S.3017 - Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017114th Congress (2015-2016)
|Sponsor:||Sen. Burr, Richard [R-NC] (Introduced 06/06/2016)|
|Committees:||Senate - Intelligence (Select)|
|Committee Reports:||S. Rept. 114-277|
|Latest Action:||Senate - 06/15/2016 By Senator Burr from Select Committee on Intelligence filed written report. Report No. 114-277. Additional and Minority views filed. (All Actions)|
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Summary: S.3017 — 114th Congress (2015-2016)All Information (Except Text)
Reported to Senate without amendment (06/06/2016)
(This measure has not been amended since it was introduced. The summary has been expanded because action occurred on the measure.)
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017
TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(Sec. 101) This bill authorizes FY2017 appropriations for the conduct of intelligence and intelligence-related activities of:
- the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI);
- the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA);
- the Department of Defense (DOD);
- the Defense Intelligence Agency;
- the National Security Agency (NSA);
- the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force;
- the U.S. Coast Guard;
- the Departments of State, the Treasury, Energy, and Justice;
- the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI);
- the Drug Enforcement Administration;
- the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO);
- the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency; and
- the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).
(Sec. 102) The amounts authorized are those in the classified Schedule of Authorizations, which shall be made available to the congressional appropriations committees and the President.
(Sec. 103) The bill authorizes FY2017 appropriations for the Intelligence Community Management Account. Additional funds identified in a classified schedule for advanced research and development shall remain available until September 30, 2018.
TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
(Sec. 201) This title authorizes FY2017 appropriations for the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund.
TITLE III--GENERAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS
(Sec. 301) Appropriations authorized by this bill for salary, pay, retirement, and other benefits for federal employees may be increased by such additional or supplemental amounts as necessary for increases in such compensation or benefits authorized by law.
(Sec. 302) Appropriations authorized by this bill shall not be deemed to constitute authority to conduct any intelligence activity not otherwise authorized by the Constitution or U.S. laws.
(Sec. 303) The ODNI may participate in fundraising events for nonprofit organizations that support: (1) surviving family members of deceased intelligence community employees; or (2) welfare, education, or recreation of intelligence community employees, former employees, or family members. It must notify Congress before engaging in such fundraising.
(Sec. 304) The ODNI must submit a five-year investment strategy for outreach and recruiting efforts in the fields of science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) that includes cybersecurity and computer literacy. From FY2018 to FY2022, each element of the intelligence community must submit an annual investment plan that supports the ODNI's strategy along with the materials it submits as justification of its budget requests.
(Sec. 305) Each element of the intelligence community may establish higher minimum rates of pay for positions that require STEM expertise.
(Sec. 306) The ODNI must submit to Congress and publish on its website an annual report regarding the intelligence community's engagements with the entertainment industry for theater productions, motion pictures, radio or television broadcasts, podcasts, webcasts, music, dance, books, or other published material. The reports must include: (1) the federal costs of such engagements, (2) a certification that each engagement did not result in a release of classified information, (3) a determination of whether any information was declassified, and (4) the results of each engagement. No element of the intelligence community may engage in such activities unless it submits a prior notice to Congress.
(Sec. 307) Inspectors general in the intelligence community must prohibit former employees of their offices from being involved in matters that affect the interests of their element of the intelligence community for at least: (1) two years after the individual leaves a senior level position, or (2) one year after the individual leaves a position that is not a senior level position.
The ODNI may not require employees of an inspector general office for an element of the intelligence community to rotate to a position in their element for which such office conducts audits, investigations, or reviews. Inspector general employees are exempt from a rotation that may impact their office's independence.
(Sec. 308) Within 15 days after the President issues a policy or the Director of National Intelligence issues policy implementation guidance that impacts the intelligence community, the ODNI must notify and provide summaries to Congress.
(Sec. 309) Elements of the intelligence community must submit to Congress each memorandum of understanding regarding intelligence activities between the intelligence community and other federal entities.
(Sec. 310) The ODNI and DHS must establish a program to provide assistance from the intelligence community to certain critical infrastructure to reduce the risk of harm caused by cyber attack where a cybersecurity incident could reasonably result in catastrophic regional or national effects on public health or safety, economic security, or national security. Voluntary participation in the program is open to entities external to the intelligence community, including: (1) critical infrastructure identified by DHS where a cybersecurity incident could reasonably result in catastrophic regional or national effects, (2) vendors and manufacturers of cyber assets and system components, (3) commercial enterprises that provide configuration and remote services, and (4) personnel of Information Sharing and Analysis Organizations.
The director of such program may expand cooperation among private sector participants and the intelligence community through: (1) sponsorship of security clearances; (2) establishment of an interagency framework to leverage intelligence community resources and identify intelligence collection requirements; (3) collaborative efforts to detect, prevent, and mitigate unauthorized activity by foreign actors against critical infrastructure, including espionage; (4) protective measures for cyber assets and networks; and (5) technical assistance, testing, and exercises.
TITLE IV--MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
Subtitle A--Office of the Director of National Intelligence
(Sec. 401) The Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive is redesignated as the National Counterintelligence and Security Center with a director to be appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate.
Subtitle B--Other Elements
(Sec. 411) The CIA may: (1) pay death benefits substantially similar to those authorized for Foreign Service members, and (2) adjust eligibility requirements for such benefits.
(Sec. 412) The CIA inspector general may designate officers or employees as law enforcement officers for purposes of pay and retirement benefits if they are appointed to a position that investigates suspected criminal offenses.
(Sec. 413) An individual may not serve simultaneously as the NSA Director and the commander of a unified combatant command.
(Sec. 414) The FBI must submit a strategic workforce report to demonstrate progress in expanding initiatives to integrate information technology expertise in the investigative process. The report must assess: (1) recruitment, training, retention of personnel with skills in encryption, cryptography, and big data analytics; (2) the integration of officers with such skills into agent-led investigations; (3) collaborations between the FBI and the private sector on cyber issues; and (4) whether to reinstitute the FBI Director's Advisory Board to advise on the integration of technical expertise.
TITLE V--MATTERS RELATING TO FOREIGN COUNTRIES
(Sec. 501) The President must establish a committee to counter active measures by Russia to exert covert influence over peoples and governments through front groups, covert broadcasting, media manipulation, disinformation or forgeries, funding agents of influence, incitement, offensive counterintelligence, assassinations, or terrorist acts. The committee shall expose falsehoods, agents of influence, corruption, human rights abuses, terrorism, and assassinations carried out by the security services or political elites of the Russian Federation or their proxies.
(Sec. 502) Accredited diplomatic personnel of the Russian Federation in the United States may not be permitted to travel more than 50 miles from their diplomatic post in the United States in a calendar quarter unless the FBI certifies to Congress that all Russian Federation diplomatic personnel complied during the preceding calendar quarter with U.S. notification requirements for such travel.
(Sec. 503) The ODNI must conduct a study to determine the feasibility of creating an intelligence sharing arrangement and database to provide foreign countries that were parties to the Treaty on Open Skies on February 22, 2016 (except for the Russian Federation or the Republic of Belarus), with aerial imagery of the territories or other parties to the treaty that is comparable, delivered more frequently, and in equal or higher resolution than imagery available through the database established under the treaty. (The Treaty on Open Skies, done at Helsinki on March 24, 1992, and entered into force January 1, 2002, established a regime for unarmed aerial observation flights over the territories of other state party participants.)
The ODNI's imagery sharing study must evaluate: (1) methods by which the United States could collect and provide imagery through commercial satellites, national technical means, or other intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance platforms under an information sharing arrangement; (2) the ability of other state parties to contribute to the arrangement; (3) statutory impediments or funding insufficiencies; (4) whether imagery of Moscow, Chechnya, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Kaliningrad, or the Republic of Belarus could be provided under such an arrangement; and (5) the costs of such an arrangement compared to the costs under the treaty for plane maintenance, aircraft fuel, crew expenses, mitigation measures necessary associated with Russian Federation overflights over the United States or other state parties, and new sensor development and acquisition.
The ODNI must report on: (1) the extent to which Russian flights under the Open Skies Treaty contribute to the Russian Federation's warfighting doctrine; (2) the Russian Federation's capability to exceed the imagery limits set forth in the treaty; and (3) the implications and reactions of state parties if the United States withdraws from the treaty and the information sharing architecture is replaced with another intelligence sharing arrangement.
(Sec. 504) The ODNI and the CIA must submit reports regarding relationships between the U.S. intelligence community and the intelligence entities of foreign countries, international organizations, nonstate actors, or substate actors. The ODNI report must describe: (1) any significant unauthorized disclosures or security or counterintelligence lapses, and (2) the alignment of such relationships with U.S. foreign policy objectives and agency activities. The CIA report must review the coordination of such relationships and assess each foreign country's strength, value, and risks.
TITLE VI--PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BOARD
(Sec. 601) The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 is amended to require the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB) to inform the ODNI, elements of the intelligence community, and the House and Senate intelligence committees about its activities.
(Sec. 602) If the position of chair of the PCLOB is vacant, the board, by a unanimous vote, may exercise the authority of the chair.
(Sec. 603) The scope of the PCLOB's review of executive branch actions, and its policy advice, is restricted to the privacy and civil liberties of U.S. persons, instead of privacy and civil liberties generally.
TITLE VII--MATTERS RELATING TO UNITED STATES NAVAL STATION, GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA
(Sec. 701) The ODNI must complete a declassification review of information on the past terrorist activities of each individual transferred or released from U.S. Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. It must: (1) make such declassified information available to the public and provide a justification to Congress about why any information subject to review was not declassified, and (2) describe mitigation measures being taken by the countries to which such individuals have been transferred or released to monitor them and prevent them from carrying out future terrorist activities.
(Sec. 702) The bill prohibits the transfer or release to a foreign country of an individual detained at Guantanamo as of October 1, 2009, who is not a U.S. national or a member of the U.S. Armed Forces and who is in or under DOD custody or control or otherwise detained at Guantanamo until after the ODNI certifies that: (1) an intelligence driven threat monitoring system has been established to mitigate the risk of such individuals reengaging in terrorist activity or posing a threat to U.S. persons or national security, and (2) the intelligence community has the capability to monitor all such individuals.
TITLE VIII--REPORTS AND OTHER MATTERS
(Sec. 801) DOD may not exercise its authority to exclude information from special access program reports for national security purposes if the information relates to intelligence activities.
(Sec. 802) DOD may establish a Cyber Center for Education and Innovation Home of the National Cryptologic Museum. DOD may enter an agreement with the National Cryptologic Museum Foundation for the design, construction, and operation of such center.
(Sec. 803) The federal criminal code is amended to: (1) add electronic communication transactional records as a category of information that the FBI may request with a certification to a wire or electronic communication service provider that the records are relevant to an authorized investigation to protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities, and (2) prohibit the FBI from requesting the contents of an electronic communication through such process.
(Sec. 804) The NSA Director must serve as the National Manager for National Security Directive 42, signed by the President on July 5, 1990, regarding the national policy for the security of national security telecommunications and information systems. Agencies are prohibited from continuing to operate or control national security systems until they register their configurations with the National Manager, and the National Manager acknowledges such registration. The National Manager may inspect national security systems and issue binding operational directives.
The definition of "national security system" is revised to remove the current exclusion of routine administrative and business applications (including payroll, finance, logistics, and personnel management applications) that contribute to the direct fulfillment of military and intelligence missions.
(Sec. 805) Elements of the intelligence community must certify to the ODNI that all prospective joint facilities in a vicinity have been considered before they purchase, lease, or construct a new facility that is 20,000 square feet or larger.
(Sec. 806) The ODNI must collaborate with DOD and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to update the strategy for an interagency review of policies for planning and acquiring national security satellite systems and architectures consistent with the National Space Policy issued on June 28, 2010.
The ODNI must appoint a single official to harmonize the intelligence community's governance, operations, analysis, and collection activities related to space and counterspace.
The NRO and the U.S. Strategic Command must submit a concept of operations for the Joint Interagency Combined Space Operations Center.
(Sec. 807) The ODNI must propose a plan to monitor advances in life sciences and biotechnology. The plan must address: (1) organic life science and biotechnology expertise within the intelligence community and the utilization of outside expertise, (2) U.S. competitiveness in the global bio-economy and the risks and threats in genetic editing technologies, and (3) organizational requirements and responsibilities.
The ONDI must report on the role of the intelligence community in the event of a biological attack on the United States, including gaps in technical capabilities to address a novel unknown pathogen.
(Sec. 808) The ODNI must submit plans to implement declassification proposals produced in the course of producing the fundamental classification guidance review for FY2017 required by Executive Order 13526.
(Sec. 809) At least every five years, federal agencies must complete a fundamental classification guidance review to: (1) ensure that their guidance reflects current circumstances, and (2) identify classified information that no longer requires protection and may be declassified. The ODNI must certify annually the creation, validation, substantial modification, or termination of proposed and existing controlled access programs.
(Sec. 810) The ODNI must report on the intelligence community's actions to implement recommendations of the National Commission for the Review of the Research and Development Programs of the United States Intelligence Community and the balance between short-, medium-, and long-term research.
(Sec. 811) The ODNI must report on a plan to implement an Intelligence Community Research and Development Corps.
(Sec. 812) The ODNI must report on information collection by individual elements of the intelligence community about the number of applicants for, participants in, and individuals hired by the intelligence community after participating in: (1) the Federal Cyber Scholarship-for-Service Program; (2) the National Security Education Program; (3) the Science, Mathematics, and Research for Transformation Defense Education Program; (4) the National Centers of Academic Excellence in Information Assurance and Cyber Defense; or (4) other intelligence community academic, scholarship, fellowship, or internship programs. If elements of the intelligence community do not independently collect such information, the report must address whether they can begin collecting such information during FY2017 and the resources required to independently collect such information.