Text: H.R.557 — 111th Congress (2009-2010)All Information (Except Text)

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Introduced in House (01/15/2009)


111th CONGRESS
1st Session
H. R. 557


To promote transparency, accountability, and reform within the United Nations system, and for other purposes.


IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

January 15, 2009

Ms. Ros-Lehtinen (for herself, Mr. Boehner, Mr. Cantor, Mr. Cohen, Mr. Pence, Mr. McCotter, Mr. Smith of New Jersey, Mr. Burton of Indiana, Mr. Gallegly, Mr. Rohrabacher, Mr. Manzullo, Mr. Royce, Mr. Blunt, Mr. Lincoln Diaz-Balart of Florida, Mrs. Blackburn, Mr. Sam Johnson of Texas, Mr. Shuster, Mr. Garrett of New Jersey, Mr. Buyer, Mr. Wolf, Mr. Poe of Texas, Mr. Boozman, Mr. McCaul, Mr. Bilirakis, Mr. Broun of Georgia, Mr. Lamborn, Mrs. Bachmann, Mr. Graves, Mr. Mario Diaz-Balart of Florida, Mr. Mack, and Mr. Hall of Texas) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs


A BILL

To promote transparency, accountability, and reform within the United Nations system, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. Short title; table of contents.

(a) Short title.—This Act may be cited as the “United Nations Transparency, Accountability, and Reform Act of 2009”.

(b) Table of contents.—The table of contents is as follows:


Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.

Sec. 2. Definitions.

Sec. 101. Findings.

Sec. 102. Apportionment of the United Nations regular budget on a voluntary basis.

Sec. 103. Budget justification for United States contributions to the regular budget of the United Nations.

Sec. 201. Findings.

Sec. 202. Definitions.

Sec. 203. Establishment and management of the Office of the United States Inspector General for contributions to the United Nations System.

Sec. 204. Transparency for United States contributions.

Sec. 205. Authorization of appropriations.

Sec. 301. Annual publication.

Sec. 302. Annual financial disclosure.

Sec. 303. Policy with respect to expansion of the security council.

Sec. 304. Access to reports and audits.

Sec. 305. Waiver of immunity.

Sec. 306. Terrorism and the United Nations.

Sec. 307. Report on United Nations reform.

Sec. 308. Report on United Nations personnel.

Sec. 309. Withholding of United States contributions to UNRWA.

Sec. 310. United Nations treaty bodies.

Sec. 311. Equality at the United Nations.

Sec. 312. Anti-Semitism and the United Nations.

Sec. 313. Regional group inclusion of Israel.

Sec. 401. Findings.

Sec. 402. Human Rights Council membership and funding.

Sec. 501. International Atomic Energy Agency.

Sec. 502. Sense of Congress regarding the Nuclear Security Action Plan of the IAEA.

Sec. 601. Reform of United Nations peacekeeping operations.

Sec. 602. Policy relating to reform of United Nations peacekeeping operations.

Sec. 603. Certification.

SEC. 2. Definitions.

In this Act:

(1) EMPLOYEE.—The term “employee” means an individual who is employed in the general services, professional staff, or senior management of the United Nations, including consultants, contractors and subcontractors.

(2) GENERAL ASSEMBLY.—The term “General Assembly” means the General Assembly of the United Nations.

(3) MEMBER STATE.—The term “Member State” means a Member State of the United Nations. Such term is synonymous with the term “country”.

(4) SECRETARY.—The term “Secretary” means the Secretary of State.

(5) SECRETARY GENERAL.—The term “Secretary General” means the Secretary General of the United Nations.

(6) SECURITY COUNCIL.—The term “Security Council” means the Security Council of the United Nations.

(7) UN.—The term “UN” means the United Nations.

(8) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—The term “appropriate congressional committees” means—

(A) the Committees on Foreign Affairs, Appropriations, and Oversight and Government Reform of the House; and

(B) the Committees on Foreign Relations, Appropriations, and Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate.

SEC. 101. Findings.

The Congress makes the following findings:

(1) The United States pays billions of dollars into the United Nations system every year (over 5,300,000,000 dollars in 2005, according to the White House Office of Management and Budget), significantly more than any other nation.

(2) Under current rules and contribution levels, it is possible to assemble the two-thirds majority needed for important United Nations budget votes with a group of countries that, taken together, pay less than 1 percent of the total United Nations regular budget.

(3) The disconnect between contribution levels and management control creates significant perverse incentives in terms of United Nations spending, transparency, and accountability.

(4) The United Nations system suffers from unacceptably high levels of waste, fraud, and abuse, which seriously impair its ability to fulfill the lofty ideals of its founding.

(5) Amidst the continuing financial, corruption, and sexual abuse scandals of the past several years, American public disapproval of United Nations has reached all-time highs. A 2008 Gallup poll revealed that 65 percent of Americans believe that the United Nations is doing a poor job, a negative assessment shared by a majority of respondents from both political parties. Research polling by another firm in late 2006 found that 71 percent of Americans think that the United Nations is “no longer effective” and needs to be significantly reformed, while 75 percent think that the United Nations “needs to be held more accountable.”

(6) Significant improvements in United Nations transparency and accountability are necessary for improving public perceptions of and American support for United Nations operations.

(7) Because of their need to justify future contributions from donors, voluntarily funded organizations have more incentive to be responsive and efficient in their operations than organizations funded by compulsory contributions that are not tied to performance.

(8) Article XVII of the Charter of the United Nations, which states that “[t]he expenses of the Organization shall be borne by the Members as apportioned by the General Assembly,” leaves to the discretion of the General Assembly the basis of apportionment, which could be done on the basis of voluntary pledges by Member States.

(9) Unlike United States assessed contributions to the United Nations regular budget, which are statutorily capped at 22 percent of the total, there is no cap on voluntary contributions.

(10) The United States, which contributes generously to international organizations whose activities it recognizes as credible, worthwhile, and efficient, contributes more than 22 percent of the budget of certain voluntarily funded United Nations Specialized Agencies.

SEC. 102. Apportionment of the United Nations regular budget on a voluntary basis.

(a) United States policy.—

(1) It is the policy of the United States to seek to shift the funding mechanism for the regular budget of the United Nations from an assessed to a voluntary basis.

(2) The President shall direct the United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations to use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States at the United Nations to shift the funding mechanism for the regular budget of the United Nations to a voluntary basis, and to make it a priority to build support for such a transformational change among Member States, particularly key United Nations donors.

(b) Certification of predominantly voluntary UN regular budget finding.—A certification described in this section is a certification by the Secretary of State to the Appropriate Congressional Committees that at least 80 percent of the total regular budget of the United Nations is apportioned on a voluntary basis. Each such certification shall be shall be effective for a period of no more than 1 year, and shall be promptly revoked by the Secretary, with notice to the Appropriate Congressional Committees, if the underlying circumstances change so as not to warrant such certification.

(c) Withholding of nonvoluntary contributions.—

(1) Beginning 2 years after the effective date of this act and notwithstanding any other provision of law, no funds may be obligated or expended for a United States assessed contribution to the regular budget of the United Nations in an amount greater than 50 percent of the United States share of assessed contributions for the regular budget of the United Nations unless there is in effect a certification by the Secretary, as described in subsection (b).

(2) For a period of 3 years after appropriation, funds appropriated for use as a United States contribution to the regular budget of the United Nations but withheld from obligation and expenditure pursuant to paragraph (1) may be obligated and expended for that purpose upon the certification described in subsection (b). After 3 years, in the absence of such certification, those funds shall revert to the United States Treasury.

SEC. 103. Budget justification for United States contributions to the regular budget of the United Nations.

(a) Detailed itemization.—The annual congressional budget justification shall include a detailed itemized request in support of the contribution of the United States to the regular budget of the United Nations.

(b) Contents of detailed itemization.—The detailed itemization required under subsection (a) shall—

(1) contain information relating to the amounts requested in support of each of the various sections and titles of the regular budget of the United Nations; and

(2) compare the amounts requested for the current year with the actual or estimated amounts contributed by the United States in previous fiscal years for the same sections and titles.

(c) Adjustments and notification.—If the United Nations proposes an adjustment to its regular assessed budget, the Secretary of State shall, at the time such adjustment is presented to the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ), notify and consult with the appropriate congressional committees.

SEC. 201. Findings.

The Congress makes the following findings:

(1) As underscored by continuing revelations of waste, fraud, and abuse, oversight and accountability mechanisms within the United Nations system remain significantly deficient, despite decades of reform attempts, including those initiated by Secretaries-General of the United Nations.

(2) Notwithstanding the personal intentions of any Secretary General of the United Nations to promote institutional transparency and accountability within the United Nations System, the Secretary General lacks the power to impose far reaching management reforms without the concurrence of the General Assembly.

(3) Groupings of Member States whose voting power in the General Assembly significantly outpaces their proportional contributions to the United Nations system have repeatedly and successfully defeated, delayed, and diluted various reform proposals that would have enabled more detailed oversight and scrutiny of United Nations system operations and expenditures.

(4) To an unacceptable degree, major donor states, including the United States, lack access to reasonably detailed, reliable information that would allow them to determine how their contributions have been spent by various United Nations system entities, further contributing to the lack of accountability within the United Nations system.

SEC. 202. Definitions.

In this title:

(1) UNITED NATIONS ENTITY.—The term “United Nations Entity” means any United Nations agency, commission, conference, council, court, department, forum, fund, institute, office, organization, partnership, program, subsidiary body, tribunal, trust, university or academic body, related organization or subsidiary body, wherever located, that flies the United Nations flag or is authorized to use the United Nations logo, including but not limited to those United Nations affiliated agencies and bodies identified as recipients of United States contributions under section 1225(b)(3)(E) of the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 (Public Law 109–364).

(2) UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM.—The term “United Nations System” means the aggregation of all United Nations Entities, as defined in paragraph (1).

(3) UNITED STATES CONTRIBUTION.—The term “United States Contribution” means an assessed or voluntary contribution, whether financial, in-kind, or otherwise, from the United States Federal Government to a United Nations Entity, including contributions passed through other entities for ultimate use by a United Nations Entity. United States Contributions include, but are not limited to, those contributions identified pursuant to section 1225(b)(3)(E) of the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 (Public Law 109–364).

(4) TRANSPARENCY CERTIFICATION.—The term “Transparency Certification” means an annual, written affirmation by the head or authorized designee of a United Nations Entity that the Entity will cooperate with the Inspector General, including by providing the Inspector General, upon request, with full access to Oversight Information as defined in this title.

(5) OVERSIGHT INFORMATION.—The term “Oversight Information” includes—

(A) internally and externally commissioned audits, program reviews, performance reports, and evaluations;

(B) financial statements, records, and billing systems;

(C) program budgets and program budget implications, including revised estimates and reports produced by or provided to the Secretary General and the Secretary General’s agents on budget related matters;

(D) operational plans, budgets, and budgetary analyses for peacekeeping operations;

(E) analyses and reports regarding the scale of assessments;

(F) databases and other data systems containing financial or programmatic information;

(G) documents or other records alleging or involving improper use of resources, misconduct, mismanagement, or other violations of rules and regulations applicable to the United Nations Entity; and

(H) other documentation relevant to the audit and investigative work of the United States Inspector General for Contributions to the United Nations System.

SEC. 203. Establishment and management of the Office of the United States Inspector General for contributions to the United Nations System.

(a) Purpose.—The purpose of this section is to make possible the independent and objective conduct of audits and investigations relating to United States Contributions to the United Nations System and the use of those contributions by United Nations Entities, in an effort to eliminate and deter waste, fraud, and abuse in the use of those contributions, and thereby to contribute to the development of greater transparency, accountability, and internal controls throughout the United Nations System.

(b) Establishment.—There is hereby established the Office of the United States Inspector General for Contributions to the United Nations System.

(c) Inspector General.—

(1) APPOINTMENT.—The head of the Office of the United States Inspector General for Contributions to the United Nations System is the Inspector General for Contributions to the United Nations System, who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, on the basis of integrity and demonstrated ability in accounting, auditing, financial analysis, law, management analysis, public administration, or investigations.

(2) NOMINATION.—The nomination of an individual as Inspector General shall be made not later than 30 days after the enactment of this Act.

(3) REMOVAL.—The Inspector General may be removed from office by the President. The President shall communicate the reasons for any such removal to both Houses of Congress.

(4) COMPENSATION.—The annual rate of basic pay of the Inspector General shall be the annual rate of basic pay provided for positions at level IV of the Executive Schedule under section 5315 of title 5, United States Code.

(5) RELATIONSHIP TO BOARD.—

(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B), the Inspector General shall report directly to and be under the general supervision of, the Board of Directors created in subsection (d).

(B) Neither the Board, any officer of the Board, nor any officer of a federal department or agency shall prevent or prohibit the Inspector General from initiating, carrying out, or completing any audit or investigation.

(6) DUTIES.—

(A) It shall be the duty of the Inspector General to conduct, supervise, and coordinate audits and investigations of—

(i) the treatment, handling, expenditure, and use of United States Contributions by and to United Nations Entities; and

(ii) the adequacy of accounting, oversight, and internal control mechanisms at United Nations Entities that receive United States Contributions.

(B) The Inspector General shall establish, maintain, and oversee such systems, procedures, and controls as the Inspector General considers appropriate to discharge the duty under subparagraph (A).

(C) The Inspector General shall carry out the duties specified in subparagraphs (A) and (B) in accordance with section 4(b)(1) of the Inspector General Act of 1978.

(D) The Inspector General shall collect and maintain current records regarding Transparency Certifications by all United Nations Entities that receive United States Contributions.

(E) The Inspector General shall keep the Board of Directors and the Congress fully and promptly informed of how United Nations Entities are spending United States Contributions by means of reports, testimony, and briefings.

(F) REFERRALS.—

(i) The Inspector General shall promptly report to the United States Attorney General when Inspector General has reasonable grounds to believe a United States Federal criminal law has been violated by a United Nations Entity or one of its employees, contractors, or representatives.

(ii) The Inspector General shall promptly report, when appropriate, to the Secretary General or the head of the appropriate United Nations Entity cases where the Inspector General reasonably believes that mismanagement, misfeasance, or malfeasance is likely to have taken place within a United Nations Entity and disciplinary proceedings are likely justified.

(7) PERSONNEL, FACILITIES, AND OTHER RESOURCES.—

(A) The Inspector General may select, appoint, and employ such officers and employees as may be necessary for carrying out the duties of the Inspector General.

(B) The inspector general may obtain services as authorized by section 3109 of title 5, United States Code, at daily rates not to exceed the equivalent rate prescribed for grade GS–15 of the General Schedule by section 5332 of such title.

(C) The Inspector General may lease, purchase, or otherwise acquire, improve, and use such real property wherever situated, as may be necessary for carrying out this section.

(D) To the extent and in such amounts as may be provided in advance by appropriations Acts, the Inspector General my enter into contracts and other arrangements for audits, studies, analyses, and other services with public agencies and with private persons, and make such payments as may be necessary to carry out the duties of the Inspector General.

(E) Upon request by the Inspector General, the head of an agency may detail any employee of such agency to the Office of the United States Inspector General for Contributions to the United Nations System on a reimbursable basis. Any employee so detailed remains, for the purpose of preserving such employee’s allowances, privileges, rights, seniority, and other benefits, an employee of the agency from which detailed.

(8) COOPERATION BY UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ENTITIES.—

(A) In carrying out the duties, responsibilities, and authorities of the Inspector General under this section, the Inspector General shall receive the cooperation of inspectors general of other Federal Government agencies.

(B) Upon request of the Inspector General for information or assistance from any department, agency, or other entity of the Federal Government, the head of such entity shall, insofar as is practicable and not in contravention of any existing law, furnish such information or assistance to the Inspector General, or an authorized designee.

(C) Whenever information or assistance requested by the Inspector General is, in the judgment of the Inspector General, unreasonably refused or not provided, the Inspector General shall report the circumstances to the Board of Directors and to the Appropriate Congressional Committees without delay.

(9) CONFIRMATION OF TRANSPARENCY BY UNITED NATIONS ENTITIES.—

(A) PROMPT NOTICE BY INSPECTOR GENERAL.—Whenever information or assistance requested from a United Nations Entity by the Inspector General pursuant to a Transparency Certification is, in the opinion of the Inspector General, unreasonably refused or not provided in a timely manner, the Inspector General shall notify the Board of Directors, the head of that particular United Nations Entity, and the Secretary General of the circumstances in writing, without delay.

(B) NOTICE OF COMPLIANCE.—If and when the information or assistance being sought by the Inspector General in connection with a notification pursuant to subparagraph (A) is provided to the satisfaction of the Inspector General, the Inspector General shall so notify in writing the United Nations Entity, the Board of Directors, and the Appropriate Congressional Committees.

(C) NONCOMPLIANCE.—If the information or assistance being sought by the Inspector General in connection with a notification pursuant to subparagraph (A) is not provided to the satisfaction of the Inspector General within 90 days of that notification, then the United Nations Entity that is the subject of the notification is deemed to be noncompliant with its Transparency Certification, and the Inspector General shall provide prompt, written notification of that fact to the Board of Directors, Appropriate Congressional Committees, the head of that United Nations Entity, the Secretary General, and any office or agency of the Federal Government that has provided that United Nations Entity with any United States Contribution during the prior 2 years.

(D) RESTORATION OF COMPLIANCE.—After the situation has been resolved to the satisfaction of the Board of Directors, a finding of Transparency Certification noncompliance pursuant to subparagraph (B) may be reversed by an affirmative vote of at least 5 of the 7 members of the Board of Directors. The Board shall promptly provide notification of such restoration, along with a description of the basis for the Board’s decision, to the Inspector General, Appropriate Congressional Committees, the head of the affected United Nations Entity, the Secretary General, and the head of any office or agency of the Federal Government that has provided that United Nations Entity with any United States Contribution during the prior 2 years.

(E) COST REIMBURSEMENT.—The Inspector General may reimburse United Nations Entities for the reasonable cost of providing to the Inspector General information or assistance sought pursuant to a Transparency Certification for the purpose of performing the duties described in paragraph (6).

(10) REPORTS.—

(A) AUDIT AND INVESTIGATION REPORTS.—Promptly upon completion, the Inspector General shall provide copies of each audit and investigation report completed pursuant to paragraph (6) to the Board of Directors, the Appropriate Congressional Committees, and, to the extent permissible under United States law, the head of each United Nations Entity that is the subject of that particular report.

(B) SEMIANNUAL REPORTS.—Not later than May 30, 2010, and semiannually thereafter, the Inspector General shall submit to the Appropriate Congressional Committees a report that, among other things—

(i) meets the requirements of section 5 of the Inspector General Act of 1978; and

(ii) includes a list of and detailed description of the circumstances surrounding any notification of noncompliance issued pursuant to paragraph (9)(C) during the covered timeframe, and whether and when Board of Directors has reversed such finding of noncompliance.

(C) PROHIBITED DISCLOSURES.—Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to authorize the public disclosure of information that is—

(i) specifically prohibited from disclosure by any other provision of law;

(ii) specifically required by Executive order to be protected from disclosure in the interest of national defense or national security or in the conduct of foreign affairs; or

(iii) a part of an ongoing criminal investigation.

(D) PRIVACY PROTECTIONS.—The Inspector General shall exempt from public disclosure information received from a United Nations Entity or developed during an audit or investigation that the Inspector General believes—

(i) constitutes a trade secret or privileged and confidential personal financial information;

(ii) accuses a particular person of a crime;

(iii) would, if publicly disclosed, constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy; and

(iv) would compromise an ongoing law enforcement investigation or judicial trial in the United States.

(E) PUBLICATION.—Subject only to the exceptions detailed in subparagraphs (C) and (D), the Inspector General shall promptly publish each report under this subsection on a publicly available and searchable Internet website.

(d) Board of Directors.—

(1) ESTABLISHMENT.—The Office of the United States Inspector General for Contributions to the United Nations System shall have a Board of Directors.

(2) DUTIES.—The Board shall receive information and reports of audits and investigations from the Office and the Inspector General, provide general direction and supervision to the Office and the Inspector General, and determine the restoration of compliance by any United Nations Entity with its Transparency Certification pursuant to subsection (c)(9)(D).

(3) MEMBERSHIP.—The Board shall consist of the Secretary of State (or the Secretary’s designee), the Secretary of Labor (or the Secretary’s designee), the Secretary of Agriculture (or the Secretary’s designee), the Secretary of Defense (or the Secretary’s designee), the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency (or the Administrator’s designee), the Secretary of the Treasury (or the Secretary’s designee), and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (or the Director’s designee).

(4) CHAIRMANSHIP.—The Board shall be chaired by a board member, and the chairmanship shall rotate among the member departments and agencies on an annual basis. The first chair shall be the Director or designee from the Office of Management and Budget.

SEC. 204. Transparency for United States contributions.

(a) Funding prerequisites.—Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no funds made available for use as a United States Contribution to any United Nations Entity may be obligated or expended if—

(1) the intended United Nations Entity recipient has not provided to the Inspector General within the preceding year a Transparency Certification as defined in section 202(4); or

(2) the intended United Nations Entity recipient is noncompliant with its Transparency Certification as described in section 203(c)(9)(C).

(b) Treatment of funds withheld for noncompliance.—At the conclusion of each fiscal year, any funds that had been appropriated for use as a United States Contribution to a United Nations Entity during that fiscal year, but could not be obligated or expended because of the restrictions of paragraph (1), shall be returned to the United States Treasury, and are not subject to reprogramming for any other use. Any such funds returned to the Treasury shall not be considered arrears to be repaid to any United Nations Entity.

(c) Presidential waiver.—The President may waive the limitations of this subsection with respect to a particular United States Contribution to a particular United Nations Entity within a single fiscal year if the President determines that it is required by the national security interests of the United States and provides notification and explanation of that determination to the Appropriate Congressional Committees.

SEC. 205. Authorization of appropriations.

There are authorized to be appropriated such sums as are necessary to carry out the activities of this title, provided that such sums be not less than one half of 1 percent of the total amount of all assessed and voluntary contributions of the United States Government to the United Nations and United Nations affiliated agencies and related bodies during the prior fiscal year, as identified pursuant to section 1225(b)(3)(E) of the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 (Public Law 109–364).

SEC. 301. Annual publication.

The President shall direct the United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations to use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States at the United Nations to ensure the United Nations publishes annually, including on a publicly searchable internet website, a list of all United Nations subsidiary bodies and their functions, budgets, staff, and contributions, both voluntary and assessed, sorted by donor.

SEC. 302. Annual financial disclosure.

The President shall direct the United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations to use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States at the United Nations to implement a system for the required filing of individual annual financial disclosure forms by each employee of the United Nations and its specialized agencies, programs, and funds at the P–5 level and above, which shall be made available to the Office of Internal Oversight Services and, upon request, to Member States and their public.

SEC. 303. Policy with respect to expansion of the security council.

It shall be the policy of the United States to use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States at the United Nations to oppose any proposals on expansion of the Security Council if such expansion would—

(1) diminish the influence of the United States on the Security Council;

(2) include veto rights for any new members of the Security Council; or

(3) undermine the effectiveness of the Security Council.

SEC. 304. Access to reports and audits.

The President shall direct the United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations to use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States at the United Nations to ensure that Member States may, upon request, have access to all reports and audits completed by the Board of External Auditors.

SEC. 305. Waiver of immunity.

The President shall direct the United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations to use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States at the United Nations to ensure that the Secretary General exercises the right and duty of the Secretary General under section 20 of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations to waive the immunity of any United Nations official in any case in which such immunity would impede the course of justice. In exercising such waiver, the Secretary General is urged to interpret the interests of the United Nations as favoring the investigation or prosecution of a United Nations official who is credibly under investigation for having committed a serious criminal offense or who is credibly charged with a serious criminal offense.

SEC. 306. Terrorism and the United Nations.

The President shall direct the United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations to use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States at the United Nations to work toward adoption by the general assembly of—

(1) a definition of terrorism that—

(A) builds upon the recommendations of the December 2004 report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change;

(B) includes as an essential component of such definition any action that is intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians with the purpose of intimidating a population or compelling a government or an international organization to do, or abstain from doing, any act; and

(C) does not propose a legal or moral equivalence between an action described in paragraph (1)(B) and measures taken by a government or international organization in self-defense against an action described in paragraph (1)(B); and

(2) a comprehensive convention on terrorism that includes the definition described in paragraph (1).

SEC. 307. Report on United Nations reform.

(a) In general.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually for each of the next 3 years, the Secretary shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on United Nations reform.

(b) Contents.—The report required under subsection (a) shall describe—

(1) progress toward the goal of shifting the funding for the United Nations Regular Budget to a voluntary basis as identified in section 102 above, and a detailed description of efforts and activities by United States diplomats and officials toward that end;

(2) progress toward each of the policy goals identified in the prior sections of this title, and a detailed, goal-specific description of efforts and activities by United States diplomats and officials toward those ends;

(3) the status of the implementation of management reforms within the United Nations and its specialized agencies;

(4) the number of outputs, reports, or other mandates generated by General Assembly resolutions that have been eliminated;

(5) the progress of the General Assembly to modernize and streamline the committee structure and its specific recommendations on oversight and committee outputs, consistent with the March 2005 report of the Secretary General entitled “In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all”;

(6) the status of the review by the General Assembly of all mandates older than 5 years and how resources have been redirected to new challenges, consistent with such March 2005 report of the Secretary General;

(7) the continued utility and relevance of the Economic and Financial Committee and the Social, Humanitarian, and Cultural Committee, in light of the duplicative agendas of those committees and the Economic and Social Council; and

(8) whether the United Nations or any of its specialized agencies has contracted with any party included on the Lists of Parties Excluded from Federal Procurement and Nonprocurement Programs.

SEC. 308. Report on United Nations personnel.

(a) In general.—Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report—

(1) concerning the progress of the General Assembly to modernize human resource practices, consistent with the March 2005 report of the Secretary General entitled “In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all”; and

(2) containing the information described in subsection (b).

(b) Contents.—The report shall include—

(1) a comprehensive evaluation of human resources reforms at the United Nations, including an evaluation of—

(A) tenure;

(B) performance reviews;

(C) the promotion system;

(D) a merit-based hiring system and enhanced regulations concerning termination of employment of employees; and

(E) the implementation of a code of conduct and ethics training;

(2) the implementation of a system of procedures for filing complaints and protective measures for work-place harassment, including sexual harassment;

(3) policy recommendations relating to the establishment of a rotation requirement for nonadministrative positions;

(4) policy recommendations relating to the establishment of a prohibition preventing personnel and officials assigned to the mission of a member state to the united nations from transferring to a position within the United Nations Secretariat that is compensated at the P–5 level and above;

(5) policy recommendations relating to a reduction in travel allowances and attendant oversight with respect to accommodations and airline flights; and

(6) an evaluation of the recommendations of the Secretary General relating to greater flexibility for the Secretary General in staffing decisions to accommodate changing priorities.

SEC. 309. Withholding of United States contributions to UNRWA.

(a) Withholding.—Contributions by the United States to the regular budget of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), to any successor or related entity, or to the regular budget of the United Nations for the support of UNRWA or a successor entity (through staff positions provided by the United Nations Secretariat, or otherwise), may be provided only during a period for which a certification described in subsection (b) is in effect.

(b) Certification.—A certification described in this paragraph is a written determination by the Secretary, based on all information available after diligent inquiry, and transmitted to the Appropriate Congressional Committees along with a detailed description of the factual basis therefor, that—

(1) no official, employee, consultant, contractor, subcontractor, representative, or affiliate of UNRWA—

(A) is a member of a foreign terrorist organization;

(B) has propagated, disseminated, or incited anti-American, anti-Israel, or anti-Semitic rhetoric or propaganda; or

(C) has used any UNRWA resources, including publications or websites, to propagate or disseminate political materials, including political rhetoric regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict;

(2) no UNRWA school, hospital, clinic, other facility, or other infrastructure or resource is being used by a foreign terrorist organization for operations, planning, training, recruitment, fundraising, indoctrination, communications, sanctuary, storage of weapons or other materials, or any other purposes;

(3) UNRWA is subject to comprehensive financial audits by an internationally recognized third party independent auditing firm and has implemented an effective system of vetting and oversight to prevent the use, receipt, or diversion of any UNRWA resources by any foreign terrorist organization or members thereof;

(4) no UNRWA-funded school or educational institution uses textbooks or other educational materials that propagate or disseminate anti-American, anti-Israel, or anti-Semitic rhetoric, propaganda or incitement; and

(5) no recipient of UNRWA funds or loans is a member of a foreign terrorist organization.

(c) Definition.—In this section, the term “foreign terrorist organization” means an organization designated as a foreign terrorist organization by the Secretary of State in accordance with section 219(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1189(a)).

(d) Effective duration of certification.—The certification described in subsection (b) shall be effective for a period of 180 days from the date of transmission to the Appropriate Congressional Committees, or until the Secretary receives information rendering that certification factually inaccurate, whichever is earliest. In the event that a certification becomes ineffective, the Secretary shall promptly transmit to the Appropriate Congressional Committees a description of any information that precludes the renewal or continuation of the certification.

(e) Limitation.—During a period for which a certification described in subsection (b) is in effect, the United States may not contribute to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) or a successor entity an annual amount—

(1) greater than the highest annual contribution to UNRWA made by a member country of the League of Arab States;

(2) that, as a proportion of the total UNRWA budget, exceeds the proportion of the total budget for the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) paid by the United States; or

(3) that exceeds 22 percent of the total budget of UNRWA.

(f) Sense of Congress.—It is the sense of Congress that, in order to alleviate the suffering of Palestinian refugees, responsibility for those refugees should be fully transferred to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

SEC. 310. United Nations treaty bodies.

The United States shall withhold from United States contributions to the regular assessed budget of the United Nations for a biennial period amounts that are proportional to the percentage of such budget that are expended with respect to a United Nations human rights treaty monitoring body or committee that was established by—

(1) a convention (without any protocols) or an international covenant (without any protocols) to which the United States is not party; or

(2) a convention, with a subsequent protocol, if the United States is a party to neither.

SEC. 311. Equality at the United Nations.

(a) Department of State review and report.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—To avoid duplicative efforts and funding with respect to Palestinian interests and to ensure balance in the approach to Israeli-Palestinian issues, the Secretary shall, not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act—

(A) complete an audit of the functions of the entities listed in paragraph (2); and

(B) submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report containing audit findings and conclusions, and recommendations for the elimination of such duplicative entities and efforts.

(2) ENTITIES.—The entities referred to in paragraph (1) are the following:

(A) The United Nations Division for Palestinian Rights.

(B) The Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People.

(C) The United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process and Personal Representative to the Palestine Liberation Organization and the Palestinian Authority.

(D) The NGO Network on the Question of Palestine.

(E) The Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories.

(F) Any other entity the Secretary determines results in duplicative efforts or funding or fails to ensure balance in the approach to Israeli-Palestinian issues.

(b) Implementation by permanent representative.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The President shall direct the United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations to use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States at the United Nations to seek the implementation of the recommendations contained in the report required under subsection (a)(1)(B).

(2) WITHHOLDING OF FUNDS.—Until such recommendations have been implemented, the United States shall withhold from United States contributions to the regular assessed budget of the United Nations for a biennial period amounts that are proportional to the percentage of such budget that are expended for such entities.

(c) GAO audit.—The Comptroller General of the United States of the Government Accountability Office shall conduct an audit of—

(1) the status of the implementation of the recommendations contained in the report required under subsection (a)(1)(B); and

(2) United States actions and achievements under subsection (b).

SEC. 312. Anti-Semitism and the United Nations.

The President shall direct the United States permanent representative to the United Nations to use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States at the United Nations to make every effort to—

(1) ensure the issuance and implementation of a directive by the Secretary General or the Secretariat, as appropriate, that—

(A) requires all employees of the United Nations and its specialized agencies to officially and publicly condemn anti-Semitic statements made at any session of the United Nations or its specialized agencies, or at any other session sponsored by the United Nations;

(B) requires employees of the United Nations and its specialized agencies, programs, and funds to be subject to punitive action, including immediate dismissal, for making anti-Semitic statements or references;

(C) proposes specific recommendations to the General Assembly for the establishment of mechanisms to hold accountable employees and officials of the United Nations and its specialized agencies, programs, and funds, or Member States, that make such anti-Semitic statements or references in any forum of the United Nations or of its specialized agencies;

(D) continues to develop and implements education awareness programs about the Holocaust and anti-Semitism throughout the world, as part of an effort to combat intolerance and hatred; and

(E) requires the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) to develop programming and other measures that address anti-Semitism;

(2) secure the adoption of a resolution by the General Assembly that establishes the mechanisms described in paragraph (1)(C); and

(3) continue working toward further reduction of anti-Semitic language and anti-Israel resolutions in the United Nations and its specialized agencies, programs, and funds.

SEC. 313. Regional group inclusion of Israel.

The President shall direct the United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations to use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States at the United Nations to expand the Western European and Others Group (WEOG) in the United Nations to include Israel as a permanent member with full rights and privileges.

SEC. 401. Findings.

The Congress makes the following findings:

(1) Since its establishment in 2006, the United Nations Human Rights Council has failed to meaningfully promote the protection of internationally recognized human rights, and has proven to be even more problematic than the United Nations Human Rights Commission that it was created to replace.

(2) The United Nations Human Rights Council suffers from significant structural flaws, such as the fact that it draws its members from the General Assembly without any substantive membership criteria, with the perverse result that a number of the world’s worst human rights abusers are members of the council.

(3) The structure and composition of the United Nations Human Rights Council have made it subject to gross political manipulation, with the result that, during its two and one-half years of operation, the Council has passed 20 resolutions censuring the democratic state of Israel, as compared to only 4 censuring the dictatorship in Burma, just one censuring the North Korean regime, and none condemning the severe, ongoing human rights abuses in Sudan, China, Cuba, Zimbabwe, Belarus, and elsewhere.

SEC. 402. Human Rights Council membership and funding.

(a) In general.—For each and every fiscal year subsequent to the effective date of this Act, until the Secretary of State submits to Congress a certification that the requirements described in subsection (b) have been satisfied—

(1) the Secretary of State shall withhold from a United States contribution each fiscal year to a regularly assessed biennial budget of the United Nations an amount that is equal to the percentage of such contribution that the Secretary determines would be allocated by the United Nations to support the United Nations Human Rights Council;

(2) the Secretary of State shall not make a voluntary contribution to the United Nations Human Rights Council; and

(3) the United States shall not run for a seat on the United Nations Human Rights Council.

(b) Certification.—The annual certification referred to in subsection (a) is a certification made by the Secretary to Congress that the United Nations Human Rights Council does not include a Member State—

(1) subject to sanctions by the Security Council;

(2) under a Security Council-mandated investigation for human rights abuses;

(3) subject, within the prior 5 years, to a country-specific resolution passed under Agenda Item 9 by the former United Nations Human Rights Commission;

(4) which the Secretary of State has determined, for purposes of section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (as continued in effect pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act), section 40 of the Arms Export Control Act, section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, or other provision of law, is a government that has repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism; or

(5) which the President has designated as a country of particular concern for religious freedom under section 402(b) of the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998.

SEC. 501. International Atomic Energy Agency.

(a) Enforcement and Compliance.—

(1) OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE.—

(A) ESTABLISHMENT.—The President shall direct the United States Permanent Representative to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States at the IAEA to establish an Office of Compliance in the Secretariat of the IAEA.

(B) OPERATION.—The Office of Compliance shall—

(i) function as an independent body composed of technical experts who shall work in consultation with IAEA inspectors to assess compliance by IAEA Member States and provide recommendations to the IAEA Board of Governors concerning penalties to be imposed on IAEA Member States that fail to fulfill their obligations under IAEA Board resolutions;

(ii) base its assessments and recommendations on IAEA inspection reports; and

(iii) take into consideration information provided by IAEA Board Members that are 1 of the 5 nuclear weapons states as recognized by the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (21 UST 483) (commonly referred to as the “Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty” or the “NPT”).

(C) STAFFING.—The Office of Compliance shall be staffed from existing personnel in the Department of Safeguards of the IAEA or the Department of Nuclear Safety and Security of the IAEA.

(2) COMMITTEE ON SAFEGUARDS AND VERIFICATION.—The President shall direct the United States Permanent Representative to the IAEA to use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States at the IAEA to ensure that the Committee on Safeguards and Verification established in 2005 shall develop and seek to put into force a workplan of concrete measures that will—

(A) improve the ability of the IAEA to monitor and enforce compliance by Member States of the IAEA with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency; and

(B) enhance the ability of the IAEA, beyond the verification mechanisms and authorities contained in the Additional Protocol to the Safeguards Agreements between the IAEA and Member States of the IAEA, to detect with a high degree of confidence undeclared nuclear activities by a Member State.

(3) PENALTIES WITH RESPECT TO THE IAEA.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—The President shall direct the United States Permanent Representative to the IAEA to use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States at the IAEA to ensure that a Member State of the IAEA that is under investigation for a breach of or noncompliance with its IAEA obligations or the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations has its privileges suspended, including—

(i) limiting its ability to vote on its case;

(ii) being prevented from receiving any technical assistance; and

(iii) being prevented from hosting meetings.

(B) TERMINATION OF PENALTIES.—The penalties specified under subparagraph (A) shall be terminated when such investigation is concluded and such Member State is no longer in such breach or noncompliance.

(4) PENALTIES WITH RESPECT TO THE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY.—The President shall direct the United States Permanent Representative to the IAEA to use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States at the IAEA to ensure that a Member State of the IAEA that is found to be in breach of, in noncompliance with, or has withdrawn from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty shall return to the IAEA all nuclear materials and technology received from the IAEA, any Member State of the IAEA, or any Member State of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.

(b) United states contributions.—

(1) VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS.—Voluntary contributions of the United States to the IAEA should primarily be used to fund activities relating to Nuclear Safety and Security or activities relating to Nuclear Verification.

(2) LIMITATION ON USE OF FUNDS.—The President shall direct the United States Permanent Representative to the IAEA to use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States at the IAEA to—

(A) ensure that funds for safeguards inspections are prioritized for countries that have newly established nuclear programs or are initiating nuclear programs; and

(B) block the allocation of funds for any other IAEA development, environmental, or nuclear science assistance or activity to a country—

(i) the government of which the Secretary of State has determined, for purposes of section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979, section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, section 40 of the Arms Export Control Act, or other provision of law, is a government that has repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism and the government of which the Secretary has determined has not dismantled and surrendered its weapons of mass destruction programs under international verification;

(ii) that is under investigation for a breach of or noncompliance with its IAEA obligations or the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations; or

(iii) that is in violation of its IAEA obligations or the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

(3) DETAIL OF EXPENDITURES.—The President shall direct the United States Permanent Representative to the IAEA to use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States at the IAEA to secure, as part of the regular budget presentation of the IAEA to Member States of the IAEA, a detailed breakdown by country of expenditures of the IAEA for safeguards inspections and nuclear security activities.

(c) Membership.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The President shall direct the United States Permanent Representative to the IAEA to use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States at the IAEA to block the membership on the Board of Governors of the IAEA for a Member State of the IAEA that has not signed and ratified the Additional Protocol and—

(A) is under investigation for a breach of or noncompliance with its IAEA obligations or the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations; or

(B) that is in violation of its IAEA obligations or the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

(2) CRITERIA.—The United States Permanent Representative to the IAEA shall make every effort to modify the criteria for Board membership to reflect the principles described in paragraph (1).

(d) Small quantities protocol.—The President shall direct the United States Permanent Representative to the IAEA to use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States at the IAEA to make every effort to ensure that the IAEA changes the policy regarding the Small Quantities Protocol in order to—

(1) rescind and eliminate the Small Quantities Protocol;

(2) require that any IAEA Member State that has previously signed a Small Quantities Protocol to sign, ratify, and implement the Additional Protocol, provide immediate access for IAEA inspectors to its nuclear-related facilities, and agree to the strongest inspections regime of its nuclear efforts; and

(3) require that any IAEA Member State that does not comply with paragraph (2) to be ineligible to receive nuclear material, technology, equipment, or assistance from any IAEA Member State and subject to the penalties described in subsection (a)(3).

(e) Nuclear program of Iran.—

(1) UNITED STATES ACTION.—The President shall direct the United States Permanent Representative to the IAEA to use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States at the IAEA to make every effort to ensure the adoption of a resolution by the IAEA Board of Governors that, in addition to the restrictions already imposed, makes Iran ineligible to receive any nuclear material, technology, equipment, or assistance from any IAEA Member State and ineligible for any IAEA assistance not related to safeguards inspections or nuclear security until the IAEA Board of Governors determines that Iran—

(A) is providing full access to IAEA inspectors to its nuclear-related facilities;

(B) has fully implemented and is in compliance with the Additional Protocol; and

(C) has permanently ceased and dismantled all activities and programs related to nuclear-enrichment and reprocessing.

(2) PENALTIES.—If an IAEA Member State is determined to have violated the prohibition on assistance to Iran described in paragraph (1) before the IAEA Board of Governors determines that Iran has satisfied the conditions described in subparagraphs (A) through (C) of such paragraph, such Member State shall be subject to the penalties described in subsection (a)(3), shall be ineligible to receive nuclear material, technology, equipment, or assistance from any IAEA Member State, and shall be ineligible to receive any IAEA assistance not related to safeguards inspections or nuclear security until such time as the IAEA Board of Governors makes such determination with respect to Iran.

(f) Report.—Not later than 6 months after the date of the enactment of this Act and annually for 2 years thereafter, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the implementation of this section.

SEC. 502. Sense of Congress regarding the Nuclear Security Action Plan of the IAEA.

It is the sense of Congress that the national security interests of the United States are enhanced by the Nuclear Security Action Plan of the IAEA and the Board of Governors should recommend, and the General Conference should adopt, a resolution incorporating the Nuclear Security Action Plan into the regular budget of the IAEA.

SEC. 601. Reform of United Nations peacekeeping operations.

It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) although United Nations peacekeeping operations have contributed greatly toward the promotion of peace and stability for nearly 6 decades and the majority of peacekeeping personnel who have served under the United Nations flag have done so with honor and courage, the record of United Nations peacekeeping has been severely tarnished by operational failures and unconscionable acts of misconduct;

(2) in response to such failures, in 2000 and 2005, respectively, the Secretary General charged the high-level Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, led by former Foreign Minister of Algeria Lakhdar Brahimi, and his Special Advisor on the Prevention of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse, His Royal Highness Prince Zeid Ra’ad Zeid Al-Hussein of Jordan, to provide honest assessments of the United Nations’ shortcomings and make recommendations that would help restore the confidence of the international community in United Nations peacekeeping operations;

(3) audits of procurement practices in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, conducted by the Office of Internal Oversight Services, also have uncovered “significant” corruption schemes, including a 2007 audit of peacekeeping contracts valued at $1.4 billion, of which more than $614 million, or 44%, were subject to corruption;

(4) despite the fact that the United Nations has had more than eight years to implement the reforms contained in the Brahimi Report, nearly four years to implement the reforms in the Zeid Report, and the fact that Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon, his predecessor Kofi Annan, and the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations repeatedly have expressed their commitment “to implementing fundamental, systematic changes as a matter of urgency,” a number of critical reforms continue to be blocked or delayed by Members States who arguably benefit from maintenance of the status quo; and

(5) if the reputation of and confidence in United Nations peacekeeping operations is to be restored, fundamental and far-reaching reforms, particularly in the areas of planning, management, procurement, training, conduct, and discipline, must be implemented without further delay.

SEC. 602. Policy relating to reform of United Nations peacekeeping operations.

It shall be the policy of the United States to pursue reform of United Nations peacekeeping operations in the following areas:

(1) PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT.—

(A) GLOBAL AUDIT.—As the size, cost, and number of United Nations peacekeeping operations have increased substantially over the past decade, an independent audit of each such operation, with a view toward “right-sizing” operations and ensuring that such operations are cost effective, should be conducted and its findings reported to the Security Council.

(B) PROCUREMENT AND TRANSPARENCY.—A modern logistics system and transparent, streamlined procurement procedures should be established within the United Nations Department of Field Support to ensure that all peacekeeping missions are resourced appropriately and in a timely fashion while individual accountability for waste, fraud and abuse within United Nations peacekeeping missions is established and uniformly enforced.

(C) REVIEW OF MANDATES AND CLOSING OPERATIONS.—In conjunction with the audit described in subparagraph (A), the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations should conduct a comprehensive review of all United Nations peacekeeping operation mandates, with a view toward identifying objectives that are practical and achievable, and report its findings to the Security Council. In particular, the review should consider the following:

(i) Except in extraordinary cases, including genocide, the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations should not be tasked with activities that are impractical or unachievable without the cooperation of the Member State(s) hosting a United Nations peacekeeping operation, or which amount to de-facto Trusteeship outside of the procedures established for such under Chapter XII of the United Nations Charter, thereby creating unrealistic expectations and obfuscating the primary responsibility of the Member States themselves in creating and maintaining conditions for peace.

(ii) Long-standing operations that are static and cannot fulfill their mandate should be downsized or closed.

(iii) Where there is legitimate concern that the withdrawal from a country of an otherwise static United Nations peacekeeping operation would result in the resumption of major conflict, a burden-sharing arrangement that reduces the level of assessed contributions, similar to that currently supporting the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus, should be explored and instituted.

(D) LEADERSHIP.—As peacekeeping operations become larger and increasingly complex, the Secretariat should adopt a minimum standard of qualifications for senior leaders and managers, with particular emphasis on specific skills and experience, and current senior leaders and managers who do not meet those standards should be removed.

(E) PRE-DEPLOYMENT TRAINING.—Pre-deployment training on interpretation of the mandate of the operation, specifically in the areas of use of force, civilian protection and field conditions, the Code of Conduct, HIV/AIDS, and human rights should be mandatory, and all personnel, regardless of category or rank, should be required to sign an oath that each has received and understands such training as a condition of participation in the operation.

(F) GRATIS MILITARY PERSONNEL.—The General Assembly should seek to strengthen the capacity the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations and ease the extraordinary burden currently placed upon the limited number of headquarters staff by lifting restrictions on the utilization of gratis military personnel by the Department so that the Department may accept secondments from Member States of military personnel with expertise in mission planning, logistics, and other operational specialties.

(2) CONDUCT AND DISCIPLINE.—

(A) ADOPTION OF A UNIFORM CODE OF CONDUCT.—A single, uniform Code of Conduct that has the status of a binding rule and applies equally to all personnel serving in United Nations peacekeeping operations, regardless of category or rank, including military personnel, should be adopted and incorporated into legal documents governing participation in such an operation, including all contracts and Memorandums of Understanding, promulgated and effectively enforced.

(B) UNDERSTANDING THE CODE OF CONDUCT.—All personnel, regardless of category or rank, should receive training on the Code of Conduct prior to deployment with a peacekeeping operation, in addition to periodic follow-on training. In particular—

(i) all personnel, regardless of category or rank, should be provided with a personal copy of the Code of Conduct that has been translated into the national language of such personnel, regardless of whether such language is an official language of the United Nations;

(ii) all personnel, regardless of category or rank, should sign an oath that each has received a copy of the Code of Conduct, that each pledges to abide by the Code of Conduct, and that each understands the consequences of violating the Code of Conduct, including immediate termination of participation in and permanent exclusion from all current and future peacekeeping operations , as well as the assumption of personal liability for victims compensation, as a condition of appointment to any such operation; and

(iii) peacekeeping operations should conduct educational outreach programs to reach local communities where peacekeeping personnel of such operations are based, including explaining prohibited acts on the part of United Nations peacekeeping personnel and identifying the individual to whom the local population may direct complaints or file allegations of exploitation, abuse, or other acts of misconduct.

(C) MONITORING MECHANISMS.—Dedicated monitoring mechanisms, such as the Conduct and Discipline Units already deployed to support United Nations peacekeeping operations in Haiti, Sudan, Kosovo, Burundi, Liberia, Lebanon, Timor Leste, Cote d’Ivoire, Western Sahara, and the Democratic Republic of Congo, should be present in each operation to monitor compliance with the Code of Conduct, and—

(i) should report simultaneously to the Head of Mission, the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, and the Associate Director of OIOS for Peacekeeping Operations (established under section 1114(b)(9)); and

(ii) should be tasked with designing and implementing mission-specific measures to prevent misconduct, conduct follow-on training for personnel, coordinate community outreach programs, and assist in investigations, as OIOS determines necessary and appropriate.

(D) INVESTIGATIONS.—A permanent, professional, and independent investigative body should be established and introduced into United Nations peacekeeping operations. In particular—

(i) the investigative body should include professionals with experience in investigating sex crimes and the illegal exploitation of resources, as appropriate, as well as experts who can provide guidance on standards of proof and evidentiary requirements necessary for any subsequent legal action;

(ii) provisions should be included in all Memorandums of Understanding, including a Model Memorandum of Understanding, that obligate Member States that contribute troops to a peacekeeping operation to designate a military prosecutor who will participate in any investigation into credible allegations of misconduct brought against an individual of such Member State, so that evidence is collected and preserved in a manner consistent with the military law of such Member State;

(iii) the investigative body should be regionally based to ensure rapid deployment and should be equipped with modern forensics equipment for the purpose of positively identifying perpetrators and, where necessary, for determining paternity; and

(iv) the investigative body should report directly to the Associate Director of OIOS for Peacekeeping Operations, while providing copies of any reports to the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Head of Mission, and the Member State concerned.

(E) FOLLOW-UP.—The Conduct and Discipline Team in the headquarters of the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations should be appropriately staffed, resourced, and tasked with—

(i) promulgating measures to prevent misconduct;

(ii) receiving reports by field personnel and coordinating the Department’s response to allegations of misconduct;

(iii) gathering follow-up information on completed investigations, particularly by focusing on disciplinary actions against the individual concerned taken by the United Nations or by the Member State that is contributing troops to which such individual belongs, and sharing such information with the Security Council, the Head of Mission, and the community hosting the peacekeeping operation; and

(iv) contributing pertinent data on conduct and discipline to the data base required pursuant to subparagraph (H).

(F) FINANCIAL LIABILITY AND VICTIMS ASSISTANCE.—Although peacekeeping operations should provide immediate medical assistance to victims of sexual abuse or exploitation, the responsibility for providing longer-term treatment, care, or restitution lies solely with the individual found guilty of the misconduct. In particular, the following reforms should be implemented:

(i) The United Nations should not assume responsibility for providing long-term treatment or compensation by creating a “Victims Trust Fund”, or any other such similar fund, financed through assessed contributions to United Nations peacekeeping operations, thereby shielding individuals from personal liability and reinforcing an atmosphere of impunity.

(ii) If an individual responsible for misconduct has been repatriated, reassigned, redeployed, or is otherwise unable to provide assistance, responsibility for providing assistance to a victim should be assigned to the Member State that contributed the contingent to which such individual belonged or to the manager concerned.

(iii) In the case of misconduct by a member of a military contingent, appropriate funds shall be withheld from the troop contributing country concerned.

(iv) In the case of misconduct by a civilian employee or contractor of the United Nations, appropriate wages shall be garnished from such individual or fines shall be imposed against such individual, consistent with existing United Nations Staff Rules, and retirement funds shall not be shielded from liability.

(G) MANAGERS AND COMMANDERS.—The manner in which managers and commanders handle cases of misconduct by those serving under them should be included in their individual performance evaluations, so that managers and commanders who take decisive action to deter and address misconduct are rewarded, while those who create a permissive environment or impede investigations are penalized or relieved of duty, as appropriate.

(H) DATA BASE.—A centralized data base, including personnel photos and fingerprints, should be created and maintained within the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Office of Field Support, and other relevant United Nations bodies without further delay to track cases of misconduct, including the outcome of investigations and subsequent prosecutions, to ensure that personnel who have engaged in misconduct or other criminal activities, regardless of category or rank, are permanently barred from participation in future peacekeeping operations.

(I) COOPERATION OF MEMBER STATES.—If a Member State routinely refuses to cooperate with the directives contained herein or acts to shield its nationals from personal liability, that Member State should be barred from contributing troops or personnel to future peacekeeping operations.

(J) WELFARE.—Peacekeeping operations should continue to seek to maintain a minimum standard of welfare for mission personnel to ameliorate conditions of service, while adjustments are made to the discretionary welfare payments currently provided to Member States that contribute troops to offset the cost of operation-provided recreational facilities, as necessary and appropriate.

SEC. 603. Certification.

(a) New or expanded peacekeeping operations contingent upon presidential certification of peacekeeping operations reforms.—

(1) NO NEW OR EXPANDED PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS.—

(A) CERTIFICATION.—Except as provided in subparagraph (B), until the Secretary of State certifies that the requirements described in paragraph (2) have been satisfied, the President shall direct the United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations to use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States at the United Nations to oppose the creation of new, or expansion of existing, United Nations peacekeeping operations.

(B) EXCEPTION AND NOTIFICATION.—The requirements described under paragraph (2) may be waived with respect to a particular peacekeeping operation if the President determines that failure to deploy new or additional peacekeepers in such situation will significantly contribute to the widespread loss of human life, genocide, or the endangerment of a vital national security interest of the United States. If the President makes such a determination, the President shall, not later than 15 days before the exercise of such waiver, notify the appropriate congressional committees of such determination and resulting waiver.

(2) CERTIFICATION OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS REFORMS.—The certification referred to in paragraph (1) is a certification made by the Secretary to the appropriate congressional committees that the following reforms, or an equivalent set of reforms, related to peacekeeping operations have been adopted by the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations or the General Assembly, as appropriate:

(A) A single, uniform Code of Conduct that has the status of a binding rule and applies equally to all personnel serving in United Nations peacekeeping operations, regardless of category or rank, has been adopted by the General Assembly and duly incorporated into all contracts and a Model Memorandum of Understanding, and mechanisms have been established for training such personnel concerning the requirements of the Code and enforcement of the Code.

(B) All personnel, regardless of category or rank, serving in a peacekeeping operation have been trained concerning the requirements of the Code of Conduct and each has been given a personal copy of the Code, translated into the national language of such personnel.

(C) All personnel, regardless of category or rank, are required to sign an oath that each has received a copy of the Code of Conduct, that each pledges to abide by the Code, and that each understands the consequences of violating the Code, including immediate termination of participation in and permanent exclusion from all current and future peacekeeping operations, as well as the assumption of personal liability for victims compensation as a condition of the appointment to such operation.

(D) All peacekeeping operations have designed and implemented educational outreach programs to reach local communities where peacekeeping personnel of such operations are based to explain prohibited acts on the part of United Nations peacekeeping personnel and to identify the individual to whom the local population may direct complaints or file allegations of exploitation, abuse, or other acts of misconduct.

(E) The creation of a centralized data base, including personnel photos and fingerprints, has been completed and is being maintained in the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations that tracks cases of misconduct, including the outcomes of investigations and subsequent prosecutions, to ensure that personnel, regardless of category or rank, who have engaged in misconduct or other criminal activities are permanently barred from participation in future peacekeeping operations.

(F) A Model Memorandum of Understanding between the United Nations and each Member State that contributes troops to a peacekeeping operation has been adopted by the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations that specifically obligates each such Member State to—

(i) uphold the uniform Code of Conduct which shall apply equally to all personnel serving in United Nations peacekeeping operations, regardless of category or rank;

(ii) designate a competent legal authority, preferably a prosecutor with expertise in the area of sexual exploitation and abuse where appropriate, to participate in any investigation into an allegation of misconduct brought against an individual of such Member State;

(iii) refer to its competent national or military authority for possible prosecution, if warranted, any investigation of a violation of the Code of Conduct or other criminal activity by an individual of such Member State;

(iv) report to the Department of Peacekeeping Operations on the outcome of any such investigation;

(v) undertake to conduct on-site court martial proceedings, where practical and appropriate, relating to allegations of misconduct alleged against an individual of such Member State; and

(vi) assume responsibility for the provision of appropriate assistance to a victim of misconduct committed by an individual of such Member State.

(G) A professional and independent investigative and audit function has been established within the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the OIOS to monitor United Nations peacekeeping operations.


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