EXPRESSING OPPOSITION OF CONGRESS TO PRESIDENT CLINTON'S PLANNED DEPLOYMENT OF GROUND FORCES TO BOSNIA; Congressional Record Vol. 141, No. 198
(Senate - December 13, 1995)

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[Pages S18470-S18513]
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   EXPRESSING OPPOSITION OF CONGRESS TO PRESIDENT CLINTON'S PLANNED 
                 DEPLOYMENT OF GROUND FORCES TO BOSNIA

  The Senate continued with the consideration of the concurrent 
resolution.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senate will now resume consideration of 
Senate Concurrent Resolution 35, offered by the Senator from Texas, 
Mrs. Hutchison.
  Mr. DOLE addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The majority leader is recognized.
  Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent the Senate resume 
consideration of Senate Concurrent Resolution 35 and it be in order for 
this Senator to offer my Senate joint resolution and that no amendments 
or motions to commit be in order to either vehicle.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? The Chair hears none, and 
it is so ordered.
  Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, let me indicate that we now have had our 
first vote. We would like to complete action on the concurrent 
resolution authored by Senators Hutchison, Nickles, and others and then 
have that vote very quickly if we can. I know a lot of people want to 
talk, but I think it is general debate. We would also like to have the 
vote on my joint resolution, the Dole-McCain joint resolution, 
sometime, hopefully by 6 o'clock this evening. So that gives us about 5 
hours of debate. We have already had a number of Members, I would say 
about 20 Members, each requesting from 10 minutes to 15 minutes to 90 
minutes.
  Now, we are not going to be able to accommodate everybody, or I hope 
they can accommodate us, and I hope we can, as much as we can, keep our 
remarks limited to 5 or 7 or 8 minutes, because if I just add up these 
requests, this will take us beyond 6 o'clock, probably 7 or 8 o'clock. 
And I would say as the Republican leader, we are trying to accommodate 
the President of the United States. So, hopefully, we will have 
cooperation on both sides. I think the Senator from Texas would like to 
have a vote about what, midafternoon, on her concurrent resolution?
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, yes, I would like to vote as early as 
we can. I think most people are speaking in general terms so I think 
midafternoon. And then I would like to see the final vote on yours 
around 5 so that the House could have the opportunity, if that is 
possible.
  Mr. DOLE. We will do our best.
  Mr. DASCHLE addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The minority leader is recognized.
  Mr. DASCHLE. Let me just add to what the majority leader said. 
Obviously, a lot of Senators wish to speak, for good reason, about this 
issue and on these resolutions. I hope, though, that we could 
accommodate all Senators who wish to speak by shortening the length of 
our statements to the extent that it is practical to do so. Obviously, 
we will have more opportunities once the resolution passes to come to 
the floor and continue this exchange and to continue to express 
ourselves.
  But if we are going to allow every Senator an opportunity to speak, 
we are going to be constrained somewhat in the time allotted for each 
Senator. So I hope everyone will bear that in mind and cooperate to the 
extent it is possible so that we can have a vote at the earliest 
possible time.
  I yield the floor.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, we need to get aunanimous consent on 
the next sequence of speakers. I wish to do that so that people know 
how to plan their afternoon.
  This is the second list after the one that was agreed to earlier, and 
it would include Senator DeWine, then Feinstein, then Lott, then Biden, 
then 

[[Page S18471]]
Ashcroft, Kohl, Hatfield, Levin, Inhofe, Byrd, Faircloth, Wellstone, 
D'Amato, Murray, Leahy, Simon, Bradley, and Nunn, and there will be 
Republicans between Murray, Leahy, Simon, Bradley, and Nunn. Senator 
Murkowski would be after Senator Byrd. I ask unanimous consent that we 
put that order in place so that people can begin to plan. And I urge, 
but do not ask for unanimous consent, that people hold their remarks to 
5 minutes so that everyone will have a chance, with the hope that we 
would be able to vote around midafternoon on the Hutchison-Inhofe 
resolution and then around 5 on the Dole-McCain resolution.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there an objection? The Chair hears none, 
and the additional Senators will be added to the list.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. I thank the Chair.
  Mr. EXON addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senator from 
Nebraska [Mr. Exon] is recognized.
  Mr. President, for the past few weeks, military and civilian 
officials from the administration have come to Congress to make the 
case as to why United States ground troops must be a central part of 
the international peacekeeping force that will go to Bosnia following 
the formal signing of the Dayton peace accord this Thursday in Paris. 
To date, I have withheld final judgment on the advisability of this 
action and kept an open mind to arguments on both sides of the debate. 
I listened closely to President Clinton's national address on Bosnia 
and have discussed, in both public and private forum, some of my 
concerns with members of his cabinet and top military advisers. In 
addition, I have sought and received the advice of my constituents in 
Nebraska, many of whom are members of the Armed Forces or have 
relatives in the services.
  I have been impressed by the bipartisan leadership on this issue by 
Majority Leader Bob Dole and Senator McCain. I support their bipartisan 
amendment.
  The facts are that the President has exercised his constitutional 
authority to dispatch troops to Bosnia. What we do by vote here today 
does not start nor can it stop troop deployment. It's a done deal 
whether we like it or not.
  I have carefully deliberated on the question of blessing or 
condemning the deployment of American peacekeepers in Bosnia. I believe 
there is no more solemn an action the President can take or we as 
Senators can take or vote to endorse the process. The deployment of 
American men and women overseas into a potentially harmful environment 
even though it is advisory, is a legislative action that requires 
particular care and a need for thoughtful introspection that is 
typically not required in the conduct of our day-to-day business. Let 
no one be under any allusions, the collective voice of Congress on the 
issue of troops to Bosnia along with the President's decision as our 
Commander in Chief will have great historic significance, affecting not 
only the short-term prospect of peace in the Balkans but also the long-
term role of America in NATO and as a worldwide leader.
  Some seem to believe that some of us who have served our country in 
the past by being placed in harm's way have some special insight or 
superior wisdom or license to be holier than thou in these decisions. 
Our wartime experience provides us with just that--experience--but not 
necessarily a priviledged status in reasoned decisionmaking because of 
our past valor.
  While the perils of participation in the international peacekeeping 
force in Bosnia are unquestionable, I believe a reasonable case has 
been made for the deployment of American troops there.
  Once the three parties sign the peace agreement in Paris on Thursday. 
For me, the debate boils down to this central question: By risking the 
safety of American troops in the next year do we avoid an even greater 
threat to our national security interests and possible loss of life in 
the future? That is a judgment call. There is no certainty. The 
question is: Will this stitch in time save nine?
  If the United States was to renege on its promise by its President 
and constitutional Commander in Chief to join 27 other nations in the 
NATO-led peacekeeping force, I am concerned the consequences would be 
dramatic and irrevocably harmful to the pursuit of peace and the 
furtherance of our security interests. If the United States does not 
followthrough with its commitment to provide one-third of the Bosnian 
peacekeeping force, it would be the end of American leadership in NATO, 
and likely the end of NATO itself. NATO has been a stabilizing force 
for peace for 50 years. To pull the rug out from under it now at a time 
when a peace agreement has been brokered that will hopefully end a 
brutal 3-year war filled with ethnic cleansing, rape, mass executions, 
and torture would be unconscionable. To scuttle the agreement now would 
throw the region back into the horrific morass of war, guaranteeing 
more civilian deaths, more refugees, more instability in Europe, and 
the very distinct possibility that the fighting will spread and soon 
ensnare other bordering nations, allies of the United States, into 
armed conflict with one another. Opponents of the President's policy 
are fond of delving into history to discuss centuries old animosities 
that exist between the warring factions in Bosnia. Let us not 
conveniently skip over, however, the lessons of World War I and what 
happens when one regional ethnic conflict, left unchecked, draws 
in other nations, which in turn brings still other nations to arms. 
European incubation of World War I and World War II eventually cost us 
522,000 deaths and 875,000 in military casualties. Whether or not we 
like it, it is clear what happens in Europe does affect us.

  Bosnians, Serbians, and Croatians came to Dayton because they sought 
an end to the fighting. The peace agreement reached in Ohio is their 
peace, not a peace that the United States or any other nation is 
imposing upon them. The Dayton agreement is quite clear about what is 
expected of each of the signatory parties. If the agreement is broken 
by any of the three parties, we and the other peacekeeping nations are 
under no obligation or commitment to remain in that troubled country. 
More importantly, the military tasks required of our troops in Bosnia 
have been explicitly set forth and can be accomplished within 12 
months, the 12-month timeframe set by the administration. Our 
peacekeeping troops will be in Bosnia to assist in the separation of 
forces along a 4-kilometer demilitarized zone of separation. We will 
assist in transferring of territories as called for in the Dayton 
agreement. We will be there to break the cycle of violence and ensure 
that all sides are living up to the requirements of the Dayton accord. 
Our ground troops will not be in Bosnia as a police force. They will 
not be asked to disarm militias or move refugees or deliver aid. Nor 
will they be required to perform many of the civilian tasks set forth 
in the Dayton agreement, such as economic reconstruction, supervising 
new elections, or bringing about a military force balance among the 
three entities within Bosnia. These tasks will be performed by 
nongovernmental organizations and other nations. In short, the United 
States military mission in Bosnia is narrow, specific, finite in 
length, and, most importantly, unencumbered by any limitations on 
American unit commanders to preemptively strike at hostile forces and 
otherwise defend our forces using whatever means necessary.

  Secretary of Defense Perry, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General 
Shalikashvili, Secretary of State Christopher, and Ambassador Holbrooke 
have gone the extra mile in my opinion to spell out as best they can 
all the intricacies of our involvement in the implementation force. 
Over many long congressional hearings they have detailed how our troops 
are being trained and prepared for mission, how and when the forces 
will enter the region and the Tuzla Zone, the steps involved with 
implementing the military tasks set forth in the peace agreement, the 
time line for transitioning to peace, and our exit strategy and have 
all been spelled out. The administration has been as forthcoming as 
possible in addressing congressional concerns with respect to rules of 
engagement, the additive cost of the operation, the command and control 
of our forces, and so forth. The steps also have been spelled out that 
will be taken to bring about a balance of military power in the region 
once the peacekeeping force is withdrawn.
  Mr. President, no military operation is risk free. Even during 
peacetime, we 

[[Page S18472]]
lose scores of men and women each year due to training mishaps and 
other duty-related accidents. Life in the Armed Forces is inherently 
dangerous. Like law enforcement and firefighting, they are 
professionals. The profession of soldier is also a voluntary one, 
filled with uncertainty and peril. That is the history of service to 
the United States of America. There are no guarantees about what will 
happen in Bosnia in the next 12 months. With or without congressional 
authorization, the President of the United States, as our Nation's 
Commander in Chief, has the constitutional authority to commit troops 
to the multinational operation in Bosnia. He has done that.
  Over the past 3 years a large number of Senators have taken to this 
floor and given an even greater number of speeches deploring the 
bloodshed in Bosnia and the desperate need to do something--anything--
to end the fighting, end the ethnic cleansing, end the raping, end the 
mass executions. Now, after years of handwriting, a window of 
opportunity has presented itself to see that the ceasefire becomes a 
peace and that the peace, in turn, can mature into lasting stability 
and the restoration of a nation figuratively and literally bled dry. I 
hope that those same Senators who called for action are now ready to 
get behind the President's policy. The reality is that for this process 
to succeed, our Nation's leadership is essential. We cannot simply wish 
for a happy ending in Bosnia. If we want the United States to continue 
to be the world's preeminent power, if we want NATO to remain strong 
and relevant into the 21st century, if we want to prevent the Bosnian 
war from rekindling and potentially spreading into neighboring 
countries, then the United States cannot disengage itself and stand on 
the sidelines and act as a critic.
  Mr. President, preserving stability on the European continent and 
strengthening NATO is in America's national security interests. If it 
was not, then we should bring home the 100,000 Americans we have 
stationed there, close dozens of bases, and cut our $264 billion 
national defense budget by a healthy percentage. But I suspect that 
those who are critical of the President's policy would squeal loudly 
over such a suggestion. Well, Mr. President, you cannot have it both 
ways. If we do not want to be the leader of NATO, then we should 
withdraw our forces and cut our defense budget. If we want to stop the 
slaughter of innocent men, women, and children in Bosnia, we must be 
willing to act, even if it means assuming some risks. The world's 
problems are often complicated. Sometimes it is too much to expect 
antiseptic, risk-free solutions, because they are unreasonable. The 
alternative of isolationism is no alternative, in my opinion, and only 
guarantees our Nation greater problems down the road. We are not 
declaring war, we are declaring peace in conjunction with 27 other 
countries sending in peace-keeping forces at the invitation of the 
previous warring parties. If we were to renege now, America would lose 
its world respect and surely darken and make more somber other 
challenges in the future that could come home to haunt us.
  I urge support for the bipartisan amendment offered and led by the 
majority leader and the Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. President, I yield back the remainder of my time, and I yield the 
floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senator from 
Tennessee [Mr. Frist] is recognized.
  Mr. FRIST. Mr. President, I rise to discuss the issue of American 
troops in Bosnia and Herzegovina. I respectfully, but strongly, 
disagree with the President's decision to deploy U.S. troops there. It 
was the wrong decision. And it is that decision that I will address in 
the next few moments.
  However, before I do, I want to make it as clear as possible that I 
am 100 percent behind our troops now that the commitment has been made 
and the process has begun to deploy them. I will support them and their 
efforts in every way possible. I will work to see that their mission is 
a narrow one, that the exit strategy is clearly defined, and that they 
return home as quickly and safely as possible.
  There are several unsettling aspects of the President's plan to send 
troops to Bosnia. They are questions that, in other circumstances, 
would have been asked and answered during open and public congressional 
debate. Unfortunately, that debate has effectively been denied to the 
American people by the President's unilateral action in committing 
American troops to foreign soil. But I still think it is important to 
ask these questions because, perhaps if they are asked this time, then 
next time they will be answered before we take action.
  The first question: Is this action in the vital national interest of 
the United States? Vital national interests can be clearly and 
specifically defined. They include defense of U.S. territory, support 
of allies who are threatened, support of treaty obligations, or 
protection of economic interests, international waters or U.S. citizens 
in operations abroad. In other words, Mr. President, vital national 
interests are interests clearly worth fighting and dying for.
  I listened to much of the debate yesterday and today and heard many 
of my colleagues address this very issue. Time and time again, the 
debate returned to the question of whether our reasons for being in 
Bosnia would satisfy the mother or the father whose son or daughter is 
killed there and who turns to us directly and asks, ``Why?''
  Like my colleagues, I have failed to hear a satisfactory answer. Some 
say because our credibility is at stake. But is it truly our 
credibility or perhaps NATO's credibility? Mr. President, I believe the 
two may be very different, particularly in a post-cold-war world.
  Others say, because without us there will be no peace. But where have 
we been for the last 3 years, and do we really believe that we can 
create peace among people who do not want it? Do we really believe that 
our presence for 12 months--for 1 year--will suddenly make the warring 
factions who have been at it for nearly 500 years suddenly forget what 
they and their ancestors have been fighting for and live as neighbors 
peacefully? I do not believe so. Mr. President, the situation in 
Bosnia, no matter how tragic, does not equate to a vital national 
interest.
  A second question: What is Congress' role under the Constitution in 
the determination to send combat troops into a conflict such as the one 
we face in Bosnia?
  Certainly the President has the authority to deploy forces in 
situations requiring immediate action, especially in situations where 
vital national interests are threatened. But committing 20,000 American 
troops to hostile territory in an action where no vital U.S. interest 
is at stake, where there is no clearly defined goal or mission, where 
the factions have been warring for centuries, where the situation, 
since the initialing of the peace agreement, has clearly deteriorated 
and where casualties, by the administration's own admission, are 
certain, in my view, necessitated first a full and fair discussion 
between the executive branch and Congress. We owe that to the American 
people and particularly to the American service men and women.
  The need for an open debate on this matter is further highlighted 
when we focus on the peace accord that was reached in Dayton. There are 
real questions as to whether a bifurcated Bosnian state will survive 
or, more importantly, whether two separate political entities can 
function as one country without the constant presence of troops to keep 
the peace.
  Even if the Bosnian conflict did involve the vital interests of the 
United States, I am concerned that the underlying peace agreement is 
fundamentally flawed. Already we have seen towns burned, American flags 
burned, and demonstrations against the Dayton accord because this is a 
forced peace. And, Mr. President, the fact that we are sending our 
troops to support this imposed peace plan with little debate in 
Congress and virtually no support from the American people troubles me 
greatly.
  Third, and perhaps most importantly, how can we prevent this 
situation from occurring again in the future? Before that question can 
be answered, we must first understand how we got to where we are. The 
slippery slope upon which we have now embarked began largely with the 
end of the cold war, when the world reverted to the ethnic, regional 
and subnational violence that characterized it before the rise of the 
bipolar world. 

[[Page S18473]]

  Unfortunately, at that time, America failed to define adequately the 
role it would play. Instead, we began a pattern of committing U.S. 
forces on hastily decided and hastily defined missions of peace, of 
peacekeeping or, tragically, the potential quagmire of peacemaking 
without the advice, consent or even the confidence of the Congress and 
the American people.
  In each instance, we have seen a President obligate funds and scarce 
military resources and place U.S. lives on the line for missions well 
outside what can reasonably be called the vital national interest. And 
in each instance, rosy administration projections and lofty 
humanitarian goals bear no resemblance to the outcome of the missions. 
Just look at Somalia and Haiti today. They are sad mockeries of what we 
were promised they would become once the most powerful military in the 
world cleaned them up.
  So we again face the question, How is it that we ultimately discover 
such a radical difference between the intentions and the outcome and 
that the mission is murkier and the price too high?
  In each and every instance, this disturbing and dangerous precedent 
has been reinforced, making it ever more likely that the pattern will 
be repeated again and again, with Congress offering fewer and fewer 
objections under its authority under the Constitution.
  It is very similar to the case whereby States' rights fell by the 
wayside in the push for a stronger and ever more powerful Federal 
Government.
  In the absence of vital national interests, a lack of clear mission 
has combined with the lack of support of the American people, and we 
have faced a loss of American life. We have ended these missions 
without reaching our goals, without achieving any semblance of peace 
and democracy, and at great cost to the real mission of our Armed 
Forces: To be ready to defend, with overwhelming force and resolve, the 
real threats to our life, liberty, and well-being--or those of our 
allies. Again, Mr. President, we need only look toward our recent 
experiences in Somalia and Haiti.
  In each of these instances, United States and Presidential 
credibility is offered as a reason such ill-conceived initiatives 
cannot be opposed. In the case of Bosnia, the Congress and the people 
are not even given the opportunity to approve or disapprove--but simply 
to give our approval and comment after the fact. Some argue that this 
is the President's prerogative under the Constitution, but it is not a 
shining moment in the life of American democracy. We are asking 
America's finest men and women to face possible death for a commitment 
outside of our national interests.
  And finally, Mr. President, will we continue to commit our blood and 
treasure to every cause which captures the moment, and which appeals to 
our collective sense of justice and compassion? Or will we finally 
define our interests and our policies, so that when a dangerous 
situation arises again--and it will--and when our credibility and vital 
national interests are truly on the line, we will be fully prepared to 
defend them.
  It's an unfortunate and dangerous chapter in the life of our beloved 
democracy, Mr. President, when we are told it was inappropriate to ask 
these questions earlier, because the matter had not been settled, and 
that is inappropriate to raise them now, because the decision has 
already been made.
  At what point do we have the chance to answer those questions? When 
they are placed before us, and when it may be too late? The question 
then becomes, Mr. President: At what point will Americans define 
American interests? I think the time has come to answer these questions 
now--before we are faced with our next Bosnia.
  I thank the chair and I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senator from 
Nevada is recognized.
  Mr. REID. Mr. President, there is a unanimous-consent order already 
in effect regarding the Senators who will speak. I ask unanimous 
consent that the next grouping, following me, would be, first, a 
Republican, and that name will be supplied by the leader. After that, 
Senator Sarbanes, and then another Republican, and after that, Senator 
Kerry of Massachusetts.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. REID. Mr. President, as Members of the Senate, the most important 
and really solemn votes that we cast are those which put at risk the 
lives of American servicemen and women.
  I have long been concerned about the conflict in Bosnia and the 
potential United States military role in ending the conflict in Bosnia. 
Mr. President, I have stated on many occasions on this floor, and in 
various places in the State of Nevada, that I personally do not believe 
that U.S. ground troops should be committed to keep the peace in this 
centuries-old civil war in Europe. But still, Mr. President, I 
recognize that I am not the Commander in Chief of the armed services of 
the United States, nor does the President need congressional approval 
to dispatch U.S. troops on this type of a peace mission.
  Mr. President, I am going to support the resolution that has been 
drafted by the Senator from Arizona, the majority leader, and the 
ranking member of the Armed Services Committee, Senator Nunn. But I say 
that I support that resolution, not because President Clinton is in 
office and is a Democrat. I would remind my colleagues, that I stood 
here and was the first Democrat to publicly support the Desert Storm 
operation in Iraq. I was standing here, and I received a call from 
then-President Bush. I was getting ready to speak on the floor. I told 
him that he did not have to ask me, I have already agreed. So I am 
going to support this resolution because I believe it is the right 
thing to do, not because the President is a Democrat. I would do the 
same for a Republican, as I have shown in the past.
  There comes a time that we in Congress, despite our opinions about a 
President's prerogatives, must lay our criticisms aside. I have given 
plenty of criticism on this issue. This is a time, Mr. President, when, 
despite our opinions, we must lay our criticism aside. As I speak, 
troops are being deployed in Bosnia. As I speak, troops are on their 
way to Bosnia by train and airplane and other vehicles. Whether this 
Bosnian peace agreement will be recorded in the history books as the 
end of a centuries-old conflict remains to be seen. In the meantime, 
the President has made his decision, and I now believe all Americans 
should stand behind those whose lives will be on the line in Bosnia.
  A number of my colleagues have cited the war in Vietnam in their 
statements in opposition to the deployment in Bosnia. I also would draw 
a comparison between the two situations, but for a different reason. 
The fine young men and women who risked their lives and, in many cases, 
sacrificed their lives in Vietnam had to perform their missions in the 
face of enormous disagreement at home about their presence overseas. 
They came home to protests, and they came home to anger. We should have 
learned by now that dissent at home costs American lives, because 
dissent encourages the enemy to kill Americans. Dissent at home costs 
American lives.
  Our colleague, the distinguished senior Senator from Arizona, 
understands what a blow that kind of civilian denunciation can mean to 
our military forces. His statements in this Chamber gave me great 
pause, as I pondered the vote I must make relative to my own personal 
misgivings. I commend Senator McCain, a war hero by any measure, for 
the work he has done on this resolution. I understand that in Arizona 
the vast majority of people think the President's decision is wrong. It 
is the same in Nevada. Therefore, it gives me even more pause to think 
how difficult this was for Senator McCain, but how right it was for 
Senator McCain.
  I also commend the distinguished majority leader for crafting a 
compromise that gives congressional support for the deployment of 
troops, but that better clarifies and defines the U.S. mission and the 
criteria that will determine its success.
  This mission must not fall into the trap of what is known as mission 
creep, where an initial goal grows vague and extended. Our troops must 
go in with a clearly defined and achievable goal and come out in a 
timely manner. This resolution, the McCain-Dole-Nunn resolution 
certainly does that.
  I intend, I think, along with a number of my other colleagues, to 
closely monitor the progress of the United 

[[Page S18474]]
States mission in Bosnia, to do it throughout the year. I look forward 
to the return of the American troops--hopefully before the year is out, 
certainly by the time the year is up.
  The commanders of NATO and the U.S. military leaders who trained our 
troops for the mission have taken every step possible to ensure the 
troops' security, but we know it would be naive to think there will be 
no casualties and we will all grieve the loss of even one American 
life. But if there is any lesson we learned from Vietnam, it is that we 
cannot send American troops overseas with a denunciation of their 
mission.
  I choose now to support the Dole-McCain resolution containing some 
defined parameters for American involvement rather than disagree with 
the President's decision.
  I was on the floor earlier today, right before the first vote, when 
the majority leader made a statement. He clearly defined the 
resolution, and he talked about heroes. John McCain was one he 
mentioned. He mentioned others. But it was interesting to note that he 
did not talk about himself.
  We have in this Chamber some people who have sacrificed a great deal 
for our country. Senator McCain, of course, was a prisoner of war in 
Vietnam for 6 years, in solitary confinement for half that time. We 
have other people who sacrificed a great deal. Senator John Chafee was 
a hero in the Second World War and the Korean conflict. Senator Heflin 
saw service in the Second World War. Senator Glenn was a marine pilot 
in the Second World War, in Korea, and then, of course, was an 
astronaut. We could go on and on with the list of people who sacrificed 
a great deal who now are serving their country in the U.S. Senate. But 
I think it is interesting to note Senator Dole did not talk about 
himself. He has sacrificed as much as anyone in the service to his 
country. During the Second World War, he was wounded. He almost died.
  So I think the record should reflect the courage of Senator Dole in 
sponsoring this amendment and drafting this resolution. It would have 
been very easy for Senator Dole--not only the majority leader but a 
Presidential candidate, who likely will be the Republican nominee for 
President next year--to have taken the easy way out. Would it not have 
been easy for him to demagog this issue and to be opposed to Bill 
Clinton? That would have been the easy thing for Robert Dole to do, but 
he did not do that. It is because of what he did and what Senator 
McCain did that there are people like Senator Reid of Nevada, willing 
to swallow, maybe, a little bit of pride, and support this resolution 
about which these two men, who are certifiable heroes, have said: Our 
troops are on their way there. Some of them are already there. It is 
wrong not to have this body support them in everything that they do 
while they are there.
  So I want the record to reflect the fact that Senator Dole in his 
statement this morning did not mention his own name. I understand that 
shows humility, but I want the record to reflect that of all the people 
who served in the U.S. Senate who have records of heroism in service in 
the military, to our country, no record tops that of Senator Robert 
Dole.
  I do not want the men and women who go to Bosnia--not to make war but 
to support a peace--to wonder whether the American people support them, 
whether this Congress supports them, and whether this Senator from 
Nevada supports them. I support them.
  The holiday season is upon us. My thoughts and my prayers are with 
the families who will not be together this year because of this 
deployment. We have seen them interviewed on CNN and in other news 
stories, how they are going to spend Christmas away from their wives 
and children and husbands. I commend the men and women who will serve 
this Nation with honor and courage in Bosnia. I do so with faith and 
hope in their ability to achieve this mission of bringing peace and 
stability to Europe.


                      Unanimous-Consent Agreement

  Mr. REID. Mr. President, I have a unanimous-consent request I would 
like to propound.
  I ask unanimous consent to add to the sequence that has presently 
been placed in the Record a Republican Senator; following that will be 
Senator Dodd; after that, a Republican Senator; after that, Senator 
Bryan; after that, a Republican Senator; after that, Senator Dorgan; 
after that, a Republican Senator; after that, Senator Glenn; after 
that, a Republican Senator; after that, Senator Harkin; after that, a 
Republican Senator, and after that, Senator Lautenberg.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Under the previous order, the Senator from Pennsylvania, Senator 
Specter, is recognized.
  Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, the most weighty factor in deciding how 
to vote on the Bosnian resolution is that United States troops will be 
deployed in Bosnia regardless of what Congress does, since there are 
not enough votes to cut off the funding. In fact, the advanced troops 
are already in Bosnia. Not only is the congressional vote 
nondeterminative, but the debate has been advanced and the votes 
expedited in the expectation that there will be some show of 
congressional support to bolster our troops' morale. Certainly we 
should do that. So that with the troops on the way and the 
congressional vote nondeterminative, all the Congress can do now is to 
make the best of it.
  After extensive discussions with my constituents, my colleagues in 
the Senate, and executive branch officials, it is my view that the 
United States does not have a vital national interest in Bosnia to 
justify sending United States troops there. When President Clinton 
called me, almost 2\1/2\ weeks ago, seeking my support, I asked the 
President what was the vital United States national interest. He 
responded by commenting on the widespread killing.
  I said I was very concerned about the atrocities, the mass killings 
and genocide, but asked him how that distinguished Bosnia from Rwanda 
or other trouble spots around the world. President Clinton then warned 
about the conflict spreading to other nations of Central Europe.
  I asked if that posed a security threat to members of NATO, which 
would activate our treaty obligations on the principle that an attack 
on one is an attack on all. The President said that he was not basing 
the national security interest on a treaty obligation on that issue.
  In extended informal discussions with colleagues, some Senators have 
argued that a vital United States national interest arises in a number 
of contexts. For example, some contend that the stability of Central 
Europe is vital to U.S. security. Other Senators have said that an 
opportunity to involve Russia in the joint action with NATO rises to 
the level of a vital national interest. Others say that there is a 
vital United States national interest in ousting the Iranians from 
Bosnia, so that the fundamentalists do not gain a foothold in that 
important region.
  Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger articulates a vital U.S. 
interest in the following way.

       The paradox of the decision before Congress is that, while 
     we have no inherent national interest to justify the sending 
     of troops, a vital national interest has been created by the 
     administration's policy.

  Dr. Kissinger continues:

       If other nations cease to believe our assurances, our 
     capacity to shape events, to protect American security and 
     values will be jeopardized.

  The problem with Dr. Kissinger's analysis is that it gives the 
President the power to create a vital national interest by unilaterally 
making an American commitment without the consent of Congress in the 
context where the consent of Congress is necessary to bind the United 
States. My own judgment is that those considerations do not aggregate 
to a vital United States national interest.
  U.S. national security is not imminently threatened, and we are not 
the world's policeman. It may be that at some point there will be 
consideration to the deployment of U.S. troops for international moral 
commitments or from some other standard, but the vital national 
interest context has been that which has traditionally governed the 
deployment of U.S. military personnel. So far, they are proposed to be 
only peacekeepers. But it is a short distance from being peacekeepers 
to being in harm's way, and really, even being peacekeepers is in 
harm's way, with the troops that are already there being apprehensive 
about taking a step off a tarmac out of concern about stepping on a 
landmine. 

[[Page S18475]]

  In 1991 on this floor I had the privilege to participate in the 
debate on the resolution for the use of force as to the gulf war. I 
believe that it was indispensable that Congress pass on that matter, 
even though it was a Republican President, President Bush, who in late 
1990 said a number of things about dispatching troops there involving 
the United States without congressional approval. But ultimately the 
President did bring back the issue to the House and to the Senate. And 
we had debates about vital national interest. A number of us were on 
the floor at that time--Senator Warner, Senator Nunn, and others--and 
comments in the media were that it was a historic debate about what are 
United States vital national interests.
  At least, in my own judgment, we have not seen the establishment of 
the vital national interest in what we have present today in Bosnia. 
But that is a judgment call like so many other judgments that we have 
here.
  In the absence of a vital national interest, it is my judgment that 
the Congress should support the troops, without endorsing the 
President's policy. Our congressional action should show as much 
national unity as possible under the circumstances and project American 
leadership to the maximum extent possible consistent with congressional 
policy not to give the President a blank check.
  It is obviously going to be a tough winter and a tough year for our 
troops so we should be as supportive as possible where they are 
concerned.
  I am encouraged by the testimony presented to the Senate Intelligence 
Committee from the executive branch. We convened those hearings in the 
Intelligence Committee, which I chair. The executive branch officials 
testified that our troops will be authorized by the rules of engagement 
to defend themselves on their finding of hostile intent rather than 
hostile action.
  That means that our troops will not have to wait until they are shot 
at; but they can take preemptive action if they conclude that there is 
hostile intent. The anticipation of hostile action gives them the 
discretion to make the judgment that preemptive action is warranted.
  It is obviously problemsome on U.S. international relationships for 
the Congress to pull out the rug from the President's unilateral 
commitments to our allies. However, it is fundamental in our 
constitutional separation of power that the President's authority in 
foreign policy and as Commander in Chief is limited by Congress' 
authority on appropriations and the declaration of war. And the 
Founding Fathers were explicit in having that kind of a separation of 
powers, and that is what we are concerned about here today.

  My preference, as I expressed it to the President in our 
conversation, was that the President come to the Congress with 
authorization in advance of dispatching the troops to Bosnia. We have 
learned from the bitter experience of Vietnam that the United States 
cannot prosecute a war, or really any extended military operation, 
without the backing of the American people. And the first line of that 
determination is to have the backing of the Congress. The President 
chose not to do so.
  When we take a look at what our allies' expectation has been, or 
should be, we have to note that repeatedly congressional action in 
opposing President Clinton's Bosnia policy has put our allies squarely 
on notice that the Congress might well disavow the President's 
promises. It was plain on the public record that the Congress voted 
overwhelmingly to lift the arms embargo unilaterally to allow the 
Bosnian Moslems to defend themselves against Serbian atrocities. In the 
Senate we had a vote of 69 to 29. In the House the vote was 298 to 128. 
All of that required a Presidential veto. And it was only after those 
overwhelming votes occurred in both Houses of Congress that the 
President's policy in Bosnia was activated.
  For a long period of time many of us had urged the executive branch 
to undertake massive bombing using our tremendous air power, and we 
were met with the response that in the absence of ground troops the 
bombing would not be effective. Once that bombing was initiated, 
however, quite the opposite occurred from what the administration and 
the Department of Defense officials had predicted, and it brought the 
Bosnian Serbs to their knees. It brought them to the bargaining table. 
And this agreement has been worked out.
  But it is in this context of the very severe disagreement that has 
been expressed by this Senator--and many others on this floor and in 
the House of Representatives--that the allies, the other party 
signatory to the agreement in Dayton, have been squarely on notice that 
the Congress might well disagree with the President.
  The institutional conflicts between the Congress and the President on 
foreign policy have a long history. Many have challenged the 
President's actions in ordering United States troops to fight wars 
without congressional authorization in Korea and Vietnam. The War 
Powers Act was an effort to establish constitutional balance. But that 
War Powers Act met with little success.
  President Clinton took the initiative in ordering an invasion of 
Haiti in the face of overwhelming congressional resolutions expressing 
disapproval of that Presidential action. Fortunately, it turned out to 
be a bloodless invasion when potential opposition withdrew.
  So, Mr. President, our allies have been on notice. Depending on 
future events, the Congress may have to assert its authority to cut off 
funding, if we conclude that the President has exceeded his authority 
or has pursued unwise policies. Those are congressional prerogatives, 
and under our constitutional system of separation of powers they have 
to be zealously guarded and observed. But since the President is not 
now usurping congressional authority to involve the United States in 
war, and since the votes are obviously not present to cut off funding, 
we should make the best of the situation in formulating a resolution to 
support the troops, and demonstrate as much national unity as possible.
  To the extent possible, the resolution should impose the maximum 
pressure to strengthen the Bosnian Moslems militarily to establish a 
balance of power in that area so that our troops may be withdrawn at 
the earliest practical date. An exit policy from Bosnia will turn on 
there being a balance of power there.
  It is critical for the United States and its NATO allies to 
articulate a plan for equipping and training the Bosnian Army. 
Regrettably, the administration has been reluctant to articulate such a 
policy. But, in letters just publicized yesterday and today, we may 
have those assurances. And those assurances and that action ought to be 
subject to the maximum possible congressional power and persuasion.
  Arming the Bosnians is critical for two reasons.
  First, it will help ensure a balance of power in the region--a 
balance that currently favors Serbia and Croatia.
  Second, the Bosnian Army must be armed before the NATO implementation 
force can leave. As former Under Secretary of Defense, Paul Wolfowitz, 
recently noted, ``Until the Bosnians have the capability of defending 
themselves, it will be impossible for us to withdraw without terrible 
consequences.''
  In addition, we should do our best to use the current situation in 
Bosnia to establish important international law precedents against 
genocide, and to prosecute war criminals.
  Bosnian-Serb leader Radovan Karadzic and army commander Ratko Mladic 
and others under indictment should be brought to trial in the War 
Crimes Tribunal. This is a unique opportunity to follow up on the 
Nuremberg precedent and to establish an international rule of law.
  Since 1989 the United States has been a signatory to the 
International Genocide Convention. The United States has been a leader 
in instituting the War Crimes Tribunal.
  For years, I have pressed resolutions adopted by the Congress to set 
up an international criminal court with the principal thrust to control 
international terrorism and drug dealing.
  It has been my view that, while it has been impossible to get 
countries like Colombia to extradite to the United States, if there 
were an international criminal court, that might be doable in a 
practical political context. And we have yet to be able to put our 
hands on the Libyans under indictment for the terrorism against Pan Am 
103.
  And there again, if an international criminal court were present, it 
might 

[[Page S18476]]
be possible to have extradition to such a court if extradition to 
Scotland or England or the United States cannot be obtained. And it is 
very important for us to press ahead on these prosecutions under the 
War Crimes Tribunal.
  In 1993, my amendment was adopted to provide $3 million to assist the 
prosecutor in gathering evidence against those who committed atrocities 
and mass killings in Bosnia. We should press all parties to the peace 
agreement to make their maximum efforts to bring the war criminals to 
trial. My recent meeting with Chief Prosecutor Justice Goldstone 
provides encouragement that a significant international legal precedent 
can be achieved in that tribunal. International action against mass 
killings and genocide would promote an important goal of the law of 
nations.
  My discussions with Secretary of State Warren Christopher and 
National Security Adviser Anthony Lake provide reassurance on the firm 
U.S. policy to bring the war criminals to trial. For myself and many 
others in the Congress, continued support of the Bosnian operation 
would be materially affected by the intensity demonstrated to bring 
such war criminals to justice.
  While I do think it an unwise policy to deploy United States troops 
to Bosnia, I am very much concerned about the kind of isolationist 
rhetoric that we have heard in this Chamber in the past 2 days. I have 
consistently supported a robust national defense and a robust foreign 
policy by the United States, an attitude gleaned from my earliest days 
studying international relations as a student many years ago at the 
University of Pennsylvania.
  The United States should not turn to isolationism, but neither should 
we turn to being the policeman of the world when there are incidents 
around the world, and so many of them, without having a vital U.S. 
national interest involved. But weapons systems, army divisions, and 
aircraft carriers are not enough to ensure our security. We must be 
committed to the notion that the United States needs to be engaged 
throughout the world diplomatically, economically, militarily, and 
always carefully. We need to use all our instruments of national power 
to shape the international security environment in a way that 
guarantees American security. In my judgment, for the reasons I have 
outlined, Bosnia and the Balkans do not rise to that level. But by the 
same token, we must be careful to resist instantaneous or knee-jerk 
reactions to any use of U.S. military force even where we did so in 
Desert Storm.
  Mr. President, these are obviously matters of great complexity. We 
vote on them in a series of resolutions trying to exercise our best 
judgment, knowing that the troops are on the way, whatever we do. We 
obviously will follow the matter very closely through our congressional 
action in a variety of committees, including the Senate Intelligence 
Committee, which I chair, to bring our best judgment to bear on the 
Bosnian situation, to support the troops wherever we can and to bring 
them home as soon and as safely as possible.
  I yield the floor.
  Mrs. BOXER addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Kyl). Under the previous order, the 
Senator from California is recognized.
  Mrs. BOXER. I thank the Chair very much.
  I rise today in support of the peacekeeping mission in Bosnia as long 
as it remains a peacekeeping mission. I also rise to express my strong 
support for our men and women in uniform who will be one-third of the 
peacekeeping force.
  We are here debating one of the most difficult and important 
decisions to face us as legislators, the deployment of American troops 
overseas. The commitment of our troops is never an issue to be taken 
lightly, so I thank the leadership for bringing this issue to the 
floor.
  I also wish to thank those committees that have held hearings on this 
issue over the past few weeks and the administration witnesses who have 
answered questions openly, candidly, and directly. These hearings have 
proven very informative and have helped me to reach my decision.
  I support the participation of U.S. troops in I-For first and 
foremost because the mission as spelled out by the President and 
subsequently by the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff is a true peacekeeping mission. This is not like the 
Persian Gulf war when we were sending our men and women off to fight a 
war. We are sending our men and women to be one-third of a peacekeeping 
force, keeping the peace as a result of the Dayton peace accord which 
is supported by all the parties involved.
  This is a point I believe must be made perfectly clear. The major 
combatants in Bosnia support this peace agreement. We are not going to 
Bosnia to force a United States vision of peace upon them. We are going 
to help implement their vision, their agreement.
  If we were not truly peacekeepers, I could not support this mission, 
and if at some future date the Dayton peace agreement changes course, I 
will immediately reevaluate my position.
  I have listened with great interest to Secretary Perry, General 
Shalikashvili, and other military and civilian leaders who have 
explained the rules of engagement for our troops in Bosnia. When I was 
a member of the House Armed Services Committee, I realized how crucial 
it is for our troops to have very clear rules of engagement. I have 
seen tragedy occur, and we have lost men and women in uniform because 
the rules were unclear. In my view, it is essential that our troops 
have the ability to aggressively respond to threats to themselves or to 
their mission. They must not be required to consult with anyone before 
responding to a potentially life-threatening situation.
  On this point, I quote the Secretary of Defense, William Perry, who 
said:

       If our forces are attacked or if hostile intent is 
     demonstrated by opposing forces, our rules of engagement will 
     permit the immediate and effective use of deadly force.

  In all of his speeches, the President has been very clear on this 
point. The message he has sent is clear and unmistakable: the first 
enemy that tries to harm our troops will never forget the lesson of the 
fateful misjudgment of our power.
  So the mission is clear and the rules of engagement are robust. The 
final element is to assure that our exit strategy is adequate and, in 
my view, it is. After close examination, I am satisfied on these 
points.
  The administration has publicly stated that our troops will come home 
in about a year. I support that kind of a timeframe. Our mission is to 
keep peace for about a year, and after that it is up to the parties to 
the agreement to sustain it. When we leave, we must leave with a much 
more balanced situation in terms of military balance. And I am pleased 
that Members of Congress have talked to the administration about this, 
and have received clear assurances that when we leave we will not go 
back to the status quo. This is very important.

  I want to make it clear that I support our participation in the 
peacekeeping force, not because the President wants it but because I 
believe it is the right thing to do. I know that some have argued we 
should support deploying our troops simply because the President has 
committed us and we must not act to undermine the Presidency. However, 
I take a different view. I believe that as the President accepts 
responsibility for his decision as Commander in Chief, we must accept 
full responsibility for our vote on this matter.
  I believe that the Congress has the absolute right to deny any 
President the funds to carry out this or any other mission. In this 
case, I did not vote to deny the President the funds, and I will not 
support the Hutchison amendment. However, the Senator from Texas has 
every right to offer it, and every Member here has every right to vote 
for it, just as they had every right to vote for the prior amendment we 
just disposed of which dealt with cutting off funds.
  So I believe that when I cast a vote for the Dole-McCain-Nunn 
amendment, I am doing the right thing, and I take full responsibility 
for it. I am not ducking behind it and saying it is because the 
President thinks it is the right thing to do. I have not voted with 
this President before on the question of Bosnia. I have voted, in fact, 
against him on two other occasions. When I vote for this, I do not do 
so as a weak partner of the executive branch but as a strong partner. 
If at some future time I disagree with the administration policy, as I 
have done in the past, I will speak out and vote accordingly. 

[[Page S18477]]

  We now have the opportunity to help bring peace to Bosnia. I believe 
that as long as our troops are part of a larger force, as long as the 
mission is peace and as long as we have an approximate exit date, I 
will be supportive of this mission.
  Mr. President, it is a rare moment in history that we have a chance 
to stop a genocide and generations of hatred. It is rare that we have a 
chance to stop the spread of war in a region where we have lost 
thousands and thousands of Americans. Some of our very own colleagues 
walk on this floor with the wounds of those wars.
  This is not some area of the world where war is unknown. Sadly, it 
is. We have seen war spread. Now, maybe, just maybe, the President has 
done something here that will stop a war from spreading. We do not know 
that. I may be back on this floor saying, ``Bring the troops home. I 
was wrong.''
  But in the war that I well remember that got me into politics, the 
Vietnam war, we said, ``Give peace a chance'' in those days, and I 
think ``give peace a chance'' has not lost its meaning in this 
circumstance, after generations of genocide and hatred. I lost part of 
my family in a genocide.
  Now we have a chance to stop it. At the minimum--at the minimum--if 
things go reasonably well, when we leave there we will leave there in a 
way where the various parties to this conflict are at least on a level 
playing field, which I think is very, very important. If there is a 
pause in the fighting, it may lead to a lasting peace as a result of 
our participation in this force.
  So let us give this peace a chance as long as it is truly a 
peacekeeping operation. Let us support our men and women who are going 
over there in a tough time, Christmastime. Let us not send signals of 
equivocation about that support. Let us support the Dole-McCain-Nunn 
amendment.
  I thank you, Mr. President, and I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, Senator Domenici and 
then Senator Kerrey are to be recognized.
  Mr. WARNER addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia is recognized.
  Mr. WARNER. I thank the Chair.
  I ask unanimous consent that I be recognized to speak at the time 
that Senator Domenici was originally to be recognized in the unanimous-
consent agreement, and that he take the place that I had.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. Would the Senator from Virginia let me make one more 
unanimous-consent request?
  Mr. WARNER. Absolutely, Mr. President.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the names 
of Senators Hatch and Chafee be added to the next available Republican 
slots, which I believe would follow Leahy and Simon.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. I thank the Chair. And I thank the Senator from 
Virginia.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, before the distinguished Senator from 
California leaves the floor, I'd like to say I was greatly taken by her 
closing remarks. And I think I jotted it down accurately. I may be 
wrong. ``I may be back here on the floor asking that we bring our 
troops home.''
  I say to the Senator, that is precisely why I oppose this 
Presidential decision to send to Bosnia a third significant element of 
U.S. troops--that is, troops on the ground. This Nation experienced the 
problem of Congress acting to withdraw our troops from Lebanon. This 
Nation experienced that problem in Somalia. I happened to have been on 
this floor protecting Presidential prerogative--at the time we took 
serious casualties in Somalia, some 18 killed in one day and some 80-
plus wounded on that same day--and I said it is the President's 
decision as Commander in Chief when a military mission is completed and 
when our forces should be brought home.
  We had a very vigorous battle right here on the floor of the Senate 
about that Somalia situation. And it was a tough fight to establish the 
President's clear right to determine when to bring those troops home 
and not rush to judgment in the sorrow of those severe casualties.
  Mrs. BOXER. May I respond?
  Mr. WARNER. This is what bothered me. The credibility of the United 
States of America will be far more endangered if we are faced in 6 or 8 
months with a decision to bring our troops home because of casualties 
and other unforeseen problems, than if we make the stand now not to go 
forward with this mission.
  Mrs. BOXER. Would the Senator yield for a very brief moment?
  Mr. WARNER. Yes. I do not yield the floor, but for a question.
  Mrs. BOXER. I understand.
  I just wanted to respond to my friend. I will, of course, put it in 
the form of a question. But the deployments that my friend talked about 
I did not support. I come here to say that I think it is worth a try in 
an area of the world where we have lost thousands and thousands and 
thousands of Americans.
  If the Senator believes that there is no chance that this war can 
spread and this mission cannot change that and is not important and is 
not worth trying, then he should absolutely vote against the Dole-
McCain amendment. And I respect his right.
  All this Senator is saying is that I have waited, and I believe--and 
I take full responsibility for that vote, and I respect my friend if he 
comes down on the other side--in this part of the world we have an 
opportunity to make a difference for peace. If it does not work out, we 
at least have tried to do so.
  I do view it quite differently than in the other areas that my friend 
has pointed to. I did not support those deployments, I say to my 
friend.
  I guess I did not have a question. I merely wanted to respond, but I 
have the utmost respect for my friend for whatever conclusion he 
reaches, and I hope he would have that same respect for this Senator if 
she comes down on the other side.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I say to my colleague from California, 
this vote is a clear vote of conscience, not politics, and each of us 
has to draw on our own life experiences, our own best judgment and make 
this tough decision.
  Mrs. BOXER. I agree with my friend.
  Mr. WARNER. I am on the side opposite the Senator from California and 
will oppose the President's deployment decision.
  Mr. President, I will go into some detail regarding my concerns. 
Indeed, this is one of the most important debates that I have been 
privileged to participate in in the recent history of the U.S. Senate. 
Our Nation has experienced a gradually growing involvement of its Armed 
Forces in the tragic civil war in Bosnia and other contiguous areas in 
the former Yugoslavia.
  Over the past year, U.S. airmen have flown the majority of the air 
missions over Bosnia, and U.S. Navy and Marine Corps personnel 
stationed in the Adriatic off the Dalmatian coast have provided a very 
significant percentage of the ships and personnel involved in the naval 
operations in that region.
  America is heavily committed militarily with its NATO allies and 
others at this very moment. There is a misconception that we are not 
involved in Bosnia and that we have to go. Wrong. We are there, very 
significantly, at this particular time, and we have been there for 
almost two years.
  But now the President has directed a further and very significant 
expansion of U.S. military involvement. I credit the President, the 
Secretary of State, and others for working out an agreement which I do 
not refer to as a peace agreement. Nevertheless, it is an agreement 
that has led to a very substantial lessening of the hostilities. It is 
an agreement that possibly could at some future date form the 
foundation for a cessation of hostilities, but I do not find that 
condition to exist now.
  Therefore, the President has ordered ground troops, some 20,000, for 
actual deployment to Bosnia and approximately another 14,000 to be 
deployed to nearby geographic regions as support and backup forces.
  It is interesting, when this mission was first described by the 
President back in February 1993, it was always said that we were going 
to send in 20,000 ground troops. But now we learn that almost a force 
of equal size will be required as backup. That is prudent military 
planning, but the initial impression across the land was of a lesser 
number. 

[[Page S18478]]

  Ever since this Presidential decision nearly 2 years ago, I have 
consistently expressed my concerns. Today, I join with many other 
Senators in expressing my total disagreement with the President. I do 
so respectful of his role as President, as Commander in Chief, but I am 
sure the President recognizes I have a right to express my views and I 
do so as a matter of conscience.
  President Clinton made this decision on his own, without that level 
of consultation from the Congress that I believe was necessary and 
might have contributed to a different decision.
  And now the Congress is left with trying to decide how best, as the 
elected representatives of the people, we can ensure that the voice of 
the American people is heard. I am privileged to do so on behalf of 
many, many Virginians with whom I have visited and from whom I have 
heard over the past months.
  Mr. President, I have always been a strong supporter of Presidential 
constitutional prerogatives in the area of foreign policy--I expressed 
that in my colloquy with the distinguished Senator from California--and 
particularly the President's authority as Commander in Chief. This very 
phrase is embodied in our Constitution. As Commander in Chief, the 
President has the right to deploy, send beyond our shores into harm's 
way if necessary, the men and women of the Armed Forces of the United 
States.
  Presidents have judiciously exercised that awesome power since the 
very formative days of our Republic. Therefore, I do not challenge the 
constitutional authority of the President to deploy United States 
ground troops to Bosnia. He has that right under the Constitution. I 
do, however, challenge the wisdom of President Clinton's decision to 
involve this third significant element of United States forces, namely 
on the ground in the territory of Bosnia.
  On the question of constitutional authority on this matter, I ask 
unanimous consent, Mr. President, to have printed in the Record 
following my remarks a very fine analysis of that issue by Lloyd 
Cutler, former Counsel to the President.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  (See exhibit 1.)
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, since the beginning of the conflict in 
Bosnia in 1992, as I said, I have consistently opposed the use of 
United States ground troops. Today, we are faced with the situation of 
what do we do now, given the President's commitment? My votes today 
expressing opposition to this Presidential decision go back to the 
fundamental question: Does the United States have a vital--and I repeat 
and emphasize the word ``vital''--national security interest at stake 
in this region of the world, such vital security interest of a level 
that would justify the added deployment of United States ground troops 
into a region that we know is fraught with risk?
  I see on the floor the distinguished Senator from Nebraska. I was 
privileged to accompany him to this region, the region of Krajina, in 
early September. We saw with our own eyes the ravages of this war-torn 
region. We looked into the faces of the refugees, combatants and 
noncombatants alike. This was the fifth in a series of trips I have 
conducted to this region over the years since the conflict has started.
  I wish to acknowledge, Mr. President, to my colleague, how much I 
value the opportunity to travel with this distinguished Senator, a 
former naval officer, highly decorated, a man whose judgment and 
opinion I greatly value on military matters.
  The reason I raise this is that I wish to apply a test to this 
deployment decision along these lines: Would I be able to go into the 
home of a service person who had been either killed or wounded in 
Bosnia as a consequence of this proposed deployment and explain to a 
parent or a spouse or a child why their loved one was sent to Bosnia 
and why their sacrifice was justified?
  This is a duty I performed earlier in life as a young Marine officer 
and again as Secretary of the Navy, and it is not an easy one, Mr. 
President. I apply that test today.
  I could not justify such a sacrifice, given the current situation in 
that region and the current status diplomatically and militarily of all 
the circumstances surrounding this peace accord.
  I have listened carefully to the administration's justification for 
this deployment, but I do not find a vital United States national 
security interest at stake in Bosnia that would justify the use of 
ground troops at this time in that nation.
  I do not want to see further American casualties in trying to resolve 
a civil war, based on centuries-old religious and cultural hatreds, 
which none of us understand. I certainly say, as hard as I have 
studied, and based on five trips, I do not understand how people in 
this civilized age of mankind can treat one another this way. These are 
well-educated people. Yet, they behave in such a manner as to be on the 
borderline of savagery. I cannot understand it, Mr. President.
  I remember so well a hearing of the Armed Services Committee in the 
aftermath of Somalia. I remember a Col. Larry Joyce, the father of a 
young Ranger who was killed in the October 3-4 raid in Somalia which I 
described earlier. He came before the committee and he said to the 
Senators as follows:

       Too frequently, policymakers are insulated from the misery 
     they create. If they could be with the chaplain who rings the 
     doorbell at 6:20 in the morning to tell a 22-year-old woman 
     she is now a widow, they would develop their policies more 
     carefully.

  I would hope that the Somalia experience would cause us to more 
carefully consider the policy decisions that put at risk the men and 
women who serve in the Armed Forces.
  I have been deeply moved, as has every other Member of the Senate, 
and indeed all Americans, by the suffering we have seen in Bosnia as a 
consequence of the hatreds and atrocities in that region. I have seen 
it in their faces, in the hospitals we visited and in the wanton 
destruction of the homes and properties--homes which are so essential 
for the return of the many refugees. Senator Kerrey and I witnessed, as 
we went through the villages, a row of houses, and one house with the 
geraniums out, the fresh laundry hanging out, and the house right next 
to it was flattened to the ground--flattened because it was once 
occupied by a Serb. That Serb had fled this village where he or she or 
the family had lived for years with their neighbors, but they were 
forced to leave in the face of the Croatian military advance. And the 
locals destroyed the Serb house--the house being a symbol of their 
hatred for that individual--and they blew it up, destroyed it, so that 
it would be of no use to anyone ever again. We saw that, as the Senator 
will recall, in village after village--a manifestation of hatred, which 
we cannot understand.
  I remember so well the Secretary of Defense in his testimony before 
our committee saying, ``My greatest fear in this operation is the 
hatreds among the people in the region.'' That is what concerns me. I 
do not want to see 20,000 U.S. troops placed in the middle of this 500-
year-old sea of hatred.
  Mr. President, we have heard President Clinton say that United States 
troops are not being sent to Bosnia to fight a war, but rather to help 
implement a peace agreement. According to a December 2 radio address by 
the President, ``It is a peace that the people of Bosnia want. It is a 
peace that they have demanded.''
  Yet, I say to my colleagues, most respectfully, I disagree with the 
President's assessment. I think the events of recent days, of recent 
weeks, of recent months, have been a harbinger of things to come. At 
the very time IFOR is beginning its deployment to Bosnia, Bosnian 
Croats are burning villages which will be returned to Bosnian Serb 
control--villages which we, the West, will have to rebuild. Reach into 
your pockets and take out the funds we are going to be asked to 
contribute to rebuild these houses, which have been wantonly destroyed, 
not as a consequence of troops marching through--in some instances, 
yes--but largely because of the hatred that exists.
  These are not the actions of a people who have embraced a peace. At 
this point, all we can really say is that the three leaders of this 
region have done their best to work out an agreement. But only time 
will tell the extent to which the people will eventually embrace this 
agreement.
  Nevertheless, the President has made a decision, and it is within his 
constitutional authority. The troops are being deployed. Initial 
elements have already arrived. We have seen the pride 

[[Page S18479]]
with which the Marines and others have unfurled Old Glory on Bosnian 
soil. We salute them and we say: One and all, we in this Chamber 
unanimously support our troops.
  It has been my privilege to work for 17 years on the Senate Armed 
Services Committee and to visit our troops many times throughout the 
world, wherever they have been deployed--in the Persian Gulf region, 
Somalia, and other areas--and to see our troops in action. So I commit 
myself unequivocally, in the same way I have throughout my entire adult 
life, to their support.
  On that point, I would like to address an issue which I do not think 
has been addressed by any other Senator to date, and it concerns me 
greatly. Frequently, I have heard a few individuals in high positions, 
both in the executive branch and in the Congress of the United States, 
make a statement along the lines that, ``Well, they are volunteers, 
they can go.''
  Mr. President, we are very proud in our country to have the All-
Volunteer Force. It originated, again, when I was privileged to be the 
Secretary of the Navy in the Department of Defense, and it was a direct 
decision from the then-Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird. Having 
heard these statements and becoming greatly troubled, I contacted the 
former Secretary and asked for his views. For the Record I would like 
to explain how we decided to have this force. During Vietnam there was 
a great strife across this Nation, much of that strife directed at 
force conscription and the draft, and President Nixon and Secretary 
Laird said they were going to take a risk and initiate the All-
Volunteer Force.
  I will read from Mr. Laird's letter of December 12, 1995. I ask 
unanimous consent that it be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                                              Melvin R. Laird,

                                Washington, DC, December 12, 1995.
     Hon. John W. Warner,
     U.S. Senate,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Senator Warner: The President's decision to commit 
     United States military forces to Bosnia has brought renewed 
     attention to the high level of patriotism and professionalism 
     of the women and men who serve as members of the All-
     Volunteer Force.
       The All-Volunteer Force was instituted during our service 
     at DoD, yours as Secretary of the Navy and mine as Secretary 
     of Defense. I regard the termination of the draft and the 
     successful creation of the All-Volunteer Armed Force as the 
     most defining action taken during my service as Secretary.
       At this time of placing American military personnel in 
     harms way, it is well to recall that the All-Volunteer Force 
     came into being to end the inequities of pay and service of 
     military conscription and to pay, train, and equip our 
     military forces as professionals. That has been accomplished 
     in large measure. Our country has the finest military force 
     in its history. Because they have volunteered, as opposed to 
     being drafted for military service, does not mean there can 
     be less of a standard for when it's in our vital national 
     interest to interject them into a dangerous environment.
       It is important that the genesis for the All-Volunteer 
     Force be a part of consideration for the justification for 
     deployment of our military force.
       With best wishes and kindest personal regards, I am
           Sincerely,
                                                  Melvin R. Laird.

  Mr. WARNER. He stated:

       Because they have volunteered, as opposed to being drafted 
     for militry service, it does not mean there can be less of a 
     standard for when it is in our vital national interest to 
     interject them into a dangerous environment.

  That is right on point, Secretary Laird. You are the father of the 
All-Volunteer Force. It has worked, and worked beyond our expectations, 
to the benefit of this country. I would not like to see this debate, in 
any way, erode the proud All-Volunteer Force concept that we have 
today.
  The clear implication of those critics that use this phrase, ``Well, 
they are volunteers,'' is that we are willing to send those who serve 
in the volunteer force to a foreign land to do missions and take risks 
that we would not have asked of a military draftee. Wrong. This is an 
atrocious implication. I hope the Members of this Senate will dispel 
any idea that, because currently the members of the Armed Forces of the 
United States are all volunteers, that they should be treated with any 
less concern than we have for generations treated previous members of 
the Armed Forces, whether they were draftees, Reserves called up, 
voluntarily or involuntarily, whatever the case may be. Once they don 
that uniform they deserve no less than the highest concern by the 
Congress, and indeed the President.
  Americans willing to ask these volunteers to risk their lives in the 
performance of missions that do not fit the clear test of being in the 
vital national security interests of this country have to ask 
themselves a question. When the Congress decided we would fill the 
ranks of our military with volunteers--a policy, as I said, that was 
initiated in the latter part of the Vietnam war, 1972-73--one of the 
concerns expressed at that time was that our military might be viewed 
as a mercenary force. Is that now the case?
  You will recall from your history that the concept of mercenaries 
prevailed through much of Europe, in the history of the Middle Ages 
and, indeed, into this century. In fact, Great Britain sent mercenaries 
to our colonies, often, to try to subjugate us.
  Anyway, I believe that every Senator in this body will agree that 
while soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marines, today are volunteers, they 
are not mercenaries. So let us put to an end any comment about, ``since 
they are volunteers, they deserve any less measure of concern by the 
Congress.'' The Congress stands, 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, 12 
months a year, as trustees--trustees to guard the safety and the 
welfare of those who wear the uniform and of the families here at home 
who await them.
  There are many aspects of this I-FoR deployment which I find 
troubling. First and foremost, I do not believe the mission of I-FoR 
has been carefully and clearly articulated. In addition to the specific 
military tasks with which I-For is charged in the Dayton accords, there 
are a list of supporting tasks which, in my view, will inevitably lead 
to mission creep and to I-FoR's involvement in implementing the 
nonmilitary aspects of the peace agreement.
  For example, I-FoR is called on to assist the UNHCR, the U.N. High 
Commissioner for Refugees, and other international organizations, in 
their humanitarian missions, to prevent interference with the movement 
of civilian populations and refugees, and to respond to deliberate 
violence to life and person. It is not clear what guidelines, if any, 
have been given to the commanders on the ground to help those 
commanders determine when I-FoR should get involved in these supporting 
tasks. This must be clarified and the mission strictly limited to 
implementing the military aspects of the agreement. I think that should 
be done before another soldier, sailor, airman, or marine departs to go 
to that region.
  I am also concerned about the administration's lack of an adequate 
exit strategy and an announced time limit of 12 months for this 
mission. Just announcing that we will leave in 12 months is not an exit 
strategy. We have to make sure that there is a balance of military 
power between these warring factions. That balance will serve as a far 
better deterrent, far better than anything else we can do.
  I salute the distinguished majority leader, the Senator from Kansas 
[Mr. Dole]. I have joined him in the past year, in trying to implement 
the concept of assisting one of those factions, the Bosnian Moslems, 
and bringing their level of armaments up to where they can possess a 
deterrent to attack.
  I think it is naive to believe in 12 months the United States and 
NATO military involvement will wipe away centuries-old hostilities. 
What I fear we are facing is a temporary lull in the fighting until the 
international community withdraws its troops. Then, I ask my 
colleagues, what will happen to the credibility of the United States 
and NATO if this mission ends inconclusively, or is possibly even 
judged to be a failure because the conflict resumes after we depart?
  Remember, remember those pictures of our brave Marines as they left 
Somalia with the people on the shore firing at them as they disembarked 
in their small craft to go out to a larger American warship and return 
home. I do not forget that. I do not forget those instances.
  Because of the serious concerns which I have outlined, I will vote to 
oppose this deployment of U.S. ground 

[[Page S18480]]
troops. This was not an easy decision for any of us to make but I do it 
as a matter of conscience. However, if that full deployment is to occur 
and does occur, then I will, as I have in every day I have served in 
this U.S. Senate, support the troops 100 percent in every way I know 
how.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that recent editorials on this 
situation by the former distinguished Secretary of the Navy James Webb, 
and by a former professional Army officer, Col. Harry Summers, be 
printed in the Record and I yield the floor.
  There being no objection, the articles were ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                [From the New York Times, Nov. 28, 1995]

                      Remember the Nixon Doctrine

                            (By James Webb)

       The Clinton Administration's insistence on putting 20,000 
     American troops into Bosnia should be seized on by national 
     leaders, particularly those running for President, to force a 
     long-overdue debate on the worldwide obligations of our 
     military.
       While the Balkan factions may be immersed in their 
     struggle, and Europeans may feel threatened by it, for 
     Americans it represents only one of many conflicts, real and 
     potential, whose seriousness must be weighed, often against 
     one another, before allowing a commitment of lives, resources 
     and national energy.
       Today, despite a few half-hearted attempts such as Gen. 
     Colin Powell's ``superior force doctrine,'' no clear set of 
     principles exists as a touchstone for debate on these 
     tradeoffs. Nor have any leaders of either party offered terms 
     which provide an understandable global logic as to when our 
     military should be committed to action. In short, we still 
     lack a national security strategy that fits the post-cold war 
     era.
       More than ever before, the United States has become the 
     nation of choice when crises occur, large and small. At the 
     same time, the size and location of our military forces are 
     in flux. It is important to make our interests known to our 
     citizens, our allies and even our potential adversaries, not 
     just in Bosnia but around the world, so that commitments can 
     be measured by something other than the pressures of interest 
     groups and manipulation by the press. Furthermore, with 
     alliances increasingly justified by power relationships 
     similar to those that dominated before World War I, our 
     military must be assured that the stakes of its missions are 
     worth dying for.
       Failing to provide these assurances is to continue the 
     unremitting case-by-case debates, hampering our foreign 
     policy on the one hand and on the other treating our military 
     forces in some cases as mere bargaining chips. As the past 
     few years demonstrate, this also causes us to fritter away 
     our national resolve while arguing about military backwaters 
     like Somalia and Haiti.
       Given the President's proposal and the failure to this 
     point of defining American stakes in Bosnia as immediate or 
     nation-threatening, the coming weeks will offer a new round 
     of such debates. The President appears tempted to follow the 
     constitutionally questionable (albeit effective) approach 
     used by the Bush Administration in the Persian Gulf war: 
     putting troops in an area where no American forces have been 
     threatened and no treaties demand their presence, then 
     gaining international agreement before placing the issue 
     before Congress.
       Mr. Clinton said their mission would be ``to supervise the 
     separation of forces and to give them confidence that each 
     side will live up to their agreements.'' This rationale 
     reminds one of the ill-fated mission of the international 
     force sent to Beirut in 1983. He has characterized the 
     Bosnian mission as diplomatic in purpose, but promised, in 
     his speech last night, to ``fight fire with fire and then 
     some'' if American troops are threatened. This is a formula 
     for confusion once a combat unit sent on a distinctly 
     noncombat mission comes under repeated attack.
       We are told that other NATO countries will decline to send 
     their own military forces to Bosnia unless the United States 
     assumes a dominant role, which includes sizable combat 
     support and naval forces backing it up. This calls to mind 
     the decades of over-reliance by NATO members on American 
     resources, and President Eisenhower's warning in October 1963 
     that the size and permanence of our military presence in 
     Europe would ``continue to discourage the development of the 
     necessary military strength Western European countries should 
     provide for them-selves.''
       The Administration speaks of a ``reasonable time for 
     withdrawal,'' which if too short might tempt the parties to 
     wait out the so-called peacekeepers and if too long might 
     tempt certain elements to drive them out with attacks causing 
     high casualties.
       Sorting out the Administration's answers to such 
     hesitations will take a great deal of time, attention and 
     emotion. And doing so in the absence of a clearly stated 
     global policy will encourage other nations, particularly the 
     new power centers in Asia, to view the United States as 
     becoming less committed to addressing their own security 
     concerns. Many of these concerns are far more serious to 
     long-term international stability and American interests. 
     These include the continued threat of war on the Korean 
     peninsula, the importance of the United States as a 
     powerbroker where historical Chinese, Japanese and Russian 
     interests collide, and the need for military security to 
     accompany trade and diplomacy in a dramatically changing 
     region.
       Asian cynicism gains further grist in the wake of the 
     Administration's recent snubs of Japan: the President's 
     cancellation of his summit meeting because of the budget 
     crisis, and Secretary of State Warren Christopher's early 
     return from a Japanese visit to watch over the Bosnian peace 
     talks.
       Asian leaders are becoming uneasy over an economically and 
     militarily resurgent China that in recent years has become 
     increasingly more aggressive. A perception that the United 
     States is not paying attention to or is not worried about 
     such long-term threats could in itself cause a major 
     realignment in Asia. One can- not exclude even Japan, whose 
     strong bilateral relationship with the United States has 
     been severely tested of late, from this possibility.
       Those who aspire to the Presidency in 1996 should use the 
     coming debate to articulate a world view that would 
     demonstrate to the world, as well as to Americans, an 
     understanding of the uses and limitations--in a sense the 
     human budgeting of our military assets.
       Richard Nixon was the last President to clearly define how 
     and when the United States would commit forces overseas. In 
     1969, he declared that our military policy should follow 
     three basic tenets:
       Honor all treaty commitments in responding to those who 
     invade the lands of our allies.
       Provide a nuclear umbrella to the world against the threats 
     of other nuclear powers.
       Finally, provide weapons and technical assistance to other 
     countries where warranted, but do not commit American forces 
     to local conflicts.
       These tenets, with some modification, are still the best 
     foundation of our world leadership. They remove the United 
     States from local conflicts and civil wars. The use of the 
     American military to fulfill treaty obligations requires 
     ratification by Congress, providing a hedge against the kind 
     of Presidential discretion that might send forces into 
     conflicts not in the national interest. Yet they provide 
     clear authority for immediate action required to carry out 
     policies that have been agreed upon by the government as a 
     whole.
       Given the changes in the world, an additional tenet would 
     also be desirable: The United States should respond 
     vigorously against cases of nuclear proliferation and state-
     sponsored terrorism.
       These tenets would prevent the use of United States forces 
     on commitments more appropriate to lesser powers while 
     preserving our unique capabilities. Only the United States 
     among the world's democracies can field large-scale maneuver 
     forces, replete with strategic airlift, carrier battle groups 
     and amphibious power projection.
       Our military has no equal in countering conventional 
     attacks on extremely short notice wherever the national 
     interest dictates. Our bases in Japan give American forces 
     the ability to react almost anywhere in the Pacific and 
     Indian Oceans, just as the continued presence in Europe 
     allows American units to react in Europe and the Middle East.
       In proper form, this capability provides reassurance to 
     potentially threatened nations everywhere. But despite the 
     ease with which the American military seemingly operates on a 
     daily basis, its assets are limited, as is the national 
     willingness to put the at risk.
       As the world moves toward new power centers and different 
     security needs, it is more vital than ever that we state 
     clearly the conditions under which American forces will be 
     sent into harm's way. And we should be ever more chary of 
     commitments, like the looming one in Bosnia, where combat 
     units invite attack but are by the very nature of their 
     mission not supposed to fight.
                                                                    ____


               [From the Washington Times, Dec. 11, 1995]

                   After the Doubts, Salute and Obey

                           (By Harry Summers)

       When it comes to the Bosnian intervention, ``the proverbial 
     train has left the station,'' said Rep. Floyd Spence, South 
     Carolina Republican, chairman of the House National Affairs 
     Committee. But that did not mean he agreed with that 
     deployment. ``I believe we will all eventually regret 
     allowing American prestige and the cohesion of the NATO 
     alliance to be put at risk for a Bosnian peacekeeping 
     operation.''
       Many senior military officers would privately agree with 
     his assessment. But now is not the time to publicly express 
     their doubts. Before a decision is made, the duty of a 
     military officer is to speak up and express any reservations 
     about a proposed course of action. But once the decision is 
     made, the duty is then to salute and obey and wholeheartedly 
     support the task at hand.
       And that support especially includes keeping their doubts 
     to themselves. Commanding a rifle company in the 2nd Armored 
     Division in 1965, my executive officer, Lt. Thomas E.M. Gray 
     II, had grave reservations about our emerging Vietnam policy. 
     Expressing those concerns in a Troop Information lecture, he 
     was surprised when the soldiers turned on him with a 
     vengeance. Many were already alerted for Vietnam, and they 
     wanted to believe in what they were being ordered to do. They 
     had their own doubts and fears to contend with, and what they 
     needed from their leaders was reassurance that the task was 
     both necessary and doable.
     
[[Page S18481]]

       Like Jesus' centurion, a soldier is ``a man under 
     authority,'' and when his civilian and military leaders say 
     go, ``he goeth.'' Despite his misgivings, Lt. Gray himself 
     went to Vietnam and was tragically killed in action while 
     serving with the 1st Infantry Division's 1st Battalion, 16th 
     Infantry. Like Lt. Gray, many others served in Vietnam, and 
     will serve in Bosnia as well, despite their private 
     reservations.
       One who did so in Vietnam was Vice President Al Gore, and 
     on the day of the president's address, the vice president 
     invited several of us to the White House for a briefing on 
     Bosnia. In the course of our talk, he called attention to a 
     Nov. 27, 1995, New York Times article headlined ``Commanders 
     Say U.S. Plan for Bosnia Will Work.'' But those comments 
     may not be as telling as he believed. They may well 
     reflect only the traditional military reluctance to 
     undermine soldiers' confidence and morale on the eve of a 
     hazardous operation.
       Whether the military commanders have private misgivings 
     about the Bosnian operation is not knowable, but what is 
     becoming clear is the lengths they have gone to ensure that 
     the military mission was limited to doable military tasks.
       Until recently, according to press reports, the military 
     operation was to include not only the ``peacekeeping'' task 
     of keeping the warring parties separated, but the 
     ``nationbuilding'' task of rebuilding the Bosnian political 
     and economic infrastructure and also the job of training and 
     equipping the Bosnian Muslim military to bring it up to par 
     with its enemies.
       At our White House meeting, the vice president took 
     particular pains to disavow any such ``mission creep.'' The 
     ``nationbuilding'' notion that led to such grief in Somalia 
     will not be a U.S. military mission, he said. That will be a 
     task for the Europeans, specifically the OSCE, the 
     Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, which 
     has several ongoing missions in the area. Training of the 
     Muslims, originally said to be a task for the U.S. Army's 
     10th Special Forces Group, will now be done by third-party 
     nationals. And the vice president categorically ruled out any 
     manhunts for war criminals, such as the one that led to the 
     disaster in Mogadishu.
       To their credit, the senior military leaders have done 
     their best to limit the mission to doable tasks. But the one 
     thing they have not succeeded in doing is resolving the issue 
     of military casualties. This is an issue of major concern, 
     and at the vice president's briefing and later in the 
     presidential address to the nation, it was emphasized that 
     the Bosnian operation is not risk free, and that casualties 
     will occur.
       But casualties per se are not the limiting factor. It is 
     whether those casualties are disproportionate to the value of 
     the mission. In World War II, the value was national 
     survival, and we willingly paid more than a million 
     casualties in its pursuit. In Somalia, the value was never 
     established, and 16 became too many. The task for President 
     Clinton is to establish the value of what we are trying to do 
     in Bosnia as the basis for the costs in both lives and 
     treasure that such an operation will entail.
       If the polls are correct, that value has not yet been 
     established. And if that task remains undone, then even one 
     casualty may prove to be too many and Mr. Spence's warning 
     will prove to have been only too correct.

                               Exhibit 1

               [From the Washington Post, Nov. 26, 1995]

 Our Piece of the Peace--Sending Troops to Bosnia: Our Duty, Clinton's 
                                  Call

                          (By Lloyd N. Cutler)

       After months of sustained effort, the Clinton 
     administration has succeeded in negotiating a peace agreement 
     among the three warring ethnic factions in Bosnia. The 
     agreements initialed in Dayton would require us and our NATO 
     allies to place peacekeeping units of our armed forces in 
     Bosnia for a year or more. This raises once again the biggest 
     unresolved issue under the U.S. system of separate executive 
     and legislative departments: Is the constitutional authority 
     to place our armed forces in harm's way vested in the 
     president or in Congress, or does it require the joint 
     approval of both?
       President Clinton has said he would follow the precedent 
     set by George Bush before the 1991 Desert Storm invasion and 
     seek a congressional expression of support before committing 
     American units to the enforcement of the Bosnian peace 
     agreement. But he has also asserted the constitutional power 
     to act on his own authority, just as Bush did. This time, it 
     is Republican congressional leaders who are challenging a 
     Democratic president's view that the president can lawfully 
     act on his own, but, more typically it has been Democratic 
     Congresses challenging presidents of either party.
       During the coming debate, Congress would be wise to bear in 
     mind, as it did five years ago, that the world will be 
     watching how the one and only democratic superpower reaches 
     its decisions, or whether it is so divided that it is 
     incapable of deciding at all. Congress needs to recognize 
     that we cannot have 535 commanders-in-chief in addition to 
     the president and that some deference to presidential 
     judgments on force deployments is in order. That is 
     especially true when, as in Korea, Iraq and Bosnia, the 
     president's proposed deployments are based on United Nations 
     Security Council resolutions that we have sponsored and on 
     joint decisions with our allies pursuant to treaties Congress 
     has previously approved.
       In the case of Bosnia, the argument for committing U.S. 
     forces to carry out a peace agreement is a strong one. All of 
     us are revolved by the ethnic cleansing and other human 
     rights abuses that the various factions have committed. 
     These abuses are likely to continue if the peace agreement 
     is not formally signed in mid-December as now scheduled, 
     or if it is signed but not carried out. If the war goes on 
     or soon resumes, it may well spread to other parts of the 
     former Yugoslavia and to the rest of the Balkans, still 
     the most unstable region of Western and Central Europe. 
     Any widening of the Balkan wars could well spread to 
     Eastern Europe and the Middle East and pose a substantial 
     potential threat to U.S. national security.
       Some foreign forces are needed to separate the contending 
     armies and to control the standing down of heavy weapons. 
     Under our leadership, and only under our leadership, NATO is 
     ready to supply the necessary forces. The stronger the 
     forces, the better the chance that they will not be attacked 
     and that they will accomplish their mission. All these 
     reasons argue for a significant U.S. military commitment, now 
     that a promising peace agreement has been reached.
       In 1991, the Democratic Congress narrowly approved 
     President Bush's decision to reverse the Iraqi invasion of 
     Kuwait, thus mooting the issues of whether the president 
     could have acted alone. Today, the Republican congressional 
     leadership, while sounding somewhat more conciliatory than in 
     recent weeks, is challenging President Clinton to make his 
     case for the proposed deployment. This war powers question 
     has come up repeatedly since the 1950 outbreak of the Korean 
     War, when President Truman committed our forces without first 
     seeking congressional approval, but has never been resolved.
       In foreign and national security policy, as in domestic 
     policy, neither Congress nor the president can accomplish 
     very much for very long without the cooperation of the other. 
     This is so for both constitutional and practical reasons. The 
     Constitution gives Congress the power to ``declare war,'' but 
     both Congress and the president share the power to raise 
     armies and navies and to raise and appropriate funds for 
     their maintenance and deployment. Only Congress can enact 
     such measures, but it needs the president's approval or a 
     two-thirds majority of both houses to override his veto. Only 
     the president can negotiate treaties, but he needs a two-
     thirds vote of the Senate to ratify them. The president's 
     separate powers are limited to receiving ambassadors, serving 
     as commander-in-chief of the armed forces and faithfully 
     executing the laws. If as commander-in-chief he orders our 
     armed forces into a combat situation, he still needs 
     congressional approval to finance such a commitment over an 
     extended period of time.
       Before the United States became a superpower, disputes over 
     the authority to commit our forces rarely arose. We had few 
     occasions to deploy our military units abroad, much less 
     commit them to conflict. Armies, navies and news of battle 
     traveled very slowly. Air forces and long-range missiles did 
     not exist. There was plenty of time after learning of a 
     threatening event for the president to deliberate with 
     Congress about the proper response. Occasionally, presidents 
     committed us unilaterally, as in our attacks on the Barbary 
     pirates in Tripoli in Jefferson's time, but it was rare for 
     Congress to claim that its own prerogatives were being 
     usurped by the president.
       Since World War II, all this has changed. As commander-in-
     chief of the democratic superpower, presidents now deploy our 
     armed forces all over the world. We can attack, or be 
     attacked, within moments. On numerous occasions, presidents 
     have committed our forces to armed conflict, sometimes of a 
     sustained nature as in Korea and Vietnam, without asking 
     Congress to declare war. In Vietnam, as it had in Korea, 
     Congress initially supported the president's initiatives by 
     appropriations and other measures. But as the duration and 
     scope of our military actions in Indochina escalated, an 
     increasingly restive Congress enacted the War Powers 
     Resolution over President Nixon's veto. The resolution laid 
     down a series of rules that require a president ``in every 
     possible instance'' to ``consult with Congress'' before he 
     commits our armed forces to combat or to places in which 
     hostilities are ``imminent.'' It also requires the withdrawal 
     of those forces if Congress fails to adopt an approving 
     resolution within 60 days.
       President Nixon and all subsequent presidents have 
     challenged the constitutionality of these prescriptions, but 
     the Supreme Court has never accepted a case that would 
     resolve this dispute and is unlikely to do so in the near 
     future. When presidents ``consult'' with Congress before 
     committing forces, they are careful to avoid saying they 
     do so ``pursuant to'' the War Powers Resolution; they say 
     they do so ``consistent with'' the resolution.
       There are obviously situations where modern technology 
     makes advance consultation with Congress impractical--most 
     notably the case where our sensor equipment indicates that a 
     missile attack has been launched on the United States or our 
     NATO allies, or where speed and secrecy are key factors, as 
     in the rescue of American hostages or reprisals against a 
     terrorist act abroad.
       But presidents have continued to commit our forces to armed 
     conflict or situations where conflict was clearly 
     ``imminent,'' whether or not split-second timing was 
     imperative. President Ford, for example responded forcefully 
     to an attack on a U.S. vessel (the Mayaguez) off the Cambodia 


[[Page S18482]]
     coast; President Carter launched a military mission to rescue our 
     hostages in Iran; President Reagan put our forces into 
     Lebanon, the Sinai, Chad and Grenada and ordered bombing 
     attacks on Libya; President Bush sent troops into Panama, 
     Liberia, Somalia, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Iraq.
       As for President Clinton, he has already ordered our forces 
     into Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti and Macedonia and has authorized 
     our air units to enforce the U.N. no-fly zone over Bosina 
     itself.
       Moreover, in the 22 years since the War Powers Resolution 
     became law, Congress has never undermined these presidential 
     uses of force by action (or inaction) in a way that would 
     have blocked the mission or required withdrawal within 60 
     days.
       All this does not mean that Congress must cede the power to 
     make national security decisions to the president. Congress 
     successfully forced Johnson and Nixon to limit and finally to 
     terminate the undeclared Vietnam War. Congress successfully 
     stopped Reagan's covert sales of weapons to Iran and his 
     covert and overt military aid to the contras. As these 
     examples show, presidents cannot effectively exercise their 
     separate constitutional powers over national security and 
     foreign policy over an extended period without the 
     cooperation of Congress. That is why Clinton, like Bush in 
     1990, has invited Congress to express its views before our 
     forces are committed to support the peace agreement in 
     Bosnia.
       A week ago Friday, while the Dayton negotiations were still 
     going on, House Republicans passed a bill that would bar the 
     expenditure of any funds to sustain U.S. forces in Bosnia. 
     Fortunately, the Senate is unlikely to follow, and even if it 
     did, a presidential veto would be difficult to override. But 
     the House Republicans who launched this preemptive strike 
     would do better to emulate former Republican congressman Dick 
     Cheney.
       In 1990, when we had a Republican president and Democratic 
     majorities in both houses of Congress, Cheney was the 
     secretary of defense. As he said before we entered the Gulf 
     War, ``When the stakes have to do with the leadership of the 
     Free World, we cannot afford to be paralyzed by an intramural 
     stalemate.'' The decision to act, he noted, ``finally belongs 
     to the president. He is the one who bears the responsibility 
     for sending young men and women to risk death. If the 
     operation fails, it will be his fault. I have never heard one 
     of my former [congressional] colleagues stand up after a 
     failed operation to say, `I share the blame for that one; I 
     advised him to go forward.' ''
       This does not mean that Congress must approve the 
     president's proposed commitments without change. For example, 
     following the Lebanon precedent, Congress could require its 
     further approval if the forces were not withdrawn within, 
     say, 18 months, a period that expires after the next 
     elections. The president and Congress have the shared 
     responsiblity of finding a solution that shows we can 
     function as a decisive superpower and as a responsible 
     democracy at the same time. The public expects no less.
       It may be too late to help in the Bosnia debate, but there 
     is one change in our process for making national security 
     decisions that ought to be adopted. The National Security 
     Council (NSC), the statutory body created to advise the 
     president on national security affairs, consists entirely of 
     officials in the executive branch. When the NSC takes up 
     issues related to the potential commitment of our forces, the 
     president could invite the attendance of the speaker, the 
     majority and minority leaders of the House and Senate and the 
     chairmen and ranking members of the national security and 
     foreign policy committees of each house. Since the NSC role 
     is purely advisory, no separation-of-powers issues would 
     arise. In this way Congress, in its own favorite phrase, 
     would be effectively consulted before the takeoff, rather 
     than at the time of the landing. The cooperation on national 
     security issues that the nation wants and expects might still 
     elude us, but the president would have done his part to carry 
     out George Shultz's admonition that trust between the 
     branches must be Washington's ``coin of the realm.''

  Several Senators addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Nebraska is next to be 
recognized under the previous order.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. Will the Senator from Nebraska yield for a unanimous 
consent request?
  Mr. KERREY. I am pleased to yield.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. I ask unanimous consent Senator Snowe be sequenced 
following Senator Bradley in speaking order.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The Senator from Nebraska is recognized.
  Mr. KERREY. Mr. President, first, the Senator from Virginia just gave 
very eloquent testimony, not just to the U.S. abilities in the past to 
accomplish good things, but the risks contained in them.
  I did have a great honor to be able to travel with the Senator from 
Virginia earlier this year, to Zagreb and down to Split and down to 
Knin in the Krajina Valley where the Croatian forces had succeeded in 
driving, by some estimates, close to 200,000 military and civilian 
personnel from that valley. It was very clear to me that I was in the 
presence of a man who understood, not just that particular region as 
well as any, but understood the great value and importance of we 
Americans leading where we can and doing what is possible to make the 
world a safer and better place. I have many of the same misgivings the 
Senator from Virginia just expressed and I know that, in expressing 
opposition to the resolution and the deployment, in his own statement 
just now he wants this mission to be successful. He wants this 
operation, this NATO operation to be a success.
  I also must say----
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I wish to thank my distinguished 
colleague. We will travel together again to other places in the world 
on behalf of our Armed Forces.
  I will be pleased to hear the Senator's remarks.
  Mr. KERREY. I look forward to the travel. I learned a great deal in a 
relatively short period of time from the distinguished senior Senator 
from Virginia. I look forward to having a chance to travel and learn 
again.
  The goal of any policy, particularly a foreign policy, I presume and 
hope, is success. But, in a complex and confused conflict, such as this 
one, which has festered for centuries, success is extremely hard to 
define. The civil war in the former Yugoslavia is the consequence of a 
very confusing sequence of events that very few people understand 
fully. Yugoslavia itself was an intricate construct of religions and 
nationalities. Even the future consequences of U.S. inaction now are 
not immediately clear. Also, there has been considerable disinformation 
put out by all sides in the conflict, to justify the claims that all 
sides have to the status of being a victim.
  The international solution coming out of the Dayton agreement is not 
exactly simple either. A NATO force, including non-NATO units and even 
Russian units, is to separate the parties along a meandering 600-mile 
boundary line and then oversee the restoration of civilian government 
functions in Bosnia.
  Meanwhile, the European Community and international donors put 
together a financial program to rebuild Bosnia's infrastructure. The 
plan may or may not be brilliant, but it certainly is not simple.
  So it is not surprising, Mr. President, that well-informed citizens--
and I am thinking in my case of Nebraskans who I had the honor of 
visiting with this week to discuss this policy--do not fully understand 
the Bosnian case.
  As I indicated earlier, I had the opportunity to travel to the former 
Yugoslavia, have attended hours of briefings in the intelligence 
community, and have visited the National Military Joint Intelligence 
Center in the Pentagon the last two Fridays. I must say I do not fully 
understand this problem, either.
  Mr. President, I do understand that American leadership has already 
made it better. My response to those who despair of improving this 
tangled region is that from the moment of President Clinton's decision 
last summer to lead the way to a solution, the former Yugoslavia has 
become a more peaceful place. Bosnia is now a safer place for its 
inhabitants.
  Mr. President, it was only last summer that the only access to 
Bosnia's capital, Sarajevo, was over the dangerous Mount Igman road. 
Three American diplomats were killed in July on that road. The airport 
was closed. Sarajevo's very life was at risk from mortar attacks, from 
snipers, and from the cutoff of the energy and food on which life 
depends.
  Then came the United States commitment to lead, Ambassador 
Holbrooke's full-court press, and today Bosnians are safer as a 
consequence. C-130's now land at Sarajevo. Sarajevans' daily brushes 
with death are over, we pray forever. Energy and food deliveries are 
resuming, Mr. President. I am describing the indicators of success--
success we have already achieved.
  The distinguished Senator from Virginia earlier indicated, and I 
think quite properly, a test that all of us should apply to an 
operation, to a mission of this kind. That is, would we be able to go 
into the home of a family 

[[Page S18483]]
who had lost a loved one in a conflict and tell them what their loved 
one had accomplished? Was it worth their sacrifice?
  Mr. President, you would, I think, be hard pressed not to be able to 
go into the homes of the three diplomats who gave their lives to secure 
peace in Yugoslavia and not be able to say that, thanks to their 
bravery in July, being willing to run the risks associated with travel 
to Sarajevo at the time, that as a consequence of their bravery we now 
have peace in that city.
  There are many people who are planning trips there and lots of travel 
going on there. Mr. President, there has been a tremendous success 
accomplished already.
  Last August when I visited Yugoslavia, Sarajevo was judged so 
dangerous that the administration said that I and the delegation that I 
traveled with should not go there. We could not get to the capital of 
the country which is at the heart of this problem. Today, not only is 
Sarajevo accessible, but Tuzla, where our troops will be stationed, is 
accessible as well. Already, several congressional delegations have 
traveled there in the past few weeks to see for themselves the 
conditions our troops will face. That access is the fruit of policy 
success.
  But success in any enterprise, Mr. President, is temporary unless you 
are willing to secure it and to build on it. The Dayton agreement 
provides for military forces to enforce separation of the parties and 
to ensure compliance with the agreement. If all the parties comply with 
the agreement, success will be achieved and a peaceful, secure Bosnia 
will not just be a possibility but an odds-on likelihood.
  Mr. President, given what has happened in Bosnia and what could 
happen without the decisive impact of American leadership, I contend 
this would be a highly successful outcome, one in which all Americans 
could take great pride.
  Mr. President, much has been said--I have listened to many 
colleagues, and I have heard, particularly on talk radio, concern 
expressed--about President Clinton as Commander in Chief. First of all, 
let it be said that Mr. Clinton, our President, is the architect of 
this policy and he is the Commander in Chief of our Armed Forces. As 
the distinguished majority leader has correctly stated, we only have 
one President, one Commander in Chief. Our Armed Forces have a high 
level of good order and discipline. They recognize that fact. They will 
follow the orders the President gives them. They will proceed to the 
places named in his orders.
  When we do our constitutional duty of debating deployment such as 
this one, we should not say or do anything which might separate the 
Armed Forces from their properly constituted chain of command. A 
resolution of this body declaring support for the troops but opposition 
to the action the President has ordered the troops to take could have 
very negative consequences for the morale of the Armed Forces as well 
as for the outcome of the mission.
  A statement by one Senator such as I read in this morning's New York 
Times to the effect that this Senator has spoken to soldiers at a 
military installation and said, ``They're with me. They're mixed. They 
know I'm for them and I'm trying to keep them out,'' is not helpful. 
The troops are with their Commander in Chief and with no one else, 
regardless of the outcome of this debate.
  There is also a good deal of talk, as I said, on talk radio 
criticizing Bill Clinton's right to deploy American forces and his 
ability to command those deployed forces because he did not go to 
Vietnam.
  I will address this topic, Mr. President, head on. Having not served, 
I must say, can be a handicap for people serving as Commander in Chief 
of the military, no two ways about it. There are parts of a job you 
grow into, and I believe strongly that the President has really grown 
as a Commander in Chief. He inherited Somalia from the Bush 
administration, and as Commander in Chief of the Somalia operation, 
Bill Clinton has experienced the human tragedy of being the leader when 
United States casualties occur. He has not flinched from hard talks 
with the families of casualties that occurred on his watch. Those talks 
are a sobering and maturing experience for any commander, even a 
President. He is not naive or starry eyed about what he is ordering 
young Americans to do.
  There is another aspect of Presidential service that must be 
considered, particularly as we engage in this kind of debate. Bill 
Clinton may not have been in combat in Vietnam, but in a very real way 
he, like all his predecessors, is experiencing combat now. He is 
experiencing the daily danger which, unfortunately, is part of his job. 
His residence has been attacked twice. He suffered the loss of a friend 
and ally, Prime Minister Rabin. He knows firsthand every day the sense 
of an unknown but ever present threat to your life and the life of your 
family, which is an essential part of combat. In this sense, too, he 
has matured a lot. The job has that effect on people.
  In the final analysis, though, the most important tool that the 
President brings to being Commander in Chief is the fact that he is 
properly sworn. He is the duly elected President of the United States 
of America. Mr. President, that is all it takes. Every American 
soldier, every American sailor, every American airman and marine must 
understand it.
  As far as a national interest, Mr. President, it does fall to the 
President of the United States to define the Nation's vital interests 
and then act to defend them. Such interests are at issue in the former 
Yugoslavia. The most important one, in my judgment, is the stability of 
Europe.
  We have learned in this century that we ignore European instability 
at our peril. Twice we have made the mistake of thinking Europeans, 
with their money and sophistication and long experience as countries, 
could maintain their own stability. Twice we have had to send millions 
of our soldiers to fight in Europe to correct the mistake and to lead 
Europeans into stable, peaceful arrangements with each other. There may 
come a time when Europeans can do this all by themselves, but the 
Yugoslavian experience of the past 4 years shows that time is not yet 
here.
  At the end of World War II, America determined to shore up the 
stability and security of Europe. Former friend and foe alike were a 
shambles, communism was a growing force in European domestic politics, 
and the Soviet Union showed both the ability and the inclination to 
incorporate all the continent into his family of satellite states.
  To our farsighted leaders of the period, a crisis was apparent. They 
responded with a decisive commitment of American leadership. They 
organized an alliance of the United States, Canada, and 13 European 
countries, an alliance with a simple but breathtakingly open-ended 
commitment, an attack on any member was an attack on all. In other 
words, we would go to war to defend any NATO member. With the 
implementing vision of the first Supreme Allied Commander, Dwight D. 
Eisenhower, the NATO alliance began a record of achievement that 
climaxed not a year later but 40 years later with the fall of the 
Berlin wall and the collapse of Soviet communism.
  Whenever we give speeches about what we are proud of in America's 
accomplishments since World War II, we brag, and very properly so, 
about our victory in the cold war and the U.S. leadership of NATO which 
made victory possible. Mr. President, our commitment in 1949 was not 
totally assured of success. Far from it. And our commitment was not 
accompanied by a congressional requirement for an exit strategy. In 
1949 our leaders acted boldly to leverage American leadership into an 
alliance with a good chance of success. Today, with a new situation in 
Europe, we face a requirement to act again, boldly, to restore and 
maintain European stability. Again, NATO is the instrument of choice. 
If we do not act, instability will spread more broadly in a region in 
which major European powers have historic interests and have not shrunk 
from war to advance those interests. If we do not use NATO as our 
instrument, this alliance will not be available to continue its 40 year 
role as the guarantor of a peaceful, stable Europe.
  It was not so long ago that our major European allies were usually at 
each other's throats. NATO created a framework of defense cooperation 
in which shared interests outweighed rivalries. Today NATO expansion 
carries the potential to extend the same cooperation 

[[Page S18484]]
into Eastern Europe and I hope, eventually, Russia and other former 
Soviet States. I cannot think of a better way to lock-in the benefits 
of the end of the cold war. But without NATO as a vibrant, capable 
organization, it will not happen. NATO cannot be such an organization 
without U.S. leadership. Mr. President, stability in Europe and the 
continued viability of NATO are our vital interests, and they are at 
issue today in the Balkans.
  We have other lesser, but important interests there. We have an 
interest in a peaceful, stable, Russia which cooperates with us and 
with NATO on defense matters and with which we can share mutual 
confidence. The deployment of Russian units to the I-FOR under United 
States command provides a potentially priceless opportunity to build 
such a relationship. Also, we have an interest in developing a better 
relationship with the Moslem world. Moslems have clearly been the 
underdog in the Yugoslav war, and American leadership to preserve and 
secure a Bosnia which is again safe for Moslems will have positive 
effect on United States relations with the Moslem world. It will show 
the truth of our national character, which is we seek justice and 
fairness and do not play ethnic favorites.


                 draft a resolution to support success

  What we vote today matters. We should not hamstring our commanders 
with requirements that make success harder to attain. When we require 
the administration to supply armaments of the highest quality to one of 
the combatants, the highest quality being the best the United States 
has in its own arsenal, or when we pass a resolution which sets an 
artificial time limit on an operation which should only be bounded by 
accomplishment of the assigned task, we are placing handicaps on 
Admiral Smith's ability to accomplish the mission. I know none of us 
wants to do that. Once our troops are committed, all of us wants them 
to succeed.
  I must also add my concern about Congress declaring U.S. 
creditability to be a strategic interest. We may be issuing an open-
ended invitation to Presidents present and future to make unilateral 
commitments and require Congress to support them on the fuzzy basis of 
credibility. The stability of Europe is reason enough for this 
operation, in my view.
  Mr. President, I have been to briefings at the Intelligence Committee 
and have spent the last two Friday afternoons at the National Military 
Joint Intelligence Center at the Pentagon, trying to learn all I can 
about this mission and the intelligence support our commanders will be 
getting. I am immensely proud to have a military that can do a mission 
like this--to go into difficult terrain in tough weather conditions and 
be able to provide its own support and security while being prepared to 
engage any or all of three contending armies. I am proud of the work 
our national and military intelligence communities have done and are 
doing to support our troops with the best intelligence available, and 
also support the NATO and foreign forces in the I-FOR. No one else in 
the world could do this, except the United States. We are doing it, as 
I said, to protect vital interests. We are doing it in a good cause.
  If all the parties to the Dayton agreement abide by it, our 
leadership will be brought peace to the Balkans. More importantly, we 
will have extended the guarantee of European stability to which we have 
been committed, in NATO, since 1949. If we lead with the vision of our 
post-war predecessors, we can achieve success in Bosnia.
  Mr. President, finally, let me point out what should be obvious. The 
success that has been achieved thus far has been a success of the 
President of the United States committed to achieve peace in the 
Balkans, but a success that has been put together by diplomats, by 
politicians, some elected and appointed leaders, not just of the United 
States but of all three of the nations in the Balkans. And if success 
is to be the end goal, and if we are to achieve that success, the 
military can only do part of it. In order for the military to be 
successful, we political leaders are going to have to do the hard work 
of making certain that all the parties adhere to the agreement that we 
expect them to sign in Paris tomorrow.
  I believe there is a good chance of success--of further and continued 
success--a chance of success that is worth the risk that we take, the 
risk of lives and the risk of capital in the Balkans.
  I hope that the debate about this resolution--a nonbinding resolution 
that does not necessarily impact the President--I hope that the 
President hears throughout all of this debate perhaps some criticism. 
But even critics have to grudgingly, I hope, acknowledge that there is 
peace in the Balkans, that you can fly to Sarajevo, that children and 
civilians in Sarajevo markets do not worry on Sundays--as they did when 
I was there on the 28th of August--that 120-millimeter rockets and 
mortars were going to rain down on them and take their lives. That fear 
is gone today. The fear of sniper attack is gone.
  If the standdown of forces occurs in the first 30 days and in the 
next 45 days and the next 180 days, if we can just stand down the 
forces, the United States of America will continue to be able to say 
that we are saving lives. There are people alive today in Sarajevo that 
would not have been alive were it not for leadership of the President 
of the United States and the people of the United States backing that 
President.
  I hope we understand and appreciate the great success that only the 
United States of America could achieve under the leadership of Bill 
Clinton. I hope this debate does not cloud that success, and I hope 
this debate does not prevent and make more difficult a continuation of 
our efforts to build upon that success.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Gorton). The Senator from Texas.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Senator 
Lott be traded in speaking order for Senator Domenici, who would be 
next, and also that Senator Kassebaum be added after Senator Nunn in 
the speaking order.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. LOTT addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Mississippi.
  Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senator from Texas 
for accommodating my schedule and allowing me to change the order of 
the list of speakers. I also want to thank her for her leadership in 
this area. It is not easy. It takes a lot of courage, and the Senator 
from Texas has done an excellent job on this issue. I support her 
resolution because it best reflects my views on this issue.
  This resolution expresses opposition to the decision to put United 
States troops on the ground in Bosnia, and also it says that we support 
our troops. Certainly, we all do, whether they are in the Continental 
United States or anywhere around the world. This resolution is simple. 
It is direct. It is to the point. And, I agree with it. I oppose the 
decision to send U.S. ground troops to Bosnia.
  Conversely, I intend to oppose the resolution by the distinguished 
majority leader, and the Senator from Arizona, Senator McCain. They 
have done excellent work on their resolution. They have improved it 
considerably. But it still has language that to me--leaves the 
impression that a vote in favor of the resolution equates to 
authorizing, or agreeing with the decision to deploy ground troops. It 
does not say exactly that, but it still has language that gives me 
discomfort in that area.
  I also have difficulty with our putting United States troops on the 
ground--supposedly as neutral I-For troops between the Serbians, the 
Bosnians, and the Croats on the other side--all while the United States 
leads an effort to train, equip, and arm the Bosnians. That is a 
precarious position for U.S forces. I think that is a very impractical 
arrangement. You cannot appear to be, or try to be neutral while you 
are in fact leading an effort to train one party of the three factions 
involved. So I have not been able to get that problem worked out in my 
mind with the language that is before the Senate in the resolution by 
Senator Dole.
  Mr. President, in 1921, Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote:

       A page of history is worth a volume of logic.


[[Page S18485]]

  Without an understanding of history, it is easy to repeat the 
mistakes of history, and it is in that context of history that we must 
carefully review President Clinton's decision to send United States 
ground troops into Bosnia.
  On November 21, 1995, President Clinton announced that an agreement 
had been reached in Dayton, OH, an agreement which he believed would 
secure peace in the former Yugoslavian Republic of Bosnia. According to 
him, key to its success would be participation of 20,000 American 
military personnel on the ground. Without American involvement, the 
President suggested there would be no peace and U.S. leadership of NATO 
would suffer, perhaps to the point of rendering NATO useless. But the 
President's dire warnings must not be simply conceded under the 
assumption that he is right. The decision to send United States troops 
to Bosnia should not be reached because of feared diminution of United 
States leadership in the world or of NATO.
  The fundamental decision should be based on answers to two simple 
specific questions: Are vital United States national security interests 
under threat in Bosnia? Do we have an effective exit strategy?
  Before going further, I want to say that the President deserves 
credit for creating a negotiating framework which brought together the 
leaders of the warring parties and for fostering an environment of 
serious work to bring peace to war-torn Bosnia.
  But the decision to deploy United States troops to Bosnia is much 
more complex than just simply affirming a peace agreement negotiated in 
Dayton. Much more must be considered before our troops are deployed en 
masse.
  Before addressing the two immediate questions regarding this 
decision, though, whether to deploy the troops, we must understand the 
history of Bosnia, if for no other reason than to gain some sense of 
the potential success or failure of that Dayton agreement.
  In his second State of the Union Address in 1862, President Lincoln 
counseled the Congress to remember that we cannot escape history. That 
same counsel applies to the strife-ridden Bosnia.
  The former Yugoslavia found its birth in 1918 as the Kingdom of the 
Serbs, the Croats and Slovenes united under the reign of King 
Alexander. In 1929, the country was renamed Yugoslavia, but the recent 
civil unrest in Bosnia can be traced much further back than that. The 
deep hatred and animosity of the Serbian, Bosnian, and Croatian peoples 
was not born from their forced union in 1918. It reaches back to the 
mid-1300's when the Ottoman Turks subdued the Serbian state.
  History is clear that death, civil strife, and general mayhem between 
the Serbs, Croats, and Bosnians was prolific between the mid-1300's 
until Tito solidified his control of Yugoslavia at the close of World 
War II. In most cases, the hostility between the parties was based on 
religious and cultural divisions and the leadership of the day, whether 
it be King Alexander or Tito, used these religious and cultural hatreds 
as tools to suppress, to check, and to trump the national aspirations 
of each of the parties in the region. The result was nearly continuous 
bloodshed between the three warring factions.
  This backward, bloody, and ugly history led British Prime Minister 
Benjamin Disraeli to tell the House of Lords in 1878 these words, which 
are applicable to today's situation. He said:

       No language can describe adequately the condition of that 
     large portion of the Balkan peninsula--Serbia, Bosnia, 
     Herzegovina and other provinces--political intrigues, 
     constant rivalries, a total absence of all public spirit--
     hatred of all races, animosities of rival religions and 
     absence of any controlling power . . . nothing short of 
     50,000 of the best troops would produce anything like order 
     in these parts.

  That was in 1878. If it would have taken 50,000 troops then, how many 
troops would it take today?
  When King Alexander was assassinated in 1934 by Croatian extremists, 
Yugoslavia began to split apart at the seams. Why was King Alexander 
assassinated? Well, in 1929 he tried to create an autonomous Serb, 
Croat, and Slovene government under a unified federalist structure 
called Yugoslavia. While one central government was to remain under his 
leadership, the three parties would achieve independence.
  The Dayton agreement--at its fundamental base--seeks to resurrect 
much of King Alexander's failed plan of 1929. But instead of creating 
three separate states under one central government, the Dayton 
agreement seeks to create two parts, the Croat-Bosnian Federation and 
the Serbian Republic, all under one central government.
  Just as President Lincoln said, ``We cannot escape history,'' neither 
can President Clinton escape the history of Yugoslavia, nor can any of 
us afford to ignore it. Based on this history, it is likely--and 
unfortunate--that there will be no peace in Bosnia with or without 
United States troops on the ground to support it.
  No international troop presence on the ground in Bosnia will restore 
peace to a region which has forgotten peace, does not remember peace, 
and does not forgive past violations of peace. United States troops 
should not be squandered on such a prospect.
  Yes, we all hope for peace, but the peace must be achieved in the 
hearts and minds of the people there who have been warring for 
centuries. America cannot impose it with military troops.
  The United States has a history, a noble history, and a heritage born 
from war in search of peace. Ours is a noble history and heritage, but 
this heritage should not and does not commit us to blind military 
commitments, the goal of which is to right historical wrongs or impose 
tranquility where tranquility does not exist or has not existed for 
over 600 years.
  War is an ugly, gruesome undertaking. War should not be pursued or 
waged for mere political expediency or humanitarian gains.
  Now, there are those who will say there is not war here; this is a 
tenuous peace. Yes, but how long will it be that way? As I pointed out, 
one of the things that worries me is if we go in saying we are neutral 
but acting in a partisan way supporting one faction, how long will that 
peace hold?
  While we must be good at waging war, not all wars are fit for the 
United States to come in and solve the problem. Why must we always be 
the one that sends our troops in, no matter where it is around the 
world, when we do not have a vital national security interest? The 
United States should only participate militarily on the ground in 
places in which U.S. interests are clear and understandable.
  I have looked long and hard to find United States vital security 
interests which are under threat by the civil strife in Bosnia. I have 
not found any. The United States does have vital security interests in 
Central and Western Europe, but the civil war in Bosnia does not 
threaten these interests. Therefore, we should not go. That is the 
fundamental hurdle that I cannot go over.
  If our vital security interests dictate that we should place troops 
in harm's way, then we must go. We should and we will. We will be 
prepared to fight for our vital national interests and win. We should 
go, though, as combatants prepared to fight, to do whatever is 
necessary, but only if our vital security interests are required.
  The President has talked about robust rules of engagement.
  But he has not clearly and specifically outlined his commitment and 
intent to respond disproportionately should U.S. troops come under 
attack or siege. If our troops go, there must be no limits. If Serb 
forces take hostages, or others, or attack U.S. patrols, the President 
must be willing, committed and intent on taking the conflict to the 
safe haven of other countries that are involved, specifically Belgrade.
  I have not heard this commitment from the President, nor do I read 
this level of commitment as his intent. Anything less will sentence 
U.S. ground personnel to a hunkered-down, bunker existence suffering 
casualties in disparate hit-and-run attacks. U.S. personnel would 
become targets, plentiful and ripe.
  We have made that mistake in the past. We made it in Somalia. And we 
should not repeat it. It may not happen immediately. Maybe it will not 
happen in the cold, snowy winter months after we first arrive. But it 
would, I think, happen sooner or later. And the price of American lives 
should not be set so low for a goal so distant from our own vital 
security interests.
  As President Clinton announced his intention to send U.S. troops to 

[[Page S18486]]
  Bosnia, I pulled out his National Security Strategy, a document that 
the President presented to the Congress in July 1994. Under the section 
addressing peace operations, on page 14, it says:

       Two other points deserve emphasis. First, the primary 
     mission of our armed forces is not peace operations; it is to 
     deter and, if necessary, to fight and win conflicts in which 
     our most important interests are threatened. Second, while 
     the international community can create conditions for peace, 
     the responsibility for peace ultimately rests with the people 
     of the country in question. That is what President Clinton 
     had to say just in July of 1994--only 17 months ago.

  The President's own national security strategy does not warrant 
sending troops into this area. Bosnia does not represent a conflict in 
which our most important interests are threatened, nor have the people 
of former Yugoslavia assumed the responsibility for peace.
  The second issue which must be considered prior to sending troops is 
the question of identifying a clear, definitive exit strategy. How will 
we know when the mission is completed and it is time to leave? We have 
been told a year, or was it about a year? Will it be 14 months or 15 
months? How much will it cost? We were told, well, $1.5 billion. And 
then we were told, $2 billion. We all know it will be $4 billion or $5 
billion.
  The President said the U.S. mission in Bosnia will be ``clear, 
limited, and achievable.'' But I have not heard articulated the most 
important point: How will we know the mission has been achieved so that 
we will know it is time for us to leave? If we do not have a clear, 
identifiable exit strategy, we will be suspect to expanding our reason 
for going. New missions will be added, like we have seen in other 
instances. Success will be harder to identify.
  A successful exit strategy cannot be driven by a time limit as the 
President has suggested and as, quite frankly, the Congress has sought. 
Is it just that we will stay 1 year, wait for the Bosnians to be 
sufficiently trained and equipped, and then leave? I do not think that 
is what was intended, but perhaps that is the real exit strategy. It 
must be constructed with the intention of leaving behind a locally 
supported peace that does not require an open-ended commitment of U.S. 
troops. Once again, the history of the region does not lead to any 
rational conclusion that is what would happen.
  I do not believe that the American people are willing to support a 
prolonged occupation by U.S. troops in Bosnia, and we will have one if 
no clear exit strategy exists.
  In the Persian Gulf we had a clear, measurable, and definite exit 
strategy--expel Iraq from Kuwait. Many people think we should have gone 
further. I am not one of them, because, you see, we had a strategy. It 
was to remove Iraq out of Kuwait and then leave, period. No one 
disputes the results of the gulf war.
  This is not the case in this present situation. Under the President's 
own National Security Strategy, he acknowledges that successful peace 
operations can only be sustained when the responsible parties want 
peace. Once again, the history of the region does not lead anyone to 
believe that the leaders of Serbia or Croatia and Bosnia want peace at 
all costs. And this plan will not grow the seeds for such a desire.
  I urge my colleagues to look at the proposed settlement map. As I 
understand it--and there has been some disagreement and controversy 
about this--but there will be some repatriation of displaced Serbs into 
Croatian-held territory. Maybe we will not be actually doing that, but 
as I understand the agreement, we will be responsible for protecting 
them and at least in some ways assisting in this operation.
  How do you think the Croatians will react to this repatriation? 
Approvingly? Or the Bosnians when people of Serbian descent are 
repatriated to Bosnia? Do not forget that this current conflict started 
when the Serbs decided they wanted to exterminate the Bosnian people 
from territory they considered theirs from centuries before.
  I just do not believe this plan will work. If it could work, it could 
work without U.S. ground troops on the ground. King Alexander tried it 
68 years ago. He paid the price with his life at the hands of a 
Croatian loyalist and extremist. If we try it, Americans will die in a 
faraway land, one steeped in hatred and one in which we have no vital 
security interests under threat.
  The United States should not resign itself to rubber stamp this 
decision--one based on noble intent, yet ill-conceived. The President 
has tried to explain the logic of deploying U.S. troops on the ground 
in Bosnia, but only one page of the history of this troubled region 
explains why we should not go.
  I urge my colleagues to vote for the Hutchison resolution and against 
the Dole-McCain resolution.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Texas.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Senator 
Mack be added in speaker order after Senator Sarbanes and Senator 
Jeffords be added after Senator Kerry of Massachusetts.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mrs. FEINSTEIN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from California.
  Under the unanimous-consent order, the next speaker on the Democratic 
side was to have been the Senator from Virginia.
  Does the Senator from California ask unanimous consent to change that 
order?
  Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Yes. It is my understanding that for the time being I 
am taking his place.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mrs. FEINSTEIN. I thank the Chair.
  Mr. President, I have really come full circle on the question of 
whether or not to send U.S. troops to Bosnia to try to keep the peace. 
I must say I was initially very skeptical. I believed that you could 
not keep a peace that the people in Bosnia do not want kept. And in the 
earlier meetings of the Foreign Relations Committee I was not convinced 
by the arguments presented by Secretaries Christopher and Perry and the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
  But as events have developed, I have come to the conclusion, after 
attending every classified briefing and every Foreign Relations 
Committee meeting, that the President's policy is the only way to stop 
this war and prevent its spread. I believe there is far greater risk in 
doing nothing and seeing the spread of this war than there is in doing 
something and trying to bring about a just peace.
  The Dayton peace agreement would not have been reached without U.S. 
leadership, and it will not be successfully implemented without our 
leadership either.
  I have also become deeply convinced that the United States has a 
moral mission here, that the cause is noble and the cause is just. 
Today one-half of the people of Bosnia are either dead or homeless. 
Rape has become an instrument of war. Atrocities have been committed 
that have not been seen since World War II. This must end. People have 
had enough of war.
  The United States is being asked essentially to provide one-third of 
the peacekeeping forces. The other day I was visited by the new British 
Ambassador. He pointed out to me that Great Britain is going to provide 
16,000 troops, a nation far smaller than ours; 13,000 in Bosnia itself 
and 3,000 in Hungary and Austria.
  He also said, ``Know this. If the United States goes, we go, too. We 
in Great Britain and in Europe look at you as the leader of NATO.'' If 
NATO is to function, the United States must lead and perform. And I 
believe that is essentially the way it is today, whether we like it or 
not.
  At our most recent Foreign Relations Committee hearing on December 1, 
I was deeply impressed with the arguments put forward by Secretary 
Christopher, Secretary Perry, and General Shalikashvili. They laid out 
not only the rationale for our involvement but a clear and well-defined 
plan for carrying out our mission.
  Some of the opponents of this policy are making the argument that 
they oppose the policy but they support the troops to carry it out. In 
fact, the Hutchison resolution that we will be voting on shortly says 
exactly that. But as I listened to these arguments, I must say that to 
me they strike me as a figleaf at best and disingenuous at worst. 

[[Page S18487]]

  We all support our troops. That goes without saying. But what message 
do we send to our troops if we send them off to do a job and in the 
same breath declare that the job that they are doing is illegitimate? 
How can you say, ``I condemn the mission you are being sent to do, but 
I support you in doing it''? Will our troops really believe they have 
our support if this is what the Congress of the United States says?
  Some have raised the specter of a repeat of Vietnam in Bosnia, but 
the real repetition of Vietnam would be to send United States troops to 
carry out a mission without supporting that mission. Some of my 
colleagues have asked: ``Does anyone believe we are really going to 
stand by our young men and women that we are going to send to Bosnia?'' 
Well, I certainly am, the President is, the full force of the United 
States military is, and I believe that the Senate will in the long run 
as well.
  In my view, the Hutchison resolution undercuts the troops. It says it 
supports the troops, but it is designed to give the President a back 
door to pull the rug out from under them. Instead of giving lukewarm 
support to the troops by questioning the wisdom of their job, we should 
unify behind the policy and commit to giving our troops every 
advantage, all the equipment and all the support they need to carry out 
the mission successfully.
  We cannot have it both ways. If we support the troops, we should 
support the policy.
  I have had an opportunity to review the Dole-McCain resolution, and I 
support it and I support it strongly. I would like to set aside some of 
the myths that I think have been raised by those who are opposed to it.
  The first is the myth of the intractable nature of the conflict. 
There are some who appear to have bought into the argument of 
ultranationalists on all sides. Yes, there have been wars for hundreds 
of years in the Balkans, but there has been a history of war and brutal 
atrocities in Britain, in France, in Germany. Today these nations are 
at peace.
  As the distinguished Senator from Ohio pointed out yesterday, we had 
Prime Minister Shimon Peres on the floor of the House yesterday 
speaking about the long history of violence in the Middle East. That 
goes back to the Crusades, and even beyond. Conflict has been endemic 
to the Middle East for centuries, but today peace is beginning to take 
hold.
  What about Northern Ireland? That conflict has gone on for a long 
time as well. But I do not think anyone here would suggest that the 
Middle East or Northern Ireland are beyond help and doomed to an 
eternity of conflict, and I do not think we should come to the 
conclusion that the only way of life in Bosnia is a way of death and 
atrocities and the spread of the war.
  The fact is that there is now an opportunity for peace, perhaps the 
only opportunity that we will have. If we fail to take this 
opportunity, this war will surely spread to Kosovo, to Macedonia. It 
then involves two NATO allies-- Greece and Turkey--and then it involves 
the rest of Europe, and Europe has always been a vital interest to the 
United States. Our men and women have fought two wars on the European 
Continent because of that interest.
  There is also the myth that there is no clear and defined mission, 
and I would like to debunk that.
  Some of my colleagues have complained that this operation is not 
clear, and that it is not achievable. But if you listen to the 
President, to Secretary Christopher, to Secretary Perry, to General 
Shalikashvili, to General Joulwan, and to others in our military, it is 
clear that this mission, in fact, is clearly defined. As a matter of 
fact, General Joulwan said yesterday he should know within the first 3 
months whether the mission can succeed or not.
  There is a clear exit strategy. Our troops are not being asked to go 
to Bosnia to engage in all sorts of nationbuilding activities. The 
military mission and the goals are explicit, and they are limited. We 
will not be engaged in civilian policing. We will not be engaged in 
refugee resettlement. We will not be engaged in civilian 
reconstruction. We will not be engaged in election monitoring.
  The President and NATO leaders have been quite clear. Our forces in 
Bosnia will monitor the military aspects of the peace agreement, the 
cessation of hostilities, the withdrawal of forces to their respective 
territories, and the lines of demarcation. They will monitor the 
redeployment of forces and heavy weapons to designated areas and the 
establishment of zones of separation. That is the mission.
  I want to speak about the one part of the Dole-McCain joint 
resolution that does concern me, and that is the part that appears on 
page 4 and speaks to the balance of power. A major portion of this 
effort is to see that when the United States pulls out in approximately 
1 year, there is a defensive balance of power so that the Bosnians, if 
need be, can defend themselves. This can be a deterrent to future wars 
if it is carried out correctly. However, it cannot become the launching 
point for radical Islamic fundamentalism on the European Continent, and 
I want to stress that.
  The Dole-McCain resolution very clearly describes periodic reports on 
the armaments provided to the Bosnians that the President will make to 
this Congress, and I think that is extremely important. I think every 
Member of this body should be militant in seeing that destabilizing 
weapons do not go into this area and that the balance of power that is 
achieved is a defensive balance of power. I think that is 
extraordinarily important, and I think it has to be clearly stated.
  There is another myth about the lack of U.S. interests in the region. 
People have said, ``You know, many of our citizens can't recognize 
Bosnia on a map. We don't want to send our people there. They may die. 
We have no major national interest in the area.'' And I thought this 
originally. But I believe the United States does have an interest in a 
safe, secure, and stable Europe. The United States does have an 
interest in assuring that this conflict does not spread and become the 
third general European war of this century.
  The United States does have an interest in supporting our NATO allies 
and assuring that NATO can continue in its role guaranteeing European 
security.
  Because of World War II and because of the threat of Communist 
aggression from the Soviet Union, the NATO alliance was set up to 
provide peace and stability for the NATO nations, and this Nation has 
always been in the leadership of that effort. We have made the 
commitment to it throughout the years, and the reason we have done so 
is because of the failure of Europe in World War I to protect itself, 
in World War II to protect itself, and, I am sorry to say, that same 
failure we see there today. You see, very few strong European leaders 
are willing to come forward and say, ``We will tackle this job alone 
because it's on our back door.''
  Now, we can be repelled by this, we can be reviled by it, we can view 
it with dismay and with some shock, but it is the real world out there, 
and, therefore, this is where the credibility of the NATO alliance 
comes in. The United States is critical to the success and survival of 
the NATO alliance.
  As the British Ambassador said to me 2 days ago, ``We will be there 
as long as the United States is. If the United States leaves, Great 
Britain leaves.'' Period. The end. That, to me, spoke volumes of the 
importance of U.S. leadership. There was no European country that could 
effect the peace. It took the United States of America to effect the 
peace. So I believe we have an interest in reaffirming our own position 
as the global leader of the free world and protecting that leadership 
and that freedom.

  I believe the United States has a moral interest in ending crimes 
against humanity. I, myself, could have been born in Eastern Europe, in 
Poland. I would never have been privileged to have a good life had that 
been the case. Well, the same circumstances are present today in 
Bosnia. I remember all during the 1940's, when people were saying, 
``How could we not have responded?'' ``How could we not have known?'' 
``How did we not know that these boxcars were traveling throughout 
Europe and turn a deaf ear to what was happening?''
  It is moral. It is just. It is noble. We are not asked to fight a 
war. We are asked to give peace a chance.
  Thank you, Mr. President. I yield the floor.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON addressed the Chair. 
  
[[Page S18488]]

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Texas is recognized.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, Senator Hatfield is on his way to the 
floor, and he is next in line to replace Senator DeWine in the order. I 
wanted to take this opportunity until he gets here to answer what 
several Senators have said on the floor--most recently, the Senator 
from California, and before that, the Senator from Connecticut--
regarding people who would support my resolution, who are in full 
support of the troops, though they have questions about this mission.
  I think it is very important that every one of us in this body give 
to each other Member the right to have a vote of conscience. And there 
are many of us who do not think this is the right mission, but who are 
going to go full force to support our troops. In fact, we believe we 
are supporting our troops in the most effective way by opposing this 
mission because we think it is the wrong one.
  I do not question anyone's motives, or how they feel, if they vote 
against the Hutchison-Inhofe resolution. But, by the same token, I 
think it is important that those who are going to support the Dole-
McCain resolution and the Hutchison-Inhofe resolution--that it be known 
that they, too, are doing what they think is right.
  It is a tough decision for anyone to vote to put troops in harm's 
way. And if someone decides that they can best support the troops by 
opposing the President's decision, I think that everyone knows, or 
should know, that that is the right of every Senator to do.
  There have been other missions in the history of this country, in 
which the people have been good people, supported by America, well 
equipped, given everything they need to succeed in their mission, but 
nevertheless the same people in America have not agreed with the 
mission.
  I think the mission in Vietnam was certainly controversial. But the 
people of this country loved and revered the people who went to Vietnam 
from our Armed Forces and fought there for our country. So I do not 
think there is any question whatsoever that you cannot support a 
mission and support the troops fully. I think that each of us has the 
ability to make this decision for ourselves.
  As I have said, I think it is incumbent on a Member of Congress to 
make this decision. It is a constitutional responsibility that we were 
given by the Founders. They did not want it to be easy to send troops 
into a foreign conflict. That is why they put Congress in the power to 
declare war. I do not know that our Founders had even thought about 
peacekeeping missions and the nuances that we would have on declaring 
war. I do not think they thought about a Commander in Chief sending our 
troops into what is talked about as peace, but which, in fact, is 
sending our troops into military conflicts. I think they would have 
envisioned that Congress should authorize a peacekeeping mission that 
the President and the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs have said is going to put troops in harm's way, where 
there may be casualties, and I believe our Founders would have wanted 
authorization by Congress.
  They did not want it to be easy to send our troops into harm's way. 
That is why they made it the decision of Congress to declare war, while 
the Commander in Chief would run the operation. The Commander in Chief 
does have the right to run the military. There is no question about it. 
But it is very clear in the Constitution that Congress should be 
consulted and authorized any time our troops are sent into harm's way.
  I was holding the floor for the distinguished senior Senator from 
Oregon, who has now arrived. I yield the floor to him for his comments.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oregon is recognized.
  Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, on Thursday, the leaders of the warring 
parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina will formally sign a peace agreement 
that was initialed last month in Dayton, OH. This formal signing will 
pave the way for the deployment of the 60,000-strong NATO peace 
implementation force.
  Congress has a role to play in making decisions about the use of U.S. 
troops in hostile situations. In fact, we have an obligation to our 
constituents to raise questions about any mission that will lead to our 
troops being put in harm's way.
  After the Vietnam war, Congress insisted that it have a partnership 
role with the President in future conflicts. So the Congress passed the 
War Powers Act. Under this act, the President retained the power to 
dispatch troops when there was an emergency. But within 60 days of the 
deployment Congress had to take action to specifically authorize the 
deployment, tell the President to bring the troops home, or to continue 
to evaluate the situation after another 60 days extension. It was 
intended to force Congress to take action, to participate in the 
decision.
  Unfortunately, Congress has found ways to avoid taking action. Since 
1965, Congress has voted only twice to authorize the deployment of 
United States troops and, in recent years, we have voted on nonbinding 
resolutions, in some cases, and we have allowed troops to be deployed 
in the Persian Gulf, Somalia, Rwanda, and Haiti, without authorizing 
legislation. We are about to do so again today.
  During the course of this debate, the Senate will have the 
opportunity to vote on three different measures relating to the use of 
United States forces in Bosnia. We have already completed the first 
one. The President has requested congressional authorization, but has 
said that he intends to deploy U.S. troops with or without that 
authorization.
  Of course, he would like to have Congress' support. The Senate's 
consideration of these measures will provide us with the opportunity to 
participate in the debate. However, do not be misled. With the 
exception of the measure passed by the House that we have defeated 
today, the other two resolutions which we will consider, and likely 
pass, are not legally binding.
  Mr. President, I want to reflect for just a moment on some very 
interesting history on Vietnam. Many who can recall during that war 
period, Members of the Senate, particularly, would stand before the 
television cameras for the evening news and wring their hands about how 
awful this war was and why it should not continue. But at no time 
during that period was any Member of Congress willing to take 
responsibility. All they wanted to do was to criticize the President. I 
have a feeling that there is a reluctance over the last few years, 
since we passed the War Powers Act, for Congress to stand up and take 
responsibility. It is much easier to criticize the President, whether 
Republican or Democrat, than to assume a partnership role, as provided 
under the War Powers Act.
  Let me say that while I know that the President is sincere in his 
attempt to bring peace to Bosnia, I find it hard to believe that anyone 
can define a successful military mission which will ensure a lasting 
peace in the region.
  The ethnic struggles which have led to war in Bosnia and Croatia are 
the result of more than 800 years of hatred and mistrust. How are we 
going to change the course of history in one short year? In my view, 
this is an impossible and unrealistic military mission.
  I will go back to school-teaching days and say I hope that people 
would take the time to read one very brief synopsis of the history of 
this region of the world. Robert Kaplan's ``Balkan Ghosts'' is a very 
straightforward treatise on the history, and the impossibility of this 
kind of a mission I would apply to that history. Read the history. We 
do so little reading, we do so little reflection on how we got to where 
we are and what were the forces that made that possible in our own 
country, let alone an area of the world that is probably one of the 
least understood areas of the world from either political, economic, 
social, or cultural history.
  During the last 3\1/2\ years we have seen more than 50 partial and 
general cease-fires signed in this region with these contestants, these 
parties. All have been broken within several weeks of their signing. My 
dear colleagues, they have been doing this for 800 years, lying to one 
another, not meaning what they were doing, because of that deep hatred 
that they have. To see this happening here, even in our own day we do 
not seem to be taking much lesson from it.
  In addition, we have seen three previous peace agreements come and 
go. Given this history, it is impossible for 

[[Page S18489]]
the President to promise he can protect U.S. troops. No one can 
guarantee their safety if the peace agreement falls apart.
  The Dayton peace accord calls for the immediate transfer of 
peacekeeping control from the U.N. peacekeeping forces to the NATO 
peace implementation force. The approximately 20,000 U.N. peacekeepers 
in Bosnia will be replaced by 60,000 heavily armed troops under NATO 
command.
  Mr. President, this is not a peacekeeping force. This is an army. It 
proves that we are trying to solve a political dilemma, a religious 
dilemma, a cultural dilemma, with military troops rather than through 
diplomacy and negotiation.
  One must only look at the peace agreement to see this. The primary 
mission of this course will be to implement the military aspects of the 
peace agreement. This includes monitoring and enforcing the 
requirements that each entity promptly withdraws their forces behind a 
zone of separation which will be established on either side of the 
cease-fire line, and that within 120 days each entity withdraws all 
heavy weapons and forces to barrack areas.
  However, under the agreement, the current warring armies will 
continue to exist. Each entity is permitted to maintain their army. The 
NATO forces will be made up of enough firepower to, in the President's 
words ``respond with overwhelming force'' to any threats to their 
safety or violations of the military aspects of the agreement.
  This does not sound like a peacekeeping mission to me, and it should 
not be promoted to the American public as a peacekeeping mission.
  Furthermore, while the agreement calls for the parties to enter into 
negotiations before the Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe on future arms and heavy equipment restrictions, the agreement 
also contradicts that arms control goal by lifting the international 
arms embargo on Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia.
  Now, get this. We are not only sending our troops in there and 
letting them maintain their own troops; we are saying we are going to 
lift the arms embargo so that they can look forward, after 180 days, to 
getting into an arms race, escalating their military equipment, their 
arms.
  The agreement states that no side may import arms for 90 days after 
the agreement enters force. There is this 180-day restriction, I 
repeat, on the importation of heavy weapons, mines, military aircraft, 
and helicopters. After that, all bets are off. In fact, administration 
officials have indicated that, if necessary, the United States 
Government will begin rearming the Bosnian army as early as next summer 
in an effort to bring a balance of power between the warring factions.
  In other words, arms beget arms, violence begets violence. And we are 
going to continue this worldwide arms merchandising that we have been 
doing with such efficiency during and ever since the Cold War.
  In addition to equipping the Bosnians, the United States will also 
provide necessary training. The agreement sets a precedent that 
military arms must be maintained to achieve stability in the region. In 
my view, this will only lead to an unfettered arms buildup and further 
undermine our ability to bring lasting peace to the region.
  The arms embargo was not a success to begin with. At the same time we 
now go through that charade, to think we are going to do something to 
reduce the arms. We should be pushing to get the region disarming; 
disarming, not rearming.
  There is no question that the war in Bosnia has had a terrible human 
toll. More than 140,000 Bosnians have been killed during the conflict. 
Another 3.6 million refugees and internally displaced persons have been 
created by this action and have had to flee their homes. Although the 
peace agreement includes provisions allowing refugees to return to 
their homes, it is unclear how many will be willing or able to return. 
And we see in the news of the sacking, the burning of those homes that 
are being vacated for the transfer of population.
  Cases of ethnic cleansing continue to come to light as mass graves 
are uncovered near the so-called safe havens that have been overrun by 
the Bosnian Serb Army.
  No side to this conflict has clean hands. I can assure you that 
during the time that this was happening, there were some of us who were 
raising the question of choking off the arms, choking off the arms that 
were flowing down the Danube from our allies, from our friends--from 
Greece, from France, from Italy, from Germany. And who knows what kind 
of arms out of our country were in a third-party transfer? We never did 
try with great effort to stop the flow of arms, even under the embargo. 
Now we are going to lift the pretense of an embargo in order to make 
them much more available and accessible.
  In order to end this human tragedy, we must take away the means to 
make war. A successful peace will be one that includes a strategy to 
diminish the war-making capability of all sides to this conflict. It is 
amazing how we can orchestrate 25 countries of the world for a common 
purpose to fight a war for oil, but somehow we do not find our ability 
to orchestrate our allies for the cause of peace, or to disarm an 
overly armed area of the world that is a great trouble spot.
  During the course of congressional consideration of the war in 
Bosnia, we have failed to take the steps necessary to limit the war-
making capability. The only votes that the Senate has taken since the 
war began in 1991 have been to unilaterally lift the arms embargo. I 
have opposed these resolutions in the past because I felt that lifting 
the arms embargo would only lead to more bloodshed. Those who supported 
the lifting of the embargo did so because they felt, if we arm the 
Bosnians, they would be able to defend themselves, thereby doing away 
the need for U.S. troops to become involved in the ground war.
  Rather than joining with our allies to secure and enforce the embargo 
against all warring parties in the region, we could only see military 
might as the solution to the complex problem. How many people do we 
have to kill in actions of war to realize the total fallacy of that 
thesis? We now say we are going to send more troops in. We are talking 
about injecting our own troops into the war--and that is what it is, 
because there has been no peace reached yet. As I said before, we are 
going into Bosnia with an army and we are going to force the peace. 
This is different from the traditional notion of peacekeeping missions, 
such as the ones we have seen in countries like Korea and others.
  I do not take this deployment lightly, nor do my colleagues. American 
soldiers will likely be killed during this mission in Bosnia. We have 
to accept that reality. Our brothers, sisters, wives, husbands, and 
children will be at risk. In Bosnia and Croatia there are nearly 6 
million landmines in the ground. These hidden enemies pose the greatest 
risk to our troops. In fact, landmines have become the leading cause of 
casualties in Bosnia of peacekeeping forces.
  Even though the peace agreement requires all sides to participate in 
identifying and removing these mines, the reality is that little 
information exists about the layout of the minefields scattered 
throughout Bosnia. As we have seen in Cambodia and Afghanistan, mine 
removal is a tedious task which takes years. Landmines in Bosnia 
endanger not only our troops and peace implementation forces, but also 
civilians who are trying to return home and rebuild their lives.
  I will not support any resolution that explicitly or implicitly gives 
the Senate's support for United States troop involvement in Bosnia. 
While I will wholeheartedly support our troops once they are there, not 
under their own doing, under the Commander in Chief, I cannot and will 
not endorse this military mission.
  We must bring a lasting peace to Bosnia, but we must do so by 
limiting, not increasing, the war-making capability of all sides in the 
conflict. In my opinion, the mission outlined by the President fails to 
meet this basic requirement. I yield the floor.


                           Order of Procedure

  Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, what I want to do, if we can--I know there 
are some people who still want to talk. I know the Senator from Texas 
would like to have a vote on her amendment. I would like to have that 
vote, if we can, at 4 o'clock. 

[[Page S18490]]

  I have just been on the phone with the President. He would like to 
have the vote as early as possible. I know the House is involved in 
debating resolutions over there. I know some of our colleagues have yet 
to speak, but there will still be one additional resolution; that is 
the Dole-McCain-Nunn-Lieberman, and others, resolution. So people could 
still speak in general debate.
  It seems to me there is no reason not to vote on the amendment by the 
Senator from Texas. There is no use making a request if it will be 
objected to. Does the Democratic leader think we can proceed on that 
basis and still have plenty of time for debate?
  Mr. DASCHLE. I have consulted with a number of our colleagues on this 
side of the aisle, and many of them feel very strongly about their need 
to speak prior to the time they will be called upon to vote on either 
measure. They would prefer to give one speech rather than two.
  In my urging to limit Members to one speech, and hopefully to keep 
those speeches to a minimum length, I will have to accommodate them and 
their interest in speaking and being protected in their opportunity to 
speak prior to the time that they would be called upon to vote.
  I am compelled at this point to object to the scheduling of the vote 
prior to the time that they have had the opportunity to speak.
  My preference would be that we have both votes back to back to 
accommodate the speeches, and I think we can get some cooperation in 
limiting the lengths of time, if that can be done.
  Mr. DOLE. Certainly this Senator does not have any problem with back 
to back--anything that would expedite the process. I think most people 
have spoken with reference to one or two of the amendments. I do not 
know how many more speakers are on this side. Some have spoken a number 
of times.
  I think if we limit our speeches to one per Member, or at least two 
per Member, that would help some. Maybe we can have a back-to-back vote 
at some time.
  How much more time do you think it will take on your side?
  Mr. DASCHLE. A lot of our colleagues are not willing to commit to a 
time limit yet. We are working on getting at least an agreement that 
everybody speak just once and then hopefully limiting their time for 
speaking.

  At this point, I am not able to give the leader any specific estimate 
as to the amount of time we need.
  Mr. DOLE. I do not make the request, then, because the Democratic 
leader has obviously not been able to give me the consent, so there is 
no need doing that.
  In the meantime, we will try to see if we cannot find some consensus, 
some agreement here, where we could have back-to-back votes at some 
reasonable hour.
  We have how many speakers left now?
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, if I could answer, I think there are 
at least 20 people signed up to this point.
  I was, of course, hoping that the distinguished minority leader might 
be able to put a time agreement together, and then I think we could 
gauge the length of the speeches a little more and perhaps reach a 
conclusion, and I assume that everyone would like to do this before the 
President leaves at 6 o'clock or so.
  Mr. DOLE. I think there is a phone on the plane.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. I am sorry to hear that.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Thompson). The Senator from Virginia.
  Mr. ROBB. Mr. President, I ask unanimous-consent the Senator from 
Florida, Senator Graham, be added in the next Democratic slot on the 
list of speakers.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. Will the Senator from Virginia yield for a unanimous 
consent request to add Senator Helms in the next available slot?
  Mr. ROBB. I am happy to yield.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent Senator Helms 
be added in the next available Republican slot.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The Senator from Virginia.
  Mr. ROBB. Mr. President, we cannot and should not attempt to act as 
the world's policeman. But that eminently sensible acknowledgment of 
the limits of U.S. power cannot and should not deter us from acting 
when it is the United States and only the United States that can end 
aggression and bloodshed, or in this case the genocide that has already 
claimed the lives of over 200,000 human beings and left over 2 million 
as refugees.
  I understand the concerns and reticence of many of our colleagues, 
indeed most of the American people. Calls in most congressional offices 
remain overwhelmingly against putting United States ground forces in 
Bosnia. But without U.S. leadership, there would be no peace. The 
Europeans tried nobly but in vain. The fighting did not stop until the 
United States led NATO in the air and led the diplomatic efforts which 
culminated in the initialing of the agreement in Dayton and the final 
signing that will take place tomorrow in Paris.
  Without U.S. leadership and active participation on the ground, the 
peace will end and the carnage will continue. We now represent the 
last, best hope to bring the war in the Balkans to a close.
  Are there risks? Certainly there are risks, serious risks. Of course 
there are some risks to our troops even in normal training exercises. 
But I believe the risks are even greater if we fail to honor this 
commitment. I do not relish putting our troops at risk in the barrens 
of northeast Bosnia.
  But for each of us, I would suggest that there are some risks--
something that we consider so important that we are willing to work, 
that we are willing to risk dying for it. I think, for example, we 
would all agree that we would do whatever it was necessary to do in 
order to protect immediate members of our family. But there are also 
larger risks that are worth dying for--as a Nation worth putting our 
troops at risk for. I have seen some of these risks. I have seen war. I 
have had men literally die in my arms in combat. I have written letters 
and talked to the parents of those who have lost their lives under 
these circumstances. It is not easy. But the cost of freedom is high. 
Yet, it is a price that I believe that we have to be willing to pay.
  We cannot shrink from the role that only the United States of America 
can play in making peace work in faraway lands when America is now the 
only nation with the capacity to lead this effort to a successful 
conclusion. No one supports the atrocities which have occurred daily in 
Bosnia. But the question we face is whether the lives of American 
service men and service women are worth risking to stop it. And I 
believe that risk is appropriate. I believe we have a moral 
responsibility to act.
  In that vein, I was struck by Elie Wiesel's comments this morning 
when he said, ``We in the United States represent a certain moral 
aspect of history. A great nation owes its greatness not only to its 
military power but also to its moral consciousness.'' He went on to say 
``What would future generations say about us, all of us, here in this 
land, if we do nothing?'' And I remember his deeply-felt plea to the 
same effect some 2\1/2\ years ago at the dedication of the Holocaust 
Museum when he turned and urged President Clinton to stop the war in 
the Balkans.
  Mr. President, doing nothing represents an abdication of our 
responsibilities as the leader of NATO and the larger community of 
nations. Doing nothing increases the likelihood of a larger war in 
Europe. Doing nothing amounts to tacit acceptance of more slaughter in 
Bosnia.
  The Prime Minister of Israel, Shimon Peres, yesterday at a joint 
session of Congress was eloquent and powerful in saying to us

       You enabled many nations to save their democracies, even as 
     you strive now to assist many nations to free themselves from 
     their nondemocratic past. You fought many wars. You won many 
     victories. Wars did not cause you to lose heart. Thanks to 
     the support you have given, and to the aid you have rendered, 
     we have been able to overcome wars and tragedies thrust upon 
     us, and feel sufficiently strong to take measured risks to 
     wage our campaign of peace.

  Mr. President, we now stand alone as the only country capable of 
restoring order and a sense of hope in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The 
American imprimatur carries enormous weight among the community of 
nations. We can and should seek to spread the word of peace to places 
like the Middle East, and Ireland--and, yes, Bosnia--that have 

[[Page S18491]]
known the language of violence and war for too long.
  Mr. President, these war and peace decisions are difficult, and they 
reach deep into our emotions. I believe our Founding Fathers were wise 
to vest in the President the responsibilities of being the Commander in 
Chief of our Armed Forces while providing Congress with the power of 
the purse and the exclusive right to declare war.
  We have only one President at a time, and he has acted in his 
capacity as Commander in Chief. Were we in his shoes we well might have 
taken 100 different courses of action in the Senate, and perhaps as 
many as 435 different courses of action in the House. Indeed, I have 
long urged more assertive action by the United States for several 
years.
  But, Mr. President, it is the President of the United States who is 
ultimately responsible for this decision, and the American people and 
ultimately history will hold him accountable. His choice to deploy 
troops to Bosnia may not be popular with the American people. But you 
cannot lead by following the polls, and for this I commend his courage.
  The President has made a choice in favor of leadership over 
isolation--in favor of standing shoulder to shoulder with our allies 
instead of abandoning them, in favor of morality rather than allowing 
the crimes against humanity to continue. I applaud his choice to 
grapple with these problems and to seek a comprehensive solution. He 
deserves enormous credit for taking on this cause of peace and freedom 
that is so ingrained in our American way of life.
  I happen to have a very high level of confidence in our troops who 
are the best led, best trained, and most powerful fighting force that 
the world has ever known. When they have successfully completed their 
limited mission in Europe, there is clearly going to be more to do with 
respect to a residual force. And, in that respect, I believe that 
Europe will step up to its responsibility at the appropriate time.
  In the same context, Mr. President, I would like to salute our 
majority leader, Bob Dole, and Senator John McCain in particular, who 
have risen above whatever partisan gain might have accrued to them by 
taking a different course of action, to join the President in leading 
the country to support our troops--just as I was pleased to help lead 
the effort and support our troops, and support President Bush when he 
asked for our help in the gulf war.

  Mr. President, I believe the President of the United States has made 
a strong case for U.S. leadership. Absent American participation peace 
will fail in the Balkans, and ongoing war will have continued to 
threaten our national security interests.
  Mr. President, I believe our security depends on joining with our 
allies in times like this, and I urge my colleagues to do what I 
believe in this case is the right thing to do. And that is to support 
the deployment and to support our troops in the commitment that the 
President of the United States acting in his capacity as Commander in 
Chief has made there and on our behalf.
  With that, Mr. President, I ask our colleagues to vote against the 
resolution which would be a resolution of disapproval, and vote for the 
bipartisan effort that the majority leader and others have sponsored to 
support our actions, notwithstanding some of their own reservations, so 
that our troops carrying our flag will know that they have our backing 
when they are placed in harm's way.
  With that, Mr. President, I thank the Chair. I yield the floor.
  Mr. DOMENICI addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Mexico.
  Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, how much time has been reserved for the 
Senator from New Mexico?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. There are no time limits.
  Mr. DOMENICI. I will try to finish in 8 minutes. Would you notify me 
when I have used 7?
  Mr. President, fellow Senators, first of all, I think everybody knows 
of my great support for Senator Dole. I am, for the most part, at his 
side in all the battles that are fought in the Senate. I cherish that 
relationship very, very much. I am also fully cognizant, at least as 
cognizant I can be, of the Commander in Chief concept that is discussed 
here so eloquently by many who know more about it than I and by people 
like the distinguished Senator from Virginia, who understands it from 
the battlefield.
  Mr. President, I have heard other Senators talk about the derivation 
of that constitutional power of the Commander in Chief. I heard one of 
the eloquent Senators last night, Senator Cohen, describe it in a way 
that I will repeat very briefly. Between the Congress and the 
President, the exercise of this constitutional power is somewhat like a 
race--whomever gets there first has this power. If Congress, 6 months 
ago, would have enacted an appropriations bill prohibiting United 
States involvement in Bosnia and prohibiting the expenditure of funds 
for that purpose, then it would be illegal to spend these funds. There 
would be no constitutional issue because the Commander in Chief would 
have no authority to spend any money.
  The power of the purse strings and of using the taxpayers' money to 
pay for events, whether they are here or overseas, is that of the 
Congress. If the President decides to involve our troops in an issue 
such as this, in a commitment such as this, and the troops are deployed 
before congressional action, then it is said that we must support this 
decision because he had the inherent power as Commander in Chief.
  Now, I do not want any misunderstanding as far as this Senator is 
concerned. There is no one in the Senate that I take a back seat to in 
terms of supporting the defense of our Nation, and I have had a lot to 
do over the last 15 years with how much we spend on defense, not 
necessarily the details, but a lot to do with the total that we spend. 
I have come down for the most part on the side of spending more rather 
than less. We must have the best equipped force rather than take any 
risks. We must pay our All-Volunteer Army enough so that it remains an 
all-volunteer army in the concept originated under the Nixon 
administration. They must be paid with some parity to civilian jobs so 
we get and keep the very best.
  All of this is said by this Senator to suggest that I want a very 
strong American military. I am proud of the fact that when we send our 
military to get involved in the world, they do their job. As far as our 
soldiers are concerned they always come out of it, with few exceptions, 
as being good people, if you can do that and have war. We are a good 
nation and we have good motives, and, with few exceptions, that is how 
we behave.
  But, Mr. President and fellow Senators, in spite of these inherent 
powers, we are each elected as a Senator from our State. American men 
and women are going to be assigned to a foreign country in large 
numbers--20,000, maybe 25,000--to accomplish a mission, and I believe 
paramount to all of these various powers is my right as a Senator to 
express myself either in favor of it or opposed to it.
  I am opposed to the involvement of the 20,000 American troops with 
40,000 from other countries, mostly the countries that were formerly 
NATO. Now we have expanded NATO's role and we have a few countries 
involved that were not part of NATO. I believe it is my right to say I 
do not think this is the right thing to do.
  Now, nobody should doubt that this view is going to lose and that the 
American troops are going to go there, and nobody should doubt that 
once they are there they will find this Senator agreeing to pay to keep 
them there and keep them the very best. When our generals say you need 
money to make sure they are as safe as possible, I will be right here 
among the first and the clearest saying I am for it.
  I am expressing myself, fortunately, before the troops are there. 
There is a small contingency there. And let me even say that my remarks 
might not even be addressed at them because that is a small 
contingency. They are there, and I do not want to see anything happen 
to them. But this issue I am addressing is-- should we put 20,000 
Americans there to maintain the peace? Frankly, I think it is a mistake 
almost any way that I look at it. We are powerful, and if we go there, 
people will think we are powerful. If we go there, Europe will think it 
is great. They will say, America is leading again.
  But the question is, leading what? What are we trying to do? And is 
there 

[[Page S18492]]
a real, bona fide probability that what we are trying to do will not 
work? I happen to know less than most around here about what went on in 
that country for the last 600 years. But I do know something. I do know 
that the only times these people have lived together in peace and 
harmony in modern times were two events in history: One, when the 
Germans occupied it. Clearly we do not intend to keep the peace among 
these people who do not seem to want to have peace among themselves 
with an occupancy like Hitler's. I hope we do not, and we are assured 
we do not.
  The other peaceful time in modern history was the reign of the 
dictator Tito. The Communists' most pervasive way of keeping peace and 
harmony is block by block behavior that must be consistent with the 
state or something happens to you, right? That is a simple way of 
saying you behave or we kill you. This was maybe not like the Nazi 
occupation, but that also maintained the peace.
  We are not going to do that. There is no one around suggesting that 
anyone is going to do that. And so we have three new countries born of 
new boundaries and we are going to ask of that leadership, the 
leadership of those countries, what I perceive to be impossible. We are 
going to ask them to do a ``Mission Impossible''--disarm those who 
would cause harm with weapons. How are they going to do that? I do not 
believe they are strong enough, and I do not believe they will get it 
done. There will be plenty of guns around for rebels who want to kill 
each other, who are angry because they do not belong in that country or 
their houses are occupied by people they do not want.
  We are also asked to be part of making sure that these countries get 
a balance of military power amongst themselves. I am not even so sure 
that will work. We have been talking about it for a long time, but I am 
wondering even if a military balance is reached then pull our troops 
out, that Bosnia could be an even bigger tinderbox and more war with 
more killing. So my own feeling is we are sending our troops to do 
something that will not work, to exhibit our leadership in a situation 
that we ought not be leading or even supporting.
  Now, obviously, it is easy to get up on the floor of the Senate and 
talk about how great America is, and how wonderful our military men and 
women are. We can almost envision in our mind's eye the great, 
beautiful sight when they arrive and show up with all of our new tanks 
and all of the American flags. It is going to be a great scene. And 
believe you me, I am going to feel very proud, because it is a 
fantastic--a fantastic--accomplishment of the people of the United 
States who regularly have been paying taxes. Let me mention right now, 
they are paying about $270 billion for the defense of our country, so 
that we can have men and women like these that we are sending there.
  So I close today very simply by saying I would not send any more 
people in, and I am voting for the resolution that says we do not 
approve of this. It is with reluctance that I will vote against the 
Dole resolution when it comes up because I do not think it is the right 
thing to do.
  I hope I have explained myself that I am not trying to pass judgment 
on these constitutional powers, be they inherent or otherwise. I am 
talking very, very simply about what I perceive to be my right and my 
responsibility. I express it as best I can here on the floor. And that 
is the way I feel. For those who have led this cause, with far more 
effort than I, I thank them for it. And I thank the junior Senator from 
Oklahoma for his leadership.
  I do believe we are going to be there for quite awhile and spend a 
lot of money. I pray that is all we spend there, and we do not spend 
any lives there. I truly believe it is possible that we will lose a lot 
of lives. But I am not standing up here saying I am frightened 
singularly of that. I just do not think we ought to do this. I do not 
think it is the right mission for us. And since I feel that way, 
neither our tanks nor our resources nor our men and women should be 
there trying to accomplish this job. I yield the floor.
  Mr. NUNN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Georgia.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, today or tomorrow the Senate will be voting 
on the President's decision to deploy United States military forces as 
part of a NATO peace enforcement mission in Bosnia.
  There are many different views of how we got to this point. You have 
my own views on that. I will discuss them at another time. I have 
already discussed them in the past on numerous occasions.
  But it is my hope that the Senate will now be able to concentrate its 
focus on the choices that are now before us. There are few things about 
the current situation that we know; a few things that we believe based 
on reasonable judgments but not certainty; and many unknowns that are 
subject only to reasonable speculation at this point, even if it is 
reasonable speculation.
  The things that we know are what I will try to deal with in a short 
and brief set of remarks today.
  First of all, we know that President Clinton has decided to commit 
United States military forces to this mission in Bosnia.
  Second, we know that NATO has decided to commit the NATO alliance to 
this peace enforcement mission. And we know that all NATO nations that 
have military forces are participating.
  Third, we know that several hundred American troops are now on the 
ground in Bosnia; and several thousand troops will be on the ground in 
Bosnia in the next few weeks.
  Fourth, we can debate the constitutional power of the Commander in 
Chief, as we have many times in the past and we will again, and we can 
debate congressional responsibility to declare war, but we all know 
that Congress has neither the ways nor the means to prevent this 
deployment unless we cut off the funds. We know that. It has already 
been decided by the Senate today that we are not going to cut off the 
funds. We know that.
  Fifth, we know that the Defense appropriations bill has passed, been 
signed, and the President, like his predecessors of both parties, will 
finance the operation out of operation and maintenance funds and then 
seek reimbursement of these funds next year in a supplemental 
appropriation.
  Sixth, we know that if Congress cuts off the funds at this point, it 
would require a majority in both Houses to pass and two-thirds vote in 
both the Senate and House to override a certain veto. The Senate 
rejected this cutoff of funds decisively today when we voted on the 
first resolution because I believe the Senators concluded this would 
have an adverse effect on our own military forces, an adverse effect on 
our allies, an adverse effect on our leadership in NATO and the world, 
as well as an adverse effect on the parties on the ground in Bosnia.
  The President has decided on deployment. The NATO alliance has 
decided on deployment. The United States forces are on the way to 
Bosnia. What then is the congressional role in this important national 
security decision?
  Mr. President, I would like to talk at length today about some of the 
constitutional challenges we have in terms of determining the role of 
Congress in the post-cold war era. I will return to that subject 
shortly.
  But today we must face a world of reality. The cards have been dealt. 
The administration's actions--starting with the President's commitment 
almost 3 years ago--and that was a public and international commitment 
that United States forces would participate in a NATO force to 
implement a Bosnian peace agreement--have put Congress in a situation 
in which a great deal is at stake, including United States reliability 
and leadership, but also including the peace agreement itself, the 
ending of the tragedy in Bosnia, as well as the future of NATO as an 
alliance.
  We also know that a cut off of funds will not become law, but passage 
of this type of legislation--followed by a veto and a vote to override, 
if the House passes it or we pass it today--would put our military 
forces in limbo in the middle of their deployment--when they are most 
vulnerable. To me this is unthinkable and unacceptable.
  We also know that the effect of such action would erode the value of 
U.S. commitments around the world and would increase the danger to U.S. 
military personnel in harm's way that are stationed in dangerous places 
around the world.
  That danger certainly would be an increase to our military forces 
whether 

[[Page S18493]]
in the Korean Peninsula or in Europe or in the Middle East because the 
greatest thing they have behind them is United States credibility and 
the credibility of our own word.
  The bottom line--Mr. President--if today Congress found a way to 
prevent the President from going forward with his commitment, the 
damage to America and the increased danger to our troops in the world 
is certain. There is really no doubt about that.
  If we do give the President the green light and permit the mission to 
go forward in a carefully prescribed manner, the risks are considerable 
but there is at least a chance of success if that term is narrowly and 
carefully defined.
  I will not dwell on the definition of success in these remarks today. 
But before the week is out I do want to give a much more detailed 
presentation including what I think we should do in terms of the 
definition of success, including the risk of this operation as well as 
the opportunities of this operation.
  Mr. President, my main concern today however is the message the 
Senate sends to our military forces who are about to embark on this 
NATO mission to Bosnia.
  I would like to read into the Record and place in the Record a letter 
I received today. It was dated December 12. It is signed by Michael S. 
Davison, General, U.S. Army, retired--many will remember General 
Davison for his service to our Nation--Andrew J. Goodpaster, General, 
U.S. Army, retired, who also served as the Supreme Allied Commander in 
Europe as well as the head of NATO forces, Walter T. Kerwin, General, 
U.S. Army, retired, who had a very distinguished career in the Army, 
William J. McCaffrey, Lieutenant General, U.S. Army, retired, William 
Y. Smith, U.S. Air Force, retired, Harry D. Train, Admiral, U.S. Navy, 
retired, and others.
  For those of us who have been here very long in the Senate, this is a 
sterling list of outstanding military leaders that have served our 
Nation with distinction. Here is what they say:

       Dear Senator Nunn: As American military forces are being 
     prepared for commitment in Bosnia, we believe it is essential 
     that they go with a clear understanding that they are 
     supported by their country--that is, by the whole American 
     people--in their difficult and dangerous assignment.
       Our military forces serving in Bosnia will be under 
     American command, acting in concert with military forces from 
     NATO and other nations that participate in the military 
     implementation of the Dayton peace agreement. The mission 
     statement and the NATO chain of command must make it clear 
     that the military forces are not to be drawn into mission-
     creep nation-building but are to be used for tasks military 
     in nature, and will not be subjected to attempts at micro-
     management from afar, or to ``dual-key'' aberrations.

  Continuing the quote from these distinguished retired military 
officials.

       As our leaders consider our country's involvement in 
     Bosnia, we encourage them to send a message to our Soldiers, 
     Sailors, Airmen and Marines wherever they may be (and to all 
     others as well) that our country is giving them its full 
     backing in the accomplishment of their assigned mission. We 
     believe it is time to close ranks, support our troops in the 
     field, and concentrate on helping them do their job in the 
     best possible way.

  And then the letter is signed by these generals.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the letter be printed in 
the Record.
  There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                                                December 13, 1995.
       As American military forces are being prepared for 
     commitment in Bosnia, we believe it is essential that they go 
     with a clear understanding that they are supported by their 
     county--that is, by the whole American people--in their 
     difficult and dangerous assignment.
       Our military forces serving in Bosnia will be under 
     American command, acting in concert with military forces from 
     NATO and other nations that participate in the military 
     implementation of the Dayton peace agreement. The mission 
     statement and the NATO chain of command must make it clear 
     that the military forces are not to be drawn into mission-
     creep nation-building but are to be used for tasks military 
     in nature, and will not be subjected to attempts at micro-
     management from afar, or to ``dual-key'' aberrations.
       As our leaders consider our country's involvement in 
     Bosnia, we encourage them to send a message to our Soldiers, 
     Sailors, Airmen and Marines wherever they may be (and to all 
     others as well) that our country is giving them its full 
     backing in the accomplishment of their assigned mission. We 
     believe it is time to close ranks, support our troops in the 
     field, and concentrate on helping them do their job in the 
     best possible way.

     Michael S. Davison, General, U.S. Army (Ret.)
     Russell E. Dougherty, General, U.S. Air Force (Ret.)
     John R. Galvin, General, U.S. Army (Ret.)
     Andrew J. Goodpaster, General, U.S. Army (Ret.)
     Walter T. Kerwin, General, U.S. Army (Ret.)
     William P. Lawrence, Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy (Ret.)
     William J. McCaffrey, Lt. Gen., U.S. Army (Ret.)
     Jack N. Merritt, General, U.S. Army (Ret.)
     Bernard W. Rogers, General, U.S. Army (Ret.)
     Brent Scowcroft, Lt. Gen., U.S. Air Force (Ret.)
     George M. Seignious, II, Lt. Gen., U.S. Army (Ret.)
     William Y. Smith, General, U.S. Air Force (Ret.)
     Harry D. Train, Admiral, U.S. Navy (Ret.)
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I agree with every word in this letter. I 
think they are absolutely right on target. This is where we are today. 
And this is the kind of consideration that the Senate must take into 
account today. We will have plenty of time to debate how we got to this 
point. But today I think we first and foremost need to consider the 
effect of what we do on not only the military forces themselves that 
are in the process of deploying, but on their families and on their 
mission.
  Mr. President, I urge the Senate today to support--or tomorrow, 
whenever we vote--the Dole-McCain resolution. This resolution has been 
the subject of intense and constructive negotiations on a bipartisan 
basis with a Democratic working group headed by Senator Daschle, 
Senator Pell and myself.
  The Dole-McCain resolution, as now worded, has a key paragraph which 
I believe conveys the kind of support our American troops and their 
families both need and deserve. I quote that paragraph because I think 
it basically follows almost exactly what these distinguished retired 
military generals and admirals have said to us in the way of advice.
  Quoting the paragraph in the Dole-McCain resolution:

       The Congress unequivocally supports the men and women of 
     our Armed Forces who are carrying out their mission in 
     support of peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina with professional 
     excellence, dedicated patriotism and exemplary bravery and 
     believes that they must be given all necessary resources and 
     support to carry out their mission and ensure their security.

  Mr. President, that is the heart of what we are going to be voting 
on. I hope that our colleagues on both sides of the aisle will 
understand the importance of what we are doing, and I hope they will 
put the military forces first and foremost in their minds.
  Mr. President, before we vote on the Dole-McCain resolution, it is my 
understanding we will vote on the Hutchison-Inhofe resolution. I have 
great respect for both Senators who sponsored this resolution. They are 
on the Armed Services Committee, and they do a sterling job of 
representing their States and representing the American people on this 
committee. But the Hutchison resolution does not provide what our 
troops need. It does not provide a sense that the Senate backs them and 
their mission. It tells our military forces, in effect--``We don't 
agree with your mission. What you're doing is not important to the 
United States. It's not important enough for you to risk your life.''
  These are the people who are going to be risking their lives. ``It's 
not important enough for you to risk your life and neither is the NATO 
alliance and its mission.''
  ``Enforcing the peace agreement in Bosnia''--and this is my 
paraphrasing of the Hutchison-Inhofe message; these are not the words. 
I do not want anyone to think I am quoting the words. This is the 
effect of those words. ``Enforcing the peace agreement in Bosnia is not 
something we agree with.'' That 

[[Page S18494]]
is what we are going to be saying implicitly if we adopt this 
resolution. Certainly we will be saying it if we adopt this resolution 
and do not pass the Dole-McCain resolution. We are also saying 
implicitly the President is totally on his own without the backing of 
the Congress and the American people.
  We go forward and say in the Hutchison-Inhofe resolution--again, in 
effect, these are my words--``We will pay you, we will equip you and we 
will wish you well. We don't agree with the mission, we don't think 
it's important enough for you to risk your life, but we are going to 
equip you, support you and wish you well.''
  Now, how are our military men and women and their families going to 
feel about undertaking this kind of mission where, indeed, many of them 
will be risking their lives? I hope not many will end up being injured 
or killed. I hope none. But nevertheless, there is a very serious risk 
here. We know that. How are they going to feel if we send them off on 
this undertaking with this message from the U.S. Senate?
  Mr. President, I understand the temptation of my colleagues to vote 
for the Hutchison-Inhofe resolution. It gives Senators the ability to 
say we were against this mission from the beginning but we support our 
troops. This resolution, which will be voted on today or tomorrow, may 
be what some Senators need, but it is not what our troops need at this 
juncture.
  It is entirely possible--I hope it does not happen--but it is 
entirely possible the Hutchison-Inhofe resolution could be agreed to 
and the Dole-McCain resolution could fail. If this occurs, then our 
American military will have the worst of both worlds. We will be 
saying, ``Full speed ahead on a risky mission that we don't agree with, 
don't approve of''--and that is what we are going to be saying--``Full 
speed ahead on a risky mission with the clear knowledge the mission is 
denounced at the outset by the U.S. Senate.''

  I urge my colleagues to vote against the Hutchison-Inhofe resolution, 
and I urge them to vote for the Dole-McCain resolution.
  I urge all of those who at this stage are thinking about voting for 
the Hutchison resolution to think very carefully. It is essential for 
the morale of our military forces that we send the clear message of the 
Dole-McCain resolution which says, in effect, ``We may not agree with 
the President or how we got to this point, but we believe the 
commitment of U.S. military forces to Bosnia is important; it is 
important to prevent the spread of the conflict, to maintain United 
States leadership in NATO, to stop the tragic loss of life, to fulfill 
American commitments and to preserve United States credibility.''
  There is a different message, a fundamentally different message that 
will go forward if we adopt the Hutchison-Inhofe resolution. If we pass 
the Dole-McCain resolution, in spite of the clear concern expressed in 
that resolution about how we got to this point, there is no doubt that 
the Dole-McCain resolution fully supports the American military forces 
and fully supports the mission that they are going to be undertaking.
  I want to read again the paragraph in the Dole-McCain resolution that 
makes this abundantly clear, and I hope Senators will concentrate on 
the difference between this language and what is in the Hutchison-
Inhofe language.
  The language in the Dole-McCain resolution says:

       The Congress unequivocally supports the men and women of 
     our Armed Forces who are carrying out their missions in 
     support of peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina with professional 
     excellence, dedicated patriotism and exemplary bravery, and 
     believes they must be given all necessary resources and 
     support to carry out their missions and ensure their 
     security.

  Mr. President, in closing, I urge the passage of the Dole-McCain 
resolution so that our military forces and their families will 
understand not only that we in Congress support them, but that the 
mission they are undertaking and the risks they will bear are important 
to America.
  I know there are others waiting to speak, and I am not going to go 
into great detail, but I do want to say, just in summarizing my 
prepared remarks, which I will not give today but will give at a later 
point in this debate or thereafter, that the Congress of the United 
States needs to take a fundamental look at the role we are playing or 
not playing in terms of these national security decisions.
  Congress must understand--if we do not at this point, we must begin 
to, and I have understood it for a number of years--the War Powers Act 
does not work. The longer this outmoded and unworkable legislation 
remains on the books, the longer we will continue the illusion that 
Congress is playing a meaningful role in the commitment of U.S. 
military forces to these types of missions.
  President Clinton will be viewed by most in Congress as assuming the 
full responsibility for the fate of the United States military mission 
in Bosnia. That is because this commitment by President Clinton was 
made in 1993 without consultation with the Congress or the 
congressional leadership.
  There is a similarity between this and the Persian Gulf where the 
President of the United States, President Bush then, committed the 
United States internationally without an approval of Congress. That is 
the parallel. We are going to face this situation over and over and 
over again, where Presidents commit internationally before they get 
approval at home.
  We have to address this. I think it is in our court. I think it is 
Congress' responsibility to make the correction. An awful lot of this 
comes from the illusion that the War Powers Act may some day 
miraculously work. It has never worked. It is not going to work. It is 
based on the fundamental flaw that assumes that congressional inaction 
can require the Commander in Chief to withdraw forces from abroad. 
Congressional inaction will never, ever force a Commander in Chief to 
withdraw forces. The only way we can do that is by cutting off funds, 
and we need to recognize this.
  No President will or should allow U.S. forces to be withdrawn from a 
military mission because of simple congressional inaction. I think, Mr. 
President, it is time to repeal the War Powers Act and replace it with 
legislation that is realistic and workable. We must find a way to 
create regular, full, and comprehensive consultation between the 
President and the Congress before the President makes concrete 
commitments and before U.S. troops are committed to harm's way.
  We do not have that mechanism now. We do not have the consultation 
taking place in a timely fashion, and that has been true both in 
Republican and in Democratic administrations.
  So I hope out of this we will begin looking at the War Powers Act and 
begin to make changes to correct it.
  I see that the Senator from Delaware is on the floor. He and I and 
Senator Byrd, as well as Senator Warner and several other Republicans, 
several years ago sponsored a revision of the War Powers Act. I hope 
our colleagues will begin to think along those lines because it is 
leading us down the primrose path of having a law on the books that 
supposedly involves Congress in these decisions when, by the time 
Congress gets involved, the international commitment has already been 
made and the choices are regrettably limited.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. ASHCROFT addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Missouri is recognized.
  Mr. ASHCROFT. Mr. President, I appreciate the debate that has been 
undertaken here in the U.S. Senate and the remarks of individuals who 
are sincere on both sides of this question. I do think, however, that 
in characterizing the resolutions upon which we will be voting, it is 
important to understand the wording of the resolutions and to take them 
for their face value.
  The distinguished senior Senator from Georgia has sought to 
characterize the resolution of Senators Hutchison and Inhofe as being 
one which would not signal to the troops that we really support them. I 
would like to read section 2, which is entitled ``Expressing Support 
for United States Military Personnel Who Are Deployed.'' The wording is 
simple, straightforward, and unmistakably clear:

       The Congress strongly supports the United States military 
     personnel who may be ordered by the President to implement 
     the general framework agreement for peace in Bosnia/
     Herzegovina and its associated annexes.

  It seems to me that that is a very clear and generous statement. It 
is an 

[[Page S18495]]
honest statement by the U.S. Senate, which allows that even if we 
disagree with the President--and many of us do--when such a deployment 
is made, in the words of the resolution, we will strongly support the 
military personnel who are ordered by the President to implement the 
particular mission which has been designated. In this case, it is to 
implement the general framework for peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
the associated annexes.
  Today, Mr. President, the United States again finds itself faced with 
the conflicting demands of a confused and chaotic world. Today's debate 
carries the name of ``Bosnia,'' but it is a debate that this Congress 
has faced numerous times before--it is just the name that has changed.
  At stake and at question are the specific terms, conditions, and 
reasons for deploying U.S. troops, and the nature of U.S. foreign 
policy generally. These are not small or trivial matters--not for the 
President or for those of us here in the Congress, not for the 
military, and certainly not for the families of America's service men 
and women, who are preparing for deployment in Bosnia.
  Like all Americans, I want to see an end to the killing and cruelty 
that have come to define the daily existence of millions of people in 
Bosnia. The atrocities committed by all parties are so heinous as to 
offend all of our consciences and to fire within us justifiable 
outrage. That these horrors come to an end is not a point of debate; 
that the United States has a special responsibility in the world, as 
the only superpower, is likewise not a matter of genuine debate.
  But today's debate is much more narrowly focused--it is a debate 
about a so-called peace plan--brokered by the United States, agreed to 
by the warring parties, signed in Dayton--and whether that plan 
warrants the involvement and possible deaths of U.S. ground troops in 
the Balkans. I believe that until the Clinton administration can 
clearly and convincingly answer why, how, and under what conditions we 
ought to be involved, I cannot support the President's decision to 
deploy American soldiers to enforce the peace agreement.
  In any deployment of U.S. ground troops, I believe that we must meet 
at least a five-part test. I will state the parts of that test again 
today, just as I have consistently over the course of the last year.
  First, I think we have to identify the vital U.S. national interests. 
It has to be a security interest. It has to be an interest which is 
important to the continuing existence of this country.
  Second, we need to outline clear U.S. military and policy objectives.
  Third, we need to construct a timetable and strategy for achieving 
those objectives.
  Fourth, we need to develop an appropriate exit strategy; and,
  Fifth, we really need to gain the support of the American people for 
the policy initiatives and the military objectives in any deployment.
  What we determine to be our vital interests is dynamic. A 
geographical region that might be vital to our interests at one time 
may not be at another time. Technology might change. Broadly defined, 
``vital'' U.S. interests are defined as being those interests that have 
a direct political and economic effect on the Nation. They ought to 
have an interest about our capacity to survive and succeed as a nation. 
Threats to strategic assets, to shipping lanes, to our strategic 
allies, and threats to our traditional sphere of influence, similarly 
represent ``clear and present danger'' to the United States. Less clear 
is the nature of humanitarian interest, and how and when such interests 
are considered vital U.S. national interests.
  Despite the protestations of members of the Clinton administration, 
it is this final category that I believe we are dealing here. In the 
course of the past few weeks, I have had the opportunity to hear from a 
number of the architects of the Dayton accord--Secretary of State, 
Warren Christopher; Secretary of Defense, William Perry; Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General John Shalikashvili, and chief 
negotiator Richard Holbrooke. Their explanations of why we should be 
involved, in my judgment, lacked credibility. Their rationale has never 
included a valid explanation of how vital U.S. national security 
interests are at stake in the Balkans at the close of this century.
  On the one hand, they have said that we have a risk of an expanded 
full-scale Balkan war that could domino its way all across Europe. Such 
assertions fly in the face of fact. Secretary Christopher has stated 
that a major reason the peace agreement was reached is that the warring 
parties are suffering from battle fatigue. This is an internal conflict 
that has raged for years, stemming from differences which have divided 
people for centuries. If the fighting factions are war weary, then what 
evidence is there to suggest that the potential for the war to spread 
is imminent or greater now than it has been in the past?
  We have seen some 30 cease-fire in this region before, which begs the 
question, is this the cease-fire of the century or a cease-fire of the 
season, with another long winter's nap? While the threat of another 
massive European war makes for good headlines, baseless threats make 
for lousy public policy.
  The President has argued that our continued leadership in NATO is at 
stake here. He believes that it is a vital U.S. interest to prove 
ourselves overseas. U.S. perception and leadership overseas are clearly 
vital. The question that no one has answered, however, is how the 
deployment of U.S. ground troops will help.
  The only response I have been given that comes close to answering 
this question is that U.S. ground troops must be deployed in order to 
vindicate the President because in a speech 2 years ago, he made a 
promise to send troops. Retreating from that promise would somehow 
signal a failure in his leadership. Well, very frankly, we should not 
put American lives on the line just to rescue an outdated Presidential 
promise.
  Following the gulf war, world perception of our resolve--of our 
determination to get things done--was clear, the United States meant 
what it said and acted accordingly. Since that time, world perception 
has taken a dramatic turn for the worse. Our foreign policy objectives 
have been unclear, and our resolve has been uncertain. Before we deploy 
U.S. troops anywhere in the world we must determine whether our vital 
national interests must be at stake.
  I am confused about the explanations by the administration which 
allege that this indeed involves a set of vital interests because when 
you ask the administration about the deployment, they say that the 
deployment will be for 1 year. The achievement is not of a vital 
interest. The achievement here is a time of duration. If these 
interests are so vital, if they are critical to the success and 
survival of this country in the next century, why is it that they are 
only critical for a year, and we will leave whether or not we will 
achieve them in a span of a year?
  The idea this is a deployment for a term of days rather than for the 
achievement of vital and specific interests is an idea which shakes and 
threatens the very foundation of the allegation that there are vital 
interests here. I guess there is the question about whether the United 
States should be a world policeman that imposes her morality on the 
world. The United States is the world's only superpower, and that role 
carries with it responsibilities no other nation has. These 
responsibilities include the responsibility to use our forces 
judiciously. We should not decide to deploy U.S. troops simply because 
we can. We should not exercise military prowess to conquer a 
mountainous civil war merely because it is there. We should not be a 9-
1-1 on call to respond to every world dispute or civil disturbance. We 
must recognize that it is possible to squander our power and our 
resources by misusing them.
  Mr. President, according to the administration, we have an expiration 
date but we have no achievement strategy. Why deploy ground troops in 
the first place if we are going to pull them out whether or not 
anything is accomplished?
  There is a related issue about this agreement that troubles me. It 
has to do with the assignment of our soldiers that they are being asked 
to undertake. There are some components of the Dayton accord which 
really elevate values in which we do not believe. We should ask 
ourselves, under the Dayton 

[[Page S18496]]
accord, will we be going abroad with our troops to enforce things and 
values which are not things that we are willing to support or that we 
respect at home? As a matter of fact, are we going there to support or 
reinforce things which we abhor at home? Would we be going there to 
enforce a type of ethnic de facto segregation that we are fighting 
against at home? Is it possible that we are deploying America's 
soldiers to fight for values of ethnic isolation that run contrary to 
America's values? Are we asking our troops to defend territorial lines 
among ethnic factions which were gained through offensive atrocities? 
Are we validating ethnic segregation of the parties to promote peace, 
when our Nation painfully learned that it is only ``united we stand, 
divided we fall.''
  For generations we pursued an international strategy of promoting 
democratic values. I think we have to ask ourselves, is that what we 
are doing here? There are a lot of nuances and uncertainties about 
foreign policies. This is not one of them. We fight abroad for our 
interests and our values. We must not agree to work for something that 
is both not in our vital national interests, but contrary to our 
values.
  Let me just say in conclusion that I believe that we must make sure 
that the deployment of our troops is not merely the appetizer and that 
the main course becomes massive foreign aid that is felt as an 
obligation of this country and Congress as a result of having had the 
deployment of our troops on the soil of a foreign nation. All too 
frequently, we feel that we must follow our troops after a deployment 
has been concluded, with an outbreak of nation building and 
infrastructure construction and resources which are beyond the ability 
of our culture to afford for ourselves--certainly not within our 
capacity to provide for everyone around the world.
  There is a substantial expense in this whole operation that is going 
to take $2 billion out of our defense budget this year, and there will 
be requests for additional money to support this deployment. Frankly, 
it will hurt--it will hurt our ability to provide defense in other 
areas.
  I am convinced that we have to be careful not to weaken our ability 
to defend strategic vital national interests where they occur around 
the world by deploying our troops in areas which do not have clear 
objectives, where there are no strategic vital national interests, or 
where those interests are not clearly outlined and where our commitment 
is not for the achievement of a specific objective but it is for a term 
of days.
  Mr. President, I intend to vote in favor of the Hutchison resolution 
because I believe that it is appropriate for us to indicate to our 
troops that when they are deployed we will provide them with all of the 
resources necessary for their security and success. But that Hutchinson 
resolution, cosponsored by a number of other Senators, including the 
leadership of the junior Senator from Oklahoma, Senator Inhofe, also 
provides an opportunity for Members of this Senate to express their 
disagreement with the decision of the President to deploy ground troops 
in Bosnia. I believe that is the appropriate position for this Senate 
to take. I urge other Senators to do so. I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Abraham). The Chair notes the list I had 
indicated Senator Biden had spoken before Senator Ashcroft, so the 
Senator from Wisconsin would be in order.
  Mr. KOHL. I yield my position to Senator Biden, and I will speak 
after Senator Inhofe, if that pleases the Chair.
  Mr. CHAFEE. Senator Inhofe and I have switched off, so I am taking 
the place of Senator Inhofe. I will follow Senator Biden.
  Mr. KOHL. I ask unanimous consent, if I yield to Senator Biden, that 
I may speak after Senator Chafee.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. KOHL. I yield to Senator Biden.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I think a little bit of immediate past 
history is important for us to recall here.
  With regard to whether or not this policy that has been pursued in 
this administration relative to Bosnia and Herzegovina was a sound 
policy or not, it is the same policy that was pursued by the Bush 
administration. The Bush administration set a policy in motion that 
said we would support an arms embargo against the Bosnian Government, 
as well as others, and that we would not use air power to relieve the 
genocidal actions of the Serbs.
  To my great disappointment, although there were faint efforts to 
change that policy by attempting to convince our allies to lift the 
embargo, the truth of the matter was this administration did not change 
the position.
  Some of us, as long ago as the last 4 months of the Bush 
administration, argued loudly, if not persuasively, that the Bush 
policy was an incorrect policy. We argued that we should lift the arms 
embargo. In addition to that, we argued that we should supply weapons 
to the Bosnian Government which at that time was a multiethnic 
government made up of a council of Presidents, roughly divided in 
thirds among Moslems, Croats, and Serbs within Bosnia, and a Bosnian 
Army made up of Bosnian Serbs, Bosnian Croats, and Bosnian Moslems. We 
even passed the so-called Biden amendment through both Houses of the 
United States Congress that authorized the President of the United 
States to seek a lifting of the embargo and to transfer up to $50 
million worth of weaponry, off the shelf, to the Bosnian Government. 
That was in the last months of the Bush administration.
  I--and I do not say this to speak to what I did or did not do, but to 
mark it historically--I, after Senator Moynihan, was one of the few 
people who went to Sarajevo, went to near Srebrenica, went to Tuzla, 
went to Belgrade, went to Zagreb, met with Karadzic, met with 
Milosevic, met with UNPROFOR, met with the Croatian leadership, came 
back and wrote a report, and was debriefed by the Secretary of State 
and the President. The report called for lifting the arms embargo and 
using air power to strike at the Serbian genocidal undertakings.
  Back then, I--and I was not the only one in the world community--I 
came back and pointed out that this was raw, unadulterated genocide. 
The Serbs had set up rape camps, a policy explicitly designed to take 
Moslem women, primarily, into camps, rape them, have them carry the 
children to term, in order to intimidate and pollute the Moslem people 
in Bosnia. Everyone said that was not going on; this was not 1937 or 
1938 or 1940. But now, no one questions it occurred.
  I remember coming back--after going up through Mount Igman and over 
the mountains into a place called Kiseljak and going through villages--
and saying, ``There are graves.'' You could ride through a village in 
the mountains and see three or four homes in a row, pristinely kept, 
window boxes with flowers. The next home, a hole in the ground. The 
next home, perfectly kept. After that, two holes in the ground or a 
chimney sticking up. And graves at the end of the town road.
  I was told by our own people as well as the French, God bless them, 
and the Brits, that these folks are all the same. They are all bad 
guys. They are all like this. They have all been doing this for all of 
the last 4 centuries--which is historically inaccurate and was 
inaccurate in terms of what was taking place at the time.
  I remember when we watched on television--the Senator from Arizona 
and I spoke to it on the floor that night--when they overran 
Srebrenica. You could actually see U.N. soldiers sitting there with 
their blue helmets and hats on top of tanks, watching the Serb 
conquerors take the women and children and send them in one direction 
and take the able-bodied men and send them in the other direction--for 
extermination. This was not because they wanted segregated prison 
cells. They took them to the woods, they dug holes, they shot them, 
they dropped them in the holes, they poured lye on their bodies and 
bulldozed the dirt over them.
  We were told no, that is not happening.
  Now we have satellite imaging that uncovers this--surprise. Surprise. 
``Oh, my Lord this is happening.''
  The reason I bother to say this, because I know you all are tired of 
hearing me saying it for the last 3 years, is to make one very 
important point. One, with all due respect, I do not 

[[Page S18497]]
think the President has accurately made. And that is, what is our 
interest in Bosnia? Is there a vital interest? Or, as my friend from 
Missouri said, ``Does this action represent our interest and our 
values?''
  If this does not represent our interests and our values, then nothing 
that has happened since the end of World War II represents our values. 
How many in this Chamber, like me, have gone to Holocaust memorial 
events and heard the refrain, ``Never again.'' Never again? On the same 
continent, in the same proximity, the same death camps--it is happening 
again. And it happened again.
  This time it was not Jews. It was primarily Moslems. In 1935 and 1937 
and 1939 and 1941 and 1943, had it been Catholics like me, or 
Protestants, like many in here, who were being taken to death camps, 
the world would have risen up years earlier. But it was not. It was 
Jews. And we all turned a blind eye, as a world.
  I respectfully suggest, were it not Moslems this time who were in the 
rape camps, were it not Moslems who were being exterminated as part of 
this new phrase ``ethnic cleansing'', that the world would have behaved 
differently. I wonder how many of us ever thought, as students of World 
War II or as participants in World War II, that we would ever serve in 
the Senate and hear the phrase, openly used by one party in a conflict, 
``ethnic cleansing.'' Ethnic cleansing. Is that not an antiseptic term?
  And notwithstanding the fact only the Serbs used the phrase, I kept 
hearing on this floor that, ``They are all the same. They are all the 
same.''
  There have been atrocities committed by Moslems and by Croats. But 
they have not set up rape camps. They have not set up death camps. They 
have not mass murdered as part of a coherent plan for people, based 
upon their ethnicity and their religion. That is called genocide--
genocide. That is what it is. And now, even in our move to state what 
our vital interest is, this administration and others who support it 
are afraid to use the word. We are told we are not taking sides.
  I am here to take sides. Milosevic, the leader of the Bosnian Serbs, 
is a war criminal. He is no better than Himmler. He is no better than 
Goebbels. He is a war criminal. Karadzic is a war criminal.
  I might add that the leader of Serbia, Milosevic, is also a war 
criminal, although he is the only one not indicted so far.
  So I hear people stand here and say, ``What is our interest? What is 
our interest?'' Our interest is that history repeated itself.
  Let me be presumptuous enough to go on a little more to what I think 
the next history lesson will be. The Soviet empire has collapsed--the 
good news. The bad news is that all of the ethnic hatreds, all of the 
ethnic fighting, all of the atrocities that occurred 100 years ago and 
40 years ago are now uncovered again. There are 25 million Russians 
living outside the border of Russia, in the Ukraine, in the Baltic 
countries, in Kazakhstan. There is war in Armenia, in Georgia, and 
almost all of it is based on ethnicity.
  What is the message we send to the world if we stand by and we say we 
will let it continue to happen here in this place but it is not in our 
interest? We do not fear that it will spread? I am not here to tell you 
that, if we do not act, it will spread and cause a war in Europe--
tomorrow or next year. But I am here to tell you that within the 
decade, it will cause the spread of war like a cancer, and the collapse 
of the Western alliance. What is so important about the Western 
alliance? NATO for NATO's sake so that we can beat our breast?
  What I am about to say is going to cause me great difficulty if I am 
reelected and come back here as the ranking member or chairman of the 
Foreign Relations Committee. But Europe cannot stay united without the 
United States. There is no moral center in Europe. When in the last two 
centuries have the French, or the British, or the Germans, or the 
Belgiums, or the Italians moved in a way to unify that continent to 
stand up to this kind of genocide? When have they done it? The only 
reason anything is happening now is because the United States of 
America finally--finally--is understanding her role.
  So we do have a national interest. Our national interest goes well 
beyond the genocide that will spread like a cancer. I will not take the 
time, because others wish to speak, to explain what the rest of it is. 
But I do in my longer statement which I will put in the Record.
  But there is a second question it seems to me after first asking what 
is the national interest of the United States. Once you establish that 
there is a national interest--and I believe there is one--then, is the 
proposed action by the President the one that can meet that national 
interest? I respectfully suggest this is not the best one. If the 
President and the administration and the last administration, in my 
view, had the gumption, they would have told our European allies that 
we are lifting the arms embargo.
  This is not a Vietnamization program. The Vietnamese and South 
Vietnam were not sure where they wanted to be, North or South. That is 
why it never worked.
  The Bosnians know where they want to be. They want to be free. They 
will fight for themselves, and all they have ever asked for is lifting 
the arms embargo.
  Prime Minister Silajdzic came after my first visit to Bosnia. I had 
him in my office and 12 of my colleagues--very good men and women came, 
Democrats and Republicans. The word was then, if we lift the embargo, 
it is just going to make it worse for those poor folks and more are 
going to get killed. One of my Republican colleagues, who is very 
informed on policy, and a Democratic colleague at my conference table 
asked the same thing of Silajdzic. Silajdzic said something I will 
never forget as long as I live.
  He looked at this Senator, and he said: ``Senator, at least do me the 
honor and the privilege of letting me choose how to die.''
  ``Senator, do not send me food to fatten me and my family in the 
winter only to be assured that I will be killed with the full stomach. 
Give me a weapon. Let me defend myself, and have the good grace to let 
me choose how to die.''
  He then went on to add, ``I am not asking for you to send a single 
American troop. I am not asking for you to send a single American. I am 
asking you to lift this immoral embargo.''
  That is what should have been done, as a student of history of the 
Balkans--I suspect that I have read as much as almost anybody here, at 
least I have tried my best, and I have gone there twice and I have 
spoken with everyone I could. During the last two Balkan wars, the only 
time they ended was when all parties concluded that they could not 
achieve any more on the ground than they could at the peace table.
  But events have overtaken us. And the event that has overtaken us is 
called Dayton. I say to my friends here in the Senate, the part that I 
do not like about being Senator is when Presidents do not get it right, 
and we do not get to make the best choice. We get to choose among bad 
choices.
  It is that old thing about the Hobson's choice. Two bad choices is no 
choice at all. The best choice is to lift the embargo, provide air 
cover, wait while it is being done, and let the Bosnian Government 
establish itself because Serbia has already lost. Milosevic has no 
interest in continuing because he is a pariah in the Western community. 
Have the War Crimes Tribunal go forward and let it be settled. But we 
did not do that.
  We have one of two choices now: One, we participate with a better 
than even chance. We provide enough time for the Bosnian Government to 
get the physical wherewithal and economic strength to defend 
themselves, and then we leave. Two, we do not participate at all, which 
means nothing happens because the Europeans have no center on this 
issue. Nothing will happen except the embargo will be on, the genocide 
will continue, our interest will be badly damaged, and the cancer will 
spread. My son may not go to Bosnia today, but he may be in eastern 
Germany in 8 years. My grandchildren may not be in Bosnia today but 
they will be in Europe fighting a war 15 years from now.
  So given the choices, I support this resolution. I support it because 
we do have a vital national interest, and we do have a moral rationale 
for our engagement. 

[[Page S18498]]

  If we thought we had a moral interest, a national interest in 
restoring the Emir of Kuwait to the throne--restoring the Emir of 
Kuwait to the throne, God bless his soul--to send 500,000 troops there, 
tell me, tell me why we do not have a moral interest in stopping what 
was international aggression by Serbia crossing the Drina River into a 
U.N.-recognized country and participating in genocide?
  In Kuwait we had a single example of one young woman who was raped 
and beaten, which turned out not to be true, to enrage people about the 
awful thing Saddam Hussein was doing. And here we have mass graves. I 
have visited with Bob Dole a hospital in Sarajevo. Do you know who was 
in the hospital? Seven children. Do you know why there were only seven 
children? Because the Serbs sit in those hills and they have as a 
campaign of terror, the maiming of children. Walk with me through 
Sarajevo's streets and see draped across the roads blankets and sheets. 
I thought it was a Lower East Side in 1919 of New York.
  I asked why. Do you know why they are there? To take over the line of 
fire from Serbian snipers shooting children. We pretended it did not 
happen. Ask Bob Dole.
  We stood beside a beautiful raven-haired child who looked at us as we 
spoke. And the neurosurgeon said, ``The reason she is not turning is 
she has no sight. He turned her head. The bullet had gone through the 
back of her head, severed the optic nerves, and came out the other 
side.
  There were seven children in that hospital. Nobody else. It was a 
planned campaign by Mladic and the Serbs to terrorize the Moslem 
community.
  So let me tell you. If your moral center is oil, I understand you. If 
your moral center is humanity, there is no comparing the restoration of 
the Emir of Kuwait with the ending of genocide in Bosnia.
  But there is only one exit strategy, I say, Mr. President, there is 
only one.
  I hope the President, with all due respect, means it. That we will 
not be able to leave unless--what Bob Dole, Joe Biden, Joe Lieberman, 
and a whole bunch of others insist be in this resolution--the Bosnian 
Government is armed and prepared to defend itself. That is the ticket 
home for Americans.
  There is a moral reason for this. There is a U.S. interest. It is not 
the best way to do it, but, as Senators, we only get to choose among 
the bad ways offered to us. It is worth doing.
  In this Christmas season, as I saw off the first group to go to 
Bosnia from Dover Air Force Base, the only thing I could think to say 
is ``thank you; watch where you walk--there are a million landmines--
and God bless you. I am telling you, you are doing something right but 
you are being put in a position that is not the one you should have 
been put in in order to accomplish it.'' It is a hell of a way to send 
them off, but we have no choice, it seems to me, to meet our moral 
obligation and our national vital interest.
  Mr. President, after nearly 4 years of indifference, half-measures, 
national policies of European governments pursued in the garb of 
international peacekeeping, and other sophistries devoid of moral 
content, the western world has finally been moved to put an end to the 
murderous fighting that has left Bosnia and Herzegovina in ruins.

  While the dilly-dallying has gone on, more than a quarter-million 
Bosnians of various ethnic and religious affiliation have been killed, 
and an additional 2\1/2\ million persons--over half the total 
population--have been driven from their homes.
  But, Mr. President, numbers alone cannot begin to convey the 
savagery, the barbarity, the depravity that has reigned in this small 
balkan country.
  There have been wars since time immemorial, many on a larger scale 
than the war in Bosnia. There have been refugee flights in other 
countries that dwarf the Bosnian numbers.
  This century has seen the Jewish Holocaust, the Armenian Genocide, 
the murderous collectivation of Ukraine, and the killing fields of 
Cambodia. So, Mr. President, I suppose cynics might say that we have 
become hardened to the unspeakable.
  Yet what has happened in Bosnia and Herzegovina not only has had 
components of the other horrors the 20th-century, it has actually added 
a diabolical new feature: The unprecedented, centrally planned campaign 
of mass rape that the Bosnian Serbs have used as a calculated weapon of 
terror designed to demoralize Bosnian Moslem communities.
  Mr. President, why was this allowed to happen? To help answer this 
question, let me offer a piece of counter-factual analysis that I have 
delivered before on this Senate floor:
  ``What if'' a Moslem-dominated Bosnia-Herzegovina had attacked a 
peaceful orthodox Christian Serbia, carried out barbaric atrocities 
against Serbian civilians, and then proudly announced that its policy 
of ethnic cleansing had been successful--would Christian Europe then 
have sat idly by, conjuring up excuse after excuse for not halting the 
cruel and cowardly aggression?
  Mr. President, I think the answer is self-evident.
  European Jewry was yesterday's victim. The Bosnian Moslems are 
today's. If we let the barbarism in Bosnia stand, who knows who will be 
tomorrow's?
  Now at last, thanks to the belated--nonetheless, praiseworthy--
leadership of the United States, we stand on the verge of a massive 
international effort designed to put a stop to the depravity, to try to 
restore a modicum of normal, civilized life to that sorry land.
  I fear that the chances for success are a long-shot. But Mr. 
President, make no mistake about it: if the United States does not 
continue to lead this effort, the chances for even a semblance of peace 
in Bosnia are zero.
  And yet the choice is not an easy one. Like almost every other 
decision concerning foreign policy that a U.S. Senator has to make, our 
choice about whether to support President Clinton's decision to deploy 
20,000 American troops to Bosnia as part of the international peace 
implementation force known as I-FoR is a reactive one.
  The U.S. Congress rarely gets to formulate policy. We cannot, and 
should not, write arms control treaties or other international 
agreements. Most of the time we are asked to react to proposed 
solutions that are far from ideal, perhaps not even the best. But often 
these solutions, however risky they may be, are nonetheless better than 
not acting at all.
  That is exactly how I feel about the proposed deployment of U.S. 
troops in the I-FoR. For more than 3 years, since September 1992, I 
have been calling for lifting the illegal and unjust arms embargo 
against the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the victim of Serbian 
aggression, no matter what our European allies think about such a 
decision.
  Concurrently, I have called for striking from the air at the 
offending Serbs while the Bosnian Government was building up its own 
military strength.
  Finally, I have advocated making clear to the Government of Serbia 
that it would suffer massive air strikes upon its territory across the 
Drina River if it increased its assistance to the Bosnian Serb 
aggressors.
  Moreover, the Biden Amendment, which I introduced in 1992, and which 
was successively approved by Congress in 1993 and 1994, authorized 
assistance to Bosnia through a drawdown of up to $50 million of Defense 
Department weapons stocks and other military equipment. This year's 
foreign operations conference report has increased this figure to $100 
million. As soon as the President receives and signs the foreign 
operations appropriations bill, he will be able to use this source any 
time upon termination of the arms embargo.
  Up until 1 month ago this policy that I proposed remained, I am 
convinced, the best option open to the United States. It would have 
created the conditions of military parity in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
that are essential for maintaining a lasting peace.
  Then came the talks at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base. The peace 
agreement that emerged from those talks is not perfect--no 
international agreement ever is--but we have to deal with the situation 
now at hand.
  Let me take this occasion to congratulate Secretary of State 
Christopher and his negotiating team for their tireless efforts that 
achieved what no one else had been able to accomplish for 3\1/2\ years: 
a multilateral agreement that offers the only real promise of ending 
the worst bloodshed in Europe since World War II. It is a highly 
significant achievement, which brings great credit to the United States 
of America. 

[[Page S18499]]

  Yet Secretary Christopher, Secretary of Defense Perry, and General 
Shalikashvili would be the first to add that the Dayton Accords are 
still only a building block for the structure of peace for the former 
Yugoslavia, which remains to be put into place.
  Let me underscore that the involvement of American ground troops in 
the peace enforcement effort--the solution less preferable than the 
lift-and-strike policy I have consistently advocated--in no way lessens 
the necessity of equipping and training the Bosnian Federation's army 
in order to allow it to defend itself when all foreign peace 
implementation forces leave. The bipartisan resolution specifically 
mentions this point.
  So I would like also to be perfectly clear that if the administration 
had not assured that this equipping and training would take place--if 
not by uniformed U.S. military personnel, then by contractors--I would 
not support the participation of U.S. ground troops in the I-FoR. Third 
countries may, of course, also contribute weapons and training to the 
Federation, but a failure of Americans to take the lead in this effort 
would quite simply be a prescription for a prolonged involvement of our 
ground forces in Bosnia, a policy which the American people will not 
countenance.
  President Clinton's outstanding televised speech to the Nation went a 
long way toward explaining to the American people the rationale for, 
and mission of our troops in the I-FoR. I do not take issue with any of 
the President's arguments.
  Above all, I would emphasize to those who wish to restrict America's 
involvement abroad that the choice facing us is not between a risky 
foreign mission and the status quo. If the United States does not 
participate in--or more precisely, lead--the I-For, I am convinced that 
the war will re-ignite, escalate, probably spread, and open the door 
for a radical destabilization of southern Europe. And that most 
assuredly is in our vital national interest to prevent.
  Finally there is the issue of American leadership in NATO and in the 
larger community of civilized nations. I have long criticized some of 
our European allies, first for their utilization of the purposefully 
hamstrung U.N. peacekeeping operation in order not to take the 
militarily resolute measures that could have stopped the Serbs in their 
tracks in 1991, and second for their obstinate unwillingness to allow 
NATO--principally American--air power to cripple the Bosnian Serb war 
machine.
  It took the massacre in the Sarajevo market at the end of August and 
the withdrawal of the hobbled European peacekeepers, for us finally to 
overrule our timorous European friends.
  Yet, Mr. President, the President of the United States has given his 
pledge of American troops; the United States was the driving force in 
crafting the Dayton accords; and our credibility as the leader of NATO 
is on the line. Bosnia has revealed strains within NATO that must be 
addressed, but this is not the time to exacerbate the tensions. 
Moreover, France has just re-entered the alliance's integrated military 
command, a sign that a successful operation in Bosnia may bode well for 
a stronger NATO in the future.
  Some of the opponents of our involvement have trotted out the cliche 
that the United States cannot be the ``world's policeman.'' Well, of 
course we can't solve every crisis everywhere. But as President Clinton 
said in his television speech, that obvious fact does not mean that we 
cannot help anywhere.
  The slaughter, rape, and destruction in Bosnia and Herzegovina should 
be an affront to the sensibilities of every American. The I-For mission 
at the very least will give the brutalized people of that land a last 
chance to stop the killing and to re-enter the world community.
  For all these reasons, then, our participation in the operation is 
vital. There are, however, serious risks associated with sending our 
troops to Bosnia, and it is incumbent upon the administration to 
explain how we are planning to minimize them. These risks include:
  Millions of lethal mines, which will probably be hidden by snow for 
several months;
  The brutal Balkan winter that makes driving hazardous;
  Irregular forces, foreign extremists, and other rogue elements that 
may specially target American troops; and
  The likelihood that an armed, hostile Bosnian Serb populace in 
several locations could both harbor attackers and engage in disruptive 
activity itself.
  From administration testimony in hearings before the Foreign 
Relations Committee, I am satisfied that these concerns have been 
thoroughly analyzed, and counter measures developed to the fullest 
extent possible.
  Last Friday at 5 o'clock in the morning, I went to Dover Air Force 
Base in my State of Delaware to personally say good-bye to a detachment 
of our troops as they embarked for Bosnia. They are as fine a group of 
American men and women as has ever represented the Armed Forces of this 
country. Every possible precaution must be taken to lessen the threat 
to their person as they carry out their duties in Bosnia. In this 
regard, I emphasize that the robust rules of engagement for our troops 
must not be altered under any circumstances.
  In larger terms, I believe that the criteria for the mission's 
success and a responsible exit strategy must be delineated even more 
clearly than has already been done. For example, is the absence of 
serious conflict after 1 year sufficient progress to warrant a 
declaration of mission accomplished?
  Stated more precisely, will we withdraw our ground troops after 
precisely 1 year even if the envisioned democratic institutions of the 
Bosnian central government are not yet functioning? If so, will other 
international units remain for a longer period?
  My own belief is that the I-For mission should be limited to creating 
the basic conditions for democratic institution-building to take place. 
There must be no mission creep for our military forces.
  Yet if the civilian aspects of the agreement do not proceed, then the 
American troops and their international colleagues will have served in 
vain. Hence, a premium must be put on coordinating the mission of the 
American military force with the work of the international civilian 
agencies preparing to implement the electoral, refugee, and 
humanitarian aspects of the Dayton accords.
  But it may well be unrealistic to expect construction of a working 
democracy in 365 days or less. Therefore, plans must be drawn up 
immediately for a ``follow-on'' force to remain in Bosnia after the 
United States troops leave. My strong feeling is that this force should 
be led by our European NATO allies, augmented by units of European 
neutrals with experience in peacekeeping operations.
  Finally, let me repeat once again the absolute necessity of creating 
a balance of military strength on the ground so that when the 
international peacekeepers are withdrawn, the federation of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina will not be vulnerable to renewed attack.
  The peace settlement is far from perfect. There is no guarantee that 
it will be implemented. The involvement of American ground forces 
means--although I pray I am wrong--that casualties and fatalities are 
likely to occur.
  But, as I have indicated, we live in a highly imperfect world. To do 
nothing would be to invite larger problems in the future that would 
require a much riskier and bloodier American involvement.
  If the conditions I have outlined are met: retention of very robust 
rules of engagement for our troops; no mission creep for our troops; 
but close coordination of the I-For with international civilian efforts 
in Bosnia; a United States lead in coordinating arming and training the 
army of the federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina; and a finely drawn 
set of criteria for mission success.
  Then I believe that President Clinton's policy deserves the support 
of the Congress. The President has promised to meet these conditions. 
Therefore, I will vote for the bipartisan resolution, and I urge my 
colleagues to do the same.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Rhode Island.
  Mr. CHAFEE. Mr. President, I support the Dole-McCain resolution which 
authorizes the participation of U.S. military forces in what is known 
as the I-For, the NATO implementation force. The purpose of this is to 
monitor the peace agreement in Bosnia. 

[[Page S18500]]

  The Dayton peace agreement and this NATO deployment represents, in my 
judgment, the only opportunity to achieve a long-term peace in Bosnia 
and with it a more stable Europe. That is a very important point, Mr. 
President--a more stable Europe, which is a matter of profound interest 
to the United States.
  The Senate's vote on the Dole resolution involves the question of 
what role the United States should play in Europe and throughout the 
world as we approach the 21st century. Let us just take a brief look 
into history, if we might. It was an assassination in the Balkans, in 
Sarajevo itself, that triggered World War I, a conflict into which the 
United States was reluctantly drawn. Indeed, we stayed out of it for 
nearly 3 years.
  At the conclusion of that devastating war, the United States made a 
very conscious decision, and that was to withdraw from any involvement 
in European security affairs. From 1919 until 1942, the United States 
remained aloof from Europe, even though World War II raged for 2\1/2\ 
years during that period. Yet, inevitably, we were dragged into that 
war, the most costly of all wars in terms of lives and treasures.
  We have now learned that the United States, the world's lone 
superpower and the undisputed leader of the NATO alliance, simply 
cannot withdraw from European security matters, nor should we. Our 
active engagement in Europe for the past 50 years since the end of 
World War II has brought enormous benefits to us, to the Europeans, and 
to the world at large. Western Europe has enjoyed peace, it has enjoyed 
freedom, it has enjoyed democracy, and it has enjoyed economic success 
ever since the end of that war.
  This has largely been due to U.S. leadership in NATO. Our leadership 
has assisted in bringing about the fall of communism and the liberation 
of Eastern Europe. But despite these successes, Europe today is not 
free of war and bloodshed and instability. We need to look no further 
than the war that has raged in the Balkans for the past 3 years. Others 
have spoken about it, and sometimes we forget these statistics: 250,000 
people have lost their lives in that conflict, and more than 2 million 
people have been displaced or are refugees. This war has the potential 
to spill over into the rest of Europe.

  The history which I just touched on has taught that maintaining a 
free, democratic and peaceful Europe is very much in our interests, in 
our security interests, and deployment of the NATO force in which the 
United States provides one-third--not one-half, not two-thirds, but 
one-third--of the troops will help ensure the type of Europe we want: A 
Europe that is free, that is Democratic, and that is peaceful.
  I would ask, Mr. President, those who oppose this deployment to 
answer this question. If we, as part of NATO, cannot lead an effort to 
try and end the war in Bosnia, then why should we be members of NATO? 
Let us forget the whole thing, at least our participation in it. It 
seems to me that helping to end destabilizing military conflicts inside 
the borders of Europe such as Bosnia represents is the type of 
responsibility NATO should undertake in the post-cold-war world.
  May I remind my colleagues that the implementation force includes 
many non-NATO forces--not just the NATO forces, but others--that share 
our interest in securing peace in the Balkans.
  Those opposing this resolution, the Dole resolution, also argue that 
U.S. troops will be at a risk of being drawn into nonmilitary 
activities and may also suffer needless casualties.
  To this I say, take a look at the Dayton peace agreement. Unlike some 
recent failures--we have had them in this Nation, particularly if you 
think of Somalia--where United States military roles were not entirely 
clear, the Bosnian deployment plan and the administration's pledges are 
very specific about what our troops will and will not do. I am 
reassured by this part of the written statements.
  In addition to its own self-protection, the mission of our force is 
to oversee and enforce implementation of the military aspects of this 
peace agreement. Now, what are we talking about? We are talking about 
cessation of hostilities, withdrawal to agreed lines, creation of a 
zone of separation, return of troops and weapons to their encampments. 
Civilian authority such as the United Nations, not our troops, will be 
responsible for many of the nonmilitary aspects that are envisioned by 
the agreement.
  Now, what are we talking about there? Overseeing elections, 
conducting humanitarian missions, helping civilians move about, acting 
as local police forces. You can be sure that Congress and the American 
people are going to be watching carefully. We are going to be 
monitoring this to see that our troops do not engage in any activities 
for which we are not responsible.
  I do not want to suggest, Mr. President, that sending United States 
military forces to Bosnia is without risk. Regrettably, we may well 
suffer casualties, as is often the case in military operations such as 
in the Balkans. But please remember that the United States and the 25 
other nations are sending a force totaling 60,000 ground troops, 
forgetting those that are in the air or on the waters. This is an 
overwhelming numerical advantage over any group or faction that would 
challenge our authority.
  I would also point out that unlike former United Nations peacekeeping 
missions in Bosnia, we will be completely prepared to defend ourselves. 
This is a mission in which if we are shot at, we are going to reply 
with bullets and shells.
  Mr. President, the rest of the world looks to the United States to be 
a leader in promoting peace and democracy, and this is certainly the 
case in the Balkans where the three signatories have authorized our 
intervention. If a United States-led NATO force can help secure peace 
in Bosnia, it will make an enormous contribution to world security.
  On the other hand, Mr. President, if we abdicate our responsibilities 
to our NATO allies, it will send a clear and I believe very troubling 
signal that the United States has once again retreated into Fortress 
America. It will show that we are not there when a difficult job has to 
be done. That is not a signal we can afford to send. So, therefore, I 
urge my colleagues to support the deployment of United States troops to 
Bosnia and to vote for the Dole-McCain resolution.
  I further would urge a vote against the Hutchison amendment, which, 
in my judgment, sends a very confusing message. It says, on the one 
hand, to our troops, we do not think you should be in Bosnia, but 
nevertheless we support you. I do not think that is the kind of message 
I, for one, would like to receive if I were risking my life or on a 
mission of this nature in Bosnia. The message, again, seems to say we 
are for you, but you should not be there. I do not find that a message 
of much comfort or encouragement, in my judgment.
  So therefore, Mr. President, I hope that my colleagues would support 
the Dole-McCain amendment.
  I thank the Chair.
  Mr. KOHL addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Wisconsin.
  Mr. KOHL. Thank you, Mr. President.
  Mr. President, the question of sending American men and women on a 
dangerous mission, whether it be to fight a war or, as in this case, to 
strengthen a fragile peace is always a difficult one. A healthy debate 
has been carried on across the Nation, and it is clear that Americans 
are reluctant to send U.S. forces in harm's way.
  While I share that reluctance, my reluctance does not stem from a 
sense of isolationism; but rather, I am reluctant to commit our troops 
when the situation on the ground is so tenuous. I understand that the 
combatants themselves have asked us to help them implement the Dayton 
accords; however, I remain skeptical about their commitment to peace. I 
question whether the presence of a large NATO force will be enough to 
overcome the daunting challenge of national reconstruction facing all 
the Bosnian people. And, given the deep hatreds that exist there, I 
wonder how realistic it is for us to think that once United States 
troops leave Bosnia the peace will hold.
  At the same time, what are our alternatives? I agree that the 
situation on the ground may have been different if the President had 
heeded Congress and lifted the arms embargo. However, as one of our 
colleagues pointed out to me recently, even if the administration had 
agreed to lift the arms embargo 

[[Page S18501]]
and the Bosnian Moslems had been better armed, there still would have 
been the need for a peace accord, and we would still be facing the 
difficult question of whether to send in United States ground forces to 
guarantee the peace.
  After 4 years of anguish over the atrocities in Bosnia, I believe we 
have a responsibility to try to end this war. We cannot turn our backs 
on the innocent men, women, and children who have lived through the 
unspeakable atrocities committed by all sides. We cannot turn down a 
request that is probably the last and best opportunity to end this 
harrowing civil war.
  At the same time, we cannot allow emotion to sway our decisionmaking 
about sending United States ground troops into what until now has been 
a war zone. We would all like to see an end to the bloodshed in Bosnia, 
and an end, for that matter, to bloodshed everywhere. But, it is 
disingenous to say that we are sending ground troops to Bosnia out of a 
sense of moral responsibility that we must police the entire world. We 
have already determined that neither do we have the desire nor the 
means to be the world's policeman.
  Recognizing we are not the world's policeman does not mean that there 
are no circumstances under which we should send U.S. troops abroad. If 
we are to take advantage of winning the cold war and retaining our 
capacity to shape events in this changing era, then we must demonstrate 
leadership and be willing to take risks for peace. The difficult 
question is, when should we take these risks?
  I have always held that any determination to commit U.S. troops 
abroad should meet four criteria:
  One, there must be a clear and compelling issue of national interest.
  Two, the benefits must outweigh the cost of endangering American 
soldiers.
  Three, there must be an established plan of action--including plans 
for troop withdrawal.
  And, four, there must be support and involvement of the international 
community.
  Unfortunately, without the stark black and white of the cold war to 
guide our foreign policy, it is less clear when our vital national 
interests are at stake. The world has become a far more complicated 
place, and there is much disagreement over whether there is a vital 
national interest at stake in Bosnia.
  Some say this is a European problem and we should leave it to the 
Europeans to solve. Indeed, the Europeans realize that they have more 
at stake here than we do. That is why they are supplying the majority 
of the forces and why they are providing most of the funding and 
technical support for the crucial task of rebuilding Bosnia.
  Then, why could not this be a European-led mission with American 
support? Frankly, the Europeans have been indecisive and unable to do 
this on their own. Yet, if this civil war rages on, it poses a serious 
threat to European stability. Just as that possibility poses a threat 
to our European allies, it also threatens us.
  That is why America must assume the mantle of leadership. The future 
stability of Europe is, and always will be, in our national interest. 
We have fought two major wars in Europe, and in the 50 years since the 
end of World War II we have committed U.S. troops and resources to the 
defense of Europe and to the leadership of the NATO alliance. Because 
of our ties to Europe--historically and economically--it is in our 
interest for NATO to be strong and it is in our interest to continue to 
lead NATO.

  That said, do the potential benefits of this mission outweigh the 
costs? There are many ambitious--I might say overly ambitious--goals 
laid out in the Dayton accords: The return of refugees, the negotiation 
of arms control agreements, the prosecution of war criminals, and the 
reconstruction of civil institutions. I am pessimistic about the 
prospects for realizing many of these nation building goals in the 
short term.
  Nonetheless, I believe there is still a potential benefit to 
participate in a strong peacekeeping force. The ominous warnings of 
many opponents of this mission belie the fact that the NATO 
Implementation Force is not embarking on a combat mission, nor is it a 
mission to impose a peace. This is not Somalia. Furthermore, our troops 
will not be leading the nation building efforts. This is not Haiti. 
This mission is in response to a direct request by the combatants to 
help them implement a peace agreement that they negotiated. The 
greatest and most achievable goals of this mission are strictly 
military goals: Separating the forces and creating an environment for 
the continued cessation of hostilities. And 1 year may not be enough 
time to rebuild Bosnia, but we cannot underestimate the potential of a 
1-year breathing period to lay the groundwork for a more stable peace 
down the road.
  How do these benefits measure up against the potential costs? There 
has been a strong consensus in the United States that sending ground 
troops at an earlier date would have been too risky and not worth the 
cost. Are we now risking the same entanglement we so assiduously 
avoided by sending in ground forces to implement this shaky peace? As 
peacekeepers, will our troops be a lightening rod for some of the more 
controversial provisions of the peace agreement many in Bosnia are not 
sure they want?
  Over the past few weeks, I have explored these and other issues 
related to the risks. I have met with the National Security Advisor, 
and yesterday with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, 
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Vice President, and with 
the President himself to express my concerns directly, and to listen to 
their responses.
  I have come to believe that it is most unlikely we will become 
entangled in a full-scale war. We are participating in a NATO operation 
to implement a peace agreement painstakingly negotiated over several 
weeks. The Dayton accords set forth clear military goals for the 
implementation force. Our troops have a limited mission--limited in the 
specific tasks designed to strengthen the peace and limited in its 
duration. We have made no commitment to stay on should the peace fail. 
And, should all out war break out before the year is up, then we surely 
will leave. Contrary to the views of some of my colleagues, I believe 
that Secretary Perry and General Shalikashvili have established a clear 
plan to action and a clear exit strategy.
  In the unlikely event that our troops become targets, we have learned 
from earlier mistakes: Our troops will be well armed, will be sent to 
Bosnia in sufficient numbers, and will be operating under the right 
rules of engagement, allowing them to defend themselves fully.
  To be sure, we can never eliminate all the risks. Even under the best 
of circumstances, Bosnia is a dangerous place. On balance, however, I 
believe that this mission is worthwhile.
  Can we state with certainty that our efforts will pay off, and that 
the war is over? Unfortunately, it is too early to tell whether the 
conditions in Bosnia are really ripe for peace. But, that does not mean 
we should not proceed. If this diplomatic effort fails it will be a 
failure of the Croatians, the Moslems and the Serbs to take advantage 
of the international commitment to help them implement the peace. Only 
time will allow us to test their commitment to the peace accord. In the 
meantime, we cannot afford to turn our backs on the most serious 
diplomatic agreement to date.
  Mr. President, I am disappointed that the majority leader has been 
compelled by members of his party to have three separate votes on 
Bosnia. Either we support this policy or we do not. It is too easy to 
say that the President has made his decision, that he has committed 
U.S. forces, and then take no responsibility for the mission but still 
vote to support the troops.
  In this case, I believe that the President has demonstrated 
leadership. He has acted in our national interest, and he has done so 
cognizant of the risks the men and women of our Armed Forces will face. 
Now that the Bosnian people have taken a step toward peace, we have the 
chance to do something concrete, specific and finite to help bring this 
bloodshed to an end. And so I say, let us do it.
  Mr. President, I will be voting against the Hutchison resolution and 
in favor of the Dole resolution.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. FAIRCLOTH addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Carolina. 
  
[[Page S18502]]

  Mr. FAIRCLOTH. Mr. President, at the outset of my remarks on Bosnia, 
I want to state for the record my total support for our men and women 
in uniform deployed in the Balkans. I know they will serve the Nation 
with honor and distinction. I commit to them today that I will make 
every effort to provide for their safety, to make every available 
resource for their defense and to work hard and look forward to their 
safe return home.
  Let me say that I have lived my entire life in a small eastern North 
Carolina town that is surrounded by Fort Bragg, Camp Lejeune, Seymour 
Johnson Air Force Base, and Cherry Point Marine Base. My whole life, I 
have literally been surrounded by people who are strongly committed to 
serving our Nation and our Commander in Chief.
  I am confident that the bravery of our soldiers deployed in Bosnia 
and their respect for their commanding officers will serve as an 
example and an inspiration to all Americans. While I have nothing but 
praise to offer for our troops, I come to the floor to voice my strong 
opposition to the President's decision to deploy United States forces 
in Bosnia.
  Despite repeated requests by Congress and the American people, the 
Clinton administration has yet to show a compelling national security 
interest which would justify the commitment of United States ground 
forces in Bosnia. In fact, President Clinton's Bosnia strategy over the 
past 3 years has been an incoherent jumble of vacillating policies.
  As a candidate, Bill Clinton criticized the policies of the Bush 
administration and advocated a forceful interventionist role for the 
United States. Once in office, President Clinton dithered while the 
Balkan situation degenerated into a brutal, dehumanizing ethnic civil 
war. Much of the tragedy we see in Bosnia occurred on President 
Clinton's watch.
  Without consulting Congress, President Clinton entered into an 
agreement to commit U.S. ground forces. He has not come before a joint 
session of Congress to explain his policies on this issue. Rather, from 
the Oval Office, President Clinton delivered a televised national 
address and then boarded Air Force One bound for Europe. It struck me 
as though he was more eager to collect congratulations in European 
capitals than to explain his Bosnian policy to Congress and the 
American people.
  Despite this absence of Presidential leadership, a rejection of the 
Clinton administration's troop deployment plans does not mean a 
rejection of American involvement in the Bosnia peace process, nor a 
retreat into isolationism.
  The United States has played a significant role in Bosnia, and we 
should continue to do so. United States military commanders provided 
leadership to NATO in advocating the use of airstrikes to break the 
Bosnian Serb military advantage, while the Clinton administration 
dallied with the United Nations.
  In the end, the administration failed to take a leadership role in 
convincing the United Nations to lift the arms embargo which would have 
allowed the Bosnian Moslems to defend themselves at a much earlier date 
and might have alleviated the need for our ground forces there at any 
time.
  We brought the warring factions to the peace table, and we have an 
interest in seeing that the peace agreement is implemented, but we do 
not--we do not--have a vital national security interest, which is the 
only thing which would justify putting at risk the lives of 20,000 
American soldiers and marines. The President was wrong to make this 
commitment, and Congress will be wrong if we endorse it.
  Some believe that President Clinton's hastily concluded decision on 
ground forces will demand congressional approval in order to preserve 
international respect for the Office of the Presidency. I disagree. 
Respect for the power of the Presidency is preserved and enhanced when 
the holder of that high office has led the Nation toward a consensus on 
military intervention before troops are deployed. Bill Clinton has 
turned Presidential leadership on its head. He is trying to build a 
national consensus after having committed U.S. forces. This is not 
leadership.
  On the ground, our troops will face overwhelming logistic hurdles. In 
addition to arriving at the height of the harsh Balkan winter, our 
troops will face 6 million landmines covering much of Bosnia. The exact 
whereabouts of many of these mines is unknown and their detection will 
not be easy, as many are made of plastic.
  The infrastructure of Bosnia has been devastated by years of war. The 
bridges, roads, and railroads which remain usable are simply not 
capable of supporting the weight of M1-A1 tanks and any other heavy 
armaments. Most existing airstrips have been seriously damaged.
  Clearly, we will have to spend millions of taxpayers' dollars, 
American taxpayers' dollars, in infrastructure before we can begin to 
adequately police the so-called peace agreement. Once we begin that 
effort, we will then spend billions more on military equipment and 
personnel. How much will this latest effort in nation building cost? 
And that is what we are doing, nation building. Some estimates are as 
high as $100 million a month. I suspect that probably is not high 
enough.
  Further, I have written to the Clinton administration requesting 
information about its plan to start supplying foreign aid to Bosnia. I 
have not yet received a response.
  We have an opportunity to avoid repeating the tragedies of Lebanon 
and Somalia. Now is the time to use our technological superiority to 
spare American lives. Many of those who opposed our investment in 
advanced military hardware and cut defense spending would now lay aside 
that advantage. Now is the time for the U.S. Air Force and the Navy to 
take the lead in enforcing this peace agreement, which grows less 
certain by the day. It is simply a bad policy to put U.S. ground forces 
between enemies who have been fighting each other for over 600 years, 
and that is how long this battle has been going on. One year of 
American troops will not end it.
  President Clinton stated that our troops will fight fire with fire. 
However, this pledge is useless when it is impossible to distinguish 
between a Serb, a Croat, and a Moslem.
  Mr. President, it is not impossible to identify a vital national 
security interest. The invasion of Kuwait and our response provides a 
textbook example of how to do it. It should be clear to all Americans 
that President Clinton has yet to measure up to the standards of Desert 
Storm. Until he does, I will continue my strong support and respect for 
our troops by opposing the President's decision to deploy ground troops 
in Bosnia.

  I yield the floor.
  Mr. LEVIN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Ms. Snowe). The Senator from Michigan is 
recognized.
  Mr. LEVIN. Madam President, as a member of the Armed Services 
Committee, I have spent a great deal of time analyzing the risks 
involved in the United States joining the NATO effort or not joining 
the NATO effort. There are risks both ways. I have concluded that the 
risks of not acting, not joining the NATO effort, are greater than the 
risks of acting with our NATO allies, and I will, therefore, support 
the Dole resolution.
  The risks of acting are clear, and include the risk of casualties 
from mines, from accidents on the road, possibly from snipers. Those 
risks are real, and I think the American public should be fully aware 
of what those risks are. As hard as we have tried to reduce those 
risks--and the Joint Chiefs and the commanders have made an 
extraordinary effort to reduce those risks in every way possible, 
through training and equipment and in other ways--those risks are there 
and they are real.
  But there are risks of not acting to join our NATO allies. Those 
risks of not participating with NATO are also very real and, in my 
judgment, are greater than the risks of joining. The risks of not 
acting, of not participating with NATO, include the risk of a peace 
agreement falling apart because of NATO's absence. That, in turn, could 
lead to a wider and more dangerous war, with continued killing, ethnic 
cleansing, rape, and other atrocities, more civilian refugees and 
humanitarian catastrophe in Bosnia, Croatia, Slovenia, Serbia, but also 
possibly in Kosova and Albania and Macedonia, and even possibly in 
Greece and Turkey.
  The effects could be felt beyond the region as well. Of great 
importance 

[[Page S18503]]
here--and this is something which I do not believe has been given 
enough attention--is that Russia is now willing to participate with the 
United States and our NATO allies in the peace implementation force in 
Bosnia. In fact, Russia is willing to place their troops in Bosnia 
directly under an American commander. That would be historic 
cooperation with long-term benefits for European security and for world 
security.
  But if this agreement falls apart and the war widens because we do 
not participate with NATO, and we know NATO will not carry out this 
operation without the United States, NATO would be weakened and 
fractured, and the United States and Russia could be pulled to opposite 
sides in a Europe newly divided.
  Hardliners in Russia would balk at working with the United States and 
would gain political points domestically in upcoming elections. So, in 
addition to the region becoming inflamed again, in addition to the 
United States potentially being dragged into a widened war in Europe, 
just as we have been dragged in twice before this century, we could see 
a Russia become more threatening to Europe and to United States 
interests, precisely when NATO is fractured and less able to deal with 
that newly threatening Russia.
  So the failure to participate here could well sink our efforts to 
improve the United States-Russia relationship, to build strong 
democracies in Europe, to expand NATO, and to integrate Russia into 
permanent European security arrangements.
  When President Clinton wrote to the Speaker of the House last month, 
he highlighted the costs of not trying to help secure the peace efforts 
of the warring parties, and this is what he said:

       Unquestionably, there are costs and risks to all involved 
     in making peace. Peace is the less risky alternative. But 
     there will be no peace without America's engagement.

  Madam President, I have asked a lot of questions about this mission 
over the last few weeks, as a member of the Armed Services Committee. 
The first question is: Are there important U.S. interests at stake? I 
believe the answer is yes.
  The United States has an interest in helping the parties establish 
peace and stability in Europe. We have an interest in preventing the 
war from spreading, which also could fracture the NATO alliance and 
which could put Russia and the United States on opposite sides of a 
renewed and wider war.
  The second question I asked: Is the mission clear, and is it limited 
and achievable? The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has testified 
that it is, and the military commanders agree. The NATO mission has 
three primary military objectives: maintaining the existing cease-fire, 
physically separating the warring parties, and overseeing the division 
of territory agreed to by the leaders in Dayton.
  Our military leaders have been clear about what our troops will not 
do, so there will not be any mission creep. They will not oversee 
election security; they will not conduct humanitarian relief missions; 
they will not help civilians relocate or act as local police.
  Now, there is a fine line between actually performing those tasks, 
which U.S. and NATO troops will not do and that the U.N. agencies and 
other private organizations will attempt to do, and helping to create a 
secure environment, which NATO's force will do while they are there so 
that those other tasks can be accomplished.
  NATO and U.S. military leaders say that they have sufficient guidance 
to make the judgment about that fine line. Our troops will not be 
directly responsible for disarming the Bosnian Serbs or equipping the 
Bosnian Government to achieve an equilibrium of forces on the ground. 
While both of those missions are desirable, it is appropriate for the 
NATO force to be able to maintain its evenhandedness in dealing with 
all of the parties and therefore to leave those tasks to separate 
mechanisms.
  The third question I asked: Has the risk to our troops been 
minimized? Bosnia, even after this agreement, is a very dangerous 
environment. I have been particularly concerned, as have many of us, 
about the threat posed by landmines, which some have estimated to 
number 6 million. General Shalikashvili has testified last week that 
the troops have received extra training before deploying to the theater 
specifically against known hazards, such as landmines and snipers. They 
will be well-armed, equipped with robust rules of engagement that they 
need to protect themselves, and local commanders will have the 
authority that they need to make decisions about using force without 
any cumbersome dual-key arrangements.
  Secretary Perry testified that they have the authorization to use 
deadly force, if necessary, and National Security Adviser Tony Lake 
warned that--

       . . . if anybody fools with our forces, they will get hit, 
     hit immediately and very hard, and we expect that any other 
     challenge or threat to our forces would be intimidated.

  In addition, there is a clear chain of command with U.S. commanders 
at the top. General Shalikashvili testified that he believes the risk 
of physical danger to be small and that he would anticipate more 
casualties from accidents than from hostile action.
  The fourth question I asked: Are there clearly defined conditions 
under which United States forces will not go into Bosnia? The answer is 
yes.
  We have received repeated testimony that NATO will not fight its way 
in. The parties have initialed an agreement, and they are scheduled to 
sign it in Paris tomorrow. Vanguard NATO units are in Bosnia. We must 
see evidence of compliance with this agreement before deployment. 
Otherwise, General Shalikashvili has testified that we are not going 
in. We are not going to fight our way in. We are going there to help 
implement a peace agreement which the parties want.
  The fifth question: Is there a clear exit strategy? Administration 
officials are clear that the deployment of United States forces with 
NATO will last approximately 1 year, and they have said that most of 
the military tasks that the NATO force is charged with achieving may be 
achievable in less than 12 months.
  There are two key issues here. One is whether an effective 
equilibrium of forces can be achieved between the parties in such a way 
that the Bosnians can defend themselves when the NATO forces leave. 
There is still a lot of doubt about this. The goal is not part of the 
military mission itself. It is a separate commitment from the United 
States to all of the parties, which all of the parties, we are told, 
have accepted.
  Now I remain skeptical, as indeed do some of the officials who 
testified before us, that an arms control agreement as outlined in the 
Dayton agreement can by itself effectively achieve that equilibrium. 
Secretary Perry says that he believes that the United States commitment 
to assure success of this effort to rearm and train the Bosnians if the 
arms control effort fails, will actually help that arms control effort 
succeed.
  We will need to watch closely to see if the parties abide by their 
obligations to reduce armaments, working with the Organization for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe. For instance, they have agreed not 
to import any weapons for 90 days and any heavy weapons for 180 days. 
If they do not abide by these aspects of the agreement, the United 
States is prepared to assure that arms and training will be provided to 
the Bosnian Government. This must be premised, of course, on the most 
reliable possible assessment of all sides' current military 
capabilities, and the assessment of what constitutes an effective 
equilibrium: defensible territory with sufficient armaments. If the 
arms control agreements are not carried out, as Secretary Perry 
testified, the United States can and will need to try to accelerate the 
arming effort during the 12-month NATO deployment period.
  The second key issue on exiting is whether a secure environment can 
continue to exist after the NATO force leaves. Annex 11, signed by the 
parties, establishes an international police task force assistance 
program to monitor, observe, inspect, advise, and train law enforcement 
agencies to improve public and state security. But that may not be 
enough. In addition to the international police task force, full and 
lasting implementation by the parties of all aspects of the peace 
agreement may require the presence of a smaller residual military force 
in the former Yugoslavia for longer than the 1 year planned for the 
NATO implementation force, and any such residual force 

[[Page S18504]]
should be comprised primarily of Armed Forces from European nations 
without U.S. Armed Forces.
  I believe there should be planning underway now for a European 
residual force. The President should be encouraging European nations 
now to initiate contingency planning for such a force that does not 
include U.S. Armed Forces to maintain a secure environment for 
implementation of the peace agreement after the NATO forces leave.
  Mr. President, there is no need to wring our hands in this body about 
not having a choice. Some say we have no choice, that the decision has 
been made. Well, we have three choices, at least.
  Choice 1 is to say there shall be no funds for these troops. That was 
the choice that we voted against earlier today. But that was a choice. 
That is a constitutional capability that we have, if we decided to 
exercise it, to say that we will use the power of the purse so that 
these troops would not go to Bosnia. By an overwhelming vote, 22 to 77, 
we decided not to use the power of the purse, not to use that 
capability that this Congress has under the Constitution to restrict 
funding in order to prevent troops from going to Bosnia. But it was a 
choice. We were not in a position where we were prevented from 
exercising that constitutional option.
  We have a second choice. We can express an opinion which is in 
opposition to this mission, short of using the power of the purse, but 
nonetheless an expression of opinion. That is what the Hutchison 
resolution does.
  It seems to me, however, that the Hutchison resolution would be a 
terrible mistake and would sap the morale of our troops terribly. To 
tell our troops that we will support you, we are all for you, as part 
of the Hutchison resolution does, to say that the Congress supports 
military personnel who may be ordered into Bosnia, but we oppose the 
decision, is telling those troops who are put in a position of danger 
that we do not support their mission.
  Now, if anything will undermine morale of troops, it would seem to 
me, it would be saying this to them: No matter how much we say in one 
paragraph of the resolution that we are behind the troops--you can say 
that all you want, you can proclaim that all you want in one 
paragraph--but it runs exactly counter and undermines that message to 
say in another paragraph, you are being sent on a mission which is 
wrong. If that mission is wrong, then the power of the purse should be 
used to prevent it.
  It should be one way or the other. We have the authority under the 
Constitution. We chose not to exercise it. I think we made the right 
decision. But we had that choice under the Constitution. Having chosen 
not to exercise a power that this Congress had to prevent the troops 
from going to Bosnia to be put in a position of danger, it seems to me 
now it is totally wrong for us to tell those troops we are now for you 
but your mission is a mistake. If that mission is a mistake, we should 
have voted not to allow it. We cannot have it both ways and expect our 
troops, who are being put in harm's way, to do anything except react in 
wonderment and amazement that a Congress could decide not to restrict 
the funds, and then to say in the same resolution we are behind our 
troops, although the mission is wrong.
  I hope we will defeat the Hutchison resolution and adopt the third 
resolution which will be voted on, the Dole-McCain resolution, which in 
a qualified way, in a very careful way, supports the continuation of 
this mission.
  Mr. President, it comes down to this: We have vital security 
interests in trying to help prevent a war in Europe from resuming and 
spreading into a wider regional war which would probably fracture NATO, 
which could very well pit NATO ally against NATO ally. We have an 
interest in reducing the chance of Europe becoming divided again with 
Russia on the other side from most of Europe, with a Russia that would 
be likely, if this peace agreement failed because the United States 
stayed out of the NATO force, to then grow as a threat to the United 
States and to our allies. If this peace agreement falls apart because 
of United States non-participation with NATO, we would be playing into 
the hands of the most extreme nationalists in Russia and furthering 
their election ambitions next year. If this NATO military mission 
succeeds, Russian troops for the first time will be under American 
command, an extraordinary development in history, and will be a greater 
part of a European security solution, instead of being part of the 
problem as they have for so many decades.
  U.S. involvement in this NATO force is essential if the peace 
agreement of the parties has any chance of being implemented. This is a 
chance, a chance that only the parties can take advantage of. But by 
participating, we would also be giving the parties a chance to end the 
slaughter and the ethnic cleansing and the use of rape as a weapon. For 
all of these reasons, and having answered the questions which I put to 
myself in good conscience over the last few weeks, I have concluded we 
should participate in the NATO force, and I hope the Dole-McCain 
resolution is adopted.
   Mr. President, against all odds and against most predictions, the 
warring parties in the Balkans came together and negotiated a 
comprehensive and complex peace agreement. It is not perfect, and its 
success is by no means assured, but it is their agreement, and as 
Assistant Secretary Holbrooke testified last week, it goes farther than 
anyone had reason to hope the parties would go when they first started.
  This agreement represents the best chance for peace in the region 
that we have seen after 4 years of devastating war. It is still up to 
the parties themselves to implement the agreement. The role of the NATO 
Implementation Force [IFOR] is to give them that chance, by creating a 
secure environment in which the many tasks set forth in the agreement 
can be pursued.
  But if the United States does not participate in that NATO force, 
after the parties have signed up to an agreement we urged upon them, 
with the expectation that we would participate, then the war will 
resume and probably spread. More civilians will be killed, tortured, 
and ethnically cleansed in a renewed war. More refugees will be 
displaced and dispersed throughout Europe. As President Clinton said 
last month:

       If we're not there, NATO will not be there. The peace will 
     collapse. The war will reignite. The slaughter of innocents 
     will begin again . . . American cannot and must not be the 
     world's policeman. We cannot stop all war for all time, but 
     we can stop some wars.

  There is wide support for this conclusion.
  President Bush's former National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft 
warned against the risks of this undertaking, but he said that ``the 
alternative, in my judgment, is a clear disaster. To turn our back now 
would be a catastrophe. . . . If we don't go in, a lot more Americans 
will die, somewhere, sometime.''
  Former Undersecretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz testified to the 
Armed Services Committee that ``if we go in, there is a modest chance 
of success. If we stay out there is a real certainty of failure.'' The 
cost to important U.S. security interests of a wider and more deadly 
war spreading throughout the region, possibly putting us in direct 
conflict with Russia again after 5 years of improving relations, would 
be enormous. It is not just the relevance and usefulness of NATO as an 
instrument of European stability that would suffer, but United States 
credibility around the globe.
   Mr. President, there are indeed reasons to be skeptical that the 
peace agreement can be fully implemented. The region has seen centuries 
of historic animosities, and 4 years of brutality. There are still 
territorial disputes whose final settlement has been put off. The man 
who fueled war with dreams of a Greater Serbia, Slobodan Milosevic, now 
claims to be the guarantor of the Bosnian Serbs' compliance with the 
agreement.
  Resettlement of refugees, guaranteed in the agreement, promises to be 
exceedingly difficult. We are not sure how many refugees will even try 
to reclaim their homes, or who will arbitrate claims of ownership. Even 
this past weekend, some Croat forces looted and burned the homes of a 
town scheduled to be returned to Serb control.
   Mr. President, I have concluded however that although there are 
serious risks to this mission, the costs and risks of not acting with 
our NATO allies, would be even greater.

[[Page S18505]]

  People around the world are watching the United States at this 
moment, watching to see whether we will fulfill again the role of 
facilitating peace that has long been our tradition. I recently 
received a letter from a old friend of mine, Eric Osterweil, now living 
in Brussels, but following our deliberations closely. Welcoming the 
Dayton peace agreement, he wrote:

       I think it is in the strategic interest of the United 
     States to ensure that peace reigns in Southeastern Europe. 
     The risks, if we fail to act, are, I think, far-reaching. 
     They include potential Russian intervention, a conflict 
     between Greece and Turkey and other disagreeable 
     eventualities. It may be difficult for the U.S. not to be 
     involved in any major conflict on the continent of Europe. To 
     me, the most potent argument, however, is that the U.S. has a 
     chance to ensure that peace prevails over war and life over 
     death.

  Mr. President, the most important votes we take in the U.S. Senate 
are those involving the deployment of U.S. military personnel to 
dangerous spots around the globe. The volunteers who make up our Armed 
Forces are dedicated, talented women and men whose lives we value and 
whose service we cherish. The NATO mission before them is challenging, 
but it is doable, as General Shalikashvili has testified, and however 
individual Senators vote on this resolution, the troops should know 
that we all stand behind them and we all stand for them.
  Mr. President, the Bosnian State outlined in the Dayton agreements 
has two armies, three administrations, and is surrounded by hostile 
neighbors. Can a civil society grow out of a land so steeped in 
mistrust, anger, and savage conflict? There is no guarantee. We cannot 
assure that there will ultimately be that successful outcome--only the 
people who live there and their leaders can achieve that. But at least 
NATO is acting to give them a chance to build a civil society and put 
war behind them. That is a mission that the United States should not 
undermine.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Brown). According to the previous 
unanimous-consent agreement, the Senator from Maine is recognized.
  Ms. SNOWE. Mr. President, let me say at the outset, while many of us 
have serious concerns with the scope and the structure of the Bosnian 
mission, there is no doubt about our troops' ability and competence to 
carry out the mission that has been assigned to them by the President 
of the United States. Like so many times in the past, when they have 
served our country well and they have made us proud, I have no doubts 
about the fact they will be no different in this mission.
  Despite what is being said here this evening, whether you are for or 
against the proposition that is before us, we will obviously not change 
the outcome. The deal, as they say, is done, because the troops are 
being deployed and will continue to be deployed, no matter what we do 
here or how we vote.
  Congress is essentially faced with a proposition of accepting the 
President's position on Bosnia, having come full circle from ``Mission 
Impossible'' several years ago, to ``fait accompli'' today. By 
disavowing any congressional role, the President has presented this 
policy no longer as the administration's policy, but now it is 
America's policy. That clearly places us in a very difficult position. 
What we can and should do today is to use this debate to express our 
reservations and concerns, our support--whatever the case may be.
  Inevitably there are constitutional conflicts between branches of 
Government. Inevitably, we have been in this role before, with respect 
to whether or not we should assign troops and whether or not the 
President should come to the Congress. I happen to think it is very 
important to express our concerns to this and future Presidents about 
the fact that Congress is not playing such a role before the fact--and 
not after the fact. The fact of the matter is, it is in America's 
interests to have congressional involvement and participation. It helps 
the President to advance his own policy and his own mission. It helps 
to broaden the support if there are doubts about such a mission. But, 
unfortunately, that is not what is before us today.
  We have also considered other alternatives with respect to Bosnia. In 
fact, I can remember as far back as 1993, in the spring, when I was a 
member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee in the House of 
Representatives, we voted on lifting the arms embargo so that the 
Bosnian Moslems could defend themselves and their families, their 
property. And for over 2 years we fought that battle, and the 
administration did not support us in that endeavor. The Europeans 
resisted this effort as well. I think that is part of the Balkan 
tragedy, the fact that the Moslems could not defend themselves; that 
they did not have the arms or the equipment or the training to defend 
themselves and their families.
  Now we are faced with the proposition of deploying troops to Bosnia. 
This should have been the last option and not the first. We should have 
exhausted all other means and all other possibilities before we 
resorted to deploying ground troops.
  Back in 1993, it is interesting, the administration presented its own 
criteria, guidelines for a future mission in Bosnia. In fact, Secretary 
of State Christopher laid out those guidelines in 1993. They said that, 
in order to deploy troops, four criteria should be met:
  First, that the goal must be clearly stated;
  Second, there must be strong likelihood of success;
  Third, there must be an exit strategy;
  Fourth, the action must win sustained public support.
  It seems to me the administration has fallen far short in meeting 
some of these criteria that the administration itself has established. 
But I would like to take a look at some of those guidelines tonight and 
how this agreement fits into the context of the criteria the 
administration laid out for such a mission.
  First, the goal must be clearly stated. When it comes to the mission 
of the troops, I think this Chamber and the American people certainly 
need to know what this deployment is or is not about. We know it is not 
a peacekeeping mission. In fact, it is much of a departure from a 
peacekeeping mission. It is a peace enforcement mission. That being the 
case, as the administration has suggested, is the goal simply to 
separate warring parties for 1 year and then leave? The administration 
has said yes, and so did witnesses before the Foreign Relations 
Committee. But at other times the administration argued that we will 
only achieve success if we succeed in creating a single, unitary, 
multiethnic Bosnian state, as Secretary Holbrooke said after the 
signing of the agreement in Dayton, when he said, ``Otherwise, we will 
have failed.''
  So, is it a part of our mission to also create a more stable arms 
balance in Bosnia, by ensuring the Bosnian Government forces receive 
the heavy armor they currently lack? Yes, that is part of the overall 
intent of this administration. But the administration has also agreed 
that the arms buildup will not occur until we can succeed first in 
pursuing an arms builddown. But there is no such mechanism for that 
builddown to occur.
  Then we have the arming and training issue. It will certainly be one 
of the focuses of this resolution before us that will be offered by 
Senator Dole. But it still is not clear what the administration has in 
mind or how, in fact, it will be accomplished. The fact is, this could 
be accomplished without even deploying troops to Bosnia. But that, 
unfortunately, is not our option today.
  So the arming, the training, the equipping of the Bosnian Moslems 
will occur in the face of opposition from our European allies and the 
Serbs. It was so much opposed that it was not even a part of the 
agreement. Yet it now happens to be, and should be, a very key 
component of the overall strategy. Because Senator Dole has been 
working on precisely defining this mission now, because it has not been 
precisely defined by this administration, it will remain one of the key 
components of this mission. Yet it will have to be done in the face of 
overwhelming opposition by our allies and the Serbs. How that will be 
done remains open to serious question.
  Is our goal, as well, to facilitate elections? Protect refugees? 
Undertake reconstruction activities? Track down and arrest war 
criminals? The administration sometimes argues no. But then it also 
argues that these nation-building activities are what will determine 
whether or not we have succeeded. So, are these our goals as well? In 
fact, this case is strengthened by the fact 

[[Page S18506]]
that in the Dayton accords the United States insisted on granting our 
forces the power to become involved in these activities.
  To quote from article 6, section 3:

       Our NATO forces will have the authority to:
       A. Help secure conditions for the conduct of free and fair 
     elections;
       B. Assist in the accomplishment of humanitarian missions;
       C. Assist the U.N. High Commission for Refugees;
       D. Prevent interference with the movement of civilian 
     populations and to respond to deliberate violence to life and 
     person.

  If our powers under article 6, section 3, are not a recipe for 
mission creep, I do not know what is.
  Second, there must be a strong likelihood of success. Is there? Of 
course, that all depends on the definition of our mission. And, as I 
have already stated, those goals are somewhat confused and vague. I 
have read the predictions of a wide range of experts on this subject, 
and few are truly optimistic about the long-term success of this 
agreement, whatever the definition of success may be. There is also a 
great deal of skepticism of the genuine commitment of all the parties 
to this agreement or to any common vision of a future for Bosnia.
  But, clearly, we are not going into Bosnia with lightly armed troops 
monitoring a peace that has been reached voluntarily and in good will 
by the parties themselves. That is what a traditional peacekeeping 
operation is all about. But that is not what this is. Rather, we will 
be moving in with one of the U.S. Army's six heavy armored divisions, 
the 1st Armored Division which served as a cornerstone of NATO's 
defense against the Soviet Union. So, this becomes more like our 
deployments to Beirut in 1983 and Somalia, in 1993, both of which ended 
with disastrous consequences, and both attempted to deploy United 
States troops in the service of so-called nation-building activities.
  Third, there must be an exit strategy.
  The administration has said it has an exit strategy by promising to 
be out within a year. But this is an exit timetable, not an exit 
strategy. It says nothing about what needs to be accomplished during 
that year to permit our successful disengagement. Again, any viable 
exit strategy defines our missions and goals. And we still have seen 
that remains nebulous at best. How can the administration legitimately 
argue that it has an exit strategy if it cannot clearly define the 
mission? In fact, Secretary Perry said before the Foreign Relations 
Committee that the exit strategy will have accomplished the cessation 
of hostilities, a separation of warring parties, and a break in the 
cycle of violence. But that really does not define an exit strategy. 
What it does is define an end date. It defines exactly what the state 
of affairs happens to be at the time in which we depart. But it does 
not define what we have accomplished.
  As Dr. Schlesinger testified before the Armed Services Committee, he 
said, ``We do not really have an exit strategy because the situation is 
too messy. We have an exit hope.''
  Finally, the action must have sustained public support. Polls have 
shown that there is not strong support for this mission to Bosnia. In 
fact, it shows the opposite. The majority of the American people oppose 
the deployment of American troops into Bosnia. We know that could 
change as the troops are being deployed and will continue to be 
deployed.
  But what is the reason for the concern among the American people? I 
think the concern stems from the fact that the administration has yet 
to make a compelling case on the merits of the mission or even to 
clearly define the mission itself in terms of our vital national 
security interests. The American people need to know--and they deserve 
to know--that the mission itself merits a military deployment of our 
troops. The American people have the right to know that the parties 
involved in Bosnia are committed to self-sustaining and enduring peace. 
And at the very least they should expect that these parties will be 
committed to a longstanding peace. That remains open to a very serious 
question. And it gets back again to the definition of our goal and 
mission.
  I happen to think that it is very important that whenever we are 
deploying our men and women to an area of conflict, when we are putting 
them in harm's way, that it is absolutely vital that the parties 
involved are absolutely committed to securing a long-lasting peace. I 
think that all that we have heard thus far remains open to very serious 
question as to whether or not that will be the ultimate outcome.
  So I think that the administration has fallen short in meeting its 
own criteria for this mission. But above and beyond that failure, there 
is another question. And that is the unprecedented nature of this 
deployment.
  It has been said that this is the first time NATO has embarked upon a 
mission outside of the treaty area itself. And there are those who 
argue in favor of such a mission because they say that it will serve as 
a model for future NATO missions as well as securing the future of the 
alliance. That may be true. But no one has answered the question as to 
what harm will come to NATO and its prestige if this mission should 
fail. And what damage will that do to the alliance? If 2 years from now 
we face renewed fighting--which indeed is a serious prospect and 
consideration--and a partition of Bosnia, as so many analysts believe 
is the most likely outcome, in the end what will we have accomplished? 
Will it have been worth the potential loss of American lives, if that 
loss could have been avoided by employing other means such as lifting 
the arms embargo?
  Mr. President, one cannot help but feel that if we had pursued and 
exhausted all other possibilities and alternatives, Congress, the 
American people, and our troops would not be faced with a situation 
that has now been forced upon us. But, unfortunately, the proverbial 
train has left the station.
  In the final analysis, this is a mission in which success is in no 
way clear--whose mission is yet to be defined, whose goals are yet 
uncertain, and whose mission does not have the sustained support of the 
American people, and with parties who are not fully committed to peace.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  Mr. BYRD addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. According to the previous order, the 
distinguished Senator from West Virginia is recognized.
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I thank the Chair.
  Mr. President, of course, there is no audience--or very little--here 
on the floor. But I do not speak tonight to the audience on the floor. 
I speak to the audience that may be listening or watching through the 
electronic eye.
  I also speak for the Record, Mr. President, because a year from now 
we are going to look back on this debate. Ten years from now we will 
look back on this Record. And this Record will stand 100 years; 1,000 
years. So I think the Record should be made for future guidance.
  (Ms. SNOWE assumed the Chair.)


                   A Contradictory Bosnia Resolution

  Mr. BYRD. Madam President, one resolution we are now debating, 
offered by the junior Senator from Texas, directly addresses the idea 
of supporting the troops and the role which they have been asked to 
play, in what I believe is a somewhat contradictory manner. The 
resolution before us would sign the Senate up to supporting U.S. troops 
in Bosnia without supporting the mission that they are called upon to 
perform.
  In two simple sentences, this resolution would purport to support 
U.S. troops while simultaneously undermining the very work they are 
performing. How can we, as the resolution before us states, ``strongly 
support the U.S. Armed Forces who may be ordered by the President to 
implement the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. . .'' after having just stated, in the same resolution, 
that ``the Congress opposes President Clinton's decision to deploy 
United States forces into the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina to 
implement the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. . .''? What kind of moral support are our troops supposed 
to find in that? And what kind of resolve does that demonstrate to 
anyone who might attempt to undermine the Bosnian peace agreement?
  This is a clear flag, Madam President, to those who would target our 
troops telling them that, if they target our troops, we will yank them 
out of 

[[Page S18507]]
that mission. So, the mission is undercut and eroded from the very 
beginning by our own actions. That is not support of the troops, to my 
way of thinking.
  This resolution also fails to address Congress' Constitutional 
responsibility to weigh in on decisions to employ U.S. troops. It is 
simply silent on that point. With this resolution, we again fail to dip 
even our toes into the icy waters of a controversial and difficult 
political decision to risk the lives of U.S. troops, even in support of 
what we all hope will be a relatively unthreatening mission in support 
of a peace agreement. Because we cannot guarantee that the life of not 
one U.S. military service person will be lost in this endeavor, we shy 
like a skittish horse from the halter of our responsibility.
  I say to my colleagues that the lives of three diplomats have already 
been lost in this effort, but we do not think their lives were lost in 
vain, because we have reached a peace agreement. Is their effort, their 
sacrifices, not worth this effort to see the hard-won peace through to 
the end? There is no better alternative, and Congress must now stand up 
and shoulder its responsibility to vote on this mission, to support 
both the troops and the job they are undertaking.
  Mr. President, it is clear from the historical record that, until 
recently, the President has had only limited powers as Commander in 
Chief. Other than repelling invasions and protecting U.S. forces, the 
President's authority as Commander in Chief was bound by the 
Congressional power to raise and support armies and the Congressional 
power to authorize the use of those forces in offensive operations. 
Congress not only supported the troops as a daily, practical matter, it 
played an essential role in deciding on the circumstances under which 
troops would be used offensively. President Jefferson and others 
recognized and acknowledged the limits on their presidential authority 
to order troops into actions that were not clearly in defense of U.S. 
territory and forces.
  It is only recent practice in which Congress has acquiesced greater 
authority to the President to employ military forces in offensive or 
non-traditional operations without specific authorization. This has had 
the effect of tying the use of troops ever more tightly with the 
President in his role as Commander in Chief. I am sorry that this is 
the case, because I believe that it is a degradation of Congressional 
authority that undermines the delicate balance of power intended by the 
Framers, but it is the situation in which we find ourselves as a result 
of our own Congressional unwillingness to assert our Congressional 
role.
  As Cassius said, ``The fault is not in our stars, dear Brutus, but in 
ourselves that we are underlings.''
  Congress remains proud of its support of the troops in terms of 
providing robust, even overblown, defense budgets, but it has failed to 
exercise its authority under the Constitution to direct or authorize 
the use of troops. This was clearly not the intent of the Framers.
  How can we reasonably tell troops in the field that we, the Congress, 
support you, the troops, but we are not willing to support the task you 
have been ordered to perform? This is what the resolution before the 
Senate says, but this is a hair that cannot be split. We must step up 
to the plate, and support the job as well as the laborer, or we are not 
fulfilling our Constitutional role. I hope my colleagues will not be 
fooled into thinking that they can have their cake and eat it, too, by 
supporting the troops without supporting the mission that they have 
been ordered to perform.
  Suppose I would say to one of my grandsons, my beloved grandsons, who 
might be going off to Bosnia, ``Well, my dear grandson, you know I love 
you; I love you more than life; but I do not support the mission that 
you are on. I am going to slam the door behind your back when you leave 
the house, and you're on your own!''
  This resolution is a slap in the face to our troops, telling them 
that we support them, but that their mission is foolhardy.
  What kind of support is that? You are up there on the high dive, 
troops, and we support you, but we do not believe there is any water of 
justification in the mission bucket you are about to dive into. That is 
not support. Anyone can see that such a claim amounts to a hollow nut! 
There is no meat in it!
  Let us read what the Apostle Paul said in his First Epistle to the 
Corinthians. It may be a little old fashioned to bring the Holy Bible 
in to the Chamber, but I am a little old fashioned. I am not of the 
religious left or the religious right, but I believe in this holy book. 
Here is what Paul said:

       And even things without life giving sound, whether pipe or 
     harp, except they give a distinction in the sounds, how shall 
     it be known what is piped or harped?
       For if the trumpet give an uncertain sound, who shall 
     prepare himself to the battle?
       So likewise ye, except ye utter by the tongue words easy to 
     be understood, how shall it be known what is spoken? for ye 
     shall speak into the air.

  Madam President, the Hutchison-Inhofe resolution speaks into the air, 
saying one thing on the one hand and another thing on the other. We are 
giving an uncertain sound with this trumpet. We are speaking into the 
air. Then in the words of Paul, ``Who shall prepare himself to the 
battle?''
  This is lighting a candle and putting it under a bushel. Jesus said, 
``Neither do men light a candle and put it under a bushel but on a 
candlestick, and it giveth light unto all that are in the house.''
  This resolution by the able Senators from Texas and Oklahoma does not 
give light to all that are in the house. It puts the candle under a 
bushel, and all that are in the house are left in darkness. And worse, 
this resolution tells the President--not just this President, but all 
future Presidents--that you can do whatever you want, we may not agree 
with you, but you can count on us to support the troops. Do what you 
want with the troops, we do not question your authority, and count on 
us to follow up with appropriations and other forms of support to the 
troops you have committed to the field. This dangerous precedent allows 
Congress to wash its hands--like Pontius Pilate--of the responsibility 
to authorize the use of troops, to stand in judgment on the mission the 
troops are called upon to carry out. We can just pass contradictory, 
confusing resolutions to ``support the troops'' in carrying out any 
Presidential whim, without dealing with our constitutional 
responsibility to deal with politically difficult decisions on how and 
when to employ force. I say to my colleagues, think again, before 
supporting this very unwise and potentially dangerous resolution.

  Mr. President, now I wish to address the resolution by Mr. Dole and 
Mr. McCain.
  I commend the majority leader, Mr. Dole, as well as the distinguished 
Senator from Arizona, Mr. McCain, for their resolution. And I commend 
them for working with the minority leader and other Senators on both 
sides of the aisle to fashion it.
  I commend the minority leader and Senator Nunn and Senator Pell and 
all the other Senators who were on the task force on the Democratic 
side who worked with the words and with the Republicans in fashioning 
the final product. It is important from a historical and constitutional 
perspective. It is important as well from a political perspective. 
First, if it passes, and I hope that it will, it provides the political 
underpinning necessary for the President to pursue a military 
deployment abroad where there are going to be costs in the billions of 
dollars, for the risk of casualties certainly exists, and where the 
credibility of the United States and NATO is at stake.
  Second, I believe that the language fulfills the constitutional 
requirement that the Congress authorize or approve the operation in 
specific enough detail to draw limits around it. In doing so, the 
Congress fulfills the exercise of its responsibilities that the Framers 
expected and that has prevailed through most of American history.
  I think it is important for Senators to reflect on our constitutional 
responsibilities in respect to our action today. The question of the 
actual constitutional reach of the President, acting alone, and without 
congressional authority to deploy forces into hostilities or 
substantial risk of hostilities has become a recurring modern issue 
between Presidents, beginning with Harry Truman and continuing through 
to today.
  When the Framers began their work at the Philadelphia Convention, 
existing models of government placed the 

[[Page S18508]]
war power squarely in the hands of the king. The English Parliament had 
gained the power of the purse in 1665 to control the king, but the 
power to go to war remained a monarchical prerogative. John Locke's 
Second Treatise of Government (1690) spoke of three branches of 
government: legislative, executive, and ``federative.'' The latter 
consisted of ``the power of war and peace, leagues and alliances, and 
all the transaction with all persons and communities without the 
commonwealth.'' The federative power (what we call foreign policy 
today) was ``almost always united'' with the executive. Separating the 
executive and federative powers, Locke warned, would invite ``disorder 
and ruin.''
  A similar model appeared in the Commentaries written by Sir William 
Blackstone, the great eighteenth-century jurist. He counseled that the 
king had absolute power over foreign affairs and war: the right to send 
and receive ambassadors, make treaties and alliances, make war or 
peace, issue letters of marque and reprisal, command the military, 
raise and regulate fleets and armies, and represent the nation in its 
intercourse with foreign nations.
  These models were well known to the Framers. They knew that their 
forebears in England had committed to the executive the power to go to 
war. When they declared their independence from England, they vested 
all executive powers in the Continental Congress and proceeded to 
incorporate that principle in the first national constitution, the 
Articles of Confederation. Later, during their learned and careful 
deliberations at the Philadelphia convention, they decided to vest in 
Congress many of Locke's federative powers and Blackstone's royal 
prerogatives. The delegates emphasized repeatedly that the power of 
peace and war associated with monarchy would not be given to the 
President. As James Wilson noted, it was incorrect to consider ``the 
Prerogatives of the British Monarch as a proper guide in defining the 
Executive powers. Some of these prerogatives were of a legislative 
nature. Among others that of war and peace.
  By the time the Framers finished their labors, the President had been 
stripped of the sole power to make treaties. He shared that with the 
Senate. He had the right to send and receive Ambassadors, but only 
after the Senate agreed to his nominations. He had no power to issue 
letters of marque and reprisal (authorizing private citizens to 
undertake military actions). That power was vested in Congress. 
Although the President was made Commander in Chief, it was left to 
Congress to raise and regulate fleets and armies. The rejection of 
Locks and Blackstone was decisive.
  The reasoning for this break is set forth clearly in The Federalist 
Papers. In Federalist No. 69, Alexander Hamilton explained that the 
President has ``concurrent power with a branch of the legislature in 
the formation of treaties,'' whereas the British king ``is the sole 
possessor of the power of making treaties.'' The royal prerogative in 
foreign affairs was deliberately shared with Congress. Hamilton 
contrasted the distribution of war powers in England and in the 
American Constitution. The power of the king ``extends to the declaring 
of war and to the raising and regulating of fleets and armies.'' Unlike 
the King of England, the President ``will have only the occasional 
command of such part of the militia of the Nation as by legislative 
provision may be called into the actual service of the Union''. No such 
tether attached to the king.
  In Federalist No. 74, Hamilton provided an additional reason for 
making the President Commander in Chief. The direction of war ``most 
peculiarly demands those qualities which distinguish the exercise of 
power by a single head.'' The power of directing was and emphasizing 
the common strength ``forms a usual and essential part in the 
definition of the executive authority.''
  Designating the President Commander in Chief represented an important 
method for preserving civilian supremacy over the military. The person 
leading the Armed Forces would be the civilian President, not a 
military officer. As U.S. Attorney General Bates explained in later 
years, the President is commander in chief not because he is ``skilled 
in the art of war and qualified to marshal a host in the field of 
battle.'' He is commander in chief for a different reason. Whatever 
soldier leads U.S. armies to victory against an enemy, ``he is subject 
to the orders of the civil magistrate, and he and his army are always 
`subordinate to the civil power.'''

  The Constitution grants to Congress a number of specific powers to 
control war and military affairs: to declare war; to raise and support 
armies and provide and maintain a navy; the power to make regulations 
of the land and naval forces; the power to call forth the militia; and 
the power to provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the 
militia. Furthermore, the Constitution vests in Congress the power to 
regulate foreign commerce, an area that has a direct relationship to 
the war power. Commercial conflicts between nations were often a cause 
of war. Guided by history, the Framers placed that power with Congress. 
James Madison later remarked: ``The constitution supposes, what the 
History of all Govts demonstrates, that the Ex. is the branch of power 
most interested in war, and most prone to it. It has accordingly with 
studied care, vested the question of war in the Legisl.''
  The debates at the Philadelphia Convention include a revealing 
discussion on Congress' power to declare war. The early draft empowered 
Congress to ``make war.'' Charles Pinckney objected that legislative 
proceedings ``were too slow'' for the safety of the country in an 
emergency. He expected Congress to meet only once a year. Madison and 
Elbridge Gerry recommended that ``declare'' be substituted for 
``make,'' leaving to the President ``the power to repel sudden 
attacks.'' Their motion carried.
  There was little doubt about the scope of the President's authority. 
The power to repel sudden attacks represents an emergency measure that 
permits the President, when Congress is not in session, to take actions 
necessary to repel sudden attacks either against the mainland of the 
United States or against American troops abroad. It does not authorize 
the President to take the country into full-scale war or to mount an 
offensive attack against another nation.

  I believe that any objective reading of this history would lead 
Senators to the conclusion that the President's scope of authority does 
not include the ordering of a deployment into Bosnia, even if a treaty 
organization such as NATO requested such action by its member states.
  The Framers empowered the President to be Commander in Chief, but 
that title relates to responsibilities that are authorized by Congress. 
The language in the Constitution reads: ``The President shall be 
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of 
the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service 
of the United States.'' Congress, not the President, does the calling. 
Article I gives to Congress the power to provide ``for calling forth 
the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections 
and repel invasions.''
  The title of Commander in Chief was introduced by King Charles I in 
1639 and was always used as a generic term referring to the highest 
officer in a particular chain of command. With the eruption of the 
English civil wars, both the king and Parliament appointed commanders 
in chief in various theaters of action. The ranking commander in chief, 
purely a military post, was always under the command of a political 
superior, whether appointed by the king, Parliament or, with the 
development of the cabinet system in the eighteenth century, by the 
secretary of war.
  England transplanted the title to America in the eighteenth century 
by appointing a number of commanders in chief and by the practice of 
entitling colonial governors as commanders in chief (or occasionally as 
vice admirals or captains general). The appointment of General Thomas 
Gage as commander in chief from 1763 to 1776 caused the colonists grave 
concern, for he proceeded to interfere in civil affairs and acquired 
considerable influence over Indian relations, trade, and 
transportation. The bitter memory of his decision to quarter troops in 
civilians' homes spawned the Third Amendment 

[[Page S18509]]
to the Constitution. These activities and others prompted the colonists 
in the Declaration of Independence to complain of King George III that 
he had ``affected to render the Military Independent of and superior to 
the Civil Power.''

  But the colonists had no reason to fear the governors who were given 
the title commander in chief, even though they controlled the 
provincial forces, since the colonial assemblies claimed and asserted 
the right to vote funds for the militia as well as to call it into 
service. In fact, grievances came from the governors, who complained of 
the relative impotence of their positions. The colonists' assemblies' 
(and later, the states') assertions of the power of the purse as a 
check on the commander in chief reflected an English practice that was 
instituted in the middle of the seventeenth century. By 1665, 
Parliament, as a means of maintaining political control of the military 
establishment, had inaugurated the policy of making annual military 
appropriations lasting but one year. This practice sharply emphasized 
the power of Parliament to determine the size of the army to be placed 
under the direction of the commander in chief.
  The practice had a long influence, for, under its constitutional 
power to raise and support armies and to provide a navy, Congress 
acquired a right that the colonial and state assemblies had to vote 
funds for the armed forces. An additional historical parallel in the 
Article I, Section 8, clause 13 provides that ``no Appropriation of 
Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than two Years.'' The 
requirement of legislative approval for the allocation of funds to 
raise troops underscores the principle of political superiority over 
military command. It also constitutes a sharp reminder that a Commander 
in Chief is dependent on the legislature's willingness to give him an 
army to command.

  The Continental Congress continued the usage of the title in 1775, 
when it unanimously decided to appoint George Washington as general. 
His commission named him ``General and Commander in Chief, of the Army 
of the United Colonies.'' He was required to comply with orders and 
directions from Congress, which did not hesitate to instruct the 
commander in chief on military and policy matters.
  The practice of entitling the office at the apex of the military 
hierarchy as commander in chief and of subordinating the office to a 
political superior, whether a king, a parliament, or a congress, had 
thus been firmly established for a century and a half and was 
thoroughly familiar to the Framers when they met in Philadelphia. 
Perhaps this settled historical usage accounts for the fact that there 
was no debate on the Commander in Chief clause at the Convention.
  President Thomas Jefferson understood the limitations of the 
Commander in Chief clause. in 1801, in his first annual message to 
Congress, he reported the arrogant demands made by Joseph Caramanly, 
the pasha of Tripoli. Unless the United States paid tribute, the pasha 
threatened to seize American ships and citizens. In response, Jefferson 
sent a small squadron to the Mediterranean to protect against the 
threatened attack. He then asked Congress for further guidance, since 
he was ``unauthorized by the Constitution, without the sanction of 
Congress, to go beyond the line of defense.'' It was left to Congress 
to authorize ``measures of offense.''
  Jefferson's understanding of the war clause underwent no revision. 
Like Jefferson, President James Madison was aggrieved by the punishment 
and harassment inflicted on United States vessels. In 1812, he 
expressed to Congress his extreme resentment of the British practices 
of seizing American ships and seamen and inducing Indian tribes to 
attack the United States. Madison complained but said the question of 
``whether the United States shall remain passive under these 
progressive usurpations and these accumulating wrongs, or, opposing 
force, to force in defense of their national rights'' is ``a solemn 
question which the Constitution wisely confides to the legislative 
department of the Government.''
  Following his 1823 announcement of what has become known as the 
Monroe Doctrine, President James Monroe was confronted with 
international circumstances that seemed to invite the use of force, but 
Monroe repeatedly disclaimed any constitutional power to initiate 
hostilities, since, he maintained, that authority was granted to 
Congress.
  President James K. Polk may well have initiated war with Mexico in 
1846, when he ordered an army into a disputed area on the Texas-Mexico 
border. But Polk understood the constitutional dimensions of the war 
power and offered the rationale that Mexico had invaded the United 
States, which, if true, would justify a response by the Commander in 
Chief.

  Until 1950, no President departed from this understanding of the 
parameters of the Commander in Chief clause. But to justify President 
Truman's unilateral decision to introduce troops into the Korean war, 
revisionists purported to locate in the President a broad discretionary 
authority to commence hostilities.
  Emboldened by Truman's claim, subsequent Presidents have likewise 
unilaterally initiated acts of war, from the Vietnam war to the 
incursions in Grenada and Panama. But this claim is cut from whole 
cloth. It ignores the origins and development of the title, the clear 
understanding of the Constitution's Framers, the nineteenth-century 
record, and the history of judicial interpretation. The Supreme Court 
has never held that the Commander in Chief clause confers power to 
initiate war. In United States v. Sweeny (1895), Justice Henry Brown 
wrote for the Court that the object of the clause was to give the 
President ``such supreme and undivided command as would be necessary to 
the prosecution of a successful war.'' In 1919, Senator George 
Sutherland, who later became an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, 
wrote, ``Generally speaking, the war powers of the President under the 
Constitution are simply those that belong to any commander in chief of 
the military forces of a nation at war. The Constitution confers no war 
powers upon the President as such.''
  While the Supreme Court has held that the President may not initiate 
hostilities and that he is authorized only to direct the movements of 
the military forces placed by law at his command, it has been contended 
that the existence of a standing army provides the President with broad 
discretionary authority to deploy troops on behalf of foreign-policy 
goals. Although the intrusion of a public force into a foreign country 
may well entangle the United States in a war, Presidents have often 
manipulated troop deployments so as to present Congress with a fait 
accompli. Given the broad range of war powers vested in Congress, 
including the authority to provide for the common defense, to raise and 
support armies, and to decide, in Madison's words, whether ``a war 
ought to be commenced, continued or concluded,'' it seems clear that 
Congress may govern absolutely the deployment of forces outside U.S. 
borders. As a practical measure, Congress may choose, within the 
confines of the delegation doctrine, to vest the President with some 
authority to send troops abroad, but there is nothing inherent in the 
Commander in Chief clause that yields such authority.
  Representative Abraham Lincoln in a letter to William H. Herndon 
said:

       Allow the President to invade a neighboring nation, 
     whenever he shall deem it necessary to repel an invasion, and 
     you allow him to do so, whenever he may choose to say he 
     deems it necessary for such purpose--and you allow him to 
     make war at pleasure. Study to see if you can fix any limit 
     to his power in this respect, after you have given him so 
     much as you propose. If, to-day, he should choose to say he 
     thinks it necessary to invade Canada, to prevent the British 
     from invading us, how could you stop him? You may say to him, 
     ``I see no probability of the British invading us,'' but he 
     will say to you ``be silent; I see it, if you don't.''
       The provision of the Constitution giving the war-making 
     power to Congress, was dictated, as I understand it, by the 
     following reasons. Kings had always been involving and 
     impoverishing their people in wars, pretending generally, if 
     not always, that the good of the people was the object. This, 
     our Convention understood to be the most oppressive of all 
     Kingly oppressions; and they resolved to so frame the 
     Constitution that no one man should hold the power of 
     bringing this oppression upon us. But your view destroys the 
     whole matter, and places our President where kings have 
     always stood.

  We are aware of the now familiar pattern of most recent Chief 
Executives in similar circumstances of invoking the 

[[Page S18510]]
title Commander in Chief and descriptions of him as being the sole 
organ of foreign relations or chief of administration to suggest a 
conclusion of constitutional invulnerability. No statutory or 
decisional authority is volunteered in support of the conclusion.
  If Congress is to have the sole authority ``to declare war,'' as the 
Constitution clearly states, then are we to suppose that, in any 
military action short of a declaration of war, the authority reposed in 
the Congress by the Constitution to declare war is shifted to another 
department? Are we to assume that any action short of a declaration of 
war, shifts the authority from the Congress to the Executive?
  As we have seen, wars can be waged, and have been waged, without a 
declaration by Congress. Such military actions, nonetheless, still 
constitute wars. The shedding of blood, the taking of lives, the 
destruction of property, the movement of navys and armies, are all the 
same, whether done under a declaration of war or without such a 
declaration. War is war whether it is a ``declared'' conflict or 
otherwise. Are we to imagine that the authority is shifted from the 
elected representatives of the people in such instances to 
someone else, or to some other department, or to the executive? The 
lack of a declaration of war does not make the conflict any less a war 
than it would be with such a declaration. The sacrifices, the costs, 
the ramifications are just as far reaching in the case of an undeclared 
war as in the case of a declared war. Why then, should we strain our 
imagination to the breaking point and pretend that, short of a 
declaration of war, the authority rests somewhere other than in the 
legislative department?

  President Clinton has taken the position that he does not believe 
that he needs the authorization or approval of the Congress to engage 
in a major military deployment in Bosnia, where warring parties have 
signed a peace agreement but where flashes of violence and hostile 
actions are so possible that NATO and other forces are needed to make 
the agreement work. His immediate predecessor, Mr. Bush, took a similar 
position in regard to his deployment of forces to Saudi Arabia to do 
battle against Iraq in Desert Storm. Nevertheless, both of them 
requested the formal support of the Congress in advance of their 
actions. I requested President Clinton on a number of occasions to seek 
the support and approval of the Congress and the American people, 
before committing troops. The Senate ``authorized'' Mr. Bush, in S.J. 
Res. 2 on January 12, 1991, ``to use United States Armed Forces'' 
against Iraq, by a vote of 52-47.
  Again, here today in the Resolution offered by the Majority Leader, 
the Senate is providing clear authorization for the President to 
undertake a specific action, and in this case in somewhat more 
specificity than was the case with regard to Mr. Bush, and for a 
limited time. The operative words are in Section 2, that ``the 
President may only fulfill his commitment to deploy United States Armed 
Forces . . . for approximately one year to implement the general 
Framework Agreement and Military Annex, pursuant to this Resolution, 
subject to the conditions in subsection (b).'' That language fulfills 
the Framers' intent, from a constitutional perspective, for the 
Congress to authorize the President to undertake war making powers that 
he would not otherwise have.
  The emphasis of the authority given here today is its limitation in 
scope and time. If, in the future, the missions engaged in by our 
forces go creeping into nation-building, to doing the job of civil 
authorities for reconstruction or refugee movements, then the President 
would have exceeded his authority. I, for one, would certainly be 
prepared to pull the plug on the operation--as I did in the case of 
Somalia--and cut off the lifeblood of its appropriated funds, if that 
kind of backsliding were to occur. The same is true if we went beyond 
``approximately one year'', language that I insisted be included in 
this resolution. Our military leaders repeatedly testified that they 
were highly confident that the military implementation tasks could 
easily be completed within a year, and the Dayton Accords obligated us 
to, specifically ``approximately one year.'' Thus, the resolution holds 
the parties' feet to the time clock. In the interim, the Bosnian 
Muslims should be properly prepared, from a military standpoint, to 
defend themselves. Furthermore, we ought to be considering putting into 
place a follow-on European-manned security force, if further military 
security from the outside appears to be needed. But, for us, our job is 
to be done in ``approximately one year,'' and that should be that.

  The Constitution divides governmental powers into three areas: 
legislative, executive, and judicial; and distributes them among three 
co-equal branches: Congress, President, and the courts; and provides a 
system of checks and balances to keep the powers separate and the 
branches equal. Underlying this scheme of government in the area of 
immediate concern is the desire to establish interdependence between 
Congress and the Executive in hopes of fostering cooperation and 
consensus in the supersensitive areas of national security and foreign 
affairs.
  As Commander in Chief and sole organ of foreign relations the 
President has independent powers, not simply those conferred on him by 
statutes. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 661 (1981), quoting 
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319-320 
(1936). At the same time, by virtue of its power over the purse and 
powers to raise and support armies, to provide and maintain a navy, and 
to regulate both, Congress has broad constitutional powers implicating 
national security and foreign affairs. Article I, 1, cls. 12, 13, 14.
  The separation of powers principle is intended to prevent one branch 
of government from enhancing its position at the expense of another 
branch and, thus, disturb the delicate balance of powers that the 
Framers assumed was the best safeguard against autocracy.
  As Commander in Chief the President has command of the army and navy 
and may respond to an attack upon the United States. See, e.g., 
Youngstown Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. at 642 (concurring opinion). Also, 
there is authority for the proposition that he may act to safeguard 
American lives and property abroad. See Durand v. Hollins, 8 F. Cas. 
111 (No. 4186) (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1860) and Slaughter-House cases, 16 Wall. 
36, 79 (1872). But see the Hostage Act of 1868, 22 U.S.C. 1732, which 
excludes war from the President's options to obtain the release of 
Americans unreasonably detained by a foreign government.
  On the other hand, aside from his powers ``to grant Reprieves and 
Pardons for Offenses against the United States . . .'' and to ``receive 
Ambassadors and other public Ministers'', the President is totally 
dependent upon Congress for authority or money and usually both to 
implement any policy. Congress is under no legal obligation to supply 
either or both. For example, it has been said that ``[w]hile Congress 
cannot deprive the President of command of the army and navy, only 
Congress can provide him an army or navy to command.'' Youngstown Co. 
v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. at 644 (concurring opinion).
  In the Dole resolution, the authority to implement the President's 
proposed Bosnia policy is clearly provided, and in so doing the Senate 
is accepting responsibility for the action. In doing so, a vital 
bipartisan political foundation is being provided for the President's 
actions, and I think it clearly follows that the consequence of 
authorizing this policy fall upon us here in this branch as well as in 
the Oval Office. If it passes, we will be giving substance to the 
proposition that politics in America stops at the water's edge, and 
this is as it should be. The American people should know that the 
Bosnia implementation is a national policy, approved through the 
constitutional scheme that was intended by the framers.
  The Constitution specifies that ``[n]o Money shall be drawn from the 
Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law. . . .'' 
This provision has been held to be a restriction upon the disbursing 
authority of the Executive Department, and means that no money can be 
paid out of the Treasury unless it has been appropriated by an Act of 
Congress. Cincinnati Soap Co. v. United States, 301 U.S. 308, 321 
(1937). Accordingly, the absolute control of the moneys of the United 
States has been said to be in Congress, and Congress is responsible for 
its exercise of this great power only to the American people. 
Harrington v. Bush, 558 F. 2d 190, 194 note 7 (D.C. Cir. 1977). The 
power to 

[[Page S18511]]
make appropriations includes the authority not only to designate the 
purpose of the appropriation, ``but also the terms and conditions under 
which the executive department of the government may expend the 
appropriation. . . . The purpose of the appropriations, the terms and 
conditions under which . . . appropriations [are] made is solely in the 
hands of Congress and it is the plain duty of the executive branch of 
the government to comply with the same.'' Spaulding v. Douglas Aircraft 
Co., 60 F. Supp. at 986.

  Mr. President, the Dole Resolution does not provide the 
appropriations needed to carry out the Bosnia operation. This is a 
policy resolution. That was also the case when we authorized President 
Bush to make war against Iraq in Desert Storm. In that case, the 
appropriations were provided later. In the same way, the Congress will 
have to approve appropriations for the Bosnia operation in the near 
future.
  I hasten to point out, Mr. President, that the power of the purse is 
our ultimate hammer, and one which is always available, to terminate 
the operation. If it turns out that the parties to this piece of 
geography fail to live up to their pledge to keep the peace and to 
provide for the security of our forces, and the agreement fails, the 
Congress can take swift action to terminate our involvement. We have 
exercised the power of the purse recently to terminate operations and 
limit them. This was the case in both Somalia and Rwanda. So, while I 
support this Resolution and believe it is appropriate and timely, I 
would certainly not hesitate to participate in an effort to end the 
operation and bring our forces home if the parties will not allow it to 
work.
  Although Congress is enacting laws has to scrupulously avoid even 
incidental, adverse effects on fully autonomous presidential powers 
(e.g., the pardoning power, Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. 333 (1867), it is 
under no similar constraints in other areas. The fact that in the 
exercise of an acknowledged power, such as powers to fund or to 
regulate the Armed Forces of the United States, the Congress may 
incidentally impinge upon presidential authority as Commander in Chief 
does not render that exercise a violation of the separation of powers. 
``There are indications that the Constitution did not contemplate that 
the title Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy will constitute him 
also Commander in Chief of the Country, its industries and its 
inhabitants. He has no monopoly of `war powers,' whatever they are. 
While Congress cannot deprive the President of the command of the army 
and navy, only Congress can provide him an army and navy to command. It 
is also empowered to make rules for the `Government and Regulation of 
land and naval Forces,' by which it may to some unknown extent impinge 
upon even command functions.'' Youngstown Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. at 
643-644 (concurring opinion.) ``The Constitution does not subject this 
lawmaking power of Congress to presidential or military supervision or 
control.'' Id. at 588 (opinion of the court).
  Although Congress is subject to the Constitution in the exercise of 
its power of the purse as in the exercise of all its powers, e.g., 
United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946), ``[e]ven when the 
President act clearly within his powers, Congress decides the degree 
and detail of its support,'' Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the 
Constitution 79 (1972), and ``it is the plain duty of the executive 
branch of the government to comply with the same.'' Spaulding v. 
Douglas Aircraft Co., 60 F. Supp. at 986.

  Mr. President, I shall enumerate the defense and war powers set forth 
in the Constitution, as bearing on the President as Commander in Chief, 
as compared with those that are directed to the legislative branch.
  Section 2 of Article 2 states: ``The President shall be Commander in 
Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of 
the several states, when called in to the actual Service of the United 
States.''
  Section 3 of Article 2 states, ``. . . He shall take care that the 
laws be faithfully executed, and shall commission all the officers of 
the United States.''
  I find nothing else in the Constitution that would indicate any 
additional authority or power given to the President with respect to 
the armed forces.
  On the other hand, there is much language in the Constitution with 
respect to the authority and power of the legislative branch anent the 
military. For example:
  Clause 1, Section 8, Article 1: ``The Congress shall have power to . 
. . provide for the common defense . . . of the United States; . . .''
  Clause 10, Section 8, Article 1 states: The Congress shall have power 
``to define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high 
Seas, and Offences against the Law of Nations;''
  Clause 11, Section 8, Article 1: The Congress shall have power ``to 
declare war, grant letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make rules 
concerning captures on land and water;''
  Under Clause 12, Section 8, Article 1, the Congress shall have power 
``to raise and support Armies, but no appropriation of money to that 
use shall be made for a longer term than two years;''
  Clause 13, Section 8, Article 1 states: The Congress shall have power 
``to provide and maintain a navy;''
  Clause 14, Section 8, Article 1 states: The Congress shall have power 
``to make Rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval 
forces;''
  Clause 15, Section 8, Article 1 provides that: The Congress shall 
have power ``to provide for calling forth the militia to execute the 
laws of the union, suppress insurrections and repel invasions;''
  Clause 16, Section 8, Article 1 states: The Congress shall have power 
``to provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia, and 
for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of 
the United States, reserving to the states respectively, the 
appointment of the officers, and the authority of training the militia 
according to the discipline prescribed by Congress;''

  Clause 18, Section 8, Article 1 states: The Congress shall have power 
``to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying 
into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by 
this Constitution in the government of the United States, or in any 
department or officer thereof.''
  If Congress is to have the sole authority ``to declare war,'' as the 
Constitution clearly states, then are we to suppose that, in any 
military action short of a declaration of war, the authority reposed in 
the Congress by the Constitution to declare war is shifted to another 
department? Are we to assume that any action short of a declaration of 
war, shifts the authority from the Congress to the Executive? To so 
suppose, strains credulity to the breaking point. I prefer to suppose 
that the Framers, being unable to foresee the various degrees of 
military action short of that which would be taken under a declaration 
of war, and, therefore, they did not attempt to go into any detail 
beyond that which would obtain in the event of all out war. Obviously, 
the President has the inherent power and authority to take action to 
repeal an invasion, or a sudden and unanticipated attack on the United 
States or its military forces. In such instances, the President would 
have no alternative but to exercise such authority, there being no time 
to consult with or to secure authorization from the Congress, which 
might not even be in session at that moment. It seems logical however, 
to believe that the specific power to declare war--that being the 
ultimate circumstance--and such declaration having been invested in the 
legislative branch, anything short of the ultimate circumstance, 
anything short of the declaration of war, the responsibility and 
authority for committing the armed forces of the United States in an 
offensive action, the authority would remain vested in the legislative 
branch. In other words, the lone authority to declare war being vested 
in the legislative branch, anything less than a declaration of war 
would seem to be reposed for its authority in the same source, namely, 
the Congress. It strains imagination to the utmost to believe that the 
authority to commit the military forces of the nation in an all out 
war, shifts elsewhere when the military forces of the nation are to be 
committed to a lesser action by the military forces than that of all 
out war. The authority to go to the ultimate limit would seem to carry 
with it the authority to extend the military action to something less 
than the all out or ultimate action of declared war. 

[[Page S18512]]

  I close by thanking the majority leader for his leadership and for 
his statesmanship in taking the position he is taking in introducing 
the resolution that we are going to vote on.
  Mr. President, I urge that the Senate vote down the resolution 
offered by the distinguished Senator from Texas and the Senator from 
Oklahoma, Mr. Inhofe, and others, and that the Senate vote to approve 
the resolution offered by Mr. Dole and Mr. McCain.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record 
the resolutions on which we will vote today in the order in which we 
will vote.
  There being no objection, the items were ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                            S. Con. Res. --

(Purpose: To Oppose President Clinton's planned deployment of US ground 
                           forces to Bosnia)

       Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
     United States of America in Congress assembled,
       Section 1. That the Congress opposes President Clinton's 
     decision to deploy United States ground forces into the 
     Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina to implement the General 
     Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
     its associated annexes.
       Section 2. That the Congress strongly supports the US Armed 
     Forces who may be ordered by the President to implement the 
     General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and 
     Herzegovina and its associated annexes.
                                                                    ____


                              S.J. Res. --

       Whereas beginning on February 24, 1993, President Clinton 
     committed the United States to participate in implementing a 
     peace agreement in Bosnia and Herzegovina without prior 
     consultation with Congress;
       Whereas the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina has been 
     unjustly denied the means to defend itself through the 
     imposition of a United Nations arms embargo;
       Whereas the United Nations Charter restates the ``the 
     inherent right of individual and collective self-defense,'' a 
     right denied the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina whose 
     population has further suffered egregious violations of the 
     international law of war including ethnic cleansing by 
     Serbian aggressors, and the Convention on Prevention and 
     Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, to which the United 
     States Senate gave its advice and consent in 1986;
       Whereas the United States Congress has repeatedly voted to 
     end the United States participation in the international arms 
     embargo on the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina as the best 
     way to achieve a military balance and a just and stable peace 
     without the deployment of United States Armed Forces in 
     Bosnia and Herzegovina;
       Whereas the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the 
     Republic of Croatia, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
     initialed the General Framework Agreement and Associated 
     Annexes on November 21, 1995 in Dayton, Ohio, after repeated 
     assurances that the United States would send troops to assist 
     in implementing that agreement;
       Whereas three dedicated American diplomats--Bob Frasure, 
     Joe Kruzel, and Nelson Drew--lost their lives in the 
     American-led diplomatic effort which culminated in the 
     General Framework Agreement;
       Whereas as part of the negotiations which led to the 
     General Framework Agreement, the United States has made a 
     commitment to ensure that the Federation of Bosnia and 
     Herzegovina is armed and trained to provide for its own 
     defense, and that commitment should be honored;
       Whereas the mission of the NATO Implementation Force is to 
     create a secure environment to provide Bosnia and Herzegovina 
     an opportunity to begin to establish a durable peace, which 
     requires the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina to be able 
     to provide for its own defense;
       Whereas the objective of the United States in deploying 
     United States Armed Forces to Bosnia and Herzegovina can only 
     be successful if the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina is 
     armed and trained to provide for its own defense after the 
     withdrawal of the NATO Implementation Force and the United 
     States Armed Forces; and
       Whereas in deciding to participate in implementation of the 
     General Framework Agreement in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
     President Clinton has cited American interests including 
     maintaining its leadership in NATO, preventing the spread of 
     the conflict, stopping the tragic loss of life, and 
     fulfilling American commitments;
       Whereas on December 3, 1995, President Clinton approved 
     Operation Joint Endeavor and deployment of United States 
     Armed Forces to Bosnia and Herzegovina began immediately 
     thereafter: Now therefore be it
       Resolved by the Senate and the House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SUPPORT FOR UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES.

       The Congress unequivocally supports the men and women of 
     our Armed Forces who are carrying out their missions in 
     support of peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina with professional 
     excellence, dedicated patriotism and exemplary bravery, and 
     believes they must be given all necessary resources and 
     support to carry out their mission and ensure their security.

     SEC. 2. DEPLOYMENT OF UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES.

       (a) Notwithstanding reservations expressed about President 
     Clinton's decision to deploy United States Armed Forces to 
     Bosnia and Herzegovina and recognizing that:
       (1) the President has decided to deploy United States Armed 
     Forces to implement the General Framework Agreement in 
     Operation Joint Endeavor citing American interests in 
     preventing the spread of conflict, maintaining its leadership 
     in NATO, stopping the tragic loss of life, and fulfilling 
     American commitments;
       (2) the deployment of United States Armed Forces has begun; 
     and
       (3) preserving United States credibility is a strategic 
     interest,

     the President may only fulfill his commitment to deploy 
     United States Armed Forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina for 
     approximately one year to implement the General Framework 
     Agreement and Military Annex, pursuant to this Resolution, 
     subject to the conditions in subsection (b).
       (b) Requirement for Determination.--Before acting pursuant 
     to this Resolution, the President shall make available to the 
     Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President pro 
     tempore of the Senate, his determination that--
       (1) the mission of the NATO Implementation Force and United 
     States Armed Forces deployed in Bosnia and Herzegovina will 
     be limited to implementation of the military provisions of 
     the Military Annex to the General Framework Agreement and 
     measures deemed necessary to protect the safety of the NATO 
     Implementation Force and United States Armed Forces;
       (2) an integral part of the successful accomplishment of 
     the U.S. objective in Bosnia and Herzegovina in deploying and 
     withdrawing United States Armed Forces is the establishment 
     of a military balance which enables the Federation of Bosnia 
     and Herzegovina to provide for its own defense without 
     depending on U.S. or other outside forces; and
       (3) the United States will lead an immediate international 
     effort, separate and apart from the NATO Implementation Force 
     and consistent with United Nations Security Council 
     Resolution 1021 and the General Framework Agreement and 
     Associated Annexes, to provide equipment, arms, training and 
     related logistics assistance of the highest possible quality 
     to ensure the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina can 
     provide for its own defense, including, as necessary, using 
     existing military drawdown authorities and requesting such 
     additional authority as may be necessary.

     SEC. 3. REPORT ON EFFORTS TO ENABLE THE FEDERATION OF BOSNIA 
                   AND HERZEGOVINA TO PROVIDE FOR ITS OWN DEFENSE.

       Within 30 days after enactment, the President shall submit 
     a detailed report on his plan to assist the Federation of 
     Bosnia to provide for its own defense, including the role of 
     the United States and other countries in providing such 
     assistance. Such report shall include an evaluation of the 
     defense needs of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
     including, to the maximum extent possible:
       (a) the types and quantities of arms, spare parts, and 
     logistics support required to establish a stable military 
     balance prior to the withdrawal of United States Armed 
     Forces;
       (b) the nature and scope of training to be provided;
       (c) a detailed description of the past, present and future 
     U.S. role in ensuring that the Federation of Bosnia and 
     Herzegovina is provided as rapidly as possible with 
     equipment, training, arms and related logistic assistance of 
     the highest possible quality;
       (d) administration plans to use existing military drawdown 
     authority, and other assistance authorities pursuant to 
     section 2(b)(3); and
       (e) specific or anticipated commitments by third countries 
     to provide arms, equipment or training to the Federation of 
     Bosnia and Herzegovina.
       The report shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may 
     contain a classified annex.

     SEC. 4. REPORTS TO CONGRESS ON MILITARY ASPECTS OF 
                   IMPLEMENTATION OF THE GENERAL FRAMEWORK 
                   AGREEMENT.

       (a) Thirty days after enactment, and at least once every 60 
     days thereafter, the President shall submit to the Congress a 
     report on the status of the deployment of United States Armed 
     Forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina, including a detailed 
     description of:
       (1) criteria for determining success for the deployment;
       (2) the military mission and objectives;
       (3) milestone for measuring progress in achieving the 
     mission and objectives;
       (4) command arrangements for United State Armed Forces;
       (5) the rules of engagement for United States Armed Forces;
       (6) the multilateral composition of forces in Bosnia and 
     Herzegovina;
       (7) the status of compliance by all parties with the 
     General Framework Agreement and associated Annexes, including 
     Article III of Annex 1-A concerning the withdrawal of foreign 
     forces from Bosnia and Herzegovina;
       (8) all incremental costs of the Department of Defense and 
     any costs incurred by other 

[[Page S18513]]
     federal agencies, for the deployment of United States Armed Forces in 
     Bosnia and Herzegovina, including support for the NATO 
     Implementation Force;
       (9) the exit strategy to provide for complete withdrawal of 
     United States Armed Forces in the NATO Implementation Force, 
     including an estimated date of completion; and
       (10) a description of progress toward enabling the 
     Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina to provide for its own 
     defense.
       (b) Such reports shall include a description of any changes 
     in the areas listed in (a) through (a)(10) since the previous 
     report, if applicable, and shall be submitted in unclassified 
     form, buy may contain a classified annex.

     SEC. 5. REPORTS TO CONGRESS ON NON-MILITARY ASPECTS OF 
                   IMPLEMENTATION OF THE GENERAL FRAMEWORK 
                   AGREEMENT.

       Thirty days after enactment, and at least once every 60 
     days thereafter, the President shall submit to the Congress a 
     report on:
       (a) the status of implementation of non-military aspects of 
     the General Framework Agreement and Associated annexes, 
     especially Annex 10 on Civilian Implementation, and of 
     efforts, which are separate from the Implementation Force, by 
     the United States and other countries to support 
     implementation of the non-military aspects. Such report shall 
     include a detailed description of:
       (1) progress toward conducting of elections;
       (2) the status of return of refugees and displaced persons;
       (3) humanitarian and reconstruction efforts;
       (4) police training and related civilian security efforts, 
     including the status of implementation of Annex 11 regarding 
     an international police task force; and
       (5) implementation of Article XIII of Annex 6 concerning 
     cooperation with the International Tribunal for the Former 
     Yugoslavia and other appropriate organizations in the 
     investigation and prosecution of war crimes and other 
     violations of international humanitarian law;
       (b) the status of coordination between the High 
     Representative and the Implementation Force Commander;
       (c) the status of plans and preparation for the 
     continuation of civilian activities after the withdrawal of 
     the Implementation Force;
       (d) all costs incurred by all U.S. government agencies for 
     reconstruction, refugee, humanitarian, and all other non-
     military bilateral and multilateral assistance in Bosnia and 
     Herzegovina; and
       (e) U.S. and international diplomatic efforts to contain 
     and end conflict in the former Yugoslavia, including efforts 
     to resolve the status of Kosova and halt violations of 
     internationally-recognized human rights of its majority 
     Albanian population.
       Such reports shall be submitted in unclassified form, but 
     may contain a classified annex.


                      Unanimous-Consent Agreement

  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I have been asked by the leader to make the 
following request:
  I ask unanimous consent that the time on our side of the aisle be 
divided as follows, in the following order:
  Senator Wellstone, 7 minutes; Senator Murray, 9 minutes; Senator 
Leahy, 7 minutes; Senator Simon, 7 minutes; Senator Bradley, 10 
minutes; Senator Sarbanes, 5 minutes; Senator Dodd, 7 minutes; Senator 
Lautenberg, 7 minutes; Senator Graham, 7 minutes; Senator Moseley-
Braun, 5 minutes; Senator Kerry, 10 minutes, and Senator Daschle, 10 
minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that at the 
hour of 10:15 this evening, the Senate proceed to the final vote on the 
pending Hutchison-Inhofe concurrent resolution without further action 
or debate, and immediately following the vote, the Senate proceed to 
the final vote on the Dole-McCain joint resolution on Bosnia, with the 
time between now and 10:15 p.m. this evening to be equally divided 
between the two leaders or their designees.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. I further ask that the Senate resume the Bosnia 
debate, and it be in order for the leader to offer his joint resolution 
at a later time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. Once again, Madam President, I thank all Senators for 
allowing us to do this so that every Member of the Senate who might be 
looking for a timetable would know that the votes do start at 10:15, 
and that the time between now and then will be equally divided.
  I yield the floor.