Amendment Text: H.Amdt.27 — 107th Congress (2001-2002)

There is one version of the amendment.

Shown Here:
Amendment as Offered (04/26/2001)

This Amendment appears on page H1640 in the following article from the Congressional Record.


[Pages H1612-H1650]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                 UNBORN VICTIMS OF VIOLENCE ACT OF 2001

  Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Speaker, pursuant to H. Res. 119, the rule 
just passed, I call up the bill (H.R. 503) to amend title 18, United 
States Code, and the Uniform Code of Military Justice to protect unborn 
children from assault and murder, and for other purposes, and ask for 
its immediate consideration.
  The Clerk read the title of the bill.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 119, the bill 
is considered read for amendment.
  The text of H.R. 503 is as follows:

                                H.R. 503

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``Unborn Victims of Violence 
     Act of 2001''.

     SEC. 2. PROTECTION OF UNBORN CHILDREN.

       (a) In General.--Title 18, United States Code, is amended 
     by inserting after chapter 90 the following:

              ``CHAPTER 90A--PROTECTION OF UNBORN CHILDREN

``Sec.
``1841. Protection of unborn children.

     ``Sec. 1841. Protection of unborn children

       ``(a)(1) Whoever engages in conduct that violates any of 
     the provisions of law listed in subsection (b) and thereby 
     causes the death of, or bodily injury (as defined in section 
     1365) to, a child, who is in utero at the time the conduct 
     takes place, is guilty of a separate offense under this 
     section.
       ``(2)(A) Except as otherwise provided in this paragraph, 
     the punishment for that separate offense is the same as the 
     punishment provided under Federal law for that conduct had 
     that injury or death occurred to the unborn child's mother.
       ``(B) An offense under this section does not require proof 
     that--
       ``(i) the person engaging in the conduct had knowledge or 
     should have had knowledge

[[Page H1613]]

     that the victim of the underlying offense was pregnant; or
       ``(ii) the defendant intended to cause the death of, or 
     bodily injury to, the unborn child.
       ``(C) If the person engaging in the conduct thereby 
     intentionally kills or attempts to kill the unborn child, 
     that person shall instead of being punished under 
     subparagraph (A), be punished as provided under sections 
     1111, 1112, and 1113 of this title for intentionally killing 
     or attempting to kill a human being.
       ``(D) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the death 
     penalty shall not be imposed for an offense under this 
     section.
       ``(b) The provisions referred to in subsection (a) are the 
     following:
       ``(1) Sections 36, 37, 43, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 229, 
     242, 245, 247, 248, 351, 831, 844 (d), (f), (h)(1), and (i), 
     924(j), 930, 1111, 1112, 1113, 1114, 1116, 1118, 1119, 1120, 
     1121, 1153(a), 1201(a), 1203, 1365(a), 1501, 1503, 1505, 
     1512, 1513, 1751, 1864, 1951, 1952 (a)(1)(B), (a)(2)(B), and 
     (a)(3)(B), 1958, 1959, 1992, 2113, 2114, 2116, 2118, 2119, 
     2191, 2231, 2241(a), 2245, 2261, 2261A, 2280, 2281, 2332, 
     2332a, 2332b, 2340A, and 2441 of this title.
       ``(2) Section 408(e) of the Controlled Substances Act of 
     1970 (21 U.S.C. 848(e)).
       ``(3) Section 202 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 
     U.S.C. 2283).
       ``(c) Nothing in this section shall be construed to permit 
     the prosecution--
       ``(1) of any person for conduct relating to an abortion for 
     which the consent of the pregnant woman, or a person 
     authorized by law to act on her behalf, has been obtained or 
     for which such consent is implied by law;
       ``(2) of any person for any medical treatment of the 
     pregnant woman or her unborn child; or
       ``(3) of any woman with respect to her unborn child.
       ``(d) As used in this section, the term `unborn child' 
     means a child in utero, and the term `child in utero' or 
     `child, who is in utero' means a member of the species homo 
     sapiens, at any stage of development, who is carried in the 
     womb.''.
       (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of chapters for part I 
     of title 18, United States Code, is amended by inserting 
     after the item relating to chapter 90 the following new item:

``90A. Protection of unborn children........................1841''.....

     SEC. 3. MILITARY JUSTICE SYSTEM.

       (a) Protection of Unborn Children.--Subchapter X of chapter 
     47 of title 10, United States Code (the Uniform Code of 
     Military Justice), is amended by inserting after section 919 
     (article 119) the following new section:

     ``Sec. 919a. Art. 119a. Protection of unborn children

       ``(a)(1) Any person subject to this chapter who engages in 
     conduct that violates any of the provisions of law listed in 
     subsection (b) and thereby causes the death of, or bodily 
     injury (as defined in section 1365 of title 18) to, a child, 
     who is in utero at the time the conduct takes place, is 
     guilty of a separate offense under this section.
       ``(2)(A) Except as otherwise provided in this paragraph, 
     the punishment for that separate offense is the same as the 
     punishment provided under this chapter for that conduct had 
     that injury or death occurred to the unborn child's mother.
       ``(B) An offense under this section does not require proof 
     that--
       ``(i) the person engaging in the conduct had knowledge or 
     should have had knowledge that the victim of the underlying 
     offense was pregnant; or
       ``(ii) the accused intended to cause the death of, or 
     bodily injury to, the unborn child.
       ``(C) If the person engaging in the conduct thereby 
     intentionally kills or attempts to kill the unborn child, 
     that person shall, instead of being punished under 
     subparagraph (A), be punished as provided under sections 880, 
     918, and 919(a) of this title (articles 80, 118, and 119(a)) 
     for intentionally killing or attempting to kill a human 
     being.
       ``(D) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the death 
     penalty shall not be imposed for an offense under this 
     section.
       ``(b) The provisions referred to in subsection (a) are 
     sections 918, 919(a), 919(b)(2), 920(a), 922, 924, 926, and 
     928 of this title (articles 118, 119(a), 119(b)(2), 120(a), 
     122, 124, 126, and 128).
       ``(c) Nothing in this section shall be construed to permit 
     the prosecution--
       ``(1) of any person for conduct relating to an abortion for 
     which the consent of the pregnant woman, or a person 
     authorized by law to act on her behalf, has been obtained or 
     for which such consent is implied by law;
       ``(2) of any person for any medical treatment of the 
     pregnant woman or her unborn child; or
       ``(3) of any woman with respect to her unborn child.
       ``(d) In this section, the term `unborn child' means a 
     child in utero, and the term `child in utero' or `child, who 
     is in utero' means a member of the species homo sapiens, at 
     any stage of development, who is carried in the womb.''.
       (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of sections at the 
     beginning of such subchapter is amended by inserting after 
     the item relating to section 919 the following new item:

``919a. 119a. Protection of unborn children.''.

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 119, the 
amendment printed in House Report 107-50 is considered adopted.
  The text of H.R. 503, as amended pursuant to House Resolution 119, is 
as follows:

                                H.R. 503

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``Unborn Victims of Violence 
     Act of 2001''.

     SEC. 2. PROTECTION OF UNBORN CHILDREN.

       (a) In General.--Title 18, United States Code, is amended 
     by inserting after chapter 90 the following:

              ``CHAPTER 90A--PROTECTION OF UNBORN CHILDREN

``Sec.
``1841. Protection of unborn children.

     ``Sec. 1841. Protection of unborn children

       ``(a)(1) Whoever engages in conduct that violates any of 
     the provisions of law listed in subsection (b) and thereby 
     causes the death of, or bodily injury (as defined in section 
     1365) to, a child, who is in utero at the time the conduct 
     takes place, is guilty of a separate offense under this 
     section.
       ``(2)(A) Except as otherwise provided in this paragraph, 
     the punishment for that separate offense is the same as the 
     punishment provided under Federal law for that conduct had 
     that injury or death occurred to the unborn child's mother.
       ``(B) An offense under this section does not require proof 
     that--
       ``(i) the person engaging in the conduct had knowledge or 
     should have had knowledge that the victim of the underlying 
     offense was pregnant; or
       ``(ii) the defendant intended to cause the death of, or 
     bodily injury to, the unborn child.
       ``(C) If the person engaging in the conduct thereby 
     intentionally kills or attempts to kill the unborn child, 
     that person shall instead of being punished under 
     subparagraph (A), be punished as provided under sections 
     1111, 1112, and 1113 of this title for intentionally killing 
     or attempting to kill a human being.
       ``(D) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the death 
     penalty shall not be imposed for an offense under this 
     section.
       ``(b) The provisions referred to in subsection (a) are the 
     following:
       ``(1) Sections 36, 37, 43, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 229, 
     242, 245, 247, 248, 351, 831, 844(d), (f), (h)(1), and (i), 
     924(j), 930, 1111, 1112, 1113, 1114, 1116, 1118, 1119, 1120, 
     1121, 1153(a), 1201(a), 1203, 1365(a), 1501, 1503, 1505, 
     1512, 1513, 1751, 1864, 1951, 1952 (a)(1)(B), (a)(2)(B), and 
     (a)(3)(B), 1958, 1959, 1992, 2113, 2114, 2116, 2118, 2119, 
     2191, 2231, 2241(a), 2245, 2261, 2261A, 2280, 2281, 2332, 
     2332a, 2332b, 2340A, and 2441 of this title.
       ``(2) Section 408(e) of the Controlled Substances Act of 
     1970 (21 U.S.C. 848(e)).
       ``(3) Section 202 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 
     U.S.C. 2283).
       ``(c) Nothing in this section shall be construed to permit 
     the prosecution--
       ``(1) of any person for conduct relating to an abortion for 
     which the consent of the pregnant woman, or a person 
     authorized by law to act on her behalf, has been obtained or 
     for which such consent is implied by law;
       ``(2) of any person for any medical treatment of the 
     pregnant woman or her unborn child; or
       ``(3) of any woman with respect to her unborn child.
       ``(d) As used in this section, the term `unborn child' 
     means a child in utero, and the term `child in utero' or 
     `child, who is in utero' means a member of the species homo 
     sapiens, at any stage of development, who is carried in the 
     womb.''.
       (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of chapters for part I 
     of title 18, United States Code, is amended by inserting 
     after the item relating to chapter 90 the following new item:

``90A. Protection of unborn children........................1841''.....

     SEC. 3. MILITARY JUSTICE SYSTEM.

       (a) Protection of Unborn Children.--Subchapter X of chapter 
     47 of title 10, United States Code (the Uniform Code of 
     Military Justice), is amended by inserting after section 919 
     (article 119) the following new section:

     ``Sec. 919a. Art. 119a. Causing death of or bodily injury to 
       unborn children

       ``(a)(1) Any person subject to this chapter who engages in 
     conduct that violates any of the provisions of law listed in 
     subsection (b) and thereby causes the death of, or bodily 
     injury (as defined in section 1365 of title 18) to, a child, 
     who is in utero at the time the conduct takes place, is 
     guilty of a separate offense under this section.
       ``(2)(A) Except as otherwise provided in this paragraph, 
     the punishment for that separate offense is the same as the 
     punishment provided under this chapter for that conduct had 
     that injury or death occurred to the unborn child's mother.
       ``(B) An offense under this section does not require proof 
     that--
       ``(i) the person engaging in the conduct had knowledge or 
     should have had knowledge that the victim of the underlying 
     offense was pregnant; or
       ``(ii) the accused intended to cause the death of, or 
     bodily injury to, the unborn child.
       ``(C) If the person engaging in the conduct thereby 
     intentionally kills or attempts to kill the unborn child, 
     that person shall, instead of being punished under 
     subparagraph (A), be punished as provided under sections

[[Page H1614]]

     880, 918, and 919(a) of this title (articles 80, 118, and 
     119(a)) for intentionally killing or attempting to kill a 
     human being.
       ``(D) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the death 
     penalty shall not be imposed for an offense under this 
     section.
       ``(b) The provisions referred to in subsection (a) are 
     sections 918, 919(a), 919(b)(2), 920(a), 922, 924, 926, and 
     928 of this title (articles 118, 119(a), 119(b)(2), 120(a), 
     122, 124, 126, and 128).
       ``(c) Nothing in this section shall be construed to permit 
     the prosecution--
       ``(1) of any person for conduct relating to an abortion for 
     which the consent of the pregnant woman, or a person 
     authorized by law to act on her behalf, has been obtained or 
     for which such consent is implied by law;
       ``(2) of any person for any medical treatment of the 
     pregnant woman or her unborn child; or
       ``(3) of any woman with respect to her unborn child.
       ``(d) In this section, the term `unborn child' means a 
     child in utero, and the term `child in utero' or `child, who 
     is in utero' means a member of the species homo sapiens, at 
     any stage of development, who is carried in the womb.''.
       (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of sections at the 
     beginning of such subchapter is amended by inserting after 
     the item relating to section 919 the following new item:

``919a. Art. 119a. Causing death of or bodily injury to unborn 
              children.''.

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. After 2 hours of debate on the bill, as 
amended, it shall be in order to consider an amendment in the nature of 
a substitute printed in the Congressional Record and numbered 1, if 
offered by the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Lofgren) or her 
designee, which shall be considered read and shall be debatable for 60 
minutes, equally divided and controlled by the proponent and an 
opponent.
  The gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. Sensenbrenner) and the gentleman 
from Michigan (Mr. Conyers) each will control 60 minutes of debate on 
the bill.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. 
Sensenbrenner).
  Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of H.R. 503, the Unborn Victims 
of Violence Act of 2001. Under current Federal law, an individual who 
commits a Federal crime of violence against a pregnant woman receives 
an additional punishment for killing or injuring that woman's unborn 
child during the commission of the crime. As a result, except in those 
States that recognize unborn children as victims of such crimes, 
injuring or killing an unborn child during the commission of a violent 
crime has no legal consequence whatsoever.
  This deficiency in the law is especially troubling, considering the 
findings of a recent study of women in Maryland published in the March 
21, 2001, issue of the Journal of the American Medical Association. The 
authors of this study found that homicide is likely the leading cause 
of death among women who are pregnant or were recently pregnant.
  Another recent study of autopsies performed on women here in the 
District of Columbia revealed that an inordinate number of women who 
died of violence were also pregnant. This study prompted a call for an 
investigation by the General Accounting Office and the FBI.
  Mr. Speaker, H.R. 503, the Unborn Victims of Violence Act of 2001, 
was designed to correct this deficiency in Federal law by providing 
that an individual who injuries or kills an unborn child during the 
commission of certain predefined violent Federal crimes may be punished 
for a separate offense. The Subcommittee on the Constitution held a 
hearing on virtually identical legislation during the 106th Congress, 
and the bill passed the House with strong bipartisan support on 
September 30, 1999, by a vote of 254 to 172.
  During the current Congress, the Subcommittee on the Constitution 
held a hearing on this legislation on March 15, 2001. The subcommittee 
held a markup on the legislation on March 21, 2001, and reported the 
bill without amendment by a voice vote. On March 28, 2001, the full 
Committee on the Judiciary held a markup and favorably reported H.R. 
503, without amendment, by a recorded vote of 15 to 9.
  Under the act, the punishment for an offense against the unborn child 
will be the same punishment that would have been imposed under Federal 
law had that conduct resulted in the same injury to the mother. For 
example, if an individual assaults a Federal official in violation of 
18 United States Code Section 111, as a result of that assault kills 
the official's unborn child, the perpetrator may be punished for either 
second degree murder, voluntary manslaughter, or involuntary 
manslaughter, for killing the unborn child, the same punishment the 
individual would have received had the Federal official died as a 
result of the assault. By its own terms, the act does not apply to 
conduct relating to an abortion for which the consent of the pregnant 
woman has been obtained or for which such consent is implied by law in 
a medical emergency.

                              {time}  1045

  So this is not an abortion bill. The act does not permit prosecution 
of any person for any medical treatment of the pregnant woman or her 
unborn child or the mother for any conduct with respect to her unborn 
child.
  The Unborn Victims of Violence Act of 2001 will provide just 
punishment for criminals like Glendale R. Black of Wisconsin, who on 
February 8, 1992, brutally beat his wife, Terry Marciniak, who was 9 
months pregnant with her unborn baby, Zachariah. Little Zachariah was 
just 4 days from being delivered from his mother's womb. At the 
hospital, Zachariah was delivered dead.
  At that time, Wisconsin did not have an unborn victims law like H.R. 
503, so Black was convicted of only assault and is already eligible for 
parole.
  The bill would also provide punishment for criminals like Reginald 
Anthony Falice, who on April 28, 1998, shot his 8-month-pregnant wife, 
Ruth Croston, at least five times as she sat at a red light in 
Charlotte, North Carolina. Falice was convicted by a Federal jury for 
interstate domestic violence and using a firearm in the commission of a 
violent crime, but because Federal law did not currently recognize the 
unborn as victims, he received no additional punishment for killing the 
near-term infant.
  Ms. Croston's brother, William Croston, testified before the 
Subcommittee on the Constitution regarding the tragic death of his 
sister and the failure of Federal law to recognize the murder of his 
unborn niece.
  Or criminals who planted a bomb just outside of Tammy Lynn Baker's 
apartment in Louisa, Virginia. Ms. Baker was near term with her unborn 
child when the bomb exploded on December 3, 1997, killing her and the 
child.
  Nearly 3 years later, Coleman Johnson, the unborn child's father, was 
arrested on a Federal explosives charge for the death of Ms. Baker and 
is awaiting trial. His charges do not include the murder of his unborn 
child.
  A similar incident occurred in Connellsville, Pennsylvania on January 
1, 1999, when Deanna Mitts, who was 8 months pregnant, returned home 
from a New Year's Eve celebration with her 3-year-old daughter, Kayla. 
A bomb exploded in her apartment, killing Ms. Mitts, Kayla, and the 
unborn child.
  Almost a year later, Joseph Minerd, the presumed father of the unborn 
child, was arrested for Deanna and Kayla's murder, but is not being 
held criminally liable for the harm caused to the unborn child.
  This legislation would also ensure just punishment for criminals like 
Gregory Robbins, an airman at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, in Ohio 
who wrapped his fist in a T-shirt to reduce the chance he would inflict 
visible bruises, and beat his 8-months pregnant wife in the face and 
abdomen, killing their unborn baby.
  Military prosecutors were able to charge Robbins for death of the 
unborn child by assimilating Ohio's fetal homicide law through the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice. Had Mr. Robbins beaten his wife just 
across the river in Kentucky, a State which has no fetal homicide law, 
he would have received no additional punishment for killing the unborn 
child.
  By enacting H.R. 503, Congress will ensure that criminals who commit 
violent acts against pregnant women are justly punished for killing 
unborn children or injuring them. Without this bill, crimes against 
these innocent victims will go unpunished.
  I have given the Members of the House a list of several heinous 
crimes. It shows the need for this legislation. It shows specifically 
that killing an innocent unborn child should be prosecuted to the 
fullest extent of the law.

[[Page H1615]]

The only way to do this is to pass H.R. 503, and I urge my colleagues 
to support this important legislation.
  Mr. Speaker, at the request of the Chairman of the Armed Services 
Committee, Mr. Stump, I submit for the Record a letter he wrote to the 
Speaker relating to the floor consideration of H.R. 503, the ``Unborn 
Victims of Violence Act of 2001.''

                                  Committee on Armed Services,

                                   Washington, DC, April 23, 2001.
     Hon. J. Dennis Hastert,
     Speaker, House of Representatives,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Speaker: In recognition of the desire to expedite 
     floor consideration of H.R. 503, the Unborn Victims of 
     Violence Act of 2001, the Committee on Armed Services agrees 
     to waive its right to consider this legislation. H.R. 503, as 
     introduced and ordered reported by the Committee on the 
     Judiciary on April 20, 2001, contains subject matter that 
     falls within the legislative jurisdiction of the Committee on 
     Armed Services pursuant to rule X of the Rules of the House 
     of Representatives.
       The Committee on Armed Services takes this action with the 
     understanding that the Committee's jurisdiction over the 
     provisions in question is in no way diminished or altered, 
     and that the Committee's right to the appointment of 
     conferees during any conference on the bill remains intact.
           Sincerely,
                                                        Bob Stump,
                                                         Chairman.

  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, I am delighted to join my colleagues in this discussion. 
I have listened to the chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary begin 
by describing, I lost count, about seven or eight horrible, offensive, 
violent incidents in which a pregnant mother and her unborn child were 
hurt or killed.
  There is not anyone in the Congress that does not feel very strongly 
about the violence against unborn victims. But if that is going to be 
the way we get to undermining Roe v. Wade, I do not think it is going 
to happen here today, because I think our job is to make it clear what 
is really going on.
  Just for the record, I would like everybody to know that there is 
punishment for the killing of a fetus. It was stated that there is no 
punishment that exists today. It is in the Federal law. It is in the 
current Federal sentencing guidelines that permit the enhancement of a 
sentence under the vulnerable victims guideline. So that is number one.
  Number two, there is a substitute. There is a remedy to the flawed 
bill that has been brought on the floor. That is the Lofgren-Conyers 
substitute, which does everything, and in some instances it has more 
penalty for the person that attacks a pregnant mother and kills an 
unborn victim than the current bill, but it gets us around the 
subversion of Roe v. Wade, and it comports with Roe v. Wade.
  I am amazed that we would begin this discussion trying to skip around 
the whole heart of this debate. This is not a matter of how many 
anecdotes you can dig up. I have 40. The gentleman has 10. I have twice 
that amount.
  The question is, how are we going to deal with the subject, Mr. 
Speaker. The right way to do it is through the substitute, which is 
going to be dealing with a way to punish the people that violate 
mothers, and by the way, it is hard to deal with an unborn victim of 
violence without hurting the mother as well. So this is what we are 
here to discuss today.
  Let us be friendly about this. This act was designed to erode the 
foundation of a woman's right to choose under Roe v. Wade by simply 
elevating the legal statuses of prenatal development under Federal law, 
and creates a separate offense during the commission of a crime ``. . . 
which causes death to a member of the species homo sapiens at any stage 
of development.'' That is a quote from the bill.
  Well, that sounds okay, but what does it mean? It means that if 
enacted, this would be the first time in the Federal legal system that 
we would begin to recognize a fertilized egg, a zygote, a 
preimplantation embryo, a blastocyst and an embryo through 8 weeks of 
pregnancy or a fetus after 8 weeks which can be a person, which can be 
an independent violent crime. That is what the bill is trying to do.
  I did not know I would have to be the first to bring it to 
discussion, since I am against it, but no sneaking around today, we are 
going to have to put it all on the table, so we might as well start off 
now defending the proposition that is embedded fatally in H.R. 503.
  These acts against women are tragic and especially for pregnant 
women. But the true aim of this legislation is not to stop violence 
against women. In fact, the protections for women are notably absent 
from this legislation.
  So what we are here today to do is to determine whether or not we are 
going to undermine a woman's right to choose by recognizing that all of 
these things that have not had separate rights are now equal to and in 
some cases superior to women who are worthy of the legal protection.
  The Supreme Court has held, I remind all the lawyers on the Committee 
on the Judiciary, the Supreme Court has held that fetuses are not 
persons within the meaning of the 14th amendment. I am not going to 
repeat that. If enacted, the bill would improperly inject debates about 
abortion into criminal prosecutions across the country. That is 
unfortunate and tragic.
  I think that may be one of the purposes of why the proponents have 
written the bill up in this way. They have crafted a bill that is 
certain to inflame the national debate about when life begins. We do 
not want to do that. We just merely want to protect unborn victims of 
violence. The way to do it is by simply moving away from the notion 
that we have just created another category of persons that have not 
ever been recognized in the Federal legal system before now. That is 
why we are going to have a fair amount of opposition to this proposal.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Speaker, I yield 10 minutes to the gentleman 
from Ohio (Mr. Chabot).
  Mr. CHABOT. Mr. Speaker, I thank the chairman for yielding time to 
me, and I thank him for his leadership on this very important issue.
  Mr. Speaker, as we conduct this debate today, we going to hear from 
opponents that, for various reasons, the Unborn Victims of Violence Act 
of 2001 is unconstitutional. We will also hear that the legislation in 
some mysterious way applies to abortion.
  I want to make very clear from the beginning that these assertions 
are false. In fact, these arguments only serve as a smokescreen, a 
distraction from the real issue at hand.
  What are the real issues? Those of us supporting this legislation 
believe that when a criminal commits an act of violence against a woman 
and her unborn child, the criminal should face punishment for both the 
harm caused to the mother and for injuring or killing the innocent 
child that she is carrying.
  Opponents of the legislation feel otherwise. They believe that the 
criminal should not face separate sanctions for harm inflicted on the 
unborn child, even if the unborn child, a child that the mother greatly 
wanted to bring into this world, is killed.
  With that in mind, Mr. Speaker, I would like to take this opportunity 
to address the legal issues that have been raised regarding the Unborn 
Victims of Violence Act.
  First, questions have been raised about Congress' constitutional 
authority to enact this legislation. The challenge to the bill on this 
ground is completely without merit. It is clear that Congress has such 
constitutional authority because the bill will only affect conduct that 
is already prohibited by Federal law.
  H.R. 503 merely provides an additional offense and punishment for 
those who injure or kill an unborn child during the commission of one 
of the existing predicate offenses set forth in the bill. If there is 
any question regarding the constitutionality of the act's reach, that 
question is addressed to the constitutionality of the predicate 
offense, not H.R. 503.
  Opponents of this legislation also argued that it somehow violates 
the decision of the Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade. This argument is also 
without merit. To begin with, H.R. 503 simply does not apply to 
abortion. On page 4 of the bill, beginning on line 9, prosecution is 
explicitly precluded ``for any conduct relating to an abortion for 
which the consent of the pregnant woman has been obtained or for which 
such consent is implied by law.''

                              {time}  1100

  So it does not apply to abortion. The act also does not permit 
prosecution

[[Page H1616]]

``of any person for any medical treatment of the pregnant woman or her 
unborn child or of any woman with respect to her unborn child.'' So it 
does not apply to abortion, period. The act could not be more clear in 
exempting abortion.
  Moreover, there is nothing in Roe v. Wade that prevents Congress from 
giving legal recognition to the lives of unborn children outside the 
parameters of the right of abortion marked off in that case. In 
establishing a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy, the Roe court 
explicitly stated that it was not resolving ``the difficult question of 
when life begins,'' because ``the judiciary, at this point in the 
development of man's knowledge, is not in a position to speculate as to 
the answer.'' That is what the Court said.
  What the court held was that the government could not override the 
rights of the pregnant woman to choose to terminate her pregnancy by 
adopting one theory of when life begins. The Supreme Court explicitly 
confirmed this understanding of Roe in Webster v. Reproductive Health 
Services. That was a 1989 case.
  Courts addressing the constitutionality of State laws that punish 
killing or injuring unborn children have recognized the lack of merit 
in the argument that such laws violate Roe and as a result have 
consistently upheld those State laws. For example, in Smith v. Newsome, 
which was decided in 1987, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
11th Circuit held that Roe was immaterial to whether a State can 
prohibit the destruction of a fetus by a third party.
  The Minnesota Supreme Court echoed that sentiment in 1990 in the case 
of State v. Merrill, holding that Roe v. Wade protects the woman's 
right of choice. It does not protect, much less confer on an assailant, 
a third-party unilateral right to destroy the fetus.
  In 1994, the California Supreme Court held in People v. Davis that 
the Roe v. Wade principles are inapplicable to a statute that 
criminalizes the killing of a fetus without the mother's consent. In 
State v. Coleman, a 1997 case, the Ohio court, my State, the Court of 
Appeals stated, ``Roe protects a woman's constitutional right. It does 
not protect a third-party's unilateral destruction of a fetus.''
  Opponents of this legislation have also argued that the use of the 
term ``unborn child'' is ``designed to inflame.'' They contend that the 
use of this term may, in the words of those dissenting from the 
Committee on the Judiciary report, result in a major collision between 
the rights of the mother and the rights of the unborn.
  This objection reflects nothing more than the semantical preferences 
of the most radical abortion advocates. It is based upon an apparent 
lack of knowledge of the widespread use of the term ``unborn child'' in 
the decisions of the United States Supreme Court and the United States 
Courts of Appeals, in State statutes and in State court decisions, and 
even in the legal writings of abortion advocates themselves.
  The use of the term ``unborn child'' by the Supreme Court can be 
illustrated by reference to Roe v. Wade itself, in which Justice 
Blackmon used the term ``unborn children'' as synonymous with 
``fetuses.'' Justice Blackmon also used the term ``unborn child'' in 
Doe v. Bolton, the companion case to Roe, in which the court struck 
down Georgia's abortion statute.
  Subsequent Supreme Court decisions have also used the term ``unborn 
child'' as synonymous with fetus. These cases include City of Akron v. 
Akron Center for Reproductive Health, decided back in 1983; Webster v. 
Reproductive Health services, decided in 1989; and International Union 
v. Johnson Controls, decided in 1991.
  There are so many decisions by the United States Courts of Appeal 
using the term ``unborn child'' that it would be too time consuming to 
go through them all.
  There are also at least 19 State criminal statutes similar to H.R. 
503 that currently use the term ``unborn child'' to refer to a fetus, 
and these statutes have been consistently upheld by the courts.
  Even abortion advocates such as Catharine MacKinnon have used the 
term ``unborn child'' as synonymous with the term ``fetus.'' In an 
article that was published in the Yale Law Journal entitled 
``Reflections on Sex Equality Under the Law,'' Professor MacKinnon 
conceded that a ``fetus is a human form of life'' that is ``alive.'' In 
her defense of abortion, Professor MacKinnon expressed her view that 
``many women have abortions as a desperate act of love for their unborn 
children.''
  Finally, opponents of H.R. 503 have argued that the bill lacks the 
necessary means requirement for a valid criminal law and is therefore 
unconstitutional. This argument reflects a lack of understanding of 
H.R. 503 and the well-established doctrine of transferred intent in the 
criminal law.
  Under H.R. 503, an individual may be guilty of an offense against an 
unborn child only if he has committed an act of violence with criminal 
intent upon a pregnant woman, thereby injuring or killing her unborn 
child. Relying upon the doctrine of transferred intent, H.R. 503 
considers the criminal intent directed toward the pregnant woman to 
have also been directed toward the unborn child.
  The transferred intent doctrine was recognized in England as early as 
1576 and was adopted by the American courts during the early days of 
the Republic. A well-known criminal law commentator describes the 
application of the doctrine to the crime of murder in language that is 
remarkably similar to the language and operation of this legislation as 
follows: ``Under the common-law doctrine of transferred intent, a 
defendant who intends to kill one person but instead kills a bystander, 
is deemed the author of whatever kind of homicide would have been 
committed had he killed the intended victim,'' which is essentially 
what we have under this legislation.
  Mr. Speaker, it is clear that the legal challenges to this bill 
cannot withstand serious scrutiny. It is clear that this law does not 
in any way impact abortion. It is especially clear that the opposition 
of the bill, in fact, stems from an objection to the very concept of 
unborn children. The opponents insist that a concept that is a well-
recognized one in the law is somehow dangerous and subversive. These 
arguments should be soundly rejected. The only people who have anything 
to fear from this bill are the criminals who engage in violent acts 
against women and the unborn children that they are carrying.
  So, again, let me remind my colleagues of what the true question is 
before us. Do you believe that a violent criminal who kills or injures 
an unborn child, a child who is loved and wanted by a mother and 
usually the father, should face an additional offense and punishment 
for their acts? I believe that the American people would answer that 
question with a resounding yes, and I hope the House would do the same 
today.
  I thank the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Graham) for his 
leadership on this issue. I also thank the gentleman from Wisconsin 
(Mr. Sensenbrenner), chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary, for 
his leadership.
  I urge Members to vote in favor of the Unborn Victims of Violence 
Act.
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, I am delighted to hear from the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. 
Chabot), the subcommittee chairman. I would like him to know that all 
of us on our side and those that support the substitute believe 
strongly that victims of violence should be punished; the victims, both 
the mother and the unborn infant, the unborn victim. Okay. We all 
believe that. We do not have a different view on that. Okay.
  The second thing that you need to know is that, if this bill does not 
deal with abortion, which I will go into later, why is it coming out of 
the Subcommittee on the Constitution instead of the Subcommittee on 
Crime?
  Mr. Speaker, I yield to the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Chabot).
  Mr. CHABOT. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding to me. It 
is because the Subcommittee on the Constitution has jurisdiction over 
this particular issue, issues of privacy, issues of civil rights, a 
whole range of issues.
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, this is a civil rights bill?
  Mr. CHABOT. Pardon me?
  Mr. CONYERS. The gentleman from Ohio said this is a civil rights 
bill?
  Mr. CHABOT. Mr. Speaker, I am saying that is one among many of the

[[Page H1617]]

other issues. I was going to say it also has jurisdiction over 
constitutional amendments and all kinds of issues.
  Mr. CONYERS. All right. Is it a crime bill?
  Mr. CHABOT. Pardon me?
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, is it a crime bill? Yes or no?
  Mr. CHABOT. Mr. Speaker, it is an issue that clearly is a crime 
against unborn children and as well as the mothers.
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, the gentleman from Ohio is saying yes, I 
take it. It is sort of a crime bill.
  Mr. CHABOT. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. CONYERS. I yield to the gentleman from Ohio. It is a crime bill.
  Mr. CHABOT. Mr. Speaker, it is a crime bill as well as a 
constitutional issue.
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Ohio. It took a 
half a minute of my time to get to that. But it is a crime bill that 
comes out of the Subcommittee on the Constitution in the Committee on 
the Judiciary.
  Now, you think we do not know why, do you not? You think we thought 
that it was tossed there by accident. But it is tossed there because it 
is changing the fundamental constitutional law in the most controlling 
case on abortion in current Federal judicial practice, Roe v. Wade. 
That is why it went there.
  So I think that we ought to put all these cards on the table and not 
try to demonize the other side because we have a bill that does the 
same thing as the primary bill. But the only thing that we do not do is 
that we do not redefine what an embryo is. We do not change the status 
of a fetus or a fertilized egg. We do not make them all persons, and 
you do. There it is, I say to the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Chabot). 
That is the difference. If my colleagues corrected that difference, we 
would all be supporting their bill.
  It turned out that the Lofgren substitute is even more harsh on those 
who violate women who are pregnant. So I just wanted my colleagues to 
take that under consideration as we continue to debate.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentlewoman from California 
(Ms. Millender-McDonald) who is the chairperson of the Women's Caucus.
  Ms. MILLENDER-McDONALD. Mr. Speaker, let me thank the ranking member 
for his leadership on this issue.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong opposition to H.R. 503. As the cochair 
of the Congressional Caucus on Women's Issues, I am insulted by this 
misleading piece of legislation. This legislation is deceptive, 
destructive, and a poor attempt to mislead and strip away a woman's 
reproductive rights. This bill is extremely volatile and has the 
potentiality to eradicate a woman's right to choose as recognized by 
the landmark case Roe v. Wade.
  This bill, in fact, undermines a woman's right to choose as cited in 
the New York Times editorial yesterday, ``The Reproductive Rights Under 
Attack.'' In fact, it says, ``Packaged as a crime fighting measure, 
H.R. 503 is actually aimed at fulfilling a long-term goal of the right 
to life movement.''
  I stand firmly in the belief that women's reproductive decisions are 
private and their individual freedoms must be preserved. Those who 
support this bill claim that it is necessary in order to vigorously 
punish offenders who harm pregnant women. If the emphasis of the bill 
is to protect women, why is this not mentioned anywhere in the bill.
  Assault against pregnant women is serious. Legislation that has a 
separate agenda such as this one cannot provide the adequate protection 
to women.
  I oppose H.R. 503 because its real purpose is to erode the 
reproductive rights of women. It is not intended to recognize violence 
against women. In fact, it does not even reference a woman. It could 
make matters worse for women by encouraging antiabortion prosecutors to 
pursue charges for harm to embryos or the fetus while ignoring the 
woman who has also been harmed.
  Mr. Speaker, this is, indeed, a smoke screen. It is an affront to 
American women who wish to have their reproductive rights left to them. 
I say, if you are going to protect the rights of all other folks, the 
gun owners, the oil drillers, then protect the rights of women. I 
oppose H.R. 503.
  Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 2 minutes.
  Mr. Speaker, the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Conyers) has questioned 
the Subcommittee on the Constitution considering this bill and has said 
that this is a wholesale assault on the constitutional rights granted 
women by Roe v. Wade. He is wrong.
  Twenty-four States have statutes similar to the one that is being 
considered today. If those statutes which protect the rights of unborn 
children were such an assault on the mother's constitutional right, 
every one of them would have been struck down by a Federal court, from 
the District Court to the Supreme Court level. They have not been, 
because it is not an assault on the constitutional right of a woman to 
choose.
  Then we just heard from the gentlewoman from California (Ms. 
Millender-McDonald) that this strips away women's reproductive rights. 
I would submit to the gentlewoman from California that, if the woman 
wanted to have an abortion, she would have had an abortion before the 
assault took place. In these cases that this bill will protect, the 
woman wants to have her child born.

                              {time}  1115

  So she has already made her choice, and that was for the child to be 
born. If someone takes away that child's right to life through an 
assault or through a murder, then that person, that criminal, ought to 
be prosecuted twice. You do not want the criminal prosecuted twice when 
the woman has chosen to bring that child to term and have that child 
born alive.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the gentlewoman from Pennsylvania 
(Ms. Hart).
  Ms. HART. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of this bill and agree with 
the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. Sensenbrenner) and the gentleman from 
Ohio (Mr. Chabot) that this issue has nothing to do with abortion. 
Unlike the substitute that will be offered later today, this bill 
specifically exempts any activity involving a legal abortion. This bill 
is directed only at protecting the unborn child. It is an extension. In 
fact, this bill allows for an additional prosecution after a person has 
committed a violent act against the woman herself. Therefore, it does 
recognize the woman. In fact, it recognizes the woman first.
  Mr. Speaker, this woman that we are talking about must be pregnant, 
but she must first be a victim of a crime of one of over 60 Federal 
statutes that are violent acts perpetrated against the woman. Only then 
will this legislation kick in, basically, as a way to also prosecute 
that perpetrator for the crime done against the unborn child.
  I commend to my colleagues that this is a measure that respects the 
decision of the woman to bear her child. This is a measure that is an 
additional ability for the Federal Government to prosecute against an 
extreme act of domestic violence that causes not only harm to a woman, 
but also harm and often death to her unborn child.
  Mr. Speaker, as a State Senator, I worked on issues of domestic 
violence, and was proud, in 1998, to support Pennsylvania's version of 
this bill. In fact, the vast majority of Senators and House members in 
Pennsylvania, both pro-choice and pro-life, supported this measure 
because we understand that domestic violence is a serious problem in 
this country. Unfortunately, statistics show that many of the children, 
the unborn children who are killed in these cases, their mothers are 
victims of domestic violence, as are they. In fact, as published in the 
Journal of the American Medical Association, March 21, 2001, a study 
that was done in Maryland recognized the highest percentage of pregnant 
women who die, die as a result of homicide.
  Mr. Speaker, I submit to my colleagues that this is a serious issue 
of violence, a serious issue of domestic violence, and it should not be 
clouded by concern about future legislation or potential legislation 
that some believe may try to overturn Roe v. Wade.
  Our ultimate concern here should be the real victims of crime. The 
real victims of crime continue to be women who are victims of domestic 
violence due to an outraged partner. The real victims of crime are 
their unborn children, who often are the cause of the violence directed 
towards the mother.

[[Page H1618]]

  Mr. Speaker, I submit to my colleagues that this is commonsense 
legislation. It is supported across the country, and it is 
constitutional.
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as she may consume to the 
gentlewoman from California (Ms. Lofgren).
  Ms. LOFGREN. Mr. Speaker, I think it is unfortunate that this 
Congress has apparently failed to take the opportunity to unite on 
something that I think we could agree on, namely, that it is wrong to 
assault women. It is wrong to assault pregnant women. It is a dreadful 
crime to cause a miscarriage through an assault on a woman. Instead of 
addressing these dreadful offenses we are back to that same old fight 
that divides this country, abortion.
  Mr. Speaker, I know that there are Members of this House on both 
sides of the aisle who disagree on the question of abortion. Oftentimes 
those viewpoints are rooted in one's religious beliefs. I accept the 
fact that this country has disagreements about abortion.
  It is unacceptable that we would use the issue of violence against 
women and causing miscarriages as the entryway to having still another 
fight about choice.
  Mr. Speaker, I believe the Unborn Victims of Violence Act will be 
found unconstitutional. The gentleman mentioned that there are State 
statutes that define a person as a zygote or an embryo, but those State 
statutes have not been tested in the Federal courts or in the Supreme 
Court, and are clearly at odds with Roe v. Wade. Instead we can adopt a 
substitute that will be offered later today that assures that any woman 
who is assaulted and, as a consequence of that assault, miscarries and 
loses her opportunity to have a much-wanted child, occasions a separate 
prosecution. We should not tolerate behavior that causes miscarriage.
  Any person who has lost a child, any person who has had a 
miscarriage, understands that is a devastating event that one never 
forgets and never gets over. I am hopeful that we can put the abortion 
debate to one side and reserve the argument about abortion for another 
day and come together with the Lofgren-Conyers substitute that will be 
offered later today and not entangle this very serious issue, of 
harming a pregnant woman, with that other fight, about abortion and 
choice.
  Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 15 seconds.
  I agree we ought to talk about abortion when an abortion bill comes 
up. You are not hearing about abortion from this side of the aisle. The 
other side of the aisle is bringing up the issue of abortion.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. 
DeLay), the distinguished majority whip.
  Mr. DeLAY. Mr. Speaker, I have to agree with the gentleman from 
Wisconsin (Mr. Sensenbrenner). This has become an abortion debate 
because the other side of the aisle has made it such. They are so 
extreme and so afraid that they would lose their right to have an 
abortion, that they would even deny those unborn children that are 
killed by crime the rights that are due every other citizen in this 
country.
  Mr. Speaker, Members should support this bill and oppose the Lofgren 
amendment because it fails to acknowledge when unborn children are 
killed, they have been murdered. Life and death should not be subsumed 
beneath some semantic fog. It is time that our society begin 
recognizing and defending both victims who are harmed when violent 
criminals attack pregnant women. Those who would artificially 
discriminate between lives lost to crime within and outside the womb 
draw empty and callous distinctions. All life is precious. Society must 
protect every victim of crime.
  Mr. Speaker, current Federal law devalues and denies significance to 
unborn children. This destructive precedence has two unfortunate 
consequences. First, current law accrues to the benefit of the 
murderous thugs who destroy the lives of unborn children. These 
criminals are not forced to atone for the young life that they have 
destroyed.
  Second, by denying a legal identity to unborn victims, we create a 
society that is coarser, less feeling and less than it would otherwise 
be. The law must not look upon a violent criminal's unborn victim with 
an indifferent eye. Every young life must be acknowledged. Every young 
life must be protected from predatory criminals.
  Of course society through manners and custom have always deferred to 
the care and comfort of pregnant women, but we would be callously 
deceived if we limited our heightened attention merely to the woman's 
physical condition without acknowledging a vital predicate. It is 
precisely because a woman carries the miracle of life within her that 
she becomes the most precious and treasured member of society. It is 
because two lives exist together that society seeks to protect the 
woman. And the law must protect both lives. The law cannot remain blind 
on this point.
  Mr. Speaker, let us take the logic underlying the opposition to this 
bill and apply it to the case of an elderly victim. It would be a truly 
repugnant idea to suggest that criminals should serve diminished 
sentences if they preyed on elderly victims with only a few years left 
to live. Fortunately, society does not draw this ugly distinction. We 
value and protect life until a person draws their final breath. It is 
intrinsically flawed reasoning leading to an equally gross injustice to 
deny explicit protection to an unborn person who is months, weeks, or 
even days from breathing his or her first breath.
  Society must extend the protection of a law to every vulnerable 
victim. The mothers of these murdered children see these crimes with 
the proper perceptive. In an all-too-common set of horrible 
circumstances, the criminal's unborn victim is actually the primary 
target when a murderer stalks a pregnant woman. Under current law, when 
an unborn victim is murdered, in the eyes of society, no one has died. 
That has to change in our society.
  Mr. Speaker, it is time to end this awful and unconscionable 
oversight. This bill extends protection to every vulnerable victim in 
America. Support this bill so that society will acknowledge and defend 
every vulnerable American.
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 7 minutes to the gentleman from New 
York (Mr. Nadler), and ask him to yield to me.
  Mr. NADLER. I yield to the gentleman from Michigan.
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I wanted to say to the gentleman from 
Texas, the very distinguished majority whip, before he leaves the floor 
that we do recognize and make prosecutable killers of women that are 
pregnant.
  Mr. Speaker, we create two separate crimes, so I do not want that 
misstated again unless you read the Lofgren-Conyers substitute. Two 
separate crimes, both prosecutable and will be prosecutable because 
they are constitutional.
  Mr. NADLER. Mr. Speaker, I oppose this bill before us today because 
it is unnecessary, misguided and facially unconstitutional. The Supreme 
Court in Roe v. Wade clearly said, ``The unborn have never been 
recognized in the whole sense,'' and concluded that ``person,'' as used 
in the 14th amendment of the Constitution, does not include the unborn.

                              {time}  1130

  As the gentleman from Texas (Mr. DeLay) just made clear in his speech 
a moment ago, as everybody I have heard on the other side has made 
clear in their speeches, the whole purpose of this bill is precisely to 
label the unborn fetus or zygote or blastocyst as a person in the whole 
sense of the word. That is their purpose. Therefore, it is an abortion 
debate, because if it is murder to cause a miscarriage of a zygote or a 
fetus, then logically it is murder to perform an abortion. That is why 
we are debating abortion, and that is why they are debating abortion, 
whether they admit it or not.
  Mr. Speaker, we are going to hear a lot today about violence to 
fetuses, embryos, zygotes, blastocysts. We will hear a lot about 
horrific acts of violence perpetrated against women at advanced stages 
of pregnancy, causing injury to the fetus. The sponsors will claim, 
even though this bill addresses only violence against fetuses, that 
this bill is really being considered to protect the welfare of these 
women.
  We should have no illusions about the purposes of this bill, that it 
is yet another battle in a war of symbols in the abortion debate in 
which opponents of a woman's constitutional right to choose attempt to 
portray fetuses from

[[Page H1619]]

the earliest moments of conception as children with the same rights as 
the adult women who are carrying them. The implication is that anyone 
who does not share the metaphysical slant of the radical antichoice 
movement that a two-celled zygote is a person on exactly the same basis 
and with the same rights as a child or adult must secretly favor 
infanticide.
  This bill, by making the destruction of a fetus or even a zygote, a 
separate crime of murder without reference to the actual harm to the 
pregnant woman speaks volumes about that view. If causing a miscarriage 
is murder, then by implication so is abortion. Even if the sponsors 
have papered over this premise with language to the contrary, no one 
should be under any illusions that this is the real and only purpose of 
this bill.
  Let us take the sponsors at their word. In the last Congress, the 
report of the majority of the Committee on the Judiciary made clear 
that their concern was that ``except in those States that recognize 
unborn children as victims of such crimes, injuring or killing an 
unborn child during the commission of a violent crime has no legal 
consequence whatsoever,'' and that the bill's purpose was ``to narrow 
the gap in the law by providing that an individual who kills an unborn 
child during the commission of certain Federal crimes of violence will 
be guilty of a separate offense.'' Providing such a separate offense 
clearly recognizes the fetus as the victim of the violence, a 
proposition that is at odds with the holding of the Supreme Court in 
reading the Constitution.
  In fact, this legislation marks a major departure from Federal law by 
elevating the legal status of a fetus at all stages of prenatal 
development to the same as that of the pregnant woman or any other 
person who is the victim of a crime. This is wrong, Mr. Speaker. It is 
against the whole scheme of Roe v. Wade, which recognizes a greater 
ability of the States to regulate, a greater interest in regulation in 
later stages of pregnancy, precisely because the Constitution 
recognizes that a fetus is not a full-fledged person from the moment of 
conception.
  For anyone still in doubt about the real purpose of the bill, the 
National Right to Life Committee, in a memo distributed to members of 
the Committee on the Judiciary, laid it out:
  They say that such a one-victim amendment, talking about the Lofgren 
amendment, would codify the fiction that when a criminal assailant 
injures a mother and kills her unborn child, there has been only a 
compound injury to the mother but no loss of any human life. The one-
victim substitute would also enact the notion that when a criminal 
assailant kills a pregnant woman, the assailant should be punished once 
for killing the mother and then again for depriving her of her 
pregnancy, but if there is only one victim, it shows the difference 
between us.
  So the radical antichoice groups acknowledge that the only difference 
of opinion here is not how much to punish these offenses, because both 
this bill and the Lofgren substitute would give heavy punishment, 
although under certain circumstances, the Lofgren substitute would give 
much heavier punishment than would this bill; the real difference is 
that this bill recognizes the crime of murder against a fetus or a 
zygote.
  The bill is also unclear, as one of the majority's witnesses 
testified in the committee hearings. Does it cover only an embryo after 
implantation or at conception? Put another way, is it only murder if 
you cause the miscarriage of a viable fetus? Or is it also murder if 
you cause the miscarriage of a not-yet-viable fetus or of a two-celled 
zygote at the moment of conception?
  I think the sponsor of this legislation, the gentleman from South 
Carolina (Mr. Graham), should tell us what the bill means. It is a 
simple question that should have a simple, straightforward answer. Yet 
I used my entire 5 minutes at the Committee on the Judiciary trying to 
get an answer from the gentleman from South Carolina. He would not give 
me an answer.
  So I will ask him now, yes or no, is it murder to murder a two-celled 
zygote under this bill or is it not?
  Mr. GRAHAM. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. NADLER. I yield to the gentleman from South Carolina.
  Mr. GRAHAM. Mr. Speaker, as I said in the Committee on the Judiciary, 
the language that we adopted in the bill is exactly what exists----
  Mr. NADLER. Yes or no. I do not have the time to have the whole 
explanation that is taken from the language of State law. Is causing a 
miscarriage murder of a two-celled zygote or not under this bill? Yes 
or no.
  Mr. GRAHAM. When the fetus attaches to the womb, that is what the 
prosecutor has to prove.
  And if I may answer your question, the definition used in this bill 
is the exact same definition that the House endorsed and passed 417-0 
that the gentleman from New York voted for. This is the same definition 
that he voted for July 25, 2000.
  Mr. NADLER. Reclaiming my time, he will not give a yes or no answer 
because he cannot.
  One last sentence on this whole thing. This bill is not about 
violence against women. That is why all the violence against women 
groups are opposed to the bill. This bill is simply to undermine Roe v. 
Wade, and it will not succeed.
  Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2\1/2\ minutes to the 
gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Pitts).
  Mr. PITTS. Mr. Speaker, look at this picture of Tracy Marciniak and 
her dead son. This little boy is not a zygote, not a blastocyst, not an 
embryo, not a fetus, not anything but a little baby, a little child who 
was brutally killed. His name was Zachariah. He was killed by his 
father, a man by the name of Glendale Black, 4 days before he was due 
to be born. He was beaten in the womb where he bled to death. And his 
father got away with it.
  Yes, Glendale Black went to jail, but not because he killed 
Zachariah. He went to jail for assaulting Zachariah's mother. At the 
time, it was not a crime to kill a woman's baby in Wisconsin as long as 
he did it before he was born. If he had done it 4 or 5 days later, he 
might have gotten life imprisonment. Instead, he is now eligible for 
parole.
  Wisconsin has since changed its law. If Tracy's ex-husband committed 
the same crime today, he would be charged with killing her child as 
well as assaulting her. But the Federal Government has no such law. In 
Federal jurisdictions, that man could get away with killing again.
  Look again at this picture. How can anyone say that this child is not 
a human being? How can anyone say that Zachariah should not have the 
same right to live as you and I have? How can anyone say that the crime 
Zachariah's father committed was not more than just assault, but also 
taking of human life? Or as his mother Tracy herself says, ``If you 
really think that nobody died that night, then vote for the one-victim 
amendment. But please remember Zachariah's name and face when you 
decide.''
  Mr. Speaker, America's first war was fought to prove that each of us 
has an inalienable right to life as well as liberty and pursuit of 
happiness. We need to affirm that we still believe in these principles. 
We need to show that we still believe in God-given rights, the right to 
life. We need to pass this good legislation. We need to pass it 
unanimously. And we should reject the so-called one-victim amendment. 
Pretending that nobody died the night Glendale Black beat his wife and 
killed his son is to deny reality. Even worse, it is to turn our backs 
on everything America stands for.
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 5 minutes to the 
gentlewoman from New York (Mrs. Maloney).
  Ms. LOFGREN. Mr. Speaker, will the gentlewoman yield?
  Mrs. MALONEY of New York. I yield to the gentlewoman from California.
  Ms. LOFGREN. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentlewoman for yielding.
  I wanted to comment on the terrible crime that we just had a 
discussion of from the prior speaker. Clearly that was a horrible 
thing, and the monster who did that is now free. That is the wrong 
thing. That should be changed.
  Unfortunately, H.R. 503 would not change a darned thing about that 
case. I understand from the mother that part of the problem with the 
prosecution was that the prosecutors could not prove the intent to harm 
the unborn child. Under H.R. 503, there is also an intent requirement. 
Otherwise, absent intent, one is limited to the term of

[[Page H1620]]

years of the underlying offense. In order to have Federal jurisdiction, 
the only assault that is cited in the bill is assault against a Federal 
officer.
  So passing this bill would not prevent that terrible, terrible 
tragedy. I just thought it was important to note that.
  Mrs. MALONEY of New York. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentlewoman for 
her statement, her leadership on this, and also the ranking member's.
  I rise in strong opposition to the Unborn Victims of Violence Act and 
urge its rejection. Some Members on the other side of the aisle today 
have indicated that they do not believe that it is a direct attack on 
Roe v. Wade and a woman's right to choose.
  Mr. Speaker, I include for the Record editorials from the New York 
Times entitled ``Reproductive Rights Under Attack,'' and also 
editorials from the 1999 debate from the Washington Post, the St. 
Petersburg Times, and the Seattle Times, all in direct opposition to 
this bill. And all point out that it is a direct assault on Roe v. 
Wade.
  The material referred to follows:

                       [From the New York Times]

                    Reproductive Rights Under Attack

       Congressional opponents of abortion have no appetite for a 
     direct and politically unpopular assault on Roe v. Wade. So 
     they are pursuing other legislative strategies that would 
     undermine women's reproductive freedom. One of the most 
     deceptive of these schemes is the benign-sounding Unborn 
     Victims of Violence Act, which is expected to come up for a 
     vote in the House this week.
       Packaged as a crime-fighting measure unrelated to abortion, 
     the bill is actually aimed at fulfilling a longtime goal of 
     the right-to-life movement. The goal is to enshrine in law 
     the concept of ``fetal rights,'' equal to but separate and 
     distinct from the rights of pregnant women. In essence, the 
     bill would elevate the status of a fetus, embryo or other so-
     called ``unborn child'' to that of a ``person'' by amending 
     the Federal criminal code to add a separate offense for 
     causing death or bodily injury to a ``child'' who is ``in 
     utero.'' The penalty would be equal to that imposed for 
     injuring the woman herself and would apply from the earliest 
     stage of gestation, whether or not the perpetrator knew of 
     the pregnancy.
       The vote this week represents a serious test. An identical 
     bill passed the House last year by a 254-to-172 vote, and its 
     present sponsors are plainly hoping the arrival of a new 
     anti-choice administration will help gain passage this time 
     around in the Senate.
       Violence against women that results in compromising a 
     pregnancy is a terrible crime. It may well deserve stiffer 
     penalties, which some states have already imposed. But the 
     bill's sponsors are more interested in furthering a political 
     agenda than in preventing and punishing criminal conduct. 
     Lawmakers who care for Roe v. Wade have no business voting 
     for this disingenuous legislation.
                                  ____


         Editorials Against ``Unborn Victims of Violence Act''

                [From the Washington Post, Oct. 2, 1999]

       ``While the bill specifically exempts abortion; it is a 
     clever, if transparent effort to establish a foothold in the 
     law for the idea that killing a fetus can be murder. What 
     makes this bill a bad idea is the very aspect of it that 
     makes it attractive to its supporters: that it treats the 
     fetus as a person separate from the mother, though that same 
     mother has a constitutional right to terminate a pregnancy. 
     This is a useful rhetorical device for the pro-life world. 
     But it is analytically incoherent.''
                                  ____


             [From the St. Petersburg Times, Oct. 2, 1999]

       ``The bill's sponsors . . . claim the measure is not an 
     attack on reproductive freedom, but a bill to fight crime. 
     They point to the bill's exceptions for legal abortion 
     providers, medical caregivers and the mother herself as proof 
     that it's not anti-abortion. They are being disingenuous. . . 
     . The public not be fooled. This bill is about abortion, not 
     crime.''
                                  ____


                [From the Seattle Times, Sept. 28, 1999]

       ``It would make sense for Congress to enhance penalties for 
     crimes against pregnant women, especially since pregnancy 
     greatly increases a woman's risk of domestic assault. It does 
     not make sense for Congress to exploit one critical health 
     issue--violence against women--to erode women's reproductive 
     rights. Its ludicrous to separate the pregnancy from the 
     woman. In 1973, the Supreme Court ruled that reproductive 
     freedom is part of the constitutional right to privacy; the 
     state can claim compelling interest only after the fetus can 
     survive outside the womb. For a quarter century, the price of 
     such freedom has been constant vigilance against laws like 
     this.''
                                  ____


               [From the New York Times, Sept. 14, 1999]

       ``Congressional opponents of abortion rights have come up 
     with yet another scheme to advance their agenda. . . . [T]he 
     measure aims to chip away at women's reproductive freedom by 
     granting new legal status to unborn children--under the 
     deceptively benign guise of fighting crime . . . . By 
     creating a separate legal status for fetuses, the bill's 
     supporters are plainly hoping to build a foundation for a 
     fresh legal assault on the constitutional underprintings of 
     the Supreme Court's ruling in Roe v. Wade. Sending the nation 
     down a legal path that could undermine the privacy rights of 
     women is not a reasonable way to protect women or deter 
     crime.''

  We should call for ``truth in Advertising.'' The sponsors make it 
sound like they want to protect the fetus. Yet the definition is so 
broad that it would cover three cells. Make no mistake, this is an 
attack on a woman's right to choose, and now we know clearly and 
squarely where the Bush administration stands.
  Mr. Speaker, I include for the Record the Statement of Administration 
Policy on this bill.

         Executive Office of the President, Office of Management 
           and Budget,
                                   Washington, DC, April 24, 2001.

                   Statement of Administration Policy

    (This statement has been coordinated by OMB with the concerned 
                               agencies)


            h.r. 503--Unborn Victims of Violence Act of 2001

                 (Rep. Graham (R) SC and 95 cosponsors)

       The Administration supports protection for unborn children 
     and therefore supports House passage of H.R. 503. The 
     legislation would make it a separate Federal offense to cause 
     death or bodily injury to a child, who is in utero, in the 
     course of committing any one of 68 Federal offenses. The bill 
     also would make substantially identical amendments to the 
     Uniform Code of Military Justice. The Administration would 
     strongly oppose any amendment to H.R. 503, such as a so-
     called ``One-Victim'' Substitute, which would define the 
     bill's crimes as having only one victim--the pregnant woman.

  I might add, why are we here today? The Bush administration has told 
us that their top priority is education. Where is the education bill? 
The Bush administration has told us that they care about the Patients' 
Bill of Rights to protect our seniors. Where is the Patients' Bill of 
Rights bill?
  But what we get on the floor is an attack on a woman's right to 
choose, attack on her health and on her privacy. That is what we get. I 
ask my colleagues, is that compassionate?
  My colleagues on the other side of the aisle have said that this is 
not a pro-life statement, it is not an attack on choice, but the 
Traditional Values Coalition, on their Web site, I pulled it off today; 
they state and I quote, ``Enactment of the bill would be a landmark 
pro-life victory by recognizing the rights of the unborn.''
  I include for the Record the pro-life organization's statement.

      Victory: Unborn Victims of Violence Act Passes in the House

       Criminals who murder or assault a pregnant woman will now 
     be held accountable to the violence inflicted on both 
     victims, the mother and her unborn child. This week the 
     Unborn Victims of Violence Act, sponsored by Representative 
     Lindsey Graham (R-SC), passed the House of Representatives by 
     a vote of 254-172. This bill recognizes that an unborn child 
     who is injured or killed during the commission of a federal 
     crime is a human victim, and the assailant could then be 
     punished for the harm caused to this most vulnerable victim. 
     This bill provides vital protection for expecting mothers and 
     their unborn children. We applaud the House for passing such 
     important legislation.
       The House also rejected an attempt to water down the 
     original act by opposing a substitute amendment offered by 
     Representative Zoe Lofgren (D-CA) by a vote of 201-224. This 
     victory is one step further in bringing justice for ALL 
     humans, born and unborn.
       Regrettably, the United States federal criminal law does 
     not give unborn children the rights of personhood. Currently, 
     a person can attack a pregnant woman, causing the death of 
     her child and only be prosecuted for the assault on the 
     mother! It is a federal crime to attack, injure, or kill a 
     woman, but it is not considered a federal crime to do the 
     same to the unborn child of the woman. However, legislation 
     introduced by Representative Lindsey Graham (R-SC) proposes 
     to recognize the humanity of unborn children by using the 
     same standard to punish violence enacted upon the unborn as 
     any other person. This major pro-life bill would protect 
     unborn children from acts of violence and enactment of the 
     bill would be a landmark pro-life victory by recognizing the 
     rights of the unborn.

  This bill treats a fetus as separate from the mother, though that 
mother has a constitutional right to abortion. This bill does not 
protect women in any way. In fact, there is nothing in the bill about 
punishing the perpetrator for the crime against the woman. That is why 
the National Coalition Against Domestic Violence opposes this bill. 
According to experts,

[[Page H1621]]

current Federal law already provides authority for the punishment of 
criminals that harm fetuses.
  Mr. Speaker, I include for the Record the statement from Ronald 
Weich, a former Special Counsel, U.S. Sentencing Commission, that goes 
into further detail.

 Testimony of Ronald Weich, Zuckerman Spaeder, L.L.P., Former Special 
  Counsel, U.S. Sentencing Commission, Before the Subcommittee on the 
  Constitution of the House Committee on the Judiciary, March 15, 2001

       Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee: My name is 
     Ronald Weich and I am a partner in the law firm of Zuckerman 
     Spaeder LLP. I respectfully request that this written 
     statement appear in the record of the Subcommittee's hearing 
     on H.R. 503, the Unborn Victims of Violence Act of 2001.\1\
       In this statement I analyze the criminal law and sentencing 
     implications of the pending bill. I bring several 
     qualifications to this task. From 1983 to 1987 I worked as an 
     Assistant District Attorney in New York City, where I 
     prosecuted a wide array of criminal cases. Thereafter I 
     served as Special Counsel to the United States Sentencing 
     Commission and participated in drafting amendments to the 
     federal sentencing guidelines. I then served on the staff of 
     several Senate committees where I assisted in the development 
     of federal crime and sentencing policy. I am now in private 
     practice, but I continue to serve on the advisory board of 
     the Federal Sentencing Reporter, a scholarly journal in which 
     I have frequently published articles on sentencing law and 
     policy. I am also a member of the Criminal Justice Council of 
     the American Bar Association.\2\
       After reviewing H.R. 503 in light of my experience in the 
     criminal justice system, my knowledge of the federal 
     sentencing guidelines and an examination of relevant case 
     law, I reach one basic conclusion: this bill is unnecessary. 
     Current federal law provides ample authority for the 
     punishment of criminals who hurt fetuses. H.R. 503 adds 
     nothing meaningful to the charging arsenal of federal 
     prosecutors or the sentencing options available to federal 
     judges.
       Because the bill is unnecessary from a criminal law 
     perspective, I suspect that its purpose, instead, is to score 
     rhetorical points in the perennial struggle over abortion 
     rights. For reasons that I will explain, I object to the use 
     of the federal criminal code as a battlefield in the abortion 
     wars.
       I will first describe why the bill is unnecessary in light 
     of current federal law and then explain why I believe it is 
     an unwise addition to federal law.


                       I. H.R. 503 is unnecessary

       Current federal law already provides sufficient authority 
     to punish the conduct that H.R. 503 purports to punish.
       At the outset it should be understood that very few violent 
     crimes are prosecuted in the federal courts. Most street 
     level violent crimes are prosecuted under state law by state 
     prosecutors in state courts. Under our constitutional system, 
     federal criminal jurisdiction only exists if the crime 
     implicates federal civil rights or interstate commerce--which 
     few violent crimes do--or if the crime occurs on a federal 
     enclave such as a federal office building, a military base or 
     an Indian reservation. Thus there are only a handful of 
     federal murder and assault prosecutions each year, and most 
     of those involve Native Americans.
       H.R. 503 targets relatively rare conduct to begin with, 
     namely criminal assault on a fetus. And in the federal 
     context, that rare conduct is even more unusual. I researched 
     federal case law and found only one reported case in recent 
     years in which the victim of the offense of conviction was a 
     fetus. In that case, U.S. v. Spencer, 839 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 
     1988), the Native American defendant assaulted a pregnant 
     woman on an Indian reservation, kicking and stabbing her in 
     the abdomen. The woman was successfully treated for life-
     threatening injuries, but her fetus was born alive and then 
     died. The Ninth Circuit upheld the defendant's conviction 
     under the federal murder statute, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1111. Thus, 
     even without the help of H.R. 503, a federal defendant was 
     successfully prosecuted for murdering a fetus.
       The Spencer decision is significant for several reasons. 
     First, it illustrates how rare such cases are in the federal 
     system--the court refers to the issue of federal criminal 
     liability for fetal death as one of ``first impression'' 
     and in the 13 years since it was decided, the issue 
     decided in Spencer appears not to have arisen in another 
     reported federal case. There is no crime wave of federal 
     fetal assaults crying out for a legislative solution. But 
     should this rare scenario present itself in federal court 
     again, Spencer stands for the proposition that criminal 
     liability may be imposed under current federal law.
       The Spencer court relies on the well established common law 
     doctrine, developed in state courts, that fetal death 
     subsequent to birth due to fetal injuries may be prosecuted 
     as homicide. See, Annotation, Homicide Based on Killing of 
     Unborn Child, 64 A.L.R. 5th 671 (1998). Among the many state 
     cases upholding homicide convictions for assaults that 
     resulted in the death of a fetus are William v. State, 561 
     A.2d 216 (Maryland 1989); State v. Cornelius, 448 N.W.2d 434 
     (Wisconsin 1989); People v. Hall, 158 A.D.2D 69 (New York 
     App. Div. 1st Dept. 1990); and State v. Cotton, 5 P.3d918 
     (Arizona 2000).
       The broad support for this rule in the state courts does 
     not argue for its necessity in the federal code, since state 
     law of this nature is incorporated into federal law by the 
     Assimilative Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 13, when the crime 
     occurs in a federal enclave such as a military base. That was 
     the basis on which the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces 
     recently upheld the homicide conviction of Gregory Robbins 
     for beating his wife and thereby causing the termination of 
     her pregnancy. U.S. v. Robbins, 52 M.J. 159 (1999). 
     Proponents of the Unborn Victims of Violence Act had argued 
     in 1999 that the Robbins case, then pending, demonstrated the 
     need for a new federal law, but the successful outcome of the 
     prosecution shows precisely the opposite: current federal law 
     is sufficient.
       Analytically separate from the question of criminal 
     liability is the question of punishment. Here again, current 
     federal law is sufficient. There is no dispute that causing 
     harm to a fetus during the commission of a federal felony 
     should generally result in enhanced punishment, and courts 
     have uniformly held that such enhancements are available 
     under the current sentencing guidelines. For example, in both 
     U.S. v. Peoples, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 27067 (9th Cir. 1997) 
     and U.S. v. Winzer, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 29640 (9th Cir. 
     1998), the court held that assaulting a pregnant woman during 
     a bank robbery could lead to a two level enhancement 
     (approximately a 25% increase) under Sec. 2B1.1(b)(3)(A) of 
     the Guidelines relating to physical injury. In U.S. v. James, 
     139 F.3d 709 (9th Cir. 1998), the court held that a pregnant 
     woman may be treated as a ``vulnerable victim'' under 
     Sec. 3A1.1 of the Guidelines, again leading to a two level 
     sentencing enhancement for the defendant. And in United 
     States v. Manuel, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 14946 (9th Cir. 1993), 
     the court held that the defendant's prior conviction for 
     assaulting his pregnant wife warranted an upward departure 
     from the applicable guideline range for his subsequent 
     assault conviction.
       While there have been no federal death penalty prosecutions 
     of civilians in recent years involving fetal assaults, the 
     military justice system treats the murder victim's pregnancy 
     as an aggravating factor to be considered during the capital 
     sentencing phase of a trial. United States v. Thomas, 43 M.J. 
     550 (U.S. Navy-Marine Corps Ct. of Crim. App. 1995). This 
     holding follows state law precedents in which the pregnancy 
     of the victim is a statutory aggravator in capital cases. 
     See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. Tit. 11, Sec. 4209(e)(1)(p) (Supp. 
     1986).
       In sum, H.R. 503 is unnecessary because federal case law 
     and the federal sentencing guidelines, building on well-
     established common law principles, already authorize serious 
     punishment for the harm that the bill seeks to address.


       II. H.R. 503 IS DETRIMENTAL TO THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM

       To say that H.R. 503 is unnecessary does not end the 
     inquiry. As members of the Judiciary Committee are aware, the 
     federal criminal code is characterized by much redundancy, 
     and one more criminal law prohibiting what is elsewhere 
     prohibited would barely add to the thicket. But for three 
     reasons, H.R. 503 would not only constitute an unnecessary 
     addition to the Code, it would also be an undesirable 
     addition.
       First, the bill has been drafted in a structurally unsound 
     manner and will lead to considerable confusion and 
     litigation. To be convicted under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1841, the 
     new criminal offense created by H.R. 503, a defendant must 
     have ``engage[d] in conduct that violates'' one of the 
     existing federal crimes enumerated in Sec. 1841(b). But must 
     the defendant be convicted of one of those other offenses 
     before he may be convicted of the separate offense under 
     Sec. 1841? That is a fair reading of the text, but the answer 
     is not without doubt. There is already considerable 
     controversy and resource-draining litigation in the federal 
     courts over whether various title 18 provisions constitute 
     separate offenses requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt 
     or sentencing enhancements requiring only proof by a 
     preponderance of evidence, see, e.g. Appendix v. New Jersey, 
     530 U.S. 466 (2000); Jones v. United States, 119 S. Ct. 1215 
     (1999). H.R. 503 would add to this confusion if there were 
     ever a prosecution under the new criminal provision it 
     establishes.
       This problem could be addressed if, instead of creating a 
     new criminal offense, H.R. 503 merely directed the Sentencing 
     Commission to either establish a new sentencing enhancement 
     when the victim of the crime is a pregnant woman, or make 
     clear that a pregnant woman may be considered a ``vulnerable 
     victim'' under existing Sec. 3A1.1 of the Sentencing 
     Guidelines. As demonstrated above, the generic provisions of 
     the Guidelines already accomplish this result. But at least a 
     sentencing enhancement bill would not foster confusion and 
     litigation.
       Second, H.R. 503 is overbroad. To begin with, it 
     incorporates by reference an unduly broad definition of 
     ``bodily injury'' from 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1365. Whereas the 
     common law rule applied to termination of the pregnancy, H.R. 
     503 would make it a violation of federal law to cause 
     ``physical pain'' to the fetus or ``any other injury to the 
     [fetus], no matter how temporary.'' 18 U.S.C. 
     Sec. 1365(g)(4). That definition may make sense in the 
     consumer safety context from which it derives, but it is 
     bizarre and extreme in the prenatal context of H.R. 503. 
     Further, H.R. 503 applies to all fetuses, not merely those 
     that are viable, and explicitly applies to unintentional as 
     well as intentional conduct. The common law rule, evolved 
     over centuries of Anglo-

[[Page H1622]]

     American jurisprudence, is that an assault causing the death 
     of a viable (or, in the archaic phrase, ``quickened'') fetus 
     gives rise to criminal liability. The rule in H.R. 503 is 
     that an assault unintentionally causing ``pain'' to a weeks-
     old fetus gives rise to criminal liability.\3\
       Third, the bill is a transparent effort to undermine Roe v. 
     Wade. Since H.R. 503 adds nothing meaningful to substantive 
     federal criminal law, its purpose is purely symbolic: to 
     bestow statutory personhood on fetuses, even those that are 
     not viable.
       It is no accident that the bill says nothing about injuries 
     to pregnant women; instead the newly created title is styled 
     ``Protection of Unborn Children.'' An assault on a fetus 
     cannot occur without an assault on the pregnant women, but 
     the bill is deliberately framed in terms that ignore the 
     woman. To be sure, there is an explicit exception to the 
     criminal penalties in the bill for ``conduct relating to an 
     abortion'' but make no mistake--this bill is just one more 
     step in the anti-abortion movement's methodical strategy to 
     humanize fetuses, marginalize women, demonize abortion 
     providers, and make the image of abortion less palatable to 
     the American people. The extreme overbreadth of H.R. 503 
     flows directly from that strategy.
       The validity of the constitutional protections established 
     in Roe v. Wade exceeds the scope of this testimony and is 
     beyond my field of expertise. But as someone who cares 
     about the integrity of the criminal law, I regret that 
     this skirmish in the abortion wars flares up unnecessarily 
     in the federal criminal code. The criminal justice system 
     is built on ancient principles such as proportionality of 
     punishment and the requirement that a wrongdoer have acted 
     with intent to cause harm (mens rea). In ignoring these 
     principles, H.R. 503 is an unsound piece of crime 
     legislation.
       Because I believe H.R. 503 to be both unnecessary and 
     unwise, I urge the subcommittee to reject it.


                                 Notes

       \1\ On July 21, 1999, I testified before this Subcommittee 
     in person regarding H.R. 2436, the version of the Unborn 
     Victims of Violence Act introduced in the 106th Congress. 
     Because H.R. 2436 and the pending H.R. 503 are substantially 
     the same, my testimony this year substantially duplicates the 
     testimony I previously provided. Nonetheless, I wish this 
     statement to appear in the record of the current hearing so 
     that it is available to members of Congress considering the 
     pending bill.
       \2\ I wish to make clear that I am not testifying on behalf 
     of the American Bar Association or any other entity with 
     which I am affiliated. Nor am I testifying on behalf of any 
     of my law or lobbying clients. For example, it is a matter of 
     public record that I have represented Planned Parenthood 
     Federation of America (PPFA) with respect to pharmaceutical 
     pricing issues, but I do not represent PPFA at this hearing. 
     The views I express herein are strictly my own.
       \3\ The bill's new Sec. 1841(a) defines the term ``unborn 
     child'' tautologically as ``a child in utero.'' Unless the 
     drafters of H.R. 2426 intend to word ``child'' to imply 
     viability, the bill would apply to conduct that impacted a 
     first trimester pregnancy. Whether an ``unborn child'' of 
     such gestational age constitutes a human being raises 
     constitutional issues beyond the scope of this testimony.

  Mr. Speaker, this bill really has nothing to do with protecting a 
fetus and it has everything to do with taking away a woman's right to 
choose. That is why all the women's organizations, that is why all the 
domestic violence organizations oppose it, but the Bush administration 
supports it. It is a sham, it is aimed at overturning Roe v. Wade, it 
is further aimed at marginalizing female victims, and it is plainly 
unnecessary.
  It is plainly wrong. I urge a no vote against this antiwoman bill.
  Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 1\1/2\ minutes.
  Mr. Speaker, on July 25, 2000, the House of Representatives, by a 
vote of 417-0, passed the Innocent Child Protection Act. This bill 
would prohibit either the Federal Government or any State from 
executing a woman while she carries a child in utero. That bill defined 
``child in utero'' in the same language as the legislation that is 
before us.

                              {time}  1145

  We heard the gentleman from New York (Mr. Nadler), and others, talk 
about two-cell zygotes and other terms that have been used during the 
development of the Homo sapiens, but the protection that was given to 
the child in utero by the bill that passed last year by a vote of 417-
0, I have the roll call here. I noticed the gentleman from New York 
(Mr. Nadler) endorsed this definition when it came to the death 
penalty, as did the gentlewoman from New York (Mrs. Maloney) and the 
gentlewoman from California (Ms. Lofgren). Why should we not use the 
same definition that everybody endorsed last year when it came to 
executing pregnant women at the State and Federal level in the 
legislation that sets up this separate crime?
  I intend to be consistent in my votes by voting for this definition 
in this bill, as I did last year for the definition in the other bill.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. 
Pence).
  Mr. PENCE. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. 
Sensenbrenner) for yielding me this time.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise today as a new Member of this body in strong 
support of H.R. 503, the Unborn Victims of Violence Act, offered by my 
friend and colleague, the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Graham).
  Mr. Speaker, it amazes this new Member that there are those who 
oppose this initiative before the House, which is simply an effort to 
defend unborn children from violence. Do we not all have an interest in 
protecting mothers and their children from violent attackers? Who in 
this House has not read a story in the newspaper about an expectant 
mother like that described by the Committee on the Judiciary chairman, 
the story of Shawana Pace whose boyfriend paid to have her assaulted 
and because of that abuse she lost her child? The outrage and the anger 
of the public after these events demands that we take action.
  Mr. Speaker, the opposition, in their zeal to prevent this bill from 
becoming law, would have us believe that punishing criminals for 
existing Federal crimes would compromise the rights of mothers. This 
premise is simply wrong. The Unborn Victims of Violence Act 
specifically targets not women or women's rights, but criminals who 
cause death or harm to an unborn child while committing one of 63 
existing Federal crimes.
  As the gentlewoman from Pennsylvania (Ms. Hart) observed, the Journal 
of the American Medical Association published a recent study that found 
that homicide is the most common cause of death among pregnant women in 
Maryland. A week later, JAMA published another study that found that 6 
percent of all pregnant women in North Carolina are abused while they 
are pregnant.
  Despite these alarming facts, Federal law does not punish criminals 
who prey on pregnant women simply because they are pregnant.
  The alternative to this bill to be offered later today fails to 
address a central cause of violence against pregnant women because it 
fails to recognize that the child is often the primary target of the 
assailant.
  Mr. Speaker, by protecting the child we protect the mother. It is a 
fundamental axiom of Western civilization, the belief in the sanctity 
of human life. By failing to recognize crimes against the life of the 
unborn child, we place not only one life at risk but two. We must 
correct this oversight in Federal law and ensure that criminals who 
prey on pregnant women and their unborn children pay the appropriate 
penalty for their crimes.
  I urge all of my colleagues to support the Unborn Victims of Violence 
Act. This Congress should seize this opportunity to extend the 
protection of the law to the most defenseless in our society.
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentlewoman from 
California (Ms. Solis).
  Mr. Speaker, will the gentlewoman yield?
  Ms. SOLIS. I yield to the gentleman from Michigan.
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentlewoman from California 
(Ms. Solis) for yielding.
  Mr. Speaker, I think the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Graham) 
was the one that said that H.R. 503 is a two-victim bill. The bill on 
the floor is not a two-victim bill. The bill only recognizes one 
victim, the embryo or the fetus. Harm to the woman does not factor into 
the bill at all. The bill does not require prosecution of the crime 
against the woman, and so to call it a two-victim bill is a fallacy.
  Ms. SOLIS. Mr. Speaker, I also would like to join my Democratic 
colleagues and rise in strong opposition to H.R. 503, the so-called 
Unborn Victims of Violence Act. While the bill supporters claim that 
they want to protect pregnant women from crime, their bill does no such 
thing. Instead, the bill recognizes for the first time a fetus as a 
person, with rights separate and equal to that of a woman.

[[Page H1623]]

  I am disappointed that the sponsors of H.R. 503 would play politics 
with the issue of women's safety. Of course we can all agree that 
pregnant women deserve protection against crime and violence, but we 
all hold very different beliefs on a woman's right to choose. Therefore 
it is simply irresponsible to confuse the two issues in H.R. 503, as 
this does.
  That is why I am not voting for H.R. 503 in favor of the substitute 
amendment, which will be offered by my colleague, the gentlewoman from 
California (Ms. Lofgren). The Lofgren substitute, the Motherhood 
Protection Act, increases the penalty for attacking a pregnant woman. 
Let us work together to pass something we can all agree on, rather than 
playing politics, and let us preserve women's safety.
  I urge my colleagues to oppose H.R. 503 and support the Lofgren 
substitute.
  Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman 
from Alabama (Mr. Bachus).
  (Mr. BACHUS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. BACHUS. Mr. Speaker, back in September of 1999, when this bill 
came before us, one of the opponents of the bill said this, because the 
criminal attack on a woman causing her to lose a child and an abortion 
are too easy to confuse, we need to vote against this bill.
  Now we are again hearing today that it is hard to distinguish between 
a criminal attack on a woman which kills her baby and an abortion. But 
I say, I think the American people can distinguish between the two of 
those, and I think Members of this body can. We also heard today, and 
we heard in that earlier argument, that this bill would do a dangerous 
thing. It would recognize the legal status of an unborn child.
  Now that is pretty dangerous, is it not, recognizing the legal status 
of an unborn child?
  Is an unborn child illegal? Are they born into the world illegal? 
When do they pass from illegal to legal? I think if a mother wants to 
have a child, wants to have that child born, wants to raise that child, 
that child is legal.
  I want to talk about something else, something else that the 
opponents I do not think would want to talk about, and I think this is 
particularly telling, it is an article in the March 2001 Journal of 
American Medicine, and it simply says one thing, the disturbing finding 
that a pregnant or recently pregnant woman is more likely to be a 
victim of homicide than due to any other cause. In other words, a 
pregnant woman is more likely to be a victim of homicide than die of 
any other cause.
  It compared that to nonpregnant women in the same age group, and that 
was the fifth leading cause of death.
  As that article asks the question, we ought to ask the same question. 
Only by having a clear understanding of the magnitude of pregnancy-
associated mortality can there be comprehensive prevention.
  In other words, pregnant women are victims of homicide in a far 
greater percentage than nonpregnant women. We need to understand that 
if we are to prevent it.
  How do we prevent it? Why does one think pregnant women are five 
times more likely to die of a homicide in this study and in an earlier 
study in the Journal of Public Health and in two studies in obstetrics 
and gynecology? I would submit that the fact they are pregnant is 
making them a target. These studies certainly say that they are a 
target. This bill, and I praise the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. 
Graham) for offering it, it is a needed step to help what has become an 
attack on pregnant women.

             Remarks Upon Passage of Bill in 106th Congress

       Mr. BACHUS. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the Unborn 
     Victims of Violence Act and opposed to the amendment.
       We have heard some very interesting statements out here on 
     the floor today. One of the opponents of this act said we 
     ought to vote against this act because, and let me quote, 
     ``because the criminal attack on a woman causing her to lose 
     a child, and an abortion, it is too easy to confuse the 
     two.''
       In other words, a criminal attack on a woman which causes 
     her to lose her unborn child, she said the only difference in 
     that and an abortion is, she says, the result is the same 
     except for the criminal intent, and we cannot always 
     determine the difference.
       Now, do my colleagues buy that? Do my colleagues buy that 
     this Congress or the American people cannot distinguish 
     between a criminal attack on a woman which causes her to lose 
     her unborn child and an abortion? I do not think so. I think 
     that is ludicrous.
       Another reason we were told to vote against this act, we 
     were told that the Federal court or the Federal jurisdiction 
     may have jurisdiction over the mother, but they might not 
     have jurisdiction over the unborn child.
       In other words, an FBI agent who is pregnant, we can try 
     someone for assaulting her or murdering her, but not her 
     unborn child, because that would not be a Federal act.
       Well, what do we do in those cases? Do we always try those? 
     Would we try them, as that person who opposes it said, we 
     ought to try that case in the State court? Of course not. 
     That is ludicrous.
       The final thing, which is probably the worst, is this 
     statement, and I say this with respect to all Members: that 
     this is the first occasion that this Congress or this Supreme 
     Court has ever recognized the legal status of an unborn 
     child. If we pass this act, we will be recognizing the legal 
     status of an unborn child.
       Well I ask you, is it an illegal status? Are unborn 
     children illegal?
       How about an unborn child whose mother has made a decision 
     to keep that child? She wants to keep that child. She wants 
     to have that child. She wants to raise that child. Is there 
     anything wrong with recognizing the legal status of that 
     child? Should that child have no status, no rights? Of course 
     not.
                                  ____


                      [From JAMA, March 21, 2001]

  Enhanced Surveillance for Pregnancy-Associated Mortality--Maryland, 
                               1993-1998

                 (By Isabelle L. Horon and Diana Cheng)

       Complete and accurate identification of all deaths 
     associated with pregnancy is a critical first step in the 
     prevention of such deaths. Only by having a clear 
     understanding of the magnitude of pregnancy-associated 
     mortality can comprehensive prevention strategies be 
     formulated to prevent these unanticipated deaths among 
     primarily young, healthy women.
       Death statistics compiled through the National Vital 
     Statistics System by the National Center for Health 
     Statistics, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, are a 
     major source of data on deaths occurring during pregnancy and 
     in the postpartum period. Original death certificates from 
     which state and national vital statistics are derived are 
     filed in and maintained by individual states. Causes of death 
     on death certificates are reported by attending physicians 
     or, under certain circumstances such as death from external 
     trauma or unexplained death, by medical examiners or 
     coroners.
       The National Center for Health Statistics is required to 
     use the World Health Organization (WHO) definition of a 
     maternal death for preparation of mortality data. According 
     to the WHO definition, a maternal death is ``the death of a 
     woman while pregnant or within 42 days of termination of 
     pregnancy, irrespective of the duration and the site of the 
     pregnancy, from any cause related to or aggravated by the 
     pregnancy or its management but not from accidental or 
     incidental causes.'' \1\ This definition includes deaths 
     assigned to the cause ``complication of pregnancy, 
     childbirth, and the puerperium'' (International 
     Classification of Diseases, Ninth Revision [ICD-9] codes 630-
     676).
       Death records are an important source of data on pregnancy 
     mortality because they are routinely collected by the states 
     and are comparable over time and across the nation. However, 
     there are several limitations to using these data to identify 
     all deaths associated with pregnancy. First, the cause-of-
     death information provided on these records is sometimes not 
     accurate. Previous studies have shown that physicians 
     completing death records following a maternal death fail to 
     report that the woman was pregnant or had a recent pregnancy 
     in 50% or more of these cases,2-4 resulting in the 
     misclassification of the underlying cause of death. Since 
     these deaths cannot be identified as maternal deaths through 
     routine surveillance methods, they are not included in the 
     calculation of maternal mortality rates.
       An additional limitation of using death records alone for 
     comprehensive identification of all deaths associated with 
     pregnancy is that the WHO definition of a maternal death 
     limits the temporal and causal scope of pregnancy mortality. 
     As defined by WHO, a maternal death does not include deaths 
     occurring more than 42 days following termination of 
     pregnancy or deaths resulting from causes other than direct 
     complications of pregnancy, labor, and the puerperium.
       To address these issues, the term ``pregnancy-associated 
     death'' was introduced by the Centers for Disease Control and 
     Prevention, in collaboration with the Maternal Mortality 
     Special Interest Group of the American College of 
     Obstetricians and Gynecologists, to define a death from any 
     cause during pregnancy or within 1 calendar year of delivery 
     or pregnancy termination, regardless of the duration or 
     anatomical site of the pregnancy.\5\ Pregnancy-associated 
     deaths include not only deaths commonly associated with 
     pregnancy such as hemorrhage, pregnancy-induced hypertension, 
     and embolism--which are captured in the WHO definition--but 
     also deaths not traditionally considered to be related to 
     pregnancy such as accidents, homicide, and suicide. The term 
     also includes deaths occurring 43 to 365 days following 
     termination of pregnancy. Since

[[Page H1624]]

     cause-of-death information on death certificates cannot 
     identify deaths from nonmaternal causes or deaths occurring 
     43 or more days following termination of pregnancy as 
     associated with pregnancy, additional sources of data must be 
     used for complete ascertainment of all pregnancy-associated 
     deaths.
       Previous studies on pregnancy-associated deaths have relied 
     largely on linkage or records 2.6-8 or the use of 
     a check box on the death certificate \9\ to identify 
     pregnancy-associated deaths. Only 1 study (Allen et al \10\) 
     in New York City used death certificates, linkage of records, 
     and review of autopsy reports to identify pregnancy-
     associated deaths. However, this study did not include all 
     pregnancy-associated deaths since only records for deaths 
     occurring within 6 months of termination of pregnancy were 
     collected, and medical examiner records for only certain 
     causes of death were reviewed.
       This article, based on Maryland resident data for the years 
     1993-1998, presents more comprehensive data on pregnancy-
     associated deaths since it includes all deaths occurring 
     during pregnancy or within a year of termination of 
     pregnancy. In addition, medical examiner records for all 
     women of reproductive age who died during the study period, 
     regardless of cause of death, were reviewed to identify 
     pregnancy-associated deaths.


                                methods

       Data for this analysis were collected from the following 3 
     sources: (1) review of death certificates to identify those 
     records on which a complication of pregnancy, childbirth, or 
     the puerperium (ICD-9 codes 630-676) was listed as an 
     underlying or contributing cause of death; (2) linkage of 
     death certificates of reproductive-age women with 
     corresponding live birth and fetal death records to identify 
     a pregnancy within the year preceding death; and (3) review 
     of medical examiner records for evidence of pregnancy.
       Vital records data were obtained from the Vital Statistics 
     Administration of the Maryland Department of Health and 
     Mental Hygiene. Identification of pregnancy-associated deaths 
     through linkage of vital records was accomplished by matching 
     death certificates for all women of reproductive age against 
     live birth and fetal death records to identify pregnancies 
     occurring in the year preceding death. Successful linkage of 
     records was achieved by matching either mother's Social 
     Security number or mother's name and date of birth on the 
     death record with corresponding information on live birth and 
     fetal death records. All linked records were manually 
     reviewed to ensure accurate matching of records.
       Medical examiner records, which include autopsy reports and 
     police records, were reviewed for all 4195 women aged 10 to 
     50 years whose deaths were investigated by the medical 
     examiner during the study period. Maryland law mandates that 
     the medical examiner investigate all deaths that occur by 
     violence, suicide, casualty, unexpectedly, or in any 
     suspicious or unusual manner. Death certificates were 
     obtained for 116 women for whom medical examiner records 
     indicated evidence of pregnancy.
       With the exception of 1 death to a 14-year-old adolescent, 
     all deaths identified through medical examiner records 
     occurred among women who were within the traditional 
     reproductive age group of 15 to 44 years. All deaths 
     identified through death certificates and record linkage were 
     among women between the ages of 15 and 44 years.
       All death records that did not identify a maternal cause as 
     the underlying cause of death (n = 184) were reviewed by 
     trained nosologists to determine the underlying cause of 
     death that would have been assigned if a history of pregnancy 
     had been reported on the death certificate. Nosologists were 
     provided with information on pregnancy outcome and, if 
     available, the date of delivery, date of pregnancy 
     termination, or gestational age. Revised underlying cause-of-
     death information was used to categorize data by cause of 
     death.


                                RESULTS

       A total of 247 pregnancy-associated deaths occurring 
     between 1993 and 1998 were identified from the 3 data 
     sources. Sixty-seven pregnancy-associated deaths (27.1%) were 
     identified through cause-of-death information obtained from 
     death certificates. Sixty-two of these records listed 
     pregnancy complications as the underlying cause of death; the 
     remaining 5 certificates listed pregnancy complications as a 
     contributing, but not underlying, cause of death. Linkage of 
     records identified 174 (70.4%) of all pregnancy-associated 
     deaths and review of medical examiner records resulted in the 
     identification of 116 (47.0%) deaths (Table 1).

  TABLE 1.--NUMBER OF PREGNANCY-ASSOCIATED DEATHS BY PREGNANCY OUTCOME AND SOURCES OF DATA, MARYLAND, 1993-1998
                                                       \1\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                        Sources of data
                                                                             -----------------------------------
                        Pregnancy outcome                            Total                              Medical
                                                                     deaths       Death       Record    examiner
                                                                              certificates   linkage    records
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
All outcomes.....................................................        247           67         174        116
  Live births....................................................        182           46         172         60
  Fetal death....................................................          5            3           2          4
  Therapeutic abortion...........................................          1            0           0          1
  Undelivered....................................................         53           12           0         50
    Ectopic pregnancy............................................          7            7           0          5
    Molar pregnancy..............................................          1            1           0          1
    All other undelivered........................................         45            4           0         44
  Unknown........................................................          6            6           0          1
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Deaths from any cause during pregnancy or within 1 calendar year of delivery or termination of pregnancy,
  regardless of the duration or anatomical site of the pregnancy. A single death may have been ascertained from
  more than 1 source, therefore columns do not sum to the total number of deaths.

       Sixty-five percent (n = 160) of pregnancy-associated deaths 
     were identified through a single surveillance method. One 
     hundred two (41.3%) were identified only through linkage of 
     records, 45 (18.2%) only through review of medical examiner 
     records, and 13 (5.3%) only through cause-of-death 
     information provided on death certificates. Thirty-five 
     percent of pregnancy-associated deaths were identified 
     through more than 1 data source (n = 87).
       One hundred eighty-two (73.7%) of the 247 pregnancy-
     associated deaths identified in this study followed a live 
     birth, 5 (2.0%) followed a fetal death, 1 followed a 
     therapeutic abortion, and 53 (21.4%) occurred among women who 
     were pregnant at the time of death. Of the 53 deaths that 
     occurred among pregnant women, 7 were the result of ruptured 
     ectopic pregnancies and 1 resulted from a molar pregnancy 
     (Table 1). Eighty-four (34.0%) deaths occurred within 42 days 
     of delivery or termination of pregnancy, and 103 (41.7%) 
     deaths occurred 43 to 365 days following delivery or 
     termination of pregnancy. The time of death was unknown for 7 
     women (Table 2).

                                                       TABLE 2--NUMBER OF PREGNANCY-ASSOCIATED DEATHS BY CAUSE OF DEATH, SOURCE OF DATA, AND TIME OF DEATH, MARYLAND 1993-1998 \1\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                            All sources                                 Death certificates                                Record linkage                             Medical examiner records
                                         -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                    After delivery of                               After delivery or                               After delivery or                               After delivery or
             Cause of death                                     termination of pregnancy                        termination of pregnancy                        termination of pregnancy                        termination of pregnancy
                                          Total \2\    During  -------------------------- Total \2\    During  -------------------------- Total \2\    During  -------------------------- Total \2\    During  -------------------------
                                                     pregnancy       42 d                            pregnancy       42 d                            Pregnancy       42 d                            Pregnancy       42 d
                                                                                43-365 d                                        43-365 d                                        43-365 d                                        43-365 d
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
All causes..............................        247         53           84          103         67         12           45            3        174          0           71          103        116         50           48           16
Homicide................................         50         23            3           24          0          0            0            0         27          0            3           24         25         23            1            1
Cardiovascular..........................         48          5           21           18         13          2            6            1         36          0           18           18         30          5           15            8
Embolism................................         21          5           14            2         11          1            9            1         14          0           12            2         14          5            8            1
accidents \3\...........................         18          6            2           10          0          0            0            0         11          0            1           10          9          6            2            1
Hemorrhage..............................         17          7            9            0         16          7            8            0          5          0            5            0         10          5            5            0
Hypertensive disorders of pregnancy.....         16          0           15            1         14          0           13            1         16          0           15            1         10          0            9            1
Infection...............................         16          0            7            8          4          0            3            0         15          0            7            8          3          0            2            1
Neoplasms...............................         15          0            0           15          0          0            0            0         15          0            0           15          0          0            0            0
Substance abuse.........................         13          1            3            9          1          0            1            0         11          0            2            9          4          1            2            1
Suicide.................................          7          2            0            5          0          0            0            0          5          0            0            5          3          2            0            1
All other causes........................         26          4           10           11          8          2            5            0         19          0            8           11          8          3            4            1
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Deaths from any cause during pregnancy within 1 calendar year of delivery or termination pregnancy, regardless of the duration or anatomical site of the pregnancy. A single death may have been ascertained from more than 1
  source, therefore columns do not sum to the total number of deaths ascertained from all sources.
\2\ Totals include 7 deaths for which the time of death was unknown.
\3\ Includes deaths from motor vehicle collisions, falls, drowning, and other unintentional injuries.

       The leading cause of pregnancy-associated death was 
     homicide (n=50). All homicides were identified through record 
     linkage or review of medical examiner records rather than 
     from death certificates, as would be expected since homicide 
     is not a maternal cause of death. Deaths from cardiovascular 
     disorders, the second leading cause of death (n=48), were 
     identified through all 3 data sources, although no single 
     source was able to identify all deaths. Of the 26 deaths from 
     cardiovascular disorders that occurred during pregnancy or 
     within 42 days of delivery and should therefore have been 
     classified as maternal deaths, only 8 were identified through 
     death certificates. A substantial proportion of deaths from 
     other maternal causes, including embolism and infection, 
     could not be identified from death certificates since the 
     physicians filling out the certificates failed to report that 
     the women were pregnant or had recent pregnancies (Table 2).
       All maternal deaths, by definition, occurred during 
     pregnancy or within 42 days of delivery or termination of 
     pregnancy. This included most deaths from embolism, 
     hemorrhage, and hypertensive disorders of pregnancy as well 
     as a substantial proportion of

[[Page H1625]]

     deaths resulting from cardiovascular disorders and infection. 
     Homicide was responsible for the majority of deaths during 
     pregnancy (23 [43.4%]) and during the 43- to 365-day period 
     following delivery or termination of pregnancy (24 [23.3%]), 
     but accounted for only a small proportion of deaths occurring 
     within 42 days of pregnancy (3 [3.6%]), when obstetric causes 
     were responsible for most pregnancy-associated deaths. 
     Cardiovascular disorders (n=21) were the leading cause of 
     death in the 42-day period following delivery or termination 
     of pregnancy and the second leading cause of death (n=18), 
     following homicide, in the late postpartum period (Table 2).
       Homicide, the leading cause of pregnancy-associated death, 
     was responsible for 20.2% of all pregnancy-associated deaths. 
     By comparison, homicide was the fifth leading cause of death 
     among Maryland women aged 14 to 44 years who had not had a 
     pregnancy in the year preceding death and was responsible for 
     457 (6.4%) of total deaths among this group (z=7.737, 
     P