FOREIGN RELATIONS AUTHORIZATION ACT, FISCAL YEARS 1996 AND 1997-- CONFERENCE REPORT
(Senate - March 28, 1996)

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   FOREIGN RELATIONS AUTHORIZATION ACT, FISCAL YEARS 1996 AND 1997--
                           CONFERENCE REPORT

  The Senate continued with the consideration of the conference report.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I was one of the first Members of the 
Senate to support Senator Helms' efforts to consolidate U.S. foreign 
policy agencies. This bill does not go as far as I or many of my 
colleagues on the Foreign Relations Committee had hoped it would in 
this respect. I, and I know the chairman, had envisioned a 
consolidation which would require the dismantlement of three agencies--
USAID, USIA, and ACDA. But just getting the bill into and out of the 
conference committee was a major accomplishment and I commend the 
chairman for it.
  I support the bill and I will vote for it. A savings of $1.7 billion 
over 4 years and the merging into the State Department of at least one 
foreign policy agency is a proposition simply too good to pass up.
  However, I do want to register my steadfast opposition to one 
particular provision in the bill. The conference report conditions 
funding for any expansion in United States diplomatic relations with 
Vietnam on Presidential certifications in a number of areas related to 
missing United States servicemen. The Senate wisely refrained from 
including similar language in its bill, and despite its several efforts 
to address the issue in previous legislation, the House included only 
sense-of-the-Congress language.
  Given that neither House decided to legislate in this area, I was 
quite dismayed to find out that somehow during the proceedings of the 
conference committee, the conferees actually decided to make the House 
language tougher. One reasonably expects--and common

[[Page S3135]]

sense would indicate--that a compromise develops midway between two 
positions. But in this case, compromise involved not only caving to the 
House position, but giving House conferees something for their trouble.
  This is the third time that I have come to the floor to register my 
opposition to the same language in different conference reports. I know 
that conferees often have a difficult time dealing with this issue. On 
one side of the debate are those who seek to block the President's 
decision to normalize relations with Vietnam at every opportunity. They 
are extraordinarily focused and unrelenting. In contrast, those on the 
other side of the debate either have an understandable predominate 
interest in reaching a real compromise, or truly see no harm in forcing 
the President's hand.
  As was the case with the CJS conference report, the balance of 
sentiments on this issue in this conference has contributed to the 
certainty of a Presidential veto. I know that the President would have 
likely vetoed the bill anyway. He has fought the idea of State 
Department reorganization since Secretary Christopher first proposed 
it. However, I think we have complicated the case for consolidation 
with this provision on Vietnam. In short, we have given the President 
one more reason to veto the bill. And unlike some of his reasons, to my 
mind, this one is legitimate.
  When the bill returns to the Senate for a possible veto override, I 
hope the conference will revisit the issue of United States-Vietnam 
relations and approve language which reflects the will of at least one 
House of Congress. Consistent with his constitutional powers, the 
President last year made a decision to normalize relations with 
Vietnam. As I have pointed out to my colleagues a number of times, this 
is a fact. The President should not be constrained in his efforts to 
carry out his decision. If we cannot respect President Clinton's 
decision on its merits, we ought to at least respect the power his 
office entitles him to exercise.
  Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I oppose H.R. 1561. I do so for many 
reasons.
  I believe that this bill is not only myopic, but it is dangerous. 
H.R. 1561 calls upon the President to eliminate one of three foreign 
policy agencies and includes authorization levels that would force the 
United States to withdraw from some international organizations. It 
overlooks the successful efforts the administration has already 
undertaken to reduce its expenditures. Mr. President, the United States 
is unquestionably the strongest Nation in the world. These foreign 
affairs agencies are essential to U.S. leadership. H.R. 1561 undermines 
our strength and leadership in the world.
  In addition to objection to the general direction the bill takes us, 
there are also specific provisions that are seriously flawed. 
Specifically, look at how this bill treats relations with Vietnam. 
Section 1214 makes funding for a U.S. Embassy in Vietnam dependent upon 
a Presidential certification that Vietnam is fully cooperating on the 
POW/MIA issue. Most certainly we all want to resolve any outstanding 
POW/MIA cases. However, this provision isn't likely to facilitate that 
end. This provision, if enacted, could threaten the progress that has 
already been made on the POW/MIA issue. Moreover, it could restrict the 
President's ability to pursue our national interests in Vietnam and put 
United States firms at a competitive disadvantage.
  Second, it terms of U.S. participation in the United Nations, this 
bill provides inadequate funding levels for fiscal years 1996 and 1997. 
The United States is already $1.2 billion in arrears to the United 
Nations. Besides being irresponsible, this outstanding obligation 
thwarts our influence in the United Nations and impedes our diplomatic 
efforts to reform the institution. Even Namibia, one of the poorest 
countries in the world with a GDP 86 times less than the United States, 
has paid up. That, Mr. President, is shameful.
  Third, H.R. 1561 fails to resolve the limitations on U.S. population 
assistance programs placed in the fiscal year 1996 foreign operations 
appropriations legislation. Such restriction will have a serious, 
detrimental impact on women and families in the developing world. These 
restrictions will cause an estimated 7 million couples in developing 
countries to be without access to safe, voluntary family planning 
services. And what will the result be? Millions of unwanted pregnancies 
and abortions. Mr. President, I am sure that none of my colleagues want 
to see this happen.
  Mr. President, I conclude my statement by reiterating that H.R. 1561 
is shortsighted, dangerous, and that I vigorously oppose it. I 
encourage my colleagues to join me in voting against the conference 
report.
  Mrs. KASSEBAUM. Mr. President, today, we have before us significant 
legislation which, if it becomes law, will restructure the principal 
institutions used to conduct America's foreign policy. The process 
leading to this point may have been less bipartisan and less open than 
some of us would have desired. But I want to commend the chairman of 
the Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Helms, for his determination 
in shepherding this difficult bill through the legislative process.
  The heart of this bill is its reorganization of our Nation's foreign 
policy bureaucracy. While I still have reservations about the continued 
deep cuts in our foreign affairs spending--an account that already has 
sustained deep cuts since the late 1980s--that is not the issue here. 
Congress made the decision to continue cutting our foreign affairs 
spending when we passed the budget resolution last year. The purpose of 
this authorizing legislation is to try to shape those cuts in a manner 
that will best protect our ability to carry out the Nation's foreign 
policy.
  I believe this conference report's approach to streamlining and 
consolidation--an approach dramatically different from the original 
versions introduced a year ago in both Houses--is reasonable. In 
essence, this legislation would require the abolition of one of our 
four principal foreign policy agencies and would require a savings of 
$1.8 billion over 4 years. It wisely vests in the President, however, 
the maximum possible flexibility to determine the details of 
reorganization.
  Because the reorganization provisions are, in my judgment, 
reasonable, I intend to vote for this legislation. However, I very much 
regret that the legislation also contains many foreign policy 
provisions which have been less scrutinized and which, in my view, 
would have been better omitted. Let me outline my specific concerns 
with the legislation:
  First, the bill contains a number of provisions that may further 
irritate our relations with China. Most important among these is the 
provision asserting that the Taiwan Relations Act takes precedence over 
the 1982 Sino-United States joint communique. The triangular 
relationship between Washington, Beijing and Taipei is a delicate 
diplomatic balance in each of its legs, and in this legislation 
Congress is needlessly seeking to strengthen one leg--the leg between 
Washington and Taipei--without regard for the effect on the other two.
  Second, the bill unwisely reopens the difficult debate about our 
relations with Vietnam. In 1994, after weighing the arguments on both 
sides, Congress concluded that normalizing relations with Vietnam best 
serves America's national interests in that region. I do not believe we 
should roll back that decision today.
  Third, the bill creates a new category of political asylum for 
persons fleeing coercive population practices. I have opposed this 
provision from its inception because I believe it may open a floodgate 
of false claims for immigrants from certain countries not otherwise 
able to enter the United States.
  Fourth, the conference report restores several provisions that 
require withholding of U.S. contributions to the United Nations--
provisions that were struck from the Senate bill at my request. I 
believe that we have reached the limits of this nickel-and-dime 
approach to reforming the United Nations and that these narrow 
withholding requirements have become counterproductive. What is needed, 
in my view, is a broader approach to reform. Unfortunately, a provision 
that I added to the Senate bill to require the administration to submit 
to Congress an overall proposal for reforming the United Nations 
consistent with several specific objectives has been dropped from the 
conference report.
  Fifth, this legislation has cherry picked the foreign aid 
authorization

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bill, incorporating a small handful of its most politically popular 
provisions into the broader State Department Authorization bill. This 
approach ensures that no other foreign aid authorization will be 
enacted this year. I worry we are creating a situation in which no 
foreign aid program other than the few in this bill will be authorized 
and, as a result, funding for any others may be blocked.
  Sixth, this authorization legislation does not deal with the 
difficult population issue of international family planning, despite 
the compromise reached in the Foreign Operations Appropriations debate 
stipulating that the matter would be handled in this bill.
  Seventh, the legislation ends the United States housing guarantee 
program, with an exception for our program in South Africa. I tend to 
believe this is an important program that should not be banned by 
statute.
  Mr. President, this is a long list of objections. To weigh them 
against the strengths of the bill's reorganization provisions was no 
easy task. I concluded, however, that the bill on balance is 
worthwhile--largely because its reorganization provisions will bring an 
order to the inevitable downsizing of these agencies that otherwise 
might not exist. I also want to support the Chairman of the Foreign 
Relations Committee. However, I understand the President has reached a 
different conclusion and intends to veto this legislation. If that 
occurs, I cannot give assurances that I would vote to override his 
veto.
  Mr. NICKLES. Mr. President, I want to compliment my friend from North 
Carolina for moving forward a proposal to reduce the size of government 
that was opposed by the Administration and those on the other side of 
the aisle. I think through his persistence we have a bill that may not 
go as far as most of us in the Senate would like to see, but at least 
it is a step in the right direction.
  I do think, however, that the debate on this bill helps to magnify 
the fundamental differences between those on this side of the aisle and 
those on the other side of the aisle.
  When this bill was originally proposed it would have eliminated three 
government agencies, The Agency for International Development [AID], 
The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency [ACDA] and The United States 
Information Agency [USIA] and folded these functions back into the 
State Department. By doing this, the American taxpayer would have saved 
$3.66 billion during the next four years.
  Now we have a bill that calls for the elimination of these three 
agencies, but the bill allows the President to issue a waiver for the 
elimination of two of these three agencies. The result is that the 
American taxpayer will only realize about half of the $3.66 billion in 
savings as originally proposed.
  I want to remind my colleagues how we got from the original version 
of the bill to the Conference Report. This is especially enlightening 
because when the bill was originally proposed, it was hailed as the 
Helms-Christopher plan because the bill mirrored a plan outlined by 
Secretary of State Warren Christopher to eliminate these agencies.
  This is what the January 12, 1995 edition of the Washington Times had 
to say about this bill:

       If imitation is the sincerest form of flattery, then 
     Secretary of State Warren Christopher and Deputy Secretary of 
     State Strobe Talbott ought to be basking in the glow of 
     admiration beaming upon them from Capitol Hill. Jesse Helms 
     and Rep. Benjamin Gilman, chairmen of the Senate and House 
     Foreign Affairs Committees, recently unveiled their plan for 
     the re-invention of the U.S. State Department and--Ta-da--it 
     bore more than a passing resemblance to the plan produced by 
     Messrs. Christopher and Talbott.

  However, when Vice-President Gore and his re-inventing government 
staff got a hold of Secretary Christoper's plan it was fundamentally 
altered. Instead of adopting it, the Vice-President decided to 
streamline these agencies. And since then, according to the August 5, 
1995 edition of Congressional Quarterly, ``the administration . . . has 
mounted a furious effort to kill the Helms bill.''
  Once again, I want to compliment my friend from North Carolina for 
continuing to move this plan as originally proposed forward in the face 
of opposition. He moved the bill through his committee, but when the 
bill got to the floor of the Senate, the Democrats here carried the 
administration's torch and frustrated efforts to eliminate these 
agencies.
  Twice the Senate tried to cut-off debate, and twice, along party 
lines, the Senate was prevented from moving forward on the bill.
  I wish to remind my friends on the other side of the aisle and the 
American people, that the bill does not eliminate the functions of The 
Agency for International Development [AID], The Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agency [ACDA] and The United States Information Agency 
[USIA]. Some have argued that the bill in its original form would have 
eliminated important government functions. I ask how? The bill 
transfers the functions of these agencies to the State Department and 
eliminates the bureaucracy created by these independent agencies.
  I wish to point out again for my colleagues in the Senate, that the 
first bill of the 104th Congress that would have eliminated three 
government agencies faced vigorous opposition by the Democrats in its 
original form. And the watered down version, which we are about to pass 
which would eliminate only one government agency, faces a certain veto 
by the President. This despite the fact that in his state of the union 
address the President said ``the era of the big government is over.''
  I don't think the American people could get a more clear picture of 
who is doing what about the size of government.
  Mr. COHEN. Mr. President, much of the debate today has addressed 
issues that are important but peripheral to the focus of this bill, 
which is the size and organization of the State Department and 
associated foreign policy agencies.
  Going back to the Nixon administration, numerous reviews have been 
conducted by the Foreign Relations Committee, its House counterpart, 
and many executive branch-appointed groups to determine how best to 
streamline the array of foreign policy agencies that exist. My staff at 
the Oversight of Government Management has studied this issue, as well. 
A common theme of these reviews has been that more efficiencies can be 
achieved, and this probably should include the merging of some existing 
agencies. The conference report now before the Senate directs, in 
essence, the elimination of at least one of three agencies--the Agency 
for International Development [AID], the Arms Control and Disarmament 
Agency [ACDA], or the U.S. Information Agency [USIA]--with primary 
focus on AID and ACDA.
  The 1989 House Foreign Affairs Committee report coauthored by 
Congressmen Hamilton and Gilman called for AID's elimination. A 1992 
report by a bipartisan group appointed by AID, itself, called for AID's 
merger into the State Department.
  A decade ago, I cochaired with Harold Brown a study group at the 
Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. We commissioned 
a paper on why ACDA should not be merged into the State Department. 
Quite frankly, despite the best efforts of the author who was an 
advocate of ACDA, the resulting paper produced only weak arguments for 
keeping ACDA as an independent agency.
  Three years ago, Lynn Davis, a protege of Secretary Browns, was 
appointed by the Clinton administration to be Under Secretary of State. 
One of her first initiatives was to push to merge ACDA into the State 
Department, but her effort failed in the face of congressional 
opposition.
  Last year, Secretary Christopher, himself, proposed merging these 
three agencies into the State Department, but his proposal was not 
accepted.
  So the concept of merging ACDA, at least, into the State Department 
is hardly radical. And few would argue that, in after the 
``reinvention'' initiatives undertaken by the current administrator, 
more must be done to reduce the size and improve the effectiveness of 
AID.
  This bill makes clear the desire of Congress to see genuine 
streamlining, talked about for so many years, finally and effectively 
implemented.
  At the same time, legitimate questions have been raised as to whether 
the specific mechanism in the conference report is the best way to go 
about it. Throughout the Reagan and

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Bush administrations, Republicans criticized congressional micromanage- 
ment of the President's foreign policy. Some will ask why now, in 1996, 
we seem to be shifting direction and trying to impose restrictions on 
the President. Even more than in the case of the reorganization 
provisions of the conference report, this is true for many of the 
conference report's policy provisions.
  In this regard, I would highlight sections dealing with the Housing 
Investment Guarantee Program, Vietnamese migrants, and China. Besides 
being unrelated to the core function of this bill, many such provisions 
contain unwise policy prescriptions.
  We should encourage, for example, aid programs that leverage private 
international investment, not terminate such programs as the conference 
report would do. We should encourage enhanced dialogue between United 
States and Chinese officials, rather than discourage it as the 
conference report would do.
  Despite these deficiencies, however, the bill does make progress on 
the decades-old project of streamlining the various foreign policy 
agencies, and so I intend to vote for it.
  If the President does veto the conference report, I hope that we can 
act promptly to rework it into a bill that can be enacted by deleting 
or modifying these objectionable provisions.
  Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum with the 
time to be charged proportionately.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Bennett). Without objection, it is so 
ordered. The time will be charged proportionately, and the clerk will 
call the roll.
  The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Several Senators addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Carolina, managing the 
bill, was seeking recognition.
  The Senator from North Carolina.
  Mr. HELMS. Let us be fair about this thing. This is two Democratic 
Senators. The Senator from Maryland has been waiting around to speak, 
and I want to be sure that he is agreeable to being preceded.
  Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, in the case of the Senator from Maryland, 
will the Chair deem that he has been yielded time by Senator Kerry?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is the Chair's understanding. The Senator 
from Maryland.
  Mr. HELMS. Very well.
  Mr. SARBANES. Mr. President, I yield myself 10 minutes. How much time 
is still available to Senator Kerry?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. He has 67 minutes and 45 seconds.
  Mr. SARBANES. I yield myself 10 minutes of Senator Kerry's time. I am 
authorized to do that.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maryland is recognized.
  Mr. SARBANES. I thank the Chair, and I thank the distinguished 
chairman of the committee.
  Mr. President, I rise in opposition to the conference report. I 
regret that should be the case, because I really do think we should 
make a very strong effort here to develop a bipartisan approach toward 
our foreign policy. But this bill takes us in so many of the wrong 
directions that I simply cannot support it.
  First of all, we must understand that we are in a new period with 
respect to foreign policy. Now that the cold war is over, in my 
judgment the United States needs to bolster its diplomatic, economic, 
and political capacities to influence events around the world. We need 
to anticipate and prevent conflicts through mediation and negotiation. 
We need to promote sustainable development and support human rights in 
order to avoid conflicts, which would then lead to even larger economic 
and human costs. We need to protect our citizens--indeed, all of the 
world's citizens--from disease, environmental degradation, exhaustion 
of natural resources, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, 
terrorism, and trafficking in narcotics.
  These are all issues that transcend national borders. They are 
sapping the vitality and strength of societies all across the world. 
And as the focus shifts to economic matters, we need to expand markets 
for U.S. goods and services and to create a level international playing 
field for American workers.
  Frankly, I think that these things often can be accomplished more 
safely, more effectively, and at lesser cost through carefully designed 
foreign assistance programs and skillful diplomatic engagement than by 
retreat back to our shores, to a new form of isolationism, or by 
resorting routinely to unilateral military intervention. The reliance 
on military force is, of course, our ultimate protection. But many of 
the problems we are now dealing with are amenable to resolution or 
subject to influence well short of that. This is a major change from 
the cold war.
  This legislation undertakes, in effect, to impose on the executive 
branch a reorganization of the foreign policy functions of the 
Government. I am very frank to tell you that I think if the political 
situation were reversed and there were a Democratic Congress trying to 
impose this upon a Republican President, my colleagues on the other 
side of the aisle would be protesting very loudly that this was an 
inappropriate intrusion into the functions of the Chief Executive, an 
improper effort to limit the executive's ability to determine the 
organization of the foreign policy agencies.
  Unfortunately, there is not a shared approach on this bill. It was 
reported out of the committee on a straight party-line vote. It 
confronted a similar situation on the floor until some concessions were 
made. Unfortunately, when we got to conference, most of those 
concessions were abandoned. So the bill now before us is markedly 
different than the bill that passed the Senate.
  I did not support the bill that passed the Senate, and since it has 
worsened in conference, by definition I would not support the 
conference report. But for those who did support the Senate bill, I 
want to underscore the fact that the bill now before us is markedly 
different from what moved out of the Senate. Moreover, in my judgment, 
in virtually every instance it is different in the wrong direction. In 
other words, there is even less reason to support this legislation, and 
more reason to oppose it.
  There are many troubling provisions in this legislation. Let me just 
touch on some of them. I am not going to try to cover them all. I know 
the hour is late, and others wish to speak.
  I have talked about the reorganization proposal that provides for 
mandatory elimination of at least one of the foreign policy agencies. I 
happen to think that these agencies are doing a good job, particularly 
under the restructuring efforts that are taking place internally, and 
in that regard I particularly cite for commendation the efforts at AID. 
Under the able leadership of the Administrator, Brian Atwood, that 
agency has been streamlined and energized in order to do its job more 
effectively.
  Secondly, this authorization bill would have the effect of providing 
caps on appropriations--in other words, of setting ceilings on 
spending--which are far below the levels necessary to conduct foreign 
policy and to sustain our interests overseas. I think we are going to 
face important challenges in the coming years. I do not think we ought 
to hamstring the ability of the Executive to deal with them. I simply 
offer to my colleagues on the other side the proposition that they have 
one of their own now seeking to be the Chief Executive, and they ought 
to stop and think twice whether they would want him hobbled and 
hamstrung, as I believe this legislation would do.
  This legislation imposes very severe cuts in terms of U.S. 
participation at the United Nations. I know for many people, the United 
Nations is not the most popular agency, but let me simply submit to 
you, if we did not have the U.N., we would have to invent it. In many 
instances, the United Nations helps us to achieve important U.S. 
foreign policy objectives. Often when a situation breaks out around the 
world, the first reaction everyone has is, ``Well, the United Nations 
ought to do something about it,'' and, in many instances, the U.N. has 
done something about it very successfully.

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  We are now the largest deadbeat at the U.N. in terms of meeting our 
dues and assessments. I think for a Nation which constantly asserts 
that it is the world's leader, this is a sorry state of affairs. 
Unfortunately, the conference report before us would only exacerbate 
this situation.
  Furthermore, this legislation makes such drastic changes with respect 
to AID that I doubt very much that that agency would be able to 
continue to function in any meaningful manner.
  In that regard, I ask unanimous consent that a letter from 20 
religious and faith-based organizations be printed in the Record at the 
conclusion of my remarks.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  (See exhibit 1.)
  Mr. SARBANES. Mr. President, this is a letter from 20 religious and 
faith-based organizations urging opposition to H.R. 1561.
  Let me quote from that letter urging this opposition to the 
conference report:

       . . . The bill would eviscerate further the U.S. commitment 
     to self-help development for poor people in the developing 
     world.
       We are particularly troubled by the bill's proposal to 
     abolish the Agency for International Development.

  They then go on to say that this would be a misordering of U.S. 
priorities; that support for poverty eradication and self-help 
development should be a primary objective of U.S. foreign aid and that 
it should be administered by an independent agency.
  They then discuss other matters in the legislation about which they 
are very concerned. I think this is a very thoughtful letter, and I 
hope my colleagues will examine it very closely.
  Mr. President, the administration has indicated that they will veto 
this legislation, as I think they should. I have not discussed some of 
the particular regional matters. A number of my colleagues have 
discussed the Taiwan Relations Act and the impact that this has on the 
United States relationship with Taiwan and on our relationship with the 
People's Republic of China. I do not think the provisions that are in 
this legislation have been carefully thought through, and if they were 
adopted we could run a high risk of destabilizing the situation and 
contributing to heightened tensions in the region.
  Others, I know, have talked also about the family planning 
implications of this legislation and the fact that it misses an 
opportunity to correct appropriations restrictions that are having a 
deleterious impact on women and families in the developing world. This 
is voluntary family planning services that we are talking about. It is 
not the abortion issue. I am talking about programs that are designed 
to make family planning information and services safe and accessible, 
programs that have had a positive impact around the world. In fact, 
U.S. foreign assistance does not provide funding for abortion. What we 
are talking about here are international family planning programs which 
have been in place for many, many years and traditionally are strongly 
supported on both sides of the aisle.
  So, in summary, Mr. President, I think this legislation falls well 
short of what we should be enacting into law. I very much regret that 
the end product is, in my view, essentially a partisan affair. We ought 
not to be formulating our foreign policy that way, but that is what has 
happened here.
  I would also like to commend Senator Kerry of Massachusetts, who has 
made a yeoman's effort to reach out in an inclusive way and to try to 
shape reasonable legislation. I very much regret that that was not 
achieved, and I urge my colleagues to vote against the conference 
report.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.

                               Exhibit 1

  20 Religious and Faith-based Organizations Urge Opposition to H.R. 
         1561, the Foreign Relations Revitalization Act of 1995

       Dear Senator: We strongly urge your opposition to the 
     conference report on H.R. 1561, the Foreign Relations 
     Revitalization Act of 1995, when it is considered by the full 
     Senate. The bill would eviscerate further the U.S. commitment 
     to self-help development for poor people in the developing 
     world.
       We are particularly troubled by the bill's proposal to 
     abolish the Agency for International Development. The harm 
     posed by such a proposal is not undone by the provision 
     allowing a presidential waiver of the requirement to abolish 
     two foreign policy agencies. While we support the reform of 
     AID, we do not believe that transferring its functions to the 
     State Department would accomplish such reform. To the 
     contrary, we believe strongly that U.S. assistance for 
     development should be administered by an agency separate from 
     the State Department so that the long-term needs for 
     sustainable development are not sacrificed for short-term 
     political objectives. Assistance in support of political 
     objectives already accounts for the majority of U.S. foreign 
     aid. This, in our view, represents a serious misordering of 
     the priorities that should govern U.S. foreign assistance. We 
     believe that support for poverty eradication and self-help 
     development should be the primary objective of U.S. foreign 
     aid and that it should be administered by an independent 
     agency.
       We are also concerned about the funding levels for a number 
     of programs as authorized in the legislation. We believe that 
     funding for U.S. contributions to international 
     organizations, including the general budget of the United 
     Nations, is inadequate. We also believe that funding for U.N. 
     peacekeeping activities for FY 97 is insufficient. We believe 
     that it is imperative that funding be approved that, at a 
     minimum, will not increase the arrearages in U.S. 
     contributions to the U.N., including peacekeeping activities. 
     Continued U.S. disregard for treaty obligations related to 
     assessed contributions will further undermine U.S. leadership 
     in the world.
       We oppose the militarization of the international narcotics 
     control program and are especially concerned that funding 
     would nearly double in FY 97 to $213 million. The program has 
     proven largely ineffective in reducing the volume of illicit 
     drugs entering the U.S. At the same time it has strengthened 
     foreign militaries that have engaged in serious and 
     systematic human rights violations.
       The bill contains a number of constructive refugee and 
     migration policy provisions that deserve support. We regret 
     that these provisions may not be enacted because of 
     objectionable provisions throughout the rest of the bill.
       We are encouraged by the Administration's statement that 
     the President will veto the bill if it is presented to him in 
     its current form. We hope that there will be sufficient 
     opposition in the Senate to defeat the measure, making such a 
     veto unnecessary. We urge you to oppose the bill.
           Sincerely,
         David Bechmann, President, Bread for the World; Mark 
           Brown, Associate Director for Advocacy, Lutheran Office 
           for Governmental Affairs, Evangelical Lutheran Church 
           in America; Imani Countess, Executive Director, 
           Washington Office on Africa; Michael Dodd, Director, 
           Columban Fathers Justice and Peace Office; Bill Dyer, 
           Justice and Peace Officer, Missionaries of Africa; 
           Richelle Friedman, Lobbyist, NETWORK, A national 
           Catholic Social Justice Lobby; Jaydee R. Hanson, 
           Assistant General Secretary, Ministry of God's 
           Creation, General Board of Church and Society, United 
           Methodist Church; Maureen Healy, Africa Liaison, 
           Society of St. Ursula; Rev. Dan C. Hoffman, Area 
           Executive, Global Ministries of the United Church of 
           Christ/Disciples of Christ; Rev. Elenora Giddings 
           Ivory, Director, Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.), 
           Washington Office; Kathryn J. Johnson, Interim 
           Director, Asia Pacific Center for Justice and Peace; 
           Jay Lintner, Director, Office for Church in Society;/
           United Church of Christ; Erich D. Mathias, Program 
           Associate, Global Ministries of the United Church of 
           Christ/Disciples of Christ; James Matlack, Director, 
           Washington Office, American Friends Service Committee; 
           Timothy A. McElwee, Director, Washington Office, Church 
           of the Brethen; Terence W. Miller, Director, Maryknoll 
           Justice and Peace Office; Richard S. Scobie, Executive 
           Director, Unitarian Service Committee, Lawrence 
           Turnipseed, Executive Director, Church World Service; 
           George Vickers, Executive Director, Washington Office 
           on Latin America; Kathryn Wolford, President, Lutheran 
           World Relief.

  Mr. BINGAMAN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Mexico.
  Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, I yield myself up to 6 minutes off the 
time Senator Kerry has reserved.
  Mr. President, I also oppose the Foreign Relations Revitalization Act 
of 1995. In my view, it is wrongheaded legislation and, if enacted, it 
will undermine our national interests. The legislation, in fact, does 
undermine the President's constitutional mandate to conduct the foreign 
affairs of the Nation. By passing a bill such as this, we would be 
trying to run America's foreign policy out of this Chamber rather than 
allowing the Executive to conduct the Nation's foreign policy.
  Among my concerns about this act is the forced consolidation of 
agencies. By passing the act, we would tell the

[[Page S3139]]

President that he is required to eliminate at least one foreign affairs 
agency, either the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the U.S. 
Information Agency, or the Agency for International Development. When 
the goal becomes putting the Government out of business and wrecking 
departments and agencies in some haphazard approach without carefully 
considering the consequences that a particular agency's termination 
might have, then something has gone very wrong.
  Furthermore, the authorization levels that are provided in the bill 
will force other organizations to retreat further from engagement in 
world affairs.
  America needs to pursue its interests vigorously in international 
affairs and to assure that the interests of American citizens are 
promoted. Withdrawing from the world will only help to make our 
citizens victims of emerging problems to which we will be ill-equipped 
to respond if this bill becomes law.
  The legislation sets authorization ceilings in fiscal years 1996 and 
1997 that are far below the levels necessary to conduct the President's 
foreign policy and to properly maintain U.S. interests abroad in such 
areas as overseas posts, foreign affairs agencies, arms control and 
nonproliferation activities, international organizations and 
peacekeeping, public diplomacy and sustainable development.
  In this bill, the Congress is recklessly venturing into an already 
stressful set of complex problems between the People's Republic of 
China and Taiwan. By amending the Taiwan Relations Act to state that 
the act supersedes the provisions of the 1982 joint communique between 
the United States and China, as the bill instructs, we are certain to 
pour oil on a smoldering flame. Many commentators and scholars argue 
that this would be seen as a repudiation of a critical and stabilizing 
element of the longstanding United States policy toward China.
  This bill also expresses the sense of Congress that the President of 
Taiwan should be admitted to the United States for a visit this year 
with all appropriate courtesies. We have already gone down that road 
once. It seems clear to me that it is foolish, if not dangerous, for us 
to do so once again.
  My list of concerns continues in that that bill prohibits any funds 
from being used to open, expand or operate a diplomatic or consular 
post in Vietnam unless a number of compliance items are met by Vietnam.
  I am not going to debate whether those compliance guidelines are 
important. I believe that they are probably valid things to pursue, but 
not as a condition to establishing an embassy or getting it operating. 
This is cold war legislation that does not appear to recognize that the 
cold war is over and that the world has moved on. It is not appropriate 
for this Chamber to micromanage the President's foreign affairs 
initiatives in this manner.
  On other fronts, the Foreign Relations Revitalization Act compels the 
United States to downgrade its participation in the United Nations, 
significantly restricts our country's ability to coordinate 
peacekeeping efforts and intelligence activities, when global stability 
issues are at stake. Our role in the United Nations is something that 
certainly deserves national discussion and debate, but this bill 
presupposes the answer to that discussion.
  Mr. President, this act should be rejected. It clearly does not 
further the best interests of the American public. I urge my colleagues 
to vote against its passage.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  Mr. NUNN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Georgia.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, how much time do I have?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 117 minutes.
  Mr. NUNN. I will not need all that time. But could I inquire of the 
Chair what happened to my 3 minutes?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. There were three quorum calls, equally 
divided. Each one took 1 minute.

  Mr. NUNN. I thank the Chair. I can assure my colleagues I will not 
need all of my time.
  Mr. President, I rise in strong opposition to the conference report 
on H.R. 1561, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for fiscal years 
1996 and 1997. Although I have a number of problems with the conference 
report, Senator Bingaman from New Mexico and others have identified a 
number of problems that I will identify myself with. I would like to 
focus my remarks on the provisions relating to China.
  Mr. President, I am relieved that tensions in the Taiwan Strait 
appear to be easing in the aftermath of Democratic elections in Taipei. 
We are already very proud of what occurred in Taipei and proud of the 
people in Taiwan for carrying out their democratic elections under 
great pressure from the mainland.
  I am pleased that the Governments of the People's Republic of China 
and Taiwan are now making conciliatory statements. I hope a high level 
of dialogue between these two Governments can take place in the near 
future.
  Mr. President, it would be truly ironic if China and Taiwan begin 
moving down the road to improving their relations while we take actions 
in the U.S. Congress that will further the deterioration in the 
relations between the United States and China. I would find that very 
ironic. But I am afraid that that is what this act will do.
  Before I discuss the specific provisions of this conference report, I 
would note that the Senate passed a concurrent resolution last Thursday 
expressing the Sense of Congress regarding missile tests and military 
exercises by China. As I noted in my floor speech on that concurrent 
resolution, which had bipartisan support and passed by a vote of 97 to 
0, it was ``well-reasoned and responsible and * * * designed to make a 
constructive contribution to the situation.''
  The concurrent resolution reviewed the history of the three joint 
communiques under three different Presidents, noted the adherence to a 
one-China policy by the administrations of Presidents Nixon, Ford, 
Carter, Reagan, Bush, and Clinton, and ``deplored'' China's missile 
tests and military exercises as ``potentially serious threats to the 
peace, security, and stability of Taiwan, and not in the spirit of the 
three United States-China Joint Communiques.''
  The concurrent resolution went on to cite provisions of the Taiwan 
Relations Act and ended by stating that--

       The Government of Taiwan should remain committed to the 
     peaceful resolution of its future relations with the People's 
     Republic of China by mutual decision.

  Mr. President, the concurrent resolution the Senate passed last week 
was responsible and was designed to make a constructive contribution to 
the situation. Unfortunately, the China provisions of the conference 
report are, in my view, not responsible and not constructive.
  I will just go into detail on a couple of the most troublesome 
provisions. Section 1601 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act now 
pending would amend the Taiwan Relations Act to provide that the Act 
supersedes the provisions of the 1982 Joint Communique issued under 
President Reagan.
  Mr. President, if it is a matter of law, and it is, that the Taiwan 
Relations Act supersedes the communique, then that already happened 
without any declaration of the Senate. Less than a week after the 
Senate, without one dissenting vote, specifically pointed to the three 
United States-China Joint Communiques, this act, if it becomes law, 
could be interpreted as nullifying the validity of one of those joint 
communiques.
  Just to go into details of the 1982 Reagan Joint Communique, it 
stated in part that--

       The Chinese Government reiterates that the question of 
     Taiwan is China's internal affair. The message to compatriots 
     in Taiwan, issued by China on January 1, 1979, promulgated 
     a fundamental policy of striving for peaceful 
     reunification of the motherland. The Nine-Point Proposal 
     put forward by China on September 30, 1981, represented a 
     further major effort under this fundamental policy to 
     strive for a peaceful resolution to the Taiwan question.

  Then section 5:

       The United States Government attaches great importance to 
     its relations with China, and reiterates that it has no 
     intention of infringing on Chinese sovereignty and 
     territorial integrity, or interfering in China's internal 
     affairs, or pursuing a policy of ``two Chinas'' or ``one 
     China, one Taiwan.''

  Then section 6:

       Having in mind the foregoing statements of both sides, the 
     United States Government states that it does not seek to 
     carry out a long-term policy of arms sales to Taiwan,

[[Page S3140]]

     that its arm sales to Taiwan will not exceed either in 
     qualitative or quantitative terms, the level of those 
     supplied in recent years since the establishment of 
     diplomatic relations between the United States and China, and 
     that it intends to reduce gradually the sales and arms to 
     Taiwan, leading over a period of time to a final resolution. 
     In so stating, the United States acknowledges China's 
     consistent position regarding the thorough settlement of this 
     issue.

  Mr. President, I believe it is instructive and very important for the 
Senate, because this is an important vote--I do not know whether people 
are listening. I do not know whether people have studied this act. I do 
not know whether people understand the far-reaching implications of 
this, but this is one of the most important votes we will make this 
year.
  I believe it is instructive, particularly for colleagues on the 
Republican side of the aisle, to note that President Reagan issued a 
statement in conjunction with the 1982 Joint Communique, which was 
prepared by the Reagan administration.
  In that statement President Reagan stated that--I am quoting--

       Regarding future U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, our policy, set 
     forth clearly in the communique, is fully consistent with the 
     Taiwan Relations Act.

  Mr. President, if President Reagan was right in that carefully 
crafted statement--this was not a speech off the cuff or a remark he 
made on television or anything of that nature. This was a very 
carefully crafted statement by President Reagan in 1982, that went 
along with the communique with China.
  Again, I want to point out the most important sentence that he said 
in that statement that relates to this act tonight. He states:

       Regarding future U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, our policy, set 
     forth clearly in the communique, is fully consistent with the 
     Taiwan Relations Act.

  Mr. President, the pending legislation strongly implies that 
President Reagan was wrong in this carefully crafted statement in 1982. 
If the Taiwan Relations Act is inconsistent with the 1982 Joint 
Communique, President Reagan was wrong, and this act would be viewed as 
creating a new interpretation of United States-China policy.
  Make no mistake about it: If President Reagan was right in his 
statement, then there is absolutely no need for this act to refer to 
any kind of superseding of the joint communique--if he was correct. If 
he was wrong, all these years under both President Reagan, President 
Bush and under President Clinton, then we have had a communique which 
the State Department, our policy, our three Presidents, have felt was 
consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act and which we have been 
following regarding arm sales and so forth, that, in effect, is now 
being implicitly overruled.
  Do we really want to implicitly take a step tonight that could be 
viewed and certainly will be viewed by China and by others in the world 
as creating a new interpretation of United States-China policy by law? 
Are we prepared to do that? That is what this legislation does. If that 
is what the Senate wants to do tonight, people can go right ahead and 
vote for it. It will pass, and the President will have to decide what 
to do.
  I do not believe the Senate of the United States is focused on this, 
and I do not believe my colleagues thoroughly understand the very 
profound implications of this, in effect, declaration, or implied 
declaration, that the Taiwan Relations Act is inconsistent with 
President Reagan's joint communique with China of 1992.
  To continue quoting President Reagan in the statement he made after 
the joint communique, not part of the joint communique: ``Arms sales 
will continue in accordance with the Act and with the full expectation 
that the approach of the Chinese Government to the resolution of the 
Taiwan issue will continue to be peaceful.''
  Do we want to implicitly overrule that sentence? Do we want to 
implicitly overrule the first sentence that I have already read twice, 
but will read again, ``Regarding future United States arms sales to 
Taiwan, our policy, set forth clear in the communique, is fully 
consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act''? Which of those sentences do 
we want to implicitly state has been superseded by the Taiwan Relations 
Act?
  ``Arms sales will continue in accordance with the Act and with the 
full expectation that the approach of the Chinese Government to the 
resolution of the Taiwan issue will continue to be peaceful.'' Is that 
statement wrong? Is the first statement wrong? That seems to be what we 
are saying.
  ``We attach great significance,'' again, President Reagan's 
statement, ``We attach great significance to the Chinese statement in 
the communique regarding China's `fundamental' policy; and it is clear 
from our statements that our future actions will be conducted with this 
peaceful policy fully in mind.''
  Continuing from President Reagan, ``The position of the United States 
Government has always been clear and consistent in this regard. The 
Taiwan question is a matter for the Chinese people, on both sides of 
the Taiwan Strait to resolve. We will not interfere in this matter or 
prejudice the free choice of, or put pressure on, the people of Taiwan 
in this matter. At the same time, we have an abiding interest and 
concern that any resolution be peaceful. I shall never waiver from this 
fundamental position.''
  Mr. President, this legislation, in effect, says that President 
Reagan did not know what he was doing when he made that statement, that 
the Taiwan Relations Act itself superseded the joint communique, 
because it was inconsistent with it. There is no reason for it to 
supersede the joint communique unless there is an inconsistency. If 
there is no inconsistency, there is no reason to say it supersedes it, 
because the consistent joint communique would not be overruled by a 
consistent United States law, which the Taiwan Relations Act is--it is 
law. There is no doubt about that.
  President Reagan made it clear in his Presidential statement that the 
reduction in arms sales to Taiwan is based upon the premise, as 
expressed in the joint communique, that the Taiwan question will be 
settled peacefully.
  Mr. President, China believes that Taiwan has acted in ways that are 
inconsistent with the one-China policy. No question but that is what 
China believes and is the basis of a lot of their action. Taiwan 
contends it does not seek independence. President Li has said that. 
President Li has also restated his desire for peaceful reunification 
with the mainland.

  China, in my view, has greatly overreacted to its perceptions by 
conducting missile launches and military exercises which I believe are 
inconsistent with the other fundamental principle of settling the 
Taiwan question peacefully. I happen to believe that what China has 
done in recent weeks is counterproductive to its own purpose, which is, 
as stated, eventual peaceful reunification.
  The Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 was enacted at the time of the 
establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and 
China, a diplomatic act which established the principle of one China. 
The Taiwan Relations Act was needed to create a foundation for dealing 
with Taiwan in the aftermath of the end of diplomatic relations with 
the Republic of China. It did not, nor did it need to, refer to the 
one-China principle, because it focused instead on ensuring that the 
Taiwan question was settled peacefully by ensuring that Taiwan had the 
means to defend itself.
  Enactment of section 1601 of this act pending before us now, which is 
the pending conference report, could be interpreted--and I say would be 
interpreted by many--to say that the Taiwan Relations Act is 
inconsistent and even supersedes the principle of one China. I do not 
believe that is what the authors intended to do here. Perhaps they can 
clarify that.
  I am fearful that a number of people in the world, including China 
itself, could very well interpret this legislation as superseding the 
principle of one China. This is a complex, complicated area where words 
really do matter. I think we should be very careful this evening.
  Mr. President, I believe China's provocative military actions have 
been dangerous and counterproductive to China's interest and certainly 
to the interest of stability in that area of the world. I believe that 
China has greatly overreacted on the subject of Taiwan. The enactment 
of this conference report will make the situation worse because it 
would undercut one of the two

[[Page S3141]]

main principles of our relationship with China and could give the 
Chinese--probably would give the Chinese--the impression that the 
United States was no longer willing to live up to its commitments as 
set out in the three joint communiques by President Nixon, President 
Carter, and President Reagan, and followed by the other Presidents, 
including President Bush and President Clinton.
  Mr. President, I believe this legislation, if it passed and became 
law, would be a very, very serious mistake, one of the most profound 
mistakes this Congress has made and probably any Congress has made in 
recent years. I think it would take our troubled relations with China 
and turn them into a real downward spiral of additional trouble.
  Mr. President, I also would like to call the Senate's attention to 
section 1702 of the act, the Declaration of Congress Regarding U.S. 
Government Human Rights Policy Toward China. Within this section, it is 
expressed in the sense of the Congress that ``The President should 
decline the invitation to visit China until and unless there is a 
dramatic overall progress on human rights in China and Tibet and 
communicate to the Government of China that such a visit cannot take 
place without such progress.''
  Mr. President, this is exactly what we have done in this country 
under two Presidents, President Bush and President Clinton, for the 
last 7 years. It does not appear to be working very well. This is 
basically a freezing, if we took the sense of the Congress seriously--
if the President did--a freezing of the status quo.
  Mr. President, while I believe it is counterproductive to our own 
goals to make human rights in China the centerpiece and the be-all and 
end-all of United States-Chinese relations, I do not think we further 
our goals when we do that, including our human rights goals. The United 
States has a strong interest in seeing respect for human rights improve 
in China and, indeed, all over the world. The enactment of this 
provision or any provision similar to it would run counter to the very 
actions the United States must take in order to address and help 
constructively resolve the differences between the United States and 
China, including, but not limited to, progress on human rights.
  Mr. President, I think a lot of people forget that the United States 
has 38,000 troops in Korea. We have the most isolated regime in the 
world, North Korea, that is not only on a quest--or has been up until 
the last year--to become a nuclear power, but also has, according to 
reports, increasing problems with starvation, including predictions by 
most organizations that the problems are going to get worse in the next 
3 or 4 months.
  Mr. President, one of the things that people do not recognize is that 
China has been very, very constructive in terms of the United States' 
position on the Korean Peninsula, both in terms of encouraging North 
Korea to behave in the nuclear area and also encouraging the parties 
there to resolve their differences with dialogue and without a war.
  This is a dangerous situation in Korea. We have 38,000 troops there. 
In our relationship with China, we appear to forget altogether about 
the connection between China and the situation in Korea.
  I do not see how we can do that and keep our minds on our duty to our 
own military forces that are stationed there. But it seems to be 
completely ignored in all of our debates about China. I would say, on 
the one side, people on the left seem to believe that, in China, 10 
dissidents is on the same level, at least, with the whole United States 
question on the Korean Peninsula. People on the right seem to believe 
that we can take positions that basically unravel, or at least 
implicitly unravel, communiques entered into by Presidents Reagan, 
Carter, and Nixon, and we can do that with impunity, and we can forget 
any relationship between what we do vis-a-vis China in terms of keeping 
our agreements, and what they may do regarding helping us resolve the 
Korean situation peacefully.
  There are a lot of other mutual interests we have with China, but 
they get lost in this atmosphere. Perhaps they will continue to get 
lost until we have the kind of high-level dialogue between the 
President of the United States and the President of China, and between 
our Secretary of State and their Foreign Minister, that can begin to 
talk about mutual interests and resolve the differences, which are 
differences of considerable importance, within the framework of working 
as partners with mutual interests. That is not possible in the current 
atmosphere.
  But what this bill says is that we should place human rights in China 
and in Tibet above anything else. The Korean Peninsula, the nuclear 
quest for arms in Korea, the 38,000 American troops that are in Korea, 
the stability of Northeast Asia, and even Taiwan-China relations. We 
are saying--if you take this seriously--that the President should not 
have any kind of visit to China until they act, in American terms, 
acceptably on human rights both in China and Tibet.
  Mr. President, on human rights, I think the United States is unique. 
But we will really be unique if we take this resolution seriously, 
because we would be the only country in the world that takes that 
position. Not a single ally--not one--has taken the position that their 
head of State should not visit China. That is what we are saying here--
that the President should not visit China.
  Mr. President, maybe we do not take these sense-of-the-Congress 
resolutions seriously. They are not law, and would not be binding the 
President. If we do not take them seriously and they are not important, 
how do we expect anybody else to take them seriously? Unfortunately, 
when we put resolutions like this in the bill, the only people that 
take them seriously are the people they affect adversely. And they 
react adversely. So I do not know what we are really trying to say 
here. But I know it is counterproductive. It would postpone, if not 
preclude, efforts to establish a much-needed strategic dialogue between 
the United States and China. Clearly, the dialog with China is more 
important than ever at this time-- unless we really want to go into a 
period of years of cold war and dangers of something far worse than 
cold war, in that part of the world.
  For the strategic dialogue between the United States and China to be 
successful in working to resolve our differences, participation is 
required on the highest levels of leadership. That means the President 
of the United States has an active role to play, whether it be 
President Clinton or President Dole in 1997. How soon this resolution 
would apply to ``President'' Dole, saying to him, ``You should not have 
any Presidential visit or dialog with China until they meet our terms 
on human rights''--I really have a hard time believing that we are 
serious about saying this.
  So whichever President is elected in 1996, that is what this 
resolution is saying. This is indefinite. This resolution says we do 
not think you should ever visit China until you have resolved the human 
rights questions in China and Tibet to our satisfaction.
  Mr. President, we have not treated any other country in the world 
this way. We do not treat Russia that way right now. We expect the 
President of the United States to meet with President Yeltsin, but most 
of us deplore what is happening in Chechnya, the continued killing of a 
tremendous number of innocent people there. We do not say to the 
President, ``Do not visit Russia.''

  Mr. President, people forget that we are very proud of what Taiwan 
has done. Taiwan had an election under very serious pressure. We are 
proud of their economic progress. All of us have very close friends in 
Taiwan. These are some of the most productive, energetic people in the 
world. And this country is always going to have a very friendly 
relationship with the people in Taiwan.
  We were very patient with Taiwan. They were not a democracy, in our 
sense of the word, for years and years. We are celebrating democracy 
now. For 35 years, we supported Taiwan when they were not a democracy. 
We have had the same thing with the South Koreans. We celebrate what is 
happening in South Korea now, with the democratic election of a 
President. We went for years and years and years, where we spent 
literally billions of dollars helping defend South Korea when they did 
not meet our definition of human rights. It is only in recent years 
that they have. And now we single out China and say, ``We do not want 
our

[[Page S3142]]

President talking to you, or visiting you, or having any dialogue with 
you, until you meet our definition of human rights.''
  I really do not believe the Senate of the United States wants to say 
this tonight. That is what we will say if we pass this resolution.
  Mr. President, 7 years have passed since an American President, or 
Vice President, has journeyed to Beijing, or the President, or premier, 
of China has been in Washington. This provision would say to the 
President: ``please do not change this situation. This is a great 
policy. It is really working.'' Well, is it working? Does anybody think 
that helped our relations? I think this is a fundamental error that 
would be damaging to United States-China relations and United States 
foreign policy.
  This conference report's provisions attempt to deal with differences 
with China by prohibiting initiatives and efforts that would help 
resolve the very differences that we are frustrated about.
  Quoting from a speech I gave on China about 3 weeks ago:

       Not only must our expectations be realistic, but we cannot 
     wait to engage extensively with China until it has become 
     more like us. . . . We must engage with China and its current 
     leaders now. . . . China's transition and its potential 
     impels America, insofar as possible, to be actors on the 
     scene.

  Mr. President, China is determined to preserve the areas it considers 
part of China, including Taiwan, Hong Kong, Macao, and Tibet. Passage 
of this legislation will inevitably cause China to harden its position. 
We should not make miscalculations regarding this.
  From the Chinese perspective, Tibet, like Taiwan, is considered to be 
an issue of sovereignty to be resolved internally by China and Tibet. 
In the Foreign Relations Authorization Act pending before us, it is 
expressed as the sense of Congress that ``Tibet * * * is an occupied 
country under the established principles of international law.'' That 
is what we are saying in this bill.
  Mr. President, as a matter of fact, longstanding United States policy 
is that Tibet is part of China. That is not a new policy by the Clinton 
administration. We have had that policy through a number of 
administrations. This is also shared by every member of the United 
Nations. Even the Dalai Lama does not go as far as this conference 
report. What are we doing? What are we doing? Do we know?
  Mr. President, I view with concern section 1303 of the act, which 
advocates establishing a special envoy for Tibet. That is what we are 
voting on. This provision would have the United States establish a 
level of official relations with Tibet--if you take it seriously--that 
undermines our longstanding, established Tibetan policy. More 
important, this provision would weaken our ability to influence Chinese 
policies in Tibet and would greatly weaken our influence to protect the 
people in Tibet from abuses, which we all know have occurred.
  My specific concerns are as follows: The proposed duties of the 
special envoy would duplicate and, I believe, greatly undercut 
responsibilities already being discharged by the United States State 
Department--that is, promoting dialog between the Dalai Lama and the 
Chinese Government concerning the religious and cultural integrity of 
Tibet and discussing the human rights problems in Tibet with Chinese 
Government officials.
  The President has already appointed, the Senate has confirmed, and 
the Chinese Government has accepted an envoy to all of China--and that 
is the United States Ambassador, resident in Beijing--our former 
colleague, Ambassador Sasser.
  The Chinese Government, in my view, would refuse to accept a special 
envoy for Tibet, and would in all likelihood make regular travel to 
Tibet impossible for United States diplomats.
  Is that what we want? Do we want to imply that Tibet is separate from 
China, and do we want to have a separate United States envoy, and 
probably in all likelihood result in virtually cutting off access of 
the United States to Tibet? Is that what we want? Because that is what 
we are voting on.
  Mr. President, this provision in my view would be counterproductive 
to its intended purpose. I am sure the purpose of the provision is to 
help the people of Tibet. My view is that it would be totally 
counterproductive to that end. The United States can maintain and 
promote good relations between the Dalai Lama and his representatives. 
We can promote the need for substantive negotiations to take place 
between the Dalai Lama, or his representatives, and senior members of 
the Government of China. We can coordinate United States Government 
policies, programs, and projects concerning Tibet, and we can carry out 
any other actions the President deems necessary with regard to Tibet 
without the need to establish a special envoy in the process.
  The United States cannot solve the question of Tibet on the floor of 
this Congress. Only the people in Tibet and the people all over China, 
including Tibet, can resolve their differences. A special envoy could 
neither contribute to this dialogue nor foster a solution, but is 
likely to be totally counterproductive.
  I will close by making just one additional observation on another 
provision, without getting into detail. Some of my other colleagues 
have already spoken on this. Section 1708 of the pending authorization 
bill states that ``the President of Taiwan should be admitted to the 
United States for a visit in 1996 with all appropriate courtesies.'' 
Mr. President, this provision, to say the least, is unwise at this 
point in time--unless we want to deploy our aircraft carriers, several 
of them, to the region, and spend a great deal of the next several 
years in the Taiwan Strait.


                         Privilege of the Floor

  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Maurice 
Hutchinson, legislative fellow of my staff, be admitted privileges of 
the floor during the consideration of the bill.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I reserve the remainder of my time.
  Mr. PELL addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Rhode Island is recognized.
  Mr. NUNN. Does anyone else have time at this point?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts has 52 minutes, 
and the Senator from North Carolina has 37 minutes.
  Mr. NUNN. I yield to the former chairman of the Foreign Relations 
Committee and ranking Democrat, Mr. Pell, whatever time he desires.
  Mr. PELL. Mr. President, I thank my colleague.
  Mr. President, I regret that I am unable to support this conference 
report on H.R. 1561, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, fiscal 
years 1996 and 1997. I recognize that House and Senate Republican 
conferees have attempted to find a middle-ground between the respective 
bills passed by each House and that this conference report is an 
improvement over the House-passed bill. Although there are some 
provisions in the bill that I support, I believe the bill is 
fundamentally flawed in four areas--reorganization of the foreign 
affairs agencies, funding for the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency 
and for our contributions to the United Nation, and American policy 
toward China.
  This bill requires the President to abolish one of the foreign 
affairs agencies--AID, USIA, or CDA. There is no doubt that this is an 
improvement over the original language in the House bill, which 
mandated the abolishment of all three of these agencies. However, this 
conference report falls far short of the Senate bill, which sought to 
force consolidation through savings rather than the mandatory abolition 
of agencies. The Senate bill preserved the President's constitutional 
right to determine how to organize those agencies which carry out the 
foreign policy directives of the President of the United States. The 
conference report takes that away. I cannot support a bill which 
crosses this line and abolishes an important foreign affairs agency 
simply for the sake of abolishment. On an issue such as this I feel it 
is important for the Congress to acknowledge the prerogative of the 
President to organize the foreign affairs agencies in a manner which 
best serves the nation's interests and the President's foreign policy 
priorities.
  As a strong supporter of ACDA and its mission, I am deeply disturbed 
by the inadequate funding levels for ACDA in this bill. The fiscal year 
1996 authorization of $35.7 million represents a 28

[[Page S3143]]

percent reduction from the fiscal year 1995 level. The fiscal year 1997 
authorization of $28 million is not only a 44 percent reduction from 
the fiscal year 1995 level, but cuts ACDA so deeply that it can no 
longer carry out its core missions, such as being our watchdog on 
proliferation, verifying arms control agreements, and monitoring 
compliance with new agreements. This is a foolish and costly approach 
at a time when our needs in the area of arms control are increasing, 
not decreasing.
  The conference report also fails to authorize the necessary funds for 
the United States to pay assessed contributions to the United Nations 
and its related agencies. I agree that we need to do all that we can to 
force the United Nations to adopt serious management and financial 
reforms but failing to meet our treaty obligations is not the way to 
achieve this goal. It simply diminishes our influence and encourages 
other nations to take the same, ill-advised approach.
  Finally, section 1601 of the conference report amends the Taiwan 
Relations Act [TRA] of 1979, to say that the provisions of the Act 
relating to arms sales to Taiwan supersede any provision of the joint 
communique, signed between the United States and China in 1982, 
limiting such arm sales. I believe this provision was added out of 
genuine concern for the people of Taiwan, a concern I share. But I also 
believe that this is the wrong approach to Taiwan's security problem 
and the wrong time to take it.
  Our relationship with the People's Republic of China is at one of its 
lowest points in history, certainly the lowest point since the 
Tiananmen massacre. We have major disputes with the Chinese on a number 
of serious issues, ranging from trade to human rights to proliferation 
of weapons of mass destruction. While we will not back away from any of 
these issues, it is important that both governments act prudently and 
not unnecessarily damage the relationship further. But this bill does 
the opposite, by undercutting the basis for United States-Chinese 
relations. Section 1601 constitutes a unilateral revision of one of the 
cornerstones of the bilateral relationship. Adopting a measure like 
this would certainly cause a backlash from Beijing, by playing into the 
hands of hard liners in the Chinese leadership and aiding them in their 
attempt to promote an anti-Western, anti-United States agenda.
  I also think this approach is likely to fail in its fundamental 
purpose of advancing Taiwan's security. For almost 3 weeks, we saw 
tensions rise in the Taiwan Strait as China tested M-9 missiles and 
held massive military exercises in an attempt to intimidate a Taipei it 
fears is heading toward a declaration of independence, aided by foreign 
powers. Just this week, after Taiwan's historic presidential election 
on Saturday, we are seeing some initial positive signs that both 
governments are reaching out to each other in order to move back toward 
a more stable relationship. A reversal of U.S. arms sales policy at 
this time would certainly hamper those efforts. It is very much in 
Taiwan's security interest that all three capitals work to defuse 
tensions, not inflame them. Section 1601 would further damage already 
strained relations with Beijing and likely endanger, rather than 
strengthen Taiwan. It is the wrong policy at the wrong time.
  Mr. President, for these reasons, I intend to vote against this 
conference report. The President has indicated that he will veto this 
bill over the issues I have discussed as well as some others, and I ask 
unanimous consent that the administration's statement to that effect be 
printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

    Statement of Administration Policy H.R. 1561--Foreign Relations 
                       Revitalization Act of 1995

       If the conference report on H.R. 1561 is presented to the 
     President in its current form, the President will veto the 
     bill. While steps have been taken to improve the bill, it 
     still contains numerous provisions which do not serve U.S. 
     foreign policy or U.S. national interests.
       The principal reasons for the veto are:
       Forced Consolidated of Agencies. The legislation interferes 
     with the President's prerogatives to organize the foreign 
     affairs agencies in a manner that best serves the Nation's 
     interests and the Administration's foreign policy priorities. 
     This bill mandates the abolition of at least one foreign 
     affairs agency, and includes authorization levels that would 
     force other organizations to retreat further from engagement 
     in world affairs. The Administration has already implemented 
     significant reinvention of and reductions in international 
     programs and is working towards further streamlining and 
     reorganization. H.R. 1561 fails to provide, however, the 
     necessary flexibility for the Administration to manage the 
     agencies that implement foreign policy, which is essential to 
     United States leadership.
       Authorization of Appropriations. The authorization levels 
     included in the bill for FYs 1996 and 1997, which constitute 
     ceilings on appropriations, are below the levels necessary to 
     conduct the President's foreign policy and to maintain U.S. 
     interests overseas in such areas as operating overseas posts 
     of foreign affairs agencies, arms control and 
     nonproliferation, international organizations and 
     peacekeeping, public diplomacy, and sustainable development. 
     In addition, these levels would cause reduction-in-force 
     (RIFs) of highly skilled personnel at several foreign affairs 
     agencies.
       Taiwan Relations Act. Section 1601 amends the Taiwan 
     Relations Act to state that the Act supersedes the provisions 
     of the 1982 Joint Communique between the United States and 
     China. This would be seen as a repudiation of a critical and 
     stabilizing element of long-standing U.S. policy towards 
     China, increasing risks at a time of heightened tensions.
       Relations with Vietnam. Section 1214, concerning the use of 
     funds to further normalize relations with Vietnam, unduly 
     restricts the President's ability to pursue national 
     interests in Vietnam, and in particular could threaten the 
     progress that has been made on POW/MIA issues and put U.S. 
     firms at a competitive disadvantage. Legislation which 
     restricts the opening of missions also raises constitutional 
     concerns.
       U.S. Participation in International Organizations. 
     Provisions related to U.S. participation in the United 
     Nations, which provide inadequate funding levels for FYs 1996 
     and 1997, and unworkable notification requirements would 
     undermine U.S. diplomatic efforts to reform the U.N. and to 
     reduce the assessed U.S. share of the U.N. budget. 
     Furthermore, the provisions could interfere with ongoing 
     Executive-Legislative Branch discussions aimed at achieving a 
     consensus on UN funding and reform issues.
       Housing Guaranty Program. Section 1111 would terminate 
     several worthwhile country program, such as those in Eastern 
     Europe and would eliminate any future programs, including 
     those for South Africa. Additionally, this provision could 
     inadvertently cause the cut-off of development assistance to 
     many of the poorest countries of the world, as well as the 
     cut-off of Economic Support Fund (ESF) anti-crime and 
     narcotics-related assistance.
       Family Planning. The conference report fails to remedy the 
     severe limitations on U.S. population assistance programs 
     placed in the FY 1996 foreign operations appropriations 
     legislation. These restrictions will have a major, 
     deleterious impact on women and families in the development 
     world. It is estimated that nearly 7 million couples in 
     developing countries, will have no access to safe, voluntary 
     family planning services. The result will be millions of 
     unwanted pregnancies and abortions.

  Mr. PELL. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I am going to suggest the absence of a 
quorum, but I want to ask unanimous consent that all quorum calls 
henceforth be charged proportionately.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it is 
so ordered.
  Mr. HELMS. I thank the Chair.
  I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, this has been cleared on both sides. I ask 
unanimous consent that the vote on the conference report occur at 9 
p.m. tonight, with the time between now and the vote to be divided as 
follows: Senator Biden, for up to 20 minutes, and all remaining time 
under the control of Senator Dole, the majority leader, or his 
designee.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. HELMS. I thank the Chair. I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

[[Page S3144]]

  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

                          ____________________