Text: S.1888 — 108th Congress (2003-2004)All Information (Except Text)

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Introduced in Senate (11/18/2003)

 
[Congressional Bills 108th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
[S. 1888 Introduced in Senate (IS)]







108th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                S. 1888

   To halt Saudi support for institutions that fund, train, incite, 
 encourage, or in any other way aid and abet terrorism, and to secure 
  full Saudi cooperation in the investigation of terrorist incidents.


_______________________________________________________________________


                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                           November 18, 2003

 Mr. Specter (for himself, Mr. Schumer, Mr. Graham of South Carolina, 
Mr. Wyden, Ms. Collins, Mr. Graham of Florida, and Mr. Bayh) introduced 
the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee 
                          on Foreign Relations

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL


 
   To halt Saudi support for institutions that fund, train, incite, 
 encourage, or in any other way aid and abet terrorism, and to secure 
  full Saudi cooperation in the investigation of terrorist incidents.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Saudi Arabia Accountability Act of 
2003''.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

    Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001) 
        mandates that all states ``refrain from providing any form of 
        support, active or passive, to entities or persons involved in 
        terrorist acts'', take ``the necessary steps to prevent the 
        commission of terrorist acts'', and ``deny safe haven to those 
        who finance, plan, support, or commit terrorist acts''.
            (2) The Council on Foreign Relations concluded in an 
        October 2002 report on terrorist financing that ``[f]or years, 
        individuals and charities based in Saudi Arabia have been the 
        most important source of funds for al-Qaeda, and for years, 
        Saudi officials have turned a blind eye to this problem''.
            (3) The Middle East Media Research Institute concluded in a 
        July 3, 2003, report on Saudi support for Palestinian 
        terrorists that ``for decades, the royal family of the Kingdom 
        of Saudi Arabia has been the main financial supporter of 
        Palestinian groups fighting Israel''. The report notes 
        specifically that Saudi-sponsored organizations have funneled 
        over $4,000,000,000 to finance the Palestinian intifada that 
        began in September 2000.
            (4) Much of this Saudi money has been directed to Hamas and 
        to the families of suicide bombers, directly funding and 
        rewarding suicide bombers. In December 2000, former Palestinian 
        Prime Minister Mahmoud Abbas wrote to the Saudis to complain 
        about their support for Hamas.
            (5) The New York Times, citing United States and Israeli 
        sources, reported on September 17, 2003, that at least 50 
        percent of the current operating budget of Hamas comes from 
        ``people in Saudi Arabia''.
            (6) Many Saudi-funded religious institutions and the 
        literature they distribute teach a message of hate and 
        intolerance that provides an ideological basis for anti-Western 
        terrorism. The effects of these teachings are evidenced by the 
        fact that Osama bin Laden himself and 15 of the 19 September 
        11th hijackers were Saudi citizens.
            (7) After the 1996 bombing of the Khobar Towers housing 
        complex at Dahran, Saudi Arabia, which killed 19 United States 
        Air Force personnel and wounded approximately 400 people, the 
        Government of Saudi Arabia refused to allow United States 
        officials to question individuals held in detention by the 
        Saudis in connection with the attack.
            (8) During an October 2002 hearing on financing of 
        terrorism before the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate, 
        the Undersecretary for Enforcement of the Department of the 
        Treasury testified that the Government of Saudi Arabia had 
        taken only ``baby steps'' toward stemming the financing of 
        terrorist activities.
            (9) During a July 2003 hearing on terrorism before the 
        Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology and Homeland Security of 
        the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate, David Aufhauser, 
        General Counsel of the Treasury Department, stated that Saudi 
        Arabia is, in many cases, the ``epicenter'' of financing for 
        terrorism.
            (10) A joint committee of the Select Committee on 
        Intelligence of the Senate and the Permanent Select Committee 
        on Intelligence of the House of Representatives issued a report 
        on July 24, 2003, that quotes various United States Government 
        personnel who complained that the Saudis refused to cooperate 
        in the investigation of Osama bin Laden and his network both 
        before and after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks.
            (11) There are indications that, since the May 12, 2003, 
        suicide bombings in Riyadh, the Government of Saudi Arabia is 
        making a more serious effort to combat terrorism.

SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

    It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) it is imperative that the Government of Saudi Arabia 
        immediately and unconditionally--
                    (A) provide complete, unrestricted, and 
                unobstructed cooperation to the United States, 
                including the unsolicited sharing of relevant 
                intelligence in a consistent and timely fashion, in the 
                investigation of groups and individuals that are 
                suspected of financing, supporting, plotting, or 
                committing an act of terror against United States 
                citizens anywhere in the world, including within the 
                Kingdom of Saudi Arabia;
                    (B) permanently close all charities, schools, or 
                other organizations or institutions in the Kingdom of 
                Saudi Arabia that fund, train, incite, encourage, or in 
                any other way aid and abet terrorism anywhere in the 
                world (hereafter in this Act referred to as ``Saudi-
                based terror organizations''), including by means of 
                providing support for the families of individuals who 
                have committed acts of terrorism;
                    (C) end funding or other support by the Government 
                of Saudi Arabia for charities, schools, and any other 
                organizations or institutions outside the Kingdom of 
                Saudi Arabia that train, incite, encourage, or in any 
                other way aid and abet terrorism anywhere in the world 
                (hereafter in this Act referred to as ``offshore terror 
                organizations''), including by means of providing 
                support for the families of individuals who have 
                committed acts of terrorism; and
                    (D) block all funding from private Saudi citizens 
                and entities to any Saudi-based terror organization or 
                offshore terrorism organization; and
            (2) the President, in deciding whether to make the 
        certification under section 4, should judge whether the 
        Government of Saudi Arabia has continued and sufficiently 
        expanded the efforts to combat terrorism that it redoubled 
        after the May 12, 2003, bombing in Riyadh.

SEC. 4. SANCTIONS.

    (a) Restrictions on Exports and Diplomatic Travel.--Unless the 
President makes the certification described in subsection (c), the 
President shall take the following actions:
            (1) Prohibit the export to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and 
        prohibit the issuance of a license for the export to the 
        Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, of--
                    (A) any defense articles or defense services on the 
                United States Munitions List under section 38 of the 
                Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2778) for which 
                special export controls are warranted under such Act 
                (22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.); and
                    (B) any item identified on the Commerce Control 
                List maintained under part 774 of title 15, Code of 
                Federal Regulations.
            (2) Restrict travel of Saudi diplomats assigned to 
        Washington, District of Columbia, New York, New York, the Saudi 
        Consulate General in Houston, or the Saudi Consulate in Los 
        Angeles to a 25-mile radius of Washington, District of 
        Columbia, New York, New York, the Saudi Consulate General in 
        Houston, or the Saudi Consulate in Los Angeles, respectively.
    (b) Waiver.--The President may waive the application of subsection 
(a) if the President--
            (1) determines that it is in the national security interest 
        of the United States to do so; and
            (2) submits to the appropriate congressional committees a 
        report that contains the reasons for such determination.
    (c) Certification.--The President shall transmit to the appropriate 
congressional committees a certification of any determination made by 
the President after the date of the enactment of this Act that the 
Government of Saudi Arabia--
            (1) is fully cooperating with the United States in 
        investigating and preventing terrorist attacks;
            (2) has permanently closed all Saudi-based terror 
        organizations;
            (3) has ended any funding or other support by the 
        Government of Saudi Arabia for any offshore terror 
        organization; and
            (4) has exercised maximum efforts to block all funding from 
        private Saudi citizens and entities to offshore terrorist 
        organizations.

SEC. 5. REPORT.

    (a) Requirement for Report.--Not later than 6 months after the date 
of the enactment of this Act, and every 12 months thereafter until the 
President makes the certification described in section 4(c), the 
Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional 
committees a report on the progress made by the Government of Saudi 
Arabia toward meeting the conditions described in paragraphs (1) 
through (4) of section 4(c).
    (b) Form.--The report submitted under subsection (a) shall be in 
unclassified form but may include a classified annex.

SEC. 6. DEFINITION OF APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.

    In this Act, the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' 
means the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the 
Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives.
                                 <all>