S.2725 - Consequences for Russia's Arms Control Violations Act of 2014113th Congress (2013-2014)
|Sponsor:||Sen. Rubio, Marco [R-FL] (Introduced 07/31/2014)|
|Committees:||Senate - Foreign Relations|
|Latest Action:||Senate - 07/31/2014 Read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations. (All Actions)|
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Text: S.2725 — 113th Congress (2013-2014)All Information (Except Text)
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Introduced in Senate (07/31/2014)
To address noncompliance by the Russian Federation of its obligations under the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty.
Mr. Rubio (for himself, Mr. Risch, Mr. Hatch, and Mr. Wicker) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations
To address noncompliance by the Russian Federation of its obligations under the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
This Act may be cited as the “Consequences for Russia's Arms Control Violations Act of 2014”.
Congress makes the following findings:
(1) A public report in The New York Times on January 29, 2014, revealed that the Russian Federation is no longer in compliance with the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, signed at Washington December 8, 1987, and entered into force June 1, 1988 (commonly referred to as the “Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty” or “INF Treaty”).
(2) On April 29, 2014, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control, Verification and Compliance Anita E. Friedt stated in testimony before the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives that, “[w]e have concerns about Russian compliance with the INF Treaty. We have raised them with Russia and are pressing for clear answers in an effort to resolve our concerns because of the importance of the INF Treaty to Euro-Atlantic security. We’ve briefed our NATO allies on our concerns and will continue to coordinate with them on this and other matters that affect our common security. We have been keeping Congress informed on this matter through briefings with relevant congressional committees and will continue to do so. We will continue to work with Russia to resolve our concerns, and to encourage mutual steps to help foster a more stable, resilient, transparent security relationship. We’re not going to drop the issue until our concerns have been addressed.”.
(3) On March 5, 2014, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Missile Defense Policy Elaine Bunn said to the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate, “[W]e are concerned about Russian activity that appears to be inconsistent with the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. We’ve raised the issue with Russia. They provided an answer that was not satisfactory to us, and we will, we told them that the issue is not closed, and we will continue to raise this.”.
(4) On April 2, 2014, the Commander, U.S. European Command, and Supreme Allied Commander Europe, General Breedlove, stated, “A weapon capability that violates the INF, that is introduced into the greater European land mass is absolutely a tool that will have to be dealt with … I would not judge how the alliance will choose to react, but I would say they will have to consider what to do about it. … It can’t go unanswered.”.
(5) The Russian Federation succeeded to the INF Treaty obligations of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in a declaration issued at Biskek, Kyrgyzstan, in October 1992.
(6) The flight test or deployment of any INF-banned weapon delivery vehicle by the Russian Federation constitutes a militarily significant violation of the INF Treaty.
(7) The INF Treaty has unlimited duration, but, under the terms of the Treaty, inspections and continuous monitoring of Russian missile production under the Treaty ceased on June 1, 2001, thus the Treaty no longer offers any verification to detect any militarily significant violations.
(8) A major problem exists with respect to the application of the INF Treaty to any new ballistic or cruise missile that is flight tested or otherwise flown once at a range not prohibited by the Treaty (that is a range less than 500 kilometers or more than 5,500 kilometers) but will be flown at a range that is banned by the Treaty (at a range that is between 500 and 5,500 kilometers) as a weapon delivery vehicle.
(9) President Barack Obama has not made use of any INF Treaty-provided means to address Russian Federation noncompliance with the Treaty, to include convening a meeting of the Treaty’s Special Verification Commission under Article XIII of the Treaty.
(10) The Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate noted in its 1988 report on the INF Treaty, “In the event Soviet actions appear to contradict their obligations under the treaty, Congress should be kept fully informed. Any questionable activity should be fully discussed in the Special Verification Commission. If the Soviet Union has not, after a sufficient period of time, satisfied United States concerns or ceased the activity in question, and if the Soviet activity is deemed to be militarily significant, the President should propose implementation of an appropriate and proportionate response.”.
(11) The Administration has not made any serious or credible effort, over several years, to respond to violations by the Russian Federation of its obligations under the INF Treaty.
(12) The INF Treaty is no longer effectively verifiable.
(13) The Russian Federation’s actions, as detailed in the January 29, 2014, report of The New York Times, have defeated the object and purpose of the INF Treaty.
(14) Continued noncompliance by the Russian Federation with its obligations under the INF Treaty and continued United States adherence to the INF Treaty, in light of failure to respond in a timely manner to Russian Federation noncompliance, places the supreme interests of the United States and its allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in jeopardy.
(15) The Russian Federation has violated its obligations under the 1994 Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances and has rendered null the effect and assurances of the NATO–Russia Founding Act of 1997.
It is the sense of Congress that—
(1) the Russian Federation, through its flight testing of both a ballistic missile intended for intermediate-range targets as well its flight testing of a ground-launched cruise missile prohibited by the INF Treaty, has acted contrary to the object and purpose of a central purpose of the Treaty and is therefore in material breach of its obligations under the Treaty; and
(2) the President, after consultation with United States allies directly affected by such Russian Federation ballistic missiles or cruise missiles, should take such actions as the President determines to be necessary to deny the Russian Federation any militarily significant advantage resulting from its noncompliance with the INF Treaty.
No funds made available to the Department of State may be used to carry out programs, projects, or activities of the U.S.-Russia Bilateral Presidential Commission until the President certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that the Russian Federation as of the date of the certification has not flight tested a ballistic missile at strategic range in a configuration (booster stages, post-boost vehicle, or reentry vehicles) that is unlike a configuration that is used for remaining tests of the system at ranges that are prohibited under the INF Treaty.
(a) Program required.—The President shall establish and carry out a program to research and develop ground-launched cruise missile and ground-launched ballistic missile capabilities, including by modification of exiting United States military capabilities, with a range between 500 and 5,500 kilometers.
(1) STUDY.—The President shall conduct a study for potential sites of the cruise missile and ballistic missile capabilities specified in subsection (a). In conducting the study, the President shall consider selecting sites on United States overseas military installations and sites offered by United States allies.
(2) REPORT.—Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that contains the results of the study.
(c) Waiver.—The President may waive the requirement to establish and carry out the program under subsection (a) if, on or before October 1, 2014, the President certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that—
(1) the Russian Federation is in compliance with all of its obligations under the INF Treaty; and
(2) the Russian Federation has verifiably and completely eliminated any military system that it has developed, flight tested, and deployed in violation of the INF Treaty.
(d) Authorization of appropriations.—There is authorized to be appropriated to the President $100,000,000 for fiscal year 2015 to carry out the program under subsection (a).
The Secretary of Defense shall ensure that the Aegis Ashore sites in Romania and Poland are deployed, consistent with the timelines established in the Ballistic Missile Defense Review of 2010, with an operational capability to defend against short-, medium-, and intermediate-range ballistic missiles and cruise missiles launched by the Russian Federation.
(a) In general.—If, on or before the date that is 180 days after the date of the enactment of this section, the President does not certify to the appropriate congressional committees that the Russian Federation is not developing or deploying any military system that violates or circumvents the INF Treaty, the President shall impose the sanctions described in subsection (b).
(1) The President shall suspend any cooperation with the Russian Federation related to any aspect of the United States program for national, theater, or regional missile defense, including any provision of any data generated by the United States in any test of any missile defense technology.
(2) The President shall deny any license pursuant to section 57 b. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2077 b.) for the export of any nuclear material, equipment, or technology to the Russian Federation.
(3) The President shall terminate the United States of the Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Russian Federation for Cooperation in the Field of Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, entered into force January 12, 2011, in accordance with the provisions of Article 20(1) of that Agreement.
(4) The President shall not award any United States Government contract to a private or public entity incorporated in the Russian Federation.
(c) Waiver.—The President may waive the requirement to impose sanctions under this section beginning on or after the date on which the President certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that the Russian Federation has provided to the United States the following:
(1) A list of all intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, as such terms are defined in the INF Treaty, as well as their launchers, support structures, and support equipment that are not intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles listed under Article III of the Treaty as existing types and which have been designed, developed, flight tested or deployed by the Russian Federation since June 1, 2001.
(2) A list of all deployment bases for any intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, as such terms are defined in the INF Treaty, including in particular, any base for any road-mobile, ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles that are not bases at which such missiles were located on June 1, 2001.
(3) A list of all flight tests carried out by the Russian Federation for any new type of ground-launched ballistic or cruise missile which has been flight tested at one or more times below a range of 500 kilometers or above 5,500 kilometers.
(4) A list of all production facilities used for the design and development of any ballistic or cruise missile that is prohibited under the INF Treaty.
(5) A description of the reasons that the Government of the Russian Federation has provided for undertaking the design, development, and deployment of any ballistic or cruise missile that is prohibited under the INF Treaty.
(a) Statement of policy.—It is the policy of the United States to not engage in further negotiations with the Russian Federation to reduce nuclear forces until the Russian Federation is in full compliance with all existing bilateral nuclear agreements with the United States, including the INF Treaty.
(b) Restriction.—Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the President shall not enter into any agreement with the Government of the Russian Federation with respect to the reduction of nuclear forces except with the advice and consent of the Senate pursuant to article II, section 2, clause 2 of the United States Constitution.
In this Act:
(A) the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives; and
(B) the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.
(2) INF TREATY OR TREATY.—The term “INF Treaty” or “Treaty” means the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, signed at Washington December 8, 1987, and entered into force June 1, 1988.