HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES—*Wednesday, May 16, 1984*

The House met at 10 a.m.

The Chaplain, Rev. James David Ford, D.D., offered the following prayer:

O God, as we ask Your blessings upon us, we are conscious of the needs of our Nation and our world. We are aware of the suffering of too many and the good fortune of too few. Open our hearts of concern to those who are hungry or ill clothed, may we heed the voice of the homeless and the forgotten, the refugee and the powerless. Help us, O God, to devote more of our energy into acts of kindness, our talents to find solutions to conflicts, our time to being reconcilers of understanding and messengers of peace. In Your name, we pray. Amen.

THE JOURNAL

The SPEAKER. The Chair has examined the Journal of the last day's proceedings and announces to the House his approval thereof.

Pursuant to clause 1, rule I, the Journal stands approved.

Mr. WEBER. Mr. Speaker, pursuant to clause 1, rule I, I demand a vote on the Speaker's approval of the Journal.

The SPEAKER. The Chair intends to have a quorum call before the President of Mexico comes, at about 10:25.

Does the gentleman withhold his motion?

Mr. WEBER. No; I will not, Mr. Speaker.

The SPEAKER. The question is on the Chair's approval of the Journal.

The question was taken; and the Speaker announced that the ayes appeared to have it.

Mr. WEBER. Mr. Speaker, I object to the vote on the ground that a quorum is not present and make the point of order that a quorum is not present.

The SPEAKER. The Chair will postpone the vote on the Journal until 10:25 a.m.

The point of no quorum is withdrawn.

The Chair will recognize 1-minute speeches.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas (Mr. WRIGHT).

INTEREST RATES MUST BE BROUGHT DOWN

(Mr. WRIGHT asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute.)

Mr. WRIGHT. Mr. Speaker, last week I talked with a young woman who is about to lose her home. She has not lost her job. She and her husband are employed. But the variable rate mortgage on their home, because of rising interest rates, is now costing them $140 more each month than they had anticipated. That amounts to almost $1,700 a year. They do not have it, cannot pay it and still provide food and clothes for their children.

This hidden hand in their pocket—the rise in interest rates over which they are absolutely powerless—is taking their home from them. There are many thousands like them throughout America.

Today the President of Mexico arrives. His entire country—and most of Latin America—is in the very same position as the young family I mentioned. Rising interest rates in the past few weeks have added $900 million to the annual burden of debt service for Mexico—and billions for the hemisphere. That in turn reduces purchases of goods from our country among our best foreign customers. It is a vicious cycle in which we all are the victims.

Unless interest rates are brought down drastically—and soon—our Nation and all our friends in the Western Hemisphere could plunge into a serious economic decline.

THE MESSAGE FROM THE PUBLIC IS CLEAR

Mr. SIKORSKI. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to address the House for 1 minute.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Minnesota?

Mr. THOMAS of California. Mr. Speaker, reserving the right to object, my understanding is that my colleague asked unanimous consent to revise and extend, and based upon the attempt to have the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD be an accurate reflection of what occurs on the floor, I would ask the gentleman if he would ask for extension only.

Mr. SIKORSKI. Mr. Speaker, my request is to address the House for 1 minute.

Mr. THOMAS of California. Mr. Speaker, I withdraw my reservation of objection.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Minnesota?

There was no objection.

Mr. SIKORSKI. Mr. Speaker, it is a cynical view of the world that names the destabilizing first-strike carrier of death a "Peacekeeper." The message from the public is clear; it is resounding. It is a message of survival; it says stop. Stop building the MX, and start talking to the Soviets. Stop using our best minds to research new weapons and turn their research to human ends.

Stop giving our children nightmares about nuclear holocaust; start giving them dreams of a brighter future. Stop believing the lie that our survival depends on the MX, and start listening to the Psalms of David, where it is said, "The war horse is a vain hope for victory, and by its great might it cannot save."

"The war horse is a vain hope for victory, and by its great might it cannot save."

THE REAL ISSUE

Ms. OAKAR. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to address the House for 1 minute.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentlewoman from Ohio?

Mr. THOMAS of California. Mr. Speaker, reserving the right to object, I did not hear the request of the gentlewoman from Ohio.

The SPEAKER. The gentlewoman from Ohio asked unanimous consent to address the House for 1 minute.

Mr. THOMAS of California. Mr. Speaker, I withdraw my reservation of objection.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Ohio?

There was no objection.

Ms. OAKAR. Mr. Speaker, I am glad the gentleman is interested in accuracy, because on May 8, in the infamous Red-baiting speech, my colleague from the other side of the aisle referred to me and stated that I had an 18-year-old son who would not serve the country in the armed services.

Mr. Speaker, I do not have an 18-year-old son. I realize that all women in this House look alike to my colleague, and I also realize that in these personal attacks, truth is not important to my colleague on the other side of the aisle.

Mr. Speaker, I also realize that the intent of that kind of rhetoric is to impugn one's reputation. Let me say that I will match my personal and professional reputation with his any day of the year. If he wants to start to do that, I am ready.

Let us not skirt the real issue; the issue is Reagan's foreign policy, which is leading us to a path of war.

AUTHENTICATED U.S. GOVERNMENT INFORMATION GPO

VARIABLE RATES/VARIABLE FUTURE

Mr. WIRTH. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to address the House for 1 minute and to extend and verify my remarks.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Colorado?

There was no objection.

Mr. WIRTH. Mr. Speaker, for the first time in 50 years, rising interest rates are an added burden to hundreds of thousands of Americans who hold variable rate mortgages. The higher market rates are pushing up monthly mortgage payments for a growing number of households that can ill afford another squeeze on their budgets.

The proportion of variable rate mortgages is still small but the trend is moving rapidly in the other direction. Almost 60 percent of new mortgages are being lent at variable rates.

Through this mechanism, the risk of inflation is shifted to the average homeowner. For more and more Americans, the price of buying a home now includes a wager that interest rates and inflation will stay low.

For the holders of variable rate mortgages, the deficits of Reaganomics will no longer be distant abstractions but something that intrudes on the ability of the average family to balance its own monthly budget. Will this lead to valid pressures for deficit reduction or only to pressures on the Federal Reserve Board to increase the money supply? No one is sure.

Mr. Speaker, what is clear is that irresponsible macroeconomic policies are casting another cloud over the American dream of owning a home. It is another example of where we should have looked before we made a financial leap.

□ 1010

LOOPHOLE OF THE WEEK

Ms. KAPTUR. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend my remarks.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentlewoman from Ohio?

Mr. THOMAS of California. Mr. Speaker, reserving the right to object, is it my understanding that my colleague has asked unanimous consent to revise her remarks? Is that correct?

The SPEAKER. The gentlewoman said to revise and extend.

Mr. THOMAS of California. I would request that her unanimous-consent request be altered to include only extension, because I believe that the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD should be an accurate reflection of what is done here. If we have changed our policy in terms of the television cameras to show truth in packaging, I think the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD should also reflect that.

I wonder if the gentlewoman would change her unanimous-consent request.

Ms. KAPTUR. I am going to read my statement and request that it be printed exactly as I read it.

Mr. THOMAS of California. Mr. Speaker, I withdraw my reservation of objection.

The SPEAKER. The gentlewoman has 1 minute.

Is there objection to the request of the gentlewoman from Ohio?

There was no objection.

Ms. KAPTUR. Mr. Speaker, the "tax loophole" this week pertains to "highway robbery"—a tax loophole scheme that robs average taxpayers by giving wealthy investors tax breaks to purchase billboards.

This tax scheme amounts to nothing more than paper shuffling at a great price to the National Treasury. Billboards, once purchased by investors, are not put to new use. They are merely leased back to the previous owner, and after 5 years, are resold to the previous owner.

Why all this nonproductive paper activity? The answer is huge tax breaks. The investors benefit from accelerated depreciation and the special capital gains tax rate to lower their taxes. Original owners of billboards benefit because, after 5 years, they are able to write off supposedly newly acquired assets under the accelerated depreciation laws. And average taxpayers? they lose in this real estate shelter scam.

The next time you drive down a highway and spot a billboard, there is something else you should think about besides the product advertised. And that is your tax dollars pay for what your eye beholds.

WELCOME PRESIDENT DE LA MADRID

Mr. ALEXANDER. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to address the House for 1 minute, to extend and verify my remarks, and to include therein extraneous matter.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Arkansas?

Mr. THOMAS of California. Reserving the right to object, Mr. Speaker, and I shall not object, I would engage the gentleman from Arkansas in a colloquy in terms of his choice of words "to verify" rather than "to revise." Was there a conscious choice of words?

Mr. ALEXANDER. Yes. Yesterday the stenographers as they took down my words and transcribed them made several errors in the transcription and I would like to reserve the opportunity to review that transcription and to correct the mistakes in the recording.

For example, yesterday I made a speech on the equal access bill and I stated in that speech that one of the problems in confusion was caused from court decisions. The stenographer took down the word "church" decisions. So I would like to reserve the opportunity to correct and make those changes in the RECORD which would accurately reflect the statements which I make this morning.

Mr. THOMAS of California. Further reserving the right to object, I congratulate the gentleman from Arkansas in resolving a concern that I have, because clearly in not asking for revision we are not interested in changing the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD; we are simply attempting to make sure that it reflects what we said. To the degree that to verify is to make those changes which accurately reflect what was said, rather than to change the substance or to delete comments that were made, I certainly accept the suggested unanimous consent from the gentleman from Arkansas.

Mr. WALKER. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield to me under his reservation?

Mr. THOMAS of California. I would continue to reserve the right to object and yield to the gentleman from Pennsylvania.

Mr. WALKER. I thank the gentleman for yielding because I think it is important to understand that the way that the rules of the House are constructed, the revision that is accorded Members is supposed to be precisely what the gentleman from Arkansas has outlined as his reason for verification.

There are not supposed to be substantive changes in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD based upon revision of remarks. That is something which has grown around here which has altered the RECORD and, in fact, the kind of verification the gentleman from Arkansas is referring to is precisely what we ought to be doing under the rules of the House as they presently exist.

Mr. THOMAS of California. If I might reclaim my time, I think what we have decided is that we now have a procedure to make sure that what the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD shows is actually what we have said and that our real intent, when we used to use the phrase "revise" was actually to verify.

There is no attempt to be obstructionist on the part of the gentleman from California because extensions are appropriate, extraneous materials are appropriate, and now we are requesting that we verify remarks rather than to revise.

I appreciate very much the solution of the gentleman from Arkansas and the gentleman from Colorado (Mr. WIRTH) to a problem which I believe

was a growing one and with concern on both sides of the aisle. I appreciate again the choice of words, which accurately reflect what most Members want to do with the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, and that is to verify their remarks so the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD is an accurate reflection of what takes place on the floor.

Mr. Speaker, I withdraw my reservation of objection.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. WILLIAMS of Montana). Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Arkansas?

There was no objection.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Arkansas is recognized for 1 minute.

Mr. ALEXANDER. Mr. Speaker, I take this time today to welcome our friend from Mexico, President de la Madrid, who will address a joint session of the Congress within the hour.

I notice in today's paper that yesterday, in his meeting with President Reagan, he stated that peace has been disrupted in Central America and that the risk of general war—the scope and duration of which no one can foresee—is growing.

President de la Madrid warned President Reagan about a month ago that his policies in Central America were causing anger among the Latin American people because of the naval operations and the continued military maneuvers in that region.

I hope that President de la Madrid will call upon the Congress and the American people for a new kind of relationship with the United States among our Latin American allies, one that was envisioned by our Founding Fathers which includes mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty and cooperation among nations of the Western Hemisphere.

ALTERING COMMITTEE TRANSCRIPTS IS NOT A CRIME

(Mr. BROOKS asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute.)

Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Speaker, last Thursday evening, proceeding under special orders, the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. WALKER) referred to a request that he and other Members made of the Attorney General to initiate an investigation to determine whether there were grounds for criminal action arising from the unauthorized alterations to committee transcripts. He alleged that the Ethics Committee was in possession of "virtually all of the evidence which would be required for a successful prosecution." He went on:

> Therefore, I am here today to request this committee to make available to the Department of Justice any and all materials in the committee files which would be germaine [sic] to their investigation into possible criminal prosecution, or a civil action for recovery, in this matter.

It is my understanding that over 6 weeks ago, the Department of Justice replied to the request for a criminal investigation and stated, "Based on the committee's extensive investigation and the preliminary investigation of the FBI, we have determined that there is insufficient evidence to warrant further investigation of this matter." The Department went on to say, "Under the law, as it now stands, the simple act of altering such transcripts regardless of intent is not a crime." I would ask the gentleman from Pennsylvania to place a copy of this letter in the RECORD at his earliest convenience.

□ 1020

THE BUCK STOPS WHERE?

(Mr. LEHMAN of California asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute.)

Mr. LEHMAN of California. Mr. Speaker, last week, Congress paid tribute to President Harry S. Truman on the 100th anniversary of his birth. President Truman was famous for his motto that "The buck stops here."

Our current President should work to follow Mr. Truman's advice in this regard.

As the prime rate has risen steadily over the past few weeks, President Reagan has begun to point the finger of blame at Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker, in effect arguing that "The buck stops over there!"

When he was running for President, Mr. Reagan claimed that the interest rate buck stopped on the desks of former President Carter and Mr. Volcker, a Carter appointee. Last year, President Reagan expressed his support for Mr. Volcker by reappointing him as Chairman of the Fed.

Clearly, the blame for the current interest rate mess should not be placed at Mr. Volcker's doorstep. Even Mr. Volcker's critics admit that, as a Reagan appointee, Mr. Volcker is conducting monetary policies that have at least tacitly been approved by the administration.

It was the President's runaway tax cut program and massive military buildup that caused the Federal deficit to eat up such a huge portion of the Nation's available capital base. By any objective analysis, the President need not look any further than his own desk top to be reminded where the buck truly stops with regard to this Nation's economic distress.

ANNOUNCEMENT BY THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Chair will announce that it intends to take one more Member on the Democratic side, and then, because the House intends to vote at 10:25, the Chair will move to the Republican side.

The Chair will recognize the gentleman from Florida.

PARLIAMENTARY INQUIRIES

Mr. LUNGREN. Mr. Speaker, I have a parliamentary inquiry.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman will state his parliamentary inquiry.

Mr. LUNGREN. Mr. Speaker, does this mean that when we come back after we have received the President of Mexico, we will resume 1-minutes?

The SPEAKER pro tempore. That is a possibility.

Mr. LUNGREN. Well, Mr. Speaker, that is really not an answer to my question. Are we or are we not going to do it? Because we have had 20 minutes of Democratic one minutes, and perhaps 4 minutes of Republican 1-minutes.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Chair will answer the gentleman that that is a possibility because it will be up to the judgment of the Speaker.

Mr. WALKER. Well, a parliamentary inquiry, Mr. Speaker.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman will state his parliamentary inquiry.

Mr. WALKER. Mr. Speaker, the gentleman in the chair is the Speaker at this point. What we need is a ruling as to whether or not the minority side is going to be accorded the right to 1-minutes, since many of us have been sitting here after, or before members of the majority side were recognized. Now, it seems to us that we deserve our opportunity to have our 1-minutes considered here, too.

Is the Chair going to allow 1-minutes or not?

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Chair will again tell the gentleman of the minority that the decision as to the earlier gentleman's request as to whether or not 1-minutes will proceed immediately after the recess, the Chair announces that decision will be the Speaker's.

The Chair will also announce that the Republican side of the aisle, as well as the Democratic side, will have an opportunity for 1 minutes sometime during the course of the day.

Mr. WEBER. Mr. Speaker, I have a parliamentary inquiry.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman will state his parliamentary inquiry.

Mr. WEBER. Mr. Speaker, does the Chair mean that the Republicans will be given the opportunity to do the 1-minutes prior to the beginning of legislative business?

The SPEAKER pro tempore. No; some time during the day.

Mr. WEBER. Perhaps at the end of legislative business?

The SPEAKER pro tempore. That will be a decision for the Speaker.

Mr. WALKER. I have a parliamentary inquiry, Mr. Speaker.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman will state it.

Mr. WALKER. Given the schedule of the House, then, it is possible our 1-minutes will fall some time late tonight? Is that a possibility?

The SPEAKER pro tempore. That is a possibility.

REQUEST TO ADDRESS THE HOUSE FOR 1 MINUTE

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Florida (Mr. PEPPER).

Mr. PEPPER. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to address the House for 1 minute.

Mr. THOMAS of California. Mr. Speaker, I object.

Mr. PEPPER. Mr. Speaker, I move that I have the privilege to address the House for 1 minute.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Chair will advise the gentleman that that motion is not in order at this time.

ANNOUNCEMENT BY THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Chair is 2 minutes away from putting the question on the Journal.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Minnesota (Mr. WEBER).

REQUEST TO ADDRESS THE HOUSE FOR 1 MINUTE

Mr. WEBER. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to address the House for 1 minute.

Mr. PEPPER. Object, Mr. Speaker.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Objection is heard.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. COATS).

REQUEST TO ADDRESS THE HOUSE FOR 1 MINUTE

Mr. COATS. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to address the House for 1 minute.

Mr. PEPPER. Object, Mr. Speaker.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Objection is heard.

REQUEST TO ADDRESS THE HOUSE FOR 1 MINUTE

Mr. WALKER. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to address the House for 1 minute.

Mr. PEPPER. Object, Mr. Speaker.

Mr. LELAND. Object, Mr. Speaker.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Objection is heard.

THE JOURNAL

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the approval of the Journal.

The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that the ayes appeared to have it.

PARLIAMENTARY INQUIRY

Mr. LUNGREN. Mr. Speaker, a parliamentary inquiry.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman will state his parliamentary inquiry.

Mr. LUNGREN. Mr. Speaker, my question is, Will the RECORD reflect that the objections on the Democratic side came from Members who were not on the floor when the Members on the Republican side arrived who have asked to give their 1-minutes?

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The RECORD will reflect what happened.

Mr. WALKER. Mr. Speaker, I object to the vote on the ground that a quorum is not present and make the point of order that a quorum is not present.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Evidently a quorum is not present.

The Sergeant at Arms will notify absent Members.

The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were—yeas 301, nays 91, answered "present" 7, not voting 34, as follows:

[Roll No. 148]

YEAS—301

Ackerman
Addabbo
Akaka
Albosta
Alexander
Anderson
Andrews (NC)
Andrews (TX)
Annunzio
Archer
Aspin
Badham
Barnard
Barnes
Bartlett
Bateman
Bates
Bedell
Beilenson
Bennett
Bereuter
Berman
Bethune
Bevill
Biaggi
Bliley
Boehlert
Boggs
Boner
Bonior
Bonker
Borski
Bosco
Boucher
Boxer
Breaux
Britt
Brooks
Brown (CA)
Broyhill
Bryant
Burton (CA)
Byron
Carper
Carr
Chandler
Chappell
Clarke
Coelho
Coleman (TX)
Collins
Conte
Conyers
Cooper
Courter
Coyne
Crane, Daniel
Crockett
D'Amours
Darden
de la Garza
Dellums
Derrick
DeWine
Dicks
Dixon
Donnelly
Dorgan
Dowdy
Downey
Duncan
Dwyer
Dyson
Early
Eckart
Edgar
Edwards (AL)
English
Erdreich
Evans (IL)
Fascell
Fazio
Feighan
Ferraro
Flippo
Florio
Foglietta
Foley
Ford (TN)
Fowler
Frank
Franklin
Frost
Fuqua
Garcia
Gaydos
Gephardt
Gibbons
Gilman
Glickman
Gonzalez
Gore
Gradison
Gray
Gregg
Guarini
Gunderson
Hall (OH)
Hall, Ralph
Hall, Sam
Hamilton
Hammerschmidt
Hatcher
Hawkins
Hayes
Hefner
Hertel
Hightower
Hiler
Hillis
Holt
Hopkins
Horton
Howard
Hoyer
Hubbard
Huckaby
Hughes
Hutto
Hyde
Jeffords
Jenkins
Johnson
Jones (NC)
Jones (OK)
Jones (TN)
Kaptur
Kasich
Kastenmeier
Kazen
Kennelly
Kildee
Kleczka
Kogovsek
Kolter
Kostmayer
Kramer
Lantos
Leath
Lehman (CA)
Lehman (FL)
Leland
Levin
Levine
Levitas
Lewis (CA)
Lipinski
Lloyd
Long (LA)
Long (MD)
Lowery (CA)
Lowry (WA)
Luken
Lundine
MacKay
Markey
Marlenee
Marriott
Martinez
Matsui
Mavroules
Mazzoli
McCain
McCandless
McCloskey
McCurdy
McDade
McEwen
McGrath
McHugh
McKernan
McNulty
Mica
Mikulski
Miller (CA)
Mineta
Minish
Moakley
Mollohan
Montgomery
Moody
Moore
Moorhead
Morrison (CT)
Mrazek
Murphy
Murtha
Natcher
Neal
Nichols
Nielson
Nowak
O'Brien
Oakar
Olin
Ortiz
Panetta
Parris
Patman
Patterson
Paul
Pease
Perkins
Petri
Pickle
Porter
Price
Pritchard
Pursell
Quillen
Rahall
Rangel
Ratchford
Ray
Regula
Reid
Richardson
Ridge
Rinaldo
Robinson
Rodino
Roe
Rogers
Rose
Rostenkowski
Roukema
Rowland
Roybal
Rudd
Russo
Savage
Schneider
Schulze
Schumer
Seiberling
Sharp
Shelby
Shuster
Sisisky
Skelton
Slattery
Smith (FL)
Smith (IA)
Smith (NE)
Snowe
Snyder
Solarz
Spratt
Staggers
Stark
Stenholm
Stokes
Stratton
Studds
Stump
Sundquist
Swift
Synar
Tallon
Tauke
Tauzin
Thomas (CA)
Torres
Torricelli
Towns
Traxler
Udall
Valentine
Vento
Volkmer
Walgren
Watkins
Waxman
Weaver
Weiss
Wheat
Whitehurst
Whitley
Whitten
Williams (MT)
Williams (OH)
Winn
Wirth
Wise
Wolpe
Wright
Wyden
Wylie
Yates
Yatron
Young (MO)

NAYS—91

AuCoin
Bilirakis
Broomfield
Brown (CO)
Burton (IN)
Campbell
Carney
Chappie
Cheney
Clay
Clinger
Coats
Coleman (MO)
Conable
Corcoran
Craig
Daniel
Dannemeyer
Daschle
Daub
Davis
Dickinson
Dreier
Durbin
Edwards (OK)
Emerson
Erlenborn
Evans (IA)
Fiedler
Fields
Fish
Frenzel
Gejdenson
Gekas
Goodling
Gramm
Green
Hansen (UT)
Harkin
Hartnett
Hunter
Ireland
Jacobs
Kindness
Lagomarsino
Leach
Lent
Livingston
Loeffler
Lott
Lujan
Lungren
Mack
Martin (IL)
Martin (NC)
Martin (NY)
McCollum
Miller (OH)
Molinari
Morrison (WA)
Myers
Oxley
Packard
Pashayan
Penny
Ritter
Roberts
Roemer
Sabo
Schaefer
Schroeder
Sensenbrenner
Shaw
Shumway
Sikorski
Siljander
Skeen
Smith, Robert
Solomon
Spence
Stangeland
Vander Jagt
Vucanovich
Walker
Weber
Whittaker
Wolf
Wortley
Young (AK)
Young (FL)
Zschau

ANSWERED "PRESENT"—7

Dymally
LaFalce
Oberstar
Obey
Pepper
St Germain
Vandergriff

NOT VOTING—34

Anthony	Harrison	Roth
Applegate	Heftel	Sawyer
Boland	Kemp	Scheuer
Coughlin	Latta	Shannon
Crane, Philip	Lewis (FL)	Simon
Dingell	Madigan	Smith (NJ)
Edwards (CA)	McKinney	Smith, Denny
Ford (MI)	Michel	Taylor
Gingrich	Mitchell	Thomas (GA)
Hall (IN)	Nelson	Wilson
Hance	Ottinger	
Hansen (ID)	Owens	

Messrs. MARTIN of North Carolina, LOTT, and SPENCE changed their votes from "yea" to "nay."

So the Journal was approved.

The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

ANNOUNCEMENT BY THE SPEAKER

The SPEAKER. The Chair desires to make an announcement.

After consultation with the majority and minority leaders, and with their consent and approval, the Chair announces that today, when the Houses meet in joint meeting to hear an address by the President of the United Mexican States, only the doors immediately opposite the Speaker and those on his left and right will be open.

Children of Members will not be permitted on the floor and cooperation of all the Members is requested.

The House is going to go into recess, but previous to that, the Chair will make the following announcement:

We hope to come back at 12 o'clock, and we will resume the orders of the day. One-minutes will be in order at that particular time.

RECESS

The SPEAKER. Pursuant to the order of the House of April 26, 1984, the House will stand in recess until approximately 12 o'clock.

Accordingly (at 10 o'clock and 47 minutes a.m.), the House stood in recess subject to the call of the Chair.

JOINT MEETING OF THE 98TH CONGRESS TO HEAR AN ADDRESS BY MIGUEL DE LA MADRID, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED MEXICAN STATES

The SPEAKER of the House presided.

The Doorkeeper (Hon. James T. Malloy) announced the President pro tempore and Members of the U.S. Senate who entered the Hall of the House of Representatives, the President pro tempore taking the chair at the right of the Speaker, and the Members of the Senate the seats reserved for them.

The SPEAKER. The Chair appoints as members of the committee on the part of the House to conduct the President of the United Mexican States into the Chamber:

The gentleman from Texas (Mr. WRIGHT); the gentleman from Washington (Mr. FOLEY); the gentleman from Louisiana (Mr. LONG); the gentleman from Florida (Mr. FASCELL); the gentleman from California (Mr. ROYBAL); the gentleman from Mississippi (Mr. LOTT); the gentleman from Wyoming (Mr. CHENEY); and the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. BROOMFIELD).

The PRESIDENT pro tempore (Mr. THURMOND). The President of the Senate, at the direction of that body, appoints the following Senators as members of the committee on the part of the Senate to escort the President of the United Mexican States into the House Chamber: The Senator from Tennessee (Mr. BAKER); the Senator from Alaska (Mr. STEVENS); the Senator from Idaho (Mr. MCCLURE); the Senator from Utah (Mr. GARN); the Senator from Oregon (Mr. HATFIELD); the Senator from Arizona (Mr. GOLDWATER); the Senator from New Mexico (Mr. DOMENICI); the Senator from California (Mr. WILSON); the Senator from West Virginia (Mr. BYRD); the Senator from Hawaii (Mr. INOUYE); the Senator from California (Mr. CRANSTON); the Senator from Rhode Island (Mr. PELL); the Senator from Texas (Mr. BENTSEN); the Senator from Louisiana (Mr. JOHNSTON); and the Senator from New Mexico (Mr. BINGAMAN).

The Doorkeeper announced the ambassadors, ministers, and charges d'affaires of foreign governments.

The ambassadors, ministers, and charges d'affaires of foreign governments entered the Hall of the House of Representatives and took the seats reserved for them.

The Doorkeeper announced the Cabinet of the President of the United States.

The members of the Cabinet of the President of the United States entered the Hall of the House of Representatives and took the seats reserved for them in front of the Speaker's rostrum.

At 11 o'clock a.m., the Doorkeeper announced the President of the United Mexican States.

The President of the United Mexican States, escorted by the committee of Senators and Representatives, entered the Hall of the House of Representatives, and stood at the Clerk's desk.

[Applause, the Members rising.]

The SPEAKER. Members of the Congress, it is my great privilege and I deem it a high honor and personal pleasure to present to you His Excellency, Miguel de la Madrid, President of the United Mexican States.

ADDRESS BY MIGUEL DE LA MADRID, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED MEXICAN STATES

(President DE LA MADRID addressed the joint meeting in Spanish. The English translation of his address follows:)

President DE LA MADRID. Mr. Speaker, Mr. President: I thank you for your generous invitation to address this joint session of the House of Representatives and the Senate. I accept this invitation on behalf of the Mexican people and in their name I express the ardent hope that relations between our two countries will always be characterized by cooperation, friendship, and mutual respect.

Honorable Members of the Congress, distinguished guests: I am honored by this opportunity to visit these Halls, which house the representatives of the people of the United States, to speak to you of matters of interest to the people of Mexico. These legislative chambers constitute a legitimate expression of democracy in the United States. They reflect the unparallelled diversity of a people that maintains a rich political tradition reinforced by their different origins and cultures, which have made respect for pluralism a governing principle of national coexistence.

Congress, above all else, embodies the political and social dynamics of its people. The constitutional system of this great Nation at the same time establishes the foundation for and the limitations to the excercise of power. The legislative body is the source of social order and the ultimate guarantee of civil liberties.

Thanks to the American revolution and the political genius of its Founding Fathers, this country has committed itself, in a form that has become classic, to the division of powers, recognition of the supremacy of law, and the sacred right to self-determination for all peoples. Without these principles, which represent America's great contribution to contemporary political and juridical culture, it is impossible to conceive of the constitutional organization of the rule of law. For the twentieth-century man, these ideals signify an irreversible advance in the march of civilization.

The United States has also contributed to the evolution of international law. From the Declaration of Independence to the Charter of the United Nations, we find institutions that express the thinking of the American people. At the end of the Second World War and in the wake of Nazi barbarity, the hopes of the community of nations rested, to a large extent, on the promise of absolute and immutable respect for the legal order.

Unfortunately, the history of recent decades has not fulfilled the expectations of development and well-being

aroused by the victorious nations. Reality would appear to confirm a hypothesis that has no moral foundation: the expansion of power, under the inexorable law of history, nullifies aspirations for freedom. The requirements of security are supposed to justify spheres of influence and unacceptable limitations on national sovereignty. This is the prism through which is seen the division of today's world into a bipolar system.

Countries should have a memory and a sense of the future. We must avoid the destructive tendency that places circumstantial interests ahead of permanent values and that seeks to negate the legitimate concerns and just aspirations of others. Without understanding and comprehension, it would be impossible to guarantee the peace and prosperity of nations.

Latin America is now awakening to an awareness of its identity. In the past, geographical distances and the structure of the international system separated us. Today, objectives and interests that coincide are distinctive features of the region's political process. We shall make the goal of solidarity a reality.

Above and beyond their similar origins and cultures, the integration of Latin American countries is essential to their development. The events of recent years show unmistakably that, in isolation, we cannot achieve the political and economic security to which we aspire. With one will, we shall forge our common destiny in this era.

Today, Latin America demands a new understanding between its countries and the industrialized countries of the hemisphere. The profound changes that have taken place make it imperative to open new channels of cooperation and trade that will ensure effective political communication and that will meet the development needs of our region.

The countries of Latin America seek, in conditions of equality and mutual respect, a new kind of relationship with the United States. They want to do away with any shadow of subordination, while preserving sovereignties and national identity. The principles of self-determination and non-intervention confirm our ability to govern ourselves autonomously. For us, independence is not a part of our past, but a daily conquest. It is the supreme value of our history.

In spite of imbalances and disparities, legal equality is the basic norm for harmonious order among the countries of the continent. This principle, the highest political achievement of the Americas, underlines the wealth of possibilities for negotiation and diplomacy. Now, more than ever before, we must use intelligence and exercise reason.

Uniformity is a utopian concept in an era of sharp contrasts and rapid change. Promising democratic developments that are evident in various Latin American nations call for the full acceptance of pluralism. A uniform style of democratic life cannot be imposed on anyone. Democracy, by definition, cannot use the arms of tyranny.

For us, peace and development have been and continue to be fundamental issues. The necessary cooperation with the countries of the North should be free of any political conditions, discriminatory criteria or demands for impossible reciprocity. Justice and well-being are the only effective guarantees for warding off the dangers of instability and a widespread conflagration in Latin America.

Unfortunately, there has been a steep decline in the region's economic activity in recent years and the standard of living of the Latin American people has seriously deteriorated. The consequences of the current recession are now added to the accumulation of our traditional unsatisfied needs. Our attention is undoubtedly focused on the deep crisis that we are experiencing.

It is true that our difficulties derive from domestic factors, but there are also decisive elements that lie within the structure of the international economy. It is generally accepted that overcoming the crisis requires new approaches to dealing with inadequacies in the cooperation among nations.

External indebtedness, high interest rates, and the growing protectionism practiced by the advanced economies are, at the same time, the cause and the effect of the crisis. In 1983, Latin America's foreign debt reached approximately 340 billion dollars, one fourth of which corresponded to Mexico. In that year, almost 35 percent of our exports went to pay interest, a proportion that exceeds the reasonable maximum for suitable budgetary management and the balance of payments.

When it recently authorized an increase in the United States contribution to the International Monetary Fund, this Congress itself set forth the need to explore measures to extend the periods set for debt payment and reduce interest rates; it also established the norm of allocating a reasonable percentage of export income to the annual servicing of the foreign debt, so as to alleviate the social impact of economic adjustment programs. Unfortunately, the course of events has taken another direction.

Faced with the crisis, Mexico is making great efforts to reorder its economy; and its notable achievements have deserved recognition by international opinion, which appreciates the courage and responsibility shown by Mexico in subjecting itself to its own project for renewal.

Such efforts are being carried out within a framework of freedoms, which has served to strengthen our institutions and the democratic life of our country, and demonstrates that our Revolution remains in force.

In 1983, success was achieved in checking the upward trend in rising prices, which was leading us to a hyperinflationary situtation; we were able to reduce the public deficit from 18 percent of the product, GDP, in 1982 to 8.5 percent in 1983. The external sector also showed substantial improvement and, for the first time in several decades, we obtained positive results. The above achievements were goals that my government had set itself and point up the consistency between what is said and what is done. We adopted measures to enforce economic discipline and the people have accepted the cost involved, since we believe, using entirely independent criteria, that such measures were necessary to establish sound basis for the future development of Mexico.

Nonetheless, the social cost of the difficult times that we are experiencing has been high. For the first time in 40 years, the Mexican economy regressed and our people saw their standard of living decline.

Countries expect to be treated fairly. How, then, can we explain that developing countries are being told to reduce their public expenditures, while other countries make use of a growing deficit as an essential lever for their recovery? How can we accept that a unilateral increase in interest rates nullifies the great efforts made for economic readjustment, accompanied by a lowered standard of living? Within interdependence, how can we justify the few enjoying prosperity, while the majority are afflicted by limitations and sacrifices?

Developing nations seem to be trapped in an iron circle of indebtedness and the cancellation of progress. High rates of interest decrease investment, reduce export capacity and thus make a greater inflow of foreign exchange impossible. An essential remedy will be for the raw materials and manufactured goods of our countries to have greater access to international markets and for protectionism to be eliminated. In a world that is becoming impoverished, we must jointly establish new bases for financial and commercial exchange.

Furthermore, the crisis paradoxically victimizes not only the least developed economies, but also broad sectors of the advanced countries. Between 1981 and 1983, Latin America stopped buying 32 billion dollars worth of exports from the United States. It is calculated that export losses affected 600,000 jobs in the United States. Ultimately, no one can escape the hard realities of mutual dependence.

By the mandate of its history and the sovereign decision of its people, the foreign policy of Mexico is ruled by unchanging principles that reflect and ensure national interests. On the basis of such principles, my government maintains friendly relations with all the nations in the world and contributes to establishing an order of peace, justice, and equality among all nations.

Faced with urgent development needs, we repeat that it is absurd to squander resources on an arms race that endangers the survival of mankind. Broad sectors of public opinion the world over call for a firm political will to achieve disarmament.

This Congress can most certainly echo the universal demand for disarmament. It is urgent to resume talks leading to a significant reduction in nuclear stockpiles and, finally, to their complete elimination. The superpowers have the unavoidable responsibility of guaranteeing that history continues and of helping to do away with the distressing consequences of backwardness and marginalization.

Regional conflicts, which tend to become generalized, also threaten international peace. Such conflicts provide opportunities for interventionist intentions, which could lead to global confrontation. Thus, responsible efforts to eliminate motives for controversy are urgent.

In our imperfect society of nations, the impossibility of coercive enforcement of international law does not detract from its legal validity and the obligatory force of its decisions. If we exclude law, our only alternative is anarchy and the arbitrary rule of whoever is able to impose his will. As nations, it is our duty to strengthen the institutions of the international community.

The efforts of the Contadora Group are being made in this spirit and represent Latin American actions to solve a Latin American problem. We maintain that dialogue and a negotiated solution to the conflicts are possible: we therefore reject, without exception, all military plans that would seriously endanger the security and development of the region. This continent must not be a scenario for generalized violence that becomes increasingly difficult to control, as has occurred in other parts of the world. For our countries, it is obvious that reason and understanding are superior to the illusion of the effectiveness of force.

In Central America, politics and diplomacy offer a real possibility of reaching agreements to prohibit the installation of foreign bases, to reduce and eventually eliminate the presence of foreign military advisers, to establish mechanisms against trafficking in arms, to prevent the activities of groups that undermine stability, and to discourage the arms race in the region. It undoubtedly involves feasible commitments that should be assumed by all parties concerned through honorable and secure agreements. The premise for such measures is the political will of the parties.

We are convinced that the Central American conflict is a result of the economic deficiencies, political backwardness, and social injustice that have afflicted the countries of the area. We therefore cannot accept its becoming part of the East-West confrontation, nor can we accept reforms and structural changes being viewed as a threat to the security of the other countries of the hemisphere.

Honorable Members of Congress, I wish to convey Mexico's recognition of the unanimous support given by the House of Representatives to the Contadora Group's actions. Your firm backing encourages us to persevere in the peace-seeking efforts and gives hope to the peoples of the region.

Mexico and the United States share a wide range of interests. In the past, our relations have, on many occasions, been difficult. On the basis of mutual respect and understanding, we have now formed firm ties of friendship. An exchange of opinions allows us to surmount differences and to take better advantage of points on which we agree.

Strong social interactions between the two nations enrich the life and culture of both countries. The contact between the people of both countries synthesizes different traditions, provides other experiences, and broadens the horizon of the future. We should therefore increase our scientific, technological, and educational exchanges, bearing in mind that the voice of each nation is a necessary point of reference for the conscience of the other.

Our geographic proximity inevitably gives rise to a number of mutually beneficial interests. Disparity of power and development cannot disguise the need for agreements satisfactory to both parties. In commerce and finance, in the definition of maritime limits, in fishing rights, and in border environmental protection, we should continue our efforts to reach solutions.

In particular, I would like to refer to the problem of undocumented workers. My country is convinced that temporary emigrants who work in the United States make a significant contribution to the development of border states and therefore to the prosperity of the overall American economy. Mexico has an ongoing interest in the full respect for their human and labor rights.

Honorable Members of Congress: The Congress of the United States is in a privileged position to uphold the permanent ideals of this great nation both at home and abroad. It should ensure that the future of your country is based on tolerance, understanding other interests, recognizing foreign identities, and respecting the wishes of others. We are confident that the American people will invariably prefer the limited exercise of power to the use of force, and reason to domination.

The cause of peace and development places responsibilities on all countries. Historically, essential changes have been brought about by the convergence of the sum total of peoples' determination and intelligence. Insofar as they are able, the countries of Latin America have long been fighting for detente and for a halt to the arms race; they have committed themselves to avoid regional conflicts, and they keep their actions within the law. Similarly, they are making efforts toward a fruitful North-South dialogue to establish the bases for a just and equitable international economic order.

Members of the United States Congress can recognize the legitimacy of the demands of Latin American countries and of developing countries in general. Their contribution will be decisive in achieving the well-being of our nations at a time when it is our lot to share crisis and prosperity.

We have said that Mexico is Latin America's border with the industrialized nations of the continent. Cooperation between our two countries shows that honorable and respectful coexistence between the developing South and the developed North is possible. I am certain that both countries will be able to find new formulas for collaboration, to broaden existing mechanisms for consultation and to strengthen the bonds of a fruitful and profitable friendship. Let us hope that this will be the hallmark of the new international community to which all the countries of the world aspire alike.

Thank you very much.

[Applause, the Members rising.]

At 11 o'clock and 30 minutes a.m., the President of the United Mexican States, accompanied by the committee of escort, retired from the Hall of the House of Representatives.

The Doorkeeper escorted the invited guests from the Chamber in the following order:

The members of the President's Cabinet.

The Ambassadors, Ministers, and Charge d'Affaires of foreign governments.

JOINT MEETING DISSOLVED

The SPEAKER. The purpose of the joint meeting having been completed, the Chair declares the joint meeting of the two Houses now dissolved.

Accordingly, at 11 o'clock and 35 minutes a.m., the joint meeting of the two Houses was dissolved.

The Members of the Senate retired to their Chamber.

The SPEAKER. The House will continue in recess until 12 o'clock noon.

AFTER RECESS

The recess having expired, the House was called to order by the Speaker at 12 noon.

TELEVISION COVERAGE OF HOUSE PROCEEDINGS

(Mr. PEPPER asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute.)

Mr. PEPPER. Mr. Speaker, not as a partisan, but as a proud Member of this House for over 20 years, I want to say a few words in great earnestness to my colleagues.

I was the first Member of the Congress to advocate the coverage of the Congress by broadcast radio, when that was the only medium of that character that we had. Later, I introduced the first television broadcast resolution as well.

Now for something over 5 years I have been proud to see the coverage of the proceedings of this House by television, by that miracle of television giving to people in their homes all over America the same privilege to hear and see the proceedings of this Chamber as if they were sitting in the gallery. I thought that was in furtherance of our democracy.

But what I want to say, Mr. Speaker, is up until recently that proceeding has gone forward without controversy. Lately there has developed a very bitter controversy about the proceedings on this floor in respect to that subject.

I want to speak from the heart in telling all my colleagues who care to see the continuity of televised broadcasting of the proceedings of this House that whoever perverts the use of television endangers the continuity of that practice.

It is just a question of time, if that continues, until it will be discontinued. And I hope all the Members will take to heart what I have said.

TIP REPORTING

(Mr. REID asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute.)

Mr. REID. Mr. Speaker, possibly, one of the most emotional issues among restaurant owners and culinary employees today is the Internal Revenue Service procedure for tip reporting.

Because of this inequitable tax treatment I have coauthored a letter requesting House conferees to make necessary changes in legislation that has passed both Houses of Congress.

Three important changes are needed. The first, to allow the Secretary of the Treasury the discretion, when conditions exist, to reduce the threshold tip reporting percentage down to a limit of 2 percent.

Next, to allow employees of an establishment to have a voice in requesting a reduced rate. Current law permits only an establishment's owner or operator to seek the reduction.

Third, to require the Secretary of the Treasury to prescribe the necessary recordkeeping measures for tip reporting.

The revenue effects of these modifications would be negligible. Yet, the impact on personal economies would be significant. In terms of equity to people in the restaurant industry these proposed changes are not only important, they are necessary.

THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR

(Mr. PEASE asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to verify and extend his remarks and include extraneous matter.)

Mr. PEASE. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to express dismay over the continuing carnage of the Iran-Iraq war. As distressed as I am by the war itself, I am also dismayed by the fact that the rest of the world could seemingly care less about what is occurring on the border between those two nations.

Granted, the Governments of Iran and Iraq are both reprehensible. It is very tempting to simply wish a pox upon both their houses. Granted, neither seems receptive to outside advice. But though our ability to influence events there is limited, as compassionate human beings, we must do what we can.

No matter how repressive, proterrorist, or anti-American the regimes in Iran and Iraq are, we ought to hang our heads in shame for casually accepting a situation where wave after wave of 15-year-old Iranian boys is sent to the front to be slaughtered like sheep and where Iraqi pilots drop canisters of poison gas upon concentrations of Iranian troops.

Mr. Speaker, with these brief remarks I include the text of a letter that 14 other Members joined me in sending to President Reagan to urge that no stone be left unturned in attempting to end the Iran-Iraq war:

Hon. RONALD REAGAN,
President of the United States, The White House, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: We are writing from deep concern over the prolonged conflict between Iran and Iraq. Even though our country has very limited influence with either of these countries, there are compelling reasons for you to speak out more visibly and more forcefully for an end to this senseless war.

Our sensibilities have been numbed by continuing accounts of the tremendous loss of life and the immense suffering inflicted by the fighting. Iraq has resorted to the use of chemical weapons against Iranian troops. Iran has seen fit to mount human wave assaults of children, elderly men, and handicapped citizens. We appeal to you on humanitarian grounds to use every appropriate international forum at your disposal to focus attention upon the need to stop the bloodshed.

Furthermore, we believe that it is very dangerous for the future of U.S. foreign policy in the region to allow the slaughter in the Iran-Iraq war to go unabated. When governments are willing to engage in the sorts of atrocities already reported in this conflict, it is quite possible that one side or the other might deliberately undertake actions to engage third parties in the struggle in order to salvage its position.

As we write, Iran has already amassed large numbers of troops and war material on its border for a new offensive against Iraq. It is imperative that you act for the reasons we have cited to ensure that our country has left no stone unturned in attempting to halt the ongoing carnage in Iraq and Iran.

THE HIGH COST OF DEFENSE PROCUREMENT

(Mr. BEDELL asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to verify and extend his remarks.)

Mr. BEDELL. Mr. Speaker, everyone has heard of the Government paying $435 for a $7 hammer. I want to tell you that that hammer was not an isolated case.

I purchased this pair of pliers for $3.77. The military paid $430 for a similar set of pliers as part of a repair kit.

I purchased a repair kit locally for $92.44. Upon checking, I found that the military had paid over $10,000 for the same items I purchased retail for $92.44.

I plan to offer two amendments to the defense authorization bill this week to help correct this waste and bring some increased competition to defense procurement.

I urge my colleagues to support these amendments and demand that the taxpayers be protected from such a waste of our tax dollars.

LEGISLATIVE SCHEDULING AND TV COVERAGE OF THE HOUSE

(Mr. WALKER asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute.)

Mr. WALKER. Mr. Speaker, I would like to talk about a couple of issues during my 1-minute this morning.

First of all, the gentleman from Texas earlier today referred to a speech that I had made last Thursday night mentioning the fact that the Justice Department had indicated that they could not find enough evidence to pursue the case. If the gentleman had read my speech further, he would know that I made mention of precisely that. If the gentleman would go to page 11894 of the RECORD, he will find

that that particular item was mentioned in my speech.

Second, Mr. Speaker, I would like to talk about the equal access bill that was not approved by this House yesterday.

Many Americans are going to ask why, when 270 Members of the House voted for a bill, did it fail.

Well, that is because of the way it was scheduled. The Speaker personally decided the bill would be brought up under a procedure that required a two-thirds vote rather than a majority vote. The reason: The Speaker is quoted as saying he did so because the House is too busy to do otherwise.

I would remind the membership that this busy House finished regular legislative business this week at 2 p.m. just this Monday.

The fact is the equal access was purposely given an extra hurdle to clear in order to defeat it unjustly and unfairly.

And finally, Mr. Speaker, I would like to refer to the remarks just made by the powerful chairman of the Rules Committee, who, it seems to me, made a shocking statement when he threatened the TV coverage of this Chamber could be abandoned.

ALL MEMBERS MUST RESPECT THE RULES OF THE HOUSE

(Mr. WEBER asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute.)

Mr. WEBER. Mr. Speaker, yesterday during floor debate I specifically asked the gentleman in the chair, Mr. MOAKLEY, to affirm that the rules of the House do indeed apply to the Speaker of the House.

Mr. MOAKLEY, of course, affirmed that fact.

Later in the day in a virtually unprecedented ruling the Chair ruled that the gentleman in the chair now, the Speaker of the House, had violated the rules in a personal attack on the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. GINGRICH).

□ 1210

It was with great disappointment, Mr. Speaker, that I then read this morning in the New York Times your response to this rebuke. According to this morning's Times, and I quote:

> In an interview later, Mr. O'Neill maintained that he too had made his point and that the reproach to him "was no crime."

Perhaps not, Mr. Speaker. But, Mr. Speaker, the integrity of this institution depends on all Members respecting the rules of the House fully. Unfortunately, Mr. Speaker, your comments in the Times this morning show no such respect.

INSULATING OLYMPIC GAMES FROM INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

(Mr. PARRIS asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to extend his remarks.)

Mr. PARRIS. Mr. Speaker, yesterday I joined with Senator BRADLEY of New Jersey in introducing legislation that we feel could lead to insulating the Olympic games from international politics. I have submitted House Concurrent Resolution 308, expressing the sense of the Congress that the International Olympic Committee should establish a permanent facility for the Olympic games. While several locations have been suggested over the years for a permanent site, we believe the IOC should make that determination.

During this century, the games have been subject to political pressures. The games scheduled for 1916, 1940, and 1944 were suspended due to international conflict. The Moscow Olympics were boycotted by numerous nations and the list of countries boycotting this summer's games continues to grow.

I believe public opinion in this country and perhaps throughout the world supports the creation of a permanent site for the Olympics. While Senator BRADLEY and I would like to continue the tradition of moving the games from country to country, we realize that we live in a world which subjects any Olympic host to political disruption, that now threatens the survival of the Olympics.

There are numerous advantages to a permanent, neutral forum for the Olympics. One obvious advantage is that the unique facilities which are required would not have to be rebuilt every 4 years. The construction and maintenance of permanent facilities could be shared by the nations that participate in the games, in addition to corporate contributions if the International Olympic Committee so desired. I urge the Members of the House to join Senator BRADLEY and me in this effort by cosponsoring House Concurrent Resolution 308.

THE USE OF SCHOOL FACILITIES FOR RELIGIOUS ACTIVITIES

(Mr. COATS asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to extend and verify his remarks.)

Mr. COATS. Mr. Speaker, many of the millions of Americans who supported the concept of allowing high school students who want to voluntarily use school facilities for religious activities on the same terms and conditions as other voluntary activities, many of these Americans were surprised to hear that even though 270 Members of this House, or 64 percent, voted for this right, the measure was defeated. Why? Why did this bill require two-thirds passage? Why was two-thirds necessary to pass it?

Well, I think the answer is given in today's Washington Post, and I quote:

> House Speaker Thomas P. O'Neill, who opposed the bill, told Perkins—that is CARL PERKINS, the distinguished gentleman from the Democrat side—"That he would not cooperate in finding a spot for the bill on the House's crowded schedule." "I realize my only choice was to bring it up now and hope for the two-thirds vote," PERKINS said.

Too crowded, Mr. Speaker? We have had time this year for Frozen Food Day, we have had time for National Photo Week, we have had time for National Beta Club Week. Too crowded to deal with an issue that addresses the question of religious freedom, freedom of expression for our students in school? Perhaps our priorities are out of line, Mr. Speaker.

AMERICA'S AGENDA

(Mr. HUNTER asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute.)

Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Speaker, let me react briefly to the gentleman from Florida, the chairman of the Rules Committee's statement, to the effect that we should not utilize the television coverage of this House to pervert the workings of the House.

I totally agree, and I am assuming that he is speaking of the times that we take for special orders after the official business is finished.

For myself, and I think I can speak for the gentleman from Georgia and the gentleman from Pennsylvania who have been taking a great deal of special order time, we have been speaking mainly about the balanced budget, the need for this House to just bring up a balanced budget, line-item veto, school prayer, and, finally, the President's 42-point crime package that passed the other body 91 to 1 and has been pronounced dead on arrival and has been bottled up here for almost a year.

So, Mr. Speaker, I think we are talking about America's agenda, and that is what we have been speaking about after hours.

And I would simply say, finally, Mr. Speaker, Mr. GINGRICH's portrayal of Members of the Democratic side and his criticism I think was justified. He challenged their judgment, not their patriotism, and I think his historical analysis was just as justified as would be the report of baseball statistics.

ENERGY DEVELOPMENT

(Mr. RUDD asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute, and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. RUDD. Mr. Speaker, I wish to take this opportunity to insert into the RECORD the following letter to me

from Hon. Donald Paul Hodel, Secretary of Energy. It is a most valuable overview on the status of energy in our country.

Secretary Hodel has spent a good part of his adult life examining and working with the issues of energy development in this Nation. He writes with the experience of being a local manager of energy production as well as someone who has given a great deal of time and thought to national energy policy.

His statement is one of the most concise and clear reports on where this Nation stands with regard to energy resources and where we need to go. I commend this valuable information to my colleagues and to the American people who have an interest in our energy needs:

THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY,
Washington, D.C., May 2, 1984.

Hon. ELDON RUDD,
House of Representatives,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR CONGRESSMAN RUDD: During the March 5 hearing of the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development, you asked me to expand on my comments regarding energy supply projections and energy needs in this country. I am pleased to do that.

The U.S. has made great progress in reducing its dependence on imported oil and in developing a balanced and mixed energy resource base. However, much still remains to be done to assure that the nation is not vulnerable to the potentially severe impacts of supply disruptions. In the near term, our supplies of oil, natural gas, coal and electric generating capacity are adequate; in the longer term, we must assure that energy supplies remain adequate to meet the needs of a growing economy. It is important that we do not become complacent in response to current positive conditions and trends.

Imports of foreign oil in 1983 were down to about 28 percent of U.S. oil requirements from their peak level of 46 percent in 1977. In addition, our sources of supply have shifted away from the OPEC countries. OPEC provided over 70 percent of U.S. net oil imports in 1977. In contrast, OPEC provided 50 percent of 1982 U.S. oil imports and only 43 percent of U.S. imports in 1983. In fact, OPEC production as a proportion of the free-world oil market has dropped from 64 percent in 1979 to 46 percent in 1983.

About 2-3 percent of U.S. oil requirements currently come from the Persian Gulf. However, about 20 percent of the free world's total oil supply moves through the Strait of Hormuz, and our allies are and will remain heavily dependent on Persian Gulf oil. A disruption of supplies to the world oil market would have potentially severe economic consequences on all nations, including our industrialized allies, developing countries, debtor nations that rely on oil, and the U.S. The U.S. could not insulate itself from the effects of a major disruption even if it imported no oil.

As economic growth continues in the near term, oil use will increase. Therefore, it is critically important that we continue to promote efficient production of conventional domestic energy resources and development of alternative technologies, as well as to exploit the resource potential of energy conservation. Within this context, our near-term energy policy actions in connection with natural gas, electric utilities and nuclear power will be particularly important.

In the short run, domestic supplies of natural gas appear to be adequate to meet expected demand for the next few years. Nonetheless, as you know, price controls on natural gas are inhibiting drilling activity and causing distortions in the marketplace. Recent studies estimate that an additional 20 to 50 trillion cubic feet of low cost, domestic gas reserves would be produced under deregulation. However, if current regulations remain in effect, these domestic reserves may never be produced. The deregulation of natural gas would result in an increase in domestic gas production and further reductions in oil imports—benefits similar to those that occurred after the decontrol of oil prices.

Following decontrol of domestic oil prices, U.S. drilling activity reached record levels, and domestic oil production has been 0.5 to 2.0 million barrels per day higher than projections made only 5 years ago. Although drilling activity declined in 1983, wells and footage drilled in 1983 exceeded levels for all previous years except 1981 and 1982. Due to better economic conditions and lower drilling costs, drilling activity in 1984 has increased.

With respect to electricity, the U.S. currently has an excess of generating capacity. This excess capacity results from the combination of slow economic growth in the late 1970's and early 1980's, and unanticipated conservation in response to past increases in real electricity prices. Assuming that growth in the economy and in electricity demand over the next decade will be about 3 percent per year—an assumption I believe is reasonable—we could need 200-300 gigawatts of additional generating capacity by the year 2000. In addition, 25-30 percent of current generating capacity may require replacement due to obsolesence, thus necessitating an additional 180 typically-sized nuclear plants or 250-300 coal-fired plants by 2000 or 2005. The utility industry is not building generating capacity at anything approaching that rate now.

You asked in particular about nuclear energy. No new nuclear plants have been ordered since 1978, and 109 units (totaling 120 gigawatts) have been cancelled between 1972 and early 1984. Utility representatives cite three reasons for the plant cancellations: a decrease in load growth; regulatory uncertainties that have led to open-ended estimates of completion costs; and economic regulation by States which, when combined with the effects of inflation and cost escalation, have made it difficult to obtain needed financing.

I believe that nuclear energy is an imperative, not an option, in securing the nation's energy future with a balanced and mixed energy resource system. The Department projects that nuclear power will generate 19 percent of the nation's electricity in the early 1990's and up to 25 percent by 2010. To allow this to happen, it is crucial that the Congress enact the Nuclear Licensing and Regulatory Reform Act of 1983 proposed by the Administration so that we can improve plant safety and reduce the length of time required to build nuclear plants.

As I said at the hearing, the solution to our longer term energy supply concerns lies in pursuing a balanced and mixed energy supply system. We can best achieve this objective by minimizing federal intervention and control in the marketplace and placing maximum reliance on the private sector for development and production of this nation's abundant energy resources. With the help of Congress, and thoughtful Members like yourself, this nation can and will make the necessary investments to assure our national security and the long-term availability of adequate energy supplies at reasonable costs.

Sincerely,

DONALD PAUL HODEL.

A LACK OF COURAGE

(Mr. SILJANDER asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to verify and extend his remarks.)

Mr. SILJANDER. I would like to define the word "discouragement." The dictionary defines the word "discouragement" as a stealing away of one's courage. I believe this House has had its courage stolen away from it. Fifty-five times we have asked to bring up unanimous-consent requests for prayer in public schools; 55 times it has been denied. And just yesterday we were required by a two-thirds vote, rather than a simple majority as most every other measure in this House is required to obtain, we asked to bring up a moderate compromise of equal access, and we were again denied in an indirect fashion by a two-thirds vote requirement to bring up an issue which American people by an overwhelming majority are demanding.

Yes, discouragement does prevail in this Congress because discouragement, defined again, is a lack of courage.

CRIME CONTROL

(Mr. SHAW asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute.)

Mr. SHAW. Mr. Speaker, the priorities of the House Democratic leadership are perhaps best illustrated by their inaction on the subject of crime. It was a full 51 weeks before the President's comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1983 was even referred to its relevant subcommittees. By that time the other body had already acted on all of the other provisions of the bill with the exception of the Federal Torts Claim Act. At the same time, it can be said that the priorities of the Democratic leadership of this body are also evident by their actions. Although we have not found time to deal with criminal justice reform, the leadership has found time to consider dairy price supports and domestic content legislation. This reflects a politization of the process at the expense of the issues for which there can be no narrowly defined constituency, yet which are of paramount concern to our national well-being.

Mr. Speaker, crime is everybody's problem—the rich, the poor, the young, the elderly. Let us go forward and represent the people of this country.

LET THE AGENDA OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE BE HEARD

(Mr. MACK asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute.)

Mr. MACK. Mr. Speaker, I can understand how pressure must be building on you, both here in this House and within your own party. But frankly, as a new Member, I was surprised and angered by your action yesterday which was an expression of your contempt for the rules of the House.

I believe that the question posed by my friend and colleague from Minnesota, "Do the rules of the House apply to the Speaker of the House?" was a valid one. We would like to follow your good example. Please give us that leadership.

Mr. Speaker, the only pressure that the minority is placing on you is this: Let our people vote. Let the agenda of the American people be heard. You tell us that you will schedule a vote on: First, a balanced budget; second, criminal justice reform; third, prayer in school; fourth, line-item veto; and fifth, reform of the rules of the House. Then we will withdraw. The need for us to use special orders to discuss these matters will no longer exist. We await your decision to schedule these votes.

BAIL REFORM

(Mr. LAGOMARSINO asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to verify and extend his remarks.)

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. Mr. Speaker, I rise to urge my distinguished colleagues in the Judiciary Committee to release the omnibus crime bill so we can debate these very important issues on the floor.

Mr. Speaker, I am concerned about one issue in particular—bail reform. A recent report showed that one out of six defendants out on bail were rearrested during the pretrial period. The point is that these crimes could have been easily prevented with a more conservative approach to bail.

The deficiencies of our current bail laws are especially prevalent in serious crimes dealing with major drug traffickers. In Miami, where a huge portion of drugs enter the United States, the average bond for drug defendents is $75,000 yet 17 percent of those arrested jump bail. In 1981 and 1982 four accused drug kingpins posted bonds of $1 million or more then jumped bail.

Mr. Speaker, title I of the crime bill would take care of the problems that I have mentioned by providing for revocation of release and increased penalties for crimes committed while on release. For those who are willing to surrender a large portion of money in order to continue doing business, title I would authorize courts to inquire into the source of property used to post bond.

Mr. Speaker, it is past time that we took a nonpartisan step to curb crime for the benefit of the people of this great Nation.

□ 1220

WHO STANDS IN THE WAY OF FOUR MOST IMPORTANT LEGISLATIVE ISSUES?

(Mr. BILIRAKIS asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute.)

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Mr. Speaker, at this time I would hope to offer unanimous-consent requests calling for consideration of amendment to permit voluntary school prayer, balanced budget, line-item veto, and legislation calling for the passage of the President's Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1983, H.R. 2151.

The Chair has ruled that in order to make these requests I must have the clearance of the majority and minority leaderships.

This request has been cleared by the minority leadership.

I would now yield to a spokesman from the majority leadership for appropriate clearance.

Mr. Speaker, I hear no response. That should make it clear to the American people who stands in the way of these four important issues—the Democratic leadership of this House.

ARE THESE THE PRESIDENT'S VIEWS TOO?

(Mr. RICHARDSON asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute.)

Mr. RICHARDSON. Mr. Speaker, last week one of the highest ranking officials of this administration hit America's 16 million Hispanics with a tar brush. Hispanics, we were told, by Housing and Urban Development Undersecretary Philip Abrams, preferred to "double up" and live in overcrowded housing because of "a cultural preference."

This, of course, is simply nonsense. As anybody with any commonsense can tell you the reason why many Hispanics live in overcrowded housing is because they cannot afford anything else. Undoubtedly, Mr. Abrams of his $70,000-plus annual Government salary can afford to live in a spacious, roomy home. And if those Hispanics who are currently jammed into overcrowded housing made that kind of money, they, too, would move into a fancy home.

Today's New York Times contains a story in which Mr. Abrams defends his remarks. Missing is any hint of remorse on his part, nor is there anything that comes close to an apology to those whom he has slighted.

But for an administration which has gone on record charging that: First, destitute people are homeless by choice; second, those who go to soup kitchens do so only because of free food, I think it is altogether fitting to include; and third, Hispanics enjoy living in overcrowded housing because of "a cultural preference."

It is no wonder that this administration is viewed as insensitive.

IN SUPPORT OF THE BENNETT-MAVROULES AMENDMENT

(Mr. BONKER asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute.)

Mr. BONKER. Mr. Speaker, as the House takes up the 1985 Defense authorization bill, perhaps the most significant decision we will have to make is whether to fund production of the expensive, vulnerable, and destabilizing MX missile. I rise in support of the Bennett-Mavroules amendment to eliminate all production funds for the MX.

The use of the MX missile system as a "bargaining chip" to force the Soviets to negotiate arms limitations has always been, in my opinion, a specious argument. In the late 1960's we were told that it was necessary to proceed with MIRV research and then production to force the Soviets to the bargaining table. Now both sides have MIRV'd missiles and we are all the closer to nuclear war as a result.

When Congress authorized and appropriated funds for the MX last year, it was told by the administration that MX deployment would give the administration necessary leverage to persuade the Soviets to negotiate an arms reduction and control agreement, based on the START proposals.

The administration has failed to demonstrate good faith in upholding its part of the "compromise package." Not only has no progress whatsoever been made by the administration toward arms control in the past year, but all arms control negotiations have been suspended. Rather than convincing the Soviets that they should negotiate a reduction in nuclear weapons, the MX program has convinced them that the Reagan administration has no genuine interest in arms control.

The best way to convince the Soviets that the United States is serious about arms reduction negotiations is to halt production for a weapon system which is inherently destabilizing and provocative. I urge my colleagues to oppose any funding for the MX missile system.

THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN GOVERNING AND SPEECHIFYING

(Mrs. SCHROEDER asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute.)

Mrs. SCHROEDER. Mr. Speaker, yesterday I know the Washington Post gave you an excellent editorial applauding your actions in expanding TV coverage of the House by allowing the cameras to pan the Chamber during special orders, after business, but I wanted you to know that in the West we also believe that Government is not a fungus and can thrive in the sunshine.

The Denver Post also printed an editorial applauding your actions in freeing the cameras. They said that the people should be able to see their elected tigers roaring to empty Chambers. That to do otherwise would focus only on the greasepaint of politics, but not measure the crowd's reaction to it.

One of the important distinctions we have to make in Government is the difference between governing and speechifying, and this is one way to do it. Mr. Speaker, the American public can now get a much fairer idea of what is happening here in the Nation's Capital after your actions and I am happy to see both the East and the West agree.

THE WORSENING SUFFERING OF INDUSTRIAL STATES

(Mr. LEVIN of Michigan asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to extend and verify his remarks.)

Mr. LEVIN of Michigan. Mr. Speaker, last month the Census Bureau released another set of figures which illustrates the tremendous suffering that has been inflicted on industrial States the last several years. These figures are State per capita income levels.

In 1970, Michigan, my home State, ranked 13; in 1980, 16. We have slipped badly the last few years to 20th in 1981, 21st in 1982, and now the figures for 1983 show 22d nationally. Those statistics indicate why so many of us from Michigan and other industrial States are interested in the issue of industrial policy. I think they also answer the question whether the people of Michigan are in better shape today than they were in 1980.

RELATIVELY EASY SOLUTIONS WHEN PEOPLE WORK TOGETHER

(Mr. THOMAS of California asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to extend and verify his remarks.)

Mr. THOMAS of California. Mr. Speaker, some of you may be aware that I have been concerned about the fact that the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD does not accurately reflect what occurs on the House floor. It has been a somewhat awkward situation of trying to request Members to not ask for a revision unanimous request.

I would like to compliment the gentleman from Colorado (Mr. WIRTH) and the gentleman from Arkansas (Mr. ALEXANDER) for coming up with what I think is a very appropriate solution. That is that the Members ask to verify their remarks. Clearly, there are oftentimes grammatical errors and factual errors in the taking down of our words, and certainly Members should be allowed to verify their remarks.

This may be a small and insignificant change for many, but it indicates that when people are willing to work together to resolve what they see as common problems, there is always a relatively easy solution.

I thank the Speaker for allowing me to verify my remarks.

SOVIETS' OLYMPIC GAMES ACTION WILL BACKFIRE

(Mr. CRAIG asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute.)

Mr. CRAIG. Mr. Speaker, the Soviet Union's decision to boycott the Los Angeles Olympics was not a total surprise to many Americans. I am sure that many of us felt they would take retaliatory action for the U.S. boycott of the 1980 summer games in Moscow.

However, the Soviet propaganda machine states the reason they will not appear in Los Angeles is because the U.S. Government and the Reagan administration were plotting to induce Soviet bloc athletes to defect, through kidnaping and the use of "psychotropic drugs which affect the nervous system."

That has got to be one of the most ridiculous charges I have ever heard from any government, friend or foe. If the Soviets feel they can embarrass our President in the eyes of the American people, they have another thought coming. The American people will not apologize for not placing bars on the dormitory windows in the Olympic village. These are Olympic games of peace, not prison games conducted behind walls, bars, barbed wire, or closed borders.

What the Soviet Union has failed to realize is that our people are free thinking, well-educated individuals, and not simplistic clones of our Government. Their attempt to influence our upcoming election will backfire for them and for the people of their nations.

A CHANCE TO DEAL WITH SUBSTANTIVE LEGISLATION?

(Mr. LUNGREN asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute.)

Mr. LUNGREN. Mr. Speaker, yesterday in a rather historic session, we had a rather heated discussion about what has been going on on the floor for some months. Mr. Speaker, I fear we may have lost sight of what it was that we were really talking about. A lot of talk had to do with whether we ought to pan the Chamber to show there are very few people here. I suppose the gentlewoman from Colorado at some point in time is going to make a motion to pan this Chamber at this moment or perhaps during legislation business. If so, I would certainly support her on that.

That is not the point. We were talking about the fact that we have not had an opportunity to deal with certain substantive legislation here. Mr. Speaker, 8 weeks ago, Mr. WRIGHT, our distinguished colleague from Texas, accused the President of having amnesia. Richard Cohen, commenting on this specific speech in the Washington Post said:

> Nothing compares with what the House majority leader said, he called the President a liar 9 times.

Now, I can imagine Mr. WRIGHT was still stinging from the President's words that:

> It is time that we take the handcuffs off law enforcement and put them on the thugs where they belong. Maybe it is time to move some politicians out of office in order to get criminals off the streets.

The President was referring to the fact that we have had very little, if any, action on his comprehensive crime reform package. We have asked on this floor many times to deal with it. Mr. Speaker, that is the question at hand: Are we going to get a chance to deal with substantive legislation?

□ 1230

ANOTHER OPPORTUNITY FOR EQUAL ACCESS BILL

(Mr. WILLIAMS of Montana asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute.)

Mr. WILLIAMS of Montana. Mr. Speaker and my colleagues: Again this morning we have heard the minority launch an attack on the established and traditional rules of the House and, worse, they continue their rather rancorous attacks, personal attacks, I believe, on the leadership of this House.

This morning they use as the mechanism for that attack yesterday's vote on the equal access bill. They call the bringing up of that bill under the suspension of the rules unjust and unfair.

What they forgot to mention, my colleagues, is that it was brought up

under the established rules of the House. What they forget to mention is that the supporters of that legislation wanted it brought up under suspension, and what they also neglect to mention is that, like any bill brought up under suspension that is defeated, the supporters of the bill will have another opportunity through the Committee on Rules to bring the bill up under regular order.

AMERICAN PASSBOOK SAVINGS BILL

(Mr. TAUZIN asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. TAUZIN. Mr. Speaker, for many years, Americans have relied upon flat-rate, long-term mortgage financing to achieve the American dream of private homeownership. Today, because of high interest rates, Americans are increasingly being required to consider exotic financing techniques such as the variable rate mortgage. Some of these new mortgage instruments provide low rates in the early years and much higher rates in the remaining years of the mortgage. Of growing concern with these new mortgage forms is the possibility of massive foreclosures should interest rates continue to rise. The recent 2 percent jump in prime interest rates has already sent variable rate mortgage payments soaring for many families in America.

The American passbook savings bill, which I and Congressman ECKART are going to introduce on Thursday, provides an opportunity to return to traditional flat-rate, long-term home mortgages. By encouraging Americans to invest in interest tax-free passbook savings accounts again, we can provide banks, savings and loans and credit unions in America with the stable source of low cost funds to make home mortgage money available again, and at decent rates again. It is time to stop quibbling over who is most responsible for high interest rates. It is time to do something about them.

PRINTING OF PROCEEDINGS HAD DURING RECESS

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the proceedings had during the recess be printed in the RECORD.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Louisiana?

There was no objection.

ELECTION OF MEMBER TO CERTAIN STANDING COMMITTEES

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. Speaker, as chairman of the Democratic Caucus, and at the direction of that caucus, I send a privileged resolution (H. Res. 499) to the desk and ask for its immediate consideration.

The Clerk read the resolution, as follows:

H. RES. 499

Resolved, That Gerald D. Kleczka, Wisconsin, be, and is hereby, elected to the Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs; and to the Committee on Government Operations.

The resolution was agreed to.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

DEFENSE DEPARTMENT AUTHORIZATIONS, 1985

The SPEAKER. Pursuant to House Resolution 494 and rule XXIII, the Chair declares the House in the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the further consideration of the bill, H.R. 5167.

IN THE COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE

Accordingly the House resolved itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the further consideration of the bill (H.R. 5167) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1985 for the Armed Forces for procurement, for research, development, test, and evaluation, for operation and maintenance, and for working capital funds, to prescribe personnel strengths for such fiscal year for the Armed Forces and for civilian employees of the Department of Defense, and for other purposes, with Mr. HARRISON (Chairman pro tempore) in the chair.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. When the Committee of the Whole rose on Tuesday, May 15, 1984, the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. PRICE) had 6 minutes of general debate remaining, and the gentleman from Alabama (Mr. DICKINSON) had 30 minutes of general debate remaining.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Alabama (Mr. DICKINSON).

PARLIAMENTARY INQUIRY

Mr. DICKINSON. Mr. Chairman, I have a parliamentary inquiry.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The gentleman will state it.

Mr. DICKINSON. Mr. Chairman, would it be permissible at this point for me to yield 15 of my 30 minutes back to the chairman? I would like to do that if I may.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Without objection, it would be perfectly permissible.

The gentleman from Illinois (Mr. PRICE) now has 21 minutes remaining, and the gentleman from Alabama (Mr. DICKINSON) has 15 minutes remaining.

Mr. DICKINSON. Mr. Chairman, since I have yielded 15 minutes of my 30 minutes to my chairman, I had agreed with the gentleman from Washington (Mr. DICKS) if time were available, I would yield 5 minutes to him. If the chairman has enough time on his side, would he yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Washington?

Mr. PRICE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Washington.

Mr. DICKS. I thank the gentleman for yielding this time to me.

Mr. Chairman, all too often as we debate the Defense authorization bill, we focus almost exclusively on dollar levels and individual weapons systems rather than addressing the overall national security requirements of the country, and the role our military forces can play in meeting these requirements.

To be truly secure, the United States must be politically, economically, and militarily strong. The greatest weakness of the Soviet Union is its over reliance on the military component of national strength. While I firmly believe in the importance of maintaining a strong military posture able to deter aggression, I also believe that we must avoid copying the mistakes of the Soviets. Our economic and diplomatic capabilities must be integrated along with our military capabilities to be mutually supportive. When we present the proper balance, the total is greater than the sum of the parts. Many argue that this administration has over emphasized the military component of national strength, and I think that is a fair criticism. It is on this basis that I feel the proper level of defense spending should be debated.

In my judgment, the centerpiece of our national security goals should be to lessen the prospect of nuclear conflict.

Well thought out and coordinated strategic modernization that is designed to promote stability is a required element of reaching such a goal, but it is not by itself sufficient.

Even more important are efforts to manage strategic force levels and characteristics through arms control agreements. Reaching satisfactory agreements with the Soviet Union is not an easy task. But this administration will be the first in 20 years which has not achieved an agreement.

There are many who sincerely question this administration's commitment to arms control, and with good cause. Often repeated statements from a number of administration officials about both past and potential future agreements have fueled this skepticism. They appear to view arms control as more a danger than a benefit.

I welcome recent positive statements from the President on this issue, and I am awaiting positive signs of a true commitment to the spirit of arms control as an integral element of U.S. policy.

A second step to reduce the chance of nuclear war, that builds on arms control efforts, are concrete actions to

insure that we do not stumble into nuclear war.

These include open communications and efforts to resolve disagreements in times of crisis with nonmilitary means. While the initial exploration of improvements in the hot line, or for creation of a crisis control center, are positive steps which I strongly support, they can not stand by themselves. The necessity to avoid miscalculation can not be accomplished in the midst of a name-calling war and poisoned overall relations.

The technical steps to foster better crisis management need to be accompanied by regular and high level cultural, political, and scientific exchanges that can give us a better assessment of Soviet thinking and motivation.

A third step toward reducing the chance of nuclear war is to reduce our reliance on battlefield nuclear weapons in order to raise the nuclear threshold. The committee report language on this issue calling on the Department to develop joint service requirements and long-term funding plans to achieve it has my strong support.

As part of an effort to address this issue I will be joining with Congressman ASPIN in offering amendments to this bill directing the Department to advise the Congress on its plans to address the issue of comingled tactical nuclear weapons in the forward areas of West Germany and to provide details on its planned reduction of 1,400 tactical nuclear weapons from Europe.

I recognize that reducing the chances that we would have to resort to first use of nuclear weapons to defend Europe will require an alliance effort to increase conventional capabilities. I believe there are a number of ways through exploitation of advanced technologies and innovative tactics and doctrine that can move us toward this goal. But there is no getting around the fact that such an effort will cost money However, in my judgment, we will never accomplish this objective if we continue to declare strategic programs totally exempt from funding adjustments and continue to place the lowest priority on sustainability, which General Rogers cites as his greatest weakness.

I am also increasingly concerned about the prospects of nuclear war initiating at sea. The Navy plans to begin deployment of a nuclear armed land attack version of the Tomahawk missile this summer. This system would have the range and accuracy to strike a wide range of Soviet hard targets, and would make every navy surface ship and a submarine a nuclear delivery vehicle. The arms control implications of this new program have not been thoroughly discussed, and until they are, I am very skeptical about proceeding with the program as planned. This bill provides an opportunity to at least begin to focus congressional attention to this issue.

At this point I will not attempt to discuss in detail my thoughts on Asats and the MX. There will be more than ample opportunity during the debate on amendments affecting those systems.

But I would like to make some general comments on the overall level of spending included in the bill. I think the Congress rightfully rejected the unprecedented in peacetime 13 percent real growth originally proposed by the administration. This is clearly not sustainable and in my view only served to help undermine the already eroding support for real growth in defense investment.

The levels presented in this bill are far more realistic, and I believe in the ballpark both for what is required militarily with proper management and prioritization, and to sustain public support. While like any member I may disagree on some specific items in the Armed Services Committee recommendations, overall they have performed a difficult task in making $19 billion in reductions from the President's original request. I commend the chairman, the ranking minority member, and all members of the committee for the effort they have expended to bring this bill to the floor.

□ 1240

Mr. DICKINSON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. HYDE).

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, this morning my colleagues were probably all the recipients of a letter signed by the senior Senator from Colorado and the former Vice President, Walter Mondale. This letter was delivered to every office—at least I got one; I am sure you did—and it said, "We are writing to urge you to vote against all funding for the production of the MX missile."

Now, I find that utterly fascinating because Mr. Mondale, when he was Vice President, was for the MX missile, but then, in explaining that, says his fingers were crossed, he really "didn't mean it."

I have an article written by Walter Mondale that appeared in the Journal of Legislation of Notre Dame Law School, Winter 1983, "Criteria for a Comprehensive Strategy for Nuclear Arms Control, Walter F. Mondale." Now, in part, let me read a couple of sentences:

> We could abandon the MX if the Soviets agreed to major cuts in the missiles that threaten our Minuteman silos. There are many other ways to relate reductions in their forces to reductions in ours. Conversely, we cannot hope to reduce the things the Soviets have that worry us unless we are prepared to discuss seriously the things we have that worry them.

Well, now, back in 1983, just a year ago, the same gentleman, now a viable candidate, reasonably, for the Presidency, was for not abandoning the MX missiles unless the Soviets agreed to major cuts in their missiles that threaten our Minutemen. But this morning as far as the MX is concerned, he is for unilateral disarmament. Now, that gentleman has a capacity to pirouette on these issues that makes Baryshnikov look clumsy.

Now, I suggest to you that the Bennett-Mavroules amendment, however well-intentioned, is a form of unilateral disarmament.

Now, what happened? What has happened to the mood of this House since we debated in 1983 the nuclear freeze?

I have here the statements of the leading initiator, the gentleman from Massachusetts. It is curious how all these things emanate from the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. The gentleman from Massachusetts, who was the initiator of the nuclear freeze, said:

> What can possibly be wrong with halting the nuclear arms race on both sides in a way that can be verified to prevent cheating, and what can possibly be wrong with having major mutual and verifiable reduction in both sides' nuclear arsenals?

Why, then, do we unilaterally give up a major weapons system? I cannot understand that. We have moved from mutual reductions to unilateral reductions.

Why reward the Soviets for playing tough guy? They have walked out of the Olympics, they have walked out of IMF, they have walked out of START, they are carpetbombing in Afghanistan, and to top it off, they have just awarded a medal to the pilot that shot down the Korean airliner.

And what is our rejoinder? Cancel a major weapons system.

The MX is not an ineffective weapon. I guess you pay your money and you take your choice on experts. It is like a personal injury case and you read the x rays. The doctors for the plaintiff say, "This man will never walk again;" the doctors for the defense say, "That leg is stronger than ever. Look at that strong fracture line."

Well, there are experts on MX, too. I choose to believe the Scowcroft Commission which had Democrats of such standing as John Deutch, who is now dean of science at MIT and served in the Carter administration; John Lyons, vice president of the AFL-CIO——

Mr. AUCOIN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HYDE. I have no time. I would if I had time. If you get me the time, I will yield to the gentleman ad infinitum.

John Lyons, vice president of the AFL-CIO and chairman of their committee on defense. Try William Perry, who served as Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering in the Carter administration. Try James Woolsey, who was Under Secretary of the Navy in the Carter administration.

How about Harold Brown, Secretary of Defense in the Carter administration? Or if that does not appeal to you, Lloyd Cutler, who was counsel to President Carter.

Don Rumsfeld, I suppose you partisans would reject out of hand. But then we have James Schlesinger, Jr., who was Secretary of everything under two Presidents. Or Mel Laird. What about Mel Laird? I suggest to you that is a pretty good lineup of experts.

Mr. AUCOIN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HYDE. I really have no time.

Mr. AUCOIN. Would the gentleman give him 1 minute to yield, please?

Mr. HYDE. He does not have it. Maybe your chairman will do it.

Mr. AUCOIN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. PRICE. I yield, Mr. Chairman——

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The time of the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. HYDE), has expired.

Mr. HYDE. I have only begun.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Regrettably, the timekeeper has concluded.

Mr. PRICE. Mr. Chairman, I yield the gentleman 5 additional minutes.

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield briefly?

Mr. HYDE. I certainly do yield to the gentleman from Washington.

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I know the gentleman from Illinois and I have disagreed about the——

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. If the gentleman will suspend, is it the Chair's understanding that the gentleman from Illinois is yielding 5 minutes?

Mr. PRICE. The Chair is correct.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The gentleman from Illinois (Mr. HYDE) is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. HYDE. I thank my colleague and the Chair, and I yield briefly to the gentleman from Washington.

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, the gentleman and I disagreed on the freeze. I voted for the freeze, I think the gentleman voted against it, and we had a very healthy debate. But in the midst of that debate the Stratton amendment was adopted, and the gentleman from Oregon, who wants to be yielded to, was one of those who spoke eloquently at the time saying, "Yes, we need to have modernization until we reach this mutual bilateral freeze."

I think all of us recognized that modernization would go on until the freeze was adopted because we unanimously supported the Stratton amendment. So I think it is important in the context of this discussion to remember the entire history that led up to the freeze.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, if I may reclaim my time, I never bought the freeze because I was never persuaded that the Soviets would permit onsite inspection for verification. There is just no chance that they would open up their society. Now, if they would, I might have bought the freeze.

Now, let me proceed. The MX is an essential near-term fix while moving toward Midgetman as a long-term solution.

I would remind my colleagues that the Soviets already have two sets of MX's. They have got SS-18's and they have got SS-19's which they have and they are developing——

Mr. AUCOIN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield? Surely the gentleman will yield now.

Mr. HYDE. Please. They are developing SX-24's and SX-25's. And what have we got? A 15-year-old Minuteman.

Mr. Chairman, I yield to my friend, the gentleman from Oregon, briefly.

Mr. AUCOIN. Mr. Chairman, the gentleman knows, does he not, that the Soviet missiles he has cited are not nearly as accurate, compared to that accuracy that the MX would have?

Mr. HYDE. No; that the MX would have?

Mr. AUCOIN. The MX missile——

Mr. HYDE. But we are not going to get the MX if you have your way.

Mr. AUCOIN. I am talking about the MX missile system that the gentleman is advocating. He suggests the Russians have accurate weapons that are equivalent to the MX. There is nothing in the Soviet arsenal that comes close to the accuracy of the MX, and I am sure the gentleman knows that.

Mr. HYDE. I hope you are right. I hope we never find out for sure.

Mr. COURTER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HYDE. I yield to my friend, the gentleman from New Jersey.

Mr. COURTER. Mr. Chairman, I thank my friend for yielding, because what the gentleman from Oregon suggested is not so.

The SS-18, which is the Soviet intercontinental ballistic missile, is 20 percent, almost 25 percent more accurate than Minuteman III, which is the most modern missile we have in the arsenal.

□ 1250

Mr. HYDE. And the SS-19 is twice as big as the MX that we may never have if these gentlemen have their way.

Mr. AUCOIN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield to me for one comment?

Mr. HYDE. No; I want to finish my statement. If I have time, I will yield to the gentleman, but let me finish my statement.

Mr. AUCOIN. I would like to answer the gentleman's question. I was discussing MX, not Minuteman 3.

Mr. HYDE. Survivability—the MX is but one leg of a triad. Each element lends survivability to the other; so do not hang your hat on vulnerability. There is a synergism between all three legs; air, land, and sea.

Yes, our bombers are 20 years old; yes, our Minutemen are 10 to 15 years old, and that is why we need the MX.

Peace is not served by a horse and buggy defense.

Now, as to the Aspin amendment, which I am going to support very reluctantly, and I would advise the Soviets to take it and run; all they need to do to get us to abandon 15—count them, 15 MX's—which are tentatively permitted under Aspin, is to send a clerk from the Soviet Union with a one-way ticket to Geneva to come and sit there at the table and, Zippo, there go 15 MX's. Some trade.

The Soviets are hardening their silos. They are hardening every installation they can, including communication and our Minutemen III's that are ancient and archaic, are not able to cope.

Now, I am sure this is a well-intentioned amendment by the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. MAVROULES) and the gentleman from Florida (Mr. BENNETT), but I suggest the Russians will be thrilled if we give up the MX, and I suppose Truman Capote, too; but I surely will not.

Mr. NEAL. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HYDE. I yield to my friend, the gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. NEAL).

Mr. NEAL. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding.

I wanted to inform the gentleman that there will be an amendment offered to the Bennett-Mavroules amendment, which would deal with the question the gentleman raised about unilateral canceling of a weapons system.

The amendment will say that we are not unilaterally canceling the system, but instead are postponing it as an attempt at offering an olive branch to the Soviets. The Strategic Arms limitations negotiations have broken.

What this amendment will say is that we, the Congress, will say to the Soviets that we are willing to postpone the MX missile. What we expect from you (Soviet Union) is an appropriate response from your side.

Mr. HYDE. In other words, they keep their missiles and we do not develop ours, if they will just talk to us. Is that what the gentleman is saying?

Mr. NEAL. No; Let me finish the thought. As we know, the Bennett-Mavroules amendment does not strike the 1984 authorization for 21 MX missiles.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The time of the gentleman from Illinois has expired.

Mr. HYDE. We still have a handful. We still have a few.

Mr. NEAL. Mr. Chairman, I ask for an additional 2 minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. The time is controlled by the gentleman from Illinois.

Mr. PRICE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from New York (Mr. DOWNEY).

Mr. DOWNEY of New York. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding time to me.

Mr. LUNDINE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DOWNEY of New York. I am happy to yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. LUNDINE. Mr. Chairman, while our national security was the first and is the foremost function of the Federal Government, as we consider this legislation today we must keep two additional objectives in mind—arms control and budget deficit reduction. The defense projects we support and the overall spending authorized in the defense area for the upcoming fiscal year must be consistent with these goals. Unfortunately, Mr. Chairman, I do not believe that this bill as it comes before us today does what needs to be done to eventually achieve these long term goals.

This bill authorizes $208.1 billion in defense spending for fiscal year 1985, which is an increase of $18.1 billion above last year's $190 billion authorization level. The recommendations in this bill represent a real growth of 6 percent over fiscal 1984 levels, or in other words, about a 10 percent increase in total dollars for the defense function over last year.

When we debated the first budget resolution a few weeks back, this legislative body agreed to real growth in the defense area of only 3.5 percent, or about a 7.5-percent dollar increase for defense. Now here we are, with the first major challenge to our capacity to keep our budgetary word, and we are looking at a committee recommendation of nearly a 10-percent increase in the defense area. We must maintain fiscal discipline. We cannot afford to bust the budget on the largest segment of Federal spending. During the course of debate on this bill we need to make cuts to get us back to the budget resolution ceiling of 3.5 percent real growth.

I realize that this legislation is the annual authorization bill, and that it is not until we adopt a defense appropriation bill that the actual budget authority or outlays in the defense area for fiscal year 1985 will formally be established. Nonetheless, if we cannot adhere to the necessary fiscal restraint when we are developing defense priorities as we are attempting to do with this bill, then we are not making the hard choices we must make to deal with our critical Federal budget shortfall.

I am also concerned that we are not doing what we must do to stop the outrageous nuclear arms race between the United States and Soviet Union. We are spending a larger and larger percentage of our defense dollars on procurement of more technologically sophisticated strategic weapons, while we are spending less on military personnel and readiness needs. Over the last 3 years, spending for procurement, research, development, and military construction have increased by 86 percent, while accounts associated with operation and support have increased only 30 percent.

There is great cause for concern over the status of arms control efforts between the United States and Soviet Union. Negotiations between the two nuclear superpowers have broken down, leaving the destiny of the human race hanging in the balance while each attempts to out modernize the other. There are several amendments which I intend to support to this bill which will contribute both to stabilizing the nuclear arms race and reducing the Federal deficit.

Toward these objectives, I will support efforts to delete authorization in this bill for the MX missile, antisatellite weapons (ASAT), B-1B bomber, nerve gas, and an amendment which will prohibit procurement spending that would exceed the fiscal year 1984 appropriation level by more than 3 percent. The Congressional Budget Office has estimated that canceling the MX missile alone would save $14 billion in budget authority—about 5 percent of total spending on strategic forces over the next 5 years.

For reasons which I will specify in greater detail during the floor debate on individual amendments, deletion of these defense items will not endanger our national security and will help significantly in our struggle to achieve fiscal austerity.

There is one other area of defense policy which I am concerned about which is not addressed in this bill. This is the very serious need for reform of the defense procurement system. The abuses which have been highlighted in recent months where the procurement of spare parts have cost astronomical and unjustifiable sums cannot be ignored.

I believe that greater competition is needed in the defense procurement process. Currently, only 6 percent of Pentagon procurement utilizes a competitive bidding procedure.

We also need to rely to a greater extent on dual sourcing of defense items so that we are not at the mercy of one defense contractor for a given item.

Since these needed reforms are not included in this bill, I urge my colleagues on the Armed Services Committee to move forward with additional legislation to bring these and other innovative reforms to bear on the defense procurement process.

Mr. DOWNEY of New York. Mr. Chairman, let me deal for a moment with the question of restraint, because it is systematically put down, by some as naive, stupid and weak kneed. The two examples where the United States decided to have the courage, and I submit to you that is what it takes, a certain amount of courage, to exercise restraint, have yielded profound results. The first example of that was in 1963 when President Kennedy decided unilaterally, to stop testing nuclear weapons in the atmosphere. Several months thereafter the Soviet Union followed suit and the atmospheric test ban treaty was signed.

In 1969, President Nixon—you all remember him—decided that he would unilaterally prevent the United States from advancing its chemical weapons stockpile and stopping the production of biological agents. It led 3 years later to the multilateral biological weapons convention signed in 1972 and at the 1974 Moscow summit.

So the examples of restraint which some so cavalierly, irrationally, and erroneously put down as not the way to deal with the Soviet Union have in two instances provided us with effective arms control agreements.

Let me deal with one other question. Fred Ilke about a year and a half ago told me at a breakfast—you know Mr. Ilke he is the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Policy—said, "Don't worry, Congressman, we'll get the Soviets to negotiate on INF, but first we have to deploy the Pershing and the cruise missile. That is the only way to get the Soviets to be serious."

Well, Mr. Ilke's view of Soviet history has been disproved by history. The Soviets are not there. They are not anywhere in arms control, except in multilateral talks on chemical weapons I deplore them for that action; but the reality is the same.

The U.S. and U.S.S.R. are not negotiating on arms. There is no rational bargaining chip. History clearly indicates that once one begins testing weapons, they no longer serve you as bargaining chips. They become weapons in arsenals and both sides are replete with examples of that failed and unfortunate policy.

Later on in the day we will have an opportunity to take a look at the work of Messrs. ASPIN, GORE, and DICKS, and those who have in my view very courageously attempted to move this administration in the direction of

arms control and we will be able to lay out, I believe, very carefully that they were able to have some impact. They did manage to move the administration somewhat, but that progress has stopped cold. There has been no more progress inside this administration.

There is no reason militarily to continue building the MX. I urge my colleagues during this debate to listen carefully—carefully to the military justifications for the MX. Put aside the notion of bargaining chips and how you will move the Russians one way or the other. Listen to the military justification.

Mr. DICKINSON. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

I thank the Chair.

Mr. Chairman, I think that at this point it might be beneficial and helpful to the Members, for the few there are present and whoever might be watching in their offices on closed circuit television, to review the issue of the MX.

Now, the MX missile, I anticipate, will be the first order of business when we get under the 5-minute rule and that an amendment will be offered to eliminate it.

Going back in the history of our Minuteman III, which are 15 to 20 years old, and deteriorating, we attempted to develop a follow-on weapon.

The first scheme was a trench based weapon. We would put it in a trench or trenches and it would go between stations and you would not know at which position in that trench it would be. Therefore, it was supposed to be relatively safe and you could not hit it. Well, for political reasons, that did not sell.

Then we came along with two different schemes. One was horizontal and one was vertical. Politically that was not acceptable.

Then the Department of Defense and the administration, and I really at this point do not remember which administration it was, came up with the multiple protective shelter system. This is when we were going to have some 4,300 shelters in the ground into which we would put 1,000 missiles. They would be put covertly in there and perhaps moved from time to time. Therefore, you would have 4,300 fixed aim points. You would not know in which silos the missiles were and this was supposed to be the best scheme. It was probably killed for political not military and not technical, but for political reasons because of the area of the country involved and the political power of the people representing that part of the State.

□ 1300

So then they came up with another scheme and said we will go to close space basing or the six-pack or Dense Pack. That died aborning.

So there is a continuing building frustration about what are we going to do for an acceptable follow-on missile to the Minuteman III which is aging, and it is inevitable at some point, I do not care whether it is 20 years, 25 years of 30 years, at some point its shelf life is going to be exhausted, and it will not be a credible deterrent.

So this administration got together the most prestigious group that it could, headed by the retired General Scowcroft. It included Democrats, Republicans, labor leaders, and business people. They were to come together and make a recommendation of what would be the most credible basing system for a follow-on missile. They did this, and that was the Scowcroft Commission report.

They recommended three things. They said first we will go forward with the state of the art in the MX and we will build 100 of them. The MX would be put into existing silo holes, recognizing that these would still be subject to being hit by the Soviets because they were fixed points.

They recommended going forward with the development of a small mobile with a single warhead missile that can be deployed and moved from spot to spot, and there is no way that the Soviets would know how to target them because there is no way of knowing the location. The problem is that the initial operational capability of such a missile starting at this time last year would be after 1990 before we could even have the first one built.

And then as a consideration to those who were unhappy with the total program there was an emphasis the Commission put on negotiations. We even got the President to write another letter agreeing to and emphasizing that the arms control negotiation and abolition of nuclear missiles would be the ultimate goal. This was part of the package that we put together and agreed on and voted on last year. This was the package that included the MX, proceeding with the development of the small, mobile, single warhead missile, and go forward seriously and earnestly toward arms control negotiation. These were the three principal elements that we agreed to last year.

The other body subsequently agreed to go forward with the building of 21 missiles. Now that is where we are now.

Since that time the Soviets have walked away from the table. They have said they do not want to negotiate, and they are not negotiating. And there is no reason at the present time for them to come back to negotiate. What possible advantage could they have to come back to the table when they see the House and the Department of Defense threatened with the cancellation of all of the weapons, of all of the MX missiles? What do they have to negotiate? All they have to do is sit and wait and let the opponents of it kill the missile. Then they would have all of theirs deployed and we have zero deployed.

Let me just point out where we stand in relative terms. The Soviets, and these are all ICBM's, have 520 SS-11's with one warhead each. They have 60 SS-13's, one warhead each; they have 150 SS-17's with four warheads each; they have 308 SS-11's. Now this is the super missile that is even bigger than what we would propose to build. They not only have them but they are deployed and they have 10 warheads each and there are 308 of them. There are 360 SS-19's with six warheads each.

Now this adds up to more than 1,400 ICBM's in place today.

We are talking about a paper missile that we are attempting to build, which we have not deployed. We have not built the first MX yet.

In addition to that, the Soviets at the present time are building two new generations of ICBM's, the SX-24 and the SX-25.

And let me point out that the 18, the 19, the 24, and the 25 all have a greater accuracy than our present Minuteman III, and this is one of the urgent reasons we need to go forward and develop and build an MX.

We have come to the point now where we have done everything that we know how to do. The only defense against a missile coming at us is a deterrent capability.

We do not have a shield. We do not have any way to shoot it down. We do not have an antiballistic missile that the Soviets have. The only deterrent, the only defense we have got against the Soviet missile is the fact that we have a credible deterrent, that we can fire back at them if they start it.

If we go ahead and cancel the MX missile we do not have a defense, we do not have a deterrent, and we will ultimately be totally at the mercy of the Soviet Union.

Mr. KEMP. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DICKINSON. I am happy to yield.

Mr. KEMP. I thank my colleague for yielding and I agree with him. Not only will we not have a defense deterrent, but we will not have an opportunity to negotiate with the Soviet Union if we unilaterally stop a program which is designed to help restore our ability to act—and negotiate—from a position of strength. It seems to me that to abolish this program or to unilaterally restrain ourselves is in effect preemptively conceding an enormous advantage to the Soviet Union, heightening instability and the risk of war. And I defy anybody to tell us how we can get the Soviets to come back to

the negotiating table if the Soviets can succeed in stopping a program unilaterally without having to give up anything in return?

So I think the gentleman is absolutely on target. He makes the point that this program is part of our deterrent, and that this country's negotiation posture and overall security would be unilaterally weakened by stopping a vital strategic modernization program here in the Halls of the U.S. Congress.

Mr. DICKINSON. I thank the gentleman.

Let me say in the brief time that we have left, we were briefed at one point by Richard Helms, head of the CIA, and he told us in 1962 that we were negotiating with the Soviets on withdrawing their missiles from Cuba. And there was a head-to-head confrontation and the Cubans and the Soviet Ambassador at that time was Kuznetsov, and the now Ambassador, finally said all right, we will withdraw our missiles from Cuba, but I want you to know, Mr. Ambassador, that never again will the United States be able to dictate to us our foreign policy and where we may put missiles anywhere in the world. From that point on they have built to the point now where they have definite superiority.

Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. NEAL).

Mr. NEAL. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

I want to speak briefly to the question of unilateral action on our part.

When the Bennett-Mavroules amendment is offered, there will be an amendment which I authored, offered to it, and I understand that it will be accepted by the authors of the original amendment. It will say that we will not be unilaterally canceling the MX program. We will be postponing it for a year.

Arms negotiations have broken down. There is little likelihood, it appears, that arms negotiations will continue at the earliest until after the election in November.

The purpose of my approach is to offer an olive branch to the Soviet Union. We would not be saying we are going to unilaterally cancel anything. What we would be saying is that we will make an offer in good faith to reverse the trend of the arms race, to deescalate the arms race if we get an appropriate response from the Soviets. And we have some time during which to decide whether or not we have gotten an appropriate response.

I think we will know, as a matter of fact, by early next year. I think the Soviets will be aware of our time schedules around here, and if they take this seriously and want to respond in kind, they will let us know clearly by the time the President submits his budget and the Armed Services Committee starts working on their next year's budget.

I would have to say that the process that we have been following is not working very well. Whose fault is it? It is not clear. I do not think that really makes any difference at this point.

What I am suggesting though is that we take another approach. Remember that the 21 missiles authorized for 1984 will still be in the production line. Research and development continues, and flight testing continues.

□ 1310

And a new President, whoever he may be, will have with the acceptance of this amendment, the same options that are available today.

I especially wanted to say something about this at this time, even though the amendment has not been adopted yet, because I want to make it clear that after adoption of this amendment, it will no longer be accurate to describe what is being attempted today as unilateral in nature.

That is the word that has most often been used in this debate. I just want to make it entirely clear that with the adoption of my amendment it will no longer be accurate for anyone to describe what we are attempting to do with the MX as unilateral.

Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Chairman, how much time does the committee have remaining?

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from New York (Mr. STRATTON) has 4 minutes remaining.

Mr. KEMP. Mr. Chairman. will the gentleman from New York yield for a question?

Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. RAY).

Mr. RAY. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the defense bill which has been presented by my colleagues on the House Armed Services Committee, and I would ask that the Members of the House give it serious consideration.

I want to point out that many hours of serious review and hearings have been given to the overall bill and it is our majority opinion that it is a sound, adequate and necessary bill.

The Armed Services Committee, as a whole, and its subcommittees are made up of serious-minded people who are dedicated as a group to the security and protection of America and the free world. Let me also take a moment to pay tribute to the highly skilled staff who work on the intricate and highly complex programs of our defense.

Mr. Chairman, it is said occasionally that our committee gives in to the military, gives them what they want, and in effect recommends a blank check.

This is not correct, and I want to assure you that the checks and balances do work, as our subcommittees make recommendations and the full committee in the final analysis does work its will.

Let me review for a minute a problem which our committee has studied long and hard to address, and it is included in our bill.

The problem is the defense and survivability of our foreign air bases in NATO—the southern flank of NATO—Turkey, and around the free world.

Mr. Chairman, included in the DOD bill is $41 million for the Air Force's dual purpose, deep-strike fighter for 1985.

This fighter program would begin in 1985 and would be completed in the year 1989, at a projected cost of approximately $4 billion. Now I support this program because I am well acquainted with the Soviet threat and I realize that the adequate defense of the free world would depend on our superior airpower.

Mr. Chairman, I have taken a special interest in the problem of how to make our airbases in Europe more survivable. I am privileged to sit through the weekly intelligence briefings and listen to witnesses testifying on various aspects of our defense program. One thing has become strikingly clear to me—our airbases are inadequately defended. In most cases they are not defended at all by point air defense systems on the ground.

Along with other members of the House Armed Services Committee, I have, on occasion, asked the experts how it could be that after more than 35 years in NATO this problem has not been addressed. Given the critical role of airpower in the event of a war in Europe, how is it that we have almost totally neglected the defense of our airbases?

The answer is shocking. The Air Force looks upon ground-to-air defense of airbases as an Army mission, so they do not devote any significant resources to the mission. The Army, on the other hand, has never been authorized the force structure to defend airbases and some of our European airbases are located in countries like Turkey and Italy where the Army has little or no physical presence. Thus, the Army feels no urgency to devote resources to airbase defense. What we have is a gap in the division of responsibilities and no one is minding the store.

As things presently stand, it is likely that most of our airbases in Europe would become inoperative in the first few days of a war because of the lack of adequate point air defenses. And since DOD has failed to address the problem, Congress has had to take the lead.

Four years ago Congress established the Rapier role model—an innovative concept under which the United

States would procure European air defense systems, provided the European host nations agreed to man the systems and assume responsibility for point air defense of our bases. As a result of this congressional initiative, I am happy to say that our air bases in the United Kingdom are now defended with Rapier missiles manned by the Royal Air Force.

In the last 2 years congress has authorized and appropriated $250 million to extend the successful Rapier role model to continental Europe. As a result, in December 1983, DOD signed a historic cooperative agreement with the Federal Republic of Germany whereby the Germans will buy and man Roland missile systems in defense of three of our air bases and will man 12 of our Patriot area air defense systems. They will also purchase 14 Patriots through foreign military sales. In exchange, the United States has agreed to provide 14 additional Patriot fire units to the Federal Republic of Germany. This is a classic illustration of how cooperation can provide enhanced capabilities that neither country has been able to provide on its own.

But that is just the beginning. Five of our air bases in Germany will still be inadequately defended. None of our bases in Italy or Turkey are defended. Our air base in the Netherlands is inadequately defended. Our GLCM bases in Europe are undefended.

The committee is recommending a comprehensive $350 million package to continue the initiative which Congress began 4 years ago, and which has yielded such positive results thus far. As a part of that package—and to insure that DOD begins to take this problem more seriously in the future—the committee is recommending statutory language that would prevent the Air Force from initiating the F-15E "deep strike fighter" program until the Secretary of Defense submits to the Congress a master plan for European air defense together with a funding plan. Quite simply, the committee cannot recommend the start of an ambitious program to develop deep strike offensive capability until DOD takes the necessary steps to insure the survivability of such aircraft at air bases which are presently so vulnerable.

Mr. Chairman, I strongly urge the Members of the House to support this air defense initiative. Already, these cooperative programs have done much to improve our political relationships in NATO. But more importantly, they have established a precedent for how we can get more capability for our money by sharing the burdens and the benefits of our common defense.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. PRICE. Mr. Chairman, I yield the balance of our time on this side to the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. DANIEL).

Mr. DANIEL. Mr. Chairman, the House will shortly debate an amendment which would delete authorization for the production of the Peacekeeper. If the House is prepared to accept unilateral disarmament, and this is the first step, then we may as well begin now to give up our institutions of freedom, tear up and throw away what is left of the Constitution; dismantle our Republic and convert the United States into the satellite of the Soviet Union.

Mr. KEMP. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DANIEL. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. KEMP. I appreciate my friend from Virginia yielding. And he is right about unilaterally disarming. The Bennett-Mavroules amendment would terminate the procurement of the 21 missiles from last year; it would cancel the 30 more that the committee has authorized for 1985, and if that is not unilateral, I do not know what is.

Now is that any way to negotiate with the Soviet Union? Does anybody really think that we can bring the Soviets back to the table by unilaterally stopping a program that is necessary to modernize the defense deterrent of the United States of America?

It is true that the American people want arms control, but they do not want arms control at the price of weakness. They do not want arms control at the price of inferiority. They do not want arms control at the price of accepting Soviet cheating.

They want arms control that will contribute to our security, and to our ability to deter war.

In short, they want arms control—but they want a strong America first.

Apparently, some of our colleagues do not understand how the two are connected.

They seem to have confused arms control with unilateral disarmament. If we cancel the MX—and the Soviets continue to build—that is not arms control; that is appeasement.

If some of our colleagues are frustrated at the lack of progress in arms control negotiations, why do they not address their anger to the Soviets who walked away from the negotiating table? Why do they reserve their indignation for our own President and our own country? Why do they seek to reward Soviet intransigence and bad faith with canceling our ICBM modernization?

If the proponents of the Bennett-Mavroules amendment have their way, soon there will be no hope for arms control negotiations at all. After all, if we unilaterally cancel our defense programs, what do the Soviets have to bargain about?

The President is carrying out the mandate of the American people to restore America's strength. He has started this country down the path of rebuilding our defenses, after a decade of neglect. And in that effort, the MX program has become a symbol of our commitment, as a nation, to fortify and embrace our role as leader of the free world, and keeper of the peace.

If we cancel the MX program, signals of America's weakness and vacillation will rebound throughout the world. Is that the message the sponsors of this amendment hope to send?

I have heard some ask, what difference does it make who is ahead and who is behind in the strategic nuclear balance?

Solzhenitsyn has an answer to this question. In 1976, he warned the West:

> At one time, there was no comparison between the strength of the U.S.S.R. and yours. Then it became equal. . . . Perhaps today it is just greater than equal, but soon it will be two to one. Then three to one. Finally, it will be five to one. With such nuclear superiority it will be possible to block the use of your weapons, and on some unlucky morning they will declare: "Attention. We're sending our troops into Europe, and if you make a move, we will annihilate you." And this ratio of three to one, or five to one, will have its effect: you will not make a move.

If we begin down a path to regain our strength and then falter in our progress, if we undertake a strategic modernization program such as the MX and then cancel that program midstream, then Solzhenitsyn's dire prophecy shall surely come to pass.

Americans know the importance of a strong defense. They agree, as I do, with what President Truman once said:

> We live in a world in which strength on the part of peace-loving nations is still the greatest deterrent to aggression.

And they agree, as I do, with President Kennedy, who said:

> I believe that there can be only one possible defense policy for the United States, a policy summed up in a single word "first".
>
> I do not mean "first, if", I do not mean "first, but", I do not mean "first, when", but I mean "first, period."

This is the democratic legacy of which all Americans can be proud.

But those who would have us disarm in the name of arms control are singing a song of delusion; and they will not find support among the American people. For we are not a people that cowers in the face of challenge. Nor are we a people that hides from our responsibilities.

Do not be deceived. Your vote on the MX is not a vote for or against arms control. For there is no real arms control without strength; there is only appeasement.

Let your vote reflect your vision of the future: whether America will continue to lead the free world, or whether we will relinquish that burden; whether we shall commit the re-

sources necessary to insure an environment where freedom can grow, or whether we are too weary of the struggle.

Simply stated, the question of nuclear arms is in reality the question of America's entire foreign policy and the future of the American experiment in the world. That is the question before us today. Let us stand together, united behind our strength of forces and strength of will, to achieve America's vision for the future.

● Mr. OXLEY. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the M-1 Abrahams tank program included in the fiscal year 1985 Defense authorization bill. The M-1 tank, produced in Lima, Ohio, began its production in February 1980, when the first two tanks rolled off the assembly line. Despite its initial growing pains in production and operation, the M-1 today can easily be categorized among our best state-of-the-art arsenal for our Nation's defense. I have personally tested the M-1 tank in Lima and in West Germany, and have talked to many of the soldiers who must operate the tank, and I am pleased to report a satisfactory report card from those personnel.

The House Armed Services Committee has reported out a bill which includes procurement levels of 840 tanks for fiscal year 1985. I commend the members of that committee for their judgment on this particular program and would urge my colleagues to approve the committee funding levels for the M-1.

The M-1 is an integral part of our Nation's defense posture and has a proven record of performance. The program deserves our continued strong support.●

● Mrs. VUCANOVICH. Mr. Chairman, today we begin consideration of one of the most important measures of this legislative session. Our debate today will focus on the security of our Nation, and the differing views we hold with respect to how that security should be maintained.

It is my fervent hope that none of us here seek to weaken our Nation's defenses through our actions today. The events of recent weeks and months have clearly shown us not only the importance of a strong U.S. defense to our own people, but to the other free peoples of the world.

Let us not forget that this Nation is now and has been for decades, locked in a struggle to maintain our freedom. We struggle with the ominous forces of the Soviet Union, not only to protect the innocent peoples of the world, but to guarantee that the world's resources will be put to uses most beneficial to mankind. That struggle is far from over; that struggle is of paramount importance in our Nation today.

It is important, then, that as we consider the measure before us and the numerous amendments that will be discussed, that we not lose sight of the purposes of our defenses, and the real implications of the changes we may seek to make in this bill.

Study of the amendments to be offered today, in light of the committee recommendation that has been made, indicate that this House today is considering a defense package that, if passed, may fundamentally alter the strategy of U.S. defense policy over the coming years. Emphasis and importance, in this measure, are shifted away from cost-effective strategic weapons systems such as the MX missile and B-1 bomber, and are redirected instead toward the more costly conventional forces that already consume the vast majority of our defense layouts each year. Certainly, this Nation needs and must have strong conventional forces. But without the protective umbrella of a technologically advanced and powerful strategic capability, this Nation compromises the security of our people by forcing a serious weakening of U.S. deterrent capability.

In addition, if this body today chooses to erode the strength of our strategic forces, we have conceded military superiority to the Soviet Union without the benefit of even discussing our differences at the bargaining table. Stated simply, this measure gives the Russians that which past administrations have concluded was too high a price to pay for symbolic handshakes and milder rhetoric from the Kremlin.

I urge my colleagues today, to make decisions based not upon the emotional pleas of those who would seek to eliminate individual programs and weapons systems, but rather on the long term strategic implications of this ill-advised shift in U.S. military strategy toward erosion of our strategic deterrent capability. I urge my colleagues to maintain the military balance that has provided peace for this world.●

● Mr. CROCKETT. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong opposition to the bill, H.R. 5167, the Department of Defense authorization for fiscal year 1985.

Mr. Chairman, last week, this House debated the foreign aid authorization bill for fiscal year 1985. I opposed that legislation for its unconscionable funding emphasis on military assistance to foreign governments, and its relative neglect of the pressing economic and humanitarian needs of three-quarters of the world's population. Now with this Department of Defense authorization bill, we continue the same misguided and shameful policies that were so clearly illustrated by the foreign aid bill—policies which place war production profits before the welfare of our people; military confrontation before negotiation and compromise; and greed and madness before compassion and justice.

There is simply no way that a Defense Department authorization of $208 billion can be justified, given our present offensive and defensive military capabilities.

Arguments which have been advanced here concerning the vulnerability of U.S. strategic forces have a "twilight zone" character to them. We have been debating whether or not to replace Minuteman ICBM's with the MX, or the B-52 bomber with the B-1 bomber, while we have lost sight of the fact that we currently have 25,000 strategic and tactical nuclear warheads with enough destructive capability to destroy the United States, the Soviet Union, and the entire planet many times over. Approval of this bill which would fund $5 billion for the MX, $7.1 billion for the B-1, $925 million for Pershing II and cruise missiles, $2.3 billion for nuclear attack submarines and hundreds of other weapons of destruction, adds an extremely dangerous overkill to America's arsenal of death.

If the House approves of this shopping list of lethal weaponry, it will increase the level of terror in the world and further orient our economy toward nonproductive, death-dealing military production. This legislation does not reflect the priorities of the American people. Instead, it dangerously sanctions the reckless, runaway power of the military-industrial complex that President Dwight Eisenhower warned us against more than two decades ago.

I ask my colleagues to reflect carefully on the implications that approval of this legislation will have; and to recognize that in budget terms and in human terms, this legislation will have a disastrous effect on our country's future prosperity and security.

In support of this observation, I include for the benefit of my colleagues a May 10, 1984, report by the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities entitled, "Controlling Defense Spending: The MX Missile." This report details the most cogent arguments against this costly program:

CONTROLLING DEFENSE SPENDING: THE MX MISSILE

The Administration is seeking $5.0 billion in budget authority in FY 1985 for the MX missile program. MX budget authority between FY 1985 and FY 1989 will total $15.4 billion under the Administration's new plan for land-based missiles, plus an additional $1.4 billion in FY 1985-1986 to develop the smaller, mobile, single-warhead Midgetman.[1] The Defense Budget Project has calculated that outlays for the MX will reach $3.4 billion in FY 1985, and total $15.3 billion over FY 1985-1989.[2]

MX DOES NOT CONTRIBUTE TO SECURITY

These huge sums will not buy the United States greater national security. The MX is a weapon which does not strengthen the U.S. deterrent.

The MX is a destabilizing weapon; its greater accuracy increases the threat to

Soviet ICBM silos, while its ten warheads make it an attractive target to Soviet war planners.

The MX is a poor bargaining chip. A good bargaining chip is one which would strengthen our forces if we had to keep it. However, a Soviet refusal to trade for the MX at the negotiating table would leave the U.S. with 100 expensive, vulnerable missiles poorly suited to their deterrent mission.

Our Minuteman force, which we are currently modernizing at tremendous cost, will fulfill the ICBM deterrent mission for years to come. This extra lead time would allow us both to develop a new missile, if necessary, and to pursue an arms control treaty which would eliminate the need to deploy any new ICBM's.

CANCELLATION OF THE MX WOULD NOT WEAKEN THE UNITED STATES MILITARILY

U.S. defense outlays have grown continuously, in constant dollars, since FY 1976, and will surpass real Vietnam and Korean War spending levels by FY 1985, according to Administration projections.[3]

The U.S. strategic deterrent is less vulnerable than that of the USSR. While 80 percent of U.S. strategic warheads are deployed on bombers and at sea, only 28 percent of Soviet warheads are equally invulnerable.[4]

CUTTING THE MX CUTS THE DEFICIT

Building this unnecessary and expensive weapon contributes to the huge budget deficits.

Outlays for the MX over the next three years will total approximately $10 billion. This equals more than 10 percent of the defense spending savings sought by the House of Representatives in its recent budget resolution. The message is clear: cancelling the MX helps cut the deficit.

U.S. DOMESTIC NEEDS ARE NOT BEING MET

Budget cuts over the past two years have weakened American society. A growing number of major social and economic needs are not being met, and the United States now trails other nations in some significant measures of social and economic strength. America is rated:[5] 8th in life expectancy, 16th in public expenditures per capita for education, 7th in school age population per teacher, 13th in public expenditures per capita for health, 19th in infant mortality rate, 26th in physicians per capita, and 34th in hospital beds per capita.

The Reagan domestic spending cuts have led to dramatic reductions in aid to needy Americans. Since Reagan took office:

One million people have been dropped from the Food Stamps program, and all who remain have had their benefits reduced.

The Child Nutrition program aids three million fewer children.

Three hundred thousand workers, primarily minorities and women, lost their Public Service Employment jobs. Many more were dropped from job training activities.

ONE MX MISSILE COULD MAKE A DIFFERENCE

Even minor reductions in the MX missile program would rescue under-funded domestic programs. A single MX missile, out of the 100 the United States plans to procure, costs $73 million.[6] This money could provide:

One month of average unemployment benefits for 214,000 unemployed workers.[7]

Six months of average food stamp benefits for 286,000 Americans.[8]

Outlay savings from MX cancellation could be used in many ways, including restoring funds to some key domestic programs. With the $3.37 billion that would be saved in FY 1985 by cancelling the MX, funding could be restored to all of the following:

Projected reductions in fiscal year 1985 budget[1]

Program and description:	Millions
Subsidized Housing Programs: Assist low-income individuals in purchasing or renting adequate housing	$1,607
Work Incentives Program (WIN): Provides work and self-support opportunities for AFDC recipients	392
Low-Income Home Energy Assistance: Assists low-income individuals with heating bills and home weatherization	459
Community Services Block Grants: Provide funding for community development, rural housing and community facilities, assistance to migrant and seasonal farm workers, and recreational activities for low-income youth	539
Health Block Grants: Federal grants to state to help fund a variety of primary and preventive health care programs	362
Total	3,359

OR

Employment and Training Assistance (excluding Job Corps and Public Service Employment): Includes Block Grants to States, Summer Youth Employment and Training Program, Dislocated Worker Assistance, programs for Native Americans, migrants, and seasonal farm workers, Veterans employment, and the effects of the Emergency Jobs Bill	2,058
Financial Aid to Needy Students: Assists students through Pell Grants, Supplemental Educational Opportunity Grants, State Student Incentive Grants, the Work/Study Program, and National Direct Student Loans	592
Social Service Block Grants (Title XX): Provide day care, legal services, foster care, child protection, homemaking services, meal preparation and delivery, counseling, and transportation for low-income individuals	550
Job Corps: Trains disadvantaged youth for employment	98
Total	3,298

[1] These figures represent the difference between (1) what spending would have been in 1985 if there had been no changes in the laws in the past three years and the program costs had been allowed to rise with inflation, and (2) fiscal 1985 spending levels requested by the Administration.

$3.37 billion would be more than enough to restore funding to any one of the following major programs:

Projected reductions in fiscal year 1984 budget.[1]

Program and description:	Millions
Food Stamps: Help low-income households afford a nutritionally adequate low-cost diet	$2,435
Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) and Child Support Enforcement: Give cash assistance to children deprived of parental support by the death, disability, or continued absence of a parent from the home	2,029
Child Nutrition Programs: Finance school lunches and breakfasts and meals at day care centers and summer feeding sites	1,490
Medicaid: Assists states in financing medical care for low-income families and individuals	1,754

[1] These figures represent the difference between (1) what spending would have been in 1985 if there had been no changes in the laws in the past three years and the program costs had been allowed to rise with inflation, and (2) fiscal 1985 spending levels requested by the Administration.

MULTIYEAR MX COSTS REVEAL COMPARATIVE SIZE OF PROGRAM

Although the MX appears small as a proportion of total National Defense budget authority (1.6 percent in FY 1985),[9] the $21.5 billion expenditure for the entire MX program is significant, particularly when compared to projected spending levels for domestic programs. To illustrate the size of the MX program, listed below are a number of domestic programs and the number of years for which $21.5 billion could provide complete funding (not just restoration of cuts) for each. For example, the whole MX program is equivalent to the entire cost of the AFDC program for three years.

Equivalent in number of years[1]

Program and description:	Years
Aid to Families with Dependent Children	3
Employment and Training Assistance: Includes Block Grants, Summer Youth Employment and Training Program, Dislocated Worker Assistance, programs for Native Americans, migrants, and seasonal farm workers, Job Corps, Veterans employment, and the effects of the Emergency Jobs Bill	4
Financial Aid to Needy Students	5
Child Nutrition Programs	5
Compensatory Education (Title I)	5
Social Services Block Grants	8
Feeding program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC): Provides prescription food supplements and nutritional counseling to pregnant and nursing women and their infants and children	13
Health Block Grants	13

[1] Total national defense figure from Office of Management and the Budget, The Budget for Fiscal Year 1985, February 1, 1984, p. 5-10.

FOOTNOTES

[1] Figures for FY 1985-1989 in "Selected Weapons Costs from the President's 1985 Program" Defense Cost Unit, Congressional Budget Office, Jonathan Tyson and Julia Doherty, March 22, 1984; and Caspar W. Weinberger, *Annual Report to Congress*, February 1, 1984, pp. 186-187.

[2] Defense Budget Project estimates based on Department of Defense data.

[3] *National Defense Budget Estimates for FY 1985*, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), March 1984, p. 111-112.

[4] Arms Control Association, "Fact Sheet on American and Soviet Strategic Forces," Spring 1984.

[5] Ruth Leger Sivard, *World Military and Social Expenditures, 1983*, Leesburg, VA, World Priorities, 1982.

[6] Estimates are based on an MX unit procurement cost of $73.5 million, the official DOD estimate as of February, 1984.

[7] Average weekly benefits were $126 per person in 1983. Source: House of Representatives, Committee on Ways and Means, "Background Material and Data on Major Programs within the Jurisdiction of the Committee on Ways and Means," February 21, 1984.

[8] Average monthly food stamp benefits are expected to average $40-45 per person in FY 1984. Source: House of Representatives, Committee on

Ways and Means, "Background Material and Data on Major Programs within the jurisdiction of the Committee on Ways and Means, February 21, 1984.

[9] Total national defense figure from Office of Management and the Budget, *The Budget for Fiscal Year 1985*, February 1, 1984, p. 5-10.

NOTE.—Calculations are made in budget authority and reflect CBO current services estimates for FY 1985-1989. Since levels after FY 1989 for these programs have not yet been determined, no adjustments have been made for changes in program costs after that year. Figures for the programs which could be funded for more than five years are, therefore, calculated using FY 1989 funding levels for FY 1990 and beyond.●

● Mr. PURSELL. Mr. Chairman, the amendment we are offering is an attempt to provide a creative incentive for resumption of arms control negotiations. Success in reducing nuclear arms is, and has always been, the foundation for my decisions on the MX and other weapons systems.

I am convinced that such success cannot be achieved by unilateral disarmament by the United States. History shows that even unilateral reduction in U.S. forces has not resulted in similar moves toward peace by Russia. Sadly, in fact, just the opposite has been true. The B-1 bomber, which I voted to forgo during the Carter administration, is one recent example.

Our proposal cuts in half the number of MX missiles authorized by the House Armed Services Committee: 15, instead of 30. The Pentagon originally sought 40 new MX missiles.

The key to our proposal is that even these reduced funds would be frozen until April 1, 1985.

If Russia will join the negotiating table, and make a good faith effort to seek a real reduction in nuclear arms, the United States need never build another MX missile. If Russia continues to obstruct arms control talks, while sustaining its longstanding military buildup, then the responsibility for any continued arms race will be crystal clear.

I have seen evidence which clearly indicates that the Soviets are testing and deploying a very advanced generation of land-based missiles.

I hope we can negotiate for both sides to reduce nuclear weapons systems. I would strongly support complete elimination of the MX program in return for a similar reduction by Russia. But Russia must not be allowed to reach a position where they could attempt nuclear blackmail.

I agree with the distinguished Soviet physicist, Andrei Sakharov, who argues that nuclear arms should be abolished, but while they exist, they must exist in parity. Sakharov contends, and I agree, that parity in both conventional and nuclear weapons is necessary to avoid war and to have any chance for success in negotiating arms control and reduction.

If, as some have suggested, the Russians are playing a waiting game until after the U.S. elections, our amendment provides time to put the election behind us. Then, no matter who wins, both the United States and Russia must get on with the essential task of making the world safer for all people and nations.●

● Mr. FAUNTROY. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to H.R. 5167, the fiscal year 1985 Defense authorization bill. This legislation would authorize $208.1 billion for military procurement, research and development, operations and maintenance, and civil defense for fiscal year 1985. This amounts to a 6-percent real growth rate for fiscal year 1985, instead of the 13-percent proposed by the administration in February, or the 7.8-percent increase requested this month. If you believe in and support the nuclear freeze resolution, passed by this body, then opposition to this authorization is in order.

If this authorization would purchase increased national security in our complex world and reflected sound and workable strategic goals and programs then, I would be in support. However, H.R. 5167 would make the world less safe, authorize a host of dangerous superweapons that enhance the threat of nuclear conflagration, encourage those wedded to military solutions, and continue to sink our country in a sea of deficits.

As a member of the Congressional Black Caucus budget team and author of the first two CBC constructive altnerative budgets, I have had the opportunity to study with my colleagues in the caucus the benefits, costs, and implications of our defense budgets.

The CBC constructive alternative budgets for the past 4 years have sought to incorporate the provisions of the nuclear freeze, and eliminate destabilizing weapons systems such as the MX missile, Pershing II and cruise missiles, and the Trident II. My colleagues and I in the CBC developed our budget proposals in the "National Defense Function" consistent with our commitment to and involvement in the nuclear freeze movement. We did this for three reasons.

First, the physical survival of our planet and its people are in immediate danger due to the threat of nuclear war.

Second, the global neglect of human needs caused by the billions we spend on nuclear weaponry versus the millions we spend on human needs structures a world in which hunger, poverty, and ill health are the defining reality for two-thirds of the people of our planet. Our world is in danger of exploding because of this human misery which leads to instability and conflict that can all too easily lead to nuclear war between the superpowers.

Third, and most immediately, on the domestic level the escalating development and deployment of nuclear weaponry is destroying our economy and causing us to neglect our people and their basic needs.

ELABORATION OF THE THREE POINTS

I. THE DANGER TO THE PLANET

Mr. Chairman, the uncontrolled buildup of nuclear weapons has resulted in a nuclear arsenal with an explosive force of 3½ tons of TNT for every person on Earth.

The continuing nuclear arms race increases the possibility of nuclear war.

The danger to our planet is real and it is immediate. Under this administration, the Nation has moved far beyond deterrence to preparing to fight, survive, and win a nuclear war.

When he was Secretary of Defense in the Kennedy administration, Robert McNamara defined deterrence as the capacity to destroy 30 percent of the Soviet population and 70 percent of its economic infrastructure. He felt that this objective could be achieved through the use of approximately 400 strategic nuclear warheads. Today, the United States of America possesses more than 10,000 strategic nuclear warheads in its nuclear arsenal, and another 15,000 intermediate range warheads for theater nuclear use.

Mr. Chairman, the second major consequence is even more ominous. This defense authorization would commit our country to the development of nuclear weapons that go beyond our capacity to verify or control. In past years, the necessity for verifiability and control have been integral elements of all previous arms control agreements and negotiations. The development of first-strike nuclear weapons, such as the MX missile, the Pershing II missile, and ground, sea, and air launched cruise missiles, usher us into a new era of the nuclear arms race.

In spite of racial advances in accuracy and power, deterrence has been subject to challenge on two grounds. One is that land-based nuclear weapons are vulnerable to destruction if the enemy strikes first, thus eliminating the power of retaliation. The other is that the use of nuclear weapons in a graduated, carefully orchestrated manner can be an integral part of warfighting strategy. Both theories are dangerous fantasies. The first theory assumes the perfection of a technology which has had a poor record of reliability. The second is in error because it imputes to human beings, under war conditions, a quality of discipline, rationality, and perfection normally attributed to a divine being.

Nevertheless, the departure from a deterrent against war to usable weapons of war is now a feature of nuclear strategy, which is used to justify further escalation in numbers and technology. It also greatly magnifies the possibility that these weapons will be used, and that nuclear war will result.

II. NEGLECT OF GLOBAL HUMAN NEEDS: WORLD INJUSTICE AND THE NUCLEAR CONNECTION

Mr. Chairman, what we are witnessing today is the neglect of human needs on a global scale. This neglect fuels an already dire situation created by social, economic, and political injustices.

The political instability that arises from these injustices, the neglect of human needs, and the lack of food, health care, and employment threatens to bring the United States and the Soviet Union into conflict in the Third World, particularly in Africa, the Caribbean, the Middle East, and Central America. Conflicts arising in these regions due to political, social, and economic factors, can all too easily escalate into a nuclear exchange between the superpowers.

The world's military spending dwarfs resources provided for human development. Global spending on the military is now at the trillion dollar level, with the United States and the Soviet Union accounting for over 50 percent of these expenditures. This represents almost a doubling of global military outlays since 1971. If only a fraction of the money, manpower, and research presently devoted to military uses were diverted to development, the future prospects of the Third World would look entirely different.

There is a moral link between the vast spending on arms and the disgracefully low spending on measures to remove hunger and ill health in the Third World.

For instance, while we are considering a defense authorization bill which involves the expenditure of $208.1 billion, the administration is holding fast to a position that we can only afford $750 million contribution to the International Development Association of the World Bank, an organization which provides concessional assistance to the poorest countries of the world.

The program of the World Health Organization to abolish malaria is short of funds; it is estimated that it will eventually cost about $450 million which represents less than one-thousandth of the world's annual military spending.

The cost of a 10-year program to provide for essential food and health needs in developing countries is less than half of 1 year's military spending.

A modern tank costs about $1 million; that amount could improve storage facilities for 100,000 tons of rice and thus save 4,000 tons or more annually. One person can live on just over a pound of rice a day.

For the price of 1 jet fighter—$20 million—40,000 village based pharmacies could be established.

One-half of 1 percent of 1 year's world military expenditure would pay for all the farm equipment needed to increase food production and approach self-sufficiency in food-deficit, low-income countries by 1990.

Moreover, arms production is not just a matter of spending but of utilizing manpower and skills. It is profoundly disturbing to realize that in both the East and West a very large proportion of scientists and much of the scientific resources of universities and industry are devoted to defense.

The obstacles to reversing these trends are formidable, but they should not be allowed to get in the way of serious discussions of the dangers of the arms race and the realization of the size of the economic burden that it involves. One of the chief enemies of disarmament is the sense of resignation and traditional acceptance that accompanies large defense spending, while the dangers are constantly mounting.

III. DOMESTIC CONSEQUENCES

Finally, Mr. Chairman, this misplaced emphasis on nuclear weaponry also mandates tragic and dangerous outcomes in domestic priorities. The misplaced priorities associated with the escalating development and deployment of nuclear weaponry leads to the same neglect of basic human needs in our own communities.

This buildup in nuclear weaponry is the fuel of an undeclared but real war against the most vulnerable and needy in our society.

If we were rushing to freeze defense expenditures and hold the authorization to a zero level of growth, we could garner $35 billion which could be used to provide a 50-percent increase in our domestic programs designed to address the problem of hunger in America. The food stamp program, the women, infants, and children program (WIC), could obtain a 50-percent increase. Aid to families with dependent children and our medicaid program could also be provided with 50 percent increases.

In 1953, Dwight David Eisenhower warned:

> Every gun that is made, every warship launched, every rocket fired, signifies a theft from those who hunger and are not fed, those who are cold and are not clothed. This world in arms is not spending money alone. It is spending the sweat of its laborers, the genius of its scientists, the hopes of its children.

CONCLUSION

It is for these reasons that I cannot support H.R. 5167 as presented. I would urge my colleagues to support the two amendments that will be offered by my friend and colleague, Congressman RONALD V. DELLUMS to strike all procurement funding ($7.1 billion) for the B-1B Bomber and to delay any further deployment of ground-launched cruise missiles or Pershing II missiles in Western Europe until September 30, 1985. Additionally, I would urge my colleagues to support:

The Bennett-Mavroules amendment to delete all production funds for the MX missiles;

The Weiss amendment to delete research and development and procurement for the Trident II/D5 missile;

The Brown amendment to halt anti-satellite weapon flight tests in space; and,

The Bethune-Porter-Fascell amendment to delete all production money for chemical weapons.●

The CHAIRMAN. All time for general debate has expired.

Pursuant to the rule, the committee amendment in the nature of a substitute now printed in the reported bill shall be considered by titles as an original bill for the purpose of amendment, and each title shall be considered as having been read.

The Clerk will designate section 1.

The text of section 1 is as follows:

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That this Act may be cited as the "Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1985".

The CHAIRMAN. Are there any amendments to section 1?

The Clerk will designate title I.

The text of title I is as follows:

TITLE I—PROCUREMENT

AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS, ARMY

SEC. 101. (a)(1) Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 1985 for procurement for the Army as follows:

For aircraft, $3,751,100,000.

For missiles, $3,196,200,000.

For weapons and tracked combat vehicles, $4,863,100,000.

For ammunition, $2,220,000,000.

For other procurement, $5,359,800,000.

(2)(A) There are hereby authorized to be transferred to, and merged with, amounts appropriated for procurement of weapons and tracked combat vehicles for the Army for fiscal year 1985 pursuant to the authorization of appropriations in paragraph (1), to the extent provided in appropriation Acts—

(i) $60,500,000 to be derived from amounts available for fiscal year 1983 for procurement of weapons and tracked combat vehicles for the Army remaining available for obligation; and

(ii) $113,300,000 to be derived from amounts appropriated for fiscal year 1984 for procurement of weapons and tracked combat vehicles for the Army remaining available for obligation.

(B) There is hereby authorized to be transferred to, and merged with, amounts appropriated for other procurement for the Army for fiscal year 1985 pursuant to the authorization of appropriations in paragraph (1), to the extent provided in appropriation Acts, $5,400,000 to be derived from amounts appropriated for fiscal year 1984 for other procurement for the Army remaining available for obligation.

(b) From the amount appropriated pursuant to the authorization in subsection (a) for aircraft for the Army that is available for procurement of AH-64 helicopters, not fewer than 18 AH-64 helicopters shall be provided for the Army National Guard.

(c) The Secretary of the Army may enter into multiyear contracts in accordance with section 2306(h) of title 10, United States Code, for the purchase of UH-60A aircraft, EH-60A aircraft, M-1 tanks or subsystems, TOW missiles, 5-ton trucks, Bushmaster Vehicle Rapid-fire weapon system, and shop

equipment contact maintenance, and for the execution of the CH-47D aircraft modernization program. Such contracts may include an unfunded cancellation ceiling. If funds are not made available for the continuation of such a contract in subsequent fiscal years, the contract shall be cancelled and the costs of cancellation shall be paid as provided in section 2306(h)(5) of title 10, United States Code.

(d) Effective on October 1, 1984, the provisions of section 794 of the Department of Defense Appropriation Act, 1984 (Public Law 98-212), shall not apply to the procurement of EH-60A and UH-60A aircraft under a multiyear contract.

AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS, NAVY AND MARINE CORPS

SEC. 102 (a) AIRCRAFT.—(1) Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 1985 for procurement of aircraft for the Navy in the amount of $10,824,700,000.

(2) There is hereby authorized to be transferred to, and merged with, amounts appropriated for procurement of aircraft for the Navy for fiscal year 1985 pursuant to the authorization of appropriations in paragraph (1), to the extent provided in appropriation Acts, $132,100,000 to be derived from amounts appropriated for fiscal year 1984 for procurement of aircraft for the Navy remaining available for obligation.

(b) WEAPONS.—Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 1985 in the total amount of $4,400,100,000 for procurement of weapons (including missiles and torpedoes) for the Navy as follows:

For missile programs, $3,451,900,000.

For the MK-48 torpedo program, $33,700,000.

For the MK-46 torpedo program, $256,000,000.

For the MK-60 torpedo program, $128,500,000.

For the MK-30 mobile target program, $21,300,000.

For the MK-38 Minimobile target program, $2,500,000.

For the antisubmarine rocket (ASROC) program, $25,900,000.

For the modification of torpedoes and related equipment, $141,100,000.

For the torpedo support equipment program, $96,000,000.

For the MK-15 close-in weapon system program, $163,900,000.

For the MK-75 76-millimeter gun mount program, $10,900,000.

For other weapons, $68,300,000.

(c) SHIPBUILDING AND CONVERSION.—(1) Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 1985 in the total amount of $11,888,700,000 for shipbuilding and conversion for the Navy as follows:

For the Trident submarine program, $1,415,000,000.

For the SSN-688 nuclear attack submarine program, $2,880,000,000.

For the aircraft carrier service life extension program (SLEP), $764,500,000.

For the CG-47 Aegis cruiser program, $3,150,000,000.

For the DDG-51 guided missile destroyer program, $1,173,900,000.

For the LSD-41 landing ship dock program, $489,500,000.

For the LHD-1 amphibious assault ship program, $39,200,000.

For the LPD-4 amphibious transport dock service life extension program, $15,000,000.

For the MCM-1 mine countermeasures ship program, $349,500,000.

For the TAO-187 fleet oiler program, $562,600,000.

For the TAGOS ocean surveillance ship program, $129,900,000.

For the TAGS ocean survey ship program, $245,000,000.

For the strategic sealift ready reserve program, $31,000,000.

For the TACS auxiliary crane ship program, $44,000,000.

For the TAVB aviation logistics support ship program, $42,800,000.

For the LCAC landing craft air cushion program, $230,100,000.

For service craft and landing craft, $93,100,000.

For outfitting and post delivery, $383,600,000.

The sum of the amounts authorized for programs under this subsection is reduced by $150,000,000 in order to meet the total amount authorized to be appropriated set forth at the beginning of this paragraph.

(2) There are hereby authorized to be transferred to, and merged with, amounts appropriated for shipbuilding and conversion for the Navy for fiscal year 1985 pursuant to the authorizations of appropriations in paragraph (1), to the extent provided in appropriation Acts, amounts appropriated for fiscal years before fiscal year 1985 for shipbuilding and conversion for the Navy and remaining available for obligation in the total amount of $676,200,000 as follows:

(A) For the Trident submarine program, $340,000,000, of which—

(i) $40,000,000 shall be derived from funds appropriated for fiscal year 1983 for the FFG-7 guided missile frigate program and shall be available only for an x-band phased array radar; and

(ii) $300,000,000 shall be derived from funds appropriated for fiscal year 1984 for the FFG-7 guided missile frigate program.

(B) For the battleship reactivation program, $336,200,000, to be derived from funds appropriated for fiscal year 1983 for the CVN aircraft carrier program.

(d) OTHER.—Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 1985 for other procurement for the Navy in the amount of $5,339,500,000, of which—

(1) $787,100,000 is available only for the ship support equipment program;

(2) $1,799,800,000 is available only for the communications and electronics equipment program; and

(3) $1,152,600,000 is available only for the ordnance support equipment program.

(e) PROCUREMENT, MARINE CORPS.—Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 1985 for procurement for the Marine Corps (including missiles, tracked combat vehicles, and other weapons) in the amount of $1,901,300,000.

(f) MULTIYEAR CONTRACTS.—The Secretary of the Navy may enter into multiyear contracts in accordance with section 2306(h) of title 10, United States Code, for the purchase of CH-53E aircraft and AN/SSQ-36 sonobuoys. Such contracts may include an unfunded cancellation ceiling. If funds are not made available for the continuation of such a contract in subsequent fiscal years, the contract shall be cancelled and the costs of cancellation shall be paid as provided in section 2306(h)(5) of title 10, United States Code.

(g) STRATEGIC SEALIFT READY RESERVE PROGRAM.—(1) None of the funds appropriated pursuant to the authorization of appropriations for the strategic sealift ready reserve program under subsection (c) may be obligated or expended for the acquisition of a specific vessel for that program until (A) the Secretary of the Navy has notified the Committees on Armed Services and on Appropriations of the Senate and House of Representatives of the proposed acquisition of that vessel for that program, and (B) a period of 30 days of continuous session of Congress has expired following the date on which that notice was received by those committees.

(2) For purposes of paragraph (1), the continuity of a session of Congress is broken only by an adjournment of the Congress sine die, and the days on which either House is not in session because of an adjournment of more than three days to a day certain are excluded in the computation of such 30-day period.

(h) DDG-51 DESTROYER PROGRAM.—None of the funds appropriated pursuant to the authorization of appropriations in subsection (c) for the DDG-51 guided missile destroyer program may be obligated or expended until the Secretary of the Navy certifies to the Committees on Armed Services and on Appropriations of the Senate and House of Representatives that the lead ship in that program is capable of being equipped with a Rankin-Cycle Energy Recovery (RACER) system without rearrangement of ship spaces and equipment or other major modification to the ship.

AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS, AIR FORCE

SEC. 103. (a)(1) Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 1985 for procurement for the Air Force as follows:

For aircraft, $25,243,200,000.

For missiles, $8,664,600,000.

For other procurement, $8,441,700,000.

(2) There is hereby authorized to be transferred to, and merged with, amounts appropriated for procurement of aircraft for the Air Force for fiscal year 1985 pursuant to the authorization of appropriations in paragraph (1), to the extent provided in appropriation Acts, $185,200,000 to be derived from amounts available for fiscal years 1983 and 1984 for procurement of aircraft for the Air Force remaining available for obligation.

(b) None of the amounts appropriated pursuant to the authorizations of appropriations in subsection (a) may be used for procurement of subsystems unique to the F-15E Dual Role Fighter program—

(1) until the Secretary of Defense provides to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and House of Representatives a comprehensive master plan for acquisition of ground and air defenses for United States airbases in Europe; and

(2) unless a request for funding to implement that master plan is included in the budget request of the Department of Defense for fiscal year 1986 in an amount equal to or greater than the amount requested for that fiscal year for subsystems unique to the F-15E aircraft program.

(c) Effective on October 1, 1984, the provisions of section 794 of the Department of Defense Appropriation Act, 1984 (Public Law 98-212), shall not apply to the procurement of engines for the F-15 aircraft.

(d) The Secretary of the Air Force may enter into a multiyear contract for the purchase of F-16 aircraft in accordance with section 2306(h) of title 10, United States Code. Such contract may include an unfunded cancellation ceiling. In the event funds are not made available for the continuation of such contract in subsequent fiscal years, the contract shall be cancelled and the costs of cancellation shall be paid as

provided in section 2306(h)(5) of title 10, United States Code.

(e) The Secretary of the Air Force shall acquire two additional used T-43 type aircraft to be used to augment T-43 national security airlift operations. Such aircraft shall be acquired using amounts which were appropriated for fiscal year 1984 for procurement of equipment for the Air National Guard and which remain available for obligation.

AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS, DEFENSE AGENCIES

SEC. 104. Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 1985 for the defense agencies in the amount of $1,160,000,000.

AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR CERTAIN NATO COOPERATIVE PROGRAMS

SEC. 105. (a) Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 1985 for activities of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering for acquisition in connection with cooperative programs of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as follows:

For acquisition of the Patriot missile system for the Federal Republic of Germany, $150,000,000.

For acquisition of point air defense of United States airbases in the Federal Republic of Germany, $100,000,000.

For acquisition of point air defense of United States airbases and other critical United States military facilities in Italy, $50,000,000.

For acquisition of point air defense for ground-launched cruise missile bases in Europe, $25,000,000.

For acquisition of point air defense of United States air bases in Turkey, $25,000,000.

(b) None of the amounts appropriated pursuant to the authorizations in subsection (a) may be obligated—

(1) for implementation of a cooperative program until the Secretary of Defense submits to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and House of Representatives a copy of each government-to-government agreement relating to that program; or

(2) for acquisitions in connection with a NATO cooperative program in which the financial obligations of the United States exceed the collective financial obligations of European countries in connection with such program.

EXTENSION OF AUTHORITY PROVIDED SECRETARY OF DEFENSE IN CONNECTION WITH THE NATO AIRBORNE WARNING AND CONTROL SYSTEM (AWACS) PROGRAM

SEC. 106. Effective on October 1, 1984, section 103(a) of the Department of Defense Authorizaion Act, 1982 (Public Law 97-86; 95 Stat. 1100), is amended by striking out "fiscal year 1984" each place it appears and inserting in lieu thereof "fiscal year 1985".

LIMITATION ON WAIVERS OF COST-RECOVERY REQUIREMENTS UNDER ARMS EXPORT CONTROL ACT

SEC. 107. The authority of the President under section 21(e)(2) of the Arms Export Control Act may be exercised without regard to the limitation imposed by section 762A of the Department of Defense Appropriation Act, 1984 (Public Law 98-212).

WAIVER OF LIMITATION ON FOREIGN MILITARY SALES PROGRAM

SEC. 108. The Arms Export Control Act shall be administered as if section 743A of the Department of Defense Appropriation Act, 1984 (Public Law 98-212; 96 Stat. 1858) had not been enacted into law.

TRANSFER OF CERTAIN MILITARY EQUIPMENT OR DATA TO FOREIGN COUNTRIES

SEC. 109. Section 765(c) of the Department of Defense Appropriation Act, 1984 (Public Law 98-212), is hereby repealed.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there amendments to title I?

AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. BENNETT

Mr. BENNETT. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. BENNETT: Page 10, line 19, strike out "$8,664,600,000" and insert in lieu thereof "$5,942,700,000".

At the end of title I (page 15, after line 5), add the following new section:

MX MISSILE PROCUREMENT

SEC. 110. None of the funds appropriated pursuant to authorizations of appropriations in this title may be used for the MX missile program.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Florida (Mr. BENNETT) is recognized for 5 minutes in support of his amendment.

Mr. BENNETT. Mr. Chairman, even the President has recommended that substantial cuts be achieved from his originally requested defense spending for 1985. The most logical and cost effective approach would be to cut out entirely a program of least value; because we all know that just reducing a program is most likely to be followed by later increases with little, if any, ultimate savings. The MX program is the least valuable major arms program we have and it should be ended now by stopping procurement of the missiles.

The MX was planned as a strategic, deterrent weapon. The President has repeatedly said that it is not planned to be a first-strike weapon, but as a deterrent. The trouble with the MX is that it is highly vulnerable in the basing mode that has been chosen for it, the old Minuteman silos and hence is not a credible deterrent.

Hear what our defense authorities have said of the MX if placed in Minuteman silos:

Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger on October 5, 1981 said:

We have examined literally hundreds of possible options. We have reached the conclusion that there isn't any ground-based system that is survivable. . .

And Gen. Lew Allen, Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force, on January 29, 1981, said:

. . . an essential feature of the MX deployment is that the basing mode be survivable. One does not obtain that through placing it in Minuteman silos. Therefore, I do not favor such a deployment.

The principal excuse suggested for procuring the MX for Minuteman silos last year was that it was a bargaining chip in arms negotiations. The President on the contrary has repeatedly said that he does not approve the MX to be a bargaining chip.

He said specifically, quoting from the President:

This is not in the sense of a bargaining chip that somebody could say, "well you're building it just to tear it down." No, we need a modernization. Even if we get the reduction of arms which we're seeking and which there's been some indication the Soviets are seriously considering, this would not be the missile that is taken out of circulation.

So the President has ruled it out for that purpose.

PARLIAMENTARY INQUIRY

Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Chairman, I have a parliamentary inquiry.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Florida would have to yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. BENNETT. I do not yield.

Mr. STRATTON. Is the gentleman offering an amendment?

Mr. BENNETT. Yes; I have an amendment, yes.

Mr. STRATTON. Was the amendment read, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk has read the amendment. The gentleman offered the amendment and the Clerk has read the amendment.

The gentleman from Florida has been recognized in support of his amendment.

Mr. STRATTON. I thank the Chairman.

Mr. BENNETT. The Russians have stayed away from the arms control tables in the meantime, but they told us even before last year's debate that they had no interest in the MX as a bargaining chip and would respond to it by building a better ICBM of their own.

The President has referred to this in recent speeches, also. They are apparently not even willing to abandon their new missiles if we were to abandon the MX. So the argument last year about how valuable the MX would be to move arms control proceedings is clearly a policy that has completely failed.

Marshal Dmitri F. Ustinov, Soviet Defense Minister said, and I am quoting from the New York Times, December 6, 1982:

If the present White House leadership . . . challenges us by starting MX missile deployment, the Soviet Union will deploy in response a new ICBM of the same class and its characteristics will not be inferior to those of the MX in any way.

□ 1320

Arms control could proceed if we were willing to give up something the Russians felt was worth bargaining for. The MX, they perceive, is not worth their giving up anything of substance for, because it can be knocked out easily in Minuteman silos, which the Scowcroft Commission found to be its best basing mode.

It is to be regretted that no good basing mode has been found for the

MX, but pretending that one has been found will fool no one, particularly the Russians. They know what it is to abandon expensive weapons systems because of discovered fault. We are not alone in that adventure. They have abandoned far more weapons systems than we have because of discovered faults.

I think they produced 11 submarines while we have been producing 1 because they have made so many faults in theirs.

Since the MX is not a first-strike weapon and is also not a deterrent because it can be knocked out because of its vulnerability, about the only affirmative quality it has is hard target kill capability. That would be only if it can be successfully launched. It is not needed for that purpose as the Trident missiles will have that capability in the same time period, launched from submarines in a mode much less vulnerable. Cruise missiles might also eventually have that same capability and even if not, the vulnerability of the MX prevents it from being an effective weapons system in any event. The fact that we would like to have an effective weapons system in the MX does not make it one, nor does it fool the Russians.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Florida (Mr. BENNETT) has expired.

(By unanimous consent, Mr. BENNETT was allowed to proceed for 5 additional minutes.)

Mr. BENNETT. The greatest peril that mankind has from weapons today comes from an overreliance on nuclear weapons. Gen. Bernard Rogers, our Supreme Allied Commander of NATO in Europe, has told Congress this year and told the world that we would not win a conventional war, in fact we would lose it in Europe today within 2 weeks or 10 days, some period of time of that nature, unless we went to the use of nuclear war.

What a tragedy. What an unnecessary tragedy. No one can win a nuclear war.

Our country is strong enough in its assets and its manpower and its ability, its technology, to win a conventional war. We just have not made the decision we will buy the tanks and the artillery—the tools of conventional war.

Gen. Bernard Rogers said:

> If attacked conventionally NATO would face fairly quickly the agonizing decision of escalating to a nuclear response in order to try and convince the aggressor to halt his advance.

I would like to see every penny saved from the MX put into the needed conventional war defenses in Europe as the first priority so that we would not have to go to nuclear war.

It has been suggested that not going through with the MX would show a lack of will on our part. There is no virtue in a determined will to make a mistake. A strong nation can look at reality, and we are a strong nation.

We are the strongest nation on Earth. We should not tremble. We have got wonderful assets. The Russians would be glad to trade our nuclear strength for theirs, because we have the submarines which are invulnerable at the present time. We have other things, like the cruise missiles which they do not have. And things of that nature. They would be happy to trade, if that reality was given to them.

The reality is that the MX is a faulted weapon and if we save these funds by not procuring it, every penny should be spent in putting us in a position where we can win a conventional war so that we will not be leading, this great Nation of ours, leading the world into a nuclear disaster.

The main objection to the MX procurement is that it represents a large expenditure of money for a very faulted weapon. Every penny of it is needed for other defense purposes.

There is another aspect of the MX that others will address in more detail, but which I would like to mention. The additional reason for not having the MX is this: Since the MX is both very lethal and very vulnerable to a first strike, its presence would tend to tip the scales toward nuclear war for that reason alone. People are now talking about launching these weapons before the receipt of an attack that would knock them out. Such a situation clearly increases the chances for nuclear war.

Mr. Chairman, in conclusion, I would like to say that I think there has not been a more important issue before us in many, many a year. And it is really important because it has to do with the destiny, not only of our own Nation and its security, but the security of all mankind.

To pursue a course which is leading us inevitably to a nuclear war when we can be secure by conventional methods is certainly the height of absurdity. A great tragedy indeed.

I certainly hope that the Members will support this amendment.

AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. PRICE TO THE AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. BENNETT

Mr. PRICE. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment to the amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

> Amendment offered by Mr. PRICE to the amendment offered by Mr. BENNETT: Strike out the amount proposed by the amendment to be inserted on page 10, line 19, and insert in lieu thereof "$7,756,600,000".
>
> Strike out the section proposed by the amendment to be inserted at the end of title I and insert in lieu thereof the following:
>
> POLICY CONCERNING ACQUISITION OF ADDITIONAL MX MISSILES
>
> SEC. . (a) It is the policy of Congress not to take any action that would reward the Soviet Union through the unilateral cancellation by the United States of the MX strategic nuclear missile weapon system for which funds are authorized in this title while the Soviet Union continues to act in a manner indicating that it is unwilling to take actions to further the control and limitation of similar types of strategic nuclear missile weapon systems.
>
> (b)(1) Subject to paragraph (3), funds appropriated pursuant to the authorization of appropriations in section 103(a) for procurement of missiles for the Air Force may be used to acquire not more than 15 additional MX missiles, but no funds may be obligated for the acquisition of such missiles until April 1, 1985.
>
> (2) Immediately after April 1, 1985, the President shall determine whether the Soviet Union is acting, as of April 1, 1985, in a manner indicating that it is willing to take actions to further the control and limitation of types of strategic nuclear missile weapon systems similar to the MX strategic missile weapons system authorized for the Air Force by this title and shall immediately transmit written notification of that determination to Congress.
>
> (3)(A) If the President's determination under paragraph (2) is that the Soviet Union is not acting in such a manner, the amount appropriated pursuant to the authorization of appropriations in section 103(a) for the acquisition of 15 additional MX missiles may be obligated, but only if the President also determines, and includes in the written notification to Congress under paragraph (2), that—
>
> (i) the obligation of such funds is in the national interest; and
>
> (ii) as of April 1, 1985, the United States is willing to act to further the control and limitation on the MX strategic nuclear missile weapon system authorized for the Air Force by this title.
>
> (B) If the President's determination under paragraph (2) is that the Soviet Union is acting in such a manner, none of the amount appropriated pursuant to the authorization of appropriations in section 103(a) for the acquisition of 15 additional MX missiles may be obligated. However, if after the determination under paragraph (2) the President makes a further determination that the Soviet Union is not acting in good faith with respect to its willingness to take actions described in paragraph (2) and transmits written notification of that determination to Congress, such funds may obligated after the end of the 30-day period beginning on the date of the receipt of that notification by Congress unless, before the end of such 30-day period, a joint resolution is enacted disapproving the obligation of such funds.
>
> (C) Obligation for the MX missile program of funds appropriated pursuant to the authorization of appropriations in section 103(a) is subject to section 1231 of the Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1984 (Public Law 98-94; 97 Stat. 693).

Mr. PRICE (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the amendment to the amendment be considered as read and printed in the RECORD.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Illinois?

There was no objection.

Mr. AUCOIN. Mr. Chairman, I reserve a point of order against the amendment.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Oregon (Mr. AUCOIN) reserves a point of order against the amendment.

Mr. PRICE. Mr. Chairman, my amendment is the compromise that has been discussed. The amendment would authorize procurement of 15 missiles but not permit the funds to be spent until April 1, 1985.

Mr. Chairman, this and other amendments will be debated at length.

I will not say any more at this time, but I think it is important that the House have opportunity to debate this compromise approach.

Mr. Chairman. I yield to the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. ASPIN).

Mr. ASPIN. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Chairman, the amendment that the chairman has just introduced is the amendment that we have been working on which is a very different concept from the Bennett amendment. And the concept difference is that it depends upon the Soviet Union, the actions by the Soviet Union.

The Bennett amendment, with zero MX's, rewards the Soviet Union for walking out of the talks and does not require them to do anything else.

The amendment that we are offering here is an amendment that says we will vote for 15 missiles, fence the money for 6 months, wait and see if the Soviets come back. If they come back to the bargaining table, the money is not spent. If they do not come back to the bargaining table, the money is released.

It is a very different, in essence, proposition in terms of the incentives that it offers. I think that for that reason it is a better amendment.

(By unanimous consent, Mr. PRICE was allowed to proceed for 3 additional minutes.)

Mr. PRICE. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from Washington (Mr. PRITCHARD).

Mr. PRITCHARD. Mr. Chairman, the question we have before us is how do we proceed without rewarding the Russians, and undercutting our allies. We should not get it mixed up in the Presidential politics and where it will be debated fully, and have this decision after the Presidential election. Finally, how do we change our strategy so that we tie arms control to our weapons procurement?

□ 1330

The Russians have walked out and no one wants to reward them. On the other hand, I think it is fair to say that many of us are not terribly enthused about the MX. This proposal is not being brought to this House by people who are gung ho MX supporters. But there is a question not only what you do but when you do it. And I for one think that it would be a great mistake to take this action now.

When you have the Washington Post—and I think all of us know that the Washington Post has been no great friend of the MX—one part of the editorial says:

> The notion that yielding it up unilaterally will somehow induce the Soviets to abandon their similar existing and prospective missiles is daffy.

"Daffy" is what the Washington Post said this morning.

So I think there is a good case to be made for a different way to meet this problem.

Now, as the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. ASPIN) has said, we fence this money off for 6 months. It gets us past the election. And obviously on April 1 we will have a clear indication whether the Russians are coming back. Everyone knows that they are not going to come back until after the election. But after the election there will be this opportunity to judge. And I think April 1 is a reasonable time. If they come back to the table, the money is continued to be fenced off.

And, you know, that is a new strategy for us.

Mr. ADDABBO. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. PRICE. I yeild to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. ADDABBO. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the Bennett-Mavroules amendment to strike authorization of procurement funds for the MX and in opposition to the Price/Aspin substitute.

Last year, the House was persuaded by a very narrow margin to fund the initial buy of 21 MX missiles. A number of Members who doubted the utility or necessity of MX were nevertheless swayed by the arms control argument. A vote for MX, we were told, was a vote for arms control. A vote for MX, we were told, would strengthen our bargaining position. A vote for MX, we were told, would give the Soviets an incentive to negotiate.

Those were the claims, Mr. Chairman. What are the realities? Sadly, we are today farther from arms control, not closer. We are no more secure today than we were a year ago; indeed, to the extent that we squander our wealth on unneeded weapons, we are less secure. Finally, the Soviet walkout at Geneva demonstrated the value of the proposition that voting for MX would induce negotiation.

Where do we go from here? Today, we are being told that voting against additional MX procurement rewards the Soviets for not being at the bargaining table. I ask the supporters of MX: If the first buy of MX missiles did not cause the Soviets to negotiate, how will buying more of them help the situation? It defies logic to claim that more of a bad policy will lead to better times.

Mr. Chairman, the fond hopes of those who voted for MX as an arms control tool have been dashed. Continued support for MX procurement will meet the same end. The plain fact is that these arguments were, and remain, untenable. The basic proposition is this: If the United States builds and deploys the MX, the Soviets will be induced to engage in escalation, not negotiation.

Building and deploying the MX will not, in fact, induce the Soviets to do anything at all. If the proponents doubt that, I ask them to explain why the claims they made last year have proved groundless. I ask them why voting funds for MX last year produced the exact opposite result.

MX has failed as a bargaining chip: Not only have all bilateral arms control talks been cut off; but also the concept of build-down has been rejected by the Soviets; and, worse yet, DOD's new Soviet military power reports the Russians have added 550 nuclear warheads to their ICBM force over the past year.

Support for MX may have hardened—not moderated—the administration's approach to arms control, as proven by the record over the past 6 months:

Threats to violate SALT II: Administration officials last month threatened to end compliance with the SALT II limits at the end of next year, and to proceed with deployment of a seventh, Trident submarine whose deployment would place the United States in violation of SALT II.

Soviet "cheating" report: The administration has publicized allegations that the Soviets have cheated on many arms control treaties, even though it admits that absolute proof is not documentable.

Full speed ahead on Asat's: The administration reported to Congress that it will proceed with Asat testing and deployment, while refusing to enter into bilateral Asat negotiations, on grounds that Asat restrictions will not be verifiable.

Threats to violate ABM Treaty: The administration has requested $1.7 billion for its downpayment on a $25 billion "Star Wars" program of ballistic missile defenses, which, if deployed, would violate both the ABM and Outer Space Treaties.

"Arm to disarm" approach to nerve gas: The administration has renewed its drive for binary chemical weapons by linking it to a new draft CW proposal, which is unlikely to be accepted due to its on-demand, onsite inspection provisions.

MX cost is rising: A forthcoming GAO report will apparently warn that the MX will end up costing 66-percent more than the Pentagon estimates; 38 percent of these overruns will result from higher than expected design and production costs.

CBO finds build-down will be viable without MX: A March CBO report on the administration's START proposals finds that cancellation of the MX "would be consistent with the philosophy underlying much of the START/build-down proposal," which aims at moving away from MIRV'd missile deployment in fixed and vulnerable silos.

Strategic spending is still increasing: Funding for strategic programs has increased 81 percent under Reagan—fiscal year 1981-84. This year, under the administration budget, it will increase 11 percent. Even under the armed services bill, which had to cut the budget by $8 billion, it is programed to increase 9 percent.

MX to be deployed without full testing results: Both House appropriations and GAO agree that MX will not be fully flight-tested by the December 1986 IDC date. The appropriations report concludes that even if 10 missiles are deployed by then, their operational capability will be low and unreliable.

Scowcroft Commission fades away: The Scowcroft Commission has issued its last report. Without it, the administration is likely to further harden its approach to arms control.

Mr. Chairman, the same situation holds today. A vote today against MX does not "reward" the Soviets for walking out at Geneva. The MX will have no effect on the Soviets' position, just as it has had no effect in the past. We delude ourselves if we believe that spending more money on MX will lead to arms control.

The first step in reducing the number of nuclear weapons is to stop building new ones. That step will in no way reduce our security. Our strength is overwhleming, as the Soviets well know. To stop the MX is not a sign of weakness; it is a statement of our confidence in that strength. It is a step toward finally getting off this dangerous treadmill.

Mr. Chairman, do we believe that threatening the Russinas with increases in Nuclear Weapons will being them to the bargaining table? Facts have proven different. We would not bend to blackmail, nor will the Russians. We have enough bargaining chips and weapons of resolve without these additional 15.

I urge defeat of the Price-Aspin amendments and passage of the Bennett-Mavroules amendments.

Would the gentleman from Washington (Mr. PRITCHARD) explain to me and the House what happens at the end of 6 months? Supposing the Russians do not go to the table within 6 months. What happens at that point in time?

Mr. PRITCHARD. If they do not come back to the table, then we go ahead with the building of the 15 MX's. Now, we know that President Carter wanted 200. President Reagan asked for 100. And this is 15. It is half of what the committee asked for.

Mr. ADDABBO. Will the gentleman yield further?

Mr. PRICE. I yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. ADDABBO. During the 6-month period, who will determine whether the Russians have actually come to the table in good faith or not? Will it be this administration?

Mr. PRITCHARD. Well, it depends. You would have to tell me who you think is going to win the Presidential election.

Mr. ADDABBO. The 6 months, if the bill is signed by June 1, expires December 1. The present administration is still in office at that time.

Mr. PRITCHARD. No. It starts in September. It is the budget period. So it does not start now in June. It starts in September. So it will be the President, whether it is a new President or whether it is the present one. They will make a judgment.

And I know there are skeptics here. I do not think you need to be, but there are skeptics here who say, "Well, you know, the Russians will come back to the table, but, of course, if we have Mr. Reagan, he just will not believe that they are coming back in good faith."

At that point, if he makes a finding that the Russians have not come back in good faith, then both Houses of Congress can then exercise our judgment.

Mr. ADDABBO. If the gentleman will further yield, the gentleman fully knows the House will be out by October, the first week of October. So if they use the same arguments they have been using before about arms control, where they have not been acting in good faith, they will say the Russians have not come in and, therefore, come October 1 or October 15, after the Congress is out, they are out building the missiles again.

Mr. PRITCHARD. No. Let me straighten the gentleman out. The time of decision is April 1, and we are always here April 1. So I do not think you have to worry about the timing. The clock starts running in September, and the 6 months is up April 1. At that time we make the decision.

So I think the time factors are very correct.

I think many of us in this country are tired of always being on the defensive, never coming up with creative ideas, never tossing the ball in the other person's court.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. PRICE) has expired.

(On request of Mr. PRITCHARD and by unanimous consent, Mr. PRICE was allowed to proceed for 2 additional minutes.)

Mr. PRITCHARD. We are not asking for hard conditions. We are not saying they have got to change their position. All we are saying is, Will they come back to the table? I do not think that is unreasonable.

Mr. MAVROULES. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. PRICE. I yield to the gentleman from Massachusetts.

Mr. MAVROULES. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

I have a question to ask, in view of the testimony given on this floor about 1 year ago, when we were talking about the MX missile and how important it was for this Congress to vote the funds for procurement for the MX missile, to make sure we bring the Soviet Union to the negotiating table. Let me ask you, let all of us ask ourselves, what has happened over the course of 12 months? Are we closer today than we were a year ago? Are we further apart? Are we not listening to the very, very same arguments put forth at that time?

Mr. PRITCHARD. I think the gentleman would agree it is the Russians who have walked away, and they are not going to come back until after the Presidential election. I think every international student, and particularly of Russian, has come to that conclusion. So I do not think you can make the case right now that somehow our actions here have chased the Russians out.

What really happened was, the Russians made a big gamble in trying to intimidate Europe and not put the Pershings in. So the Russians walked out of this because our allies stood up and took the votes. And they are not coming back to the table.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. PRICE) has again expired.

(On request of Mr. PRITCHARD and by unanimous consent, Mr. PRICE was allowed to proceed for 5 additional minutes.)

Mr. PRICE. Mr. Chairman, I continue to yield to the gentleman from Washington (Mr. PRITCHARD).

Mr. PRITCHARD. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. MAVROULES. If the gentleman will continue to yield to me, I appreciate the gentleman yielding to me and perhaps later on, when we get into it, I will be glad to yield to the gentleman.

Let me ask the gentleman this one question: In your judgment, do you honestly believe it is the MX missile that is keeping the Soviet Union away from the table or bringing them to the table versus the cruise missile or Pershing II?

Mr. PRITCHARD. Well, first of all, right now they are not coming back to the table because they are going to stay away until after the Presidential election.

We know there is not one thing that keeps the Russians away or brings

them back. I think all of us would agree on that. There is a variety of things. But any time we can put something out there that is an inducement, any time we can put some carrots out there, we want to do it. And I think this goes in the direction that most Americans want. They want the two countries to get back to the table, and if we can frame this amendment so that we give some incentive, I think it makes a great deal of sense.

You have to realize, I am not a great advocate of the MX.

Mr. MAVROULES. I know.

Mr. PRITCHARD. But I think to do what the gentleman would like to do is bad timing. I think that the proposal that the gentleman from Wisconsin has come up with is very creative and goes in the right direction.

Mr. LOWRY of Washington. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. PRICE. I yield to the gentleman from Washington.

Mr. LOWRY of Washington. I thank my colleague for yielding.

As I read the description of the amendment the gentleman is speaking for, it says if the Soviets do not return to the bargaining table, arms negotiation table, the money for the 15 missiles will be released.

Do I read this description correctly that the amendment is contingent upon the Soviets returning to the arms control table?

Mr. PRITCHARD. Oh, yes. They have to come back. It is an inducement for them to come back.

Mr. LOWRY of Washington. So the expenditure of the dollars in this bill for the procurement of the missiles is contingent upon the Soviets returning to the arms control table or not, one or the other?

Mr. PRITCHARD. Well, it is an inducement for them to come back. And I certainly think that is right.

I do not want to take up all the time, because I know the gentleman from Wisconsin would like to participate in this debate, and he is far more able than I to make these arguments.

Would the gentleman from Illinois yield some time to the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. MAVROULES) so that he can ask a question?

Mr. PRICE. I yield to the gentleman from Massachusetts.

Mr. MAVROULES. I want to thank the chairman, and I want to thank the gentleman from Washington for his kindness.

We continue to talk about arms control, and the gentleman is a very responsible Member of this august body.

Mr. PRITCHARD. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. MAVROULES. Let us go back. If we really and truly want arms control, then what we ought to be doing is having the Senate vote on SALT II, and then we should have some kind of an agreement.

□ 1340

I think what we have to do is make an honest and true comparison of where we were back in 1980, versus where we are in 1984, and where are we going in 1986 and 1988, when you have a third generation of weapons being produced by this country and a sixth generation being produced by the Soviet Union. We have to look at the hard picture. I am not so sure we are doing that because we are further away today than we were 4 years ago.

Mr. PRITCHARD. Let me just respond to two things.

There is not any question that we have got to come up with some new approaches. This amendment is a new approach as to the history since 1980, that will be the debate that goes on for the Presidential election.

In that respect, I think it really does make a lot of sense to set this over for 6 months and allow that Presidential debate to go on.

Mr. DOWNEY of New York. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. PRICE. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. DOWNEY of New York. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

I believe the gentleman's intentions toward arms control are sincere. We have discussed this often. What I want to know is where in history the gentleman can cite some examples of weapons that have gone through a test phase that have served as useful bargaining chips? Can any examples come to the gentleman's mind?

Mr. PRITCHARD. I just have to say this: We do not have any successful history in arms control. So it is very hard to go back into history and come up with some examples.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Illinois has expired.

Mr. PRICE. Mr. Chairman, I do not seek any further time.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Oregon (Mr. AUCOIN) has reserved a point of order. Does the gentleman wish to pursue that?

Mr. AUCOIN. Yes, Mr. Chairman. Under the rules of the House I understand I am not required to raise the point of order at this particular point. But I do continue to reserve my point of order.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair has the discretion to entertain the point of order, and the Chair chooses at this time to have the gentleman state his reservation.

Does the gentleman make a point of order?

Mr. AUCOIN. Mr. Chairman, if the Chair would indulge me for just 30 seconds, I would be ready to make my point of order.

I am standing over here at a microphone without my notes, and I would like to have those notes before I make my point of order.

The CHAIRMAN. Does the gentleman then just wish to strike out the last word?

Mr. AUCOIN. I move to strike the last word, Mr. Chairman.

POINT OF ORDER

Mr. AUCOIN. Mr. Chairman, I make a point of order against the Price amendment on the grounds that its scope is broader than that of the primary amendment, title 1, and therefore is not germane to the primary amendment.

The Price amendment would condition MX missile procurement authorization on a Presidential determination. The exact nature and notification of this action is not specified in the amendment; it is open to various interpretations. A number of those interpretations have been brought out on the floor in the colloquy which just preceded my point of order stated by the gentleman from Washington State.

That interpretation is that the MX procurement authorization would be contingent upon a Presidential report or certification regarding arms control negotiations. This, is in fact the interpretation, as I have indicated it, Members who support the amendment have built into the legislative history just set forth.

Since arms control negotiations involve agencies not charged with procurement of the MX missile, nor with procurement of any weapons, the Price amendment is not germane to the primary amendment according to Deschler's Precedents, chapter 28, section 24, point 23, based on a ruling made February 22, 1978.

The amendment is also inconsistent with rulings made in similar cases on July 8, 1981, and July 9, 1981.

Mr. ASPIN. Mr. Chairman, may I be heard on the point of order?

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Wisconsin.

Mr. ASPIN. Mr. Chairman, the language of the amendment says that the President shall determine whether the Soviet Union is acting, as of April 1, 1985, in a manner indicating that it is willing to take actions to further the control and limitation of types of strategic nuclear missile weapons systems. It does not mention negotiations. The amendment itself is in line with other types of amendments that we have had, and it is a general finding by the President, and I believe it is within the rules of the House.

Mr. LOWRY of Washington. Mr. Chairman, may I be heard on the point of order?

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Washington.

Mr. LOWRY of Washington. Mr. Chairman, in the colloquy I just had with the gentleman from the State of Washington, he answered the question that this amendment is contingent

upon arms control negotiations. I ask that specifically because on July 8, 1981, I presented an amendment to the floor on Pershing II's that was ruled out of order as stated and that amendment on Pershing II's held the dollars for the expenditure for the deployment until the President has certified that Congress of the United States has forwarded to the Soviet Union initial proposals for arms control negotiations. Essentially the same thing.

That amendment was ruled out of order, the amendment made by this gentleman, was ruled out of order, and part of the reason that it was ruled out of order as stated was the Chair would further point out that the arms control negotiations fall within the jurisdiction of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and not within the jurisdiction of the committee reporting this bill, and thereby out of order.

In the colloquy, I asked the gentleman, and the arguments made for this amendment, if the releasing of the dollars for the procurement is contingent upon the arms control part of this, and the answer was yes.

Mr. ASPIN. May I be heard again, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Wisconsin.

Mr. ASPIN. The difference is of course that the gentleman from Washington's amendment that he referred to, did mention arms control negotiations in his amendment. The amendment which the chairman of the committee, Mr. PRICE, has put forward does not mention arms control negotiations in his amendment.

Mr. AUCOIN. Mr. Chairman, I seek to be recognized further.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Oregon.

Mr. AUCOIN. Mr. Chairman, I am looking at page 2, and on page 2, lines 5 and 6, it states, lines 4, 5, and 6, it states, "* * * acting in a manner indicating that it is willing to take actions to further the control and limitations of types of strategic missile weapons systems similar to the MX."

Mr. Chairman, my point is this: One cannot define a missile system that is similar to the MX. The amendment does not define it. As this debate has already brought out, it is subject to a great difference of opinion on the floor of the House. I make the point, Mr. Chairman, my point of order is, therefore, that the amendment is broader in scope than that of the MX because it necessarily brings into play questions of missile systems beyond the MX. It is only the MX that is in dispute and subject to debate at this point. So I renew my point of order.

Mr. DICKINSON. Mr. Chairman, I would like to be heard on the point of order.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Alabama.

Mr. DICKINSON. Mr. Chairman, the amendment is clearly germane and does not exceed the scope of the original bill. It does not introduce a new and different subject than that in the amendment offered by the gentleman from Florida (Mr. BENNETT). Both amendments deal with the procurement of MX missiles. The amendment differs only in degree. The amendment offered by the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. PRICE), does place additional conditions on the release of funds for the procurement of MX missiles, but does not introduce any new or additional subject, and is therefore clearly germane.

The amendment offered by the gentleman from Florida contains a provision providing, "None of the funds in this title" may be used for the MX missile program.

□ 1350

It should be noted that there are other provisions in title I of this bill regarding international treaty obligations. Section 105, for instance, deals with our international obligations with NATO countries. Section 107 of this bill also contains provisions extending certain authorities to the President under the Arms Export Control Act.

So I think neither in enlarging the scope nor on the question of germaneness would a point of order lie.

Mr. FRANK. Mr. Chairman, the gentleman from Wisconsin, when he rebutted the gentleman from Washington who spoke, said yes, the gentleman from Washington had a point if this talked about negotiations, but he says it does not allude to negotiations.

I must say that, I think, would come as a surprise to most of the Members, so I wanted to ask the gentleman from Wisconsin, if I can, when he says that the President shall go ahead with the MX unless he finds that the Soviet has indicated that it is willing to take actions to further the control and limitation of types of strategic nuclear missile weapons systems, and if the Soviet is acting in such a manner, are we to determine that without regard to negotiations? Are we going to do this by reading Pravada and Izvestia, or does the gentleman anticipate that some unilateral Soviet actions will anticipate?

I agree that it does not say the magic word "negotiations," but it clearly assumes that the President will engage in negotiations and make a judgment there. So the gentleman from Wisconsin, it seems to me, having conceded that if this was based on an assessment of negotiations, a point of order would lie, he is simply, by not mentioning the word "negotiations" talking about a process of negotiations.

Is the gentleman saying that in the President's assessment of the Soviet's behavior, he does not assume that there will be any allusion to negotiations?

Mr. ASPIN. If the gentleman will yield, no. The issue is whether they are acting, as the amendment says, in a manner indicating they are willing to take actions to further the control and limitation.

Mr. FRANK. And that would not involve their behavior in negotiations?

Mr. ASPIN. Of course. Of course. It could.

Mr. FRANK. It could.

Mr. ASPIN. If the gentleman would yield for a response, I would be happy to answer the question.

There are a lot of ways in which this can be indicated. Negotiations is but one.

Mr. FRANK. Mr. Chairman, I will take my time back. The gentleman has answered my question, sort of.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Massachusetts may continue at the Chair's descretion for 1-minutes.

Mr. FRANK. I thank the Chair.

Mr. Chairman, it seems to me the gentleman from Wisconsin has again conceded the point. Obviously the intention of this is that the President would assess the Soviet behavior in negotiations. As a matter of fact, although the magic word "negotiations" is not mentioned, that really makes it an issue on all fours with the point of the gentleman from Wisconsin and the gentleman from Washington.

Simply not mentioning negotiations when you describe a process that can only be assessed through negotiations clearly seems to make it the case. If the gentleman is really saying that the President should assess this important decision without regard to negotiations from the Soviet Union, then the amendment makes even less sense than I though it did, and I did not come here with a high opinion of it.

Mr. DICKINSON. Mr. Chairman, I demand regular order.

The CHAIRMAN (Mr. ROSTENKOWSKI). The Chair is ready to rule.

The Chair feels the arguments made, to sustain the point of order, are much broader than the Chair would interpret the amendment. The amendment offered by the gentleman from Florida reduces the line-item authorization for Air Force missiles and also adds a section at the end of title I prohibiting the use of any funds authorized in title I for fiscal year 1985 for the procurement of the MX missile.

The amendment offered by the gentleman from Illinois, in lieu of a prohibition on the use of the authorized funds in fiscal year 1985 for the procurement of any MX missiles, would instead reduce the same line-item authorizations for Air Force missiles by a lesser amount and would add a different section at the end of title I stating

a policy with respect to the use of fiscal year 1985 authorized funds in title I for the unilateral cancellation of the MX system, while the Soviet Union continues to be unwilling to take actions to control and limit similar strategic missile weapons systems.

In effect, the amendment would authorize fiscal year 1985 funds for the procurement of not more than 15 MX missiles after April 1, 1985, if the President determines that the Soviet Union is not acting in manner to control similar systems.

In the opinion of the Chair, the issue of the availability of any funds in fiscal year 1985 for MX procurement prsented by the original amendment permits as an alternative approach a conditional restriction on the availability of those same funds dependent upon Presidential determinaiton of procurement of similar systems by the Soviet Union.

It is certainly a related issue to condition of the availability of the funds in the bill upon observed conduct on the part of the Soviet Union with respect to a similar weapons system, and the Chair overrules the point of order

Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the amendment offered by the gentleman from Illinois, (Mr. PRICE). There was some discussion earlier on behalf of the gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. NEAL), that we would not hear anything more about unilateral disarmament if his formulation, which is largely patterned after the formulation developed by the distinguished chairman, the gentleman from Illinois. But as long as the amendment offered by the gentleman from Florida (Mr. BENNETT), remains in its original form, it is a unilateral disarmament amendment, and then we are going to hear a good deal about unilateral disarmament. But I do not think there are very many Members in the Chamber who really support unilateral disarmament.

On the other hand, the amendment offered by the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. PRICE), is an extremely constructive amendment. We reduce the number of missiles from the figure of 40, which the President requested. We have even reduced it from the figure of 30, which the Committee on Armed Services reduced it to. In the Price amendment we bring it down to the number of 15.

The number of 15 represents a figure that is a reasonably economic rate for production of that missile, so that by reducing the missile we do not also automatically increase the size of the defense budget. By so doing, we continue not only the production of the missile, we not only continue to test it, we not only continue to carry out the research and development; we are also providing for the continuation of one of the very important arms control elements that the House insisted on last year when we supported 21 missiles of the MX variety, namely, the Midgetman missile.

I can remember very clearly in the Committee on Armed Services a number of members insisting that they were not going to support the MX unless the Air Force was forced to go ahead with the development of the Midgetman, a single-warhead missile, which would be mobile and which would, hopefully, shame the Russians into abandoning their own multiwarhead missiles to go along with us.

So this Price amendment does have a very genuine aspect of arms control and, of course, it also recognizes what all of us realize: That whether we are for the MX or whether we are against the MX, this is a decision that is not going to be made, fundamentally, in this particular Congress. Of course we have a national referendum ahead of us in November; and the future of the MX will depend on who is chosen as the leader of our country and who are chosen to be the Representatives who sit in the 99th Congress.

So what we have recognized in the Price amendment is that if the current occupant of the White House is reelected, clearly he will have behind him the support of the electorate for proceeding further with the MX, as he has suggested. But if one of the three Democratic candidates who are now competing should become the President of the United States, all three of them have indicated that they are going to throw out the MX missile.

So we are simply recognizing the political realities, and in a very useful way.

The trouble with the amendment offered by the gentleman from Florida (Mr. BENNETT) as it stands, is that it would reward the Soviet Union for having walked out of the missile talks in Geneva, both the INF and the START talks. Let us not forget that a year ago the Soviets were in Geneva. They were negotiating there.

□ 1400

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from New York (Mr. STRATTON) has expired.

(On request of Mr. DICKS, and by unanimous consent, Mr. STRATTON was allowed to proceed for 5 additional minutes.)

Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Chairman, when we approved the 21 MX missiles, last year, the Soviets were at the START talks. They were negotiating, they were talking. They were not getting upset over the fact that Congress had approved 21 MX's. As a matter of fact, most of their concern in Geneva seems to have been over the Pershing II and the GLCM rather than over the MX.

But if we now go along with the naked, bare, unilateral disarmament amendment of the gentleman from Florida, we will be rewarding the Soviets for their intransigence, not only in walking out of the arms talks but for even rejecting out of hand in a very obnoxious way a letter from the President of the United States carried by General Scowcroft to the head of the Soviet Union. And would be further rewarding them for having walked out of the Olympics. And I would think that Members from the great State of California would be very much concerned about that kind of walkout because that will surely damage the economy of the State of California as well as bringing a devastating result to a lot of determined and serious athletes who have been practicing long and hard for the Olympics.

Mr. Chairman, I have just one other point I would like to make before I sit down. Yesterday, as we considered under suspension the resolution condemning the treatment of Andrei Sakharov and his wife, Mrs. Bonner, we heard a number of very eloquent denunciations of the Soviet philosophy, of Soviet behavior, and of the nature of their particular empire, whether it was evil or not. As it came out in those remarks yesterday, it certainly sounded like the kind of an evil empire that the occupant of the White House has been talking about. Are we really going to reward the Soviet Union by wiping out this weapon that has concerned them and will reward them with unilateral disarmament after their atrocious treatment of Andrei Sakharov?

Mr. Chairman, I think anybody who participated in that argument yesterday and who voted for the resolution to condemn the Soviet Union over Mr. Sakharov ought to vote overwhelmingly for the Price amendment.

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. STRATTON. I yield to my friend, the gentleman from Washington.

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I am glad that the gentleman mentioned Mr. Sakharov, because, as we recall, Mr. Sakharov last year wrote an open letter to Sidney Drell, and in it he suggested that as much as he understood and shared the pacifist views that are very strong in the West, he understood that we needed to show the Soviet Union that we have the will to modernize our land-based forces. And he said that he would prefer to see a negotiation so that we did not have to go ahead, but he felt that until those negotiations were successful, we had to go ahead on some of these missiles.

Mr. STRATTON. The gentleman is correct.

Mr. DICKS. That was Mr. Sakharov's statement last year, and I think it

surprised a lot of the Members who were talking yesterday.

Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Chairman, the gentleman is correct. I am glad that he made that point, and I am sure that if Andrei Sakharov were a Member of this body today, he would certainly support the Price amendment.

Mr. WEISS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. STRATTON. I yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. WEISS. Mr. Chairman, I thank my distinguished colleague and the dean of my delegation for yielding.

I am not sure if I caught the gentleman's argument in the early stage of his statement correctly. Was the gentleman suggesting that the elections in November are going to be a referendum on the MX?

Mr. STRATTON. I think they are going to be a referendum on the MX, along with many other things, but clearly the future of the MX is going to be dependent on the outcome of the election.

Mr. WEISS. Mr. Chairman, is the gentleman telling us, then, that he is going to be casting his vote on the basis of which of the candidates is supporting the MX in the Presidential campaign?

Mr. STRATTON. No; I am not getting into the Presidential campaign. I am concerned with the future security of the country.

Mr. WEISS. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for his response.

Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

● Mr. COLEMAN of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the amendment offered by my colleagues—Mr. PRICE, chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, and cosponsored by Mr. ASPIN.

There needs to be some middle ground between concern for rewarding the Soviet Union for intransigent behavior at the bargaining table in Geneva and a general lack of enthusiasm for the MX system. I believe this amendment achieves that middle ground.

We sometimes forget, in the heat of debate, that the MX weapons system does not exist in a vacuum. The critical question facing the Congress and the United States in this: What combination of dollars, hardware, and strategy can best guarantee our national security and at the same time, maximize the arms control impact to lower the threshold of nuclear war? Surely too few arms create an imbalance just as dangerous as too many. This amendment avoids the twin dangers of too many, and takes into account the stark realities of global politics.

Under the terms of the Price-Aspin compromise, the President's original request for 40 MX missiles would be reduced to 15. It provides a 6-month delay before any of the money may be spent. It requires the money to be frozen for the remainder of the fiscal year if the Soviets return to the bargaining table. If they do not return to Geneva, the money for the 15 missiles would be released.

I am one Member who voted against procurement of the MX during the last authorization process. The concerns I had then are still viable—costs and vulnerability of the system. However, more important than this is my personal commitment to the goal of returning to the negotiations in Geneva to craft an equitable and verifiable arms control agreement. This issue transcends partisan politics and election-year rhetoric.

Two things cannot be forgotten. First, although we are continuing to work on the problem, we still do not have a reliable basing mode for the MX, a factor identified by the Scowcroft Commission as crucial to the entire system. And second, the MX cannot be counted on to be the primary force to change Soviet behavior, despite the administration's promises last year. That is why this amendment, which makes the funds available for additional MX production but does not slam shut the door on arms control, is the best choice given today's strategic situation. It is exactly the bargaining chip that the administration has requested: Either the Soviets return to the negotiating table or we proceed with additional production.

It is thus in humanity's best interest that the President dedicate all of his energies to reopen the arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union, which would negate the need for further production of the MX.●

AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. MAVROULES AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR THE AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. BENNETT

Mr. MAVROULES. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment as a substitute for the amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. MAVROULES to the amendment offered by Mr. BENNETT: Page 10, line 19, strike out "$8,664,600,000" and insert in lieu thereof "$5,942,700,000".

At the end of title I, page 15, after line 5, add the following new section:

MORATORIUM ON MX MISSILE PROCUREMENT

SEC. 110. (a) None of the funds appropriated pursuant to authorizations of appropriations in this title may be used for the MX missile program.

(b) It is the intent of Congress that the denial of funds for procurement under the MX missile system program for fiscal year 1985 constitutes a moratorium on procurement of missiles under such program but does not constitute a unilateral termination of that program.

POINT OF ORDER

Mr. DICKINSON (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I have a point of order.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman will state his point of order.

Mr. DICKINSON. Mr. Chairman, it is my understanding that we are debating a perfecting amendment which is not amendable.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair will state that the gentleman from Massachusetts is privileged to offer a substitute for the Bennett amendment.

The Clerk will read.

The Clerk concluded the reading of the amendment:

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. MAVROULES) is recognized for 5 minutes in support of his amendment.

Mr. MAVROULES. Mr. Chairman, I am delighted to have this opportunity to offer the substitute for the amendment, and it is cosponsored at this stage by my dear friend, the gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. NEAL), and it is offered with his full support.

Mr. Chairman, I rise to speak in opposition to further procurement of the MX missile.

To Members who are open minded and undecided; To those troubled by $200 billion deficits; To colleagues concerned over an arms race and the future of their children, today, Mr. BENNETT and I offer you a choice. Today, you can make a difference.

Join us in halting an MX program which is wasteful and unnecessary. The message we will send is one of support for security and stability. No longer will Congress support billion dollar dinosaurs promoting deficits but not deterrence.

We are told by our friend from Wisconsin that no further MX procurement sends the wrong signal; and he is joined by the President in making this claim. This is the same President who 6 months ago claimed bringing our Marines home from Lebanon—removing them from a defenseless position in Beirut—sent the wrong signal. We made the right decision then, and today, you have the chance to make another right decision.

So many words have been written about MX, arms control, and bargaining chips. Yes, it was true there was once a time when American and Soviet missiles were part of an arms limitation ceiling. MX was included. The agreement was SALT II, and it was negotiated by Presidents Nixon, Ford, and Carter.

Yesterday, Members received this volume from the administration outlining all of the President's positions on arms control. You will not find a word on the "window of vulnerability" in the text. You will find the quote that "President Reagan has no higher priority" than an arms agreement.

To the President, to his supporters in this House, to his spokesman on arms control, the gentleman from Wisconsin, I offer this challenge. Mr. President, do not submit notebooks on issues; submit SALT II to the Senate

for ratification. That, will be an arms control start.

For other Members, from California and Connecticut, Missouri and Massachusetts, there is another issue—Jobs, Jobs building MX. Those troubled by this question, I only point out the position we have taken in Massachusetts, the No. 2 State in MX contracts and jobs. Yes, we want our people to work. But, a $20 billion program is too high a price for a few thousand jobs.

Let us be honest on a few points. The United States today operates a modern and capable strategic deterrent. Our goal must be to preserve the strategic balance at the lowest level of risk. The charge is made that not building MX rewards the Soviets. I am astonished each time the gentlemen on the other side raise this issue.

They ignore the billions in this bill for Trident submarines and missiles; the B-1 an advanced technology bomber; two generations of high technology cruise missiles; Pershing missiles; and, a new generation of lethal warheads. These systems are ignored, in favor of constant discussion on an MX program which is far more questionable in capability than any other strategic system in this bill.

It does not send the wrong signal to stop a program which is obsolete before a single missile is deployed, and which will cost billions in the coming years. Quite the opposite, supporting the Bennett-Mavroules amendment will demonstrate that Congress has the discipline and will not fund a marginal weapons program. If you support the Aspin substitute on the grounds that it will slow deployment of the system, I remind you the Senate is unlikely to support his language in conference. And then, where does the White House stand? Is the Aspin substitute the President's position? Or, is it just the President's position for today?

If you want to stop MX; or, if you just want to slow it down, support the Bennett-Mavroules position. Then, at least you will have a bargaining chip with the Senate for conference.

Finally, we have heard so much in this debate about symbols. My colleagues, do not worry about the wrong signal. Instead, just make the right choice. Send a message to millions of worried people. Do not fund the MX missile.

Mr. AUCOIN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MAVROULES. I yield to my friend, the gentleman from Oregon.

Mr. AUCOIN. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the gentleman yielding. I commend the gentleman for his remarks and I appreciate the leadership the gentleman has shown on this issue.

I, too, am upset with the fact that some Members would say that if we kill a weapons system, that most Members who are supporting the Aspin-Price amendment concede makes no intrinsic military sense, that somehow we are rewarding the Russians.

I remember last year they said:

> We are negotiating with the Soviet Union now. The last thing we need to do is to kill the MX missile, because we will hurt the negotiations. We have got to fund the MX missile in order to keep the Soviets negotiating.

Now we are here after the collapse of the negotiations, there are no negotiations, and now we are being told that we cannot kill the MX missile because of the opposite reasons.

I think the question is this; If we cannot kill the MX missile when there are negotiations, and we cannot kill the MX missile when there are not negotiations, when can we kill a weapons system that everyone agrees makes no intrinsic military sense?

The gentleman identifies the issues. I compliment him for enunciating the issue and hope Members will support his substitute.

Mr. MAVROULES. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman very much for his remarks.

I would be pleased to yield to my friend, the gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. NEAL), the cosponsor of this substitute.

Mr. NEAL. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding and I thank him for offering this substitute on our behalf.

I would like to say a couple words about it. It has been said many times that the Bennett-Mavroules amendment would constitute unilateral disarmament. I would like to point out that if we adopt this substitute that is now under discussion, that could no longer be said with accuracy.

In essense, the Bennett-Mavroules amendment, with the adoption of this amendment, offers no unilateral disarmament. It offers a postponement. It sends, if we support it, a message to the Soviet Union which says that we want to wind down the arms race. We are not going to do it unilaterally. We demand an appropriate response from the Soviet Union.

Mr. Chairman, I cannot tell you today what that appropriate response would be. Everyone here knows, I am sure, that under all amendments we would continue the development and production of the 21 MX missiles provided for under the 1984 authorization. Research and development continues. Flight testing continues. There is no unilateral cancellation of that program. The program continues.

What we would be saying here is that if the Soviets will give us an appropriate response, there is the possibility that we will not continue with this MX program.

Arms negotiations between our countries have broken down. We are not at the bargaining table. There is an opportunity here for the Congress, this Congress, to send a message to the Soviet Union that we do not want this arms race to continue forever, and if they will respond appropriately, we can begin to deescalate the ever escalating arms race.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Massachusetts has again expired.

Mr. MAVROULES. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to proceed for an additional 5 minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Massachusetts?

Mr. DICKINSON. Reserving the right to object, Mr. Chairman, I certainly have no intention of trying to cut off debate, but I did have a substitute I wanted to offer, if the Chair would protect me at the proper time.

Mr. Chairman, I withdraw my reservation of objection.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Massachusetts?

There was no objection.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. MAVROULES) is recognized for an additional 5 minutes.

Mr. MAVROULES. Mr. Chairman, I would be happy to yield to all of those who are seeking some time, but I have made some commitments to those here, but I will come back when we have some time.

I am pleased to continue to yield to the gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. NEAL).

Mr. NEAL. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding.

I just want to make one other point about the merits of this approach relative to that offered by the distinguished chairman of the committee and authored by the distinguished gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. ASPIN) and others.

My concern about their approach is that the Soviets will read it as not much of a change. Under the bill we would schedule 30 missiles. Under the approach of the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. ASPIN) there would be 15. It seems to me that if I were a Soviet viewing this, I would say, "Well, really, what has happened? They have already got 21 in the pipeline. They are going to add another 15. That is 36 big missiles. Is that really a reduction in the arms race or is it not?"

I do not think I would see it as such, but I think under my substitute approach the Soviets would recognize a very sincere and significant gesture. It would be a real change in course, no doubt about it, and then we would have an opportunity to make our own independent judgment as to whether or not the Soviets had responded appropriately. If they do, the Congress would have made a very significant

first step toward reversing the tend of the arms race. We would have deescalated what has been for many years, an ever escalating arms race. By the implementation of my amendment and an appropriate response on the part of the Soviets we would have reversed somewhat the arms race and help create a somewhat less risky world.

Mr. MAVROULES. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for his contribution.

I now yield to my dear friend, the gentlewoman from California (Mrs. BURTON).

Mrs. BURTON of California. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank the gentleman. I want to compliment the gentleman first on his amendment.

First of all, I would like to know, are there not a number of experts who said that the MX is obsolete as a weapon by the time we build it?

Mr. MAVROULES. As a matter of fact, the experts have so stated that. We are always going to get two sides to an issue.

I think I also stated that in my remarks here this morning, that it could very well be obsolete by the time it is in operation, figuring 1988 or 1990.

Mrs. BURTON of California. I must say as someone who knows the language, the Russian language, and as someone who has lived in that part of the world, I think it is absurd to think that to rebuild the MX if we procure it, if we spend money for it, that the Soviets will come to the table.

I had an opportunity of meeting the Soviets who are doing the negotiating at START with General Rowny, who is a Pole, and we talked and we talked and we talked.

I think that if we stopped the MX, we have an opportunity of getting the Russians to the table. Sure, they are not going to do anything before the election, but right after the election I assure you they are going to come and negotiate, but not if we continue with the MX missile.

□ 1420

I am supporting your position.

Mr. MAVROULES. I thank you very much for your contribution.

Mr. RATCHFORD. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MAVROULES. I yield to the gentleman from Connecticut.

Mr. RATCHFORD. Would the gentleman agree that the fact that we are here this afternoon is evidence of the bankruptcy of our efforts in the diplomatic field?

Mr. MAVROULES. I think all we have to do, my dear friend from Connecticut, is go back to 1980 and find out where we were in arms control negotiations compared to where we are in 1984.

But more importantly I believe the issue cries out: Where are we going to be in 1986 and 1988 after all generations are built?

Mr. RATCHFORD. The gentleman further agrees there is evidence to the fact that our arms control efforts are bankrupt, also.

Mr. MAVROULES. There is no question in my mind, at least in my judgment.

Mr. RATCHFORD. The gentlemen give compelling reasons for the adoption of his amendment. In the matter of which of the options we are looking at this afternoon, I find it very interesting that we have come from 40 to 30 to 15. If this is such a good system, why have we seen these concessions over the past several months?

The reality is that there are many reasons for not going forward. In the areas of cost, if we go forward now with procurement, we are making a down payment on a deficit that will reach $35 billion on this system alone. Would the gentleman agree?

Mr. MAVROULES. Yes; I agree.

The other point, I think all we have to do is go back in the last 30 years, and I challenge anyone to come before us and say to us that we have canceled a major weapons system. We have not. Once the system begins, once it is started, they see it all the way through.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. MAVROULES) has again expired.

Mr. MAVROULES. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to proceed for 5 additional minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Massachusetts?

Mr. BADHAM. Mr. Chairman, reserving the right to object, and I have no reason to pursue this, but I would like to inquire of the gentleman. This is supposed to be a debate, and right now it is a very one-sided thing with only the proponents. I suggest that all the proponents might each get their own individual time so that opponents of this amendment might have their time also rather than the time until we drive ourselves into a request for a limitation of time.

Mr. MAVROULES. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BADHAM. I yield to the gentleman from Massachusetts.

Mr. MAVROULES. I certainly have no argument with that request. I believe in fairness and I think you know that. I know you and you understand me.

But the point is that there are people here who want to get into a very important part of the colloquy relative to the substitute.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Massachusetts?

Mr. BADHAM. Further reserving the right to object, might I ask the gentleman how much longer he would wish to continue?

Mr. MAVROULES. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BADHAM. I yield to the gentleman from Massachusetts.

Mr. MAVROULES. I am going to request further time so long as there are Members on this floor who want to engage in a colloquy and want to debate with me. And I think it is only fair for the system.

I have never in all my years that I have been in Congress objected to any one particular person taking extra time on this floor. So I can only answer you that I want to be fair, but if they are requesting time I intend to yield to them.

Mr. BADHAM. Mr. Chairman, I withdraw my reservation of objection.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Massachusetts?

There was no objection.

The gentleman from Massachusetts will be recognized for 5 additional minutes.

Mr. RATCHFORD. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MAVROULES. I yield to the gentleman from Connecticut.

Mr. RATCHFORD. I thank the gentleman for taking the time because I think colloquy is important, and I do not think it should be a one-sided colloquy either. There is a difference of opinion here.

But is it not true that in the history of the system we have now seen about 30 different options offered, and we have had experts as well known as Secretary Weinberger saying that "there is not any ground based system that is survivable?" Is that not a quote from the Secretary of Defense?

Mr. MAVROULES. You are correct. As a matter of fact, I believe it is correct to say there are 35 different basing modes that they came forward with. That is a good point.

Mr. RATCHFORD. I may be a bit conservative in my quoting of a number. But it is clear that we are talking about a system (1), that is costly and (2), that cannot be defended. And finally, I would say to the gentleman, did you not state in your opening remarks that we are proceeding in other areas, that we are proceeding with the cruise missile, that we are proceeding with the Trident submarine and that we are looking at options relating to the Trident, and that these options are there and they are both less expensive and less vulnerable than what is being talked about today?

Mr. MAVROULES. Not only that, my dear friend, but when you talk about the other parts of the triad system, I think it is only fair that those who take the floor give a true analysis and a true judgment call on the qualitative superiority, qualitative

superiority that we do have in other parts of the triad.

Mr. RATCHFORD. I would thank the gentleman. I think he makes the point and makes it well.

There is a quote from H. G. Wells that really applies here. Wells said that "history more and more is a race between education and catastrophe." I would say this afternoon, based upon all of the information that we have, that we ought to cast an educated vote in favor of the Marvroules amendment, avoid a catastrophe and end this continuing saga of the MX missile.

I thank the gentleman.

Mr. MAVROULES. I thank you very much.

Before I yield to my dear friend from New York and then my dear friend from New Jersey, I just want to once again put to sleep, you know, the term unilateral disarmament which has been used here a number of times. If you read the substitute to the amendment of Mr. BENNETT's we eliminate that argument once and for all here today.

Mr. GREEN. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MAVROULES. I yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. GREEN. I thank my colleague from Massachusetts for yielding, and I rise in support of his amendment.

Frankly, I think I differ from some other supporters of his amendment because I do not think it makes much difference in terms of the arms control negotiation whether we build 40 MX missiles or 30 MX missiles or 15 MX missiles. We know and the Soviets know that this is a weapon that does not do what it was intended to do.

When the Carter administration began this program for the MX missile, it did so because the Minuteman was not survivable in a Minuteman silo. Now we are going to put that MX missile in the same unsurvivable silo.

Plainly it does not work, and I do not think it does much good to build 40 of them, or 30 of them, or 15 of them if it does not do the job for which it is intended.

Now we learn that even the offensive part of its job, if God forbid we wanted a first strike weapon, would not work either. For heaven's sake, when we are facing a $200 billion deficit, why waste the money on this when we have so many other important needs and important needs in the defense area.

I worry that we have no capacity for projecting conventional forces into the Persian Gulf. If it is a choice for me between the MX missile and the C-17 aircraft, I sure would rather have that transport capability and the ability to protect American interests.

So I think that for budgetary reasons and for defense reasons we make a great mistake to waste this money on a weapon that does not work.

I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. MAVROULES. I thank the gentleman for his comments.

Mr. COURTER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MAVROULES. I yield to the gentleman from New Jersey.

Mr. COURTER. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

There are a couple of points I would like to make. One is just a legitimate question because I am not sure about the containment of your amendment, your substitute. Does your substitute eliminate the $1 billion, strike the $1 billion that is necessary for the production of the 21 MX missiles that this body approved last year?

Mr. MAVROULES. It is a question of interpretation and that was a question that was brought up here this morning.

Mr. COURTER. It is an important question.

Mr. MAVROULES. Our substitute, the original amendment reduces by $2.7 billion the procurement of the 30 missiles which has been agreed to by the Armed Services Committee.

Mr. COURTER. If the gentleman will continue to yield, you did not really answer the question to my satisfaction. Do I take it from your comments that indeed your substitute does eliminate the $1 billion that would be necessary for the production of the 21 missiles we approved last year?

Mr. MAVROULES. No. There is no straight up or down answer on that.

Mr. COURTER. It may or may not?

Mr. MAVROULES. Excuse me, let me respond. There is no straight up or down answer on that. I think if you want to take into consideration all of the funds that we have voted for the procurement and production——

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. MAVROULES) has again expired.

(On request of Mr. COURTER and by unanimous consent, Mr. MAVROULES was allowed to proceed for 3 additional minutes.)

Mr. MAVROULES. In order to continue this colloquy, the interpretation given to me by a staff member this morning is that we take $1 billion out of there and you knock it all out. My interpretation is that you get some $3 billion for the procurement and production of the 21 missiles last year. And it is my opinion they can continue with the procurement of those 21 missiles.

Mr. SIMON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MAVROULES. I yield to the gentleman from Illinois.

Mr. SIMON. I thank the gentleman. I want to commend him and my colleague from Florida.

It seems to me we have a couple of fundamental questions. One is, What is the fundamental military need of this country? And that I think the gentleman from Florida has addressed, and that is in the conventional weapon area.

The second question is: What is a deterrent? Do we have a satisfactory deterrent?

Well, if all of the thousands of warheads we have without this particular MX missile is not a deterrent, then there is no one rational on the Soviet side, and the MX is not going to do the trick either.

□ 1430

When you take your children to the toy store, you cannot let them buy every toy in the store. And when you take the admirals and generals to the weapons store, you cannot let them buy every weapon in the weapon store.

We have to be looking at what the real needs, the real defense needs of this country are. And I commend the gentleman.

Mr. MAVROULES. I thank the gentleman.

I yield to my dear friend, the gentleman from North Dakota.

Mr. DORGAN. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

I come from the State of North Dakota and a couple of weeks ago when I was home I was flying in a small plane up in the northern part of the State, and I looked down once again on that concrete pyramid that the Government built in the 1970's. It is the free world's only antiballistic missile system. It cost us, I think with R&D about $5 billion.

The reason I mention it today is it still sits up there on the prairies, but it is just a shell. When it was debated in Congress we were told the ABM was absolutely essential for this country's defense; absolutely essential for the defense of America, they said. We spent the billions of dollars on that ABM system, and within 30 days after they opened the doors, they announced they were dismantling it.

Why? Because they said it was not useful; it was obsolete.

So I understand about wasting money for defense projects over in the Pentagon. We understand it well in North Dakota. We also have 300 underground ICBM Minuteman III with MIRV'ed warheads. So we understand about the Minuteman program also.

Now I want to ask the gentleman a question. There are two parts to this MX debate that puzzle me. One, for a couple of years the President has insisted that these Minuteman missiles imbedded in the prairies in North Dakota and Montana are vulnerable to Soviet attack. Now he is suggesting we build a better missile, a more expensive and more accurate, and put them into those same silos—the silos he said are vulnerable.

Does that suggest they will be less vulnerable to Soviet attack?

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

(On request of Mr. DORGAN, and by unanimous consent, Mr. MAVROULES was allowed to proceed for 4 additional minutes.)

Mr. DORGAN. If the gentleman will continue to yield for a question.

Does that suggest the silos will be any less vulnerable for the MX than currently exists, according to the President and his advisers, for the Minuteman missile?

Mr. MAVROULES. As a matter of fact, what they are trying to do, I believe, is harden those silos in order for the MX missile to be a little more effective. If you read in your GAO report, even they doubt if we can harden those silos hard enough to take any kind of a hit from a Soviet Union missile.

As a matter of fact they even have doubts about their own accuracy.

Mr. DORGAN. If I may ask the second question, it seems to me the notion behind the building of an MX is that the MX has greater accuracy and they suggest somehow that if we can put at risk the Soviet land-based system, that we will be advantaged. It seems to me you would not want to put at risk an empty silo. So what you put at risk is a silo with a Soviet missile in it.

The only possible reason for wanting to do that would be to develop a first strike capability. Does that not completely depart from existing nuclear strategy in this country?

Mr. MAVROULES. There is no question. As a matter of fact, this was before I came here, in 1979, the reason they wanted the MX system as part of a mobile system is because the present basing mode could not take any kind of a hit from the Soviet missile, and they have come full circle, right around the circle to the same basing mode.

Mr. DORGAN. Let me again congratulate the gentleman. Without levity, I suggest if the Soviets announced tomorrow they were developing a cavalry, some of us in this Chamber would start buying horses. We continue to insist we want to keep up with something being done elsewhere even if it is stupid. That does not make sense to me.

Mr. MAVROULES. I thank the gentleman for his contribution. I yield to my dear friend, the gentleman from Montana.

Mr. WILLIAMS of Montana. I thank the gentleman for yielding and want to expand on what our colleague from North Dakota said, concerning the reason for the MX.

The reason being, to use the short-term phrase, the window of vulnerability. There are many in this country and I count myself among them, who question that window of vulnerability. I believe that the facts amply demonstrate that the American people have been snookered by Defense Department analysts for more than a third of a century now.

We all remember the bomber gap of the 1950's, the missile gap of the 1960's, the ABM gap, and now the window of vulnerability. Let me briefly discuss each.

In the bomber gap of the 1950's, it was projected that the Soviet Union would have 600 to 700 long-range bombers by 1959. So we began to build. In reality, they had not built 600 to 700 by then; they had built less than 200; but in response, we built 600.

And then came the missile gap of the 1960's and to show that this is nonpartisan, the missile gap was the invention of a Democratic administration. The missile gap projected through defense analysts in the Pentagon that the Soviets would have 1,000 missiles by 1961. So we began to build.

We had 1,000 and they had 10; count them, 10. And then came the ABM gap. And it was projected that the Soviets would have 10,000 ABM's by 1970.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

(On request of Mr. WILLIAMS of Montana, and by unanimous consent, Mr. MAVROULES was allowed to proceed for 2 additional minutes.)

Mr. WILLIAMS of Montana. Will the gentleman continue to yield.

Mr. MAVROULES. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. WILLIAMS of Montana. So in the ABM gap to which I refer, it was projected that the Soviets would have 10,000 ABM's by 1970. When the ABM treaty was signed in 1972, the Soviets had only 64, not 10,000. The American people paid through the nose for those defense analysts' mistakes.

The American people were snookered. And now we have the window of vulnerability. And this administration asks that the American people spend $685,000 a minute for the Pentagon alone to close that window of vulnerability.

Thus, just in the 2½ hours of this debate, this Nation has spent $100 million to close a window of vulnerability which we will find out at the end, of this decade never existed. The American people are being snookered. We should not build the MX. It is not needed.

I thank the gentleman.

Mr. MAVROULES. I thank the gentleman for his contribution.

I yield to my dear friend from California.

Mr. HUNTER. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to answer the gentleman from Montana and the gentleman from Illinois and tell them what is real and what has happened.

Since 1972 the Soviet Union has built, emplaced, and targeted on ourselves and our allies some 758 SS-17's, SS-18's, and SS-19's. Since that we have built zero missiles since that time.

The Soviets have emplaced or built and launched 38 ballistic missile submarines; we have built and launched 3. The Soviet Union has built and has operational some 200 strategic bombers; we have built none.

That is the arms race. And I would suggest to the gentleman who said that our arms negotiation policies were bankrupt in the year 1983, that nobody in this House can claim that the atmosphere was conducive to arms negotiations following the KAL 007 incident.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

(On request of Mr. HUNTER, and by unanimous consent, Mr. MAVROULES was allowed to proceed for 30 additional seconds.)

Mr. MAVROULES. I yield further to the gentleman from California.

Mr. HUNTER. I thank the gentleman for continuing to yield. You know, we had Mr. Gromyko coming back and talking to our Secretary of State and saying the infamous words, "We will do it again." I do not think anybody can lay that at the door of President Reagan and say our negotiating policies were bankrupt in 1983. It was not a year to negotiate arms control policy.

AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. DICKINSON TO THE AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. MAVROULES AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR THE AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. BENNETT

Mr. DICKINSON. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment to the substitute amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. DICKINSON to the amendment offered by Mr. MAVROULES as a substitute for the amendment offered by Mr. BENNETT: Strike out the amount proposed by the substitute amendment to be inserted on page 10, line 19, and insert in lieu thereof "$7,756,600,000.

Strike out the section proposed by the substitute amendment to be inserted at the end of title I and insert in lieu thereof the following:

POLICY CONCERNING ACQUISITION OF ADDITIONAL MX MISSILES

SEC. . (a) It is the policy of Congress not to take any action that would reward the Soviet Union through the unilateral cancellation by the United States of the MX strategic nuclear missile weapon system for which funds are authorized in this title while the Soviet Union continues to act in a manner indicating that it is unwilling to take actions to further the control and limitation of similar types of strategic nuclear missile weapon systems.

(b)(1) Subject to paragraph (3), funds appropriated pursuant to the authorization of appropriations in section 103(a) for procurement of missiles for the Air Force may be

used to acquire not more than 15 additional MX missiles, but no funds may be obligated for the acquisition of such missiles until April 1, 1985.

(2) Immediately after April 1, 1985, the President shall determine whether the Soviet Union is acting, as of April 1, 1985, in a manner indicating that it is willing to take actions to further the control and limitation of types of strategic nuclear missile weapon systems similar to the MX strategic missile weapons system authorized for the Air Force by this title and shall immediately transmit written notification of that determination to Congress.

(3)(A) If the President's determination under paragraph (2) is that the Soviet Union is not acting in such a manner, the amount appropriated pursuant to the authorization of appropriations in section 103(a) for the acquisition of 15 additional MX missiles may be obligated, but only if the President also determines, and includes in the written notification to Congress under paragraph (2), that—

(i) the obligation of such funds is in the national interest; and

(ii) as of April 1, 1985, the United States is willing to act to further the control and limitation on the MX strategic nuclear missile weapon system authorized for the Air Force by this title.

(B) If the President's determination under paragraph (2) is that the Soviet Union is acting in such a manner, none of the amount appropriated pursuant to the authorization of appropriations in section 103(a) for the acquisition of 15 additional MX missiles may be obligated. However, if after the determination under paragraph (2) the President makes a further determination that the Soviet Union is not acting in good faith with respect to its willingness to take actions described in paragraph (2) and transmits written notification of that determination to Congress, such funds may be obligated after the end of the 30-day period beginning on the date of the receipt of that notification by Congress unless, before the end of such 30-day period, a joint resolution is enacted disapproving the obligation of such funds.

(c) Obligations for the MX missile program of funds appropriated pursuant to the authorization of appropriations in section 103(a) is subject to section 1231 of the Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1984 (Public Law 98-94; 97 Stat. 693).

Mr. DICKINSON (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the amendment be considered as read and printed in the RECORD.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Alabama?

There was no objection.

Mr. DICKINSON. For the information of the Members, this is in substance and form and in fact the same wording of the amendment that we are already discussing. There was a substitute offered, so I had to offer the same amendment that had been offered on the original. So it is not a deviation.

The same arguments that were applicable before are still applicable.

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield to me?

Mr. DICKINSON. Yes; I would be pleased to yield to the gentleman from Washington (Mr. DICKS).

□ 1440

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, first of all, I want to say of my friends who have offered the Bennett-Mavroules amendment, I know many of the individuals who are involved in this effort very well and I reject this notion that any one of them supports unilateral disarmament. I think that is wrong.

On the same score, the gentleman from New York made some comments about the group of us who have tried to work with the administration to impliment the Scowcroft recommendations. In some areas, we have succeeded and in some areas we wish we had succeeded more and we find ourselves today in a very difficult situation.

I happen to believe that the amendment that has been offered by Mr. PRITCHARD and Mr. ASPIN is a fair compromise. It gives us an opportunity to fence for at least 6 months the money for 15 missiles.

Last year, Congressman GORE and I offered an amendment to reduce MX from 27 down to 21. This year we are going from 40, in the President's budget, down to 15. We are slowing the deployment of this missile so that we can preserve its negotiating capability in the negotiations, if they are resumed next year. I hope that they are.

But I want to tell my colleagues something else. When we started on this effort to impliment the Scowcroft recommendations, I was convinced that the administration was headed on a confrontational path with the Soviet Union. We hoped that by saying that we would support the recommendations of the Scowcroft report that we could get off that confrontational path and get onto an arms control path, a negotiating path.

We said to the administration that we felt that their position at INF and START were basically nonnegotiable, that they had to be changed. Over the opposition of many in the Defense Department, Mr. Perle, Mr. Ikle, Mr. Weinberger, the President overruled those people and said, yes, we will change these positions to make them more negotiable, to make them have the credibility for honest negotiations.

Now the President also said something that has been overlooked. He said in his letter to us last spring that he would not develop a first-strike potential. And I am very concerned that we not develop a first-strike potential.

In order to decide what that is, one has to look at the Soviet force structure. They have about 1,400 ICBM's, three-fourths of their warheads are held by their ICBM's. I would be very concerned that if, when we added up 100 MX's, or 50—which is where I am going to end this relationship—and the D-5's that we are going to deploy, and the Midgetman that we are going to deploy, that when you added up all those warheads, that we had the capability to take out the 1,400 land-based Soviet ICBM's. I think that would be dangerous and destabilizing.

The challenge for us is to set subceilings on MX, D-5 and Midgetman so that in the totality of the deployment, we do not achieve so much hard target capability to give a first-strike threat.

What we are talking about here today, even with 100 MX's, does not give the United States a first-strike potential. It does not get anywhere near that threshold.

So I reject out of hand this notion that the MX is a first-strike weapon because we do not have enough MX's to have the potential of a first-strike against the Soviet Union.

This was something that the Scowcroft Commission recognized in cutting back from 200 missiles down to 100. They understood that we should not develop a first-strike potential.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Alabama (Mr. DICKINSON) has expired.

(By unanimous consent, Mr. DICKINSON was allowed to proceed for 5 additional minutes.)

Mr. DICKS. If the gentleman will continue to yield, we are caught in a very difficult situation. I understand how deeply many of my friends on the Democratic side feel in opposition to MX, but I also feel that the commitments that the administration has made: one, not to develop a first-strike capability; two, to maintain flexibility in its negotiating positions, and three, and this is very important, the President and Mr. McFarlane have pledged that they will keep SALT I, SALT II and the ABM agreement as long as the Soviets respond and reciprocate. I think those are important things that we want to keep this President's feet to the fire in response to. I think if we break off the Scowcroft Commission agreement that we entered into last year and the President should be reelected—by the way, I am supporting a Democrat, Mr. Mondale, for President. I feel if you want real arms control and people in the administration who are really committed to arms control, the best thing you can do is vote for Mr. Mondale, that is my first position—but if perchance Mr. Reagan is reelected and we have him for another 4 years as President of the United States, then we are going to want these commitments that were made last year to be enforced. If we breach this agreement now, I think we will hand a victory to the people in the Pentagon who want to discard arms control, who want to resort to classical defense, who want an unrestrained arms race.

I think the President is a man of his word. I have trouble with some of his advisers who I do not think support his commitment to the Scowcroft Commission recommendations, but I do believe that the commitments that have been made will be honored. And I think that is a very positive step in the right direction.

Now let us talk about MX as a military system. A lot of disparaging comments are made about it. Yes; I understand those, but for my friends who talked about the window of vulnerability, remember the Scowcroft Commission report said that when you look at the synergistic relationship between the submarines, the bombers, and the land-based missiles, only a fool would try to strike the land-based missiles by themselves, because they would be faced with a devastating response.

So there is survivability because we have a triad. But beyond that and most importantly, we now are on the verge of a technical breakthrough that will allow us to harden our silos so that at least 50 percent of the 100 missiles would survive in a first strike by the Soviet Union.

And beyond that, the Soviets are moving out of vulnerable silos into hardened silos. So the leveraging effect that the Scowcroft Commission report talked about of getting them into more secure silos and getting them to move toward mobile basing modes, those two things are being accomplished. They add to stability. That is what we want. We want both sides to have secure forces.

And the fact of MX has moved them toward mobility and extra hardness which adds to stability.

So MX in my mind now can be reduced to modernization. Minuteman IV, a new system to replace our old ICBM's. And I think in terms of the freeze resolution we all agree that some modernization had to occur before we got to the freeze.

This is the proper form in terms of that modernization.

Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DICKINSON. I yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. SOLOMON. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of these amendments that would continue the development and deployment of the MX missile program.

There are a number of important political, and diplomatic benefits to be gained from deployment of the MX missile. The success of future arms control talks hinge on the determination of the United States to maintain a sufficient deterrence and efforts short of this goal not only fail to provide sufficent incentives to negotiate seriously, but also place at risk the security of the United States and our allies.

Short of deploying the MX, the Soviets have absolutely no incentive to negotiate seriously or even return to the arms talks which were suspended following the Soviet walkout.

The United States has failed over the last 10 years to modernize our ICBM force according to announced timetables.

Retention of the strategic triad, land, sea and air-based forces, upon which our security is based, hinges on improving and modernizing our ICBM force. No other leg of the triad provides the hard-target strike capability and targeting accuracy of the land-based systems.

Failure to make such improvements reduces U.S. deterrence vis-a-vis the Soviets and places at risk other legs of the triad. The proposed small ICBM, so-called Midgetman, will not have the hard target capability of the MX missile and is intended to complement the MX missile, not replace it.

In addition, the MX missile silo can be superhardened. With superhardened silos, the MX missile is survivable and it is the most cost-effective system to strengthen and modernize our strategic forces.

Building the MX missile is the first U.S. attempt to significantly improve our land-based strategic deterrence in over a decade. During the same period of time, the Soviets have deployed over 600 new missiles which have placed existing U.S. land-based forces in jeopardy. These Soviet deployments and corresponding improvements in targeting and guidance, coupled, with declining U.S. land-based strength, is quickly providing the Soviet Union with an assured, first-strike capability.

The MX missile represents not only the most effective means to address this U.S. strategic deficiency in the short term, but also provides a credible land-based deterrence well into the 21st century. The MX missile, with its improved guidance and ability to place at risk-hardened Soviet targets, begins to redress the imbalance and does so at the earliest possible date. The MX, far from acting as a destabilizing weapon system, actually serves to decrease the threat of a Soviet first-strike attack on the United States.

I urge you to support the continued development and deployment of the MX program.

Mr. DICKINSON. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from California (Mr. BADHAM).

Mr. BADHAM. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Chairman, we are here discussing how best we might reward the Soviet Union for walking away from the bargaining table. We have one proposal that would suggest that we reward them by ending production of last year's model and of this year's model MX missile, which most experts would agree is a needed weapons system.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The time of the gentleman from Alabama (Mr. DICKINSON) has again expired.

□ 1450

(On request of Mr. CHENEY and by unanimous consent, Mr. DICKINSON was allowed to proceed for 5 additional minutes.)

POINT OF ORDER

Mr. HERTEL of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, I have a point of order.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. SIMON). What is the point of order of the gentleman from Michigan?

Mr. HERTEL of Michigan. Just to clarify things. We have been at the debate almost 3 hours at this point. My point of order is that the Dickinson amendment presently before us is the same as the Price amendment that was offered before, that the Mavroules substitute to the Price substitute, it was a substitute to the Bennett amendment originally, that the Mavroules substitute is the same as the Bennett amendment originally.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The point of order comes too late if the gentleman is objecting to the Dickinson amendment.

Mr. HERTEL of Michigan. It is more a point of inquiry. If we are having an escalation of amendments, this can go on and on, so far as offering further amendments that are exactly the same.

It has nothing to do with the gentleman making his remarks at this time. It is just an overall question I ask of the Chair.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The final stage in the amendment process has been reached.

First of all, the question will be put on the Price amendment. If the Price amendment should be disposed of, then an additional amendment to the Bennett amendment would be in order at that point.

Mr. HERTEL of Michigan. I thank the Chair.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Alabama (Mr. DICKINSON).

Mr. DICKINSON. Mr. Chairman, I continue to yield to the gentleman from California (Mr. BADHAM).

Mr. BADHAM. I thank the gentleman for his continuing to yield.

I might say at this juncture that when the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. MAVROULES) was offering another substitute, we let him go on and on and on, and I particularly questioned him as to whether or not he should have the time, and we all agreed, and I withdrew my reservation on the basis that he should have the time. And now the opposite is being taken by the proponents of this amendment.

To continue, Mr. Chairman: Or we are going to offer a lesser reward to the Soviet Union for walking away from the bargaining table by only producing 15 needed MX missiles this year and just halting production for a while, which disrupts the production line, which makes the whole program more expensive, in the hopes that we might be holding out on an olive branch to the Soviet Union in hopes that they might come back to the bargaining table.

We have held out olive branches before, Mr. Chairman and my colleagues. We held out the B-1, a rather large olive branch, and in response did the Soviets come back to the table? No. Did they stay at the table? No. What they did do as we all know they produced the Backfire intercontinental bomber, and they produced the Blackjack intercontinental bomber. That is some response to an olive branch.

But I would like to raise one point that I do not think has been raised in this amendment, and that is the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Since the 1940's and the 1950's, in order to promote nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, we the United States, offered to be the free world's safety umbrella of nuclear weapons if other people would not produce them. "We will protect you, citizens of Europe and allies of NATO, with our nuclear deterrent, which we will use if challenged by the Soviets."

So Europe is without a nuclear deterrent.

Only recently, after the installation and deployment of some 372 triple warheaded SS-20 European-range Soviet missiles did we agree to remove our short-range nuclear missiles from Europe and replace them on a build-down basis with Pershing II and ground-launched Cruise missiles.

It has been, like pulling teeth to get our NATO allies to agree, in the case of the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany, and the Italian Government, to install these nuclear missiles on their soil. If they did not do this, they would put to risk all people in Europe against blackmail, nuclear blackmail. If nuclear blackmail were attempted on the Europeans or one nuclear missile was fired at Europe, the President of the United States would have the choice of letting Europe go, or firing our ICBM force from the United States. Hardly a very good choice.

If we were now to destroy MX, if we were to eliminate the MX program, it would be a clear signal to the Europeans that we do not care about them and we do not care that much about ourselves, and you can bet your bottom dollar that the GLCM's and the Pershing missiles would on request be removed from European soil, and the NATO alliance would go down the drain. That would be the ultimate reward for the Soviets leaving the bargaining table.

I think it is unfortunate that we even have to consider a compromise, but I think the compromise is necessary.

I thank the gentleman, my esteemed colleague from Alabama, for yielding.

Mr. WIRTH. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DICKINSON. I yield to the gentleman from Colorado.

Mr. WIRTH. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

(By unanimous consent, Mr. WIRTH was allowed to speak out of order.)

DR. EDWARD TELLER AND DR. CARL SAGAN TO DISCUSS NUCLEAR WINTER AT 3 P.M. IN SPEAKER'S DINING ROOM

Mr. WIRTH. Mr. Chairman, the purpose of taking this time is to remind the Members that 3 o'clock this afternoon in the Speaker's dining room, Congressman GINGRICH and I are sponsoring a discussion of nuclear winter between Dr. Edward Teller and Dr. Carl Sagan. That will be at 3 o'clock this afternoon in the Speaker's dining room, two different perspectives on nuclear winter. The ramifications of that for this debate on the MX I think should be understood by all of us. It is for Members only, at 3 o'clock this afternoon, at the Speaker's dining room.

Mr. CHENEY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DICKINSON. I yield to the gentleman from Wyoming.

Mr. CHENEY. Mr. Chairman, I am disturbed by what I see happening here today, not only with some of the arguments I have heard offered, but also because I sense that what we have before us is evidence that the United States is incapable of making a decision—a difficult decision, admittedly—and carrying through with it in any kind of reasonable fashion.

As most of you know, the MX is scheduled for deployment in my State. Certainly my life would have been much simpler in recent months if the decision had been made to deploy it elsewhere. But people in Wyoming were prepared to accept the decision and to move forward and to do their part to enhance the Nation's security.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The time of the gentleman from Alabama (Mr. DICKINSON) has again expired.

(On request of Mr. CHENEY and by unanimous consent, Mr. DICKINSON was allowed to proceed for 5 additional minutes.)

Mr. DICKINSON. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to continue to yield to the gentleman from Wyoming.

Mr. CHENEY. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Chairman, let me briefly for the record again remind my colleagues of what has transpired over the last 12 or 15 years:

In the early 1970's, the Nixon administration decided we would eventually need a follow-on system for the Minuteman and began on the MX.

In the mid-1970's, the Ford administration reviewed all of the issues involving the land-based ICBM force and decided to proceed with the MX.

In the late 1970's, the Carter administration addressed the issues anew and decided to proceed with the MX.

In the early 1980's, the Reagan administration reviewed the issues involving ICBM's and decided to proceed with the MX.

In 1982 and 1983 the distinguished Scowcroft Commission composed of senior defense experts from the past four administrations reviewed the issues and decided to proceed with the MX.

And, finally, this House has debated this issue repeatedly throughout my time here and decided to proceed with the MX.

Now we are faced once again with yet another effort to undo all that has gone before and to reverse all of those earlier decisions and terminate the MX deployment.

You must admit that an objective observer reviewing the history of the MX might reasonably conclude that as a nation we are incapable of making an important decision and carrying through with determination to see that it is implemented.

What I am most concerned about, however, is not just the MX, but the question of whether we will ever be capable as a House of making a decision to modernize and upgrade our land-based ICBM force.

If we fail to upgrade our land-based ICBM force, we will implicitly be supporting an end to one leg of our strategic triad, the foundation of our security for 30 years.

Many of my colleagues today who will vote to shut down the MX program will justify their vote on the grounds that they still support modernization of our force because they support the development and deployment of the so-called Midgetman. I, too, think we should pursue the concept of small, mobile, single warhead missiles, both to improve the survivability of our force and, hopefully, as part of an effort to increase the stability in the nuclear relationship by reducing the ratio of warheads to launchers. But, Mr. Chairman, I am a skeptic. I am a skeptic because I question whether or not this House will ever be prepared to vote to deploy the Midgetman.

I am well aware of the political controversy that surrounds a decision to deploy an ICBM in a congressional district. It is not easy to persuade people that their community should be home to intercontinental ballistic missiles armed with nuclear warheads and

therefore a potential target of the Soviet Union. If we scrap the MX for Midgetman, and given the 10 to 1 ratio on warheads, it will take 1,000 Midgetman missiles to compensate for the MX program. Clearly a decision to deploy Midgetman will involve a decision to locate those missiles in congressional districts all over America. I wonder how many of my colleagues are prepared to step forward today and to announce that they are prepared to have some of those missiles based in their districts.

Quite frankly, Mr. Chairman, I do not believe Midgetman will ever be deployed.

□ 1500

On the subject of arms control, I must say that I have grave doubts that what we do here today will advance the cause of arms control. All the discussion so far seems to assume that we have total control over whether or not there are arms control talks. But obviously, the Soviets have something to say about it as well.

In my opinion, the Soviets have made a decision to resist all blandishments to enter into any arms control agreement. I do not believe the Soviets want an arms control agreement. I think they perceive the whole question of arms control as a device to divide the West, to separate the United States from its NATO allies. They have concluded that their interests are served by walking out of the arms talks, both the INF and the START talks.

Furthermore, there is considerable evidence to indicate that the Soviets are not complying with existing arms control agreements. Some of my colleagues suggest that since the Soviets walked out of the talks we should now cancel the MX. I must say the Soviets appear to be on the verge of achieving far more significant limitations on U.S. military capability than they could have ever hoped to achieve if they had stayed at the bargaining table in Geneva.

A vote for the Bennett-Mavroules amendment, no matter how you might seek to rationalize it, is a vote to reward the Soviets for their contemptuous behavior. Much as I respect my colleagues who offer the amendment, and after listening to hours on the subject, I still fail to understand why we should unilaterally, and I say unilaterally cancel our only near term hope of responding to the Soviet military buildup.

From the standpoint of our European allies, I also fear approval of the Bennett amendment will threaten to unravel all of the progress that has been made over the last few months to implement the two-track NATO decision, to negotiate and to deploy the Pershing II and the ground-launched cruise missile.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The time of the gentleman from Alabama (Mr. DICKINSON) has again expired.

(By unanimous consent, Mr. DICKINSON was allowed to proceed for 2 additional minutes.)

Mr. DICKINSON. Mr. Chairman, let me say before I yield, it is not my intent to control the time here. I sought the time so that some who are not on the committee could be heard at this time. I notice though, that most of the people that are standing seeking recognition are members of the committee, and for that reason, I am not going to seek any further extensions of time.

I yield to the gentleman from Wyoming (Mr. CHENEY).

Mr. CHENEY. I thank the gentleman for yielding further.

The Dutch are already threatening to renege on their commitment to deploy cruise missiles. The pending vote in the Dutch Parliament next month is likely to go against deployment, especially if we lack the will to carry through on deployment of the MX here in the United States.

The hope that somehow delaying the MX for a year or canceling it altogther will bring the Soviets back to the table or lead to a breakthrough in arms talks is naive in the extreme. It is the worst sort of wishful thinking to assume that somehow the Soviets will now be willing to accept limits on those systems they possess which threaten the United States when we are foolish enough to give up our systems unilaterally without regard to the fact that the Soviets have given up nothing in return.

Mr. Chairman, continued progress on building and deploying the MX Peacekeeper missile is vital to the modernization of our strategic triad; it is essential for continued maintenance of allied unity in responding to the Soviet threat, and it is vital that we not reward Soviet intransigence by unilaterally canceling one of our most efficient and powerful weapons systems.

In the final analysis, Mr. Chairman, I am prepared to support the amendment of the gentleman from Illinois, the distinguished chairman of the committee, Mr. PRICE, as the least worst alternative. But none of the alternatives we are presented with here today is very acceptable.

Mr. DICKINSON. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. BROOMFIELD).

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I commend the President for his arms reduction efforts, and his appeals to the Soviets to return to the talks. Now is the time to move ahead with the MX effort, and the bipartisan program that we approved last year.

I believe that the Aspin approach is both a sound and a sensible one. It is a program that all of us can live with. The plan would authorize funds for a limited number of these missiles, at this time. The funds would not be spent, however, until a later date. It will give all of us some breathing space while we see if future arms reductions talks move along.

Although this approach is less than going full steam ahead with the MX program, it is realistic and deserves our support. The Aspin proposal keeps the MX program alive. It clearly does not reward the Soviets for walking out on the Geneva talks. It gives our future negotiators in the talks leverage. It encourages our Government to continue its serious and active efforts in arms reductions.

Our country has a strong record of carrying out our commitments under previous international agreements. We have supported, and will continue to support, arms reduction efforts. We have encouraged the Soviet Union to join us in a spirit of cooperation to achieve real reductions. We truly want to reduce the risk of nuclear war.

Since 1979, the United States has withdrawn over 1,000 nuclear weapons from Europe. We will continue to withdraw one additional nuclear device for each Pershing and cruise missile deployed. America and its allies have also announced plans to withdraw an additional 1,400 nuclear weapons from the European theater. We even missed our target date for fielding a modernized ICBM system by the end of the 1970's.

In response to our efforts to reduce the levels of warheads, the Soviets undertook a massive buildup of offensive strategic weapons. This response included the deployment of SS-20 missiles which were aimed at European cities. The Soviet effort was clearly excessive. They have deployed over 800 SS-17's, SS-18's, and SS-19's. These missiles are similar to the MX. Now, the Soviets are testing two new ICBM's, the MIRV'd SSX-24, and the SSX-25. The Soviet Union is still pursuing its comprehensive program to strengthen its strategic forces.

Our bargaining position at the Strategic Arms Reductions Talks (START) is flexible and fair. It incorporates the Scowcroft Commission's recommendations to have mutual and guaranteed build-down and tradeoffs for each side.

A few months ago, negotiations at the Mutual Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks resumed. The United States announced a new initiative to break the deadlock over existing force levels. The United States is also promoting a ban of chemical weapons at the Conference on Disarmament. The Soviets, however, have not responded to our MBFR or Conference on Disarmament proposals.

Unfortunately, the Soviet representative walked out of the Intermediate Nuclear Force (INF) talks. The Krem-

lin has yet to resume the START talks. Our Government is prepared to negotiate immediately, without any preconditions. We are determined to reduce the present high levels of nuclear weapons in the world. Despite our Government's initiatives, the Soviets are still refusing to return to the bargaining table.

It is noteworthy that our Government is attempting to conduct serious talks with the Soviets in spite of the U.S.S.R's unfortunate track record in complying with international agreements. The tragic downing of the unarmed Korean airliner last September was a clear violation of both the spirit and the letter of international air accords. After saying that they would participate in the Olympics, the Soviets quickly backed out. I firmly believe that Moscow's refusal to return to the talks, as well as the planned Salvadoran guerrilla "Tet offensive" on the eve of the Presidential elections, are parts of a clever campaign to influence the outcome of the elections.

Now is the time to show our national strength. We cannot afford to wait. We must maintain our determination to achieve significant arms reductions. To get these meaningful reductions, however, our Nation must show strength and resolve.

From a national security point of view, our country truly needs the MX. It is a key part of the overall strategic modernization program. It will serve to counter the buildup of the large, land-based missiles in the Soviet Union.

Stopping the MX program now would damage our national security efforts. It would reward the Soviet Union for its recent arms control behavior. Disapproval of the missile would encourage that country to further stonewall our arms control efforts. We must not reward the Kremlin for their current unacceptable behavior toward arms control.

Let us face the facts. We need the MX for legitimate national security reasons. Should the Soviets fail to negotiate seriously in future arms talks, we can proceed ahead with the full MX program, no holds barred. I am willing to give the Aspin alternative a chance. I call upon my colleagues to join me in support of this effort.

Mrs. SCHROEDER. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words, and I rise in support of the Bennett amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I have always wanted to have a research grant to study what the vote count was before we began congressional debate, and then what the vote count is after the congressional debate to show how effective congressional debate is. Because I often have a feeling that we do not listen to each other and we hear the same arguments over and over and over again without really listening to each other.

Today I would like to bring some new information to shed on the debate and I really hope people will listen. Congresswoman MARY ROSE OAKAR and myself went to the Soviet Union over Easter when they invited all the Congresswomen to come and discuss arms control. We went there and spent 4 intensive days discussing arms control with them during the Easter break. We started early in the morning; we went late at night, and being as to how there are only two of us, we really got into detail. We took our new Defense Department's book showing how they are ahead. They countered with their book showing we are ahead. We went head on, item by item. My 11 years on the Armed Services Committee was very helpful.

We discussed very intently the problems in militarizing space, because that was a very major concern of theirs. We discussed the Pershing II; we discussed the cruise; we discussed the Chemical Weapons Treaty; we discussed the MBFR; we discussed all sorts of areas such as that. We discussed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty; we discussed SALT II; we discussed many things that have been laying on the table.

But, we had to bring up the MX. Remember that bargaining chip has been on the table for years. The Soviet Union officials never mentioned it in any of our talks; never mentioned it. It is an old issue. We would say, "What about the MX?" The MX has been funded every year by Congress. And they would say, "You go ahead and build it, that is fine, that is not a concern." They really could not have cared less; we had to mention it and we had to bring it up over and over again to even get a reaction. Even then, it was so be it.

One of the things we keep hearing about is this is modernization. The Soviets agree. They said the MX is modernization, go ahead. Let us do history. The MX did not get started as modernization. The MX got started because someone said, "Oh, my goodness, the Soviets have satellites up there and they have taken pictures of all the holes where we keep our land based missiles." OK?

They have taken pictures of the holes, and we have missiles in the holes, and the holes do not move, and as their targeting gets better, they target the holes. Therefore, our missiles in the holes are vulnerable because they are in nonmobile holes.

Now let me tell you, after you spend all this money on the MX you know what you are going to have? The same hole. You are literally throwing taxpayer's money down the same old vulnerable holes. The Soviets know it, and that is why they do not use night lights, worrying about the MX. They would love to see us throwing more taxpayer money down that hole because it frees them to go spend money on other things. There is nothing more fun than watching your opponent waste money. The thing that makes it even better is instead of having 3 missiles in the hole as we do now, after we have this wonderful modernization program and we will have 10 missiles in the same hole. So they can go after 10 rather than going after 3 missiles and it frees up their missiles to target other things, as long as we are under the limit on the number of missiles on each side.

Ms. OAKAR. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield?

Mrs. SCHROEDER. I yield to the gentlewoman from Ohio.

Ms. OAKAR. I thank the gentlewoman for yielding to me.

I am glad the gentlewoman recounted our visit during the Easter recess to the Soviet Union concerning arms control. We are hearing today the old Red sort of baiting cliche that if you vote against the MX missile you are rewarding the Soviet Union. We have heard that for the last couple of weeks, as a matter of fact, in terms of impugning peoples' reputations, but we will not go into that today.

What really astounded me when we had this dialog related to arms control was that they were indeed very concerned. The bottom line of every discussion was the militarization of space. They never once raised the issue of the MX missile. We raised the issue and they said, "Do what you want, we do not feel that is any problem."

The point is, they could care less about our building it. They would like us to build this boondoggle, this $30 billion boondoggle as a kind of reward to bankrupt our own people.

□ 1510

They would like to see us spend 30 times more on this than we do on the older Americans in this country. They would like to see us spend 30 times more on this issue that is a boondoggle—they know it; they never raised it—than we do on educational programs for students who want to pursue education.

It is a drain. It is a boondoggle. This business of saying that we will be rewarding the Soviet Union if we vote against the MX missile is total, blatant nonsense.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. SIMON). The time of the gentlewoman from Colorado (Mrs. SCHROEDER) has expired.

(On request of Ms. OAKAR and by unanimous consent, Mrs. SCHROEDER was allowed to proceed for 5 additional minutes.)

Ms. OAKAR. If the gentlewoman will yield further, as a matter of fact, if you recall, they almost burst out

laughing when we raised the issue. They thought it was almost at the point where they were almost hoping that we would built it, and they certainly did not bring this issue up. They could care less about it.

I am glad I made the trip to talk about areas that relate to arms control. They do not feel this is one of them. We made a tragic mistake in draining our taxpayers at a time when we can least afford it.

I just hope that the Red-baiting and all that nonsense that we have been hearing over the last couple weeks ceases. Let us just talk on the merits of the issue and let us not fool the American people in using these cliches that we are trying to reward the Soviet Union.

They want us to build it. They know it is a drain on the taxpayer, and they also know that it will contribute nothing to our national security. I want to commend the gentlewoman for her remarks today.

Mrs. SCHROEDER. I thank the gentlewoman from Ohio. I think that was exactly what we came away with. They were very diplomatic, obviously, when we brought it up. They said, "If you feel that you should do this, we certainly would not have any opinion about that," but I think you could translate that from diplomatic parlance to, "Sure, if you want to throw money down that hole, throw money down that hole. That is just fine with us."

It is almost like we would be doing them a favor if we would throw money down the hole because we would not have it to spend on other things.

Mr. AuCOIN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield?

Mrs. SCHROEDER. I would be delighted to yield to the gentleman from Oregon.

Mr. AuCOIN. I appreciate the gentlewoman yielding, and want to associate myself with many of her remarks.

Mr. Chairman, one of the points the gentlewoman made was how we got into this whole business in the first place.

Mrs. SCHROEDER. That is right.

Mr. AuCOIN. This fear that the silos that our Minuteman missiles are vulnerable to an incoming Soviet rocket and could be blown to smithereens and, therefore, was in jeopardy.

I have some figures here that I think amplify the point the gentlewoman was making in ridiculing this argument because now, of course, we have an even higher prized asset that we are being asked to put in those same silos. That is the MX missile with 10 warheads; not 3 warheads, but 10 warheads.

Mrs. SCHROEDER. Could the gentleman expound on that a bit for people, because I think it is important to put that into context. I think maybe I glossed over it too rapidly.

When you put 10 warheads in the same nonmobile vulnerable hole where you now have 3 in the name of modernization and you have both sides agreeing to abide by SALT I limits, what does that mean if you are a Soviet planner?

Mr. AuCOIN. It means you have a much more inviting target to aim at if you are a Soviet planner. In fact, this is the point I wanted to get and I am glad the gentlewoman started this part of the discussion.

If you take the vaunted arms control offer that the administration has laid on the table in Geneva, and add build down to that, here is what the result would be: Today, minus build down, we have in Minuteman III's and Minuteman II's, 1,000 launchers and 2,100 warheads. But remember, build down is a 2-for-1 replacement. You scrap two for every new one you build. MX's are new, so every new MX you build, you have to scrap two. To build the MX's, then, you would have to scrap virtually all of the Minuteman III's.

What does that do in terms of those holes, the targets the gentlewoman mentioned which caused this whole debate to take place in the first place, those holes that will be the Soviet targets.

That will reduce the number of silos, holes, to about 133, in which some 1,100 warheads would be placed. If we are worried about targets for the Soviet Union, MX will give us fewer targets for the Russians to shoot at. If that is not enough to make Members who are undecided think twice about Aspin, Price, and every other concoction here to try to salvage this turkey of a weapons system, I do not know what is.

But let me add one last thing. I compliment the gentlewoman's leadership on this question.

The Scowcroft Commission mentioned this idea of synergism; it said that our bomber-based capability would be safe from an attack on the land-based leg of our triad, and if the Soviets ever dared attack our ICBM's, we would have enough at sea in warheads and enough warheads on our bombers to blow the Soviets to smithereens; they said that synergism protects our land base.

My question of the gentlewoman is: If that synergism, that the Scowcroft Commission suddenly discovered when it wanted to save the MX, is indeed valid, why is it not valid for Minuteman III's, Minuteman II's, in existing silos? Why does that synergism not protect them, and if it does, why do we need to spend some $60 billion, of the taxpayers' money at a time when deficits are going up, interest rates are rising, when we are trying to bring the deficit under control.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The time of the gentlewoman from Colorado (Mrs. SCHROEDER) has again expired.

(On request of Mr. AuCOIN and by unanimous consent, Mrs. SCHROEDER was allowed to proceed for 3 additional minutes.)

Mrs. SCHROEDER. I thank the gentleman from Oregon for answering that question.

People keep talking about how many more generations of Soviet missiles there have been in a short time, and how few we have had, and on and on and on. The issue is, we could have had more generations of missiles if we wanted to? We could have put chrome on them. We could have played the Detroit game. We could have had a new model every year. We could have played all those kinds of things. We did not because we did not need to.

We were perfectly content with the Minuteman I, Minuteman II, Minuteman III in that progression, and no one is still upset about the missile. No one is saying that the Minuteman III can no longer reach the Soviet Union, that it is not working, and we must modernize. They said it was vulnerable because it was not mobile.

This whole debate began about the holes; not the missiles in the holes.

Mr. AuCOIN. Exactly right.

Mrs. SCHROEDER. And the whole debate was not that we needed a new missile in the hole; it was that we needed something more mobile that moved, because the holes did not move. Now all we have is a bigger missile to stuff in the same hole that still does not move.

People all over this country think we do nothing under this dome except throw money—their money—down a rat hole, and this is the day that we are really showing that is very close to true, because when you go back and look at the debate from day one, and heaven only knows they tried; they tried to come up with all sorts of mobile systems for the MX, but the problem was they built the missile before they built the basing mode and they had too big a missile to make it mobile. So they ended up backing off to save face and this is what we got. That history is important. Remember the history so we do not buy into the silly modernization rationale.

Ms. OAKAR. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield?

Mrs. SCHROEDER. I would be delighted to yield to the gentlewoman from Ohio.

Ms. OAKAR. Then if it is not really in the best interest of our national defense and it is an easy target, would the gentlewoman conclude, or should we conclude, that somebody owes some big contractors a little more business? Is that why taxpayers are being asked to foot the bill for a boondoggle of this nature that so many people who have a background in the mili-

tary—I am proud of my Senator, Senator GLENN, who thinks this is a real boondoggle.

What is the purpose, then? What is the point? Who do we owe these contracts to? Why are we draining the American taxpayer for one of the biggest boondoggles that does not contribute to our national defense, and the Soviet people could care less about it. The Government could care less about it. They do not think it is a problem at all. They want us to build it.

Mrs. SCHROEDER. I thank the gentlewoman from Ohio for asking that question. I obviously do not have the answer. They have not confided in me as to why they are going to push for this thing no matter what.

I have never seen a weapons system killed once it gets started. It takes on a whole life of its own.

I must also admit, if I were politically wise, since that missile system will come to my part of the country and be made in my part of the country, and it means jobs in my part of the country, I suppose I should jump up and down and scream, "Pork barrel. Hooray."

□ 1520

But the people in my part of the country have a lot of sense. They know the debt is a problem and there are better ways to create jobs. I know the gentleman from Wyoming mentioned previously the MX divides the West. I think he meant the free world. But it also divides the western part of the United States. My State, Colorado, has been suing, trying to get environmental impact statements about the effect of the basing, even though one of the significant contractors is in Colorado.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. SIMON). The time of the gentlewoman from Colorado (Mrs. SCHROEDER) has expired.

(By unanimous consent, Mrs. SCHROEDER was allowed to proceed for 2 additional minutes.)

Mrs. SCHROEDER. Mr. Chairman, my State has taken this position even though the contractor is in Colorado and many of those jobs are there.

So I think that is a very important thing. We are not treating this as pork barrel in our State. We are very worried about the environmental impact, so much so that this State is suing on it.

And when you really look at the whole history of the MX, when you look at how it is viewed on the other side of the free world, in other words, the nonfree world, you really have to shrug your shoulders and say, "Why in the world are you doing this? Wouldn't it be a wonderful victory for sanity if we say, wait a minute, wait a minute, we are going to spend our money in a more efficient manner in which we get readiness?"

The other thing that is so disconcerting is that even the Defense Department is showing, with all this buildup, that procurement is going straight up but readiness is going down.

All wars, if you have them—and heaven help us, I hope we do not have them—are come-as-you-are wars, and it is a little silly to bankrupt our readiness and spare parts and things like that and continue building things like MX. But these systems take on a life of their own, and once you get the lobbying groups going for them, it is very difficult to have a victory for commonsense. You can always come up with a reason to spend taxpayers money and the best reason in the world is to do the Red baiting and do the "Russians are coming," and I think it is so important to point out that "the Russians aren't coming on this one; they're yawning." It has been out there for years and they are not scared. We should have spent the money for spare parts.

Ms. OAKAR. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield?

Mrs. SCHROEDER. I yield to the gentlewoman from Ohio.

Ms. OAKAR. So, Mr. Chairman, the patriotic vote that is really for the American people and our own security at the same time in terms of the quality of defense that we all feel strongly about the biggest reward to the taxpayer is to vote against this boondoggle, the MX missile, that even the Soviets do not care about?

Mrs. SCHROEDER. That would certainly be my interpretation, and, as you know, as we sat there and watched them add 35 percent to the pay of every teacher in the country because they felt that was a very important national security goal, I mean we really have to talk about national security in a broader aspect, as the Soviet Union is.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The time of the gentlewoman from Colorado (Mrs. SCHROEDER) has again expired.

(On request of Ms. OAKAR, and by unanimous consent, Mrs. SCHROEDER was allowed to proceed for 2 additional minutes.)

Ms. OAKAR. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mrs. SCHROEDER. I am delighted to yield to the gentlewoman from Ohio.

Mr. DOWNEY of New York. Mr. Chairman, on that I reserve the right to object.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The permission has already been granted to the gentlewoman.

Ms. OAKAR. Mr. Chairman, the gentlewoman mentioned the education of our own people and how we are cutting those kinds of programs to support boondoggles like this. I was astounded the other day that the Senate Budget Committee cut medicare benefits by the largest amount in the history of our country, $10 billion, which means more out-of-pocket expenses for our older Americans and our disabled Americans, and they can hardly afford their medical expenses now.

This is where our national priorities are going, rewarding a few contractors versus the security and the safety and the quality of life of our own people; namely, in this case the young people who need that education in order to get that job and older Americans who are going to be penalized. We can afford these boondoggles that reward a few of the contractors that apparently are friends of somebody.

That is the real issue, and the issue has nothing to do with the quality of defense. Most people, including the Soviet Union, know that it does not protect anyone.

Mrs. SCHROEDER. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentlewoman for her statement, and I think it proves that too often on this floor we get into national defense as a one-dimensional item.

It is very important. It is very important what we have in our military budget and how ready we are and all that, there is no question about it. But the health of our people, the well-being and the education of our people, and the national debt, which can also destroy us, are also very important components. And I must say the interesting thing is that in the Soviet Union that debate is going on as to how much should be spent, and we should keep that whole thing in focus, too, what kind of balance is needed.

The MX really throws the budget out of balance. It really is not militarily needed, and I really think it is a tremendous waste.

Mrs. HOLT. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the Aspin substitute for both of the amendments.

Mr. Chairman, one of the first amendments expected to be offered to this bill will be an amendment to deny authorization for the MX missile. I will oppose that amendment when it is offered, but I want to take the brief time allotted to me today to try to offset some of the misinformation that has been circulated about the MX system.

There are four primary points that are usually made about the MX:

First, we do not need the MX because we already have Minuteman and Trident I.

Second, it is said that deployment of the MX in Minuteman III silos will make them just as vulnerable as the Minuteman III's that they replace.

Third, it is argued that the MX is a first-strike weapon and that it will evoke a nervous response from the Soviets.

Fourth, it is argued that deployment of the MX will somehow harm our strategic arms control objectives.

I will take these arguments up in order.

First, Why do we need the MX? President Carter directed that full-scale engineering development begin on the MX system in 1979 for two reasons. During the 6 years that the SALT II agreement was being negotiated, the Soviets increased the base and scope of their ICBM programs by placing large numbers of SS-17, SS-18, and SS-19 missiles in hardened silos. As reported to the Congress by Hon. George M. Seignious II, the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in 1979, these new missiles, carrying multiple high-yield warheads, could begin to threaten U.S. strategic forces with a preemptive attack. The United States has no ICBM's capable of putting Soviet silos and other Soviet hard targets at risk. Mr. Seignious also reported that the perception among U.S. allies that the Soviets had achieved a considerable strategic superiority could cause international political repercussions adverse to the United States.

The conclusion of the SALT II Treaty in 1979 did nothing to alleviate these problems. SALT II left all of these heavy Soviet missiles untouched.

The MX, with its improved accuracy and heavier multiple warheads, was designed to provide the required hard target kill capability to partially restore stability in strategic weapons between the United States and the Soviet Union.

It is not true that the MX will be just as vulnerable as the Minuteman III. In fact, MX silos will be hardened, the missile will be shock insulated, the missile would be much more able to fire through the debris created by a possible attack, and the MX warhead itself would be more survivable.

Certainly, no silo can survive a direct attack or a very near miss by a heavy nuclear warhead; but the probability of direct hits, or very near misses, against a number of silos would cast doubt on the expectations of plans of those who would try to execute a preemptive attack. From the 1,000 MX warheads deployed, a potential planner would have to expect a considerable number to survive and be used in retaliation against his high value hard targets. And each surviving MX missile would have more than three times the number of warheads each with twice the effectiveness of Minuteman III.

Vulnerability of the MX cannot be considered in isolation from other U.S. strategic forces. Although it would be highly desirable for the 100 MX missiles to be deployed so that they would be totally secure from attack—as were the Minuteman forces in the 1960's—this is not possible to do during the decade of the 1980's. The Scowcroft Commission report that the Congress approved last year recommended multiple approach to survivability of strategic forces. This recognizes the reality that the Soviets could not concentrate an attack solely upon ICBM forces and ignore U.S. submarine launched missiles and bomber forces. While the report did not advocate a launch on warning strategy, it did recognize the reality that the Soviets must consider that the MX might be launched on warning, launched under attack, or launched after an attack on other forces. The reality of the situation is this.

No single leg of the U.S. strategic triad is invulnerable to warheads possessing a hard target kill capability.

So long as the U.S. acquires a hard target kill capability, Soviet SS-18 and SS-19 missiles that also possess such a capability will not enjoy a sanctuary.

If sufficient doubt and uncertainty exists in the minds of Soviet planners of a potential first strike, deterrence is served and the problem of short-term vulnerability can be tolerated.

The restoration of a measure of strategic stability through deployment of the MX will permit time to work out more satisfactory arrangements through arms control agreements or movement toward small single warhead missiles in the future.

Is the MX a first strike weapon? In one sense, any weapon is a "first strike" weapon if it is used first. However, "first strike" weapons are those disarming weapons deployed with sufficient accuracy, with sufficiently large yield warheads, and in sufficient numbers to theoretically knock out the opponent's retaliatory weapons. Assuming that the Soviet Union does not add even one more ICBM missile to its arsenal, the 1,000 MX warheads that will not be deployed until late 1989 could not be expected to destroy the 1,400 Soviet ICBM's that are now in silos, nor could they be expected to knock out a considerable number of the Soviet sea launched ballistic missile forces. On the other hand, the 5,000 Soviet SS-18's and SS-19 hard target warheads could do a much more credible job against 1,000 MX, Minuteman III, and Minuteman II missiles. But as Mr. Seignious pointed out in 1979 and as the Scowcroft Commission pointed out in 1983, the planner of a preemptive attack must consider the entire range of retaliatory weapons available to the other side. While a Soviet planner would be faced with a great deal of uncertainty about the total effectiveness of any attack, his problems would not be nearly as severe as those of a U.S. planner under existing circumstances.

How does the MX fit into the arms control picture? The fact is that SALT II was negotiated while the Soviet negotiators had full knowledge that the United States was developing the MX. It was known to U.S. negotiators that the Soviets were also developing at least one new type of ICBM. It now turns out that the Soviets have indeed developed at least two new types, the SS-24 and SS-25.

The role of the MX is to provide an improved measure of crisis stability within a relatively short period of time. During this period of time, the parties will have years to negotiate before even a marginal MX capability can be deployed to partially offset the existing Soviet advantage in ICBM's. It should be noted that during the aborted START negotiations, the Soviets made no attempt to negotiate away the MX program in exchange for reductions in their SS-18 and SS-19 forces. Their stated reason for leaving the table at START was NATO's deployment of intermediate range missiles—not the MX. The assessment made by Mr. Seignious back in February 1979 that the MX could have a stabilizing effect in the strategic area was consistent with the recommendations of the 1983 Scowcroft Commission report on the same subject.

In conclusion, I believe that the MX program represents the highest strategic priority for this country; and if strategic arms control is a primary objective, I do not believe that that objective can be obtained without the MX. If we vote to kill the MX program, the Soviets will know that they can better achieve their objectives away from the bargaining table than at it, and at the cost of absolutely no concessions on their part.

Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield?

Mrs. HOLT. I yield to the gentleman from Indiana.

Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentlewoman for yielding.

Mr. Chairman, we have heard a lot of issues raised in the colloquy that just took place, and I would like to respond, if I may, to a couple of them.

First of all, when our friends on the other side go to the Soviet Union and discuss our missile systems, and the MX in particular, the question immediately jumps into my mind: Did you talk to them about the SS-17's and 18's, 19's and 20's that they are deploying?

Mrs. SCHROEDER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BURTON of Indiana. I will not yield at this time.

Mrs. SCHROEDER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield later?

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The Chair will state that the gentlewoman from Maryland (Mrs. HOLT) has the time.

Mrs. HOLT. Mr. Chairman, I will not yield at this time. I will allow the

gentleman from Indiana to finish his statement. I continue to yield to him.

Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Chairman, the point is that time and time again when the gentlewoman was at the microphone, I attempted to get her to yield to me so I could ask these questions, but she would not yield to me, so I will go ahead and proceed with my comments.

I do not understand why our congressional delegations go to the Soviet Union and only talk about our weapons systems to the Soviets and not talk about what the Soviets are doing. We all know the Soviet Union is deploying one new SS-20 intermediate range ballistic missile in the Warsaw Pact countries adjacent to our NATO allies per week. They have five new ICBM systems either in progress or on the drawing boards at the present time. Last year it is estimated they spent $400 billion on weapons systems and defense, and we have not matched that.

The Soviet Union just goes on doing as they please while we debate these issues, and the American people are led to believe that we are the ones who are the aggressors. That simply is not the case.

I hope that the people across this country who are watching this debate realize how important what we are talking about is, and I hope that they will be students of history and think about what happened prior to World War II. It is my feeling, after listening to all this debate over the past several hours, that had the people who control this House and who control this debate been in charge of Great Britain's Government or our Government prior to and during World War II, we would all be speaking German today.

Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentlewoman for yielding.

Mrs. SCHROEDER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield to me?

Mrs. HOLT. No; I will not yield.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. ASPIN. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words, and I rise in support of the Price-Dickinson amendment.

Mrs. SCHROEDER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. ASPIN. Mr. Chairman, let me finish my spiel, and then I will be happy to yield to anybody. Let me just explain for a few minutes here the situation that we are facing as far as the parliamentary situation goes.

We have the Bennett amendment which has been amended by the Price amendment, which is the amendment that the gentleman from Washington (Mr. PRITCHARD) and I were going to offer. That will be the first vote.

There is also a substitute for the Bennett amendment offered by the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. MAVROULES) and there is an amendment to that offered by the gentleman from Alabama (Mr. DICKINSON) which again is the same thing as Mr. PRITCHARD's and mine.

So the first vote will come on the compromise amendment, the 15 missiles, the 6-month pause to see what the Soviets do.

It seems to me that there is one point that ought to be pointed out here, and that is the question about the bargaining chip, the MX missile as a bargaining chip. Unfortunately, what has happened is that the thing has not been tried. The build-down position of the Reagan administration was presented at the Geneva talks in October. Very soon thereafter, the Soviets walked out of the talks. Now, they walked out, having nothing to do with the START talks and having nothing to do with the MX. They walked out because of the deployment of the Pershing and the ground-launched cruise missiles and the issues surrounding the IMF talks.

But what that meant was that we never really had a chance to see whether the Soviets were willing to negotiate to reduce the number of MX missiles or to eliminate the number of MX missiles. It has been asserted off and on here this afternon that the Soviets are not afraid of the MX and would like us to spend more money on the MX. I do not know where anybody gets that notion. From everything that anybody has ever said about this issue and pointed out about this issue, the Soviets know that land-based missiles are good stuff. They would not pour all their energy and their time and their money into big land-based missiles if they did not think they were any good.

□ 1530

The SS-18, the SS-19, and the SS-17, that is the part of the Soviet strategic forces which is really the part where they have the greatest money put in and the greatest amount of effort; so what we are doing is building one like that in the hopes of entering into negotiations.

I would just like to quote Mr. Sakharov, who does know something about the Soviet mind on these issues. He wrote a position, we had a lot of praise for Mr. Sakharov yesterday, but Mr. Sakharov wrote an open letter which appeared in the Foreign Affairs magazine last year. That article talked about United States-Soviet relations. Now, here is a man who knows something about the Soviet Union and what kind of an operation we are up against. Let me just quote a couple of lines from Mr. Sakharov's letter. He says:

While the U.S.S.R. is a leader in the field—

Meaning land-based nuclear weapons, land-based missiles—

while the U.S.S.R. is a leader in the field, there is very little chance of easily relinquishing that lead. If it is necessary to spend a few billion dollars on MX missiles to alter this situtation, then that is perhaps what the West must do; but at the same time if the Soviets in deed and not just in word take significant verifiable measures for reducing the number of land-based missiles, more precisely for destroying them, then the West should not only abolish MX missiles or not build them, but carry out other significant disarmament programs as well.

I would say that the amendment that the gentleman from Washington (Mr. PRITCHARD) and I have embodies this notion, that we will do something if the Soviets do it.

This is the case for the MX as a bargaining chip. It seems to me it is something we ought to try.

I say to the gentlemen on this side of the aisle who say they want zero MX's, what is wrong with getting something from the Soviet Union if we are going to do zero MX's?

Remember, the amendment we are talking about could provide zero MX's in 1985. All the Soviets have to do is come and bargain in good faith. Why not? Why are we giving them zero MX's and not having anything in exchange?

It seems to me that it is not an unreasonable proposition to say, let us ask them to do something in exchange for the zero MX's.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The time of the gentleman from Wisconsin has expired.

(At the request of Mr. KASICH, and by unanimous consent, Mr. ASPIN was allowed to proceed for an additional 5 minutes.)

Mr. KASICH. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. ASPIN. I yield to the gentleman from Ohio.

Mr. KASICH. Mr. Chairman, the gentleman made the point during the debate the last time about the fact that we have to show the will and the resolve to in fact put in place this system. We were joined in that argument by the gentleman from Washington.

Let me just ask the gentleman his opinion on this matter. The argument being that the Soviets in fact want us to spend our money, or the other converse argument, that the Soviets just flat out want us to go ahead and drain ourselves, does the gentleman not think this has not really scared them or frightened them into negotiating? Is it the gentleman's point of view that the Soviets are not yet convinced in their own minds that we have the will and resolve to actually go forward to deploy this weapon and they have not even considered negotiating at the table yet because they do not believe at this point that we really have the will and resolve to deploying a missile that would represent activity that we

have not seen in this country for well over a decade? I wonder if the gentleman would comment on that.

Mr. ASPIN. I agree entirely. I think the gentleman is making a very good point.

Mr. DAUB. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. ASPIN. I yield to the gentleman from Nebraska.

Mr. DAUB. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding. I want to take just a minute or maybe a little more. As my colleagues know, I represent a portion of the State of Nebraska. I am very much a supporter of what I consider the MX or Peacekeeper missile system and I do intend to vote in favor of it; but more especially, I intend to vote for the gentleman's amendment. I think it is a reasonable compromise when I consider the following four things:

First, that our ability to deter Soviet forces is the most effective means of preserving freedom and independence in the Western World. Providing for the Nation's defense is not an inexpensive proposition, but we should not seek to achieve false economies by significantly reducing these fundamental securities for Americans.

Second, when you talk about the MX, whatever the numbers are going to be, it is a modernizing and a replacement system, if you will, for certain aging forces that we do have now in our triad.

Third, if you go back to 1946 and study the whole history of negotiations from the Baruch plan through ABM, Vladivostok, SALT I and SALT II, all we have seen occur is the madness of allowing numbers to increase on both sides.

Fourth, when we talk about any President, this one or whoever it might be, come April 1985, I think we have to look at the MX and perhaps its symbolism in a way that should be more restrictive. If we take it to be too all-encompassing, we will end up, I say to my colleagues, forfeiting our ability to deal with issues like the GLCM, the Trident, the cruise missile, the Pershing, our tanks, our strategic and forward force conventional modernization, because there will be no reason for the Soviets to bargain in good faith.

I thank the gentleman for the time.

Mr. ASPIN. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for his comments.

I yield to the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. HYDE).

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I thank my friend for yielding.

I want to support what the gentleman from Wisconsin said by quoting from the Secretary of Defense under President Carter, Harold Brown. Now, here is what he said, and it just makes imminent good sense:

We said in the early 1970's that we would modernize with a new missile in the late 1970's. In the mid-1970's we said that we would do so in the early 1980's, and in the late 1970's that we would in the mid-1980's. We have failed so far to do any of those things, even while the Soviets were deploying over 600 new ICBM's, each with a payload equal to or greater than that of MX, and with accuracies now matching those of the most accurate U.S. ICBM's.

To say that the United States will modernize in the early 1990's with a small single-warhead missile will just not be believable. The Soviets would be justified in calculating that any new U.S. ICBM system will be aborted by some combination of environmental, doctrinal, fiscal, and political problems.

Now, I believe that absolutely and I just suggest to my friends over there who used the word "Red baiting," that is a fascinating word, when we are presenting resolutions condemning the Soviet Union for brutality as regards the Sakharov family. That is just a viable realism, but when you talk about defense and criticize the Soviet Union, that is red baiting.

If you want to save money, if money is the big issue here, we just forgave REA loans to a total of $7.9 billion.

To my friend, the gentleman from North Dakota, we have a farm program that pays the farmers about $22 billion for not growing sugar beets. So we can save money all right, but some things are not really worth it.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The time of the gentleman from Wisconsin has again expired.

(At the request of Mr. HYDE, and by unanimous consent, Mr. ASPIN was allowed to proceed for an additional 5 minutes.)

Mr. ASPIN. I yield to the gentleman from Illinois.

Mr. HYDE. The Minuteman III's we have were deployed under Lyndon Johnson, 1960's technology. Meanwhile, the Soviets have marched on through four new generations of ICBM's.

Our response, a stack of CONGRESSIONAL RECORDS. That is trading chickens for horses.

I thank my friend for yielding.

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, will my friend yield?

Mr. ASPIN. I yield to the gentleman from Washington (Mr. DICKS.)

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding.

There is considerable discussion about what the Soviets are concerned about. Obviously, I think any of us who have been to the Soviet Union realize that the Soviets are very concerned about the Pershing II and the INF; but they were also I think interested in the MX as well.

The point is, and the gentleman has made the point and Secretary Brown made the point, that while we have debated this issue for 10 years, the Soviets have deployed 600 SS-18's and 19's, all of which have MX quality warheads. They have deployed 6,000 MX quality warheads.

Now, I believe the reason that they do not appear to make a big fuss over the MX is that they realize we are going to modernize our forces and we are going to upgrade our ability, our capability.

They also recognize, I think, as they move to silos that are harder and less vulnerable, that we are going to do the very same thing, because it is a logical evolution in terms of modernization and increasing survivability.

I think people really underestimate what hardening now can do. I think hardening can answer one of the real questions and that is survivability and vulnerability. It goes beyond just synergism and gives us a valid basing mode.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The time of the gentleman from Wisconsin has again expired.

(At the request of Mr. MAVROULES, and by unanimous consent, Mr. ASPIN was allowed to proceed for an additional 4 minutes.)

Mr. MAVROULES. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. ASPIN. I yield to the gentleman from Massachusetts.

Mr. MAVROULES. Mr. Chairman, I thank my dear friend for yielding.

Mr. Chairman, there are different signals coming from many areas, I say to the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. ASPIN). I think the gentleman is aware of it.

Let me share a conversation that I had with Ambassador Rowny just yesterday, who did call me on behalf of the Aspin amendment.

I asked him the question, "Is this a bargaining chip?"

□ 1540

Mr. MAVROULES. I asked the question is this a bargaining chip or is it not, because I personally have faith in Ambassador Rowny. He is trying to do a good job. He said to me it is not a bargaining chip.

Let us clear the air. Not once has he offered the MX as a bargaining chip for the United States. As a matter of fact, you yourself stated, and you are correct, we have not offered this at the bargaining talks in Geneva.

Let me share another conversation I had with you, and perhaps we can get in a colloquy. On the one hand we talk about arms control. You are never going to receive, at least in my judgment, any kind of arms control agreement if you seek superiority, and that is exactly what we are trying to do. I would ask the gentleman to let me just finish.

Mr. ASPIN. I would like to answer, but go ahead and whenever you are finished I will go ahead.

Mr. MAVROULES. According to Mr. Richard Perle, who is a spokesman for the administration, when I asked him the question, when Mr. Adelman made

the remark, and you are aware of it, when he said perhaps that the Soviet Union would give up their 18's and 19's, which is a devastating weapon, we might consider the MX missile. I asked this question of Mr. Perle, would you agree with Mr. Adelman.

The response from Mr. Perle. He speaks for the President. Let me say this, he said, "I want the MX missile. I want the B-1 bomber. I want the Stealth bomber. I want the D-5 missile with 10 warheads. I want the Star Wars complex."

Now how can we negotiate an arms agreement with that kind of an attitude?

Maybe you can respond to that.

Mr. ASPIN. I will be happy to respond.

First of all, the problem of saying whether it is a bargaining chip by the chief negotiator I think is a real one. I believe it is a bargaining chip. I can stand in the well of the House and say it is a bargaining chip.

If I am the chief negotiator of the U.S. Government I would not say that it is a bargaining chip. It discounts the value of it. You cannot admit that it is a bargaining chip.

Let us leave that aside. What the administration has presented, and I am not saying that it is a unanimous view in the administration on the issue of the MX, I mean we all know that there are certain people in the Reagan administration who are extremely hawkish, nonenthusiastic I guess is the best way you might say it about arms control. The question though is what do they finally do and what do they propose.

What the administration has proposed at the bargaining table is a build-down concept, which if the Soviets were to pick it up and sign on the dotted line, let us just say that they do not even change our formula, they just sign on the dotted line our proposal, it would be extremely stupid to be building any MX's, and you could not build 100 because the cost in terms of systems that you would have to dismantle in order to put the 10 warheads MX's out there in any significant numbers would be so costly that you would not do it.

If the Soviets were to just take our proposal and sign it, whether Rowny calls it a bargaining chip, whether Perle says he wants it, whatever else, the point is that it would not make any sense to build it.

So I think that the issue that you have out there is a bargaining chip. What the United States is saying is our proposal is build-down. If you do not agree with build-down and negotiate about build-down, we are going to build the MX. But if you accept our build-down proposal and others, it really is that we are accepting also something that is very costly to build, the MX's, and we would not build the MX's.

Mr. MAVROULES. If you would yield for a response I really appreciate this, and if I have time later I will yield to you.

This is the crux of the argument here this afternoon. Put all of this facade aside, just throw it away and let us key in on the ingredients which constitute this amendment.

The Soviet Union is not concerned with the MX missile. The MX missile will not bring the Soviet Union back to the bargaining table. But I think I can tell you what would. The Pershing missile, that will bring them back to the bargaining table, the cruise missile will bring them back to the bargaining table, and maybe the outer space concept would bring them back to the bargaining table.

The MX missile in my judgment, although we differ, will not bring them back.

Mr. ASPIN. I would say that it is a judgment call. The gentleman from Massachusetts believes that. I believe that they are worried about the MX. I think the MX is a bargaining chip.

Mr. ALBOSTA. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. ASPIN. I yield to the gentleman from Michigan.

Mr. ALBOSTA. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

I have listened to the discussion this afternoon for some time, and it seems to me to be missing the point. I do not believe that there is any question that the Soviet Union knows that we can destroy them 10 or 12 or 14 times over. We can destroy the whole world 10 or 12 or 14 times overall with a nuclear weapon.

I ask the gentleman in the well do you believe the Soviets know that?

Mr. ASPIN. I believe they do.

Mr. ALBOSTA. Do we believe, the U.S. Government, the State Department, and Members of Congress believe that the Soviet Union can destroy us 10 or 12 or 14 times over besides and they can destroy the world?

Mr. ASPIN. I cannot vouch for everybody, but yes, I think that is generally concluded, yes.

Mr. ALBOSTA. I think the whole point here ought to be how in the world can we stop this crazy madness that we are in. It is not a question that we have to build any more missiles. We do not have to do anything. They know this already I am sure, and I appreciate the gentleman yielding. But this point seems to be so important.

Mr. ASPIN. Let me try to respond. May I try to respond?

Mr. ALBOSTA. We need to go to the negotiating table and start talking about this whole question so that we try to save the world from destruction.

Mr. ASPIN. I agree. And remember that the amendment that I am offering here, that all of us are offering, the point, if I might address the gentleman from Michigan's concerns, is that the point of the whole thing is that what our amendment is trying to do, of course, is to get them back to the bargaining table so they will negotiate. They are not now at the bargaining table, not having anything to do with the MX or having to do with the START proposal of the Reagan administration, but because of things that went on in the INF talks.

So we are trying to get them back to the bargaining table.

But the point you raise about the amount of destruction on both sides, the problem with the arms race is not a quantitative issue, it is a qualitative issue.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The time of the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. ASPIN) has expired.

(On request of Mr. DOWNEY of New York and by unanimous consent, Mr. ASPIN was allowed to proceed for 5 additional minutes.)

Mr. ASPIN. The thing that causes the arms race to continue, and MX, and Trident, and B-1's to be built as well as SS-18's, 19's, SS-25's, and SS-24's, the whole panoply of the Soviet system, is not because we do not have enough, but because of a qualitative arms race. It is trying to improve. You are trying to improve the accuracy, you are improving the hardness, you are improving the survivability, and that is what does it. And that is what we have to get at.

The purpose of all of these things is to try and get the arms control negotiations, which will limit and eliminate hopefully the destabilizing weapons systems on both sides, those weapons systems that are more likely to be needed in a time of crisis.

Let me just finish with the gentleman's point.

Mr. ALBOSTA. I do not believe it makes us any more powerful if we can destroy the Soviet Union 14 times over. I think they know that, and I think what we have to find is a different method of trying to go there before we bankrupt ourselves.

Mr. ASPIN. I agree. And if it were just building more Minuteman or something that we already had, the gentleman's point would be a good one. But always there is the qualitative edge, and that is what we are trying to do at the START negotiations, is to reduce the numbers and capabilities, the warheads, the throwweight of the Soviet land-based missile systems. Basically, unless we are able to do that, we are not able to deal with the land-based vulnerability, which is at the core of the instability of the crisis situation.

Mr. AUCOIN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. ASPIN. Let me yield to the gentleman from Oregon.

Mr. AuCOIN. I appreciate the gentleman yielding.

I want to say to the gentleman, despite our differences on this issue, which clearly remain and I have high regard for him, I do not have a high regard for his amendment, and I think he understands that.

□ 1550

Mr. ASPIN. I understand.

Mr. AuCOIN. I want to engage in a colloquy with the gentleman, because I have real difficulty understanding how a nice guy like him can make a statement that we ought to have the MX.

In a colloquy I had a few minutes ago with the gentlewoman from Colorado (Mrs. SCHROEDER) we walked through what the numbers would be if we at that time, if we assume sincerity, which the gentleman has accepted, on the part of the administration; take its sincerity for arms control, at face value and believe that they really argue for a build-down and START, let us assume that and let us assume, that the Soviets are going to say "Fine, every "i" dotted, every "t" crossed, we are going to sign." If we do that, what that will do to the land base of the U.S. triad because of the two for one build-down is reduce the number of launchers from 1,000 holes in the ground which are targeted, as the gentlewoman from Colorado mentioned; vulnerable targets, 1,000 of them, reduce them to 133; that means fewer easier targets for the Soviets to shoot at.

Mr. ASPIN. Correct.

Mr. AuCOIN. That, it seems to me, make us more vulnerable; that is not qualitative improvement; that is destablizing, that is an invitation for an attack.

Mr. ASPIN. Yes.

Mr. AuCOIN. How can a nice guy like the gentleman from Wisconsin advocate something like that?

Mr. ASPIN. Yes. But that is why I was, in answer to the question raised by the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. MAVROULES) what I am saying is that if you accept build-down you do not build 100 MX's, because you will put yourself in a weaker position.

Mr. AuCOIN. Now, that raises an interesting question, if the gentleman would yield to me further.

Mr. ASPIN. Yes.

Mr. AuCOIN. Because I think all Members ought to contemplate just how many members of the administration understand the trap that the gentleman from Wisconsin believes he has set for the administration.

He believes he has set a trap in which they will not be able to build the weapon that they have said they want—regardless of whether or not there is a treaty.

Mr. ASPIN. No; the gentleman is putting words in my mouth.

Mr. AuCOIN. No, no; I am not putting words in the gentleman's mouth.

Mr. ASPIN. Please, please.

Mr. AuCOIN. I am suggesting.

Mr. ASPIN. I am saying that if the Soviet Union accepts the build-down proposal on the table now, the United States does not build 100 MX missiles. I am not saying they are not going to build any; they could build 50 and in fact 50 probably with the right combination of Trident submarines with D-5 missiles and Midgetman; remember there is a constituency out here, I include myself as one, that want 1,000 Midgetmans, if you get all of those under the 5,000 warhead limit, under the build-down proposal, you can only build about 50 MX's.

Mr. AuCOIN. If the gentleman will yield further, I would like to extend the colloquy for just a few minutes longer.

Mr. ASPIN. I sure do.

Mr. AuCOIN. If the gentleman would continue to yield.

Mr. ASPIN. Happy to, go ahead.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

(On request of Mr. AuCOIN, and by unanimous consent, Mr. ASPIN was allowed to proceed for 5 additional minutes.)

Mr. ASPIN. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. AuCOIN. I appreciate the gentleman yielding. I know the gentleman believes that this is in effect a trap that would be——

Mr. ASPIN. It is not a trap, it is understood.

Mr. AuCOIN. In which the MX cannot then be built.

Mr. ASPIN. No.

Mr. AuCOIN. But I have talked to the administration officials who have a significant role in this matter.

Mr. ASPIN. No question.

Mr. AuCOIN. And they believe that they can have the treaty they have offered and also have at least 100 MX's.

Mr. ASPIN. MX, but what number of MX's? They can have the MX, the question is the number of MX's. And I think part of the point about bargaining chips is that you might build some, you build none, you might build half of what you want; you might build two-thirds, three-quarters, one-quarter, you do not know yet.

But the point about this thing, let me again emphasize that what we are trying to do is to reduce the number of warheads on the Soviet side and it has got to get down to something like 5,000 or Midgetman is not survivable. Remember, this is a package; and there is no way to deal with the land-based missile vulnerability without a package.

The first package was the Carter racetrack crazy, Rube Goldberg racetrack with SALT II, and the combination would have worked. We had enough AIM points in the racetrack and enough limits on the warheads in SALT II that it would have meant that the land-based missiles were survivable.

The whole thing fell apart for different reasons; SALT II did not pass and the racetrack, people out in the Western States did not like it, so it did not happen.

The next combination to make this thing work is Midgetman running around on military reservations; but in order to make that survivable, you have got to reduce the number of warheads on the Soviet side; otherwise they just saturate the military reservations.

Let me just finish my thought.

"How do you get the Soviets to reduce the number of warheads?" is the name of the game. You cannot do this thing without some combination of deployment plus arms control. The deployment is Midgetman on the military reservations, the arms control is reduce the number of warheads on the Soviet side.

The build-down proposal would have worked just fine if we could get the Soviets to accept it. But how do you get them to accept them? We tried in Vladivostok, we tried in SALT II even harder to get the Soviets to reduce those SS-18's and SS-19's. No luck, no success, very little progress.

Why? Because a whole series of negotiators believed we did not have anything to bargain with.

Remember this MX is something that has been around for three or four administrations; it started under Nixon, Ford, Carter, and Reagan. Lots of people there, many of which are dedicated people to arms control.

Mr. AuCOIN. Will the gentleman yield one more time?

Mr. ASPIN. Happy to.

Mr. AuCOIN. I appreciate the gentleman yielding further.

The gentleman makes a point he has made before, and that is the virtue of a Midgetman, a mobile single warhead weapon system; but the difficulty in buying into the gentleman's argument, that somehow MX is going to coax a reluctant administration into an arms control regime that will ultimately get us to that millenium that the gentleman forsees; is this: That the arms control proposition the administration has laid on the negotiating table in Geneva speaks not at all toward the real threat to Midgetman; which is depressed trajectory technology and capability by Soviet submarine-launched missiles which could, if perfected by the Soviet Union, take out our Midgetman with a small number of warheads.

Mr. ASPIN. If the gentleman would yield, it depends on how many warheads they have. The only threat to Midgetman on land, running around the military reservations is a very large number of Soviet warheads which they have now.

I mean, it would make no sense; I warn the House that I am for the Midgetman missile, if we kill the MX and because we kill the MX we get no arms control agreement with the Soviet Union to reduce the number of warheads that they have; I cannot support the Midgetman.

Midgetman without a reduction in Soviet warheads is as vulnerable as Minuteman in the silos is today.

Mr. AUCOIN. If the gentleman will yield further, I say to the gentleman, if you examine the arms control proposition that our administration has placed on the table, it does not bar the Soviet Union from making use of its satellites locating the Midgetman and using a depressed trajectory missile to wipe out the Midgetman.

The gentleman's arms control he is trying to protect does not do the job.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. PRITCHARD. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent the gentleman be allowed to proceed for 5 additional minutes.

Mr. McCURDY. Mr. Chairman, reserving the right to object, as a member of the committee and my good friend and colleague from Wisconsin knows that I am not going to object, but there have been a number of committee members who have been seeking time. I understand other Members have the right to get time.

But it might proceed in a more orderly basis if we were to go back to the proposition of getting and using your own time and alternating between the two aisles.

Mr. Chairman, I withdraw my reservation of objection.

(On request of Mr. PRITCHARD, and by unanimous consent, Mr. ASPIN was allowed to proceed for 5 additional minutes.)

Mr. ASPIN. The build-down proposal is not the answer to all of the threats of the land-based system, it is not the answer to all of the threats to nuclear war.

We still have ASATS; we still have sea-launched cruise missiles, there is a lot of other issues out there in the arms control area which the build-down does not address.

But it addresses one critical one, which is the number of warheads that the Soviet Union has and of course including the number of warheads that we have and the ratio of warheads to missiles, which is the key.

It seems to me that that is a very, very important thing and that is the most important thing that we ought to be working on. It is not the only thing as we will have other amendments here to deal with later today.

But I think an amendment to kill the MX, if we do not proceed with the MX, we still have to answer the question, How are we going to get the Soviets to reduce their number of warheads, because without the reduction in warheads, all of our other ways of dealing with the vulnerability of the land-based missile system are not working.

□ 1600

We have got to somehow deal with that issue and it seems to me that we ought to give this issue a try and why not. If we are not going to build any MX's in 1985, why do we not just ask and make sure that the Soviets get back to the bargaining table

Mr. PRITCHARD. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. ASPIN. I yield to the gentleman form Washington.

Mr. PRITCHARD. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Chairman, I would also like the gentleman to touch on the subject of undercutting our allies because the Germans and the British went right to the wall on standing up in a very tough election for the Pershings and you can get into the argument of how they got into that election, but when they were all done, that was a very tough stand for them to take.

About 2 or 3 weeks from now the Netherlands are going to vote on this.

Mr. ASPIN. I think that is correct.

Mr. PRITCHARD. What bothers me is that I am afraid that we are going to start unraveling that whole NATO structure if we take what would look like a unilateral approach. I just think that this, a very imaginative approach that the gentleman has come with, I think holds a certain amount of integrity as far as our actions and the European actions.

Mr. ASPIN. I agree. The point about the vote in the Netherlands, I think, is critical at this point. They are about to vote on whether to deploy the ground-launched cruise missiles.

Mr. RINALDO. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. ASPIN. I yield to the gentleman from New Jersey.

Mr. RINALDO. I thank the gentleman for yielding. Mr. Chairman, I do not like the MX, but I voted for it the last time around, because I felt that it provided the incentive the Scowcroft Commission stated in their report was needed for arms negotiations. That did not take place, and I have been listening attentively to the debate, because I was one of those Members of this House that was undecided up to this point.

But I now feel that the best of all of the choices offered here today is the choice offered by the gentleman from Wisconsin's amendment.

As I view the gentleman's amendment, and as I understand it, the essential purpose is to get the Soviet Union back to the bargaining table.

Mr. ASPIN. Correct.

Mr. RINALDO. Certainly I do not know of any better method to get them back to that bargaining table in Geneva and to negotiate seriously on nuclear arms reductions.

These negotiations are crucial to the safety of the entire world. For many years, the Soviet Union has built up its supply of nuclear weapons, and we in the United States have had to maintain parity in order to preserve a credible nuclear deterrent. The nuclear arsenals of both our countries now threaten the continued survival of the whole world.

Killing the MX missile outright will not eliminate the nuclear danger. Both of our countries still have sufficient nuclear strength to destroy the world several times over. Ultimately, our only safety lies in negotiated reductions in nuclear weapons, and we must do everything possible to get the negotiators on both sides back to the bargaining table.

The Soviet refusal to return to Geneva is obviously based on nothing but politics. They want to deny President Reagan's administration any credit for progress in arms control negotiations, and they are probably hoping that the coming election will bring to office a new President less committed to a strong American defense.

Even the most generous offers on the part of the United States would therefore be unlikely to succeed in bringing the Soviets back to Geneva. Our only present recourse is to make nuclear arms reductions a matter of immediate self-interest for the Soviet Union.

The Aspin amendment would accomplish this by letting the Soviets know that funding for more MX missiles will be indefinitely suspended if they return to the bargaining table by next April. There have been many indications that the Soviets view the MX as a major threat. The Aspin amendment would give them the opportunity to avert this danger to their defense by returning to the START talks in Geneva. Our offer not to expand the MX missile program, which has already received preliminary production funding, would also be a substantial concession on the part of the United States.

The fear of a powerful new nuclear weapon must not blind us to its usefulness as a means of forcing the negotiations which are crucial to our survival. We cannot bargain alone, and while our decision to go ahead with the MX missile did not keep the Soviets in Geneva, I am confident that our offer to suspend increased production will bring them back.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The time of the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. ASPIN) has again expired.

(At the request of Mr. RINALDO and by unanimous consent, Mr. ASPIN was

allowed to proceed for 3 additional minutes.)

Mr. RINALDO. Finally, I think that this amendment should help everyone who favors a nuclear freeze. I told the head of the nuclear freeze movement in a recent meeting in my office, that I would like to see them picket the Soviet Embassy. Let us tell the people of this world that the Soviets are the ones that are not bargaining. Let us tell the people of this world that we want to get the Soviet Union back to the bargaining table.

I hope the head of the nuclear freeze movement takes up my call. I will join him on a picket line; I do not believe that there is a person in this Chamber who would disagree with the fact that arms control is one of the most important issues before this Congress.

The Aspin amendment would indefinitely suspend MX funding if they return to the bargaining table by next April. We are not going to build any more missiles. Let them get to the bargaining table and negotiate in good faith.

Mr. COURTER. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mrs. BYRON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. COURTER. I yield to the gentlewoman from Maryland.

Mrs. BYRON. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Chairman, I had not planned to get up and speak on this amendment, although I am completely in support of the Aspin amendment. But there have been two points that have been brought up that I think should be reiterated.

In the last colloquy we had, there was a discussion on the GLCM and the Pershing II missile and the concern of the Russians. This is one issue that might get them back to the bargaining table. I think when you look at those issues as has just been mentioned, you find the German public went to the ballot box a year and a half ago on the missile issue, when you look at the face that Great Britain with deployment of the GLCM, had much discussion on the missile and in Sicily with the Italian Government with the deployment of the GLCM, there was much governmental discussion. I have looked at those sites, I know what it means to those countries. I think for this Nation, at this time, to decide not to go ahead with the MX, to let down our NATO allies, to not support the continuation of the modernization of our missile program is a wrong signal.

I think the fact that we have the Dutch Parliament having a very serious debate, one that will be very critical to their whole government, at this time, for this body, to make the decision not to go ahead with the MX is the wrong decision to make.

And I support the Aspin amendment.

Mr. DANIEL. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. COURTER. I yield to the gentleman from Virginia.

Mr. DANIEL. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Chairman, I served as chairman of the Subcommittee on NATO for a number of years and I am aware of sensitivity of this issue. I think this is a terribly important point insofar as the defense of Europe is concerned.

The gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. MAVROULES), my very good friend, stated a few moments ago, and he is entirely correct, that the Pershing and cruise could very well serve as a deterrent, could very well be the missile that we need to get the Soviets back to the bargaining table.

□ 1610

That is a valid point.

My concern is that if this Congress today decides that we are no longer willing to build the MX, then I think that the Europeans could very well turn around and say, "Well, if the United States is no more concerned about protecting us, as they said they would do, cancel the MX, then why should we be obligated to continue to deploy missiles on our soil?"

And I might add that these gentlemen, these politicians in Europe, agreed to do this at considerable risk to their own survival.

And while I am on my feet, let me make one other point. The gentlewoman from Ohio said that she had talked with the Soviets and they were not concerned about MX. And while this debate is too serious for levity, I would point out that Brer Rabbit said that he would not want to be thrown in a briar patch. I think that is a valid comparison.

She also said that what we need to do is take care of our old people. Well, I am one of those old people, and I want to be taken care of. But I stand with the gentleman from Alabama, who said yesterday that the first responsibility of government is to keep its people alive and free. I believe that is the position that most of those in my district who have lived long would take.

I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. COURTER. I thank the gentleman for his comments, and I think it is important to note the fact that this debate cannot be looked at only in the context of how it affects the United States but also how it affects our allies. I am glad that the gentleman pointed out the fact that what we do here today and tomorrow will, no doubt at all in my mind, affect what happens in Europe, particularly our allies, as they make very important decisions as to whether they will deploy a new land-based system themselves.

I found the dialog a few moments ago very interesting because much was made about the fact that we were going to possibly but not necessarily, under the Aspin amendment, be deploying an additional 15 MX missiles. Much was said about the fact that we are putting the same missiles in the existing silos and therefore we are getting less security because there are fewer targets for the Soviet Union to target.

I think, once again, the fault is the fact that we are not looking at our strategic——

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The time of the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. COURTER) has expired.

(On request of Mr. DANIEL and by unanimous consent, Mr. COURTER was allowed to proceed for 5 additional minutes.)

Mr. COURTER. I think it is important to recognize that, just like we cannot take the debate here in isolation as it affects only the United States, because indeed it will affect Western Europe, we must recognize the fact that the debate on the MX, on the Aspin amendment, must be viewed in the context of the other legs of our strategic triad.

There is a synergistic effect between the land-based leg of our triad, the air-based leg of our triad and the sea-based leg of our triad. Each leg has certain properties that are not necessarily the same as legs of the triad, and that is something that is very important. Indeed, if the MX missile is going to be placed in existing Minuteman II and III silos, it is not going to be invulnerable to a first strike by the Soviet Union. But the Soviet Union is not going to be looking at our MX's in isolation. They will be looking at other legs of our triad, the sea-based leg of our triad and the air-based leg of our triad. Indeed, the air leg has properties that are good because, although it is slow, you can call it back. The sea-based leg of the triad is to date invulnerable and therefore very good, but on the other hand, accuracy and command and control and communication to our submarines is not that perfect. The land-based leg of the triad has other types of characteristics. Indeed it may be vulnerable, viewed in isolation. But it cannot be viewed in isolation. So therefore the comments relative to its inherent vulnerability in isolation, are not proper because it cannot be looked at in isolation.

Mrs. LLOYD. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. COURTER. I yield to the gentlewoman from Tennessee.

Mrs. LLOYD. I thank the gentleman for yielding. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the Aspin-Price amendment. I think there are basically three reasons for the United States to continue procurement of the MX system,

albeit at a reduced rate from that anticipated in last year's authorization bill, and in the fiscal year 1985 Department of Defense authorization as it was reported from the Armed Services Committee. First, the doctrine of strategic deterrence has served this Nation's security interests well for the past 30 years. That doctrine rests upon the assumption that given a variety of strategic nuclear systems capable of surviving a first-strike Soviet offensive, the risk of massive retaliation will discourage an attack. The key element of this assumption is that sufficient forces would survive the first-strike. In the past limited accuracy of Soviet systems helped insure that survivability. But as Soviet technology has improved their ability to pinpoint targets, great emphasis has been placed upon the diversity of our weapons systems. This has been reflected in the triad concept that, has been discussed here this afternoon. The triad consists of the landbased ICBM's, the submarine launched missiles which are now effectively ICBM's, and the penetrating manned bombers. The fact that we can rely on one particular leg of the triad, say the SLBM's, to remain relatively invulnerable while we proceed to unilaterally dismantle the other two legs, is insufficient to maintain strategic deterrence. Once the Soviet Union is able to focus on only one element of the triad the value of that leg will quickly diminish. By forcing the Soviets to face the full array of potential second-strike weapons we greatly increase the deterrent effect of each individual element. Quite simply, the whole is greater than the sum of its parts.

Beyond this synergism, the second reason for proceeding with procurement of 15 MX missiles is the fact that if we do not we will be clearly rewarding the Soviets not only for walking out of the arms reduction talks, and incidentally boycotting the Olympics, but more important we will be encouraging them to continue with their current arms buildup while we fall farther and farther behind. This too undermines the doctrine of deterrence by increasing the likely success of a first strike.

Finally, whatever the outcome of the election this November, there is likely to be a shift in the MX program. The Democractic contenders have all called for terminaton of the MX. If one of them emerges as President, a reduction from 30 to 15 will reduce the potential loss from termination of the program in January of next year. On the other hand if Mr. Reagan is reelected, then we will have sent a strong message to the Soviets to return to the bargaining table while maintaining full capability to produce and deploy the MX.

There is a far greater risk to be faced, both strategically and economically from the decision to halt procurement today; than will result from the procurement of 15 MX missiles if we decide, either as a result of policy, or because of negotiation to halt production at some future date.

Mr. ASPIN. I thank the gentlewoman for her comments.

Mr. HILLIS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. COURTER. I yield to the gentleman from Indiana.

Mr. HILLIS. Mr. Chairman, the gentleman is making a very important point here, and I just want to add the comment that as you talk about the synergistic effect of the triad and the invincibility or the invulnerability of the sea-based leg, nowhere has anything been said that I have ever seen in the debates on arms limitations that would ask the Soviet Union to cease and desist the development and the future technology and the study of antisubmarine warfare. It is not without the realm of possibility that in that area some day a technological breakthrough can be made that would take away this ace in the hole that everybody says, "This is why you do not need the MX, because we have got these submarines at sea," and it is because of the triad effect that I think once you dismantle the MX, the other legs can become more vulnerable. I wanted to emphasize that point. I think it is an important point that the gentleman has made.

Mr. COURTER. I thank the gentleman for his comments.

To go on, it was mentioned during the debate earlier that during a conversation with the Soviet Union that some Members of this body had, the Soviet Union did not bring up MX and it was extrapolated from that conversation that they are not worried about MX. It would be my observation that indeed they are concerned about the MX characteristics and capabilities.

It does not bother me that the Soviet Union did not bring it up because they are building, as has been mentioned a number of times in debate, about 750 MX type missiles, so therefore our desire to build, at a maximum, 100 indeed would not excite them.

But during the conversations that the Members from this body had with the Soviets, I wonder whether the Soviet Union brought up during conversation the fact that they are at the present time violating, according to the reports and the best evidence that we have, a number of international arms control agreements at this very moment.

It is clear to me, after having been briefed extensively on the topic, that the Soviet Union at the present time is violating the Geneva protocol of 1925, the chemical weapons agreement of 1975, the SALT I ABM aspect of SALT I, SALT II, the modernization of the SSX-25, and also by the massive encryption that is going on, prohibiting us from actually monitoring Soviet behavior to see if they comply.

What I would like to do is urge my colleagues to get the same briefing that I did. There is a report by the General Advisory Committee on Arms Control, which is a bipartisan organization, that did an objective study, "Twenty-five Years of the Arms Control Compliance Record of the Soviet Union," and I can summarize by saying it is not a good one.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The time of the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. COURTER) has again expired.

(On request of Mr. DANIEL and by unanimous consent, Mr. COURTER was allowed to proceed for 3 additional minutes.)

Mr. COURTER. I thank the gentleman. I will try to complete my statement in 3 minutes.

Mr. Chairman, it is important also during these debates to keep in mind that the Soviet Union at the very time that they have entered agreements have indeed violated them.

Finally, I would like to mention a couple of other things. I asked the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. MAVROULES) whether his amendment deleted funds that were necessary in order to deploy the 21 MX missiles that we voted to procure and deploy last year.

His answer was that he was not sure, and it could be interpreted both ways.

I have checked with counsel for the committee, and there is only one clear interpretation of that amendment, and that is the fact that not only if you voted in favor of the Mavroules amendment are you eliminating and prohibiting the construction and deployment of new MX missiles, but in fact you are undoing what we did approximately 12 months ago. That is very important to keep in mind.

Mr. ADDABBO. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. COURTER. I yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. ADDABBO. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Chairman, I am glad the gentleman mentioned the study made on Russian arms control. I was wondering if a study was also made of what the U.S. policy has been on arms control, especially since we passed the last MX-21 missile as a bargaining chip, and if it has not, let me just point out some of the things that have happened as far as U.S. arms control. We have a threat to violate SALT II by deployment of the seventh Trident submarine without the deployment of other missiles. We claim the Soviets are cheating, but we have no proof of that. We are going full speed ahead on Asat's. We threaten to violate the

ABM Treaty by appropriating $1.7 billion this year and $25 billion in the next 5 years on Star Wars, which would completely violate the ABM Treaty, and we go right down the line. Everything has happened since we passed the 21 missiles, which was supposed to have been moving us toward arms control.

Mr. COURTER. If the gentleman will permit me to respond, I will respond in two ways. No. 1, we have not violated any agreements whatsoever.

□ 1620

None whatsoever have we violated. The gentleman talks in terms of our desire to build an Asat weapon or our desire to build a ballistic missile defense system. That would only be done by proper notification to the Soviet Union under the terms of the agreements.

Finally, the gentleman said that we do not have evidence of the fact that the Soviet Union has violated these agreements. You can count them; seven violations. I ask the gentleman whether he has been briefed by the General Advisory Committee. Have you read the report, have you had the codeword top secret briefing as I have? I will ask the gentleman. Has the gentleman received the same briefing that I did so he could definitely say whether the Soviet Union has violated or not? Did the gentleman receive the briefing?

I yield to the gentleman for his reply.

Mr. ADDABBO. I have not received the briefing.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The time of the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. COURTER) has expired.

Mr. COURTER. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent for 3 additional minutes.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from New Jersey?

Mr. McCURDY. Mr. Chairman, reserving the right to object, I made the same statement to my colleague from Wisconsin, who is also a member of the committee, that there are members of the committee seeking time, and that in order for this to proceed orderly and perhaps more rapidly, if we could again have each Member seek their own time, perhaps this can move more quickly.

Mr. COURTER. If I could have the 3 additional minutes, because I promised that I would yield to my good friend from Ohio and then I will yield back on my time.

Mr. McCURDY. Mr. Chairman, I withdraw my reservation of objection.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from New Jersey?

There was no objection.

Mr. COURTER. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. KASICH).

Mr. KASICH. I appreciate the gentleman yielding to me.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to commend the gentleman for his statement, particularly in the area of the triad. I would have to agree with not only him but Mr. HILLIS. In terms of the effectiveness of the triad it is to confuse the Soviet military planners. It has been a policy that has been effective in keeping the peace since we have entered the nuclear race.

I would like to make a comment in regard to what we have done and what the Soviets have done in the area of arms control. I had a young man call me today who was a student, and he said why do we not take the first step, in terms of delaying this MX missile. I said to him, let us look at the numbers.

Over the period of the last 10 to 15 years, and I am going to try to trace it up as quickly as I can, this country has deployed no new missile systems. While at the same time the Soviets have deployed 150 SS-17's, 308 SS-18's, and 300 SS-19's. We have deployed zero.

In the bomber leg of the triad, since 1962 we have deployed no new bombers. The Soviet started deploying, which has intercontinental capability, the Backfire and probably 250 to 300 of them today.

In submarines, from 1966 to 1981, they have deployed 61 new ballistic missile submarines, we have deployed one. Let us look beyond that. Let us talk about IMF. The Soviets said, Brezhnev at the time, said we need to restore the balance in Europe and we need 100 SS-20 missiles; they deployed 100. They said we have reached rough equivalency. Then the Soviets came back and Brezhnev said, we need to deploy some more, and they deployed 200. They said well we think we are somewhere in the neighborhood of equality.

Right now in Europe the Soviets have deployed somewhere over 340 SS-20 missiles, and how many have we deployed? Just one battery of Pershing II's and GLCM's. Now, at the same time in the long-range talks that were going on, the President suggested a reduction of one-third in the total number of nuclear weapons; the Soviets rejected it.

The President suggested that the Soviets dismantle their SS-20 and we will not deploy Pershing II's or ground-launched cruise missiles; the Soviets rejected it. They not only rejected it, but they left the table. It is the Soviets who left the table, not the United States. It is their chairs that are empty; not our chairs. If we look beyond that and look at chemical weapons, the administration has just placed on the table a ban of all chemical weapons in this world. What did the Soviets do? They rejected the treaty. And why did they reject it? On the flimsy grounds of onsite inspection, something that they use as an excuse consistently.

If we look at the other proposal that was put on the board, the proposal on troop reductions, where this administration and NATO got together, where the administration suggested to the Soviets that we accept their rough numbers in terms of troop reductions in Europe. What did the Soviets do on that front? They rejected it.

So they left the IMF talks, they left the long-range talks, they rejected the chemical weapons proposal that would ban all weapons, they rejected the troop reduction talks. Not to mention the rapid deployment of SS-20's in Europe since 1974 when we have done nothing or the massive buildup in ICBM's and bombers and submarines, and I told this young man, not to mention KAL.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The time of the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. COURTER) has expired.

(On request of Mr. KASICH and by unanimous consent, Mr. COURTER was allowed to proceed for 2 additional minutes.)

Mr. KASICH. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. COURTER. I yield to the gentleman from Ohio.

Mr. KASICH. I think that when you look at the issue of submarines, bombers, ICBM's, chemical weapons, troop reductions, KAL, Afghanistan, I think the United States has gone miles and miles and miles to ask the Soviets to come to the table and what are we doing now? In this amendment we are saying we will deploy 15 MX's, first new generation of missiles in 10 to 15 years, but we are going to fence them in. We are going to give the Soviets another opportunity to come to the table. We are going to give them another chance to come and enter into solid negotiations that will call for what this administration and those who support a strong defense in this country want, and that is arms reductions. And it has been clear, that as we have assumed a unilateral nuclear freeze for the period of the last 15 years in all these areas, we have had no progress at the table.

Now we are going to give them another opportunity on the MX and we will see if they come back. We will see if they come back on SS-20's. I appreciate the gentleman yielding, and I think this is an absolutely crucial point for where we want to be to get those Soviets to negotiate a reduction.

Mr. COURTER. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman and I yield to the gentleman from Washington (Mr. CHANDLER).

Mr. CHANDLER. Mr. Chairman, I rise today in support of the amendment offered by my distinguished colleagues, Congressmen PRICE, ASPIN, and PRITCHARD. As in past debates on the MX program, we must again decide what message we will send the Soviet Union. Before us are three alternatives.

We can approve the bill as it stands, authorizing the production of 30 more MX missiles, hoping that this aggressive posture will intimidate the Soviets back into negotiations. We can halt production of MX altogether, hoping that the Soviets will accept this feeble bribe as sufficient incentive to come back to the talks. Or, we can support the logical middle ground, as embodied in the proposal forwarded by my colleagues.

The Price-Aspin-Pritchard amendment does the following: It provides funding in fiscal year 1985 for 15 MX missiles. But, the funding will only be released if the Soviets fail to return to serious arms control negotiations. If, after 6 months, when we have either reelected President Reagan or sworn in a new President, the Soviets have begun negotiating again, no funds for the MX will be released.

I believe that this amendment is consistent with the signal we have sent to the Soviet Union to date. Since this time last year, we have seen a number of significant changes in the administration's arms control policy. These changes include endorsement of the Scowcroft Commission's recommendations, which place the MX in the context of a comprehensive, overall arms reduction plan. The President has also acknowledged the importance of pursuing stability by neither procuring nor negotiating first-strike capability. The administration has acted upon the Scowcroft Commission proposal, endorsed by Congress, that development of a small, single-warhead missile begin. Clearly, the administration has accepted the concept of a balanced, multifaceted nuclear strategy, thus challenging the argument that, once it is built, we may not be willing to bargain MX away. Finally, the President has shown, even in the face of continued Soviet provocation, increasing flexibility in his instructions to our START negotiating team.

It has been suggested on the floor of the House today that simply to kill the MX will entice the Soviets to bargain. Frankly, I believe this could not be further from the truth. As Congressman ASPIN has so eloquently pointed out, both the Ford and Carter administrations offered Moscow many inducements to reduce the huge and superior number of MX-type missiles in its arsenal, with no results. The failure was in large part because the United States had nothing equivalent to bargain with.

It has also been argued today that building the MX will accomplish nothing more than to frighten the Soviets and cause them to rush out and build a weapon to match. Please understand that the Soviets already have an MX-type of weapon and that over 300 of them, each with 10 warheads, are in the ground and aimed at us right now. Why on earth should they agree to eliminate or even stop building these weapons if we are unable to even build up to 100 weapons to match what they already have? The answer to that question from the Washington Post is clear: "The notion that yielding it (the MX) up unilaterally will somehow induce the Soviets to abandon their similar existing and prospective missiles is daffy."

Of course, the prospect of an expensive and dangerous arms race is alarming to us all. But we are dealing with a determined and forceful adversary in the Soviet Union. To suggest that somehow all we have to do is be the "good guys" and the Soviets will behave is to ignore the reality of history.

Today we have an opportunity to support an amendment which provides a logical and sensible middle ground between saber-rattling and unilateral disarmament. By voting in favor of the Price-Aspin-Pritchard amendment, we will reward the Soviets not for leaving negotiations, but for returning to them. We will reduce the number of missiles authorized to a level which indicates not belligerence, but rather a prudent desire to maintain an adequate deterrent. And, we will prove once again that this body is able to rise above partisan differences and seek compromise in the best interest of peace and freedom.

I urge my colleagues on both sides of the aisle to join with me in voting in favor of this amendment.

Mr. McCURDY. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, at the outset I would like to commend my colleagues Mr. ASPIN, Mr. DICKS, and the authors of this amendment and the chairman of the full committee. I also want to associate myself with the remarks of the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. KASICH) which I thought was a very eloquent statement.

Mr. Chairman, strategic arms control is not dead. There is no doubt that eventually the United States and the Soviet Union will return to the negotiating table, because both sides realize that arms control reduces the risk of nuclear war. But, as I speak, the Soviet Union is vigorously pressing forward with ICBM modernization. They are testing both the silo-based and mobile versions of the MX equivalent, the SSX-24, and their own version of the Midgetman, the SSX-25. Canceling the MX program would leave the Soviets with virtually no incentive to negotiate reductions in the nuclear systems we find so threatening: intercontinental ballistic missiles.

Mr. Chairman, if we are serious about wanting to negotiate reductions in ICBM's, we must keep the MX program going. But this is not to advocate a continuation of the MX program solely under the rationale that we need it as an arms control bargaining chip. Indeed, to do so is to render it largely ineffective for that purpose. Only when a weapons system can be seen as serving a national security need first can it be an effective bargaining chip second. The MX program will increase the probability of obtaining an arms control agreement on ICBM's, because from the Soviet perspective the MX makes a significant contribution to U.S. national security as a viable and realistic response to Soviet attempts to achieve a significant advantage in land based missiles.

In the late seventies, the Soviets made a key breakthrough in the ability to superharden missile silos, and they applied this new technology to protect their newest ICBM's, as well the key command and control centers from which would come the orders to launch these missiles. This hardening process has been so successful that even our latest version of the Minuteman has, at best, only low credibility as a necessary response to the Soviet initiatives.

At the same time the Soviets were superhardening their best missiles and key command and control facilities, they were deploying enough MIRV'd warheads to target each of our missiles at least twice. In doing so, the Soviets have weakened deterrence and threatened the nuclear balance to the extent that at a time of utmost desperation, when going to war with the United States appears to be a viable option to the Soviet leadership, the knowledge that their most powerful nuclear weapons are virtually invulnerable to U.S. missiles just might embolden them to cross the threshold—a threshold that could lead to a nuclear holocaust.

We can eliminate this option from Soviet planning and restore the nuclear balance by deploying the one weapons system that can negate this Soviet advantage: That system is the MX. Yet even if we were to deploy all 100 MX—and I do not believe we need to do so—we would still not be able to cover all of the superhardened Soviet silos and command centers. Thus, we could not obtain the so-called first-strike capability. And we do not need to hold all of them at risk to be able to negate the Soviet advantage. The knowledge that we can hold at prompt risk some of them will be sufficient from the standpoint of deterrence be-

cause the Soviets will not know which ones.

It is interesting to note that Soviet and United States leaders agree that neither side has, or can achieve, a true first-strike capability. The very real unknowns of attempting a first strike, coupled with the certainty of retaliation, makes such a probability extremely low—certainly low enough as to make the current technical vulnerability of U.S. silos not a sufficient rationale to stop the emplacement of MX in upgraded Minuteman shelters.

Like the Scowcroft Commission, the committee believes we must continue the MX program. But in view of budget constraints and the need to maintain conventional force readiness as the first line of deterrence, it is our judgment that we should reduce the fiscal year 1985 request from 40 missiles to 30 and now to 15. This provides some $908 million that we do not have to cut from conventional forces. Estimates of the total cost of the MX program range from $21 billion to $34 billion. This indeed is a lot of money, and I am not convinced that we need to spend all of it. But I am convinced that we must spend enough on MX to respond to the Soviet's silo hardening and MIRV'd warhead buildup.

This does not change my view that intercontinental ballistic missiles are weapons of mutual suicide. They are useless as fighting instruments. But until we can figure out a way to get rid of them, we must have them to provide a credible deterrent to nuclear war.

□ 1630

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Oklahoma (Mr. McCURDY) has expired.

(On request of Mr. MONTGOMERY and by unanimous consent, Mr. McCURDY was allowed to proceed for 2 additional minutes.)

Mr. McCURDY.Mr. Chairman, the need is especially critical because we are now in the process of unilaterally reducing our ICBM megatonnage by one-third with the destruction of the dangerously aging Titan II ICBM. We had 54 of these huge missiles. We are now down to 36, and by 1987 we will have destroyed them all. Without MX, the land-based leg of our strategic nuclear triad will be significantly weakened, and consequently so will our overall capability to deter nuclear war.

From a geopolitical standpoint, it is important for the Soviets to perceive the United States as a strong, resolute nation that can implement measures it believes are necessary for its security. Our last four Presidents have supported the MX system in this regard. If we fail to move forward with MX now, we will be sending a signal to the Soviets that we are irresolute, and unwilling to protect our Nation's vital interests.

If you want to strengthen deterrence, diminish the chance of nuclear war, and improve the prospects for arms control, I urge you to support continuation of the MX program and support the Aspin amendment.

Mr. MONTGOMERY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. McCURDY. I am glad to yield to the gentleman from Mississippi.

Mr. MONTGOMERY. I thank the gentleman for yielding. I will not ask for 5 minutes, so others can talk on this amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the Price-Aspin-Dickinson-Dicks amendment, and I would like to say that one of the strong reasons that I support the MX is that, quite frankly, the Minuteman, the Titan missile, are worn out, they cannot hit the targets, and to deter the Soviet Union it just makes good sense that we implement and move ahead with the MX. We will never have to use it if we keep our arsenal updated and move ahead to deter the Soviet Union.

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. McCURDY. I yield to the gentleman from Washington.

Mr. DICKS. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Chairman, I think the gentleman has made a very important statement. He has gotten right down to the nub of what the Soviet Union modernization has been about and what they are trying to do to harden their silos, and the implications of that in terms of our existing force structure.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Oklahoma (Mr. McCURDY) has again expired.

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the gentleman be granted 3 additional minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Washington?

Mr. HARTNETT. Mr. Chairman, reserving the right to object, the gentleman in the well waited patiently this afternoon to have his time, and then requested that each of us be allowed to attempt to receive our own time, and yet now he goes forth with yielding and sharing time.

I will not object, Mr. Chairman, at this point, but I would ask that the gentleman in the well live up to his request that we attempt to get our own time.

Mr. Chairman, I withdraw my reservation of objection.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Washington?

There was no objection.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Oklahoma (Mr. McCURDY) is recognized for 3 additional minutes.

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield further to me?

Mr. McCURDY. Before I yield, the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. HARTNETT) makes a good point and I will attempt to cut it short.

Mr. Chairman, let me yield to the gentleman from Washington and then I will yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, as the gentleman knows, if we went ahead, and the gentleman and I both agreed that something under 100 is probably where we are going to wind up on this deployment, but also as we deploy MX, we are taking our 100 Minuteman IIIs.

I think it is important to make sure that everybody recalls that, and also we are dismantling the Titan missile. So there is a substantial reduction that goes along with this aspect of the modernization.

The gentleman is aware, and we have talked about this somewhat, that there is new data about missile silo hardening based on what we have witnessed the Soviets doing. We have had some demonstrations of that. For a lot of the people who in one breath say there is no window of vulnerability and in the next breath say they worry about MX being in silos that are vulnerable, it seems to me this is a very important point, because if we could achieve the same kind of hardening that the Soviets have achieved, we could, for a while at least, have a more survivable basing mode. I am told that about 50 percent of the missiles would survive if we could get the same kind of hardening the Soviets have.

The point is, if both sides harden and make their land-based forces survivable, does that not add to stability? Is that not the gentleman's understanding, as mine is, that that would enahance stability? So for all those people who have worried for so long about the survivability of the MX, this would be a step in the right direction, if we want to make the investment in that hardening. Is that not correct?

Mr. McCURDY. Yes; I agree with the gentleman and I commend him for his contribution.

Again, living up to my own request that we seek our own time, I am going to yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. HARTNETT. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman and my colleagues, I generally rise to speak somewhat tongue in cheek and maybe try to, through some attempt at humor, make a point, but I am compelled this afternoon to try to participate in this debate as seriously as I possibly can.

We have heard a lot this afternoon about the Soviet Union and about the possibility of resuming arms reduction talks with them, from which they have repeatedly walked out.

Mr. Chairman, I do not know that I could eloquently or intelligently add anything to the conversation and to the debate which has taken place here this afternoon, particularly by the very able legislator, the gentleman from Wisconsin, my colleague, the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. KASICH) and others who have preceded me to both of these podia.

But, Mr. Chairman, I do know this, and I think the American people know this: That in order to have serious arms reduction we have to have serious negotiations. To have serious negotiations, we have to have an adversary, a counterpart, who is willing to negotiate.

Make no mistake about it, my friends: We are dealing here with a ruthless potential adversary, an adversary who time and time again has shown absolutely no regard or respect for honor, for human rights, for human life, for human dignity. They have run roughshod over governments and peoples time and time again. I cite to you their invasion of Czechoslovakia, their refusal to let anybody in Poland negotiate through Solidarity, their refusal to let the people of Honduras and El Salvador live in peace by exporting arms and terrorism through their country and through their surrogates in Cuba and Nicaragua.

□ 1640

I submit to you that if John Kennedy in 1963 had opted to negotiate the removal of Soviet missiles from Cuba, we would still be urging the Soviets to come to the negotiating table and to negotiate the removal of the Soviet missiles from Cuba.

They are not a negotiating people, by their very nature, by their government structure, by their doctrine, by their beliefs. There are no two political parties in Russia that negotiate with the Government. They would not permit, through their surrogate country, Poland, a Solidarity Union of people to negotiate with the Polish Government.

They are not a negotiating people. And if we are to have arms reduction negotiations with the Soviet Union, we have to have them be willing to negotiate.

Now, I, by my very nature, object to the compromise amendment, because we are allowing ourselves to be held hostage and we are allowing the defense of this Nation and the defense of our allies to be held hostage by what the Soviets might and might not do between now and next April. So as far as I am concerned, this amendment has a high odor, so as not to use any offensive language, as to say it is rank.

You are either for the MX missile and what it means for our defense, or you are opposed to the MX missile. You either think it is vital to our defense or you think that it is vital to arms negotiations, or you do not.

What is the difference between 40 and 15? You either want the MX missile for our own defense or you do not. And if the MX missile is not a creditable, viable deterrent to nuclear war, then vote against it. But if you feel that it is, then you should feel obliged to vote for it.

We are not in any way going to bring a ruthless adversary like the Soviet Union to the negotiating table. That has been proven throughout history in administration after administration.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. HARTNETT) has expired.

(By unanimous consent, Mr. HARTNETT of Michigan was allowed to proceed for 2 additional minutes.)

Mr. HARTNETT. Mr. Chairman, we have proven throughout history and in administration after administration that the Soviet Union has no interest whatsoever in arms reductions.

Mr. Chairman, if this country is willing to hold our freedom hostage and to hold the potential freedom of our allies to Soviet whim and fancy by passing this amendment, this compromise amendment, I am willing to vote for it if one last time we say to the Soviet Union, not that "Here is an olive branch" but "Here is a whole olive orchard" that we are giving them—the whole orchard, the whole farm.

But if we think and if, in the wisdom of this Congress and this administration, they think that through offering them this olive orchard one last time, we can further insure the hope of this world that there will be a nuclear arms reduction, then I am going to reluctantly go along with this amendment, and I urge my colleagues on both sides of the aisle to please vote for this compromise amendment.

Mr. KEMP. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HARTNETT. I yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. KEMP. Mr. Chairman, I was just going to say that I think this is the gentleman's finest hour. I agree with him wholeheartedly and thank him for an eloquent and insightful speech.

Under the new Marquis of Queensbury rules around here, we are never supposed to mention anything that might offend anybody in a political floor debate, but under those rules, I just want to say to my colleagues who were clapping a moment ago that there is no doubt in my mind that to deny the Aspin-Pritchard compromise is not just a vote against the Aspin amendment; it is a vote for unilaterally reducing, if not totally withdrawing, our leverage at the bargaining table. It is not a vote for arms control; it is a vote against arms control. It is a giant step toward unilateral disarmament. It undercuts our negotiations and weakens the chances for peace.

Mr. Chairman, the gentleman has just conducted his finest hour on the floor of the House, and I compliment him again for a brilliant speech. I share his disapproval of the compromise, but will vote for it at least to get to conference with the Senate, where hopefully we can ameliorate some of the ill-advised certification requirements contained in the amendment as now written.

Specifically, I would like to state for the record that if the Congress of the United States ever were to tie vital U.S. strategic modernization to Soviet behavior, we would be setting a dangerous precedent indeed. If the language currently in this amendment should ever become law, we would be giving the Soviets veto power over our key defense modernization, for in order to kill the MX, the Soviets would need only to agree to talk. Moreover, we would be setting up an artificial diplomatic confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union, by forcing the President to certify that the Soviets are acting in bad faith, in order to be able to proceed with the MX program.

But as bad as this amendment is, it is all we have at present. Since I support the President's negotiations at the START talks, and I support his modernization program, I shall vote for the amendment and ask all my colleagues to do so as well.

We must reject the Bennett-Mavroules amendment, which guts unilaterally our modernization program for our land-based ICBM. I urge the defeat of Bennett-Mavroules.

Mr. HERTEL of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. DICKINSON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HERTEL of Michigan. I yield to the distinguished ranking member.

Mr. DICKINSON. Mr. Chairman, I would just like to make an inquiry.

Certainly the chairman has said in the Rules Committee, and I concur, that we want to do nothing to curtail debate of anyone who wants to be heard. I was just wondering—it is now a quarter of 5—if we could get some indication of the number of Members yet seeking to be heard on this to get some idea how long we might be around here tonight.

Mr. HERTEL of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, I will take back my time at this time, Mr. Chairman.

A lot of these Members have been here for nearly 5 hours with me, and they have quite a bit to say. I know that the gentleman who has asked for time now, the ranking member, early on in this debate said, "Let's try to limit the amount of time Members are taking."

But the fact is that we have had very few Members until the last few speakers dominate the first 4 hours of this debate, taking well over a half hour apiece on the floor, and a lot of the Members who are waiting want their chance to speak and make their points.

Mr. DICKINSON. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman will yield, I do not deny what he is saying. I was simply asking as a matter of inquiry in order to get some feel for how long we might want to run tonight. It seems that we will be running a while yet.

Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentlemen for yielding.

Mr. HERTEL of Michigan. I thank the ranking member.

Mr. Chairman, I think the last two gentlemen who spoke in this debate were really starting to clarify it because the point they were making is that you are either for the MX and it is a good weapons system, or it is a bad system.

The Aspin amendment is a copout. As the gentleman from New York just said, it is to keep it alive. It is to keep it alive once again so they can increase it later.

The President asked for 40; the committee voted 30; the Price amendment or the Dickinson amendment makes it 15. Well, let me say that if we pass 15, wait until conference committee. Wait to see what number comes out there, and wait until next year to see how many they bargained for over again.

We have four amendments before us, leapfrogging amendments, because two of the four on each side do the very same thing—Bennett-Mavroules to cut, Price-Dickinson to keep it at 15. It is an escalation of amendments.

Why? Because the last two gentlemen who are for the Aspin amendment pointed out that this is the guts of the issue. If you are for the MX, then you vote for the Aspin amendment. I say, "Don't talk to me about 15 or 40 or 30." If you are opposed to the MX, then you vote the Aspin amendment down, vote the Price amendment down, and vote the Dickinson amendment down, and all the others that they will put up.

We have heard again from many of our colleagues that have given their expertise on Soviet negotiations and policy. Many of them were the same ones who predicted last year: Give us the MX and we will have negotiations. Give the President the MX and we will be successful.

Well, that was last year, and things have gone downhill since then. We do not have a table to fight about. There is no table to negotiate at. There is no progress being made on negotiations, and every time we strike well on one of our arguments they come up with a new argument.

If all the MX missiles are no good to get them to negotiate, all 40 in this case or all 100 overall, then why are the Soviets going to negotiate if we put 15 in this bill? Why would fewer be better? Why would less missiles than the administration has asked for bring the Soviets to their knees to negotiate when the larger authorization last year made no progress whatsoever and we are back in a worse stance in negotiations this year than last?

Then they say that these negotiations or these MX missiles are linked to what goes on in our deployment in Europe. Well, this House has stood firm on deploying those missiles in Europe, and that is in the agreement with our allies in NATO. But there is no agreement regarding the MX with our allies in NATO, and there is no linkage. As hard as they try to say there is linkage, there is no linkage. Our NATO allies have never asked us to deploy the MX. They know it does not add anything to the security of the country.

For 10 years, we have heard about putting the MX on planes, on boats, and today we have had a very long discussion about the vulnerability of the silos. Now, certain Members here can talk about the new methods for hardening and the new techniques for hardening, but we still know they are vulnerable. No one is denying that. We all agree they are vulnerable.

Mr. MAVROULES. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HERTEL of Michigan. I will yield in a minute to the distinguished maker of the amendment.

□ 1650

The Scowcroft Commission was the commission that pointed out to all of us and reported to all of us that there was no window of vulnerability. That is why we have not heard that in this debate as we did 2 years ago. There is no window of vulnerability and the Scowcroft Commission, General Scowcroft in meeting with a good number of us himself for quite a length of time, only said that we should pass the MX to show resolve. He did not say that it would be a good system.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. HERTEL) has expired.

(By unanimous consent, Mr. HERTEL of Michigan was allowed to proceed for 5 additional minutes.)

Mr. HERTEL of Michigan. He just said, Mr. Chairman, in his final statement, in his final answer to all of us, that would show resolve.

Well, the debate today for nearly 5 hours has shown there are many other ways to show resolve.

We discussed a bit about how we could strengthen our submarine force and how we could speed up the deployment.

We talked about the need to strengthen our conventional forces as a deterrent to nuclear war.

Our policy is not to have a first-strike reaction policy, but as the debate proceeds this year as in past years we see that the MX because it is so vulnerable can only be a first-strike weapon if there are enough MX's deployed. That can encourage the Soviet Union.

If it is not good as a deterrent, if it does not have good vulnerability, if it is easier to target these than our present older missiles, then what are we going to spend $30 billion for? If it is not going to bring the Soviets to the negotiating table as it did not before, then what are we going to spend over $30 billion for?

Very often I hear Members on this floor get up week after week and say that they think that we are living in a period similar to 1939. I would like to say that I am very frightened that the period we are living in might be more similar to 1913-14, the period framed by miscalculation and mistake, our entire world and the problems that we face, because that war was created and our world was changed in this century by miscalculation, by huge armaments increases, by lack of communication, things that we have going on today in our world between the super powers, and finally our world was changed in 1914 by mistake.

I say to the Members, we have many good things in this bill. We have shown our resolve by spending so much on defense, $1 out of $3 by increasing defense, but this system, as Member after Member has spoken out today, makes no sense, does nothing for our security. It only leads to instability.

Mr. MAVROULES. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HERTEL of Michigan. I yield to the gentleman from Massachusetts.

Mr. MAVROULES. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding. The reason I have asked the gentleman to yield is that I just want to commend him for articulating a poignant point in a position that should be listened to very carefully.

I think the end result is this, and the gentleman has made the point and the previous speaker made the point, that if you truly believe in the MX missile and all that it can do, then I think those who believe in it have an obligation to vote for the 30 missiles, rather than vote for the 15 missiles.

I just want to commend the gentleman on his statement.

Mr. HERTEL of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman.

I want to underscore that point. Let us make it clear for those in the middle, and I know many Members are still thinking about this important vote. There is no middle ground. We agree, those who oppose Aspin, and the gentleman from New York and the gentleman from South Carolina who

back Aspin, make it very clear for us, if you are for the MX to be continued, if you think it is a good missile and a good policy, vote for Aspin. If you are opposed to this policy and you think it is wasteful, you think it is going to lead to instability, then vote against Aspin.

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, I would first like to congratulate the distinguished gentleman from Florida and the gentleman from Massachusetts for offering amendments that force us to address this significantly important issue.

Back in 1977, we offered the first amendment to strike all funds for the MX missile. Eleven people stood with us at that moment. It has been a long journey from 1977 to now in opposition to this weapons system.

A number of things have been said this afternoon. I think it is important for us to come back to what this debate is all about, and that is to either support or not support going forward with a significant weapons system. I believe that we should oppose it, but let us go back to the early days of how we got to this point.

A number of people in the Pentagon said that when they evaluated America's nuclear triad, that they came to the interesting conclusion that our land-based missiles would be vulnerable to Soviet attack sometime in the mid-1980's. A number of us, the distinguished gentleman from New York (Mr. DOWNEY), myself and others, took the floor in the 1970's and argued against the assertion.

We said you do not need each leg of the nuclear triad to be independently survivable. To use the argument of my colleague, the gentleman from Washington, we argued that the synergistic relationship among the three aspects of the triad collectively would not allow this country to be vulnerable, that no rational Soviet planner would look at America's ICBM's and say, "Aha, they are now vulnerable to attack," because they knew what we knew. We had two other legs of the triad that could wreak havoc on the Soviet Union, so we said the argument in support of the MX missile is a falacious, absurd, shallow argument. You do not need each leg to be independently survivable.

But nevertheless, the proponents continued to go forward. They went forward over a number of years trying to find the elusive survivable basing mode for the MX missile.

Now, I have only done this a couple times on the floor. It has been a long time since I have done it. I would like to now cite for you the litany of lunacy as the Pentagon attempting to find, with support of this Congress, the survivable basing mode for the MX missile.

They started off with a basing mode known as Launch Under Attack, or LUA.

Orbital based, but then they found that was vulnerable to attack in orbit.

Shallow Underwater Missile, euphemistically referred to as SUM. That was vulnerable.

Then Hydra. That was vulnerable.

Then they came up with another basing mode, ORCA. Negative features, cannot check status without revealing location, so clearly that was vulnerable.

Ship—Inland. Did not work.

Ship—Ocean. Would not work.

Sea Sitter. That did not work.

Wide Body Jet basing mode option, euphemistically referred to as W.B.J.

Short Takeoff and Landing. Did not work.

Vertical Takeoff and Landing, VTOL. Did not work.

Dirigible. Negative features. Easy to track and attack. Vulnerable.

Midgetman. Excessively costly. Violates interim SALT II. So we dropped that.

Hard Rock Silo. Negative features. Defeated by evolutionary accuracy improvements. So we dropped that.

Hard Tunnel.

South Side Basing.

Sandy Silo.

Commercial Rail. That almost got over.

Dedicated Rail.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from California has expired.

(By unanimous consent, Mr. DELLUMS was allowed to proceed for 5 additional minutes.)

Mr. DELLUMS. Dedicated Rail. Had a number of negative features.

Off-Road Mobile.

Then we came up with the GEM, literally Ground Effect Machine, GEM. Negative features. It was vulnerable.

Road Mobile (Minuteman).

Road Mobile (New Missile).

Covered Trench.

Hybrid Trench.

Dash to Shelter.

Mobile Front End.

Mobile Back End.

Pool.

Then we came down to Minuteman/MPS.

MX/MPS.

Continuous Airborne Aircraft.

Deep Underground Basing.

Ballistic Missile Defense, and finally, Dense Pack.

□ 1700

All of these were rejected. The country is now wreaking havoc so the President said we must do something, we must save the MX missile, we must find the elusive survivable basing mode for the MX missile.

So we did what we often do when we cannot solve problems. We created a committee. But at the Federal level you do not call them committees, you call them commissions. And we said we will have a Scowcroft Commission.

The Scowcroft Commission went forward seeking the elusive survivable basing mode for the MX missile.

And then it was interesting. They went forward, labored diligently, and guess what they come up with? A mobile missile system? Survivable basing mode?

No. They said let us put 100 missiles in existing Minuteman vulnerable silos.

After all those months, thousands of dollars, brilliant minds, they could not come up with a survivable basing mode for the MX missile.

My colleague from New York, Mr. DOWNEY, PAT SCHROEDER of Colorado, and others, we had said that for a number of years. We gave it to you cheap. But they had to have the commission to give us this.

And then an interesting thing. When we said wait a minute, you mean you are coming in with a vulnerable basing mode? We said how can you now justify a vulnerable basing mode?

Then guess what argument we heard? The synergistic relationship among the various legs of the triad collectively does not render us vulnerable. And what I am saying is it took them years to then take our argument away from us and present it after spending thousands and thousands of taxpayer dollars. That is the absurdity. They took the very argument that we had offered them free on the floor of Congress many years before, and the Scowcroft Commission comes forward with this.

Now that we have then challenged them and said well, we told you the Soviet planners would be absurd to try to attack one leg when they knew that we could respond with two other legs, they then said but aha, the issue is not now survivability, the issue is modernization.

So the gentleman that preceded me in the well from Michigan was perfectly correct. This whole thing is all about trying to save a weapons system, not because we need it. I am now one of the senior members of the committee. When the inner sanctum meets, I am in the room. And when the inner sanctum meets, what they have been talking about is saving the weapons system.

We know this is not needed. And in trying to modernize it what are we modernizing? We are placing a highly accurate, extremely powerful weapon in a vulnerable basing mode.

Now, what does that generate? It generates the potential of attack, because the Soviet Union is sitting there saying you are placing a highly accurate land-based missile in a vulnerable silo. The only thing we can interpret from that is a first strike weapon, be-

cause if it is in a survivable basing mode maybe you could make the argument that it is not first strike.

Mr. DICKS. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DELLUMS. In a minute.

Mr. DICKS. You just said it was survivable. They bought the Dellums-Downey argument about synergism. How did we get it now into an unsurvivable base?

Mr. DELLUMS. I take back my time. What I am saying is if you agree with what I said there is no need for the MX in the first place. That is the major argument that this gentleman is trying to make, because all along I kept saying that the only reason to pursue the MX was to pursue a new missile. And to pursue a new missile for what reason? For deterrence?

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The time of the gentleman from California (Mr. DELLUMS) has expired.

(By unanimous consent, Mr. DELLUMS was allowed to proceed for 5 additional minutes.)

Mr. DELLUMS. Not to get a new missile in the arsenal for deterrence. We already had deterrence and we ought to be at the negotiating table trying to negotiate back from the brink of nuclear disaster.

We are frightening our children to death. If all of you tested your children here and asked do you think you are going to survive to the year 2100, over half of them would say I do not believe I am going to grow up because some tired old people are going to destroy the world in a thermonuclear war.

And that is all this weapons system is about. And this tap dancing about 30, 40 or 15 is nothing but a cop-out. All it is is trying to save a weapons system.

We are not here to negotiate a treaty. What we are here to do is to determine whether we need a weapons system or not. And I am saying to you, brother and sister, we do not need this weapons system. It is dangerous. It is expensive. It is unnecessary.

Mr. DICKS. Will my colleague yield?

Mr. DELLUMS. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. DICKS. The gentleman from California has made I think a very important point and he has emphasized that the Scowcroft Commission eventually came back with all of these top military experts and former Secretaries of Defense, former Secretaries of State, and they came back with the conclusion that the synergistic relationship does in fact work.

But the gentleman from California, and he knows that I have the greatest personnel respect for him, and I think he is a very valuable Member of the Congress, should remember one thing, even though it is vulnerable now, and even though we can rely for a while on the synergistic relationship, eventually we want to get the missile into a survivable basing mode. And that is where we talked about a mobile single warhead system or potential hardening, because of the fact that someday our bombers or our submarines may become vulnerable, just like the missiles have. And you cannot then rely on the other aspects of the triad.

So I think it is important to state that though the synergism works for a while, eventually we would want to get this into a survivable basing mode, if possible.

Mr. DELLUMS. Let me make this comment, or let someone else through me make this comment in response to you so that it is not, you know, left of center, RON DELLUMS making this argument.

Adm. Stansfield Turner makes the following comment with respect to the Scowcroft Commission, and I think it goes directly to your point:

> The Scowcroft Commission makes three recommendations to you: two of them would move us towards the policy of deterrence; the other towards a policy of war-fighting. Let me take them up individually. . .
>
> The first recommendation is that we proceed deliberately to develop a single warhead, small, mobile intercontinental ballistic missile. I think this is a good move because it emphasizes survivability of the missile, an essential part of a deterrence strategy. . .
>
> The second recommendation of the Scowcroft Commission is to shift the basis for counting in our arms control. . .
>
> The third recommendation of the Scowcroft Commission, however, to build the MX missile and to place it in existing silos, is not consistent with these other two, and points toward a war-fighting strategy. . .
>
> Now why would the United States, or the Soviet Union, want or need that kind of a swift reaction, hard-target capability? I believe primarily because they would want to use it in a surprise first attack on the other. . .
>
> Worst of it, if the MX does come into being, Mr. Chairman, it would send a signal to the Soviet Union that we are embarking on a war-fighting strategy by building a vulnerable missile for which there is very little logic other than use in a first-strike surprise attack. . .
>
> We now are all agreed, the Commission, everybody, that the MX, the Minuteman are all vulnerable. It makes no sense whatsoever to replace a vulnerable mode of the triad with a more or equally vulnerable mode.

I think that those are remarkable statements that go right to the center of the argument that simply says, the bottom line, because I believe and I assert this aggressively, I do not think that this MX missile system has anything to do with the negotiation or whatever. I think politically what many of the supporters of the MX missile understand is that if those of us who are talking about arms control and nuclear disarmament are ever able to stop the madness of the MX missile, we may very well begin to unravel this entire insanity. And I think the reason why there is so much pressure on this MX missile is because if the MX missile is defeated, then we have the potential for the integrity of the freeze, and the integrity of the movement to move totally back from the brink of nuclear disaster.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The time of the gentleman from California (Mr. DELLUMS) has again expired.

(On request of Mr. WOLPE and by unanimous consent, Mr. DELLUMS was allowed to proceed for 5 additional minutes.)

Mr. WOLPE. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DELLUMS. I yield to the gentleman from Michigan.

Mr. WOLPE. I want to commend the gentleman on the extraordinarily incisive critique that he has presented this afternoon.

One of the things that has been most fascinating about the debate over the MX missile is the shifting ground of the arguments.

We originally were told that the reason for building the MX was because of the insufficiency of our deterrence. Then, when that was challenged, we were told that the MX was a bargaining chip.

And just a moment ago we heard the gentleman from Washington acknowledge that the present synergistic relationship of the triad is indeed a sufficient deterrent, but now the argument is that we have to be looking toward the future.

□ 1710

I want to address just very briefly and ask the gentleman if he might assist in responding, the issue of the sufficiency of the deterrent. If tomorrow the Soviet Union were to launch a first strike, and succeeded in destroying every single one of our land-based missiles, all of our aircraft that carry nuclear warheads, and all of our nuclear submarines in port at any one time, the United States would still retain at sea at least 20 nuclear submarines, each one of which has the capability of taking out 160 Soviet cities and collectively destroying the Soviet Union three times over.

Mr. DELLUMS. Exactly.

Mr. WOLPE. There is more explosive power within one nuclear submarine today than all the munitions combined that went off on both sides in all of World War II.

Mr. DELLUMS. Exactly.

Mr. WOLPE. Is it not sufficient? Is it not appropriate at this point that we ask when is enough enough?

Mr. DELLUMS. I think the question is a terribly important question. Obviously it is a judgment question. Some people on one side of the aisle will say it is not sufficient. But I believe very strongly we do have enough weapons.

As I have said on this floor a number of times, when McNamara tried to

define nuclear deterrent in some quantitative fashion, he talked about having the capacity in 400 nuclear weapons. We now have 10,000 strategic, 15,000 tactical, moving rapidly toward a nuclear arsenal by the end of this decade, somewhere in excess of 40,000 nuclear weapons. That is certainly many times more than the 400 we envisioned back in the 1960's.

We are moving toward disaster and at the same time we are rendering ourselves impotent in our capacity to address human misery in our various constituencies as we continue to pursue this absurdity. We are not throwing nuclear weapons at this moment, and in the climate of not engaging in nuclear exchange, the highest and best use of both sides' time is to come back around the negotiating table.

We do not need to go forward with more weapons. My colleagues made a statement on a number of occasions that once you deploy a weapon, it ceases to become a bargaining chip; it then becomes a complicating factor to be dealt with negotiations.

I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. DOWNEY of New York. I congratulate my colleague; when we first took up this fight in 1977, we were alone. We are joined by many more of our colleagues who understand, over the years, the absurdity of the arms race.

I want the gentleman to address some of the points that our colleagues, Mr. ASPIN and Mr. GORE made over the course of this debate.

One of the points Mr. ASPIN has made is the fact that the MX is the necessary bridge to Midgetman; indeed, without MX and without the Soviets making some adjustment in their land-based missiles, we will not have Midgetman; Midgetman will be vulnerable.

I would point out to the gentleman in asking this question, that as long as you have MX, you will never have Midgetman because MX will crowd Midgetman out. But is there any validity to the Aspin contention that in order to get the Soviets to move toward bargaining, toward reducing their SS-18's and SS-19's, is to threaten their land-based missiles with our land-based missiles? That, distilled, is the argument that Mr. ASPIN continues to make; that you can only move them by threatening their land-based missiles.

Mr. DELLUMS. Yes. All right. Let me give you this response: First of all, that is the argument the gentleman made last year. We are not at the bargaining table, we did not bring them to the table in fear and trembling. Look, we are the two most powerful nations in the world; we have between us the collective capacity to destroy all life on this planet, and it would seem to me dangerous, absurd, and ignorant to continue to try to threaten each other with greater capacity to destroy life.

At some point we are going to lock step, locked toward confrontation, and that is all this Aspin approach gives us; continued movement toward triggering a nuclear confrontation, because the weapon system is vulnerable and highly accurate.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

(On request of Mr. DOWNEY of New York, and by unanimous consent, Mr. DELLUMS was allowed to proceed for 5 additional minutes.)

Mr. DELLUMS. I yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. DOWNEY of New York. I thank the gentleman.

The gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. ASPIN) made the point earlier in his debate that we needed to pay attention to the Soviets' land-based missiles development. It is a point that I would like both the gentleman from Wisconsin and the gentleman from California who are present to comment further on.

The Soviets have decided to build lots of land-based missiles because it is an extension of their artillery force. They also did that because they got to Peenemunde before the allies did and managed to get more German scientists who understood propulsion before we did.

So the Soviets have decided to place their nuclear eggs in a land-based basket for reasons of physics, for reasons of expediency, for reasons of geography.

Does it make sense to follow the mistake they made in placing some of their nuclear eggs in potentially vulnerable baskets by our mirroring their mistake? Because it is the inescapable conclusion that we will have mirrored the Soviet mistake in placing missiles in vulnerable land-based silos.

Mr. DELLUMS. The single answer to that question is, have you heard any of the advocates of this position suggest that we trade our nuclear force with the Soviet's nuclear force? No, because they realize our nuclear force is a much more balanced capability.

To move down this road is to pursue absurdity.

Mr. AUCOIN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DELLUMS. I yield briefly to the gentleman from Oregon.

Mr. AUCOIN. I appreciate the gentleman yielding. Following up on the point of the gentleman from New York, which was that the MX is being offered to us as a way to threaten the Soviet ICBM's, I would ask the gentleman from California if he does not agree that the only way an MX missile can threaten Soviet ICBM's is if we use them in a first strike, because if we do not they are vulnerable to Soviet attack?

Mr. DELLUMS. That is the belief of this gentleman.

Mr. AUCOIN. Will the gentleman yield further, for one further observation?

Mr. DELLUMS. Sure, then I want to make one final comment.

Mr. AUCOIN. I want to compliment the gentleman for an outstanding statement this afternoon, and I hope Members everywhere were paying attention to it. He is in the inner circle club that produced this bill, and brings it to the floor; I have respect for every member of the club and every member of the committee.

But I would say the gentleman is right, the emphasis here has been, "How on God's Green Earth can we save this Missile?" That is, that has been the effort. One scenario after another has been concocted in order to save this bill.

If anyone thinks this is an exercise in trying to achieve arms control, pay heed only to the chief strategic arms control negotiator who said just last week, "We have tried in the Reagan administration to distance ourselves from making arms control the centerpiece of our foreign policy. To some extent we have succeeded," he said.

Well, ladies and gentleman, what those of us who oppose the Aspin-Price amendment are saying is we want to distance the American people from the risk of a first-strike assault between the two superpowers and this headlong race toward first strike; let us distance the American people from that risk.

That is what the gentleman from California is arguing and I join him in that argument.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

(By unanimous consent, Mr. DELLUMS was allowed to proceed for 2 additional minutes.)

I just want to make one final argument. The gentleman from Wisconsin is an advocate of the build-down concept. And all of my colleagues are aware of the term oxy-moron, which connotes ability in contradiction and the oxy-moron that comes quickly to my mind is right wing intellectual; I think that is a build-in contradiction.

But build-down in my estimation is a nuclear oxy-moron, build-down.

Let me tell you the game that they run. They say, "Look, you are interested in arms control? Hocus-pocus, we are going to give you arms control. You give us two old missiles and let us give you one shiny brandnew missile and if you buy the concept of build-down within a relatively short time we will reduce the nuclear arsenal by 50 percent."

Now if you are not thinking very profoundly, you might buy that argument. If you are thinking at a rather shallow effort you may buy that argu-

ment. But if you really—I would like to have some order, Mr. Chairman.

Disrespectful, particularly when I am trying to address your argument—the concept of the build-down, one new missile for two tired old missiles, yes. What do you get with the new missile? And that is the question you must ask and that is the question the American people must ask.

And I am saying to you that you may be sowing the seeds of your own despair by buying the concept of the build-down, because each new missile is more accurate, each new missile has greater range, each new missile has greater capacity to destroy life.

Question: Why do you need greater accuracy, greater range, greater capacity to destroy? Is it for defense?

□ 1720

Obviously not. Is it for war fighting? I believe the answer is "Yes."

And so to me the concept of the build-down is to embrace the principle of a war fighting nuclear strategy that we ought to be challenging on this floor, that we ought to be going forward saying to the American people, we are not going to place your life in the hands of this kind of absurdity.

So the principle of the build-down, in my estimation, is something we ought to debate because I think it is dangerous. It is a recipe for despair, and it is a recipe for disaster.

I thank my colleagues for the time that they have given me. I hope my colleagues will join the gentleman from Florida and the gentleman from Massachusetts in rejecting this weapons system.

Mr. BOEHLERT. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, I have been very attentive during this debate. I have been here all afternoon, because I recognize that this is very important work we are doing. I want to compliment my colleagues because I think they have done this institution proud by the high level of debate, whether it has been on the part of the coauthors of this amendment—and I happen to support their position—or it has been my distinguished colleague from California, who has just left the well. They do our House proud by the seriousness with which they approach this very important topic.

But I would like to make a few observations, Mr. Chairman, on some of the things that have been mentioned today.

We hear that it is foolish to build the MX because it will be vulnerable from day one. We all know that there is ongoing research and development and probably it will not be too long in the future before the silos are hardened.

But that is not our primary interest to make the MX invulnerable. Our primary interest is to make it unnecessary.

We are told it is costly. Of course it is too costly. Every weapons system we buy is too costly. And I would prefer that we spend our very limited resources on those systems and things that are designed to build, rather than spend money for things that might some day destroy.

But my observation is this: What is the price we are willing to pay to preserve freedom and to promote world peace?

Then, I must admit I was really disturbed when, during the debate, perhaps an hour or so ago, it was suggested that you are patriotic if you vote one way, but you are unpatriotic if you go the other way. That is unmitigated baloney. There are true patriots in this Chamber. Every single person here who is going to cast a vote wants the same thing, peace for the world. We may disagree on how best to get it, but this is a patriotic institution and an institution of patriots.

I do not like the MX any more than any of my colleagues who are most eloquent in speaking in opposition. I did not work and vote for the MX last year and I am not working and voting for the MX this year.

What I am working in support of and what I have voted in support of is something that gives promise of ending this maddening arms race.

Last year I bought the Scowcroft Commission recommendations and I bought the bargaining chip theory. Here we are months later, no progress. Why? I think that is easy to explain. For at least half of the time of the 15 months that Mr. Andropov was in charge over there he was probably non compos mentis. It scared me to think about possibly the President of the United States needing to pick up that "hot line" telephone and make an emergency call. Who would he have talked to?

But Mr. Andropov is gone now. And now we have a new guy on the block, Chernenko. It is probably a little too early to expect anything dramatic from him. He is still trying to get his feet on sound ground. We all also know the reality of our being in a Presidential election year. Nothing is going to happen before that election. It is foreordained we all know that.

But there is hope. And I think the Aspin-Pritchard amendment offers the best hope that we will realize our dreams. It is not the administration's request for 40 MX's or even 30 MX's as requested by the House Armed Services Committee, but just 15, with a 6-month moratorium, taking us from October of this year to April of next year, a period during which we will do nothing but give the Soviets the opportunity to come back where they belong, to the bargaining table so that we can continue to pursue what some view as the impossible dream.

I was a strong supporter of the freeze resolution, but a freeze would not make me happy in and of itself. I have no comfort for myself or my family or for generations to come when we talk in terms of freezing mutual assured destruction. Mad indeed it is.

I want a reduction. I want fewer weapons of war for this world.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from New York (Mr. BOEHLERT) has expired.

(By unanimous consent, Mr. BOEHLERT was allowed to proceed for 2 additional minutes.)

Mr. BOEHLERT. I think we will all sleep a little more easily with fewer and fewer nuclear arms on both sides.

I think also the Aspin-Pritchard bipartisan compromise offers us the best hope of getting us where we want to go.

I urge its approval, not because it is absolutely right and everything else is wrong. Mr. Chairman, I urge its approval because upon close examination it appears to offer the best of all the alternatives.

Mr. DOWNEY of New York. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, we debate more than just the MX missile today, we debate the very essence of the Reagan build-up and the insanity of the arms race. That is why we have spent the last 6 hours debating it.

Consider what has been said in the past in defense of this system. My colleague, the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. ASPIN), the gentleman from Tennessee (Mr. GORE), the gentleman from Washington (Mr. DICKS) and others have privately told us that we needed the MX to convince the Reagan administration to be serious about arms control. Indeed, they made some progress on that score in forcing the Reagan administration from a basically preposterous initial proposal to the Soviets to one that made marginally more sense.

Nobody disputes that. That was accomplished.

Now we hear a different argument: Let us not reward the Soviets for walking away from the table. Indeed, my colleague, Mr. ASPIN, said on television the other day this is a bad time because the Soviets have walked out of the Olympics.

There are a whole host of reasons that might be offered, but certainly I do not think that anyone is seriously proposing that we build weapons systems because it would undermine our athletes.

There will always be a justification. As the great philosopher, Rosanne Rosannadanna said, "It will always be something." And that is true with the

MX as it is with most of the weapons systems that this administation wants.

Let me deal with the question of the bargaining chip because we have heard about this over and over and over again. My colleagues have already heard that Ambassador Rowny, our principle START negotiator, does not believe it is a bargaining chip.

Let us assume that Mr. ASPIN is right, that indeed it is a bargaining chip. What is the history of the bargaining chip argument in favor of this missile?

I stated in general debate that in the history of East-West negotiations that whenever a weapons system has been tested it has been entered into the force. It is not a bargaining chip, it is a weapon. That goes as far back as the naval disarmament conferences of the twenties and the thirties.

So do not say you can bargain away a system that you are testing, that has enormous momentum. You cannot. The momentum, the inevitability of continuing a system has a gigantic weight that cannot be overcome by reason or anything else. You are not going to bargain this system away.

Now let us deal with the question of in whose arms we are throwing ourselves, because despite the fact that Ronald Reagan has been converted to the idea that nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought, that seething below the surface of the Reagan administration, turning the cauldron of the weapons are Richard Perle, Caspar Weinberger, General Rowny, and Fred Ikle.

□ 1730

And if you scratch their surface, you know you will find this conviction: "Real men don't control weapons; real men build them."

That is what they have always believed. That is what they will continue to believe. And you will have Ronald Reagan, who has made a virtue of not knowing detail on anything, saying, "Well, I listen to my advisers, and they do not want arms control."

Take a look at the history of this administration on the entire question of arms control. The vast majority of the American people wanted the freeze; the administration fought the freeze. The administration fought the ratification of the SALT II agreement which would immediately provide us a 10-percent reduction in the Soviet arsenal. The administration walked away from the work of six former Presidents on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. No, they did not want to take a look at it. And now, on space weapons, the final leap into the unknown into the arms race, we have the President's science adviser telling us, "We don't want agreements; we want weapons in space."

These are the people that you are going to reward with the MX. These are the same people who have walked away from every meaningful idea on arms control in the past. And you are going to say to them, "It's OK, go ahead, you can have this destabilizing system."

Now, let me take one quick look at what this Government should be doing for itself. Let us assume the Soviets do not come back to the negotiations for a while. What sort of deterrence, what sort of system is best for the United States? Forget what the Soviet Union wants. What is best for us?

Now, that has always been difficult to determine because we have had two very divergent philosophies between ourselves and the Russians.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from New York (Mr. DOWNEY) has expired.

(By unanimous consent, Mr. DOWNEY of New York was allowed to proceed for 5 additional minutes.)

Mr. DOWNEY of New York. The Russians have learned at last the lesson of World War II. Remember that Stalin's generals told him that there were German troops marshaling on the border, and that with the superiority that the Russians had at the time in tanks and manpower, that they should preempt the German advance. But Stalin said, "No, I have got this agreement with Hitler, I do not have to do that." But inevitably the Germans betrayed them and attacked; the Russians fought World War II on German terms for the first year and a half of that war, and lost 20 million people in the war.

Clearly, the strategy of the Soviet Union, with their SS-18's, with their hard-target capabilities, is to preempt the United States in the next war. If they believe we are going to go first, they are not going to make the mistake that Stalin made at the outset of World War II. They will try to preempt us. That is why they have decided to have hard-target capability.

What should our response be to that? How do we counter it?

Well, the history of postwar planning has left us in a schizophrenic state. It initially said that we do not have to worry about war fighting, it was simple enough to kill lots of Russians and to destroy their society. That was mutual assured destruction. Then some bright people in the Pentagon began to ask moral questions—should moral questions ever arise in the Pentagon—about the notion of indiscriminately killing Russians, about indiscriminately trying to destroy the Soviet Union.

And out of that discussion came Presidential Directive 59, which gives us now the ability to wage nuclear war if we should so choose.

So now some of us believe we should just destroy the Russians if they attack us. And there are others of us who believe we should have the ability to wage nuclear war.

I say to you, we can structure our arsenal that makes sense for us, and sense for arms control, without the MX missile. We can have a survivable, accurate, second-strike force without the MX missile, so that the Russians will know that if they attack first, we will have a credible second-strike capability. We do not need the MX missile to do it.

That is the bottom line. Not the maneuvering, the dancing on the head of a theological pin, but an arsenal that makes sense for the United States.

I hope that ultimately we can have arms control negotiations that will lead to more stability on both sides. But it is clear to me—and it should shout itself from the mountaintops to the Members here—that the MX missile is the last thing we need. It is the wrong system for stability, and it is the wrong system for arms control.

Mr. MAVROULES. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DOWNEY of New York. I yield to the gentleman from Massachusetts.

Mr. MAVROULES. I thank the gentleman for yielding, and let me commend the gentleman for his eloquent statement.

Does the gentleman recall, back when we heard the same arguments on the floor here about 1 year ago, maybe a little short of that, when we were discussing the Pershing II deployment? I think I recall at that time statements being made by the administration that we had to do that, deploy the Pershing missile, so that we could get the Soviet Union to take arms control more seriously. I think that debate took place on the floor of this House.

What just happened this past week? It has been reported that the Soviet Union has responded in kind by now putting up more missiles in East Germany. Am I correct in making that statement?

Mr. DOWNEY of New York. The gentleman is correct.

Mr. AUCOIN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DOWNEY of New York. I yield to the gentleman from Oregon.

Mr. AUCOIN. I appreciate the gentleman's yielding, and I certainly appreciate the point the gentleman has made. I hope the gentleman will amplify on it a bit for the Members who may not have been paying careful attention.

It seems to me that what the gentleman is saying is that if the United States has a survivable retaliatory capability, we then can send a message to the mind of the Soviet leader, that if he should ever dare strike us first, it is over for him, his industry, his society, his civilization absolutely reduced to a stone age state. We can say that

with a retaliatory capability. Is that not what the gentleman is saying?

Mr. DOWNEY of New York. That is correct. But I would go one step further. I would concede the argument of some of the hawks who have said in the past that you do not want to limit your force in a way that only allows you the option of the destruction of the Soviet Union or no response at all.

The difference between my view and those who want to build a prompt hard-target capability is that I do not believe in the probability of escalation control or anything like that. I believe once these weapons start going off, that you are in big trouble.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from New York (Mr. DOWNEY) has again expired.

(On request of Mr. AUCOIN and by unanimous consent, Mr. DOWNEY of New York was allowed to proceed for 3 additional minutes.)

Mr. DOWNEY of New York. I do not believe that once a nuclear war is started that you could control it. But I may be wrong.

So given the fact that I may be wrong, I want to be able to know in my arsenal that I have the ability to hit some hard targets, if in fact this insanity becomes a reality. We have that ability with the cruise missile, and we have that ability with the existing Minuteman. So it is not something that we need to build the MX or Trident II missile to have. We have it now. We will be getting more of it later. So we have hedged our bets.

Mr. AUCOIN. If the gentleman will continue to yield, what the gentleman is saying is: With this mix in our arsenal today, with a solid, survivable retaliatory capability, and with some hard targets, preferably not promptly delivered but still a hard-target kill capability built into it, we do not need the MX and some of the follow-on weapons that have such war-inciting first-strike capability, because then you move into a total first-strike hard target counterforce capability. And what message does that send to the mind of the Soviet leader?

Mr. DOWNEY of New York. Of course there will be our hawkish colleague who say, "I don't care what the Russians think."

Mr. AUCOIN. I care. I care very much what they think.

Mr. DOWNEY of New York. I am a little worried about the fact that they have 9,000 warheads aimed at us, and I do not want them to by accident or miscalculation start World War III because they believe we are about to start World War III. I want to make sure that we move further and further away from the beginning of World War III.

Mr. KEMP. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DOWNEY of New York. No, I will not.

Mr. KEMP. The gentleman refuses to yield? After all that talk yesterday about debate?

Mr. DOWNEY of New York. Regular order, Mr. Chairman.

I continue to yield to the gentleman from Oregon (Mr. AUCOIN).

Mr. AUCOIN. I appreciate the gentleman yielding, and this is the last time I will ask him to yield. The gentleman is making the statement, then, that we have run fewer risks by having a basic survivable retaliatory capability with some hard-target capability mixed in, but that if we move to the D-5 missile, and the MX missile, this will give us massive prompt counterforce; it raises possible confusion in the mind of some future Soviet leader that we may be preparing a first strike. If he thinks so, we can conclude, based on their history, that he will decide he better attack before he is attacked.

□ 1740

That is not deterrence; that is the collapse of deterrence.

That is an invitation for the outbreak of hostilities.

Mr. DOWNEY of New York. I think the gentleman is absolutely correct. We know that World War IV will be fought with sticks and stones; we are beginning to learn that World War III might be fought with the weapons in this budget.

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DOWNEY of New York. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. DICKS. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

I do not think the gentleman from Oregon meant to suggest that we are rushing to judgment here. We have been in a 10-year debate over the MX. We are not going to deploy one MX until late 1986 or 1987 at the earliest date.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has again expired.

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the gentleman have 1 additional minute.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Washington?

Mr. KEMP. Mr. Chairman, I object.

The CHAIRMAN. Objection is heard.

Mr. FRANK. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, I want to congratulate the gentleman from South Carolina, who is not on the floor right now, for his intellectual honesty and I mean that very seriously. What he did was to take a good shot at the figleaf, and what he said was we are talking here about whether you are for or against the MX.

I am not going to add to what a lot of others have said about the weapon itself. Let me just recount where we are parliamentarily and politically. The MX lost, it seems to me, the battle. The supporters of the MX knew they were losing, so they came up with the Aspin amendment in its various permutations as the Price amendment and the Nichols amendment. We ought to be very clear about that. This brilliant scheme for punishing the Russians, bringing them to the table. The gentleman from Wisconsin said this was not necessarily to make them negotiate, so the table in question may be the breakfast table or the multiplication table or the table of contents or the water table, or perhaps the table of elements. But the table, that is ex post facto. There is one constant in here, the commitment of the gentleman from Wisconsin and a few friends to the MX.

Now we had last year's rationale which is let us vote for the MX to bang Ronald Reagan. Now we have got this year's rationale, we are going to vote for the MX to bang the Russians. I am tempted to ask the gentleman from Wisconsin for the preview of coming attractions. I want to know what next year's rationale is going to be for the MX. I can tell what it will not be, it will not be from the gentleman from Wisconsin a description of the military use of the weapons. That has been conceded. It is not to protect against what we are told is the Dutch tilt, that was in the letter we got, we are going to have the Dutch tilting. We are going to have the West Germans and Europeans, the West Germans and the British are going to get all upset, I am not aware that they are asking us to build it.

What is the new figleaf? Let us be very clear. They are not talking about the MX on its merits. They got committed to being for it. They said if we voted for it last year, Ronald Reagan would be for arms control. They got some people to believe that. Now they have got a new argument: If we vote for it, the Russians will come to the table. I guess we do not mean tables, we means fables. It is going to be "Aesop's Fables," and they will have a new one next year. Maybe they will get some of you not to believe it, some of our moderate friends. Because you do not believe it, but you are hoping some other people will believe it, because this is the figleaf for voting for the MX.

The fact is that it does not have any merit. Let us look at the Aspin amendment as it is proposed. Talk about the separation of powers. You know who gets to decide if we build the MX under this? The Russians, because it is right in here that they see April 1, 1985, is coming, and they say, oh, according to the Aspin amendment, if we are good boys, and if we look good to the Americans, not necessarily with

negotiations, the gentleman from Wisconsin said, but if we look flexible, they will not build the MX.

Now, they will decide, do they want us to build the MX or do they not? If they do not want us to build the MX, then they will look very reasonable. April 1 will come, and the President will say, we do not build the MX. Then they will wait a month, and then they will get bad again. And then we will have to build it again, and then they will be good. It is like, remember when Harpo Marx of the Marx Brothers was looking in the mirror and trying to anticipate the other guy? They will go like this, and we will go like that. And they will go like this, and we will go like that. They will turn that pipeline on and off and on and off until, of course, the summer of 1985 because then the gentleman from Wisconsin will have a new rationale for the MX. Then it will be to get the Chinese to behave.

The gentleman from South Carolina was absolutely accurate. We have two choices here. Do we build a weapon which has no real use. The Scowcroft Commission said it was a test of national will. All that is, it seems to me, is a test of my pronunciation and a few of the others, because none of us can get the man's name right. But I do not think he got the missile system right either.

We are back, as the gentleman from California (Mr. DELLUMS) pointed out, to where we were again. We are back trying to put these in the holes that were the reason, their vulnerability, for building them in the first place. Some of our colleagues are for any weapon, and they have a right to be, they have never met a weapon system that they do not like, and they are entitled.

Some of us think it is a great waste of money, and the only serious thing we are going to do to reduce the deficit is not to build it if we do not need it. Then we have got about 20 people in the middle who have been keeping the House in turmoil over this for a couple of years. Last year they told people they were going to vote for it because they were going to make Ronald Reagan negotiate. This year they are going to vote for it because they are giving the Kremlin the power to decide to build it.

Mr. Chairman, I want to say one thing: If the Russians want to come in here and decide American military policy, let them run for Congress like the rest of us. Why should we go and put up with all the aggravation of elections, and all the PAC money, and all the speeches, and all the people that interrupt you at dinner, and then Chernenko and Gromyko and whosis and whatsis just because of the gentleman from Wisconsin's amendment can say in March: OK, do we want the Americans to build the MX, or do we not? And if we do, we will look unreasonable. If we do not, we will look reasonable. You talk about the separation of powers, this thing gives to the Kremlin the power to decide whether we build the MX or not. We are going to have the division of Kremlinology trying to figure out whether they should or whether they should not.

Now, of course, the gentleman from Wisconsin said that the President last year complied with his agreement.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Massachusetts has expired.

(By unanimous consent, Mr. FRANK was allowed to proceed for 5 additional minutes.)

Mr. FRANK. I thank the Chairman and the membership.

Last year, you see he made a deal with Mr Reagan. The only arms control agreement that Ronald Reagan has ever signed, he signed with the gentleman from Washington, the gentleman from Tennessee, and the gentleman from Wisconsin. But they made a mistake, because they did not listen to Richard Perle and they did not get verification. They took his word for it. Very big error. Very big error.

But they told us that agreement was OK. Now, I have to say, Mr. Chairman, by the standards that they used to find Ronald Reagan a dedicated arms controller, the Russians are going to pass that test easily. So then the MX will not get built. Now I have to ask them, do they think it is a serious weapon or not. If you really believe, as they say, that it is important for the synergism of the triad, a phrase I am sure will be tripping off all of our tongues as we take to the campaign trail this October, if you believe it is essential to the synergism of the triad, then you want to build it. If you think that America does not need it, that it is wasteful, that the single best thing we can do to control the deficit is to not spend this money, then you will not build it.

Can they seriously believe, those who have offered this amendment in its various forms, the gentleman from Wisconsin, the gentleman from Washington, the gentleman from Illinois, and the gentleman from Alabama, and everybody else, they are telling us that they believe this weapon is necessary, but they will give to the Kremlin the power to stop us from building it. That is simply intellectually incoherent.

If you believe, as the gentleman from South Carolina had the courage and the honesty to say that you need it because the Russians are by race not negotiators, as he said, then you vote for it. If you believe, as many of us do that it is a first-strike weapon if it is useful at all, and that it costs too much money, you vote against it. But please, figleaf me no figleaves. Do not try to hide behind this piece of transparency because you are going to get bagged for being lewd and lascivious.

This has no cover; this gives you no cover. What it says is, this terribly important weapon that we need to protect ourselves against the Russians, if the Russians read it, and in the months of February and March act accordingly, on April 1, 1985, the most appropriate date in an amendment I have ever seen, we will not build it.

You really mean to tell us that you think this is essential for American defense, essential to show our resolve, but you are going to give to the Russians the power to push the self-destruct button. This is not a first-strike weapon or a second-strike weapon, this is a no-strike weapon. The Russians, all they have to do is balk and they are going to get rid of this one, they do not have to throw a pitch at all, because all they have to do is appear to be reasonable, and even if we do not use the lenient standards of the trio from Wisconsin and Washington and Tennessee, another synergistic traid, if we just use their standards, then the Russians are going to pass the test.

The gentleman from South Carolina, I know is right. We have a very simple question here. We have got a terrible deficit. We also have a very strong defense. We have got nuclear submarines and air-launched cruise missiles and an absolutely strong defense which we are all glad we have. Should we for political reasons, should we for reasons of demonstrating our national resolve, for preventing the Dutch tilt, and the British waffle, and the German who knows what, and should we so Members can look consistent, commit ourselves to about $20 billion at best and more like $30 billion through a weapon which will be useless if we are lucky, and dangerous if we are not?

□ 1750

Seriousness about the deficit, seriousness about the legislative process, seriousness about the American Constitution and not allowing the Soviet Union a major piece of our national security decision is what is going to be riding today. I hope the membership will vote against the amendment.

Mr. OBERSTAR. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. DICKINSON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. OBERSTAR. Yes; I would be happy to yield to the gentleman from Alabama.

Mr. DICKINSON. Mr. Chairman, I thought I would like to try just one more time to get some consensus of the amount of time that might be required this evening, to make some reasonable offer. I see 10 Members standing.

I wonder if we could get an agreement to end debate at 8 o'clock. That is 2 hours and 10 minutes from now. I think we might wind up before then, but could we put that limitation on it?

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Alabama?

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, reserving the right to object, is that to each amendment and all amendments thereto?

Mr. DICKINSON. That is correct.

Mr. DICKS. We would vote in order?

Mr. DICKINSON. To the Bennett amendment and all amendments thereto, and that time will cease and arguments desist at 8 o'clock.

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I withdraw my reservation of objection.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Alabama?

Mr. LEVITAS. Mr. Chairman, reserving the right to object, I do so to pose a parliamentary inquiry.

PARLIAMENTARY INQUIRY

Mr. LEVITAS. Mr. Chairman, I have a parliamentary inquiry.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman will state it.

Mr. LEVITAS. Mr. Chairman, as I understand it, at the present time the first vote would be on the Price amendment.

The CHAIRMAN. That is correct.

Mr. LEVITAS. If the Price amendment should be defeated, would the Bennett amendment be open to further amendment at that time?

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman is correct.

Mr. LEVITAS. And if this unanimous-consent request were agreed to, there would be no debate on any further amendments?

The CHAIRMAN. Depending on whether the time had expired.

Mr. LEVITAS. I object, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Objection is heard.

The gentleman from Minnesota (Mr. OBERSTAR) is still recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. OBERSTAR. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from New York (Mr. WEISS).

Mr. WEISS. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. CHAIRMAN, I rise in strong support of the Bennett-Mavroules amendment and in opposition to any funding for the MX missile system.

Whatever the rationalizations of the Reagan administration, the MX is not a bargaining chip, nor will it do anything but further destabilize United States-Soviet relations.

Deploying cruise and Pershing 2 missiles has not brought the superpowers any closer to arms control. Nor has this administration's massive arms buildup. Can we really expect that deploying 100, or 60, or 30, MX missiles—the most accurate nuclear weapons now produced by either superpower—will make the Soviets more willing to reach an agreement on arms reductions?

The President believes that by outspending the Soviets he can force them to the negotiating table, and scare them into accepting arms reductions. Earlier this month, the administration's chief arms negotiator, Edward Rowny, candidly stated that the Reagan administration has tried "to get away, to distance ourselves, from making arms control the centerpiece of our foreign policy."

They have succeeded beyond their wildest dreams.

There are no arms control talks today. There are no START talks. There are no INF negotiations. And as a result the world is more tension-filled than at any time since the 1962 missile crisis.

Our task today is to return arms control to the center of our country's foreign policy, and to restore sanity to superpower relations. Now is the time for this Congress to demonstrate that we have come close enough to the precipice of nuclear war. Now is the time to draw back, before it is too late.

Mr. OBERSTAR. Mr. Chairman, today the House has the opportunity to avoid further waste of billions of dollars in continued production of the MX missile. It is an opportunity which commonsense, fiscal responsibility and a minimal concern for arms control, for a responsible, consistent program of arms control requires this body to take.

Last year the House regrettably approved production of 21 MX missiles. This year the President asked the Congress for 40 missiles. The Committee on Armed Services has cut that back to 30, and now we have an amendment pending that says, "Let us do only 15."

I support the Bennett-Mavroules amendment for all the reasons the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. FRANK) suggested a little while ago, and for some additional ones. It gives the Russians the opportunity, in fact, to dictate the future of U.S. arms control, the future of our defense policy, and because I think we really do not need this missile.

To do less than to strike the entire $2.8 billion funding would be to avoid the hard choice that the House must make either this year or next year. We had better make it now. The people who sent us here expect us to make those kinds of hard choice decisions.

Are we going to decide whether to go ahead with production of a first-strike strategic weapon which, in its basing mode is vulnerable, as has been demonstrated many times over in debate here on the House floor, or are we going to stop production of that weapon system and stop it now, while we have an opportunity to avoid further waste of billions of dollars and time?

That is a decision that has to be made in the context of international negotiations which are underway; but it also has to be made in the context of what is in our best national security interest and what is in our best national economic interest. In my judgment, the MX missile is a threat to our national security, it is a threat to our fiscal security. Its reliability is questionable, its ultimate cost is uncertain, and it makes sense as a strategic weapon only if the United States contemplates a first strike.

I have always thought that if ever there was a nation on the face of this Earth that were to contemplate and have as a matter of its national policy a first-strike use of nuclear weapons, we would not be that nation. We did it once. We certainly would want to avoid doing it again.

Much of the MX debate has shifted away from the focus that it should have. It should be focusing on the effectiveness of this weapon system, on its economic impact upon our national economy, on it destablizing consequences for internatonal security. Instead the focus has shifted to whether we are going to spend billions of dollars to establish something in our national arsenal that only is going to be a bargaining chip with the Soviet Union, and this latter seems to be the strongest argument that the advocates of the MX missile can possibly make.

That focus obscures the fundamental weakness of our military policy, which is that in approving these 15 or 30 MX missiles, we would be approving production of a weapon system that will be a total flop as a matter of national security and as a defensive system.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Minnesota (Mr. OBERSTAR) has expired.

(By unanimous consent, Mr. OBERSTAR was allowed to proceed for 3 additional minutes.)

Mr. OBERSTAR. Mr. Chairman, we ought to make it clear that the MX missile system makes sense only if we in the United States intend to use it as a first-strike weapon system. The bargaining-chip idea literally avoids the ultimate decision of whether we are going to negotiate seriously with the Soviet Union for a freeze on weapons and reduction of those that are in the system, or at best, the bargaining-chip idea postpones that ultimate decision until some time in 1985, when we hopefully have a new President, a new leadership in charge of the national security of this country. But I think it is incumbent on us to make that decision today.

It is illusory for this body to believe that the Reagan administration's com-

mitment to arms control will be strengthened by adding 15 or 30 more MX missiles to our arsenal. It is illusory to think that 15 more missiles are going to make the Soviet Union any more willing to negotiate than they are now.

If Congress is serious about cutting waste in the military budget, we will not vote another $2.8 billion for a missile system whose basing mode is vulnerable and whose first use is questionable, at least by the United States. We should not give a new weapon system to a President who is indifferent to arms control and expect that arms control will result from it.

If the House approves funding for these 15 or 30 missiles, we will be saving the MX missiles, but we will not be strengthening international security or the national and economic security of the United States, and that ought to be our first and only consideration.

Mr. SHANNON. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, last summer when President Reagan needed Congress to approve the production of the first 21 MX missiles, he told us that a "no" vote would "send the wrong signal to the Soviet Union * * * and pull the rug out from under the negotiators in Geneva." In other words, the President said that we need the MX to successfully complete negotiations.

Today, we could rename the START talks the STOP talks, the INF talks are indefinitely in recess, the President has refused to resume the comprehensive test ban negotiations, there are no antisatellite weapons negotiations underway, and the SALT II Treaty remains in limbo.

And President Reagan tells us that we need the MX now because without it, and I quote: "the incentive for the Soviets to return to the bargaining table is greatly reduced."

So depending on what time it is, we need the MX because we are negotiating or we need the MX because we are not negotiating. By this tortured logic, the MX cannot lose. In this world of mirrors, the Reagan administration could justify every weapons system which the Pentagon dreams up.

The MX reflects an economically wasteful and intellectually lazy approach to defense. For $15 billion over the next 5 years, this chip is no bargain. The $2.7 billion we are invited to donate today is just one more downpayment on a layaway plan that could tie this economy in deficit knots for decades to come. As a weapon, the MX is laughable. The Air Force has shown that by 1996, only 1 percent of the MX's would survive a surprise Soviet attack. And because of its extreme vulnerability, the MX is only useful as a first-strike weapon, which makes it profoundly destabilizing.

Either the MX is a defensive weapon, in which case it is useless, or it is a first-strike weapon, in which case it is provocative and dangerous. America does not need a sitting-duck system for missiles, and it does not need a first-strike weapon whose first victim is the health of our economy. The MX spells destruction all around.

Most Americans are now extremely discouraged about the commitment of this administration to progress in arms control and disarmament. It seems that the only time we hear the President speak of arms control in a serious fashion is when he is attempting to justify his extravagant requests for unjustifiable weapons systems. I have a hunch that the administration does not expect us to see what is really going on here, that it expects us to remain in the dark.

But the truth is that the Members of this body perceive precisely what is going on here. The President says that the MX is a bargaining chip in the arms-control process with the Soviet Union. The truth is that the arms-control process with the Soviet Union is a bargaining chip in the President's effort to get the MX from Congress. The Reagan administration wants the MX, not arms control. That set of priorities does not accord with the will of this body, so we must defeat the MX.

I urge my colleagues to vote for the Mavroules-Bennett amendment. Let us not bury the MX, let us bury the MX proposal.

□ 1800

Mr. Chairman, let me just say that the Aspin amendment, the Price amendment, whatever we call it here, is a clever trick. It is just that, a trick. It is an opportunity for Members to go home to their constituents and say: "I am really not for it, I am really not against it."

I think the American people deserve better than that. Let us have a clear vote up or down on this missile system. We have had a good debate here today. Let us not obfuscate the result for the American people. Let us get the vote that we need, a vote on the Bennett-Mavroules amendment.

Mr. RITTER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SHANNON. I am happy to yield to the gentleman from Pennsylvania.

Mr. RITTER. Mr. Chairman, I thank my friend and colleague, the gentleman from Massachusetts, for yielding.

I detected in his remarks that somehow the reason that we have not moved toward substantial arms control is because of the Reagan administration; that somehow it is not the Soviets who are responsible for the lack of progress but it is the Americans, that somehow we walked out of the arms-control talks and not the Soviets. Well, the record is precise on who has exhibited intransigence on arms control and it certainly has not been the Americans.

I would just make one additional point. There are a number of reasons why the Soviets are not at the arms-control table today. One big reason, which has not been mentioned today, is that nobody really knows who is in charge there at the present time. As we know, Andropov was very sick, and the leadership was not solidified, and Chernenko is just at the point of solidifying his leadership. Perhaps they do not feel ready to enter into any concrete arms-control arrangements.

Mr. SHANNON. Mr. Chairman, if I may reclaim my time from the gentleman, I am sorry to cut the gentleman off, but I do want to respond to the gentleman.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Massachusetts has expired.

(By unanimous consent, Mr. SHANNON was allowed to proceed for 1 additional minute.)

Mr. SHANNON. Mr. Chairman, let me just say that I understand that arms-control talks are always going to be difficult, but I also believe that the United States can take the lead and can do a better job than it has done in leading the world toward peace. I also would say to the gentleman that——

Mr. RITTER. But it takes two to tango on arms control, and you cannot dance by yourself, except if you are a ballerina——

Mr. SHANNON. Mr. Chairman, let me reclaim my time. I have not yielded to the gentleman.

Let me say that the world is looking to the United States to take that lead. We are strong enough and we have the will and we have the ability to do it.

Mr. RITTER. And we have been trying to do that, if the gentleman will yield.

Mr. SHANNON. Twenty years ago, when the question of atmospheric tests came up, President Kennedy took the lead and unilaterally, if you will, suspended atmospheric tests. I would like to see this administration and this Government jointly show that same type of commitment today. I think the time is ripe and the world is looking for that leadership.

Mr. RITTER. But we showed we were committed, and they walked out. They walked out not us.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. SHANNON) has expired.

Mr. McKERNAN. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. McKERNAN. I yield to my friend, the gentleman from California.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding.

I would like to read just a very brief statement to the body, if I might.

"The Nation has moved to modernize its strategic deterrent through the MX, Trident, and cruise missile systems. The MX missile deployment will enhance the survivability of our land-based intercontinental ballistic missile force."

That, I say to my friends and colleagues, is from the Democratic platform of 1980.

Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the Aspin amendment to provide adequate funding for the 15 Peacekeeper missiles, and to give a 6-month breathing space, and against those amendments which reduce procurement funds for this much-needed program.

As stated by the House Armed Services Committee:

> The Soviet Union continues to modernize its (ICBM) force through the development of two new solid propellant and mobile ICBM's—the SS-X-24 and SS-X-25. The Soviet strategic offensive and defensive buildup strongly suggests that the Soviet Union believes that a nuclear war can be fought and won.

In addition, the report language states, "The deployment of MX missiles in Minuteman silos—although vulnerable—obviates the Soviet ICBM sanctuary and contributes greatly to restoring the strategic balance." From the committee's own language it should be clear that while the United States once enjoyed nuclear superiority, those days are now gone. Indeed, from the available evidence, one conclusion can be drawn—the United States is now in a position, or dangerously close to one, of strategic inferiority.

Mr. Chairman, let me briefly remind the Members of the four important conclusions of the bipartisan, blue-ribbon Scowcroft Commission. First, the Commission stated:

> It is illusory to believe that we could obtain a satisfactory agreement with the Soviets limiting ICBM deployments if we unilaterally terminated the only new U.S. ICBM program that could lead to deployment in this decade * * * Abandoning MX at this time would jeopardize, not enhance, the likelihood of reaching a stabilizing agreement. It would also undermine the incentives to the Soviets to change the nature of their own ICBM force and thus the environment most conducive to the deployment of a small missile.

Second, the Commission stated that deterrence is in no small fashion linked to the perception in the minds of Soviet leaders. Canceling the MX at this point would effectively demonstrate a lack of national will and cohesion needed to address the previously mentioned problem of a Soviet ICBM sanctuary.

Third, the Commission pointed up the serious imbalance between the Soviets' massive ability to destroy hardened U.S. land-based military targets with their ICBM force, and our lack of such capability. "In the interest of the alliance as a whole," the report stated, "we cannot safely permit a situation to continue wherein the Soviets have the capability promptly to destroy a range of hardened military targets and we do not." The Commission's report goes on to state, "We must have a credible capability for controlled, prompt, limited attack on hard targets ourselves." I remind my colleagues that today, the United States does not possess weapons in its inventory which, like the Soviets' SS-18 and SS-19, can alone destroy hardened targets.

Fourth, and finally, the Commission noted the significant age of our ICBM force. We have a tangible need to modernize this important leg of the strategic nuclear triad. We do not need to match the overall capability of recent Soviet deployment of over 600 modern ICBM's of MX size or larger.

Mr. Chairman, the buzzword of today's debate seems to be unilateralism. The Soviets have walked away from the negotiating tables in Geneva. They have deployed over 600 modern ICBM's as large or larger than the MX in the past decade. The Soviets have deployed several hundred SS-20's aimed at our allies. What would some here have us do? Reward them for these actions. Terminate the MX. I fail to see the logic, Mr. Chairman.

There is a lot of talk here today as to what will or will not cause the Soviets to bargain in good faith on arms control.

Let me relate my own experience. In a meeting with the presiding of the supreme Soviet I asked them how they were going to reciprocate for President Carter's cancellation, deferral, and delay of a number of strategic weapons systems. The reply was short and concise and, submit, very significant. "We do not believe in unilateral disarmament."

Mr. Chairman, I submit there is political hypocrisy on the part of some MX opponents.

When President Carter proposed 200 MX missiles—not 110—as proposed by President Reagan—many of the same people who are opposing the MX today supported him. It was contained in the 1980 Democratic platform.

I urge my colleagues to support the Aspin amendment.

[From the Washington Post, May 16, 1984]

ANOTHER MX VOTE

A year ago Mr. Reagan and Congress made a bargain: the president made his approach to strategic arms control more negotiable and Congress voted to start building the MX missile. Since then, however, Soviet-American relations have gone from bad to worse; the Soviets have walked out of both the talks on strategic arms and those on missiles in Europe (INF). As a result, strong elements in the Democratic-controlled House now want to go back on the 1983 bargain and stop funding the MX.

It's a shortsighted idea. The MX is the same unlovely missile, controversial but supported in its various stages of development by four administrations, that it's always been. It's also the same potential bargaining lever that it's always been meant to be. The notion that yielding it up unilaterally will somehow induce the Soviets to abandon their similar existing and prospective missiles is daffy. The three Democratic presidential candidates say no, and they are wrong.

There is, however, a real problem, which is that no negotiations are going on or are on the near horizon. The country is in the early stages of an interesting and necessary debate about the extent to which this is Ronald Reagan's fault. Certainly it is so that he has not persuaded everyone that he is serious about arms control. This important consideration however, is whether the person who is president when the Soviets decide to come back to the table will have the MX available to him as a bargaining counter. It is startling again, that a Democratic presidential candidate could ask to weaken his own prospective position.

Rep. Les Aspin has a sensible suggestion (on the op-ed page today) for keeping considerations of arms control and considerations of arms building in reasonable balance for the duration of the current cold spell. Vote the money for a certain number of MX missiles, he advises, but don't spend it until a few months have passed in order to see how the American elections and the first stage of a resumed negotiation go. It's a bit complicated, and it puts Congress more directly into the business of negotiations than any president would prefer. But it ensures that the American president, when he finally sits down again with the Kremlin, does so with a decent hand.

HOW MANY MX'S?

The House today will again vote on the MX missile—and once again, there are good arguments on both sides. On one side is the concern that we should not reward the Soviet Union for walking out on the arms talks in Geneva. To kill the MX is hardly an inducement for them to return to the talks; in fact, it is an inducement to avoid the talks, to continue with the tactics that got them what they wanted for free.

But there are also good arguments against giving Ronald Reagan all the MXs his heart desires. When the Scowcroft Commission pressed successfully for the MX compromise last year, it said the MX gave the United States leverage with the Soviets—but, importantly, it also gave arms control supporters leverage with the Reagan administration. We lose a good deal of that leverage with Reagan if we press full steam ahead with the MX program.

What are we to do? The defense bill on the floor of the House today provides 30 MXs for 1985. An amendment (the Bennett-Mavroules amendment) will be offered to make MX procurement zero for next year.

There are essentially two reasons why we should not go ahead with 30 missiles and two reasons why we shouldn't vote for zero missiles.

Don't go full steam ahead:

First, there is the presidential election. All three candidates for the Democratic presidential nomination are opposed to the MX. If we go ahead with the MX and the eventual Democratic nominee wins, one could

expect the MX program to be ended. It makes no sense to begin production of 30 missiles only to have the program canceled on January 20.

Second, we don't want to lose that leverage with Reagan, if by some strange quirk of history he is reelected. It is popular to say that Reagan is opposed to arms control; I find that a bit of an exaggeration. But certainly there are those in the Reagan administration who are less than enthusiastic for arms control. To go full steam while there are no talks going on would suit them just fine. But we would lose leverage with them. The closer we get to approving the full 100 MX program, the less leverage we have.

On the other hand, don't kill off the MX:

First, to reward the Soviets for leaving the Geneva talks (and only days after boycotting the Olympics to boot) is shooting ourselves in the foot, if we really want to see more arms talks. It tells the Moscow they can win by going into a blue funk. In only a few weeks, the Netherlands is due to decide on deploying the Pershing missile. Dutch politicians who would rather avoid the unpleasant constituent complaints the deployment would generate will be overjoyed if the House votes no on MX; it will allow them to vote no to Pershing with a clear conscience, arguing that they aren't letting the NATO alliance down but merely following the American lead. That will further reenforce the Soviets view that there is much to be gained by forgetting negotiations.

Second, the MX is still good negotiating leverage in the talks. Unless we are totally pessimistic about the future of arms control, the talks will one day begin again. When that happens, the Scowcroft recommendations will still be valid. We need some leverage to get the Soviets to talk seriously about their MX equivalents—the SS 18s and the SS 19s. The Ford and Carter administration offered Moscow many inducements to lower the numbers of those missiles. But as the history of these talks indicates the going was pretty tough—we had nothing equivalent to bargain with.

The MX is the equivalent, and it is so viewed by many with arms control credentials. The decision to go ahead with MX was not made by Ronald Reagan, staunch critic of SALT I and SALT II. The decision to develop the MX was made by Richard Nixon, architect of SALT I, and the decision to procure the MX was made by Jimmy Carter, architect of SALT II. Whatever one may think of those two presidents, it is impossible to criticize their fundamental dedication to arms control.

What do we do if we don't like either 30 MXs or zero MXs in the 1985 budget? One option is to make the MX contingent on a Soviet return to the bargaining table. We could vote for 15 missiles but lock the money up for six months until after whoever wins the election is inaugurated. If the Soviets have not then returned to the bargaining table, the money would be released. But if they come back to the table, and bargain in good faith, the money remains locked up.

I will offer this third alternative as an amendment on the House floor today. Voting for zero MXs rewards the Soviets for not being at the bargaining table. Voting for this amendment rewards them if they return to the bargaining table.

Mr. McKERNAN. Mr. Chairman, as I listened to the debate today, I was reminded of the words of H. R. Mencken who said that "Every complex problem has a simple solution, and it is usually wrong."

I think it should be clear from the debate today that this is a complex problem. That should be clear from the fact that there have been inconsistent arguments, frankly, on both sides of this issue. Members are opposing the MX for certain reasons that are inconsistent with other Members who are opposing the MX. The same thing is true of those of us who are supporting the Aspin-Pritchard amendment.

What I would like to do is talk about why some of us are supporting the Aspin-Pritchard amendment. I talk about that because there may only be 20 of us in this House who are holding the balance between whether or not we continue with the MX program or whether we do not. But as somebody who feels very strongly that we ought to have a mutual and verifiable freeze, who feels that is in the best interest of this country, who voted for a mutual and verifiable freeze, and who agrees with the Scowcroft Commission report that there is no present window of vulnerability, I think we need to also be concerned about the signals we send to the Soviet Union.

Frankly, I would be willing to trade off the MX for the SS-24. And I point out to my friends who oppose the Aspin-Pritchard amendment, who want us to abide by the SALT II agreement, that those two missiles would be allowed in that agreement.

But that is not the issue here today. There is an old Maine story about a fisherman who was asked how to get to East Vassalboro. After thinking for a while, the fisherman said, "Come to think about it, you can't get there from here."

Without the talks going on in Geneva, the same thing is true with arms control. We cannot get to an arms control agreement from where we are today.

The question is, What do we as the people who set policy in this country do about it? I am convinced that killing a program that we have been developing for 10 years certainly is not the first step. In fact, it would be counterproductive. But I think we ought to also realize, those of us on my side of the aisle especially, that our adminstration has spoken with a number of different voices about our seriousness about arms control and what our policy is on arms control, because that has caused this amendment to be offered today.

Frankly, I think everyone in this body realizes the votes are not there to pass the MX missile without this kind of conditional language. Frankly, I would not vote for the MX missile without this kind of conditional language, because I think what has happened over the past year or year and a half is that the contradictory statements coming out of this administration have sent some signal to the Soviet Union that probably should not have been sent.

What this amendment does is send a signal that the United States is serious about arms control, and to demonstrate that seriousness we are willing to say that we will not build any new MX missiles until 1985 if the Soviet Union comes back to the table.

Mr. LEVITAS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield on that point?

Mr. McKERNAN. I am happy to yield to the gentleman from Georgia.

Mr. LEVITAS. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Chairman, this ties in precisely with the remark made by the last speaker, the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. SHANNON) who addressed the issue in a serious vein and made the point that President Kennedy was successful in getting the Soviet Union to negotiate a test ban treaty. And how did he do that? He did it precisely the same way that the Aspin amendment is proposing. He said that we will declare a moratorium for a certain period of time on atmospheric testing in order to assess the Soviet Union's response.

He did that, and they responded. Averill Harriman went to Moscow and negotiated that treaty in 13 days.

If it worked for President Kennedy, it can work for this administration. I think we ought to adopt the moratorium proposal of the Aspin amendment.

Mr. McKERNAN. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. LEVITAS).

I hardly have a need to finish my speech, because that was my big conclusion.

Mr. LEVITAS. I am sorry about that.

Mr. McKERNAN. That is all right because I am glad that we are in agreement, and I think it is important to point that out, and that is that we want to demonstrate our good faith, the good faith of the United States to enter into a serious arms control agreement that is going to result in reductions of nuclear weapons in this world.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Maine (Mr. McKERNAN) has expired.

(By unanimous consent, Mr. McKERNAN was allowed to proceed for 1 additional minute.)

□ 1810

Mr. McKERNAN. I think that the Aspin amendment allows us to demonstrate our good faith and it also allows the Soviet Union to demonstrate its good faith. If the Soviet Union is not willing to do that, we ought to reconsider what we are going to do on the MX missile and we ought to reassess our whole arms control program.

Mr. RITTER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. McKERNAN. I would be happy to yield.

Mr. RITTER. Mr. Chairman, I thank my colleague from Maine for yielding.

Again getting back to this issue of who is responsible for lack of progress in arms control and what we are trying to do in order to encourage arms control, I think it needs to be pointed out that in October of 1983, the U.S. position included a draft treaty which would relax the former limit of 850 on ballistic missiles. The Soviets were very concerned about that. They wanted to have a higher number. It offered flexibility on missile throw-weight. Of course the throw-weight of the Soviet missiles is far more than that of the American missiles. It reduced the air-launched cruise missile loading limit on heavy bombers, which was again a kind of limitation on us with respect to them.

In October, the United States offered further concessions.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Maine has expired.

(At the request of Mr. RITTER, and by unanimous consent, Mr. McKERNAN was allowed to proceed for an additional 2 minutes.)

Mr. McKERNAN. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. RITTER. I think, Mr. Chairman, it is important to realize that we have made steps forward. In October, the United States offered a mutual guaranteed build-down of ballistic missile warheads and bombers, a proposal for a build-down working group, a willingness to further limit the size of the ALCM forces and a willingness to negotiate tradeoffs between Soviet advantages and United States advantages.

Now, the record is clear. What I keep hearing from certain Members on the other side of the aisle is that somehow the impasse in arms control is due to the United States of America. I think that is a basic misunderstanding of the Soviet Union today.

I mentioned in my previous comment that the leadership of the Soviet Union is as yet not solidified. In the final 6 months of Andropov's tenure, he was out of commission. Chernenko is still in a position of solidifying his own position and even he is said to be ill with emphysema. It is not known who is wielding the power in the Soviet Union today. Is it the party, the military, the KGB—who knows?

I think we have to also realize that if the Soviets feel that by hostility, and certainly they have exhibited a kind of rare degree of hostility over the last 8 months or so, the litany of which has been brought out earlier in discussion of the civilian airliner downing and the recent award, to the pilot of the fighter plane that downed the airliner, of a medal. Recent carpet bombing in Afghanistan; vast shipment of weapons into Cuba, Nicaragua, and the Caribbean; the rejection of each and every American arms control proposal show an extraordinary level of Soviet militarism. If we kill MX, are we rewarding Soviet intransigence? Are we rewarding Soviet belligerence? Are we retreating from the modernization of our own deterrent forces? Are we rewarding the behavior of the Soviet Union over the last 8 months? Will the Soviets get a message that the more belligerent they become, the more concessions they can get? Do we violate the mutual bilateral considerations which even the nuclear freeze movement has advocated?

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Maine has expired.

Mr. PRITCHARD. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the gentleman from Maine may have 3 additional minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Washington?

Mr. MONTGOMERY. Reserving the right to object, Mr. Chairman, I certainly will not, and I am the acting chairman over here, but if we could limit where Members would not go much over 5 or 6 or 7 minutes, then we only have about six Members over here who would like to speak, maybe we could have a vote sometime in the next 40 or 50 minutes around 7 o'clock on this one amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I withdraw my reservation of objection.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Washington?

There was no objection.

Mr. PRITCHARD. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. McKERNAN. I yield to the gentleman from Washington.

Mr. PRITCHARD. Mr. Chairman, I just want to thank the gentleman for all of his work on this amendment. He was a key player on our side of the aisle. The gentleman comes to the issue as I do, not a strong supporter of the MX, but wanting to come up with a better system than just giving it up here in this Chamber and he thinks it is a better way to do it. So I want to compliment the gentleman from Maine for all his leadership. He has played a key part in this action.

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. McKERNAN. I would be happy to yield.

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I, too, want to compliment the gentleman from Maine, who has been very steadfast and very moderate, very balanced, and I think his statement today reflects a tremendous amount of preparation of work and knowledge and understanding of this issue.

I know it is very difficult to be questioned, as we all have been questioned, about why we are trying to see if there is a way to get this administration into a posture where negotiations can succeed.

I think because of the work of the gentleman from Maine and the other group of moderates, that we have gotten the administration into a much better position in terms of negotiations, and I think this amendment as crafted will contribute to that, but I want to compliment the gentleman from Maine for his courage and his steadfastness.

Mr. MAVROULES. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. McKERNAN. I yield to the gentleman from Massachusetts.

Mr. MAVROULES. Mr. Chairman, as a point of clarification, under the SALT II agreement, I believe, although the SS-18's and 19's are not precluded from it, I think they are limited as to the number of warheads, the same as the MX missile would be limited as to the number of warheads.

I thank the gentleman very much.

Mr. McKERNAN. I think that is accurate.

Mr. PANETTA. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, this debate has been an important debate because I think it focuses on the difficult choices that face this Nation at this time and into the years in the future, between diminishing resources, between growing deficits and between our priorities, be they military, security, or human needs.

The bottom line, I think, is that we simply no longer can afford everything we want without asking the question whether it works or not, what is the cost of it, what are its implications, what are it consequences in terms of our fiscal situation, in terms of our military situation, in terms of our diplomatic situation. That is the reality of our budget, the Federal budget. It is the reality of the defense portion of that budget and it is the reality of the MX system.

A few weeks ago here in this House we debated the budget resolutions. It was recognized at that time that the nature of our deficits crisis is such that if we are to deal with these growing deficits, we simply have to deal with the 85 percent of the Federal budget that is virtually uncontrollable. There is 30 percent going for defense, 46 percent going to entitlements, and now almost 12 percent going for payment of interest on the national debt; 85 percent of the Federal budget that is virtually uncontrollable. We have got to deal with those areas.

Every proposal, every alternative that we voted on here on the floor of the House recognized the need to pro-

vide some control on the growth of defense spending, every alternative that we voted on. Indeed, the House adopted a proposal which set a 3.5-percent limit on real growth in the defense area.

Now, whether you agree with that or not, if you agree with 3.5 percent, if you agree with 4-percent real growth, if you agree with 5-percent real growth, 6-percent real growth, the reality is that unless you are willing to gut the maintenance, personnel, readiness, transportation, training portion of the defense budget, you simply have to deal with the procurement problem. That is the reality. If you are going to limit defense at the level and you do not want to gut readiness, or any of the other areas that deal with our conventional preparedness, then you have to deal with the procurement budget.

Procurement is the fastest growing part of the Federal budget next to interest rate growth. It is the fastest growing part of the defense budget. Between 1980 and 1984, the procurement budget increased by 140 percent. Between 1976 and 1985, it increased by almost 151 percent. It is growing at a rate that is second only to interest on the national debt and interest is obviously the most uncontrollable portion of it because we cannot stop the interest payments on the debt.

Eighty percent of the procurement budget is determined by prior-year contracts and obligations. We have locked in almost $64.1 billion into the 1985 budget by virtue of procurement and contracts.

□ 1820

In this bill we are dealing with, we have 170 major weapons systems. We are talking about trying to stop the MX. But there are 170 major weapons systems that are included in this bill.

Even the Armed Services Committee, let me say, recognized this, and let me quote from the Armed Services Committee: "Continued increases of the magnitude projected by the Department of Defense in the procurement area are neither fiscally affordable nor politically supportable."

The point is this: If we are serious about the need to control the growth in the defense area, then we have got to be serious about making judgments on weapons systems that are either duplicative, that are not effective, that are costly and that do not do the job.

Surely, surely the $21 billion involved in the MX system qualifies as one of the most questionable weapons systems that we are now embarked upon.

Aside from the arguments that have been presented on destabilization and first strike, I think all of us recognize the convoluted logic we have gone through with regard to the MX system over the last 20 years: 35 different basing modes from mobile to stationary, from 100 MX's to 30 to 15.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from California (Mr. PANETTA) has expired.

(By unanimous consent, Mr. PANETTA was allowed to proceed for 3 additional minutes.)

Mr. PANETTA. The GAO and the proponents admit that it is vulnerable, and so the arguments now, instead of turning to the viability of the weapons system, are turning to the bargaining chip, they turn to the fact of whether we should reward or punish the Russians for their behavior.

The final reality is that this proposal that has been offered by the gentleman from Wisconsin will never in and of itself bring the Russians to the bargaining table. The Pershing did not do it, the cruises did not do it. That is a lesson we should have learned long ago.

What is happening is that in our effort to try to trap or force the Russians to the bargaining table we are in essence trapping ourselves into having to make a decision on a system that can be legitimately questioned in terms of its value. We are paralyzing ourselves out of fear, out of frustration, out of a lack of willingness to make the tough decisions.

I am not going to be blackmailed. We talk about blackmailing the Russians or blackmailing others into decisions. I am not going to be blackmailed. It is not a question of who I am punishing or who I am rewarding. I just do not think we ought to spend this kind of money on a system that cannot be justified at the present time, and that is the basic reason why I feel that we ought to eliminate this system.

I urge you to recognize the realities of the present, to reject the fear and reject the arguments that really are driven out of weakness, and to assert the strength of our will and good judgment and commonsense that ultimately is essential to both our fiscal security and our national security.

Mr. GRAY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. PANETTA. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. GRAY. I would like to compliment the gentleman and identify myself with his remarks, as well as the gentleman from California (Mr. DELLUMS), who spoke earlier, who was the first to introduce an amendment to cut the MX.

I think the gentleman from California (Mr. PANETTA) has made a very strong argument for many of us who struggle on the Budget Committee in dealing with these deficits, that we cannot continue going at the same rate that we have been. And I would like to join with him in urging that we look at these particular systems based on their merits.

We have heard three arguments over the last 3 years. First, we must close the window of vulnerability with the Soviets. Second, we need a bargaining chip in negotiations with the Soviets. And now we hear the argument, do not reward the Soviets. All these arguments are wrong, simplistic, and absurd.

But it seems to me that the gentleman has brought another very good perspective; and that is the whole question, not only of the strategic need and the appropriateness of the system, but also what it is doing to the whole process of our fiscal priorities.

I just want to identify with what the gentleman has said.

Mr. MICHEL. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words, and I rise in support of the perfecting amendment of the chairman of the committee.

(By unanimous consent, Mr. MICHEL was allowed to proceed for 2 additional minutes.)

Mr. MICHEL. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the perfecting amendment introduced by the distinguished chairman of the committee Mr. PRICE.

If a visitor from another planet had been listening to the arguments of the opponents of the MX these past years, he would have a strange idea of this weapon.

The critics have told us for years that we should not have the MX because it is dangerous, deadly, and destabilizing, a first-strike monster.

But now we are told by the same people we should not have the MX because it "has questionable military value."

We are now told we should not have the MX because it is vulnerable to a Soviet first strike.

But the same people who are saying this now denied the concept of vulnerability when the President raised it. They used to tell us the Soviets would never dare to attempt a first-strike and that vulnerability was not a real issue.

So this visitor from another planet could only conclude that the MX is a dangerous weapon that does not work and that it is terribly vulnerable even though it is in no danger of attack.

Consistency has never been the hallmark of the antimodernization crowd. But this time they have outdone themselves.

The critics tell us the MX is not a bargaining chip because although we have provided funds for some MX's the Soviet Union walked away from the bargaining table.

The critics say this proves the MX will not get the Soviet Union to negotiate.

There is one little part of the equation the critics conveniently leave out.

The Soviet Union knows there is a chance the MX can either be crippled

or eliminated by what we do here in the Congress.

So the true reason they do not see the MX as an inducement to return to the table now is that they are waiting for us to eliminate the MX from the bargaining table before we ever sit down again and talk.

The true test of the bargaining power of this missile can be discovered only when the Soviets are convinced we in Congress are going to fund the MX. Give them even a tiny doubt on that score, and they will stay away forever.

And speaking of the fact that it is the Soviet Union that walked away from the table—have you noticed President Reagan is blamed for that?

It is the old game of "Blame the Victim."

Why are the Soviets deploying SS-20's?

It is Reagan's fault for saying all those nasty things about them. They feel threatened, the poor dears.

Why have they boycotted the Olympics?

It is Reagan's fault—he has been unkind and spiteful by pointing out their human rights record.

Why did they walk away from arms-reduction negotiations?

It is Reagan's fault he is not trying hard enough. If only he would stand on his head they just might be persuaded to come back.

The report of the President's Commission on Strategic Forces, March 21, 1984, just 2 months ago said the MX has a "crucial task" to perform in creating "an arms control environment."

Stripped of the jargon of the arms controllers, that means that with an MX program we can get the Midgetman and without the MX program we cannot.

On March 16, 1983, I pointed out to our colleagues that the freeze debate we were engaged in was only one part of a larger debate dealing with our national security.

I said, paraphrasing Winston Churchill: "This freeze resolution is only the first sip of the bitter cup that will be proffered to you. Again and again you will be told cut funds for one weapon and then another and then another."

Forgive me for quoting myself.

But it is irresistible to do so because today, little more than a year after I made that prediction, it has been vindicated—with a vengeance.

Here we are, being asked to eliminate one entire strategic weapon system. Soon it will be another. And then another.

And at each step, the proponents of these moves will tell us that such eliminations strengthen our security, foster the cause of world peace, and make it more likely the Soviet Union will come back to the bargaining table.

Such geostrategic fantasies seem to have been created in a collaboration between the "Wizard of Oz" and "Alice in Wonderland."

In my office, I have displayed a copy of two headlines. One from the Washington Post, the other from the Baltimore Sun.

They are dated December 9, 1982.

The Sun headline says: "Soviets Cheer House for Rejecting MX Missile Appropriations."

The Post headline says: "Soviets Voice Satisfaction on MX Rejection."

Mind you, what I have read is not the opinion of some Reaganite hardliner who believes cutting the MX plays into the hands of the Soviet Union.

No, what I have read are headlines from newspapers who never have been found guilty of practicing conservatism with consenting adults.

These newspapers simply reported the facts. And when we said "no" to funds for the MX back in 1982—the major issue then was the "dense pack" basing mode—they accurately reported the Kremlin's reaction.

I hope there is not one of us who wants to see similar headlines tomorrow morning.

But our free press will report the facts.

What facts will they report?

The answer to that is up to each of us.

□ 1830

I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. NEAL. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to remind my colleagues that there is a third option to be considered today. It is my amendment which was introduced for me by my colleague Mr. MAVROULES.

Mr. Chairman, my amendment would add an important provision to the Bennett amendment. It would declare that deleting funding for the MX missile for fiscal year 1985 does not constitute a unilateral termination of the program but, rather, a moratorium on procurement of the missiles. The amendment presents a challenge to the Soviet Union to demonstrate its commitment to arms control by responding in an appropriate fashion before the next Congress decides on defense funding for the 1986 fiscal year. As a practical matter this means that we must be fully aware of their response by the spring of 1985.

Mr. Chairman, last year support for the MX missile seemed a key to progress on arms control negotiations, which at that time did not seem high on the administration's agenda. In exchange for congressional support for the missile, the President promised to be more forthcoming and serious concerning his negotiating position on nuclear weapons. I became convinced that this compromise could result in real progress at the negotiating table. It was worth a try. Therefore, I supported the MX missile each time it was considered on the House floor. Nonetheless, the year ended with a disturbing deterioration in both the INF and START talks.

The administration maintains that the Soviets are responsible for the breakdown in negotiations. Critics of the administration, of course, claim the reverse is true. No doubt there is at least a bit of truth in both arguments. Regardless of who is wholly or partially to blame, we must not allow the situation to deteriorate further without some effort to break through the impasse in negotiations. It concerns me, too, Mr. Chairman, that the Soviets may have decided not to negotiate with a Reagan administration—not just for the remainder of the election year, but even extending into the next term, should Mr. Reagan be reelected.

Arms control, Mr. Chairman, is vital to our existence. We simply cannot afford to wait another 4 years for progress. However, we might yet use the MX to further arms control. By placing a moratorium on procurement funding of the MX missile, my amendment may serve as a catalyst to overcome the deep mutual distrust that has hindered progress thus far.

Mr. Chairman, the MX is an important nuclear weapons system that has been supported by the last four Presidents. By delaying funding, practically on the eve of deployment, Congress would be sending a clear signal to the Soviet Union that the American people want to end this senseless race toward destruction. It is our hope that the Soviets, who have as much to gain as we do by reducing world tension and the threat of nuclear war, would respond appropriately to this gesture.

There are those who would argue that killing the MX missile program would send the same signal to the Soviets as would a moratorium. I do not believe that this is time, Mr. Chairman. In fact, I would argue that unilateral cancellation of the MX—particularly if the administration is correct and the Soviets are not interested in arms control—would reward the Soviet Union for leaving the bargaining table, and possibly remove any incentive for the Soviets to bargain.

But what of the substitute offered by the gentleman from Wisconsin? It purports to be a third option between the Reagan buildup and those who want to kill the program. With all due respect, Mr. Chairman, the substitute, in my opinion, is little more than a continuation of the Reagan policies. It extends production authorization and provides little value as a tool for bringing the Soviets back to the bargaining table for meaningful negotiations. A

moratorium, if it is to have any value, must send a clear and unmistakable signal to the Soviets.

I am concerned—no matter what the intention of the authors and supporters of the Aspin amendment might be—that it would put congressional intent in doubt. The Soviets might logically assume that the amendment is simply an attempt by MX supporters to keep the program alive and to skirt this sensitive issue during an election year. The Aspin substitute is profoundly different from that of my own amendment. My moratorium on production represents an olive branch, whereas the substitute is a Damoclean sword held above Soviet negotiators. Why would the Soviets respond to that approach any differently than they have responded to Mr. Reagan's threats?

Would we be taking too great a risk by stopping production of the MX for an entire fiscal year, Mr. Chairman? The answer simply is that there is very little risk involved. After all, Mr. Chairman, it is not as if we do not have nuclear weapons. Our strategic arsenals are formidable. Our invulnerable sub forces represent a very high percentage of our nuclear arsenal. One sub alone could destroy every major city in the Soviet Union. Moreover, under my amendment research and development, flight testing, MX production lines, and the 21 MX missiles authorized for fiscal year 1984 remain in place and the new President—whoever he may be—will have the same range of options as is now available.

Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues to support my perfecting amendment and to vote for an alternative approach to the current policies which have not succeeded in reducing the threat of nuclear war. Most Americans, I believe, feel less secure than they did 4 years ago.

I would caution those who would simply eliminate the MX system entirely without gaining anything from the Soviets in return. The arms race is a two-way street. The Soviet Union is a major player in this terrible race and we simply cannot afford to ignore that reality if we are ever to bring the arms race under control.

Mr. Chairman, Mr. ASPIN asks the question of what do we do if we do not want to vote for 30 missiles, but also do not want to eliminate it entirely. His solution to vote for 15 hardly provides an alternative that offers much leverage for future arms talks. It is not a new approach, but a variation on the same theme. I submit, Mr. Chairman, that my approach is the best alternative. It is truly a moratorium that clearly and unmistakably signals to the Soviet Union that we want to begin a new chapter in arms control.

Another copy of my amendment follows these remarks, and again, I urge my colleagues to adopt this perfecting amendment:

AMENDMENT AUTHORIZED BY MR. NEAL OF NORTH CAROLINA TO THE AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. BENNETT OF FLORIDA

In section 110 proposed to be added by the amendment—

(1) insert "(a)" after "SEC. 110."; and

(2) add at the end thereof the following:

(b) It is the intent of Congress that denial of funds for procurement under the MX missile system program for fiscal year 1985 constitutes a moratorium on procurement of missiles under such program but does not constitute a unilateral termination of that program.

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. NEAL. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. DICKS. I appreciate the gentleman's amendment and I think that he, himself, genuinely believes that this is an alternative. I guess I understand how you are going to start the moratorium.

What I do not understand is how you are going to stop the moratorium? I do not hear a lot of your colleagues saying they are going to be prepared in 6 months, 9 months to start up the MX. Their argument is MX makes no sense in the first place.

So I am afraid you may be kind of lonely when it comes time to trying to start the process again. The Aspin approach is a better approach because it suspends for 6 months and gives the Soviets an opportunity.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

(On request of Mr. PRITCHARD and by unanimous consent, Mr. NEAL was allowed to proceed for 2 additional minutes.)

Mr. DICKS. I would end by saying that I know the gentleman is sincere about a moratorium but I have to question whether many of the people on the gentleman's side on this issue are going to be there when the moratorium comes to an end.

Mr. NEAL. Let me respond to the gentleman.

There have been a lot of attempts here today to read the Soviet mind. Some say they will bargain seriously only if we build many MX missiles; others say they will respond better if we do not build the MX missile.

I do not know; I certainly do not know how to read minds. What I will say is we can try by adopting this amendment, to begin deescalating the arms race. If the Soviets do not respond appropriately, I think those who favor many more MX missiles would have the overwhelming argument on their side. They say now that the Soviets will not respond in an appropriate way to our offer and if they prove to be right they will have a very strong argument for building more MX missiles and I could agree with them.

Mr. PRITCHARD. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. NEAL. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. PRITCHARD. It seems to me your proposal is really more strict than ours. You are saying next spring you will have a chance to look at it.

Mr. NEAL. Yes.

Mr. PRITCHARD. Under our proposal, it is April 1st, which is spring. In your case, you are saying there has to be concrete proposals, concrete evidence of progress.

Mr. NEAL. Appropriate response.

Mr. PRITCHARD. That is right. Under ours, we say they just have to come back to the table.

Mr. NEAL. Exactly.

Mr. PRITCHARD. In all fairness, I think yours is a more restrictive condition than ours is.

Mr. NEAL. Yes.

Mr. PRITCHARD. I would say I doubt if the people you have been talking with really support that, because if they support that, they support something more strict than what we are offering.

Mr. NEAL. May I say to the gentleman, the people I have talked to from both sides of the argument, support my approach because they see it as resulting not in words but in deeds. We make an opening offer, the Soviets must respond in deed, not in words.

They do not have to come back and sit down at a table. They have to go do something. What might that be? It could be any number of things. It might be that they would destroy some of their SS-18's, an MX-comparable missile system. Would they do that? I do not know. But I am convinced it is worth a try. If the Soviets do not respond with action that is appropriate to our action all the options we have available now will still be available next year. We have much to gain and nothing to lose.

Mr. PRICE. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, let me explain what is and what is not in this amendment.

First, some of the phraseology may strike the ear as curious. Quite frankly, this is because of the House rules of germaneness. We are linking funding for procurement of this fiscal year 1985 buy of MX missiles to Soviet presence and conduct at the START negotiations in Geneva. But an amendment that discusses arms control and negotiations with a foreign power is not germane to the defense authorization bill. Therefore, you see the terminology used in this amendment, with its references to the Soviets "acting in a manner to further the control and limitation of types of strategic nuclear missile weapon systems similar to the MX." For the record, let me make plain that these references are to Soviet presence and conduct at the START talks in Geneva.

Second, the amendment provides funds for 15 missiles but locks that money up until April 1. That allows the President elected this November to make the determinations of Soviet compliance mandated in this amendment. The funds that are locked up for the first 6 months of the fiscal year are the funds allocated specifically for the 15 missiles. In other words, the obligation of funds for advance procurement of missile components could go forward during that period. This is permitted specifically to avoid a wrenching disruption to the production program which would result in a substantial monetary penalty to the Government.

Third, the amendment provides $1.8 billion in funds for MX procurement. This includes authorization for appropriations for 15 missiles and for the support and procurement of mechanical, electrical, and other components required to prepare for the deployment of 20 of the 21 missiles approved by the Congress in fiscal year 1984. In other words, if this amendment is approved, the bill will deny authorization for 25 of the 40 missiles requested and for the entire $233 million requested for initial spares.

Fourth, this amendment allows the money fenced off until April 1 for buying 15 additional missiles to be released after that date under either of two conditions: either the Soviets have not returned to the START talks or they have returned but are stalling and not negotiating in good faith. It will be up to the President to make any determination that they are not bargaining in good faith. If the Congress disagrees with the President's determination, it always has the authority to reverse the President's decision and lock up the money once again. Subsequent to April 1, should the President notify Congress that he wishes to unlock funds that have remained locked away, the Congress will have 30 days in which to approve a joint resolution of disapproval and the President may not obligate any of the missile funds during that time period.

Mr. Chairman, I also ask unanimous consent that all debate on the Price amendment cease at 7 o'clock.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Illinois, on the Price amendment alone?

Mr. LOWRY of Washington. Reserving the right to object, make it 7:30, Mr. Chairman. We have more Members standing.

Mr. PRICE. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that all debate on the Price amendment end at 7:30.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Illinois?

There was no objection.

The CHAIRMAN. Members standing at the time of the request will be recognized for 2½ minutes each.

The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from California (Mrs. BOXER).

□ 1840

Mrs. BOXER. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the Dickinson amendment and support the Bennett-Mavroules-Neal approach.

I think it is very important that I note that with my support I join 112 organizations across our great country—patriotic organizations, grassroots organizations, who want to see our country on the right track.

But I also want to say, Mr. Chairman, that this debate has been a fantastic one. I have heard Members from both sides of the aisle be eloquent.

However, one thing has occurred that has disturbed me greatly and I would like to tell my colleagues about it.

One of our colleagues is walking around talking to Members whose districts would receive jobs if the MX goes forward. He is telling those Members they better vote for the MX. I hope that Members will rise above that because at worst, it is blackmail; at best, it is logrolling. I do not think we can afford that when we are talking about an issue of survival.

Mr. MATSUI. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield?

Mrs. BOXER. I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. MATSUI. I thank the gentlewoman for yielding.

I had not realized that that situation was a pattern. I was also approached on the floor and advised that in my district there be a $250 million contract let or one has been let that would cost some 1,900 jobs if, in fact, the MX is turned down.

I am somewhat surprised that the gentlewoman also had been approached. I would suspect perhaps other Members were. I am very surprised that the proponents of the MX missile and the Aspin amendment would engage in that kind of activity that we would vote for it on the basis of jobs in our districts, when we are really talking about strategic weapons, when we are talking about the issue peace and survivability. I am also disappointed as well that this has become a pattern rather than a matter that was an isolated incident.

Second, I have to believe that perhaps the Pentagon provided this kind of information and that leads me to even have a greater concern about what happened.

I thank the gentlewoman.

Mrs. BOXER. I thank the gentleman.

I think this issue is of utmost importance.

A child in my district wrote me a note and he said: "One bomb wipes out all memory." One bomb wipes out all memory. Let us remember, let us not lose our memories. We know that the MX is not a deterrent. We have information that shows that. We know the MX is a first strike weapon. We have to remember that the MX is adding billions of dollars to the deficit, brilliantly explained by my dear friend and colleague from California (Mr. PANETTA). We have to remember that we need to change the course of this arms race. We need to do it in a sound way. That way is offered to us by the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. MAVROULES).

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Oregon (Mr. WEAVER).

Mr. WEAVER. Mr. Chairman, as I listened to the debate one thing that is patently clear is that the hawks and doves are living in two different worlds. They seem even to have completely different gray matter in their minds. Their facts are completely different, the logic is different.

The interesting thing is that personally we do not fit our types. Many on our side, doves are pugnacious, as the Members can see and many hawks are as charming and gentlemanly as the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. HARTNETT) and our dear friend, the gentleman from Mississippi (Mr. MONTGOMERY).

President Reagan is good natured and friendly and yet an out-and-out hawk, a complete hawk. It is the way he thinks. He wants every weapon he can get, no matter what it is or how much it costs. And he does not want arms control. We know President Reagan has no desire and no earnest wish for arms control at all. Arms control is repugnant to him. He wants complete and utter superiority by this country and that is fine, if it were not for one thing. And being a hawk is fine, if it were not for one thing, and that is we have nuclear weapons today.

I like hawks. We need them. But with nuclear weapons they can lead us to perdition. They can destroy this world.

I am led to the conclusion, however, that the hawks are going to win. And only when the generals finally realize that they cannot fight a war with nuclear weapons, that it would destroy the world completely, as we know any setting off of any nuclear weapon would do, when the generals finally realize that and realize the nuclear weapon is unusable, that they themselves will do away with the nuclear weapons.

Until that happens and unless that happens, the world creeps ever closer to complete destruction and the end of all we know in civilization.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Washington (Mr. LOWRY).

Mr. LOWRY of Washington. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the Aspin-Pritchard et al. amendment. It is an amendment to continue the procurement of the MX missile. It is not an amendment that is at all conditioned on future arms control.

There have been many excellent Members of this House stand today to say that they have chosen to go for the Aspin-Pritchard amendment because it holds out the future of arms control.

It specifically does not or it would have been ruled out of order this morning when the gentleman from Oregon made the point of order against the Aspen amendment because it could not contain conditionality of arms control and be in order.

And when the chairman read the chairman's finding on that ruling, it said specifically that this amendment is for fiscal 1985 funds for the procurement of 15 MX missiles after April 1, 1985, if the President determines that the Soviet Union is not acting in a manner to control similar systems. Nothing on arms control.

If you vote for the Aspin amendment, you are voting for the procurement of 15 more MX missiles and no conditionality on arms control period.

Now, what does the Aspin amendment say? It says that after April 1 the President will send up a declaration as to whether the Soviets have been acting in the manner required to stop the building of the 15 missiles, the President will send up a declaration and we have 30 days from that time to pass a joint resolution of Congress which, as my colleagues know, must be signed by the President. A joint resolution of Congress and we have 30 days to disapprove his finding to build the MX missile.

Do my colleagues remember the El Salvador conditions by which the President would have to certify improvement in controlling the death squads by the government?

What this amendment does is say the President will determine, we will have 30 days to pass both Houses of Congress, a joint resolution, disapproving the President's declaration which the President must sign.

This is no conditionality at all on arms control. This is a vote for 15 MX missiles and do not tell any of your constituents differently.

If you are opposed to the MX you will vote against the Aspin, Pritchard, and Dickinson amendments and for the Bennett and Mavroules amendment.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from North Dakota (Mr. DORGAN).

Mr. DORGAN. Mr. Chairman, many of us on this floor have studied carefully the defense issues that we are faced with. I have been in a Minuteman silo, I have been up in the bomb bay of a B-52, I have been in a nuclear submarine. I have really tried conscientiously to study what our nuclear policy ought to be, what our nuclear strength ought to be.

It seems to me that if you take a look at programs like Stealth or cruise or the Trident I which I have supported, they make sense for this country's nuclear policy.

But the MX missile does not make a bit of sense at all for this country's nuclear policy.

It seems to me it is a military hood ornament that No. 1 is expensive and No. 2 is dangerous.

Let me just make two points that have been made over and over again this afternoon. They are points that the sponsors of the Aspin amendment have been unable to respond to.

First, they want to put the MX missile in silos the President says are vulnerable. Why on Earth would we want to build a new expensive missile and put it in a Minuteman silo that the President has spent 2 years telling us is vulnerable?

No. 2, the only conceivable reason to build an MX missile, which is more accurate, is to put at risk the Soviet land-based missiles. The only reason to put at risk a Soviet land-based missile is not to put at risk an empty silo—it is to put at risk a silo with a missile in it and that spells a first strike capability for this country. That means that the MX is a destabilizing weapon.

□ 1850

We have a term up in the ranching country of North Dakota for the Aspin amendment. We would call it—All hat and no saddle. It does not make a bit of sense. It is a useless and impotent weapon system we should not buy and that we cannot afford.

Finally, I want to ask one question of those who so fervently support this weapons proposal. Where on Earth are you going to get the money for a weapon system that does not make any sense? With a $200 billion Federal deficit, we better start thinking about internal security as well as external security. Those Federal deficits that come from buying all of these gold plated weapons programs are going to bankrupt this country.

Let us scrap this missile program—we do not need it, and we cannot afford it.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. LEVITAS).

Mr. LEVITAS. Mr. Chairman, the issue of avoiding nuclear war is perhaps the most grim and important question that faces this planet today. Part of that solution is to achieve a mutual and verifiable nuclear arms reduction of dramatic proportions. But the truth is that you do not achieve that simply by wanting it to happen. It has to be a result of very tough decisions that need to be made. And our adversaries must be aware of the fact that we are willing to make the commitment to action and at the same time be willing to make the negotiated agreement that will make the world a safer place.

The proposal of the gentleman from Wisconsin, Mr. ASPIN, is the opportunity for us to have real arms reduction negotiations. His amendment keeps the MX program alive but imposes a moratorium for a period of about 10 months. Simply, to give the Soviet Union everything they want without bargaining for it is no way to induce them to engage in negotiations. In effect, the amendment that is being proposed creates a moratorium. It keeps the production line open but says to the Russians, "If you respond, we will not go forward."

That is precisely the way President Kennedy was able to bring about the successful treaty that was negotiated banning atmospheric nuclear tests. He made a proposal, a moratorium, and indeed the Soviet Union did respond and we did achieve the treaty.

How did we get the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty? The Soviets had ABM capability and would not negotiate. But, immediately after Congress voted for our ABM System, the Russians agreed to negotiate a treaty and we achieved one.

Without adopting the Aspin amendment what we will have done is say to the Soviet Union, "Obviously, you should not come back and negotiate, wait long enough, Congress will give you what you want to begin with."

Some have criticized the MX as being a first strike weapon and, therefore, destabilizing. These people never refer to the destabilizing nature of the Soviets' hundreds of land-based, MIRV'd, SS-18's and SS-19's. But, nevertheless, it is clear that the MX is not a "first strike" weapon.

No single weapon—or even a hundred—constitutes a "first-strike" capability. First-strike capability is based on the overall ability of an attack to destroy the enemy's retaliatory capability.

Both sides already have enough weapons to kill the world's population many times over. And, I have deep concerns about the enormous destructive capacity of the United States and Soviets nuclear arsenals. But I think it is important to recognize that, for centuries, there have been enough guns and bullets and bows and arrows to kill every person in the world. The question before us today is not: Do not we already have the capability to blow up the world? Instead, the question is: Do we permit a situation to develop that would give the Soviet Union such

enormous capability and nuclear superiority that they can merely blackmail us into submission? The Soviet capability of launching a first-strike against our counterforce retaliatory capability and still having enough weapons to launch a second massive attack after our retaliation is what we must guard against. The massive Soviet military buildup presents a great threat to the peace-loving nations of the free world. If we cannot respond to this threat, the Russians can eliminate our ability to continue to live in peace.

Some other critics have argued that there is no military value to the MX. That, also, is not true. While I have some concerns about the silo basing-mode of the MX, the fact is that only the MX has the accuracy and power to pose a threat to the hardened Soviet ICBM silos. That type of capability is needed to deter the Soviets.

The de-MIRV'd single-warhead Midgetman missile that is now under development is the best way to proceed. But that is almost a decade away. The MX development and the Midgetman are linked together and we need to go forward to enhance our security, to create a climate for negotiation and to have an arms reduction threaty that will make the world a safer place.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, let me say that we make an important step toward negotiation of nuclear arms reductions by adopting the Aspin amendment. But in the last analysis we must go beyond even that. We must work toward creating a world arms relations in which the need for nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrent is not needed. That goes beyond the number and type of missiles and warheads, for a very few can still destroy our civilization. We must avoid nuclear war and we must create a situation between the superpowers that makes living together on planet Earth not an uncertain prospect.

(By unanimous consent, Mr. ECKART yielded his time to Mr. MARKEY).

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. MARKEY) for a total of 5 minutes.

Mr. MARKEY. I thank the gentleman from Ohio for yielding me his time.

Mr. Chairman, soon we are going to vote on the Edsel of missile systems, the MX. This is a weapon that we do not need at a price we cannot afford.

This week President Reagan told us that he needs the MX to get progress in arms control. But last year President Reagan also told us that he needed money for the MX to achieve progress in arms control.

President Reagan, we gave you the MX money last year. In return, you promised glowing achievements in arms control. Last year we asked you, "Where's the beef?" This year we ask, "Cut the bull." We do not need any more phony arguments. We do not need any more doubletalk. You talked about progress at the bargaining table, but now you are not even sitting at a bargaining table. We are not talking about strategic arms control with the Soviets; we are not talking about arms control in Europe; we are not talking with the Soviets at any level on anything. If we could not communicate with the Soviets about the Olympics boycott, how will we communicate about a nuclear crisis?

My colleagues have been bamboozled if they ever believed that the Reagan administration would use the MX to achieve progress in arms control. Do you really believe that President Reagan is committed to arms control? Let us look at the record.

Ronald Reagan opposed President Kennedy's Test Ban Treaty in 1963; he opposed President Johnson's efforts for nuclear nonproliferation in 1967; he opposed President Nixon's SALT I treaty in 1972; he opposed President Ford's restrictions on the sale of weapons-grade material in 1975; he opposed President Ford's Zladivostok agreement in 1976; he opposed President Carter's SALT II treaty in 1979. Ronald Reagan has opposed every effort for arms control in the past 20 years.

And since taking office, President Reagan has maintained his sterling record on arms control. He refused to seek ratification of SALT II. He walked away from the negotiations on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. He turned over every key arms control position in his administration to people who are philosophically opposed to arms control. He frittered away 18 months before he even came up with an arms control proposal. And when he finally did get to the bargaining table with the Soviets, his proposals were mainly public relation ploys.

As Ronald Reagan ends his term, he is the first American President since Eisenhower not to conclude an arms control treaty with the Soviets. And he is the first President since Herbert Hoover not to have met with the leadership of the Soviet Union.

Is this the kind of person who wants the MX so that he can achieve arms control?

And if you think building the MX is going to bring the Soviets whimpering to the negotiating table, you are living in a dream world. The history of the last 30 years has shown that the new weapons we have deployed have driven the Soviets to the production line, not to the negotiating table. When we deployed MIRV's, the Soviets deployed MIRV's; when we developed a long-range cruise missile, the Soviets started developing a long-range cruise missile; and when we deploy a first-strike missile like the MX, the Soviets will not rest until they deploy their own counterpart first-strike weapon.

Will that make us more secure?

Let us be direct. The MX is needed only if we want to fight a nuclear war. We already have thousands of nuclear warheads aimed at the Soviet Union. The Minuteman missiles we have in the ground are just as lethal as they ever were. The fact is, the MX is not a shoot-back missile. It is a shoot-first missile. The MX is designed to fight a nuclear war, not to prevent one. To build the MX is to tighten a finger on the nuclear trigger that could end the world as we know it. In a crisis, the MX would not be a Peacekeeper, it would be a war starter.

It is time to move back from the brink of nuclear extinction and toward national security.

Two years ago the White House and the Air Force were telling us that we need to deploy the MX because we have a window of vulnerability problem. Now the Air Force and the White House are telling us we can deploy the MX because we do not have a window of vulnerability problem.

Talk about double-talk, talk about a carnivorous vegetarian, talk about twisting the facts into a pretzel.

I say it is time to put a halt to all these phony arguments and to defeat the MX missile.

(By unanimous consent, Mr. DICKS, and Mr. MCKERNAN yielded their time to Mr. GORE.)

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Tennessee (Mr. GORE).

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. GORE. I yield to the gentleman from Washington.

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, the Members of this House face a seeming dilemma in addressing the issue of MX missile procurement. I think all of us are reluctant to be seen as rewarding the Soviets for their intransigence and refusal to return to the bargaining table. As the President has stated, such an action would "dramatically undermine our efforts" to maintain incentives for concrete positive arms reductions.

At the same time, we recognize that based on the recommendations of the Scowcroft Commission the rationale for proceeding with MX is closely tied to arms control efforts. Negotiations on strategic weapons have been suspended and it is unclear when they will resume. Thus there is an understandable reluctance to go forward in an unconstrainted manner on MX for fear that by the time negotiations resume it will have proceeded so far as to be realistically immune to any "bargaining chip" role.

A careful reading of the Scowcroft Commission report, however, indicates that MX is seen not just as a useful

bargaining chip in the classical sense. It also provides leverage on the Soviets to alter their current course of heavy investment in large, highly accurate multiple warhead ICBM's. To date, the Soviets have deployed over 600 ICBM's of MX size or larger. By demonstrating to the Soviets that the long-term survivability of such forces has to be considered questionable, the MX can help shape Soviet force developments and encourage them to reach an arms control agreement that limits these weapons. The fact that the Soviets presently place nearly three quarters of their nuclear forces in land based ICBM's compared to our one quarter only increases the incentives for the Soviets to reach such an agreement.

If on the other hand, the United States unilaterally terminates the MX, our overall commitment to prudent strategic modernization will come into question. The hardliners in the Kremlin will argue that they should just sit back and see which system is next to be terminated, rather than return to negotiations.

Some would argue that the precise balance of land based ICBM's is irrelevent in an age of massive nuclear overkill. They may in fact be technically correct. But deterrence is fundamentally based on perceptions. To the extent that the present ICBM balance brings into question the resolve of the United States to respond in certain scenarios, stability is undermined, and nuclear blackmail, if not nuclear war, becomes more likely.

Andrei Sakharov, in his now famous open letter to Dr. Sidney Drell, sums up this argument well when he states:

> No less important a problem is that of the powerful silo-based missiles. At present the U.S.S.R. has a great advantage in this area. Perhaps talks about the limitation and reduction of these most destructive missiles could become easier if the United States were to have MX missiles, albeit only potentially (indeed that would be best of all).

Others have argued that we should proceed directly with the single warhead missile without the interim step of the MX. However, I agree with the analysis of the Scowcroft Commission. An affordable, survivable single warhead ICBM is only possible in an arms control environment that puts controls on MIRV'd ICBM's and provides disincentives for their proliferation. And such an agreement is much more likely if we do not act to unilaterally terminate the MX. It is in this way that the three elements of the Scowcroft recommendations work together. Without any one element, the others lose their rationale.

Another issue of contention involves the survivability of the MX in existing silos. I would note first the irony of many Members, who have consistently opposed MX, arguing this point fervently when only a few years ago when we were debating the MPS basing system they consistently dismissed the vulnerability argument. Clearly they cannot have it both ways.

When one views the totality of our strategic triad, the survivability of our ICBM leg, when viewed in isolation, can be put in perspective. The synergistic relationship between the legs of the triad, and the fact that unlike the Soviets we maintain over half our warhead inventory in survivable submarines, make this question less critical for us than for the Soviets.

A recent GAO report has raised the issue of silo hardening. Indeed preliminary U.S. tests have shown promise for "superhardening" silos, and we have a research program underway to determine if this could be applied at some future date to any MX force we deploy. The report also raises questions about the Soviet hardening effort. Personally, I hope that both sides can achieve hardness levels that will enhance survivability, and hence stability. But again, the incentive for the Soviets to go to the high expense of such an action is enhanced by the potential of MX on the horizon.

In my view the two most troubling arguments surrounding MX are the question of first-strike capability and the commitment of this administration to pursue "vigorous" arms control, as advocated by the Scowcroft report.

I share the concerns of many on the first-strike issue. That is why I joined with others to specifically receive an administration commitment on this question. In his letter of May 11, 1983, the President stated very clearly:

> Let me emphasize that we do not seek a first strike capability. To this end, we have constrained the number of MX missiles we plan to deploy to the minimum number needed to assure the effectiveness of our deterrent, and no more.

But there are widely differing definitions about what in fact constitutes a first strike capability. I am convinced that 100 MX, by themselves, come no where near giving us an even theoretical first strike capability. But there are legitimate concerns about what the cumulative impact of the MX, the D-5 Trident II missile, and the single warhead missile, all hard target accurate, will be.

It is for this reason that I am joining with my colleague from Tennessee, Mr. GORE, in offering an amendment requiring the President to report on the long-term plans for accurate ballastic missile systems and what in his view would constitute a "first strike capability." Such a report will provide some valuable guidance as the Congress considers future requests for not only the MX, but the D-5 and SICM as well.

Finally we come to the question of the administration's vigorous commitment to arms control. I believe that the President has made important adjustments in the U.S. START position to make it more negotiable and bring it in line with the Scowcroft recommendations. And clearly the bulk of the blame for the present impass must rest with the Soviets.

But the administration is not squeaky clean on this issue. I believe they missed an important opportunity to resolve the INF issue, which was central to the Soviet walkout, by its failure to aggressively pursue the so-called walk in the woods solution developed by Ambassador Nitze.

The administration's unwillingness to do anything more than indefinitely "study" arms control options for space also undercuts the credibility of their commitment to negotiated solutions.

And recent press statements by a wide range of administration officials questioning the rationale behind the ABM treaty, speculating on whether we will continue to adhere to SALT II, and rhetorically suggesting we may have to abandon treaties and resort to "classical defense" have combined to seriously undermine the administration's credibility on this issue.

The recent statements from the President reaffirming his intention to adhere to existing treaties in addition to seeking further agreements have been helpful, but the doubts remain.

Ironically, the MX program can also serve to provide leverage on the administration on this issue. It has already helped shape positive adjustments in our START position and it holds the administration to following the full range of Scowcroft recommendations.

How do we resolve the dilemma of providing the kind of leverage we desire both on the Soviets and on reluctant actors in this administration? I do not believe it is by terminating procurement of the MX with the Bennett-Mavroules amendment. Regardless of the arguments that the R&D funds would remain, I do not think there is anyone in this Chamber that would deny that what we are really saying with that amendment is that MX should be immediately terminated.

I believe the approach of the Price-Dickinson amendment presents a better balance. It slows the MX planned procurement substantially so that we do not become overcommitted before arms control negotiations have a chance to resume. But it clearly signals that we are not willing to reward the Soviets with unilateral termination of the program.

In addition, it provides a positive reward for Soviet good behavior, through the extension of the 6-month fencing mechanism if they are taking steps to help control these forces, primarily by a return to serious arms negotiations.

The fencing mechanism also allows whoever is elected President in November to make the decision on proceeding with MX, and if he does it also gives Congress a chance to determine whether in fact the parties are bargaining in good faith.

As was repeatedly stated last year by those of us who have tried to forge a bipartisan consensus on strategic modernization, the Congress will have frequent opportunities on annual authorization and appropriations bills to control the direction of the MX program. We have already voted to reduce the number of missiles procured last year, limited the number of them that could be deployed to 10, and have tied MX progress to that of the small missile.

With this amendment we are again modifying the program toward a more constrained and prudent pace. We are indicating a willingness to hold off if the Soviets do in fact decide to seriously bargain. This is the essence of the Sakharov statement on the United States having the potential of the MX as an incentive to the Soviets.

For all these reasons I urge support of this amendment.

Mr. GORE. Mr. Chairman, the heart of this issue is whether the United States has a political system which is capable of supporting an arms control process. It is a serious question, the answer to which hangs in the balance today. The stalemate which we now have in strategic arms control does indeed owe a great deal to misconceptions and ill will on the part of the Reagan administration during its first 3 years. It is also true that there are continuing deep divisions within the administration on the general question of arms control, and it is true that the President has not disciplined his administration as effectively as he should have to speak with one voice.

But it is also undeniably true that the President of the United States and his administration has kept the bargain he made by revising our Nation's position in the START talks and pursuing a position which the arms control community concedes is a reasonable and good position, and they pursued it vigorously and in good faith.

The deepest causes of the arms control stalemate lie in the obstinacy and the ambitions of the Soviet Union. It is the Soviet Union and not the United States which walked out on the arms control negotiations.

I had the experience of personally asking President Reagan to privately and without publicity send Gen. Brent Scowcroft to the Soviet Union as a private emissary, with authority to talk to the Soviet leaders and deliver a message from the President about his desire to get these talks back on track. For 4 days the Soviet leaders refused to see him, they refused to accept delivery of the letter. The administration has tried hard and in good faith to get those negotiations back on track and to pursue meaningful arms control and the START negotiations.

There is no more excuse of the Soviet boycott of the START talks in Geneva than there is for the Soviet boycott of the Olympic games. Both are tactics based on a calculated intention to intimidate and thereby influence the policies of our Government and even the Presidential election.

The raw fact of the matter is that if the Congress of the United States cancels the MX because the Soviets have suspended the arms control process, we shall have given the Soviets for free what ought to be available to them only in a fair exchange of values.

□ 1900

We have before us in the Bennett-Mavroules amendment what purports to be a compromise measure designed to create merely a hiatus in the MX program. But all of us on all sides of this issue know that the purpose of the amendment is to abolish the MX missile once and for all; that is the intent.

We also have before us the Price amendment or the Pritchard-Aspin amendment, which seeks for the second time, to continue to link the MX missile with the arms control process. Such a linkage was established for the first time early last fall when the administration bowed to pressure from Congress and undertook a major renovation of its approach to strategic arms control.

If we pass Bennett-Mavroules, the Soviet Union's decision to treat that development with contempt, will have paid off for them. If by contrast we pass the Price amendment, the Soviet Union must again confront a choice in which it has something to gain as well as something to lose. The Price amendment or Pritchard-Aspin amendment gives the Soviet Union 6 months to think things over. For these 6 months, funds otherwise intended for the production of the MX missile will be fenced in. If the Soviets return to the negotiating table, and bargain in good faith, the possibility of an additional delay exists. If the Soviet Union refuses to return, then the missile will be produced.

Vote for arms control; vote for the Price amendment.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. LEVIN).

Mr. LEVIN of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, this has been an excellent debate, and here is the import of what I have heard from the proponents.

No. 1, anything we do not build constitutes unilateral disarmament. That is patent nonsense.

Second, MX is not essentially a bargaining chip; I heard Ambassador Rowney say that this morning. But then the President says, "Without it, the incentive for the Soviets to return to the negotiating table is greatly reduced." That is patently inconsistent.

Third, any rejection of more military strength is weakness; some have implied that. That kind of thinking, if it is adopted universally, is a likely ticket to mutual doom.

The fourth argument we have heard: the process is more important than the product. Or, another form, if the other side walks out of negotiations, we have to automatically go ahead, because otherwise we would be rewarding intransigence. Well, there is more weight to that argument than the other three. But if it is applied universally, regardless of the merits of the issues underlying the walkout, it is likely to lead to escalation after escalation.

Keep the MX alive at any price—that is the purpose of the Aspin amendment. But there is no price worth the cost of keeping MX. The longer any governmental program goes on, the harder it is to terminate it. For MX, the time to terminate is now. I urge opposition to the Price amendment, and that we support the Bennett-Mavroules amendment.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Mississippi (Mr. MONTGOMERY).

Mr. MONTGOMERY. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from Alabama (Mr. NICHOLS).

Mr. NICHOLS. Mr. Chairman, the silo-based intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) force has been and continues to be a mainstay of both the U.S. and U.S.S.R. strategic deterrent. This leg of the triad has the unique qualities of being visible, verifiable, controllable and has low operating and maintenance cost.

Each side has the ability to monitor and assess the changes in this force. The missile, and warhead count is known; the modification/capability improvements are known. There is great assurance of being able to communicate with and therefore fully control this system at all times.

The silo vulnerability issue has received more than its share of criticism. We have never lost a silo-based missile in conflict. Planes have been shot down, submarines sunk but we only lose silos in negotiations. The United States has not upgraded its silo-based ICBM force since 1970. The Soviets have deployed 1,238 ICBM missiles since 1970. Only 160 of their missiles were deployed prior to 1970. Our ICBM force, while still effective as a deterrent, is in need of modernization and will in fact be 20 years old before the MX is fielded. Our present force of Minuteman, 450 Minuteman II's, and 550 Minuteman III's, were designed for a 10-year operational life. Major action has begun to correct the

deteriorating physical condition of the missiles and the launch facilities.

The eventual breakdown of propellant in the upper stage of the missiles had been predicted and has now come about. Second stages are being repoured and nose tips are being replaced. The silos and launch control facilities have been eroded by water seepage and are in need of general renovation. This work will begin in 1985.

The big concern about Minuteman is the shortfall in hard-target kill capability.

Since the mid-1970's, the Soviet Union has hardened or superhardened most of its ICBM silos and control facilities, and it appears that most of them will be superhard by the 1990's. The Minuteman warhead, based on technology developed in the early 1960's, was never designed to attack targets hardened to these levels.

Soviet hard-target capability, however, has been improving by leaps and bounds. Late model SS-18 and SS-19 systems have significant destructive potential against U.S. ICBM silos.

The MX missile is designed to fill this U.S. gap primarily through improved accuracy and starting last June, MX flight tests, "have been" meeting the extreme high accuracy that was expected.

Altogether, 20 such tests are scheduled through the end of 1987. The first nine from above-ground test stands, the remainder from silos replicating those in which the ICBM's will be emplaced at F. E. Warren AFB, Wyo. Construction of 15 base-support buildings will begin at Warren this spring. MX will start going into silos there in 1986 and the first 10 missiles will be operational by the end of that year. The full complement of 100 MX's is expected to be operational by the end of 1989.

There are now 200 Minuteman III ICBM's on alert around Warren, with silos in adjoining corners of Wyoming, Colorado, and Nebraska. Modifications of half of those silos for the MX will be relatively minor. The silos will not be hardened above present levels. But the MX will be given added protection in the form of new shock isolation systems, and by means of the canisters in which they are designed to repose.

MX is a four-stage missile configured to deliver 10 reentry vehicles (RV's) to disparate targets at ranges of more than 5,000 miles. Its first three stages use solid propellants. Its fourth stage—the postboost vehicle embodying up to 10 RV's—gets its power from a liquid propellant, axial-thrust engine. Eight small engines provide attitude control. The postboost vehicle also contains the missile's guidance and control system and a deployment module.

The guidance system is the prizewinner. MX classified circular error probable (CEP) will be significantly tighter than the Minuteman III CEP, which is believed to be about 700 feet. Such accuracy, together with the MK 21 RV's payload, will make MX the unrivaled hard-target destroyer in the U.S. strategic arsenal.

Mr. Chairman. The defense of this Nation must not be predicated on emotion.

I hope the House will support the amendment offered by the committeeman from Wisconsin.

Mr. MONTGOMERY. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the Price amendment, and if not adopted, in effect this kills the MX program. We end up with a bunch of old, outdated missiles that cannot hit the target.

We found in the Carter administration, when we slowed down military spending, the Soviets speeded up. So if we stop here tonight, the Soviets are not going to stop building missiles.

President Eisenhower had a gentleman's agreement with the Soviets; no testing of nuclear weapons and we were negotiating in Geneva. All of a sudden the Soviets started exploding nuclear weapons all over the place. They caught us short; we fell behind in nuclear testing and equipment and we cannot let this happen again.

We have a hard time catching up with the Soviets; so let us stay in the ballgame, my colleagues, let the Soviets walk out but not us. Let us support the Price amendment.

Mr. LOWERY of California. Mr. Chairman, today I rise in opposition to the proposed amendment which would delete the fiscal year 1984 funding authorization for the MX missile.

For over 20 years, the United States has relied on a combination of land-based missiles, sea-based missiles, and bombers to deter Soviet aggression. This strategic triad insures that the U.S. forces will be able, under all conditions, to retaliate after a Soviet first strike.

Intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM's) offer a unique contribution to the effective deterrent value of the strategic triad. They are accurate, responsive and reliable, and they offer alert rates approaching 100 percent. These high alert rates and excellent supporting communications systems make ICBM's the most responsive element of the triad. The ICBM's ability to put hardened Soviet targets at risk is essential to effective deterrence. ICBM's, therefore, make it more difficult for the Soviets to plan and execute a successful attack on all three triad components.

We face growing asymmetries, however, with respect to our capability against hardened targets. Since the late 1960's, the Soviet Union has engaged in a massive and destabilizing strategic arms buildup that threatens the survivability and retaliatory effectiveness of the triad.

Specifically, the Soviets have developed and deployed numerous large and highly accurate weapons. The Soviets have also taken steps to reduce our ability to retaliate. They have hardened their ICBM silos and critical command and control facilities to the point that our Minuteman missiles have only limited capabilities against them. This imbalance is such a critical component of strategic capability that it seriously undermines the strength of our nuclear deterrence. The MX is essential to redress these asymmetries as soon as possible and to encourage the Soviet Union to negotiate arms reductions.

As reported from committee, H.R. 5167 authorizes $2.5 billion for procurement of 30 MX missiles—10 missiles and $400 million less than the President argued was necessary in his budget request.

However, Mr. Chairman, the proposed Bennett-Mavroules amendment calls for the elimination of funds authorized for the MX, maintaining that MX funds would better be used for the modernization of conventional forces and for rebuilding the U.S. Navy. The two gentlemen offering this amendment also argue that the MX is destablizing because they believe it is not survivable and hence promotes launch on warning.

Mr. Chairman, the Bennett-Mavroules amendment must be rejected by this body because it relies on unsound fiscal, military, and diplomatic reasoning. The Bennett-Mavroules amendment is nothing short of unilateral disarmament.

First, decrying the rise in military procurement and overall defense spending because of its impact on the deficit and then arguing that the moneys deleted from MX funding should be used for the modernization of our conventional capability does absolutely nothing to reduce the deficit. Obviously, the simple transfer of $2 billion from nuclear arms to conventional forces does nothing to subtract from total spending.

To the contrary, the loss of hard-targetting capability as a result of this amendment would pose serious threats to our overall deterrence and would require vastly increased conventional defense expenditures to provide for the defense of the Western alliance. Mr. Speaker, this amendment does not save money. On the contrary, its long-term consequences would be greater deficits.

Second, deleting the MX funding now would do great harm to our strategic posture.

According to the bipartisan Scowcroft Commission, America's ICBM force has three main strategic purposes: one, serving as a hedge against possible vulnerabilities in our submarine force; two, introducing complexity

and uncertainty into any plan for Soviet attack because of the different types of attacks that would have to be launched against our ICBM's and our bombers; and three, helping to deter Soviet threats of massive conventional or limited nuclear attacks by the ability to respond promptly and controllably against hardened military targets.

However, our current ICBM force lacks the requisite yield and accuracy to threaten retaliation against hardened Soviet assets, and are vulnerable themselves to a Soviet first strike. It was for this reason that administrations of both parties saw the undeniable need for a modernization of our ICBM forces.

In its report on the U.S. strategic posture, the Scowcroft Commission recognized that no single weapons system or basing mode would be able to solve all of our problems and meet all of our requirements for both the near and the longer term. The Commission's recommendations, which the President accepted and Congress approved, calls for the deployment of 100 MX missiles in Minuteman silos as one element of an overall strategic force modernization and arms control package. Deployment of the MX will eliminate the Soviet monopoly of prompt hard-target capability.

Although the authors of this amendment have professed great concern about the possible vulnerability of the MX missles based in silos, the Scowcroft Commission asserted that silo vulnerability "is not a sufficiently dominant" part of the ICBM modernization problem. While silo-based MX's are vulnerable when viewed in isolation, the entire U.S. strategic force must be taken into account. The Soviets could not destroy all U.S. strategic forces, so would face an unacceptable retaliation even if they did destroy the MX force.

In addition, tests last year of steel-clad and steel-reinforced concrete structures reveal that structural hardness levels of over 25 times that of current silos may be achieved.

Third, the Bennett-Mavroules proposal amounts to nothing more than unilateral disarmament and rewards the Soviets for abandoning the negotiating process. Our support for the MX at this time is crucial to the development of a solid foundation for progress in arms control and is key to the conduct of an effective foreign policy.

In the words of Secretary of State Shultz:

> Dilution or abandonment of our strategic modernization goals would be a concession that rewards the Soviets for their withdrawal from arms control negotiations. It would also add a large measure of success to Soviet efforts to limit the U.S. force modernization without negotiating and without concessions of their own. The only way to achieve the reductions we seek is at the negotiating table. In view of the Soviet refusal to resume nuclear arms control negotiations, full implementation of the Scowcroft Commission's recommendation is even more important today to provide an incentive for the Soviets to return to arms control negotiations.

Before we attempt to somehow persuade the Soviets to disarm by offering to do it unilaterally, we must ask ourselves why it was that the Soviets left the strategic arms reduction negotiations in Geneva.

Mr. Chairman, we must not forget what has transpired in the last year which led up to the Soviet walkout. The Soviets have replaced one aging decrepit leader with another, paralyzing their decisionmaking process and making any kind of bilateral negotiations difficult, if not impossible.

During its transition period, the lack of clear command in the U.S.S.R. contributed to the decision to shoot down an unarmed Korean air liner. Soviet attempts to influence the German elections were rebuffed and the Soviets were unable to prevent the scheduled deployment of Pershing missiles in Europe. It was in the context of a leadership crisis in the U.S.S.R. and an across-the-board failure of the Soviet policy of intimidating Western Europe, that the Soviets first abandoned the Geneva negotiations.

The Soviets stalled in Geneva in an attempt to prevent the deployment of Pershings and they stalled in Geneva in an attempt to prevent the deployment of the MX. The Soviets withdrew from those talks when the West remained firm. To adopt the Bennett-Mavroules amendment would be to give them unilaterally what they refused to negotiate, rewarding them for their intransigence.

Mr. Chairman, even some of my colleagues from across the aisle have stated what a diplomatic blunder this amendment would be: "The result would be to give the Soviets what they want without the bother of going back to the INF talks in Geneva * * *. The fundamental question is whether we are prepared to reward the Soviet Union for leaving the negotiating table. A vote for zero MX's rewards Moscow for leaving the table."

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, the Bennett-Mavroules amendment is the wrong action at the wrong time. It sends the wrong signal, and it undermines all legitimate attempts to persuade the Soviets to reduce their own forces.

● Mr. RICHARDSON. Mr. Chairman, the question of whether to continue funding production of the MX missile system is unquestionably the most important and fateful issue to come before the 98th Congress.

This is not simply just another weapon system. If we continue to proceed down this MX path, we will have entered new territory for which we have no known road maps. We will have crossed the threshold into the world of first-strike capability and launch on warning.

Air Force studies still concede that the Minuteman silos, in which our MX missile would be placed, are vulnerable to Soviet attack. All the evidence indicates that by the time we deploy the MX in the late 1980's, Soviet improvements in missile accuracy could result in their ability to destroy 99 percent of our fixed silo-based missiles, including the MX. Not only does this add nothing to our retaliatory capability, indeed it forces us, in violation of all American principles and declared official policy, to use the MX as a first-strike weapon. If the Soviets attack us first, there won't be any MX's left, so the MX would have to be launched first if it is to do the job it is intended to do—knock out the Russian ICBM's.

Additionally, I do not believe that procuring weapons as bargaining chips is the best way to either accumulate leverage or to achieve negotiations. We have ready in our arsenal D-5 missiles in our invulnerable Trident submarines in addition to our retrofitted Minuteman III missiles as well as our ground- and air-launched cruise missiles. Those forces provide us with the power to insure not only effective deterrence but bargaining leverage as well in arms control talks.

So let us take one small step back from the brink. Deployment of the MX is a needless escalation of the arms race that can only make genuine arms control even more remote than they seem today. Let us return to the path of sensible strategic weapons policy and serious arms control.●

● Mr. SHUMWAY. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong opposition to the Bennett-Mavroules amendment which deletes the authorization for the procurement of the MX missile. While I recognize the complexity of the issues regarding MX production, I strongly believe a vote for zero MX missiles is a vote to limit U.S. force modernization without negotiation and to reward the Soviet Union for walking away from the negotiating table in Geneva.

Mr. Chairman, less than 1 year ago, this body concluded that it was in the national interest to go forward with the immediate deployment of the MX missile as recommended by the President's Commission on Strategic Forces, commonly known as the Scowcroft Commission. At that time, we reaffirmed the importance of the MX as an essential element of an overall modernization program that includes development of a small, single-warhead ICBM and ambitious arms-control proposals directed at achieving greater strategic balance between the United States and the Soviet Union. In my view, support for the deployment of the MX indicates the urgent need to strengthen not only our military

posture, through modernization of the U.S.'s aging land-based leg of the strategic triad, but our negotiating posture as well. I firmly believe that the United States cannot expect to negotiate with the Soviets for meaningful reductions from a position of weakness; clearly, the Soviet's strategic advantage in ICBM forces must be addressed if we are to negotiate successfully.

Yet while 1 year ago our vote in favor of the MX demonstrated the resolve of our Nation to address the existing imbalance in ICBM capabilities and to improve our arms-control leverage, a vote today to abandon the MX will demonstrate our willingness to unilaterally limit U.S. force modernization and to reward the Soviet Union for its withdrawal from arms control negotiations in Geneva.

Let us not forget, Mr. Chairman, that it was the Soviet Union which walked out of both the intermediate nuclear forces (INF) and strategic arms reduction talks (START) talks in Geneva last December, not the United States. Since that time, the United States has made it clear that it stands ready to resume negotiations without preconditions. Despite our appeals, however, the Soviet Union has shown no interest whatsoever in resuming negotiations.

Mr. Chairman, I certainly agree that the United States must pursue all reasonable and appropriate avenues to bring the Soviet Union back to the negotiating table. I submit, however, that a decision by the United States to unilaterally kill the MX is hardly an effective inducement for the Soviet Union to resume meaningful, good-faith negotiations. Unilateral strategic arms reductions and limitations by the United States have not persuaded the Soviets in the past toward similar action. Rather, the defeat of the MX at this time would undermine our negotiating efforts and encourage continued Soviet intransigence by giving the Soviet Union what it sought to gain at the Geneva talks, without the United States securing commensurate concessions.

We should not be rewarding the Soviet Union for leaving the negotiating table. Rather, we should be encouraging their return to these vital talks, for it is only through negotiation that we will achieve the reductions which we all seek. I therefore believe the alternative offered by Congressmen ASPIN and PRITCHARD represents an option far preferable to the abandonment of the MX program.

I therefore urge my colleagues to join me in supporting continued funding for the MX missile. As the Soviet Union continues its aggressive policy to achieve relative superiority in ICBM's, the United States cannot afford to delay the MX program any longer. We must follow through on the implementation of the Scowcroft Commission's recommendations, of which the MX is an integral element, if we are to maintain incentives to encourage the Soviet Union to return to the negotiating table. Mr. Chairman, to limit unilaterally the U.S. strategic modernization program and to reward the Soviet Union for suspending arms control negotiations is not the way to achieve the effective and mutually verifiable arms control agreements which we all seek to achieve.●

● Mr. FORD of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of the amendment offered by Congressman CHARLES BENNETT and NICK MAVROULES to H.R. 5167, the Department of Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1985. this amendment would delete $2.8 billion in procurement funding for the next 30 MX missiles. It is time for the House to put a stop to the production of this expensive and destabilizing weapons system.

Last year a majority of the Congress agreed to authorize production of the first 21 missiles as part of a package of recommendations issued by the President's Commission on Strategic Forces—the Scowcraft Commission. This three-part package consisted of deployment of the MX, development of a new Midgetman missile, and new arms control initiatives in Geneva. President Reagan's commitment to follow the Scowcraft Commission's proposals for arms control lasted only as long as it is necessary to open the production line for the MX missile.

As we are well aware, last year the Reagan administration touted the MX missile as a "bargaining chip" for use in arms control negotiations with the Soviets. Now that the strategic arms reduction talks [START] are suspended, the administration has found a new role for the MX as a means to encourage the Soviets to return to the bargaining table. The administration has been unwilling to use the first 21 MX missiles as a means to convince the Soviet Union that it should negotiate reductions in nuclear weapons. In fact, each of the Reagan administration's START proposals has included deployment of the MX missile. The MX missile never was intended to be and never will be bargained away by this administration.

In the MX, the United States is constructing a missile system that will profoundly reshape the nuclear strategy of our Nation. With its hard-target capability and multiple warheads, the MX is a destabilizing missile that provides an all too inviting target for Soviet ICBM's. Even supporters of the MX acknowledge that these missiles will be vulnerable targets when deployed in Minuteman silos. The Air Force itself admits that by 1996, only 1 percent of the MX's would survive a Soviet surprise attack. Since these missiles would be destroyed by such an attack, the only viable strategic role for the MX would be as part of a U.S. first strike attack on the Soviet Union or as a part of a launch-on-warning retaliatory attack against the Soviets. Such a nuclear defense strategy not only substantially increases the chances of an accidental nuclear war, but also severely limits the options of the President. If the United States is relegated to the adoption of launch on warning to save the MX missiles, the last human link in the chain of nuclear war decisionmaking will be eliminated.

The U.S. strategic arsenal is replete with less vulnerable nuclear weapon systems. Among others, air-launched cruise missiles (ALCM) and submarine-based missiles provide accurate and nearly invulnerable nuclear deterrents and are more attractive options than the MX. As a result of their survivability, these weapons are not destabilizing systems that serve as an incentive for a Soviet first strike. These systems are also part of an ongoing effort to modernize our nuclear arsenal. This modernization includes retrofitting of Minuteman missiles with new warheads, deployment of additional Trident submarines, new cruise and Pershing II missiles, and development of the Midgetman. With these new systems, we simply do not need a dangerous and ineffective missile such as the MX. Cutting the MX missile will not weaken our national defense, but will instead lessen the likelihood of a nuclear war.

Aside from the strategic shortfalls, the authorization for these missiles should be deleted because of their excessive cost. When annual budget deficits continue to hover near the $200 billion level, we cannot afford to purchase such an ill-advised missile. It is estimated that the total cost of 100 MX missiles will exceed $15 billion from fiscal years 1985 through 1989. Let us not fool ourselves; every dollar spent on these missiles adds a dollar to the Federal deficit. Deficit control has become synonymous with moderating increases in military spending. We simply cannot continue to lavish money on the Pentagon when important education and social programs have been reduced in recent years. I urge my colleagues to support this crucial amendment and halt the procurement of the MX.●

● Ms. KAPTUR. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the Bennett-Mavroules amendment to delete funding for production of the MX missile. Passage of this amendment would constitute a crucial step in halting the escalation of the nuclear arms race. Further, production of the MX diminishes our national security and would be a wasteful expenditure of billions and billions of dollars at a time when our Nation confronts the largest budget deficit in

its history. Such an expenditure only undermines our economy, the health of which is the true bedrock of our security. The MX, Mr. Speaker, is both an economic and defense policy mistake—a mistake our country cannot afford to make.

Last year, President Reagan was able to garner support for the missile by claiming that it was necessary to achieve arms control, a so-called bargaining chip. As many of us predicted then, the MX has not advanced arms control—negotiations have been suspended and an intensive arms buildup continues. According to former CIA Director, William Colby:

> The "bargaining chip" theory upon which prior decisions to go ahead with the MX were taken, has little relevance in the current stalemate of the U.S. and U.S.S.R. nuclear negotiations.

In fact, Mr. Colby believes that—

> Suspension of the MX could serve as a useful signal to encourage a reopening of arms control negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States.

Mr. Colby states:

> While I do not believe in unilateral concessions to the Soviets, I do believe that abandonment of this useless and dangerous weapon can be justified in our own interest independently of the Soviets. This step, accompanied by vigorous diplomacy, could provide the Soviets the face-saving positive move by the U.S. that they have demanded after the defeat of their campaign to block the deployment of Pershing and cruise missiles to Europe.

The MX continues to be a missile in search of a purpose. It remains no less vulnerable to attack today than studies demonstrated it was last year. In fact, the evidence grows.

Repeatedly, experts in the defense establishment have warned that if the MX is deployed in existing silos, it would not survive a Soviet first strike. Yet, we have decided to put the MX in those very Minuteman silos which have been deemed to be too vulnerable. An Air Force study showed that by 1996 only 1 percent of MX's would survive a Soviet surprise attack, thus adding virtually nothing to U.S. retaliatory capability. No nation in history has proposed to spend so much money on such a vulnerable weapons system.

Given that it is so vulnerable to attack, the MX will undoubtedly be perceived by the Soviets as a first strike weapon. As such, it will only lead to a further fueling of the nuclear arms race. A recent GAO study states that according to information supplied by the Air Force, the Soviet Union has already increased the hardness of its silos threefold since the MX missile entered full development in September 1979. The study goes on to say, "The ability of the Peacekeeper to accomplish its mission may have been impaired because a major change has occurred in the threat it was initially designed to overcome." Because the MX Peacekeeper is vulnerable, it could lead to a launch-under-attack response to a Soviet threat, thereby, increasing the probability of accidental nuclear disaster. The real danger of preparing a showpiece to dissuade the Russians is that this showpiece will lead to destabiliation, threating world peace, not enhancing it.

Futhermore, we must not dismiss the exorbitant cost of the MX. While budget deficits threaten economic recovery, are we in the Congress going to proceed with the production of a controversial missile with a total price tag of over $30 billion? The GAO report previously mentioned has further indicated that there are serious technical difficulties with the MX. The Air Force, for example, will not be able to adequately test various key MX components before the missiles are scheduled to be deployed, and problems with other components have yet to be solved.

Over 30 years ago, President Eisenhower stated the costs of unnecessary military spending, such as the MX, on our citizens:

> Every gun that is made, every warship launched, every rocket fired signifies a theft from those who are hungry and are not fed, those who are cold and not clothed. This world in arms is not spending money alone. It is spending the sweat of its labors, the genius of its scientists and the hopes of its children.

The United States has redundant firepower in its nuclear arsenal to wipe out the Soviet Union many times over, without building and deploying the discredited MX at enormous cost. At best, the MX is a foolish project; at worst, it will dangerously escalate the nuclear arms race. I urge my colleagues to stop this ineffective missile now before much more money is wasted. Support the Bennett-Mavroules amendment to strike all MX procurement funding.●

● Mr. COYNE. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the amendment offered by Mr. BENNETT and Mr. MAVROULES which would strike all funding for procurement of the MX missile.

The MX is a weapons system which makes little sense from the military or the economic perspective.

If we are to measure its utility by asking whether the system adds or detracts from our national security, I would suggest that by the nature of the weapon, it most certainly detracts.

A weapon of this sort can indeed make us less secure rather than more secure. Air Force studies indicate that by 1996 only 1 percent of the MX's would survive a surprise Soviet attack. A weapon of such vulnerability clearly does not rank as a defensive weapon. This suggests a more probable use as a debilitating, first strike weapon.

I do not need to remind my colleagues that it has never been the policy of this Nation to launch a nuclear first strike. Nor should we develop weapons systems which must be launched on warning of a Soviet attack, as some have suggested the MX should be used. This option sharply reduces the amount of response time a President needs to avert a nuclear war.

The administration was able to secure approval of the MX in Congress last year by arguing that the weapon was needed as an arms control bargaining chip with the Soviet Union.

In terms of reducing the chances of nuclear war, are we better off now than we were a year ago?

We are not. We promote an upward spiral of arms building, matched by the Soviet Union, when we commit ourselves to a new weapons system such as the MX missile.

If we are interested in progress at the bargaining table, let us take a step toward arms limitation. We can do it by eliminating the $2.7 billion request for procurement of 30 MX missiles, as this amendment provides. We can then challenge the Soviets to take a similar step, moving away from the war rooms toward the bargaining table.

We have much to gain from such an action and very little to lose in our defensive capability. As I have pointed out, only 1 percent of the MX missiles will survive a surprise attack by the mid-1990's. We can do without this vulnerable weapon without lessening our ability to deter attack. While 75 percent of the Soviet nuclear force is land-based, only 25 percent of the U.S. force is based on land. Our nuclear submarines and nearly invulnerable B-52's assure our deterrence.

This amendment, if approved, could be a turning point in national defense, reversing an unfortunate trend toward more spending on nuclear weapons, often at the expense of more legitimate needs. Strategic weapons spending over the last 10 years has increased 125 percent in constant dollars. Weapons procurement has increased 151 percent in constant dollars. Spending on personnel needs has gone up only 14 percent in real terms. It would be wiser for this Congress to direct attention away from increasing the amount of nuclear firepower toward the readiness of our personnel.

One simple observation should be kept in mind as we are asked to vote on such items as the MX: More nuclear weapons do not lessen the chances for nuclear war, fewer weapons do. By refusing to add another weapon to the arms race, we add not only to our national security, but to the world's security.

I urge a yes vote on the Bennett-Mavroules amendment.●

● Mr. EDGAR. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the Bennett-Mavroules amendment.

It is ironic—though altogether appropriate—that the debate on the MX in Congress should begin now. Just yesterday, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency released a study of world military expenditures.

As the study notes, such expenditures grew substantially in the last decade, from $300 billion in 1972 to over $800 billion in 1982. And they are projected to exceed $1 trillion by next year.

Are these data trying to tell us something here today? How can it be that since we started on this arms spiral Peacekeepers have taken us further away from peace, and bargaining chips have only succeeded in raising the ante in nuclear confrontation? Are such systems as MX more the problem rather than the solution?

What makes this growth in arms particularly troublesome is that the true costs are often hidden. They are best indicated by the resources which have to be diverted from the civilian to the military sector. President Eisenhower understood well the opportunities given up when he once commented that the real costs of increased arms were the hospitals we could not build and the schools we could not support.

The MX has similar costs: A single MX missile could provide 1 month of average unemployment benefits for 145,000 unemployed workers, or 6 months of average food stamp benefits for 286,000 Americans.

Yet the contribution of the MX to our national security is questioned by many defense experts, even as it erodes our economic strength at home.

It is questioned because it is a destabilizing weapon—its greater accuracy increases the threat to Soviet ICBM silos, while its 10 warheads make it an attractive target to Soviet war planners.

It is questioned because it is a poor bargaining chip—a Soviet refusal to trade for the MX would leave the United States with expensive, vulnerable missiles poorly suited to their deterrent mission.

And it is questioned because it is wasteful—our Minuteman force, which we are currently modernizing at tremendous cost, will fulfill the ICBM deterrent mission for years to come.

At a time when we are confronting deficits as far as the eye can see, and when we will be asked almost daily over the next several months to balance budget priorities, spending $15 billion over the next 4 years for MX is unconscionable. Even maintaining MX production at low rates will only create additional pressure for higher spending in the future and make deficit control a much more difficult task.

Our defense dollars can go for more needed areas—particularly a revitalized conventional force, operationally ready, and with incentives designed to recruit and maintain skilled personnel.

As we progress in this debate, let us keep these priorities clear.●

● Mr. BEDELL. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the Bennett-Mavroules amendment and urge my colleagues to join with us in support of its passage. Mr. Chairman, in my view the amendment before us now is vital to the long-term national security of the United States and its allies. The purpose of this amendment is straightforward—the amendment strikes the $2.7 billion in procurement funding for the MX missile that was approved by the Armed Services Committee. Why should we do this?

Quite simply, the MX remains a missile without a mission and more importantly, despite the present plan to deploy MX missiles in existent Minuteman silos, a missile without a home. We all know the justifications for the MX but I would like to review two of them.

First, during the Carter administration, we were told that the MX was absolutely necessary to offset certain Soviet advantages in heavy missiles. Thus, MX would serve to close the so-called window of vulnerability and preserve the balance of strategic forces that was established in the SALT II Treaty Agreement. Many of us here today questioned the logic of that argument. Many of us contended that the MX was unnecessary and wasteful. Many of us pointed to other ongoing defense efforts such as improvements in the sea-based leg of the strategic triad that were better investments to insure the long-term national security interests of the United States. Many of us maintained that those defense efforts were the best way to close the window of vulnerability. Many of us argued that there was, in fact, no window of vulnerability and that brings me to my second point.

During his campaign for the Presidency, candidate Reagan contended that the United States had negotiated a bad deal with the Soviets in agreeing to the SALT II Treaty. However, I find it interesting to note that the United States continues to abide by this so-called bad deal agreement and I, for one, am pleased that we do. Candidate Reagan also contended that U.S. missile silos were vulnerable to a preemptive Soviet attack. In this regard, I find it even more interesting to note that the President has determined to deploy the MX in the same silos that only 4 years ago were vulnerable to Soviet preemptive attack. Upon entering office, President Reagan committed his administration to the largest peacetime buildup of U.S. defense capabilities and last year, was extremely successful in persuading the Congress to approve funding for the first batch of MX missiles which were now known as the Peacekeeper. Why did Congress approve this funding?

Well as I recall, the mission of the MX had changed. The MX was no longer necessary to close the window of vulnerability. Its new mission was far more important. The MX would not be used to accomplish two even more important tasks than it had been previously assigned. First, MX would not be used as a bargaining chip that would induce the Soviets to agree to "deep cuts" in their strategic missile forces. Second, MX would permit the development of a new small ICBM—Midgetman—that would lessen the likelihood and risk of nuclear war and provide for greater stability in superpower strategic relations. Well, in my mind, if we do determine the need to build a new small ICBM, let us do it. We do not need to build the MX in order to secure the construction of the Midgetman. These are separate issues. There is no room for linkage here. But it is on the first point Mr. Chairman—that MX would serve as a valuable bargaining chip—that I take umbrage with. MX has never been nor will it ever be a valuable bargaining chip.

The last time I looked around, there were no negotiations going on in Geneva. As a matter of fact, both sides seem bent upon building more and more and newer and more lethal versions of nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union is in the process of developing a missile similar in characteristic to the MX—a missile that is capable of carrying out a first strike. Thus, both sides move closer and closer to the adoption of launch on warning strategies that serve to preclude the loss of strategic assets in the event of a preemptive attack. Launch on warning strategies also lead us one step closer to a nuclear war through accident or miscalculation. Thus, MX does not close the window of vulnerability or preserve the relative strategic balances that were established in the SALT II Treaty Agreement. As a matter of fact, the MX may well serve to open the window of vulnerability and for the life of me, I fail to see where the MX has contributed to greater stability in strategic relationships between superpowers.

Mr. Chairman, I know that it is 1984, I know that the President is telling us that the best way to achieve less is by building more, I know that the President is telling us that the best way to get the Soviets back to the negotiating tables is by threatening them even more and I know that the President is telling us that the most lethal weapons system even designed is the best insurance policy against the outbreak of nuclear war, Mr. Chairman, try as I might, I cannot accept the complete illogic of these advisements. If the MX is really the best system through which to secure the long-term national

security interests of the United States, we should fund and build it in sufficient numbers that will allow it to live up to its Orwellian name—Peacekeeper. If on the other hand, MX is bad for long-term U.S. national security interests—and I think that it is—we should support the Bennett-Mavroules amendment and strike all funding for the procurement of the MX. In my mind, our path is clear. The MX is the wrong missile, at the wrong time. We have only one choice before us and that choice is the Bennett-Mavroules amendment. I urge my colleagues to join with us in support of this imminently valuable national security and arms control amendment.●

● Mr. DURBIN. Mr. Chairman, along with many of my colleagues, I have detailed the reasons for my opposition to this missile system. It is worthwhile to review the recent legislative history of this weapons system.

The argument that persuaded enough Members to eke out a victory in last year's fight on the MX was that the missile represented an important bargaining chip in arms control negotiations.

Now that we are not engaged in any formal arms control talks with the Soviets, or even much informal contact, it is difficult to make that same argument in this year's debate. However, this argument has resurfaced in a slightly different form. MX supporters contend that when we do resume arms control talks, the MX can be used as leverage. We have also heard the argument that canceling the MX will ease pressure on the Soviets to come back to the bargaining table.

I am not persuaded by these points. A vote in favor of the MX last year has clearly done little to promote arms control talks, and there is little reason to think that the outcome will be any different this year.

Another reason to oppose the MX has come to light over the past year. We have now begun to hear reports from the military about the growing imbalance in our combat capabilities as a result of the President's unprecedented peacetime military buildup.

The military has documented many cases of its readiness problems. All of our Armed Forces reportedly lack enough ammunition for both training and prolonged combat. They lack spare parts for our planes and other weapons; they lack noncommissioned officers to provide vital frontline leadership; and they lack sufficient transport to get troops and material to where it is needed in times of war. All of this occurred while we were shattering spending records on our military budget.

One of the major reasons for these readiness problems under the President's military buildup is the emphasis on procurement of new weapons systems at the expense of the maintenance of our Armed Forces. As one example, the budget for ammunition, spare parts and other items in war reserve stockpiles has risen from $8.3 billion in 1981 to $10.8 billion in 1984—which is a much slower rate of growth than that for weapons and equipment.

With the MX's questionable strategic value and with its lack of success as a bargaining chip, it is one weapons system that can easily be eliminated from this year's defense budget. Deletion of fiscal year 1985 production funds for the MX missile would both contribute to our effort to enforce budgetary restraint in all areas of Federal spending and encourage the efficient allocation of funds within the defense budget. I urge my colleagues to keep this in mind while casting their vote. Let us vote for a strong defense, but not for a wasteful and questionable missile system.●

● Mr. WOLF. Mr. Chairman, the issue we are considering today is a very difficult and complex one. Because I am concerned about the ability of the United States to participate in meaningful arms-reduction negotiations, which insure the best interests of this country and peace in the world, I rise in support of continued development of the MX missile with the conditions provided in the Price-Aspin-Pritchard amendment to the defense authorization bill.

The Soviets are relentlessly continuing to move forward with their ICBM modernization programs. Recent Soviet treaty violations of both SALT I and SALT II, through the testing of two new ICBM's (the SS-24 and SS-25) and the construction of a battle-management radar system—giving the Soviets antiballistic missile breakout capabilities—are a strong indication of a significant shift in the balance of nuclear power.

To attempt to counter that unprecedented buildup, we voted last year to add the MX missile to the U.S. arsenal and begin production. Recently, however, United States-Soviet relations have become strained. Specifically, the Soviets have left both the talks on strategic arms and those on missiles in Europe. I do not, however, believe these events justify elimination of the MX peacekeeper. On the contrary, we must continue a course which gives the United States the MX as the necessary bargaining tool. The Price amendment achieves this goal by continuing production of the MX, but giving the Soviets incentive to come to the bargaining table by delaying release of funds for the MX if the Soviet Union will negotiate.

This amendment would decrease the number of MX missiles authorized for procurement in fiscal year 1985 to 15, from the 30 approved by the Armed Services Committee and the 40 requested by the administration, and would delay availability of funds for 6 months, until April 1985, after which the funding will be released only if strategic-arms-reduction talks with the U.S.S.R. have not resumed by that date. If the Soviets return to the bargaining table, the money would be frozen for the remainder of the fiscal year; if they do not return to the table, the money for the 15 missiles is released. I believe this amendment is a demonstration of a good-faith effort on the part of the United States to negotiate a meaningful arms reduction and is a signal that the United States is serious about reducing arms. What we want in return is a good-faith effort on the part of the Soviet Union to meet us at the negotiating table and this amendment gives the Soviets time to do just that.

I believe the arguments in support of this amendment were well made today in an editorial in the Washington Post and an op-ed article in the same edition by Mr. Aspin. I include those with this statement.

The Price perfecting amendment is a reasonable and responsible approach to arms control and I urge my colleagues to support this amendment.

[From the Washington Post, May 16, 1984]

ANOTHER MX VOTE

A year ago Mr. Reagan and Congress made a bargain: the president made his approach to strategic arms control more negotiable and Congress voted to start building the MX missile. Since then, however, Soviet-American relations have gone from bad to worse; the Soviets have walked out of both the talks on strategic arms and those on missiles in Europe (INF). As a result, strong elements in the Democratic-controlled House now want to go back on the 1983 bargain and stop funding the MX.

It's a shortsighted idea. The MX is the same unlovely missile, controversial but supported in its various stages of development by four administrations, that it's always been. It's also the same potential bargaining lever that it's always been meant to be. The notion that yielding it up unilaterally will somehow induce the Soviets to abandon their similar existing and prospective missile is daffy. The three Democratic presidential candidates say so, and they're wrong.

There is, however, a real problem, which is that no negotiations are going on or are on the near horizon. The country is in the early stages of an interesting and necessary debate about the extent to which this is Ronald Reagan's fault. Certainly it is so that he has not persuaded everyone that he is serious about arms control. The important consideration, however, is whether the person who is president when the Soviets decide to come back to the table will have the MX available to him as a bargaining counter. It is startling, again, that a Democratic presidential candidate could ask to weaken his own prospective position.

Rep. Les Aspin has a sensible suggestion (on the op-ed page today) for keeping considerations of arms control and considerations of arms building in reasonable balance for the duration of the current cold spell. Vote the money for a certain number of MX missiles, he advises, but don't spend it until a few months have passed in order to see how the American elections and the

first stage of a resumed negotiation go. It's a bit complicated, and it puts Congress more directly into the business of negotiations than any president would prefer. But it ensures that the American president, when he does finally sit down again with the Kremlin, does so with a decent hand.

[From the Washington Post, May 16, 1984]

HOW MANY MX'S?

(By Les Aspin)

The House today will again vote on the MX missile—and once again, there are good arguments on both sides. On one side is the concern that we should not reward the Soviet Union for walking out on the arms talks in Geneva. To kill the MX is hardly an inducement for them to return to the talks; in fact, it is an inducement to avoid the talks, to continue with the tactics that got them what they wanted for free.

But there are also good arguments against giving Ronald Reagan all the MXs his heart desires. When the Scowcroft Commission pressed successfully for the MX compromise last year, it said the MX gave the United States leverage with the Soviets—but, importantly, it also gave arms control supporters leverage with the Reagan administration. We lose a good deal of that leverage with Reagan if we press full steam ahead with the MX program.

What are we to do? The defense bill on the floor of the House today provides 30 MXs for 1985. An amendment (the Bennett-Mavroules amendment) will be offered to make MX procurement zero for next year.

There are essentially two reasons why we should not go ahead with the 30 missiles and two reasons why we shouldn't vote for zero missiles.

Don't go full steam ahead:

First, there is the presidential election. All three candidates for the Democratic presidential nomination are opposed to the MX. If we go ahead with the MX and the eventual Democratic nominee wins, one could expect the MX program to be ended. It makes no sense to begin production of 30 missiles only to have the program canceled on January 20.

Second, we don't want to lose that leverage with Reagan, if by some strange quirk of history he is reelected. It is popular to say that Reagan is opposed to arms control; I find that a bit of an exaggeration. But certainly there are those in the Reagan administration who are less than enthusiastic for arms control. To go full steam while there are no talks going on would suit them just fine. But we would lose leverage with them. The closer we get to approving the full 100 MX program, the less leverage we have.

On the other hand, don't kill off the MX:

First, to reward the Soviets for leaving the Geneva talks (and only days after boycotting the Olympics to boot) is shooting ourselves in the foot, if we really want to see more arms talks. It tells the Moscow they can win by going into a blue funk. In only a few weeks, the Netherlands is due to decide on deploying the Pershing missile. Dutch politicians who would rather avoid the unpleasant constituent complaints the deployment would generate will be overjoyed if the House votes no on MX; it will allow them to vote no to Pershing with a clear conscience, arguing that they aren't letting the NATO alliance down but merely following the American lead. That will further reinforce the Soviet view that there is much to be gained by forgetting negotiations.

Second, the MX is still good negotiating leverage in the talks. Unless we are totally pessimistic about the future of arms control, the talks will one day begin again. When that happens, the Scowcroft recommendations will still be valid. We need some leverage to get the Soviets to talk seriously about their MX equivalents—the SS18s and the SS19s. The Ford and Carter administrations offered Moscow many inducements to lower the numbers of those missiles. But as the history of these talks indicates, the going was pretty tough—we had nothing equivalent to bargain with.

The MX is the equivalent, and it is so viewed by many with arms control credentials. The decision to go ahead with the MX was not made by Ronald Reagan, staunch critic of SALT I and SALT II. The decision to develop the MX was made by Richard Nixon, architect of SALT I, and the decision to procure the MX was made by Jimmy Carter, architect of SALT II. Whatever one may think of those two presidents, it is impossible to criticize their fundamental dedication to arms control.

What do we do if we don't like either 30 MXs or zero MXs in the 1985 budget? One option is to make the MX contingent on a Soviet return to the bargaining table. We could vote for 15 missiles but lock the money up for six months until after whoever wins the election is inaugurated. If the Soviets have not then returned to the bargaining table, the money would be released. But if they came back to the table, and bargain in good faith, the money remains locked up.

I will offer this third alternative as an amendment on the House floor today. Voting for zero MXs rewards the Soviets for not being at the bargaining table. Voting for this amendment rewards them if they return to the bargaining table.●

● Mr. STARK. Mr. Chairman, well here we are again ladies and gentlemen. Another MX deal. Once again we are being asked to buy a bill of goods by several of our colleagues. "Strike another deal with the Reagan Administration." they ask. "We'll make this missile a bargaining chip yet," they say. Well, let us take a look at the history of the deals we have made with Ronald Reagan, and their results.

This body passed the President's 1981 tax cut and budget package because many Members took the President at his word. The President said his trickle-down tax cut and budget package would result in a balanced Federal budget and prosperity by 1984. Look around. Look at the President's deficit, his interest rates, his unemployment lines.

I should not have to remind anyone of Secretary Regan's creative spreading of the blame for the effects of the President's deficit. But I will. Mr. Regan claims that it has been our failure to deal with the deficit that has increased interest rates. Our budget resolution would reduce the deficit by $182 billion over 3 years. The President's original proposal would have reduced his deficit by only $86 billion over the same period. Yet we in Congress are blamed for the results of the President's policy.

And who in this body has forgotten our ill-fated deal concerning the President's policy in Lebanon? We authorized the President to keep our troops in Lebanon for 18 months in exchange for a backhanded Presidential recognition that, yes, the War Powers Act does exist. The President's policy was unfortunately a failure. Once again, we in Congress were blamed. We gave the President what he asked for, and he gave us the blame for his failure.

And what of the social security compromise? Yes, that has been adhered to thus far. But already some Reagan administration officials are chomping at the bit, talking about making radical changes in the social security system in a hypothetical Reagan second term.

Fortunately, there is still time to prevent the social security deal from being unilaterally abrogated by the President.

And there is still time to avoid another disastrous deal with the President on the MX missile. That time is now.

Last year we were told that the MX should be approved as a bargaining chip, because its military justifications are ludicrous. A chip for the Russians, and a chip for the President. Well, somehow while we were busy negotiating an arms-control agreement with our own President, the Soviets did exactly what they said they would do: they left the negotiations. There is no bargaining with the Soviets today, but our negotiations with Ronald Reagan continue.

I refuse to buy another Reagan deal. Open your eyes. The track record of our dealings with this President is abysmal.

What we have here is a Presidential compliance problem. Call it Presidential breakout, if you like. And, reelected, Ronald Reagan will break out of this year's MX deal. In this area, Ronald Reagan is consistent.

The MX deal of last year did not keep the Soviets at the negotiating table. The deal being proposed this year will not bring them back. What will bring the Soviets to the table, and keep them there, is an American arms-control policy. That, my friends, we do not have.

The only thing that can be said in favor of a deal with the President on MX is that he will not be able to blame us for the failure of his nuclear-arms policies. That failure will be final, and there will be no one left to blame.●

(By unanimous consent, Mr. CHENEY yielded his time to Mr. DICKINSON.)

(By unanimous consent, Mr. MAVROULES yielded his time to Mr. BENNETT.)

Mr. BENNETT. Mr. Chairman, we have had a lot of conversation here about rewarding the Soviets if we should pass the Bennett-Mavroules amendment. This statement assumes that MX is a valuable strategic

weapon that will enhance our national security. However, this is clearly not the case. I believe that halting funding of such a costly program that is of so little military value, and putting this money into that, when there are so many better places to put it, is a very foolish thing to undertake.

We have had some observations here just recently about what the Russians feel about this. The Russians told us on December 6, 1982, Dimitri Ustinov, Soviet Defense Minister said:

> If the present leadership challenges us by starting MX missile deployment, the Soviet Union will deploy in response a new ICBM of the same class, and its characteristics will be inferior to those of the MX in any way.

That is not really a bluff; that is just exactly what they have done on every other weapon that has come down the pike. President Reagan said this is not in the sense of a bargaining chip that somebody could say, well, you are not going to build it, just tear it down. No, we need a modernization. Even if we get the reduction of arms, which we are seeking, and which there has been some indication the Soviets are seriously considering, this would not be the missile that is taken out of circulation.

In looking at this matter, the defeat of the money to buy 30 or more MX missiles would represent a return of some commonsense to our defense procurement policy. We are currently undertaking a number of valuable strategic modernization programs. The development of the B-1 bomber, which I support, as well as others, a new Stealth bomber, a cruise missile program, new Trident submarines. Trident II missile, as well as Midgetman land-based missile program.

Strategic spending has increased 342 percent over the last 10 years. That is 125 percent in constant dollars. These programs are needed and I strongly support them. However, we should not continue to waste valuable defense dollars on questionable strategic programs such as the MX. But instead use the money to rebuild our conventional forces, and if we have anything left over after that, which I doubt, but if we do, then to go into producing more Trident missiles or other types of strategic power.

Strategic spending, as I said, has increased 125 percent when adjusted for inflation over the last 10 years. Another area of Government spending where this is the case I do now know of. I do not know a place where we have gone up that much. We have deployed 550 Minuteman III missiles, with 1,650 warheads from 1970-75. These missiles are the world's first MIRV'd missiles by over 5 years, and some Minuteman III missiles were built as late as 1978 with new guidance and warheads installed on some 300 of these in the late 1970's.

We have also continued to upgrade other areas of our strategic forces as the Trident missiles with some 2,200 warheads began to enter service in 1979 are still in production. The truth is of the 8,000 warheads on ballistic missiles, only 500 are on missiles 15 years of age or older.

It is true that the Soviets enjoy some advantages in land-based forces, but they have chosen to concentrate their strategic forces on land, while we have chosen to concentrate ours in the air and at sea. Their reason for going to the land instead of going to sea is because they have not been able to produce a submarine which was not detectable by our forces. We are stronger than they are because of the invulnerability of our submarines today.

The United States has no shortage of accurate hard-target killers. Our Minuteman III missile, with the Mark 12-A warhead has this capability as well as thousands of additional hard-target killers on submarines and on bombers. This certainly provides us with more than enough hard-target kill capability. In fact, currently over 60 percent of the Soviet's total strategic force is susceptible to a first strike, while only 25 percent of the United States force is so susceptible.

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(By unanimous consent, Mr. NEAL yielded his time to Mr. MORRISON of Connecticut.)

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. MORRISON).

Mr. MORRISON of Connecticut. Mr. Chairman, the logic that has been used in support of this weapon system today could support any weapon system, regardless of its value. Proponents of the MX say that we have got to have it, because if we vote to eliminate the MX, we will be rewarding the Soviet Union.

This is no way to set priorities in our defense spending. Our decision should be made on the basis of whether or not this system advances the interests of the United States, whether it will benefit our defense and add to our security. The fact is that this vulnerable, dangerous weapon system is not only expensive, but cosmetic as well. As a military system, it does not have any value.

As in the debate last year, proponents argue that the MX is valuable as a bargaining chip, notwithstanding the fact that our votes on MX have thus far failed to bring the Soviets back to the bargaining table. Even so, they want to try it in a new way that suggests that it is up to the Soviets to decide whether or not we will have this weapon. It is not their decision to make.

The vote today is about whether this Congress and this country will decide whether we need this weapon system. I say we do not. I say that it is destabilizing. I say that it is a first-strike weapon. I say that it endangers our security and undermines prospects for advances in arms control. We should stand up and say "No" and stop fooling ourselves and the American people with talk about bargaining chips and other illusions.

The MX missile should be put to rest on this floor this day.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York (Mr. STRATTON).

Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Chairman, I was interested to realize that there is one Member in this body who apparently does not care about jobs in her home district when voting on legislation. The gentlewoman from California (Mrs. BOXER) was offended that somebody should point out the number of jobs that are involved when you wipe out a major weapons system.

Certainly in New York, in my State, we are concerned about jobs, and I would think that they would be concerned about jobs in the State of California. But apparenty she does not care. We are going into all of this strategic analysis that has been given us by all of these experts here in the well in the last couple of hours, but nobody has bothered to find out what the elimination, the wiping out of the MX, is going to do to human beings who are employed in legitimate jobs.

In 13 districts of California, for example, there are 15,770 jobs connected with the MX. If those are wiped out, does that not concern the Congressman from that district?

In the State of Massachusetts, for example, if the MX is wiped out, as the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. MAVROULS) wants, 11,864 jobs are going to be wiped out and 11,864 people are going to be out on the unemployment rolls.

Even in the State of Florida there are 2,146 jobs tied in with the construction of the MX.

This is the action that we took last year. These jobs have been produced by the approval of the 21 MX's that we funded last year, but there is not going to be any MX on the Christmas tree if this amendment by the gentleman from Florida and by the gentleman from Massachusetts prevails.

I think we ought to at least have the sense and the wisdom to find out what is going to happen to your district, and if anybody is interested in jobs, if anybody is interested in the economic health of his constituency, I would be very happy to show him this list.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. FEIGHAN).

Mr. FEIGHAN. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of the substitute offered by the gentleman from Massa-

chusetts (Mr. MAVROULES), and in opposition to the amendment by the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. ASPIN). As so many of my colleagues have pointed out today, the MX is a failed weapon. Just this week, the GAO released a report that said the MX would need a substantial increase in power and accuracy to accomplish its mission. It added that these improvements would lead to even higher costs, which have already jumped by 36 percent since the program began.

Even more disturbing, the Minuteman silos which house the MX are as vulnerable now as they were when they were rejected as a basing mode some 6 years ago. And this problem will get worse as Soviet missiles improve, making the MX—at best—a temporary and expensive solution to an enduring problem.

But today's debate is not ultimately about the Christmas tree of the MX, the military and strategic arguments against the missile: that is does not address the "window of vulnerability;" that it is destabilizing; that it will lead both sides to a suicidal "launch-on-warning" posture—are clear to many Members on both sides of the aisle.

What today's debate is about however is how the Nation is going to deal in the future with the Soviet Union. Are we going to continue down the path that has led to the suspension of all serious arms control talks? Are we going to approve yet another flawed and frightening weapon on the dubious promise of bargaining it away at some later date?

In short, the fate of the MX now rests on two very time-worn words: bargaining chip.

President Reagan and the Scowcroft Commission would have us believe that weapons deployments are the only way to pry concessions from the Soviets. To support their theory, they point to the successful use of bargaining chips in the antiballistic missile negotiations of SALT I, arguing that the Soviets pursued an agreement only after the Senate voted to deploy the safeguard ABM system. But this claim is simply not true. As SALT I negotiator, Gerard Smith, has pointed out: the Soviets expressed strong interest in an ABM agreement throughout the negotiations. And they made a significant secret offer on limiting defensive missiles over a month before the Senate vote on safeguard.

A more telling example of how bargaining chips work comes from that same era. In 1971, Deputy Defense Secretary Packard pushed MIRV'd missiles on Congress by calling them a very important bargaining chip. Today, we and the Soviets have deployed over 15,000 MIRV'd warheads.

The MIRV experience highlights the irony of today's vote. The Scowcroft Commission has now determined that MIRV'd missiles—like the MX—are dangerous and destabilizing. And they have recommended that we shift our strategy to rely on the small, single-warhead Midgetman missile. But first, they insist, we must demonstrate our national will by deploying the MX.

Using a logic worthy of the "Mad Hatter" from "Alice in Wonderland," they tell us that we must approve an admittedly ineffective weapon—MX—in order to buy an allegedly useful weapon—Midgetman—that will create the stable strategic environment we might have had, if we did not invest in bargaining chips to begin with.

Well Alice was not swayed by the Mad Hatter, and I hope this House does not bow to the Scowcroft Commission. The bargaining chip theory has always given us more than we bargained for: More weapons, with more warheads, that add up to more danger.

We are kidding ourselves if we think the so-called Peacekeeper is some sort of olive branch that will make the Soviets see the light and convince them to be serious and faithful negotiators. Instead, as we have seen time and time again, they will keep quiet at the bargaining table, and we will be no closer to a stabilizing arms control pact. During crises, fingers will tighten on the nuclear trigger, as each side is faced with the dilemma of using its weapons first or losing them to enemy attack.

Mr. Chairman, weapons systems that enhance our national security can stand on their own merits. But the MX falls flat on its face. Let us not prop up a bad weapon with a bankrupt theory.

Mr. VENTO. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. FEIGHAN. I yield to the gentleman from Minnesota.

Mr. VENTO. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the gentleman's statement. I rise in favor of the Mavroules-Bennett amendment and just remind Members that this is a $2.7 billion ante in this particular bargaining chip which become deployed weapons throughout history. That is the history of it. They go through an evolution of research, development, bargaining chips, failed negotiations, and the end result is that they are deployed weapons.

I commend the gentleman from Ohio for his statement.

Mr. Chairman, this has been a long debate, an important debate. I rise in opposition to the Aspin amendment and in favor of the Bennett-Mavroules amendment to strike out all MX procurement funding, some $2.7 billion.

Where is the United States going with current nuclear arms policy in 1984? Down the path of a full blown, out of control nuclear race to the next generation of ICBM and INF weapons, even into space with nuclear weapon development and research.

This amendment to strike the funding of MX is more justified today than ever before. The past policies concerning forcing the Soviets to the bargaining table have resulted in utter failure. Today there are no nuclear arms discussions much less new agreements to consider. The United States does not share the responsibility alone for this dismal state of affairs, but the question to the Congress, as policymakers, and to the administration, is what can we do, what should we do to get nuclear arms talks and agreements on reductions back on track?

It is not a question of which nations are culpable, but a question of whether the United States is going to lead.

The research and development in the United States goes forward with all good intentions. The United States develops new more powerful, more accurate, and just plain more nuclear weapons. We say it is for parity for deterrence for negotiation purposes. We refer to these nuclear weapons as bargaining chips.

It is apparent that this is a profoundly risky nuclear game that, for indeed all mankind is subjected to live or die according to its outcome; to the real risk and foolish gamble it represents. The evolution from research, testing, development to bargaining chip, and failed negotiation has been played over and over and the end result is always new generations of more effective more risky deployed nuclear weapons.

It is imperative that Congress call a halt to the betting and the MX missile as the $2.7 billion ante. At some time, commonsense ought to prevail, these weapons do not make us safer, they do not make us stronger, rather they run the very real risk that they will make irreversible changes in the balance of nuclear power.

Once developed and deployed, the history of nuclear weapons is that they stay in service until something more effective, more accurate, and more powerful take their place.

The United States military is not much different than the Soviets in holding on to nuclear weapons and only trading for even more dangerous and more risky nuclear systems.

These are difficult choices and votes—but necessary. Today I hope my colleagues in the House will agree to an important step toward reducing the risks that mankind faces, and vote to stop the MX.

(By unanimous consent, Mr. PRITCHARD yielded his time to Mr. O'BRIEN.)

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. O'BRIEN).

Mr. O'BRIEN. Mr. Chairman, I keep thinking of the statement made by a mute but not inglorious man who said,

"He tired the sun with talking and he walked him down the sky." I do not know whether the pro-MXers are right or the anti-MXers are right; but I know that GORE, PRICE, ASPIN, and DICKS are not wrong.

This is the only chance we have. I simply think it is hedging your bet. It is insurance, and we are not in a presidential debate; we are doing our own thing right here in the House, irrespective of party. There is no place else to go.

The Russians give nothing for nothing. They are not attuned to the joy of giving. They are not philanthropists. That is all we know about them. But this is our only best shot to say, "Look, we are in earnest. We are offering something that would be of value to get rid of from your standpoint." The gentleman may be very right. Perhaps the Russians will decide. But what I admire about this particular group is they are willing to go after it, and the protagonists on one side or the other are totally wrong, but these people are not.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Alabama (Mr. DICKINSON).

Mr. DICKINSON. Mr. Chairman, before I conclude with my few remarks, I thought I would perhaps review quickly for my colleagues here the voting procedure that we anticipate.

There are four items pending. The first was the Bennett amendment. The second was the Price-Aspin amendment to that, to which there was the substitute by Mr. MAVROULES, to which I offered a substitute. The Price-Aspin substitute and my substitute are identical.

I am told by the Parliamentarian that the vote will be, first, on Price-Aspin, second on my substitute, third on the Mavroules substitute, and fourth on the Bennett, assuming that they all go down. If there are no intervening amendments offered, that is the order in which they would be offered, so I am told.

Mr. Chairman, I would just like to say in conclusion, how can anyone say, how can anyone possibly think, that the Soviets would voluntarily return to the bargaining table for arms control talks when they get more than they could possibly get by not returning if we cancel the MX missile today?

□ 1920

This amendment is designed to do two things. One, to go forward with the MX, the procurement thereof, or to enter into serious arms control and hopefully we will get the arms control.

One of the earlier speakers made fun of the fact that the Soviets will make the decision for us. I have no apology for that. That is true. If they want to negotiate, all they have to do is come and meet us in Geneva and we will sit down and negotiate. If they are unwilling to do that, then, yes, we are going forward with it and the ball is in their court. I have no apology for that. I think it makes sense. It shows our good faith, our good will. If they want to negotiate, we are ready, willing and able. If they do not want to negotiate, there is no need of us waiting any longer. We will go ahead and build ours, even though they are about 3 years ahead of us in deploying.

It is just like the B-1 bomber was back 4 years ago. We put a hold on it in the Congress waiting to see who the new President was going to be. We did change Presidents and it was canceled.

A group of us were in Geneva and we met with the delegates at the disarmament talks there at that time and we asked one of the Russian generals, "Well, now, we have canceled the B-1 bomber. What are you going to give us in return?"

And the general said, "Gentlemen, we are neither fools nor philanthropists."

Nothing is what we got in return and that is exactly what will happen with the MX. We cancel it and what do we get in return? They are neither fools nor philanthropists. We get zero. We continue to live right under the gun. They continue to build and to deploy as they have for the past umpteen years.

Their attitude is just to wait. Let their propaganda and let their misinformation work on the fear and the ignorance of the American people and it will fall into their hands just like a ripe plum because we have neither the intelligence or the nerve to go forward to do what is in our best interests and that is to deploy the MX if they will not negotiate.

For the Soviets, it is a wonderful proposition. For them it is heads I win, tails you lose. They cannot lose the way we are going now if we do not go forward with the amendment offered by the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. PRICE).

Let me add one thing, too, that I do not know everybody understands. There is about $1 billion, $990 some million in this bill for the basing money of the 21 missiles that were approved last year, so while we are talking prospectively shall we build 15 more missiles if they do not come to the table, by this one act offered by the Bennett-Mavroules amendment, we are also killing the basing of the 21 missiles we approved last year, so we are taking out the entire program.

I think it is shortsighted. I think it is anything but in our best interests that we take out the 15 missiles plus the money from before.

I would urge my colleagues, please support the Price-Aspin amendment.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. MAVROULES).

Mr. MAVROULES. Mr. Chairman, I might respond to my distinguished chairman, the gentleman from New York, that when we start taking jobs away from our communities it takes a little intestinal fortitude and you have to dig down deep and dig hard.

In my opinion and in my judgment, this is the wrong missile for arms control. I believe we have a pair of deuces trying to call the bluff of the Soviet Union and they know it.

The correct vote today is to support the Mavroules-Bennett amendment.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. PRICE) to close the debate.

Mr. PRICE. Mr. Chairman, I want to discuss the MX issue by directing my remarks to my Democratic colleagues.

In doing so, I want to make a couple of initial points.

First, I respect the right of any Member in the House to express his or her views and vote his or her convictions on any issue that comes before us.

Second, I have always approached issues of national security in a nonpartisan manner. To me, there can be no partisanship over the conduct of this country's national security policy.

Having said this, I want to make it clear that I am proud to be a member of the Democratic Party and have been an active member throughout my career. I believe in the Democratic party, its principles and its efforts to protect the well-being of the American people.

These principles embrace a strong national defense system. Without such, we would undermine the basic security of our people. A strong national government must protect its people.

Looking at the MX then, I want my Democratic colleagues to consider the position that they intend to take on the amendment that would strike all of the procurement funds for the MX.

In all candor, we accomplish nothing but to open ourselves to political hyperbole and demagoguery. If we want to be able to debate national defense policy in a positive nonpartisan manner, then we should not put ourselves on the defensive at the outset.

Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues to think in the interest and only in the interest of our national defense. I urge my colleagues to support this amendment.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. PRICE) to the amendment offered by the gentleman from Florida (Mr. BENNETT).

The amendment to the amendment was agreed to.

AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. MAVROULES TO THE AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. BENNETT, AS AMENDED

Mr. MAVROULES. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment to the amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. MAVROULES to the amendment offered by Mr. BENNETT: At the end of the section proposed to be added by the amendment add the following:

MORATORIUM ON MX MISSILE PROCUREMENT

SEC. 111. (a) Notwithstanding section 103(a) of this title, the maximum amount that may be appropriated for fiscal year 1985 for missiles for the Air Force is $5,942,700,000.

(b) None of the funds appropriated pursuant to authorizations of appropriations in this title may be used for the MX missile program.

(c) It is the intent of Congress that the denial of funds for procurement under the MX missile system program for fiscal year 1985 constitutes a moratorium on procurement of missiles under such program but does not constitute a unilateral termination of that program.

Mr. DICKINSON. Mr. Chairman, I reserve a point of order on the amendment.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Alabama (Mr. DICKINSON) reserves a point of order.

PARLIAMENTARY INQUIRY

Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Chairman, a parliamentary inquiry.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman will state it.

Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Chairman, did the Chair rule that the Price amendment was adopted?

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman is correct.

Mr. MAVROULES. Mr. Chairman, my amendment is very plain and the reason that I offered the amendment is because we have been debating this issue now for the last 5 or 6 hours and the importance of the issue demands fairness. We demand an up-or-down vote on the amendment. There are those of us who could have asked for a recorded vote on the chairman's amendment. We did not do that.

We have raised the public awareness of this issue. We have millions of people watching it and they deserve an up-or-down vote on the amendment put forth by the gentleman from Florida (Mr. BENNETT) and the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. MAVROULES) and that is the reason I offered the amendment.

I ask for your cooperation. I ask for fairness among both sides, proponents and opponents, and give this thing a chance to work. Let us vote it up or down.

□ 1930

Mr. NEAL. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MAVROULES. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. NEAL. Could the gentleman tell me if the amendment that I had offered earlier is included in your amendment?

Mr. MAVROULES. It is inclusive.

Mr. NEAL. So the amendment now says that we will not produce the MX missile for a year, awaiting an appropriate response by the Soviet Union?

Mr. MAVROULES. That is correct.

Mr. NEAL. I thank the gentleman and commend him for his efforts.

POINT OF ORDER

The CHAIRMAN. Does the gentleman from Alabama (Mr. DICKINSON) insist on his point of order?

Mr. DICKINSON. The gentleman will insist on the point of order.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman will state his point of order.

Mr. DICKINSON. Mr. Chairman, without having had an opportunity to study it, and I have not, but let me attempt to, it appears that this is broader then the scope of what we have just worked on. And I think it takes out missiles for more than just the MX. At this point it affects 1984 money, and at this point, without having any prior notice, there is no chance for me or staff to study it. I am just doing the best I can.

So I respectfully submit that it is not germane, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Does the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. MAVROULES) desire to be heard on the point of order?

Mr. MAVROULES. I just feel that the amendment is pertinent to the issue at hand and I will follow your recommendation and your ruling.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair would rule that the amendment offered by the gentleman from Massachusetts is germane to the Bennett amendment as amended and the Chair does not rule on the consistency of amendments and, therefore, rules that the amendment is in order.

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask my friend from Wisconsin (Mr. ASPIN), I want to make sure that everybody understands the parliamentary situation before we get to this vote. As I understand it, and maybe the chairman or the gentleman from Wisconsin can help me, the Aspin-Pritchard amendment has been adopted.

Mr. ASPIN. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DICKS. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. ASPIN. The gentleman is correct.

Mr. DICKS. And so that is done. Now we are on an amendment to this.

So for those people who believe, as we all do here in this little colloquy, that the Aspin-Pritchard amendment is the way to go because we reserve the funding for 15 missiles, contingent upon how the Soviets proceed, that this is an amendment then, if we were following the regular order we would just defeat this amendment and move back to the Aspin-Pritchard amendment. Is that a fair understanding of the situation?

Mr. ASPIN. That is correct.

Mr. DICKS. I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. BENNETT. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

I will not take long, but since there has been some discussion about the pertinence of this to the amendment of the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. MAVROULES) which he and I introduced to begin with, I must say that I really had it planned at the very beginning to have the gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. NEAL's provision in it. It was just the parliamentary procedure that caught me off base, and I offered the Bennett-Mavroules amendment without this, because even before we came here today I thought that the gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. NEAL) had made a good point. I think the debate has shown that it would be a good idea to have this type of a moratorium. So I myself have no opposition to this amendment.

Mr. DOWNEY of New York. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BENNETT. I yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. DOWNEY of New York. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

I think it is very important for Members who are just tuning in for the first time to understand what this amendment that we will be voting on consists of. This is not the Aspin language for 15 missiles. This is the Bennett-Mavroules amendment on the zero missiles, and it is amended, and improved in my opinion, by Mr. NEAL's language which further states, as the gentleman has done, that this is not a unilateral action.

So this is the Bennett-Mavroules language as amended by NEAL that Members will be voting on.

Mr. BENNETT. I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. DICKINSON. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment.

Mr. Chairman, it is not my intent to go to the merits. I think we have discussed the merits sufficiently today.

I say even though an explanation has just been offered, there was a great deal of confusion in the Chamber. And also there was some who watching on closed circuit television, some who will not know the parliamentary procedure when they arrive.

I am asking a no vote because when the vote was taken on the Price-Aspin amendment it carried by voice vote. The gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. MAVROULES) was on his feet, got to his feet having lost that vote. I thought he was going to ask for a rollcall vote and I did nothing to intervene. Instead he fooled me. He did not

ask for a rollcall vote. He offered this substitute which we are about to vote on, which in effect, if this is voted down, then we will have a vote again on the Dickinson amendment, which is the same as the Price-Aspin amendment.

So I am asking for a no vote on this, which will retain the 15 missiles and give us until next April to force the Soviets to come to the negotiating table.

Mr. DICKS. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DICKINSON. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. DICKS. It is fair to say if you want to sustain the Aspin-Pritchard amendment we vote no, is that correct?

Mr. DICKINSON. I thought that was what I said.

● Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment offered by Mr. BENNETT and Mr. MAVROULES which prohibits the authorization of any appropriations for the MX missile program.

Moreover, Mr. NEAL's amendment to the Bennett-Mavroules amendment is a curious one. In short, the Neal amendment eliminates Bennett language which conditions the moratorium on subsequent Soviet actions in the area of nuclear weapons development, production, and deployment. In short, under the Neal amendment, U.S. defense decisions need not be predicated whatsoever upon Soviet strategic activities. Moreover, it appears that under Mr. NEAL's language, there is little if any difference between a moratorium and a unilateral termination and I would ask the gentleman from North Carolina to define these differences under his amendment.

These amendments are simply unilateral freeze proposals that would eliminate our ability to modernize our land-based ICBM's. Unless our 1960 vintage ICBM's are eventually replaced, we will find our systems failing due to normal aging, while the Soviets' ICBM's still will be in prime condition. Seventy-seven percent of U.S. strategic nuclear vehicles are more than 15 years old. Seventy-seven percent of Soviet strategic nuclear vehicles are less than 5 years old and the Soviets are presently developing a new generation of ICBM's including a gigantic new missile which is their equivalent of the MX.

As was stated by Mr. MARKEY in the last historic debate on the nuclear freeze, "The objective of the freeze is to preclude the necessity of any further force modernization."

Mr. MARKEY also stated during the freeze debate that, "In the eyes of the Broomfield supporters modernization means construction of the MX and the Trident II and all of the first-strike nuclear weapons that are on the design board of the Pentagon." Note he never discusses Soviet weapons.

I urge my colleagues to vote against these unilateral freeze amendments.●

● Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of the Bennett-Mavroules amendment to delete $2.5 billion for the procurement of 30 MX missiles. Once again, the Congress must decide between options with vastly different ramifications. Do we continue to travel down the path of instability by producing a first-strike system, or will the Congress utilize its authority to withhold funds for the deadly MX, which could provoke a Soviet attack because of its enormous destructive potential and its vulnerable basing mode?

Mr. Chairman, I do not think there really is a choice here today. We must cut through the rhetoric and the public relations gimmickry which has been so skillfully employed by the President for his escalation of the arms race with the Soviets. Mr. Speaker, it is incumbent upon this House to exert some control over this administration which continues to advocate tremendous increases in our nuclear arsenal while failing to advance arms control negotiations whatsoever.

We are all weary of comparisons of life in America today with the society created by George Orwell in his famous novel, 1984. But in what language is President Reagan talking, if not Newspeak, when he has the audacity to call the MX the Peacekeeper. The MX is the most dangerous, most destabilizing, weapon ever created. Its deployment would threaten world peace as no nuclear bomb ever has before. Its combination of huge payload and pinpoint accuracy poses an obvious threat to the Soviet Union. It is the weapon the Kremlin would most like to rid us of. And by basing the MX in silos that were too vulnerable for even the smaller Minuteman missiles, we provide a most inviting target to the Russian bombers. If we go ahead with this insane weapon, we might as well paint a bullseye around Wyoming, Colorado, and Nebraska, because the MX certainly invites the Soviets to attack us before we can get them.

Mr. Chairman, as we stand on the floor today, we hear the same arguments which were used last year about the need for the MX as a bargaining chip with the Soviet Union. For those in this Chamber who might have a spell of temporary amnesia, it is now 1 year later and there has been not one iota of progress in either intermediate-range or strategic nuclear weapons negotiations. In fact, there are not any negotiations taking place at all. One must wonder exactly where this country is going and what leverage the Congress can apply on the President to once and for all get serious about achieving meaningful progress on arms control.

Let us all recognize that the American people and the Congress are now receiving another dose of hypnotic rhetoric from President Reagan and his supporters, who tell us that building this 10-warhead missile is essential for maintaining peace. We are told that if the Congress does not continue to fund the MX, we will be responsible for unilateral disarmament. Mr. Chairman, I would really like to know exactly what progress this administration has made in arms control. It is with sadness for the people of this country and for the future of all people on this Earth that an honest assessment of the past 3 years reveals that under President Reagan we have regressed in arms control as we have embarked on program after program for the development of new nuclear weapons, including highly destabilizing space war technology.

If the Congress wishes to allow the President to seek cover for his dismal arms-policy failures by bowing to his demands for the MX missile, the burden for this error will rest upon our shoulders. We have the opportunity here today to take a firm stand for maintaining a policy of deterrence and real protection for the American people, or we can continue to fund the MX and a variety of other weapons systems which increase the vulnerability of our country. Mr. Chairman, we must take concrete action to preserve peace, and stop wasting the hard earned taxpayers dollars on the development of a system which brings all people on this Earth another step closer to nuclear annihilation.●

● Mr. LEVINE of California. Mr. Chairman, the vote we will cast on the Bennett-Mavroules amendment to strike all procurement funding for the MX missile will be one of the most important votes of this session. I urge my colleagues to support this important effort to stop construction of this wasteful, destabilizing, and vulnerable weapon.

We are now living in a time of unprecedented danger of nuclear holocaust. The Reagan administration has asked Congress to approve the most massive peacetime build-up of our armed forces in history. We are now embarked on a defense build up which will result in deployment of the MX, the Trident D-5 missile, a new generation of chemical and biological warfare weapons, the placement of Pershing and cruise missiles in Europe, and futuristic, "Star Wars" weapons in outer space.

The administration claims that we need these weapons to bring the Soviet Union to the negotiating table. Yet, today there are no negotiations in progress between the two superpowers on limiting or reducing strategic or

theater nuclear weapons. In addition, relations between the United States and the Soviet Union are at an all-time low.

It is in this atmosphere that the administration and its allies in Congress now are attempting to win funding for construction of the MX. Predictably, MX supporters continue to market this weapon as an arms control tool. They must know better.

At a time of unprecedented budget deficits, a decision to continue construction of the MX is fiscally irresponsible. A recent Air Force study found that 99 percent of all MX missiles would be destroyed by a Soviet first strike. As a result, the MX would add little or nothing to our retaliatory capabilities. This has caused many to view it as a first strike weapon which either must be used before the Soviets launch a nuclear attack or fired "on warning" of a Soviet first strike. Such a policy would significantly increase the danger of an accidental nuclear war.

This administration has also claimed that the MX is needed to offset a Soviet advantage in strategic weaponry. Yet, representatives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have repeatedly told Congress that they would not trade our existing strategic arsenal for the Soviet Union's.

Even if all of our land-based missiles were to be destroyed, the missiles on just two Poseidon submarines have the capability to destroy every city in the Soviet Union with a population in excess of 100,000.

Mr. Chairman, the MX is a weapon without a purpose or justification. It will increase the danger of nuclear war, and will not add measurably to our nuclear deterrent. I urge my colleagues to join with me in supporting the Bennett-Mavroules amendment.●

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. MAVROULES) to the amendment offered by the gentleman from Florida (Mr. BENNETT), as amended.

The question was taken; and the Chairman announced that the noes appeared to have it.

RECORDED VOTE

Mr. MAVROULES. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.

A recorded vote was ordered.

The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were—ayes 212, noes 218, not voting 3, as follows:

[Roll No. 149]

AYES—212

Ackerman
Addabbo
Akaka
Albosta
Annunzio
Anthony
Applegate
AuCoin
Barnes
Bates
Bedell
Beilenson
Bennett
Bereuter
Berman
Biaggi
Boggs
Boland
Bonior
Bonker
Borski
Bosco
Boucher
Boxer
Brooks
Brown (CA)
Bryant
Burton (CA)
Carper
Carr
Clarke
Clay
Coelho
Collins
Conte
Conyers
Coughlin
Coyne
Crockett
D'Amours
Daschle
Dellums
Derrick
Dingell
Dixon
Donnelly
Dorgan
Dowdy
Downey
Durbin
Dwyer
Dymally
Dyson
Early
Eckart
Edgar
Edwards (CA)
Evans (IA)
Evans (IL)
Fascell
Feighan
Ferraro
Florio
Foglietta
Foley
Ford (MI)
Ford (TN)
Fowler
Frank
Garcia
Gaydos
Gejdenson
Gephardt
Gibbons
Glickman
Gonzalez
Gradison
Gray
Green
Guarini
Hall (IN)
Hall (OH)
Hamilton
Harkin
Harrison
Hawkins
Hayes
Heftel
Hertel
Howard
Jacobs
Jeffords
Jenkins
Jones (NC)
Jones (OK)
Kaptur
Kastenmeier
Kennelly
Kildee
Kleczka
Kogovsek
Kolter
Kostmayer
LaFalce
Lantos
Leach
Lehman (CA)
Lehman (FL)
Leland
Levin
Levine
Long (LA)
Long (MD)
Lowry (WA)
Luken
Lundine
MacKay
Markey
Martinez
Matsui
Mavroules
Mazzoli
McCloskey
McHugh
McKinney
McNulty
Mica
Mikulski
Miller (CA)
Mineta
Minish
Mitchell
Moakley
Moody
Morrison (CT)
Mrazek
Murphy
Natcher
Neal
Nowak
Oakar
Oberstar
Obey
Olin
Ottinger
Owens
Panetta
Paul
Pease
Penny
Perkins
Petri
Rahall
Rangel
Ratchford
Richardson
Ridge
Rodino
Roe
Rostenkowski
Roukema
Roybal
Russo
Sabo
Savage
Scheuer
Schneider
Schroeder
Schumer
Seiberling
Sensenbrenner
Shannon
Sharp
Sikorski
Simon
Sisisky
Slattery
Smith (FL)
Smith (IA)
Smith (NE)
Solarz
Spratt
St Germain
Staggers
Stark
Stokes
Studds
Swift
Synar
Tauke
Torres
Torricelli
Towns
Traxler
Udall
Vento
Volkmer
Walgren
Waxman
Weaver
Weiss
Wheat
Whitten
Williams (MT)
Wirth
Wise
Wolpe
Wright
Wyden
Yates
Young (MO)
Zschau

NOES—218

Alexander
Anderson
Andrews (NC)
Andrews (TX)
Archer
Aspin
Badham
Barnard
Bartlett
Bateman
Bethune
Bevill
Bilirakis
Bliley
Boehlert
Boner
Breaux
Britt
Broomfield
Brown (CO)
Broyhill
Burton (IN)
Byron
Campbell
Carney
Chandler
Chappell
Chappie
Cheney
Clinger
Coats
Coleman (MO)
Coleman (TX)
Conable
Cooper
Corcoran
Courter
Craig
Crane, Daniel
Crane, Philip
Daniel
Dannemeyer
Darden
Daub
Davis
de la Garza
DeWine
Dickinson
Dicks
Dreier
Duncan
Edwards (AL)
Edwards (OK)
Emerson
English
Erdreich
Erlenborn
Fazio
Fiedler
Fields
Fish
Flippo
Franklin
Frenzel
Frost
Fuqua
Gekas
Gilman
Gingrich
Goodling
Gore
Gramm
Gregg
Gunderson
Hall, Ralph
Hall, Sam
Hammerschmidt
Hansen (UT)
Hartnett
Hatcher
Hefner
Hightower
Hiler
Hillis
Holt
Hopkins
Horton
Hoyer
Hubbard
Huckaby
Hughes
Hunter
Hutto
Hyde
Ireland
Jones (TN)
Kasich
Kazen
Kemp
Kindness
Kramer
Lagomarsino
Latta
Leath
Lent
Levitas
Lewis (CA)
Lewis (FL)
Lipinski
Livingston
Lloyd
Loeffler
Lott
Lowery (CA)
Lujan
Lungren
Mack
Madigan
Marlenee
Marriott
Martin (IL)
Martin (NC)
Martin (NY)
McCain
McCandless
McCollum
McCurdy
McDade
McEwen
McGrath
McKernan
Michel
Miller (OH)
Molinari
Mollohan
Montgomery
Moore
Moorhead
Morrison (WA)
Murtha
Myers
Nelson
Nichols
Nielson
O'Brien
Ortiz
Oxley
Packard
Parris
Pashayan
Patman
Patterson
Pepper
Pickle
Porter
Price
Pritchard
Pursell
Quillen
Ray
Regula
Reid
Rinaldo
Ritter
Roberts
Robinson
Roemer
Rogers
Rose
Roth
Rowland
Rudd
Sawyer
Schaefer
Schulze
Shaw
Shelby
Shumway
Shuster
Siljander
Skeen
Skelton
Smith (NJ)
Smith, Denny
Smith, Robert
Snowe
Snyder
Solomon
Spence
Stangeland
Stenholm
Stratton
Stump
Sundquist
Tallon
Tauzin
Taylor
Thomas (CA)
Thomas (GA)
Valentine
Vander Jagt
Vandergriff
Vucanovich
Walker
Watkins
Weber
Whitehurst
Whitley
Whittaker
Williams (OH)
Wilson
Winn
Wolf
Wortley
Wylie
Yatron
Young (AK)
Young (FL)

NOT VOTING—3

Hance
Hansen (ID)
Johnson

□ 1950

Mr. D'AMOURS changed his vote from "no" to "aye."

So the amendment to the amendment, as amended, was rejected.

The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Alabama (Mr. DICKINSON) to the amendment offered by the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. MAVROULES) as a substitute for the amendment offered by the gentleman from Florida (Mr. BENNETT), as amended.

RECORDED VOTE

Mr. DICKINSON. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.

A recorded vote was ordered.

The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were—ayes 229, noes 199, not voting 5, as follows:

[Roll No. 150]

AYES—229

Alexander
Anderson
Andrews (NC)
Andrews (TX)
Applegate
Archer
Aspin
Badham
Barnard
Bartlett
Bateman
Bethune
Bevill
Bilirakis
Bliley
Boehlert
Boner
Breaux
Britt
Broomfield
Brown (CO)
Broyhill
Burton (IN)
Byron
Campbell
Carney
Chandler
Chappell
Chappie
Cheney
Clarke
Clinger
Coats
Coleman (MO)
Coleman (TX)
Conable
Cooper
Corcoran
Courter
Craig
Crane, Daniel
Crane, Philip
Daniel
Dannemeyer
Darden
Daub
Davis
de la Garza
DeWine
Dickinson
Dicks
Dreier
Duncan
Edwards (AL)

Edwards (OK)
Emerson
English
Erdreich
Erlenborn
Fazio
Fiedler
Fields
Fish
Flippo
Franklin
Frenzel
Frost
Fuqua
Gekas
Gilman
Gingrich
Goodling
Gore
Gramm
Gregg
Gunderson
Hall, Ralph
Hall, Sam
Hammerschmidt
Hansen (UT)
Hartnett
Hatcher
Hefner
Hightower
Hiler
Hillis
Holt
Hopkins
Horton
Hoyer
Hubbard
Huckaby
Hughes
Hunter
Hutto
Hyde
Ireland
Jenkins
Jones (TN)
Kasich
Kazen
Kemp
Kindness
Kramer
Lagomarsino
Latta
Leath
Lent
Levitas
Lewis (CA)
Lewis (FL)
Lipinski
Livingston
Lloyd
Loeffler
Lott
Lowery (CA)
Lujan
Luken
Lungren
Mack
Madigan
Marlenee
Marriott
Martin (IL)
Martin (NC)
Martin (NY)
McCain
McCandless
McCollum
McCurdy
McDade
McEwen
McGrath
McKernan
Michel
Miller (OH)
Molinari
Mollohan
Montgomery
Moore
Moorhead
Morrison (WA)
Murphy
Murtha
Myers
Neal
Nelson
Nichols
Nielson
O'Brien
Olin
Ortiz
Oxley
Packard
Parris
Pashayan
Patman
Patterson
Paul
Pepper
Pickle
Porter
Price
Pritchard
Pursell
Quillen
Ray
Regula
Reid
Rinaldo
Ritter
Roberts
Robinson
Roemer
Rogers
Rose
Roth
Rowland
Rudd
Sawyer
Schaefer
Schulze
Shaw
Shelby
Shumway
Shuster
Siljander
Skeen
Skelton
Smith (NJ)
Smith, Denny
Smith, Robert
Snowe
Snyder
Solomon
Spence
Spratt
Staggers
Stangeland
Stenholm
Stratton
Stump
Sundquist
Tallon
Tauzin
Taylor
Thomas (CA)
Thomas (GA)
Valentine
Vandergriff
Vucanovich
Walker
Watkins
Weber
Whitehurst
Whitley
Whittaker
Williams (MT)
Williams (OH)
Wilson
Winn
Wise
Wolf
Wortley
Wylie
Yatron
Young (AK)
Young (FL)

NOES—199

Ackerman
Addabbo
Akaka
Albosta
Annunzio
Anthony
AuCoin
Barnes
Bates
Bedell
Beilenson
Bennett
Bereuter
Berman
Biaggi
Boggs
Boland
Bonior
Bonker
Borski
Bosco
Boucher
Boxer
Brooks
Brown (CA)
Bryant
Burton (CA)
Carper
Carr
Clay
Coelho
Collins
Conte
Conyers
Coughlin
Coyne
Crockett
D'Amours
Daschle
Dellums
Derrick
Dingell
Dixon
Donnelly
Dorgan
Dowdy
Downey
Durbin
Dwyer
Dymally
Dyson
Early
Eckart
Edgar
Edwards (CA)
Evans (IA)
Evans (IL)
Fascell
Feighan
Ferraro
Florio
Foglietta
Foley
Ford (MI)
Ford (TN)
Fowler
Frank
Garcia
Gaydos
Gejdenson
Gephardt
Gibbons
Glickman
Gonzalez
Gradison
Gray
Guarini
Hall (IN)
Hall (OH)
Hamilton
Harkin
Harrison
Hawkins
Hayes
Heftel
Hertel
Howard
Jacobs
Jeffords
Johnson
Jones (NC)
Jones (OK)
Kaptur
Kastenmeier
Kennelly
Kildee
Kleczka
Kolter
Kostmayer
LaFalce
Lantos
Leach
Lehman (CA)
Lehman (FL)
Leland
Levin
Levine
Long (LA)
Long (MD)
Lowry (WA)
Lundine
MacKay
Markey
Martinez
Matsui
Mavroules
Mazzoli
McCloskey
McHugh
McKinney
McNulty
Mica
Mikulski
Miller (CA)
Mineta
Minish
Mitchell
Moakley
Moody
Morrison (CT)
Mrazek
Natcher
Nowak
Oakar
Oberstar
Obey
Ottinger
Owens
Panetta
Pease
Penny
Perkins
Petri
Rahall
Rangel
Ratchford
Richardson
Ridge
Rodino
Roe
Rostenkowski
Roukema
Roybal
Russo
Sabo
Savage
Scheuer
Schneider
Schroeder
Schumer
Seiberling
Sensenbrenner
Shannon
Sharp
Sikorski
Simon
Sisisky
Slattery
Smith (FL)
Smith (IA)
Smith (NE)
Solarz
St Germain
Stark
Stokes
Studds
Swift
Synar
Tauke
Torres
Torricelli
Towns
Traxler
Udall
Vento
Volkmer
Walgren
Waxman
Weaver
Weiss
Wheat
Whitten
Wirth
Wolpe
Wright
Wyden
Yates
Young (MO)
Zschau

NOT VOTING—5

Green
Hance
Hansen (ID)
Kogovsek
Vander Jagt

□ 2010

So the amendment to the amendment offered as a substitute for the amendment, as amended, was agreed to.

The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment, as amended, offered by the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. MAVROULES) as a substitute for the amendment offered by the gentleman from Florida (Mr. BENNETT), as amended.

The amendment, as amended, offered as a substitute for the amendment, as amended, was agreed to.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Florida (Mr. BENNETT), as amended.

The amendment, as amended, was agreed to.

PERSONAL EXPLANATION

Mrs. JOHNSON. Mr. Chairman, I was unavoidably away from the Chamber during rollcall No. 149. If I had been here, I would have voted "yes," and am pleased I was able to be here for this succeeding vote.

Mr. PRICE. Mr. Chairman, I move that the Committee do now rise.

The motion was agreed to.

Accordingly the Committee rose; and the Speaker having assumed the chair, Mr. ROSTENKOWSKI, Chairman of the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, reported that that Committee, having had under consideration the bill (H.R. 5167) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1985 for the Armed Forces for procurement, for research, development, test, and evaluation, for operation and maintenance, and for working capital funds, to prescribe personnel strengths for such fiscal year for the Armed Forces and for civilian employees of the Department of Defense, and for other purposes, had come to no resolution thereon.

WAIVER OF COTTON DUST STANDARD

(Mr. VENTO asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to extend his remarks, and include extraneous matter.)

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Minnesota?

There was no objection.

Mr. VENTO. Mr. Speaker, I am very concerned that OSHA (the Occupational Safety and Health Administration) is soft-pedaling its enforcement responsibilities regarding accepted cotton dust standards as well as lead standards and other health and safety standards.

The Washington Post reported on May 13, 1984, that the Reagan administration's OSHA has endorsed and encouraged officials in the State of Virginia to waive the cotton dust standard at the Dan River textile company as part of an experiment to determine the cause of brown lung disease, thereby permitting a business which has a questionable history of complying with worker health and safety standards, to further postpone the installation of a dust reduction ventilation system. Ironically, most of the workers at the Dan River mills are unaware of this proposed test and the fact that the Virginia Department of Labor has decided to waive the cotton dust standard in this instance. Dan River mills will be seeking Federal funding for this experiment through NIOSH (the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health).

Mr. Speaker, this story points out the need for strong workers' right to know laws, such as those that have been enacted in 14 States including my home State of Minnesota, which OSHA is attempting to preempt. It is very disturbing that OSHA has chosen to endorse this experiment with the health of American workers. OSHA's position on this cotton dust waiver and other waivers in other work places is highly suspect based on the track record of OSHA over the past 3 years.

What are the rights of workers? Are they to be subjects in experimentation without their full knowledge and consent? Clearly workers have the right to expect Federal regulatory agencies such as OSHA to uphold and enforce health and safety standards instead of helping businesses find ways to avoid complying with these standards when their health is being jeopardized in

the name of research. OSHA has failed this test.

I ask that the Washington Post article of May 13 be printed in the RECORD at this point.

Article follows:

[From the Washington Post, May 13, 1984]

VA BACKS FIRM'S RESEARCH, LETS IT EXCEED DUST STANDARD

(By Sandra Sugawara)

Virginia officials have approved a proposal by Dan River Inc., the state's largest textile firm, that would allow the company to exceed federal state and cotton dust standards as part of an experiment to find the exact cause of brown lung disease.

The project has provided strong protests from the United Textile Workers of America and other labor groups, who call it "human experimentation," although officials of the UTWA local in Danville, where the plants involved in the experiment are located, have not objected.

"We don't think Virginia workers should be used as guinea pigs," said Virginia R. Diamond, research director for the Virginia AFL-CIO.

"This is just a convenient excuse to delay investment in ventilation equipment" that will cost Dan River millions of dollars if it is forced to meet current cotton dust standards, said Eric Frumin, safety director of the Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union.

The experiment has been endorsed by the federal Occupational Safety and Health Administration, and will be paid for by federal funds. Both federal and state safety officials have been assured by Dan River that it will move swiftly to install the ventilation equipment should there be any indication that the experiment is not obtaining the results researchers are seeking. In the meantime, Dan River workers will continue to wear safety equipment that OSHA has said provides adequate protection from cotton dust.

Cotton dust consists of particles that get into the air during the processing and handling of raw cotton in textile manufacturing. Some particles in airborne cotton dust are small enough to enter the lung and they appear to cause brown lung disease or byssinosis, which causes breathing problems, saps energy and can result in death.

In 1978, OSHA set regulations designed to cut sharply workers' exposure to cotton dust. The deadline for meeting those standards, which required firms to install millions of dollars worth of new equipment, was March 27.

Dan River, which has textile operations in Virginia, South Carolina and Alabama, has 10 work places with 633 workers that do not meet these cotton dust standards. All are located in Danville.

A few months before the deadline, Dan River asked Virginia for permission to waive the requirement in order to test a theory that byssinosis is caused by bacteria. Cotton dust levels have to be kept high in order to conduct the test, which is designed to determine the precise agent in cotton dust that causes byssinosis, and thus ultimately improve worker protection, according to Dan River.

The study, to be conducted by Russell Harley of the Medical University of South Carolina and J.D. Hatcher of Clemson University, will be financed by the National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health.

"They [Dan River] have come up with a better way of protecting the workers," said Marshall Coleman, the former Virginia attorney general and Republican gubernatorial candidate who now represents Dan River, "and they have demonstrated that there is no current danger to workers."

But state and national labor groups have countered that the experiment is merely a back-door attempt by Dan River to avoid installing the ventilation equipment required by the new federal and state laws—equipment that the firm estimates will cost about $7.5 million or $12,000 for each worker affected. Labor groups argue that allowing cotton dust levels to exceed the standards will endanger the workers' health.

The Dan River experiment is the latest chapter in the controversy over brown lung that has spanned several decades. The textile industry has argued that a vast number of lung ailments identified as brown lung are really caused by smoking. Given such scientific uncertainties, industry representatives argued in a two-year court battle against the new regulations, saying the cost of compliance is far too high.

Despite the court ruling, the Reagan administration has remained sympathetic to those arguments, and the Office of Management and Budget lobbied for several months last year to have the engineering requirements dropped. OMB eventually backed down after a public outcry and opposition from OSHA.

However, OSHA chief Thorne G. Auchter has enthusiastically endorsed the Dan River experiment. "Virginia's encouragement of such studies would appear to be in the best interest of OSHA and the health of textile workers," said Auchter, in a letter to Virginia Commissioner of Labor and Industry Eva S. Tieg.

State rather than federal approval was needed because Virginia is one of 22 states that has assumed responsibility for the enforcement of OSHA regulations.

Auchter also has recommended that NIOSH finance the study, which will cost an estimated $414,314, according to a preliminary proposal. That has prompted protests from national and state labor groups that the grant would merely be rewarding Dan River for failing to meet the standards.

One reason the Dan River experiment, and particularly OSHA's vigorous endorsement of it, has sparked such concern among labor groups is that it comes on the heels of OSHA's approval of another experiment, allowing a Tampa, Fla., battery manufacturer to exceed federal OSHA limits for the maximum acceptable amount of lead in workers' blood.

Under the six-month Tampa experiment, which was approved March 16, a worker with lead levels in excess of the standard will continue to work but will be given a special type of fresh air respirator. Such workers will be tested monthly, and if their lead levels continue to rise or if there is evidence of kidney malfunction, the workers will be removed, according to Roy Resnick, an OSHA industrial hygienist.

"The two efforts to try to do an experiment to see if there are any adverse health effects on people from lowering standards comes close to human experimentation," said Peg Seminario, health and safety specialist for the AFL-CIO in Washington "It's a cause for concern."

OSHA technical support director Edward Baier responded that experimental variances are granted only if the project could benefit a large segment of the population, is designed to safeguard workers' health, and has been agreed to by the workers.

Kim Meeks, business manager of United Textile Workers of America Local 248 in Danville, said union representatives have told state and Dan River officials that the union currently has "no plans" to oppose the variance. The UTWA is the only union at the mills, but it represents fewer than 1,000 of the 10,000 Dan River textile workers.

Meeks said local union officials have "not endorsed" the experiment and may protest in the future. But he said they are interested in the project, because they have been told it might result in better worker protection.

Alice Adkins, a member of the Virginia Brown Lung Association in Danville, said last week that most workers at the Dan River mills were unaware of the test. "This makes me so mad," said Adkins, who does not work at the mills, but whose husband worked there for more than 30 years until he died March 1. She said he died of brown lung.

Under the state order, issued May 4, Dan River will have until July 1 to submit a grant proposal to NIOSH. If NIOSH does not fund the experiment by Nov. 1, the firm must install new ventilation.

Dan River must also submit to the state by Oct. 15 a preliminary study that must corroborate the theory that brown lung is caused by bacteria.

If the funds are allocated, the experiment will take an estimated 18 months to two years to complete. Dan River has assured state officials it is prepared to move swiftly to install the ventilation equipment should the data not support the bacteria theory.

In approving the Dan River proposal, Tieg said the specific agent in cotton dust that causes brown lung has never been identified. She also noted OSHA's endorsement of the project.

Because byssinosis cannot be detected by X-rays, it can be confused with other lung disorders such as chronic bronchitis or emphysema.

Usually symptoms of byssinosis, or "Monday Fever" as it's known in the mills, are evident at the beginning of the week, when a worker has a cough and severe attacks of breathlessness. In its mildest form, byssinosis can make activities like work, walking or sexual relations difficult. In its most severe form, it can cause heart ailments and death.

Estimates of the frequency of brown lung in the textile industry vary widely. A private study done for OSHA two years ago found that about 7.6 percent of textile workers develop byssinosis. Industry puts that figure at 0.68 percent, while some public interest groups say the figure is closer to 20 percent.

The researchers plan to study the relationship between cotton dust, weave room dust, bacteria and endotoxins, by selectively reducing particular elements of dust and studying the effect on workers, according to the research proposal. Their objective is to test the theory that bacteria found in textile dust—thermophilic actinomycetes—are the cause of byssinosis.

The proposal said that the concentration of that bacteria may vary widely within the dust, meaning that even low levels of dust could contain enough bacteria to cause problems. If that were true, according to Dan River officials, lowering the dust level with ventilation equipment may not offer workers much protection, and high dust levels may not be more of a threat.

Thus, said the Virginia Labor Department decision: "Requiring compliance with the engineering requirements of the cotton dust

standard would defeat the purpose of the proposed study."

The project requires that 210 volunteers—who will be paid $25 for participating—be monitored in areas that do not meet the cotton dust standards. Studies will be repeated on most of those volunteers after "atmospheric conditions" are altered. Those participating in the second round of tests will get an additional $25.

"Some studies will be repeated more than once in selected individuals after trends are established," the proposal said.

"If the experiment is successful it will be possible to design new, more effective procedures to protect workers against lung impairment, perhaps obviating the need for the required engineering controls," B.C. Dungan, assistant general counsel for Dan River, said in a letter to Tieg.

Under OSHA regulations, workers in areas with high levels of cotton dust are required to use respirators. Dan River, federal OSHA and state officials believe that the respirators will provide adequate worker protection during the experiment.

State and national labor groups, however, disagree. Frumin, of the Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers, said that OSHA said in 1978 that respirators should be used only in emergencies or as a temporary tool, while engineering controls were being put in place.

"Respirators are simply not as effective," said Seminario. She said it is difficult to fit the mask well enough to keep out impurities, particularly as workers move around or as they sweat. In addition, she said for those with lung impairments, respirators make breathing more difficult.

A vast majority of textile firms in the country have already met the cotton dust standards, according to OSHA.

Many industry officials now believe that the new equipment required by the OSHA cotton dust regulations improved productivity, thus diminishing industry hostility toward the requirement, according to a recent article in Dun's Business Month.

"We thought we settled this issue," said Seminario. "Now we have this company trying to get in through the back door."

CLUBB-CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS UNITED FOR A BALANCED BUDGET

The SPEAKER. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Idaho (Mr. CRAIG) is recognized for 60 minutes.

Mr. CRAIG. Mr. Speaker, I have taken this special order this evening to discuss an issue that to many of us in this body remains a critically important topic which we should all be well aware of. I took a special order out several months ago to discuss the formation of an organization here in the Congress called Congressional Leaders United for a Balanced Budget.

The purpose of this organization was to work for the passage of and the placement in the Constitution of the United States, a balanced budget tax limitation amendment. Few things have changed since the beginning of the formation of CLUBB. In fact, activities occurred today that convince more and more of us here in the House of the critical necessity of placing in the Constitution of this country a tax limitation balanced budget amendment.

Let me talk about some of the things that have changed that I think are important and continue to emphasize the need for this kind of action. First of all, prime interest rates have begun to move up slightly since I took this well several months ago to talk about a balanced budget amendment. Why is that happening? In large part because of the inability of this body or the body across the rotunda from us to deal with the critical budget issues of the day.

To deal with them in such a way that the private sector of this country can see that we will build in a long-term declining deficit, and finally arrive, some day, at a point where we can balance revenues and expenditures. We simply as a Congress have not been willing to come to grips with the real issue of the deficit. We are talking about a deficit downpayment. But as we talk about a deficit downpayment, we are also talking about increasing taxes and expenditures at the same time. Of course, that sends the private sector of this economy into great frustration as to how we will get our House, in fact, how we will bring the budget under control.

CLUBB, that organization that I chair here in the House, is now 75 Members strong. Seventy-five bipartisan Members who believe as I and others do that we simply must grasp this issue with a kind of firmness that will lead us to the constitutional amendment.

□ 2020

My colleague from Georgia, ELLIOTT LEVITAS, said recently it may not be the best idea, but it is the only idea, if not the only alternative to bringing our fiscal house in order. And he said this body, this Congress, will not pass that amendment without the kinds of pressures that can be brought through the second portion of article V of the Constitution. That, of course, is to have the necessary States, 34 States, to force the real issue of a balanced budget amendment here in the House.

Mr. CONABLE. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. CRAIG. I yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. CONABLE. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Speaker, I will be very brief. I would like to thank the gentleman in the well for the initiative he has taken on this issue. I happen to think it is critically important.

I personally believe that it is necessary for the Members of this body and the other body, as well, to accept some responsibility for limiting the free exercise of judgment which, in the past, has led us into fiscal excess with the result that there has been great damage to the economy, and greater damage pends unless we react responsibly.

There is, in my view, very little justification for forcing the State legislatures to impose on us from outside, via the instrumentality of a Constitutional Convention, the kind of limitation on our judgment which we should accept ourselves in the light of our fiscal history. The American people are going to get some restraint in fiscal matters one way or another, and I would like to see this body behave responsibly and impose the kind of restraint on ourselves that would permit us to live with the final resolution.

We do not know what will come out of a Constitutional Convention, but in my view, we are playing a dangerous game in forcing the people to take this issue away from us by failing to answer the call, the responsible voice, of the gentleman in the well.

As a man in a terminal legislative condition at this point, I have to say it is very reassuring to find some of the younger Members of this House coming forward and accepting responsibility willingly for what we all know has to be done one way or another. I am very proud to see this act of renewal going on, and I believe we will all benefit from the initiative that you are taking on it. I would like to thank the gentleman and to express my confidence that eventually we are going to do what is necessary to impose greater presumptions in favor of fiscal restraint through such an amendment as the gentleman is advocating.

Mr. CRAIG. Let me thank my colleague from New York who, for many years, has been the leader here in the House and across the country for congressional action and an amendment crafted by this Congress that would be sent to the States to create that constitutional amendment to balance the budget. I have to concur with his thoughts that it is this body that should be responsible for issuing forth that amendment for State ratification, and yet we know that that amendment has year after year resided in the Committee on the Judiciary without action, a willingness on the part of that committee to act, while this House, by its actions, and this Congress by their actions, drive us, this country, our taxpayers, deeper and deeper in debt.

So let me thank my colleague from New York for the tremendous leadership that he has offered throughout the years on this issue, and I thank him for joining us tonight in this special order.

Mr. BOEHLERT. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. CRAIG. I yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. BOEHLERT. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Speaker, I would like to commend my colleague for having this special order on this very important topic.

I would like to remind my colleagues that following this colloquy, there will be another very special special order to talk about a nationwide campaign that deeply concerns me, one that is frightening and deceiving millions of senior citizens across this country.

I asked permission, and have had that permission granted, to have a special order to address the subject of the mailings of the National Committee to Preserve Social Security and Medicare, and I would urge my colleagues to stick around, because this is a very important subject that I would like to discuss once you have completed your important colloquy on this subject.

Mr. CRAIG. I thank the gentleman very much.

Mr. MACK. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. CRAIG. I would be happy to yield to the gentleman from Florida.

Mr. MACK. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Speaker, I just want to take a moment, I guess, to put again what we are doing here this evening into the proper perspective, and that is, the last several days there has been a lot of controversy about the use of special orders and what those in the minority are attempting to use those special orders for.

I think it has been misinterpreted. The real purpose of why we are here tonight, and I would remind the Members that it is 8:30, it has been a long day, it has been an active day, but we are here this evening because it is our only opportunity to talk about a balanced budget amendment. We have not yet been fortunate enough to get that type of legislation to the floor of the House to debate.

So the Members we are going to hear here this evening are Members who are willing to stay around and talk about this issue because they only have one other time to talk about it, and that is in 1-minutes. I would suggest that those people who talk about the possibility of eliminating special orders are once again talking about limiting the right of the minority to voice its opinion.

So I just want to again put it into perspective. We are here because it is our opportunity, the only real opportunity that we have, to talk about something that is meaningful to us and meaningful to the people we represent. I want to compliment the gentleman for his special order, and thank him for the time.

Mr. CRAIG. Let me thank my colleague from Florida for bringing up what is truly a most important point. For the last several days here in the House, the issue of special orders has in fact been an issue. I took a special order out on the most critical issue of the day, in my opinion, and that, of course, is our deficit problem and the budgetary crisis that I believe this Congress currently resides in.

It is that whole issue that the American public has continually said time and time again in the polls across this country, that 75 to 80 percent of them agree that the Congress of the United States ought to balance expenditures and revenues in what we call a balanced budget, but strangely enough, we have not been allowed to debate that here on the floor. We have not been allowed, other than through one minutes at the beginning of the day, or a special order at the end of the day, to talk about this issue that such a large majority of Americans want addressed by this Congress, because that very issue, that very amendment, has stayed locked up in the Committee on the Judiciary of this House while the Senate has gone ahead to have hearings on a constitutional amendment to balance the budget and limit taxes.

So let me thank my colleague from Florida for bringing that point up. It is most critical.

Mr. MACK. If the gentleman will yield further, let me just clarify a point.

What the gentleman mentioned was that the other body has held hearings on the question, on the matter of a balanced budget amendment.

Mr. CRAIG. That is correct.

Mr. MACK. Could the gentleman tell me how many hearings have been held here in the House on this particular matter? Have there been any?

Mr. CRAIG. To my knowledge, none to date, and we have continually over the last 4 to 5 months consistently asked for the opportunity not only through unanimous consent, but through direct appeals to the chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary, and that opportunity simply has not come forward.

Mr. MACK. I realize the gentleman is referring to the floor of the House, that we have not had hearings. Certainly one of the committees in the House has been having hearings about this very important subject.

Mr. CRAIG. No.

Mr. MACK. There have been no hearings in any of the committees?

Mr. CRAIG. None at all. No, my colleague from Florida is correct. Even with the urging of a large number of Members in this House, that opportunity has not been granted us in the Committee on the Judiciary.

Mr. MACK. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. ROBERT F. SMITH. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. CRAIG. At this time I yield to the gentleman from Oregon.

Mr. ROBERT F. SMITH. I thank the gentleman from Idaho for yielding and I want to commend him, as others have, for this opportunity to discuss what I consider to be likely the most important issue facing this Nation, and that is the issue of a constitutional amendment to balance the budget of this country.

I do not want to discuss at great length the connection between deficits of $200 billion and the high and ever growing higher interest rates in this country, but I think others will, and the connection obviously is there, for the people in this country believe, as I believe, that deficits are crucial to the question of higher interest rates.

I come to support the balanced budget issue as a result of eliminating all the alternatives that seem to be present, or at least have been discussed by this Congress.

□ 2030

Let me go through them with you just to show you that the alternatives to this issue are certainly not apparent to me.

First of all, there is the myth and misconception about how we might grow out of this predicament that we are in, how the country might grow. For instance, given these very conservative scenarios of 8 percent interest rates for the next 5 years, of 7 percent unemployment for the next 5 years and of a growth of 6 to 8 percent in the gross national product for the next 5 years, we find we are still facing deficits of nearly $600 billion in that time.

Obviously, we are not going to grow out of it. Therefore, doing nothing about the economy, doing nothing about spending, means that we will be in the predicament from now on.

What about some of the other alternatives? We have discussed the freeze on many occasions, freezing the budget. That has failed in this Congress.

We have discussed the pay-as-you-go plan. That has failed in this Congress. We have discussed the Roemer plan and eight other plans that were discussed when we had the downpayment on the deficit discussion here on the floor and, by the way, the downpayment idea of $150 billion is a charade in my opinion. Any time that you have to combine 3 years of savings and spending into a 1-year identity, you know it is a charade. Therefore, the downpayment, I think, does very little to correct the problem of the huge deficits we are facing in the next 3 years.

Well, Congress did not implement any of these alternative plans and, of course, those are the alternatives that are available to a balanced budget. However, some believe that we can change the composition of the Congress and, therefore, provide some sort of control on spending.

Well, I suggest practically that I think we can all agree that the Senate likely is not going to change composition; likely the House is not going to change composition, or for that matter leadership. Therefore, we can expect the same philosophies to continue on next year and the year after likely as we have this year.

Well, I think there is a mindset that has developed over the past 50 years in the Members of Congress, certainly, and that simply is that if you want to be reelected to this place, and by the way, the most important issue to me and to the Members of the Congress is to be reelected; the country will fail unless we are returned to office; the most important issue is to be sure that we are reelected and to do that I must dig in the pocket of Uncle Sam as deeply as I can to find enough money to send to my district in Oregon so the people will pat me on the back and say, "Bob, you have done a nice job. Congratulations. We are going to return you to Congress." That mindset for the past 50 years has worked and that is the old spend, spend, elect, and elect philosophy.

Now, unfortunately, that has worked and the Congress today is operating under that mindset.

I suggest that rather than people thinking that the Congress is not responsive, I suggest that the Congress is too responsive. I think it is so responsive to people's needs that at any time a person in my district or any other district in this country has a problem, the Congress corrects it. We spend money. That is why we are in trouble. That is why we have a $200 billion deficit.

Well, it is not an easy problem. Certainly with the fact that within the budget 42 percent of this total budget is involved in entitlements, 29 percent of the budget is involved in defense. If you would eliminate the rest of the budget, protecting entitlements and defense, you would have a little more than necessary to correct the $200 billion deficit. Therefore, unless we address these issues of entitlements and defense in the total scenario, we are never going to get to the area of reducing deficits in this country.

I do not mean to say that is easy. It is not easy. That is why I think that rather than allowing Democrats to blame Republicans or allowing Republicans to blame Democrats, the President blames the Congress, the Congress blames the President and we go on and on chasing our tail, everybody hiding, everybody blaming someone else and the deficits rise.

I suggest that we need a higher goal, a higher goal for all of us in the Congress, rather than just the sensitive area of specialities of electing BOB SMITH to the Congress.

I think we ought to go for a constitutional amendment which will require the first duty of a Congressman is to balance the budget and to follow the Constitution of this country. If that were true, I believe in the next few years we would begin a trend toward a balanced budget and upon the passage of a constitutional amendment to balance the budget, we would have reduced impact on short-term and long-term interest rates, the markets would respond, the country would see a light at the end of the tunnel and I think we would begin to move this economy.

I do not believe the great enemy of this Nation lies across the borders or across the ocean. I believe the great enemy of this country lies with the insatiable desire of the Congress to spend money for its own constituency and I suggest a higher goal would be the passage of a constitutional amendment to balance the budget.

Mr. CRAIG. Mr. Speaker, let me thank my colleague from Oregon for what I think is a very cogent observation of the kinds of problems that we face here in the U.S. Congress.

I do not know how many times I have heard someone say, "Well, Congressman, why don't you just balance the budget? That is the responsible thing to do. Can't you just bring expenditures and revenues into line? Surely you don't need a constitutional amendment to do that. You people ought to be responsible enough back there to do that which we perceive—" we being the voters out there—"as being a responsible act."

I do not know how many times we have heard, "Well, we have to do it in our businesses. We have to do it in our households."

My State government in Idaho and some 43 other State governments must balance their budgets. Now, surely, Congress can do that.

The gentleman from Oregon (Mr. ROBERT F. SMITH) mentioned a mindset and I think those of us who have served any time here in this Congress can recognize the very thing the gentleman is talking about, that there are some 4,200 special interest groups and there are a myriad programs that we call entitlement programs that continually work at gaining a portion of their benefit from the largess of the Public Treasury.

So just to be able to say no when there are 435 of us in this House, when there is probably at least one special interest that is of vital concern to our particular congressional district that we find it very difficult to say no to, when we have those kinds of pressures vying on this Congress every day of the week and there is no law, there is no constitutional requirement, there is no parameter in which we must operate that brings revenues and expenditures into line, then the very kind of problem that the gentleman speaks of continues to perpetuate itself year after year and, of course, that is what has ultimately led us to a Congress that in large part has allowed its budget to run away from it, that now is over $185 billion in deficits and as the gentleman speaks of nearly 75 or 80 percent of it is totally out of control unless this Congress were to go in and substantively change the law, that requires a cap and/or forces each one of those kinds of programs to be looked at on an annual basis on the budgetary process.

In other words, there is a legal, statutorial, driving force behind over 80 percent of the expenditures of our budget that we can shrug our shoulders about and say, "Well, that is out of my control."

The reason we say that in large part, or a good many Members say it, is because they simply do not want to control that process.

So let me thank the gentleman again.

Mr. ROBERT F. SMITH. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield further?

Mr. CRAIG. Yes; I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. ROBERT F. SMITH. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman.

The gentleman made a point which I want to amplify because I think it is so important, and that is simply that the people watching and listening and conerned about their family budget, balance their own budgets. They must do that or they go broke.

The facts are that 43 States in the Union have balanced budget amendments to their constitutions. They balance their budgets, they must by constitution.

I think that given the fact to allow the American people an opportunity to answer this issue, I think the people are way ahead of the Congress on this question. In fact, the polling that I have done shows that between 70 and 80 percent of the people in this country to the question, "Do you believe that the Federal Government should balance its budget?" will say yes, because that is the frugal means by which we have existed all these years.

So I think the gentleman made a good point and I believe the American people are ahead of the Congress, and given a chance the American people will be heard and I urge them and urge us to continue this effort, because it is only going to be through a grassroots kind of effort, hearing from the people, pressuring the Congress to act on this issue, that it will ever be accomplished.

Again, I thank the gentleman.

□ 2040

Mr. CRAIG. Let me thank you once again, my colleague from Oregon, and not only for his time here this afternoon on this special order, but for becoming a member of Congressional Leaders United for a Balanced Budget,

and taking the leadership role that you have taken on this most important issue that is not an Oregon issue or an Idaho issue. It is truly a national issue. Let me once again thank you for the strength you have dealt in support of this organization.

Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. CRAIG. I am happy to yield to my colleague from California.

Mr. HUNTER. I thank the gentleman for yielding and for taking out the time for this special order.

I was listening to the chairman of the Rules Committee today, the gentleman from Florida (Mr. PEPPER) speak about television coverage and about our special order time. And he said essentially that we have to use this time and the coverage that we have of this Chamber during that time in a responsible manner. And I can think of no more responsible agenda for this House during special order time than to debate and discuss a balanced budget.

For the last 55 days in this House, and I believe we have missed 1 or 2 days perhaps, but basically for the last 55 days of session we have brought up on the floor of the House the request of the Democratic leadership to allow us to even ask unanimous consent to bring up a balanced budget, along with a line-item veto, along with school prayer. And now the 1983 President's comprehensive crime control package. All of these issues are very important to the American people. This is America's agenda and I know the gentleman has been traveling throughout America trying to succeed in this national crusade to put through a constitutional amendment to balance the budget.

I would like to ask the gentleman from Idaho what has happened in the most recent weeks and how close are we now to securing passage of a constitutional amendment to balance the budget?

Mr. CRAIG. I appreciate that question, because what the organization, Congressional Leaders United for a Balanced Budget, is really all about, is the effort to use the second part of article V of the Constitution. And in essence what that says, or what it means and what our Founding Fathers meant when they crafted it, was that if there were a time when the Congress of the United States chose not to be responsive to what was a majority will of the people, that the people could by their own expression work together toward the change in the Constitution or a change. And it says that when two-thirds of the States of this Nation petition this Congress that this Congress shall convene a convention for the purpose of crafting an amendment to the Constitution of this country.

Of course, we believe the Congress itself, which is in fact a continual seated convention to deal with the Constitution, could issue forth that amendment.

With that in mind, starting in about 1976, States began to recognize that if they did not become involved in this process that Congress would probably never bring forth a balanced budget. And since that time, up to the current day, we have 32 States that have requested of this Congress that we balance our budget, and they have done so through resolutions coming out of those State legislatures.

We only lack two more States in the Nation, must two more States of forcing this Congress vis-a-vis the Constitution to issue forth that amendment or allow the convening of a Constitutional Convention for that purpose.

As a result of that, the organization that I chair, that my colleague from California is a member of, has been intent on causing those States that have not petitioned the Congress to do so. As I mentioned, there are 32 to date who have.

California has now qualified on the ballot through an initiative drive to vote on that critical issue in November of this year. We are working in the State of Montana at this moment and the State of Washington through the initiative drive. We have been active in the State of Michigan through the legislature route. That State's senate recently passed by nearly a 2-to-1 vote a resolution requesting Congress for an amendment to the Constitution on a balanced budget and tax limitation. It is now in the House of the Michigan Legislature.

In the State of Ohio another initiative drive goes forth.

So this is very much a live issue in a variety of States across this Nation. And I believe it is truly one of the strongest grassroots issues that we have seen sweeping this country in a good long time.

The only thing that now stands between the wishes of the people and a constitutional amendment that would require this Congress to be fiscally responsible is the Congress itself.

So I want to thank my colleague from California for bringing up that most important point and what our CLUBB and other organizations are now doing to try to stimulate the legislative State route to cause this Congress to respond to its constitutional mandate.

Mr. HUNTER. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. MARLENEE. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. CRAIG. I will now be happy to yield to my colleague from Montana (Mr. MARLENEE). He has been actively involved in the initiative drive that is currently underway in the State of Montana and is an active and an aggressive member of the Congressional Leaders United for a Balanced Budget. I thank you for joining me in this special order this evening.

Mr. MARLENEE. I would like to congratulate my colleague from Idaho, one of the great leaders of a grassroots movement, perhaps the most significant grassroots movement to take place in this country in the last century. And I want to congratulate him on being a leader here in Congress of Congressional Leaders United behind a balanced budget. Your leadership is an example to all of us, and I know there are a number waiting to speak here this evening, among them BILL DANNEMEYER who has been very active in California on this particular issue and has been an inspiration to me in trying to put together the initiative on the ballot in Montana.

When I was invited to join with my colleagues in this effort, and then I was asked to head the effort in Montana, I was elated. It took me about as long to accept as it takes me to accept a cold beer after branding all day in Montana. Not very long.

Montana I am very proud of. It is the 34th State to attempt to get this particular initiative on the ballot. For that reason it plays an extremely historic role in this particular movement.

I believe that if Montanans are given the opportunity they will overwhelmingly approve this balanced budget amendment or initiative on the ballot. We need 36,000 signatures in the State of Montana, and I think that it will be an easy effort.

But once we get those signatures, it has been indicated to me by my polling that 78 percent of the people in my State will approve this balanced budget. They know that they have to balance their checkbooks and they believe that the U.S. Government should balance theirs also. What is fair for them certainly ought to be fair for the Congress of the United States of America.

Of course, there are a lot of allegations that are being made, and perhaps my colleague could help enlighten the people. These allegations are being made in the State of Montana that this will hurt the elderly, and the needy and the poor people of this country.

That is a myth in my opinion and a misrepresentation. It is irresponsible spending, irresponsible spending by the Congress of the United States that creates the inflation, that erodes the buying power of the elderly who are on fixed incomes. It is that inflation that devastates the poor people of this country.

They are wise enough to know that this balanced budget initiative, and if it is passed, and if it is forced on Congress, will bring responsibility back and will hold that inflation down. That means that they will continue to have jobs. We have to control inflation

before we have the creation of jobs in the marketplace.

Another myth that seems to be quite prevalent in the State, and they are trying to misrepresent that issue with, is that the Constitutional Convention could get out of control. I do not believe that this is true because there are several safeguards and processes that it goes through, the last of which is that it must be ratified by the States, by 38 States, and that that is a position where one State counts as much as any other State.

□ 2150

And I do not think that the Eastern Seaboard States are going to run away with this convention. I think controls can be put on it. And I would solicit a comment from our leader on this particular issue.

But in closing, I would like to say that I think Montanans will overwhelmingly approve this initiative when it gets on the ballot and I think that they will be proud to have played a historic role in the future of this country of ours, bringing responsibility back to Congress.

I again wish to thank my colleague, Congressman CRAIG from Idaho, and my colleague from California, BILL DANNEMEYER, both of whom have been to Montana to assist us out there in formulating the direction we need to take, both Westerners.

I think you know our people as well as I do. Again, I thank you both for your participation. I am proud to be part of this effort.

Mr. CRAIG. Let me thank my colleague from Montana for participating with us in this most important special order this evening.

I have to concur with a good many of the things you have said. Montana, your State, plays a most critical role in causing this Congress to move for the first time in its history toward addressing the issue from a constitutional point of limiting its expenditures to its revenues, in other words, a balanced budget.

And the gentleman is absolutely right, if Montanans participate in that initiative drive and vote for that initiative with the percentages that they agree on through the polling that we have seen in the State of Montana, of those endorsing the concept of a balanced budget, then we will have those 34 States by November of this year.

Then this Congress will not be able to duck the issue, the most critical issue of the balanced budget amendment.

So once again, let me thank you for your leadership not only here in the Congress, as a Member of Congressional Leaders United for a Balanced Budget, but by wrapping up that initiative drive out in your State of Montana, bringing it to the people, giving them the opportunity to express themselves and to participate in what I think, something the gentleman said is absolutely right: a most important historical event and opportunity.

Mr. MARLENEE. Will my colleague yield briefly?

Mr. CRAIG. Glad to.

Mr. MARLENEE. Another allegation that has been made and we know this is a historic time and we should press forward with this; another allegation by the opponents, the big spenders is, "Well, we have to do something right away, and this is meaningless."

Can you shed some light on that particular allegation? I think that the impact, personally, I think the impact will be immediate. The people have expressed their will in 34 States in this United States of America, and Congress will take heed. They certainly should after that many States pass that type of a referendum.

Mr. CRAIG. Let me respond briefly to that and then I will be happy to yield to my colleague from California, who is here with us this evening. There are some who say to me oftentimes when I talk about it, "Congressman, how possibly can you today balance a budget that is $185 billion in deficit?"

And I look at them and have to very honestly say "You can't, you can't do that today or tomorrow or the next day." But what you must do, what we must do, is put in place a process and therefore put in place a movement, a motion that will cause this Congress to move in the direction of a balanced budget as quickly as they can get there; knowing that at a given point they must balance the budget.

In fact, I am so bold as to say, and I firmly believe that we would not, based on current budget levels, see major cuts in the budget.

What I think we would see and what I believe this Congress would so is slow down the rate of growth while the private economy of this country, recognizing that at some point out there, probably 1988 or 1989, that Congress would, by constitutional requirement, have to balance the budget, once the private economy of this country saw that, we would begin to see some very exciting kinds of things begin to happen.

By that I mean a declining interest rate, because they would not be fearful that Congress would spend them back into inflation and as a result of that we would see the kind of productivity that we saw in the last quarter of this economy.

Those kinds of things, being able to sustain them on a progressive basis, in my opinion allows us to make the assertion and I think it is a responsible one, that we would not see major cuts in the budget; we would simply see a slowing down of the growth rate at a time when the private economy of this country would be allowed to catch up and surpass us.

Mr. MARLENEE. This passage would inject into the economy, a confidence and an inspiration that would push the economy forward and it would be a great thing for this country.

Mr. CRAIG. Well, the gentleman is absolutely right. Many people have said to me, "Congressman, do you know why interest rates are as high as they are today?" Of course I have my thoughts and reasoning and explanation. They said: "Because the financial community of this country are scared to death that you are not going to be able to stop your spending back there and you are going to send us back into an inflationary cycle which will drive up interest rates."

So there is about a two-point margin in there, as a hedge against inflation. It is that kind of activity, that kind of banking practice, if you will, out there in the private sector today that would disappear. If those people were convinced that this Congress was going to balance its budget some time in the near future, not just because we said we were going to, but because the people knew we simply would have to and that we would not balance it simply by raising all the taxes or the revenues necessary to do it.

But we would be able to restrict the growth of revenues while at the same time restrict the growth of spending as this budget came into balance.

Once again, let me thank my colleague from Montana for joining me and especially once again for taking the kind of leadership he has here and in his State in pushing this most important initiative drive.

I would now like to respond to my colleage from California (Mr. LOWERY) who has been a major leader in this with us in our drive toward a constitutional-mandated balanced budget.

Mr. LOWERY of California. I appreciate the gentleman from Idaho yielding and commend him for asking for this special order this evening.

Mr. Speaker, the economic harm of routine Federal deficits is commonly acknowledged. Government deficits crowd out private borrowers from capital markets in the process of driving up interst rates. Employment in the housing, durable, and investment goods industries especially is depressed by high interest rates, and the costs of resulting idle labor include sluggish economic growth and the tens of billions of dollars of goods and services never produced.

Unfortunately, we have very recently seen a manifestation of this crowding out theory. The interest payments on the debt now amount to 12 percent of the current budget. During the last month, interest rates on conventional, fixed-rate mortgages have climbed to

around 13.78 percent, approaching last year's highest rate and a full percentage point above the average rate a year ago. Meanwhile, the Veterans' Administration announced that it was raising the interest rate on its guaranteed mortgages to 13.5 percent, the second half-point rise in the last 2 months. The prime interest rate was increased to 12.5 percent last week. And so it goes.

In addition to the situation we find ourselves in today, the outlook for the future is grim indeed. Annual deficits in the $200 billion to $250 billion range are projected through 1988, even assuming economic growth stronger than any since the early 1960's. Annual deficits will total 5 percent to 5.6 percent of domestic GNP through 1988. This contrasts with deficits which averaged 0.3 percent of GNP during the Eisenhower years and 2 percent of GNP during the Nixon/Ford years. Federal credit demands are projected to absord 50 to 70 percent of the Nation's net savings over the next 4 years. This would nearly double the percentage of net savings absorbed by the Federal Government in earlier years. Interest on the national debt will approach $200 billion by 1988 and account for $1 in $6 in the Federal budget.

There have been efforts to control Federal spending in the past, but a lack of self-discipline rendered these efforts ineffective. The congressionally imposed spending ceilings of the 1960's and 1970's could be modified or waived. The process under the current Congressional Budget Act seems to have largely fallen apart, leaving spending to a series of continuing resolutions. The time has clearly come for a balanced budget amendment.

I am particularly pleased, as a Representative from San Diego, that the voters of California will have the opportunity to vote on the balanced budget amendment this November. This initiative qualified for the November ballot in February, with an estimated 600,000 signatures. If approved by the electorate and approved by the State legislature, California could be the 33d State, of the required 34, to call for enactment of the tax limitation/balanced budget amendment.

I strongly urge my colleagues to support this effort. There is no more important issue before us.

Mr. CRAIG. Let me reclaim my time to congratulate the gentleman at the moment for what I think is already a bit of making history. I have been told that a good many people said in California, following initiative 13, I believe, which limited property taxes in California that never again would Californians move through the use of the initiative effort to in any way limit controls on expenditures, that that is a monstrous task in a State the size of California, to get enough signatures to qualify an issue on the ballot, some 345,000, I believe.

Mr. LOWERY of California. Well, they received in excess of 600,000 signatures to qualify.

Mr. CRAIG. Thank you. That is what I think is so important. Californians responded when they were given the opportunity to respond, over 600,000 strongly; nearly double the State requirement for qualifying an issue on the ballot, which just shows to me not only what Californians think of this issue, but I think as a cross section of the American public, what the American public thinks.

Happy to yield further.

Mr. LOWERY of California. I just want to say that with California and one other State, we will make history for the first time since the original Constitutional Convention, the people undertake to themselves the power that we have neglected so in terms of getting our fiscal affairs in order.

□ 2100

Mr. CRAIG. Let me thank my colleague from California for joining with me this evening in this special order on the issue of a constitutional amendment to a balanced budget.

Once again, let me thank the gentleman for the leadership role the gentleman has played here in the House and in the gentleman's State on this vital issue.

Mr. LOWERY of California. CLUBB.

Mr. CRAIG. Yes; that is CLUBB, Congressional Leaders United for a Balanced Budget.

My colleague from Montana spoke of some myths that are now being used across the United States by certain organizations in their accusation that if we are to move toward a convention that would be responsible for crafting an amendment, a constitutional amendment for the balanced budget, that we would see that convention spiral out of control and it could be possible, the argument is used, that you would see other major changes in the Constitution.

That fear is used by some who I think truly believe that that could happen. And certainly that fear is used by a variety of very strong national organizations who are now so dependent on receiving a certain amount of their largesse from the Public Treasury that they simply do not want the Government to have that requirement and therefore assume that kind of fiscal responsibility because they feel that in some way the revenues that they benefit from, that flow from the taxpayers of this country, might be cut off.

The myth of a runaway constitutional convention is something that I think is important to address here this evening.

I think there are eight check points that need to be understood, not only by Members of this body, but by the American people when we talk about the potential for a constitutional convention.

First of all, Congress itself could avoid the convention and I think that is the hope of a large majority of the Members of this body. But, first of all, I think demonstrated by the inability of this Congress to act in the late summer of 1982 to ratify a convention and send it out to the States and we missed that two-thirds requirement by several votes, that Congress must be forced. Now Congress, I think once forced by the States, will be able to draft and put forth that amendment for State ratification.

But let us assume they do not. Let us assume the worst scenario, the second part of article 5 of the Constitution, which in fact Congress would then allow the convening of a convention.

First of all, Congress must establish the procedure by which that convention could be convened. In other words, there are no laws on the statutes of the United States today that has within it a procedure by which to convene and therefore conduct a constitutional convention. So Congress itself would have to create that procedure. I am convinced that because of the pressure that the American people would put on them that we would write that procedure in such a way that would limit that convention to address specifically the issue that was brought about by those 34 States who had presented the resolution and therefore the call.

There is a third point and that is, if you will, the oath that the members of that convention would have to take. And from that oath I think there would not only be a moral obligation, but clearly a legal obligation to send that convention through the process of crafting the single amendment that it was charged with the responsibility of crafting when the convention was convened. And that of course is what the legislatures of the States have done by demanding that we deal with the single issue through their resolution call of a constitutional amendment and a tax limitation tied to that.

So there is clearly another check.

I think probably the final check and the most important check is that 38 States, three-quarters of the States of this Nation, would have to ratify a constitutional amendment to balance the Federal budget once the convention had crafted it and sent it back to the States for their approval.

Now I think a good example of how difficult that process is, because of how discerning our State legislatures are, is an example of the equal rights amendment. Whether you agree or

disagree with that amendment, the point was that legislatures had some 7 years to deal with that issue and we could never gain the necessary 38 States by which to ratify it and put it into the Constitution of this country. In fact, this body, this Congress, gave the States an extension of 2 years to try to get enough States to ratify the equal rights amendment.

So I think the idea of a runaway convention is just that, a myth, that there are clearly enough checks and balances now, along with those that we would craft through the procedural process of making the law that would convene the convention, to clearly protect the Constitution as it is today and to force that convention to address the single issue, the single most important issue of crafting an amendment that dealt with a balanced budget requirement.

Mr. WALKER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. CRAIG. I yield to the gentleman from Pennsylvania.

Mr. WALKER. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

I think that the gentleman would agree with me though that far preferable to that would be to have this House act, to have this Congress act and get it done right away rather than to have to go that route.

Mr. CRAIG. Absolutely.

Mr. WALKER. And I think the gentleman would also agree with me that one of the problems that we have in getting that done is just the fact that this place realizes that once you pass a constitutional amendment on the balanced budget, once we have to really begin to discipline ourselves around here, we would have to begin to make the tough choices that so far we really have not been willing to make, that somehow along the line we just have not been able to tell ourselves that when we are spending other people's money we ought to do it with some degree of reasonableness and with some degree of understanding.

The constitutional amendment would basically force that on us and the question, I guess, around here is whether we are willing to accept the discipline that most State legislatures have to accept, that virtually every family in the country has to accept, and that this Congress should be willing to accept.

Mr. CRAIG. Well, let me thank my colleague from Pennsylvania who, as a member of CLUBB, and clearly a leader in this body has stressed for such a long time, the importance of fiscal responsibility and on numerous occasions has challenged this Congress to adhere to laws that it put on the books time and time again over the years, laws that said this Congress will balance its budget only to have one Congress after another deny what the Congress before had requested of it. And that of course is the important reason why we must have that constitutional requirement.

Mr. WALKER. If the gentleman would yield further, we still do have a law on the books that we tend to ignore around here that says that we are supposed to be balancing the budget, that we should have started balancing the budget in the early 1980's and we passed a law. But the problem is that Congress also has the unique view of the laws of this land that they apply to everybody else but the Congress.

So having passed a law for almost purely political reasons, we now have decided that, well, we did not really mean it, it is not really a law that we have to obey, and we go about our way disobeying the law and passing more and more unbalanced budgets.

Mr. CRAIG. Let me thank the gentleman once again. The gentleman mentioned something that I think is most important when he said Congress would have to, for the first time, begin to make the tough choices to establish priorities of how we are going to spend our money. In other words, when I am talking to citizens that are concerned about the balanced budget, I say that for the first time in a long time this Congress is going to have to be politically honest with the American people. And I say that because out of one side we have the ability to say we will give you all we need for your programs, while on the other side we are willing to say, but we want to cut taxes. It makes it very difficult for me to be able to understand how we can promise everything on the side in the form of money and promise tax reductions on the other side and, of course, that in part is what has got us into the problem we have today and that is why I say it makes us politically honest.

Let me address another issue that I think is most important and that we do not hear talked about a lot today. My colleague from Montana spoke of the senior citizen community of this Nation and the kind of difficulties they have living on a fixed income in an inflationary environment. And of course there are a good many of us who believe that one of the prime chargers of inflation is Federal deficit spending and the kind of money supply that is basically created by those kinds of large deficits.

□ 2110

And all that he said was true. But there is the other side of the coin that is just as important. When I look at my two sons and my daughter today, I say, "Look at the kind of debt that I am passing on by the actions of this Congress to future generations." In other words, we are spending, if you will, today money that we are going to ask our children and our grandchildren to pay for. In other words, that is like your father going out and spending out of control all of his life, building up a monstrous debt, and when he died the law would require that that debt be transferred to his children and his children would have to pay for it. And yet he received total benefit of the ability to spend in his lifetime, but his children are going to be asked to pay for it. And that is exactly what this Congress is doing today.

I know of no act more immoral than charging the young people of this country with $1.7 trillion growing debt that they are going to be asked to be paying interest on at the rate of over $100 billion a year and growing, year after year, all of their lives, and yet it was not them but their mothers and fathers and their grandparents that received the benefit of those expenditures. And yet they are saddled with the responsibility of paying off that kind of monstrous debt that past citizens and therefore past Congresses allowed to be generated.

That is one of the great immoral acts of constantly causing the Federal budget of this country to be in perpetual deficit and to build up the kinds of huge Federal debts that this country now has that causes this economy of ours to struggle at the rate that it is to attempt to come alive.

It is for these issues and a good many others that I and nearly 78 other Members, bipartisan, of this body and of the U.S. Senate have agreed that the only avenue left, the only possible way that we are going to be able to bring fiscal responsibility to this Congress, is to force the issue through an amendment to the Constitution of this country requiring that that budget be balanced and that we have tax limitation tied to it so that we merely do not try to spend our way out of the kinds of deficits that we have built through increasing revenues through taxation.

I am convinced, a good many others here are convinced, and, of course, we know that a large majority of the American people are convinced that there is no other opportunity left, that we must by the constitutional route force the issue that then builds the framework inside the procedures of this Congress as to how they will deal with fiscal matters and how they will deal with, therefore, revenues and expenditures and bring them into balance so that we quit generating this monstrous Federal debt and realize at some point a balanced budget that begins to move the economy of this country to the kinds of dynamics that brings us to full employment, that holds interest rates down, and, of course, that brings the kind of prosperity that all Americans are asking for and that all Americans deserve.

I would like to thank my colleagues for joining with me in this special order this evening on this most important national issue.

● Mr. PAUL. Mr. Speaker, I want to thank my colleague, Mr. CRAIG, for taking this special order today to discuss the merits of a balanced budget/tax limitation amendment to the Constitution. We in CLUBB are committed to such an amendment; moreover, we are committed to putting an end to the irresponsible practice of deficit spending which jeopardizes the very survival of our Republic.

I support a balanced budget amendment; however, I realize that it is only a first step toward solving our budgetary problems. A balanced budget/tax limitation amendment is only a mechanism by which, we hope, we can force Congress to put our Nation's finances in order; it imposes a limitation on Federal spending, but it offers no suggestions as to how and where we will cut. And, as the title of the amendment implies, Federal spending will have to be cut to meet this mandate. I strongly believe that if Congress is to exercise the fiscal responsibility which the people demand, and a constitutional amendment would require. Then there are going to have to be some major changes made.

For too long Americans have been led to believe that deficits do not matter; that we must spend hundreds of billions of dollars defending our wealthy allies to insure our own national security; that it is the Federal Government's responsibility to house, feed, educate, train, and employ every individual. Americans have had to stand by and watch as the Federal Government, ever-increasingly, usurps their liberties and prerogatives, as well as those of our State and local governments. It is past time to change these perceptions, and to impose a limitation not only on Federal expenditures, but on illegitimate and costly governmental functions. I believe we already have such a limitation, it is called the Constitution. I dare say that if we had honored the parameters which it imposes, then we would not be in the mess we are today.

While a balanced budget amendment is a positive step, it is worthless unless the perceptions of the people—and the attitude of elected officials who perpetuate these perceptions—change. The root of the problem is that the Federal Government has grown too big, it has tried to do too much; this growth threatens to bring our Republic down. It also brings us to where we are today, at a crossroads; down one road lies freedom and prosperity, the other leads to more Government control of our lives and our economy and, perhaps, to financial ruin.

It is imperative, I believe, that we act now to change our course, and readopt a policy of fiscal responsibility. A balanced budget/tax limitation amendment to the Constitution offers a chance to again reemphasize our commitment to sound, fiscally responsible Government, and to move foward from this mandate to reducing the size of our overgrown Federal Government.●

GENERAL LEAVE

Mr. CRAIG. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days in which to extend their remarks in the RECORD on the subject of my special order today.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Idaho?

There was no objection.

NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO PRESERVE SOCIAL SECURITY AND MEDICARE MISLEADS SENIOR CITIZENS

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from New York (Mr. BOEHLERT) is recognized for 60 minutes.

GENERAL LEAVE

Mr. BOEHLERT. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks on the subject of this special order.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from New York?

There was no objection.

Mr. BOEHLERT. Mr. Speaker, when someone upsets my grandmother, I am upset and I try to do something about it. And when someone upsets millions of grandmothers across this great country, we should all be upset and collectively resolve to do something about it.

I requested this opportunity to address the House this evening after a very long legislative day—we have been in session 10 hours, and I am willing to stay 10 more—because I want to focus attention on a national campaign which is frightening and deceiving our senior citizens. When there is an organized national campaign which is frightening and deceiving millions and millions of our senior citizens, we must all be concerned and we must recognize an obligation to do something about it.

I am referring to the fundraising drive by the noble sounding National Committee to Preserve Social Security and Medicare. This drive has consistently rested upon misrepresentation of both the nature of the social security program and system and of national committee itself. I will be backing up that statement in great detail. But first let me make my own goals clear, because the national committee has begun questioning the motives of its critics.

I am not here out of any animosity toward the national committee's chairman, James Roosevelt. I have the utmost respect for the Roosevelt name, and I admire FDR's awesome and enduring achievements and legacy to the American people, the social security system. Nor am I an opponent of either social security or medicare. My statements and my voting record demonstrate that long before the national committee came on the scene I was a champion of both programs and an opponent of efforts to cut benefits to current recipients. Indeed, I doubt that there are many issues on which the national committee and I would disagree. And when I met with Mr. Roosevelt in March I told him, "Clean up your act, and I will be glad to join your organization and work cooperatively with you." I said that because I am deeply committed to the preservation and strengthening of social security and medicare. And so, too, is the overwhelming majority of this body, Democrat and Republican alike.

I have no quarrel with the national committee's goals, but I take strong offense to its behavior. That is what the issue is. Not James Roosevelt, not social security, not medicare, but the activity of an organization that is acting like a rogue elephant. This is a group that has found the perfect pitch to exploit the ever-present fear of senior citizens that the benefits they worked so hard for will be swept away. And this pitch has been alarmingly effective.

Congressional offices, State agencies and senior citizens advocacy groups have been swamped by calls from senior citizens who were upset or bewildered by the national committee's fundraising letter. The Washington Post reported that some seniors who had received the letter were showing up at Social Security offices asking to pay the $10 they thought was needed to save their benefits.

Is this the reaction an organization dedicated to protecting senior citizens would want to provide? I do not think so. The many Congressmen who have called my office, Republicans and Democrats alike, to find out more about the national committee do not think so, and advocacy groups that have an established record of providing real help to senior citizens, groups like the American Association of Retired Persons, the National Council of Senior Citizens, Save our Seniors, and the Association of Retired Federal Employees do not think so either.

Let us take a look at the tactics the national committee has used to inspire such widespread concern. They are a textbook example of how not to form a credible organization.

First, the national committee has cloaked its mailings in the trappings of official documents. This has only one

conceivable purpose: To deliberately mislead the recipient of the mailing.

This exploitive disguising begins with the envelope. The organization's first letter mailed in early 1983 came in an envelope marked "Urgent. Important Social Security and Medicare information enclosed. Attention Postmaster: Time dated legal documents enclosed."

The Postal Service requested that the committee change the envelope because, as the Postal Service said, and I quote, "It suggested to the recipient that the envelope contains official information pertaining to his or her individual benefits."

□ 2120

The national committee did make one change on the envelope, the envelope now reads, "Time-dated official documents enclosed." Needless to say, this minor revision clarified absolutely nothing. It is the ultimate example of a difference without a distinction.

The committee's reply to this charge has been to argue that the envelope violates no laws. That is a great attitude; it violates no laws. Is this the group's goal, to exploit the elderly by staying one step ahead of the law? The misleading appearance of officiality is maintained once the envelope is opened. The final item inside the envelope is also falsely presented as being official. The petition includes an, officially certified petition number. What on Earth does that mean? The misleading appearance of the group's mailings is matched by their misleading tone and content.

Here again we see a pattern that dates back to the group's first fundraising letter. That first letter of 1983 offered to send those people who paid $10 to join the national committee, a copy of their social security records. The letter neglected to mention that those records are available for free at any time to any citizen from the Social Security Administration.

That letter caused such an uproar that the organization agreed to a followup mailing clarifying the matter and offering to return the $10 to anyone who felt misled. The committee now tries to trivialize this episode, referring to the letter as a test mailing. I am sure that designation would come as a surprise to the unfortunate guinea pigs around the country who received the letter and sent in their $10. But the primary reason the incident is not trivial is that it reflects the devil-may-care attitude that continues to mark and mar the national committee's operations.

For example, a letter the national committee mailed last fall stated the medicare fund has borrowed $12.4 billion from the social security fund. Medicare is in so much trouble, says the committee, it has been unable to even pay the interest on the loan. In November, the Social Security Administration alerted the national committee that this statement was just plain wrong. Social Security has borrowed from the medicare fund, and will be able to pay that loan back when it is due in 1989.

What was the reaction of the national committee? Nothing. Absolutely nothing. When the next fundraising letter from the group went out, it started arriving in mailboxes in February of this year, the letter still contained the gross misstatement of fact in precisely the same words. Only after congressional offices began complaining in March did the group even talk about correcting the error, and I have yet to hear of anyone receiving a corrected version of that letter.

The committee now refers to pointing out this mistake is nitpicking. What a cavalier attitude toward truth, to call it nitpicking. The organization felt the point about interfund borrowing was significant enough to give it prominent play in the letter and to highlight it with exclamation points and underlining. Yet, when the group is told that statement is false, blatantly untrue, the paragraph suddenly becomes of minor importance.

But there are still more problems with the winter's mailing. The letter that has elicited so much concern from those who are committed to helping the elderly; let me emphasize, it has elicited so much concern from all of us in this Chamber, Democrats and Republicans alike, to those of us who are committed to helping the elderly.

We have in this Chamber the distinguished chairman of the Subcommittee on Social Security, and at any time he wishes to be recognized, I will be privileged to yield to him.

Mr. PICKLE. I thank the gentleman for yielding to me, and I appreciate the time he has taken to discuss this problem.

I think we all should be careful not to impugn the integrity of many organizations who are engaged in dissemination of information, whether it is in the field of retirement or medicare or social security or health. Many of these organizations serve a very worthwhile purpose. We have to applaud them for their interest.

But in this particular case that the gentleman has been discussing, I would say that I too am concerned about some of the statements and activities of the national committee to preserve social security, a group lead by our good friend and former colleague James Roosevelt.

I am disturbed and disappointed that this organization has engaged in a national fundraising effort sometimes based on arousing fear in the public mind about the solvency of our social security retirement funds. It is irresponsible to use scare tactics to arouse concern and mobilize the public to defend our social security system against a false threat. All the responsible economic reports, including that of the actuaries in the trustees report, indicate that our OASDI trust funds are in balance and that benefits will be paid on time and in full. Certainly we in Congress must watch carefully to insure that this balance is maintained, but at the present time there is no justification for alarm.

For anyone to suggest otherwise, be they the National Committee to Preserve Social Security, the Committee on Economic Development, Secretary of the Treasury Donald Regan or President Reagan, is unfortunate and does a great disservice to the American public. I have in the past and I will continue to condemn such scare tactics. Only last week Secretary Regan made unnecessary statements that has caused alarm and fear—and his statements were unwarranted, as well as inaccurate.

I am also concerned about the true nature and purpose of any group which sends out millions of letters soliciting money and memberships. We in Congress seldom see very little to suggest what has been done with all the money rasied. While this organization originally raised money as the National Committee to Preserve Social Security, it is now calling itself the National Committee to Preserve Social Security and Medicare. This represents a shift in position and I have to ask myself will their position shift again, and who will make that decision?

I am also disturbed by the numerous complaints that my colleagues have brought to me about this organization. These stem largely from the nature of the fundraising letters which have been mailed out. Their envelopes, petitions, and solicitations have been criticized as sometimes being misleading or containing incorrect statements. Questions have been raised with the Department of Justice, the Post Office, the IRS, and the Social Security Administration.

Because of my concerns and all the controversy in this area I have been carefully following this organization. I have met personally with Mr. Roosevelt and have made formal written inquiry about many aspects of his organization asking such questions as:

What is the organization's IRS classification?

Who are the members of the governing board?

Who are the executive officers?

What expenditures has the organization undertaken in the area of educational and lobbying activities?

What are the present and past fundraising activities?

I have made these and other concerns known to Mr. Roosevelt and I

have his assurance that changes have and will continue to be made.

I would hope that no former colleague or any other official would lend his or her name to any organization which engaged in purposefully or even unintentionally misleading the public. While this is a relatively new organization such newness provides no excuse for making unreasonable charges regarding the financial solvency of the social security funds or maligning Congress commitment to this program.

As the chairman of the House Subcommittee on Social Security, I am and will continue to closely watch the actions of this organization and other organizations such as this. I assure my colleagues that I will take whatever further steps prove necessary to protect the public interest, including holding public hearings, should they be warranted. I look forward to working with my colleagues in the House to insure that the debate over the role of social security in meeting our Nation's needs is not clouded by misleading or sensational claims from whatever quarter.

□ 2130

And, Mr. Speaker, I also feel we should be entitled to see how is being paid in these organizations, what amounts they are being paid, and if, indeed, someone is profiteering. I certainly do make that accusation about Mr. Roosevelt, but I do feel that there may be others in other kinds of organizations, and perhaps that organization, who should be held accountable. We ought to encourage organizations to be interested in social security and the program and its future, but we ought not to just let them have a free hand to say any and all things they want to while they are raising funds for the purpose of just getting membership primarily for fund purposes. I think social security is too important to let these things go unnoticed.

So I am glad the gentleman is making these comments. I think his statements have been measured and have been reasonable. We are not trying to stop any organization, but I think we ought to say that this can be served as a notice that the Congress is not going to be unmindful or organizations that specifically lobby for the sake of carrying out the purposes of an organization that is primarily based on fundraising. I think the public is entitled to better protection.

Mr. BOEHLERT. I want to thank the distinguished chairman of the Subcommittee on Social Security for his support for this effort. There is no Member of the Congress of the United States who works harder or more effectively in the interest of our senior citizens than the distinguished subcommittee chairman from Texas, and I want to thank him for his participation.

Mr. PICKLE. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. BOEHLERT. The gentleman is so correct. We are after corrective action. We have no interest in impugning anyone's character. This is extremely important.

Mr. DAUB. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BOEHLERT. I would be glad to yield to my colleague, the gentleman from Nebraska.

Mr. DAUB. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Speaker, I do not want to take a lot of time from this very important special special order, as I heard the gentleman refer to it earlier in the proceedings, but I do want to say a few things about the seriousness of this matter and in so doing commend the gentleman, my good friend and distinguished colleague from New York for his interest in fairly presenting the matter to his colleagues and to those who may be informed of these proceedings.

Mr. Speaker, the so-called National Committee to Preserve Social Security and Medicare, led by former Member of this body, Congressman James Roosevelt, is generating confusion and uncertainty among about 9 million elderly citizens regarding their social security and medicare benefits. Mr. Roosevelt's mailings take the form of newsletters that present misleading half-truths about social security and medicare and ask for a $10 contribution from the recipient.

Many of our elderly constituents believe that their benefits will be threatened if they fail to send in the $10 to this fundraising organization or that this committee is the only source of information about social security and medicare benefits. The Social Security Administration, however, has always provided the most clear and up-to-date information on these Federal benefits and continues to prepare and distribute information about these programs to everyone—free of charge.

I first became concerned about the activities of this committee in January when I was contacted by one of my constituents. The first paragraph of his letter demonstrates the concern of many elderly people in my Second Congressional District in Nebraska. He wrote, and I quote:

> My mother is an 81 year old widow on Social Security. She recently got this letter from what I assume is some kind of senior citizens lobbying group. What I want to bring to your attention is the way that the envelope and so-called petition are captioned so as to mislead people that these are official matters from the Social Security Administration. I think that this kind of thing should be stopped. As you know, old people are sensitive about Social Security matters and this kind of junk mail styled as official business is bad practice which can easily confuse elderly people.

My constituent is absolutely correct. Although he intercepted this letter for his 81-year-old mother, many other elderly people receiving this and other misleading mailings will be and still are confused and upset.

I moved immediately on the concerns of my constituents and others and wrote to Mr. Roosevelt on February 20 urging him to make revisions in his mailing. I made it quite clear to Mr. Roosevelt that as a member of the House Select Committee on Aging, I have a special interest in working toward solutions to protect social security and medicare that have been earned by my constituency and that his organization's support of bipartisan efforts in the Congress to strengthen the solvency of the social security and medicare systems would be greatly appreciated.

Indeed, I pointed out that petitioning the Congress is a practice that I wholeheartedly encourage; however with references made to "official documents" on the envelopes from some of those mailings, and a return address that reads "National Administrative Office" in Washington, D.C., many elderly people are led to believe that these mailings are official documents from an agency of the Federal Government.

I have also contacted the U.S. Postal Service whose inspection service have informed me that they are now in the process of again redetermining whether a full investigation into the possibility of mail fraud is warranted.

The Social Security Administration, too, is aware of the problems these mailings have created. For example, some of the statements on Mr. Roosevelt's mailings lead elderly people to believe something is true when it is only true under certain circumstances.

The format and innuendo of Mr. Roosevelt's mailing is, I must say to my colleagues in the House, a disservice to older Americans who merit very accurate and very clear information about their Government benefits. We should all be encouraging our constituents to contact their congressional representatives with the concerns they might have about the solvency of the social security and medicare programs.

I would hope that Mr. Roosevelt's group would reassess their efforts and redesign their fundraising mailings in an effort to work in the best interest of our elderly in this country, the very interest that Mr. Roosevelt and these mailings proclaim that he is trying to help.

I want to thank the gentleman again for his insight, for his very hard work on this matter. I have read of his continuing effort to correct these things in a number of national publications, and I want to say to him that I, for one, as a member of the Select Committee on Aging, and particularly the

Subcommittee on Long Term Health Care, that the watchfulness of the gentleman in the well and his alertness to these kinds of things will indeed help to not only perhaps cure some of the deficiencies that he is pointing out in his special order, but maybe put others on guard, to put them on awares, that the Congress will not tolerate this kind of misinformation being sent to citizens and constitutents across the country not only for fundraising purposes, but indeed for the kind of consternation and, I guess, just plain metabolism that gets upset when somebody who is dependent upon these programs reads this kind of information. I want to thank the gentleman again for all of his work.

Mr. BOEHLERT. I want to thank my colleague from Nebraska. As I said at the outset, when someone upsets my grandmother, I am upset and I want to do something about it. But when millions of grandmothers across the country are upset, we should all be concerned and resolve collectively to do something about it.

Mr. DAUB. Might I say one more thing to my good friend, and that is, I am not only upset when someone upsets my mother or my grandmother; I am upset when someone upsets the sons and daughters of those mothers and grandmothers.

Mr. BOEHLERT. By all means, and I thank my colleague for participating in this very important discussion.

Mr. McCAIN. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BOEHLERT. I am glad to yield to my colleague, the gentleman from Arizona.

Mr. McCAIN. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Speaker, I would first like to thank both my colleagues here, including my colleague, the gentleman from Nebraska (Mr. DAUB), who I also serve with on the Aging Committee and the Subcommittee on Health and Long Term Care. I think he has highlighted some of the problems. I would particularly like to thank my colleague, the gentleman from New York who, because of his efforts, we are here tonight in trying to bring attention to this very serious issue. I know he has worked tirelessly on it and I think that this and many of the other efforts that will be made hopefully to bring a stop to this kind of thing not only on this particular issue, but on others that we are aware of that are somewhat similar, that we can bring people's attention to it and bring it to a stop. I think the gentleman deserves a tremendous amount of credit.

I would like to make my remarks very brief. It is late and we have a long day, a long session, and another one tomorrow, but I think the fact that we are here is an indication of how important this issue is.

□ 2140

I was particularly gratified to see our colleague from Texas who probably knows more about the social security system than any living American give those words of reassurance to our senior citizens, that the social security system at this time is solvent and they do not have to be concerned about any immediate threat to their social security payments and I think that is an important message that has to be repeated again, and repeated again, and again.

The first time I ran into this problem I was having a townhall meeting a few months ago. An elderly lady came up to me and said: "Mr. McCAIN, how much money do I have to give and do I have to send it to you or do I have to send it to the committee?"

I said: "What do you mean?"

She showed me the petition that we are all familiar with and that the gentleman has described earlier here tonight. It had my name on it, unbeknownst to me, and the names of the two Senators from my State, that somehow this petition, as it was said was going to be sent to me and I would be contacted, with the clear inference at least so many of my constituents have received that they would be required to send money in order to see that their social security was saved.

Now, that may not be what is printed, but that is certainly the inference that many of my elderly and senior constituents receive.

Expenditures. Let us talk about where this money went. I was astonished and I think that my colleague from New York has already mentioned this, that $1.73 million was raised last year, of which according to the figures I have, and I certainly would be proud to be corrected if necessary, one-fourth of this sum was spend on administrative and solicitation purposes, and even more alarming than that is the fact that more money was spent on solicitation than on legislative and research efforts.

This committee, by the way, has not contacted anyone that I know of in the Congress. Does the gentleman know of anyone, I ask my colleague?

Mr. BOEHLERT. No; my colleague is absolutely right on target. As a matter of fact, in the first 16 months of the committee's existence, reports indicate it has spent millions of dollars to raise millions of dollars, ostensibly for the purpose of lobbying the Congress of the United States in behalf of social security and medicare programs, and yet chairman after chairman in both the House and the Senate report to us their committees have not been contacted, their committees have not had an appearance from any representative of this committee to lobby in support of any legislation.

That is why I got involved in this, not that I want to stifle individual opinion, not that I want to discourage anyone from doing anything possible constructive in support of social security or medicare, but I want people to be honest and up front and do exactly what they say they are going to do and not use deceptive practices to scare our senior citizens out of their hard-earned money.

Mr. McCAIN. Well, if my colleague would yield further, it would not be unfair to describe this fundraising effort as at least deceptive, because the people that gave that money believed that Members of Congress, including the gentleman, and me, and other colleagues here, were going to be contacted on behalf of their social security and the solvency of it and the medicare funds; so I do not think it is too harsh to describe it as deceptive. Maybe there are others that could be used.

I would like to just mention if I could and discuss with the gentleman the overall philosophy of this kind of fundraising efforts. It appears to me that this is not the first time that something like this has gone on. In fact, political parties have indulged in this kind of activity, but I think it is important for us to try to bring a stop to the kinds of solicitations of senior citizens, and by the way, I will bet that if we took a poll to see who gave the most money it would be at the lowest end of the economic scale, because those are the least educated of our citizens and these kinds of solicitations, in my opinion, if necessary, maybe we should consider some kind of legislation. I am not one who believes, nor do I believe my colleague from New York, that we have to pass specific legislation to cure evils; but if the senior citizens of America are being taken advantage of in this kind of fashion and being deceived, then possibly maybe the Congress of the United States should act in order to being it to a stop.

Again, as the gentleman has so eloquently stated, I say to my colleague from New York, this is not in any way trying to prevent people from using the U.S. mails for purposes of information, education, and others, which is an important way of our life, but what seems to be taking place is exploitation of certain segments of our society in sensitive subjects which mean a great deal to them, their livelihood in this case, and therefore finding a way of soliciting money.

One of the great names in the history of America is the name Roosevelt. It evokes an era of our country and our memories of greatness of America, of caring for the poor, the elderly, the handicapped, a name which I am sure will go down as one of the great names of this century.

I am sorry to see the name Roosevelt attached to this kind of solicitation. I

would hope that we might be able to prevail upon this organization to change, and change rather dramatically.

Again, I would like to express the appreciation of many, many people who appreciate the efforts that the gentleman is making on behalf of, I think, a very important issue.

I would like to add, Mr. Speaker, that during the winter months of 1983, Members of Congress worked together on a compromise package designed to address the financial solvency of the social security trust fund. Admittedly, the package was not perfect. It was, however, a landmark piece of legislation which provided necessary changes to maintain the financial solvency of the trust fund. If additional changes need to be made, there is ample time to do so through the legislative process. Most recently, the social security trustees reported that "benefits can be paid on time well into the next century" even under the most pessimistic set of assumptions.

It was during the first few months in 1983 that I received hundreds of letters from senior citizens who were frightened and concerned about the loss of their social security benefits. For many senior citizens, this is their only source of income. Just when I thought their fears had been laid to rest, I received more letters. However, this time they stated where they received their facts—from former Representative James Roosevelt's letter for his nonprofit National Committee to Preserve Social Security and Medicare.

I have to question the tactics of Mr. Roosevelt's committee. The committee's inaccurate and deceptive statements, found in their direct-mail campaign letters, forecast the immediate collapse of the social security and medicare trust funds. Through the misrepresentation of facts, half-truths, and the distortion of material contained in envelopes labeled: "time dated legal documents enclosed," the elderly are frightened into contributing money to the committee. If Mr. Roosevelt's committee was truly concerned and dedicated to helping the elderly, I do not believe they would mislead senior citizens into thinking that they may not receive their next social security check.

Additionally, I examined Mr. Roosevelts' 1983 committee budget. I was alarmed at the expenditure outlays. The income from membership dues totaled $1.73 million. One-fourth of this sum was spent on administration and solicitation costs. Even more alarming was the fact that more money was spent on solicitation costs than legislative and research efforts. If the committee was actively working for senior citizens, I would have expected more of the budget to be targeted on legislative efforts than the solicitation of additional funds.

On a matter which affects so many Americans, I do not believe that payments or contributions to organizations using tactics such as Mr. Roosevelt's committee are productive. Rather, concerns should be shared directly with Members of Congress. The circulation of inaccurate and misleading information, in an attempt to garner frantic financial responses of desperate hope, will not result in the appropriate corrective legislation.

As a Member of Congress, it is part of my job to represent our Nation's elderly. Mr. Roosevelt's committee is unnecessary and possibly unethical. I believe the American people should speak out against this type of hypocrisy.

Mr. BOEHLERT. Mr. Speaker, I thank my colleague for his remarks. I know he has been deeply concerned about this whole issue and he has been very actively involved in efforts to guarantee that what the House of Representatives and the Congress of the United States do with respect to programs affecting our senior citizens is responsible action and in their best interests.

So I thank the gentleman once again for participating.

It has been mentioned here throughout this discussion that millions of millions of senior citizens across the country have received a solicitation letter and I have that solicitation letter and most of my colleagues have also received copies from their constituents.

Let me go over this letter in some detail. This letter which has apparently been mailed to 10 million Americans, the wording of the letter is needlessly inflammatory. It implies that social security and medicare are in danger of collapsing immediately, not in a decade, not in a few years, but right now.

The panic reaction of senior citizens who have received the letter is ample proof of that.

The letter also implies that the only way medicare costs can or have been reduced is by cutting benefits. This, of course, is just not true.

Finally, the letter implies that Congress is unconcerned about the future of social security and medicare and is poised to slash benefits. That is absurd.

The National Commission on Social Security Reform which did a magnificent job for this system and for the American people last year, the membership of this commission reads like a who is who in America: CLAUDE PEPPER, Congressman from Florida. Senator PEPPER was the U.S. Senator the year I was born. I know of no one in all 50 States out of 220 million Americans who is more concerned about the needs of our senior citizens and about the need to guarantee the integrity of social security than CLAUDE PEPPER and he was part of this magnificent job done by the committee last year and Congress responded to those recommendations and took actions to guarantee that social security is sound well into the next century.

And yet if you read this letter, you have the impression, and senior citizens are given the impression, that social security is on the verge of collapse, it is going over the edge at any minute. That just is not so.

It is not just Senator PEPPER. One of my own constituents served on that National Commission on Social Security Reform. The senior Senator from the State of New York, a Democrat, Senator DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN. He, too, is concerned about the future of social security. He, too, proudly identified with this report and recommendations that the Congress of the United States approved and that was signed into law by the President of the United States.

There is Lane Kirkland, president of the AFL-CIO, and right down the list.

There is BARBER CONABLE, senior Republican on the Committee on Ways and Means.

JOHN HEINZ, Senator from Pennsylvania.

ROBERT DOLE, Senator from Kansas.

WILLIAM ARMSTRONG, Senator from Colorado.

Alexander Trollbridge, president of the National Association of Manufacturers.

Alan Greenspan, chairman and president of Townsend, Greenspan & Co. of New York.

The list goes on and on, a who is who in America, Republicans, Democrats, concerned Americans, and yet this letter says that what they did is not enough, does not even come close to addressing the problem.

The letter is just inaccurate. It is misleading.

Mr. WALKER. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BOEHLERT. I would be glad to yield to my colleague from Pennsylvania.

Mr. WALKER. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Up in Pennsylvania Dutch Country, we have a term up there that is often used when things like this are being looked at. The term is shyster. It sounds to me as though we almost have a case here of shysters who are preying on older people using the Social Security Administration's good name as a way of getting money. That comes awfully close to being consumer fraud.

□ 2150

Is the gentleman aware that some of these activists around the country like Ralph Nader have done anything to look into this matter of almost a consumer fraud situation?

Mr. BOEHLERT. Let me respond to the gentleman by saying this: No. 1, I have asked the Justice Department to look into this. No. 2, there are some States attorneys general looking into it. There are a number of people going over this with a fine tooth comb to see just what response is appropriate.

Let me also make clear one very important point. I am not impugning the motives or the integrity of the chairman of this organization. I met personally with Mr. Roosevelt. I think that he is deeply committed to preserving the integrity of the legacy his great father left this Nation.

But I am deeply disturbed that people using his name are misleading elderly Americans, and in the process collecting millions of dollars of hard-earned money, ostensibly for the purpose of lobbying the Congress of the United States to do what the Congress of the United States is determined to do: Guarantee the future of the medicare system, just as we did with the social security system.

Mr. WALKER. Will the gentleman yield further?

Mr. BOEHLERT. I will be glad to.

Mr. WALKER. I think the gentleman has made very clear that he feels that Mr. Roosevelt is sincere about the project, and I think he has made that clear on the record.

The fact is, though that the additional record is out there in the country that these letters that are mailed to my constituents, mailed to most people's constituents here, have been I think properly characterized by the gentleman, too, as being very, very misleading.

Mr. BOEHLERT. Nearly 10 million of these letters have gone out.

Mr. WALKER. And the bottom line is people are sending in an awful lot of money to this organization in order to do something which we have reason to believe that the organization may not be able to deliver on.

Can the gentleman give us some idea as to what this money is being spent for?

Mr. BOEHLERT. I am glad the gentleman brought that up. Let me talk about the worst trick which I refer to as the worst trick, the cruelest distortion of all. It seems the national committee has been misleading potential members about the activities and accomplishments. Get this. For example, both the fundraising letters mailed late last fall and this winter state that paying the $10 will mean "Most importantly, you will be helping to make it possible to continue our work here in the Capitol." Capitol with an "o" meaning this very building. And they are referring to this very building.

This is a cruel joke. Continue the group's work? What work?

This group which was formed in November of 1982, and immediately began writing to seniors about the "urgent" action needed to save social security did not even register to lobby until 2 months ago, more than a year after it was organized, more than a year after it began collecting money, not just $10 at a time, but literally thousands of dollars at a time, well over $1 million already.

Mr. WALKER. If the gentleman will yield further, what were they doing in the meantime? Do we have any idea what they were doing for that year when they were telling people were lobbying on their behalf, and it edoes not seem there was any kind of legal activity going on of that type?

Mr. BOEHLERT. To the best of my ability, I have tried to answer that very question. And the conclusion I have reached, after asking a number of questions of a number of people, the committee has used the hundreds of thousand of dollars it has collected to send out more mailings to collect more money. So what started as tens of thousands quickly became hundreds of thousands and now we are talking in terms of millions. And when I started this effort in early March, they had not registered as lobbyists. They had not appeared before any committee of the Congress to lobby in behalf of anything.

Mr. WALKER. If the gentleman will yield further, a lot of the people who are sending this group $10 are people who are getting $300, $400, $500 a month in social security checks. Do we have any idea what they may be paying the people who are running this organization?

Mr. BOEHLERT. I have a lot of questions about that, and as you were here a little bit earlier, you heard the distinguished chairman of the Subcommittee on Social Security of the Ways and Means Committee tell this body and the American people that he has asked for this information. Where is all of this money going? Who is being paid what? What is the $10 bill that some senior citizen, solely dependent on a modest social security check, what is that $10 bill being used for?

I cannot answer that question yet.

Mr. WALKER. If the gentleman will yield further, we know in this town that there are an awful lot of $100,000 and $200,000 lobbyists in this town. I mean it is possible that this is, what we have here, is that these people are sending in all this money, and what it is really going for is to pay $100,000 salaries in this organization.

Mr. BOEHLERT. Circumstantial evidence would lead one to conclude that a considerable amount of money is being paid to a number of people to help collect more money from millions of elderly Americans.

Mr. WALKER. If the gentleman would yield further, is any of this money going into political campaigns of any kind?

Mr. BOEHLERT. We are still in the process of our investigation on that. But we are also told that this organization has formed a political action committee and is in the process of soliciting.

Mr. WALKER. One of the notorious PAC's is being formed here?

Mr. BOEHLERT. It has already been formed, I am told. And I am told they have collected in excess of $100,000 for so-called political activity. And I am also told, and we are in the process of verifying this, that there has only been one substantial payment made from that political action committee, and that is to an attorney.

Mr. WALKER. Wait a minute. If the gentleman would yield further, we have a political action committee being formed that has raised $100,000. We are in a campaign year and the only payment it has made so far is to an attorney? Is he running for office?

Mr. BOEHLERT. No; not that I know of. The only substantial payment has been made to an attorney. There have been other payments, I am told, and we are in the process of getting the documented information.

Mr. WALKER. That sounds typical of what goes on in this town in terms of lobbying organizations and so on, and the attorneys always seem to get the money. But it is disturbing when we know, in fact, that we are doing this on the backs of hundreds of thousands of older citizens across this country who can ill-afford that kind of money coming out of their meager paychecks to go to what they think is a worthwhile cause, which is obviously just another Washington name on the door that raises a lot of money but does not really do many of the things, at least very influentially, that they claim to do.

We have a lot of things around here like that. It is not just this organization. There are many organizations that are doing mailings into my district, many of them going to those same elderly citizens who are telling them if you send in this card and send us some money, and so on, we are going to get the budget balanced for you next week. Or if you send in this card and send in this money, we are going to bring school prayer back next week and so on. And a lot of those kinds of things are in the same manner.

But this one is very disturbing because in this case it is obvious that what they were attempting to do was to use the social security system as a basis on which to raise the money. And really I thank the gentleman for yielding to me and for the information he has disseminated here, and for taking this special order so we might all learn.

Mr. BOEHLERT. I want to assure my colleague from Pennsylvania that

this effort will not end with this special discussion this evening. I intend to pursue it, as do a number of my colleagues, Republican and Democrat alike.

Those offering up their $10 in response to this letter have not received much lobbying bang for the buck. In fact, the only substantial lobbying the National Committee has undertaken appears to be its Herculean effort to persuade Congress that the group is legitimate. Judging by the private comments of many of my colleagues, the group has not been very successful.

The fundraising letter is not the only place where the National Committee has tried to cover up its woeful lack of activity. Let me cite a more recent example.

In a May 2, letter to one of our colleagues, the chairman of the committee wrote, "We are producing our first legislative newsletter 'Senior Focus on Washington.'" Keep in mind, more than a year after the committee was formed, a couple of million dollars later, or near a couple of million dollars later in fundraising and they are talking about their first legislative newsletter in the production stage. But 2 days earlier, 2 days prior to this May 2, announcement in a letter to a nationally syndicated columnist, the chairman wrote: "We publish a legislative newsletter 'Senior Focus on Washington.'"

So one day they are telling the world that they are just going to put out their first legislative newsletter in the production stage, but 2 days prior to that, to a nationally syndicated columnist who would give exposure to this idea across this Nation to millions of Americans, they point out that they have already published the legislative newsletter.

□ 2200

Boy, that is playing fast and loose with the facts.

Some of the materials prepared for members of the National Committee have been misleading as well. For example, one issue of the chairman's report—none of the issues are dated—says, "I put my entire staff onto the notch year issue." What staff? The group does not even have an executive director.

The report goes on to state, "I am pleased to report to you that I have received a written commitment from the Social Security Administration that no person born during the notch years will ever receive less than a similarly situated person born later." That pledge should not have been very difficult to extract. It is simply a statement of current law.

Some of the group's so-called research projects and educational materials are also misleading. A prime example is an April 7, 1983, report entitled, "Analysis of the Social Security Amendments of 1983 as Reported to the National Committee To Preserve Social Security." In his letter last week to the columnist, Mr. Roosevelt referred to this analysis, saying, "We put together a blue ribbon panel of experts to take a look at the legislation."

The group did no such thing. What it did do, apparently, was lift material from other reports without authorization and then arrange the material to look like the transcript of a symposium. The AARP staffer who is quoted in the report, for example, said he knew nothing about it. Why would any legitimate organization practice this sort of deception?

In some cases, the National Committee is not even following through on its promise to send materials to people who send in their $10. Several people have complained that they sent in their money, got back their canceled check and then received nothing—not even the worthless membership card—for months. AARP has received a number of such complaints, I have received one and the Illinois State Attorney General's Office is investigating a similar complaint.

But while many of the group's activities verge on fantasy, the National Committee's impact on senior citizens has been all too real. Real people, who, the committee will tell you, are financially strapped, have been exhorted to pay $10 to a group that has done virtually nothing for them. Real people, who, the committee will tell you, rely on their benefits to survive, have been caused to panic because of misleading and incorrect information arriving at their homes.

What can we do to protect our senior citizens from this and other scare campaigns spawned by the growing direct mail industry?

I think our first step must be to hold congressional hearings. Let us find out just what the goals of groups like the National Committee are and what they plan to do to achieve them.

I have written to Chairman PICKLE and to Chairman ROYBAL, requesting such hearings. They are looking into the matter as Mr. PICKLE revealed here tonight and I look forward to their response.

Again, the purpose of such hearings would not be to stifle debate on social security and medicare, both of which are vital programs. They would simply insure tht such a debate is carried on without resorting to distortion and fear mongering.

I have put out mailings about medicare. Those newsletters have said that the fund may very well be out of money by the end of the decade. And the newsletters outlined the various proposals that have been made to deal with the problem—including those that would cut benefits. But my mailing relied on straightforward facts, not on misstatements, or exaggeration or innuendo.

The elderly cannot continue to be just so much prey for organizations trying to raise some money. Groups cannot be allowed to don a mantle of respectability just by claiming to help senior citizens.

We had better make that clear to the National Committee or it may never carry out any of the "educational activities" about which it talks so nobly.

This is very important business we are about this evening as we discuss this sensitive topic. We are doing it because we care about our Nation's elderly, because we are committed to preserving for them the benefits that they have worked for so many years to earn.

We care and we are going to do something about it.

● Mrs. JOHNSON. Mr. Speaker, I wish to join my colleagues today in condemning the activities of an organization which is misleading millions of our Nation's senior citizens into believing that our national retirement system is on the brink of disaster.

The National Committee To Preserve Social Security and Medicare, a group which claims to lobby on behalf of older Americans, has been conducting a direct-mail fundraising effort that preys on the fears of retired people. Through factual errors, innuendo, and pernicious scare tactics, this committee to "preserve" social security is, frankly, defrauding the elderly of money they cannot affort to spend.

Last year, Congress passed the Social Security Amendments of 1983. Based on the recommendations of the President's National Commission on Social Security Reform, Congress acted to protect Americans' investment in the future. And we did a good job. Current actuarial projections estimate that the system will remain solvent beyond the year 2000. But the solicitation from the committee to "preserve" social security denigrates this important measure as "stopgap."

Many of the reforms enacted last year were tough, it is true, but not as tough as the committee wants its victims to believe. The letters state, "social security payments are now going to be taxed for the first time in history." It neglects to mention that only those seniors with incomes in excess of $25,000 will be taxed, and even then, the tax only applies to one-half of benefits. The letters state, "The medicare fund has borrowed from the social security fund." In fact, it was the other way around, and repayment with interest is insured by law.

And what of the committee's claim to be working in behalf of senior citizens, so "the investment of so many Americans" will not go to waste? The

Washington Post reports that the committee, which raised $1.73 million last year, has only $15,034 left, but registered as a lobby only last March.

Many of the residents of Connecticut's Sixth District have contacted my district office, concerned, and rightly so. They know that they do not need to pay $10 and receive a gold embossed card to contact me and protect the social security system we all value. All they need to pay is the price of a phone call or a 20-cent stamp.●

● Ms. SNOWE. Mr. Speaker, I would like to join my colleagues today to indicate my own concern with the alarmist tone and statements made by the National Committee To Preserve Social Security and Medicare (NCPSSM).

Many of my constituents were so confused by the NCPSSM petition that they wrote or visited my district offices to inquire into the future of the social security program. They also wanted to know how the NCPSSM intends to spend the $10 requested of social security recipients.

I will have to admit that I am also confused by the tenor and text of the NCPSSM petition, especially in view of the recently issued annual report by the trustees of the social security system saying that the trust fund was in good financial condition, capable of paying all benefits well into the next century.

In an effort to better understand NCPSSM's intent in circulating such a pessimist assessment of social security's future, I have joined many Members from both parties on the House Select Committee on Aging who recently wrote NCPSSM Chairman Roosevelt requesting answers to these and other question raised by the petition. I am hopeful Chairman Roosevelt will accept Members' invitation to appear at a future hearing so all misunderstandings can be cleared up as soon as possible.

We in Congress have continuously and steadfastly shown our strong commitment to the future solvency of the social security program as we understand its undisputable importance to each of its 36 million beneficiaries. I wish to assure my constitutents of my own firm support for the program and of my intention of only supporting those proposals which would further strengthen—not weaken—the system for future beneficiaries.●

● Mrs. LLOYD. Mr. Speaker, I want to take this opportunity to voice my disapproval of the tactics now being used by the National Committee To Preserve Social Security and Medicare. I certainly have no quarrel with the committee's professed concern about the social security and medicare programs. I have always worked to insure the continuation of these important and very necessary programs. I strongly disagree, however, with the group's methods.

By using misstatements and half truths, the committee has created a great deal of fear and concern among the elderly citizens of this country. This committee is now sending a letter all over the country which intimates that the social security and medicare programs are on the brink of collapse, that benefits are being severely cut, and that medicare has borrowed $12.4 billion from social security. The letter has been signed by former Congressman James Roosevelt to give it increased legitimacy.

I know these facts to be wrong. First, the social security and medicare programs are not on the verge of collapsing and in fact, have enough funds to last until the years 2000 and 1922, respectively. This certainly provides Congress with enough time to make changes within the programs to solve the current problems. Second, nowhere does the letter mention that the cuts in the programs affect the providers—doctors and hospitals—not the beneficiaries. Third, the committee is plainly wrong in stating that medicare has borrowed funds from social security. In fact, it is the social security program which has borrowed money.

I am astounded by the blatant use of half-truths that the committee has incorporated in its letter. It goes even further by stating that social security payments are now being taxed. It neglects to mention that this policy will only apply to elderly with substantive incomes of which only half of the benefits will be taxed.

Both the Social Security Administration and the Postal Service have been investigating the Committee To Preserve Social Security and Medicare and Mr. Roosevelt's connection with it. They have requested that specific changes be made in the letter. Additionally, the Justice Department has requested that the facsimile of the U.S. Seal be removed from all correspondence in order to avoid any impression that the Federal Government is sponsoring this mailing.

These investigations have resulted in changes being made in the letter. Greater efforts are needed however. These mailings are instilling fear within our Nation's elderly—fear that their benefits will be reduced or completely cut off. We cannot allow this to continue. It is the responsibility of this body to further investigate this matter and to insure that this situation is not allowed to continue.●

● Mr. MATSUI. Mr. Speaker, I would like to join my distinguished colleague, Representative SHERWOOD BOEHLERT, in objecting to this unfortunate mail-order, fundraising appeal that has played on the fears of million of senior citizens.

In Sacramento, senior Americans have been confused, frightened, and misled by this organization and its claims that the social security system is on the brink of bankruptcy.

Social security and medicare are not on the verge of disaster and Mr. Roosevelt knows it. Only recently, the social security medicare trustees' report revealed that the three social security and hospital insurance trust funds will be sufficient to meet all of their obligations for the next 25 years. Actuarial estimates show social security remaining healthy well beyond the year 2000 and medicare not running out of money until 1992, enough time for Congress to solve this problem.

What most disturbs me about this appeal, however, is the organization's tactics. I, therefore, join in requesting congressional hearings to investigate this committee and the manner in which it has conducted business.

There is simply no excuse for an organization preying on society's most vulnerable citizens by claiming erroneously that their very lifeblood will soon be running out. There is no excuse for stamping "urgent" on an envelope when that is clearly not the case, or stamping "time dated legal document" when that is also blatantly false.

Such a callous campaign breeds fear, mistrust, and distress. We in Congress must not allow these tactics to continue.●

● Mr. BILIRAKIS. Mr. Speaker, I wish to commend my colleague from New York (Mr. BOEHLERT), for requesting this special order on the National Committee To Preserve Social Security and Medicare—an organization that has presented misleading information to millions of older Amercians.

Somehow this organization has led our seniors to believe that they are in danger of losing their social security and medicare benefits. Regretfully, a former Member of Congress is largely responsible for this—one, who certainly knows that this body has no intention of ever taking any action which would be destructive to the social security and medicare benefits which have been solemnly promised to our people, as he states in his mailing. I commend my colleague and those that have joined us for taking the time to clarify this matter.

Recently, our offices have been flooded with phone calls and letters from concerned seniors who are often panic stricken, and who are trying to find answers to the confusion that this organization has caused.

I am proud to say that a letter from Members of the Select Committee on Aging is being sent to Mr. Roosevelt, requesting clarification on the national committee that he heads, as well as it is goals and activities. It is our purpose, in sending this letter, to not only

gain a better understanding of the committee, but also to protect the citizens we represent. Hopefully, Mr. Roosevelt is watching this evening and will take the time to prepare a proper and responsible response to Congress and the citizens of this Nation—something, I believe he owes us.

The growing awareness and concerns over this national committee seem to increase each day. Several major newspapers have carried feature articles on this issue. The National Council of Senior Citizens has requested a congressional hearing on the matter. And now, Members of Congress have brought the matter to the floor of the House. Certainly something must be done.

I believe that it is important that our seniors remember that their elected officials will defend and protect their rights. The doors of the Members of this Congress are always open, and we are ready and willing to listen. It does not take a membership fee to any type of national organization to express ones thoughts on matters. We are elected to represent these people and I, personally, am offended by the deceiving language that this organization uses, especially with the words "The politicians say we can't afford Social Security and Medicare." I represent the Nation's fastest growing areas of older Americans. And, believe me, there is no way I would ever make statements of this sort. In fact, I have already cosponsored legislation, along with Congressman PEPPER, in addition to having written the President, to form a bipartisan Commission on Medicare, as was done with social security, to insure its financial stability and solvency. In closing, I again wish to commend my colleague and hope that the older Americans of this Nation are watching and know that this Congress is ready to take action on this matter. I also challenge Mr. Roosevelt, if he really cares about the elderly, to come forth and clarify his position and the work and activities of his organization.●

● Mr. WISE. Mr. Speaker, I, too, have received many inquiries in my district from anxious senior citizens who are concerned that their social security and medicare payments are in danger. This anxiety is a direct result of the mass mailings sent by Mr. James Roosevelt by his group—the National Organization to Save Social Security and Medicare—to elderly Americans throughout my State of West Virginia and across the country. This mailing contained dire threats that social security and medicare were on the verge of bankruptcy. In actuality, social security, as a result of the recent reform legislation passed by Congress, is secure beyond the year 2000 and medicare is not expected to run out of money until 1992, allowing Congress adequate time to find a solution to its problems.

Upon receiving a copy of one of these mailings, I was not only shocked but outraged at the misleading and confusing nature of the material. The alarming tone of the letter would lead many senior citizens to be unnecessarily concerned that these programs were facing imminent collapse. In addition, the official tone of the mailings confused many of my constituents. Not only was the enveloped marked, "Urgent! Important Social Security Information Enclosed," but it also inaccurately stated that "Time Dated Legal Documents" were enclosed. Many of my constituents, under the mistaken assumption that somehow they were contributing directly to the social security trust fund in order to save it, gave money to Roosevelt's organization.

Not only were many of the statements in the letter inaccurate, but the fact that this organization made so little effort to check its facts and deliver a precise explanation of how the contributions would be spent only leads me to suspect its intentions. As a member of the House Aging Committee, I strongly support the instigation of hearings to investigate this organization and its mailings. My own investigation has revealed that although this group claims to be a lobbying organization, it has actually made little if any visible effort to express its views on senior citizen issues. So far, the organization has not spent any of the $1.73 million it raised last year in any perceivable manner which would save social security and medicare. This is one of the concerns raised by both the American Association of Retired Persons and the National Council of Senior Citizens.

I am deeply concerned that such scare tactics might be repeated again by some other organization for some other cause. If this organization is sincere in its effort to help senior citizens then it can stand up to a closer investigation. In addition, a genuine effort should be made by this organization to retract the insensitive and inaccurate reports it has issued.

To date, it seems Mr. Roosevelt, despite national attention on this issue and repeated appeals from Members of Congress, has made very few changes in his methods of soliciting money for his organization. Since this organization persists in frightening our senior citizens, I think, in representing those senior citizens, it is our responsibility to bring this issue to the attention of every elderly American who has been affected by it.●

● Mr. STENHOLM. Mr. Speaker, I would like to commend the gentleman from New York (Mr. BOEHLERT) for calling this special order for the purpose of receiving comment from other Members concerning the National Committee To Preserve Social Security and Medicare, and the information they have been sending out to the elderly of our Nation alleging the imminent collapse of the social security and medicare programs, and the Congress apparent disinterest in this regard.

The 17th District of Texas, which I represent, has an elderly population of 22 percent. Many of these folks depend almost entirely on social security and medicare benefits for their well-being and livelihood. The communications they have received from the National Committee To Preserve Social Security and Medicare have frightened them, and this has got to stop.

I first began hearing from my constituents regarding this matter last autumn. Some of my constituents could see through this scam, but others were not quite so astute. This is not surprising, given the official format which these communications take. Some constituents have contacted their local social security offices in confusion; some are frightened because they cannot spare the $10 annual membership fee charged by the National Committee To Preserve Social Security and Medicare—a membership fee which these constituents feel they must pay in order to guarantee receiving future social security benefits.

On November 7, 1983, I wrote to former Congressman James Roosevelt, the chairman of the National Committee To Preserve Social Security and Medicare. In my letter, I acknowledged that the hospital insurance trust fund, medicare, was facing financial difficulties, but that this funding crisis, like the social security crisis of 1983, would be resolved by the Congress because of the importance of the social security and medicare programs to our Nation. I said then, and I say again, now, that the information generated by the National Committee To Preserve Social Security and Medicare amounts to nothing less than scare tactics. This type of approach is harmful and wrong, and instills fear into the hearts and minds of the elderly and those who depend on these programs.

It was not until the end of January of this year that I received a written response from Mr. William Wewer, executive director of the National Committee To Preserve Social Security and Medicare. Mr. Wewer did not bother to sign the letter, but he did give me a glowing report expressing the committee's concern for the elderly and an outline of some very laudable goals and objectives. I responded to Mr. Wewer's letter and agreed with one of the objectives he had mentioned in his letter: the need to provide the elderly, and those planning for their retirement, with information about how various entitlement programs work and what to expect from them. I em-

phasized again that there could be no place for scare tactics or the politicizing of issues as important as health care for the elderly and continued social security benefits. Mr. Wewer did not respond to my letter.

The distorted and inaccurate information generated by the National Committee To Preserve Social Security and Medicare is accompanied by a very official-looking stationery, complete with an emblem not unlike the seal of the House. The most recent communication I received from one of my constituents contained this individual's plastic membership card; this card came complete with a number and an expiration date, and bore a disturbing resemblance to a social security card. By what rights is the National Committee To Preserve Social Security and Medicare using these emblems? Is it any surprise that some of our senior citizens are alarmed and have both called and visited their local social security offices, expressing worry and confusion about these communications?

I would like to join my colleague from New York (Mr. BOEHLERT) in encouraging the Ways and Means Social Security Subcommittee or the Select Committee on Aging to hold hearings on this matter. As for the National Committee To Preserve Social Security and Medicare, I would encourage Mr. Roosevelt and company to cease and desist from continuing to frighten our senior citizens about the alleged destruction and collapse of the social security and medicare programs.

Let us not kid ourselves. There is a threat to the long-term fiscal soundness of the social security trust funds, and changes are necessary to guarantee benefits to current and future beneficiaries. Let me also express my sincere conviction that the Congress will meet this challenge with legislation which is equitable, reasonable, and which will take into consideration the needs of current and future beneficiaries. This much I know; this issue will not be resolved through the use of scare tactics and political demagoguery but instead will require honest, straightforward, sincere, and bipartisan cooperation. The National Committee To Preserve Social Security and Medicare would do well to keep this in mind.●

● Mrs. MARTIN of Illinois. Mr. Speaker, I join with my colleagues today in calling upon the chairmen of the Select Committee on Aging and the Social Security Subcommittee to schedule hearings in order to get to the root of problems caused by an organization called the National Committee To Preserve Social Security and Medicare.

In Rockford and northwest Illinois, as throughout the Nation, senior citizens have been bombarded with letters of financial solicitation, signed by former Congressman James Roosevelt, requesting membership dues of $10 to join the national committee. There is nothing inherently wrong with asking for money to support an organization, but Mr. Roosevelt's group appears to have done everything possible to confuse and frighten seniors into sending money.

Official-looking envelopes, bearing a likeness of the Great Seal of the United States of America, insists "Urgent—Important Social Security and Medicare Information Enclosed." Readers are presented with misleading, deceptive, and false information which presents an unrealistically gloomy picture of imminent social security and medicare collapse. Financial support is requested for lobbying and educational efforts to "save social security and medicare. Many seniors, believing that the letters are from the Social Security Administration, have shown up at regional social security offices throughout the Nation, $10 donation in hand, scared that their retirement benefits are going to be terminated.

Even seniors who fully understand that the national committee is in no way connected with the Federal Government complain that they never have received promised membership cards, legislative newsletters, or in any way heard again from this organization after they have mailed in their dues.

Where has the $1.75 million collected over the last year by the national committee been spent? In what educational and lobbying activities have Mr. Roosevelt and his fellow board members been involved? Why have not seniors who have invested their scarce dollars not heard back from the national committee? New questions about this organization continually crop up, and congressional hearings could provide an appropriate forum in which to get some answers. Mr. Speaker, the questions have been far too many, the answers far too few.●

● Mr. YOUNG of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I have appealed many times to those, who for political reasons, scare our Nation's retired citizens to death with threats that the future of the social security system is in jeopardy. No one in this Chamber would stand idly by and allow the social security system to stop paying benefits.

Congress has repeatedly demonstrated its concern and willingness to act to preserve the integrity of the social security system and all retirement programs. To enhance congressional oversight of these programs, Congress in 1974 approved my initiative to create the House Select Committee on Aging. Under the chairmanship of my distinguished colleague from Florida CLAUDE PEPPER, the committee in a truly bipartisan manner during its first 8 years advanced many significant reforms and improvements to various legislation affecting older Americans.

In a similar bipartisan effort, President Reagan appointed a commission to develop a series of legislation proposals to insure the financial solvency of the social security system. The commission's recommendations were the basis for legislation approved last year by the Congress that the actuaries of the Social Security Administration assure us will guarantee the financial stability of the social security trust funds and payments into the next century.

Despite our efforts in this regard and the positive reassurance of the Social Security Board of Trustees in its latest report, there are organizations that continue to use scare tactics concerning the stability of the social security system as a means to raise funds. One such organization is the National Committee To Preserve Social Security and Medicare, which continues to frighten our Nation's senior citizens with rumors that the social security system is not financially sound.

This group has mailed millions of alarming letters to social security recipients throughout our Nation. These letters solicit contributions from the recipients under the guise that the money will be used to preserve their social security benefits. Some people who received these letters were so upset that they contacted me to ask if they would lose their social security benefits if they did not contribute. In response to these inquiries, I have assured my constituents that the financial integrity of the social security system will be preserved regardless of whether or not the Committee To Preserve Social Security and Medicare receives any contributions because, as their elected Representatives in Congress, we are firmly committed to protecting the future of the social security system and their earned benefits.

The U.S. Postal Service reviewed the mailings by this group and requested that its stationery and envelopes be changed since they too closely resemble official Government mail and callously frighten recipients with bold lettered warnings on the envelopes saying "Urgent" and "Time-dated legal documents."

It is beyond belief to this Member that anyone would attempt to raise money by needlessly scaring our Nation's senior citizens with threats that their financial lifeline—social security and medicare benefits—are in jeopardy. It is my hope that any future mass mailing campaigns of this sort are prevented. No responsible group would deliberately mislead older Americans; no responsible organization would deliberately attempt to confuse older Americans to justify its existence; and, no responsible associa-

tion would deliberately misrepresent facts to help it raise money. For these reasons, I question the sincerity of the National Committee To Preserve Social Security and Medicare, and I take this opportunity to assure our Nation's older Americans that this Member will always stand up for their rights and for the preservation of the integrity of the social security system.●

● Mr. HORTON. Mr. Speaker, traveling through my district the past several months, I have spoken with many senior citizens. All have expressed their consternation over receiving the letter being mailed out in the name of former Congressman James Roosevelt. These senior citizens are being led to believe that this is an official document, sent out by the Federal Government, to raise money to save the social security and medicare systems. This letter is causing unnecessary fear among the elderly, and many of them are sending in their hard-earned money, which they can ill afford, in response to the mailing, wishing to do their part to save the system.

These are people who have worked hard all their lives, and contributed to the social security system. They are receiving, in many cases, the minimum monthly payments with which they must budget. There is very little left over to use in support of a fund that supposedly will go toward maintaining the solvency of social security and medicare.

Mr. Speaker, I believe that a committee hearing is in order. The situation requires investigation. The letters being sent out are extremely misleading and our senior citizens are being deceived. There have been numerous attempts to obtain direct information but none have produced any significant or meaningful results. It is time for the issue to be examined thoroughly, and for the objectives of this organization to be brought into the open. In my view, the only way to accomplish this is to conduct hearings, consider the questions raised by Mr. Roosevelt's group, weigh the explanations and testimony, and then, put the matter to rest.●

Mr. BOEHLERT. I yield back the balance of my time.

MAKING THE FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD MORE ACCOUNTABLE

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from New York (Mr. KEMP) is recognized for 60 minutes.

● Mr. KEMP. Mr. Speaker, today I testified before the Joint Economic Committee on the crucial issue of reforming our Nation's monetary policy. I wanted to share my remarks with my colleagues, and urge them to read the editorial from the New York Post on the importance of making the Federal Reserve Board more accountable to the public.

The testimony and the editorial follow:

Testimony on Federal Reserve Monetary Policy Submitted to the Joint Economic Committee, U.S. Congress, Washington, D.C., Wednesday, May 16, 1984

(By Congressman Jack Kemp)

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the invitation to testify before the Joint Economic Committee on legislation designed to improve both the policy and policy-making of the Federal Reserve System.

The need for such a reform was made clear recently, Mr. Chairman, by an incident involving Frank Morris, the President of the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston. According to the Washington Post of May 2, 1984, Mr. Morris disclosed to a group of business economists that the Federal Reserve tightened monetary policy at the March 26–27 meeting of the Federal Open Market Committee, because it is concerned that the economy is growing too fast.

This disclosure created something of an uproar. The next day, the Wall Street Journal reported one "Fed official" as saying: "I almost choked when I opened my paper this morning." Federal Reserve Board Governor Henry Wallich declined comment, saying, "I would only be compounding the indiscretion."

Randal Forsyth put the reaction more pungently in Barron's (May 7):

Frank Morris got a lot of his colleagues at the Federal Reserve mad at him last week by doing what central bankers are never supposed to do: saying loud and clear what the monetary policy makers are up to.

"The President of the Boston Fed told a meeting of economists in Beantown that the Federal Open Market Committee voted unanimously to tighten policy at its March 26–27 meeting in order to slow the economy. That revelation wasn't supposed to be made until minutes of the confab were released on May 25, just before Wall Street and everybody else breaks away for the Memorial Day weekend. And, if FOMC decisions are to be leaked before their appointed time, that's the job of a certain tall, bald, cigar-smoking officials who calls favorite reporters, not Reserve Bank heads who blab."

This incident is significant for two serious reasons, Mr. Chairman. In the first place, it highlights the fact that the 12-member Federal Open Market Committee, which meets in secret, does not even disclose its decisions for a long time after they are made, unless a member of the FOMC should happen to leak the results to some favored party, like Mr. Morris's business economists. There is not even a legal requirement to release the decisions, ever. What purpose does secrecy about decisions already made serve, except to churn speculation about policy and increase the opportunity for insider trading? And why do we have to piece together a guess about what the Fed is doing by reading between the lines of the newspapers?

Second, the incident brings into question the propriety of the policy itself. Why in the world is the Federal Reserve trying to slow down the economy? Put another way, what on earth is wrong with strong economic growth if it is accompanied by low or no inflation? If its concern is with price stability, why isn't the Federal Reserve targeting price stability, instead of economic growth?

I believe that there is something wrong, Mr. Chairman, both with the process of Federal Reserve policy-making, and with the recent policy itself. Together with many colleagues I recently introduced two pieces of legislation designed to address these two concerns, H.R. 5459 and H.R. 5460. In my testimony, I would like to explain these two bills and the reasoning behind them.

PROCESS

When the Federal Reserve System was established in 1913, the discretion of its executives was limited, both by its charter and by the system within which it operated. We were under a gold standard, which meant that the Fed had no monetary powers, and the Fed was originally given a very limited control of credit and banking. Over the years, the first constraint was weakened and finally eliminated, while the Federal Reserve's regulatory powers and control of credit were steadily expanded. In the past decade, for the first time in its history, the Federal Reserve has enjoyed sweeping powers over both money and credit. Yet the Federal Reserve continues to formulate policy under conditions of relative secrecy and lack of accountability which have long since become obsolete.

There is a manifest need to allow the markets and the American people more—and more timely—information about policy decisions which affect them. Today there is not even any legislative requirement for the FOMC to release minutes or publicize its policy decisions, although it has become customary for the Committee to release a selected summary after an irregular interval of one or two months.

Recently, this delay has engendered extreme uncertainty in the world's stock, bond, commodity and currency markets, as they have reacted to each rumor and perception of monetary policy changes. It is axiomatic that the efficiency of markets depends on the general availability of accurate information. The recent uncertainty has undoubtedly damaged the stability which is necessary for economic and investment decisions. This benefits no one but those who trade upon rumor and real or imagined inside information. The continuation of Fed secrecy under these circumstances is an anachronism, as many respected economists, such as Milton Friedman, have pointed out.

All agencies of the government have undergone similar democratic reforms in the last ten or fifteen years. Disclosure naturally tends to be resisted at first by those within the institutions themselves. But "sunshine" and freedom of information measures have been applied to countless other agencies, with positive effect. Clearly, it is a positive benefit where no overriding national security interest is involved. The time has come for the United States' central bank to participate in the general openess. Its decisions are too important to be held from the knowledge of the American people.

Our first bill, The Federal Reserve Reform Act of 1984 (H.R. 5459), contains several provisions which would open the decisionmaking process of the Federal Reserve. However, it is important to note that the traditional relationship between the Federal Reserve and the Congress would be unchanged. The bill's provisions are as follows:

1. The Federal Open Market Committee shall announce changes in its policy on the day the decisions are adopted.

This measure, advocated over the years by many economists, including Milton Friedman, would end volatile speculation in the

financial markets due to rumors and uncertainty over Federal Reserve policy.

2. The four-year term of the Chairman of the System shall begin in February of the calendar year after the year in which the President's term begins.

This makes the President's and Chairman's terms concurrent except for a one-year lag. The provision is supported by Chairman Paul Volcker, the Reagan Administration, and the House Banking Committee.

3. The Secretary of the Treasury shall be made an *ex officio* member of the Federal Open Market Committee.

The Treasury Secretary was a member of the Federal Reserve Board for many years, until the mid-1930s. This provision would restore his earlier status. This would increase the input and understanding of the Administration with regard in formulating monetary policy. It would also make it impossible for the Administration to disclaim responsibility for a monetary policy in which it had no part. When I questioned him before a House subcommittee recently, Treasury Secretary Donald Regan supported the idea.

4. The terms of the seven members of the Board of Governors would be reduced from 14 to 7 years each.

This would permit a somewhat faster turnover of membership. However, a 7-year term would still provide continuity in policymaking—which was apparently the original idea behind the 14-year term—since it is longer than terms of U.S. Presidents, Senators, or Congressmen.

Taken together, these measures would modernize the Federal Reserve, bringing its practice of decisionmaking to the threshold of the twenty-first century.

POLICY

Just as important as the way in which policy is made, is the effectiveness of the policy itself. Much of the current uncertainty over Federal Reserve policy reflects the unlimited discretion of the Federal Open Market Committee, and the absence of an established rule for guiding its policy.

This is partly a failure of the law. Surprisingly, the legislation authorizing the Federal Reserve contains no direction stating that the integrity of our currency should be the central bank's overriding goal. Our second bill, the Balanced Monetary Policy and Price Stability Act of 1984 (H.R. 5460), corrects this omission by instructing the Federal Reserve, for the first time, to make long-term price stability its overriding objective. Thus it would avoid inflationary as well as deflationary swings in prices.

Also, in the absence of a firm monetary standard like the precious metals, the Fed needs stricter guidelines for its discretion in setting intermediate policy. Accordingly, our second bill would direct the Fed to abandon its on-again, off-again policy of "targeting" measures of the money supply which are constantly being shifted, changed, and redefined. Nor would it be permitted to "peg" interest rates, as it did for many years, without reference to its overriding goal of price stability.

If the central bank's objective is price stability, we believe it should actually target some proxy for the general price level, and not something else. H.R. 5460 directs the Federal Reserve Board Chairman and the Treasury Secretary to devise a price index for this purpose; to set a target range for the index; and to conduct FOMC policy according to this target. Under the current monetary standard, no other guide can possibly determine whether monetary policy is too loose (inflationary) or too tight (deflationary).

Specifically, H.R. 5460 does the following:

1. The bill makes it clear for the first time that of all the desirable goals mentioned in the authorizing legislation, price stability is paramount. The bill states that "it shall be the policy of the [Federal Open Market] Committee to maintain low interest rates and stable exchange rates, and to encourage strong economic growth, to the extent that such policy is consistent with long-term price stability."

2. The bill establishes a "price rule" for conducting monetary policy.

(a) The Federal Reserve Board Chairman and the Secretary of the Treasury are directed to develop a price index to assist the FOMC in conducting its policy.

(b) The index shall contain one or more commodities, such as the precious metals, which are chosen for their sensitivity primarily to secular or long-term trends in inflation and deflation, rather than to the business cycle or supply disturbances.

(c) The Chairman and the Secretary shall establish a target range for the price index which, in their judgment, will not result in a decline in the general price level.

(d) If the index rises above the target range, the FOMC shall tighten the cost and/or availability of bank reserves; if the index falls below the target range, the FOMC shall ease the cost and/or availability of bank reserves.

(e) In case of a serious threat to domestic or international financial stability, the Chairman and the Secretary together may, after a joint declaration of the extraordinary circumstances, set a new target range.

A word of explanation is in order about the price index, Mr. Chairman. While there are many existing price indexes which could conceivably be used, none of them was specifically designed for conducting monetary policy. Many of the indexes go back three or four decades, or even more. By permitting the adoption of a new index, our legislation permits the monetary authorities to take advantage of the latest research on the subject.

Having said that, though the bill does not require it, I am personally convinced that the best proxy for the price level is also the oldest—the precious metals, and specifically the price of gold. The purchasing power of gold over long periods has remained remarkably constant. It is the most "monetary" and forward-looking of all commodities. Indeed, I think we must eventually restore a modern gold standard. But that goes beyond my purpose here today.

If the "price rule" policy outlined in H.R. 5460 had been in place, it is likely that we would have avoided the wild swings in prices, interest rates, unemployment, exchange rates, and economic growth, of the past dozen years.

3. The Secretary of the Treasury is directed to seek the establishment of a new international advisory task force, and ultimately an international monetary conference, consisting of representatives of the major industrial nations. The purpose of the task force and the conference is to explore reforms of the international monetary system which would improve world-wide price stability, stability of exchange rates, and the prospects for liberal trade and strong, noninflationary economic growth.

This provision lays the groundwork for reform of the international monetary system. It would address many of the root causes of the international debt crisis of pressures for protectionism, and of debilitating currency swings like the fall of the dollar in the 1970's and the rise of the dollar since 1980.

In summary, Mr. Chairman, the time is long overdue for a reform of the Federal Reserve—both concerning the process of policymaking, regardless of the content of policy; and concerning the nature of the policy itself. Our two bills. H.R. 5459 and 5460, are designed to address both problems. I am firmly convinced that these bills would result in much better Federal Reserve policy, while increasing the stability of the markets by providing more accurate and timely information about policy decisions.

Our ultimate goal is not merely better monetary policy, Mr. Chairman, but hope for those Americans whose lives are touched in any way by the value of money. Greater certainty of policy, and greater confidence in price stability, will mean lower interest rates, higher economic growth, and more jobs for working men and women like my Buffalo-area steelworkers. While monetary policy often seems to be obscure, it really translates into a bread-and-butter matter for most Americans. That is why we must go ahead and undertake the necessary reforms of monetary policy and continue the progress which has begun, toward full employment without inflation.

Thank you again, Mr. Chairman, for permitting me to bring this legislation to our Committee's attention.

FEDERAL RESERVE'S SECRECY ONLY HARMS THE ECONOMY

The Reagan Administration has only itself to blame for what it condemns as an overly tight grip on the money supply by the Federal Reserve Board, which is now pushing up the prime rate.

It had the opportunity to install its own man last July when Fed chairman Paul Volcker's six-year term ended.

Instead, it opted to reappoint Volcker and must now live with the bizarre situation whereby the most secret operation in Washington is not conducted by the CIA but by the Federal Reserve Board.

Volcker's Open Market Committee meets every month behind closed doors to review the economy and decide whether the money supply should be eased or tightened, and determine the level of interest rates and bank reserves.

But the committee's policy decisions and the evidence on which its decisions are taken are available only after a delay of six weeks—and by then, of course, the committee has held another meeting and could have adopted a different policy which, again, will be kept secret for six weeks.

Indeed, the White House's only evidence that the Fed recently adopted a tighter money policy is the result of a breach of this secrecy.

Frank Morris, a president of the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, unwittingly revealed last week that at the board's March meeting it decided to tighten its monetary grip to counter what it viewed as inflationary growth of the economy and of total credit.

Clearly, this is a self-defeating process which regularly does enormous damage.

The Open Market Committee is the most important financial policymaking body in the world. Its judgments affect every aspect of the U.S. economy and the decisions of business executives, international traders, investors and governments everywhere.

It is a contradiction in terms that a so-called Open Market Committee should function secretly.

The secrecy generates intense speculation by the entire financial community which must chase telltale, often unreliable, indicators of what might have been decided—whether the Fed is buying or selling securities, for example, or changes in the interest rate which banks charge each other for overnight money.

Like all bureaucrats, Volcker and his board members do not want to reveal how they reach their decisions. They want to go on pretending that they have no influence on the financial market—or the economy.

Rep. Jack Kemp (R-N.Y.) is right on target with his proposed legislation to make the Open Market Committee's deliberations truly open.

This is an open society. There is no justification whatever for the most important influence on the cost of money—the operations of the Open Market Committee—to be a closed secret.

If Congress really wants to spur the economy and help reduce the budget deficits, it will order the Fed to publish the Open Market Committee's decisions on the day they are made—together with the evidence which went into making those decisions.●

SPECIAL ORDERS

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. WALKER) is recognized for 60 minutes.

Mr. WALKER. I thank the Speaker.

Mr. Speaker, I assure you that I will not take the 60 minutes. But we have had quite a bit of controversy develop in recent days over the whole business of special orders. So I thought that this evening I might, even though the hour is late, try to for a few moments anyhow put the special orders into some kind of perspective because of all the controversy.

In fact, the controversy has grown so much here in the last couple of days that I understand I am now being referred to back in the cloakrooms as Wide Angle Walker, as a result of all this.

I guess that is an honor; I am not certain. But this is not something which has just come about; you know, during the days that the television cameras have been here or even since the time that the television cameras have been panning the floor here in the evenings.

Special orders are a rather long tradition in this House. They have been here for some time. They are a way in which Members have of communicating on issues that otherwise would not be brought to the House for debate and discussion. And to some extent it is now a shame to hear them disparaged. Because we have had a number of statements made in recent days that somehow the special order time is not real time in the House, that in fact the Members who are here are speaking only for consumption back home or speaking for some other purpose.

Well, if that is the case, I would submit that it has been the case for a long, long time because of course you do not even have to come to the House floor in order to have a special order included in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD. Something a lot of people do not seem to really understand, that you can if you want to, for instance, take out special order time or bring a statement to the House floor, put it into the RECORD and not even have been here to deliver it.

I will say that is something for those of us who are here delivering the remarks that at least we wait around, we come and we talk the issue and we do not hide behind the fact that we have long discourses in the RECORD that were never delivered on the floor.

The only reason why I raise that is obviously if you put some long discourse in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, you have to assume that maybe that is going to be used for home consumption as well.

So that that has been going on around here for years. One has to assume that it is not unusual for home consumption to be done here.

But it still, it seems to me, is a shame to disparage this time because it just might be, it just might be that those of us who take this time in order to discuss issues that we regard as important are really sincere.

Now, I grant you that a lot of people would find that a little hard to grant from time to time. You know we have heard an awful lot of things here on the House floor recently that indicates that there is a lack of sincerity on it. But you know, it just might be that some of us who come out here and wait to take this time and wait to discuss these issues really are sincere about wanting to have on the record of this House and to communicate insofar as we can to the country some of the things that are of deep concern to all of us.

□ 2210

And despite empty chairs and despite all other things, we really do have something that we want to communicate.

For example, here tonight on the House floor, we have had Members come to the floor, a number of Members, come to the floor talking about issues like balanced budget and issues like the one just discussed here, the protection of our senior citizens from what appears to be a case bordering on consumer fraud.

I must tell you that those are issues that probably will not get onto the floor for discussion in any other way. The Members who came here to discuss those tonight I think did so with a great deal of sincerity, hoping to communicate that message.

But it is also important to recognize that despite the fact that there has been a lot of partisan wrangling over the last couple of days about this whole business of special orders, the fact is that both parties use special orders rather extensively. As a matter of fact, the use of the special orders by those of us on the minority grew out of something which the Democratic leadership put together last year in which they decided that special order time could be used as a way of replying to a Republican President. And they put together a series of special orders here on the floor in which they targeted certain things that the President was doing and they used the special order in which to reply.

We thought that was a pretty good idea. The more we looked at it, the more we saw that that was something that maybe we could use successfully ourselves. So we began to schedule, at the beginning of this session, some special order time.

I am pleased here this evening that my colleague, the gentleman from Texas, is here, because he has used special orders very successfully in many instances over the year. We had a conversation earlier this evening where he was telling me as a result of a series of special orders that he did that he was able to bring about some change in a crime situation that he had discussed extensively in his home State of Texas.

I remember once in the course of all of that that for some nefarious purpose around here, we of the minority had some problem on the floor one day and we tried to cut the gentleman off and tried to take his special order away from him one night. His Democratic colleagues, probably rightfully, I mean, as I think back on it, they were probably right, they came to the floor and they voted to make certain that the gentleman from Texas could take his special order that evening. We had a recorded vote of the majority party saying that they wanted that special order to go forward.

It seems to me that we have, from time to time, in instances like that held that this time is important, that Members do have the right to come to the floor and discuss certain things of major importance.

It seems to me rather interesting then that now that the majority has adopted a strategy, based around utilizing special orders, that we hear a somewhat different story. We now hear it called a misuse of the time, now it seems as though something is wrong when it is our message that is being communicated here, rather than a message from the majority.

One has to guess that it is the message rather than the means of bringing the message that is the real problem. One has to guess that the message that we have been communicating is beginning to chaff a bit, is begin-

ning to have some political impact out across the country, maybe is even having some political impact here in the Chamber where some Members of Congress do stay in their offices and watch these special orders on their televisions.

But the idea that we limit debate in this House to prevent certain messages from being communicated is most disturbing to me and I think to many other Members.

The issue here, as it has been developed over the last few days, is not whether or not the cameras should pan across the Chamber while we speak. From my standpoint, that is just fine. I just wish we would do it day in and day out, from gavel to gavel, so that we see the House in the proper perspective not only during this special order time, but during all time.

But that, as I say, is clearly not the issue that we are involved in here. The issue is whether we are now suggesting that some discussion on this floor should be relegated to a secondary status. If that is the issue, then the attempted degradation of special orders is worth noting. It is worth noting for this reason: When the minority utilizes this time, it is the only time when we can get a blocked period where we control the subject matter, where we decide what the issue will be and where we can discuss the issue on our own terms. That is the only time that we have during the day when that would be true.

For the majority, they have all kinds of time that they can get. They can bring bills to the floor and discuss precisely what they want to discuss on those bills. Oh sure, they yield us some time. We get half the time, but getting half the time to discuss the subject they want to discuss is not exactly time that the minority really controls.

Here we control the time. Here we can discuss the things that we want to discuss.

So, when you have this time then relegated to a secondary status, when you have the Speaker of the House and others disparaging this time, it is really an attack upon time that the minority has as an opportunity to make its points felt.

Our fear is that the minority is being systematically denied its opportunity to bring its concerns to this floors. Not only through special order time, but in many, many other ways as well. That kind of dictatorial pattern is disturbing to many Members, I think, both in the majority party and in the minority party.

But over the last few days, we have seen it revealed as extending to something as longstanding a tradition in this House, as this period of special orders.

I think that that is what we are concerned about. Wide angle or not, what we really are talking about is whether or not the minority should be granted its right to talk to the American people about what it regards as being important.

I yield back the balance of my time.

CENTRAL AMERICA: A PLEA FROM THE HEART

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. CROCKETT) is recognized for 5 minutes.

● Mr. CROCKETT. Mr. Speaker, I recently received from one of my constituents a copy of her most eloquent and touching letter to President Reagan, seeking a new direction in U.S. foreign policy toward the nations of Central America.

My constituent, Ms. Barbara Whitney, is only one of many individuals who have written to me about their frustrations over the Reagan Central American policy. Many, like Ms. Whitney, have been strong supporters of the President on other issues, and are frustrated and angry at the direction of foreign policy toward Nicaragua, El Salavador, Cuba, and other nations of Central America. Ms. Whitney puts it quite succinctly: "I am convinced that you misunderstand the reasons for the conflict (in Central America), and your solution of military control of the guerillas will never work over the long haul."

Mr. Speaker, I commend to my colleagues the heart-felt plea from my constituent for a change in Central American policy:

APRIL 23, 1984.

Hon. RONALD REAGAN,
The White House, Washington, D.C.

DEAR. MR. PRESIDENT: I have supported and admired your domestic policies over the past three years. The trend back toward individual self-reliance and local control of essential programs is wise. I also respect you as an older person who is still vital, healthy, good natured, and a fine role model for all Americans. Your obvious love of country and old-time American values is touching. I believe you are a decent, fine man.

On a less positive note, I must very strongly protest your present actions in Central America. I have done much research on the long-standing problems of this area, and I am convinced that you misunderstand the reasons for the conflict, and your solution of military control of the guerrillas will never work over the long haul.

While it is certainly true that the Russian leaders will take every opportunity to cause trouble for us anywhere in the world and are guilty of barbaric acts against freedom-seeking people, Central America is an area that was ripe for change. The Russians have not caused the conflict. It is because of long-standing policies of repression of the many by few. A government that allows improverished people no option to improve their situation in the world, other than by taking up arms, is a government that needs to be changed. Successful governments are not static. Governments must change as events and times dictate. The situation in Central America has been simmering for too long with no visible improvement for the majority of the people. Too many people were living under hopeless conditions. Since the ruling families saw no advantage to changing the status quo, the impetus for change had to come from the bottom.

Our role, as the large, powerful, intensely interested neighbor should have been to exert economic pressure on the ruling families to gradually allow for greater sharing among all strata of society. Had we done that, we would now have an immensely strong North America with thriving industry, agriculture, education—in short—a busy, prosperous, happy populace. That is the way to fight against "communist inroads." The communists would not be able to get even a toe-hold on such a continent. It is not too late. If we would seek to act as mediator between the two sides, a solution without further bloodshed could be worked out.

Can you not see this? I feel angry and frustrated because you treat this as an East-West conflict and you appear to want to control the guerrillas at all costs. Does that mean sending American Troops? Rather, we should be working to see that a "revolution" does occur but a "peaceful revolution" resulting in a better life for all.

Re: Nicaragua. From my readings, it seems that the majority of the people are reasonably satisfied with the new government even though it is not to our liking. After all, it is only four years old. It's understandable that strict controls initially be put on. As the leaders become more secure in their roles, I believe they will allow for a more pluralistic society to evolve.

As good neighbors, we should be working to build ties. Let us help them get on a strong economic footing. Through connections between our two countries, we will be able to show them they have nothing to fear from us. By our acceptance of them, we can make it to their advantage to encourage peace and prosperity to flower in all of Central America. Gradually, they will realize it is better for them to be our friend than our enemy. I do not believe this is a simplistic policy but rather one of common sense and self-preservation. Surely, if we can have friendly relations with a communist country of 1,000,000,000 souls, we should be able to have a workable policy with a communist nation of only a few million. I would include Cuba also in this strategy.

Please consider the points I have offered above. This letter is sent from my heart. I just do not want to see any more mistakes made in foreign policy that cause the loss of one more young American life. A precisely-folded American flag handed to a grieving mother cannot substitute for a living, loving son.

Even though it will be a new and unsettling experience for me to vote for a Democrat, I can assure you that I will withhold my vote from you unless I see a change of direction in Central America.

Best Wishes to you and Mrs. Reagan for continued good health.

Respectfully,

BARBARA A. WHITNEY.●

H. K. THATCHER LOCK AND DAM

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gen-

tleman from Arkansas (Mr. ANTHONY) is recognized for 5 minutes.

● Mr. ANTHONY. Mr. Speaker, I am today introducing legislation to designate the Calion lock and dam on the Ouachita River as the H. K. Thatcher lock and dam.

Mr. H. K. Thatcher provided the inspired leadership to encourage development of the Ouachita River. His vision and dedication to the goal of navigation on the Ouachita has almost been realized. It is particularly appropriate that this honor be bestowed on him at this time.●

LEE IACOCCA IS RIGHT

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from New York (Mr. LAFALCE) is recognized for 5 minutes.

● Mr. LAFALCE. Mr. Speaker, I would like to bring to the attention of my colleagues an extraordinary speech given yesterday by Mr. Lee Iacocca, chairman of the Chrysler Corp., to the League of Women Voters National Convention.

In his speech, Mr. Iacocca called upon Special Trade Representative William Brock to convene a summit conference of the U.S. auto manufacturers and the United Auto Workers Union to begin to develop an industrial policy for the American auto industry rather than the disjointed, irrational, ad hoc industrial policy we have now. In addition, he listed several proposals he would bring to the bargaining table. He would freeze Chrysler's U.S.-built small-car prices now, for as long as it takes, in return for Reagan administration action to bring the dollar/yen differential into line and to reduce Japanese subsidies of its auto exports. He also offered to freeze Chrysler's use of imported auto parts at current levels if the United Auto Workers agreed to modify some of its work rules, to tie wage increases to productivity and quality improvements, and to trim the costs of its medical plan. In addition, he offered to limit bonuses for Chrysler's top management to 50 percent of what Ford and GM paid.

While there is obviously room for negotiation over the specific bargaining proposals made by Mr. Iacocca, his call for a conference of labor, management, and Government to begin to address the long-term problems of the auto industry is long overdue. The time has come for the Federal Government to begin to develop a more coordinated, strategic set of policies for all of American industry, and to make sure we get something back for the assistance we provide. The Council on Industrial Competitiveness and its industry subcouncils, which I have proposed and the House Banking Committee has passed, would be a mechanism for achieving that end without having to rely on ad hoc conferences which farsighted leaders such as Mr. Iacocca of necessity must resort to.

I would like to congratulate Mr. Iacocca for asserting some desperately needed leadership in this area, and urge the Reagan administration to pay heed.

At this time, I would like to share with my colleagues the full text of Mr. Iacocca's remarks.

REMARKS BY L. A. IACOCCA

Thank you Ms. Robbins. And good morning, ladies . . . and ladies.

I was tempted to open this talk by thanking all of you for coming to Detroit to visit me. But that seemed a little presumptuous, so I'll just say, "welcome to Detroit. The city is honored and privileged to have you here." And for those of you who follow the great game of baseball—I hope you'll come back again in October for the World Series!

It's the right time, and the right place, for you to be meeting. The right time, because we're in the midst of a Presidential election campaign; the right place, because "Smokestack America" has an awful lot at stake in this election, and Detroit's right smack in the middle of Smokestack America. And yours is a forum uniquely qualified to hear out the issues, and I want to raise a few today. Because what our government does, or chooses *not* to do, will be critical to the lives of millions of Americans over the next four years.

Your founders were not cynics or fatalists. They knew government was *important*. They knew that government policies made a *difference*. They knew that if these policies were intelligent and effective and fair, that government could be a positive force—that it could help create a better future for everyone.

In the 65 years since the League was founded, you've helped give milions of women the tools to get involved and choose a better future.

But you've done even more than that. By registering voters, by helping voters understand the public issues, by promoting discussion of government policies, by sponsoring televised debates among Presidential candidates—you've helped give all Americans more meaningful choices. You've helped improve American democracy.

You've helped all of us cast our votes on the basis of something more than a family habit, or a candidate's haircut—on something more than clever symbols or empty slogans.

Nothing could be more important because the very essence of democracy is that the voters make an informed choice.

They can't just accept what the so-called experts tell them. They've got to deal with the facts in the real world.

Well, the real facts about Detroit and the auto industry and government policies that affect us are pretty hard to get these days. On the surface, things look just great. This is a city that has literally risen from the ashes over the past 18 months. And we are all proud of—and grateful for—that fact.

We at Chrysler are particularly proud.

We had a brush with death; the Wall Street Journal, along with a lot of others even said we should die with dignity. Right or wrong, we chose not to. That we made it through the graveyard is due to the efforts of a lot of people, our suppliers, bankers, dealers, employees, cities, states, our federal government.

But, mostly to the goodwill and the support of the American people. Given a chance and given a choice—they opted to help save a company and a lot of jobs by buying what they believed to be pretty good products, even though the company that built them might not be around.

So we should be pretty pleased, as we meet here today. But we're nervous, and the laughter is restrained, because some major issues remain unresolved. One of them is the subject of industrial policy, which you asked me to speak about today . . . which must mean it's on your minds as well. But, before I get into that, I think I should set the record straight and get rid of some of the phony issues, first.

Let me get to the ones that are on the front pages and the TV screens right now, and put them aside. The first one we read and hear about is that Detroit's profit levels are excessive, and due only to "voluntary" Japanese restraints. The next one is that Detroit's prices have gone up 40-60 percent (pick your number), due to the same restraints. The third one is that we're lining our pockets with over-the-moon bonuses, as a result of the first two.

Well, I'm not going to devote a lot of time to defending the auto industry today . . . you've got more important things on your agenda. But let me get the record straight, and then get on with it.

First, prices. Chrysler didn't get healthy (and I didn't get rich) because we jacked up prices while protected by a shield against Japanese products. We got healthy because we got efficient; we built good products and the market improved. Period!

For the record, Chrysler's prices (equipment adjusted) in the subcompact, small specialty and compact segments . . . where the Japanese do 94 percent of their volume . . . went up, during the first three year restraint period by three percent. Three percent! Over three years! (McDonald's hamburgers went up 9 percent during that period!)

Our total car prices, in aggregate, went up eleven percent, because we brought in some new, higher priced models like the front-wheel-drive New Yorker, which doesn't compete with Japanese cars—just GM cars.

During that same period, the auto industry's aggregate prices went up by 12 percent. Japanese car prices went up by 15 percent. The consumer Price Index went up by 17 percent. Newspaper prices by 24 percent, fuel prices by 27 percent, and a ticket to the Tiger games by 28 percent (although I have to admit the quality improved).

And our 3 percent on small cars didn't include the cost of our five-and-fifty warranty or the cost of our free automatic transmission offer on our subcompact and compact cars at $439 a pop. So anybody who says we're gouging in our pricing is just plain wrong.

Sure, consumers are buying a heftier mix of luxury cars, and automatic air conditioning and six-speaker stereos . . . and average purchase price has gone up from the recession period . . . but that's not Detroit's pricing, folks—that's the beloved free market at work! (I can't let the free traders work both sides of the street on me!)

Then there's profits. I used a chart at my last press conference—I call it the "Red Sea" chart, and I didn't part it, believe me, I just tried to swim through it. The chart is full of red ink, and it covers my five years at Chrysler. What it says is that even after the $700 million profit we turned in last year (a record), and the $706 million profit in the

first quarter of this year (a real record!), I'm still in the hole $1.9 billion!

So, if we can keep flying high, by mid 1985, Chrysler will have managed to break even for the entire six-and-one-half year period of my peerless leadership!

Big deal . . . I saw Boone Pickens on TV, he raided an oil company, lost the take-over struggle, and came on the tube with his drawl and said "I guess I lost." He made $700 million that night!

What will we use these "obscene" profits for? First, we've got to fund a UAW wage settlement of $1.1 billion over the next 18 months, as a payback, if you will, for some of the sacrifices our workers made. And I have to come up with $9 billion in capital investments in new products and facility modernization over the next five years—just to stay competitive, to retool for the highest quality products in the world.

And we'd like to pay our shareholders a modest dividend, for their patience over the past few years. I've always thought that's what you're supposed to do with profits in a free enterprise system. . . reinvest in the business, increase your productivity, improve your products and give the owners a return on their investment.

I'm not going to touch executive compensation with a ten-foot pole. But I have to wonder if the so-called auto moguls are at the top of the heap even in this town. A couple of years ago the Detroit Red Wings were bought for $10-12 million by a pizza king, and last year the Detroit Tigers were bought for $43 million. . . by another pizza king. And they ain't even Italian!

The truth is, we're walking on eggs. We don't know whether we're supposed to be proud, or ashamed, of the turnaround. We got clobbered when we lost money and we get clobbered when we make a profit. The other day I suggested that "maybe we should have a long range plan to break even. . . then nobody would get mad!"

But I'm not mad. . . I'm worried. I'm worried about the real issues. What are they: isn't the recession over?

Well, there are some ominous clouds on the horizon.

Interest rates, which brought the housing industry, the auto industry and the whole economy to it knees, are inching up again. If the prime goes past 12-14 percent, watch out!

The United Auto Workers are gearing up for the most critical labor negotiation this country has seen in many years. They'll hit GM and Ford this fall, at a time when the industry's profits are at record levels. If all sides forget the bitter lessons we're supposed to have learned over the last five years, watch out!

The twin badges of our economic shame . . . . the budget deficit and the trade deficit . . . continue out of control. We're shipping our jobs overseas and hocking our kids' futures. And, in my opinion, we're chipping away at the Federal deficit boulder with a blunt chisel!

The truth is, our national deficit is our national scandal. We're heading for a trillion dollar deficit—give or take a few billion—in the next five years. We picked up a deficit that big once before. It took us a few years—1776 through the fall of 1981 (I looked it up).

Think of it. It took us 206 years—during eight wars, two depressions, a dozen recessions, two space programs, the opening of the West, and the terms of 39 Presidents!

And now we're going to duplicate that feat in (5) years, while we're at "peace" and during a period of so-called economic "recovery." And the Administration and the press are busy doing a war dance about car prices and auto bonuses! Talk about recognizing your priorities!

That trillion dollars comes to $15,000 in new debt for every one of America's 13 million working families. Every one of them could buy a pretty fancy new car for that . . . and at least they'd have the car! In my book, the boys in Washington—and I mean all of them—get an "F," a flunking grade, on the deficit. If they don't get serious about it and I mean right now—watch out!

And then there's the trade deficit. Did you know that America, in the 15 years from 1956 through 1970, accumulated a $60 billion trade surplus! People were buying American products, from American workers, around the world. It was a golden decade . . . and a half.

Well, last year we set a new kind of record. We achieved a $60 billion trade deficit—in one year! And now we're on the way, this year, to double that record . . . while "restraining" the Japanese to a measly two million cars!

And what are we doing about it? We're talking about turning them loose for another million or so cars in 1985, while we negotiate about a little extra access to their protected markets! Talk about recognizing your priorities! Have we all gone crazy? Do we understand the price we pay for those kinds of imbalances?

Since 1974, we've lost two-and-one-half million American jobs to foreign competition. If this year's trade deficit goes past $100 billion—and I guarantee it will; it's hitting $10 billion a month like clockwork—another million jobs will bite the dust in one year. In April alone, the Japanese trade surplus was $3 billion with the U.S.—mostly from car and truck exports. And that's before the quotas get lifted and the Japanese really turn up the ratchet. If that happens . . . watch out! So the government gets another "F" or flunking grade for its trade policies.

I have to ask: what was all the suffering of the last (4) years all about? Not for just a one-or-two-year uptick (I hope) and then back to the same old habits of sky-high interest rates and double digit unemployment. Did we go through all the pain, all the misery, from '79 to '83 just to wind up starting out down the same road again . . . and continuing to lose our basic industries, and their jobs, to unfair foreign competition?

Let me be specific about that unfair competition in the car business. It's the result of industrial policy . . . somebody else's industrial policy. It amounts to $1600 per car on every Japanese car sold in this country.

The sixteen hundred-dollar advantage is not because of greater Japanese efficiency. It's not Japanese workers doing calisthenics and then marching to the factory singing the national anthem. It's not even Japanese "cheap labor;" that's largely a myth anyway.

No. That sixteen hundred-dollar advantage is just two things; currency . . . and taxes.

First: the Japanese yen is under valued by at least 15 percent (and everybody agrees on that). That alone gives every Japanese car an automatic cost advantage of at least nine hundred dollars.

Second: when a Japanese car is put on a boat for the U.S., the Japanese Government rebates the commodity tax to the manufacturer; that's about another seven-hundred dollar advantage for every car. (That means a Tokyo housewife pays $700 more for her Toyota than the San Francisco housewife for the same car—its price drops like magic as soon as it hits the dock.)

Now, all of this adds up to a lot of money.

During the period of so-called restraints, the Japanese auto companies made $9 billion. By the way, the U.S. auto companies lost $6 billion during the same period, but forget that.

Do you know how much of the Japanese auto profit came from the U.S. market? Nine billion dollars—or 100 percent. Do you know how much of it came from the funny yen-dollar ratio and the commodity tax rebates? Nine point four billion dollars . . . more than 100 percent. Some "restraint," huh? Talk about picking a chicken clean.

Last month the Japanese Agriculture Minister said he could not expand U.S. beef and citrus exports to Japan. He said "the Japanese beef and citrus industry is vital to the country's food supply," (and, get this) "and vital to our national security."

If I got started on the subject of who's paying for their defense, I could go on all day. And that, by the way, is the root of the problem of the two country's tax structure and the reason Japan can rebate their commodity taxes on automobiles.

Our forefathers, in Europe, play hard ball on this issue. England and Germany allow the Japanese 10 percent of their markets. France allows three percent. Italy—I love those Italians—says 2,000 per year, any kind you want to ship. Why? Because they think it's fair.

Now, I'm a realist: I know we can't go that far . . . and I know you're against the quotas. Let me tell you something that may surprise you—so am I. All I've said . . . all I've ever said . . . is get rid of the $1,600 per car unfair Japanese advantage . . . what I call the unlevel playing field in Japanese American trade . . . and we'll play them straight up.

Now, that would be an Industrial Policy . . . to neutralize Japanese industrial policy. And it wouldn't be our first one. Anyone who's familiar with Washington knows that Washington is "Subsidy City." And each subsidy adds up to an "Industrial Policy." We've got hundreds of them.

Start with the Federal Loan Guarantees (I'm sort of expert in this area). We weren't the first; there were $409 billion in loans, guaranteed, before I went to Washington to ask for my measily billion-five guarantee. And now, under a conservative Republican, we're up to over $500 billion in guarantees (off the balance sheet) just four years later. That's an industrial policy.

Defense—the military. I used to be in this business. Military contractors are a 100 percent protected industry. (And they're the only ones left, by the way.) The Japanese can't play in this, by law; no bids from foreign countries accepted. Profits—lots of profits—even spare parts profits—guaranteed. Hell, I sold my protected battle tank business and kept cars. I should have sold the car business and kept the tanks . . . it was easier. That's an industrial policy. Eisenhower even warned us of that one. He called it the military-industrial complex—beware!

Then take agriculture—my favorite. Taxpayers pay $50 billion a year to help private farmers, many of whom are large, rich corporations. In the Thirties, United States agriculture was an unmitigated disaster. Now it's the marvel of the world. In fact we feed much of the world.

What made the difference? It wasn't just good climate and good soil and hard working farmers—we had all those in the Thirties and we still had Okies and dust bowls. No—it was the government's conscious decision to make agriculture a winner at whatever the cost.

It was rural electrification, and irrigation, and TVA's, and county agents, and agricultural schools, and land banks, and credit programs, and PIK payments—$10 billion last year just for that, to pay you not to plant. But man, did it work! (I mean woman, did it work!)

Now all our government policies have one thing in common: they daily affect the industrial life of America. But they are confusing. They are uncoordinated. And they're very often conflicting.

So let's be honest. We don't want to admit it but we do have industrial policies. We have them all over the map. We have them for farmers and bankers and defense and even for housing. But what we don't have is an industrial industrial policy.

As a result, we're moving too fast to write smokestack America off, without any conception of the human and social consequences. There are 155 thousand laid-off auto workers outside this building who havn't been called back, and probably won't be; and 60 thousand more rubber workers in towns like Akron and 266 thousand more steel workers in places like Lackawanna, New York, and Johnstown, Pennsylvania, in the same boat.

Their jobs, and their lives, have been ripped out from under them, and it's a cruel hoax to be talking to them about high-tech and service industries.

We cannot afford to become a nation of video arcades, drive-in banks and McDonald's hamburger stands . . . we can't just take in each other's laundry and sell microchips to the world. And, by the way, the biggest microchip customers of all are right here, in Detroit, in good old smokestack America.

Did you know that IBM's (3) biggest customers (ex-defense) are GM, Ford, and Chrysler? That we use more robots, CAD-CAM) and computers than anybody else. There is an onboard computer on every car we build, and in our more exotic models there are (5) computers!

So you obviously can't sell silicon chips by the pound in your local supermarket. They're worthless unless you put them to work, to reduce emissions, or give you more miles per gallon, or give you precision and quality in the way you build a car.

So, you see, there is no such thing as high-tech versus low-tech, or winners versus losers.

I'm sorry, but I don't have much time for the economists and futurists sitting comfortably in some think-tank telling us about structural adjustments and readjustments. And I get damn mad when I hear them say that the whole industrial workforce has got to be retrained, because the country's got no choice but to let our basic industry and its jobs move offshore.

There has to be a better answer.

I've tried to use the Chrysler turnaround as a good, constructive example of an industrial policy that worked. . . that added to choice and competition in the marketplace and saved a few hundred thousand jobs. I thought it was a good example, because it worked; because it showed that when everybody got together and contributed something, a minor miracle could be pulled off.

There was what we called "equality of sacrifice" from all the constituencies—in this case, the government. . . labor. . . management. . . dealers. . . suppliers. . . banks—and because there was an objective, and a plan, and tough running rules, and apparently irreversible situation was reversed.

I still think it's a good example of sound industrial policy. And most of the audiences I've spoken to seemed to agree. But the bottom line is that it hasn't seemed to make any difference. The term "industrial policy" is still considered to be a dirty word—another phrase for socialism—by too many people who remain concerned about ideology, and not about results.

Well, I'd like to try again. I have a suggestion. I suggest that we drew from the Chrysler experience. . . from the lesson of equality of sacrific. . . and we try to apply it on a broader scale.

I think the time has come for Mr. Brock, and the other trade and economic experts to call the domestic auto manufacturers and the UAW together for a little conference on whether we want to get this thing off dead center. We've had enough rhetoric and enough finger-pointing. It's time for some action!

To get some, I'm prepared to bring some specific proposals to the party. Let me tick them off for you. I'll start with prices and executive compensation, since Mr. Brock chose to make these the centerpiece of his industrial policy for the auto industry.

First, prices. I'll freeze Chrysler's U.S.-built small-car prices now, for as long as it takes, if the Administration will commit to leveling the playing field.

Second, compensation. That's not really an issue with me. We don't even have a bonus plan yet; in fact Chrysler management hasn't had a bonus in seven years. But if our stockholders do approve a plan, I'll commit to restraint. What's restraint? I don't know: maybe 50 percent, for top management, of what GM and Ford paid themselves. I think that's pretty responsible given the fact that our management worked to generate almost a billion dollars in operating profit last year.

Now, let me throw out a third—because it's not just consumers that need to be protected. . . but jobs. To compete, we're going to have to send them offshore like there's no tomorrow. I would say to our union; "if you'll show some restraint in your demands, I'll freeze the buying I do outside of North America—at the current level right now, (and I'm using less than the others).

In our business, that's called outsourcing. And a moratorium for a year or two would slow down the shipping of jobs overseas.

I would expect, in return, that UAW agree to modify some of its work rules that keep us from being more competitive. I would expect it to agree to tie wage increases to productivity and quality improvements. I would expect it to get serious about trimming medical costs that now are averaging about $600 a car. I'm not talking about concessions or roll-backs. I just want to know what labor will bring to the party.

And then comes the biggest challenge of all, and that one I make to our government. Are you willing to address the unfair playing field . . . yes or no? Are you willing to take on the $1,600 year/tax disadvantage as the price for eliminating quotas, moderating prices to the consumer and preserving American jobs?

I'd like to find out. I'd like to find out where the Administration, and the leaders of both parties, really stand on jobs and prices and fair trade. And where GM, Ford and UAW stand—and what they're willing to contribute. Maybe we should all get together and talk it over. I'm ready, if you are.

This is not a protectionist proposal. This is a fix-the-fundamental-problems-that-got-us-into-the-soup-proposal.

I think the American people deserve to know where everybody stands. We're talking about 2 million jobs, and the people whose jobs are at stake really deserve to know.

Haven't we had enough talk? Haven't we had enough posturing? Haven't we had enough confusion? Don't we want something to happen?

I don't know what would happen . . . I don't know if everybody would come. But I'd like to find out who would, and who wouldn't. I'd like to either get the rhetoric toned down and get something underway, or really pin the tail on the right donkey, once and for all.

The League can help. You'll be sponsoring the Presidential debates this summer, for which I applaud you. I urge you to ask the President and the Democratic candidate, point blank, where they stand on the issue of automotive jobs and automotive-related jobs . . . and the Japanese trade situation and the tilted playing field.

If they're not ready to address these issues, let them say so now . . . so the voters of this country will know, before the election. We can't let them cop out, or say it's much too early—that we should wait till after the election. Baloney! That's what an election is for—to choose between alternative plans.

And let me add one more thing: if the candidates for this country's next Administration are not ready to stand up and say what they think on the subject—if they really believe that jobs are irrelevant—then the hell with it. Let the quotas come off, now—I'll compete.

Because I'm ready to compete. That's exactly what we've been doing at Chrysler for the last (3) years.

And, let me put the record straight on what we did do during those (3) years.

We paid off the loan guarantees seven years early, and we paid the government a profit of $311 million!

We called back 36 thousand workers, and we averted the possibility of 600 thousand more being put out to pasture permanently.

We led this industry's conversion to front-wheel-drive; as a result, we improved our average fuel economy to 27 miles per gallon. Today's we're the only one of the Big Three who's meeting the fuel economy standards, which are the law of the land.

We improved our quality by over 24 percent, and we offered the American consumer a 5-year, 50,000-mile warranty. No charge.

We improved our productivity; we used to build 10 cars per employee; now we build 19 cars per employee.

We cut our costs by $2 billion and cut our break-even point in half in the process. We got rid of our deficit!

We've been busy as beavers. So, I'd like to walk into the next Congressional leadership meeting and ask, "Hey, what have you guys been doing for the last (3) years?"

Have you cut your deficits? On April 1, 1981 (when voluntary restraints were started) your budget deficit was still $43 billion. Now, as of 1984, it's $177 billion. The trade deficit was $19 billion . . . now it's $93 billion.

Has the undervalued yen problem been fixed? No way. Today, the yen is at 230 to the dollar—in the spring of 1981 it was 226 to the dollar.

Has the Japanese commodity tax rebate problem been fixed? No, the issue isn't even being discussed.

In other words, gentlemen, has Washington done a single damn thing to level the playing field and get rid of the $1600 per car unfair Japanese advantage—in (3) years? The answer is no!

I think I should turn to Mr. Brock and say, "Mr. Ambassador—I think we've been had!"

So, how much additional time does this Administration and Congress need to get its problems straightened out? I'm willing to give them some breathing room, just as they gave this industry some breathing room. How much do they need? A year? Three years? What's the plan? What is their position on jobs in smokestack America?

I'm tired of the ideological debate . . . of the abstractions . . . of the finger-pointing. I'm tired of disjointed, irrational, ad hoc industrial policy. Where does everybody stand? What are we waiting for?

I'm ready, Mr. Reagan and Mr. Brock. I'm ready, Mr. Bieber. I'm ready, Ford and GM. Let's get on with it.●

COMMUNICATION FROM CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEE ON VETERANS' AFFAIRS

The SPEAKER pro tempore laid before the House the following communication from the chairman of the Committee on Veterans' Affairs, which was read and, without objection, referred to the Committee on Appropriations:

COMMITTEE ON VETERANS' AFFAIRS,
Washington, D.C., May 10, 1984.

Hon. THOMAS P. O'NEILL, Jr.,
The Speaker, House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. SPEAKER: Section 5004 of Title 38, United States Code, requires that the Committee on Veterans' Affairs adopt a resolution approving major medical construction projects and leases of $500,000 or more proposed by the Veterans' Administration for each fiscal year. The House Committee on Veterans' Affairs met on May 10, 1984, and authorized the construction and leasing of various projects in fiscal year 1985.

A copy of the Resolution adopted by the Committee and a listing of the projects authorized are attached.

Sincerely,
G. V. (SONNY) MONTGOMERY,
Chairman.

MAY 10, 1984.

RESOLUTION OF THE COMMITTEE ON VETERANS' AFFAIRS, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Resolved by the House Committee on Veterans' Affairs, That pursuant to the provisions of Section 5004, Title 38, United States Code, the attached listing of major medical construction projects and leases is approved. This approval is by project and includes funds authorized in Fiscal Year 1985 and future fiscal years.

G. V. (SONNY) MONTGOMERY,
Chairman.

There was no objection.

GENERAL LEAVE

Mr. GONZALEZ. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may be permitted to extend their remarks and to include therein extraneous material on the bill, H.R. 5167, Department of Defense Authorization Act, which was debated earlier today.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Texas?

There was no objection.

REBUTTAL AND DENIAL OF JACK ANDERSON ALLEGATIONS REGARDING PRESIDENT OF MEXICO

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Texas (Mr. GONZALEZ) is recognized for 60 minutes.

Mr. GONZALEZ. Mr. Speaker, the occasion of the visit of the President of Mexico today was a very historic accomplishment.

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But unfortunately it was clouded by a very, very unfortunate incident of the publication of a column by Jack Anderson, the columnist, which appeared throughout the United States and in the Washington Post, in which the President of Mexico was accused of having amassed riches and had opened a secret Swiss account. This has aroused great consternation in our neighboring country, among the group accompanying the President, among the Government officials representing that Government here in the Capitol.

I am inserting in the RECORD the Anderson column at this point, followed by clarification by way of a letter on the editorial page in today's Washington Post by the spokesman for the Mexican President, in which each and every allegation made by Mr. Anderson is specifically denied, rebutted, and absolutely clarifying the integrity of the President of Mexico:

[From the Dallas Morning News, May 15, 1984]

DE LA MADRID AMASSES RICHES

(By Jack Anderson)

WASHINGTON.—Mexican President Miguel de la Madrid, who meets with President Reagan in the White House today, has amassed a multimillion-dollar fortune since he took office, according to highly classified U.S. intelligence documents.

Self-enrichment is a tradition among Mexican presidents; it may also be perfectly legal under Mexican law. The presidential salary is secret, and the single political party's only rule, according to one insider, is: "Don't rock the trough."

Perhaps in deference to his country's precarious financial situation and the extreme poverty of its people, de la Madrid is believed to have collected a secret "salary" far more modest than his predecessors'. It is, nevertheless, huge.

One high-level administration source with regular access to ultra-secret intelligence reports told my associate that in one series of transactions in the four months after he took office in December 1982, de la Madrid salted away $13 million to $14 million in a Swiss bank.

Another source with access to CIA and National Security Agency data cited one report last fall, based on cable intercepts of international bank transactions, that put the total of de la Madrid's "take" during his presidency at $162 million—minimum. At the CIA, the six-year presidential term is referred to jokingly as the "golden parachute" that carries every president safely to a sizable fortune.

Efforts to reach de la Madrid for comment were unsuccessful, but a spokesman at the Mexican Embassy said the U.S. intelligence information was wrong—"absolutely out of the question." He pointed out that de la Madrid had been mounting an aggressive anti-corruption campaign.

That too is an honored presidential tradition in Mexico. De la Madrid's immediate predecessor, Jose Lopez Portillo, went through the same ritual, calling corruption "the cancer of Mexico." Yet Lopez Portillo, who ruled during the heady days of Mexico's short-lived oil prosperity, amassed a personal fortune. By the CIA's estimate he salted away a staggering $1 billion to $3 billion.

The symbol of Lopez Portillo's wealth is the luxurious, 32-acre estate he built overlooking Mexico City. It is nicknamed "Dog Hill," in mocking reference to Lopez Portillo's statement that he would "fight like a dog" to defend the shrinking value of the peso.

While many of his countrymen live in adobe or corrugated metal hovels, Lopez Portillo and his family have bathrooms of marble and gold, according to Mexican press accounts. Some floors are made of jade; one is transparent, with a detailed model of the Acropolis visible through it.

The Mexican government installed a power plant for what a Mexican magazine called the "walled medieval fortress overlooking the capital." The public works agency spent $33 million on the access road, sewage and water lines for Lopez Portillo's estate.

The ex-president's largesse reportedly extended even to a high-level government official who was his alleged mistress. Her house is said to be so large one of the closets measures 27 feet by 100 feet and has a mezzanine.

Despite the blatancy of Lopez Portillo's self-enrichment in office, U.S. and Mexican sources doubt he will ever be a target of his successor's cleanup campaign. Instead, de la Madrid has moved against some officials of the former president's regime, including the former head of the national oil monopoly and the former chief of Mexico City's police.

Safety debate: The Consumer Product Safety Commission will decide today whether U.S. manufacturers should be allowed to export articles that have been banned from the market in this country as dangerous.

At least one commissioner, Terrence Scanlon, favors allowing such exports. He cites a recent court decision which ruled the sale of products abroad is a matter for the importing nations to handle. An internal commission memo notes that allowing unsafe products to be exported would help the manufacturers recoup their losses, though the price they'd get "in all probability will be substantially less than for complying goods."

Consumer groups oppose the export permission, on grounds hazardous goods will cause harm wherever they are sold.

Some companies whose products have run afoul of the commission have indicated

they'd sell the faulty items abroad if it were legal to do so. One of these had manufactured silver baby rattles the commission decided were "too small and too long" to be safe. Another had produced painted shirts that contained lead.

[From the Washington Post, May 16, 1984]

MEXICO'S "MILLIONAIRE PRESIDENTS": A REPLY

Jack Anderson's article ["Mexico Makes Its Presidents Millionaires," May 15], regarding President Miguel de la Madrid, is inaccurate and biased.

President de la Madrid has no bank account in any foreign country and has never transferred any amount of money outside of Mexico. His salary is precisely defined by the Law on Expenditures of the Nation, approved by Congress and in compliance with the Law of Responsibilities of Public Official—which President de la Madrid himself amended to make more stringent and to fight public corruption. He has duly and promptly submitted his statement on assets and properties with a detailed list of all his properties and economic resources.

Likewise, his tax return file is up to date, perfectly well in order, and information has recently been provided to the Mexican public on the submission of President de la Madrid's tax return for 1982-1983, which is absolutely in keeping with the law.

It is most unfortunate that the sensationalism shown by Mr. Anderson stains the pages of such a serious and prestigious newspaper as The Post. He does it with completely false imputations, which he attributes to "American intelligence sources," without giving specific names. A responsible and professional journalist would not act to offend the head of state of a friendly nation with the lightness and lack of responsibility shown by Mr. Anderson.

MANUEL ALONSO M.,
Press Secretary to the President of Mexico.
WASHINGTON.

It so happens that this President of Mexico is one of the most real reform Presidents in recent modern Mexican history. He is a man of absolute integrity. It was most unfortunate that this happened. I am asking that the RECORD reflect the clarification so that in some small way this can be interpreted as an apology on our part, some of us Members of the House of Representatives, to this visiting dignitary.

SPECIAL ORDERS GRANTED

By unanimous consent, permission to address the House, following the legislative program and any special orders heretofore entered, was granted to:

(The following Members (at the request of Mr. BILIRAKIS) to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material:)

Mr. WALKER, for 60 minutes, today.

Mr. MCEWEN, for 60 minutes, May 22.

Mr. MCEWEN, for 60 minutes, May 23.

Mr. FRENZEL, for 60 minutes, May 22.

Mr. FRENZEL, for 60 minutes, May 23.

Mr. FRENZEL, for 60 minutes, May 21.

(The following Members (at the request of Mr. TAUZIN) to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material:)

Mr. ANNUNZIO, for 5 minutes, today.

Mr. ALEXANDER, for 60 minutes, today.

Mr. CROCKETT, for 5 minutes, today.

Mr. ANTHONY, for 5 minutes, today.

Mr. LAFALCE, for 5 minutes, today.

Mr. ALEXANDER, for 60 minutes, on May 17.

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

By unanimous consent, permission to revise and extend remarks was granted to:

Mr. LOWERY of California, immediately preceding the vote on the MX, on H.R. 5167, in the Committee of the Whole today.

(The following Members (at the request of Mr. BILIRAKIS) and to include extraneous matter:)

Mr. LENT.

Mr. JEFFORDS.

Mr. YOUNG of Alaska in three instances.

Mr. PORTER.

Mrs. VUCANOVICH.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO.

Mr. BROOMFIELD in three instances.

Mr. SHUMWAY.

Mr. GEKAS.

Mr. MCGRATH.

Mr. DAUB.

Mr. WORTLEY.

Mr. WILLIAMS of Ohio.

Mr. KEMP in two instances.

Mr. MARTIN of North Carolina.

Mr. WOLF.

(The following Members (at the request of Mr. TAUZIN) and to include extraneous matter:)

Mr. PEASE.

Mr. HAMILTON in two instances.

Mr. ROYBAL.

Mr. HERTEL of Michigan.

Mrs. BYRON.

Mr. FLORIO.

Mr. DORGAN.

Mr. FASCELL.

Mr. COLEMAN of Texas.

Mr. ACKERMAN in four instances.

Mr. SKELTON in two instances.

Mr. SCHUMER.

Mr. STOKES in two instances.

Mr. ROSTENKOWSKI.

Mr. LAFALCE.

Mr. GEJDENSON.

Mr. LONG of Maryland.

Mr. MOAKLEY.

Mr. OBEY.

Mr. LEVINE of California.

Mr. MURPHY.

Mr. EDWARDS of California.

Mr. LANTOS.

Mr. TOWNS.

Mr. WIRTH.

Ms. FERRARO.

Mr. ADDABBO.

Mr. STARK.

Mr. SOLARZ.

ADJOURNMENT

Mr. GONZALEZ. Mr. Speaker, I move that the House do now adjourn.

The motion was agreed to; accordingly (at 10 o'clock and 21 minutes p.m.), the House adjourned until tomorrow, Thursday, May 17, 1984, at 10 a.m.

EXECUTIVE COMMUNICATIONS, ETC.

Under clause 2 of rule XXIV, executive communications were taken from the Speaker's table and referred as follows:

3363. A letter from the Under Secretary of Defense (Research and Engineering) transmitting the 1983 annual report on the defense industrial reserve, pursuant to the act of July 2, 1948, chapter 811, section 5 (87 Stat. 618); to the Committee on Armed Services.

3364. A letter from the General Counsel, Department of Defense, transmitting a draft of proposed legislation to amend title 10, United States Code, to authorize waiver of application of any provisions of law in connection with the acquisition of petroleum products during periods of petroleum shortages, and for other purposes, pursuant to 31 U.S.C. 1110; to the Committee on Armed Services.

3365. A letter from the Acting Commissioner, Social Security Administration, transmitting notification of a proposed new system of records, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(o); to the Committee on Government Operations.

3366. A letter from the Secretary of the Interior transmitting notification of a proposal received under the Small Reclamation Projects Act, pursuant to the act of August 6, 1956, chapter 972, section 10; to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

3367. A letter from the controller, Boys' Clubs of America, transmitting a copy of the Boys Clubs' audited financial report for the year ending December 31, 1983, pursuant to Public Law 88-504, section 3 (36 U.S.C. 1103); to the Committee on the Judiciary.

3368. A letter from the Director, National Legislative Commission, the American Legion, transmitting statements describing the financial condition of the American Legion as of December 31, 1983, pursuant to Public Law 88-504, section 3 (36 U.S.C. 1103); to the Committee on the Judiciary.

3369. A letter from the Secretary of Transportation transmitting the fourth annual report on the status of the development of collision avoidance systems in the national air traffic control system, pursuant to Public Law 96-193, section 401; to the Committee on Public Works and Transportation.

3370. A letter from the Acting Assistant Secretary for Conservation and Renewable Energy, Department of Energy, transmitting the eighth annual Interagency Geothermal Coordinating Council report for fiscal year 1983, pursuant to Public Law 93-410, section 302(a); to the Committee on Science and Technology.

3371. A letter from the Executive Secretary, Department of Defense, transmitting a report on DOD procurement from small and other business firms for October through November 1983, pursuant to SBA, section 10(d); to the Committee on Small Business.

3372. A letter from the Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative and Intergovernmental Affairs transmitting a report on emigration and human rights policies of the Government of Haiti and its cooperation with U.S. efforts in halting illegal emigration for Haiti and with U.S. development assistance progams with Haiti, pursuant to Public Law 98-151, section 101(b)(2) (97 Stat. 971); jointly to the Committees on Appropriations and Foreign Affairs.

3373. A letter from the Secretary of Energy transmitting a copy of the seventh annual report on Federal energy education, extension, and information activities, pursuant to Public Law 95-39, Section 509(c) and Public Law 96-294, Section 404; jointly, to the Committees on Energy and Commerce and Science and Technology.

3374. A letter from the Acting Comptroller General of the United States transmitting a report entitled "An Assessment of SES Performance Appraisal Systems," (GAO/GGD-84-16, May 16, 1984), pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 4312(c)(2), jointly, to the Committees on Government Operations and Post Office and Civil Service.

3375. A letter from the Comptroller General of the United States transmitting a report entitled "Examination of the Financial Statements of the Export-Import Bank of the United States for the Fiscal Year ended September 30, 1983," (GAO/AFMD-84-48, April 26, 1984), pursuant to 31 U.S.C. 9106(a); jointly, to the Committees on Government Operations and Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs.

3376. A letter from the Acting Comptroller General of the United States transmitting a report entitled "Assessment of Special Rules Exempting Employers Withdrawing from Multiemployer Pension Plans from Withdrawal Liability," (GAO/HRD-84-1, May 14, 1984), pursuant to Public Law 96-364, Section 413(a); jointly, to the Committees on Government Operations, Education and Labor, and Ways and Means.

REPORTS OF COMMITTEES ON PUBLIC BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS

Under clause 2 of rule XIII, reports of committees were delivered to the Clerk for printing and reference to the proper calendar, as follows:

[Omitted from the Record of May 15, 1984]

Mr. DE LA GARZA: Committee on Agriculture. H.R. 5151. A bill to alleviate hunger in the United States by strengthening Federal nutrition programs; with an amendment (Rept. No. 98-782, Pt. I). Ordered to be printed.

[Submitted May 16, 1984]

Mr. ROSTENKOWSKI: Committee on Ways and Means. H.R. 5665. A bill to provide for a temporary increase in the public debt limit, and for other purposes. (Rept. No. 98-785). Referred to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union.

REPORTED BILLS SEQUENTIALLY REFERRED

Under clause 5 of rule X, bills and reports were delivered to the Clerk for printing, and bills referred as follows:

[Omitted from the Record of May 15, 1984]

Mr. MONTGOMERY: Committee on Veterans' Affairs. H.R. 4694. A bill to amend title 38, United States Code, to authorize the Administrator of Veterans' Affairs to waive mandatory reductions in military retirement pay of certain retired military officers recruited for employment by the Department of Medicine and Surgery; referred to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service for a period ending not later than June 15, 1984, for consideration of such provisions of the bill as fall within that committee's jurisdiction pursuant to clause 1(o), rule X (Rept. No. 98-783, Pt. I). Ordered to be printed.

PUBLIC BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS

Under clause 5 of rule X and clause 4 of rule XXII, public bills and resolutions were introduced and severally referred as follows:

By Mr. ROSTENKOWSKI (for himself and Mr. CONABLE):

H.R. 5665. A bill to provide for a temporary increase in the public debt limit, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. ANTHONY:

H.R. 5666. A bill to designate the Calion lock and dam located on the Quachita River, near Calion, Ark., as the "H. K. Thatcher Lock and Dam"; to the Committee on Public Works and Transportation.

By Mr McKINNEY (by request):

H.R. 5667. A bill to establish the Mental Health Corporation, and for other purposes; to the Committee on the District of Columbia.

By Mr. OTTINGER:

H.R. 5668. A bill to amend title 18, United States Code, to exempt certain individuals, persons and organizations from the prohibition against depositing in residential letter boxes nonprofit, noncommercial mailable matter on which no postage has been paid; jointly, to the Committees on the Judiciary and Post Office and Civil Service.

By Mr. STARK:

H.R. 5669. A bill to increase the column 1 rates of duty on certain structural units of iron or steel, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. YOUNG of Alaska (for himself and Mr. DAVIS):

H.R. 5670. A bill to require construction contractors for the Coast Guard to employ local residents in areas of high unemployment; to the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries.

By Mr. MOAKLEY:

H.J. Res. 571. Joint resolution designating July 28, 1984, as "First United States Olympic Team Day" in honor of the U.S. participants in the 1896 Olympics; to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service.

MEMORIALS

Under clause 4 of rule XXII, memorials were presented and referred as follows:

393. By the SPEAKER: Memorial of the General Assembly of the State of Colorado, relative to preferential treatment to cash paying customers; to the Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs.

394. Also memorial of the Senate of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, relative to congratulating the State of Israel on the 36th anniversary of its founding year; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

395. By Mr. RUDD: Memorial of the Legislature of the State of Arizona, relative to the restriction of travel by Soviet diplomats in Arizona; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

396. Also, memorial of the Legislature of the State of Arizona, relative to the persecution of the Baha'is in Iran; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

ADDITIONAL SPONSORS

Under clause 4 of rule XXII, sponsors were added to public bills and resolutions as follows:

H.R. 1657: Mr. SOLARZ and Mr. HANCE.

H.R. 2053: Mr. KLECZKA.

H.R. 2262: Mr. BADHAM, Mr. HUNTER, and Ms. MIKULSKI.

H.R. 2468: Mr. GOODLING.

H.R. 2960: Mr. MCHUGH, Mr. DOWNEY of New York, and Mr. SCHEUER.

H.R. 2976: Mr. LEVIN of Michigan.

H.R. 3200: Mr. GREGG, Mr. BOUCHER, Mr. DIXON, Mr. ROYBAL, Mr. CARPER, Mr. BROWN of California, Mr. CROCKETT, Mr. SABO, Mrs. COLLINS, Mr. OWENS, and Mr. WEAVER.

H.R. 3750: Mr. EDGAR, Mr. SAVAGE, Mr. HEFTEL of Hawaii, Mr. GUARINI, Mr. GORE, Mr. SKELTON, Mr. BIAGGI, and Mr. SIKORSKI.

H.R. 3775: Mr. STARK.

H.R. 3821: Mr. MARTINEZ and Mrs. SCHNEIDER.

H.R. 4360: Mr. ACKERMAN, Mr. SHANNON, and Mr. DONNELLY.

H.R. 4440: Mr. BATES, Mr. BORSKI, Mr. HOWARD, Mr. HUGHES, Mr. SIKORSKI, and Mr. WISE.

H.R. 4760: Mr. LELAND and Mr. STOKES.

H.R. 4773: Mr. PATMAN, Mr. MOODY, Mr. PURSELL, Mr. BOEHLERT, Mr. ROTH, Mr. MCDADE, Mr. MCKERNAN, Mr. FRANK, and Mr. DAVIS.

H.R. 4832: Mr. CLINGER and Mr. WEISS.

H.R. 4966: Mr. SOLARZ.

H.R. 4988: Mr. STANGELAND.

H.R. 5032: Mr. YOUNG of Alaska, Mr. EDWARDS of California, Mrs. BURTON of California, Mr. PASHAYAN, Ms. MIKULSKI, Mr. AUCOIN, Mr. LUKEN, and Mr. GEJDENSON.

H.R. 5098: Mr. FEIGHAN, Mr. STARK, Mr. HOWARD, Mr. BATES, Mrs. BOXER, and Mr. HEFTEL of Hawaii.

H.R. 5196: Mr. WHITLEY and Mr. ACKERMAN.

H.R. 5261: Mr. ST GERMAIN.

H.R. 5310: Mr. KINDNESS, Mr. FRENZEL, Mr. SMITH of New Jersey, Mr. RANGEL, Mr. GILMAN, Mr. ST GERMAIN, Mr. RAHALL, Mr. BADHAM, Mr. HYDE, Mr. VOLKMER, Mr. THOMAS of California, Mr. GOODLING, and Mr. PASHAYAN.

H.R. 5335: Mr. WEISS, Mr. TOWNS, Mr. HUGHES, and Mr. SEIBERLING.

H.R. 5377: Mr. LAFALCE, Mr. LEVIN of Michigan, Mr. GEJDENSON, and Mr. D'AMOURS.

H.R. 5440: Mr. DOWNEY of New York, Mr. HUGHES, Mr. LUKEN, Mr. MITCHELL, Mrs. HALL of Indiana, and Mr. WEAVER.

H.R. 5486: Mr. GOODLING and Mr. BLILEY.

5496: Mr. SIKORSKI.

H.R. 5511: Mr. DEWINE and Ms. KAPTUR.

H.R. 5538: Mr. SIKORSKI.

H.R. 5568: Mr. ADDABBO, Mr. SCHUMER, Mr. HERTEL of Michigan, Mr. MCKINNEY, and Mr. MITCHELL.

H.R. 5569: Mrs. SCHNEIDER, Mr. HOYER, Mr. WOLPE, Mr. DYMALLY, Ms. FIEDLER, Mr. RATCHFORD, Mr. CROCKETT, Mr. LEVIN of Michigan, Mr. LONG of Louisiana, Mr. RANGEL, Mr. FRANK, and Mr. CONABLE.

H.R. 5571: Mr. FORD of Tennessee, Mr. FORD of Michigan, Mr. WYDEN, and Mr. LEHMAN of California.

H.R. 5591: Mr. STOKES, Mr. CONYERS, Mr. MITCHELL, Mr. EDWARDS of California, Mr. MRAZEK, Mr. WEAVER, Mr. EVANS of Illinois, and Mr. GARCIA.

H.R. 5601: Mr. SIKORSKI.

H.R. 5602: Mr. SIKORSKI.

H.R. 5640: Mr. HUGHES, Mr. PRITCHARD, Mr. ADDABBO, Mr. SIKORSKI, and Mrs. JOHNSON.

H.J. Res. 153: Mr. HANCE, Mr. SHANNON, Mr. BRYANT, Mr. LEATH of Texas, Mr. HOYER, and Mrs. JOHNSON.

H.J. Res. 272: Mr. LONG of Louisiana, Mr. LAGOMARSINO, and Mr. MCEWEN.

H.J. Res. 389: Mrs. ROUKEMA.

H.J. Res. 497: Mr. CHAPPIE, Mr. BURTON of Indiana, Mr. GREGG, Mr. SCHEUER, Mr. PANETTA, Mr. COLEMAN of Texas, Mr. ALBOSTA, Mr. CLINGER, Mr. OXLEY, Mr. WEAVER, Mr. LIVINGSTON, Mr. BARTLETT, Mr. YATRON, Mr. IRELAND, Mr. LOEFFLER, Mr. ANTHONY, Mr. DAVIS, and Mr. ALEXANDER.

H.J. Res. 512: Mrs. ROUKEMA, Mr. HYDE, Mr. GREEN, Mr. RANGEL, Mr. LEVIN of Michigan, Mr. ANDREWS of Texas, Mr. WEISS, Mr. WOLF, Mr. FEIGHAN, Mrs. SCHNEIDER, Mr. MARRIOTT, Mr. GRADISON, Mr. RATCHFORD, Mr. PORTER, Mr. ST GERMAIN, Mr. VANDERGRIFF, Mr. MADIGAN, Mr. REID, Mr. LOEFFLER, Mr. YATRON, Mr. LUKEN, and Mr. OTTINGER.

H.J. Res. 526: Mr. ANDREWS of North Carolina, Mr. KEMP, Mr. STOKES, Mr. KASTENMEIER, Ms. KAPTUR, Mr. SNYDER, Mr. HIGHTOWER, Mr. BREAUX, Mr. FISH, Mr. CARNEY, Mr. HYDE, Mr. FAUNTROY, Mr. DENNY SMITH, Mr. BLILEY, Mr. OXLEY, Mr. BILIRAKIS, Mr. BURTON of Indiana, Mr. GINGRICH, Mr. FUQUA, Mr. TOWNS, Mr. BROYHILL, Mr. RINALDO, Mr. WORTLEY, Mr. TORRICELLI, Mr. DIXON, Mr. BONER of Tennessee, Mr. SKEEN, Mr. NEAL, Mr. PRITCHARD, Mr. RIDGE, Mr. RICHARDSON, Mr. GEKAS, Mr. ADDABBO, Mr. SHUSTER, Mr. BARNES, Mr. CHANDLER, Mr. FLIPPO, Mr. SUNIA, Mr. THOMAS of California, Mrs. BOXER, Mr. STAGGERS, Mrs. MARTIN of Illinois, Mr. BROWN of Colorado, Mr. ROEMER, Mr. MOLINARI, Mr. HILER, Mr. CRAIG, Mrs. VUCANOVICH, Mr. DEWINE, Mr. HUCKABY, Mr. STUMP, Mr. IRELAND, Mr. MCCOLLUM, Mr. NICHOLS, Mr. KASICH, Mr. NIELSON of Utah Mr. SAM B. HALL, JR., Mr. KAZEN, Mr. PICKLE, Mr. BARTLETT, Mr. ROGERS, Mr. RUDD, Mr. PACKARD, Mr. MORRISON of Washington, Mr. GUNDERSON, Mr. MCGRATH, Mr. MCCAIN, Mr. GILMAN, Mr. SPENCE, Mr. SHAW, Mr. SUNDQUIST, Mr. PETRI, Mr. GREGG, Ms. SNOWE, Mrs. JOHNSON, Mr. FRANKLIN, Mr. SLATTERY, Mr. BENNETT, Mr. PARRIS, Mr. HILLIS, Mr. BROOMFIELD, Mr. ROSE, Mr. PERKINS, Mr. WIRTH, Mr. ROBINSON, Mr. LUNGREN, Mr. MYERS, Mr. WEAVER, Mr. DORGAN, Mr. CONABLE, Mr. YOUNG of Alaska, Mr. VANDER JAGT, Mr. EVANS of Illinois, Mr. COELHO, Mr. SMITH of New Jersey, Mr. WAXMAN, Mr. ANDERSON, Mr. LUNDINE, Mr. DURBIN, Mr. MCCURDY, Mr. SYNAR, Mr. AUCOIN, Mr. BEILENSON, and Mr. DOWNEY of New York.

H.J. Res. 533: Mr. MCKERNAN and Mr. EMERSON.

H.J. Res. 543: Mr. BARNARD, Mr. TORRICELLI, Mr. FAUNTROY, Mr. KOSTMAYER, Mr. CHAPPIE, Mr. LELAND, Mr. SHELBY, Mr. EDWARDS of Alabama, Mr. FLIPPO, Mr. REGULA, Mr. BENNETT, Mrs. BOXER, Mr. PACKARD, Mr. DICKINSON, Mr. LEWIS of Florida, Ms. OAKAR, Mr. KILDEE, Mr. MOLLOHAN, Mr. D'AMOURS, Mr. DOWDY of Mississippi, Mr. TAUKE, Mr. OWENS, Mr. ALEXANDER, Mr. FRANKLIN, Mr. SMITH of Florida, Mr. MCDADE, Mr. FASCELL, Mr. MURPHY, Mr. CLARKE, Mr. DWYER of New Jersey, Mr. STANGELAND, Mr. WEAVER, Mr. YATRON, Mr. RAHALL, Mr. ERDREICH, Mr. CORRADA, Mr. SAWYER, Mr. OLIN, Mr. DYSON, Mr. EMERSON, Mr. DYMALLY, Mr. BADHAM, Mr. ANTHONY, Mr. TALLON, Mr. TRAXLER, Mr. YOUNG of Florida, Mr. PASHAYAN, Mr. PURSELL, Mr. WINN, and Mr. QUILLEN.

H.J. Res. 563: Mr. GREEN, Mr. YOUNG of Missouri, and Mr. SIKORSKI.

H. Con. Res. 219: Mr. WYDEN and Mr. ANDREWS of Texas.

H. Con. Res. 226: Mr. HOPKINS, Mr. MARKEY, and Mr. SEIBERLING.

H. Con. Res. 260: Mrs. KENNELLY.

H. Con. Res. 265: Mr. ACKERMAN, Mr. DIXON, Mr. KILDEE, Mr. KOGOVSEK, Mr. MARTINEZ, Mr. MCHUGH, and Mr. WAXMAN.

PETITIONS, ETC.

Under clause 1 of rule XXII, petitions and papers were laid on the Clerk's desk and referred as follows:

364. By the SPEAKER: Petition of the Township Council of Bridgewater, N.J., relative to cable legislation; to the Committee on Energy and Commerce.

365. Also, petition of the City Council of Norfolk, Va., relative to municipalities liability under the Federal antitrust laws; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

AMENDMENTS

Under clause 6 of rule XXIII, proposed amendments were submitted as follows:

H.R. 5167

By Mr. GREEN:

—At the end of Title II, add the following new section:

LIMITATION OF FLIGHT TESTING OF MX MISSILE

SEC. . None of the funds appropriated pursuant to authorizations of appropriations in this or any other Act may be obligated for flight testing of the MX missile during fiscal year 1985 unless the president has certified to Congress that the Soviet Union, after the date of enactment of this Act, has flight tested a new type of intercontinental ballistic missile as defined under the provision of the SALT II agreement.

By Mr. LEVINE of California:

—Page 10, line 18, strike out "$25,243,200,000" and insert in lieu thereof "$25,253,700,000".

Page 11, strike out lines 19 through 22 and insert in lieu thereof the following:

(c) The Secretary of the Air Force may not make a contract for the procurement for engines for the F-15 aircraft that includes an amount for payment for the warranty required by section 797 of the Department of Defense Appropriation Act, 1983 (set forth in section 101(c) of Public Law 97-377), that is greater than 8 percent of the total contract price.

By Mr. OTTINGER:

—Page 131, line 5, insert "(a)" after "SEC. 801."

Page 131, after line 8, insert the following new subsection:

(b) None of the funds appropriated pursuant to the authorization of appropriations in subsection (a) may be used for civil defense programs to prepare for, or respond to, nuclear attack.

By Mrs. SCHROEDER:

—At the end of title I (page 15, after line 5) insert the following new section:

FREEZE ON TOTAL AMOUNT AUTHORIZED AT FISCAL YEAR 1984 APPROPRIATION LEVEL

SEC. 110. The total amount that may be appropriated pursuant to authorizations of appropriations in this title may not exceed the amount equal to 103 percent of the total amount appropriated for procurement for fiscal year 1984 in title IV of the Department of Defense Appropriation Act, 1984 (Public Law 98-212).

By Mr. SENSENBRENNER:

—At the end of title III (page 29, after line 14), insert the following new section:

TRANSPORTATION TO CENTRAL AMERICA OF SUPPLIES FOR HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

SEC. 310. The Secretary of Defense shall provide that during fiscal year 1985 supplies furnished by a source outside the Department of Defense that are intended for humanitarian assistance in a country in Central America shall be transported by the Department of Defense to that country on a space-available basis and (notwithstanding any other provision of law) at no charge. Any assistance transported pursuant to this section shall be distributed under the control of an agency of the United States government or its designee.