H.R.2786 - National Missile Defense Deployment Criteria Act of 2001107th Congress (2001-2002)
|Sponsor:||Rep. Markey, Edward J. [D-MA-7] (Introduced 08/02/2001)|
|Committees:||House - Armed Services; Rules; International Relations|
|Latest Action:||House - 08/29/2001 Executive Comment Requested from DOD. (All Actions)|
This bill has the status Introduced
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Summary: H.R.2786 — 107th Congress (2001-2002)All Information (Except Text)
National Missile Defense Deployment Criteria Act of 2001 - Amends the National Missile Defense Act of 1999 to allow deployment of a national missile defense system (system) only if: (1) the system is technologically feasible; (2) system cost in relation to other Department of Defense (DOD) priorities will not lead to an overall reduction in national security by reducing resources available for other defense priorities; (3) the system will not diminish overall U.S. national security; (4) the system will not threaten to disrupt relations with U.S. nuclear allies, U.S. European allies, Russia, the People's Republic of China, and other nations; and (5) the threat of a long-range ballistic missile attack from a nation of concern is clearly demonstrated.
Introduced in House (08/02/2001)
Prohibits the President from directing DOD to deploy a system unless and until: (1) the President certifies to Congress that the above deployment conditions have been met; and (2) a joint resolution is enacted concurring in the President's certification.
Prohibits DOD procurement funds from being obligated for a system unless: (1) the President certifies to Congress that adequate system tests have been undertaken to meet identified threats against countermeasures; and (2) a joint resolution is enacted concurring in the President's certification.
Requires the Secretary of Defense to direct the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization to: (1) include specified system countermeasures in system ground and flight testing conducted before the system becomes operational; and (2) determine the extent to which the exoatmospheric kill vehicle and the system can reliably discriminate between warheads and such countermeasures.