H.R.2861 - Shareholder Empowerment Act of 2009111th Congress (2009-2010)
|Sponsor:||Rep. Peters, Gary C. [D-MI-9] (Introduced 06/12/2009)|
|Committees:||House - Financial Services|
|Latest Action:||House - 06/12/2009 Referred to the House Committee on Financial Services. (All Actions)|
This bill has the status Introduced
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Summary: H.R.2861 — 111th Congress (2009-2010)All Information (Except Text)
Introduced in House (06/12/2009)
Shareholder Empowerment Act of 2009 - Amends the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to direct the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to prohibit national securities exchanges and associations from listing the securities of any issuer unless, to the extent permitted by state law, such issuer requires: (1) the election of directors who receive the majority of votes in uncontested elections or a plurality of votes in contested elections; and (2) directors who are not reelected to offer to tender their resignations.
Directs the SEC to: (1) require issuers to identify and provide security holders with an opportunity to vote on director candidates who have been nominated by holders of at least 1% of the issuer's voting securities for at least two years, provided security holders have nominated fewer than a majority of the directors then authorized to serve; (2) prohibit brokers from voting securities on an uncontested election to the board of directors without having received specific instructions from the securities' beneficial owners; and (3) requires listed issuers, to the extent possible, to have an independent chairman of their board of directors who has not served as an executive of the issuer.
Requires any proxy or consent or authorization for an annual or other meeting of a securities issuer to permit a separate shareholder vote on executive compensation, though such vote shall not be binding on its board of directors.
Directs the SEC to direct the national securities exchanges and national securities associations to prohibit: (1) issuers from retaining advisors in negotiating executive employment or compensation agreements that are not independent or are protected from liability by such issuers; (2) the listing of issuers that do not have a (clawback) policy of recovering executive payments that were unearned due to fraud, faulty financial statements, or some other cause; and (3) the listing of issuers that provide severance payments to senior executives who are terminated for poor performance.
Directs the SEC to require additional disclosure of specific performance targets issuers use in determining a senior executive's eligibility for bonuses, equity, and incentive compensation.