Summary: H.R.2403 — 101st Congress (1989-1990)All Information (Except Text)

There is one summary for H.R.2403. Bill summaries are authored by CRS.

Shown Here:
Introduced in House (05/18/1989)

International Plutonium Control Act - Urges the President to seek negotiations with the Soviet Union on a verifiable agreement to end the production by both countries of plutonium and highly enriched uranium for weapons purposes.

Expresses the sense of the Congress that the United States and the Soviet Union should: (1) establish verification arrangements to monitor the cessation of activities under this Act, including mutual inspections of production reactors, chemical separation and uranium enrichment facilities, and isotope separation plants; (2) furnish the equipment and personnel to implement safeguards at civilian nuclear facilities and consider transferring the safeguards mission to the International Atomic Energy Agency; and (3) consider increasing their respective contributions to the Agency to fund the assignment of fully trained inspectors to each country to assume additional safeguards responsibilities at civilian nuclear facilities.

Urges the President to seek agreement with the Soviet Union that the United States and the Soviet Union will: (1) exchange information on the location, mission, and maximum annual capacity of their facilities essential to the production of tritium for stockpile replenishment; and (2) provide to each other a complete inventory of facilities dedicated to the production of plutonium and uranium for weapons purposes.

Prohibits funds from being obligated or expended by the United States to operate facilities dedicated to the production of plutonium for weapons purposes unless the President certifies to the Congress that: (1) the Soviet Union has refused to enter in good faith into the negotiations; (2) the United States is unable to determine that Soviet facilities producing plutonium have ceased operation; or (3) the Soviet Union is continuing to obtain plutonium by operating civilian chemical separation plants that are not under bilateral U.S.-Soviet safeguards.