FOREIGN RELATIONS AUTHORIZATION ACT, FISCAL YEARS 1996 AND 1997-- CONFERENCE REPORT
(Senate - March 28, 1996)

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[Pages S3125-S3133]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




   FOREIGN RELATIONS AUTHORIZATION ACT, FISCAL YEARS 1996 AND 1997--
                           CONFERENCE REPORT

  The Senate continued with consideration of the conference report.
  Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I believe I have an hour reserved and 
I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. President, I rise as a member of the Foreign Relations Committee 
to

[[Page S3126]]

express my strong opposition to the conference report to accompany H.R. 
1561, the State Department authorization bill.
  This bill has been the cause of much turmoil, as we all know. It 
began with the markup of a bill that the Democrats on the Foreign 
Relations Committee had no part in drafting, and that many felt 
contained an excessively far-reaching plan to eliminate three foreign 
affairs agencies: The Agency for International Development, the Arms 
Control and Disarmament Agency, and the U.S. Information Agency.
  When that bill reached the floor, Republicans were unable to invoke 
cloture on it. Meanwhile, the Senate was prevented from taking action 
to confirm 18 ambassadors, several hundred Foreign Service officer 
promotions, and to consider two critical arms control treaties--START 
II and the Chemical Weapons Convention.
  Finally, last December, after several arduous weeks of negotiating, 
the distinguished chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, Senator 
Helms, and the distinguished Senator from Massachusetts, Senator Kerry, 
reached a compromise version of the consolidation plan that allowed the 
bill to be voted out to conference.
  This, in turn, resulted in the Senate immediately confirming the 
ambassadorial nominations that had been on hold, and taking action soon 
thereafter to ratify the START II treaty. In addition, hearings are now 
underway that will lead to a vote by the full Senate on ratification of 
the Chemical Weapons Convention by April 30. For that I am grateful.
  I was among those who voted for S. 908 last December, in part because 
I felt the compromise consolidation plan reached by Senators Helms and 
Kerry was a reasonable plan. However, my major motivation was to get it 
to conference so that we could take action on the ambassadors and 
treaties that were before the Senate.
  Unfortunately, the bill that has come back from conference has many, 
many problems. First of all, the consolidation plan that came back from 
conference has moved considerably from the fairly reasonable compromise 
reached by Senator Helms and Senator Kerry. The conference report 
version requires the elimination of three agencies: USAID, ACDA, and 
USIA, two of which the President can later choose to preserve. This 
provision differs sharply from the preconference version which gave the 
President full discretion over whether or not to eliminate an agency. 
The new report also requires $1.7 billion in savings over 4 years, 
rather than over 5 years, as was in the Senate-passed bill.
  Now, philosophically, Mr. President, it is my very strong belief that 
a President, any President, must and should be able to organize or 
reorganize the foreign affairs agencies of the United States as he or 
she sees fit.
  I basically believe that foreign policy should be bipartisan, that we 
should work out our difficulties and speak as one Nation, as 
represented by our President. But I believe the President must be in 
charge of foreign policy. I came to that belief, Mr. President, 
ironically when I was a mayor. I was visited by the Chancellor of 
Germany, Helmut Schmidt. I saw, when I visited with him at the Fairmont 
Hotel, that he was chain smoking and was very upset. I said, ``What is 
wrong?'' He said to me an interesting thing. He said, ``You know, you 
Americans have no idea what you do when you reinvent the wheel of 
foreign policy every 4 years. You have no idea what it does to your 
allies.'' He went home and, 2 weeks later, he resigned.
  I thought that was very interesting, and I never forgot what he said. 
So I began to watch American foreign policy a little differently. I saw 
where it is very difficult for many countries to really understand with 
what voice this Nation really speaks. I understand the separation of 
powers. I understand the balance of powers. And yet, we must, as a 
nation, speak to other nations with one voice and with clearly defined 
policies. I am finding that becomes more and more difficult.
  So, consolidation is not the issue. Many of us support consolidation, 
but we can only support it if it is done in such a way that we provide 
our President, whether he be Republican or Democrat, with flexibility 
in the organization of the foreign affairs agencies. Unlike the 
compromise version that passed the Senate, this conference report 
returns to a coercive approach that forces the President to eliminate 
at least one agency over his objections. I simply cannot support a 
consolidation plan structured in this manner.
  Second, this conference report does nothing to address the 
unprecedented restrictions that were placed on U.S. international 
population and family planning assistance in the fiscal year 1996 
foreign operations bill.
  After months of stalemate on that bill, a conference report was sent 
to the President, which has the effect of cutting U.S. international 
population and family planning programs by some 85 percent. These 
restrictions will have a seriously negative effect on women and 
families around the world. Family planning assistance, which helps 
women plan and space their pregnancies, has proven to be a major factor 
in curbing poverty and starvation and overpopulation, and providing the 
opportunity for a decent way of life in many parts of the world that 
are badly overcrowded with children, starving by the thousands because 
of lack of food.
  Ironically, the restrictions in the foreign operations bill are 
advocated by those who oppose abortion and argue for a so-called pro-
family agenda. But U.S. law already forbids the use of any U.S. foreign 
assistance for the provision of abortions.
  As the distinguished chairman of the Appropriations Committee, who is 
a proud opponent of abortion, has pointed out time and time again, 
depriving millions of poor women of access to voluntary family planning 
services will only result in more unwanted pregnancies and more 
abortions. This bill fails to address these misguided restrictions.
  Third, this bill prohibits any funds from being used to open, expand, 
or operate diplomatic or consular posts in Vietnam, unless the 
President certifies that the Vietnamese Government is fully cooperating 
with the U.S. in a number of areas related to the search for POW's and 
MIA's--a worthy statement. The problem is that these areas are 
effectively uncertifiable. In addition, failure to expand our new 
relationship with Vietnam could actually jeopardize the significant 
progress that has been made on the POW/MIA issue.
  Furthermore, this provision unduly restricts the President's ability 
to conduct foreign relations according to his understanding of U.S. 
national interests. And by this I mean that it places conditions on 
whether or not the President can open an embassy.
  Finally, at the time of the vote on S. 908, I made it very clear that 
there was an entire category of provisions in the bill, wholly separate 
from the consolidation aspect, that I found deeply troubling. These 
provisions related in various ways to the United States' relationship 
with the People's Republic of China, the largest country on Earth, and 
the most dynamically growing country in the world today.
  At that time, I expressed the hope that these provisions would be 
ameliorated or removed in conference. In fact, I said that the 
resolution of these matters would be critical to my consideration of 
whether or not to support the conference report.
  Unfortunately, virtually every one of these provisions remains in the 
bill. Some are in a slightly modified form, but they remain 
objectionable. There are even some new provisions on China in this 
conference report that were not in the original bill. Let me first list 
the provisions in this bill relating to China and then explain why they 
will result in my voting against this conference report.
  Section 1601 declares that the provisions of the Taiwan Relations Act 
supersede provisions of the United States-China joint communique of 
August 17, 1982.
  Section 1603 allows the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative 
Office, TECRO, to change its name to the Taipei Representative Office.
  Section 1606 imposes unnecessary new reporting requirements on the 
Department of State to provide detailed information and political 
judgments on the implementation of the Sino-British Joint Declaration 
on Hong Kong.
  New in the bill, section 1702 imposes excessive reporting 
requirements on the President with respect to human

[[Page S3127]]

rights in China, beyond those already required in the annual Human 
Rights Report, which I have just read. It is a detailed report, and I 
believe very strongly that it was inaccurately reported in the press. 
Section 1702 expresses the sense of Congress that the President should 
impose human rights-related preconditions on a possible future visit to 
China.
  Section 1708 supports the admission of the President of Taiwan to the 
United States for a visit in 1996 ``with all appropriate courtesies''.
  A new section, section 1709, supports the United States pushing for 
Taiwan's admission to the World Trade Organization [WTO], without 
respect to the status of China's application to join the WTO.
  Section 1303 authorizes the President to appoint a special envoy for 
Tibet, and such a person would have to carry the rank of Ambassador.
  Another new section in the bill, section 1701, provides that the 
President should condemn a prison system in China and, in essence, 
demand that China dismantle the prisons. What nation has ever told us 
to dismantle a prison? Would we listen to that, and would we be 
affected by it if they did that? I think not.
  The simple fact of these eight provisions, and others, suggests 
something about this bill: It is excessively preoccupied with China. No 
other country receives half the attention China receives in this bill.
  But far more serious than the preoccupation with China is the very 
serious damage that these provisions could do to our increasingly 
important and, I must say, increasingly strained relationship with 
China. I happen to believe strongly in the importance of the proper 
development of a relationship with the People's Republic of China, 
which is the most overlooked and most significant bilateral 
relationship in the world today.
  I also happen to believe that there are those in China and in this 
country who would like to see it became an adversarial relationship. 
Yes. Would they like to see a return to the dangerous, pivotal, bipolar 
superpower arrangements that existed all during the cold war? That is 
what is understood by their actions. Nations then line up. They are 
either in one camp or the other. It is good for weapons sales. I do not 
want to see that happen. This relationship is too important to peace 
and stability in Asia. And, yes, it is too important to the prevention 
of major misunderstanding which could lead to a potential and 
devastating third world war.
  As my colleagues know, the past few weeks have seen tensions in the 
triangular United States-China-Taiwan relationship reach new heights. 
As Taiwan's first fully democratic presidential election approached, 
China felt compelled to vent its displeasure over what it has perceived 
as a pro-independence policy in Taiwan by conducting missile tests and 
live-ammunition military exercises in the Taiwan Strait. These tests 
and exercises by China were unnecessary, dangerous, and provocative. 
And I have said as much directly to the highest-level Chinese 
officials.
  The administration responded prudently by expressing its deep 
concern, by sending the U.S.S. Nimitz carrier group to join the U.S.S. 
Independence carrier group in the region to monitor events there, and 
by making it clear to the Chinese that any attack on Taiwan would have 
very grave consequences. This is in anyone's book strong and definitive 
action.
  Under these tense circumstances Congress, I believe, must be very 
careful right now, post-Taiwanese election, not to take any action that 
would make a potentially difficult situation worse. There is a real 
window of opportunity. There is a calling for the first democratically 
elected President of Taiwan to take some steps to clarify Taiwanese 
policy, to indicate the willingness to reinstitute the across-the-
strait dialog, and to clarify once and for all--perhaps jointly with 
China--a One-China policy.
  I believe, as far as the United States is concerned, that we do not 
need legislation to further inflame the situation. The point has been 
made. The election has been held. The Taiwanese President has been 
reelected. Now we need to play the pivotal role of encouraging the 
parties to get together and discuss a peaceful resolution of their 
difficulties.
  Without firm United States adherence to the principle of one China we 
would be unable to conduct any kind of normal relations with Beijing. 
This is an undeniable fact of life, no matter what anybody in this body 
says.
  If there is not a One-China policy, we drive the People's Republic of 
China into the adversarial Soviet Union-type of response and a cold 
war. I do not believe this is desirable United States policy. And that 
is the impact. That is the practical, as I would say, ``on the 
streets'' impact of this bill.
  I do not believe that the United States is going to retreat on a One-
China policy. But to amend the Taiwan Relations Act to explicitly 
supersede the 1982 joint communique is to give substance and 
credibility to China's fears. That is what they suspect we are up to. 
Why would we take that provocative step at this time? For what reason 
other than to enable ourselves to become incendiary? From the Chinese 
prospective, it would be tantamount to a declaration that we were about 
to send a new round of arms sales to Taiwan, that we no longer 
subscribe to the One-China policy, and that we are meddling deeply in 
their internal affairs.
  Not only would passing this provision be foolhardy; it is also 
unnecessary. The Taiwan Relations Act is the law of the land. And, like 
any law, it carries greater weight than any diplomatic agreement, other 
than a treaty.
  But to amend the act to explicitly state that it supersedes the 1982 
joint communique would be seen by China as an outright repudiation of a 
critical and stabilizing element of our longstanding policy toward 
China subscribed to by six United States Presidents.
  I want to commend the administration for listing this provision 
prominently among the principal reasons the President will veto this 
bill when it lands on his desk.
  Elsewhere in this conference report Congress expresses its support 
for a visit to the United States by the President of Taiwan in 1996 
``with all appropriate courtesies''. I must ask my colleagues: How 
short are our memories? For over 10 months our relationship with China 
has been in crisis. Here is a country--Taiwan--that says it is in 
opposition to independence, that says as late as March 5 in a written 
directive by the Taiwanese premier, that ``We are in opposition to 
independence.'' Why then would we ask a leader who is not representing 
an independent country to make an official visit? It does not make 
sense.
  Li Teng-hui's visit to Cornell was the event that sparked the 
incendiary nature of the last few months. And remember, that visit was 
billed as a private one; an unofficial one. One can only assume by 
using the phrase ``with all appropriate courtesies" the authors of this 
provision mean to imply some kind of an official visit despite 
America's commitment--we made a commitment--to maintain only economic, 
cultural, and unofficial relations with Taiwan. That is our commitment. 
If our relationship with China has suffered that much over an 
unofficial visit, one can scarcely imagine the damage it would suffer 
in the wake of an official one.
  I think we face a similar problem with the proposed name change of 
the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office. It was only a 
year ago that the Taiwanese reached an agreement with the 
administration to change the office's name from the Coordinating 
Committee for North American Affairs to its current title. Now some are 
advocating a change to the Taipei Representative Office. I have asked 
the Taiwanese if they asked for this change. They said no, they did 
not. Then why are we doing it? Only to tweak China? Is this really 
necessary? Is this how we want to make foreign policy, a tweak here and 
a tweak there? ``We know your Achilles' heel, China, and now we are 
going to press on it a little bit.'' Oh, my goodness.
  The current title of the office accurately reflects the unofficial 
nature of our relationship with Taiwan based primarily on economic and 
cultural relations. There is no need to create a new title that is not 
desired, that implies some kind of broader recognition, other than to 
tweak China.
  The people of Taiwan are to be congratulated for the democratic 
elections they have recently held. They can be justifiably proud. But 
the crux of our

[[Page S3128]]

difficulties with China is China's concern that we are in some way 
egging Taiwan on toward a declaration of independence.
  That should not be the message we send.
  These provisions give credible substance to China's fear. They 
suggest we are not satisfied with Taiwan's status and will undertake 
unilateral actions to nudge it in the direction of independence.
  As I said, that is not our role. Our role as a friend of China and a 
friend of Taiwan is to encourage the peaceful resolution of the Taiwan 
issue by negotiation and mutual decision. The United States has no 
right to take actions that could lead to either a nonpeaceful outcome 
or a non-negotiated outcome. Unilateral actions by any party in this 
matter are not acceptable.
  There are other provisions which will be irritants of our 
relationship with China at best and counterproductive to our own goals 
at worst. For example, I am aware that the backers of the provision 
authorizing a special envoy for Tibet have only the best of 
intentions--to see life improved for the Tibetan people. However, I can 
assure my colleagues that the appointment of a special envoy for Tibet 
with the rank of Ambassador would be seen by the Chinese, once again, 
as an attempt to advocate for independence of an area they consider 
within their territorial boundaries. Even if this person never set foot 
in Lhasa--and we know that with the rank of Ambassador the Chinese 
would never let him set foot in Lhasa--we know the Chinese will view 
such a special envoy as interfering in their internal affairs.
  Now, I am as committed as any Member of this body to improving the 
lives of the Tibetan people. My husband and I both regard his Holiness, 
the Dalai Lama, as a personal friend. I first met him in Dharmsala in 
1978 and have spent many hours with him and his representatives 
discussing ways to help Tibet and Tibetans. In January, in Hong Kong, I 
met with his older brother, Gyalo Thondup, who has been his 
representative in many negotiations with the Chinese, and had an 
extensive discussion.
  In 1991, I carried a letter from his Holiness, the Dalai Lama, to 
President Jiang Zemin asking for negotiations between the two sides. As 
mayor of San Francisco in 1979, I was the first public official to 
invite the Dalai Lama to visit a city in the United States--San 
Francisco, an official visit to my city. And since then I have been 
trying to find ways to bring the two sides together and to encourage 
China to understand that it is to China's great advantage to see that 
the culture and religion of the Tibetan people are protected and that 
human rights for the Tibetan people are improved.
  I recite this background merely to make the point that I am well 
acquainted with the issue of Tibet and have spent many years working on 
it. In my view, the appointment of a special envoy by the United States 
would be counterproductive. It would result in the Chinese being 
unwilling to talk with us or anyone else about ameliorating conditions 
for the Tibetan people.
  What we need to do instead, through intense, continuing, low-key 
diplomacy, is to convince the Chinese that it is to their advantage to 
engage in talks with the Dalai Lama in which all issues other than 
Tibetan independence would be on the table. This I believe is an 
achievable goal but only if we avoid somehow injecting ourselves in the 
issue in such a way that the Chinese see us as advocates for Tibetan 
independence. You cannot have a special envoy with the rank of 
Ambassador and not create the impression that what we are trying to do 
is see Tibet as independent. Therefore, the Chinese will fight any 
improvements all the way. That is why I think this is not well thought 
out.
  There has already been at least one missed opportunity to advance the 
cause of Tibet. After the last Panchen Lama died, the Chinese 
authorities invited the Dalai Lama to come to Beijing for a memorial 
service, but he declined the invitation. I believe that was a mistake 
because it would have given a new generation of Chinese leadership an 
opportunity to get to know the Dalai Lama as the fine person he truly 
is, as a caring, loving person, and a devout Buddhist.
  By all means, we should continue to explore ways to achieve cultural 
and religious autonomy for Tibet and hopefully 1 day the return of the 
Dalai Lama and Tibetans in exile to their native soil. And in the words 
of an ancient Chinese proverb, When water flows, there will be a 
channel. I am hopeful that the water of negotiations will flow before 
too long.

  In my discussions with Chinese leaders over the last year, they have 
repeatedly raised their concern that the United States is pursuing a 
policy of containment with respect to China, perhaps in the guise of 
something else. I do not believe we have such a policy, and I have said 
so. However, when I look at a bill like this one, full of provisions 
that deal almost patronizingly with an independent nation, China, I 
must say it seems that some, for whatever reason, do genuinely want to 
pursue a policy of containment. One certainly could not blame a Chinese 
observer for drawing that conclusion.
  I think we have discussed at length in the past why a containment 
policy is unworkable and unwise. China is a nation of 1.2 billion 
people. It is a nuclear power. It is a permanent member of the U.N. 
Security Council and one of the fastest growing and most dynamic 
economies in the world. China is not going to be contained. What we 
need to do is set a long-term strategic and conceptual, goal-oriented 
relationship with certain priorities in our policies, areas where we 
can work together, and a methodology for areas where there is a 
difference of opinion to be able to sit down over the long term at the 
table and make progress on those issues that divide us. I believe this 
is possible. We have enormous national interests in developing a 
peaceful and cooperative relationship with China, and we cannot do so 
by setting them apart, by making them the adversary that they do not 
want to be and that we do not want them to become.
  I hope my colleagues will reconsider the wisdom of legislating in 
this area so excessively in the future.
  Mr. President, for all of the problems contained in this bill, I urge 
my colleagues to oppose the conference report. If the bill is passed, I 
wish to commend the President for pledging to veto this legislation, 
and I look forward to congratulating him when he does.
  I thank the Chair. I reserve the remainder of my time
  Mr. SIMON addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Abraham). Who yields time?
  Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I am assuming that Senator Kerry will 
yield. Would the Chair recognize that assumption?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Illinois is recognized on the 
time of the Senator from Massachusetts.
  Mr. HELMS. Very well.
  Mr. SIMON. I thank the Chair, and I will try not to impose on the 
time of Senator Kerry. I am going to vote against this, though I differ 
somewhat with my colleague from California, as I will explain very 
shortly.
  I think the bill as a whole does harm to what we are trying to do in 
the area of foreign relations, and I say this with great respect for my 
friend from North Carolina, who chairs the Foreign Relations Committee, 
and who is my neighbor in the Dirksen Building and a friend.
  We cut back on foreign aid. I know there is popularity to that. But 
when at town meetings people say, ``Why don't we cut back on foreign 
aid and help the people in our country?''--as the Presiding Officer 
knows, I have been voting to help people in our country. Then I ask 
them, ``What percentage of our budget do you think goes for foreign 
aid?'' They usually guess 10 percent, 15 percent, 25 percent. And I 
say, ``Less than 1 percent.''

  They are startled. We spend less, as a percentage of our budget, on 
foreign aid than any of the Western European countries and Japan. If 
you put all the Western European countries and Japan together, we spend 
less than any of them. It does not make sense.
  We are authorizing $6.5 billion for fiscal year 1996-97. That is a 
$500 million cut, while at the same time, this year, we have given the 
Pentagon $7 billion more than they requested. U.S. security would be 
helped immensely if we were to give the Pentagon what they requested 
and use a portion of this for foreign aid.

[[Page S3129]]

  For example, the housing guarantee programs in South Africa and 
Eastern Europe are totally eliminated. I know a little bit about South 
Africa. I do not know that much about Eastern Europe, but I think the 
situations are somewhat similar. In South Africa, it is vitally 
important for that country to show the people of that country that they 
are going to make some progress. Nelson Mandela is immensely popular 
today, both in the white and black community in South Africa. Public 
opinion polls are almost identical for whites and blacks there. But the 
reality is, he has to show that he can deliver for people who have been 
oppressed, and the housing program is an inexpensive way for the United 
States to help. Mr. President, 28 million poor people have been helped 
by our housing program in Eastern Europe and South Africa--and we want 
to eliminate that.
  Regarding limitations on U.S. assistance on population, if you do not 
have population assistance, let me tell you, the abortion rates go up 
and other problems arise. It is very interesting. If you look at Japan, 
for example, where they have programs to tell people about 
contraception and other things, you have a very low abortion rate. You 
also have less than 1 percent of children born out of wedlock. If you 
have assistance on planned parenthood and that sort of thing, we reduce 
the abortion rates.
  We also reduce the problem--it depends on whose estimates you 
believe, but the world population is going to grow. It will roughly 
double in the next 45 to 60 years. The most conservative estimates are 
45 years; the more optimistic are 60 years. We ought to be helping out.
  The United Nations--and here I applaud my colleague who is the 
Presiding Officer for being very responsible in this area--the United 
Nations, we now owe them $1.4 billion. The budget for the United 
Nations, for New York, Geneva, and the six commissions, not counting 
peacekeeping, is $1.2 billion for a year. In other words, we owe more 
than a year's expenses for running the United Nations. Running the 
United Nations takes $500 million less than running the New York City 
police department. The No. 1 deadbeat in the world is the United 
States.
  Do not kid yourself that we are not hurting ourselves. Here is 
today's newspaper, an Associated Press story, ``World Bank Arrears 
Disqualify United States. American contractors can't bid on $2.1 
billion in projects.'' Why? Because the World Bank has a rule, if you 
get too far back in what you owe, that country cannot bid on projects. 
So, contractors in Illinois and Arkansas and North Carolina and Vermont 
are hurt by our being a deadbeat here. I hope we will do better.
  Then I would like to comment on the China situation a little bit. 
Real candidly, if I were to write the language in this resolution, I 
would write it differently. But I have to say, I do not think we should 
quake every time China growls. I share with the chairman of the Foreign 
Relations Committee a feeling that we should let Taiwan know that a 
freely elected government is regarded as a friend of the United States.
  Perhaps inviting President Li officially here right now may not be 
the right thing while China's leadership is going through this turmoil, 
but to turn a cold shoulder constantly to Taiwan, when they have a free 
press, multiparty system, free elections--they are the seventh biggest 
trading partner of the United States, they are second only to Japan in 
the foreign reserves they have--to pretend there are not two countries 
there is just a mistake.
  I heard my colleague from California, Senator Feinstein, for whom I 
have high regard, I heard her talking about the Shanghai communique 
and, while we have said as a nation we recognize one China, frankly I 
think that was a mistake. We cannot reverse that overnight. But that 
was done at a time when we were worried about the Soviet Union and we 
were trying to keep China and the Soviet Union apart. But the reality 
is, we ought to treat China and Taiwan as we did West Germany and East 
Germany. Both East Germany and West Germany did not like it that we 
recognized the other side, but that did not prevent the two of them 
from eventually coming together again. But we said the reality is there 
are two governments and that is the reality today.
  I think we have to be sensitive to the Chinese situation. I do not 
think, to use Senator Feinstein's language, we should just be tweaking 
China whenever we can. I think we ought to be firm, solid, and let them 
know that military aggression is not going to be tolerated. We have not 
been as firm as we should be.
  Senator Feinstein is right when she says our policy has been one of 
zigzagging. Without going to the Presidential level, I frankly think we 
ought to have cabinet members from both sides appearing in each other's 
country. When I was in Taiwan, I do not know, 3 years ago or so, the 
Foreign Minister had a luncheon honoring me, but our representative in 
Taiwan--we do not even have the courage to call him an ambassador--our 
representative in Taiwan could not come because the luncheon was in a 
government building. He is not allowed to go into a government 
building.
  That is just ridiculous. We have to recognize reality. When we face a 
choice of cuddling up to democracies or dictatorships, the United 
States of America should not have a difficult time. We ought to be 
siding with democracies rather than dictatorships.
  I think we ought to say to China, ``We want you to be our friend.'' 
But we also ought to say, just as firmly, ``We are for democracies.'' 
And I hope gradually we will recognize that there are, in fact, two 
governments over there. To pretend anything else invites possible 
trouble.
  Let me just add this. I heard Tibet mentioned. That is history now, 
not good history, but I am afraid that is done. But if we do not say 
very clearly ``you cannot invade Taiwan or send missiles there,'' 
dictatorships are never satisfied with just one piece of property.
  The reality is, if China takes Tibet, it will not be too long and 
they are going to go up and take Mongolia. Look at some of those 
Chinese maps. They already have Mongolia as part of China, and who 
knows where it goes next. We should learn the lessons from history, and 
we should side with democracies while we maintain reasonable relations 
with dictatorships.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  Mr. HELMS addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jeffords). The Senator from North Carolina 
is recognized.
  Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, what we are doing is alternating this side 
and that side. I suggest it is appropriate now for the Chair to 
recognize the distinguished Senator from Maine.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine is recognized.
  Mr. HELMS. I thank the Chair.
  Ms. SNOWE. Mr. President, I want to thank the chairman, and I want to 
thank you, Mr. President.
  I rise in strong support of the conference report to accompany H.R. 
1561, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for fiscal years 1996 and 
1997. As chair of the Foreign Relations Subcommittee on International 
Operations, we have jurisdiction over these issues contained in this 
legislation, and I am very pleased with the report that the conference 
committee issued with respect to this important bill.
  I commend the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, Chairman 
Helms. I know this has been a long and difficult road to bring this 
authorization bill to this point. Regrettably, we did not have enough 
assistance from the administration or the State Department to work out 
the differences that developed between the committee and this 
administration and the State Department. But regardless, I think the 
bill that has come before the Senate and has come before the House is a 
bill that certainly should be accepted by both sides.
  Frankly, as one who has been involved in this process as the ranking 
member of the similar subcommittee in the House for almost 10 years, I 
am somewhat surprised at the way in which the State Department or the 
President has refused to negotiate the differences on some of the 
issues that have been at the forefront of this authorization bill for 
more than 1 year.
  I have never been in a situation in being responsible for this 
authorization bill in which the President has never submitted an 
authorization request. We have not yet to date ever received

[[Page S3130]]

a State Department authorization bill for the issues before us 
referring to the State Department authorization and the other related 
agencies, such as international broadcasting activities, international 
exchanges, as well as international organizations and our contributions 
to the United Nations as well.
  We have never yet in this entire process received a bill from the 
administration with respect to any one of these issues. And, as I said, 
this is the first time in all of the years in which I have had the 
responsibility of addressing the State Department authorization bill 
that a President has failed to submit a legislative authorization bill.
  But be that as it may, we worked it through the process, as Chairman 
Helms indicated. It was a difficult process, to say the least. But here 
in the Senate in December, the bill passed by a margin of 82 to 16. It 
received tremendous bipartisan support. So I would expect that this 
conference report should receive the same bipartisan support. If 
anything, this conference report is even stronger than the bill that 
passed the Senate back in December.
  But I think it is important to review what occurred over this last 
year to have reached this point and to demonstrate that the conference 
report that is before this body reconciled the differences, in fact, 
came a long way to accommodate the differences that the minority had in 
the committee or here on the floor or that the President had or that 
the State Department had, but every time we reconciled those 
differences, they moved the goal posts. They were unwilling to resolve 
and to reconcile the issues that are before us today.
  But I think it is important to review exactly how much we have 
accommodated the administration's concern, as well as the minority.
  First of all, when you are looking at the consolidation issue, it is 
important to remember that back in January of 1995, Secretary 
Christopher himself acknowledged that consolidation was possible. He, 
in fact, proposed to the administration that the consolidation of three 
agencies into the State Department was a realistic approach.
  The Vice President recommended that we could achieve savings in the 
State Department and related agencies of approximately $5 billion over 
4 years. So that is the point at which we started this whole 
proposition.
  So the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, with Chairman Helms, 
recommended that we consolidate three agencies with a savings of $3 
billion.
  We started working through the differences. The minority members of 
the committee said, ``No, we don't want to support consolidating any 
agencies.'' But they did, in fact, agree to consolidating one agency 
with a savings of $2 billion over 4 years. The majority in the 
committee said we will consolidate three agencies with $3 billion over 
4 years.
  So here we are at this point with a conference committee report, and 
what do we have? We have a conference committee report that says we 
have to reconcile the differences between the Senate and the House. And 
so the Senate position going into conference was no agency 
consolidation but a mandate requiring $1.7 billion over the next 4 
years.
  The House, on the other hand, had a position of consolidating three 
agencies over the next 5 years, with no specified savings. So what did 
we do? We came out of the conference committee with one agency, a 
savings of $1.7 billion. That is very close to the position that was 
supported by the Senate back in December with a vote of 82 to 16.
  I guess it is hard to understand why anybody would suggest that this 
is an unrealistic or unachievable consolidation proposal. We have come 
from the Vice President's proposal of $5 billion down to $1.7 billion, 
and even the minority on the committee supported $2 billion worth of 
savings, and in the conference report we have $1.7 billion in savings, 
so even less than what even they supported. They supported one 
consolidation, one agency to be consolidated in the State Department. 
That is what came out of the conference committee. We got one agency 
requirement for consolidation or merging into the State Department. So 
we have come a long way to reconcile those differences.
  It is really hard to understand why there has been so much resistance 
to this effort and to make some accommodation to bridge the 
differences. We have certainly gone a long ways to reconciling those 
differences, not only within this body, but with the House as well.
  Then we had the issue of the international family planning proposals. 
Well, again, the House bill contains some very restrictive language 
with respect to UNFPA and Mexico City policy provisions that, in fact, 
those are the same provisions that endangered the foreign operations 
appropriations bill last year. But we were able to remove those onerous 
provisions from the conference report. We removed all of them. But yet 
at the same time, again, we had objections from the other side, because 
they said, ``Well, that's not enough. It is not enough that you took 
those provisions out. You should also have language in this conference 
report that overturns the restrictions and the reductions in 
international family planning programs in the appropriations bill.''

  That is an interesting recommendation considering the fact that the 
minority did not want to have any development assistance proposals in 
the State Department bill, and that is why almost all of the foreign 
aid language was removed, rightfully so, because the Senate never had 
that opportunity to consider that legislation. So it was removed. We 
took out all the international family planning restrictions and all the 
development assistance legislation. But yet at the same time, they are 
saying, ``It is not enough because we think we should overturn the 
appropriations language.''
  Well, that process is occurring right now, hopefully, in the 
conference committee on the omnibus appropriations bill. But certainly 
the conference report is not the vehicle to do it, since we have taken 
out all the other foreign aid components.
  I should say that the language that is in the current continuing 
resolution with respect to the international family planning programs 
are the very same programs in the very same continuing resolution that 
the President signed into law and was supported by Members of this 
body.
  The appropriate vehicle for resolving the appropriation differences 
on international family planning funding is in the conference committee 
on the omnibus appropriations. That is where that debate should occur, 
not here in this conference report.
  Our goal was to remove the restrictive language on international 
family planning and Mexico City provisions that would have set us back 
in those areas. We did that. That was a major accomplishment. There are 
important issues in this legislation that ought to be supported by all 
Members of this body.
  This legislation contains several important policy initiatives, such 
as the McBride Principles. This would codify the McBride Principles and 
place them in permanent law.
  The McBride Principles would establish a standard of 
nondiscrimination for any project or enterprise in Northern Ireland 
funded through our contributions to the International Fund for Ireland. 
This is a very important principle to uphold. I think this would be the 
first time that will provide an opportunity for all Members of this 
Senate to vote on the McBride Principles and to support codifying them 
into Federal law.
  Another important policy initiative that this bill would place into 
permanent law is the Humanitarian Aid Corridor Act. This provision, 
first enacted on a 1-year basis in the foreign operations 
appropriations bill, would require that recipients of American aid not 
block the delivery of any humanitarian aid to any neighboring country. 
While drafted generically, it is intended to send a strong signal to 
Turkey, which in the past has frequently attempted to block the 
delivery of desperately needed humanitarian assistance to the people of 
Armenia.
  A third major legislative initiative in this conference report is the 
Terrorist Exclusion Act, which I first introduced in the last Congress. 
This would restore the President's authority to exclude the entry into 
the United States of any individual who is a member of a violent 
terrorist organization. This is basically to restore the law prior to 
1990.

[[Page S3131]]

  So, I guess it is hard again, going back to the administration's 
position, to understand why the President and the State Department have 
gone on record in opposition to this legislation, because the agency 
reorganization is essential, even by the Secretary of State's own 
admission, even by the Vice President's own recommendations to save $5 
billion.
  I cannot imagine that anybody would suggest that we cannot merge one 
agency into the State Department, that we cannot merge the Arms Control 
and Disarmament Agency. It is a modest agency of 250 people, that in 
this day and age when we need a new world order, when it comes to our 
own State Department and related agencies, we have to reorganize. It is 
important to have a unified, singular voice when it comes to delivering 
our foreign policy. That was the basic intent of this agency 
consolidation. But we have met resistance at every step of the way by 
the administration, even though at some point in time the 
administration or Members on the other side have indicated that they 
support such consolidation.

  Let us talk about the funding levels. The authorization level in this 
conference report represents probably a high point in funding levels 
for these agencies. In fact, it is in conformance with the budget 
resolution. The reductions in funding are modest, no more than $500 
million under the 1995 funding level.
  The President has argued for cuts in domestic programs, but this is 
the one area in which he is recommending an increase. In fact, the 
President recommended a $1 billion increase in the foreign aid 
accounts. I think it is interesting that the President would recommend 
cuts in so many domestic discretionary programs in order to achieve a 
balanced budget, but insist on continued growth in foreign spending. 
But that is exactly the case, because in the statement that was issued 
by the administration, they objected to the funding levels that were 
incorporated in this conference report.
  There has been opposition by some because of the provision that 
addresses the International Housing Guarantee Program. This program is 
routinely criticized as one of AID's most ineffective and wasteful 
programs. In fact, GAO has conducted a study of this program which 
subsidized housing for citizens of other countries. The GAO found that 
this program is well on its way to wasting $1 billion in U.S. 
taxpayers' money--$1 billion.
  I cannot believe that the administration again is objecting to this 
provision to remove this program when it has already been demonstrated 
to lose for the taxpayers more than $1 billion. The overall program 
represents a 40 percent loss to the American taxpayers with respect to 
the inefficiency and the ineffectiveness of this program. Yet, again, 
the administration states as one of its objections the fact that it 
cuts this International Housing Guarantee Program.
  We come to the issue of Vietnam. The bill simply requires the 
President to certify that Vietnam is fully cooperating on the POW/MIA 
accounting prior to establishing even closer relations with Vietnam. 
Now, how can anyone find this objectionable? The President has already 
taken every opportunity to state his belief that Vietnam is fully 
cooperating.

  I may disagree with the President on that assertion, but be that as 
it may, if the President certifies that they are fully cooperating--
that is his own prerogative and initiative as described in this 
provision--then he can move forward to establish even broader 
diplomatic relations. So I cannot understand why the President would 
object to this language.
  Mr. President, it has been a long process with respect to this 
conference report. As I said earlier, again, I think it is important to 
remind Members of this body that we had no guidance, no counsel, from 
this administration. The fact is, in the process during the conference 
committee and prior to the meeting of the conference committee, members 
of the State Department, representing the administration and the 
Department, refused to offer language or to cooperate in the process 
throughout the month-long effort.
  I think we could have reached a consensus at some point. It is hard 
to believe they could not support this conference report, because I 
cannot imagine being more accommodating on all of the issues that were 
of concern to them originally in terms of how many agencies would be 
required to be merged into the State Department, or how much savings we 
would realize as a result.
  I mean, we basically went from three to one agency, and we went from 
$3 billion to $1.7 billion worth of savings as a result of agency 
consolidation and reorganization. From my estimation, I think that is a 
pretty reasonable compromise. I want to further remind this body again 
the Vice President said that we could achieve $5 billion worth of 
savings, the Secretary of State said and recommended to the 
administration that we ought to be able to consolidate three agencies 
into the State Department. But we are only talking about one here now. 
We are only talking about saving $1.7 billion.
  We have had no legislative recommendations from this administration 
with respect to this State Department authorization. Again, as I said 
earlier, for more than a decade that I have been working on this very 
issue, I have never had an administration not submit a legislative 
proposal with respect to authorization for the State Department and 
related agencies.
  The President, of course, can veto this legislation and has indicated 
he will. I hope that he will not because I do believe this conference 
report does strike a compromise between the House and the Senate. It 
accommodates the concerns and the views of the administration. I think 
it is unfortunate if the President moves forward with a veto because he 
will have failed to seize an opportunity to move forward in this 
consolidation process and to reorganize our foreign policy structure.

  It will be the President who vetoes that consolidation, and it will 
be the President who vetoes the savings in this bill. It will be the 
President who vetoes the McBride Principles and the codification of the 
Humanitarian Aid Corridor Act. It will be the President who denies 
himself the authority he needs to prevent members of terrorist 
organizations from entering the United States and endangering the lives 
of American people. That is the bottom line here with respect to this 
conference report.
  I hope that Members will give this very serious consideration and 
adopt this conference report because it is, I think, a step towards the 
kind of goals we want to accomplish for our foreign policy structure, 
not only for the short term but for the long term.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  Mr. BUMPERS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to proceed for 2 
minutes on the time of the Senator from Massachusetts, to be followed 
by Senator Pryor, who has some time coming.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. BUMPERS. Mr. President, I was sitting in my office earlier this 
afternoon and the senior Senator from Arizona came to the floor and 
chastised President Clinton for apparently discussing on the telephone 
with President Yeltsin the poultry embargo that the Russians had 
imposed against all American poultry. The Senator suggested that he 
hoped that the President had much greater things to discuss with the 
President of Russia.
  Now, Mr. President, I do not know what they talked about, but I 
personally applaud President Clinton for bringing up that very 
difficult issue. The Russians import $2.1 billion worth of all products 
in the United States every year, a little over $2 billion, and one-
third of that, over $700 million of that, is poultry. Not just my 
State--it is North Carolina, Mississippi, Alabama, Texas.
  Now, the Senator from Arizona acted as though there were something 
small or childish about the President talking to President Yeltsin 
about that embargo, which has now been solved. The President did 
exactly what I would expect him to do.
  I know that the Senator from Arizona is not speaking for Senator 
Dole. Would he say the same thing if they embargoed rice or wheat? 
Would we have heard that same speech if President Clinton had called 
President Yeltsin about a wheat embargo? I do not think so. I know that 
if Senator Dole ever became President and we

[[Page S3132]]

had that kind of an embargo, in my opinion, he would not hesitate to 
pick up the phone and call the President of Russia about it.
  I am just amazed. Here is a big trade issue, and trade is about all 
we talk about here anymore and about the so-called 301 retaliatory 
measures. I suspect, frankly, that President Clinton's intervention on 
that helped resolve it, and the people of my State are working today, 
the people in North Carolina, Alabama, and Texas are working today 
because the President called the President of Russia and said, ``This 
is a funny issue. Why don't you let up?'' I think that is what solved 
the problem.
  I applaud President Clinton for his intervention. I deplore people 
trying to treat that in such a cavalier, simplistic manner.
  Mr. PRYOR. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent the Senator from 
Alaska be recognized for 8 minutes, and after the Senator from Alaska 
finishes, I be recognized for a 10-minute period. I ask that the time 
that I use be charged to Senator Kerry of Massachusetts.

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. And the time of the Senator from Alaska?
  Mr. MURKOWSKI. I believe Senator Helms indicated a willingness to 
yield time.
  Mr. HELMS. The Senator from Alaska, as far as I am concerned, can 
speak as long as he likes, but he has stipulated 8 minutes.
  Mr. MURKOWSKI. I concur with the floor manager. Senator Pryor was 
kind enough to allow me to go out of turn.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Eight minutes is charged to Senator Helms. The 
time of the Senator from Arkansas is charged to Senator Kerry.
  Mr. SARBANES. Is it possible to continue the sequence of speakers, or 
does the chairman not wish to do that?
  Mr. PRYOR. If I may respond, what we are doing is continuing the 
sequencing, because Senator Bumpers, after finishing his presentation, 
we have asked that Senator Murkowski on the other side be recognized, 
and then I would be recognized. I guess I would be recognized after 
Senator Murkowski.
  Mr. HELMS. In the natural course of things, Senator Sarbanes would be 
recognized if time is yielded to him. I am sure that he can get that by 
unanimous consent, to be charged to Senator Kerry.
  Mr. SARBANES. After Senator Pryor?
  Mr. HELMS. No, no, go back and forth. The Senator from Alaska is 
going to speak only 8 minutes.
  Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, as we prepare to vote on the conference 
report on H.R. 1561, the Foreign Relations Revitalization Act of 1995, 
I rise to express my specific concerns that the statement of 
administration policy indicates that the President appears to be going 
to veto this bill based at least in part on section 1601, which 
reaffirms the primacy of the Taiwan Relations Act.
  Mr. President, the opponents of the provision claim we are nullifying 
the joint communique. I totally disagree with this interpretation. Let 
me refer to the definition of the specific word ``supersede'' as used 
in section 1601. The Oxford dictionary say ``supersede'' means 
override. I was an original author of this language so I know a little 
about its legislative intent, and that is that the Taiwan Relations Act 
overrides the provisions of the communique only if the two are in 
conflict.
  Now, section 3 of the Taiwan Relations Act commits the United States 
to sell Taiwan whatever defense articles it needs for self-defense and 
that the executive branch and the Congress will jointly determine what 
those needs might be.
  In 1982, President Reagan pledged in a joint communique with China to 
decrease arm sales to Taiwan. That was the so-called bucket.
  The Taiwan Relations Act was ratified by Congress and is the law of 
the land. Make no mistake about it. The 1982 communique is an executive 
agreement never ratified by the Congress.
  Now, all that the provision in the conference report says is that the 
law of the land--the law of the land, Mr. President--the Taiwan 
Relations Act, will supersede the provisions of the joint communique if 
the two are in conflict. They have to be in conflict, Mr. President. 
That is the difference. This is simply a matter of legal precedence.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reference from the 
Oxford dictionary be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

       Supersede: To desist from, discontinue (a procedure, an 
     attempt, etc.); not to proceed with -1750. b. intr. 
     To desist, forbear, refrain -1850. 2. To refrain from 
     (discourse, disquisition); to omit to mention, refrain from 
     mentioning -1689. 3. To put a stop to (legal 
     proceedings, etc.); to stop, stay -1838. b. Law. To discharge 
     by a writ of supersedeas 1817. 4. To render 
     superfluous or unnecessary -1797. 5. To make of no effect; to 
     render void, nugatory, or useless; to annul; to override. Now 
     rare or Obs. 1654. 6. pass. To be set aside as useless or 
     obsolete; (to be replaced by something regarded as superior 
     1642.) 7. To take the place of (something set aside or 
     abandoned); to succeed to the place occupied by; to serve, be 
     adopted or accepted instead of 1660. 8. To supply the place 
     of (a person deprived of or removed from an office or 
     position) by another; also, to promote another over the head 
     of; pass. to be removed from office to make way for another 
     1710. b. To supply the place of (a thing) 1861. 9. Of a 
     person: To take the place of (some one removed from an 
     office, or promoted); to succeed and supplant (a 
     person) in a position of any kind 1777.
       5. The Norman invader superseded Anglo-Saxon institutions 
     1863. 6. When this work must be superseded by a more perfect 
     history 1838. 7 Oxen were superseding horses in farm-work 
     1866. 9. Captain Maling takes his passage to s. Captain 
     Nisbet in the Bonne Citoyenne Nelson.

  Mr. MURKOWSKI. For example, if the threat to Taiwan is increasing, 
defensive arm sales should go up. They should not be arbitrarily 
limited by the bucket. Prior administrations have followed this 
principle in practice, such as selling F-16's to Taiwan, even though 
they were outside the dollar limits of the bucket.
  It was a matter of convenience. We wanted to do it, so we found a way 
to do it. I do not see why the administration is objecting to this 
provision, because it is consistent with current practice. I would also 
remind my colleagues that the identical language passed out of the 
Foreign Relations Committee in 1994 on a 20-0 vote when I was a member 
of that committee.
  Mr. President, I again find it incredible that the administration 
would issue this veto threat over a provision that was intended merely 
to restate reality: The law of the land takes precedence over a 
statement of policy. I do not think you could find one constitutional 
scholar who would disagree with that proposition.
  Secretary of State Christopher, in correspondence with me in 1994, 
acknowledged that it was the administration's position, as it was of 
previous administrations, that the Taiwan Relations Act as a public law 
takes legal precedence over the 1982 joint United States-China 
communique, an Executive communication that was never, as I said, 
ratified by Congress. Mr. President, I have that letter from Secretary 
of State Christopher. When the letter was given to me, I told the 
Secretary, at his request, that I would not release the letter. But I 
think that the State Department should look up that letter and find out 
what the Secretary said because I think what he said then is as 
applicable today, March 28, 1996, as it was April 22, 1994. So I 
suggest that the State Department do a little backtracking.
  It is important to remember that the 1982 communique was based on the 
premise that the future of Taiwan would be settled solely--this is 
important--by peaceful means and was signed at a time when decreased 
tensions between China and Taiwan meant that Taiwan's self-defensive 
needs were not increasing.
  The Senate voted 97-0 last week to reaffirm the commitments made in 
the Taiwan Relations Act. One of the commitments is that the President, 
in consultation with the Congress, will review whether the capabilities 
and intentions of the People's Republic of China have increased the 
threat to Taiwan. If so, defensive arms sales to Taiwan, obviously, 
should be adjusted upward accordingly, if indeed that is the case.
  Well, we have seen, in recent weeks, the heightened tensions. I do 
not have to go into the significance of what the M-9 missile message 
was. It was that China can indeed launch a missile from the mainland, 
and it can indeed go to Taiwan. Indeed it has a payload of about 1,200 
pounds, and it drops its locomotion in entry, and, as a consequence, it 
is very difficult to pick up.

[[Page S3133]]

 I am not sure that the technology is available to counter that missile 
threat.
  As we look at some of the other missile threats to the United States, 
including to my State of Alaska and to Hawaii, we find we are in the 
range of some of those, which the rest of the United States is not in 
the range of. I do not think Hawaii and Alaska are expendable, although 
some of my colleagues may differ from time to time.
  Since 1994, China has mounted a series of military exercises near 
Taiwan. In September and October 1994, the People's Liberation Army 
conducted combined air, land, and sea exercises on Chou Shan Island, 
about 60 miles south of Quemoy. At that time, Assistant Secretary of 
State Winston Lord described these exercises as ``the most expansive * 
* * that China has conducted in 40 or 50 years.'' In June and July of 
last year, the PLA conducted more exercises, including firing four 
medium range M-9 missiles--the first time China had used missiles to 
threaten an opponent. Right before the Legislative Yuan elections in 
November, China conducted large-scale com- 
bined-arms, amphibious and airborne assault exercises designed to 
simulate an invasion of Taiwan.
  Then, on the eve of the first direct democratic presidential election 
in Taiwan, China began a series of three more tests. First, China fired 
four more M-9 missiles into closures within 25 to 35 miles of the two 
principal northern and southern ports of Taiwan. China followed the 
missile tests with live ammunition war games in a 2,390-square-mile 
area in the southern Taiwan Strait, followed by another live ammunition 
exercise between the Taiwan islands of Matsu and Wuchu.
  China may not yet have the capability to invade and conquer the 
Republic of China on Taiwan, but it does have the capability to do 
significant harm by mining ports, undertaking a limited blockade with 
its 5 nuclear-powered and 45 conventional-powered attack submarines, 
and conducting a terror campaign with missiles capable of carrying 
nuclear or chemical warheads. Taiwan lacks a reliable missile defense 
and has only two modern conventional submarines.
  I do not consider myself an expert on defense matters, but it appears 
that Taiwan needs additional deterrence capability, especially with 
regard to missile defenses. I commend the Clinton administration for 
sending our carriers into the area of the Taiwan Strait recently to 
monitor China's war exercises. This exercise should put the Defense 
Department in a very good position to evaluate the threat to Taiwan 
from China in determining the level of future arms sales.
  Mr. President, I only hope that the diplomats in the State Department 
do not ignore the military reality in making decisions about future 
arms sales to Taiwan because of a fear of China's reaction. But, 
unfortunately, that is what I believe is the driving force behind the 
veto threat. The administration states that section 1601 ``would be 
seen as a repudiation of a critical and stabilizing element of 
longstanding U.S. policy toward China, increasing risks at a time of 
heightened tensions.''
  Mr. President, the most critical element in U.S. policy toward China 
is the peaceful resolution of Taiwan's future. If China, by force, 
repudiates that element, then the basis of the United States' one-China 
policy is simply stripped away.
  We should recognize that that provision in the Foreign Relations 
Authorization Act does not repudiate U.S. policy, it reaffirms it. I 
call on the administration to drop this veto threat and implement the 
law as required.
  Mr. President, I am grateful to my good friend from Arkansas, who has 
accommodated me and my schedule. I thank the floor manager.
  Mr. PRYOR addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arkansas.

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