Text: H.R.5682 — 109th Congress (2005-2006)All Bill Information (Except Text)

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Public Law No: 109-401 (12/18/2006)




[109th Congress Public Law 401]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]


[DOCID: f:publ401.109]

[[Page 2725]]

               UNITED STATES AND INDIA NUCLEAR COOPERATION

[[Page 120 STAT. 2726]]

Public Law 109-401
109th Congress

                                 An Act


 
 To exempt from certain requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 a 
proposed nuclear agreement for cooperation with India. <<NOTE: Dec. 18, 
                         2006 -  [H.R. 5682]>> 

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

  TITLE I-- <<NOTE: Henry J. Hyde United States-India Peaceful Atomic 
   Energy Cooperation Act of 2006.>> UNITED STATES AND INDIA NUCLEAR 
COOPERATION

  

SEC. 101. <<NOTE: 22 USC 8001 note.>> SHORT TITLE.

    This title may be cited as the ``Henry J. Hyde United States-India 
Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 2006''.

SEC. 102. <<NOTE: 22 USC 8001.>> SENSE OF CONGRESS.

    It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, other 
        weapons of mass destruction, the means to produce them, and the 
        means to deliver them are critical objectives for United States 
        foreign policy;
            (2) sustaining the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) 
        and strengthening its implementation, particularly its 
        verification and compliance, is the keystone of United States 
        nonproliferation policy;
            (3) the NPT has been a significant success in preventing the 
        acquisition of nuclear weapons capabilities and maintaining a 
        stable international security situation;
            (4) countries that have never become a party to the NPT and 
        remain outside that treaty's legal regime pose a potential 
        challenge to the achievement of the overall goals of global 
        nonproliferation, because those countries have not undertaken 
        the NPT obligation to prohibit the spread of nuclear weapons 
        capabilities;
            (5) it is in the interest of the United States to the 
        fullest extent possible to ensure that those countries that are 
        not States Party to the NPT are responsible in the disposition 
        of any nuclear technology they develop;
            (6) it is in the interest of the United States to enter into 
        an agreement for nuclear cooperation arranged pursuant to 
        section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153) 
        with a country that has never been a State Party to the NPT if--

[[Page 120 STAT. 2727]]

                    (A) the country has demonstrated responsible 
                behavior with respect to the nonproliferation of 
                technology related to nuclear weapons and the means to 
                deliver them;
                    (B) the country has a functioning and uninterrupted 
                democratic system of government, has a foreign policy 
                that is congruent to that of the United States, and is 
                working with the United States on key foreign policy 
                initiatives related to nonproliferation;
                    (C) such cooperation induces the country to 
                promulgate and implement substantially improved 
                protections against the proliferation of technology 
                related to nuclear weapons and the means to deliver 
                them, and to refrain from actions that would further the 
                development of its nuclear weapons program; and
                    (D) such cooperation will induce the country to give 
                greater political and material support to the 
                achievement of United States global and regional 
                nonproliferation objectives, especially with respect to 
                dissuading, isolating, and, if necessary, sanctioning 
                and containing states that sponsor terrorism and 
                terrorist groups that are seeking to acquire a nuclear 
                weapons capability or other weapons of mass destruction 
                capability and the means to deliver such weapons;
            (7) the United States should continue its policy of 
        engagement, collaboration, and exchanges with and between India 
        and Pakistan;
            (8) strong bilateral relations with India are in the 
        national interest of the United States;
            (9) the United States and India share common democratic 
        values and the potential for increasing and sustained economic 
        engagement;
            (10) commerce in civil nuclear energy with India by the 
        United States and other countries has the potential to benefit 
        the people of all countries;
            (11) such commerce also represents a significant change in 
        United States policy regarding commerce with countries that are 
        not States Party to the NPT, which remains the foundation of the 
        international nonproliferation regime;
            (12) any commerce in civil nuclear energy with India by the 
        United States and other countries must be achieved in a manner 
        that minimizes the risk of nuclear proliferation or regional 
        arms races and maximizes India's adherence to international 
        nonproliferation regimes, including, in particular, the 
        guidelines of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG); and
            (13) the United States should not seek to facilitate or 
        encourage the continuation of nuclear exports to India by any 
        other party if such exports are terminated under United States 
        law.

SEC. 103. <<NOTE: 22 USC 8002.>> STATEMENTS OF POLICY.

    (a) In General.--The following shall be the policies of the United 
States:
            (1) Oppose the development of a capability to produce 
        nuclear weapons by any non-nuclear weapon state, within or 
        outside of the NPT.
            (2) Encourage States Party to the NPT to interpret the right 
        to ``develop research, production and use of nuclear energy

[[Page 120 STAT. 2728]]

        for peaceful purposes'', as set forth in Article IV of the NPT, 
        as being a right that applies only to the extent that it is 
        consistent with the object and purpose of the NPT to prevent the 
        spread of nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons capabilities, 
        including by refraining from all nuclear cooperation with any 
        State Party that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
        determines is not in full compliance with its NPT obligations, 
        including its safeguards obligations.
            (3) Act in a manner fully consistent with the Guidelines for 
        Nuclear Transfers and the Guidelines for Transfers of Nuclear-
        Related Dual-Use Equipment, Materials, Software and Related 
        Technology developed by the NSG, and decisions related to the 
        those guidelines, and the rules and practices regarding NSG 
        decisionmaking.
            (4) Strengthen the NSG guidelines and decisions concerning 
        consultation by members regarding violations of supplier and 
        recipient understandings by instituting the practice of a timely 
        and coordinated response by NSG members to all such violations, 
        including termination of nuclear transfers to an involved 
        recipient, that discourages individual NSG members from 
        continuing cooperation with such recipient until such time as a 
        consensus regarding a coordinated response has been achieved.
            (5) Given the special sensitivity of equipment and 
        technologies related to the enrichment of uranium, the 
        reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel, and the production of heavy 
        water, work with members of the NSG, individually and 
        collectively, to further restrict the transfers of such 
        equipment and technologies, including to India.
            (6) Seek to prevent the transfer to a country of nuclear 
        equipment, materials, or technology from other participating 
        governments in the NSG or from any other source if nuclear 
        transfers to that country are suspended or terminated pursuant 
        to this title, the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2011 et 
        seq.), or any other United States law.

    (b) With Respect to South Asia.--The following shall be the policies 
of the United States with respect to South Asia:
            (1) <<NOTE: India. Pakistan. People's Republic of 
        China.>> Achieve, at the earliest possible date, a moratorium on 
        the production of fissile material for nuclear explosive 
        purposes by India, Pakistan, and the People's Republic of China.
            (2) Achieve, at the earliest possible date, the conclusion 
        and implementation of a treaty banning the production of fissile 
        material for nuclear weapons to which both the United States and 
        India become parties.
            (3) Secure India's--
                    (A) full participation in the Proliferation Security 
                Initiative;
                    (B) formal commitment to the Statement of 
                Interdiction Principles of such Initiative;
                    (C) public announcement of its decision to conform 
                its export control laws, regulations, and policies with 
                the Australia Group and with the Guidelines, Procedures, 
                Criteria, and Control Lists of the Wassenaar 
                Arrangement;
                    (D) demonstration of satisfactory progress toward 
                implementing the decision described in subparagraph (C); 
                and

[[Page 120 STAT. 2729]]

                    (E) ratification of or accession to the Convention 
                on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage, done 
                at Vienna on September 12, 1997.
            (4) Secure India's full and active participation in United 
        States efforts to dissuade, isolate, and, if necessary, sanction 
        and contain Iran for its efforts to acquire weapons of mass 
        destruction, including a nuclear weapons capability and the 
        capability to enrich uranium or reprocess nuclear fuel, and the 
        means to deliver weapons of mass destruction.
            (5) Seek to halt the increase of nuclear weapon arsenals in 
        South Asia and to promote their reduction and eventual 
        elimination.
            (6) Ensure that spent fuel generated in India's civilian 
        nuclear power reactors is not transferred to the United States 
        except pursuant to the Congressional review procedures required 
        under section 131 f. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 
        2160 (f)).
            (7) Pending implementation of the multilateral moratorium 
        described in paragraph (1) or the treaty described in paragraph 
        (2), encourage India not to increase its production of fissile 
        material at unsafeguarded nuclear facilities.
            (8) Ensure that any safeguards agreement or Additional 
        Protocol to which India is a party with the IAEA can reliably 
        safeguard any export or reexport to India of any nuclear 
        materials and equipment.
            (9) Ensure that the text and implementation of any agreement 
        for cooperation with India arranged pursuant to section 123 of 
        the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153) meet the 
        requirements set forth in subsections a.(1) and a.(3) through 
        a.(9) of such section.
            (10) Any nuclear power reactor fuel reserve provided to the 
        Government of India for use in safeguarded civilian nuclear 
        facilities should be commensurate with reasonable reactor 
        operating requirements.

SEC. 104. <<NOTE: 22 USC 8003.>> WAIVER AUTHORITY AND CONGRESSIONAL 
            APPROVAL.

    (a) In General.--If the President makes the determination described 
in subsection (b), the President may--
            (1) exempt a proposed agreement for cooperation with India 
        arranged pursuant to section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 
        1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153) from the requirement of subsection a.(2) 
        of such section;
            (2) waive the application of section 128 of the Atomic 
        Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2157) with respect to exports to 
        India; and
            (3) waive with respect to India the application of--
                    (A) section 129 a.(1)(D) of the Atomic Energy Act of 
                1954 (42 U.S.C. 2158(a)(1)(D)); and
                    (B) section 129 of such Act (42 U.S.C. 2158) 
                regarding any actions that occurred before July 18, 
                2005.

    (b)  <<NOTE: India.>> Determination by the President.--The 
determination referred to in subsection (a) is a determination by the 
President that the following actions have occurred:
            (1) India has provided the United States and the IAEA with a 
        credible plan to separate civil and military nuclear facilities, 
        materials, and programs, and has filed a declaration regarding 
        its civil facilities and materials with the IAEA.

[[Page 120 STAT. 2730]]

            (2) India and the IAEA have concluded all legal steps 
        required prior to signature by the parties of an agreement 
        requiring the application of IAEA safeguards in perpetuity in 
        accordance with IAEA standards, principles, and practices 
        (including IAEA Board of Governors Document GOV/1621 (1973)) to 
        India's civil nuclear facilities, materials, and programs as 
        declared in the plan described in paragraph (1), including 
        materials used in or produced through the use of India's civil 
        nuclear facilities.
            (3) India and the IAEA are making substantial progress 
        toward concluding an Additional Protocol consistent with IAEA 
        principles, practices, and policies that would apply to India's 
        civil nuclear program.
            (4) India is working actively with the United States for the 
        early conclusion of a multilateral treaty on the cessation of 
        the production of fissile materials for use in nuclear weapons 
        or other nuclear explosive devices.
            (5) India is working with and supporting United States and 
        international efforts to prevent the spread of enrichment and 
        reprocessing technology to any state that does not already 
        possess full-scale, functioning enrichment or reprocessing 
        plants.
            (6) India is taking the necessary steps to secure nuclear 
        and other sensitive materials and technology, including 
        through--
                    (A) the enactment and effective enforcement of 
                comprehensive export control legislation and 
                regulations;
                    (B) harmonization of its export control laws, 
                regulations, policies, and practices with the guidelines 
                and practices of the Missile Technology Control Regime 
                (MTCR) and the NSG; and
                    (C) adherence to the MTCR and the NSG in accordance 
                with the procedures of those regimes for unilateral 
                adherence.
            (7) The NSG has decided by consensus to permit supply to 
        India of nuclear items covered by the guidelines of the NSG.

    (c) Submission to Congress.--
            (1) I <<NOTE: President. Reports.>> n general.--The 
        President shall submit to the appropriate congressional 
        committees the determination made pursuant to subsection (b), 
        together with a report detailing the basis for the 
        determination.
            (2) Information to be included.--To the fullest extent 
        available to the United States, the report referred to in 
        paragraph (1) shall include the following information:
                    (A) A summary of the plan provided by India to the 
                United States and the IAEA to separate India's civil and 
                military nuclear facilities, materials, and programs, 
                and the declaration made by India to the IAEA 
                identifying India's civil facilities to be placed under 
                IAEA safeguards, including an analysis of the 
                credibility of such plan and declaration, together with 
                copies of the plan and declaration.
                    (B) A summary of the agreement that has been entered 
                into between India and the IAEA requiring the 
                application of safeguards in accordance with IAEA 
                practices to India's civil nuclear facilities as 
                declared in the plan described

[[Page 120 STAT. 2731]]

                in subparagraph (A), together with a copy of the 
                agreement, and a description of the progress toward its 
                full implementation.
                    (C) A summary of the progress made toward conclusion 
                and implementation of an Additional Protocol between 
                India and the IAEA, including a description of the scope 
                of such Additional Protocol.
                    (D) A description of the steps that India is taking 
                to work with the United States for the conclusion of a 
                multilateral treaty banning the production of fissile 
                material for nuclear weapons, including a description of 
                the steps that the United States has taken and will take 
                to encourage India to identify and declare a date by 
                which India would be willing to stop production of 
                fissile material for nuclear weapons unilaterally or 
                pursuant to a multilateral moratorium or treaty.
                    (E) A description of the steps India is taking to 
                prevent the spread of nuclear-related technology, 
                including enrichment and reprocessing technology or 
                materials that can be used to acquire a nuclear weapons 
                capability, as well as the support that India is 
                providing to the United States to further United States 
                objectives to restrict the spread of such technology.
                    (F) A description of the steps that India is taking 
                to secure materials and technology applicable for the 
                development, acquisition, or manufacture of weapons of 
                mass destruction and the means to deliver such weapons 
                through the application of comprehensive export control 
                legislation and regulations, and through harmonization 
                with and adherence to MTCR, NSG, Australia Group, and 
                Wassenaar Arrangement guidelines, compliance with United 
                Nations Security Council Resolution 1540, and 
                participation in the Proliferation Security Initiative.
                    (G) A description and assessment of the specific 
                measures that India has taken to fully and actively 
                participate in United States and international efforts 
                to dissuade, isolate, and, if necessary, sanction and 
                contain Iran for its efforts to acquire weapons of mass 
                destruction, including a nuclear weapons capability and 
                the capability to enrich uranium or reprocess nuclear 
                fuel and the means to deliver weapons of mass 
                destruction.
                    (H) A description of the decision of the NSG 
                relating to nuclear cooperation with India, including 
                whether nuclear cooperation by the United States under 
                an agreement for cooperation arranged pursuant to 
                section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 
                2153) is consistent with the decision, practices, and 
                policies of the NSG.
                    (I) A description of the scope of peaceful 
                cooperation envisioned by the United States and India 
                that will be implemented under the agreement for nuclear 
                cooperation, including whether such cooperation will 
                include the provision of enrichment and reprocessing 
                technology.
                    (J) A description of the steps taken to ensure that 
                proposed United States civil nuclear cooperation with 
                India will not in any way assist India's nuclear weapons 
                program.

    (d) Restrictions on Nuclear Transfers.--

[[Page 120 STAT. 2732]]

            (1) In general.--Pursuant to the obligations of the United 
        States under Article I of the NPT, nothing in this title 
        constitutes authority to carry out any civil nuclear cooperation 
        between the United States and a country that is not a nuclear-
        weapon State Party to the NPT that would in any way assist, 
        encourage, or induce that country to manufacture or otherwise 
        acquire nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices.
            (2) NSG transfer guidelines.--Notwithstanding the entry into 
        force of an agreement for cooperation with India arranged 
        pursuant to section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 
        U.S.C. 2153) and pursuant to this title, no item subject to such 
        agreement or subject to the transfer guidelines of the NSG, or 
        to NSG decisions related thereto, may be transferred to India if 
        such transfer would be inconsistent with the transfer guidelines 
        of the NSG in effect on the date of the transfer.
            (3) Termination of nuclear transfers to india.--
                    (A)  <<NOTE: President.>> In general.--
                Notwithstanding the entry into force of an agreement for 
                cooperation with India arranged pursuant to section 123 
                of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153) and 
                pursuant to this title, and except as provided under 
                subparagraph (B), exports of nuclear and nuclear-related 
                material, equipment, or technology to India shall be 
                terminated if there is any materially significant 
                transfer by an Indian person of--
                          (i) nuclear or nuclear-related material, 
                      equipment, or technology that is not consistent 
                      with NSG guidelines or decisions, or
                          (ii) ballistic missiles or missile-related 
                      equipment or technology that is not consistent 
                      with MTCR guidelines,
                unless the President determines that cessation of such 
                exports would be seriously prejudicial to the 
                achievement of United States nonproliferation objectives 
                or otherwise jeopardize the common defense and security.
                    (B) Exception.--The President may choose not to 
                terminate exports of nuclear and nuclear-related 
                material, equipment, and technology to India under 
                subparagraph (A) if--
                          (i) the transfer covered under such 
                      subparagraph was made without the knowledge of the 
                      Government of India;
                          (ii) at the time of the transfer, either the 
                      Government of India did not own, control, or 
                      direct the Indian person that made the transfer or 
                      the Indian person that made the transfer is a 
                      natural person who acted without the knowledge of 
                      any entity described in subparagraph (B) or (C) of 
                      section 110(5); and
                          (iii) <<NOTE: Certification.>> the President 
                      certifies to the appropriate congressional 
                      committees that the Government of India has taken 
                      or is taking appropriate judicial or other 
                      enforcement actions against the Indian person with 
                      respect to such transfer.
            (4) Exports, reexports, transfers, and retransfers to india 
        related to enrichment, reprocessing, and heavy water 
        production.--
                    (A) In general.--

[[Page 120 STAT. 2733]]

                          (i) Nuclear regulatory commission.--The 
                      Nuclear Regulatory Commission may only issue 
                      licenses for the export or reexport to India of 
                      any equipment, components, or materials related to 
                      the enrichment of uranium, the reprocessing of 
                      spent nuclear fuel, or the production of heavy 
                      water if the requirements of subparagraph (B) are 
                      met.
                          (ii) Secretary of energy.--The Secretary of 
                      Energy may only issue authorizations for the 
                      transfer or retransfer to India of any equipment, 
                      materials, or technology related to the enrichment 
                      of uranium, the reprocessing of spent nuclear 
                      fuel, or the production of heavy water (including 
                      under the terms of a subsequent arrangement under 
                      section 131 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 
                      U.S.C. 2160)) if the requirements of subparagraph 
                      (B) are met.
                    (B) Requirements for approvals.--Exports, reexports, 
                transfers, and retransfers referred to in subparagraph 
                (A) may only be approved if--
                          (i) the end user--
                                    (I) is a multinational facility 
                                participating in an IAEA-approved 
                                program to provide alternatives to 
                                national fuel cycle capabilities; or
                                    (II) is a facility participating in, 
                                and the export, reexport, transfer, or 
                                retransfer is associated with, a 
                                bilateral or multinational program to 
                                develop a proliferation-resistant fuel 
                                cycle;
                          (ii) appropriate measures are in place at any 
                      facility referred to in clause (i) to ensure that 
                      no sensitive nuclear technology, as defined in 
                      section 4(5) of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act 
                      of 1978 (22 U.S.C. 3203(5)), will be diverted to 
                      any person, site, facility, location, or program 
                      not under IAEA safeguards; and
                          (iii) <<NOTE: President.>> the President   
                      determines that the export, reexport, transfer, or 
                      retransfer will not assist in the manufacture or 
                      acquisition of nuclear explosive devices or the 
                      production of fissile material for military 
                      purposes.
            (5) Nuclear export accountability program.--
                    (A)  <<NOTE: President.>> In general.--The President 
                shall ensure that all appropriate measures are taken to 
                maintain accountability with respect to nuclear 
                materials, equipment, and technology sold, leased, 
                exported, or reexported to India so as to ensure--
                          (i) full implementation of the protections 
                      required under section 123 a.(1) of the Atomic 
                      Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153 (a)(1)); and
                          (ii) United States compliance with Article I 
                      of the NPT.
                    (B) Measures.--The measures taken pursuant to 
                subparagraph (A) shall include the following:
                          (i) Obtaining and implementing assurances and 
                      conditions pursuant to the export licensing 
                      authorities of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
                      and the Department of Commerce and the authorizing 
                      authorities of the Department of Energy, 
                      including, as appropriate, conditions regarding 
                      end-use monitoring.

[[Page 120 STAT. 2734]]

                          (ii) A detailed system of reporting and 
                      accounting for technology transfers, including any 
                      retransfers in India, authorized by the Department 
                      of Energy pursuant to section 57 b. of the Atomic 
                      Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2077(b)). Such 
                      system shall be capable of providing assurances 
                      that--
                                    (I) the identified recipients of the 
                                nuclear technology are authorized to 
                                receive the nuclear technology;
                                    (II) the nuclear technology 
                                identified for transfer will be used 
                                only for peaceful safeguarded nuclear 
                                activities and will not be used for any 
                                military or nuclear explosive purpose; 
                                and
                                    (III) the nuclear technology 
                                identified for transfer will not be 
                                retransferred without the prior consent 
                                of the United States, and facilities, 
                                equipment, or materials derived through 
                                the use of transferred technology will 
                                not be transferred without the prior 
                                consent of the United States.
                          (iii) In the event the IAEA is unable to 
                      implement safeguards as required by an agreement 
                      for cooperation arranged pursuant to section 123 
                      of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153), 
                      appropriate assurance that arrangements will be 
                      put in place expeditiously that are consistent 
                      with the requirements of section 123 a.(1) of such 
                      Act (42 U.S.C. 2153(a)(1)) regarding the 
                      maintenance of safeguards as set forth in the 
                      agreement regardless of whether the agreement is 
                      terminated or suspended for any reason.
                    (C) Implementation.--The measures described in 
                subparagraph (B) shall be implemented to provide 
                reasonable assurances that the recipient is complying 
                with the relevant requirements, terms, and conditions of 
                any licenses issued by the United States regarding such 
                exports, including those relating to the use, 
                retransfer, safe handling, secure transit, and storage 
                of such exports.

    (e) Joint Resolution of Approval Requirement.--Section 123 d. of the 
Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153(d)) is amended in the second 
proviso by inserting after ``that subsection'' the following: ``, or an 
agreement exempted pursuant to section 104(a)(1) of the Henry J. Hyde 
United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 2006,''.
    (f) Sunset.--The authority provided under subsection (a)(1) to 
exempt an agreement shall terminate upon the enactment of a joint 
resolution under section 123 d. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 
U.S.C. 2153(d)) approving such an agreement.
    (g) Reporting to Congress.--
            (1)  <<NOTE: President.>> Information on nuclear activities 
        of india.--The President shall keep the appropriate 
        congressional committees fully and currently informed of the 
        facts and implications of any significant nuclear activities of 
        India, including--
                    (A) any material noncompliance on the part of the 
                Government of India with--
                          (i) the nonproliferation commitments 
                      undertaken in the Joint Statement of July 18, 
                      2005, between the President of the United States 
                      and the Prime Minister of India;

[[Page 120 STAT. 2735]]

                          (ii) the separation plan presented in the 
                      national parliament of India on March 7, 2006, and 
                      in greater detail on May 11, 2006;
                          (iii) a safeguards agreement between the 
                      Government of India and the IAEA;
                          (iv) an Additional Protocol between the 
                      Government of India and the IAEA;
                          (v) an agreement for cooperation between the 
                      Government of India and the United States 
                      Government arranged pursuant to section 123 of the 
                      Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153) or any 
                      subsequent arrangement under section 131 of such 
                      Act (42 U.S.C. 2160);
                          (vi) the terms and conditions of any approved 
                      licenses regarding the export or reexport of 
                      nuclear material or dual-use material, equipment, 
                      or technology; and
                          (vii) United States laws and regulations 
                      regarding such licenses;
                    (B) the construction of a nuclear facility in India 
                after the date of the enactment of this title;
                    (C) significant changes in the production by India 
                of nuclear weapons or in the types or amounts of fissile 
                material produced; and
                    (D) changes in the purpose or operational status of 
                any unsafeguarded nuclear fuel cycle activities in 
                India.
            (2)  <<NOTE: President.>> Implementation and compliance 
        report.--Not later than 180 days after the date on which an 
        agreement for cooperation with India arranged pursuant to 
        section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153) 
        enters into force, and annually thereafter, the President shall 
        submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report 
        including--
                    (A) a description of any additional nuclear 
                facilities and nuclear materials that the Government of 
                India has placed or intends to place under IAEA 
                safeguards;
                    (B) a comprehensive listing of--
                          (i) all licenses that have been approved by 
                      the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the 
                      Secretary of Energy for exports and reexports to 
                      India under parts 110 and 810 of title 10, Code of 
                      Federal Regulations;
                          (ii) any licenses approved by the Department 
                      of Commerce for the export or reexport to India of 
                      commodities, related technology, and software 
                      which are controlled for nuclear nonproliferation 
                      reasons on the Nuclear Referral List of the 
                      Commerce Control List maintained under part 774 of 
                      title 15, Code of Federal Regulation, or any 
                      successor regulation;
                          (iii) any other United States authorizations 
                      for the export or reexport to India of nuclear 
                      materials and equipment; and
                          (iv) with respect to each such license or 
                      other form of authorization described in clauses 
                      (i), (ii), and (iii)--
                                    (I) the number or other identifying 
                                information of each license or 
                                authorization;
                                    (II) the name or names of the 
                                authorized end user or end users;

[[Page 120 STAT. 2736]]

                                    (III) the name of the site, 
                                facility, or location in India to which 
                                the export or reexport was made;
                                    (IV) the terms and conditions 
                                included on such licenses and 
                                authorizations;
                                    (V) any post-shipment verification 
                                procedures that will be applied to such 
                                exports or reexports; and
                                    (VI) the term of validity of each 
                                such license or authorization;
                    (C) a description of any significant nuclear 
                commerce between India and other countries, including 
                any such trade that--
                          (i) is not consistent with applicable 
                      guidelines or decisions of the NSG; or
                          (ii) would not meet the standards applied to 
                      exports or reexports of such material, equipment, 
                      or technology of United States origin;
                    (D) either--
                          (i) an assessment that India is in full 
                      compliance with the commitments and obligations 
                      contained in the agreements and other documents 
                      referenced in clauses (i) through (vi) of 
                      paragraph (1)(A); or
                          (ii) an identification and analysis of all 
                      compliance issues arising with regard to the 
                      adherence by India to its commitments and 
                      obligations, including--
                                    (I) the measures the United States 
                                Government has taken to remedy or 
                                otherwise respond to such compliance 
                                issues;
                                    (II) the responses of the Government 
                                of India to such measures;
                                    (III) the measures the United States 
                                Government plans to take to this end in 
                                the coming year; and
                                    (IV) an assessment of the 
                                implications of any continued 
                                noncompliance, including whether nuclear 
                                commerce with India remains in the 
                                national security interest of the United 
                                States;
                    (E)(i) an assessment of whether India is fully and 
                actively participating in United States and 
                international efforts to dissuade, isolate, and, if 
                necessary, sanction and contain Iran for its efforts to 
                acquire weapons of mass destruction, including a nuclear 
                weapons capability (including the capability to enrich 
                uranium or reprocess nuclear fuel), and the means to 
                deliver weapons of mass destruction, including a 
                description of the specific measures that India has 
                taken in this regard; and
                    (ii) if India is not assessed to be fully and 
                actively participating in such efforts, a description 
                of--
                          (I) the measures the United States Government 
                      has taken to secure India's full and active 
                      participation in such efforts;
                          (II) the responses of the Government of India 
                      to such measures; and
                          (III) the measures the United States 
                      Government plans to take in the coming year to 
                      secure India's full and active participation;

[[Page 120 STAT. 2737]]

                    (F) an analysis of whether United States civil 
                nuclear cooperation with India is in any way assisting 
                India's nuclear weapons program, including through--
                          (i) the use of any United States equipment, 
                      technology, or nuclear material by India in an 
                      unsafeguarded nuclear facility or nuclear-weapons 
                      related complex;
                          (ii) the replication and subsequent use of any 
                      United States technology by India in an 
                      unsafeguarded nuclear facility or unsafeguarded 
                      nuclear weapons-related complex, or for any 
                      activity related to the research, development, 
                      testing, or manufacture of nuclear explosive 
                      devices; and
                          (iii) the provision of nuclear fuel in such a 
                      manner as to facilitate the increased production 
                      by India of highly enriched uranium or plutonium 
                      in unsafeguarded nuclear facilities;
                    (G) a detailed description of--
                          (i) United States efforts to promote national 
                      or regional progress by India and Pakistan in 
                      disclosing, securing, limiting, and reducing their 
                      fissile material stockpiles, including stockpiles 
                      for military purposes, pending creation of a 
                      worldwide fissile material cut-off regime, 
                      including the institution of a Fissile Material 
                      Cut-off Treaty;
                          (ii) the responses of India and Pakistan to 
                      such efforts; and
                          (iii) assistance that the United States is 
                      providing, or would be able to provide, to India 
                      and Pakistan to promote the objectives in clause 
                      (i), consistent with its obligations under 
                      international law and existing agreements;
                    (H) an estimate of--
                          (i) the amount of uranium mined and milled in 
                      India during the previous year;
                          (ii) the amount of such uranium that has 
                      likely been used or allocated for the production 
                      of nuclear explosive devices; and
                          (iii) the rate of production in India of--
                                    (I) fissile material for nuclear 
                                explosive devices; and
                                    (II) nuclear explosive devices;
                    (I) an estimate of the amount of electricity India's 
                nuclear reactors produced for civil purposes during the 
                previous year and the proportion of such production that 
                can be attributed to India's declared civil reactors;
                    (J) an analysis as to whether imported uranium has 
                affected the rate of production in India of nuclear 
                explosive devices;
                    (K) a detailed description of efforts and progress 
                made toward the achievement of India's--
                          (i) full participation in the Proliferation 
                      Security Initiative;
                          (ii) formal commitment to the Statement of 
                      Interdiction Principles of such Initiative;
                          (iii) public announcement of its decision to 
                      conform its export control laws, regulations, and 
                      policies with

[[Page 120 STAT. 2738]]

                      the Australia Group and with the Guidelines, 
                      Procedures, Criteria, and Controls List of the 
                      Wassenaar Arrangement; and
                          (iv) effective implementation of the decision 
                      described in clause (iii); and
                    (L) the disposal during the previous year of spent 
                nuclear fuel from India's civilian nuclear program, and 
                any plans or activities relating to future disposal of 
                such spent nuclear fuel.
            (3) Submittal with other annual reports.--
                    (A) Report on proliferation prevention.--Each annual 
                report submitted under paragraph (2) after the initial 
                report may be submitted together with the annual report 
                on proliferation prevention required under section 
                601(a) of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (22 
                U.S.C. 3281(a)).
                    (B) Report on progress toward regional 
                nonproliferation.--The information required to be 
                submitted under paragraph (2)(F) after the initial 
                report may be submitted together with the annual report 
                on progress toward regional nonproliferation required 
                under section 620F(c) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 
                1961 (22 U.S.C. 2376(c)).
            (4) Form.--Each report submitted under this subsection shall 
        be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a classified 
        annex.

SEC. 105. <<NOTE: 22 USC 8004.>> UNITED STATES COMPLIANCE WITH ITS 
            NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY OBLIGATIONS.

    Nothing in this title constitutes authority for any action in 
violation of an obligation of the United States under the NPT.

SEC. 106. <<NOTE: President. 22 USC 8005.>> INOPERABILITY OF 
            DETERMINATION AND WAIVERS.

    A determination and any waiver under section 104 shall cease to be 
effective if the President determines that India has detonated a nuclear 
explosive device after the date of the enactment of this title.

SEC. 107. <<NOTE: 22 USC 8006.>> MTCR ADHERENT STATUS.

    Congress finds that India is not an MTCR adherent for the purposes 
of section 73 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2797b).

SEC. 108. TECHNICAL AMENDMENT.

    Section 1112(c)(4) of the Arms Control and Nonproliferation Act of 
1999 (title XI of the Admiral James W. Nance and Meg Donovan Foreign 
Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 2000 and 2001 (as enacted into 
law by section 1000(a)(7) of Public Law 106-113 and contained in 
appendix G of that Act; 113 Stat. 1501A-486)) <<NOTE: 22 USC 2652c.>> is 
amended--
            (1) in subparagraph (B), by striking ``and'' after the 
        semicolon at the end;
            (2) by redesignating subparagraph (C) as subparagraph (D); 
        and
            (3) by inserting after subparagraph (B) the following new 
        subparagraph:
                    ``(C) so much of the reports required under section 
                104 of the Henry J. Hyde United States-India Peaceful

[[Page 120 STAT. 2739]]

                Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 2006 as relates to 
                verification or compliance matters; and''.

SEC. 109. <<NOTE: 22 USC 8007.>> UNITED STATES-INDIA SCIENTIFIC 
            COOPERATIVE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION PROGRAM.

    (a) Establishment.--The Secretary of Energy, acting through the 
Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration, is 
authorized to establish a cooperative nuclear nonproliferation program 
to pursue jointly with scientists from the United States and India a 
program to further common nuclear nonproliferation goals, including 
scientific research and development efforts, with an emphasis on nuclear 
safeguards (in this section referred to as ``the program'').
    (b) Consultation.--The program shall be carried out in consultation 
with the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense.
    (c) National Academies Recommendations.--
            (1) In general.--The <<NOTE: Contracts.>> Secretary of 
        Energy shall enter into an agreement with the National Academies 
        to develop recommendations for the implementation of the 
        program.
            (2) Recommendations.--The agreement entered into under 
        paragraph (1) shall provide for the preparation by qualified 
        individuals with relevant expertise and knowledge and the 
        communication to the Secretary of Energy each fiscal year of--
                    (A) recommendations for research and related 
                programs designed to overcome existing technological 
                barriers to nuclear nonproliferation; and
                    (B) an assessment of whether activities and programs 
                funded under this section are achieving the goals of the 
                activities and programs.
            (3) Public availability.--The recommendations and 
        assessments prepared under this subsection shall be made 
        publicly available.

    (d) Consistency With Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.--All United 
States activities related to the program shall be consistent with United 
States obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
    (e) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized to be 
appropriated such sums as may be necessary to carry out this section for 
each of fiscal years 2007 through 2011.

SEC. 110. <<NOTE: 22 USC 8008.>> DEFINITIONS.

    In this title:
            (1) The term ``Additional Protocol'' means a protocol 
        additional to a safeguards agreement with the IAEA, as 
        negotiated between a country and the IAEA based on a Model 
        Additional Protocol as set forth in IAEA information circular 
        (INFCIRC) 540.
            (2) The term ``appropriate congressional committees'' means 
        the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the 
        Committee on International Relations of the House of 
        Representatives.
            (3) The term ``dual-use material, equipment, or technology'' 
        means material, equipment, or technology that may be used in 
        nuclear or nonnuclear applications.
            (4) The term ``IAEA safeguards'' has the meaning given the 
        term in section 830(3) of the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention 
        Act of 1994 (22 U.S.C. 6305(3)).

[[Page 120 STAT. 2740]]

            (5) The term ``Indian person'' means--
                    (A) a natural person that is a citizen of India or 
                is subject to the jurisdiction of the Government of 
                India;
                    (B) a corporation, business association, 
                partnership, society, trust, or any other 
                nongovernmental entity, organization, or group, that is 
                organized under the laws of India or has its principal 
                place of business in India; and
                    (C) any Indian governmental entity, including any 
                governmental entity operating as a business enterprise.
            (6) The terms ``Missile Technology Control Regime'', 
        ``MTCR'', and ``MTCR adherent'' have the meanings given the 
        terms in section 74 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 
        2797c).
            (7) The term ``nuclear materials and equipment'' means 
        source material, special nuclear material, production and 
        utilization facilities and any components thereof, and any other 
        items or materials that are determined to have significance for 
        nuclear explosive purposes pursuant to subsection 109 b. of the 
        Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2139(b)).
            (8) The terms ``Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty'' and 
        ``NPT'' mean the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
        Weapons, done at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968, 
        and entered into force March 5, 1970 (21 UST 483).
            (9) The terms ``Nuclear Suppliers Group'' and ``NSG'' refer 
        to a group, which met initially in 1975 and has met at least 
        annually since 1992, of Participating Governments that have 
        promulgated and agreed to adhere to Guidelines for Nuclear 
        Transfers (currently IAEA INFCIRC/254/Rev.8/Part 1) and 
        Guidelines for Transfers of Nuclear-Related Dual-Use Equipment, 
        Materials, Software, and Related Technology (currently IAEA 
        INFCIRC/254/Rev.7/Part 2).
            (10) The terms ``nuclear weapon'' and ``nuclear explosive 
        device'' mean any device designed to produce an instantaneous 
        release of an amount of nuclear energy from special nuclear 
        material that is greater than the amount of energy that would be 
        released from the detonation of one pound of trinitrotoluene 
        (TNT).
            (11) The term ``process'' includes the term ``reprocess''.
            (12) The terms ``reprocessing'' and ``reprocess'' refer to 
        the separation of irradiated nuclear materials and fission 
        products from spent nuclear fuel.
            (13) The term ``sensitive nuclear technology'' means any 
        information, including information incorporated in a production 
        or utilization facility or important component part thereof, 
        that is not available to the public and which is important to 
        the design, construction, fabrication, operation, or maintenance 
        of a uranium enrichment or nuclear fuel reprocessing facility or 
        a facility for the production of heavy water.
            (14) The term ``source material'' has the meaning given the 
        term in section 11 z. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 
        U.S.C. 2014(z)).
            (15) The term ``special nuclear material'' has the meaning 
        given the term in section 11 aa. of the Atomic Energy Act of 
        1954 (42 U.S.C. 2014(aa)).

[[Page 120 STAT. 2741]]

            (16) The term ``unsafeguarded nuclear fuel-cycle activity'' 
        means research on, or development, design, manufacture, 
        construction, operation, or maintenance of--
                    (A) any existing or future reactor, critical 
                facility, conversion plant, fabrication plant, 
                reprocessing plant, plant for the separation of isotopes 
                of source or special fissionable material, or separate 
                storage installation with respect to which there is no 
                obligation to accept IAEA safeguards at the relevant 
                reactor, facility, plant, or installation that contains 
                source or special fissionable material; or
                    (B) any existing or future heavy water production 
                plant with respect to which there is no obligation to 
                accept IAEA safeguards on any nuclear material produced 
                by or used in connection with any heavy water produced 
                therefrom.

  TITLE II-- <<NOTE: United States Additional Protocol Implementation 
Act.>> UNITED STATES ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL IMPLEMENTATION

SEC. 201. <<NOTE: 22 USC 8101 note.>> SHORT TITLE.

    This title may be cited as the ``United States Additional Protocol 
Implementation Act''.

SEC. 202. <<NOTE: 22 USC 8101.>> FINDINGS.

    Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) The proliferation of nuclear weapons and other nuclear 
        explosive devices poses a grave threat to the national security 
        of the United States and its vital national interests.
            (2) The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty has proven critical 
        to limiting such proliferation.
            (3) For the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to be 
        effective, each of the non-nuclear-weapon State Parties must 
        conclude a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA, and 
        such agreements must be honored and enforced.
            (4) Recent events emphasize the urgency of strengthening the 
        effectiveness and improving the efficiency of the safeguards 
        system. This can best be accomplished by providing IAEA 
        inspectors with more information about, and broader access to, 
        nuclear activities within the territory of non-nuclear-weapon 
        State Parties.
            (5) The proposed scope of such expanded information and 
        access has been negotiated by the member states of the IAEA in 
        the form of a Model Additional Protocol to its existing 
        safeguards agreements, and universal acceptance of Additional 
        Protocols by non-nuclear weapons states is essential to 
        enhancing the effectiveness of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
        Treaty.
            (6) On June 12, 1998, the United States, as a nuclear-weapon 
        State Party, signed an Additional Protocol that is based on the 
        Model Additional Protocol, but which also contains measures, 
        consistent with its existing safeguards agreements with its 
        members, that protect the right of the United States to exclude 
        the application of IAEA safeguards to locations and activities 
        with direct national security significance or to locations or 
        information associated with such activities.

[[Page 120 STAT. 2742]]

            (7) Implementation of the Additional Protocol in the United 
        States in a manner consistent with United States obligations 
        under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty may encourage other 
        parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, especially non-
        nuclear-weapon State Parties, to conclude Additional Protocols 
        and thereby strengthen the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 
        safeguards system and help reduce the threat of nuclear 
        proliferation, which is of direct and substantial benefit to the 
        United States.
            (8) Implementation of the Additional Protocol by the United 
        States is not required and is completely voluntary given its 
        status as a nuclear-weapon State Party, but the United States 
        has acceded to the Additional Protocol to demonstrate its 
        commitment to the nuclear nonproliferation regime and to make 
        United States civil nuclear activities available to the same 
        IAEA inspections as are applied in the case of non-nuclear-
        weapon State Parties.
            (9) In accordance with the national security exclusion 
        contained in Article 1.b of its Additional Protocol, the United 
        States will not allow any inspection activities, nor make any 
        declaration of any information with respect to, locations, 
        information, and activities of direct national security 
        significance to the United States.
            (10) Implementation of the Additional Protocol will conform 
        to the principles set forth in the letter of April 30, 2002, 
        from the United States Permanent Representative to the 
        International Atomic Energy Agency and the Vienna Office of the 
        United Nations to the Director General of the International 
        Atomic Energy Agency.

SEC. 203. <<NOTE: 22 USC 8102.>> DEFINITIONS.

    In this title:
            (1) Additional protocol.--The term ``Additional Protocol'', 
        when used in the singular form, means the Protocol Additional to 
        the Agreement between the United States of America and the 
        International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of 
        Safeguards in the United States of America, with Annexes, signed 
        at Vienna June 12, 1998 (T. Doc. 107-7).
            (2) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term 
        ``appropriate congressional committees'' means the Committee on 
        Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the 
        Committee on Appropriations of the Senate and the Committee on 
        Armed Services, the Committee on International Relations, the 
        Committee on Science, and the Committee on Appropriations of the 
        House of Representatives.
            (3) Complementary access.--The term ``complementary access'' 
        means the exercise of the IAEA's access rights as set forth in 
        Articles 4 to 6 of the Additional Protocol.
            (4) Executive agency.--The term ``executive agency'' has the 
        meaning given such term in section 105 of title 5, United States 
        Code.
            (5) Facility.--The term ``facility'' has the meaning set 
        forth in Article 18i. of the Additional Protocol.
            (6) IAEA.--The term ``IAEA'' means the International Atomic 
        Energy Agency.
            (7) Judge of the united states.--The term ``judge of the 
        United States'' means a United States district judge, or

[[Page 120 STAT. 2743]]

        a United States magistrate judge appointed under the authority 
        of chapter 43 of title 28, United States Code.
            (8) Location.--The term ``location'' means any geographic 
        point or area declared or identified by the United States or 
        specified by the International Atomic Energy Agency.
            (9) Nuclear non-proliferation treaty.--The term ``Nuclear 
        Non-Proliferation Treaty'' means the Treaty on the Non-
        Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at Washington, London, 
        and Moscow July 1, 1968, and entered into force March 5, 1970 
        (21 UST 483).
            (10) Nuclear-weapon state party and non-nuclear-weapon state 
        party.--The terms ``nuclear-weapon State Party'' and ``non-
        nuclear-weapon State Party'' have the meanings given such terms 
        in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
            (11) Person.--The term ``person'', except as otherwise 
        provided, means any individual, corporation, partnership, firm, 
        association, trust, estate, public or private institution, any 
        State or any political subdivision thereof, or any political 
        entity within a State, any foreign government or nation or any 
        agency, instrumentality, or political subdivision of any such 
        government or nation, or other entity located in the United 
        States.
            (12) Site.--The term ``site'' has the meaning set forth in 
        Article 18b. of the Additional Protocol.
            (13) United states.--The term ``United States'', when used 
        as a geographic reference, means the several States of the 
        United States, the District of Columbia, and the commonwealths, 
        territories, and possessions of the United States and includes 
        all places under the jurisdiction or control of the United 
        States, including--
                    (A) the territorial sea and the overlying airspace;
                    (B) any civil aircraft of the United States or 
                public aircraft, as such terms are defined in paragraphs 
                (17) and (41), respectively, of section 40102(a) of 
                title 49, United States Code; and
                    (C) any vessel of the United States, as such term is 
                defined in section 3(b) of the Maritime Drug Law 
                Enforcement Act (46 U.S.C. App. 1903(b)).
            (14) Wide-area environmental sampling.--The term ``wide-area 
        environmental sampling'' has the meaning set forth in Article 
        18g. of the Additional Protocol.

SEC. 204. <<NOTE: 22 USC 8103.>> SEVERABILITY.

    If any provision of this title, or the application of such provision 
to any person or circumstance, is held invalid, the remainder of this 
title, or the application of such provision to persons or circumstances 
other than those as to which it is held invalid, shall not be affected 
thereby.

                     Subtitle A--General Provisions

SEC. 211. <<NOTE: 22 USC 8111.>> AUTHORITY.

    (a)  <<NOTE: President.>> In General.--The President is authorized 
to implement and carry out the provisions of this title and the 
Additional Protocol and shall designate through Executive order which 
executive agency or agencies of the United States, which may include but 
are not

[[Page 120 STAT. 2744]]

limited to the Department of State, the Department of Defense, the 
Department of Justice, the Department of Commerce, the Department of 
Energy, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, shall issue or amend and 
enforce regulations in order to implement this title and the provisions 
of the Additional Protocol.

    (b) Included Authority.--For any executive agency designated under 
subsection (a) that does not currently possess the authority to conduct 
site vulnerability assessments and related activities, the authority 
provided in subsection (a) includes such authority.
    (c) Exception.--The authority described in subsection (b) does not 
supersede or otherwise modify any existing authority of any Federal 
department or agency already having such authority.

                    Subtitle B--Complementary Access

SEC. 221. <<NOTE: 22 USC 8121.>> REQUIREMENT FOR AUTHORITY TO CONDUCT 
            COMPLEMENTARY ACCESS.

    (a) Prohibition.--No complementary access to any location in the 
United States shall take place pursuant to the Additional Protocol 
without the authorization of the United States Government in accordance 
with the requirements of this title.
    (b) Authority.--
            (1) In general.--Complementary access to any location in the 
        United States subject to access under the Additional Protocol is 
        authorized in accordance with this title.
            (2) United states representatives.--
                    (A) Restrictions.--In the event of complementary 
                access to a privately owned or operated location, no 
                employee of the Environmental Protection Agency or of 
                the Mine Safety and Health Administration or the 
                Occupational Safety and Health Administration of the 
                Department of Labor may participate in the access.
                    (B) Number.--The number of designated United States 
                representatives accompanying IAEA inspectors shall be 
                kept to the minimum necessary.

SEC. 222. <<NOTE: 22 USC 8122.>> PROCEDURES FOR COMPLEMENTARY ACCESS.

    (a) In General.--Each instance of complementary access to a location 
in the United States under the Additional Protocol shall be conducted in 
accordance with this subtitle.
    (b) Notice.--
            (1) In general.--Complementary access referred to in 
        subsection (a) may occur only upon the issuance of an actual 
        written notice by the United States Government to the owner, 
        operator, occupant, or agent in charge of the location to be 
        subject to complementary access.
            (2) Time of notification.--The notice under paragraph (1) 
        shall be submitted to such owner, operator, occupant, or agent 
        as soon as possible after the United States Government has 
        received notification that the IAEA seeks complementary access. 
        Notices may be posted prominently at the location if the United 
        States Government is unable to provide actual written notice to 
        such owner, operator, occupant, or agent.
            (3) Content of notice.--

[[Page 120 STAT. 2745]]

                    (A) In general.--The notice required by paragraph 
                (1) shall specify--
                          (i) the purpose for the complementary access;
                          (ii) the basis for the selection of the 
                      facility, site, or other location for the 
                      complementary access sought;
                          (iii) the activities that will be carried out 
                      during the complementary access;
                          (iv) the time and date that the complementary 
                      access is expected to begin, and the anticipated 
                      period covered by the complementary access; and
                          (v) the names and titles of the inspectors.
            (4) Separate notices required.--A separate notice shall be 
        provided each time that complementary access is sought by the 
        IAEA.

    (c) Credentials.--The complementary access team of the IAEA and 
representatives or designees of the United States Government shall 
display appropriate identifying credentials to the owner, operator, 
occupant, or agent in charge of the location before gaining entry in 
connection with complementary access.
    (d) Scope.--
            (1) In general.--Except as provided in a warrant issued 
        under section 223, and subject to the rights of the United 
        States Government under the Additional Protocol to limit 
        complementary access, complementary access to a location 
        pursuant to this title may extend to all activities specifically 
        permitted for such locations under Article 6 of the Additional 
        Protocol.
            (2) Exception.--Unless required by the Additional Protocol, 
        no inspection under this title shall extend to--
                    (A) financial data (other than production data);
                    (B) sales and marketing data (other than shipment 
                data);
                    (C) pricing data;
                    (D) personnel data;
                    (E) patent data;
                    (F) data maintained for compliance with 
                environmental or occupational health and safety 
                regulations; or
                    (G) research data.

    (e) Environment, Health, Safety, and Security.--In carrying out 
their activities, members of the IAEA complementary access team and 
representatives or designees of the United States Government shall 
observe applicable environmental, health, safety, and security 
regulations established at the location subject to complementary access, 
including those for protection of controlled environments within a 
facility and for personal safety.

SEC. 223. <<NOTE: 22 USC 8123.>> CONSENTS, WARRANTS, AND COMPLEMENTARY 
            ACCESS.

    (a) In General.--
            (1) Procedure.--
                    (A) Consent.--Except as provided in paragraph (2), 
                an appropriate official of the United States Government 
                shall seek or have the consent of the owner, operator, 
                occupant, or agent in charge of a location prior to 
                entering that location in connection with complementary 
                access pursuant to sections 221 and 222. The owner, 
                operator, occupant, or agent in charge of the location 
                may withhold consent for any reason or no reason.

[[Page 120 STAT. 2746]]

                    (B) Administrative search warrant.--In the absence 
                of consent, the United States Government may seek an 
                administrative search warrant from a judge of the United 
                States under subsection (b). Proceedings regarding the 
                issuance of an administrative search warrant shall be 
                conducted ex parte, unless otherwise requested by the 
                United States Government.
            (2) Expedited access.--For purposes of obtaining access to a 
        location pursuant to Article 4b.(ii) of the Additional Protocol 
        in order to satisfy United States obligations under the 
        Additional Protocol when notice of two hours or less is 
        required, the United States Government may gain entry to such 
        location in connection with complementary access, to the extent 
        such access is consistent with the Fourth Amendment to the 
        United States Constitution, without obtaining either a warrant 
        or consent.

    (b)  <<NOTE: Courts.>> Administrative Search Warrants for 
Complementary Access.--
            (1) Obtaining administrative search warrants.--For 
        complementary access conducted in the United States pursuant to 
        the Additional Protocol, and for which the acquisition of a 
        warrant is required, the United States Government shall first 
        obtain an administrative search warrant from a judge of the 
        United States. The United States Government shall provide to 
        such judge all appropriate information regarding the basis for 
        the selection of the facility, site, or other location to which 
        complementary access is sought.
            (2) Content of affidavits for administrative search 
        warrants.--A judge of the United States shall promptly issue an 
        administrative search warrant authorizing the requested 
        complementary access upon an affidavit submitted by the United 
        States Government--
                    (A) stating that the Additional Protocol is in 
                force;
                    (B) stating that the designated facility, site, or 
                other location is subject to complementary access under 
                the Additional Protocol;
                    (C) stating that the purpose of the complementary 
                access is consistent with Article 4 of the Additional 
                Protocol;
                    (D) stating that the requested complementary access 
                is in accordance with Article 4 of the Additional 
                Protocol;
                    (E) containing assurances that the scope of the 
                IAEA's complementary access, as well as what it may 
                collect, shall be limited to the access provided for in 
                Article 6 of the Additional Protocol;
                    (F) listing the items, documents, and areas to be 
                searched and seized;
                    (G) stating the earliest commencement and the 
                anticipated duration of the complementary access period, 
                as well as the expected times of day during which such 
                complementary access will take place; and
                    (H) stating that the location to which entry in 
                connection with complementary access is sought was 
                selected either--
                          (i) because there is probable cause, on the 
                      basis of specific evidence, to believe that 
                      information required to be reported regarding a 
                      location pursuant

[[Page 120 STAT. 2747]]

                      to regulations promulgated under this title is 
                      incorrect or incomplete, and that the location to 
                      be accessed contains evidence regarding that 
                      violation; or
                          (ii) pursuant to a reasonable general 
                      administrative plan based upon specific neutral 
                      criteria.
            (3) Content of warrants.--A warrant issued under paragraph 
        (2) shall specify the same matters required of an affidavit 
        under that paragraph. In addition, each warrant shall contain 
        the identities of the representatives of the IAEA on the 
        complementary access team and the identities of the 
        representatives or designees of the United States Government 
        required to display identifying credentials under section 
        222(c).

SEC. 224. <<NOTE: 22 USC 8124.>> PROHIBITED ACTS RELATING TO 
            COMPLEMENTARY ACCESS.

    It shall be unlawful for any person willfully to fail or refuse to 
permit, or to disrupt, delay, or otherwise impede, a complementary 
access authorized by this subtitle or an entry in connection with such 
access.

               Subtitle C--Confidentiality of Information

SEC. 231. <<NOTE: 22 USC 8131.>> PROTECTION OF CONFIDENTIALITY OF 
            INFORMATION.

    Information reported to, or otherwise acquired by, the United States 
Government under this title or under the Additional Protocol shall be 
exempt from disclosure under section 552 of title 5, United States Code.

                         Subtitle D--Enforcement

SEC. 241. <<NOTE: 22 USC 8141.>> RECORDKEEPING VIOLATIONS.

    It shall be unlawful for any person willfully to fail or refuse--
            (1) to establish or maintain any record required by any 
        regulation prescribed under this title;
            (2) to submit any report, notice, or other information to 
        the United States Government in accordance with any regulation 
        prescribed under this title; or
            (3) to permit access to or copying of any record by the 
        United States Government in accordance with any regulation 
        prescribed under this title.

SEC. 242. <<NOTE: 22 USC 8142.>> PENALTIES.

    (a) Civil.--
            (1) Penalty amounts.--Any person that is determined, in 
        accordance with paragraph (2), to have violated section 224 or 
        section 241 shall be required by order to pay a civil penalty in 
        an amount not to exceed $25,000 for each violation. For the 
        purposes of this paragraph, each day during which a violation of 
        section 224 continues shall constitute a separate violation of 
        that section.
            (2) Notice and hearing.--
                    (A) In general.--Before imposing a penalty against a 
                person under paragraph (1), the head of an executive 
                agency designated under section 211(a) shall provide the 
                person with notice of the order. <<NOTE: Deadline.>> If, 
                within 15 days after receiving the notice, the person 
                requests a hearing, the

[[Page 120 STAT. 2748]]

                head of the designated executive agency shall initiate a 
                hearing on the violation.
                    (B) Conduct of hearing.--Any hearing so requested 
                shall be conducted before an administrative judge. The 
                hearing shall be conducted in accordance with the 
                requirements of section 554 of title 5, United States 
                Code. If no hearing is so requested, the order imposed 
                by the head of the designated agency shall constitute a 
                final agency action.
                    (C) Issuance of orders.--If the administrative judge 
                determines, upon the preponderance of the evidence 
                received, that a person named in the complaint has 
                violated section 224 or section 241, the administrative 
                judge shall state the findings of fact and conclusions 
                of law, and issue and serve on such person an order 
                described in paragraph (1).
                    (D) Factors for determination of penalty amounts.--
                In determining the amount of any civil penalty, the 
                administrative judge or the head of the designated 
                agency shall take into account the nature, 
                circumstances, extent, and gravity of the violation or 
                violations and, with respect to the violator, the 
                ability to pay, effect on ability to continue to do 
                business, any history of such violations, the degree of 
                culpability, the existence of an internal compliance 
                program, and such other matters as justice may require.
                    (E) Content of notice.--For the purposes of this 
                paragraph, notice shall be in writing and shall be 
                verifiably served upon the person or persons subject to 
                an order described in paragraph (1). In addition, the 
                notice shall--
                          (i) set forth the time, date, and specific 
                      nature of the alleged violation or violations; and
                          (ii) specify the administrative and judicial 
                      remedies available to the person or persons 
                      subject to the order, including the availability 
                      of a hearing and subsequent appeal.
            (3) Administrative appellate review.--The decision and order 
        of an administrative judge shall be the recommended decision and 
        order and shall be referred to the head of the designated 
        executive agency for final decision and 
        order. <<NOTE: Deadline.>> If, within 60 days, the head of the 
        designated executive agency does not modify or vacate the 
        decision and order, it shall become a final agency action under 
        this subsection.
            (4) Judicial review.-- <<NOTE: Deadline.>> A person 
        adversely affected by a final order may, within 30 days after 
        the date the final order is issued, file a petition in the Court 
        of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit or in the Court 
        of Appeals for the district in which the violation occurred.
            (5) Enforcement of final orders.--
                    (A) In general.--If a person fails to comply with a 
                final order issued against such person under this 
                subsection and--
                          (i) the person has not filed a petition for 
                      judicial review of the order in accordance with 
                      paragraph (4), or

[[Page 120 STAT. 2749]]

                          (ii) a court in an action brought under 
                      paragraph (4) has entered a final judgment in 
                      favor of the designated executive agency,
                the head of the designated executive agency shall 
                commence a civil action to seek compliance with the 
                final order in any appropriate district court of the 
                United States.
                    (B) No review.--In any such civil action, the 
                validity and appropriateness of the final order shall 
                not be subject to review.
                    (C) Interest.--Payment of penalties assessed in a 
                final order under this section shall include interest at 
                currently prevailing rates calculated from the date of 
                expiration of the 60-day period referred to in paragraph 
                (3) or the date of such final order, as the case may be.

    (b) Criminal.--Any person who violates section 224 or section 241 
may, in addition to or in lieu of any civil penalty which may be imposed 
under subsection (a) for such violation, be fined under title 18, United 
States Code, imprisoned for not more than five years, or both.

SEC. 243. <<NOTE: 22 USC 8143.>> SPECIFIC ENFORCEMENT.

    (a) Jurisdiction.--The district courts of the United States shall 
have jurisdiction over civil actions brought by the head of an executive 
agency designated under section 211(a)--
            (1) to restrain any conduct in violation of section 224 or 
        section 241; or
            (2) to compel the taking of any action required by or under 
        this title or the Additional Protocol.

    (b) Civil Actions.--
            (1) In general.--A civil action described in subsection (a) 
        may be brought--
                    (A) in the case of a civil action described in 
                paragraph (1) of such subsection, in the United States 
                district court for the judicial district in which any 
                act, omission, or transaction constituting a violation 
                of section 224 or section 241 occurred or in which the 
                defendant is found or transacts business; or
                    (B) in the case of a civil action described in 
                paragraph (2) of such subsection, in the United States 
                district court for the judicial district in which the 
                defendant is found or transacts business.
            (2) Service of process.--In any such civil action, process 
        shall be served on a defendant wherever the defendant may reside 
        or may be found.

                   Subtitle E--Environmental Sampling

SEC. 251. <<NOTE: 22 USC 8151.>> NOTIFICATION TO CONGRESS OF IAEA BOARD 
            APPROVAL OF WIDE-AREA ENVIRONMENTAL SAMPLING.

    (a)  <<NOTE: Deadline. President.>> In General.--Not later than 30 
days after the date on which the Board of Governors of the IAEA approves 
wide-area environmental sampling for use as a safeguards verification 
tool, the President shall notify the appropriate congressional 
committees.

    (b) Content.--The notification under subsection (a) shall con- 
tain--

[[Page 120 STAT. 2750]]

            (1) a description of the specific methods and sampling 
        techniques approved by the Board of Governors that are to be 
        employed for purposes of wide-area sampling;
            (2) a statement as to whether or not such sampling may be 
        conducted in the United States under the Additional Protocol; 
        and
            (3) an assessment of the ability of the approved methods and 
        sampling techniques to detect, identify, and determine the 
        conduct, type, and nature of nuclear activities.

SEC. 252. <<NOTE: 22 USC 8152.>> APPLICATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY 
            EXCLUSION TO WIDE-AREA ENVIRONMENTAL SAMPLING.

    In accordance with Article 1(b) of the Additional Protocol, the 
United States shall not permit any wide-area environmental sampling 
proposed by the IAEA to be conducted at a specified location in the 
United States under Article 9 of the Additional Protocol unless the 
President has determined and reported to the appropriate congressional 
committees with respect to that proposed use of environmental sampling 
that--
            (1) the proposed use of wide-area environmental sampling is 
        necessary to increase the capability of the IAEA to detect 
        undeclared nuclear activities in the territory of a non-nuclear-
        weapon State Party;
            (2) the proposed use of wide-area environmental sampling 
        will not result in access by the IAEA to locations, activities, 
        or information of direct national security significance; and
            (3) the United States--
                    (A) has been provided sufficient opportunity for 
                consultation with the IAEA if the IAEA has requested 
                complementary access involving wide-area environmental 
                sampling; or
                    (B) has requested under Article 8 of the Additional 
                Protocol that the IAEA engage in complementary access in 
                the United States that involves the use of wide-area 
                environmental sampling.

SEC. 253. <<NOTE: President. 22 USC 8153.>> APPLICATION OF NATIONAL 
            SECURITY EXCLUSION TO LOCATION-SPECIFIC ENVIRONMENTAL 
            SAMPLING.

    In accordance with Article 1(b) of the Additional Protocol, the 
United States shall not permit any location-specific environmental 
sampling in the United States under Article 5 of the Additional Protocol 
unless the President has determined and reported to the appropriate 
congressional committees with respect to that proposed use of 
environmental sampling that--
            (1) the proposed use of location-specific environmental 
        sampling is necessary to increase the capability of the IAEA to 
        detect undeclared nuclear activities in the territory of a non-
        nuclear-weapon State Party;
            (2) the proposed use of location-specific environmental 
        sampling will not result in access by the IAEA to locations, 
        activities, or information of direct national security 
        significance; and
            (3) with respect to the proposed use of environmental 
        sampling, the United States--
                    (A) has been provided sufficient opportunity for 
                consultation with the IAEA if the IAEA has requested 
                complementary access involving location-specific 
                environmental sampling; or

[[Page 120 STAT. 2751]]

                    (B) has requested under Article 8 of the Additional 
                Protocol that the IAEA engage in complementary access in 
                the United States that involves the use of location-
                specific environmental sampling.

SEC. 254. <<NOTE: 22 USC 8154.>> RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.

    As used in this subtitle, the term ``necessary to increase the 
capability of the IAEA to detect undeclared nuclear activities in the 
territory of a non-nuclear-weapon State Party'' shall not be construed 
to encompass proposed uses of environmental sampling that might assist 
the IAEA in detecting undeclared nuclear activities in the territory of 
a non-nuclear-weapon State Party by--
            (1) setting a good example of cooperation in the conduct of 
        such sampling; or
            (2) facilitating the formation of a political consensus or 
        political support for such sampling in the territory of a non-
        nuclear-weapon State Party.

 Subtitle F--Protection of National Security Information and Activities

SEC. 261. <<NOTE: 22 USC 8161.>> PROTECTION OF CERTAIN INFORMATION.

    (a) Locations and Facilities of Direct National Security 
Significance.--No current or former Department of Defense or Department 
of Energy location, site, or facility of direct national security 
significance shall be declared or be subject to IAEA inspection under 
the Additional Protocol.
    (b) Information of Direct National Security Significance.--No 
information of direct national security significance regarding any 
location, site, or facility associated with activities of the Department 
of Defense or the Department of Energy shall be provided under the 
Additional Protocol.
    (c) Restricted Data.--Nothing in this title shall be construed to 
permit the communication or disclosure to the IAEA or IAEA employees of 
restricted data controlled by the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 
1954 (42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq.), including in particular ``Restricted 
Data'' as defined under paragraph (1) of section 11 y. of such Act (42 
U.S.C. 2014(y)).
    (d) Classified Information.--Nothing in this Act shall be construed 
to permit the communication or disclosure to the IAEA or IAEA employees 
of national security information and other classified information.

SEC. 262. <<NOTE: 22 USC 8162.>> IAEA INSPECTIONS AND VISITS.

    (a) Certain Individuals Prohibited From Obtaining Access.--No 
national of a country designated by the Secretary of State under section 
620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2371) as a 
government supporting acts of international terrorism shall be permitted 
access to the United States to carry out an inspection activity under 
the Additional Protocol or a related safeguards agreement.
    (b) Presence of United States Government Personnel.--IAEA inspectors 
shall be accompanied at all times by United States Government personnel 
when inspecting sites, locations, facilities, or activities in the 
United States under the Additional Protocol.

[[Page 120 STAT. 2752]]

    (c)  <<NOTE: President.>> Vulnerability and Related Assessments.--
The President shall conduct vulnerability, counterintelligence, and 
related assessments not less than every 5 years to ensure that 
information of direct national security significance remains protected 
at all sites, locations, facilities, and activities in the United States 
that are subject to IAEA inspection under the Additional Protocol.

Subtitle G-- <<NOTE: President.>> Reports

SEC. 271. <<NOTE: 22 USC 8171.>> REPORT ON INITIAL UNITED STATES 
            DECLARATION.

    Not later than 60 days before submitting the initial United States 
declaration to the IAEA under the Additional Protocol, the President 
shall submit to Congress a list of the sites, locations, facilities, and 
activities in the United States that the President intends to declare to 
the IAEA, and a report thereon.

SEC. 272. <<NOTE: 22 USC 8172.>> REPORT ON REVISIONS TO INITIAL UNITED 
            STATES DECLARATION.

    Not later than 60 days before submitting to the IAEA any revisions 
to the United States declaration submitted under the Additional 
Protocol, the President shall submit to Congress a list of any sites, 
locations, facilities, or activities in the United States that the 
President intends to add to or remove from the declaration, and a report 
thereon.

SEC. 273. <<NOTE: 22 USC 8173.>> CONTENT OF REPORTS ON UNITED STATES 
            DECLARATIONS.

    The reports required under section 271 and section 272 shall present 
the reasons for each site, location, facility, and activity being 
declared or being removed from the declaration list and shall certify 
that--
            (1) each site, location, facility, and activity included in 
        the list has been examined by each agency with national security 
        equities with respect to such site, location, facility, or 
        activity; and
            (2) appropriate measures have been taken to ensure that 
        information of direct national security significance will not be 
        compromised at any such site, location, facility, or activity in 
        connection with an IAEA inspection.

SEC. 274. <<NOTE: 22 USC 8174.>> REPORT ON EFFORTS TO PROMOTE THE 
            IMPLEMENTATION OF ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS.

    Not later than 180 days after the entry into force of the Additional 
Protocol, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional 
committees a report on--
            (1) measures that have been or should be taken to achieve 
        the adoption of additional protocols to existing safeguards 
        agreements signed by non-nuclear-weapon State Parties; and
            (2) assistance that has been or should be provided by the 
        United States to the IAEA in order to promote the effective 
        implementation of additional protocols to existing safeguards 
        agreements signed by non-nuclear-weapon State Parties and the 
        verification of the compliance of such parties with IAEA 
        obligations, with a plan for providing any needed additional 
        funding.

[[Page 120 STAT. 2753]]

SEC. 275. <<NOTE: 22 USC 8175.>> NOTICE OF IAEA NOTIFICATIONS.

    The President shall notify Congress of any notifications issued by 
the IAEA to the United States under Article 10 of the Additional 
Protocol.

               Subtitle H--Authorization of Appropriations

SEC. 281. <<NOTE: 22 USC 8181.>> AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

    There are authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be 
necessary to carry out this title.

    Approved December 18, 2006.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY--H.R. 5682 (S. 3709):
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

HOUSE REPORTS: No. 109-590, Pt. 1 (Comm. on International                 
        Relations) and 109-721 (Comm. of Conference).
SENATE REPORTS: No. 109-288 accompanying S. 3709 (Comm. on Foreign       
  Relations).
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, Vol. 152 (2006):
            July 26, considered and passed House.
            Nov. 16, considered and passed Senate, amended, in lieu of 
                S. 3709.
            Dec. 8, House and Senate agreed to conference report.
WEEKLY COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS, Vol. 42 (2006):
            Dec. 18, Presidential remarks and statement.

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