(Senate - March 28, 1996)

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[Pages S3105-S3114]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office []

                           CONFERENCE REPORT

  The Senate continued with the consideration of the conference report.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, this conference report that we are now 
considering on H.R. 1561 is not a traditional nuts-and-bolts 
authorization bill for the Departments of State, USIA, and ACDA. It is, 
regrettably, a nonbipartisan and controversial bill in its current 
  This bill seeks to reorganize the foreign affairs agencies of the 
executive branch by forcing on the President a consolidation of one 
Agency, USIA, AID, or ACDA, even though the administration has made it 
very, very clear that is unacceptable to them. So, for that reason 
alone, this particular bill is subject to veto by the President. He has 
said that he will, indeed, veto it on that basis. I think it is 
regrettable we are going to take the time of the Senate to go through 
the process of sending the President something that he has already said 
he is going to veto, but that is what we are going to do.
  But there are other implications in here. If a President of the 
United States asserts constitutional authority with respect to 
particular prerogatives within the formulation of the conduct of 
American foreign policy, it seems to me we ought to be careful to at 
least examine, if not respect at face value, those assertions with 
respect to that constitutional authority. And I think that there are 
legitimate questions here about whether or not it is appropriate, if 
the President says that is a prerogative and he does not want to be 
forced into that position, whether or not we should not respect that 
and create a different formulation by which we end up with the same 
  We did offer a different formulation by which we would end up with 
the same result during the course of the conference. That was rejected. 
Specifically, we offered the same amount of savings that we will 
achieve under the numbers in this bill--actually, a slightly lower 
aggregate amount of savings--but we recommended that we only hold out 
the threat of closure of these agencies if the President refused to 
return to us a sufficient plan with respect to the reorganization of 
our foreign policy agencies, and we had the right to determine whether 
or not we thought that was a sufficient plan. If we did not, we could 
reject it and start again.
  In addition to that, there are a series of policy issues attached to 
what should, in normal circumstances, be a nuts-and-bolts 
reauthorization. Those policy decisions, each and every one of them, 
present their own set of problems. One such policy issue is the very, 
very significant alteration of our relationship with China, it might be 
said, literally shaking the foundations of that relationship at a very 
precarious time in our dealings with both China and Taiwan. I will have 
more to say about that subsequently, as will other colleagues.
  In addition to that, it undermines the President's July 1995 decision 
with respect to normalization with Vietnam, and puts language into the 
authorizing process that, in effect, sets back our accountability 
process on the POW/MIA's.
  Furthermore, it fails to meet the administration's budget requests 
for fiscal year 1997, particularly for the critical account of 
peacekeeping. The United States is engaged, as we all know, in most 
critical peacekeeping efforts in the world, most recently in Bosnia. To 
suggest the Congress is going to be unwilling to meet what we know are 
the agreed-upon figures and responsibilities for those peacekeeping 
efforts is simply irresponsible. Moreover, it sends a very, very 
dangerous, damaging message to our relationships with our allies.
  Yesterday, I had the privilege of having a meeting with our 
Ambassador to the United Nations, Ambassador Albright, whom I think 
most would agree has been really doing an outstanding job on our behalf 
in New York at the United Nations. She relates that, literally in every 
debate, in every single effort, now, to try to bring our allies along 
on some particular effort, she meets with not just resistance, but a 
level of cynicism and scorn with respect to the United States' 
arrearages and the United States' slowness in paying with respect to 
  Even in Bosnia, we are $200 million shy of a $200 million commitment. 
And the on-the-ground effort which the European representative, Carl 
Bildt, is trying to implement on our behalf and the European's behalf, 
is significantly restrained by virtue of the perception that we are not 
serious, we are not there, we are not going to really leverage this and 
try to guarantee that the on-the-ground civilian component can be as 
successful as the on-the-ground military component has been to date.

  In addition to that, the United States-assessed contributions to the 
United Nations and its related agencies, as well as ACDA and the 
International Exchange Programs, are all significantly underfunded for 
the 1997 year.
  I know, as my colleagues know, there is no easier whipping boy in the 
United States today than foreign policy and the United Nations. If you 
want to get applause at a local meeting at home, if you want to get 
people to kind of vent some of their anger at the waste of Washington, 
all you have to do is say to them, ``By God, I think the money ought to 
be going here to X, Y, or Z town instead of to these foreign efforts.'' 
And most people will automatically cheer and say you are absolutely 
  When you ask most Americans how much money they think is going into 
our foreign policy effort, it is really amazing how far off most 
Americans are. I go to town meeting after town meeting; when the issue 
comes up, I say, ``How much do you think we are paying for foreign 
assistance, foreign aid? Do you think it is 20 percent of the budget?'' 
And a number of hands go up. ``Do you think it is 15 percent of the 
budget?'' Quite a few hands go up. ``Do you think it is 10, 9, 8 
percent of the budget?'' A lot of hands go up, the vast majority. ``Is 
it 5 percent of the budget?'' And you get the remainder of the hands 
with the exception of a few.
  Then, when you finally get down and say, ``Is it 1 percent or less of 
the budget,'' I usually have one or two hands go up. That is what it 
is. That is what it is. It is 1 percent or less. It is less than 1 
percent of the budget of the United States that we commit to all of our 
interests in terms of peacekeeping, AID, efforts to leverage peace in 
the Middle East. And most of the money, as we know, is contained 
within, almost, two items, Egypt and Israel, but significant portions 
are spread around with respect to some of the development programs and 
other efforts to curb drugs, narcotics, money laundering, immigration--
a whole lot of things that we try to do in that field, including, I 
might add, one of the most important of all today: our economic 
  We are shortchanging ourselves in places like Hong Kong, Singapore, 
the Far East, with respect to our Foreign Commercial Service, where we 
are losing countless job opportunities for Americans, countless 
manufacturing opportunities in this country, because we do not have the 
people on the ground sufficient to marry those opportunities with the 
opportunities in this country. That is extraordinarily shortsighted, 
because we could pay their salaries many times over in a matter of 
months, and I think that has been proven many times over.

  So, Mr. President, the current level of funding is a very significant 
issue to the administration, and the administration has appropriately, 
in my judgment, suggested that those numbers are sufficiently low that 
that is a reason to veto this bill.
  In addition to that, there still is no satisfactory solution to the 
question of family planning, and it is ultimately a bill that, in my 
judgment, is deficient.
  I think many of my colleagues know that Senator Helms and I have been 
grappling in good faith with the central and perhaps most controversial

[[Page S3106]]

issue in this bill, and that was the reorganization of the foreign 
affairs agencies.
  At the start of the year, I was excited about the proposition, and I 
still remain excited about the proposition, that we could consolidate, 
we might even merge, we need to reduce the size. I applaud the Senator 
from North Carolina in his efforts to try to press that. It is very 
legitimate. There does need to be a savings. There can be some savings, 
but I think there is an equally legitimate question about whether or 
not, at first instance, we should make an executive department decision 
regarding reorganization.
  I think if we were to create the framework, if we were to hold a very 
heavy sword over the head of the administration, suggesting that if 
they do not do it sufficiently, they will pay a price, I think that 
would have been a very appropriate approach and it is one which we 
offered. In the absence of the administration being willing to accept a 
forced agency numbered closure, it is very difficult, obviously, to 
pass a bill.
  I appreciate the fact--and I want the chairman to know it--I 
appreciate the fact that this conference report does contain a 
compromise on reorganization, and I think that did reflect a 
willingness of the House Republican conferees to move away from the 
House-passed bill's requirement that all three agencies be abolished. I 
want to respect the fact that they did move and say it on the record, 
and it would have been my hope that we might have been able to come to 
a final agreement on this.
  But regrettably, the compromise does not meet the veto proof test, 
because it denies the President that executive department right of how 
to reorganize and, therefore, it is not just the fact of reorganization 
that is being asserted here, it is the principle of Presidential 
prerogative which, as we know, is not unimportant in the context of 
foreign policy.
  Moreover, there is a very serious question, which I am confident the 
Senator from Arizona [Mr. McCain], who is on the floor, will share with 
me, that it is really inappropriate for this conference effort to 
prohibit the President from following through on an Executive 
determination and an Executive right with respect to diplomatic 
relations with another country. Having determined, as a matter of that 
Presidential right, that we will establish diplomatic relations, for 
the Congress to then not fund the requisites of that diplomatic 
process; that is, an embassy, is to come in through the back door to, 
again, deny the President the prerogatives of Presidential authority in 
the conduct of foreign affairs.

  So, again, that is a problem with respect to this particular issue.
  Mr. President, let me say further that one of the most damaging 
components of this conference report, which I know the Senator from 
Louisiana is going to talk about and I know Senator Nunn of Georgia is 
going to talk about, is the very provocative and, in my judgment, ill-
advised initiatives with respect to Taiwan and China.
  I do not want to suggest that Taiwan should not be considered at some 
point for membership in GATT or the United Nations. It may well be that 
in the context of further marching down the road of one China and two 
systems and of bringing a sufficient dialog together between China and 
Taiwan, it will be possible to work those details out. But it is 
clearly on its face ill-advised in the context of the current 
difficulties for the U.S. Congress to step in and make extraordinarily 
important and provocative statements about that relationship that can 
only lend further fears to a Beijing that is so significantly caught up 
in, convoluted by, constrained by the transition process today, the 
leadership transition process.
  Any of us has to understand that there are certain limits as to what 
the center of China, the Beijing regime can do at a time when there is 
a leadership transition in the shadows and perhaps sometimes not even 
so much in the shadows. For us to step in and alter in a unilateral way 
the Shanghai communique and the Taiwan Relations Act and the 1982 
further communique would be to disrupt and, in fact, make more 
dangerous an already fragile and difficult situation.
  There is no question but that the President of the United States on 
those items alone--just on the question of President Lee Teng-hui's 
visit to the United States, GATT and U.N. membership, and on the 
question of the relationship of the Taiwan Relations Act and the 1982 
communique--those items alone, each and every one of them individually, 
let alone in the aggregate, ought to be grounds for a veto.

  I think it is important for us to understand that while all of us 
here share a deep-rooted belief that the words of the communique are 
critical with respect to peaceful transition in Taiwan and that the 
words of the communique are critical with respect to our commitment to 
the Taiwanese not to ever be subjected to an invasion or to takeover by 
force or to a subversion of the democracy they are increasingly 
choosing and practicing, it would be equally wrong for us to just move 
away from the policy track that has guided our movements in that region 
for so long.
  I think it is fair to say that if we were serious about establishing 
that as a policy of the United States Congress, it would be fair to 
understand that China would interpret that as an extraordinarily 
belligerent, provocative move that would elicit nothing but a hard-line 
response and wind up having exactly the opposite effect of what we are 
trying to achieve in the long run and make the world a far more 
dangerous place.
  I believe that we can continue to back the principles of the 
communique and Taiwan Relations Act without resorting to those 
measures. We will still sell weapons to Taiwan as they need it for 
defense, and we will still abide by the guarantees of the two systems 
and of a peaceful transition. But what a terrible mistake it would be 
to start to assert a sort of ``435-person House and 100-person 
Secretary of State policy'' from the U.S. Congress.
  Mr. President, finally, let me just say, turning to the funding 
levels, I want to speak for a quick moment about not just the 
peacekeeping money, but the relationship with the United Nations itself 
and our arrearages.
  Ambassador Albright has made it very, very clear, and I think all of 
us need to really think about this--I encourage colleagues to go to New 
York and meet with representatives of various countries, find people 
who they respect in the process as observers and truly inquire 
independently of an advocate of the administration--whether or not our 
arrearages are creating a legitimate problem in our ability to achieve 
the very reforms that we are seeking at the United Nations.
  In the context of this conference process, Congressman Hamilton and I 
offered a proposal that would have allowed for continued leverage to 
get reform from the United Nations. We proposed that we not pay the 
arrearages back in one lump sum so that we lose leverage and control, 
but rather that we agree to pay them back, that we make it clear that 
we are going to do that, while simultaneously over a 5-year period 
achieving a fixed set of reforms within the U.N. itself, as well as 
achieving from the U.N. commitments with respect to changing the 
formula for contributions in and of itself.
  I believe the contribution formula ought to change. The world has 
changed since the formula was set up. The gross domestic products of 
our partners have grown, and, on a relative basis, ours is shrinking 
compared to theirs. So it is appropriate for us to look to the United 
Nations and to our allies for fair contribution, for burden sharing and 
for a more fair distribution of that effort.
  But right now, as a consequence of our unilateral decision not to 
pay, our allies are paying more than 100 percent. I will tell you, our 
allies, ranging from the British, the Canadians, French and others, are 
looking at us askance and wondering and increasingly feeling a sense of 
the inappropriateness of our unilateral actions. I know that our envoys 
are hearing about this on a regular basis, and it is diminishing our 
ability, Mr. President, to be able to achieve the very goals we are 
trying to achieve.
  Let me say, finally, that this bill is an improvement over the House-
passed bill on a number of different questions. It is my hope that 
after the President has vetoed this bill, that we might be able to 
quickly meet and resolve these particular issues. It was my feeling, 
had we embraced a couple of these concepts in the course of the 

[[Page S3107]]

rather than simply shunting them aside, we might still have been able 
to have the consensus and bipartisanship necessary to pass this.
  Mr. President, the conference report on H.R. 1561, which we are now 
considering, is not just a traditional nuts-and-bolts authorization 
bill for the Department of State, USIA, and ACDA. It is a controversial 
bill with far-reaching provisions.
  This bill seeks to reorganize the foreign affairs agencies in the 
executive branch by forcing the President to abolish one agency--USIA, 
AID or ACDA--even though the administration has made it clear from day 
one that it will not accept any forced consolidation of agencies. It 
undermines the President's July 1995 decision to normalize relations 
with Vietnam and threatens to set back the POW/MIA accounting process 
that we have worked so hard to put in place. It shakes the foundations 
of United States relations with China and tilts the balance toward 
Taiwan at a precarious time in the relations between Taiwan and China. 
It is a bill which fails to meet the administration's anticipated 
budget requests for fiscal year 1997, particularly for critical 
accounts such as peacekeeping, U.S.-assessed contributions to the 
United Nations and related agencies, ACDA, and international exchange 
programs. It lacks a satisfactory solution to the family planning 
issue. In short, it is a bill that I cannot support and that the 
President has indicated that he will veto.
  I think all of my colleagues know that Senator Helms and I have been 
grappling with the central, and perhaps most controversial issue in 
this bill--the reorganization of the foreign affairs agencies--for over 
a year. As I indicated from the start, I am sympathetic to the idea of 
consolidation, and I believe that Senator Helms provided the committee 
with a thought-provoking plan for reorganizing the foreign affairs 
agencies. Personally, I can envision ways in which functions of the 
State Department and one or more of the three other foreign affairs 
agencies could be merged. In fact, as the chairman knows, I offered an 
amendment in committee to abolish one agency and consolidate its 
functions into the State Department. However, this proposal--like the 
chairman's proposal to abolish all three agencies, AID, USIA, and 
ACDA--was rejected by the administration.
  The fact of the matter is that the administration does not now, and 
has never, supported the forced consolidation of agencies. That is why 
I worked with the chairman to forge a compromise in the Senate that 
would force consolidation through savings rather than through the 
mandatory abolition of agencies, and at the same time allow the Senate 
to act on S. 908. It was clear then, as it is clear now, that the 
Senate-passed version of consolidation was the only version that could 
possibly gain the support of Democrats in this body and of the 
  I appreciate the fact that this conference report contains a 
compromise on reorganization which reflects the willingness of the 
House Republican conferees to move away from the House-passed bill's 
requirement that all three agencies be abolished. However, this 
compromise does not meet the veto-proof test because it denies the 
President the right to determine how to reorganize the foreign affairs 
agencies under his control. I believe this is a right that any 
President, Democrat or Republican, would assert.
  Section 1214 of this conference report essentially prohibits the 
President from establishing an American embassy in Vietnam unless he 
certifies that Vietnam is fully cooperating on the POW/MIA issue in the 
four areas set forth by President Clinton. The Senate-passed bill 
contained nothing on this issue. The House bill contained weaker, sense 
of the Congress language. Unfortunately, the Republican conferees 
decided to up the ante by including the language now in section 1214--
language which was in the fiscal year 1996 Commerce, State, Justice 
appropriations conference report that President Clinton vetoed. He 
indicated his opposition to this provision in that veto statement and 
he has cited it as one of the provisions that will provoke a veto of 
this conference report.
  On the face of it, section 1214 might look like a harmless provision. 
But the fact of the matter is, this is a veiled attempt to go 
backwards--to nullify the decision made by President Clinton last July 
to normalize our relations with Vietnam.
  That decision was the culmination of a process begun several years 
ago by President Bush, when he laid out a road map for improvement in 
relations between the United States and Vietnam. Under the road map, 
which the Clinton administration has embraced, genuine progress on the 
POW/MIA issue would result in the establishment of full diplomatic 
  Genuine progress has been made. Through the efforts of people like 
Gen. John Vessey and the often heroic work by our own joint task force 
personnel and their Vietnamese counterparts in the field, we have a 
process in place that is producing that accounting.
  Of the 2,154 Americans technically classified as MIA's in all of 
Southeast Asia, we have only 50 in Vietnam whose fate has yet to be 
confirmed. That means we have confirmed the fates of 146 of the 196 
priority discrepancy cases. We have determined that 567 Americans were 
lost over water or in other circumstances where survival was doubtful 
and where the recovery of remains is a very difficult. We have 
recovered 520 remains from Vietnam, 170 of which have already been 
positively identified as American. The remainder are pending 
identification by our scientists at CILHI. We have investigated all 
unresolved live sighting reports and received over 27,000 materials 
including photos and other archival materials. It is clear that Vietnam 
is working diligently to help us resolve outstanding POW/MIA cases.
  Last November, the Defense Department's POW/MIA office released its 
comprehensive review of individual cases of Americans unaccounted for 
in Southeast Asia. In testimony on the report before the Military 
Personnel Subcommittee of the House Committee on National Security, 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense James W. Wold stated the bottom 
line. He said, ``We have no evidence that information is being 
deliberately withheld.'' In addition, all of our United States military 
personnel involved in the POW/MIA accounting process, from the 
Commander in Chief of United States Forces in the Pacific to the 
private first class excavating a crash site have confirmed that 
Vietnam's cooperation has been extraordinarily extensive and represents 
a genuine effort on the part of the Government and people of Vietnam to 
resolve this issue once and for all.
  The United States under Presidents Bush and Clinton made a commitment 
to Vietnam that the bilateral relationship would move forward as their 
cooperation on the POW/MIA issue improved. Vietnam is doing its part. 
The United States must fulfill its commitment in turn. The language in 
section 1214 of this bill puts that commitment in question and, in so 
doing, threatens to undermine the successful accounting process that we 
have put in place.
  Apart from the damaging section on Vietnam, this conference report 
contains several provisions on China-Taiwan issues which are 
potentially damaging to our bilateral relations with Beijing. For 
example, section 1708 expresses the Sense of Congress that Taiwanese 
President Li should be allowed to visit the United States in 1996. 
Section 1709 advocates Taiwan's admission into GATT and the WTO. Most 
damaging of all, section 1601 subordinates the 1982 Joint Communique 
between the United States and China to the Taiwan Relations Act, in 
order to enable the United States to provide more weapons to Taiwan. 
This provision unilaterally repudiates a fundamental and longstanding 
element in the bilateral relationship between the United States and 
China. The administration has made it clear that this provision is a 
veto item.
  Taken together, these provisions are a provocation to China. They 
raise the specter of a United States that is tilting toward Taiwan, 
encouraging Taiwan's apparent quest for independence, and positioning 
itself to enhance Taiwan's military capabilities in contravention of 
the fundamental nature of the United States-China relationship. To 
adopt these provisions now, when China and Taiwan are reaching out to 
each other to defuse the tensions between them, would be a mistake.
  Turning to funding levels, this bill fails to meet the 
administration's likely budget request for fiscal year 1997,

[[Page S3108]]

particularly, as I said earlier, in key accounts such as peacekeeping, 
assessed U.S. contributions to the U.N. international exchanges, and 
ACDA. I understand that the Republican conferees wanted to stay within 
the caps set by the budget resolution for function 150, the 
international affairs function. All of us, including President Clinton, 
understand that economies must be achieved if the budget is going to be 
balanced. However, the glide path in the existing budget resolution for 
function 150 is too steep--as it is for other functions--and if we 
stick to this glide path, our ability to promote and protect our 
national interests and to conduct diplomacy will be greatly 
  For example, we are not going to be able to use our leverage 
effectively at the United Nations to secure management reforms and 
revisions in our assessed contributions if we continue to be the 
deadbeat debtor. This conference report prevents us from paying not 
only through inadequate authorization levels but also by withholding 
high percentages of our peacekeeping contributions and our 
contributions to the regular budget until the President can certify 
that various reforms have been achieved. There is no disagreement over 
the need for reform at the United Nations but there is real 
disagreement among us over how to achieve it. The money card can only 
work so long and I think its effectiveness has run out. Few, if any, at 
the United Nations believe we are going to pay and as long as they do 
not believe it, we have no leverage to promote reform.
  This conference report also includes some foreign aid provisions. Of 
these, the most problematic--and one cited by the administration as a 
reason for Presidential veto--is section 1111 which effectively 
terminates the housing guarantee program in several countries such as 
those in Eastern Europe and South Africa.
  Finally, I should point out that this bill is an improvement over the 
House-passed bill on the question of family planning because it does 
not contain the objectionable provisions on Mexico City and 
prohibitions on funding for UNFPA. However, in an effort to avoid a 
fight over this issue--on which the House and Senate are so divided--
the Republican conferees decided to remain silent on the family 
planning issue. In so doing they missed the opportunity to release 
funds for population assistance that have been held up under the fiscal 
year 1996 foreign operations appropriations bill. The restrictions in 
that bill cut family planning aid by 35 percent below last year's 
levels, and prohibit using any of the 1996 funds until July. 
Ironically, such restrictions could actually serve to increase the 
number of abortions and maternal deaths in developing countries, since 
they mean fewer couples will have access to contraceptives, health 
services and information. Therefore, the administration strongly 
opposes these restrictions and has cited the failure of this conference 
report to resolve the family planning issue as another reason for a 
  Mr. President, this conference report represents a radical departure, 
not only from the traditional bipartisanship that has marked American 
foreign policy for so long, but also from the traditional 
bipartisanship that has enabled the foreign affairs committees of the 
Senate and the House to fulfill their authorizing responsibilities for 
the State Department and related foreign affairs agencies. Some will 
argue this is just politics, but they are wrong. The gulf between us is 
rooted in policy and the policy in this bill is not in our national 
interests. That is why I am going to vote against this conference 
report and why the President is going to veto it.
  I reserve the remainder of our time at this point in time, Mr. 
  Mr. HELMS addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Carolina.
  Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, let me spend just 2 or 3 minutes in 
respectful response to my friend from Massachusetts. His statement that 
the Taiwan Relations Act, which is a public law passed by the Congress 
of the United States, supersedes an Executive order, that is a matter 
of fact. The United States Congress was clear in its intent to support 
Taiwan's defense needs when this Taiwan Relations Act was passed.
  The 1982 Executive order, referring to the ability of the United 
States to sell arms to Taiwan, seems to contradict certain terms of the 
Taiwan Relations Act. Now then, section 1601 does not--does not--
repudiate the 1982 Executive order, though I confess that I wish it 
did. It does, however, clarify that in those instances in which the 
Taiwan Relations Act and the 1982 Executive order seem to contradict 
one another, the Taiwan Relations Act is, after all, United States law, 
therefore, stipulates the policy to which the United States should and 
must adhere.
  Not once--this is the point, Mr. President--not once during the 
course of the conference between the House and the Senate did a single 
Member of the House or a single Member of the Senate raise this 
provision as a problem. As a matter of fact, I think it is worthy of 
note that when the staff met preliminarily, the staff of the Senate and 
the staff of the House, Democrats and Republicans, the Democrats' staff 
members made it clear that they were not there to participate; they 
were only to take notes. They refused to take any action or any part in 
the proceedings. So that is a little bit like the fellow who killed his 
mother and father and asked for mercy in the court because he was an 
orphan. They did not participate when we wanted them to, when we were 
begging them to.
  With that said, I remind my colleagues that this provision was 
adopted by both Houses of Congress. Therefore, it was in both the House 
and the Senate bills. I also remind my distinguished colleague and 
friend from Massachusetts that he, himself, voted in support of this 
exact language during the committee consideration of the State 
Department authorization bill.
  Mr. President, I reserve the remainder of my time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, for a long time now many critics of the 
administration's Russia policy have been voicing our deep concern that 
that policy is structured to serve a variety of interests, few of which 
could be defined as America's national security interests.
  Let me just mention two of the more obvious administration positions 
which manifest a greater concern for Russia's interests than our own. 
The administration's persistent reluctance to seize the present 
opportunity to expand NATO has been maintained out of deference to the 
political sensibilities of current Russian leaders who wish to take 
political advantage from Russian nostalgia for empire.
  The administration's opposition to lifting the unjust arms embargo 
imposed on the Government of Bosnia, a position which eventually 
required the United States to deploy our military forces to that 
country, was partially a consequence of the administration's fear of 
offending Russia's fraternal regard for the Serbian aggressors in 
  Mr. President, over the last 2 days we have learned that the 
administration's Russia policy is intended to serve the interests of at 
least one American, the President's, to the extent that the President 
defines his interests as being reelected to office.
  The Washington Times reported yesterday and today that at the 
terrorism summit earlier this month, President Clinton privately 
pledged to maintain positive relations with President Yeltsin, as both 
men seek reelection this year, and President Clinton helpfully 
identified to President Yeltsin one issue of an extraordinary national 
security value to the United States that the Russian President could 
help him with--U.S. sales of chickens to Russia.
  Mr. President, in the Washington Post today there is an article 
entitled: ``White House Asks for Probe in Leak of Clinton-Yeltsin Talk 
Memo.'' Mr. McCurry, that erudite observer of national security issues 
says in the article:

       The President feels like he ought to be able to sit down 
     with the President of Russia and have a private conversation.

  I agree with Mr. McCurry:

       State Department officials said that the Talbott memorandum 
     was circulated fairly widely . . ..

  Incidentally, I would like to say I am proud to have opposed Mr. 
Talbott's nomination on two occasions.
  The article goes on:

[[Page S3109]]

       The memo, as quoted in the Times, said President Clinton 
     pledged to work with Yeltsin to maintain positive relations 
     with the United States, as both men seek reelection this 
     year. One way to do this, the memo quoted President Clinton 
     as saying, is for Yeltsin to stop restricting poultry 

  President Clinton said--and I quote:

       ``This is a big issue, especially since 40 percent of U.S. 
     poultry is produced in Arkansas,'' the memo said.

  I ask unanimous consent that the article from the Washington Post and 
an another article from the Washington Times on the issue be printed in 
the Record.
  There being no objection, the articles were ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

    White House Asks for Probe in Leak of Clinton-Yeltsin Talk Memo

                          (By John F. Harris)

       The White House yesterday asked the Justice Department to 
     investigate the leak of a classified State Department memo 
     detailing a recent conversation between President Clinton and 
     Russian President Boris Yeltsin.
       Clinton was ``concerned'' by a report in yesterday's 
     Washington Times based on a memo written by Deputy Secretary 
     of State Strobe Talbott, according to White House press 
     secretary Michael McCurry. It recounted talks between Clinton 
     and Yeltsin earlier this month when both leaders attended an 
     anti-terrorism summit in Egypt.
       National security adviser Anthony Lake instructed an aide 
     to call the Justice Department to encourage the FBI to 
     investigate an apparent ``violation of federal law,'' the 
     spokesman said.
       At a news briefing yesterday, McCurry said ``the Washington 
     Times appears to be illegally in possession of a classified 
     document,'' but in a later interview he said that comment had 
     been ``inartful.'' The White House believes the illegality 
     was committed by someone in the government who leaked the 
     information, not by the newspaper in taking the document or 
     publishing it, McCurry explained.
       Asked for comment on the investigation yesterday, Times 
     editor-in-chief Wesley Pruden said, ``I always wish the FBI 
     well in whatever endeavors they undertake.''
       McCurry said Clinton and Lake considered the leak to be far 
     more sensitive than the typical anonymous disclosure that 
     is commonplace in Washington journalism. ``The president 
     feels like he ought to be able to sit down with the 
     president of Russia and have a private conversation,'' 
     McCurry said.
       State Department officials said that the Talbott memorandum 
     was circulated fairly widely within the administration, and 
     would have been seen by senior officials in other government 
     departments, in addition to the State Department.
       The memo, as quoted in the Times, said Clinton pledged to 
     work with Yeltsin to maintain ``positive'' relations with the 
     United States as both men seek reelection this year. One way 
     to do this, the memo quoted Clinton as saying, is for Yeltsin 
     to stop restricting poultry imports. Clinton said ``this is a 
     big issue, especially since 40 percent of U.S. poultry is 
     produced in Arkansas,'' the memo said.
       Lake, according to White House and Justice Department 
     officials, instructed the National Security Council lawyer 
     yesterday to initiate a criminal investigation. Justice 
     officials said yesterday that they had not yet turned the 
     matter over to the FBI but expected to do so soon.
       McCurry said administration officials have been concerned 
     about other disclosures published in the Times under reporter 
     Bill Gertz's byline, and hinted that law enforcement officers 
     earlier had been called in to track down his sources.
       Lake, he said, wanted the FBI to ``add this to any ongoing 
     inquiry that they have going.''
       Gertz, a national security reporter, in recent months has 
     written other articles based on classified documents 
     concerning arms control and missile defense.
       The White House has brought on troubles for itself by 
     encouraging the FBI to launch investigations. When White 
     House travel office staff members were fired in 1993, 
     administration officials called in the FBI to investigate the 
     employees. Congressional critics said that was an attempt by 
     the White House to use the agency for political ends.

                 Clinton Vows Help for Yeltsin Campaign

                            (By Bill Gertz)

       President Clinton, in a private meeting at the recent anti-
     terrorism summit, promised Boris Yeltsin he would back the 
     Russian president's re-election bid with ``positive'' U.S. 
     policies toward Russia.
       In exchange, Mr. Clinton asked for Mr. Yeltsin's help in 
     clearing up ``negative'' issues such as the poultry dispute 
     between the two countries, according to a classified State 
     Department record of the meeting obtained by The Washington 
       Mr. Clinton told Mr. Yeltsin that ``this is a big issue, 
     especially since about 40 percent of U.S. poultry is produced 
     in Arkansas. An effort should be made to keep such things 
     from getting out of hand,'' the memo said.
       White House and State Department spokesmen confirmed the 
     authenticity of the memo but declined to comment on what they 
     acknowledged was an extremely sensitive exchange between the 
     two leaders.
       The memorandum on the March 13 talks in Sharm el-Sheikh, 
     Egypt, does not quote the two presidents directly but 
     paraphrases in detail their conversation.
       According to the classified memorandum, Mr. Yeltsin said 
     ``a leader of international stature such as President Clinton 
     should support Russia and that meant supporting Yeltsin. 
     Thought should be given to how to do that wisely.''
       The president replied that Secretary of State Warren 
     Christopher and Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov 
     ``would talk about that'' at a meeting in Moscow. The meeting 
     ended last week.
       Mr. Clinton told Mr. Yeltsin ``there was not much time'' 
     before the Russian elections and ``he wanted to make sure 
     that everything the United States did would have a positive 
     impact, and nothing should have a negative impact,'' the memo 
       ``The main thing is that the two sides not do anything that 
     would harm the other,'' Mr. Clinton said to Mr. Yeltsin. 
     ``Things could come up between now and the elections in 
     Russia or the United States which could cause conflicts.''
       The memorandum, contained in a cable sent Friday by Deputy 
     Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, was marked 
     ``confidential'' and was intended for the ``eyes only'' of 
     Thomas Pickering, U.S. ambassador to Russia, and James F. 
     Collins, the State Department's senior diplomat for the 
     former Soviet Union.
       The memo said Mr. Clinton suggested that the chicken 
     dispute and others like it could be made part of talks 
     between Vice President Al Gore and Russian Prime Minister 
     Victor Chernomyrdin.
       Mr. Gore announced Monday that Russia has lifted the ban on 
     U.S. chicken imports that had been imposed out of concern 
     that the chicken was tainted with bacteria.
       The Washington Times reported March 8 that Mr. Clinton 
     intervened personally in the poultry dispute late last month.
       The president's directives to his staff to solve the 
     problem right away benefited powerful Arkansas poultry 
     concerns. Among them is the nation's leading producer, Tyson 
     Foods Inc., whose owner, Don Tyson, has long been a major 
     contributor to Mr. Clinton's campaigns.
       U.S. poultry exports make up one-third of all U.S. exports 
     to Russia and are expected to total $700 million this year.
       Asked about the memo on the Clinton-Yeltsin meeting, White 
     House Press Secretary Michael McCurry said yesterday that it 
     is ``inaccurate'' to say Mr. Clinton promised to orient U.S. 
     policy toward helping the Russian leader's political 
     fortunes. Rather, he said, the president wanted to make sure 
     that issues in the two countries do not hamper good 
     relations. The poultry issue was raised in that context only, 
     the press secretary said.
       Mr. McCurry, who said he was present at the meeting, also 
     said the president was referring to ``positive relations'' 
     between the two countries and not political campaigns.
       Those present at the meeting included Mr. Christopher, CIA 
     Director John Deutch, National Security Adviser Anthony Lake 
     and, besides Mr. Yeltsin, four Russian officials, including 
     Mr. Primakov and Mikhail Barsukov, director of the Federal 
     Security Service.
       During the discussion, Mr. Yeltsin outlined his political 
     strategy for winning the June presidential elections and said 
     he still had doubts about running as late as last month.
       ``But after he saw the Communist platform, he decided to 
     run,'' the memo said, ``The Communists would destroy reform, 
     do away with privatization, nationalize production, 
     confiscate land and homes. They would even execute people. 
     This was in their blood.''
       Mr. Yeltsin said he will begin his campaign early next 
     month, traveling throughout Russia for two months to ``get 
     his message to every apartment, house and person'' about his 
     plan to strengthen democracy and reforms.
       ``The aim of Yeltsin and his supporters would be to 
     convince the candidates one by one to withdraw from the race 
     and to throw their support behind Yeltsin,'' the memo said.
       Russian Communist Party leader Gennady Zyuganov is ``the 
     one candidate who would not do this'' because he is ``a die-
     hard communist,'' and Mr. Yeltsin noted that he ``would need 
     to do battle with him.''
       Mr. Yeltsin dismissed former Soviet President Mikhail 
     Gorbachev as ``not a serious candidate.''
       ``He had awoken one morning and decided to run and would 
     wake up another morning and decide to withdraw his 
     candidacy,'' Mr. Yeltsin said of his predecessor. ``This 
     would be better for him because he now had some standing and 
     if he participated in the elections, he would lose any 
     reputation he had left.''

  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, give me a break. What kind of foreign 
policy is that? Does President Clinton know that he is President of the 
United States now and not Governor of Arkansas? Since when is poultry 
sales a big issue to be discussed between two Presidents? What happened 
to NATO expansion, Bosnia, proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction, recent allusions in Russia to the restoration of the 
Soviet Union, and a host of other genuine big issues? But what does 

[[Page S3110]]

President do? He calls a big issue the fact that 40 percent of U.S. 
poultry is produced in Arkansas, so it is a big issue between himself 
and President Yeltsin.
  Mr. President, that is unacceptable conduct and shows again that on-
the-job training has failed as the domestic policy; President puts his 
toe in the water on foreign policy.
  Mr. President, I do not want to diminish the importance of selling 
chickens to Russia where sales were restricted until now. Poultry sales 
are a legitimate industry in the United States and surely deserve some 
consideration. Neither would I begrudge the President's concern for his 
own home State of Arkansas, which happens to produce about 40 percent 
of the poultry in the United States. But I would like to think that 
when the President of the United States sits down with the President of 
Russia to discuss big issues with him, areas of real security concern 
to the United States, there would be something somewhat higher on the 
agenda than chicken sales. I would also like to think that President 
Clinton would regard United States national security interests to be 
the priorities of United States policy with Russia, not anyone's 
  I assure the President, the satisfactory resolution of outstanding 
differences with Russia on the questions I have identified will do a 
lot more to restore the President's credibility as a statesman, and 
consequently enhance his reelection prospects, than will his efforts to 
boost chicken sales abroad.
  What does the priority given by the President's Russian policy to 
narrow parochial interests say about his position on other questions 
which should concern us in Russia? It may say a great deal. The 
President encourages the IMF to approve one of the biggest loans in its 
history to Russia. Was this part of the President's plan for his and 
Mr. Yeltsin's reelection? Is our muted reaction to Moscow's brutality 
toward Chechnya a consequence of the bilateral Presidential campaign?
  As we all read today, the leaked memo by Deputy Secretary of State 
Strobe Talbott, which referred to this Presidential discussion and 
President Clinton's intention to conduct our relations in a way that 
would have only a positive impact on President Yeltsin's reelection 
prospects, thereby reaffirming once again the administration's 
personality based Russian policy, has caused the administration to 
initiate an FBI investigation to determine the identity of the leaker. 
That endeavor, I am confident, will prove to be a colossal waste of the 
FBI's time.
  What the classified memo really indicates is not some official's 
indiscretion, but the administration's abuse of the tool of security 
classification. Chicken sales and the reelection desires of President 
Yeltsin and President Clinton are not--I repeat, not--state secrets. 
Indeed, I believe it is very important for the American people to 
discover at last what interest the administration's policy to Russia, 
this most critically strategic of relationships, are intended to serve. 
Today, we have our answer: It is the same interests which most of the 
administration's policies are intended to serve--President Clinton's 
  Mr. President, let me say again, I strongly condemn the use of 
important U.S. diplomacy, which should be reserved for our most vital 
national security interests, to serve anyone's campaign interest, much 
less the President of the United States.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Kempthorne). The Senator from Louisiana.
  Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, I got to the floor to speak about China, 
but first a word about chickens.
  Mr. President, chickens may be an important industry in Arkansas, and 
they are, but the reason I think it is entirely legitimate--in fact, 
entirely important--for this President to speak to President Yeltsin 
about chickens is because Russia was denying entry into the Russian 
market of American chickens, perhaps grown in Arkansas, but grown in 
America by Americans, for the wrong reasons. That is, they were not 
permitting these chickens to come in because they did not want the 
  Mr. President, this President, any President, has a great interest in 
open markets, particularly with a country which we are doing a lot to 
help and who we are encouraging to have open markets. I applaud this 
President for seeking to do away with those barriers to open markets in 
  Mr. SARBANES. Will the Senator yield?
  Mr. JOHNSTON. I yield for a question, yes.
  Mr. SARBANES. In fact, the President's efforts, it would seem to me, 
are part of a strategy to try to bring Russia into the international 
economic system as a legitimate player like other countries that are 
playing by the rules of trade. Would that not be correct?
  Mr. JOHNSTON. That is precisely right. One of the problems with 
Russia now is that they do not have open markets. We are trying to 
encourage that. It so happens that chickens are a huge business in 
Russia, and the American chicken is more economically produced, is a 
better quality, and is preferred by Russians.
  Mr. SARBANES. It could have been any product, for that matter, but 
the basic point is that we are trying to move Russia toward a market 
economy, something that the former Soviet Union did not do. That was a 
command economy.

  Everyone says Russia ought to become a market economy, and obviously 
the United States and other countries in the West have a role to play 
in that. It seems to me this effort of the President was part and 
parcel of trying to move Russia in the direction of becoming a free 
market system and of participating in the global economy.
  Mr. JOHNSTON. This is not the only item of interest and not the only 
thing that the President discusses with President Yeltsin, but it 
certainly is a legitimate one.
  I can say if those were Louisiana chickens, I would be calling him up 
and saying, ``Mr. President, don't stand for this. Speak to your 
friend, President Yeltsin, about it.''
  Now, Mr. President, this time last week we had a very dangerous world 
situation where two American carrier battle groups were steaming in the 
vicinity of the Strait of Taiwan and where the People's Republic of 
China, the largest country in the world, was engaging in live-fire 
tests, close to Taiwan. It is not an understatement to say that the 
world was in real danger of a conflagration at that time, not because 
anyone desired war but because the close proximity of these forces 
involving live fire made the possibility of a misstep, of a bump in the 
night between two ships, of a misspent or misfired rocket or shell, a 
very great danger.
  Today, Mr. President, we all breathe easier as the crisis has passed. 
Mr. President, the problem remains. The potential for a huge crisis 
  I would like to speak to what I regard as a very fateful decision. 
That is, the pending legislation; the pending legislation, Mr. 
President, would move this country, in my view, from a policy of 
engagement with the largest country in the world to a policy of 
containment of the largest country in the world, and containment 
equals--make no mistake about it--a new cold war. I can assure my 
colleagues that if I know anything about China, they will not be 
contained, and you can get ready for a new cold war if this bill should 
pass and become law.
  Now, this bill, Mr. President, in my view, is potentially the most 
insidious bill that has been passed by either House in my 24 years in 
the U.S. Senate. I believe it has the significance, if passed and 
signed into law, of the Tonkin Gulf resolution. I think Senator Nunn 
has called it a declaration of war. The President has promised to veto 
  Mr. President, make no mistake, it is a very serious step for the 
U.S. Congress to be considering. I believe the Senate should sober up 
before this ill-conceived policy takes root.
  Now, just what is this bill, and why do I call it so insidious and 
potentially--potentially--a Gulf of Tonkin resolution? First, it says 
that the Taiwan Relations Act supersedes the Shanghai communique. Of 
course, the Taiwan Relations Act deals with the defense of Taiwan; the 
Shanghai communique deals principally with a one-China policy. What do 
we mean by one-China policy? One China, two systems, peaceful 
reunification. The three points of the triangle which have been 
repeated by everyone: one China, two systems, peaceful reunification.

[[Page S3111]]

  To say that the Taiwan Relations Act supersedes the Shanghai 
communique is not simply to say, as my dear friend from North Carolina, 
Senator Helms, says, simply to state the obvious--that is, that an act 
of Congress supersedes an executive agreement. We know that. What it is 
saying is that, in effect, it nullifies, it subsumes, it cancels out 
the Shanghai communique and that the United States Congress, in this 
case, because it is a sense-of-the-Congress provision, that the United 
States Congress is abandoning the Shanghai communique. That, Mr. 
President, is very serious.
  It also encourages the Taiwanese to move toward independence. We also 
rename and upgrade the Taipei representative office. In itself, this 
does not constitute a move toward independence. But taken together, 
particularly with an invitation to President Li Teng-hui to visit the 
United States ``with all appropriate courtesies,'' these three elements 
taken together, Mr. President, are unmistakable. They are abandonment 
of the one-China policy, a move for independence for Taiwan.

  Now, Mr. President, the House, apparently sensing the seriousness of 
the step they were taking, adds a further element not contained therein 
that it is our intention to assist in the defense of Taiwan, which, 
indeed, might be necessary should we enact this ill-conceived piece of 
legislation--a fateful, fateful decision, Mr. President.
  One thing is absolutely clear: The unilateral declaration of 
independence by Taiwan is unacceptable to the People's Republic of 
China and will be resisted. Now, up until last year, things were going 
along swimmingly. The United States, the People's Republic of China, 
and Taiwan were all reading off the same song book. We were all saying 
one China, two systems, peaceful reunification and, indeed, we have 
reinforced, many times over, the Taiwan Relations Act, which was not at 
all inconsistent with one China, two systems, peaceful reunification. 
That is what the Taiwanese were saying, what the PRC was saying, and 
that is what President Nixon said in the Shanghai communique; that is 
what President Carter said in the joint communique of 1979; that is 
what President Reagan said in the joint communique of 1982; that is 
what President Bush said, and that is what President Clinton is saying. 
All were saying the same thing.
  Things were going along very well. There were 1\1/2\ million 
Taiwanese who visited the People's Republic of China. There were tens 
of billions of dollars of investment by Taiwan in China. Talks were 
going on between the leaders of the two countries, or two areas. And 
then what happens? Well, we had what the Congress regarded as a very 
innocent invitation by Cornell University to have their distinguished 
alumni, President Li Teng-hui, come back and make a speech. We, in the 
Congress--or at least almost everyone in the Congress said, ``Look, 
this is not a State visit, there is no significance to this. This is 
simply a homecoming to the old university, the old school.'' Well, Mr. 
President, we may have thought that in the Congress--but, I did not 
share that view, and I was the only Member of the Senate who voted 
against that visit--but I can tell you that the world, and certainly 
the People's Republic of China, and certainly Taiwan, did not regard it 
as such an innocent visit. On the visit, he brought along government 
leaders from Taiwan. He promised no press conferences, but said, ``I 
will be available if you stand behind this bush when I am walking on 
the Ellipse. You can ask your question and I will give you an answer.'' 
And that happened.
  He was met by Members of Congress. It had all the trappings, Mr. 
President, of a State visit, and it was clearly regarded by the 
People's Republic of China as being something more than a homecoming to 
the old university. And that, in turn, Mr. President, has been 
accompanied by a whole barrage of acts and initiatives designed to move 
in the direction of independence.
  Why does a province of China--if that is what Taiwan is, as the 
Chinese claim--need membership in the United Nations? That upsets the 
PRC. We put that kind of language, also, in our resolutions, and, Mr. 
President, it constitutes still another act of this Congress moving 
toward unilateral independence of Taiwan.
  Mr. President, just a few days ago, Deputy Foreign Minister Liu was 
meeting with us down in S-211, a stone's throw from where we stand. Ten 
Senators were there. We had an in-depth discussion with Deputy Foreign 
Minister Liu. He reiterated the peaceful unification theme. He 
reiterated the indelible, irrevocable friendship between the United 
States and the People's Republic of China. But he said, ``The United 
States, of all countries, should understand our attitude in the 
People's Republic of China about Taiwan.'' He said, ``You fought a 
civil war, the bloodiest war in the history of your country, about the 
question of unification, and about the question of unilateral 
declarations of independence. So you, America, ought to understand our 
feeling, because our feeling was just like President Lincoln's feeling 
about the American Civil War.'' He said, ``The issue is sovereignty. We 
regard a declaration of independence by Taiwan as a matter of 
sovereignty, which we will safeguard.'' He said--and I took down these 
notes--``It is an overriding task. There is no other choice.'' He 
quoted Deng Xiaoping as saying this was an ``explosive issue, as big as 
the universe; compared to it, all other issues are easy.''

  Mr. President, you can take solace from that in the repetition of the 
peaceful reunification. You can take solace from the fact that it is a 
one China, two systems, peaceful reunification system, which he 
repeated. You can take solace from the fact that he repeated the 
friendship of the People's Republic of China with the United States. 
But it is unmistakable--unmistakable--that a unilateral declaration of 
independence by Taiwan and moves by the United States Government to 
encourage that are unacceptable and are going to lead to trouble.
  Now, if that is what we are going to do, Mr. President, as a nation, 
as a State Department, as an administration, as a Congress, I, for one, 
want this Congress to have its eyes wide open about what the 
implications are of that fateful move. This is not a series of moves to 
invite people back to universities for the old alumni to get together 
and give the old college yell. It is not about that. It is about war 
and peace, about the stability of Asia, and it is about the future of 
this country.
  Now, Mr. President, one of the most important questions I think you 
can ask is: What is the defining international event of this era? What 
is the defining international event of this era? Is it the war in 
Bosnia? Is it peace in the Middle East and all that that portends and 
all of its implications? Is it the demise of the Soviet Union and the 
rise of Russia and privatization, and all of the problems that are 
happening in Russia? I do not believe so. Mr. President, Sareed 
Zakaria, the managing editor of Foreign Affairs, stated in the New York 
Times of February 18 that, ``The defining international event of this 
era is the rise of China to world power.'' It is happening so fast, its 
implications are so vast that it is an event that is being missed. And, 
certainly, the implications of the event are being missed by the vast 
proportion of Americans, and I submit, by most Members of this 
Congress. Indeed, I, myself, really missed the significance of what is 
  I first went to China with a number of my colleagues in 1976. At that 
time, China was backward and poor and oppressive. It was depressing. 
Everybody dressed the same. No food. No travel. No automobiles. No 
jobs. No nothing. I remember the one particular riveting sight I saw 
was the cabbages piled on the street--and this was in November--for the 
winter. There was just a big mound of cabbages to be used by the people 
to eat. They were piled on the street, and they would come and grab a 
cabbage when they needed it. And you could go to the markets, which we 
did, and there was nothing there.
  So, Mr. President, as I read about progress and growth in China, as 
the years passed since that trip in 1976, I intellectually could 
believe it. But I just did not really realize it until 1992 when I went 
to a conference where Larry Summers, who at that time was the chief 
economist of the World Bank, was making a speech. He said that China 
would be the largest economy in the world shortly after the turn of the 
century. These words rang in my head like an unbelievable statement--
the largest economy in the world, that backward country that I saw, was 
impossible I thought.

[[Page S3112]]

  So I made arrangements within a month to go to China. Mr. President, 
I was blown away. It was astonishing. It is one vast construction site 
in China. It is already the second or the ninth largest economy in the 
world depending on how you calculate those things, what figures you 
use. But it is arguably the second largest economy in the world. There 
are traffic jams. There is abundant food. There is colorful and even 
stylish clothing. Forty percent of the people have color televisions. 
Twelve percent of the people in China had VCR's. You have CNN, you have 
five-star hotels, and as I mentioned, you have traffic jams.
  In 1976, when we landed in Shanghai, they did not even have 
automobiles. They had to bring the automobiles down from Beijing on 
railroad cars. Now when you go to China there are traffic jams. On my 
trip last year, going back to Beijing from where we were should have 
taken about 2\1/2\ hours. It took 7 hours because of the traffic jams.
  The growth is so vast. Kwangtung Province, where I arrived, is larger 
than any country in the European Community, other than reunited 
Germany. They have had in the previous 10 years a cumulative growth of 
440 percent--440 percent in 10 years. It is a growth rate today of 
three to four times the growth in the United States. We are very proud 
of our growth rate here. They continue to project a growth rate of 8 to 
9 percent.
  Mr. President, it is astonishing what is going on. I urge my 
colleagues, every Member of the Senate, to get over there and see. See 
for yourself, not just the growth, but make your own opinion about what 
kind of country this is and what kind of future they have.
  In my view, Mr. President, 20 years from now our country will be 
judged by its success in foreign policy, in its stability, in the 
prosperity of its citizens, in the job rate, and in the growth rate, 
all of those things, but also by how successfully we deal with China 
and these other rapidly growing countries on the Pacific rim.
  This is one area where we make or break, in my judgment, the future 
of this country.
  So just what are the implications then of having a policy--of 
changing from a commitment to engagement to a policy of containment 
toward this rapidly growing country? I can tell you, this, Mr. 
President, a policy of containment, I believe, leads to cold war. Here 
is what I think is possible. A hot war is possible--not probable, but 
it is possible. The destabilization of Asia is an expected event.
  What is Japan going to do when the area becomes destabilized? I can 
tell you what Japan is going to do. They are either going to insist 
that the United States come in with our nuclear umbrella in vastly 
greater numbers, or they are going to want to rearm. It is tit for tat. 
When Japan begins to rearm, the People's Republic of China is going to 
want to rearm that much more. What do they do in Indonesia? They will 
want to rearm. What about Vietnam, which has been a traditional enemy 
of the People's Republic of China? They are going to rearm. Pretty soon 
you have a real donnybrook of a cold war.
  Mischief in Korea? Look at the People's Republic of China. They have 
played a very salutary and peacemaking role with the United States in 
trying to moderate North Korean policy. Believe me. Everybody knows 
that. As a member of the Intelligence Committee, I can tell you that 
everybody knows that. You can read it in the paper. But if they are 
suddenly our adversary, what is their role going to be with respect to 
Korea? Arms proliferation? Oh, I know, it has been prominently printed 
that they have violated the MTCR, the Missile Treaty Control Regime, by 
shipping M-11 rockets to Pakistan and that they are shipping magnets 
which can be used for uranium enrichment also to Pakistan.

  Mr. President, there is a lot of evidence printed in the paper about 
these things. I must tell you that, while I clearly do not countenance 
what they have done or what they have alleged to have done, these are 
hardly the kind of violations that rise to the level of what is 
possible. These enrichment magnets that they talk about can be used for 
uranium enrichment, no doubt. But they do not find themselves on the 
schedule of things that were prohibited. That is their argument at 
least; it is for uranium enrichment and not for making bombs. On the 
MTCR violations, they are not alleged to have shipped anything lately. 
None of that has appeared in the newspapers.
  The administration, faced with the information, did not see fit to 
put sanctions for that reason. But whatever their present conduct is 
with respect to proliferation, it is nothing, compared to what they 
could possibly do. Do not forget what their capabilities would be on 
proliferation. They have the capacity to vastly increase their military 
spending. They are being criticized for increasing it way too much 
right now. But it is less than 12 percent of what we spend.
  Mr. President, they have the capacity. If we want to provoke them, if 
we want to challenge China's pride and national feeling, believe me, 
they can increase way beyond 11.8 percent of what the United States 
  What kind of damage would this do to the U.S. economy? Well, you can 
count on inflation because I guess we, along with all of this new cold 
war, revoke MFN. And all of these products which we import from them, 
we pay more for those. How much tax would we pay for this new cold war, 
for this new military buildup that would come? How many lost jobs in 
America? Most important, Mr. President, could we be successful? If we 
set out to contain China, could we be successful? I can tell you this, 
Mr. President. We successfully contained the Soviet Union, but it took 
us trillions of dollars, it took us 40 years, and it took the unified 
support of all of the countries of Western Europe all working together, 
all joining together in NATO.
  Who is coming to the defense of the United States saying, ``Yes, 
United States, let us contain China.'' Who is doing that? Name for me 
one country that is doing that outside of Taiwan. Do the Germans? No. 
Look, Helmut Kohl has been to the PRC--over there at least twice 
seeking commercial contracts. They have invited Li Peng to come to 
Germany. The British? Oh, no. They may disagree a little bit about Hong 
Kong, but, Mr. President, the British are not trying to contain the 
People's Republic of China. The French? No. The French are selling 
nuclear reactors to China and beefing up in contracts all the time.
  Nobody would support a policy of containment. It is a cold war that 
we would have to sustain ourselves. So, if we are going to try to 
contain and have a new cold war with the People's Republic of China, we 
are going to have to do it alone, and it is going to be a very, very 
expensive endeavor.
  We are not going to pass this kind of legislation on the cheap. It is 
going to be very expensive--not just in the dollars we put into 
defense, not just in the jobs lost in America, but what it does to the 
economy of this country.
  To abandon one China, to abandon a policy of containment, to make 
China our adversary would constitute perhaps the greatest diplomatic 
failure in United States history.
  The fault of all of this is that we are presented with two choices. 
They say it is either appeasement or it is containment. It is either 
you are weak or you are strong. You have no other choice in between.
  Those are the wrong choices. We are told that if we are weak, you 
encourage and you reward misconduct. If you do not stand up and tell 
them exactly what to do on human rights, then you are countenancing all 
these violations. And there are violations of human rights, to be sure. 
And the same thing is true of trade and Taiwan and proliferation; you 
have to stand up and be strong, they say. And if you are strong, we can 
change it all. We have absolute power, so Americans think, or some 
Americans think, to change China. All we have to do is tell them what 
to do and they will do it.
  As Orville Schell said in the New Yorker--Orville Schell is a great 
author. You remember he wrote that book about nuclear winter, so he 
certainly knows about the dangers of international conflicts. But just 
last week he said in effect: Mao taught his comrades in arms to respect 
real power.
  The idea that, if you are strong, stand up and it will happen. Or 
Charles Krauthammer said, ``We ought to revoke MFN. Send the fleet into 
the Taiwan Strait,'' said Krauthammer, and

[[Page S3113]]

 ``After all,'' he says, ``if you wait for war, you invite war.''
  I am not sure what he meant by that. I took it to mean that you ought 
to go ahead and risk war right now and let us have it sooner rather 
than later.
  Mr. President, this kind of talk--be tough, challenge them, tell them 
exactly what to do--in my view are not the choices facing this country. 
Appeasement or containment are not the proper choices.
  The faults of China are very well-known. I really believe that the 
press, to some degree, has done a job of demonizing China. Part of that 
is China's fault because reporters go to China and they are treated 
badly. They treat reporters in China like a lot of politicians in 
America would like to treat reporters if they thought they could get 
away with it. But we know better and so we smile all the while. How do 
you think George Bush would have treated reporters if he thought he 
could have gotten away with it, or Bill Clinton, how do you think he 
feels about some of these reporters who write about Whitewater? But the 
Chinese treat them that way and they get terrible press.
  Look, China is not a democracy. They do not have a Bill of Rights. 
They have all kinds of human rights violations. Ask Wei Jen Sheng about 
that. No question about that. Trade abuses? Yes. Intellectual property 
abuses? Yes. Live fire was a provocative thing in the Strait of Taiwan. 
Proliferation, MTCR, all of these things are faults of China which have 
been publicly and widely chronicled all over the United States, so we 
know they have plenty of faults.
  Mr. President, if they have faults, they are not nearly as bad as 
their harshest critics would indicate. This is not a hostile regime. 
This is not a regime that is threatening its neighbors. It is not 
threatening to invade Taiwan. It is certainly not threatening any of 
their other neighbors. They never have, Mr. President. They have 
committed themselves over and over again to what they called 
nonhegemony in the region. They are proceeding toward Westernization at 
an astonishing pace. Privatization.
  It may not be a democracy, Mr. President, but it is certainly not 
communism. Their market is about half-and-half--half free open market 
and about half State controlled, and the proportion that is free is 
growing all the time. I remind my colleagues that this country does not 
have a 100-percent free market. There are vast areas such as the post 
office, such as the Government which are not free in the United States. 
But theirs is about 50-50. The products produced are free.
  The difference between China in 1976 when I was first there and now 
is mind-boggling. There is travel now. Just to give you one example is 
the unit system they used to have in 1976. A block captain would give 
out the job, the ration stamps, and the housing of every person. They 
were tethered to and controlled by their block and their block captain. 
They could not travel. They would not have had the money to travel. 
There was no job to be had elsewhere.
  Indeed, in 1989, Tiananmen Square was more of a revolt against the 
assignment of jobs, I believe, than it was about democratization. 
Today, the block system does not exist in vast areas of China. There 
are hundreds of millions of Chinese who travel and have traveled and 
take jobs on their own without permission of the block captain.
  You want to know what real freedom is, Mr. President, or what real 
oppression is. It is the inability to travel and get a job and work 
where you wish. But now there is this freedom to get jobs and jobs in 
Western-controlled companies where they are absorbing Western culture, 
Western ways, and Western freedom.
  We hear that there are widespread death penalties in China. According 
to the New York Times, in the first 6 months of 1995 there were 1,865 
death penalties meted out in China. That is not disproportionate to the 
amount of death penalties meted out in this country for those whose 
conduct merits the death penalty. I happen to be a supporter of the 
death penalty properly acquired. You may still disagree with 1,865 
death penalties meted out in China in the first 6 months, but this is 
hardly Nazi Germany during their worst times.
  The National People's Congress, Mr. President, is acquiring more and 
more power all the time. Indeed, there are some China watchers who say 
that Choa Zhenwei, who is the head of the National People's Congress, 
is a competitor with Jiang Zemin for power. I do not give that as my 
own view, but it is clear that the National People's Congress is 
getting additional power and is making a step, a real step in the 
direction of some kind of democracy. In fact, they fairly recently 
enacted measures which provide that you cannot be held for more than 30 
days without charges being filed, a presumption of innocence.
  That sounds fundamental, and it is, but they did not have it in China 
and they now have it and the National People's Congress gave it to us. 
You now have lawsuits in China about the environment, about zoning, 
consumer lawsuits. These did not exist a few years ago. They did not 
exist, indeed, at the time of Tiananmen Square in 1989.
  Now, all of these things which I am telling you may not help Wei Jen 
Sheng, who is probably the most prominent of the dissidents at this 
time. But it is progress. And the point is, this is not a rogue regime. 
It may not be a saintly regime. It is neither. Just as the economy is 
not a Communist economy, it is not a total free market either. It is 
about 50-50. And you have to engage China as an emerging country, as a 
changing country.
  What I believe this country needs is to determine what kind of China 
we want and devise a policy that has some possibility of getting us 
there. What do we want from China? Most important, we want a 
responsible member of the international community. We want a country 
that respects the rule of law--certainly in trade--and in human rights 
and in commerce and in every way that we can urge them to do so, a 
responsible member of the international community. We want them, I 
believe, to be a prosperous China. With 1.2 billion citizens and all 
that power, a country which is declining, which is not prosperous, is a 
dangerous country for all of Asia and all the world. Most of all, we 
want a friendly China.
  It is clear, to get there, that China does not respond to a list of 
demands. I wish that it were true. I wish that we could give them our 
list and tack it on the church door and expect that these things would 
be done, but they have shown time and time again that public pressure 
and hectoring of the Chinese is counterproductive.
  I would say the degree of success, of what we are able to extract 
from the Chinese in terms of our demands, is inversely proportionate to 
the amount of publicity that we give to those set of demands. Why is it 
that they are so inordinately sensitive, unreasonably sensitive to the 
demands of the United States? Very simple. They have one of the most 
searing histories of humiliation, certainly of a great power, that 
exists on the face of the Earth. In the last 150 years, they have been 
dominated at least four times by foreign powers. The opium wars in the 
19th century--do you know, Mr. President, in the opium wars, the 
British invaded and subjugated China because they were trying to 
restrict their market of opium? Can you imagine anything less 
reasonable, less civilized, more to be criticized than that? That is 
what the British did.
  The Japanese did not just attack China. You had the rape of Nanking.
  When the British controlled Shanghai, as the great commercial 
center--and they had these clubs; they would not even admit Chinese in 
the clubs in their own city of Shanghai.
  Mr. President, it is a series of humiliations, historically, that 
have been seared into the consciousness of the Chinese. The 1949 
revolution was as much about nationalism as it was about communism, and 
I can tell you there are strong strands of nationalism that bind the 
Chinese, all 1.2 billion of them, in the strongest kind of way.
  Add to the sensitivity that comes from that historical humiliation 
the fact that this country is a country in transition. Add to that the 
explosive growth. In that same article in the New York Times by Sareed 
Zakaria, the managing editor of foreign affairs, he says, ``Nowhere in 
history has a country grown as fast as China without political and 
social upheaval.''
  So here you have a China that is in a power transition, with human 
growth almost double digits, and you have this

[[Page S3114]]

sensitivity. So it requires, on our part, the most enormous amount of 
sophistication and sensitivity that we are capable of giving.
  So, what, then, should we do? Mr. President, we ought to get a clear 
and consistent China policy and articulate it. I wish the President of 
the United States would make a statement of where we stand. Yes, he has 
stated that we continue to adhere to the Shanghai communique, but he 
needs to make that clear. We need to understand that Taiwan is central 
to this issue of engagement of the largest country in the world in 
population and soon perhaps to be the largest economy of the world. And 
what does that mean? It means we need to reassure the People's Republic 
of China that we will not be a party to unilateral declarations of 
independence, that the Shanghai communique, that the Nixon doctrine, 
that the Reagan communique, that the Carter communique are still our 
policy and are not subsumed and superseded by, but are consistent with, 
the Taiwan Relations Act.
  At the same time, we should continue to reassure Taiwan that we will 
stand behind them when it comes to any threat of invasion; that 
unification needs to be peaceful. But that is what we have said all 
along. That is what China has said all along: One country, two systems, 
peaceful reunification. Now, what is wrong with that? And why can we 
not articulate that clearly?
  We need to treat their leaders with respect and dignity. As I say, 
they are enormously sensitive and we frequently fail to recognize that 
this country, the Middle Kingdom, as it has been historically called, 
has not, in fact, been treated with the proper respect and dignity.
  I do not believe that most Americans know what is going on in China 
in terms of the huge--not just huge growth, but huge strides forward 
that they are making. We need to recognize the limitations that there 
are on human rights. We just cannot give a list of demands, as much as 
we want to do so. We have to recognize those limitations. That does not 
mean we do not continue in the strongest way possible, that can be 
effective, to stand up for human rights and dignity all over the world, 
but it means that we do so in a way that is likely to be effective.
  Mr. President, if we do those things, then it will allow us to be 
more firm on the missile treaty control regime. It will allow us to be 
more firm on trade. The problem is, when you have two carrier battle 
groups steaming in the Strait of Taiwan, then to invoke sanctions on 
trade looks like a further step toward containment and cold war and 
makes it inappropriate to take the kind of steps on trade or MTCR that 
you ought to do.
  So that, in effect, by dealing with Taiwan in a traditional way that 
we should, that is to reassure all parties, one China, two systems, 
peaceful reunification--to reassure all parties that our policy allows 
us, then, to be more firm in areas that are likely to make it 
  We have surely made our point. The Chinese, I submit, have made their 
point, that is, they are not going to stand for a unilateral 
declaration of independence. We have made our point with not one but 
two carrier groups--not one but two carrier battle groups. We have made 
that point strongly. We have stood up for Taiwan, our friend.
  Now it is time for us to be more patient, to lower our voices, to 
have a greater engagement with the People's Republic of China, to have 
high level discussions and, most of all, to kill this very ill-
considered piece of legislation.
  This piece of legislation, at this sensitive time, could do more than 
anything I know to put us at odds and put us in a position of 
containment and cold war with the largest nation on Earth.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. DOLE addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senate majority leader is recognized.