Text: S.3531 — 110th Congress (2007-2008)All Information (Except Text)

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Introduced in Senate (09/22/2008)


110th CONGRESS
2d Session
S. 3531


To authorize assistance for Afghanistan, and for other purposes.


IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

September 22 (legislative day, September 17), 2008

Mr. Lugar (for himself, Mr. Biden, and Mr. Hagel) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations


A BILL

To authorize assistance for Afghanistan, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. Short title.

This Act may be cited as the “Afghan Freedom Support and Security Act of 2008”.

SEC. 2. Findings.

Congress makes the following findings:

(1) More than 6 years after the liberation of Afghanistan from the Taliban, who provided Osama Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda with a safe haven for planning the attacks of September 11, 2001, Afghanistan remains highly unstable and the government of President Hamid Karzai remains subject to attacks from remnants of the Taliban who have regrouped in the region with other insurgent groups, including foreign fighters associated with Al-Qaeda.

(2) The Government of Afghanistan supports the continued deployment of international forces to supplement its own nascent national security forces and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces, which took over international stability operations for the entire country through the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) on October 5, 2006.

(3) An insurgency that began in a relatively weak position at the end of 2005 has expanded to pose a serious threat to the Government of Afghanistan and the international NATO/ISAF and Operation Enduring Freedom forces, whose casualties have mounted significantly during 2008, while civilian casualties have also increased substantially in Afghanistan, resulting in significant popular disenchantment and concern about the prospects of peace and stability in the near future.

(4) A January 2008 issue brief published by the Atlantic Council of the United States, entitled “Saving Afghanistan: An Appeal and Plan for Urgent Action”, states: “On the security side, a stalemate of sorts has taken hold. NATO and Afghan forces cannot be beaten by the insurgency or by the Taliban. Neither can our forces eliminate the Taliban by military means as long as they have sanctuary in Pakistan. Hence, the future of Afghanistan will be determined by progress or failure in the civil sector. However, civil sector reform is in serious trouble. Little coordination exists among the many disparate international organizations and agencies active in Afghanistan. Legal and judicial reform (including reducing corruption), and control of narcotics are interdependent efforts and must receive the highest priority. To add insult to injury, of every dollar of aid spent on Afghanistan, less than ten percent goes directly to Afghans, further compounding reform and reconstruction problems.”.

(5) Despite the establishment of a constitution and a constitutionally-elected government in Afghanistan, the failure to build the core institutions of the state and the market has resulted in opportunities for massive corruption and the mounting loss of trust of the Afghan people in their government.

(6) The Secretary of Defense clarified that the emphasis of international effort must be far more than military assistance, stating in testimony before Congress on September 10, 2008, “. . . additional forces alone will not solve the problem. Security is just one aspect of the campaign, alongside development and governance. We must maintain momentum, keep the international community engaged, and develop the capacity of the Afghan government. The entirety of the NATO alliance, the EU, NGOs, and other groups—our full military and civilian capabilities—must be on the same page and working toward the same goal with the Afghan government.”.

(7) The international effort to retrain and help establish an effective police force in Afghanistan has fallen well short of expectations despite 4 distinct efforts over 7 years, costing billions of dollars of investment. Respected assessments over the last several years by the Government Accountability Office, the International Crisis Group, and the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, have dramatically noted the paramount importance of capable national and local police forces in a stable and secure society and the abject failure to achieve such an outcome in Afghanistan due to—

(A) entrenched corruption in the Ministry of Interior;

(B) lack of consensus on strategic focus among donors;

(C) a lack of accountability over police trained and returned to their communities, including the dearth of women police; and

(D) the failure to backstop policing with rule of law institutions, such as courts and prisons.

(8) The Government Accountability Office report released on June 18, 2008 (GAO–08–883T) indicates that “although the [Afghan National Police] has reportedly grown in number since 2005, after an investment of nearly $6 billion, no Afghan police unit (0 of 433) is assessed by Defense as fully capable of performing its mission” and there is not any verified database of police personnel.

(9) The Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit released a report in July 2007, entitled “AREU-Cops or Robbers; The Struggle to Reform the Afghan National Police”, which observes that the most consistent theme that emerged was that without comprehensive reform of the Ministry of Interior, which is notoriously corrupt, factionalized, and an increasingly important actor in Afghanistan’s illegal drug economy, police reform efforts will fail and the money spent on reform will be wasted.

(10) The International Crisis Group report released in August 2007, entitled “ICG-Reforming Afghanistan’s Police”—

(A) asserts that police training must stress quality rather than quantity;

(B) quotes an experienced police adviser, “I would rather have a force of 20,000 credible and effective police officers than 60,000 or even 80,000 men who have been through some sort of nominal training process which is not fully fit-for-purpose”; and

(C) reports that by July 2007, 71,147 rank and file police had received training, of whom only 118 were women.

(11) The failure of the current counter-narcotics strategy for Afghanistan has diminished Afghan political will to take on the increasingly powerful drug interests in the country. The lack of significant results is due to factors such as—

(A) the failure to have in place in Afghanistan the essential institutional elements necessary to arrest and prosecute mid- and high-level drug traffickers and enablers; and

(B) the lack of economic mechanisms, such as finance facilities and services and adequate land rights, to enable Afghan farmers to develop alternatives to opium production.

(12) The violence and instability in Afghanistan is further exacerbated by corruption and the flourishing trade in opium and opium-related products, which—

(A) has reached record levels;

(B) fuels local militias;

(C) corrupts the national and local governments; and

(D) provides funding for insurgent and terrorist groups.

(13) There is a consensus that the judiciary is ineffective and corrupt, which—

(A) puts property rights at risk;

(B) prevents the prosecution of drug dealers and criminals; and

(C) opens up a space for the Taliban’s version of arbitration and dispute settlement among ordinary people.

(14) On July 1, 2008, the Office of Inspector General of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) released a report, which states “USAID/Afghanistan’s own assessment identified three material weaknesses in its system of management controls, all of which are related to the country’s difficult security situation:

    “1. Unsuitable working and living conditions.

    “2. Inability to readily travel to project sites.

    “3. Retention of personnel and delays in the assignment of personnel.”.

(15) The USAID mission in Kabul reported that because of the 3 material weaknesses it identified—

(A) its ability to achieve objectives was significantly impaired;

(B) its ability to obtain, report, and use reliable and timely information for decision making was impaired; and

(C) statutory or regulatory requirements could be violated.

(16) On July 1, 2008, the Office of Inspector General of the United States Agency for International Development released a report stating “USAID obligations in Afghanistan for fiscal years 2002 through 2006 totaled nearly $4.4 billion.” and the Office of Inspector General, operating from Manila, Philippines, expended $1,992,282 in base appropriations and supplemental funding to oversee USAID’s activities in Afghanistan.

(17) The position and influence of Afghan women, although improved since the removal of the Taliban, remains limited and precarious. If Afghan women are to realize constitutionally guaranteed legal rights, economic opportunities and legal constructs will be essential.

(18) Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index places Afghanistan 172nd out of 179 countries in 2007, joining Somalia, Burma, Iraq, and Sudan at the bottom of the index, much worse than the situation in 2005, at which time Afghanistan ranked 115th out of 159.

(19) The Bonn Agreement and the process that brought it about—

(A) provided legitimacy and initial stability in Afghanistan between late 2001 and 2006; and

(B) enabled the drafting of a new constitution, the first directly elected President in the history of Afghanistan, and a sitting National Parliament.

(20) The Bonn Agreement also provided the political platform through which a series of benchmarks were set. These benchmarks were met against a carefully sequenced timeline for a narrow list of institutional priorities upon which the Afghan Government, Afghan citizens, and their international supporters could collaborate. National programs such as the National Health System, the Afghan National Army, the National Solidarity Program, the National Telecommunications program, and the National Transportation System provided a clear framework for the establishment and coordination of goals, tasks, benchmarks, and allocation of responsibilities, and were made possible through the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund.

(21) On February 1, 2006, the Government of Afghanistan and the international community issued the Afghanistan Compact, which sets forth both the international community’s commitment to Afghanistan and Afghanistan’s commitment to state building and reform.

(22) The Afghanistan Compact, which is supported by the Afghan National Development Strategy—

(A) provides the core framework for building an effective, accountable state in Afghanistan;

(B) sets goals and standards for improvements in security, governance, and development;

(C) includes measures for reducing the narcotics economy, promoting regional cooperation, and making aid more effective, particularly at the local and provincial levels; and

(D) established a mechanism to monitor Afghanistan and the international community’s adherence to the time lines, goals, and objectives set forth in the document.

(23) In June, 2008, international donors pledged $20,000,000,000 toward the reconstruction of Afghanistan, as part of a $50,000,000,000 5-year development plan, of which the United States pledged over 50 percent.

SEC. 3. Sense of Congress.

It is the Sense of Congress that—

(1) following the liberation of Afghanistan from the Taliban in 2001, the Federal Government underestimated—

(A) the nature of the challenge in Afghanistan;

(B) the time horizon for restoring political and economic stability in Afghanistan; and

(C) the type of resources required to help ensure a stable Afghanistan with effective and accountable state institutions and developing economic opportunities;

(2) In order to provide appropriate and forthright expectations of the long and challenging commitment necessary for success in Afghanistan and accurately estimate the nature of the resources required, the international community must concentrate efforts on—

(A) a full assessment of natural resources and a profile of human capital required for the effective and sustainable functioning of the Afghan state;

(B) a clear accounting of resources available to achieve an effective and sustainable Afghan government, as well as those expected to be required to maintain its effectiveness in the future; and

(C) the development of human capital and an investment in quality leaders and managers through the establishment of upper level training and education, as well as primary and secondary, including tertiary and vocational institutions to ensure they meet regional standards as well as at least two that meet global standards;

(3) Afghanistan remains a country of paramount importance to our national security and building Afghanistan into an effective state with political and economic stability is a goal that the United States shares with the Government of Afghanistan and its citizens;

(4) the region in which Afghanistan is situated is of paramount importance to the national security of the United States and our diplomatic initiatives and foreign policy in this region must be harmonized and coherent across the region;

(5) the most important partners in the security, stability, and development of Afghanistan are the people of that country, who should remain a prime focus of our efforts to build their sustained capacity to govern;

(6) long-term, consistent, and coordinated international support and assistance is required in Afghanistan to secure, stabilize, and develop the country so that it is capable of sustaining good governance and becoming a responsible and valued partner in the international community;

(7) setting appropriate expectations in Afghanistan and in donor and partner capitals is essential to effective and responsible foreign assistance policy; and understanding the necessity for long-term engagement in such situations will prevent short term, unsustainable outcomes;

(8) Afghanistan and its neighbors have a mutual responsibility to ensure that their territories are not the source, and their policies are not complicit in, the destabilization or deprivation of other countries in the region;

(9) the challenges Afghanistan faces stem more from weak governance than from a strong enemy and can be overcome by the unity and resolve of the Afghan people and the international community;

(10) American academic and policy institutions and several respected outside organizations have conducted significant close and prolonged studies of the Afghanistan situation, generating reports and comprehensive reviews of post-conflict reconstruction, counter-narcotics, economic development, security force training, and counter-insurgency efforts that warrant review and consideration by United States policy makers to develop a more responsive United States strategy to address the crisis in Afghanistan;

(11) corruption—

(A) is one of the chief corrosive elements of misgoverned countries, especially in those countries confronted with the scourge of narcotics trafficking; and

(B) if left unchecked, leads to failed states;

(12) the Government of Afghanistan is riven with corruption at every level, especially at the national level;

(13) Afghanistan has been described by some as bordering on being a narco-state, influenced by the traffickers, resources, and abettors of illegal narcotics trafficking;

(14) significant resources and significant measures must be taken by international donors to mentor and enable current and future government officials and institutions to eliminate corrupt officials and practices in order to—

(A) combat corruption;

(B) improve transparency and accountability;

(C) increase the participatory nature of governmental institutions; and

(D) promote other forms of good governance and management in all levels of government in Afghanistan;

(15) anti-corruption is as reliant on an effective and engaged civil society as on an effective government;

(16) United States assistance to Afghanistan should reflect the intent to fight corruption and the influence of public officials;

(17) as Afghan line ministries prove capable of administering services in their area of responsibility, they should be further empowered and resourced to capitalize upon such progress and better build incentives toward effective management and oversight;

(18) despite some delays in its broad deployment, the Afghan National Army (ANA), which is an essential element in the stability of Afghanistan in a volatile region, must continue to be properly trained and equipped by a rededicated effort from the international community to achieve effective and independent operational capability that is sustainable;

(19) the security of Afghanistan is closely intertwined with those of its regional neighbors;

(20) success in Afghanistan, both economic and political, will be dependent on stability in the region;

(21) chronic food insecurity is—

(A) a burden on Afghanistan and its neighbors;

(B) threatens life and stability in the country; and

(C) diminishes the impact of other assistance efforts;

(22) the commitment of the international community to provide significant resources over the long-term will help establish a foundation for governance and commerce and ultimately food security for tens of millions of people in the region;

(23) a comprehensive approach to food security should encompass improvements in nutrition, education, agricultural infrastructure and productivity, finance and markets, safety net programs, household incomes, and emergency preparedness;

(24) essential opportunities for achieving food security in Afghanistan include—

(A) ensuring that any emergency response is linked to, or helps to, establish the means and organization for sustainable food security in the country, such as through the National Solidarity Program;

(B) using community development councils as a governance mechanism for—

(i) serving their communities in difficult decisions regarding development priorities, including water, energy, education, and agriculture; and

(ii) substituting legitimate crops for poppies; and

(C) creating a consortium of United States land grant colleges and other agricultural schools—

(i) to strengthen Afghan institutions and share knowledge to build the agricultural sector, which consists of over 80 percent of the Afghan economy; and

(ii) to use as an instrument for rewarding provinces that have dropped opium cultivation and creating incentives for dropping opium in others;

(25) the Overseas Private Investment Corporation should, in accordance with its mandate to foster private investment and enhance the ability of private enterprise to make its full contribution to international development, exercise its authorities under title IV of chapter 2 of part I of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2191 et seq.) to further increase efforts to promote and support United States-sponsored private investment, including in the energy sector, in Afghanistan;

(26) it is essential that United States policy be harmonized and complementary across the region; and

(27) the magnitude of the resources devoted and significance of our national interest in the effective and accountable stabilization and reconstruction effort in Afghanistan, including additional regional efforts to build economic capacity such as that in the Pakistan, requires a robust regional office presence for the Inspector General of the United States Agency for International Development and the Inspector General of the Department of State.

SEC. 4. Declaration of policy.

It shall be the policy of the United States—

(1) to render appropriate, long-term assistance to Afghanistan in a consistent and coordinated fashion with willing and responsible partners in the international community;

(2) to ensure that our foreign policy in this region is responsive to and in partnership with the people of Afghanistan;

(3) to harmonize its assistance efforts in Afghanistan and neighboring countries across—

(A) all associated Federal agencies; and

(B) to the maximum extent possible, with congruent international partner assistance efforts;

(4) to regularly, comprehensively, and openly review stabilization, reconstruction and development efforts in Afghanistan to ensure flexibility and the most effective utilization of resources toward specific, tangible outcomes, including a review of the effectiveness of the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund and associated programs and mechanisms, in order to determine the relative benefit and effectiveness of such funding vehicle, and its programs and mechanisms, in comparison to other reconstruction and stabilization efforts; and

(5) to identify and utilize, to the greatest extent possible, the most effective funding mechanism that—

(A) satisfies accountability and transparency requirements; and

(B) has proven capable and sufficient to support the implementation of national programs by the government and people of Afghanistan for the benefit of Afghans.

SEC. 5. Definitions.

(a) In general.—In this Act, except as otherwise provided, the term “congressional committees” means the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.

(b) Amendment.—Section 1(c) of the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002 (22 U.S.C. 7501) is amended to read as follows:

“(c) Definitions.—In this Act:

“(1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—Except as otherwise provided, the term ‘appropriate congressional committees’ means—

“(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;

“(B) the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate;

“(C) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives; and

“(D) the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.

“(2) GOVERNMENT OF AFGHANISTAN.—The term ‘Government of Afghanistan’ includes—

“(A) the government of any political subdivision of Afghanistan; and

“(B) any agency or instrumentality of the Government of Afghanistan.

“(3) INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE FORCE; ISAF.—The terms ‘International Security Assistance Force’ and ‘ISAF’ means the international security assistance force established to assist in the maintenance of security in Afghanistan pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolution 1386 (2001), as amended by United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1413 (2002), 1444 (2002), 1510 (2003), 1563 (2004), 1623 (2005), and 1707 (2006).”.

SEC. 6. Purposes of assistance.

The purposes of United States assistance authorized by this Act are—

(1) to help assure the security of the United States and the world by—

(A) reducing or eliminating the likelihood of violence against the United States and partners in Afghanistan; and

(B) reducing the chance that Afghanistan will become a source of international terrorism;

(2) to signal our Nation’s long-term commitment to Afghanistan and its people, the region, and partners in the international community;

(3) to provide United States civilian agencies with the appropriate resources to effectively plan, implement, and monitor assistance programs in an exceptionally challenging environment, including—

(A) expanding the presence of United States diplomatic personnel in key provincial capitals and at locations at which Provincial Reconstruction Teams are to be sustained;

(B) integrating a more substantial, long-term presence of experienced development experts; and

(C) establishing a robust regional office in the South Asia subregion for the Inspector General of the United States Agency for International Development;

(4) to help Afghans realize a stable and secure country with effective, accountable state institutions that effectively administer the basic needs of the Afghan people for services, safety, the rule of law, and increased economic opportunity, by focusing United States efforts on—

(A) establishing viable Afghan security institutions;

(B) building Afghan governance and rule of law capacity, especially at the sub-national level;

(C) enabling a vibrant economic and social environment through reconstruction of critical infrastructure and focused development;

(D) investing in the capabilities of the growing young generation of Afghans;

(E) promoting an accountable and transparent public finance system for all Afghan revenues and expenditures;

(F) combating insurgency as an ongoing, regionally-fueled, threat; and

(G) incorporating counter-narcotics as integral to this mission; and

(5) to realize, as milestones to Afghanistan’s progress, combined with sustained political will on the part of our Afghan and international partners—

(A) Afghan National Security Forces that plan and execute operations against Taliban and other insurgents, with United States, NATO, and other partner nations’ forces in support and ensure that Afghan citizens are protected from criminal elements;

(B) state-sponsored justice institutions in every province and in key districts that provide the majority of Afghans with access to formal justice;

(C) governors in every province dedicated to and held accountable for delivery of services to the district level;

(D) a strengthened, private sector friendly, legal and commercial framework and basic infrastructure for private sector development in every province, including roads for commerce;

(E) reduced rates of poppy cultivation and trafficking based on parallel strides made in improving security, enhancing local-governing capacity and justice institutions, and promoting economic development nationwide as the security environment dictates;

(F) the timely completion of the 2009 and 2010 scheduled presidential and parliamentary elections with an improved level of competence, legitimacy, and effectiveness in the administration of government for the Afghan people;

(G) a multi-year human development plan for Afghan capabilities that involves the leaders, managers, and other professionals necessary for ensuring a functioning state, modern economy, and a vibrant civil society; and

(H) a public finance system that is capable of—

(i) conducting a full, system-wide assessment of potential sources of revenue in the country, including customs, which can establish a basis for payment of essential services;

(ii) conducting an assessment of revenue sources that are lost due to misappropriation, corruption, and mismanagement;

(iii) developing a plan for closing the gaps between potential revenue and actual revenue collected; and

(iv) maintaining the resources necessary for essential services, including the sustainability of the security sector institutions essential to regional stability and security within Afghanistan.

SEC. 7. Authorization of appropriations.

(a) In general.—There are authorized to be appropriated to the President up to $3,000,000,000 for each of the fiscal years 2009 through 2013 to provide assistance to Afghanistan under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.).

(b) Sense of Congress.—It is the sense of Congress that up to $3,000,000,000 should be authorized to be appropriated for each of the fiscal years 2014 through 2018 to provide assistance to Afghanistan under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.

SEC. 8. Monitoring and evaluation of assistance.

(a) In general.—The President shall establish and implement a system to monitor and evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of assistance provided under this Act on a program-by-program basis in order to maximize the long-term sustainable development impact of such assistance.

(b) Requirements.—In carrying out subsection (a), the President shall—

(1) establish performance goals for assistance authorized under this Act and expresses such goals in an objective and quantifiable form, to the extent practicable;

(2) establish indicators to be used in measuring or assessing the achievement of the goals described in paragraph (1); and

(3) provide a basis for recommendations for adjustments to assistance authorized under this Act to enhance the impact of such assistance.

(c) Assistance To enhance the capacity of Afghanistan.—In carrying out subsection (a), the President shall provide assistance to enhance the capacity of the Government of Afghanistan to monitor and evaluate programs carried out by the national, provincial, and local governments in Afghanistan in order to maximize the long-term development impact of such programs.

(d) Authorization of appropriations.—There are authorized to be appropriated $5,000,000 for each of the fiscal years 2009 through 2013 to carry out this section.

SEC. 9. Program oversight authorization.

(a) Sense of Congress.—It is the Sense of Congress that—

(1) the establishment of the Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan is a positive, although insufficient, development in—

(A) the oversight and monitoring of United States efforts in Afghanistan to meet the extensive needs of the critical and expensive stabilization and reconstruction operation; and

(B) recognizing the necessity to establish permanent capacity within the Inspector General offices of the Department of State and the United States Agency for International Development; and

(2) efforts by United States Inspectors General in Afghanistan should seek ways to increase the capacity of the Government of Afghanistan to build Afghan oversight and anti-corruption institutions.

(b) Assistance authorized.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The Office of the Inspector General of the Department of State and the Office of the Inspector General of the United States Agency for International Development in Afghanistan shall audit, investigate, and oversee the programs authorized under this Act.

(2) OFFICE OF TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE.—The Office of Technical Assistance of the Department of the Treasury shall—

(A) conduct annual assessments of Afghanistan’s public finance system, broken down by line ministry and by province;

(B) submit a report to Congress that describes the results of each assessment conducted under subparagraph (A); and

(C) make copies of the report submitted under subparagraph (B) available to the Government of Afghanistan and the Afghan people.

(c) Requirement for in-country presence.—The Office of the Inspector General of the Department of State and the Office of the Inspector General of the United States Agency for International Development, after consultation with the Secretary of State and the Administrator for the United States Agency for International Development, shall permanently deploy not fewer than 2 staff from each such Office in Afghanistan to carry out this section.

(d) Authorization of Appropriations.—

(1) AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS.—Of the amounts authorized to be appropriated under section 7 for each of the fiscal years 2009 through 2013—

(A) not less than $3,000,000 shall be made available to the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of State to carry out this section; and

(B) not less than $5,000,000 shall be made available to the Office of the Inspector General of the United States Agency for International Development to carry out this section.

(2) RELATION TO OTHER AVAILABLE FUNDS.—Amounts made available under paragraph (1) are in addition to amounts otherwise available for such purposes.

SEC. 10. Coordination of assistance.

(a) Congressional finding.—Congress finds that the individual responsible for coordinating assistance for Afghanistan, as of the date of the enactment of this Act, has been constrained in achieving the objectives of an integrated approach to United States assistance programs for Afghanistan.

(b) Appointment of coordinator.—Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall appoint a coordinator. who—

(1) shall report directly to the President;

(2) shall have the rank and status of Ambassador; and

(3) may not hold any other position within the United States Government.

(c) Duties of coordinator.—The coordinator appointed pursuant to subsection (b) shall—

(1) design an overall non-military strategy, in coordination with the heads of relevant Federal departments and agencies, including regional United States Ambassadors, to advance United States interests in Afghanistan, including policy coordination relating to—

(A) security and stability within Afghanistan;

(B) political and economic reconstruction and development;

(C) counter-narcotics; and

(D) activities to equip and train the Afghan National Security Forces;

(2) ensure policy coordination among relevant Federal departments and agencies, including the Department of Defense, in carrying out the strategy described in paragraph (1);

(3) coordinate with other countries and international organizations with respect to assistance for Afghanistan, especially in areas in which ground coordination and collaboration is essential, such as activities to—

(A) equip and train the Afghan National Security Forces;

(B) build the capacity of the Government of Afghanistan at the local, district, province, and national levels, with increased emphasis on the subnational level; and

(C) undertake phased reconstruction and development activities, especially activities associated with sustainable counter-narcotics operations and programs;

(4) coordinate the implementation of assistance programs for Afghanistan described in paragraph (1) and oversight with relevant Federal departments and agencies;

(5) ensure expeditious resolution of policy disputes with respect to United States assistance for Afghanistan described in paragraph (1) among relevant Federal departments and agencies;

(6) ensure coordination among the United States, the Government of Afghanistan, NATO–ISAF, the United Nations, and other international partners that are supporting counter-terrorism, counter-insurgency, and counter-narcotics efforts; and

(7) carry out a review of major security and development contracts in order to—

(A) evaluate the degree of effectiveness relative to the perceived value of such contracts; and

(B) provide recommendations to enhance local capacity and participation of Afghan organizations at the highest levels of reconstruction and development.

(d) Deputy coordinators.—The coordinator may appoint up to 4 deputy coordinators to assist the coordinator with the duties of the coordinator described in subsection (c), including duties relating to counter-narcotics, reconstruction and development, and equipping and training Afghan National Security Forces. A deputy coordinator may not hold any other position within the United States Government.

SEC. 11. Humanitarian assistance for war victims.

(a) Sense of Congress.—It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) the President should continue and expand programs of assistance to innocent Afghan individuals, families, and communities that suffered losses as a result of military operations conducted by United States and NATO/ISAF forces; and

(2) the programs described in paragraph (1) help innocent civilians rebuild their lives and build goodwill for the United States and our allies.

(b) Report.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees on the feasibility of expanding assistance programs described in subsection (a) to include—

(1) the provision of additional assistance to families of Afghan civilians who—

(A) were injured or killed during such operations; and

(B) were the primary source of income for their families;

(2) the provision of assistance in excess of $2,500 to families of Afghan civilians described in subsection (a); and

(3) the provision of other assistance that might be required as a result of ongoing military operations in Afghanistan.

SEC. 12. Sense of Congress concerning United Nations mandate in Afghanistan.

It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (referred to in this section as the “UNAMA”) plays a vital role in coordinating international assistance efforts and should strengthen that role;

(2) the UNAMA ensures that the emergency assistance it coordinates is expended as part of the effort to build national capacity in sustainable institutions and practices, including emergency food assistance;

(3) the upcoming parliamentary and presidential elections in Afghanistan are the most critical proximate event for which the UNAMA should prioritize its efforts in order to help solidify the political transformation begun during the Constitutional Loya Jirga in 2003 and further enshrined in national elections in 2004 and 2005, and should do so by—

(A) providing a thorough review of lessons learned from the Afghan elections of 2004 and 2005;

(B) preparing a detailed plan of how the UNAMA intends to support free and fair elections in 2009 and 2010 in time to effectively implement such plan;

(C) including the consideration of a modern, fraud-resistant information management system to prevent multiple voting; and

(D) building the capacity and consistency of the Afghan Electoral Commission and enabling the Commission to enforce stricter compliance with the guidelines for participation by candidates in the elections to ensure appropriate vetting to strengthen Afghan voter confidence in their electoral system; and

(4) the United Nations Security Council should expand the United Nations mandate in Afghanistan by—

(A) authorizing international civilian law enforcement missions in Afghanistan as a part of peace operations of the United Nations in Afghanistan and as a partner in the consolidation of the international response to the challenge of building effective police forces;

(B) authorizing the International Security Assistance Force to participate in counter-drug interdiction operations, to the extent appropriate, practicable, and consistent with ongoing operational activities and international law, against major narcotic traffickers, their operations, and their infrastructure in Afghanistan, with the concurrence of the Government of Afghanistan; and

(C) amending and extending the authorization of the International Security Assistance Force beyond October 2008.

SEC. 13. Special envoy for regional cooperation in South and Central Asia.

(a) Sense of Congress.—It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) it is in the national interest of the United States that—

(A) the countries of South and Central Asia work together to address common challenges hampering the stability, security, and development of their region; and

(B) appropriate resources and diplomatic personnel are available to enhance, where possible, such cooperation; and

(2) the strategic importance of South and Central Asia, and the particular challenges and threats represented by political instability, terrorism, insurgencies, and nuclear proliferation, warrant further resources and diplomatic capacity to facilitate the efforts by United States Ambassadors in the region.

(b) Appointment.—The President [shall] appoint, with the advice and consent of the Senate, a special envoy, who shall—

(1) report through the Assistant Secretary, Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs;

(2) have the rank of Ambassador; and

(3) shall harmonize United States efforts to enhance cooperation between the countries of South and Central Asia.

(c) Duties.—The special envoy appointed pursuant to subsection (b) shall—

(1) coordinate United States policy on issues relating to strengthening and facilitating relations between the nations of South and Central Asia for the benefit of stability and economic growth in the region;

(2) advise the President and the Secretary of State, as appropriate; and

(3) in coordination with the Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, make recommendations regarding effective strategies and tactics to achieve United States policy objectives to—

(A) stem cross-border terror activities;

(B) provide guidance and assistance to refugees to ensure orderly and voluntary repatriation from neighboring states;

(C) bolster people-to-people ties and economic cooperation between the nations of South and Central Asia, including bilateral trade relations;

(D) explore opportunities to anticipate and seek solutions to critical cross-border issues, such as transport, energy, food security, and water; and

(E) offer comprehensive review and advice to support effective counter-narcotics strategies across the region, including effective regional food security assistance.

SEC. 14. Reauthorization of Radio Free Afghanistan.

(a) Findings.—Congress makes the following findings:

(1) Since January 30, 2002, RFE/RL, Incorporated (formerly known as Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty) has provided 12 hours of daily surrogate broadcasting services through Radio Free Afghanistan in Dari and Pashto languages to the people of Afghanistan.

(2) Radio Free Afghanistan is the leading broadcaster in Afghanistan with an audience of nearly 60 percent of the adult population.

(3) It is in the national interest to continue Radio Free Afghanistan's surrogate broadcasts to Afghanistan in order to provide accurate news and information, help give voice to ordinary Afghans, and provide programs on the fundamentals of democracy.

(b) Authorization of appropriations.—For each of the fiscal years 2009 through 2013, there are authorized to be appropriated to the Broadcasting Board of Governors such sums as may be necessary for grants to support 12 hours of daily surrogate broadcasting services through Radio Free Afghanistan in Dari and Pashto languages to the people of Afghanistan.

SEC. 15. Reports required.

(a) Report on progress toward security, stability, and development in Afghanistan.—Not later than July 1, 2009, and annually thereafter through July 1, 2018, the President shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees that—

(1) sets forth a comprehensive set of performance indicators and measures of progress in order to establish a baseline upon which to plan and build toward sustainable security, stability, and development in Afghanistan and the surrounding region;

(2) describes the progress achieved based upon such measures of performance in the previous 3 years; and

(3) sets goals for such measures of performance over the subsequent 3 years.

(b) Comprehensive strategy for sustainable security, stability, and development in Afghanistan.—Not later than October 1, 2009, and annually thereafter until October 1, 2018, the President shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees that sets forth a comprehensive interagency strategy for achieving sustainable security, stability, and development in Afghanistan and the surrounding region.

(c) Government Accountability Office report.—Not later than 270 days after the submission of each report required under subsection (a), the Comptroller General of the United States shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees that contains—

(1) a review of, and comments addressing, the most recent report submitted under subsection (a); and

(2) recommendations relating to any additional actions the Comptroller General determines to be necessary to improve on United States efficiency and effectiveness in meeting the goals set forth in the most recent report submitted under subsection (a).