Text: S.3563 — 110th Congress (2007-2008)All Information (Except Text)

There is one version of the bill.

Text available as:

Shown Here:
Placed on Calendar Senate (09/24/2008)

Calendar No. 1074

110th CONGRESS
2d Session
S. 3563

[Report No. 110–496]


To authorize appropriations under the Arms Export Control Act and the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 for security assistance for fiscal years 2009 and 2010, and for other purposes.


IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

September 24 (legislative day, September 17), 2008

Mr. Dodd, from the Committee on Foreign Relations, reported the following original bill; which was read twice and placed on the calendar


A BILL

To authorize appropriations under the Arms Export Control Act and the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 for security assistance for fiscal years 2009 and 2010, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. Short title; table of contents.

(a) Short title.—This Act may be cited as the “Security Assistance Act of 2008”.

(b) Table of contents.—The table of contents for this Act is as follows:


Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.

Sec. 101. Foreign military financing program.

Sec. 102. International military education and training.

Sec. 111. Waiver of net proceeds resulting from disposal of United States defense articles provided to a foreign country on a grant basis.

Sec. 112. Additions to war reserve stockpiles for allies for fiscal years 2009 and 2010.

Sec. 113. Assistance for law enforcement forces.

Sec. 114. Database of United States military assistance.

Sec. 115. Annual report on foreign military training.

Sec. 116. Demining programs.

Sec. 117. Special waiver authority.

Sec. 118. Military coups.

Sec. 119. Focus on international military education and training.

Sec. 121. Thresholds for advance notice to Congress of sales or upgrades of defense articles, design and construction services, and major defense equipment.

Sec. 122. Clarification of requirement for advance notice to Congress of comprehensive export authorizations.

Sec. 123. Transfers of small arms and light weapons.

Sec. 124. Plan regarding cluster munitions sold to foreign countries.

Sec. 125. Authority to provide cataloging data and services to non-NATO countries.

Sec. 126. Haitian Coast Guard.

Sec. 127. Security cooperation with the Republic of Korea.

Sec. 201. Short title.

Sec. 202. Transfer of naval vessels to certain foreign recipients.

Sec. 301. Nonproliferation, anti-terrorism, demining, and related programs.

Sec. 302. Contributions to international organizations supporting key nonproliferation goals.

Sec. 311. Amendments to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.

Sec. 321. Amendments to the Arms Control and Disarmament Act.

Sec. 322. Adequate funding for IAEA safeguards.

Sec. 323. Amended annual report on nuclear nonproliferation.

Sec. 324. Amended additional reports on nonproliferation.

Sec. 325. Consolidation of reports on non-proliferation in South Asia.

Sec. 326. Repeal of annual report on Russian debt reduction for nonproliferation.

Sec. 327. Annual assessments of nonproliferation and disarmament fund projects.

Sec. 328. Reports on 2010 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference.

Sec. 401. Short title.

Sec. 402. Appropriate congressional committees defined.

Sec. 411. Findings.

Sec. 412. Declaration of policy.

Sec. 413. Safeguards Analytical Laboratory.

Sec. 414. Safeguards technology development program.

Sec. 415. Safeguards Cadre Program.

Sec. 421. Authority for bilateral and multilateral nuclear fuel supply mechanisms.

Sec. 422. Report on the establishment of an international fuel authority.

Sec. 423. Sense of the Senate on IAEA fuel supply.

Sec. 501. Short title.

Sec. 502. Findings; purpose.

Sec. 503. Definitions.

Sec. 504. Eligibility for assistance.

Sec. 505. Restriction.

Sec. 506. Fellowship program.

Sec. 507. In-country training in laboratory techniques and disease and syndrome surveillance.

Sec. 508. Assistance for the purchase and maintenance of public health laboratory equipment and supplies.

Sec. 509. Assistance for improved communication of public health information.

Sec. 510. Assignment of public health personnel to United States missions and international organizations.

Sec. 511. Expansion of certain United States Government laboratories abroad.

Sec. 512. Assistance for international health networks and expansion of Field Epidemiology Training Programs.

Sec. 513. Reports.

Sec. 514. Authorization of appropriations.

Sec. 601. Short title.

Sec. 602. Authority to make certain extraordinary payments in connection with the International Space Station.

SEC. 101. Foreign military financing program.

(a) Authorization of appropriations.—There are authorized to be appropriated to the President for grant assistance under section 23 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2763), $4,982,000,000 for fiscal year 2009 and such sums as may be necessary for fiscal year 2010.

(b) Assistance for israel.—Section 513(c) of the Security Assistance Act of 2000 (Public Law 106–280; 114 Stat. 856), as amended by section 1221(a) of the Security Assistance Act of 2002 (division B of Public Law 107–228; 116 Stat. 1430), is further amended—

(1) in paragraph (1), by striking “2002 and 2003” and inserting “2009 and 2010”;

(2) in paragraph (3), by striking “Funds authorized” and all that follows through “later.” and inserting “Funds authorized to be available for Israel under subsection (b)(1) and paragraph (1) for fiscal year 2009 shall be disbursed not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of an Act making appropriations for foreign operations, export financing, and related programs for fiscal year 2009, or October 31, 2008, whichever is later”; and

(3) in paragraph (4)—

(A) by striking “2002 and 2003” and inserting “2009 and 2010”; and

(B) by striking “$535,000,000 for fiscal year 2002 and not less than $550,000,000 for fiscal year 2003” and inserting “$2,550,000,000 for fiscal year 2009 and not less than $2,550,000,000 for fiscal year 2010”.

(c) Assistance for egypt.—Section 514 of the Security Assistance Act of 2000 (Public Law 106–280; 114 Stat. 857), as amended by section 1221(b) of the Security Assistance Act of 2002 (116 Stat. 1430), is further amended—

(1) in subsection (c) by striking “2002 and 2003” and inserting “2009 and 2010”; and

(2) in subsection (e), by striking “Funds estimated” and all that follows through “of the respective fiscal year, whichever is later” and inserting “Funds estimated to be outlayed for Egypt under subsection (c) during fiscal year 2009 shall be disbursed to an interest-bearing account for Egypt in the Federal Reserve Bank of New York not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of an Act making appropriations for foreign operations, export financing, and related programs for fiscal year 2009, or by October 31, 2008, whichever is later”.

SEC. 102. International military education and training.

(a) Authorization of appropriations.—Section 542 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2347a) is amended by striking “There are authorized” and all that follows through “fiscal year 1987” and inserting “There are authorized to be appropriated to the President to carry out the purposes of this chapter $91,500,000 for fiscal year 2009 and such sums as may be necessary for fiscal year 2010”.

(b) Authority to provide to international organizations.—Section 541 of such Act (22 U.S.C. 2347) is amended in the first sentence by inserting “and comparable personnel of international organizations” after “foreign countries”.

SEC. 111. Waiver of net proceeds resulting from disposal of United States defense articles provided to a foreign country on a grant basis.

Section 505(f) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2314(f)) is amended by striking “In the case of items which were delivered prior to 1985, the” in the second sentence and inserting “The”.

SEC. 112. Additions to war reserve stockpiles for allies for fiscal years 2009 and 2010.

Section 514(b)(2)(A) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2321h(b)(2)(A)) is amended by striking “for each of fiscal years 2007 and 2008” and inserting “for each of fiscal years 2009 and 2010”.

SEC. 113. Assistance for law enforcement forces.

Section 660 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2420) is amended—

(1) in subsection (b)—

(A) in paragraph (4), by striking “or”;

(B) in paragraph (6), by striking “and the provision of professional” and all that follows through “democracy” and inserting “including any regional, district, municipal, or other subnational entity emerging from instability”;

(C) by striking the period at the end of paragraph (7) and inserting a semicolon; and

(D) by adding at the end the following new paragraphs:

“(8) with respect to assistance to combat corruption in furtherance of the objectives for which programs are authorized to be established under section 133 of this Act;

“(9) with respect to the provision of professional public safety training, including training in internationally recognized standards of human rights, the rule of law, and the promotion of civilian police roles that support democracy;

“(10) with respect to assistance to combat trafficking in persons; or

“(11) with respect to assistance for constabularies or comparable law enforcement authorities in support of developing capabilities for and deployment to peace operations.”; and

(2) by striking subsection (d) and inserting the following new subsection:

“(d) Subsection (a) shall not apply to assistance for law enforcement forces for which the President, on a case-by-case basis, determines that it is important to the national interest of the United States to furnish such assistance and submits to the committees of the Congress referred to in subsection (a) of section 634A of this Act an advance notification of the obligation of funds for such assistance in accordance with such section.”.

SEC. 114. Database of United States military assistance.

Section 655 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2415) is amended by striking subsection (c) and inserting the following new subsection:

“(c) Availability of report information on the internet.—

“(1) REQUIREMENT FOR DATABASE.—The President shall make available to the public the unclassified portion of each such report in the form of a database that is available via the Internet and that may be searched by various criteria.

“(2) SCHEDULE FOR UPDATING.—Not later than April 1 of each year, the President shall make available in the database the information contained in the annual report for the fiscal year ending the previous September 30.”.

SEC. 115. Annual report on foreign military training.

Subsection (a)(1) of section 656 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2416) is amended—

(1) by striking “January 31” and inserting “March 1”; and

(2) by striking “and all such training proposed for the current year”.

SEC. 116. Demining programs.

(a) Clarification of authority.—Section 551 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2348) is amended—

(1) in the second sentence, by striking “Such assistance may include reimbursement” and inserting “Such assistance may include the following:

“(1) Reimbursements”; and

(2) by adding at the end the following:

“(2) Demining activities, clearance of unexploded ordnance, destruction of small arms, light weapons, and other conventional weapons, and related activities, notwithstanding any other provision of law.”.

(b) Disposal of demining equipment.—Notwithstanding any other provision of law, demining equipment available to the United States Agency for International Development and the Department of State and used in support of the clearance of landmines and unexploded ordnance for humanitarian purposes, may be disposed of on a grant basis in foreign countries, subject to such terms and conditions as the President determines appropriate.

SEC. 117. Special waiver authority.

(a) Revision of authority.—Section 614 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2364) is amended in subsection (a)—

(1) by striking paragraphs (1) and (2) and inserting the following new paragraph:

“(1) The President may authorize any assistance, sale, or other action under this Act, the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.), or any other law that authorizes the furnishing of foreign assistance or the appropriation of funds for foreign assistance, without regard to any of the provisions described in subsection (b) if the President determines, and notifies the Committees on Foreign Relations and Appropriations of the Senate and the Committees on Foreign Affairs and Appropriations of the House of Representatives in writing—

“(A) with respect to assistance or other actions under chapter 2 or 5 of part II of this Act, or sales or other actions under the Arms Export Control Act, that to do so is vital to the national security interests of the United States; and

“(B) with respect to other assistance or actions, that to do so is important to the security interests of the United States.”; and

(2) by redesignating paragraphs (3), (4), and (5) as paragraphs (2), (3), and (4), respectively.

(b) Increased limitation on single country allocation.—Subsection (a)(3)(C) of such section, as redesignated, is amended by striking “$50,000,000” and inserting “$75,000,000”.

(c) Repeal of provisions relating to germany and a certification requirement.—Section 614 of such Act is further amended by striking subsections (b) and (c).

(d) Inapplicable or waivable laws.—Such section, as amended by subsection (c), is further amended by adding at the end the following:

“(b) Inapplicable or waivable laws.—The provisions referred to in subsection (a) are those set forth in any of the following:

“(1) Any provision of this Act.

“(2) Any provision of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.).

“(3) Any provision of law that authorizes the furnishing of foreign assistance or appropriates funds for foreign assistance.

“(4) Any other provision of law that restricts assistance, sales or leases, or other action under a provision of law referred to in paragraph (1), (2), or (3).

“(5) Any provision of law that relates to receipts and credits accruing to the United States.”.

SEC. 118. Military coups.

Section 620 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2370) is amended by inserting after subsection (l) the following new subsection (m):

“(m)(1) No assistance may be furnished under this Act or the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.) for the government of a country if the duly elected head of government for such country is deposed by decree or military coup. The prohibition in the preceding sentence shall cease to apply to a country if the President determines and certifies to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives that after the termination of assistance a democratically elected government for such country has taken office.

“(2) Paragraph (1) does not apply to assistance to promote democratic elections or public participation in democratic processes.

“(3) The President may waive the application of paragraph (1), and any comparable provision of law, to a country upon determining that it is important to the national security interest of the United States to do so.”.

SEC. 119. Focus on international military education and training.

Section 541 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2347) is amended—

(1) by striking “or (iv)” and inserting “(iv)”; and

(2) by striking “rights.” and inserting “rights, or (v) improve the protection of civilians, especially women and children, including those who are refugees or displaced persons.”.

SEC. 121. Thresholds for advance notice to Congress of sales or upgrades of defense articles, design and construction services, and major defense equipment.

(a) Letters of offer to sell.—Subsection (b) of section 36 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2776) is amended—

(1) in the first sentence of paragraph (1)—

(A) by striking “Subject to paragraph (6), in” and inserting “In”;

(B) by striking “Act for $50,000,000” and inserting “Act for $100,000,000”;

(C) by striking “services for $200,000,000” and inserting “services for $350,000,000”;

(D) by striking “$14,000,000” and inserting “$50,000,000”; and

(E) by inserting “and in other cases if the President determines it is appropriate,” before “before such letter”;

(2) in the first sentence of paragraph (5)(C)—

(A) by striking “Subject to paragraph (6), if” and inserting “If”;

(B) by striking “costs $14,000,000” and inserting “costs $50,000,000”;

(C) by striking “equipment, $50,000,000” and inserting “equipment, $100,000,000”;

(D) by striking “or $200,000,000” and inserting “or $350,000,000”; and

(E) by inserting “and in other cases if the President determines it is appropriate,” before “then the President”; and

(3) by striking paragraph (6).

(b) Export licenses.—Subsection (c) of section 36 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2776) is amended—

(1) in the first sentence of paragraph (1)—

(A) by striking “Subject to paragraph (5), in” and inserting “In”;

(B) by striking “$14,000,000” and inserting “$50,000,000”;

(C) by striking “services sold under a contract in the amount of $50,000,000” and inserting “services sold under a contract in the amount of $100,000,000”; and

(D) by inserting “and in other cases if the President determines it is appropriate,” before “before issuing such”;

(2) in the last sentence of paragraph (2), by striking “(A) and (B)” and inserting “(A), (B), and (C)”; and

(3) by striking paragraph (5).

(c) Presidential consent.—Section 3(d) of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2753(d)) is amended—

(1) in paragraphs (1) and (3)(A)—

(A) by striking “Subject to paragraph (5), the” and inserting “The”;

(B) by striking “$14,000,000” and inserting “$50,000,000”; and

(C) by striking “service valued (in terms of its original acquisition cost) at $50,000,000” and inserting “service valued (in terms of its original acquisition cost) at $100,000,000”; and

(2) by striking paragraph (5).

SEC. 122. Clarification of requirement for advance notice to Congress of comprehensive export authorizations.

Subsection (d) of section 36 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2776) is amended—

(1) in paragraph (1)—

(A) by inserting “(A)” after “(1)”;

(B) by striking “this subsection” and inserting “this subparagraph”; and

(C) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:

“(B) Notwithstanding section 27(g), in the case of a comprehensive authorization described in section 126.14 of title 22, Code of Federal Regulations (or any corresponding similar regulation) for the proposed export of defense articles or defense services in an amount that exceeds a limitation set forth in subsection (c)(1), before the comprehensive authorization is approved or the addition of a foreign government or other foreign partner to the comprehensive authorization is approved, the President shall submit a certification with respect to the comprehensive authorization in a manner similar to the certification required under subsection (c)(1) of this section and containing comparable information, except that the last sentence of such subsection shall not apply to certifications submitted pursuant to this subparagraph.”; and

(2) in paragraph (4), by striking “Approval for an agreement subject to paragraph (1) may not be given under section 38” and inserting “Approval for an agreement subject to paragraph (1)(A), or for a comprehensive authorization subject to paragraph (1)(B), may not be given under section 38 or section 126.14 of title 22, Code of Federal Regulations (or any corresponding similar regulation), as the case may be,”.

SEC. 123. Transfers of small arms and light weapons.

(a) Letters of offer to sell defense articles or services.—Subsection (b)(1) of section 36 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2776) is amended—

(1) in subparagraph (O), by striking “; and” and inserting a semicolon;

(2) in subparagraph (P), by striking the period at the end, and inserting “; and”; and

(3) by inserting after paragraph (P) the following new subparagraph:

“(Q) for any proposed sale of firearms listed in category I of the United States Munitions List that require a license for international export under this section—

“(i) an analysis of the impact of the proposed sale on efforts by the United States relating to the collection and destruction of excess small arms and light weapons; and

“(ii) a detailed description of any provision or requirement for the recipient state to dispose of firearms that would become excess as a result of the proposed sale.”.

(b) Applications for export licenses.—The second sentence of subsection (c) of such section is amended by inserting after “such offset agreement.” the following: “Each numbered certification regarding the proposed export of firearms listed in category I of the United States Munitions List shall include an analysis of the impact of the proposed sales on efforts by the United States relating to the collection and destruction of excess small arms and light weapons and a detailed description of any provision or requirement for the recipient state to dispose of firearms that would become excess as a result of the proposed export.”.

(c) Transfers of certain excess defense articles.—Subsection (f)(2) of section 516 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2321j) is amended—

(1) in subparagraph (C), by striking “; and” and inserting a semicolon;

(2) by redesignating subparagraph (D) as subparagraph (E); and

(3) by inserting after subparagraph (C) the following new subparagraph:

“(D) for any proposed transfer of firearms listed in category I of the United States Munitions List that would require a license for international export under section 36 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2776)—

“(i) an analysis of the impact of the proposed sale on efforts by the United States relating to the collection and destruction of excess small arms and light weapons; and

“(ii) a detailed description of any provision or requirement for the recipient state to dispose of firearms that would become excess as a result of the proposed transfer; and”.

SEC. 124. Plan regarding cluster munitions sold to foreign countries.

(a) Findings.—Congress makes the following findings:

(1) Use by recipient countries of United States-origin cluster munitions that result in high rates of unexploded ordnance can damage the reputation of the United States, even if the United States no longer controls how such weapons are used, because of the human and economic damage such unexploded ordnance can cause.

(2) According to a 2005 report by the Defense Science Board Task Force on Munitions System Reliability, cluster munitions from a weapon acquisition program that reached the production and deployment phase by the first quarter of fiscal year 2005 are a major contributor to unexploded ordinance from cluster munition submunitions.

(3) According to the same 2005 report, cluster munitions are more likely to fail, and therefore leave unexploded ordnance, as they age past their design life.

(4) On June 19, 2008, the Secretary of Defense issued a memorandum on Department of Defense policy on cluster munitions and unintended harm to civilians.

(5) Under the June 2008 policy, the Department of Defense may, consistent with United States law and policy, seek to transfer cluster munitions that do not meet a specified performance rate for unexploded ordnance only if the receiving foreign government agrees not to use such cluster munitions after 2018.

(6) The June 2008 policy does not address cluster munitions that are past their design life.

(b) Plan required.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, shall provide to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives an unclassified report, with a classified annex as necessary, that—

(1) identifies those cluster munitions that have been sold or transferred pursuant to the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.);

(2) identifies the countries to which cluster munitions have been transferred pursuant to the Arms Export Control Act, and the numbers of such munitions in such countries that are, or will soon be, beyond their design life;

(3) identifies those countries that received cluster munitions that are, or will soon be, beyond their design life and have destroyed, deactivated, or refurbished such munitions or will not use such munitions, except for purposes of training or development of detection and clearing methods; and

(4) details a plan to eliminate from operational stockpiles of other countries the risks to innocent civilians posed by United States-origin cluster munitions that are past their design life.

SEC. 125. Authority to provide cataloging data and services to non-NATO countries.

Section 21(h)(2) of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2761(h)(2)) is amended by striking “to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization” and all that follows through “provides” and inserting “to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, to any member government of that Organization, or to the government of any other country if that Organization, member government, or other government provides”.

SEC. 126. Haitian Coast Guard.

The Government of Haiti shall be eligible to purchase defense articles and services for the Haitian Coast Guard under the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.), subject to the prior notification requirements under section 634A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2394–1).

SEC. 127. Security cooperation with the Republic of Korea.

(a) Findings.—Congress makes the following findings:

(1) Close and continuing defense cooperation between the United States and the Republic of Korea continues to be in the national security interest of the United States.

(2) The Republic of Korea was designated a Major Non-NATO Ally in 1987, the first such designation.

(3) The Republic of Korea has been a major purchaser of United States defense articles and services through the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program, totaling $6,900,000,000 in deliveries over the last 10 years.

(4) Purchases of United States defense articles, services, and major defense equipment facilitate and increase the interoperability of Republic of Korea military forces with the United States Armed Forces.

(5) Congress has previously enacted important, special defense cooperation arrangements for the Republic of Korea, as in the Act entitled “An Act to authorize the transfer of items in the War Reserves Stockpile for Allies, Korea”, approved December 30, 2005 (Public Law 109–159; 119 Stat. 2955), which authorized the President, notwithstanding section 514 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2321h), to transfer to the Republic of Korea certain defense items to be included in a war reserve stockpile for that country.

(6) Enhanced support for defense cooperation with the Republic of Korea is important to the national security of the United States, including through creation of a status in law for the Republic of Korea similar to the countries in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand, with respect to consideration by Congress of foreign military sales to the Republic of Korea.

(b) Special foreign military sales status for Republic of Korea.—Section 36 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2776) is amended—

(1) in subsection (b), by inserting “the Republic of Korea,” before “Japan” each place it appears;

(2) in subsection (c), by inserting “the Republic of Korea,” before “Australia” both places it appears; and

(3) in subsection (d)(2)(A), by inserting “the Republic of Korea,” before “Australia”.

SEC. 128. Sense of congress on agreements relating to assistance, transfer, or sale of certain military technologies.

It is the sense of Congress that it is the responsibility of the United States Government, not a private entity, to negotiate with foreign governments any agreement pursuant to section 646(b)(2) of the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2008 (division J of Public Law 110-161; 121 Stat. 2336) specifying that qualifying cluster munitions or cluster munitions technology will only be used against clearly defined military targets and will not be used where civilians are known to be present.

SEC. 201. Short title.

This title may be cited as the “Naval Vessel Transfer Act of 2008”.

SEC. 202. Transfer of naval vessels to certain foreign recipients.

(a) Transfers by grant.—The President is authorized to transfer vessels to foreign recipients on a grant basis under section 516 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2321j), as follows:

(1) PAKISTAN.—To the Government of Pakistan, the OLIVER HAZARD PERRY class guided missile frigate MCINERNEY (FFG–8).

(2) GREECE.—To the Government of Greece, the OSPREY class minehunter coastal ships OSPREY (MHC–51) and ROBIN (MHC–54).

(3) CHILE.—To the Government of Chile, the KAISER class oiler ANDREW J. HIGGINS (AO–190).

(4) PERU.—To the Government of Peru, the NEWPORT class amphibious tank landing ships FRESNO (LST–1182) and RACINE (LST–1191).

(b) Grants not counted in annual total of transferred excess defense articles.—The value of a vessel transferred to a recipient on a grant basis pursuant to authority provided by subsection (a) shall not be counted against the aggregate value of excess defense articles transferred in any fiscal year under section 516 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2321j).

(c) Costs of transfers.—Any expense incurred by the United States in connection with a transfer authorized by this section shall be charged to the recipient (notwithstanding section 516(e) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2321j(e))).

(d) Repair and refurbishment in United States shipyards.—To the maximum extent practicable, the President shall require, as a condition of the transfer of a vessel under this section, that the recipient to which the vessel is transferred have such repair or refurbishment of the vessel as is needed, before the vessel joins the naval forces of the recipient, performed at a shipyard located in the United States, including a United States Navy shipyard.

(e) Expiration of authority.—The authority to transfer a vessel under this section shall expire at the end of the 2-year period beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act.

SEC. 301. Nonproliferation, anti-terrorism, demining, and related programs.

(a) Authorization of appropriations.—There are authorized to be appropriated to the President $578,500,000 for fiscal year 2009 and such sums as may be necessary for fiscal year 2010 for nonproliferation, anti-terrorism, demining, and related programs and activities under—

(1) chapter 8 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2349aa et seq.), for anti-terrorism assistance;

(2) chapter 9 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2349bb et seq.), for export control and related border security assistance, for preventing diversion of scientific and technical expertise related to nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and their means of delivery, and for other global proliferation threat reduction efforts;

(3) paragraph (2) of section 551 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2348), as added by section 116 of this Act, for humanitarian demining;

(4) section 504 of the FREEDOM Support Act (22 U.S.C. 5854), for the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund;

(5) section 23 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2763) and section 11 of the Department of State Authorities Act of 2006 (22 U.S.C. 2349bb–6), for conventional weapons destruction;

(6) section 301 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2221), for a voluntary contribution to the International Atomic Energy Agency and a United States contribution to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization Preparatory Commission; and

(7) the Global Pathogen Surveillance Act of 2008 (title V of this Act).

(b) Suballocation.—Of the amounts authorized to be appropriated under subsection (a)—

(1) for fiscal year 2009, $45,000,000 is authorized to be available until expended, and for fiscal year 2010, such sums as may be necessary are authorized to be available until expended, for the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund, to promote, notwithstanding any other provision of law, bilateral and multilateral activities relating to nonproliferation and disarmament, including, when in the national security interests of the United States, with respect to international organizations and in countries other than the independent states of the former Soviet Union;

(2) for fiscal year 2009, $41,300,000 is authorized to be available until September 30, 2010, and for fiscal year 2010, such sums as may be necessary are authorized to be available until September 30, 2011, for export control and related border security assistance;

(3) for fiscal year 2009, $69,000,000 is authorized to be available, and for fiscal year 2010, such sums as may be necessary are authorized to be available, for global threat reduction;

(4) for fiscal year 2009, $66,000,000 is authorized to be available, and for fiscal year 2010, such sums as may be necessary are authorized to be available, for a voluntary contribution to the International Atomic Energy Agency;

(5) for fiscal year 2009, $10,000,000 is authorized to be available until September 30, 2013, for a voluntary contribution to the International Atomic Energy Agency’s Nuclear Security Fund, to support measures to protect against nuclear terrorism, provided—

(A) that such amounts may be deposited in the Fund only to the extent of deposits of matching amounts in that Fund by other governments, entities, or persons in excess of the amounts contributed by such governments, entities or persons to the Nuclear Security Fund in 2007; and

(B) that there are no conditions attached to the contributions being matched that would prevent the IAEA Office of Nuclear Security from using such contributions on any project that accords with a Nuclear Security Plan already approved by the IAEA Board of Governors;

(6) for fiscal year 2009, $31,000,000 is authorized to be available, and for fiscal year 2010, such sums as may be necessary are authorized to be available, for a United States contribution to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization Preparatory Commission, to pay the current and outstanding United States share of construction and provisional operation of the International Monitoring System and related functions;

(7) for fiscal year 2009, $160,000,000 is authorized to be available until September 30, 2010, and for fiscal year 2010, such sums as may be necessary are authorized to be available until September 30, 2011, for anti-terrorism assistance, of which—

(A) $8,900,000 is authorized to be available for fiscal year 2009 and such sums as are necessary are authorized to be available for fiscal year 2010 for the Terrorist Interdiction Program;

(B) $1,200,000 is authorized to be available for fiscal year 2009 and such sums as are necessary are authorized to be available for fiscal year 2010 for counterterrorism engagement with allies; and

(C) $8,425,000 is authorized to be available for fiscal year 2009 and such sums as are necessary are authorized to be available for fiscal year 2010 for counterterrorism financing; and

(8) for fiscal year 2009, $151,200,000 is authorized to be available, and for fiscal year 2010, such sums as are necessary are authorized to be available, for conventional weapons destruction.

(c) Availability.—Amounts authorized under this section for the purposes specified in this section are in addition to amounts otherwise available for such purposes.

SEC. 302. Contributions to international organizations supporting key nonproliferation goals.

(a) Findings.—Congress makes the following findings:

(1) The United Nations Security Council, in Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004), affirmed that “proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as their means of delivery, constitutes a threat to international peace and security”.

(2) The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968, and entered into force March 5, 1970 (commonly known as the “Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty” or “NPT”) and the effective functioning of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are of critical importance to international peace and security and United States national security.

(3) President George W. Bush told the 46th General Conference of the IAEA in 2002, “The threat from nuclear proliferation remains real, immediate, and dangerous. We must ensure that the IAEA has the resources it needs to carry out its mission effectively.”

(4) The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, done at Paris January 13, 1993, and entered into force April 29, 1997 (commonly known as the “Chemical Weapons Convention” or “CWC”) and the effective functioning of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) furthers United States national security by verifying that stockpiles of chemical weapons are destroyed and by ensuring that declared peaceful chemical activities are not diverted to weapons purposes.

(5) On April 29, 2007, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice offered her congratulations on the tenth anniversary of the CWC to Ambassador Rogelio Pfirter, Director-General of the OPCW. In that message, Secretary Rice stated, “The Organization for the Prohibition for Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and its staff continue to make important contributions to increasing security for every nation against the threat of chemical weapons.” Secretary Rice also assured Director-General Pfirter of “the United States government’s continued strong support for and commitment to the Convention and the OPCW”.

(6) Before fiscal year 1982, the United States paid its assessed contributions to the IAEA by making quarterly payments with funds appropriated for the fiscal year ending in the same year that contributions were due.

(7) At the request of the Executive Branch, Congress in fiscal year 1982 began deferring payments so that contributions to several international organizations, including the IAEA, are paid in one lump sum near the end of the organization’s calendar year (or even later), with funds appropriated for the fiscal year ending in the following year.

(8) For those contributions paid under the deferral policy, in the best case no appropriated funds are available to pay the United States assessment before the final quarter of an international organization’s budget year. As early as February 1983, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) found that later United States payments as a result of the deferral policy “contributed to existing cash flow problems [at the relevant international organizations]”.

(9) The deferral policy leaves very little overlap between the calendar year for which international organizations need the funds and the United States fiscal year in which payments are appropriated. The deferral policy therefore exacerbates the negative impact of failing to appropriate funds before the beginning of a given fiscal year. As a result of the deferral policy, the United States is often unable to pay its dues before the end of organizations’ budget years.

(10) Late payment of United States dues can impair the ability of the IAEA and the OPCW to carry out critical missions.

(11) After entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention, the United States did not apply the formal deferral policy to assessed payments to the OPCW. Recent budget shortfalls and exchange rate losses in the “Contributions to International Organizations” account have led the United States in recent years to defer, however, approximately 70 percent of its assessed payment to the following fiscal year.

(12) For 2008 the OPCW has approved its third straight budget of zero nominal growth. Nevertheless, for five straight years OPCW has had to return unspent cash surpluses to Member States, in large part because the organization was unable to carry out budgeted activities when assessed dues were not paid in a timely manner. OPCW Director-General Pfirter in August 2007 stated, “The shortfall in cash receipts could, of course, severely undermine the financial health of the OPCW.”

(13) Large portions of both the OPCW Verification and Inspections budget and the IAEA safeguards budget are allocated to paying fixed staffing costs for already-hired inspectors. These organizations have few other choices than to cut back on budgets for recruitment and training of new inspectors and investments in verification technology if cash is not available in a timely manner.

(14) The short-term budget gains created by the 1981 deferral switch have long since disappeared, while the damage both to the performance of organizations of vital importance to United States nonproliferation goals and to the standing and influence of the United States in those organizations continues. Ending the deferral policy for organizations serving missions of critical importance to international peace and security would entail higher budget costs for a small number of transition years but would pay benefits for many years to come.

(b) Authorization of appropriations.—In addition to any other amounts authorized for contributions to international organizations, there is authorized to be appropriated $50,000,000 for fiscal year 2009, for contributions to international organizations, to meet obligations for membership in the International Atomic Energy Agency and in the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons assessed by those organizations for calendar year 2008.

(c) Report.—Not later than June 30, 2009, the Secretary of State shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives a report that includes the following:

(1) The amounts of any assessments by the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons for calendar year 2009 or any prior year that the Secretary determines will remain unpaid by the United States on October 1, 2009.

(2) The reason or reasons such assessments will not have been paid by October 1, 2009.

SEC. 311. Amendments to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.

(a) Information to accompany proposed agreements for nuclear cooperation.—Section 123(b) of the Atomic Energy Act (42 U.S.C. 2153(b)) is amended by inserting after “Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement” the following: “and a report on the actions taken and planned by the United States with the country identified in the proposed agreement for cooperation to fulfill the purposes of the program authorized in Section 502 of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978 (22 U.S.C. 3262)”.

(b) Subsequent arrangements under agreements for nuclear cooperation.—Section 131(b)(1) of such Act (42 U.S.C. 2160(b)(1)) is amended by inserting after “elapsed” the following: “, except that for any such subsequent arrangement under an agreement for cooperation which did not, pursuant to section 123(d) of this Act, become effective until there was enacted a joint resolution favoring such agreement, the Secretary of Energy may not enter into any such subsequent arrangement until Congress adopts, and there is enacted, a joint resolution approving such subsequent arrangement, which resolution shall be considered pursuant to the procedures set forth in section 130(i) of this Act”.

(c) Amendments to agreements for nuclear cooperation.—Section 123(d) of such Act (42 U.S.C. 2153(d)) is amended—

(1) by inserting after “in connection therewith)” the following: “, or an amendment to such agreement,”;

(2) by inserting after “contained in that subsection” the following: “, or an agreement with a nation or group of nations that does not have in force an additional protocol to its agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards,”; and

(3) by inserting after “the Henry J. Hyde United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 2006” the following: “, or an amendment to such agreement,”.

SEC. 312. Biosecurity engagement program.

Chapter 9 of Part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2349bb et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 584 the following new section:

“SEC. 584A. Global pathogen security program.

“(a) Establishment.—The Secretary of State shall establish a program to combat bioterrorism world-wide by providing training, equipment, and financial and technical (including legal) assistance in such areas as biosecurity, biosafety, pathogen surveillance, and timely response to outbreaks of infectious disease, and by providing increased opportunity for scientists who possess expertise that could make a material contribution to the development, manufacture, or use of biological weapons to engage in remunerative careers that promote public health and safety.

“(b) Activities included.—Activities in the program established pursuant to subsection (a) may include such activities as the Biosecurity Engagement Program of the Office of Cooperative Threat Reduction in the Department of State.”.

SEC. 321. Amendments to the Arms Control and Disarmament Act.

(a) Verification of compliance.—Section 306(a) of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act (22 U.S.C. 2577(a)) is amended by inserting “or other formal commitment” after “agreement” each place it appears in paragraphs (1) and (2).

(b) Annual reports to Congress.—Section 403 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act (22 U.S.C. 2593a) is amended to read as follows:

    Annual reports to Congress

“Sec. 403. (a) Report on objectives and negotiations.—Not later than April 15 of each year, the President shall submit to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and to the Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a report prepared by the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Energy, the Director of National Intelligence, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on the status of United States policy and actions with respect to arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament. Such report shall include—

“(1) a detailed statement concerning the arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament objectives of the executive branch of Government for the forthcoming year; and

“(2) a detailed assessment of the status of any ongoing arms control, nonproliferation, or disarmament negotiations, including a comprehensive description of negotiations or other activities during the preceding year and an appraisal of the status and prospects for the forthcoming year.

“(b) Report on compliance.—Not later than April 15 of each year, the President shall submit to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and to the Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a report prepared by the Secretary of State with the concurrence of the Director of National Intelligence and in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Energy, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the status of United States policy and actions with respect to arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament compliance. Such report shall include—

“(1) a detailed assessment of adherence of the United States to obligations undertaken in arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament agreements, including information on the policies and organization of each relevant agency or department of the United States to ensure adherence to such obligations, a description of national security programs with a direct bearing on questions of adherence to such obligations and of steps being taken to ensure adherence, and a compilation of any substantive questions raised during the preceding year and any corrective action taken;

“(2) a detailed assessment of the adherence of other nations to obligations undertaken in all arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament agreements or commitments, including the Missile Technology Control Regime, to which the United States is a participating state, including information on actions taken by each nation with regard to the size, structure, and disposition of its military forces in order to comply with arms control, nonproliferation, or disarmament agreements or commitments, including, in the case of each agreement or commitment about which compliance questions exist—

“(A) a description of each significant issue raised and efforts made and contemplated with the other participating state to seek resolution of the difficulty;

“(B) an assessment of damage, if any, to United States security and other interests;

“(C) recommendations as to any steps that should be considered to redress any damage to United States national security and to reduce compliance problems; and

“(D) for states that are not parties to such agreements or commitments, a description of activities of concern carried out by such states and efforts underway to bring such states into adherence with such agreements or commitments;

“(3) a discussion of any material noncompliance by foreign governments with their binding commitments to the United States with respect to the prevention of the spread of nuclear explosive devices (as defined in section 830(4) of the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act of 1994 (22 U.S.C. 6305(4)) by non-nuclear-weapon states (as defined in section 830(5) of that Act (22 U.S.C. 6305(5)) or the acquisition by such states of unsafeguarded special nuclear material (as defined in section 830(8) of that Act (22 U.S.C. 6305(8)), including—

“(A) a net assessment of the aggregate military significance of all such violations;

“(B) a statement of the compliance policy of the United States with respect to violations of those commitments; and

“(C) what actions, if any, the President has taken or proposes to take to bring any country committing such a violation into compliance with those commitments; and

“(4) a specific identification, to the maximum extent practicable in unclassified form, of each and every question that exists with respect to compliance by other countries with arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament agreements and other formal commitments with the United States.

“(c) Chemical weapons convention compliance report requirement satisfied.—The report submitted pursuant to subsection (b) shall include the information required under section 2(10)(C) of Senate Resolution 75, 105th Congress, agreed to April 24, 1997, advising and consenting to the ratification of the Convention on the Prohibition of Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, with annexes, done at Paris January 13, 1993 and entered into force April 29, 1997 (popularly known as the ‘Chemical Weapons Convention’; T.Doc. 103–21).

“(d) Classification of report.—The reports required by this section shall be submitted in unclassified form, with classified annexes, as appropriate. The report portions described in paragraphs (2) and (3) of subsection (b) shall summarize in detail, at least in classified annexes, the information, analysis, and conclusions relevant to possible noncompliance by other countries that are provided by United States intelligence agencies.

“(e) Reporting consecutive noncompliance.—If the President in consecutive reports submitted to the Congress under subsection (b) reports that any country is not in full compliance with its binding nonproliferation commitments to the United States, then the President shall include in the second such report an assessment of what actions are necessary to compensate for such violations.

“(f) Additional requirement.—Each report required by subsection (b) shall include a discussion of each significant issue described in paragraph (4) of such subsection that was contained in a previous report issued under this section during 1995, or after December 31, 1995, until the question or concern has been resolved and such resolution has been reported in detail to the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.”.

SEC. 322. Adequate funding for IAEA safeguards.

(a) Section 201(b) of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (22 U.S.C. 3241(b)) is amended to read as follows:

“(b) ensure that the IAEA has the financial, technical, and personnel resources available to fully carry out its safeguards mission and that, to the maximum extent possible, safeguards activities are financed by the regular budget of the IAEA and not by voluntary contributions to the Agency;”.

SEC. 323. Annual report on nuclear nonproliferation.

(a) Report required.—Not later than March 1 of each year, except in 2009 and every fourth year thereafter not later than June 1, the President, shall, submit to Congress a report on the efforts of Federal departments and agencies to prevent nuclear proliferation. The report shall include—

(1) a description of the progress made toward—

(A) negotiating the initiatives contemplated in sections 104 and 105 of Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (22 U.S.C. 3223 and 3224);

(B) negotiating the international arrangements or other mutual undertakings contemplated in section 403 of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (42 U.S.C. 2153b);

(C) encouraging non-nuclear-weapon states that are not party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to adhere to the Treaty or, pending such adherence, to enter into comparable agreements with respect to safeguards and to foreswear the development of any nuclear explosive devices, and discouraging nuclear exports to non-nuclear-weapon states which have not taken such steps;

(D) strengthening the safeguards of the IAEA as contemplated in section 201 of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (22 U.S.C. 3241), particularly including ensuring that IAEA safeguards programs are adequately funded and reducing the proportion of IAEA funding for safeguards activities covered by voluntary contributions; and

(E) renegotiating agreements for cooperation as contemplated in section 404(a) of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (42 U.S.C. 2153c);

(2) an assessment of the impact of the progress described in paragraph (1) on the non-proliferation policy of the United States;

(3) an explanation of the precise reasons why progress has not been made on any particular point and recommendations with respect to appropriate measures to encourage progress;

(4) a statement of the President’s general and specific nonproliferation and threat reduction objectives and how the efforts of Federal agencies will be coordinated most effectively, pursuant to section 1334 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003 (50 U.S.C. 2357b), to achieve those objectives;

(5) a statement of what legislative modifications, if any, are necessary in the President’s judgment to achieve the nonproliferation policy of the United States;

(6) a determination as to which non-nuclear-weapon states with which the United States has an agreement for cooperation in effect or under negotiation, if any, have—

(A) detonated a nuclear device;

(B) refused to accept the safeguards of the IAEA on all of their peaceful nuclear activities;

(C) refused to give specific assurances that they will not manufacture or otherwise acquire any nuclear explosive device; or

(D) engaged in activities involving source or special nuclear material and having direct significance for the manufacture or acquisition of nuclear explosive devices;

(7) an assessment of whether any of the policies set forth in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (Public Law 95–242) have, on balance, been counterproductive from the standpoint of preventing proliferation;

(8) a description of the progress made toward establishing procedures to facilitate the timely processing of requests for subsequent arrangements and export licenses in order to enhance the reliability of the United States in meeting its commitments to supply nuclear reactors and fuel to nations which adhere to effective non-proliferation policies;

(9) a description of the implementation of nuclear and nuclear-related dual-use export controls in the preceding calendar year, including a summary by type of commodity and destination of—

(A) all transactions for which—

(i) an export license was issued for any good controlled under section 309(c) of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (42 U.S.C. 2139a(c));

(ii) an export license was issued under section 109 b. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2139(b));

(iii) approvals were issued under the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2401 et seq.) or section 109 b.(3) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2139(b)(3)), for the retransfer of any item, technical data, component, or substance; or

(iv) authorizations were made as required by section 57 b.(2) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2077(b)(2)) to engage, directly or indirectly, in the production of special nuclear material;

(B) each instance in which—

(i) a sanction has been imposed under section 821(a) or section 824 of the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act of 1994 (22 U.S.C. 6301(a)) or section 102(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2799aa–1(b)(1));

(ii) sales or leases have been denied under section 3(f) of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2753(f)) or transactions have been prohibited by reason of acts relating to proliferation of nuclear explosive devices as described in section 40(d) of that Act;

(iii) a sanction has not been imposed by reason of section 821(c)(2) of the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act of 1994 (22 U.S.C. 6301(c)(2)) or the imposition of a sanction has been delayed under section 102(b)(4) of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2799aa–1(b)(4)); or

(iv) a waiver of a sanction has been made under—

(I) section 821(f) or section 824 of the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act of 1994;

(II) section 620E(d) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2375(d)), or paragraph (5) or (6)(B) of section 102(b) of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2799aa–1(b));

(III) section 40(g) of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2780(g)) with respect to the last sentence of section 40(d) of that Act (22 U.S.C. 2780(g)); or

(IV) section 614 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2364) with respect to section 620E of that Act (22 U.S.C. 2375) or section 3(f), the last sentence of section 40(d), or 102(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act; and

(C) the progress of those independent states of the former Soviet Union that are non-nuclear-weapon states and of the Baltic states towards achieving the objective of applying full scope safeguards to all their peaceful nuclear activities.

(b) Form.—Portions of the information required by subsection (a)(6) may be submitted in classified form, as necessary. Any such information that may not be published or disclosed under section 12(c)(1) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2411(c)(1)) shall be submitted as classified.

(c) Incorporation by reference.—

(1) COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION PROGRAMS.—Information relevant to the report required under this section that is already contained in an annual report on activities and assistance under Cooperative Threat Reduction programs submitted to Congress under section 1308 of the Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001 (Public Law 106-398; 114 Stat. 1654-341) for the year for which the report required under this section is submitted may be cited by reference in the report required under this section.

(2) IMPLEMENTING RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE 9/11 COMMISSION ACT OF 2007.—Information relevant to the report required under this section that is already contained in an annual report on the strategy and policies developed pursuant to section 1841 of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (50 U.S.C. 2931) for the current and future fiscal years during which the report required under this section is submitted may be cited by reference in the report required under this section.

(3) ARMS CONTROL, NONPROLIFERATION, AND DISARMAMENT.—Information relevant to the report required under this section that is already contained in an annual report on the status of United States policy and actions with respect to arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament developed pursuant to section 403 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act (22 U.S.C. 2593a) for the year for which the report required under this section is submitted may be cited by reference in the report required under this section.

(4) NUCLEAR WEAPONS SECURITY.—Information relevant to the report required under this section that is already contained in an annual report on the security of nuclear weapons and related equipment and formula quantities of strategic special nuclear material outside of the United States developed pursuant to section 3134 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (22 U.S.C. 3244 note) for the year for which the report required under this section is submitted may be cited by reference in the report required under this section.

SEC. 324. Amended additional reports on nonproliferation.

Section 602(c)(1) of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (22 U.S.C. 3282(c)(1)) is amended—

(1) by striking “Director of Central Intelligence” and inserting “Director of National Intelligence”;

(2) by inserting “, Armed Services,” after “Foreign Relations”; and

(3) by striking “Committee on International Relations” and inserting “Committees on Foreign Affairs and Armed Services”.

SEC. 325. Consolidation of reports on non-proliferation in South Asia.

(a) In general.—Section 620F(c) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2376(c)) is amended by adding at the end the following: “Such report shall also include a description of the efforts of the United States Government to achieve the objectives described in subsections (a) and (b) of section 1601 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law 107–228; 116 Stat. 1459), the progress made toward achieving such objectives, and the likelihood that such objectives will be achieved within the year following the reporting period.”.

(b) Elimination of duplicative reporting requirements.—Section 1601 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law 107–228; 116 Stat. 1459) is amended—

(1) in subsection (a), by striking “by September 30, 2003”;

(2) in subsection (b), by striking “not later than September 30, 2003”; and

(3) by striking subsection (c).

SEC. 326. Repeal of annual report on Russian debt reduction for nonproliferation.

Section 1321 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law 107–228; 22 U.S.C. 5952 note), is hereby repealed.

SEC. 327. Annual assessments of nonproliferation and disarmament fund projects.

(a) In general.—No later than September 1, 2009, and annually thereafter for the following two years, the Comptroller General of the United States shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Appropriations in the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Appropriations in the House of Representatives an assessment of projects and project proposals carried out under the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund (hereinafter, “NDF”) authorized under section 504 of the FREEDOM Support Act (Public Law 102–511; 22 U.S.C. 5854). The first such assessment shall apply to projects approved to be carried out during the previous 5 calendar years, and to project proposals not carried out by the NDF that were submitted to it between January 1, 2004, and December 31, 2007. Each subsequent assessment shall cover projects approved to be carried out by the NDF during the previous calendar year.

(b) Content.—The first such assessment under subsection (a) shall include—

(1) An examination of each project proposal, including—

(A) the purpose of such proposal;

(B) the name of the requesting Federal agency or drafting office;

(C) the reason or reasons why the Federal agency or drafting office requesting that the NDF carry out such proposed project was not able to undertake such project;

(D) a statement as to whether such project proposal was—

(i) fully funded;

(ii) funded at a different amount than the Federal agency or drafting office submitting such proposal requested;

(iii) deferred (including the reason why such proposal was deferred); or

(iv) not funded (including the reason or reasons why such proposal was not funded).

(2) An examination of each project approved to be carried out under the NDF, including the information required under subparagraphs (A), (B), and (C) of paragraph (1) and—

(A) the date on which the project was approved;

(B) an assessment of whether the approved project included a schedule for completion;

(C) a review of the contract for the project, including whether the contract is consistent, or, for those projects with respect to which NDF notwithstanding authorities were used, would have been consistent, with the Federal Acquisition Regulations;

(D) an examination, in consultation with the Office of the Legal Adviser in the Department of State, of whether and to what extent it was necessary to rely on NDF notwithstanding authorities to carry out such project;

(E) if the contract for the project involves design, construction, or acquisition of equipment, a listing of the private entities associated with such activities;

(F) an estimate of whether the project can be completed within the funding amounts previously notified to Congress;

(G) the name of any international organization receiving funds from the NDF and the purposes for which such funds are being made available to that organization; and

(H) the office that serves as the executive agent for such project.

(3) A summary of all funds that have been de-obligated for any NDF project previously notified to Congress.

(4) An examination of any funds previously notified to Congress that will not be expended on the originally notified project, and an assessment of the reasons why the amounts notified to Congress were not expended on that project, including whether such project was completed, withdrawn, or the funds were otherwise no longer needed.

(5) A summary of the unobligated and obligated balances of the NDF.

(6) An assessment, for those projects carried out by the NDF, of the extent to which the Federal agency or drafting office effectively coordinated draft project proposals with all Federal agencies with applicable policy responsibilities.

(7) A review of NDF project implementation and mission management, including the following:

(A) The roles and functions with respect to NDF project implementation and mission management of each of the following NDF officers:

(i) The Director.

(ii) The Deputy Director.

(iii) The Comptroller.

(iv) NDF Policy Officers.

(v) NDF Negotiators.

(vi) The Executive Secretary.

(vii) The Chief of Operations.

(viii) Program managers.

(ix) Contract administrators.

(x) Project support specialists.

(xi) Financial Specialists.

(B) The extent to which any of the positions set forth in subparagraph (A) rely on or are performed by private entities.

(C) The extent to which accounting and fund control programs and offices of the Department of State, including the NDF Comptroller, have the necessary information technology and oversight tools to ensure that NDF funds are used in an efficient and accountable manner.

(D) Whether NDF has adequate internal audit capabilities.

(c) Subsequent assessments.—Each subsequent assessment under subsection (a) shall include only the matters addressed under paragraphs (2), (3), (4), (5), and (6) of subsection (b).

SEC. 328. Reports on 2010 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference.

(a) Report on comprehensive objectives, strategy, and policies.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than October 31, 2009, the President shall submit to Congress a report, in classified and unclassified forms, that details the comprehensive objectives, strategy, and policies of the United States regarding the 2010 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference.

(2) CONTENT.—The report required under paragraph (1) shall describe—

(A) overall changes or revisions to the international nuclear nonproliferation framework, including the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, that may be needed to realize a more robust and effective global nuclear nonproliferation system;

(B) the spread of sensitive nuclear technologies, in particular uranium enrichment and nuclear fuel reprocessing;

(C) country-specific nuclear proliferation concerns;

(D) efforts to uphold Article IV commitments on peaceful nuclear use, including the establishment of a nuclear fuel bank or authority;

(E) accelerated implementation of obligations and commitments under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty or pursuant to resolutions supported by the United States and adopted at previous Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conferences for the purpose of reducing the world's stockpiles of nuclear weapons and weapons-grade fissile material;

(F) nuclear and other nonproliferation initiatives such as the Proliferation Security Initiative;

(G) the United States assessment of the objectives and strategies of other states with regard to the 2010 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, including the Nuclear Weapons States under the Treaty, members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, and leading States Parties associated with the Non-Aligned Movement; and

(H) the United States diplomatic strategy leading up to the Conference to build and strengthen the international consensus regarding United States objectives.

(b) Report on outcomes of conference.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 60 days after the conclusion of the 2010 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, the President shall submit to Congress a report, in classified and unclassified forms, regarding the outcomes of the Conference.

(2) CONTENT.—The report required under paragraph (1) shall provide an assessment of the overall outcome of the Conference as well as United States consultations and negotiations and outcomes regarding the items listed in subsection (a)(2).

SEC. 401. Short title.

This title may be cited as the “Nuclear Safeguards and Supply Act of 2008”.

SEC. 402. Appropriate congressional committees defined.

In this title, the term “appropriate congressional committees” means the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.

SEC. 411. Findings.

Congress makes the following findings:

(1) The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are indispensable to international peace and security.

(2) Congress has long supported efforts aimed at effective and efficient assurances of nuclear fuel supply, the strengthening of IAEA safeguards, and assistance to the developing world for nuclear and non-nuclear energy sources, as embodied in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (22 U.S.C. 3201 et seq.).

(3) The February 22, 2005, Report of the IAEA Experts Group on Multilateral Approaches to the Nuclear Fuel Cycle found that, in addition to increased verification activities in various nations such as Iran, another factor contributing to significant and troubling demands on the IAEA safeguards system was that “the civilian nuclear industry appears to be poised for worldwide expansion” and that “[r]apidly growing global demand for electricity, the uncertainty of supply and price of natural gas, soaring prices for oil, concerns about air pollution and the immense challenge of lowering greenhouse gas emissions, are all forcing a fresh look at nuclear power. As the technical and organizational foundations of nuclear safety improve, there is increasing confidence in the safety of nuclear power plants. In light of existing, new and reawakened interest in many regions of the world, the prospect of new nuclear power stations on a large scale is therefore real. A greater number of States will consider developing their own fuel cycle facilities and nuclear know-how, and will seek assurances of supply in materials, services and technologies.”

(4) The same report also found, “Two primary deciding factors dominate all assessments of multilateral nuclear approaches namely ‘Assurance of non-proliferation’ and ‘Assurance of supply and services’. Both are recognised overall objectives for governments and for the NPT community. In practice, each of these two objectives can seldom be achieved fully on its own. History has shown that it is even more difficult to find an optimum arrangement that will satisfy both objectives at the same time. As a matter of fact, multilateral approaches could be a way to satisfy both objectives.”

(5) The same report also found, “The non-proliferation value of a multilateral arrangement is measured by the various proliferation risks associated with a nuclear facility, whether national or multilateral. These risks include the diversion of materials from [a multilateral nuclear approach or MNA] (reduced through the presence of a multinational team), the theft of fissile materials, the diffusion of proscribed or sensitive technologies from MNAs to unauthorized entities, the development of clandestine parallel programmes and the breakout scenario. The latter refers to the case of the host country ‘breaking out’, for example, by expelling multinational staff, withdrawing from the NPT (and thereby terminating its safeguards agreement), and operating the multilateral facility without international control.”

(6) The 2004 Report of the United Nations Secretary-General's High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change found that creating incentives for countries to forego the development of domestic uranium enrichment and reprocessing facilities is essential, and that such suggestions, if implemented swiftly and firmly, offer a real chance to reduce the risk of a nuclear attack, whether by states or non-state actors, and that such proposals “should be put into effect without delay”.

(7) On February 11, 2004, President George W. Bush stated, “The world's leading nuclear exporters should ensure that states have reliable access at reasonable cost to fuel for civilian reactors, so long as those states renounce enrichment and reprocessing. Enrichment and reprocessing are not necessary for nations seeking to harness nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.”

(8) According to some experts, global energy demand will grow by 50 percent in the next 20 years, predominantly in the developing world.

(9) Nuclear power may play an increasing role in electricity supply to both the developed and the developing world over the next several decades.

(10) The Government Accountability Office (GAO) stated in testimony before Congress in September 2006 that a significant factor limiting the effectiveness of the current IAEA safeguards system is that “more than half, or 111 out of 189, of the NPT signatories have not yet brought the Additional Protocol into force, including the United States”.

(11) The GAO also testified that an additional “weakness in implementing strengthened safeguards is that safeguards are significantly limited or not applied in about 60 percent, or 112 out of 189, of the NPT signatory countries—either because they have an agreement (known as a small quantities protocol) with IAEA, and are not subject to most safeguards measures, or because they have not concluded a comprehensive safeguards agreement with IAEA”.

(12) The GAO also testified that “while IAEA is increasingly relying on the analytical skills of its staff to detect countries’ undeclared nuclear activities, the agency is facing a looming human capital crisis. In the next 5 years, IAEA will experience a large turnover of senior safeguards inspectors and high-level management officials. Delays in filling critical safeguards positions limit IAEA’s ability to implement strengthened safeguards.”

(13) Outdated and unnecessary staff restrictions have prevented the IAEA from maintaining and equipping a well-trained cadre of professional staff at the IAEA’s Safeguards Analytical Laboratory (SAL), located at Seibersdorf, Austria.

(14) A goal of the Department of State’s budget request for fiscal year 2007 for United States voluntary contributions to the IAEA was “[s]trengthening quality control and sensitivity of analyses by the Safeguards Analytical Laboratory (SAL) and the Network of Analytical Laboratories, and reviewing needs for possible refurbishment or replacement of SAL”.

(15) Considerable investment is needed for SAL to meet future IAEA requirements as its workload is growing, the laboratory’s infrastructure is aging, and IAEA requirements have become more demanding, and while initial plans have been made for laboratory enhancement and are currently pending budgetary approval (sometime in 2009), the simple fact is that, as more countries implement IAEA safeguards, many more nuclear samples come to SAL for analysis.

(16) Any proposals for the creation of bilateral or multilateral assurances of supply mechanisms must take into account, and be achieved in a manner that minimizes, the risk of nuclear proliferation or regional arms races and maximizes adherence to international nonproliferation regimes, including, in particular, the Guidelines of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), and the IAEA Additional Protocol.

(17) Any proposal to create an assurance of supply mechanism in or with a certain country or group of countries should not result in decreased emphasis on existing nuclear safeguards verification efforts and compliance challenges.

(18) The existing funding, planning, and execution of IAEA safeguards is not sufficient to meet the predicted growth in the future of civilian nuclear power, and therefore any growth in civilian nuclear power must be evaluated against the challenges it poses to verification of the assurances of peace and security provided by the IAEA safeguards system.

(19) The existing IAEA safeguards system, and the Additional Protocol and the Guidelines of the NSG, represent the current, minimum standards for controlling access to and trade in civilian nuclear technology and should continue to be improved, expanded, and strengthened.

SEC. 412. Declaration of policy.

(a) Continuation of existing policy.—It shall remain the policy of the United States—

(1) to create mechanisms to provide adequate supplies of nuclear fuel consistent with the provisions of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (22 U.S.C. 3201 et seq.), in particular title I of such Act (22 U.S.C. 3221 et seq.);

(2) to strengthen the IAEA safeguards system consistent with the provisions of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (22 U.S.C. 3201 et seq.), in particular title II of such Act (22 U.S.C. 3241 et seq.); and

(3) to cooperate with other nations, international institutions, and private organizations to assist in the development of non-nuclear energy resources under title V of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (22 U.S.C. 3261 et seq.).

(b) Declaration of new policy.—It shall be the policy of the United States to discourage the development of enrichment and reprocessing capabilities in additional countries, encourage the creation of bilateral and multilateral assurances of nuclear fuel supply, and ensure that all supply mechanisms operate in strict accordance with the IAEA safeguards system and do not result in any additional unmet verification burdens for the system.

SEC. 413. Safeguards Analytical Laboratory.

(a) Authorization of appropriations.—In addition to the amount requested by the President for United States Voluntary Contributions to the IAEA for Fiscal Year 2009, an additional $10,000,000 is authorized to be appropriated under this Act for the refurbishment or possible replacement of the IAEA Safeguards Analytical Laboratory.

(b) Report.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the refurbishment or possible replacement of the IAEA Safeguards Analytical Laboratory pursuant to subsection (a).

SEC. 414. Safeguards technology development program.

The Secretary of State is authorized, in cooperation with the Secretary of Energy and the Directors of the National Laboratories and in consultation with the Secretary of Defense and the Director of National Intelligence, to pursue a program—

(1) to strengthen technical safeguards research and development;

(2) to increase resources, identify near-term technology goals, formulate a technology roadmap, and improve interagency coordination on safeguards technology; and

(3) to examine proliferation resistance in design and development of all future nuclear energy systems.

SEC. 415. Safeguards Cadre Program.

(a) In general.—The Secretary of State, in cooperation with the Secretary of Energy and the Directors of the United States Department of Energy National Laboratories and Technology Centers (in this title referred to as the “Directors of the National Laboratories”), is authorized to develop, in accordance with section 3343 of title 5, United States Code, a program to create a dedicated cadre of professionals assigned to the task of promoting, strengthening, and providing technical assistance to the IAEA safeguards system.

(b) Content.—The program authorized under subsection (a) shall ensure that—

(1) necessary incentives are in place to ensure that any United States persons serving within the IAEA are not professionally disadvantaged by such service when returning to the Federal workforce;

(2) high priority is placed on safeguards positions within the IAEA by the United States;

(3) budget authority is provided to train and retain those personnel designated to be a part of the safeguards cadre program; and

(4) safeguards professionals retain appropriate security clearances during any work they undertake while serving in the IAEA safeguards system.

SEC. 421. Authority for bilateral and multilateral nuclear fuel supply mechanisms.

(a) In general.—The President is authorized to create, consistent with title I of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (22 U.S.C. 3221 et seq.), and other applicable provisions of law, bilateral and multilateral mechanisms to provide a reliable supply of nuclear fuel to those countries and groups of countries that adhere to policies designed to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and that decide to forgo a national uranium enrichment program and spent nuclear fuel reprocessing facilities.

(b) Purpose of mechanisms.—The mechanisms authorized under subsection (a) shall, to the maximum extent practicable, take into account the following:

(1) The economic rationale for a country or countries pursuing nuclear power, including existing sources of power for such country or countries.

(2) Whether such country or countries are in compliance with their obligations under applicable safeguards agreements and additional protocols with the IAEA.

(3) Whether or not the development in such country or countries of the complete nuclear fuel cycle would impose new, costly IAEA safeguards measures that cannot be supported by current IAEA safeguards implementation in such country or countries, such that there is a reasonable assurance that all nuclear materials in such country or countries are for peaceful purposes and that there are no undeclared nuclear materials or activities in such country or countries.

(4) An evaluation of the proliferation dangers of such country or countries developing nuclear fuel cycle facilities for the production and disposition of source and special nuclear materials.

(5) Whether or not the country or countries that would be recipients of nuclear fuel or other assistance provided by the United States are or have ever been designated as state sponsors of terrorism pursuant to section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2371), section 40 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2780), or section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act (50 U.S.C. App. 2405(j)).

(6) If done under a bilateral supply mechanism, whether IAEA safeguards are being applied or will be applied to any facility, site, or location where international nuclear fuel supply activities are to be carried out.

(7) Whether, in the case of a multilateral supply mechanism, procedures are in place to ensure that when United States funds are used or when United States nuclear materials are to be used, exported, or reexported, all applicable provisions of United States law are followed.

(8) Whether the recipient country or countries of any fuel provided under this Act are or will become a party, prior to the commencement of any nuclear fuel supply under this Act, to—

(A) the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty;

(B) in the case of a non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, a comprehensive safeguards agreement that is in force, pursuant to which the IAEA has the right and obligation to ensure that safeguards are applied, in accordance with the terms of the agreement, on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such country, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;

(C) an additional protocol;

(D) the Convention on Nuclear Safety, done at Vienna September 20, 1994, and entered into force October 24, 1996;

(E) the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials, done at Vienna October 26, 1979, and entered into force February 8, 1987; and

(F) the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage, done at Vienna September 12, 1997.

(9) The extent to which the recipient country or countries have or will have prior to the commencement of any nuclear fuel supply under this Act effective and enforceable export controls regarding nuclear and dual-use nuclear technology and other sensitive materials comparable to those maintained by the United States.

(10) The conformity of the safety and regulatory regimes in the recipient country or countries regarding the nuclear power sector with similar United States laws and regulations.

(11) The history of safety or environmental problems associated with any nuclear site, facility, or location in the recipient country or countries in the past, and the potential for future safety or environmental problems or issues in connection with the civilian nuclear power development plan of the country or countries.

(12) Whether the recipient country or countries have resident within them any persons or entities involved in the illicit trafficking of nuclear weapons, nuclear materials, or dual-use nuclear technology.

(13) Whether the recipient country or countries have or will have sufficiently open and transparent civilian power markets such that United States firms may benefit from any such bilateral or multilateral supply mechanisms.

(c) Rule of construction.—Nothing in this Act shall be construed to provide any authority with respect to bilateral cooperation with another country or countries or any international organization or organizations in atomic energy that is additional to the authority provided under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq.) and all other applicable laws and regulations in effect on the date of the enactment of this Act.

SEC. 422. Report on the establishment of an international fuel authority.

(a) Report required.—Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report detailing the feasibility of establishing an International Nuclear Fuel Authority (INFA) as called for in section 104 (a)(1) of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (22 U.S.C. 3223(a)(1)).

(b) Content.—Without regard to any previous reports submitted under section 104 (a)(1) of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (22 U.S.C. 3223), the report required under subsection (a) shall evaluate, with respect to the feasibility of the establishment of the International Nuclear Fuel Authority, the following:

(1) United States laws and regulations that could be affected by the establishment of an INFA.

(2) What the cost to the United States Government could be of establishing an INFA.

(3) Potential locations for the INFA.

(4) The potential for creating a fuel supply bank under the control of the INFA.

(5) Nuclear materials that should be placed within the control of the INFA, including which nuclear activities should be carried out by the INFA for the production of nuclear fuel or for use as fuel.

(6) Whether the INFA should provide nuclear fuel services to recipient countries.

(7) Whether a multilateral supply mechanism, such as the INFA, is, in the judgment of the President, superior to bilateral mechanism for nuclear fuel supply.

(8) How such an international organization should operate to preserve freedom of markets in nuclear fuel and avoid undue interference in the efficient operation of the international nuclear fuel market.

(9) The degree and extent to which such a multilateral supply mechanism should be under the control of, or a subordinate organization within, the IAEA, including whether establishing such an INFA would be superior or preferable to allowing the IAEA, pursuant to Article IX of the Statute of the IAEA, to become an international broker of nuclear fuel and nuclear fuel services, including with respect to an examination of the costs to IAEA Member States of effectively carrying out clauses (1) through (4) of paragraph (H) of such Article.

(10) The likely receptivity of the major countries involved in the supply of nuclear fuel and nuclear services to the creation of a multilateral supply mechanism such as the INFA or one under the IAEA.

SEC. 423. Sense of the Senate on IAEA fuel supply.

It is the sense of the Senate that—

(1) consistent with the long-standing support provided by Congress for the nuclear verification and technical cooperation projects of the IAEA, and with a view toward effective verification of safeguards and a desire to ensure that the expansion of nuclear power remains only for peaceful purposes, the United States should support, either in annual voluntary and off-budget contributions to the IAEA, or in the provision of nuclear fuel to the IAEA, a nuclear fuel bank within the IAEA;

(2) the Senate commends the President for the September 26, 2005, announcement at the 49th Session of the General Conference of the IAEA that the United States will reserve up to 17 metric tons of highly enriched uranium for an IAEA verifiable assured supply arrangement;

(3) the Senate commends the efforts of the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) to contribute $50,000,000 to the IAEA to help create a low enriched uranium stockpile owned and managed by the IAEA; and

(4) a combination of public and private efforts, including the provisions of law previously enacted in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (22 U.S.C. 3201 et seq.) and other applicable laws, initiatives supported by the President, efforts provided for by private groups, and the recommendations of many relevant studies, such as those cited in section 101, will be necessary to effectively and flexibly manage the growth of civilian nuclear power in a manner that does not result in undue burdens on the IAEA safeguards system.

SEC. 501. Short title.

This title may be cited as the “Global Pathogen Surveillance Act of 2008”.

SEC. 502. Findings; purpose.

(a) Findings.—Congress makes the following findings:

(1) The frequency of the occurrence of biological events that could threaten the national security of the United States has increased and is likely increasing. The threat to the United States from such events includes threats from diseases that infect humans, animals, or plants regardless of if such diseases are introduced naturally, accidentally, or intentionally.

(2) Bioterrorism poses a grave national security threat to the United States. The insidious nature of a bioterrorist attack, the likelihood that the recognition of such an attack would be delayed, and the underpreparedness of the domestic public health infrastructure to respond to such an attack could result in catastrophic consequences following a biological weapons attack against the United States.

(3) The ability to recognize that a country or organization is carrying out a covert biological weapons programs is dependent on a number of indications and warnings. A critical component of this recognition is the timely detection of sentinel events such as community-level outbreaks that could be the earliest indication of an emerging bioterrorist program in a foreign country. Early detection of such events may enable earlier counterproliferation intervention.

(4) A contagious pathogen engineered as a biological weapon and developed, tested, produced, or released in a foreign country could quickly spread to the United States. Considering the realities of international travel, trade, and migration patterns, a dangerous pathogen appearing naturally, accidentally, or intentionally anywhere in the world can spread to the United States in a matter of days, before any effective quarantine or isolation measures could be implemented.

(5) To combat bioterrorism effectively and ensure that the United States is fully prepared to prevent, recognize, and contain a biological weapons attack or emerging infectious disease, measures to strengthen the domestic public health infrastructure and improve domestic event detection, surveillance, and response, while absolutely essential, are not sufficient.

(6) The United States should enhance cooperation with the World Health Organization, regional international health organizations, and individual countries, including data sharing with appropriate agencies and departments of the United States, to help detect and quickly contain infectious disease outbreaks or a bioterrorism agent before such a disease or agent is spread.

(7) The World Health Organization has done an impressive job in monitoring infectious disease outbreaks around the world, notably in the April 2000 establishment and subsequent operation of the Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network.

(8) The capabilities of the World Health Organization depend on the timeliness and quality of the data and information the Organization receives from the countries that are members of the Organization, pursuant to the 2005 revision of the International Health Regulations. Developing countries, in particular, often lack the necessary resources to build and maintain effective public health infrastructures.

(9) Developing countries could benefit from—

(A) better trained public health professionals and epidemiologists to recognize disease patterns;

(B) appropriate laboratory equipment for diagnosis of pathogens;

(C) disease reporting systems that—

(i) are based on disease and syndrome surveillance; and

(ii) could enable an effective response to a biological event to begin at the earliest possible opportunity;

(D) a narrowing of the existing technology gap in disease and syndrome surveillance capabilities, based on reported symptoms, and real-time information dissemination to public health officials; and

(E) appropriate communications equipment and information technology to efficiently transmit information and data within national, international regional, and international health networks, including inexpensive, Internet-based geographic information systems and relevant telephone-based systems for early recognition and diagnosis of diseases.

(10) An effective international capability to detect, monitor, and quickly diagnose infectious disease outbreaks will offer dividends not only in the event of biological weapons development, testing, production, and attack, but also in the more likely cases of naturally occurring infectious disease outbreaks that could threaten the United States. Furthermore, a robust surveillance system will serve to deter or contain terrorist use of biological weapons, mitigating the intended effects of such malevolent uses.

(b) Purposes.—The purposes of this title are as follows:

(1) To enhance the capability of the international community, through international health organizations and individual countries, to detect, identify, and contain infectious disease outbreaks, whether the cause of those outbreaks is intentional human action or natural in origin.

(2) To enhance the training of public health professionals and epidemiologists from eligible developing countries in advanced Internet-based disease and syndrome surveillance systems, in addition to traditional epidemiology methods, so that such professionals and epidemiologists may better detect, diagnose, and contain infectious disease outbreaks, especially such outbreaks caused by the pathogens that may be likely to be used in a biological weapons attack.

(3) To provide assistance to eligible developing countries to purchase appropriate communications equipment and information technology to detect, analyze, and report biological threats, including—

(A) relevant computer equipment, Internet connectivity mechanisms, and telephone-based applications to effectively gather, analyze, and transmit public health information for infectious disease surveillance and diagnosis; and

(B) appropriate computer equipment and Internet connectivity mechanisms—

(i) to facilitate the exchange of Geographic Information Systems-based disease and syndrome surveillance information; and

(ii) to effectively gather, analyze, and transmit public health information for infectious disease surveillance and diagnosis.

(4) To make available greater numbers of public health professionals who are employed by the Government of the United States to international regional and international health organizations, international regional and international health networks, and United States diplomatic missions, as appropriate.

(5) To expand the training and outreach activities of United States laboratories located in foreign countries, including the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention or Department of Defense laboratories, to enhance the public health capabilities of developing countries.

(6) To provide appropriate technical assistance to existing international regional and international health networks and, as appropriate, seed money for new international regional and international networks.

SEC. 503. Definitions.

In this title:

(1) ELIGIBLE DEVELOPING COUNTRY.—The term “eligible developing country” means any developing country that—

(A) has agreed to the objective of fully complying with requirements of the World Health Organization on reporting public health information on outbreaks of infectious diseases;

(B) has not been determined by the Secretary, for purposes of section 40 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2780), section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2371), or section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (as in effect pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act; 50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.), to have repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism, unless the Secretary exercises a waiver certifying that it is in the national interest of the United States to provide assistance under the provisions of this title; and

(C) is a party to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, done at Washington, London, and Moscow April 10, 1972 (26 UST 583).

(2) ELIGIBLE NATIONAL.—The term “eligible national” means any citizen or national of an eligible developing country who—

(A) does not have a criminal background;

(B) is not on any immigration or other United States watch list; and

(C) is not affiliated with any foreign terrorist organization.

(3) INTERNATIONAL HEALTH ORGANIZATION.—The term “international health organization” includes the World Health Organization, regional offices of the World Health Organization, and such similar international organizations as the Pan American Health Organization.

(4) LABORATORY.—The term “laboratory” means a facility for the biological, microbiological, serological, chemical, immunohematological, hematological, biophysical, cytological, pathological, or other medical examination of materials derived from the human body for the purpose of providing information for the diagnosis, prevention, or treatment of any disease or impairment of, or the assessment of the health of, human beings.

(5) SECRETARY.—Unless otherwise provided, the term “Secretary” means the Secretary of State.

(6) DISEASE AND SYNDROME SURVEILLANCE.—The term “disease and syndrome surveillance” means the recording of clinician-reported symptoms (patient complaints) and signs (derived from physical examination and laboratory data) combined with simple geographic locators to track the emergence of a disease in a population.

SEC. 504. Eligibility for assistance.

(a) In general.—Except as provided in subsection (b), assistance may be provided to an eligible developing country under any provision of this title only if the government of the eligible developing country—

(1) permits personnel from the World Health Organization and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention to investigate outbreaks of infectious diseases within the borders of such country; and

(2) provides pathogen surveillance data to the appropriate agencies and departments of the United States and to international health organizations.

(b) Waiver.—The Secretary may waive the prohibition set out in subsection (a) if the Secretary determines that it is in the national interest of the United States to provide such a waiver.

(c) Prior notice of waivers.—A waiver pursuant to subsection (b) may not be executed until 15 days after the Secretary provides to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives written notice of the intent to issue such waiver and the reasons for doing so.

SEC. 505. Restriction.

(a) In general.—Notwithstanding any other provision of this title, no foreign national participating in a program authorized under this title shall have access, during the course of such participation, to a select agent or toxin described in section 73.4 of title 42, Code of Federal Regulations (or any corresponding similar regulation) or an overlap select agent or toxin described in section 73.5 of such title (or any corresponding similar regulation) that may be used as, or in, a biological weapon, except in a supervised and controlled setting.

(b) Relationship to regulations.—The restriction set out in subsection (a) may not be construed to limit the ability of the Secretary of Health and Human Services to prescribe, through regulation, standards for the handling of a select agent or toxin or an overlap select agent or toxin described in such subsection.

SEC. 506. Fellowship program.

(a) Establishment.—There is established a fellowship program under which the Secretary, in consultation with the Secretary of Health and Human Services and the Secretary of Homeland Security and subject to the availability of appropriations, shall award fellowships to eligible nationals to pursue public health education or training, as follows:

(1) MASTER OF PUBLIC HEALTH DEGREE.—Graduate courses of study leading to a master of public health degree with a concentration in epidemiology from an institution of higher education in the United States with a Center for Public Health Preparedness, as determined by the Director of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.

(2) ADVANCED PUBLIC HEALTH EPIDEMIOLOGY TRAINING.—Advanced public health training in epidemiology for public health professionals from eligible developing countries to be carried out at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, an appropriate facility of a State, or an appropriate facility of another agency or department of the United States (other than a facility of the Department of Defense or a national laboratory of the Department of Energy) for a period of not less than 6 months or more than 12 months.

(b) Specialization in bioterrorism.—In addition to the education or training specified in subsection (a), each recipient of a fellowship under this section (in this section referred to as a “fellow”) may take courses of study at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention or at an equivalent facility on diagnosis and containment of likely bioterrorism agents.

(c) Fellowship agreement.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—A fellow shall enter into an agreement with the Secretary under which the fellow agrees—

(A) to maintain satisfactory academic progress, as determined in accordance with regulations issued by the Secretary and confirmed in regularly scheduled updates to the Secretary from the institution providing the education or training on the progress of the fellow’s education or training;

(B) upon completion of such education or training, to return to the fellow’s country of nationality or last habitual residence (so long as it is an eligible developing country) and complete at least 4 years of employment in a public health position in the government or a nongovernmental, not-for-profit entity in that country or, with the approval of the Secretary, complete part or all of this requirement through service with an international health organization without geographic restriction; and

(C) that, if the fellow is unable to meet the requirements described in subparagraph (A) or (B), the fellow shall reimburse the United States for the value of the assistance provided to the fellow under the fellowship program, together with interest at a rate that—

(i) is determined in accordance with regulations issued by the Secretary; and

(ii) is not higher than the rate generally applied in connection with other Federal loans.

(2) WAIVERS.—The Secretary may waive the application of subparagraph (B) or (C) of paragraph (1) on a case by case basis if the Secretary determines that—

(A) it is in the national interest of the United States to provide such a waiver; or

(B) humanitarian considerations require such a waiver.

(d) Agreement.—The Secretary, in consultation with the Secretary of Health and Human Services and the Secretary of Homeland Security, is authorized to enter into an agreement with the government of an eligible developing country under which such government agrees—

(1) to establish a procedure for the nomination of eligible nationals for fellowships under this section;

(2) to guarantee that a fellow will be offered a professional public health position within the developing country upon completion of the fellow’s studies; and

(3) to submit to the Secretary a certification stating that a fellow has concluded the minimum period of employment in a public health position required by the fellowship agreement, including an explanation of how the requirement was met.

(e) Participation of United States citizens.—On a case-by-case basis, the Secretary may provide for the participation of a citizen of the United States in the fellowship program under the provisions of this section if—

(1) the Secretary determines that it is in the national interest of the United States to provide for such participation; and

(2) the citizen of the United States agrees to complete, at the conclusion of such participation, at least 5 years of employment in a public health position in an eligible developing country or at an international health organization.

(f) Use of existing programs.—The Secretary, with the concurrence of the Secretary of Health and Human Services, may elect to use existing programs of the Department of Health and Human Services to provide the education and training described in subsection (a) if the requirements of subsections (b), (c), and (d) will be substantially met under such existing programs.

SEC. 507. In-country training in laboratory techniques and disease and syndrome surveillance.

(a) Laboratory techniques.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary, after consultation with the Secretary of Health and Human Services, the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of Homeland Security and in conjunction with elements of those departments that engage in activities of this type overseas, and subject to the availability of appropriations, shall provide assistance for short training courses for eligible nationals who are laboratory technicians or other public health personnel in laboratory techniques relating to the identification, diagnosis, and tracking of pathogens responsible for possible infectious disease outbreaks.

(2) LOCATION.—The training described in paragraph (1) shall be held outside the United States and may be conducted in facilities of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention located in foreign countries or in Overseas Medical Research Units of the Department of Defense, as appropriate.

(3) COORDINATION WITH EXISTING PROGRAMS.—The Secretary shall coordinate the training described in paragraph (1), where appropriate, with existing programs and activities of international health organizations.

(b) Disease and syndrome surveillance.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary, after consultation with the Secretary of Health and Human Services, the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of Homeland Security and in conjunction with elements of those departments that engage in activities of this type overseas, and subject to the availability of appropriations, shall establish and provide assistance for short training courses for eligible nationals who are health care providers or other public health personnel in techniques of disease and syndrome surveillance reporting and rapid analysis of syndrome information using geographic information system tools.

(2) LOCATION.—The training described in paragraph (1) shall be conducted via the Internet or in appropriate facilities located in a foreign country, as determined by the Secretary.

(3) COORDINATION WITH EXISTING PROGRAMS.—The Secretary shall coordinate the training described in paragraph (1), where appropriate, with existing programs and activities of international regional and international health organizations.

SEC. 508. Assistance for the purchase and maintenance of public health laboratory equipment and supplies.

(a) Authorization.—The President is authorized to provide, on such terms and conditions as the President may determine, assistance to eligible developing countries to purchase and maintain the public health laboratory equipment and supplies described in subsection (b).

(b) Equipment and supplies covered.—The equipment and supplies described in this subsection are equipment and supplies that are—

(1) appropriate, to the extent possible, for use in the intended geographic area;

(2) necessary to collect, analyze, and identify expeditiously a broad array of pathogens, including mutant strains, which may cause disease outbreaks or may be used in a biological weapon;

(3) compatible with general standards set forth by the World Health Organization and, as appropriate, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, to ensure interoperability with international regional and international public health networks; and

(4) not defense articles, defense services, or training, as such terms are defined in the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.).

(c) Rule of construction.—Nothing in this section shall be construed to exempt the exporting of goods and technology from compliance with applicable provisions of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (as in effect pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act; 50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.).

(d) Limitation.—Amounts appropriated to carry out this section shall not be made available for the purchase from a foreign country of equipment or supplies that, if made in the United States, would be subject to the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.) or likely be barred or subject to special conditions under the Export Administration Act of 1979 (as in effect pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act; 50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.).

(e) Procurement preference.—In the use of grant funds authorized under subsection (a), preference should be given to the purchase of equipment and supplies of United States manufacture. The use of amounts appropriated to carry out this section shall be subject to section 604 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2354).

(f) Country commitments.—The assistance provided under this section for equipment and supplies may be provided only if the eligible developing country that receives such equipment and supplies agrees to provide the infrastructure, technical personnel, and other resources required to house, maintain, support, secure, and maximize use of such equipment and supplies.

SEC. 509. Assistance for improved communication of public health information.

(a) Assistance for purchase of communication equipment and information technology.—The President is authorized to provide, on such terms and conditions as the President may determine, assistance to eligible developing countries to purchase and maintain the communications equipment and information technology described in subsection (b), and the supporting equipment, necessary to effectively collect, analyze, and transmit public health information.

(b) Covered equipment.—The communications equipment and information technology described in this subsection are communications equipment and information technology that—

(1) are suitable for use under the particular conditions of the area of intended use;

(2) meet the standards set forth by the World Health Organization and, as appropriate, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, to ensure interoperability with like equipment of other countries and international organizations; and

(3) are not defense articles, defense services, or training, as those terms are defined in the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.).

(c) Rule of construction.—Nothing in this section shall be construed to exempt the exporting of goods and technology from compliance with applicable provisions of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (as in effect pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act; 50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.).

(d) Limitation.—Amounts appropriated to carry out this section shall not be made available for the purchase from a foreign country of communications equipment or information technology that, if made in the United States, would be subject to the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.) or likely be barred or subject to special conditions under the Export Administration Act of 1979 (as in effect pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act; 50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.).

(e) Procurement preference.—In the use of grant funds under subsection (a), preference should be given to the purchase of communications equipment and information technology of United States manufacture. The use of amounts appropriated to carry out this section shall be subject to section 604 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2354).

(f) Assistance for standardization of reporting.—The President is authorized to provide, on such terms and conditions as the President may determine, technical assistance and grant assistance to international health organizations to facilitate standardization in the reporting of public health information between and among developing countries and international health organizations.

(g) Country commitments.—The assistance provided under this section for communications equipment and information technology may be provided only if the eligible developing country that receives such equipment and technology agrees to provide the infrastructure, technical personnel, and other resources required to house, maintain, support, secure, and maximize use of such equipment and technology.

SEC. 510. Assignment of public health personnel to United States missions and international organizations.

(a) In general.—Upon the request of the chief of a diplomatic mission of the United States or of the head of an international regional or international health organization, and with the concurrence of the Secretary and of the employee concerned, the head of an agency or department of the United States may assign to the mission or the organization any officer or employee of the agency or department that occupies a public health position within the agency or department for the purpose of enhancing disease and pathogen surveillance efforts in developing countries.

(b) Reimbursement.—The costs incurred by an agency or department of the United States by reason of the detail of personnel under subsection (a) may be reimbursed to that agency or department out of the applicable appropriations account of the Department of State if the Secretary determines that the agency or department may otherwise be unable to assign such personnel on a non-reimbursable basis.

SEC. 511. Expansion of certain United States Government laboratories abroad.

(a) In general.—Subject to the availability of appropriations and with the concurrence of the government of each host country, the Director of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and the Secretary of Defense shall each—

(1) increase the number of personnel assigned to laboratories of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention or the Department of Defense, as appropriate, located in eligible developing countries that conduct research and other activities with respect to infectious diseases; and

(2) expand the operations of such laboratories, especially with respect to the implementation of on-site training of foreign nationals and activities affecting the region in which the country is located.

(b) Cooperation and coordination between laboratories.—Subsection (a) shall be carried out in such a manner as to foster cooperation and avoid duplication between and among laboratories.

(c) Relation to core missions and security.—The expansion of the operations of the laboratories of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention or the Department of Defense located in foreign countries under this section may not—

(1) detract from the established core missions of the laboratories; or

(2) compromise the security of those laboratories, as well as their research, equipment, expertise, and materials.

SEC. 512. Assistance for international health networks and expansion of Field Epidemiology Training Programs.

(a) Authority.—The President is authorized, on such terms and conditions as the President may determine, to provide assistance for the purposes of—

(1) enhancing the surveillance and reporting capabilities of the World Health Organization and existing international regional and international health networks; and

(2) developing new international regional and international health networks.

(b) Expansion of Field Epidemiology Training Programs.—The Secretary of Health and Human Services is authorized to establish new country or regional international Field Epidemiology Training Programs in eligible developing countries, with the concurrence of the government of each host country.

SEC. 513. Reports.

Not later than 90 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary, in conjunction with the Secretary of Health and Human Services, the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of Homeland Security, shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives a report on the implementation of programs under this title, including an estimate of the level of funding required to carry out such programs at a sufficient level.

SEC. 514. Authorization of appropriations.

(a) Authorization of appropriations.—Subject to subsection (c), there are authorized to be appropriated for the purpose of carrying out activities under this title the following amounts:

(1) $40,000,000 for fiscal year 2009.

(2) $75,000,000 for fiscal year 2010.

(b) Availability of funds.—The amounts appropriated pursuant to subsection (a) are authorized to remain available until expended.

(c) Limitation on obligation of funds.—Not more than 10 percent of the amount appropriated pursuant to subsection (a)(1) may be obligated before the date on which a report is submitted, or required to be submitted, whichever first occurs, under section 513.

SEC. 601. Short title.

This title may be cited as the “International Space Station Payments Act of 2008”.

SEC. 602. Authority to make certain extraordinary payments in connection with the International Space Station.

Section 7(1)(B) of the Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act (Public Law 106–178; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended—

(1) by striking “except that such term does not mean payments” and inserting the following: “except that such term does not mean—

“(i) payments”;

(2) by striking “or contract related thereto.” and inserting “or contract related thereto; or”; and

(3) by adding at the end the following new clause:

    “(ii) payments in cash or in kind made or to be made by the United States Government between January 1, 2012, and reentry into Earth’s atmosphere of the International Space Station at its end of life, for work to be performed or services to be rendered during that period necessary to meet United States obligations under the Agreement Concerning Cooperation on the Civil International Space Station, with annex, signed at Washington January 29, 1998, and entered into force March 27, 2001, or any protocol, agreement, memorandum of understanding, or contract related thereto, except that this clause does not allow for payments in cash or in kind to be made by the United States Government for—

    “(I) any cargo services provided by a Progress vehicle; or

    “(II) any crew transportation or rescue services provided by a Soyuz vehicle after—

    “(aa) the Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle reaches full operational capability; or

    “(bb) a United States commercial provider of crew transportation and rescue services demonstrates the capability to meet mission requirements of the International Space Station.”.


Calendar No. 1074

110th CONGRESS
     2d Session
S. 3563
[Report No. 110–496]

A BILL
To authorize appropriations under the Arms Export Control Act and the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 for security assistance for fiscal years 2009 and 2010, and for other purposes.

September 24 (legislative day, September 17), 2008
Read twice and placed on the calendar
Share This