for himself, Mr. MOTT, Mr. MURPHY of Pennsylvania, Mr. CORRADA, Mr. KINDNESS, Mr. BEARD of Tennessee, Mr. GUYER, Mr. GAYDOS, Mr. RAHALL, Mr. CARNEY, Mr. QUILLIN, Mr. HARRINGTON, Mr. HEFTTEL, Mr. LEDERER, Mr. MOORHEAD of Pennsylvania, Mr. DENT, Mr. ASPIN, Mr. AMMERMAN, Mr. RICHMOND, and Mr. SOLARZ):

H.R. 12730. A bill to amend title 23 of the United States Code relating to the special bridge replacement program, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Public Works and Transportation.

By Mr. CUNNINGHAM (for himself and Mr. BONKER):

H.J. Res. 903. Joint resolution disapproving proposed regulations of the Department of the Treasury requiring centralized governmental registration of firearms; jointly, to the Committees on the Judiciary, and Ways and Means.

By Mr. MURPHY of New York (for himself, Mr. ANNUNZIO, Mr. CONTE, Mr. CORMAN, Mr. DENT, Mr. DERRICK, Mr. EARLY, Mr. ECKHARDT, Mr. FARY, Mr. HANNAFORD, Mr. HOWARD, Mr. JONES of Oklahoma, Mr. KOSTMAYER, Mr. LE FANTE, Mr. McDADE, Mr. MEEDS, Mr. MOORHEAD of Pennsylvania, Mr. ROBINSON, Mr. RONCALIO, Mr. RYAN, Mr. STARK, Mr. THOMPSON, Mr. VANIK, Mr. CHARLES H. WILSON of California, and Mr. YOUNG of Missouri):

H.J. Res. 904. Joint resolution authorizing and requesting the President of the United States to issue a proclamation designating the 7 calendar days beginning September 17, 1978, as "National Port Week"; to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service.

By Mr. RANGEL (for himself, Mr. BRODHEAD, Mr. RICHMOND, Mr. HAWKINS, Mr. EDWARDS of California, Mr. COTTER, Mr. SIMON, Mr. ROBINO, Mr. CLAY, Mr. CORMAN, Mr. NIX, Mr.

CORRADA, Mr. ADDABBO, Mr. PANETTA, Mr. WAXMAN, Mr. WOLFF, Mr. PHILLIP BURTON, Mr. DRINAN, Mr. ROE, Miss JORDAN, Mr. MITCHELL of Maryland, Mr. VAN DEERLIN, Mr. McHUGH, Mr. BONIOR, Mr. GARCIA, and Mr. VENTO):

H.J. Res. 905. Joint resolution authorizing the appropriation of funds for the acquisition of a monument to Dr. Ralph J. Bunche and its erection in United Nations Plaza Park in New York City; to the Committee on House Administration.

By Mr. RINALDO:

H. Con. Res. 622. Concurrent resolution relating to the proposed increase in first class postal rates; to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service.

## MEMORIALS

Under clause 4 of rule XXII,

402. The SPEAKER presented a memorial of the Legislature of the State of Louisiana, relative to Federal recognition of the Choctaw-Apache Indian and affiliated tribes of northwestern Louisiana; to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

## PRIVATE BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS

Under clause 1 of rule XXII,

Mr. BRODHEAD introduced a bill (H.R. 12731) for the relief of Michelle A. Mudie, which was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary.

## AMENDMENTS

Under clause 6 of rule XXIII, proposed amendments were submitted as follows:

H.R. 39

By Mr. DELUMS:

On page 135 of the substitute, after line 24, insert the following new subsections:

(q) PROHIBITION ON ALTERNATE TOWNSHIP SELECTIONS.—(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any land withdrawn pursuant to section 11(a)(1) of the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act which is outside the boundaries of any conservation system unit and which is not selected by or conveyed to a Native Corporation shall not be available for selection by the State of Alaska.

(2) The Secretary shall retain in Federal ownership the lands referred to in paragraph (1) in order to provide opportunity for sub-

sistence uses pursuant to title VII of this Act. In managing such lands, the Secretary shall not permit any use, or grant easements for any purpose, unless such use or purpose is compatible with the provision of opportunity for subsistence uses pursuant to title VII of this Act.

(r) EXCHANGE OF INHOLDINGS.—Following the date of approval of this Act, and notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, the right of the State of Alaska to lands in furtherance of its entitlement under section 6 of the Alaska Statehood Act shall be satisfied first by conveyance of unreserved and unappropriated public lands in exchange for lands which the State has selected or received tentative approval or patent to within conservation system units in Alaska, and second, after all such lands have been exchanged, by conveyance of other unreserved and unappropriated public lands in the State which are outside the boundaries of such systems.

Page 219, after line 5, insert the following new subsections:

(q) PROHIBITION ON ALTERNATE TOWNSHIP SELECTIONS.—(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, and land withdrawn pursuant to section 11(a)(1) of the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act which is outside the boundaries of any conservation system unit and which is not selected by or conveyed to a Native Corporation shall not be available for selection by the State of Alaska.

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## SENATE—Monday, May 15, 1978

(Legislative day of Monday, April 24, 1978)

The Senate met at 10 a.m., on the expiration of the recess, and was called to order by Hon. ROBERT MORGAN, a Senator from the State of North Carolina.

### PRAYER

The Chaplain, the Reverend Edward L. R. Elson, D.D., offered the following prayer:

Eternal God, we thank Thee that Thou hast given us the upward look, the desire to transcend our human weakness, our disharmony, our frailty and to find healing and strength in Thee. Gird us with truth and wisdom as we face the

difficult tasks of the coming week. Shed upon our way the light of Thy constant presence that we may be better than we are and act wiser than we are in our own strength. Rule over the deliberations of this body for Thy glory, and the good of this people.

O Lord our God, lift the work of the President, the Vice President and all the leaders of this Nation into the higher order of Thy kingdom. Grant to them and to us a sacred stewardship of the wealth and power Thou hast bestowed upon this land.

We pray in the Redeemer's name. Amen.

### APPOINTMENT OF ACTING PRESIDENT PRO TEMPORE

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will please read a communication to the Senate from the President pro tempore (Mr. EASTLAND).

The legislative clerk read the following letter:

U.S. SENATE,  
PRESIDENT PRO TEMPORE,  
Washington, D.C., May 15, 1978.

To the Senate:

Under the provisions of rule I, section 3, of the Standing Rules of the Senate, I hereby appoint the Honorable ROBERT MORGAN,

a Senator from the State of North Carolina, to perform the duties of the Chair.

JAMES O. EASTLAND,  
*President pro tempore.*

Mr. MORGAN thereupon assumed the chair as Acting President pro tempore.

#### THE JOURNAL

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Journal of the proceedings be approved to date.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

#### RECOGNITION OF LEADERSHIP

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from West Virginia is recognized.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I have no desire for my time.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Tennessee is recognized.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, I yield to the distinguished senior Senator from New York such of my time under the standing order as he may require.

#### PRIVILEGE OF THE FLOOR—SENATE CONCURRENT RESOLUTION 86

The following Senators requested and, by unanimous consent, the privilege of the floor was granted in behalf of the following staff members:

Mr. JAVITS: Peter Lakeland; Mr. RIBICOFF: Arthur House and Susan Fruing; Mr. GLENN: Pat Chaska and Roy Werner; Mr. SARBANES: Judy Davidson.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, I have no further requirement for my time under the standing order, and I yield it back.

#### SENATE CONCURRENT RESOLUTION 86—SALES OF ARMAMENTS TO EGYPT, ISRAEL, AND SAUDI ARABIA

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Under the previous order, the Senator from West Virginia (Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD) is recognized to move to consider Senate Concurrent Resolution 86, which will be stated by title.

The legislative clerk read as follows:

A concurrent resolution (S. Con. Res. 86) relating to action by Congress on certain sales of armaments to Egypt, Israel, and Saudi Arabia.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, if the Senator would withhold, I express the hope to the distinguished Senator that we could proceed to the resolution without a rollcall vote—just have a voice vote and then put in the quorum call. Is that satisfactory?

Mr. JAVITS. Perfectly satisfactory.

Senator CASE is due to handle this matter. It is for no other reason.

Mr. BAKER. I hope we can have a little time until Senator CASE arrives in the Chamber, and we can clear that with him. I am fairly certain that he would have no objection to proceeding in that way, but I would like him to be here when we do it.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The clerk will call the roll.

The second assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, under the built-in time agreement I believe the majority and minority leaders, or their designees, have control over the time on the resolution once it is before the Senate. Am I correct?

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator is correct.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. And am I also correct, Mr. President, that the motion to proceed is not debatable?

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator is correct.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, is the Senate still on the motion to proceed at this point?

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The motion has not yet been made or agreed to.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to proceed for 2 minutes.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

#### ORDER FOR RECOGNITION OF SENATOR RIBICOFF TODAY

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that at 1:30 p.m. today the distinguished Senator from Connecticut (Mr. RIBICOFF) be recognized to speak in the event the resolution is before the Senate and that he be recognized to speak for 30 minutes, after which the Senate go into closed session. He will make that motion at that time, and I will second it, so we may as well just do it by unanimous consent at this time.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

#### TIME LIMITATION AGREEMENT

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the closed session not extend beyond 2 hours.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield to me?

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. I yield.

Mr. BAKER. The statute provides that the majority and minority leaders have control of the time. Since there is a good probability the majority and minority leaders may be on the same side of this issue, I wonder if the distinguished majority leader has any suggestion on how we might parcel out time and control it under those circumstances?

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I suggest that the majority leader and the

minority leader each allot half of the time that is allocated to the majority and minority leaders to the opponents and half to the proponents, and for my part I will be glad to allot my time in support of the resolution to Mr. BIDEN and/or Mr. CHURCH and the time in opposition to the resolution to Mr. SPARKMAN, who is the chairman of the committee, and who opposes the resolution.

Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, I thank the majority leader. I think that is a good arrangement. On this side, I will retain half of the time under the statute in opposition to the resolution of disapproval, and I will yield the other half of the time, 2½ hours, to Senator CASE, the senior Republican on the Foreign Relations Committee, or to Senator JAVITS if he prefers to handle it that way.

Mr. JAVITS. Do it the same as they and, and/or JAVITS.

Mr. BAKER. I think the best way, then, is to say I will yield to Senator CASE, or his designee, so we will follow the same procedure.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Very well.

Mr. President, I wonder if the distinguished Senator from New York will now be willing for the Senate to proceed by voice vote to take up the resolution.

Mr. JAVITS. I am willing to proceed to do it by unanimous consent, Mr. President. No vote is necessary.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Very well.

Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, if the Senator will yield to me, Senator CASE is not yet here. I think on these assurances from the distinguished Senator from New York we should proceed, and I have no objection.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate so proceed.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, the motion is agreed to.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. I thank all Senators.

Mr. President, I have indicated the Senators to whom I will designate time. Mr. BIDEN is here on my side, and he will have control of half of my time in support of the resolution. Mr. SPARKMAN will be here shortly. Until he arrives I will control the other time.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Tennessee (Mr. BAKER).

Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, a parliamentary inquiry.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator will state it.

Mr. BAKER. Are we now on the resolution?

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. We are, and the time is under control.

Mr. BAKER. I thank the Chair. Mr. President, I yield myself such time as I may require to make an opening statement.

I believe that each of these sales, individually, is in the best interest of the United States. But I have been deeply troubled at the way in which the President has linked them together as a package, and at the implications for



future policy which might be drawn from that linkage. The central factor in American policy in the Middle East has been and must remain the security and survival of Israel. That small country is our only democratic ally in the most dangerous place in the world. When we act in a way that even appears to foreshadow a shift in our commitment to the unique relationship between Israel and the United States, we touch on the deepest emotions of millions of Americans who remember the way in which Israel was reborn only 30 years ago in the aftermath of the insane genocide that destroyed 6 million of Europe's Jews.

Mr. President, that historic fact must and should color every action taken by the world's largest Western democracy in relation to one of the world's smallest. I fully understand that it is a close question, and that there is sharp disagreement among many of us who share deeply held commitments in common. But I believe that the Government of Saudi Arabia is an important moderating influence on the behavior of her friends and allies in the Middle East. I am aware of the rhetoric employed in that part of the world and I deplore it. But I am concerned in this situation about the way governments behave far more than I am with what they say.

That moderation may well be encouraged if Saudi security is bolstered by the fulfillment of these requests. But, even more important, Saudi pride and Saudi moderation will receive a stunning blow if a commitment made publicly by the President of the United States is publicly repudiated by the U.S. Congress. I believe that the prospects for peace in that area would be significantly eroded by such a repudiation, and so I must reluctantly vote for the sale on that ground alone.

But there is an awful paradox at work here. Because the President has chosen to grant the Saudi request for the sale of F-15s, the Government of Israel has been confronted by a change in Israel's security situation. The Carter administration, when it created this package, ignored a fundamental U.S. obligation—to maintain the balance of military power in the Middle East as it is. In connection with the Israeli withdrawal from the Gidi and Mitla passes in the Sinai desert, the United States offered her our most advanced aircraft to compensate for tactical or strategic losses that might be suffered if Israel assented to our request. The Israelis did withdraw. There were no questions at that time of increasing the military strength of Israel's adversaries or potential adversaries in future Middle East war. There was certainly no "package deal" on the horizon. And that, Mr. President, is how we have arrived at this unfortunate juncture.

On Tuesday, May 2, 1978, I visited with President Carter and told him that I regarded a compromise that would preserve our commitments to maintain Israel's defense posture as essential if these sales were to be approved. In the

aftermath of that meeting, the administration agreed to increase the complement of F-15's to be sold to Israel from 15, as first proposed by the President, to 35, for a total of 60 F-15's in the Israeli Air Force.

But, Mr. President, that match for the Saudi F-15's hardly preserved the balance of strength to which the United States had pledged itself. Although I believe we must sustain President Carter's promise to Saudi Arabia, and although I believe that we must honor President Sadat's request in light of his historic peace initiative, I am convinced that it is imperative for the United States to assure Israel of its unique relationship to our interests in the Middle East, by granting the 150 F-16's the Israel Government has requested.

On April 24, 1978, the distinguished minority leader of the House of Representatives, the Honorable JOHN J. RHODES, wrote to President Carter as follows:

Your decision to send letters of intent to sell arms to Israel, Egypt and Saudi Arabia in the context of a "package deal" has given many Members of Congress serious concern. I believe that the "package" approach contravenes the intent of Congress when it passed the 1976 amendments to the Arms Control Act. Those amendments were enacted to bring Congress into the decision-making process as to major arms sales. I therefore suggest that you seriously consider removing these unsanctioned constraints on congressional participation in this decision; and regard each of these sales individually and on the merits, as is the intent of the law. . . . Each of the proposed sales has an individual negotiating history and purpose. . . . it is my belief, in fact, that the proposed sale to Israel is totally inadequate to meet her defense needs. That would be the case particularly if Congress were to approve the sale of arms to other countries in the Middle East. I suggest that Israel should be provided with . . . one hundred and fifty F-16s as the Israeli Government requested. Conformity with that request is directly linked to the spirit of the agreement signed between the Government of Israel and the Government of the United States in 1978 with the Israeli withdrawal from the strategic passes in the Sinai Desert at the request of the United States.

Mr. President, I have privately expressed myself in similar terms to the President of the United States, that we should go forward now, following this sale of F-15 aircraft to the Israelis, with the further commitment to sell the full number of F-16's to the State of Israel. Now, Mr. President, I renew that view in public.

President Carter can and should allay much of the public concern over these sales by making those adjustments necessary to fulfill the perceived needs of Israel security. For the connection between Israel and the United States goes beyond questions of self-interest on the part of either of the two countries. Our peoples are linked by common values; and by a shared heritage that marks American life with a zest for freedom and individual achievement and aspiration unique in the world's history. The people of Israel and the people of the United States are more than friends and allies;

we are members of the same family. We may differ over issues of the moment, but we are firmly committed, each to the other, to our mutual survival in peace and dignity.

So, Mr. President, I will support this proposal. I believe that it should pass. I believe the resolution of disapproval should be defeated, and I will work in that effort. But I also believe that the security of the State of Israel should be fully provided for by honoring their legitimate request for the full number of F-16 aircraft which were first requested and which, I believe, are the subject of a solemn undertaking between our two countries.

Mr. President, I reserve the remainder of my time.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Who yields time?

Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, if I may, since the Senator from New Jersey is here, may I reiterate what I had said previously that since the statute provides that the time on this resolution is under control by the majority and minority leaders, I am prepared to yield half of my time under the statute to the distinguished Senator from New Jersey, which I now do, and the majority leader will yield half of his time in opposition to a Member on his side. So at this time I relinquish control of one-half of the time under the statute to the distinguished Senator from New Jersey.

Mr. CASE. Mr. President, I thank my leader. I think the arrangement is extremely fair and, I think, sensible.

May I ask, I think in effect, the four of us, does the Senator have any idea as to how the time should be allotted?

Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, there is now an arrangement on the sequence of speakers except with respect to a request by the distinguished Senator from Connecticut who wishes to speak at 1:30, and then to convene in executive session, a secret session, of the Senate at 2 p.m. But, other than that, the Senator from New Jersey is free to suggest whatever yielding and recognizing he wishes.

Mr. CASE. Is the Senator from Tennessee handling his 2½ hours himself?

Mr. BAKER. Yes. I may designate someone else in the course of the day, but that is the way it stands now.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I would like to suggest to the Senator from New Jersey, since I am apparently a designee for the majority leader, that I will be happy to determine the 5 hours of time and look to the senior Senator from New Jersey as to how he would most likely proceed in terms of the opposition. Although theoretically I have 2½ hours of control on this side, it seems to me we should look to the Senator as to the way in which he would like to allocate time. I will be happy to do that.

Mr. CASE. But I say to my dear colleague, Delaware is the first State. Since we are contiguous in any event, I should be greatly surprised if we have any difficulty. The Senator is most generous. Has the Senator spoken in opposition?

Mr. BIDEN. No, I have not. There has been no discussion in opposition. I would

suggest that when the appropriate time comes the Senator from New Jersey can lead off, and then I will have a brief statement, and the Senator from New York has indicated that he has a statement and is prepared to go forward. I would suggest that after we have each made opening statements we might yield to the State of New York as both Senator JAVITS and Senator MOYNIHAN are prepared to proceed.

Mr. CASE. Shall we let the Senators from New York go first?

Mr. BIDEN. That is fine with me.

Mr. CASE. I think that is a good idea, after our leader and the Senator from Alabama have made their opening statements.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, will the chairman yield to me?

Mr. SPARKMAN. I yield.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. I wonder if it would be agreeable that we agree at this point that the time consumed by the closed session be equally divided between the proponents and the opponents.

Mr. CASE. Will the majority leader repeat that for us?

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. I had suggested that the time in the closed session be equally divided. Of course, time will be kept otherwise in closed session by the clerk as it is in open session.

Mr. CASE. Is that time for the closed session agreed upon, as to how long it will be?

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. It is not to exceed 2 hours and that time comes out of the 10 hours.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, if I could suggest, I would prefer, as we go along, to have the clerk keep that time. I do not think the opponents require much time in closed session for their argument.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that following the closed session Mr. GLENN be recognized to make his statement.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the following staff members of the Committee on Foreign Relations be authorized the privilege of the floor during the consideration of Senate Concurrent Resolution 86: Norvill Jones, Bill Ashworth, Hans Binnendijk, and Roy Werner.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, if the Senator will yield, I make a similar request for Paul Laudicina and Joyce Shub.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. SARBANES. Mr. President, I make the same request for Barry Schochet, Mike Kraft, Ira Nordlicht, Steven Emerson, and Richard Perle.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, I make the same request for Bob Dawning of my staff.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. MOYNIHAN. Mr. President, if the Senator will yield further, I ask unanimous consent that Charles Horner be granted the privilege of the floor.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Mr. President, I, along with other members of the Committee on Foreign Relations, have given the question of the sale of aircraft to Egypt, Israel, and Saudi Arabia a great deal of time and study in recent weeks. The committee held five meetings in public and five in executive session on this matter. At the conclusion of the committee's deliberations, members were evenly divided on the question of whether the Senate should object to these sales. Accordingly, a resolution of disapproval for all sales was rejected by a vote of 8 to 8. I have given careful consideration to all points of view about these sales. After doing so, I reached the judgment that the sales should be allowed, as the President has proposed.

I reach this judgment for the following reasons:

The proposed sales will not upset the military balance in the region.

Approval of the sales will demonstrate that the United States is willing to respond to all three nations who have turned to us for equipment to meet legitimate defense needs—Egypt, Israel, and Saudi Arabia.

The sale will bolster and encourage the Arab forces of moderation in the Middle East.

The sale is of crucial importance in maintaining the central role of the United States in efforts to reach a peace agreement.

Rejection of the proposals will drive a wedge between the United States and Saudi Arabia that could lead to disastrous political and economic consequences.

Rejection may undercut the moderate Arab forces in the Middle East and lead to a resurgence of Arab radicalism.

Rejection will set forces to work that may result in undermining irretrievably the long-term security of Israel, a basic concern of the United States.

The wisdom of the timing of this proposal has been questioned. No politician welcomes having to confront a controversial issue, particularly in an election year. But timing to me is not a central issue here. Possibly this factor would be more compelling if we were to consider these sales at a time when there was more evidence that a settlement was about to be achieved. But this is not the case. Peace is not in sight. We must face these proposals now. All nations want their sale approved now. Rejection with thin promises that Congress might consider something later will not be very persuasive to the Arab world. Delay will only postpone a hard decision.

If we are responsive to Egypt's President Sadat now, we will demonstrate the wisdom of his choice to turn from the Soviet Union to the United States. We cannot afford for President Sadat or those who support him to conclude

that he made the wrong decision when he turned toward the West. Members should not forget that there are many in the Arab world who would rejoice at a serious setback for President Sadat.

Much has been said of the economic benefits we derive from our important relationship with Saudi Arabia. I do not intend to hold up the specter that parts of the United States will go dark if the United States and Saudi Arabia go in divergent directions. I hope that ways can be found to prevent such a calamity. We must remember, however, that we have benefited and will continue to benefit from the prudent and supportive approach taken by Saudi Arabia to world economic problems, such as its support for the dollar, and by the Saudi willingness to keep the lid on oil prices. Saudi Arabia has legitimate security concerns about radical Arab neighbors. We should respond to those concerns.

In a letter to me on May 9, Secretary of Defense Brown pointed out that the Saudi Arabian Government is willing to give important assurances in regard to the F-15 aircraft that would be sold under the administration's proposal. According to Secretary Brown:

The Government of Saudi Arabia has assured us that it has no aggressive intentions against any state, that it will use the F-15 aircraft only in furtherance of its legitimate self-defense, and that it will not employ the aircraft offensively. The Saudi Arabian Government has similarly assured us that it will not transfer the F-15 aircraft to any third country or permit the nationals of such country to train on the F-15 aircraft, serve as pilots, or otherwise have access to the aircraft without the authorization of the United States.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have the text of Secretary Brown's letter included in the Record following my remarks.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection it is so ordered. (See exhibit 1.)

Mr. SPARKMAN. The aircraft the administration proposes to sell to Saudi Arabia would be configured so as to limit their ground attack capability. The F-15 will substantially enhance the air defenses of Saudi Arabia and play a major role in defending the oil fields which are so important, not only to the Saudis, but also to the entire non-Communist industrial world. It would be folly for the Saudis to contemplate the use of the F-15 to strike at Israel from their own territory under any circumstances. Israel's retaliation, clearly, would be overwhelming and devastating. There is every evidence that the Saudis realize that fact.

The F-15's and F-16's to be provided to Israel under this proposal are eagerly sought by that nation. I am confident that there would be no question of the wisdom of making this sale were the sales to Egypt and Saudi Arabia not being considered at the same time.

I am reassured that the administration is fully cognizant of America's traditional willingness to be responsive to the defensive needs of Israel. I was



pleased to receive the following information from President Carter on May 9:

To emphasize the deep and continuing character of our commitment to Israel, we will give sympathetic consideration to the request from Israel for additional combat aircraft for delivery in subsequent years. In particular, I am pleased to give a firm assurance at this time that I will transmit to Congress in 1979 a subsequent proposal to make available to Israel twenty F-15s in 1983-84.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the full text of the President's letter be included in the RECORD following my remarks.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection it is so ordered. (See exhibit 2.)

Mr. SPARKMAN. Congressional agreement to allow these sales to go forward would not be a lessening of the long-term commitment of the United States to Israel. I have reached my decision to support these sales in the firm conviction that Israel's interests will best be served by making these sales at this time.

If Saudi Arabia and Egypt turn to other suppliers for their planes, the United States will have no control over the use of those aircraft. There is persuasive evidence that Saudi Arabia will buy Mirages from France if Congress blocks the President's proposal. And then what control would the United States have over the course of Saudi Arabia's defense policy? If these sales to Egypt and Saudi Arabia are blocked we are likely to find that we will have lost much of our leverage to move the nations of the Middle East toward peace. Then, we could only stand by helplessly as the peace that we all want so very much slipped away.

In today's world, like it or not, arms are influence. And, if peace is ever to come to the Middle East, we must pursue an honest broker's role with all major parties.

The President's sales proposal will help to accomplish that.

I urge that the resolution be rejected.

#### EXHIBIT 1

WASHINGTON, D.C.

May 9, 1978.

Hon. JOHN J. SPARKMAN,  
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,  
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: During recent conversations with you and other members of your Committee, a number of questions have been raised regarding the characteristics of the F-15 aircraft we propose to sell to Saudi Arabia and reassurances as to the purposes for which Saudi Arabia will use the aircraft. I would like to respond to these questions and attempt to resolve any uncertainties that members may have felt regarding the proposed sale.

#### I. THE F-15 AIRCRAFT

The F-15 we plan to sell to Saudi Arabia will have the same configurations as the interceptor model approved for the United States Air Force. During the developmental phase of the F-15, initial plans called for giving the aircraft a ground attack capability. However, the availability of other aircraft with superior strike capabilities led the

Air Force to alter its plans and to limit the role of the F-15 to that of an air superiority fighter. Consequently, the development of new ground attack systems for the F-15 was discontinued in 1975.

Saudi Arabia chose the F-15 because of its extended patrol capability and superior air defense characteristics (including an advanced, all-weather air-to-air radar system). The F-15 best meets Saudi Arabian requirements for the air defense of a vast territory. In choosing the F-15, Saudi Arabia rejected aircraft with powerful ground attack capabilities such as the F-16.

As Saudi Arabia has selected the F-15 to defend its national territory, it would be folly, as the Chairman designate of the JCS, General David Jones, USAF, observed in testimony, to use the F-15 offensively against neighboring countries. This is particularly so vis-a-vis Israel, whose air strength is, and will be, so much greater. Not only would the F-15 be relatively ineffective in an offensive mode, and the risk of loss of the aircraft high, but its use away from Saudi Arabia would leave vital oil facilities, urban centers and military installations without necessary air defense cover. From the standpoint of military planning, it would make no sense whatsoever for Saudi Arabia to acquire an aircraft with the characteristics of the F-15 with an idea of using it as a ground attack aircraft. I am confident the Saudis have no such intention.

Like the USAF model, the F-15 for Saudi Arabia will be equipped with air defense armament, namely four AIM-9 Sidewinder air-to-air missiles, four AIM-7 Sparrow air-to-air missiles and a 20 mm. gun.

The aircraft can carry three external fuel tanks, but the plane requested by Saudi Arabia will not be equipped with special features that could give it additional range. Specifically, the planes will not have conformal fuel tanks ("fast packs"), i.e., auxiliary fuel tanks that conform to the body of the plane, and Saudi Arabian KC-130 tankers do not have equipment for air refueling of the F-15.

Saudi Arabia has not requested that the plane be outfitted with Multiple Ejection Racks (MER 200) which would allow the plane to carry a substantial bomb load. The U.S. will not furnish such MERs, and testing and certification of a MER system for the F-15 would not be feasible by another country without U.S. authorization. While aircraft could conceivably carry three standard MK-84 bombs, they would each replace an external fuel tank; this would greatly shorten the aircraft's range and increase its vulnerability. Moreover, in contrast to the F-16, the F-15 does not have a radar system designed for bombing.

Saudi Arabia has not requested nor do we intend to sell any other systems or armaments that would increase the range or enhance the ground attack capability of the F-15.

Pursuant to our national security disclosure policy, certain highly sensitive subcomponents of the U.S. Air Force version of the F-15 (e.g., cryptologic equipment and some special electronic capabilities) will not be sold to Saudi Arabia.

In sum, it is clear that the F-15 will help Saudi Arabia deter and defend against those nations that are hostile to its role as a leading moderate Arab state.

#### II. ASSURANCES

The Government of Saudi Arabia has assured us that it has no aggressive intentions against any state, that it will use the F-15 aircraft only in furtherance of its legitimate

self-defense, and that it will not employ the aircraft offensively. The Saudi Arabian Government has similarly assured us that it will not transfer the F-15 aircraft to any third country or permit the nationals of such country to train on the F-15 aircraft, serve as pilots, or otherwise to have access to the aircraft without the authorization of the United States.

We have specifically discussed these restrictions on use and prohibitions on transfer with the Government of Saudi Arabia. They have assured us that they intend scrupulously to comply with these prohibitions and restrictions. The record of Saudi Arabia in this respect is excellent. However, should the assurances be violated, the United States can take appropriate action, including suspension of services and of delivery of spare parts and other military equipment. Without such services the usability of the F-15 would degrade rapidly.

It is also important to note that the sales agreement reserves to the United States the right to suspend or cancel deliveries at any time "when the national interest of the United States so requires." Further, under Section 21(c) of the Arms Export Control Act, no U.S. person employed under Foreign Military Sales contracts in Saudi Arabia or any other country would be permitted to perform services in support of combat operations.

Questions have been raised concerning the possible basing of the F-15 aircraft at Tabuk Air Base. I would like to repeat to you the assurance given to me and other United States officials by the Saudi Arabian Government that Saudi Arabia will base the F-15 aircraft, not at Tabuk, but at Dhahran, Taif and possibly at Riyadh or Khams Mushait. Basing the F-15 at the vulnerable Tabuk base could place in needless jeopardy these vital aircraft which will form the heart of the Saudi Arabian air defense system. In addition, Tabuk is not equipped to serve as an operating base for the F-15s, and could not be so equipped without extensive U.S. assistance which would not be provided. These practical considerations, of which Saudi Arabia is well aware, strengthen the assurances that the F-15s will not be based at Tabuk.

The question has also been raised whether the Government of Saudi Arabia intends to acquire additional combat aircraft from other countries. The Saudi Arabian Government has assured us that it does not intend to add to its inventory any combat aircraft from other countries while it is preparing for and receiving the sixty F-15s. The shortage of trained personnel in Saudi Arabia would severely constrain Saudi Arabia's ability to utilize any additional new aircraft beyond the F-15 during this period.

With respect to the security of the aircraft, the Government of Saudi Arabia has expressed its determination to provide carefully for the physical protection of the aircraft, manuals and other material related to it. Prior to the delivery of the aircraft, we will work with the Government of Saudi Arabia to ensure that adequate safeguards are in place to prevent unauthorized persons from obtaining access to the aircraft or information about it.

The proposal with respect to Saudi Arabia, like all such proposals, stands on its own merits, and I hope the foregoing information will be helpful to you and that you and the members of your Committee will join in support of the Administration's proposals to sell aircraft to Israel, Egypt and Saudi Arabia.

Sincerely,

HAROLD BROWN.

## EXHIBIT 2

THE WHITE HOUSE,  
Washington, May 9, 1978.

HON. JOHN SPARKMAN,  
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,  
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.

To Chairman John Sparkman:

When we submitted the formal Notifications of the Mideast aircraft sales to Congress on April 28, we stressed, as we have so often, that as a nation we have a strong and unshakable commitment to the security of Israel.

The delivery of the aircraft for Israel covered by these Notifications will be completed by the third quarter of 1983. To emphasize the deep and continuing character of our commitment to Israel, we will give sympathetic consideration to the request from Israel for additional combat aircraft for delivery in subsequent years. In particular, I am pleased to give a firm assurance at this time that I will transmit to Congress in 1979 a subsequent proposal to make available to Israel twenty F-15s in 1983-84.

Sincerely,

JIMMY CARTER.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Mr. President, at this point, I ask unanimous consent to read an article that was in the Washington Post this morning, written by George Ball, former Under Secretary of State, known to many of us. It is entitled "The F-15 Sale."

The proposal to sell F15s to Saudi Arabia has been debated on the false premise that Israel's security is the principal issue. Yet, if the Saudis cannot buy F15s—a defensive long-range interceptor—they will unquestionably buy French Mirage F1s, which are a much more effective offensive weapon, thus affecting Israel's security far more seriously.

I skip to the concluding paragraph:

So far, Saudi Arabia has given helpful support to Anwar Sadat's peace initiatives. It has assisted America's interests by exercising a moderating influence on OPEC pricing policies, by continuing to sell oil for dollars, and by expanding its own oil production so as to meet world requirements. But today some influential younger Saudis are pressing their government to cut down production, keep the oil in the ground and sell it later at higher prices. America's rejection of the F15 sale would not only strengthen that faction but also discourage the Saudis from cooperation and further peace efforts.

Mr. President, I did not read all of the article, but I read the beginning and the concluding paragraphs. I ask unanimous consent, however, that the full article be printed in the RECORD at this point.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

## THE F-15 SALE

The proposal to sell F15s to Saudi Arabia has been debated on the false premise that Israel's security is the principal issue. Yet, if the Saudis cannot buy F15s—a defense long-range interceptor—they will unquestionably buy French Mirage F1s, which are a much more effective offensive weapon, thus affecting Israel's security far more seriously.

On this the military evidence is overwhelming, especially since the Saudis can obtain the first Mirages next spring rather than waiting until 1981 for the first F15s. Unlike the F15s, they can buy Mirages complete with bomb-racks, in almost unlimited

quantities, and with no restrictions on use or transferability. Since other Arab states have Mirages they could, in a war, utilize them effectively.

Because Saudi Arabia's existing fighter aircraft are obsolete, it has understandable security worries. Occupying a sparsely settled territory as large as the United States east of the Mississippi while possessing one-fourth of the world's oil resources. It is a tempting target for aggression. Thus the Saudis have reason to fear the Soviets' new strong position in Ethiopia, a possible attack from Soviet-dominated South Yemen (from which they have been bombed in the past), and a radicalized Iraq with which they share a long border and an ancient antagonism. With their vast financial resources they have no choice but to procure weapons to protect themselves as any responsible nation must. There is nothing the United States can do to prevent it.

The F15 incident illustrates a point too often overlooked. Although our commitment to Israel's security is categorical and America's and Israel's nation interests are to a large degree congruent, there are areas where they necessarily diverge. Israel is a small, beleaguered nation surrounded by a huge Arab population it views as hostile. The United States, on the other hand, is a superpower with world responsibilities; while faithfully assuring Israel's security it must look beyond short-range and narrow regional concerns if it is fully to serve its own broad interests.

So far, Saudi Arabia has given helpful support to Anwar Sadat's peace initiatives. It has assisted America's interests by exercising a moderating influence on OPEC pricing policies, by continuing to sell oil for dollars, and by expanding its own oil production so as to meet world requirements. But today some influential younger Saudis are pressing their government to cut down production, keep the oil in the ground and sell it later at higher prices. America's rejection of the F15 sale would not only strengthen that faction but also discourage the Saudis from cooperation and further peace efforts.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Mr. President, I yield the floor at this time, but reserve the remainder of my time.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from New Jersey.

Mr. CASE. Mr. President, I yield myself such time as I may use. May I ask whether any time, until now, has been taken by the opposition, or in this case, the proponents of the resolution?

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Tennessee has used 9 minutes, the Senator from Delaware has used 1 minute. So a total of 10 minutes has been used by the proponents.

Mr. CASE. By the proponents of the resolution?

May I ask further, because that seems a little strange, who used that 9 minutes?

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Tennessee used 9 of his minutes, but I believe that would be part of the opponents. Only 1 minute—

Mr. CASE. So, only 1 minute has been used so far?

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. That is correct.

Mr. CASE. Out of the 5 hours.

I thank the Chair. I am glad to have that straightened out.

Mr. President, I think it should be possible, and I believe it will be, to discuss this very important question without a

bruising debate. I think we should be able, and I think we will be able, to keep the matter within those limits that will prevent a very difficult situation from being exacerbated by the way in which our discussions are carried on.

Having said that, I want to immediately say that I think this is perhaps the most important question that I personally have been directly involved in since I have been a Member of the Senate.

I think it involves, in a very direct way, the whole matter of the strength of the West in its confrontation with the Soviet Union. It also involves the ability of the West to maintain itself against the constant pressure of the Soviet Union, and its physical ability to do this—as well as its moral ability to handle this situation.

Mr. President, it used to be axiomatic that Israel's strength was an essential element of the strength of the West. There seems to have been serious erosion at high levels in our Government in the strength of that concept. In fact, persons high in Government circles have protested bitterly at the idea that Israel's existence and Israel's strength, her abilities to survive on her own, have any significant value to the West. The person protesting this has said, "No, it isn't Israel's value to the United States that is in question here."

We are committed to Israel. That is a slippery word, Mr. President, "commitment," and what does it mean? Does it mean a promise? Does it mean a matter of words? Does it mean an internal feeling of benevolence?

That is what those in high places in our Government today would have us believe our relationship and attitude toward Israel is and should be. This represents, Mr. President, I think, one of the gravest errors that we could allow ourselves to fall into.

How we regard this matter will affect the whole course of decision on questions of the sort before us today. If our relationship with Israel is merely that of kindness, of the rich uncle, of the benefactor, of the patron toward the patronized, then we can afford, I think, properly, to equate our relationship with Israel with our relationship with all other countries in that area.

In a general sense, we wish all countries well, all peoples well.

But that, my conscience tells me, my judgment tells me, is the worst possible error we can slip into. And we are not only slipping into it, Mr. President, we are being pushed into it by the very propaganda from abroad and by people in high places in our own Government.

I dwell on this rather vague concept at this point, Mr. President, because I think it is so very basic to our whole attitude, to the course of our policy in regard to the Middle East, that I think it cannot be neglected.

If we just have an obligation to help Israel as far as we can, conveniently, if the existence of Israel is a matter of interest to us sentimentally, or for historical reasons, or other things, we can, with some equanimity, regard the in-



terests of other countries with the same general benevolence. In conflicts between them and Israel, we thus can afford to take the kind of position of neutrality that a kind parent, a kind friend to all the world might take. We can consider our attitudes in regard to those countries and their quarrels—age-old quarrels—with a kind of remote benevolence, and we could treat them all alike.

It looks to me, Mr. President, as if that situation is one we have slipped into almost imperceptibly. Yet I cannot otherwise explain the presentation of these four arms sales offers to us with the statement that we can take them all or let them all go, we cannot choose among them.

I cannot in any other way explain the attitude of people testifying before us saying that if Israel gets into trouble we will go in and help her.

Israel need not worry. But if I were Israel I would worry at such a reduction in the strength of our relationship to it, because everyone knows, Mr. President, that a state's commitment will be honored only so long as it appears to be in a state's interest, and that the beneficiary of such a commitment had better not rely on it if its existence and its survival are at stake. And they are so now.

If we regard this situation in the Middle East as one for our indifferent benevolence—indifferent as among the various nations there—it is perfectly reasonable to say that we will give so much to this country and so much to the other country and that it will all balance off; that we are being fair.

Mr. President, I suggest it is time that we recognized again and kept bright and shining in our eyes this truth: The existence of Israel, its strength to defend itself, is essential to the preservation of the West, to the preservation of NATO, and inevitably, in the end, to the preservation of the United States. More than that, it is essential to the preservation of the moderate Arab regimes.

Can you imagine, if there were no Israel, the kind of fighting that would go on among the various nations and interests and groups within the Middle East?

Can you imagine the fertile field for Communist stirring up of strife that would exist if that happened? Can you imagine the possibility—any possibility—of moderate leaders such as President Sadat surviving long in such a shambles? I cannot. I think no reasonable people can. Can you imagine the moderate Saudis—moderate after their fashion, at least—surviving among the age-old rivalries and passions and quarrels and wars that will revive again in that part of the world?

It is time that we restored to our thinking the concept that a strong Israel is not just a beneficiary of the United States. It is essential to the security of the United States and of all the West.

Mr. President, this should put a different light upon the problem before us. I would like to develop that, and I shall

do so later today. I do not want to take too much time from my colleagues in these introductory remarks.

I should like to make only one other broad point, and it is this: Those of us who feel that these offers should be rejected in toto want to make it very clear at the outset that we do not regard that as a final disposition of these questions.

We think the wise thing to do is to put them all on the back burner for the time being, with a complete understanding that the administration can renew all or any of them at any time; but that the present time is the wrong time to push.

I think it is time we stopped regarding these questions—especially this particular question—as of chief significance as a contest between the President of the United States and Congress, or as between the American Jewish community and the Government of the United States, or in any such purely narrow, political sense. However, we can be sure that the headlines tomorrow will be either that the President wins or the President loses. The question is not whether the President wins or the President loses, whether Congress wins or Congress loses. The question is whether democracy in the West—the United States of America—wins or loses in this matter.

So let us try to keep it—at least among ourselves—at a level higher than that, and I know we want to do that.

The President will gain strength or lose it in this matter by the wisdom of his conduct and the clarity of his expression, and so will the Congress of the United States—not by one winning over the other. To the extent that we evidence maturity in our handling of this question, so will our influence in the world increase or decrease, and so will our friends have confidence or lose confidence in us.

This is a very important matter, Mr. President. When you have an asset such as the State of Israel, you do not lightly consider tossing it away. We are concerned, and rightly so, by a strong mercenary force of Cubans moving around the world, dominated, directed, and financed by the Soviet Union. It is terribly difficult for us in the West, as a democracy, to deal with a situation such as this. We have an asset in place that is 10 times more valuable, a hundred times more valuable, than a Cuban mercenary force. That asset is the State of Israel, dedicated to the West.

Will we risk destroying it by gradually eroding our support, and letting it sink lower and lower in its ability to defend itself against all comers—to the point where it loses the self-confidence essential to the maintenance of the existence of any country? That is the question here.

Yet, Mr. President, we do not have to decide this matter. All we have to do is to agree that we will consider it a little more thoroughly, a little more deliberately, than we have done so far. To do that, all we have to do is to postpone these questions by adopting this

resolution of disapproval, without prejudice, without determining any of the great questions which I raise now for the purpose of indicating how serious I think the matter is.

I reserve the remainder of my time. Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I yield myself such time as I may require. I do not believe it will be more than 5 minutes. Then I will yield to the Senator from New York.

Mr. President, in light of the fact that I suspect I am going to have numerous opportunities to respond to specific arguments, I am not going to make a formal opening statement, but I would like to highlight a few points.

First of all, I do not believe this is the time nor the forum for us to be conducting this debate. By the forum, I do not mean that the Senate is the inappropriate forum. I mean the forum in which we are asked to view and look at these arms sales questions in the Middle East.

I think the central question here, which everyone will be getting back to from different perspectives, is the question of peace in the Middle East and what accommodates that.

I say at the outset that, unlike some people who may speak today in support of the position I hold, I believe that the administration truly believes that this is the best way to encourage peace, to secure Israel's best interests, and to move in the best interests of the United States. I do not question their intent. I do not question their desire. I do not question their commitment to Israel. I do question their judgment.

The arguments we are going to hear most often today against our resolution will be these:

No. 1, Saudi pride. If, in fact, we do not approve this sale of the 60 F-15's, to Saudi Arabia, their pride will be injured; and as a consequence of their injured pride, they will take courses of action which are inimical to the best interests of Israel and the best interests of the United States of America—in short, against the best interests of peace in the Middle East.

The second argument that I suspect we will hear time and again, as we heard in committee, is that if we do not, the French will. If we do not supply the 60 F-15's to the Israelis, they will go out and buy Mirages from the French; and that will be real trouble, if they do that.

The third argument we will hear is that the rationale for the needs for F-15's on the part of Saudis is simply and only to meet their legitimate defense needs. They do have legitimate defense needs, with which I do not argue.

The fourth argument made, I suspect, will be that the failure to provide the Saudis and Egyptians and the Israelis, all at once, with these planes, the entire package, will diminish the prospects for peace, but that to assure that we do not diminish that prospect, even with the package, we had better up the ante 20 more for Israel. Because the opponents of our resolution recognize that one of the central questions of whether or not there is peace in the Middle East, or the per-

ception of each of the Middle Eastern nations toward our actions, and they acknowledge that now the Israelis perceive that our sale of F-15's to the Saudis is against their interests—in order to assure them that it is not against their interests, what we must do is to give them 20 more F-15's at some time in the future.

Lastly, Mr. President, we will hear that the fact of the matter is that failure to go along with this entire package now will severely jeopardize Saudi Arabia's security interest now.

Our distinguished chairman of the full committee, Senator SPARKMAN, pointed out sort of an interesting contradiction, I think, in that argument, that we need to move forward now, and I do not think he meant to do it. He pointed out that really Israel should not worry very much because these planes are not going to be there until 1983 or 1984 and in the air and flying. If that is the case, and if Saudi Arabia's defense needs are so critical right now, why do we not meet their legitimate defense needs now with other potential help, everything from ground radars to a different mix of airplanes, but do something about it now?

Mr. President, the fact of the matter is that the entire debate on this question really comes down to talking about perceptions, perceptions of relationships among the Mideastern countries and what our involvement will or will not do to change those perceptions and enhance the possibility of peace in the Middle East.

Mr. HART. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. BIDEN. I yield.

Mr. HART. Will the Senator give me his judgment as to the effect on the relationship between this country and Saudi Arabia will be if this package is rejected?

Mr. BIDEN. I think if this entire package is rejected and we reject the Israeli portion of the package also, there will be no long-term negative effect with regard to our relationship with Saudi Arabia, but I think we should take a look at what is that relationship we now have with Saudi Arabia. We talk about it as if it were a sacrosanct relationship whereby we had an ally in Saudi Arabia that was actively initiating every possible approach to peace in the Middle East in conjunction with the United States of America, that is being the honest broker in the Middle East and is moving forward to propel that possibility with all deliberate speed.

Although Saudi Arabia is an ally, although Saudi Arabia is important, there is a qualitative distinction in terms of the nature of the relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia as distinguished from the United States and Israel in terms of how we each, the United States and Saudi Arabia, the United States and Israel, view the United States interests in the Middle East.

So, although it is an important relationship, it is not the same relationship that we have with Israel.

Mr. HART. If the Senator will yield further, I have heard few people in any

position of authority make that characterization of the nature of that relationship. What I have heard put forward by serious students of the area is that the future relationship of this country to the Saudis and to the present Saudi leadership is extremely important not only to this country and our interests in that part of the world but also to the possibility of peace and to the survival of the Government of Israel.

Mr. BIDEN. Without debating that point at this point, I only respond by saying similar serious students have pointed out a fact of life that exists in the Middle East and that is that the Saudis can ill afford not to have a positive relationship, long-term, with the United States of America. I do not know where else their long-term interests lie other than with the United States of America. So instead of the United States of America being reactive to what the Saudis view as the essential ingredient toward that relationship, even when we disagree with it and saying, well, it would be better if we did not have to move with 60 planes, but if we do not the Saudis will do the following things, I think is the inappropriate way for us to view that relationship.

I think there is a mutuality of interest between Saudi Arabia and the United States of America; although I think there could be and will be hurt feelings and they will be temporary, I think the long-term possibilities of Saudi Arabia moving to a position that is anti-United States, against U.S. interests, if not very realistic.

Mr. ABOUREZK. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. HART. If I may say to the Senator, I am not an advocate of either side in this matter. I have not decided what my vote will be. But I personally do not like the attitude that says that the Saudis have nowhere else to go, and that regardless of how we treat them or how we respond to their requests for not only military assistance but also a variety of other aid, they are going to be our friends anyway. I think that attitude frankly has gotten this country into a lot of trouble around the world in a variety of other contexts. These are proud people. They do not need, frankly, to be pushed around by this country, or to be told what is best for them. I do not think that we should take the attitude that we have to give them all they want, but I think, on the other hand, it would be unfortunate if we took the attitude that they have nowhere else to go regardless of how we treat them, or that the consequences would be the same. I am particularly concerned with the Senator's use of the word "temporary," because that really goes to the heart of the question I originally asked. The Senator concluded. I think, in his remarks, that any unhappiness on the part of that government toward this country would be temporary. I would be interested in the Senator documenting that, particularly in the context of hearings held by the committee on which the Senator serves.

Mr. BIDEN. First of all, there is no

way the Senator can document whether there will be a temporary unhappiness or any unhappiness or what the form of that unhappiness will take. Obviously, I cannot any more than if I ask the Senator from Colorado to document what the Israeli reaction would be, what impact that would have on our relationship and to document that in the Record.

Mr. ABOUREZK. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. BIDEN. The only point that I am trying to make here in response to the Senator's original question is that we should not cavalierly treat the Saudis. That is why the Senator, when drafting this package, this resolution, wanted to do it in the context of all or none because it should not be viewed as a slap in the face to the Saudis, that we do not believe that we have an interest that we share with them, and that we do not think they have legitimate needs. What it should be viewed as is that No. 1, this is not the forum in which that mutuality of interests should be met; No. 2, although they may very well determine that it is in their best interests to have 60 F-15's, that we should not react to them or any other country, Israel included, based upon our judgment of whether or not it is in the best interests not of Saudi Arabia but the United States of America. The best interests of the United States of America are served by peace in the Middle East. Sale at this time, an agreement to have the sale of over \$4.5 billion worth of warplanes to that area of the world now, I think, and hope to elaborate as we get into this debate, will have a debilitating effect on the prospects of peace.

Absent peace in the Middle East, the U.S. interests continue to be in jeopardy regardless of our relationship with Saudi Arabia and regardless of our relationship with Israel. We need peace in the Middle East for the U.S. interests. I believe that Saudi Arabia needs peace in the Middle East for its interests and I believe Israel and Egypt also need it, and it is a matter of perception as to how we best accommodate that mutual interest. And I hope during the course of this debate that we will not dwell on who we like more, do we like the Saudis more than the Israelis, do we like the Egyptians less than the Saudis or more, that whole argument. What is most likely to bring about peace in the Middle East, how will it best be accomplished and should the Saudi determination of how peace be best arrived at be accepted without question by us any more than should the Israeli perception as to how peace should be best accomplished in the Middle East be accepted by the United States?

Mr. HART. I will just make one comment, and then I will be finished. In my judgment, and to the degree to which I have looked at this, it seems that what the Saudi Government infers from this vote could be very crucial to the short-range and long-range prospects for peace, so I myself would probably not dismiss that concern quite as easily as the Senator has.



Mr. BIDEN. I do not dismiss it. I would assume the Senator would concede that the Israelis' attitude which they take on what action we take here could easily impact upon the peace process.

Mr. HART. Based upon contacts I have had with my constituents—

Mr. BIDEN. Do they speak for Israel?

Mr. HART. I think that has already been determined.

Mr. BIDEN. Do they speak for Israel?

Mr. HART. To answer the Senator's observation, I believe it is a foregone conclusion in the minds of people in this country who are concerned about Israel and our relationship to Israel that the package should be defeated. I think the Senator is aware of that. So I do not think there is any concern in anybody's mind on that.

Mr. BIDEN. I will yield to the Senator from New York in just a moment because I do not want to take up too much time in the beginning of this debate until everyone makes his opening statement. But I just want to make one thing clear: as I understood it, the Senator from Colorado indicated that the Saudis, based upon whether we accept or reject this package, could impact upon the prospect of peace; is that correct? Is that what he was saying?

Mr. HART. Yes, that was an observation I made.

Mr. BIDEN. Is not the observation equally as legitimate, assuming for the moment the Israelis viewed what was the consequence of this package going forward, then they would not be willing to move any further in terms of any concession in the Middle East, and would that not equally impact upon the prospect for peace?

Mr. HART. I think it certainly would. But I also said that I think it is very clear to all of us, based upon our contacts with our constituents, that that judgment has already been made, that the defeat of this package would in no way condition Israel's attitudes about the long-range prospects for peace.

What I am asking is—

Mr. BIDEN. I would disagree. What would the Saudis do?

I will yield for a brief question, I hope.

Mr. ABOUREZK. A very brief question. The Senator said he thought if the package were turned down as a package any feelings on the part of the Saudis might be temporary, if they exist at all. Does that accurately state what the Senator said?

Mr. BIDEN. Yes.

Mr. ABOUREZK. Then would the Senator give us an assessment of what those feelings might be if the package were turned down and several months later Israel came back by itself and got the warplanes it requested? Would that make a difference or would it be the same?

Mr. BIDEN. I think it would exacerbate whatever feelings existed at that time.

I will yield to the Senator from Maryland.

Mr. SARBANES. I simply want to say

to the very able Senator from Colorado that he has raised some important questions. But what has to be perceived and understood is that to a large extent what is at issue here is the question of the art of governance on the part of the Government of the United States.

Now, members of the Foreign Relations Committee, all of them, I think, are sensitive to some of the considerations that have been brought forth with respect to America's relationship with each of these three countries. The questions that were asked in the committee during the hearings on this matter reflected that sensitivity. Members of the Senate ought to recognize that sensitivity as being important, because it goes to the proposition that support for and passage of the resolution of the Senator from Delaware today does not mean that nothing will be done with respect to these three countries thereafter. In fact, support of that resolution was put forth by its proponents in the committee as being without prejudice to any of the three countries.

Now, there is a question of skill and competence in the art of government. The questions that really have to be asked are: First, why was a package submitted by the President? Why was this matter placed in such a context, a context which raises extremely serious questions concerning the nature of America's historical commitments to Israel and questions about America's specific commitments stemming out of the recent 1975 accords?

Second, why has the administration been unwilling to alter the dimensions of these sales—the numbers—particularly, in terms of moving them downward. A move that might well prompt a responsive attitude on the part of Congress. Third, why are these arms sales being submitted at this time? A time which many see as exactly the wrong time rather than the right time to be moving forward with a major injection of advanced military planes into that area?

A perhaps more basic question that ought to be asked is why the administration is insisting in moving forward in this manner when in the view of many, it was possible for the administration to modify its position and move in such a way that over a reasonable period of time it could respond to the concerns it has put forward, and do it in such a way as to command a general consensus in the Congress and in the country. Why is the administration insisting on pressing forward with an approach that runs counter to some very fundamental principles with respect to our foreign policy? Why are they doing that?

Would it not be better for the peace effort, and for our relationships with all of the countries, if the actions our Government finally takes are actions that command a general consensus?

We have heard how this vote is being portrayed by spokesmen for the administration. They are back to the discredited concept of "Let us win this one.

It is a fight between the President and the Congress."

That is not the issue, or at least that ought not to be the issue. The issue ought to be to evolve an American foreign policy that responds to our national interests, that moves toward peace, in the area, and that commands the broadest base of support.

I think such a foreign policy could have been developed in this instance; it could have been done. But the administration has not done it, and has not been willing to do it. They have brought us here to the floor on this matter without responding to those various fundamental considerations I outlined earlier.

The adoption of the Biden resolution will not then simply leave us without any options; it will still be open to the administration to engage in some creative statesmanship. In fact, the situation begs for creative statesmanship, which we have been asking the administration to produce for weeks and months. Earlier this year a majority of the Foreign Relations Committee wrote to the administration and said, "Do not come forward with the sales now given the ongoing efforts for peace. Do not come forward."

They came forward. Then they say to us, "Well, now that we have come forward you must support us." The Administration places us on a downward treadmill, if there can be such a thing, and then says we have to stay there.

We do not have to stay there. The adoption of this resolution is not the end of this matter. There will still be room for some creative statesmanship on this issue.

Mr. HART. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for just one comment?

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, how much time does the Senator from Delaware have under his control, how much time remains?

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. McGOVERN). The Senator from Delaware has 128 minutes under his control.

Mr. BIDEN. I thank the Chair for making it difficult for me.

At this point, Mr. President, I do not want to cut off the Senator from Colorado, but I would suggest that possibly time could be yielded to him at the appropriate time for the opponents of this measure, and with the permission—

Mr. HART. I am not one of the opponents. I am trying to get some information. Maybe it is more important for people to make their opening statements than to get information.

Mr. BIDEN. I think that might be.

Mr. President, I believe the Senator from New Jersey had suggested an order of either one of the two Senators from New York proceeding at this point.

Mr. CASE. If that is agreeable, we will go ahead with that arrangement.

Mr. BIDEN. That is fine with me.

Mr. CASE. In that case, Mr. President, I yield such time as he may desire to the Senator from New York (Mr. JAVITS).

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I would appreciate it if I were advised by the Chair when I have consumed 15 minutes.

If the Senator from Colorado will give me his attention, I would like to answer his question. The answer to the question is that planes are not the issue. I can assure Senator HARR that every country will get their planes, in time, and that all of the effort to approve the "package" sale is simply subscribing to the unreality of the present argument.

Let me tell you why. It is said that the Saudis have to have these planes now because the Soviets are threatening from the Horn of Africa; second, that a pincers movement is about to take place between Iraq on the north and South Yemen on the south, which are the recipients of enormous amounts of Soviet arms; and third, that because of the disorder in Lebanon and the general stirrings in the Arab world, Arab radicals threaten the regime within Saudi Arabia.

Mr. President, these planes are going to be delivered in 1981. That is 3 years hence; and it is going to take a minimum of 2 to 3 years for pilots and personnel to learn to operate the planes. By the way, there are thousands of Americans in Saudi Arabia now. You do not need any better trip-wire than they.

So the argument that they need them to repel a Soviet threat from the Horn or from the south or from the north is nonsense. If there is a threat to Saudi Arabia, there is only one power that is going to defend it. That will be NATO or the United States, or both, because their fundamental interests are involved. As JOHN GLENN, who is opposite me on this issue, I am sorry to say, has said 60 planes are not going to make or break it. Saudi Arabia is an enormous area, as large as the United States east of the Mississippi. I must say if we are going to expect the Saudis themselves to defend it against the Soviet threat, we had better triple the population of Saudi Arabia, in the first place.

I think the President set out to teach the Israelis a lesson. That is what this is all about. That is shown by the way that he cut their numbers. That seems to be his policy, and he is going to cut them down on both sides.

I believe that, on the pending resolution, that is a great disservice to the United States, and our colleague from New Jersey and our colleague from Delaware have explained why. We are worrying about 30,000 Cubans in Africa, but we have 3 million Israelis in Israel. Are we going to sap their vitality and their morale and cut their legs out from under them? That is what this is all about.

We would have no right to debate this matter if that were not the issue. Senators ask me what the Saudis think. Frankly, we will never know how much is for the record and how much they really think. Prince Saud the other day, for whom I have enormous regard, made some untoward statements about this letter regarding the F-15's—a scrap of paper; we will not worry about that. But what caused the administration to say that he did not really mean that, he meant something else? And former Israeli Foreign Minister Allon this morn-

ing said, I presume to the United States, "This is really inimical to Israel."

Everybody has to take a stand. There is an enormous amount of posturing over there; it takes a lot of sophistication to sort it out. With my utmost regard for the Saudis and for Mr. Allon, we have to dig beneath the surface to find out how the Saudis feel.

So far as the Saudis are concerned, why should they be with us? They should be with us because we are the backbone of the world in which they have all their wealth. Their billions are all in dollars, and they do not want to throw them over, because they really think this country is the strongest and most dependable country for their investment and for themselves. Do you think they are going to lean on France for their security for the next 5 years? They are not crazy, believe me.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. JAVITS. I yield.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Mr. President, the Foreign Relations Committee has a meeting at 11:30.

Mr. CASE. Take the microphone.

Mr. SPARKMAN. We have set a meeting of the Foreign Relations Committee for 11:30, if we can get a quorum, and as a matter of fact with those on the floor at the present time and those already down there, we will have a quorum, and it will take us less than 5 minutes to transact the necessary business. It is to vote on a couple of important appropriations, particularly the Foreign Assistance Act. We have completed the hearings and everything is ready, and we can complete that within just a few minutes. It is essential that we get that out today, because this is the deadline.

Mr. CASE. Mr. President, would the Senator suggest we have a quorum call, and charge the time to neither side?

Mr. SPARKMAN. My thought was that, since the other Senator from New York (Mr. MOYNIHAN) is ready to speak, we might yield to him while we are gone.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I am going to continue for another 5 minutes and, I will then be down and vote in the Foreign Relations Committee.

Just to go on with this for a minute, to take this offer made Tuesday by the President—again with utmost sincerity and good faith, he is going to give Israel 20 more F-15's, just to even things out. That simply bears upon the matter which we are discussing. The President said, in his letter of May 9 which makes this proposal:

... we will give sympathetic consideration to the request from Israel for additional combat aircraft for delivery in subsequent years. In particular, I am pleased to give a firm assurance at this time that I will transmit to Congress in 1979 a subsequent proposal to make available to Israel twenty F-15s in 1983-84.

Mr. President, that is outside the 5-year cycle, and within the cycle in which both Saudis and Egyptians will fit. That puts it in another cycle in which the Egyptians and everybody else will get planes, and while it is a nice thing to do,

and I appreciate the President's gesture, it does not basically and substantively affect the situation we are talking about. One more thing, and I shall be through. My friend from Colorado made a very perceptive comment, that we are not going to know from what the parties say what the situation is going to be tonight and tomorrow morning; we are going to have to judge it today on the basis of the national interest of our country and the continuance of a policy which so far has put the United States and the Middle East on top, over the Soviet Union. That is what the Soviet Union is fulminating about. That was the reason for the Cubans, the reason for the threats, and the reason for that joint communique of the President and Brezhnev respecting Geneva. That was a very great mistake; we took in a partner we did not need and who is bound to compromise us, because it is to their interest to keep the Middle East in panic and disorder, and to say that Israel is no more, or is so weak she does not amount to anything.

That is their business; that is not our business.

So the main argument here is what is the impact of this determination today upon the Middle East policy of the United States? I respectfully submit that if we go with the President, sincere as he is, it will be highly adverse to the best interests which the United States has to the effort to redeem that whole area from its age-old poverty and ignorance and blindness. That is the issue. I hope very much that the Senator, who is a very thoughtful man, and others in the Chamber will vote upon this matter in that light. That is the real issue. I could be right or I could be wrong, but at least let us keep our eye on what is the issue.

Mr. HART. Will the Senator yield?

Mr. JAVITS. I yield.

Mr. HART. I think the Senator from New York, characteristically, has hit the nail on the head. The question still remains that if the vote on this sales proposal is adverse, will the circumstances be different tonight and tomorrow in the Middle East then they are right now?

I think the role of the Saudi Government in those circumstances is extremely important, and I hope that those who favor this resolution can help resolve that question for some of the rest of us.

Mr. JAVITS. That is what I was trying to do. I was trying to do that by discussing the subsequent interests of the parties. I am pointing out that we never know from their statements what position they particularly desire to take today, yesterday, or the day before for the record. So we have to go to the substantive issue. My conclusion is that on the substantive issue, the substantive interest of Saudi Arabia is to be with us. We are the only dependable power for them to protect their real interests. I am glad we are. Let us not be concerned about the fact that somebody is going to have to have his nose out of joint tomorrow. If he has his nose out of joint tomorrow, he can get over it tomorrow night.

Mr. HART. And they want to know



that when they do depend on us, we are there.

Mr. JAVITS. Right, absolutely. And we are, and we will be. In my judgment both sides agree on that.

Mr. CASE. I just want to underscore what the Senator from New York has said in this fashion: We never hesitate to ask Israel to understand the nature of our problems and to yield a bit on its immediate requests. If we are such friends of the Saudis and they of us, why cannot we talk to them as equals and ask them to make concessions on their immediate request for the common interest? That is what we are asking here.

(Mr. HART assumed the chair.)

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I yield to the junior Senator from New York for 20 minutes to speak in support of this resolution.

Mr. MOYNIHAN. I thank the distinguished sponsor of the resolution (Mr. BIDEN) which I rise to support.

I am pleased that the Senator from Colorado (Mr. HART) is presiding and has a responsibility to attend to the speaker at this moment. Although he cannot respond, I will try to speak to the point he has raised because clearly it is the one that most concerns Senators, such as the Senator from Colorado, who have not decided how they will vote, and who, in the most attractive way, are asking questions that in the end they will reach a decision.

The sale of these aircraft to the Arab neighbors of Israel is, in essence, a rationalization of American nervelessness in the area of international economic policy as well as political and military policy.

It is 3 months now since the administration made known its desires to sell, as a "package," jet aircraft to Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia. The three proposals have diverse histories and it was thus peculiar that, from the very beginning, they came to be linked. The sale to Israel in fact originates in the so-called second disengagement agreement of 1975—negotiated by Secretary of State Kissinger—between Israel and Egypt. Israeli assent was gained, in part, by an assurance from the United States to supply adequate numbers of F-16 aircraft.

Meanwhile, the sale to the Egyptians originates in the history of Egyptian dissociation from the Soviet Union. Presumably, the decision springs from a strategic calculation—a desire to replace the Soviets as Egypt's primary source of arms. The sale to the Saudis comes from yet another place, though, in truth, its origins—both historically and diplomatically—remain far more obscure. The F-15 aircraft offered to Saudi Arabia are said to be symbols of the increasing friendship between our two countries.

On February 14, the day these proposals were first made public, I stated my opposition. I do so again today, and will so vote.

Our debate is governed by two things—the insistence by the administration that the three proposals be considered together, and the provisions of the Arms Control Export Act of 1976 which say

that a resolution of disapproval, as reported to us by the Foreign Relations Committee, cannot be amended on the floor of the Senate.

Of these two constraints, I would note the one more relevant to us. The law gives the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 10 days to act against any arms sales proposal once it has been formally tendered. A short time, so one would think, to render a judgment of such significance. But it is not 10 days, but rather 3 months, which have intervened.

Hence a first point: In the 3 months that this proposal has been in the public domain, it has become more controversial, not less. The more it was examined, the harder it seemed to make a case for it. The 8-to-8 vote in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee reflects, indeed, a deeper absence of consensus within the country. Even those who endorse the proposal do so—if I may be permitted the observation—more in deference to the President than in support of the President.

Our Foreign Relations Committee is rightly regarded as a Senate institution with rare powers of knowledge and analysis. Such, surely, is its history. Why does it choose not to render a decisive judgment in this matter? Why are there those who find the arguments of the administration so lacking in persuasiveness?

I submit, first of all, that it is neither the sale of airplanes as such, nor the airplanes themselves, which are responsible. There are circumstances under which, I imagine, a proposal of this sort would have been quite well received, or at the least, far less controversial.

What is the matter?

The matter, I am forced to say, is a striking lack of confidence in the quality of the ideas which inform current Near East policies. My own feeling—and I hazard that it is not so different from the feelings of many others—is that the so-called "arms package" comes about from the very incorrectness of things the administration has done in the past, that the seeming clarity of the proposal is in fact the result of confusion, that the advance promised by the proposal is in fact the product of a series of retreats. We are asked, in sum, to do something which will perpetuate, not alleviate, our problems.

For this is not the crowning event of a series of successes. If the administration came to us upon the conclusion of an Israeli-Egyptian agreement; if it came with the news that the position of the West in the Near East has been solidified or, at least, that there now existed a plan to make it so; if it came with a case that our relations with the oil cartel had been altered to our advantage, or that there were some prospect that they might be; and if it came with a plausible claim that these sales might reverse disturbing trends—then we would think differently.

I wish now to address each of these three areas—the peace negotiations, the geopolitical situation, petroleum depend-

ency—for each has its role in the decision before us.

The peace negotiations, first of all.

We have to understand, we simply must understand, that the Sadat-Begin discussions began, because both leaders had been staggered by the Middle East policy of the United States—the policy announced in the joint Soviet-American statements of October 1, 1977. The Sadat initiative—his dramatic visit to Jerusalem—is the rejection of, the denial of, the hopeful escape from the policy of the United States as then declared.

Now, so far as one can tell, the policy of the United States remains what it was last October: A denial of the utility of a separate Israeli-Egyptian agreement; a desire for the inclusion of Syria and the PLO; and, accordingly, an accommodation to Soviet regional pretensions in return for the help of the Soviets in "delivering" its Palestinian and Soviet clients at some future peace conference.

This policy is still being pursued, and the nature of this "arms package" shows it.

Note, first of all, the very idea of a "package."

For the first time, an alarming proposition is put forward: though Israel may need American aircraft, its acquisition of those aircraft depends on whether Arab States acquire American aircraft. What is the argument for this unprecedented all-or-nothing proposition? How does it happen that Israel's security requirements come to be measured in terms of the Congress' willingness to endorse sales to Egypt and to Saudi Arabia? Of a sudden, the security of Israel becomes negotiable, if certain other American-Arab bilateral arrangements are not made. Or, put another way, the security of Israel becomes an item of barter in United States-Arab relations.

Disturbing surely—as is the timing of the sale. For the proposal comes forward at a time when the Israeli-Egyptian negotiations are in difficulty. It comes, inescapably, as a de facto endorsement of the Egyptian position—the Saudi-subsidized Egyptian position. What might have been a proper American response to successful Israeli-Egyptian discussions becomes, instead, an American subsidy for failure; indeed, it is almost a built-in incentive for failure.

For, surely, Saudi Arabia will not conclude from this episode that it ought to use its influence to make Egypt more "flexible." No. The pressure for flexibility will come exclusively from the United States and it will be directed exclusively against Israel—even as the prospects for an Israeli-Egyptian agreement recede.

And, as it recedes, the policy of October 1 will once again be allowed to proceed—the Washington, Moscow, Damascus, PLO policy of October 1, no longer confounded by a detour from Cairo to Jerusalem.

Indeed, it is an awareness of this prospect which informs a letter which Senators JACKSON, NUNN, and I wrote to the President on April 25. In it, we proposed

a delay in the arms sales proposal. We wrote:

Our national effort would be far better directed toward encouraging a peace between Israel and Egypt, to reinforcing the promising elements of the Sadat-Begin dialogue and to bringing those negotiations to a favorable conclusion. Were the proposed arms sales presented to the Congress following a peace between Israel and Egypt, there is no doubt that it would receive favorable consideration in the Congress...

Approval by the Congress with a consensus rather than the probable rejection of part of the package after a bitter controversy is clearly in the national interest. A delay would facilitate an intensified negotiation effort.

As it is, the consequences of the administration's choice to press ahead are almost predictable. Israel will, necessarily, put less credence in American assurances, and become more inclined to question the negotiating objectives of the United States.

And, when this happens, the administration will feel fortified that its policy of October 1, 1977, was correct all along—and that the correctness of it will then be plain to the world. The central proposition of that policy will once again become more prominent, the proposition that the Soviets should be—can be—drawn into a constructive role in the Near East.

And here we must turn to the context in which these events unfold—the geopolitical situation. Now the Soviets are well established in Syria and Iraq. Syria and the PLO have between them brought about the destruction of Lebanon—the only democracy, save for Israel, that used to exist in the region—is unremarked upon, is instead accepted as part of the ongoing, unexceptional, routine of life.

And there has been a Communist coup in Afghanistan, with powerful implications for Iran, and Pakistan—themselves traditional objects of Tsarist, then Soviet, imperialism. Soviets and Cubans are much in evidence in the Horn of Africa, and in Mozambique, Angola, and other places.

One learns at the least that the Soviets are powerful and persistent and ambitious, that they are prepared to commit substantial resources to their undertakings, that they are prepared to deal ruthlessly with those who stand in their way—whether they be Muslims in Afghanistan, Maronite Catholics in Lebanon, or Jews in Israel.

And the Soviets are clearly present in the debate over these arms sales. It is not merely those of us who oppose the sale who have placed them there. There is a booklet that has been distributed to Senate offices, paid for by the Saudi Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It says:

Saudi Arabia has increasingly become the target of extremist pressures both on and around the Arabian peninsula.

The pamphlet goes on to list Saudi Arabia's neighbors:

Iraq: "Recipient of major Soviet arms..."  
Oman: Victim of a "Communist-supplied rebellion..."

South Yemen: "Within the last year, 500 to 2,000 Cubans have surfaced at Aden..."

Somalia: "Had naval and military ties with the Soviets..."

Ethiopia: "Received massive Soviet-Cuban-Eastern European military aid..."

Sudan: "Had to fight off several Communist coup attempts..."

Egypt: "Received major Soviet military assistance for twenty years..."

Libya: "Launching pad for Soviet policy..."

The Saudis pay for the printing of these things presumably because they want us to know them. Surely they are concerned. The fate of traditional monarchies in Libya and Iraq is warning enough. Have the Saudis become convinced that the administration has a policy that can help protect them from Soviet hegemonial ambitions? Does the administration in fact have such a policy? If so, what is it?

It must be the sale of these F-15 aircraft to Saudi Arabia—at least in part. And, therefore, one must ask—though it is painful to ask—what are we to take as the more revealing symbol of American policy?

The F-15, or silence in the face of the destruction of Lebanon.

The F-15, or the cautious courtship of the PLO.

The F-15, or studied nonchalance at the prospective disappearance of Afghanistan into the bosom of the Soviet Union.

The F-15, or Secretary Vance's statement in a Time interview that President Carter and Mr. Brezhnev share "similar dreams and aspirations."

Let there be no misunderstanding on this point, for Soviet activity does indeed threaten the royal monarchy of Saudi Arabia as it does the parliamentary democracy of Israel. If the administration wishes to speak with us and to us of the expansion of Soviet power, if it seeks from us the means of resistance, let it so state. Let it not delude us, and itself, and the Saudi Arabians that it has grasped the enormity of the problem and is prepared to deal with it. Let it not tell us that it has a policy, when what it truly has is technology. Ingenious, wondrous, efficiently lethal, technology—the engineering and manufacturing genius that is the F-15. But not a policy.

At least, not a policy that grows out of a recognition of our geopolitical predicament.

And here, I must turn to the third of the three areas I said I would speak of at the outset of these remarks—petroleum dependency. For here too—perhaps most of all—we find the process of illusion at work—as we found in the realm of the Israeli-Egyptian peace talks and in the arena of the Soviet effort to become the dominant political force in the Eastern Hemisphere—Europe, Africa, and Asia.

For to speak of our dependency on oil imports is to notice immediately the remarkable—and in my view, dangerous, change that has taken place in the perception of our own situation.

It is not even 5 years since we were subject to economic attack by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries of which its Arab subgroup was

surely the driving force. The industrial democracies, the poorer states—all were the victims of a conspiracy among 13 foreign governments, governments who in the main professed friendship toward us. This in fact is the origin of the "energy crisis." This is the act of aggression which called forth the national energy plan, called—very appropriately called—the moral equivalent of war by President Carter.

Once—it seems long ago, but is not even 5 years ago—the situation was understood, perhaps, as the functional equivalent of war. In November 1973, Secretary Kissinger said that—

The United States would consider countermeasures if the oil embargo is continued indefinitely or unreasonably.

In January of 1975 he said:

We cannot take the position that no matter what the producing countries do we will acquiesce.

Whatever the debate about what to do at that time, there was at least an attitude: First, what had happened was bad for the United States; and, second, what had happened was a proper concern of the foreign policy of the United States.

But by the middle of 1977, it seemed that the nature and the origins of the problem had been moved elsewhere. At the commencement address at Baruch College on June 9, I felt obliged to say:

We tell ourselves the nation faces an energy crisis. But we do not tell ourselves that this problem has come about through a massive defeat in foreign policy, which is to say the successful quadrupling of oil prices by the OPEC oil cartel at the time of the 1973 Mid-East war. A foreign cartel restricts supply: we tell ourselves that a problem of supply is a problem of demand. A foreign cartel raises the price: we tell ourselves that a problem of price is a problem of profligacy.

And our unwillingness to see the matter for what it is has had predictable consequences. Now, I pretend to no special expertise in the substance of the international petroleum business. I would immediately defer to Senator Church, whose Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations has become a repository of information and insight. His own expertise in these questions is well known to this body.

But this much is understandable even to the layman:

In 1973, about 18 percent of our crude oil imports came from Arab sources. At the end of 1977, it was about 45 percent. In 1977, Saudi Arabia alone accounted for about 20 percent of all U.S. crude oil imports, whereas in 1973, it provided about 10 percent of a far smaller total.

It is far from obvious why the United States, as a country, has not pursued a policy of greater diversification in the sources of oil imports. So rapid an increase in our dependency on Arab sources is not a physical necessity. It has been suggested that one reason for the disproportionate increase in Arab source oil has to do with the preferences of the large companies which actually do our importing for us. They are said to have a strong economic preference for marketing Middle East oil in the United States, rather



than in searching out for oil elsewhere in the world that might be shipped here. This reason, or some other. But I believe the fundamental point will stand, namely, that it was not necessary for our dependency on purely Arab sources—as distinct from foreign sources in general—to grow as rapidly as it has.

The result is that we have not only increased our reliance on the most politically and strategically vulnerable sources, but more: We have disguised the nature of that dependency by changing our entire view of the nature of OPEC and its objectives.

In late 1973, we thought that Saudi Arabia's petroleum policy bespoke a fundamental hostility toward the United States. It was a policy thought to damage us, to weaken our allies. It was a policy, incidentally, that was strongly and publicly supported by the Soviet Union—no opponent of disorder and uncertainty in the Western World. And so we wondered about the future of the weaker democracies in Asia and in Europe. We worried about the collapse of the international financial system.

We could not live with this—or so we said.

Five years pass, nothing fundamental changes—except that we now congratulate ourselves on our adaptability. Except that we became more vulnerable. Except that we could not admit how vulnerable we were, so that we did not even have—at the minimum—an oil import policy to apportion the vulnerability.

Except that we stopped talking of this as a foreign policy problem—that is, as something someone else had done to us—and began instead to talk of it as something we had done to ourselves.

And then we went even further, to say that, in retrospect, all that had happened had been good for us, almost a blessing in disguise. Why? How? We know the presentation: OPEC price increases reminded us of the "true" value of a finite resource; OPEC price increases have caused us to seek "alternative," "renewable," "synthetic," "nonpolluting" sources of energy; OPEC has been the catalyst that has caused us to examine the wasteful and destructive aspects of our social life. And more startling still, it was decided that OPEC was good for us abroad, good for our foreign relations. In particular, Saudi Arabia was now "good" for our foreign policy. The Saudi rise to international prominence was a stroke of good fortune. Was not Saudi Arabia now said to be acting in our interests? Using their vast sums to lure the Sudanese or the Somalis away from the Soviets, to moderate the extremist character of the PLO, to prop up the shaky American currency.

In sum, it was now possible for Saudi Arabia to do for us what we could not do for ourselves—provide oil, restrain Communists, mollify terrorists, and so on.

And so it happens that the foreign and domestic well-being of the United States—the world's foremost democracy, which claims also to be the world's most powerful country—is in fact increasingly dependent upon the decision taken by the

royal family of Saudi Arabia. And this may explain the more and more frequent claims that the Saudis are more and more friendly to us. It is not true, but our dependency on them makes us almost desperate to believe that it is true.

Five years ago, we could not live with Saudi foreign policy; today, we cannot live without it. Is this not the measure of our position in the world, and what has become of our position in the world, in that period?

These, in sum, are the components of our situation which, when taken together make the arms package so wholly unappealing. In the context of events and policies in which it is offered, it furthers none of our fundamental interests in the Middle East. Indeed, it prevents us from seeing those interests with sufficient clarity.

I began by noting that it was neither the sale as such, nor the aircraft as such, which impelled so many to oppose the project. Certainly, we seek nothing but the best of relations with the Arab peoples who seek better relations with us. For those of us who will vote to disapprove the sales, what we hope to disapprove is the substitution of airplanes for analysis, of ill-considered "packages" for policy.

We hope that we can learn something thereby.

It is useful to recapitulate the relationship of these proposals to the future security of Saudi Arabia. For far from being a true gesture of support to the Saudis—who need our support and whose support we need—the F-15 sale is yet another disguised American retreat of a kind that is taking place around the world.

I mentioned that the Saudi Arabian ministry of Foreign Affairs had financed the publication of a pamphlet called "Questions and Comments on the President's Authorization of F-15 Planes for the Defense of Saudi Arabia." It describes, in very vivid terms, Soviet expansion in the Middle East, expansion on Saudi Arabia's east flank, and on its west flank, and, again and most dramatically in the military-turned-Communist coup in Afghanistan, to the northeast.

For a century and a half the Russians and British fought for dominance in that area and the Russians finally won last weekend.

Thus the Saudis perceive this encirclement. They see Afghanistan, Ethiopia, and Yemen.

In this morning's Washington Post there is quite a lengthy article which I ask unanimous consent to have printed at this point in the RECORD. It discusses Saudi Arabia's cool reaction to U.S. African policy.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

SAUDI ARABIA COOL TO U.S.-AFRICA POLICY  
(By David B. Ottaway)

RIYADH, SAUDI ARABIA—America's most important ally in the Red Sea region, and increasingly throughout Africa, is becoming one of the sharpest overseas critics of what

it regards as the Carter administration's policy of courting favor with black Africa by refusing to meet head-on the growing Soviet-Cuban challenge.

As the Saudis see it, the Soviet Union has now established its clear intention of intervening wherever possible all over Africa and the surrounding region. This, they make clear in their mild-mannered, soft-spoken way, is a direct threat to the Saudi kingdom that cannot be dealt with merely by verbal protests from Washington.

"It has been shown that this thing grows," said Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud Faisal in a recent interview, referring to Soviet and Cuban intervention in various African countries. "When Angola came, it was said to be a unique situation. But it repeated itself in Zaire and in Ethiopia. So it does spread."

The recent coup in Afghanistan, resulting in the establishment of a Communist-dominated government there, has only served to confirm the Saudis' worst fears about Soviet intentions. With thousands of Cuban troops present just across the Red Sea in Ethiopia and a strong Soviet-Cuban presence in South Yemen, there is a growing sense of encirclement here.

All this helps to explain why the Saudis are pressing the Carter administration to adopt a more aggressive posture in Africa, including an increase in military assistance to moderate Arab and black African states, and even hinting at the need for a direct American intervention to counter the expanding Soviet-Cuban military presence. At this point, it appears that Saudi Arabia distributes more aid in black Africa than the United States.

The real issue, according to Prince Saud, is not the Carter administration's policy of nonintervention, but whether the Soviet policy of repeated massive involvement in the internal affairs of African countries, and even intra-African crises, will go on unchallenged.

Saudi Arabia is rich in oil and dollars and the situation "is not a financial problem," remarked Prince Saud, who describes his kingdom as a "small country" of limited defense means. Something more than verbal protest from the United States has become "a necessity," he added.

The Saudis are stepping up their financial assistance to pro-Western African states threatened by the escalating Soviet-Cuban presence in Africa. It is not known by outsiders here exactly how much of the estimated \$6.6 billion Saudi Arabia distributed in aid last year was earmarked for African countries.

It is likely, however, that the amount easily surpassed the \$350 million given out by the United States, making the Saudis an important asset in American efforts to stem the Soviet-Cuban tide on the continent.

There is a notable irony in the new Saudi activist role in Africa and Saudi complaints about American passivity toward Soviet-Cuban challenge. Only a few years ago, the Nixon-Ford administration was pushing a somewhat lethargic Saudi government to do more to help the West contain the spread of Communist influence on the Arabian Peninsula. Now, it is the Saudis who are pressing the Carter administration on the same point in both Africa and the Red Sea region.

With the United States increasingly dependent on Saudi oil and backing for the besieged dollar, Washington can no longer afford to ignore the pressure from Riyadh. But it has placed the Carter administration in the difficult position of having to reconcile the demands of its new black African allies with those of its most important Arab oil partners.

While these Arab states tend to view Africa mainly as a new Cold War theater and the soft underbelly to their own exposed

lands, much of black Africa is preoccupied now with the problem of containing local forces threatening the national unity of various countries and that of ending white rule in southern Africa. On both accounts, the Soviets and Cubans have suddenly emerged as black Africa's most important allies.

The growing disagreement between Washington and Riyadh over the Carter administration's new Africa policy came to a head last year over the U.S. refusal to provide Somalia with arms after President Mohammed Siad Barre cut most of his ties to the Soviet Union and broke relations with Cuba.

The Saudis had been encouraging the United States to do more to wean Somalia away from the Soviet bloc for years before the Somali-Ethiopian war led to Siad Barre's break with Moscow. They were deeply disappointed when the split came and there was no "positive answer" from Washington, as Prince Saud put it.

But Washington found itself under enormous pressure from its black African allies not to reward Somalia because it was regarded as a flagrant violator of Ethiopia's borders. Pro-Western Kenya, another neighbor fearing Somalia's territorial ambitions, was particularly insistent that the Carter administration reject Somalia's request for military assistance.

Meanwhile, the malaise in the special Saudi-American relationship is deepening over the lack of a strong U.S. response to the expanding Soviet-Cuban presence in the Red Sea region. It is exacerbated as the number of Cuban troops increases just across that strategic waterway in Ethiopia's northern war-torn Eritrea Province.

"It is in principle a threat to the independence and security of our region and directly a threat to the independence and security of our country," remarked Prince Saud. "What conceivable basis would they have for intervening in that area?"

For the Saudis, the primary issue at stake in Ethiopia is not the preservation of its territorial integrity against a separatist movement, which is the view most black African nations hold and have impressed on the Carter administration. Rather, it is in the Saudi view the massive intervention of the Soviet Union in the internal affairs of an African country, this time one that could easily serve as a springboard into the Arabian Peninsula.

As a first step, the Saudis clearly want the Carter administration to step up their military assistance to moderate African and Arab countries with Soviet-backed neighbors, such as Kenya, Zaire and Sudan.

"If threatened countries are left alone, then there is not hope," said Prince Saud. "If they are not given arms even when they want to fight, if they are not given the opportunity to do so, then we are really in a hopeless situation."

The Saudis seem to be convinced that the next arena for a major Soviet intervention will be southern Africa. Saudi Arabia has just agreed to open an embassy in the Zambian capital of Lusaka and will probably provide financial assistance to that economically hard-pressed country.

Saudi Arabia is also providing millions of dollars to the special \$12 million Arab fund in support of the Rhodesian nationalist Patriotic Front, apparently hoping to offset Soviet and Cuban influence inside the guerrilla alliance. There are also reports in Salisbury that Arab money is going to the new biracial Rhodesian government, although it is not clear which countries are supplying it.

The Saudis are also financing Sudanese and Egyptian arms purchases in the West, the Moroccan and Mauritanian war against the Soviet-backed Polisario liberation movement in the old Spanish Sahara, and various

pro-Western African states, like Zaire, that are now in desperate financial straits.

Mr. MOYNIHAN. The point I would like to make to the Senator from Colorado is this: A true response to the concerns which the Saudis manifest would be a coherent policy of resistance to Soviet expansion by us, by NATO. As it is, our policy appears to be leaving the Saudis with 60 F-15's, a bottle of whiskey and a box of jasmine tea, themselves to face the consequences of the actions of the Soviet Union and its surrogates.

If we think it impossible that Cubans should appear in Saudi Arabia, remember that Cubans are in Yemen now, and were in the Golan Heights in 1973.

I once said that the Rand Corp. at the height of its genius could never have conceived a Third World weapon system as effective as the Cuban Army. It is ideologically free to go anywhere and kill anyone and, with increasing frequency, that is what they do.

If I am not mistaken, the Saudis perceive a withdrawal by the United States and the commencement, the onset, of an unstated American assumption, that the Soviet Union has assumed the initiative in world affairs, that the Soviet Union now in fact exhibits the characteristics of the dominant military power.

The Senator from Colorado (Mr. HART) has spoken of the decline of the American Navy relative to the Soviet Navy. What an extraordinary situation for the Soviets to find themselves at least the equal of us in naval power. Does this not help explain the newly assertive behavior of the Soviet Union?

The revelatory event, like a flash of lightning illuminating a landscape at night, was the October 1 joint statement of the United States and the Soviet Union which brought the Russians back into the Middle East.

(Mr. McGOVERN assumed the chair.)

Mr. MOYNIHAN. The first three and a half paragraphs leapt off the page. It was obviously a Soviet draft. And so it was admitted. The State Department says it was not the first draft; the first draft was even worse.

As the Soviets and other Nations look around the world, what they see is a United States in retreat, a United States confronting active Soviet military policy—like that of 1948 in Eastern Europe, 1950 in Korea, in the 1960's and 1970's in Southeast Asia—and like those out through surrogates. But unlike these occasions, the United States seems no longer willing to adopt a policy of resistance, either military or political.

One of the extraordinary things about our behavior in Rhodesia, for example, is the clear fact that we say to ourselves that we must deal with the Rhodesian equivalent of the PLO because, if we do not, the Soviets will send Cubans. It is that nervelessness and retreat that is, in a curious way, I suggest, symbolized by saying, to the Saudis: here are 60 planes, good luck."

If we really wish to sustain the Saudis, we should say: "Do not fear that the United States, will in fact, consent to any more Soviet expansion.

And then for the United States to say to the Soviets: "When you appear on the eastern flank of the Saudi Arabians, and when you appear on the western flank, then you are going to be in trouble with us. We cannot allow it, it is too important geopolitically, and we cannot acquiesce in it. We will link one thing to another and make you wish you had not done it."

Mr. HART. Will the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. MOYNIHAN. Happily.

Mr. HART. If, in fact, the Senate today acts favorably on the resolution of disapproval and votes against the package, in the Senator's judgment, can the Saudi leadership conclude from this that we are not willing to make the kind of commitment to their defense that he believes is important—both to them and to us?

Mr. MOYNIHAN. I ask the Senator from Colorado to accept the seemingly ironic proposition, which is that if the Saudis get these planes from us, they—now, under today's circumstances—ought to fear for our future support in fact. This is the point I developed earlier: Military technology is no substitute for sound policy. Policy should come first.

If I may say, Senators NUNN and JACKSON and I, on April 25, sent the President a long letter. I ask unanimous consent to have it printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

WASHINGTON, D.C.,  
April 25, 1978.

The President,  
The White House,  
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Without getting into the substance of your proposal to sell sophisticated aircraft to Saudi Arabia, Israel and Egypt, we write to address the issue of the timing of the Administration's request to the Congress to authorize a new arms "package."

There is no doubt that the proposal will face an intensive and divisive debate in the Senate where the outcome is uncertain. Indeed, there are strong indications that a majority of the Senate will vote to disapprove at least one of the proposed sales. We share what we believe to be the overwhelming sentiment of the Senate that the package not now be presented for debate and decision.

Our national effort would be far better directed toward encouraging a peace between Israel and Egypt, to reinforcing the promising elements of the Sadat-Begin dialogue and to bringing those negotiations to a favorable conclusion. Were the proposed arms sales presented to the Congress following a peace between Israel and Egypt, there is no doubt that it would receive favorable consideration in the Congress.

Approval by the Congress with a consensus rather than the probable rejection of part of the package after a bitter controversy is clearly in the national interest. A delay would facilitate an intensified negotiation effort.

Once a peace agreement has been reached, the Congressional attitude toward the provision of sophisticated weapons to the parties would be very different from what it is today. In the aftermath of a peace agreement, the atmosphere in which the arms proposals



would be considered would be far more conducive to the outcome you desire.

For all these reasons we believe that a delay of a few months is essential. It would provide additional time and additional incentives for the realization of a peace accord. It would spare the country and our friends in the Middle East a debate certain to be marked by bitterness and contention. We hope that you will give serious consideration to this proposal; and we stand ready, individually, to assist in the efforts to bring about a peace in the Middle East.

Sincerely,

HENRY M. JACKSON,  
DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN,  
SAM NUNN,

U.S. Senators.

Mr. MOYNIHAN. We simply asked whether we could not try to get some peace between Israel and Egypt before we go forward with these sales. It is the context of this sale that troubles us—not the sale itself. That is our point. And I believe the Saudis can understand it.

At this point, Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed the Saudi Arabian pamphlet I mentioned earlier.

There being no objection, the pamphlet was ordered to be printed in the RECORD.

Certain portions of the pamphlet are not reproducible in the RECORD:

QUESTIONS AND COMMENTS ON THE PRESIDENT'S AUTHORIZATION OF U.S. SALE OF F-15 PLANES FOR THE DEFENSE OF SAUDI ARABIA

Question: Why is the President authorizing the sale of 60 F-15's to Saudi Arabia?

Answer: It is vital to the United States and the Free World that Saudi Arabia maintain an adequate defense.

Explanation: Saudi Arabia possesses twenty-five percent of the earth's proven oil reserves. The wealth generated by Arabian resources has been used in support of the Free World economy and as a moderating force in Mid-East affairs. It is in the interest of the United States economically and politically to maintain and strengthen its relationship with Saudi Arabia and to demonstrate its concern about the preparedness of Saudi military forces.

Question: Who determined that current Saudi military forces constitute an inadequate defense?

Answer: United States Defense officials.

Explanation: Separate United States military teams examined Saudi Arabia's air defense requirements in the early and mid-1970's. These studies concluded that the existing Saudi force of British-made Lightning planes is obsolescent and should be phased out beginning in 1978. It was their recommendation that Saudi Arabia acquire F-15s or comparable defense equipment in order to safeguard the kingdom's security.

Question: Is the Government of the United States committed to sell F-15s to Saudi Arabia?

Answer: Yes.

Explanation: In 1976, President Ford specifically affirmed the sale of F-15s to Saudi Arabia. President Carter reaffirmed this commitment after an independent study in 1978 and has authorized the sale of 60 F-15s to the kingdom.

Question: Does the sale of F-15s to Saudi Arabia have implications which go beyond providing Saudi Arabia with an adequate defense?

Answer: Yes.

Explanation: More than any other nation in this region, Saudi Arabia has demonstrated its willingness to work in close co-

operation with the United States both economically and politically. Failure to honor the commitment of two presidents would bring into question the ability of the American nation to play a constant and dependable role in Mid-East affairs. It would also seriously jeopardize the position of Mid-East nations which have resisted extremist pressure and chosen to maintain a strong identification with pro-Western policies.

Question: Is the security of Saudi Arabia being threatened?

Answer: Yes.

Explanation: Saudi Arabia has increasingly become the target of extremist pressures both on and around the Arabian peninsula. Among the most recent: the 1977-1978 Soviet-Cuban build-up on the Horn of Africa (only a half-hour's flying time from key Saudi population centers) and the Soviet upgrading of South Yemen air and ground forces. This build-up, along with the arrival of Cuban advisors, has already encouraged the South Yemen government to make probing flights over Saudi territory.

Soviet-Cuban forces have shown little restraint in achieving their policies aims through military intervention on the Horn of Africa and are currently expanding their involvement and commitment in the nations which surround the Arabian peninsula.

Question: Why is Saudi Arabia a target of Communist expansionism and political extremists?

Answer: In addition to being the richest and most anti-Communist nation in the region, Saudi Arabia has consistently supported the general aims of United States and Free World foreign and economic policy.

Explanation: Saudi Arabia opposes and has demonstrated its opposition to the spread of communism in this region. It has provided strong support for the Free World economy and the United States dollar. It has been a leading spokesman for restraint of oil prices and has been a proponent of moderation in behalf of a comprehensive Middle East settlement. Each of these specific Saudi policies favors the United States and Free World interests and directly conflicts with the goals of the Soviet Union and its client states in Africa and on the Arabian peninsula.

Question: Are United States arms sales responsible for growing tension in the region?

Answer: No. Although the United States has been a major arms supplier of those nations which cooperate in advancing American interests, United States involvement has not been directed towards increasing regional tensions. The Soviets, however, have provided arms to client states and extremist groups in this volatile part of the world for three decades. This Soviet commitment towards increasing regional tensions has accelerated in the 1970s.

Explanation: Soviet military and economic aid has been used to increase Communist influence throughout the Arabian peninsula. A closer look at the region shows:

Iraq—is closely associated with the Soviet Union politically and a recipient of major Soviet arms. The Iraqis have a four hundred mile common border with Saudi Arabia, a substantially larger population, and a more advanced military establishment than Saudi Arabia. Major new Iraqi oil discoveries have recently been reported. Iraq's reliance on and allegiance to Soviet policy is a key to increased Mid-East tension.

Oman—adjoins Saudi Arabia to the south. With British and Iranian help Oman has, in the last three years, been able to put down a Communist-supplied rebellion in its Dhofar sector, the region adjoining both Saudi Arabia and South Yemen.

The People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (South Yemen)—lies next to the

southern flank of Saudi Arabia and is currently undergoing a substantial Soviet-Cuban-East European arms build-up. It has a population almost as large as Saudi Arabia, but in a much smaller area. Its port of Aden was long strategically critical to the British, and is now under Soviet influence. Within the last year, 500 to 2,000 Cubans have surfaced at Aden along with Soviet and East European technicians and advisors. It has been reported that the Soviets have recently been granted a naval concession at Aden.

Somalia—on the Horn of Africa, southwest of Saudi Arabia; had naval and military ties with the Soviets in the mid-'70s until it was won away with Saudi aid. Somalia is currently seeking Peking assistance following its defeat this year at the hands of Cuban and Soviet-backed Ethiopian troops.

Ethiopia—just across the Red Sea from Saudi Arabia, a half hour's flight from Saudi cities in the south, received massive Soviet-Cuban-Eastern European military aid in 1977 and 1978. Ethiopia is currently using Soviet-Cuban support to assist itself along the Red Sea opposite Saudi Arabia. There are over 16,000 Cubans and 1,000 Soviet military personnel stationed there.

The Soviet purpose in Ethiopia, according to Henry Kissinger (Washington Post, April 21, 1978), is "to outflank the Middle East, to demonstrate that the U.S. cannot protect its friends, to raise doubts in Saudi Arabia" and Egypt, the Sudan, and Iran.

Sudan—immediately across the Red Sea from Saudi Arabia, the Sudan is closely associated with the Saudis, but had to fight off several serious Communist coup attempts in the mid-'70s, which led to an expulsion of the Soviets in 1977.

Egypt—also across the Red Sea from Saudi Arabia, received major Soviet military assistance for twenty years. Saudi aid to Egypt and Sudan was instrumental in helping those countries move away from the Soviet sphere of influence. Saudi assistance to Egypt in the '70s has been greater than the U.S. Marshall Plan program for all of Western Europe after World War II. (Just beyond the Sudan and Egypt is Libya, which is now a military warehouse and "rejectionist" launching pad for Soviet policy in the area.)

Conclusion: In the last several years, Saudi Arabia has had to face developing Communist pressure to its north, south, and southwest. Because of its pro-Western policies and its great wealth, Saudi Arabia is and will remain the prime target for Soviet expansionism and political extremism in the Mid-East.

The popular notion that the F-15s promised to Saudi Arabia by the United States are to be used to change the current Arab-Israeli military balance is dangerous both to the interests of the Free World and Saudi Arabia, for it overlooks the political realities of the Mid-East scene today and seeks to obscure the very real need of Saudi Arabia to provide its citizens and resources with an adequate defense in this very volatile part of the world.

Question: Wouldn't it be better if the United States declared a moratorium or sharply slowed arms sales in the Middle East, starting with the F-15 sale?

Answer: In the abstract, one could certainly argue yes. But in this real-world setting, Saudi Arabia must protect itself. The growing strategic importance of oil reserves and the increasing importance of Saudi Arabia require the kingdom to upgrade its still modest security arrangements.

Explanation: Compared to other principal countries in this area, Saudi Arabia is significantly underarmed. An objective analysis by security analyst S. Fred Singer was recently published in Foreign Policy magazine (Spring 1978, see "Limits of Arab Oil", page

78). An excerpt: "Paradoxically, while many people perceive and overestimate Arab oil power, the reverse may be true; Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates may not have enough power to maintain their own security or even independence over the long run. Their weakness presents a serious security problem to the West, which depends on Persian Gulf oil, while the Soviet Union is largely self-sufficient... In the south, the Republic of South Yemen provides a center for subversion and infiltration, in the north, Iraq, and to a lesser extent Syria, may do the same."

Question: What is the danger to Israel if the Saudis get the F-15s?

Answer: Saudi Arabia has neither used its air force nor generally been considered a confrontation state in any of the Arab-Israeli conflicts of the last thirty years.

Explanation: Saudi Arabia is a vulnerable country. It has a large land mass to defend with very limited armed forces. The compelling realities of the region dictate against an offensive Saudi military role in a conflict with Israel.

Saudi population centers and oil fields would be vulnerable to attack and destruction by superior Israeli military forces.

Once attacked, Saudi oil fields which are so critical to the kingdom and the Free World economy would be inoperable and the kingdom as it exists today would be severely threatened or destroyed.

An armed conflict with Israel would compromise the ancient Saudi responsibility for the protection and peace of the two most holy cities of Islam—Mecca and Medina.

An armed conflict with Israel would make Saudi Arabia and its conservative pro-Western leadership even more susceptible to attack, infiltration, and subversion by already existing extremist and leftist regimes in the region.

Question: If the United States sells F-15s to Saudi Arabia, could the Saudis turn them over to a third power?

Answer: No.

Explanation: Saudi Arabia has received military equipment from the United States since World War II and has obtained it on the basis of compliance with the U.S. preconditions that there can be no transfer to any third party or offensive use of the material. Those conditions apply to the F-15 sale, and the Saudis have stated that they are prepared to purchase the planes subject to the conditions which they have satisfied for a great many years.

Question: What about news reports that the F-15s would be stationed at the airfield closest to Israel?

Answer: They are not true.

Explanation: As stated by Secretary of State Vance in Congressional testimony March 9, the planes would not be placed at Saudi Arabia's military base at the city of Tabuk guarding the country's northwest approaches and thus the closest to Israel. Military logic dictates that the planes be located well inside the kingdom, where they can protect the principal cities across the east-west center of the country, the oil fields in the eastern province (along the Gulf), and the southern approaches from which the growing Communist pressure comes.

To keep the city of Tabuk and its base in perspective, it should be noted that a military post has existed there guarding the north-west approaches to the Arabian Peninsula since at least the time of the Prophet Mohammad, over 1,300 years ago. A major upgrading was done just before World War II, then to a lesser extent in the 1960s, and again in the '70s. Some of the Saudi Lightning interceptors have been located there; retiring these and placing the F-15s much further south in the center of the country,

as Secretary Vance has indicated, would decrease the danger level at Tabuk.

The Israelis began overflying the city of Tabuk and the base almost two years ago, thus repeatedly going well into Saudi territory. These flights have persisted despite American and Saudi objections. Israeli naval maneuvers off the Saudi shore also occurred in late March of 1978. The Israeli complaint that Tabuk is only four minutes flying time from Israeli territory ignores the fact that Israel was fifteen minutes away until Israel expanded into the Sinai.

Strong proof of the Saudis' overall defensive commitment is provided by the fact that the primary military base construction is in an approximate triangle stretching across the east-west central zone of the kingdom (from the oil fields to the east to the principal cities in the western part of the country, to cities well south of the capital and the city of Jeddah on the west coast). Placing the F-15s in that central zone of the country rather than at a frontier air base like Tabuk would make the planes less vulnerable to a surprise attack and the risk of being knocked out on the ground.

Question: Will the United States have any influence on the F-15s after they are delivered?

Answer: Yes.

Explanation: Even without Saudi assurances, their past restraint, and the underlying realities of the country, the F-15s are subject to significant continuing control by the United States. The F-15 requires extensive, sophisticated ground support facilities and systems, substantial specialized pilot training, highly developed replacement parts, and a readily controllable special armaments inventory, all subject to strict American control. It makes neither military nor political sense to assume that the Saudis would give up their principal air defense system, transfer it to another country, risk the sudden retaliation of Israel, or lose their armaments inventory resupply by violating U.S. agreements. The F-15s are tied to the bases where the U.S. will provide ground support facilities and systems and where special security precautions can be taken.

Conclusion: The commitment of the Saudis, their own vulnerability, the nature of the F-15s, the continuing control the U.S. will have over the planes and—most important—the critical importance of the overall Saudi-U.S. relationship to both countries, all militate against misuse or transfer of the planes.

Question: Why the F-15? Why not some other plane?

Answer: Because the F-15 is the most practical defense-interceptor available.

Explanation: U.S. defense officials offered the Saudis a test-flying choice of the F-14, F-15, F-16 and F-17 (now F-18) at the time the detailed, technical military studies were made. The Saudis rejected the other planes as not compatible enough with present equipment, requiring too many additional pilots, lacking availability within the needed time period, and because of other air defense requirements.

Question: Why can't congressional consideration of the sale be delayed?

Answer: The Saudis have already waited almost four years since they were first informed by U.S. officials that the British Lightnings were obsolete and would have to be phased out beginning in 1978.

Explanation: Even if a firm order is placed now for the F-15s, the first deliveries would not be made until early 1982, and full defense capability would not be reached until the mid-1980s. The long lead-time required simply does not allow further delay. The Lightning planes must be retired from service because of metal fatigue and other obsolescence.

Candor requires recognition of the fact

that if the American decision is put off until the 1978 Congressional elections or the 1980 Presidential election, it could become even more of a political issue. A special effort must be made to prevent critical security and strategic questions from being obscured by emotional political issues.

Question: Does Saudi Arabia really need sixty F-15s? Wouldn't a smaller number do?

Answer: Not according to U.S. sources.

Explanation: The U.S. military teams which examined the kingdom's military requirements concluded that Saudi Arabia should acquire up to 120 F-15s or comparable defense equipment. Saudi military experts independently made their own study and recommended that 60 F-15s should be purchased. U.S. criteria would have required a larger number.

Question: Do the Saudis have any alternative to accepting the F-15s on such terms and at such times as the U.S. decides?

Answer: The Saudis have a number of alternatives.

Explanation: The Saudis prefer the F-15. In addition, they prefer to satisfy their military equipment requirements in cooperation with their closest Western ally—the United States. If the U.S. will not supply Saudi Arabia with the F-15s, however, the kingdom is obviously not going to abandon its determination to acquire a modern air defense system.

Question: If the United States refuses to sell F-15s, where would the Saudis turn for their defense needs?

Answer: Most probably to France or Britain.

Explanation: Should the United States refuse to honor its commitments to sell F-15s to Saudi Arabia, the kingdom would be forced to turn to France or Britain. The Saudis have already held discussions and done test flights. The Saudis have indicated that if they are to obtain planes other than F-15s, they may have to contribute research and development funds to insure that the alternative plane approaches the sophistication of the F-15. It is possible that with French or British technology, and Saudi funds, either nation could develop an aircraft and manufacturing capacity that could challenge the previously unrivaled American industrial and military position in arms manufacture.

Question: Are there any other negatives to the United States if Saudi Arabia purchases planes from Britain or France?

Answer: Yes.

Explanation: Aircraft purchased by Saudi Arabia from France or Britain would not be subject to United States control.

Question: Are the British or French interested in selling aircraft to Saudi Arabia?

Answer: Yes.

Explanation: The British and especially the French have stepped up their efforts to get the Saudis to purchase advanced aircraft now being developed. A new arms cooperation agreement covering technical assistance and production was signed by France, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the Gulf states of Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates in Paris on March 14, 1978.

Question: Could the alternatives to the F-15 be used as an offensive weapon?

Answer: Yes.

Explanation: The principal alternatives to the F-15 are as capable of an offensive ground attack as the F-15. The existing Saudi air force has ground attack capacity and can also be used to drop lethal armament in flight. No Saudi aircraft, however, has ever been used in an armed conflict in the Middle East. No alternative to the F-15, however, either foreign or U.S. is a more suitable interceptor for defensive use.

Question: The defensive value of the F-15 has been documented. Has the plane ever been used for offensive purposes?



Answer: Yes, by Israel in the March, 1978 invasion of Lebanon.

Explanation: During the invasion of Lebanon, Israel used the F-15 as an offensive weapon in violation of security agreements with the United States. This action has drawn criticism even among Israel's own leading military commentators; one, quoted in the Washington Post on March 30th (page 21), wrote, "Reliance on high performance jets including the F-15 made precise targeting impossible and they have lead to overly massive and unneeded artillery and air strikes."

Question: Why not remove some of the more sophisticated technology from the F-15s before selling them to the Saudis?

Answer: That would significantly lessen the defense capacities the Saudis need and the United States has recommended they possess. It would also seriously injure the kingdom's ability to maintain and demonstrate its close friendship and support of the United States. Such an action would underscore America's lack of confidence in Saudi reliability and security since F-15s have already been sold elsewhere in the region with full armament. In all likelihood a proposal to reduce the defensive capacity of the F-15 would encourage Saudi Arabia to seek alternative planes.

Question: Has the American debate of the proposed sale of F-15s to Saudi Arabia had implications beyond Saudi Arabia?

Answer: Yes.

Explanation: What should have been a fairly routine and legitimate United States step in supplying the strategic needs of an ally has now turned into a high-profile international political issue. Both Communist and non-Communist governments are watching to see how steadfast the United States will be in its commitment to an ally who is helping to protect the dollar, moderate oil pricing, work for a comprehensive settlement in the Mid-East, and closely associate itself with the United States on a broad range of shared efforts. Despite the commitments of two United States presidents, the ability of the United States to support its allies is being seriously questioned in the Middle East.

Question: Why is there vehement opposition to the F-15 sale?

Answer: In addition to unrealistic concerns about shifting power balances in the Mid-East, much of the opposition generated to the sale of the jets is being directed at the strong Saudi-U.S. trade, financial, and strategic relationship. Some seem to find it difficult to recognize that United States interests in the Middle East now include not only the unequivocal security of Israel, but also the significant and growing American stake in Saudi Arabia and the area as a whole.

Question: What impact does Saudi oil have on American energy supplies?

Answer: America now receives almost 20% of its oil imports from Saudi Arabia. Nearly one-tenth of all oil being used by Americans is produced in Saudi Arabia. This oil provides the energy for millions of American jobs, heats and cools millions of American homes and apartments, and fuels millions of American vehicles. It has been estimated that by the mid-1980s, over 30% of all United States oil imports, or 15% of all oil used by Americans, will come from Saudi Arabia.

Question: What are the Saudis doing in return for the U.S. purchase of Saudi oil?

Answer: The United States is Saudi Arabia's largest trading partner and has been so since World War II. This year alone, Saudi Arabia is expected to purchase almost \$5 billion worth of goods and services from the United States. Orders for future deliveries of American goods and services to Saudi Arabia already exceed \$25 billion. These

Saudi purchases create hundreds of thousands of United States jobs.

Saudi Arabia's 1975-80 development program calls for the expenditure of \$142 billion; the kingdom's 1981-86 program will considerably exceed \$200 billion. The purchase of Saudi oil by the United States along with the Saudi commitment to pro-Western policies has allowed the kingdom to play a vital part in the economy of the United States.

Question: How have the Saudis helped to support the United States dollar?

Answer: In many ways.

Explanation: Saudi Arabia, in close consultation with the United States government, has invested many billions of dollars in United States government securities as well as obligations of various U.S. government agencies and major corporations which have sought Saudi funds for their pension and bond programs. In international terms, the Saudis have contributed significantly to helping maintain the dollar and relieve pressure on United States public debt markets, recycle petrodollars, and support the Free World's economic system.

Question: Are the Saudis in any other way supporting the United States dollar during this crisis period?

Answer: Yes.

Explanation: The Saudis have consistently supported the dollar as the basis for determining world oil prices. Should the Saudis elect to base the price of oil on any other currency, the dollar would be dramatically weakened.

Question: Does the growing Saudi-American relationship threaten other United States allies?

Answer: No.

Explanation: As a global power, the United States has many different relationships around the world. The U.S. maintains strong relationships with many different kinds of peoples and governments throughout the world. In recent years the United States has elected to establish new relationships in both Western and Eastern Europe despite the fact that the foreign policy aims of these nations often conflict. The U.S. also has sought to reduce tensions with both the Soviet Union and Red China. Supporting Saudi Arabia does not mean that United States and Israeli relations must change.

Question: Would this type of even-handed approach to foreign policy work in the Mid-East?

Answer: Yes. It is working today.

Explanation: An even-handed approach in recognition of the role that the Saudi government plays in the world economy is long overdue in this strategically volatile part of the world. Maintaining America's commitment to the security and future of Israel should not and does not preclude the United States from also acting on behalf of the security of other nations. Building good relationships with both the Arab nations and Israel is no more a contradiction than United States commitment to the security of both Greece and Turkey. American foreign policy should continue to be directed towards promoting world peace and economic order by maintaining and strengthening relationships with traditional allies such as Western Europe and Japan and new allegiances with Arab nations and the developing world.

Question: Are there any other regional realities which the United States must recognize in its dealing with Saudi Arabia?

Answer: Yes. There are many.

Explanation: In historical terms, there is a growing need to recognize the unmistakable stirring among the Saudis and 130 million other Arab people for a better life and a more dynamic destiny. The United States and the Free World have a profound stake in assuring that this historical dynamism

relates constructively to the West and that the Arab world is not turned away to become an economic and strategically isolated vacuum or bridgehead for Soviet and other Communist intentions. Even more important, American values as well as American interests require recognition of the God-given dignity of all people in this part of the world and that they view this region not just in terms of petrodollars, but of people.

Mr. MOYNIHAN. I do not perceive this pamphlet as a misstatement of fact. It is a meticulous listing of what the Soviets are up to in one country after another in that region—Iraq, Oman, South Yemen, Somalia, Ethiopia, Sudan, Egypt, Libya.

I suggest that in the proper context the Saudis can be reassured by a decision not to go forward at this time with this proposal.

Mr. HART. Would the Senator expand upon that, because that is extremely important. It is not only ironic; it is extremely complex logic.

Mr. MOYNIHAN. In the first instance, what do we say about our policy, our intentions, if we do something which clearly injures Israel's in standing in the world's perception of the global situation—Iraq, which, as Senator CASE and Senator JAVITS have said so brilliantly, is a true force for the moderate regimes of the Middle East. It is irrevocably pro-Western. There ought to be a day when Israel and Iran and Saudi Arabia and Egypt agree. Yet we do something which weakens Israel but does not in fact strengthen Saudi Arabia. Sixty airplanes will not stop the Soviet Union in this move forward. If they can see that this decision of the Senate to support Senator BIDEN's resolution was in fact a decision to stop the American retreat before Soviet expansion, to reconstruct our policies and attitudes before proceeding, then I think the Saudis could be heartened and encouraged. If, on the other, we sell airplanes without developing a true sense of the situation, they ought to be discouraged.

Mr. HART. How can they reach that conclusion? That is what I am asking. How, by the adoption of this resolution, can they make that leap of faith?

Mr. MOYNIHAN. What we say on the Senate floor; by what I hope might be, at the end of the day, your standing up and saying that you are persuaded that, far from constituting a reinforcement of the United States support for the Saudis, this airplane agreement would represent a diminution of the position of the United States in the Middle East. By postponing this sale so that we can have proper consideration of what is involved.

I offered the image, not perhaps the happiest, of giving the Saudis 60 planes and a bottle of whisky and wishing them well. That will not work and the Saudis will realize that, by itself, it cannot work. They cannot sustain their independence on their own, not remotely. They can sustain that independence only in the context of a U.S. Government policy that will no longer rationalize additional countries being taken over by the Soviet Union or its surrogates. Not one more.

I can get somewhat angry at the prospect of an increasingly pusillanimous American Government which, every time it confronts the prospect that the Communist, totalitarian forces in the world will use force, its first proposition is that we will not. Therefore, we must concede.

The events in Rhodesia have been astounding in this respect. The administration said it cannot accept the majority government the Rhodesians seem to have worked out, because if it does, the Russians will send the Cubans. What has come of the American Republic?

If we are that fearful of the situation, we should have the honor to stay out of it.

Mr. HART. If the Senator will yield—

Mr. MOYNIHAN. I am happy to yield.

Mr. HART. I apologize for being so persistent, but I am still trying to see how the rejection of this arms package—a rejection of a request made over 2 years ago by the Saudi Government—can be linked with the reversal of American policy in that part of the world, an area that is becoming more and more anti-Communist. I cannot make that jump.

Mr. MOYNIHAN. I ask the Senator to look at many of the persons who now stand up on this floor in support of the resolution of disapproval. We are the Senators from New York, New Jersey, and elsewhere. We are not known for neoisolationism. We are not known for our failure to support the military forces of the United States. We are not known for our assumption that the Soviets' behavior in the world is imitative of ours.

Now the Senator from South Dakota has not joined us in this, and there are reasons for that having mentioned him, however, I must immediately note that I am aware he is presiding and would come roaring to his own defense if he were not. I say to my colleague that is one of the few occasions in my experience—the only one really—in which I have had the advantage over him and I mean to pursue it for at least a few minutes until he is released.

Mr. ABOUREZK. Will the Senator yield?

Mr. MOYNIHAN. I am happy to yield.

Mr. ABOUREZK. I do not know what Senator from South Dakota he is referring to.

Mr. MOYNIHAN. The Senators from South Dakota will serve my purpose.

Mr. ABOUREZK. What I should say in response to what the Senator from New York said is that the Senators from South Dakota are not in the position of sending young men out to die for somebody else's cause, some old men's cause. That has been our position, I think, for a number of years. We would just like that to be on the record.

Mr. MOYNIHAN. What the Senator says is perfectly legitimate. But is not given to us in the world to maintain the boundaries of democracy in a world of Soviet and totalitarian expansion by saying that we will never fight. That perception is, indeed, growing in the world.

And here is the illustrative point.

When the Saudis see that it is those

who say, "We will never fight for old men's causes", who are also the ones in favor of giving them the planes and saying, "Fight yourselves," they will learn something from that. But there are those of us who see this as a more complex world, a more tragic world, a far more threatening world.

Does the Senator from Colorado accept that those of us on this side see the world as a threatening one?

Mr. HART. Let me see if I can reconstruct the logic of the Senator from New York. It is that if I were a leader in the Saudi Government, I could conclude that because the sale of weapons to my government is opposed by those who feel strongly about Communist aggression, I could take heart that those same people will set to it that, when the crunch comes, the United States will be there, because I will be defenseless?

Mr. MOYNIHAN. It is the timing of the decision that will be instructive. I would like to ask that the Senator from Colorado remember that we are also saying, "No sales to anybody at this moment" until we can get our policies much more effectively formulated and stated.

Mr. HART. But the Saudi leadership said:

We've waited long enough, we're going to read United States intentions in this vote.

Mr. MOYNIHAN. The Saudi leadership is not wrong. They have waited long enough—but it is aircraft, truly, which they await? Or do they await something else?

I can well conceive this agreement going forward in a situation where Egypt and Israel were really talking peace or where Soviet expansion in Ethiopia had not taken place. But such is not our situation.

What the Saudis really worry about is what they write in their pamphlet, what they say in the Washington Post. I think that is it.

Of course, I do not know what they really think and it is easy for me to prescribe what they ought to think.

Mr. HART. But do they not have the right to define U.S. intentions with regard to their own terms?

Mr. MOYNIHAN. They do.

Mr. HART. Which is what they are trying to do.

Mr. MOYNIHAN. Yes. Hence, it seems to me, for us to say, "If you could only understand the importance of our relationship with Israel, which is a country which supports things you, the Saudis, also support in the Middle East, then you could see that we cannot seem to be injuring Israel. If we are going to pursue what you want us to pursue, give us some time and understand that those who oppose these planes do so precisely because they do not want to retreat any further."

American retreat has gone far enough. It is quite extraordinary to remember.

Does the Senator not find it extraordinary to read on the front page of the Washington Post that the Saudis say, in effect "What on earth are you people doing in Africa, every time a Russian force appears you run out and you rationalize."

Mr. HART. I think it is also equally

extraordinary, as the Senator from Delaware suggested earlier, for us to tell the Saudis, "Don't worry about your own defense; we'll take care of it," given the set of circumstances the Senator from New York has just stated.

Mr. MOYNIHAN. But I ask the Senator from Colorado to consider, they cannot defend 6.5 million people. They cannot defend themselves against the Soviets.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. BUMPERS) Who yields time?

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, the Senator from Wisconsin is on his way to the floor. Rather than use up the time at this point, I would like to suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. METZENBAUM. Mr. President, would the Senator from Delaware be willing to yield to the Senator from Ohio 10 minutes at the hour of 1:15?

Mr. BIDEN. The Senator will definitely yield 10 minutes to the Senator from Ohio. I cannot guarantee that I will be in control of the time at 1:15, but assuming I am, I will be happy to yield 10 minutes.

Mr. METZENBAUM. May I, therefore, ask unanimous consent that I may be allocated time at 1:15 for a period of 10 minutes.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, reserving the right object, I think it would be difficult to do that only because there may have been time allocated at 1 o'clock to someone for 20 minutes.

Mr. METZENBAUM. If there has not been.

Mr. BIDEN. I suggest that the managers of this position will endeavor in every way to meet that request, but I would like not to hold up those who might precede the Senator at 1:15 who wish to go forward and then interrupt them at that time.

I promise the Senator from Ohio that we will endeavor to do that at 1:15 and I do not expect we will not be able to, but I would not like to have it in the form of a unanimous-consent request at this point.

Mr. METZENBAUM. I withdraw the unanimous-consent request under those circumstances.

I appreciate the consideration accorded me by the Senator from Delaware.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. On whose time?

Mr. BIDEN. To be equally divided—on neither time, not charged to either side.

Mr. CASE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent—

The PRESIDING OFFICER. There is a unanimous-consent request that the quorum call requested not be charged to either side. Is there objection?

Without objection, it is so ordered.

The clerk will call the roll.

The second assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Who yields time?



Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, on behalf of Mr. SPARKMAN, I yield 20 minutes to Mr. MCGOVERN.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Dakota (Mr. McGovern) is recognized for 20 minutes.

Mr. MCGOVERN. Mr. President, there are some public issues in which the choice between right and wrong, between commonsense and—

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, may we have order?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator may proceed.

Mr. MCGOVERN. Mr. President, there are some public issues in which the choice between right and wrong, between commonsense and nonsense, is so obvious that one has little difficulty making a clear and certain decision.

It is not difficult, for example, to arrive at a definite moral judgment against the practice of racial discrimination or the abuse of children. No morally grounded person can condone the torture of prisoners as practiced in some societies.

The brutal slaughter now being carried out in Uganda and Cambodia should be condemned straight out by all those who respect the elemental virtues of civilization.

Many of us believed that the war in Vietnam presented such a choice between right and wrong, between reason and unreason. We shall continue to feel the repercussions of that tragic misadventure in foreign policy for years to come.

But one unfortunate legacy of the Vietnam era and the debate surrounding it is the tendency to see all foreign policy issues with a simplistic moralism that belies the complex nature of most international questions. There are, in fact, few issues of international dimension that lend themselves to an obvious moral division between right and wrong. Nowhere are the issues more complex and the solutions less conducive to simplistic moral pronouncements than in the Middle East.

In the age of fast-moving television images, it is tempting for those of us in public life—especially with the wounds of Vietnam still raw—to set forth our views in dramatic, moralistic phrases. How good it feels to zing the evil enemy with a righteous thrust to the breast. I plead guilty to doing my full share of that business.

But this technique—successful as it may be in exploiting the media and the public yearning for quick, simple-sounding solutions—is not helpful in the practical compromise of longstanding issues among nations.

Such an issue is now before us—the proposed sale of a certain number of planes to Egypt, Israel, and Saudi Arabia. When I hear colleagues whom I greatly respect asking: "How can throwing \$5 billion worth of arms into the Middle East tinderbox contribute to peace?" or "Why should we arm both sides of a potential conflict?" I know that those questions will make telling points on the television screen. I also know that they cannot be refuted in the same brief, appealing style. They cannot be refuted

simply and briefly because neither the underlying issues nor the solutions are simple and brief. But while the basic negotiations for these sales began in the Ford administration in 1975 and deliveries in the main will not take place until well into the 1980's, the Congress must make its judgment within a 30-day timespan.

A persuasive argument could be made that now is not an appropriate time for a divisive congressional debate on arms supply to the Middle East. Had I the power to control the timing of events, I would not have submitted these proposed arms sales to the Congress at this critical period when negotiations for a Middle East peace settlement seem to have fallen on hard times.

But there is little to be gained now in wringing hands over whether the President should have postponed a congressional division on this issue. The issue is now before us and the debate has already moved to a high pitch within the Congress, across the Nation and throughout the Middle East.

I have carefully followed and reluctantly joined this debate. I join the debate, not because I see one side of the issue with such clarity that I am eager to speak. But because I have come to the conclusion that difficult and hazardous as it may be to approve these sales, the consequences of disapproval represent even greater difficulties and hazards for the United States, for Israel and for the Middle East as a whole.

What are the potential consequences of the Congress rejecting these sales which the administration has negotiated with Egypt, Israel, and Saudi Arabia?

The first consequence would be a shattering vote of no confidence in our President, our Secretary of State, our Secretary of Defense and our Joint Chiefs of Staff. This, of course, need not be a fatal or even the major consideration in our judgment. But at a time when the President and his associates are being asked by the major Middle East governments to assist them in negotiating a peace settlement, we should carefully weigh the consequences of publicly repudiating the judgment and reliability of our own leaders.

A second consequence of rejecting the negotiated sales would be to undermine the political prestige of the moderate Arab States. We would not consider selling planes to militant, pro-Soviet states such as Iraq or Libya. We have responded to Egyptian and Saudi Arabian requests for such sales partly to manifest our appreciation for their consideration of our national interests. President Sadat risked the approbation of much of the Arab world by his peace initiative last year. He needs to resume that initiative. But if he is to be politically effective, he must demonstrate that having cut his arms supply channel to Moscow, he can now depend on the United States for essential defensive equipment.

Saudi Arabia has not been so helpful in the peace initiatives. The Saudi leaders owe it to their own best interests to seek a just and lasting peace with

Israel. They can do better than they have. I would not favor selling them arms if I did not think it would encourage them to do better as a responsible world power. But one must recognize that already they have exercised a restraining influence on the OPEC price of oil—including the price of oil supplied to Israel and the United States. We need their continued good will and cooperation in restraining oil prices, stabilizing international monetary issues, and in moderating radical tendencies throughout the Middle East.

A third consequence of rejecting the arms sales is to weaken the possibilities of a negotiated settlement in the Middle East. President Carter and Secretary Vance, like their predecessors President Ford and Secretary Kissinger, have tried to adopt the evenhanded role of an honest peace broker in the Middle East. Our leaders have not hesitated to underscore the special relationship which Americans, myself included, have always felt and continue to feel toward Israel. At the same time, it is increasingly evident that the greatest contribution we can make to Israel is to encourage the forces of moderation in the Arab world to negotiate a peaceful relationship with Israel. Our success in this dual role of sustaining Israel while increasing our influence with the Arab moderates depends on preserving a more or less evenhanded role. That is why we are asked to consider not only the defense needs of Israel, but the defensive needs of Egypt and Saudi Arabia.

It may be argued that these planes could be used by the states receiving them against each other. That, of course, is always a possibility. But at least in the case of Saudi Arabia, it seems clear that if denied American F-15's, the Saudis will purchase French war planes. This could constitute an even greater danger to Israel, since the United States would then have no restraint over the use of the planes. The American arrangement with Saudi Arabia would require American instructors, American technicians, and American spare parts. It would also bar the transfer of the planes to Israel's confrontation neighbors, or their basing at Tabuk near the Israeli border. None of these restraints would be operative if we spurn the Saudi plane contract and thus invite them to secure their defense needs from France.

Let us be clear on the nature of this resolution that is now pending. It is a proposal to limit arms to Israel, and it is a proposal to limit arms to two of the most moderate of the Arab States, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia. And it is beyond me to comprehend how that helps to assure the security of Israel. What does this resolution accomplish as far as limiting arms to Iraq is concerned? Will it limit arms to Libya? To Syria? To South Yemen or Ethiopia? Obviously, it will not. Those more radical states have other sources of supply, and they get no arms from us. So we have before us a resolution to limit arms to Israel and to the least threatening Arab States, even if the most belligerent countries in the Middle East arm themselves to the teeth. That

does not serve our interests or those of our friends; rather, it defies the interests of both Israel and the United States.

But the central factor, I believe, is not military; it is rather political and psychological. The arms package now proposed will have little, if any, effect on the Arab-Israeli military equation. Israel will remain the preponderant airpower in the Middle East with or without these sales.

But the rejection of these sales after we have so generously supplied sophisticated arms to Israel for so many years would be viewed by the Arabs as giving the lie to the American insistence that we want the friendship, confidence, and cooperation of the moderate Arab States, as well as a continued warm relationship with Israel.

This, to me, is the key factor in my own decision to back the arms package—the urgency of reassuring the key Arab leadership that we have enough confidence in their judgment and integrity that we are willing to trust them to use these aircraft only for legitimate defensive purposes.

There is one final concern that has been in my mind these past few days. I express that concern as an American who greatly admires the courage, the tenacity and the devotion to democracy of the people of Israel. Furthermore, I believe the survival and well-being of Israel is important to our own security and well-being. What concerns me is that well-meaning advocates of Israel may unwittingly undermine Israel's base of support among the American people. I understand the desire of the American Jewish community to compensate in every possible way for the horrible memories of the Holocaust that brutally destroyed 6 million European Jews during Hitler's mad rampage. I understand, too, the special and constant anxiety of American Jews as they contemplate the conflict and terrorism that has surrounded Israel's troubled 30-year struggle to be an independent Jewish State in a hostile Arab world.

But if Israel's most outspoken American advocates press the case for Israel to the point where America loses its capacity to influence the Arab leadership toward the peace table, that may set in motion a backlash both in the Middle East and in the United States that can only harm the Israel cause. If by the rejection of his request for arms, President Sadat is politically weakened; if the Saudi Government loses its interest in cooperating with the United States and Americans see the war clouds gathering even as the threat of another oil embargo emerges, it is questionable how the American public will react. I do not want by my vote on this arms issue to aggravate those political forces that could weaken Israel's position in the eyes of the American public. I plead with my Israel friends not to press the American public and the U.S. Congress too one-sidedly. Do not ask us to spurn Egypt and Saudi Arabia to demonstrate that we treasure our important relationship with the people and government of Israel.

Let us go forward with these arms sales

to Egypt, Israel and Saudi Arabia—not in the certainty that it is totally right. Rather, let us do it because it promises to be one practical step to preserve the tenuous hope that a steady, even-handed effort by the United States may yet help to move the various parties toward peace in the Middle East.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

Mr. STENNIS and Mr. PROXMIER addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, the Senator from Alabama yielded me 20 minutes at this point. I think we can work out something here. The Senator from Wisconsin wishes recognition.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I understand the Senator from Wisconsin wishes to be yielded 10 minutes at this point. We asked him to come over from the committee.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I shall not contest with the Senator from Wisconsin under those circumstances. The Senator from Alabama is not in the Chamber. If he were here at this moment I wish, subject to Mrs. HUMPHREY being ready, to proceed following the Senator from Wisconsin.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?

Mr. PROXMIER. Mr. President, will the Senator from Delaware yield me 10 minutes?

Mr. BIDEN. I yield 10 minutes to the Senator from Wisconsin.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Wisconsin (Mr. PROXMIER) is recognized for 10 minutes.

Mr. PROXMIER. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Mississippi for his courtesy. I appreciate it.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Peter Burleigh and Ron Tamm, of my staff, be accorded the privileges of the floor during debate and votes on this resolution.

Mr. President, I speak today in support of the resolution of disapproval for all four proposed sales in the Middle East sponsored by Senator BIDEN. On May 1, I introduced four separate resolutions of disapproval for the sales and I had every intention of calling them to the floor of the Senate. I planned to do that because on an issue of such fundamental importance to the American national interest, every Senator should have the right to be counted. Every Senator would want to be counted, I am sure.

Mr. President, there is some irony in the fact that we will be considering the proposed arms sales as a package, just as the administration originally insisted. While it was clear that the administration could not force the Senate to consider the four proposals as a package, now the Foreign Relations Committee has reported them as a package to the Senate as a whole. This is the case even though that committee could not itself reach agreement on either a positive or negative position on the resolution.

I understand that the primary motivation for this decision by the committee was its concern that the Senate not be-

come embroiled in a rancorous, country-by-country, debate on the merits of each sale, the quality of our bilateral relations with the state concerned, and so on. I understand this logic although I believe it would have been just as effective if the Senate had turned down each sale individually. As I have made clear in my earlier speeches on this subject, no sensible person questions the importance, indeed the growing importance, of our relations with Egypt, Israel, and Saudi Arabia. We all recognize the need to further strengthen those relations and I for one hope that it will be possible to do so.

We can do so and at the same time, vote for the Biden resolution. That vote will record our disapproval of all four sales to three important, friendly countries. This debate will help make clear the sense of the Senate that while rejecting these particular sales proposals, we are in no way calling into question our basic interest in strong relations with the three states.

Mr. President, I have opposed these four sales proposals from the minute the administration announced that it intended to make them. It is because of our intense concern for the people and countries of the Middle East as well as our national interests which are increasingly involved with them, that we must reject this package.

At this time, it would be the wrong message to send to the region. Our message should be a message of peace and friendship. The message should be a creative one and one which is aimed at convincing the region's states to return to the negotiating table. The strategy of further arms sales, and this time of very deadly aircraft, is an old and discredited one. It is the message of death and destruction and distrust that has been thoroughly discredited. It has not worked. Four wars later surely we have learned that lesson.

There are four main reasons for disapproving these proposals—each one of them.

First, the package deal threatens the security of Israel.

Second, it threatens the security of Saudi Arabia.

Third, it endangers the American economy and the economic stability of the world—as well as our role as trusted mediator in the regional dispute—because it encourages the idea that we will trade arms for oil.

Fourth, the sale of this immensely destructive aircraft to the Middle East will only serve to increase the sense of insecurity on all sides and thus result in an increasing appetite for more and more advanced weaponry. We set in motion a cycle of escalating demands, which we will not be able to control; more arms will lead to greater sense of threat and insecurity, which in turn will require more arms. It never stops. Particularly in a region where the stakes of the conflict are seen by the participants as such basic issues as racial, religious, and ethnic survival.

Mr. President, if we reject this package proposal now, we send a clear signal to



both the Administration and the Middle East nations that we are not satisfied that negotiated solutions to the regional problem have been exhausted—or even seriously explored. We have not been convinced that an attitude of compromise has characterized the Egypt-Israel negotiations. Those two nations need the active and public support of the other moderate countries in the region.

For our side, I have not been impressed with the administration's record to date in attempting to convince the Soviets and our Western European allies to show some restraint in their arms deals with the region. We have hardly had a credible position in the limited discussions which have gone on already with the Soviets, the French, the British. When, as the President has noted in several contexts, we are the world's leading arms merchant, how can we expect our attempts at preaching restraint to be seriously received?

We cannot until we take some decisions which reflect our national determination to restrain ourselves—and especially in this explosive region of the world. We have the chance today for the Senate to declare itself on the side of negotiations and peace. Let us take it.

Let me explain briefly why the proposed sales threaten the security of both Israel and Saudi Arabia. First, the case of Israel. The sales of 60 F-15s to Saudi Arabia represents a major shift in previous American policy in the region. It will be the first time that we have supplied an Arab nation with the most sophisticated aircraft at our disposal.

I fully understand the Saudi and Administration arguments that the F-15s will not be used against Israel. I appreciate that intention. However, I question whether in the heat and emotion of another Arab-Israeli war, the Saudis would be able—despite their best intentions—to resist the pressure that would be brought to bear to deploy the aircraft to the joint Arab cause. Saudi leaders have said as much—that all they have is in the service of the Arab nation. To expect another position from the Saudis is to be naive as well as to misunderstand the Saudi position in the Arab world.

Israeli planners, on the other hand, would be irresponsible not to take into consideration the presence of the F-15s, wherever they are based. Any prudent Israeli military strategist would want to wipe them out. Thus the aircraft would be inimical to the security of both Israel and Saudi Arabia, for a preemptive attack would bring Saudi Arabia directly into any new outbreak of hostilities.

My third point of contention with the administration is that we have been told, in veiled but nonetheless clear terms, that unless we agree to the supply of these F-15s to Saudi Arabia, we face probable Saudi actions which will undercut the position of the dollar, increase the cost of oil, and weaken our growing and important commercial and economic relations with the kingdom. Mr. President, so far in our relations with the OPEC countries, we have insisted that oil should be produced and priced only

through the mechanism of the market forces and the need to preserve international economic stability. Now, for the first time, we say that an arms transfer is essential to keep oil flowing, its price stable, and the dollar sound. We should reject this kind of pressure in no uncertain terms. If we do not, there will be no end to the requests and pressures for further sales, further reassurances of our support and further chaos in the region. It should be pointed out that only U.S. officials have threatened us with the oil-arms linkage. While the Saudis have denied any attempt to hold oil hostage for the F-15s, the unmistakable message from our diplomatic corps has been exactly that. If we do not provide the aircraft the Saudis want, then they will retaliate with the oil weapon. This is precisely the kind of unsavory blackmail that this country must forever resist.

Mr. President, if we can step back for a moment from this immediate question of the four sales, I think it is important to recognize and define the direction which American policy should be moving. First, we should be putting our entire weight behind the peace negotiations so boldly initiated by President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin. They deserve our active and complete support. Negotiations are the route to peace in the Middle East, not the fueling of a further arms race. Secondly, we should be initiating intensive, high-level, deeply serious negotiations with the French and the British and the Soviets to convince them to show restraint equal to ours when we reject this sale.

The supply of arms to all sides in this dispute is a poor substitute for peace talks. The logic of providing weapons in the hope that more weapons mean greater security is illusive if not completely false. Weapons create tensions. Tensions sometimes erupt into warfare—they certainly have in the Middle East. And then the weapons we supply are used.

Mr. President, I once again thank my good friend from Delaware for yielding, and I thank the Senator from Mississippi for his courtesy.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, does the distinguished Senator from Minnesota wish to speak at this time? If not, I yield 15 minutes to the distinguished Senator from Mississippi (Mr. STENNIS).

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I certainly thank the Senator from West Virginia for yielding his time to me. I will be fairly brief.

I notice here on the copy of my speech, Mr. President, it says "Statement by Senator JOHN C. STENNIS, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services." That was error. I am not trying to speak today as chairman of the Armed Services Committee but I am speaking as a member of this body on my impressions of this problem. It is a problem going back to the time many years ago when the State of Israel was recognized. I have consistently supported that concept, and I do now, of friendliness and protection in military aid and other aid to a people who I think are very brave people.

However, this matter now has gone beyond the so-called small nation. It has bloomed into a situation that can be a menace not only to the immediate people there but a menace to the economy of the nations of the world, most of them, that have a free economy and based partly on the concept of balance of power—that this package undertakes to bring about. I think the President has made a wise and timely move. Instead of resisting it because it is a package, I think that that is one of the strongest features, and one of the best practical features, about the entire matter.

I have, as I said, concluded this based on my own experience here. I am as far removed as anyone could be from wanting to sell planes or wanting to get military hardware into any particular place outside of our Nation, I have formed what conclusions I have on it, as I said, as an individual Senator, based on these experiences that I have seen come and go over the years.

I believe that the only peace these people can have is a peace that they are willing to impose on themselves. We can help and other nations can help, but the real peace they will have and can live with is going to be based largely on what concessions they are willing to make to each other and what their demands are for their own protection and what they may be able, and God help them, to work out along those lines.

I certainly want us to meet them always with an effort to help them as they search for their own safety, the safety of their nation and the well-being of their people.

The Senate takes up today a concurrent resolution which would, if passed, disapprove the so-called Middle East aircraft sales package. There are four separate items in this package including a sale to Israel of 15 F-15 fighter aircraft valued at \$430.7 million; a sale to Israel of 75 F-16 fighter aircraft valued at \$1.52 billion; a sale to Egypt of 50 F-5 fighter attack aircraft valued at \$590 million; and a sale to Saudi Arabia of 60 F-15 fighter aircraft valued at \$2.5 billion. President Carter made a wise decision to put the sales to all three of these countries in the same package. It is not only a sound position, but it is almost necessary to proceed in this way.

I believe we must decide on this package based on what is in the hard interests of the United States. After careful thought I have concluded the Senate should reject this resolution of disapproval and thereby permit the President to go forward with his plans on these aircraft sales.

In my judgment, it is essential that the United States maintain and enhance its influence in this important and volatile part of the world. I say this not because I believe the United States has some right to dominate other countries or some duty to be policeman of the world. It cannot be done. I say this because I believe it is in the long run best interests of the United States to have influence and be able to exercise some control, even limited control, over events in the Middle East. A few facts will demon-

strate this hard, long term U.S. interests in the Middle East.

First, we all know the United States has a real and practical need for oil from that part of the world. Some 20 percent of all of our oil today is imported from the Middle East, 8 percent from Saudi Arabia alone. It seems to me to be absolutely vital that the United States maintain its influence in that area or any area of the world where we have become so vitally dependent for our day to day energy supply. That is preeminent, and that fact is undisputed.

Second, the United States and its NATO allies have been the bulwark of the Western World—I mean by that the free world—for the last 30 years. But a quick look at the facts will show our NATO allies are even more dependent on Middle East oil than is the United States. For more, Western Europe imports some 79 percent of all its oil from the Middle East. The United States, as the largest partner in the NATO Alliance, and the figures will prove this, has some responsibility to help keep the Middle East from drifting into war or a political situation that could threaten the very existence of the NATO Alliance itself.

Third, both the United States and many of its NATO allies have supported the idea of maintaining the security of the State of Israel. I do not believe that the long run security of the State of Israel can be separated from U.S. influence and even limited control over the events throughout the Middle East. Anything that diminishes U.S. influence in the Middle East tends to diminish the security of Israel. It must be clearly understood—and I think my position is crystal clear—that I do not favor sending American ground troops to this area of the world to become engaged in fighting the wars of other nations. This fact must always be made firm and clear, and I reiterate it here to show that I am not yielding as to that position.

Fourth, the real alternative to U.S. influence and control in the Middle East is of course the Soviet Union. There is being filed today a report on our military authorization bill. For one year alone, \$128.7 billion is proposed in that bill, and a great percentage of it, as we know, goes toward the support of this NATO concept. The United States, NATO and Israel would all be in for serious trouble if we permit the Soviets to exercise political or military influence over the Middle East as a whole. The Russians are trying as they will always try. They and the Cubans are fighting battles in the horn of Africa, day after day and month after month. They have politically and militarily penetrated some of the smaller Middle Eastern countries. The United States and its NATO allies must be on their guard when both are so dependent on the oil resources that come from this volatile part of the world.

I have made clear that that is not the only interest we have, but that is a vital necessity.

In a way, this arms sales package is more important to the United States than it is to the countries that will buy

the airplanes. Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Israel each feel that these aircraft are essential to their security. The U.S. Government agrees that these sales meet legitimate defense requirements. Each of the three countries might well go elsewhere to obtain similar aircraft if this sales package is disapproved by our Government. Each of these three countries is in a position to do so. Let us not forget that they are not hanging on the brink of military disaster if this sales package is disapproved. They are not now at war. Many of these aircraft would not be delivered for 4 or 5 years, and they do have time to look elsewhere. But rejection of this arms sales package could be a turning point to lessen U.S. influence in the Middle East. Rejection of the sales package could leave these countries feeling that the United States had abandoned them, feeling less confident about their own security and feeling they must look elsewhere for help. That could be a severe blow and an unnecessary blow to the vital interests of both the United States and NATO.

So for these reasons, I plan to support the President's proposal to sell these aircraft to Egypt, Israel, and Saudi Arabia. I urge my colleagues in the Senate to reject any attempt to disapprove all or even a part of this package under this concept.

I hope it does not sound harsh, because I do not mean to be harsh, but I point out again that the balance of power concept is never stable. It is always uncertain to a degree. But in our own experience as well as that of other nations, it is about the most effective arrangement that we have now. I pray we will have better arrangements later, but for now this is our choice.

Mr. President, I thank the Senator for yielding time to me.

Mr. HARRY F. BYRD, JR. and Mr. BENTSEN addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?

Mr. HARRY F. BYRD, JR. Mr. President, the Senator from West Virginia said I might have 12 minutes following the Senator from Mississippi.

Mr. BENTSEN. There must be some mixup. I had understood I was to be recognized. I was told by the Senator from Alabama that I was to follow the Senator from Mississippi.

Mr. HARRY F. BYRD, JR. I will be glad to follow the Senator from Texas.

Mr. BENTSEN. I have been yielded 20 minutes by the Senator from Alabama.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Texas (Mr. BENTSEN) is recognized for 20 minutes.

Mr. BENTSEN. Mr. President, I rise in opposition to the resolution that would disapprove sales of aircraft to Egypt, Israel, and Saudi Arabia.

I, too, have been concerned with the potential for additional violence in the Middle East. I have been concerned about it for 30 years. Like many of my colleagues, I yearn for the day when our main exports to the Middle East will not be arms, but tools for development.

I am proud of my record of support for the security and the sovereign independ-

ence of the Jewish State of Israel. I am proud of the fact that this Nation has provided over \$10 billion of military and economic aid since 1973, and I am determined to continue aid, to that country.

I was in Israel before it was a country. I have seen what they have done to make the desert bloom, and I am proud of what they have done in building a free and independent nation.

Let me also say that I headed a financial institution that bought some of the very first bonds of Israel. And we did not do it for show; we kept those bonds on through to maturity.

I vividly remember a visit to Israel and I walked in to see Golda Meir, and she said,

Well, Senator, I suppose you are here because you are going to tell me that you want to do something in the best interests of Israel.

I said,

No, Mrs. Meir, I am here because I want to do something in the best interests of the United States, as a United States Senator; but I also believe there are many of those objectives that are mutual objectives, for the mutual interest of the United States and Israel.

She said,

Good. With that kind of candor, we can talk.

That is the kind of candor I want to talk with today.

On that same trip, I went by to see Sadat. I spent an hour and a half with him in a gazebo out in his garden in Cairo, and I gave him a very tough time about the 17,000 Russian advisers he had in his country, about the influence they had on the leadership of Egypt, and the fact that he could not get out from under their domination.

I remember him shaking his finger at me and saying,

Now, Senator, I will tell you this. I am going to get rid of them, and I am going to run them all out of my country.

I did not believe him. I came back and told Kissinger that, and Kissinger did not believe him either. But shortly thereafter he did it, and I have had a great deal of respect for the courage of that man ever since.

It is on this basis that I address the Senate today. I do not believe there is any fundamental contradiction between the best interests of the United States and the best interests of Israel when it comes to the President's offer of fighter aircraft to three Middle East nations.

You will forgive me, Mr. President, if I confess a little bewilderment at the turn this debate has taken. When President Carter announced his intention, Congress willing, to sell advanced fighter aircraft to Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia, he presented us with a package deal, to be accepted or rejected in toto. Some Members of Congress took great umbrage at this tactic, demanding the right to assess each segment of that sale on its merits. So the President stopped calling it a package, but he tacitly reserved the right to treat it as



one. That semantic stroke of genius seemed to allay some of the concerns.

Today we will spend 10 hours debating a package, a package of our own wrapping, a package that cannot be untied, that will either be accepted or rejected in its entirety.

Let me just ask a question: If the President had proposed to sell 75 F-16's and F-15's to Israel, would we be saying give peace a chance and debating the sale for 10 hours? No; of course we would not. There is precious little opposition in this body to selling aircraft to Israel, and certainly none on the part of the Senator from Texas.

Would we be spending 10 hours in debating the sale of 50 F-5's to Egypt?

Probably not. There is a broad and commendable willingness in this body to support President Sadat's peace initiative and to reinforce the ties between Egypt and the United States.

But let us suppose we did not sell those to Egypt. Sadat has to have something to cling to in this situation, since he has thrown out those Russian advisers and turned to the United States. If we turn him down, see who you have who succeeds Sadat. He will make Nasser look like an amateur.

Mr. President, we now have that request for 50 F-5's Egypt, and it hardly constitutes any kind of a compelling threat to the security of Israel. President Sadat has turned to a friend. Are we really prepared to turn down that kind of a modest request? When we cut through all of this smoke and thunder, Mr. President, it is clear we are here for one reason only: because President Carter has offered 60 F-15's to Saudi Arabia, and because the Government of Israel objects to that sale.

Rather than address the real issue, Saudi Arabia, we have chosen instead to adopt some kind of a protective coloration and talk about arms sales in general. We shall debate a slogan, "give peace a chance," rather than the one issue which is really confronting this body.

Mr. President, I want to speak to that issue. I would like to describe why I think it is in the best interests of the United States to sell F-15's to Saudi Arabia and why I believe the Saudis need the planes quite apart from any aggressive intentions on Israel. Then I would like to say why I believe approval of this resolution would be contrary to the long-term interests of Israel and harmful to Israeli-American friendship.

Few would argue, Mr. President, with the assertion that Saudi Arabia has recently joined the ranks of some of the most important nations in the world. Saudi Arabia is important because she controls one-quarter of the world's proven resources of oil.

Yes, it is true Saudi Arabia took part in the 1973 OPEC embargo and it led to a staggering increase in worldwide oil prices. It is true that this cannot be interpreted as an act in the best interests of the United States.

However, Mr. President, it is also true that since 1973 the best interests of Saudi Arabia and the best interests of

the United States have been intertwined.

For the past 5 years Saudi Arabia has been a force for moderation within OPEC on the question of oil prices. The Saudis have steadfastly resisted efforts of some of our other friends, like Venezuela and Iran, in trying to ratchet up the oil prices some more. They have not turned away from the dollar as a medium of exchange, which they could have easily done as they saw a deterioration in the dollar.

They are producing 8.5 million barrels of oil per day. They do not need to produce 8.5 million barrels per day. Their budget requirements could easily be taken care of by 5 million barrels per day. And now we are going to talk to them about increasing that production beyond what it is today, when they know it is to their economic self-interest to keep it in the ground where it is appreciating in value instead of taking depreciating American dollars.

The importance of Saudi Arabia is not limited to oil. For the past 5 years they have played a responsible role in international financial circles. They have helped recycle some of those petrodollars.

Mr. President, even the hardest critics of this sale recognize the importance of friendship, of having the best possible relations between Saudi Arabia and the United States. They would probably acknowledge that we need Saudi Arabia as much as Saudi Arabia needs us.

Having established the fact that Saudi Arabia is an important nation, well inclined toward the interests of the United States, a responsible actor on the international stage, now let us consider the central point in this debate: why we should refuse to provide Saudi Arabia with 60 F-15's.

In the final analysis there is only one good reason to refuse to sell the aircraft to Saudi Arabia: that they would jeopardize, to a greater or a lesser degree, the security of Israel, and the security of Israel has been a cardinal point of U.S. foreign policy for over a generation.

Yes, there are some side issues, such as the debate over Tabuk. There are marginal relevancy questions such as the transferability in the case of war; whether or not these F-15's can be flown to another nation and other pilots jump into those cockpits and fly off to battle. There are questions of in-flight refueling, the AIM 9M and Sidewinder, all of those raised and dismissed.

But the relevant issue, Mr. President, is the fear that the Saudis might be tempted to use the world's best fighter against Israel.

If we could provide some guarantee of the ultimate intentions of the Saudis, if we could find a way where, if they flew over the Israel border, the F-15 would suddenly self-destruct in the air, then the issue would be settled. But we cannot guarantee that and we know that.

I cannot guarantee that F-15's will never be used against Israel. I can suggest that it would be the height of stupidity for Saudi Arabia to commit its air defense to unprovoked battle with one of the finest air forces in the world.

I can suggest that the Israelis could almost certainly cope with this remote possibility.

I could suggest that if the Saudis were looking for a fighter-bomber to inflict damage on Israel, they would sure be well advised to buy some other plane other than the F-15 which is primarily an air-to-air fighter, an interceptor.

If we assume, Mr. President, that the Saudis are determined to fight Israel, then we can certainly make a case that the F-15's could be employed against Israel. But if we assume that Saudi Arabia need a modern air defense capability, if we assume that they have a legitimate requirement to be able to defend their airspace, then the F-15 is the plane for that job.

I would suggest, Mr. President, that Saudi Arabia has a legitimate claim for self-defense. I think the King would be remiss in his duties if he were not in the market for the best fighter aircraft available.

Sitting here on the floor of the Senate it is easy for us to dismiss these potential threats to Saudi Arabia from Soviet-armed nations like Iraq, like the People's Republic of Yemen, where we are now advised the Cubans are in force.

We can say the Saudis should not be overly concerned about what is happening in the Horn of Africa. We can assume continued stability in the Gulf. We can suggest that one of the world's richest nations, which commands some of the world's most valuable real estate, is menaced by no one. But you do not believe that, and I do not believe that.

Neither do the Saudis. They feel menaced. They recognize they could be menaced at any time. They want to be able to protect themselves in an extremely volatile world. And they want to be able to buy time—4, 5, 6 days—while other nations can respond to try to assist them in protecting some of the world's most valuable resources.

The only question is, are they going to be doing it with French aircraft, delivered tomorrow, off the assembly line, in abundance, no strings attached. Our F-15's talk about the first deliveries in 3 years, and with strings attached.

Senate adoption of this resolution of disapproval will not eliminate the potential threat to Israel's security posed by a modern Saudi air force. Senate approval of this resolution could, in fact, accentuate that threat and bring it to fruition long before 1984. It could also have adverse consequences for the future of our relationship with Saudi Arabia and, finally, could serve to retard the prospects for peace in the region.

Time and time again, the Saudis have followed through for us to the point where, in the Arab world, they are often called the lackeys of the United States. What do you think is going to happen to them when they turn to us and ask for weapons of defense and we turn them down? How long do you think that influence will last? And where else will they turn? They will find ready vendors amongst the French—people who have told them that if they will work with the Egyptians, put \$1 billion into research and production, they will build a Mirage 2,000 and build a real weapons base. Is that going to lead toward peace, influ-

ence by the United States, and trying to bring about a final settlement that assures the strength and the independence of Israel?

Mr. President, every analysis of the subject I have seen suggests that Israel enjoys and will continue to enjoy, even if F-15's for Saudi Arabia are factored into the equation, a measure of strategic superiority over potential adversaries, in a long war or in a short one, which I would be proud to claim for this nation.

We have been instrumental in providing Israel with that security, and I am proud of that fact. Mr. President, I do not believe that 60 F-15's, delivered to Saudi Arabia between 1981 and 1984 will substantially diminish Israel's strategic superiority in the air over her Arab neighbors. To adopt this resolution will do incalculable damage to Saudi-American relations. It will cause Saudi Arabia to lose influence in the Arab world and question the continued benefit of friendship with this country.

I commend President Carter for his courageous and correct decision on this matter of aircraft sales to the Middle East. I agree with him entirely when he points out:

The long-term interests of Israel are served by the proposed sales to Egypt and Saudi Arabia. It is in Israel's interest to encourage the forces of moderation in the Middle East, and to promote their close relationship with the United States. It would not serve Israel's interest if we were to fail to keep bipartisan commitments made by the prior Administration as well as by mine, to provide aircraft for the defense of Saudi Arabia. It would be against Israel's interest if moderate nations are brushed aside by the United States, opening vast possibilities for the intrusion of hostile influences.

Mr. President, I urge Senate rejection of this resolution of disapproval.

(Mr. NUNN assumed the chair.)

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I yield 12 minutes to the distinguished Senator from Virginia (Mr. HARRY F. BYRD, JR.).

Mr. HARRY F. BYRD, JR. Mr. President, I have withheld judgment as to how I shall vote on President Carter's proposal to sell modern aircraft to Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia. Only this morning did I reach a decision.

First, I am not much inclined toward supplying weapons to both sides of a potential conflict. We have done that in the past with undesirable results, the war between India and Pakistan being but one example.

Would the arms sale to the three Middle East nations enhance or discourage a peaceful settlement of their problems? I doubt that any can say the answer to that with any degree of certainty.

President Carter argues that the sale of aircraft to the two Arab nations will serve to encourage a continuation of the moderating influence of the Arab side of the dispute.

The President, the State Department, and the Defense Department all emphasize that the sale of aircraft to Egypt and Saudi Arabia—coupled with supplying Israel—will not alter significantly

the military balance between those nations.

While American Mideast policy has been, at times, meandering, if not a bit contradictory, there have been at least two constants.

One is dedication to Israel's survival and security. This has been demonstrated tangibly by the American taxpayers providing more than \$10 billion in economic and military aid since the 1973 Middle East war.

Another increasingly important goal is to improve relations with the Arab world surrounding Israel.

I have reached the conclusion that if aircraft were to be sold to any of the three nations, there are important reasons for supporting the sale to all.

Each is a friend of the United States.

Each, in its own way, is important to a stable Middle East; each has a major role to play in thwarting Russian objectives in North Africa, the Middle East, and the Indian Ocean.

It is unfortunate, I think, that Israel is seeking to make the arms sale package a test of support for Israel.

Israel would get 90 fighter aircraft, costing \$2 billion. Israel would be immediately released from one-half of its liability to repay the U.S. Government—and the other one-half would be paid from the credits which Israel receives from the U.S. foreign aid program.

Saudi Arabia and Egypt, on the other hand, will pay cash—and the full amount—for the aircraft which they purchase.

Both Egypt and Saudi Arabia have what I believe to be a clear need for improved defense capabilities. Egypt faces potential threats entirely aside from Israel.

Libya, which has been openly hostile to Egypt, and is dominated by an unpredictable dictator, has been provided highly sophisticated aircraft by Russia. These aircraft are a direct threat to Egypt, as are recent events in the Horn of Africa.

Saudi Arabia is a country with hostile nations on its borders—most notably Iraq and South Yemen—and it contains 25 percent of the world's proven oil reserves. It could be an inviting target for Russia which is constantly extending its influence and military presence throughout Africa and the Middle East, including nearby Ethiopia.

Indeed, President Carter has just confirmed the presence in South Yemen of large numbers of Cuban military personnel.

President Carter, and before him President Ford, agreed to sell the F-15 fighter aircraft to Saudi Arabia. The Saudis consider the fulfillment of such promises a basic test of whether their friendship with the United States and their policy of Mideast moderation is worthwhile.

In addition, it is obvious that if the United States refuses to sell, Saudi Arabia will acquire modern aircraft elsewhere. It has the resources to do so.

It has been argued that the F-15 aircraft conceivably could be used to attack

Israel—even though the aircraft is not optimized for the attack mission. But this would leave Saudi territory open to retaliation from a vastly superior Israeli air force.

Further, the F-15 would be subject to a substantial amount of control by the United States because it requires extensive ground support systems, and would be dependent on a continued flow of sophisticated spare parts from the United States.

I admire the Israelis and I am proud of my close association and friendship with the Jewish community of my State of Virginia.

During the past several weeks, I have been asked by many of my Jewish friends as to whether I detect a change in attitude toward Israel on the part of the United States. My answer has been "No."

I have added, however, I feel there has been a change in attitude—one of greater cordiality—toward Egypt and Saudi Arabia.

I want to state frankly that I was much impressed by President Sadat's unprecedented and politically dangerous visit to Jerusalem and his obviously earnest quest for peace.

I had had a lengthy discussion with President Sadat at his home in Egypt 2 years previous. I came away from my visit with him convinced of his sincerity in seeking a permanent peace for the Middle East. His subsequent mission to Jerusalem confirmed my appraisal.

Saudi Arabia, too, has been a moderating influence and has consistently supported U.S. positions on international issues.

I regard both nations as friends of the United States—just as is Israel. I do not regard it as necessary to oppose one friend in order to justify support for another friend.

The Middle East is a powder keg. And not only because of the hostility which exists between Israel on the one hand and some Arab nations on the other.

The greater overall danger to Israel—and to Saudi Arabia and Egypt—is Russia. Were Russia to dominate Saudi Arabia, it would be devastating to the interests of the United States, and to world peace.

I have concluded that it is important that Saudi Arabia, and Egypt, be permitted to purchase the modern aircraft necessary for defense.

I shall vote against the effort to repudiate President Carter's commitment. I shall support the sale of aircraft to the three Middle East nations.

Mr. MATHIAS addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maryland.

Who yields time?

Mr. MATHIAS. Mr. President, I believe the leadership indicated they would allow me some time.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maryland is recognized on the time of the Senator from Tennessee.

TOWARD PEACE

Mr. MATHIAS. Mr. President, it is difficult to suppress the sense of outrage I



feel that the foreign policy of the United States has been allowed to drift so aimlessly that the Senate is presented with an issue guaranteed to embarrass our national interests. The way in which the Mideast plane package has been wrapped makes it impossible to disentangle American policy from the morass of Middle East politics.

The question the administration has framed permits no answer which will not be perceived as either weakening of our commitment to Israel or as a gratuitous humiliation to President Sadat and to Saudi Arabia. The irony is that the Arab world does not expect the former, and the interests of Israel will not be served by the latter course.

To a large extent the planes have become symbols representing the "American Connection" and, as such, have acquired a significance beyond even their military potency and monetary value. On the symbolic level, which is a matter of perception, one thing is clear. There will be many opportunities in the years immediately ahead to prove our continuing commitment to the survival of Israel. On the other hand, an active rejection at this time could be politically fatal to President Sadat and his peace initiative. Equally serious, an active rejection could trigger a redirection of Saudi Arabian policy and interest that could be highly prejudicial to the United States, the Western World, and to Israel itself. In short, while the results of either potential decision are distasteful, one is certainly remediable, the other is probably irremediable.

But, we should not be so preoccupied with perceptions of symbolism embodied in the plane package that we neglect the substantive questions that are also raised.

To those who question how the plane package will affect our commitment to the survival of the State of Israel, I say, not at all. That commitment is unique and unalterable. It was forged in the fierce crucible of the Holocaust. It has been and will remain the lodestar of our Middle East policy. It is our only "special relationship" in the Middle East.

To those who ask whether oil plays a part in this decision about the plane package, I say that it does. We, ourselves, need Middle Eastern oil but we can make do without it. Our allies cannot. Japan imports over 70 percent of its oil from the Persian Gulf area; key European

And to those who hold that these answers are incompatible, I say, you are wrong. The United States' unique relationship with Israel is not and should not be exclusive. The more isolated Israel is and the more isolated we are in our relationship with Israel, the more we endanger the peace process in the Middle East.

The United States has a variety of interests in the Middle East and its environs—in Pakistan, in Iran, and in the moderate Arab States. The stability we seek to promote in these relationships is in our vital interest and in the vital interest of Israel as well. We ignore those relationships only at our mutual peril.

Nor can we afford to ignore the growing threat the Soviet Union poses to the stability of this vital region. The danger signs are everywhere.

Turkey, which straddles the Dardanelles and controls Soviet access to the Mediterranean, has a NATO contingent second in size only to our own. Yet, today, we are barred from our intelligence bases in Turkey and criticism of ties with the West is shrill and insistent throughout that country. It is no coincidence that Turkey has been one of the largest recipients of Soviet economic aid outside the Communist bloc.

Moving across the Mediterranean, we come to Ethiopia where our bonds of friendship have been long and strong. Yet, all that is past and there are now close to 20,000 Cuban troops and roughly 1,000 Soviet advisers in Ethiopia which dominates the Red Sea approach to the Suez Canal. This strategic location made Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa an irresistible target of opportunity for the Soviets, following up on Angola.

Egypt has cut its ties with the Soviet Union, but the Soviet threat in the region is growing nonetheless. Libya is an arsenal of Soviet equipment and South Yemen too is being supplied by the U.S.S.R. There are now substantial contingents of both Soviet and Cuban advisers stationed in South Yemen, and any additional buildup would pose a clear danger to Saudi Arabia and to Oman a tempting target at the entrance to the Persian Gulf.

Moving further east the recent coup in Afghanistan gives cause for concern. It brought to power the Khalq Party and a civil-military government many of whose members are strongly pro-Soviet. Both Pakistan and Iran have expressed serious concern regarding this coup.

And finally, returning to the Arab world, both Iraq and Syria have received substantial Soviet military and economic aid. But, Iraq, with more than 200 of the most sophisticated Soviet combat planes poses a direct threat to the stability of the region. It represents the anti-Western, radical vanguard in the area, and its capacity to do serious damage should not be discounted.

The Soviet noose around the Middle East is tightening. This is no time for us to make mistakes. In this area the interests of Saudi Arabia and Israel coincide. Both are anti-Soviet. Both actively promote our interests, as well as their own, by combating radicalism in the region. Both are good friends to the United States. And both need our support.

For these reasons, I will cast my vote today against the resolution of disapproval of the plane package. I cast it in the conviction that strengthening the moderate forces in the Arab world can only serve the process of peace.

But, should events prove me wrong, it is well to recall that under this agreement no planes will be delivered in Saudi Arabia until 1982. Meanwhile, the United States retains the option to reconsider and refuse delivery. We have exercised such options in the past in the cases of arms shipment to Ethiopia and Libya.

In this case, I do not think we will have to exercise the option. I believe we have ample evidence that Saudi Arabia seeks to enhance the prospects for peace in the Middle East. And I fervently hope that by 1982 the peace process, begun by President Sadat and Premier Begin, will have advanced so far that the questions we have taxed ourselves with in this debate will sound strangely on the ear like vestiges of a bygone day.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Casimir Yost of my staff, have the privilege of the floor during the remainder of this debate and any rollcall votes that may occur.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. GRAVEL. Mr. President, will the Senator from West Virginia yield me 10 minutes?

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. I yield 10 minutes to the Senator from Alaska.

Mr. GRAVEL. I yield to the Senator from Vermont.

Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Robert Paquin, of my staff, have the privilege of the floor during the debate on this matter and votes in all open sessions.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. RIBICOFF. Mr. President, I make the same request for Malcolm Campbell, of my staff.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. STONE. Mr. President, I make the same request for Mr. Schochet of my staff.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. GRAVEL. Mr. President, I rise to speak on this issue with some degree of concern. I will vote against the resolution, and I will do so with some ease with respect to the logic of the issue. With respect to the personal aspects of the issue, I do it with a great deal of personal pain, as much personal pain as I have ever suffered in my tenure in the Senate.

I say it is easy for me to vote this way from the point of view of logic. I have followed the issue very closely. I have read up on it. I feel as comfortable with the information and facts of this issue as on any issue I have ever voted on in the Senate. So it is with some ease that I make a judgment that I think is in the best interests of the United States and the best interests of all the nations in the Middle East.

Where I have difficulty, of course, is in the personal aspect; because I, like many Members of the Senate, up to now have what would be considered a 100-percent voting record for Israel, and I have enjoyed the beneficence of that at the polls and in financial backing.

The way the issue stands now, as I understand it—and I think how other people understand it—is that this is the litmus test. This vote, if it is not done properly, kisses away in the future all kinds of financial support that would inure to a candidate for office. That may well be the case. At least, that is certainly the case that I think exists. That does not bother me all that much, be-

cause there is a certain egotistical pleasure that one can take in exercising a judgment in conscience, and that is what I feel I am doing today.

However, where I am chagrined is that this vote that I cast in this sincerity, because I think that, among other things, it is in the best interests of Israel, will cost me some very important personal friendships. For that, I am unbelievably chagrined, because I will know of no way to recoup those personal friendships. These are Jewish friends of mine whom I have held dear all my life—some of the closest friends I have on this earth, who are lost to me today because of this decision I make in conscience.

I think this will be the watershed year of Jewish influence in this country; because I am sure that what is happening to me is happening to other Members of the Senate who have been loyalists to the Jewish cause in the Middle East. When you deliver an ultimatum once, you cannot deliver it twice or three times. When you are told, "This is it," then you have to live with that situation; and they cannot come back to the well with the same degree of threat, because you have broken away into what now becomes a total independence.

Win or lose on this issue, the Israeli community and the Jewish community of the United States will lose. Win or lose, they will lose. They will lose because a lot of individual credibility has been used up. They will lose because the American people are going to begin to understand and realize that there is a certain unfairness where one nation can beseech us for aid, and we do it profusely and generously; and then when others ask us and beseech us for the same aid, that nation stands up and says, "Don't give it to them."

I think the American people are going to sense that unfairness. If it is OK to help one country, it is just as OK to help another country, if they feel they need that help, and if we judge that helping is meritorious.

I think that if this resolution is approved, there are going to be some economic consequences. I cannot for a moment buy the argument that the Saudis have to love us, or the Egyptians have to love us, any more than I would accept the argument that we do not have to help Israel because we are the only friend they have of any meaningful proportion in the world; that we do not have to help them and they are forced to help us. If that logic does not apply in support of Israel, that logic does not apply in support of the Arab world, whose friendship is of equal value to us.

How did the issue come forward? We see people here standing up and blaming Jimmy Carter. Jimmy Carter is not to blame. When I hear people regale against the package I am dumbfounded. Even a person with half-baked political acumen would have put a political package together in his position. Why not put a package deal together? The Arab deal by itself would have been in great jeopardy. There is no constituency in this country for the Arab community—there literally is none—and there is a very

strong and healthy and vibrant and powerful constituency for the Israeli community. So why would not a President who wanted to provide succor to both sides tie them together and say, "If you don't buy one, you're not going to get the other?" The President would not have been acting intelligently if he had not done just that.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the hour of 1:30 having arrived, the Senator from Connecticut (Mr. RIBICOFF) is recognized.

Mr. GRAVEL. Mr. President, will the Senator permit me to finish my statement?

Mr. RIBICOFF. Yes. I shall allow the Senator to conclude.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I yield to the Senator from Connecticut 30 minutes and he may yield whatever time he wishes.

Mr. RIBICOFF. I yield to the Senator so he may conclude.

Mr. GRAVEL. If I could finish my statement, I do not think I shall be long.

Mr. President, let us ask ourselves why we are here and how we got here. The reason why we are here is that a decision was made in Jerusalem by the leadership of the Jewish State that they were going to oppose the sale of these jets to Saudi Arabia and to Egypt. This opposition to the sale has now transcended the technical requirements of the issue. And rightfully so. The issue has now become, Is Israel safe with the sale or not safe with the sale?

I think everyone realizes that the way the package has been put together Israel's security is not jeopardized one bit.

So that is why, as our colleague stated earlier, this whole issue has risen to the level of symbolism.

What is the symbolism in this case? I find it very frightening because I see two heads of government pitted against one another, not over the technical issue of their defense, but pitted against one another in ideological combat. I see the leadership of Israel under Prime Minister Begin feeling very strongly about the territories that they conquered, that they were forced to conquer as a defense mechanism. And I see a change in events with the movement of Mr. Sadat away from confrontation into a negotiating position. In that negotiating position things are not quite so clear for Israel, and things are not quite so clear for the people who support Israel. And in that lack of clarity, I pray God, may lie the opportunity to secure peace in the Middle East. But in that lack of clarity, as we proceed to that goal of peace, we will have a great deal of insecurity both on the part of the Israelis and on the part of the Arabs.

So what is at stake in this symbolic combat? What is at stake is the present leadership of Israel under Mr. Begin, and I submit that if this vote is not affirmative to Israel this will erode his ability to stay in office. On the other side, what will certainly be the result of a pro-Israeli vote in the Senate today will be the diminution of the power of the moderate Arab community.

What will be the consequences of that? A return to the situation that existed prior to last November.

Every time I have been to the Middle East I have come back totally pessimistic, totally despondent and totally convinced that there was no solution save war. It was just a question of waiting until the next war came along. But with the movement of the moderate Arab community represented by Mr. Sadat, for the first time in my 10 years in this responsible position I see a glimmer of hope.

So I am fearful that the actions of the Israeli community to thwart the sale of these jets will threaten the existence of this new moderate Arab element, which creates confusion in the situation but brings so much—so much—hope.

I just hope we recognize that, if that Arab community leaves the scene, we are back again to simplistic black and white, we are back to Senate votes of just supporting Israel through a moral commitment, albeit a commitment which is valid. Well, I do not want to go back to the period of such knee-jerk votes. I think the complexities are an advancement.

Mr. President, it was stated earlier by the senior Senator from New York that the crux of this issue was the impact on U.S. Middle Eastern policy, and I agree. And I think I must admit that not all U.S. policy in the Middle East must be viewed through the eyes of the Israeli community, that we have a broader spectrum of interest than just that one nation. That is not to say that that one nation cannot command in us a high threshold of moral commitment. It does. It does with me, and I will be there again and again for their support. But I think we who are not locked into their position as a warfare state—which they have had to become in order to protect themselves—have a broader responsibility to peace in the Middle East. I think we have a responsibility not only to the security of Israel but to the security of the Saudi Arabians, the Egyptians, and every single human being in the Middle East.

And of greater consequence to the world, I think the United States of America has a responsibility to world economic security. We must think of what would happen as a result of dislocations in the supply of oil, which could take place both from unilateral action or as a result of war. Also we must ponder the possibility of the discontinuation of the use of the dollar as the international medium of exchange, the consequences of which could well be a world depression.

These are our responsibilities and I think important ones.

I hope that this Senate will not approve this resolution. If something is viewed as fair for Israel that same view must compel us in logic to say that it must also be fair for the Arabs.

Mr. President, I shall speak later on the subject. I thank my colleague from Connecticut for withholding his remarks so that I might complete the main thrust of my statement. I thank him for the courtesy.



The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut.

Mr. RIBICOFF. Mr. President, the sale of these military aircraft to Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia is an emotional issue. But it is also a military, economic, and diplomatic issue which affects the vital security of the United States.

The question we must now decide is what is in our best national interest.

The first issue is whether to sell military aircraft to Israel. Israel has been the bedrock of our policy in the Middle East. Our strength has been mutually reinforcing. American power has been an Israeli asset. Our cultural and political ties are special. We have given Israel decisively favorable weight in the regional power balance. By every analysis I have seen the F-16's and F-15's proposed for Israel will increase its favorable balance of strength for years to come.

Israel's security was a matter of prime concern during the Foreign Relations Committee hearings. Let me quote Secretary of Defense Brown's testimony:

The salient feature of the military situation in the Middle East is Israel's military superiority. Following the 1973 war, the Government of Israel embarked on an expansion and modernization program for its armed forces. Israel's forces have grown to 150 percent of their 1973 strength, and are being modernized with new equipment. Israel has the area's strongest military forces. It is the judgment of the Defense Department—a judgment shared by myself, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and our civilian and military analysts—that Israel could defeat any combination of likely opposing forces even without further modernization, and will continue to be able to do so for quite a few years to come. The proposed aircraft sales will not change this conclusion.

This does not mean we are complacent about Israel's security situation. We recognize that the facts of geography and population allow Israel little margin for error. We should not be sparing in assessing Israel's military requirements. I believe we have not been, nor will we be. The sale of the additional F-15s and the F-16s will continue the program of modernizing Israel's Air Force, by replacing older F-4 and A-4 aircraft. This modernization program will help assure Israel's air supremacy through the 1980s.

Israel's security should be a prime concern of the United States. As Israel celebrates its 30th anniversary the people of this courageous country have much to fill it with pride. It has enabled an in-migration of persecuted and homeless Jews from all over the world to live as free men. It has successfully fought four wars and repelled continual terrorist attacks. It has made the desert bloom into the Biblical land of "milk and honey." Its education, health, and science are among the foremost in the world. In art, music, literature, culture and archeology it is not surpassed. In agriculture and industry Israel shows the entire underdeveloped world how to become a modern nation.

But above all its attributes Israel was born as a democracy, lives as a democracy, and will stay a democracy. It is the only democratic country in the Middle East. In spite of wars, troubles, and adversity, Israel has remained true

to democratic principles. Freedom of speech and discussion is a basic tenet of Israel's existence and faith whether in the Knesset, in the press, in the home, on the street, or in the field.

Support for Israel has been a constant part of our foreign policy and it should continue. Israel could not have existed and cannot exist without strong U.S. support. I and most of you here have consistently voted for this assistance. The sales before us for Israel will enhance both its security and its sense of security. A strong and secure Israel is in our national interest. But a strong U.S. militarily, economically, and diplomatically is also in the best interests of the State of Israel.

The second item is the sale of F-5E's to Egypt. The most profound strategic change in the Middle East in recent years has been in Egypt. The Soviet Union was kicked out of Egypt and lost a valuable strategic position. President Sadat has shown uncommon courage. He expelled the Soviets and thereby lost his main source of arms. He went to Jerusalem seeking peace. Golda Meir used to say that when an Arab leader talks directly to Israel there will be peace. President Sadat raised hopes in Israel and in Egypt and in the world that the next 30 years might not bring four more major wars.

I think there is broad agreement that President Sadat is a responsible man who will surely not abuse the modest boost in Egyptian air strength which will result from the proposed sale. Egypt lies between Libya and Ethiopia. Libya is an aggressive neighbor which has fought with Egypt and the Sudan. Ethiopia—which has one of the two sources of the Nile—is in chaos. Both countries have Soviet and Cuban advisers and are now in the Soviet camp. It is therefore clearly in our national interest to support President Sadat, who has been a statesman in a troubled region.

Mr. President, the third issue is Saudi Arabia. We have failed to discuss the importance to us and to the entire free world of this country. Nor have we recognized the Soviet threat in the region. The Soviets have armed aggressive neighbors, have provided advisers, and recently have moved Cuban military technicians into the region. Saudi Arabia has a security problem. We will be more specific on this point in closed session.

Saudi Arabia has emerged as a significant world power. Saudi leaders seek help, friendship, and ties with the United States. This is a new relationship and skepticism is understandable. But rejection and turning our back are not. Saudi Arabia should not be dismissed simply because it is an Arab country. The threat it faces from the Soviets and radical Arab countries is real. This demands innovation and nuance in our foreign policy. It forces us in this country to take a fresh look. To ask hard questions. These new realities will bring harsh and emotional resistance. But Mr. President, we must remind ourselves that we are here to serve our national interest. Our Middle East policy has re-

mained virtually unchanged for 30 years, while the region itself has changed dramatically. The Mideast nations have come to exert a significant influence on world affairs. With its oil and financial resources Saudi Arabia is now a major world power. Ecopolitics has a place side by side with geopolitics in the affairs of nations. And petropolitics has a particularly decisive role.

People try to avoid it, but let us talk about oil. The Saudis have a quarter of the world's oil reserves: they are the largest producers and have the largest reserves in the world. Saudi Arabia produces at the rate of 9 million barrels a day. They would prefer to produce about 5 million barrels a day. And if they do not move up to 12 million in coming years we will face an international oil shortage. Only the Saudis of all OPEC producers have the flexibility to expand or contract production for market stability.

It is hard to love the oil industry or the main source of international energy. We have to have a tough energy policy in the United States—but we do not. And 20 percent of our imports come from Saudi Arabia. The fact is that without a stable, predictable supply of oil from Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf the West would face the worst depression of the industrial era.

The United States now imports 50 percent of its oil. Japan, France, and Germany import virtually all their oil. Consider these approximate figures:

#### Oil imports

[Percent]

	From Persian Gulf	From Saudi Arabia
United States.....	40	22
Germany .....	55	25
Japan .....	70	33
United Kingdom....	75	25
France .....	75	40
Israel .....	70 (Iran)	

It is true in 1973 Saudi Arabia led the Arab oil boycott and shouldered a major responsibility in raising the world price of oil. But of all OPEC countries the Saudis have taken seriously the effects of their policies on the West, beginning in 1975. In 1975 and 1976 they were the key factor in holding OPEC prices. In 1977 the Saudis kept the OPEC prices from increasing to the level other members had demanded at the December 1976 Doha Conference. And last December at Caracas the Saudis were the main force in causing OPEC to have a price freeze.

We have serious economic problems in this interdependent world. Our imported oil bill last year was about \$45 billion and we ran an unprecedented balance-of-payments deficit. Each 5 percent increase in oil price increases the world's oil bill by \$6 billion and the U.S. oil bill by \$1.5 billion.

We also have an inflation problem. There is no greater ripple effect throughout our economy than that of higher energy costs.

As we enter the 1980's both supplies and prices of oil will be crucial. Conservative estimates are that the world oil market will need at least a 50-percent oil production increase from Saudi Arabia. The extent of increased production and the price at which it is sold will be critical.

#### FINANCE

The Saudis have accumulated vast financial reserves because they are producing more than they want. They would rather leave this resource in the ground. Right now Saudi reserves are more than \$60 billion and they will be \$100 billion by 1980. A third of these assets are here in the United States; \$20 billion in Treasury notes and private bank deposits.

Saudi financial policies are directly tied to the value of the dollar. Saudi deposits are a major source of support for the Eurodollar market. Their willingness to accept dollars—which have depreciated drastically this past year—as their reserves has given strength to the dollar. If Saudi Arabia decided to hold other currencies thereby putting all those dollars on the market, where would the dollar be? If they were to decide that the price of oil should be set in special drawing rights or another basket of currencies—our oil bill would go sky high again.

The Saudis have used their wealth constructively. Ten percent of Saudi surpluses have been invested in international organizations such as the World Bank and the IMF. Over the past 4 years about 10 percent of its gross national product has gone to foreign aid. They have helped prop up moderate Arab nations such as Egypt and Jordan. In 1977 alone Saudi Arabia gave about \$2 billion to Egypt.

Mr. President, international economic policies have become as important as military policies. This country and Saudi Arabia need to cooperate. They have acted as strong and willing partners of the United States in supporting a healthy world economy. Cooperation with the Saudis for a strong international financial system is in our national interest.

#### THE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS

Mr. President, a hard and almost irreconcilable fact of life in international relations is that the need for security and the search for peace must continue simultaneously. Although today our optimism for a peace settlement has dimmed somewhat from a few months ago, peace is still possible. These sales were first discussed in the early 1970's. The planes will be delivered in the early 1980's. The period of facing this decision crossed a Presidential election, Congressional elections, and changes of government in the Middle East. This decision is a tough one. But Senators and Presidents are going to have to face it. So let us do it and get on with the peace talks.

Saudi Arabia has pursued peace as well as its own security. They convened the Riyadh conference in October 1976 to deal with the civil war in Lebanon. They have demonstrated support for Sadat by maintaining large financial assistance to Egypt. They have made it

clear to the United States and the Arab countries involved that Saudi Arabia will devote large resources to peacetime economic development in the region.

The Saudis are central to the search for peace in the Middle East. They have a moral and economic force in the Islamic Arab world. They can use financial power constructively. They have been close to the United States and are not a confrontation state. They have backed moderate Arab regimes. And they have looked to the United States as a partner. And our country has always been open to sincere offers of cooperation.

There are those who treat the whole Arab world as a monolithic entity. We are told that defensive weapons for Saudi Arabia to defend its oil fields will soon turn into offensive aircraft to destroy Israel. We are asked not to distinguish radical and aggressive nations from a more cautious, Western-oriented, more moderate nation. Arabs have been portrayed as a united and hostile bloc. We have to be more discerning. We have to look at each country and each man and make individual judgments.

Mr. President, Saudi Arabia can help bring peace to the Middle East. Co-operating with such a new friend of course brings risks. We as a nation must accept them, and we do so in our national interest.

#### ASSURANCES

Mr. President, this third issue demands close examination. We are considering the sale of advanced interceptors to a nation close to Israel. We must be assured that all reasonable steps have been taken to protect Israel from harm because of these sales. I have followed the debate in the Foreign Relations Committee closely. I have been part of discussions between the executive branch and the Senate leadership. Qualifications have been raised. Assurances have been sought. And before the American public two Senators have raised important questions. On April 16 on the television program "Face the Nation" the Senator from Tennessee (Mr. BAKER), the minority leader, raised several issues. On May 7, also on "Face the Nation," the Senator from Idaho (Mr. CHURCH) again placed before the American people the sorts of questions that must be answered. Every basic objection raised in these discussions and these news programs has been met by sound assurances.

Mr. President, let me reiterate some of the basic questions asked and the assurances provided.

#### Question by Senator CHURCH:

The plane also would be a definite threat to Israel if it were stationed at Tabuk, and therefore, the deployment of the plane, since Saudi Arabia is as large as the United States east of the Mississippi—the deployment of the plane in the central and southern parts of Saudi Arabia would be essential.

#### Answer by Secretary Brown:

I would like to repeat to you the assurance given to me and other United States officials by the Saudi Arabian Government that Saudi Arabia will base the F-15 aircraft, not at Tabuk, but at Dhahran, Taif and possibly at Riyadh or Khams Mushait. Basing the F-15

at the vulnerable Tabuk base could place in needless jeopardy these vital aircraft which will form the heart of the Saudi Arabian air defense system. In addition, Tabuk is not equipped to serve as an operating base for the F-15s, and could not be so equipped without extensive U.S. assistance which would not be provided. These practical considerations, of which Saudi Arabia is well aware, strengthen the assurances that the F-15s will not be based at Tabuk.

#### Question by Senator BAKER:

How are these aircraft to be protected and what sorts of arrangements will be made to see that they don't fall into hostile hands?

#### Answer by Secretary Brown:

With respect to the security of the aircraft, the Government of Saudi Arabia has expressed its determination to provide carefully for the physical protection of the aircraft manuals and other material related to it. Prior to the delivery of the aircraft, we will work with the Government of Saudi Arabia to ensure that adequate safeguards are in place to prevent unauthorized persons from obtaining access to the aircraft or information about it.

#### Question by Senator BAKER:

How much and what type of sophisticated equipment will be aboard those F-15's?

#### Answer by Secretary Brown:

Pursuant to our national security disclosure policy, certain highly sensitive subcomponents of the U.S. Air Force version of the F-15 (e.g., cryptologic equipment and some special electronic capabilities) will not be sold to Saudi Arabia.

#### Question by Senator CHURCH:

The F-15 is a plane with real offensive capabilities, and therefore, there would have to be definite assurances that only defensive ordnance would be sold to the Saudis.

#### Answer by Secretary Brown:

The F-15 we plan to sell to Saudi Arabia will have the same configurations as the interceptor model approved for the United States Air Force.

As Saudi Arabia has selected the F-15 to defend its national territory, it would be folly, as the Chairman designate of the JCS, General David Jones, USAF, observed in testimony, to use the F-15 offensively against neighboring countries. This is particularly so vis-a-vis Israel, whose air strength is, and will be, so much greater. Not only would the F-15 be relatively ineffective in an offensive mode, and the risk of loss of the aircraft high, but its use away from Saudi Arabia would leave vital oil facilities, urban centers and military installations without necessary air defense cover. From the standpoint of military planning, it would make no sense whatsoever for Saudi Arabia to acquire an aircraft with the characteristics of the F-15 with an idea of using it as a ground attack aircraft. I am confident the Saudis have no such intention.

Like the USAF model, the F-15 for Saudi Arabia will be equipped with air defense armament, namely four AIM-9 Sidewinder air-to-air missiles, four AIM-7 Sparrow air-to-air missiles and a 20 mm gun.

The aircraft can carry three external fuel tanks, but the plane requested by Saudi Arabia will not be equipped with special features that could give it additional range. Specifically, the planes will not have conformal fuel tanks ("fast packs"), i.e., auxiliary fuel tanks that conform to the body of the plane, and Saudi Arabian KC-130 tankers do not have equipment for air refueling of the F-15.

Saudi Arabia has not requested that the plane be outfitted with Multiple Ejection Racks (MER 200) which would allow the



plane to carry a substantial bomb load. The U.S. will not furnish such MERs, and testing and certification of an MER system for the F-15 would not be feasible by another country without U.S. authorization. While aircraft could conceivably carry three standard MK 84 bombs, they would each replace an external fuel tank; this would greatly shorten the aircraft's range and increase its vulnerability. Moreover, in contrast to the F-16, the F-15 does not have a radar system designed for bombing.

Saudi Arabia has not requested nor do we intend to sell any other systems or armaments that would increase the range or enhance the ground attack capability of the F-15.

#### Question by Senator CHURCH:

... (Are) the Saudis, who have money to burn, willing to assure us that they will not buy 50 F-15's from the United States and then turn around and buy 50 Mirage 2000's from the French?

#### Answer by Secretary Brown:

The question has also been raised whether the Government of Saudi Arabia intends to acquire additional combat aircraft from other countries. The Saudi Arabian Government has assured us that it does not intend to add to its inventory any combat aircraft from other countries while it is preparing for and receiving the sixty F-15s. The shortage of trained personnel in Saudi Arabia would severely constrain Saudi Arabia's ability to utilize any additional new aircraft beyond the F-15 during this period.

Senator BAKER raised the question of delivery schedules and said:

You can even juggle the numbers of airplanes between Israel and Saudi Arabia.

Senator CHURCH also raised the question of number of aircraft, saying that he "would much prefer a reduction" in planes to Saudi Arabia, but on the other hand the Chiefs of Staff advocated more F-15's and F-16's for Israel. "An accommodation one way or the other, I think, is essential."

Answer by President Carter to Chairman SPARKMAN in a letter dated May 9, 1978:

When we submitted the formal Notifications of the Mideast aircraft sales to Congress on April 28, we stressed, as we have so often, that as a nation we have a strong and unshakable commitment to the security of Israel.

The delivery of the aircraft for Israel covered by these Notifications will be completed by the third quarter of 1983. To emphasize the deep and continuing character of our commitment to Israel, we will give sympathetic consideration to the request from Israel for additional combat aircraft for delivery in subsequent years. In particular, I am pleased to give a firm assurance at this time that I will transmit to Congress in 1979 a subsequent proposal to make available to Israel twenty F-15s in 1983-84.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD, Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the distinguished Senator from Connecticut be permitted to complete his prepared statement before the Senate goes into closed session.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. RIBICOFF, Mr. President, these assurances (except for the last one from the President) were given in a letter dated May 9, 1978 from Secretary of

Defense Brown to the Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, Senator SPARKMAN. The letter also describes the assurances that the aircraft will be used only in furtherance of legitimate Saudi self-defense, that it will not be transferred to any third country, and that no third country nationals will train on the aircraft without U.S. authorization. I ask unanimous consent that this letter be printed in the RECORD at this point.

There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE,  
Washington, D.C., May 9, 1978.

HON. JOHN J. SPARKMAN,  
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,  
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: During recent conversations with you and other members of your Committee, a number of questions have been raised regarding the characteristics of the F-15 aircraft we propose to sell to Saudi Arabia and reassurances as to the purposes for which Saudi Arabia will use the aircraft. I would like to respond to these questions and attempt to resolve any uncertainties that members may have felt regarding the proposed sale.

#### I. THE F-15 AIRCRAFT

The F-15 we plan to sell to Saudi Arabia will have the same configurations as the interceptor model approved for the United States Air Force. During the developmental phase of the F-15, initial plans called for giving the aircraft a ground attack capability. However, the availability of other aircraft with superior strike capabilities led the Air Force to alter its plans and to limit the role of the F-15 to that of an air superiority fighter. Consequently, the development of new ground attack systems for the F-15 was discontinued in 1975.

Saudi Arabia chose the F-15 because of its extended patrol capability and superior air defense characteristics (including an advanced, all-weather air-to-air radar system). The F-15 best meets Saudi Arabian requirements for the air defense of a vast territory. In choosing the F-15, Saudi Arabia rejected aircraft with powerful ground attack capabilities such as the F-16.

As Saudi Arabia has selected the F-15 to defend its national territory, it would be folly, as the Chairman designate of the JCS, General David Jones, USAF, observed in testimony, to use the F-15 offensively against neighboring countries. This is particularly so vis-a-vis Israel, whose air strength is, and will be, so much greater. Not only would the F-15 be relatively ineffective in an offensive mode, and the risk of loss of the aircraft high, but its use away from Saudi Arabia would leave vital oil facilities, urban centers and military installations without necessary air defense cover. From the standpoint of military planning, it would make no sense whatsoever for Saudi Arabia to acquire an aircraft with the characteristics of the F-15 with an idea of using it as a ground attack aircraft. I am confident the Saudis have no such intention.

Like the USAF model, the F-15 for Saudi Arabia will be equipped with air defense armament, namely four AIM-9 Sidewinder air-to-air missiles, four AIM-7 Sparrow air-to-air missiles and a 20 mm gun.

The aircraft can carry three external fuel tanks, but the plane requested by Saudi Arabia will not be equipped with special features that could give it additional range. Specifically, the planes will not have conformal fuel tanks ("fast packs"), i.e., auxiliary fuel tanks that conform to the body of

the plane, and Saudi Arabian KC-130 tankers do not have equipment for air refueling of the F-15.

Saudi Arabia has not requested that the plane be outfitted with Multiple Ejection racks (MER 200) which would allow the plane to carry a substantial bomb load. The U.S. will not furnish such MERs, and testing and certification of a MER system for the F-15 would not be feasible by another country without U.S. authorization. While aircraft could conceivably carry three standard MK 84 bombs, they would each replace an external fuel tank; this would greatly shorten the aircraft's range and increase its vulnerability. Moreover, in contrast to the F-16, the F-15 does not have a radar system designed for bombing.

Saudi Arabia has not requested nor do we intend to sell any other systems or armaments that would increase the range or enhance the ground attack capability of the F-15.

Pursuant to our national security disclosure policy, certain highly sensitive sub-components of the U.S. Air Force version of the F-15 (e.g., cryptologic equipment and some special electronic capabilities) will not be sold to Saudi Arabia.

In sum, it is clear that the F-15 will help Saudi Arabia deter and defend against those nations that are hostile to its role as a leading moderate Arab state.

#### II. ASSURANCES

The Government of Saudi Arabia has assured us that it has no aggressive intentions against any state, that it will use the F-15 aircraft only in furtherance of its legitimate self-defense, and that it will not employ the aircraft offensively. The Saudi Arabian Government has similarly assured us that it will not transfer the F-15 aircraft to any third country or permit the nationals of such country to train on the F-15 aircraft, serve as pilot, or otherwise to have access to the aircraft without the authorization of the United States.

We have specifically discussed these restrictions on use and prohibitions on transfer with the Government of Saudi Arabia. They have assured us that they intend scrupulously to comply with these prohibitions and restrictions. The record of Saudi Arabia in this respect is excellent. However, should the assurances be violated, the United States can take appropriate action, including suspension of services and of delivery of spare parts and other military equipment. Without such services the usability of the F-15 would degrade rapidly.

It is also important to note that the sales agreement reserves to the United States the right to suspend or cancel deliveries at any time "when the national interest of the United States so requires." Further, under Section 21(c) of the Arms Export Control Act, no U.S. person employed under Foreign Military Sales contracts in Saudi Arabia or any other country would be permitted to perform services in support of combat operations.

Questions have been raised concerning the possible basing of the F-15 aircraft at Tabuk Air Base. I would like to repeat to you the assurance given to me and other United States officials by the Saudi Arabian Government that Saudi Arabia will base the F-15 aircraft, not at Tabuk, but at Dhahran, Taif and possibly at Riyadh or Khamis Mushait. Basing the F-15 at the vulnerable Tabuk base could place in needless jeopardy these vital aircraft which will form the heart of the Saudi Arabian air defense system. In addition, Tabuk is not equipped to serve as an operating base for the F-15s, and could not be so equipped without extensive U.S. assistance which would not be provided. These practical considerations, of which Saudi

Arabia is well aware, strengthen the assurances that the F-15s will not be based at Tabuk.

The question has also been raised whether the Government of Saudi Arabia intends to acquire additional combat aircraft from other countries. The Saudi Arabian Government has assured us that it does not intend to add to its inventory any combat aircraft from other countries while it is preparing for and receiving the sixty F-15s. The shortage of trained personnel in Saudi Arabia would severely constrain Saudi Arabia's ability to utilize any additional new aircraft beyond the F-15 during this period.

With respect to the security of the aircraft, the Government of Saudi Arabia has expressed its determination to provide carefully for the physical protection of the aircraft, manuals and other material related to it. Prior to the delivery of the aircraft, we will work with the Government of Saudi Arabia to ensure that adequate safeguards are in place to prevent unauthorized persons from obtaining access to the aircraft or information about it.

The proposal with respect to Saudi Arabia, like all such proposals, stands on its own merits, and I hope the foregoing information will be helpful to you and that you and the members of your Committee will join in support of the Administration's proposals to sell aircraft to Israel, Egypt and Saudi Arabia.

Sincerely,

HAROLD BROWN.

Mr. RIBICOFF. Those are the objections raised and the solid answers given. After obtaining the concessions, what is left but reluctance to face the issue squarely? Here we have it: defensive interceptors for Saudi Arabia. Not to be used offensively or transferred. Based 800 miles or farther from Israel. Capable of defending Saudi Arabia but lacking offensive capability. To be paid for in cash from an emerging, powerful nation looking to the United States for common purpose and cooperation. To quote our Secretary of Defense from his May 3d testimony:

An attack on Israel by Saudi Arabia would lead to almost certain destruction of the Saudi F-15 force. This would open the country to attack by any of its neighbors. . . . In my judgment, there is no significant military risk to Israel from this sale to Saudi Arabia.

We can meet this issue with a rational response as proposed. Or we can damage this relationship and turn the Saudis to the French F-1 and Mirage 2000 without all these assurances and capable of bombing Israel. Mr. President, is not our national interest clear? Have not President Ford and Secretary Kissinger, President Carter and Secretary Vance faced this problem directly? Should not the U.S. Senate do the same? Who is to decide our foreign policy? Should it not be the President and the Secretary of State and the Congress?

Facing new problems and exchanging yesterday's answer for tomorrow's challenge is difficult. But if we are not honest with ourselves down what dark and uncertain road do we travel? If we are to accept the responsibility of guiding this nation's foreign policy and of assuring our future survival as a great nation we must have the courage, we must have the guts, to face a changing world and the will to serve our best national interests.

# CLOSED SESSION

Mr. RIBICOFF. Mr. President, I move to close the doors of the Senate in order to discuss classified information.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the motion. The motion was agreed to.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. If there is no further statement, the Senate will go into closed session at this time. The Sergeant at Arms is instructed to clear the galleries, and all unauthorized persons are requested to leave.

At 2 o'clock and 4 minutes p.m., the doors of the Chamber were closed.

(Upon unanimous consent request by Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD on May 19, 1978, the expurgated transcript of the proceedings in closed session was ordered to be printed in the daily RECORD of that date and subsequently to be published at the appropriate place in the permanent RECORD of May 15, 1978. The expurgated transcript of the proceedings in closed session follows:)

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that during the closed session, in addition to the Secretary of the Senate, the Assistant Secretary of the Senate, the Legislative Clerk, the Journal Clerk, the Sergeant at Arms, and the Deputy Sergeant at Arms, all of whom are authorized under rule 36, except that current titles have been used where they have been changed, that the following personnel be authorized to be on the floor:

The Parliamentarian, the Executive Assistant to the Sergeant at Arms, the Secretary to the Minority and his assistant, the Chief Counsel, and one staff member of the Democratic Policy Committee, Messrs. Hart and Purvis; the administrative assistant to the minority leader, the legislative assistant to the minority leader, and the administrative assistant to the Vice President, Messrs. Cannon, Liebengood, and Smith; the floor assistant to the majority leader and the assistant secretary to the majority, the floor assistant to the minority whip, the official reporters of debate, Mr. Walker, Mr. Timberlake, Mr. Perry, Mr. Mohr, Mr. Reynolds, Mrs. Ross, Mrs. Garro, Mr. Smoskey, and Mr. Firshein; the Director of the Office of Classified National Security Information, Mr. Murphy; and two members of the Foreign Relations Committee staff, Mr. Norvill Jones and Mr. Hans Binnendijk.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Official Reporters of Debate be authorized to report verbatim the proceedings of the closed door session; that the notes be transcribed, and that when the session is concluded the original notes, together with all material and papers used in the transcription process of the proceedings, be personally delivered in a sealed envelope by the Chief Reporter to the Secretary of the Senate for storage in the Office of Classified National Security Information, and kept secret along with other minutes and matters of such nature already in the custody of that Office.

I further ask unanimous consent that the transcript of the remarks of each Senator who participates in the debate be made available by the Secretary of the Senate under his direction to said Senators for revision of their said remarks, and when that process is completed the transcript be resealed and stored in the Office of Classified National Security Information for safekeeping and/or further disposition if ordered by the Senate.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. INOUE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the following staff members of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence—Mr. William Miller, Mr. Ed Levine, and Ms. Catherine Essoyan—be permitted the privilege of the floor during this session.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?

Without objection, it is so ordered.

(Mr. HODGES assumed the chair.)

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I yield to the distinguished Senator from Connecticut (Mr. RIBICOFF). Senators will not forget that the public address system is not working.

Mr. RIBICOFF. Mr. President, I requested this closed session to discuss the Soviet threat to the Arabian Peninsula and the Persian Gulf. I believe this threat is of serious consequence to the United States and the Western World. Most of the information I shall use is classified secret.

The Soviets have long been interested in this region and the reason is obvious. The Persian Gulf area has half the world's oil reserves and half of the region's reserves are in Saudi Arabia. Since World War II, the United States has had control of the area. When the British completed their withdrawal in 1971, something had to happen. Either we had to replace the British, or our friends had to have means to defend themselves. I tried to check the Soviet strategy of gain. That is where we are today.

Saudi Arabia fears the Soviets and has every reason to. According to the CIA, the Soviets are not developing new oil reserves enough to offset declining production. Current Soviet oil production is close to the estimated maximum potential of 11 to 12 million barrels a day. By 1985, Soviet production is likely to fall to 8 to 10 million barrels a day, and demand will even be higher. The CIA does not foresee increased production from the Soviet Union until the 1990's, and it would be extremely difficult to extract the oil because of the terrain.

There are two major points here. The first is that running out of oil would cause enormous political and economic difficulties for the Soviet Union. The second is that even greater damage would be realized in the west by the loss of these oil fields. Such a catastrophe would trigger a great depression and would probably be a cause of war.

Last June, 1977, I accompanied Secretary Vance to the OECD meeting in Paris. I was privileged to sit in with him on bilateral talks with a score of foreign ministers. There was a discussion of the relationship between the United States



and each one of their countries. What surprised me was, whether we were talking to the Finns or the Portuguese or the Australians or the Germans or the French or the Italians, every one would end up asking, "How about the Middle East?"

The final talk was between Secretary Vance and the Japanese foreign minister. They discussed the problems between China and the United States and Japan; they talked about South Korea, they talked about Taiwan, they talked about the problems of trade. When it was all through, the Japanese foreign minister turned to Secretary Vance, and he said: "Mr. Secretary, how about the Middle East?"

Secretary Vance then said: "Mr. Foreign Minister, I wonder if you would allow Senator Ribicoff to respond?"

I said to him: "Mr. Foreign Minister, first, I want to tell you that I am of the Jewish faith. My sympathies are completely with the State of Israel. But I am very curious. I have sat in on the bilateral conferences now with the Secretary of State and with a score of foreign ministers. Every one of the foreign ministers has asked exactly the same question you have asked. Why do you ask that question?"

He thought for a minute, and said: "95 percent of our energy is dependent on oil. 70 percent of our oil comes from the Persian Gulf. If the Middle East is not straightened out and something happens to cut off the supply of that oil," he said: "it would lead to grave harm to Japan economically, politically, and socially."

How are the Soviets moving in the region and why are they there? In the final analysis, what is there in Yemen and what is there in Ethiopia? There are no assets in Yemen and Ethiopia. But look at what you have. First, if you control Saudi Arabia, 50 percent of Middle East oil comes down through the narrow Straits of Hormuz. With this, whoever controls this controls 50 percent of the oil of the world.

Here is the pincer that comes right into the Red Sea. Let me analyze this. In red, you have the states under Soviet control, you have the states that have Soviet and Cuban arms and personnel.

Syria is a hard-line radical state. I had a chance to hear the Syrian rhetoric. A few of us went to Syria for just a short period last year. It was amazing. I spent all my conversations, not talking about Israel or the United States. I spent all my time, all my time, defending Sadat. [Class. deleted.]

Gentlemen, all I can say is that the Israelis and this country ought to pray every night for the physical and political survival of President Sadat. Should these peace efforts fail and should Sadat fall, what would replace Sadat would be a radical government. The Soviet Union, that was kicked out of Egypt, will come back into Egypt with Russian arms. That is what the Israelis will be faced with, the Soviet Union back in Egypt with these arms.

The Syrians have an enormous military establishment, with 200,000 men,

500 jet fighters, and 2,800 tanks. There are 2,600 Soviet advisers in Syria, and Syria is a jealous, angry nation, out to get some of the riches. This is what they want. They want the riches that come from oil.

Take Iraq. For 20 years since the Iraqi revolution, radical government in Baghdad has posed a political and military threat to Saudi Arabia and the smaller Gulf States. Iraq still has not given up its claim to Kuwait. It has promoted unrest in the small Gulf States which, in turn, look to the Saudis for protection. Iran cannot be the protector, because it is not an Arab State. Iraq has 185,000 men in its military. I have all the figures right here and you can all come up and look at them. They have 412 jet fighters and over 2,000 tanks. Right now, there are 1,150 Soviet advisers and 150 to 500 Cubans in Iraq.

#### AFGHANISTAN

Afghanistan has recently had a coup. We don't know much about the new government except that it appears to be more pro-Soviet than the last one. The military has Soviet equipment and there are 300 Soviet advisers.

#### SOUTH YEMEN

South Yemen has become a serious and active Soviet base of operations. It is small but has a well-trained military. Its army is roughly half the size of Saudi Arabia's—20,000 men. It has over 200 tanks and 83 jet fighters. There are 300 Soviet advisers and from 300 to 350 Cubans. The Soviets have use of the naval facilities in Aden. South Yemeni military forces are fighting alongside Russians and Cubans in the Horn of Africa.

Saudi concern here is real: There have been three military engagements between South Yemen and Saudi forces in border areas since 1969.

#### ETHIOPIA

The Soviets backed Somalia until they found a better target and switched their emphasis to Ethiopia. Ethiopia is in chaos. It is going through an internal leftist revolution—a bloody one—while at the same time it is fighting against Somalia. By African standards the Ethiopian Army is large—200,000 men, as is its air force, with 97 jet fighters. Most of the categories of military assets in Ethiopia have increased during the past few months. Most disturbing—and central to my concern—is that Ethiopia has 1,200 Soviet advisers and 17,000 Cubans. They are an army. They are guns for hire and they are there where they mean business.

The Russian advisers do not fight, but the Cubans fight and the Cubans are there ready to do harm and to do mischief and come wherever the pressure can be.

#### LIBYA

Libya is a dangerous country, especially because of a belligerent and I think irrational president. Libya has been the most blatant supporter of international terrorism. It also has 300 jet fighters, 900 Soviet advisers, and 150 Cubans.

I have summarized the force strength

or Saudi Arabia's immediate neighbors: Syria, Iraq, South Yemen, and Ethiopia. Compared to Saudi Arabia they are ominous. Saudi concern is understandable.

	Syria, Iraq S. Yemen & Ethiopia	Saudi Arabia
Men -----	595,000	45,000
Jet fighters-----	1,092	173
Tanks -----	5,460	300
Soviet advisers---	5,250	350 U.S. Military Advisers
Cuban advisers--	17,500	---

Mr. President, the point of all this is that the Soviets know the value of the region they are surrounding. Does anyone think they give a damn about Afghanistan or Yemen or Ethiopia? And they are active. Let me cite an example. The Sultanate of Oman borders both South Yemen and Saudi Arabia. It controls with Iran on the other side the straits of Hormuz—through which half the world's oil exports and 20 percent of our oil consumption pass every day. The straits have a preferred navigation channel of about 3 miles and those of us who have flown over here can recognize how narrow those straits are. The Soviets have supported South Yemen's efforts to foster a rebellion in Oman. Oman has resisted and looks to the Saudis.

The problem is both serious and extensive. It will not be solved by selling 60 F-15's to Saudi Arabia. The United States and Iran and Saudi Arabia will have to pay attention to the gulf and the entire region. The point is that while everyone is drawing attention to the confrontation states at the eastern end of the Mediterranean Sea, we had better watch out for the back door and what the Soviets and Cubans are up to in the Arabian Peninsula and the Persian Gulf.

But what the Soviets want and what the Soviets need is control of that oil.

You can say what you want, whoever controls that oil will control the economic lifeblood of the West. Let the Soviets control that oil, and they are in a good way to surrounding at the present time, and where will the United States be? Where will Western Europe be? Where will Japan be?

So when we say now that we will deny these planes to Saudi Arabia, why?

We have had all types of assurances and these assurances came about through the questions that were raised in those two "Face the Nation" broadcasts by the Senator from Tennessee and Mr. CHURCH.

The Saudis have a contract with the French, conditioned on the Senate turning down this deal. If the Senate turns down the sale of the planes to the Saudis, the Saudis are ready to buy F-1's from France, and they do not have to wait until 1981 to get delivery. Those planes will be delivered by the French to the Saudis this fall.

Furthermore, there will be an advance payment of \$1 billion, which is the

money the French aircraft industry needs to develop its Mirage 2000 and its Mirage 4000. Do you think the French are going to care very much what the Saudis will do with the plane? It will be air-to-ground. Our F-15's are not air-to-ground. They are interceptors.

So we are gaining nothing but turning over the influence in this entire area to the French.

I have asked the Defense Intelligence Agency to prepare the map which is displayed here. It is current as of February 1978 and I have given the changes in my remarks. This map shows the approximate military configuration of the region. I invite every Senator to have a look at this map and see for himself what surrounds the world's oil reserves.

This map does not indicate the force readiness, or quality of the equipment, and the Senator from Ohio, Senator GLENN may wish to add comments on that.

While we are in closed session I hope that any questions or information of a classified nature from any Senator can be shared.

Mr. ALLEN. Mr. President, will the Senator from Connecticut yield for 1 minute?

Mr. RIBICOFF. I yield.

Mr. ALLEN. Mr. President, I say to the distinguished Senator from Connecticut, as I have said before on the floor of the Senate, that the distinguished Senator from Connecticut is one of the few men in the U.S. Senate who rates the word "statesman" being applied to him.

No matter how we may vote on this issue, we cannot help but admire the distinguished Senator from Connecticut for the statesmanlike position he has taken on this issue. I know the wrestling with his soul and his conscience that has taken place within him as he has taken this statesmanlike position.

I have stated on the floor before, as the distinguished Senator knows, when we were discussing critical issues before the Senate, that he is a true statesman. Very few Members of the U.S. Senate deserve that accolade. The distinguished Senator from Connecticut does. [Applause.]

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. RIBICOFF. I yield.

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I had the privilege of being with the Senator from Connecticut and others in Saudi Arabia.

One of the things that has bothered me about this is the escalation in the numbers of the aircraft we are talking about. My memory—I am digging out my notes on it now—of our conversation when we were in Saudi Arabia is that they were talking about 40 to 44 planes. Now we are talking about 60, and we are talking about raising the number of planes to 60 for the Israelis.

As a former pilot, the total firepower that is going into that area bothers me.

I join in the comments that have been made about my good friend from Connecticut. I recognize you as a true statesman. Does it bother you that we are constantly escalating the numbers of these very sophisticated aircraft?

I thought one of these F-15's is equivalent to a squadron of Thunderbolts from World War II. I was corrected. One is equivalent to a wing of World War II fighter planes.

The total fire power in this area bothers me.

Mr. RIBICOFF. It does not bother me. I wish all our friends had more.

It is obvious that we are a giant with our hands tied behind our back. We are not doing much of anything, and the Soviets and the Cubans are gradually encroaching upon the positions of strength.

Evidently, the Soviets and their Cuban satellites have a pretty good idea of geopolitics, ecopolitics and petropolitics. They know the way the world has changed, and they understand what to do with power.

Apparently, the total I gave you, if you would add them up, is the overwhelming power that we have in this area under domination.

What you have in red is where the Soviet advisers and Cubans are, and the Cuban planes and the Cuban tanks and the Cuban guns that are available to the Soviet Union for their objectives. We have very little to show for it. We have the Israelis; we are trying to get defense in Saudi Arabia; we have nothing in Egypt. We are outmanned and outgunned.

So I am not bothered about whether it is 60. There were some who wanted to cut it down to 40 or 50 for the Saudis. I would like to see the Saudis have more. I would like to see the Israelis have more. I would like to see the Egyptians have more.

I would like to see the people who are our friends get backed up. But we are not doing that, and we are being chased out of the elements of power. There is more power in a barrel of oil than there is in a barrel of a gun. This is one of the great problems facing us as a country.

The Saudis want to be our friends. I would like them to be our friends. We need that oil and so does the entire West need it.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired.

Mr. STEVENS. I thank the Senator.

Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, I understand that under the arrangement we have, I have control of the remainder of the time. However, since the first hour of this closed session has been devoted, in essence, to support of the position which I represent, I yield now to the Senator from New Jersey the remainder of the time, for his control during the remainder of the secret session.

Mr. CASE. I appreciate that.

How much time remains, Mr. President?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The closed session can continue until 4:04, at a maximum. We began at 2:04, with an hour under the control of the majority leader and an hour under the control of the minority leader.

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, a parliamentary inquiry.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator will state it.

Mr. BIDEN. The 2 hours of closed

session comes out of the time allotted to the proponents and opponents based on how much of that 2 hours they use, is that correct, out of their total 5 hours?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Yes, that is correct.

Mr. BIDEN. I thank the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?

Mr. CASE. Mr. President, I yield myself such time as I may require for the moment, and yield to Senator JACKSON for a question.

Mr. JACKSON. I wonder if I could get an answer to this question. There is a rumor going around that the Saudis have already an order in for aircraft which will be delivered this fall by the French regardless of what happens in the sale.

Mr. RIBICOFF. Senator CHURCH asked that assurance be given. I responded in Secretary Brown's reply that there is no such—they will not have an order. I could get my remarks and give it exactly. They have, if this goes through, a conditional offer if the Senate turns them down, but there has been assurance given in the response to Senator SPARKMAN that I put in the RECORD that during the time frame covered in this sale of 60 airplanes there will be no other planes purchased from anyone else.

Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, could I answer that?

Mr. JACKSON. Whoever has the answer.

Mr. GLENN. In Secretary Brown's letter he said:

The question has also been raised whether the Government of Saudi Arabia intends to acquire additional combat aircraft from other countries.

The Saudi Arabian Government has assured us that it does not intend to add to its inventory any combat aircraft from other countries while it is preparing for and receiving the sixty F-15s.

Which means 1984:

The shortage of trained personnel in Saudi Arabia would severely constrain Saudi Arabia's ability to utilize any additional new aircraft beyond the F-15 during this period.

They have assurances up to the end of 1984.

Mr. JACKSON. May I ask a question of the Foreign Relations Committee? Did they have any testimony in the hearings as to how Saudi Arabia plans to defend itself? I think there is a clear and present threat to Saudi Arabia. It is obvious. Did the committee have any testimony as to how they propose to defend themselves in the absence of direct support from the Shah, from the Israelis, or from the Egyptians? I mean it is clear in my mind that F-15's, which are not going to be ready until 1982—

Mr. JAVITS. 1981.

Mr. JACKSON (continuing). Or 1983, have no relationship to the immediate threat, [class. deleted].

[Class. deleted].

[Class. deleted].

So I am just calling attention of my colleagues of the mixed situation here, and the facts are that Saudi Arabia is terribly vulnerable. They are 7 million people in Yemen and there are only 5 million in all of Saudi Arabia. The real



threat to Saudi Arabia. I think, comes from a possible coup. The infrastructure is very, very weak. There is no real system of defense within that country. And I wanted to ask if the Foreign Relations Committee had any testimony.

Mr. CASE. I recall no testimony on that subject.

Mr. JACKSON. Therein lies the problem, and I think in the end what we have to try to achieve in the Middle East with a hopeful settlement between the Egyptians and the Israelis is a mutual defense pact because it is only the indigenous forces in that area that have the military capability that can defend the critical area of the Middle East which is Saudi Arabia. I do not dispute at all the need to defend Saudi Arabia. I think they are in here asking for equipment that has no relevant bearing on the improvement of their ability to defend themselves.

Mr. RIBICOFF. Would the Senator give them nothing? I am not a military expert. The distinguished Senator from Hawaii is here. He is a member of the Intelligence Committee. There are members of the Armed Services Committee here. I am no military expert. The Senator from Ohio may have some of the answers. I am just giving this as I see it with the problems that we have. Does that mean because they have difficulty we do not give them anything? It is time to build them up. The Saudis are scared, and I think they ought to be scared because they have what the whole world wants, that is oil, and that is a mighty powerful package.

Mr. BIDEN addressed the Chair.

Mr. JACKSON. What would happen right now, in the event of a coup or overt aggression, from where it is most apt to come either Iraq, Yemen—I mean the Saudis do not have effective ground forces. They change their chief of staff at regular intervals because they are afraid of internal military power.

Mr. RIBICOFF. I say this: If today Iraq, Yemen, Libya and Syria came in here with what they have now if we did not go in the Russians would take over.

Mr. JACKSON. How do the F-15's relate to that?

Mr. RIBICOFF. As to the F-15's they are giving them interceptors to build it up. Does that mean we should give them nothing?

Mr. JACKSON. No. I think they are in with the wrong package. The F-15's have no possible bearing for years to come. They have no pilots trained. They do not have an air force. What they really need are ground forces. They need a paramilitary force that can deal with those problems. That is my point.

You look at that vast area and you talk about F-15's, and there is no infrastructure in the form of ground forces to do it. I think it will just not achieve the objective.

I agree with the Senator from Connecticut about the threat to Saudi Arabia. There is no question about it. I think there is a real threat, and I do believe that the real problem arises as to how you are going to defend that area.

Mr. CASE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. JACKSON. It is the Senator's time.

Mr. CASE. I think it is the time I had yielded, and I am happy to do it.

Mr. JACKSON. That is right.

Mr. CASE. If more time is desired, I would do it.

But I wish to ask if the point the Senator is making is not that it would be a good idea to send all of these back and then rediscuss the whole package?

Mr. JACKSON. I think they ought to all be postponed for six months because all we are going to do is end up in a situation here where it is going to be far more difficult to negotiate a settlement in my view.

Mr. BIDEN addressed the Chair.

Mr. CASE. The Senator from Delaware, I think, wants to be yielded time.

Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, a parliamentary inquiry.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator will state it.

Mr. GLENN. What time remains on each side on this point so we will know where we stand? I am a little confused as to how much time remains on the side for Senator RIBICOFF.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Tennessee has 129 minutes.

Mr. GLENN. How much time within the 2 hours?

Mr. CASE. There is no rule about that.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. There is no allocation within the 2 hours.

Mr. BIDEN addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Jersey has the floor.

Mr. McCURE. Mr. President, a parliamentary inquiry.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator will state it.

Mr. McCURE. Did I understand the Chair to say there is no allocation of time within the closed session?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is correct.

Mr. SARBANES. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent—

Mr. McCURE. Would it be out of the way, Mr. President, to ask unanimous consent that the time within the closed session be equally divided?

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from West Virginia.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I made that suggestion earlier today and the distinguished Senator from Delaware suggested that the time during the closed session be kept by the clerk as it is being kept in the open session and charged to both sides in the same way.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, if the Senator will yield on that point, the main reason I made that suggestion is I guessed, and I think correctly so, that the opponents of our resolution would want to use more of the time in closed session than we would want to use, and that is the only reason I did not want to be bound by having to use an hour of our total 5 hours in closed session.

So that is the reason why we arrived at that. I am sure if there is anything of great consequence as this debate proceeds in closed session, we could ask unanimous consent to extend the closed

session a little while longer if anyone felt he needed to raise a question that could be raised only in closed session.

Mr. President, I would like to yield myself 5 minutes and then yield to the Senator from Florida who has been seeking recognition on my time. I believe the Senator from Idaho also would like to speak. As a matter of fact, I will use less than 5 minutes.

I think the Senator from Connecticut made a very, very eloquent case for Saudi Arabia in the sense that he pointed out, I think very accurately, the jeopardy which Saudi Arabia is in as a consequence of her neighbors.

But I think you could take, you can take, the very facts he cited as some of the most eloquent arguments for going forward with the sales at this time. It seems to me that the Senator stated several things, and I hope I do not misstate what I assume he was saying or what he is saying. First of all, the Senator from Connecticut pointed out that Saudi Arabia's long-term interests in the Middle East lie in her alliance with the Israelis, the Egyptians, and the Iranians, and I doubt whether many people would argue with that, and ultimately her long-term interests lie with the United States of America because her long-term and short-term detriment lies to the north, the Soviet Union.

If that, in fact, is the case, it seems to me that the next step to be considered and the question to be asked is the one raised by the Senator from Washington about what relevance do 60 F-15's have to that security interest now. I think all of us here would have to acknowledge in light of the fact that they are not going to even come onstream until 1983 or 1984, and even if they were coming onstream now, that is not enough for the Saudis to look out for their own interests, so we are back again to how do we ultimately arrive at that alliance of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Israel, and Iran.

It seems to me the only way we arrive at that is through peace in the Middle East in terms of the Arab-Israeli conflict, because until that point is arrived at the Israelis and the Saudi Arabians will not be able to move jointly against the perceived and real threat to Saudi Arabia.

I think there are few in here who would deny that this package, this sale, of the 60 F-15's to Saudi Arabia at least is exacerbating her relationship with Israel, at least is doing that, and most of us have agreed in open session here that the main thrust of this debate is really not the military force structure as a consequence of this sale but the psychological reaction each nation will have as a consequence of our actions.

The point I am trying to get to, and I probably am taking longer than the 5 minutes I allotted to myself, it seems to me is if this sale would take us further away from a peace settlement in the Middle East, it takes us further away from securing Saudi Arabia's interest. It seems to me further that in terms of Middle East alliances, the single most important military ally to Saudi Arabia is Israel. But if Israel at this point perceives, rightly or wrongly, that as a consequence

of our actions we are either withdrawing the covenant we have had with the Israelis and the special relationship or as a consequence of this action they believe they are in jeopardy or at least more jeopardy than they were before with the combined forces in the Arab world, with Saudi Arabia being put in a position if, in fact, there is another war they will not be able to stand back with these planes in their arsenal and say to the more radical Arab nations, "We cannot get involved, we cannot be there," they become a confrontation state.

If either of those two things occurs, that is, that Israel believes that Saudi Arabia is a real short-term threat to her interests or that they believe this heralds the beginning of an era of a change in our relationship with them, it seems to me that moves them further from the peace table, it moves them further from the point of making some necessary concessions I believe they must make, Israel, and I believe, many of us believe, that, and if that is the case, then Saudi Arabia's interests are, in fact, jeopardized more by the sale even though we all should sit here and say: "If only the Israelis knew better, if only the Israelis would not react that way."

Well, I think we cannot react based on what we think should happen. I think we should react based on what we feel will happen. As the distinguished Senator from Colorado asked me earlier today in the open debate, could I predict what the Saudis will do if these sales do not go through, I said I could not do that, but I think we can more accurately predict what the Israelis will do if the sales go through, rightly or wrongly; it seems to me all the evidence indicates the Israelis will harden in their position.

If you want to ask the negative aspect to this, will they become more paranoid instead of less paranoid? Will they become less trusting instead of more trusting? Will they move further away from the table rather than closer to the table? And we answer: "We will solve that, we will send the Israelis 20 more planes."

By sending the Israelis 20 more planes, and we said we were not going to do it, we are tacitly acknowledging that the fear they had in the first instance, which may not be justified, is more justified.

One last thing: It seems one other thing I know is not very palatable to say in open session, and I was criticized for alluding to it this morning by one of my colleagues, and that is they are saying what will Saudi Arabia do if we do not. Let me ask it the other way: What can Saudi Arabia do if we do not? I realize that injures pride, it injures their attitude in terms of their own sovereignty and whether or not they are a powerful nation.

But, practically speaking, folks, what can they do if we do not, assuming that the argument made by the Senator from Connecticut is true, which I think it is, and that is that Saudi Arabia is in jeopardy? They must look West and not East; they must look moderate rather than radical; they must look to the United States rather than the Soviets for their own interests.

Mr. RIBICOFF. Mr. President, may I respond to what would the Saudis do? First, they will buy Mirages for immediate delivery from the French. That is No. 1.

Second, my prediction would be they would cut back their oil production to 5 million barrels a day. No boycott, 5 million barrels a day, from 9 million barrels a day.

Put yourself in the United States, in Western Europe and in Japan with 5 million barrels a day. You know the dollar is not so strong. They have got \$20 billion in the United States. So they will buy deutschmarks, and buy Swiss francs, and what happens to the dollar? The underpinning of \$20 billion in deposits in the United States is lost to us.

We are talking about power.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time on this?

Mr. RIBICOFF. Mr. President, will the Senator yield time?

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. BAKER has the time.

Mr. STEVENS. What time does the Senator want?

Mr. RIBICOFF. Just 3 minutes.

We are talking about power, and the people of this country ought to understand power, and power today is not just planes and guns. Power is finances, money, oil and economic strength.

There are great changes in the world. The United States had so much power, but it does not now, and other nations have it. You can talk all you want to about pride, but prideful people sometimes would rather go down through revenge, and take revenge on those they thought sold them out.

The only friend the Israelis have is the United States, and what a tragedy it would be at this point to come into this confrontation with the United States of America, and that is what it would be.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield to me?

Mr. BIDEN. I yield to the Senator.

Mr. JAVITS. Three minutes.

Mr. GLENN. Could we have the answers to these questions?

Mr. JAVITS. Remember, I have a real interest in this issue as a U.S. Senator, just like the Senator from Connecticut.

Mr. GLENN. The Senator from Delaware asked a question that has not been responded to yet.

Mr. JAVITS. I will respond to it.

Mr. CASE. This time is coming out of my time, for Senator JAVITS.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I have no desire to debate this issue with Senator RIBICOFF, none whatever. I hope this will be the limit of my participation in this debate. But when you appeal to the views which Senator RIBICOFF has appealed to, I must speak out.

I know something about this. I have been living with it for 30 years, and I have lived with it as a long-standing member of the Foreign Relations Committee.

I take my text from Senator RIBICOFF. He said one thing that struck me very forcibly, and I copied it down. He said:

We must have the courage, the guts, to face the changing times.

I say, Mr. President, that government by foreign nations could bring this Nation down, and concern about our domestic ethnic groups is pale by comparison.

What are we arguing about here, pressure by our own ethnic groups or pressure by oil from Saudi Arabia?

What policy are we talking about? Saudi Arabia is, I believe, a critical factor for peace but its policy is ambivalent. It feels it has to support the PLO, to this day, notwithstanding the terror and murder for which the PLO seeks credit and which we just saw in Israel. How do you think the PLO survives? Where do you think the PLO gets the money to buy their arms?

Mr. President, 60 F-15's are not going to make or unmake the security of Saudi Arabia. They will get them.

What will happen today, if we vote this resolution down, is to send a signal to Israel. Israel consists of 3 million courageous people—on occasion, 3 million heroes. They have withstood four wars. Is that not worth something in the struggle against communism? Are they worth less than the alleged 30,000 Cubans in Africa? What are the Israelis going to think when we cut them off at the knees? What is their morale going to amount to? Are they going to run for cover and say, "There is nobody to depend on"? Talking about hate, and talking about sacrifice, what about the Jews at Masada? Were they afraid to throw themselves over the parapet? Their courage is no less today, and is a big asset for us.

Gentlemen, tear the blinds from your eyes. The Saudis will not leave us, because they have no one else they can really depend on. Senator JACKSON put his finger on that. What are they going to do even if they have the 60 F-15's? As JOHN GLENN will tell you, it is just a drop in the bucket in terms of the vastness of Saudi Arabia. They will depend on us.

They have got our dollars, and they are not going to dump them, because the dollar is still the safest currency in the world.

In a military sense, these arms sales are a small issue. Israel will get its planes, Egypt will get its planes, and Saudi Arabia will get its planes. But the President of the United States in effect has told us: "I am adopting a new policy in this country, a new policy after 30 years. I am going to give the Arabs [deleted] they want, and I will give the Israelis some of the things they want—if the Arabs get what they want." There has been a lot of talk of parity. But where is the parity, with 100 million people against 3 million, occupying a tiny speck on the map? They have had four wars, one by surprise on their holiest day, Yom Kippur. Are we going to say and that this is a light matter?

Where are our guts, our sense of justice, our morality that Senator RIBICOFF talked about? Where are we going to direct it; only to those who are swimming in oil, who have oceans of oil, oceans of land, and oceans of assets—and much of it being invested right in this country now? Why are so many of the American business community against this res-



olution, I ask you? Is it because of dollars or because of morality?

Thank you very much.

Several Senators addressed the Chair. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I yield, from the time of the majority, 10 minutes to the Senator from Florida (Mr. STONE).

Mr. STONE. I thank the distinguished Senator from Delaware. Mr. President and Senators, this is a closed session. Therefore, I would like to use at least a part of my time to talk about a briefing of the CIA that was done before the Foreign Relations Committee, in which the Senator from Connecticut participated. I was also there.

Admiral Turner, of the CIA, lined up the order of battle between Israel and those Arab nations that had contributed forces in the last war, and that includes Saudi Arabia.

The order of battle lined up the warplanes. Admiral Turner separated the [warplanes count into two categories,] first-class jets, and less-than-first-class jets and standard warplanes.

The ratio of first-class, high-quality jets confronting Israel was more than 2 to 1. And the ratio on the other jets was more than that. The Saudis contributed token units in the past wars, because they had only token units to offer. [Class. deleted.]

Who here is ready to say that when there is another war in the Middle East against Israel, the Saudis will not contribute their forces? [Class. deleted.] Senator ZORINSKY and others joined me at lunch with his Royal Highness Prince Turki, who is the head of the security operation of Saudi Arabia, at lunch in S. 116 a few weeks ago. I asked Prince Turki this question: I said, "Your Royal Highness, the Crown Prince has said publicly that in another conflict, the forces of Saudi Arabia would be available for use against the common enemy. The common enemy is Israel, is it not, Your Royal Highness? Would these F-15 planes be used?"

He said: "Yes, yes, they would be used. Therefore I submit they would have to be drawn in, and at least some of these F-15's would be used."

That is why Senator ZORINSKY put out a public statement that he was going to oppose these sales, and that is why it was printed in his State that that is the reason he would oppose these sales, because the one commitment you have not heard from the Saudi leadership is: "We will not use these planes against Israel."

As a matter of fact, Secretary Christopher testified that these planes could not only be used to protect the territory of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, but the general area of the Saudi protection, which, at the very least, would include the buffer area of Jordan, buffering Saudi Arabia, and the areas of Egypt now occupied by Israel.

Mr. SARBANES. Mr. President, will the Senator yield on that point?

Mr. STONE. Yes.

Mr. SARBANES. Admiral Turner was asked a question about possible involve-

ment by Saudi Arabia in the secret briefing to our committee.

Mr. CASE. Speak louder, PAUL.

Mr. STONE. He never speaks louder.

Mr. SARBANES. Let me add that I do think before we finish it is very important for Members to take a look at that chart of weapons available to each country and to start adding up the planes and see what the ratios are.

As Senator JACKSON pointed out, a lot of the concern is psychological in terms of anticipating what is coming; but those anticipations are very important in the strategic context of the question of the potential Saudi involvement.

Admiral Turner was asked whether it would be expected that Saudi Arabia would go into another Arab-Israeli war and this is Admiral Turner's response:

It is always risky to predict national reactions in the future by looking at the past, but in three out of four wars that the Arabs and Israelis have had, the Saudis have tried but have not been very effective in getting to the battlefield. They have actually been scarred with combat once, but they have tried to get there on three occasions. [Classified deleted.]

Mr. STONE. I thank the distinguished Senator from Maryland.

That is the case, that is the fact, they would get there.

One thing about this Tabuk, and I made a speech on this floor when this arms package was first raised. Tabuk, I maintain, need not be used as a permanent base, because what prevents the F-15's from being based in the south and using Tabuk, and the other two fields right alongside Jordan, as a refueling stop and for frontline combat work? That is the approach contained in our NATO plan. That is in all the other valid plans of every nation, to have forward bases. That is the way it could be used and probably would be used.

But most important of all to me, Members of the Senate, is not that risk, which I, for one, would be willing to accept at the appropriate time. What is important to me, and what I think is most important to the United States of America, is to get peace in the Middle East. For the first time in 30 years when we have a face-to-face conference, which unfortunately at the moment is deadlocked, between Egypt and Israel, we dump warplanes on the parties as a reward for that deadlock. The Saudis do not really support that Egyptian initiative—it is said they pay money to Egypt, and they do, but all of the evidence we have is that the Saudis are offended with the Sadat initiative. They do not like it, and they want to get Egypt back with Syria for a renewed confrontation. What will happen? I am convinced that if this sale goes through, and I think it is going through, within weeks we will see the end of the Sadat peace initiatives. You will see Sadat back with Assad and you will hear prattle about a comprehensive Geneva approach, which did not work, which is not working, and which will not work. The greatest chance of peace we have had in 30 years, the direct talks between Sadat and Israel, the committee in Jerusalem and the committee in Cairo, will have been killed.

I could be wrong because in the Middle East anything is possible. But I think it is likely. And I think that this policy is wrong. I think we should be supporting acts of moderation, not moderates for what they may have felt like. We should be putting these warplane incentives in front of an action of restoration of the Sadat peace talks and for that we need at least 4 or 5 months. Senator JACKSON says 6 months. I say at least 4, 5, or 6 months. If we did that, and then the Sadat initiative collapsed, then we could look at the order of battle, the risks involved, and entertain arms requests based on the reality of the situation.

Finally, let me say that I applauded Senator RIBICOFF's statement along with the rest of you, but there was one thing that ought to be corrected. The implication that to support this arms package, which flies in the face of congressional intent that arms requests should not be linked country to country—that to support it is pro-American but to oppose it somehow is an ethnic policy is unworthy of the applause which I gladly joined in for the statesmanship of the senior Senator from Connecticut, whom I revere.

I have encouraged the National Association of Arab Americans in my office and in public to express themselves. They have a right to express their feelings. That, to me, should not be labeled ethnic politics. People who came from Greece and who have a feeling for Cyprus when they express it should not be labeled with "ethnic politics." We are all Americans together.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. CHILES). The Senator's 10 minutes have expired.

Mr. GLENN. Will the Senator from Alaska grant me 5 minutes?

Mr. STEVENS. Yes.

Mr. GLENN. I would like to respond to the remarks of the Senator from Delaware and the Senator from Florida. I agree our objectives should be peace in the Mideast. That has to be the No. 1 objective. We are faced with choices today which are lesser of evil type choices, as Senator BAKER stated one day in committee. I agree with him completely.

The question comes down to a pretty basic question after we talk about all the other details of things. That is whether we, in fact, go ahead and approve the arms sale and retain some control, retain absolute control, over their use, and still have some influence in getting people to the peace table, or if we turn this down, promote the sale of the French, which is extensive and which is the main answer to the question of the Senator from Delaware, and lose control, lose the influence we have for getting the people back to the peace table in the Mideast, which still has to be our number one objective.

Let me address this control. We are saying will the Saudis live up to the bargain that they have made; will they live up to their agreements? That is under our control and positively under our control. This is an air-to-air weapons system that we are delivering. It has extremely limited ground attack capabilities. Our

own Air Force stopped even testing it in that mode back in 1975.

When we talk about the limitations that we have on this airplane, where on earth do we think the Sidewinder missiles that go air-to-air, where do we think the Sparrow missiles, come from? They come from here.

These things are nothing but high-speed gliders, single-person transports, if you will. Without the equipment that we send over there, and without the spare parts that we send over there, they are useless aircraft. They are nothing but ornaments on a flight ramp someplace unless we continue to furnish that. So we do retain control over the use of these vehicles.

There can be no question about that.

So we come down to what will the French do, in answer to the Senator from Delaware.

Well, the French have indicated a deal they have been negotiating—and I will have a longer statement after we are out of closed session on this—which basically is this: They are negotiating 60 F-1 fighters with substantial air-ground capabilities, deliveries to start not in 1980-84 but this summer, 1978. They are also negotiating the possibilities of coproducing in Egypt the F-2000 fighter, also with extensive air-ground attack capability, a real attack airplane, with a guarantee of at least a 125-plane production.

The French also have about to fly this fall a brandnew and much advanced airplane comparable or perhaps even better than the F-15, although that is debatable, which would be the next generation aircraft, with first flight this fall. It is my understanding that they have discussed giving the Saudis the option of first buys on this airplane. Sixty F-1's are certainly in no way comparable with the F-15, but the F-2000 is a potent fighter by any modern-day standards, extensive air-to-ground capability, with all these others to follow. This can involve several hundred aircraft.

Quite apart from the numbers the major consideration is that these aircraft will be completely out of our control, with transfer anywhere in the Arab world, based at Tabuk or even new airfields if they want to build them at optimum distance from Israeli targets to fit the aircraft capability, with an air refueling capability for extending range and combat radius, if they so desire, and only minutes away from critical Israeli installations. In short, if this buy from the French is consummated there would be no restrictions to basing these airplanes anywhere in the Arab world, transferring them anywhere, training pilots of any nation, or doing anything they want to do.

We are talking about selling 50 airplanes to cover an area equal to the United States east of the Mississippi, 60 airplanes to cover an area of that magnitude, with us controlling the weapons, with us controlling the spare parts to see that they live up to every bargain they have possibly made, plus controlling the air-to-air missiles that I did some work on 20 years ago that now are far

beyond that in capability. But we control this situation.

That is our decision today. Do we take a situation that we have control over with this limited number of airplanes, retain the confidence of the Saudis, hopefully influencing this toward the peace table? Do we throw that down? Do we spurn their cooperation in this area? Do we drive them—

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired.

Mr. GLENN. Do we drive them toward the other camp and have the French come in with this kind of a massive buy which literally may mean we have to go back to Israel with hundreds and hundreds of F-15's to limit this in years hence? I am for the stand taken by Senator Ribicoff and join others in applauding his stand. I hope everyone considers these details.

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I yield 15 minutes to the chairman of the Intelligence Committee.

Mr. INOUE. Mr. President, earlier this year, in my capacity as chairman of the Foreign Operations Subcommittee, I requested the Select Committee on Intelligence to examine the intelligence material available in this country and provide a report on the Arab-Israeli military balance. This request was supported about a week later by my distinguished colleague from New Jersey (Mr. CASE). I wish to say the committee's staff received full cooperation from the intelligence community and had the opportunity to examine and review extensive intelligence material, including the National Intelligence Estimates on the Middle East military balance since 1962.

At the outset, I believe it is important to note certain limitations inherent in the material and information available to the community and to the committee. Although intelligence on the Middle East is among the best available of any part of the world, it is not complete in all areas.

On the whole, information on the Israeli order of battle is more complete and reliable than that on the Arab order of battle. This is due in part to the fact that the United States is Israel's major arms supplier, and is therefore confident of its figures on the quantities of weapons furnished Israel. Even here, however, there are some uncertainties. For example, figures on Soviet tanks that Israel captured from the Arabs are less certain, although the approximate figures are more than adequate.

Information on the numbers of Arab weapons systems is much less precise—often inferred from data collected by technical means. Particularly soft are the estimates of reserves available for mobilization on the Arab side. In general, though, the areas of uncertainty have a relatively small effect on the aggregate figures.

Incidentally, Mr. President, if any Member of the Senate desires, we do have a very sensitive top secret document here which can be made available under Senate Resolution 400. It is here at the present time.

A serious question addressed in this study is the dependence of intelligence

community assessments of Israel's military superiority on largely qualitative factors and how this dependence affects the credibility of the judgments. Against the Arabs' quantitative advantage, in terms of numbers of troops, tanks, and aircraft, intelligence community analysts repeatedly stress the importance of qualitative factors such as motivation, morale, leadership, training, education, technical competence, and command and control capabilities. The intelligence community judgment of 1977 is "manpower—quality is perhaps the most significant component of the Arab-Israeli balance."<sup>1</sup> Estimates of these human factors are by their nature "subjective, difficult to quantify, and error-prone."<sup>2</sup>

[Class. deleted.]

Finally, it should be noted that this report is essentially a critical analysis of two types of material: finished intelligence estimates, most of which have gone through a process of inter-agency review and accommodation; and staff interviews with intelligence analysts who have participated in the preparation of those estimates. It should be further noted as a caution that the staff did not have the time or resources to review the massive amounts of available raw intelligence.

#### THE MIDDLE EAST ARMS BALANCE

Community-wide assessments of the Middle East military balance from 1962 to the present indicate that analysts have consistently concluded that Israel has maintained military superiority over the Arabs. [Class. deleted]<sup>3</sup> made reference to the "longstanding superiority of the Israeli defense forces" IDF.<sup>4</sup> In the view of the intelligence community, Israel's margin of military superiority has increased since the October 1973 war.

A review of the principal judgments of the intelligence community's relevant estimates of the last 5 years illustrates the continuity in intelligence community assessments:

[Class. deleted].<sup>5</sup>

[Class. deleted].<sup>6</sup>

[Class. deleted].<sup>7</sup>

[Class. deleted].<sup>8</sup>

[Class. deleted].<sup>9</sup>

[Class. deleted].<sup>10</sup>

[Class. deleted].<sup>11</sup>

The July 1973 estimate was seen in retrospect to have been in error on several crucial points. There was—perhaps inevitably—little attention given to the possibility that new weapons or tactics would be developed which would enable the numerically superior Arab armies to fight on a par with the qualitatively superior Israelis. (Both the implications of use of new Soviet SAM's and antitank missiles and the development of high-pressure hose techniques for breaching Israeli defenses on the Suez Canal were not anticipated by the intelligence community.) Moreover, analysts failed to appreciate the occasional ability of the Arab countries to mount a coordinated surprise attack on Israel. They may also have underestimated the willingness of Arab leaders to undertake a war which they knew would be lost in the narrowest military sense.

Footnotes at end of proceedings.



The intelligence community is now more sensitive to the possibility that Arab leaders will undertake a "losing" war for political objectives and is engaged in a more thorough analysis of such hard evidence as is available on qualitative factors. It should be remembered, however, that the United States has better information on and better rapport with the Israeli military than it has with Arab forces.

In the view of the intelligence community, Israel went back to the drawing boards after the Yom Kippur war and focused seriously on correcting the gaps perceived and errors made in the war. Israel has made considerable progress, particularly in her electronic countermeasures (ECM) to the Arab air defense system, and in her artillery and anti-tank capability. Israel has also adapted her tactical doctrine in light of the experience of the 1973 war. [Class. deleted].

[Class. deleted].<sup>12</sup>

Since 1973, Israel has acquired weaponry of greater sophistication than the Arabs, and the high proficiency and motivation of her manpower allows Israel to take full advantage of the technologically advanced equipment.<sup>13</sup> Her industrial base gives her the capability to modify and repair her fighter aircraft. In the 1973 war, Israel could repair significant damage in 72 hours. She has improved since then and [class. deleted] is striving for an 18- to 24-hour turnaround repair capability in wartime.

At present Israel is the only nation in the Middle East with F-15's—14 at present with 11 more expected by the end of 1978.

Israel's air force has grown more rapidly than the Arabs' since the 1973 war. An important point [class. deleted] is that this raises the possibility that Israel is reaching a "threshold" of the arms she can absorb, maintain, and deploy effectively. Analysts have noted a decline in the quality of pilots under the strains of increasing recruitment needs.

[Class. deleted].<sup>14</sup>

[Class. deleted].

The Egyptian Air Force has deteriorated because of insufficient Soviet resupply after the October 1973 war and the cutoff of military aid in 1975. [Class. deleted]. The Mig-21's have serious maintenance problems and Egypt is exploring the possibility of contracting with Western firms to do necessary repair work.

[Class. deleted].

Syria has received substantial quantities of military equipment from the Soviet Union since 1973. However, her involvement in Lebanon (which represents a commitment of one-fourth of her troops on a rotating basis), has had a damaging effect on troop training and morale. Partially as a result of this, Syrian military capabilities on the Golan front are at their weakest since 1973. [Class. deleted]. [Class. deleted].

On the other hand, there is evidence that the Syrians are trying to correct some of the deficiencies that became visible in the October war.

[Class. deleted].<sup>15</sup>

[Class. deleted].

Since 1973, Iraq has made great strides in troop and weaponry build-up and is expected to figure more significantly in any future Arab-Israeli conflict than it did in 1973 when the force that was sent to Syria performed poorly. [Class. deleted].

This assessment of greater Iraqi involvement in the next Arab-Israeli war is based on the following factors: the requirement for Iraqi forces to deal with the Kurdish problem has largely subsided, relations with Iran have improved, and Iraq is experiencing no major difficulty in absorbing the large quantities of new military equipment.

[Class. deleted].

Libya has also amassed considerable quantities of Soviet and Western European military equipment over the past 2-3 years—[class. deleted]. [Class. deleted] far too much for her 43,000-man armed forces to operate, and more, in fact, than it can adequately maintain despite the fact that the bulk of it is in storage. It could be a ready source of resupply for Egypt and/or Syria in the event of hostilities. It would be possible to preposition the weaponry, but such activity would be likely to be detected by Israel and could trigger an Israeli reaction. The aircraft could be transferred to Egypt in a matter of hours, with supplies being carried by C-130 transports. [Class. deleted]. Such shipments could be subject to possible Israeli interdiction before they reached the front. Unless Soviet amphibious ships were used, troops and equipment could not be shipped simultaneously to Syria and Egypt.<sup>16</sup> Given these formidable logistical constraints and the expected short duration of a war, it is uncertain how much Libya could contribute to a future war.<sup>17</sup>

[Class. deleted].

Jordan's ability to wage war against Israel was effectively eliminated in the 1967 conflict. She sent a token force to the Golan front in 1973, but did not make a significant contribution to the war effort. Although it remains uncertain whether she would in fact participate in a future war, she has been concentrating recently on improving her admittedly limited capability. She has recently reorganized her army from five to four divisions and is [class. deleted] as a "small, capable force." Jordan is the only Arab confrontation state with U.S. fighter aircraft at present—she has about 70 F-5's. Jordan has also recently purchased U.S.-made HAWK air defense missiles.

[Class. deleted].

[Class. deleted].

[Class. deleted].

As noted above, there have been some qualitative improvements in Arab military forces. [Class. deleted].

Another factor which has figured in judgments of Israel's military superiority over the years is the Arabs' historical inability to marshal their collective forces and effectively work together. One notable exception to this was the high degree of military and political coordination demonstrated by Egypt and Syria in the October 1973 war. Since 1973, this

coordination has decreased as Egypt and Syria have followed different postwar policies. [Class. deleted].<sup>18 19</sup>

On the other hand, the improvement in political relations between Jordan and Syria has led to closer military cooperation as well. Also, Iraq's logistics build-up (in particular, her new direct rail link with Syria) indicates Iraq is likely to contribute more than it did in 1973 to any collective Arab military efforts. Finally, it must be kept in mind that the inter-Arab political situation is characterized by a high degree of fluidity, and that it is extremely difficult to make any judgments about the degree of unity or disunity the Arab world will experience in the early 1980s.

[Class. deleted].

[Class. deleted].

#### CONCLUSIONS

[Class. deleted].

[Class. deleted].<sup>20</sup>

[Class. deleted]. These factors are not as hard as quantitative order-of-battle figures, yet many hard sources of information are used in arriving at these judgments. Analysis of such information is by its nature more subjective than that of quantitative data.

#### MILITARY EFFECTS OF PROPOSED ARMS SALES

The preceding analysis provides a context for the proposed arms sales to Middle Eastern countries first introduced in February 14 and formally presented to Congress April 28. The terms of the proposal are:

	Billion
Egypt, 50 F-5's.....	\$0.6
Saudi Arabia, 60 F-15's.....	2.5
Israel, 15 F-15's; 75 F-16's.....	1.9

(See Attachment IV)

A March 7, 1978 intelligence community evaluation of the effect of these sales on the Middle East arms balance stated that in the view of the intelligence community they "would not reduce Israel's military superiority over the Arabs . . . and may even enhance it."<sup>21</sup> Close examination of the assessment and follow-up discussion with the analysts filled in some of the evidence supporting such a judgment.

#### THE SALE TO EGYPT

The F-5E's considered for sale to Egypt are roughly comparable in terms of capability to the Mig 21 and would not, on grounds of capability alone, threaten Israel's air superiority. In numerical terms, the F-5E's do not reverse the deterioration of the Egyptian Air Force relative to the Israelis. The significance of an Egyptian arms deal with the U.S., in the view of the intelligence community, is less military than political. In the view of the intelligence community, should the F-5E deal not go through, it is unlikely that Sadat would seek an arms deal with the USSR. The intelligence community believes that Egypt's only realistic alternative sources would be France and perhaps the United Kingdom. In addition, the Arab Organization for Industrialization has been examining the possibility of Egyptian-French co-production of fighter aircraft.<sup>22</sup>

Footnotes at end of proceedings.

## THE SALES TO ISRAEL AND SAUDI ARABIA

The F-15's proposed for sale to Saudi Arabia and Israel would all apparently be the interceptor model, not outfitted primarily for ground attack. (According to State Department analysts, 15 of the Saudi F-15's are trainer aircraft.) Israel is currently evaluating a McDonnell Douglas bomb rack developed for use in the F-15, but not purchased by the USAF. It increases the bomb-carrying capacity from three 2,000-pound bombs to eighteen 500-pound bombs. Neither the Israelis nor the Saudis are currently authorized to purchase these bomb racks; however, CIA analysts judge that similar bomb racks and necessary modifications to the planes could be produced by the Israelis or procured by either country from other countries such as France.

U.S. military attachés and some analysts at the State Department believe that in the event of hostilities, the Saudis would choose not to use their F-15's but would rely solely on the more far-reaching international political impact of the oil weapon.

The intelligence community assesses the impact of the F-15's on the Middle East military balance in these terms: Saudi F-15's could provide more of a challenge to Israeli air space than other Arab-piloted aircraft. We believe this threat could be countered effectively by the Israelis, however, although at the cost of some diversion of resources from other combat sectors.<sup>23</sup>

Since every plane in the Israeli Air Force can reach Tabuk airbase, just southeast of Eilat, Israel's Red Sea port, it would not [class. deleted] be militarily reasonable to station the F-15's at Tabuk and thus make them an inviting target. Although the F-15's are likely to be based in southern Saudi Arabia, should the Saudis choose to use them in an Arab-Israeli conflict, they could be staged through Tabuk on a mission against Israel. Tabuk airfield would require no major modification to allow such a one-time operation. At long ranges, the Israelis believe the Saudi F-15's would have to be opposed by other F-15's; at shorter ranges, Mirage V's, KFIR's, and F-16's could be used. The exchange ratios that might result from clashes between Israeli and Saudi F-15's would depend on the extent to which the air battles took place over Saudi air space protected by Hawk SAM's. In any case, the relatively automated nature of the F-15 fire control system suggests that the exchange ratios would be much less favorable to Israel than has been the case in past Arab-Israeli air battles.

Intelligence community analysis stress that "practical considerations argue against the efficacy of a transfer of (Saudi) F-15's" to one of the Arab confrontation states, specifically Egypt. They cite the lack of "qualified pilots or a logistics and maintenance staff familiar with the F-15's" in any Arab state. Even in their own country, the Saudis would be dependent for continued operations on U.S. technical assistance and maintenance which, in view of the intelligence community would "pre-

sumably" cease in the event of hostilities.<sup>24</sup>

The F-15's allotted to Israel would boost Israel's inventory to 40 F-15's. The recent compromise, giving Israel 20 additional F-15's would make her F-15 inventory equal to that of Saudi Arabia. The ground attack capabilities and long range of the F-16's to be sold to Israel could enhance Israel's ability to cut off Arab expeditionary forces sent, for example, from Iraq, in the case of hostilities. CIA analysts indicate that this would represent an improvement of Israel's military capabilities.

Israel's purchase of four E-2C Hawkeye airborne early warning combat information centers from the United States (scheduled for delivery June through September of this year) will considerably strengthen Israel's early warning capability and will enable it to detect any movement of the Saudi F-15's. This will enable Israel on a routine basis to keep two planes up during the daylight periods when a surprise Arab air attack would be more likely to occur. During crises or hostilities, three planes could be on patrol when the threat appeared particularly great.

Guarding against the possibility that she will not get the F-15's, Saudi Arabia is engaged in negotiations with the French for the purchase of Mirage F-1's. The possible F-1 deal is clearly a contingency plan; according to CIA analysts, both the Saudis and the French understand that it would not be pursued should the F-15's come through. If it turns out that the Saudis do not get the F-15's and do indeed purchase F-1's, these would complement F-1's recently bought (though not yet all received) by Kuwait [class. deleted], Iraq [class. deleted], and Libya [class. deleted]. Although the F-1 is not as sophisticated as the F-15, it is a considerably more advanced aircraft than the F-5E. Existence of F-1's in four Arab nations could facilitate transfers since each country would develop a familiarity with the plane, and have the necessary ground support. The necessary support systems for the F-15 are not completely compatible with the support systems for the F-1.

The intelligence community recognizes that the important question to be addressed is not only who might win a war in the Middle East, but also what casualties will be incurred, what political opportunities the war will create, and what amount of economic disruption it will cause. In the view of CIA analysts, for example, Egypt "recognizes that it is not going to defeat Israel." Its wartime objective, therefore, would be to "exact maximum casualties."

Unfortunately, the intelligence community has as yet produced, to our knowledge, no studies discussing how the proposed sales would alter the expected outcome of a Middle Eastern war when viewed from this perspective. Nor has the intelligence community, to our knowledge, addressed the question of how the sales would alter the incentives for any of the parties to go to war, except to say that the military balance would not be

appreciably changed and to suggest that the existence of the F-15's in Saudi Arabia and, in particular, any indications of their deployment to Tabuk airfield, might prompt an Israeli preemptive strike.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I yield such time to the Senator from Idaho as he may require.

Mr. CHURCH. I thank the Senator.

Mr. SARBANES. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a moment or two?

Mr. CHURCH. I yield to the Senator from Maryland.

Mr. SARBANES. Mr. President, I wanted to follow up the statement made by the distinguished Senator from Hawaii concerning intelligence reports.

I must say that when we received a secret briefing from Admiral Turner in the Foreign Relations Committee, I expected that the briefing, in effect, would reassure me about this problem of military balance. Instead, it heightened my concern.

The fact is that the Arab States have a ratio over Israel of well over 2-to-1 in tanks, in airplanes and of course in men. If you want to break the airplanes down into modern airplanes and old airplanes, they maintain the same ratio in terms of their air forces.

So the concept that Israel can handle this situation has to be put entirely, as I think the Senator from Hawaii has stated in effect, on certain qualitative considerations: better readiness, better training, better preparation to carry forward the battle.

The raw numbers are however important because they do have an effect on what the balance is and on what the perceptions in the area are.

Just on planes alone, Admiral Turner stated to us that the gap was that about [class. deleted] combat aircraft would be committed against an Israel air forces of [class. deleted].

When we went into the composition of the [class. deleted], which involved the front-line states, the confrontation states, plus what our intelligence thought would be committed by the other states, it then turned out that the assumptions as to what would be committed by the other states were quite conservative. Iraq was expected to send [class. deleted] planes, of a force of about [class. deleted]. That was the assumption about the nature of their commitment in an all-out Arab-Israeli conflict in the region.

So I think the numbers become quite worrisome. The notion that it can be met by pumping up the number of planes has a problem with it that the Senator from New Jersey (Mr. CASE) brought out in questioning Admiral Turner, when Senator CASE said:

The point also is that Israel's limit of manpower and its economy place very severe constraints on what Israel's complete capacity is. If you take away a similar fraction of Israel's capability, it means a large chunk of its available manpower. It does not have unlimited resources, even if it had the planes.

Admiral Turner responded:

I have mentioned that they are stretched today in their air force for quality of people. Their accident rate has gone up.

Footnotes at end of proceedings.



Of course, the distinguished Senator from Hawaii touched on that point as well.

So I really implore Members, before the closed session ends, to come over and take a look at this chart. Take a look at what is listed as available in terms of the order of battle for Israel and then for the Arab countries.

Recognizing the points that were made about Saudi Arabia, the fact remains that if you arm them to a level to resist Iraq and other Arab States, the total amount of arms going to the Arab States jumps significantly. What happens if they then all join together and direct them against Israel; you will have totally changed the military balance in the area.

I would like to make one final point: Approval of the disapproval resolution, voting for the disapproval resolution, is not an end to this issue. That does not mean that we cannot then go back with the administration and put together a response that meets the legitimate concerns of each of the three countries but avoids some of the pitfalls and mistakes that are inherent in the administration's proposal.

In fact, the most distressing thing about this entire issue is that, had the administration been willing to adjust numbers downward—which, after all, is the most sensible thing to do—we would not be here today, debating this resolution of disapproval. It is my submission that it could have been done in such a way that it would have responded to the needs of these countries; for example, would have met the fear of the French connection with the Saudis. There is nothing magic about the 60 figure. It would have met the Egyptian concern arising from their having broken loose from the Soviet Union. It would have responded to Israel's needs, without creating a sense of despair about their future security position being dependent upon other considerations than their legitimate defense needs.

Had the administration's submission been done differently, I think it could have commanded a general consensus in Congress and acceptance in the country.

If that is the case, why would not the administration take that approach and modify its submission? Why have they insisted that this issue be fought out, as it were, on the question of who is going to win—the President or Congress? That is not the objective. The objective is, Can we arrive at a policy that serves our national interests, that responds legitimately to the needs of these countries, and that commands a broad consensus in this Congress and across this country?

I submit to you that that could have been done. I know how hard the Senator from Idaho and the Senator from New York have worked to try to get the administration to move to a position that would respond to all these needs in a legitimate way. That did not take place, and that is why we are here today.

Voting for the Biden resolution does not mean that the opportunity is lost to come back and address this matter in a constructive and a creative way, really

practicing the art of governance. That is what is missing. With a skillful practice of the art of governance by the administration, we would not be here on this issue, and still the United States would have responded to the legitimate issues that were raised.

Mr. HART. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. SARBANES. I yield.

Mr. HART. What assurance does the Senator have that tomorrow, two of those parties to the agreement will still be there? That is the question I asked this morning. The Senator from New York (Mr. JAVITS) is very cavalier in saying that Egypt and Saudi Arabia will be back tomorrow and will be willing to discuss. I would like some assurance from the Senator that that, in fact, is the case.

Mr. SARBANES. I could not give the Senator an ironclad assurance, and he knows that when he asks the question.

Mr. HART. No. The Senator has been through the hearings. I have not. I do not know what representations have been made by the administration in this regard. Merely to say, "Everybody is going to get his airplanes; don't worry about it," bogs over the central, crucial issue before the Senate.

Mr. SARBANES. It is my perception that the bottom line on numbers is the administration's bottom line and not a bottom line of the country; that an administration that wished, as I said, to practice some creative statesmanship could have moved this thing in such a way, both in terms of how it was presented to the Congress and the dimensions of what was presented, that it would have met with general acceptance.

One of the objectives should be to have a foreign policy that responds to legitimate interests with the broadest base of support. I subscribe to a lot of concerns that have been outlined by people on the other side of this issue. The objective should be to respond to those legitimate concerns with the broadest consensus that can be obtained, not to try to drive it through with the narrowest of margins.

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, first, I commend the Senator from Maryland, who said more in 2 minutes than I have ever heard any Senator say. I agree with his conclusions. I would like to spend what little remaining time there may be—

Mr. McCLURE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. CHURCH. I would like to make the presentation first.

Mr. McCLURE. It is on the question of the Senator's intention. Did I correctly understand him to say that he intended to use the remaining time?

Mr. CHURCH. The remaining time available to the Senator from Delaware.

Mr. McCLURE. As I understand, that is enough to use up the remainder of the closed session.

Mr. CHURCH. There are only 10 minutes.

Mr. McCLURE. Some of us have been waiting patiently for the opportunity to speak.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Fourteen minutes remain.

Mr. CHURCH. How much time remains to the Senator from Delaware?

Mr. BIDEN. The Senator from Delaware has more than 14 minutes, has he not?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware has 67 minutes remaining.

Mr. SARBANES. Mr. President, in fairness to the Senator from Idaho who is in the well, I think it is correct to say that much more than half of the time of the debate in the closed session has been used by the opponents to the resolution of disapproval.

Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, I point out majority leader tried this morning to get agreement to split this time and that was refused by the Senator from Delaware so this is of their own making.

Mr. BIDEN. I point out that is a red herring, how much time has been used by the opponents.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair is not recognizing anyone right now. If Senators will wait a minute, the Chair will say how much time has been used by each party.

Sixty-one minutes of the closed session have been used by the opponents of the resolution.

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, I shall try to say what I sought before to say in 10 minutes.

Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, if the Senator will yield briefly to me, in that case I ask unanimous consent we now provide for 4 minutes to the distinguished Senator from Idaho in closed session.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?

Mr. McCLURE. Mr. President, reserving the right to object, and, of course, I shall not because I will be grateful for 4 minutes, but after waiting for 2 hours I had hoped I would have a few more minutes than that, and I thought it was the consensus arrived at earlier we might extend the closed session if, as a matter of fact, we had not completed the discussion at the end of 2 hours.

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the time that has been consumed in discussing the allocation of the remaining time might not be charged against the time that was originally meant to embrace the closed session. That would give us a little additional time.

Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, reserving the right to object, and I shall not object, that is a good unanimous-consent request, and I have a request long outstanding for the Senator from Idaho for 10 minutes in closed session. I wonder if there is any objection, then, to extending the time in closed session so we may honor that request.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Do the Senators from Idaho jointly request unanimous consent that each be extended 10 minutes in closed session?

Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, I make that unanimous-consent request.

Mr. BAYH. Mr. President, reserving the right to object, may I pose a question to the leadership? Is there anything sacrosanct about the time limit on the time of closed session? It seems to me that any Senator who has something he

wishes to express in closed session should have a chance to do that. When we get through saying what we wish to keep secret we then go public.

Mr. BAKER. What about removing the limit altogether on the secret session?

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. I think we should proceed to the limit and then if time is necessary let us get it. We still have 10 minutes under the original order. It is more than that.

Mr. McCLURE. Mr. President, the Senator from Tennessee, as I understood it, asked that the closed session be extended so that my senior colleague from Idaho would have 10 minutes and the junior Senator from Idaho would have 10 minutes. I wonder if we might get that unanimous consent.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?

Mr. BAYH. Mr. President, I reserve the right to object. This is an ongoing debate and any other Member of the Senate, who has not had a chance to say anything in the debate, might feel compelled to rise and say something in secret session.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair points out that any Senator may move to go into closed session once the Senate is in open session.

Mr. BAYH. That, I may say with all respect to the Chair, is hardly an orderly way of doing things. Since we have one closed session we should lengthen it to the extent for everyone to be heard.

Mr. BAKER. I will renew the request and assure my friend from Indiana that if he has a requirement for additional time I shall join in that request as well.

I ask unanimous consent that both Senators from Idaho have 10 minutes in closed session to make their presentation.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?

Mr. BARTLETT. Mr. President, reserving the right to object, and I shall not object, I point out that some of us are looking forward to time in open session that was predicated on the terminus of the closed session time, so there is an interest in how long this is extended. I have no objection to this request, and I think it is a bilateral one of some importance, but I do think there are time schedules that some of us do have with the time we were looking forward to and for that reason I tend to object to any further extension of time.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the request?

Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. CHURCH addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Idaho.

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, first of all, I shall address myself to the very provocative argument offered by the distinguished Senator from Connecticut which I find—

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Will the Senator refrain a minute? We have to have order here when we do not have the mike.

Mr. CHURCH. The Senator from Connecticut has argued with great persuasion that we must be mindful of the So-

viet interest in the Middle East and of those countries encircling Saudi Arabia that are more or less sympathetic with the Soviet Union. He has based his justification for the sale of F-15's to Saudi Arabia upon his assessment of that threat. Fair enough.

I remember a time when the United States gave large quantities of arms to Pakistan because of our assessment of the Soviet threat to that country. Later, we began to sell and grant arms to India because of our assessment of the Communist threat to India. But while we were assessing the Communist threat and supplying large quantities of arms, both to Pakistan and India, those two governments prepared to go to war against one another. In the end, they went to war, using American supplied weapons on both sides. The Pakistanis blamed us for arming the Indians, and the Indians blamed us for arming the Pakistanis. It was the Russians who stepped in as peacemakers at Tashkent.

I have two objections to these offers of sale.

First, the way they were brought to Congress and, second, the timing the way and the when of the sales.

There has been much discussion of the threat to Saudi Arabia. Now I ask Senators:

If Saudi Arabia is so weak and Iraq so strong, why has Iraq refrained from making her move against Saudi Arabia?

I must dismiss Libya, Ethiopia, and Yemen as serious threats. But Iraq is formidable.

Yet, despite the Saudi weakness, Iraq has never moved. Perhaps that has much to do with her assessment of the Iranian response, in the event she were ever to attack Saudi Arabia.

The question we must ask ourselves is which war is the more likely? Is it a war between Iraq and Saudi Arabia? Is it some fancied encirclement including Afghanistan, Libya, Yemen, and Ethiopia that constitutes the threat to the Saudis and the likelihood of war? Or is the war which is most likely to explode again, the one between Israel and her traditional foes?

Well, if the past is any teacher, we must admit that the more likely war is the one that will come upon renewal of the arms race between Israel and her Arab neighbors.

I have listened to the assessment of the CIA which, incidentally, happened to be in error when it failed to anticipate the outbreak of the Yom Kippur war. The assessment tells me only that Israel presently enjoys military preponderance.

But if there is no settlement in the Middle East, and if Israel continues to hold onto the occupied lands, then all those burning coals that have led to the flareup of four wars in the region will continue to smolder, and then what is going to happen? I will tell you. Yes, there will be French planes built in Egypt; yes, there will be a new arms race in the Middle East financed by the Saudis; yes, there will be a new military equation emerging from that arms race; yes, there will be another war.

I, too, would like to see the American position in the Middle East solidified. I wish for something more than a peace settlement between Israel, Syria, Jordan, and Egypt. I would like to see an alliance for mutual defense and economic development put together among the four, an alliance for prosperity and peace in the Middle East, joining together Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia, and I would like to see us a part of it. But none of that is going to happen until these parties return to the negotiating table, until we have a settlement between Israel and Egypt.

Until then, the greatest danger is not war that involves an attack on the Saudis; it is the renewal of the war that has so long separated Israel from her neighbors.

Why am I against these sales? Because, in my judgment, they set back the prospects for peace at the negotiating table, the essential peace between Israel and Egypt. Remember, the President's proposal represents a fundamental change in American policy. When Mr. Kissinger negotiated Sinai I and Sinai II, what was said to the Israelis? "Yield territory, yield the canal, yield the oil fields. Move back to the passes, and you can be assured that your security needs in the future will be attended to by the United States of America." And explicitly written into the Sinai II agreement is the statement that we would attend to those needs.

It was unconditional. The President of the United States has suddenly, and without warning, made what was an unconditional commitment to Israel a highly conditional one. He has said, "Unless Congress approves our sale of top-of-the-line interceptors to the Saudis, and, for the first time, modern aircraft to Egypt, unless Congress puts its stamp of approval upon a policy by which the United States begins furnishing arms of the most sophisticated kind to both sides, I shall not go forward on our commitment to Israel."

That is what he said. That is a fundamental shift in the American position.

He sends it up here and he says to us, "If you do not approve every part of it, each proposal, I will withdraw them all."

Should we be surprised that the Israelis are suddenly so deeply troubled? It will be much more difficult for them to yield more occupied territory, now that we have started to arm both sides. And the prospects for peace will suffer. Until you get the Israelis and the Egyptians back together, until you get a settlement of that long-standing dispute, you will have no foundation to build upon in this area of the world, which has so long been called the strategic crossroads, and which is now even more vital because of the oil.

My second objection, with which I will conclude, is the way these sales were presented, tied together in a package. This can be cured only by recognizing that this package remains a package, and rejecting it. This is not the time to be authorizing the injection of \$5 billion worth of warplanes into this vola-



tile area of the world. This is a time when our single-minded purpose should be focused upon getting the parties back together at the negotiating table. This is a time when we should be saying, "Give peace a chance." If the process fails, then there will be time enough to consider how many planes we should sell to the countries in the area. But if the process succeeds, it is entirely possible that we will need to sell no more planes at all.

Nothing can be lost by waiting 6 months. No country is singled out or insulted by that action. But the U.S. Senate will have shown the wisdom of giving peace a chance, with an opportunity to come back again, if necessary, to a consideration of what our policy should be in this area if a settlement does not ensue.

It is on this basis that I hope the Senate will vote to approve the resolution of disapproval.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. MELCHER). The Chair recognizes the junior Senator from Idaho.

Mr. McCLURE. Mr. President, I thank the Chair and I thank my colleagues for not having raised objection when the time for the closed session was asked to be extended, and I will not burden you with some of the general debate which might well wait for the open session, but I think there are two or three things that might better be said in closed session than in open session.

Senator STONE mentioned in his remarks that Admiral Turner had indicated that in prior conflicts the Saudis had tried to reach the battlefield and had failed. I think perhaps a more accurate statement of what the CIA had indicated was not that they tried and failed, but that they failed to get there.

I make that comment because I think there is substantial evidence that the Saudis were very desperately trying to avoid getting on the battlefield in time without appearing that they did not wish to be involved in the fighting so as to cause themselves problems with their fellow Arabs; that the fact that they did not get there is a fact. Their motivation we have to leave to interpretation.

I agree with my colleague from Florida that to go to Geneva to seek a comprehensive agreement would be a disaster, and that the kinds of talks that have been going on in the Middle East bilaterally with the United States providing the intermediary services perhaps carries with it more promise for a successful conclusion than the organized press relations circus that would surround a total comprehensive conference in Geneva.

I agree with my colleague from Idaho that our efforts ought to be directed toward promoting a peaceful solution and a peaceful settlement, to try to get the parties in that area of the world to come to their own conclusion concerning the kind of settlement they can live with rather than failing in that settlement and dying over that failure.

It is not my intention to debate what that settlement ought to be or even to

try to indicate who is at fault or who is right. That goes back thousands of years, and we are not going to settle that in a couple of minutes. But we can have differences as to what is the best manner in which to achieve that which we both say we desire to achieve.

I have made four trips to the Middle East, and I recite that only as a way of background because I have had the opportunity to observe first hand, in talking to people in each of these countries, the evolution of their feeling over the last 5 years.

My friend, the Senator from Delaware, asks where else will the Saudis go? Well, first of all, the Saudis can go to France to buy planes that will be delivered much more rapidly, as my friend, the Senator from Ohio, has indicated, and much more adapted to ground combat than the ones we would sell, that would be available to them at a much later date.

They would also provide \$1 billion in advance payments for the follow-on fighter to be produced by the French, the 4,000.

It is unlikely, in my judgment, that that plane will ever be produced and marketed unless the Saudis are turned down now on the U.S. sales. And it is almost inevitable that the French will produce and market that plane if we do turn down the sale to the Saudis at this time.

But beyond that, what is the reaction of the Saudis? When I first met the Foreign Minister of Saudi Arabia, he was a deputy minister in another agency. That was 5 years ago.

I talked to him last in Riyadh in January. It was a private meeting, and that is the reason why I wanted to recite to you what he told me at that time in closed session.

He said:

Unfortunately, the plane sale has become symbolic in our minds. It is a symbol of whether or not the United States will remain a dependable friend of the Saudis.

Senator RIBICOFF has stated very eloquently what some of the consequences would be if we failed to maintain our good relationship with the Saudi Government in terms of energy, in terms of economics, in terms of geopolitics, and in terms of military balances in the Middle East. I can do no more than underscore the absolute seriousness with which the Saudi officials addressed me when I was there in January for the fourth time in their country.

Lest friends of Israel think I am totally on one side on this issue, I have also visited in Israel. I have been to the Golan Heights. I have talked with people in Israel in the various ministries at some length, in their country and here, and I recognize that they, too, feel very strongly, and they have emotional ties to this argument.

I am sorry that we might lose our objectivity as we engage in the emotions of the hour. But let me ask this question of my colleagues: There is no doubt in my mind that if the Soviet Union attacked and attempted to capture the oil fields in Saudi Arabia, World War III would result. But what would be the reaction of the United States if a radical

Arab Government were installed in Riyadh by the Soviet Union and with their help and support, that would have the same effect as a Soviet takeover? Would we then declare war?

I suggest to you that we would not, in spite of the fact that if that did happen, the United States would be isolated in the world, because Europe and Japan cannot afford—cannot survive without Arab oil, and the minute that oil is lost to the western industrialized world, the western industrialized world is totally destroyed economically, unless they do whatever is necessary to maintain the access to that oil.

We are at that point in our history where we must decide whether we will take that risk—not which war is most likely to happen, but which one is the greatest threat to the survival of the United States? I think if we will look at it in that perspective, we will not take that chance. We will not run the risk of driving the Saudis over the brink, either by internal coup or by external takeover from more radical countries, into the arms of the Soviets, to the point of destroying the ability of the United States to work in concert with the rest of the free world.

That, to me, is the significance of this vote, and the reason why I have every reason to hope that the Senate will reject the resolution of disapproval.

Mr. President, even though I have a minute or two remaining, I will yield back the remainder of my time.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I yield 1 minute to the Senator from Washington.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair must point out that under the unanimous-consent agreement, the closed session is concluded.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the closed session continue for another 5 minutes.

Mr. CHAFEE. Mr. President, I would like to have 3 minutes to ask a question in closed session.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. I ask unanimous consent that the closed session continue for another 10 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. BIDEN. I yield 2 minutes to the Senator from Washington.

Mr. CASE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. JACKSON. I have only 2 minutes.

Mr. CASE. On my time.

Mr. JACKSON. Yes.

Mr. CASE. I would like to ask, in the interests of orderly procedure, if there is anybody else on our side who wishes to speak against the sale.

Mr. McCLURE. In closed session?

Mr. CASE. In closed session or in open session. I know of only two in addition to Mr. JAVITS and me.

Mr. MOYNIHAN. The Senator from New York would like 30 seconds.

Mr. CASE. Bless your heart. I just want general information about Republicans who want to talk against the sales.

Mr. DOLE. In open session?

Mr. CASE. Either open or closed. We

have two here, and that is all I know of. Is the Senator from Wyoming going to talk against the sales?

Mr. HANSEN. No; I misunderstood.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Washington is recognized for 2 minutes.

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, I think I can sum up in 2 minutes about where we are.

It seems to me an overwhelming majority of this body wants to do everything it can to protect the territorial integrity of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Israel. There has been discussion also about vulnerability, and so on. I would point out that Saudi Arabia is a prime target. The Russians are not going to move overtly against Saudi Arabia or any of the nations in the Middle East. They are going to operate by proxy. That is point No. 1.

Point No. 2 is, Saudi Arabia meets the fundamental test of vulnerability. What is vulnerability? Vulnerability is a weakness, which is true of Saudi Arabia, a weak infrastructure in a very, very wealthy country, which makes it a prime target.

But, Mr. President, assuming all this to be true, I submit that we are offering the wrong remedy to deal with the security of Saudi Arabia. That is where all the discussion centers.

Mr. President, they do not have the infrastructure to even protect the F-15's if they are assigned there. The real threat to Saudi Arabia will come through a coup, or it will come from a border attack. That is the real issue before this body.

I would hope, and I am prepared to offer a resolution with some of my colleagues, to delay all of this for 6 months. Here we are, agreeing that all three countries are vital to our own security. Here we are, in a situation where we are all uptight about offending the Saudis. That is what this discussion has boiled down to.

Well, it is nonsense. The proof is that what we are offering here is going to make us look ridiculous if there is a coup and a takeover. And that, to me, is a real possibility. If I were to select a country in all of the world that is vulnerable to a takeover, it is Saudi Arabia, with almost half the oil reserves of the entire world.

What we are doing here—and it is clear that we are going to reject the resolution of disapproval—I think is to embark on a course that is only going to make it more difficult to negotiate. The No. 1 objective is to get the Egyptians and Israelis back together again. This is not going to do it, Mr. President, and we are going to find ourselves in a situation where planes are not going to be available until 1981 or 1982, and whether they can fly them by that time, I think, is highly questionable.

I strongly support a military assistance program to Saudi Arabia that will in fact deal with its vital national security interests, and the remedy we have here is nothing more or less than psychological, totally irrelevant to the threat. I hope the Senate will adopt the resolution.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I yield 2 minutes to the Senator from New York.

Mr. MOYNIHAN. I thank the Senator from Delaware. I will not require 2 minutes.

Mr. President, because I do believe it does appear evident that our position will not prevail, I rise to say something which I would not now feel free to say in public.

[Deleted.]

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time to the Senator from Rhode Island?

Mr. BAKER. I yield 2 minutes to the Senator.

Mr. CHAFEE. Mr. President, I have a question for Mr. CHURCH. Of course, we are all here to find the best way to find peace. I believe we all wish this package deal had not come before us in this manner, but it is here so we have to decide. One of the most attractive proposals which is continually being put forth here is to set the whole thing aside for 6 or 9 months and nothing will change. The Senator from New York said, "If you tell the Saudis they cannot get them on Tuesday, they will be back on Wednesday and everybody will be happy."

Well, now, that really, it seems to me, is the question.

Looking at it from the Saudi point of view and whether they should have these arms as the Senator from Washington suggests, or whether these are wrong arms for them, at least they think they are the right arms and they have asked for them. They did not ask for F-16's; they did not ask for tanks. They asked for F-15's. So if the Saudis are turned down in this deal, why should they have any confidence that the United States will come forward, that this body will say, "Just take it easy. Come back in 9 months or 6 months and everything will be all right."

It seems to me they would feel considerably shaken in their confidence in the United States. I do not think they are going to cut off our oil overnight, but obviously they have to make different defense arrangements to protect themselves. Why does everybody say to put it off for 6 months and everything will be all right?

Mr. CHURCH. I am not at all sure I can satisfy the Senator with my answer. Perhaps it comes down to whether we are going to break Israeli confidence in the United States or Saudi confidence. I cannot guarantee the Senator that, if we turn all these sales down, the Saudis will not buy some F-1's from France. Perhaps they will. But if we do not obtain a settlement in the Middle East, a negotiated settlement, between the principal combatants, then I can assure the Senator that we will be in for 2 or 3 years of a massive arms buildup, and that the Saudis will be financing it, not only for themselves, but for the Egyptians and the Syrians, and perhaps even for the Jordanians as well. That will be the prelude to another war in the Middle East, in my judgment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired.

Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, I will be glad to yield another minute to the Senator from Rhode Island or we can go into public session and I will give him time there.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Only 1 minute remains.

Mr. BAKER. I yield that to the Senator from Rhode Island.

Mr. CHAFEE. It seems to me that if we are going to get this settlement that we all want, it will require absolutely that the Saudis have confidence in us and a feeling that we are indeed an honest broker. If we toss them out in this proposal which is before us today—and in which, by the way, I am not sure we are breaking our covenant with the Israelis since they do get their aircraft—if the Saudis do not get theirs, I would think they would be considerably less forthcoming in trying to arrive at an amelioration of the situation there which is absolutely required on their part and Egypt's part if we are going to get an honest, lasting, and peaceful settlement.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's 1 minute has expired.

Mr. INOUE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to proceed for 30 seconds.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair hears no objection. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. INOUE. Much has been said about the American commitment to the State of Israel and the Sinai 2 has been cited. I think if we search back in our minds we will recall that at the time of the Sinai 2 agreement there was a dollar package of 800-plus million dollars. Since then, most of us here who voted for assistance for the State of Israel will recall that the military package has exceeded \$2 billion. So to suggest that we have not lived up to our commitment we made in Sinai 2 is not correct.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. MELCHER). Under the previous order, the Senate will now go out of closed session and will resume open session.

#### FOOTNOTES

<sup>1</sup> [Class. deleted].

<sup>2</sup> [Class. deleted].

<sup>3</sup> [Class. deleted].

<sup>4</sup> [Class. deleted].

<sup>5</sup> [Class. deleted].

<sup>6</sup> [Class. deleted].

<sup>7</sup> [Class. deleted].

<sup>8</sup> [Class. deleted].

<sup>9</sup> [Class. deleted].

<sup>10</sup> [Class. deleted].

<sup>11</sup> [Class. deleted].

<sup>12</sup> [Class. deleted].

<sup>13</sup> [Class. deleted].

<sup>14</sup> [Class. deleted].

<sup>15</sup> [Class. deleted].

<sup>16</sup> [Class. deleted].

<sup>17</sup> [Class. deleted].

<sup>18</sup> [Class. deleted].

<sup>19</sup> [Class. deleted].

<sup>20</sup> [Class. deleted].

<sup>21</sup> [Class. deleted].

<sup>22</sup> [Class. deleted].

<sup>23</sup> [Class. deleted].

<sup>24</sup> [Class. deleted].

<sup>25</sup> [Class. deleted].

(This concludes the expurgated transcript of the closed session of the Senate on May 15, 1978.)



## LEGISLATIVE SESSION

At 4:27 p.m. the doors of the Chamber were opened, and the session of the Senate was resumed.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. MELCHER). The Senator from Ohio (Mr. GLENN) is recognized. Who yields time to the Senator?

Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, a parliamentary inquiry.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator will state it.

Mr. BAKER. How much time remains to me?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Ninety-nine minutes remain to the Senator from Tennessee.

Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, at this time I would like to say that I have requests to speak from five Senators on this side of the aisle.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator will be in order.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator from Tennessee yield time to the Senator from Ohio?

Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, I might ask how much time the Senator from Ohio needs? If he has 30 minutes, will that do?

Mr. GLENN. Yes.

Mr. BAKER. Before that, I should like to use just 1 minute of my time.

Before I proceed, Mr. President, will the Chair advise me how much time is, in fact, remaining?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair was in error previously. The Senator from Tennessee has 89 minutes remaining.

Mr. BAKER. Eighty-nine minutes instead of 99?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Instead of 99.

Mr. BAKER. Very well, Mr. President; I have a number of Senators who wish to speak, and before I yield first to the Senator from Ohio for 30 minutes, I should like to yield myself 1 minute.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senate will come to order. We cannot proceed until the well is cleared.

The Senator from Tennessee.

Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, I shall take just one moment to say that, in the course of the closed session of the Senate, I believe all of us benefited from the meaningful and significant debate, particularly the presentation of the distinguished Senator from Connecticut (Mr. RIBICOFF). Seldom in my time in the Senate have I seen a man who presented his point of view with such courage, such care, and so effectively.

I pay equal respect to the distinguished Senator from New York and the distinguished Senator from Delaware (Mr. BIDEN) and to others who conducted an orderly and worthwhile debate during the closed session of the Senate. My respect to all of them.

Mr. President, I yield 30 minutes to the distinguished Senator from Ohio.

Mr. THURMOND. Will the distinguished Senator yield so I may get floor privileges for some staff?

Mr. GLENN. Yes, I yield.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Hargrave Mc-

Elroy of my staff may be granted the privilege of the floor during this debate and Edward Kenney of the Senate Armed Services staff during debate and vote.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. HOLLINGS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Michael Copps have the privilege of the floor during consideration of this matter.

Mr. BARTLETT. I make the same request for Tom Gibson of my staff.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, the issue of arms sales to Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt is a question of the least undesirable choice. No one wants to see new armaments placed in a volatile situation which may increase the chances of a potential future conflict, and yet the alternatives of not going ahead might make the likelihood of war even greater.

Emotions involving these sales run very high, and I am the last person who is going to try to say to a person of Jewish heritage that "I can understand your feelings, but—and so forth." I do not think any person can truly appreciate the feelings of those whose friends and relatives have gone through the Holocaust, who have endured centuries of discrimination, and who, even today, experience slights and prejudices.

The United States has taken, and I pray will continue to take, a leading role in influencing events in the Mideast along the least dangerous course. This makes for some paradoxical choices, such as the current situation wherein the Senate must choose between the lesser of two evils. For example, it seems at first consideration absolutely ridiculous to talk about "arms for peace" in a situation where the emotions run so high and potential for conflict is so great, and yet that is exactly one of your choices. We can approve the sale and send limited arms into a volatile area, with controls that can be readily enforced, and by doing so, give a reasonable chance of encouraging peace efforts. Alternatively, we can disapprove the sale and permit unlimited amounts of arms to be shipped into that area from other countries, thereby relinquishing U.S. control over parts, weapons, and deployment; with the necessary result of diminishing our ability to influence movement toward the peace table.

(Mr. SASSER assumed the chair.)

Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, that objective of movement toward the peace table must remain before us.

Although the choices are not pleasant, it would seem, from all the study I have given this complex subject, to be more dangerous both to the United States and Israel to block this sale than to approve it.

I did not agree with the administration's submission of these arms sales to the Mideast as a package, but that is now not our choice. The proposed sale is comprised of 50 F-5's to Egypt, 60 F-15's to Saudi Arabia to be delivered in a 1981-84 time period, 15 F-15's to be de-

livered to Israel in addition to the 25 they now have, with the promise of an additional 20 in the 1981-84 time period, plus 75 F-16's.

The part of this package, however, that has received the most attention is the sale of F-15's to Saudi Arabia, and I would like to address that in more detail. Secretary of Defense Harold Brown has written a letter to the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee (Mr. SPARKMAN) which details:

The type of plane and equipment limitations; assurances given by Saudi Arabia as to their use of the F-15; and how we maintain control of such use of the airplane by Saudi Arabia. That is an important part.

Secretary Brown's letter is so important to understanding the proposal that I shall read from it in its entirety as part of my statement:

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE,  
Washington, D.C., May 9, 1978.

HON. JOHN J. SPARKMAN,  
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,  
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: During recent conversations with you and other members of your Committee, a number of questions have been raised regarding the characteristics of the F-15 aircraft we propose to sell to Saudi Arabia and reassurances as to the purposes for which Saudi Arabia will use the aircraft. I would like to respond to these questions and attempt to resolve any uncertainties that members have felt regarding the proposed sale.

## I. THE F-15 AIRCRAFT

The F-15 we plan to sell to Saudi Arabia will have the same configurations as the interceptor model approved for the United States Air Force. During the developmental phase of the F-15, initial plans called for giving the aircraft a ground attack capability. However, the availability of other aircraft with superior strike capabilities led the Air Force to alter its plans and to limit the role of the F-15 to that of an air superiority fighter. Consequently, the development of new ground attack systems for the F-15 was discontinued in 1975.

Saudi Arabia chose the F-15 because of its extended patrol capability and superior air defense characteristics (including an advanced, all-weather air-to-air radar system). The F-15 best meets Saudi Arabian requirements for the air defense of a vast territory. In choosing the F-15, Saudi Arabia rejected aircraft with powerful ground attack capabilities such as the F-16.

As Saudi Arabia has selected the F-15 to defend its national territory, it would be folly, as the Chairman designate of the JCS, General David Jones, USAF, observed in testimony, to use the F-15 offensively against neighboring countries. This is particularly so vis-a-vis Israel, whose air strength is, and will be, so much greater. Not only would the F-15 be relatively ineffective in an offensive mode, and the risk of loss of the aircraft high, but its use away from Saudi Arabia would leave vital oil facilities, urban centers and military installations without necessary air defense cover. From the standpoint of military planning, it would make no sense whatsoever for Saudi Arabia to acquire an aircraft with the characteristics of the F-15 with an idea of using it as a ground attack aircraft. I am confident the Saudis have no such intention.

Like the USAF model, the F-15 for Saudi Arabia will be equipped with air defense armament; namely, four AIM-9 Sidewinder air-to-air missiles, four AIM-7 Sparrow air-to-air missiles and a 20 mm gun.

The aircraft can carry three external fuel tanks, but the plane requested by Saudi Arabia will not be equipped with special features that could give it additional range. Specifically, the planes will not have conformal fuel tanks ("fast packs"), i.e., auxiliary fuel tanks that conform to the body of the plane, and Saudi Arabian KC-130 tankers do not have equipment for air refueling of the F-15.

Saudi Arabia has not requested that the plane be outfitted with Multiple Ejection Racks (MER 200) which would allow the plane to carry a substantial bomb load. The U.S. will not furnish such MERs, and testing and certification of a MER system for the F-15 would not be feasible by another country without U.S. authorization. While aircraft could conceivably carry three standard MK 84 bombs, they would each replace an external fuel tank; this would greatly shorten the aircraft's range and increase its vulnerability. Moreover, in contrast to the F-16, the F-15 does not have a radar system designed for bombing.

Saudi Arabia has not requested nor do we intend to sell any other systems or armaments that would increase the range or enhance the ground attack capability of the F-15.

Pursuant to our national security disclosure policy, certain highly sensitive subcomponents of the U.S. Air Force version of the F-15 (e.g., cryptologic equipment and some special electronic capabilities) will not be sold to Saudi Arabia.

In sum, it is clear that the F-15 will help Saudi Arabia deter and defend against those nations that are hostile to its role as a leading moderate Arab state.

#### II. ASSURANCES

The Government of Saudi Arabia has assured us that it has no aggressive intentions against any state, that it will use the F-15 aircraft only in furtherance of its legitimate self-defense, and that it will not employ the aircraft offensively. The Saudi Arabian Government has similarly assured us that it will not transfer the F-15 aircraft to any third country or permit the nationals of such country to train on the F-15 aircraft, serve as pilots, or otherwise to have access to the aircraft without the authorization of the United States.

We have specifically discussed these restrictions on use and prohibitions on transfer with the Government of Saudi Arabia. They have assured us that they intend scrupulously to comply with these prohibitions and restrictions. The record of Saudi Arabia in this respect is excellent. However, should the assurances be violated, the United States can take appropriate action, including suspension of services and of delivery of spare parts and other military equipment. Without such services the usability of the F-15 would degrade rapidly.

Mr. President, I would add that Secretary Brown's letter could also include a potential use of Sidewinder missiles and Arrow missiles which we could furnish, and under the terms of the Secretary's letter we could cut off the supply of those missiles if necessary.

I continue with Secretary Brown's comments:

It is also important to note that the sales agreement reserves to the United States the right to suspend or cancel deliveries at any time "when the national interest of the United States so requires." Further, under Section 21(c) of the Arms Export Control Act, no U.S. person employed under Foreign Military Sales contracts in Saudi Arabia or any other country would be permitted to perform services in support of combat operations.

Questions have been raised concerning the possible basing of the F-15 aircraft at

Tabuk Air Base. I would like to repeat to you the assurance given to me and other United States officials by the Saudi Arabian Government that Saudi Arabia will base the F-15 aircraft, not at Tabuk, but at Dhahran, Taif and possibly at Riyadh or Khams Mushait. Basing the F-15 at the vulnerable Tabuk base could place in needless jeopardy these vital aircraft which will form the heart of the Saudi Arabian air defense system. In addition, Tabuk is not equipped to serve as an operating base for the F-15s, and could not be so equipped without extensive U.S. assistance which would not be provided. These practical considerations, of which Saudi Arabia is well aware, strengthen the assurances that the F-15s will not be based at Tabuk.

The question has also been raised whether the Government of Saudi Arabia intends to acquire additional combat aircraft from other countries. The Saudi Arabian Government has assured us that it does not intend to add to its inventory any combat aircraft from other countries while it is preparing for and receiving the sixty F-15s. The shortage of trained personnel in Saudi Arabia would severely constrain Saudi Arabia's ability to utilize any additional new aircraft beyond the F-15 during this period.

With respect to the security of the aircraft, the Government of Saudi Arabia has expressed its determination to provide carefully for the physical protection of the aircraft, manuals and other material related to it. Prior to the delivery of the aircraft, we will work with the Government of Saudi Arabia to ensure that adequate safeguards are in place to prevent unauthorized persons from obtaining access to the aircraft or information about it.

The proposal with respect to Saudi Arabia, like all such proposals, stands on its own merits, and I hope the foregoing information will be helpful to you and that you and the members of your Committee will join in support of the Administration's proposals to sell aircraft to Israel, Egypt and Saudi Arabia.

Sincerely,

HAROLD BROWN.

Mr. President, it was somewhat difficult during the early stages of consideration of this package to obtain accurate information about Israel's views. There has been conflict among the statements of Prime Minister Begin, Defense Minister Dayan, the press, television, and those made directly to Secretary of State Cyrus Vance. There is other evidence of this uncertainty.

Prime Minister Begin visited the United States in March for discussions with President Carter on a number of issues. I met with President Carter, along with several other Senators, the morning following Prime Minister Begin's departure, and was extremely surprised when President Carter, in summarizing his conversations with Prime Minister Begin, indicated that the subject of the arms sales in the Mideast, and in particular the sale to Saudi Arabia, was never even brought up for discussion. The President indicated his very great surprise at this, as did several members of the Foreign Relations Committee. It was only several weeks later, after considerable discussion had developed in this country, that Israel's concern was evidenced. During Prime Minister Begin's last trip to the United States, he gave many speeches in different parts of the country, and his major concern regarding the F-15 sale to Saudi Arabia seemed

to center on the attack capability of the F-15, a subject Secretary Brown covered quite adequately in his letter, from which I quoted.

Let us now turn to the alternative to approval and establish the situation that will exist if the sale to Saudi Arabia is disapproved. The Saudis have cash. There is no doubt about that. They can buy anywhere and have already had negotiations with the French to buy 60 F-1 fighters with a substantial air-ground capability, with deliveries to start not in 1981-84 as would be the case with the U.S. F-15's, but this summer, now—1978. The Saudis are also negotiating with Egypt the possibility of coproducing the French F-2000 fighter in Egypt with a guarantee of at least a 125-plane production. The F-2000 also has a formidable air-ground attack capability. In addition, the French have a new and much advanced F-4000 fighter as a next generation aircraft, with the first flight in the fall of 1978, and it is my understanding they have also discussed giving options to Saudi Arabia for buys of that airplane. The 60 F-1's are certainly in no way comparable with the F-15, but the F-2000 is a very potent fighter by any modern-day standards, with extensive air-ground attack capability, and the F-4000 as a follow-on will be a highly advanced aircraft. This package being discussed can obviously involve several hundred aircraft for Saudi Arabia. But quite apart from numbers, the major consideration is that these aircraft will be completely out of our control, transferable anywhere, based at Tabuk or anywhere else the Saudis might wish to base them. This could result in construction of new airfields in Saudi Arabia very close to Israel, planes with an extensive air-ground attack capability and an air refueling capability for extending range could be based at these new airfields, and this could be only minutes away from critical Israeli installations. In short, if this potential aircraft purchase from the French is consummated, there would be no restrictions to basing these planes anywhere in the Arab world, transferring the aircraft anywhere in the Arab world, and training pilots of any nation. This clearly would not be in the interest of Israel.

There are other considerations. If we spurn the Saudi Arabian request, they will in all probability be far less likely to follow our leadership in bringing all parties to the peace table. At the present time, the Government of Egypt receives from Saudi Arabia a total of approximately \$2 billion per year which is vital to the Egyptian economy. While the Saudi Arabian Government's official statements regarding peace initiatives by President Sadat were critical, they have nevertheless not seen fit to withdraw their support of Israel during this critical period.

An additional consideration is to look at this problem from the Saudi Arabian viewpoint, and ask why they need a highly sophisticated weapons system such as the F-15. They obviously have an honest concern when we recognize that some 25 to 50 percent of the world's oil reserves are in Saudi Arabia, but



they are completely dependent on others for defense against a major threat to their country. Prior to the recent flow of enormous wealth into the Mideast, Saudi Arabia could not have afforded major military strength notwithstanding their concerns about the value of their natural resources. That time has now passed. Saudi Arabia possesses enormous wealth, and certainly feels the independence this economic strength gives them. Then want their own defense, and I am sure they also want the prestige that comes with sufficient military strength to determine their own future and not be dependent upon other nations for their defense. It is also a test of the sincerity of U.S. promises made to them since 1975. A test of our friendship—is it real or only talk?

There is an additional factor that has received little attention during much of the debate in committee. This factor has not generally been spoken of in terms of the Israel-Arab conflict in the Mideast, which is the frame of reference usually used in any discussion of this arms sale. Look with me for a moment at the overall geo-political situation in that part of the world as it affects Israel, the Arab world, the United States, and indeed the whole free world. In these days of global energy hunger, I can think of no piece of geography in the whole world more important to the energy problem than control of the Persian Gulf, and that supercritical 1- to 3-kilometer-wide passageway out of the Persian Gulf, the Strait of Hormuz. A tanker goes through that strait every 9 minutes day and night, year round. When a group of my colleagues and I visited that area a year and a half ago and flew over the strait, we were advised that through the strait at that time passed 18 percent of the total U.S. oil—not just imports, but 18 percent of our total—70 percent of Western Europe's oil, and an astounding 85 percent of Japan's oil. In fact, during the last Mideast war, I was reliably informed that 70 percent of the oil bound for Israel through that strait continued in spite of the conflict. Until the United States and the remainder of the free world improves the energy situation, control of that geography will remain of the highest order of importance.

But with regard to this geopolitical situation, let us broaden our viewpoint and look at what has happened in the recent past with regard to Soviet moves in the area. Recently a Soviet-sponsored coup has taken over in Afghanistan. The northern Iranian border, which has long been a trouble spot, reportedly reflects shipments of new Soviet arms. Syria and Iraq have had a \$3 to \$5 billion infusion of Soviet arms. Libya has long received Soviet help. The increased Soviet activity in the Horn of Africa, first in Somalia with a submarine base they tried to establish and more recently in Ethiopia, has caused us increased concern. Couple all of that with an increased Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean, and we see a circle of Soviet activity around the Mideast, and in particular around the Persian Gulf, that is anything but reassuring.

We must also analyze this pattern in conjunction with the step-by-step involvement of Soviet surrogates, the Cubans, and their activities in the area. First we had a rumor of Soviet equipment being moved into Angola, followed by Cubans using that equipment. There was a rumor of Soviet equipment being put into Ethiopia in massive amounts, also followed by a Cuban move into the area to use that equipment. Cuban involvement in Africa is estimated now to be somewhere around 40,000 personnel. Just yesterday there was a move into Zaire, the former Belgian Congo, with reports of Cuban involvement. But more importantly to our discussion today are the moves into South Yemen, which borders on Saudi Arabia. Three times since 1969 South Yemen has attacked various Saudi installations or facilities along the border. There have been reports of a promised 50 Soviet Mig 23's to South Yemen, with support equipment already arriving. This is in addition to the 200 tanks already there. Most disturbing now, however, is the estimate that 1,200-1,500 Cuban surrogates have moved into South Yemen in the last few weeks. This follows a pattern of past troublemaking that bodes ill for that area.

I am certainly not here today, Mr. President, to claim that the Soviets are about to start a war in the Middle East. But I am not sufficiently naive to believe that all these moves around the Persian Gulf area are accidental in the geopolitical alignments they create when viewed as a whole. If troubled starts in the Middle East, the Soviets are certainly well-positioned.

Saudi Arabia has been staunch in its opposition to communism. This cannot be said of the leftist extremes in control on the northern Saudi border in Iraq, and on the southern Saudi border in South Yemen.

Let no one misinterpret my remarks. I still see Israel as the bastion of strength in the Middle East with regard to these larger geopolitical considerations. Israel has by far the most potent well-trained and well-equipped fighting force in the Middle East. But I point out these other facts to indicate the legitimacy of a Saudi concern for defense of their own territory. I suppose there could be a scenario where we could see the might of Israel and the Saudi military forces aligned together, even though that alignment is certainly not preeminent in our considerations here today.

As to past cooperation with the United States, I think it is fair to say that while we deplore the tremendous increases in oil pricing that have driven our energy costs so high, it is nevertheless important to note that had the Saudis not insisted on maintaining oil production at a level approximately 3 million barrels per day over that which some have recommended, oil prices would be even higher today than they are. Along with that, we must remember that it was the Saudi Arabians who insisted that the dollar remain as the basic currency for oil exchange, and this shored up a weakening dollar in international markets.

The Saudis need a strong West, both

to sell to and to buy from, and so their interests are certainly not altruistic. But that same strong West is absolutely vital to Israel. No one would deny that Israel is still many years from self-sufficiency, and she cannot go it alone, without major support coming from the United States—support which has totaled \$10 billion since 1973. The U.S. commitment to a strong Israel remains firm. I certainly support the strengthening of Israel to cope successfully with whatever situation arises in the Middle East, and my voting record since coming to the Senate will attest to that fact. But the strength of the West, which is so vital to Israel, is fragile with respect to oil, even though Western strength is enhanced to some degree by the comparative moderation the Saudis have shown. It would not take much of an upward revision in OPEC pricing policies to cause very serious troubles with prices, employment, and other factors at home. And if we have serious trouble, it means that Israel has many times our difficulties because they cannot retrench and cut back as we would be able to do. What would happen to Israel if the United States found itself in a position unable to give the measure of support we have given in the past? Once embarked down that road, the United States could be hurt, the economy of the whole free world could be in difficulty, but it would be devastating to an Israel that could not adapt.

These are not fantasies, Mr. President, these are the realities of global politics, and I would come back to my opening remarks briefly. Our greatest concern in the Middle East must be to encourage whatever action will get all parties to the peace table. Our vote today is crucial in that direction, for our choice is indeed one of the lesser of evils. We can approve these sales, maintaining U.S. controls and preserve a reasonable chance of encouraging peace efforts, or we can witness the spectre of unlimited arms flowing into the Mideast coupled with a loss of any possible direct U.S. control in either quantity or use of aircraft. This would result in a greatly diminished peace potential.

I met with Jewish leaders in Cleveland last Saturday and discussed all these considerations with them in depth. At the end of our discussion, one of the gentleman indicated that he felt these major considerations were of little significance at the moment, for Israel's concern has always been how to survive from day to day. He indicated Israel did not have the luxury of considering some of the global relationships mentioned today which I had also introduced into this discussion on Saturday. I agreed with his analysis of Israel's situation, and compared it to the situation of a man in a foxhole whose attention is obviously riveted on who is sniping at him and not on the more long-range matter of the supply ships coming across the ocean. This is fully understandable. I would submit, however, that with the Sadat initiatives and with the opportunity I hope we now have to get all parties to the conference table, that keeping the moderate voices alive and cooperative are of paramount importance to Israel.

The passionate concerns of this moment may also indicate this is a time when we must exercise the utmost care if we are to hold out the hope of keeping all concerned parties in a cooperative mood.

Mr. President, I repeat again my support for our long-term commitment to and friendship with Israel, and my belief that a vote against the motion of disapproval is in the best interests of the United States and Israel.

Our choice comes down to one of whether we maintain control of the very limited arms sale in the Mideast, or whether we see that situation out of our control, with sales of aircraft being made in unlimited numbers and with no restrictions whatsoever on their use. That is our choice. It is a difficult one at best, but I cannot support the proposal of disapproval as being in the interest of peace, Mr. President.

And I thank my colleagues for their attention.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, on behalf of Senator CASE I yield 10 minutes to Senator DOLE of Kansas.

Has anyone yielded to Senator METZENBAUM?

Mr. METZENBAUM. No one has as of yet, and I appreciate it, but I think the Chair has the next statement from Senator PACKWOOD, and I would very much appreciate if I could have time after him.

Mr. BARTLETT. Mr. President, if the Senator will yield, it is my understanding they are alternating from side-to-side, and I think the Senator from Tennessee has time for me after Senator DOLE.

Mr. JAVITS. Right now it is Senator DOLE's turn.

Mr. BARTLETT. That is correct.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Kansas.

Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, the Senator from Kansas has been here since about 10:15 this morning and has listened to the debate in the closed session.

I certainly commend all those who participated in the debate. It has been instructive. It has been exceptionally objective.

We are faced with a very difficult situation. There is no doubt in my mind that the vote to table the resolution of disapproval will pass rather easily.

But the Senator from Kansas just has not figured this out. I have listened to the distinguished Senator from Ohio and others tell us about the Soviet threat, and it is real and it could happen. We have heard debates and discussion about everyone's hopes for peace in the Mideast. But it is hard for many of us to understand how this package concept at this time is in the furtherance of peace. Maybe there is such a thing as arms for peace. We are going to find out. By spending or sending \$5 billion in sophisticated weaponry to the Mideast, maybe that will improve the chances for peace.

The Senator from Kansas never fully understood how you can arm everyone to the teeth and say we are on the road to peace. But if this is the arms-for-peace proposal that President Carter desires, there is no doubt he is going to have it, and then we will find out just

what happens insofar as peace negotiations are concerned.

I am not certain, as I have listened to the plight of the Saudis, who are in a very difficult position, what happens between today and the delivery date of the F-15's, which will start the earliest, as I understand it, in 1981 and extend through 1984.

The record indicates that we have a commitment to the Saudis and that we have over the past 3 or 4 years sold them a great deal of military equipment. I hope that we are not under any illusion that this is some new policy.

I was under the impression, during a recent campaign that I was involved in a peripheral way, that President Carter had a plan to reduce arms sales around the world. I heard that statement so many times and many Americans applauded him.

Maybe this is not the time. Maybe now is the time to arm the Mideast for peace. Maybe now is the time to make certain that everyone has all they need. And then some suggest, if that is not enough, we will give Israel 20 more F-15's, or 75 more F-16's, to make certain everyone has an abundance. One wonders sometimes where they find all the pilots in these small countries to fly the fighters that we sell.

It seems to this Senator that we all stand up and explain and exclaim our great commitment to Israel, and I am certain that is generally the case in this body. But I suggest that they are an ally, not a client. They are not a client in the Mideast. They are a strong ally in the Mideast, without any criticism to the Saudis or Egyptians. They are our friends in the Mideast.

There is no doubt in my mind that we are over a barrel. We are over a barrel of oil. That is what it boils down to. The Saudis have the oil. We do not have an energy policy. So now we have to do what we can to make certain that they are not going to close that tap, and I just suggest that I cannot for the life of me understand the timing. It would seem to me that it would serve the ends of peace in the Mideast and the interests of the Saudis, the Egyptians, and the Israelis if we followed the advice of the American people.

In a recent survey 54 percent of the American people opposed the sale; 28 percent approved it.

We went through this recently in the Panama Canal debate, where about 65 to 70 percent of the American people said "Don't give it away." We said, "We will give it away anyway."

Maybe some think the American people do not understand the issue, but I think they do. They understand that when you sell someone sophisticated weapons, whether it is Israelis, Saudis, Egyptian, or anyone else, they might be used for peace; they might be used for war.

A little more than 2 weeks ago, the President formally submitted to Congress his notification of proposed fighter aircraft sales to Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia. At the time, the Senator from Kansas expressed his opinion that the proposals were poorly timed, poorly pre-

sented, and that the "package" concept tying all three sales together was unacceptable. Also at that time, I suggested that "our attention and energies should remain focused on achievement of a responsible Middle East settlement as the first priority, and arms sales might best be postponed until that goal has been reached." This Senator remains committed to that point of view, and it appears that more and more of us share that opinion.

Only 9 weeks ago, a nationwide Gallup poll survey indicated overwhelming popular opposition to Middle East arms sales at this time. Fifty-four percent of those surveyed were opposed to providing arms or materials to Israel, compared to 28 percent in favor. By the same token, 68 percent opposed U.S. arms or material to the Arabs, against 15 percent in favor. An even half of our colleagues on the Foreign Relations Committee, who have had the opportunity to study the issue in great depth, voted against the President's sales proposals last Thursday. So I think there is ample evidence of disagreement with the concept of pouring billions of dollars of weapons into the region at present.

From the beginning, President Carter's arms proposal has reflected the misplaced priorities of this administration with respect to conditions in the Middle East. At a time when negotiations between Israel and Egypt have reached an impasse, it seems to this Senator that our Government's primary attention and efforts should be directed first at reviving those negotiations, and at renewing efforts to achieve a comprehensive peace settlement in the Middle East. We should be reiterating our basic policy commitment to the survival of Israel, and to the resolution of territorial and boundary disputes among the nations in the region.

To a large degree, this is a matter of principle. It is a question of whether the United States will back up its commitment to nurture the cause of peace as the first priority in the Middle East. As a matter of principle, that consideration should override secondary issues, such as differences of opinion about Saudi Arabian defense needs, questions about the air-to-ground capabilities of the F-15, or prospects for Arab arms purchases elsewhere.

#### ARMS SALES SHOULD BE POSTPONED

For this reason, the Senator from Kansas believes that all four arms sales proposals should be rejected at this time, and held in abeyance until a peace settlement is reached between Israel and her neighbors. This is not to say that the proposals are totally unacceptable on their face. Nor does it imply that they should automatically be approved once a peace accord is reached that is not the point.

The objective is to enhance and promote the achievement of a just and lasting peace settlement for all nations in the Middle East. President Carter should not ignore the opportunity to move toward that objective during this period, which I feel is particularly well-suited to our positive initiatives for peace.



The so-called "compromise" seems to many of us to be little more than a desperate last-minute effort to salvage a poorly composed proposal. The offer to sell Israel an additional 20 F-15 fighters to "balance" sales to Saudi Arabia, is a remarkably superficial and overly simplistic solution to a complicated issue. It attempts to evade the real issues involved in the arms proposals.

Try as it might, the administration has not been able to overcome arguments against pouring the world's most sophisticated fighter weapons into such a volatile situation.

Instead of positive reasons for providing these large volumes of weapons at this time, the administration has deluged Congress and the public with negative arguments—dire predictions of developments if arms proposals are rejected. We are told there may be sanctions against our oil supplies. We are told our prestige in the Middle East may decline. We are told the Saudis may turn to France for fighter aircraft. This does not seem to be an effective way to promote a program. We simply should not throw billions of dollars of deadly weapons into an unstable area on the basis of questionable fears about what could happen if we do not do it.

#### SAUDI SECURITY

With regard to the issue of security for Saudi Arabia and its valuable oil fields, the key question is not whether the United States will agree to provide jet fighters, but whether the United States will stand up to Soviet aggression in Africa and the Middle East. The Saudi foreign minister noted in a recent interview that the major point of his country's concern is whether the Soviet policy of massive intervention in Africa will go unchallenged.

The Senator from Kansas suggests that the United States could have done far more to enhance regional security and to ease Saudi concerns if the administration had shown a little more backbone during recent Soviet and Cuban aggression in Ethiopia. That strategically located country lies just across the Red Sea from Saudi Arabia. In conjunction with the growing Soviet influence in South Yemen and Afghanistan, the Ethiopian conflict has naturally contributed to a growing sense of encirclement by the Saudi Arabian Government.

Therefore, if friction develops between the United States and Saudi Arabia over matters relating to Saudi security, it will more likely be a result of our administration's poor response to expanding Communist threats in Africa, rather than a result of our decision not to provide 60 aircraft at this particular time—aircraft which the Saudi's can easily obtain elsewhere.

#### WILL OFFER RESOLUTION

Under the provisions of the 1976 International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act, which governs the proposed sales, it is not possible to amend or recommit the resolution of disapproval now before us. Thus, we must decide now whether to disapprove the proposals, or else to stand aside and

allow the President to go forward with his plans to provide the aircraft.

However, in view of the unstable situation in the Middle East region, and the continuing potential for an outbreak of hostilities, I believe it is imperative that the actual transactions be delayed until a more propitious time. Consequently, if the resolution of disapproval is defeated this afternoon, I shall offer a separate Senate resolution, expressing the sense of this body that the President should postpone the actual issuance of the letters of offer until a comprehensive peace settlement has been reached in the Middle East.

This, at least, would give the Senate an opportunity to go on record as opposed to any immediate delivery of weapons, and would conceivably help promote an early peace accord among these three nations, as well as other governments they may be able to influence.

It has been suggested by the distinguished Senator from Washington, Senator JACKSON, that we could approve the resolution of disapproval, and somehow postpone consideration of this very controversial matter for up to 6 months. That makes some sense, but it seems to this Senator that beyond that it might be better to postpone consideration of this until we have some comprehensive peace settlement in the Mideast.

It would seem to this Senator that the 6-month period might not be quite enough time. It seems that in view of the unstable situation in the Middle East and the continuing potential for an outbreak of hostilities, we should delay consideration of this agreement, package, or whatever, until a more propitious time.

Therefore, I will offer a separate Senate resolution, which I assume will meet the same fate as efforts to oppose the sale, which would express the sense of this body that the President should postpone the actual issuance of the letters of offer until a comprehensive peace settlement has been reached in the Middle East. This at least would give the Senate an opportunity to go on record as opposed to any immediate delivery of weapons and would conceivably help promote an early peace accord among these three nations as well as other governments they may be able to influence.

I say, after having listened to all the debate today in the secret session and in the open session, probably two arguments are made by those who propose or are in favor of the sale.

One is that the Saudi's might buy their planes from the French: We would have no control if they bought it from the French. It is my understanding that the plane they might buy from the French is inferior to start with. It is not the same quality airplane. Second, we are told that we must do this now so the Saudis will be protected, because they are threatened all around.

Still, we are told there is no delivery of this plane until 1981 through 1984.

I have not heard a satisfactory answer to the question of what we will do between now and the time of delivery if this is the real reason for the sale, if it is because we feel so strongly about the Saudis

and about protecting their rights and their interests.

I would suggest, as I said earlier, we have, I think, done quite well by the Saudis insofar as weapons are concerned. Since 1973 we have provided Saudi Arabia with more than \$12.6 billion in military equipment, construction, and services. Right now there are about 3,500 Americans stationed in Saudi Arabia, working on military-related jobs. So it is not that we have not provided some protection, some assurance, for the Saudis. We have, and we are, and we should continue to do so.

But I would suggest it boils down again to the oil equation, the oil factor in the equation. They have the oil; we do not have a program. We are dependent on the Saudis for oil and, oh, yes, we want to protect that from the Soviet threat because of our interest and because of other interests.

But it seems to this Senator that, try as President Carter may, he just has not made a good case in this instance. It would be my hope, even though the chances are dim, that we would disapprove, we would adopt this disapproval resolution.

I ask unanimous consent that a statement of the Emergency Committee for Middle East Peace be made a part of the RECORD at this point.

There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

#### STATEMENT OF THE EMERGENCY COMMITTEE FOR MIDDLE EAST PEACE

The historic meeting in Jerusalem between President Sadat of Egypt and Prime Minister Begin of Israel was hailed around the world as a great and bold step toward the achievement of a just and lasting peace in the troubled Middle East. But it has been a mere six months since that first meeting and the progress of peace negotiations has been slow and difficult—understandably so, given the long and tragic history of the conflict.

With peace negotiations still in their infancy, we believe that the Administration's proposal to pour billions of dollars worth of advanced aircraft into that volatile area is not only ill-timed but also undermines the prospects for reaching a lasting settlement. We cannot understand what is so compelling about providing these armaments to countries which are trying to forge peace out of thirty years of war.

We respectfully urge the members of the United States Senate to vote against the commitment of this arms package to the Middle East in order to Give Peace A Chance.

Sponsored by: (Organizations listed for identification only):

Dr. Archie Buffkins, Chairman, Executive Board, National Black Think-Tank.

Rt. Rev. John H. Burt, Episcopal Bishop of Ohio.

Mr. David Cohen, President, Common Cause.

Rev. William H. Harter, Sec-Treas. Nat'l Christian Leadership Conference for Israel.

Dr. David Hyatt, President, Nat'l Conference of Christians and Jews.

Mr. Max Kampelman, Mr. Lane Kirkland, Sec-Treas. AFL-CIO.

Ms. Judith Levine-Lichtman, Women's Legal Defense Fund.

Rev. Dr. Franklin H. Littell, Chairman, Graduate Studies in Religion, Temple University.

Mr. Clarence Mitchell, Leadership Conference on Civil Rights.

Mr. Paul O'Dwyer.  
 Sister Daniel Turner, Executive Director, National Leadership Conference of Women Religious.  
 Rev. Dr. Arnold T. Olson, Past President, Nat'l Association of Evangelicals.  
 Mr. Martin Peretz, Publisher, New Republic.  
 Mr. Joseph Rauh.  
 Mr. Leon Shull, Executive Director, Americans for Democratic Action.  
 Rev. John Steinbruck, Pastor, Luther Place Memorial Church, Washington, D.C.  
 Sister Rose Thering, Department of Education, Seaton Hall University.  
 Sister Margaret Ellen Traxler, Past President, National Coalition of American Nuns.  
 Mr. Ben J. Wattenberg, Chairman, Coalition for a Democratic Majority.  
 Mr. Elle Wiesel.  
 Adm. Elmo Zumwalt, President, American Medical Buildings Inc.  
 Mr. Bayard Rustin, President, A. Philip Randolph Institute.  
 Mr. Jerry Wurf, President, AFSCME.  
 Theodore Bikel, Concert Artist.  
 Aryeh Neier, Executive Director, ACLU.  
 Sister Ann Patrick Ware, National Coalition of American Nuns.  
 Professor John Kenneth Galbraith.  
 Dr. James E. Wood, Baptist Joint Committee on Public Affairs.  
 Father Edward H. Flannery.

Mr. DOLE. The resolution I intend to propose, delaying delivery of the aircraft, would not negate the Senate's action in giving tacit approval of the President's arms sales proposal. It simply expresses the sense of the Senate that the President should hold up on actual delivery of the fighter aircraft, whose terms will be laid out in letters of offer, until some form of comprehensive settlement is achieved in the Middle East. This way the F-15's, the F-16's, and the F-5's provided under the current arms sales package could not be used to exacerbate the present tensions in the region.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. JOHNSTON). The Senator's 5 minutes have expired.

Mr. DOLE. I thank my distinguished colleague, and I yield the floor.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?

Mr. BAKER. I yield 10 minutes to the distinguished Senator from Oklahoma.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oklahoma.

Mr. BARTLETT. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senator from Tennessee.

I wish to commend the distinguished Senator from Connecticut (Mr. RIBICOFF) for his remarks which he made in open session prior to the closed session. I did not hear his speech but I read it, and I certainly compliment him for a very fine explanation of his position. I find that I share his position, and I share it with enthusiasm.

I feel the overriding issue that we have is what our perceived actions will indicate to observers around the world.

For many years we have in this body supported the Israeli Government and have talked about a special relationship that we have with this Nation.

Then more recently we have talked about being evenhanded, between our actions with Israel and actions with various Arab countries. So our policy today is one of maintaining the special relation-

ship with Israel and then also being evenhanded with various Arab nations.

I think it is important that we define our meaning of "evenhandedness," in the practical terms of this sale. Some might even consider it in pragmatic terms. But, nonetheless, what we say in defining "evenhandedness" is going to reflect on our credibility in the minds of Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt as well as observers from the rest of the world. So, our credibility is at stake.

Our credibility was at stake in opposing Communist forces in Angola. The question was raised and answered, after the Tunney amendment was adopted overwhelmingly in this body, that we did not have the will to provide opposition to adventurism by the Soviet-backed activities of the Cubans in the now Communist country of Angola.

So I think it is vital that we look to see whether there are legitimate defense needs that Saudi Arabia and Egypt may have, and thereby know exactly where we stand before the world.

The current tactical forces of Saudi Arabia are very meager in comparison with those of Iraq, for example, which certainly poses a threat to them.

I have here a table from the "National Security Challenges to Saudi Arabia" by Dale R. Tahtinen, published in the last month. I ask unanimous consent that the table be printed in the RECORD at this point.

There being no objection, the table was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

TABLE 1		
MIG 23B fighter, ground attack...	90	--
Su-7B fighter-bomber.....	60	--
MIG-17 fighter-bomber.....	30	--
Hunter ground attack.....	20	--
Tu-16 medium bomber.....	4	--
Il-28 light bomber.....	10	--
T-52 light strike.....	20	--
MIG-21 interceptor.....	115	--
MIG-19 fighter.....	20	--
Total .....	369	--
F-5E fighter.....	70	20
BAC-167 ground attack.....	30	11
Lightning fighter.....	37	--
Total .....	137	31

Mr. BARTLETT. It shows a comparison of 369 aircraft, military aircraft, combat aircraft, for Iraq compared to only 137 for Saudi Arabia, most of which are obsolete compared to the latest Iraqi hardware, supplied by the Soviets.

I think this difference shows a great need that the Saudi Arabians have for increased aircraft, for the 60 F-15's.

It has been stated that the Saudi Arabians could use ground forces to defend themselves in the large country that they have, that is over one-third as large as this Nation. But population numbers only 5 million and, hence, can never hope to muster a ground army able to defend the borders of their nation. They need to have a capability to use military hardware, particularly aircraft that fit into their manpower limitations. The F-15, with its modular composition, fits this need very well.

South Yemen has attacked Saudi Ara-

bia three times in the last decade. They have today some 100 military aircraft, including Mig 21's. Saudi Arabia then, has a hostile Soviet-backed aggressor to the south to complement the Iraqi threat to the north.

The sale of U.S. planes in all cases to Egypt and Saudi Arabia will be under our aegis, with a considerable U.S. military presence stationed in Saudi Arabia. This, to counter the claims that the Saudis will have a free hand to transfer or to utilize the F-15's, contrary to sale agreements.

Certainly the French would be quick to sell the Saudis the F-1 right away, if the sale of the F-15's is not a reality. Then they would, I believe, buy the Mirage 2000, and even the Mirage 4000, to be delivered in the early 1980's as a follow-on weapons system. All this, without any restrictions or guidelines concerning their use.

I do not think we can be blind to the pincer movement, an encirclement, by Soviet-supported Communist nations around Saudi Arabia and around Egypt. This includes the nations of Syria, the recent coup in Afghanistan, Iraq to the north of Saudi Arabia, South Yemen, which is used as a staging area, with a considerable Soviet arms depot for the activities in Ethiopia and, of course, in Ethiopia itself.

The adventurism of the Soviets, with the Cubans as their surrogates, started in Angola, was given a green light by the Tunney amendment, and it continues today to be a threat in Africa and in that part of the world which bears on Saudi Arabia and the pipeline by water, by which travel millions of barrels of oil to the West, to NATO, to Europe, and to this country.

The recent CIA reports indicate that the Soviet Union will change from an exporter of oil to an importer by the mid-1980's, and be importing some 3.5 million barrels a day. They have been supplying their Communist satellites with oil, and those satellites are going to continue to want oil from the Soviet Union.

Obviously, the oil-rich nation of Saudi Arabia is weakly defended, and a most attractive property. Oil may be very important to all nations of the world, but of all the nations, it is particularly important to the United States. I think we must acknowledge that the Saudis have been a moderating influence in holding the OPEC prices down, which affect the purchases of oil in behalf of all the nations of the world buying from the OPEC nations. They are delivering much more oil to us, and have been providing us with all of our increases in imports of oil, and they do not want to do that. It is not in their interest, because they have all the money they want. They could easily continue in their development program by the revenues of only three-fifths of what they now export. They want to retain their oil. Certainly their younger people want to have the larger income that would come by inflated sales in the future, rather than today.

But nonetheless, they have recognized that we have a great need for additional supplies of oil, that our economy



needs it and wants it. Hence they have been helping us, through great sacrifice on their part. They have strengthened the dollar by their actions in retaining the large amount of dollars that they have, some \$20 billion worth, rather than dumping them on the market, which they could do at any time if they wished.

So we have a partnership with them. One that works both ways—but certainly I think it works to our greatest benefit. We need to strengthen it and recognize it as being an indication of our credibility as a nation in the Middle East, supporting our friends.

Also, we must recognize that in the littoral states of the Indian Ocean—the United States does not have a military presence of any real significance. We have two destroyers and a support vessel, and these are not supported at any bases among the littoral nations of the Indian Ocean. So the Saudis need to have additional capability, and I believe it our mandate as partner and friend to the Saudis, to provide additional capacity to them.

**THE PRESIDING OFFICER.** The Senator's time has expired.

**Mr. BARTLETT.** I thank the Chair.

**THE PRESIDING OFFICER.** Who yields time?

**Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD.** Mr. President, on behalf of Mrs. HUMPHREY, I ask unanimous consent that Maureen Norton be accorded the privilege of the floor during the debate on this bill.

**THE PRESIDING OFFICER.** Without objection, it is so ordered.

**Mr. CHAFEE.** Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Mr. Kip Hawley of my staff, be accorded the privilege of the floor during consideration of the resolution.

**THE PRESIDING OFFICER.** Without objection, it is so ordered.

**Mr. JAVITS.** Mr. President, I might tell the Senator from Ohio I have first to yield to the Senator from Connecticut (Mr. WEICKER). He will be followed by Senator PERCY, and then by Senator METZENBAUM.

On behalf of the Senator from New Jersey (Mr. CASE), I yield 15 minutes to the Senator from Connecticut.

**Mr. WEICKER.** Mr. President, if there is a person in this Chamber who has not agonized over the issue that confronts us today, I cannot imagine who that person might be. In the simplest sense, we must decide whether to accelerate the arms race in a part of the world sorely in need of peace. While we are struggling desperately ourselves to find an arms limitation agreement with the Soviet Union, we are exporting to the Middle East the philosophy which has led to the world's strategic arms buildup, and has brought us all face to face with the prospect of annihilation.

Within the context of the Middle East, the analogy with the strategic arms race is accurate for there is no meaningful distinction between strategic and tactical weapons in a situation where adversaries are contiguous, where distances are short, where hostility is local and where the difference between a strategic weapon and a tactical weapon is a technological quibble. If we could deal with

this matter in the simplest sense, it would make our task easier.

I think we would say "no." Food for peace, "yes," technology for peace, "yes," cultural exchange, student exchange, trade all of it for peace, "yes." F-15's to Saudi Arabia for peace, "no."

But the issue is not so simple as that, and there are several issues which have brought us to this painful occasion. For Israel, there is one issue, and it is unique. It is survival. No other nation in the Middle East confronts that issue. Israel does. For 30 years, she has called across the deserts "peace," and the answer has echoed back "war."

We have helped to maintain her military strength to cope with that answer. Three times since the war of independence, the need for that military strength has been demonstrated. Should another occasion arise in which Israel is threatened by arms, we must ask how she would fare against the sophisticated weaponry we now propose to place within the Arab States through Saudi Arabia.

For the Arab world, the issues are multiple and complex. The Arab world, as we know, is not a monolith; it consists of a number of nations, some actively hostile to Israel, and others not so much. Among those nations we call the confrontation states, there is a single unifying feature. It is not the Moslem religion nor a common culture, nor a common experience of oppression at the hands of foreign colonizers nor fraternal affinity; it is, bluntly, hatred of Israel.

If I ask myself, "Does this Arab merchant hate the Jewish farmer from whom he buys his produce," I think the answer is "No." If I ask myself, "Does this Arab mother rejoice to know that an Israeli mother lost her son in battle," I believe the answer is "No." And if I ask myself, "Do I truly believe that the Arab and Jew can never live together in 'peace,'" the answer is "no."

Out of what chemistry, then, comes the glue of hatred? As I have said the Arab world is not a monolith. Between the confrontation states, there is competition, conflict, and hostility, and there is competition for leadership in the Arab world. There is conflict over territorial claims.

On this point, consider as one small example the fact that in 1951 when Jordan proclaimed the annexation of the West Bank taken from Israel in 1948, not a single Arab state recognized the annexation. Why? Because none were willing to acknowledge any Jordanian land claim, not even a claim to legitimacy within the boundaries of the territory which the British gave to Hussein's grandfather, Abdullah, when he was thrown out of Saudi Arabia by the grandfather of the present rulers of Saudi Arabia. These are feudal conflicts, and are very much alive today under the thin patina of unity which comes with a common opposition to Israel's existence.

Why, for example, are we told the Saudis need F-15's? Not to war against Israel, but to protect herself against Iraq, another member of the Arab world. Again, these are feudal conflicts, which we now propose to augment with space age weapons.

What sublimates these conflicts? Hatred. Hatred, as a matter of national policy, toward Israel. Upon what grounds has each leader founded his claim to leadership in the Arab world? Upon the extent to which he is willing to act to destroy Israel. Some are more moderate, some more radical, depending on the national circumstances. Some are willing to delay the objective, whether any are willing to forgo it remains to be seen. Anyone who doubts that has simply not been paying attention to the Middle East for the past 30 years.

Opposition to Israel is not, I believe, a matter of personal preference by the Arab people, but a matter of policy established by their leaders, and it has gone on, in one fashion or another, for generations.

When we speak of ending 30 years of hostility, let us remember that what is involved is more than 30 years. It is centuries of hostility to the Jewish people.

And there is wealth as a source of hostility between the Arab nations. Some are rich and some are poor. Those that are rich do precious little to help those which are poor. They are willing, to be sure, to help them purchase arms.

Consider the circumstances of the governments within each of the confrontation states. Each is maintained by force. In Syria, Haddad is a member of the minority Alawite sect. The power he has was taken by force and can be taken from him by force. He is a member of the Baath Party of Syria which is at dagger points with the Baath Party of Iraq.

The eternal attempts of subversion by Iraq make his position more precarious. The litmus test of his authority is his opposition to Israel. Those who apply the test seek the destruction of Israel.

What does this tell us about the prospect of peace between Syria and Israel? Under Haddad almost nonexistent. And should it become a remote possibility, the probability of Haddad's being eliminated and replaced by someone more probably antipathetic to Israel is 100 percent.

Hussein of Jordan has been the target of countless assassination attempts. He is a fortunate man. Consider the fate of his foreign minister, Wasfi Tell, shot down on a sidewalk in Cairo where he was attending an Arab conference in 1971. His assassins knelt down and lapped up his blood.

Consider the fate of the Secretary of State of the United Arab Emirate, shot down at the airport in Abu Dhabi last year. But this was an unfortunate mistake. His assassins had intended to murder the Syrian Secretary of State who was being seen off on his return to Damascus.

King Faisal was murdered in his palace 2 years ago. Is there any guarantee that Saudi Arabia will always have a government which will honor the commitments made by this one?

Cavour said you can do anything with bayonets but sit on them. All these leaders sit on bayonets and rule with the help of arms, including President Sadat. President Sadat has offered recognition of Israel and peace, and that is a positive step, surely. But it is not the millen-

nium. The outpouring of hatred and assassination threats from other Arabs which came on the occasion of his overtures to Israel cannot be taken lightly. The only constitutional democracy in the Middle East, Lebanon, has been destroyed by the Palestinians and occupied by the Syrian Army.

So what is at issue in giving F-15's to Saudi Arabia? The act confers a degree of prestige upon the Saudis giving them a leg up in the struggle for leadership in the Arab world. The act has created, as I have no doubt it was intended to create, a confrontation between Israel and the United States, between American Jewry and the U.S. Government, between what I here referred to constantly as the Jewish lobby and the U.S. Congress. This all confers prestige, indeed.

The planes can make Saudi Arabia an estimable military force in one stroke. I cannot see that the utility to Saudi Arabia of F-15's extends much beyond those things if the Saudis wish evidence of our friendship. Why couldn't they ask for teachers, medical technicians, doctors, agricultural expertise? We would give them all that and more. But, no, they must have 60 of the world's most highly rated fighter bombers.

What is the issue for the United States? The issue is our inability to meet our energy crisis like a responsible people. We have permitted ourselves to fall into a position of dependence, for not only our foreign policy but our most cherished moral values are being held hostage. We have allowed another nation to take responsibility for the health of our own economy, for our energy needs, and for our dollar, and they are charging us the most usurious rate for the luxury of refusing to cope with our own problems.

The exact figures reflecting the degree to which Saudi influence now pervades American society are difficult to come by. The Saudis do not want it known. The U.S. Treasury does not want it known. American banks say privacy laws prohibit their releasing such information. But some studies have been done and some estimates are considered reasonably valid.

The conclusion to be deduced from these are unavoidable and should wave like a red danger flag before every American concerned with the independence at home and overseas of this Nation.

In 1972, the year before the oil embargo, the Arab nations had approximately \$700 million invested in the United States. Currently they have \$55 billion invested in this country, mostly in Government bonds, currency, and stocks, and far and away the largest chunk of that investment is Saudi Arabia. A good deal of the remainder is from Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates, both strongly influenced by the Saudis.

There are those who argue that our dependence upon Saudi Arabia is a specious argument, that there are other sources of oil, that other nations hold more of our national debt. Further, the Saudis would not wish to endanger the safety of their investments here by rash

actions. Yet that very contention betrays the truth of situation.

The Saudis possess a powerful tool and it is their choice and only their choice when or if they invoke it, and a dangerous weapon one nation possesses and another does not, whether it be a nuclear bomb, or oil, or money, changes the relationships between those countries.

I have watched with great interest the speed with which this body has considered this arms sale request from President Carter. It has moved through committee and onto the floor and is about to be decided all in fewer than 30 days. It is, therefore, mystifying to me why a national energy policy is still wallowing in the Congress; 5 months just as to the conference aspect of it.

We would not be debating this arms package today were it not for our energy vulnerability. Only one thing is different between these issues. One requires a price to be paid thousands of miles away by people who do not vote for American officeholders, and the other requires the price to be paid right here by people who determine whether you and I will remain in office or Jimmy Carter stays in the White House. It is a difference as blatant as it is ignoble and it does no credit to us that is the situation.

I say to you that if Washington applied half so much time and pressure to the problem of producing a sound energy program as it has applied to the objective of arming Israel's adversaries we would not be here today meeting on this matter. The question of whether to pay blackmail would have never been raised. What we are asked to do here will bring nothing more than a temporary respite for this Nation, but it will create a permanent danger to Israel. Nor will this Saudi demand be the last. Paying blackmail does not sate the appetite of the blackmailers. It sharpens his appetite.

My friends, if we permit the Saudi Government to guide our hand in drawing the mark of shame upon this body, all the bloodshed it will risk and all the tears we may shed over its almost inevitable consequences will not serve to wash that mark away.

We are told if we do not sell these planes to Saudi Arabia, they will get them elsewhere. This has been the rationale we have used over and over to arm so many nations in the world. This and profit have made us an arms merchant to the world. Let us consider for a moment the pressure which these planes would create on Israel. Israel is a tiny country. She has no great land areas to retreat into, when she fights. She must respond rapidly when threatened. Think how sharply reduced the reaction time would be.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired.

Mr. JAVITS. I yield 2 additional minutes to the Senator.

Mr. WEICKER. We are here today like Robert Bruce upon his bed watching a spider try again and again to fix the line from which he might then weave his fatal web. When the Arabs are defeated in war they can come back again

and again, each time more seasoned, better prepared, and better equipped. They can do it because Israel does not seek to destroy them but to defend herself and to be left in peace. Is that the wish of the Arab States? You know it is not.

Let us turn back from this dangerous course. Let us see our proper place in the circumstances that confront us. One of the great men in the history of this Nation, of this body, Hubert Humphrey said it all. He said:

All of history is a constant struggle for emancipation from fears, from tyranny, from ignorance. We are the emancipators. That is what this is all about, even if we don't recognize it.

That is the kind of role we can play in the Middle East. Moral commitments and moral actions are what this country is all about. It is the state of our spirit that determines the state of the Union, and the state of our spirit today seems to be defined in terms of quid pro quo deals in planes, missiles, oils, and so forth.

I like to think, Mr. President, that the unsophisticated but heartfelt commitment of 1948 better represented what America is all about than the wheeling and dealing of 1978 which suggests that the national posture is kneeling, that the backbone is spaghetti, and that the heart is for sale. I yield the floor.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I thank the Senator for his very illuminating and very eloquent address on what I consider to be the right side of this issue.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?

Mr. METZENBAUM. Mr. President, will the Senator yield to me?

Mr. BIDEN. I yield to the Senator from Ohio 10 minutes on our time.

Mr. METZENBAUM. I thank the Senator from Delaware.

Mr. President, I rise to express in the strongest terms my opposition to the proposal before us today.

I believe that this proposal, which would introduce \$4.8 billion worth of America's most lethal weapons of death and destruction into one of the world's most unstable areas, is based on a shortsighted and exceedingly naive reading of our nation's true interests in the Middle East.

I believe that the proposal represents a turning away by this country from our commitment to the security and the survival of Israel, a nation whose very existence is vital to our interests in the Middle East.

I believe that this proposal will hinder, rather than help, the prospects for peace in the Middle East. I fervently hope that I am wrong in that assessment.

The proposed sale sends a message to all parties in the Middle East.

That message is clear.

It is unmistakable.

It says to the Israelis that they can no longer rely on the one great nation which has stood side by side with them for 30 years. It tells the Israelis that they must turn inward, that they must keep their own counsel, that they cannot



afford to accept outside guarantees where their security is concerned.

Israel, we must remember, was promised U.S. assistance in maintaining her air defenses at the time she agreed to the 1975 Sinai disengagement and gave up to Egypt her control of the strategic Sinai mountain passes and the Abu Rudeis oil field. Our government promised at that time to sell Israel 50 F-15's and 250 F-16's. The present package includes only 15 F-15's, in addition to the 25 already approved, and 75 F-16's instead of the promised 250.

This administration has not kept the promises it made to Israel and it has tied aircraft for Israel to weaponry for her potential Arab adversaries. The message to Israel could not be more blunt. It could not be more clear.

The proposal says something to the Arab world as well. It says to the Arabs that we are so anxious for a settlement in the Middle East that we are prepared to compromise Israel's security to achieve it.

It says to the Arabs that we are so hopelessly addicted to overconsumption of oil that they can hold our foreign policy hostage almost at will if only they will promise that the oil will continue to flow.

It says to the Arabs that there is no reason whatever to settle now with Israel because it is obvious that our support for Israel will become softer and softer in direct proportion to our increasing dependence on Arab oil, to the increasing influence in our economy of the petro-dollars it generates, and to our continued inability to enact and implement a tough domestic energy program.

For both sides in the Middle East, the meaning of the package before us is not one of peace. No one can convince the peoples of the world that selling \$4.8 billion worth of arms to the Arabs and the Israelis will help move us forward on the road to peace. And the people of this country—in a recent national opinion poll—made it clear by an overwhelming margin that they oppose the sale.

Then why are we doing it? Because oil policies once again dominate American policies. Exclude the Saudi oil price and supply pressure, and ask yourself, "Would we ever be considering this proposed package sale?" The answer is, "Of course not."

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the May 1, 1978, issue of the Harris survey be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the survey was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

#### AMERICANS REJECT PLANE SALES

President Carter's plan for selling \$4.8 billion worth of military aircraft to Israel, Egypt and Saudi Arabia meets with a flat 66-26 percent rejection by Americans. The administration's proposal is for a package deal under which all of the countries would receive planes or, if this were rejected, none would receive any.

When the three-country package is unbundled and the public is asked what it thinks of each individual sale, substantial

majorities oppose selling the planes to any of the Middle East powers. By 64-28 percent, a majority is against the sale of the planes to Israel. An even higher 71 to 20 percent majority opposes selling the planes to Egypt. And the proposed sale to Saudi Arabia meets a 73-18 percent opposition.

One reason for this opposition is that a 60-31 percent majority of Americans is consistently wary of almost any arms sale abroad. Another reason stems from a deep feeling that U.S. efforts in the Middle East should be concentrated on making peace, not on escalating an arms race in that region.

Based on these results, it will be difficult for U.S. senators and representatives, especially those up for election this November, to try to defend President Carter's aircraft sales package to their constituents. Of course, under the system now in effect, the President does not need Congressional ratification of such an arms sale. But Congress has the right to vote against it within 30 days after the President decides to make such a sale. In effect, it has a veto power over the three-nation package military aircraft deal. If Congress does not act, then the sale can automatically take effect.

The findings of this latest Harris Survey of 1,199 adults nationwide have serious implications for the three countries scheduled to receive the military aircraft. One might have thought that the Israelis would have been pleased to see such solid public opposition to the proposed Carter package deal since it would allow them to maintain their present air superiority in the areas. But the fact that a 64-28 percent majority opposes selling the Israelis the F-15s and F-16s they want must make them feel uneasy about the American willingness to maintain the flow of weaponry to their country. A U.S. commitment of military assistance has been both an implicit and cardinal assumption of military planning for Israel.

For Egypt, the findings of this Harris Survey suggest that although Americans deeply admire President Sadat's efforts to achieve peace in the Middle East, they reject Egyptian moves to increase its military power. The public is clearly worried about the prospect of military aid being used in another war.

Americans have repeatedly shown their understanding of the key role that Saudi Arabian oil plays in supplying U.S. needs. Many also appreciate the anti-inflationary importance of the Saudi decision to freeze oil price increases for 1978. Despite this, the public is not at all willing to make a deal for better treatment on oil in return for building up the Saudi Arabian military capability with the proposed sale of 60 F-15s.

President Carter, now laboring under a 64-33 percent negative rating, the lowest of his administration, will clearly be courting real disfavor with the American people if he presses forward with this military aircraft sale to the Middle East. Americans took his campaign pledge to decrease the sale of military arms abroad seriously and many will feel that his latest proposal leads straight in an opposite direction.

On April 19 and 20, the Harris Survey asked the cross section:

"President Carter wants to go ahead with the sale of military aircraft to Israel, Saudi Arabia and Egypt for \$4.8 billion. He wants to sell Israel 15 F-15s and 75 F-16s, the most modern jet planes the United States produces. Egypt would receive 50 F-15Es, which are effective short-range fighter/bombers. Saudi Arabia would receive 60 F-15s, a sophisticated long-range fighter. The President wants to sell all of the planes as one package: either all three countries receive their planes or none receive them. Do you favor or oppose this U.S. sale of military planes to Israel, Egypt and Saudi Arabia?"

#### U.S. sale of military planes to Israel, Egypt and Saudi Arabia

	Percent
Favor .....	26
Oppose .....	66
Not sure .....	8

"Now let me ask you about the sale of military planes to each individual country. Do you favor or oppose the sale of these military planes to (read list)?"

#### Sale of military planes to each individual country

[In percent]

	Favor	Oppose	Not sure
Israel .....	28	64	8
Egypt .....	20	71	9
Saudi Arabia .....	18	73	9

Mr. METZENBAUM. This proposed sale does much more than complicate the path to peace in the Middle East. It says to all the nations in the world that our fine talk about reducing our role as the world's leading exporter of the instruments of mass destruction is just that—fine talk. The proposal makes it obvious that we intend to continue to cooperate with the enormous buildup of arms by the oil exporting nations around the Persian Gulf.

This buildup involves the largest overseas military effort by the United States since the end of our misadventure in Indochina, and it may well bring us the same results.

Mr. President, on April 1, 1976, Jimmy Carter, then a candidate for the Presidency, addressed the issue of our country's growing role as purveyor of arms by appointment to the monarchies of the Persian Gulf region.

Mr. Carter said at the time:

I am concerned with the way in which our country, as well as the Soviet Union, Britain and France, has poured arms into certain Arab countries far beyond their legitimate needs for defense. . . . This headlong rush for weapons increases the chances of war. It postpones peace negotiations. . . . It erodes security.

Candidate Carter was right then and his words ring true now.

Yet President Carter is asking us to vote today for the largest single Middle East arms deal in history and one which sets the stage for much larger orders in the future.

In an article that appeared in the May 8, 1978, edition of the Baltimore Sun, Joseph Churba, formerly special adviser to the Air Force Chief of Staff for Intelligence, gave an estimate of the implications of the F-15 deal for further U.S. technology transfer to Saudi Arabia.

Mr. Churba wrote:

Like its predecessor, the Carter administration seeks to obscure the true magnitude of its projected sales to Saudi Arabia.

However, in the absence of official disclosures, it is still possible to discern much from what is left unsaid by the administration. For example, for most effective performance, the F-15 requires the support of sophisticated ground or airborne radar, either the Grumman E-2C Hawkeye or the Boeing E-3A airborne warning and control

system (AWACS) with such support, the F-15 can "lock on" and be directed to targets at ranges over 100 miles. This significantly enhances its capability to control large areas of air space. Therefore, the sales of F-15's to Saudi Arabia would almost certainly be followed by the sale of advanced radar systems. The alternative to AWACS would be ground systems, requiring thousands of American technicians whose continued control by the U.S. Government would be questionable.

I ask unanimous consent that the full text of Mr. Churba's May 8, 1978, article from the Baltimore Sun be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

**ARMS TO ARABIA**  
(By Joseph Churba)

Current efforts by the Carter administration to secure congressional approval for the sale of 60 F-15s to Saudi Arabia is but the latest phase of a long-standing plan for the piecemeal transfer of sophisticated military technology to the Arabs.

The last clash on the issue occurred in September, 1976 when the Ford administration officially notified Congress of its intention to provide the Saudis with \$700 million in weapons, military construction and training. The sale, approved only after the initial requests were substantially modified, included 650 Maverick air-to-surface missiles, 850 Sidewinder (AIM 9-J) air-to-air missiles and 1,000 TOW anti-tank missiles. While significantly lower than the number of weapons originally sought, the deal brought the total planned arms sales and military construction for Saudi Arabia to more than \$7.5 billion in 1976 alone.

Indeed, since 1950, the United States has sold Saudi Arabia more than \$15 billion worth of arms and military construction. All of Saudi Arabia's legitimate defense needs have been met, yet there is no end in sight to the massive transfer of high technology now under way.

Like its predecessor, the Carter administration seeks to obscure the true magnitude of projected sales to Saudi Arabia. However, in the absence of official disclosures, it is still possible to discern much from what is being left unsaid by the administration. For example, for the most effective performance, the F-15 requires the support of sophisticated ground or airborne radar, either the Grumman E-2C Hawkeye or the Boeing E-3A Airborne Warning and Control system (AWACS). With such support, the F-15 can "lock on" and be directed to targets at ranges over 100 miles. This significantly enhances its capability to control large areas of air space. Therefore, the sale of the F-15 to Saudi Arabia would almost certainly be followed by the sale of advanced radar systems. The alternative to AWACS would be ground systems, requiring thousands of American technicians whose continued control by the U.S. government would be questionable.

The General Accounting Office (GAO) has joined the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the Pentagon's Office of Policy Analysis and Evaluation in expressing serious reservations about this sale. The GAO worries that shortages of skilled people in the U.S. military could result from the continued expansion of American advisory and training responsibilities in Saudi Arabia as more and more U.S. technicians were assigned to help the Saudis.

One might add that given the fragmentary structure of the Saudi armed forces, the status of American personnel could be of decisive importance in the event of renewed Arab-Israeli hostilities, an Arab-Iranian confrontation, or an internal coup. The implicit threat of the United States being drawn into

the vortex of domestic and regional squabbles grows with an expanding American presence on the ground.

The dilemma thus confronting policymakers is to choose between the disadvantages inherent in an expanding physical presence in Saudi Arabia and the real threat of compromising the technology of the world's most advanced fighter and airborne radar. A single F-15 Saudi pilot defection either to Iraq or Syria would register a negative effect on NATO's defense. Administration spokesmen have nowhere acknowledged that security in Saudi Arabia is loose and that some of its airport technicians are Syrian, Iraqi and Palestinian aliens who could also be Soviet sympathizers.

The compromise proposal, not to station the F-15 at Tabuq (six minutes flying time from Israel) and to offer a primarily defensive configuration of the weapons on the F-15 is misleading. First, the F-15 has a flight range of 2,800 miles. Even if the planes were based as far away as Riyadh or Dhahran, 900 miles from Jerusalem, they could be flown against targets in Israel without refueling. Secondly, the Saudi, if they so desire, could buy the necessary equipment elsewhere to convert the F-15 for ground-attack missions. Bomb racks are fairly simple in design and easily acquired, as are air-to-air and air-to-surface weapons. There is no effective way to guarantee that the Saudis would not use their F-15s against Israel or transfer them to another country for that purpose. In fact, the Saudis have already trained Egyptian pilots on their American-supplied F-5s, in violation of U.S. law.

As debate on the F-15 intensifies, the administration will most certainly argue that unless the sale goes through, the Saudis will raise oil prices at the next OPEC meeting scheduled in June. The onus for double-digit inflation and unemployment would then be placed on congressional shoulders for "failure" to induce Saudi moderation in oil pricing and production. Yet, if we are not prepared to resist blackmail during the present oil glut, then when? As for the argument that unless the United States sells, the Saudis will buy elsewhere, it is a fact that neither the Soviets, the French nor the British have anything comparable to the F-15. The French F-1 is both less sophisticated and more difficult to fly. And the Saudis are likely to buy F-1s whether or not they get the F-15.

It is disturbing, therefore, to observe this administration manipulating the news, distorting issues of grave consequence and suppressing vital information. It is a further demonstration of the inability of recent presidents to loosen the formidable grip of the Arabist bureaucracy in the State Department and Pentagon.

President Carter's current statements directly contradict his campaign rhetoric: for example, a statement he made April 1, 1976, to the effect that "This headlong rush for weapons (by Saudi Arabia) increases the chance of war. It postpones negotiations. It defers development. It erodes security."

By his actions, the President confirms his true position. His head is buried in the sands of Arabia.

**Mr. METZENBAUM.** Mr. President, it is sobering to note that this one \$4.8 billion arms deal with Egypt, Israel, and Saudi Arabia is in itself three times larger than our military sales to all the world as recently as 1971.

It is shocking to note that, between 1971 and fiscal year 1979, our participation in the world arms trade has grown from \$1.5 billion per year to over \$13 billion. Our arms exports are double those of the Soviet Union and in spite of claims by the administration to the

contrary, there are few signs that we are prepared to abandon our dubious pre-eminence in this field.

On May 12, the Washington Post published an excellent article on our arms trade by George C. Wilson and Laurence Stern. I ask unanimous consent that the text of this article, entitled "The Heightening Paradox of Carter's Arms Policy," be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

**THE HEIGHTENING PARADOX OF CARTER'S ARMS POLICY**

(By George C. Wilson and Laurence Stern)

The words are those of candidate Jimmy Carter in New York City. The date—April Fool's Day, 1976.

"I am concerned with the way in which our country, as well as the Soviet Union, Britain and France, have poured arms into certain Arab countries far beyond their legitimate needs for defense . . . This headlong rush for weapons increases the chance of war. It postpones peace negotiations . . . It erodes security."

Today, ironically, President Carter's proposed \$4.8 billion warplane sales package to Egypt, Israel and Saudi Arabia is being viewed as a major test of his administration's clout in a seriously divided Congress.

In the continuing Washington game of "Promises, Promises"—comparing the president's words and deeds—Carter's pronouncements on the subject of U.S. arms sales abroad probably score as the most contradictory utterances on any issue.

After becoming president, Carter—in his March 17, 1977, speech to the United Nations—reiterated his campaign commitments to throttle down the U.S. role in the worldwide arms race.

" . . . We will try to reach broader agreements among producer and consumer nations to limit the export of conventional arms, and we, ourselves, will take the initiative on our own because the United States has become one of the major arms supplier of the world."

This year, according to Pentagon projections, U.S. arms sales abroad will reach their highest level in history—\$13.2 billion. Next year the total is expected to go up to \$13.5 billion, thanks in part to the new Middle East airplane deal.

In defending his decision to go ahead with the new sales of planes to Egypt, Israel and Saudi Arabia, the president has repeatedly cited the commitments forged by prior Republican administrations whose arms sales policies he campaigned against.

The paradox heightened yesterday when State Department spokesman Hodding Carter read the wording of a U.S.-Soviet communique announcing that the two countries have agreed to confer regularly on steps to cut the sale of arms to Third World countries.

As Hodding Carter was reading the statement at noon he was handed a report that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee had failed to block the president's \$4.8 billion sale of sophisticated military aircraft to the three Middle East countries.

The United States and the Soviet Union are the world's two biggest arms suppliers and overall military spenders, not surprisingly. Between 1966 and 1975 the United States shipped \$34.9 billion in arms abroad and the Soviets \$20.2 billion.

U.S.-Soviet talks in Helsinki May 4-8, officials said, have laid the basis for the first systematic talks between the two superpowers on limiting nonnuclear weaponry. Conceding that this subject has aroused more expectation and less results than almost any other in modern diplomacy, Hod-



ding Carter drily noted, "Experience obviously produces its own restraint on expectations."

In defense of the president the basic commitments for expanded sale of military jets were made during the Nixon and Ford administrations. The great leap was made between 1971 and 1976 when U.S. foreign military sales jumped from \$1.5 billion to \$13.1 billion. Within that period the largest single-year rise came in 1973-1974 when sales—primarily to Middle East customer nations—increased from \$4.5 billion to \$10.5 billion.

From the standpoint of the present administration in Washington, as with its Republican predecessors, the underlying issues in the current warplane sales controversy are political and diplomatic rather than considerations of strictly military security.

The political and diplomatic chits are oil, petro dollars and Israel's influential constituency of supporters in the United States—all of which the president as well as Congress are trying to juggle. It is a minefield of contradictory interests in which it is impossible to assuage all the contending parties. In 1977 Iran, Saudi Arabia and Israel—in that order—were among the top customers for American arms sold abroad.

In its "white paper" on foreign military sales last year the administration gave recognition to the growing reality of the oil imperative. It cited as one rationale for selling weapons abroad the need "to influence the political orientation of nations which control strategic resources."

The white paper, which reflected the more pragmatic approach of State Department director of political-military affairs Leslie H. Gelb and other advisers, also said that the United States "will continue to utilize arms transfers where necessary to promote our own strategic interest . . ."

Such benefits presumably included bolstering the U.S. balance of payments against the drain of increased oil prices and also lowering the cost of new military aircraft development for the Pentagon. When the United States sells weapons such as the advanced F15 and F16 abroad it charges the foreign customer for part of the research expense. Also, the larger the production run, the lower the cost of each weapon.

The sale of such advanced aircraft as the F15 and F16 is a striking departure from the policies of the mid-1960s when the McNamara Pentagon sought to limit sales to weapons with limited offensive capability such as the F5 "Freedom Fighter"—precursor of the far more sophisticated version the president is proposing to sell to Egypt.

But the F15s and F16s destined for Saudi Arabia and Israel are to the F5 as a cannon is to a pop gun. The same observation could be made about U.S. arms sales policy today.

**Mr. METZENBAUM.** Mr. President, I believe that when we consider providing advanced weapons to foreign nations—and our arms exports in recent years have increasingly been top-of-the-line systems like the F-14, F-15, and F-16—we must take the discussion beyond the abstract ideas involved in comparative avionics and military strategy.

We must remember that a plane like the F-15 is not designed as a status symbol. It is not just something to fly over a crowd on this or that country's independence day. It is a lethal weapon, a sophisticated instrument of death.

And where the Middle East is concerned, we must look beyond the assurances given by the nations there that the weapons they purchase are intended for purely defensive purposes. We must remember that those countries have fought

four bitter, bloody wars in the past 30 years.

In Israel's war of independence in 1948, 21,000 Israelis and 40,000 Arabs were listed as killed, wounded, or missing.

The toll for the 1956 war was 1,300 on the Israeli side and 12,735 for the Arabs.

In 6 days in 1967, Israel suffered 5,515 killed, wounded, and missing and inflicted nearly 18,000 casualties on her adversaries.

During the Yom Kippur War of 1973, losses on both sides grew dramatically. As advanced weaponry, supplied mainly by the two superpowers, was tested on Middle East battlefields, Israel's casualties rose to 12,000 in 1973. The Arabs lost three times that number—36,000 men.

And, we must not forget that, since 1965, 1,100 people have died at the hands of Palestinian terrorists and their allies. The victims include Israeli athletes massacred at the Munich Olympics, Israeli schoolchildren slaughtered at Ma'Alot and more than 30 Israeli civilians gunned down by Palestinian raiders in March of this year. They include Christian pilgrims from Puerto Rico, gunned down by Japanese Red Army terrorists at Lod Airport and the German pilot coldly executed by Palestinians at Mogadishu. All the world has suffered from this plague of terror. It knows no boundaries of nationality or language or religion.

If there is a next round of fighting in the Middle East, and let us pray that there will not be, we can be sure that some or all of the weapons we are being asked to approve today will come into play. If we approve this sale, we must be prepared to accept the moral responsibility for its possible consequences.

Mr. President, the administration has gone to great lengths to assure the Congress, the American people, and the nations in the Middle East that the weapons to be transferred to that region, particularly the F-15's, are to be used for defensive purposes only.

We are told that the F-15 is primarily a defensive weapon and that the models provided to the Saudis will not have offensive capability.

We are told that Saudi Arabia requires these aircraft for self-defense and that we should gladly provide the Saudis with them as a reward for Saudi political and economical moderation.

We are told that Saudi Arabia is not a confrontation state, that its air force constitutes no threat to Israel and that the F-15's will not be based at the large new air force facility that Saudi Arabia has constructed within a few minutes flying time of Israel's population centers.

All of these claims are open to serious doubt—so serious that I believe examination of the claims must cause us to reject each and every one of them.

The President and the Secretary of Defense may, for example, sincerely believe that the F-15 is a defensive weapon. But the U.S. Air Force pilots who fly that plane think otherwise.

On April 13, 1978, the Philadelphia Inquirer published an article by James McCartney of that paper's Washington

Bureau, who took the trouble to visit Langley Air Force Base and to talk with the men who know the F-15 best—the USAF officers who stand ready to take it into combat.

Mr. McCartney wrote the following:

Etched on the fuselage of an F-15 fighter plane parked on the tarmac at Langley Air Force Base here is the slogan "The Meanest Man." There is every indication that the description is apt.

The Carter administration is trying to persuade Members of Congress that the F-15 it plans to sell to Saudi Arabia is a "defensive" weapon and thus no direct threat to Israel.

But a close up look at the sleek, silver craft and interviews with the men who fly it for the 27th Tactical Fighter Squadron tell a different story.

They present a graphic picture of the world's finest fighter plane, a plane that can not only "defend" if called on, but also can attack at blinding speed.

"It is blatantly obvious," said Major Steve Demuth, a pilot and Vietnam veteran, "that it can be used for either offensive or defensive purposes."

"It is a political question. It depends on how it is used."

I ask unanimous consent that the full text of Mr. McCartney's article be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

#### F-15'S DEFENSIVE, BUT THAT'S ONLY HALF THE STORY

(By James McCartney)

HAMPTON, VA.—Etched on the fuselage of an F-15 fighter plane parked on the tarmac at Langley Air Force Base here is the slogan, "The Meanest Man."

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But a close-up look at the sleek, silver craft and interviews with the men who fly it for the 27th Tactical Fighter Squadron tell a different story.

They present a graphic picture of the world's finest fighter plane, a plane that not only can "defend" if called on, but also can attack at blinding speed.

"It is blatantly obvious," said Maj. Steve Demuth, a pilot and Vietnam veteran, "that it can be used for either offensive or defensive purposes."

"It is a political question. It depends on how it is used."

That is likely to be a key question in what may become one of the major battles of the year in Congress.

The proposal to sell 60 F-15s to the Saudis for \$42 million each is the most controversial part of a \$4.8 billion administration aircraft "package" for the Mideast. Other elements include 50 far less sophisticated F-5Es for Egypt and 15 F-15s and 75 smaller, but highly sophisticated, F-16s for Israel.

The F-15s for the Saudis, however, have touched the most sensitive nerve. Israel and its friends in Congress have mounted a major campaign against the sale on grounds that it would raise tensions and upset the military balance in the Mideast.

Israeli lobbyists, in a lengthy memorandum for members of Congress, state flatly: "The F-15s would enable Saudi Arabia to strike deeply into Israel."

The Saudi ambassador to Washington has insisted in reply that the F-15s will be used only defensively. The country "Must rely on

sophisticated modern weapons such as the F-15 to defend itself," he has said.

U. S. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance has contended that the sale is necessary to maintain good relations with the oil-rich Saudis and that it would not disrupt the military balance of power. He called the Saudi request "reasonable and in our interest to fulfill."

Since this war of words has opened, few in Congress have stopped long enough to take a close look at the plane itself, at what it can and cannot do.

There are 72 F-15s at Langley, the only combat-ready base in the United States that has the plane. The men here know it well. They fly it every day.

Though the airmen have no desire to be dragged into political arguments, they are familiar with the issues that already have emerged.

What kind of plane is it? What was it designed for and what does it do best?

If the plane is sold for defensive use, how hard would it be to equip it to take the offense?

Does it make any difference where and how the plane is based? If planes were based far from Israel, for example, would that provide some guarantee that they could not be used against the Israelis?

The F-15, built by McDonnell Douglas Corp. of St. Louis, is a pilot's dream. "It drives like a Cadillac," says Capt. Don Waddell.

It was designed to be what the Air Force calls an "air superiority" fighter, which means, as Waddell puts it, "to fight and destroy any other aircraft, to control whatever air space you want to control."

It is fast, able to go  $2\frac{1}{2}$  times the speed of sound (approximately 1,800 miles an hour), and powerful, with two giant turbofan engines, each generating 25,000 pounds of thrust. It will fly straight up. It is highly maneuverable, capable of tight turns without losing air speed.

In modern aerial combat it is agility, not speed, that counts most. Therefore, the plane is designed for quick turns and rapid acceleration, because as was demonstrated in Vietnam, much dogfighting takes place at low to medium altitudes and at subsonic speeds.

The basic armament on the F-15 are guns and missiles to destroy other aircraft. The F-15s at Langley, which defend the East Coast of the United States, are equipped with air-to-air weapons.

State Department officials say the F-15s for Saudi Arabia would be for only this purpose: To defend air space over that country.

But in designing the F-15 as an highly maneuverable, powerful, air combat weapon, the Air Force also created a plane with superb capabilities as an attack aircraft, for air-to-ground strafing or bombing missions. The F-15 can carry 15,000 pounds of bombs and bullets for ground attack.

As the official Air Force fact sheet on the plane states it, even though the F-15 was developed "as an uncompromised air superiority fighter, . . . it contains the structural ruggedness, flight characteristics, survivability features, and equipment essential for the attack mission without modification."

Administration officials have suggested to some members of Congress that the United States might refuse to sell the Saudis gear that would enable the plane to go on ground attack missions.

But converting any F-15 for ground attack missions "would not be difficult if they decided they wanted to spend the money," said Col. Neil Eddins, commanding officer of the First Tactical Fighter Wing here. He and others explained that bomb racks are fairly simple in design and easily fabricated, as are other necessities for ground attack.

All the equipment could be bought on the open, commercial market in the United States.

Col. Eddins said that an F-15, if equipped to drop bombs and to strafe, "would be as good" as the F-4 "Phantom" and probably better.

In addition, pilots here doubt that the capabilities of the F-15 could be limited to any notable extent by agreements to base it far from the Israeli border.

A particular issue has been whether F-15s bought by the Saudis might be based at the Tabuk air base, about 125 miles from the southern Israel port city of Elat.

Israeli lobbyists have pointed out that this is only six minutes' flying time from Israel proper for an F-15, and that the Saudis have other air bases 10 and 12 minutes away.

Vance and the Saudis have sought to assure Congress that the Saudis would not want the planes at Tabuk, or other forward bases, for fear they would provide an inviting target for an Israeli pre-emptive strike.

But pilots here do not believe it would matter much if the planes were based as far away as Riyadh, the Saudi capital, which is more than 800 miles from Jerusalem, or in the oil fields at Dhahran, about 900 miles away.

The F-15 has a flight range, without refueling, of 2,800 miles, and could be flown to a combat zone in a few hours, at most. The planes and all the necessary support are easily redeployed for combat. Therefore, planes based at Riyadh would be moved to Tabuk and ready for battle within 24 hours.

Mr. METZENBAUM. Mr. President, the American pilot quoted by Mr. McCarty was correct in pointing out that the manner in which the F-15 is used—offensively or defensively—must inevitably be the result of political decisions by those who control the aircraft.

Advocates of this sale maintain that Saudi Arabia is a moderate and responsible power. The Saudis, they say, can be counted upon to stay out of any future Arab-Israeli conflict. The Saudis are said to have agreed not to transfer the aircraft to other Arab States and they are said further to have taken a constructive position with regard to President Sadat's peace initiative.

Mr. President, there is no doubt that the Saudis have taken moderate and constructive positions on many issues, though it should also be noted that these positions are very much in Saudi Arabia's own national interest.

There is no question that the current leaders of Saudi Arabia are anti-Communist and that their views in this area stem from deep religious belief. But it is also true that Communist and radical gains in the Middle East and Africa pose a direct threat to the Saudi monarchy.

The Saudis have also been helpful in holding down OPEC oil prices. But again, we must recall that the Saudis have a massive and vital stake in the stability of our economy and in the economies of the Western European countries and Japan without the West, and the United States in particular, the Saudi regime could not and would not exist. The Saudis know that. Only our Government seems not to.

Mr. President, the Saudi record in the Middle East conflict can hardly be called one of moderation, unless, of course, one wishes to compare it with that of Libya, Iraq, or the PLO.

If Saudi Arabia has been of assistance

in furthering the Sadat initiative, that assistance is a very well kept secret. In fact, columnist Joseph Kraft recently wrote that the Saudi have been an impediment to President Sadat in his efforts to reach an understanding with Israel.

According to Mr. Kraft, the Saudis "have opposed the Sadat initiative from the first, King Khalid," Mr. Kraft wrote—

\*\*\* was originally irritated that the Egyptian leader went to the Knesset in Jerusalem at a time when good Moslems were supposed to be wending their way to Mecca. Since then, Riyadh has consistently emphasized Palestinian self-determination. While continuing to subsidize Egypt, the Saudis have also continued subsidies for the most bitter opponents of the Sadat initiative: Syria and the Palestinian Liberation Organization.

"The Saudis," Mr. Kraft continued,

\*\*\* have also used their influence to keep King Hussein of Jordan out of the talks. Now they and Hussein are readying a proposal for a summit meeting of Arab leaders including Sadat and present Hafez Assad of Syria. At that meeting, Sadat would acknowledge that his peace initiatives have been killed by Israeli intransigence and be welcomed back into the Arab fold. That, in effect, would be the end of the peace initiative.

I ask unanimous consent that the full text of Mr. Kraft's column, entitled "The Jet Sales: A Carter Power Play," be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

#### THE JET SALE: A CARTER POWER PLAY

Part of the confusion about the proposed sale of planes to Israel, Egypt and Saudi Arabia is tactical. All the parties are masking their position of trading purposes.

But a deeper and far more serious muddle jumbles the deal to the point of craziness. The sales bear no visible relation either to peace in the Middle East or to defense of the area against the Soviet Union.

With respect to peace, what hope remains springs from President Sadat's visit to Jerusalem. In the subsequent negotiations Egypt and Israel came very close to striking a bargain. The Israel offer to return the whole of the Sinai desert to Egyptian sovereignty stumbled only on the matter of Israeli settlements. That is easy to compromise, as many leading Israelis, including foreign minister Moshe Dayan, have said flatly they will not let the settlements stand in the way of peace.

More difficult is the future of the territories west of the Jordan River, which the Israelis call Judea and Samaria. Prime Minister Menachem Begin has offered self-rule to the Arabs in the area and suspended indefinitely any Israeli claim to sovereignty.

But the local residents who want the West Bank to be the base of a Palestinian state demand the right of immediate self-determination. So the Egyptians, though they do not want a Palestinian state unless it is part of Jordan, have felt obliged to press for self-determination.

In fact, the issue cannot be settled now, and the various attempts by the Carter administration to write declarations of principle were condemned to failure. What can be done is to leave the future open.

The Israelis should add to their present offer a proviso that after a certain period of time there would be genuine self-determination. The Egyptians would accept the decision that self-determination be achieved



only after a period of time. That would close the deal, and as a sweetener both countries could be given the arms they now seek.

The Saudis, however, have opposed the Sadat initiative from the first. King Khalid was originally irritated that the Egyptian leader went to the Knesset in Jerusalem at a time when good Moslems were supposed to be wending their way to Mecca. Since then Riyadh has consistently emphasized Palestinian self-determination. While continuing to subsidize Egypt, the Saudis have also continued subsidies for the most bitter opponents of the Sadat initiative: Syria and the Palestinian Liberation Organization.

The Saudis have also used their influence to keep King Hussein of Jordan out of the talks. Now they and Hussein are readying a proposal for a summit meeting of Arab leaders including Sadat and President Hafez Assad of Syria. At that meeting Sadat would acknowledge that his peace initiatives have been killed by Israeli intransigence, and be welcomed back into the Arab fold. That, in effect, would be the end of the peace initiative.

Authorizing a sale of advanced jet planes to the Saudis, in these circumstances, makes no sense at all. It is a reward for being unhelpful—a death shot at the peace initiative Washington should be trying to keep alive.

As to the defense problem, the Soviet Union is arming the Syrians, the Iraqis, the Libyans and the Palestinians in the Middle East. In the horn of Africa, the Russians are beefing up the forces of South Yemen and Ethiopia. These groups all threaten Saudi Arabia and Egypt and they—at least—pose problems for Israel.

So as part of the continuing effort to block Soviet expansion, the plane sales make sense. But they have not been joined in any coherent relation. There is no provision for an American coordinating role, with a base in the area (perhaps in Sinai) and a command that could organize the anticommunist forces for common action.

What all this says to me is that the plane deal is essentially a power play—a vehicle whereby the administration can win one over the Congress and over the so-called Israeli lobby. The deal does nothing to advance the common defense, and it actually works against the prospects for settlement in the Middle East.

So in my view the House and the Senate ought to do what in their guts and hearts they want to do. That is to force the suspension of all the sales until the Sadat initiative has had a chance to run its course.

Mr. METZENBAUM. I do not believe, Mr. President, that the Saudi policies described by Mr. Kraft smack of moderation. Rather, they indicate that Saudi Arabia is and is likely to remain an obstacle to compromise in the Middle East.

Let us not forget, Mr. President, that Saudi Arabia has never acknowledged the right of Israel to exist.

Let us not forget that Saudi forces participated actively in three of the four Arab-Israeli wars.

Let us not forget that Saudi Arabia is and has been a major force of financing for the PLO—\$48 million in the past year alone.

Let us not forget that when Palestinian raiders attacked Israeli civilians in March of this year, the initial Saudi reaction was praise for the terrorists. Only later did the Saudis issue a statement asserting their opposition to random violence.

And also let us not forget that when Israel apprehended those terrorists, they

found them in possession of U.S.-made weapons with Saudi Army markings.

And let us remember that Saudi Arabia is the leader in enforcing the unconscionable Arab economic boycott of Israel and of Jewish-owned firms and Jewish personnel in third countries.

Furthermore, Mr. President, let us not forget that the Saudi leaders themselves have made repeated statements that contradict the assurances we have received from our own Government about Saudi intentions of deployment and use of the F-15's.

In a letter to Chairman SPARKMAN dated May 9, 1978, Secretary of Defense Brown stated the following, and the quote is familiar to Members of the Senate, because it has been previously read:

The Government of Saudi Arabia has assured us that it has no aggressive intentions against any state, that it will use the F-15 aircraft only in furtherance of its legitimate self-defense and that it will not employ the aircraft offensively. The Saudi Arabian Government has similarly assured us that it will not transfer the F-15 aircraft to any third country or permit the nationals of such country to train on the F-15 aircraft, serve as pilots, or otherwise to have access to the aircraft without the authorization of the United States.

But there is evidence that Secretary Brown's understanding of the conditions attached to the sales does not match that of Saudi Arabia's leaders.

On April 21, 1978, for example, the French magazine, *Paris Match*, carried an interview with Saudi Crown Prince Fahd, who stated his country's position as follows:

Saudi Arabia allocated all its forces and strength to bring about victory of the Arab rights, their honor and all that is sacred in their eyes. . . . This means that the task entrusted to our army is not only to protect the kingdom, but that it could intervene anywhere that our national duty commands. Our army was in Syria; we have units in Jordan. . . . All this shows our readiness. (Prince Fahd, incidentally, will most likely be Saudi Arabia's next ruler.)

Earlier, the Christian Science Monitor quoted Defense Minister Prince Sultan as asserting:

All we own is at the disposal of the Arab nations and will be used in the battle against the common enemy.

Saudi Defense Minister Prince Sultan told the Arab Week Events of December 3, 1976, that as far as conditions on re-exports and transfer without prior agreement, "There were never such conditions and we do not accept such conditions."

And on Friday of last week, May 12, CBS news broadcast an interview by Walter Cronkite with Foreign Minister Saud Faisal in which Foreign Minister Saud stated that Saudi Arabia would only accept a limitation on F-15 deployment "That is of general applicability" and is "not aimed individually at Saudi Arabia for a specific requirement." "As far as I am concerned," he said, "why should Saudi Arabia be the sole country to have a condition imposed upon it that no, you can't put this plane on this base or on that base."

Why indeed. And why, I wonder, does

our Government feel that it is necessary to make claims about Saudi intentions that the Saudis themselves have repudiated time and again? And how do we reconcile the White House statement that Prince Saud's comments do not contradict Secretary Brown's letter with the statement itself and with similar remarks by Prince Fahd and Prince Sultan? Who, in other words, speaks for Saudi Arabia? Is it the Saudi leadership? Or is it the Carter administration?

Mr. President, I believe that the arms sales before us today are a serious mistake.

I believe that they could have devastating consequences for our friends in the Middle East, Arab, and Israeli alike.

I believe that they enhance the danger of war in the region, that they make a mockery of our commitment to controlling weapons exports and that they threaten to embroil our country in conflicts beyond our control and contrary to the wishes of our people.

I will vote against these dangerous sales, Mr. President, and I hope that a majority of my colleagues will see fit to join me and to do what they know is the right thing. Mr. President, I am firmly convinced that to vote against these arms sales is to vote to give peace a chance in the Middle East.

Mr. HOLLINGS addressed the Chair. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?

Mr. HOLLINGS. Mr. President, under the previous arrangement with the Senator from Tennessee, I have 5 minutes. I yield myself that 5 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina.

Mr. HOLLINGS. Mr. President, I rise to oppose the resolution of disapproval because I believe that the arms sale to Israel is really in the best interest of Israel, that the sale to Saudi Arabia is in the best interest of Saudi Arabia, and that the sale to Egypt is in the best interest of Egypt.

The one great bone of contention, namely, the sale of F-15's to Saudi Arabia, was considered by this Senator at a time earlier this year when we visited Saudi Arabia with a delegation of some five Senators. We had a chance to be present and to discuss it. It was not part of a package. And we generally agreed at that time that it was in the best interests of the United States. Historically, Saudi air defense requirements were studied by American military experts in 1973, 1974, and 1975. President Ford committed to it in 1976 and in January of this year, just preceding our visit there, the commitment was reaffirmed by President Carter.

So we have a somewhat similar situation to the Panama debate—not 12 years and four American Presidents, but at least 5 years and two American Presidents, of both parties.

I think what we have, in essence, is a very sincere and statesmanlike stand taken by the Senator from Connecticut (Mr. RIBICOFF). I wish we could have all been in the closed session. I commend him for his courage on his stance on this particular point.

Mr. President, I come to this particular position with some misgivings about the concerns of my constituency in the State of South Carolina. As in Panama, I sure did not have a majority here. A majority of friends of Israel who speak at this particular time have some misinformation, in my opinion. But they also have some very valid points. With the limitation of time, there is one distinguished friend of mine, Samuel J. Tenenbaum, whose views I would call to your attention.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD his letter to me on this particular point.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

LETTER FROM SAMUEL J. TENENBAUM

One of the reasons for the serious opposition to the Carter arms deal for the Middle East is that it is perceived as a one way deal for Saudi Arabia and that a total shift has happened within the Government of the U.S. concerning Israel. It is as if a tidal wave of fear has struck those of us who happen not only to support Israel but who also have a love for her. Not only are we concerned with this shift of policy from Israel but we are concerned that our own government has lost the proper perception of the Middle East due to the petro dollar and oil or better yet the "Golden Calf." Big bucks seem to be the great hypnotizer of the policy makers of our government.

If you examine the Carter arms deal, one sees many faults in it; not only because of the potential harm to Israel but that we (the U.S.) could have or still can help the peace process with certain demands or qualifications or whatever you would like to call them to the arms package. One may want to use the word linkage between the U.S. Government and its Middle Eastern friends but we seem to be throwing away a grand opportunity by not linking these ideas to the arms package. Let me state a few.

EGYPT

Do we have a firm commitment from President Sadat to begin a true negotiating process without his media histrionics? We should! Not only should we have that commitment but there should be public comment from him (Sadat) reaffirming this commitment and that these new arms will not be used against Israel for he has forsaken war. Also Mr. Sadat should be pressuring privately or publicly King Hussein to join with him in negotiations with Israel. For one of the real reasons the talks broke down in January was that Sadat had gone as far as he could probably go without some one representing the West Bank area. Also the U.S. should put immense pressure on Jordan to join the negotiating process without his usual preconditions of give me everything back first, then we will talk. I think one other thing all these Arab countries around Israel can cease and desist with immediately is the hate and venom that still spews forth in the printed media and electronic media, particularly radio. Also Egypt could go as far as requesting Israel to grant her press an open door policy as he would do for her press. If these things could begin immediately, then a process or processes of peace will begin to develop in the over all societies and peace will be given a chance.

SAUDI ARABIA

This nation is one of the keys if there is to be peace and we, the U.S. must link not only our arms sales but our technology, our food, and others to the peace process. The Saudi Arabians must understand that our

relationship is two-way street and that they need peace and stability more than anybody since they have successfully transferred so much of the world's wealth into the hands of the few. Also since we are told by so many persons that the Saudi Arabians are a moderate force, let them begin to demonstrate this so-called moderation immediately by (1) to cease and desist from financing "terror international" through their P.L.O. connection. You know the P.L.O. is for the Soviet Union its Middle Eastern destabilizer as the Cubans are in Africa for the Soviet Union.

The Saudi Arabians, as Egypt did, should openly state Israel's right to exist and then very privately begin to meet with Israel leaders somewhere on our small planet. They should openly or even privately pressure King Hussein to join Egypt in negotiation with Israel without pre-commitments. With Saudi Arabia joining with Egypt, Jordan in a true peace process, then Syria must decide if she will be a rejectionist state in the Middle East or join the civilized club and then peace will have a chance. Saudi Arabia must cease and desist with all its anti-Israel and anti-Jewish propaganda.

If as John West and our State Department are correct about Saudi moderation, then let the Saudi Arabians demonstrate in these tangible areas. We in the West have suffered enough with their continuing financial hijacking.

Senator, if we could get our Arab friends on this track, then the arms deal becomes palatable, but as the President sent it to the Senate, it should be disapproved.

Mr. HOLLINGS. Mr. President, Mr. Tenenbaum points out the things that I would have if there is to be a linkage, namely, that there be a greater effort on the part of Mr. Sadat privately or publicly to have King Hussein join in the negotiations and that if we have linkage, then let us link not only arms sales, but technology, food, and other things in the peace process.

These are important matters that should be pursued, and I intend to pursue them with the administration.

It is not a military question. We have a good time here playing war, as Senators always do. We did it for 10 years in Vietnam. As to what balance it would make, stone walls do not a prison make, and 60 F-15's does not make anyone a power. But they do have to have some front line of defense out there.

The question is a matter of faith and trust. It is a matter of credibility and of respect. It involves the symbolism and the reality of the United States as a friend, maintaining its credibility in the Mideast and maintaining its influence in trying to influence the peace process.

I want to take issue with the so-called CIA estimates of Saudi Arabia. The worst case I can possibly take is the statement made by the CIA that one-third of these planes could be used against Israel. Let us admit that, because the Senator from Nebraska (Mr. ZORINSKY) is present and put out a public statement to the effect that is why he cannot support it.

Of course, I do not support these sales to get some weaponry against Israel. But certainly, if we turn this down, rather than have F-15's delivered in 1982, 1983, and 1984 of a defensive nature, and limited to 60 (with 15 of them being trainers, leaving 45 F-15's) then we will have, this year—this year, Mr. Presi-

dent—a delivery of 60 F-1's from the French.

They say it is not the time now. They all want to talk about arms sales, the sudden urge to control arms in the Mideast, and so we have this in the Senate. But the fact is the French have been negotiating for quite some time. Some say now is not the time, but if we delay this now, the Saudis will immediately take the French upon their contract for these, and give them the billion dollars to gear up. This is Saudi Arabia.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's 5 minutes have expired.

Mr. HOLLINGS. I have 2 more minutes from the majority leader. That will be my total time.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator may proceed.

Mr. HOLLINGS. Then, Mr. President, the Saudis would also gear up for the F-2000's and have attack planes instead of defensive planes. And yet we hear, "Now is not the time."

The fact of the matter is that they would cut back in Saudi Arabia in drilling the oil, some 5 to 9 billion barrels. They would take some \$80 billion in American dollars invested in the United States and transfer these to deutsche marks.

But, more than anything else is the argument of a Senator about a coup. I do not know how to better erode the leadership, such as it is in Saudi Arabia, than to tell their military that the United States does not trust them, that they cannot get the United States to go forward on their commitments.

I do not know how better to endanger the monarchy in Saudi Arabia than to turn this down. Nothing could promote a coup any quicker.

I am thoroughly convinced, Mr. President, that the best interest of Israel is that these sales be approved.

The final question is, yes, if the Soviets went in and took over those oil fields, certainly the United States would go in, too, and we would have world war III. But if they were taken by way of coup or covert activity, the question is whether this U.S. Senate and Congress would move, and there would be grave doubts there.

So I think very seriously that we who support this particular sale to Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Israel are acting in the best interests of the United States of America, No. 1, and Israel's interests, No. 2.

I yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?

Mr. BIDEN. I yield 5 minutes to the Senator from Rhode Island.

Mr. PELL. I thank the Senator from Delaware.

Mr. President, there are five reasons why we should not approve this sale.

First, it is not the time to send the weapons in, while we are in the very process of peace negotiations. It will not move forward the peace process one whit and could increase the intransigence on each side.

Second, I do not think it is the place to send the weapons. It is a volatile area,



with already a fair amount of sophisticated weapons; and to send the same sort of weapons in there is like seeing a fire and trying to put it out with gasoline. It is not going to increase the ease of making it a more peaceful situation.

Third, it is not the kind of weapons we should be sending in there. They are sophisticated. They are going to increase the arms potential of all the countries that receive them. It will just require that they be balanced by other sophisticated weapons furnished to their neighbors by other powers.

Fourth, we hear about the Saudi assurances that the weapons will not be used for aggressive purposes. Four years ago we saw what happened with Turkish assurances that they would not use their weapons for aggressive purposes. Yet, in spite of the fact that they are still doing so, the administration is of the view that we should ignore that fact that they are using their weapons for aggressive purposes in the occupation of Cyprus, and give them more weapons. The same argument could be used with respect to Saudi Arabia. They will give us assurances that they will not use the weapons, and the time will come when they will use them, and we will forgive them.

Assurances do not mean too much. We have seen a country that is an honorable and a staunch ally, such as Turkey, violate those assurances because they considered it in their national interest to do so. I regret to say that history shows us, as a general rule, that when a nation thinks its interests run counter to a treaty obligation or assurance, a national interest, as interpreted by that country, will prevail, and that will happen in this case.

Fifth, the bottom line here is the security of Israel. What we are concerned with is that that country preserve its independence and its viability.

Thirty years ago, the United States played its role in founding that country. Why did we take a leading role? Because a very few years earlier, we had been part of the general world community that turned its backs on the problems that were going on in Europe, the holocaust that was going on there. We turned back a vessel with more than 900 Jews on it, sent them back to Germany, to be slaughtered.

At the Avion Conference, prior to World War II, the Western nations gathered to decide what could be done about the resettlement of the Jews. Hitler wanted them resettled and removed. The rest of the world was uninterested in their problems. He took his cue from that, and that is why the holocaust came.

We must be sure that that never could occur again. It is for that reason that anything that detracts from her security, to my mind, would be a bad idea.

For these five reasons, I hope that this motion to disapprove is agreed to.

I support the resolution of disapproval of the sale of fighter aircraft to Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Israel. As my colleagues are aware, the vote that was held last Thursday in the Foreign Relations Committee on the substance of this resolution resulted in an 8-to-8 dead-

lock. The full Senate must now decide this issue without the benefit of a recommendation from the committee.

In my view, these sales should be rejected for two reasons. First of all, now is the worst possible time to be shipping arms to the Middle East. The Israeli-Egyptian peace talks are stalled, and I do not see how increasing the level of arms held by Egypt and Saudi Arabia can possibly further the cause of peace. The time to consider such sales, if at all, should be only after some real progress has been made in achieving peace. On January 24, I and six other Senators wrote to President Carter urging him, at a minimum, to delay the sale to Saudi Arabia until the outcome of the Israeli-Egyptian talks was clearer. I continue to believe that that is the correct course of action and that it should apply to the sale to Egypt as well.

Second, I am deeply concerned about the size of the proposed sale of super-sophisticated F-15 aircraft to Saudi Arabia. The sale of 60 of these aircraft goes well beyond the need to replace the 37 aging British Lightning aircraft now in the Saudi inventory. Even the U.S. Air Force survey team that in 1974 recommended the sale of advanced aircraft to Saudi Arabia only recommended providing 40. While I appreciate the President's gesture in offering to increase the number of F-15's provided to Israel, a better approach would have been to decrease the number of aircraft provided to Saudi Arabia rather than increasing the total number of sales.

Furthermore, the restrictions to be imposed on the use, basing, and equipment to be provided in connection with the sale to Saudi Arabia do not impress me. In particular, the Saudi assurances that the F-15's would be used only for defensive purposes are insufficient. Turkey violated a similar pledge in invading Cyprus in 1974, and Saudi Arabia could do the same. In this connection, I was struck by the fact that many of the administration spokesmen who testified before the Foreign Relations Committee in support of the sale to Saudi Arabia were the same ones who also testified that the arms embargo against Turkey should be lifted because it was ineffective in persuading Turkey to stop its illegal use of U.S.-supplied arms in the continued occupation of northern Cyprus. With that kind of precedent established, why should the Saudis be afraid of violating a similar promise to use U.S.-supplied weapons for defense only?

Finally, I would like to comment on the Foreign Relations Committee's decision to include all of the proposed aircraft sales, including those to Israel, in a single resolution of disapproval for consideration by the full Senate. It was the unanimous view of the committee that the Senate should act on these proposed sales in the same manner that they were submitted by the administration; that is, as a package. These proposed sales should have been submitted separately, to be considered individually on their own merits; but unfortunately the President chose to do otherwise.

Although Secretary of State Vance made a gesture in the direction of sepa-

rating the sales in his letter of April 28 to Senator Church, the administration in effect still preserved the package approach by saying that the President reserves "judgment on the ultimate action to be taken until he has had an opportunity to review the action taken by the Congress on each of the separate certifications." Although Israel, as the only Middle Eastern nation whose very existence is threatened, can certainly justify its need for additional aircraft, I reluctantly concluded that in the face of the reality that the President was maintaining his package approach to these sales that it would be best for the Senate to meet the challenge in the form that it was presented to us.

Israel and its many supporters in this body as well as in the country at large should not, therefore, interpret a rejection of the entire package as a sign that Israel's defense needs are not fully appreciated. In fact, it is my impression that Israel is prepared to forego its share of the package if that is necessary to prevent an increase in the Arab military threat.

In conclusion, I urge my colleagues to give peace a chance by supporting the resolution of disapproval reported by the Foreign Relations Committee. Only by such action, will a clear message be sent out that we believe more negotiations, not more arms, are the key to peace.

Mr. Percy addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Illinois is recognized for not to exceed 5 minutes.

Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, I have served with Senator JAVITS and Senator RIBICOFF in the Senate for many years. Very seldom have we seen them differ on important issues, but on this vital issue they have evaluated it differently and have come to different conclusions.

I returned from Chicago today. Some of the leading members of the Jewish community in the State of Illinois have seen this issue differently, though the great majority are on one side of it. We have, therefore, an issue in which Americans of good will, earnestly wishing to serve first the interests of their own country but also the interests of our friends and allies abroad have evaluated the same set of facts and have come to different conclusions. They do so with an earnestness of purpose that I admire and respect.

I am supporting the proposed sales of military aircraft to Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia as being in the best interest of both the United States and Israel, though I respect the feelings of those who disagree with me. My decision is based on testimony on all sides of the issue before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, on discussions with the President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Acting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Director of Central Intelligence, with representatives of the three countries and delegations from the Jewish communities of Illinois.

I know that my decision is unpopular in the Jewish community where the overwhelming majority is opposed to the

sale of planes to Saudi Arabia. Frankly, despite my decision, I understand why those who have the strongest emotional attachment to the State of Israel would be concerned about the provision of combat aircraft to a neighboring Arab State. They do not want Saudi Arabia to have the capability of inflicting casualties on Israel.

Neither do I. That is why I have urged from the beginning that there should be no bomb racks on the F-15's and that the planes should not be stationed at Tabuk, the only Saudi military airfield close to Israel. The administration and the Government of Saudi Arabia have now in recent days agreed to these conditions. Moreover, the Saudis have said clearly that they only intend to use the planes for defense of their country.

On the question of transshipment, the Saudis have made a commitment to the U.S. Government that they will not send the planes to any other country.

Saudi Arabia has not been a confrontation state and has participated in the Arab-Israeli wars only to a minimal extent. Having shown this restraint in the past, and being a supporter today of the Sadat-Begin peace process, Saudi Arabia has demonstrated that she will not make a rash judgment which could lead to her destruction. Were Saudi Arabia to threaten Israel, all know that Israel could inflict unacceptable losses on Saudi Arabia.

In view of this and the hostility toward Saudi Arabia from neighboring radical, Soviet-backed Arab States, there is credibility in the Saudi insistence that they need these modern planes for defense of their oil fields.

Actually I think the F-15's in Saudi Arabia will pose more of a problem for Saudi Arabia than for Israel. I have advised the Saudi Government that, in time of war, I think Israel would be tempted to take out the F-15's immediately, lest they be used against Israel. If they were so used, their survivability in combat with Israeli planes or flying over Israel's sophisticated air defenses would be very poor. The response I received was that Saudi Arabia does not think of the planes in the context of the Arab-Israeli dispute, that Saudi Arabia needs the planes to protect their oil fields which are far removed from Israel.

I think the demonstration we have had earlier today of a very severe and real threat to Saudi Arabia makes it crystal clear that Saudi Arabia has a legitimate need to provide for its defense.

Before coming to a decision, I had considered the possibility of opposing all the sales at this time when the Israeli-Egyptian negotiations may be resumed. After all, it defies logic to sell armaments to both sides when they are engaged in a peace process. However, those who argue that the plane sales should be postponed until there is progress toward peace also defy logic by saying in effect that we should reward the making of peace by sending weapons of war.

Ultimately, the knowledge that Saudi Arabia could obtain F-1 fighters from France almost immediately—followed by the highly sophisticated Mirage 2000's and 4000's later—was more compelling to

me. If the Saudis were going to get their planes anyway, how could we fairly deny the planes proposed for Israel and Egypt? Yet the administration has said it would not send the planes to Israel and Egypt if Congress denies them to Saudi Arabia.

Moreover, it is true that it is better for Israel and the United States if the Saudis receive their planes from us, rather than the French. This way we have control over the details of the planes' configuration, their auxiliary equipment, the provision of spare parts, and a commitment against transfer of the aircraft to confrontation states. If the sale were to go to France, the French—who do not have our national commitment for Israel's security—could be expected to provide their planes without any restrictions whatsoever. The French, unlike us, have no regulations against transfer of planes to another country. Furthermore, the French would sell more planes, if the Saudis wanted them, than the United States is prepared to sell. And the French are not expected to specify that the planes should not be based at Tabuk, only minutes from Israel.

Another factor is the importance of keeping Saudi Arabia as a Western ally which acts with a moderation and understanding that has prompted President Carter to say "No other government has been more helpful to me than Saudi Arabia." The Saudis have supported the Sadat-Begin peace initiative, have tried to restrain other OPEC countries from further major increases in oil prices and have given Egypt the financial support which enabled President Sadat to withdraw from the Soviet embrace. The Saudi influence helped to keep Syria from interfering with the Israeli incursion into Lebanon. The Saudis chose long ago to be friends of the United States.

For all these reasons, and because no Saudi military threat to Israel is conceivable in view of the Saudis' small population and inadequate technological and industrial base, I am voting for the arms sales.

With regard to Egypt, the case has been well stated by President Carter in a letter addressed to each Senator dated May 12, 1978, a portion of which I quote:

The choice is stark and fundamental. Shall we support and give confidence to those in the Middle East who work for moderation and peace? Or shall we turn them aside, shattering their confidence in us and serving the cause of radicalism?

It is my considered judgment that the aircraft sales to Egypt are essential to enable President Sadat to continue his efforts for peace. At great personal and political risk, President Sadat has taken an initiative which has created the best prospects for peace in the Middle East in three decades. With similar risks, he has turned away from a relationship with the Soviet Union and placed his trust in the United States.

To reject the proposed aircraft sale to Egypt would be a breach of that trust. Such a rejection would be a devastating blow to President Sadat, to the military forces of Egypt, to the people of Egypt, and to the forces of moderation in the Middle East.

Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, none of us can foresee the future or read the minds of those whose actions will determine the future. Therefore, we cannot claim in-

fallibility in our judgments. However, we have a duty to take the facts available to us and to reach decisions. I approached the problem of the plane sales with an open mind and no predisposition except to decide on the basis of maintaining American influence in the Middle East and doing what I considered would be best on balance for the United States, Israel, and the peace process.

These will continue to be my criteria in judging Middle East issues.

Mr. CASE. Mr. President, I yield 15 minutes to Senator Packwood.

Mr. PACKWOOD. Mr. President, we have heard a good deal in the debate today about ethnic politics, about the loyalties of people, and whether they are to this country or to some other country. We have heard them sometimes if not in a harsh tone at least in a negative tone.

Yet, I do not recall anyone in this Chamber or in this country saying that when the people in this country whose ancestry was from Eastern Europe opposed the Helsinki accords, which ratified for all time the de facto World War II Eastern European boundary positions—I did not find anyone in this Chamber or anybody else saying that those people of East European ancestry were a Polish lobby or a Czechoslovakian lobby or a Bulgarian lobby. They were Americans who had a legitimate interest in the country of their ancestry.

I have not heard anyone in this country accusing the Americans of Greek ancestry in this country of being disloyal Americans because they are upset with the Turkish invasion of Cyprus.

Nor has anyone accused the blacks in this country of disloyalty because of their natural affinity for the cause of human liberties in Africa. Nor did anyone criticize those of Hungarian extraction in this country who were quite upset about the return of the Crown of St. Stephen to Hungary.

All of those groups are loyal Americans who put America first, but they have understandable interest in the homeland of their forefathers.

It is with sorrow and disgust, therefore, that I hear the State Department time and again refer to the Jewish lobby or the Israel lobby in a tone suggestive of a group which puts the interests of another country ahead of the United States. There is nothing disloyal about a love of one's roots.

This is a State Department, I might add, that is still run with the philosophy that has not changed in half a century. This is a State Department that never murmured a word of discontent when Iraq was created from part of the old Turkish Empire that Britain and France took over after World War I. Nor did the State Department worry about whether the Jews in Baghdad wanted the State of Iraq created. Nor did this State Department worry about the repression of the rights of Jews in Iraq. Nor did the State Department complain when Syria was created or Jordan was created or Lebanon was created specifically as a quasi-Christian country because of a strong Christian enclave around Beirut.

This is the same State Department that never said a word about encourag-



ing the United States to take refugees in 1937 and onward when Fascists around this world were repressing the Jews, never a murmur.

Never a murmur from this State Department, not until 1947, when the United Nations created the State of Israel, did we hear a murmur of discontent from the State Department. They opposed the creation of the State of Israel.

The papers that have been revealed in the last 6 months indicate that Secretary of State Marshall felt strongly about it, so strongly that he toyed with the idea of resigning as Secretary of State over the issue of the creation of the State of Israel. It was only the courage and tenacity of Harry Truman who stood by Israel that allowed that state to be created with our blessing.

Now it is 30 years later and the State Department is again winning. They have somehow hornsogged this President into swallowing their line.

No one should be surprised, it is not a new position for them. It probably will not be a new position for them 20 or 30 years from now, and I tell this Senate 20 or 30 years from now Israel will still exist, but with no help from the State Department.

Last month I was in Israel, and I had the unique opportunity to go into southern Lebanon while the Israeli forces still had control of the territory of the Litani River.

For all of the prime ministers you can meet, ministers of defense, ministers of justice, there is nothing quite as good as looking at the territory so that you understand what you are talking about.

I remember being on a hillside not a mile and a half from the Khardali bridge an hour after the Swedish truck had run over a land mine and one Swede had been killed and another injured. I went farther down the Litani and was looking over the Qaaquayet bridge which the Iranians hold, again with a pair of binoculars, not a mile and a half from the bridge. I was struck by the similarity between a story in the Washington Post today and some notes from my diary which I try to keep daily. Let me read first from my diary:

We went to look over the second bridge on the Litani, the Qaaquayet bridge. The Iranians were supposed to be guarding this bridge. As I looked at it through the binoculars, there was a PLO bunker on the other side. The escort officer pointed it out to me. You could see that there were PLO in it because every now and then you could see the glint of sunlight off of the metal which you would assume to be a rifle or machine gun. That was on the north end of the bridge. On the south end where the Iranians were supposed to be patrolling it, I could see no Iranians. A road came off the bridge and then curved 90 degrees to the right and about 300 yards down the road was an Iranian outpost. For the life of me I don't see how the Iranians could see anybody if they were crossing the bridge.

In the Washington Post this morning there is a story called "Doubts Grow on U.N. Role in Lebanon," and referring to the Iranian troops I quote:

Iranian U.N. troops are "pretty good," a military source said, but he added that the

unit guarding a key crossing point over the Litani River into the heart of south Lebanon, has been "fairly ineffective. The Palestinians go trudging across the bridge and they just wave at them."

I was also struck by a comment in the Post today as follows:

Other U.N. elements also have some difficulty. Some units don't speak English, Arab, or French. So they have a communication problem. Others have complained about a lack of clear instructions in military planning.

On the same day that I looked over the bridges, after I had returned into northern Israel, I met with a Norwegian major who was in charge of the unit that was going to take the place of the Swedes at the first bridge. I asked him what his orders were, could he shoot back if shot at. The French were guarding a bridge close to Tyre. They said they only had the right to shoot in self-defense. The Norwegian major said, and again I am quoting from my diary:

They could shoot in self-defense and carry out their "terms of reference."

By that I assume he meant his orders. But he said he had not seen his terms of reference yet.

So an Israeli lieutenant said, "What will you do if PLO starts to cross the bridge and they are armed?"

And the Norwegian said:

Well, you've got to understand we don't know these people like you do. How do we know what a PLO is? We don't even speak their language.

That is the situation Israel faces every day. By the action that we are apparently going to take tonight we are going to make their security and their safety one bit weaker. The State Department will have succeeded again.

It is unusual. This is a State Department that very wisely, I thought, crowded with elation when President Kennedy managed to force the Russians to turn their ships around and take their missiles out of Cuba so Cuba could not shell the United States. We said that for our peace of mind and our security we cannot tolerate missiles in an island 90 miles away. But when Israel tries to go into southern Lebanon to destroy missile sites shelling from a mile-and-a-half away, killing Israel's citizens, this State Department says, "No, Israel, you cannot do that. You do not have the same right of self-defense that we claim for ourselves, and we will make the situation that much more difficult by giving 60 F-15's to Saudi Arabia."

Mr. President, Saudi Arabia does not need the F-15's. In and of themselves they do not need them for their self-defense. Whatever problems they may have in terms of internal security, whatever problems they may have with dissidents, whatever problems they may have with revolution are not going to be solved with F-15's. They may need Piper Cubs and halftracks and machine guns and walkie-talkies, and the ability to search house-to-house, but they are not going to do that with an F-15.

The State Department says over and over there is going to be economic consequences if we do not sell the F-15's to

Saudi Arabia. They might cut off our oil or raise the price. It has only gone up six times. They might raise it again. If that is what our friends do to us, raising the price of oil six times, thank God our enemies do not control all the oil. But there will be economic consequences.

Do you know what that reminds me of? When one reads the book "A Man Called Intrepid," William Stevenson who was in charge of all intelligence gathering for the British, was working in very close cooperation with Franklin Roosevelt and several people in our War Department, behind the backs of our State Department in 1939 and 1940 because the State Department could not be trusted. They had an ambassador in Great Britain who was pro-German.

We had Germany sweeping all across Europe. Only Britain was left. Do you know what the argument was given by those who did not want us to go to England's aid? There would be economic consequences.

Mr. President, what about the moral consequences?

The Founders of the country said that he who would trade liberty for security will lose both.

Now, we are going to trade integrity for energy. We will again lose both.

There has been a great celebration in this country and in Israel and in other areas around the world because this is the 30th anniversary of the creation of the State of Israel. The slogan of its creation was "Never again." Never again would a people be left without a homeland, someplace to flee when they are repressed by their indigenous governments.

We have, however, forgotten another anniversary. This year is the 40th anniversary of Munich. I would have thought from Munich we would have learned "never again." Never again will we appease someone who says, "All I want is the Sudetenland. All I want are F-15's." Next year when our integrity is gone we will have nothing left to trade. The demands are not going to stop with these planes or with this country. If we approve the sale of these planes tonight it is not just a sad day for Israel; it is a sorry day for America because we will have forgotten the lesson of Munich and instead we will now have to learn the lesson of Riyadh.

Mr. STEVENSON addressed the Chair. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?

Mr. STEVENSON. Mr. President, I have 5 minutes. I yield myself 5 minutes.

Mr. CASE. Mr. President, I suggest that the two Senators decide which 5 minutes go first.

Mr. HANSEN. I yield to my good friend from Illinois.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Illinois is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. STEVENSON. I thank my friend from Wyoming.

Mr. President, our founders reposed responsibility for the conduct of foreign policy in the President. They recognized that the day-to-day protection of U.S.

interests in the world required constant attention, a discernible purpose and a deft hand for nuance and foreign sensibilities, as well as a capacity for secrecy.

The arguments for congressional circumspection are stronger today than in the beginning because events move with a greater rapidity, and we sometimes act before the passions and distempers subside. Issues are more complex and less intelligible to 535 individuals who make up a Congress surfeited by domestic problems and political pressures. The stakes are larger in a nuclear world. But the seamy events which pass under the rubric of Watergate have diminished the public's confidence in the Government and left the Congress more tempted than before to do the popular thing. Vietnam brought on the temptation to hold the President within bounds. And so the Senate is today, as it did not over the long course of history, acting to disapprove arms sales country-by-country, blocking arms for Turkey in indignation over their abuse, while Members applaud the sale of arms to Israel, ignoring its invasion of Lebanon. In days ahead we will debate efforts to politicize the international monetary system in the name of human rights and cut off credits for the Union of South Africa, while extending them to the People's Republic of China.

I am not sanguine about the congressional conduct of foreign affairs.

Traumatized by Vietnam, the Congress cut off funds for the victims of Soviet-Cuban aggression in Angola, inviting an ancient Russian imperialism elsewhere. Ethiopia followed predictably, only to be met by more U.S. irresolution. South Yemen is already a Russian beachhead opposite Ethiopia on the eastern side of the strategic Red Sea. The historic Russian interest in warm water ports, and a presence in the Middle East and Indian Ocean, frustrated by internal weakness and external resistance, may be realized in our time. Afghanistan has moved within the Russian pale. Pakistan is shaky, India ambivalent. The dynamics of Iranian politics are not easy to divine, but that country is subject to destabilizing influences from hostile sources in Iraq, as well as Russia.

The President's indecision over the neutron bomb, the clash between reality and rhetoric over arms sales and human rights, the inability to defend the dollar, to adopt an energy policy or otherwise offer the world political and economic leadership is making a reality of that apparition the unlamented Mr. Nixon most feared, a pitiful, helpless giant.

Congress has reacted, not to history, but to the aberrations of history with such "reforms" as this which afford opportunities for congressional disapproval, country-by-country, of sales of arms, instead of procedures which establish broad criteria to be followed by the President in the conduct of foreign policy. Foreign policy is a fit subject for debate, and this would not be such an unhappy situation, if the Congress was fit for the debate.

This debate proceeds from the curious notion that F-15's in the hands of Israelis are defensive while in the hands of

Saudis they are offensive. It is colored by fears rooted in centuries of tragedy and isolation. It is not easy to debate this issue rationally, bending minds to fact and reality and to the Nation's interest. Those centuries will not be superseded by a millennium of peace in the Middle East and a free, secure, prosperous Israel overnight no matter what we do, but they could be prolonged by what takes place in this cockpit of emotion and expediency, as well as wisdom and courage.

It is said these arms sales will alter the military balances in the Middle East. According to the best sources at our disposal, that is not true. The Israelis have enhanced their military superiority since 1973. And according to these sources it is possible the proposed sales will enhance it further. Every plane in the highly competent Israeli Air Force can reach Tabuk, so it is not likely the Saudis will station the F-15's there. Transfers are next to impossible since the trained pilots and support systems are not available elsewhere. Indeed, 15 of the F-15's destined for Saudi Arabia are for training, and the support systems will require an American presence which would not be available in the event of hostilities with Israel. The Israelis are not similarly handicapped and could acquire bomb racks which would turn the F-15's into more formidable weapons. It already has 25 F-15's.

The more serious complaint is that the peace process will be upset by the introduction of these arms on both sides.

Mr. President, there is no peace process in the Middle East to upset. The Sadat initiative was flawed from the beginning, though few acknowledged as much. If it had a premediated purpose, it was to win the public relations contest to which this issue has been reduced. Now both sides posture before cameras to influence the American public, having concluded that is the way to influence the American Government. What peace process can a decision to sell arms to Egypt and Saudi Arabia interrupt? It is more likely that the sales will make a peace process possible. What process would be possible if the United States spurns the most powerful and moderate Arab forces in the Middle East—both still seeking friendship with the West and resistance to Russian adventurism? Any process which did follow a U.S. decision to cut off the Egyptians and the Saudis would lack the influential participation by the United States. The radical/rejectionist elements in the Middle East would be vindicated, their authority enhanced. Others less attentive to the requirements of regional stability and Israel's security would move in to become the suppliers of arms. And what little the arms for Saudi Arabia and Egypt lost in quality would be more than compensated by their enhanced quantity from other sources and their ready integration with the forces of other Arabs.

Is the conduct of the new Government of Israel, including its pretext for an invasion of Lebanon, its calls for "liberation" of greater Israel and its settlement policy in the West Bank, to be rewarded as the Arab moderates are repudiated? Our commitment to the survival of Israel

is unequivocal. But that does not mean Mr. Begin, right or wrong. Israelis themselves are protesting that the government of Mr. Begin seeks territory, not peace. Are we to be more acquiescent than the Israelis themselves?

A decision by the Senate to disapprove the sales would send a message to the world. The President has been rendered powerless, it would be said; the President is without the confidence of the Congress; the Congress subordinates national interest to political expediency. That would be the message. The United States would be seen as incapable of resisting Russian imperialism anywhere. This event would be piled upon the mounting evidence of national impotence and irresolution. It would be said in the world that it is necessary now to accommodate the interests of the world's one great power—the Soviet Union.

Tangled in the tragedy of such a decision for America is the irony for Israel. The survival of Israel cannot be reconciled with the appeasement of Russia in the Middle East. Israel's oil comes in the main from Iran. That source should be made secure. And that will not happen, except by stability in the Middle East, including U.S. guarantees of Israeli sovereignty and regional counterweights to deter and, if necessary, prevent more subversion and aggression. It has been suggested that Israel with all its might, by far the strongest Middle East power, could serve such a strategic purpose—the defense of the Middle East. Such fantasy is the product of a fear and isolation which blinds intelligent people to the most obvious reality. Israel is the adversary of the Arab Middle East; it is not and cannot be, its defender.

The emotions stirred by the prospect of arming Israel's enemies are understandable. The President's position is not the easy one, and we in the Congress are always tempted to take the easy way out. It would have been best long ago to cut off arms to all sides, but that was not easy either. Instead we poured the arms into Israel, deferred peace negotiations, let the elapse of time without movement toward peace heighten the influence of the most radical elements in the Middle East. Now the region is critical to the stability of the world and the survival of the West. And we dare not take the easy way out again.

We should support the President. It is past time we began to reestablish American authority in the world, and it is past time the process of peace began. These sales would undermine the rejectionists of peace. They could win some respect for the United States from those who seek economic and political stability through moderation and are prepared to accept the right of all, Israelis and Palestinians included, to exist in peace and with a right to determine their own peaceful destinies.

The United States has no commitment to sell Israel all the arms it wants and none to others in the Middle East, as has been suggested. There was no such commitment in the Sinai agreements. Fearing such misunderstanding, some of us were at pains during the Senate debate



over the Sinai agreements to make the obvious more so. There were no such promises—and even if there were, they would not be binding on the United States.

Our commitment is to the national interest—and it would not be served by repudiation of the President and friendly, moderate forces in the Middle East.

National interest is best served by a show of some resolve in the face of Arab rejectionism and Russian imperialism. History would not deal kindly with an America that repudiated its friends and its own interests for what is perceived to be indecision and expediency.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Wyoming is recognized. He would be next in order. He had given way to the Senator from Illinois.

Mr. HANSEN. Mr. President, I would like first to yield to the Senator from North Carolina.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Wyoming has 5 minutes.

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, the sale of the F-15 fighter aircraft to Saudi Arabia is related to a very real question about the role of the United States in world affairs.

Therefore, the sale should not be viewed solely in light of a possible conflict between Israel and its neighbors, Saudi Arabia among them. The defense needs of Saudi Arabia should be considered in the light of the fact that Saudi Arabia is a prime target for Soviet military and economic planners. Oil from Saudi Arabia and its neighbors is the lifeblood of Europe's economy. Additionally, Saudi and Middle Eastern oil increasingly supplies America's growing energy needs.

Saudi Arabian willingness to peg oil prices to the dollar, and Saudi's reinvestment of U.S. oil dollars back into the American economy, have helped stem the tide against the dollar on world money markets. The direct consequences of our domestic fiscal and economic mistakes, in effect, have been softened in no small part by Saudi Arabian economic friendship.

Saudi oil resources are valuable—indeed vital—to the industrialized West. Because of this, Saudi Arabia is a prime target for the Soviet Union and its surrogates. As such, Saudi defense needs are great.

Where do the threats to Saudi Arabia come from?

One need only look at recent Soviet-backed activities in the area to find the answer.

Ethiopia, a former ally of the United States, is now well inside the Soviet camp. Soviet bases there—air, naval, and troop—pose an immediate threat to Saudi Arabia.

The so-called People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, a radical Arab State used as a training ground for terrorists, is ready and willing to supply guerrilla troops for use in a so-called "war of national liberation" in Saudi Arabia or any other oil-producing Arab State.

Iraq and Syria continue to be supplied by the Soviet Union with modern weaponry, including aircraft.

Finally, there is great concern with

what appears to be a Soviet policy of encirclement of oil-producing Arab States. I refer here to recent Soviet-sponsored activities along the shores of the Indian Ocean.

Soviet sponsorship of the new Marxist regime in Ethiopia is well known to all Americans by now. Additional Soviet activities in the Horn of Africa have raised grave concerns in the minds of responsible Western leaders, not only in the United States, but in Europe too.

The rapidity with which the pro-Soviet communist faction in Afghanistan overthrew the neutralist government there caught the West by surprise.

The signal that the coup in Afghanistan sends to nations along the Indian Ocean littoral is not a good one. Nor does the U.S. nonresponse engender confidence in the minds of our allies in the area.

Who is next, nations are asking? Pakistan? India? Iran? Saudi Arabia?

While such concern may seem far-fetched to Americans thousands of miles removed from the scene, we can be sure that these fears are legitimate and of real concern to leaders of the nations involved.

Has the United States given up? Will the United States stand by its allies and its commitments in the area? Will we aid Pakistan? Are we willing to send in troops or a naval force to defend our allies against the Soviet-backed onslaught?

These are real concerns for the people on the scene. Who can say with full confidence that there are not leaders in the area, including our friends in Saudi Arabia, who now are wondering whether or not they might be allied with the wrong nation?

For the Saudis, these questions are real ones. Why, Saudis are asking, continue to support the U.S. dollar or make Saudi oil available to the West when the U.S. Congress seems about to refuse Saudi Arabia vital weaponry it feels strongly it needs to provide for its national defense?

They ask, is Israel's defense the only legitimate defense need in the Middle East?

Anyway, is war between Israel and Saudi Arabia really that imminent—or even probable?

A STRONG COMMITMENT TO ISRAEL AND OUR ARAB ALLIES

Let me be clear about my personal commitment to the defense of our allies in the Middle East, Mr. President. Israel is one of those allies, and our Nation's commitment to Israel's defense and national sovereignty is a continuing obligation that must be met, as is our commitment to Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and other friends in the area.

WHO DETERMINES THE DEFENSE NEEDS OF AN ALLY?

Therefore, our decision on the F-15 must be made in terms of the defense needs of each of our allies—needs as our allies perceive them in light of the particular threats to their national security; and, of course, as we judge those threats to exist.

No one nation in the area should determine the defense needs of another.

Therefore, Saudi defense needs and how the United States helps meet those needs should not be determined by Israel any more than the Saudis should determine Israel's defense requirements and how the United States should meet those requirements.

We must do all that we properly can as a nation to help meet the legitimate defense needs and requirements of all of our allies in the Middle East. Our commitments there are strong; our ties are deep and longstanding.

Because of the nature of our arms sales, when the United States supplies any nation with its weaponry, it also must—of necessity—supply spare parts necessary to maintain fragile and sophisticated U.S. weaponry; and technicians, to train local personnel in the use of our weaponry and often to operate vital logistical back-up for the weaponry supplied.

Therefore, the U.S. Government, and the Congress, exercise a substantial amount of control over the use of the weaponry we supply.

If a nation become too belligerent, the United States can cut off its logistical support and supplies, and soon render that nation's U.S.-supplied weaponry ineffective.

Therefore, the use of weapons supplied by the United States can be restricted. For example, we can suggest that the Saudis base the F-15 in the south of their country, near their greatest threats, and away from Israel.

This is to the advantage of the Saudi Arabians in any event. Why? Because Israel has made it very clear that if a war is imminent and the Saudis possess the F-15 aircraft, the Israelis will knock out the Saudi F-15 force in a preemptive strike at the outset of any war.

WAR IS NOT THE ANSWER

The outlook of the Israelis and the Saudis has changed, respectively, since the 1973 war.

War between these two nations—who now have a real stake in preventing war—is much less likely now than it was just 5 years ago.

Nor is the United States likely to allow a situation to develop leading to war between two allies as important as Israel and Saudi Arabia. This is especially true when we control much of the weaponry that both sides to a potential conflict rely upon.

WHAT MIGHT THE SAUDIS DO IF WE REFUSE THE F-15 SALES?

Denying the Saudis the F-15, as promised by two Presidents, can lead to serious complications. What happens if the Saudis are denied the F-15? There are several possible alternatives open to the Saudis, none of them leading to a peaceful settlement of the Middle East's many problems.

Denying this sale, I submit, can be very destabilizing in the Middle East.

Why?

The Saudis have determined that an advanced fighter aircraft comparable to the F-15 is vital to their national defense and survival.

They have the dollars, billions of them, to purchase such aircraft, for cash. There are aircraft in the world that are comparable to the F-15. The French Mirage is one such aircraft that readily comes to mind, of course.

Additionally, if such comparable aircraft do not now exist, they can be developed. I submit that the French—always proud and independent of U.S. control—would like nothing better than to sell the Saudis their Mirage jet aircraft. This aircraft, I might add, is not only a defensive fighter aircraft, as is the F-15, but it also is an offensive weapon, both a fighter aircraft and a bomber.

I further submit that the French would be very pleased indeed to have a large infusion of Saudi billions to develop a new fighter-bomber that is in every way better than the F-15. For the French, the research and development spinoffs would be great. A new aircraft of this type would upgrade significantly the French defenses. The billions of dollars that sales of these aircraft would generate for the French economy would be most welcomed, indeed.

To the French, there are, then, nothing but advantages from such a deal with the Saudis. Because the economy of France is smaller than that of the United States; and because France is much more heavily dependent on Saudi petroleum than is the United States, the stabilizing influence that France could exercise over potential Saudi adventurism in the Middle East is greatly reduced.

The leverage the Saudis could have over the French would preclude action by the French to exert a pacifying influence on the Saudis in the face of radical Arab demands for a holy war against Israel.

The French simply do not share the same interests as the United States in the region.

Therefore, forcing the Saudis to go elsewhere to purchase weapons—in this instance, the F-15—which they clearly intend to obtain, is potentially very destabilizing for peace in the Middle East. Immediately, Israel is the loser. Ultimately, the United States and its European allies are the losers. Valuable constraints that the United States could exert on the Saudis not to go to war against Israel would be lost.

#### A WORST CASE SCENARIO

Saudi purchases of advanced weaponry from the French is potentially destabilizing enough. But there is a worst scenario.

What if the Saudis decided that trends in world power relationships do not bode well for them as long as they are an ally of the United States?

After all, they might conclude, what kind of ally is the United States if it will not even help Saudi Arabia defend itself, a much weaker commitment than that which the United States has made to Israel?

Could not Saudi strategists conclude that it might be more in the national interest of Saudi Arabia to make its peace with the Soviet Union, and move

under the protection of the Soviet defense umbrella?

As remote as we might wish this possibility to be, such an occurrence cannot be ruled out. If the Saudis were to move into the Soviet camp, the West may as well write off the Middle East. And its oil.

For Europe, such an occurrence would mean that it is only a matter of time before Europe, too, moves into the Soviet economic orbit.

#### LET'S HELP ALL OF OUR ALLIES

Mr. President, I wish that there were no need for any weapons to be supplied to any nation in the Middle East: not to Saudi Arabia; not to Egypt; not to Israel.

Unfortunately, we do not live in a world which allows the granting of this most desirable wish.

Israel needs our advanced aircraft for its defense against Soviet-backed radical Arab activity. Egypt needs our F-5E aircraft for its defense and security, especially with regard to radical neighbors like Libya to the West, and Soviet-backed regimes to the South. And, Saudi Arabia needs our F-15's.

The U.S. commitment to Israel's defense, security and national independence is such that Israel need never again fear for its security and safety. Billions of U.S. dollars in direct aid and credits, and the strong sentiment of the Congress attest to that commitment.

Yet, the same kind of commitment does not flow to our allies, Saudi Arabia and Egypt. For one, their constituency in the United States is not as great as that of Israel.

Therefore, they must take more unilateral action—without the special commitment of the United States that Israel enjoys—to provide for their own defense against a number of potential enemies. They have sought our help in providing for their national defense, since we are their allies.

As we find it in our national interest to continue to supply advanced U.S. weaponry to Israel to aid in Israel's national defense; so, too, we hold it in our national interest to provide Egypt and Saudi Arabia the aircraft that they need to provide for their national defense.

Our resolve to protect Israel continues. So should our commitment to help Egypt and Saudi Arabia defend themselves.

Mr. HANSEN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may yield to the Senator from Oklahoma without losing my right to the floor for the remainder of my time.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection.

Mr. BELLMON. Mr. President, the proposed sale of aircraft to Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia is a matter about which I claim no special expertise. However, as long ago as June 2, 1970, I spoke on the Senate floor urging a more even-handed U.S. policy toward efforts to establish a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. It appeared to me at that time, and succeeding events have reinforced the impression, that peace in the

Middle East could not come through force of arms. Rather, a negotiated settlement must be worked out which will assure the survival and economic health of Israel and at the same time provide reassurance against further military conquests to Israel's Arab neighbors.

In a floor speech on June 2, 1970, I took the position that "the illusion that superior Israeli military power will overwhelm the Arab nations" is dangerous. Mr. President, as I further stated in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, page 17798, June 2, 1970:

Experience should show that this policy will not succeed. This was evidenced by the November 1956 Israeli war. Nothing was settled by that war. The Government of Israel felt that because of the interference of the United States and the Soviet Union, Israel was denied the fruits of victory. More important, Israel seemed to think that its military superiority has not been clearly demonstrated, since the Arabs seemed convinced that the Arab defeat was caused by the intervention of British and French forces.

Again, in June of 1967, war was believed to have settled the issue once and for all. In the aftermath of the Israeli's 6-day victory there was euphoria generated by the belief that the Arabs had finally been convinced of the futility of armed confrontation with Israel, and that the Arabs would thereafter submit to the fate which had befallen them. However, we have seen that neither of these wars brought the desired settlement that Israel sought, they did not bring peace to the area, and ironically, the vanquished powers seemed even more determined to strike a belligerent pose and regain what they believe to be their just rights.

Mr. President, I submit that these assumptions by Israel are ill founded—that no war, regardless of the damage it may cause to the Arabs, will bring about tranquility and peace, that greater destruction wrought on Arab States will be fruitless. In the light of past history, the present policy of the Government of Israel is wholly unrealistic and it could in the long run cause great harm to the very fabric of the State of Israel. A country which was formed on the noblest ideals of Judeo-Christian tradition cannot forever withstand the daily stress and demands required in a perpetual armed camp environment. Indeed, there are many friends of Israel who are fearful that the constant need to demonstrate military prowess will render the nation into a modern Sparta, a nation devoid of a soul.

The Arabs have also entertained certain illusions. Regardless of the merits of the arguments of the Arabs concerning the establishment of the State of Israel, the Arabs must realize that Israel has a right to exist and no responsible country in the world would be prepared to relinquish its moral obligation to maintain the independence and existence of Israel.

In any analysis of the Middle East situation, a certain burden for the lack of resolution in this matter must rest with the world powers. The actions of the Soviet Union in this area have often been baffling and at times have shown a total lack of concern in using their influence to bring about a just and lasting settlement. At times it also appears that the Government of the United States either through its preoccupation with other areas of the world or with unnecessary sensitivity toward domestic political issues, has missed opportunities to exercise its full powers and failed to maximize its efforts to bring about peace following the June 1967 war. Furthermore, our pronounced support of the November 1967 resolution has often not



been pursued with sufficient resolve and diligence.

In the interest of peace, the leaders of the belligerent countries must act to dispel long held illusions and arrive at a settlement of the conflict.

Mr. President, this is the first time since I have been a Member of the Senate that the United States is taking an even-handed position so far as arms sales to the Middle East is concerned. In my judgment, this action, which does not jeopardize the security of Israel, will help create a more favorable climate for negotiations and assist in the achievement of a lasting peace settlement. So long as the United States has been perceived to be primarily concerned with the security and survival of Israel, our credibility as an honest broker is impaired. The approval of this sale should make it plain that, while the U.S. interest in peace in the Middle East is in no way diminished, we are willing to be helpful to our friends on both sides of the question.

Mr. President, to those who are troubled that the sale may touch off an arms race in the Middle East, let me only say that it is my feeling that it will have exactly the reverse effect. There has long been an arms race in the Middle East but the contestants have not been competing on an equal footing. Therefore, neither side has been as receptive to a peaceful settlement as the world interests would mandate. This sale should give the Arabs the confidence they need to negotiate on equal terms toward a peace settlement and should encourage the Israelis to place less reliance on the strength of arms.

Therefore, Mr. President, I support this sale as a move in the direction of a lasting peace.

Mr. HANSEN. Mr. President, I rise in opposition to Senate Concurrent Resolution 86, a resolution of disapproval of proposed aircraft sales to Israel, Egypt and Saudi Arabia.

After listening to the debates on the floor today, it seems quite apparent to me that the key issue of the resolution concerns the proposed sale of 60 F-15 aircraft to Saudi Arabia.

No one questions the proposed aircraft sales to Israel, which are needed for that country's defensive needs and to maintain its political integrity. Few question the proposed aircraft sales to Egypt, particularly in view of the fact that the Egyptian Air Force has heretofore been mainly equipped with Soviet-supplied aircraft and weapons systems which are becoming obsolete and short of replacement parts. As further assurance, it has been noted that the capabilities of the F-5 aircraft are limited, of short range, and designed primarily for defensive operations.

The main controversy centers on the proposed sale of 60 F-15's to Saudi Arabia chiefly on the grounds that there is a possibility that this highly sophisticated aircraft may be employed someday in the future against Israel. But we may ask, are these fears justified?

Concerning the prior Arab-Israeli wars,

I think it should be noted that Saudi Arabia has not participated significantly in any of these wars against Israel. In fact, the Saudi's small military force would not be a serious military factor.

From its own defensive needs, the Saudis must provide and improve their own present air defense by the early 1980's in view of the fact that their present Lightning interceptors are being phased out.

I read carefully the May 9 letter of Secretary of Defense Brown addressed to the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, Senator SPARKMAN, concerning the proposed military uses to be put by Saudi Arabia of the F-15 aircraft. In his letter, Secretary Brown discusses defense needs and outlines a number of restrictions the United States is placing on the aircraft's range, weapons systems, and deployment. The basis for this proposed sale, as Secretary of State Vance confirmed is that "the Saudi Government has a legitimate requirement to modernize its very limited air defense."

Secretary Vance went on to state that:

Saudi Arabia is of immense importance in promoting a course of moderation in the Middle East—and more broadly in world affairs as in petroleum and financial policy.

I share that view.

In the petroleum field, I should like to note a few facts concerning our dependence on Saudi Arabia as a major oil exporter.

At the time of the 1973-74 Arab oil embargo, the United States was importing about 6.5 million barrels per day of crude oil and refined products. About 1.5 million barrels per day were of Arab origin.

Last year the import rate was 8.5 million barrels per day and the Arab countries, principally Saudi Arabia, are now furnishing 3 million barrels per day.

Saudi Arabia alone is supplying us almost as much oil as all of the Arab countries in 1973-74.

Finally, we all know that Saudi Arabia has been an effective moderating influence in the OPEC price negotiations.

In the financial field, Saudi Arabia has been a substantial contributor and strong supporter of the World Bank, the IMF, and various foreign aid programs. The extent of these activities and the scope of the Saudi's contributions to other countries, particularly black Africa, is not generally known.

Today our colleague from Connecticut (Mr. RIBICOFF) spoke most knowledgeably of the worldwide contributions made by the Saudis to petroleum production, to international banking institutions, to the Eurodollar, and in foreign aid, and of the Saudis initiatives taken to promote peace in the Middle East.

As we are debating the merits of the proposed F-15 aircraft to Saudi Arabia, I read with interest an interview published in this morning's Washington Post of Prince Saud of Saudi Arabia which took place in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.

In this interview, Prince Saud points out a number of activities and interests that Saudi Arabia is actively participat-

ing in to overcome Soviet and Cuban intervention in various African countries. Prince Saud states his concerns over the initial Soviet intervention in Angola that has expanded to Zaire, Ethiopia, and the recent coup in Afghanistan. Prince Saud then goes on to describe how the Saudis are increasing their financial assistance to pro-Western states now coming under the Soviet-Cuban challenge. While there are no published final figures, it has been estimated that Saudi Arabia distributed \$6.6 billion in aid last year for certain selected African countries.

I will also hasten to say that Prince Saud is reported as quite critical of the lack of strong leadership and efforts by the United States to meet the Soviet and Cuban challenge in Africa. On this point, in my view, his criticism is well taken.

I believe that a strong case has been made for the sale of 60 F-15's to our reliable ally and firm friends, the Saudis. I would hope that the aircraft sales to all three countries, Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia may proceed accordingly under the President's program.

As Senator RIBICOFF pointed out so persuasively earlier today the sale of these military aircraft to Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia is an emotional issue. But it is also a military, economic, and diplomatic issue which affects the vital security of the United States.

The question we must now decide, Senator RIBICOFF continues, is what is in our best national interest.

On that basis I shall vote to reject the resolution of disapproval.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. GLENN). The Senator's 5 minutes have expired. Who yields time?

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I yield 10 minutes or less to the Senator from Nebraska (Mr. ZORINSKY).

Mr. ZORINSKY. I thank the Senator from Delaware.

Mr. President, the timing of the announcement of proposed jet aircraft sales to Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia could scarcely be worse. In the midst of a fragile truce and delicate discussions to achieve peace in the Middle East, the administration has thrust a divisive and destabilizing weapons controversy. At the same time the administration is urging Israel to accept American proposals as "perhaps the only possibility" for advancing peace, it is also trying to persuade Israel and a dubious Congress to accept changes in the military balance of power in the Middle East.

Accusations that the administration is abandoning our Nation's 30-year commitment to Israel border on recklessness. Equally dangerous are assertions that the proposed shift of U.S. arms policy in the Middle East will not threaten the security of Israel. Though I do not believe the President intends by the proposed arms sales to weaken the security of Israel, I fear this will be the consequence.

Never before has the United States tied the supply of arms to Israel to the supply of arms to its adversaries. And,

contrary to the assurances of the administration that the aircraft will be used for defensive purposes, Prince Turki Al-Faisal stated that the planes could be used to support other nations friendly to Saudi Arabia. The Prince who is the national security chief for Saudi Arabia, made this statement here in the Capitol at a luncheon attended by 20 Senators, including myself.

The situation in the Middle East is fraught with dangers. Those dangers will not be lessened by the sale of advanced aircraft to Saudi Arabia, a nation which does not recognize the right of the State of Israel to exist. If the proposals were only for arms to Egypt and Israel, I would still question the timing, but I would be supportive. The Saudi sale injects destabilization and threatens Israel just as we are trying to give both sides the confidence with which to achieve a lasting peace.

Negotiations for a peace settlement appear at a stalemate with intense pressure on both sides to return to the bargaining table. In such a delicate climate what can be the motive in creating an arms sale controversy? Is the administration attempting to force Israel to make further concessions for peace out of fear that its Arab neighbors, armed with advanced United States aircraft, will be in a stronger bargaining position in the early 1980's? If such is the aim of the administration, it is misguided.

The proposed aircraft sales to Israel were promised for past concessions, past moderation. To demand now a double measure of concessions is cruelly unfair. The demand is also counter-productive. An arms sales controversy is likely to guarantee not peace, but hostility and polarization. Even if peace were achieved in such a climate of fear and mistrust, its chances of survival would be slim.

The proposed aircraft sales to Saudi Arabia are touted as a reward for moderation. Though I recognize the importance of Saudi support of Egypt and of recent restraint in oil pricing, I believe both these points need further scrutiny. We are shortsighted if we see Saudi support for Egypt as hard evidence of moderation. The Saudis supported Egypt when it was less moderate, and the Saudis have their own interest in maintaining a stable Egyptian Government. More to the point, the Saudis also support Syria and the Palestine Liberation Organization which have not been moderating forces in the Middle East.

In the oil market the Saudis recently have helped to hold down prices and maintain production, but only after quadrupling prices and finding that moderation in oil pricing was in its own best interest.

If oil is our motive, then the proposed arms sales are a throw-back to the Kissinger style diplomacy of promising everyone everything, and of valuing expediency over principle. Apparently, the former Secretary of State now opposes the timing of the sales, while continuing to support the package he helped to create. As a Democrat frequently re-

mind of my Republican background, I can sympathize with the administration, but I also recall the promises of a principled foreign policy that helped to bring the present administration to office. The United States has long worked to advance its interest in a Middle East peace through a commitment to support Israel. Our interests and our commitment are not changed by the reality of Saudi oil.

All this is not to say that Saudi moderation lacks value or that Saudi Arabia should be expected to act against its own best interests. It is to say that moderate Saudi policies are likely to continue regardless of our action on the proposed arms sales. And even if we were threatened with an abrupt halt in Saudi moderation, it would mean little sense to reward moderation in pursuit of peace with the means to unravel peace.

We have heard, and will continue to hear, much about the technical capabilities of the F-15 aircraft proposed for sale. Distinctions between offensive and defensive uses blur into meaninglessness when we consider the possibility of Saudi F-15's creating a diversion or Israeli aircraft launching a preemptive strike against Saudi Arabia. There are many questions for which we have no answers, nor will we have answers until the aircraft are actually deployed.

At present we do know that Israel is the only nation in the Middle East to have the technologically superior F-15 aircraft. Consequently, an agreement to provide these planes to Saudi Arabia threatens the security of Israel.

We also know that negotiations for peace are at a crucial stage. Israel is under pressure to trade strategic land areas for recognition of the right to exist and for assurances of peace. It requires great courage to exchange the tangible for the intangible. This is particularly true in the case of Israel which is overwhelmingly outnumbered in manpower and entirely dependent on an arms lifeline from the United States.

In the long term Israelis, Arabs, and Americans share the common goal of peace. Israel, our historic ally, is more likely to negotiate peace—and that peace is more likely to be durable—if Israel continues from a position of strength. I strongly urge that, for the present, we adopt the resolution disapproving the arms sales to Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia.

I yield back the remainder of my time.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I yield 5 minutes to the Senator from Missouri.

Mr. EAGLETON. I thank my colleague.

Mr. President, I have agonized over the decision which is thrust upon us today more than any other I can recall since coming to the Senate. For me, the easy vote and the politically smart vote would be to reject the administration's package in favor of sales only to Israel. There is no political constituency for going any other way.

And yet, I have come to the reluctant conclusion that the interests of this

country and of the Middle East are best served by proceeding with the sales as proposed.

I believe that Saudi Arabia has legitimate defense needs and that our own security is served by assisting that country. It would be a catastrophe if the huge Saudi oil reserves, estimated at one-quarter of the known free world reserves, were to fall under the control of a hostile power. Better that we provide a means for the Saudis to defend that vital resource themselves than face the possibility of some day being forced to commit our own military forces. That is the hard choice we face.

The other plain fact which influences my vote today is that if we do not provide the Saudis with the advanced aircraft they want and need, other nations will. If that should occur, we would forfeit the substantial control over the deployment and use of the planes which U.S. technical support would give us. The F-15 cannot be operated as an effective force without the elaborate maintenance and support base the United States alone is in a position to provide. In addition, we have assurances from the Saudis that they will not base their aircraft near the borders of Israel and, in the event of a new Middle East conflict, will not transfer the planes to another Arab State.

If we are truly concerned about the transfer of aircraft by Saudi Arabia, we must be wary of forcing the Saudis to turn to the French for purchase of the Mirage F-1 fighter. The Mirage already is in the weapons inventories of Iraq, Libya, and Kuwait, and it is on order for Syria. Thus, the Mirage would be far more transferrable than the F-15. Should a war break out, and should the Saudis also be armed with F-1's, the Saudis no doubt would come under pressure to pool their planes with the other Arab States, or at the very least to provide ground support for the other nations' F-1 squadrons. The development of such a "French Connection" among the Arab States clearly is not in the best interests of Israel, or of bringing peace to the Middle East.

Mr. President, if I believed for a moment that this sale would jeopardize the security of Israel, I would reject it out of hand. Any commitment we may have made to the Saudis must come second to our more pressing commitment to the preservation of Israel's security. I am persuaded that these sales, far from endangering Israel, will enhance the security of that country and in the long run will improve the chances of peace in the Middle East.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I yield 5 minutes to the Senator from Florida.

Mr. STONE. Mr. President, in terms of winning and losing, the administration will lose this vote today. In terms of winning and losing peace, the administration will lose this vote today.

I am convinced that in the next few weeks, less than several months, this



arms package will kill the Sadat peace initiative.

At least one Senator has described the Middle East peace process today as nonexistent. In effect, at least one Senator has said:

What do we have to lose? Nothing is going on.

Mr. President, what we have to lose is the Sadat peace initiative which, for the first time in 30 years, has brought Egypt and Israel to the conference table; has created a political committee sitting in Jerusalem and a military committee sitting in Cairo which, in a few short days of negotiation, came very close to success. Since the deadlock has continued, through mediation efforts of the United States, visits here by both sides, the chance for the revival of the Sadat peace initiative still exists.

An editorial in this morning's Baltimore Sun says it quite well when it urges the Congress to reject this ill-conceived aircraft package, and asserting that these arms should be negotiated on their own merits rather than as part of a cynical all-or-nothing Carter ploy that tempts Congress with aircraft previously promised Israel.

Mr. President, I ask that the full text of the editorial be printed in the RECORD at this point.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

#### ARMS PACKAGE SHOWDOWN

The dangers implicit in President Carter's arms diplomacy in the Middle East have come to pass. With a showdown vote scheduled in the Senate today on the \$4.8 billion aircraft package for Israel, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, there is little the victory-hungry administration has accomplished other than bringing a tawdry triumph within reach. And at what cost.

Congress stands divided, unhappily so, over an issue it feels should never have been forced upon it at this time and in this form.

The Jewish community in America for the first time feels itself estranged from the White House, a development that evokes shudders.

Israel, a nation obsessed with security for good reason, believes its vital U.S. relationship has been compromised by the American hunger for Arab oil.

Saudi Arabia and Egypt find their prestige and their policy options tied to the success or failure of a Carter initiative now blown out of all proportion.

Those who believed Mr. Carter's campaign laments against the United States as chief arms merchant to the world consider themselves traduced.

As for Egyptian-Israeli peace efforts, they have been effectively stalled since the U.S. arms package was dumped on the bargaining table.

If this is Mr. Carter's idea of good governance, then he would be well advised to write himself a new set of standards. He has sought not consensus but confrontation, not national unity but division, not healthy development of U.S.-Saudi or U.S.-Egyptian ties on their own but in competition with Israel.

To be sure, the President has orchestrated this issue far better than others that have come his way. The nation's foreign policy establishment, bristling with bipartisanship,

has wheeled smartly into line. Aircraft manufacturers and oil moguls are naturally for the \$4.8 billion bonanza (after all, it cuts unit costs and reduces the trade imbalance caused by oil imports). The doublespeak of arms merchantry—peace through strength; the deterrence of mutual destruction; restraint via spare parts—has been given a new workout. And now, with the vote approaching, President Carter and Saudi King Khalid have found a Cuban-Soviet menace growing in South Yemen.

Not for one minute does this newspaper discount Moscow's relentless quest for power in the Middle East and the need for confident, secure ties between Washington and Riyadh. Indeed, we feel the United States should remain Saudi Arabia's chief arms supplier. But these arms should be negotiated on their own merit rather than as part of a cynical all-or-nothing Carter ploy that tempts Congress with aircraft previously promised Israel. Egypt, too, is deserving of U.S. support in response to President Anwar el Sadat's courageous peace journey to Jerusalem. But the aircraft for Egypt, like the aircraft for Israel, should not be a pawn in peace negotiations between the adroit Mr. Sadat and prickly Prime Minister Menachem Begin. Rather, they should be part of the diplomatic process only after tangible steps away from war have been made.

The Sun, therefore, urges Congress to reject Mr. Carter's ill-conceived aircraft package. But whether the President wins or loses this test, we hope he will reassess each sale to each country in consultation with Congress. The legislative branch is determined to have its say in foreign policy; a President with a SALT II pact in prospect should act accordingly.

Mr. STONE. The assurances provided the Congress and the country by the Secretary of Defense leave something to be desired. May I just point out one thing? In the May 8 draft of the Secretary Brown letter appears this sentence, referring to the multiple ejection bomb racks. The sentence read:

The U.S. will not furnish such MER's, and the Saudis have indicated they have no intention of procuring elsewhere.

In the May 9 version of that same letter, that phrase of the Saudis' intention not to procure MER's elsewhere is omitted, and it is not in this assurance that we have.

Mr. President, who on this floor can assure this country that with the leadership of Islam, which the Saudis enjoy, with their position in spiritual leadership and in many ways financial and temporal leadership of the Arab world—who can assure this country that the Saudis will stay out of the next war if one develops against Israel? And, on the contrary, their leadership has said many times, and recently, that what they have militarily would be at the disposal of their Arab brothers against the common enemy. For common enemy, read Israel.

As to the consequence of the French connection, how can the administration have it both ways? Either the Saudis have no aggressive intention against Israel and, therefore, it is safe to provide them with F-15's, or they have aggressive intentions against Israel and for that reason it is unsafe to allow them to procure French weapons. It cannot be done: Either they have no aggressive intention or they have. If they do not, there is

no risk in their acquiring French planes. But if they have, there is every risk in providing them with the top of the line F-15's.

Mr. President, I conclude as I commenced. The administration will win this vote today but if and when the Sadat initiatives are killed in the near future the administration will lose this vote today.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired. Who yields time?

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I yield 6 minutes to the Senator from Missouri.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Missouri has 6 minutes.

Mr. DANFORTH. Mr. President, with great reluctance and genuine sadness, I shall vote to support the administration's package of arms sales for the Middle East. It is my opinion that rejection of the sales would constitute a major rebuff to President Sadat of Egypt and to the moderate leadership of Saudi Arabia. The consequence of such a rebuff would be contrary to the interests of this country. It would strike directly at the interests of moderation in the Middle East and, therefore, pose very serious threats to the security of Israel.

I have long taken the position that this country should resist arms sales to actual or potential enemies of the state of Israel. However, it is now clear to me that new sophisticated fighter aircraft will be sold to Egypt and Saudi Arabia either by the United States or by some other countries. Therefore, it is my view that the remaining question concerns whether or not the sales are made with reasonable controls attached.

My vote on this issue, which necessarily must be either yes or no, does not constitute an endorsement of President Carter's inconsistent and ill-conceived policies in the Middle East or of the manipulative manner in which this package sale has been engineered. The take-it-or-leave-it basis on which President Carter has presented this issue to Congress has confronted me with the most difficult decision I have had to make since I have been a Senator. I strongly resent the manner in which the administration has handled this sale. I oppose the package concept of the sale which has tied the security of Israel to the military requirements of Arab countries. The idea of a package arms sale is contrary to the special relationship which has long existed and must continue between Israel and the United States.

The President's timing in sending this package to the Congress could not have been worse. The President has succeeded in diverting attention from peace negotiations in the Middle East by interjecting the question of arms into those deliberations at this time.

The President's package provides 50 percent more F-15's to Saudi Arabia than was recommended by the Defense Department analysis and provides substantially fewer F-15's and F-16's to Israel than recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Therefore, President Carter has abandoned the best military

advice available in this country in favor of designing his own arms package. I am very concerned that the numerical shift by the administration may be seen as a symbol of a change in America's longstanding commitment to Israel.

If the possibility of altering the package were available to me, I would not hesitate to do just that. At this point, however, I am left with what, to me, is an intolerable dilemma: Will sales be made in a way which will be viewed as a rebuff by the United States to moderate Arab countries or, in the alternative, will sales be made in a way which, hopefully, will further the relationships between the United States and moderate Arab countries?

Last week, former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that he favored an increase in the number of F-16's to be sold to Israel for the purpose of creating a better balance. From a discussion I had with one Israeli official, I believe that such an increase for Israel would be highly welcomed by that country. I have discussed this possibility with President Carter, who did not rule it out. I would support such a proposal if presented to Congress.

Finally, I am deeply troubled by this additional example of the President's failure to exert a steady hand in the Middle East. He mistakenly continues to seek an all-or-nothing solution to ancient, complex problems. He has improperly called for a Palestinian homeland. He has attempted to reinvolve the Soviets in the peace talks. He has characterized far-reaching Israeli peace proposals as "intransigent." My vote today in no way constitutes support for this policy. Instead, it is a very reluctant vote for the lesser of two evils, which, I hope, will not be viewed as a change in my longstanding and deeply held support for the survival of Israel.

Mr. SARBANES. Will the Senator yield if he has time available?

Mr. ALLEN and Mr. RIEGLE addressed the Chair.

Mr. SARBANES. Will the Senator yield?

Mr. DANFORTH. I yield.

Mr. SARBANES. I commend the Senator for a very thoughtful statement. I do not come out where he comes out, but I think the fact of the matter is that what the administration has done shows a complete lack of the art of government. They have presented an intolerable situation. They need not have done it. We have to take the package or not take anything. The President could have presented a different proposal which would have commanded a general consensus in this body and he refused to do it. He knew the situation.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's 6-minutes have expired.

Who yields time?

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I yield to the Senator from Minnesota (Mrs. HUMPHREY).

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Minnesota is recognized for not to exceed 10 minutes.

Mrs. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, today we have before us a resolution to disapprove the President's proposal to sell arms to Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia. As a lifelong friend and supporter of Israel, my decision to support the administration's proposal has been the most difficult one that I have had to make as a Senator.

The factors relating to this decision are complex; the implications of deciding either way are profound. However, I firmly believe that my decision is the right one for the United States, for Israel, and for all those whose first priority is to create the conditions for peace in the Middle East.

My love for Israel and her people cannot be questioned. Hubert and I have established our unequivocal position as friends of Israel by our unfailing support of that country for over 30 years. We have had the pleasure of visiting Israel many times and learning of its problems and determination to solve them. Our affection for the Jewish community in this country is unsurpassed.

We have consistently and successfully worked to insure that a major portion of our military aid be allocated to guarantee her security. My support for Israel is absolute. And I believe that my vote on the President's arms sale proposal is completely consistent with that unshakable commitment.

As a Senator, I am in a unique position. I am completing Hubert's tenure in the Senate and I will not again be a candidate for public office. Thus, there can be no question that my decision has been made solely on the basis of the merits of this proposal and as objectively as is humanly possible.

It is my responsibility, as a Senator, to vote according to my conscience and after a thorough analysis of all the facts bearing on my decision. This was Hubert's way, and it is mine.

During the past few weeks, I have sat through hours of invaluable meetings and hearings on this proposal. I have engaged in long discussions of the complexities of this proposal with friends, with experts, with concerned citizens, and with my own staff. I have read classified and unclassified documents and reports.

Throughout, I have attempted to hear and evaluate the views on all sides. I have weighed the competing arguments conscientiously, carefully, and critically. In the course of this review, I have consistently asked, "What is in the best interest of the United States, the best interest of Israel and the best interest of peace in the Middle East?"

At this point, the question is not whether we support Israel. We do, and that commitment is unshakable. The real question is what must we do to maintain the security of Israel and, at the same time, enhance the prospects for successful Middle East peace talks?

To answer this question, the following points were, in my mind, the most persuasive. And, given that we have no option other than voting for or against

the resolution, they are, to me, the most compelling arguments in favor of the sale.

Israel's security is directly linked with the success of future peace talks. Under what circumstances will these talks lead to long-term peace and a comprehensive settlement for the entire area?

We must retain the confidence of the Arab nations and of Israel if we are to be successful in our role as a mediator in the conflict. To do so, we must consistently manifest our concern for the legitimate needs, aspirations, and interests of both Israel and the Arab nations.

If history teaches us anything, it is that a mediator who abandons the interests of one side in any dispute only generates suspicion, divisiveness, and hostility. The mediator becomes a partisan and unable to serve his intended role.

It is in our interest, in Israel's interest, and in the interest of long-term peace that we be perceived as trustworthy and evenhanded by both sides. Only a settlement arrived at by such a process will prevent future hostilities and wars of retaliation.

Rejecting the proposed arms sales would, in my view, undermine confidence in our relationship with the nations of the Middle East. It would indicate a lack of sincerity in finding a just and equitable peace for all the people whose security is threatened. It would reinforce the voices of belligerency who every day question our objectivity in this vital area of the world.

In conclusion, I do not know how Hubert would have voted on the proposal that is before the Senate. No one does. And no one wishes he were here to make this decision more than I do. But I knew Hubert and his thinking better than anyone. I believe that he would have gathered the facts, as I have, analyzed them, as I have, sought out the counsel and advice of those most intimately involved with the issues, as I have, and ultimately decided that the President's arms sale proposal is in the best interest of the United States, Israel, and all those who seek a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.

I thank the Chair.

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I yield 1 minute to the Senator from Michigan (Mr. GRIFFIN).

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan is recognized for 1 minute.

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, he is not here. In his absence let me yield 5 minutes to the Senator from South Carolina.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. MATSUNAGA). The Senator from South Carolina is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, the question before the Senate is clear—what is best for our country in the matter of arms sales to the Mideast? The answer is not so simple.

In the beginning, I opposed the "original" package sale of F-15's, F-16's,



and F-5's by the United States to Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia. I felt that that particular proposal would be destabilizing to peace efforts in the Middle East.

I felt the President's proposal was badly timed and its linkage with our prior commitment to Israel was inconsistent. However much I might disagree with the timing and the coupling, we must face the issue not as we might prefer it, but as we now find it to be.

The question before us represents a compromise between the Senate and the President. Twenty additional F-15 planes have now been offered Israel; conditions have been placed on the F-15's to Saudi Arabia; and the King of Saudi Arabia in a letter to President Carter day before yesterday, May 13, 1978, has assured our President that "the planes are being acquired for defense."

#### COMMITMENT TO ISRAEL

My commitment to the security of Israel is firm. I have always stood forthrightly for Israel, whether it be military or economic aid. Further, I understand the very deep apprehension expressed by many of my constituents on this issue, and I have weighed their concerns most carefully.

The revelations in today's secret session of the Senate and my own study of the issues have led me to the conclusion that a defeat of the President's proposal would create a dangerous power vacuum in the Middle East where Soviet influence is making dramatic gains. Further, repudiation of the sales would also impair the ability of the United States to obtain an effective peace agreement. Such an agreement would hinge largely on the maintenance of our good relations with Egypt and Saudi Arabia, as well as Israel.

#### UNITED STATES INFLUENCE VALUABLE

The question is not whether the Arabs will have modern aircraft, but rather from which country they will purchase them. If they buy these planes from the United States, the operation and maintenance of these complex aircraft would be tied to U.S. support. This support would involve lengthy training contracts as well as the supply of spare parts and other technical aid. It would give the United States greater influence over the use of the planes and the events that take place in that part of the world.

The Saudis have demonstrated their willingness to work with the United States, both politically and economically. United States friendship with the Saudis may be able to accomplish more for the survival of Israel than the sale of 60 aircraft would threaten that survival.

The economic power of the Arab States will continue to grow, strengthening their ability to enhance their own military forces. In such circumstances, U.S. friendship and involvement with certain Arab States could be vital in preventing war and achieving peace.

With Egypt as the most flexible of the Arab belligerents and the Saudis as the financial backer for various Arab States,

U.S. influence with both should be greatly enhanced and beneficial to Israel. All those who favor violence and disruption in the Middle East would welcome a rupture in United States-Arab relations, which would likely follow the rejection of these sales.

#### SOURCE OF PROBLEMS

In meeting this issue, I hope the Congress will not overlook one reason the Saudis feel the need of modern weapons. This country has hardly lifted a finger as one African State after another has fallen under Communist influence through force of arms aided by Cuban and Soviet personnel. Our own foreign policy failures have contributed to the Saudi's feelings of being threatened. President Carter must exercise some leadership or see U.S. interests in these areas disintegrate further.

#### COMPROMISE PROPOSAL

The inherent dangers of the "original" proposal have been reduced by the basing and modification agreements accepted by the Saudis. Further, the additional sales to Israel should help ease the legitimate concerns of that nation.

On balance, I believe these sales will give to the United States greater leverage in its efforts to bring about peace and stability in the Middle East and better protect Israel.

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Tom Carter of Senator HAYAKAWA's staff be granted privilege of the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. CASE. Mr. President, I yield 5 minutes to Senator RIEGLE.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. RIEGLE. I thank the Senator from New Jersey.

Mr. President, I think it is clear that this administration is new to foreign policy and, unfortunately, too often it shows.

In my own judgment, they made a serious error on this issue. It is not the first mistake, I might say, concerning the Middle East.

I think the unfortunate joint communication with the Soviet Union some months ago was just as dramatic a mistake. But the consequences there were far less severe than I think there are now.

I think what has happened is that the administration has painted itself into a corner with this arms package and now it has attempted, and I think probably successfully, to paint the Congress into the same corner and we are, once again, hearing the same shopworn arguments that the new President's prestige is on the line and we will weaken the administration if we vote against the package.

I happen to believe myself that we will be hurting American interests unless we do vote against this package.

My overriding interest in the Middle East today is reaching a secure and lasting peace settlement. I must say that I

fail to see how \$5 billion of additional arms introduced in the Middle East enhances chances for peace.

I respect the Sadat peace initiative. I am interested and sympathetic to the strategic defense needs of both Egypt and Saudi Arabia—now and in the future.

But let no one fail to understand the 60 F-15's to Saudi Arabia marks a profound change in U.S. policy in the Middle East.

Coming now, that request, coupled with the scaled down request for Israeli weapons, carries a profound message that no country in the Middle East will misunderstand, and no one here ought to misunderstand, because that step tips the equation away from Israel and toward Arab oil in oil dollars.

I think we ought not to kid ourselves. I think, outside this Chamber, much of the rush to embrace Saudi Arabia is by people who have dollar signs in their eyes. Hundreds of millions, indeed billions of dollars, are to be made by those who are the new and passionate friends of Saudi Arabia. And while much of it is couched in a fear about a cutoff of oil, I suspect it is just as much about fear of a cutoff of Arab oil dollars flowing into the income statements of many of the private interests in the United States.

I have heard a few of them who complained about the possibility that this package might be turned aside and have that effect.

If peace efforts are to succeed in the Middle East at this time, it will take a greater sense of confidence on the part of the confrontation states.

If Israel is to take the risks for peace in the West Bank that are required, she must feel more secure about her ability to defend herself than she presently does.

Does this arms package give Israel the incentive to take the risks for peace? Clearly, the answer is, "no."

We have only one wise course of action left to us, and that is to put this package aside for a period of time and turn our full efforts to a renewed investment of our full national effort in the search for Middle East peace.

Frankly, we are spread out over a 10-acre lot in our foreign policy, and it is no wonder the peace initiative is not moving faster than it is.

We should suspend any further sales in the Middle East for at least a few months, in order to give peace a chance.

If the Saudis are alarmed about Russian and Cuban initiatives in Africa—I know that I am—then perhaps U.S. policy in that area should be changed. That would be a more appropriate response to that problem than this arms package. I believe this arms package is a war package, not a peace package. It moves us toward war and away from peace.

Therefore, I must vote against any more arms for the Middle East at this moment, and I strongly support the motion of disapproval.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I yield 7 minutes to the Senator from Alabama.

Mr. ALLEN. I thank the distinguished Senator from Delaware for yielding time to me.

Mr. ALLEN. Mr. President, I have decided to vote in favor of Senate Concurrent Resolution 86 and against the proposed Mideast aircraft package. I have not reached this decision lightly, and I have studied carefully each argument advanced by the administration to support the proposed sales. But, Mr. President, I have not found the arguments in favor of the proposed sale to be persuasive nor have I found them to outweigh the many other factors which dictate rejection of the delivery of these 200 advanced fighter aircraft into the Mideast tinderbox.

Now, Mr. President, since section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act requires a separate transmittal for each sale in excess of \$50 million, the Mideast aircraft arms sales package was transmitted to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in four separate parts. The first component proposes the purchase of 50 F-5 aircraft (42 F-5E and 8 F-5F) by Egypt. The second component proposes the purchase of 15 F-15C's by Israel. The third component proposes the purchase of 75 F-16A's and F-16B's by Israel. The fourth component proposes the sale of 60 F-15's (45 F-15A's and 15 TF-F-15A trainers) by Saudi Arabia. The transmittal of the four components on the same day, and the administration has not retreated from its basic position that the proposed sales are submitted to the Congress as a package deal. Similarly, opponents of the arms sale to Saudi Arabia have decided also to treat the submission as a package deal by proposing to disapprove the entire package. So, Mr. President, like it or not, we are talking about a package deal for the introduction of 200 new fighters into the Mideast at a time of great military and political instability in a part of the world long known for its potential for violent conflict.

Although this proposed package deal appears on its face to be defective, to understand completely why the proposed arms sale is not justified, a realistic examination of the existing force structure in the Mideast is essential. The primary factor in that analysis is the strength of the existing air forces in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Israel. Only against an understanding of the existing air defense capabilities of these three countries can Congress realistically assess the proposed new sales.

Of the three countries, Egypt has the greatest need for air defense capability improvement. At present, the Egyptian Air Force consists of Soviet-supplied Mig fighters of obsolescent quality. Additionally, the elimination of Soviet technical support has further eroded the capabilities of the Egyptian Air Force. The proposed sale of 42 F-5E fighters and 8 F-5F fighter-trainers to Egypt is wholly justified by the defense requirements of Egypt and by the recent pro-Western policies adopted by the Egyptian

Government. The aircraft provided to Egypt will not materially threaten Israel but would provide Egypt with a credible defense against Libyan or Ethiopian air attack. Regrettably, the sale to Egypt is made part of an arms package which is otherwise unacceptable.

In my judgment, the proposed sale of 15 F-15C's and 75 F-16A's to Israel is, standing alone, wholly unjustified. Israel already possesses vast air superiority in the Mideast with an air force comparable to our own, equipped with A-4 attack aircraft, F-4 fighters, Mirage-III, and Mirage-V fighters, and the indigenous KRIF C-2 fighter. Additionally, Israel already has received 9 F-15 fighters and is scheduled already to receive a total of 25 F-15 fighters not including the new proposed sale of 15 extra F-15C's. The fighters already delivered or scheduled to go to Israel consist of 4 F-15 test and evaluation aircraft (from our very earliest developmental production of the F-15—these have already been delivered), 2 TF-15A trainers, and 19 F-15A basic production aircraft. The Israeli Air Force is, and will be well into the 1990's, fully capable of repelling any conceivable threat from any air force of a neighboring state. The F-4 fighter, the backbone of the Israeli fighter force, is capable of countering the MIG 25 so that the need for the F-15 is predicated on the unproven theory that the Soviet Union will (like the United States in the case of the F-15) be willing to provide to the Iraqis or possibly the Syrians its most advanced fighter aircraft. The Russians will not be this stupid, although apparently we are. Note in this connection that the 15 extra F-15C's proposed to be sold to Israel (part 2 of the package) will be a sale of the ultimate advanced version of the fighter configured with add-on components of our very best and most secret technology. For example, the Israeli F-15C's will be equipped with the interrogator identification friend or foe system and with laser-guided precision munitions. Also the Israeli fighters will be equipped with the advanced multiple ejection rack system which will inter alia improve the nuclear delivery capability of the F-15C.

The proposed sale of 75 F-16 aircraft to Israel (part 3 of the package) is also objectionable but not as completely unjustified as the proposed sale of the additional 15 extra F-15C's. The F-16 is an advanced, single seat, light weight, all weather, multi-purpose fighter, but its range is limited and it is primarily a short-turnaround fighter designed to defeat easily the MIG 23, MIG 25, and other advanced Soviet fighters. The sale of 75 F-16A's and the F-16B's to Israel in itself guarantees defensive air superiority to the Israeli Air Force into the late 1990's or early 21st century. The sale of 75 F-16's should more than adequately meet Israeli requirements without the need for the unwise add-on sale of 15 F-15C's.

But, Mr. President, of all the proposed components of the administration's arms sale package, the most completely un-

justified and irrational is the proposed sale of 60 F-15's to Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia is already receiving from the United States 110 F-5E's specially upgraded with the Maverick television-guided, air-to-ground missile and the latest version of the Sidewinder air-to-air missile. These aircraft are a more than adequate replacement for the British Lightning fighter still in some Saudi Air Force squadrons. In my judgment, the sale of 60 F-15's to Saudi Arabia from a military standpoint is ridiculous. The Saudis should be sold additional F-5E's or perhaps a modest number of F-16's. There is no conceivable military threat to Saudi Arabia warranting equipping this repressive medieval sheikdom with the world's most advanced high-technology fighter aircraft.

So, Mr. President, the existing air defense needs of Saudi Arabia and Israel are well met by already programed aircraft sales. The air defense needs of Egypt require upgrading, but such action should occur without linkage to other arms sales which are unjustified from the perspective of the national interests of the United States.

Now, Mr. President, against this understanding of the military balance in the Middle East, there are three primary reasons which I have found compelling in reaching a decision to vote against the administration aircraft arms package: First, the sale of extremely advanced technology fighters to the countries involved is per se unwise and degrades the role of the United States as a strategic military power by permitting other nations to share, from inception, in our very best and most advanced military technology; second, the timing of the proposed sale could not be worse from the perspective of current peace negotiations; and third, the practice of submitting package arms sales to Congress should be opposed as a matter of policy, so that the executive branch does not again attempt to link sales to one country with sales to another country.

At a time when the military capability of the United States is rapidly declining—and I believe it is—the sale of our very best warplane to primitive, backward countries such as Iran and Saudi Arabia is an indicator of our growing moral and military weakness. The sale of the F-15 to Iran was ill advised. The new proposed sale of the F-15 to Saudi Arabia ought to be resisted if for no other reason than to prevent the United States from becoming another France or Sweden in its willingness to sell to the highest bidder. I daresay that less than 2 years ago, the idea of selling our very most advanced fighter aircraft to Saudi Arabia, a country which only now is emerging from the Dark Ages and many of whose people essentially despise the United States, would have been considered ludicrous. Indeed, Mr. President, contrary to administration assertions, the sale of the F-15 to Saudi Arabia is in fact an aberration of very recent origin. Until only a few months ago, the admin-



istration, both under President Ford and President Carter, urged the Saudis to buy increased numbers of F-5E's or perhaps F-16's. The proposed sale of the F-15 did not become a serious subject for negotiation with the Saudis until early 1978 and appears to have been justified primarily on the basis of Soviet/Cuban activity in Ethiopia, Soviet activity in the Peoples Democratic Republic of Yemen, Soviet activity in Iraq, and the price of oil. The new theory advanced early this year was that the F-15 was needed to defend against these perceived Communist threats and that delivery of the warplane would enhance our relations with Saudi Arabia. Frankly, the latter point was the factor given the greatest emphasis.

First, by no stretch of the imagination could Ethiopia, Iraq, or Yemen mount any attack against Saudi Arabia which could not be easily countered by the Saudis with American support. Additionally, the air forces of these countries are not equipped with advanced Soviet fighters and are not likely to receive advanced Soviet fighters because the Soviet Union has the ability to understand the advantages of retaining in its own exclusive control its most advanced weapons systems. The postulated threat to Saudi Arabia does not hold water in the real world. The only real threat to Saudi Arabia would come direct from the Soviet Union itself in the event of a strategic global war, in which case Saudi Arabia would be merely a pawn in the play of global conflict. Saudi Arabia's prime purpose in obtaining the F-15's is not to counter the supposed new Communist threat in the region, but is rather to attempt to redress the balance of power in the Mideast vis-a-vis Israel.

The administration, incredibly, insists that the 60 F-15's proposed for Saudi Arabia could not be used to advantage against Israel in the event of a new Mideast war. I find this assertion so patently false as to warrant little comment beyond noting that even the mere potential for the introduction of the 60 Saudi F-15's into a new Mideast war would itself require the diversion of substantial Israeli air power, regardless of whether the Saudi F-15's ultimately actually engaged in combat. As few as two of three F-15's from Saudi Arabia could be used to strike successfully critical Israeli targets, such as Eilat's oil refinery facilities or the nuclear reactor at Dimona. Additionally, the fact that the F-15 is principally an air superiority fighter and not specially equipped for air-to-ground attack is totally without significance in considering the military balance between the Arab States and Israel. In a new Mideast war, if Saudi Arabia engaged, its 60 F-15's would be used as cover for attacking Egyptian, Syrian, Iraqi, and Jordanian aircraft. In short, the Saudi F-15's would seek to achieve local air superiority to allow other Arab aircraft to strike ground targets in Israel. In that effort the F-15 equipped with four long-range Sparrow air-to-air missiles and four Sidewinder missiles would be greatly superior to the

Israeli F-16 equipped with Sidewinders only and could shoot down the F-16 (by using the Sparrow missile) at ranges in excess of those at which the Israelis could engage. The only way the Israelis could encounter the F-15 would be with its own F-15's. The prospect of two opposing forces of U.S.-built F-15's firing at each other the U.S.-built Sparrow missile is perhaps the best evidence of the folly of this entire package.

Assuming this sale should go through at any time, then this is the worst possible time. Peace negotiations have stalled as much as a result of Arab unwillingness to compromise as because of the media-covered Israeli failure to compromise. Thus, while the Israelis have essentially offered to return the Sinai to Egypt and to return the West Bank to Jordan, the Arabs have refused on grounds that a separate Palestinian State must be established on the West Bank. In the Mideastern tinderbox, negotiations have reached a delicate stage demanding extreme caution. In this environment, these new proposed arms sales, which the administration asserts are designed to enhance the prospect of peace, demonstrate logic reminiscent of that shown during the Vietnam war: "It was necessary to destroy the city in order to save it."

Under no circumstances does arming Third World countries produce peace. The possession of arms, in itself, motivates conflict. Time and again in the 20th century, two-bit Third World countries have built up military forces with external support, promptly engaged in a local war wherein their military strength was dissipated, and thereafter entered into peace negotiations when their ability to conduct continued modern warfare no longer existed. The best way to achieve peace in the Mideast is to deny the most advanced and modern weaponry to the potential adversaries.

In that connection, Mr. President, the argument that purchases will be made elsewhere is not in the least persuasive in the context of the sale of the F-15 fighter. No existing fighter aircraft is comparable to the F-15. Therefore, there is no other available source of supply. The Saudis will not buy the Mirage F-1 fighter because the Saudis must maintain arms ties with the United States for overriding internal and external political considerations. If the sale of the F-15's to the Saudis is rejected, the Saudis will buy additional numbers of the more appropriate F-5E or perhaps the F-16. The same reasoning holds for the proposed additional sale of 15 F-15C's to Israel.

Finally, in order to maintain creditable restraints on the periodic excesses of the executive branch, it is critical to reject this package arms deal. Failure to reject the submission of this major arms sale in its package form will inevitably encourage the executive branch to link up other major arms transactions so that the power of the Congress to reject such transactions will become even more without real effect than at present. In other words, this or some future administration could, for example, be encouraged to link

up an arms deal for Red China with life-sustaining arms arrangements for South Korea or Taiwan. Thus, Mr. President, the politically indefensible could be accomplished by forcing the Congress to make an election between the continued existence of some valued ally and the acceptance of a totally reprehensible part of a packaged transaction. The pending arms package is a new departure from all past practice, and, even if not warranted by the merit of the actual transactions proposed, ought to be rejected for policy reasons.

To summarize, Mr. President, as a matter of policy the Congress must not permit the submission of arms proposals in linked packages if the disapproval mechanisms of the Arms Export Control Act are to have any true viability. But of chief importance, Mr. President, I cannot support the administration proposal for these aircraft sales because this proposal would add fuel to a region where the hot ashes of war still smolder and would degrade our country's own strategic role in that critical part of the world.

Mr. CASE. Mr. President, I yield 6 minutes to the Senator from Washington (Mr. JACKSON).

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, there is only one issue before the Senate and that is whether, on this day in May 5, 1978, the Congress ought to give its approval to an administration proposal to sell \$5 billion of sophisticated armaments to Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia. The question is not whether we should sell arms to the Middle East. It is not whether we ought to assist Israel or Egypt or Saudi Arabia. It is not whether the security problems of any or all of these countries will be solved or mitigated by the proposed sale. The issue is whether this is the right time to approve this sale—whether these are the right circumstances—and whether approval of this sale will enhance or diminish the prospects for a negotiated settlement between Israel and Egypt, whether it will advance or retard the cause of peace in the Middle East.

Mr. President, I believe that approval of this sale will complicate the search for peace. I intend to vote for the resolution disapproving the administration's request.

Without meeting the real security needs of Saudi Arabia, which are largely internal, the transfer of F-15's to that country will have a profound and destabilizing effect on the delicate military balance between Israel and her neighbors. The simple fact is that the F-15, unlike the other aircraft available for use against Israel, can be flown with high performance by even a mediocre pilot. Thus possession of the F-15 in the hands of the Saudis will erode the basis upon which Israel has thus far maintained a military balance in the region—the man-for-man superiority of its highly trained air force.

Action that could significantly alter the military balance at a moment when every effort should be made to encourage and nurture the halting steps toward

a peace settlement that began with the Sadat-Begin talks is, in my judgment, profoundly mistaken. Approval of this sale will encourage inflexibility in these languishing negotiations at precisely the moment when what is needed is a new receptivity to accommodation. The flow of arms today will mean an increased likelihood that blood will flow tomorrow.

Saudi Arabia's real defense needs cannot be met through acquisition of the F-15, because the threat to Saudi Arabia—and it is real—does not take the form of air strikes from without. Far more likely is a coup against the present leadership, perhaps stirred up in connection with internal conflict encouraged from outside. Given its potential internal vulnerability and its vast wealth, it is only prudent to assume that Saudi Arabia is high on the target list for any group or faction able to muster enough local force to assume control of the present government. Libya and Afghanistan are far more persuasive—and more disconcerting—models of the future threat to Saudi Arabia than scenarios in which Soviet or Iraqi bombers launch massive attacks against the Saudi homeland.

It has been argued that, if the United States does not now, today, agree to sell the F-15 to Saudi Arabia, the Saudis will turn to the French. In my judgment the Saudis will contract for the purchase of French aircraft in any case, whether we approve or disapprove the present proposal. No Senator should comfort himself with the illusion that the F-15 is a substitute for French aircraft over which, it is argued, we would have less control. So long as the Government of Saudi Arabia, encouraged by the United States, identifies the threat to itself as a conventional military one we can expect the Saudis to build up their conventional arsenal with sophisticated weapons obtained from a number of suppliers. As they do so the likelihood of Saudi participation in a war against Israel will increase—and with it the very instability and insecurity that we fear most. The acquisition of the F-15 now by Saudi Arabia is, for these reasons, dangerous to Israel and dangerous to Saudi Arabia itself.

Mr. President, the assurances conveyed to the Senate from Secretary of Defense Brown are wholly inadequate. This proposed sale is not safeguarded in critical respects. It is not adequately safeguarded with respect to basing—since the F-15 can be staged through forward bases even if they are permanently stationed elsewhere. It is not adequately safeguarded with respect to an enhanced ground attack mission—the technology necessary to greatly enhance the air-to-ground capability of the F-15 is widely available. It is not adequately safeguarded with respect to third country transfers in the event of hostilities. There is, in all of this, lack of deliberation, a lack of care, a lack of serious concern to see that the proposed sale will not eventuate in results that we neither intend or desire.

Much has been said about the package nature of the current proposal. And on this issue I am deeply troubled. In the course of the negotiation of the Sinai II agreement this country made certain commitments to supply Israel with weapons necessary to redress the military balance which was affected by Israel's withdrawal from the strategic Sinai passes. These commitments were an essential part of the bargain; and they reflected a solemn pledge from the Government of the United States to the Government of Israel.

In making the fulfillment of those pledges contingent upon congressional approval of arms for Saudi Arabia and Egypt, the administration has broken a solemn American commitment; and this it has done at the very moment when it seeks to encourage Israel to take additional risks in negotiation with its adversaries. What is involved is a question of honor; and on that ground alone, Mr. President, the Senate should reject the arms package now before us.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired.

Who yields time?

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I yield 3 minutes of my time to the Senator from Maryland.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maryland is recognized for 3 minutes.

Mr. SARBANES. Mr. President, as the Senate draws toward the end of the debate, I think it is important to realize that what the administration has done departs in three very essential ways from fundamental American policy.

First of all, it packages the U.S. commitment to Israel's security with military provisions for other nations. We have not done that in the past.

We have had from the very founding of the State of Israel a general commitment to its security, and in the current context we have a specific commitment arising out of the 1975 Sinai accords. A commitment that included Congress which, as part of its approval of the 1975 agreement, had as backup material on the public record the undertakings which the U.S. administration had made to meet the security needs of Israel. That commitment is now being packaged with other requirements, something never contemplated at the time of the 1975 assurances.

Second, we give lethal weapons to Egypt for the first time and third, we give the very top of the line in terms of our military technology to an Arab country, another radical departure in terms of our policy.

Now the administration has created this problem, and having placed us in this position they argue that the Senate has no choice but to adopt the administration's position because the repercussions of rejecting it would be too severe. In other words, they now seek to foreclose our judgment with respect to the proposal they have made. We are confronted with a procedure where we cannot modify the proposal; we can only

accept it or reject it. If we could modify it, I have no doubt that we could modify it in such a way that it would command general support here and still meet the concerns which have been raised with respect to the American relationship to each of these three countries. That could be done.

Why did the administration not seize the opportunity to do exactly that? Why did they reject the suggestion that we be given an additional 30 days, reject that suggestion out of hand, in an effort to work out such an accommodation which would command general consensus and general support both in this body and in the country. The administration has been unwilling to do the constructive sort of statesmanship that could take a situation which is fraught in its implications for fundamental American commitments and deal with that matter in such a way that the United States would remain true to these commitments, responsive to the present situation and command the support of Congress and of the American people.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's 3 minutes have expired.

Who yields time?

Mr. CASE addressed the chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Jersey.

Mr. CASE. Mr. President, I yield 10 minutes to the Senator from New York (Mr. JAVITS).

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New York is recognized for 10 minutes.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I thank my colleague for yielding, and before Senator JACKSON leaves the Chamber, I tell him that the speech he made just a minute ago was one of the finest analyses I have ever heard. It was absolutely brilliant.

Mr. METZENBAUM. Mr. President, will the Senator from New York be good enough to use his microphone?

Mr. JAVITS. I am so sorry.

I said the speech that Senator JACKSON made a few minutes ago was one of the finest he has delivered and one of the finest I have heard in this Chamber.

Mr. JACKSON. I thank my good friend from New York for his kindnesses. He has been an astute leader on this issue.

Mr. JAVITS. His analysis was very astute and very correct. I shall not go over the same ground, but I have a few other things I wish to call to the Senate's attention.

One of the things that struck me in this debate was the constant reiteration, by those who are going to vote against the resolution of disapproval, of the assertion that the U.S. commitment to Israel is unshakable, and notwithstanding the "no" that they are going to cast somehow or other the Israelis are to understand that.

The Israelis and the Americans who feel as I do, are likely to read the signal that is going to go out from this Chamber today quite differently. Intelligent people in the imperiled and exposed position that the Israelis are in are going



to look again to their own safety and their own security. They are going to take measures on the assumption that no is no and it cannot be interpreted into yes by the fact that our commitment to Israel is stated to be unshakable. The vote today may raise doubts now for the first time in 30 years respecting our commitment given the overtones and context of this debate.

This sale is not central to the security of Saudi Arabia. The first deliveries are not made until 1981.

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. JAVITS. Of course.

Mr. JACKSON. I think my good friend from New York has zeroed in on the precise problem we face. What does the administration propose to do between now and 1981, 1982, 1983 for the security of Saudi Arabia? There Mr. President, is the heart of the problem. The Saudi need is for a military infrastructure to deal with the threat from within.

I would point out the threat in Yemen, Mr. President, in Yemen itself, there are 1.7 million Yemenites. How many people are there in Saudi Arabia?

Mr. JAVITS. 5.5 million.

Mr. JACKSON. 5.5 million.

The administration is wrong in arguing that sending these highly sophisticated planes is going to provide for Saudi Arabian security. There are only two countries in that area that could defend Saudi Arabia in the event of a takeover: the State of Israel and Iran.

Mr. JAVITS. Now, Mr. President, that is exactly the point, Mr. President, I am deeply concerned that many here are being taken in by a very spurious argument, which is that these planes are essential to the defense of Saudi Arabia. That is what it comes down to when you look through what we are doing and what we are accomplishing. We are accomplishing nothing except to scare the living daylights out of Israel. That is all we are accomplishing.

In view of the fact that you want Israel to give—that is the whole purpose of this exercise, that Begin is too inflexible. Well, my friends, are you going to make him less flexible by the fact that you are scaring all his people to death by a demonstration that the United States is breaking with past policy and is now going to link the weapons it gives the Israelis to the weapons which it gives to the Arabs. Is that going to be the way we are going to save Saudi Arabia or save our Middle Eastern position?

It is unbelievable to me—Senator RIEGLE put his finger on it—that you are going to get peace by putting an additional 5 billion dollars' worth of lethal weapons into the Middle East. If that is how you are going to get peace, it is an unheard of proposition. Yet that seems to be current in this debate.

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. JAVITS. Yes.

Mr. CHURCH. I saw in the newspapers this morning that the Israeli chief-of-staff made a public statement to the effect that Israeli security called for continued retention of the Golan Heights and the West Bank.

I ask the Senator if this might not be regarded as the first dividend of the administration's policy of forcing the sales on us at this time and packaging them together?

Mr. JAVITS. There is no question about it, and you are going to get more and more of that.

Suppose you are an Israeli. General Jones himself, when we questioned him in the committee, said the Israeli military planners must assume in their planning that in any battle the F-15's, may be in it. They just cannot assume otherwise.

It may be that this is going to be voted against us tonight, it may be. But, Mr. President, we will be alive tomorrow, too, and our colleagues had better take very strict account of the policy which they are making because it is a major break and must appear to be that to the Israelis and to everybody else, including Sadat, and I will come to him in a minute. It is a major break with our policy in the past.

Now, Sadat, many people think, well, he has really tried for peace, notwithstanding the fact that while I give him every credit for his going to Jerusalem, he has been absolutely inflexible and has made conditions precedent even to negotiations.

Since then—and he is the one, not the Israelis, who pulled his ambassadors out of the negotiations when he did not like what was going on, if it did not suit his preconditions—but, be that as it may, Mr. President, how is Sadat going to read this? He is going to read this as a message to him to get back together again with the oppositionist Arab States. That is where the money is, that is where the United States thinks the moxie is, and the strength is, so he had better get back in there. He is going to get his money and his planes from the United States anyhow. We make no precondition.

Lastly, Mr. President, does the Senate have to act on this matter in this way? Resoundingly, no. We have a military assistance bill coming on the floor within a week or two, and we could use that bill to create and design any sales package we wanted to. I myself have said that if you want to settle, this thing without having blood on the Senate floor, take the recommendations of the Department of Defense, which were 40 F-15's for the Saudis and 40 F-15's for the Israelis, and 125 F-6's for the Israelis. But the administration, the minute the majority leader told them he had the votes, would not hear of it. They were not worried about blood on the floor of the Senate. Lots of the people here are, but they were not. Once that curtain went down that was it. That was the end of any discussion.

There is one last point, and then I shall quit. And that is the rebuff theory. The rebuff theory is a theory which says that the Saudis will be rebuffed, and then

they will turn to the French and they will get planes from the French.

Well, in the first place, as has been said here time and again they get—

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's 10 minutes have expired.

Mr. CASE. I yield 2 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New York is recognized for an additional 2 minutes.

Mr. JAVITS. Only 2 minutes. I want to leave time for others. We have had our respects already paid to the French deal in the fact that the administration says it has the assurance, that Saudi Arabia will not buy French planes, unless we refuse but then they will. Mr. President, the Saudis are not interested in French planes. They are interested in the U.S. security guarantee. That is what they are essentially bargaining for; and they have a tripwire of thousands of U.S. employees in Saudi Arabia.

They are not going to be rebuffed, Mr. President, and throw the United States over.

Do you think, Mr. President, or does anybody in this Chamber think, that the Saudis are going to exchange dollars for francs? Do you think they are going to exchange a French guarantee of their security for that of the United States? They are much more sophisticated and much more intelligent than that.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired.

Mr. BIDEN. I yield myself 10 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware is recognized for 10 minutes.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I think the comments that have been made the last half-hour on this floor have finally focused on what I believe to be the central issues of this debate. We were in closed session for 2 hours this afternoon, and discussed in detail many aspects of these issues that have been more generally raised here in the last half-hour of debate. But, Mr. President, I think a few things should be set straight.

First, if this resolution is to be adopted—if we have the votes—it does not mean that Saudi Arabia has been denied, Egypt has been denied, nor Israel has been denied. What it does mean is that we have delayed judgment on that question. It should not be construed as denying a future possibility of selling weapons, sophisticated or otherwise, to Saudi Arabia.

I should also like to point out that we have discussed all day whether or not disapproving the sale would be a slap in the face to the Saudis, whether their pride could sustain it. The sale was spoken of as a litmus test as to whether or not the United States was committed to Saudi security interests, and so on.

For the record, since 1973 we have provided Saudi Arabia with more than \$12.6 billion in military equipment, construction, and services, and currently there are more than 3,500 American personnel who are stationed in Saudi Arabia working in military related jobs.

I respectfully suggest, Mr. President, that my colleagues should look at the total picture. If we disapprove the entire Middle East package, I do not understand how that is tantamount to our saying that we do not recognize the security interests of Saudi Arabia. How can it be said that we do not recognize their friendship or we do not recognize their importance, in the light of the fact that for more than 40 years, and particularly since 1973, we have made a significant financial commitment to Saudi Arabia. We have made a significant commitment in terms of personnel and a significant commitment in terms of technology for military as well as civilian use. In brief, to disapprove the entire arms package to the Middle East is not singling out Saudi Arabia for an arms sale rebuff.

Second, the most cogent argument made today, an argument in opposition to our resolution of disapproval, has been the fact—I wish we had the maps back that we had this afternoon in the closed session—that Saudi Arabia's interests are imperiled at the moment because of the hostile conditions on the horn of Africa, in Yemen, in Iraq, and to the north, in the Soviet Union. The peril was described to us as a great pincer movement threatening Saudi Arabia. And it went on and on. Several of our colleagues made very cogent arguments that the security interests of Saudi Arabia are in jeopardy and will continue to be in jeopardy, if the United States does not do something about it.

I do not disagree with that. But I do not see how 60 F-15's being delivered to Saudi Arabia, at the earliest in 1981—it will probably be 1983 before they can fly the planes in their defense—is adequate for her defense needs. This has been pointed out very cogently this afternoon by the distinguished junior Senator from Washington.

It was also pointed out time and again here today that Saudi Arabia has a mutuality of interests with Israel, Egypt, Iran, and Syria.

Assuming that to be true, which I think it is, how are we going to assure that these mutual interests emerge unless there is peace between Saudi Arabia and Israel, Egypt and Israel—in short, peace in the Middle East?

Yet we are told by the administration that if we do not go forward with these sales to Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Israel now, we are going to diminish the peace prospects. I, for one, fully agree with the senior Senator from New York who pointed out very clearly, what the reaction in Israel would likely and justifiably be as a consequence of this action.

When I have argued against the sales to the Middle East, some of my colleagues have countered with, "Oh, the Israelis are paranoid." Well, without debating the issue of paranoia, the fact of the matter is that the Israelis fear for their security, they fear for their life in real terms—now. Today not tomorrow. Not in 10 years or 20. But now. And, Mr. President, if in fact as a consequence of this sale the Israelis feel that their rela-

tionship with the United States has been significantly altered, I see them being driven even further into a corner adding fuel to the charges of their critics.

As my distinguished colleague Senator CHURCH pointed out a few minutes ago, I think we are already beginning to see the results of the lack of wisdom of packaging the arms sales if one can judge by the remarks made today by the Israeli officials.

Mr. MOYNIHAN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. BIDEN. Certainly.

Mr. MOYNIHAN. I appreciate the Senator's giving me a moment to ask him a question, which I think is obviously one he will answer in a way I will agree with.

We have the much advertised paranoia of the Israelis, a term which should never be addressed to an ally and a friend that has experienced a threat and danger of attacks as they have.

With respect to this particular proposal, is it not the case—and as the Senator knows, as I mentioned when I spoke earlier today, I was U.S. permanent representative to the United Nations in the fall of 1975, at the time our second agreement was reached. In a most solemn commitment, we asked the Israelis to move out of strategically powerful positions they had in the Sinai, in return for which we said we would provide them with 25 F-15 aircraft.

We made that agreement with respect to the adversaries all around them, which at that time clearly included the Saudi Arabians. Is it paranoid for them now to ask, "How could a far greater number of planes to the Saudis be connected to a solemn agreement with Israel?" Is that a question of paranoia, or a question of asking the U.S. Government to keep solemn agreements solemnly arrived at and publicly made before the whole world?

Mr. BIDEN. In the interests of time, my answer is clearly "no." I believe Israel's fears for her security are justifiable.

Mr. ABOUREZK. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a comment?

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President a parliamentary inquiry.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator will state it.

Mr. BIDEN. How much time do I have remaining?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 2 minutes of his 10, and 3 additional minutes left.

Mr. BIDEN. A total of 5 minutes remaining?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. A total of 5 minutes remaining.

Mr. BIDEN. I will yield for 30 seconds for a brief question.

Mr. ABOUREZK. I missed something here. The Senator from New York is against this sale. Included in this sale are 25 plus 20, 45 F-15's to Israel, which he says we gave a commitment to deliver back during the Sinai 2 agreement.

If he is worried about the commitment to Israel, why is he voting to deny the sale of airplanes to Israel? I do not understand.

Mr. BIDEN. If I may I would like to ask the Senator from New York to answer that question in the cloakroom after the debate is over. Since the question is not addressed to me, and my time is limited, I prefer to use the remainder of my time now, and trust that the Senator from New York will respond later.

One more point with regard to Israel's concern: The justification for the sale to the Saudis is to meet their legitimate security interests. We are assured that the F-15 will only be used defensively and will in no way threaten the security of Israel. Yet the administration, in order to sweeten the pot, comes along and says, "If you all go along with this idea, what we are going to do is promise to sell another 20 F-15's at a future date to the Israelis."

It seems to me that by saying that they acknowledge that the Israelis have a legitimate concern. The Administrator recognizes that the net effect of these sales will be to further jeopardize Israel's security interests. If this is not so, why are they offering another 20 F-15's at \$15 million a crack? I assume it is based upon their recognition of the Saudi sale as increasing the threat to Israel.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's 10 minutes have expired.

Mr. BIDEN. I yield myself the remaining 3 minutes that I have.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is recognized.

Mr. BIDEN. First, delaying this sale does not deny the security requirements of Saudi Arabia. Quite to the contrary, the sale of 60 F-15's can in no way guarantee the security requirements of Saudi Arabia. That can only come as a consequence of peace. But the sale to the Saudis does have the effect of driving the Israelis further from a negotiated settlement.

Second, this is not the time for a Middle East arms sale. We are still engaged in a peace process. The Sadat peace initiative is still alive and hopefully negotiations will soon be resumed.

Third, this is not the proper solution in any case, even if it were the time. To put a package of arms worth billions of dollars into an area which does not meet any individual nation in that area's ultimate security requirements is just the beginning of even greater misjudgments. Or is this package just a start? Since 60 F-15's do not really meet Saudi Arabia actual defense needs adequately, is the administration really saying to us, "We are going to be back here for 60 or 120 or 180 more."

Last, the central issue here is not the number, nor the amount. The question, and the only question here, is peace. There will only be security for Saudi Arabia and Egypt and Israel when there is peace in the Middle East. For those of my colleagues who truly believe that this



arms sale package will bring us closer to the peace table, then they must vote their conscience and vote for it. But I would like them to reexamine whether or not they truly believe that a sale of weapons is likely to persuade the parties to return to the peace table and continue their efforts for a negotiated settlement. I suggest it would not.

I thank the Senate for its indulgence.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time of the Senator from Delaware has expired.

The Senator from New Jersey.

Mr. CASE. I yield 1 minute to the Senator from Delaware so I may ask him a question.

I think the most important statement that the Senator from Delaware has made tonight, and he has made many, is the fact that the only security that can come to any country in that part of the world is through the achievement of peace, and that the peace negotiations should be our first concern.

I agree further that these sales will not advance the negotiations for peace. Should we not make it clear to the Saudis and to the rest of the Arab nations that the time has come for them to move up to the point where Israel is? They should be ready for negotiations on the basis of the conditions set forth by the President of the United States. These conditions include, of course, the recognition of Israel's right to survive, right to be a nation. That recognition has not been given.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's 1 minute has expired.

Mr. CASE. I yield 1 more minute so the Senator can respond.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware is recognized.

Mr. BIDEN. There has been a lot of discussion about the moderating influence of the Saudis. They have been considerably more moderate than other Arab States. But keep in mind that they have yet to recognize the State of Israel. And I am not aware of the Saudi moderating influence on the current peace process.

If the administration came to us and offered us substantive evidence that the sale to any or all the countries would encourage the peace process, then the sale would make some sense. But I know of no relationship between the arms sale and the peace process. Nor of a relationship between the arms sale to Saudi Arabia and that country's recognition of the State of Israel.

Mr. CASE. I yield myself 1 minute, Mr. President.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Jersey is recognized for 1 minute.

Mr. CASE. I had intended to take this minute a little later but I believe I had better take it now.

We need to read nothing in the papers and hear nothing on radio and television except that Israel is being pushed to be less intransigent, it is being pushed to

yield. To yield what, Mr. President? To yield on matters which Israel regards essential to her security. This represents, it seems to me, an upsidown view of the right way to deal with this problem in the Middle East.

It is time that we bring out, and I think this debate may have helped to bring out, two things: One, that we are not doing Israel a favor by letting her exist. She, in effect, is doing us a favor by existing. Indeed, we need Israel's existence far more than Israel needs patronage.

Second, that the time has come for us to move directly to bring the Arab world, the moderate Arabs, if you will, to a recognition that Israel is important to them, and that if they want peace and security they can find it only by recognizing Israel. And then the parties can move together. Without that on the Arab part, talk about negotiations and all the rest is vain.

I yield 3 minutes to the Senator from Texas.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Texas is recognized for 3 minutes.

Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, it is certainly in the national interest of the United States that we should protect the political and territorial integrity of Israel. Beyond that, it is indeed a moral imperative.

That matter rests more on geopolitical considerations sometimes than it does on the question of military posture. I find that many of our friends here today who are arguing against the arms sale are people who have continued to vote to keep us reduced to a status of dependency on the Middle East for our energy resources by refusing to free up the price of oil and gas in this country so that more will be produced. That is very fundamental in this whole debate.

Somehow it is all right to pay the Middle Eastern countries \$14 a barrel of oil but not all right to pay our own domestic producers.

Believe me, according to a recent study, we are facing up to a shortfall in capital to develop our own resources in this country.

There is yet another question. Many of those who oppose this arms sale had once wanted to impose an arms embargo on Turkey, which has a vital geopolitical situation, which monitors the movements of the Soviet fleet, which is a vital anchor of NATO in the Eastern Mediterranean and the defection of which would pose a great hazard to the peace and security of Israel.

So the preservation of the territory and political integrity of Israel goes far beyond the mere business of military posture, and I only hope that my colleagues will reflect on that when we deal with some of these other issues.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?

Mr. CASE. Mr. President, I yield 5 minutes to the Senator from Alabama, the chairman of our committee.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Alabama is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. SPARKMAN. I thank my good friend and coworker. I have very little to say. I did make a brief statement when we started this debate this morning. However, there are some things that I think we ought to be reminded of.

First of all, I want to compliment every Senator who has spoken today. I think they have been wonderful statements by all.

I recall when this started, so far as we were concerned. Secretary Vance proposed a program, which I thought was a well-balanced program, among the three nations that we are primarily concerned with. About that time I called President Carter personally and talked with him. I suggested that he withdraw his proposal and give us time for negotiation. I felt very strongly that we could negotiate our differences. But he told me that he could not do it. Therefore, we went to work on this whole program, all angles of it.

I yield to no man in his desire for peaceful solution, and may I say, for a lasting peace in the Mideast.

I think we all believe in that and want to work to that end.

We have had long meetings in the Committee on Foreign Relations regarding this. We have listened to the testimony given by all sides. We have voted on it. As a result of that vote, it is before us today.

I want to say one thing while I think of it: Some mention was made earlier in the afternoon about the testimony of Admiral Turner, Director of Central Intelligence. Admiral Turner testified before us in closed session, and I am not going to relate any of his testimony. I will say that, when he finished his testimony, I said to him, "Admiral, have you conveyed to the President of the United States the same things you have conveyed to us?"

He said, "Yes, I have."

So we cannot say that the President was working on something that he had no information on. All of that was transferred to him. He still stayed by his proposal.

I do not like to see these tremendous arms sales. I hope the time will come when we will not be the great arms market for the nations of the world. I think it can be achieved. But we are not there yet. I think the program, as it has been proposed, the one that is being debated here today and is almost at its end so far as the debate is concerned, is the best that can be achieved at the present time. Therefore, I am supporting it and supporting it in good conscience, because I think it is right. I think it is the proper course to take at this time. I propose to support the President in his program.

I yield back my time.

Mr. ABOUREZK addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired.

Who yields time?

Mr. CASE. Mr. President, I yield 1 minute to the Senator from Ohio (Mr. GLENN).

Mr. GLENN. I thank the Senator from New Jersey. I shall be very brief.

Mr. President, although some have interpreted the reporting of this resolution as a device permitting the Senate to work its will, let me restate the obvious. The Committee on Foreign Relations was deadlocked, 8 to 8; the resolution of disapproval failed.

I take as my theme the same proposition I argued in committee sessions: Approval of these sales is essential to U.S. economic security, benefits Israeli security in the long term, and is more likely to insure peace.

There is no utopia, no perpetual peace which can be attained in international politics. There is no escape from difficult choices. Although I wish these sales could have been delayed, the choice is not ours. Each nation has insisted upon going ahead. Some today have debated timing. It is a false issue. The die is cast. Our task is to search among the competing alternatives and select the course that maximizes U.S. interests and the prospects of peace.

The subject of our debate is the Middle East, its past agony and its future hope. What we do here will signal far more than approval or disapproval of mere aircraft sales. It will, to some extent, determine our economic condition; it will either constrain or encourage Soviet-Cuban imperialism; it will either encourage Arab moderates, thereby promoting Israeli security, or lead to round five in Arab-Israeli wars. The Arab-Israeli military balance is not the issue. Those who insist upon such a one-dimensional model ignore the geopolitical significance of the Middle East sitting astride three continents—Africa, Asia, and Europe—and containing the world's greatest concentration of oil.

#### OIL AND ECONOMICS

It is oil, of course, that is the world's most important commodity. From the Arab/Persian Gulf through the narrow Strait of Hormuz flows 18 percent of U.S. oil, 70 percent of Western European oil, and 85 percent of Japanese oil. There is no more strategic piece of geography in the world. Thus, it is not surprising that the Soviet-Cuban team is fighting throughout the Horn of Africa, waiting to exploit developments further in central and southern Africa, expanding Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean, fermenting coups in Afghanistan, supplying radical Arab regimes in Libya, Syria, and Iraq and now active in South Yemen.

Oil, black gold, is the prize. If we reject these sales, the incentive for Saudi Arabia to continue production well in excess of its own fiscal needs is significantly reduced. In time, production curtailments are likely. Further, the Saudi support of the dollar may be lessened, investment withdrawn and fiscal cooperation curtailed. Such developments in the next decade would severely hamper our economy.

Because of oil, the Soviet Union is carefully building a circle of influence through semicovert actions and proxy war. The specter of Soviet imperialism stalks the region. Saudi Arabia borders two Soviet-assisted enemies—Iraq with a far larger air force and South Yemen, where some 200 tanks and 50 Mig-23 aircraft are in the process of being deployed. Just across the Red Sea is Ethiopia, another Soviet-aided potential enemy. Given the Saudi oil wealth, obsolescent British Lightning Aircraft of a 1950 era, and modern air threats, I for one believe the Saudis want the world's finest air interceptor for very good reasons. Moreover, their defensive intent is made clear by their agreement to forgo many air-to-ground capabilities. Hence, for our own economic security, these sales should be approved.

#### ISRAELI SECURITY

My second argument is that these sales benefit Israeli security. Let us not mince words. For many Senators the security of Israel is the paramount issue. The integrity and security of Israel is central to our foreign policy. To this small nation saddled with the legacy of four wars and more populous and hostile neighbors, the threat of war is all too menacing.

I yield to none in my support of Israeli security. But, there are differing interpretations of what is in Israeli security interests. We must remember that Arab politics is extraordinarily diverse; revolutionary and radical regimes in Iraq, Libya, South Yemen; conservative and moderate governments in Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia. Further, Arab animosity toward Israel has never been sufficient to fully coordinate military actions against Israel or, after wars, to agree upon a common diplomatic position toward Israel. If we reject sales to moderate Arab States, we unleash those very forces that are most likely to threaten Israel. Radical regimes in Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Egypt would be far more dangerous to Israel than the incumbent governments.

Some suggest further that less advanced French aircraft are less of a threat to Israel than the F-15 Eagle in Saudi hands. This is simplistic. If we sell the F-15, we have U.S. technicians on the ground, we control not only the flow of spare parts but also the supply of air-to-air weapons to be utilized, and we know what is going on. However, if we disapprove these sales, the Saudis will turn to the French where we exert no limitations on numbers, armaments, third-country transfer and training, or awareness of Saudi intentions. Let there be no delusions. The Saudis are rich enough to acquire aircraft at their choosing. No matter what we decide, they will get modern aircraft. From my military experience, I can assure you, Mr. President, a French connection in unlimited quantities and with its potential for Arab standardization is significantly more dangerous to Israeli security than 60 F-15 aircraft with U.S. involvement.

The essential fact in the military equation is Israeli superiority. Stocks of war

materials in Israel are such that she can even avoid dependence on the United States for the first 3 weeks of any war—and none has gone that long since 1948. Sixty Saudi F-15's, with very minimal air-to-ground capabilities are but a marginal threat against the only effective air defense system in the Middle East and 560 first-line Israeli combat aircraft. Nor would cost-effectiveness dictate that F-15's, at \$16 million apiece, be used in air-to-ground combat missions. The U.S. Air Force has not qualified these aircraft on air-to-ground modes and there is even less sense in Saudi Arabia doing so. Moreover, the President has stated his intention to provide 20 additional F-15's to Israel in 1979. And, of course, as intelligence reports reveal, the operational readiness rates for Arab aviation assets are far below corresponding Israeli figures. Yet, it is this rate, not numbers of aircraft, that determine combat capabilities against Israel.

Each state wants these aircraft. Israel desires the further modernization inherent in the proposed sale of 90 aircraft. Although 50 F-5E's to Egypt will not drastically affect the military balance, Egypt needs them to show further gains from the turnaway from Soviet supplies. Saudi Arabia is growing increasingly conscious of air threats from Iraq and South Yemen and wants a symbol of U.S. evenhandedness in the Middle East. The reasons for these requests from each country thus are defensive and political.

#### PEACE: EVERYONE'S OBJECTIVE

My third yet paradoxical point is that these sales can help revive the momentum to peace which is grinding to a halt. As former Israeli Ambassador Abba Eban noted in 1969,<sup>1</sup> "history works not in logic or precision but in irony." Strategy is a mix of complex international relationships and weapons technology. A weapon is morally neutral, only intent is offensive or defensive. By reaffirming our special relationships with each of the three nations, by meeting legitimate needs of each state at a time of their choosing, we build a confidence in the United States as an honest broker of peace. We also aid moderate Arab leadership. Real progress toward peace demands a two-sided relationship between the United States and the Arabs.

Some of my Jewish friends argue this will make Arabs intransigent. I disagree. Egypt, overpopulated, poor and the principal combatant against Israel in the past, is better led by President Sadat than by some obscure Army colonel. Israeli security is better entrusted to the first Arab leader eager to reduce the crippling burden of military budgets, brave enough to journey to Jerusalem. Saudi Arabia, underpopulated, rich, with the weakest military force, remains quite vulnerable to a concentrated Israeli combined air and ground attack. Thus, she has neither motive nor capability to threaten Israel. If the Middle East is to avoid the cruel dilemma of no war, no

<sup>1</sup> Jerusalem Post, June 6, 1969.



peace, mutual confidence must be built. These sales, paradoxical as it may seem, are a further step toward peace. The conduct of diplomacy is always a delicate adjustment, a mutual exploration of intentions and capabilities geared to finding an equilibrium which, if not fully satisfying, is tolerable to all.

There are, to be sure, references to a spiraling arms race endangering peace. This blanket assertion ignores two realities: First, for 30 years we have been supplying arms to Israel; second, Arab oil wealth means they will get weapons. Against these realities must be weighed another important fact—there is no proof that a causal relationship exists between armaments and war. Armaments reflect political tensions, but arms do not create these tensions. Saudi Arabia and Egypt are not determined to resort to violence. The military balance is not altered; suspicions are not aroused by these sales. More significantly, it must be remembered that arms sales in the Middle East are intertwined with arms races and political ferment in Africa and Arab fears of these developments. If we examine history since World War II, it can be argued that armaments have helped to stabilize situations. Until recently, Europe was the largest importer of arms, yet—perhaps for that reason—it became more stable and moved from military confrontation to détente. Thus, it is by no means certain that the potential for violence is increased by the transfer of these arms—especially when the alternatives—a potential Soviet return to Egypt if Sadat fails and falls, a deterioration in Saudi-American bilateral relations, and no control over French armament deliveries which ultimately greatly increase the threat to Israel—are unacceptable. It is for these compelling reasons that I urge my colleagues to reject this resolution.

Mr. President, we have gone quite a long way today in this discussion. It has covered many areas. I ask my colleagues to consider that when it comes down to the vote this evening, our choice is very simple. It is not the many extraneous items that have been brought in today. It really is this: Do we approve the arms sales and retain what U.S. controls we have over the use of those sales and the influence it can carry toward the peace table again?

Or do we disapprove the sale and take a desperate gamble on losing what influence we have and open the specter of the unlimited and uncontrolled sale of arms in the Mideast, over which we have no control whatsoever?

Mr. President, I urge my colleagues to vote against this motion of disapproval.

Mr. CASE. Mr. President, I yield 2 minutes to the Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. BROOKE).

Mr. BROOKE. Mr. President, I thank my distinguished colleague.

Mr. President, the interests of the United States are inevitably intertwined

with those of many countries in the Middle East. However, our most deep and abiding commitment in that part of the world is to the security of Israel as a Jewish homeland. It has been U.S. policy over the three decades since the establishment of the State of Israel to assist in her efforts to maintain the military capability necessary to insure her survival amidst her oftentimes antagonistic Arab neighbors. That policy should not and must not change. And it must form the basis from which we judge other U.S. actions in the area impacting upon security questions.

We also recognize that it is in our interest to cultivate effective and cordial relations with the moderate Arab States. For that reason we are providing a great deal of economic assistance to Egypt and Jordan. For that reason also we have a close relationship with Saudi Arabia. I believe each Member of the Senate deeply appreciates when our acts of friendship are reciprocated by the Arab States. There are many interests we hold in common with them that form a solid foundation for continued amity.

It is also apparent that the United States cannot be indifferent to the security challenges faced by the Arab moderates from Arab extremists and the latter's chief supporter—the Soviet Union. I share with the Saudis a deep concern over the events of the past year in the Horn of Africa. Soviet-Cuban military activities in Ethiopia and elsewhere do pose a challenge to Saudi Arabia and other Arab moderates as does the pro-Soviet orientation of Iraq. Egypt also feels pressure from the radical Libyan regime of Colonel Qaddafi.

While we must be sensitive to the security challenges faced by all our "friends" in the Middle East, we cannot avoid the reality that, lacking an effective binding accommodation between Israel and the Arab moderates, the United States cannot make its arms transfer decisions to the Middle East solely on the basis of the very real Soviet-Arab extremist threat. It must, like it or not, take into consideration the effect of transfers of sophisticated military equipment on the Israeli-Arab military equation.

It is my considered judgment that, at this point in time, a very crucial period in the search for the desired Israeli-Arab accommodation, the administration's proposal to provide F-15's to Saudi Arabia represents an unwise qualitative escalation of arms capabilities in the Middle East. Such an escalation would have little impact on the efforts to counter the growing Soviet threat to the Arab moderates, but it would have an impact on the Israeli-Arab issue.

At a minimum, it would lessen the margin of military security for Israel and would force Tel Aviv to plan for another air front in a possible future war with the Arabs. This would mean, in turn, that there would exist even greater "preemption" incentives for Israel under crisis conditions. This is

neither in the interests of Israel, the United States nor the Arab moderates. Regardless of well meant intentions, the F-15 sale at this time would introduce a further destabilizing element into the Middle East. Therefore, I intend to vote in favor of the resolution of disapproval.

I am well aware of the importance that we must attach to good relations with the Arab moderates. I will continue to seek such relations. Yet, to agree to an arms transfer that does not hold out sufficient promise of contributing to the search for an Israel-Arab accommodation in a meaningful way while at the same time it contains the possibility of altering the Mideast military equation in a negative way, does not seem to me to be a wise choice.

The difficult choice the administration's proposal has placed before us has convinced me that now is the time for some serious attention to the larger strategic dimensions of the Middle East situation. Too often our understandable desire for a lasting peace in that area of the world has blinded us to the reality that our major adversary in the world—the Soviet Union—does not have a similar interest. It has sought to maximize its influence in the area by encouraging tension and seeking to undermine the moderate elements in the Middle East.

It is time for the United States, Israel, and the Arab moderates to concentrate on the real threat to their interests, namely the effort of Moscow to gain control over the area.

Israel is not the enemy of the Arab moderates. President Sadat acknowledged that by his trip to Jerusalem. And I believe that the Saudis also recognize that such is the case. It is the Kremlin and its extremist clients in the Middle East that would overthrow the Arab moderates; jeopardize the future of Israel; and place a stranglehold over Mideast energy resources so vital to the free world.

It is clearly in the interest of the United States to assist Israel and the Arab moderates in a concerted effort to thwart Soviet and Arab-extremist designs. But, we will not be able to do so by "quick fixes" such as the President's proposal we will vote on today.

What is needed is a Middle East security arrangement that involves a de facto partnership between Israel and the Arab moderates in meeting the Soviet-extremist threats. While such a statement may sound fanciful under present conditions, I believe that a binding Israeli-Arab accommodation that makes such a partnership possible is the necessary precondition to greatly expanded U.S. involvement in military security efforts in the Middle East such as those contemplated by the administration's proposal. Without such a partnership, arms transfers such as those before us, would be illusory regarding the realistic security goals we should be seeking vis-a-vis the Middle East.

Mr. President, I just cannot, for the life of me, understand why this particular

proposal is before us at this time. In 1976 we all listened to candidate Jimmy Carter say—and many people believed—that the United States should decrease its export of weapons of destruction to the rest of the world. He stated he was tired of seeing this country as the major exporter of arms. Now, as President, he is proposing to us that we put \$5 billion worth of arms into the Middle East and apparently expects such an action to help achieve peace. That, more than anything, disturbs me. I would be fascinated to know what happened to change his mind in such a fundamental way.

We all want peace. It is true that Saudi Arabia has been a great friend of the United States. It is true that President Sadat's visit to Jerusalem was a magnificent gesture toward peace. If I believed that this \$5 billion would help achieve peace, or if any of us believed that this \$5 billion sale would help achieve peace, I think we would have 100 votes in the U.S. Senate in favor of the arms proposal. But it is inconceivable to me that, at this juncture in time, we are going to escalate the scope of our arms transfers to include F-15 sales to Saudi Arabia. No compelling arguments have been offered to justify such a course of action.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's 2 minutes have expired.

Mr. CASE. Mr. President, I yield 1 minute to the Senator from Maryland (Mr. SARBANES).

Mr. SARBANES. Mr. President, in view of the question that was put by the Senator from Ohio, I simply want to say these words:

I am particularly concerned by our Nation's role as the world's leading arms salesman. Sometimes, we try to justify this unsavory business on the cynical ground that by rationing out the means of violence, we can somehow control the world's violence. The fact is that we cannot have it both ways. Can we be both the world's leading champion of peace and the world's leading supplier of the weapons of war?

Mr. President, those are not my words. Those are the words of Jimmy Carter in a major speech before the Foreign Policy Association in New York City.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired.

Mr. CASE. Mr. President, I yield the remaining time to the majority leader.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from West Virginia, the distinguished majority leader, is recognized for 22 minutes.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, after examining the proposed sales separately and collectively, I have concluded that they are consistent with our national interests and with our efforts to help bring about peace in the Middle East.

The willingness of the administration to heed the calls from the Senate to provide certain assurances about the sales has been an important factor in gaining support for the proposals. Of particular

importance have been the assurances concerning future F-15 sales to Israel.

Many of the concerns and questions raised within Congress have been resolved and I believe this is indicative of an important congressional role in shaping the final terms of the sales.

It is in our interest to maintain a strong relationship with all three of the nations involved. Approval of the sales will constitute recognition of our increasingly strong and mutually important relationship with Saudi Arabia and Egypt—as well as our long-standing commitment to Israel.

#### ISRAEL

Clearly, Israel is at the heart of U.S. policy in the Middle East. The State of Israel has just marked its 30th anniversary as a proud and independent nation, and throughout this time the United States has stood firmly beside her. It is a unique relationship and one about which the American people feel very strongly.

Israel remains the largest recipient of U.S. foreign assistance. Just since the 1973 war we have provided more than \$10 billion in economic and military aid to Israel, about two-thirds of which has been in the form of direct grants or concessional loans.

This sale of F-15 and F-16 aircraft is further evidence of our commitment to Israel, as are the assurances about future F-15 sales.

By selling aircraft to Saudi Arabia and Egypt in addition to Israel, we will not be upsetting the balance of air power in the Middle East. Israel now has and will retain a substantial margin of military superiority, particularly air superiority. If I thought these sales were contrary to Israel's security interests, I certainly would not support them.

In evaluating these proposed sales, it is also essential to take into account the potential consequences of not making the sales to the other nations—not just the consequences for long-term Israel security, but the overall economic, diplomatic, and military impact.

Let me turn, therefore, to the proposed sales to Egypt and Saudi Arabia and indicate why I believe them to be consistent not only with our best interests, but with those of Israel and of the prospects for peace in the Middle East.

#### EGYPT

The sale of 50 F-5E Tiger aircraft to Egypt will take our relations with Egypt across a new threshold and is reflective of the increasing ties between our two countries.

These ties have been significantly bolstered by Egypt's moderate and conservative role in the Middle East peace effort, under the leadership of President Anwar Sadat.

Egypt needs the planes in order to maintain a viable air defense capability. That capability has steadily deteriorated since the cessation of Soviet arms and spare parts deliveries in 1975. The F-5's would not introduce significant new qualitative capabilities into the area and,

because the F-5 is a relatively short-range interceptor which can carry only limited payloads, it does not represent a serious offensive threat—particularly when contrasted to Israel's military strength.

Egypt has legitimate security concerns which are not directly related to Israel. Tension with Libya continues to run high and President Sadat is deeply concerned about the Soviet-armed Libyans, as well as Communist-supported threats in other African nations. The Egyptians are especially concerned about any potential threat to the headwaters of the Nile, on which the Egyptian economy is so dependent.

Egypt is at the geographical center of the Arab world and is the largest Arab country as well as one of the largest on the African continent. I believe it is clearly in our interest to maintain a good relationship with and enjoy the confidence of the Egyptians. This could be critical in enabling President Sadat to continue as a major influence for peace in the Middle East.

#### SAUDI ARABIA

A number of important factors weigh heavily in favor of the sale of the 60 F-15 "Eagle" fighter aircraft to Saudi Arabia.

The sale is looked upon by the Saudis as not only vital to their national security, but as symbolic of a continuing close relationship with the United States. Saudi Arabia and the United States have a mutuality of interests and the Saudis have repeatedly demonstrated their friendship for this country.

When oil was discovered in Saudi Arabia in 1933, all the developing countries were champing at the bit for rights to develop the resources. The Saudis turned to the United States. And they did so because they knew that ours was not an imperialistic Nation, because they knew that American oil exploration would not mean American economic exploitation. With 25 percent of the world's proven oil reserves, Saudi Arabia last year was the major exporter of oil to the United States. And this year, Saudi Arabia, whose largest trading partner since the Second World War has been America, is expected to buy about \$5 billion worth of goods and services from the United States—up from \$2.8 billion in 1976.

With a total area equivalent to the section of the United States east of the Mississippi River, widely disbursed concentrations of population and resources, and extremely limited manpower, the importance of the Saudi air defenses becomes obvious.

Saudi Arabia has genuine concerns about possible threats from its Soviet-supplied neighbors—Iraq and the Peoples Democratic Republic of Yemen. And Ethiopia, just across the Red Sea, has become a Soviet arsenal and a Cuban staging ground.

Even with the F-15, Saudi Arabia would continue to have the smallest inventory of combat aircraft in the area.



with the exception of Jordan and the Peoples Democratic Republic of Yemen. Iraq, Iran, Israel, Syria, and Egypt all have air forces three to four times as large as that of Saudi Arabia, and all now have advanced fighter aircraft, which the Saudis would not have operational in their country until 1982-83.

The sale of the F-15's to Saudi Arabia would provide an appropriate counter to external threats. The Saudis are seeking increased defensive capability, and that is what the F-15's offer.

Israel's military capabilities far exceed those of Saudi Arabia. Use of the F-15's against Israel, which seems highly unlikely in any case, would not only pit the Saudis against the highly sophisticated Israeli air defense network, but would leave the Saudi home territory vulnerable. And, as administration officials have repeatedly emphasized—and as the Saudis have made clear—the F-15's is intended for a defensive role.

In addition to the fact that the F-15 is basically designed as a defensive aircraft, equipped for air-to-air engagements rather than air-to-ground missions, there are several other factors which make it apparent that the Saudi F-15's are for defensive purposes and are not a threat to Israel.

We would not equip the planes with the special supplemental bomb racks. The bomb racks are included with the F-15 is intended for a defensive role. be delivered to Israel.

The Saudis have assured us that the F-15's would not be stationed at Tabuk Air Base. There has been concern that some of the planes might be based at this facility, which is only 125 miles from Israel. In any case, as Saudis point out Tabuk, which is actually an expanded civil airport, is not really sufficient to support the stationing of F-15 aircraft. Instead, Saudi Arabia apparently plans to locate the planes at Tayif, southeast of Jiddah and near the holy cities; at Dhahran on the Arabian Gulf; and at Khamis Mushayt, near the Red Sea.

The base at Khamis Mushayt would seem to be especially strategic, since planes based there could be used to defend Bab Al Mandab, the door to the Red Sea from the Indian Ocean and the major oil supply line to Israel. Bab Al Mandab was closed by Egypt in 1973, but the United States was able to convince Egypt to reopen it. I doubt whether our powers of persuasion would be as effective if the Communists, or a Soviet-backed nation closed that passage.

Another Israeli concern has been that in the event of renewed conflict, the F-15's might be transferred to Arab "confrontation" states. However, Saudi Arabia is fully aware of its obligations not to transfer U.S. equipment supplied under the foreign military sales program without U.S. permission. Indeed, this is a condition of any U.S. letter of offer to sell major defense equipment.

Because of U.S. dependence on Saudi Arabia for 20 percent of our oil imports—1.7 million barrels a day—and because of the heavy trade between our two nations.

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there has been some talk that this proposed arms sale was motivated by the threat of economic blackmail. To believe that is to believe that the Saudis do not need the United States.

That is simply not the case. As in most lasting relationships between nations, ours with Saudi Arabia was founded on friendship and has matured because of inter-dependency. Saudi Arabia may value our friendship, but they need our technology. And they will continue to need it for the foreseeable future. Whether it is drilling for oil or building cities on what is now just barren desert, the Saudis have turned to the United States—not just because they trust us as a people, but also because they know that our technology is the best in the world.

I do not believe that, if this proposed arms sale were rejected, Saudi Arabia could afford to sever ties with America, or try to "punish" us economically. Thus, in supporting the proposal, I do not feel that we are acting with a cocked pistol at our temples, or with the threat of economic blackmail in the backs of our minds.

#### CONSEQUENCES OF REJECTION

As I said earlier, we must also consider the consequences of not making the proposed sales. One of the most important questions in evaluating this proposal is what would happen if the sale to Saudi Arabia is rejected. In this case, the result is starkly apparent.

There can be little doubt that the Saudis would quickly turn elsewhere, almost certainly to France and its Mirage aircraft. The F-1 Mirage has much greater offensive capability than the F-15. And, instead of obtaining 60 F-15's over a 4- to 5-year period from the United States, the Saudis could get an equal number of the French F-1 Mirage fighter-bombers almost immediately, with prospects for buying more. The French would like to coproduce the new Mirage F-2000 with the Egyptians and Saudis—using Saudi money—and the Saudis would acquire up to 125 planes. Unlike planes purchased from the United States, those bought from France might be freely transferred among Arab States. If the Saudis are using F-15's, then the United States will maintain a degree of technical control and influence. By refusing the sale, we would quite possibly forfeit that influence, probably to Israel's detriment.

As Gen. David Jones, Air Force Chief of Staff and Chairman-Designate of the Joint Chiefs, recently stated, Israel would probably face a far greater threat if the Saudis made a purchase from the French than could possibly be the case if the F-15 sale is made.

The sales to Egypt and Saudi Arabia are not contrary to Israel's interests, and, for the reasons I have cited, are consistent with U.S. interests and with efforts to achieve peace in the Middle East. Failure to approve the sales to Saudi Arabia and Egypt at this stage would seriously damage our credibility with these two key nations and under-

mine our ability to serve as a mediator in the Middle East.

Our relationship with Egypt and Saudi Arabia, as well as Israel, is based on much more than our role as a supplier of arms. However, it is in our common interests for each of these nations to have a strong national defense.

As I have indicated in the past, major arms sales should be an instrument of U.S. foreign policy only under exceptional circumstances. I continue to believe that efforts must be made to bring down the total of arms sales and I strongly hope that this can be done. I am pleased that we have recently reached agreement with the Soviet Union to hold talks on limiting arms sales and I hope that such talks will lead to positive and concrete steps to curb the world arms trade. But it must be a mutual action involving all the major arms suppliers. What we are able to do in this regard will, of course, inevitably be influenced by what other supplier nations are doing.

And although we should continue our efforts to bring about a reduction in arms sales, we must consider the sales currently before us based on the situation which now prevails.

Mr. President, there are those who view the arms sales issue before us as a tug-of-war between Israeli and Arab interests.

The dividing line here is not between Israel and Saudi Arabia, but between the radical and moderate influences in this troubled region. This gulf is deep and wide.

There is a certain reality that must be faced here—a reality as stark and apparent as any threat has ever been to our own national interests. The road to peace is not measured in feet but in miles, and we must have the vision to see the longer distance.

For it is easy to forget that Iraq, Ethiopia, South Yemen, Cuba, and, of course, the Soviet Union are volatile and adverse components in the complex puzzle of Middle East peace and stability.

If these sales are disapproved, we will have provided comfort to the enemies of moderation. We will have served up—on the proverbial plate—a victory to radicals in the region and to the clients of the Soviet Union.

No, I do not look at this issue as a struggle between Israeli and Arab interests. I see it as a battle for the best interest of the United States, Israel, and the moderate Arab States.

Mr. President, I urge the Senate to vote no on the disapproval resolution. I had earlier intended to move to table or to move to indefinitely postpone, but I have decided not to do that. Therefore, I shall expect a vote to occur up or down on the disapproval resolution.

Let me take just a moment to compliment all sides on this debate. Those who have supported the resolution of disapproval and those who have opposed the resolution of disapproval, I think, are all to be complimented.

I believe that, as far as my own position is concerned, it was very adequately stated already by those who view the

matter as I do, and particularly by Mr. RIBICOFF and Senator MURIEL HUMPHREY.

I also want to compliment the distinguished chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, Mr. SPARKMAN, as well as the fine work of the floor managers in support of the resolution, Mr. BIDEN, Mr. CASE, and Mr. JAVITS. Finally, I want to compliment the distinguished minority leader, Mr. BAKER, for his bipartisan leadership in this very important area of our foreign affairs.

Mr. President, a vote "aye" is a vote against the proposed arms sales to Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia. A vote "no" will support the sales to those three countries.

I urge the Senate to vote "no."

Mr. President, I yield back the remainder of my time.

Before yielding back the time, I yield briefly to the Senator from South Dakota.

Mr. ABOUREZK. Mr. President, I just want to say to our leader that I had a beautiful speech prepared to deliver on this issue, but it could not compare to all of the oratory I have heard today. So I ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the RECORD.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(The VICE PRESIDENT assumed the chair.)

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, will the majority leader yield?

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I yield to the distinguished Senator from Idaho.

Mr. CHURCH. It had been agreed that the Senator from New Jersey would give me some time to summarize my position for the public record. Quite inadvertently, he thought he had given me that time and had not. The time has now expired. Since I unburdened myself in the secret session and my remarks did not touch upon any sensitive issue, I wonder if this omission could be corrected by my securing unanimous consent from the Senate that my argument made in secret session become part of the public record as well? That will suffice for my public testimony on this question.

I ask unanimous consent to that end.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(The statement follows:)

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, first of all, I shall address myself to the very provocative argument offered by the distinguished Senator from Connecticut which I find—the Senator from Connecticut has argued with great persuasion that we must be mindful of the Soviet interest in the Middle East and of those countries encircling Saudi Arabia that are more or less sympathetic with the Soviet Union. He has based his justification for the sale of F-15's to Saudi Arabia upon his assessment of that threat. Fair enough.

I remember a time when the United States gave large quantities of arms to Pakistan because of our assessment of

the Soviet threat to that country. Later, we began to sell and grant arms to India because of our assessment of the Communist threat to India. But while we were assessing the Communist threat and supplying large quantities of arms, both to Pakistan and India, those two governments prepared to go to war against one another. In the end, they went to war, using American supplied weapons on both sides. The Pakistanis blamed us for arming the Indians, and the Indians blamed us for arming the Pakistanis. It was the Russians who stepped in as peacemakers at Tashkent.

I have two objections to these offers of sale.

First, the way they were brought to Congress and, second, the timing—the way and the when of the sales.

There has been much discussion of the threats to Saudi Arabia. Now I ask Senators:

If Saudi Arabia is so weak and Iraq so strong, why has Iraq refrained from making her move against Saudi Arabia?

I must dismiss Libya, Ethiopia, and Yemen as serious threats. But Iraq is formidable.

Yet, despite the Saudi weakness, Iraq has never moved. Perhaps that has much to do with her assessment of the Iranian response, in the event she were ever to attack Saudi Arabia.

The question we must ask ourselves is which war is the more likely? Is it a war between Iraq and Saudi Arabia? Is it some fancied encirclement including Afghanistan, Libya, Yemen, and Ethiopia that constitutes the threat to the Saudis and the likelihood of war? Or is the war which is most likely to explode again, the one between Israel and her traditional foes?

Well, if the past is any teacher, we must admit that the more likely war is the one that will come upon a renewal of the arms race between Israel and her Arab neighbors.

I have listened to the assessment of the CIA which, incidentally, happened to be in error when it failed to anticipate the outbreak of the Yom Kippur war. The assessment tells me only that Israel presently enjoys military preponderance.

But if there is no settlement in the Middle East, and if Israel continues to hold onto the occupied lands, then all those burning coals that have led to the flare-up of four wars in the region will continue to smolder, and then what is going to happen? I will tell you. Yes, there will be French planes built in Egypt; yes, there will be a new arms race in the Middle East financed by the Saudis; yes, there will be a new military equation emerging from that arms race; yes, there will be another war.

I, too, would like to see the American position in the Middle East solidified. I wish for something more than a peace settlement between Israel, Syria, Jordan, and Egypt. I would like to see an alliance for mutual defense and economic development put together among the four, an alliance for prosperity and peace in the

Middle East, joining together Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia, and I would like to see us a part of it. But none of that is going to happen until these parties return to the negotiating table, until we have a settlement between Israel and Egypt.

Until then, the greatest danger is not war that involves an attack on the Saudis; it is the renewal of the war that has so long separated Israel from her neighbors.

Why am I against these sales? Because, in my judgment, they set back the prospects for peace at the negotiating table, the essential peace between Israel and Egypt. Remember, the President's proposal represents a fundamental change in American policy. When Mr. Kissinger negotiated Sinai I and Sinai II, what was said to the Israelis? "Yield territory, yield the canal, yield the oil fields. Move back to the passes, and you can be assured that your security needs in the future will be attended to by the United States of America." And explicitly written into the Sinai II agreement is the statement that we would attend to those needs.

It was unconditional. The President of the United States has suddenly, and without warning, made what was an unconditional commitment to Israel a highly conditional one. He has said, "Unless Congress approves our sale of top-of-the-line interceptors to the Saudis," and, for the first time, modern aircraft to Egypt, "unless Congress puts its stamp of approval upon a policy by which the United States begins furnishing arms of the most sophisticated kind to both sides, I shall not go forward on our commitment to Israel."

That is what he said. That is a fundamental shift in the American position.

He sends it up here and he says to us, "If you do not approve every part of it, each proposal, I will withdraw them all."

Should we be surprised that the Israelis are suddenly so deeply troubled? It will be much more difficult for them to yield more occupied territory, now that we have started to arm both sides. And the prospects for peace will suffer. Until you get the Israelis and the Egyptians back together, until you get a settlement of that long-standing dispute, you will have no foundation to build upon in this area of the world, which has so long been called the strategic crossroads, and which is now even more vital because of the oil.

My second objection, with which I will conclude, is the way these sales were presented, tied together in a package. This can be cured only by recognizing that this package remains a package, and rejecting it. This is not the time to be authorizing the injection of \$5 billion worth of warplanes into this volatile area of the world. This is a time when our single-minded purpose should be focused upon getting the parties back together at the negotiating table. This is a time when we should be saying, "Give peace a chance". If the process fails, then



there will be time enough to consider how many planes we should sell to the countries in the area. But if the process succeeds, it is entirely possible that we will need to sell no more planes at all.

Nothing can be lost by waiting 6 months. No country is singled out or insulted by that action. But the U.S. Senate will have shown the wisdom of giving peace a chance, with an opportunity to come back again, if necessary, to a consideration of what our policy should be in this area if a settlement does not ensue.

It is on this basis that I hope the Senate will vote to approve the resolution of disapproval.

● **Mr. CULVER.** Mr. President, the choice the Senate faces today on these proposed arms sales is a very difficult one with strong and powerful arguments for either viewpoint. The outcome of the vote, at this hour, remains in doubt. The complex issues involved are far broader than the immediate question of approving or disapproving these sales, for they include our national policy on arms sales and our peace policy in the Mideast.

The central point that must guide us here is the national interest of the United States. After carefully weighing the arguments pro and con, I have come to the decision that approval of these sales at this time will preserve favorable U.S. relations with the Saudis and the Egyptians without prejudicing the prospects for a fair and durable peace.

Rejection, however, would endanger our relationships with the Arabs which might therefore hamper our efforts to serve as honest broker in the peace negotiations.

In addition to being favorable to our own national interest, this action, if it is to be taken, must be consistent with our long-standing commitment to the survival and security of Israel. I believe it is. The greatest threat to Israel is not from the Saudis or the Egyptians, but from the continuing failure to achieve a just peace. The aircraft provided by these sales, when ultimately delivered several years hence, will not appreciably change the balance of military power in the Mideast. Moreover, the question is not whether the Saudis will obtain sophisticated warplanes, but whether they will obtain them from us. Other advanced aircraft can be purchased from the French without the restrictions and safeguards provided in this proposed sale.

Another major consideration is that these sales do not set a precedent for future escalation of arms sales in the Mideast. This action must be accompanied by a commitment to an effort for general restraint in arms sales by the arms-producing nations throughout the world, and I believe President Carter has been clear in making such restraint a principal and welcome component of U.S. foreign policy. While I will cast my vote for these particular sales, in these unique circumstances, my dedication to the general proposition of limiting foreign military sales remains undiminished. I am convinced that Saudi Arabia

has genuine and understandable concern about threats to its own security.

The potentially adverse military consequences of this sale, as Israel sees it, would not come until 1981. Moreover, some of these consequences have been mitigated, in response to concerns expressed in Congress, by the President's announced willingness to sell additional planes to Israel and by the Secretary of Defense's assurances regarding the defensive configuration of the planes for Saudi Arabia. In short, while the diplomatic consequences of rejection would be immediately harmful to United States-Arab relations, the military impact of approval, even if as significant as some predict, would not be felt for a period of years. In the meantime, the situation could be changed completely by a breakthrough for peace.

As a final safeguard, approval of these sales need not be viewed as irrevocable, but subject to review in the context of future developments in the Mideast. The Executive Branch already has the right, written into every foreign military sales contract, to cancel any sale prior to delivery "under unusual and compelling circumstances when the best interests of the United States require it."

I believe that the Congress has the right to invoke that contractual provision by appropriate legislation. Accordingly, we can and should exercise the right to review the military balance prior to delivery of these planes. In this way, we can be sure that the peace process has not been jeopardized by these sales and would still be served by the final transfer of the aircraft.

Mr. President, whatever the outcome of this debate may be, it should be recognized that the Senate is united on two main objectives—the security of Israel and the achievement of just and lasting peace in the Mideast. With the clear understanding that no precedent for open-end arms sales in the future is being established, I am convinced, for my part, that these two objectives will best be served by approval of this proposal. ●

● **Mr. ROTH.** Mr. President, I believe the Senate should reject the proposed sale of sophisticated aircraft to the Middle East. These are the wrong sales at the wrong time. In making these sales, the United States would be fueling an ongoing arms race and jeopardizing prospects for peace.

For years, I have urged successive administrations to seek multilateral restraints on the supply of sophisticated weapons to volatile regions of the world. In my judgment, we should only make such sales when there is a compelling American national interest in the sale. I have listened carefully to the arguments today both for and against the Middle East sales, and I believe no compelling case has been made. Indeed, the stronger argument is that these sales should not be consummated while the outcome of the recent peace initiatives remains so uncertain.

In my judgment, the administration has made two serious mistakes in han-

dling these sales. They are clearly premature, coming at a time when the peace prospects look less hopeful than a few months ago. I believe the President should have made it very clear that favorable congressional consideration would depend very heavily on progress and flexibility in the peace negotiations and, particularly, some sign that the Saudi Government supported the initiatives of Mr. Begin and Mr. Sadat.

Second, the administration showed poor judgment in insisting on linking the sales to the three countries. Of course, our sale of arms to any country in the Middle East must be evaluated in the context of the overall balance of power and the psychological and symbolic ramifications of the sale throughout the region. But by insisting for so long on a formal linkage of these sales, the administration made it very difficult for the Congress to examine them on their own merits. Instead, they have incorrectly become interpreted as a symbolic test of American friendship and support for the three countries involved, and any action we take will be regarded as a victory for one side and a defeat for the other.

This has presented the Senate with an unnecessary damned-if-you-do, damned-if-you don't situation. If the sales are approved, they will be regarded in Israel as a lessening of American support, and this will make it much more difficult politically for Israel to pursue the peace initiatives. If the sales are disapproved, then as a result of the administration's linkage, this action may be unfortunately misinterpreted in Saudi Arabia and Egypt as signifying a weakening of American interest in developing constructive relations with these two countries.

In this situation, it is essential to reaffirm the importance the people of the United States attach to their relations with all three countries involved and our deep hope that a satisfactory and lasting peace can be worked out.

Our relations with Israel are so deep and fundamental, it is a sad commentary on the present conduct of our foreign policy that they should require reaffirmation. Israel is the only country in the Middle East that shares our basic democratic values. The people of the United States are proud of the role we played in the creation of the modern State of Israel 30 years ago, and we firmly believe that a peace settlement must be based around recognition of Israel's right to security and peaceful pursuit of prosperity.

In the case of Saudi Arabia, it is clearly in the interests of the United States to maintain close ties with an anti-Communist Saudi Arabia. This country now supplies 10 percent of our oil, and we should seek to help it meet its legitimate security needs, so long as these do not conflict with our other interests in the region. Recent Soviet activities in the Horn of Africa, in the southern part of the Arabian peninsula, and in Iraq and Afghanistan have been profoundly upsetting to the government of Saudi

Arabia, and the United States should help Saudi Arabia help strengthen itself against the kinds of threats these activities pose.

Finally, we also have an important interest in the continuation of a moderate, anti-Communist Government in Egypt, as represented by Mr. Sadat.

Mr. President, I strongly believe the United States needs to develop firm ties with moderate, anti-communist governments such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia, while maintaining its traditionally close relationship with Israel. In my judgment, the administration's arms sales package will move us away from, rather than toward, these objectives.●

● Mr. BAYH. Mr. President, the issue before us today requires one of the most difficult decisions I have been called upon to make in my 16 years in the U.S. Senate. The difficulty has resulted from the sincerity and plausibility of those representing both sides of the arms sales question before us. President Carter, Vice President Mondale, and other administration officials have sincerely expressed their opinions that acceptance of the package is vital for the continued pursuit of peace in the Middle East.

We have heard eloquent discussions of the importance of maintaining a balanced posture if we are to have the maximum effect in helping the parties negotiate a successful peace agreement. We have been reminded of the importance of maintaining influence with the moderate Arab States in the Middle East in their confrontations with the radical Arabs and Soviet subversion. Special emphasis has been placed on the importance of our relationship with Saudi Arabia and the role the Saudis have played and will continue to play relative to oil and the economic well-being of the industrialized world.

However, I am forced to conclude that lasting peace in the Middle East is the one most important goal to be considered in assessing the merits of the arms package and, in my judgment, the likelihood of peace is lessened, not strengthened, by supporting the particular arms package before us.

In the past, when the United States has provided arms to traditional adversaries, the cause of peace has not been served. The scarred remnants of Indian and Pakistani tanks—all made in the United States—are sorry evidence of this kind of even handed approach. Yet supporting this package would be to refuse to learn from history. It provides little real comfort to be advised that commitments to limit the use of Saudi planes have been forthcoming. Although these commitments may have been given with the greatest of sincerity today, it is unrealistic to expect Saudi officials to resist the pressure which will exist years hence when, in a confrontation with Israel, the true test of Saudi-Arab loyalty is the commitment of their F-15's. Surely there must be a way for the United States to provide sufficient support for the present Saudi Government against those forces which

threaten her in the Persian Gulf area without providing the most sophisticated weapons of war which can reasonably be envisioned as a subsequent threat to Israel.

An even more compelling reason for my opposition to the package is my fear that the package will have a negative impact on the Israelis willingness to make the concessions necessary for a peace settlement in the Middle East. To achieve peace, all of the parties in the area will have to make concessions. This is the substance of negotiation. For Israel to be persuaded to make the maximum necessary concessions, she must be completely confident, have absolute faith, in the commitment of the United States to provide the necessary military support if Israel is ever again attacked by hostile forces. The package before the Senate ties support to Israel, support promised in exchange for Israeli pullback from the Sinai, to the provision of sophisticated weapons of war to Israel's potential adversaries. It is my judgment that this proposal and its ratification by the Senate will seriously damage Israeli confidence in the future United States commitment. Without this faith, the Israelis will be less likely to withdraw from the necessary kilometers and to abandon the necessary settlements which will be required if a final settlement is to be reached. For this reason I intend to cast my vote in support of the resolution of disapproval.●

● Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, that most volatile and vital part of the world, the Middle East, once again claims our attention. Our challenge is to strike a balance between our bilateral interests with key countries and our overriding interest to activate and advance a Middle East peace process whose purpose is to achieve a just and lasting settlement among the traditional contestants. The sales of American jet aircraft to Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia are reasonable and responsible only if they fit into the framework of those interests.

The essence of present-day U.S. policy in the Middle East is to advance the prospects of peace. This objective is shared by Israel and by Egypt and other Arabs of good will. History, however, has bitterly taught us that there is no clear and obvious road which will take us to the day when Jews and Muslims can co-exist without the daily threat of military conflict or terrorist attack.

The sophisticated nature and enormous capability of the weapons systems being debated today underline the need for each side to give if each side is to gain the goal that has eluded the region for so long a time.

The obstacles to peace in the Middle East seem insurmountable—more often than not. From one perspective, additional arms, of the kind we are debating, may add to those obstacles, rather than reduce them.

That risk should not be ignored.

On the other hand, these sales may, ironically, advance the peace process and add to regional stability.

We cannot be certain which of these risks will materialize if these sales go forward:

They do not guarantee that the negotiations between Israel and Egypt will move off dead center, but they give the new bilateral relationship between Israel and Egypt a longer period of time to gestate and work itself out.

They do not guarantee that the multitude of anti-Sadat Arabs will stop berating the Egyptian president for his efforts to come to terms directly with the Israelis, but the F-5E's demonstrate that the United States recognizes his historic mission and believes that his approach toward settling differences with Israel can achieve some concrete results.

It is clear that disapproval of the sales will send a negative signal to the Arab world and perhaps to Israel as well. Moderation and realism a la Sadat in dealing with Prime Minister Begin and his cabinet members will be challenged. The Saudi pro-American course of action will be subject to ridicule in the Persian Gulf area. Close United States-Saudi relations will be at serious risk.

Mr. President, the U.S. relationship with Israel is based on deep and long-standing moral and strategic/political interests. American cooperation with Israel has been, and as far as I can foresee, will be extremely close and mutually beneficial. Our two countries must strive together to achieve the reality of recognition by Israel's neighbors of its enduring existence as an essential part of the region, as well as advance a settlement with Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and eventually Syria in every possible way.

This is of critical importance. The continuing Arab/Israeli conflict has proved to be impervious to long-term stabilization by means of war. A new war, no matter the outcome, will not improve the chances of a political settlement.

The question for the United States, then, is how to improve Israel's security in the decade ahead.

Four factors must be weighed as we consider these sales:

First is the quality of Israel's armed forces. Israel considers control of the air to be its key to survival. The sale of F-15s and F-16s will provide sophisticated replacements in the 1980s for its aging fleet of A-4s and F-4s. Israeli pilots are among the best in the world. In their hands, the F-15 will be an extremely effective air superiority fighter. The F-16, with its superior ground-attack capabilities, will be able to provide effective combat support for Israel's armored forces. The F-16 is capable of delivering the full range of precision-guided munitions. The numbers involved—75 F-16s and F-15s—with an additional 20 F-15s at a later date—will meet Israeli requests for deliveries through 1983.

Second is the nature of the threat which Israel faces. Egypt represents the greatest potential military threat to Israel's security. It is extremely important that Egypt not turn back to the Soviet Union as its main military supplier. Sadat has courageously broken with the



Soviets both politically and militarily, and is turning to Europe and, to a lesser degree, the United States, for Egypt's military needs.

Sadat depends on the support of the armed forces, and evidence of American willingness to help Egypt defend itself is of great importance in resisting pressures to return to the Soviet fold. In 1970, some 15,000 Soviet advisers were in Egypt and Soviet pilots flew combat sorties against Israeli aircraft during the war of attrition. It is not in Israel's interest or ours to allow such a situation to develop in the future. Third is the U.S. commitment to Israel's security. Israel requires economic and military assistance from us. In fiscal year 1979, it appears that Congress will provide \$1 billion in foreign military sales and \$785 million in security supporting assistance. On the basis of decisions already made, Israel will receive into the 1980's an uninterrupted supply of advanced American weaponry. The Carter administration has pledged not to use the supply of military equipment as a form of pressure on Israel. I know that this is very much the intent of Congress as well.

Fourth is the achievement of a peace settlement. Such an accomplishment with Egypt, and, hopefully, with Jordan and Syria, would greatly enhance Israel's security. For peace to be reached, Sadat's overture must not be allowed to fail. Sadat has many enemies in the Arab world, and it is clear that the Soviets would be delighted to see him replaced.

Saudi support is essential to Sadat's ability to stick to a course of direct negotiations. Egypt's long-term future requires a peace settlement, as well as close ties with both the United States and Saudi Arabia. To enlist Saudi Arabia in the peace effort, it is in the U.S. interest to be responsive to Saudi inter-Arab security requests, particularly in the case of the F-15's, where a prior commitment exists.

Mr. President, I know from my discussions in recent weeks with Israeli leaders that military planners in Tel Aviv are wary about the F-15's to be sold to Saudi Arabia. However, these risks must be weighed against the situation that would prevail if the F-15's were not provided.

Saudi Arabia will acquire a modern air defense capability. The French Mirage F-1 is the likely alternative. It is less effective as an interceptor, but it has greater ground-attack capability. It will also be in the inventories of several other Arab States—Iraq, Syria, Libya, Morocco—all of whom could provide pilots or technicians to make use of Saudi F-1's.

By contrast, no other Arab pilots will be able to fly the F-15. It cannot be transferred easily to any other country. U.S. technicians will be involved in its maintenance, and U.S. officials will be able to monitor carefully its basing and any possible misuse. Indeed, we in Congress may want to write this requirement into legislation.

Equally important, Mr. President, if the Saudis are rebuffed at this time, many voices in the Arab world will question the value of cooperation with the United States. Sadat will become more vulnerable. The Soviets could easily ex-

ploit the situation. The best chance for a peace settlement in 30 years could well be lost.

In that event, Israel's security will be jeopardized and the probability of another round of conflict will increase. The fact that Israel could prevail militarily in any future confrontation is no reason for complacency.

Mr. President, it is in the U.S. interest to pursue and cultivate a prudent and close relationship with the Middle East's most important Arab countries, Egypt and Saudi Arabia. The United States has crucial interests in these nations as it does in Israel.

Good sense tells us that the pursuit of these interests now and in the years ahead requires good relations with the Israelis and Arabs simultaneously and the accommodation of their principal respective concerns as well as our own.

We want foremost to avoid the serious consequences of confrontation and the tragedies of war.

We want Arab recognition of, and normal economic and commercial intercourse with, Israel.

We want to be sure that Saudi Arabia has the capacity to defend its borders from increasing Soviet pressures—not only the influence of the Russians in Iraq and Syria—not only the existence of Cuban soldiers in South Yemen—but also the pressure which the Soviets are exerting on the Horn of Africa. Saudi Arabia has reason to be concerned and we have reason to share her concern.

We want to prevent the reassertion of Soviet influence in Egypt's peace efforts. We want President Sadat to succeed in his peace efforts. We want to encourage the Egyptian Government to focus on its country's ailing economy and on the unmet needs of its creative, but fast-growing, population.

We want to insure the uninterrupted flow of Arabian oil to ourselves, Japan, and our NATO allies.

We want to secure Saudi Arabia's cooperation in restraining the rise of oil prices.

We want our private citizens to participate in the Egyptian and Saudi modernization planning and project implementation.

We want to strengthen American financial interests in exporting civilian goods and services to oil-rich Arab countries.

We want, in turn, not to weaken Arab financial interests in America.

Since 1973, the Saudi Kingdom has pursued an increasingly important regional and international role. This obviously stems from its central position regarding oil. It also reflects a more assertive use of its economic power.

Saudi Arabia contains the largest known reserves of oil in the world. This presently amounts to at least one-quarter of the world's known oil reserves. Further exploration will almost certainly reveal additional reserves.

The Saudis' ability to expand production rapidly provides them the ability to prevent a price rise by artificial manipulation of supply shortages. This threat has kept OPEC members from following a completely cartel-like policy of ex-

tracting the highest possible price on the lowest volume of production.

On oil prices, the Saudis have helped to hold the line on prices since 1974. At the last OPEC meeting in December, the Saudis supported a price freeze throughout 1978. This has meant a decline in the real price of oil in the past 2 years.

The Saudis have used their financial and political resources in support of moderate regimes in the Middle East and Africa.

Egypt. Saudi financial support may be as much as \$2 billion annually. The Saudis now finance most of Egypt's military purchases in the West. They have quietly thrown their diplomatic weight behind Sadat's initiative. Sadat's willingness and ability to break with the Soviets was in large part due to the Saudis.

Syria. The Saudis, although troubled by some of Syria's actions, have worked hard to keep Syria from total dependency on the Soviets.

Somalia. As much as anyone else, the Saudis persuaded Siad Barre to expel the Soviets from Berbera. They provide significant economic assistance.

Jordan. A large portion of Jordan's defense spending is covered by Saudi Arabia, including the cost of the F-5E's that we have sold to Jordan.

South Yemen. The Saudis have been trying to turn the regime in South Yemen away from the Soviets, thus far with only limited success. The South Yemenis have, however, virtually ended their support for the rebellion in Oman.

North Yemen. This chronically poor but populous country is virtually a client of Saudi Arabia.

Sudan. The second largest, potentially agriculturally rich Arab country, is of great strategic concern to the Saudis and to Egypt. The Saudis have participated in funding economic/development activity.

A number of other African countries—Niger, Chad, Zaire—have profited from Saudi largesse, as have international lending institutions. The Saudis devote a much larger proportion of their GNP—approximately 10 percent—to foreign assistance than we do. Since 1974, the Saudis have committed through bilateral and multilateral channels well in excess of \$10.0 billion in economic assistance. As we find it increasingly difficult to raise capital for foreign assistance, the possibility of wedding Saudi capital to U.S. technology may provide the best hope of development for many of the poor countries.

It should be pointed out here that, as President Sadat has often avowed, the successes the United States has encountered in advancing American interests in the Arab countries have rested decisively on our especially close and abiding relationship with Israel. It is imperative, therefore, to preserve that relationship and to strengthen our ties with those in the Arab world who continue to seek the good will of the United States.

Achieving this objective can be realized only in the context of an effort to achieve a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

The proposed jet sales are intended to cultivate this delicate but potentially fer-

tile garden. But because they are also high-risk tools, when Congress approves their transfer into Israeli, Egyptian, and Saudi hands, there must be diligent follow-through to care for and to seek tangible progress in the peace process.

The Sinai accord in 1975 demonstrated the need for American diligence and American instruments of diplomacy, only after the United States induced Egypt to take another step forward, and then induced Israel to close the remaining gap, by providing it with the added security and other assets it sought in exchange for the Sinai passes and the oilfields, did the process succeed. That is our goal again.

In summary, Mr. President, I shall vote for these sales. I know there are inherent risks involved, but I expect the United States, Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia to gain more than they lose by them. These are the objectives:

First, that the United States increase its diplomatic influence and leverage in the region.

Second, a resumption of face-to-face negotiating efforts by Israel and Egypt in the near future.

Third, the United States-Israeli bilateral relationship to be as special and strong in the future as it has over the last 30 years.

Fourth, the U.S. relationship with Saudi Arabia also to remain close and strong.

Fifth, that the Soviet Union will not be involved in the peace process. Moscow has demonstrated it has no positive role or willingness to play. The Russians consistently refuse to risk their necks on behalf of reconciliation and rapprochement.

Sixth, that tangible support of Sadat will begin paying off within Egypt, between Egypt and Israel, and within the Arab world. Hopefully, with our support, the Egyptian approach will be viewed as more productive than the Syrian approach.

And seventh, that the whole Middle East will receive the strong political signal that the United States is deeply involved and will remain that way with those forces who share our objectives and who actively support countries which share our objectives. In turn, the United States is prepared to consider and meet their respective needs.●

● Mr. HART. Mr. President, I am voting against the proposed arms sales package because I do not feel it clearly advances the interests of the United States in the Middle East.

First, and most importantly, I believe any foreign policy action we take in that area must advance, rather than retard, the chances for peace between Israel and the Arab states. No persuasive case has been made by the proponents of the arms sale that, under present circumstances, chances of war in the area are reduced by selling advanced aircraft simultaneously to the opposing sides. The transfer of high technology U.S. weapons to multiple states in the region represents such a major shift of U.S. policy in the Middle East that the burden of proof on how this change advances the prospects of peace must be on those who advocate it.

They have not convinced me that these sales will restimulate the movement toward negotiations, rather than freezing what I hope is a momentary stalemate.

Second, the issue, as framed by the administration, has confused two separate, but urgent, policy questions. One is the guarantee of the security of Israel through the consistent and continuous commitment by the United States to provide advanced military equipment. In the case under consideration, the commitment of advanced fighter planes for Israel was made by the Ford administration as part of the so-called Sinai agreement in 1975. I must note that I opposed the Ford administration proposal at that time, principally on the grounds that the United States undertook a number of secret commitments in that agreement to various parties that could lead to the kind of controversy in which we are presently involved.

The other policy issue, possibly of even more crucial long-range implication to United States' interests, is that of the security of non-Communist interests in the entire region. Communist activities, led, financed, and promulgated by the Soviet Union—with considerable direct assistance from Cuban military forces—have become consequential enough to engender real concern, particularly by those in the area who are strongly adverse to Communist ideology. Saudi Arabia and Egypt share this aversion, as does Israel.

Thus, tragically, the proposal before us confuses these two imperative foreign policy problems. Consequently, each has suffered at the expense of the other and to the detriment of long-term U.S. security interests on both fronts. Unhappily, voting for the "package" promises merely to exacerbate this terrible confusion and to prevent resolution of either serious problem.

Confusion between these two policy problems also runs the risk of sending signals on U.S. policy that will be misread by the U.S.S.R. Cuba and each Middle Eastern and African nation.

One signal that I earnestly hope will not be misread is my vote in favor of disapproving these sales. It does not mean we should turn our backs on the security needs of Egypt and Saudi Arabia. I am convinced both Egypt and Saudi Arabia have raised strong arguments in favor of our military support for each of them.

Had each sale proposal been presented separately, and had peace negotiations not been at such a crucial point, I could have given each proposed aircraft sale strong support. It is in the United States' best interest to establish solid relationships with both Saudi Arabia and Egypt. If the pending proposal fails, the Senate would be unwise to consider subsequently a unilateral proposal to provide arms to any single participant in the "package." Instead, I hope that the administration will submit individual proposals which can be considered, each on its own merits, separately but concurrently. This would permit those who share the administration's Middle East concerns to support their laudable efforts to expand our mutually advantageous friendships with

Egypt and Saudi Arabia, as well as maintaining our unshakeable commitment to Israel.●

● Mr. SCHMITT. Mr. President, the issue of the presently proposed arms sales to Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia is one of the most important, most difficult, and most poorly timed foreign policy issues this Congress has or will be asked to consider. All three nations are strategically and psychologically critical to the United States and the free world. While each sale of aircraft can be justified, it is difficult for many to understand how these sales, at this time, will advance the delicate search for peace that is taking place.

The timing of this proposal is very poor and raises serious and troublesome questions regarding the administration's understanding of the situation as it presently exists in the Middle East. While the Congress had little or no influence in the decision to go ahead with these sales at this time, we are being forced to take a stand which has major long-term implications for U.S. foreign policy and peace in the Middle East. I fear these implications have not been as carefully considered by the administration as one might have hoped and expected.

Now with regard to the situation in Saudi Arabia, there is no doubt that the Saudis have major national security concerns. With a hostile Iraq to the north and a similarly hostile South Yemen to the south, the Saudis must focus attention on their security requirements for the coming years. The ominous and increasing Soviet and Cuban presence in Ethiopia and South Yemen increases this need.

Saudi Arabia probably possesses about 25 percent of the world's proven oil reserves. With these, the Saudis currently are responsible for 14 percent of the world oil output. This factor is most important to the United States, Western Europe, and Japan as 95 percent of Saudi oil export is shipped to these three areas of the world. Thus, the continued supply of oil is absolutely vital to the economic, military, and political security of the free world. In addition to our country, our NATO allies, Japan, and Israel have a vital interest in the ability of the Saudis to protect themselves.

It must be understood that the continued economic and military strength of the United States is a prerequisite to Israeli security. Should the oil flow from Saudi Arabia to the United States be cut or otherwise impaired, the result would gravely damage the United States and, as a result, it could be catastrophic for Israel.

The United States will depend on oil supplies from Saudi Arabia for the foreseeable future. Unfortunately, the President and the Congress have done nothing, nor could the Carter energy proposals do anything about decreasing our dependence on Middle Eastern oil, specifically Saudi Arabian oil. Only vastly increased incentives for domestic oil and gas production and clear encouragement of the development and use of alternative energy sources could have rapidly changed this dependence to future independence. Thus, we now must insure



that the Saudis can protect our source of energy supply until we finally wake up to the problem. The folly of such dependence on a small, underdeveloped and militarily weak nation for our national security seems to have been lost on the administration and the majority in the Congress.

Further, the administration has found itself philosophically incapable of countering the growing Soviet threat to Saudi Arabia and its oil posed by the recent and continuing aggression in the Horn of Africa. When needed, we may not be in a position to intervene to protect the Saudis, so we must insure that they can protect themselves as we must insure that these Israelis can protect themselves. At the same time, we should give the strongest commitment possible to intervene against any Soviet-sponsored aggression in the Middle East.

The fact is that the Saudis will in any case purchase advanced aircraft. They will in all probability assist Egypt in the purchase of the new aircraft it feels it needs. If this sales agreement is stopped by the Congress, then the Saudis will shop somewhere else, probably in France. The F-15's which are contained in this agreement are under defacto restrictions as to their use. The important aspect is that these restrictions can be enforced. With the United States as the only source of replacement parts, and even more importantly, the only source of expertise in the training of pilots and mechanics and the maintenance of the planes, the United States can exercise some influence over the use or nonuse of the planes.

Should the Saudis purchase planes for themselves and Egypt from any other country, the United States would lose virtually all influence in their use. In addition, other countries do not normally restrict the use or transfer of their military sales. Furthermore, should we turn our back on the Saudis, we could cause them to reassess their longstanding and close relationship with the United States. Such a revision could have tragic implications for free people everywhere.

There can be no doubt that the best interests of Israel are served by continued U.S. influence in Saudi Arabia, Egypt and throughout the Middle East. The Saudis in the past have been a moderating force in that part of the world. Continued good United States-Saudi relations will help guarantee that the future will not bring a change in Saudi policy toward the free world.

At the present time and in the foreseeable future, Israel will continue to have the best air defense of any nation in that part of the world and probably of any nation in the world. The sale of F-15's to Saudi Arabia in no major way threatens that security.

The situation in Egypt is somewhat different. The F-5 aircraft involved are not as sophisticated as in the Israeli and Saudi cases. Egypt has been increasingly threatened by Soviet-sponsored forces in other Arab countries and by internal political pressures. While Egypt does also have legitimate security needs and a need for more aircraft, I do believe that

a better time could have been found for this sale. The interests of peace may not be served by increasing the weapons available to potential adversaries during this fragile period.

The situation with Israel is somewhat similar to Egypt in that Israel is also involved in these delicate negotiations. In both the Egyptian and Israeli situations, I am not so opposed to the sales as to their timing. Both sales could have been used to serve as a further incentive to progress in the talks taking place.

The resolution before us today, however, offers only a vote on the total arms sales package. On balance and reluctantly, I shall vote in favor of the sale and against the resolution of disapproval.

The long-term solution to the issues between the various parties of the Middle East will come only as these issues become unimportant relative to the cooperative economic development of the entire area. The economic potential of the region is staggering; hopefully, it soon will become the focus of discussions between the nations and peoples who have the most to gain from its realization. The United States could perform no greater service than to encourage and sponsor such discussions. ●

● Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, I voted in committee for the resolution of disapproval of these four arms sales to the Middle East, and I intend to do so again here on the floor of the Senate.

I do so in full recognition of the legitimate defense needs of our friends in Saudi Arabia.

I do so very much aware of the contribution to peace made by Egypt's President Anwar Sadat.

And I do so profoundly aware of the moral commitment of this Nation to the security and integrity of Israel.

Mr. President, I intend to vote against this massive sale of arms into this most volatile area because I do not see that it serves the true interest of any of the parties—of Israel, of Saudi Arabia, of Egypt, nor of the United States.

Israel in these days is celebrating its 30th birthday. It is a fact that throughout its short existence Israel has had to fight, or be prepared to fight, for its national survival. Various attempts at negotiating peace have been made in the past—the Rhodes talks, the "Rogers" plan, Henry Kissinger's shuttles. But never before, it seems to me, have the prospects for peace been so promising.

In this respect, Egyptian President Sadat deserves the moral appreciation of the world for his heroic gesture in going to Jerusalem for the face-to-face talks the Israeli government has for so long felt to be vital.

Israeli Prime Minister Begin also deserves our profoundest respect for the efforts he has made, under extremely difficult emotional and political conditions, to respond to Mr. Sadat's initiative.

The rulers of Saudi Arabia also have a claim on our appreciation for the efforts they have made in the area, for their willingness to help Egypt through its extremely difficult economic travails.

But, Mr. President, given this new

situation, given the unprecedented willingness on the part of all the parties to at least try to work out a negotiated settlement, I have argued ever since President Carter announced his intention to make these sales that the time is inauspicious. I want to emphasize this: the timing is simply inappropriate.

Let us look at what is being proposed. A sale of 75 F-16's, the most modern fighter of its kind in the world, to Israel. A sale of 15 F-15's, probably the world's most sophisticated airplane of any kind, to Israel. A sale of F-15's—60 of them—to Saudi Arabia. And a sale of 50 F5E's to Egypt.

This is a package totaling almost \$5 billion. This is without question an introduction into region of the most advanced military weapons in the world.

Some of these weapons are going to have to be delivered at some point. Each of the three nations, all friends of the United States, has legitimate defense needs. Each government feels a responsibility and the necessity to meet these needs. Ultimately, they will all acquire additional weapons, if not from the United States, then from other sources.

But my question to the administration, and to the parties concerned is why now? Can we not wait a bit? Can we not go slow in pouring weapons into the area until we have a better fix on where these peace negotiations are going? For that matter, can we not withhold these sales for now expressly with the objective of encouraging the parties to work their differences out peacefully?

Let me comment particularly on one aspect of the current political tug of war, and that is the President's willingness to assure Israel an additional 20 F-15's in order to put a "balance" into the deal. To this I would say: This is the wrong direction. Adding another 20 of the world's most deadly airplanes, passing on an additional \$1 billion worth of war material, is not, it seems to me, the way to go about bringing peace to the Middle East.

President Carter, in both his campaign and his early administration, put special emphasis on the need to restrain American arms sales abroad. As President, Mr. Carter said in April 1976, in Boston:

I do not believe arms sales buy lasting friends. I am concerned with the way in which our country, as well as the Soviet Union, Britain and France, have poured arms into certain Arab countries far beyond their legitimate needs for defense—5 or 6 times more than Israel receives.

This headlong rush for weapons increases the chance for war. It postpones peace negotiations. It defers development. It erodes security. That is why it would not be wise at this time to supply strike weapons to Egypt, despite that nation's recent signs of friendship for the United States. With its vast population and deep poverty, Egypt needs housing and jobs and health care far more than offensive weapons such as tanks and planes and missiles.

I could not agree more.

Last May his administration produced a special policy statement which committed the administration to restraint in such sales abroad. I joined in praising this initiative because we have for too

long been the major arms merchant in the world, and I for one do not believe this is an appropriate role for us.

Mr. President, the extent to which these proposed sales undermine President Carter's own arms transfer policy was emphasized in a report by the Foreign Relations Committee staff, which concluded that the sales would "be seen by other arms suppliers as the final indication that the United States is not serious about implementing arms restraint." I think that comment is fully justified.

I know that it is argued that it is naive to assume that we can impede the flow of arms into this area. I am fully aware that other governments are knocking on the Saudi doors, prepared to deliver lethal weapons without any restrictions as to configuration, deployment, or their use in any potential regional war. To this I would only urge our friends to show restraint, to understand why we in America, who could so easily simply pour more weapons into the area, would choose the more difficult route, and would decide that, at least for the time being, enough is enough.

This proposed arms sale package is contrary to all the logic of the situation. It is the wrong time to sell weapons. We should be working for peace. These are the wrong weapons, we should be restraining the introduction of high technology into the area, and above all it is the wrong signal to the parties, there are other ways of supporting the peace initiative in the Middle East than delivering vast arsenals of devastating weapons.

For all these reasons, I hope that our friends—Israel, Saudi Arabia, Egypt—will understand why I have chosen to oppose all these sales at this time. May they understand my motivation, and, if it prevails, the motivation of this Senate. May they realize that it is simply my best judgment, having heard testimony and all the arguments, that the struggle for peace in the Middle East is not best served by the export of these weapons.

May they understand our motivation, and instead of irritation and frustration, look again at the possibilities of achieving a peaceful settlement, trying to bring peace to the Middle East by providing every side with increasing amounts of arms can only serve, in the last analysis, to create more suspicion and hostility.●

● Mr. HASKELL. Mr. President, on February 10 of this year, more than 2 months before Congress was officially notified of the administration's proposed package arms sale, I wrote Secretary of State Cyrus Vance questioning the decision to sell sophisticated F-15 aircraft to Saudi Arabia. In that letter, I expressed my reservations about the choice of aircraft and the timing of the proposed sale. I also noted that delicate negotiations, aimed at achieving a just and lasting peace in the Middle East, were then in progress. I concluded by observing that the timing of this sale could endanger those negotiations.

Three months later, this continues to be the case. Though debate on the proposed sales has sometimes turned on technical points involving the availability of bomb racks and the location of forward air bases, the Senate must ultimately make its decision based on whether these sales enhance or diminish the chances for peace in the region. After reviewing all the arguments, I remain convinced that the introduction of additional sophisticated weaponry into the Middle East at this time poses a threat to the prospects for a settlement. Thus, I will vote to disapprove these sales.

Much of the discussion of these sales has centered on the need of Saudi Arabia to acquire modern defensive weapons. Similarly, Egypt's defensive requirements have been examined and the necessity of an expression of support for President Sadat's peace initiative has been asserted. I understand that the Middle East does not exist in a vacuum, and though the Arab-Israeli conflict has dominated the political relations of that area for a generation, all the nations of the region face threats from other sources. The prospect of another Arab-Israeli conflict is, however, manifestly the gravest and most immediate danger to all the countries in the Mideast. Efforts to foster negotiations must take precedence over all other concerns.

Moreover, I would argue that many of the other challenges these arms sales are intended to meet will be alleviated by the successful conclusion of peace negotiations. Halting the spread of advanced weaponry to additional areas of the Middle East seems a prudent step at this time.

It is important to keep in mind the impact of the proposed sales will have on the fundamental immediate and long-range interests and objectives of American Middle East policy. For the immediate future, the prevention of another Arab-Israeli conflict is imperative. The prospects for a negotiated settlement in the Middle East remain better today than ever before, but no one expects the process to be easy. Thirty years of conflict and mutual suspicion cannot be resolved by a few meetings or by negotiations between only two of the several hostile parties. I am gratified, however, that the major emphasis in the Senate debate is on how proposed sales will affect peace talks rather than the military balance in the next war. But I am still convinced that approval of these sales poses a threat to the peace process.

The arms sales must also be examined in terms of their impact on our long-range objectives in the Middle East. Several important continuing United States interests must be served. First, America's support for the survival of a free and strong Israel must be unequivocal. Though Israel has never requested direct American assistance—despite four major wars and the continuing challenges of smaller assaults—America's commitment to Israel's welfare and our willingness to supply Israel with the arms necessary for self-defense have remained constant. This commonality of interest

and mutual trust has established a special relationship. For moral, practical, and historic reasons this relationship must continue to exist exclusively between Israel and the United States.

Certainly America has important joint concerns with a number of other countries, but with Israel we share an ethical and religious heritage and a commitment to democracy unique among nations. Furthermore, I believe that maintenance of this special relationship is essential to achieving peace in the Middle East. If Israel feels it must stand alone, then military might and retention of all currently administered territory would necessarily characterize future Israel policy. With undiminished confidence in the generous and sympathetic support of America, however, Israel can entertain new approaches to negotiations. America must not impose a solution, but by reaffirming our commitment to Israel we improve rather than harm the chances of a settlement.

Second, support for Israel does not preclude cooperation with Arab nations, especially Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Clearly, we have mutual economic and political concerns. I sense, too, a common understanding of the immense benefits which peace would bring to the entire Middle East. We also share with all the nations of the Middle East a moral commitment to end the suffering of the Palestinian people. A successful resolution of the refugee problem, in conjunction with a settlement mutually agreeable to all parties, would be a major contribution toward assuring the prosperity and peace to which all the residents of the Middle East are entitled. I am persuaded that America's relations with Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and other Arab nations will not be harmed by disapproving arms sales at this time.

The Middle East has acquired increasing economic and strategic significance. The United States as the world's leading power has many, occasionally competing, interests in the region. It is clear, however, that all of America's interests and every nation of the region will benefit from a negotiated settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The offer to sell sophisticated aircraft to three Middle Eastern nations has provoked extensive debate here and in the Middle East. Questions about shifting American allegiances and an altered military balance in the Middle East have dominated discussion. Though the administration has steadfastly maintained that the arms sales represent no change in U.S. policy and will not provide the Arab nations with a tactical advantage, raising such issues during the most encouraging peace initiatives in a generation is counter-productive. Only a decision to disapprove the arms sales will lay these distracting question to rest.

I have been to the Middle East and seen American weapons facing each other across borders which have too often been invaded. Now is not the time to add to the size and destructiveness of the Middle East arsenal. The vital interests of America and every Mideast na-



tion will be best served by the United States turning all its efforts toward achieving a just and lasting resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. I cast my vote convinced that opposition to the arms sale will contribute to that goal. ●

● Mr. ABOUREZK. Mr. President, I sincerely hope my colleagues will not lose sight of what this debate is actually all about, since it really has very little to do with the sale of warplanes. It is a debate of much larger scope, and it deals, I believe, with the future prospects of peace vs. continued war in the Middle East.

No one in the Congress, or in the press, is naive enough to believe that the sale of warplanes, or the refusal to sell them, is the central issue here today. It should be obvious to everyone by now that if this package were to be disapproved, Saudi Arabia and Egypt would simply go to France, or to England to make their purchases. Since Israel gets the airplanes virtually free of charge from the United States, it will return in a few months and reorder the warplanes it wants. And it will get them, just as it has, ever since we started shipping warplanes to Israel. In fact, the Government of Israel is playing something of a cynical, Machiavellian game with respect to this sale. While Begin and Dayan are now publicly saying they will not refuse their warplanes, the Israeli Embassy here in Washington and the lobby are directing their usual campaign of intimidation toward Senators who would like to support President Carter in his request.

Do you actually believe anyone is fooled by the arguments raised by the Israeli lobby, that Saudi Arabia might attack Israel if we sell them F-15's? You can say what you want about Saudi Arabia, but one thing you cannot say is that they are suicidal. In fact, all of the arguments raised by the Israeli lobby and its supporters here in the Senate have faded into oblivion, simply because they are without basis in fact. It would be impossible, for example, to transfer the F-15's to another country because of the complex training involved.

After these arguments failed, the lobby administered what I considered to be its ultimate argument—that if we sell F-15's to Saudi Arabia, Israel would be forced to attack. So, in order to save Saudi Arabia from such an attack by Israel, we should deny it the warplanes. While all countries must agree, in order to obtain U.S. weapons, that they cannot be used aggressively, the additional conditions of how the planes were to be equipped, and where they could be based are designed by the Israeli lobby solely for the attempted humiliation of a sovereign country.

We have all heard, to the point of nausea, that Tabuk Air Base in Saudi Arabia is only 28 minutes away from Tel Aviv. Now, unless I am mistaken, it would take the same amount of time for an Israeli F-15 to fly from Tel Aviv to Tabuk Air Base. Have we forgotten that Israel was created out of Arab lands? That no Arab country sits on Israeli lands? Have we forgotten which country is aggressive, and which is nonaggressive?

More significant than the groundless military arguments raised is the total lack of objection the Israelis have raised to the Egyptian sale. Is it not strange that Egypt, which has fought four wars against Israel, is totally ignored by the Israeli lobby in this particular sale? And is it not strange that the Israelis would focus on Saudi Arabia, a country which has not been in military confrontation with Israel, and does not have the military capacity ever to be? It is strange only if one does not try to look into the future. The policy planners for Israel have, for years, seen it in their interest to disrupt relationships between the United States and the Arab world. It is not in their interest to have a close relationship develop, especially between the United States and Saudi Arabia, whose oil reserves give it a great deal of clout throughout the Arab world.

This airplane sale has been described as the beginning of the end to the special relationship which has previously existed between Israel and the United States. One analysis I have read describes Israel's reaction as something like the shock realized by an only child when someone else is brought into the family. But I believe the implications go beyond even that. It matters little to Israel if Egypt is turned down, since Egypt has no leverage over the United States. But if Saudi Arabia is turned down, Israel's desire for Saudi economic retaliation against the United States will hopefully be realized.

Whether Saudi Arabia might decide to demand payment for their oil in deutsch marks, instead of dollars; whether Saudi Arabia might remain silent the next time Iran tries to increase oil prices within OPEC; or, whether another oil embargo might be possible; any of these forms of retaliation would work in the interests of Israel. The fact that they also might be against the interests of the United States seems to escape those who support Israel's objectives. But, of course, we have, for years, allowed Israel to run our Middle East foreign policy, to our own national detriment. This is the lobby's need to threaten each President, in turn, with being overridden by Congress.

One must ask why Israel is so totally opposed to the United States expanding its diplomatic relationships in the Middle East? The answer is direct and straightforward. The bottom line of Israel's policy is expansionism, its intention to keep the occupied territories it has taken by force from its neighbors. Until now, we in the United States have supported that policy of expansionism with money, weapons, and political help. Should the United States suddenly discover that a different set of interests exists in the Middle East which need to be promoted for valid reasons of national interest, our support for continued Israeli expansionism might be watered down, and it is just possible that our double standard vis-a-vis our Middle East foreign policy might come to an end.

How much longer can we, as a nation, close our eyes to the massive violations

of human rights committed by Israel—to its land acquisition policies in the occupied West Bank, to its indiscriminate slaughter of civilians in Lebanon—to its alliance and support for and sale of arms to racist South Africa?

The conditions talked about in this particular arms sale are laughable, especially when they are dictated by Israel and its lobby here in Washington. In spite of our agreement that Israel would use cluster bombs we have furnished for use only in the event of all-out war, and then only against military targets, Israel has dropped some 27,000 such cluster bombs, primarily on civilian targets—in Lebanese villages and Palestinian refugee camps. During the 5-year campaign of terror bombing by Israel in southern Lebanon between 1970 and 1975, not one question was raised in the American press. In fact, except for an article in *New Times* magazine, not one word was printed in the American press about the inhuman slaughter of innocent civilians in Lebanon over that period. When someone finally disclosed how many civilians Israel had killed during their invasion of Lebanon, partly with the barbaric use of cluster bombs, Israel's leaders pled a "mistake" and now will be furnished more of the bombs by us after a new agreement is signed.

The double standard does not end there. In spite of mild protests by our Government against the continued settlement of occupied territories, we continue to send money and arms to Israel—money and arms which enable Israel to continue its illegal policy of expansion into occupied territories. If the terms "expansion" and "illegal settlements" sound cold and clinical here in Washington, D.C., let me try to demonstrate in human terms the potential for disruption inherent in such a policy.

The original expansion of Israel took place in 1948, when a policy of terrorism and military action resulted in Israel establishing itself as a so-called independent nation in the Middle East. It did so on land belonging to the Palestinians, of which three-quarter of a million were driven out to create the exclusive Jewish state. Those Palestinian refugees were placed into camps, where a full generation of bitter, young people have been born and have grown up, resentful of the right of Jews born in Europe and South Africa to live in Palestine, while they are prohibited from returning to their homeland. Many of the Palestinians have become double refugees since 1967, when Israel occupied the West Bank. Israel is now in the process of either deporting or imprisoning Palestinian intellectuals in the West Bank, so as to destroy any capacity for political leadership amongst them.

These actions have been joined, hand in glove, with a deliberate propaganda campaign to dehumanize Arabs in this country, a dehumanization process which makes everything else possible for Israel in the Middle East. After all, if the Arabs were not thought of as sub-humans, how else could Israel escape, with only slight criticism, the invasion of a defenseless country and the slaughter of thousands of civilians? How could it be possible for

Israel to violate the very Geneva conventions it sponsored in 1949 concerning settlements, if the Palestinians were not made to appear as inconsequential? Isn't it easier to trample on the human rights of Palestinians and Lebanese if they are all lumped together under the umbrella term "Arab terrorists?"

I am amazed at the complicity of the press in this effort by Israel's supporters to dehumanize Arabs in the eyes of the American public. Last year for example when the Washington Post headlined \$10 million in secret CIA payments to Jordan, at the same time it deliberately suppressed and covered up between \$70 and \$80 million in secret CIA payments to Israel. How many times have we watched on television the sad funerals of Israeli civilians killed in Fedayeen raids in Israel? But, at the same time, have we ever been shown the sadness of the deaths of thousands of Arab families in Lebanon of those who died at the hands of Israel's military? If we were to believe the emphasis placed on the two different events by the American media, we would soon believe that the life of an Israeli is worth far more than the life of an Arab. Is not this racism of the worst kind?

Let me put all of you here to the test of whether or not we are allowing a blanket of racist dehumanization to be laid over Arabs and Arab-Americans, in our effort to discredit one side of this conflict. I would simply ask you to substitute the word "Jew" each time the word "Arab" is used in a derogatory manner.

For example, here is a newspaper headline that appeared not long ago: "A Group of Jews Buy Bank in Detroit."

Or, what about, "A Jew Lost Millions at the Las Vegas Gambling Tables." Or one that you read in the Washington Post not long ago, "Jews are Buying All the Expensive Property in London."

Do you remember when our sensibilities were shocked when General Brown used the racist canard that "Jews own all the Banks, and the media?"

Then why are we not shocked when the same kind of racism is directed toward Arabs? Is it because this campaign of anti-Arab racism is directed by the Israeli lobby and their friends in the media? Or is it fashionable to be a racist only toward those people disapproved of by Israel?

The bottom line of this campaign is to prevent a political condition from coming into existence that would require Israel to give up the territories it has taken by force, and to allow the Palestinians a state of their own—a state of the kind they were deprived of when Israel drove them out of Palestine in 1948.

Israel can be intransigent about a genuine peace settlement where it might have to return territories—it can refuse to make the accommodations necessary, primarily because it maintains its overwhelming military power at the expense of both the United States, and of our interests in the Middle East.

Is it not much easier for Israel to refuse to talk with the PLO if we are led to believe that all 3 million Palestinians are terrorists? I have heard, more

than a few times, the argument that Israel could not stand a Palestinian state next to it, because it would be a base for terrorists. That in itself is an incredibly racist statement, but one made possible by the lumping together of all Arabs as terrorists, no matter what their individual makeup might be. This is the kind of political objective that is sought to be achieved by the campaign to discredit Arabs and Arab-Americans.

People tend to forget that terrorism in the Middle East was invented by Jewish terrorist groups—notably the Stern Gang and the Irgun, which was under Menachem Begin's leadership. I think it is ironic indeed that, from 1948 to 1967, when the Palestinians sat peacefully, hoping that Israel would obey the U.N. resolutions and let them return to their homeland, they were totally ignored, and, in fact, altogether forgotten by the world. It was only after the PLO organized its military arm that the world community decided the Palestinians had a point, except that Israel now uses that as an excuse not to allow a state for the Palestinians. It is a Catch-22 situation—first they were denied a state because they were peaceful, and now they are denied one because they are exercising a military option.

The ultimate irony is to hear Menachem Begin say he refuses to talk to the PLO because they are murderers and terrorists.

And as long as we are speaking of double standards, I think it is highly interesting that a number of Senators have suddenly discovered the virtue of arms control in the Middle East—now that the President is offering to sell planes to the Arab world. Where were all these "Doves" during the years we armed Israel to the teeth—to allow it to bomb Lebanese civilians with cluster bombs, phosphorus, and napalm? Where were they when we voted arms to Israel to allow it to move settlers into the occupied territories?

I would be happy to join with the opponents of this arms sales package in a "No" vote—if I could get a commitment from each one of them to vote against future requests by all three countries for arms. But that would be too much to hope for, since the strategy of the Israeli lobby is eminently clear—defeat this package, then return later for warplanes for Israel alone.

And for those who are genuinely concerned about arms shipments to the Middle East, I can offer only one solution—a general peace settlement based on the return of the occupied territories by Israel and the establishment of a Palestinian state.

In the interim, it is futile to talk about negotiating a mutual arms reduction between all the parties in the Middle East, primarily because we refuse to communicate with most of those countries involved in the conflict in any way or another. Iraq, Libya, and, in particular, the Palestinian Liberation Organization. Our refusal to recognize and talk with the PLO is another result of how Israel has dictated our Middle East foreign policy.

The real questions to be decided here

today in actuality dwarf the question of the sale of warplanes. They deal with whether or not we are able to conduct our foreign policy without interference into our decisionmaking processes by a foreign government—by Israel and its lobby within the United States. They deal with whether we will be able to influence a just peace settlement, or whether we will continue to act as a "helpless giant," paralyzed by an ethnic lobby concerned more with the interests of Israel than with the interests of the United States.

In the final analysis, it is a question of whether we are capable of protecting our own national interest with respect to the formulation of a constructive Middle East policy that will be just and fair with all nations in that region.

The Israeli lobby has pretty much romped free in the Congress for a long time now, using the threat of political and financial reprisal against Members of Congress who do not fall into line. I suspect that the President's position will be supported by the Senate today, but even if it is close, the outcome will be sort of a declaration of independence on the part of the Congress. The country will be as proud of that, as it was 200 years ago at the time of the first declaration of Independence.●

● Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, there are few issues more difficult and complex than the one we face on this floor today: The administration's proposed sale of advanced aircraft to Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia.

I have listened carefully to the debate. I, and I know all of my colleagues, have considered the issues thoroughly. I believe that all of us are agreed that our objectives are the same: the furtherance of the U.S. national interest, the assurance of Israeli security, and rapid progress toward a just and durable peace in the Middle East.

Moreover, these objectives can and must continue to be consistent with each other. The United States has a fundamental interest in the security of Israel and in the Middle East peace process. We also have an interest in maintaining constructive relations with moderate governments of the Arab world, working with them to advance the peace process and to contribute to a stable and healthy world economy.

Our differences arise over how best to achieve these objectives. Those arguing for the aircraft sales emphasize their contribution to the defense requirements of each of the recipients, their role in assuring continuing political relationships without which the peace process will suffer, the prior arms supply undertaking, of Presidents Ford and Carter, the likelihood of French supply of potentially more threatening aircraft in the absence of U.S. supply, and the combination of political consequences and technical constraints designed to prevent offensive uses of the Saudi aircraft.

I believe that most Americans understand the strength of these points, whether or not they agree with them. But despite all the arguments that I have heard and considered, I cannot support



the arms transfers proposed here today. I will vote for the resolution of disapproval, because it is my judgment that:

There is too high a risk that the supply of these arms will retard rather than advance the critical process of building a just and durable peace;

The United States has a basic interest in restraining rather than contributing to arms races, not least in the Middle East and Persian Gulf, a region in which I have always opposed ever-increasing supplies of more and more sophisticated weapons;

Each of the countries involved has an overriding interest in a close, cooperative relationship with us, and after all is said and done none of the governments should desire to disrupt those fundamental ties; and

We can and should put increasing pressure on France, the Soviet Union and other arms suppliers to match our restraint with their own. But if they refuse to do so, it is still no act of friendship for us to provide our friends with more weapons to kill each other.

This said, I recognize that neither course of action we can take today is free of risks for the United States, Israel, and the Middle East as a whole. The decision is an extremely close and difficult one for those who desire peace, and who analyze objectively the current circumstances in the Middle East.

Whatever the outcome, it behooves all of us to review the longer-term policies of the United States to insure that they are indeed designed to effectively advance the peace process in the Middle East and to effectively restrain the international transfer of conventional arms.

Our policies should be guided by an unremitting search for peace, not by the supply of arms which could be used in a future Middle East war.

They should be guided by the enhancement of political and economic ties, not by ever-increasing arms commitments.

They should be guided by restraint in global transfers of conventional arms, not by increasing races to supply more arms to areas of conflict or instability. Tragically, the United States continues to be the leading arms merchant of the world, despite the commendable multilateral initiatives of the Carter administration.

Whether or not the Congress disapproves these particular sales at this particular time, I urge the administration to intensify its efforts for a diplomatic settlement in the Middle East. The best efforts of Israel and the Arab States—including Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and others—will be needed to bridge the differences which remain on both sides. The United States must continue to play a vital role in helping to bridge these differences, and the governments of the region can and should be induced to take the necessary steps for a just and durable peace. ●

● Mr. HAYAKAWA. Mr. President, I rise in opposition to the resolution of disapproval of the three separate plane sales to the countries of Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia. My decision was based not only on assuring the continued secu-

rity of the nation of Israel should the sales go through—if stems from a wider perspective on the present global situation in which the streets of the United States and its allies are protected.

It is important that we not make arguments for and against the proposed sales just in the context of Middle East peace. We are all hoping for a just and permanent peace in that area as soon as we can get it. If one places these sales against the backdrop of American foreign policy on the global scene, however, there are some fundamental appraisals which we have to make outside the realm of the Middle East conflict.

For some time now, I have been concerned with Soviet global strategy. Recently, we have seen glimpses of it in the ongoing SALT negotiations, continued support of Cuban troops in Africa, and obstinacy at the Belgrade conference, just to quote a few examples. I have many reservations about the agreement this country may end up with at the conclusion of the SALT talks. For our purposes here, however, I would like to discuss recent Soviet escapades in and around the Middle East.

Recently we have seen a glaring example of Soviet adventurism in the Horn of Africa and although the conflict has abated somewhat, we cannot assume that the Soviets have decided to behave. The Soviet pattern of behavior has not gone unnoticed by the Saudis. Just this morning the Washington Post published part of an interview with Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud Faisal. "It has been shown that this thing grows," he said, referring to Soviet and Cuban intervention in various African countries. "When Angola came, it was said to be a unique situation. But it repeated itself in Zaire and in Ethiopia. So it does spread." As for Cuban troops in Ethiopia: "It is in principle a threat to the independence and security of our region and directly a threat to the independence and security of our country \* \* \*. What conceivable basis would they have for intervening in that area?" So it is clear that Saudis regard the Horn as a springboard into the Arab Peninsula.

The article also indicated that the Saudis regard southern Africa as the Soviets next target in the continent. I find myself in agreement with this theory. I believe that the lack of support for the internal settlement in Rhodesia will contribute to this process. The Saudis want the United States to step up military assistance to countries like Sudan, Kenya, and Zaire which have Soviet-backed neighbors. They have agreed to open an embassy in the capital of Zambia. Some sort of financial assistance to that country will no doubt follow.

If I were sitting on 25 percent of the world's proven oil reserves and saw the kinds of inroads the Soviet Union had made around me, I believe that I would have good cause for alarm. Apart from the threat in Africa, the Saudis face to the north a well-supplied Soviet-backed Iraq and Syria. The fact that Syria receives a lot of advice from Moscow is well known; Iraq has more than triple the armed forces of the Saudis and an

aggressive Ba'athist ideology hostile to the very existence of "reactionary" Arab regimes. This situation has existed since 1963 without any flareups so far; but nevertheless it does create tension in the area.

To the south, it is clear that the Soviets have considerable influence in bordering South Yemen. President Carter has condemned the excessive presence of Cuban military forces there. Even more recently, the establishment of what is apparently a Communist-dominated government in Afghanistan can only contribute to Saudi Arabian distrust of Moscow's intentions. The sense of encirclement obviously troubles the Saudis—as well it might.

The request for aircraft from the United States has not been the Saudis' only response to these growing threats. They are engaged in a thorough and systematic program to develop—from the ground up—a complete military infrastructure, including airfields, naval port facilities, radar communications systems, and maintenance and repair facilities—directed against whom? Surely not Israel, so much as against unfriendly nations acting under Soviet inspiration and guidance.

I wish to make it clear that I do not believe that these precautions being taken by the Saudis will prevent the Soviets from an incursion into that country. Such a strike, if it occurred, would no doubt take place in the middle of the night before any Saudi aircraft could take off. My main point is that we should not allow such a strategic raw material exporting country to become vulnerable to Soviet adventurism. The F-15s give Saudi Arabia, for the first time, the ability to destroy aircraft far from its own borders. This range is also necessary to protect its oil installations and cities, which are widely dispersed.

In addition, the first of the American planes on order will not arrive in Saudi Arabia until sometime in 1981 and will not be immediately operational. If we are not pleased with Saudi policies at that point, we can halt the deal. It is the present Saudi leadership we are dealing with. Their orientation is crucial to our long-term energy-planning. They have used their influence in OPEC to hold down drastic rises in oil prices. More importantly, Saudi Arabia's decision not to abandon the dollar despite its recent decline has protected the United States against sharp inflation in the costs of imported oil.

It is true that the Saudis have criticized some of Mr. Sadat's peacemaking moves. However, they have consistently supported an ailing Egyptian economy and this has no doubt kept Mr. Sadat in power. I see this type of support as contrary to the interests of the Soviet Union. The Egyptians have expelled the Soviets from their country. An alliance between the Soviet Union and Saudi Arabia is pretty much out of the question.

The problem the United States faces here is how to give a show of support to two moderate Arab regimes while maintaining Israel's interests. If we drive Sau-

di Arabia and Egypt into the arms of the Soviets, will not Israel be the loser?

I want to assure the safety and prosperity of Israel. Such a goal is very close to my heart. But the achievement of this goal requires that our other allies, such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia, must also feel secure against external attack. How can we secure this security for Israel, Egypt and Saudi Arabia? Long run security and peace require that we think of the problems not of one nation at a time, but all them together.●

Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, is there 1 minute remaining?

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. I understand the Senator from Tennessee is going to yield his time back. I am prepared to yield my time back. I urge the Senate to vote no on the question which will now be put, it being up or down.

Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, I yield back the remainder of my time.

The VICE PRESIDENT. All time having been yielded back, the question is on agreeing to the resolution.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Is there a sufficient second? There is a sufficient second.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The yeas and nays have been ordered and the clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk called the roll.

Mr. CRANSTON. I announce that the Senator from Kentucky (Mr. HUDDLESTON) is necessarily absent.

Mr. STEVENS. I announce that the Senator from Nevada (Mr. LAXALT) is absent to attend the funeral of a relative.

The result was announced—yeas 44, nays 54, as follows:

[Rollcall Vote No. 161 Leg.]

YEAS—44

Allen	Ford	Nelson
Anderson	Hart	Nunn
Bayh	Haskell	Packwood
Biden	Hatfield	Pell
Brooke	Mark O.	Proxmire
Burdick	Hathaway	Riegle
Case	Heinz	Roth
Chiles	Jackson	Sarbanes
Church	Javits	Sasser
Clark	Kennedy	Schweiker
Cranston	Matsunaga	Stone
DeConcini	McIntyre	Talmadge
Dole	Melcher	Welcker
Domenici	Metzenbaum	Williams
Durkin	Moynihan	Zorinsky

NAYS—54

Abourezk	Gravel	McGovern
Baker	Griffin	Morgan
Bartlett	Hansen	Muskie
Bellmon	Hatch	Pearson
Bentsen	Hatfield	Percy
Bumpers	Paul G.	Randolph
Byrd	Hayakawa	Ribicoff
Harry F., Jr.	Helms	Schmitt
Byrd, Robert C.	Hodges	Scott
Cannon	Hollings	Sparkman
Chafee	Humphrey	Stafford
Culver	Inouye	Stennis
Curtis	Johnston	Stevens
Danforth	Leahy	Stevenson
Eagleton	Long	Thurmond
Eastland	Lugar	Tower
Garn	Magnuson	Wallop
Glenn	Mathias	Young
Goldwater	McClure	

NOT VOTING—2

Huddleston Laxalt

So the resolution of disapproval (S. Con. Res. 86) was rejected.

(Later the following occurred:)

Mr. BAYH. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that my vote on the last issue be cast "aye" instead of "nay."

I misunderstood the order in which we were voting.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, reserving the right to object, but only for the purpose of the record, I say to the Senator that the changing of his vote would not alter the outcome.

Mr. BAYH. I understand that.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered.

(The above rollcall vote reflects the foregoing order.)

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the resolution was rejected.

Mr. BAKER. I move to lay that motion on the table.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

AUTHORIZATION TO FILE LATE REPORT

Mr. BENTSEN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on Environment and Public Works have until midnight to file the remainder of the report on the Federal Aid Highway Act of 1978.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

ORDER OF BUSINESS

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, the Senate will now proceed to take up the conference report on the budget resolution, under the leadership of Mr. MUSKIE and Mr. BELLMON.

I ask the distinguished Senator whether or not he expects a rollcall vote.

Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, we have inquired of all interested parties—I think we have—and there is no desire for a rollcall vote. So far as we are concerned, there is no need for a rollcall vote, unless some Senator now present wishes it.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, if I may be heard by all Senators—

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. MATSUNAGA). The Senate will come to order. The Senate will be in order.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, unless a Senator now indicates that he intends to ask for the yeas and nays on the adoption of the conference report on the budget resolution, I take it that there will be no rollcall votes, and the matter will be decided by voice vote, and Senators may govern themselves accordingly.

Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. I yield.

Mr. MUSKIE. I suggest that this report is of surpassing interest, and for those who would like to linger for the purpose of hearing it, we would be delighted to have an audience.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Of course. I thank all Senators.

Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, is the conference report at the desk?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The conference report is not yet before the Senate.

Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

AUTHORIZATION TO TRANSMIT ADDITIONAL VIEWS ON S. 2441 TO PRINTER

Mr. WILLIAMS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the additional views on S. 2441, the Federal Public Transportation Act of 1978, be sent to the printer not later than the close of business on May 16, 1978.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

FIRST CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET RESOLUTION, 1979

Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, I submit a report of the committee of conference on Senate Concurrent Resolution 80 and ask for its immediate consideration.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The report will be stated.

The legislative clerk read as follows:

The committee of conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses on the amendment of the House to the concurrent resolution (S. Con. Res. 80) setting forth the congressional budget for the United States Government for the fiscal year 1979, having met, after full and free conference, have agreed to recommend and do recommend to their respective Houses this report, signed by a majority of the conferees.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the Senate will proceed to the consideration of the conference report.

(The conference report is printed in the House proceedings of the RECORD of May 15, 1978.)

Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the following members of the staff of the Committee on the Budget be allowed to remain on the floor during consideration of and votes on Senate Concurrent Resolution 80: John McEvoy, Karen Williams, Sid Brown, Van Ooms, George Merrill, Dan Twomey, Tom Dine, Ira Tannenbaum, Jacques Cook, Elizabeth Tankersley, Bob Sneed, Barbara Levering, Charles Flickner, Terry Finn, John Giles, Rodger Schlickeisen, Don Campbell, Tony Carnevale, Rob Fersh, Gail Picker, Anne Lockwood, and Brenda Tremper.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. MAGNUSON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a half-minute?

Mr. MUSKIE. I yield to the distinguished chairman of the Appropriations Committee, Senator MAGNUSON.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Washington.

Mr. MAGNUSON. Mr. President, I compliment the conferees on arriving at



what I think is quite a reasonable figure on outlays, and it will really reduce the so-called estimates of the budget deficit quite a bit. I know the Senator from Maine might agree with me that we in the Appropriations Committee may reduce it even more.

Mr. MUSKIE. I appreciate that.

Mr. MAGNUSON. But I compliment the Senator on giving us some leeway, some flexibility to look at these programs for needs of the American people in the way we can, but I know the Senator from Maine hopes that we will even cut it a little further.

Mr. MUSKIE. I would not want to deprive my good friend from Washington of that pleasure and prerogative.

Mr. MAGNUSON. I thank the Senator.

Mr. MUSKIE. I thank my good friend for that statement.

We concluded this conference report this afternoon, just hours before the May 15 deadline for final congressional action on the budget resolution.

I wish I could report that both Houses can complete action on this conference report before the midnight deadline. Regrettably, an unforeseeable week-long delay encountered by the House in its debate of the resolution also delayed our conference for a week.

So now we are up against the deadline for final action. But I hope we can adopt this conference report in the Senate tonight, so that final action will be possible in the House early tomorrow.

#### THE CONFERENCE AGREEMENT

Mr. President, in order to help Senators understand the conference report, a full copy of that report and the statement of managers accompanying it has been placed on every Senator's desk.

In addition, a document summarizing the conference report and statement of managers has also been placed on every desk.

As Senators can see from those documents, the \$50.9 billion deficit contained in this conference agreement is significantly lower than the deficit contained in either the House or Senate version of the budget resolution.

A the same time, with a few nonsubstantive exceptions, the spending totals contained in the conference report are at least as great as the amounts contained in the Senate-passed resolution.

I do not make that statement about spending totals with any great pride. The Senate regularly passes more frugal budget resolutions than those adopted by the House. And, generally, we must increase our totals to some extent to achieve conference agreement with the House.

I do cite this fact as an assurance to Senators who may be concerned that the conference agreement might crowd out spending plans countenanced by the Senate-passed version of the resolution. It does not. Frankly, however, many of our Senate conferees, including myself, regret the fact that to reach agreement with the House, we had to increase the Senate-passed budget levels in many cases.

I am very pleased to report that the deficit contained in this resolution is

lower than that considered by either House.

It is also \$10 billion lower than the deficit contained in the President's budget, and \$6 billion lower than the projected deficit for 1978.

We have achieved this lower deficit principally by agreeing to tax cuts lower than those originally contemplated by either House.

The Senate budget resolution contemplated a tax cut of \$25 billion on a 12-month basis and \$19.4 billion on the 9-month basis. Those were the estimates upon which the budget resolution was based. The House had proposed a tax cut of \$18.2 billion on an annual basis.

The conference agreement, regarding revenues, arrived at after consultation with the President and his economic advisers and the leadership of the House and Senate, reduces the size of the tax cut to a total cut of \$19.4 billion on an annual basis. It also assumes an effective date for any tax cut not earlier than January 1, 1979, so that the tax cut will be in effect only for 9 months of the fiscal year. Thus, the total \$19.4 billion tax reduction in the Senate-passed resolution is reduced to \$15 billion in the conference agreement.

We had at least three reasons for reducing the tax cut.

First, the economy now appears to be more robust than economists predicted only a few months ago. Accepting a deficit of a magnitude which a few months ago appeared necessary for continued economic recovery, now appears more likely to raise inflationary expectations, force up interest rates and weaken the dollar. So we scaled it back.

Second, joblessness has declined more rapidly than expected when the tax cut was first proposed. It now appears we do not need as much tax-cut job stimulus as appeared necessary last winter. So we scaled it back.

Third, and very important, we want to send a signal to the American people, American business, and the world community that we are serious about controlling inflation in this country. We are not going to lose sight of the unemployment problem or deny jobs to those who want and need them. But we are not going to overstimulate the economy and we are going to hold the line on spending and the deficit whenever and wherever we can.

Inflation control means budgetary control.

Furthermore, Mr. President, by setting a 5.5-percent limit on Federal employee pay raises, this conference agreement sends another strong signal to the American people that the Congress is serious about curbing inflation.

Mr. President, the conference agreement significantly increased the Senate-passed budget levels in such budget categories as agriculture, transportation, energy, veterans, higher education, and jobs programs. The defense category, although reduced somewhat from the Senate-passed level, represents an actual increase of \$2 billion over the President's budget, taking into account slip-page in the Trident submarine program

unforeseen when that budget was submitted and the anti-inflationary pay cap proposed in this budget.

The conference agreement, as I have already noted, also makes cuts in several other areas of the budget. Except for the defense category, which remains well over the President's budget request, these reductions are all technical estimating differences, which do not affect program levels.

Let me now turn to some of the other major points of difference between the conference agreement and the budget resolution which passed the Senate 2 weeks ago.

#### NATIONAL DEFENSE AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

The conference agreement for national defense provides for budget authority of \$128.7 billion and outlays of \$115.7 billion.

The proposed target for budget authority is \$0.3 billion over the President's defense budget of \$128.4 billion. However, when an adjustment of \$1.7 billion is made to the President's request for the congressional assumptions regarding deferment of the Trident submarine, a 5.5-percent "pay cap" and 20-percent absorption of the October 1978 pay raise, the conference level is \$2.0 billion higher than the President's request.

The proposed target for outlays is \$2.1 billion below the President's request. This amount does not actually reduce the President's proposed spending level because the conferees assumed the CBO outlay reestimate associated with a lower rate in DOD obligations than previously anticipated.

The Senate conferees' major concern is that the United States maintain real growth in defense spending, particularly in those investment areas that are intended to enhance the strength of the NATO alliance. The proposed conference targets allow for a defense budget which can provide for substantial improvements in U.S. force capabilities as a means for meeting the NATO pledge of each member nation to aim for 3 percent real growth in defense spending for the next several years. The Senate conferees believe that this is necessary to counterbalance Soviet and Warsaw Pact attempts to strengthen their defense forces.

The conference agreement for international affairs is only slightly changed from the Senate-passed levels for this function. Budget authority remains at \$12.8 billion. The conferees having agreed to language designating \$1.8 billion of this amount for a possible fiscal year 1979 appropriation for the IMF Witteveen Facility. Outlays have been reduced by \$0.3 billion, to \$6.9 billion, mostly as a result of technical adjustments.

#### PHYSICAL RESOURCES

For energy, the conferees agreed to \$10.4 billion in budget authority and \$9.8 billion in outlays. These amounts reflect an increase in budget authority of \$0.2 billion above the Senate-passed targets but a decrease in outlays of \$0.3 billion.

In budget authority these amounts can accommodate the President's full fund-

ing request for the strategic petroleum reserves as well as congressional initiatives in energy supply-related programs. In addition, the amounts will cover many of the energy conservation spending programs authorized in the National Energy Act now in conference, including several energy programs the House placed in other functions.

The decrease in outlays reflects acceptance of the House's lower estimate for outlays from the strategic petroleum reserves. These targets reflect the view of both Budget Committees that energy remains a critically important national priority.

For natural resources and environment, the conferees agreed upon budget authority of \$13.3 billion and outlays of \$12.2 billion. The conference targets represent decreases of \$0.1 billion in budget authority and \$0.3 billion in outlays below the Senate-passed figures. These targets still would allow for continuation of ongoing water resources programs as well as new project starts, and provide increases for conservation and renewable resources programs. Increases for recreational resources programs and the research and regulatory programs of the Environmental Protection Agency also are provided, although a more realistic estimate of outlays is now included.

In recognition of the special problems in the agriculture sector, the conferees agreed upon budget authority of \$12.3 billion and outlays of \$8.3 billion for these purposes. These targets are \$0.1 billion in budget authority below and \$0.5 billion in outlays above the Senate-passed levels. Budget authority was reduced to reflect CBO's reestimate of funds needed for the agriculture credit insurance fund. With respect to outlays, the conference agreement provides \$0.5 billion more than the Senate-passed level to allow some flexibility in funding agriculture initiatives. The agreement funds CBO's latest current law estimate for CCC price support activities; allows for CBO's estimate for H.R. 6782, the Emergency Agriculture Act of 1978, as passed by Congress; and provides \$0.8 billion for new farm programs or reestimates.

For commerce and housing credit activities, the conferees accepted the Senate targets of \$5.9 billion in budget authority and \$3.6 billion in outlays. The targets should accommodate the projected operations of Federal mortgage assistance programs, including GNMA's targeted tandem program. They assume continued appropriations to the Postal Service in keeping with existing law, and anticipate that small business assistance in fiscal year 1979 will place greater emphasis on loan guarantees than in the past. Providing that other spending initiatives do not completely utilize the first budget resolution, these targets could be accommodated.

In transportation, the conferees agreed upon budget authority of \$20.3 billion and outlays of \$17.8 billion. These targets represent increases of \$0.8 billion in budget authority and \$0.3 billion in outlays above the Senate-passed figures, and were reluctantly agreed to by the Senate

conferees in order to accommodate at least a portion of the transportation funding increases being proposed, primarily by the House Public Works Committee. The conference recommendation is adequate to cover the priority requirements for funding increases to highway, railroad, mass transit, and air transportation programs. At the same time, it is inadequate to accommodate the extravagant funding increases being proposed in the House.

In the community and regional development area, the conferees agreed upon \$11.1 billion in budget authority and \$9 billion in outlays. These targets represent increases above the Senate-passed figures of \$0.7 billion in budget authority.

The conference agreement would accommodate substantially expanded economic development programs and full funding of these elements of the President's urban initiative that are likely to be enacted for fiscal year 1979.

#### HUMAN RESOURCES

In the human resources area, the conference agreement on the budget resolution provides for \$299.95 billion in budget authority and \$261.1 billion in outlays. These amounts are \$2.15 billion in budget authority and \$0.7 billion in outlays above the Senate resolution.

The conference agreement makes room for additional Federal efforts in several high priority programs serving the Nation's human needs.

The resolution agreed to in conference maintains the Senate's assumption of substantial funding increases for education programs; the veterans' pension program and other veterans' benefits; programs aimed at improving health care services, planning, and research; and social services grants.

Mr. President, the conference agreement will provide for up to \$1.0 billion in additional middle-income student tuition assistance. The resolution would allow for a revenue loss of up to \$0.3 billion to accommodate a tuition tax credit and up to \$0.7 billion for student aid to middle-income college students.

The conference agreement maintains the Senate assumption that employment and training programs ought to be continued at current policy levels, but that half the available resources for such programs will be redirected from the temporarily unemployed to the structurally unemployed, who now comprise the largest portion of the unemployed population. The conference agreement assumes that the targeting of these programs will produce savings in public assistance programs in function 600.

The conference agreement reflects the continuing concern of both the House and the Senate over the rapid inflation in health care costs and supports efforts to restrain these costs including the hospital industry's voluntary efforts. At the same time, the conference agreement allows for some expansion of the medic-aid program as well as increases in other health service programs. The conference agreement does not assume reduction in the level of funding for research and health education programs to the extent proposed by the President.

The conference agreement also as-

sumes enactment of significant reforms in the Veterans' pension program. The conferees expect that, while short-term costs will be incurred as a result of this reform, it will ultimately lead to substantial savings.

The conference agreement also assumes enactment of welfare reform initiatives effective in fiscal year 1979, with an expanded earned income credit and fiscal relief to states as major possibilities.

The conference agreement also accommodates various other new initiatives, including elementary/secondary education funding, expanded nutrition program funding, and additional funding for social services.

#### REVENUES

Turning to revenues, the conference agreement provides for fiscal year 1979 revenues of \$447.9 billion. This is \$4.6 billion more than had been provided under both the House and the Senate resolutions of \$443.3 billion. As I have noted previously, the increased revenue floor results from a deliberate fiscal policy decision taken by the conference, in conjunction with the administration, to moderate the size of a fiscal year 1979 tax reduction in response to changes in economic circumstances over the past several months.

The revenue target would accommodate a general tax reduction of \$15 billion effective not earlier than January 1, 1979, as well as structural tax law changes which would reduce fiscal year 1979 revenues by \$1.4 billion. These changes include a tuition tax credit, a targeted employment tax credit and other miscellaneous provisions.

The revenue target also reflects acceptance by the conferees of the Senate position that refundable tax credit payments in excess of the recipients' tax liabilities should be treated as outlays and budget authority, rather than as revenue reductions.

#### FISCAL POLICY AND THE DEFICIT

The coexistence of unemployment and inflation means that a moderate economic expansion must be continued. The current expansion must be extended over a much longer period than the 34 months averaged by other peace-time recoveries since World War II. At the previous average, the present recovery would end this year, leaving the economy stranded with substantial unemployment and continuing inflation.

The economic environment has changed dramatically in the 5 months since the preparation of the President's budget and tax proposals at the end of 1977. Inflation has increased and unemployment has fallen more than expected. Monetary policy has become more restrictive, and interest rates have risen, in response to higher inflation and the weakness of the dollar.

In light of all these circumstances, a moderate and prudent fiscal policy is appropriate for fiscal year 1979. The budget resolutions passed by both the Senate and the House reduced fiscal stimulus and the budget deficit below those contained in the President's budget proposals. The recent perform-



ance of the economy subsequently indicated that an even smaller budget deficit for fiscal year 1979 might be desirable.

The chairmen of the budget committees therefore met with the President to examine the economic outlook and fiscal policy. The President concurred in the view that a reduction in the budget deficit for fiscal year 1979 below those proposed in the budget resolutions of the House and the Senate would be appropriate at this time.

The report of the conference committee therefore accommodates general tax reductions for fiscal year 1979 effective January 1, 1979 and an aggregate tax cut of \$24.7 billion including the extension of \$8.3 billion of previous tax cuts.

In combination with the spending recommendations of the Conference Committee, this would result in a budget deficit for fiscal year 1979 of \$50.9 billion. This reduced deficit will signal Congress' determinations to maintain fiscal discipline, reduce inflationary pressures, ease the pressures on capital markets, and maintain the integrity of the American dollar as a reserve asset.

As in the past 3 years, the projected Federal deficit is associated with economic activity, incomes and employment below the full capacity of our economy. This reduced level of activity shrinks Government revenues while it raises costs of unemployment compensation and other income support programs. Unacceptably large budget deficits can be eliminated only by a strong economy. The fiscal policy in the conference report will move the economy further towards full employment and budgetary balance.

#### INFLATION

According to a recent Harris poll reported in this morning's Washington Post, Americans are more worried about the rise in the cost of living than they have been since January, 1975. The inflation rate remains unacceptably high, and recent increases in the wholesale price index and consumer price index are a cause for particular alarm.

To achieve a decline in inflation, however, it will be necessary to follow moderate but supportive fiscal and monetary policies. We cannot stop inflation with Draconian policies which throw millions of Americans out of work, any more than we can cure unemployment with higher inflation. Progress towards full employment and lower inflation can be achieved only through consistent policies which avoid the boom-and-bust cycle of too much stimulus followed by excessive restraint.

In addition to reducing the budget deficit, the recommendations of the conference discourage specific actions which increase prices and the inflation rate in particular sectors. The conference agreement recognizes, for example, an urgent need to curb the rapid inflation in medical care costs. It recommends lower outlays in the health function to reflect enactment of legislation to reduce such cost inflation. The conference substitute also recognizes the need for a Federal pay cap.

The committee endorses the "targeted" public service jobs concept which emphasizes employment and training for the structurally unemployed—unskilled workers, young people, and welfare recipients. This policy will improve the longer-run trade-off between inflation and unemployment.

#### JOBS

Over 6 million Americans remain out of work in spite of the drop in the unemployment rate to 6 percent in April. Indeed, the fact that a 6-percent unemployment rate is now regarded as an achievement, rather than as a challenge, indicates the severity of the recent recession. We cannot rest on the last year's employment gains. We must continue and strengthen our commitment to steady economic growth and to reducing structural unemployment.

The conference agreement provides for steady job gains in 1979. Employment should increase by over 2 million jobs from the end of 1978 to the end of 1979.

#### COORDINATION OF FISCAL AND MONETARY POLICY

Mr. President, coordination of fiscal and monetary policies has now become critically important. As the Congress maintains fiscal discipline and moves to a less expansive fiscal policy, it is vital that monetary policy be accommodative enough to encourage the private investment required for increases in productivity and growth. A proper balance between fiscal and monetary policy is essential to achieving a strong economy with lower budget deficits.

The prudent fiscal policy recommended by the conference committee should have a beneficial effect on the economy. The Chairman of the Federal Reserve has emphasized that Federal Reserve monetary policy will be responsive to fiscal discipline by the Congress and the size of the budget deficit. This fiscal policy will provide additional latitude for the relaxation of monetary policy and for a better balance between fiscal and monetary policy. We are confident that Chairman Miller and the Federal Reserve will provide a monetary policy which accommodates this congressional fiscal policy and provides for continued economic growth, progress against inflation, and further gains in employment.

We must also recognize that price increases may result from supply shortages, as recently occurred in food and energy. The last several years have taught us that fiscal and monetary restraint cannot prevent price increases of this type, even at unacceptably high levels of unemployment.

Mr. President, we can reduce inflation only through deescalation of wage and price increases and careful attention to the effects of public policies on costs and prices. However, in fighting inflation, we must not mistake inflation caused by severe weather, or by unavoidable increases in energy prices, with inflation caused by excess demand. Our fight against inflation should not cause us to adopt overly restrictive fiscal and monetary policies that threaten another recession.

#### PARLIAMENTARY SITUATION

Mr. President, as has frequently occurred in previous years, this conference report is being submitted by the managers on the part of the two Houses in technical disagreement.

As in the usual case, the disagreement is not over substance. It is a parliamentary technicality. This result has occurred because the parliamentarians of the two Houses have ruled that, even on technical matters, a conference report on a budget resolution must in all its particulars remain within the range established by the action of the two Houses. Thus, where numbers are even slightly below or above the range, the conference must report in disagreement. This is what has occurred here.

The conference agreement contains revised figures for fiscal year 1979 that are in some cases outside the range of the House and the Senate provisions. It is the intention of the conferees of both Houses to urge adoption of the substitute budget resolution described in the statement of managers accompanying this conference report in disagreement.

So when the Senate votes today, we will first be voting to confirm the conference report in disagreement. A second vote will then occur to adopt to the original House amendment to the Senate budget resolution, with an amendment which is spelled out in the statement of managers accompanying the conference report. Other than this two-step procedure, this consideration of the conference report can proceed as if it had been reported in agreement.

#### CONCLUSION

I urge all Senators to support this conference report today, and throughout the summer as we consider the spending and tax legislation which must be made to fit within it. In my view, this is the best prescription for strengthening the public's confidence in the ability of the Government to cope with and to resolve our financial problems.

Finally, Mr. President, again I want to express my sincere appreciation to the ranking minority member (Mr. BELLMON) and to the other Senate conferees for their splendid efforts, cooperation, and loyal support in the conference and in bringing this report to the floor for consideration today. I wish to express again my thanks to Chairman GAIAMO and his conferees for their cooperation in reaching this agreement.

And I want to acknowledge and express our committee's gratitude for the high level of consideration and support the majority leader (Mr. BYRD) continues to give the entire budget process.

Finally, I want to commend the staff of the Budget Committee for their superb and indefatigable performance over the months leading up to this report, and in particular for their efforts in making it possible for us to bring this conference report to the Senate at 8:30 this evening, with all of the complicated paperwork completed for our consideration, even though the conference was not concluded until 4 o'clock this afternoon. We have come to expect such efforts from

them but we are nonetheless deeply grateful, and want to make sure that we indicate our appreciation on the record on occasions such as this.

Mr. President, I am happy to yield now to my good friend the Senator from Oklahoma (Mr. BELLMON), with my special thanks for his efforts.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oklahoma is recognized.

Mr. BELLMON. I thank our distinguished chairman.

Mr. President, 2½ weeks ago, the Senate overwhelmingly approved a budget for fiscal year 1979 that balanced our many conflicting concerns, providing adequate spending for our major programs and policies, while accommodating our macroeconomic objectives. Reconciling our many and diverse priorities with those of the House proved to be a difficult and arduous task. I support the conference agreement on the fiscal year 1979 budget resolution and note that outlays and the deficit are below the respective amounts in both the Senate and House resolutions.

As should be expected, however, several changes have been made in that budget, some of which I find troubling. First, while the Senate resolution placed a high priority on aiding the improvement of our national defense forces, the House was not so disposed. It may prove necessary to raise these Defense totals in the second resolution later this year.

Second, the conferees increased the revenue floor by \$4.6 billion over the figure in the Senate resolution. The conference revenue number does not totally restrict the flexibility of tax programs however. A variety of tax packages presently under consideration could be altered or added to fit within this revenue floor.

Mr. President, we on the Senate side of the budget process have continuously resisted the temptation to produce a line-item budget. Rather, we have worked hard to keep the budget resolutions and the accompanying reports free of details so as to preserve maximum flexibility for the authorizing and appropriations committees. This conference agreement is consistent with that approach. When we mentioned a specific assumption, we do so without prejudice to other alternative decisions the Congress may choose to make.

For example, in function 600 (Income Security) the report indicates that initiatives related to welfare reform can be accommodated within the functional target. Although no mention is made in the conference report of the possible expansion of the earned income credit, the Finance Committee will be free to present a bill expanding the credit, so long as it stays within the overall revenue floor and the spending allocations made available under this Resolution.

Though I agree with the need to reduce the budget deficit, I regret that this reduction could not have been partially accomplished through further cuts in spending. The Senate conferees offered numerous motions to reduce spending below the House levels. Should anyone believe that reductions of this magnitude were not feasible, I would note that

many spending functions have enjoyed considerable real increases in recent years. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a table documenting this growth pattern be printed in the RECORD at this point.

There being no objection, the table was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

PERCENTAGE INCREASES IN BUDGET AUTHORITY AND OUTLAYS

(FY 1975 actual to FY 1979 Senate-passed level)

Function:	Budget authority	Outlays
050 National defense .....	50	36
150 International affairs .....	27	4
250 General science, space, and technology .....	30	25
270 Energy .....	176	359
300 Natural resources and environment .....	7	71
350 Agriculture .....	110	359
370 Commerce and housing credit .....	-52	-36
400 Transportation .....	-4	68
450 Community and regional development .....	126	143
500 Education, training, employment, and social services .....	95	96
550 Health .....	76	79
600 Income security .....	21	47
700 Veterans benefits and services .....	26	25
750 Administration of justice .....	43	45
800 General government .....	32	32
850 General purpose fiscal assistance .....	35	33
900 Interest .....	51	51
920 Allowances .....	(*)	(*)
950 Undistributed offsetting receipts .....	22	22
Total budget .....	37	53

\* Actual amounts are spread among other budget functions.

Mr. BELLMON. Mr. President, though there are disappointments, my support for the conference report is based upon my belief that these targets are not wholly inappropriate and generally reflect proper national priorities.

For example, a major effort has been made by the conferees to address the persistent problem of inflation. By arriving at a deficit of \$50.9 billion, which is \$4.7 billion below the deficit in the Senate resolution and a full \$7.2 billion below the President's request, we are taking strong action to allow the economy to sustain its momentum without putting additional upward pressure on prices. Furthermore, to demonstrate that the Federal Government must take the lead in this battle, we have assumed a 5.5 percent pay cap for Federal, civilian, and military employees and have suggested redirecting many of our jobs programs toward the structurally unemployed.

This resolution also reflects our desire to limit the overall growth of the Federal Government by containing spending. The outlay level agreed to in conference is \$0.1 billion below the Senate target, is \$2.6 billion below the House's and \$0.6 billion below the President's.

Mr. President, while the deliberations on the budget resolution have reflected a spirit of cooperation by Members of

both the House and Senate, acceptance of these targets represents only the first step in our effort to bring Federal spending and revenue policy under control. The task we now confront, and it will be a difficult one, is to abide within these constraints. If Congress is to effectively assert a responsible fiscal role, and I believe it will, this cooperation must continue, in fact as well as in spirit.

Mr. President, Members of the Senate who are not privileged to serve on the Budget Committee cannot know of the enormous debt of gratitude this body and the country owes to Chairman MUSKIE. It is only through his leadership, dedication, his negotiating skill, his thorough understanding both of the budget process and the need for sound fiscal policy that progress has been possible. Truly, Ed MUSKIE is the right man in the right place at the right time. I can only hope other Members of the Senate can grasp the same sense of urgency that the senior Senator from Maine has shown toward getting effective control over Federal spending and to give the budget process the same support given by our chairman; 1978 is a crucial year in the budget process. I congratulate Chairman MUSKIE and the able and dedicated staff of our Senate Budget Committee for their effectiveness and urge the full Senate to abide by the functional totals in this report.

Mr. President, I believe we all respect the fact that inflation has come to be an increasing threat, and the main thrust of this budget is to respond to that threat by holding down the deficit and by taking action that we feel will help to contain inflation without throwing the economy into a tailspin.

I ask unanimous consent, Mr. President, that a table showing the changes that this resolution makes in the first resolution that passed the Senate be printed at this point in my statement.

There being no objection, the table was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

Changes in Conference result from original Senate level

	BA	O
050 Defense .....	-1.1	-0.9
150 International affairs .....	-	-0.3
250 General Science & Space .....	-	-
270 Energy .....	+0.2	-0.3
300 Natural Resources .....	-0.1	-0.3
350 Agriculture .....	-0.1	+0.5
370 Commerce & Housing .....	-	-
400 Transportation .....	+0.8	+0.3
450 Community & Regional Level .....	+0.7	-
500 Education, Training .....	+1.4	+0.2
550 Health .....	-0.15	-
600 Income Security .....	+0.6	+0.3
700 Veterans Benefits .....	+0.3	+0.2
750 Justice .....	-	-
800 General Government .....	-	-
850 General Purpose Fiscal Assistant .....	-	-
900 Interest .....	+0.2	+0.2
920 Allowances .....	+0.1	+0.1
950 Undistributed Offsetting Receipts .....	-0.1	-0.1
Total change from Senate .....	+2.74	-0.1



Mr. BELLMON. Mr. President, I ask further unanimous consent that a statement by the senior Senator from New Mexico (Mr. DOMENICI) be printed in the RECORD.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

#### STATEMENT BY SENATOR DOMENICI

As much as I regret to do so, I find that I must oppose this Conference Report on the First Concurrent Resolution for Fiscal Year 1979. I take my position as a member of the Senate Budget Committee and as a conferee on this budget resolution very seriously and, consequently, I feel I owe my colleagues and the American public an explanation of my opposition.

During the entire time I have been involved in the new congressional budget process, I have tried to accommodate diverse interests for the good of the process. As many of my colleagues, I earnestly want the budget process to succeed, to grow and become the controlling force in budgeting for our national government. This desire has prompted me on several past occasions to agree to budget resolutions I found questionable in some details and in general effect.

I still have that same strong desire to see the budget process prosper and become that vital force for meaningful budget restraint and effective fiscal policy direction this country needs and deserves. Unfortunately, even as far as we have proceeded toward that goal, this resolution throws us considerably off track because it mandates the adoption of fiscal policies and spending decisions which I feel are not in the best interests of the Nation.

I say this not just because I disagree with some of the fiscal policies implicit in this resolution and certain specific spending levels, but because this budget resolution represents a sudden unexplained reversal of revenue decisions previously announced with great fanfare and resulting high expectation on the part of the general public. That expectation was for a general tax cut on the order of \$25 billion annually, a tax cut long overdue for hard working Americans who have seen their spendable incomes eaten away by inflation and elevation to higher tax brackets. Now they will wake up tomorrow morning and find that the Congress, by means of the First Concurrent Resolution on the Budget, has demolished that expectation.

It seems to me that this resolution could have been adjusted in other places enough to have allowed the \$19.4 billion dollar tax cut the Senate provided room for in S. Con. Res. 80. To be sure, this resolution has some attractive features compared to either the House or Senate versions. For example, the

most attractive feature is that it estimates the FY 79 deficit at \$50.9 billion compared to the Senate's \$55.6 billion and the House's \$57.0 billion. Before we make too much of that, however, we should be aware that this comparatively low deficit has been achieved largely at the expense of the larger tax cut contained in the Senate version.

While a smaller deficit is a highly desirable goal and one we ought always to seek, it should not become so dominant that other important considerations are ignored or rejected. To this point, many will claim that a recent change in economic conditions—the leveling off of unemployment and the continuing spiral of inflation—justify a smaller tax reduction. That argument is grounded on the premise that a general tax cut as large as \$25 billion on an annual basis would be too inflationary. This may be a reasonable and defensible economic thesis and I recognize that tax cuts do carry inflationary consequences, but in my mind, those possible consequences are more than offset by the documented need for a large general tax cut and by the economic benefits which would result.

So, in spite of the reduction in the estimated deficit, I feel we are making a mistake and that we are failing in our duty to the American taxpayer by limiting substantially the tax cut that could be enacted by FY 79, not to mention the implication of this action for future year revenues.

To be more specific, let me close by itemizing my other objections to this approach.

1. This resolution can be correctly described as effectively raising the taxes paid by individual Americans by \$4.4 billion in FY 79.

2. This action took the pressure off spending limitations both now and in later years because it guarantees higher revenues to pay for larger spending programs.

3. It provides for real growth in all functional areas of the budget, some well beyond justification, while refusing to allow taxpayers the full tax reduction they are entitled to and have been led to expect.

Just a word now about the spending side as a further indication of my dissatisfaction with this resolution. In the National Defense Function, 050, the Conference settled on \$128.7 billion in Budget Authority and \$115.7 billion in Outlays. This is \$1.2 billion less in BA and \$0.9 billion less in Outlays than the amounts the Senate approved in S. Con. Res. 80. It should be emphasized that the Senate strongly supported those numbers and I feel that we did not adequately fulfill our duty as Senate Conferees by reducing our commitment to a strong National Defense.

There are those, apparently a majority of my fellow conferees, who feel that the mili-

tary can always make do sufficiently with a couple of hundred million less. Perhaps they are right. There are those, again apparently a majority of my fellow conferees, who feel that we can play off the lower deficit figure against a smaller tax cut, justifying the latter in the name of fighting inflation, and no one will be the wiser. These are notions I cannot support, as much as I would like to, and, accordingly I must vote against this resolution.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine.

Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, I would like to express my personal appreciation to the distinguished Senator from Oklahoma for the undeserved comments with respect to my performance. I wish I had thought of them. I would have directed them to his performance and his support of the budget process.

I did not know Senator BELLMON well before he came to the Budget Committee where he joined me some 3 or 4 years ago. Having worked with him for these years, I must say I now regard him as one of the preeminent Senators in this body in terms of intellect, balance of judgment, and just plain courage. I am proud to serve with him and will always remember our association in this process with great affection. I shall never forget the strength and support he has given me in difficult times in conferences as well as in the Budget Committee itself.

Mr. BELLMON. Mr. President, I thank my distinguished chairman for those kind and undeserved comments.

Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a statement of the managers of the conference report be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

(Statement of managers is printed in the House proceedings of May 15, 1978.)

Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, I also ask to have printed in the RECORD a table showing the conference agreement broken into the mission categories which the Senate Budget Committee used in the process of developing the budget resolution.

There being no objection, the table was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

Amounts in Conference Agreement on S. Con. Res. 80, First Budget Resolution for FY 1979, by Function and Mission

[In billions of dollars]

	Budget authority outlays			Budget authority outlays	
Function 050—National defense:			Function 250—General science, space, and technology:		
Mission 1 Strategic warfare forces.....	13.9	13.3	Mission 1 Science.....	1.4	1.3
Mission 2 Tactical warfare forces.....	79.5	69.7	Mission 2 Civilian space program.....	3.8	3.8
Mission 3 Defensewide forces and support.....	22.3	20.0	Function 250 total.....	5.2	5.0
Mission 4 Other national defense programs.....	13.0	12.7			
Function 050 Total.....	128.7	115.7	Function 270—Energy:		
Function 150—International affairs:			Mission 1 Energy supply.....	4.0	4.8
Mission 1 Foreign economic assistance and finan- cial programs.....	9.1	4.9	Mission 2 Energy conservation.....	1.2	1.0
Mission 2 Foreign military assistance and sales.....	2.3	0.5	Mission 3 Emergency energy preparedness.....	4.3	3.2
Mission 3 Other international affairs programs.....	1.5	1.5	Mission 4 Other energy programs.....	0.9	0.8
Function 150 total.....	12.8	6.9	Function 270 total.....	10.4	9.8

Amounts in Conference Agreement on S. Con. Res. 80, First Budget Resolution for FY 1979, by Function and Mission—Continued

[In billions of dollars]

	Budget authority outlays			Budget authority outlays	
<b>Function 300—Natural resources and environment:</b>			<b>Function 600—Income security:</b>		
Mission 1 Water resources .....	3.6	3.6	Mission 1 General retirement and disability in-	107.1	109.2
Mission 2 Conservation and land management .....	2.3	1.9	surance .....		
Mission 3 Recreational resources .....	1.9	1.9	Mission 2 Federal employee retirement and dis-	20.3	12.0
Mission 4 Pollution control and abatement .....	5.7	5.2	ability .....	16.5	11.1
Mission 5 Other natural resources and environ-			Mission 3 Unemployment compensation .....	19.4	19.3
ment programs .....	0.1	(*)	Mission 4 Public assistance .....	3.7	3.7
Function 300 total .....	13.6	12.2	Mission 5 Nutrition programs .....	25.6	4.4
<b>Function 350—Agriculture:</b>			Mission 6 Housing assistance .....	0.5	0.5
Mission 1 Farm income stabilization .....	10.9	6.9	Function 600 total .....	193.1	160.2
Mission 2 Agricultural research and services .....	1.4	1.4			
Function 350 total .....	12.3	8.3	<b>Function 700—Veterans benefits and services:</b>		
<b>Function 370—Commerce and housing credit:</b>			Mission 1 Income security for veterans .....	11.7	11.4
Mission 1 Mortgage credit and thrift insur-			Mission 2 Veterans education, training, and re-	2.8	2.9
ance .....	2.4	0.3	habilitation .....		
Mission 2 Postal service .....	1.8	1.8	Mission 3 Hospital and medical care for vet-	6.0	6.0
Mission 3 Other commerce and housing credit			erans .....	0.6	0.6
programs .....	1.7	1.4	Function 700 total .....	21.3	21.0
Function 370 total .....	5.9	3.6			
<b>Function 400—Transportation:</b>			<b>Function 750—Administration of justice:</b>		
Mission 1 Highways .....	8.4	7.4	Mission 1 Federal law enforcement activities .....	2.1	2.1
Mission 2 Railroads .....	2.4	2.4	Mission 2 Criminal justice assistance .....	0.7	0.7
Mission 3 Mass transit .....	3.6	2.6	Mission 3 Other administration of justice pro-	1.5	1.4
Mission 4 Air transportation .....	3.8	3.4	grams .....		
Mission 5 Water and other transportation .....	2.1	2.0	Function 750 total .....	4.3	4.2
Function 400 total .....	20.3	17.8			
<b>Function 450—Community and regional develop-</b>			<b>Function 800—General government:</b>		
ment:			Mission 1 Legislative functions .....	0.9	0.9
Mission 1 Community development .....	5.5	4.1	Mission 2 Other general government programs .....	3.2	3.2
Mission 2 Area and regional development .....	4.4	3.9	Function 800 total .....	4.1	4.1
Mission 3 Disaster relief and insurance .....	1.2	1.0			
Function 450 total .....	11.1	9.0	<b>Function 850—General purpose fiscal assistance:</b>		
<b>Function 500—Education, training, employment,</b>			Mission 1 General revenue sharing .....	6.9	6.9
and social services:			Mission 2 Other general purpose fiscal assistance	2.8	2.7
Mission 1 Elementary, secondary, and vocational			programs .....		
education .....	7.7	6.5	Function 850 total .....	9.7	9.6
Mission 2 Higher education .....	5.2	4.3	<b>Function 900—Interest:</b>		
Mission 3 Research and general education aids .....	1.4	1.3	Mission 1 Interest on the public debt .....	53.2	53.2
Mission 4 Training and employment .....	12.2	12.9	Mission 2 Other interest .....	-6.2	-6.2
Mission 5 Other labor services .....	0.5	0.5	Function 900 total .....	47.0	47.0
Mission 6 Social services .....	6.1	6.0			
Function 500 total .....	38.0	31.4	<b>Function 920—Allowances:</b>		
<b>Function 550—Health:</b>			Mission 1 Civilian agency pay raises .....	0.8	0.8
Mission 1 Health care services .....	47.7	44.9	Function 920 total .....	0.8	0.8
Mission 2 Health research .....	3.1	3.0	<b>Function 950—Undistributed offsetting receipts:</b>		
Mission 3 Education and training of the health			Mission 1 Rents and royalties on the Outer Con-	-2.8	-2.8
care work force .....	0.8	0.8	tinental Shelf ("OCS receipts") .....	-5.4	-5.4
Mission 4 Consumer and occupational health and			Mission 2 Employer share, employee retirement .....	-9.2	-9.2
safety .....	0.9	0.9	Mission 3 Interest received by trust funds .....		
Function 550 total .....	52.5	49.5	Function 950 total .....	-17.3	-17.3
			Budget total .....	568.85	498.8

\* Less than \$50,000,000.

Mr. BELLMON. Will the Senator yield for a unanimous-consent request?

Mr. MUSKIE. Yes.

Mr. BELLMON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that R. S. Boyd, Charles McQuillen, Bob Fulton, Bill Stringer, Carol Cox, Becky Davies, Gary Kuzina, Paul Carttar, and Barry Kinsey have the privileges of the floor during the consideration on this resolution.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Is the Senator from Virginia seeking recognition?

Mr. HARRY F. BYRD, JR. Yes, Mr. President.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia is recognized.

Mr. HARRY F. BYRD, JR. Mr. President, I applaud the Senator from Maine

and the Senator from Oklahoma for their work on this matter. I know how conscientious and dedicated they are. I dislike to express a contrary view to those expressed by my two distinguished colleagues. I feel, though, that I should at least present a minority point of view.

Obviously, there is no political sex appeal in Government finance, and I do not know of any more dramatic evidence of



that than the fact that we are considering tonight a budget resolution dealing with \$500 billion of American tax funds and there are three Senators on the floor of the Senate: The Senator from Maine, the Senator from Oklahoma, the Senator from Virginia, and the distinguished Presiding Officer, the Senator from Hawaii. There are three on the floor and the captive in the chair.

Mr. President, I think the Congress and the Senate take too lightly the financial affairs of our Government.

May I ask a question of the distinguished manager of the resolution?

Mr. MUSKIE. By all means.

Mr. HARRY F. BYRD, JR. What is the Federal funds deficit?

Mr. MUSKIE. I do not have a breakout of just the Federal funds. The figure I presented earlier was Federal funds and trust funds. I will try to get that information for the Senator as soon as possible.

Mr. HARRY F. BYRD, JR. I thank the Senator. As the Senator well knows, the Federal funds budget is the general operating cost of the Government. The unified budget takes into consideration the surplus in the trust fund. I think the most significant figure to use in regard to deficits is what is the deficit in the Federal funds in the general operations of Government, the general expenditures of Government as compared to the general revenues of Government.

I think there is some significance to the fact that we do not even have that figure available at the moment.

Now let us get to the other figure. There has been great praise tonight that this budget resolution provides for a deficit of only \$50 billion.

Well, I do not join in that praise. I do not join in that praise for one moment. It is a \$50 billion deficit and we are praising it, saying how great it is that we only have a deficit of \$50 billion.

Mr. MUSKIE. Will the Senator yield?

Mr. HARRY F. BYRD, JR. I yield.

Mr. MUSKIE. I do not believe the distinguished Senator from Oklahoma or the Senator from Maine referred to a \$50.9 billion deficit in that context at all. I have constantly worked, as has the Senator from Oklahoma, to bring the deficit lower by proposed cuts in committee and in conference.

We take no satisfaction whatsoever from a deficit of this magnitude. I shall take no satisfaction until we have arrived at a balanced budget.

I do not object, of course, to the Senator's unhappiness with a \$50.9 billion budget. I share it. I just do not want my position misunderstood. I take no satisfaction whatever from it. But it is better than the \$80 billion deficit I feared would be the consequence when I got the recommendations of the Senate Committee on Finance and the Senate Committee on Appropriations; better than the \$61 billion deficit that the President proposed and that I feared we might have to accept during the markup in the Senate Budget Committee; better than the \$55.6 billion deficit that was the result after Senate consideration of the budget resolution.

I should like it to be below 50, below 40, below 30, below 20, at balance. I take no satisfaction from it.

I want the Record clearly to reflect that. If the Senator wants to express his indignation about any deficit, he can be my guest. I share that concern with him.

Mr. HARRY F. BYRD, JR. Thank you, sir. I am delighted to hear that. I appreciate the comments of the chairman of the Budget Committee. I am glad to hear him state that he feels that what we should have is a balanced budget. I am glad to know that he feels that way, because most of the Senators do not feel that way.

This \$50.9 billion deficit that the Budget Committee has brought into the Senate is the third largest deficit in the history of the Nation. That is just the unified budget deficit. We have not even been able to get the Federal funds deficit yet.

Mr. MUSKIE. On that score, if the Senator will yield, I think we did give the Senator that figure during consideration of the Senate budget resolution.

Mr. HARRY F. BYRD, JR. I am asking the Senator for it now. What is the figure?

Mr. MUSKIE. I do not have that figure with me now, but if the Senator will subtract \$4.6 billion from the Senate-passed level, he will have today's figure.

Mr. HARRY F. BYRD, JR. I thank the Senator from Maine, but we are dealing with a new budget resolution tonight.

Mr. MUSKIE. I understand, but I am not a walking encyclopedia of every number in this budget. I believe the Senator had the number when the deficit in the resolution was \$55.6 billion. The deficit is now \$50.9 billion. All he has to do is take the difference, and subtract it from the earlier Federal funds deficit, and he will have it.

Mr. HARRY F. BYRD, JR. Well, I want to say to the Senator from Maine—I do not want to say it to the Senator from Maine; I shall just say it to the Senate:

The Senate is being asked tonight to consider a budget resolution authorizing the expenditure of \$500 billion of American tax funds. Those who are handling the budget resolution are able to tell the Senate what the unified budget deficit is, \$50.9 billion. But up to this point, those who are handling the budget resolution are not able to tell the Senate what the Federal funds deficit is. That is the key to this whole thing. That is the key to the cost of Government.

Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. HARRY F. BYRD, JR. Yes.

Mr. MUSKIE. If the Senator's memory met the standard he applies to mine, he would have the number.

Mr. HARRY F. BYRD, JR. I am not applying a standard to anybody's memory. I am talking about the resolution tonight, the new figures being brought before the Senate tonight.

Mr. MUSKIE. I told the Senator that if he will take the earlier number and will subtract from it this \$4.6 billion, he will have the figure.

Mr. HARRY F. BYRD, JR. I am going to—

Mr. MUSKIE. I do not mind substantive disagreements, I say to the Senator, but nitpicking is something I do not understand.

Mr. HARRY F. BYRD, JR. Nitpicking?

Mr. MUSKIE. Yes. You ask for a figure now, but you do not remember the earlier figure.

Mr. HARRY F. BYRD, JR. Senator MUSKIE, I shall give you the figure and you tell me whether the figure is wrong. The figure, the Federal funds deficit—I will make it a statement, and if I am wrong, you can correct me.

Mr. MUSKIE. Yes.

Mr. HARRY F. BYRD, JR. The Federal funds deficit was \$73.9 billion. If that figure has been changed, I should be glad if the Senator from Maine would tell me how that has been changed.

Mr. MUSKIE. Of course it has been changed, because revenues have been increased by \$4.6 billion.

Mr. HARRY F. BYRD, JR. Well, then, is the Senator from Virginia to understand that the Federal funds deficit will be \$69.3 billion?

Mr. MUSKIE. If the \$73.9 billion figure is accurate. I assume the Senator is quoting accurately. If that is the case, then that is the arithmetic.

Mr. HARRY F. BYRD, JR. I should think that, with all the dozens of people around here, we ought to be able to find out what the exact figure is.

Mr. MUSKIE. Well, even if I had an army of people here, I would not necessarily be able to pick out any single figure in the Federal budget in a matter of seconds.

Mr. HARRY F. BYRD, JR. The figure that I am speaking of, I say to the Senator from Maine—

Mr. MUSKIE. I am getting that figure for you.

Mr. HARRY F. BYRD, JR. If you will just let me finish: The figure I am speaking of is the second most significant figure in the entire budget; namely, what is the deficit of the Federal funds. The deficit of the Federal funds, up to this time—I do not know what it is now, but up to this new budget resolution, it was \$73.9 billion. That was the highest deficit of Federal funds that this country has ever experienced. All I am asking is, before we have to vote on this resolution, how is that changed?

Mr. MUSKIE. Well, I have given, based upon your recollection of what it was 2 weeks ago, its value on the basis of the major change that has taken place.

We will get your number, but we cannot get it instantly.

Mr. HARRY F. BYRD, JR. Thank you, sir.

Mr. MUSKIE. It takes a little time. When you begin to belabor me because I do not instantly produce one number out of a complex Federal budget, then I am tempted to believe—

Mr. HARRY F. BYRD, JR. I do not consider that it is belaboring anyone when you ask for a matter-of-fact piece of factual information.

I shall not pursue the point.

Regardless of what the figure is, and if I am off the Senator from Maine will correct me, the budget resolution tonight provides for the highest Federal funds deficit in the history of our Nation—the highest Federal funds deficit in the history of this Nation—and we are talking about getting inflation under control. We are talking about getting inflation under control with this budget resolution.

Nothing could be further from the case.

I know how hard the chairman and the ranking minority member worked on this budget and I dislike to take disagreement with them. But I have a strong feeling about this Government finance and I feel we are headed for trouble. This country is headed for trouble because of the Congress and because of the executive branch, too.

I took encouragement, however, and I want to commend the Senator, when the Senator from Maine said, and if I quote him wrong I know he will correct me, but in his remarks he said this: "Inflation control means budget control."

I want to repeat that. If I took it down accurately, the remarks of the chairman of the Budget Committee (Mr. MUSKIE) were: "Inflation control means budget control." That is the point I have been trying to make around here for years and years and years. We are not going to get inflation under control until we get the cost of Government under control.

This budget resolution does not get the cost of Government under control.

As the Senator from Maine pointed out, as the Senator from Oklahoma pointed out, the only reason that it is a lower deficit is not because there is a reduction in spending. The only reason it is a lower deficit is that less money is being given back to the people in the form of a tax reduction. The spending is just the same. This budget deficit being brought in by this resolution, compared to the other resolution, this deficit figure is lower not because of less spending, but because of less tax reduction.

Mr. President, this country is headed for deep trouble. It is heading for deep trouble because of the excessive and just totally unrealistic, in my judgment, spending by the Federal Government.

I think the people of this Nation have seen that for quite a while. I believe that Congress is beginning to see it.

I take great encouragement, I will repeat it again, in what the Senator from Maine said just a little while ago in his opening remarks: "Inflation" control means budget control."

Now, the distinguished Vice President spoke in Virginia last Friday evening. He spoke at Hot Springs to the Advisory Council on Business, or something like that, and the headline in the Richmond Times Dispatch the next morning was along this line:

Mondale seeks spending restraint.

Well, I thought to myself, is this my long-time colleague and long-time friend, FRITZ MONDALE? I think it probably is, but in the nearly 13 years I served with him, it is the first time I have heard

him call for budget control, for spending restraint, and to me that is a very encouraging sign.

I point that out tonight to commend our Vice President and to associate myself with him in calling for spending restraint.

So I think between the comment made Friday evening by the Vice President and the comment made tonight by the senior Senator from Maine (Mr. MUSKIE), that they are two very encouraging statements, that inflation control means budget control.

But despite the fact that they are encouraging, that does not at all persuade me to vote in favor of this budget resolution.

This budget resolution says this, and I will quote several parts of it:

The appropriate level of new budget authority is \$568,850,000,000.

I do not regard that an appropriate level. I regard it as much too high. The resolution says:

The appropriate level of total budget outlays is \$498,800,000,000.

I do not regard that as appropriate. I regard that as much too high.

Then it says:

The amount of the deficit in the budget which is appropriate is \$50.9 billion.

I do not regard that as appropriate. I regard that as totally inappropriate. I am not going to vote for anything that says that is an appropriate deficit.

Then it says:

The appropriate level of the public debt is \$849,100,000,000.

I do not agree that that is appropriate. Then it says:

The amount by which the statutory debt limit on such debt should accordingly be increased is \$97,100,000,000.

This budget resolution will increase the public debt between now and September 30, 1979, by \$97,100,000,000.

Yes, Mr. President, the public debt will be increased in that short period of time by more than \$97 billion and this is presented to the Senate as being an appropriate budget resolution. In my judgment, it is a totally inappropriate budget resolution.

Mr. President, as one who rather consistently has been in the minority when it comes to Federal spending, Federal deficits, I am not at all surprised that I am in the minority this evening. I dislike it. I dislike having to take exception to the proposals recommended by two outstanding Members of the Senate. Rightly or wrongly, I believe that it is so vitally important that Federal spending be got under control that I feel it is necessary to say these few words.

The American people are going to suffer, in my judgment, very severely through the inflation which this budget resolution will help stimulate. We cannot continue to spend as if there is no tomorrow. We cannot continue to pile up ever higher deficits without somebody, some way, paying the price.

We hear a lot about reducing taxes. My impression is that the average citizen

realizes that you cannot very well logically reduce taxes unless you are able to control spending.

The current resolution provides for a tremendous increase in the cost of Government. That increase must be paid for. It can be paid for through direct taxation, or it can be paid for by the hidden and cruel tax of inflation. That is the way we have been paying the debts around this place for a long time now.

We have not been willing to finance the Government on a sound basis. We are saying, "We'll just create the deficits; we will let somebody worry about the deficits later, and we will let it be paid for through inflation," because that is the way it has been paid for.

I say again that Government spending must be paid for. Whether we in Congress realize it or not, it must be paid for. It must be paid for either through direct taxation or through the hidden and cruel tax of inflation.

When the vote comes, I shall vote against this resolution, because I do not feel it to be in the best interests of the people of our country.

Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, I will take a few minutes to make sure that the record of this discussion contains at least minimal information with respect to the so-called Federal funds deficit.

I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD the table on page 261 of the Federal budget.

There being no objection, the table was ordered to be printed in the RECORD as follows:

BUDGET SURPLUS OR DEFICIT (—) BY FUND GROUP<sup>1</sup>  
(In billions of dollars)

Description	1977 actual	1978 estimate	1979 estimate
<b>Federal funds:</b>			
Transactions with the public <sup>2</sup> ..	-25.2	-43.3	-44.1
Transactions with trust funds..	-29.3	-28.8	-30.4
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>-54.5</b>	<b>-72.1</b>	<b>-74.5</b>
<b>Trust funds:</b>			
Transactions with the public <sup>2</sup> ..	-19.8	-18.5	-16.5
Transactions with Federal funds..	29.3	28.8	30.4
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>9.5</b>	<b>10.3</b>	<b>13.9</b>
<b>Budget total:</b>			
Federal funds.....	-54.5	-72.1	-74.5
Trust funds.....	9.5	10.3	13.9
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>-45.0</b>	<b>-61.8</b>	<b>-60.6</b>

<sup>1</sup> For purposes of this analysis, payments from Federal funds to the general revenue sharing trust fund are treated as transactions with the public instead of transactions with a trust fund; and the corresponding payments from the general revenue sharing trust fund to the public are accordingly omitted. This is because the general revenue sharing trust fund has no independent source of funding, and serves only as a channel through which a Federal funds payment is made to the public.

<sup>2</sup> Includes some incidental transactions with off-budget Federal entities.

Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, from this table comes the following information bearing upon the question of the distinguished Senator from Virginia.

The Federal funds deficit in that table is \$74.5 billion. That is the figure that seems roughly to coincide with the figure the Senator from Virginia used in the course of the debate in the Senate on the budget resolution.

The trust fund surplus in that table for 1979—it is an estimate—is \$13.9 bil-



lion, for a total deficit of \$60.6 billion, which was the President's deficit.

At the time we considered the Senate Budget Committee's first resolution, the deficit in that resolution was \$55.6 billion, or \$5 billion less than the President's deficit. The effect of this on the Federal funds deficit at that time was to reduce it to \$69.5 billion. There is one caveat to that figure: It depends upon the trust fund surplus, and that \$13.9 billion may well have been affected and probably was affected, by other actions taken in connection with the budget resolution. We would have to examine separate accounts, throughout the budget, in order to determine the exact value of the trust fund surplus of the budget which the conference agreed to this afternoon.

So at the time the first resolution was agreed to by the Senate—bearing in mind the possibility that the trust fund surplus may have changed, and assuming it did not—the Federal funds deficit was \$69.5 billion. We have reduced the deficit to \$50.9 billion. We have reduced it by \$4.7 billion. We therefore would take the Federal funds surplus down to \$64.8 billion instead of \$74 billion, which is the figure that the Senator from Virginia was using.

When we have been able to evaluate fully the impact of the conference report on the trust fund surplus then, and only then, can we give a current estimate of the Federal funds deficit.

Incidentally, it is not my impression that the Federal funds deficit, separate from trust fund revenues and outlays, is as good a measure of economic impact as unified budget deficit, which takes into account all revenues and spending by the Government. The more comprehensive measure is superior.

If one is interested in the economic impact, I believe that the \$50.9 billion which this conference report represents provides the essential information.

Mr. President, I take it that now the first parliamentary step is to move that the conference report be agreed to—and it is the conference report in disagreement, I might say.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on the adoption of the conference report.

Mr. HARRY F. BYRD, JR. Mr. President, I do not want to pursue the issue with the able Senator from Maine as to the Federal funds deficit. I will say this:

It has only been in the last few years that the unified deficit has been a figure utilized around the halls of Congress. If one will go back a few years, it was always a Federal funds deficit. The change began to come about—it was not accomplished then, but it began to come about—during the administration of President Johnson. The Federal funds deficit became so high—it looks low now, but it was high then—that the Johnson administration recommended and urged that Congress go to the unified basis.

When one goes to the unified basis, when you take into consideration the trust funds, then you have taken into consideration funds not from general taxation.

The social security tax is paid by the employer and the employee. Except to a very minor degree, there are no Federal general revenues involved in that.

So I think there is a great distinction between Federal funds and the trust funds. The trust funds can be used only for specific purposes. They are in trust. They are in trust for the most part to pay the social security recipients.

The Federal funds, the Federal reve-

nues, or the general revenues, are used for the general operation of Government and that determines the extent and the cost of the general operation of all of the Government activities of the Nation leaving out the trust funds which, as I say again, can be used only for a specific purpose and are in trust for that one purpose. So the significant figure dealing with the Government deficit is how much is the Government in the red insofar as the general operations of Government are concerned. And that figure is far greater than is the unified deficit. But let us assume now we do not want to worry about the general fund deficit. The unified deficit still is over \$50 billion in this resolution that the Senate is being asked to approve this evening.

I have some tables which in a moment—I do not now—I will ask to print in the RECORD, and with the exception of fiscal 1976 and with the exception of fiscal 1978, the current year, the deficit for the upcoming year will be the largest deficit that our Nation has had on a unified basis. When you get to the Federal funds basis, it will be the highest deficit that we have had. So, I am not sure that we are making a great deal of progress in putting the Government's financial house in order, but as I say, I am encouraged by the fact that has been asserted on the floor today that inflation control means budget control, and I commend again the Senator from Maine for that assertion, and associate myself with his comments in that regard.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to print in the RECORD three tables that I have prepared.

There being no objection, the tables were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

Deficits in Federal funds and interest on the national debt for fiscal year 1959-79, inclusive

[Billions of dollars]

(Prepared by U.S. Senator HARRY F. BYRD, JR., of Virginia)

Year:	Receipts	Outlays	Surplus (+) or deficit (-)	Debt interest
1959	65.8	77.0	-11.2	7.8
1960	75.7	74.9	+ 0.8	9.5
1961	75.2	79.3	- 4.1	9.3
1962	79.7	86.6	- 6.9	9.5
1963	83.6	90.1	- 6.5	10.3
1964	87.2	95.8	- 8.6	11.0
1965	90.9	94.8	- 3.9	11.8
1966	101.4	106.5	- 5.1	12.6
1967	111.8	126.8	-15.0	14.2
1968	114.7	143.1	-28.4	15.6
1969	143.3	148.8	- 5.5	17.6
1970	143.2	156.3	-13.1	20.0
1971	133.8	163.7	-29.9	21.6
1972	148.8	178.1	-29.3	22.5
1973	161.4	187.0	-25.6	24.8
1974	181.2	199.9	-18.7	30.0
1975	187.5	240.0	-52.5	33.5
1976	200.3	269.1	-68.8	37.7
Transition quarter	54.0	65.0	-11.0	8.3
1977	240.4	294.9	-54.5	42.6
1978*	267.9	332.7	-64.8	48.4

\*Estimated figures.

SOURCE.—Office of Management and Budget.

Unified budget receipts, outlays and surplus or deficit for fiscal years 1958-1979, inclusive

[Billions of dollars]

(Prepared by U.S. Senator HARRY F. BYRD, JR., of Virginia)

Fiscal year:	Receipts	Outlays	Surplus (+) or deficit (-)
1958	79.6	82.6	-3.0
1959	79.2	92.1	-12.9
1960	92.5	92.2	+0.3
1961	94.4	97.8	-3.4
1962	99.7	106.8	-7.1
1963	106.6	111.3	-4.7
1964	112.7	118.6	-5.9
1965	116.8	118.4	-1.6
1966	130.8	134.6	-3.8
1967	149.5	158.2	-8.7
1968	153.7	178.8	-25.1
1969	187.8	184.6	+3.2
1970	193.8	196.6	-2.8
1971	188.4	211.4	-23.0
1972	208.6	231.9	-23.3
1973	232.2	247.1	-14.8
1974	264.9	269.6	-4.7
1975	281.0	326.1	-45.1
1976	299.2	365.6	-66.4
Trans. Qtr.	81.8	94.8	-13.0
1977	356.9	401.9	-45.0
1978*	400.5	453.5	-53.0

\*Estimated figures, March 1978.

SOURCE.—Office of Management and Budget.

*The national debt in the twentieth century:  
Totals at the end of fiscal years 1900-79  
(Rounded to the nearest billion dollars)*

1900	1
1901	1
1902	1
1903	1
1904	1
1905	1
1906	1
1907	1
1908	1
1909	1
1910	1
1911	1
1912	1
1913	1
1914	1
1915	1
1916	1
1917	3
1918	12
1919	25
1920	24
1921	24
1922	23
1923	22
1924	21
1925	21
1926	20
1927	19
1928	18
1929	17
1930	16
1931	17
1932	20
1933	23
1934	27
1935	29
1936	34
1937	36
1938	37
1939	40
1940	43
1941	49
1942	72
1943	137
1944	201
1945	259
1946	269
1947	256
1948	251
1949	252
1950	256
1951	254
1952	258
1953	265
1954	271
1955	274
1956	273
1957	272
1958	280
1959	288
1960	291
1961	293
1962	303
1963	311
1964	317
1965	323
1966	329
1967	341
1968	370
1969	367
1970	383
1971	410
1972	437
1973	468
1974	486
1975	544
1976	632
1977	646
1978*	709
1979*	778
	866

\* Estimated figures.

Source. Office of Management and Budget (March 1978).

● Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, I oppose the first budget resolution setting spending and revenue targets for fiscal year 1979.

The American taxpayer is lashed to the center of this target and is about to be the victim of a direct hit.

Let us be clear what we have done here today. We are reducing the size of the deficit at the expense of a tax cut. Why should Americans sacrifice for Federal excesses in runaway spending?

The root cause of inflation is Federal spending. Let us attack that, instead of the hard-pressed taxpayer.

This Congress is going on record as showing its concern for inflation by delaying and reducing the size of the tax cuts in order to reduce the budget deficit. But raising taxes to reduce the budget deficit will not reduce inflation. It will drain resources out of the economy just as budget deficits do.

We shot down nine amendments to reduce Federal spending—this body rejected all of them—including one aimed solely at the elimination of documented waste in HEW. That amendment alone would have accommodated the tax cuts we are now voting to deny our citizens.

The President has called upon the country to adopt serious anti-inflationary measures, to make sacrifices, to hold down spending for the good of the country. This resolution is hardly the message we, as responsible legislators, should be sending home to both labor and management.

This is a blueprint for bigger Government and a continuation of the spend, spend—tax, tax, tax philosophy.

The right kind of tax cut—a tax rate reduction—would not be inflationary. Substantial tax rate reductions will increase the incentive to work, save, and produce, expanding the production of goods and services in the economy and resulting in lower prices and more jobs.

Michael Evans, president of Chase Econometrics Associates, has written that—

Income tax cuts, particularly those for corporations, raise investment and productivity growth, and hence lower inflation.

Evans also believes a reduction in income tax rates would produce more, not less, Federal revenues. He wrote that—

A reduction in income tax rates increases the size of the private sector of the U.S. economy, thus reversing the erosion of the tax base which has occurred almost continuously over the postwar period. Federal government revenues, after declining initially, will begin to rise much more rapidly as the private sector expands. For example, an extra 1 percent growth in real GNP during the past twelve years would have generated an additional \$47 billion in Federal tax receipts in 1977 and \$16 billion less in expenditures, thus resulting in a slight surplus of further tax reduction. In the long run the Federal budget deficit will be larger with an oppressive tax system than it will be with lower tax rates and rapid growth.

We have robbed Peter, taxed Paul, and now we are going to systematically mug 216 million Americans.

It's time to blow the whistle.

Mr. President, I submit for the RECORD an article entitled "The Dangers of

Budget Bloat," which was published in the May 15, 1978, issue of Time Magazine.

#### THE DANGERS OF BUDGET BLOAT

Even conservatives now accept that moderate deficit spending is often necessary to lift the economy out of a recession. Fair enough, but as the U.S. enters the fourth year of recovery, deficit spending is reaching tidal wave proportions. The deficit called for in Jimmy Carter's budget for fiscal 1979 is \$60.6 billion, and it promises to keep the flood of red ink cresting at least through 1980 and probably much longer.

The dizzy growth of the deficit must be reversed because it condemns the U.S. to unending inflation, sapping not only the nation's economic vitality but even the strength of its political institutions. When the Government spends beyond its means, the Federal Reserve Board confronts a cruel choice. If it prints more money to accommodate the Government's heavy borrowing, it feeds inflation. If the board refuses to print the money, it risks creating a recession, because the Government sops up so much credit that little is left for private borrowers.

Congress is only making the deficit problem worse. As next week's deadline approaches for House approval of the so-called target budget, which will determine the basic size of fiscal 1979 spending, many of the 435 Congressmen are rushing to push various pet projects into the overloaded document. Expenditures for agriculture, education, community development, and veterans' benefits all have been increased by at least \$1 billion more than Carter proposed. Complains House Budget Committee Chairman Robert Glaimo of Connecticut: "We've got to stop all these bright little ideas from being passed. You add them up and multiply by 435 and you've got trouble."

In recent weeks Congress has grown uneasy about the size of the deficit, but instead of acting to limit spending, a movement is gaining ground to reduce or delay the \$25 billion tax cut that Carter plans for October. Doing that might crimp the growth of the economy. It would be far better to reduce spending and use part of the savings to cut taxes.

The problem is that Congress has historically viewed the very idea of budget cutting as rather like repealing Christmas. Special-interest groups instantly howl, and Congress listens. The groups are as large as the 34 million Social Security beneficiaries and as small as the 1,700 beekeepers who this year will draw \$2.9 million in federal indemnities because their bees may have been harmed by Government spraying of pesticide.

Beyond that, many of Washington's ever multiplying programs provide funding commitments that grow automatically with the population or the inflation rate. In the past ten years, the share of the budget consumed by these programs has increased from less than 30% to nearly 45%. Because of all these factors, perhaps as much as 90% of the entire budget is treated as politically untouchable by Congress.

All this makes a mockery of Carter's vow to discipline the budget process by requiring each department to justify every dollar in its annual spending request. That approach, known as "zero-based budgeting," is saving little or no money and is simply creating a lot more paper work.

The President has abandoned his campaign pledge to balance the budget by 1981, and the Office of Management and Budget admits that a 1981 deficit of "around \$10 billion" is more likely. If present spending trends continue, the Administration will not come anywhere near the target. In fact, computer projections by Data Resources, Inc., show that if the Administration gets just a few



bad breaks—a continued substantial upward thrust in food prices, sporadic big increases in the cost of imported oil—the deficit could explode to \$220 billion in 1987.

The first step to prevent such a disaster is for Carter to block spending from going any higher, he can do this by adhering to his pledge to veto bills that would push the budget above his suggested \$500.2 billion. In addition, although most of the 1979 budget is fixed in stone, some cuts can be made. Wisconsin's William Proxmire, chairman of the Senate Banking Committee, ambitiously calls for a total reduction of as much as 7%; Jack Carlson, chief economist of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, urges a 2% across-the-board reduction, amounting to \$10 billion. At the least, Carter has to start pressing Congress to accept even sharper reductions in the rate of spending growth in fiscal 1980 and later years. The only way to do that is for some "uncontrollable" spending to be controlled, some "mandated" programs to be unmandated. Among the fastest growing:

#### FEDERAL PENSIONS

Spending for civil service and military pensions has surged from less than \$3 billion in 1955 to \$20 billion annually. A \$15,000-a-year Government worker can retire at 55, after 30 years of service, and draw \$703 a month, with cost of living increases. After 20 years, a member of the military can retire with an inflation-proofed pension equal to 50% of his salary; then, as a veteran, he gets preference for a civil service job. If he had joined the armed forces at age 17, he could leave at 37, go to work as a federal civilian employee, retire at 67 and draw Social Security, military and civil service pensions all at once.

#### GRANTS TO STATES

Federal grants-in-aid to state and local governments have just about doubled from \$43 billion in 1973 to Carter's recommended \$85 billion in fiscal 1979. But 44 of the nation's states are awash in budget surpluses that total \$10 billion. So why did Congress this year appropriate \$250 million just to help them fill potholes in their streets? A portion of the money that Washington will give to state and local governments in 1978 is supposed to be spent for recession-fighting public works projects; the funds keep pouring in, even though the recession is over and unemployment dropped last month to a 3½-year low of 6%.

#### EDUCATION

Since 1972, aid to education has more than tripled, to \$3.2 billion. Typical of the excess is the interest-subsidized student loan program, which began in the mid-1960s to help needy children go to college. Students now qualify if their families earn up to \$25,000, and defaults have soared. Next year's default write-offs and interest charges will cost the Government \$670 million. Yet Congress is considering spending perhaps as much as \$3 billion a year more to allow any student, no matter how wealthy, to qualify for a loan.

Additional waste is contained in the panoply of programs for elementary and secondary schools. So-called impact-aid funding started during the Korean War to help educate children from G.I. families, has been unnecessarily broadened to cover children of all federal workers, at a cost of \$712 million annually. A bill now in the House would lift this to \$1.3 billion by 1980. Not many Congressmen will oppose it: 411 of them come from districts that will benefit.

#### SOCIAL SECURITY

Now the largest single program in the budget, Social Security has grown from \$17.5 billion in 1965 to as much as \$133 billion next fiscal year. Congress saved the whole program from eventual bankruptcy only by

passing a Social Security tax increase of \$227 billion over the next ten years by far the largest peacetime revenue-raising measure in the nation's history. Collapse threatened because Social Security payments have been automatically increased to offset inflation, a scheme that does more to spread the plague than cure it. Nobody wants to reduce current benefits, but their future growth can be contained. The rising cost of health care has also burdened the program. Beginning in 1966, low-cost medical care for the elderly has been provided by Social Security through the Medicare program, but without sufficient funds to do the job.

#### DEFENSE

Though the nation has been at peace for the past five years, military spending has grown by 58%. Money is wasted by maintaining dozens of unnecessary defense bases, many of which were set up during World War II when 12 million men and women were in the services, v. 2 million now. Reports TIME Washington Correspondent Simmons Pentress: "There is no compelling strategic or economic reason not to shut down such large military training bases as Fort Dix, N.J., or Fort Jackson, S.C. But there are political reasons. For six years the Pentagon has been trying to close the training facilities at Fort Dix, and for six years the effort has been fought off by the New Jersey congressional delegation." Last month Defense Secretary Harold Brown joined the battle all over again, announcing a plan to phase out the Fort Dix facilities and eliminate or consolidate 84 other bases. The saving would be \$337 million a year, but at a cost of 23,200 jobs, and Congressmen in the affected districts are up in arms.

Cutting the budget down to affordable size would not mean unraveling every spending program, but would require a sober reappraisal of what Government can and should accomplish. The basic question is whether even the world's wealthiest nation has the resources to heap one program on top of another with little thought to the consequences. Some of the goals are admirable, but the run-away spending is producing a stumbling nanny-state that tries to help powerful special interests but in fact hurts the whole nation by ravaging it with inflation. ●

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I compliment the distinguished Senator from Maine and the distinguished Senator from Oklahoma on a job well done. It is a thankless task, really. There are no headlines back home, no votes back home, but innumerable hours of labor, sweat, worry, tension, and the Senate is in their debt.

If there is one thing that has made this Budget Reform Act work it has been the steel discipline, the determination, the skill and effectiveness of Senator MUSKIE and Senator BELLMON and those members of the Budget Committee who spend hours and days and weeks poring over books, papers, arguing, and preparing for the floor debate, and I personally express my gratitude, my respect, and my high regard for them and again I believe that I speak the sentiments of the Senate. It is a tough, tough job but I will say to these two men they are tough, tough men, and I admire them.

Mr. MUSKIE. I thank the majority leader and I also do not want to neglect to thank the distinguished Senator from Virginia. He has even a lonelier job than we have. If I lose patience with him at times, it is because I share his frustra-

tion but from a different perspective—frustration with the difficulty of bringing our financial house in order. And I hope he understands that.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MUSKIE. I yield.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. I have something to say about the distinguished Senator from Virginia, Mr. HARRY F. BYRD, JR. He is one tremendous man. His father was a man who was a student of economics of our Government and HARRY FLOOD BYRD, JR., has certainly followed in his footsteps, and I express deep admiration for him and for his dedication and devotion.

So to all these men I salute. But again I say, as I said before and as I will have reason to say again, I am tremendously grateful to the men on this Budget Committee for the herculean task that they confront and confront well, studiously, effectively, and with such dedication.

Mr. BELLMON. Mr. President, if the Senator will yield, I also express my gratitude and appreciation to the distinguished majority leader. The work on the Budget Committee is difficult but it is certainly a highly educational process. So we on the committee gain a great deal from our experiences but we appreciate very much the support that the majority leader gave the budget process. Without him it could not come as far as it has. I hope he will help us further when we come down to the votes later on where some Members will be trying to add spending that will breach the budget resolutions.

I also say, Mr. President, I hope the distinguished Senator from Virginia realizes that the chairman of the Budget Committee and myself are in concert with him. We are trying to hold the spending down as far as we can, but we are not the whole committee, and we are not certainly the whole conference. We had hours, days of debate, sometimes almost battle with the House of Representatives over these figures and if the Senator from Maine or I could have had our way, we would have been several billion dollars under where we are, but this represents the best arrangement we could work out with the House of Representatives. While we are sorry that the deficit is as large as it is, it could have been much larger, had it not been for the leadership of Senator MUSKIE and those on the Senate side who supported him. So we are in accord with the objectives the Senator from Virginia has but we cannot get there as rapidly as we would like to.

Mr. MUSKIE. The frustrating thing, if I may say to the Senator, is in the course of the conference with the House of Representatives. As I listened to their rhetoric and their pleas to lift the spending ceilings I was made to feel like Scrooge. Then I come to the floor of the Senate and the distinguished Senator from Virginia makes me feel like Santa Claus, and I am not entirely sure what my role is. But I will try to carry both costumes with me to wear on an appropriate occasion.

But we must not forget this final vote we need to have, Mr. President, so I move that the Senate concur in the House amendment to Senate Concurrent Resolution 80 with an amendment which is at the desk.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The conference report must be acted upon. The question now occurs on the adoption of the conference report.

(Putting the question)

The conference report was agreed to.

UP AMENDMENT NO. 1314

Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, I move that the Senate concur in the House amendment to Senate Concurrent Resolution 80, with an amendment which is at the desk.

The amendment is as follows:

It is the intention of the conferees that the managers on the part of the Senate will offer a motion in the Senate to recede and concur in the House amendment to the Senate-passed resolution with an amendment (in the nature of a substitute) consisting of the language agreed to in conference. Upon the adoption of such amendment in the Senate, the managers of the House will offer a motion in the House to concur therein.

The managers on the part of the House and the Senate submit the following joint statement in explanation of the action agreed upon by the managers:

The substitute language which is to be offered as described above (and which should be considered the language of the concurrent resolution as recommended in the conference report for purposes of section 302(a) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974)—hereinafter in this statement referred to as the "conference substitute"—is as follows:

That the Congress hereby determines and declares, pursuant to section 301(a) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, that for the fiscal year beginning on October 1, 1978—

(1) the recommended level of Federal revenues is \$447,900,000,000 and the amount by which the aggregate level of Federal revenues should be decreased is \$24,700,000,000.

(2) the appropriate level of total new budget authority is \$568,850,000,000.

(3) the appropriate level of total budget outlays is \$498,800,000,000.

(4) the amount of the deficit in the budget which is appropriate in the light of economic conditions and all other relevant factors is \$50,900,000,000 and

(5) the appropriate level of the public debt is \$849,100,000,000 and the amount by which the statutory limit on such debt should accordingly be increased is \$97,100,000,000.

Sec. 2. Based on allocations of the appropriate level of total new budget authority and of total budget outlays as set forth in paragraphs (2) and (3) of the first section of this resolution, the Congress hereby determines and declares pursuant to section 301 (a) (2) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 that, for the fiscal year beginning on October 1, 1978, the appropriate level of new budget authority and the estimated budget outlays for each major functional category are as follows:

(1) National Defense (050):

(A) New budget authority, \$128,700,000,000;

(B) Outlays \$115,700,000,000.

(2) International Affairs (150):

(A) New budget authority, \$12,800,000,000;

(B) Outlays, \$6,900,000,000.

(3) General Science, Space, and Technology (250):

(A) New budget authority, \$5,200,000,000;

(B) Outlays, \$5,000,000,000.

(4) Energy (270):

(A) New budget authority, \$10,400,000,000;

(B) Outlays, \$9,800,000,000.

(5) Natural Resources and Environment

(300):

(A) New budget authority, \$13,600,000,000;

(B) Outlays, \$12,200,000,000.

(6) Agriculture (350):

(A) New budget authority, \$12,300,000,000;

(B) Outlays, \$8,300,000,000.

(7) Commerce and Housing Credit (370):

(A) New budget authority, \$5,900,000,000;

(B) Outlays, \$3,600,000,000.

(8) Transportation (400):

(A) New budget authority, \$20,300,000,000;

(B) Outlays, \$17,800,000,000.

(9) Community and Regional Development (450):

(A) New budget authority, \$11,100,000,000;

(B) Outlays, \$9,000,000,000.

(10) Education, Training, Employment, and Social Services (500):

(A) New budget authority, \$33,000,000,000;

(B) Outlays, \$31,400,000,000.

(11) Health (550):

(A) New budget authority, \$52,550,000,000;

(B) Outlays, \$49,500,000,000.

(12) Income Security (600):

(A) New budget authority, \$193,100,000,000;

(B) Outlays, \$160,200,000,000.

(13) Veterans Benefits and Services (700):

(A) New budget authority, \$21,300,000,000;

(B) Outlays, \$21,000,000,000.

(14) Administration of Justice (750):

(A) New budget authority, \$4,300,000,000;

(B) Outlays, \$4,200,000,000.

(15) General Government (800):

(A) New budget authority, \$4,100,000,000;

(B) Outlays, \$4,100,000,000.

(16) General Purpose Fiscal Assistance

(850):

(A) New budget authority, \$9,700,000,000;

(B) Outlays, \$9,600,000,000.

(17) Interest (900):

(A) New budget authority \$47,000,000,000;

(B) Outlays, \$47,000,000,000;

(18) Allowances (920):

(A) New budget authority \$800,000,000;

(B) Outlays, \$800,000,000.

(19) Undistributed Offsetting Receipts

(950):

(A) New budget authority, —\$17,300,000,000;

(B) Outlays, —\$17,300,000,000.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the motion of the Senator from Maine.

The motion was agreed to.

Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the motion was agreed to.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. I move to lay that motion on the table.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

Mr. HARRY F. BYRD, JR. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for just a moment? I would like the record to show that the Senator from Virginia voted in the negative.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The record will so show.

#### ROUTINE MORNING BUSINESS

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that there now be a period for the transaction of routine morning business.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

#### MESSAGES FROM THE PRESIDENT DURING THE RECESS

Under authority of the order of Thursday, May 11, 1978, the Secretary of the Senate on May 12, 1978, received messages from the President of the United States submitting sundry nominations, which were referred to the Committee on the Judiciary.

(The nominations received on May 12, 1978, are printed at the end of the Senate proceedings.)

#### MESSAGES FROM THE PRESIDENT

Messages from the President of the United States were communicated to the Senate by Mr. Marks, one of his secretaries.

#### EXECUTIVE MESSAGES REFERRED

As in executive session, the Presiding Officer laid before the Senate messages from the President of the United States submitting sundry nominations which were referred to the appropriate committees.

(The nominations received today are printed at the end of the Senate proceedings.)

#### PROPOSED RESCISSION OF BUDGET AUTHORITY—MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT—PM 176

The PRESIDING OFFICER laid before the Senate the following message from the President of the United States, together with accompanying papers, which were referred to the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry, the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, the Committee on Environment and Public Works, the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, and the Committee on Foreign Relations, pursuant to the order of January 30, 1975:

*To the Congress of the United States:*

In accordance with the Impoundment Control Act of 1974, I herewith report one proposal to rescind \$30.0 million in budget authority previously provided by the Congress. In addition, I am reporting four new deferrals of budget authority totalling \$55.1 million and two revisions to previously transmitted deferrals increasing the amount deferred by \$0.7 million in budget authority.

The rescission proposal affects the Department of Agriculture's drought and flood assistance program. The new deferrals and revisions to existing deferrals involve programs in the Departments of Commerce, Energy, and the Interior, the Corps of Engineers, and the International Communication Agency.

The details of the rescission proposal and the deferrals are contained in the attached reports.

JIMMY CARTER.

THE WHITE HOUSE, May 12, 1978.



### MESSAGES FROM THE HOUSE DURING THE RECESS

#### ENROLLED BILL AND JOINT RESOLUTION SIGNED

Under authority of the order of Thursday, May 11, 1978, the Secretary of the Senate on May 12, 1978, received a message from the House of Representatives which announced that the Speaker has signed the following enrolled bill and joint resolution:

H.R. 8331. An Act to amend the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970; and

H.J. Res. 859. A joint resolution making supplemental appropriations for the United States Railway Association for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1978, and for other purposes.

The enrolled bill and joint resolution were subsequently signed today by the Acting President pro tempore (Mr. MORGAN).

### MESSAGES FROM THE HOUSE

At 11:14 a.m., a message from the House of Representatives delivered by Mr. Berry, one of its reading clerks, announced that the House disagrees to the amendments of the Senate to the bill (H.R. 11504) to amend the Consolidated Farm and Rural Development Act, provide an economic emergency loan program to farmers and ranchers in the United States, and extend the Emergency Livestock Credit Act; agrees to the conference requested by the Senate on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses thereon; and that Mr. FOLEY, Mr. JONES of Tennessee, Mr. POAGE, Mr. DE LA GARZA, Mr. RICHMOND, Mr. BALDUS, Mr. BEDELL, Mr. ENGLISH, Mr. PANETTA, Mr. HARKIN, Mr. FITHIAN, Mr. GLICKMAN, Mr. BROWN of California, Mr. WAMPLER, Mr. MADIGAN, Mr. JEFFORDS, Mr. KELLY, Mr. COLEMAN, and Mr. MARLENEE were appointed as managers of the conference on the part of the House.

The message also announced that the House agree to the amendments of the Senate to the resolution (H.J. Res. 873) making an urgent supplemental appropriation for the disaster loan program of the Small Business Administration for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1978.

At 12:32 p.m., a message from the House of Representatives delivered by Mr. Berry, announced that the House has agreed to the following concurrent resolution, in which it requests the concurrence of the Senate:

H. Con. Res. 617. A concurrent resolution denouncing the assassination of Aldo Moro.

#### HOUSE JOINT RESOLUTION SIGNED

The message also announced that the Speaker has signed the following enrolled joint resolution:

H.J. Res. 873. A joint resolution making an urgent supplemental appropriation for the disaster loan program of the Small Business Administration for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1978, and for other purposes.

At 5:52 p.m., a message from the House of Representatives delivered by Mr. Hackney, one of its reading clerks,

announced that the House has passed the following bill, without amendment:

S. 1588. A bill to name the lake located behind Lower Monumental Lock and Dam, Washington, "Lake Herbert G. West."

### HOUSE CONCURRENT RESOLUTION REFERRED

The following House concurrent resolution was read by title and referred as indicated:

H. Con. Res. 617. A concurrent resolution denouncing the assassination of Aldo Moro; to the Committee on Foreign Relations.

### ORDER TO HOLD H.R. 12255 AT THE DESK

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that at such time as H.R. 12255, the Older Americans Act Amendments of 1978, is received, that it be held at the desk pending further disposition.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

### ORDER TO DISCHARGE A COMMITTEE

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on Environment and Public Works be discharged from further consideration of S. 2541, and that the bill as reported from the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation be placed on the calendar.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

### COMMUNICATIONS

The Presiding Officer laid before the Senate the following communications, together with accompanying reports, documents and papers, which were referred as indicated:

EC-3575. A communication from the Secretary of the Senate, submitting, pursuant to law, a statement of receipts and expenditures of the Senate, showing in detail the items of expenses under proper appropriations, the aggregate thereof, and exhibiting the exact condition of all public moneys received, paid out, and remaining in his possession from October 1, 1977, through March 31, 1978; which was ordered printed as a Senate document.

EC-3576. A communication from the Director, Office of Management and Budget, Executive Office of the President, transmitting, pursuant to law, a cumulative report on rescissions and deferrals for May 1978; to the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on the Judiciary, the Committee on Governmental Affairs, the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry, the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, the Committee on Environment and Public Works, the Committee on Human Resources, and the Committee on Finance, jointly, pursuant to the order of January 30, 1975.

EC-3577. A communication from the Deputy Secretary of Defense, reporting, pursuant to law, the annual compensation of any officer or employee of a Federal Contract Research Center (FCRC) in excess of \$45,000

from federal funds; to the Committee on Armed Services.

EC-3578. A communication from the Associate Director, Legislative Liaison, Department of the Air Force, transmitting, pursuant to law, a report on the progress of the Reserve Officers' Training Corps Flight Training Program for the calendar year 1977; to the Committee on Armed Services.

EC-3579. A communication from the General Counsel of the Department of Defense, transmitting a draft of proposed legislation to amend title 10, United States Code, to authorize waiver of application of certain laws in connection with the acquisition of property or services from friendly foreign governments and international organizations to facilitate cooperation relating to defense equipment, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Armed Services.

EC-3580. A communication from the Director, Defense Security Assistance Agency, reporting, pursuant to law, concerning the Department of the Air Force's proposed Letter of Offer to Korea for Defense Articles estimated to cost in excess of \$25 million; to the Committee on Armed Services.

EC-3581. A communication from the Director, Defense Security Assistance Agency, reporting, pursuant to law, concerning the Department of the Air Force's proposed Letter of Offer to the Republic of China for Defense Articles estimated to cost in excess of \$25 million; to the Committee on Armed Services.

EC-3582. A communication from the Director, Defense Security Assistance Agency, reporting, pursuant to law, concerning the Department of the Air Force's proposed Letter of Offer to Iran for Defense Articles estimated to cost in excess of \$25 million; to the Committee on Armed Services.

EC-3583. A communication from the Director, Defense Security Assistance Agency, reporting, pursuant to law, concerning the Department of the Air Force's proposed Letter of Offer to Iran for Defense articles estimated to cost in excess of \$25 million; to the Committee on Armed Services.

EC-3584. A communication from the Director, Defense Security Assistance Agency, reporting, pursuant to law, concerning the Department of the Air Force's proposed Letter of Offer to Spain for Defense Articles estimated to cost in excess of \$25 million; to the Committee on Armed Services.

EC-3585. A communication from the Secretary of the Treasury, transmitting, pursuant to law, the Sixth Annual Report and Final Report of the Emergency Loan Guarantee Board, covering the period October 1, 1976, through January 31, 1978; to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs.

EC-3586. A communication from the Comptroller General of the United States, transmitting, pursuant to law, a report entitled "Amtrak's Subsidy Needs Cannot be Reduced Without Reducing Services," May 11, 1978; to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation.

EC-3587. A communication from the President, United States Railway Association, transmitting, pursuant to law, a report concerning expenditures and uses of funds, status of projects and a projection of activities proposed for the next quarter; to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation.

### REPORTS OF COMMITTEES DURING THE RECESS

Under the authority of the order of Thursday, May 11, 1978, the following reports of committees were filed on May 12, 1978, during the recess:

By Mr. SPARKMAN, from the Committee on Foreign Relations, with amendments:

H.R. 11877. An act to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1979 for the Peace Corps and to make certain changes in the Peace Corps Act (Rept. No. 95-807).

By Mr. ABOUREZK, from the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, with an amendment:

S. 975. A bill to improve the administration of the National Park System (Rept. No. 95-808).

S. 2566. A bill to amend the Pennsylvania Avenue Development Corporation Act of 1972 to authorize appropriations and borrowings from the U.S. Treasury for further implementation of the development plan for Pennsylvania Avenue between the Capitol and the White House, and for other purposes (Rept. No. 95-809).

By Mr. BUMPERS, from the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, with an amendment:

S. 2820. A bill to authorize the Secretary of the Interior to construct, restore, operate, and maintain new or modified features at existing Federal reclamation dams for safety of dams purposes (Rept. No. 95-810).

By Mr. ABOUREZK, from the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, with an amendment and an amendment to the title:

S. 2876. A bill to provide for increase in appropriations ceilings, for development ceilings, land acquisition for boundary changes in certain units of the National Park System, and for other purposes (Rept. No. 95-811).

H.R. 8336. An act to enhance the outdoor recreation opportunities for the people of the United States by expanding the National Park System, by providing access to and within areas of the National Park System, and for other purposes (Rept. No. 95-812).

By Mr. ABOUREZK, from the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, with amendments:

H.R. 11662. An act to provide for the establishment of the Towell National Historical Park in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, and for other purposes (together with minority and additional views) (Rept. No. 95-813).

By Mr. CANNON, from the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, with an amendment:

S. 1896. A bill to amend the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1979 (Rept. No. 95-814).

By Mr. CANNON, from the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, with an amendment and an amendment to the title:

H.R. 10732. An act to authorize appropriations to carry out the Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976 during fiscal years 1979, 1980, and 1981 (Rept. No. 95-815).

By Mr. CANNON, from the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, with an amendment and an amendment to the title:

H.R. 10878. An act to extend until October 1, 1981, the voluntary insurance program provided by sec. 7 of the Fishermen's Protective Act of 1978, and for other purposes (Rept. No. 95-816).

H.R. 11465. An act to authorize appropriations for the U.S. Coast Guard for fiscal year 1979, and for other purposes (Rept. No. 95-817).

By Mr. CANNON, from the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, with an amendment and an amendment to the title:

H.R. 11657. An act to authorize appropriations to carry out the Central, Western, and South Pacific Fisheries Development Act until the close of fiscal year 1983, and for other purposes (Rept. No. 95-818).

By Mr. SPARKMAN, from the Committee on Foreign Relations, without amendment:

S. Res. 450. An original resolution waiving section 402(a) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 with respect to the consideration of H.R. 11877. Referred to the Committee on the Budget.

## REPORTS OF COMMITTEES

The following reports of committees were submitted:

By Mr. HATHAWAY, from the Committee on Human Resources, with amendments:

S. 2915. A bill to amend the Alcohol and Drug Abuse Education Act to extend the authorization of appropriations for carrying out the provisions of such Act, and for other purposes (Rept. No. 95-819).

S. 2916. A bill to amend the Drug Abuse Office and Treatment Act of 1972 to extend the programs of assistance under that Act for drug abuse prevention, education, treatment, and rehabilitation, and for other purposes (Rept. No. 95-820).

By Mr. HATHAWAY, from the Committee on Human Resources, without amendment, without recommendation:

H.R. 10569. An act to amend the Alcohol and Drug Abuse Education Act to extend the authorizations and appropriations for carrying out the provisions of such Act, and for other purposes (Rept. No. 95-821).

By Mr. CRANSTON, from the Committee on Human Resources, with an amendment and an amendment to the title:

S. 2522. A bill to amend title X of the Public Health Service Act to extend appropriations authorizations for five fiscal years (Rept. No. 95-822).

By Mr. CRANSTON, from the Committee on Human Resources, with an amendment:

S. 2617. A bill to authorize appropriations for programs under the Domestic Volunteer Service Act of 1973, to amend such Act to facilitate the improvement of programs carried out thereunder, and for other purposes (Rept. No. 95-823).

S. 2759. A bill to provide for Federal support and stimulation of State, local, and community activities to prevent domestic violence and assist the victims of domestic violence, for coordination of Federal programs and activities pertaining to domestic violence, and for other purposes (Rept. No. 95-824).

By Mr. CRANSTON, from the Committee on Veterans' Affairs, with an amendment and an amendment to the title:

H.R. 5029. An act to amend title 38 of the United States Code in order to authorize contracts with the Republic of the Philippines for the provision of hospital care and medical services to Commonwealth Army veterans and new Philippine Scouts for service-connected disabilities; to authorize the continued maintenance of a Veterans' Administration office in the Republic of the Philippines; and for other purposes (Rept. No. 95-825).

By Mr. STENNIS, from the Committee on Armed Services, with an amendment:

S. 2571. A bill to authorize appropriations during the fiscal year 1979, for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, tracked combat vehicles, torpedoes, and other weapons, and research, development, test and evaluation for the Armed Forces, and to prescribe the authorized personnel strength for each active duty component and of the Selected Reserve of each Reserve component of the Armed Forces and of civilian personnel of the Department of Defense, to authorize the military training student loads, and to authorize appropriations for civil defense, and for other purposes (Rept. No. 95-826).

By Mr. NELSON, from the Select Committee on Small Business, with an amendment:

H.R. 11445. An act to amend the Small Business Act and the Small Business Investment Act of 1958 (Rept. No. 95-827).

H.R. 11713. An act to create a solar energy and energy conservation loan program within the Small Business Administration, and for other purposes (Rept. No. 95-828).

By Mr. BURDICK, from the Committee on Environment and Public Works, with an amendment:

S. 1816. A bill to amend the Public Works and Economic Development Act of 1965 to authorize a program of research, development, and demonstration of guayule rubber production and manufacture as an economic development opportunity for the southwestern States (Rept. No. 95-829).

By Mr. RANDOLPH, from the Committee on Environment and Public Works, with an amendment:

S. 2444. A bill to amend the Act of August 8, 1972 (Public Law 92-367) relating to a national program of inspection of dams (Rept. No. 95-830).

S. 2973. A bill authorizing appropriations to the Secretary of the Interior for services necessary to the nonperforming arts functions of the John F. Kennedy Center for the Performing Arts, and for other purposes (Rept. No. 95-831).

By Mr. RANDOLPH, from the Committee on Environment and Public Works, without amendment:

S. 3072. An original bill to amend the Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act to authorize appropriations for Title I and II for fiscal years 1979 and 1980 (Rept. No. 95-832).

By Mr. BENTSEN, from the Committee on Environment and Public Works, without amendment:

S. 3073. An original bill to amend title 23, United States Code, to authorize Federal-aid highway programs through fiscal year 1980, and for other purposes (Rept. No. 95-833).

By Mr. GRAVEL, from the Committee on Environment and Public Works, with amendments:

S. 2437. A bill to amend the Act of August 8, 1972 (Public Law 92-367) to provide Federal assistance to the States for the development and implementation of effective dam safety programs, in order to protect human life and property (Rept. No. 95-834).

S. 2701. A bill to amend the Water Resources Planning Act (79 Stat. 244, as amended) (Rept. No. 95-835).

S. 2704. A bill to promote a more adequate and responsive national program of water research and development, and for other purposes (Rept. No. 95-836).

By Mr. KENNEDY, from the Committee on Human Resources, with an amendment:

S. 2534. A bill to revise and extend the provisions of title XIII of the Public Health Service Act relating to health maintenance organizations (Rept. No. 95-837).

S. 2450. A bill to extend the assistance programs for community mental health centers and for biomedical research, and for other purposes (Rept. No. 95-838).

S. 2466. A bill to amend the Public Health Service Act to establish the National Institutes of Health Care Research; to extend and revise the assistance programs for health services research and health statistics; to establish the National Center for the Evaluation of Medical Technology, and for other purposes (Rept. No. 95-839).

By Mr. SPARKMAN, from the Committee on Foreign Relations, without amendment:

S. 3074. An original bill to amend the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to authorize development assistance programs for fiscal year 1979, and for other purposes (Rept. No. 95-840).

S. 3075. An original bill to amend the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and the Arms Export Control Act, and for other purposes (Rept. No. 95-841).



S. 3076. An original bill to authorize appropriations for the fiscal year 1979 for the Department of State, the International Communication Agency, and the Board for International Broadcasting, and for other purposes (Rept. No. 95-842).

By Mr. SPARKMAN, from the Committee on Foreign Relations, with amendments and an amendment to the title:

H.R. 11832. An act to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1979 under the Arms Control and Disarmament Act (Rept. No. 95-843).

By Mr. STEVENSON, from the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, without amendment:

S. 3077. An original bill to amend and extend the Export-Import Bank Act of 1945, and for other purposes (together with additional views) (Rept. No. 95-844).

By Mr. KENNEDY, from the Committee on Human Resources, with an amendment:

S. 2410. A bill to amend titles XV and XVI of the Public Health Service Act to revise and extend the authorities and requirements under those titles for health planning and health resources development (together with additional views) (Rept. No. 95-845).

By Mr. NELSON, from the Select Committee on Small Business, without amendment:

S. Res. 451. An original resolution waiving the provisions of section 402(a) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 with respect to H.R. 11445. Referred to the Committee on the Budget.

By Mr. HART, from the Committee on Armed Services, with an amendment and an amendment to the title:

H.R. 4895. An act to amend the Strategic and Critical Materials Stock Piling Act, and for other purposes (Rept. No. 95-846).

By Mr. HART, from the Committee on Armed Services, without amendment:

S. 3079. An original bill to authorize certain construction at military installations, and for other purposes (Rept. No. 95-847).

By Mr. HART, from the Committee on Environment and Public Works, with an amendment and an amendment to the title:

S. 2584. A bill to authorize appropriations to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in accordance with section 261 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and section 305 of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended, and for other purposes (Rept. No. 95-848).

(The remarks of Mr. HART when he filed the above report appear elsewhere in today's proceedings.)

By Mr. ALLEN, from the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry, without amendment, but with an amendment to the title:

S. 3045. A bill to amend the Farm Credit Act of 1971 (85 Stat. 583) to extend the term for production credit association loans to producers or harvesters of aquatic products (Rept. No. 95-849).

By Mr. LEAHY, from the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry, with an amendment:

S. 2391. A bill to extend the Commodity Exchange Act, and for other purposes (Rept. No. 95-850).

By Mr. KENNEDY, from the Committee on Human Resources, with an amendment:

S. 2549. A bill to authorize appropriations for the activities of the National Science Foundation, and for other purposes (together with minority views) (Rept. No. 95-851).

By Mr. KENNEDY, from the Committee on Human Resources, with amendments:

S. 2579. A bill to amend the Public Health Service Act to establish the President's Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research, and for other purposes (Rept. No. 95-852).

By Mr. KENNEDY, from the Committee on Human Resources, without amendment, without recommendation:

H.R. 11400. An act to authorize the appropriations of specified dollar amounts for each of the National Science Foundation's major program areas (and certain subprograms), and to provide requirements relating to periods of availability and transfers of the authorized funds (Rept. No. 95-853).

By Mr. McGOVERN, from the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry, with an amendment and an amendment to the title:

S. 2833. A bill to amend, improve, and clarify the Farmer-to-Consumer Direct Marketing Act of 1976 (Rept. No. 95-854).

By Mr. EAGLETON, from the Committee on Human Resources, with an amendment:

S. 2850. A bill to amend the Older Americans Act to provide for improved programs for the elderly, and for other purposes (Rept. No. 95-855).

By Mr. PELL, from the Committee on Human Resources, with an amendment:

S. 1753. A bill to extend the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, and for other purposes (together with additional views) (Rept. No. 95-856).

By Mr. WILLIAMS, from the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, with an amendment:

S. 2441. A bill entitled the "Federal Public Transportation Act of 1978" (together with additional views) (Rept. No. 95-857).

By Mr. HOLLINGS, from the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, with amendments:

S. 2883. A bill to amend the Communications Act of 1934 to extend and improve the provisions of such Act relating to long-term financing for the Corporation for Public Broadcasting and relating to certain grant programs for public telecommunications, and for other purposes (Rept. No. 95-858).

By Mr. KENNEDY, from the Committee on Human Resources, with amendments:

S. 2416. A bill to amend title VIII of the Public Health Service Act to extend for two fiscal years the program of assistance for nurse training (Rept. No. 95-859).

By Mr. KENNEDY, from the Committee on Human Resources, with an amendment and an amendment to the title:

S. 2474. A bill to amend the Public Health Service Act to extend through the fiscal year ending September 30, 1983, the assistance program for community health centers; migrant health services; to extend through the fiscal year ending September 30, 1981; hemophilia; home health services; to extend through the fiscal year ending September 30, 1979, the assistance programs for comprehensive public health services hypertension programs; disease control programs; venereal disease programs; genetic diseases programs; and lead-based paint programs, and for other purposes (Rept. No. 95-860).

By Mr. CANNON, from the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, with an amendment and an amendment to the title:

S. 2604. A bill to amend the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 and the Motor Vehicle Information and Cost Savings Act to authorize appropriations for fiscal years 1979 and 1980 (Rept. No. 95-861).

By Mr. CANNON, from the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, with an amendment:

H.R. 10823. An act to amend the National Advisory Committee on Oceans and Atmosphere Act of 1977 to authorize appropriations to carry out the provisions of such Act for fiscal year 1979, and for other purposes (Rept. No. 95-862).

S. 2928. A bill to amend the International Investment Survey Act of 1976, and for other purposes (Rept. No. 95-863).

By Mr. SASSER, from the Committee on Governmental Affairs, with an amendment:

S. 990. A bill to amend title 5, United States Code, to provide special allowances to certain physicians employed by the United States in order to enhance the recruitment and retention of such physicians (Rept. No. 95-864).

By Mr. CANNON, from the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, without amendment:

S. 3081. An original bill to amend the Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970 to provide the Secretary of Transportation a longer period within which to assess civil penalties for certain violations, to extend authorizations of appropriations for fiscal year 1979 and 1980 for the rail safety program, and for other purposes (Rept. No. 95-865).

By Mr. MUSKIE, from the committee of conference, submitted a report of the disagreeing votes of the two Houses on the amendment of the House to the concurrent resolution (S. Con. Res. 80) setting forth the congressional budget for the United States Government for the fiscal year 1979 (Rept. No. 95-866).

By Mr. SASSER, from the Committee on Governmental Affairs, with an amendment:

H.R. 3161. An act to amend title 5, United States Code, to improve the basic workweek of firefighting personnel of executive agencies, and for other purposes (Rept. No. 95-867).

H.R. 11003. An act to clarify the authority for employment of personnel in the White House Office and the Executive Residence at the White House, to clarify the authority for employment of personnel by the President to meet unanticipated needs, and for other purposes (Rept. No. 95-868).

By Mr. EAGLETON, from the Committee on Governmental Affairs, with an amendment:

S. 2316. A bill to establish an actuarially sound basis for financing retirement benefits for policemen, firemen, teachers, and judges of the District of Columbia and to make certain changes in such benefits (Rept. No. 95-869).

By Mr. SPARKMAN, from the Committee on Foreign Relations, without amendment:

S. Res. 453. An original resolution waiving section 402(a) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 with respect to the consideration of S. 2075. Referred to the Committee on the Budget.

By Mr. CANNON, from the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, with amendments:

S. 2541. A bill to amend chapter 4 of title 23 of the United States Code to authorize appropriations for certain highway safety programs, and for other purposes (Rept. No. 95-870). (Committee on Environment and Public Works discharged by unanimous consent.)

By Mr. PROXMIRE, from the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, without amendment:

S. 3084. An original bill to amend and extend certain Federal laws relating to housing, community, and neighborhood development and preservation, and related programs, and for other purposes (Rept. No. 95-871).

By Mr. CULVER, from the Committee on Environment and Public Works, with amendments and an amendment to the title:

S. 1140. A bill to encourage and assist the States to develop improved programs for the conservation of nongame species of native fish and wildlife, and for other purposes (Rept. No. 95-872).

By Mr. CULVER, from the Committee on Environment and Public Works, with amendments:

S. 2987. A bill to extend the authority for carrying out conservation and rehabilitation programs on military reservations and certain public lands (Rept. No. 95-873).

S. 2899. A bill to amend the Endangered Species Act of 1973 to establish an Endangered Species Interagency Committee to review certain actions to determine whether exemptions from certain requirements of that act should be granted for such actions (Rept. No. 95-874).

By Mr. CULVER, from the Committee on Environment and Public Works, without amendment:

S. 3083. An original bill to extend the authorizations for the Noise Control Act of 1972, to expand the quiet communities program, and for other purposes (Rept. No. 95-875).

By Mr. CULVER, from the Committee on Environment and Public Works, with an amendment:

H.R. 10884. An act to authorize appropriations to the Council on Environmental Quality for fiscal years 1979, 1980, and 1981 (Rept. No. 95-876).

By Mr. CULVER, from the Committee on Environment and Public Works, with amendments:

H.R. 11302. An act to authorize appropriations for environmental research, development, and demonstrations for the fiscal year 1979, and for other purposes (Rept. No. 95-877).

By Mr. CLARK, from the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry, with an amendment:

S. 2912. A bill to strengthen the economy of the United States through improved loan rates and target prices for producers of wheat, feed grains, and upland cotton (Rept. No. 95-878).

By Mr. LEAHY, from the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry, with an amendment and an amendment to the title:

S. 3033. A bill to authorize and direct the Secretary of Agriculture to provide cooperative forestry assistance to States and others, and for other purposes (Rept. No. 95-879).

S. 3034. A bill to authorize and direct the Secretary of Agriculture to carry out forest and rangeland renewable resources research, to provide cooperative assistance for such research to States and others, and for other purposes (Rept. No. 95-880).

By Mr. LEAHY, from the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry, with an amendment:

S. 3035. A bill to provide for an expanded and comprehensive extension program for forest and rangeland renewable resources (Rept. No. 95-881).

By Mr. TALMADGE, from the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry, without amendment:

S. 2946. A bill to authorize the Secretary of Agriculture to relinquish exclusive legislative jurisdiction over lands or interests under his control (Rept. No. 95-882).

S. 2951. A bill to authorize the Secretary of Agriculture to accept and administer on behalf of the United States gifts or devices of real and personal property for the benefit of the Department of Agriculture or any of its programs (Rept. No. 95-883).

By Mr. McGOVERN, from the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry, without amendment:

S. 3085. An original bill to extend and amend the special supplemental food program and the child care food program, and for other purposes (Rept. No. 95-884).

By Mr. CANNON, from the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, with an amendment:

S. 2788. A bill to amend section 216 of the Regional Rail Reorganization Act of 1973 to authorize the purchase of an additional \$600,000,000 of the series A preferred stock of the Corporation, and for other purposes (Rept. No. 95-885).

S. 2767. A bill to amend section 204 of the Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 1972 to extend the authorization

for appropriations for fiscal years 1979 and 1980 (Rept. No. 95-886).

By Mr. CANNON, from the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation and the Committee on Human Resources, jointly, with an amendment:

H.R. 10822. An act to improve the operations of the national sea grant program, to authorize appropriations to carry out such program for fiscal years 1979 and 1980, and for other purposes (Rept. No. 95-887).

By Mr. CANNON, from the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, with amendment:

H.R. 10730. An act to authorize appropriations to carry out the Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972 during fiscal years 1979, 1980, and 1981 (Rept. No. 95-888).

By Mr. CANNON, from the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, with amendments:

S. 2796. A bill to amend the Consumer Product Safety Act to extend the authorization of appropriations, and for other purposes (Rept. No. 95-889).

By Mr. RANDOLPH, from the Committee on Human Resources, with an amendment and an amendment to the title:

S. 2600. A bill to amend the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 to extend certain programs established in such Act, to establish a comprehensive services program for the severely handicapped, and for other purposes (Rept. No. 95-890).

By Mr. NELSON, from the Committee on Human Resources, with an amendment:

S. 2570. A bill to amend the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act of 1973 to provide improved employment and training services, to extend the authorization, and for other purposes (Rept. No. 95-891).

S. 2090. A bill to extend for three additional years the authorization of titles I, II, III, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, and IX of the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, and for other purposes (Rept. No. 95-892).

## INTRODUCTION OF BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS

The following bills and joint resolutions were introduced, read the first time and, by unanimous consent, the second time, and referred as indicated:

By Mr. ABOUREZK (for himself and Mr. McGOVERN):

S. 3069. A bill to provide that members of the Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux Tribe may request the Secretary of the Interior to acquire certain lands, and to provide that the Tribe shall have a preference right to purchase certain lands held in trust by the United States for tribal members; to the Select Committee on Indian Affairs.

By Mr. ABOUREZK:

S. 3070. A bill for the relief of Valentin Mendoza; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. CURTIS:

S. 3071. A bill to amend title 39 of the United States Code to provide that the United States Postal Service shall not impose any fee in connection with providing change of address services for senders of matter to blind and other handicapped persons; to the Committee on Governmental Affairs.

By Mr. RANDOLPH (from the Committee on Environment and Public Works):

S. 3072. A bill to amend the Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act to authorize appropriations for Titles I and II for Fiscal Years 1979 and 1980; original bill reported and placed on the calendar.

By Mr. BENTSEN (From the Committee on Environment and Public Works):

S. 3073. A bill to amend title 23, United States Code, to authorize Federal-aid highway programs through fiscal year 1980, and

for other purposes; original bill reported and placed on the calendar.

By Mr. SPARKMAN (from the Committee on Foreign Relations):

S. 3074. A bill to amend the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to authorize development assistance programs for fiscal year 1979, and for other purposes; original bill reported and placed on the calendar.

S. 3075. A bill to amend the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and the Arms Export Control Act, and for other purposes; original bill reported and placed on the calendar.

S. 3076. A bill to authorize appropriations for the fiscal year 1979 for the Department of State, the International Communications Agency, and the Board for International Broadcasting, and for other purposes; original bill reported and placed on the calendar.

By Mr. STEVENSON (from the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs):

S. 3077. A bill to amend and extend the Export-Import Bank Act of 1945, and for other purposes; original bill reported and placed on the calendar.

By Mr. JACKSON (by request):

S. 3078. A bill to authorize the Secretary of Energy to enter into cooperative arrangements to contain and to reduce potential radiation exposure from residual radioactive materials, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources.

By Mr. HART (from the Committee on Armed Services):

S. 3079. A bill to authorize certain construction at military installations, and for other purposes; original bill reported and placed on the calendar.

By Mr. ALLEN:

S. 3080. A bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to exclude certain service performed on fishing boats from coverage for purposes of unemployment compensation; to the Committee on Finance.

By Mr. CANNON (from the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation):

S. 3081. A bill to amend the Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970 to provide the Secretary of Transportation a longer period within which to assess civil penalties for certain violations, to extend authorizations of appropriations for fiscal year 1979 and 1980 for the rail safety program, and for other purposes; original bill reported and placed on the calendar.

By Mr. CANNON (for himself, Mr. MAGNUSON, Mr. PEARSON, and Mr. STEVENS) (by request):

S. 3082. A bill to amend the North Pacific Fisheries Act of 1954; to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation.

By Mr. CULVER (from the Committee on Environment and Public Works):

S. 3083. A bill to extend the authorizations for the Noise Control Act of 1972, to expand the quiet communities program, and for other purposes; original bill reported and placed on the calendar.

By Mr. PROXMIER (from the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs):

S. 3084. A bill to amend and extend certain Federal laws relating to housing, community, and neighborhood development and preservation, and related programs, and for other purposes; original bill reported and placed on the calendar.

By Mr. McGOVERN (from the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry):

S. 3085. A bill to extend and amend the special supplemental food program and the child care food program, and for other purposes; original bill reported and placed on the calendar.

## STATEMENTS ON INTRODUCED BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS

By Mr. ABOUREZK (for himself and Mr. McGOVERN):

S. 3069. A bill to provide that members of the Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux



Tribe may request the Secretary of the Interior to acquire certain lands, and to provide that the tribe shall have a preference right to purchase certain lands held in trust by the United States for tribal members; to the Select Committee on Indian Affairs.

#### THE SISSETON-WAHPETON SIOUX TRIBE

● Mr. ABOUREZK, Mr. President, I am introducing legislation to amend the act of October 26, 1974, Public Law 93-491, 88 Stat. 1468, which provides for the Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux Tribe of the Lake Traverse Reservation to consolidate its landholdings in North Dakota and South Dakota. The amendments would authorize the Secretary of the Interior to acquire certain lands for individual members of the Sisseton-Wahpeton Tribe as well as for the tribe itself; and it authorizes the tribe to exercise a first right of purchase with respect to lands held in trust by the United States for tribal members when the lands are offered for sale at public sale or auction.

The amendments to section (1) would allow individual members of the Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux Tribe the same authority as the tribe to acquire land for homesites, businesses or to buy out other heirs. This would permit consolidation and reacquisition of Indian land for individual members as well as for the tribe. And, by reducing the fractionated ownership of allotted land, it would allow the land to be developed and used more efficiently. This land consolidation would rely on voluntary sales and purchases. The lands acquired under these amendments would be held in trust by the U.S. Government for the Indians.

The section 2(b) amendment would provide the tribe with a first right of purchase when individual trust land is for sale at public sale or auction. This proposed amendment will help prevent Indian land from passing out of Indian ownership as well as providing the tribe with another mechanism for acquiring the land base needed for self-sufficiency.

This legislation was proposed by the Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux Tribal chairman, Jerry Flute, and it has the support of the Governor of South Dakota.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill, S. 3069 be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

S. 3069

*Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That (a) the first section of the Act of October 26, 1974, Public Law 93-491, 88 Stat. 1468, is amended—*

- (1) by inserting "or upon the request of any member of the tribe" after "South Dakota" the first place it appears;
- (2) by inserting "for the tribe or member thereof" after "gift, or exchange";
- (3) by inserting "or member thereof" after "available to the tribe"; and
- (4) by inserting "or for the individual member for whom the land is acquired" before the period at the end thereof.

(b) Section 2 of the Act of October 26, 1974, Public Law 93-491, 88 Stat. 1468, is amended by redesignating subsection (b) as subsection (c) and adding after subsection (a) the following new subsection:

"(b)(1) Notwithstanding any other pro-

vision of law, the Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux Tribe of the Lake Traverse Reservation, acting through its governing body or its designated agent, shall have a preference right to purchase any land held by the United States in trust for any member or members of the Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux Tribe offered at public sale or auction. The Tribe shall have thirty (30) days from the date bidding is closed to match the high bid and the terms of the notice of sale."

(d) The amendments made by this Act shall become effective on the date of the enactment of this Act.

By Mr. JACKSON (by request):  
S. 3078. A bill to authorize the Secretary of Energy to enter into cooperative arrangements to contain and to reduce potential radiation exposure from residual radioactive materials, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources.

#### RESIDUAL RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS ACT OF 1978

● Mr. JACKSON, Mr. President, by request, I send to the desk for appropriate reference a bill to authorize the Secretary of Energy to enter into cooperative arrangements to contain and to reduce potential radiation exposure from residual radioactive materials, and for other purposes.

Mr. President, this draft legislation was submitted and recommended by the Department of Energy, and I ask unanimous consent that the executive communication accompanying the proposal from the Secretary of Energy be printed in the RECORD at this point in my remarks.

There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

#### DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY,

Washington, D.C., April 27, 1978.

HON. WALTER F. MONDALE,  
President of the U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I am transmitting herewith a proposed bill to authorize the Secretary of Energy (Secretary) to enter into cooperative arrangements with States to clean up residual radioactive materials in and around inactive uranium mill tailings sites.

This legislation would provide financial assistance to the States of Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, New Mexico, Oregon, Texas, Utah, Wyoming, Pennsylvania and any other States as determined by the Secretary to aid in the stabilization or disposal of such radioactive residues.

These residues resulted from the operation of private plants under procurement contracts with the Federal Government for processing uranium ore for the Manhattan Engineering District and the Atomic Energy Commission ("AEC") from the mid-1940's to 1970. The costs for stabilization or disposal of the radioactive residues or tailings were either not included in the procurement contracts, or were not accomplished to meet current standards for unrestricted use of the sites. Neither the AEC nor its regulatory successor, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission ("NRC") exercised regulatory jurisdiction over these radioactive residues. Licenses which were obtained have been allowed to expire.

As agency regulations and procurement contracts did not require more stringent measures to stabilize or dispose of such residues, neither the Federal Government nor the States have clear legal responsibility for cleaning up the sites. The owners are either unwilling or financially unable to clean up the sites, and the Federal Government does

not have the contractual or regulatory authority to require them to do so. However, the radioactive residues at these sites pose a possible threat to the public through exposure to low levels of radioactivity. For this reason, a joint effort should be undertaken by the Federal Government and the involved States to protect the public health.

The proposed legislation provides for a cooperative Federal/State program in which the Federal Government would pay 75 percent of the direct cost of remedial action, and the States would pay 25 percent. Where the sites are located on Indian lands, the legislation provides for Federal payment of 100 percent of the costs and also for the management of the cleanup program.

The proposed legislation excludes the following classes of sites:

1. Mills licensed by either the NRC or "agreement States", under Section 274 of the Atomic Energy Act. Under NRC's interpretation of the National Environmental Policy Act, NRC has the responsibility under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, to assure that all mills licensed by it to process uranium ore properly clean up and stabilize mill tailings after closure. With respect to mills licensed by "agreement States", control over cleanup and stabilization of mill tailings belongs to the licensing State. This would exclude all mills currently in operation, as well as the inactive Edgemont, South Dakota mill site which is still licensed.

2. Sites owned by the Federal Government. There are two such sites: Monticello, Utah, owned by DOE, and Edgemont, South Dakota, owned by the Tennessee Valley Authority. Since they are federally owned, the States cannot be expected to participate financially in their stabilization.

3. Sites of mills which never had a Government contract. This covers the Ray Point, Texas site owned by Exxon Corporation.

The cost of remedial actions at the inactive uranium mill sites has been estimated to range from \$80 to \$125 million. This variation is due to the remedial alternatives available for the Secretary's determination: Stabilization of the uranium mill tailings on-site, or the more costly removal of the tailings to a more suitable location for long-term stabilization or other disposition.

The Department of Energy currently is surveying a number of additional sites which may require remedial action. When these surveys are completed later this year, we will submit additional proposed legislation if necessary to authorize the appropriate remedial actions.

A \$350 million budget authority and \$3.0 budget outlay has been included in the current fiscal year 1979 DOE budget for activities related to this proposal but not requiring new substantive legislation. A request for an additional \$3.0 million budget authority and \$2.0 million budget outlay to implement the program in fiscal year 1979 is being submitted separately.

Requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act will be adhered to throughout this program. The Environmental Protection Agency will be responsible for prescribing standards and criteria to assure the adequate protection of the public health and safety and the environment in connection with the remedial actions. The NRC will be responsible for implementing and ensuring compliance with these standards and criteria.

The Office of Management and Budget has advised that enactment of this proposed legislation would be in accord with the program of the President.

Sincerely,

JAMES R. SCHLESINGER,  
Secretary.

By Mr. ALLEN:

S. 3080. A bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to exclude certain service performed on fishing boats from

coverage for purposes of unemployment compensation; to the Committee on Finance.

AMENDMENT TO UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION LAW

Mr. ALLEN. Mr. President, I am introducing legislation today which I believe will correct an inequity which presently exists in the Internal Revenue Code with reference to the shrimping industry.

Under the Tax Reform Act of 1976, criteria were established under which certain crewmen would not be considered employees of the owner or operator of the boat. In effect, the Internal Revenue Service has declared shrimp boat crews to be self-employed provided that, first, the crewman does not receive any cash remuneration; second, the crewman receives a share of the boat's catch of fish or a share of the proceeds from the sale of the catch; third, the amount of the crewman's share depends on the amount of the boat's catch; and fourth, the operating crew of the boat is normally made up of fewer than 10 individuals. These criteria were made applicable for purposes of withholding Federal tax and Federal Insurance Contributions Act tax; and consequently exempts the employer—in this case the boatowner or operator.

The inconsistency to which I referred lies in the IRS Code regarding the Federal Unemployment Tax Act. This tax is applicable to employers only. Yet, under this act fisherman employers are exempt from the payment of Federal contributions for unemployment purposes only if the services performed are related to catching halibut or salmon for commercial purposes or the services are performed on a vessel of more than 10 net tons. Shrimp boat owners and operators find themselves paying unemployment taxes on those who under another law are classified as self-employed. Though these are different taxes, there is no reason for inconsistency in exemptions. If a person is considered self-employed under the criteria of the one, there is no reason why an employer should be required to pay unemployment tax on that self-employed individual. Exclusion from coverage under FICA should be extended to mean an exclusion from coverage under FUTA. Either a man is self-employed or he is not. It is inconsistent to declare a man self-employed under one act and claim that same man is an employee under another act.

This legislation would simply amend section 3306(c) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (relating to the definition of employment under the Federal Unemployment Tax Act) by using the same criteria to determine self-employment of the crewman for unemployment tax purposes as used to determine self-employment of the crewman under the Tax Reform Act of 1976; namely:

First. The crewman does not receive any cash remuneration;

Second. The crewman receives a share of the boats' catch of fish or a share of the proceeds from the sale of the catch;

Third. The amount of the crewman's

share depends on the amount of the boats' catch; and

Fourth. The operating crew of the boat is normally made up of fewer than 10 individuals.

Mr. President, this legislation would consequently exclude these boatowners and operators from the excessive burden of paying unemployment tax on those crewmen defined as being self-employed under the Tax Reform Act of 1976, and bring some consistency in the enforcement of and compliance with these two laws. Employers need some relief from excessive Government intervention and regulations. Enactment of my proposal would be tax reform in its purest sense. Tax consistency would be a welcome reform and a welcome relief.

By Mr. CANNON (for himself, Mr. MAGNUSON, Mr. PEARSON, and Mr. STEVENS) (by request):

S. 3082. A bill to amend the North Pacific Fisheries Act of 1954; to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation.

● Mr. CANNON. Mr. President, the bill I am introducing today, by request of the State Department, is the implementing legislation for the newly negotiated protocol amending the International Convention for the High Seas Fisheries of the North Pacific Ocean.

I ask unanimous consent that the bill and the letter of transmittal be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the bill and letter were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

S. 3082

*Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the Pacific Fisheries Act of 1954, P.L. 83-579, as amended by Public Law 92-471 (16 U.S.C. 1021, et seq.) is amended as follows:*

1. Section 2(a) is amended to read:

"'Convention' means the International Convention for the High Seas Fisheries of the North Pacific Ocean with a protocol and annex relating thereto signed at Tokyo May 9, 1952, as amended by the Protocol Amending the International Convention for the High Seas Fisheries of the North Pacific Ocean signed at Tokyo April 25, 1978."

2. Section 2(e) is amended to read:

"'Fishery conservation zone of the United States' means the fishery conservation zone established by Section 101 of the Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976 (16 U.S.C. §§ 1801 et seq.)."

3. A new section 2 (f) is added as follows:

"'Fishing vessel' means any vessel engaged in catching fish or processing or transporting fish loaded in the Convention area, or any vessel outfitted for such activities, or any vessel in normal support of another vessel as described above."

4. A new section 2(g) is added as follows:

"'Permit' means a permit issued by the Secretary of State in cooperation with the Secretary of Commerce under Section 13 of this Act."

5. Section 6 is amended to read:

"APPROVAL OF COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS—The Secretary of State, with the concurrence of the Secretary of Commerce, is authorized to accept or reject, on behalf of the United States, recommendations made by the commission in accordance with Article III, section 1 of the Convention."

6. Section 7 is amended to read:

"The Secretary of Commerce is authorized and directed to administer and enforce all the provisions of the Convention, this chapter, and regulations issued pursuant thereto, except to the extent otherwise provided for in this Act. In carrying out such functions he is authorized and directed, in consultation with the Secretary of the department in which the Coast Guard is operating, to adopt such regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes and objectives of the Convention and this Act, and, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, he may cooperate with the duly authorized officials of the government of any party to the Convention. He shall adopt such regulations on consultation with the United States Section and they shall apply only to stocks of fish in the Convention area north of the parallel of north latitude of 48 degrees and 30 minutes. No such regulations shall apply in the Convention area south of the 49th parallel of north latitude with respect to sockeye salmon (*Oncorhynchus nerka*) or pink salmon (*Oncorhynchus gorbuscha*)."

7. Section 9 is amended to read:

(a) "IN GENERAL.—The provisions of this Act shall be enforced by the Secretary of Commerce and the Secretary of the department in which the Coast Guard is operating. Such Secretaries may, by agreement, on a reimbursable basis or otherwise, utilize the personnel, services, equipment (including aircraft and vessels), and facilities of any other Federal agency, including all elements of the Department of Defense, and of any State agency, in the performance of such duties."

(b) ENFORCEMENT WITHIN THE FISHERY CONSERVATION ZONE OF THE UNITED STATES.—

(1) Any officer who is authorized (by the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of the department in which the Coast Guard is operating, or the head of any Federal or State agency which has entered into an agreement with either such Secretary under subsection (a)) to enforce the provisions of the Convention and this Act may within the fishery conservation zone of the United States—

a. with or without a warrant or other process—

(i) arrest any person, if he has reasonable cause to believe that such person has committed an act prohibited by section 10;

(ii) board, and search or inspect, any fishing vessel which is subject to the provisions of the Convention and this Act;

(iii) seize any fishing vessel (together with its fishing gear, furniture, appurtenances, stores, and cargo) used or employed in, or with respect to which it reasonably appears that such vessel was used or employed in, the violation of any provision of the Convention or this Act;

(iv) seize any fish (wherever found) taken or retained in violation of any provision of the Convention or this Act; and

(v) seize any other evidence related to any violation of any provision of the Convention or this Act;

b. execute any warrant or other process issued by any court of competent jurisdiction; and

c. exercise any other lawful authority.

(2) JURISDICTION OF COURTS.—The district courts of the United States shall have exclusive jurisdiction over any case or controversy arising under the provisions of this Act. Any such court may, at any time—

a. enter restraining orders or prohibitions;

b. issue warrants, process in rem, or other process;

c. prescribe and accept satisfactory bonds or other security; and

d. take such other actions as are in the interest of justice.

(3) FOR PURPOSES OF THIS SECTION.—

a. The term "provisions of this Act" in-



cludes any regulation adopted or permit issued pursuant to this Act, and

b. The term "violation of any provision of this Act" includes (1) the commission of any act prohibited by section 10, and (2) the violation of any regulation or permit, referred to in paragraph (A).

(c) Enforcement in the Convention Area Outside the Fishery Conservation Zone of the United States and Similar Zones of Canada and Japan.

(1) POWERS OF AUTHORIZED OFFICERS.—Any officer who is authorized (by the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of the department in which the Coast Guard is operating, or the head of any Federal or State agency which has entered into an agreement with such Secretaries under subsection a)) to enforce the provisions of the Convention and this Act may in the convention area outside the fishery conservation zone of the United States and similar zones of Canada and Japan.

a. Board any vessel of Canada or Japan fishing for anadromous species and without warrant or process, inspect equipment, logs, documents, catch and other articles and question the persons on board for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of the Convention and this Act.

b. When any such person or fishing vessel is actually engaged in operations in violation of the provisions of the Convention or this Act, or there is reasonable ground to believe was obviously so engaged prior to boarding of such vessel by any authorized official, detain such person or vessel and further investigate the circumstances if necessary. Such person or vessel shall be further detained and shall be delivered as promptly as practicable to the authorized officials of the nation to which such person or vessel belongs in accordance with the provisions of the Convention.

(2) Any officer authorized to enforce the provisions of the Convention and this Act (as provided for in this section) may be directed to attend as witnesses and to produce such available records and files or duly certified copies thereof as may be necessary to the prosecution in Canada or Japan of any violation of the provisions of the Convention or any Canadian or Japanese law for the enforcement thereof when requested by the appropriate authorities of Canada or Japan respectively."

8. Section 10 is amended to read:

"It is unlawful—

(1) for any person—

(a) to violate any provision of the Convention or this Act or any regulation adopted or permit issued pursuant to the Convention or this Act, provided that enforcement shall be carried out in accordance with section 9(b);

(b) to refuse to permit any officer authorized to enforce the provisions of the Convention and this Act (as provided for in section 9) to board a fishing vessel subject to such person's control for purposes of conducting any search or inspection in connection with the enforcement of the Convention or this Act or regulation or permit referred to in subparagraph (a);

(c) to forcibly assault, resist, oppose, impede, intimidate, or interfere with any such authorized officer in the conduct of any search or inspection described in subparagraph (b);

(d) to resist a lawful arrest or detention for any act prohibited by this section;

(e) to ship, transport, offer for sale, sell, purchase, import, export, or have custody, control, or possession of, any fish taken or retained in violation of the Convention or this Act or any regulation or permit referred to in subparagraph (a); or

(f) to interfere with, delay, or prevent, by any means, the apprehension, arrest or detention of another person, knowing that

such other person has committed any act prohibited by this section."

9. Section 11 is amended to read:

"(a) CIVIL PENALTIES.

(1) ASSESSMENT OF PENALTY.—Any person who is found by the Secretary of Commerce, after notice and an opportunity for a hearing in accordance with section 554 of title 5, United States Code, to have committed an act prohibited by section 10 shall be liable to the United States for a civil penalty. The amount of the civil penalty shall not exceed \$25,000 for each violation. Each day of a continuing violation shall constitute a separate offense. The amount of such civil penalty shall be assessed by the Secretary of Commerce, or his designee, by written notice. In determining the amount of such penalty, the Secretary of Commerce shall take into account the nature, circumstances, extent, and gravity of the prohibited acts committed and, with respect to the violation, the degree of culpability, any history of prior offenses, ability to pay, and such other matters as justice may require.

(2) REVIEW OF CIVIL PENALTY.—Any person against whom a civil penalty is assessed under subsection (1) may obtain review thereof in the appropriate court of the United States by filing a notice of appeal in such court within 30 days from the date of such order and by simultaneously sending a copy of such notice by certified mail to the Secretary of Commerce. The Secretary of Commerce shall promptly file in such court a certified copy of the record upon which such violation was found or such penalty imposed, as provided in section 2112 of title 28, United States Code. The findings and order of the Secretary of Commerce shall be set aside by such court if they are not found to be supported by substantial evidence, as provided in section 706(2) of title 5, United States Code.

(3) ACTION UPON FAILURE TO PAY ASSESSMENT.—If any person fails to pay an assessment of a civil penalty after it has become a final and unappealable order, or after the appropriate court has entered final judgment in favor of the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of Commerce shall refer the matter to the Attorney General of the United States, who shall recover the amount assessed in any appropriate district court of the United States. In such action, the validity and appropriateness of the final order imposing the civil penalty shall not be subject to review.

(4) COMPROMISE OR OTHER ACTION BY SECRETARY OF COMMERCE.—The Secretary of Commerce may compromise, modify, or remit, with or without conditions, any civil penalty which is subject to imposition or which has been imposed under this section.

(b) CRIMINAL OFFENSES.—

(1) OFFENSES.—A person is guilty of an offense if he commits any act prohibited by section 10(1) (b), (c), (d), or (f).

(2) PUNISHMENT.—Any offense described in subsection (b)(1) is punishable by a fine of not more than \$50,000, or imprisonment for not more than 6 months, or both; except that if in the commission of any such offense the person uses a dangerous weapon, engages in conduct that causes bodily injury to any officer authorized to enforce the provisions of this Act, or places any such officer in fear of imminent bodily injury, the offense is punishable by a fine of not more than \$100,000, or imprisonment for not more than 10 years, or both.

(3) JURISDICTION.—There is Federal jurisdiction over any offense described in this section.

(c) CIVIL FORFEITURES.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Any fishing vessel (including its fishing gear, furniture, appurtenances, stores, and cargo) used, and any

fish taken or retained, in any manner, in connection with or as a result of the commission of any act prohibited by section 10 shall be subject to forfeiture to the United States. All or part of such vessel may, and all such fish shall, be forfeited to the United States pursuant to a civil proceeding under this section.

(2) JURISDICTION OF COURTS.—Any district court of the United States which has jurisdiction under section 9(b)(3) shall have jurisdiction, upon application by the Attorney General on behalf of the United States, to order any forfeiture authorized under subsection (1) and any action provided for under subsection (4).

(3) JUDGMENT.—If a judgment is entered for the United States in a civil forfeiture proceeding under this section, the Attorney General may seize any property or other interest declared forfeited to the United States, which has not previously been seized pursuant to this Act or for which security has not previously been obtained under subsection (d). The provisions of the customs laws relating to—

a. the disposition of forfeited property,  
b. the proceeds from the sale of forfeited property,  
c. the remission or mitigation of forfeitures, and

d. the compromise of claims, shall apply to any forfeiture ordered, and to any case in which forfeiture is alleged to be authorized, under this section, unless such provisions are inconsistent with the purposes, policy, and provisions of this Act. The duties and powers imposed upon the Commissioner of Customs or other persons under such provisions shall, with respect to this Act, be performed by officers or other persons designated for such purpose by the Secretary of Commerce.

(4) PROCEDURE.—a. Any officer authorized to serve any process in rem which is issued by a court having jurisdiction under section 9(b)(3) shall—

(i) stay the execution of such process; or  
(ii) discharge any fish seized pursuant to such process;

upon the receipt of a satisfactory bond or other security from any person claiming such property. Such bond or other security shall be conditioned upon such person (1) delivering such property to the appropriate court upon order thereof, without any impairment of its value, or (ii) paying the monetary value of such property pursuant to an order of such court. Judgment shall be recoverable on such bond or other security against both the principal and any sureties in the event that any condition thereof is breached, as determined by such court.

b. Any fish seized pursuant to this Act may be sold, subject to the approval and direction of the appropriate court, for not less than the fair market value thereof. The proceeds of any such sale shall be deposited with such court pending the disposition of the matter involved.

(5) REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION.—For purposes of this section, it shall be a rebuttable presumption that all fish found on board a fishing vessel which is seized in connection with an act prohibited by section 10 were taken or retained in violation of the Convention and this Act.

10. Section 12 is deleted.

11. Section 13 is redesignated as Section 12 and subsection (b) is amended to read:

"Such funds as shall be made available to the Secretary of Commerce for research and related activities shall be expended to carry out the program of the Commission in accordance with the recommendations of the United States Section and to carry out other research and observer programs established pursuant to the Convention."

A new subsection (c) is added as follows:

(c) There are authorized to be appropriated to the Secretary of Commerce, for purposes of carrying out the provisions of Section 14, such sums not to exceed \$1,000,000 for fiscal year 1979 and such sums as may be necessary for fiscal year 1980.

12. A new section 13 is added as follows:

**"SECTION 13. PERMITS.—**

(a) Every Canadian or Japanese fishing vessel which is authorized to fish in the fishery conservation zone of the U.S. pursuant to the Convention shall have on board a registration permit issued pursuant to subsection (b).

(b) The Secretary of State, in cooperation with the Secretary of Commerce, shall issue annually a registration permit for each Canadian or Japanese fishing vessel which is authorized to fish within the fishery conservation zone of the United States pursuant to the Convention. Each such permit shall set forth the terms and conditions contained in the Convention that apply with respect to such operations, and shall include the additional requirements that the owner or operator of the fishing vessel for which the permit is issued shall comply with any regulations issued under section 14(b)(2) of this Act and shall prominently display such permit in the wheelhouse of such vessel and show it, upon request, to any officer authorized to enforce the provisions of the Convention or this Act (as provided for in section 6 of this Act). The Secretary of State, after consultation with the Secretary of Commerce and the Secretary of the department in which the Coast Guard is operating, shall prescribe the form and manner in which applications for registration permits may be made, and the forms of such permits. The Secretary of State may establish, require the payment of, and collect fees for registration permits; except that the level of such fees shall not exceed the administrative costs incurred by him in issuing such permits.

(c) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, Canadian and Japanese fishing vessels authorized to fish outside the fishery conservation zone of the United States pursuant to the Convention for anadromous species shall not be required to obtain any permit relating to such species.

13. A new section 14 is added as follows:

**SECTION 14. MARINE MAMMALS.—**

(a) **POLICY.**—The objects and purposes of the Convention shall be interpreted to include not only the protection of North American salmon, but also the establishment and implementation of measures directed toward the determination of the effect of the Japanese salmon fishery on marine mammal populations and the reduction or elimination of the incidental taking of marine mammals.

(b) **RESEARCH AND REDUCTION OF INCIDENTAL TAKING.**—The Secretary of Commerce is authorized and directed to take those actions he determines to be necessary and appropriate to assure that the provisions of the Convention relating to marine mammal research and the reduction or elimination of the incidental taking of marine mammals are fully implemented including, but not limited to: (1) placement of duly authorized agents on board Japanese fishing vessels for the purpose of making scientific observations and studies relating to the incidental taking of marine mammals pursuant to the terms of the Convention; and (2) in conformity with the provisions of the Convention, adoption of regulations governing the incidental taking of marine mammals by Japanese fishing vessels within the fishery conservation zone of the United States, including provisions for the collection of biological material and data on all marine mammals incidentally taken within the fishery conservation zone of the United States and the use of such gear and fishing techniques to reduce or eliminate such incidental taking as are determined to be feasible, based upon the results of the research program conducted pursuant to the Convention and this Act.

(c) **INTERNATIONAL.**—In order to insure the full implementation of the objects and purposes of this Convention, the Secretary of State shall request from the Government of Japan a full report each year of the activities undertaken by the Government of Japan relating to marine mammal research and the reduction or elimination of the incidental taking of marine mammals under the Convention and consider the negotiation of additional measures to fulfill these objects and purposes.

(d) The Secretary of Commerce, in consultation with the Secretary of State, shall submit to the Congress on May 1, 1979, and May 1, 1980, and thereafter as requested by Congress, a report detailing the steps taken to implement the Convention, the results of all research and statistical reporting and analysis carried out pursuant to the Convention and a description of all enforcement activities and their disposition. The report shall include estimates of the magnitude of incidental taking of Dall's porpoise (*Phocoenoides dalli*) by Japanese fishing vessels, estimates, as possible, of the abundance, distribution, recruitment rates, status, trends, and impacts of incidental taking upon the optimum sustainable populations of Dall's porpoises, and any proposals for adoption of fishing gear or techniques designed to reduce or eliminate such incidental taking. If available information is inadequate to provide the basis for such estimates or proposals, the report shall include an indication of what research efforts are needed to provide the requisite information. A copy of the report requested from the Government of Japan pursuant to subsection (c) shall be appended to the report of the Secretary of Commerce.

(e) During the research period ending June 9, 1981, permit requirements of United States law relating to the incidental taking of marine mammals in the fishery conservation zone shall be imposed in accordance with paragraph 1(c) of the Annex to the Convention provided, however, that if the Secretary of Commerce finds:

(1) as a result of the research program conducted pursuant to the Convention and this Act, that the populations of Dall's porpoise or any other marine mammals affected by such incidental taking are below their optimum sustainable population and are not trending upward toward such level or are trending downward or are in danger of depletion; or

(2) that the contemplated research efforts cannot be successfully implemented or that necessary and desirable potential reductions or elimination of incidental taking of marine mammals, although feasible, are not being realized,

the Secretary of Commerce shall, through the Secretary of State, immediately initiate negotiations with the Government of Japan to modify the Convention or recommend such other action as is necessary to limit or eliminate the incidental taking of marine mammals to the extent feasible and, in any event, to the extent required to assure that such populations attain and remain at their optimum sustainable population levels.

14. A new section 16 is added as follows:

**SEC. 16. AUTHORIZATION TO ADMINISTER ACT ON A PROVISIONAL BASIS.**—The Executive Branch is authorized to administer the Act consistent with the terms of the Convention on a provisional basis pending the exchange by all the Contracting Parties of instruments of ratification or approval of the Protocol in accordance with Article II thereof.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,  
Washington, D.C., May 9, 1978.

HON. WALTER F. MONDALE,  
President, U.S. Senate.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: The Department of State, in consultation with the Department of Commerce, the Department of Transportation (the Coast Guard), and the Marine Mammal Commission, has concluded that

legislation is needed to implement the Protocol Amending the International Convention for the High Seas Fisheries of the North Pacific Ocean, signed by representatives of the Governments of the United States, Canada and Japan at Tokyo, April 25, 1978.

We have prepared draft legislation which we transmit herewith and request that it be enacted into law. The draft legislation is in the form of amendments to the North Pacific Fisheries Act of 1954 (16 U.S.C. §§ 1021, et. seq.), the implementing legislation for the existing International Convention for the High Seas Fisheries of the North Pacific Ocean.

The Protocol provides for the extensive amendment of the existing International Convention for the High Seas Fisheries of the North Pacific Ocean signed on May 9, 1952. Under the Protocol salmon of North American origin will receive substantially greater protection than is afforded under the existing Convention.

The legislation will conform United States domestic law with the rights and obligations of the United States under the Protocol. The legislation will, for instance, provide the appropriate Executive departments with enforcement authority consistent with the terms of the Convention, including authority to board vessels of Japan fishing for salmon beyond the U.S. fishery conservation zone to investigate compliance with the Convention.

The Protocol will enter into force when the three contracting governments exchange instruments of ratification or approval. Completion of ratification or approval processes in all three countries may require considerable time. Because of the greater protection for salmon of United States origin provided by the Protocol, it is in the United States interest for Japan to abide by the terms of the Protocol prior to its formal entry into force. To expect such cooperation from Japan, the United States must be in a position to reciprocate. Accordingly, the legislation will authorize the appropriate Executive departments to act consistently with the terms of the Protocol pending its entry into force.

Under the Protocol, the season for Japanese salmon fishing in the United States fishery conservation zone will begin on June 9. It is critical that the necessary enforcement and permit provisions be in place by that time. For this reason and because of the benefits to United States fishery interests provided by the Protocol, we respectfully request consideration of this legislation at the earliest possible date.

The Office of Management and Budget has advised that there is no objection to the presentation of this legislation to the Congress and that its enactment would be consistent with the Administration's objectives.

Sincerely,

DOUGLAS J. BENNET, Jr.,  
Assistant Secretary for  
Congressional Relations.●

**ADDITIONAL COSPONSORS**

S. 224

At the request of Mr. INOUYE, the Senator from South Dakota (Mr. McGovern), the Senator from Ohio (Mr. METZENBAUM), the Senator from Idaho (Mr. McCLURE), and the Senator from Utah (Mr. HATCH) were added as cosponsors of S. 224, a bill to amend title 5, United States Code, to allow credit for civil service retirement purposes for time spent by Japanese-Americans in World War II internment camps.

S. 551

At the request of Mrs. HUMPHREY, the Senator from Montana (Mr. PAUL G. HATFIELD) was added as a cosponsor of S. 551, the Victims of Crime Act.



S. 1140

At the request of Mr. HART, the Senator from Rhode Island (Mr. PELL) was added as a cosponsor of S. 1140, the Federal Aid in Non-Game Fish and Wildlife Conservation Act.

S. 2192

At the request of Mrs. HUMPHREY, her name was added as a cosponsor of S. 2192, a bill to provide grants to community agencies to use vacant and unused schools for community-based service programs.

S. 2378

At the request of Mr. INOUE, the Senator from Minnesota (Mrs. HUMPHREY), and the Senator from South Dakota (Mr. McGOVERN) were added as cosponsors of S. 2378, a bill to increase the amount of funds available for Native American employment and training programs.

S. 2437

At the request of Mr. McCURE, the Senator from Minnesota (Mr. ANDERSON), the Senator from Wyoming (Mr. HANSEN), the Senator from California (Mr. HAYAKAWA), the Senator from South Dakota (Mr. MCGOVERN), the Senator from Michigan (Mr. RIEGLE), the Senator from New Mexico (Mr. SCHMITT), and the Senator from Alaska (Mr. STEVENS) were added as cosponsors of S. 2437, a bill to amend the act of August 8, 1972 (Public Law 92-367) to provide Federal assistance to the States for the development and implementation of effective dam safety programs.

S. 2534

At the request of Mr. SCHWEIKER, the Senator from California (Mr. CRANSTON) was added as a cosponsor of S. 2534, the Health Maintenance Organization Act Amendments of 1978.

S. 2617

At the request of Mr. CRANSTON, the Senator from New York (Mr. JAVITS) was added as cosponsor of S. 2617, the Domestic Volunteer Service Act Amendments of 1978.

S. 2724

At the request of Mr. INOUE, the Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. BROOKE) was added as a cosponsor of S. 2724, a bill to require reciprocal access to the courts of a foreign sovereign government by U.S. residents and the U.S. Government to sue for injuries resulting from anticompetitive and restrictive trade practices, and for other purposes.

S. 2744

At the request of Mr. SCHWEIKER, the Senator from Vermont (Mr. LEAHY) was added as a cosponsor of S. 2744, the Rural Health Services Act of 1978.

S. 2747

At the request of Mr. HASKELL, the Senator from New York (Mr. MOYNIHAN) was added as a cosponsor of S. 2747, a bill to provide for a study of methods by which individuals could be aided in filing their Federal income tax returns, as amended.

S. 2825

At the request of Mr. BARTLETT, the Senator from Texas (Mr. TOWER), and the Senator from New York (Mr.

JAVITS) were added as cosponsors of S. 2825, a bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code with respect to certain charitable contributions.

S. 2833

At the request of Mr. ABOUREZK, the Senator from Vermont (Mr. LEAHY) was added as a cosponsor of S. 2833, the Farmer to Consumer Direct Marketing Act of 1978.

S. 2850

At the request of Mr. EAGLETON, the Senator from Maine (Mr. HATHAWAY), the Senator from New York (Mr. JAVITS), the Senator from Rhode Island (Mr. CHAFFEE), the Senator from Vermont (Mr. STAFFORD), and the Senator from California (Mr. CRANSTON) were added as cosponsors of S. 2850, a bill to amend the Older Americans Act to provide for improved programs for the elderly, and for other purposes.

S. 2862

At the request of Mr. HASKELL, the Senator from Ohio (Mr. METZENBAUM) was added as a cosponsor of S. 2862, the Regulatory Control Act.

S. 2867

At the request of Mr. GOLDWATER, the Senator from Alabama (Mr. ALLEN) was added as a cosponsor of S. 2867, a bill to remove residency requirements and acreage limitations applicable to land subject to reclamation law.

S. 2928

At the request of Mr. INOUE, the Senator from Indiana (Mr. BAYH) was added as a cosponsor of S. 2928, a bill to amend the International Investment Survey Act of 1976, and for other purposes.

S. 2929

At the request of Mr. HELMS, the Senator from Texas (Mr. TOWER) was added as a cosponsor of S. 2929, the Taxpayers' Bill of Rights.

S. 2972

At the request of Mr. RANDOLPH, the Senator from Louisiana (Mr. JOHNSTON) was added as a cosponsor of S. 2972, the Opportunities Industrialization Centers and Community-Based Organizations Services Improvement Act.

S. 3033

At the request of Mr. LEAHY, the Senator from Indiana (Mr. LUGAR) was added as a cosponsor of S. 3033, the Cooperative Forestry Assistance Act.

S. 3034

At the request of Mr. LEAHY, the Senator from Indiana (Mr. LUGAR) was added as a cosponsor of S. 3034, the Forest and Rangeland Renewable Resources Research Act.

S. 3035

At the request of Mr. LEAHY, the Senator from Indiana (Mr. LUGAR) was added as a cosponsor of S. 3035, the Renewable Resources Extension Act.

S. 3057

At the request of Mr. RIBICOFF, the Senator from Rhode Island (Mr. CHAFFEE), and the Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. KENNEDY) were added as cosponsors of S. 3057, a bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to provide

relief to residential and certain institutional users of refined petroleum products in the event of a Presidential adjustment of imports of petroleum.

S. RES. 447

At the request of Mr. PEARSON, the Senator from North Dakota (Mr. YOUNG), and the Senator from Minnesota (Mrs. HUMPHREY) were added as cosponsors of S. Res. 447, relating to the importance of increasing agricultural exports from the United States.

S. CON. RES. 79

At the request of Mr. McCURE, the Senator from Missouri (Mr. EAGLETON), the Senator from Colorado (Mr. HASKELL), the Senator from Iowa (Mr. CLARK), and the Senator from South Carolina (Mr. HOLLINGS) were added as cosponsors of S. Con. Res. 79, disapproving proposed regulations of the Department of the Treasury requiring centralized registration of firearms and other matters.

AMENDMENT NO. 1847

At the request of Mr. HART, the Senator from Hawaii (Mr. MATSUNAGA), and the Senator from New Hampshire (Mr. DURKIN) were added as cosponsors of amendment No. 1847, intended to be proposed to S. 2646, the Development Assistance Authorizations.

AMENDMENT NO. 1936

At the request of Mr. CRANSTON, the Senator from Florida (Mr. STONE) was added as a cosponsor to amendment No. 1936 intended to be proposed to S. 2539, to provide a hold-harmless mechanism for the Veterans' Cost-of-Instruction program.

#### SENATE RESOLUTION 450—ORIGINAL RESOLUTION REPORTED DURING THE RECESS WAIVING CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET ACT

Under authority of the order of Thursday, May 11, 1978, Mr. SPARKMAN, on May 12, 1978, from the Committee on Foreign Relations reported the following original resolutions, which was referred to the Committee on the Budget:

S. Res. 450

Resolved, that pursuant to Section 402(c) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, the provisions of Section 402(a) of such Act are waived with respect to the consideration of H.R. 11877 an act to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1979 for the Peace Corps and to make certain changes in the Peace Corps Act. Such waiver is necessary to allow the authorization of \$3,713,000 in additional funds for fiscal year 1978 for Peace Corps programs. The amount previously authorized for the Peace Corps, \$83.9 million for FY 1978 is not adequate to cover the \$2 million in increased costs due to inflation and unanticipated support requirements, for statutory salary increases or the costs of rebuilding the Peace Corps program. The Administration has requested an additional \$3,644,000 to pay for program improvements, primarily in the area of training, and \$69,000 for statutory salary increases.

Compliance with Section 402(a) of The Congressional Budget Act of 1974 was not possible by the May 15, 1977 deadline, because there had been inadequate time for the new Administration to formulate its own proposals for the Peace Corps. Improved training and programming were subsequent-

ly identified as primary needs but implementation of planned improvements will cost more than the \$82.9 million in program funds authorized for FY 1978. Peace Corps did not include a calculation for overseas inflation in its FY 1978 budget request and has consequently confronted difficulties paying for inflationary cost increases.

The effect of defeating consideration of the supplemental authorization will be to delay most program improvements for a full year since the majority of Peace Corps training is conducted in the summer. It will also put a strain upon ongoing operations in the field. There is little or no surplus in other accounts to finance improved training because inflation, together with efforts to rebuild the program have strained all accounts.

The desired authorization will not delay the appropriations process and will not need to be accommodated in a supplemental appropriation.

This authorization is sufficiently small that it will not significantly affect the congressional budget. However, its impact on Peace Corps efforts to improve its program, as advocated by a number of Senators, will be considerable.

#### SENATE RESOLUTION 451—ORIGINAL RESOLUTION REPORTED WAIVING CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET ACT

Mr. NELSON, from the Select Committee on Small Business, reported the following original resolution, which was referred to the Committee on the Budget:

S. RES. 451

*Resolved*, That the provisions of section 402(a) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 are waived with respect to H.R. 11445, an act to amend the Small Business Act and the Small Business Investment Act of 1958.

#### SENATE RESOLUTION 452—SUBMISSION OF A RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING PRINTING

Mr. RIBICOFF submitted the following resolution, which was referred to the Committee on Rules and Administration:

S. RES. 452

*Resolved*, That the committee print of the Committee on Governmental Affairs entitled "Interlocking Directorates Among Major U.S. Corporations" be printed as a Senate document, and that there be printed five hundred additional copies of such document for the use of that committee.

#### SENATE RESOLUTION 453—ORIGINAL RESOLUTION REPORTED WAIVING CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET ACT

Mr. SPARKMAN, from the Committee on Foreign Relations, reported the following original resolution, which was referred to the Committee on the Budget:

S. RES. 453

*Resolved*, that pursuant to Section 402(c) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, the provisions of Section 402(a) of such Act are waived with respect to the consideration of S. 3075 a bill to amend the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and the Arms Export Control Act and for other purposes. Such waiver is necessary to allow the authorization of \$5,000,000 in additional budget authority for fiscal year 1978 for foreign military sales credits. The amount previously authorized for this purpose, \$677,000,000 has proven inadequate for the task of providing sufficient

foreign military sales credits to Lebanon. The Administration has requested an additional \$5,000,000 in budget authority in order to provide \$50,000,000 worth of foreign military sales credits to help rebuild the Lebanese Army.

Compliance with Section 402(a) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 was not possible by the May 15, 1977 deadline, because the political and military situation in Lebanon has worsened since that date.

The effect of defeating consideration of the supplemental authorization will be to reduce the effectiveness of the Lebanese army with possible negative consequences for peace in southern Lebanon and the Middle East region.

The desired authorization will not delay the appropriations process and will need to be accommodated in a supplemental appropriation.

This authorization is sufficiently small that it will not significantly affect the congressional budget. However, a modest and timely foreign military sales program would provide additional stability in southern Lebanon as Israeli forces withdraw from the area.

#### SENATE RESOLUTION 454—SUBMISSION OF A RESOLUTION WITH RESPECT TO PROPOSED SALES OF AIRCRAFT TO THE MIDDLE EAST

Mr. DOLE submitted the following resolution, which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations:

S. RES. 454

Whereas, peace negotiations between Israel and Egypt, which were initiated in January of 1978, have been suspended;

Whereas, disagreements over territorial boundaries, settlements, and provisions for refugees in the Middle East region continue;

Whereas, the potential for an outbreak of hostilities in the Middle East remains a viable threat;

Now, therefore be it,

*Resolved*, That it is the sense of the Senate that the President should delay the issuance of any letter of offer to Israel, Egypt, or Saudi Arabia for the proposed sale of aircraft described in transmittal notices submitted to the Congress on April 28, 1978 (numbered 78-32, 78-33, 78-34, and 78-35), notwithstanding the failure of the Congress to object to such proposed sale pursuant to section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act, until after a comprehensive agreement has been reached establishing peace in the Middle East.

SEC. 2. The Secretary of the Senate shall transmit a copy of this resolution to the President.

● Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, I am submitting today a Senate resolution urging the President to delay delivery of fighter aircraft to Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia, until a more peaceful climate exists in the Middle East region. The resolution does not negate the Senate's action yesterday in giving tacit approval to the President's arms sales proposals for these three countries. The resolution in no way attempts to block the sales or to detract from the President's authority in this regard.

Instead, my resolution would simply express the "the sense of the Senate" that the President should hold up on the actual delivery of the fighter aircraft—whose terms will be laid out in the letters of offer—until some form of a comprehensive settlement is achieved in the Middle East. In this way, the F-15's, F-16's, and F-5's provided under the current arms sales package could not be used to exacerbate the present tensions

in the region. Instead, the sales could actually help expedite achievement of a comprehensive settlement if delivery is contingent upon it.

I have been advised by the Defense Security Assistance Agency, at the Department of Defense, that projected delivery dates for the aircraft will be contained within the President's letters of offer, which are to be extended to Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia once congressional approval is secured.

Consequently, once the President issues the letters of offer, the United States may be committed to the delivery dates outlined in the proposals submitted to Congress.

Those dates are, for the RECORD, as follows:

Fifty F-5's to Egypt, beginning during the third quarter of CY 1978, followed by deliveries through CY 1981.

Seventy-five F-16's to Israel, to be delivered during FY 1983.

Fifteen F-15's to Israel, scheduled to be delivered in FY 1981 and FY 1982.

Sixty F-15's to Saudi Arabia, with deliveries beginning in 1981 and extending through 1984.

Therefore, Mr. President, I propose that the Senate call upon the President to delay the issuance of the letters of offer to these three countries until a "comprehensive agreement" on peace has been reached in the Middle East.

#### COMPREHENSIVE PEACE SETTLEMENT

The precondition of a "comprehensive agreement" on peace is intentionally ambiguous, to give the President some flexibility in determining what would constitute a "comprehensive settlement." It is not this Senator's desire to delineate specific settlement terms or to specify which parties must necessarily participate in such an agreement. But it would seem, at the very least, that a "comprehensive Middle East peace agreement" should involve the three nations in question: Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia.

Ideally, the peace settlement would include other nations in the area as well: Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon. In fact, there is ample reason to suspect that the Saudi's could help lead these other nations to the peace table, and that is exactly what one might hope this resolution would help accomplish. It is reasonable to believe that both Egypt and Saudi Arabia would lend their best efforts to bringing all Arab nations into a comprehensive peace agreement if aircraft sales to those countries were contingent upon it.

But, almost any concept of a Middle East "peace settlement" would reflect an improved climate over what exists now. My intention is not to postpone the transactions indefinitely, but to carry them out in a more stable and tranquil period when peace will not be jeopardized by the influence of large weapons.

If the Senate goes on record at this time in support of postponing deliveries until a peace settlement is reached, two objectives can be realized: We will prevent the use of any of these aircraft to undermine the fragile conditions for peace which now exist in the Middle East; and we will exert some leverage toward bringing all affected parties back to the bargaining table for peace negotia-



tions. The resolution would not be binding upon the President, but a strong show of support by this body would, I believe convince the President that he should delay the transactions that will commit us to specific delivery dates.●

#### AMENDMENTS SUBMITTED FOR PRINTING

#### CIVIL SERVICE REFORM ACT OF 1978—S. 2640

AMENDMENT NO. 2084

(Ordered to be printed and referred to the Committee on Governmental Affairs.)

Mr. RIBICOFF (for himself, Mr. PERCY, Mr. SASSER, and Mr. JAVITS) submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by them, jointly, to the bill (S. 2640), to reform the civil service laws.

● Mr. RIBICOFF. Mr. President, along with the Senator from Illinois (Mr. PERCY), the Senator from New York (Mr. JAVITS), and the Senator from Tennessee (Mr. SASSER), I am introducing an amendment to S. 2640, the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978. This amendment was transmitted to the Committee on Governmental Affairs by OMB Director James T. McIntyre, Jr., and Alan Campbell, Chairman of the Civil Service Commission. It would propose to set forth in statute the principles which have guided labor-management relations in the Federal sector since 1962. I ask unanimous consent that the letter of transmittal appear in the RECORD at this point.

There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

WASHINGTON, D.C.,  
May 10, 1978.

HON. ABRAHAM A. RIBICOFF,  
Chairman, Committee on Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: On March 2, 1978, the President submitted the bill to reform the civil service laws titled the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978. As originally submitted, the bill contained no provision on the labor-management relations program.

The President believes the time has come to give Federal labor-management relations the stature and stability of law by inclusion in the civil service reform bill. Accordingly, we are transmitting herewith our proposed amendment to incorporate "Labor-Management Relations" as Title VII in the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978. Sections 701-705 of the civil service reform bill would thereby be renumbered 801-805 as Title VIII "Miscellaneous."

The new Title VII would place the basic, well-tested provisions, policies and approaches of Executive Order 11491, as amended, into law and provide that the independent Federal Labor Relations Authority and its General Counsel set up by the Reorganization Plan, administer the program. It would also align reserved management rights with current practice, authorize negotiation of an expanded coverage for grievance arbitration, provide specific remedial authority and subpoena power, and spell out in greater detail the obligation to bargain in good faith. Inclusion of the Executive order program, with these revisions, in civil service reform legislation will complement our other proposals in accomplishing the overall objectives of civil service reform.

We look forward to working with you and

the Committee in moving this legislation quickly.

Sincerely,

ALAN K. CAMPBELL,  
Chairman, Civil Service Commission.  
JAMES T. MCINTYRE, JR.,  
Director, Office of Management and Budget.●

● Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, 2 months ago, I joined with my colleagues, Senators RIBICOFF, SASSER, and JAVITS in cosponsoring the administration's Civil Service Reform Act in the Senate. I took this step to express my support for the objectives of civil service reform, and to aid in the most expeditious consideration of the vital issues contained in that proposal.

At that time, however, those civil service proposals remained in an incomplete form, lacking suggestions to provide reform of the labor relations aspects of Federal personnel management.

We have now received from the administration its proposals in the Federal labor-relations field. Public sector labor relations at the Federal level remain a particularly novel area of law, and these proposals will receive the same objective scrutiny that other committee members and I have accorded the balance of the civil service reform package. However, in the same spirit of cooperation and expedition with which we first sponsored S. 2640 2 months ago, I am also cosponsoring this amendment to facilitate committee consideration of the entire reform package.●

#### LABOR LAW REFORM ACT OF 1978—S. 2467

AMENDMENT NO. 2085

(Ordered to be printed and to lie on the table.)

Mr. INOUE submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill (S. 2467) to amend the National Labor Relations Act to strengthen the remedies and expedite the procedures under such Act.

● Mr. INOUE. Mr. President, today I am submitting an amendment to S. 2467, a bill to amend the National Labor Relations Act, which would assure that essential maritime transportation is provided, especially to our "noncontiguous States" in the Pacific Basin.

Since World War II, more than 4 years' time has been lost through transportation strikes affecting Hawaii, and of the eight strikes involved, only one was centered in Hawaii. In July of 1975, after extensive hearings and debate, the Senate passed by a vote of 58 to 39 necessary legislative relief. Unfortunately, the U.S. House of Representatives did not act favorably upon this measure. Accordingly I have now decided to again bring a similar measure to the Senate floor as it is untenable for the residents of island "communities" such as Hawaii to continue to have to live under the constant threat of maritime strikes that are out of their control. It should be clear that any prolonged interruption of maritime transportation upon which the residents of those States are almost totally dependent for food, energy supplies, and other necessities, threatens the economic well-being, job security, health, and safety of these persons. Indeed, such a condition is an undue

burden on commerce. By this act the Congress will authorize and direct the Secretary of Commerce to assure that this essential transportation is provided.

I ask unanimous consent that the text of this amendment be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the amendment was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

#### AMENDMENT NO. 2085

On page 22, strike section 14 and insert in lieu thereof the following:

SEC. 14. To regulate certain interstate commerce and to assure that essential maritime transportation is provided, and for other purposes.

That this act may be cited as the "Essential Maritime Transportation Act of 1977."

(A) DECLARATION OF POLICY.—The Congress finds and declares that the economic well-being of noncontiguous States, and the job security, health, and safety of the residents of those States, are almost totally dependent upon the transportation by water to such States of food, energy supplies, and other necessities from the contiguous States. Any prolonged interruption of this essential maritime transportation threatens this well-being, job security, health, and safety and constitutes an undue burden on commerce. It is the purpose of the Congress in this Act to authorize and direct the Secretary of Commerce to assure that essential maritime transportation is provided in the event of any such interruptions.

(B) DEFINITIONS.—As used in this act:

(1) The term "chief executive officer" means the Governor or, with respect to the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, the High Commissioner.

(2) The term "contiguous States" means the 48 States of the United States which are physically connected to one another.

(3) The term "essential maritime transportation" means any transportation by water between any port or place in a noncontiguous State and other port or place in the United States, of food, energy supplies, consumer goods, or equipment and material necessary for employment.

(4) The term "interruption" means any cessation or other suspension in the provision of essential maritime transportation, whether caused by any natural disaster, war, national emergency, explosion or other property destruction, labor-management disagreement, or other natural or manmade occurrence.

(5) The term "noncontiguous State" means Alaska, Hawaii, Guam, American Samoa, the Northern Mariana Islands, and the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands.

(6) The term "Secretary" means the Secretary of Commerce or his designee, including the Administrator of the Maritime Administration.

(C) NECESSARY MARITIME TRANSPORTATION CONTINUATION.—Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Secretary shall, in the event of a prolonged interruption in the provision of essential maritime transportation and upon the request of the chief executive officer of an affected noncontiguous State, take any action authorized in this section, whichever is most appropriate, and shall take such other steps as are necessary, to provide for essential maritime transportation. The Secretary may, in case of any interruption of more than 5 days in duration—

(1) activate and direct any vessel of the national defense reserve fleet to provide, or to assist in providing, essential maritime transportation;

(2) request any other officer, or any department, agency, or instrumentality, of the Federal Government to make available on a nonreimbursable basis any personnel, service, or facility which the Secretary deems necessary, for use in providing essential maritime transportation;

(3) commence, on an emergency basis, a civil action in any appropriate court of the United States for an order that may terminate, or assist in terminating, such interruption; or

(4) take any other lawful action which he deems appropriate as a means of terminating such interruption or otherwise providing for essential maritime transportation.

The courts of the United States shall, notwithstanding any other provision of law, have jurisdiction to issue an order requested by the Secretary in an action under this section upon a finding by the court that (A) such order is necessary to assure the provision of essential maritime transportation; and (B) no practicable alternative to such order, which is likely to result in the prompt provision of such transportation, is available. All other Federal departments, agencies, and instrumentalities shall, in consultation with and with the assistance of the Secretary, utilize their authorities under other provisions of law in furtherance of the purpose of this Act, including but not limited to, complying with requests made under paragraph (2).

Sec. 15. Except as otherwise specifically provided in this Act, the amendments made by this act shall take effect sixty days after the date of enactment of this act.

#### AMENDMENTS NOS. 2086 THROUGH 2090

(Ordered to be printed and to lie on the table.)

Mr. HELMS submitted five amendments intended to be proposed by him to the bill (S. 2467), *supra*.

#### AMENDMENT NO. 2091

(Ordered to be printed and to lie on the table.)

Mr. HEINZ submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill (S. 2467), *supra*.

#### AMENDMENTS NOS. 2092 THROUGH 2106

(Ordered to be printed and to lie on the table.)

Mr. THURMOND submitted 15 amendments intended to be proposed by him to the bill (S. 2467), *supra*.

### NATIONAL CAR CARE MONTH— S.J. RES. 126

#### AMENDMENT NO. 2107

(Ordered to be printed and referred to the Committee on the Judiciary.)

Mr. CURTIS submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to Senate Joint Resolution 126, to authorize the President to proclaim the month of May 1978 as "National Car Care Month."

### NOTICES OF HEARINGS

#### COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES

● Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, I would like to announce for the information of the Senate and the public, the scheduling of an informational hearing before the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee.

The hearing is scheduled for May 22, 1978, beginning at 2:30 p.m. in room 3110, Dirksen Senate Office Building. Testimony is invited regarding this informational hearing on the proposed Guam Constitution, which was transmitted to the Congress by the President

in accordance with the provisions of section 5 of the act of October 21, 1976 (Public Law 94-584).

For further information regarding the hearing you may wish to contact Mr. James Beirne, of the committee staff on extension 4-2564. Those wishing to submit a written statement for the hearing record should write Mr. James Beirne, Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee, 3106 Dirksen Senate Office Building, Washington, D.C. 20510.

#### COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE, NUTRITION, AND FORESTRY

● Mr. TALMADGE. Mr. President, I wish to announce that the Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry will consider the nomination of David G. Gartner to be a Commissioner of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission on Wednesday, May 17 at 10 a.m. Anyone wishing to testify should contact Denise Love, hearing clerk, at 224-2035.

#### CUSTOMS COURT ACT OF 1978

● Mr. DECONCINI. Mr. President, I wish to announce that open hearings will be held by the Subcommittee on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Committee on the Judiciary on S. 2857, a bill to clarify and revise various provisions of title 28 of the United States Code relating to the judiciary and judicial procedure regarding judicial review of international trade matters, and for other purposes.

The hearings will be held on June 23 and 27, 1978, commencing at 9 a.m. in room 4232, Dirksen Senate Office Building.

Persons who wish to testify or submit a statement for inclusion in the Record should communicate, as soon as possible, with the subcommittee, 6306 Dirksen Senate Office Building, Washington, D.C. 20510.

#### DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION HEARINGS

● Mr. RIBICOFF. Mr. President, the Committee on Governmental Affairs will continue its consideration of S. 991, a bill to establish a separate, Cabinet-level Department of Education in the Federal Government, on Wednesday, May 17, 1978, at 10 a.m. in room 3302 of the Dirksen Building.

The Honorable James T. McIntyre, Director of the Office of Management and Budget, will appear before the committee to present the details of the administration's views on the legislation.

#### SUBCOMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATION PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

● Mr. ABOUREZK. Mr. President, I wish to announce that the Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Committee on the Judiciary, will have a meeting to continue markup of pending legislation. The meeting will be on May 17, 1978, at 10 a.m., 155 Russell Building.

#### COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

● Mr. RIBICOFF. Mr. President, the Committee on Governmental Affairs will hold a business meeting on Thursday, May 18, and Wednesday, May 24, to consider and markup S. 2640, the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978.

#### COMMITTEE ON BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs will hold hearings on May 22 and 23, 1978 on our current inflation situation and new anti-inflationary proposals, such as TIP—taxed-based incomes policies. The hearings will be in room 5302 of the Dirksen Senate Office Building.

Inflation is a very serious problem. All the public opinion polls taken recently indicate the great concern that our citizens have with inflation. I have called for these hearings because it has become quite clear that traditional means of stopping inflation, through tight monetary and fiscal policies, have devastating effects on the economy that are unacceptable. If we sit back and shy away from a truly difficult situation, I am afraid that the situation will only get worse, not better. The Congress, the administration, business and labor all have an obligation not to let that happen. If traditional methods will not work, new methods must be found. The solutions are bound to be unpopular and difficult to devise, but they must be sought.

On Monday, May 22, 1978, the committee shall have hearings in both the morning and the afternoon. At 10 a.m. the committee shall hear the testimony of four witnesses: The Honorable Henry C. Wallich, Member, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System; Dr. Arthur Okun, Brookings Institution; the Honorable David Lilly, former Member, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System; and Mr. Emil M. Sunley, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Tax Analysis, Department of the Treasury.

On Monday afternoon beginning at 3 p.m. the committee shall hear the testimony of Ambassador Robert Strauss who the President has appointed as his top anti-inflation spokesman and adviser.

The committee shall meet again on Tuesday morning to receive testimony from four witnesses: Dr. Barry Bosworth, Director, Council on Wage and Price Stability; Prof. Albert Rees, Princeton University, Economics Department; Prof. Sidney Weintraub, University of Pennsylvania, Economics Department; and Prof. Laurence S. Seidman, University of Pennsylvania, Economics Department.

Anyone interested in obtaining additional information about the committee's hearings should contact Steven M. Roberts, chief economist for the committee, at 224-0893.

#### CORRECTION OF NOTICE OF A HEARING

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, I would like to amend a statement I made on May 10 concerning a hearing to be held by the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs.

The committee will hold a 2-day hearing, on the afternoon of Thursday, May 25, at 3 p.m., and on Friday morning, May 26, at 10 a.m., on the interstate land sales program under the administrative jurisdiction of the Department of Housing and Urban Development.

The hearing is being held for the purpose of reviewing the program and also



for the consideration of legislative proposals.

The hearing will be held in room 5302, Dirksen Senate Office Building.

Statements for inclusion in the hearing record are welcome.

#### ADDITIONAL STATEMENTS

##### ASSISTING VICTIMS OF CRIME

● Mrs. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, I am pleased that Senator PAUL HATFIELD from Montana has joined in sponsoring S. 551, the Victims of Crime Act. I submit for the RECORD an important statement by Senator HATFIELD on this legislation.

The statement follows:

STATEMENT OF SENATOR PAUL HATFIELD IN SUPPORT OF S. 551, THE "VICTIMS OF CRIME ACT OF 1978"

Today I am privileged to join twenty of my colleagues sponsoring S. 551, the "Victims of Crime Act of 1978," which would restore some sense of perspective to our criminal justice system by compensating victims of violent crimes in Federal jurisdictions and assist States in funding comparable victim compensation programs.

The distinguished former senior Senator and Majority Leader from my home State of Montana, Mike Mansfield, was long an advocate of the principle of Federal assistance to States in the area of victim compensation and sponsored many bills to give it effect. On April 10, 1975, he stood in this Chamber and said:

There is a striking similarity in rationale and origin, for example, between the idea of compensating victims of crime, assuring them a reasonably safe society in which to live.

The bill now before the Committee on the Judiciary is one of the richest bequests in the great legacy left to us by the late senior Senator from Minnesota, Hubert H. Humphrey. In typically eloquent fashion, he provided to us in clear and unassailable terms the reason why this bill must pass:

The number of violent crimes has increased an astounding 259 percent since 1960. Since 1970, the number of violent crimes has increased by nearly 40 percent. These are crimes in which innocent victims are assaulted, maimed, or murdered. Many of the victims are the poor or the elderly—people who can least afford to be hospitalized or out of work. They make very few demands and very little noise. Yet, the injuries they sustain can be economically devastating . . .

[T]he Federal Government spends almost \$8,000 annually for food, clothing, medical services, psychiatric care, vocational training and general administrative costs for the rehabilitation of violent offenders. Yet we make little effort to provide for the victims of their criminal acts.

The objective of this legislation, quite simply, is to put justice back in "criminal justice." As a practicing trial lawyer, district judge and, most recently, chief justice of the Montana Supreme Court, no one is more aware than I of the horrible social costs of violent crime. Ninety percent of the time, if not more often, we worry about the strain it places upon public resources and general welfare programs and think of new ways to tinker with "the system" to improve its ability to process and warehouse offenders. Overlooked and neglected is the person who suffers the most, in every sense of the word—the victim. His or her miseries begin when the fates conspire to make him or her a statistic. Besides the immediate trauma of per-

sonal confrontation or attack and imminent economic loss, personal injury is normally part of the equation. Adequate psychiatric, emotional and medical attention is beyond the ability of most jurisdictions to give because of the total dedication of scarce resources to catching the perpetrator and beyond the reach of the average victim for the same reason. Loss of wages and burdensome out-of-pocket expenses to meet court dates, which change and compound due to overloaded dockets, are the norm for victims with the stamina to be good citizens and try to spare others the unrequited indignity of the crime they suffered. Once in court, they are confused and misled by plea-bargaining, trial tactics and other legal maneuvering. Bargained pleas, reduced, concurrent and suspended sentences and the possibility of early parole make the prospect of punishment more of a hope than reality. Through the process, the victim is barely remembered, and then only to serve the convenience of its managers. Once the offender has been "processed," the victim is totally forgotten—physically, psychologically and economically scarred, as much if not more so by his or her search for justice as by the crime itself.

S. 551 is the long-needed first step toward righting this gross imbalance. The bill would authorize the Attorney General to make annual grants to States having crime victims' compensation programs which meet minimum criteria to cover 25 percent of the non-administrative costs incurred by any State in compensating a victim of a qualifying criminal act or omission which is criminally punishable under a State statute, and 100 percent of the non-administrative costs incurred by a qualified State in compensating a victim of a criminal act or omission subject to exclusive criminal jurisdiction. Each State determines the crimes which will qualify under its compensation program and Federal funding could be limited to the 25 percent category in most cases. State participation in the program is totally voluntary—a State is not required to establish a victims' compensation program nor must it apply for a grant if it already has such a program in operation. A State seeking funds under the bill would have to establish a program which meets a number of minimum standards set forth in the bill.

This bill is no Federal giveaway. To be eligible for any part of the \$40 million authorized for fiscal 1979, \$50 million for fiscal 1980 or \$60 million for fiscal 1981, an applying State would have to—

(1) adopt a program which offers compensation for personal injury to an individual who suffers the injury as a result of a qualifying crime and which also offers death benefits to surviving dependents of a crime victim whose death is the direct result of the crime;

(2) adopt a program which offers the right of a hearing to aggrieved claimants, with the right to appeal, either administratively or judicially, the initial decision;

(3) adopt a program which includes, as a condition for compensation, that claimants cooperate with law enforcement authorities;

(4) adopt a program which places no limitation based upon the financial means of any claimant;

(5) have in effect a requirement that the appropriate law enforcement agencies inform victims of the compensation program and the procedures for applying for compensation;

(6) have in effect a State law or rule subrogating to the State any right of action which the claimant has against the perpetrator;

(7) agree that it will not require any claimant to participate in any benefit in the

nature of public assistance, unless the participation preceded the crime;

(8) provide for denial or reduction of the claim if the victim or claimant contributed to the injury or death resulting from the crime; and

(9) enact a State law or rule independently requiring the perpetrator of any qualifying crime to make restitution to any victim or surviving dependent of a victim.

Finally, besides the mandatory exclusion of States' administrative costs in making compensatory awards, there are several other noteworthy limitations placed upon the use of Federal funds by the bill. Any amount awarded by the State for pain and suffering or for property loss not related to medical services will be excluded from the Federal grant, and the excess of any amount of a single award over \$50,000 will be excluded. Funds compensating a victim for personal injury or death paid from any other source for the same occurrence are also excluded, as are amounts of compensation for medical expenses paid through health insurance. Compensation for loss of earnings or support under \$100 or based on less than five working days would be excluded from grant entitlement computations as would similar claims paid by a State at a rate greater than \$200 per week. Crimes not reported within 72 hours of occurrence or claims not filed within 1 year after the crime took place could not be compensated with Federal funds.

Every Senator who is concerned about restoring the public's faith in the criminal justice system at both the national and local levels should support this legislation. I have heard it said that this kind of support to victims gives legislative expression to a cynical belief that there is nothing that can be done about crime but pay off the victims when they fall prey to it. I take the opposite view. I believe legislation like this is a positive demonstration to every citizen that he merits at least as much attention as does the criminal when it comes time to invest tax dollars in the protection of society. I urge each and every one of my colleagues to cast a vote for the average citizen and support S. 551, the "Victims of Crime Act of 1978." ●

#### RISKS FOR PEACE

● Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, some newsmen and pundits have begun hailing recent questionable military moves by President Carter as a willingness "to take risks for peace." This has been applied to such actions as those to postpone plans to produce the neutron bomb, cancel the B-1 bomber, and drastically reduce requested funds for bringing our naval strength up to par.

Mr. President, I do not like the idea of a man with limited military experience taking risks with the security of this Nation and the welfare of the free world regardless of how motivated his reasons. In fact, I agree with a recent article by Mr. Michael Novak in the Washington Star which describes the President's actions as a new form of "Soviet Roulette." I ask that this be printed in the RECORD.

The article follows:

WHAT PRICE CARTER'S RISKS FOR PEACE?

President Carter and other good religious men around him appear to be making a religious wager with the security of all of us, a new form of "Soviet Roulette." James Reston has long been a conduit for authoritative statements from the White

House; here is his description of Carter's position on the neutron bomb: "For him, the ever-expanding development of weapons is not only a military and political but a moral question. He is more willing than his colleagues in the Defense Department to take risks for peace. . . ." When Mr. Carter takes "risks for peace," he places all of us in jeopardy. Should he impose his "morality" in this matter on the rest of us? His "morality" on such matters is not reassuring.

Suppose for a moment that Carter misunderstands his enemy. Leonid Brezhnev is not a Christian gentleman. No doubt, he is a nice man, pleasant to his children, a delight to nephews and nieces, an old man who enjoys family holidays. But he also happens to believe that Christianity is devastatingly wrong about human nature. The Soviet state not only has a Manifest Destiny to rule the world, Brezhnev believes, but a moral obligation to do so. His concept of paradise is a world wide Socialist state, whose Five-Year-Plans are made in Moscow.

Mr. Carter should ask Comrade Brezhnev why he has positioned 25,000 tanks along the European front. These are new tanks, heavily armored tanks. They are not, after all, defensive weapons. European nations threaten no attack on anyone.

Mr. Carter, Mr. Vance, and Mr. Warnke, this nation's chief negotiators with the Soviets, seem to imagine that if we "take risks for peace," the Soviets will also disarm, a little. They have given up the B-1 bomber; delayed the neutron bomb; sunk a huge portion of the plans for our own future navy; and rest content with bomber systems built in the 1950's, and with missiles 10 or 20 years deep in rust, dirty grease, and inactivity.

Defense now takes 23 percent of our budget (most of that for salaries and pensions) while welfare consumes 46 percent. We are paying people unemployment benefits, while our military makes do with creaky equipment a generation old. We are doing this while the Soviets grow stronger and bolder day by day.

Suppose that the Soviets are pursuing the opposite course from Carter's. Suppose that they are "taking risks for war." Suppose that cold-eyed generals in the Soviet Union believe that democracies are cowardly at heart. Suppose they see a connection between their growing strength and our growing weakness. Suppose they, too, have a wager: that we are afraid to compete with them. That as they grow bolder, we will grow more timid.

If cold-eyed Soviet strategists are observing the actions of Jimmy Carter, Cyrus Vance, and Paul Warnke, rather than their words, what do they see? Strength? Or weakness?

The actual rhythm of events seems to go like this: The Soviets advance, the U.S. retreats. Carter, Vance, and Warnke must seem to them too nice, the easiest numbers they have ever faced.

Suppose, as well, that the Soviets have good intelligence about the two advisers Mr. Carter trusts most, Hamilton Jordan and Jody Powell. Both these young men, the Soviets know, belong to the Vietnam generation. Neither one saw service in Vietnam. Both are anxious to keep their anti-war credentials straight among their friends. Both have as their primary concern the popularity of the central figure in their lives, Jimmy Carter. Neither has a constitutional obligation to anybody else.

Jody Powell and Hamilton Jordan opposed the building of the neutron bomb, according to published reports, and they prevailed.

Overriding the advice of senior aides ex-

pert in such matters, President Carter has decided to "take risks for peace," based upon the wisdom of Jody Powell and Hamilton Jordan. I don't mind Mr. Carter taking risks for himself. I do not trust his grasp of the security of the rest of us. ●

#### REV. HENRY GRANT

● Mr. HOLLINGS. Mr. President, we hear a lot these days about the "New South," and it is often described in terms of a miracle transformation.

But it was no miracle. The "New South" is simply the "Old South" advanced and enriched by the efforts of committed, hard-working people, and every manifestation of progress we enjoy today—in improved relations between people, in economic vitality, in better education and good government—is the result of individual effort.

I can think of no better example of the individual commitment I speak of than that of the Reverend Henry Grant of Charleston, S.C., an old and dear friend who has become something of an institution in the black and white communities of my hometown. The Reverend Grant was recently the subject of a lengthy story in the News and Courier. He personifies much of the spirit of the thousands of Southerners, white and black, who have built our "New South" and who continue to work for its improvement, and I ask that the article be printed in the Record for the information of my colleagues.

The article follows:

THE REV. HENRY GRANT  
(By Isabella Leland)

When the Rev. Henry Grant came to Charleston 16 years ago he was an outsider not only to the white community, but to the black community as well.

This was in the early days of civil rights legislation, and involvement had not yet become acceptable.

A native of North Augusta, he held a bachelor's degree from Johnson C. Smith University in Charlotte and a Master's Degree from State University of Iowa, both in political science. Equipped with these, he began work in what was then considered the most congested slum area of Charleston, the East Side. It was described as a "forgotten neighborhood"; "a place with no vision," and there seemed little likelihood that one man could effect a change. By 1964 Charleston's police chief Kelly was citing a drop in the crime rate in the area, and today freshly painted houses, improved health, a community medical clinic, tennis courts and a crime rate decreased by 32 percent are some signs of the changes.

Grant credits Mrs. Thomas N. Carruthers, widow of the late Episcopal bishop of South Carolina, for the initial idea. Her husband died before he could implement it, but under the Rt. Rev. Gray Temple her suggestion was presented to the South Carolina Episcopal Diocesan Convention. It was to broaden the Episcopal Church's ministry to involve the economy, health and well-being of citizens in addition to their spiritual life.

Grant had been serving as chaplain at Voorhees College in Denmark and it was he to whom Bishop Temple offered the challenging position. He was to survey Charleston and decide for himself the area that most needed

this type of ministry. So Grant walked streets and knocked on doors and, he says, "got a feel for the community." He found, however, that there were several individual communities: East Side, West Side, and downtown, and it was the East Side that needed him most.

Previously residents in the parish of St. John's Episcopal Church at 18 Hanover St. had been white, but six or seven years before Grant's arrival they had moved across the Ashley River to Oakland. The Hanover Street churchyard was overgrown—the neighborhood now entirely black.

Grant became priest-in-charge of St. John's Mission Center and of St. Stephen's Church on Anson Street. The bishop suggested the latter be closed after Christmas, for its congregation consisted of only six families and a total of approximately 11 persons.

After Grant came to know his parishioners, however, he told the bishop, "These people have not for many years had a chance to love or be loved," and succeeded in getting a three month extension. Today St. Stephen's numbers about 161 baptised members, some 112 confirmed, and four years ago came into communion with the Diocese as a self-supporting mission, and there was no mention again of the three month trial period.

In the meantime Grant was unobtrusively working on the East Side with his headquarters at the large barnlike St. John's church building. It was the center of a 12 block area of 1,800 low-income families, with 3,300 children. There were no playgrounds, no leadership or organized activities and little hope for the future among its residents.

Before the Center's formal opening in June of 1962, Father Grant, as he was now known community-wide, had organized five social clubs of 82 members, three for boys and two for girls; patrolman Reuben Nelson, Olympic Trials Winner in wrestling and weight lifting, was supervising recreation in his off-duty hours and holding physical fitness classes. Kindergartens were established so older children could attend school instead of remaining home to baby-sit.

Head Start, day care, sewing, art, singing, remedial studies, hygiene and adult education were a few of the doors the Center opened to its neighborhood. Volunteers from fashionable St. Michael's and St. Philip's took the first neighborhood Scout troops on field trips, exposing most of them for the first time to a new world beyond their ghetto.

In 1970 Operation Summer Fun was initiated for girls and Operation Compensio at Pawleys Island offered a summer remedial program for boys and girls with instructors from prestigious North Eastern colleges vying for positions on its staff.

The present staff is predominately black, and Mr. Grant says there has never been a big issue of race at the Center. His ambition is that a boy from the East Side will go through the program at the Center, and return to become its director. Nothing makes him happier than to watch youngsters who once couldn't see over the ping-pong table, return to help at Compensio, or girls return to hold their wedding receptions at the Center, and second-generation children taking part in the activities.

Through the Episcopal Church Mr. Grant established good relations with the white community, and the positive results of his quiet work behind the scenes began to attract the attention of local leaders, concerned by the growing racial tensions of the 60s.

Approached for his reaction to the for-



motion of a race relations committee, he advocated one representing the broad spectrum of local feeling—from John Birchers to the ultra-liberal of both races. His idea was to plan the direction of the community not only for the immediate "long hot summer" white leaders were envisioning in 1968, but for the future.

It was three months after the racial violence at South Carolina State College in Orangeburg that he was elected chairman of a thirty man committee, and his voice soon began to be heard.

An editorial in the News and Courier termed him "a bridge of communication between the races," and stated he "commands attention on both sides of whatever racial gap exists." This was only the first of several editorials, all affirming his work and citing him as an "example of social action of a high order."

He taught the people in the area of the Center to organize and make their weight felt politically, encouraging voter registration when that was a dirty word.

Mr. Grant told the Charleston Rotary Club that race relations is a two way street; that people of both black and white communities must change and learn new responses to each other if law and order were to be achieved; and declared the answer to Charleston's poverty problems was not money, but people-to-people communication. He reminded local businessmen that the worker performs better if his home life is in good order, and pushed for better housing, diet and health care, as well as economic support, to provide a labor force that would attract major industries whose Federal contracts required hiring a certain percentage of blacks.

He was the Charleston Trident Chamber of Commerce's first black member. He has been chairman of the Charleston Office of Economic Opportunity for almost 10 years; serves on the Charleston County Board of Health, the United Way Planning Board; is a trustee of Voorhees College and is on the Christian Action Award of the South Carolina Christian Action Council, and the Sertoma Club's "Service to Mankind Award." In 1971 he received an honorary doctorate of divinity degree from the Episcopal General Theological Seminary in New York City—the leading seminary of the Episcopal Church, and an honor that has been accorded no other minister in South Carolina.

In the eyes of his bishop, Mr. Temple, Mr. Grant is "a remarkable man," and the outstanding clergyman of any denomination in the state of South Carolina.

Asked how he feels about race relations in Charleston today, Father Grant says that while Charleston's progress has been slower than that of Atlanta or Jacksonville, at the same time it has been firmer.

He sees more interest in education as a means to economic security, and says blacks no longer have to leave the Charleston area to find work. He thinks if what Charleston has built up in race relations can be constantly shored up, and if good quality housing, education and health are sustained, everything else will take care of itself. He warns, however, that while good relations exist between the races now, this requires eternal vigilance, and believes there is too much relaxing of efforts. He would like to see more of the genuine exchange of ideas today which occurred in time of crisis.●

#### NATIONAL WILL

● Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, throughout history it has been shown

conclusively that when powerful nations lose their will they move to the brink of extinction. This happened, of course, to the Roman Empire and it happened to Western Europe in the late 1930's. Now, we find the United States beginning to lose its will to exercise its responsibility for the peace of the world. We are following a policy of weakness and withdrawal; of appeasement and placation in areas where we should be demonstrating a will and a determination to oppose aggression.

Mr. President, recently, Prof. Thomas Sowell of the University of California Los Angeles, wrote an article appearing in the May 6 edition of the Star entitled "When a Nation's Will Dies" which I ask be printed in the RECORD.

The article follows:

#### WHEN A NATION'S WILL DIES

(By Thomas Sowell)

The barbarian armies that finally over-ran the Roman Empire were smaller than other barbarian armies that had been turned back and cut to pieces by the Roman legions in earlier centuries. The Barbarians weren't stronger. Rome was weaker—and it was self-weakened. Each Roman legion was smaller than before, less heavily armed and armored, and less disciplined. The Roman aristocracy no longer provided officers for the legions. Emperors no longer led them in battle. Roman youths increasingly evaded military service. Rome's enemies could destroy it only after it lost the will to resist.

America's will to resist has also been visibly declining. We have abandoned the defense of American vessels seized on the high seas—both fishing boats and U.S. Navy craft. We have let our once superior military power deteriorate to what we now hope is "parity," as more and more of the military share of the federal budget has been diverted to welfare spending. Rome did that too—it makes politicians popular in the short run. Finally, we have advertised to the world our declining will to resist by turning over the Panama Canal under threat of violence.

A flood of political rhetoric about our "generous" or even "courageous" act cannot conceal the brutal fact of surrender to threats—a fact made plain by Panamanian dictator Torrijos, who went on television immediately after the treaty vote to announce that he would have begun sabotaging the canal within 24 hours if the Senate had not given it to him. We cannot grandly soar above all this on grounds that "of course" the United States could defeat Panama militarily if we wanted to. The question is not our ability; the question is our will. Lack of will defeated Rome, and it nearly destroyed the Western democracies when Hitler began his rampage through Europe in the 1930's.

Numerous probes of the will to resist preceded the onslaught on Rome and the Nazi blitzkrieg. Some of these probes were by small powers seeking small concessions, but what was ultimately crucial were the soft spots discovered by these probes. If we think that the Soviets were looking the other way while we paid ransom to South American countries who seized American fishing boats, while Idi Amin made Carter back down and eat crow, or while we crawled to get the Pueblo crewmen back, we are just kidding ourselves. Perhaps even more revealing was the denunciation and derision that greeted President Ford's attempt to reverse this trend by using troops to rescue the crew of

the Mayaguez. Our sophisticates howled down this square man and his square decision, in terms reminiscent of the Western sophisticates of the 1930's who asked, "Why die for Danzig?"

The Senate has said, in effect, that we are not about to send American boys off to die over the Panama Canal. Perhaps that is just as well, if we really don't have the determination to back them up and see it through. It may even be courageous and patriotic for a Senator to put his political life on the line by opposing public opinion, if the public itself will not be willing to pay the price of its desire to keep the canal. But if that is where we are, we need to be told that loud and clear, like a danger signal in the night. Instead, all sorts of efforts are made to conceal it, with verbal sleight-of-hand about our generosity or anti-colonialism or other such drivel. If our leaders' diagnosis of the public's will is wrong, we need to correct it at the next election. And if the diagnosis is right, we need to realize that far more formidable adversaries than Torrijos are likely to know it, and that the ultimate cost may be far higher than the Panama Canal.

A post-Vietnam unwillingness to get involved militarily overseas is understandable, as a short run swing of the pendulum. A similar sense of the futility of war overwhelmed a whole generation disillusioned by the carnage of World War I. Young men in the 1930's openly took the "Oxford pledge" never to fight for their country. But once they saw the bombs falling on their homes, this generation vindicated themselves in the skies over Britain and on the beaches at Normandy. But a terrible price was paid by the whole world in the meantime—and it was almost too late. The timetable of a nuclear war may not permit second thoughts.

Once we have traded away enough military technology for social programs, giving the Soviets a decisive advantage, it may no longer be possible to decide that we have gone too far and turn back. If the Soviets ever get the same overwhelming military advantage over the United States that America once had over them, they can unilaterally forbid our development of the needed technology by declaring that to be an act of war. Just as they had to back down in the Cuban missile crisis, we would have to back down or face annihilation.

Mutual nuclear overkill can be oversold as a deterrent to international blackmail. Does a policeman have "overkill" whenever he faces five criminals single-handedly, just because he has six bullets in his revolver? It is problematical whether he can fire them at all, much less fire all of them with deadly accuracy. Nuclear delivery and defense systems, and their ever-changing technology, make the question much more complicated than whether our arsenal could theoretically kill every Russian five times over. Maybe the Maginot Line could have killed every Nazi soldier if World War II had been fought differently, but such numerical calculations would have been small consolation to a defeated France.

Even where mutual overkill is maintained—and the neutron bomb decision (or vacillation) makes that questionable—there is mutual deterrence only as long as both sides have the will to resist, not when one side is repeatedly advertising its willingness to capitulate.●

#### WILLIAM P. LEAR

● Mr. STEVENSON. Mr. President, William P. Lear, one of the Nation's fore-

most innovators in aeronautical technology, passed away Sunday, May 14, at age 75. As the holder of more than 150 patents, a most worthy achievement for a self-taught American, Bill Lear has clearly made significant contributions to the advancement of aeronautical and communications technology. He has also demonstrated a unique entrepreneurship in converting his ideas to reality and thereby fulfilling identified needs.

It was my privilege last October to receive a detailed briefing on his latest development, the Learfan, a new business aircraft utilizing advanced material and propulsion concepts designed to meet the fuel efficiency standards required in aircraft of the future. Initiating this development at age 75 was characteristic of this man—always involved, always thinking and always striving to apply the benefits of advancing technology. I believe his ability, his enthusiasm, and his successes set a fine example for other Americans to follow.

Mr. President, I ask that the obituary of Mr. Lear appearing in the May 15, 1978 edition of the Washington Post be printed in the RECORD.

The obituary follows:

DESIGNER WILLIAM P. LEAR DIES

(By J. Y. Smith)

William P. Lear designed and developed the Lear Jet, perhaps the most successful executive airplane in the world. He also invented the automatic pilot for jets.

For people who drive rather than fly, Bill Lear invented the car radio. Years later, he invented the eight-track stereo for cars. He held more than 150 patents.

In the late 1960s, he put \$17 million of his own money into the development of a steam-powered automobile, because he said, "I wanted to develop something that would prove that I wasn't just lucky."

Prove it to whom?

"To the world," he said.

The car never went anywhere. But when he died of leukemia in a Reno, Nev., hospital yesterday at the age of 75, Lear was on the verge of producing a new executive plane, the Learfan, which is covered with molded plastic held together with glue.

Lear claimed that his new plane was the safest aircraft ever designed. It is powered by two gas turbine engines that turn a single four-bladed propeller in the rear. He said it would also prove to be one of the most economical planes ever to fly—a cruising speed of 400 m.p.h. at a rate of 12 miles to the gallon, or only 25 per cent of the fuel consumption of the Lear jet.

"I'm not a tinkerer," Lear said recently. "In fact, I'm not very good with tools. My outstanding ability is to recognize a market and to fill it."

This ability made Lear a millionaire many times over.

He began with almost nothing. William Powell Lear was born in Hannibal, Mo. His father was a carpenter and Lear once said that "my father worked his . . . off to earn a decent living. I never saw anyone work so hard. He hauled oil rigging, never had proper equipment to do the job."

When Lear was 6, his parents separated and his mother took him to Chicago. He finished his formal schooling with the eighth grade. At 14 he became a mechanic and at 16 he joined the Navy and studied radio.

"I remember working out a blueprint for my future when I was 12 years old," Lear told

an interviewer for The Saturday Evening Post in 1956. "I resolved first to make enough money so I'd never be stopped from finishing anything; second, that to accumulate money in a hurry—and I was in a hurry—I'd have to invent something that people wanted; and third, that if I ever was going to stand on my own feet, I'd have to leave home."

After his World War I naval service, Lear learned to fly and worked as a radio engineer. One of his first inventions was a non-battery home radio receiver, but it was not until 1924 that he had his first major success. He invented a radio that would fit into an automobile.

"That was so people wouldn't have to rush home and listen to 'Amos 'n' Andy,'" he said last month.

Unable to get financial backing to produce it himself, he sold the device to Motorola.

In the next several years he founded a number of companies of his own and several of them failed. He also married three times and was divorced three times. In 1934, he designed a radio frequency amplifier that could be used in any radio set. The Radio Corporation of America bought it from him for a substantial sum and Lear used the money to found Lear Avia Corp. in Dayton, Ohio.

By 1939, more than half of the private planes in the United States were using radio equipment and direction finders made by Lear Avia. In that year, Lear founded Lear Inc. During World War II, the company did about \$100 million in Government business.

In the post-war years, Lear invented an automatic pilot that could be used in jet aircraft. Between 1950 and 1962, sales of Lear Inc. doubled to \$90 million. It was in these years that Lear decided to go into the executive jet aircraft business. When the directors of his company refused to authorize the huge sums necessary to develop and produce what became the Lear Jet, Lear sold out his interest and started again on his own.

He set up Lear Jet Inc. in Wichita, Kans. The first Lear Jet was sold in 1963. The plane carried eight passengers at 560 m.p.h. and cost about \$650,000 fully equipped—about \$400,000 less than its competitors.

In the mid-1960s, Lear invented the eight-track stereo for automobiles. The stereo was popular, but one of Lear's subsidiaries was losing so much money that he was forced to sell Lear Jet Corp. to the Gates Rubber Co. in 1967. The price for the aviation and electronics operations was \$28 million.

Within a year, Lear was in Reno, where he bought for \$1.3 million the 3,000 acres that had been Stead Air Force Base. His next project was the steam-powered car, the failure of which left him with no more than "blueprints and memories," he said.

He claimed last month that his new plane, the Learfan, was "an iconoclastic airplane, far more advanced than my jet."

Lear was outgoing and outspoken. He described himself as an arch-conservative. He contributed to Richard M. Nixon's election campaigns in 1968 and 1972. But in 1976 he supported Gov. Jerry Brown of California, a liberal Democrat.

In 1956, he piloted his own plane to Moscow, where he was entertained by Soviet trade officials.

Lear's honors include the Horatio Alger Award for 1954, the Collier Trophy in 1950, the Great Silver Medal of the City of Paris, the Swedish Thulin Medal, and an honorary degree from the University of Michigan.

In 1942, Lear married a fourth time. His wife was Moya Marie Olsen, the daughter of the late comedian Ole "Hellzapoppin'" Olsen. They had four children, John, Shanda, David and Valentina. Lear also had a son, William P. Jr., and a daughter, Patricia, by his third

marriage, and another daughter, Mary, by his second marriage. ●

## KOREAN TROOP WITHDRAWAL

● Mr. BARTLETT. Mr. President, one of my great pleasures, as a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, has been to work closely with my good friend from Georgia, Senator SAM NUNN.

Senator NUNN and I have tried to take a nonpartisan approach in our efforts to enhance our Nation's defense effort. We went to Europe together to study the problems faced by our NATO alliance, and we have gone to the Pacific together to study the state of our military forces in the Far East. We may not always agree on the details we emphasize, but the facts we find drive us to similar policy conclusions. Such is the case with respect to the President's decision to withdraw troops from Korea.

Senator NUNN and I have examined that decision carefully. We have found the President's justification lacking. For that reason, we were both pleased that the President has decided to pause and reconsider the total withdrawal.

I have no doubt that much of the credit for the President's recent delay in implementing the withdrawal belongs to Senator NUNN. His analysis of the situation and his straightforward presentation of the facts to the President, who came from his own political party, has been instrumental in delaying the implementation of what I believe to have been a bad policy decision.

Mr. President, I would like to commend to all of my colleagues a superb statement by Senator SAM NUNN, of Georgia, on the Korean troop withdrawal. In a speech on April 24, 1978, before the Aviation Space Writers Association, Senator NUNN detailed the costs and dangers associated with a hasty withdrawal of American forces from Korea. In particular, I would like to steer my colleagues' attention to Senator NUNN's discussion of Soviet perception of the Korean withdrawal in the light of the SALT talks and unilateral actions taken by the President concerning the neutron warhead, the MX, and naval shipbuilding.

Mr. President, I ask that the full text of Senator NUNN's statement be printed in the RECORD following my remarks.

The statement follows:

## KOREAN WITHDRAWAL

As you know, last Friday President Carter announced his decision to defer the scheduled withdrawal of U.S. combat troops from Korea, except for one battalion. I am pleased with the President's decision.

As I have previously stated, both publicly and privately to the top Carter Administration officials, I have long been concerned with the various rationales offered by the supporters of the Korean withdrawal plan. I have also been concerned over the timing.

Even the advocates of a complete withdrawal of all American ground combat units certainly must concede that the President has acted with prudence by delaying any major removal of forces during a time when Congressional interest in things Korean has been centered on Tongson Park and his alleged relationship to Congress.



An integral part of the Administration's withdrawal plan is Congressional approval of the transfer military and of foreign military sales credits for Korea. This legislation was submitted last October. However, we should be candid: the atmosphere in Congress is not now conducive to an objective analysis of the Administration's plan for Korean withdrawal based on the long-term national security interests of the United States.

I am concerned not just about the timing of the proposed withdrawal. I am also concerned about the actual plan itself. The subject of withdrawal was discussed at length last June on the floor of the Senate. Last June, of course, the Senate had no detailed plan from the Administration, and I then emphasized that when a plan was presented, my Subcommittee on Manpower and Personnel would consider it in our review of the requested military end strengths for FY 1979. The plan has been submitted by the Administration and our review is now in process.

I do not believe that the Carter Administration has yet presented convincing evidence to support the major benefits which have been attributed to withdrawing U.S. ground combat troops from Korea.

The idea of pulling U.S. ground troops out of Korea is not new, and long antedates the Carter Administration. In the early 1970s the idea was seriously considered within the Nixon Administration, and although ultimately rejected, U.S. ground forces in Korea were nevertheless reduced by one full Army division.

Prior to President Carter assuming office, I listened carefully to those who advocated a U.S. withdrawal from Korea. The principle reasons given for the withdrawal of ground forces were twofold—to save money and to reduce the risk of automatic U.S. involvement in a Korean conflict. I believe the Administration's plan should be examined with these two original objectives in mind.

First, will the proposed withdrawal plan save money? No. In fact, the plan will require substantial increases both in the defense budget and in foreign assistance. The Administration has been very candid about some of these costs. The decision not to eliminate the 2nd Division from the force structure upon its return from Korea will necessitate the expenditure of some \$400-\$800 million in relocation costs. Moreover, the 2nd Division is scheduled to leave behind in Korea all of its equipment, whose cost after depreciation is estimated at \$800 million. An additional \$1 billion will be required to realize the Administration's intention to re-equip the 2nd Division as a mechanized infantry division. The Administration has also requested appropriations of \$275 million in foreign military sales credits this year, and has stated that it intends to do so in future years as well. There is a further appropriations request for training of Korean forces.

In short, far from sparing the taxpayer, the Administration's Korean troop withdrawal plan is certain to require an increase of at least \$2 billion in the defense and foreign assistance budgets.

Second, will the proposed withdrawal plan eliminate the prospect of automatic U.S. involvement in a future Korean conflict? There is no assurance that it will. Even after the proposed withdrawal is completed in 1982, some 6,000 U.S. Army and 8,000 other U.S. military personnel will remain in Korea. The continued presence of 14,000 U.S. troops—including tactical combat aviation units—virtually guarantees immediate and substantial U.S. casualties in the event of another conflict on the Korean peninsula, with all of

the attendant political pressures to escalate U.S. involvement.

In summary, the Administration's plan accomplishes neither of the principal goals set forth by those who have long advocated withdrawal. This is clear from the record, and I believe knowledgeable members of the Administration would agree. Other reasons must be forthcoming from the Administration if Congress and the American people are to be persuaded that this is a step in our long-term national security interests.

In my view, the questions which we should focus on during the delay in withdrawal stemming from the President's recent announcement are the following:

Will the proposed withdrawal plan preserve deterrence in Korea?

What reaction do we anticipate from North Korea?

Will the proposed withdrawal plan substantially increase incentives for South Korea to develop an independent nuclear deterrent?

What effect will the proposed withdrawal have on our long-term military and economic partnership with Japan?

What effect will the proposed withdrawal have on U.S.-Chinese relations and on U.S.-Soviet relations?

What effect will the proposed withdrawal have on Soviet-Chinese relations?

Finally, do we have a long-term post-Vietnam Pacific policy, and how does the proposed withdrawal plan further that policy, assuming that such a policy exists?

I have talked to many knowledgeable Americans who are well versed in national security and foreign policy. I have also talked to many Asians and experts on Asia. They are frankly puzzled by our Nation's Pacific policy. Several have posed a question which is difficult to answer: What is the logic behind a plan which withdraws U.S. ground forces from the one area in Asia which is directly threatened on land by a country which is not only hostile to the United States but which has also demonstrated a propensity toward bloody military adventures?

I believe that a determination of appropriate American policy or definition of our national security interests on any question—be it the Korean withdrawal or SALT II—requires not only a thorough analysis of the specific issues at hand, but also the context of those issues in the broader climate of world events. As much as some continue to criticize former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's "policy of linkage," in my view they will soon discover that linkage is inevitable—if not as a deliberate policy, then at least as an unavoidable reality. It is simply not possible to weigh a policy in one area of the world without taking into consideration that policy's potential consequences for developments and trends elsewhere.

Nor can policy be made in disregard of the attitude of the American people and the Congress. This is true of our Korean decisions. It is also true of SALT II and the chances of its ratification in the Senate.

Korea is not an island unto itself. What we do in individual foreign policy and military decisions cannot be divorced from trends in the world. First and foremost among these trends is the expanding military power of the Soviet Union, which has been accompanied by a new willingness to exploit that power beyond the traditional confines of Russian security interests. A few weeks ago, President Carter stated in Wake Forest that "there has been an ominous inclination on the part of the Soviet Union to use its military power to intervene in local conflict with advisors, with equipment and with full logistical sup-

port and encouragement for mercenaries from other communist countries, as we can observe today in Africa."

I am not a long-time veteran of the Washington scene. I was present, however, during the first acts of the Vietnam debacle, and I was present when the curtain fell on our Vietnam involvement. That was three years ago. Yet, the psychological damage of that war lingers on in the American political bloodstream, and in my view, it has impeded a calm, firm, and consistent defense of American security interests abroad. Fear of another Vietnam has led many to equate any involvement with intervention.

I was also present late one evening on the floor of the Senate when the Senate voted to cut off all aid to the pro-Western functions in Angola, thus giving the green light to the Soviet-Cuban imperial interventionist policy in Africa and the Third World.

Upon assuming office, President Carter inherited a hesitant foreign policy consumed by fear of another Vietnam and unsure of the nature of the new Soviet challenge to U.S. security interests which had emerged while we were bogged down in Indochina. Many subsequent decisions in defense and foreign affairs—although sincere—betrayed a continuing confusion over means and ends. I refer specifically to:

The cancellation of the B-1 Bomber program outside the context of SALT II;

The decision to delay indefinitely a production decision on the "neutron bomb" with expressed hope of reciprocal Soviet concessions;

The submission of a sharply reduced budget for Naval shipbuilding;

The decision to slowdown the MX program; and,

The substantial U.S. retreat from its March 1977 SALT proposals.

These decisions have taken place during a time when the Soviet Union has steadily expended its strategic power and its land, air, and naval forces. They have been taken at a time when the Soviet Union has demonstrated an increasing willingness to exploit their expanding military power.

Admittedly, each of these decisions by the Carter Administration are subject to legitimate debate, with strong arguments to be made on both sides.

However, taken together the decisions suggest a trend in foreign policy which may well be interpreted by the Soviet Union as one lacking in firmness and consistency. The danger is obvious: that the Soviets will conclude that this Administration is vulnerable to adventurous and potentially perilous Soviet challenge.

I believe this would be a mistaken perception on the part of the Soviets. I am confident the Carter Administration will respond vigorously to the new Soviet challenge—today, tomorrow, and in the future. The point is, however, that the world will be a lot safer if there are no miscalculations, if there are no erroneous perceptions, if there are no Soviet-U.S. confrontations.

Nothing worse could befall our country than a war stemming from a combination of Soviet misjudgment of American resolve to resist a challenge, and a heavy-handed American response to a Soviet challenge dictated by a sudden awareness that the time had come to stand firm.

In closing, I would suggest that the Vietnam war is over. We must think anew. We must act anew. The challenge before us is to develop a peaceful world. To preserve, protect, and nourish this goal, our leadership must be firm, calm and consistent. In my view, the President's decision to delay the withdrawal of U.S. ground troops from Korea will hopefully be the first step in a restora-

tion of the firmness, calmness, and consistency our foreign policy must have if we are ever to emerge psychologically from the post-Vietnam era.■

### PROPOSED ARMS SALES

● Mr. SPARKMAN. Mr. President, section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act requires that Congress receive advance notification of proposed arms sales under that act in excess of \$25 million or, in the case of major defense equipment as defined in the act, those in excess of \$7 million. Upon such notification, the Congress has 30 calendar days during which the sale may be prohibited by means of a concurrent resolution. The provision stipulates that, in the Senate, the notification of proposed sale shall be sent to the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee.

In keeping with my intention to see that such information is immediately available to the full Senate, I ask to have printed in the RECORD at this point the 10 notifications I have just received.

The notifications follow:

In reply refer to: I-13127/77 ct.

WASHINGTON, D.C.,  
May 11, 1978.

HON. JOHN SPARKMAN,  
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,  
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Pursuant to the reporting requirements of Section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act, we are forwarding herewith, Transmittal No. 78-38, concerning the Department of the Air Force's proposed Letter of Offer to Spain for major defense equipment, as defined in the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), estimated to cost \$5.2 million and support costs of \$5.8 million for a total estimated cost of \$11 million. Shortly after this letter is delivered to your office, we plan to notify the news media.

Sincerely,

ERNEST GRAVES,  
Lieutenant General, USA, Director,  
Defense Security Assistance Agency.

[Transmittal No. 78-38]

NOTICE OF PROPOSED ISSUANCE OF LETTER OF OFFER PURSUANT TO SECTION 36(b) OF THE ARMS EXPORT CONTROL ACT

- (i) Prospective Purchaser: Spain.
- (ii) Total Estimated Value:

	Millions
Major Defense Equipment*	\$5.2
Other	5.8
Total	11.0

\*As included in the U.S. Munitions List, a part of the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR).

(iii) Description of Articles or Services Offered: Four (4) RF-4C aircraft and support equipment.

(iv) Military Department: Air Force.

(v) Sales Commission, Fee, etc. Paid, Offered or Agreed to be Paid: None.

(vi) Date Report Delivered to Congress: May 11, 1978.

WASHINGTON, D.C., May 11, 1978.

In reply refer to: I-298/78ct.

HON. JOHN J. SPARKMAN,  
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,  
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Pursuant to the reporting requirements of Section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act, we are forwarding herewith, Transmittal No. 78-39, concerning

the Department of the Navy's proposed Letter of Offer to Spain for major defense equipment, as defined in the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), estimated to cost \$23.2 million and support costs of \$5.8 million for a total estimated cost of \$29 million. Shortly after this letter is delivered to your office, we plan to notify the news media.

Sincerely,

ERNEST GRAVES,  
Lieutenant General, USA, Director,  
Defense Security Assistance Agency.

[Transmittal No. 78-39]

NOTICE OF PROPOSED ISSUANCE OF LETTER OF OFFER PURSUANT TO SECTION 36(b) OF THE ARMS EXPORT CONTROL ACT

- (i) Prospective Purchaser: Spain.
- (ii) Total Estimated Value:

	Millions
Major Defense Equipment*	\$23.2
Other	5.8
Total	29.0

\*As included in the U.S. Munitions List, a part of the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR).

(iii) Description of Articles or Services Offered: Forty (40) HARPOON missiles—surface ship launched and support.

(iv) Military Department: Navy.

(v) Sales Commission, Fee, etc. Paid, Offered or Agreed to be Paid:

(a) The McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company—East P.O. Box 516, St. Louis, MO. 63166.

(b) Compania Aeronautica Espanola, S.A. Antonia Maura, Madrid, Spain.

(c) One-percent of the sale price.

(d) 40 Harpoon missiles.

(e) The information contained in paragraph (v) consists of proprietary data within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. 1905, and, accordingly, may not be disclosed except pursuant to the provisions of the code.

(vi) Date Report Delivered to Congress: May 11, 1978.

WASHINGTON, D.C.,  
May 11, 1978.

In reply refer to: I-13480/77ct.

HON. JOHN J. SPARKMAN,  
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,  
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. SPARKMAN: Pursuant to the reporting requirements of Section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act, we are forwarding herewith, Transmittal No. 78-41, concerning the Department of the Army's proposed Letter of Offer to Korea for major defense equipment, as defined in the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), estimated to cost \$8 million. Shortly after this letter is delivered to your office, we plan to notify the news media.

Sincerely,

ERNEST GRAVES,  
Lieutenant General, USA, Director,  
Defense Security Assistance Agency.

[Transmittal No. 78-41]

NOTICE OF PROPOSED ISSUANCE OF LETTER OF OFFER PURSUANT TO SECTION 36(b) OF THE ARMS EXPORT CONTROL ACT

	Million
(i) Prospective Purchaser: Korea.	
(ii) Total Estimated Value:	
Major Defense Equipment*	\$8.0
Other	0.0
Total	8.0

\*As included in the U.S. Munitions List, a part of the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR).

(iii) Description of Articles or Services Offered: One thousand one hundred (1,100) TOW guided missiles (BGM-71A-1).

(iv) Military Department: Army.

(v) Sales Commission, Fee, etc. Paid, Offered or Agreed to be Paid: None.

(vi) Date Report Delivered to Congress: May 11, 1978.

WASHINGTON, D.C.,  
May 11, 1978.

In reply refer to: I-13429/77ct.

HON. JOHN J. SPARKMAN,  
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,  
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Pursuant to the reporting requirements of Section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act, we are forwarding herewith, Transmittal No. 78-42, concerning the Department of the Air Force's proposed Letter of Offer to Korea, for other than major defense equipment, as defined in the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), estimated to cost \$29.0 million. Shortly after this letter is delivered to your office, we plan to notify the news media.

Sincerely,

ERNEST GRAVES,  
Lieutenant General, USA, Director,  
Defense Security Assistance Agency.

[Transmittal No. 78-42]

NOTICE OF PROPOSED ISSUANCE OF LETTER OF OFFER PURSUANT TO SECTION 36(b) OF THE ARMS EXPORT CONTROL ACT

- (i) Prospective Purchaser: Korea.
- (ii) Total Estimated Value:

	Millions
Major Defense Equipment*	\$0.0
Other	29.0
Total	29.0

\*As included in the U.S. Munitions List, a part of the International Traffic in Arms Regulation (ITAR).

(iii) Description of Articles or Services Offered: Cooperative logistics supply support arrangement, stock level case FMSO I for follow-on spares and supplies for support of U.S. origin (F-4s, F-5s, A-37s, T-33s, T-37s, and C-123 aircraft.)

(iv) Military Department: Air Force.

(v) Sales Commission, Fee, etc. Paid, Offered or Agreed to be Paid: None.

(vi) Date Report Delivered to Congress: May 11, 1978.

WASHINGTON, D.C.,  
May 11, 1978.

In reply refer to: I-13430/77 ct.

HON. JOHN J. SPARKMAN,  
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,  
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Pursuant to the reporting requirements of Section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act, we are forwarding herewith, Transmittal No. 78-43, concerning the Department of the Air Force's proposed Letter of Offer to Korea for other than major defense equipment, as defined in the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), estimated to cost \$30 million. Shortly after this letter is delivered to your office, we plan to notify the news media.

Sincerely,

ERNEST GRAVES,  
Lieutenant General, USA, Defense Security Assistance Agency.

[Transmittal No. 78-43]

NOTICE OF PROPOSED ISSUANCE OF LETTER OF OFFER PURSUANT TO SECTION 36(b) OF THE ARMS EXPORT CONTROL ACT

- (i) Prospective Purchaser: Korea.
- (ii) Total Estimated Value:

	Million
Major Defense Equipment*	\$0.0
Other	30.0
Total	30.0

\*As included in the U.S. Munitions List, a part of the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR).



(iii) Description of Articles or Services Offered: Cooperative logistics supply support arrangement, stock level case FMSO II for follow-on spares and supplies for support of U.S. origin (F-4s, F-5s, A-37s, T-33s, T-37s, and C-123 aircraft).

(iv) Military Department: Air Force.

(v) Sales Commission, Fee, etc. Paid, Offered or Agreed to be Paid: None.

(vi) Date Report Delivered to Congress: May 11, 1978.

WASHINGTON, D.C., May 11, 1978.

In reply refer to: I-13428/77ct.

Hon. JOHN J. SPARKMAN,  
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,  
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Pursuant to the reporting requirements of Section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act, we are forwarding herewith, Transmittal No. 78-44, concerning the Department of the Air Force's proposed Letter of Offer to the Republic of China for other than major defense equipment, as defined in the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), estimated to cost \$35 million. Shortly after this letter is delivered to your office, we plan to notify the news media.

Sincerely,

ERNEST GRAVES,  
Lieutenant General, USA, Director, Defense Security Assistance Agency.

[Transmittal No. 78-44]

NOTICE OF PROPOSED ISSUANCE OF LETTER OF OFFER PURSUANT TO SECTION 36(b) OF THE ARMS EXPORT CONTROL ACT

(i) Prospective Purchaser: Republic of China.

(ii) Total Estimated Value:

	Million
Major Defense Equipment*	\$0.0
Other	35.0

Total 35.0

\*As included in the U.S. Munitions List, a part of the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR).

(iii) Description of Articles or Service Offered: Cooperative logistics supply support, FMSO II for follow-on spares and supplies for support of aircraft of US origin. (F-86, F-100, F-104, F-5, T-33, C-119, C-47, and C-54 aircraft).

(iv) Military Department: Air Force.

(v) Sales Commission, Fee, etc. Paid, Offered or Agreed to be Paid: None.

(vi) Date Report Delivered to Congress: May 11, 1978.

WASHINGTON, D.C., May 11, 1978.

In reply refer to: I-14227/77ct.

Hon. JOHN J. SPARKMAN,  
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,  
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Pursuant to the reporting requirements of Section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act, we are forwarding herewith, Transmittal No. 78-45, concerning the Department of the Army's proposed Letter of Offer to Spain for major defense equipment, as defined in the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), estimated to cost \$9.2 million and support costs of \$4.4 million for a total estimated cost of \$13.6 million. Shortly after this letter is delivered to your office, we plan to notify the news media.

Sincerely,

ERNEST GRAVES,  
Lieutenant General, USA, Director, Defense Security Assistance Agency.

[Transmittal No. 78-45]

NOTICE OF PROPOSED ISSUANCE OF LETTER OF OFFER PURSUANT TO SECTION 36(b) OF THE ARMS EXPORT CONTROL ACT

(i) Prospective Purchaser: Spain.

(ii) Total Estimated Value:

	Million
Major Defense Equipment*	\$9.2
Other	4.4

Total 13.6

\*As included in the U.S. Munitions List, a part of the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR).

(iii) Description of Articles or Services Offered: One hundred two (102) armored personnel carriers model M113A1, eighteen (18) mortar carrier model M125A1 and four (4) command post carriers model M577A1.

(iv) Military Department: Army.

(v) Sales Commission, Fee, etc. Paid, Offered or Agreed to be Paid: None.

(vi) Date Report Delivered to Congress: May 11, 1978.

WASHINGTON, D.C.,

May 11, 1978.

In reply refer to: I-13468/77ct.

Hon. JOHN J. SPARKMAN,  
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,  
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Pursuant to the reporting requirements of Section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act, we are forwarding herewith, Transmittal No. 78-46, concerning the Department of the Air Force's proposed Letter of Offer to Iran for other than major defense equipment, as defined in the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), estimated to cost \$125.0 million. Shortly after this letter is delivered to your office, we plan to notify the news media.

Sincerely,

ERNEST GRAVES,  
Lieutenant General, USA, Director,  
Defense Security Assistance Agency.

[Transmittal No. 78-46]

NOTICE OF PROPOSED ISSUANCE OF LETTER OF OFFER PURSUANT TO SECTION 36(b) OF THE ARMS EXPORT CONTROL ACT

(i) Prospective Purchaser: Iran.

(ii) Total Estimated Value:

	Million
Major Defense Equipment*	\$0.0
Other	125.0

Total 125.0

\*As included in the U.S. Munitions List, a part of the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR).

(iii) Description of Articles or Services Offered: Cooperative logistics supply support arrangement (FSMO II) requisition case for support of Iranian aircraft of U.S. origin.

(iv) Military Department: Air Force.

(v) Sales Commission, Fee, etc. Paid, Offered or Agreed to be Paid: None.

(vi) Date Report Delivered to Congress: May 11, 1978.

WASHINGTON, D.C., May 11, 1978.

In reply refer to: I-13418/77ct.

Hon. JOHN J. SPARKMAN,  
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,  
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Pursuant to the reporting requirements of Section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act, we are forwarding herewith, Transmittal No. 78-47, concerning the Department of the Army's proposed Letter of Offer to Iran for other than major defense equipment, as defined in the Inter-

national Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), estimated to cost \$33 million. Shortly after this letter is delivered to your office, we plan to notify the news media.

Sincerely,

ERNEST GRAVES,  
Lieutenant General, U.S.A., Director,  
Defense Security Assistance Agency.

[Transmittal No. 78-47]

NOTICE OF PROPOSED ISSUANCE OF LETTER OF OFFER PURSUANT TO SECTION 36(b) OF THE ARMS EXPORT CONTROL ACT

(i) Prospective Purchaser: Iran.

(ii) Total Estimated Value:

	Million
Major Defense Equipment*	\$0.0
Other	33.0

Total 33.0

\*As included in the U.S. Munitions List, a part of the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR).

(iii) Description of Articles or Services Offered: Follow-on technical assistance, consisting of forty one (41) contractor personnel, for the establishment, development and implementation of an Improved HAWK air defense peculiar maintenance capability in Iran and the training of 12 Iranian AF personnel in the US

(iv) Military Department: Army.

(v) Sales Commission, Fee, etc. Paid, Offered or Agreed to be Paid: None.

(vi) Date Report Delivered to Congress: May 11, 1978.

WASHINGTON, D.C., May 11, 1978.

In reply refer to: I-13481/77ct.

Hon. JOHN J. SPARKMAN,  
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,  
U.S. Senate,  
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Pursuant to the reporting requirements of Section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act, we are forwarding herewith, Transmittal No. 78-49, concerning the Department of the Air Force's proposed Letter of Offer to Iran, for other than major defense equipment, as defined in the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), estimated to cost \$56.0 million. Shortly after this letter is delivered to your office, we plan to notify the news media.

Sincerely,

ERNEST GRAVES,  
Lieutenant General, USA, Director, Defense Security Assistance Agency.

[Transmittal No. 78-49]

NOTICE OF PROPOSED ISSUANCE OF LETTER OF OFFER PURSUANT TO SECTION 36(b) OF THE ARMS EXPORT CONTROL ACT

(i) Prospective Purchaser: Iran.

(ii) Total estimated value:

	Million
Major Defense Equipment*	\$0
Other	56.0

Total 56.0

\*As included in the U.S. Munitions List, a part of the International Traffic on Arms Regulations (ITAR).

(iii) Description of Articles or Services Offered: A modification program to retrofit 172 Iranian aircraft with airborne countermeasures ALR 69 radar warning receivers.

(iv) Military Department: Air Force.

(v) Sales Commission, Fee, etc. Paid, Offered or Agreed to be Paid: None.

(vi) Date Report Delivered to Congress: May 11, 1978.●

## SOUTH AFRICAN ACTION

● Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, of late we have been hearing anguished cries of protest from the Carter administration and the United Nations over the preemptive action taken by the South African Government against terrorist guerrillas who operate under the banner of the South West Africa People's Organization. To hear the administration and the U.N. talk, this was a brutal, uncalled for action taken by a repressive South African regime. But, as so often happens, there are two sides to the story and I believe a careful examination of all the facts will show conclusively that the action taken by South Africa was both carefully considered and absolutely necessary under the circumstances in that region.

Mr. President, so that the Senate can have all the facts in this situation, I am presenting for the RECORD a communication which the South African Government sent to the governments of five Western Security Council members explaining that Government's side of the story. I ask that this be printed in the RECORD.

## The communication follows:

## COMMUNICATION

1. Recently, and particularly following South Africa's acceptance of the Western proposals for an internationally recognized solution in South West Africa, the intensity of acts of violence and the frequency of border violations by terrorists had increased dangerously as will be seen from the attached document listing such incidents since January 1978. This escalation took place in spite of South Africa's efforts to secure a peaceful solution and the South African Government was confronted by urgent appeals from the leaders of South West Africa for protection. They are further profoundly dismayed and shocked by Mr. Nujoma's concluding statement to the special session of the General Assembly on 3 May 1978 that "SWAPO . . . will persevere and intensify the armed liberation struggle. . . ." South Africa could no longer continue to ignore these pleas.

The action then taken had limited objectives and was carried out with limited forces including black and white South West Africans. It was mainly directed at the two most important SWAPO headquarters used for operations against South West Africa.

2. As expected the SWAPO base headquarters, Cassinga situated 15 KMS north of the mining town Technutete formerly called Cassinga was an extensive SWAPO military installation, it contained formidable defense works such as trenches, bunkers and underground shelters. It was established beyond doubt that this base constituted SWAPO's main operational centre, responsible for overall planning, logistics, communications and strategy.

Vast quantities of weapons and ammunition were found and destroyed and considerable documentation was found and removed.

The SWAPO personnel included women, in uniform, fully armed and actually fighting in the trenches. The dead included some of these. The personnel not killed were rounded up and disarmed. As they could not be evacuated, they were released when the South African group left. There were also a number of camp followers, including women, who apparently lived in the confines of the base. Some of them might have become casualties. A number of the children who were hijacked across the border on 28 April were found and, at their request, these were going to be taken back. Unfortunately, just as the final evacuation was in progress, an armed attack

from the direction of Technutete occurred. Mortar, cannon and small arms fire was directed at the camp by this force. In these circumstances it was not possible to evacuate the children.

The second base Chetequera was the centre for the hit-and-run operations against western Owambo. Here too a well prepared Communist-type military base with trenches and inter-connecting tunnels and large quantities of arms and ammunition were found. On the way back further SWAPO elements were mopped up.

The documentary and other evidence, found at these SWAPO terrorist bases, is being analysed and further particulars about SWAPO involvement in acts of terrorism already committed and the planning for its future campaign of intimidation, including political murders etc., will be made available.

By way of example the following extract from one of the documents, illustrates SWAPO's real intentions:

"SWAPO will win, Namibia will be free. Issued by Greenwell Matongoh, Chief Political Commissar and Dimo Hamaabo, Commander of the Armed Forces, 14 February 1978, Moscow.

Notes taken during the address of MCC and youth leader, Ode Ndali Kamati, at the parade, Cassinga, R.P.A.

Comrade Kamati slogan-ed, then expressed his gratitude for having stayed in Cassinga for 7 days.

1. He continued by remarking that the coming of many comrades abroad, is testimony to the great momentum with which the revolutionary trend is sweeping over Namibia. The celebration of 26 August, Namibia Day, right inside, testifies that the armed liberation struggle is also lived in by the non-armed comrades inside the country.

2. The Gang of Five—South African talks in New York.

Commander Ndali said SWAPO has also been invited to the talks. He then said that the occupation of Namibia is actually led by the Gang of Five, U.S.A., Canada, United Kingdom, France and Germany. These are the same people who initiated the talks, these are the same people exploiting our mineral resources. These are supposedly now forcing South Africa to quit Namibia. Their move, however, follows realisation that SWAPO would have to win. They would not like to see what happened in Angola being repeated in Namibia, as this could be detrimental to their economic interests in Namibia. They hope to get South Africa out peacefully and win the favour of SWAPO and to continue their exploitation of our resources.

In short, no genuine attempt can be made by imperialists to free Namibia . . .

. . . It is clear that no real independence can be gained plain sailing. Countries like Malawi, Zambia, Zaïre have only false independence symbolised by flags. Their economies are ran by their former colonizers. We must abide to our decision to fight even for 10 to 20 years if need be. Who is not determined should go and join the turn-halle. . . ."

3. An urgent appeal is made to the international community to insist that SWAPO immediately cease further acts of violence against the territory and the people of South West Africa. SWAPO cannot follow a dual strategy i.e. to appear to be negotiating and at the same time delaying their reply and continuing brutal acts of violence and terror against the people whom they claim to represent.

4. In these circumstances it is urged that finally on the implementation of the western proposals be reached as soon as possible. The sooner this is done the sooner the international community will be in a position to keep itself fully informed on what is happening in the territory and for to speeding up of the process leading to free democratic elections and to independence by the end of the year.

5. The following background documents are enclosed:

(A) Statement by the South African minister of defense concerning the limited preemptive action taken by South Africa in regard to SWAPO terrorist camps.

(B) Summary of incidents since January 1978.

(C) Statement issued by the South African Minister of Foreign Affairs on May 5, 1978.

## ANNEXURE A

## STATEMENT BY THE SOUTH AFRICAN MINISTER OF DEFENCE CONCERNING THE LIMITED PRE-EMPTIVE ACTION TAKEN BY SOUTH AFRICA AGAINST SWAPO TERRORIST CAMPS

As a result of the ominous buildup of SWAPO forces in southern Angola and the extensive campaign of intimidation of the local inhabitants and the murder of political leaders in south west Africa, as well as the large number of border violations during the past few weeks, a limited military operation against SWAPO forces has been carried out over the border.

The limited operation was embarked on after large numbers of heavily armed SWAPO terrorists recently crossed the border, attacked our forces in Owambo and fled back to safety in Angola.

The Ruacana power station was also fired on and the buildings extensively damaged.

After the attack, the latest since SWAPO intensified its hostilities, we were forced to resort to follow-up actions.

I trust that the limited operation will leave those who wish to threaten us under no illusions.

We have already leaned over backwards to seek the solution along other lines and will continue to do so in the interests of peace in this subcontinent.

But the South African Government can no longer allow, with self-respect, emergency calls from peaceful leaders to remain unanswered.

We have a moral duty towards the people of South West Africa and cannot sit silently and with folded hands and see how peaceful citizens and leaders of this remote area are murdered, assaulted, kidnapped and threatened and intimidated by other methods of terrorism.

I have in the past repeatedly expressed the hope that military bases will not be made available to terrorists in southern Angola but this apparently has fallen on deaf ears.

On April 22 a bus was hijacked on the road between Oshakati and Ruacana. The bus with about 70 to 80 people on board was taken to Angola.

On April 24 South African forces made contact with 20 terrorists approximately 10 km south of the Angolan-South West African border. After a fire fight the enemy withdrew northwards over the border.

On April 24 a vehicle of South African forces was ambushed by SWAPO terrorists approximately six kilometers south of the Angola-South West African border. Security forces returned fire following which the terrorists withdrew to the safety of Angolan territory. A South African soldier was killed in this incident.

On April 28 an SADF patrol was attacked from a Cuca shop approximately 25 km east of Ruacana.

On April 29 shots were fired at the border post at Ruacana. Fire was not returned.

On April 29 and 30 landmines of Communist origin were set to explode at the new homes built for the members of the Owambo cabinet and the legislative assembly building at Ongwediva.

On April 30 an SADF patrol was attacked by approximately 10 SWAPO terrorists 45 km east of Enana. One SADF member killed.

On May 1 heavy fire was brought down on an SADF patrol approximately 43 km south-east of Enana. A follow-up operation was



mounted and the enemy fled over the Angolan border.

On May 2 the water pipe-line running between Ondangua and Oshikango was sabotaged. This pipe-line is essential for the livelihood of the local inhabitants.

On May 3 heavy fire was directed at the guard post and buildings at Ruacana including structures of the water scheme. Several buildings were damaged. Fire was not returned.

Latest intelligence reveals that SWAPO has recently established three new bases in southern Angola close to the SWA border. This confirms the pattern of consolidation which is a prerequisite for increased terrorist activity against South West Africa.

Over the period 1 to 3 May several landmines had to be lifted in the border area.

#### ANNEXURE B

##### SUMMARY OF INCIDENTS SINCE JANUARY 1978

On January 5 this year the body of an Owambo man was found after he had been shot by a gang of terrorists. The body was found on a fence and a number of AK 47 cartridge cases were later discovered near the body.

On January 8 a private car with 10 civilian passengers detonated a Russian landmine. Four of the passengers were killed outright and six were seriously injured. This and other mine incidents forced the Chief Minister of Owambo, Pastor Ndjoba, at the time to call for stronger action against the terrorists.

On February 7 the Owambo Minister of Health, Mr. Shilagaya, was assassinated with a Russian-made pistol after a political meeting in Owambo.

On February 21 a group of terrorists abducted 119 children and their teacher from the St. Mary's Mission School in Owambo. Three children later escaped and could tell how they were forced over the border and taken to terrorist training camps. Once again Pastor Ndjoba called for firmer action by the security forces.

On March 3 sub-headman Nangola Kanyala was killed by a group of terrorists. His body was mutilated and his wife and children abducted.

On March 25 another sub-headman, working for the South African police, was shot by terrorists using a Russian-made pistol.

On March 27 two terrorists assassinated the leader of the Herero people, Mr. Clemens Kapuuo. The attack took place at his home in Katutura just a short while after he and his tribal council decided on asking the Administrator-General for better protection of the political leaders of south west Africa. Before his death Mr. Kapuuo was a strong supporter of the total destruction of terrorist bases across the Angolan border.

On April 18 two Owambo children were killed by a Russian handgrenade set by terrorists for a patrol of the security forces.

On 21 April an attempt was made on the life of Owambo's Minister of Justice, Mr. Tara Imbili, when a terrorist tried to plant a mine on the road leading to his house.

#### ANNEXURE C

##### STATEMENT ISSUED BY THE SOUTH AFRICAN MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS ON 5 MAY 1978

In all our negotiations the Western Powers laid great stress on the essential need for the halting of violence. As a matter of fact, the crux of the Western proposals is that the continuous violence and intimidation must be ended in order to give the people of South West Africa the opportunity to exercise their right of self-determination untrammelled and freely.

South Africa remains willing and ready to implement the Western proposals for a settlement of the South West African issue but we also keep insisting that the terrorists should end their acts of violence. It must be emphasized that SWAPO not only con-

tinued its programme of terror after South Africa had accepted the proposals but that it had also during the past few days extended and intensified its acts of violence over a wide front.

SWAPO's answer to our acceptance of the proposals for a peaceful settlement has been to commit more violence.

For that matter SWAPO openly boasts that it will continue and extend its onslaughts.

I once again appeal to the Western powers to urgently pilot their proposals through the Security Council.

The leaders of South West Africa are not prepared to wait much longer.

The people of the territory are entitled at this stage to enter and to finalise the process which must lead to independence.

In the meantime South Africa cannot forsake its duty to give the people of the territory the necessary protection. Without that they will be entirely defenceless and become the prey of merciless suppression through physical violence.

#### PERSONAL FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE

● Mr. DECONCINI. Mr. President, pursuant to a long-standing commitment and belief that all public officials should make full financial disclosure, I am submitting for the RECORD this date a financial report dated December 31, 1977 of DENNIS and Susan DECONCINI. Having supported the new Senate Code of Conduct and believing in strict financial disclosures, I urge all colleagues to comply immediately with such disclosure. It is my hope that the public will have confidence in its public officials when there is an overwhelming effort to all Members of Congress to make such disclosures without reservation.

It is important in our American way of life for public officials to reach out to the American constituency with total candor such as exhibited by the new Code of Conduct and the exemplary efforts of many Members of Congress with their willingness to make financial disclosure a way of life.

Mr. President, I urge the executive branch to impose upon itself, as well as the judicial branch of Government, a requirement to make similar financial disclosure. No one should be afraid of the American people, who we all profess to represent.

I ask that this statement and the accompanying financial report be printed in the RECORD.

The material follows:

SENATOR DENNIS DECONCINI and Mrs. DENNIS (SUSAN) DECONCINI, FINANCIAL REPORT, DECEMBER 31, 1977

SCHORR, LEONARD & FELKER, P.C.,  
Tucson, Ariz.

HON. DENNIS DECONCINI,  
U.S. Senate,  
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR DECONCINI: Pursuant to your instructions, we have prepared a Balance Sheet with accompanying Schedules for the year ending December 31, 1977. The Balance Sheet includes both the separate and community property of you and your wife.

The Balance Sheet and its Schedules were prepared without audit, but were prepared from information we believe reliable, including information supplied by you and information available to our firm by reason of representing you, members of your family, and in the matters involving state and federal taxation, including the preparation of state and federal income tax returns. We conducted such other inquiries that we deemed necessary to determine the assets in

which you have an interest and the extent of your interests therein.

The reported basis of each asset is that basis which would be used in calculating gain or loss for federal income tax purposes.

Based on the foregoing, it is our opinion that the Balance Sheet and Schedules accurately disclose all property, including, but not limited to, real property, partnerships, corporations, trusts, or other entities in which you have a financial interest and the extent of your financial interest therein. This acknowledges that our firm does not have a financial interest in any of the assets.

Sincerely,

SIDNEY LEX FELKER.

SENATOR DENNIS DECONCINI and Mrs. DENNIS (SUSAN) DECONCINI, BALANCE SHEET, DECEMBER 31, 1977

ASSETS	
Current assets:	
Cash in banks.....	\$102,062
Account receivable, Committee for DeConcini for Senate (note 2).....	72,026
Loans receivable, unsecured.....	20,600
Total current assets.....	194,688
Income properties—schedule I:	
Buildings.....	269,685
Less accumulated depreciation.....	78,938
Total.....	190,747
Land.....	103,226
Total rental properties.....	293,973
Other investments:	
Stocks and bonds, schedule II.....	44,186
Undeveloped land.....	72,557
Real estate mortgages and contracts receivable.....	18,756
Real estate partnerships, schedule III.....	192,675
W. M. Investments, an investment club.....	4,205
Roadrunner T. V., a partnership.....	4,569
Cash surrender value, life insurance.....	60,979
Residence, Arizona.....	68,920
Residence, Virginia.....	159,065
Personal property.....	30,831
Assets owned by Susan DeConcini, schedule IV.....	448,432
Total other investments.....	1,105,175
Total assets.....	1,593,836
LIABILITIES AND NET WORTH	
Current liabilities:	
Note payable, secured by savings account.....	27,000
Current portion of long-term debt.....	26,907
Deposits payable.....	300
Total current liabilities.....	54,207
Long-term debt:	
Mortgage notes, secured by rental property, schedule I.....	190,387
Mortgage notes, secured by residences.....	129,224
Mortgage notes, secured by land.....	9,040
Notes payable, unsecured.....	140,837
Mortgage notes secured by real estate owned by Susan DeConcini.....	39,117
Total.....	508,605
Less current portion above.....	26,907
Total long-term debt.....	481,698
Net worth.....	1,057,931
Total liabilities and net worth.....	1,593,836

## SCHEDULE I

SENATOR DENNIS DeCONCINI—SCHEDULE OF INCOME PROPERTIES, DEC. 31, 1977

	Land	Improvements	Accumulated depreciation	Net book value	Mortgages	Mortgagee
Standard Station, Country Club Manor, Pima County, Ariz.....	\$16,322	\$22,019	\$22,019	\$16,322	None	
Tijuana Taco, National City Annex, Pima County, Ariz.....	3,000	27,000	13,259	16,741	\$15,352	I. DeConcini trust.
Circle K and Ages Laundry, National City Annex, Pima County, Ariz.....	1,000	35,070	24,705	11,365	None	
Salem St. parking lot, Mission Beach, Calif.....	27,500			27,500	15,924	Beth V. Paynter.
Sunset Cliff, business rental, Ocean Beach, Calif.....	26,830	85,170	11,924	100,076	62,727	Home Federal Savings (1st), Marie Krause (2d).
Crystal Dr., residential, Pacific Beach, Calif.....	28,574	100,426	7,031	121,969	58,252	American Savings (1st), James Dunlap (2d).
Total.....	103,226	269,685	78,938	293,973	190,387	

## SCHEDULE II

Senator Dennis DeConcini, Schedule of  
Stocks and Bonds, December 31, 1977

Number of shares and name:	Cost					
40 ARCO.....	\$2,432	20 E-Systems.....	420	100 U.S. Filter.....	1,459	
200 Brunswick Corp.....	3,025	119 Fidelity Trend.....	2,500	1 State of Israel Bond.....	1,000	
2 Southwestern Research Corp.....	20	40 Homestake Mining Co.....	1,400	24 Monterey Water Co.....	5,400	
		10 IBM.....	2,692	100 Communication Systems.....	1,738	
		100 Inter-Island Resorts, Ltd.....	516	800 Valley National Bank.....	16,062	
		100 Liberty Corp.....	1,772			
		300 National Airlines.....	3,760	Total.....	44,186	

## SCHEDULE III

SENATOR DENNIS DeCONCINI, SCHEDULE OF REAL ESTATE PARTNERSHIP INTERESTS, DEC. 31, 1977

	Total	3-D properties	2-D properties	4-D properties	DeConcini, Hurley	2-D Larriva	3-D Niles	4-D Gallo	Demby properties
<b>ASSETS</b>									
Real estate (at cost or tax basis):									
Depreciable assets:									
Buildings.....	\$611,047	\$331,878			\$95,551		\$33,052		\$150,566
Other improvements.....	64,690	1,515							63,175
Furnishings.....	12,351	3,273			5,679				3,399
Total.....	688,088	336,666			101,230		33,052		217,140
Less accumulated depreciation.....	209,608	153,604			20,481		14,767		20,756
Net depreciable assets.....	478,480	183,062			80,749		18,285		196,384
Land.....	775,844	155,820	\$55,264	\$295,447	48,835	\$41,548	8,739	\$70,191	100,000
Total real estate.....	1,254,324	338,882	55,264	295,447	129,584	41,548	27,024	70,191	296,384
Other Assets:									
Shopping Center, Inc., stock.....	400,000			400,000					
Mortgage notes receivable.....	234,507		149,091	36,328		28,380		20,708	
Accounts receivable.....	20,986	6,856		14,105				25	
Prepaid expense.....	3,510	1,343							
Cash.....	27,739	1,877	1,428	2,970	5,037	1,206	3,920	9,313	2,167
Total other assets.....	686,742	10,076	150,519	453,403	5,037	29,586	3,920	30,046	4,155
Total assets.....	1,941,066	348,958	205,783	748,850	134,621	71,134	30,944	100,237	300,539
<b>LIABILITIES AND CAPITAL</b>									
Long-term debt:									
Mortgage notes due financial institutions.....	462,882	182,632	28,789	4,875			21,786		224,800
Notes due individuals.....	546,862	69,372		432,490	45,000				
Total long-term debt.....	1,009,744	252,004	28,789	437,365	45,000		21,786		224,800
Other liabilities.....	216,107		184,203	20,759	453	10,555			137
Partners' capital:									
Dennis DeConcini.....	192,675	36,679	(3,604)	71,949	44,584	15,145	1,766	16,706	9,450
Other partners.....	522,540	60,275	(3,605)	218,777	44,584	45,434	7,392	83,531	66,152
Total partners' capital.....	715,215	96,954	(7,209)	290,726	89,168	60,579	9,158	100,237	75,602
Total liabilities and capital.....	1,941,066	348,958	205,783	748,850	134,621	71,134	30,944	100,237	300,539

<sup>1</sup> Condemnation award, deferred gain.<sup>2</sup> Installment sale, deferred gain.

## SCHEDULE IV

Susan DeConcini, statement of financial condition, December 31, 1977

<b>ASSETS</b>	
Current assets:	
Cash in banks.....	\$90,700
Securities.....	57,590
Total current assets.....	148,290
Real estate investments:	
Buildings and investments, California rentals.....	78,897
Less accumulated depreciation.....	36,768
Total.....	42,129
Buildings and improvements, Arizona rentals.....	66,000
Less accumulated depreciation.....	13,523
Total.....	52,477

Land, California rentals.....	39,355
Land, Arizona rentals.....	110,786
One-half interest in 12 acres, Maricopa County, Arizona.....	5,220
One-half interest in 5 acres, Maricopa County, Arizona.....	2,175
One-half interest in 120 acres, Maricopa Garden Farms.....	48,000
Total real estate investments.....	300,142
Total assets.....	448,432

<b>LIABILITIES AND NET WORTH</b>	
Liabilities:	
Mortgages payable, California rentals.....	39,117
Net worth:	
Susan DeConcini.....	409,315
Total liabilities and net worth.....	448,432

Dennis DeConcini: Notes to Balance Sheet and Schedules for year ending December 31, 1977:

Note 1. Assets are reported at that basis which would be used in computing gain or loss for Federal income taxes. No attempt has been made to determine the fair market value of the assets.

Note 2. The receivable of \$72,026 from the Committee for DeConcini for Senate represents loans made by Dennis DeConcini to the Committee. It is impossible as of this date to determine whether the balance or a portion thereof will be paid.®

## SALT TALKS

• Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, we have been reading a lot of reports and speculation these days about the current SALT II treaty negotiations. From all



I can tell at the present time, I have to agree with those who see a strategic disaster looming in the policies of the Carter administration. One thing is crystal clear and that is that we are not negotiating from a position of strength. Another point is that we are approaching this thing from a premise that is entirely different from the one being followed by the Russians. It seems we want a treaty to minimize the risk of nuclear war while the Soviets want a treaty to minimize the risks of our winning a nuclear war.

Mr. President, an excellent article concerning some phases of the SALT negotiations was written recently by Mr. John P. Roche and appeared in the Washington Star under the title "Some Un-savorinesses of SALT." I ask that this article be printed in the RECORD.

The article follows:

#### SOME UNSAVORINESSES OF SALT

(By John P. Roche)

The average citizen reading about our Strategic Arms Limitations Treaty (SALT) negotiations with the Soviets must wonder if he has been accidentally shipped through time to an early Christian council arguing the nature of the Godhead. The arguments are extraordinarily intricate and the debate quasi-theological, with each side assuming—fully in the tradition of the Christian Fathers—the other is out to pull a fast one.

However, there are some basic considerations that provide perspective on the issues. The first and most important is the difference in premises between Washington and Moscow. We want a treaty to minimize the risk of nuclear war; the Soviets want a treaty to minimize the risk of our winning a nuclear war.

They can be the most forthcoming negotiators in history when, as in 1972, they agreed to cut back ballistic missile defense systems—where we had at least a five-year technological headstart. They will, I'm sure, be glad to freeze development of hunter-killer satellites: theirs are operational; ours on the drawing board.

When they spot a major area of U.S. strategic vulnerability, they move firmly to capitalize on it.

Consider the dispute over the character of their new Backfire bomber. If it is deemed "strategic," then each plane must be considered a nuclear delivery vehicle charged against the ceiling of 2,400 accepted by the U.S. and U.S.S.R. at Vladivostok in November 1974. Thus if the 85 Backfires currently operational are "strategic," the Soviets should deactivate 85 missiles.

The Backfire is an elegant plane with a range of about 5,000 miles and a speed maximum two and half times the speed-of-sound (Mach 2.5). It is equipped with air-to-surface missiles which have a range of 450-500 miles at Mach 3 and could carry nuclear warheads. Backfire has allegedly been equipped with cones for aerial refueling.

But is it "strategic"? Moscow says "No!" Why? Because they don't plan to employ it in a strategic mode. Gosh, thanks a lot. Besides, they add, it couldn't make it to the United States and back without refueling. They don't point out it could without refueling, make it from a Soviet base to our east coast and, with no layover, to Cuba.

But American negotiators are extremely reluctant to push the Backfire issue. I suspect their rationale is right out of "Alice in Wonderland."

To put it starkly, we have no air defense system. While the U.S.S.R. has deployed over 2,500 interceptors and well over 10,000 surface-to-air missiles (including the new SA-10 which hits Mach 5), we have practically eliminated the SAMs which once sat around

cities and have some aging F-106s as our "flying coast guard." A while ago when some Soviet snoopers were overflying Atlantic naval maneuvers, the Air Defense Command had to draw on Phantom F-4 fighter-bombers to engage in counter-surveillance.

In short, once we admit that the Soviet Union, like ourselves, has a strategic air command, our nakedness becomes inexcusable. The president of the United States could, I suppose, distribute the World War II training manual on what to do when your unit is strafed by a Japanese Zero: "(from memory) 'Take cover and fire well ahead of the aircraft. One well-aimed bullet has brought down a plane!' There would be a brawl in Congress over whether the risk really exists or has been invented by mad cold warriors and over who is to blame."

All in all, a messy prospect. Let's take a dive and consider the Backfire just a "heavy medium bomber." This seems to be the logic accepted by the president in current SALT talks.

I have limited my discussion to Backfire because it symbolizes so much of the asymmetrical "bargaining" that has been going on in the SALT talks. A decision that Backfire is not strategic gives the Soviets three discrete victories: first, they don't have to decommission 85 existing missiles (plus two a year—the estimated Backfire production). Second, they know and we know the Backfire is a strategic weapon, a freebie above the Vladivostok limit. Third, except for radar to provide warning of its arrival, we have no air defense system against the plane and predictably nothing will be done to remedy this gap in our defenses.

Politicians share with doctors the ability to bury their mistakes and there is a vast vested interest in covering up this strategic miscalculation. Backfire is therefore defined as a heavy medium bomber not to be employed in a strategic capacity. If you don't believe Cy Vance and Paul Warnke, ask Andrei Gromyko. He hasn't told a serious lie since 1972 when he promised Chairman Kissinger the Soviets would never encourage an Arab attack on Israel. ●

#### DR. W. A. BISSON HEALTH CLINIC

● Mr. SASSER. Mr. President, for more than 30 years, Dr. Wheelock Alexander Bisson has provided faithful service to the people of Memphis and Shelby County.

To demonstrate the widespread appreciation for Dr. Bisson's untiring efforts, the Shelby County Quarterly Court passed a resolution to name a health clinic after him. The W. A. Bisson Health Clinic will be an impressive monument to Dr. Bisson's outstanding service to his community.

Dr. Bisson's dedication to providing quality health care for all, regardless of financial resources, provides an inspiring example of an unselfish and dedicated medical practitioner. For years, Dr. Bisson has worked without pay in the Memphis and Shelby County Health Department's Well Child Clinic for low income families.

Dr. Bisson has already earned many honors for his service. In 1966, he was elected second vice president of the National Medical Association. In 1967, he was given the Practitioner of the Year award by the National Medical Association, and was named Tennessee Doctor of the Year by the Volunteer State Medical Association.

to retire this year. But the W. A. Bisson At 80 years of age, Dr. Bisson plans

Health Clinic will carry on his good work after he retires and his legacy of unselfish dedication will be remembered for generations.

I ask that the resolution of the Shelby County Quarterly Court honoring Dr. Bisson and his biography be printed in the RECORD.

The resolution and biography follow:  
RESOLUTION HONORING DR. W. A. BISSON BY NAMING THE WELLINGTON STREET CLINIC FOR HIM

Whereas, Dr. W. A. Bisson has unselfishly served the citizens of Memphis and Shelby County for over thirty years; and

Whereas, Dr. Bisson has donated his services without pay in the Memphis and Shelby County Health Department's Well Child Clinic for low income families; and

Whereas, Dr. Bisson has been the recipient of numerous awards for his dedicated and untiring service to the citizens of Memphis and Shelby County; and

Whereas, The citizens of the Orange Mound community have submitted a petition with over fifteen hundred names requesting that the Wellington Street Health Clinic be renamed for Dr. Bisson, said petition and request being the citizens' manner of showing and expressing their sincere appreciation for Dr. Bisson;

Now, therefore, be it resolved and ordered by the quarterly County Court of Shelby County, Tennessee, That the renaming of the Mitchell Road Health Clinic to the Dr. W. A. Bisson Health Clinic is hereby adopted and approved.

Be it further resolved and ordered, That said name change is an expression of gratitude and honor by the Shelby County Government to Dr. W. A. Bisson.

Be it further resolved and ordered, That the County Mayor and other County officials are hereby authorized to execute any and all documents necessary to effectuate the above name change.

W. A. BISSON, M.D.

Physician: Born in Key West, Florida 1898, son of George Henry Bisson and Sarah Jane Bisson:

B.S. Florida A. & M. University 1922, graduate work at Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass. M.D. Meharry Medical College, Nashville, Tennessee 1929. Married Maude Lee Voorhies on June 2, 1930. Interned at Royal Circle Hospital Memphis, Tennessee 1931-1933. General Practice Memphis since 1933. Clinician Memphis Health Department from 1933 to 1970. He was named Tennessee Doctor of Year by Vol., State Medical Association 1962 and 1963. In 1963 the Vol., State Medical Journal was dedicated to Dr. Bisson.

In 1964 he was given a meritorious achievement award by Florida A. & M. University. On October 28, 1965 Dr. Bisson was honored by the City of Memphis for 35 years of unselfish service. Mayor William Ingram presented him a special citation and Golden Key to the City. The late Dr. Noble Guthrie, Director of Memphis Health Department presented him a plaque and former Tennessee Governor the late Honorable Frank Clement presented him a letter of commendation.

In 1966 he was elected 2nd Vice-President of the National Medical Association. In 1967 he was given the practitioner of the year award by the National Medical Association and also re-elected 2nd Vice-President of that Association at the 72nd Annual Convention at the Chase Park Plaza Hotel in St. Louis, Mo., August 10, 1967. Dr. Bisson is a former State President of the Volunteer State Medical Association. He is also a former State President of the Tennessee Elks. He is a 33 Degree Mason. He is a Member of King Frederick Conistory No. 38. He is a Noble of the Mystic Shrine. He is a member of the Omega Psi Phi Fraternity and an active member of Emmanuel Episcopal Church.

Dr. Bisson holds membership in the American Thoracic Society, The Tenn. Academy of Science, The American Association for the Advancement of Science, The National Public Health Association, The National Medical Association, The Bluff City Medical Society, The Volunteer State Medical Association, The American Medical Association, The Memphis and Shelby County Medical Society, The Tennessee State Medical Association, The National Public Health Association, The National Rehabilitation Association, The Y.M.C.A., The Boy Scouts of America. He is a paid up life member of the N.A.A.C.P.

Dr. Bisson is Secretary of the Bluff City Medical Society. A position he has held for forty years. He is chairman of the Trustee Board of the Volunteer State Medical Association and also Treasurer of the Association. He is also chairman of the Tuberculosis Committee and the Legislative Committee of that Association. Dr. Bisson is a member of the National Sickle Cell Anemia Committee of the Pediatric Section of the National Medical Association. He is also a member of the Cynthia Milk Fund Committee which is the oldest newspaper charity organization in the city of Memphis. This organization supplies free milk to all the needy infants and children in the city of Memphis and Shelby County, Tennessee.

Dr. Bisson is listed in Personalities of the South and Southwest. He is listed in Who's Who in America. He is listed in Tennessee Lives, The Volunteer State Historical Record. He is listed in the Dictionary of International Biography. He is also listed in Community Leaders of America. Dr. Bisson is a Fellow of the International Biographical Association. He is also listed in 2,000 men of Achievement. Dr. Bisson is a member of the International Platform Association, The Intercontinental Biographical Association. He is listed in the National Register of Prominent Americans and International Notables.●

#### HUMAN RIGHTS AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

● Mr. CURTIS. Mr. President, recently a great deal of publicity has been focused on the United States' relationship with South American countries. President Carter has declared "a new cooperative relationship with all of Latin America." This new cooperative relationship with Latin America has resulted in the President negotiating two treaties that will turn over control of the Panama Canal, a canal that is vital to this Nation's interests, to the Republic of Panama. Much attention has been focused on this new relationship between the United States and Panama. Far less attention has been focused on the United States' relationship with another Latin American country, Nicaragua. The American public should become aware of the Carter administration's new relationship with Nicaragua. Because despite Nicaragua's long relationship with the United States and the current government of President Somoza's championing of American interests, the Carter administration has chosen Nicaragua as a "test case" for its human rights initiatives.

The State Department has reported that it will request no military sales credits for Nicaragua for fiscal year 1979 and it will reduce its budget for military training from \$600,000 in 1978 to \$150,000 for 1979. This radical move against a tra-

ditional ally of the United States is apparently due to the Carter administration's desire to punish countries that do not live up to the Anglo-American legal system's definition of human rights.

Apparently the Carter administration has forgotten or deems unimportant the fact that the United States and Nicaragua have had a close association since the mid-19th century and that Nicaragua has twice served as a staging base for American operations against communism in Latin America. In World War II it provided the United States with valuable raw materials for our war effort and during the Korean and Vietnam wars it provided the United States with troop support. Today, at a time when many Latin American countries are seizing and nationalizing American businesses, Nicaragua has welcomed U.S. businesses to their country. While other Latin American countries have become allied with Havana or Moscow, Nicaragua has been a staunch ally to the United States. Nicaragua and the government of President Somoza have played a stabilizing role in Latin America.

This traditional ally of the United States is now being punished for its alleged human rights violations by the Carter administration decision to reduce U.S. arms sales to Nicaragua. These alleged violations are measured by the Anglo-American legal system's idea of what constitutes human rights and often do not take into consideration the differences in political and judicial systems found in other countries. The result is that many countries feel the United States is intruding into their sovereignty and involving itself in their internal affairs. Many countries, such as Brazil and Argentina, renounced agreements with the United States following criticism of their human rights policies. Nicaragua has been one of the most responsive countries to U.S. pressure to conform to our definition of human rights and increase the individual's rights in Nicaragua.

It has recently made great strides forward in human rights. The 3-year state of siege which was instituted following guerrilla assaults in 1974, was lifted the summer of 1977. The charges of serious rights violations by the Nicaragua National Guard have decreased lately and in recent testimony before the House International Relations Subcommittee, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Sally Shelton testified that Nicaragua's human rights record had improved markedly and that the Nicaraguan National Guard had behaved in a restrained manner since the rioting and strikes which followed the death of publisher and opposition leader Pedro Joaquín Chamorro. The result of the loosening of rights and adherence to the Anglo-American definition of human rights has been a growing unrest in Nicaragua and a renewal of terrorist attacks by the Sandinist National Liberation Front, a "liberation" group heavily bankrolled by Fidel Castro.

This attachment of human rights vio-

lation evaluations to military credit sales programs has led not only to cancellation of agreements with the United States by countries who feel the United States is intruding into their internal affairs but it has also forced former allies into exploring military agreements with European and Soviet suppliers. The Soviet military deliveries to Latin America have risen sharply in the last 5 years. In 1972 military arms deliveries to Latin America from the Soviets were negligible, but in 1974 they had risen to \$25 million worth and in 1976 they rose to \$80 million worth.

The danger in the Carter administration's human rights initiative is that a double standard is emerging. The United States in its quest for human rights has intruded upon the sovereignty of nations and their internal affairs. This has had the result of damaging relations with our allies but having no real effect within nations like Russia, Mainland China, Vietnam, and Cuba, whose political opposition and press is controlled and who are not dependent on American aid plans. The United States in its efforts to reopen diplomatic relations with Cuba and deride "inordinate fears of communism" has welcomed countries with far worse records of human rights violations.

The United States and Cuba have opened up interest sections in Washington, D.C., and Havana as a prelude to reopening diplomatic relations with Cuba, despite reports from Amnesty International that there are 20,000 political prisoners in Cuban jails, men and women of the revolution, rotting there for 16, 18, and 20 years for the crime of criticizing Castro. Ugandan pilots continue to be trained in the United States, despite the long list of human rights violations by Uganda's Idi Amin that prompted President Carter to remark that "Uganda's actions has disgusted the entire civilized world." Yet it is reducing aid to Nicaragua, a longtime friend to the United States and a strategic ally in Latin America.

The Carter administration's human rights initiative may have a noble purpose but by linking human rights violations with U.S. aid and military credit sales programs, it has had a detrimental effect on U.S. foreign policy. This policy of using U.S. aid and military sales credits to enforce human rights initiatives should be reevaluated. Reevaluated to insure that alleged human rights violations are based on fact, not rumor. Reevaluated to insure that the definition of human rights takes into consideration the different social, political, and legal systems of each country. Reevaluated to take into account whether or not the individual countries are making efforts to correct past human rights violations and extend the rights of individuals within the country, reevaluated to insure that a double standard of ignoring human rights violations in some countries while strictly enforcing the human rights initiative in others does not occur.

If the Carter administration continues to enforce its human rights initiatives in this manner, then U.S. foreign policy is in grave danger.●



### UNIQUE CANCER SERVICES IN MINNESOTA

● Mrs. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, our country has a restless and enterprising citizenry. Our citizens also exhibit a sense of compassion and the willingness to extend a helping hand to other people. By combining these two features some unique and innovative approaches to service have evolved.

I want to bring to the attention of the Senate a program that is underway at North Memorial Medical Center in Minneapolis, Minn. Under the major program of cancer services at the hospital, they have instituted two support programs to help the individual and the family cope with the devastating effects of cancer.

I believe that my colleagues will find this program of social service of interest as we consider legislation along these lines. We must remember that these types of beginnings need nurturing so that in time they may come to fruition for all our people.

Mr. President, I ask that a brief description of this innovative approach to a very serious human problem be printed in the RECORD.

#### UNIQUE CANCER SERVICES IN MINNESOTA

Cancer Services, at North Memorial Medical Center in Minneapolis, is single minded in its purpose to help persons who have cancer, and their families, to live with this disease. This program is based on the belief that cancer is a chronic, treatable disease. It has been found that by helping people learn to cope, they regain control over their lives and are strengthened by this ability.

An essential factor in these services is the continuity of care as patients and families move from an in-hospital care setting back to their home and community. However, a wide range of activities is offered within Cancer Services. To facilitate the various programs, health care professionals are employed.

Providing a cancer support group is an important part of the program of the Cancer Services. Cancer tends to isolate individuals in their thought processes and in their true feelings from either family or friends, greatly increasing emotional stress.

Through the "Share and Care" group, people are able to share these feelings with others who have similar problems. For one hour each week, group members, along with an oncology nurse, a social worker, a nurse educator, and a chaplain, meet to learn together so that patients can adapt to living with their cancer.

Participants determine the format of each meeting, the topics discussed, and the questions asked. The concern and support of the group goes beyond these meetings.

The group members also serve as advocates to newly diagnosed cancer patients. They support each other when there is a recurrence or a change in treatment.

Some serve on advisory boards for cancer programs and as volunteers for the American Cancer Society. Together, these people are learning to live with, not in spite of, their chronic disease. When one of them dies, they have learned to recognize that death is also a part of life.

The opportunity to study about cancer and its related problems was the basis of a second program offered by Cancer Services at the Center. "I Can Cope" is a structured twelve hour educational course for persons with cancer and their families. The Minnesota Division of the American Cancer Society partially funded the original research

for this program, when it was first developed and implemented in April, 1977 by two Minnesota nurses, Judi Johnson and Nat Norby. It now is offered at the Center every three months. The first goal of the course was to help cancer patients help themselves by learning to live with their chronic disease.

The sessions are based on information from cancer patients. The course contains information requested by people with cancer interests. Additional facts and viewpoints were gathered from up-to-date professional literature as well as from other existing disease programs such as asthma, diabetes and heart disease.

The purpose of the course is to:

Help patients and their families learn to cope with the disease of cancer;

Help them interrupt the focus on internal anxieties and re-focus on external life continuing processes;

Learn what the disease is and the different methods of treatment;

Learn how to handle stress;

Learn how family members can help one another; and

Learn about resources that can help.

Formal evaluation data from the pilot study provides experimental evidence that the use of a structural educational program does help people to adapt to living with their cancer. Study results showed that people who have taken the course increased their knowledge about cancer, increased their sense of purpose in life, and their level of anxiety decreased. Results of in-depth interviews showed that the course gave participants a greater appreciation of life and a more positive attitude toward living.

In April, 1978, these two innovative programs were presented by Ms. Norby and Johnson at the Annual Meetings of the American Society of Clinical Oncology, The American Association for Cancer Research, and the Oncology Nursing Society. The Minnesota Division of the American Cancer Society has contracted to have the content and material of the "I Can Cope" course packaged as a training manual. This will enable other health care professionals to adapt this material to their use.

On the national level the Office of Cancer Communication of the National Cancer Institute has been working on effective and positive programs to help cancer patients and their families during this stressful time. A state of the art paper, *Coping With Cancer*, A Sourcebook for the Health Professional, will soon be finished.

Out of the dire needs of others, Cancer Services has developed into an eminently thoughtful and caring program at North Memorial Medical Center. The current support programs, "Share and Care" and "I Can Cope," have been invaluable in helping to meet the individuals' stress through learning to live and die with cancer. ●

### GABRIEL LEWIS

● Mr. HOLLINGS. Mr. President, many people made important contributions to the ratification of the Panama Canal Treaties. Many of these contributions have been recognized; for others, praise has gone unsung. But no one played more vital a part than Panama's outstanding Ambassador to the United States, Gabriel Lewis. The length of Ambassador Lewis' tenure in Washington has been short. He arrived only a year ago, and already he is departing. But without his tireless energy, his innovative diplomacy, and his friendly demeanor, the job of ratifying the canal treaties would have been immeasurably more difficult—perhaps impossible.

The story was told very well in last

Sunday's edition of the Washington Post by Haynes Johnson. I think it is an account that should be widely circulated and read, and for that reason I ask that the article, from the May 7 Washington Post, be printed in today's edition of the RECORD.

Ambassador Lewis arrives home in Panama to the grateful appreciation of his people. For them he has helped turn a dream of 75 years into a reality. He leaves the United States with the appreciation of everyone who has been involved in the long and arduous ratification process. He takes his leave from our Capitol City sooner than anyone anticipated. But he got the job done while he was here, and now he moves on. He has been the right man in the right place at the right time for the past year, and I count myself fortunate in having had the opportunity of knowing and working with this extraordinary man and Ambassador. Everyone in Panama, everyone in the United States, is in his debt for a job well done.

The article follows:

#### ROOKIE DIPLOMAT WINS ONE IN THE BIG LEAGUES, THEN RETIRES

(By Haynes Johnson)

Exactly one year ago Gabriel Lewis arrived in Washington, brimming with energy and an understandable sense of trepidation. He was an unknown, taking on a tough and delicate mission in a field in which he was unfamiliar. Now he's heading home, mission accomplished, and carrying with him the affection of a wide range of Washington types who operate in this hard and cynical city.

He's a success story in what seems a day of failures. More important, he's a reminder that the old saw about good guys finishing last isn't always true.

The manner of his departure is as striking as his arrival. In a city where longevity counts more than originality and official status often rates higher than personal competence, Gabriel Lewis offers a refreshing exception. He's leaving just when his own personal prestige and status have risen, and the prospect of a comfortable Washington tenure beckons.

None of that seemed at all certain just a year ago. Then Lewis stood at the bottom of the State Department's protocol list, or "Order of Precedence" as the ranking of diplomats is stuffily called. His assignment was unenviable: to carry the case of Panama into the charged atmosphere of domestic American politics.

He had been in Washington less than two weeks when the call came to present his credentials as Panama's new ambassador to Jimmy Carter in the White House. Lewis, a man of unbounding exuberance, was elated. He would have an immediate chance to give his views on passage of a new Panama Canal treaty. His hopes were shortlived. The State Department told him there wouldn't be time to discuss substantive issues with the president; the meeting was a formality—a polite hello, a quick goodbye.

Carter had been in Europe when the White House visit was scheduled. But as soon as he came back, the president took a direct hand. He told the State Department he wanted the meeting with Lewis to be more than ceremonial; it should be a chance for a serious discussion of the canal treaty issues. Lewis was so instructed.

The ambassador was nervous when he entered the Oval Office.

"I apologized to him," he remembers. "I said, 'Mr. President, I'm not a diplomat. Forgive me if I make a breach of etiquette. I don't know much about protocol. I'm a

businessman, and I don't have a background in this type of work."

Carter replied: "Look, don't worry about that. I'm a farmer. I don't know anything about protocol, either."

The president made a further statement as he received the credentials: he meant business about the canal issue. "He was 'willing to put all of his prestige on the line over the canal. That's what he told me,'" Lewis recalls.

From that moment, Gabriel Lewis' life became a whirlwind of activity as he participated in one of the more unusual diplomatic missions of our times.

Looking back now, Lewis seems to find it hard to absorb. He shuttled between Panama and Washington some 30 times. From personal obscurity and beginning as a novice at diplomacy he quickly found himself consulting intimately and frequently with the mighty—in the Pentagon, in the State Department, in the White House.

For nearly eight months until the de-nouement his stocky, jaunty figure became so familiar that White House guards greeted him with "Hi'ya, Gabriel" as he made his executive office rounds. He was averaging four White House visits a week in those months—surely more diplomatic appointments than any other ambassador of the Carter presidency, and what must rank as among the more frequent high-level diplomatic contacts in our history.

As the treaty fight grew more complex—and endangered—Lewis' dealings became increasingly intricate. The early perception that all the problems would be resolved with the actual signing of the treaties in Washington, amid the glare of the TV cameras, quickly dissipated. Ratification was going to be more difficult than even he anticipated.

There was the private White House coordination to be considered; there was the sensitivity of the Senate, and the necessary massaging of egos; there was the political opposition to be countered.

Lewis, with the assistance of the White House, worked at organizing Senate tours in Panama. Group after group went until 55 senators in all had made the trip, each one personally led by Lewis.

"We wanted them to see that another country cannot have another country inside its borders," he explains. "We wanted to show them—look, if you're a fair people, I'm sure you wouldn't like this type of arrangement. It's emotional. It's like not wanting your neighbor to be all day in your kitchen."

The real crisis came, of course, at the end when the Senate adopted language by the freshman legislator from Arizona, Dennis DeConcini, that raised all the old fears in Latin America about Yankee intervention and gunboat diplomacy.

The situation became so sticky that Lewis found himself in the midst of a melodrama—secret flights in rented jets under assumed names to an abandoned U.S. military base in Florida; clandestine gatherings on strategy, with the adoption of codes to be used in communicating progress on the treaty battle; pre-arranged public announcements to hide goings and comings and throw a pursuing press off the real story.

And the climax of all this secret scurrying came in Frank Church's Senate office, with Majority Leader Robert Byrd kneeling on the floor and bending over a low desk to draft language that would break the impasse and be acceptable both to Panama and the U.S. Senate. There were five drafts until the final one was worked out on Sunday, April 16.

"Byrd told me that if we accepted that language he was willing to fight for it even if he had to go down with it," Lewis remembers.

The language was coded and dispatched to Panama. Back came the reply from Panama's leader, Gen. Omar Torrijos: "La Mula Tumo a Genaro—the donkey threw the horse." Agreement, acceptance, followed by another message to Byrd: "You're the captain. Take the ship to port and you can be sure I'll have the pier in the right place."

Gabriel Lewis is now packing his bags, winding up his affairs and getting ready to leave. He's resigning as ambassador, and going back to his paper and box manufacturing business. He's an emotional person, and he views what happened in those terms. He speaks with an old-fashioned fervor:

"This has been the year in which I've met the most interesting people in my life. I have found that the American people are really people that believe in fair play, in not doing to others what they don't like being done to themselves. And the proof of that is the approval of the canal treaties."

"I dreamed about this the whole time, because I could visualize my country going to pieces if this was not done. I love my country very much, and now it's time to go back to another part of my life. After everything that's happened this year, the job as ambassador would be very dull. So I have to look for action somewhere else."

He takes away his memories, and the good will of many. That's better than can be said about many other departures from Washington. And he carries with him one treasured memento. It's a photograph, taken the final day in the White House, with the inscription "To Gabriel from his friend Jimmy Carter." Underneath the president wrote a postscript: "We both won."

And so they did. ●

#### JUDGE WILLIAM O. BEACH

● Mr. SASSER. Mr. President, I am delighted to bring to the attention of my colleagues the election of Judge William O. Beach of Montgomery County, Tennessee, as president of the National Association of Regional Councils. The NARC plays a major role in the development and implementation of domestic policy throughout the country.

Adding to this honor and distinction is the fact that he is also serving as president of the National Association of Counties. To my knowledge, this is the first instance of a person serving in these two positions at the same time.

As a fellow Tennessean, I am proud that my friend Bill Beach has reached this high level of achievement. As a legislator, I am encouraged that Congress will be able to draw on the resourcefulness and the insight of this man in his capacity of national leadership.

An honor graduate of Vanderbilt Law School, William O. Beach held city and county judicial offices before being elected Montgomery County judge in 1961. He served as president of the Tennessee County Judges Association in 1965 and of the Tennessee Mental Health Association. He was a member of the Tennessee Judicial Conference and American Judicature Society from 1961 to 1974, and of the Tennessee Law Enforcement Planning Commission from 1970 to 1971. Currently, Judge Beach is a member of the board of the Tennessee County Services Association and is in his third 4-year term as vice chairman of the State board of tax equalization.

His expertise, knowledge and experi-

ence at the regional level comes from his service as President of the Mid-Cumberland Council of Governments and Mid-Cumberland Development District from 1969 to 1970, his membership in the Mid-Cumberland Regional Health Planning Conference from 1967 to 1971, his current membership on the board of directors and as finance chairman of the Middle Tennessee Health Systems Agency.

Nationally, Judge Beach has served as chairman of the National Citizen Advisory Board on Youth Opportunity and as a member of the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations. Prior to his recent election, Judge Beach served as second vice president of the National Association of Regional Councils.

Judge Beach is energetic, he is imaginative, and he is determined to have a positive impact on the way this Government works. With his dual national roles as President of the National Association of Counties and President of the National Association of Regional Councils, Judge William O. Beach has the opportunity to bring his wisdom and his energy to bear on the problems that confront us as a nation. We would all do well, Mr. President, to listen carefully to his advice. ●

#### LEGAL SERVICES FOR THE ELDERLY NOW UNDER CONSIDERATION BY CONGRESS

● Mrs. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, legal services for seniors are a local priority in nearly every region of Minnesota. Several areas now have senior citizens legal projects but only a fraction of the older persons in the State can presently be served. Several successful projects which have been funded under title III of the Older Americans Act are reaching the end of the 3-year funding cycle. The future of legal services for seniors, especially in the rural areas, depends in large part on the passage of legislation such as Senator KENNEDY's bill S. 2394.

I am a cosponsor of S. 2394 and S. 2969, Senator CHURCH's Older Americans Act Amendments of 1978, which incorporates the Kennedy proposal as a separate legal services section under title III. Under these measures, appropriations of \$75 million would be authorized over 3 years for legal services.

I believe that the Older Americans Act should be made more responsive to the needs of the elderly. The establishment of a well funded legal services program for seniors would greatly enhance the Older Americans Act.

S. 2394 is designed to make more readily available legal services—to middle income aged—and fees to fund services when a legal problem occurs. Unfortunately, the middle income aged frequently have too much income to qualify for existing legal services programs but not enough income to pay attorney fees. This legislation will complement existing legal service corporation programs serving the elderly poor.

The Minnesota Board on Aging has an-



nounced its strong endorsement for such a legal services program. The elderly not only face the same legal problems as other citizens. They also experience legal problems that are unique to their age group—for example, age discrimination in employment, protection with respect to nursing home care, involuntary commitment, and enforcement of pension rights.

The Kennedy/Church proposals, which I fully support, would authorize grants to State agencies on aging to support a staff person within the agency to oversee and coordinate the delivery of legal services to the elderly and provide legal advice and technical assistance on a wide range of issues. Authorizations would be in the amount of \$20 million for fiscal year 1979, \$25 million for fiscal year 1980 and \$30 million for fiscal year 1981.

All too often, when seniors reach retirement age and start to rely upon Federal programs—such as supplemental security income, social security, medicare, railroad retirement, and other Government pension and retirement programs—legal problems surface. The elderly are often confused by the numerous regulations, guidelines, and application requirements. It is a sad fact that some needy seniors forfeit their rights because they are unable to obtain legal assistance. The provision of legal recourse and guidance for the elderly is our responsibility.

Although there already are several successful legal service projects which have been funded under title III, only a fraction of older persons can presently be served. I encourage my colleagues to support these measures. Legal services projects have a great potential for helping seniors to help themselves and improve access to a multitude of other services.●

#### FULL VOTING REPRESENTATION IN CONGRESS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA—CASUALTY FIGURES FOR THE VIETNAM WAR

● Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, House Joint Resolution 554, now on the Senate Calendar, would amend the Constitution to enable citizens of the District of Columbia to elect Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives.

One of the most important arguments in favor of House Joint Resolution 554 is contained in the statistics of the Department of Defense on casualties in the Vietnam War. The figures indicate that 237 citizens of the District lost their lives in Vietnam. That casualty level is higher than the levels for 10 States—Alaska, Delaware, Idaho, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Vermont, and Wyoming.

The people of those 10 States, and of every other State, were represented in the House and Senate throughout the period of the Vietnam War. These people had a voice in the decisions of Congress on the war, decisions that affected the lives of so many thousands of their citizens who were asked and compelled

to serve their country in that war. But the 700,000 citizens of the District of Columbia had no such representation and no such voice.

Mr. President, we cannot remedy that injustice for the past. But we can do so for the future. At a time when Congress exerts such a profound and growing influence over so many different aspects of American life, the people of the District of Columbia have a right to be heard in our deliberations. House Joint Resolution 554 would give them the voice they deserve.

Mr. President, I ask that a table showing the State-by-State casualty figures for the Vietnam War be printed in the RECORD.

The table follows:

CASUALTIES INCURRED BY U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL IN THE VIETNAM WAR (JAN. 1, 1961, THROUGH SEPT. 30, 1977)

State	Hostile deaths	Nonhostile deaths	Total
Alabama	973	214	1,187
Alaska	38	17	55
Arizona	495	109	604
Arkansas	475	105	580
California	4,502	970	5,472
Colorado	489	120	609
Connecticut	492	98	590
Delaware	103	17	120
District of Columbia	183	54	237
Florida	1,546	359	1,905
Georgia	1,266	284	1,550
Hawaii	223	51	274
Idaho	159	51	210
Illinois	2,361	522	2,883
Indiana	1,257	256	1,513
Iowa	685	135	820
Kansas	499	115	614
Kentucky	850	189	1,039
Louisiana	701	171	872
Maine	263	69	332
Maryland	822	174	996
Massachusetts	1,067	236	1,303
Michigan	2,201	402	2,603
Minnesota	878	175	1,053
Mississippi	502	128	630
Missouri	1,111	273	1,384
Montana	197	63	260
Nebraska	304	82	386
Nevada	122	22	144
New Hampshire	176	42	218
New Jersey	1,192	246	1,438
New Mexico	318	74	392
New York	3,333	710	4,043
North Carolina	1,288	292	1,580
North Dakota	157	37	194
Ohio	2,486	543	3,028
Oklahoma	817	158	975
Oregon	560	132	692
Pennsylvania	2,492	581	3,073
Rhode Island	167	33	200
South Carolina	725	158	883
South Dakota	141	46	187
Tennessee	1,058	219	1,277
Texas	2,710	622	3,332
Utah	285	68	353
Vermont	79	21	100
Virginia	997	276	1,273
Washington	823	196	1,019
West Virginia	582	133	715
Wisconsin	937	196	1,133
Wyoming	96	21	117
Total	46,182	10,265	56,447

#### MINNEAPOLIS PEDESTRIAN SAFETY PROGRAM FOR SENIORS

● Mrs. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, the Minneapolis Police Department, Senior Citizen Centers of Greater Minneapolis, Inc., and other civic minded local organizations have taken the initiative to sponsor a "Step Rightly" program aimed at making seniors more aware of the "rights and wrongs" of pedestrian activity.

The majority of the pedestrians killed on Minneapolis streets are senior citizens and, what is worse, the number of senior traffic victims has increased dramatically in recent years.

Statistics from the Minneapolis Police Department show that most senior citizen accident victims are struck at intersections by cars making left turns. One police officer explained that—

Older people tend to watch their feet and the ground when crossing streets, instead of the traffic.

He added that several accidents have occurred when people stepped off buses and attempted to cross in front of a bus or behind it rather than moving to the sidewalk and crossing after the bus had departed.

These facts have prompted the creation of a hard-hitting educational program designed to reduce the toll among senior citizens. I wish to commend the various community organizations in the Minneapolis area for initiating the "Step Rightly" program and urge other cities to develop pedestrian safety programs for the elderly in their communities.●

#### TRIBUTE TO TOM ANDERSON: A GREAT SPORTSWRITER

● Mr. SASSER. Mr. President, recently sports fans throughout Tennessee mourned the passing of one of the great sportswriters of our time, Tom Anderson of the Knoxville Journal.

Tom was a great wordsmith and a keen student of human nature. He had the uncanny ability to see the human side of sports and the good humor to point up the amusing side, not only in sports but in other dimensions of life.

It has been said that Tom Anderson could have made more money in other places because of his writing skills and his wit. But he chose to remain in Knoxville with the people and the paper he loved.

Tom brought smiles and chuckles to thousands of Tennesseans everyday—and it is sad indeed to mourn the passing of this fine man. I want to extend to his wife and the other members of his family this expression of sympathy in their loss and bereavement.

I would like to place in the RECORD an editorial from the Knoxville Journal commenting on his passing. The editorial follows:

#### TOM ANDERSON

Perhaps no newspaper writer in the history of Knoxville journalism ever entertained his readers over a longer period of time than Tom Anderson, who died this past Sunday at the age of 75.

Tom's career spanned 40 years, from 1938 until shortly before his death. Two generations of Knoxville Journal readers looked forward each morning to his column, Up Close, expecting the best in wit and writing style, and he never disappointed them.

Tom was more than just a sportswriter. Although sports was the main theme of his articles, he often branched into other areas of the contemporary scene. He was a humor-

ist, a commentator, a critic, and, above all, a gifted writer of enormous natural talent.

He despised hypocrisy, and he enjoyed pricking the bubbles of inflated egos. But at heart he was a very gentle and shy man, and his barbs never sank deeply enough to hurt anyone. The Journal and its readers will miss him. ●

#### HOW UNITED STATES CAN BOOST EXPORT TRADE, STRENGTHEN DOLLAR

● Mr. STEVENSON. Mr. President, I call to the attention of my colleagues an article by Senator BROOKE which appeared in the Boston Globe on May 1. Senator BROOKE calls for a national export policy to help reduce our mounting trade deficit and suggests a number of measures the Federal Government can take to increase U.S. trade competitiveness.

The Subcommittee on International Finance has been holding hearings on export policy for several months. Additional hearings are scheduled for May 16 and 17, on high technology exports and research and development and on foreign barriers to U.S. exports. The hearings have attracted interest, and I am hopeful that the recommendations which will result from the subcommittee's study will attract strong support.

Mr. President, I ask that the article by Senator BROOKE be printed in the RECORD.

The article follows:

#### HOW U.S. CAN BOOST EXPORT TRADE, STRENGTHEN DOLLAR

(By EDWARD W. BROOKE)

The United States continues to run an enormous trade deficit, \$9.5 billion for the first three months of this year, and the value of the dollar in the international exchange markets has yet to stabilize, despite massive intervention by both the Federal Reserve System and European central banks.

Though there are several long-term steps that can be taken to redress the trade imbalance, including energy conservation and the development of alternative energy sources, one obvious and immediate step is to promote US exports vigorously.

Despite the fact that the United States is still the world's biggest exporter, our share of total world exports has declined significantly from 28.6 percent in 1960 to 19.9 percent in 1977. Furthermore, US exports grew only 4.6 percent last year, the lowest growth rate since 1971, while the exports of our major competitors grew up to five times as fast.

The decline in United States export performance can be attributed largely to the aggressive export policies of our trading competitors and to the lack of any real national export policy in this country.

Export credit assistance offered by other nations goes far beyond what the United States offers. Such assistance includes mixed credits (combining Export credit and foreign aid), inflation and exchange-rate fluctuation, insurance, foreign content and local cost financing and large credit lines that are available for extended periods.

It is obvious that we need to reassess our thinking on exports and recognize that export growth must be an integral part of any plan to deal with the trade deficit.

A well-defined national export policy,

stating objectives and establishing priorities, should be the first step.

Further, we should:

(1) Reauthorize the Export-Import Bank and increase its commitment authority. We should also encourage the bank to offer competitive rates and terms to those offered by similar export credit agencies abroad whenever necessary to avoid the loss of an export due to a financing decision.

(2) Increase our export promotion efforts, by restructuring and coordinating the present programs of Commerce, State, and Eximbank and by educating small- and medium-sized businesses and regional banks in the art of exporting, identifying potential export markets for US products and services, providing complete foreign country economic and market data and utilizing US embassy personnel overseas.

(3) Continue to negotiate for trade liberalization and the elimination of predatory export credit practices in international forums such as the Multilateral Trade Negotiations and the OECD, as well as in bilateral negotiations. A strong US export posture will increase the likelihood of reaching a new international consensus on export promotion and credit practices.

(4) Not phase out the Domestic International Sales Corporation (DISC) program. DISC stimulates US exports by providing a tax incentive for US companies to expand their export operations and by partially offsetting the substantial tax advantages provided our foreign trading competitors by their governments.

(5) Examine our antitrust laws to determine whether they unnecessarily limit the ability of our exporters to compete. We should reappraise the Webb-Pomeroy Act, which was enacted in 1918 to promote exports but which has been used only sparingly. We should consider changes in the act to encourage its utilization.

(6) Increase government support of research and development in high technology areas. Our comparative trade advantage historically has been in R & D intensive products. R & D expenditures (as percent of GNP), though, have declined steadily in the US for the past 10 years compared with increases of 40 percent and 74 percent, respectively, in Germany and Japan during the same period.

We cannot continue to run a huge trade deficit or allow the dollar to remain unstable for any length of time. To do so could result in higher inflation, loss of jobs, greater protectionist pressures and a slowdown of economic growth worldwide. These dangers can be avoided if we move expeditiously to implement an export-oriented trade policy. And by making clear our intention to redress our trade imbalance, we can send a signal to the foreign-exchange markets that the dollar will continue to be a sound medium of exchange for international transactions. ●

#### WORLD CITIZENS ASSEMBLY SUPPORTS THE U.N. SPECIAL SESSION ON DISARMAMENT

● Mr. CRANSTON. Mr. President, the United Nations General Assembly will hold a special session devoted to disarmament this May and June—only the 9th special session held in the 33-year history of the United Nations. My deep hope is that this session will focus attention of all nations on the great challenges facing our common goal of a peaceful world.

Much of our own national energy has been focused on the SALT talks, a bilateral forum for discussing only strategic nuclear weapons. This focus is understandable given the immense destructive potential of these weapons.

At the same time, however, all nations are involved to some degree in a continuing arms buildup—of the most sophisticated conventional to the most bizarre and highly technical weapons.

While we strive to reach a good SALT II agreement with the Soviet Union which would, for the first time, mandate the destruction of existing nuclear weapons, both countries are developing weapons which could destroy the very satellites by which we verify existing arms control agreements.

We have initiated bilateral negotiations to stop these antisatellite weapons, but past experience shows that reaching agreement will be a long hard process.

But, I am optimistic that peoples throughout the world will continue to commit themselves to reversing the arms race. The fact that this U.N. special session on disarmament will be held is evidence of the commitment by many.

The World Citizens Assembly, a group of distinguished supporters of the special sessions, has its secretariat in my State of California.

At the second World Citizens Assembly meeting in Paris last July, the 600 delegates, representing 25 countries, unanimously adopted a resolution which it has presented to the Secretary General of the United Nations.

Mr. President, I ask that the World Citizens Assembly's resolution and list of distinguished sponsors of the resolution be printed in the RECORD in recognition of the great efforts made by this group on behalf of world peace.

The resolution and sponsors follow:

#### WORLD CITIZENS ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION TO END THE ARMS RACE

"The future of mankind depends on the capacity of the present generation to realize this interdependence (the link between disarmament, development, and security) and take urgent action at the international level to achieve the necessary progress in disarmament."—Kurt Waldheim, Secretary General, United Nations

Whereas, the priority task facing the world community is to stop the arms race; to achieve drastic reductions in military expenditures, together with programs converting the arms industry into peaceful production; and

Whereas, it is essentially through ending the arms race that a new world economic order can be funded which will provide a more equitable distribution of the world's wealth and resources, and assure an improved quality of life for the people of the earth; and

Whereas, negotiations between the major powers, including the SALT agreements, have failed to slow the arms race, and the world arms trade continues to escalate; and Whereas, concrete steps toward controlled disarmament can lead to a strengthened United Nations with the authority to settle disputes between nations through the framework of world law; and

Whereas, the central purpose of the United Nations Charter is to end the scourge of war, the corollary is to implement this principle by all peaceful means;



Therefore, be it resolved that the World Citizens Assembly, meeting with 600 delegates from 25 countries in Paris, July, 1977, appeals to all peoples, all governments, and all NGOs to support the United Nations General Assembly on Disarmament in 1978; to arouse public opinion through persuasion and direct action, in order to insure that this most crucial Assembly attains positive results;

Further, be it resolved that the World Citizens Assembly, seeking a significant input at the Special Assembly on Disarmament, appeals to the Secretary General and the organizers of the Special Session to permit the full participation of peoples' organizations as well as governments in this historic opportunity to save humanity.

The following list of individuals and organizations have endorsed the World Citizens Assembly Resolution to end the arms race:

## NOBEL LAUREATES

Dr. Hannes Alfvén, 1970 (Physics), Swedish.  
 Dr. Christian Anfinsen, 1972 (Chemistry), American.  
 Dr. Kenneth Arrow, 1972 (Economic Science), American.  
 Lord Philip Noel-Baker, 1959 (Peace), British.  
 Sir Frank Burnet, 1960 (Medicine or Physiology), Australian.  
 Mairead Corrigan, 1976 (Peace), Irish.  
 Dr. Andre Cournand, 1956 (Medicine or Physiology), American.  
 Dr. Christian de Duve, 1974 (Medicine or Physiology), Belgian.  
 Dr. Paul Glory, 1974 (Chemistry), American.  
 Dr. Ilya M. Frank, 1958 (Physics), Russian.  
 Dr. Ragnar Granit, 1967 (Medicine or Physiology), Swedish.  
 Dr. Albert Szent-Gyorgyi, 1937 (Medicine or Physiology), Hungarian-American.  
 Dr. Odd Hassel, 1969 (Chemistry), Norwegian.  
 Dr. Alfred Hershey, 1969 (Medicine or Physiology), American.  
 Dr. Gerhard Herzberg, 1971 (Chemistry), Canadian.  
 Dr. Dorothy Crowfoot Hodgkin, 1964 (Chemistry) British.  
 Dr. Francois Jacob, 1965 (Medicine or Physiology) French.  
 Dr. Brian Josephson, 1973 (Physics), British.  
 Dr. Alfred Kastler, 1966 (Physics), French.  
 Dr. Wassily Leontief, 1973 (Economic Science), American.  
 Dr. Konrad Lorenz, 1973 (Medicine or Physiology), Austrian.  
 Dr. Salvador Luria, 1969 (Medicine or Physiology), American.  
 Dr. Andre Lwoff, 1965 (Medicine or Physiology), French.  
 Sean MacBride, 1974 (Peace), Irish.  
 Dr. Rudolf Mossbauer, 1961 (Physics), German.  
 Dr. Robert Mulliken, 1966 (Chemistry), American.  
 Gunnar Myrdal, 1974 (Economic Science), Swedish.  
 Dr. Severo Ochoa, 1959 (Medicine or Physiology), American.  
 Dr. George Palade, 1974 (Medicine or Physiology), American.  
 Dr. Linus Pauling, 1954 (Chemistry), 1962 (Peace), American.  
 Dr. Max Perutz, 1962 (Chemistry), British.  
 Dr. James Rainwater, 1975 (Physics), American.  
 Dr. T. Reichstein, 1950 (Medicine or Physiology), Swiss.  
 Dr. Hugo Theorell, 1955 (Medicine or Physiology), Swedish.  
 Dr. Jan Tinbergen, 1969 (Economic Science), Dutch.  
 Dr. Nikolaas Tinbergen, 1973 (Medicine or Physiology), Dutch.

Dr. Charles Townes, 1964 (Physics), American.  
 Dr. Harold C. Urey, 1934 (Chemistry), American.

Dr. George Wald, 1967 (Medicine or Physiology), American.

Dr. James Watson, 1962 (Medicine or Physiology), American.

Patrick White, 1973 (Literature), Australian.

Betty Williams, 1976 (Peace), Irish.  
 International Peace Bureau, 1910 (Peace).  
 Simeon O. Adebo, former Under Secretary-General, United Nations; former Ambassador of Nigeria to the United Nations.

Frank Allaun, Member of Parliament (England); Chairman, Labour Action for Peace.

R.K.R. Alston, President of the United Nations Association of Australia.\*

A. T. Ariyaratne, President, Lanka Jatika Sarvodaya Shramadana Sangamaya, Sri Lanka.

Dr. Frank Barnaby, Director, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.

Dimitri Bitsios, former Permanent Representative of Greece to the United Nations.

Rev. Eugene Blake, former Secretary General, World Council of Churches.

H. E. Mr. Frank Boatén, Ambassador of Ghana to the United Nations.

Arthur Booth, Chairman, International Peace Bureau, Switzerland.

Marjorie Boehm, President, U.S. Section, Women's International League for Peace and Freedom.

Harry Bridges, President Emeritus, International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union.

Center of Economic and Social Studies of the Third World, Mexico.

Ruth Gage-Colby, U.N. Representative, Another Mother for Peace.

Dr. Jerome Davis, author, peaceworker, recipient of the Gandhi Peace Prize.

Ernest DeMalo, U.N. Representative, World Federation of Trade Unions.\*

Samuel Day Jr., Editor, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.

Ahmad Subardjo Djoyoadisurjo, former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Indonesia; President, Indonesian Institute of International Affairs.

Dr. Luther Evans, former Director-General, UNESCO.

Archbishop Angelo Fernandes, President, World Conference on Religion and Peace; Archbishop of Delhi.

Howard Frazier, Executive Director, Promoting Enduring Peace, USA.

Dr. Carlton B. Goodlett, President, National Newspaper Publishers Association, Black Press of America.

Canon Raymond Goor, Lenin International Peace Prize.

Rev. Gerard Grant, President of the Executive Council, World Association of World Federalists.\*

Dr. Lucille Green, President of the Executive Committee, World Citizens Assembly.

George Hakim, former Chairman of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, Lebanon.

Brigadier General Hugh Hester, U.S. Army (retired).

Dr. Yasumi Hirose, Chairman of Japan Religious Leaders Committee for World Federation.

Dr. Kazuteru Hitaka, Executive Director, United World Federalists of Japan.

Walter Hoffmann, Chairman, Campaign for U.N. Reform.

The Honorable Hubert Humphrey, U.S. Senator, former U.S. Vice-President.

India Federation of United Nations Associations.

Elena Gil Izquierdo, President, Movement for Peace and Sovereignty of the People, Cuba.

P. A. Curtis Joseph, Nigerian Peace Council

James Avery Joyce, author, consultant at the United Nations

Revas King, President, SERVAS International

Bhupendra Kishore, Asian Secretariat, Service Civil International, India

Shinichi Kato, Director, World Citizens Center, Hiroshima

Funmilayo Ransome Kuti, President, Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, Nigeria

Dr. Harry Lerner, Executive Director, The Coalition for International Cooperation and Peace, USA

Victor Lloyd, Director, SANE, USA

Claran McKeown, Chairman, Community of Peace People, Northern Ireland

Dr. Margaret Mead, Anthropologist

Rev. Toshio Miyake, Vice-President, World Conference on Religion and Peace

Kathleen Tacchi-Morris, President, Women for Disarmament, England

Dr. Robert Muller, Director of Coordination, Special Agencies, United Nations

Eeva-Liisa Myllymaki, President, Finnish Peace Research Association

C. V. Narasimhan, Under-Secretary-General for Inter-Agency Affairs and Coordination, United Nations

Pastor Martin Niemoller, former President, World Council of Churches, Lenin International Peace Prize

B. P. Nigam, Advocate, Delhi High Court

Savitri Nigam, former Member of Parliament; Special Advisor to the 26th Session of the United Nations, India

Shella Oakes, General Secretary, National Peace Council, England

Alan Paton, author, politician, human rights leader, South Africa

Aurelio Peccol, Founder, Club of Rome

Franco Perna, Director, International Secretariat, Service Civil International, Luxembourg

Dr. John Robbins, President, World Federalists of Canada

H.E. Mr. Zenon Rossides, Ambassador of Cyprus to the United Nations

Elliman A.S.P. Sarr, Secretary General, International Organization of Good Templars, Gambia

Dr. Harold Snyder, former Executive Director, American Friends Service Committee

Soviet Peace Committee, USSR

Detha Tai, Secretary, United Nations Association of Jamaica

Dr. Cahit Talas, Chairman of the Turkish United Nations Association

Yoshiharu Tamaoki, Director, Japan-Asia Association

Rene Wadlow, Editor, Transnational Perspectives, Switzerland

Norman Walbek, Executive Director, Consortium on Peace Research, Education, and Development, USA.

\*Organization listed for identification purpose only.●

THE RIGHT TO KNOW, THE RIGHT TO ACT

● Mr. PELL. Mr. President, the flood of unauthorized words released in the Warsaw Pact states as a result of the 1975 Helsinki Accord is a seminal development which Americans and others have been slow to appreciate and comprehend.

Freedom of expression is such a commonplace of our democracy that we may tend to undervalue the power of the word.

In societies where the state monopolizes the marketplace of ideas, neither the authorities nor those who hold other views make that mistake. For both the issue is clear: Free expression and the unhampered flow of information erode the

power of any one group to impose its rule and its dogma on the mass.

Much of that uncensored post-Helsinki outpouring from Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union has reached us in abridged and disjointed form. Primarily through Western press accounts and occasionally in the testimony of exiles, we have heard the voices of dissent more as a Babel than a concerted chorus. Nevertheless, taken together, these voices represent a powerful new factor in the Communist world—a force which over time can lead to fundamental change.

Under its mandate to monitor implementation of the Helsinki Accord, the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe has been systematically following the currents of protest in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, Romania and the U.S.S.R. This week the Commission has published the first English-language compilation of the documents of Helsinki-related dissent from those countries.

The volume, titled "The Right to Know, the Right to Act," brings together an extraordinary sampling of authors and subject matters. The writers include coal miners and hotel porters in Romania, a pop singer in Czechoslovakia and an actress in Poland, Orthodox priests, a former metal worker and political prisoners in the Soviet Union. They report on harassments as seemingly petty as disconnected telephones and as obviously terrifying as forcible psychiatric confinement. They plead for the rights of dispossessed ethnic minorities to return to their land and of divided families to be reunited. They document censorship of subjects ranging from religious expression to economic information.

Together, in this volume they present the two unifying, democratic themes of dissent in the Communist world: Respect for the rule of law and for the right to exchange information and ideas openly. In principle VII of the Helsinki Accord, the 35 signatory states pledged to respect the "right of the individual to know and act upon his rights and duties" in the field of human rights. The volume just published by the CSCE Commission demonstrates how individuals in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, basing their actions on respect for domestic and international law, have undertaken to make that pledge a reality. It shows the coherence of dissent and the courage of dissenters. I recommend it to my colleagues for their thoughtful study. ●

#### CONTINUING TRAGEDY OF CAMBODIA

● Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, although developments in Cambodia remain closed to the view, and certainly to the comprehension, of the international community, what news that does emerge continues to tell of a massive human tragedy.

As I noted several months ago, and in a Refugee Subcommittee report last year, refugees remain a key source of first-hand information on events in Cambodia.

Their stories tell of a grim and systematic program of repression, cruelty and bloodshed on a scale hard to describe, much less comprehend.

Occasionally, other sources of information confirm the general accounts of the refugees—the most recent example being a group of Yugoslav journalists permitted to tour Cambodia. Their guarded findings upon leaving Phnom Penh are related in a recent dispatch from Henry Kamm of the New York Times.

Mr. President, the continuing tragedy in Cambodia must remain a source of deep concern to the international community, and we must, in concert with others, redouble efforts to respond to this massive violation of human rights. And we must do more to support international humanitarian efforts, under the auspices of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and others, to meet the needs of thousands of Cambodian refugees in Thailand and elsewhere.

I ask unanimous consent that two recent reports from the field—an article in the New York Times by Henry Kamm and a report in the Christian Science Monitor—be printed at this point in the RECORD:

[From the New York Times, May 13, 1978]  
CAMBODIAN REFUGEES DEPICT GROWING FEAR AND HUNGER

(By Henry Kamm)

BANGKOK, THAILAND, May 12.—A number of recent refugees from Cambodia report that their country, in its fourth year under Communist rule, is suffering continuing bloodletting, even among factions of the ruling party, and starvation, nationwide forced labor and regimentation.

In view of Cambodia's almost total isolation from the outside world, refugees are the most significant source of information.

In March, for the first time since the Communist victory in April 1975, a group of European journalists—Communists from Yugoslavia—were taken on a guided tour of the country.

#### ONLY IMPLICIT CONDEMNATION

One of them reported that they were appalled by much of what they saw, although, restricted by the conventions of Communist fraternalism, they said so only implicitly in their dispatches. Significantly, the Yugoslav reported, one television journalist who was preparing a documentary on the visit told Cambodian officials that filming of the vast use of child labor in rigorous agricultural tasks would make a bad impression on the outside world. The Cambodians, however, urged him to film it.

What is shown in the Yugoslav television film—soon to be seen in the United States—and what scores of refugees reaching Thailand in recent months have related bear each other out.

The refugees were interviewed in the police station in Trat, in southeastern Thailand, where nine who fled last month are being confined in a small cage; in a nearby refugee camp in Khlong Yai; in a large refugee camp in Surin, in northeastern Thailand, and in a disused prison in the nearby province capital of Buriram, where most Cambodians who have crossed since Nov. 15 are being held as illegal entrants.

The Yugoslavs and the refugees related the now familiar description of a nation in which cities and towns stand empty while the people, divided into labor brigades, till the soil and build a countrywide system of

small-scale irrigation earthworks with rudimentary tools and under primitive conditions.

The Yugoslavs, complying with implicit restrictions on Communist journalists working in other Communist countries, raised no questions about persistent reports of death on a great scale through political purges that recall in their wide sweep Stalinist methods, about overwork and undernutrition, or about the almost total absence of medical care or medicine.

Another subject not publicly raised by the Yugoslavs involved the reports of profound differences in living conditions between the sub-Spartan standards and the vast majority of Cambodians and the privileges of the select minority of government officials and soldiers.

These subjects dominated the refugees' accounts. The hardships of their lives needed little underscoring. Most of the recent arrivals were emaciated, their hands worn and their feet—unshod since their last pre-"liberation" sandals wore out—calloused, scarred and soiled seemingly beyond cleaning. They still wore the poor clothes that they wore in Cambodia, tattered pre-1975 shirts and pants or almost equally ragged black uniforms of Communist issue.

Their bearing and comportment recall concentration camp survivors in the Europe of 1945. They seem dazed and cowed by all who have not shared their experience. They find concentrating on any subject difficult, complain frequently of headaches, physical weakness and an inability to sleep soundly and consider their future a blank that they have not yet the strength to consider seriously.

They are, in the vast majority, men of hardy peasant stock—illiterate, their knowledge of the world beyond the confines of their native districts minute. Most have left their wives and children behind, because undertaking an escape through the rugged and heavily mined border country burdened with children appeared doomed to failure. As it is, most of the refugees told tales of how members of their groups died on the way; how many whole groups of escapees fell victim to military patrols, mines, starvation and exposure cannot be known.

#### PERIL OF THE EDUCATED

Of more than 5,000 refugees confined in the places visited—only a few hundred of them crossed this year—fewer than 10 were found who spoke basic French. None spoke fluently. Under the previous regimes French had been the language of most schooling beyond the first few elementary years, and everyone with a high-school education spoke it more or less fluently.

The absence of French-speaking people and the generally peasant character of recent refugees lent credence to reports that the Communist regime was methodically killing the educated classes and that the great majority of the millions of people driven from cities and towns after the Communist conquest had withstood the rigors of the new life even less well than the rural people.

Apart from the continued killing of the educated, of officials down to the most minor of previous governments, and of former soldiers in the pre-1975 government, army and their families, the refugees reported that growing numbers of local Communist officials had been killed in what appeared to be an ongoing wave of violent purges.

#### LOCAL KNOWLEDGE ONLY

The only clue to the nature of the purges, as well as corroboration that they are taking place, comes from official Government pronouncements that Vietnam, with which Cambodia is in a state of limited war, has tried to bring down the Government of Prime Minister Pol Pot through internal subversion.



None of the refugees questioned know anything about purges above the level of their rural districts. In fact, none had ever learned the names of officials above that rank, except for President Khieu Samphan. They came from four of the provinces bordering on Thailand none had ever known the name of a province chief.

But all questioned were specific on the names of their village and district chiefs and the sequence of succession among them. Most reported that the new leaders had announced to the people at the frequent evening meetings that their predecessors had been killed as "enemies."

Sen Smean and Lem Loeng, who escaped at the end of January from the village of Kok Moun Om in the district of Ampil in Battambang Province, related that Nan, the district chief, had said at a Lunar New Year meeting in February 1977 that his predecessor, Tem, had been killed because those who came to power in 1975 were still under the influence of the regimes of Prince Norodom Sihanouk and his successor, Lon Nol.

#### A CONSTANT PURGE

The two refugees said that Nan himself had been replaced at the end of the year by Van. They said that Van had announced at a meeting that his predecessor had been killed as an "enemy" within 15 days of his removal from office.

The refugees added that the changes of district chiefs were always accompanied by the disappearance of village chiefs and frequently of the small teams of soldiers who supervise the villagers' work.

Similar precise accounts were given by refugees from the provinces of Siem Reap, Oudon Meanchey and Koh Kong. Analysts who gather refugee accounts on a regular basis consider them indicative of a constant process of purging. They speculate that if purges were so widespread in the areas most remote from Vietnamese influence, they were likely to be more frequent and extensive nearer to the war zones, where the suspicion of subversion was closer.

Refugees from Siem Reap Province reported in separate interviews that the month of April last year had been marked by wide-scale purges of local officials and Communist soldiers which, for the first time since the victory of two years before, had led to open opposition.

#### MET WITH GREAT RETALIATION

The incidents apparently were largely limited to clashes and killings among the soldiers. But a number of accounts of incidents have become known in which the public participated in attempts to give vent to their resentments.

Tach Keo Dara, a 20-year-old former high school student from Phnom Penh, said that he had been in a crowd that had taken advantage of strife among the leaders in three villages in the Chikreng district of Siem Reap Province to kill eight soldiers. The youth, now imprisoned in Buri Ram, said that he personally had not participated in the killings, which he said were carried out with knives.

The riots had occurred, he said, from April 11 to 17, and were followed by large-scale retaliatory killings. Refugees from the same province reported that these outbreaks of opposition had subsided as suddenly as they had sprung up and that the regime's hold over the province had never been threatened.

The refugees reported that hatred of the Communist soldiers and officials was general and based on the privileged position they held. Accounts of continually diminishing food rations—thin rice gruel rather than boiled rice, which is Cambodia's staple, few vegetables, little salt, no fish or meat—contrasted with the better diet enjoyed by those who professed that the new Cambodia had created equality among all its citizens.

By all accounts the soldiers who supervise the work day, which begins when bells are rung to awake the villagers at about 4 a.m. and often ends as late as 10 p.m., live separately from the people, cook for themselves and eat their meals in seclusion. They eat chicken and pork, many refugees said.

People do not dare to watch near their kitchen, said Ok Eum, a 44-year-old former army sergeant. He explained that to have knowledge of the soldiers' privileges was dangerous in a country where power over the people was in the soldiers' hands and death appeared to be the only punishment.

#### RECEIVE REGULAR CLOTHING RATIONS

Choun Sakhon, a soldier who defected last month, said that soldiers received clothing regularly and wore sandals made of used tires while civilians went barefoot. Many soldiers had the use of motorcycles in a country where people walk except on rare occasions when the very old or very young were transported in oxcarts to obligatory rallies at district towns.

Refugees from various regions gave similar accounts of the apparent freedom of a soldier to choose any woman to be his wife without the women's consent. Referring to the Communist soldiers' privileges in this regard, Mr. Ok Eum related:

When a Khmer Rouge loves a girl, there is a village meeting. He asks her to marry him. She does not dare say no. Then they are considered married.

Civilians need the permission of their village chiefs to marry, except when the marriages are arranged by the authorities without either partner's consent. San Daravong, who is 26 years old, said that he and Kim Kolab, 24, were married although they hardly knew each other. But they said in Buri Ram prison that they loved each other now.

Marriage ceremonies always take place en masse, the refugees reported, and only once a year.

#### HUNGER AND DEATH

While accounts of many aspects of the new way of life have to be drawn out of the refugees through questioning, two subjects come spontaneously from them—reports of mass deaths in their villages and constant hunger.

Malaria, cholera, diarrhea, tuberculosis and enfeeblement from pervasive malnutrition took a catastrophic toll in the district of Banteal Srel, the site of one of the most splendid temples of the Angkor complex, where Mona, a male former medical student from Phnom Penh, had been banished after being driven out of the capital with the rest of its people.

The former student said that children, particularly infants, suffered the most cruelly from illnesses and died in frightening numbers. He said that infant mortality was particularly high because mothers, as a result of malnutrition, had little milk and no substitutes were available. His medical observations bore and accounts provided by all other refugees.

Detailed narratives of mass killings of enemies give rise to an impression that the regime has lost what inhibitions it may have had in its early stages and is conducting mass slayings without regard to the presence of witnesses. A number of refugees reported that officials were more and more openly speaking of a need to kill great numbers of Cambodians.

Mr. Sen Smean said that Nan, the late district chief, had announced at a meeting early last year that of the 15,000 people of the district, 10,000 would have to be killed as enemies and that 6,000 of them had already perished.

"We must burn the old grass and the new will grow," Nan said, according to Mr. Sen Smean.

#### SLAYING OF WIVES AND CHILDREN

Analysts have speculated on the number of Cambodians who have died during and after the war and occasional contradictory pronouncements by the present Government have added fuel to the efforts, but no solid information has become available. However, refugee accounts since 1975 leave no doubt that the toll has been heavy and the birth rate exceedingly low. In 1970, the population of the country exceeded seven million.

The principal targets for extermination, according to all accounts, continue to be former government employees, soldiers and those in Cambodia called intellectuals, those with higher education.

A devastating new element that emerges from the refugees' accounts of the last year is that the regime now appears to be methodically killing wives and children, many long after the husbands were killed.

Mr. San Daravong said that toward the end of last year he had witnessed the killing of 108 wives and children of former soldiers outside the village of Chba Leu, situated about 10 miles east of the town of Siem Reap, in the midst of the Angkor temple complex.

#### DESCRIBES SOLDIERS' RETALIATION

He said that the victims had been led to a dike, their arms tied to their sides, and pounded to death with big sticks in groups of 10 by a small group of soldiers. Some of the small children, he said, had been thrown into the air and impaled on bayonets; others were held by their feet and swung to the ground until dead.

He learned the exact number, he said, because villagers had been called to bury the dead.

Kang Vann Dy said that he had decided to try to escape in February from the village of Roluos in Siem Reap Province because, after having killed former officers and sergeants, the Communist soldiers had come to the part of the village where he lived with a number of other former soldiers and had taken them and their families away.

Mr. Kang Vann Dy hid. Later in the day, he found their bodies in a well. Asked whether he knew the names of the victims, he slowly called the roll, straining to remember.

"Cheam," he said. Kok Min Phath. There were others, but I don't know the names. Asked how many bodies he had counted, he painfully added up those of the wives and of the children he knew and said, "at least 19."

To stay alive himself he hid in the forest at the edge of the Great Lake of the Tonle Sap for two months, living from fish and from stolen food before making his way across the border.

Mr. Ok Eum said that he came from the district of Siem Reap Province where former President Lon Nol was born. He said that to celebrate the second anniversary of their victory in April 1977, the Communists had killed the entire population of the former leader's village. The former soldier said that the district chief, Sun, who was later killed himself, announced that the villagers had been slain because all were relatives of Lon Nol. Throughout the district, Mr. Ok Eum said, about 350 families had been killed on that occasion, their family names recorded by authorities and displayed at the anniversary rally.

"If the Communists continue, there will be no more Cambodians in the land of Cambodia," Mr. Ok Eum said in a flat voice of despair.

#### FLIGHT FROM FEAR

Since the Communist takeovers of Cambodia and Vietnam three years ago last month, thousands have fled the new regimes in those countries. Many of these

people find their way to refugee camps in Thailand, where they become favorite sources of information about conditions in their homelands, even as they await hoped-for resettlement somewhere else.

Their testimony often is colored by the limits of their personal experiences, by the biases growing out of bitter memories, and by the fact that they would not have left if they had been able to adjust to a new way of life under Communist rule.

Still, their contrasting accounts offer significant insights into the methods of operation of the current governments in Phnom Penh and Hanoi.

What follow are the stories of a representative selection of these refugees—three Cambodians and three Vietnamese.

As many as 300,000 Cambodians have been executed by the Khmer Rouge government, according to Amnesty International, the London-based human-rights organization. Refugees say these executions almost always are without trial. An even larger number of people have died from malnutrition and illness since the April 17, 1975, fall of the Lon Nol regime, according to a U.S. Government specialist on Cambodia.

Since last September, most of the Cambodian refugees reaching Thailand have been poor farmers, students, soldiers, and low-ranking former government officials. (The more prosperous—those who were not caught and executed by the Khmer Rouge—generally escaped much earlier and already have been processed out of the Thai camps.) The following refugees were interviewed at Camp Surin, about 200 miles northwest of Bangkok and 40 miles from the Cambodian border.

#### MAO SOEUNG: HIS VILLAGE WAS VANISHING

Mao Soeung is a dark-complexioned farmer who says he fled the village of Russeysanh in western Cambodia in mid-March.

Of the 360 people in his village, he said about 45 disappeared and apparently were killed by the Khmer Rouge, including village leaders and anti-Communist soldiers. "Many, many were killed, so I thought I would be killed, too," he explained, adding that his father was once "a simple soldier" in the anti-Communist army of former Cambodian President Lon Nol.

Mao Soeung said he personally witnessed six executions, by beating and knifing, including those of three small children. "They let us see the killings to make us afraid," he explained.

He said he thought he, too, was marked for killing because he wanted to take a vacation and because he associated with the older people in his village.

But the Khmer Rouge never directly took over his village: "Their squads slipped in at night to kill." Yet every villager had to supply his personal history to the Khmer Rouge, and this, he said, is how they decided whom to kill.

Near Russeysanh was a new settlement of some 1,000 people forced out of the major cities. "I had no time to visit there," Mao Soeung said, "but I heard many died at the hands of the Khmer Rouge."

He said he escaped his village with about 25 other persons, walking and running for four days and nights without food. Of them, 11 made it to safety and 14 are missing, he continued. His wife and small child had to remain behind because they were not up to the arduous journey.

"I don't know if they are still alive, but I hear other families were killed if any of their members tried to escape," Mao Soeung said.

Why did the Khmer Rouge not try to kill him early on? "At first they wanted to speak sweet words to our village," he said in explanation.

By 1977, some of the Khmer Rouge were killing other Khmer Rouge, he claimed. But he disagreed with the theory that the executed Khmer Rouge were sympathizers of the arch-rival Vietnamese. Rather, he said, those who were executed had bungled their jobs.

#### DARA KIM: THE EDUCATED WERE TARGETS

Dara Kim is a serious-looking former law student who fled Cambodia in July, 1977.

"One afternoon my neighbors told me a group of Khmer Rouge were looking for me," he said. "I knew they would kill me, so I decided I must run." For six days he hid in bushes, walking by night from a western Cambodian village near Battambang to the border with Thailand. He recalled: "They killed the former soldiers, teachers, and students. For a year and a half I hid in a village and concealed my identity. But then they found out."

Life was hard in his village. It meant working in the fields and in a nearby forest from 6 in the morning to 6 in the evening, with two meals a day. Most residents of Battambang were moved out to the villages. Children under six were cared for by a village woman, but all others joined their parents in the fields.

"For almost two years I went along. There could be no music, no happiness, no comforts of life," Dara Kim said. "If you played music, you were killed. I wanted liberty, some free time, and I had to escape. But I worry about my parents. After my escape, perhaps they were killed."

Dara Kim said he heard many tales of killings and executions, including the shooting, beating, and knifing of prisoners kept in a nearby Buddhist monastery that had been converted into a prison for thieves and other detainees.

Dara Kim considers himself a witness to one killing. Three Khmer Rouge went to the house of a neighbor, a mathematics professor named Lee. "I saw them go in and then I heard the gunshot," he recalled.

"The Khmer Rouge are 'small knowledge' people," he declared. "They come from the country side, not from the city, and, often they can't speak or write well."

"The killing will be repeated. One day people will rise up, and all those who associated with the Khmer Rouge will be killed."

Dara Kim said he would like to go to the United States, "but I have no sponsor. I have two brothers there, but they don't know where I am."

#### BOU THUON: TWO YEARS OF HIDING FIRST

As sturdy Bou Thuan farms the vegetable patch around the hut where he lives, he hardly looks like a man who was once an officer in Lon Nols' anti-Communist army. He fled Cambodia last August.

For two years he concealed his identity in the western Cambodian city of Battambang, but then, he said, Khmer Rouge officials came with a list of names of former Army officers: "They asked all of us who had been officers to step to one side of the room. I did so because I knew they had photographs. I fled the next day because a friend told me I would soon be killed."

Bou Thuan had thought of fleeing for two years, but hesitated because he did not know how to reach the Thai border. Then he met a Khmer Rouge soldier who faced certain death for violating a rule against conducting a love affair. Together they made their way to the border.

Some 2,000 teachers, former soldiers, farmers, and former government officials were moved from the capital, Phnom Penh, to a rural area about 60 miles from Battambang, Bou Thuan said. They were put to work from 6 o'clock to 11 in the morning and from 1 o'clock to 5:30 in the afternoon. In the evening all worked digging irrigation ditches.

Bou Thuan said he witnessed the execu-

tion of "about six" former Lon Nol soldiers without trial. "He [the word most Cambodian refugees use to describe the Khmer Rouge] told the families of the men they should come out to the fields to gather in oxen," the former officer related. "But when the men reached the fields I saw them beaten to death by the Khmer Rouge."

Those were the only eyewitness executions Bou Thuan recalled. But he spoke of going into fields to hoe and coming upon the remains of many other people. "Friends told me of seeing the family of a former soldier taken and beaten to death," he said.

Like Mao Soeung, he told of hearing widespread reports of "new Khmer Rouge" killing "old Khmer Rouge" (i.e., those who had joined prior to 1970).

Bou Thuan said he had not heard whether the "old Khmer Rouge" were Vietnamese-trained, although some refugees have testified that there was a purge to try to get rid of Vietnamese-trained Communists who infiltrated into western Cambodia in the 1960s.

Only a handful of executions are reported from Vietnam, but at least 200,000 people—including high-ranking former soldiers and government officials—are said to have been confined to "reeducation" camps for the past three years. Sometimes conditions in the camps are harsh.

In the meantime, other former military officers, small-business men, onetime employees of American wartime agencies, and coastal fishermen have fled what used to be South Vietnam. Many escape by boat, have relatives who already are overseas, and hope these contacts will help speed their processing through refugee camps.

An estimated 1,500 "boat people" are now in Thailand, including the following, who were interviewed at Camp Lam Sing.

#### NGUYEN MUOI: 'CONVERT' UNTIL THE RIGHT TIME

Nguyen Muoi is a former South Vietnamese Army officer and painter who spent seven months and five days in a reeducation camp—before being released because "inside I felt one way, but on the outside I acted another."

But "good behavior" at the reeducation camp made him no more ready to accept the Communist system.

"I planned for one year before buying a small boat that brought us out—5 men, 6 women, and 9 children. Once we bought the boat from a fisherman it took four months of preparation. We traveled the 300 kilometers [about 180 miles] from Saigon [now Ho Chi Minh city] to Ca Mau City after buying permits for 50 plasters for each family."

"I left because I was concerned about the future of my four boys," said Nguyen Muoi. "I am afraid university education will be reserved for the people who actively contributed to the revolution."

"Reeducation camp consisted of lessons about communism with about 300 people in one class," he said. Each class then broke down into small discussion groups of about 10 persons each. It went on for eight hours a day, with each person required to offer self-criticism. Every two days there was a recapitulation of the lesson.

"After four months we started building houses and planting rice. We worked from 7 to 11 in the morning and 12 to 4 in the afternoon. In the evenings we had political discussions," said Nguyen Muoi. "It made me angry. I had to say I was guilty of helping the Americans. But I did not feel guilty."

The men at the reeducation camp planted potatoes and corn, Nguyen Muoi recalled.

"I don't know why, but I gained two pounds," he said.

Only a small number of people have been released from reeducation camp, Nguyen Muoi claimed—a conclusion that is shared



by independent analysts of Vietnamese affairs.

"Officers over the rank of major were sent to the north, near the Vietnamese-Chinese border, where they had to work very hard. Some of these prisoners have been worked virtually to death," notes one outside observer. This observer maintains, as others do, that a number of high-ranking military officers were forced to take part in highly risky bomb-clearing operations.

THAI HUNG: PHOTOGRAPHER SANS FREEDOM

Thai Hung is a thin, intense photographer of Chinese descent. He had a good job in Vietnam with a private firm but said the new Communist government would not let him keep it.

One reason he decided to leave was fear that the government would send him to one of the "new economic zones," areas designed to help meet the national rice shortage, absorb the unemployed of Saigon, and populate the land near the disputed border with Cambodia.

"I talked to people who had been there, and they told me it's like jail," Thai Hung recalled. "There is nothing you can do. There are no facilities to grow vegetables, all you can do is go to the forest, cut trees, and catch some fish for the market."

Since the Vietnamese-Cambodian war started, the authorities have tried hard to move people to the new economic zones, he said.

So Thai Hung bought a fisherman's small boat and reequipped it with a six-hp. diesel engine. Then he set sail, along with his wife, two children, a nephew, and a friend.

"It was very easy to escape," he claimed because security near the sea was loose. "I went fishing on my boat frequently," he added "so they would not be suspicious when I finally left."

Thai Hung said he would have left Vietnam even if he did not face life in a new economic zone.

"It is very hard to live," he indicated. "Controls are tight. There is little opportunity to do business, and it's hard to buy goods, except in the black market."

NGUYEN HUU, FISHERMAN; SAVIOR TO 63

Nguyen Huu is a rough-hewn, taciturn fisherman. As a Roman Catholic and an anti-Communist, he fled North Vietnam for the south in 1954.

Now he has fled again, this time on the fishing boat he used to earn his living. He had special reason to leave, he said, because of his religion and because he served in a local anti-Communist militia.

"Two years ago they started to use our church for a reeducation camp," he recalled.

The Catholics asked for their church back, and 10 days later it was returned. But religious holidays were limited, a security guard was assigned to the church, and some musical instruments, a speaker, and an amplifier were removed by the new government.

In his town on the island of Phu Quoc (300 miles southwest of Saigon) Nguyen Huu also faced the prospect of "collectivization" of his fishing business.

"They were going to divide us into groups, to control us," he said. "So I decided to escape before they could do it. Each group was to have a security man."

According to Mr. Huu, each group also would have had six boats, and 50 percent of the fishing catch would have gone to the government. The rest was to be sold at low prices.

Altogether, 63 persons joined Nguyen Huu for the escape aboard his boat, including five fishermen, five university students, at least one former employee of the U.S. Government, and a variety of other friends and their dependent. All contributed money.

Most of them left Saigon by bus and transferred to a small boat to take them to Phu Quoc. Security was described as loose, and no identification cards were required.

Nguyen Ngoc Hoa, a former office employee of the Americans, and her nine-year-old daughter, Nguyen Phuong Chi, were among those who joined Nguyen Huu on his boat. They hid in a forest while waiting to board the boat.

Their escape was prompted by fear of job and education discrimination, Mrs. Nguyen said. And, she added simply, "I did not just want to hear songs about Ho Chi Minh." ●

#### NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION AUTHORIZATIONS, 1979 (REPT. NO. 95848)

● Mr. HART. Mr. President, I am pleased to file today S. 2584, a bill to authorize appropriations for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission for fiscal year 1979, as amended by the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works. The bill authorized \$336,395,000 which is \$5,725,000 above the administration request, and also calls for the reallocation of \$8,140,000 within NRC's programs to fund certain activities in which the committee has special interest. The fiscal year 1979 authorization level is \$41,807,000 higher than the estimated expenditures in fiscal year 1978.

I ask to have a summary of the bill printed in the Record.

The summary follows:

#### SUMMARY OF NUCLEAR REGULATION COMMISSION—FISCAL YEAR 1979 AUTHORIZATION

**Nuclear Reactor Regulation (Section 1(a)(1))**—The bill includes an authorization of \$46,880,000 which is \$870,000 above the budget request. Of the total, \$1,070,000 (including 9 staff-years) is for alternate fuel cycle activities above and beyond the fiscal year 1978 level, and \$740,000 (including 8 staff-years) above the fiscal year 1979 budgeted level of \$1,340,000 is for the additional advanced reactor activities discussed below. To cover them fully, an additional \$940,000 is to be reallocated within the program.

**Standards Development (Section 1(a)(2))**—The bill includes an authorization of \$14,945,000 which is \$465,000 above the budget request. Of the total, \$500,000 above the fiscal year 1979 budgeted level of \$150,000 is for the additional low-level radiation effects activities discussed below. To cover that fully, an additional \$35,000 is to be reallocated within the program.

**Inspection and Enforcement (Section 1(a)(3))**—The bill includes an authorization of \$38,760,000, as requested by the Administration, an increase of \$3,000,000 over Fiscal Year 1978. These funds will be used for Agency activities to assure thorough field inspection and investigation, that nuclear reactors, fuel cycle facilities and materials are used in a safe manner and in full compliance with NRC licenses, rules and regulations. The primary cause of the funding increase over Fiscal Year 1978 is the implementation of a new resident inspector program, which will locate NRC inspectors full-time at selected nuclear sites, as a means of enabling increased oversight of licensee performance.

**Nuclear Materials Safety and Safeguards (Section 1(a)(4))**—The bill includes an authorization of \$27,240,000 which is \$1,140,000 above the budget request. Of the total, \$1,300,000 (including 10 staff-years) above the FY 79 budgeted level of \$6,827,000 is for the additional Nuclear Waste activities, and \$540,000 (including 8 person-years) above and beyond the FY 78 level is for the additional Alternate Fuel Cycle activities dis-

cussed below. To cover them fully, an additional \$1,200,000 is to be reallocated within the program. These funds will cover the Agency's efforts in licensing and regulating all commercial nuclear materials and facilities, except reactors, including safeguarding of materials from sabotage, theft or diversion. New initiatives for FY 79 are in the areas of nuclear waste including aid to states faced with reviewing proposed waste facilities, and alternate fuel cycle activities.

**Nuclear Regulatory Research (Section 1(a)(5))**—The bill includes an authorization of \$166,640,000 which is \$3,170,000 above the budget request. Of the total, \$2,500,000 is for the improved safety systems research activities, \$3,150,000 (including 5-staff years) above the fiscal year 1979 budgeted level of \$1,298,000 is for the additional nuclear waste research activities, \$330,000 (including 1-staff year) above and beyond the fiscal year 1978 level is for the additional alternate fuel cycle activities; and \$3,000,000 above the fiscal year 1979 budgeted level of \$15,833,000 is for additional advanced reactor research activities discussed below. To cover them fully an additional \$5,810,000 is to be reallocated within the program.

**Program Technical Support (Section 1(a)(6))**—The bill includes an authorization of \$13,480,000 which is \$80,000 above the budget request. Of the total, \$160,000 (including 2 staff-years) above and beyond the fiscal year 1978 level is for the Office of International Programs' additional alternate fuel cycle activities discussed below. To cover them fully an additional \$80,000 is to be reallocated within the program.

**Program Direction and Administration (Section 1(a)(7))**—The bill includes an authorization of \$27,950,000—equal to the budget request. Of the total, \$75,000 (including 1 staff-year) above the fiscal year 1979 budgeted level of \$150,000 is for the equal employment opportunity activities discussed below. To cover them fully, \$75,000 is to be reallocated within program direction and administration.

**Two-Year Authorization**—The Committee dropped the 2-year authorization from the Administration bill and included authorizations only for fiscal year 1979.

**Reprogramming Authority (Section 1(b))**—The bill continues present practice of allowing reprogramming between major program offices, up to 15 percent of the sending or receiving office budget and up to a \$10 million aggregate limit. Thirty day notice must be given to the authorizing committees of Congress.

Reprogramming within major programs is permitted, and will be required to carry out the increased effort in specific activities required by the bill. Reprogramming, or lack thereof, is not to be used to detract from those specific activities.

**Nuclear Waste Disposal (Section 1(a)(4)(5))**—The bill provides a significant (55 percent) increase in the resources for the waste management program. The bill adds \$4.45 million, including 15 people, to increase NRC's efforts to help solve the critical problems of waste disposal and management as soon as possible.

**Advanced Reactor Research and Licensing (Section 1(a)(1) and (5))**—The Committee recommends an increase of \$3 million in the authorization for the Commission's advanced reactor safety research program to be used for two purposes: (1) safety research work on advanced reactor types which are not in NRC's current program and which have the potential for near-term and mid-term commercial availability in the United States and (2) additional safety research work on specific advanced reactor types, in the event NRC receives firm indications that a lead plant design will be submitted for NRC review in fiscal year 1979. The Committee also recommends an increase of \$740,000, includ-

ing funding for eight additional positions, in the authorization for the advanced reactor program in the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation. This increased authorization would allow for preapplication review work on a lead plant design for an advanced reactor in the event NRC receives firm indications that a lead plant design will be submitted for NRC review in fiscal year 1979.

**Executive Director (Section 2(a)).**—The bill requires the Directors of Program Offices, if they communicate directly with the Commission, to keep the Executive Director for Operations fully and currently informed of the content of such communications.

**Equal Employment Opportunity (Section 1(A) (7) and (2) (b)).**—The bill requires the Executive Director for Operations to report to the Commission review the problems, progress, and status of the NRC's equal employment opportunity efforts.

The bill also authorizes \$225,000 for equal employment opportunity activities.

**Low-Level Radiation (Section 1(a) (2) and Section 3).**—The bill requires that the NRC and EPA develop, with joint lead responsibilities, a preliminary planning study which will result in the design of a comprehensive Federal epidemiological study of the effects of low-level ionizing radiation. The planning study will be carried out in consultation with appropriate Federal and State agencies, and scientific organization. This study will culminate in a report to Congress by April 1, 1979. NRC and EPA are further required to submit to Congress, within 30 days of enactment of the legislation, a memorandum of understanding delineating the respective responsibilities and funds allocated for each agency in this effort.

**Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (Section 4).**—The bill requires the NRC to undertake a comprehensive review of the Agency's procedures for selection and training of Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (ASLB) members. The study, which will include but not be limited to an examination of selection criteria, including qualifications, the selection procedures and the training programs for Board members, shall be presented to Congress by January 1, 1979.

Based on the findings of the study, the Commission is directed to revise the selection and training process, where appropriate.

**Alternate Fuel Cycles (Sections 1 and 5).**—The bill establishes an internal NRC Fuel Cycle Evaluation Task Force, reporting to the Executive Director for Operations. NRC must report to Congress semi-annually on the progress of domestic and international fuel cycle evaluations, including the health, safety and safeguards implications of the leading nuclear fuel cycle technologies. An additional \$2.1 million, above the fiscal year 1978 level of activity of \$0.2 million is allocated for this purpose. Approximately 20 staff-years, above the fiscal year 1978 level of activity of 5 staff-years, will also be required.

**Aid to Impacted States in Nuclear Waste Licensing (Section 6).**—The bill includes an authorization of \$500,000, to remain available until expended, for the purpose of providing grants to any State in which a long-term storage or disposal facility for certain specified radioactive wastes is proposed. Such individual grants, in amounts up to \$500,000 and in accordance with regulations promulgated by NRC, would be provided to facilitate independent review by the State of a proposal to develop a waste disposal facility within its borders.

**Employee Protection (Section 7).**—The bill includes a provision to protect employees of NRC licensees, applicants, or subcontractors thereof from discrimination as a result of "whistleblowing" activities.

**Contractors and Consultants (Section 8).**—The bill requires the NRC to report to Congress on January 1, 1979, and annually

thereafter on its use of contractors, consultants and the National Laboratories. The report shall be comprehensive, including information on bidding procedure, nature of the work, duration of the contract, progress of work, relation to previous contracts, and the amounts both authorized and spent, for each contract.●

#### EXPULSION OF ROBERT REID FROM CZECHOSLOVAKIA

● **Mr. BIDEN.** Mr. President, I would like to protest the recent expulsion of the Associated Press correspondent Robert Reid from Czechoslovakia. Mr. Reid's only "crime" was to visit a leader of the courageous Charter 77 movement in legitimate pursuit of his professional activity. Mr. Reid's expulsion, for which he was never given a reason by the Czech Government, is in direct violation of the Helsinki accord.

The Helsinki accord contains very specific and unusually lengthy provisions on the "Improvement of Working Conditions for Journalists" (Basket Three, Section 2(c)). Among those provisions is a specific clause stating that "the participating states reaffirm that the legitimate pursuit of their professional activity will neither render journalists liable to expulsion nor otherwise penalize them."

Czechoslovakia has generally had a poor track record in implementing Basket Three of the final act. The expulsion of Robert Reid is the latest in a series of violations and is to be deplored by all those who in good faith signed and supported the Helsinki accords.●

#### WILMA MILLER

● **Mr. LUGAR.** Mr. President, on May 9, 1978, Wilma Miller of Wabash, Ind., passed away after a brief illness here in Washington.

Wilma came to work in the Senate with former Senator Homer E. Capehart of Indiana, when he was elected in 1945. She had previously been his personal secretary at the Capehart Manufacturing Co. in Indianapolis, where she was employed following her graduation from Manchester College at North Manchester, Ind. She served with Senator Capehart until he left the Senate in 1962. Upon Senator Capehart's leaving the Senate, the late Senator John McClellan of Arkansas asked Wilma to join the staff of his Subcommittee on Patents and Copyrights, from which position she retired just last June.

Many Hoosiers who visited Washington over the years came to know Wilma, whose energy and vivacity made her a popular personality in the Senate. She will be missed by her many friends and colleagues. On their behalf, Mrs. Lugar and I, together with former Senator and Mrs. Capehart, offer our deepest sympathies to members of her family.●

#### THE PLIGHT OF MIDDLE-INCOME FAMILIES

● **Mr. MOYNIHAN.** Mr. President, are middle-income families facing difficulty in paying the costs of college for their

children? One would think the answer self-evident. I doubt that there is a single Member of the U.S. Senate who has not had the point clearly established by large numbers of hard-pressed constituents. For those of us with college age youngsters of our own, it is if anything an even clearer and more immediate concern.

Still, the analysts have been having a field day trying to refute the proposition that it is difficult to pay for college, harder in any case than it once was.

This is surely an interesting line of inquiry. Alas, it is not one that readily yields definitive answers, for college attendance patterns have changed, aspirations are in flux, and reliable, comparable data are hard to come by.

Yet it is possible to avoid some of the more obvious analytical pitfalls. One would expect more from the Congressional Budget Office, for example, than a simple comparison of pretax median family incomes and average "student charges" compiled by adding tuition, room and board rates. It is true that such a comparison supports—though just barely—the conclusion reached in a recent CBO paper that "there is no evidence to indicate that the financial burden of sending children to college has been increasing." But how can anyone in conscience attempt to examine the economic condition of American families over the last decade without at least considering changes in their tax burden?

It is a relatively simple matter to come up with an estimate of the aggregate burden of Federal, State, and local taxes. The Congressional Research Service has produced such an estimate. To no one's surprise, its turns out that whereas the median before tax income of families with 18- to 24-year-old dependents rose 78.8 percent between 1967 and 1976, the corresponding after tax income increased just 66.8 percent.

The next question is what measure of college going costs to use for comparison. At least with respect to the tuition tax credit debate, the appropriate gage is obviously tuition rates, for the tax credit envisioned in the Senate and House bills would not be available for room, board, or miscellany. It would help with only the central and most fundamental cost associated with college attendance: the tuition (and fees) levied by the college or university itself.

According to the National Center for Education Statistics, tuition and fees in public institutions rose by an average of 94 percent from 1967 to 1976. The corresponding figure in private colleges and universities is 93 percent.

I believe it is more than reasonable—it is logical—to match the 66.8 percent increase in after tax family incomes with the 93 or 94 percent rise in college tuitions over the past 10 years and to conclude that for the average family it has become harder, palpably harder, to provide a college education for one's children.

Admittedly, these percentages are dry and thus difficult to associate with the experiences of real people. For that reason, I would like to introduce into the



RECORD at the conclusion of these observations a remarkable letter that recently came to my attention. It is a copy of one that a constituent of mine sent to the Director of Financial Aid at a major private university that has admitted his son. According to the College Scholarship Service analysis of that family's economic situation, my constituent is expected to "contribute" \$8,000 annually to the young man's education.

The letter explains the total unreality of that estimate by setting forth the family's own budget in considerable detail and explaining some of the pressures on it. As will be obvious, this is hardly an impoverished family. Its gross income places it well into the top 10 percent of all American families. Still, it is demonstrably unreasonable to expect that family to pay even the \$5,110 that the College Scholarship Service estimates to be the average cost of attendance at a 4-year private college next year, let alone the significantly higher costs associated with attendance at a selective private university such as the young man hopes to attend.

I have deleted the names. Otherwise, this eloquent letter is unaltered.

To be sure, a tax credit in the amount of \$500 per year will not suffice to solve the problems faced by families such as this one. But it is a step in the right direction. In that connection, it should be noted that the administration's so-called alternative to tax credits would confine Federal grant aid to families earning less than \$25,000, and would thus provide no help to my constituent and the millions like him. I would also note my personal conviction that it is wrong to depict grant and tuition tax credits as "alternatives." Both are needed, and no overlap will ensue, as tuitions paid by anyone other than the taxpayer would not be eligible for the credit.

Finally, it should be pointed out that if the administration were sincere in its desire to extend the basic grants program to students from families earning between \$15,000 and \$25,000, it could do so with a stroke of the pen. No legislation is required. All that would be needed is a few changes in the "family contributions schedule" of the basic educational opportunity grants program.

That schedule is the responsibility of the Commissioner of Education, and can be revised without legislation. What the Congress can do—and in my view should do—is to revise the Internal Revenue Code to make tax credits available to millions of young Americans for whom college is otherwise unattainable, including those who may receive student aid but whose aid is inadequate to meet the soaring cost of higher education.

The letter referred to above follows:

NEW YORK, N. Y.,

April 22, 1978.

DIRECTOR OF FINANCIAL AID  
(DELETED) University

DEAR MISS (DELETED): Yesterday I received the Financial Aid Form Acknowledgement for 1978-79 from the College Scholarship Service of the College Board in Princeton, N. J. I read it with surprise, shock and disbelief. Let me explain to you why.

Some time ago I did work out a last year's budget summary of the fixed and unavoidable cost of living for our six-member family. A copy of it is herewith enclosed.

As you may know, we in New York City are subjected to Federal, State, City income, sales and other taxes. Together with FICA they added up to \$16,950.

The rent and other expenses for our five-room apartment in the city (accommodating six persons of our family) come to \$5,216 per year. As an employee of (deleted) the City of New York I am encouraged to live within the city limits.

Medical and dental expenses came to \$2,259. These can be considered moderate in view of the advanced age (above 70) of two members of our family.

Income and life (\$15,000) insurance premiums came to \$765, church and charitable contribution a modest \$446, compulsory union and other dues \$495, mandatory pension contribution \$823.

We have a car of which I am the only driver and must nevertheless pay, in New York City, an insurance premium of \$479. The car is eight years old so, last year, it required a new transmission etc. for a total of \$1,082. Transportation by subway to and from work necessitates an additional minimum of \$270 per year.

Repayment for the home improvement loan came to \$2,317; for a piano (my wife studied the instrument and my children are learning too) the loan repayment was \$1,147. Expenses on our summer home (which we were lucky to buy eleven years ago for \$5,000 and worked to improve it ever after) were \$1,774. Adding all these and other unavoidable expenses brought the expense budget to \$40,269.

When one subtracts this amount from the total 1977 income of \$48,172.35, one is left with \$7,903.35. We have tried to keep our food budget down to \$120 a week. (The number of meals is equal to the product of 7 days×3 meals a day×6 persons in the household=126, i.e. we kept the cost at less than one dollar per meal.) This requires for the 52 weeks an expense for food of \$6,240. Subtracting this from the above \$7,903 leaves \$1,664 for all other possible expense—clothing, entertainment, replacement of worn articles, stationery, family gifts, mail charges, everything: a yearly sum of \$277 per person or about 75 cents per day.

Of course, the ladies and gentlemen of the College Scholarship Service may remark that the (deleted) family could have done without the car or the summer home. They should note, however, that we have not had a vacation trip for the last fifteen years nor have we gone out to movies, concerts or restaurants more than once a year for as long as we can remember. We do not own a color television set; no one in our household smokes nor do we enjoy liquor. Without the weekends at our country retreat we would not have what to look forward. The Scholarship Service people may also view the private high school expenses as expendable. Without that educational opportunity, however, our son would probably not have earned admission to your excellent institution.

This in short is the factual story of the financial status of the (deleted) family—a family which journalists and statisticians call upper middle income. We are certainly not completely atypical. Consequently, how the College Scholarship Service could have determined that our total family contribution can exceed \$8,000 is beyond my comprehension. Their personnel must be either extremely ignorant or callously careless.

I would very much like to see my son have the opportunity to continue his education at the University. He worked hard and earned his credentials. To this end I esti-

mated that our family would be able with additional belt-tightening to contribute a sum of about \$3,000. However, if the CSS unrealistic estimate is left to stand, it would become totally impossible for us to underwrite the required expenses.

I apologize for the length of this letter, but I felt that anything more abbreviated would not do justice to the problem. I trust that you will be kind enough to look into the difficulty; I hope that the Financial Aid Office will somehow make it possible for our son to attend your college.

Sincerely,

(NAME DELETED).

*Summary of the fixed and unavoidable expenditures for the year 1977*

1. Taxes:	
Federal .....	\$9,730
State, city, sales, etc. ....	6,254
FICA .....	966
Total .....	16,950
2. Apartment:	
Rent .....	\$4,460
Electricity and gas .....	396
Telephone .....	320
Building personnel .....	40
Total .....	5,216
3. Medical expenses:	
Doctors, dentists .....	\$1,999
Medicines .....	260
Total .....	2,259
4. Insurance:	
Income .....	\$178
Life .....	587
Property .....	155
Total .....	920
5. Mandatory pension contribution .....	\$823
6. Family car:	
Insurance .....	\$479
Gasoline .....	520
Repairs, tires, etc. ....	1,082
License fees .....	48
Total .....	2,129
7. Transportation to work .....	270
8. Summer home:	
Electricity (with water heater) ..	264
Gas (with auxiliary heating) .....	520
Repairs and improvements .....	950
Total .....	1,654
9. Loan repayments:	
Bank loan .....	2,317
Ret. system loan .....	1,148
Total .....	3,465
10. Interest expense .....	1,242
11. Church and charitable contributions .....	446
12. Union and other dues .....	495
13. School tuition (son and daughter) .....	4,400
Grand total .....	40,269
<i>Analysis of disposable income</i>	
Gross income .....	\$48,175.35
Fixed and unavoidable expenses ..	40,269.00
Disposable income .....	7,803.35
Weekly food budget at \$0.95 per meal per person, 3 meals per day .....	\$120.00
Total for the year .....	6,240.00

Disposable income available for clothing, replacement of worn articles, stationery, mail, family gifts, entertainment, city and other travel, books, toiletry, and everything else, for 6 persons ..... 1,644.00  
That is \$274 per person per year or about 75 cents per person per day. ●

#### HOW RELEVANT IS SALT TO OUR SECURITY?

● Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, while we debate the merits of the administration's proposal to sell planes to those nations in the Middle East, an issue of importance to our country's security and well-being looms ever present on the horizon. We have recently concluded the debate on the Panama Canal treaties and a person cannot help but wonder why the administration sprung those treaties on the Senate when it did. Why did the administration present them when it did? Many political experts are of the opinion that the Carter administration is attempting to deflect the attention and energy of the Senate from the SALT issues and the increasing military buildup of the Soviet Union. This line of logic gains more credibility when one considers the continued rapid fire submitting of foreign policy issues to the Senate by the administration. Already in this month we will have considered the Middle East plane sale, the lifting of the arms embargo against Turkey, and on the calendar is the United States-United Kingdom Tax Treaty. This pattern has led me to believe that the administration does intend to distract the Senate from keeping a close eye on the negotiations being conducted in Geneva.

As the basic structure of a possible SALT II agreement came into the open, some Senators charged that other Senators leaked the substance of the impending agreement so that they might openly attack it. Apparently, some Members of the Senate still believe that the administration should conduct foreign policy in secret and submit the results to the Senate for its rubberstamp approval. Some Senators continue to view the Soviets through wistful hopes and daydreams. In 1965 Secretary of Defense McNamara reassured the Nation that: "The Soviets have decided that they have lost the quantitative race and they are not seeking to engage us in that contest. There is no indication that the Soviets are seeking to develop a strategic nuclear force as large as our own." How much longer will some of the Members of the Senate continue to hide their heads in the sand when it comes to the Soviet confrontation. Congressman JOHN BRECKINRIDGE visited the Soviet Union and while there had the opportunity to meet for nearly 4 hours with the First Deputy Minister of Defense, N. V. Ogarkov, Marshal of the Soviet Union. Ogarkov underscored the significance of America's decline as a world power in the following way:

The United States has always been in a position where it could not be threatened by foreign powers. That is no longer true. Today the Soviet Union has military superiority

over the United States and henceforth the United States will be threatened. You had better get used to it.

Mr. President, how many times can we be so totally misled and still survive as an independent and viable nation? I believe that we have listened to the people who have repeatedly misled us for longer than we can afford. I don't believe that we can afford to listen to these people one more time.

I support those Senators who maintain that the SALT discussions never should have been a secret process in the first place. Such secrecy only excludes the Congress and the American people from making their concerns and their opinions known to the President. In this connection, I might say that the record of secret negotiations and treaties with the Communists in recent years—witness the debacle of the secretly negotiated Paris accords, which provided a Nobel Peace Prize to its chief American architect and a loss of freedom to the South Vietnamese people—indicates that we do better sharing our secrets with ourselves than with our enemies and potential enemies.

At another level of argument, we note seemingly erudite exchanges and charges over the military implications of this looming SALT treaty. The modern jargon having to do with such entities as throw-weights, warhead yields, missile accuracy, silo survivability, launcher aggregates, strategic equivalence, sufficiency, stability—all this pervades the rhetoric, causing many people to gasp in puzzlement and disbelief, and highly sophisticated experts, such as former Defense Department policy analyst Robert Leider to suggest that nuclear "word-limitation," rather than "arms limitation," talks receive first priority.

Whatever the value of this controversy may be, there is one dominant aspect of it which should be realized, namely, essentially all of it stems from a reaction to the disclosed agreements between the administration and the Soviet Union. For its peculiar multitude of reasons, the Senate is taking sides in either supporting the potential treaty terms of finding fault with them. Supporters of the treaty find it to well-serve U.S. security interests, and those who object find it inimical to our interests.

However, as far as I have observed, short of throwing around the military-technical verbiage of arms control and claiming that U.S. concessions have been either acceptably safe-sided or unacceptably one-sided, there seems to have been a great paucity of convincing evidence that the treaty will be helpful or harmful. What the Senate must do is to grapple with the problem of whether the treaty, in whatever form it finally takes, will be meaningful in enhancing U.S. security.

Frankly, I have become increasingly concerned over the apparent one-sidedness of U.S. SALT concessions. There is little doubt that we have backed away from most major positions taken earlier in the negotiations. On these grounds alone, I would be inclined to vote against a treaty which incorporated these concessions; for to do otherwise would be

condoning a weak and dangerous negotiating practice. However, even if we held firm and consummated an agreement along the lines of the Vladivostok accords, proposed by President Carter last spring, I still would have grave reservations.

I would have reservations because the agreement sidesteps the major real world issue—how both sides, ourselves and the Soviet rulers—view the possibility and meaning of nuclear war.

This real world issue embraces far more factors than each side agreeing to numbers of missiles and bombers in arms control treaties. It embraces the very distinct possibility—supported by some very unpleasant, cold, hard facts—that the Soviet Union is determined to put the United States in a position where its nuclear weapons are not capable of checking the Soviet drive for dominance in the world. And, paradoxically enough, one of the most critical Soviet means of reaching this objective is via the arms control process with the United States.

When the SALT I agreements were signed in 1972, the support in the United States, including the Senate, was overwhelming. Looking backward to that episode, perhaps it should not have been that way. There should have been more skepticism and suspicion about dealing with the Russians, whose arms control record prior to SALT I was not illustrious. Maybe we should have paid more attention to the deepseated and long-held state doctrine of the U.S.S.R. and, in this light, tried to figure out what they were up to in SALT besides mouthing the sweetness of détente.

There was considerable evidence at that time to show that basic Soviet state doctrine—and not the political propaganda of détente was indeed the driving factor behind Soviet actions. Instead, as Americans are prone to do, we euphorically chose to pick the hopeful side of détente, instead of the grim side of declared Soviet objectives.

In explaining the advantages of SALT I to the American people, Henry Kissinger pointed out that had we not accepted these agreements the momentum of the Soviet ballistic missile buildup—in contrast to the U.S. stagnation—would have provided them, in a very few years, with a much larger margin in their favor than the 3 to 2 advantage we conceded to them. Of course, it was never made clear—other than by assuming that the Soviets, in the spirit of détente and arms control, simply were being charitable to us—why the U.S.S.R. chose not to reach for an even larger missile disparity in their favor, unless they never had any such intention to do this.

Taking stock of what has happened since 1972, it is obvious why the Soviets elected not to further expand their strategic ballistic missile force. There was far more to be gained by putting a lid on ours and, at the same time, causing the United States to scrap its anti-missile program which could have provided substantial defense to our land-based missiles.

Having placed a limit on the potential amount of missile firepower the United States could deliver against the U.S.S.R.,



the Soviets could then go about taking the required steps—both offensively and defensively—to insure that a U.S. retaliatory blow would be insufficient to reduce the Soviet Union to the status of an unviable social system. This is precisely what they have been doing; and if we had bothered, in 1972, to take seriously the avowed state doctrine of the Soviet Union it would have been very clear why they would do this.

Long before SALT became a serious potentiality, the Soviets had accepted the distinct possibility of nuclear war with the West and had set out to take the necessary steps to fight and win such a war—at a price acceptable to them. Listen to the statements which have been guiding the course of action of the Soviet state:

"... it would be extremely dangerous if the opinion became firmly established in public circles that everything is now completely in order and that the threat of war has become illusory," President Brezhnev.

"Closely connected with the views on the character of a world war is the question of its consequences. In the West, for instance, it is claimed that humanity, world civilization would perish in the event of such a war, that everything living on earth would be annihilated. Marxist-Leninists resolutely reject these attempts. They have always considered and still consider war, all the more so a thermonuclear war, as the greatest calamity for the people. But Communists harbor no sentiments of hopelessness or pessimism," Admiral Shelyag.

"The imperialist ideologists are trying to lull the vigilance of the world's people by having resource to propaganda devices to the effect that there will be no victors in a future nuclear war. Their false affirmations contradict the objective laws of history... Victory in war, if the imperialists succeed in starting it, will be on the side of world socialism..." Marshal Krylov.

"While the Armed Forces take as their objective to prevent the use of destructive means against the rear of the country by the destruction of the attack weapons or the interception of the weapons on their way to the target, Civil Defense, by carrying out protective measures and the thorough preparation of the population, seeks to achieve the maximum weakening of the destructive effects of modern weapons."

"Under present conditions... the preparation of this country's rear for defense against means of mass destruction has become, without a doubt, one of the decisive strategic factors assuring the ability of the state to function in wartime, and in the final analysis, the attainment of victory," General Altunin.

What the Soviets openly have been telling us is that: First, nuclear war can happen; second, if it did happen, it would not necessarily be the end of everything, and they, the Soviets, would win; and third, through a combination of active and passive defense, the ability to win would be decisively enhanced. It is worrisome enough that the Russians would so vehemently admit to the possibility of thermonuclear war and claim their ability to win it, but it is terrifying to contemplate that they are actually planning for this possibility—for we neither admit to, or plan for, this contingency. To us even fighting, let alone winning, is meaningless.

I might say that this observation is fully supported by the Joint Chiefs of

Staff who have declared: "Soviet strategic policy and force development continue to be based on this military doctrine, which calls for the capabilities to fight, survive, and win a nuclear war. American strategy is premised on the principle of war avoidance while that of the Soviet Union is premised on war winning."

The U.S. attitude toward thermonuclear war, an attitude which has been fundamentally responsible for shaping our SALT philosophy, has been forcefully expressed by our prime architect in SALT, Henry Kissinger:

"... The existence of nuclear weapons creates conditions that are unprecedented in history, in that a war under current circumstances could lead to the destruction of all civilized life as we know it..."

"Although we [the U.S. and the USSR] compete, the conflict will not admit of resolution by victory in the classical sense. We are compelled to coexist..."

And so we see this drastic difference in attitudes between ourselves and the Russians. However, the difference is far more than ideological, for unlike the Russians, we have no military plans and capabilities for actually fighting a war. The military balance is swinging overwhelmingly in favor of the Soviet Union.

Since SALT I was signed, the Soviets have moved on all fronts in developing, producing, and deploying major new weapon systems. They have added new classes of land- and sea-based strategic nuclear ballistic missiles including two land-mobile strategic missiles, the SS-16 and SS-20, and have introduced a new supersonic bomber—the Backfire. They have improved substantially their already massive air defense system and apparently, as former Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird has revealed, completed research and development in flagrant violation of the SALT I Treaty on an antiballistic-missile (ABM) system which readily could be deployed around the Soviet Union. Finally, they have greatly accelerated their civil defense program, along with means to disperse and harden critical economic assets.

On our side, and in stark contrast to the Soviet efforts, to a first approximation during the last 5 years, we have sat on our hands. Not one new strategic ballistic missile system has entered the inventory. We have no firm commitment to produce and deploy a mobile ballistic missile, and even were such a commitment actually to be made, it would not be until the late 1980's until such a system was in place. We have canceled our B-1 supersonic bomber, giving the Russians an absolute monopoly in this area. The final dismantling of our air defenses has taken place, and even the minimum ABM capability which SALT I permitted us to have has been put in mothballs. By comparison with the Soviets, our ABM research and development goes on at a minuscule level. Finally, our economic survival and civil defense programs continue to be nonentities.

Despite these huge, and growing, disparities between ourselves and the Russians, we are told by the administration that there is no cause for undue concern.

Even though it is admitted, to quote the Secretary of Defense, that "We cannot rely on our present ICBMs to survive an attack in any large numbers past the early to mid-1980's," at the same time we are reassured that during this critical period those strategic forces which might survive a Soviet attack would be sufficient to wreak unacceptable damage against the Russian economy and population. Perhaps so, but I do not find the arguments very reassuring and would observe that the supporting studies behind these arguments have yet to be provided to the Congress and the American people for their assessment and reassurance.

As to the possibility that the Soviets might deploy an ABM system under the guise of an air defense system, which is not barred by SALT, we are told by the Secretary of Defense that this would be an exercise in futility, that such a system would not be effective against a U.S. missile attack. How do we know this? By whose standards is the effectiveness of a Russian ABM to be determined—ours or theirs?

Obviously, we are making the incredible mistake of thinking that the Soviets think exactly as we do. Yet, at the same time that we tell ourselves that Soviet ABMs are ineffective we also tell ourselves that the discovery of an actual buildup of such weapons would necessitate "our taking actions to build up our forces in a massive way," which is another way of telling ourselves that perhaps the Russian ABMs are effective, or at least that we cannot afford to take the chance that they might be. Logic and consistency is deplorably lacking in our position.

I, for one, would agree with the contradictory part of this twisted logic. If the Russians are sinking all that money and effort into their ABM program, prudence and a basic concern for our security would dictate that we build up our offense to match a possible Soviet ABM deployment, and our defense to counter a Soviet first strike. Considering the massive Soviet ABM effort, an effort which a Library of Congress report calls unswerving in purpose, and the fact, as stated by Soviet General Altunin, that such defense is a doctrinal objective for the Soviet Union, it would seem irresponsible for us to do anything else.

As for the effectiveness of the Soviet economic and population defense program, the Defense Department reassures us that even though the program is indeed expanding, like their ABMs this too, is an exercise in futility. The program will not work, we are told, because the United States can modify its offensive forces to make sure it will not work. Moreover, the Soviet plan for evacuating their population will fail for lack of realistic practice. The Secretary states: "I think that the idea of evacuating people from big cities into the country, without practice—and there hasn't been practice in the Soviet Union—means that the plan would fail in the event." Note that it will not work because we say it will not work, not because the Russians think it will not work.

Regarding the protection that the Soviets are providing their economy through dispersal and hardening of key elements, how does the Defense Department know that this is actually counterproductive for the Soviets? Surely the Soviets must understand the mechanics of missile force modification and determine for themselves the efficacy of such measures. Moreover, I would seriously question whether the office of the Secretary of Defense is even able to make responsible calculations on such Soviet measures. One should realize that this is an intelligence area which has gone badly neglected until very recently. I highly doubt whether we know the full extent of the current measures which have been taken, and there certainly is no way of our projecting what future Soviet capabilities in this area may be. I do not find this very reassuring, especially if our required force modifications are to be unrealistically restricted, primarily by Soviet design, in a new SALT Treaty.

With respect to the claim that the Soviet population evacuation program is infeasible due to lack of realistic practice, I would point out that a comprehensive study of emergency evacuation of populations has been conducted recently by the Stanford Research Institute. The conclusion reached was that practice does not necessarily make for perfect in this area, in fact, it might even make for negative results. To quote the major conclusion of the SRI study:

There is, as it were, no compelling reason to believe that public drills would enhance the population's capacity to cope with disasters more effectively or improve planning and there is fair evidence that the results might well be counterproductive.

Is the Secretary, on such a crucial matter, giving a subjective opinion or are his remarks based on detailed investigations such as SRI's?

A year before the outbreak of World War II, and 2 years before continental Europe fell to Hitler's armies, Neville Chamberlain saw hope for détente with the Nazis and an effective arms control process as well—all this, while recognizing the realities of German expansion and military buildup. In this vein, the Prime Minister of Great Britain spoke:

I am a realist—nevertheless. . . . I do see fresh opportunities of approaching this subject of disarmament opening up before us, and I believe that they are at least as hopeful today as they have been at any previous time. It is to such tasks—the winning back of confidence, the gradual removal of hostility between nations until they feel that they can safely discard their weapons, one by one, that I would wish to devote what energy and time may be left to me.

As we all know, it was Winston Churchill who had most persistently fought Chamberlain's attitude and pleaded with his countrymen to build up their armed forces. And, of course, when the bubble burst, it was Chamberlain who left in disgrace and Churchill who was called upon to direct England through the war, which it came perilously close to losing.

All this is familiar history, and in Britain's case a failure to learn previous

lessons of history almost cost its freedom. However, one should keep in mind that all this happened before the nuclear age. It was in the nature of conventional warfare that nations might have time and space to overcome the initial adversities arising from having neglected the realities around them. Almost miraculously Britain was able to do this, with assistance from the United States. And we should not forget that it also was time and space which enabled the United States to overcome the disaster of Pearl Harbor and the Japanese onslaught in the Pacific.

Shortly before he died, Churchill warned the West that nuclear weapons had changed the classical pattern of the past. There could be no repetition of what had happened before:

Sometimes in the past we have committed the folly of throwing away our arms. Under the mercy of Providence, and at great cost and sacrifice, we have been able to recreate them when the need arose.

But if we abandon our nuclear deterrent, there will be no second chance. To abandon it now would be to abandon it forever.

Not too slowly, and certainly surely, I fear, we have been ignoring Churchill's warning and emasculating our nuclear deterrent. For some of the reasons I have brought out here, our Government seems to have been prone to rationalize this process, as did the British Government during the mid and late 1930's. We are pinning our hopes on an arms control process whose record so far for enhancing our security is dubious at best, and, I must sadly note, we are basing our security on SALT treaties in the making, rather than on actual military capability to deter the Soviet across-the-board preparations for nuclear war.

It has become fashionable these days to observe that the Senate is on the verge of a great debate over our strategic posture. However, despite these sage observations, the only debate which seems to be materializing is over the acceptability of a new SALT agreement, not over the adequacy of our strategic defense posture vis-a-vis that of the Soviet Union. As I indicated at the beginning, the Senate is reacting far more to an arms control process which seems to ignore reality, rather than to reality itself.

Before the Senate can pass proper judgment on SALT and a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which could be thrust upon an unprepared Senate, this debate has to take place.●

#### THE LAW OF THE SEA

● Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, there are some vitally crucial issues in the world that can fortunately be written about with a light touch. In a recent issue of the Economist the seventh annual U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea is described as progressing in Geneva at great cost, and with even greater solemnity. The author, while chiding the 158 well intentioned delegations for taking 10 days and \$2 million to produce a chairman, wonders whether the Creator will "pull the plug" on the sea before a com-

prehensive treaty can be produced to save it.

Mr. President, I ask that the attached article from the Economist be printed in the RECORD.

THE SEA

There are limits even to divine providence. Before the Creator pulled the plug on this planet a creature which he had (for reasons of his own) programmed to be messy, wasteful and destructive, he wisely covered two thirds of the globe's whole surface with salt water. This worked quite well until a few years ago. The dry third of the world might be ravaged by men's wars, fouled by their leavings, eroded, defaced and plundered by their flocks, their crops, their industrial cities and their mines; but the watery two thirds remained clean, quietly absorbed all the muck that men tipped into it, and provided them with ever-renewed supplies of fish, pure rain and oxygen.

The Creator's finest creation, man, has changed all that. Between 1950 and 1970 the world's annual fish catch was quadrupled; areas which had been known as rich fishing grounds since memory began have been virtually vacuum-cleaned in a few years. Modern man pours so much sewage, effluent, poisonous chemicals and other waste down the rivers or straight into the sea that the old oceanic cleansing processes can no longer cope. Man-made pollution is accumulating even in mid-ocean, and enclosed seas such as the Mediterranean are on the way to becoming latter-day Dead Seas. Here and there rivers catch fire—something that did not happen even in Sodom and Gomorrah. Man has burrowed into the seabed so extensively that a quarter of his oil and gas already comes from under the water. In the crowded sea lanes (merchant shipping tonnage, too, quadrupled between 1950 and 1970) huge tankers with tiny crews carry huge cargoes of oil and from time to time bestow them on the beaches which the patient sea used to keep sparkling clean.

Warnings about the marine crisis became so plentiful by the early 1970s that the world's governments were forced to take the minimal action of calling a conference. The current United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (Unclos) was called in 1973. Its seventh session began in Geneva two weeks ago. The 158 delegations have agreed (repeatedly) that their task is urgent. They have agreed on many other things too. Unfortunately the most important thing so far agreed is that none of the things already agreed can be finally agreed until everything has been agreed. It's all or nothing; and, so far, nothing.

#### IT'S MINE, IT'S MINE

Meanwhile the sea has been up for grabs. Unclos was originally launched against a background of pious slogans about "the common heritage of mankind". During its long sessions and long recesses, nearly a third of all the oceans has been arbitrarily appropriated by about 60 coastal states, in the form of "exclusive economic zones". Seabed claims, in places, go still farther; they could be tripled by the now fashionable choice of the continental margin, instead of the shelf, as a limit. A conference that began with much talk about the urgent need for co-operative, constructive international action looks like ending (if it ever ends) with the retrospective legitimizing of an unparalleled series of annexations.

Reassembling on March 28th after a restful but otherwise unproductive nine-month break, the Unclos delegates devoted their first 10 days (at a cost of over £100,000 per day) to wrangling about the chairmanship. They may thus have made Mr. Amerasinghe of Sri Lanka the world's first Two Million Dollar Charman, but they have made them-



selves look cheap. Nobody now expects that this, their seventh session, is going to produce the comprehensive treaty which has eluded them at the previous six. The distress signal, Save Our Seas, is still being ignored. How long, oh Lord, how long? There may be limits even to divine patience, and the Creator could hardly be blamed for, in despair at man's new inroads into His watery creation, He reached down and pulled the plug on him. ●

#### WHERE IS THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY?

● Mr. HANSEN. Mr. President, this morning the Energy and Natural Resources Committee, on which I am the ranking Republican, held a hearing on the Department of Energy budget. The hearing was held at my request because I have been unable to obtain straight answers to a series of questions regarding the Department's budget. At this point, I ask that my letter of May 10 to Chairman JACKSON be printed in the RECORD.

The letter follows:

UNITED STATES SENATE,  
COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND  
NATURAL RESOURCES,  
Washington, D.C., May 10, 1978.

Hon. HENRY M. JACKSON,  
Chairman, Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.

DEAR SCOOP: As you probably know, I have been exchanging correspondence with Secretary Schlesinger for the past six days dealing with a series of recent, controversial issues in the Department of Energy budget. Copies of the various letters to and from the Secretary have been sent to you.

As the correspondence indicates, I unfortunately have been unable thus far to get any reasonable answers regarding the President's announced \$100 million reprogramming for solar energy, and particularly the source of these funds from other programs, or any straight answers regarding the status of the so-called Phase II energy supply initiatives, about which Secretary Schlesinger testified on March 1, and Deputy Secretary O'Leary reported to Senator Bartlett and me on April 22. In fact, I received a letter yesterday from Mr. O'Leary which attempted to deny the President's widely reported disapproval of Phase II last week. I felt strongly that the attempted denial was an exercise in semantics, and I sent another request for the information yesterday.

Also, we are having difficulty in getting reasonable answers on the strategic petroleum reserve budget, the uranium enrichment revenues, and the uranium enrichment project at Portsmouth. These various uncertainties in the DoE budget before us could total between \$500 million and \$1 billion, and they have already been the subject of considerable interest already in the markups. I also am aware of the overall budgetary concerns which have been expressed by many Members in the markup, particularly regarding the SPR program.

Consequently, on behalf of the Minority Members of the Committee, I formally repeat the request I made in markup today that Secretary Schlesinger be called to testify, regarding these issues in the DoE budget at one final hearing before we complete action on the authorization bill. Hopefully, we could obtain responsive answers at the hearing on these important budget issues. I personally will be available to help with such a hearing at any time, morning, afternoon or evening. Thank you for your consideration.

Sincerely,

CLIFFORD P. HANSEN,  
Ranking Minority Member.

Mr. HANSEN. Before I comment further on the hearing this morning, I would like to make some brief remarks about the reason for this hearing. Last Wednesday, I formally requested, on behalf of the minority, that the chairman schedule another hearing on the energy budget with Secretary Schlesinger before we completed action later today on the budget. I requested the hearing because we have been unable to get straight and responsive answers to a series of critical questions, involving literally billions of dollars in this budget. One issue alone, the strategic petroleum reserve, could involve a difference of up to \$2 billion in next year's budget.

These multibillion-dollar questions have arisen in the past 2 weeks as a result of administration actions during our consideration of this budget. The specific issues include the following items:

Item 1. The "phase II" energy supply initiatives. On March 1, Secretary Schlesinger testified here in presenting the budget that he recognized the need for additional supply initiatives in this budget, and that he would propose them by May 1. Phase II has been discussed a great deal since then, and we now know it could involve up to \$500 million in the pending budget and, in fact, Deputy Secretary O'Leary briefed several of us about it on April 25. Also, Senator CHURCH and Senator HATFIELD formally requested, for the committee, that the department provide details on the phase II status to support markup. During the week of May 1, it was widely reported that the President disapproved phase II on his western trip, despite Dr. Schlesinger's personal plea. We have received no responsive answer on the reported disapproval, other than an exercise in semantics, nothing evasively that the President has not finally disapproved phase II. Of course, it is no secret that the committee is under intense pressure to fund some of these phase II projects, such as the \$150 million, S.R.C. two, coal conversion plant, which I understand we may consider later today. Also, just last Friday, the Department finalized a new regulation to give all liquid synthetic fuels a special entitlements treatment, with a benefit equivalent to \$2 per barrel, and which we had understood was part of phase II. If, in fact, the entitlements action Friday is part of phase II, that will require some further inquiries to sort out the situation, and its impact on this budget, as well as hundreds of millions in indirect funding.

Item 2. \$100 million solar "reprogramming." During the President's trip to the West, on May 3, he announced a \$100 million reprogramming in this budget for solar energy projects. We have been unable to get any answer on the details of the new solar projects, or equally as important, what programs and projects in this budget are to be cut to fund the solar ones. We did not even get an answer after suggesting that the absence of this information would render the President's announcement as purely political.

Item 3. \$675 million direct funds and \$1.5 billion in loan guarantees for energy impact assistance to States. On the same western trip, the President announced this new energy impact assistance program. The Department has been responsive in providing information on this new program. Since the program could duplicate several similar programs already in law or now under consideration, such as synfuels, coal, and geothermal development impact assistance, which are in this budget, and since the new program is placed in the Department of Commerce, not the Energy Department, there remain significant policy issues for this budget.

Item 4. \$115 million reduction in funding for the centrifuge enrichment facility. In testimony in late April in the House and in a May 1 letter to the committee, the Department amended its request for the Portsmouth centrifuge facility from \$220 to \$105 million, and proposed a major change in its plan, with a shift to a phased commitment to additional enrichment capacity. Again, the Department has been responsive, but this change involves very significant policy and budget issues related to our whole management of the Federal uranium enrichment program, involving literally billions of dollars.

Item 5. Use of \$800 million in uranium enrichment revenues. The Department informed Senator McCLURE on April 28 that it was not controlling the \$800 million in uranium enrichment revenues in the current fiscal year as the Congress intended and the law provides, and apparently would not do so under existing law next year. Senator McCLURE referred the matter to the Comptroller General on May 5 for a GAO investigation. In the meantime, we have been unable to get any answer from the Department on how those funds are being used and accounted for this year, and how they are intended to be used next year, when they will total almost \$1 billion.

I sent Secretary Schlesinger a letter on May 5 asking for details on all of the mentioned items. An answer last Monday was not responsive at all on phase 2, solar reprogramming, and the enrichment revenues, and raised additional questions on the other items. I sent a second letter on Tuesday reasking the original questions and following up on the Monday answers. I also sent the letter to the chairman Wednesday asking for this hearing on these specific issues, and also on the strategic petroleum reserve, which has just developed as another major budget issue.

Item 6. Strategic petroleum reserve issue. During the last 2 weeks the committee has focused increasingly on the Department's request for \$4.2 billion for the strategic petroleum reserve. The issue surfaced in the consideration of the latest amendment to the reserve plan, which this committee and the Senate disapproved last month. Because of questions during the markups in the Church subcommittee, and later in full committee, the staff was directed to review thoroughly the budget request of \$4.2 billion. A May 1 letter from Deputy Secretary O'Leary stated that the full

amount was needed, but new details in a May 9 letter from Assistant Secretary McIsaacs indicated that as much as \$1.5 to \$2 billion could be cut from the request.

The staff will be providing details to the committee on this new information and analysis, but suffice it to say that this is a very significant budget matter and a truly strategic policy matter for the United States. Because of my very serious concern about this matter, I had our staff notify the Department last Friday, and again on Saturday, about our review of the McIsaacs letter, so that they could be prepared to discuss it fully this morning, and would not be caught unprepared. This committee simply must know what the facts are in making a decision later today on the budget for the strategic reserve. Mr. Chairman, I believe that all of the issues I have mentioned, with their immediate and direct impact on the Department's budget, and the literally billions of dollars in direct funding, as well as hundreds of millions, if not billions, in indirect funding, are indicative of the fully responsible and very serious and as yet unanswered questions about this budget that I have raised.

This committee deserves factual and responsive answers from the Department before we finally approve the Department's budget. Now, I am quite disturbed that some have suggested that my questions and my request for this hearing are purely political in nature. I would hope that this discussion also demonstrates clearly the responsible, and not purely political nature, of my request in fact, the latest letter from the Department last Friday night indicated their expectation to be able to deal finally with these unanswered questions today. I certainly hope so.

Finally, Mr. President, before I turn to the testimony and questions, I would like to make one further observation. I asked that Secretary Schlesinger appear at the hearing to give us straight answers on these several, critical budget issues. I am told he refuses to testify. My response is simple and straightforward—where is the Secretary of Energy? I repeat, where is the Secretary of Energy?

Mr. President, at his confirmation hearing on August 3, 1977, Secretary Schlesinger was asked by the Chairman:

Will you be available to appear before this committee and other congressional committees to represent departmental positions and respond to issues of concern to the Congress?

Dr. Schlesinger answered, "absolutely." Repeat "absolutely." Again where is the Secretary of Energy, when the issue of concern to this committee is literally billions of dollars and major policy and program issues in this budget? Does he have no interest in two billion dollars for the strategic petroleum reserve? A billion dollars of enrichment revenues? A billion dollars in energy research and development funding?

The Department of Energy Organization Act requires the Secretary to keep us "fully and currently informed" on the budget, policies and programs in the Department. Again. Where is the Secretary

to provide answers to those very questions about the new Department's first budget? Deputy Secretary O'Leary in his May 1 letter defended full funding for the strategic petroleum reserve, and we now find from the McIsaacs letter that there may be a factual difference. Also, Deputy Secretary O'Leary signed the letters to me last week claiming that the President did not turn down Secretary Schlesinger on phase II and refusing to provide any details on the status of phase II, the solar reprogramming, and the use of enrichment revenues. Again, where is the Secretary of Energy to provide answers on the President's decisions, and the other budget issues in dispute? Secretary Schlesinger is scheduled to appear tomorrow before the Senate Interior Appropriations Subcommittee to present the Department's budget. Where is the Secretary of Energy today to defend that budget before this committee, which must authorize those appropriations in the face of these billions of dollars in unanswered questions? Must I initiate formal subpoena action to get the Secretary here? In fact, despite the fact that he knows of my request, neither the Secretary nor the Department has offered any excuse for his refusal to testify this morning. I honestly cannot remember any time in my service in the Senate when a Secretary of a Department would refuse to testify on such critical issues in his budget and programs.

The Secretary's refusal to testify necessarily raises speculation about the reasons for his refusal. Is he embarrassed that the presidentially announced solar reprogramming, in fact, was purely political, and there actually is no source of these funds? Is he embarrassed that the Department of Commerce has been given responsibility for Energy Impact Assistance to the States, despite his own statutory authorities? Is he embarrassed because the President, in fact, did disapprove the bulk of the phase II program or direct him to take it out of other programs? Is he embarrassed that commitments on certain projects like S.R.C. 1 and 2 cannot be kept? Is he embarrassed that the Portsmouth facility effectively is being deferred, with major policy and budget ramifications? Is he embarrassed that the Department now is unable to defend fully the one-third of its \$12 billion budget for the strategic petroleum reserve? Again, where is the Secretary of Energy to deal with these issues?

His refusal also necessarily raises other speculations regarding the energy conference. He has been all over Capitol Hill in recent months, negotiating, cajoling, pleading, and promising. We hear daily about new deals associated with the natural gas compromise, such as the Northeast entitlements deal. And, we are aware of actions underway now in the Department and FERC, or planned which otherwise appear to be intended to garner support for the gas compromise. Perhaps, the Secretary feels he has to avoid close questioning by the committee on these reported actions, and the many apparent contradictions they involve. Perhaps, the Secretary is afraid his answers to such questions could unravel the gas compromise. For instance, the relation

of new subsidies and guarantees for coal gas and unconventional gas to the great production gains supposedly produced by the gas compromise.

Again, where is the Secretary of Energy, and why does he allow his refusal to testify to feed these speculations?

Mr. President, it is a sad day when the Secretary of Energy refuses to testify and intentionally avoids this committee. As I stated before, such a refusal on such major issues is unprecedented in my service in the Senate. This is the second time in 4 weeks when I must say that I am sadly disappointed in the actions of the top leaders of this new Department. Of course, I refer to our review of the unfortunate conduct of FERC Chairman Charles Curtis in the natural gas conference and in other meetings, and his self-assumed role as a policymaker, as well as an independent regulator. Now, 4 weeks later, we have the Secretary refusing to testify, possibly because of fears related to the conference or his effectiveness.

I sincerely hope that these two serious and unprecedented situations are not indicative of an incurable cancer in the management of this critical new Department. I hope the Secretary and Chairman Curtis can get their situations and the Department back on an even keel, before the Department loses all credibility with this committee, the Congress, and ultimately the American people and the rest of the world.

Mr. President, let me report the results of the hearing this morning for the benefit of the Senate, by noting at the outset that, one, the Secretary of Energy did not appear; and two, none of the witnesses, including Deputy Secretary O'Leary or Assistant Secretaries McIsaacs or Thorne, knew where he was, or if they did, they failed to reveal that knowledge. So my fundamental inquiry as stated repeatedly above remains unanswered—where is the Secretary of Energy? What responsibility, if any, is he willing to take for his budget of the program areas that were the subject of this hearing?

Surprisingly, Mr. President, the witnesses who were present did not answer any questions from the letters of May 5 and May 9. Additionally, the witnesses did not present any formal statement as had been agreed by the respective staffs, but merely presented themselves for the committee's questions, even though I had already asked 10 pages of virtually unanswered questions. I believe, quite reasonably, we expected that the department witnesses would have prepared a formal statement documenting for the committee affirmative answers to each of the pending questions. In effect, the department did not deliver on the promises contained in deputy secretary O'Leary's May 12 letter that:

We expect to be able to discuss the details of the additional \$100 million FY 1979 budget amendment for solar and renewable energy research with you and the committee during the hearing on Monday, May 15,

Nor—

We will discuss with you on Monday the administration's position on the energy sup-



ply programs and projects mentioned in your questions.

What the witnesses did do, after several expressions of surprise from the committee that there was no statement or documents, was to hand the committee a two-page list of additions and subtractions of funds from the president's budget request. I ask that the two pages be printed at this point in the RECORD.

#### SUMMARY OF SUPPLY INITIATIVES

(Dollars in millions)

Increases in budget authority	
FY 1979 DOE Budget Amendment:	
Oil shale tax credit.....	N/A
Regulations to provide oil shale and other synthetic liquids entitlements treatment.....	N/A
Unconventional natural gas.....	\$10
High Btu coal gas loan guarantees.....	20
Photovoltaic research.....	30
Wind machine demonstrations.....	20
Gas and liquid fuels from biomass.....	10
Low-head hydro power program.....	20
Appropriate technology grants.....	5
Dispersed energy systems demonstration.....	5
Passive solar heating and cooling.....	5
Leveraging Federal purchases of solar.....	N/A
Solar training and education.....	5
Subtotal.....	130
Energy Impact Assistance.....	150
FY 1978 Reprogramming for synthetic liquid and solid plants.....	35
Total.....	315
Light water reactor technology.....	-10
Waste management facilities.....	-51
Advanced technology and assessments projects.....	-5
National uranium resource evaluation.....	-10
Vanpooling.....	-9
Clean boiler fuel demonstration (Coalcon).....	-45
Total.....	-130

Mr. HANSEN. I am sure all Senators will be interested in the listing of the dollars indicated. Certainly, the committee found it to be particularly interesting. But I am just as sure every Senator would be even more interested in the full explanation of each of the listed items, which we did not receive at the hearing. Deputy Secretary O'Leary spoke from what he characterized as "crib sheets" and at one point, upon our request, he even gave us one of the "crib sheets" for a program under discussion, the synthetic coal liquids program. I request that the "crib sheet" be printed in the RECORD at this point for the information of all interested Senators.

#### SYNTHETIC LIQUID AND SOLID COMMERCIAL DEMONSTRATION

##### PROBLEM

Domestic coal potentially can provide a large supply of liquid and clean solid fuels, which will be needed in the late 1980's and the 1990's. Synthetic liquid and solid technology has not been demonstrated on a commercial scale in the U.S. In South Africa, however, advanced versions of processes used in Germany during World War II now produce synthetic gasoline from coal, but at high costs.

New processes to produce lower-cost synthetic products are under development in the U.S. The most advanced include solvent refined coal (SRC-I, a solid and SRC-II, a

liquid), H-Coal and Donor Solvent. Each process differs in the way coal is treated, the products produced, and the status of the pilot plants.

Coal liquids from commercial-scale versions of these new processes are estimated to cost from \$20 to \$35 per barrel (SRC-I solid products would cost slightly less but would be of lower value). Since these costs substantially exceed current world oil prices, government assistance is required at this juncture to advance synthetic coal liquid and solid processes to the point of commercial readiness.

##### PROPOSAL

We propose the following steps to develop, as rapidly as technically feasible, a capability to produce alternative synthetic liquids and solids from coal:

Process design studies will be initiated for four or five bonafide coal liquid and coal solid demonstration plants. The studies will cost approximately \$6 to \$8 million each and will be started in FY 1978 and completed in mid FY 1979.

At this point, the SRC processes are at a more advanced stage of development than other processes currently under development in the United States. If the process studies and parallel negotiations on cost sharing are successful on the SRC processes, DOE would proceed to detailed design for two plants using the funds currently in the President's FY 1979 budget (\$23 million) and in FY 1980 would move into the procurement and construction phases on one or two plants. If the above conditions are not met by either one or both of the SRC technologies, DOE would be in a position to finance one or more of the other proposals in FY 1980. This approach will assure expeditious development of synthetic coal technology within the levels provided in the FY 1979 budget.

##### DISCUSSION

This program is designed to demonstrate the economic and technical viability of synthetic liquids and solids from coal. If the program meets its schedule goals, the first demonstration modules would be on line by 1983 and commercial-scale plants could be on line by 1987. The preliminary process design studies will assess whether proceeding to detailed design and construction make technical and economic sense. A decision to proceed will not be made until the process design studies are completed.

Electric and gas utilities are discussing the possibility of purchasing a portion of the output from the SRC I and SRC II plants during the early years of their operation.

Demonstrating the ability to produce synthetic fuels from coal provides major benefits. In the event that world oil prices rise moderately to levels at which synthetic fuels are competitive, production could be initiated rapidly, many years sooner than without such a program. This would reduce oil imports through direct displacement and it would exert a downward pressure on world oil prices by reducing the demand for OPEC exports. The coal solids technology also provides a promising cost effective means for meeting environmental standards.

Mr. HANSEN. Deputy Secretary O'Leary did promise to provide a full budget amendment discussion of each of the listed items and deletions. Many of the members of the committee inquired about individual items on the list. Others were specifically interested in the Department's discussion, primarily presented by Assistant Secretary McIsaacs, author of the May 9 letter, regarding the justification for full funding of the \$4.2 billion in the President's request for the strategic petroleum reserves. It is clear that many of the members shared with me

a sense of serious concerns regarding the exact status of the strategic petroleum reserve program and a responsible funding level for next year's budget. I must say candidly that every new encounter with the strategic petroleum reserves program increases the misgivings and confidence of this Senator and I sense many other Senators on the committee. It is clear that we must exercise extremely close oversight and authorization control of this program to avoid major difficulties in the future. Accordingly, it may be most prudent to reduce the fiscal year 1979 funding by as much as \$2 billion.

Many Senators were astounded to find that the administration was proposing a \$51 million cut in the nuclear waste program, at a time when the continued viability of the nuclear option is directly and inextricably linked to the confidence of the Congress and the American people in the Department's ability to ultimately demonstrate a viable waste disposal approach. In fact, Senator McClure pointedly inquired if the \$51 million cut in the waste disposal program, as well as another \$20 million in nuclear research cuts are intended to be the "signal" from the President in support of the LWR nuclear program, particularly the "signal" which has been offered as part of the accommodations in the various, proposed compromises terminating the Clinch River Breeder Reactor project.

Mr. President, these are just some of my reflections on the substance of the hearing this morning. Obviously, there were many others, including concerns about the Portsmouth, Ohio centrifuge enrichment facility, the SRC-1 coal conversion project, the May 12 announced use of the entitlements program for synthetic liquid fuels, among others. Many of the Senators present joined me during the hearing in reiterating my original question, "Where is the Secretary of Energy?" To this moment, we have had no formal or informal response to that inquiry. As the previously mentioned issues and unanswered questions should readily demonstrate, the Secretary should have testified in the hearing this morning. On behalf of many members of the committee, I reported to the full committee in the business meeting after the hearing about the unsatisfactory results of the testimony from the Deputy Secretary and the two assistant secretaries of Energy, and the many remaining unanswered questions and open issues which bear directly on the Department's budget and policies.

One of our fellow Senators stated his belief that the President should direct Secretary Schlesinger to appear before the committee and failing that appearance, should demand his resignation. It also was stated that it was now clear that Secretary Schlesinger was stonewalling the Senate Energy Committee. That obviously is very strong and powerful language from a fellow Senator who is a member of the President's own party, and is indicative of the mood in the Energy Committee this morning.

Mr. President, I would hope that Secretary Schlesinger will get our "signal"

and make himself available to testify on his budget and his policies. His continued failure to do so can only cause the Secretary and his Department to lose completely any remaining credibility with the Energy Committee, the Congress, and ultimately the American people and the rest of the world. Wherever the Secretary may have been this morning, or may be now, I urge him to respond to my repeated inquiry. Where is the Secretary of Energy?

Thank you, Mr. President.●

#### ORDER FOR RECESS UNTIL 11:30 A.M. TOMORROW

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that when the Senate completes its business today it stand in recess until the hour of 11:30 tomorrow morning.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

#### AUTOMATIC TRANSFERS

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, the Federal Reserve and the FDIC recently authorized "automatic transfers" from savings accounts to checking accounts for commercial banks. This new service may be offered by commercial banks beginning in November 1978 and should prove to be very useful and offer substantial cost savings to consumers. Instead of having to pay \$5 to \$10 whenever a check is bounced because the customer's account is temporarily without sufficient funds, that customer will be able to give preauthorized instructions to his or her bank to transfer funds from his or her savings account to cover the amount of the overdraft. The cost of this service is likely to be small compared to the charges now levied. In addition, the payments system will be more efficient because of the automatic transfers. Many of the checks that are now returned for insufficient funds will not have to be reprocessed by the payments mechanism; they will be covered within the bank from funds in a savings account. Clearly, there are substantial public benefits in the automatic transfer service that has just been authorized.

In today's New York Times, Prof. Albert Hart of Columbia University writes in a letter to the editor that the automatic transfer service "undermines the effectiveness of the system of reserve requirements through which the Federal Reserve has been able to keep the commercial banks from indulging in unlimited money-creation through credit expansion." The reason that Professor Hart gives is the lower level of reserve requirements against saving deposits than applies against demand deposits.

Professor Hart is correct, of course, that the reserve requirement is lower, and therefore, the multiplier relationship between reserves and money growth, which every money and banking textbook teaches so forcefully, will have a greater potential for expansion. The Federal Reserve must be mindful of this potential as it monitors deposit growth; that is its job and the Congress must expect that much of the Federal Reserve.

The Federal Reserve must monitor deposit flows connected with the new automatic transfer service with utmost care. The Board has told the Congress frequently that innovations in financial services have altered the traditional relationship between the monetary aggregates and economic activity. The rapid growth of velocity in 1975 and 1976 has often been given as evidence of the changing relationship.

The important point to be taken from Professor Hart's letter is that if the Federal Reserve is to use control of the monetary aggregates as a guide to its ultimate objectives with regard to the growth of real GNP, the reduction of unemployment, and the stabilization of prices, it must carefully define the monetary aggregates to reflect "money" in our economy. The prohibition against interest payment on demand deposits has resulted in the creation of numerous money substitutes in recent years. NOW accounts are just as much money as checking accounts, yet they are not included in the definition of M-1. The same is true of savings deposits that can be transferred to a customer's checking account by a simple telephone call and overnight repurchase agreements between banks and their customers. When the new automatic transfer service becomes available on a wide basis we will have yet another new money substitute, but one with widespread consumer appeal that must be recognized.

In other words, Mr. President, if the Federal Reserve is to continue to use the monetary aggregates in formulating its monetary policy plans and objectives, the time has come for the monetary aggregates to be redefined in a careful and practical way to reflect current media of exchange usage in our economy. Redefinition of the money stock measures would also serve to clarify the multiplier relationship that Professor Hart indicated was so important to money stock control. The Federal Reserve has been studying the money stock definitional problems for several years, and it should be in a position to move ahead and make the needed changes without further delay.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Professor Hart's letter to the New York Times be inserted at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

#### MONEY POLICY: THE INFLATION FIGHTER

To the Editor: The vote of the Federal Reserve Board to authorize "automatic transfers" from savings accounts into checking accounts is another long step toward destroying the usefulness of monetary policy for opposing inflation. Anybody who has a savings account (and this kind of account is no longer limited to individuals but begins to be generally available for business firms) will find it best to deposit every paycheck or other item of receipts in his savings account, not bothering to replenish his checking account. Whenever a check is drawn, absence of funds to cover it in the checking account will be made good by automatic transfer. This system is fully equivalent (except for some bookkeeping fuss at the bank) to merging the customer's checking and savings accounts

and letting the merged account both yield interest and serve as cover for debts.

While there has been objection to automatic transfer on the ground that it might give undue competitive advantage to commercial banks as against savings institutions, the true public-policy objection has been overlooked. What is really wrong about this measure is that it undermines the effectiveness of the system of reserve requirements through which the Federal Reserve has been able to keep the commercial banks from indulging in unlimited money-creation through credit expansion. For major banks, reserve requirements against checking ("demand") deposits have recently been 16½ percent while requirements on the various categories of time deposits have ranged from 1 to 5 percent. By encouraging customers to hold their funds in "savings" accounts (with a 3 percent reserve requirement), major banks can release from reserve funds into earning assets 13 percent of the amount of the deposits.

The basic instrument of monetary policy has been to use open-market operations to vary the banks' holding of "unborrowed reserves" relative to the amount of reserves required. Under the automatic-transfer system, the amount of reserves required will cease to be directly related to the money supply, since the mass of savings deposits will include both funds held for transactions purposes and funds held for long-term purposes. While reserve requirements against time deposits are not eliminated by the change to automatic transfer, these requirements are not only low but are too amorphous a structure to serve as fulcrum for monetary policy. Besides, extension of checking-with-automatic-transfer to savings institutions is already foreshadowed by the Federal Reserve's statement, and may leave the reserve-requirement system entirely without any grip on the monetary situation.

In taking this action, the Federal Reserve Board has bypassed Congressional consideration of bills to authorize it. In view of the fact that the Federal Reserve has for some years now been following a path which tends toward complete abdication of power over the effective supply of money, it becomes urgent for Congress to assert itself, legislate for the restoration of control in the monetary field, and frame for the Federal Reserve an unmistakable directive to defend the public interest against stimulating inflation by unlimited creation of "invisible greenbacks" by credit expansion at the banks and other credit institutions.

ALBERT G. HART.

#### AUTHORIZATION FOR COMMITTEE ON BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS TO HAVE UNTIL MIDNIGHT, MAY 16 TO FILE REMAINDER OF REPORT ON S. 3084

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, I am reporting from the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs a committee bill entitled the "Housing and Community Development Amendments of 1978." I ask unanimous consent that the committee have until midnight, Tuesday, May 16, to file the balance of the report, with additional views thereon.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. HARRY F. BYRD, Jr.). Without objection, it is so ordered.

#### SEVERE BLACK TEENAGE UNEMPLOYMENT—WHAT THE EXPERTS SAY

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, when the unemployment figures for April were



announced on May 5, 1978, there was general rejoicing. The unemployment rate was down to 6 percent, the lowest level in 3½ years.

Total employment grew by more than half a million and it was up by four and a half million persons in the household survey over a year ago.

The proportion of the working age population which was employed was at an all-time high; namely, 58.4 percent.

This was good news indeed. While unemployment is still too high, it is decreasing at a faster rate than expected and employment and the proportion of those at work is rising steadily.

#### THE BAD NEWS

But there was bad news as well on the unemployment scene. Unemployment among blacks was 11.8 percent, almost double that of the 6 percent general level and down only slightly from the 12.3 percent of April 1 year ago.

But of greatest concern was the black teenage unemployment level. In April 1978 it was a whopping 35.3 percent. A year ago it was 35.8 percent. Because of the relatively small sample, it can be said that the two figures are essentially identical.

In other words, during a year of colossal gains on the employment front and while there was a major drop in unemployment generally, black teenagers were essentially unaffected by the improvement. They were left out.

#### LETTER TO EXPERTS

Because of this general situation, last January I sent letters to about 18 experts in this field. I told them about my concern for black unemployment. I asked them two questions.

First. What is the explanation for the rise in teenage black unemployment and its general high level at a time when unemployment declined among other groups?

Second. What proposals would you suggest to attack this problem?

I sent the letter to the Secretaries of Labor and Commerce, to the staff directors of both the Joint Economic Committee and the Congressional Budget Office, to seven former members or chairmen of the Council of Economic Advisers, to a former member of the Federal Reserve Board, and to a variety of academic and foundation economists who are experts on this subject.

I ask unanimous consent that a copy of the letter I sent to Secretary of Labor F. Ray Marshall, which is identical to the letters I sent to the others, be printed in the RECORD at this point.

There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

JANUARY 16, 1978.

HON. F. RAY MARSHALL,  
Office of the Secretary, Department of Labor,  
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: As Chairman of the Senate Banking Committee and as a member of both the Senate Appropriations Committee and the Congressional Joint Economic Committee, I am deeply concerned about unemployment, especially unemployment among blacks and black teenagers.

Almost every month since April, 1971, I have chaired the JEC hearings when the monthly unemployment figures are released.

This past year (December to December) the number of employed persons has risen dramatically, by over 4 million. The unemployment rate has dropped from 7.8 to 6.4 percent. Some 1.2 million fewer people are unemployed.

Nevertheless, unemployment among blacks remains at a very high figure—12.5 percent, and unemployment among black teenagers actually went up from 34.8 to 37.3 percent. While this latter figure suffers from a large margin of statistical error, both its extremely high level and its direction continue to be alarming.

As you are one who has great expertise in the areas of both economics and unemployment, I am writing to ask two questions.

First, what explanation or explanations are there for the rise in teenage black unemployment and its general high level at a time when both employment rose and unemployment declined among other groups? Why didn't black teenage employment gain at least proportionately with gains among others?

Second, what proposals would you suggest to attack this problem? Do you agree that it seems unlikely to be helped even if there is a further dramatic decrease in unemployment? If so, what needs to be done specifically to help solve this problem?

I would appreciate it very much if you could address yourself to this issue, for it appears to me to be one of the most discouraging and intractable of all those we face.

With best wishes.

Sincerely,

WILLIAM PROXMIRE,  
U.S. Senator.

MR. PROXMIRE. I have now received replies from 14 of those I wrote to. In addition I have a letter from the Commissioner of Labor Statistics, the Honorable Julius Shiskin, on this same subject, dated last September.

I have replies from Secretary Marshall, Secretary Kreps, Mrs. Alice Rivlin, the head of the Congressional Budget Office, Mr. John Stark, the Staff Director of the Joint Economic Committee, Messrs. Alan Greenspan, Herb Stein, Paul McCracken, Arthur Okun, and Otto Eckstein all of whom served either as Chairman or members of the Council of Economic Advisers, Robert Gordon who served as chairman of the Gordon Commission some years ago on the subject of the unemployment statistics, Andrew Brimmer who was formerly a member of the Federal Reserve Board and who has very intelligent insights into this problem, Ralph K. Davidson of the Rockefeller Foundation, who included a study by Lester Thurow with comments by Drs. Bernard Anderson of the Wharton School, John Dunlop of Harvard, Beatrice Rubens of Columbia, and James Tobin of Yale, and a letter from Thomas F. Johnson of the American Enterprise Institute.

In addition, Professor McCracken urged that I write to Prof. Thomas Sowell of the Hoover Institute, who is also a professor at UCLA, and I have heard from him.

Furthermore, Professor Gordon enclosed a study by Margaret S. Gordon entitled "Youth Unemployment In The United States and Other Western Countries" which she did for the University of California and the Carnegie Council on Higher Education. I am not including it because of its length but it is available in my office.

In some other cases fairly voluminous materials or studies were included with the reply. I do not plan to include all 7 of them in the RECORD either but they are available in my office or from the person who replied in case a member of the public wishes to see them.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the replies I received from these outstanding experts on the subject of black teenage unemployment be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the replies were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR,  
Washington, D.C., April 18, 1978.

HON. WILLIAM PROXMIRE,  
U.S. Senate,  
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR PROXMIRE: Thank you for your letter concerning the problems of continuing high unemployment rates for black teenagers. Please accept our apologies for the delay in replying. I will try to be as illuminating as possible about what we know and what we plan to do about this problem.

The black teenage unemployment rate has shown little improvement since the first quarter of 1975 when the recession reached its trough. During the same period, the unemployment rate for other groups within the economy has fallen substantially. Focusing, however, only on the rate of employment masks the true story. During 1975 and 1976, black teenage employment grew very little. Reported unemployment among black teenagers failed to worsen only because there was almost no growth in the black teenage civilian labor force. This was despite civilian population growth of about 5.5 percent over the 2 years. Thus, the real seriousness of the black teenage unemployment problem remained partly "hidden." We believe that there was little job growth among black teenagers because of the sectoral and geographic unevenness of the recovery, which bypassed central cities where most black teenagers reside. The lack of job opportunities encouraged black teens to withdraw from the labor force.

During 1977, however, black teenage employment turned around. During the year ending December 1977, black teenage employment grew by 53,000 persons, an increase of 8.7 percent. This was about twice as great as the employment increase in the overall economy which was around 4.7 percent. The unemployment rate for black teenagers did not fall during 1977 because of an extraordinary increase in the black teenage civilian labor force which occurred during the year. After showing almost no growth between 1975 and 1976, the black teenage civilian labor force increased almost 12½ percent between December 1976 and December 1977. We realize, of course, that the black teenage employment problem remains serious. We believe, however, that recent events imply that the situation is improving, at least to the extent that the true magnitude of the problem is becoming more visible.

I might note that the problem is greater than black teenagers; black young adult males follow the same pattern. Like teenagers, their employment levels in the fourth quarter of 1977 were lower than they had attained in the previous cycle peak 4 years previous. Only a small fraction of the losses can be explained by their attachment to declining industries; most are due to a fall in the shares of jobs they hold across almost all industries and occupations. I might add that they share this general problem with white male youth; overall, there has been a substitution of older for younger workers in that youth have failed to maintain their shares of employment growth since 1973. The

problem has been felt much more acutely by blacks and other minorities, however. Part of the problem may be a perceived (or actual) decline in the relative qualifications of the black jobseekers. Job loss among black males 16-24 has been particularly acute among dropouts, with some losses among graduates as well, while students have increased their employment over the period October 1973-October 1977. Part of the problem is also the lack of job growth in central cities over the last 4 years, where many black youth reside.

Regarding solutions, I do think that there is likely to be some improvement given a further decline in unemployment. This is because the groups with the most severe structural problems often lag behind in the initial stages of a recovery. After labor supplies of more qualified workers are absorbed into employment, recovery proceeds for the structurally unemployed. We may have seen a reflection of that during this last year. Nevertheless, I think it is clear that nothing in our postwar experience would lead us to believe that economic recovery by itself will bring the black teenage unemployment rate down to acceptable levels.

I cannot say that we have the perfect policy to deal with this problem. Our job creation programs have reduced the unemployment rates of teenagers somewhat, and we know that long-term gains are accruing to graduates of training programs under title I of the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act and Job Corps, but their magnitude is not sufficient to deal with the whole problem. We are hoping that we will gain insights into the problem and develop some additional effective approaches through the new programs being implemented under the Youth Employment and Demonstration Projects Act (YEDPA) of 1977. We are building into these programs a strong research and evaluation component to ensure that we learn what we can from novel approaches, particularly those addressed to the matter of transition from school to work. As of this writing, these programs are getting underway; a year from now, close to 200,000 youth should be in these projects. We anticipate a favorable impact on the unemployment rate as well as long-term benefits from the aggregate of YEDPA programs. We will be exploring new initiatives toward the private sector in a \$400 million effort in 1979 and anticipate that youth will be important beneficiaries.

I am glad to receive your expression of concern about this problem. I think you can see that we are trying to deal with it as well as we can, given the state of our knowledge and the extent of our resources. We have a long way to go, but I think we are moving in the right direction.

Sincerely,

RAY MARSHALL,  
Secretary of Labor.

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR,  
Washington, D.C., September 27, 1977.

HON. WILLIAM PROXMIER,  
U.S. Senate,  
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR PROXMIER: I am writing in response to your letter of September 9, regarding your inquiry at the last JEC hearing as to the reason for the sharp rise of black unemployment in August. Enclosed is a copy of a brief analysis of recent developments in unemployment of blacks and youth, which my staff prepared as part of Secretary Marshall's recent report to the President (Enclosure I).

As I have pointed out many times at the JEC hearings, underlying economic trends are often obscured by erratic movements in month-to-month changes. This is particularly true of our series based on small samples, such as black unemployment. Thus, our data are simply not adequate to pinpoint the precise cause of the July-August surge in

black unemployment. While there is no question that a worsening in the black-white jobless rate ratio has taken place over the past few months, the extremely sharp rise in the black jobless rate in August is suspect. We are uncertain as to whether the increase reflects an accurate measurement of black unemployment or rather is a statistical aberration that will reverse itself when the September figures become available. For this reason, our analysis focused on developments which have occurred in recent months and on longer term structural imbalances which are evident among black and white workers.

You may recall a statement I made at the JEC hearings in May which alluded to an imbalance in the recovery from the high levels of unemployment in 1975 among various worker groups. This "two-tier" pattern, which is even more pronounced now, is particularly evident in an examination of recent unemployment changes among black and white workers. As can be seen in Enclosure II, differences are particularly marked for black adult women and teenagers. The adult black male rate tracked the overall rate fairly closely until last April but has gone awry during the past few months. The figures for this group were so far off the track last month that it would be well to wait another month or two for confirmation of the current trend.

I am also enclosing the chart which I promised at the hearing to send to you, which shows real earnings by demographic groups (Enclosure III).

Sincerely yours,

JULIUS SHISKIN,  
Commissioner.

#### ANALYSIS OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN BLACK AND YOUTH UNEMPLOYMENT

The employment situation among black Americans in general, and black youth in particular, is serious. Although the just released August jobless rate for blacks of 14.5 percent was especially bad, this should be viewed in the context of developments over the past several months, in which all of the improving labor market developments occurred among white workers. The situation for blacks first stood still and then deteriorated to the point where their unemployment rate in August equaled its postwar high reached in September 1975. Whites, by contrast, with an overall rate of 6.1 percent in August, were more than 2 percentage points below their 1975 record high. Thus, the black rate has soared to 2.4 times the white rate; this ratio had been less than 2 to 1 during most of the 1970's.

Black workers represent some 1.7 million, or 24 percent, of the 6.9 million unsuccessful job seekers in the Nation. You might recall that blacks represent only 12 percent of our working age population, which underlines still more the disproportionality of their job market bind.

In addition to blacks, youth are affected more severely than other worker groups by the inability to find jobs. Although it remained virtually unchanged at 17.5 percent in August, the jobless rate for teenagers is down only slightly from the 18.2 to 20.8 percent marks recorded during 1975 and 1976.

For black teenagers, the combination of youth and minority race membership has been a double burden. Their jobless rate hovers around 40 percent, the highest found among worker groups.

#### BLACK WORKERS

In August, jobless rates rose for both black men—to 11.7 percent—and black women—to 12.2 percent. The rate for black teenagers "remained" at just over 40 percent. By marked contrast, there was little change in the ever so much lower unemployment rates among white men (4.5 percent), women (6.3 percent), or teenagers (14.7 percent). Since April, the jobless rate for white workers has

declined modestly from 6.3 to 6.1 percent. During the same period, the rate for blacks rose from 12.3 to 14.5 percent. As a result of these developments, the ratio of black-to-white jobless rates has risen to 2.4 to 1 in August, an unusually high level. The relationship generally held at 2 to 1 or more during the 1950's and 60's, while for most of the 1970's, the ratio has been slightly less than 2 to 1.

Factors responsible for this recent worsening in the disparity between black and white unemployment are difficult to identify. One factor is suggested, however, by recent months' labor market developments. During the same period that the black-to-white unemployment rate differential has been widening, there has been a surge in the participation of black workers in the labor force. Since April, the black participation rate has risen from 59.2 to 60.3 percent, while that for whites edged up from 62.4 to 62.6 percent. Thus, there was a 3-percent increase in the number of black workers entering the labor force during the four-month period, compared with a less than 1-percent increase among their white counterparts—resulting in a narrowing in the gap in participation. This development suggests that a large number of blacks who had not been participating in the labor force were encouraged over job prospects by the solid labor market improvement which occurred in late 1976 and early 1977. This rise in job expectations apparently brought more workers into the job market than could be accommodated with jobs. Thus, while the number of employed blacks was about unchanged between April and August, the number of unemployed black workers rose by 300,000.

Aside from this recent worsening in the black-white unemployment situation, it is well to bear in mind that blacks as well as other minority races historically have constituted a disproportionate share of the unemployed. Thus, as noted earlier, in August 1977, although blacks comprised only 12 percent of the working age population, they made up 24 percent of the unemployed.

Following are three factors, other than discrimination, which contribute to this differential: (1) The concentration of black workers in central cities and their disproportionate representation in the Nation's poverty areas; (2) Their gap in levels of educational attainment; and (3) The over-representation of blacks in low-paying, less-skilled jobs. These points are amplified below.

Unemployed blacks tend to be concentrated in small geographic areas to a greater extent than whites, and, to the extent that there are fewer jobs available in these areas, this situation exacerbates the problem. About 60 percent of the Nation's unemployed blacks live in the central cities, most of them within the low income areas of these cities. Thus, in the second quarter of 1977, there were about 845,000 unemployed blacks living in the central cities. Among whites there is much greater dispersion—about 40 percent of the unemployed whites live in suburban areas and another 30 percent live outside of metropolitan areas. Not only is black unemployment concentrated in central cities in general, it is located in some specific cities, mainly in the northwest and midwest. In 1976, one-fifth of the Nation's unemployed blacks—or 315,000 persons—lived in nine major central cities—Baltimore, Chicago, Cleveland, Detroit, Milwaukee, New York, Philadelphia, St. Louis, and Washington, D.C.

With respect to educational attainment, the proportion of black workers who have completed four years of high school or more remains lower than for whites. In 1976, the proportion of blacks with at least a high school education was 60 percent, compared to 74 percent of white workers. Unfortunately, the available statistics do not shed any light on the relative quality of the schooling attained by black and white work-



ers, but we suspect that blacks fare poorly in this regard.

A third factor relating to the differential is that, despite a significant amount of occupational upgrading which has occurred among black workers in the late sixties and the seventies, black workers still lag far behind in the proportion holding higher-paying, high-status jobs, and are overrepresented in lower-paying, less-skilled jobs, which are more often characterized by high turnover and incidence of unemployment. In 1976, for example, the proportion of black men employed in the relatively stable white-collar occupations was 21 percent, less than half the proportion of white workers. At the lower end of the skills spectrum, 32 percent of employed black men (more than twice the white proportion) were working as laborers or as service workers, occupations subject to higher than average jobless rates.

#### YOUTH

The Nation's youth face severe difficulties in finding good jobs. Because of their age, they tend to have little experience and few marketable skills. Perhaps the best statistical indicator of their problem is the fact that teenagers account for about one-tenth of the Nation's labor force but almost one-quarter of the unemployed. Teenagers tend to have the most difficulty finding jobs within the central cities; employment opportunities are more favorable in nonmetropolitan areas. The very high jobless rate for black youth is thus partially explained by their concentration in the central cities; about 60 percent of all unemployed black teenagers—a total of some 225,000—live in the central cities.

Both school attendance and lack of school attendance contribute to the labor force problems of young people. Those in school often have constraints on the hours they can work, which may prevent them from obtaining jobs; while this point may not represent a national policy problem, it does help explain the high incidence of youth joblessness. Of those young people who are not in school, many left before completing high school and thus do not have the credentials or the skills which employers often require. During the 1970's, the unemployment rate of young dropouts has been about 10 percentage points higher than that of recent high school graduates.

In the summertime, of course, most young people are available for full-time work. However, for those intending to return to school, the job must be temporary, and for all, it must only require the skills and experience they possess. Each summer, the economy tries to cope with the influx of young people entering the labor force, which this year totaled 3.8 million. Jobs are provided by the government, through CETA and other programs, through the job placement efforts of such private concerns as the National Alliance of Businessmen, and by those areas of the private sector which have traditionally sought young people in the summer, including construction, recreation, and replacement for vacationing personnel. While a record number of young people found jobs this summer, it appears that a disproportionate share of the jobs were filled by white youth, and thus the unemployment rate for blacks 16 to 21 years of age reached its highest summertime (July) rate—2.8 times that for young whites.

[Enclosures available in Senator PROXMIER's office.]

THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE,  
Washington, D.C., February 9, 1978.

HON. WILLIAM PROXMIER,  
U.S. Senate,  
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR PROXMIER: Thank you for your letter of January 16, in which you request my views on the reasons for the high and apparently rising level of teenage black

unemployment, and my suggestions for dealing with the problem.

An examination of the available data suggests that the higher level of unemployment rates for black teenagers compared with their white counterparts can be attributed in part to considerably higher rates of population growth. In the past 5 years, the civilian teenage (16-19) population of blacks and other minorities has increased by about 14 percent, compared with less than 5 percent for whites. In conjunction with the largely segregated housing patterns of the population, and the fact that teenagers generally do not commute far out of their own areas in taking jobs, population factors have contributed to the substantially higher teenage unemployment rate for blacks than for whites.

Higher population growth is only one side of the explanation, however. The other is the failure of job opportunities for black teenagers to keep pace with those for whites. From the first quarter of 1974 to the second quarter of 1975, teenage employment fell 16 percent for black males and 8 percent for white males. Since then, employment has risen by 14 percent for white males, but only 9 percent for blacks. The recession had only a slight effect on employment of teenage females, but measured against pre-recession peaks in the first quarter of 1974, employment of white females has risen 6 percent, while that of black females has changed little.

Labor force participation rates for teenagers indicate some discouragement during the recession for whites as well as blacks, and females as well as males, but it was evidently greatest for black males. For these, the participation rate fell from 49 percent in the first quarter of 1974 to only 41 percent in the last two quarters of 1975. No real rebound appeared until last year, when the rate rose from 41 percent in the first two quarters to 46 percent in the last two. For white males, the participation rate declined from 63 percent to 61 percent in the recession, but has since risen to 65 percent.

Among teenage females, participation rates were almost unaffected by the recession. However, when the figures for black females are compared with those for white females, they suggest a chronic state of discouragement for blacks. In the last 5 years, quarterly participation rates for black females have fluctuated somewhat irregularly between 31 and 36 percent, showing no distinct long-term trend either up or down. The rates for white females, on the other hand, have shown an almost steady upward trend, from about 48 percent in 1972 to about 55 percent currently.

The continuing high level of unemployment rates for black teenagers this year seems to be attributable in part to a reversal of the discouragement factor—in other words, to hidden unemployment coming out into the open. During 1977, black participation rates for both males and females rose sharply. It is not unreasonable to suppose that the promise of more public service jobs induced many discouraged black teenagers to renew their job search. From this standpoint, it could be argued that the continuing high unemployment rates in 1977 are not a sign that the problem is necessarily getting worse, but that the prospect of improvement has caused it to appear worse.

As for your second question, solving the problem of black teenage unemployment clearly is a difficult challenge. A number of seemingly promising approaches have been tried without notable success. I have no magic solutions but I can offer the following thoughts.

First, while it is true that black teenage unemployment is not very responsive to general economic policy measures, it will avail us little to educate, train, and counsel black youths for jobs if the jobs are not out there. Specific, structural programs, if they

are to be effective, must go hand in hand with general measures to stimulate the economy and increase the demand for workers. Measures to facilitate and encourage economic regeneration in older central cities should be especially helpful.

Second, the jobs for which we are training black youths are mostly situated in private business. It is obviously good sense, therefore, to try to enlist the help of businesses in the training process to the greatest possible extent. The President's budget, as you know, makes provision for a new private-sector jobs initiative.

Third, we must work harder to coordinate our educational facilities with actual, available jobs, first, to give meaning and significance to education as a stepping stone to earning a livelihood; and second, through work-study programs to provide financial support to young people who might otherwise drop out of school.

Fourth, we must provide extra counseling services of various kinds to help young blacks make the transition to the larger world surrounding the ghetto. These young people have been called the underprivileged, the disadvantaged, and the hard-to-employ; a far more apposite term would be the underprepared. For white youths, it is enough to offer vocational training and provide jobs, but many black inner-city youths need coaching as well as job training. This kind of help is already being offered in a small way in a few places, but it needs to be provided on a much larger scale.

Finally, a program of research and experimentation is required. We need to review our past programs to see where they fell short or went wrong, to study the experience of other countries in dealing with similar problems, and to try out a variety of new programs on a pilot-plant basis to see which ones work and which do not. Fortunately, we are already moving in this direction; I am particularly heartened by the Youth Employment and Demonstrations Projects Act of 1977, which now provides for just this kind of experimenting on a small scale.

I am optimistic for the future. If we have not yet found the answers, we at last seem to be moving in the direction in which answers are to be found. It will take time, but there are no quick and easy solutions.

Sincerely,

JUANITA M. KREPS.

CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE,  
Washington, D.C., February 8, 1978.

HON. WILLIAM PROXMIER,  
Chairman, Committee on Banking, Housing,  
and Urban Affairs, U.S. Senate, Wash-  
ington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Thank you for your letter of January 16, concerning the causes of the rise in teenage black unemployment and proposals for attacking this problem.

The problem has both long-term and short-term causes. The unemployment rate for black teenagers has been on an upward trend for more than two decades. During that period it has rarely declined except during periods of strong demand for labor generally, and even then it remained very high. In addition, there has been a trend toward substantially lower labor force participation rates for black compared to white teenagers so that unemployment figures give an incomplete picture.

It is difficult to weigh the relative importance of different factors behind this deterioration. Racial discrimination, inadequate skills and education, location in economically depressed areas, diminishing numbers of manual jobs, the dead-end nature of many jobs, and intensified competition in the labor market are some of the long-term causes; and the business cycle is a principal short-term cause.

**Racial discrimination.**—Direct discrimination in the job market, though difficult to measure, has probably not become worse and may have become less intense over the last 10 to 15 years. Nevertheless, discrimination may hamper black youths in adjusting to changes in the job market. Further, discrimination has played a role in the evolution of other causes of disadvantage, such as those associated with education, location, lack of job contacts, etc.

**Inadequate skills.**—There is a gap in education and job preparation between white and black youths. The quantitative gap in terms of the number of years of schooling achieved has been diminishing over time. On the other hand, the gap in on-the-job experience seems to have widened.

**Location.**—Locational factors are important since a large proportion of black teenagers are located in run down sections of central cities. The shift in retail and service jobs to the suburbs seems especially significant, since those sectors employ disproportionate numbers of teenagers.

**Dead-end jobs.**—The jobs available to many black teenagers are at the bottom of the job scale; and, in many such jobs, neither the employer nor the employee have incentives to develop long term relationships, with high turnover and high frictional unemployment resulting even when unemployment is low nationally.

**Intense competition.**—The labor supply of teenagers and adult women has expanded rapidly; and the numbers of black teenagers have increased considerably faster than white teenagers. The large increase in supply has put downward pressure on wages for teenagers; but the minimum wage has limited this type of adjustment.

**Business cycle.**—The business cycle is an important short-term factor affecting black teenage unemployment in recent years. Teenage employment—especially black teenage employment—is cyclical in the sense that the share of teenage employment in total employment increases during business expansions and falls during recessions. In the last recession, employment declines were sharper for black teenagers than for other demographic groups. Further, the recovery in employment to previous peak levels came much more slowly for black teenagers than other groups. Eventually, black teenagers did begin to share in the employment advance. From December 1976 to December 1977, employment increased 7.8 percent for black teenagers, but 9.0 percent for white teenagers. There has been some cyclical recovery in the labor force participation rate for black teenagers. This has made the recent growth in the civilian labor force of black teenagers unusually rapid—12.6 percent from December 1976 to December 1977—and was one of the factors that kept the unemployment rate for the group from declining during the last year along with the unemployment rates of other groups.

**Policy alternatives.**—Both employment and unemployment of black teenagers are much affected by the state of the economy. Thus, monetary and fiscal policies used to affect the macroeconomy also impact on the labor market for black teenagers. Three caveats are to be noted. First, the long-term upward trend in the unemployment of black teenagers obscures the effect of the business cycle. Second, there is some evidence to suggest that some tightening in the labor market is necessary before economic expansion has much effect on the black teenage unemployment rate. Third, the unemployment rate for black teenagers would still be very high—although probably not as high as it is now—if the overall unemployment rate were reduced to, say, 5 percent which was the average for the period 1960 to 1974.

The last 15 years of experience with so-called "structural" programs, designed to assist the disadvantaged in the labor market;

indicates that these programs work best when overall unemployment rates are low so that there are jobs available at the end of the training pipeline. The basic structural approaches have included remedial education, both institutional and on-the-job training and direct public job creation. Experience has been mixed; and competent evaluators hold widely differing views about whether or which types of programs work. Perhaps more has been learned about what does not work than what does work. On-the-job training programs seem to work better than "institutional" classroom programs, perhaps in part because participants already have jobs. Numerous observers have been critical of jobs programs for disadvantaged youths for being hastily thrown together—a problem that last minute budgeting at the federal level has sometimes exacerbated in the past—and for involving little or no skill development.

Other structural approaches with perhaps a greater involvement of the private sector have been suggested, including targeted wage subsidies or exemption from payroll taxes. In addition, the fact that many black teenagers live where the local economies are depressed suggests that assisting youths might be tied in with broader policies and programs designed to assist in urban economic development.

The Congressional Budget Office has undertaken several studies in the areas of youth employment problems and black-white differences in employment experience. I enclose three of these papers—two on youth employment and the other on black-white unemployment differences.

In addition, we are continuing to do work in this area; and I will see to it that your office gets a copy of any forthcoming CBO papers on these topics.

I hope these comments will be helpful. Please let me know if I can be of further assistance.

Sincerely,

ALICE M. RIVLIN,  
Director.

[Available in Senator PROXMIER's office.]

JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE,  
Washington, D.C., March 9, 1978.

HON. WILLIAM PROXMIER,  
U.S. Senate,  
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR: This is in the nature of a brief progress report on the subject of unemployment among blacks. It is obviously a crucial problem as indicated in the forthcoming JEC Annual Report.

I want you to know I explicitly brought it up with our Special Study Group on Economic Change which is looking into longer-range economic problems that will command the attention of the Congress. I will continue to follow this with great interest. Also, I will see that you are apprised of developments as they occur.

Meanwhile, I have thought for some time that we need to develop a special exception to the minimum wage in the case of teenager and young adult blacks. It would be productive to provide low paying jobs for these groups while at the same time giving on-the-job training. Additional training credits could also be earned as an incident of such work, much as military service entitled GIs to educational benefits when they left military service under the GI Bill of Rights. This idea would serve three important purposes:

- (1) It would provide some much needed income to these youngsters;
- (2) It would give them useful training; and finally
- (3) It would mitigate labor union complaints about violating the minimum wage because these trainees would be realizing two kinds of compensation—wages and future training benefits.

As soon as the Annual Report is finished I will pursue this notion.

Sincerely,

JOHN R. STARK,  
Executive Director.

TOWNSEND-GREENSPAN &  
COMPANY, INC.,  
New York, N.Y., January 27, 1978.

HON. WILLIAM PROXMIER,  
U.S. Senate, Committee on Banking, Housing  
and Urban Affairs, Washington, D.C.

DEAR BILL: I have been giving some thought in recent days to the questions you raised in your thoughtful letter of January 16th. There are specific statistical answers to the questions as to why black teenage unemployment has worsened relative to white. But they don't answer the more fundamental question as to why so profound a change has occurred in our labor market for black teenagers generally during the past thirty years. Certainly the data of the early post World War II period indicate that there is nothing inherent in our system to create the phenomenon of unemployment rates amongst blacks running two or three times the rate for white teenagers. In 1948, for example, teenage unemployment for male whites and nonwhites was roughly the same. Even in the recession year 1949 the spread was not particularly large between black and white male teenage unemployment rates.

I have not as yet heard a sufficiently satisfactory explanation of what has happened to cause the degree of deterioration in the last thirty years but, a worsening of the conditions of transition from school to work is surely part of the problem. It is certainly difficult to argue that discrimination is worse today than it was thirty years ago. Moreover, the proliferation of federal programs directed at solving the black teenage unemployment problem have, if one believes the statistics, made things worse, rather than better.

I have been thinking of certain approaches to try to come up with a better diagnosis of the nature of the problem (and therefore the form a solution must take). Should I come up with any useful insights I will, of course, communicate them to you. In the interim, you may already know that Martin Feldstein has set up a project in the National Bureau of Economic Research to confront the whole problem of teenage unemployment.

Best regards,

Cordially,

ALAN GREENSPAN.

HERBERT STEIN,  
Washington, D.C., February 5, 1978.  
Senator WILLIAM PROXMIER,  
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban  
Affairs, Washington, D.C.

DEAR BILL: This is in reply to your letter of January 16 about unemployment among blacks and black teenagers. I am glad that you are raising the important questions about the causes of high unemployment rates in this sector of the population and about the remedies.

Let me say candidly at the outset that I am not confident that I have any important part of the answers to these questions. I think the first step to wisdom in this field is the negative one of recognizing as you do, that general expansion of the economy is not solving the problem. The second step is to recognize that we will have spent \$44 billion on Federal training and employment programs between 1969 and 1978 without any visible improvement. We have spent tens of millions in evaluating these programs without discovering any significant success. I refer you to page 240 of the Special Analyses volume of the Fiscal 1979 Budget for a demonstration of the slimness of the claims that can be made for the benefits from these programs.

I am not against these programs. However, I think they are only half a policy. We have been busily offering the hard-to-employ, and



the potentially hard-to-employ, education, training and work-experience. But we have not been motivating the participants in these programs to study, to work, to accept discipline and generally to take advantage of these programs. The result has not been to upgrade the participants as workers but to degrade education, training and work. In fact, the programs may have demoralized some of the participants by leading them to think that finding and keeping employment is not their responsibility at all, but is entirely the responsibility of the government.

I think the most important thing we need is something the Federal government cannot do much to provide. We need some leadership that will teach the affected groups that they have a responsibility to themselves to take advantage of the opportunities offered—to study in school, to use the training programs they are offered, to learn to work and to be prepared to accept private employment of the kind for which they are qualified. This teaching has to be done by people in whom the affected groups have confidence. In the case of the black community it has to be done by the leaders of that community.

Sincerely yours,

HERB STEIN.

THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN,  
Ann Arbor, Mich., February 3, 1978.

HON. WILLIAM PROXMIRE.

Chairman, Committee on Banking, Housing,  
and Urban Affairs U.S. Senate, Wash-  
ington, D.C.

DEAR BILL: Thanks immensely for your letter of January 16 regarding the urgent problem of Black unemployment. While I am not a close-range expert on labor force economics, I am impressed with the extent of agreement among economists about the contribution of Government itself to teen-age unemployment. For example, the Congress and the President last year almost certainly made this problem worse by the substantial escalation of the minimum wage. I would strongly urge you to request the views, if you have not already done so, of Thomas Sowell, Hoover Institution. Tom is an exceptionally able and clear-headed economist also a Black, and he has some definitive views on this matter.

Regards,

PAUL W. McCracken.

FEBRUARY 20, 1978.

MR. THOMAS SOWELL,  
Hoover Institution,  
c/o Stanford University,  
Palo Alto, Calif.

DEAR MR. SOWELL: Paul McCracken has told me of your work in studying the problem of black unemployment and the perplexing failure of black unemployment to improve in the past year anything like the way white unemployment improved.

In view of the enactment of a whole series of anti-discrimination laws in the 60's and in view of the substantial improvement in the education of young blacks, it is very difficult to understand why teenage unemployment, particularly, has been so persistently high and why, given the substantial increase in the black population, participation in the work force by blacks has not increased in the same proportion as white participation has increased.

Any views at all you may have on this subject would be very welcome indeed.

Sincerely,

WILLIAM PROXMIRE, U.S.S.

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA,  
LOS ANGELES,  
Los Angeles, Calif., March 13, 1978.

Senator WILLIAM PROXMIRE,  
U.S. Senate,  
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR PROXMIRE: Your letter of February 20th has just been forwarded to me from the Hoover Institution.

The extremely high unemployment rates among black teenagers and young adults appear quite puzzling at first, in view of the anti-discrimination laws that you mentioned—and still more puzzling when looking back through time and seeing that those unemployment rates were nowhere near as high—nor significantly different from their white contemporaries—back in the late 1940's and early 1950's. However, this additional puzzle also provides a clue as to what is and is not a major influence on the current situation.

"Racism" has been an all too easy explanation, but surely no one would say that there was less racism in the 1940's and 1950's than today. The same point is reinforced when looking at the steep decline in unemployment rates among young blacks between their late teens and late twenties. They have not ceased being black, but they have somehow ceased being unemployable. You mentioned the difference in labor force participation rates between the black and white populations as a whole. Historically, that too is a relatively recent phenomenon. Every Census from 1890 through 1930 showed blacks with a higher labor force participation rate than whites. In recent years it is just the reverse, and the gap is widening. Again, it is hard to believe that there was less racism in the earlier period.

What has been true of the post-1930 era in general, and the post-1950 era in particular is (1) a growing elimination of low-skill, low-wage jobs, and (2) the creation of more alternatives such as unemployment benefits, welfare, etc. The rise of various forms of wage-fixing, through unions and government—but especially the Fair Labor Standards Act—has simply priced inexperienced black youngsters out of the market. The timing of the effects is about as conclusive as social data ever get. Although the minimum wage law was passed in 1938, its level and coverage remained virtually unchanged in money terms through a decade marked by inflation that effectively repealed the law as an economic reality. Beginning in the 1950's, the minimum wage was repeatedly raised and—perhaps equally or more important—its coverage broadened so that there was "no place to hide" for the low-skill worker whose labor could not command the wage the government made a prerequisite for his employment. Numerous studies by independent academic economists, using different techniques, have documented that this has had an especially devastating effect on black teenagers.

Some people argue that the answer to black youth unemployment is either a general "full employment" policy or specific job-creation programs targeted for that group. Neither seems promising to me. Black teenage unemployment has never been as low, during even the fullest employment years of the past quarter-century of rising minimum wages, as it was in the recession year of 1949. Full employment has simply never compensated for pricing these young people out of the market. Job-creation programs on top of full employment have not done it either.

The steep decline in unemployment rates among black youths between their late teens and mid-to-late twenties suggests an enormous value to early job experience, even in so-called "dead end" jobs. This seems far less likely to be due to "skills," as ordinarily conceived, than to acquiring the necessary work habits—the discipline of a schedule, the ability to work with others, and the general shedding of immaturity. As one who was once part of those black teenage unemployment statistics—thank God, in the 1940's when it wasn't so bad—I know how painful the adjustment can be for both the young worker and for the employer. In retrospect, it is easy enough to see that it would never have paid an employer to hire me at a "reasonable" wage for an experienced adult.

What worries me about job-creation is that the jobs created will be watered down in their on-the-job requirements, and therefore unduly prolong the transition to maturity. Working for a "program" that has to hire you (legally or politically) may be counterproductive preparation for working for a private employer who doesn't. Much of the special problem of the black youngster is due precisely to his having been passed through schools without any real standards. To extend that same principle into the first stage of the job market may simply postpone his adjustment to the adult world of work.

Thank you for offering me the opportunity to express my views on this subject.

Sincerely,

THOMAS SOWELL,  
Professor of Economics.

THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION,  
Washington, D.C., January 19, 1977.  
Hon. WILLIAM PROXMIRE,  
New Senate Office Building,  
Washington, D.C.

DEAR BILL: I wish I had more wisdom (as well as more time) to offer on the puzzling and terribly important problem of black unemployment cited in your letter of January 16. Unfortunately, I can give you only a very inadequate reply; I am trying to atone by at least making the reply prompt. Here are a few thoughts that may serve to identify some clues.

First, there is a typical cyclical pattern whereby black unemployment rates rise less than proportionately in recession years and then fall less than proportionately in early years of recovery. As one example, the year of the entire postwar period with the lowest ratio of black to white unemployment rates was 1975 at 1.78; and that, of course, was the most severe unemployment year for both blacks and whites.

I think I understand why that pattern emerges. The largest layoffs and job losses during a recession occur in high-paying jobs in durable-goods manufacturing and construction where blacks are still underrepresented in the work force. Then when the economy makes a partial recovery from recession, some of the jobless whites who are normally factory workers take service-type jobs that might normally go to blacks. So black unemployment does not fall readily. Thus previous business cycles have offered evidence that blacks are last hired (although it does not confirm the general view that they are first fired).

This time, however, the pattern is more pronounced and more dismal than in the past. In recent months, the black-white unemployment ratio has been running around 2.2, which is unusually high. One relevant fact must be the especially high birth rates among blacks that prevailed during the baby boom; these raised the black working-age population by 36 percent in the past decade, compared with an 18 percent growth among whites. A second probable factor is that the increase of participation of white women and white teenagers in the labor force tends to squeeze out blacks. This is especially the case if employers prefer to hire whites.

Another suspect is the concentration of blacks in urban areas. But I understand that people who have tried to track that clue down can attribute only a tiny part of excess black unemployment to urban concentration. Finally, and this has to be pure conjecture, I suspect strongly that the employment of illegal aliens has tended to displace less skilled American workers and especially black teenagers.

According to past evidence, the completion of recovery has a more than proportional favorable effect in lowering black unemployment. For example, between 1963 and 1965, when the overall unemployment rate fell from 5.7 to 4.5 percent, that among blacks

fell from 10.8 to 8.1. Similarly while the black rate (unlike the white rate) actually rose a little in 1972, it fell by 1.1 percentage points in 1973. In my view this is another consideration underlining the general need for containing and reducing inflation by methods other than maintaining a weak labor market. Prosperity is an indispensable ingredient in the solution of the black unemployment problem.

But there must be other ingredients. Those ought to include a serious effort to stop continuing racial job discrimination and to curb the employment of illegal aliens. Beyond that, I really don't know how to judge the relative efficacy of various pinpointed programs—government jobs, training, and private employment incentives. I would encourage exploration of wage subsidies aimed at workers who have had a hard time in the labor market. In particular, the "voucher plan" proposed by Guy Orcutt of Yale deserves much more attention than it has received.

Again, I wish I had better answers!

Sincerely,

ARTHUR M. OKUN.

DATA RESOURCES, INC.,  
Lexington, Mass., February 20, 1978.

Senator WILLIAM PROXMIRE,  
U.S. Senate, Committee on Banking, Housing,  
and Urban Affairs, Washington, D.C.

DEAR BILL: In reply to your letter looking for possible explanations of the continued very high unemployment rate among black teenagers, DRI has done a little econometric work to see if the current very high rate represents some new deterioration or is just a persistence of an always bad condition.

We developed a very simple equation which "explains" the black teenage unemployment rate in terms of the national unemployment rate and the fraction of the population over age 16 which is in the teenage (16-19) years. The simple equation does not explain the entire historical record by any means, but it has considerable explanatory power as the attached chart and table show.

The results show that black teenage unemployment is abnormally high since the beginning of 1977. During the fourth quarter, actual black teenage unemployment was 38.3 percent; if the historical relationship had held, it would have improved to 33.3 percent. In January, which is only one month for the current quarter, the national unemployment rate fell further, but black teenage unemployment edged higher to 38.7 percent. Thus, last observed, the situation was deteriorating.

Four quarters of such deviation are not sufficient evidence to conclude that there is a new, profound structural change. As the chart and the table show, there have been such periods of deviation in the past, such as in 1956, 1959, 1963-64 and 1974. The explanation for these errors may lie as much in measurement as in the statistical explanation. The monthly household survey from which these data are drawn consisted of 47,000 people until this past month. Only about one percent of the labor force is black teenagers, so only a few hundred of them are in the sample. The difficulty of surveys for a group such as this is that one must expect that there be a considerable sampling error. Nonetheless, the record is running up a warning flag that the situation is getting worse.

In a general way, there is not much mystery to this phenomenon. Inexperienced workers are always at a disadvantage. Under the U.S. job system, the normal unemployment rate for young workers is always high because of the frequency of voluntary job changing. The rate for blacks is high partly because of location in the inner cities while new jobs develop on the peripheries of metropolitan areas. Once high unemployment becomes part of the way of life of a group, for

whatever reason, attitudes toward job holding change, normal individual growth of skills is lost, and there is a great tendency for the situation to perpetuate itself.

There are no simple solutions. Nationwide progress on unemployment is an absolute must if any other solution is to stand a chance. Progress in the macro economy can bring the black teenage unemployment rate down from 38 to the 25-30 percent range. But from that point on, it will take a more effective integration of this group into the mainstream of the American economy, through improved education, job training, equal opportunity, mass transit to jobs, and other measures. Public service employment also has some potential, although the recent experience with this program suggests that it is becoming increasingly a routine source of financing for local government activities, and is not targeted on the youth unemployment group. I have not had the opportunity to analyze the new youth unemployment proposals to assess how much can be expected from them.

Sincerely yours,

OTTO ECKSTEIN.

# BLACK UNEMPLOYMENT RATE, 1970-77

Year and quarter	Actual rate	Explained rate <sup>1</sup>	Error	Percent error
1970:				
I.....	25.5	27.0	1.5	5.8
II.....	27.5	28.6	1.1	4.1
III.....	30.4	29.9	-.5	-1.6
IV.....	32.1	31.8	-.3	-.9
1971:				
I.....	31.4	32.0	-.5	-1.7
II.....	32.5	32.1	-.4	-1.2
III.....	31.6	32.5	.9	2.9
IV.....	31.5	32.4	.9	2.9
1972:				
I.....	36.7	32.0	-4.7	-12.9
II.....	31.4	31.7	-.3	-.7
III.....	31.4	31.6	-.2	-.5
IV.....	35.4	30.9	-4.4	-12.5
1973:				
I.....	29.7	29.9	-.2	-.7
II.....	30.7	29.8	-.8	-2.7
III.....	31.8	29.8	-2.0	-6.3
IV.....	28.7	29.7	1.0	3.4
1974:				
I.....	30.2	30.3	-.1	-.4
II.....	31.1	30.6	-.5	-1.6
III.....	33.5	31.9	-1.6	-4.8
IV.....	36.4	34.6	-1.8	-5.0
1975:				
I.....	38.8	38.4	-.5	-1.2
II.....	36.7	40.0	3.3	8.9
III.....	36.1	39.5	3.4	9.4
IV.....	35.9	39.0	3.2	8.8
1976:				
I.....	35.6	37.1	1.5	4.3
II.....	39.1	36.4	-2.6	-6.8
III.....	37.2	36.9	-.3	-.7
IV.....	36.6	36.9	.3	.9
1977:				
I.....	37.5	36.0	-1.5	-4.1
II.....	38.1	34.9	-3.2	-8.4
III.....	39.2	34.2	-5.0	-12.7
IV.....	38.3	33.3	-5.0	-13.0

<sup>1</sup> Unemployment rate calculated from relationship described in text.

Note: Details may not add to totals due to rounding.

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY,  
Berkeley, Calif., February 8, 1978.

Senator WILLIAM PROXMIRE,  
Chairman, Committee on Banking, Housing,  
and Urban Affairs, U.S. Senate, Wash-  
ington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR PROXMIRE: This is in reply to your challenging letter of January 16 regarding the tragically high unemployment rates for black teenagers. The questions you ask—why and what can we do about it—have no simple answers. All I can do is offer some comments based on my own research and that of others and also on my reflections about the problem.

First, I am sending you under separate cover a manuscript copy of my new monograph, "Disaggregating the Goal of Full Employment," which will be published by the National Commission for Manpower Pol-

icy in March. In this monograph I review the changes that have occurred in the level and pattern of unemployment rates when the labor force is classified by age, sex, color, and in other ways. The problem of black teenagers is a two-fold problem: They are teenagers, and they are black. (See pp. 11 ff. of my monograph on teenagers and young adults; pp. 21 ff. on unemployment rates for nonwhite teenagers and young adults; and pp. 29 ff. on unemployment in poverty areas.) I also call your attention to the last paragraph on p. 31 regarding the importance of the social and economic environment in which most urban blacks live. You may also be interested in the first and last chapters of the monograph, in which I call for less emphasis on a single figure for the goal of full employment and much more emphasis on specific targets for blacks, youth, and other groups with relatively high unemployment rates.

I should next like to call your attention to the work on youth unemployment currently being done by my wife, Dr. Margaret S. Gordon, who is Associate Director of the Carnegie Council for Policy Studies in Higher Education. (Clark Kerr is the Director). The Carnegie Council plans to issue a policy statement on youth unemployment, which is currently being drafted by Mrs. Gordon. She has given me her permission to enclose with this letter some tentative "Policy Options" which she has drafted for consideration by the Carnegie Council. No public use of this should be made without her permission. She is also now editing a large collection of papers on youth employment in most of the industrial countries in Western Europe and in Japan, Mexico, and South Asia. She hopes to have the volume ready for press in about two months and says that she could then send you a copy of the manuscript if you wish. The address of the Carnegie Council is 2150 Shattuck Avenue, Berkeley 94704.

I am also enclosing a copy of a paper on youth unemployment that she prepared for a recent conference and which she plans to develop further for the volume that she is editing.

I assume that you and your staff are familiar with the new policy statement just released by CED on what to do about unemployment among the disadvantaged, including youth. I think it is an excellent report, and, if you have not already done so, you should seek the help of Frank Schiff, Vice President and Research Director of CED, who prepared the report. See also the excellent set of case studies that CED published at the same time. I call your attention particularly to the report on "Chicago United" and "Chicago Alliance of Business Manpower Services."

Permit me now to sketch out my own views on the two questions that you raise.

First as to why. The rise in black youth unemployment rates is a product of several factors. First, there is the increase in teenage unemployment rates generally that began in the early 1960's. That situation is almost certain to improve in the next 10-15 years as the fraction of the labor force made up of teenagers declines. But, as you mention in your letter, the black-white ratio for teenagers has steadily worsened, and there is no assurance that it will improve significantly in the future. I offer the following hypotheses (and I emphasize this word) for this phenomenon.

1. The reluctance of employers to employ teenagers in ladder jobs is compounded in the case of blacks; and even in some types of jobs in the "secondary" labor market employers are reluctant to employ young blacks, even when they will hire white teenagers.

2. The migration of blacks to central cities in the North, Midwest, and Pacific Coast has led to their concentration in so-called pov-



erty areas, where unemployment ratios are particularly high. Here I call your attention to the comment on page 31 of my monograph that "not only people but environments have children." Low incomes and high unemployment keep many more blacks than whites in poverty areas, and continued residence in poverty areas tends to perpetuate low incomes and high unemployment, for both youth and adults.

While the migration to northern cities has abated in recent years, today's black teenagers are the children of parents who fled from the South in the 1950's and 1960's.

3. With civil rights legislation and improved schooling, aspirations of black youth have risen. Not as many of them are willing to accept menial jobs as was once the case. I do not want to make too much of this point, particularly when I read news stories of black teenagers lining up early in the morning when they hear a report of some jobs being available.

4. Related to higher aspirations and concentration in the slum areas of central cities is the increased availability of other sources of income—hustling, crime, etc.

These suggested causes are certainly not the entire story, but I think they are important elements in the total picture.

Now as to what can be done about the problem. I subscribe to virtually all of the tentative proposals suggested by Mrs. Gordon in the enclosed outline for the Carnegie Council. In addition, I should emphasize the following suggestions.

1. When the President submits to Congress his bill for helping the cities, the final legislation should include specific provisions, adequately funded, for using inner city youth to renovate slum housing.

2. Congress should consider establishing and adequately funding a Youth Employment Service on the British model—with greatly increased counseling in the schools and with responsibility for placing school-leavers (both drop-outs and graduates) in jobs. Counseling in American high schools is inadequately staffed and heavily oriented toward those going on to college.

3. As the CED report suggests, more attention should be paid to the possibilities of placing youth in small business firms.

4. I think that perhaps the most urgent need is to develop on a much more extensive basis than now exists a comprehensive and well developed system of work-study programs in the high schools. This is now being tried on a more extensive basis than before, but still on a very limited basis and without full support from local business communities. Here is an area in which, incidentally, the resources of small business firms can be tapped—but it will require planning, education, and hard work.

5. In this connection I strongly support the proposals put forward by Willard Wirtz and the National Manpower Institute for an experimental program of Community Education—Work Councils. This program is now being tried out on an experimental basis in a sample of communities with federal and other aid. The program should be fully supported and the results carefully evaluated.

6. The new Youth Employment and Demonstration and Projects Act of 1977 holds some promise, and I was encouraged to read a few days ago that President Carter promises to submit to Congress an enlarged budget to continue the main provisions of the act beyond September, 1978. I urge you, however, to consider whether the Act needs to be modified to put fewer constraints on employers in applying for funds.

7. We shall continue to need a substantial program of Public Service Employment jobs for teenagers who cannot otherwise find jobs. Such PSE jobs should provide a sub-

stantial element of training—not merely for specific jobs but also remedial education and work discipline.

8. I favor, as do many if not most economists, a lower minimum wage for youth. Since this is not politically feasible, I suggest that both teenagers and their employers be relieved of Social Security taxes.

I could go on, but I think I have said enough, at least as a starter. You will find a number of other proposals in Mrs. Gordon's suggestions for consideration by the Carnegie Council.

Please feel free to call on either or both of us if you or your staff think that we can be of further help.

Sincerely yours,

R. A. GORDON,  
Professor Emeritus.

[Enclosure]

BRIMMER & CO., INC.,

Washington, D.C., January 27, 1978.

HON. WILLIAM PROXMIRE,  
Chairman, Committee on Banking, Housing,  
and Urban Affairs, U.S. Senate, Washing-  
ton, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR PROXMIRE: In his absence, Dr. Brimmer has asked me to send you a copy of his remarks before the White House Conference on Balanced National Growth and Economic Development. This paper which is titled "Economic Growth and Structural Unemployment" touches on many of the concerns expressed in your letter of January 16th.

Sincerely,

MARIE MURRAY,  
Assistant Vice President.

[Doctor Brimmer's remarks are available in Senator Proxmire's office.]

THE ROCKEFELLER FOUNDATION,

New York, N.Y., February 16, 1978.

SENATOR WILLIAM PROXMIRE,  
Chairman, Committee on Banking, Housing,  
and Urban Affairs, U.S. Senate, Washing-  
ton, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR PROXMIRE: A year ago our Trustees asked staff in the Foundation to prepare for them a paper outlining the dimensions of the problem of minority youth unemployment. We asked Professor Lester Thurow of MIT to write such a paper for us. Following that, we held a meeting at the Foundation to discuss the paper and some of its implications. That paper and an edited version of the meeting was contained in the enclosed working paper on "Youth Unemployment." Professor Aaron Gordon told me of your interest in the problem and suggested I send a copy of the working paper to you.

Sincerely yours,

RALPH K. DAVIDSON,  
Deputy Director.

[Professor Thurow's study available in Senator Proxmire's office.]

AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE,  
Washington, D.C., January 27, 1978.

HON. WILLIAM PROXMIRE,  
U.S. Senate,  
Dirksen Senate Office Building,  
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR PROXMIRE: Thank you for your letter of January 16 concerning the black teenage unemployment problem. This is a particularly intractable problem where substantial increases in total employment and decreases in the overall unemployment rate in the economy do not seem to extend to unemployed black teenagers.

The economy has been performing exceedingly well in providing new jobs over the last several years—over four million last year alone. The employment-to-population

ratio is at a new high of 58 percent and, as Commissioner Julius Shiskin pointed out during his appearance before your committee on January 11, if this ratio is computed using the age group 18 to 64 years of age, it is over 67 percent. This means that more than two-thirds of the nation's population of 18 to 64 years of age is at work. This is indeed an impressive performance. I might add that the December data indicate not only a fall in the overall unemployment rate but that the fall in the rate extends to all groups, including teenagers and blacks.

But, as you indicate in your letter, unemployment among teenagers remains high and the rate for black teenagers actually rose in 1977. The teenage unemployment rate will always be higher than for older demographic groups in the population—heads of households, etc.—simply because of the nature of the teenage demographic group and its more loose attachment to the labor force. This does not mean, of course, that efforts should not be made to reduce the teenage unemployment rate.

When one examines the labor force data, particularly the figures on duration (over 73 percent of the unemployed have been in this category for 14 weeks or less), it is apparent that most entrants are moving into employment fairly quickly. Further, in a civilian labor force of almost 100 million (of which 93 million are employed), it is necessary to keep the teenage unemployment problem in perspective. While the percentages are higher than for older groups, the number of teenage unemployed is about 1.4 million, of which 395,000 are blacks.

These data clearly indicate one thing—the teenage, and particularly the black teenage, unemployment problem does not lend itself to solution through macro-economic monetary and fiscal policy measures. Further stimulation of the economy will have little, if any, effect upon the problem. Also, as the President pointed out, the private sector has to create meaningful jobs; the government cannot do it. Therefore, job programs of the federal government, such as the CETA program, are of limited usefulness.

But measures designed to remove or reduce the barriers to employment of young and for the most part inexperienced workers should, in time, have some effect on the teenage unemployment rate. One such measure could be a teenage differential in minimum wages for an apprenticeship period. Each time the minimum wage has been raised, it has had an adverse effect on teenage employment. Therefore, some adjustment mechanism would help mitigate this effect. Other measures that reduce the cost and provide incentives to employers to hire and train young workers should be beneficial. Efforts in this direction, over time, offer our best chances in dealing with this problem, but there are no quick or easy solutions.

Sincerely yours,

THOMAS F. JOHNSON,  
Director of Economic  
Policy Studies.

## CANCER RESEARCH MILLIONS, THE CONGRESSIONAL DILEMMA

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, in my more than 20 years in this body I have been subjected to all kinds of lobbying entreaties to support or oppose legislation.

But in the past few days I have been subjected to a new and more potentially effective lobbying pressure than before.

On Sunday May 7 a full page ad ap-

peared in the largest daily newspaper in my State—the Milwaukee Journal. The ad featured one of the most compelling and attractive figures in this country, Ann Landers, in an appeal to increase the spending for one of the most irresistible and worthy causes this body votes on, that is cancer research. The ad asks this Senator's Wisconsin constituents to tell him to vote to increase the budget by \$158 million more than the President has requested for cancer research.

What makes this ad unique is that it is aimed at a single member of Congress, specifically at this Senator. This Senator is singled out because he is a member of the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee for Health, Education and Welfare.

The cost of that one ad to influence one Senator to vote for one part of the appropriation bill, in just one of the Appropriation Committee's subcommittee, is over \$6,000.

The ad was paid for by a national organization headquartered in New York City.

If each of the 12 members of the subcommittee receive similar treatment, and only a single ad is run in one newspaper in each of the States, the total cost might be about \$70,000.

Mr. President this is a pretty nifty gambit and here is why: Once the subcommittee puts the additional sum into the budget, it would be a very long shot indeed to take it out. No one who ever expects to run again for reelection wants to be in the position of being charged by an opponent with voting to reduce the funds to fight cancer.

And that, Mr. President, is exactly why we have a situation in which we have almost drowned the National Cancer Institute in Federal dollars.

We have labored under the misapprehension that if we come on with enough hundreds of millions of dollars we can quickly prevent and cure cancer.

Mr. President, that is unfortunately not the case, as most responsible experts at the National Cancer Institute will tell you confidentially, and as experts in the other National Institutes of Health will tell you even more emphatically.

President Carter, like his predecessors in the presidency, has not held down his request for money for the National Cancer Institute because he does not hope and pray that we can find a way to stop cancer. Like all of us he wants to do so with all his heart. But he recognizes that this takes time and patience as well as money.

Mr. President, in the last 10 years we have increased funds for cancer research from \$178 million in 1969 to \$878 million, for 1979, that is by a whopping \$700 million or by more than 390 percent. That will be what we will appropriate for the coming year if we simply pass the President's budget request for 1979 without increasing it.

The House would go to about \$900

million. The Ann Landers ad would take it to \$1,036 billion.

As the ad says, we have indeed made spectacular progress in combating cancer in the past 10 years, thanks to research by the National Cancer Institute.

Yes, indeed, we should maintain this high level of expenditure, and as time goes on increase it. But after a colossal explosion in spending for this purpose it does seem that this is as the administration maintains, a reasonable time to consolidate operations and proceed more efficiently.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a copy of the advertisement to which I have referred be printed in the RECORD at the conclusion of my remarks.

There being no objection, the ad was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

"IF YOU WANT TO BE PART OF AN EFFORT THAT MIGHT SAVE MILLIONS OF LIVES—MAYBE YOUR OWN—PLEASE STAY WITH ME."—ANN LANDERS

Dear Readers: For those of you who look to my column for laughs, sorry, I have nothing for you today. My message is a somber one, but it also offers you an opportunity to do something about the most feared disease known to man.

If prayers are heard in heaven, the prayer heard most often is this one: "Please, dear God, don't let it be cancer." Every person who is reading this column has lost a loved one to that terrifying disease—mother, father, husband, wife, sister, brother, child or close friend.

One out of every four Americans will get cancer at some time during his life. One out of every six will die from it, unless new treatments and cures are found. Scary, isn't it? Especially when you look at it this way: If you have a dinner party and invite five couples, two people at your party (including you and your spouse) may be a cancer fatality.

These are depressing figures, but the picture isn't all black. Here are some encouraging signs:

We now know that there are over 100 different types of cancer. We also know that 8 types of cancer, considered virtually hopeless ten years ago, have shown more than a 50% survival rate for five years or longer. Such spectacular progress is proof that medical research does pay off.

The more we hunt, the more we will find. Hunting costs money, but we must not let that stop us.

Medical research unlocked the secrets of diphtheria, TB, smallpox and polio. Medical research will eventually find cures for all cancers.

People complain about high taxes and government spending—and well they might. The cost of living is out of sight. Everything has a bigger price tag than last year. Moreover, things will probably get worse before they get better.

The Federal Budget for 1979 is \$502 billion—yes, I said Billions. That's a B. Is it unreasonable to ask Congress to spend an additional \$158 million on basic research, cancer centers, education of physicians in cancer treatment and prevention, and the development and use of new and improved drugs for clinical research? These additional funds will bring the total amount spent to fight cancer through the National Cancer Institute to One Billion Thirty-Six Million Dollars this year, but human life can't be measured in dollars and cents.

The Subcommittee on Appropriations for

Health, Education, and Welfare will very soon decide on whether or not our Government will spend the additional funds. Here is where you come in.

In your district, the key man is your Senator, William Proxmire. His address is Senate Office Building, Washington, D.C. 20515.

Write to your Congressman or clip this column and write across it "Vote for more money to conquer cancer" and sign your name. This one simple act will take no more than five minutes of your time. It will cost 13 cents for the stamp.

Can you think of anything more important to do today than join hands with your fellow Americans and launch a greater all-out attack on the most horrible disease known to mankind? I can't.

Get going and God bless.

#### STUDY SHOWS NEED FOR GENOCIDE CONVENTION

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, I would like to direct the Senate's attention to a survey conducted at the Hillside division of the Long Island Jewish Hillside Medical Center in New York. There, psychiatrists studied 30 individuals between the ages of 18 and 35, whose parents lived through the Nazi concentration camps of World War II. These psychiatrists found that the nightmares the parents lived through had profound psychological consequences for their children.

Specifically, the study found that the children are unconsciously reenacting their parent's concentration camp experiences. Based on the descriptions of their parent's persecution, these patients experienced confused feelings of identity and a strong sense of alienation. Many had problems coping with emotional situations. Of the 30, only 3 had married; two of them had already divorced.

I am reporting this study to emphasize the insidious effects of genocide. Fatality statistics just don't convey the human misery and suffering of those who live through genocidal campaigns. This study shows that these survivors experienced a psychological trauma which affected even the lives of their offspring some 35 years later. The horrors of genocide ultimately touch all members of a persecuted race.

This study conclusively demonstrates the need for the Senate's ratification of the Genocide Treaty. Thirty years ago, the United States was instrumental in drafting this treaty. Shockingly, the Senate has failed to ratify this treaty in that time. These individuals highlighted in this study are further evidence that we can no longer ignore the tragedy of genocide. We must ratify the Genocide Treaty.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from West Virginia.

#### ORDER FOR RECOGNITION OF SENATOR LEAHY AND SENATOR ROBERT C. BYRD TOMORROW

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that tomorrow



after the prayer, the Senator from Vermont (Mr. LEAHY) be recognized for not to exceed 15 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I will revise that request. I ask unanimous consent that after the two leaders or their designees have been recognized under the standing order tomorrow, Mr. LEAHY be recognized for not to exceed 15 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. I ask unanimous consent that at the conclusion of Mr. LEAHY's remarks I be recognized under the order previously entered some days ago for the purpose of calling up either the House or the Senate so-called labor reform bill.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered.

#### AUTHORITY FOR COMMITTEES TO FILE BILLS AND REPORTS CONTAINING NEW BUDGET AUTHORITY UNTIL MIDNIGHT TONIGHT

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that all Senate committees have until midnight tonight to file bills and reports containing new budget authority, which must be filed by midnight to comply with the Budget Act.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

#### ORDER FOR JOINT REFERRAL

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that S. 3003, a bill to amend the Rural Electrification Act of 1936, which was previously referred to the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry, be jointly referred to that committee and the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

#### STANDARD REFERENCE DATA ACT AUTHORIZATIONS

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate proceed to the consideration of Calendar Order No. 717, H.R. 11232.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill will be stated by title.

The legislative clerk read as follows:

A bill (H.R. 11232) to authorize appropriations to carry out the Standard Reference Data Act.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the present consideration of the bill?

There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to consider the bill, which had been reported from the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation with an amendment to strike all after

the enacting clause and insert the following:

That there are authorized to be appropriated to the Department of Commerce not to exceed \$4,000,000 for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1979, not to exceed \$5,000,000 for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1980, and not to exceed \$6,000,000 for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1981, to carry out the purposes of the Standard Reference Data Act (15 U.S.C. 290-290f).

SEC. 2. The Act entitled "An Act to establish the National Bureau of Standards", approved March 3, 1901 (15 U.S.C. 270 et seq.) is amended as follows:

(a) Section 12(a) of such Act (15 U.S.C. 278b(a)) is amended by striking out ", and additional amounts as from time to time may be required for the purposes of said fund are hereby authorized to be appropriated".

(b) Section 18 of such Act (15 U.S.C. 278h) is amended by (1) designating the existing paragraph as "(a)"; and (2) adding immediately thereafter the following:

"(b) There are authorized to be appropriated to carry out the provisions of this Act (including the Working Capital Fund referred to in section 12(a)), except section 16, such sums as may be necessary for each of the fiscal years 1979, 1980, and 1981."

The amendment was agreed to.

The bill was ordered to be engrossed for a third reading, read the third time, and passed.

The title was amended so as to read:

An act to authorize appropriations to carry out the Standard Reference Data Act, and to authorize appropriations for the National Bureau of Standards.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the bill was passed.

Mr. STEVENS. I move to lay that motion on the table.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD an excerpt from the report (No. 95-786), explaining the purposes of the measure.

There being no objection, the excerpt was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

#### PURPOSE AND BRIEF DESCRIPTION

The purpose of the bill is to authorize appropriations to the Department of Commerce to carry out the provisions of the Standard Reference Data Act (Public Law 90-396) and amend the Organic Act for the National Bureau of Standards (Public Law 56-177) to provide authorizations of appropriations through fiscal year 1981. The bill provides authorizations of appropriations of \$4 million, \$5 million, and \$6 million for fiscal years 1979, 1980, and 1981, respectively, for the Standard Reference Data Act, and such sums as may be necessary for fiscal years 1979, 1980, and 1981 for the National Bureau of Standards.

#### BACKGROUND AND NEEDS

##### STANDARD REFERENCE DATA ACT

The Standard Reference Data Act (Public Law 90-396) (15 U.S.C. 290-290f) was enacted in 1968 and reauthorized in 1972 and 1975. The act establishes a standard reference data system within the Department of Commerce to be administered by the Na-

tional Bureau of Standards. Under the authority of the act, the Bureau provides reference data on the chemical and physical properties of materials for use by Government, industry, universities, and the public. Through the compilation and dissemination of standard reference data for use by the public and private sector, the Bureau program helps increase the productivity of research and development activities.

Reliable scientific and technical information is vital to any research and development effort. In providing for standard reference data on the physical and chemical properties of materials, the Bureau collects, compiles, and critically evaluates published scientific articles and then disseminates standard reference data for use by scientists and engineers. The Bureau estimates that there are approximately 300,000 articles published annually in the scientific literature which contain new measurement data on physical and chemical properties.

For scientists and engineers involved in research, it is important to have both reliable and accessible data. Bureau specialists review the scientific literature for relevant articles on the physical and chemical properties of materials, evaluate the accuracy and consistency of the data, and then provide that information for use by scientists and engineers in the field. The Bureau program saves scientists and engineers throughout the Government, industry, and universities a great deal of time. Moreover, the data produced by the Bureau is viewed by the technical community as reliable.

The Bureau conducts its work through 22 different data centers. Fourteen of these centers are part of the Bureau with the remaining eight located in various parts of the country. The main mechanism the Bureau employs the disseminate information is the Journal of Physical and Chemical Reference Data. The journal is published through a cooperative program with the American Institute of Physics and the American Physical Society. In addition, the Bureau provides selected articles and publications on specific subjects.

The Bureau program has been funded at approximately \$3 million with an additional \$2 million received in pass-through funds for "other agency" work. On occasion the Bureau conducts a review of chemical and physical properties data for particular industries for which the Bureau is reimbursed. For example, various firms involved in the production and use of ethylene recently banded together and requested that the Bureau compile standard reference data on the properties of ethylene. A 5-year, \$490,000 program was established with the industry and the Bureau each contributing about half of the cost.

The standard reference data program is quite small, particularly when viewed in relationship to the level of research and development funded by Government and industry. With the vast amount of research conducted in the United States and worldwide, it is important that some standardization of research data be conducted. A National Academy of Sciences evaluation panel which annually reviews the status and effectiveness of the Standard Reference Data program, recommended in 1977 that the Bureau program be increased to a level of \$15 million. In hearings before the committee, a \$10 million level was recommended. These recommendations, if implemented, would provide for a three to five times larger program. The Bureau indicates that there is a need to expand the current program and initiate new activities in the following areas which they consider to be high priority:

Thermal data for organic, chemical and power industries;

Physical reference data for medicine and biology;  
Stability of alloys and ceramic materials;  
Fractured properties of structural materials;  
Chemical modeling data for water pollution.

While the committee is unable to judge at this time the merits of these proposed areas of future activity, it concurs with the recommendations of various panels and individuals that the Bureau program should be expanded, and that this growth might be on the order of 25 percent annually. The committee therefore recommends an authorization level of \$4 million, \$5 million and \$6 million for fiscal years 1979, 1980 and 1981, respectively, for the Standard Reference Data program. This authorization will permit continued support of ongoing efforts and the initiation of certain new activities to meet identified national needs. The committee expects the Bureau to be able to continue its effective work in compiling and evaluating research results and articles in the literature while keeping to a minimum the research the Bureau actually conducts.

An issue was raised dealing with the appropriate period for reauthorization of the Standard Reference Data Act. While, until now, the National Bureau of Standards has operated on the basis of a continuing authorization, the Standard Reference Data Act has been reauthorized for periods of 3 years. The committee believes it is important to make the authorization period of the Standard Reference Act consistent with the authorization period of the Bureau. A 3-year authorization period through fiscal year 1981 is provided under the bill, and as discussed below, the bill would amend the National Bureau of Standards Organic Act to provide for an authorization of the Bureau through fiscal year 1981.

#### REAUTHORIZATION OF THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS

The National Bureau of Standards was created by statute in 1901. The NBS Organic Act (Public Law 56-177), as amended in 1950, is the basis for the oldest national laboratory, and possibly the Nation's only true national laboratory. Unlike other national laboratories, the Bureau is nonsector specific, and is not directly assignable to any single Government functional area, such as health, energy, transportation, or environment. Its capabilities are applicable to a wide range of problems and are available for use by any other Federal agency.

The main mission of the Bureau is to develop national standards of measurements for use in scientific investigations, engineering, manufacturing and commerce. Over the years, the Bureau has had a reputation as an outstanding scientific and technical organization and a valuable national resource. During the past several years, however, a number of concerns have been expressed on the state of health of the Bureau. The committee is sensitive to these expressions of concern which have come from a number of sources: the Bureau, the Department of Commerce, the Office of Management and Budget, industry, State and local officials, the National Academy of Sciences and Engineering, professional societies, the scientific and technical community, generally, and articles appearing in various publications.

The committee initiated a review of Bureau activities in 1977. Two days of oversight hearings were held on February 15 and April 6, 1978. These hearings mark the first general oversight hearings conducted by a Senate committee in the 20th century. The House of Representatives conducted oversight hearings of the Bureau in 1959 and 1971. While there has been very little con-

gressional oversight of the Bureau, it apparently is held in high regard by Congress since more than 10 statutes have been enacted over the past 15 years which assign additional responsibilities to the Bureau. The committee is interested in correcting this neglect of congressional oversight.

Problems at the Bureau have been attributed to a variety of factors: inadequate congressional oversight, inadequate financial resources, insufficient personnel, aging equipment, increased attention to short-term missions at the expense of long-term research, and general neglect by the Department of Commerce. During the past year, the administration has taken steps to correct certain of these problems. The fiscal year 1979 budget request for the Bureau proposes a significant increase. A competency fund is proposed to restore basic scientific expertise of the Bureau. A reorganization of the Bureau, the first since 1964, went into effect April 9, 1978, and with the new organizational structure, a planning office is proposed.

Many of the steps proposed by the administration are necessary to improve the scientific and technical capabilities of the Bureau. In addition, the committee believes that it is important to exercise careful oversight of the Bureau activities. In this regard, the committee has asked assistance from the General Accounting Office and the Office of Technology Assessment. The committee also believes that requiring periodic reauthorization of an agency and its programs generally results in a more effective agency operation that is more responsive to the agency's mission. At present the Bureau operates on a continuing authorization and its activities are reviewed only periodically by the Appropriations Committee.

The committee desires a strong and effective National Bureau of Standards. To help accomplish this, the committee believes that the Bureau should be placed on a periodic reauthorization basis. This recommendation is a result of careful review of the oversight hearings, various reports, statements and suggestions from both inside and outside the Government. While certain agencies, such as the National Science Foundation and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration have annual authorizations, the committee does not believe that an annual authorization is necessary or appropriate for the Bureau at this time. The bill would establish a 3-year authorization period for the Bureau which would permit the committee to continue its oversight activities and to review current efforts to strengthen the Bureau.

The bill provides an authorization of appropriations of such sums as may be necessary for fiscal year 1979, 1980, and 1981.

#### PROHIBITION OF RATE DISCRIMINATION

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate proceed to the consideration of calendar order No. 723, S. 2249.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill will be stated by title.

The legislative clerk read as follows:

A bill (S. 2249) to prohibit discrimination in rates charged by the Southwestern Power Administration and to require due process in the confirmation of such rates by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the present consideration of the bill?

There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to consider the bill, which had

been reported from the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources with an amendment on page 2, beginning with line 6, strike through and including line 11, so as to make the bill read:

*Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

SECTION 1. Power and energy marketed by the Southwestern Power Administration pursuant to section 825s of title 16, United States Code (1970), shall be sold at uniform systemwide rates, without discrimination between customers to whom the Southwestern Power Administration delivers such power and energy by means of transmission lines or facilities constructed with appropriated funds, and customers to whom the Southwestern Power Administration delivers such power and energy by means of transmission lines or facilities, the use of which is acquired by lease, wheeling, or other contractual arrangements. Agreed points of delivery shall not be changed unilaterally.

The amendment was agreed to.

The bill was ordered to be engrossed for a third reading, read the third time, and passed.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. HARRY F. BYRD, Jr.). Without objection a motion to reconsider the vote is tabled.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. The Senator from Virginia is right on the ball.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD an excerpt from the report (No. 95-792), explaining the purposes of the measure.

There being no objection, the excerpt was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

#### PURPOSE

The purpose of S. 2249 is to remove a transmission service charge imposed on a group of six Missouri generation and transmission cooperatives, known as Associated Electric Cooperative by the Southwestern Power Administration.

#### BACKGROUND

Congress enacted the Flood Control Act of 1944 (16 U.S.C. 825s) to authorize the marketing of hydroelectric power from Federal projects. One of the Federal marketing agencies governed by the act is the Southwestern Power Administration (SPA), which sells and transmits hydropower to customers in Arkansas, Kansas, Louisiana, Missouri, Oklahoma, and Texas.

In passing the act, Congress rejected the concept that power should be delivered to customers at the dam sites, and instead authorized the use of transmission lines to carry power to customers load centers. The act authorized two methods for obtaining transmission facilities: (1) Transmission lines could be constructed by the Government from funds appropriated by Congress, or (2) the Government could "acquire" the lines of other utilities "by purchase or other agreement," including rental or wheeling (transmission) agreements. Early on, Congress made a series of policy decisions declining to appropriate funds for construction of federally owned transmission lines if wheeling or rental arrangements were attainable.

Congress also established a policy of "postage stamp" rates, that is, that rural customers of Federal power projects, situated at a distance from government powerplants, should pay no more for electricity than those located closer to the points of generation. Rates were to be uniform, with no discrimination between customers receiving power over government-owned lines or over



lines acquired by SPA by lease or wheeling agreements.

Appropriations were accordingly sought to construct transmission lines from the dams to the municipalities and to the load centers of the rural electric cooperatives in the SPA service area. Those efforts succeeded in some States, but Congress refused to appropriate funds to build the "backbone" transmission lines in Missouri. Instead, in 1949, Congress and the administration developed an alternate plan for the construction of transmission lines in Missouri, centered on the authority under section 5 of the Flood Control Act to "acquire, by purchase or agreement" the necessary transmission facilities. The plan was as follows:

(1) The Rural Electrification Administration (REA) would lend to certain generation and transmission (G. & T.) cooperatives the money required to build a "backbone" 161-kV transmission system in Missouri, as well as 69-kV lines connected these 161-kV lines with the load centers of the G. & T.'s.

(2) SPA would lease these facilities from the cooperatives, and SPA would operate them, paying the cooperatives rentals so calculated as to service the REA debt, and reimburse costs of operation, maintenance, and replacements.

(3) SPA would sell power from Bull Shoals and Table Rock Dams to the cooperatives at their load centers, delivering such power over this federally financed system, at the SPA systemwide rates (postage stamp), just as though the lines had been constructed with appropriated funds.

A "Continuing Fund" was established by Congress to fund the rental agreements. This continuing fund was codified as 16 U.S.C. § 825e-1.

It is clear, from this legislative history of what has come to be known as the continuing fund statute, that Congress made a decision in favor of using the device of rentals of transmission lines, in lieu of appropriations for construction of such lines, as a method for getting power to the rural cooperatives at the same price as though the lines had been built with appropriated funds.

SPA's authority to enter into these agreements was attacked by certain utility companies, but was sustained, in *Kansas City Power & Light Co. v. McKay*, 115 F. Supp. 402 (D.D.C. 1953), judgment vacated for lack of plaintiff's standing to sue, 96 U.S. App. D.C. 273, 225 F.2d 924 (D.C. Cir. 1955). During the pendency of the foregoing litigation, however, appropriations to the continuing fund were suspended.

After the *McKay* decision in the court of appeals, Congress resumed appropriations to the continuing fund for fiscal year 1956, and ordered that the lease contracts be reactivated, noting that it approved them, but instructing the Secretary as to the terms of certain amendments desired by the congressional committees. The House Committee on Appropriations, in its report to accompany H.R. 6766, the Public Works Appropriation bill for fiscal year 1956 (H.R. Rep. No. 747, 84th Cong., 1st sess.), pp. 5-6, said:

"This action makes it possible to reactivate valid and legal contracts which certain G and T (Generating and Transmission) cooperatives have with SPA. These contracts at their inception were examined by the Congress and funds were available to carry them out thru the Continuing Fund for fiscal years 1950 thru 1953.

"The contracts in question have been tested in the courts.

"In reactivating the contracts with the G. and T. cooperatives, the Department of the Interior is instructed to delete any pro-

visions providing for the option to purchase G. and T. transmission lines or other facilities by the Southwestern Power Administration. The contracts are also to provide: (1) that the G. and T. cooperatives will operate and maintain their own transmission systems under lease to the SPA; (2) that the SPA and the G. and T. cooperatives will settle accounts for power purchased and sold on the basis of net-balances as is done under existing contracts to which SPA and private utilities are parties; and (3) that power and energy will be delivered to the load centers of all G. and T. contracting systems at the basic SPA rate." (Emphasis added.)

The conference report on that same appropriation bill contained comparable language. (H.R. Rep. No. 1085, 84th Cong., 1st sess.) It was adopted by the votes of both houses.

Three points of controlling significance are in the foregoing account of the reports of the House committee and the conferees on the 1956 bill: (1) Congress determined that the contractual payments were "valid and legal"; (2) Congress determined that power should be delivered to the load centers of the cooperatives over lines rented by SPA; and (3) Congress determined that power should be priced at the basic SPA rate, applicable everywhere on the transmission system owned by or available to SPA.

The contracts made pursuant to these directives uniformly contained stipulations that the SPA payments would continue until the cooperatives REA debt was fully repaid. The reason for such stipulations was stated by Chairman Cannon of the House Appropriations Committee in testimony in 1955 before a subcommittee of the House Committee on Government Operations:

"... They [the cooperatives] would not have taken on such a financial burden but for the fact that they had a solemn and binding contract with the Government extending over a period of 40 years, under which they would receive sufficient income to amortize the loan from the Government and pay back every dollar with interest." (Hearings on Effect of Administration Acts and Policies of Department of Interior and Rural Electrification Administration on Rural Electric Cooperatives, Public Bodies, and Municipal Electric, Hearing Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Gov't Operations, 84th Cong., 1st sess. at 5 (1955).)

In 1961, the Secretary of the Interior expanded these Missouri power supply arrangements, to the Government's great advantage, as he reported to Congress.

He proposed to the cooperatives that the Missouri cooperatives, statewide, federate as Associated Electric Cooperatives, and enter into a contract with him which would enable SPA to sell all of its power as "peaking" power, accompanied by limited quantities of energy, instead of "firm" power as previously. To accomplish this, it was necessary that the Government hydrogeneration be integrated into that of thermal-powered systems having five or six times the generating capacity of the Government's hydroplants. Associated's lines would be employed to do this. The Secretary would contract to sell peaking power to three large investor-owned companies—the Missouri companies—to be delivered over associated's lines. In addition, associated would borrow money from REA to extend its lines to enable interconnection between SPA and the Government's Missouri basin system, some 300 miles away from SPA. Associated would wheelpower to six municipalities. It would furnish power from other sources to make good all transmission losses. Associated would furnish "standby" power, in case of failure of government generating

facilities. SPA would continue to sell power to the cooperatives, delivered, at the basic SPA rate as before, but this would be the basic SPA rate for peaking power, not firm power.

SPA promised to pay Associated \$2,647,000 annually for its transmission services, in the form of credits against payments for power and energy at the basic SPA rate for peaking power. This amount included, as theretofore, the annual debt service to REA—enlarged to build the interconnections stipulated by SPA—and operating costs, and it provided reimbursement to Associated for the power and energy it furnished to replace transmission losses. The contract would obligate the Secretary specifically to continue to pay (credit) this amount annually until the REA debt is fully paid (1997). Because of the wheeling arrangements and advantages of integration gained through SPA's contracts with Associated, Congress would not, and did not, have to appropriate funds for the construction of new Government-owned lines for Missouri.

The cooperatives accepted the proposal, and Congress repeatedly appropriated money from the continuing fund to carry it out.

#### ORDER FOR SANITIZING THE RECORD OF TODAY'S CLOSED SESSION, AND FOR RELEASE OF THE SANITIZED VERSION

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD, Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the staffs of the Foreign Relations and Intelligence Committees be authorized to sanitize the completed marks in S-406 of the Capitol under the supervision of the Secretary of the Senate or his designee; and that when this has been completed and approved by the chairmen and ranking minority members of those committees, the sanitized version of today's remarks be released to the news media no later than 96 hours after the completion of business today.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

#### RECESS UNTIL 11:30 A.M. TOMORROW

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD, Mr. President, if there be no further business to come before the Senate, I move, in accordance with the previous order, that the Senate stand in recess until 11:30 a.m. tomorrow.

The motion was agreed to; and at 10:02 p.m. the Senate recessed until tomorrow, Tuesday, May 16, 1978, at 11:30 a.m.

#### NOMINATIONS

Executive nominations received by the Senate May 12, 1978, under authority of the order of the Senate of May 11, 1978:

##### DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Peter F. Vaira, Jr., of Illinois, to be U.S. attorney for the eastern district of Pennsylvania for the term of 4 years, vice David W. Marston.

Philip B. Heymann, of Massachusetts, to be an Assistant Attorney General, vice Benjamin R. Civiletti, elevated.

### Executive nominations received by the Senate May 15, 1978:

NATIONAL COUNCIL ON EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH  
The following-named persons to be members of the National Council on Educational Research for the terms indicated:

For a term expiring September 30, 1979:  
Carl H. Pforzheimer, Jr., of New York, vice Ralph M. Besse, term expired.

Wilson C. Riles, of California, vice Ruth Hurd Minor, term expired.

For a term expiring September 30, 1980:  
Alonzo A. Crim, of Georgia, vice Larry A. Karlson, term expired.

Betsy Levin, of North Carolina, vice Carl H. Pforzheimer, Jr., term expired.

Catharine C. Stimpson, of Washington, vice Wilson C. Riles, term expired.

#### IN THE ARMY

The following-named officers for promotion in the Reserve of the Army of the United States, under the provisions of title 10, U.S.C., section 3370 and 3383:

#### ARMY PROMOTION LIST

##### To be colonel

Berry, Robert W., [REDACTED]  
Bevan, Earl D., [REDACTED]  
Butera, Charles W., [REDACTED]  
Crow, Samuel, [REDACTED]  
Dearing, James H., [REDACTED]  
Donaldson, Walter A., [REDACTED]  
Draghetti, Peter M., [REDACTED]  
Edgington, Walter, [REDACTED]  
Fauntleroy, Hermanze, [REDACTED]  
Gambino, Robert W., [REDACTED]  
Graham, John F., [REDACTED]  
Harris, Lee G., Jr., [REDACTED]  
Hilliard, James C., [REDACTED]  
Johnson, Lamarr L., [REDACTED]  
Kassner, Herbert A., [REDACTED]  
Kennealy, James E., [REDACTED]  
King, Mark R., [REDACTED]  
Latshaw, Richard K., [REDACTED]  
McArthur, Charlton, [REDACTED]  
Moffett, Ralph, [REDACTED]  
Morehead, Robert N., [REDACTED]  
Ottley, John K., [REDACTED]  
Owens, Richard H., [REDACTED]  
Packard, Richard D., [REDACTED]  
Sabo, Peter J., [REDACTED]  
Schmidt, Homer C., [REDACTED]  
Shannon, Clayton E., [REDACTED]  
Smith, Cromwell G., [REDACTED]  
Smith, James J., Jr., [REDACTED]  
Sneed, Ronald E., [REDACTED]  
Spreen, Francis F., [REDACTED]  
Timbes, Raphael A., [REDACTED]  
Whitton, Elliott A., [REDACTED]  
Willis, Alvie J., [REDACTED]

#### CHAPLAIN

##### To be colonel

Jensen, Merle B., [REDACTED]

#### ARMY NURSE CORPS

##### To be colonel

Olson, Beverly L., [REDACTED]  
Schuler, Dolores A., [REDACTED]

#### MEDICAL CORPS

##### To be colonel

Carter, James H., [REDACTED]  
Gordon, Stephen M., [REDACTED]  
Messany, Franklin L., [REDACTED]  
Stabler, Carey V., [REDACTED]  
Stoebner, John M., [REDACTED]  
Walden, Robert E., [REDACTED]

#### MEDICAL SERVICE CORPS

##### To be colonel

Klemme, Roland V., [REDACTED]  
The following-named officers for promotion in the Reserve of the Army of the United States, under the provisions of title 10, U.S.C., sections 3367 and 3383:

#### ARMY PROMOTION LIST

##### To be lieutenant colonel

Aldrich, Jerry L., [REDACTED]  
Artman, Robert H., [REDACTED]  
Ballard, Albert L., [REDACTED]  
Berman, Alan, [REDACTED]  
Best, Cecil B., [REDACTED]  
Bielawa, Frederick, [REDACTED]  
Biggs, William A., [REDACTED]  
Bishop, Carl B., [REDACTED]  
Bissell, Robert, [REDACTED]  
Brown, Gerald M., [REDACTED]  
Cammuso, Francis, [REDACTED]  
Coughlin, Paul K., [REDACTED]  
Cox, John R., [REDACTED]  
Cummings, George F., [REDACTED]  
Depasque, Robert E., [REDACTED]  
Doherty, Dennis E., [REDACTED]  
Duvall, Henry P., [REDACTED]  
Eckler, Richard M., [REDACTED]  
Finchum, George A., [REDACTED]  
Gallucci, John V., [REDACTED]  
Gatt, Larry A., [REDACTED]  
Ginsburg, Edward F., [REDACTED]  
Gober, Lee G., [REDACTED]  
Gradwohl, Richard A., [REDACTED]  
Granados, Anthony F., [REDACTED]  
Haas, Willis J., Jr., [REDACTED]  
Hasenel, Gordon J., [REDACTED]  
Henry, Donald F., [REDACTED]  
Herlihy, Robert D., [REDACTED]  
Hornburg, Kenneth L., [REDACTED]  
Hullinger, Don R., [REDACTED]  
Jerominek, Ronald F., [REDACTED]  
Johnson, Andrew M., [REDACTED]  
Johnson, Russell G., [REDACTED]  
Jones, Allen C., [REDACTED]  
Kearny, James A., [REDACTED]  
Keith, William F., [REDACTED]  
Kelly, John F., [REDACTED]  
Ketterer, Marvin K., [REDACTED]  
Kikukawa, Herbert H., [REDACTED]  
Lanphere, James A., [REDACTED]  
Lendermon, William, [REDACTED]  
Lewis, John I., [REDACTED]  
Lister, Paul R., [REDACTED]  
Lochner, Robert C., [REDACTED]  
MacFarland, Francis G., [REDACTED]  
Mack, George E., [REDACTED]  
Martin, William E., [REDACTED]  
Maul, David L., [REDACTED]  
McKee, Burton R., [REDACTED]  
Miller, Christian J., [REDACTED]  
Moor, Ralph C., Jr., [REDACTED]  
Negri, George, [REDACTED]  
Page, Louis V., [REDACTED]  
Patton, Donald G., [REDACTED]  
Phillips, Billy G., [REDACTED]  
Phillips, John J., [REDACTED]  
Phillips, Richard J., [REDACTED]  
Platek, Paul A., [REDACTED]  
Popelka, Thomas J., [REDACTED]  
Potts, Richard K., [REDACTED]  
Ranch, Lewis C., [REDACTED]  
Rider, Hugh L., [REDACTED]  
Romanko, David M., [REDACTED]  
Ross, Dale J., [REDACTED]  
Ross, Richard L., [REDACTED]  
Schmidt, Gerald L., [REDACTED]  
Segel, Frank, [REDACTED]  
Simek, John E., [REDACTED]  
Spahlinger, Karl A., [REDACTED]  
Stephens, Lionel L., [REDACTED]  
Stoddard, Dwight L., II, [REDACTED]  
Strickland, Bobby G., [REDACTED]  
Sullivan, Charles B., [REDACTED]  
Sutter, Thomas J., [REDACTED]  
Tankel, Leslie F., [REDACTED]  
Thill, Edward P., [REDACTED]  
Thomas, Charles R., [REDACTED]  
Thompson, James B., III, [REDACTED]  
Tiffany, Ronald R., [REDACTED]  
Van Nort, Gerald T., [REDACTED]  
Vokins, Leroy D., [REDACTED]  
Wilkinson, Cicero, Jr., [REDACTED]  
Yoshimura, Richard M., [REDACTED]

#### CHAPLAIN

##### To be lieutenant colonel

Hembrock, Richard G., [REDACTED]  
Humphrey, Donald, [REDACTED]  
Kesler, James W., [REDACTED]  
Quigley, Fred W., [REDACTED]

#### ARMY NURSE CORPS

##### To be lieutenant colonel

Abel, James E., [REDACTED]  
Barker, Mary K., [REDACTED]

#### DENTAL CORPS

##### To be lieutenant colonel

Fritz, Andrew J., [REDACTED]

#### MEDICAL CORPS

##### To be lieutenant colonel

Bissanda, Nabil K., [REDACTED]  
Coil, James A., Jr., [REDACTED]  
Douthitt, Thomas E., [REDACTED]

#### MEDICAL SERVICE CORPS

##### To be lieutenant colonel

Burkett, Samuel L., [REDACTED]  
Carpenter, Frank C., [REDACTED]  
Foreman, Rodney M., [REDACTED]  
James, Rogers B., [REDACTED]  
Judd, Ken K., [REDACTED]  
Kelley, Pierre J.J., [REDACTED]  
Loetell, Joseph W., Jr., [REDACTED]  
Menker, George T., [REDACTED]  
Neumann, Dale H., [REDACTED]  
Williams, Louis A., [REDACTED]  
Willner, Gerald J., [REDACTED]

The following-named officers for appointment in the Reserve of the Army of the United States, under the provisions of title 10, U.S.C., sections 591, 593, and 594:

#### MEDICAL CORPS

##### To be colonel

Ebaugh, Franklin G., Jr., [REDACTED]

#### DENTAL CORPS

##### To be lieutenant colonel

Berkley, Roger M. G., [REDACTED]  
Brown, Norman G., [REDACTED]  
Colgan, Robert E., [REDACTED]  
Drucker, Harold, [REDACTED]  
Gordon, Stanley E., [REDACTED]  
Hanley, Joseph B., Jr., [REDACTED]  
Levy, Harry R., [REDACTED]  
Pirk, Frederick W., [REDACTED]  
Riggs, Robert C., [REDACTED]  
Scullin, John P., [REDACTED]

#### MEDICAL CORPS

##### To be lieutenant colonel

Bolick, Larry E., [REDACTED]  
Burmeister, Roy W., [REDACTED]  
Collier, Robert W., Jr., [REDACTED]  
Cucinell, Elymore A., [REDACTED]  
Douglas, George C., [REDACTED]  
Dwyer, John E., [REDACTED]  
Engeler, James E., Jr., [REDACTED]  
Ferguson, James S., [REDACTED]  
Freeland, Alan E., [REDACTED]  
Glery, Richard A., [REDACTED]  
Glenchur, Harry, [REDACTED]  
Hudson, Royal C., Jr., [REDACTED]  
Johnson, James L., [REDACTED]  
Johnson, Lewis A., [REDACTED]  
Kuczera, Wladimir, [REDACTED]  
Lawrence, Frank M., [REDACTED]  
Luton, Samuel S., [REDACTED]  
McMillen, John A., Jr., [REDACTED]  
Mills, Herbert R., [REDACTED]  
Milson, Bertram I., [REDACTED]  
Nadeau, Conrad J., [REDACTED]  
Ramos-Gomez, Jacobo, [REDACTED]  
Rothmeyer, David C., [REDACTED]  
Russo, Pietro, [REDACTED]  
Sanford, John L., [REDACTED]  
Shelden, Russell D., [REDACTED]  
Sheldon, Robert D., [REDACTED]  
Steele, Russell W., [REDACTED]  
Trivette, Parks D., [REDACTED]  
Wachtel, Andrew S., [REDACTED]



## ARMY MEDICAL SPECIALIST CORPS

## To be lieutenant colonel

Kannegeiter, Ruthan B., [REDACTED]

The following-named officers for appointment in the Army of the United States, under the provisions of title 10, U.S.C., section 3494:

## MEDICAL CORPS

## To be lieutenant colonel

Brigham, John, [REDACTED]  
 Carlson, Homer J., [REDACTED]  
 Courteau, Robert D., [REDACTED]  
 Coussirat, Adolfo C., [REDACTED]  
 Davis, Parma C., Jr., [REDACTED]  
 DeRuyter, Hana, [REDACTED]  
 Duarte, Cristobal G., [REDACTED]  
 Franklin, Lawrence C., [REDACTED]  
 Hannon, William H., [REDACTED]  
 Heiselt, Lawrence R., [REDACTED]  
 Hentz, Edwin C., [REDACTED]  
 Holt, Charlene P., [REDACTED]  
 Humbert, Paul, [REDACTED]  
 Jahanger, Mohammed S., [REDACTED]  
 Keepman, Jay P., [REDACTED]  
 Lagaldo, Anthony J., [REDACTED]  
 Luce, James, [REDACTED]  
 Lutz, Ronald L., [REDACTED]  
 McManus, William F., [REDACTED]  
 Nelson, Ralph A., [REDACTED]  
 Reynolds, James S., [REDACTED]  
 Rosen, Howard M., [REDACTED]  
 Stecher, William A., [REDACTED]  
 Sube, Janice, [REDACTED]  
 Swift, Dean C., [REDACTED]

The following-named Army National Guard officers for appointment in the Reserve of the Army of the United States, under provisions of title 10, U.S.C., section 3385:

## ARMY PROMOTION LIST

## To be colonel

Baird, Douglas A., [REDACTED]  
 Blackburn, Charles F., [REDACTED]  
 Bogle, Robert L., [REDACTED]  
 Brice, Forrest W., [REDACTED]  
 Cobb, Leroy M., [REDACTED]  
 Coster, Clarence M., [REDACTED]  
 Emerson, Donald L., [REDACTED]  
 Hallmark, Estle H., [REDACTED]  
 Hayes, Roger L., [REDACTED]  
 Ing, Melvin G., [REDACTED]  
 Klefer, Lawrence R., [REDACTED]  
 Meixner, Allan R., [REDACTED]  
 Nielsen, Charles R., [REDACTED]  
 Reynolds, Thomas W., [REDACTED]  
 Sbarboro, Gerald L., [REDACTED]  
 Smith, Eugene P., [REDACTED]  
 Thompson, Harold M., [REDACTED]  
 Williams, Teddy E., [REDACTED]  
 Wolgaert, Edward H., [REDACTED]

## MEDICAL CORPS

## To be colonel

Bell, Eldon E., [REDACTED]

## ARMY PROMOTION LIST

## To be lieutenant colonel

Bentzen, Donald H., [REDACTED]  
 Blandford, John L., [REDACTED]  
 Bonnano, Frank C., [REDACTED]  
 Camacho, Salvador L., [REDACTED]  
 Cox, John H., [REDACTED]  
 D'Araujo, John R., [REDACTED]  
 Dase, Ralph L., [REDACTED]  
 Fish, Jerry D., [REDACTED]  
 Gerhardt, Edward H., [REDACTED]  
 Gray, Franklin M., [REDACTED]  
 Hopkins, Alben N., [REDACTED]  
 Krebs, John W., [REDACTED]  
 Laurino, Thomas P., [REDACTED]  
 Megorden, Philip C., [REDACTED]  
 Moen, Rex, [REDACTED]  
 Moore, Albert F., [REDACTED]  
 Moore, Paul A., [REDACTED]  
 Moyer, Russell E., [REDACTED]  
 Nakatus, Myles M., [REDACTED]  
 Newton, Walter H., [REDACTED]  
 Polson, James D., Jr., [REDACTED]

Robitaille, Fabian J., [REDACTED]  
 Rodgers, Charles A., [REDACTED]  
 Rueger, James F., [REDACTED]  
 Shaughnessy, Michael E., [REDACTED]  
 Sheridan, Max P., [REDACTED]  
 Spruilell, John T., [REDACTED]  
 Westergard, Raymond L., [REDACTED]

## DENTAL CORPS

## To be lieutenant colonel

Hodges, Morris C., [REDACTED]

## MEDICAL CORPS

## To be lieutenant colonel

Breitenstein, Bryce D., [REDACTED]  
 Fairfax, Walter A., Jr., [REDACTED]  
 Hudgins, James J., [REDACTED]  
 Mara, Francis J., [REDACTED]  
 O'Loughlin, John M., [REDACTED]  
 Wood, Thomas C., [REDACTED]

## IN THE NAVY

The following-named chief warrant officer, W-2 of the U.S. Navy for temporary promotion to the grade of chief warrant officer, W-3, pursuant to title 10, United States Code, section 5787c, subject to qualification therefor as provided by law:

Aitken, Robert P. Folkenroth, Jan P.  
 Allen, Merrile J., Jr. Franzen, Gerald J.  
 Anderson, Milburn M. Geary, John R.  
 Andrews, Emerson L. Goldin, Milton, Jr.  
 Arsenault, Raymond E. Goldsberry, Richard E.  
 T. Goodlet, Sammie  
 Arthur, Joseph H. Gore, William L.  
 Ball, William A. Graves, Robert L.  
 Ballew, Neil G. Grissom, James M.  
 Barrow, Maxie R. Gross, Gary D.  
 Bartleman, James P. Hale, Lorne B.  
 Beach, Frank A. Handy, Christopher C.  
 Beauregard, Roger P. Hardy, Michael C.  
 Beck, Richard L. Harritt, John D.  
 Bennett, Donald S. Helm, Freddie L.  
 Birr, Donald K. Hernandez, Steve J.  
 Bodkin, David M. Hickson, Dewey W.  
 Bonilla, Samuel R. Hill, Lamar K.  
 Booker, Charles M. Houck, Norman L., Jr.  
 Boothe, John P. Houston, Grady  
 Bowen, James C., III Hudgen, Earther L.  
 Boyce, Richard A. Hunt, John H., Jr.  
 Breunig, John V. Ivie, Perry G.  
 Briggs, Terry G. Johnson, Johnny R.  
 Brinley, Laird E. Johnson, Sidney E.  
 Buckley, Thomas F. Jones, Ronald D.  
 Butler, Louis E. Kanning, Diederick E.  
 Candanoza, Jose R. Kelley, Steven J.  
 Caponis, John A. Kelsey, Diane M.  
 Carson, Bill Kennedy, James V.  
 Carter, Lorenza Kenney, William P.  
 Chambers, James D. Kidd, Ronald J.  
 Christman, Peter T., Jr. Kreis, Jack A.  
 Clark, Richard O. Krieg, Donald W.  
 Cleghorn, John T. Kruse, Lance Merit  
 Clements, Jerry E. Kunkle, Gallard L.  
 Colon, Pedro A. Law, Donald G.  
 Comer, Louis J. Lewis, William H.  
 Conley, Amos B., Jr. Lightfoot, Bernard, Sr.  
 Contino, Philip A. Lynch, John F.  
 Crawford, Frank L., Jr. Maples, Gene D.  
 Crossman, David C. Mara, George  
 Crouch, Thomas H. Martin, John K.  
 Crowhorn, James R. Maughmer, Earl K.  
 Cruz, Adelbert, Jr. McGrath, Michael S.  
 Cullison, Richard C. McKillips, Lester T.  
 Darling, Peter L. McKinney, Frank A., II  
 Davidson, Robert H. McKnight, Rhodus  
 Dean, Theodore P. McMillan, Charles L.  
 Dew, Harold W. Merideth, Allen T.  
 Dickerson, Robert C. Merrell, Richard L.  
 Dill, Richard L. Monroe, Gregory E.  
 Doolittle, Richard F. Moore, Robert C.  
 Doss, Larry W. Morgan, Franklin H.  
 Doyle, William T. Morin, Robert W.  
 Dunlap, Robert B. Morris, Charles J.  
 Eastman, Guy W. Moultrie, Freddie, Jr.  
 Ellsworth, Richard H. Mueller, John H.  
 Feeser, Elmer L. Nace, Niles E., Jr.  
 Fernandez, Wilfredo O. Newton, Howard W.  
 Ogden, Charles T.

Oleary, John T. Slade, George W.  
 Pauls, Thomas E. Smith, Carl H.  
 Paulson, Robert A. Smith, Donald J.  
 Pavidis, Peter E. Smith, James H.  
 Perry, Harry M. Snock, Maximillion R.  
 Pettaway, Henry E. Spangler, Ercell D.  
 Philbrook, Keith A. Spiller, Jerry W.  
 Poppe, Gilbert C. Syrovatka, Vladimir  
 Putnam, Bruce C., Jr. Szakas, John F.  
 Reeves, Richard D. Taylor, Jerry A.  
 Reiter, Michael L. Taylor, Walter T.  
 Rhodes, Francis S. Temple, James M., Jr.  
 Richardson, Randall M. Timmons, Ronald  
 Ritchie, Donald D. Waltrip, Melvin D.  
 Roby, David A. Waterfield, James L.  
 Rodriguez, Jose P. Webb, Alvin C.  
 Rogers, William E. Welch, Claire H.  
 Romine, Duane L. Whiting, Daniel E.  
 Rossi, Michael A. Wild, Lawrence A.  
 Rundall, Stanley R. Williams, Samuel S.  
 Sanders, Stanley G. Witkowski, John A.  
 Sawyer, Robert H. Woods, Benjamin F., Jr.  
 Scarbrough, Travis E. Woodward, Curtis B.  
 Schamp, Richard M. Woolsey, Ronald T.  
 Shutters, William D. Yatsko, George P.  
 II. Young, David E.  
 Sisemore, Marion R. Young, John W.  
 Skiba, Edward J. Young, William R.  
 Skinner, Tommie W. Youngblood, Adrian C.  
 Skrapits, Anthony A.

The following-named chief warrant officer, W-3 of the U.S. Navy for temporary promotion to the grade of chief warrant officer, W-4, pursuant to title 10, United States Code, section 5787c, subject to qualification therefor as provided by law:

Abbruzzese, William Brooks, Richard D.  
 C. Brown, Leroy A.  
 Adams, Orland I. Brown, Tommy A.  
 Albertin, James M., Jr. Buckhold, Fred, Jr.  
 Allen, Charles E. Bumgarner, Elmo L.  
 Allen, Duke D. Burns, John F.  
 Amber, Lawrence W. Burris, William A.  
 Anderson, Charles L. Burrows, Gerald E.  
 Anderson, Edward W. Buzzell, Ralph C.  
 Anderson, Jeffrey L. Cameron, Robert E.  
 Arnold, Charles D. Campbell, David M., II  
 Arnold, David W. Carpenter, Russell R.  
 Asbury, Virgil W. Carr, David P.  
 Ashdown, Allen S. Carter, Lee D.  
 Attebury, Ervel E. Casey, Paul J.  
 Azzole, Peter J. Cavanaugh, Thomas W., Jr.  
 Baker, Raleigh D., Jr. Cheatham, Grady K.  
 Baldwin, Robert E. Chelgren, Karl W.  
 Bargelski, Michael J. Chesla, Frank J.  
 Barker, Loyd N. Christensen, Bo G.  
 Bates, William A., Jr. Clark, James H.  
 Bean, Wilfred J. Clark, William P., Jr.  
 Beck, Donald D. Coleman, Richard L.  
 Bellflower, Robert J. Combs, Russell W.  
 Berkheimer, Thomas Concepcion, Apollinario T.  
 Betancourt, Alberto L. Conner, Roger A.  
 Bigelow, Johnathon Connors, Edwin J., Jr.  
 M. Connors, Daniel  
 Bledsoe, John R. Cooper, Charles W.  
 Boatright, Thomas E. Cope, Nathan J., Jr.  
 Boehl, Richard W. Cox, William T.  
 Boggs, Donald G. Cozzolino, Andrew  
 Bookwalter, James M. Curtis, Harold R.  
 Boon, Gene R. Curtis, Ronald W.  
 Booz, Charles G., Jr. Dalton, Merrill A.  
 Borner, Wesley F. Daly, James  
 Borno, Louis M., Jr. Davis, Joseph C.  
 Botwright, Richard E. Davis, Levi  
 Boyden, John P. Davis, William H.  
 Braddy, James R. Delaney, Darrell D.  
 Bragg, Noel W. Devlin, Donald F.  
 Brandon, George A. Dickinson, Bruce R.  
 Branson, Jack R. Dixon, Lee A.  
 Braswell, MacArthur D. Dixon, James W.  
 Breslin, Joseph J., III Doan, Carl E.  
 Brice, Gerald T. Dodson, Doyle W.  
 Brittain, William G., Jr. Dooling, Franklin J.  
 Brooks, James A. Dote, Michael K.  
 Dowty, Bobby L.

Doyle, David M.  
Driscoll, Michael B.  
Duncan, Danny R.  
Ekdahl, Matthew M.  
Elzner, Jack E.  
Englebracht, Frank J.  
English, James T.  
Evans, James M.  
Fairchild, David R.  
Faltsek, Dale W.  
Faulk, Robert L.  
Field, Philip H.  
Fisher, Roy F.  
Flores, Pablo J.  
Foley, James R., Jr.  
Forsmark, William T.  
Fuller, William J.  
Galles, Thomas J.  
Gee, James T.  
Genin, Louis P.  
Golden, Larry F.  
Golden, Richard F. D.  
Gorday, Vivian W., Jr.  
Gordon Harry J., III  
Gordon, Harold L.  
Graham, Thomas H.  
Grant, John D.  
Griensmann, Robert R.  
Grutta, Frank T.  
Gullixson, Dean R.  
Hall, Allen E.  
Hall, Richard T.  
Harris, Gerald W.  
Harrison, Paul W.  
Harvey, Fred S., Jr.  
Haw, Billy W.  
Haynes, Arthur D.  
Haywood, Louis F.  
Henderson, Harold D.  
Henry, Eldon P., Jr.  
Hieber, Raymond A.  
Highlander, Lucian P., Jr.  
Hitchcock, James O.  
Holloway, Wilmer W.  
Howard, John A.  
Hunt, Roy L.  
Huhter, Thomas D.  
Hussey, George O.  
Hyster, David R.  
Ingram, John E., Jr.  
Innella, Michael J.  
Jacks, Curtis D.  
Jackson, Bernard T.  
Jackson, Charles R.  
Jackson, Daniel F.  
Jackson, Robert D.  
Jacobs, Harold L.  
Jennings, Gary H.  
Johnson, Troy R.  
Johnson, William S.  
Jones, Arthur H.  
Jones, Buck P.  
Jones, Preston L.  
Jones, Thomas E.  
Joyce, Richard C.  
Joye, Jerry H.  
Judisch, Carl W.  
Julian, Thurman J.  
Keawe, John K.  
Kennedy, John P.  
Kern, Phillip E.  
Kerns, Harold E., Jr.  
Klrhv, Wayne E.  
Kirkland, Ronald E.  
Klinehoffer, Larry B.  
Knapp, Frank C., Jr.  
Koch, Harry G.  
Koder, Thomas J.  
Koder, Gerald D.  
Kowalski, James A.  
Kraft, Michael J.  
Kruger, Frederick L., II  
Lacambra, Joseph L.  
Laib, Duwaine L.  
Lambert, Carlton D.  
Lane, Robert T., Jr.  
Lanzner, Richard C.  
Lavigne, David E.

Lawrence, Thomas M.  
Leach, Clifford, Jr.  
Leach, John W.  
Leal, Pedro G.  
Leblanc, George E.  
Lemcool, Richard J.  
Lemere, Dean J.  
Lindholm, Glenn R.  
Locke, Edward S.  
Logan, Howard L.  
Long, Gary A.  
Lukens, Frank A.  
Mack, Judson C.  
Manley, John J., Jr.  
Manogue, Edward M.  
Marinacci, Charles R.  
Marshall, Robert G.  
Matula, Melvin G.  
May, Robert A.  
McCollum, James W.  
McElhinney, William J.  
McGlothen, James B.  
McKenzie, Thomas H.  
McKinney, George R.  
McNabb, Donald G.  
Meadows, John R.  
Merritt, Ronald J.  
Metcalf, Robert W.  
Metzger, Ronald E.  
Miller, Harry F., Jr.  
Millwood, William  
Minnis, Jessie C., Jr.  
Mixon, Frank L.  
Mooney, Jerry D.  
Morris, Louis E.  
Morris, Thomas W.  
Mosher, Robert D.  
Moss, Curtis  
Mowery, Kenneth L.  
Muir, John C.  
Mullinax, Robert G.  
Murphy, Patrick J.  
Mutch, John R.  
Nagy, Francis  
Nance, Roger A.  
Neal, Robert A.  
Neeley, Carl E.  
Norman, Carl G.  
Orr, Wayne K.  
O'Sullivan, John  
Otto, Willmer J.  
Page, Mitchell B.  
Parker, Kenyon B.  
Parker, Robert L.  
Parsons, Walter P.  
Pauls, Foster W., Jr.  
Pearce, Johnny L.  
Pennington, Tyrone P.  
Petersen, John S.  
Petty, Marion A.  
Pfuhl, John F.  
Piepenhagen, Ulrich G.  
Pim, Bruce B.  
Pittman, Adrain R.  
Power, Jerry R.  
Pratt, George T.  
Puckett, Roy D.  
Randall, Bobby L.  
Randolph, George H.  
Reilly, Miles L.  
Reitz, Richard D.  
Remer, James W.  
Rhodes, John A.  
Richards, Jack, Jr.  
Richards, Walter D.  
Riggs, Marvin J.  
Roach, Frank E., Jr.  
Roberts, Donald R.  
Robertson, Thomas A.  
Rodeffer, Ronnie L.  
Rogers, Russell E.  
Rose, Paul J.  
Rosenberg, Leo C.  
Ross, Steven S.  
Rotruck, Robert R.  
Rouse, James W., Jr.  
Rowe, James F.  
Rowell, William H.  
Royster, David M.

Rundgren, Conrad L.  
Rutledge, Samuel C., III  
Salavejus, James L.  
Saika, Michael S.  
Schmidt, William A.  
Schmitt, GERALD W.  
Schneider, Charles V.  
Seymour, Lyle M.  
Shank, John  
Shermer, Thomas G.  
Shoaf, Charles W.  
Sides, John E.  
Simpson, Halley L.  
Sinclair, Robert G.  
Sirmans, Lance D.  
Slayton, Gerald C.  
Smallwood, James V.  
Smith, Henry B.  
Smith, Jeffrie H.  
Smith, Jerry C.  
Smith, Randall C.  
Smith, Thomas P.  
Snyder, Howard R.  
Solomon, Robert  
Sorensen, Ralph M.  
Stahl, David M.  
Stanbridge, Robert E.  
Stearns, Wesley E.  
Stomboli, James R.  
Stricklen, James O.  
Sullivan, Mickey D.  
Szydowski, Chester P.  
Tharp, Burton P.  
Thompson, Danny K.

## IN THE MARINE CORPS

The following-named male officers of the Marine Corps for temporary appointment to the grade of lieutenant colonel under the provisions of title 10, U.S. Code, section 5769:

Ronald E. Ablowich  
James S. Adams  
Robert A. Adams  
Alfred J. Allega  
William S. Ainsley, III  
Peter F. Angle  
John C. Arick  
Lowell E. Austin, Jr.  
John C. Baggett  
Thomas V. Barrett  
William C. Bartels  
Thomas Y. Barton, Jr.  
Delbert M. Bassett  
Dennis C. Beyma  
Roy D. Black  
Harold W. Blot  
Walter G. Boeck  
Ronald R. Borowicz  
Gary R. Braun  
George D. Brennan, II  
William T. Bridgman, Jr.  
Gene A. Brown  
John R. Burns, Jr.  
John M. Butler, Jr.  
Ronald F. Calta  
Thomas E. Campbell  
William R. Campbell, Jr.  
John W. Cargile  
Kenneth C. Carlson  
John D. Carr  
John J. Carroll  
Gene E. Castagnetti  
James H. Champion  
George R. Christmas  
Donald E. Christy  
Michael L. Cluff  
Richard L. Cody  
Roland W. Coleman  
Anthony C. Conlon  
Terence P. Connell  
Charles R. Connor  
Richard W. Crain  
Dennis W. Craney  
Herbert L. Currie  
Dennis E. Damon  
Charles E. Daniel  
Charles E. Davis  
Andrew D. Debona  
Richard A. Delaney

Robert G. Jessee  
Harry N. Johnson  
Ken H. Johnson  
Kenneth W. Johnson  
Poindexter M. Johnson  
Kenneth D. Jordan  
August J. Kalimanos  
Gerald J. Keller  
James L. Kerney  
George A. Kiesel  
Roger E. Klib  
Blaine D. King  
Francis J. Kirchner  
Joseph F. Kline  
Thomas L. Kosciw  
James Lau  
Robert P. Learnard  
John Lecornu  
Gregory W. Lee  
Edward O. Leroy  
Frederick E. Lewis  
Bertram L. Linkonis  
James E. Livingston  
Calvin A. Lloyd, II  
Mark E. Loveless  
Darrell M. Lowe  
Albert F. Lucas, Jr.  
Howard L. Luttrell  
James P. Mangan  
Anthony E. Manning  
Paul S. Marcani  
William E. Marcantel  
Richard E. Maresco  
Elliott R. Markell, Jr.  
David E. Marks  
Norman Marshall  
Robert J. Mastrion  
Gregory A. McAdams  
Charles E. McDaniel  
Lawrence J. McDonald  
Dayle O. McGaha  
Michael J. McGowan  
Thomas K. McKeown  
John J. McNamara  
Richard G. McPherson  
Thomas H. Metzger  
John L. Mikkelsen  
David F. Miller  
Donald G. Miller  
Jerry L. Miller  
Neil F. Mitchell  
Robert W. Mitchell, Jr.  
Joe D. Moody  
Alfred H. Moore  
Allen R. Moore  
Jerry L. Morgan  
John J. Mullen, Jr.  
James M. Myatt  
Jimmie C. Nelson  
James L. Neyman  
Gerald J. Oberndorfer  
Fred E. Ogline  
Paul F. Okeefe  
Francis D. Pacello  
Fred J. Palumbo  
Robert L. Pappas  
Gary W. Parker  
Harold J. Phelan  
John C. Pilley

The following-named male officers of the Marine Corps Reserve for temporary appointment to the grade of lieutenant colonel under the provisions of title 10, U.S. Code, section 5769:

Terry W. Cannon  
Bobby L. Coleman  
Frank J. Kennedy

The following-named women officers of the Marine Corps for permanent appointment to the grade of lieutenant colonel under the provisions of title 10, U.S. Code, section 5771:

Judybeth D. Barnett  
Lynn Mertes  
Sara J. Pritchett

The following-named (Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps) graduate for permanent appointment to the grade of second lieutenant in the Marine Corps, pursuant to title 10, U.S. Code, section 2107, subject to the qualifications therefor as provided by law:

Steven H. Mattos

Stanley G. Pratt  
Donald L. Price  
Robert A. Queen  
William M. Rakow, Jr.  
John P. Ray  
Lawrence E. Reed  
Michael E. Rich  
Albert R. Rideout, III  
Charles S. Rigby, III  
Edward F. Riley  
Michael B. Riley  
Maurice A. Roesch, III  
Joseph G. Roman  
Joseph M. Romero A.  
Dale C. Ross  
Richard B. Rothwell  
Peter J. Rowe  
Henry J. Sage  
William Sahno  
Michael F. Scanlon  
Theodore J. Scotese  
Denver D. Scott  
Robert E. Setser  
Carl A. Shaver  
John J. Sheehan  
Robert J. Sheehan  
James A. Shepherd  
Jerry C. Shirley  
Donald K. Shockey, Jr.

Roy W. Sims  
Walter H. Skierkowski  
Albert C. Slater, Jr.  
Charles R. Smith, Jr.  
William R. Smith  
James A. Spait  
James D. Sparks  
Burton P. Sperry, III  
John W. Spivey  
Victor M. Szalankiewicz  
Kenneth T. Taylor  
Robert A. Tiebout  
Philip H. Torrey, III  
Samuel D. Turner, Jr.  
Joseph E. Underwood  
Charles W. Vanhorne  
Hugh M. Vann, III  
Jay R. Vargas  
Amilcar Vazquez  
Clyde L. Vermilyea  
Bill D. Waddell  
William L. Waters  
Lewis C. Watt  
Dwight D. Weber  
Malcolm W. Wehrung  
Julian A. Weingarten  
William H. White  
George A. Whitfield  
John A. Williams  
John A. Williams  
Thomas Williams, Jr.  
Robert J. Wilson  
Donald T. Winter  
Charles J. Wolk, Jr.  
Regan B. Wright  
Peter B. Wyrick  
Harvey L. Zimmerman  
Ralph A. Zimmerman