CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION
(Senate - April 24, 1997)

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[Pages S3570-S3658]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                      CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

  The Senate continued with the consideration of the convention.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The pending business before the Senate is 
ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention.
  The Senator from North Carolina has 1 hour and 20 minutes. The 
Senator from Delaware has 46 minutes.
  Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I yield 7 minutes to my friend from New 
York.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New York.
  Mr. MOYNIHAN. I thank the Chair.
  May I ask my good friend if he didn't wish that the time be charged 
to the Senator from Delaware?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time will be charged to the Senator from 
Delaware.
  Mr. MOYNIHAN. I thank the Chair. I thank my dear friend, the 
chairman.
  Mr. President, I rise in support of the resolution of ratification. I 
will take just a moment of the Senate's time to put this matter in a 
historical context.
  Since its development by 19th century chemists, poison gas--as it was 
known--has been seen as a singular evil giving rise to a singular cause 
for international sanctions.
  In May 1899, Czar Nicholas II of Russia convened a peace conference 
at The Hague in Holland. Twenty-six countries attended and agreed upon 
three conventions and three declarations concerning the laws of war. 
Declaration II, On Asphyxiating or Deleterious Gases stated:

       The Contracting Parties agree to abstain from the use of 
     projectiles the sole object of which is the diffusion of 
     asphyxiating or deleterious gases.

  Article 23 of the Annex to the Convention added:

       In addition to the prohibitions provided by special 
     Conventions, it is especially forbidden:
       (a) To employ poison or poisoned weapons * * *

  Our own Theodore Roosevelt called for a second peace conference which 
convened in 1907. This time, 45 countries were in attendance at The 
Hague, and reiterated the Declaration on Asphyxiating Gases and the 
article 23 prohibition on poisoned weapons.
  The Hague Conventions notwithstanding, poison gas was used in World 
War I. Of all the events of the First World War, a war from which this 
century has not yet fully recovered, none so horrified mankind as gas 
warfare. No resolve ever was as firm as that of the nations of the 
world, after that war, to prevent gas warfare from ever happening 
again.
  Declaring something to be violation of international law does not 
solve a problem, but it does provide those of us who adhere to laws 
mechanisms by which to address violations of them. In June 1925, the 
Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, 
Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare was 
signed in Geneva. This reaffirmed the Hague prohibition and added 
biological weapons to the declaration.
  In the Second World War that followed, such was the power of that 
commitment that gas was not used in Europe. It was expected, but it did 
not happen.
  Then came the atom bomb and a new, even more important development in 
warfare. In time it, too, would be the subject of international 
conventions.
  As part of the peace settlement that followed World War II, President 
Roosevelt, with the British, Chinese, and French, set up the United 
Nations. In 1957, within the U.N. system, the International Atomic 
Energy Agency was established. The new agency fielded an extraordinary 
new device, international inspectors, who began inspecting weapons 
facilities around the world to ensure compliance. This was enhanced by 
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which came into force in 
1970, allowing inspectors to monitor declared nuclear sites. This was 
an unheard of compromise of traditional sovereignty. It has not worked 
perfectly. The number of nuclear powers, or proto-nuclear powers, has 
grown somewhat. But only somewhat: around 10 in a world with some 185 
members of the United Nations. And never since 1945 has a single atomic 
weapon been used in warfare.
  The Chemical Weapons Convention incorporates the advances in 
international law and cooperation of which I have spoken; it extends 
them. Its inspections can be more effective than the IAEA because of 
the ability to conduct challenge inspections when violations of the CWC 
are suspected.
  If the Senate should fail--and it will not fail--to adopt the 
resolution of ratification, it would be the first rejection of such a 
treaty since the Senate in 1919 rejected the Treaty of Versailles, with 
its provision for the establishment of the League of Nations. It would 
be only the 18th treaty rejected by the Senate in the history of the 
Republic.
  Every living Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff over the past 20 
years has called for ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention.
  Our beloved former colleague, Senator Bob Dole, has given his support 
and asked us to do what I think we can only describe as our duty. The 
President pleads.
  Here I would note a distinction. In 1919, Woodrow Wilson could have 
had the Versailles Treaty, we could have joined the League of Nations, 
if only he had been willing to make a modicum of concessions to then-
chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee and majority leader, Henry 
Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts. Wilson was too stubborn; in truth, and it 
pains an old Wilsonian to say so, too blind. Nothing such can be said 
of President Clinton. In a month of negotiations with the current 
chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee and the current Republican 
leader, the administration has reached agreement on 28 of 33 
conditions. Only five proved unacceptable. And, indeed, sir, they are. 
The President could not in turn ratify a treaty with those conditions.
  Again to draw a parallel with 1919. During consideration of the 
Treaty of Versailles, the Senate was divided into three primary camps: 
those who supported the treaty; those who opposed the treaty, no matter 
what shape or form it might take--known as ``irreconcilables'' or 
``bitter enders''--and those who wanted some changes to the treaty, 
most importantly led by Senator Lodge.
  There are some modern day irreconcilables who oppose this Treaty for 
the same reason they eschew international law: viewing it as an 
assertion of what nice people do. Such a view reduces a magisterial 
concept that there will be enforced standards to a form of wishful 
thinking. A position which runs counter to a century of effort. Today I 
would appeal to those Republicans who might compare themselves with 
Senator Lodge. Unlike 1919, this President has heard your concerns and

[[Page S3571]]

worked carefully to address them in the form the resolution of 
ratification containing 28 conditions which is now before the Senate.
  To fail to ratify the CWC would put us on the side of the rogue 
states and relieve them of any pressure to ratify the convention 
themselves. As Matthew Nimitz has argued, the United States has a 
unique interest in international law because it cannot ``match the 
Russians in deviousness or the Libyans in irresponsibility or the 
Iranians in brutality * * *. [It is the United States] which stands to 
lose the most in a state of world anarchy.''
  The Chemical Weapons Convention builds on the laws of The Hague: a 
century of arms control agreements. It bans chemical weapons--hideous 
and barbaric devices--completely. International law can never offer 
perfect protection, but we are primary beneficiaries of the protection 
that it does provide. I urge my colleagues to support this important 
treaty.
  I thank the Chair. I yield the floor.
  Might I ask? Does time run consecutively and is it divided equally?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Yes. It will be divided equally.
  Mr. MOYNIHAN. I thank the Chair.
  Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I yield 3 minutes to my friend from 
Minnesota.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Minnesota.
  Mr. WELLSTONE. I thank the Chair.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a congressional fellow 
from my office, Ashley Tessmer, be allowed in the Chamber during the 
Chemical Weapons Convention debate.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President, the Chemical Weapons Convention goes 
into force April 29 with or without U.S. participation. This, after 
more than 100 years of international efforts to ban chemical weapons, 
including the Hague Convention of 1889 and the Geneva Protocol of 1925 
which placed restrictions on the use of chemical weapons. The history 
of chemical weapons use is a long one--from 1915 with the German use of 
chlorine gas in Belgium during World War I, to the Iraqi use of poison 
gas to kill an estimated 4,000 people in the Kurdish village of Halabja 
in 1988, and the very recent threat of chemical weapons use in the 
Persian Gulf war.

  These chemical weapons are dangerous--not only because of 
intentional, but also accidental use. In Minnesota, I've listened to 
many gulf war veterans who've told me about their experiences during 
the conflict. Much is still unknown about chemical weapons use in the 
gulf and there is great concern throughout the Minnesota veterans 
community. I've seen the tragic effects of this when I've met with gulf 
war veterans who went to the gulf in perfect health but became 
seriously ill after they returned. While many are uncertain about the 
causes of their illnesses, they suspect that exposure to toxic chemical 
agents was a factor.
  Mr. President, I want to tell my colleagues about a story I recently 
heard concerning veterans who were part of the 477th Ambulance Company 
who may have been exposed to toxic chemicals. After the war, a couple 
of company members went exploring the area nearby and noticed a spill 
on the floor of a warehouse. There's no way of knowing now exactly what 
the substance was, but they are concerned about possible exposure to a 
nerve agent. They were alarmed because even this kind of low-level 
exposure can be a serious threat to our soldiers' safety and health. 
The plea from the Minnesotan who told this story is, ``Please! Get 
everyone to stop using this junk!'' Well, that is exactly what we are 
trying to do, and ratifying the CWC is a vital step in that direction. 
If we don't sign up, America's soldiers--and indeed, all Americans--
will be the worse for it.
  Another Minnesotan who was a nuclear-biological-chemical warfare 
specialist during the war talked about the panic and incorrect use of 
protective equipment that occurred when there were scud alerts 
accompanied by CBW alerts. There were soldiers who just couldn't handle 
the threat of possible chemical attacks. And why should we be 
surprised? The use of chemical weapons is inhuman and even the 
perceived threat has to be psychologically damaging. These stories just 
strengthen my resolve to do all I can to push for ratification of this 
treaty.
  Mr. President, we face a decision between taking a lead role in this 
effort or standing on the sidelines--this decision should not be 
difficult for the United States which historically has taken the lead 
in arms control, seeking agreements that are in the national interest, 
verifiable, and contribute to world peace. I repeat in the national 
interest, verifiable, and contribute to world peace. And there is no 
question in my mind that the CWC fully meets these standards.

  To me, it is a great mystery why this treaty is not already ratified. 
After all, Congress directed in 1985 that all U.S. chemical munitions 
be destroyed by 1999--since amended to 2004. Subsequently in 1993, the 
United States became one of the original signatories of the CWC, now 
awaiting ratification by this body. It would seem that there's nothing 
so dramatic as waiting until the last minute to make an obvious and 
sensible decision. This international treaty takes a major step forward 
in the elimination of the scourge of chemical weapons. As the world's 
only superpower and leader in the fight for world peace, we must be out 
front on this convention.
  This treaty itself has a very interesting and solid bipartisan 
history as well as strong popular support, and I am mystified as to why 
some of my colleagues want to reject a treaty for which we are largely 
responsible. The CWC was conceived during the Reagan administration, 
crafted and signed during the Bush administration and further 
negotiated during the Clinton administration. Former President Bush has 
continued to proclaim strong support for ratification. Its bipartisan 
creditials are thus impeccable. Legislators and national security 
experts from both parties firmly support it. Former Secretary of State 
James Baker argues that it is outrageous to suggest that either 
Presidents Bush or Reagan would negotiate a treaty that would harm 
national security. President Clinton sees the accord as building on the 
treaty than bans nuclear tests in the atmosphere that President Kennedy 
signed more than three decades ago. The Senate now needs to complete 
the weapons-control work to which Presidents Kennedy, Reagan and Bush 
and Clinton were and have been committed.
  By at least restricting the manufacture, sale, and possession of 
toxic chemicals capable of being used as weapons, the United States 
makes it more difficult for rogue nations or terrorist organizations to 
obtain the raw material for weapons. Ultimately, we then better protect 
our soldiers and civilians. We should help lead the world away from 
these graveyard gases, and not pretend they are essential to a solid 
defense. Do we plan to use chemical weapons? No. Then do we lack the 
courage to lead? I certainly hope not.
  Mr. President, according to Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, 
the United States is the only nation with the power, influence, and 
respect to forge a strong global consensus against the spread of 
weapons of mass destruction.
  There is also support for this treaty from the armed services. I have 
the unique perspective of serving on both the Foreign Relations 
Committee and the Committee on Veterans' Affairs. I know that many 
veterans organizations support this treaty--VFW, VVA, Reserve Officers 
Association of U.S., American Ex-prisoners of War, AMVETS, Jewish War 
Vets to name a few. What better testimony to its value? The treaty will 
reduce world stockpiles of weapons and will hopefully prevent our 
troops from being exposed to poison gases. And, for my colleagues who 
are still not convinced on the merits of the treaty--over three 
quarters of the American public--as much as 84 percent in a recent 
poll, favors this treaty.

  But why then are there opponents to this treaty? I cannot answer 
that. I can only say that it is always easier to tear something down 
than it is to build it. Ask ethnic minorities in Iraq--who

[[Page S3572]]

were the victims of Saddam's chemical attacks--why there are opponents. 
Ask Generals Schwartzkopf and Powell why there are opponents. According 
to General Powell, this treaty serves our national interest--to quote 
his comments at last week's Veterans' Affairs Committee hearing: ``For 
us to reject that treaty now because there are rogue nations outside 
the treaty is the equivalent of saying we shouldn't have joined NATO 
because Russia wasn't a part of NATO.'' If we don't sign this treaty, 
their will still be rogue nations. Ask the State Department, the 
intelligence community, the chemical manufacturers who stand to lose as 
much as $600 million in sales, why there are opponents to this treaty. 
And ask our own gulf war veterans who lived with the fear of chemical 
attack and may now be suffering the effects of exposure to chemicals 
why there are opponents. They and I will never understand it.
  Mr. President, ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention is 
crucial to all nonproliferation efforts. If America's message to the 
world is that the United States is not deeply concerned about the 
production of weapons of mass destruction, then it will encourage rogue 
states to either continue clandestine projects or to begin producing 
these weapons that could imperil U.S. troops in future conflicts. Lack 
of U.S. resolve on the CWC and the unraveling effect it would have on 
other arms control treaties, would make it easier for rogue states in 
two ways: they could more easily acquire chemical weapons materials and 
more effectively hide their production programs. How can we best 
protect the future of our children, our soldiers, our trade, our 
country's position in the world? By ratifying this treaty.
  I'm deeply puzzled as to why, when at long last the Senate is on the 
verge of giving its advice and consent to CWC ratification, we are 
being asked to consider treaty-killer conditions. Again, I remind my 
colleague, this treaty has been more than 15 years in the making with 
two Republican Presidents and one Democratic President involved in 
negotiating and crafting the final product. It is the result of years 
of bipartisan efforts. The CWC has been strongly endorsed by former 
Secretary of State James Baker and former National Security Adviser 
Brent Scowcroft--both of whom served Republican Presidents. It also 
enjoys the support of our top commanders during the Persian Gulf war, 
including General Schwarzkopf, who clearly recognize that it is in our 
national interest to ratify the treaty.

  While I do not question the motives and integrity of my colleagues 
who support these four killer conditions, it is clear that they are not 
a result of insufficient Senate scrutiny and debate. In fact, the CWC 
has been before the Senate since November 1993, when it was submitted 
by President Clinton. During the past 3\1/2\ years, the Senate has held 
17 hearings on the treaty and the administration has provided the 
Senate with more than 1,500 pages of information on the CWC, including 
over 300 pages of testimony and over 400 pages of answers to questions 
for the record. It is important to recall that in April 1996 the Senate 
Committee on Foreign Relations voted the treaty out of committee by a 
strong bipartisan majority, 13 to 5. Why then, only 1 year later, are 
we confronting four conditions, any of which will prevent us from 
ratifying the treaty by April 29 when it will automatically go into 
effect, and a fifth condition that is unacceptable and would undermine 
the treaty?
  Mr. President, I hope that all of my colleagues realize that the 
United States will incur serious costs if we don't submit instruments 
of ratification by April 29. Unless we join the convention now, the 
United States will be barred from having a seat on the executive 
council, the key decisionmaking body of the convention, for at least a 
year and, perhaps, longer. We would thus be precluded from influencing 
vital decisions to be made by the executive council regarding the 
detailed procedures that will be followed under the convention. 
Moreover, sanctions against U.S. companies--the requirement that they 
obtain end-user certificates to export certain chemicals--will commence 
on April 29 if we are not a convention party. If we still haven't 
joined in 3 years, U.S. firms would be subject to a ban on trade in 
certain chemicals. In addition, U.S. citizens won't be hired as 
officials or inspectors by the body that will implement the convention 
until the United States becomes a party to the CWC. And, even more 
important than these costs to the United States, is the fact that 
failure to ratify the treaty, which was produced because of U.S. 
leadership, will have a negative impact on American leadership around 
the world.
  While I will never understand why we have come to such a pass, it is 
crystal clear to me why we have to move to strike all five of these 
conditions. Mr. President, permit me to briefly summarize each of the 
five conditions and to spell out the key reasons why I'm unalterably 
opposed to them:
  CWC condition No. 29 on Russia precludes the United States from 
joining the convention until Russia ratifies and satisfies other 
specified conditions. This is a killer condition that would hold 
hostage our ability to join the CWC to hardliners in the Russian Duma. 
As the President put it, ``this is precisely backwards [since] the best 
way to secure Russian ratification is to ratify the treaty ourselves.'' 
I couldn't agree more with the President, whose position parallels that 
of Vil Myrzyanov, a Russian scientist who blew the whistle on the 
Soviet Union's CW program and strongly backs the treaty. In a recent 
letter to my distinguished colleague, Senator Lugar, he said ``Senate 
ratification of the convention is crucial to securing action on the 
treaty in Moscow.'' Unless, my colleagues join me in striking this 
amendment, we'll be permitting Russian hardliners to decide our foreign 
policy, while dimming prospects that Russia--which has the world's 
largest stockpile of chemical weapons--will ratify the CWC. How can 
this be in our national interest?

  CWC condition No. 30 on rogue states bars the United States from 
ratifying the CWC until all states determined to possess offensive 
chemical weapons programs, including China, North Korea, Libya, Syria, 
Iran, and Iraq, and other states deemed to be state sponsors of 
terrorism, have ratified. This is a killer condition likely to prevent 
the United States from ever joining the CWC. If this condition is not 
struck we would be using the lowest common denominator as a principle 
for determining our foreign policy. The United States would be placed 
in the bizarre and embarrassing position of allowing the world's most 
recalcitrant regimes to determine when we join the CWC, if ever. As 
former Secretary of State James Baker has said: ``It makes no sense to 
argue that because a few pariah states refuse to join the convention 
the United States should line up with them rather than the rest of the 
world.'' Makes no sense at all, which is precisely why I strongly 
support striking this condition.
  CWC condition No. 31 on barring CWC inspectors from a number of 
countries such as Cuba, Iran, Iraq, and North Korea, from ever entering 
the United States as part of CWC inspection teams. This is an 
unnecessary condition that has the potential to seriously hamstring CWC 
implementation. To begin with, the United States already has the right 
under the CWC to bar inspectors on an individual basis each year when 
the CWC proposes its list of inspectors. If this condition is not 
struck, it is likely to provoke reciprocity, resulting in other nations 
blackballing all American inspectors. This would have the perverse 
effect of undermining one of our main objectives in joining the treaty: 
to ensure American inspectors take the lead in finding violations. In 
addition, condition No. 31 would bar inspectors from a country like 
China even if United States national security might be better served by 
letting them confirm directly that the United States is not violating 
the CWC, but fails to require rejection of inspectors from other 
countries who might be known spies or have a record of improper 
handling of confidential data. Because of these serious flaws, I urge 
my colleagues to join me in voting to strike this condition.
  CWC condition No. 32 which prohibits the United States from joining 
the CWC until the President certifies that the parties to the 
convention have agreed to strike article X and amend article XI. This 
provision is an outright killer that will prevent the United States 
from joining the Convention. Clearly the President can't make such a 
certification prior to April, and likely won't ever be able to do so 
since the

[[Page S3573]]

Convention permits a single State party to veto such amendments. 
Proponents of condition No. 32 wrongly contend that the Convention 
requires the United States and other parties to share sensitive 
technology that will assist such countries as Iran to develop offensive 
CW capabilities.

  In fact, Mr. President, neither article X nor article XI have such 
requirements. Article X, which focuses mainly on assisting or 
protecting convention member countries attacked, or facing attack, by 
chemical weapons, provides complete flexibility for states to determine 
what type of assistance to provide and how to provide it. One option 
would be to provide solely medical antidotes and treatments to the 
threatened state. This is precisely the option the President has chosen 
under agreed condition No. 15 which specifies that the United States 
will give only medical help to such countries as Iran or Cuba under 
article X. Moreover, beyond medical assistance, the President has made 
clear the United States will be careful in deciding what assistance to 
provide on a case-by-case basis. In sum, there is no valid 
justification for scrapping article X.
  Opponents of the CWC contend that article XI, which addresses the 
exchange of scientific and technical information, requires the sharing 
of technology and will result in the erosion of export controls now 
imposed by the Australia Group of chemical exporting countries, which 
includes the United States. While this is plainly not the case, the 
President under agreed condition No. 7 is committed to obtain 
assurances from our Australia Group partners that article XI is fully 
consistent with maintaining export curbs on dangerous chemicals. 
Condition No. 7 also requires the President to certify that the CWC 
doesn't obligate the United States to modify its national export 
controls, as well as to certify annually that the Australia Group is 
maintaining controls that are equal to, or exceed, current export 
controls.
  Mr. President, one final point regarding the Condition's proponents 
concern that articles X and XI will require technology that will assist 
other countries to develop offensive chemical weapons programs. 
Exchanges of sensitive technology and information provided under terms 
of both articles would be legally bound by the fundamental obligation 
of treaty article I, which obligates parties never to ``* * * assist 
encourage, or induce, in any, anyone to engage in any activity 
prohibited to a State party under this convention.'' This would ban 
assisting anyone in acquiring a chemical weapons capability.

  I strongly urge my colleagues from both sides of the aisle to join me 
in voting to strike this condition.
  CWC condition No. 33 would prohibit the United States from ratifying 
the CWC until the President can certify high confidence U.S. 
capabilities to detect within 1 year of a violation, the illicit 
production or storage of one metric ton of chemical agent. Since this 
is an unachievable standard for monitoring the treaty, this is a killer 
condition that would permanently bar U.S. participation in the CWC.
  Mr. President, no one can deny that some aspects of the CWC will be 
difficult to verify, nor can anyone affirm that any arms control 
agreement is 100 percent verifiable. And, as Gen. Edward Rowny, who was 
special adviser to Presidents Reagan and Bush, pointed out in the 
Washington Post any chemical weapons treaty is inherently more 
difficult to verify than a strategic arms treaty, under which missiles 
and bombers can be observed by national technical means. For one thing, 
chemical weapons can literally be produced in thousands of large and 
small laboratories around the world. But the bottom line is one made 
succinctly and clearly by General Rowny: ``If we are within the CWC, 
well-trained and experienced American inspectors, employing an agreed 
set of procedures, intensive procedures, will have an opportunity to 
catch violaters. Outside the CWC, no such opportunity will exist.'' I 
couldn't agree more. As in many other matters, the perfect is not only 
unattainable but is also the enemy of the good. I hope than many of my 
colleagues will see this issue in the same light and will join me in 
voting to strike condition No. 33.
  In conclusion, I want to stress that America has always been a leader 
in international arms negotiations. America should continue this proud 
tradition of leading the way. We as a nation have the opportunity to be 
one of the world's leading guardians of the peace through the 
application of this treaty; we can participate in safeguarding our 
armed forces, our citizens, our children from the horrors of chemical 
weapons; we can lessen the likelihood of chemical weapons being used 
again in warfare.
  But to make all this possible, we must have the perspicacity and 
foresight to grab this fleeting opportunity, this historic moment where 
we decide to join with other nations to improve the quality of life 
worldwide and assure a safer, saner world. We have just celebrated 
Earth Day--and I ask what better way to honor our planet is there than 
by now ratifying a treaty that will protect and safeguard her people?
  Mr. President, there is not a lot of time to go through such an 
important issue, but I thought I would just draw from some very 
poignant and personal discussion back in Minnesota that we have had 
with gulf war veterans.
  To quote one of the veterans who himself is really struggling with 
illness which he thinks is based upon some exposure to chemicals during 
his service in the war, he said, ``This is my plea. Please get everyone 
to stop using this junk.''
  I really do think that the more I talk to veterans with their service 
in the gulf war fresh in their mind, many of whom are ill, many of whom 
are struggling with illness, who were fine before they served in the 
war and are not now and want to know what has happened to them, there 
are two different issues. I have the honor of being on both the 
Veterans' Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. One, on 
the Veterans' Committee, is to get to the bottom of this and make sure 
veterans get the care they deserve. But the other is when we have such 
an important treaty, such a historically important agreement which is 
in the national interest, which is verifiable and which contributes to 
world peace and helps us get rid of this junk and is so important not 
only to our soldiers-to-be but also to children and grandchildren, Mr. 
President, I do not think there is any more important vote that we can 
make than one of majority support for the Chemical Weapons Convention.
  In my State of Minnesota, I know that people are overwhelmingly for 
this agreement. People are under no illusion. They do not think it is 
perfect, but they think it is an enormous step forward for all of 
humankind, an enormous step forward for people in our country, an 
enormous step forward for people in other countries as well. Since the 
United States of America has taken a leadership position in the 
international community, in the international arena, it would be, I 
think, nothing short of tragic if we now were on the sidelines, if we 
were not involved in the implementation of this agreement, if we were 
not involved in exerting our leadership in behalf of this agreement.
  I urge full support for this agreement, and I really do think I speak 
for a large, engaged majority in Minnesota.
  I thank the Chair.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. If there is no objection, time will be 
deducted equally.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I withhold my suggestion of the absence of 
a quorum. I yield 7 minutes to my friend from North Dakota.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Dakota.
  Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, today the Senate will vote on the Chemical 
Weapons Convention. President Reagan began the negotiations on this 
treaty. President Bush signed it. And President Clinton sent it to the 
Senate for our advice and consent.
  We do a lot of things in this Chamber. Some of them are small and 
rather insignificant. But we also do some very big and important things 
and make some big and important decisions. The vote this evening on 
this treaty is a very significant decision for the people of America 
and also people around the world.
  There are some who have opposed virtually all efforts in all cases to 
limit arms. They vote against all of the arms

[[Page S3574]]

control treaties, believing that they are not in our country's best 
interests. I think they were wrong, and I think they have been proven 
wrong in a number of areas.
  In previous arms control agreements, we have achieved significant 
success in reducing the nuclear threat against this country. I held up 
in this Chamber--in fact, somewhere right near this spot--not too many 
months ago a large piece of metal that I held up from that missile is 
metal that comes from the scrap heap because the missile does not exist 
any longer.

  In the missile silo that existed, in the hole in the ground in the 
Ukraine, that hole in the ground which contained a missile with a 
warhead ensconced in that silo, there is now simply dirt. And in that 
dirt are planted sunflowers--no missile, no silo--sunflowers.
  Now, why are sunflowers planted where a missile was once planted, a 
missile with a nuclear warhead aimed at the United States of America? 
Because of an arms control agreement which required that that missile 
be destroyed. So sunflowers exist where a missile once stood poised, 
aimed at our country.
  Arms control agreements have worked. This particular convention which 
we will vote to ratify today would eliminate an entire class of weapons 
of mass destruction.
  One could come to the floor of the Senate today and hold up a vial of 
sarin gas, and if one should drop that vial of gas on this desk and it 
would break, those in this room might not be leaving the room; they 
might not survive. If someone came here with a vial and a gas mask and 
wore the mask and appropriate protective clothing, then they would 
suffer no consequences.
  My point is, who are the most vulnerable in our world when there is a 
poison gas or chemical weapon attack? The population of ordinary 
citizens is the most vulnerable. There are armies, if forewarned, that 
can defend themselves against it, but the mass population of citizens 
in our countries is extraordinarily vulnerable to the most aggressive 
poison gas and chemical weapons known to mankind.
  There are a lot of arguments that have been raised against this 
convention, but none of them make much sense. Our country has already 
decided to destroy our stockpile of poison gas and chemical weapons. We 
have already made that decision. President Reagan made that decision. 
We are in the process of finishing that job. The question before the 
Senate is whether we will join in a treaty ratified already by over 70 
other countries, whether we will decide to work to eliminate chemical 
weapons and poison gas from the rest of the world, to decide that if 
ever American men and women who wear a uniform in service of our 
country go abroad or go somewhere to defend our country, they will not 
be facing an attack by chemical weapons or poison gas.
  That is what this debate is about. This is not a small or an 
insignificant issue. This is an attempt by our country and others to 
join together to ban an entire class of weapons of mass destruction.
  Mr. President, I have spoken several times in this Chamber about the 
vote that we are to take today. This vote is late. This debate should 
have taken place long ago, but it did not. We pushed and agitated and 
pushed and pushed some more to get it to the floor of the Senate 
because we face a critical end date of April 29.
  I commend those who finally decided to join with us and bring this to 
the floor for a debate, but now as we proceed through several 
amendments and then final passage, it is important for the future of 
this country, for my children and the children of the world, that this 
Senate cast a favorable vote to ratify the treaty that comes from this 
convention. It will be a better world and a safer world if we do that.
  I want to commend those who have worked on this in Republican and 
Democratic administrations, those whose view of foreign policy is that 
it is a safer world if we together, jointly, reduce the threats that 
exist in our world. Yes, the threat from nuclear weapons. We have done 
that in arms control treaties. Those treaties are not perfect, but we 
have made huge progress. And now, also, the threat of chemical weapons 
and poison gas.
  I am proud today to cast a vote for a treaty that is very 
significant, and I hope sufficient numbers of my colleagues will do the 
same. I hope that the news tomorrow in our country will be that the 
United States of America has joined 74 other countries in ratifying 
this critically important treaty for our future.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor and I make a point of order that a 
quorum is not present.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time will be divided equally.
  The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The Chair recognizes the Senator from Vermont, who has an hour under 
the agreement.
  Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I yield myself such time as I may need 
under the hour reserved to the Senator from Vermont.
  Mr. President, today the Senate will exercise its advice and consent 
authority under article II, section 2, clause 2 of the United States 
Constitution. We have to decide whether we will advise and consent to 
the Chemical Weapons Convention that has been the product of 
negotiations conducted by the Reagan, the Bush and the Clinton 
administrations. If we advise and consent to it, then President Clinton 
will be free to ratify the convention. If we do not, of course, he does 
not have that power to do so.
  Last week I did not object to the unanimous-consent agreement by 
which the Senate is now finally able to consider the Chemical Weapons 
Convention. I did comment at that time on the manner in which we are 
proceeding. We have been forced to take the unusual step of discharging 
this important treaty from the Foreign Relations Committee without the 
benefit of committee consideration or a committee report. And, what is 
most extraordinary, is that it is the Republican leadership for the 
Republican majority that has insisted on this extraordinary procedure.
  Last week we were required to discharge the Judiciary Committee from 
any consideration of S. 495, a bill that was taken up last Thursday 
with no committee consideration, no committee report, and an absolute 
minimum of debate. In fact, the Senate was asked to consider a revised, 
unamendable substitute version of the bill that was not made available 
to us until that very afternoon. I raised concerns that it might, in 
fact, serve to weaken criminal laws against terrorism. I daresay at 
least 90 out of the 100 Senators who voted on S. 495 last week had not 
read it and probably did not have much idea of what was in it.
  I mention this because we have taken a lot of time for recesses this 
year but we did not come up with a budget on April 15, even though the 
law requires us to do so. The leadership decided not to bring one 
before the Senate to vote on. Each one of us had to file our taxes on 
April 15, or the IRS would have come knocking on the door, but even 
though the law requires the leadership to bring up a budget bill, none 
was. I am not suggesting we not bring up the Chemical Weapons 
Convention now. It should have been brought up last September. But I 
worry that the Senate is suddenly doing this, launching into issue 
after issue, not following the kind of procedures that would enable us 
to really know what we are talking about. I suggest that we should be 
looking at the way we have done this.
  In 1988 I chaired hearings on the threat of high-tech terrorism. I 
continue to be concerned about terrorist access to plastique 
explosives, sophisticated information systems, electronic surveillance 
equipment, and ever more powerful, dangerous weapons. With the sarin 
nerve gas attack on the Tokyo subway system 2 years ago, we saw the use 
of harmful chemicals to commit terrorist acts.
  In our Judiciary hearings in 1988, 1991 and 1995, we heard testimony 
on easily acquired, difficult to detect chemical and biological weapons 
and explosions. On April 17, 1995, the date of the bombing of the 
Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, we all learned how easy it is 
for somebody, intent on terrorism, to concoct a lethal compound out of 
materials as easily available as fertilizer.

[[Page S3575]]

  So, for more than a decade I have raised issues about the threats of 
nuclear, biological and chemical terrorism. I have worked with Members 
on both sides of the aisle to minimize those threats. We have 
cooperated on measures included in the Violent Crime Control and Law 
Enforcement Act of 1994, and the Antiterrorism Act, passed in April of 
last year. We have concurred on those. Assuming we advise and consent 
today, and I think now that we will--I think some who wanted to hold it 
up realize that this is not the kind of posture they want to be in, 
especially as a party going into elections next year--but, assuming 
that we advise and consent and the President can ratify it, I look 
forward to working with Senator Hatch to promptly consider and report 
implementing legislation that will continue the progress we are making 
today.
  I look forward to hearings in the Judiciary Committee on S. 610, 
having that committee consider that measure and report it to the Senate 
before the Memorial Day recess.
  I do not expect the distinguished senior Senator from Utah, chairman 
of the Judiciary Committee, to bottle up this measure or to deny the 
Senate the benefit of our committee's views. I am going to try to get 
something approaching regular order. We have not on anything else yet 
this year, but maybe on this issue we could.
  We have had the Chemical Weapons Convention before us since November 
1993. As the April 28, 1997, deadline approaches--after which our lack 
of ratification risks economic sanctions against our chemical industry 
that would actually cost U.S. chemical companies hundreds of millions 
of dollars--I hope the Republican majority will join with the President 
and ratify it, and allow him to sign this treaty. I understand all 
Democrats will vote for it. I hope enough Republicans will, too.
  In fact, our good friend and former colleague, Senator Bob Dole, 
endorsed ratification yesterday. I hope others are now going to follow 
him, because, really, we are deciding whether the United States will be 
a member of a treaty that goes into effect on April 29, with or without 
us. No matter what we do on the floor of the Senate, this treaty goes 
into effect on April 29. If we do not advise and consent, the United 
States will be left on the outside of the world community, with states 
like Iraq and Libya, which have refused to become parties to this 
important arms control measure. It is a fascinating situation, Mr. 
President. If we do not advise and consent, we can say we are standing 
shoulder to shoulder with Iraq and Libya because we did not join the 
chemical weapons treaty. This is one of the most ambitious treaties in 
the history of arms control. It bans an entire class of weapons, which 
have been one of the great scourges of the 20th century. In fact, this, 
along with antipersonnel landmines, have been among the greatest 
scourges of 20th century warfare. This treaty prohibits a full spectrum 
of activities associated with the offensive use of chemical weapons, 
including the development, production, acquisition, stockpiling and 
assistance to anyone engaging in these activities.
  The convention creates a comprehensive verification regime which 
makes it easier to detect and monitor emerging chemical weapons 
threats. The vigorous verification procedures established in this 
treaty will help deter countries from developing chemical weapons, and 
will make it more likely that cheaters are detected. Those nations that 
do not ratify it, and we could be among them, will be subject to trade 
sanctions. Nonparticipating nations will also face increasing 
international pressure to comply, as their number dwindles to an 
unsavory few. I hope the United States will not be one of those 
unsavory few.
  In the last day, I have heard preposterous statements from the Senate 
floor about what damage this treaty will do to our national security, 
about what a burden it will be on American business--the same 
businesses that are hoping that we will advise and consent to it; about 
how rogue states will suddenly produce unconstrained amounts of 
chemical weapons to use on our soldiers. Others eloquently exposed 
these charges for what they are: flat-out false.
  What this debate is really about is how we monitor the rest of the 
world to ensure the use of these weapons is deterred and minimized. For 
we all know, the United States by law is committed to destroying our 
own chemical stockpiles by 2004. We are doing this because we know that 
these weapons have limited military utility and because civilized 
people around the world agree their use is morally wrong. And the 
United States is not going to use them.
  So, how do we encourage other states to do what we are going to do 
anyway? Should we go at it unilaterally or multilaterally? Do we want 
American inspection teams to mount short notice inspections of 
potential violators or not? Do we want international penalties to apply 
to those who flout this treaty or not? Are we safer if the Russians 
destroy their 40,000 tons of chemical weapons, or not? Do we join with 
the 74 nations who have ratified this treaty, and the 162 countries 
that have signed it, or not? Or, does the United States, the most 
powerful nation in the history of the world, choose, somehow, to go it 
alone, with all the problems that would entail?
  Let us not forget that the United States had a primary role in 
designing and shaping this treaty, from the time it was first proposed 
by President Reagan. In recent weeks, the ranking member of the Foreign 
Relations Committee, working in concert with the Clinton 
administration, has worked very hard to address the concerns that some 
Members of this body have. Yesterday we passed 28 declarations to the 
resolution of ratification that provide even greater protections to 
U.S. business, and our soldiers, and those who are concerned about 
constitutional violations.

  Shortly, we are going to vote to strike five other conditions that 
opponents of the treaty say are necessary to address their concerns. I 
hope that, rather than addressing their concerns, we address the 
concerns of the United States. Those five conditions should be seen for 
what they are, treaty killers, designed by those who have no desire to 
see us participate in this treaty, no matter how many modifications we 
make.
  I want to speak briefly about two of the amendments. The 
distinguished chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, Senator 
Helms, has been very insistent on them. They are important with respect 
to this treaty, and also with respect to the issue of antipersonnel 
landmines. That is a matter of special importance to me.
  Proposed condition 29 would, among other things, prohibit the United 
States from ratifying the treaty until Russia has done so. Proposed 
condition 30 would prohibit the United States from ratifying the treaty 
until all States having chemical weapons programs, including China, 
North Korea, and Iraq, have ratified the treaty. In other words, we 
would say that China, North Korea, and Iraq would determine the 
timetable for the United States. Can you imagine that in any other 
context? We would be screaming on this floor. Of course we would not 
allow that to happen. These conditions would effectively prevent the 
United States from ratifying the Chemical Weapons Convention and allow 
the world's most recalcitrant regimes to decide the rules of 
international conduct.
  To its credit, the administration strongly opposed these amendments. 
It argues, and I agree, that we should ratify the treaty even before 
Russia does, and even assuming that rogue States like Iraq and Libya 
and North Korea do not. In other words, even if these other nations 
which could easily produce chemical weapons do not join the treaty, the 
United States should still do so. Why? Because, by ratifying the treaty 
we isolate the rogue nations, we make it harder for them to produce and 
use chemical weapons. And, were they then to do so, if all of us had 
joined in this convention and they moved outside the convention, they 
would suffer international condemnation and sanctions.
  In support of this argument the administration has turned to some of 
our most distinguished military and national security leaders. Let me 
quote what they are saying about linking our ratification to Russia's 
or to the actions of such nations as China and Iraq.
  Gen. Brent Scowcroft and former CIA Director John Deutch say:

       [U.S. failure to ratify] gives Russia--which has the 
     world's largest stock of chemical weapons--an easy excuse to 
     further delay its own accession to the CWC.


[[Page S3576]]


  Former Secretary of State James Baker says:

       [S]ome have argued that we should not contribute to the 
     treaty because states like Libya, Iraq and North Korea, which 
     have not signed it, will still be able to continue their 
     efforts to acquire chemical weapons. This is obviously true. 
     But the convention . . . will make it more difficult for 
     these states to do so. . . . It makes no sense to argue that 
     because a few pariah states refuse to join the convention, 
     the United States should line up with them, rather than the 
     rest of the world.
  Secretary of Defense William Cohen says:

       [T]he CWC will reduce the chemical weapons problem to a few 
     notorious rogues. . . .

  And last, but certainly not least, Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf has said:

       We don't need chemical weapons to fight our future wars. 
     And frankly, by not ratifying that treaty, we align ourselves 
     with nations like Libya and North Korea, and I'd just as soon 
     not be associated with those thugs in that particular battle.

  I agree with General Schwarzkopf. I do not want to have the United 
States lumped in with Libya and North Korea on the CWC.
  By ratifying the treaty, we and the overwhelming majority of nations 
establish the rules by which the conduct of nations is measured.
  Will some nations violate the treaty? Perhaps. But that is no more 
reason to oppose ratification than it would be to oppose passage of 
other laws outlawing illegal conduct. We pass laws all the time, 
criminal laws in this country, and treaties, that say what shall be a 
crime or a violation of the treaty. We do not withhold passing them 
because somebody might break that law. It is one of the main reasons we 
do pass a law, to try to deter unacceptable conduct.
  And by isolating the rogue nations, we pressure them to refrain from 
producing or using chemical weapons. When they tire of being branded 
outlaws, they may even join in ratifying the treaty and complying with 
it themselves.
  The arguments we hear on the floor from some today in opposition to 
this also apply to the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Not all nuclear powers 
are signatories to that treaty. But the effect of the treaty is a 
powerful disincentive on any state, signatory or not, from testing 
nuclear weapons. We know there are some countries today that have 
nuclear weapons. They have not signed the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, but 
because the major countries have, it limits their own scope of 
activity.
  These treaties were the subject of many, many years of negotiations, 
negotiations that went nowhere until the United States said that it 
would renounce the use of chemical weapons, and stop nuclear testing. 
And once the United States said that, then negotiations were pursued 
vigorously. The treaties were signed within a few years time.
  I commend the administration and other proponents of the CWC for 
arguing so strongly and effectively in favor of ratification. The 
President has made the case very, very well, and members of his 
administration have too.
  I would say with some irony though, this is precisely the argument 
that I have been using on antipersonnel landmines. I could repeat 
verbatim what the President, the White House staff, the Secretary of 
Defense, General Schwarzkopf, and former Secretary Baker have said. 
These arguments apply lock, stock, and barrel to the problem of 
antipersonnel landmines. We all want Russia and China to be part of a 
treaty banning antipersonnel landmines. But that is not going to happen 
any sooner than Iraq is going to sign the chemical weapons treaty.
  Their failure should not be used as an excuse for the United States 
not to sign a treaty banning antipersonnel mines when 100 other 
nations, including many that have produced and used landmines or have 
been devastated by their effects, are ready to sign such a treaty.
  When the administration on the one hand says we have to go forward 
with the Chemical Weapons Convention--and I agree--even though some 
countries, the worst ones have not yet joined, it is unfortunate that 
the administration then turns around and says we cannot do the same 
thing with antipersonnel landmines until everybody joins in.
  No treaty is universal. In fact some treaties have taken effect with 
only 20 signatories. But by establishing the international norm, the 
rogue nations are isolated and pressure builds on them to sign. And 
that is the only way.
  So I ask, Mr. President, why does the administration argue one way on 
chemical weapons but not follow through on its argument when it comes 
to antipersonnel landmines? Landmines are just as indiscriminate.
  Why, when many more American soldiers and many more innocent 
civilians, Americans and others, have been killed and horribly maimed 
by landmines than by chemical weapons?
  The reason, of course, is we pushed for the Chemical Weapons Treaty 
because we have already renounced our own use of chemical weapons, just 
as we pushed for the Test Ban Treaty because we had renounced our own 
nuclear tests. But we have not yet renounced our use of antipersonnel 
landmines.
  If we did do so, if the United States were to renounce its use of 
antipersonnel mines, as so many other nations have done, including many 
of our NATO allies, I guarantee that the administration would make 
exactly the same arguments in support of a treaty banning those weapons 
as it is making in support of the CWC.
  They would say that we should not allow Russia, China, and others to 
decide what the rules of international conduct should be. They would 
say it makes absolutely no sense that because a few pariah nations 
refuse to join a landmine ban the United States should line up with 
them rather than the rest of the world. And they would say that a 
treaty banning antipersonnel landmines would reduce the landmine 
problem to a few notorious outlaws and make the world safer for all its 
people. These are the arguments they made on the Chemical Weapons 
Convention. They are right. They also would be right in making these 
same arguments in support of a treaty banning antipersonnel landmines.
  In fact, Mr. President, in a letter to the New York Times today by 
Robert Bell, the Senior Director for Defense Policy and Arms Control, 
National Security Council, Mr. Bell wrote:

       We will be in a much stronger position to make sure other 
     parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention do the same if we 
     are inside, not outside a treaty.

  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that that letter be printed in 
the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                [From the New York Times, Apr. 24, 1997]

                U.S. Would Benefit From Chemical Treaty

                          (By Robert G. Bell)

       To the Editor:
       Re A.M. Rosenthal's ``Matter for Character'' (column, April 
     22), on the Chemical Weapons Convention, which the Senate 
     will vote on April 24:
       Mr. Rosenthal says that Article 10 of the treaty should be 
     a ``deal breaker'' because it allegedly would give 
     ``terrorist nations'' access to defensive technology that 
     would help them evade the defenses of responsible states.
       Only countries that have joined the Chemical Weapons 
     Convention, renounced chemical weapons and destroyed their 
     stockpiles can request defensive assistance--and then only if 
     they are threatened with or under chemical attack. Further, 
     President Clinton has committed to the Senate in a binding 
     condition that the United States will limit our assistance to 
     countries of concern, like Iran or Cuba--should they ratify 
     and comply with the treaty--to emergency medical supplies.
       And we will be in a much stronger position to make sure 
     other parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention do the same 
     if we are inside, not outside a treaty that will compel other 
     nations to do what we decided to do years ago: get rid of 
     chemical weapons.

  Mr. LEAHY. I agree with Mr. Bell, and I know he worked tirelessly on 
the CWC. But unfortunately, Mr. Bell, who I am sure is well motivated, 
has not been willing to apply that same argument to antipersonnel 
landmines. The Vice President will not apply that argument. Many of the 
same people who are up here arguing for the Chemical Weapons Convention 
make one argument for the Chemical Weapons Convention and turn that 
argument completely around when it comes to antipersonnel landmines 
even though we face a grave danger, every day, from antipersonnel 
landmines.
  There are 100 million of antipersonnel landmines in the ground in 68 
countries, where every few minutes somebody is maimed or killed by 
them. This is, in many ways, a greater danger

[[Page S3577]]

to innocent people than chemical weapons. And I wish the 
administration, I wish Mr. Bell, I wish the Vice President, I wish 
others who have not made their same arguments on antipersonnel 
landmines that they do on chemical weapons will reconsider. Because, 
like chemical weapons, antipersonnel landmines are weapons we do not 
need.
  What we do need are defenses against them, because, like chemical 
weapons, they are easy and cheap to produce. They pose a grave threat 
to our troops. They are the Saturday night specials of civil wars. They 
kill or maim a man, woman or child every 22 minutes every day of the 
year. They are aptly called weapons of mass destruction in slow motion. 
In fact, they are the only weapon where the victim pulls the trigger. 
They are a weapon where one Cambodian told me, in their country they 
cleared their landmines with an arm and a leg at a time.
  I am proud to support the President, the Vice President, and the rest 
of the administration on the Chemical Weapons Convention. But I hope 
that they will soon take the same position on antipersonnel landmines 
and say, let us bring together the like-minded states--and there are 
many who are ready to join in a treaty to ban them, join with them, and 
then put the pressure on the other countries like Russia and China and 
so on who will take longer to do it.
  If American children were being torn to pieces every day on their way 
to school, or while playing in their backyards, we would have made it a 
crime long ago. It is an outrage that should shock the conscience of 
every one of us.
  So I am going to vote to advise and consent to the Chemical Weapons 
Convention so the President can ratify it and to exert the leadership 
necessary to help rid the world of the scourge of chemical weapons. I 
look forward to ratification and to the implementation legislation to 
make the treaty a reality.
  And I will also continue to work to convince the administration this 
is the kind of leadership we need if we are to rid the world of 
antipersonnel landmines--a scourge every bit as horrifying as chemical 
weapons, frankly, Mr. President, a scourge that is killing more people 
today and tomorrow and last year and next year, and on and on, than 
chemical weapons. We should be leading the world's nations to end the 
destruction and death caused each day by landmines, not sitting on the 
sidelines.
  I will conclude, Mr. President, by quoting from a letter to President 
Clinton signed by 15 of this country's most distinguished military 
officers, including Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf; former Supreme Allied 
Commander John Galvin; former Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, David 
Jones, and others. They said:

       We view such a ban [on antipersonnel landmines] as not only 
     humane, but also militarily responsible.

  I quote further:

       The rationale for opposing antipersonnel landmines is that 
     they are in a category similar to poison gas. . . . they are 
     insidious in that their indiscriminate effects . . . cause 
     casualties among innocent people. . . .

  They said further:

       Given the wide range of weaponry available to military 
     forces today, antipersonnel landmines are not essential. 
     Thus, banning them would not undermine the military 
     effectiveness or safety of our forces, nor those of other 
     nations.

  Mr. President, every single argument the administration has made in 
favor of us joining the Chemical Weapons Convention could be made to 
ask us to go to Ottawa to sign a treaty banning antipersonnel 
landmines. Because by doing that, we would have 90 percent of the 
nations of this world pressuring the remaining 10 percent, and that 
pressure would be enormous.
  I reserve the balance--
  Mr. President, how much time is remaining to the Senator from 
Vermont?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Twenty-seven minutes.
  Mr. DODD. May I inquire, Mr. President, from the Senator from 
Vermont, there are a couple of us here who have requested some time. In 
fact, I know my colleague from California has made a similar request. 
My colleague from Maryland also has. I ask if our colleague from 
Vermont would be willing to yield us some time off his time. We could 
make some remarks and maybe expedite this process.
  Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I intend to be speaking again further on 
this. I have 27 minutes remaining.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. There is a correction of the time. You 
actually have 32 minutes left.
  Mr. DODD. I needed 10 minutes.
  Mrs. BOXER. If I could have 7 minutes, I would ask the Senator.
  Mr. LEAHY. I will yield 10 minutes to the Senator from Connecticut, 7 
minutes to the Senator from California, and withhold the balance of my 
time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from California.
  Mrs. BOXER. Thank you very much.
  I appreciate my friend from Connecticut allowing me to proceed. I may 
not use the full 7 minutes. I will try to be very concise.
  Mr. President, I rise in strong support for ratification of the 
Chemical Weapons Convention. And I base my support on four main facts.
  First, the Chemical Weapons Convention is in the national security 
interests of the United States of America because it reduces the 
likelihood that American soldiers or civilians will ever face a 
chemical weapons attack.
  We should not lose sight of why this is so important. The effects of 
chemical weapons are so barbaric, so devastating, that we must do all 
we can to ensure that they are never used again.
  Chemical weapons are among the most horrible devices ever conceived. 
If they do not kill their victims instantly, chemical weapons invade 
the respiratory system making it unbearably painful to breathe. When 
chemical weapons were used in Iraq by Saddam Hussein, against the 
Kurds, eyewitnesses reported that the pain was so great that many 
victims submerged themselves in nearby rivers to escape the spreading 
gas.
  Mr. President, we are a civilized Nation here. We must do all we can 
to prevent this torture. And approving the CWC is a major step. I know 
many of my colleagues had questions. I know that Senator Biden and 
others have worked tirelessly to address those problems. And I feel 
what we will have before us, if we defeat the killer amendments, the 
five killer amendments, will lead us to a far more civilized world.
  All signatory nations of the CWC agree never again to manufacture 
chemical weapons, nor to use them in war. They agree to destroy all 
existing stockpiles of chemical weapons. They agree to allow 
inspections of chemical plants to verify that no weapons are being 
manufactured illegally.
  To those who say there are some nations who may not sign on, we know 
that is so. I will say this: If we sign this treaty and we are a party 
to it, it will be far more difficult for nonsignatory nations to 
develop chemical weapons. This is the case because rogue states will 
find it far more difficult to import the raw materials and 
manufacturing equipment they need to develop chemical weapons.
  Another reason, the second reason: If the United States fails to 
ratify the convention, it will still go into effect, but it will be 
weaker. It will be weaker because many nations will stay off this 
treaty and, therefore, there will be fewer who are actually bound by 
it. Also, our inspectors will not be on the team to go and search for 
possible CWC violations. Our inspectors are among the best in the 
world, and they will give us confidence as to the true state of 
chemical weapons production. Why would we want to stay off a treaty 
that will go forward that will not have our inspectors on those teams?
  Third, failure to ratify will hurt American business. The CWC imposes 
trade sanctions against nonsignatory nations that limit the ability of 
their chemical industries to export many of their products overseas. It 
could cost our companies hundreds of millions of dollars every year. 
Now, opponents say that the CWC would impose additional regulations on 
an already heavily regulated industry, our chemical industry. They 
argue the convention will result in vast new compliance costs. But when 
you take the compliance costs of $250,000 to $2 million for the entire 
industry, that is a small price to pay compared to the hundreds of 
millions of dollars that would be lost if sanctions were imposed.
  The vast majority of the chemical industries strongly supports the 
CWC. U.S. chemical companies advised the

[[Page S3578]]

Reagan and Bush administrations throughout the original CWC 
negotiations. Leading U.S. chemical trade associations support the CWC. 
They know the costs of compliance are small and the risks to industry 
are great if we fail to ratify.
  Fourth, failure to ratify will undermine our credibility, America's 
credibility, in the world. Imagine a treaty that was brought forward by 
Ronald Reagan, continued toward the goal line by George Bush, and now a 
Democrat President, following a legacy of those two Republican 
Presidents, wanting to take this over the goal line, and suddenly we 
are going to back off. It seems to me our credibility is absolutely at 
stake here. I believe we should not back away from this treaty. We 
should pass it and defeat the killer amendments.
  Mr. President, to those who raise all sorts of flags about this 
treaty, we should understand this: We could always exercise our right 
to withdraw from the convention on 90 days' notice. This right to 
withdraw is guaranteed to all signatory nations by article XVI of the 
CWC.
  Mr. President, in closing, I thank the Senator from Vermont for his 
generosity, and my friend from Connecticut. I join with them. The CWC 
is in our national interests. It will enhance national security, 
protect American jobs; it will help maintain our position of global 
leadership; and, my friends, most important of all, it really will 
protect the world from the most horrible, horrible weapons of our time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut.
  Mr. DODD. Thank you, Mr. President. I thank my colleague from Vermont 
for his generosity in yielding time.
  Mr. President, yesterday I included some extensive remarks in the 
Record regarding the overall treaty. I let those remarks speak for 
themselves today.
  First, I begin by commending our colleagues, the chairman of the 
Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Helms; the ranking Democrat on the 
committee, Senator Biden; the majority leader, Senator Lott; and the 
minority leader, Senator Daschle, for working out the arrangements of 
this treaty so we can come up for a vote prior to the April 29 
deadline.
  Let me also say, Mr. President, while there are disagreements--and 
there will be over the ultimate decision of whether or not to support 
the treaty--I think the debate and the process we have gone through has 
been healthy. I suspect those who are deeply involved in the workings 
of this treaty have improved it. So I commend all of our colleagues for 
the work they have done on this particular effort. I think it is how 
the Senate of the United States ought to conduct its business when it 
comes to matters dealing with obligations to commit our country for 
many years to come. It was no mistake that our Founding Fathers 
required supermajorities to commit this Nation to international 
arrangements, and the fact that we require supermajorities for 
treaties, I think, is worthwhile.
  Mr. President, I want to focus my attention, if I can, on the first 
amendment that will be raised here. The amendment will strike a 
condition in the treaty that has been included by Senator Helms. I am 
going to oppose condition 30, which I believe will be the first vote we 
will cast. This is the rogue states condition. I will explain what that 
means and express why I think it ought to be struck from this treaty in 
the brief time I have available to me.
  Mr. President, we must ask only one question today. We must ask: Is 
this treaty in the best interests of our country? That is our 
obligation as Members of the U.S. Senate. That is the question which we 
must address. This condition 30, the rogue states condition, I think, 
is not in the best interests of the United States. I think it would 
prohibit the United States from ratifying the Chemical Weapons 
Convention. It would prohibit us, of course, from ratifying the 
convention until nations such as North Korea, Libya, Syria and Iraq 
ratify the treaty.
  More than any of the other conditions we will vote on, Mr. President, 
later today, this condition would delay indefinitely, in my view, the 
ratification of this treaty. The so-called rogue states condition would 
force the United States of America to wait until all of the pariah 
states of the world ratify before we, ourselves, would accept the 
treaty that we, ourselves negotiated.
  There is a reason, Mr. President, that we use the words rogue and 
pariah to describe these countries such as North Korea, Libya, Iran. 
These are the nations that are the loners in the international arena 
and who routinely disregard international opinion in pursuing their own 
interests. These rogue nations, these renegade nations, have never 
given weight to world opinion. There is no reason to expect that they 
will have a change of heart any time soon. Waiting for these rogue 
states to accept this treaty is literally like waiting for Godot.
  Let it be known, then, that a vote against striking this condition 
is, in my view, without any question whatever, a vote to prohibit U.S. 
participation in the Chemical Weapons Convention. If we include, Mr. 
President, this condition 30, the rogue states condition, we might as 
well include a condition that requires ratification by every single 
nation on Earth before we ratify, for these are, indeed, the very last 
nations that would ever accept this treaty. That is because these 
nations, these rogue nations, fear this treaty and the international 
determination that it demonstrates.
  Our country, Mr. President, has decided unilaterally to destroy its 
aging chemical weapons stockpile by the year 2004. That is a decision 
we have already made. Regardless of what other nations do, we have 
decided to take ourselves out of the chemical weapons business 
unilaterally, and yet the assumption under this faulty condition is 
that we must not disarm until other nations with chemical weapons or 
chemical weapons capability disarm as well.
  We must be clear, Mr. President, that having agreed, ourselves, to 
destroy our chemical weapons, this treaty deals with whether or not we 
can act with the backing of the world to bring other nations to do the 
same. As Secretary Albright has said very simply, ``This treaty is 
about other nations' chemical weapons, not our own.'' We will destroy, 
Mr. President, our weapons because they are no longer needed. So this 
idea that we must wait for other nations to ratify this treaty, I 
believe, is fatally flawed.
  This convention would establish an international norm that will allow 
us to pressure rogue states who decide they would rather keep and 
enhance their chemical weapons stockpile. On the basis of what we now 
know about the Persian Gulf war, that many thousands of this Nation's 
troops may have been exposed to chemical agents, we must not pass up 
the chance, in my view, to establish a norm that would have made it far 
more difficult for Iraq to have the weapons in the first place. 
Remember, Mr. President, there is no law that bars a nation from 
building, stockpiling, upgrading, or transferring their chemical 
weapons. In fact, when Iraq used chemical weapons against the Kurds, as 
heinous an act as it was, the Iraqis did not even violate the Geneva 
Protocol because they did not use the agents in an international 
conflict.
  What we need today, Mr. President, is a new agreement. This 
convention goes much farther in establishing a basis for international 
action against chemical weapons themselves.
  I further object, Mr. President, to this rogue states condition 
because we should not allow our foreign policy decisions to be dictated 
by rogue states--by a Libya, a North Korea, and an Iraq. Let us 
remember that the negotiating teams of President Reagan and President 
Bush anticipated the likelihood that rogue nations would not accept 
this treaty. That is why President Reagan's and President Bush's teams 
included sanctions, when they wrote this treaty, against nations that 
remained outside of this treaty. This condition 30, the rogue states 
condition, insults those negotiating teams that worked so hard and with 
such great foresight on this very treaty. It assumes that they were so 
shortsighted that they did not anticipate that rogue nations would 
oppose it. That is not the case. The truth, again, is that the 
negotiators knew very well that these rogue nations would look upon 
this treaty as something that they would have to oppose, so we and 
other nations demanded that these renegade nations be penalized.
  How ironic it is, Mr. President, that unless the United States 
strikes this

[[Page S3579]]

rogue states condition, we now will be penalized ourselves. Germany, I 
point out, has already indicated its intent to impose the sanctions 
against nonparticipants that this treaty mandates.

  Let us be aware, Mr. President, we live in a new world. Scholars use 
the words ``multipolar'' and ``post-nationalist'' to describe today's 
world. Other nations are increasingly capable of taking action without 
our leadership, regretfully I might add. Those who think this treaty 
will not go into effect without our ratification are thinking of an 
older world, of the days when the United States declined to participate 
in the League of Nations and it failed as a result. Mr. President, that 
was over three-quarters of a century ago. Let me assure my colleagues 
that to the extent we isolate ourselves today, our country will pay a 
price tomorrow.
  The question before us this hour with this condition that will come 
up shortly, is, will we allow a group of rogue, renegade nations to 
disengage the United States from the international community on this 
issue of chemical weapons?
  Mr. President, when this Nation allows itself to be held back by the 
shortsightedness, the evil of other nations, we make a huge mistake 
indeed. President Reagan did not wait for other nations when he took 
the first step forward on the matter of chemical weapons by declaring 
that the United States would unilaterally destroy its chemical weapons 
stockpile. President Reagan did not wait for other nations when he 
initiated negotiations to ban chemical weapons from this Earth. 
President Bush did not wait for other nations to sign this treaty. 
Presidents Reagan and Bush did not follow others in making those 
critical decisions. We led, as great nations must, and others have 
fallen in behind us. Our Nation set the example. Now it is time for us 
to set the example once again.
  Finally, Mr. President, we must keep in mind that opponents of this 
treaty argue both sides of the issue. On the one hand, they argue that 
rogue states will reap great benefits from the technology and 
intelligence available to them as participants in this treaty.
  That argument assumes that these nations can't wait to participate in 
this treaty. Yet, on the other hand, this condition that we will vote 
on assumes that rogue states will avoid participating in this treaty.
  If parties to this treaty pick up such a technological advantage, why 
aren't these rogue nations crawling over themselves to ratify the 
treaty? They should be the first in line if that is the case. Why then 
do we need this condition?
  The truth is, Mr. President, that rogue nations fear this convention 
and this treaty. Waiting for them to ratify is absurd. No one expects 
them to ratify, so we should at least become a party to a treaty that 
will severely restrict the flow of chemicals to those nations, rather 
than assisting them by a reluctance to move forward.
  Mr. President, I urge the adoption of the amendment to strike, and I 
urge the adoption of the treaty itself.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The chair recognizes the Senator from New 
Mexico and asks, who yields time?
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I yield 7 minutes to my friend from New 
Mexico.
  Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, first let me say that I believe the 
Senate has done itself proud with reference to the debate and 
participation of our Members in this series of debates and discussions 
regarding this treaty. When you add to it the closed session we had 
today, I think every Senator has had an ample opportunity to thoroughly 
understand this situation. I believe when the day ends and you have 
heard all of that, the overwhelming majority of the U.S. Senators are 
going to vote to ratify this treaty. I believe they are going to do 
that not because it is perfect, but because the world is better off and 
we are better off if we have this treaty than if we don't.
  Having said that, while the world has set about to perfect chemical 
weapons, there is nothing new about this. In fact, I can remember, as a 
very small boy, a great uncle who was a totally disabled American 
veteran. He was an Italian immigrant taken into the First World War. He 
served in the U.S. Army, and he was the victim of mustard gas. In that 
war, the Germans used mustard gas, a chemical weapon on the front, on 
the lines. Many Americans received toxic doses. In fact, this great 
uncle of mine, as I indicated, collected veteran benefits for his 
entire life for a total disability because of the mustard gas being 
used in World War I.
  Science has perfected weapons beyond mustard gas, and the world lives 
under three scourges today. One is the possible proliferation of 
nuclear weapons; another is the proliferation of chemical weapons, and 
the third is the proliferation of biological weapons. Now, we have 
attempted in the past, starting with President Eisenhower, to do 
something about the proliferation of nuclear weapons. While we haven't 
succeeded in totality, we have clearly succeeded beyond anything men of 
that day thought. It was not perfect. There were those who wanted to 
argue about it because it was not perfect, but we could not have ended 
an entire era without Atoms for Peace and everything that came with it. 
Having said that, let me suggest that we probably won't find a way to 
enter into an international treaty on biological weapons. They are 
principally weapons of terrorists.
  Let me talk about this treaty and tell the Senate in my own way why I 
am for it. First of all, I think it is an imperative. Even though it 
was said before, I say this one more time. Frankly, the reason this 
treaty exists is because we are trying--the United States of America--
to set in motion in the world a security and arms control treaty, and 
the overreaching question is: Will we be better off or worse off if we 
commit to its terms?
  Now, this is not a treaty that is going to prevent terrorists from 
using chemicals as weapons if they see fit. This is more of a treaty 
that addresses itself to the military use of these kinds of drastic 
weapons. Now, it is not perfect, but let me suggest the second 
principle that everybody should know, including those Americans who 
worry about this treaty: America has already committed to totally 
destroying all of its chemical weapons. President Ronald Reagan, many 
years ago, said, let's get rid of one kind of weapon, leaving only one 
left over. President Bush also agreed to get rid of them. America is 
now on a path to get rid of them in 10 years. All of this discussion 
has not changed that. So when we talk about the dangers to America, it 
should be understood that we have already decided that on our own. We 
want to get rid of them either because we think that is in our best 
interest--I would assume that is the case--and/or we think it is better 
for the world that we not have any because we think the world may 
follow our example.

  Having said that, it seems to me that, with the United States having 
agreed to destroy all of their weapons of this type, we ought to look 
at the treaty and ask, is it apt to work its will on the rest of the 
world quicker and better than if we didn't have it? In everything I 
hear, everything I have read, in discussions with scientists that 
worked on it, including some of the top scientists who negotiated this 
agreement, they have all said that, even with its defects, the CWC is 
more apt than not to bring the rest of the world to the same conclusion 
that America has come to. They support that we might get to a point 
where there are none of these weapons around sooner rather than later 
if we have this treaty, as compared with no treaty.
  There are all kinds of nuances that one can talk about as you look at 
something as complicated as this. But I think, fundamentally, the issue 
is: what is best for the United States after we have committed to 
destroy our chemical weapons, is it better that we have the treaty or 
not? From everything I can tell, the 28 conditions that have been 
agreed upon are good clarifying language and many contain protections 
to our private property rights that we may have assumed early on would 
not be violated. But then we got concerned with the CWC and properly 
so. Now, there is going to be some judicial process to be required 
before inspections can occur. I believe we now will protect private 
facilities as well as public facilities like our national laboratories 
through requirements for search warrants as part of the language that 
Senator Helms agreed on with our staff.
  In summary, it seems to this Senator that if we join with other 
countries and begin moving to implement this treaty,

[[Page S3580]]

that we are better off with it than without it. Will it be difficult to 
get everyone in the world to agree with our position--the civil 
position of moral, decent leaders? I am not sure. But the question is, 
will it be any easier, or are we apt to succeed better, without the 
treaty? I am convinced that such is not the case.
  Now, Mr. President, there are so many Senators to thank, but I say to 
Jon Kyl, whose position I don't agree with, that I don't believe 
anybody has done a better job on something as complicated as this since 
I have been in the Senate, which is now 25 years. I compliment him for 
that.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I yield 5 minutes to the distinguished 
Senator from Maryland.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maryland.
  Mr. SARBANES. I thank the able Senator from Delaware, and I commend 
him for his extraordinary leadership with respect to the Chemical 
Weapons Convention. I know personally of the time and effort he has 
devoted to this cause. We are all in his debt.
  Mr. President, it is now less than a week before a landmark treaty--
one which the United States led the world in negotiating--goes into 
effect internationally. The Chemical Weapons Convention, signed by 
President Bush on January 13, 1993, has now been ratified by 74 
countries. The eyes of the world are upon the United States as we 
decide whether or not to join them.
  It would be a major mistake if this treaty were to go into effect 
without us. Worse yet, if we fail to ratify, we could be jeopardizing 
our best chance to eliminate the chemical weapons that some day would 
be used against us.

  This is a treaty that was advanced, negotiated, and signed by 
Republican Presidents, with the encouragement, in 1989, of some 75 U.S. 
Senators. What a mistake it would be if the Senate were to forfeit this 
opportunity to protect American security, promote American interests 
and preserve American leadership.
  If we fail to ratify the CWC, we will have done just that. If the 
Senate does not approve this historic treaty, our economic and security 
interests will suffer. Despite widespread and continuing bipartisan 
support for this treaty, despite support from some of our Nation's 
outstanding military leaders--such as General Shalikashvili and former 
Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell, Admiral Crowe, 
General Vessey, and General Jones--some of my colleagues argue that 
this convention does not serve our security interests.
  The Chemical Weapons Convention is an unprecedented international 
agreement designed to eliminate an entire class of weapons of mass 
destruction. Unlike earlier protocols that prohibit only the use of 
chemical weapons, this convention aims at stopping their production, 
transfer, and storage by providing incentives for participation, 
verification of compliance, and penalties for violation. The United 
States is the only major industrialized country not to have ratified it 
yet. Our participation is critical to its ultimate success.
  This convention will not make the threat of chemical weapons 
automatically disappear from the face of the Earth. But it will 
constrain their proliferation and make it harder for rogue regimes and 
terrorists to gain access to them. By increasing the legal, moral, and 
financial costs of acquiring chemical weapons, it will deter covert 
chemical weapons programs and increase the likelihood they will be 
discovered.
  There are three major reasons why this treaty will serve American 
interests and why a failure to ratify it could have severe 
repercussions.
  First, the convention requires other nations to do something we 
already plan to do--destroy chemical arsenals. Under a law first signed 
by President Reagan, the United States will eliminate our current 
stockpile of chemical weapons by the year 2004, independent of what 
happens in this treaty. Our own military thinks that is a wise thing to 
do, even on a unilateral basis. The convention will simply ensure that 
others do the same.
  In other words, this is not a debate over eliminating our own 
chemical weapons. We are already programmed to do so. This is a 
question of whether we can establish a regime that will require other 
countries to destroy their chemical weapons and stop building new ones. 
That is why Admiral Zumwalt had stated, militarily, this treaty will 
make us stronger.
  It is not enough, however, to ask other nations to ratify the treaty. 
We must do so ourselves. Today, we have an opportunity to lead the 
world in abolishing these terrible weapons, rather than providing 
others with an excuse not to do so. If we do not adopt this treaty, or 
if we add crippling amendments, we will have single-handedly undermined 
the hope of ridding the world of this deadly scourge and of reducing 
the threat to our own citizens.
  The second major reason to ratify this treaty is that it will provide 
us with better information about what other countries are doing in the 
realm of chemical weapons. We know the verification regime is not 
perfect. The verification regime is never perfect in any treaty. There 
may be states that try to cheat on this agreement and others that 
refuse to sign it. But if we are party to the treaty, we will have an 
opportunity to investigate and sanction potential violations. We will 
take part in the organization established to monitor implementation, 
and we will help enforce its rules and procedures. As former CIA 
Director James Woolsey noted, ``We will know more about the state of 
chemical warfare preparations in the world with the treaty than we 
would know without it.''
  Moreover, once we ratify the treaty we will be in a better position 
to do something about noncompliance. The CWC throws the force of world 
public opinion behind the identification and exposure of violators. Any 
violations that are discovered will be made widely known and receive 
universal condemnation. We will be able to punish violators through 
multilateral action, rather than going it alone, or trying to convince 
the world that our suspicions are correct without revealing our 
intelligence sources. As former Secretary of State Christopher 
explained, ``By ratifying the Convention, we will add the force and 
weight of the entire international community to our efforts.''
  The third reason we must ratify this treaty is that a failure to do 
so will put U.S. chemical manufacturers at a serious competitive 
disadvantage. Once the CWC enters into force--which will happen next 
Tuesday, with or without U.S. participation--chemical manufacturers in 
countries that have not ratified will find themselves faced with 
international economic sanctions. These companies will be required to 
obtain end-user certificates for the sale of certain chemicals abroad, 
and after 3 years, they will not be able to export those chemicals at 
all. The United States will be treated on a par with rogue states, who 
will no longer be trusted to conduct normal, commercial trade in 
chemicals.
  These dismal scenarios were certainly on the minds of the chief 
executives of 53 of the Nation's largest chemical firms last August, 
when they expressed their concern in a joint statement, warning: ``Our 
industry's status as the world's preferred supplier of chemical 
products may be jeopardized if the United States does not ratify the 
Convention. If the Senate does not vote in favor of the CWC, we stand 
to lose hundreds of millions of dollars in overseas sales, putting at 
risk thousands of good-paying American jobs.'' American chemical 
companies have indicated a willingness to comply with inspections under 
the treaty because they are not conducting illegal activity, and 
because they helped to design the treaty's inspection regime so that it 
would not threaten legitimate business secrets or compromise 
proprietary information.
  Earlier this year, President Bush reaffirmed his support for 
ratification, telling reporters the treaty should transcend 
partisanship. ``I think it is vitally important for the United States 
to be out front, not to be dragged, kicking, and screaming to the 
finish line on that question. We do not need chemical weapons, and we 
ought to get out front and make clear that we are opposed to others 
having them.''
  The CWC has been before the Senate for consideration for nearly 4 
years now, providing ample opportunity for examination. Last year, 
after exhaustive hearings and review, it was reported favorably by the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, but not brought to a vote on the 
floor of the Senate.

[[Page S3581]]

  Over the past few weeks a new series of hearings has been held, in 
open and in closed session, and all perspectives have been thoroughly 
aired. The administration has worked in good faith to negotiate a new 
resolution of ratification that addresses the earlier concerns and 
more, including 28 agreed conditions, declarations, statements, and 
understandings. The remaining five conditions that have been proposed 
will undercut and place in jeopardy the effectiveness of this treaty, 
and I urge my colleagues to reject them.
  The conditions to which the administration has already agreed will 
resolve every legitimate concern that has been raised. I would urge my 
colleagues not to vote for pending amendments that would require 
renegotiation, delay, or abrogation of the CWC. If we don't take this 
opportunity to begin abolishing these terrible weapons, we will rue the 
day and have only ourselves to blame.
  Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I rise today to express my strong 
support for the Chemical Weapons Convention. I believe it is very much 
in our national interests to ratify this treaty, after we strike five 
conditions in the resolution of ratification.
  Let me first express my respect and appreciation for the 
distinguished ranking member of the Foreign Relations Committee, 
Senator Biden. He and his staff have really done the heavy lifting in 
getting this treaty to the floor, including many long hours of 
negotiations on the package of 28 agreed conditions.
  I also want to express my respect for the opponents of this treaty, 
including the distinguished chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee 
and the Senator from Arizona, Senator Kyl. I have worked well with 
Senator Kyl on many issues, including, at the moment, our strong effort 
to pass a Victims' Rights Amendment to the Constitution.
  I know that in this debate these Senators are motivated by their 
genuine and deeply felt concern for America's national security. 
However, I must disagree with the view that we would be better off 
without this treaty, or by passing a resolution of ratification that 
essentially renders the treaty meaningless.
  Mr. President, the threat of chemical weapons falling into the hands 
of terrorists, or being used as a weapon of war by a rogue state, has 
increased dramatically in recent years.
  One need only reflect on the dangers faced by our military by Iraq's 
incipient chemical weapons program during the gulf war, or the 
tragedies our Nation has suffered with the bombing of the World Trade 
Center, the Federal building in Oklahoma City, and the Olympic Park in 
Atlanta, to fully appreciate the dangers posed by the proliferation of 
chemical weapons. In each of these cases, the tragedy and loss of life 
could have been magnified significantly had chemical weapons been used.
  The people of Japan know this first-hand. The deadly sarin gas attack 
carried out in the Tokyo subway system by the Aum Shunrikio cult was 
testimony to the power of even a relatively small amount of chemical 
weapons.
  Chemical weapons are among the most barbaric of mankind's inventions. 
They are so awful, that the United States, by act of Congress, has 
decided to eliminate our own stocks of these weapons by 2004. They are 
designed to kill and incapacitate by causing such effects as skin 
blistering, blindness, lung damage, choking, nervous system disruption, 
paralysis, or oxygen starvation. Because of the ease of their dispersal 
over a wide area, chemical weapons are especially useful for targeting 
civilian populations.
  The Chemical Weapons Convention is the most far-reaching attempt ever 
by the international community to control the spread of chemical 
weapons. It bans for the first time the development, production, and 
possession of chemical weapons and reinforces the international norm 
against their use. Since we are destroying our own chemical weapons, it 
only makes sense that we should want other nations to do so as well.
  The convention requires all signatory states to declare and destroy 
any chemical weapons and the facilities used to produce them. It 
requires member states to submit annual reports on the production and 
use of certain sensitive chemicals. This information, combined with our 
own intelligence resources, will significantly improve our ability to 
monitor and prevent illegal transfers and uses of such chemicals.
  Once the CWC takes effect, it will make it much harder and more 
costly for proliferators and terrorists to acquire chemical weapons. An 
intrusive verification system will be set up to detect violations. 
Sanctions will be imposed against nations that refuse to participate, 
making it more difficult for them to acquire precursor chemicals for 
poison gas and easier to monitor their efforts to do so.
  The intelligence-sharing and global verification network that will 
result from this treaty will increase the chances that terrorist 
attacks involving chemical weapons can be prevented before they ever 
occur--a net gain in the security of our troops and our citizens.
  Now, a number of very serious concerns have been raised about the 
CWC. I myself have shared some of these concerns. I will not speak to 
every criticism of the treaty, but I want to address some of these 
concerns now, because I believe very solid answers have been provided 
to virtually all of them.

  Verification: Critics of the CWC have complained that it is not 
verifiable, and that it will be easy for nations who sign up to the 
treaty to cheat without getting caught.
  We must start with the proposition that no arms control agreement is 
100-percent verifiable. But with the CWC, we will know far more about 
who is trying to develop chemical weapons, where, and how than we would 
without the treaty. That is why the intelligence community has 
consistently testified that, while the treaty is not completely 
verifiable, they regard it as a highly desirable tool that will enhance 
our knowledge of chemical weapons programs and our ability to stop 
them.
  The CWC's verification regime requires routine inspections of all 
declared facilities working with significant amounts of chemicals 
listed by the treaty. In addition, any site, declared or not, may be 
subject to short-notice challenge inspections if there are suspicions 
that it is being used to produce or store banned chemicals.
  The CWC also establishes significant trade restrictions on precursor 
chemicals. These restrictions will make it more difficult for nations 
who are not parties to the treaty to acquire these chemicals, and will 
provide us with much more information than we currently have about who 
is seeking to import such chemicals, and in what amounts.
  So the concern about verification, while valid, I believe has been 
more than adequately addressed. We must go into this treaty with our 
eyes open, aware that it will not detect every violation. But why would 
we deprive ourselves of the extremely useful tools and information this 
treaty would provide on the grounds that they are not fool-proof? It 
would be incredibly short-sighted to do so.
  Sharing Defense Technologies: During one of the hearings in the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee earlier this month, the concern was 
raised that Article X of the CWC would require the United States to 
share advanced chemical defense technologies with rogue nations like 
Iran, who may sign and ratify the treaty. If indeed the treaty required 
that, there would be significant grounds for concern. But I believe the 
concern is overstated.
  In an April 22 letter to me, National Security Adviser Sandy Berger 
makes it very clear that Article X of the CWC would impose no 
obligation on the United States to assist Iran with its chemical 
weapons defense capabilities.
  I ask unanimous consent that Mr. Berger's letter be printed in the 
Record at the conclusion of my remarks.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  (See exhibit 1.)
  Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. Berger makes clear that paragraph 7 of Article X, 
which spells out the obligations of States Parties to assist others 
threatened by chemical weapons, would require the United States to 
provide nothing more than medical antidotes and treatments to any state 
we deemed unreliable. We have the option to provide more advanced 
assistance to those nations we trust, but no obligation.
  The administration is so comfortable with this reading of the treaty, 
that, in their negotiations with Senator Helms

[[Page S3582]]

and with the Majority Leader's task force on the CWC, they have agreed 
to a binding condition (number 15) that would ensure that the United 
States will not provide any assistance other than medical assistance to 
any rogue nation that becomes a party to the treaty.
  Another concern about Article X is that paragraph 3, which calls for 
parties to ``facilitate . . . the fullest possible exchange'' of 
information and technology on protection against chemical weapons, 
would require the United States to share such equipment with rogue 
nations who sign and ratify the treaty.
  The administration has made clear that the use of the words 
``facilitate'' and ``possible'' in this paragraph mean that we will 
determine whether any specific exchange is appropriate, and we will not 
pursue those we deem inappropriate. In making these decisions, we will 
do nothing to undermine our national export controls.
  With these assertions in hand, I am satisfied that the United States 
will in no way be obligated to provide chemical weapons technology to 
any nation we deem to be untrustworthy.
  Some have also raised the concern that Article X might induce other, 
less conscientious nations, to supply rogue states with defense 
technologies. But there is nothing that prevents those sales from 
taking place today, with no CWC in effect.
  With the CWC, the countries who make exchanges allowed in Article X 
are legally bound by the treaty's overriding principle, stated in 
Article I, that they can do nothing to ``assist, encourage, or induce, 
in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State 
Party under this Convention.''

  In addition, the CWC would provide us with far more ability to 
scrutinize any exchanges than we have today. The result is a net 
increase, not decrease, in our knowledge of defense exchanges with 
rogue nations, and our ability to address any compliance concerns that 
may arise from these exchanges.
  Cooperation on Chemical Technology: Another concern that has been 
raised involves Article XI. Some have suggested that Article XI, which 
deals with cooperation in chemical activities not prohibited by the 
treaty, would require the United States to provide other nations with 
access to our dual-use technologies and manufacturing secrets. Here 
again, the concern is unwarranted.
  Article XI does aim to ensure that parties to the treaty can conduct 
legitimate chemical commerce, which is reasonable. But in his April 22 
letter, Mr. Berger explains that this article does not require the 
United States, or any U.S. company, to provide any confidential 
business information to any foreign party.
  As to the concern that Article XI will undercut export controls, 
indeed, the reverse is true. Mr. Berger makes clear that the all U.S. 
export controls now in effect are fully consistent with the CWC. In 
addition, our allies in the Australia Group, all 28 of them, have 
pledged to maintain all existing multilateral export controls, which 
they agree are fully consistent with the CWC.
  Here again, the problem identified by critics of the CWC would 
actually be worse without the treaty. The CWC will allow us to better 
monitor chemical commerce that occurs today without our knowledge. It 
will also provide the basis for further multilateral efforts to control 
exports, above and beyond our own existing export controls and those of 
the Australia Group.
  To address the concerns raised about Article XI, the Administration 
has agreed to a binding condition (number 7) that the President must 
certify now and on an annual basis that the Australia Group is 
continuing to effectively control chemical exports and remains a viable 
mechanism for doing so.
  According to this condition, the President must also certify that 
nothing in the CWC obligates the United States to weaken our own export 
controls, and that each member of the Australia Group remains committed 
to maintaining current export controls.
  With this condition added to the resolution of ratification, I 
believe concerns about Article XI can be laid aside.
  In fact, the negotiations between the Administration and Senator 
Biden on the one hand, and Senator Helms and the Lott task force on the 
other, have been remarkably successful in addressing the concerns that 
have been raised about the treaty.
  In all, 28 conditions have been agreed to in these negotiations, on 
subjects ranging from verification and Articles X and XI, to 
Congressional prerogatives in providing funding for the OPCW; the 
establishment of an inspector general at the OPCW; safeguards on 
intelligence sharing; the Senate's role in reviewing future treaty 
amendments; constitutional protections in the inspection of U.S. 
facilities; our armed forces' continued ability to use non-lethal riot 
control agents, such as tear gas; and maintaining robust U.S. chemical 
defense capabilities.
  With all of these conditions agreed to, there are only five areas 
remaining in dispute. One would think we were near the point of a 
virtually unanimous vote to ratify the CWC.
  And yet, we still hear charges that the administration is 
``stonewalling.'' That is simply not the case. Far from stonewalling, 
the administration has worked very hard to address the Senate's 
concerns. But it appears that some people simply do not to want to take 
yes for an answer.
  And so, we have five conditions in this resolution of ratification 
which the Administration has identified as ``killer'' conditions. These 
conditions would make our ratification of this treaty meaningless, 
because they would either gut central provisions of the treaty, or set 
up unachievable goals that must be met for us to deposit our 
instruments of ratification. They should all be defeated.
  Let me briefly address each of these killer conditions:
  Condition 29 would prohibit the United States from ratifying the CWC 
until Russia ratifies it and takes a series of other actions to comply 
with past agreements.
  Besides holding United States foreign policy hostage to a group of 
hardliners in the Russian Duma, this condition ignores the fact that 
the CWC provides precisely the tools that would be helpful in detecting 
Russian violations of this and past treaties. It also gives Russia an 
easy excuse to delay ratification itself. On the grounds of self-
interest, this condition shoots ourselves in the foot.
  Condition 30 would prohibit the United States from ratifying the CWC 
until rogue states such as North Korea, Libya, Syria, Iran, and Iraq 
have ratified it. By accepting this treaty, we allow these rogue 
regimes to set the standards of international conduct. It is the 
equivalent of saying that we should not outlaw drug smuggling because 
some people will still smuggle drugs.
  By ratifying the CWC, the United States will make it easier to forge 
international coalitions aimed at eliminating the chemical weapons 
programs of these regimes, even through military force when necessary. 
It will also set a standard for those nations to meet if and when their 
current regimes are replaced by more responsible ones.
  Condition 31 requires the United States to reject all CWC inspectors 
from countries like Iran and China. This condition is unnecessarily 
rigid. It would prevent us from allowing suspect states from seeing for 
themselves that we are not violating the treaty. It would also 
certainly result in American inspectors being excluded from inspections 
in these countries.
  A better approach would be to strike this language and enact 
implementing legislation that would allow Congress a role in 
determining which inspectors should be barred, which the CWC allows the 
United States to do on a case-by-case basis.
  Condition 32 would prohibit the United States from ratifying the CWC 
until Article X is eliminated and Article XI is amended. This is 
completely unrealistic and completely unnecessary. Articles X and XI 
were included to reassure countries who signed the treaty that they 
would not be prevented from developing chemical weapons defenses or 
engaging in legitimate chemical commerce.
  None of the 160 nations who have signed or 74 nations that have 
ratified the treaty will agree to renegotiate these provisions at the 
eleventh hour. It will simply result in our exclusion from the CWC--
which is clearly the intent.
  As Gen. Brent Scowcroft, National Security Adviser to President Bush,

[[Page S3583]]

testified before the Foreign Relations Committee on April 9, 1997: 
``Starting over. . .is pure fantasy. If we reject this treaty, we will 
incur the bitterness of all our friends and allies who followed us for 
10 years in putting this thing together. . . The idea that we can lead 
out again down a different path I think is just not in the cards. We 
have got to deal with the situation we face now, not an ideal one out 
in the future.''
  The concerns raised about Articles X and XI--which I shared--have 
been more than adequately addressed by the agreed conditions. This is 
what I mean about not wanting to take yes for an answer.
  Condition 33 would prevent the U.S. from ratifying the treaty unless 
the President can certify with ``high confidence'' that we would be 
able to detect the production or storage of a single metric ton of 
chemical agent.
  This is an absurdly high standard. The intelligence community has 
consistently said it could detect ``militarily significant'' cheating, 
but the production of one ton of agent does not qualify.
  But the tools created by the CWC will only enhance our abilities to 
detect these violations. It would be foolish to kill the treaty with a 
condition like this that makes the perfect the enemy of the good. This 
condition is not about verification--it is about killing the treaty.
  Tomorrow, each of these five amendments will be subject to a motion 
to strike. Failing to strike them would be tantamount to killing the 
treaty. I urge my colleagues to vote for each motion to strike. Those 
who do not are essentially voting against ratification of the entire 
CWC.
  Mr. President, I think this debate really comes down to whether or 
not one supports international arms control agreements. Many of the 
criticisms of the CWC--such as that it would lull us to sleep, or that 
it is not verifiable--were levied against all previous successful arms 
control treaties, such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and the 
START treaty.
  Those who worry that the United States will weaken its vigilance in 
our efforts to guard against the threat of chemical weapons have 
actually done us a service. I believe the intensity of this debate has 
helped to ensure that we will never allow ourselves to believe that the 
treaty by itself is enough. We will follow the course that President 
Reagan did--a strong national defense and arms control agreements with 
verification.
  The CWC is not a panacea, and none of its proponents believes it is. 
It will not by itself banish chemical weapons from the earth, but it 
would result in the destruction of much of the world's chemical weapons 
stocks, and provide us with a valuable set of tools that would 
significantly strengthen our ability to monitor and defend against the 
threat of chemical weapons.
  Our failure to ratify this treaty would be a grave mistake. The 
treaty will enter into force on April 29, with or without us. This is 
the only treaty that there is, and it requires U.S. leadership to make 
it work. Only by being a party to this convention can we make it 
function to its fullest possible extent.
  I believe every Member on this side of the aisle supports this 
treaty. I urge my Republican colleagues to vote for ratification, after 
voting to strike the five killer amendments.

                               Exhibit 1


                                              The White House,

                                       Washington, April 22, 1997.
     Hon. Dianne Feinstein,
     U.S. Senate,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Senator Feinstein: I am pleased that we were able to 
     talk last week about ratification of the Chemical Weapons 
     Convention, including the concerns which have been raised 
     about Articles X and XI of the treaty. I would like to take 
     the opportunity to elaborate further on these issues and set 
     the record straight.
       Regarding Article X, concern has been expressed that this 
     provision might force us or other treaty parties to share 
     advanced chemical defense technologies and equipment with 
     rogue nations like Iran and to assist in the development of 
     CW defense capabilities. This simply is not the case.
       First, only countries that have joined the CWC and 
     renounced CW can request assistance and only then if they are 
     threatened or attacked with CW. Indeed, the very purpose of 
     Article X is to encourage countries to join the CWC and 
     eliminate their CW programs by providing an assurance of 
     international assistance in the event that they are 
     threatened or attacked with CW by a non-party. For states in 
     good standing under the CWC that do qualify for Article X 
     aid, there is no requirement to provide high tech defenses or 
     even gas masks. The obligation to assist can be satisfied 
     with medical or humanitarian aid. Indeed, the President has 
     committed in an agreed condition on the Resolution of 
     Ratification (Condition #15) that the United States will only 
     give medical help to certain countries of concern, such as 
     Iran or Cuba, under Article X.
       Second, with regard to the actions of other states, let me 
     point out that countries contemplating any exchanges under 
     Article X are legally bound by the fundamental obligation in 
     Article I of the treaty never ``to assist, encourage or 
     induce in any way anyone to engage in any activity 
     prohibited'' under the Convention. This means that all 
     relevant transfers must be subject to very close scrutiny, 
     especially with countries whose compliance may be in doubt. 
     We will use every instrument of U.S. diplomacy and leverage 
     at our disposal to ensure that transfers do not occur which 
     could undermine U.S. national security interests, including 
     the extensive verification and compliance provisions in the 
     Convention. As Secretary Cohen said on ``Meet the Press'' on 
     Sunday, we will be in a much better position to do this if we 
     are inside the treaty rather than outside. Frankly, other 
     countries will have little incentive to work with us to 
     ensure that inappropriate transfers do not occur if we have 
     not ratified ourselves.
       Article XI encourages free trade in non-prohibited 
     chemicals among States that join the CWC and renounce any CW 
     capability. Some have charged that this provision might force 
     us or our chemical industry to share dual-use technologies 
     and manufacturing secrets with other countries. Such an 
     interpretation is totally at odds with the plain language of 
     the treaty. It also defies logic to suggest that a treaty 
     expressly devoted to eliminating chemical weapons somehow 
     requires its parties to facilitate the spread of chemical 
     weapons.
       First, Article XI is explicitly subject to the fundamental 
     ban in Article I on assisting anyone in acquiring chemical 
     weapons. Moreover, in order to reinforce the treaty's 
     constraints against the transfer of dangerous technology, the 
     President has committed in agreed condition #7 in the 
     Resolution of Ratification to obtain official assurances from 
     our Australia Group partners at the highest diplomatic levels 
     that Article XI is fully consistent with maintaining strict 
     export controls on dangerous chemicals and that they are 
     committed to ensuring the Group remains an effective 
     mechanism for dealing with CW proliferation. I would note 
     that this condition also requires annual certification.
       Second, with the CWC the countries undertaking exchanges 
     are legally bound by the fundamental obligations in Article 
     I. As Ron Lehman, former Arms Control Director under 
     President Bush, recently stated in testimony before the 
     Senate Foreign Relations Committee: ``We made it very clear 
     throughout the negotiations that all of this was subject to 
     Article I, which is the fundamental obligation not to assist. 
     . . . But the most important, I think, telling fact in 
     support of the U.S. interpretation is the fact that after the 
     Convention was done so many of the usual list of suspects 
     were so unhappy that they did not get what they wanted in 
     these provisions.''
       I would note, in conclusion, that renegotiation of Articles 
     X and XI of the CWC, as the Helms condition (#32) in the 
     Resolution of Ratification would require, is not a realistic 
     option. This treaty was intensively negotiated for more than 
     10 years. It has been signed by 162 countries and ratified by 
     74. As Brent Scowcroft recently testified, ``Starting over . 
     . . is pure fantasy. If we reject this treaty, we will incur 
     the bitterness of all of our friends and allies who followed 
     us for 10 years in putting this together . . . the idea that 
     we can lead out again down a different path I think is just 
     not in the cards. We have got to deal with the situation we 
     face now, not an ideal one out in the future.'' This is why 
     the Senate must vote to strike this Helms Condition.
       I hope this information facilitates the Senate's 
     consideration of the CWC and look forward to a successful 
     vote in the coming days.
           Sincerely,

                                             Samuel R. Berger,

                                    Assistant to the President for
                                        National Security Affairs.

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll. The time will be 
equally divided.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.


                            Amendment No. 47

 (Purpose: To strike condition no. 30, relating to chemical weapons in 
                             other states)

  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.

[[Page S3584]]

  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Delaware [Mr. Biden] proposes an amendment 
     numbered 47.
       On page 63, strike lines 8 through 20.

  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, this is condition No. 30. As was indicated 
at the outset of the unanimous-consent agreement, the Senate has now 
agreed to 28 of the 33 conditions that were attached to the treaty that 
is before us today.
  As I indicated at that time that I would be moving to strike five of 
the conditions, any one of which--at least four of which--if adopted, 
would essentially vitiate the treaty; would make our ratification 
useless.
  They are killer amendments. This is one of those amendments. Mr. 
President, condition No. 30 would hold hostage our joining the Chemical 
Weapons Convention to the condition that rogue states--several rogue 
states, such as Iraq, Libya and North Korea--would have to sign and 
ratify the treaty before we became party to the treaty.
  This has a very perverse impact. The first impact is we wouldn't be 
in the treaty. We would not have ratified the treaty, if we ratified 
this condition. Second, it has a perverse impact. It would prevent the 
United States from participating in the convention until a band of 2-
bit regimes that specialize in flaunting norms of civilized behavior 
decide for us when we should be a member of this treaty. Seventy-four 
nations have already signed onto it.
  This condition turns the present global arrangement on its head. 
Instead of the civilized nations of the world setting the rules, this 
condition effectively let's the villains determine the rules of the 
road and American policy. This condition ignores the critical fact that 
regardless of what the rogue states do, regardless of whether we join 
the CWC, or not, we have decided unilaterally to destroy our chemical 
weapons stockpile.
  We will not use chemical weapons to respond to a chemical weapons 
attack. That is a judgment our military and our last Commander in Chief 
and this one has made. Instead, we will rely on what General Schwarzkof 
said, and General Powell, General Shalikashvili, and others will rely 
upon our overwhelming nonchemical military capabilities to deter and 
retaliate against the use of chemical weapons.
  The best way to affect the behavior of these rogue states is to bring 
to bear the combined weight of the civilized nations of the world to 
isolate, sanction, and target those nations who would continue to 
produce chemical weapons in defiance of the creation of this 
international norm. But, Mr. President, first we have to establish the 
norm. If the United States of America says we will not join unless the 
bad guys join, then there is no reasonable prospect that such a norm 
will be established.
  As Secretary of State Madeleine Albright has noted, to say that we 
should not have a CWC because there will be people out there who will 
continue to produce chemical weapons, or who will cheat, is a little 
bit like saying we should not have laws because people will break them. 
We should not have laws against murder because we know people are going 
to murder people. So have no laws against murder.
  The point is that today there is nothing illegal--let's get this 
straight--under international law about producing chemical weapons, 
developing chemical weapons, or stockpiling chemical weapons. The 
purported Libyan chemical weapons program is completely legal today. 
The Iraqi chemical stockpile is completely legal today. In fact, there 
is nothing in international law that prohibits the use of chemical 
weapons internally. Like Saddam Hussein's poison gas attack against the 
Kurds within Iraq, there is nothing illegal about having or using these 
weapons in your own country. That will change once the CWC is in force.
  To quote Gen. Colin Powell, ``For us to reject this treaty now 
because there are rogue states outside that treaty is the equivalent of 
saying that we should not have joined NATO because Russia wasn't part 
of NATO.'' That is former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Colin Powell--
not me.
  This treaty will establish standards by which to judge others. If it 
is violated--that is, if the treaty is violated --it will provide the 
basis for harsh action to punish and bring violators into compliance. 
The opponents will say that norms are meaningless unless there is a 
will to enforce those norms. They are right. But on that point, I would 
point out that without a norm there is nothing to enforce.
  The bottom line is this: With the treaty we will have more tools and 
greater flexibility to act against those countries that threaten us and 
their neighbors. Should we choose military action we would be able to 
justify it as a measure taken to enforce the terms of a treaty to which 
we and 160 other nations who are signatories--only 74 ratified--are 
parties. North Korea is not. Libya is not. But 160 other nations have 
signed, and we are going to say that we will not join unless North 
Korea joins. As Gen. Colin Powell said, I am glad these folks weren't 
around when NATO was starting up to say we are not going to have NATO 
because Russia can't be a part.
  Mr. President, I reserve the remainder of my time. I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. HELMS addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator from North 
Carolina.
  Mr. HELMS. I thank the Chair.
  Mr. President, there is a lot of misunderstanding about this treaty. 
It has been advertised implicitly--not explicitly, of course--as a 
cure-all; as an end to the perils of chemical warfare. And a lot of 
people think it will all be over, and we will not have any more danger. 
The truth of the matter is that they will not do a thing in the world 
to help the situation because the Chemical Weapons treaty--Convention, 
as it has been called--is not a comprehensive ban. This treaty 
contributes to the national security of the United States and the 
American people, and that is what I am primarily interested in.
  This treaty, it seems to me, must at a minimum affect those countries 
possessing chemical weapons which pose a threat to the United States. 
Accordingly, the United States should not become a party to this 
treaty--many Senators feel--until those countries are also 
participants. And no effort has been made to encourage them to come in. 
We are standing alone, and they are going to go about their little 
deviltry unmolested. Rogue states--like Iran, Iraq, Libya, Syria, and 
North Korea--clearly represent a threat to United States security and 
the security of key United States allies. And not one of these 
countries has ratified the CWC, and not one of them is likely to 
ratify.
  First, the intelligence people in our own country--we call it the 
intelligence community--reported that all of these governments have 
active aggressive programs to develop and produce chemical weapons.
  In March 1995, I believe it was, regarding the nonproliferation 
treaty, the Central Intelligence Agency released an unclassified 
estimate that gave a troubling assessment of the likely impact that the 
CWC would have upon the proliferation of chemical weapons.
  This report said:

       A number of states continue to pursue the development or 
     enhancement of a chemical weapons capability. Some states 
     have chosen to pursue a chemical weapons capability because 
     of relatively low cost, and the low technology required for 
     chemical weapons production. Moreover, they believe that a 
     CWC ability can serve as both a deterrent to enemy attack and 
     as an enhancement of their offensive military capability.

  I am quoting. The report says:

       Currently, at least 15 countries have an offensive CWC 
     program in some level of development, and the most aggressive 
     chemical weapons programs are in Iran, Libya, and Syria. The 
     CWC will continue to be a serious threat for at least the 
     remainder of this decade despite a number of armaments 
     control efforts, such as the Chemical Weapons Convention. 
     Several countries have expressed concern, excluding Libya, 
     Syria and Iraq, which have so far refused to sign the CWC, 
     and some CW-capable countries that have signed the treaty 
     show no signs of ending their programs.

  That was our intelligence community's assessment of the situation as 
of 1995.
  Mr. President, while the intent of the CWC is good, what it proposes 
is to create a global chemical weapons ban, and it will not do any such 
thing. It simply will not achieve any other of the goals. Thirty 
percent of the countries with chemical weapons programs, including all 
of those with what is called aggressive programs, have not yet signed 
the treaty, let alone ratified it. Yet, these

[[Page S3585]]

countries have been and will continue to be the paramount chemical 
weapons threat to the United States.
  About 6 years ago, during Operation Desert Storm, the United States 
was so concerned about Iraq's chemical weapons program that we focused 
a huge percentage of long allied air attacks upon Saddam Hussein's 
chemical weaponry. A facility 65 miles north of Baghdad was the nucleus 
of Iraq's chemical weapons program, and a priority target during the 
early days of the gulf war. I was amazed then that no one seemed to pay 
much attention. And I am amazed now that no one seems to remember 
General Schwarzkopf's remarks during a press briefing at that time in 
Saudi Arabia. It was on February 27, 1991. Here is what he said:

       The nightmare scenario for all of us would have been to go 
     through the Iraqi tank barrier, get hung up in this breach 
     right here and then have the enemy artillery rain chemical 
     weapons on the troops that were in the gaggle, in the breach 
     right here.

  Pointing to specific points.
  Well, the point is this. That nightmare scenario exists today since 
Iraq has neither signed nor ratified this treaty.
  Let us look at another rogue regime, North Korea. On March 18, 1996, 
the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, Lt. Gen. Patrick 
Hughes, forwarded to me a DIA assessment of North Korea's military 
capabilities which underscored United States concern with the war-
fighting uses to which chemical weapons can be put.
  Now, according to that study, and I am quoting, ``In any attack on 
the South, P'yongyang could use chemical weapons to attack forces 
deployed near the DMZ, suppress allied air power and isolate the 
peninsula from strategic reinforcements.''
  Now, in boasting that this treaty will make American soldiers free 
from the threat of chemical weapons, the administration either has 
forgotten or deliberately ignored the fact that North Korea has neither 
signed nor ratified the CWC and the threat posed by North Korea and 
Iraq and others here. Now over 30,000 United States troops face North 
Korean troops armed and extensively trained with chemical weapons. Key 
airfields and ports are within striking distance of North Korean 
missiles, and with just a handful of chemical weapons North Korea could 
force United States aircraft to withdraw from the Korean Peninsula to 
Japan, and in fact in the near future North Korea may be even able to 
strike air bases in Japan with chemical munitions. Without air support 
and reinforcement, our ground forces and our South Korean allies would 
be overwhelmed within days.
  The threat to the United States forces in the Persian Gulf being 
rotated from Iran and Iraq is no less troubling, Mr. President. The 
bottom line, I guess, is that rogue states--if you will look at the 
chart--see chemical weapons as the best means to offset the superior 
conventional forces of the United States and its allies. These 
countries continue to develop plans to use chemical weapons in the 
event of war, and we must remember I think, Mr. President, that each of 
these countries are state sponsors, Government sponsors, of terrorism 
and may supply chemical weapons to terrorist groups.
  So when the CWC enters into force, our troops will be no safer from 
chemical attacks than they are today because the countries of greatest 
concern have not acceded to this treaty. For the CWC to offer any 
improvement, however modest, to the national security of the United 
States, it must at a minimum, I think, affect those countries with 
aggressive chemical weapons programs, those countries which have 
hostile intentions toward the United States and the American people.
  I urge Senators, please, to oppose this motion to strike this key 
provision.
  Have the yeas and nays been ordered on the motion?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. They have not.
  Mr. HELMS. I ask for the yeas and nays.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there is a sufficient second?
  Is there a sufficient second?
  There is a sufficient second.
  Mr. HELMS. I thank the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I yield the distinguished Senator from 
Massachusetts up to 10 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator from 
Massachusetts for 10 minutes.
  Mr. KERRY. I thank the Chair. I thank the distinguished minority 
manager.
  We have now finally arrived at the first of a series of real 
confrontations on this treaty, and we will vote shortly on this 
striking of the first reservation. It really is not possible to 
overemphasize the importance of each of these votes. There are four 
votes, each of which would cripple this treaty. If there are 100 
Members of the Senate prepared to vote for this treaty--and we know 
there are not--but if there were and we subsequently were to adopt one 
of these reservations, those 100 votes would be absolutely meaningless 
because we would have denied ourselves the capacity for this treaty to 
go into effect if we do not strike these reservations.
  The fact is that the United States would be simply unable to ratify 
now or at any time in the immediate future, and quite possibly never, 
if the effort to strike any one of these four fails. That is the 
gravity of what we are going to be doing in this Chamber in the course 
of this afternoon.
  The first of these conditions, condition 30, which the Senator from 
Delaware has ably discussed, has been called, somewhat antiseptically, 
``Chemical Weapons in Other States.'' The text is very short, and I 
just want to quote it verbatim. It says:

       Prior to the deposit of the United States instrument of 
     ratification, the President, in consultation with the 
     Director of Central Intelligence, shall certify to the 
     Congress that countries which have been determined to have 
     offensive chemical weapons programs, including Iran, Iraq, 
     Syria, Libya, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, 
     China, and all other countries determined to be state 
     sponsors of international terrorism have ratified or 
     otherwise acceded to the convention.

  Let me translate that into simple English. Under the terms of that 
condition, we will hold ourselves hostage to the very outlaw, rogue 
states that we seek to control by passing this convention. Under the 
terms of that condition, we would in fact do nothing to change the 
status quo.
  The distinguished chairman of the committee said we have to hold on 
to this amendment and defeat the treaty essentially because Iraq, Iran, 
Libya, these countries have chemical weapons today. Well, if we do not 
pass this treaty, nothing whatsoever will change with respect to the 
threat versus the United States. Each and every one of those countries 
will continue to produce and we will continue on the path that we have 
been on for some years which is destroy our chemical weapons stocks. 
Why? Because we have decided, and appropriately I believe, that we do 
not need and do not intend to fight a war with chemical weapons.
  Now, this particular reservation has a noble objective. I do not 
think any of us would argue, the real objective is to get those rogue 
states to get rid of their chemical weapons. We are all in favor of 
that, if that is the real objective. But I respectfully suggest the 
real objective is to come around through the back door and do through 
the back door what they may not be able to do through the front door. 
There is no Senator in this Chamber who does not hope that Iran, Iraq, 
Syria, Libya, North Korea, China, Cuba, and Sudan, in fact, every 
nation on Earth, is going to someday ratify the CWC. If that was the 
case or it was about to happen or had happened, there would be a lot 
less concern about how we are going to go about clarifying, inspecting, 
or challenging during the course of this treaty. But that is not the 
case. There is not one of those Senators who has drafted this 
resolution who can look any other Senator in the eye in this Chamber 
and say today that they believe that any of those rogue states are 
about to ratify tomorrow, the next day, or the next day. That is not 
going to come as any surprise to anybody here in the Chamber, Mr. 
President.
  There is not one who would do that. In fact, during most of the 10 
years during which the Reagan administration and the Bush 
administration negotiated over exhausting amounts of time and developed 
this treaty, they developed it to structure sanctions that would apply 
to trade in chemicals conducted by nations that do not ratify the 
treaty.

[[Page S3586]]

  Let me be clear about that. The primary purpose of the strict 
requirements for challenge inspection and the process of tracking 
precursor chemicals is not necessarily to keep track of the people that 
we know are going to live up to this treaty. It is precisely to keep 
track of the people that are most likely to break the treaty, and every 
one of the experts has suggested that with respect to the rogue states 
you are better off having that tracking process, the declarations of 
sales, the ability to be able to track the fingerprint of chemicals 
through the globe in order to be able to hold those countries 
accountable.
  That is the purpose of this treaty. So we have sort of a double 
negative here. If we allowed this particular reservation to stand, not 
only would we hold ourselves hostage to the very countries that we want 
to have eliminate the weapons, but we also would eliminate the means 
that we have created to be able to get them to eliminate those weapons.
  So, Mr. President, I respectfully suggest this treaty was negotiated 
and crafted precisely to apply the pressure of world opinion, the 
diplomatic pressure, the economic pressure on the recalcitrant nations 
whose leadership flaunts the civilized norm.
  The Senator from North Carolina is absolutely correct. These nations 
do have these materials. These nations will, I am convinced, in a 
number of cases continue to produce them. But the issue is how you best 
try to pressure them to reform their behavior. How do you make it as 
difficult as possible for those nations to do that? How do you isolate 
them in the greatest manner possible? Plainly speaking, the authors of 
this amendment have to know the distinction between having those 
mechanisms in place, which the Defense Department and others have all 
said will help them more to be able to do the tracking, than not to 
have them.
  I want to emphasize also that there is an irony in this because some 
of the people who are advocating that we wait until the rogue nations 
turn around and change their mind are, frankly, the very same people 
who usually say never give up any sovereignty of the United States to 
another nation. Here we are turning over the entire sovereignty of the 
United States to make a decision in our best interests to the very 
rogue states that have indicated already no willingness to try to 
adhere to these standards.
  Second, the condition either fails to recognize or ignores 
purposefully the reality that at midnight of next Tuesday, April 29, no 
matter what the Senate does today, the Chemical Weapons Convention 
takes effect with or without U.S. participation.
  So the question of whether or not this convention is foolproof, is 
absolutely the best convention in the world, really begs the issue. The 
real question before the United States is are we better off with this 
treaty in terms of protecting our security interests by being part of 
the convention, within its organization able to change it, which has 
already been ratified by 74 nations and signed by over 160? If we fail 
to ratify, or if we fail to ratify by not taking out this reservation, 
then where are we? We have joined the outlaw nations. We will have 
joined the very nations that we want most to affect the behavior of.
  I think it is important to note that some of our most respected 
voices in this country with respect to military affairs and national 
security affairs have all agreed that it is significant for the United 
States to be able to not align itself with those nations. General 
Schwarzkopf said:

       I am very, very much in favor of the ratification of the 
     treaty.

  And he said:

       We don't need chemical weapons to fight our future wars. 
     And frankly, by not ratifying that treaty, we align ourselves 
     with nations like Libya and North Korea and I would just as 
     soon not be associated with those thugs in this particular 
     measure.

  I think that is a pretty strong statement about precisely what this 
reservation would have the effect of doing.
  General Powell, who has already been quoted by my colleague, made it 
very clear that we should not do this and made the analogy to NATO, to 
our not joining NATO simply because Russia was not a member.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired.
  Mr. BIDEN. I yield my colleague another 30 seconds.
  Mr. KERRY. Former Assistant to President Reagan and Secretary of 
State Jim Baker said:

       Some have argued that we shouldn't commit to the treaty 
     because states like Libya, Iraq and North Korea, which have 
     not signed it, will still be able to continue their efforts 
     to acquire chemical weapons. This is obviously true, but the 
     convention, which will go into effect in April whether or not 
     we ratify it, will make it more difficult for those states to 
     do so by prohibiting the sale of materials to nonmembers that 
     can be used to make chemical weapons.

  He said:

       It makes no sense to argue that because of a few pariah 
     states refusing to join the convention, the United States 
     should line up with them rather than the rest of the world.

  This is a bipartisan sentiment, Mr. President, and I hope the Senate 
will recognize the gravity of the vote we are about to take.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Kempthorne). Who yields time? The Senator 
from North Carolina.
  Mr. HELMS. I have here, Mr. President, a group of editorial comments, 
making, as Sam Ervin used to say, uncommon good sense, in opposition to 
this treaty. I ask unanimous consent they be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the editorials were ordered to be printed 
in the Record, as follows:

                [From the Washington Post, Mar. 5, 1997]

                     No to the Chemical Arms Treaty

     (By James Schlesinger, Caspar Weinberger, and Donald Rumsfeld)

       The phrase ``damning with faint praise'' is given new 
     meaning by the op-ed by Brent Scowcroft and John Deutch on 
     the Chemical Weapons Convention [``End the Chemical Weapons 
     Business,'' Feb. 11]. In it, the authors concede virtually 
     every criticism made by those who oppose this controversial 
     treaty in its present form.
       They acknowledge the legitimacy of key concerns about the 
     Convention: its essential unverifiability; its lack of global 
     coverage; the prospect that it will inhibit non-lethal use of 
     chemicals, including tear gas; and its mandating the transfer 
     of militarily relevant chemical offensive and defensive 
     technology to untrustworthy countries that become parties. It 
     is our view that these problems are inherent in the present 
     treaty.
       Take, for example, Scowcroft and Deutch's warning against 
     cutting investment in chemical defensive measures. 
     Unfortunately, treaties such as the Chemical Weapons 
     Convention (CWC)--which promise to reduce the menace posed by 
     weapons of mass destruction but which cannot do so--
     inevitably tend to diminish the perceived need and therefore 
     the support for defenses against such threats.
       In fact, in December 1995, the then-vice chairman of the 
     Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended a reduction of more than 
     $800 million in investment on chemical defenses in 
     anticipation of the Convention's coming into force. If past 
     experience is a guide, there might also be a reduction in the 
     priority accorded to monitoring emerging chemical weapons 
     threats, notwithstanding Scowcroft and Deutch's call for 
     improvements in our ability to track chemical weapons 
     developments.
       Scowcroft and Deutch correctly warn that the ``CWC [must] 
     not [be] exploited to facilitate the diffusion of CWC-
     specific technology, equipment and material--even to 
     signatory states.'' The trouble is that the Chemical Weapons 
     Convention explicitly obligates member states to facilitate 
     such transfers, even though these items are readily 
     exploitable for military purposes. What is more, the treaty 
     commits member states not to observe any agreements, whether 
     multilateral or unilateral, that would restrict these 
     transfers.
       In short, we believe that the problems with the Chemical 
     Weapons Convention in these and other areas that have been 
     identified by Brent Scowcroft and John Deutch clearly 
     demonstrate that this treaty would be contrary to U.S. 
     security interests. Moreover, in our view these serious 
     problems undercut the argument that the CWC's ``imperfect 
     constraints'' are better than no constraints at all.
       The CWC would likely have the effect of leaving the United 
     States and its allies more, not less, vulnerable to chemical 
     attack. It could well serve to increase, not reduce, the 
     spread of chemical weapons manufacturing capabilities. Thus 
     we would be better off not to be party to it.
       Notably, if the United States is not a CWC member state, 
     the danger is lessened that American intelligence about 
     ongoing foreign chemical weapons programs will be dumbed down 
     or otherwise compromised. This has happened in the past when 
     enforcement of a violated agreement was held to be a greater 
     threat to an arms control regime than was noncompliance by 
     another party. The United States and the international 
     community have been unwilling to enforce the far more easily 
     verified 1925 Geneva Convention banning the use of chemical 
     weapons--even in

[[Page S3587]]

     the face of repeated and well-documented violations by Saddam 
     Hussein. What likelihood is there that we would be any more 
     insistent when it comes to far less verifiable bans on 
     production and stockpiling of such weapons?
       As a non-party, the United States would also remain free to 
     oppose dangerous ideas such as providing state-of-the-art 
     chemical manufacturing facilities and defensive equipment to 
     international pariahs such as Iran and Cuba. And the United 
     States would be less likely to reduce investment in chemical 
     protective capabilities, out of a false sense of security 
     arising from participation in the CWC.
       In addition, if the United States is not a CWC party, 
     American taxpayers will not be asked to bear the substantial 
     annual costs of our participating in a multilateral regime 
     that will not ``end the chemical weapons business'' in 
     countries of concern. (By some estimates, these costs would 
     be over $200 million per year.) Similarly, U.S. citizens and 
     companies will be spared the burdens associated with 
     reporting and inspection arrangements that might involve 
     unreasonable searches and seizures, could jeopardize 
     confidential business information and yet could not ensure 
     that other nations--and especially rogue states--no longer 
     have chemical weapons programs.
       Against these advantages of nonparticipation, the purported 
     down-sides seem relatively inconsequential. First, whether 
     Russia actually eliminates its immense chemical arsenal is 
     unlikely to hinge upon our participating in the CWC. Indeed, 
     Moscow is now actively creating new chemical agents that 
     would circumvent and effectively defeat the treaty's 
     constraints.
       Second, the preponderance of trade in chemicals would be 
     unaffected by the CWC's limitations, making the impact of 
     remaining outside the treaty regime, if any, fairly modest on 
     American manufacturers.
       Finally, if the United States declines to join the present 
     Chemical Weapons Convention, it is academic whether 
     implementing arrangements are drawn up by others or not. In 
     the event the United States does decide to become a party at 
     a later date--perhaps after improvements are made to enhance 
     the treaty's effectiveness--it is hard to believe that its 
     preferences regarding implementing arrangements would not be 
     given considerable weight. This is particularly true since 
     the United States would then be asked to bear 25 percent of 
     the implementing organization's budget.
       There is no way to ``end the chemical weapons business'' by 
     fiat. The price of attempting to do so with the present 
     treaty is unacceptably high, and the cost of the illusion it 
     creates might be higher still.
                                                                    ____


               [From the Weekly Standard, Mar. 24, 1997]

                      Just Say No to a Bad Treaty

       The United States Senate must decide by April 28 whether to 
     ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention. The press, the 
     pundits, and the Clinton administration have treated the 
     debate over the treaty as another in a series of battles 
     between ``internationalists'' and ``isolationists'' in the 
     new, post-Cold War era.
       It isn't. What we really have here is the continuation of 
     one of this century's most enduring disputes. In the first 
     camp are the high priests of arms control theology, who have 
     never met an international agreement they didn't like. In the 
     second camp are those who take a more skeptical view of 
     relying on a piece of watermarked, signed parchment for 
     safety in a dangerous world.
       The case for ratifying the Chemical Weapons Convention is a 
     triumph of hope over experience. It is an attempt to reform 
     the world by collecting signatures. Some of the most 
     dangerous nations--Iraq, Syria, Libya, and North Korea--have 
     not ratified the convention and, for all we know, never will. 
     Some of the nations that are signatories, like Russia, China, 
     Iran, and Cuba, are manifestly unreliable and are already 
     looking for ways to circumvent the convention's provisions.
       The convention's most prominent American defenders admit 
     that the agreement is probably not verifiable. And it isn't. 
     Chemical weapons can be produced in small but deadly amounts 
     in tiny makeshift laboratories. The nerve gas used by 
     terrorists to poison subway riders in Japan in 1995, for 
     instance, was produced in a 14 ft.-by-8 ft. room. No one in 
     the American intelligence community believes we would be able 
     to monitor compliance with an international chemical weapons 
     regime with any reasonable degree of confidence.
       The Washington Post opines that these failings in the 
     convention--the very fact ``that the coverage of this treaty 
     falls short and that enforcement is uncertain''--are actually 
     arguments for ratifying it. Presumably, signature of a flawed 
     treaty will make all of us work harder to perfect it.
       Great.
       At the end of the day, the strongest argument proponents of 
     ratification can offer is that, whatever a treaty's manifest 
     flaws, it is better to have one than not to have one. How 
     could it be bad to have a treaty outlawing production of 
     chemical weapons, no matter how full of holes it may be?
       Well, actually, such a treaty could be worse than no treaty 
     at all. We have pretty good evidence from the bloody history 
     of this century that treaties like the Chemical Weapons 
     Convention--treaties that are more hortatory than 
     mandatory, that express good intentions more than they 
     require any actions to back up those intentions--can do 
     more harm than good. They are part of a psychological 
     process of evasion and avoidance of tough choices. The 
     truth is, the best way of controlling chemical weapons 
     proliferation could be for the United States to bomb a 
     Libyan chemical weapons factory.
       But that is the kind of difficult decision for an American 
     president that the Chemical Weapons Convention does nothing 
     to facilitate. Indeed, the existence of a chemical weapons 
     treaty would make it less likely that a president would order 
     such strong unilateral action, since he would be bound to 
     turn over evidence of a violation to the international 
     lawyers and diplomats and wait for their investigation and 
     concurrence. And as Richard Perle has recently noted, even 
     after Saddam Hussein used chemical weapons in flagrant 
     violation of an existing prohibition against their use, the 
     international bureaucrats responsible for monitoring these 
     matters could not bring themselves to denounce Iraq by name. 
     In the end, it would be easier for a president to order an 
     air strike than to get scores of nations to agree on naming 
     one of their own an outlaw.
       The Chemical Weapons Convention is what Peter Rodman calls 
     ``junk arms control,'' and not the least of its many 
     drawbacks is that it gives effective arms control a bad name. 
     Effective treaties codify decisions nations have already 
     made: to end a war on certain terms, for instance, or to 
     define fishing rights. Because they reflect the will of the 
     parties, moreover, the parties themselves don't raise 
     obstacles to verification.
       But treaties whose purpose is to rope in rogue nations that 
     have not consented, or whose consent is widely understood to 
     be cynical and disingenuous, are something else again. They 
     are based on a worldview that is at best foolishly optimistic 
     and at worst patronizing and deluded.
       One of the important things separating Reaganite 
     internationalism from the more starry-eyed Wilsonian version 
     is the understanding that treaties must reflect reality, not 
     hope. The Chemical Weapons Convention turns the clock back to 
     the kind of Wilsonian thinking characteristic of the Carter 
     administration. It is unfortunate that among its strongest 
     backers are some prominent Republicans who have served in key 
     foreign-policy positions. It is true that the origins of the 
     Chemical Weapons Convention date back to the Reagan years, 
     and the convention was carried to fruition by the Bush 
     administration. But let's be candid. In the Reagan years, the 
     treaty was mostly a sop to liberals in Congress, an attempt 
     to pick up some points for an arms control measure at a time 
     when Reagan was trying to win on more important issues like 
     the defense buildup and the Strategic Defense Initiative. And 
     President Bush pushed the treaty in no small part because he 
     had disliked having to cast a tie-breaking vote in the Senate 
     as vice president in favor of building chemical weapons. 
     Republicans today are under no obligation to carry out the 
     mistakes of their predecessors.
       In one respect, the debate over the Chemical Weapons 
     Convention calls to mind the struggle for the party's soul 
     waged in the 1970s between Kissingerian detente-niks on one 
     side and the insurgent forces led by Ronald Reagan on the 
     other. Back then, conservative Republicans like Senate 
     majority leader Trent Lott knew without hesitation where they 
     stood. They should stand where they stood before, foursquare 
     with the ideas that helped win the Cold War, and against the 
     Chemical Weapons Convention.
                                                                    ____


               [From the Arizona Republic, Mar. 9, 1997]

                             Chemical Pact


                         say no to this treaty

       Make no mistake about it.
       Those were the words of President Bill Clinton, referring 
     to the Chemical Weapons Convention in his State of the Union 
     address.
       He said ratification of the CWC ``will make our troops 
     safer from chemical attack . . . we have no more important 
     obligations, especially in the wake of what we now know about 
     the Gulf War.''
       Although all civilized nations can embrace the notion of 
     eliminating chemical weapons, it would, nevertheless, be a 
     mistake to ratify the CWC, signed by more than 160 nations--
     including the United States during the Bush administration.
       The treaty requires the destruction of chemical weapons 
     that signatories to the treaty own or possess, or weapons 
     anywhere under their jurisdiction; the destruction of 
     chemical weapons abandoned on the territory of another state; 
     the destruction of chemical-weapons production facilities; 
     the prohibition of riot-control agents as a method of 
     warfare--all reasonable and worthy goals.
       Ever since 1675, when a French-German agreement not to use 
     poison bullets was concluded in Strasbourg, nations have 
     struggled with how to limit the terribly destructive nature 
     of chemical weapons, though none of the subsequent 
     international agreements prevented the use of chemical 
     weapons by warring factions.
       In the 1980s, Iraq used chemical weapons, including nerve 
     gas, against Iran, clearly violating the 1925 Geneva 
     Protocol. But an international conference in Paris failed to 
     enforce or fortify the Geneva Protocol, proving the 
     difficulty is not a lack of law, but the failure to enforce 
     it.
       Under terms of the CWC, for the first time in U.S. history, 
     private industry will be subject to foreign inspection, with 
     inspectors

[[Page S3588]]

     being dispatched from an agency based in the Netherlands. In 
     addition, businesses must prove to the U.S. government and 
     international inspectors that they are not producing or 
     stockpiling chemical weapons, with non-compliance fines 
     reaching as high as $50,000 per incident.
       Tucson's Sundt Corp. estimates that ``with five major 
     offices/warehouses/shops in two states, up to 35 job-site 
     offices utilizing subcontractors and suppliers in eight 
     states, the complete and final determination of what we have 
     in the way of compounds and their derivative, the interactive 
     relationships (with the list of chemicals) could involve the 
     cost of a chemist's or consultant's time amounting to 
     $50,000-$100,000 per annum, not including Sundt Corp.'s 
     administrative time.''
       Under the terms of the treaty, inspections may be conducted 
     at any facility within a state party without probable cause, 
     without a warrant. Inspectors will be authorized under the 
     treaty to collect data and analyze samples. This could result 
     in the loss of proprietary information, or ``based upon the 
     depth of inspection, e.g. interviews with corporate 
     personnel, employees, vendors, subcontractors; review of 
     drawings, purchase orders, subcontracts; inspection and 
     review of internal and external correspondence; we feel that 
     it could be difficult to safeguard confidential business 
     information during this inspection,'' says the Sundt Corp.
       The obligation to open on-site inspections raises clear 
     Fourth and Fifth Amendment concerns, inasmuch as no probable 
     cause need be shown while a foreign state will have the right 
     to a challenge inspection of a U.S. facility without the 
     grounds that are essential for a search warrant.
       As Sen. Jon Kyl, R-Ariz., has pointed out, the CWC may 
     actually contribute to the proliferation of chemical 
     technology because of its requirement that the United States 
     share information with rogue nations, once they sign onto the 
     CWC.
       Further, American technology that might actually enhance 
     the safety of U.S. troops--such as non-lethal immobilizing 
     agents--could be prohibited if the Senate ratifies the 
     convention in its present form.
       The forces on both sides of this issue in Washington are 
     men and women of good will. But the CWC is not a good deal 
     for the United States. That is the message the Senate should 
     continue to send to Bill Clinton, in unmistakable terms.
                                                                    ____


              [From the Wall Street Journal, Apr. 1, 1997]

                             The Bum's Rush

       The debate over the Chemical Weapons Convention looks like 
     it's about to turn into a slugfest, notwithstanding last 
     week's spectacle of Jesse Helms and Madeleine Albright 
     holding hands. Intimations of the battle to come were heard 
     the week before last, when Democrats threatened to stall all 
     Senate actions unless a ratification vote is scheduled. The 
     Administration, meanwhile, is hyping April 29 as the drop-
     dead date for ratification in the hope of getting the Senate 
     to shortchange the ``advise'' part of its advise-and-consent 
     responsibilities and rush to a vote before it has a chance to 
     review it properly.
       Majority Leader Trent Lott, who hasn't let on how he will 
     vote, is the point man here. How he handles the treaty's 
     passage through the Senate will be an important test of his 
     leadership. While he has pleased Democrats by promising to 
     bring the treaty up when the Senate returns from recess in a 
     few days, that doesn't mean that he's going to ram a vote 
     down the Senate's throat, as the Administration hopes. 
     Senator Lott is perfectly capable of spotting a bum's rush 
     when he sees one, and he expressly made no promise for a vote 
     before April 29, the date the treaty goes into effect with or 
     without U.S. ratification. Despite Chicken Little warnings 
     from the White House, there is no deadline for ratification; 
     the U.S. can join as a full member at any time.
       Before a ratification vote, there is plenty of time for a 
     vigorous, public examination. The best place to start is with 
     hearings, which Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Helms 
     has scheduled to begin on April 9. Senators, especially the 
     15 new ones who missed last year's hearings, deserve a chance 
     to understand exactly what they are being asked to vote on. 
     At the moment the focus is on political maneuverings instead 
     of where it should be: the content of the treaty.
       For starters, Senator Helms could call the four former 
     Defense Secretaries who adamantly oppose the CWC: James 
     Schlesinger, Donald Rumsfeld, Casper Weinberger and Dick 
     Cheney. Ask them about the treaty's verifiability, and 
     they'll tell you it's impossible. (So, for that matter, will 
     the treaty's supporters, whose best argument is that the 
     treaty is flawed, but we ought to sign it anyway.) Douglas 
     Feith, a Reagan Administration chemical weapons negotiator, 
     likens enforcement to a drunk searching for his keys under a 
     lamppost because that's where the light is. Under the CWC, 
     members could look for chemical weapons in New Zealand or the 
     Netherlands, but not in North Korea or Libya or Iraq, which 
     have no intention of joining.
       The former Defense Secretaries could also talk about 
     Articles X and XI, which would require American chemical 
     manufacturers to share their latest technology with fellow 
     signatories--including the likes of Iran and Cuba. Legal 
     scholars could offer some thoughts on the treaty's 
     requirement that American companies open their doors to 
     surprise inspections as to whether that squares with the 
     Constitution's protection of property rights and its ban on 
     search and seizure. CEOs could testify on the treaty's 
     regulatory burdens, not to mention the threat of industrial 
     espionage as inspector-spies snoop around their factories and 
     troll through their files. Intelligence experts could discuss 
     the impact on national security.
       All this and more should emerge in hearings. In recent 
     days, Republicans and Democrats have come to agreement on 21 
     of 30 points of contention over the treaty. That progress 
     (which comes after weeks of Administration stonewalling, by 
     the way) is on relatively minor issues and doesn't extend to 
     the key concerns on verifiability, constitutionality or 
     national security. The Administration would like nothing 
     better than a perfunctory day or two of hearings on these 
     crucial matters followed by a quick transfer to the Senate 
     floor for a vote billed as ``for'' or ``against'' poison gas. 
     It should come as no surprise if it doesn't want Senators to 
     take too close a look: if they do, there's a good chance they 
     might not like what they see.

  Mr. HELMS. I yield to the distinguished Senator from Arizona [Mr. 
Kyl], such time as he may require. Does he have an estimate?
  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, 10 minutes.
  Mr. HELMS. Take a shot at it. I want to be through along about 3:30, 
so we can vote.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. KYL. I also ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record a 
number of op-ed pieces.
  There being not objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

               [From the Washington Times, Mar. 4, 1997]

                 Don't Rush the Chemical Weapons Treaty

       George Bush, James Baker, Brent Scowcroft--this is not 
     exactly a lineup one would expect to find on the side of the 
     Clinton White House. However, in the past few weeks, the 
     administration has drawn upon all available resources in the 
     hope of prevailing upon Congress to ratify the Chemical 
     Weapons Convention--and to do it at once. A deadline of April 
     29 looms ominously on the horizon, so we are told, by which 
     time the treaty goes into effect, having already been 
     ratified by the necessary 65 countries. If the United States 
     does not ratify by then, we will be left out in the cold with 
     other non-signing ne'er-do-wells, and the world will laugh at 
     this failure of American leadership. For heavens' sake, this 
     is a treaty the United States itself negotiated! How can we 
     possibly not ratify it?
       Hold the horses here. As critics of the treaty including 
     four past secretaries of defense have pointed out, it's not 
     at all clear that it is in the interest of the United States 
     to ratify the CWC, at least not until a number of problems 
     associated with it have been resolved. The famous deadline of 
     April 29 is basically of the administration's own making and 
     ought not intimidate anyone. Of the 65 countries needed to 
     trigger the treaty to take effect, the last one, Hungary, did 
     so in November, and only after consultation with the White 
     House, which told Budapest to go ahead.
       In point of fact, as Michael Waller notes on today's Op-ed 
     page, Russian Prime Minister Victor Chernomyrdin specifically 
     warned Vice President Gore in a letter against rushing the 
     process with other countries before ratification by the two 
     most important signatories, Russia and the United States. 
     Disregarding Mr. Chernomyrdin's warning, the Clinton 
     administration pressed ahead in order to try to force the 
     Senate's hand.
       President Clinton and Secretary of State Madeleine Albright 
     argue that non-ratification by the United States by April 29 
     will mean that we will be shut out from the regime's 
     executive board. This is highly unlikely to happen, 
     especially given that the United States is being asked to 
     pony up a full 25 percent of the budget for enforcement. 
     That's $52 million this year.
       The fact of the matter is that the CWC may be in just as 
     much trouble in the Senate now as it was back in the fall, 
     when then-secretary of State Warren Christopher decided to 
     postpone the debate for lack of support. For one thing, this 
     Senate is more con- servative than the previous one, and for 
     another, numerous concerns have not been addressed. It 
     redounds to the credit of Republicans that they have 
     declared themselves willing to work with the 
     administration to iron out these difficulties, but there 
     is a very long way to go. Sen. John Kyl of Arizona tells 
     The Washington Times' editorial page, ``I believe we have 
     an obligation to try to get as close as possible to making 
     the treaty workable. And we'll see how far we can get.''
       Mr. Kyl, however, points to some serious problems. For one 
     thing, it is not global. Iran and Libya, for instance, have 
     not signed, and China and Russia have not ratified it. Should 
     we be concerned about chemical weapons in Belgium and 
     Holland? Of course not. They are not the problem. For 
     another, the treaty is not adequately verifiable. Even the 
     Clinton administration admits as much. And third, much like 
     the Atoms for Peace program, it will spread the knowledge of 
     a potentially lethal technology to countries that could make 
     dangerous use of it. Add to these concerns the huge 
     regulatory burden the treaty will impose on American chemical 
     companies, in effect an

[[Page S3589]]

     unfunded mandate, as well as the constitutional problems with 
     spot checks by international inspectors.
       There may be ways out of these problems without sending the 
     treaty back to the drawing board. One would be for the Senate 
     ratification resolution (a document that accompanies all 
     international treaties ratified by the Senate) to posit a set 
     of conditions that must be fulfilled before the United States 
     formally joins the CWC regime. A creative solution might be, 
     for instance, to say that the CWC regulatory burden should 
     not be imposed on American companies at least until such a 
     time as the treaty has been ratified by countries that are 
     key to its effectiveness--say, Russia, China and Iran.
       On Friday, Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott informed 
     administration negotiators that they will have to deal 
     directly with the staff of Sen. Jesse Helms' Foreign 
     Relations Committee, which is indeed where the responsibility 
     belongs. Mr. Helms has some other issues outstanding with the 
     administration, including State Department reorganization. If 
     the CWC is truly as important as the White House claims it 
     is, there's little time to be lost in getting the White House 
     to work on the legitimate problems of this treaty.
                                                                    ____


              [From the Wall Street Journal, Feb. 13, 1997

                      The Chemical Weapons Coverup

                         (By J. Michael Walker)

       President Clinton had hardly completed his first year in 
     office when Sen. William Cohen (R., Maine) suspected that the 
     administration was covering up ominous Russian military 
     developments. Mr. Cohen introduced legislation requiring the 
     president ``to tell us and the American people what the 
     Russian military was doing and what the implications were for 
     American and Allied security.'' The Pentagon made the 
     information available to Congress--but withheld it from the 
     public. Mr. Cohen complained that the report ``was classified 
     from cover to cover, even though much of the report did not 
     warrant being restricted by a security classification.''
       ``Perhaps,'' Mr. Cohen surmised in a speech on the Senate 
     floor, ``the administration was worried about being 
     embarrassed given its acquiescence to Russian military 
     adventures.'' Whatever the reason, he said, ``the decision to 
     classify the report from the cover to cover has prevented 
     Congress from conducting a complete public debate about 
     Russian actions and the administration's policy toward 
     Russia, and it has prevented the American people from 
     becoming fully informed on these matters.''


                            Eerily Resonant

       Mr. Cohen's criticisms of the administration to which he 
     now belongs seem eerily resonant. The issue today is the 
     administration's campaign to win Senate ratification of the 
     Chemical Weapons Convention. Intended to abolish all chemical 
     weapons world-wide, the CWC contains many loopholes, legal 
     discrepancies and weak enforcement mechanisms that render it 
     ineffective. In particular, there is every reason to believe 
     that Russia has continued work to develop deadly new chemical 
     weapons that would skirt the treaty's requirements.
       Hungary recently became the 65th country to ratify the CWC, 
     tripping a mechanism that puts the treaty into effect April 
     29 with or without the ratification of Russia, China and the 
     U.S. Thus the administration is pushing hard for ratification 
     by that date, though it had put the CWC on hold last 
     September over concerns that the CWC might unnecessarily 
     burden U.S. industry. American companies would be subject to 
     new regulations and would be compelled to open their records 
     to foreign inspectors. Firms having nothing to do with 
     chemical weapons--wineries, breweries, distilleries, food-
     processing companies and manufacturers of electronics and 
     soaps--could be forced to reveal trade secrets to the 
     inspectors, to the benefit of foreign competitors.
       In its zeal to ratify the CWC, the administration has been 
     distorting and even concealing vital information about the 
     treaty. Written exchanges between key senators and the 
     executive branch show grave inconsistencies and worse in the 
     selling of the CWC:

                         Verification questions

       Many senators are worried that the U.S. lacks the 
     capability to verify other countries' compliance with the 
     CWC. This disquiet is fueled in part by the rather vague 
     assessments by Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Director 
     John Holum and other officials, who repeatedly have reassured 
     the Senate that the CWC is ``effectively verifiable.'' 
     Indeed, proponents say CWC will provide an added tool for 
     intelligence collection.
       But intelligence reports demonstrate it is insufficient, 
     even though intelligence chiefs have given the CWC their 
     obligatory endorsement. In 1994, then-CIA Director R. James 
     Woolsey told senators that ``the chemical-weapons problem is 
     so difficult from an intelligence perspective that I cannot 
     state that we have high confidence in our ability to detect 
     noncompliance, especially on a small scale.'' And a May 1995 
     National Intelligence Estimate stated that production of new 
     classes of chemical weapons ``would be difficult to detect 
     and confirm as a CWC-sponsored activity.''

                         Clandestine production

       Several countries--notably including Russia--maintain 
     clandestine chemical weapon programs designed to elude 
     detection. The administration virtually ignored reports of 
     Moscow's continuing covert development and production of 
     binary nerve agents, and made no visible attempt to induce 
     Moscow to terminate the programs--until last week, when the 
     Washington Times made public a classified Pentagon report. 
     The report described Foliant, the code name of a supersecret 
     program begun under the Soviets to develop nerve agents so 
     lethal that microscopic amounts can kill. One of those 
     substances is A-232 of the Novichok class of binary weapons, 
     which were designed to circumvent future bans on such agents.
       The Pentagon report says the chemical formulas are not 
     defined in the CWC lists. Therefore, Novichok weapons 
     technically are not banned under the treaty. The 
     administration counters that they are banned ``in spirit,'' 
     but as with all its arms control agreements, Moscow has been 
     banking on the technicality and the camouflage.
       Russian military scientists and journalists revealed the 
     program, but Russian officials were not alone in trying to 
     cover it up. The leaked Pentagon report's low level of 
     classification--secret as opposed to top secret--suggests 
     that protecting intelligence sources and methods was not the 
     objective of the secrecy. Rather, it appears the facts were 
     simply too inconvenient for the administration's purposes.
       Nearly all the leaked information had appeared in the press 
     long before. In September 1992, Vil Mirzayanov, a dissident 
     Russian scientist who worked for 26 years on the clandestine 
     programs, wrote an article in Moscow News describing the 
     existence and nature of Novichok, and the specific intent to 
     circumvent the CWC. More details emerged over the next two 
     years as authorities persecuted--but never disputed--Mr. 
     Mirzayanov. One of Russia's top binary weapons scientists, 
     Vladimir Ugiev, revealed the existence of A-232--which he 
     personally developed--in an interview with the magazine 
     Novoye Vremya in early 1994. And in May 1994 Mr. Mirzayanov 
     wrote about A-232 and other substances in an article for this 
     page. Along with these first-person accounts came additional 
     revelations of both programs in the Baltimore Sun and other 
     publications.
       Backed by letters from Sens. Bill Bradley (D., N.J.) and 
     Jesse Helms (R. N.C.), U.S. Ambassador Thomas Pickering held 
     a Moscow news conference in January 1994 defending Mr. 
     Mirzayanov for ``telling the truth about an activity which is 
     contrary to treaty obligations.'' Yet in Washington, 
     officials kept silent. Only the embarrassment of last week's 
     Washington Times report has spurred the administration to ask 
     Russia to stop.

                          Weapons destruction

       The U.S. and other nations have repeatedly offered to help 
     Moscow destroy the tens of thousands of tons of declared 
     chemical agents in its arsenals. A legal base toward this 
     goal in the 1990 Bilateral Destruction Agreement. Visiting 
     Bonn last spring, Mr. Holum of the Arms Control and 
     Disarmament Agency learned that Moscow was planning to 
     withdraw from the BDA, and wrote a May 21 cable to Washington 
     with the news. Lawmakers who asked to see the cable were told 
     for weeks that it did not exist. Senate sources say. Sen. Jon 
     Kyl (R., Ariz.), a member of the Select Committee on 
     Intelligence, wasn't allowed to read the cable until the eve 
     of the expected September ratification vote, when he was 
     shown only a redacted version.

                      Chernomyrdin letter to Gore

       Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin sent a letter to 
     Vice President Al Gore on July 8, 1996, warning that if the 
     CWC went into effect before Russia's ratification, Moscow 
     probably wouldn't ratify it. The letter was faxed all around 
     Washington, but when Sen. Helms, chairman of the Foreign 
     Relations Committee, asked the administration for a copy, the 
     administration classified it.


                           strategy backfired

       The Clinton administration had hoped to present the Senate 
     with a fait accompli: that's why it encouraged Hungary and 
     other nations to ratify the treaty and automatically trigger 
     its implementation. Yet the White House strategy seems to 
     have backfired. After Hungary set the CWC in motion, the 
     upper house of the Russian Parliament voted down a long-
     awaited law that would establish the legal basis for 
     chemical-weapons destruction. Just as the administration 
     began its new CWC sales pitch, the Pentagon was forced to 
     explain why it had done nothing for four years to convince 
     Moscow to terminate its clandestine binary weapons program. 
     And with former Sen. Cohen settling in at the Pentagon, 
     others in the administration still hide behind their paper 
     shield of secrecy.
                                                                    ____


             [From the Wall Street Journal, Feb. 19, 1997]

                           A Dangerous Treaty

       Among the many good reasons why the Senate should not 
     ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention is a substance known 
     as A-232. This highly lethal nerve agent was concocted by a 
     Russian scientific team precisely for the purpose of 
     circumventing the terms of the CWC, which both the U.S. and 
     Russia have signed but not yet ratified. A-232 would escape 
     scrutiny under the treaty because it is made from 
     agricultural and industrial chemicals that aren't deadly 
     until they are mixed and therefore don't appear on the CWC's 
     schedule of banned chemicals.

[[Page S3590]]

       The world has known about A-232 since the May 1994 
     publication on this page of an article by a Russian 
     scientist, who warned how his colleagues were attempting to 
     camouflage their true mission. It is now the subject of a 
     classified Pentagon paper, reported in the Washington Times 
     earlier this month, on the eve of what is shaping up to be an 
     escalation of the battle joined in September over 
     ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention.
       The Administration was forced to sound the retreat then, 
     pulling the treaty from consideration when it became clear 
     that the Senate was preparing to vote it down. Now it's 
     trying again, this time in full cry about the urgency for 
     U.S. ratification before April 29, the date it goes into 
     effect. For now, Senator Jesse Helms has kept the treaty tied 
     up in the Foreign Relations Committee, making the sensible 
     argument that the new Senate ought first to focus on matters 
     of higher priority than ramrodding through a controversial 
     treaty that merits careful deliberation.
       The Administration, meanwhile, is mounting a full-court 
     press, with the president offering a plea for ratification in 
     his State of the Union address ``so that at last we can begin 
     to outlaw poison gas from the earth.'' This is an admirable 
     sentiment--who isn't against making the world safe from the 
     horrors of poison gas?--but it's far from the reality. In 
     fact, ratification would more likely bring the opposite 
     result.
       Article XI is one of the key danger areas. It would 
     obligate U.S. companies to provide fellow signatories with 
     full access to their latest chemical technologies, 
     notwithstanding American trade or foreign policy. One country 
     delighted at the prospect of upgrading its chemical industry 
     is China, which, upon signing the CWC, issued a declaration 
     saying, ``All export controls inconsistent with the 
     Convention should be abolished.'' No doubt Cuba and Iran, to 
     name two other signatories, share the same sentiment. The 
     Russian team that came up with A-232 no doubt could 
     accomplish much more with the help of the most up-to-date 
     technology from the U.S.
       Verification is an insurmountable problem, and no one--not 
     even the treaty's most ardent supporters--will promise that 
     the treaty can be enforced. In the administration's 
     obfuscating phrase, the CWC can be ``effectively verified.'' 
     Yet if chemical weapons are easy to hide, as A-232 proves, 
     they are also easy to make. The sarin used in the poison-gas 
     attack on the Tokyo subway was created not in a fancy lab but 
     in a small, ordinary room used by Aum Shinri Kyo's amateur 
     chemists. The treaty provides for snap inspections of 
     companies that make chemicals, not of religious cults that 
     decide to cook up some sarin in the back office. The CWC 
     wouldn't make a whit of difference.
       Those snap inspections, by the way, could turn into a huge 
     burden on American businesses, which would have to fork out 
     millions of dollars in compliance costs (though the biggest 
     companies no doubt would watch the heaviest burden fall on 
     their smaller competitors).
       More than 65 countries have already ratified the CWC, 
     including most U.S. allies. But somehow we don't think the 
     world is more secure with Australia and Hungary committed to 
     ridding the world of chemical weapons when such real threats 
     as Libya, Iraq, Syria and North Korea won't have anything to 
     do with the CWC. How can a treaty that professes to address 
     the problem of chemical weapons be credible unless it 
     addresses the threat from the very countries, such as Syria 
     and Iraq, that have actually deployed these weapons?
       With or without the CWC, the U.S. is already committed to 
     destroying its chemical weapons by 2004. That doesn't mean 
     the rest of the world shares any such commitment; what 
     possible peaceful purpose does Russia have in the clandestine 
     production of A-232? Instead of pushing a treaty that can't 
     accomplish its impossible goals, the Administration would be 
     better advised to use its clout, rather than that of some 
     planned U.N.-style bureaucracy, in getting the Russians to 
     stop making nerve gas.
       It's hard to find a wholehearted advocate of the treaty. 
     The gist of the messages from most of its so-called champions 
     is that it's a poor deal, but it's the best on offer. But 
     their cases have acknowledged so many caveats that it's hard 
     to see how they've reached such optimistic conclusions. The 
     biggest danger of ratification is that it would similarly 
     lull the U.S. and other responsible nations into the false 
     belief that they are taking effective action against the 
     threat of chemical weapons. The case for this treaty strains 
     belief too far.

  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, the condition we have before us right now is 
whether or not the United States will be a party to a meaningful 
treaty, that is to say a treaty that covers nations that it needs to 
cover. It will not do us any good if we are a party to a treaty, paying 
25 percent of the costs, to inspect ourselves. Right now, the countries 
that have ratified this treaty are not the countries that are of 
concern to us. They do not have weapons. As a matter of fact, right now 
the countries that are parties have nothing to inspect. The United 
States, if it believes this treaty is ultimately going to have any 
positive effect, that is to say if it has significant verification 
features, and if it is global in the sense that most of the countries 
of the world that have chemical weapons are parties to it, and if it is 
enforceable--at that point in time the United States presumably could 
get something out of this treaty. In the meantime, the only thing we 
get out of it is the opportunity to pay a lot of money, as I say, to 
inspect ourselves. Because the countries that need to be inspected are 
not yet in it.
  Specifically, 74 countries have ratified the treaty and they are the 
countries of least concern to the United States. The three countries 
that have the largest amount of chemical weapons in the world--Russia 
and China and the United States--are not parties, nor are any of the 
so-called rogue countries of the world.
  Many of these countries have no intention of signing onto the treaty. 
North Korea, Iraq, Libya, Syria, and Sudan have all refused to sign the 
treaty. Others, such as Cuba and Iran, have signed the treaty but have 
not yet ratified it. In the meantime, some of these countries, such as 
Iraq, continue to stockpile and develop chemical weapons.
  So, the question is, will the United States enter this treaty at a 
time when it is meaningless, or will we, instead, use our entry as a 
prod to cause other countries of the world that need to be parties to 
be parties. For the treaty to offer any potential improvement, however 
modest, to the national security interests of the United States, I 
think at a minimum it must affect those countries with aggressive 
chemical weapons programs and which have hostile intentions toward the 
United States. Let me just outline briefly who these--who some of these 
countries are.
  North Korea--North Korea's program involves the stockpiling of a 
large amount of nerve gas, blood agents, and mustard gas. And it is 
capable of producing much more, according to our intelligence sources. 
Its armed forces have the ability to launch large-scale chemical 
attacks using mortars, artillery, multiple rocket launchers, and Scud 
missiles. And it is presently developing a new generation of medium-
range ballistic missiles that will be able to carry chemical warheads. 
North Korea has neither signed nor ratified the Chemical Weapons 
Convention.
  Iraq--despite the most intrusive inspection and monitoring regime in 
the history of the world, Iraq has retained a chemical weapons 
production capability and continues to hide details and documents 
related to its chemical weapons program. The U.N. Special Commission 
believes that Iraq continues to hide chemical agents, precursors, and 
weapons. Iraq admitted in 1995 that it had produced over 500 tons of a 
lethal nerve gas agent before the Gulf war. The U.N. inspectors had 
previously been unable to uncover evidence of this, despite a more 
rigorous inspection regime than even those mandated by the Chemical 
Weapons Convention verification regime. As noted, Iraq has neither 
signed nor ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention.
  Iran--Iran has been producing chemical weapons at a steadily 
increasing rate since 1984 and now has a stockpile of choking, blister 
and blood agents of over 2,000 tons. It also may have a small stockpile 
of nerve agent. It has the ability to produce an additional 1,000 tons 
of chemical agents per year.
  It has signed but not ratified the CWC. Even so, and this is 
critical, Iran's chemical weapons program is among the largest in the 
Third World. It has continued to expand, even since Tehran signed the 
CWC. And the Central Intelligence Agency believes that Iran has no 
intention of abiding by the terms of the CWC.

  Iran is making improvements to its chemical capabilities that suggest 
it has made a long-term commitment to its chemical program. I repeat, 
the CIA believes that Iran has no intention of abiding by the terms of 
the CWC. It is the most active state sponsor of international 
terrorism. It is directly involved in planning and directing terrorist 
attacks. And it could supply chemical weapons to a number of terrorist 
groups. Iran has not ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention.
  Syria has produced chemical weapons since the mid-1980's. The CIA 
believes that it is likely that Syria's chemical weapons program will 
continue to expand. Syria can indigenously produce

[[Page S3591]]

nerve agents and mustard gas, and is stockpiling both agents. It may 
have produced chemical warheads for its Frog and Scud missiles for use 
against Israeli cities. Syria has not signed nor ratified the Chemical 
Weapons Convention.
  Libya--Libya has produced at least 100 tons of chemical agents, 
including mustard and nerve gas. Libya is capable of delivering its 
chemical weapons with aerial bombs, and may be working to develop a 
chemical warhead for ballistic missiles. It also possesses cruise 
missiles. Libya has neither signed nor ratified the Chemical Weapons 
Convention.
  Mr. President, the point is, unless these countries are party to this 
treaty, whatever benefits the treaty has are essentially meaningless. 
This is one of the reasons why former Defense Secretary Dick Cheney 
said this, in a letter he wrote about a week ago. He said:

       Those nations most likely to comply with the Chemical 
     Weapons Convention are not likely to ever constitute a 
     military threat to the United States. The governments we 
     should be concerned about are likely to cheat on the CWC, 
     even if they do participate.
       In effect, [he wrote] the Senate is being asked to ratify 
     the CWC even though it is likely to be ineffective, 
     unverifiable, and unenforceable. Having ratified the 
     convention, we will then be told we have ``dealt with the 
     problem of chemical weapons'' when in fact we will have not. 
     But, ratification of the CWC will lead to a sense of 
     complacency, totally unjustified given the flaws in the 
     convention.

  Finally, to the point. The Senator from Massachusetts said that we 
are somehow holding ourselves hostage to the rogue states. Precisely 
the opposite is the case. We decide when to join this convention, not 
because the administration says there is an automatic deadline under 
which we have to do so, but when we say it will matter. When we are not 
having to pay 25 percent of the costs of a meaningless convention, in 
effect 25 percent of the costs to inspect ourselves. Mr. President, 
$200 million a year to help this U.N.-style bureaucracy, in addition to 
putting the businesses of the United States through all the hoops they 
are going to have to go through in order to comply with this 
convention.
  I have written to my constituents the names of companies on the list 
supplied to us by the Government as potentially required to comply with 
the reporting requirements of the convention. They write back to me 
saying it would cost them $50,000, $70,000, or more than $100,000 a 
year, just to fill out the forms.
  What we are saying is, instead of putting our businesses through the 
expense and hassle of having to comply with this when nobody in the 
United States has any intention of violating this treaty--these 
companies back in Arizona have no intention of producing chemical 
weapons--instead of submitting ourselves to that intrusive bureaucratic 
regulation and expense, not to mention the expense to the U.S. 
taxpayer, let us be involved in this when it means something; that is 
to say, when the countries we really care about are involved in it.
  Finally, to the point that we are somehow associating ourselves with 
thugs by not joining, I find that really an argument that is, really--
  Mr. HELMS. Insulting?
  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I don't want to use the word insulting, but 
it has no persuasive force, let's put it that way.
  Does this mean if a country like Iran or Cuba, for example, signs up, 
that we would be associating with lesser thugs? Actually, don't the 
proponents of the treaty want us to associate with thug nations, if 
this is going to mean anything? Don't we want all of those countries in 
the treaty with us?
  Somehow, under their logic, we don't want to associate with these 
thugs. Yet, they want to pass a treaty that, presumably, if it is going 
to mean anything, has these thugs in it, in which case we are 
associating with them.
  Obviously, the point is not whether we are associating with thugs. I 
don't think that any of us can fail to make appropriate distinctions 
here. The fact of the matter is, those thug nations, if this treaty is 
to mean anything, ought to be part of the organization and, at that 
time, the United States then could participate in a meaningful way. 
Until those thugs are a part of this treaty, we are just wasting our 
time and money and putting a lot of our citizens to an awful lot of 
unnecessary hassle.
  The point of this condition is to make a point, to make the point 
that the countries that really matter are not even going to be governed 
by this treaty. It is one of the reasons why this treaty, in the end, 
cannot be supported.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time? The Senator from North 
Carolina.
  Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, allow me to inquire of the distinguished 
colleague, does he have somebody ready to go now? I do, if he does not.
  Mr. BIDEN. Why don't you go ahead?
  Mr. HELMS. I believe I have an hour and 6 minutes that I saved a 
while ago. I yield 10 minutes of that to the distinguished Senator from 
Texas.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Texas is recognized.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished chairman of 
the Foreign Relations Committee for his leadership on this issue, for 
talking about this treaty so that all of America is beginning to see 
what the issues are.
  I hope to be able to support the Chemical Weapons Convention as 
strengthened by the resolution of ratification introduced by the 
chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee.
  Before I address this resolution, I want to draw our attention to the 
remarkable events in Lima, Peru. The Peruvian Armed Forces and police 
conducted a bold, daytime raid and rescued 71 of the 72 hostages being 
held by a terrorist group for 4 months. As part of the operation, the 
Peruvian Army used riot control agents to stun the terrorists and 
rescue the hostages.
  I would caution my colleagues, regardless of where they come out on 
this treaty, that the actions of the Peruvian Armed Forces that 
resulted in minimal loss of life among the hostages were quite possibly 
a violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention, which expressly forbids 
the use of riot control agents as a method of warfare.
  I make this point because this treaty has many things in it that we 
must think about very carefully. I believe the proposals the 
distinguished Senator from North Carolina has offered in the resolution 
before us will turn a flawed treaty into an effective, verifiable tool 
of American foreign policy. We are talking about safeguards that ensure 
the treaty will be something that America can support, knowing that we 
are protected, both in our constitutional rights and in the security of 
our country.
  One of the amendments before us today would take away one of the very 
important elements of protection about which I speak. The amendment I 
am referring to does not require that the Director of the CIA certify 
that the countries which have been determined to have offensive 
chemical weapons, like Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya, North Korea, China--
have ratified the convention. We want to make sure that those countries 
are going to come under the auspices of this convention. I think it is 
important that we have those safeguards.
  So, I hope my colleagues will support the resolution, the underlying 
resolution, rather than the amendments that are being put forward.
  I am glad the Senate is taking the opportunity to improve this 
treaty. Our constitutional responsibility to advise and consent on 
treaties is one of the most important that we have. Unfortunately, we 
have gotten into the bad habit of all consent and no advice. When it 
comes to that, we cannot let that happen. That is why we are here. That 
is why the Constitution requires two-thirds of our body to ratify any 
treaty that America would participate in.
  Mr. President, international treaties extend the full faith and 
credit of the United States, and they become the law of our land when 
they are ratified. So the United States cedes a little sovereignty with 
every treaty the Senate ratifies. That is why the framers of our 
Constitution wanted to be very careful that two-thirds of the Senate 
would be needed to ratify any treaty that would become the law of our 
land.
  Like no other treaty before it, the Chemical Weapons Convention will 
make this loss of sovereignty apparent to thousands of Americans at 
thousands of companies who will be faced with new Government 
regulations or be subject to searches and seizures of

[[Page S3592]]

their property by teams of international inspectors. These are the 
practical effects this treaty will have on ordinary Americans.
  As many as 670 companies in my home State of Texas will be directly 
affected by this treaty. Only a handful of these companies are actually 
in the chemical industry. Many others use small amounts of chemicals 
for legal, nonmilitary purposes. But according to this treaty, they 
will be required to submit business information to a new United 
Nations-style international organization that will monitor this treaty, 
or they will have to open their property to inspections by teams of 
international inspectors.
  Because of the way this treaty will affect ordinary Americans, it is 
a profound departure from previous arms control treaties which were 
really limited to military contractors and installations. That is why 
we must look so carefully at this treaty. If we are going to impose 
this burden on ordinary Americans, then we must make sure that the 
benefits outweigh the costs.
  First, let me say, without qualification, that chemical warfare is 
reprehensible and it deserves uniform condemnation. I am proud that the 
United States has already decided to destroy any chemical weapons that 
we might have with or without this treaty. But, Mr. President, it is 
also our responsibility to make sure that we have defenses against any 
country that might use chemical weapons in order to be sure that we are 
not unilaterally disarming ourselves.
  I support the 1989 and 1990 agreements between the United States and 
Russia that ban the production of chemical weapons and require both 
countries to destroy their stockpiles. Those two agreements were backed 
up by tough onsite inspections in which each side can watch the other 
destroy the weapons.
  Unfortunately, neither the Geneva Protocol against chemical weapons 
use nor the two agreements that we have signed with Russia are actually 
being enforced.
  When the Government of Iraq used chemical weapons against its own 
citizens in the 1980's, the United Nations could not even agree upon a 
resolution condemning Iraq.
  The two Russian agreements are dead, too. The Russian Prime Minister 
told Vice President Gore in July 1996 that both agreements have 
outlived their usefulness. It appears that the Russians do not intend 
to honor these agreements. I remind my colleagues that Russia has the 
world's largest stockpile of chemical weapons, and this is not a 
trivial matter.
  So, Mr. President, we have three good, tough, supposedly enforceable 
international agreements to restrict the use of and destroy chemical 
weapons. But those agreements have failed. So now we are here today to 
consider another agreement, even tougher, that involves more countries, 
and we hope it will work where others have failed.
  Mr. President, I think we have to address three key questions when we 
are talking about not only destroying our chemical weapons but sharing 
the technology that we have for defending against them.

  My first question: Will this treaty achieve the desired objective, an 
objective we all want, and that is to rid the world of chemical 
weapons?
  I do not think so. Even the most ardent supporter of the treaty knows 
that this is not going to rid the world of chemical weapons. We know 
that there are outlaw regimes producing chemical weapons as we speak 
that have no intention of signing or ratifying this treaty.
  Iraq is one example. Iraq makes a mockery of international 
agreements. The Government of Iraq has used chemical weapons against 
its own people, for Heaven's sake. Who among us believes that a 
government that would do this would honor an agreement when it has 
already used these weapons on its own people?
  Even worse, this treaty as written actually encourages the spread of 
chemical weapons technology among the countries that are parties to it 
because articles X and XI require treaty participants to share their 
chemical weapons defense technologies and prohibits countries from 
placing restrictions on commerce in chemicals that can be used for 
weapons purposes.
  Mr. President, I think what we see here is good-intentioned, but we 
are talking about restricting ourselves from producing chemical 
weapons, which we want to do, and we are talking about sharing our 
defenses against chemical weapons with countries that may be 
represented in international inspection groups that would come into our 
businesses and could easily give this information back to the countries 
who are not signatories.
  That is why these amendments are so important, so that every one of 
these countries that has chemical weapons will be a party to this 
agreement, so that at least we would know that we have some ability to 
sanction these countries when they are not able to show us that they 
are complying.
  Mr. President, my second question is: Can we determine with 
reasonable accuracy that the other countries that have signed the 
treaty will honor it, as we certainly will? We all remember President 
Reagan's words, ``trust but verify.'' We need the ability to verify.
  This is a treaty that I am afraid there is no way we could really 
verify. In fact, even the supporters admit that you cannot really 
verify it. We are trying to strengthen it so that we will have at least 
some ability. But then it comes into question, are we going to exercise 
those abilities?
  I think one of the concerns that I have is that we know that 
countries with whom we trade, countries with whom we have good 
relations, are actually selling the equipment to make nuclear weapons 
to these countries that are rogue nations, that are terrorist states, 
right now as we speak. Germany is. Russia is. China is.
  What are we doing about it? What are we doing? We are not standing up 
and saying, there are consequences to that action, because we do not 
want to rock the boat in some other area of foreign policy.
  Mr. President, if we are not going to stand up when countries with 
whom we are trading and with whom we have friendly relations are this 
very day selling nuclear weapons or nuclear capabilities to rogue 
nations, like Iran and Iraq, how could we ever say that this treaty 
would be verifiable and that all of the signatories would comply with 
this treaty and that we would in fact do anything if they were not?
  Mr. President, my third question is: Can we protect the 
constitutional rights of ordinary Americans affected by the treaty who 
are engaged in activities that have nothing to do with the production 
of chemical weapons? I think this is one of the most important issues--
the constitutional right against an unreasonable search or seizure.
  The protections offered by the chairman of the Foreign Relations 
Committee, Mr. Helms, is a first step. But we are going to have to hold 
on to the protections that have been put in the bill by the committee 
because the fourth amendment to the Constitution is a pillar of the 
Bill of Rights. It protects the rights of our people against 
unreasonable searches and seizures. Yet this agreement, the chemical 
weapons treaty, would allow people to come in, international groups, to 
inspect our companies, not companies that are making chemical weapons--
we do not do that--but companies that use chemicals for any other 
myriad of purposes, to get their trade secrets or our defense 
mechanisms against the chemical weapons that we may have to face one 
day.

  Mr. President, I am just very worried that we would disarm ourselves 
and lose the ability to protect ourselves against a rogue nation that 
will not sign and ratify this treaty.
  The amendments offered today would take away the protections that are 
now in the resolution against that happening because the resolution 
says all of these rogue nations must be a party to the agreement so 
that at least we would have the mechanisms to go in and try to find 
these chemical weapons. Yet, you know even the best effort that we have 
been able to make in finding chemical weapons in Iraq have failed. 
Right now our international agreements allow us to look in Iraq for 
chemical weapons. We have not found any. And yet all of the inspectors 
in the international group that are trying to find those weapons have 
not been able to do it, but they say they know they are there. They are 
sure that they are there. So the verifiability becomes a real issue.

[[Page S3593]]

  Mr. President, I think that the committee has done an excellent job 
of protecting the interests of Americans in this treaty. I hope that we 
can keep the safeguards so that all of us can vote for this treaty. I 
would like to because I respect the people who are for the treaty.
  I have the greatest regard for President Bush. I think he is a 
wonderful man. He would never leave the United States of America 
defenseless. But you know, if Senator Kyl and Senator Helms had not 
stood up, one of the safeguards that President Bush put in the treaty 
would have been taken out, and that is the use of tear gas by our 
forces in wartime, because President Bush made sure that we said right 
up front, yes, we will use tear gas because we would rather use tear 
gas than bullets.
  President Clinton disagreed with that. He said, no, we would not use 
tear gas. But because of the efforts of Senator Helms and Senator Kyl, 
we have been able to agree on that issue.
  So, Mr. President, I hope to be able to support this treaty. I thank 
the distinguished chairman of the committee for allowing me to speak 
and for his leadership. I would like to be able to support it, but I 
will not support this treaty without the safeguards to the security of 
America. That is my first responsibility.
  Thank you, Mr. President.
  Mr. HELMS. I thank the Senator.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. BIDEN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware.
  Mr. BIDEN. I yield 10 minutes to my colleague from Indiana.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Indiana is recognized for 10 
minutes.
  Mr. LUGAR. I thank the Chair.
  I thank the distinguished Senator from Delaware.
  Mr. President, the objective of the Chemical Weapons Convention, the 
debate that we are involved in now, is leadership, a question of 
leadership by our country.
  We can take a look at all the exceptions and the negative views, but 
the very positive force I think we want to stress in framing this issue 
is, the United States of America, our statesmen, President Ronald 
Reagan, George Bush, now President Bill Clinton, and many who have 
worked with them in the Armed Forces and in statecraft, recognize that 
our country has a very substantial problem in the world; namely, that 
of chemical weapons.
  We came to a determination on our part that these weapons were 
unreliable, unstable, dangerous, and so dangerous, as a matter of fact, 
that we did not wish to employ them--we wished to destroy them. We have 
been doing that as a nation.

  Our dilemma is that other nations, primarily Russia, with substantial 
stores much greater than our own, but a variety of other nations, 
purportedly have these weapons. Our problem is to convince other 
nations in the world that we all ought to be about the task of ending 
production of these weapons, ending possession, storage, ending any 
vestige of them.
  Now, in order to do that, we have to bring other nations into this 
with us. Therefore, we have offered leadership now for many years. We 
have convinced 74 other nations that have already ratified the Chemical 
Weapons Convention that they ought to be with us in this quest. I make 
that point at the outset, Mr. President, because the motion before the 
Senate is to strike a condition added, at least to this treaty, that 
would say we ought to forgo our leadership, we ought to really forget 
what our objective has been for years. I presume we ought to forget we 
are in the process of destroying all of our own chemical weapons and 
simply hope that others might proceed.
  As a matter of fact, if we do not ratify this convention this 
evening, others will proceed, but they will proceed without us. Our 
diplomacy with Russia will be severely impaired. As a result, even 
though we are working with Russia now--as a matter of fact, to help 
them destroy chemical weapons--through reasons the world will find hard 
to understand, we will have denied the very treaty we have asked others 
to join us in. It makes no sense.
  Let me say with all due respect to those who formulated the idea that 
we should not ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention unless the so-
called rogue states--named as North Korea, Libya, Syria, Iran, and 
Iraq--join, must have really stayed up nights trying to think of some 
way to throw us off course. I presume they felt that our antipathy to 
some of these states would be such that we would say if they are not 
going to be a part of it, we ought not to be a part of it, we ought to 
simply go after them in a unilateral way. Let me examine that for a 
moment, Mr. President.
  The Senator from Delaware and the Senator from Massachusetts have 
talked about law, about legitimacy. As a matter of fact, our Nation 
does have the mobility to be an enforcer. In the event we feel our 
security is threatened, our President might, in fact, consider a 
military action against a nation that offered a security threat to us. 
But let us examine the implications if our President decides to do 
this. If he is going to act unilaterally without benefit of 
international law--and international law does count because other 
nations understand the implications of that cooperation and the binding 
that brings--if we are going to contemplate solo strikes without 
benefit of international law, then we will have to think about 
overflight rights, about the problems of our pilots if our aircraft are 
down, about a number of implications in which we count upon cooperation 
of nation-states. International law does count. It makes a difference 
that there is a law against this, and that the United States acts with 
other nations and with their backing to enforce that, and that we shall 
have to do.
  Much has been said about lack of military will or lack of political 
will, but, Mr. President, I have seen very little of that in this 
Chamber during this debate. We are serious about this.
  Mr. President, let me add just as a topical matter, because the 
Members of the Senate who have been watching local television at least 
in the last half-hour appreciate that in northwest Washington, in the 
downtown area near the B'nai B'rith headquarters, a vial of chemical 
material or biological material is present that authorities of the 
police and fire department and special persons in the Washington, DC, 
area have now picked up this material, and people in the B'nai B'rith 
headquarters are being decontaminated. A suggestion is that it may be 
anthrax, a very deadly biological weapon.
  It was not long ago on this floor, Mr. President, that the Nunn-
Lugar-Domenici Act was debated and we talked then in terms of 
attempting to bring Department of Defense resources into play with the 
cities of this country--Washington, DC, being prominent among them, 
Atlanta, GA, Denver, CO, and 23 other cities have been named--so that 
in the event there should be anthrax, which was specifically mentioned 
in the debate, we were prepared to move. That is leadership, Mr. 
President. We saw the threat and we prepared to move upon it. We have 
done so.

  Now, we will do so with regard to the international scene. But the 
treaty gives us the basis of international law. To suggest for a 
moment, Mr. President, we ought to be deterred from our leadership by 
whether Iraq joins, whether Iran is involved, whether North Korea 
should ever be involved, is to stretch credibility really to the 
breaking point. These nations are irrelevant to our membership and our 
leadership. They are irrelevant to our standing for international law 
and our ability to act, and to act decisively. That must be our 
standard, Mr. President. With imagination, one will think of all sorts 
of hobgoblins that can be thrown up to make an interesting debate, but 
debate is leadership, and debate is decisive political will, and the 
debate is our ability to convince other nations of the world they 
should come with us, that we are reliable, that we stay the course, 
that our word is good, administration after administration.
  Mr. President, this is the reason we should vote to strike this 
amendment, this condition, from the convention immediately, decisively. 
It has been a point, clearly, a parliamentary procedure, and that our 
failure to do so, as a matter of fact, jeopardizes the entire treaty. 
It is improbable, if not impossible, our Nation would ever join, would 
ever follow through on our leadership, if we were to wait upon states

[[Page S3594]]

that are irrelevant to the whole proposition.
  I conclude, Mr. President, by saying obviously, threats in those 
states are not relevant. We must be decisive. We need going for us 
international law, enhancement of our intelligence that the intrusive 
inspections and all of the trade accounts will give to us, so that when 
we strike, we will strike accurately and completely and bring the 
security to the world that this treaty attempts to promote.
  Mr. HELMS. I yield such time as the Senator from Arizona may consume.
  Mr. KYL. I will be very brief to a matter of news interest here in 
the Washington, DC, area. People might be watching this on a different 
channel of their television, viewing the ambulances and people 
attempting to assist, and at least two people who appear to have been 
exposed to some kind of chemical agent. My understanding is that 
Senator Lugar has just discussed this matter briefly, as well. This 
occurred at or near a B'nai B'rith facility here in Washington, DC.
  I think that while neither side in this debate would want to use an 
unfortunate incident to bolster their case, and while our first concern 
ought to be for the people who may have been exposed to some agent 
here--and we all certainly hope there is no harm done and that if, in 
fact, it was not accidental that the perpetrators are dealt with in the 
appropriate fashion--I think it is also an inappropriate place to make 
the point that contrary to those who assert that the Chemical Weapons 
Convention deals with this problem, it does not. We should be very, 
very clear about that.
  There are reasons for proponents to suggest that this Chemical 
Weapons Convention should be supported. There are arguments of 
opponents as to why that should not be the case. But I hope that we do 
not have people arguing on the floor of the Senate here that the 
Chemical Weapons Convention will deter terrorists, that somehow this 
will make us safer from terrorist attack, because it cannot fulfill 
that noble goal. We will literally be buying on to something that 
cannot come to pass if the treaty proponents try to sell it on that 
basis.
  As a matter of fact, there is specific declassified intelligence 
information directly on this point. I will quote that before the 
chairman resumes his time. A declassified section of the Defense 
Intelligence Agency document of February 1996, with specific reference 
to the Tokyo subway attack by terrorists at that time said:

       Irrespective of whether the Chemical Weapons Convention 
     enters into force, terrorists will likely look upon CW as a 
     means to gain greater publicity and instill widespread fear. 
     The March 1995 Tokyo subway attack by Aum Shinrikyo would not 
     have been prevented by the Chemical Weapons Convention.
  In May of 1996, another CIA report, a portion of which has been 
declassified, contains this statement:

       In the case of Aum Shinrikyo the Chemical Weapons 
     Convention would not have hindered the cult from procuring 
     the needed chemical compounds used in the production of 
     sarin. Further, the Aum Shinrikyo would have escaped CWC 
     requirement for an end use certification because it purchased 
     the chemicals within Japan.

  There are some additional things we can quote. The point I am making 
is that reasonable people can differ about the pros and cons of this 
treaty. That will be reflected in the vote on the treaty here. I hope 
that Americans do not get the idea that we will be safe from terrorist 
attack or even significantly safer by the adoption of this Chemical 
Weapons Convention. Terrorist attacks are not what it was designed to 
deal with. I hope that point is crystal clear.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Carolina.
  Mr. HELMS. I thank the Senator for that explanation. I think it was 
very timely.
  I yield 12 minutes to the distinguished Senator from Oklahoma [Mr. 
Inhofe], following which I suggest we vote.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oklahoma is recognized.
  The Senator from North Carolina has 4\1/2\ minutes remaining on the 
amendment.
  Does the Senator wish to yield from your resolution time?
  Mr. HELMS. In that case, I misunderstood the statement of the 
Parliamentarian.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Carolina, do you yield 
the remaining time of the amendment or from the resolution time?
  The Senator from Oklahoma is recognized for 12 minutes.
  Mr. INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. President. I will probably not take the 12 
minutes.
  The Senator from Arizona is exactly right. I think even the strongest 
opponents of the ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention have 
said this is not going to affect terrorist activities. Obviously, by 
the very title ``terrorists'' they are not going to be complying with 
this.
  I have to say I feel the same way about these countries that we are 
discussing right now. The condition which is under debate at this time 
is whether or not to strike that portion with regard to Iran, Syria, 
Libya, North Korea, and China. It would be, if we were only concerned 
about those countries that have signed or have ratified or have an 
expressed intention to ratify, that would be very nice, because we 
would be talking about Canada, the Fiji Islands, Costa Rica, and 
Singapore, Iceland. That is not where the threat is. The threat is the 
rogue nations. That is what we are talking about right now.
  I will for a moment bring this up to date by quoting a couple of 
things. General Schwarzkopf, during a press conference in Riyadh said:

       ,The nightmare scenario for all of us would have been to go 
     through this [the Iraqi tank barrier], get hung up in this 
     breach right here, and then have the enemy artillery rain 
     chemical weapons down on the troops that were in the gaggle 
     in the breach right here.

  General Hughes said:

       In any attack in the south, Pyongyang could use chemical 
     weapons to attack forces deployed near the DMZ, suppress 
     allied air power, and isolate the peninsula from strategic 
     reinforcement.

  Four days ago in a Seoul, North Korea, newspaper there was an article 
quoting very high North Korean officials as saying they now have 
adequate chemical weapons to annihilate South Korea. This is going on 
as we speak. So we are talking about nations that are not going to be 
our friends. These are the ones that, whether they are signatories, or 
whether they ratify or not, it doesn't make too much difference. It 
tickles me when they talk about, ``Russia is going to do that.'' Last 
night, I was on a talk show and we finally agreed that on the 1990 
Bilateral Destruction Agreement, they have been found in noncompliance 
of that, and of the START I, of the Conventional Forces in Europe. Even 
though my opponent denied it was the INF, in fact, they were. In the 
1995 Arms Control Disarmament Agency report, it says they were not in 
compliance with that; the ABM Treaty, they have not been in compliance 
with that.

  But let's assume if a country like Russia doesn't comply when they 
ratify, what about these rogue nations? I can tell you for sure that 
those proponents of the ratification have gone to every extent possible 
to make it look like--or to make us believe that the Reagan 
administration, if they were here today, would be in support of this 
Chemical Weapons Convention. I can assure you that they would not. 
Coincidentally, I happened to be on a talk show--``Crossfire''--with a 
very fine gentlemen, Ken Adelman. He had been in the Reagan 
administration. We found out, after he gave his testimonial as to why 
we should ratify--and he admitted it was not verifiable nor is it 
global, but he still thought we should do it--that Mr. Adelman might be 
prejudiced by his membership on two boards of directors, the 
International Planning and Analysis Center and on Newmeyer and 
Associates. These companies, which he directs, have clients in many 
foreign countries, including China and Japan, and they represent 
companies that deal in chemicals such as those from the UpJohn Co. 
People say this is just chemicals. It is not just chemical companies we 
are talking about. In this chemical association that gets so much 
attention, it represents 192 chemical companies. These are the large 
ones, the giants. There are some 4,000 other companies, and you can 
expand it beyond purely chemical companies to some 8,000 other 
companies, most of whom are opposed to this, because they would be shut 
out in the competition.
  I think the whole thing on this particular amendment is whether or 
not this would have any positive effect on the rogue nations if we 
should ratify

[[Page S3595]]

the Chemical Weapons Convention. I don't think there is anybody here 
who is so naive to think that, voluntarily, if they are a part of it, 
they would reduce their chemical behavior. I think those of us in this 
room can argue and debate that.
  So I go back to the people who are the real authorities. You have 
heard Dick Cheney quoted several times on the floor, in his letter that 
we have quoted several times. He said, ``Indeed some aspects of the 
present convention--notably, its obligation to share with potential 
adversaries, like Iran, chemical manufacturing technology that can be 
used for military purposes in chemical defense equipment--threaten to 
make this accord worse than having no treaty at all.'' That is Dick 
Cheney, not some guy that read a couple of articles and determined it 
was wrong. What is he talking about? He is talking about something that 
will be debated here shortly, and we will get into that in more detail. 
Part of article X says, ``The technical secretariat shall establish not 
later than 180 days after entry into force of this contract, and 
maintain for the use of any requesting state party, a data bank 
containing freely available information concerning various means of 
protection against chemical weapons, as well as such information as may 
be provided by states' parties.''
  Well, I can remember in the Armed Services Committee when Schwarzkopf 
was here. I said:

       General, you are in support of the Chemical Weapons 
     Convention.

  I read that, and then I will read a transcript, because I think 
everybody who might be basing their vote on what General Schwarzkopf 
said, here is a transcript from that meeting:

       Senator Inhofe. Do you think it wise to share with 
     countries like Iran our most advanced chemical defensive 
     equipment and technology?
       General Schwarzkopf. Our defensive capabilities?
       Senator Inhofe. Yes.
       General Schwarzkopf. Absolutely not.
       Senator Inhofe. Well, I'm talking about sharing our 
     advanced chemical defensive equipment and technologies, which 
     I believe under article X (they) would be allowed to (get). 
     Do you disagree?
       General Schwarzkopf. As I said, Senator, I'm not familiar 
     with all the details--you know--you know, a country, 
     particularly like Iran, I think we should share as little as 
     possible with them in the way of our military capabilities.

  I am not critical of General Schwarzkopf. It is a very complicated 
thing. I don't know how many people read the whole thing. I haven't, 
but I read enough to know, as far as our treatment with rogue nations, 
I would not want to be ratifying this contract unless they ratified it. 
Then I would not trust them any more than we would trust Russia, and if 
they do ratify, I question if they will honor it.
  One of the other conditions we are going to talk about is, should we 
do it, should we put in a requirement that they would have to ratify 
before we will. Well, we had that requirement 2 years ago when I voted 
against the START II treaty. They said we have to do it before Russia 
because they won't ratify unless we do. Guess what, Mr. President, they 
still haven't ratified.
  Lastly, to kind of express the urgency of this, former Secretary of 
Defense, James Schlesinger, said, ``To the extent that others learn 
from international sharing of information on chemical warfare defenses, 
our vulnerability is enhanced rather than diminished. Finally, this 
treaty in no way helps shield our soldiers from one of battlefield's 
deadliest killers. As indicated earlier, only the threat of effective 
retaliation provides such protection.''
  What he is saying there is not that we would use chemical weapons, 
but by the fact that we are not a party to this treaty is one that 
would at least offer some type of a deterrent. So I think, Mr. 
President, when you look and read of the hostility that is over there--
James Woolsey said, in 1993:

       More than two dozen countries have programs to research or 
     develop chemical weapons, and a number have stockpiled such 
     weapons, including Libya, Iran, and Iraq--

  Three of the countries we are talking about:

       The military competition in the always volatile Middle East 
     has spurred others in the region to develop chemical weapons. 
     We have also noted a disturbing pattern of biological weapons 
     development following closely on the heels of the development 
     of chemical weapons.

  Mr. President, the threat is there, and we know that other countries 
can sell their technology, as well as their systems, to rogue nations. 
We know Russia has done this, to specifically Iran and other nations, 
not when they sold their technology, but also their equipment. So it is 
a very scary thing to think that we might be putting ourselves in a 
position that would increase our exposure to the threat of chemical 
warfare and would increase the proliferation of chemical weapons in the 
Middle East.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I believe time has expired. Parliamentary 
inquiry.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator will state it.
  Mr. HELMS. If the Chair will refresh my memory, a motion to table is 
not in order, is that correct?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time would have to be yielded back on the 
amendment in order for a motion to table to be in order. The unanimous-
consent agreement does not appear to preclude a motion to table.
  Mr. HELMS. How much time remains, Mr. President?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Currently, the Senator from North Carolina 
would have 4 minutes 27 seconds on the amendment. The Senator from 
Delaware would have 2 minutes 37 seconds.

  Who yields time?
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, how much time remains for me?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator controls 2 minutes 37 seconds.
  Mr. BIDEN. I yield myself the remaining time. I will speak to a 
couple of points. With regard to Ken Adelman, I am sure our colleague 
from Oklahoma didn't mean to impugn his motivation by suggesting for 
whom he worked. I would not suggest that of Mr. Rumsfeld because of 
where he works now, that it caused him to have that view. Ken Adelman--
although I disagree with him most of the time, he was an able member of 
the administration. He was viewed as a hawk at the time he was here. 
For the record, I am sure there was no intention to do that?
  Mr. INHOFE. If the Senator will yield, I made it very clear before my 
remarks that I hold him in the highest of esteem. However, the fact 
remains that he does work for those companies that have an interest, 
and that could be a conflict of interest. I think that could be drawn 
by anyone.
  Mr. BIDEN. I thank the Senator for making clear what he meant. I 
didn't think that's what he meant. I was hoping that is not what he 
meant, but it is what he meant. That could be said about almost 
everybody who testified before our committee, for and against this 
treaty, and I really, quite frankly, think that the leaders for and 
against this treaty in the last two administrations are men and women 
of integrity who would have no conflict. They are consistent with what 
they did within those administrations.
  Let me point out a few things. It seems interesting to me that here 
we are, the very people--our very colleagues who want to have a 
provision saying that we want all these rogue nations in the treaty 
before we get into the treaty, argue in the alternative, that these 
nations in the treaty mean the treaty is worthless. Translated, very 
simply, they are not for this treaty under any circumstance, whether or 
not these nations are in the treaty or out of the treaty. I also point 
out that--in the interest of time, I will not be able to point it out 
in detail--every argument against this treaty made thus far on the 
floor today, I respectfully suggest, is made worse by not being in the 
treaty, by not having the treaty. I find it, quite frankly, 
interesting.
  My time is up. I hope my colleague will not move to table. We agree 
not to attempt to amend any of these conditions. I hope we will have a 
vote up or down. Apparently, it is not in the agreement. If he chooses 
to do it, I guess he has the right.
  Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I shall not move to table. I will yield 
back such time as I may have.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time having been yielded back, the 
question is on agreeing to amendment No. 47.

[[Page S3596]]

  The yeas and nays have been ordered.
  The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk called the roll.
  The result was announced--yeas 71, nays 29, as follows:

                       [Rollcall Vote No. 46 Ex.]

                                YEAS--71

     Abraham
     Akaka
     Baucus
     Biden
     Bingaman
     Bond
     Boxer
     Breaux
     Bryan
     Bumpers
     Byrd
     Chafee
     Cleland
     Coats
     Cochran
     Collins
     Conrad
     D'Amato
     Daschle
     DeWine
     Dodd
     Domenici
     Dorgan
     Durbin
     Feingold
     Feinstein
     Ford
     Frist
     Glenn
     Gorton
     Graham
     Gregg
     Hagel
     Harkin
     Hatch
     Hollings
     Inouye
     Jeffords
     Johnson
     Kennedy
     Kerrey
     Kerry
     Kohl
     Landrieu
     Lautenberg
     Leahy
     Levin
     Lieberman
     Lugar
     McCain
     Mikulski
     Moseley-Braun
     Moynihan
     Murray
     Nickles
     Reed
     Reid
     Robb
     Roberts
     Rockefeller
     Roth
     Santorum
     Sarbanes
     Smith Gordon H
     Snowe
     Specter
     Stevens
     Torricelli
     Warner
     Wellstone
     Wyden

                                NAYS--29

     Allard
     Ashcroft
     Bennett
     Brownback
     Burns
     Campbell
     Coverdell
     Craig
     Enzi
     Faircloth
     Gramm
     Grams
     Grassley
     Helms
     Hutchinson
     Hutchison
     Inhofe
     Kempthorne
     Kyl
     Lott
     Mack
     McConnell
     Murkowski
     Sessions
     Shelby
     Smith Bob
     Thomas
     Thompson
     Thurmond
  The amendment (No. 47) was agreed to.
  Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. BIDEN. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  Mr. BIDEN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Brownback). The Senator from Delaware.
  Mr. BIDEN. Parliamentary inquiry.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. May we please have order.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I withdraw my inquiry I did not make.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware withdraws his 
inquiry. Who seeks time?
  Mr. LOTT addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Mississippi, the majority 
leader.
  Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, can I get time off the manager's time from 
the bill?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. LOTT. I do still have my leader time. If I need that, we can use 
that also.
  Mr. President, I had planned on and had hoped to be able to speak 
after all of the votes on the motions to strike because I did not in 
any way want to distract from those motions to strike. I have hopes 
that at least some of them might actually be defeated, particularly the 
one with regard to inspectors coming into the United States from some 
of the so-called rogue countries, but I think it is important we go 
ahead and state our positions at this point. Everybody has made their 
case. It is time to make decisions and to move on. I want to start by 
thanking Senator Helms for his cooperation. Without his cooperation, we 
would not be here today. His cooperation guaranteed that we were able 
to develop a process that was fair, that allowed us to get S. 495 up 
and voted on last week, that all of the remaining issues in 
disagreement would have an opportunity to be debated, considered and 
voted upon.
  He really has done an excellent job. There is no question that he 
continues to have great reservations about this legislation. But his 
efforts and the efforts of Senator Kyl from Arizona have been nothing 
short of heroic. They have been tenacious. They have done their 
homework. They have made excellent statements both here and in our 
closed session earlier today. I think they should be commended for what 
they have done. In fact, their work and their success has contributed 
greatly to the likelihood that this treaty actually will pass. That had 
not necessarily been their intent, but they wanted to make sure, if it 
did pass, they wanted it to pass in the best possible form.
  I also thank the Democratic leader for his courtesies as we worked 
through a very complicated unanimous-consent agreement. We were watched 
over very carefully by the Senator from West Virginia. I thank the 
Senator from Delaware, [Mr. Biden] for his cooperation and his 
patience, and I think the fact that we have all sort of kept cool heads 
and been careful how we proceeded has served us well.
  Mr. President, our Constitution is unique in the power it grants the 
Senate in treaty making. Article II, section 2 states the President 
``shall have the power, by and with the advice and consent of the 
Senate, provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur.''
  The Senate's coequal treaty making power is one of our most important 
constitutional duties. All 100 Senators have approached this duty very 
seriously in examining the Chemical Weapons Convention, as we should. 
We have participated in and we have listened to hearings laying out the 
arguments for and against the convention. We have looked closely at 
many provisions of the convention and have sought the advice and 
counsel of experts and former policymakers. We read many articles and 
we have heard the arguments making the case for and against it.
  Before addressing my views on the convention itself, I should like to 
share with my colleagues a brief history of the Senate's action on this 
convention, how we got to where we are today.
  The Chemical Weapons Convention was signed by the United States as an 
original signatory on January 13, 1993, in the last days of President 
Bush's administration. For reasons that remain unclear, it was 10 
months before President Clinton sent the convention to the Senate. In 
his transmittal letter, dated November 23, 1993, President Clinton 
wrote:

       I urge the Senate to give early and favorable consideration 
     to the convention and to give advice and consent to its 
     ratification as soon as possible in 1994.

  Let me remind my colleagues that for the next 11 months, until the 
103d Congress adjourned on December 1, 1994, the Senate majority leader 
was George Mitchell and the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee 
was Claiborne Pell.
  Despite Democratic control of the White House and the Senate, the 
Senate did not consider the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1994.
  In late 1995, Senate Democrats began a filibuster on the State 
Department authorization bill to force action on the CWC. On December 
7, 1995, an agreement was reached providing for the convention to be 
reported out of the Foreign Relations Committee by April 30, 1996. The 
committee honored that agreement, and the convention was placed on the 
Executive Calendar.
  That is where matters stood when I became majority leader on June 12, 
1996. Only 6 days later, before I had a chance to get my sea legs at 
all, there began a filibuster once again by the Senate Democrats to 
force Senate action on the convention.
  To allow critical national defense legislation to proceed, we worked 
with Senators on both sides of the aisle, and again we reached an 
agreement guaranteeing a vote by September 13, 1996.
  In the weeks preceding the vote, opponents and proponents of the 
convention made their case to Senators. On September 6, 1996, I 
requested the declassification of certain key judgments of the 
intelligence community relating to key aspects of the convention. On 
September 10, the administration partially complied with that request, 
and certain intelligence judgments were made public. I ask unanimous 
consent that the exchange of letters on the intelligence judgments be 
printed in the Record.
  Mr. President, I understand the Government Printing Office estimates 
it will cost $1,288 to print these letters in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                                                      U.S. Senate,


                                Office of the Majority Leader,

                                Washington, DC, September 6, 1996.
     President William Jefferson Clinton,
     The White House,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. President: I am writing to ask your cooperation 
     and support for Senate efforts to obtain information and 
     documents directly relevant to our consideration of the 
     Chemical Weapons Convention.
       As you know, the Senate is currently scheduled to consider 
     the Convention on or before September 14, 1996 under a 
     unanimous consent agreement reached on June 28, 1996. 
     Immediately prior to the Senate agreement on the Convention, 
     I stated, ``With respect to the Chemical Weapons Convention, 
     the Majority Leader and the Democratic Leader

[[Page S3597]]

     will make every effort to obtain from the administration such 
     facts and documents as requested by the Chairman and ranking 
     member of the Foreign Relations Committee, in order to pursue 
     its work and hearings needed to develop a complete record for 
     the Senate . . .''
       I regret to inform you that your administration has not 
     been fully cooperative in Senate efforts to obtain critical 
     information. Chairman Helms wrote to you on June 21, 1996--
     prior to the Senate setting a date for a vote on the 
     Convention--and asked eight specific questions. Chairman 
     Helms also requested the provision and declassification of 
     documents and a cable relating to critical issues of Russian 
     compliance with existing chemical weapons arms control 
     agreements and with the Chemical Weapons Convention.
       On July 26, 1996, having received no response to his 
     earlier letter, Chairman Helms reiterated his earlier request 
     and asked additional questions concerning the apparent 
     Russian decision to unilaterally end implementation of the 
     1990 U.S.-Russian Bilateral Destruction Agreement on chemical 
     weapons. Chairman Helms also asked for specific information 
     and documents concerning Russian conditions for ratification 
     of the Chemical Weapons Convention, as well as other 
     information important to our consideration of the Convention. 
     While Chairman Helms did receive responses to his letters on 
     July 31 and on August 13, his request for declassification of 
     documents was refused and the answers to many of his 
     questions were incomplete.
       During a Senate Select Committee on Intelligence hearing on 
     June 17, 1996, Senator Kyl asked for a specific document--a 
     cable written in Bonn, Germany by Arms Control and 
     Disarmament Agency (ACDA) Director Holum concerning current 
     Russian government positions on the Bilateral Destruction 
     Agreement, ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention 
     and on U.S. assistance for the destruction of Russian 
     chemical weapons. On numerous occasions, Senator Kyl was told 
     the document did not exist. Finally, on July 26, Senator Kyl 
     was able to see a redacted version of the document under 
     tightly controlled circumstances but the document has not 
     been made available to Chairman Helms or other Senators.
       Mr. President, the unanimous consent agreement of June 28, 
     1996, was entered into in good faith, and based on our 
     understanding that the administration could and would be 
     fully forthcoming in the provision of information and 
     documents to enable the Senate to fulfill its constitutional 
     responsibilities. Numerous judgements of the United States 
     intelligence community deserve as wide a circulation as 
     possible--particularly since they are distinctly different 
     than some public statements made by officials of your 
     Administration concerning the Convention.
       Accordingly, I respectfully request that you reconsider 
     your refusal to declassify critical documents and consider 
     the declassification of important intelligence community 
     judgements--consistent with the need to protect intelligence 
     sources and methods. Specifically, I request that you act 
     immediately to declassify the May 21, 1996, cable written by 
     ACDA Director Holum and the July 8, 1996, letter from Russian 
     Prime Minister Chernomyrdin to Vice-President Gore, and 
     consider immediately declassification of the paragraphs from 
     which the attached statements are excerpted--all drawn from 
     documents produced by the Central Intelligence Agency and the 
     Defense Intelligence Agency on the Russian chemical weapons 
     program, the verifiability of the Chemical Weapons 
     Convention, the effect of the Convention on the chemical 
     weapons arsenals of rogue states, and the relevance of the 
     Convention to acts of terrorism committed with chemical 
     weapons.
       I make these requests to enable the Senate to fully prepare 
     for its consideration of the Chemical Weapons Convention. I 
     am certain you would agree it is necessary for the Senate to 
     have complete and usable information in order fulfill our 
     constitutional obligations and to responsibly meet the terms 
     of the current unanimous consent agreement. Because the 
     unanimous consent agreement calls for the Senate to vote on 
     the Chemical Weapons Convention by September 14, 1996, I 
     respectfully request that you respond to my declassification 
     requests no later than the close of business on Tuesday, 
     September 10, 1996. With best wishes, I am
           Sincerely,
     Trent Lott.
                                                                    ____



                                              The White House,

                                   Washington, September 10, 1996.
     Hon. Trent Lott,
     Majority Leader, U.S. Senate,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Leader: The President has asked that I respond to 
     your letter regarding Senate consideration of the Chemical 
     Weapons Convention (CWC).
       On behalf of the President, I would like to thank you for 
     your cooperation and leadership in scheduling a Senate vote 
     on this vital treaty which, as you know, has been before the 
     Senate since November 1993. The CWC, which was negotiated 
     under President Reagan and concluded and signed under 
     President Bush, is an important element of our bipartisan 
     efforts over the years to address two of the most important 
     threats facing us in the post Cold War era: the proliferation 
     of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism.
       I was concerned by your letter and regret that you believe 
     that the Administration has not been fully cooperative with 
     Senate efforts to obtain critical information. I want to 
     assure you that the Administration remains eager and 
     committed to continuing to assist the Senate in developing a 
     complete record for its consideration prior to floor action 
     on the CWC, as stated in the June 28, 1996, unanimous consent 
     agreement.
       During the almost three years the Convention has been 
     before the Senate, the Administration has worked very hard to 
     ensure that the Senate has been fully informed on the 
     Convention and that all its questions have been answered. Our 
     efforts to inform the Senate have included testimony at 13 
     hearings, including testimony by many Cabinet officials. We 
     have conducted dozens of briefings for members and staff by 
     representatives of key agencies, including yesterday's 
     productive session with the Arms Control Observer Group. The 
     President has appointed two Special Advisors on the CWC, to 
     address Senate questions and concerns as part of the 
     ratification process. Former Representative Martin Lancaster 
     served in this capacity in 1995 and Dr. Lori Esposito Murray 
     currently holds this position. On behalf of the President, 
     they have personally briefed every Senate office, offered 
     individual briefings to every member of the Senate and 
     personally briefed over 40 Senators.
       In addition, we have answered over 300 questions for the 
     record. Senator Helms has asked many of these questions and 
     we have always responded to his concerns. For example, we 
     have not only provided Senator Helms our database of 
     companies likely to be affected by the CWC, but we have also 
     provided him a list of chemical companies we have determined 
     unlikely to be affected by the CWC. Overall, the 
     Administration has provided the Senate with over 1500 pages 
     of information on the CWC--over 300 pages of testimony, over 
     500 pages of answers to Senate letters and reports, over 400 
     pages of answers to Senate questions for the treaty record 
     and over 300 pages of other documentation.
       With regard to Senator Helms' most recent letters, the 
     President and I both personally responded to Senator Helms, 
     first on July 31 and then again on August 13; these responses 
     included detailed attachments that answered a series of 
     specific questions asked by Senator Helms.
       The Administration has repeatedly offered to make relevant 
     classified information available to the Senate through 
     classified briefings and reports. I explained to Senator 
     Helms in my response to his most recent letters that, while I 
     regretted we could not declassify the documents he requested, 
     we remained eager to brief the Senator and any of his 
     colleagues, as well as cleared staff, at the earliest 
     possible time, both on those documents as well as on other 
     concerns. Such a briefing was provided to Senator Kyl but, to 
     date, Senator Helms has not responded to these offers.
       We have carefully reviewed your request for 
     declassification of the May 21, 1996 cable written by ACDA 
     Director Holum, the July 8, 1996 letter from Russian Prime 
     Minister Chernomyrdin and selected paragraphs from various 
     intelligence community documents. I regret that we cannot 
     declassify the May 21, 1996 Holum Cable or the letter from 
     Russian Prime Minister Chernomyrdin to Vice President Gore 
     because these documents have been properly classified 
     pursuant to E.O. 12958; they contain sensitive diplomatic 
     information regarding high-level, ongoing negotiations, the 
     disclosure of which may affect our ability to negotiate in 
     confidence. In addition, the correspondence you requested is 
     between the highest levels of the United States and Russian 
     governments, and was exchanged with the expectation that it 
     would be kept in the strictest confidence. As you know, an 
     essential element of the Executive Branch's conduct of 
     foreign relations is the protection of the confidentiality of 
     high level, sensitive diplomatic discussions and 
     correspondence.
       After a careful review of the paragraphs of the 
     intelligence documents that you requested be declassified, we 
     have determined they were properly classified. However, we 
     have been able to declassify a portion of the material 
     without risk to sources and methods and it is attached. 
     The sentences and paragraphs that are still classified 
     remain so because they contain information which could 
     place sources and methods at risk. In several cases, 
     declassification of requested materials also would reveal 
     information about U.S. force vulnerabilities. The 
     paragraphs from which most of the judgments were extracted 
     remain classified because it is difficult to identify 
     clearly the source paragraphs. Therefore, granting 
     paragraph release authority could inadvertently permit 
     release of intelligence which would be damaging to 
     declassify.
       I would like to reaffirm personally the Administration's 
     commitment to brief you or any other Senator and cleared 
     staff on the documents discussed above under appropriate 
     classification at any time before the Senate debate on the 
     CWC. As you know, a high-level Administration team briefed 
     Senators and staff on the CWC, including many of the issues 
     raised in your letter, on Monday, September 9, 1996. We 
     remain committed to continuing to assist the Senate as it 
     prepares to vote on advice and consent to ratification on 
     this vital Convention.

[[Page S3598]]

       As part of this continuing effort, I have attached a 
     detailed response which includes the declassified material.
           Sincerely,
                                                     Anthony Lake,
         Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

           Responses to Issues Raised by Majority Leader Lott

       The issues addressed in the attachment to your letter 
     concern chemical weapons proliferation challenges we must 
     address, with or without the CWC. The CWC provides concrete 
     measures that will raise the costs and risks of engaging in 
     CW-related activities. The CWC also will improve our 
     knowledge about CW activities worldwide. This is why the CWC 
     has been strongly supported by both President Bush and 
     President Clinton.
       Since the CWC was submitted to the Senate in 1993, the 
     Intelligence Community has kept the Senate fully informed of 
     its judgments regarding the Convention. During the past three 
     years, the Intelligence Community has produced two NIEs and 
     numerous other reports, testified in numerous public and 
     executive session hearings, answered dozens of intelligence 
     questions for the record and provided a number of briefings 
     on precisely the issues you raise in the attachment to your 
     letter, as well as many others.
       Intelligence Community judgments on the CWC are not at odds 
     with Administration policy. In fact, Intelligence Community 
     judgments play an integral role in the formation of policy 
     regarding the Chemical Weapons Convention. The following 
     responses regarding the issues raised in the attachment to 
     your letter may help clarify this.


                            1. novel agents

       New chemicals of concern and novel agents are covered under 
     the CWC; it is incorrect to assert that because an agent is 
     not on the Schedules it is not subject to the CWC. The CWC 
     captures new chemicals of concern and novel agents under the 
     definition of a ``chemical weapon'' and prohibits the 
     development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, retention, 
     use and direct or indirect transfer to anyone of chemical 
     weapons. Concerns that new chemicals of concern and novel 
     agents were being used to violate the CWC would provide a 
     basis for bilateral consultation and challenge inspection 
     under Article X of the Convention. It would not be necessary 
     to show that such chemicals are listed in the Schedules of 
     the Convention to exercise this option.
       Furthermore, the CWC explicitly provides for expanding the 
     lists of chemicals subject to declaration and verification as 
     new CW agents are identified and to improve verification 
     procedures and equipment as new technology emerges and 
     experience is gained.
       As regards our chemical defense capabilities, the 
     Department of Defense Counterproliferation Program is, with 
     Congress' support, already aggressively pursuing an effective 
     response to ensure that our troops are the best protected and 
     best equipped fighting force for operations in a nuclear, 
     biological, or chemical environment. The National Defense 
     Authorization Act for FY 94 led to the formation of the Joint 
     Nuclear Biological and Chemical (NBC) Defense Board, the 
     Joint Services Integration Group and the Joint Services 
     Material Group. These boards, which have representatives from 
     the Services, Joint Staff and OSD, are working to identify 
     the needs of the military for chemical/biological defense and 
     are providing input to the Defense Acquisition Board process 
     through the Secretary of Defense.
       The U.S. military is well aware that it may be called upon 
     to operate in a hostile environment in which chemical weapons 
     may be used or threatened to be used. Though U.S. chemical 
     equipment is second to none, we understand the need to 
     continually improve our capabilities. Through the Defense 
     Acquisition Board process, the military is taking steps to 
     ensure these improvements continue. The Administration's 
     budget request for FY 97 for our chemical defense programs is 
     $505 million.
       In this context, the following paragraph from NIE 95-9/I of 
     May 1995 is hereby declassified: ``Production of new binary 
     agents would be difficult to detect and confirm as a CWC-
     prohibited activity.''


            2. Russian Intentions Regarding Chemical Weapons

       It is important to keep in mind, when discussing Russian 
     intentions regarding chemical weapons, that there is not yet 
     in force a treaty obligation prohibiting the possession of 
     chemical weapons against which we can measure compliance. The 
     CWC will establish such a prohibition and, most importantly, 
     the new tools to pursue any concerns we may have about 
     suspected CW activities, whether in Russia or any other State 
     Party. As the Intelligence Community has testified, the CWC 
     will provide us with access to information not otherwise 
     available which will help us in our efforts to detect, deter 
     and, if necessary, punish violations of the CWC.
       Regarding the views of the Russian leadership, President 
     Yeltsin and other senior government officials have repeatedly 
     expressed support for the CWC. We will expect Russia and all 
     other Parties to adhere to all the Convention's provisions 
     including those concerning CW development and production. The 
     Russian Government has recently reaffirmed its commitment to 
     become an original Party to the CWC and announced it is 
     seeking speedy submission of the Convention to the Parliament 
     for ratification.
       In this context, the following paragraph from NIE 95-9/I of 
     May 1995 is hereby declassified:
       ``President Yeltsin has publicly endorsed CW disarmament 
     and supported ratification and implementation of CW arms 
     control agreements to which Russia is a signatory. The extent 
     to which Yeltsin has attempted to enforce his will on the 
     bureaucracy is not clear. He may not be aware of the scope of 
     ongoing CW activities, or if he is aware, he may be unable to 
     control them. We cannot exclude the possibility that Yeltsin 
     approves of an offensive CW capability and will support a 
     covert program once the CWC enters into force. He may accept 
     the military's argument about the need to retain a CW 
     capability. Moreover, being subjected to far more 
     bureaucratic pressure to sustain the program than to do away 
     with it, he may find it easier to give way to military 
     arguments.''
       It should be noted, however, that detailed information on 
     the views of key individuals is limited and insufficient to 
     document with confidence their current personal and 
     professional positions for maintaining CW programs.


                            3. Verification

       No treaty is 100 percent verifiable. While the Intelligence 
     Community has indicated that CW development and production is 
     and will remain difficult to distinguish from legitimate 
     commercial activities, they have simultaneously noted the 
     importance of acquiring the CWC as a new collection tool to 
     aid their efforts to monitor CW proliferation, which we must 
     do, with or without the CWC.
       The CWC's verification provisions constitute the most 
     comprehensive and intrusive verification regime every 
     negotiated, covering virtually every aspect of a CW program, 
     from development through production and stockpiling.
       The CWC's declaration provisions will improve the U.S. 
     ability to obtain information about other countries' CW 
     efforts. These provisions will facilitate detection and 
     monitoring of prohibited activities by providing the U.S. 
     access to certain information about declarations of CW 
     production facilities and storage sites as well as relevant 
     chemical industry facilities and activities.
       The CWC's inspection provisions permit access to both 
     declared and undeclared facilities and locations, thus making 
     clandestine CW production and stockpiling more difficult, 
     risky and expensive. Routine inspections will enhance 
     deterrence and detection of clandestine product by monitoring 
     activities and relevant chemical industry facilities. These 
     inspections will increase the cost and the risk of carrying 
     out illicit chemical weapons activities.
       Challenge inspections will further enhance deterrence and 
     detection of prohibited activities by providing States 
     Parties with the right to request an international inspection 
     at any facility or location in another State Party in order 
     to clarify and resolve a potential compliance concern. As the 
     scope and size of a program increases, it is more likely that 
     illicit activities will be detected. Challenge inspections 
     are but one part of the CWC's comprehensive verification 
     regime which, in its totality, complements our ongoing 
     intelligence monitoring effort in this area. As former DCI 
     Woolsey testified before the Senate Foreign Relations 
     Committee on June 23, 1994:
       ``The CWC will, however, strengthen our ability to deal 
     with the problem that we confront with or without the 
     Convention: the requirement to discover what states are 
     developing and producing chemical weapons when these 
     activities are difficult to distinguish from legitimate 
     commercial endeavors. The isolation and adverse attention 
     that nonsignatories will draw upon themselves may spur 
     greater multinational cooperation in attempting to halt 
     offensive CW programs.
       ``In sum, what the Chemical Weapons Convention provides the 
     Intelligence Community is a new tool to add to our collection 
     tool kit. It is an instrument with broad applicability, which 
     can help resolve a wide variety of problems. Moreover, it is 
     an universal tool which can be used by diplomats and 
     politicians, as well as intelligence specialists, to further 
     a common goal: elimination of the threat of chemical 
     weapons.''
       In this context, the following paragraphs from NIE 93-32J/I 
     of August 1993 are hereby declassified:
       ``The capability of the Intelligence Community to monitor 
     compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention is severely 
     limited and likely to remain so for the rest of the decade.''
       ``The key provisions of the monitoring regime--challenge 
     inspections at undeclared sites--can be thwarted by a nation 
     determined to preserve a small, secret program using the 
     delays and managed access rules allowed by the convention.''


                              4. Terrorism

       The CWC will increase the difficulty for terrorists and 
     proliferators of acquiring chemical weapons and significantly 
     improve our law enforcement ability to investigate and 
     prosecute chemical terrorists even before chemical weapons 
     are used. Japan serves as an example of the importance of 
     this treaty and its implementing legislation in combating the 
     terrorist threat. Within 10 days of the poison gas attacks in 
     the Tokyo subways, the Japanese enacted the CWC implementing 
     legislation. The Japanese completed ratification of the CWC a 
     month later.
       No treaty is foolproof. However, the CWC and its 
     implementing legislation will provide

[[Page S3599]]

     significant benefits in dealing with the threat of chemical 
     terrorism. Implementing legislation will strengthen our legal 
     authority to investigate and prosecute persons who commit 
     acts prohibited by the treaty. It will also make the public 
     more aware of the threat of chemical weapons and of the fact 
     that the acquisition of such weapons is illegal .
       The following are among it significant benefits:
       Investigation. The proposed U.S. implementing legislation 
     contains the clearest, most comprehensive and internationally 
     recognized definition of a chemical weapon available. The 
     definition contained in the implementing legislation will 
     enable an investigator to request a search warrant on the 
     basis of reasonable suspicion of illegal chemical weapons 
     activity (such as production of chemical weapons agent), 
     rather than suspicion of an attempt or conspiracy to use a 
     weapon of mass destruction, as under current U.S. law. By 
     providing law enforcement officials and prosecutors an 
     actionable legal basis for investigating the development, 
     production, transfer of acquisition of chemical weapons, CWC 
     implementing legislation improves prospects for detection, 
     early prosecution and possibly even prevention of chemical 
     terrorism in the United States.
       Prosecution. The proposed U.S. implementing legislation 
     will also aid prosecution. Because possession of a chemical 
     weapon (whether or not it is intended to be used) would be 
     prohibited under the Convention, it would also be illegal 
     under the CWC implementing legislation and thus would provide 
     a sufficient basis for prosecution. Currently, prosecutors 
     must rely on legislation intended for other purposes, such as 
     a law against conspiracy to use a weapon of mass destruction.
       Penalties. Under the proposed U.S. implementing 
     legislation, any person who knowingly engages in prohibited 
     CW-related activities far short of actual use of a chemical 
     weapon could be subject to the maximum punishment of life in 
     prison or any term of years. In contrast, under existing U.S. 
     legislation, equivalent penalties require proof of use or an 
     attempt or conspiracy to use a weapon of mass destruction. 
     Thus, it would be difficult under current law for prosecutors 
     to prove that a violation of the law has occurred unless a 
     scheme to use chemical weapons is well advanced.
       Trade Controls. The proposed U.S. implementing legislation 
     would also supplement existing export/import control laws and 
     regulations by strictly controlling the import and export of 
     those chemicals posing the greatest risk (listed in Schedule 
     1 of the CWC) and also regulating the production, 
     acquisition, retention, transfer or use of such chemicals 
     within the U.S. Fines of up to $50,000 could be imposed for 
     unlawful production, acquisition, transfer, etc. of such 
     chemicals.
       Emergency Authority. The proposed U.S. implementing 
     legislation contains authority to seize, forfeit and destroy 
     chemical weapons. This important provision protects the 
     constitutional rights of property owners while allowing law 
     enforcement officials to seize and destroy a chemical weapon 
     under exigent circumstances (i.e. where harm is imminent or 
     likely). This provides additional authority to prevent a 
     potential catastrophe and save lives.
       Public Awareness. Tips by concerned private citizens are 
     the lifeblood of successful police investigations. 
     Ratification of the CWC and enactment of its implementing 
     legislation will ensure, due to reporting and inspection 
     requirements and penalties for violations, that private 
     companies and concerned citizens are more alert to and more 
     likely to report any suspected chemical weapons-related 
     activities.
       The nonproliferation provisions of the CWC will deny 
     terrorists easy access to chemical weapons by requiring 
     Parties to eliminate national stockpiles and by controlling 
     international transfers of certain chemicals than can be used 
     to make chemical weapons. In particular, the CWC requires 
     Parties to cease transfers of certain CW agents and CW 
     precursor chemicals to non-Parties and restrict such 
     transfers to Parties. In addition, reporting is required on 
     anticipated production levels of Schedule 1, 2 and 3 
     chemicals and anticipated imports and exports of Schedule 1 
     and 2 chemicals. These measures will help restrict access to 
     key chemicals, while also helping to alert law enforcement 
     and other government officials to suspicious activities.
       Finally, one of the key tools in combating terrorism is 
     early intelligence. The CWC will provide access to 
     international declaration and inspection information and will 
     strengthen the intelligence links between the United States 
     and the international community that will help us detect and 
     prevent chemical attacks. By tying the United States into a 
     global verification network and strengthening our 
     intelligence sharing with the international community this 
     treaty can be an early warning that is essential for 
     combating terrorism.
       In this context, the following paragraph from DIA PC-1563-
     4-96 of February 1996 is hereby declassified:
       ``Irrespective of whether the CWC enters into force, 
     terrorists will likely look upon CW as a means to gain 
     greater publicity and instill widespread fear. The March 1995 
     Tokyo subway attack by the Aum Shinrikyo would not have been 
     prevented by the CWC.''
       I would also invite your attention to the following 
     conclusions concerning the impact of the CWC contained in the 
     May 1996 report issued by the Director of Central 
     Intelligence Interagency Committee on Terrorism entitled 
     ``Aum Shinrikyo: Insights to the Chemical and Biological 
     Terrorist Threat'':
       ``The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) is designed to 
     regulate and monitor the procurement, production, and use of 
     some chemicals used in CW production with varying degrees of 
     intrusiveness, depending on which of the three Schedules of 
     Chemicals a compound is listed. Within five years of the 
     CWC's entry into force, transfer of all Schedule 1 and 2 
     chemicals to non-States Party will be banned, and transfer of 
     Schedule 3 chemicals to non-States Party will require end-use 
     certificates. In addition, all sites within a State Party are 
     subject to challenge inspections initiated by another State 
     Party with substantive information that illegal activities 
     are taking place by the government or any other group. The 
     Convention's provisions probably would make it more difficult 
     and costly for terrorists to acquire CW by increasing the 
     risk of detection, but a determined group could circumvent 
     the provisions.
       ``The CWC mandates that each State Party establish national 
     laws to prohibit anyone on its territory or any citizen 
     abroad from developing, producing, stockpiling, acquiring or 
     using CW. Each State Party must develop and pass national 
     legislation to ensure the implementation of all CWC 
     obligations and provisions. Depending on the quality of the 
     legislation and its enforcement, the institution of 
     these laws would help establish a political and legal 
     basis for the prosecution of a terrorist group.
       ``In the case of Aum Shinrikyo, the CWC would not have 
     hindered the cult from procuring the needed chemical 
     compounds used in its production of sarin. Further, the Aum 
     would have escaped the CWC requirement for an end-use 
     certification because it purchased the chemical within 
     Japan.''


                            5. Rogue States

       The Administration recognizes the possibility that not all 
     States Parties may comply with their CWC obligations 
     immediately upon the Convention's entry into force. However, 
     information acquired through the CWC's declaration and 
     inspection provisions will supplement our national 
     intelligence resources and place us in a better position than 
     we are now to deter and detect clandestine chemical weapons 
     programs. Moreover, unlike any previous arms control 
     agreement, the CWC provides a range of punitive measures 
     including trade sanctions that can be imposed against a Party 
     to the treaty who fails to meet its treaty obligations.
       In short, as former DCI Woolsey and other intelligence 
     officials have pointed out, the CWC will provide a useful 
     tool in our inventory of means to stem the worldwide 
     expansion of chemical weapons capabilities and to assist in 
     monitoring CW programs worldwide, whether inside or outside 
     the CWC.
                                                                    ____

                                                      U.S. Senate,


                                Office of the Majority Leader,

                                  Washington, DC, January 8, 1997.
     Hon. William Jefferson Clinton,
     President of the United States,
     The White House, Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. President: Following our phone conversation, I 
     arranged a meeting later today with your Acting National 
     Security Adviser, Sandy Berger, to discuss the Chemical 
     Weapons Convention. Before that meeting however, I wanted to 
     inform you personally of how your Administration's actions on 
     critical arms control issues have complicated efforts to work 
     cooperatively.
       As you know, many Members of the 104th Congress have 
     expressed concern over the security implications of certain 
     arms control positions taken by your Administration. The 
     security concerns are aggravated by your Administration's 
     unwillingness to seriously consider our views on the 
     appropriate Constitutional role of the Senate in providing 
     advice and consent on treaties. I would point to three 
     important issues: demarcation limits to the Anti-Ballistic 
     Missile Treaty of 1972 (ABM Treaty); multilateralization of 
     the ABM Treaty; and flank limits to the Conventional Armed 
     Forces in Europe Treaty of 1990 (CFE Treaty). In each of 
     these cases, your Administration has negotiated substantive 
     modifications of the treaties, and then taken questionable 
     legal positions that render Senate advice and consent an 
     option that can be ignored rather than a constitutional 
     obligation that must be fulfilled.
       Congress has legislated on the proposed demarcation limits 
     and the proposed multilaterization of the ABM Treaty. Section 
     232 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
     1995 (P.L. 103-337) addresses both issues. It states ``the 
     United States shall not be bound by any international 
     agreement entered into by the President of the United States 
     that would substantively modify the ABM Treaty unless the 
     agreement is entered into pursaunt to the treaty making power 
     of the President under the Constitution.''
       Section 235 of the National Defense Authorization Act for 
     Fiscal Year 1996 (P.L. 104-106) addresses demarcation and 
     states ``any international agreement that would limit the 
     research, testing, or deployment of missile defense systems, 
     system upgrades, or system components that are designed to 
     counter modern theater ballistic missiles in a manner that 
     would be more restrictive than the compliance criteria 
     specified in paragraph 1 should be entered into only pursuant 
     to the treaty making powers of the President under the 
     constitution.''
       The position of Congress concerning the substantive 
     modifications your Administration has sought to the ABM 
     Treaty is clear:

[[Page S3600]]

     Senate advice and consent is needed for their entry into 
     force. Despite this clear position, your Administration 
     continues to argue that Senate advice and consent is not 
     necessary in the case of multilateralization, and is but one 
     among several options you might choose in the case of 
     demarcation. This is unacceptable.
       With specific reference to the Agreed Statement on 
     Demarcation reached last summer, section 406 of the 
     Department of State and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 
     1997 (P.L. 104-208) prohibits expending funds on the Standing 
     Consultative Commission ``unless the President provides to 
     the Congress a report containing a detailed analysis of 
     whether * * * the Agreed Statement regarding Demarcation 
     agreed to by the Standing Consultative Commission on June 24, 
     1996 * * * will require the advice and consent of the Senate 
     of the United States.'' The report submitted on your behalf 
     did not answer this question.
       Finally, the May 31, 1996 Conventional Forces in Europe 
     flank agreement contains negotiated amendments and 
     significant changes to the 1990 CFE Treaty. Yet, again your 
     Administration has taken the legal position that Senate 
     advice and consent is not necessary.
       Mr. President, I have pledged to work with you in a 
     bipartisan fashion on a wide range of challenges facing our 
     country. Nowhere is such cooperation more important than in 
     foreign policy and national security. But bipartisanship must 
     be a two-way street. Your Administration has now re-started a 
     public campaign to gain Senate advice and consent for the 
     Chemical Weapons Convention. As you seek bipartisan 
     cooperation, you must understand our expectation for such 
     cooperation on ABM multilateralization, ABM demarcation, and 
     CFE flank limits.
       Senate advice and consent arms control treaties after their 
     negotiation and after their substantive modification is not 
     an option--it is a requirement of our Constitution. I am sure 
     you understand that it will be very difficult to explore the 
     possibility of Senate action on the Chemical Weapons 
     Convention without first addressing legitimate security and 
     Constitutional concerns on other important arms control 
     issues. I stand ready to work with you and your national 
     security team in a comprehensive manner to address arms 
     control issues in the 105th Congress. With best wishes, I am,
           Sincerely,
     Trent Lott.
                                                                    ____

                                                      U.S. Senate,


                                Office of the Majority Leader,

                                   Washington, DC, March 18, 1997.
     Hon. William Jefferson Clinton,
     President of the United States, The White House, Washington, 
         DC.
       Dear Mr. President: As you know, we have been working in 
     good faith to try to establish a process under which the 
     Senate might consider a resolution of ratification for the 
     Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).
       As we consider the next steps in this process, I want to 
     remind you of two problems that remain unresolved. First, on 
     January 8, 1997, I wrote to you expressing concerns about 
     your administration's approach to a number of critical arms 
     control issues, including demarcation limits and 
     multilateralization of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 
     1972 (ABM Treaty) and about the flank limits to the 
     Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty of 1990 (CFE 
     Treaty). To date, I have not received a response. Each of 
     these significant treaty modifications are subject to the 
     constitution's shared treaty making power and, accordingly, 
     cannot enter into force until receiving the advice and 
     consent of the United States Senate.
       Second, I have repeatedly pointed out that the CWC is 
     currently under consideration by the Committee on Foreign 
     Relations. Accordingly, it is essential that you and your 
     administration honor the publicly-stated commitments to work 
     closely and expeditiously with Chairman Helms on issues 
     before the Committee, including the presentation of a plan to 
     reorganize U.S. foreign affairs agencies. Until that occurs, 
     Chairman Helms has made it clear to me that he is unlikely to 
     consider next steps in the CWC process.
       As I have said privately and publicly, bipartisanship must 
     be a two-way street. I look forward to hearing from you soon 
     on these important issues. With best wishes, I am,
           Sincerely,
     Trent Lott.
                                                                    ____



                                              The White House,

                                       Washington, March 25, 1997.
     Hon. Trent Lott,
     Majority Leader, U.S. Senate,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Leader: The President has asked me to reply to 
     your letter concerning the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) 
     and the role of the Senate under the Constitution in giving 
     its advice and consent to treaties. Our staffs have held some 
     discussions on this matter, but I want to address in more 
     detail each of the three treaty issues you raise in the 
     letter: the CFE flank agreement, ABM multilateralization and 
     ABM/TMD demarcation.


                          CFE Flank Agreement

       On May 31, 1996, the United States, our NATO allies, Russia 
     and the 13 other States Party to the CFE Treaty approved a 
     document in Vienna culminating more than two years of 
     intensive negotiations on the CFE flank issue. The 
     centerpiece of this agreement was a realignment of the CFE 
     map (depicting the territory of the former USSR in the CFE 
     area), which has the effect of reducing the size of the flank 
     zone. The CFE parties had deliberately not included this map 
     as part of the Treaty when it was signed in 1990, and the 
     Bush Administration did not submit the map to the Senate in 
     1991 as part of the formal documents for advice and consent. 
     Accordingly, legal counsels in the Clinton Administration's 
     national security agencies determined last year that a change 
     to the map does not constitute a formal amendment to the 
     Treaty.
       At the same time, we determined that a realignment of the 
     map did constitute a change in a ``shared understanding'' 
     formed with the Senate at the time the Senate gave its advice 
     and consent to the Treaty. That ``shared understanding'' 
     established that the Treaty would be applied and interpreted 
     on the basis of the original map. According to the 1988 
     ``Biden Condition'' on treaty interpretation (which was 
     attached by the Senate to its resolution of ratification for 
     the INF Treaty), Senate consent or congressional approval is 
     required to change a shared understanding.
       When the Administration submitted the CFE flank document 
     for legislative approval last August, we were faced with a 
     time-urgent situation: by its own terms, the document 
     required all States parties to confirm their approval by 
     December 15; yet very little time remained before the 
     adjournment sine die of the 104th Congress. In this 
     circumstance we chose to seek statutory approval by both 
     houses, as is explicitly permitted under the Biden Condition.
       We now face a complex situation. At the Lisbon OSCE Summit 
     in December, the 30 States party to the CFE Treaty agreed to 
     extend the deadline for confirmation of approval to May 15, 
     1997. In recent months, it has become evident that the flank 
     agreement underpins the new negotiations in Vienna on ``CFE 
     adaptation,'' which in turn underpins NATO's efforts to 
     define the new security environment in Europe as NATO 
     enlarges. In addition, both adaptation of the CFE Treaty and 
     the admission of new states to NATO will be effected through 
     agreements that will be submitted for the advice and consent 
     of the Senate. The situation and timing is therefore 
     different from when the Administration submitted the CFE 
     flank agreement for legislative approval last August. 
     Accordingly, the Administration is prepared, without 
     prejudice to its legal position vis-a-vis the approval 
     options we believe are available to us, to seek Senate advice 
     and consent to the flank Document provided the Senate will 
     act on this crucial matter before May 15.


                         MOU on ABM Succession

       As noted in the President's November 25, 1996 report to 
     Congress submitted in accordance with Section 406 of the FY 
     1997 State Appropriations Act (the ``Livingston Report''--
     hereafter referred to as ``the Report''), executive 
     agreements recognizing the succession of new States to the 
     treaty rights and obligations of their predecessors have 
     traditionally not been treated as treaty amendments or new 
     treaties requiring Senate advice and consent. Rather, they 
     have been treated as the implementation of existing treaties, 
     which is recognized as an exclusively Presidential function 
     under the Constitution. The Report elaborates the specific 
     reasons why this conclusion applies in the case of the June 
     24, 1996 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on ABM Succession 
     reached ad ref between the United States, Russia, Ukraine, 
     Belarus and Kasakstan in the Standing Consultative Commission 
     (SCC). It also explains why the MOU does not constitute a 
     substantive modification of the ABM Treaty.
       In dealing with matters of succession, a key U.S. objective 
     has been to reconstitute the original treaty arrangement as 
     closely as possible. This was true with respect to the 
     elaboration of the ad ref MOU as well and, accordingly, the 
     MOU works to preserve the original object and purpose of the 
     ABM Treaty. We hope that the breakthrough on ABM/TMD 
     demarcation achieved at the Helsinki Summit will set the 
     stage for a meeting at which all parties would sign this MOU. 
     The Administration continues to believe that the agreement 
     does not require the advice and consent of the Senate, or any 
     other form of congressional approval, to enter it into force.
                                                                    ____



                                              The White House,

                                       Washington, April 24, 1997.
     Hon. Trent Lott,
     Majority Leader, U.S. Senate,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Leader: During Senate ratification proceedings on 
     the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), concerns have been 
     raised over Article X, which provides for certain types of 
     defensive assistance in the event that a State that has 
     joined the treaty and renounced any chemical weapons (CW) 
     capability is threatened with or suffers a chemical weapons 
     attack, and Article XI, which encourages free trade in non-
     prohibited chemicals among states that adhere to the CWC. 
     Some have suggested that these Articles could result in the 
     CWC promoting, rather than stemming, CW proliferation despite 
     States Parties' general obligation under Article I ``never 
     under any circumstances . . . to assist, encourage or induce, 
     in any way, anyone to engage in any

[[Page S3601]]

     activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention.''
       To respond to these concerns, the Administration has worked 
     closely with the Senate to develop conditions relating to 
     both Articles that have now been incorporated in the 
     resolution of ratification (Agreed Conditions #7 and 15). 
     These two conditions would substantially reinforce and 
     strengthen the treaty by: prohibiting the United States under 
     Article X from (a) providing the CWC organization with funds 
     that could be used for chemical weapons defense assistance to 
     other States Parties; and (b) giving certain states that 
     might join the treaty any assistance other than medical 
     antidotes and treatment; and requiring the President to (a) 
     certify that the CWC will not weaken the export controls 
     established by the Australia Group and that each member of 
     the Group intends to maintain such controls; (b) block any 
     attempt within the Group to adopt a contrary position; and 
     (c) report annually as to whether Australia Group controls 
     remain effective.
       With respect to the latter condition, I am pleased to 
     inform you that we have now received official confirmations 
     from the highest diplomatic levels in each of the 30 
     Australia Group nations that they agree that the Group's 
     export control and nonproliferation measures are compatible 
     with the CWC and that they are committed to maintain such 
     controls in the future.
       While supporting these guarantees and safeguards, you 
     expressed the concern on Sunday that nations might still try 
     to use Article X or XI to take proscribed actions that could 
     undercut U.S. national security interests, notwithstanding 
     the best efforts of U.S. diplomacy to prevent such actions. I 
     am, therefore, prepared to provide the following specific 
     assurance related to these two Articles:
       In the event that a State Party or States Parties to the 
     Convention act contrary to the obligations under Article I 
     by:
       (A) using Article X to justify providing defensive CW 
     equipment, material or information to another State Party 
     that could result in U.S. chemical protective equipment being 
     compromised so that U.S. warfighting capabilities in a CW 
     environment are significantly degraded;
       (B) using Article XI to justify chemical transfers that 
     would make it impossible for me to make the annual 
     certification that the Australia Group remains a viable and 
     effective mechanism for controlling CW proliferation; or
       (C) carrying out transfers or exchanges under either 
     Article X or XI which jeopardize U.S. national security by 
     promoting CW proliferation:
       I would, consistent with Article XVI of the CWC, regard 
     such actions as extraordinary events that have jeopardized 
     the supreme interests of the United States and therefore, in 
     consultation with the Congress, be prepared to withdraw from 
     the treaty.
           Sincerely,
                                                     Bill Clinton.

  Mr. LOTT. On September 12, the day the Senate was scheduled to begin 
debate on the convention, Secretary of State Christopher called me and 
asked that the vote be canceled. I quizzed him. I wanted to make sure 
that was what the administration was asking and that I would be able to 
come out to the floor of the Senate and explain that is why it was 
being done. It was canceled because it was clear, in my opinion, the 
convention was likely to be rejected at that time by the Senate.
  I acceded to the Secretary's request. We canceled the vote, and it 
went back to the Foreign Relations Committee calendar at the end of the 
104th Congress.
  In January of this year, the President and his national security 
advisers made it clear that the Chemical Weapons Convention remained a 
top priority. On January 8, 1997, I wrote to the President explaining 
some of our arms control priorities, including the submission of three 
significant treaty modifications for advice and consent: The ABM 
Demarcation Agreement, the ABM Multilateralization Agreement and the 
flank agreement to the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty. The 
administration had previously refused to submit these treaties for 
Senate ratification.
  I wrote at that time.

       Bipartisanship is a two-way street. Your administration has 
     now restarted a public campaign to gain Senate advice and 
     consent for the Chemical Weapons Convention. As you seek 
     bipartisan cooperation, you must understand our expectation 
     for such cooperation on ABM multilateralization, ABM 
     demarcation and CFE flank limits.

  On March 18, I again wrote the President reminding him that I had not 
received a response to that January 8 letter. I also pointed out that 
``it is essential that you and your administration honor the publicly 
stated commitments to work closely and expeditiously with Chairman 
Helms on issues before the committee, including the presentation of a 
plan to reorganize the U.S. foreign affairs agencies.
  From the beginning of the 105th Congress, I made clear as best I 
could to all who would listen in the administration that bipartisanship 
could not mean forcing the Senate into acting on administration-chosen 
priorities if we did not likewise have an opportunity to consider 
issues that are important to the Senate, in fact, issues we think have 
long since been sent to us for action with regard to arms control 
treaties.
  We stated that we thought it was vital that we get State Department 
reorganization and real reform at the United Nations. This was not a 
quid pro quo but a simple statement of reality. Working in a 
cooperative fashion, as we must, means that both sides have to be 
forthcoming on issues in these foreign policy very important, critical 
areas.
  Let me briefly review the status of each of these three related 
issues. On the arms control treaties, the administration did reconsider 
their positions very carefully and they came back and agreed to send 
the Conventional Forces in Europe Flank Agreement to the Senate for 
advice and consent. Hearings have already been scheduled on this 
treaty, and I expect a resolution of ratification to be before the full 
Senate in the near future. President Clinton agreed to submit the 
agreed statement on demarcation to the Senate for advice and consent. 
This treaty, agreed to in principle between Presidents Clinton and 
Yeltsin at the Helsinki summit, will provide the Senate an opportunity 
to consider the administration's approach toward negotiating 
constraints on our defensive systems pursuant to the administration's 
interpretation of the ABM Treaty. I am sure we will have quite an 
interesting and lively debate on that, but certainly we should take 
advantage of our responsibilities to do just that. Along with many of 
my colleagues, I have expressed grave doubts about the wisdom of this 
administration's approach in that area. Now, however, we have a full 
opportunity to debate the policy and this treaty in the ratification 
process.
  The President still does not agree that they should send forward the 
treaty dealing with multilateralization. We think the Constitution 
requires it; his lawyers disagree. We will continue to press the 
administration to accept our position in this area, and they understand 
we should keep talking about it.
  If this provision is contained in the final agreement that is 
submitted to the Senate for advice and consent in connection with 
demarcation, it will give us an opportunity to debate it.
  On U.N. reform, our now Secretary of State Madeleine Albright asked 
that we begin to actually meet and talk about U.N. reform; that we meet 
with a U.N. presiding officer; that he come and visit with us. He did. 
We have started a process between the House and Senate, Republicans and 
Democrats, our chairmen and ranking members, to take a look at what 
should be done with regard to the arrearages we may or may not owe, how 
can we deal with the U.S. assessment at the United Nations that could 
be fairer, and we are working from a comprehensive Republican document 
as a basis for the discussions. I think we see some action already 
occurring. The Secretary General has been working at it, and I think he 
understands we are very serious about U.N. reform.
  On State Department reorganization, I am very pleased that the 
administration has proposed, I think, some major changes. Chairman 
Helms, and many others, have worked to streamline our foreign policy 
bureaucracy, and now it looks like we are going to have a chance to do 
that.
  The Agency for International Development, the Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agency and the U.S. Information Agency were started and 
organized during the cold war. Barely more than a year ago, President 
Clinton vetoed a bill which would have mandated the dismantling of only 
one foreign affairs agency. Last week, however, thanks to the efforts 
of Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and the involvement of the 
President, the President agreed to abolish both the USIA and ACDA and 
to fold many of AID's functions into the State Department. This will 
make our scarce resources go farther, increase coordination and help 
ensure American interests, not bureaucratic interests, are behind our 
foreign policy decisionmaking.

[[Page S3602]]

  On each of these parallel issues--and I call them parallel, that is 
the way they have always been discussed--we have made progress. I think 
it is important that we realize that. Thanks to the persistence of the 
chairman and thanks to a Secretary of State that is working with us 
now, we have made progress with U.N. reform, with State Department 
reorganization, and the fact we will be able to consider these 
treaties. No serious observer can claim that we have not moved forward 
in these areas.
  There have been important changes in the Chemical Weapons Convention 
over the past few months. Last September, I worked closely with 
Senators Helms, Kyl and others in opposition to the treaty. Had we not 
canceled the vote, I would have voted against it, and I believe that it 
would have failed.
  In the aftermath of that debate, some in the White House blamed 
political motivations. The President said it was partisan politics 
involving America's security. But, fortunately, calmer heads have 
prevailed this year. The administration did come to the table and they 
have negotiated with us. They recognize the legitimate concerns that 
were ignored last year. So we have engaged in a process of member-and-
staff-level discussions that have had a major impact on this 
convention.
  There are 28 agreed items in this resolution of ratification that 
were not there last September. Senator Kyl, Senator Helms, and Senator 
Biden have been working together on this. They reached agreements. Some 
of them Senator Biden said, ``Yes, we should do this,'' and the 
administration didn't particularly agree. Others in the administration 
said, ``Yes, we should do it,'' and some of our colleagues did not 
agree with it. There has been a give and take, but real progress has 
been made.
  Many of these items have addressed the concerns that have been cited 
by opponents as reasons to oppose the CWC last year. I have gone over 
some of the letters, some of the memos I have received--and I have 
received a lot of them--and point by point has been addressed, maybe 
not 100 percent, maybe not to their total satisfaction, but progress 
has been made. I will not go down the whole list of 28, but I want to 
list some of the more critical ones where real progress has been made.
  First, on search and seizure, condition 28 requires search warrants 
for all involuntary searches of American facilities. We were worried 
about a constitutional problem here. Now it has been addressed.
  Second, on our ability to use riot control agents, condition 26 
ensures that the U.S. policy since 1975 remains in effect. Our military 
can use nonlethal agents, such as tear gas, to rescue downed pilots. 
Certainly, that should have been in there all along. I don't know why 
there was resistance to it, but it has been addressed.
  Third, on intelligence sharing, condition 5 places strict limits on 
all U.S. intelligence shared with the international organization 
established under the CWC.

  Fourth, on maintaining robust chemical defenses, condition 11 
mandates a series of steps including negotiations with our allies, 
planning for chemical weapons in war game scenarios and high-level 
leadership of the U.S. Army's Chemical School.
  Fifth, on information sharing, an area that has worried me the most 
and right up until this very moment, progress has been made in two 
ways. First, with regard to these articles X and XI, condition 7 makes 
crystal clear that nothing in the CWC undermines U.S. export control 
laws, and that the informal Australia Group export controls will 
continue. Condition 15 helps to ensure that defensive assistance under 
the convention will be strictly limited. So I invite my colleagues who 
may still have some doubts to look at these conditions--conditions 7 
and 15--dealing with information sharing and how we have restrictions 
on the defensive assistance.
  Sixth, on financing Russian implementation, which I think is a 
ridiculous idea personally on its face, but condition 14 precludes the 
United States from making any commitment to finance Russia's chemical 
weapons destruction program in an effort to secure Russian ratification 
of CWC.
  Seventh, conditions 1, 17, 6, and 20 preserve Senate prerogatives in 
this and in future treaties. They preserve our right to pass 
reservations to treaties, to ratify future amendments to the CWC and to 
make clear the executive branch cannot commit to appropriations in 
advance of congressional action.
  Eighth, on noncompliance, condition 13 requires a series of steps to 
be taken by the United States in the event of noncompliance by a party 
to the convention. Condition 13 mandates unilateral actions and 
requires the United States to seek a series of multilateral actions to 
deal with CWC violations.
  Ninth, conditions 3 and 22 address financial concerns about the 
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons set up under this 
convention. One sets a binding limit on the U.S. assessment to ensure 
we are not creating another international entitlement program, and the 
other requires an independent inspector general be created to increase 
accountability of the OPCW.
  Finally, condition 10 requires an annual report of condition that, 
for the first time in arms control, shifts the burden of proof to 
making the administration certify compliance. As previous experience 
has demonstrated, the arms control bureaucracy has refused to find 
clear evidence of noncompliance. This condition will change and will 
ensure our vigilance on monitoring issues.
  Each of these conditions makes the resolution before us today a 
better document, there is no doubt about it, certainly better than the 
document we were considering last fall. Each of these changes addresses 
concerns raised by treaty opponents last year and addresses my own 
concerns. In addition, the Senate is considering this convention in a 
manner agreed to by all 100 Senators. We first considered, and passed, 
as I said earlier, S. 495, the Chemical and Biological Weapons Threat 
Reduction Act of 1997 sponsored by Senator Kyl. We are considering the 
resolution of ratification drafted by Senator Helms. Think about that. 
We are considering that resolution that he drafted and that he had in 
the committee. That is what we brought to the floor, and the process 
requires that motions to strike be offered to take provisions out. Much 
progress has been made, and many Senators have been cooperative.
  But there should be no mistake, serious problems remain with this 
convention. Unfortunately, key protections in the resolution of 
ratification may be stricken out in our debate today, and we will have 
some more votes in a few minutes.
  Condition 33 on verification requires the President to certify the 
same standard of verification developed under the Reagan-Bush 
administrations--high confidence in detecting militarily significant 
violations in a timely manner. Detecting the production and stockpiling 
of chemical weapons may be more difficult than detecting the existence, 
obviously, of nuclear-armed warheads.
  But I will vote to retain the verification standard that has served 
our country well in previous arms control agreements. I understand why 
my colleagues might not agree with that and they might vote in a way 
that would lower this verification standard, but it is a serious 
problem.
  Condition 30, which we just voted on, I think should have been kept 
in the document.
  Condition 29 conditions U.S. participation in the convention upon 
demonstrated actions by the country with the largest chemical weapons 
arsenal on Earth--Russia. Russia has not implemented the Bilateral 
Destruction Agreement signed in 1990. Russia has not submitted accurate 
data on chemical weapons. That is a real concern, and we have reason to 
believe they are devoting resources now to develop new chemical agents 
which are outside the scope of CWC. I support retaining this condition 
because I believe it makes sense to expect Russia to live up to past 
agreements before entering into new ones.
  I strongly support condition 31 which would require the President to 
exercise the power given in the verification annex to the convention to 
bar inspectors from terrorist states and from states which have 
violated U.S. proliferation law, particularly, I hope and think that we 
can defeat the motion to strike here. It is not a killer amendment and 
we ought to retain the right to bar those inspectors.

  Finally, there is the most serious question of articles X and XI, 
whether

[[Page S3603]]

these provisions on information sharing will increase the likelihood 
of, in fact, chemical weapons proliferation. Over the past few weeks, I 
made it clear to the administration as best I could the legitimate 
concerns about the impact of articles X and XI had to be addressed more 
than what was in the condition. I support delaying our ratification 
until the CWC is renegotiated to deal with these articles. For obvious 
reasons, the administration does not want to do that, and probably the 
majority of the Senate would not want to do that.
  But this very morning, I received a letter from President Clinton 
which I think is significant. The President made specific assurances 
that the United States would exercise its right to withdraw from the 
convention if any one of three things occurred: If countries used 
``article X to justify providing defensive chemical weapons equipment, 
material, or information to another state party that could result in 
U.S. chemical protective equipment being compromised. . .'';
  If countries use article XI to justify chemical transfers which 
undermine the Australia Group.
  If countries carried ``out transfers or exchanges under either 
article X and XI which jeopardize U.S. national security by promoting 
chemical weapons proliferation;
  These are specific and probably unprecedented. Yes, it is a letter. 
It is not in the document, but it is signed by the President of the 
United States in very strong language that, frankly, I was pleased but 
somewhat surprised that he agreed to say, I will withdraw after 
consultation with the Senate. If any one of these things happen, he is 
the President and his assurances in foreign policy must make a 
difference. They address countries even justifying transfers where 
there is concern. They address transfers which promote chemical weapons 
proliferation.
  Mr. President, I think this is a very important document. I have made 
that letter available to our colleagues. I have more copies.
  Every Member has struggled with one fundamental question: Are we 
better off with or without this convention? In my mind, there is no 
easy answer. I want to know that my children and our country will be 
better off, and that we will be better able to deal with chemical 
weapons with it, but I have my doubts.
  Experts, whose opinions I respect deeply, are divided on the 
question. Over the last 2 weeks, I have had many conversations to 
discuss this convention. I spoke with Presidents Bush and Ford. I 
talked with my good friend, former Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, 
former Secretary of Defense Cap Weinberger, Steve Forbes, former 
Secretary of State James Baker, Jim Schlesinger, Colin Powell, 
uniformed military officers--a great variety of people. I met with 
leaders of groups that are deeply opposed and well informed about the 
treaty's flaws. I talked with President Clinton, Secretary Albright, 
and Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Shalikashvili.
  Republican Senators, with long experience in national security 
matters, are divided. On this issue, reasonable people can and do 
disagree, and reasonable people will vote on opposite sides.
  After our negotiations, hearings, and discussions, it is time to make 
decisions--decisions that will be important to the future of our men 
and women in uniform, and the future security of our country.
  I have decided to vote in support of the Senate giving its advice and 
consent to the Chemical Weapons Convention. I will do so not because I 
believe it will end the threat posed by chemical weapons or rid the 
world of poison gas. I will do so not because I believe this treaty is 
verifiable enough or even enforceable enough. And I will not do so 
because I believe there are no additional proliferations concerns 
related to articles X and XI.
  I will vote for the convention because I believe there will be real 
and lasting consequences to the United States if we do not ratify the 
convention. In a very real sense, the credibility of commitments made 
by two Presidents of our country--one Republican and one Democrat--is 
at stake.
  I will vote for the convention because the judgment of the most 
senior former and current military commanders believe it will make our 
soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines more safe in potential 
battlefields and less likely to face the horrible prospect of chemical 
weapons.
  I will vote for the convention because I believe the United States is 
marginally better off with it than without it. It will provide new 
tools to press signatories for compliance. It will enable us to gain 
access to sites and information we are currently unable to examine.
  Through the important and enlightening debate we have had over the 
past few months, I am convinced the convention will bring new focus and 
energy to this administration's nonproliferation efforts. We have 
certainly heightened the awareness and knowledge of the concerns we 
have. One year ago, few of us even knew about the Australia Group. Now 
we have committed ourselves and the administration to keeping the 
Australia Group as a viable tool to limit access to chemicals and 
technology.
  Yes, the CWC may give legal cover to proliferators in Teheran or in 
Beijing. But they have undertaken such efforts in the past and no doubt 
will do it again in the future.
  I believe our allies in Europe are more likely to join with us in 
isolating Iran if we are a party to this convention than if we reject 
it tonight. They have made it clear that they hope we will ratify it, 
whether it is Canada or whether it is Britain or our European allies or 
Japan.
  I believe this convention will increase the cost of covert chemical 
weapons programs, and it will increase our chances of detecting such 
programs.
  I think there is a long list of good reasons why we should do this 
today. I have struggled with it. I would like to take just a minute, if 
I can, to talk on a personal note.
  Many people in the media have tended to say, well, you know, this is 
going to determine the fate of various and sundry Senators and tell a 
lot about leadership. It has been exaggerated.
  I have talked to a lot of Senators one on one. Not one of them--not 
one of them--has said that they would vote on it on any basis other 
than what is best for our country.
  The way the Senate works, we debate these issues--we read, we study, 
we argue, we go back and forth. We set up a fair process, and then we 
come to a conclusion. We make a decision. We vote on it. And I do not 
think it is fair to exaggerate any one Senator's role in this whole 
effort.
  I think the Senate should be complimented today for the way it has 
handled this. I think that Madison, and others, placed their faith in 
this institution. And I think it has worked well.
  The efforts of Senator Helms and Senator Kyl have been heroic. They 
have done a magnificent job. Others that have supported the convention 
have done their part, too.
  I think that this process has helped the Senate as an institution to 
exercise the leadership assigned to it by the Constitution. And that, I 
submit, is the only real test of leadership that truly matters.
  I urge the adoption and ratification of this treaty.
  Mr. HELMS addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Carolina.
  Mr. HELMS. I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. HELMS. We have a small difficulty which can be remedied in short 
order. Without going into a great deal of detail, we are trying to 
adjust the time back to have accommodated the majority leader and his 
remarks.
  So I ask unanimous consent that--how much time did we agree to?
  Mr. BIDEN. That the remaining time that the chairman have be 35 
minutes, the remaining time under the control for the Senator from 
Delaware be 15 minutes, and I believe Senator Leahy has 14 minutes 
anyway, and that be the remaining time on the bill.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. HELMS. I thank the Chair.

[[Page S3604]]

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who seeks time?
  Mr. HELMS addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Carolina.
  Mr. HELMS. How many minutes?
  Mr. BURNS. Ten or less.
  Mr. HELMS. Ten minutes.
  Mr. BURNS. Or less.
  Mr. HELMS. I yield 10 minutes to the Senator from Montana.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Montana is recognized for 10 
minutes.
  Mr. BURNS. Mr. President, I thank Senator Helms, the chairman of the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
  History has to be recorded that this has probably been the most ever-
changing and cloudy situation that we have faced here in the U.S. 
Senate. Some in this body have changed their minds as they have tried 
to read the public opinion polls, and even some of those who have 
served in the administration have done the same--the history, as it was 
articulated here by the majority leader, of getting caught up in 
Presidential politics in 1996.
  But basically what it was, it was most of us sitting down and reading 
the words and trying to make a decision based on what we think is best 
for our country. No matter the winds that blow in politics or in public 
opinion, this issue must be considered and decided on its merits. There 
is just too much at stake. The President has written a letter to the 
majority leader. If you will read the words real carefully, you could 
even say you could argue both sides of the issue on that letter alone.
  But I rise today to express my opposition to this Chemical Weapons 
Convention treaty.
  There are several reasons why I have chosen to oppose the treaty. 
Some would say that it is verifiable. I am not fully convinced of that, 
yet. Some would say that it does not hinder or break the Constitution. 
I think I would question that. When it comes to sovereignty of the 
United States, I would say that very much was in jeopardy. However, I 
will focus my concerns with article XI and my fears that this article 
will compromise both the United States and the citizens that live here.
  Article XI of the Chemical Weapons Convention treaty prohibits 
countries from denying others access to dual-use chemicals--that means 
chemicals that can be used in any manner--processes, and technology. In 
effect, mandating access to and sharing of materials and the methods of 
making chemical weapons. By legitimizing commerce in dangerous, dual-
use chemicals and processes the CWC will increase, not reduce, the 
ability of countries to acquire chemical weapons.
  Second, Mr. President, article XI gives states the treaty right to:

       Facilitate and have the right to participate in, the 
     fullest possible exchange of chemicals, equipment, and 
     scientific and technical information relating to the 
     development and the application of chemistry for [peaceful] 
     purposes . . .

  Have we not had enough experience over nuclear problems of this 
world, just with one country that is on this planet?
  Third, transferring chemical-related technologies and material to 
members of the CWC such as Cuba, Iran, India, Pakistan, and China will 
help them establish and/or improve their chemical weapons programs. 
This is because there is very little difference between the legitimate 
commercial chemical processes and those processes used to make chemical 
weapons.
  Article XI also legitimizes trade in dangerous dual-use chemicals. 
The treaty right will be used by countries such as China, India, and 
Russia to override Western objections to their provision of sensitive 
chemicals and production technologies to countries such as Iran. China 
and India already supply Iran with such chemicals, but the CWC will 
legitimize this trade and allow these countries to expand the volume of 
commerce conducted in dual-use chemicals.
  Mr. President, I take a moment to focus on the fact that by ratifying 
this treaty, Iran will be permitted to have access to our chemical 
secrets, to have the ability to obtain chemical information from other 
rogue nations. If ratified, we are allowing a nation that we have 
confirmed, we have confirmed as a terrorist nation, one that is the 
primary suspect in numerous terrorist attacks against the United 
States, and one that calls for the destruction of this country to get 
more information, not less, on deadly chemicals.
  How many in this body think that if allowed this information, Iran 
will, of its own accord, destroy these potentially deadly weapons and 
not use them against United States citizens around the world? I think 
that is a legitimate question. How many in this body really think that 
the United States will be in a more secure position? Finally, how can 
we in clear conscience give them this information when American men and 
women have been murdered by their actions?
  Mr. President, for this reason, I cannot vote for the passage of this 
treaty.
  I have heard all the reasons why we would be just a tiny bit better 
off being part of the convention. Well, this Senator thinks you have to 
be a bigger part. It falsely promises security to our Nation, and would 
betray those U.S. citizens who have died by the hand of terrorists. I 
urge my fellow colleagues to contemplate what I have stated here. I 
urge a ``no'' vote on ratification of this treaty. This is not an easy 
decision but is a decision where the majority of people who serve in 
this body have read and have made their decision on what is actually in 
it and not the emotion of the times. I urge them to read it and vote 
accordingly.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Carolina.
  Mr. HELMS. I yield to the Senator from Oklahoma.


                         Privilege of the Floor

  Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Jeff Severs 
be permitted privileges of the floor for the duration of the debate.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.


                            Amendment No. 48

 (Purpose: To strike condition no. 29, relating to Russian elimination 
                          of chemical weapons)

  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask for 
its immediate consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The bill clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Delaware [Mr. Biden] proposes an amendment 
     numbered 48.
       Beginning on page 61, strike line 21 and all that follows 
     through line 7 of page 63.

  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, this amendment strikes condition 29. I will 
speak to this in a moment, but I yield as much time of the half-hour 
that I control as my friend from Indiana desires to discuss this.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Indiana is recognized.
  Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I thank the Chair and I thank the 
distinguished Senator from Delaware. The condition that we move to 
strike, condition 29, would prohibit the United States from ratifying 
the Chemical Weapons Convention until the President certifies that 
Russia has done the following:

       Ratified the CWC, complied with the 1990 bilateral 
     destruction agreement, fulfilled its obligations under the 
     1989 Wyoming memorandum of understanding, and ceased all 
     chemical weapons activities.

  Mr. President, two arguments against this condition prevailed, at 
least on the last vote that we had. I cite the first important argument 
is simply that this is a killer amendment. Senators need to know that a 
vote to leave this in the convention effectively terminates the 
convention. Senators cannot have it both ways.
  I simply indicate, in his very important statement, the majority 
leader, Senator Lott, referencing a particular condition that he found 
appealing, indicated it was not a killer amendment. But, in fact, this 
one is a killer amendment. Therefore, there is a crucial reason to vote 
to strike it.
  Second, Mr. President, once again we are talking about American 
leadership. It is in our interest, clearly, to get Russia's attention 
to the chemical weapons problem. We have decided unilaterally in this 
country that chemical weapons are not useful to us in our defense, 
largely because we cannot necessarily guard our own troops against the 
fallout and against the problems they create. So we are destroying 
them.
  Russia always had greater stocks than we have. They still do. It has 
been in our interest to work with the Russians. In the Cooperative 
Threat Reduction Act, so-called Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Act, we have worked 
with the

[[Page S3605]]

Russians in a first instance to assist them in the techniques of 
destroying chemical weapons in Russia. There are seven very large sites 
that need to be dealt with. We are dealing now with the Russians at the 
first.
  Mr. President, I speak today from a personal experience of last 
October when it was my privilege to accompany the then Secretary of 
Defense, William Perry, and my colleagues Senator Sam Nunn and Senator 
Joe Lieberman, in a visit to Russia, specifically to the Defense 
Department of Russia and to military persons involved in weapons of 
mass destruction. Perhaps equally importantly, Mr. President, it was my 
privilege to go with my colleagues from America to the Russian Duma. On 
that particular day, our first attempt was to attempt to gain some 
understanding by members of the Duma about the importance of the START 
II treaty and its ratification. While we were there, we visited with 
the relevant committees comparable to our Foreign Relations and our 
Armed Services Committee about the Chemical Weapons Convention.
  The Russians--in what we characterize as the Russian administration, 
the executive branch, and the legislative branch, the Duma--made 
identical points to us, that the START II treaty was coupled in 
consideration with the expansion of NATO. They said this is a political 
issue. These two are joined together.

  With regard to the Chemical Weapons Convention, they made the clear 
distinction that it was not political, it was not involved with either 
NATO or START II or other arrangements. As a matter of fact, they 
perceived it was in the interests of Russia to ratify the treaty. They 
also pointed out that Russia has very little money, that at this 
particular point in history Russian taxes are not being paid with 
regularity. The soldiers are not being paid, or at least their 
paychecks are often delayed. As a result, they pointed out that arms 
control expenses were a very great problem for them. I think we 
understand that. That is not a sufficient reason for Russia to dodge 
its responsibilities. But it was a reason offered as to why they had 
postponed consideration.
  In addition, Mr. President, they have postponed consideration because 
despite our leadership from the very beginning, our leadership to 
destroy our own chemical weapons, then to try to sign up all the 
nations of the world to destroy theirs, and to make this an 
international law project, the Russians read our press and they 
understood that we had had difficulty last December in ratifying this 
convention. So they simply were curious as to whether we were serious 
now. Well, we are, Mr. President. I simply say that the question that 
is before the Senate should not be delay or perhaps failure to ratify 
the treaty, because we are waiting on Russia. Our leadership is 
imperative. We are the country that is leading the world. We are the 
country that is leading Chemical Weapons Convention matters. Our 
citizens of the United States take that seriously. Mr. President, a 
large majority of Americans want us to act. They believe the U.S. 
Government ought to do everything possible, and they recognize, as do 
most Senators, that this convention is unlikely to get that job done 
very swiftly but they do recognize it is an advance, it is a 
constructive step. To offer as a reason why we would not proceed that 
we are waiting for Russia, or hoping that two agreements that are 
specified in the condition might somehow come to fulfillment is to miss 
the entire point of the leadership that is involved and the persuasion 
we must have.
  Mr. President, I believe it is important, as soon as we ratify this 
convention, for the President of the United States to press on 
President Yeltsin his responsibility to gain ratification. At the 
Helsinki summit meeting recently, President Yeltsin assured our 
President he would offer that leadership. He assured our President he 
understood the responsibility of the Russians. He also asked our 
President to do his duty to help get the job done here. In fairness, 
our President has been fulfilling that responsibility, as did Senator 
Dole yesterday, as have President Bush and President Ford, as they have 
come forward as Presidents who understand, and as the majority leader 
understands. In his statement today, he mentioned one reason for voting 
for this treaty is the fact that two Republican administrations have 
made a commitment. An American word means something. Our leadership has 
continuity and staying power. It does not flip one way or another, 
depending upon Iraq or Russia.
  Mr. President, I simply say, once again, American leadership is at 
stake. We are looking at a killer amendment. This condition must be 
struck. I ask Senators to vote aye when the roll is called.
  I thank the Chair.
  Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, before I plead on this amendment, I have 
been around this place for quite a while. Before I came to the Senate 
as a Senator, I had the honor of serving with two Senators as 
administrative assistant. Time after time, at the conclusion of long 
arduous debate and votes on various issues, a parting ``thank you'' is 
made to the staff people who did most of the work. I talked to Senator 
Biden and told him I want to do it now before we begin to sign off. He 
suggested that I go first.
  Admiral Nance, sitting back there, with the white hair, that young 
man, he and I were boyhood friends back in Monroe. Adm. James W. Nance, 
the chief of staff of the Foreign Relations Committee; Tom Klein; Mark 
Theissen; Steve Biegun; Marshall Billingslea--particularly Marshall 
Billingslea--Colleen Noonan; Beth Wilson, and the rest of the Foreign 
Relations Committee staff.
  Senator Kyl has three remarkable young people: David Stephens, John 
Rood, and Jeanine Esperne. Senator Craig has Yvonne Bartoli and Jim 
Jatras.
  I want to thank, in particular, some people from the outside who 
helped enormously in our trying to build a case to protect the American 
people from the extravagances of this treaty. But that is neither here 
nor there, but I want to thank those four great former Secretaries of 
Defense who came up--Dick Cheney; Cap Weinberger; Don Rumsfeld; James 
Schlesinger; the marvelous Jeane Kirkpatrick; Steve Forbes, who came 
down from New York; Richard Perle; Frank Gaffney; Doug Feith, and Fred 
Clay. I also want to include the retired flag and general officers.
  I know that when I am driving home in a few hours from now, I will 
think of others. Just speaking for all of us, I want to thank them all. 
I know Senator Biden wants to do the same thing on his side.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I thank the chairman. I apologize because I 
may have to augment this. Although it is a very good idea to do it now, 
I was preparing to do it later, so I may leave somebody out, and I may 
amend this.
  Let me begin by thanking a young man, who came over from my personal 
staff to the Foreign Relations Committee and I think maybe Mr. 
Billingslea may have thought he was his cousin, they spent so much time 
together in the last couple of months, and that is Puneet Talwar. He 
has done a great deal of the heavy lifting for me on this, along with 
Ed Levine, from the Intelligence Committee, who is now working with me. 
Ed Hall, the minority staff director; John Lis; the young man--well, he 
has been with me so long that he is getting old--Brian McKeon, who is 
counsel for the minority; Frank Januzzi; Dawn Ratliff; Kathi Taylor; 
Ursula McManus, who we kept up late at night writing memos and other 
things on our behalf; Casey Adams; Bill Ashworth, a former long-time 
staff member of the Foreign Relations Committee and Senator Pell's 
staff; David Schanzer, who worked with me on the Judiciary Committee; 
Mary Santos; Kimberly Burns; Jennette Murphy; Larry Stein; Randy 
DeValk; Sheila Murphy, all leadership staff persons who have worked 
with me.
  I have left out some, but I will augment this with the staff members 
of the Intelligence Committee, the Appropriations Committee, the 
Judiciary Committee, and the Armed Services Committee. They all played 
major rolls.
  The hearings that the distinguished chairman had on this treaty this 
time around were, I think, among the best hearings--even though I 
didn't always agree with the witnesses--that I have participated in in 
my 25 years. The cast of characters were the luminaries of previous 
administrations, as well as

[[Page S3606]]

this administration. We had the who's who of the foreign policy 
establishment, literally. These people were particularly helpful to me, 
which is going to sound strange. He was up in the gallery, but I am 
referring to General and former Ambassador Rowny, a close friend and, I 
think, neighbor of the chairman. I know he is much more philosophically 
compatible with the chairman than with me, but we found ourselves on 
the same side of this issue. Everybody wondered why Bob Dole changed 
his mind--not changed his mind, but why Bob Dole concluded that the 
conditions that were added to the treaty sufficiently corrected its 
defects. It is my understanding that General Rowny bumped into Bob Dole 
in a coffee shop at the Watergate Hotel. I can see the distinguished 
Senator from Arizona wishing he had been at that coffee shop. But there 
was Gen. Brent Scowcroft, one of the most respected people in this 
town, Adm. Elmo Zumwalt; John Deutch; Fred Webber and his staff at the 
Chemical Manufacturers Association; Gen. Colin Powell; Amy Smithson of 
the Stimson Center; John Isaacs; Brad Roberts, Institute for Defense 
Analysis; Barry Kellman, DePaul Law School; Ron Lehman of the Reagan 
and Bush administrations. I am leaving a number of people out who I 
will add later.

  I thank them all for contributing to this debate. I want to make a 
personal thanks, if I may, Mr. Chairman and Mr. President, to one of 
the most competent staff people I have ever dealt with in the 
administration, Bob Bell, who works for Sandy Berger and who also, I 
think, did an incredibly good job here, and Lori Murray, also of that 
staff. Bob Bell is a walking encyclopedia, who negotiated with the Lott 
committee. He is a man who has the ability to understand very complex 
notions and put them into language everybody can understand. He has 
done an admirable job. There are other people to thank.
  Mr. LUGAR. Will the Senator yield?
  Mr. BIDEN. Yes.
  Mr. LUGAR. I would like to ask if he would include Kenneth Myers and 
Kenny Myers, on my staff and the staff of the Intelligence Committee, 
who have been invaluable.
  Mr. BIDEN. The answer is I would absolutely like to do that. The 
statement I was going to introduce has a paragraph about that.
  I express my deep appreciation to Senator Lugar, with whom I have 
talked every day for the past few months as we have tried to move the 
ball forward in this treaty. He was very committed. He is truly the 
Senate's leading expert on the treaty and, I think, one of the leading 
experts in this country on foreign policy. We would not have gotten 
this far without his efforts. Perhaps the reason he is as good as he is 
that he has a father and son team working for him, Kenneth and Kenny 
Myers. I envy Ken Myers, Senator Lugar's long-time staff aide, because 
he gets to work with his son, Kenny Myers, every day. The only thing I 
found, Mr. Chairman, in my meetings with them is that, like with my 
sons, I occasionally observe that the son knew more than the father. So 
my compliments to both of them.
  The bottom line of all this--and I assume this was one of the 
intentions of the Senator from North Carolina, the chairman--is that 
regardless of the final outcome of each of these remaining amendments 
and the treaty, this has been done fairly and honorably. Everyone has 
kept their word. We said we would negotiate in good faith; we both did. 
All of the staff members involved acted in the same way.
  Lastly--and I hope this doesn't come out the wrong way--I want to 
thank the chairman of the full committee for the honorable way in which 
he has dealt with this entire matter. I mean that sincerely.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. HELMS. I thank the Senator. I will add two things. One, I hope 
Bob Dole stays out of those coffee shops from now on. I am going to see 
if the distinguished ranking member would mention probably the most 
prominent player in this game. He didn't, but I will, because I had the 
honor of escorting her to North Carolina--the new Secretary of State, 
Madeleine Albright. I don't always agree with her, nor she with me. But 
she is a great lady and she is doing a good job for this country. I 
thank her.
  Mr. President, one of the many fine people who contributed to the 
Chemical Weapons Convention is no longer among us. Mrs. Sherry Stetson 
Mannix, a retired U.S. Air Force lieutenant colonel, joined the U.S. 
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in 1984 and became its top expert 
on chemical weapons. She helped negotiate the treaty, and then she 
became a resource person for Members and staff of the Senate as we 
began to consider whether to give our advice and consent to 
ratification.
  Lieutenant Colonel Mannix was dying of cancer in 1994, when the 
Foreign Relations and Intelligence Committees first held hearings on 
the CWC. Despite being in terrible pain, Lieutenant Colonel Mannix 
faithfully and effectively managed the process of responding to our 
committees' questions for the Record.
  Sherry Mannix was only 44 years old when she died in early 1995. She 
had hoped to live long enough to see this convention ratified. We were 
unable, Mr. President, to grant that last wish. But Sherry Mannix kept 
faith with us, with her comrades in the U.S. Armed Forces, and with her 
country. Now we have the opportunity to keep faith with her, and with 
all our military personnel who long for ratification of this convention 
as a step toward curbing the menace of chemical weapons.
  Mr. HELMS. What is the pending business, Mr. President?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment offered by the Senator from 
Delaware.
  Mr. HELMS. Which is?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. No. 48.
  Mr. HELMS. I yield to the distinguished Senator from Arizona [Mr. 
Kyl] for whatever time he may require.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I will, at a later time, join in thanking the 
various staff and other people who have been so useful in ensuring a 
good debate. I think the Senate has gotten very serious about this 
matter. As the majority leader said earlier, as a result of the 
application of various Members of the Senate, a great deal of progress 
has been made in trying to bring the sides closer together in getting a 
treaty that, if it is entered into, will be more in the interest of the 
United States than as originally submitted.
  There are a couple of conditions, however, in the resolution of 
ratification which we believe ought to be a part of this treaty before 
the President submits those articles for ratification, signifying the 
U.S. entry into the treaty. One of the most important is the one before 
us at this moment. There is a motion to strike this condition from the 
resolution of ratification. We believe that this condition should 
remain. As the majority leader earlier said, he believes this condition 
should remain. Here is what it provides: Prior to depositing the U.S. 
instrument of ratification, the President must certify four things: 
First, that Russia is making reasonable progress on implementing the 
1990 bilateral destruction agreement entered into between the United 
States and Russia. Second, that outstanding compliance related to the 
1989 Wyoming memorandum of understanding have been resolved to U.S. 
satisfaction. Third, that Russia has deposited its articles of 
ratification of the conventional weapons agreement. Fourth, that it is 
committed to foregoing any weapons development.
  Those are four important conditions, if our partner, Russia, and the 
United States are to effectively utilize the Chemical Weapons 
Convention. The reason is, first of all, because Russia is the world's 
largest possessor of chemical weapons. It has anywhere from 60 to 70 
percent of the world's chemical stocks. For the Chemical Weapons 
Convention to be global, in the sense that it covers the weapons, and 
to be effective, it should involve the country with the largest 
inventory of chemical weapons.
  Now, Russia has signed the Chemical Weapons Convention, but has 
indicated that it will not ratify, at least at this time and, as a 
matter of fact, in a communication to the Vice President of the United 
States, one of the Russian leaders, Chernomyrdin, said, in effect, that 
Russia would prefer that the two parties, if they are going to come 
into the treaty, come in at the same time rather than one preceding the 
other, 

[[Page S3607]]

and, therefore, said that it would be integral to Russian entry that 
the United States entered first, which is what we are about to do.

  I think these four commitments by Russia are integral to the success 
of the Chemical Weapons Convention if we are to have a truly global 
ban. That is why this condition 29 should remain a part of the 
resolution of ratification.
  Quickly, to the four points: First, reasonable progress in 
implementing the 1990 Bilateral Destruction Agreement. Reasonable 
progress simply means that we are continuing to work on complying with 
it. That is what the Russians agreed to do when they entered into this 
agreement in June 1990. This is an agreement between President Bush and 
President Gorbachev.
  By the way, when proponents of this treaty speak of it as a Reagan-
Bush-Clinton treaty, I point out the fact that the treaty was different 
in the Reagan and early Bush years than it is now. One of the 
underpinnings of the treaty was that this bilateral destruction 
agreement between Russia and the United States would be in place and 
would be enforced and would be complied with by the two parties. This 
agreement was designed specifically to ban the production of chemical 
weapons, their agents, the destruction of chemical weapons agents, to 
provide for onsite inspections of CW facilities, and require data 
declarations.
  The Bilateral Destruction Agreement is central to the CWC before us 
today. Without it the Chemical Weapons Convention is a much weaker 
treaty than it would otherwise be. The CWC was negotiated with the 
assumption that the United States and Russia would both destroy and 
verify destruction of their stockpiles under the Bilateral Destruction 
Agreement. But Russia has not implemented the Bilateral Destruction 
Agreement, and it appears that it has no intention of doing so.
  Russian Prime Minister Chernomyrdin, in this letter to Vice President 
Gore that I mentioned before, essentially stated that the Bilateral 
Destruction Agreement and the 1989 Wyoming Memorandum of Understanding 
have outlived their usefulness insofar as Russia is concerned.
  The Chemical Weapons Convention before us today is no substitute for 
the Bilateral Destruction Agreement. Under the Bilateral Destruction 
Agreement, the inspectors of Russian facilities would not be 
international inspectors. They would be U.S. professional inspectors, 
and there would be more frequent inspections. The United States would 
have guaranteed access to data declarations, none of which would be the 
case under the CWC.
  So it is important that Russia at least indicate to us that it is 
making reasonable progress to implement the BDA before we enter into 
force CWC.
  Second, the resolution says there should be compliance with the 1989 
Wyoming Memorandum of Understanding. Without getting into a lot of 
detail, I will simply note that this memorandum of understanding was 
essentially an agreement between the two states that we would exchange 
data on how much chemical weapons we had and to provide the information 
on the status for binary weapons programs.
  To comply with this declaration, the United States has given 
information to the Russians. Russia declared a 40,000 metric ton agent 
stockpile. However, present reports and other information allege that 
the Defense Intelligence Agency estimates that the former Soviet--now 
Russian--stockpile could be as large as 75,000 tons. Russia has refused 
to provide information on the status of its binary weapons program. 
And, according to the former Director of Central Intelligence Jim 
Woolsey, ``The data we have received from Russia makes no reference to 
binary chemical weapons or agents. That is contrary to our 
understanding of the program that was initiated in the former Soviet 
Union.''
  There are additional indications of activity on the part of the 
Russians, all of which suggest that they are not in compliance with 
this 1989 memorandum of understanding.
  Our second point in this condition is getting compliance with that.
  Third, we want the Russians to ratify this treaty at the same time 
that we do. That is what they want to do. We believe that will be a 
preferable course of action to the United States entering into the 
treaty causing the Russians to be concerned that we would set up the 
rules of the treaty, in effect, in a way that would be amicable to 
their interests, thus perhaps causing them never to enter into the 
treaty.
  A CWC without Russia, furthermore, means that over 50 percent of the 
world's known chemical weapons stockpile will be outside of the treaty 
regime. Should the United States ratify the CWC absent Russian 
participation or the involvement of other states that have weapons, the 
treaty's intrusive verification schemes would, for all intents and 
purposes, be focused solely on the United States, the only nation 
likely to declare integral weapons inventory. In effect, we would be 
paying 25 percent of the cost of the treaty to verify our own 
compliance.
  Finally, Russian commitment to forego a chemical weapons capability. 
This is central to the meaning of the CWC. If Russia is not willing to 
do this, obviously their intentions are not to comply with CWC.

  We have evidence of the so-called Novichok class of nerve agents that 
is more lethal than any other known chemical agent in the world.
  According to Jane's Land-Based Air Defense 1997-98, Russia is 
developing three new nerve agents, two of which are eight times as 
deadly as the VX nerve agent stockpiled by Iraq.
  Mr. President, Russia's new chemical agents do not depend on 
stockpiles that are on the CWC list of scheduled chemicals, according 
to sources. Thus, inspectors will neither be prepared nor allowed to 
look for them, nor will Russia be precluded from importing these 
components. A declassified portion of a May 1995 national intelligence 
estimate states ``Production of new binary agents would be difficult to 
detect and confirm as a CWC-prohibited activity.''
  In conclusion, in light of these ongoing activities and related 
United States intelligence estimates, it is reasonable to condition 
United States ratification of the CWC to the President certifying that 
Russia is committed to foregoing chemical weapons capability or other 
activity contrary to the purpose of the convention weapons treaty.
  For those reasons, Mr. President, I join the distinguished majority 
leader and the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee in urging 
that we not strike this condition from the resolution of ratification.
  Mr. LEVIN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, parliamentary inquiry: How much time is 
under the control of the Senator from Delaware?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Seventeen minutes.
  Mr. BIDEN. I yield 5 minutes to the distinguished Senator from 
Michigan. Next, I will let people know that I understand Senator Inhofe 
is going to speak in opposition to this motion to strike. Then I would 
like to yield, just to let people know, 5 minutes to the distinguished 
Senator from Virginia.
  That is for informational purposes. I am not asking UC.
  I now yield 5 minutes to the Senator from Michigan.
  Mr. HELMS. I ask for the yeas and nays.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
  There is a sufficient second.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan is recognized.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, it isn't always that our top military 
officials so strongly and jointly agree that an arms control treaty is 
in our national security interest. But in the case of the chemical 
weapons treaty before the Senate today, that strong support has been 
expressed over and over and over again.
  The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Shalikashvili, speaking on 
behalf of the Chiefs of each of the services and the combatant 
commanders, urged the Senate to ratify this treaty because it would 
make it less likely that our troops will face chemical weapons. Their 
position is not based on politics or public opinion polls; it is based 
on their military judgment.
  The acting head of Central Intelligence, George Tenet, has said that 
this treaty will give us additional tools to inspect for chemical 
weapons that we otherwise would not have.

[[Page S3608]]

  The United States, under former President Bush, led the way to the 
negotiation of this treaty. It would represent a tragic blow to 
American leadership were the Senate to reject a treaty negotiated and 
supported by three Presidents. If we don't lead the way, if and when 
the day comes that we must act militarily to eliminate a country's 
chemical weapons, the credibility of and support for, that effort will 
be undermined by our lack of clean hands and our refusal to ratify a 
treaty that makes it less likely those weapons will be created to begin 
with.
  The CWC destroys stockpiles that could threaten our troops; it 
significantly improves our intelligence capabilities, and it creates 
new international sanctions to punish those states that remain outside 
of the treaty. If we fail to ratify the convention, we will imperil our 
leadership in the entire area of nonproliferation, perhaps the most 
vital security issue of the post-cold-war era.
  Relative to condition 29 that is before us, there is a motion to 
strike this condition that has been made by the Senator from Indiana. 
It is based on many grounds. But the first ground that he points out, 
which seems to me is the foremost ground even before we get to the 
details of this condition, is that this condition is a killer 
condition. If this condition stays in this resolution, it kills this 
ratification resolution because it makes it conditional on somebody 
else ratifying.
  Do we want to make our ratification conditional upon these other 
events? Do we want to give Russia the power to decide our participation 
in the leadership of this crucial treaty? The President has said--I am 
here quoting him--``This is precisely backwards. The best way to secure 
Russian ratification is to ratify the treaty ourselves. Failure to do 
so will not only give hard-liners in Russia an excuse to hold out but 
also to hold onto their chemical weapons.''
  Do we want Russia to ratify? Clearly we do. General Shalikashvili, 
who has so strongly supported the ratification of this treaty, has 
testified before us in the Armed Services Committee as follows: ``The 
most significant advantage derived from the convention is the potential 
elimination of chemical weapons by state parties.'' He went on to say, 
``Eventual destruction of approximately 40,000 tons of declared Russian 
chemical weapons will significantly reduce the global chemical 
threat.''
  That is why General Shalikashvili has said, among other reasons, that 
the ratification of this treaty will make it less likely that our 
troops would ever face chemical weapons because the largest declared 
stockpile by Russia must be destroyed under this treaty. General 
Shalikashvili, Chairman of our Joint Chiefs, speaking for each of the 
chiefs and our combatant commanders, says that destruction of 40,000 
tons of declared chemical weapons by Russia is the most significant 
advantage to this treaty.
  What does our ratification have to do with Russian ratification? I 
would suggest here that we listen to a number of voices. But one of 
them is a Russian voice--a Russian scientist who blew the whistle 
actually on the Soviet Union chemical weapons program. His name is Vil 
Myrzyanov. He is a high-level Russian scientist. This is what he said 
about the relationship in a letter that he wrote to Senator Lugar. 
``Senate ratification of the convention is crucial to securing action 
on the treaty in Moscow.''
  Our ratification, he is telling us--this is an inside voice--is 
critical to getting the Duma to ratify this treaty. And getting the 
Duma to ratify this treaty is, in the eyes of General Shalikashvili, 
the single most important advantage of the treaty because then 40,000 
declared tons of chemical agents, the largest stockpile in the world, 
will be destroyed and less available for leakage, less available to any 
potential sale or disposition to others adversely or inadvertently.
  So our leadership is important to a safer world. This is a treaty 
that we helped to draft, negotiated, and now it is before us to ratify. 
But our leadership is also important to ratification of this treaty 
inside of Russia.
  The decision of whether the United States ratifies this convention is 
for this body, the United States Senate to decide--not the Russian 
Duma. We should strike this killer condition.
  The purpose of both the Bilateral Destruction Agreement and the 
Wyoming MOU was to help make progress towards achieving a CWC.
  Now that we have the CWC complete, the BDA and the Wyoming MOU are 
less relevant. We can enter the CWC without the BDA being implemented.
  The BDA does not go as far as the CWC. BDA would permit both sides to 
keep 5,000 tons of chemical agent. The BDA does not permit challenge 
inspections.
  The CWC requires complete destruction of all chemical weapons, and 
provides for challenge inspections to any facility suspected of a 
violating suspected of violating the CWC.
  If the CWC is ratified by the United States--which this killer 
condition would prohibit--and by Russia--it is entirely possible that 
the United States and Russia can finish negotiations on the BDA and let 
it enter into force.
  If the United States does not ratify this convention, there is little 
chance Russia will ratify it and there is no chance for this BDA ever 
entering into force.
  If we want Russia to ratify the CWC--and surely we must--then we 
should ratify the CWC--which, in turn requires us to strike this 
condition.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Carolina is recognized.
  Mr. HELMS. I thank the Chair.
  Mr. President, I am going to abbreviate my statement in the interest 
of time, hoping that we can help Senators get out a little bit earlier, 
including the distinguished occupant of the Chair.
  Mr. President, this condition is very important. It forbids the 
deposit of the United States instrument of ratification until Russia 
has made significant progress in implementing the 1990 Bilateral 
Destruction Agreement and has resolved concerns over its incomplete 
data declarations under the Wyoming memorandum of understanding, 
ratified the convention and has committed to forgo the clandestine 
maintenance of chemical weapons production capability.
  That sounds like a lot but more than anything else it is a 
measurement of how Russia is playing games in terms of not doing things 
to live up to its agreement.
  I have the highest hope that Russia one day will have a free 
enterprise economy and all the rest of it, but such commitments by 
Russia are absolutely imperative and essential to the success of this 
CWC, this treaty, in securing a truly global ban on possession and use 
of chemical weapons. If Russia continues to drag its feet, this 
convention will be worth almost nothing. And for my part, as one 
Senator, I am extremely concerned that Russia, the country that 
possesses the largest and the most sophisticated chemical weapons 
arsenal in the world, has refused consistently to agree to implement 
its commitments to eliminate its chemical weapons stockpile despite the 
1990 United States-Russian Bilateral Destruction Agreement.
  Now, put any face on it you want, but if Russia fails to do that, 
then Russia is telling this Senate, this Government, the American 
people, we don't care what you want; we are going our way. And that is 
a pretty dangerous position for Russia to take in terms of world peace.
  This coupled with the Russian withdrawal from the BDA and the Russian 
Parliament rejection of the chemical weapons destruction plan portend 
ominous things to come in terms of Russia's ratification of this 
treaty.
  Now, I hope Senators are aware, and if they are not aware, that they 
will become aware, that Russia is by far and away the world's largest 
possessor of chemical weapons. If the United States in eliminating its 
own chemical stockpile could assure that Russia also destroyed its 
stockpile through the Bilateral Destruction Agreement, 99 percent of 
the world's chemical arsenal would be eliminated independently of this 
treaty. So that gives you some idea of the enormity of this situation 
which has been passed over and over and over. I think enough is enough.
  Now, of course, Russia has signed the CWC but it has not ratified 
this treaty. Evidence has come to light recently, by the way, 
suggesting that Russia may not pursue ratification of this treaty in 
the near term and does not intend to abide by the CWC even if it 
ratifies it.
  I just want Senators to understand what they are doing. It is all 
very well

[[Page S3609]]

and good to succumb to the imaginative suggestion that we are doing 
something about chemical weapons when we pass this treaty. We are not. 
It is not going to do one bit of good until the United States is able 
to persuade some other people to do things that they have already 
agreed to do. So the danger is how the American people are being misled 
by those who have endorsed this treaty into believing that something is 
being done about chemical weaponry.
  I hope, if we do nothing else in our opposition to this treaty, we 
can make the American people aware that nothing is being done for their 
safety by this treaty. I wish it were different. I wish I did not have 
to stand here and say this. But those are the facts. This treaty is 
absolutely useless in terms of giving the American people any security 
at all.
  According to a May 6, 1996, letter from the DIA, the 
Defense Intelligence Agency, to the chairman of the Senate Select 
Committee on Intelligence:

       There are several factors affecting Russia's actions 
     regarding its CW programs and arms control commitments. 
     Russian officials probably believe they need a CW capability 
     to deter other nations from chemical warfare. They cite a 
     potential threat from purported CW programs in the United 
     States, other Western nations, and several countries on or 
     near Russia's borders.

  Now, the DIA continued:

       In addition, Russian officials believe that dismantling the 
     CW program would waste resources and rob them of valuable 
     production assets. They maintain that the CW production 
     facilities should not be destroyed but be used to produce 
     commercial products.

  Well, la-de-da. Every nation that has some ulterior motives with 
chemical weapons can say the same thing.

       Moreover, these officials do not want to see their life's 
     work destroyed, their jobs eliminated, and their influence 
     diminished.

  And here we are probably going to ratify this treaty in spite of the 
great concern about the views of Russia's senior military leadership on 
the Chemical Weapons Convention and on the elimination of Russia's 
chemical warfare capability in general.
  On numerous instances, the United States has received indications 
that key elements within the Russian Government staunchly oppose the 
CWC. Back in 1994, October 25, Dr. Lev Fyodorov--I never met him, do 
not know how to pronounce his name--head of the Union for Chemical 
Security, told Interfax news service that key officers from the Russian 
Ministry of Defense had spoken against the treaty during the Russian 
Duma defense committee's closed hearings on October 11 1994.
  Now, my concerns about the two Russian generals responsible for 
Russia's chemical warfare elimination program have been well documented 
in a series of letters to President Clinton, and I ask unanimous 
consent that these letters be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                                                      U.S. Senate,


                               Committee on Foreign Relations,

                                 Washington, DC, October 25, 1995.
     The President,
     The White House
     Washington, D.C.
       Dear Mr. President: I take no offense at your declaration 
     to the effect that I am irresponsibly delaying consideration 
     of the Chemical Weapons Convention. Both of us know that this 
     is not so. Moreover, the CWC is a treaty which in my view 
     must not be seriously considered by Congress unless and until 
     the issue of verification can be resolved.
       There is no disagreement that the production stockpiling 
     and use of chemical and biological weapons is inherently 
     abhorrent, and especially by rogue regimes. Yours is the 
     second Administration with which I have raised compelling 
     questions about verification, Russian compliance, Russian 
     binary weapons programs--and the cost of the Chemical Weapons 
     Convention.
       If and when we receive satisfactory answers to these 
     concerns, there would be a substantial increase in the 
     probability of this treaty's being reported out of the 
     Foreign Relations Committee for formal consideration by the 
     Senate.
       I was astounded to learn, as surely you were, that the 
     former Chairman of the [Russian] President's Committee on 
     Conventional Problems of Chemical and Biological Weapons, 
     Lieutenant General Anatoliy Kuntsevich, is now under the 
     house arrest for his having delivered 1,800 pounds of 
     military chemicals to terrorists in the Middle East in 1993. 
     What's more, the Russian intelligence service asserts that 
     General Kuntsevich attempted to sell 5 tons of military 
     chemicals to the same buyers a year later, in 1994. He was 
     caught in the act.
       Needless to say, the arrest of this key Russian negotiator 
     of the Chemical Weapons Convention on trafficking charges--
     for dealing in the very same chemical agents he was 
     supposedly trying to control--calls into question the 
     integrity of every provision of the Chemical Weapons 
     Convention. It certainly lends credibility to concerns about 
     he trustworthiness of Russian declarations regarding its own 
     current chemical and biological programs, its stockpiles, and 
     the sincerity of the Russians' willingness, and ability, to 
     abide by the CWC and other agreements.
       General Kuntsevich's role in chemical weapons dates to the 
     1980s. As Deputy Commander of Soviet Chemical Forces, he was 
     honored as a hero of Socialist Labor in 1981. In 1988, he 
     became a member of the Soviet delegation to the United 
     Nations Conference on Disarmament, which negotiated the CWC. 
     In 1991, he received the Lenin Prize for his work on binary 
     chemical weapons. Through his many years as a negotiator for 
     the Soviet/Russian governments, Kuntsevich won a number of 
     concessions on the Chemical Weapons Convention and follow-on 
     provisions to the Bilateral Destruction Agreement. Moreover, 
     he was responsible for Russia's dubious declarations under 
     the Wyoming Memorandum of Understanding.
       While General Kuntsevich is said to have been removed by 
     President Yeltsin in April 1994, concern remains that the 
     General may have conspired to negotiate significant loopholes 
     in the agreements with the obvious intent of enabling him and 
     others to engage in chemical trafficking with impunity--and 
     possibly to permit Russia to evade its obligations.
       I respectfully request a thorough analysis of the 
     negotiating record of the CWC and the Bilateral Destruction 
     Agreement in order to review the role of General Kuntsevich 
     in securing various provisions and concessions. I regard this 
     analysis to be essential to any credible review.
       Furthermore, I need to know General Kuntsevich's role in 
     the provision of questionable data declarations under the 
     Wyoming Memorandum. Has he been allowed to retain contacts 
     with the Yeltsin government since his removal?
       There are three other questions, Mr. President, that simply 
     must be answered:
       (1) When did the U.S. government learn of General 
     Kuntsevich's role in trafficking chemical weapons and other 
     corrupt practices?
       (2) Were you aware of his activities, and his arrest, while 
     you were urging the Congress to move forward on the 
     ratification of the CWC?
       (3) If General Kuntsevich has been under house arrest since 
     April 1994, what could explain the timing of the Russian 
     government's revelations regarding his activities?
       The Russian government should be urged to accelerate and 
     complete its investigation of General Kuntsevich. I do hope 
     you will obtain from the Russian government a full accounting 
     of precisely what was sold and to whom, and how Russian 
     export controls were circumvented. Additionally, what 
     precautions, if any, have been taken to prevent such future 
     incidents from occurring?
       Obviously, unless and until these concerns and those raised 
     previously have been addressed, it would not be fair to the 
     security and safety of the American people even to consider 
     moving the Chemical Weapons Convention out of Committee.
           Respectfully,
     Jesse Helms.
                                                                    ____

                                                      U.S. Senate,


                               Committee on Foreign Relations,

                                 Washington, DC, October 30, 1995.
       Dear Colleague: I am confident that you were astonished, as 
     I was, that Russia's former chief negotiator for the Chemical 
     Weapons Convention is now under house arrest for trafficking 
     in the very military chemicals he purportedly was seeking to 
     control. Apparently, General Kuntsevich in 1993 sold 1,800 
     pounds of chemical agents to terrorists in the Middle East. 
     He was caught attempting to sell another 5 tons a year later.
       Many of us have consistently raised concerns regarding the 
     verifiability and enforceability of the Chemical Weapons 
     Convention. This most recent incident makes it demonstrable 
     that the CWC, even had it been in effect, would have been 
     helpless to interdict illicit trade in chemicals. (General 
     Kuntsevich is alleged to have transferred chemicals not 
     listed in the chemicals annex of the CWC, and those chemicals 
     went to a country that was not even a signatory to the 
     Convention. He was caught red-handed by traditional, national 
     law enforcement means, not by some global policing 
     mechanism.)
       Furthermore, had General Kuntsevich not been caught, it is 
     conceivable that he and/or his cronies may have worked their 
     way into

[[Page S3610]]

     the administrative body of the CWC, and would then have 
     access to a plethora of information regarding the chemical 
     programs of all signatories, and forewarning of all short-
     notice inspections to be conducted under the Convention.
       The attached letter that I sent to President Clinton 
     underscores my concerns arising from the arrest of General 
     Kuntsevich. Given Kuntsevich's influence over the negotiating 
     process of the CWC, and his responsibility for overseeing the 
     destruction of his own personal empire under the U.S.-Russian 
     Bilateral Destruction Agreement, I have requested a thorough 
     review of the negotiating record of both agreements.
       I bring this new incident to your attention as the Senate 
     continues its discussion of issues surrounding the Chemical 
     Weapons Convention. General Kuntsevich's activities and 
     arrest highlight the many legitimate concerns we all share 
     regarding how best to guard against the threat that chemical 
     weapons pose to our nation's security.
           Respectfully,
     Jesse Helms.
                                                                    ____

                                                      U.S. Senate,


                               Committee on Foreign Relations,

                                    Washington, DC, June 21, 1996.
     The President,
     The White House,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. President: I was gratified to note your 
     Administration's decision to impose sanctions against 
     Lieutenant General Anatoliy Kuntsevich, former Chairman of 
     the [Russian] President's Committee on Conventional Problems 
     of Chemical and Biological Weapons. (I had written to you on 
     October 25, 1995 regarding his having been arrested on 
     charges of selling military chemicals to Middle East 
     terrorists.)
       Disturbing information about General Kuntsevich's 
     activities prompted my concerns about whether the U.S. can 
     believe Russian declarations regarding: (1) its current 
     chemical and biological programs and stockpiles; (2) its 
     willingness to abide by the 1990 U.S.-Russian Bilateral 
     Destruction Agreement (BDA); and (3) its intent to ratify the 
     Chemical Weapons Convention.
       General Kuntsevich was, after all, one of the most senior 
     officers in Russia's chemical weapons program. Indeed, in 
     1994 it was he who signed, in conjunction with Colonel 
     General S.V. Petrov, the U.S.-Russian work plan for the 
     destruction of Russia's chemical weapons.
       At that time, your National Security Advisor assured me 
     that General Kuntsevich was acting independently of the 
     Russian government. I was also told that his actions in no 
     way called into question the willingness of Russia to abide 
     by its commitments to eliminate its stockpile of chemical 
     weapons. However, it subsequently came to my attention that 
     yet another high-ranking Russian general, General Petrov, has 
     openly alluded to the desirability of maintaining a chemical 
     weapons capability. General Petrov, the other signatory to 
     the 1994 Work Plan, expressed his views in the November-
     December 1994 edition of the official Russian Military 
     Journal, Military Thought. Such a belief, stated publicly by 
     a key Russian officer, prompts concern that key elements 
     within the Russian government may not even intend to 
     implement the BDA, ratify the CWC--or abide by either 
     agreement.
       Most troubling to me, however, are rumors that have begun 
     to circulate that Russia no longer favors implementation of 
     the six-year old Bilateral Destruction Agreement. I further 
     understand that Russia will not seek to ratify the Chemical 
     Weapons Convention in the near future, and that the United 
     States has been told to delay its own ratification 
     indefinitely--or risk the possibility that Russia will never 
     ratify the CWC.
       I am concerned that nearly a month has elapsed and the 
     Senate Foreign Relations Committee has yet to be notified of 
     such an ominous change in Russian policy towards the 
     destruction of its chemical arsenal.
       Accordingly, I respectfully request immediate 
     declassification of any documents or cables pertaining to the 
     aforementioned issues, including cable number 607329 
     dispatched from Bonn on May 21, 1996, and their being 
     provided to the Committee. I also respectfully request 
     detailed, and unclassified responses to the following 
     questions:
       (1) Has the intelligence community conducted any assessment 
     identifying Russian officials believed to oppose 
     dismantlement of Russia's chemical weapons stockpile, or who 
     oppose Russian ratification of the CWC? Please declassify 
     these reports provide them to the Committee.
       (2) The Central Intelligence Agency stated in a report in 
     March, 1995, that ``some CW-capable countries that have 
     signed the CWC show no signs of ending their programs.'' Does 
     the intelligence community believe that Russia intends to 
     forgo all aspects of its chemical weapons program?
       (3) Is it the case that Russia has not yet constructed even 
     a pilot chemical weapons destruction facility? Is it also 
     true that the Shchuch'ye Implementation Plan exists only on 
     paper, and that the plan does not yet even include such 
     rudimentary components as baseline data, engineering survey 
     data, or a site feasibility study? How many years will 
     finalization of these critical elements of the Russian 
     destruction program take?
       (4) On June 23, 1994, the then-Director of Central 
     Intelligence, R. James Woolsey, stated that the U.S. had 
     ``serious concerns over apparent incompleteness, 
     inconsistency and contradictory aspects of the data'' 
     provided to the United States by Russia regarding its 
     chemical weapons program. How will Russian withdrawal from 
     the BDA affect U.S. efforts to resolve questions regarding 
     ``contradictions'' in Russia's declarations about its 
     chemical weapons stockpile? Is the Administration prepared to 
     challenge immediately the veracity of Russian reporting under 
     the CWC if Russia provides data which mirrors that provided 
     to the United States under the 1989 Wyoming Memorandum of 
     Understanding?
       (5) Dr. Vil Mirzayanov, former chief of counterintelligence 
     at the State Union Scientific Research Institute for Organic 
     Chemistry and Technology, has alleged that Russia has 
     produced a new class of binary nerve agents five to eight 
     times more lethal than any other known chemical agent, and 
     that work may be continuing on these chemical weapons. Is the 
     Administration satisfied that the Russian Federation has 
     indeed ceased the development and/or production of all 
     offensive chemical weapons agents?
       I will appreciate your assistance in resolving these 
     questions which concern issues which so directly impact on 
     the national security of the United States.
           Respectfully,
     Jesse Helms.
                                                                    ____

                                                      U.S. Senate,


                               Committee on Foreign Relations,

                                    Washington, DC, July 26, 1996.
     The President,
     The White House
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. President: When I wrote to you on June 21 
     regarding perhaps the most significant, ominous shift in 
     Russian arms control policy since the end of the Cold War, I 
     respectfully requested, among other things, information from 
     the Administration concerning reports that Russia will not 
     implement the six-year old U.S.-Russian Bilateral Destruction 
     Agreement (BDA) or pursue ratification of the CWC in the near 
     future.
       Mr. President, since writing to you, my concerns as to 
     whether Russia intends to implement the BDA and ratify the 
     CWC have been confirmed beyond peradventure. To be specific: 
     Russian Prime Minister Chernomyrdin wrote to Vice President 
     Gore on July 8, stating officially that both the BDA and the 
     Wyoming Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) have outlived their 
     usefulness to Russia. Moreover, it has been established that 
     Prime Minister Chernomyrdin (1) linked Russian ratification 
     of the CWC to U.S. agreement to a Joint Statement linking 
     ratification by the United States to Russian ratification, 
     (2) stated that the American taxpayers must pay the cost of 
     the Russian destruction program, and (3) linked ratification 
     to U.S. acquiescence to Russia's position on conversion of 
     its chemical weapons facilities.
       Even more disturbing is the report that the Prime Minister 
     declared that if the CWC enters into force without Russia, it 
     will be impossible for Russia ever to ratify the treaty.
       Mr. President, the Russian Federation appears to anticipate 
     that due to intense U.S. diplomatic lobbying the CWC may 
     enter into force this summer. I am concerned that U.S. 
     efforts at inducing nations to ratify the treaty, and bring 
     it into force before the views of the United States Senate 
     have been expressed on the CWC, have virtually ensured that 
     neither the United States nor Russia will have a hand in 
     finalizing the 37 uncompleted implementation procedures of 
     the treaty. Once 65 countries have ratified, all manner of 
     detailed guidelines affecting the CWC's verification regime, 
     ranging from the conduct of inspections to the safeguarding 
     of samples transferred for analysis off-site, will be 
     finalized rapidly.
       Prime Minister Chernomyrdin's letter was clear: ``Speaking 
     candidly,'' he wrote ``I shall say that the Convention's 
     entry into force without Russia would hamper its ratification 
     with us.'' On July 22, 1996, the Russian delegation in The 
     Hague repeated this position, stating that ``the entry into 
     force of the Convention without Russia, to be perfectly 
     candid, would hamper its ratification in our country.''
       Since Russia is bound to know that the treaty will enter 
     into force without Russia's participation, is it not evident 
     that Russia is preparing a diplomatic exit strategy from the 
     CWC?
       The Senate needs to be informed by the Administration 
     precisely how Russian withdrawal from the BDA and the Wyoming 
     MOU will affect U.S. efforts to resolve questions concerning 
     Russia's various declarations about its chemical weapons 
     stockpile.
       The Director of Central Intelligence, James Woolsey, 
     testified on June 23, 1994, that the U.S. had ``serious 
     concerns over apparent incompleteness, inconsistency and 
     contradictory aspects of the data'' submitted by Russia under 
     the Wyoming MOU.
       So, Mr. President, if Russia is now refusing to answer any 
     more questions about the size of its chemical weapons 
     stockpile or its binary weapons program (which it has failed 
     to mention at all), does this not cast doubt as to whether 
     Russia will ever fully disclose its chemical weapons 
     activities? Is the Administration prepared to challenge 
     immediately the veracity of Russian reporting under the CWC 
     if Russia provides data which mirrors that provided to the 
     United States under the Wyoming MOU?
       Additionally, given that the bilateral inspection regime 
     (under the BDA) was to have substituted for multilateral 
     inspections under the CWC, does Russian withdrawal

[[Page S3611]]

     from the BDA lower the intelligence community's already poor 
     level of confidence in its ability to monitor Russian treaty 
     compliance?
       Mr. President, I respectfully reiterate my request for 
     detailed, and unclassified responses to the questions I asked 
     of you on June 21, 1996. I also will appreciate your 
     providing to the Committee:
       (1) the Chernomyrdin letter of July 8, 1996, which I 
     understand must be unclassified since it was transmitted by 
     facsimile around Washington on unsecured lines;
       (2) all assessments by the intelligence community 
     discussing the views of Prime Minister Chernomyrdin towards 
     the BDA, the CWC, and any assessments as to whether he favors 
     complete elimination of Russia's chemical weapons arsenal;
       (3) the draft Joint Statement and all relevant documents 
     supplied by Russia to Vice President Gore prior to the 
     President's Moscow Summit;
       (4) a detailed assessment of discrepancies in Russia's 
     Wyoming MOU data and the results of any bilateral discussions 
     regarding those discrepancies;
       (5) a detailed assessment by the intelligence community of 
     the impact that non-implementation of the BDA and Wyoming MOU 
     will have upon the U.S. ability to monitor Russian compliance 
     with the CWC;
       (6) a detailed estimate of the additional cost to the 
     United States of implementing the CWC without the BDA in 
     place;
       (7) an estimate of the total cost of destroying Russia's 
     chemical weapons stockpile; and
       (8) all documents relating to any discussions with or 
     assurances made to Russia by the Administration regarding 
     U.S. assistance to the Russian destruction program.
       In closing, Mr. President, I should note for the record 
     that the unanimous consent agreement in the Senate (to 
     proceed to consideration of the CWC on or before September 
     14, 1996) is predicated entirely upon the administration's 
     providing ``such facts and documents as requested by the 
     Chairman and ranking minority member of the Foreign Relations 
     Committee.''
       I hope we can work together on this matter. I will 
     appreciate your assistance in resolving these questions 
     concerning issues which so directly impact on the national 
     security of the United States and the American people.
           Respectfully,
                                                      Jesse Helms.

  Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, we are all aware of how the administration 
has refused, refused to provide the Senate, despite my repeated 
requests, my repeated entreaties to them, to give us an updated 
assessment of the Russian position regarding the BDA and the CWC.
  Russian Prime Minister Chernomyrdin wrote to Vice President Gore on 
July 8, 1996 stating that both the BDA and the 1989 Wyoming memorandum 
of understanding have outlived their usefulness to Russia, don't you 
see. Moreover, the Prime Minister, one, tied Russian ratification of 
this treaty, the CWC, to United States agreement to a joint statement 
linking ratification by the United States to Russian ratification; two, 
stated that the American taxpayers--get this--the American taxpayers 
must pay the cost of the Russian destruction program; and three, he 
linked ratification to United States acquiescence to Russia's position 
on conversion of its chemical weapons facilities. The shift in Russian 
arms control policy, you see, will have important ramifications.
  First, the minimalist approaches taken by Russia in its data 
declaration on the Wyoming memorandum of understanding will go 
unresolved. Russia has stated that the total size of its stockpiled 
chemical weapons is equivalent to 40,000 tons of agent. This 
declaration is absolutely untrue. The Director of Central Intelligence, 
James Woolsey, testified before the Foreign Relations Committee on June 
23, 1994, that the United States had ``serious concerns over apparent 
incompleteness, inconsistency and contradictory aspects of the data'' 
submitted by Russia under the Wyoming MOU. On August 27, 1993, Adm. 
William Studeman, Acting Director of Central Intelligence, wrote to 
Senator Glenn stating:

       We cannot confirm that the Russian declaration of 40,000 mt 
     is accurate. In addition, we cannot confirm that the total 
     stockpile is stored only at the seven sites declared by the 
     Soviets...

Articles in both the Washington Post and the Washington Times alleged 
that the Defense Intelligence Agency has estimated the Soviet stockpile 
could be as large as 75,000 metric tons.
  Omissions in Russia's MOU data declarations have clear implications 
for how Russia will interpret the various provisions of the CWC. 
Because the BDA mandates annual updates to the Wyoming MOU, Russian 
withdrawal from the BDA may also signal that Russia will henceforth 
refuse to entertain any additional United States questions about the 
size of its chemical weapons stockpile or its binary weapons program. 
Senators should be concerned that Russia may intend to provide to the 
OPCW data which mirrors that provided under the Wyoming MOU. This 
would, in this Senator's view, serve as a clear indicator that Russia 
intends to violate the CWC.
  Second, Russia has consistently refused to provide information on the 
status of its binary chemical weapons program. On June 23, 1994, then-
Director of Central Intelligence James Woolsey declared that ``the data 
we have received from Russia makes no reference to binary chemical 
weapons or agents. That is contrary to our understanding of the program 
that was initiated by the former Soviet Union.''
  Dr. Vil Mirzayanov, former chief of counterintelligence at the State 
Union Scientific Research Institute for Organic Chemistry and 
Technology, has stated that the Russian Federation may continue work on 
novel nerve agents far more lethal than any other known chemical 
agents--substance A-230, substance 33, and substance A-232. In an 
article in the Wall Street Journal on May 25, 1994, Dr. Mirzayanov 
wrote:

       It is very easy to produce binary weapons without detection 
     under the guise of agricultural petrochemicals. The products 
     easily pass all safety tests and become registered with the 
     government as legitimate commercial products. The plant 
     receives a license for production and goes into operation. 
     Neither the firm's leaders, its staff, nor international 
     inspectors know that the chemicals are a component of a new 
     binary weapon.
       As the public talks toward banning chemical weapons 
     progressed, the more intense became Russia's secret 
     development and testing of binary weapons... our laboratories 
     created Substance A-230, a weapon about which I can only say 
     that its killing efficiency surpassed any known military 
     toxin by a factor of five to eight.
       ...Two more major achievements took place in 1990 and 1991. 
     First, a binary weapon based on a compound code-named 
     Substance 33 passed site tests and was put into production 
     for the Soviet army.
       ...The second development was the synthesis of a binary 
     weapon based on Substance A-232, a toxin similar to A-230. 
     This new weapon, part of the ultra-lethal ``Novichok'' class, 
     provides an opportunity for the military establishment to 
     disguise production of components of binary weapons as common 
     agricultural chemicals; because the West does not know the 
     formula, and its inspectors cannot identify the compounds.
       ...Fifteen thousand tons of Substance 33 have been produced 
     in the city of Novocheborksarsk... But our generals have told 
     the U.S. that Novocheborksarsk is turning out another 
     substance known as VX.

  Dr. Mirzayanov and other dissident Russian scientists have claimed 
that Russia's binary weapons program has been specifically crafted to 
evade detection under the verification regime of the CWC. They allege 
that components for the binary agents have been given legitimate 
commercial applications, that they are not covered under the CWC's 
schedules, and that OPCW inspectors will not know what they are 
examining when they come across such chemicals. The United States 
should not ratify the CWC until Russia agrees to forgo this abhorrent 
program.
  Third, the BDA provides for United States on-site inspections of 
Russian storage, destruction and production facilities, combined with 
data declarations. The United States can expect to gain real monitoring 
benefits from the CWC only if the Bilateral Destruction Agreement [BDA] 
is implemented. This agreement provides for United States on-site 
inspections of Russian storage, destruction and production facilities. 
Without the BDA, the United States will be forced to verify Russian CWC 
compliance based upon a smaller number of inspections than anticipated 
under the bilateral arrangement, with inspections of Russian sites by 
the OPCW rather than by United States personnel, and with no guaranteed 
United States access to detailed inspection data. In other words, the 
intelligence community's already poor confidence level in its ability 
to monitor Russian treaty compliance will fall even lower.
  Fourth, Russian insistence on excluding several of its chemical 
weapons-related facilities from the BDA's definition of ``chemical 
weapons production facility,'' and hence from the CWC's definition, 
relates directly to its desire to maintain a clandestine chemical 
weapons production capability. The

[[Page S3612]]

United States refusal to accede to the Russian position, which would 
have--in turn--strengthened the Russian case for facility conversions 
under the CWC, may be a primary reason that Russia has refused to 
implement the BDA. We should not, under any circumstance, allow Russia 
to exclude its chemical weapons facilities from inspection.
  Moreover, without the bilateral agreement the OPCW will increase the 
size of its international inspectorate and purchase of additional 
equipment. This will drive up vastly the expected costs of the regime. 
Further, the CWC requires States Parties to pay for monitoring of their 
chemical weapons production, storage, and disposal facilities.
  Mr. President, I guess we ought to respond once more--it is an 
exercise in futility, but we ought to keep responding to that old 
litany that we have heard this day about making the United States 
ratification of the CWC contingent upon Russia's acting first.
  Let us look at a little bit of history. This Senate approved the 
START II treaty amidst a clamor of claims by the administration that a 
failure to act was preventing Russian approval of that treaty. Does 
anybody hear anything familiar about that? More than 15 months have 
passed and the Russian Duma still has not approved START II. Instead, 
the Russian leadership rendered ratification of the START II treaty 
contingent upon United States acquiescence to Russian interpretation 
of, get this, the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and now the 
Chemical Weapons Convention is being tied to NATO enlargement and other 
issues.
  Mr. President, surely, surely, Senators will not fail to refuse such 
linkages, and the best way to do it is to require, to stipulate 
unmistakably that Russia must act in good faith and ratify the Chemical 
Weapons Convention first. Indeed, in his letter to Vice President Gore, 
the Prime Minister of Russia stated that the United States should wait 
for Russia.
  I urge Senators to reject that motion to strike.
  I yield the floor. I do not know who has been waiting the longest.
  Mr. WARNER. I think the Senator from Oklahoma, Mr. President, has 
been waiting longer than I. I will follow him.
  Mr. HELMS. I did not see anybody over here.
  Mr. LEVIN. Senator Warner is going to get part of our time.
  Mr. INHOFE. I think Senator Warner should go ahead since we are going 
back and forth across the aisle.
  Mr. LEVIN. I yield 5 minutes to Senator Warner.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan yields to the 
Senator from Virginia.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I was asked by a reporter my view of the 
distinguished majority leader's role in this very important debate, and 
I replied, without hesitation, that the tougher the issue, the closer 
the division within the ranks of the Senate and most particularly 
within our party, the tougher the leadership challenge. I am proud to 
join others in saying our leader has met that challenge.
  Likewise, my distinguished colleague and friend from day one in the 
Senate, the senior Senator from North Carolina, together with Senators 
Kyl and Smith and Inhofe, have met the challenge. They have ensured 
that the Senate has conducted a full and thorough debate on this 
treaty, and they have been instrumental in achieving the 28 conditions 
which have been adopted by the Senate. Those conditions have improved 
the document which the President submitted to the Senate in 1993.
  There is a clear division within the ranks of Republicans on this 
issue, and it has been a conscientious and thoughtful process by which 
each has reached his or her position.
  Now, Mr. President, to go to the subject itself. I will not go into 
the details of this treaty. I would like to speak to the broader issue.
  I first learned of chemical weapons at the knee of my father who was 
a surgeon in the trenches in World War I. He described to me in vivid 
detail how he cared for the helpless victims of that weapon.
  On through my years on the Armed Services Committee, where I was the 
point man in the 1980's to drive through the legislation for binary 
chemical weapons because I wanted this country to be prepared to deter 
the use of those weapons. And, then, through the Reagan-Bush era, our 
Nation has come full circle, and decided to lead in the effort to 
eliminate these weapons. Whether that can be done I know not, nor does 
anyone. But we cannot turn back now from that leadership role.

  This treaty does not meet my full expectations. But I think we can 
fight better in the arena, in the ring, to improve this treaty than 
were we to stay outside and peer over the ropes. It is for that reason 
that I shall cast my final vote in support of this convention.
  I recall the ABM Treaty. I was in Moscow as a part of President 
Nixon's team, as Secretary of the Navy. The drafters of that treaty put 
their minds to dealing with the threat at that period of time. They 
never envisioned, nor could they envision, a decade or two decades 
hence, what the scientific community might produce. Therein we have 
made a mistake as a nation by not adapting that treaty over time to 
deal with technological developments. I shall continue to fight very 
vigorously to see that that treaty does not become written in stone so 
as to block the efforts of our Nation to properly defend itself against 
attack from short-range missiles.
  I cite that as an example, because technology is outpacing what the 
best minds in this Nation can draft--whether it is a treaty or a law. 
We have to look upon this treaty--as we should look upon all treaties--
as a living document, a document that must be changed by the 
conscientious efforts of the signatories to this treaty. It must be 
changed to meet the advancements of technology in the area of chemical 
weapons; it must be changed to address the concerns that have been 
raised during this debate.
  Like our Constitution--a document that has lived and survived so that 
we, the United States, are the oldest continuously functioning form of 
democratic republic on Earth--this convention must be a living 
document. Our Constitution has been amended. It shall be amended, 
perhaps, in the future. Because it is a living document. It has adapted 
to the many changes we have witnessed as a nation.
  This treaty must be regarded as a living document and it is incumbent 
upon this President and his successors thereafter to work 
conscientiously, within the arena, to see that it is strengthened.
  The work in this debate has gone far to show that it is a living 
document. Under the leadership of Senator Helms and Senator Lott we 
have already brought about a number of changes. The Senate may effect 
further changes as the evening progresses. But the important thing we 
must keep in mind is that this document must be regarded as one that 
has to be improved. And it is the leadership of the United States that 
must step forward to achieve that goal.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Bennett). The Senator from North Carolina.
  Mr. HELMS. May I ask the distinguished Senator from Oklahoma how much 
time he believes he will need?
  Mr. INHOFE. May I have 6 minutes?
  Mr. HELMS. I yield 7 minutes to the Senator.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Carolina has 5 minutes 
remaining on the amendment.
  The Senator is recognized for the remainder of the time.
  Mr. INHOFE. I inquire of the Senator from North Carolina if he has 
other Senators requesting time?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Carolina has 5 minutes 
remaining.
  Mr. HELMS. Yes. I think I have some time over in one corner.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has time on the resolution, if he 
wishes. There are 5 minutes remaining on the motion.
  Mr. HELMS. I understand that. I have 5 minutes. Then he would like 2 
minutes. So take it out of the other pot.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oklahoma is recognized for up 
to 2--up to 7 minutes.
  Mr. INHOFE. Are you sure that's right?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Yes.

[[Page S3613]]

  Mr. INHOFE. I thank the Senator from North Carolina. I do want to 
address this particular amendment. Before I do, I have three articles, 
and I ask unanimous consent to have them printed in the Record after my 
remarks.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  (See exhibit 1.)
  Mr. INHOFE. The first one is a Wall Street Journal editorial of 
September 9, 1996. I will just read the last paragraph.

       Ultimately the treaty's most pernicious effect is that it 
     would lull most responsible nations into the false belief 
     that they'd ``done something'' about the chemical weapons 
     problem and that it now was behind them. Yes, the world would 
     be a better place without chemical weapons. But this treaty's 
     attempt to wave them away isn't going to make that happen.

  The other two, one by Frank Gaffney, Jr. and the other by Douglas 
Feith, address the regulation problems that would come from this to 
literally thousands of companies throughout America. In fact, the 
Commerce Department guidance on recordkeeping for affected businesses 
runs more than 50 pages.
  Mr. President, you have run companies. You know one of the major 
reasons we are not globally competitive here in the United States is 
that we are overregulated. There is a tremendous cost to these 
regulations. If the requirements exceed 50 pages, imagine what the 
companies would have to do.
  Mr. President, in a way I think the other side of this has perhaps 
used the wrong argument. There is an argument they are overlooking, and 
that is it does not seem to make a lot of difference whether Russia 
ratifies this or not because, as we have said several times during the 
course of this debate, they ratified a lot of treaties, including the 
1990 Biological Weapons Destruction treaty, the ABM Treaty--that goes 
all the way back to the 1970's--the START I, CFE, INF. And while they 
have ratified these, they have not complied.
  There are three steps you go through. One is you have to sign them. 
Second, you ratify them. But, third, you have to comply. And they have 
been found out of compliance. I cannot imagine why we would expect that 
they would comply with this one if they ratified it if they have not 
complied with the previous ones.
  The distinguished Senator from Michigan quoted, somewhat extensively, 
Gen. John Shalikashvili, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as 
saying that this would have the effect of reducing the proliferation of 
chemical weapons.
  I would only say, trying not to be redundant, if that is the case, 
then you are taking his word over four previous Secretaries of Defense: 
Dick Cheney, James Schlesinger, Don Rumsfeld, and Cap Weinberger, all 
four of whom said this would have the effect of increasing the 
proliferation of chemical weapons and their use in the Middle East.
  But, one of the statements that was made by the distinguished Senator 
from Michigan I thought was interesting. He said, if I got it right, 
and correct me if I am wrong: ``The single most important reason to 
ratify the treaty is to encourage Russia to ratify it.'' Again, if they 
do, it really does not seem to make that much difference because of 
their past history on what they have done.
  I would like to clear up something because I think we have gone 
through a lot of debate on this issue. It has been clearly implied by 
both Republicans who are supporting the ratification of the Chemical 
Weapons Convention as well as Democrats who are supporting it that this 
was started in the Reagan administration and that Ronald Reagan was in 
support of a chemical weapons treaty.
  I happened to run across something here that I am going to read. 
These are the conditions--I am going to save the best one until last--
the conditions under which Ronald Reagan said he would agree to the 
ratification of a chemical weapons convention.
  First, the condition was that strategic defense initiative and 
theater missile defense systems would be deployed and operational as 
one safeguard against cheating.

  As we know, currently we do not have those in place.
  No. 2, that the Chemical Weapon Convention's international executive 
council would consist of 15 members, including the United States as one 
of the five permanent members, just like the U.N. Security Council. The 
current treaty gives us a 41-member executive council, each with 2-year 
terms, and no permanent members; hence, no veto.
  Third, that the United States would have absolute veto power over all 
CWC decisions. Obviously, in this one there is no veto power. 
Obviously, the President would not have supported this.
  President Reagan also, even though it is not on my list, verbally 
indicated on more than one occasion that one of his conditions would be 
that we would not have to incur the financial responsibility, in the 
United States, of other countries complying with it. In fact, right now 
our compliance costs on this convention appear to be, according to the 
Foreign Relations Committee report, $13.6 billion and the cost of 
Russia complying with this would exceed that.
  It has been stated on this floor many times that Russia has somewhere 
between 60 and 70 percent of all the chemical weapons in the world, so, 
obviously it would be more than that. What is Russia going to do? Are 
they going to comply? Let us say they go ahead and ratify. If they 
ratify it, you know, everyone in this Chamber knows, that they are 
going to look to the United States to pay for their obligation under 
the treaty. That is what they are doing on START II. In fact, I have to 
go back and make that statement also, that we are hearing this same 
argument all over again right now that we heard 2 years ago. Mr. 
President, 2 years ago we stood in this Chamber and they said: If we 
don't ratify this, Russia won't ratify it. Here it is 2 years later and 
Russia has not ratified it.
  So I think this is a very significant requirement, the fact that 
Ronald Reagan said--and this is a direct quote, coming out of his 
committee at the time--for ratification, ``All Soviet obligations of 
previous arms control agreements would have to be corrected.'' And we 
have five such agreements that have not been corrected to date.
  So, I hope no one stands on the floor the rest of the evening and 
talks about how Ronald Reagan would have ratified this Chemical Weapons 
Convention.

                               Exhibit 7

             [From the Wall Street Journal, Sept. 9, 1996]

                           Poisons for Peace

       The greatest misperception about the Chemical Weapons 
     Convention, which comes before the Senate this week for 
     ratification, is that it can't do any harm and might do some 
     good. Former Reagan defense official Fred Ekle aptly calls 
     this mind-set ``poisons for peace.'' Who could possibly be 
     against making the world safe from the horrors of poison gas? 
     In fact, this treaty would make the horrors of poison gas an 
     even greater possibility.
       The first problem is that many of the nations we have cause 
     to worry about most aren't about to sign. What good is a 
     treaty that doesn't include Iraq or Libya or Syria or North 
     Korea? Somehow knowing that New Zealand and the Netherlands 
     have both ratified it doesn't help us sleep more soundly.
       Worse, the treaty would give all signatories access to our 
     latest chemical technology, since Article XI enjoins 
     signatories from keeping chemicals, information or equipment 
     from one another. This means not only countries such as China 
     and Russia, but also Cuba and Iran, which have both signed. 
     In other words, forget about the trade embargoes and forget 
     about foreign policy. The treaty would require the U.S. to 
     facilitate the modernization of the chemical-weapons industry 
     in a host of countries that just might use them.
       The second problem is verification. No one, not even its 
     most ardent supporters in the Administration, is naive enough 
     to claim that the treaty is verifiable. Chemical weapons are 
     easy to make and easy to hide. The sarin that was used in the 
     attack in the Tokyo subway last year was concocted in an 812 
     room. Instituting snap inspections of companies that make or 
     use chemicals isn't going to stop a future Aum Shinri Kyo. 
     Nor is it going to stop a determined government.
       In addition, the inspection and reporting procedures 
     required under the treaty would be a huge burden on American 
     business, which of course would become even more nervous 
     about industrial espionage. Senator  Jon Kyl estimates that 
     up to 10,000 American companies would be affected at a 
     cost approaching $1 billion a year. Every company that 
     uses or produces chemicals would fall under the long arm 
     of the treaty--companies like Pfizer and Quaker Oats and 
     Strohs Brewery and Maxwell House Coffee and Goodyear Tire. 
     Dial Corp., which uses 5,000 different chemicals to 
     produce an array of household products, estimates that it 
     will have to spend $70,000 a year to meet the treaty's 
     reporting requirements.
       The small number of chemical companies that make the lethal 
     stuff would of course be covered, too, and much has been made 
     of the

[[Page S3614]]

     treaty's endorsement by the Chemical Manufacturers 
     Association, which represents just 190 member companies and 
     had a hand in formulating the treaty's verification 
     procedures. The industry is already very heavily regulated, 
     and the treaty's inspection and reporting requirements 
     wouldn't be much of an additional burden. It also can't hurt 
     that the treaty would increase its members' trading and sales 
     opportunities thanks to Article XI.
       The list of problems with the treaty goes on and on. 
     Constitutional scholar Robert Bork raises the possibility 
     that the verification requirements might violate the 
     Constitution's ban on search and seizure, and its property 
     rights guarantees. The Pentagon isn't happy with it since, 
     under the Clinton Administration's interpretation, it would 
     prohibit the military from using non-lethal chemical agents. 
     It's not hard to imagine a scenario in which the Army is 
     forced to shoot people because it's not permitted to use tear 
     gas.
       Ultimately the treaty's most pernicious effect is that it 
     would lull responsible nations into a false belief that 
     they'd ``done something'' about the chemical weapons problem 
     and that it now was behind them. Yes, the world would be a 
     better place without chemical weapons. But this treaty's 
     attempt to wave them away isn't going to make that happen.
                                                                    ____


               [From the Washington Times, Sept. 4, 1996]

                          Impending CWC Debate

                        (By Frank Gaffney, Jr.)

       There is a certain irony to the timing of the looming 
     Senate debate on the Chemical Weapons Convention. After all, 
     in a sense this treaty was the direct result of one of Saddam 
     Hussein's earlier genocidal operations against the Kurds of 
     Northern Iraq. It came about after the abysmal 1989 
     conference in Paris where scores of nations could not being 
     themselves even to cite--let along condemn or sanction--the 
     Iraqi government for its use of chemical weapons against its 
     own people, let alone the Iranian military. Such attacks 
     directly violated the existing ``international norm'' on 
     chemical warfare: the 1925 Geneva Protocol banning the use of 
     chemical weapons.
       In a bid to deflect criticism for the international 
     community's failure to enforce one relatively verifiable arms 
     control treaty, the politicians and diplomats decided to 
     negotiate a new, utterly unverifiable agreement. After four 
     years of further negotiations in Geneva, a brand new 
     ``international norm'' against chemical warfare was minted: 
     the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).
       Now, readers of this column learned last week that, quite 
     apart from the problems with this treaty from the standpoint 
     of its verifiability and enforceability, there are a number 
     of questions that have been posed about how the CWC has been 
     affected by Russian bad faith and other changed circumstances 
     since the United States signed up in 1993. Such questions 
     were supposed to have been answered before the Senate 
     considered this accord on or before Sept. 14. As the answers 
     are inconvenient (for instance, confirmation that Moscow is 
     welching on a 1990 Bilateral Destruction Agreement and 
     demanding that the West pay the estimated $3.3 billion it 
     will take Russia to dismantle its vast chemical arsenal), it 
     has employed its favorite tactic with regard to congressional 
     information requests: Stonewall.
       Since that column was written, however, the 
     administration's machinations on behalf of the Chemical 
     Weapons Convention have, as Alice said of Wonderland, become 
     ``curiouser and curiouser.'' This is particularly evident in 
     the Clinton teams's efforts to dissemble about what the CWC 
     won't do--and what it will.
       For example, the administration convened a series of 
     briefings for Senate staffers over the August recess. In 
     these lopsided sessions, a gaggle of 15 or more executive 
     branch officials harangued three of four folks from Capitol 
     Hill, in some cases for hours on end. Unfortunately, the 
     briefers repeatedly misled the staffers--notably with respect 
     to the costs of the CWC to American taxpayers and to 
     thousands of American companies. Among other things, the 
     administration is significantly low-balling the U.S. portion 
     of the expenses associated the new U.N.-style international 
     bureaucracy created to gather data and conduct inspections. 
     Clinton officials have also minimized the likely loss of 
     proprietary data when a company's sensitive facility is 
     gone over for up to 84 hours by inspectors who will be, 
     likely as not, detailed from foreign commercial espionage 
     organizations.
       Incredibly, even some of the companies at greatest risk 
     appear to be susceptible to the administration's 
     disinformation on this score. Take, for example, an Aug. 7 
     letter to Sen. Richard Lugar from the Pharmaceutical Research 
     and Manufacturers of America (PhARMA), a trade association 
     for some of the nation's most cutting-edge biotech firms. 
     Clinton officials reportedly induced PhARMA's president to 
     tell the treaty's top Senate cheerleader that it supported 
     the CWC with the promise that the administration would not 
     allow the CWC's verification protocol to be extended to the 
     existing (and similarly unmonitorable) Biological Weapons 
     Convention.
       PhARMA's members clearly understand an important reality: 
     If, under the biological weapons treaty, America's 
     pharmaceutical manufacturers were subjected to a reporting 
     and inspection regime similar to that of the CWC, they could 
     lose their shirts. After all, on average these companies 
     invest 12 years and some $350 million to produce a new 
     breakthrough drug. Trial inspections suggest that a single 
     on-site, inspection by a trained intelligence operative could 
     greatly reduce, if not wipe out, the competitive advantage 
     acquired at such a high price.
       The only problem with PhARMA's stance is, that many of its 
     member companies will find themselves subjected to precisely 
     that danger under the terms of CWC. So might a great many 
     other companies having nothing to do with chemical weapons 
     and in industries as diverse as automotive, food processing, 
     electronics, alcohol distilling and brewing, oil refining, 
     soap and detergents, cosmetics, textiles and paint and tire 
     manufacturers. Among the companies listed on a recent Arms 
     Control and Disarmament Agency list of businesses ``likely'' 
     to be affected by the CWC's various requirements are: Eli 
     Lilly, Sherwin-Williams, Nutrasweet, Jim Beam, Archer Daniels 
     Midland, Lever Brothers, Kaiser Aluminum, Goodyear Tire and 
     Rubber, Xerox Raythoen and Conoco. If the trade associations 
     representing these major American businesses are operating 
     under illusions similar to PhARMA's their member companies 
     may wish to join the call for a ``time-out'' on Senate action 
     on the CWC.
       Some senators may be tempted to ignore the administration's 
     stonewalling of legitimate and troubling questions relevant 
     to the CWC that have been posed by their own leadership. Some 
     may consider the administration's understanding of the 
     treaty's associated costs and its inflating of the claims 
     benefits to be business as usual for the Clinton team. It is, 
     however, very much to be hoped that at least 34 members of 
     the U.S. Senate will refuse to tolerate such behavior and, 
     insist that consideration of the Chemical Weapons Convention 
     be postponed until corrective action can be taken and, 
     failing that, that the convention be defeated outright.
                                                                    ____


           [From the San Diego Union-Tribune, Sept. 8, 1996]

``Open up in the Name of the . . . Organization for the Prohibition of 
                          Chemical Weapons?''

                         (By Douglas J. Feith)

       The Chemical Weapons Convention would be the first arms 
     control agreement to reach into the lives of non-military 
     U.S. businesses and impose costs and regulatory burdens.
       It would oblige the government to adopt implementing 
     legislation to compel a wide range of American businesses--
     including tire, paint, pharmaceutical, fertilizer and 
     electronics manufacturers, distillers, food processors and 
     oil refiners--to keep special records. (The Commerce 
     Department guidance on record-keeping for affected businesses 
     runs more than 50 pages.)
       Affected businesses would be forced to submit to routine 
     and possibly ``challenge'' inspections by officials of an 
     international organization--the Organization for the 
     Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. The warrantless inspections, 
     which may run afoul of U.S. constitutional rights under the 
     Fourth and Fifth Amendments, could jeopardize important 
     private proprietary information.
       The regulatory cost is just one of a number of flaws. In 
     the final analysis, what the CWC amounts to is a general 
     declaration, a statement of disapproval of chemical weapons 
     that would be made sincerely only by the world's law-abiding 
     nations. The treaty would accomplish little more than the 
     typical United Nations General Assembly resolution. Such 
     rhetorical exercises are not necessarily bad or useless, but 
     they do not amount to a whole lot.
       We would favor paying a substantial price for a ban on 
     chemical weapon possession if such a ban covered the relevant 
     countries and it could be made effective through reliable 
     detection of illegal production and stockpiling. But such 
     results hardly seem likely. We tend to think of the Chemical 
     Weapons Convention this way: Even a price you may be willing 
     to pay for a new car will appear ridiculously high if you 
     learn that the car cannot be made to drive.

  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I yield 2 minutes to the Senator from 
Massachusetts.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts.
  Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I strongly support this treaty, and I 
strongly urge the Senate to ratify it.
  In a sense, this debate is as old as America. Two centuries ago, with 
our independence newly won, the Founding Fathers urged us to beware of 
``entangling foreign alliances.'' They wrote into the Constitution a 
requirement that any treaty with foreign nations must be confirmed by a 
two-thirds vote of the Senate.
  By any rational standard, this treaty meets that test.
  Nevertheless, the treaty is being opposed by an entrenched band of 
foreign policy ideologues and isolationists who think the United 
Nations is the enemy and who say the arms race should be escalated, not 
restricted. History proved their ilk wrong once before, when they sank 
the League of Nations in the 1920's. And it will prove them wrong again 
with far more drastic consequences than World War II, if they prevail 
today.
  We cannot let that happen. The Senate should reject the remaining 
killer

[[Page S3615]]

amendments, and give this treaty the two-thirds vote it needs and 
deserves.
  The 29-year-old pursuit of a chemical weapons treaty has finally 
reached its moment of truth in the U.S. Senate. Few votes cast in this 
Congress or any Congress are likely to be more important.
  The effort to achieve this treaty was launched in 1968, and its 
history is genuinely bipartisan. It has moved forward under Republican 
and Democratic Presidents alike. In 1968, the final year of the Johnson 
administration, international negotiations began in Geneva to build on 
the 1925 Geneva Protocol and try to reduce the production of chemical 
weapons.
  In the 1970's, President Gerald Ford had the vision to take that 
initiative a major step forward during intense international 
negotiations.
  President Ronald Reagan advanced it to the next stage with his 
efforts on arms control in the 1980's. And President Bush deserves high 
praise for embracing the ideal of eliminating chemical weapons, for 
making it a serious worldwide effort, and at long last bringing it to 
the stage where it was ready to be signed. In one of his last acts in 
office, George Bush signed the treaty, on January 13, 1993.
  President Clinton formally submitted the Chemical Weapons Convention 
to the Senate for its advice and consent later that year. Now, it's our 
turn. Today, the Senate can and should join in this historic endeavor 
to rid the world of chemical weapons. We can bestow a precious gift on 
generations to come by freeing the world of an entire class of weapons 
of mass destruction.
  The chemical weapons treaty bans the development, production, 
stockpiling, and use of toxic chemicals as weapons. Previous agreements 
have merely limited weapons of mass destruction. But the Chemical 
Weapons Convention sets out to eliminate them from the face of the 
earth.
  The United States has already taken many steps unilaterally to 
implement a ban of our own. As long ago as 1968, this country ordered a 
moratorium on chemical weapons production.
  When President Bush signed the treaty on behalf of the United States, 
he also ordered the unilateral destruction of the U.S. stockpile of 
these weapons. Regardless of the treaty, the United States is 
destroying its chemical weapon stockpile.
  Today culminates many years of work and compromise. The Senate has 
held 17 hearings on the convention. Every issue has been exhaustively 
analyzed. The result is the shoot-out that the leadership has arranged 
today on this series of killer amendments.
  Bipartisan negotiations have achieved agreement on 28 amendments to 
the treaty, none of which go to the heart of the treaty and many of 
which help to clarify it.
  But five major issues have not yet been settled. The five amendments, 
on which we are voting today, seek to settle differences of opinion the 
wrong way. They are killer amendments. I hope the Senate will note 
``no'' on all of them. If any of them passes, it will doom our 
participation in the treaty, and relegate us to the company of outlaw 
regimes like North Korea and Libya, who also reject the treaty.
  Two of the killer amendments condition our participation on whether 
other nations--Russia, Iran, Iraq, Syria, and China--have already 
become participants. Essentially, they would hand over U.S. security 
decisions to those nations.
  A third killer amendment arbitrarily excludes all representatives 
from certain other countries from participating in verification 
inspections. This amendment ignores the ability that the treaty already 
gives us to reject any inspectors we believe are not trustworthy.
  A fourth killer amendment omits and alters other key parts of the 
treaty that deal with the export of certain materials. Its proponents 
fear that rogue nations may gain valuable technology from us.
  Nothing in the convention requires the United States to weaken its 
export controls. Experts in the chemical industry, trade organizations, 
and government officials have worked to ensure that nothing in the 
treaty threatens our technology and industrial power.
  The fifth killer amendment places an unrealistically high standard of 
verification on the treaty. It requires the treaty verification 
procedures to accomplish the impossible, by being able to detect small, 
not militarily significant, amounts of dangerous chemical meterials.
  No international agreement can effectively police small amounts of 
raw materials that might possibly be used in chemical weapons 
production. Every effort is being made and will be made to make the 
detection procedures as effective as possible. It is hypocritical for 
opponents to attempt to scuttle this treaty because they feel it does 
not go far enough.
  The overwhelming majority of past and present foreign policy 
officials, military leaders, large and small businesses, Fortune 500 
companies, Nobel laureates, veterans organizations, religious groups, 
environmentalists and public interest groups are united in their strong 
support of the convention. It is a practical international agreement 
with practical benefits for the United States, and the United States 
should be a part of it.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, how much time do I have on this amendment?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware has 5 minutes 45 
seconds.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, unless there is someone in opposition, I 
yield as much time of the remaining time that my colleague from 
Pennsylvania would like to the Senator from Pennsylvania, Senator 
Specter.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Pennsylvania is recognized.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I would like to reserve 30 seconds of 
whatever my time is.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Pennsylvania is recognized 
for 5 minutes.
  Mr. SPECTER. I thank my colleague from Delaware for yielding the 
time.
  Mr. President, on the pending issue, having studied the conditions as 
to what is sought here by way of preliminary action by Russia before 
ratification should occur by the United States, it is my strong view 
that we really ought not to play Gaston and Alphonse with the Russians 
to require them, as article C does, for Russia to deposit their 
ratification before the United States ratifies.
  I think that that sets up a condition which is just not reasonable. 
If they took the same position, as Alphonse and Gaston, no one would 
ever enter the door.
  With respect to the other conditions which are set forth here, all of 
the substantive matters would be superseded by the Chemical Weapons 
Convention, that the requirements set forth in this treaty would impose 
more obligations on Russia than are contained in these instruments.
  And under instrument A, where it is talked about, an agreement 
between the United States and Russia, that was never formalized into an 
agreement because all terms were never agreed to by the parties, so 
that this is not a condition which adds any measure of safety to the 
United States since all of the requirements imposed on Russia in these 
collateral arrangements would be superseded and more stringent 
requirements would be added by the Chemical Weapons Convention.
  Mr. President, I compliment my colleagues on both sides for what I 
believe has been a very, very constructive debate in the highest 
tradition of the U.S. Senate. I compliment the distinguished chairman 
of this committee, Senator Helms, for his determination.
  And it is noted that some 28 of the 33 conditions have been agreed 
to. Even beyond those conditions, the President today, in writing to 
the distinguished majority leader, has articulated further safeguards 
which would be present so that in sum total we have an agreement which, 
while not perfect, advances the interest of arms control.
  In my capacity as the chairman of the Senate Veterans Committee, I 
have chaired hearings on the issue of the gulf war syndrome where there 
is evidence that our veterans in the gulf were damaged by chemical 
substances, not conclusively, but that is the indication, and that had 
such a treaty been in effect, again, not conclusive, but a strong 
indication, that our troops might have been saved to some extent.
  And certainly if we intend to take a firm stand on a moral plane, the 
United States has to be a part of this covenant to try to reduce 
chemical weapons. And this treaty goes a substantial way.

[[Page S3616]]

  And the search and seizure provisions are adequate to protect 
constitutional rights, a field I have had substantial experience with 
as a district attorney, so that there will have to be a criminal 
standard of probable cause.
  Taken as a whole, with the additions by the President today--even 
though it had been made a part of the Record, I ask unanimous consent 
that, following my comments, the President's letter to Senator Lott be 
printed in the Record.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  (See exhibit 1.)
  Mr. SPECTER. All factors considered, this is a treaty which ought to 
receive Senate ratification.

                               Exhibit 1


                                              The White House,

                                       Washington, April 24, 1997.
     Hon. Trent Lott,
     Majority Leader, U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Leader: During Senate ratification proceedings on 
     the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), concerns have been 
     raised over Article X, which provides for certain types of 
     defensive assistance in the event that a State that has 
     joined the treaty and renounced any chemical weapons (CW) 
     capability is threatened with or suffers a chemical weapons 
     attack, and Article XI, which encourages free trade in non-
     prohibited chemicals among states that adhere to the CWC. 
     Some have suggested that these Articles could result in the 
     CWC promoting, rather than stemming, CW proliferation despite 
     States Parties' general obligation under Article I ``never 
     under any circumstances . . . to assist, encourage or induce, 
     in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a 
     State Party under this Convention.''
       To respond to these concerns, the Administration has worked 
     closely with the Senate to develop conditions relating to 
     both Articles that have now been incorporated in the 
     resolution of ratification (Agreed Conditions #7 and 15). 
     These two conditions would substantially reinforce and 
     strengthen the treaty by:
       Prohibiting the United States under Article X from (a) 
     providing the CWC organization with funds that could be used 
     for chemical weapons defense assistance to other States 
     Parties; and (b) giving certain states that might join the 
     treaty any assistance other than medical antidotes and 
     treatment.
       Requiring the President to (a) certify that the CWC will 
     not weaken the export controls established by the Australia 
     Group and that each member of the Group intends to maintain 
     such controls; (b) block any attempt within the Group to 
     adopt a contrary position; and (c) report annually as to 
     whether Australia Group controls remain effective.
       With respect to the latter condition, I am pleased to 
     inform you that we have now received official confirmations 
     from the highest diplomatic levels in each of the 30 
     Australia Group nations that they agree that the Group's 
     export control and nonproliferation measures are compatible 
     with the CWC and that they are committed to maintain such 
     controls in the future.
       While supporting these guarantees and safeguards, you 
     expressed the concern on Sunday that nations might still try 
     to use Article X or XI to take proscribed actions that could 
     undercut U.S. national security interests, notwithstanding 
     the best efforts of U.S. diplomacy to prevent such actions. I 
     am, therefore, prepared to provide the following specific 
     assurance related to these two Articles:
       In the event that a State Party or States Parties to the 
     Convention act contrary to the obligations under Article I 
     by:
       (A) using Article X to justify providing defensive CW 
     equipment, material or information to another State Party 
     that could result in U.S. chemical protective equipment being 
     compromised so that U.S. warfighting capabilities in a CW 
     environment are significantly degraded;
       (B) using Article XI to justify chemical transfers that 
     would make it impossible for me to make the annual 
     certification that the Australia Group remains a viable and 
     effective mechanism for controlling CW proliferation; or
       (C) carrying out transfers or exchanges under either 
     Article X or XI which jeopardize U.S. national security by 
     promoting CW proliferation:
       I would, consistent with Article XVI of the CWC, regard 
     such actions as extraordinary events that have jeopardized 
     the supreme interests of the United States and therefore, in 
     consultation with the Congress, be prepared to withdraw from 
     the treaty.
           Sincerely,
                                                     Bill Clinton.

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware has 1 minute 
remaining.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, let me just take the minute to say the 
following: If you do not like this treaty and you are not for it, vote 
against it. If you think this treaty makes sense, vote for my 
amendment, because if this treaty contains this provision, it is dead. 
This is a so-called killer amendment.
  So those of you who have concluded you are not going to vote in the 
final analysis for this treaty, vote no. Those of you who have decided 
you want to vote for this treaty--to cut through it all--vote yes. I 
mean, it really is that basic, because if my motion fails to strike, 
this treaty is dead.
  I yield back the remainder of my time, if my colleague from North 
Carolina is prepared to yield back his time. I am prepared to vote.
  Mr. HELMS. The yeas and nays have been ordered?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The yeas and nays have been ordered. All time 
has expired.
  The question occurs on agreeing to amendment No. 48 offered by the 
Senator from Delaware. The yeas and nays have been ordered. The clerk 
will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk called the roll.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are there any other Senators in the Chamber 
desiring to vote?
  The result was announced--yeas 66, nays 34, as follows:

                       [Rollcall Vote No. 47 Ex.]

                                YEAS--66

     Akaka
     Baucus
     Biden
     Bingaman
     Boxer
     Breaux
     Bryan
     Bumpers
     Byrd
     Chafee
     Cleland
     Coats
     Cochran
     Collins
     Conrad
     D'Amato
     Daschle
     DeWine
     Dodd
     Domenici
     Dorgan
     Durbin
     Feingold
     Feinstein
     Ford
     Frist
     Glenn
     Gorton
     Graham
     Gregg
     Hagel
     Harkin
     Hatch
     Hollings
     Inouye
     Jeffords
     Johnson
     Kennedy
     Kerrey
     Kerry
     Kohl
     Landrieu
     Lautenberg
     Leahy
     Levin
     Lieberman
     Lugar
     McCain
     Mikulski
     Moseley-Braun
     Moynihan
     Murray
     Reed
     Reid
     Robb
     Roberts
     Rockefeller
     Roth
     Sarbanes
     Smith Gordon H
     Snowe
     Specter
     Stevens
     Torricelli
     Wellstone
     Wyden

                                NAYS--34

     Abraham
     Allard
     Ashcroft
     Bennett
     Bond
     Brownback
     Burns
     Campbell
     Coverdell
     Craig
     Enzi
     Faircloth
     Gramm
     Grams
     Grassley
     Helms
     Hutchinson
     Hutchison
     Inhofe
     Kempthorne
     Kyl
     Lott
     Mack
     McConnell
     Murkowski
     Nickles
     Santorum
     Sessions
     Shelby
     Smith Bob
     Thomas
     Thompson
     Thurmond
     Warner
  The amendment (No. 48) was agreed to.
  Mr. LEAHY. I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. BIDEN. I move to lay it on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, how much time is reserved for the Senator 
from Vermont?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 14 minutes remaining on the 
resolution.
  Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, for the benefit of my colleagues, I will be 
very brief. Mr. President, I appreciate efforts of the Senator from 
Utah to get order, and that is no more than I could expect for somebody 
that bears certain similarities to the Senator from Vermont.
  Earlier, the distinguished Senator from Delaware read a long list of 
staff and Senators and others who deserve praise for getting us as far 
as we are. The name of the distinguished Senator from Delaware is 
notably absent, and I think that those who support the CWC owe a debt 
of gratitude to the Senator from Delaware. In the customary practice, 
he left his own name off, but if I might add his name to the record and 
put it in.
  Mr. President, I am, as you know, a supporter of the CWC. Again, I 
compliment what we have done. As in the test ban treaty, when countries 
were not coming forward, the United States unilaterally banned their 
own tests and then other countries joined us--not every country that 
has nuclear capability, but other countries did join us--and we brought 
the pressure forward for a test ban treaty.
  The United States took an initiative with chemical weapons. We banned 
our own use, unilaterally. When we did that, other countries joined us. 
Not all countries, but other countries, most countries, joined us.
  Now if we vote to advise and consent on this treaty we will have 
pressure, the pressure of the most powerful Nation on Earth, joined by 
all these other countries, pressure on the few rogue countries who have 
not done that. I say that, Mr. President, because there is one other 
weapon, a weapon that kills

[[Page S3617]]

and maims far more people than chemical weapons. That is the weapon of 
antipersonnel landmines. There are 100 million landmines in over 65 
countries today. As one person told me, in their country, they clear 
these landmines an arm and a leg at a time. Every 22 minutes an 
innocent civilian--almost always a civilian--is killed or injured by an 
antipersonnel landmine. The United States should now do the same thing 
they did.
  The United States should do the same thing we did with chemical 
weapons. We should move unilaterally, ban our own use, ban our own 
export, ban our own production of antipersonnel landmines, expand on 
the Leahy legislation already passed by the House and Senate. Do that 
and then join with like-minded nations. There are tens of like-minded 
nations that have already done that.
  Join with them, agree, together, that this is what we will do. It 
will not be every nation. It will not be some of the nations most 
needing to do this like Russia and China, but we will have the same 
moral suasion that we have with the chemical weapons convention. We can 
do it with chemical weapons and should. Now let us follow exactly the 
same step, join with the Canadians and others and do it with 
antipersonnel landmines. This country is capable of it. It would be a 
moral step. It would be a dramatic step that would help the innocent 
civilians who die from that.
  I withhold the balance of my time and yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Carolina.
  Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, we all know full well that this 
administration has already testified that the CWC is ``effectively 
verifiable.'' The Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 
John Holum, testified on March 22, 1994, that ``the treaty is 
effectively verifiable'' and that the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense 
for Policy, Walter Slocombe, made similar claims on May 13, 1994. 
However, just because administration officials have declared the CWC to 
be ``effectively verifiable'' does not make it so.
  Indeed, by making such claims the Clinton administration has done 
great violence to the standard of ``effective verification'' developed 
and refined by the Reagan and Bush administrations as a key criteria 
for arms control treaties. The definition of ``effective verification'' 
was first offered to the Foreign Relations Committee by Ambassador Paul 
Nitze during hearings on the INF Treaty in 1988 and subsequently 
further refined on January 24, 1989, by ACDA's Director, Maj. Gen. 
William Burns, and again in January 1992 by Secretary of State James 
Baker. The components of effective verification, as defined during 
testimony, are: (1) a ``high level of assurance'' in the intelligence 
community's ability to detect (2) a ``militarily significant'' 
violation in (3) a ``timely fashion.'' That definition is the one used 
in this condition.
  This yardstick of ``effective verification'' has been the standard 
against which every arms control treaty for the last decade has been 
measured. It should be the standard against which the CWC is measured 
as well.
  For any arms control treaty to be effective it must be verifiable. 
When Vice President George Bush put forward the first U.S.-sponsored 
text for the CWC, he told negotiators in Geneva on April 18, 1984, 
that:

       For a chemical weapons ban to work, each party must have 
     confidence that the other parties are abiding by it. . . . No 
     sensible government enters into those international contracts 
     known as treaties unless it can ascertain--or verify--that it 
     is getting what it contracted for.

  I could not agree more.
  In my view, this standard cannot be met by the CWC. On March 1, 1989, 
then-Director of Central Intelligence [DCI] William Webster stated that 
monitoring the CWC ``is going to be costly and difficult, and, 
presently, the level of confidence is quite low.'' On January 24, 1989, 
Director Burns noted that ``verification of any chemical ban is going 
to be extremely difficult.'' ACDA's section 37 report on the CWC, 
submitted on March 18, 1994, states that the CWC's verification 
provisions, together with National Technical Means [NTM], ``are 
insufficient to detect, with a high degree of confidence, all 
activities prohibited under the Convention.'' Then-DCI Woolsey 
testified on June 23, 1994 that ``I cannot state that we have high 
confidence in our ability to detect noncompliance, especially on a 
small scale.''

  Most significantly, declassified portions from the August 1993 NIE 
note:

       The capability of the intelligence community to monitor 
     compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention is severely 
     limited and likely to remain so for the rest of the decade. 
     They key provision of the monitoring regime--challenge 
     inspections at undeclared sites--can be thwarted by a nation 
     determined to preserve a small, secret program using the 
     delays and managed access rules allowed by the Convention.

  With respect to military significance, General Shalikashvilli 
testified on August 11, 1994 that:

       In certain limited circumstances, even one ton of chemical 
     agent may have a military impact . . . With such variables in 
     scale of target and impact of chemical weapons, the United 
     States should be resolute that the 1 ton limit set by the 
     Convention will be our guide.

  The bottom line is that a stockpile of 1 ton of chemical agent can 
prove of military significance. Unclassified portions of the NIE on 
U.S. monitoring capabilities indicate that it is unlikely that the 
United States will be able to detect or address violations in a timely 
fashion, if at all, when they occur on a small scale. And yet, even 
small-scale diversions of chemicals to chemical weapons production are 
capable, over time, of yielding a stockpile far in excess of a single 
ton. Moreover, few countries, if any, are engaging in much more than 
small-scale production of chemical agent. For example, according to 
today's Washington Times, Russia may produce its new nerve agents at a 
pilot plant in quantities of only 55 to 110 tons annually.
  In other words, the intelligence community has low confidence in its 
ability to detect in a timely fashion the covert production of chemical 
weapons which could produce militarily significant quantities. We 
should not cheapen the norm of effective verifiability by claiming that 
the CWC meets this standard--for it patently does not.
  In conclusion, verification of the CWC is plagued by the fact that 
too many chemicals are dual-use in nature. Chemicals used to make pen 
ink can be used to make deadly agent. It is impossible to monitor every 
soap, detergent, cosmetic, electronics, varnish, paint, pharmaceutical, 
and chemical plant around the world to ensure that they are not 
producing chemical weapons, or that toxic chemicals are not being 
diverted to the production of weapons elsewhere. Countries such as 
Russia are well aware that if they ratify the CWC, they can cheat with 
impunity. Indeed, on May 6, 1996 the Defense Intelligence Agency 
informed the chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 
that Russia intends to maintain the capability to produce chemical 
weapons, regardless of whether or not it ratifies the CWC.

  The Senate, therefore, should not agree to this treaty until U.S. 
intelligence capabilities have caught up with President Clinton's 
Wilsonian idealism.
  Finally, I will say a word or two about the counter-arguments we have 
heard on this condition. Patently ignoring the conclusions of the Joint 
Chiefs, the administration has claimed that the right standard for 
detecting violations is not 1 metric ton, but a ``large-scale, 
systematic effort by a potential adversary to equip its armed forces 
with a militarily significant chemical warfare capability * * *'' It is 
absurd to say that if the intelligence community has high confidence in 
its ability to detect ``any large-scale, systematic effort by a 
potential adversary to equip its armed forces with a military 
significant chemical warfare capability * * *'' the CWC is effectively 
verifiable.
  I have no doubt that it would be difficult to conceal the existence 
of a program the scope and size of the former Soviet Union's for 
example. But not one of the countries that currently envisions a need 
for chemical weapons intends to wage World War III and conquer Western 
Europe. Not one.
  Again, let me reiterate just how ridiculous this argument is. 
Nobody--not Russia, China, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Syria, India, Pakistan, 
Egypt, or North Korea--is engaged in a large scale effort.
  Indeed, such a certification is inherently contradictory since a 
country desirous of developing a militarily significant stockpile of 
chemical agent

[[Page S3618]]

need not engage in a large-scale, systematic effort. The Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General John Shalikashvilli, testified 
before the Armed Services Committee on August 11, 1994, that:

       Even one ton of chemical agent may have a military impact . 
     . . With such variables in scale of target and impact of 
     chemical weapons, the United States should be resolute that 
     the 1 ton limit set by the Convention will be our guide.

  In other words, the production of 1 militarily significant ton of 
agent does not require a large-scale program. To knock-out every key 
logistical node in Saudi Arabia, Saddam Hussein needs only a handful of 
SCUD's with chemical warheads. He does not need an elite force of 
infantry trained in chemical-environment combat.
  Accordingly, the intelligence community's confidence in its ability 
to detect the annual production of 1 metric ton in a timely fashion is 
the benchmark question by which the Senate should assess the 
verifiability of the CWC. I urge the Senate to reject this motion to 
strike and to uphold President Reagan's standard of effective 
verifiability.
  Mr. President, I ask that Senator Shelby of Alabama be recognized 
next for 10 minutes. Does the Senator have somebody?
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, if I could ask a parliamentary inquiry. A 
lot of our colleagues are looking to determine when the final vote will 
take place. It is my understanding that the Senator from Delaware has 
the option to move to strike three more conditions--one relating to 
intelligence verification, one relating to inspectors, and one relating 
to articles X and XI. On each of those motions of the Senator from 
Delaware, there is an hour reserved, equally divided, is that correct?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is correct.
  Mr. BIDEN. The attempt is being made, as we speak, to reduce the time 
on those amendments. I respectfully suggest that on the next amendment 
that I am going to move--my intention was to move to strike the 
intelligence provision--or verification, I should say, No. 33, and that 
instead of an hour equally divided on that amendment, I respectfully 
suggest we have 20 minutes equally divided on that amendment. Is that 
all right with the Senator?
  Mr. HELMS. That will be fine, from this point. I will consume a few 
minutes.
  Mr. BIDEN. In other words, the Senator has already spoken on the 
intelligence issue. The time he has spoken on it would be taken out of 
the 10 minutes that we are about to agree to on the amendment I have 
not yet sent to the desk. The Senator was under the impression I 
already sent the amendment to strike.


                            Amendment No. 49

      (Purpose: To strike condition No. 33, relating to effective 
                             verification)

  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask for 
its immediate consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Delaware [Mr. Biden] proposes an amendment 
     numbered 49.
       Beginning on page 65, strike line 25 and all that follows 
     through line 3 of page 67.

  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the time 
consumed by the Senator from North Carolina in his previous speech be 
deducted from the 10 minutes of time allotted to his side, and that 10 
minutes remain on the side of the Senator from Delaware on this 
amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Mr. HELMS. Reserving the right to object.
  Mr. BIDEN. I ask unanimous consent that there be a total of 20 
minutes on this amendment equally divided.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Who yields time?
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, on this amendment, of my 10 minutes, I will 
yield 7 minutes to the Senator from Rhode Island. But prior to doing 
that, let me say briefly what this amendment does.
  This amendment strikes a condition in the treaty that sets a 
verification standard that, if it were in the treaty, would not be able 
to be met; therefore, it would kill the treaty. I will not speak more 
at this time.
  I yield to the Senator from Rhode Island.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Rhode Island is recognized.
  Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, just a moment. I must leave the Chamber for 
a few minutes. After the Senator from Rhode Island has concluded, I ask 
unanimous consent that the Senator from Alabama be recognized to 
consume our 10 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The Senator from Rhode Island.
  Mr. CHAFEE. Mr. President, I strongly support the Chemical Weapons 
Convention, a treaty which serves our national security interests in a 
number of ways. U.S. ratification would help set an international 
standard that would put political pressure on outlaw nations to rid 
themselves of chemical arsenals. This treaty will also give our 
intelligence community valuable new tools to combat illicit production 
of deadly chemicals, even among nations that do not ratify the 
convention.
  Mr. President, ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention by the 
Senate this evening would continue our Nation's proud tradition of 
leadership in the field of international security. We took the lead in 
the formation of NATO, on the containment of communism, and on the 
defeat of Iraqi aggression in the Persian Gulf. This evening, we can 
again assert our irreplaceable leadership by participating in an effort 
to ban chemical weapons around the world.
  Mr. President, condition No. 33, which we are now debating, must be 
stricken in order for the United States to participate in the CWC. 
Condition No. 33 requires that the President--these are the conditions 
of condition No. 33--the President of the United States must certify 
with ``a high degree of confidence'' that our intelligence community 
can detect ``militarily significant'' violations of the convention.
  Now, Mr. President, what does ``militarily significant'' mean? It is 
defined as 1 metric ton or more of these chemical weapons.
  Mr. President, this condition is simply impossible to achieve. This 
condition would bar the U.S. participation in the CWC forever. We must 
understand that the convention seeks to ban chemical weapons. These 
weapons, by their very inherent composition, are extremely difficult to 
detect in relatively small quantities, such as a ton. This truth has 
been known from the beginning, and no one, Mr. President, has alleged 
that the CWC will eliminate chemical weapons from the face of the 
Earth.
  If an individual wants to build a chemical weapon somewhere in a 
small shack or a cave in some remote area of the world, he or she will 
always be able to do so, regardless of the outcome of this vote. No 
treaty, no matter how it is written, will ever be able to stop such an 
occurrence. Our inability to verify fully the CWC is not a result of 
any flaws in the convention. It is due to the innate difficulty in 
monitoring chemical weapons and their components.
  Mr. President, I also question the definition of ``militarily 
significant quantity,'' as being 1 metric ton or more of chemical 
weapons agent. Although 1 metric ton can certainly do a lot of damage, 
particularly in a terrorist attack, I will defer to military experts to 
consider what is military significant. In testimony to the Senate, Gen. 
John Shalikashvili stated that tonnage is not the only factor to 
consider in assessing the military capacity of these weapons. To 
transform an illicit chemical stockpile into something militarily 
useful, an adversary must have vast supplies of these weapons, and he 
must have an infrastructure for handling them and must have troops 
trained in the use of these weapons.
  It is these more complex activities--the training of the troops, for 
example--that the Chemical Weapons Convention, together with our 
intelligence resources, will be able to verify. As Gen. Brent Scowcroft 
has testified to the Foreign Relations Committee, under the CWC, it 
will no longer be possible for a country to buy a few pounds of these   
chemicals from 

[[Page S3619]]

various sources around the world to amass an abnormal supply of 
chemicals. Our intelligence community has, in fact, indicated on a 
number of occasions that this convention will provide another tool to 
the U.S. inventory of ways to stem worldwide expansion of chemical 
weapons capabilities. In brief, the Chemical Weapons Convention will 
supplement--it will not replace, but it will add to--ongoing efforts to 
monitor chemical weapons production worldwide.
  Now, critics of this treaty claim it is unverifiable, that we will 
not be able to catch adversaries abroad who cheat. But they also allege 
that the CWC's verification regime, while too weak to catch those 
cheaters abroad, is too intrusive for American industry. In other 
words, it won't let us find anything abroad, but it is too intrusive 
for other nations as far as inspection in the United States. They can't 
have it both ways.
  The fact is that the Chemical Weapons Convention's verification 
tools--in other words, how to determine whether there are weapons in 
other countries--go beyond those of other arms control treaties that we 
have approved in the Senate in the past. No treaty will ever be able to 
verify totally a ban on chemical weapons. Condition No. 33 is 
impossible to meet. The condition that is in this, which we are seeking 
to strike, is an impossible condition to meet. It serves no purpose 
other than to prevent U.S. participation in the Chemical Weapons 
Convention treaty. So I urge my colleagues to support the motion to 
strike this amendment.
  I thank the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Alabama is recognized.
  Mr. SHELBY. Mr. President, I rise to address the issue of 
verification, and in opposition to the motion to strike condition No. 
33 contained in the resolution of ratification, relating to effective 
verification.
  I have a number of serious concerns with respect to the Chemical 
Weapons Convention.
  As chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, however, I have a 
particular responsibility to ensure that any treaty ratified by this 
body can be effectively verified by the intelligence community.
  If it cannot be verified, the CWC could become the means by which CWC 
member states, such as China and Iran, expand and enhance--rather than 
renounce--their CW capabilities.
  In negotiating the INF Treaty, ratified in 1988, President Reagan set 
forth an eminently reasonable standard to guide the negotiation and 
implementation of arms control agreements. ``Trust,'' he said, ``but 
verify.''
  But I am afraid that the critical, second part of President Reagan's 
formula seems to have been forgotten with respect to this treaty. The 
CWC, and especially the verification regime, is based on the triumph of 
hope and trust over experience and history.
  In its efforts to obtain ratification, the administration has--if I 
may borrow a phrase from a former vice-chairman of the committee, 
Senator Moynihan--``defined verification down.''
  Condition No. 33 to the resolution of ratification seeks to correct 
that problem.
  It conditions deposit of the U.S. instrument of ratification on a 
Presidential certification to Congress that the treaty is effectively 
verifiable.
  This term, as used in the resolution, contains the following 
elements, based on the traditional definition of ``effective 
verification'':
  A ``high degree of confidence'' in our ability to detect,
  ``Militarily significant violations''--meaning one metric ton or more 
of chemical agent--
  ``In a timely fashion,''--meaning detection within 1 year--and
  Detection of ``patterns of marginal violation over time.''
  Effective verification is ultimately a political judgment that must 
be made by the President and his national security advisors. However, a 
key input to this decision is the judgement of the intelligence 
community.
  It is currently impossible to reconcile the above definition of 
``effective verification'' with the intelligence community's own 
statements over the past 4 years, which is why condition 33 calls for a 
new Presidential certification.,
  I would like to briefly restate the intelligence community's key 
conclusions as to the verifiability of the CWC, as set forth in 
recently declassified material from the National Intelligence Estimate 
of August 1993:

       The capability of the Intelligence Community to monitor 
     compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) is 
     severely limited and is likely to remain so for the rest of 
     the decade.

  Our intelligence community is the most capable in the world today. It 
enjoys extensive resources, and employs an impressive variety of assets 
to collect information affecting our national security.
  Yet with all of the sophisticated assets at our disposal, we cannot 
be confident of verifying this treaty.
  And some of the most promising new intelligence methods which might 
have improved this score over the last 4 years, have been significantly 
underfunded by this administration.
  We should look to the certification required by condition 33 as an 
opportunity for the President to tell us of his plans to invest in 
improvements to our technical collection capabilities to enable 
effective verification.
  Therefore I strongly support condition 33 of the resolution of 
ratification, and oppose the motion to strike.
  While most will acknowledge that we do not have the technical 
intelligence capabilities currently in place to provide effective 
verification, the proponents of the treaty place great stock in the 
contribution of the verification mechanisms contained in the treaty.
  For example, the creation of the Organization for the Prohibition of 
Chemical Weapons [OPCW], and the ability of OPCW inspectors to carry 
out challenge inspections of suspected violations, are cited as 
evidence for a mechanism of effective verification.
  Yet in an unclassified excerpt from the 1993 NIE on verification, the 
intelligence community states that:

       The key provision of the monitoring regime--challenge 
     inspections at undeclared sites--can be thwarted by a nation 
     determined to preserve a small, secret program by using the 
     delays and managed access rules allowed by the convention.

  Those, Mr. President, are not my words. Those are the words of the 
intelligence community describing its ability to monitor compliance 
with the treaty before us.
  I should point out to my colleagues, in light of the fact that the 
National Intelligence Estimate from which I have quoted is dated August 
1993, that the Acting Director of Central Intelligence, George Tenet, 
and other intelligence officials have confirmed on numerous occasions 
that the key judgments cited above are unchanged.
  In an open hearing on February 5 of this year, I asked George Tenet, 
the acting Director of Central Intelligence, about the verifiability of 
the CWC. Our discussion went, in part, as follows:
  Acting Director Tenet said: ``We can never guarantee that a power 
that signs up to this agreement won't cheat. These . . . chemical and 
biological developments are small, they are easily hidden. They are not 
like big nuclear developments that have big signatures that everybody 
understands.''
  I replied: ``In other words, it will be fairly easy to cheat some, 
wouldn't it?''
  Acting Director Tenet responded: ``It will be easy to cheat, Mr. 
Chairman.''
  Mr. President, the treaty before us today is deficient in many 
respects: both in what it does, and in what it fails to do.
  As chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, I must therefore 
conclude that the greatest flaw with the CWC is that, absent a 
certification of effective verification, we cannot even know if it is 
doing what it is supposed to be doing, and we cannot know the extent to 
which it is failing to do what it should do: This treaty is 
unverifiable.
  Therefore, I support condition No. 33, and oppose the motion to 
strike.
  If I have any time left, I yield it to the distinguished Senator from 
Colorado.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Colorado.
  Mr. ALLARD. Mr. President, I thank the chairman for yielding to me.
  Mr. President, I rise in opposition to the motion to strike condition 
33, relating to effective verification.
  As a member of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, I believe 
I have a responsibility to ensure that this treaty can be effectively 
verified by the intelligence community.

[[Page S3620]]

  If the CWC cannot be verified to ensure that it will, in fact, 
eliminate the scourge of chemical weapons, then what is the point of 
ratifying it?
  In fact, the CWC may well make things worse, not better, Some 
signatory countries like China and Iran will use the technology-sharing 
provisions of titles X and XI, combined with the cloak of international 
respectability they gain by joining the CWC, to advance their CW 
programs and exports.
  Condition 33 of the resolution of ratification seeks to address the 
verifiability problem, by requiring the President to certify to the 
Congress that the CWC is effectively verifiable before submitting the 
U.S. instrument of ratification.
  Mr. President, we have all heard what the intelligence community said 
about the verifiability of the CWC in its National Intelligence 
Estimate of August 1993, but I think this judgment is worth repeating:

       The capability of the Intelligence Community to monitor 
     compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) is 
     severely limited and likely to remain so for the rest of this 
     decade.

  If that judgment has changed, the President should be able to provide 
the necessary certification. But as we well know, and as the Acting 
Director of the CIA George Tenet has confirmed on several occasions, 
that judgment has not changed. With all the assets at our disposal, the 
intelligence community still cannot verify compliance with this treaty.
  The Senate has already discussed the classified aspects of our 
intelligence and verification capabilities in considerable detail in 
closed session, and I cannot add anything to that debate now.
  What I would like to do, is provide an example of the way in which a 
determined proliferator can evade, and deflect, what is perhaps the 
most extensive scrutiny ever imposed on an unoccupied nation in 
peacetime. I am referring, of course, to Iraq.
  Iraq is exhibit A for a number of propositions. First, Iraq is the 
very model of a rogue state. It is a country that has not only 
developed chemical and biological weapons [CBW], and come within a 
hair's breadth of producing a nuclear device, but has actually used 
chemical weapons against Iran, and against its own citizens.
  Second, as a nonsignatory to the CWC, Iraq is an example of those 
countries that will not be constrained by the CWC, and will proceed 
apace with the production of chemical weapons.
  Third, and this is the point I wish to focus on, Iraq is the most 
current example of the effectiveness--or the lack thereof--of even the 
most intrusive international monitoring.
  Treaty supporters point to the Organization for the Prohibition of 
Chemical Weapons [OPCW]--and especially the ability of OPCW inspectors 
to carry out challenger inspections of suspected violations--as a means 
of effective verification.
  Yet the intelligence community concludes, in an unclassified excerpt 
from the 1993 NIE, that:

       The key provision of the monitoring regime--challenge 
     inspections at undeclared sites--can be thwarted by a nation 
     determined to preserve a small, secret program by using the 
     delays and managed access rules allowed by the convention.

  Acting CIA Director Tenet reiterated that judgment in a letter to 
Senator Kyl, dated March 26, 1997.
  In the 6 years since the end of the Persian Gulf war, weapons 
inspectors from the U.N. Special Commission [UNSCOM] have combed Iraq 
in search of nuclear, chemical, biological, and missile production and 
storage sites--inspectors armed with powers far greater than those of 
OPCW inspectors, I might add.
  Despite this extraordinary level of scrutiny, Iraq is believed to 
retain: chemical weapon precursors and production equipment, and 
possibly large quantities of deadly VX agent and munitions; BW 
cultures, production equipment, agent and weapons. These stocks can be 
used to create a large stockpile in a matter of days; and an 
operational SCUD missile capability, including support vehicles, 
launchers, fuel, operational missiles, and, most alarming of all, 
possible chemical or biological warheads.
  Last, Iraq retains nuclear weapons blueprints, machine-tools, and 
know-how; is believed to be continuing its nuclear weapons design work; 
and probably has the ability to create a nuclear weapon--if it obtains 
fissile materials--with very little warning.
  Mr. President, I am not reciting this information in order to 
criticize UNSCOM. I commend Ambassador Rolf Ekeus, and the dedicated 
UNSCOM inspectors, for their persistence in the face of determined 
Iraqi resistance and intimidation.
  But if these are the results of 6 years of international monitoring 
of Iraq--a pariah country, defeated in war, and subjected to massive 
invasions of its national sovereignty--then I wonder what the OPCW 
inspectors, with their far more limited powers, can realistically hope 
to accomplish in other countries?
  As a final note, I should remind my colleagues that before the gulf 
war, Iraq was a member in good standing of the International Atomic 
Energy Commission, or IAEA, subject to all the usual IAEA inspections 
and safeguards.
  Yet Saddam Hussein was within months of having a nuclear weapons 
capability on August 2, 1990, when he invaded Kuwait. Had Saddam waited 
until he had a nuclear device, Kuwait might yet be the 19th province of 
Iraq--and tens of thousands of people, including thousands of American 
soldiers, might have died.
  Mr. President, I believe that our experience with Iraq demonstrates 
the intractable problems posed by the verification of the CWC. 
Supporters of the treaty say, ``But we have learned from our experience 
with Iraq, and we will do better next time.'' I cannot join them in 
that optimistic conclusion.
  If the President of the United States cannot certify that this treaty 
can be effectively verified, as defined in condition 33, then the 
Senate should not ratify this treaty.
  I oppose the motion to strike condition 33.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I yield the remainder of the time to the 
Senator from Nebraska.
  Mr. KERREY. Mr. President, I rise today in support of striking 
condition 33 from the resolution of ratification of the Chemical 
Weapons Convention. Condition 33 would bar the United States from 
ratifying the convention until the President can certify with high 
confidence that we have the capability to detect, within 1 year of a 
violation, the illicit production or storage of a single metric ton of 
chemical agent. As the authors of this condition fully realize, this 
standard is unattainable and would effectively bar the United States 
from participation in the CWC forever.
  Mr. President, I do not come to the floor as the vice chairman of the 
Intelligence Committee to say to my colleagues that this treaty is 
absolutely verifiable. The distinguished chairman of the committee 
indicated that Mr. Tenet, Acting Director of Central Intelligence, said 
it will be difficult to verify and quoted him as saying it would be 
easy to cheat. What he did not do, regrettably, is go on with the 
follow-on quote. The next sentence in his answer was, ``But, in the 
absence of the tools the convention gives us, it will be much harder 
for us to apprise you''--meaning the committee--``and apprise the 
military and policymakers of where we think we are in the world with 
regard to these developments.''
  Let me be clear. The United States has made a decision that we are 
going to destroy our chemical weapons and try to lead the world in the 
elimination of chemical weapons. That is what this policy is all about. 
We didn't have this treaty presented to us. We made a conscious 
decision to eliminate our own chemical weapons and then try to develop 
a regimen that enables us to identify and detect as much as possible. 
Our Director of Central Intelligence, as well as our military, has 
indicated to us that this treaty will increase the identification that 
we are able to do and increase the likelihood that we will be able to 
end up with the result being that we have no chemical weapons in any 
military arsenal on this planet.
  No treaty is absolutely verifiable. Condition 33 make verification 
more difficult by setting a level of identification, we do not need to 
benefit from the convention. Far more important to our security are the 
improvements to our identification efforts we stand to gain under the 
CWC.
  Verification is a political decision made by policymakers. To make 
this

[[Page S3621]]

decision, our intelligence agencies will need to provide evidence to 
support a conclusion made by policymakers. The benefits we will receive 
under the CWC come from our increased ability to identify whether a 
nation is developing, producing, and storing chemical weapons. Under 
the CWC's routine and challenge inspections, we will be better able to 
identify the storage and destruction of declared chemical weapon 
stocks. We will also be better able to identify a nation's attempt to 
develop the infrastructure to handle chemical weapons and any military 
training in the use of these weapons.
  U.S. intelligence officials have stated that the CWC will add to 
their monitoring tools to counter the chemical weapons threat. Data 
declarations will provide evidence of compliance or non-compliance, 
routine inspections make it more difficult and costly to use legitimate 
facilities to produce chemical weapons, and challenge inspections will 
give the United States the opportunity to seek further indications and 
evidence under the CWC.
  In addition, the CWC will help stymie chemical weapons development by 
non-signatory, rogue nations by restricting trade in key precursor 
chemicals to non-parties. Acquisition efforts for chemicals, 
technology, and equipment by non-signatories will provide tip-offs to 
pursue compliance concerns with parties who may be the source of the 
materials.
  These are real benefits to our identification efforts that will help 
ensure the safety of our troops and citizens. However, if we impose an 
impossible standard of verification and fail to ratify the CWC, we will 
lose these benefits.
  Further, condition 33 creates an arbitrary definition of what is a 
``militarily significant'' amount of chemical weapons. This condition 
deems one metric ton of chemical weapons to be a threat to our 
military. But General Shalikashvili, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, has testified that ``a militarily significant quantity of 
chemical weapons is situationally dependent.'' It depends on the 
terrain, the weather, the number of troops, the type of chemicals used, 
how the chemicals are delivered, and the chemical weapons defensive 
system of the targeted forces. He stated that, ``The quantity is 
totally scenario dependent, and it would be difficult to cite a 
specific amount as militarily significant.''
  During the Iran-Iraq war, both sides used tens of tons against each 
other without altering the course of the war. The Defense Department 
found that it would take several hundred to a thousand tons to 
seriously disrupt U.S. logistics in a war; and the United States's own 
stockpile of chemical weapons, which we are committed to destroy with 
or without the CWC, is about 30 thousand tons. One metric ton of 
chemical weapons, while still posing a horrible threat under some 
conditions, in no way is a militarily significant threat to our 
national security.
  Without the CWC, chemical weapons production and stockpile on a small 
or grant scale will still be an acceptable practice. Under the CWC, not 
only will this no longer be acceptable, but we will have additional 
tools in our arsenal to identify chemical weapons programs. Since we 
will have to monitor this threat whether or not we join the CWC, our 
security interests are improved under the treaty rather than without 
it.
  This condition must be removed from the resolution if the United 
States is to participate in the Chemical Weapons Convention. Therefore, 
Mr. President, I support striking condition 33 from Executive 
Resolution 75.
  Mr. President, and colleagues, I believe strongly that this 
particular condition, regardless of how you feel about the treaty, sets 
an unrealistic level of requirement for verification, and under no 
circumstances are we going to be able to verify a ton of chemical 
weapons under the evaluations of the military. We do not need to accept 
this kind of arbitrary standard.
  Mr. President, regardless of whether or not you are going to vote for 
or against this treaty in the end, I urge my colleagues to vote to 
strike condition 33.
  Mr. BIDEN. I yield myself 1 minute on the time left.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Sessions). The Senator from Delaware.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, let's get this straight. Verification is 
about whether or not we can know whether or not our security interests 
are going to be put in jeopardy. A useful chemical weapons capacity 
requires a lot more than just whether or not you can produce illicit 
chemical weapons. It requires a delivery system, infrastructure, 
storage, and use of chemical weapons. It includes defense preparations, 
extra security around the storage areas, and training and exercising of 
troops who will use those weapons. It goes on and on.
  The ability to put together a chemical weapons capability to go 
undetected that will diminish our security is not real.
  I yield back the time and ask unanimous consent that we defer a vote 
on this amendment at this moment, that we turn to my next motion to 
strike, which will relate to inspectors, condition 31, that there be 10 
minutes equally divided on condition 31, that vote on condition 33 and 
on condition 31 be stacked after the conclusion of the debate on 
condition 31, with 15 minutes on the first vote, 10 minutes on the 
second vote, and with 1 minute intervening.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Without objection, it is so ordered.


                            Amendment No. 50

(Purpose: To strike condition no. 31, relating to the exercise of right 
                       to bar certain inspectors)

  Mr. BIDEN. I send an amendment to the desk.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The bill clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Delaware [Mr. Biden] proposes an amendment 
     numbered 50.
       Beginning on page 63, strike line 21 and all that follows 
     through line 4 of page 65.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, let me also say for the benefit of my 
colleagues that we are trying to accommodate schedules. I thank the 
Senators from Arizona and Georgia, who were running around trying to 
get their agreement. At the completion of the two rollcall votes--we 
are trying to get additional time on one amendment relating to articles 
X and XI, and we have an hour set aside for it now and we hope to 
reduce that time. At the conclusion of that vote we would then go to 
final passage, although there probably may be a few minutes intervening 
because each has some time left. That is the objective. Some are trying 
to catch planes and trains and the like.
  Mr. President, let me suggest quickly what this does. The amendment 
that I sent to the desk strikes a condition which unilaterally says at 
the front end we will not allow any inspector from such states as 
China, Iran, and Iraq, et cetera, if they are signatories to the 
treaty. If they have deposited their instruments of ratification, now 
they are in the deal. We are saying, if they are in, we will not allow 
any inspector from their countries to be any part of a team that would 
inspect U.S. facilities.
  The intention is obvious, and it is laudable. The intention is to 
keep the bad-guy inspectors out because we are worried that what they 
would do is send over an intelligence officer as part of that 
inspection team, learn all secrets from us and take them back home. It 
is not likely that can happen anyway. But let's assume it did.
  The intelligence community says this is a very bad idea. The reason 
it is a bad idea if we do that, Mr. President, is every other country 
will issue a blanket rejection of any U.S. inspectors. We are the class 
of the field. You have heard all day--and in the closed session--my 
colleagues expressing their concern about verification. The more we 
have American inspectors involved, the more likely we are to be able to 
detect wrongdoing because we are the class of the field. We don't want 
to be excluded across the board from being on any inspection team. So, 
therefore, this is intended to do something good but is extremely 
counterproductive. It is counterproductive, and the intelligence 
community says so as well.
  But beyond that, it is unnecessary. There is a provision. In the 
interest of time--we were going to have an hour of debate; I was going 
to put all of this out to you--but in this treaty there is a provision 
now that says the United States, or any other country, can at any time 
strike an inspector. The way this works, as most of our colleagues

[[Page S3622]]

know, is when there is going to be a challenge inspection, or a routine 
inspection, there is a list of inspectors. They give the names. As few 
as 3 and as many as 15 inspectors are going to show up on the doorsteps 
of X, Y, Z company, and they list their names and their country. Guess 
what? Our intelligence community from the time those names are given--
it is like a jury pool. The Presiding Officer was a Federal prosecutor. 
It is like a grand jury. Every country submits inspectors that they 
want participating. Their committee picks inspectors from each of the 
countries. They sit in one town and one city. When an inspection comes 
up, they say ``You, you, you, and you, go and inspect.'' They have to 
submit those names. Our intelligence community, when that pool is 
picked, will do a background check on every one of those guys and 
women. They know their names. So they can, in fact, go out there and 
say--we can say, or the intelligence community can say--``Look, he is 
on that inspection group. Strike him. We don't want him.'' You can do 
that. The only time we can't strike is when--I have a smart staff here. 
In the late hours they think they are humorous.
  You are fired.
  [Laughter.]
  I am only kidding. That is a joke; a little levity at this time.
  As my distinguished friend on the Intelligence Committee, formerly of 
my staff, wrote, ``They can't strike when they are on the plane.'' You 
have to give 24 hours notice you don't want So and So in there.
  So the point is you can already strike anybody. We do this in a 
blanket way. We knock the class of the field out of the inspection 
process. We don't want to do that. With all due respect, this is not a 
thoughtful amendment. This is counterproductive.
  I ask for the yeas and nays on this amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
  There is a sufficient second.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, have the yeas and nays been ordered on the 
previous amendment? If not, I would ask for the yeas and nays on the 
previous amendment as well.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
  There is a sufficient second.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, if I have any time left on this, I reserve 
it, and I will yield the floor now for my colleague from Arizona.
  Mr. KYL. I thank the Senator.
  Mr. President, Senator Helms had intended to present these remarks, 
and he cannot be here right at this moment. Therefore, I am going to 
proceed to deliver his remarks and then also yield to the majority 
leader should he wish to make a remark or two about this condition.
  If ratified, Mr. President, the Chemical Weapons Convention would 
provide inspectors from foreign countries unprecedented access to U.S. 
facilities, both commercial and Government-related. Inspectors would be 
permitted to interview site personnel, inspect records, photograph 
onsite apparatus, take samples, record readings of plant equipment, and 
use instruments to monitor processes. The risk that trade secrets or 
national security secrets could be stolen during inspection is very 
high.
  First, proprietary information is often the basis for a chemical 
company's competitive edge. Industrial espionage can enable a 
competitor to obtain at a minimal cost information that its originator 
acquired only through an enormous investment of time and money, thereby 
erasing the company's competitive advantage. For this reason, the theft 
of trade secrets can cripple even a giant company and can be fatal to a 
smaller enterprise.
  Second, because chemicals covered by the CWC are used in a variety of 
aerospace activities, from the manufacture of advanced composites and 
ceramics to additives for paints and fuels, dozens of defense 
contractors are targeted for routine inspections under the CWC. That 
means that when we are talking about proprietary information, we may 
also be talking about national security information.
  A company such as Lockheed Martin, Courtalds Aerospace, Hercules, 
Raytheon, and the Hexcel Corp. will be forced to allow foreign 
nationals access to their facilities, employees, and records. Our 
national laboratories further could be inspected under this treaty, as 
will Government facilities.
  Previous national trial inspections conducted in the United States in 
preparation for the CWC revealed that inspections under the treaty are 
an extremely dangerous threat to sensitive information. Soil and water 
samples were collected in the vicinity of rocket propellant production 
facilities on one such inspection. They were analyzed at the Lawrence 
Livermore National Laboratory. Using modern techniques, analysts were 
able to discern classified information about the formulation of the 
rocket propellant and the process used to make it.
  Finally, Mr. President, China and others likely intend to use CWC 
inspections for espionage purposes. They should not be allowed to do 
that. The officials of the preparatory commission for the Organization 
of the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, the OPCW, have stated that all 
of the Chinese inspectors were directed to volunteer for the 
organization and that these inspectors have direct ties to China's 
defense chemical warfare program. Accordingly, and the point of this 
condition, the Senate should uphold this provision which would direct 
the administration to exercise a United States treaty right--as the 
Senator from Delaware pointed out, we have this right under the 
treaty--we are simply directing the President to exercise this right to 
bar inspectors from China, which has an active industrial espionage 
program and has violated United States nonproliferation laws, from 
entering the United States to engage in these inspections. In addition, 
it would prevent inspectors from countries which are hostile to the 
United States and are state sponsors of terrorism--Iran, Iraq, Syria, 
Libya, Sudan, North Korea, and Cuba--from participating in these 
inspections.
  Mr. President, I do not think this is an unreasonable provision. 
There is no downside to the provision, only the positive potential that 
fewer trade and national security secrets would be handed over to 
countries that are openly hostile to the United States.
  Therefore, I urge the Senate to reject the motion to strike.
  At this time I yield the remaining time to the distinguished majority 
leader.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The majority leader is recognized.
  Mr. LOTT. Could I inquire about how much time is remaining?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. There are 1\1/2\ minutes.
  Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I have already stated my position. I do 
think we should vote to ratify this convention, but I think we should 
defeat this motion to strike. This is not a killer amendment. This is 
very serious, where we are just saying that we should have the ability, 
the President should have the ability, to bar these inspectors from 
these countries that have violated U.S. nonproliferation laws. You are 
talking about inspectors from so-called, as the Secretary of State has 
called them, ``rogue nations'' that want to come in here and get into 
finding information that could help them to further contribute to 
proliferation.

  So I urge the Senate on this motion to vote to defeat the motion to 
strike. We should have the ability, we should as a matter of fact I 
think require that we bar these inspectors from coming into this 
country when they are contributing to the problem all over the world. 
So I yield the remainder of my time.
  Mr. BIDEN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware.
  Mr. BIDEN. I yield myself 30 seconds off my time on the bill.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is recognized for 30 seconds.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, two very quick points. The companies named 
by my distinguished friend, including Hercules, which is headquartered 
in my State, that are supposedly worried, they support this treaty. 
Hercules supports this treaty. They are not worried about this being 
trouble.
  Second, this is not a killer, but it rips the heart out of our 
inspection regime, and I would not be objecting, I say to the majority 
leader, I would not be seeking to take it out if it gave the President 
the option. It gives the President no option. It requires him--it

[[Page S3623]]

requires him--to ban. And what it does again, I say to my colleagues, 
it then says they will ban us. We have the class of the field doing the 
inspection. It is not a smart thing to do, in my humble opinion.
  I yield the floor.


                        Vote on Amendment No. 49

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the question is on 
agreeing to amendment No. 49. The yeas and nays have been ordered. The 
clerk will call the roll.
  The bill clerk called the roll.
  The result was announced--yeas 66, nays 34, as follows:

                      [Rollcall Vote No. 48 Ex.] 

                               YEAS--66 

     Akaka
     Baucus
     Biden
     Bingaman
     Boxer
     Breaux
     Bryan 
     Bumpers
     Byrd
     Chafee
     Cleland
     Coats
     Cochran
     Collins
     Conrad
     D'Amato
     Daschle
     DeWine
     Dodd
     Domenici
     Dorgan 
     Durbin
     Feingold
     Feinstein
     Ford
     Frist
     Glenn
     Gorton
     Graham
     Hagel
     Harkin
     Hatch
     Hollings
     Inouye
     Jeffords 
     Johnson
     Kennedy
     Kerrey
     Kerry
     Kohl
     Landrieu
     Lautenberg 
     Leahy
     Levin
     Lieberman
     Lugar
     McCain
     Mikulski
     Moseley-Braun
     Moynihan
     Murray
     Reed
     Reid
     Robb
     Roberts
     Rockefeller 
     Roth
     Santorum
     Sarbanes
     Smith (OR)
     Snowe
     Specter 
     Stevens
     Torricelli
     Wellstone
     Wyden 

                               NAYS--34 

     Abraham
     Allard
     Ashcroft
     Bennett
     Bond
     Brownback 
     Burns
     Campbell
     Coverdell
     Craig
     Enzi
     Faircloth 
     Gramm
     Grams
     Grassley
     Gregg
     Helms
     Hutchinson
     Hutchison 
     Inhofe
     Kempthorne
     Kyl
     Lott
     Mack
     McConnell
     Murkowski 
     Nickles
     Sessions
     Shelby
     Smith (NH)
     Thomas
     Thompson 
     Thurmond
     Warner
  The amendment (No. 49) was agreed to.


                            Amendment No. 50

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order--the Senator from 
Delaware.
  Mr. BIDEN. I am sorry to interrupt the Chair. You were going to say 1 
minute for explanation, is that correct, equally divided?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is correct.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, the purpose of my amendment is to strike a 
provision in the bill that requires the President to disallow an 
inspector from any of a number of countries, from Russia to Iran.
  There is in the treaty already the ability of the United States to 
strike any inspector. The inspectors must be named before an inspection 
takes place. The reason why we do not want a blanket exemption is, if 
we blanket exempt all those folks, they will blanket exempt any U.S. 
inspector.
  We want inspectors in the bad guy's country. We do not want to do 
this. It is counterproductive.
  Mr. KYL addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, let met summarize the argument the majority 
leader and I made in opposition to the motion to strike this condition.
  The treaty currently provides for the President to say that he does 
not want inspectors from certain countries coming into the United 
States. There is a reason for that. What we are doing is directing him 
only in two cases to, in advance, say, these are the countries covered: 
Those countries that sponsor state terrorism, pursuant to our 
definition of that, and China because of its violation of another law.
  So it is only those countries that have violated American law and who 
are the state-sponsored terrorists who can be denied inspectors in the 
United States.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time has expired. Under the previous 
order, the question now occurs on agreeing to the Biden amendment No. 
50. They yeas and nays have been ordered. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk called the roll.
  The result was announced--yeas 56, nays 44, as follows:

                       [Rollcall Vote No. 49 Ex.]

                                YEAS--56

     Akaka
     Baucus
     Biden
     Bingaman
     Boxer
     Breaux
     Bryan
     Bumpers
     Byrd
     Chafee
     Cleland
     Cochran
     Collins
     Conrad
     D'Amato
     Daschle
     Dodd
     Dorgan
     Durbin
     Feingold
     Feinstein
     Ford
     Frist
     Glenn
     Graham
     Harkin
     Hollings
     Inouye
     Jeffords
     Johnson
     Kennedy
     Kerrey
     Kerry
     Kohl
     Landrieu
     Lautenberg
     Leahy
     Levin
     Lieberman
     Lugar
     Mikulski
     Moseley-Braun
     Moynihan
     Murray
     Reed
     Reid
     Robb
     Rockefeller
     Roth
     Sarbanes
     Snowe
     Specter
     Stevens
     Torricelli
     Wellstone
     Wyden

                                NAYS--44

     Abraham
     Allard
     Ashcroft
     Bennett
     Bond
     Brownback
     Burns
     Campbell
     Coats
     Coverdell
     Craig
     DeWine
     Domenici
     Enzi
     Faircloth
     Gorton
     Gramm
     Grams
     Grassley
     Gregg
     Hagel
     Hatch
     Helms
     Hutchinson
     Hutchison
     Inhofe
     Kempthorne
     Kyl
     Lott
     Mack
     McCain
     McConnell
     Murkowski
     Nickles
     Roberts
     Santorum
     Sessions
     Shelby
     Smith Bob
     Smith Gordon H
     Thomas
     Thompson
     Thurmond
     Warner
  The amendment (No. 50) was agreed to.
  Mr. HELMS. I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. BIDEN. I move to lay it on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  Mr. BIDEN. As I understand, there is 1 hour remaining on the last 
amendment of the Senator from Delaware to strike condition 32, is that 
correct?
  The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator is correct.
  Mr. BIDEN. It is my understanding the Senator from Delaware has 
control of an additional 8 minutes on the bill?
  The VICE PRESIDENT. Fifteen minutes.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I have spoken to the majority on this. The 
distinguished Senator from Virginia has been waiting around patiently 
all day and I keep bumping him. I want to yield up to 5 minutes of my 
time on the bill to him at this moment, and then I will move, with 
permission of the chairman, to the last condition.
  I yield to the Senator from Virginia.
  The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator from Virginia.
  Mr. ROBB. I thank my friend and colleague from Delaware.
  Mr. President, there's not much left to say about ratification of the 
CWC--even here in the Senate. We've had seventeen formal hearings on 
the topic over the last two years--both open and closed--and as a 
member of all three national security committees, I have participated 
in most of them. In addition, the salient features have been discussed 
in countless meetings and fora that have that have been widely reported 
in both print and broadcast media. Finally, for everyone involved, the 
moment of truth has arrived and we will cast what will certainly be one 
of the most important votes of the 105th Congress.
  Mr. President, I have been committed to ratification for some time, 
but I know some of our colleagues have had reservations. There is no 
question that respected opponents of ratification have raised important 
and legitimate questions. But those questions have been thoroughly and 
painstakingly answered by the proponents, including and I believe that 
our failure to ratify this chemical weapons convention today would 
represent a serious setback for the United States and the entire 
international community and unquestionably would be viewed as a failure 
of leadership by the world's indispensable nation.
  I will not repeat all of the arguments that have been made. In his 
news conference earlier today the majority leader framed the essential 
question. And he repeated it here on the Senate floor earlier this 
afternoon. And I certainly commend him for the way he responded. He 
asked will we be better off with or without the treaty--for me that is 
not a close call.
  I believe we will be much better off, by any measure I can think of, 
if we ratify the convention.
  I hope that the 28 conditions that we agreed to yesterday, and the 
additional reassurances provided by the President today, will insure 
that at least two-thirds of our colleagues reach the same conclusion.
  The United States is getting out of the chemical weapons business 
with or without an international agreement--and because over 70 other 
nations have already ratified the convention, it goes into effect on 
April 29th, regardless of

[[Page S3624]]

what we do. The only matter we'll decide tonight is whether we'll be 
able to participate and shape banning the use, development, production, 
and stockpiling of chemical agents, or be cast with the pariah states 
that will face increasing difficulty due to permanent trade 
restrictions on non-CWC members.
  If we want to play a leading role in at least reducing the likelihood 
that poison gas will be used against us or the rest of the 
international community, we have no choice but to ratify this 
convention.
  Of course, there are no absolutes when it comes to arms control 
verification, but through the most far-reaching, extensive, and 
intrusive inspection procedures ever agreed to, the CWC represents a 
clear step in the right direction.
  I do not question the patriotism of any of our colleagues who oppose 
ratification, but I belive we owe a special debt of gratitude to those 
statesmen who might find some partisan or ideological advantage in 
opposing ratification, but who put our country's interest first in 
supporting it.
  In that regard, I'd like to single out our former colleague and 
Majority Leader, Bob Dole, who now joins the Presidents of both parties 
who negotiated, signed, and submitted the convention for ratification, 
as well as a distinguished galaxy of present and past top-level 
national security leaders.
  And, I would like to conclude by commending Senator Biden, the 
ranking member of the Foreign Relations Committee, and Senator Lugar, a 
longstanding expert in the area of arms control, for their leadership 
and tenacity these last few weeks. Due to their tireless efforts, I 
hope we will have the votes to ratify the CWC and signal to the world 
our continuing leadership, by example, to eliminate these weapons of 
mass destruction from the face of the earth.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.


                            Amendment No. 51

    (Purpose: To strike condition no. 32, relating to stemming the 
                   proliferation of chemical weapons)

  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask for 
its immediate consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Enzi). The clerk will report.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Delaware [Mr. Biden] proposes an amendment 
     number 51.
       On page 65, strike lines 5 through 24.

  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, we now turn to the last condition that I am 
seeking to strike which will require the President, before he deposits 
the instrument of ratification, to certify that the Chemical Weapons 
Convention has been amended by striking article X and article XI in 
several respects.
  Mr. President, I apologize for the shorthand, because it does not do 
justice to the arguments of my friends who oppose this, but this is 
what we call in the trade a killer amendment. Were this to pass, there 
is no treaty. I will speak to that later.
  With permission of the chairman of the committee, I yield to the 
Senator from Arizona, Senator McCain, who, as the old saying goes, has 
forgotten more about this treaty than most people know. I yield such 
time as he consumes.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, failure to approve the amendment proposed 
by the Senator from Delaware would require the United States to delay 
ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention until we obtain the 
agreement of other CWC parties to delete one of the treaty's articles 
and significantly alter another.
  I believe the issue of technology transfer is a serious one because 
it is the one argument that seeks to demonstrate that ratifying the CWC 
will actually harm the United States national security.
  The critics argue because of article XI of the CWC we will have to 
eliminate our national controls on chemical technologies and disband 
the Australia Group, a multilateral framework for restraining transfers 
of sensitive chemical technology. This interpretation of the treaty is 
contradicted not only by the text of the treaty which subordinates 
Article XI on the basic undertakings in Article I for parties not to 
acquire chemical weapons or to assist another state in doing so, but 
also by our experience with other nonproliferation treaties and the 
agreed consensus conditions included in the resolution of ratification 
before us.
  First of all, Mr. President, our experience with essentially similar 
language in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty shows that we need not 
weaken our national or multilateral export controls. The Nuclear 
Suppliers Group, the counterpart of the Australia Group, was actually 
founded after the NPT went into force. Nor has the NPT obliged us to 
curtail our national controls on the transfer of nuclear technology, 
even to other NPT parties. The United States enacted the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Act of 1978, 10 years after the NPT was signed.

  Moreover, beyond the text of the CWC itself we have condition 7 of 
the resolution of ratification before us. This requires the President 
to certify not only that the United States believes that the CWC does 
not require us to weaken our export controls but also that all members 
of the Australia Group have communicated at the highest diplomatic 
levels their agreement that multilateral and multinational controls on 
sensitive chemical technology are compatible with the treaty and will 
be maintained under the CWC.
  We also have condition 15 obliging the United States to share only 
medical antidotes and treatment to countries of concern if they are 
attacked with chemical weapons.
  Finally, we have received today from the majority leader a letter 
which President Clinton has sent to him committing the administration 
to withdraw from the CWC if other parties misuse articles X and XI of 
the treaty. In the words of the majority leader, this commitment is 
unprecedented and ironclad.
  Let me just remind my colleagues, Mr. President, that the President 
of the United States in this letter states:

       In the event that a State Party or States Parties to the 
     Convention act contrary to the obligations under Article I 
     by:
       (A) using Article X to justify providing defensive CW 
     equipment, material or information to another State Party 
     that could result in U.S. chemical protective equipment being 
     compromised so that U.S. warfighting capabilities in a CW 
     environment are significantly degraded;
       (B) using Article XI to justify chemical transfers that 
     would make it impossible for me to make the annual 
     certification that the Australia Group remains a viable and 
     effective mechanism for controlling CW proliferation; or
       (C) carrying out transfers or exchanges under either 
     Article X or XI which jeopardizes U.S. national security by 
     promoting CW proliferation:
       I would, [the President of the United States] consistent 
     with Article XVI of the CWC, regard such actions as 
     extraordinary events that have jeopardized the supreme 
     interests of the United States and therefore, in consultation 
     with the Congress, be prepared to withdraw from the treaty.

  Mr. President, I do not know how we could be any clearer than that 
letter from the President of the United States.
  Conversely, if the United States rejects ratification, I doubt that 
we will be able to play our traditional leadership role in attempting 
to persuade other chemical suppliers to exercise restraint.
  The world will blame the United States for undermining a chemical 
weapons ban that the vast majority of other countries were willing to 
sign. If we reject ratification, where will we get the moral and 
political authority to persuade other Australian Group participants to 
block exports to countries of concern?
  Mr. President, the supporters of this condition portray renegotiating 
the CWC to change these two articles as a feasible undertaking. We are 
talking about a new treaty with more than 160 other signatories, more 
than 70 of which already ratified. In this context, retired Gen. Brent 
Scowcroft, former National Security Adviser, recently testified:

       Starting over, as was suggested this afternoon, I think it 
     is pure fantasy. If we reject this treaty, we will incur the 
     bitterness of all our friends and allies who followed us for 
     ten years in putting this together. The idea that we can lead 
     out again down a different path I think is just not in the 
     cards. We have got to deal with the situation we face now, 
     not an ideal one out in the future.

  I think that the CWC, as we have it now and as strengthened by the 28 
agreed conditions, is good enough. I urge my colleagues to adopt the 
amendment of the Senator from Delaware.

[[Page S3625]]

  Mr. President, I don't--to the relief of most--intend to speak again. 
I want to congratulate Senator Helms for his leadership on this issue, 
for his willingness to bring this treaty, which he opposed, to the 
floor. I congratulate Senator Biden for his consistent leadership. He 
just said that I knew more about the treaty. I know of nobody who knows 
more details of the treaty than the Senator from Delaware, unless it is 
the Senator from Indiana, Senator Lugar, who has consistently led on 
this and is also responsible in the Senate for ratification of this 
issue along with Senator Biden.
  I congratulate my colleague from Arizona, Senator Kyl, who fought 
long and hard in this cause. He has done a masterful and admirable job 
in articulating his position on this issue. Our majority leader, 
Senator Lott, has been through hundreds of hours of meetings and has 
had tough negotiations with the administration. Senator Lott got from 
the President of the United States a letter which he calls 
unprecedented. I agree. I believe that it is something that can assure 
all of our citizens that if there are violations of this treaty, the 
United States of America will leave, and leave immediately. Senator 
Lott has done a job unequaled by any in his leadership on this issue. I 
am grateful for it.
  Finally, I also want to express my appreciation to the former 
majority leader, Senator Dole, who, of course, decided that this issue 
was important enough for him to inform our colleagues.
  Finally, Mr. President, sometimes the Senate doesn't have great days, 
and sometimes the Senate has moments of which we can all be proud. I 
believe, watching carefully this debate for the last 2 days and what 
has transpired here on the floor of the Senate, I think the opponents 
and proponents of the treaty can be proud of the level of debate, both 
in its comity and also in its content. I congratulate my colleagues on 
a hard-fought debate, one of which I think every Member, whether we are 
on the winning or losing side, can be proud.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. ENZI. Mr. President, one of the charges made consistently during 
the weeks of debate over this treaty is the charge that supporters of 
this treaty desired to see chemical weapons abolished from the earth, 
while opponents have no such interest. Nothing could be further from 
the truth. Opponents of the treaty also desire to see these heinous 
weapons abolished. We have simply contended that a poorly drafted 
treaty will not only fail to achieve that worthy end, but could even 
lead to their increased proliferation.
  I am pleased to report that, as of this morning, opponents of the 
original treaty draft have prevailed in our efforts to add teeth and 
additional safeguards to what was heretofore an unacceptable document. 
To begin with, the Senate yesterday voted to add twenty-eight 
additional provisions to the CWC. These provisions tighten our 
intelligence sharing procedures to keep classified information out of 
the wrong hands, would maintain the stricter exporting restrictions as 
outlined in the ``Australia Group'' protocol, would enhance monitoring 
and verification of compliance, and would greatly beef up our 
military's chemical warfare defense capabilities. In addition, the 
Senate leadership this morning received a letter from the President 
committing him to withdrawing from the convention if it leads to the 
degradation of our chemical weapons defenses, or leads to chemical 
weapons proliferation.
  I believe this treaty is now worthy of ratification and will vote 
accordingly. Rest assured, however, that a treaty is only as reliable 
as the offices administering it. Consequently I have every intention of 
continuously evaluating the performance of the administration and the 
United Nations relative to their implementation of these treaty 
provisions. Should any party come up short in their verification and 
enforcement duties, we will be right there to set them straight.
  Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I suppose, at this point, it would be an 
exercise in futility to go into great detail about why the Senate 
should reject this chemical weapons treaty. But let me touch on it. I 
ask the Chair to notify me when I have talked for 8 minutes.
  Mr. President, this treaty won't touch--won't touch--terrorist states 
like Libya, Iraq, Syria and North Korea. The administration admits this 
itself. The administration also admits that this treaty is 
unverifiable. The fact that Russia is already cheating, even before 
this treaty goes into effect, and the rather incredible refusal by the 
administration to bar inspectors from hostile nations, such as Iran and 
China, to come and ``inspect'' the businesses of the United States of 
America. It seems to me that each of these defects, in and of 
themselves, are reason enough to oppose the treaty.
  But one in the Senate often has to face reality. Let me say this. 
There is one issue that has raised the greatest concern among Senators, 
I believe--the issue on which the ratification vote should hinge--and 
that is the administration's refusal to modify Articles X and XI of 
this treaty.
  Now, these controversial provisions require the transfer of dangerous 
chemical agents, defensive gear and know-how to any nation that joins 
the CWC, including--get this--terrorist states like Iran and Cuba, and 
known proliferators, such as Russia and China. Now, think of the 
implications of that. If anybody is out there in televisionland, I hope 
you will contemplate what is going on here on the Senate floor and 
watch who votes how when the roll is called up yonder in just a little 
while.
  Former Secretary of Defense, Dick Cheney, during the previous public 
administration, the Bush administration, by the way, told the Foreign 
Relations Committee earlier this month that Articles X and XI amount to 
what he said are ``a formula for greatly accelerating the proliferation 
of chemical warfare capabilities around the world.''
  Now, this condition is an essential protection in the Senate's 
resolution of ratification. It would make approval of this treaty 
absolutely contingent upon the administration's agreement to seek 
modifications of Articles X and XI. You have heard me say that over and 
over again for the past several weeks and months. Now, I have urged 
Senators to oppose efforts to strip out that key protection. But here 
we go again. If this motion to strike prevails, it will be an 
invitation to the Senate to reject the treaty entirely. But I don't 
think the Senate is going to accept that invitation.
  In any case, why should we modify Articles X and XI? The 
administration argues that, in spite of all its flaws, the CWC is 
better than nothing. Well, to the contrary. With Articles X and XI 
unmodified, this treaty is far worse than nothing. Instead of halting 
the spread of poison gas, this treaty will be aiding in its 
proliferation by helping countries like Iran modernize their chemical 
arsenals, giving them access to our secrets for defending against 
poison gas attack, and giving a United States imprimatur to third 
country transfers of dangerous chemicals and defensive technology to 
rogue states.
  Anybody who needs a road map or wants one for how this will work 
doesn't have to go to a lot of trouble. Just examine how Russia has 
taken advantage of similar provisions in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty. Russia is, at this very moment, using that treaty to justify 
its sale of nuclear reactors to Iran, under a provision known as 
``Atoms for Peace,'' if you can believe that. Under this CWC treaty's 
Articles X and XI--again, I have to chuckle when I say it--dubbed 
``Poisons for Peace''--if Russia or China decide, for example, to build 
a chemical manufacturing facility in Iran, giving that terrorist regime 
the chemical agents and high technology it needs to modernize its 
chemical weapons program, Russia and China not only could argue that 
they are allowed to give Iran this technology, but that they are 
obliged to do so under a treaty, mind you, ratified by the Senate of 
the United States.

  In short, ratifying the chemical weapons treaty sends a signal to the 
world that something has been done about the proliferation of chemical 
weapons when, in fact, we would not have done anything at all except 
make bad matters worse, because Articles X and XI of this treaty--this 
dangerous, dangerous treaty--assure that the Chemical Weapons 
Convention will increase the spread of chemical weapons rather than 
stop it.
  So in this next to the last vote of the evening, Senators have a 
choice. In

[[Page S3626]]

making that choice, I for one cannot imagine that the U.S. Senate would 
reject the advice of four former distinguished Secretaries of Defense, 
who testified that unless Articles X and XI are modified, the Senate 
should refuse to ratify this treaty.
  Mr. President, I reserve the balance of my time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mrs. FEINSTEIN. I note that the ranking member is not present on the 
floor at the moment, Mr. President. I will yield myself 10 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I want to express my strong support 
for the motion to strike condition 32 from the resolution of 
ratification.
  I strongly support the Chemical Weapons Convention. I believe it is 
very much in our national interests to ratify this treaty.
  The pending motion is to strike condition 32 from resolution of 
ratification of the CWC. It is essential that this motion pass, because 
if it does not, our decision to ratify the treaty will be meaningless.
  During the debate over this treaty, a number of serious concerns have 
been raised over Articles X and XI. I myself have shared some of these 
concerns. But I want to address these criticisms of the CWC now, 
because I believe that very solid answers have been provided to 
virtually all of them.
  I met at the White House last Friday with National Security Adviser 
Sandy Berger and Special Assistant to the President for Defense Policy 
and Arms Control Robert Bell, who explained these answers to me in 
detail, and I found their explanations persuasive.
  Sharing Defense Technologies: During the April 9, 1997 hearing in the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the concern was raised by several 
witnesses that Article X of the CWC would require the United States to 
share advanced chemical defense technologies with rogue nations like 
Iran, who may sign and ratify the treaty.
  If indeed the treaty required that, there would be significant 
grounds for concern. But I believe the concern is unwarranted and 
unfounded.
  In an April 22 letter to me, National Security Adviser Sandy Berger 
makes it very clear that Article X of the CWC would impose no 
obligation on the United States to assist Iran with its chemical 
weapons defense capabilities.
  I ask unanimous consent that Mr. Berger's letter be included in the 
Record at the conclusion of my remarks.
  Mr. Berger makes clear that paragraph 7 of Article X, which spells 
out the obligations of States Parties to assist others threatened by 
chemical weapons, would require the United States to provide nothing 
more than medical antidotes and treatments to any state we deemed 
unreliable. We have the option to provide more advanced assistance to 
those nations we trust, but no obligation.
  The Administration is so comfortable with this reading of the treaty, 
that, in their negotiations with Senator Helms and with the Majority 
Leader's task force on the CWC, they have agreed to a binding condition 
(number 15) that would ensure that the United States will not provide 
any assistance other than medical assistance to any rogue nation that 
becomes a party to the treaty.
  Another concern about Article X is that paragraph 3, which calls for 
parties to ``facilitate * * * the fullest possible exchange'' of 
information and technology on protection against chemical weapons, 
which some here have said would require the United States to share such 
equipment with rogue nations who sign and ratify the treaty.

  The Administration has made clear that the use of the words 
``facilitate'' and ``possible'' in this paragraph mean that the United 
States will determine whether any specific exchange is appropriate, and 
we will not pursue those we deem inappropriate. In making these 
decisions, we will do nothing to undermine our national export 
controls.
  With these assertions in hand, I am satisfied that the United States 
will in no way be obligated to provide chemical weapons technology to 
any nation we deem to be untrustworthy.
  Some have also raised the concern that Article X might induce other, 
less conscientious nations, to supply rogue states with defense 
technologies. But there is nothing that prevents those sales from 
taking place today, with no CWC in effect.
  Within the CWC, the countries who make exchanges allowed in Article X 
are legally bound by the treaty's overriding principle, stated in 
Article I, that they can do nothing to ``assist, encourage, or induce, 
in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State 
Party under this Convention.'' Any country's failure to uphold this 
obligation would enable the full force of over 160 nations to coalesce 
in support of sanctions, and possibly military action.
  In addition, the CWC would provide us with far more ability to 
scrutinize any exchanges of chemical defense equipment than we have 
today. The result is a net increase, not decrease, in our knowledge of 
defense exchanges with rogue nations, and our ability to address any 
compliance concerns that may arise from these exchanges.
  Cooperation on Chemical Technology: Another concern that has been 
raised involves Article XI. Some have suggested that Article XI, which 
deals with cooperation in chemical activities not prohibited by the 
treaty, would require the United States to provide other nations with 
access to our dual-use technologies and manufacturing secrets. Here 
again, the concern is unwarranted.
  Article XI does aim to ensure that parties to the treaty can conduct 
legitimate chemical commerce, which is reasonable. But in his April 22 
letter, Mr. Berger explains that this Article does not require the 
United States, or any U.S. company, to provide confidential business 
information to any foreign party.
  As to the concern that Article XI will undercut export controls, 
indeed, the reverse is true. Mr. Berger makes clear that all U.S. 
export controls now in effect are fully consistent with the CWC. In 
addition, our allies in the Australia Group, all 28 of them, have 
pledged to maintain all existing multilateral export controls, which 
they agree are fully consistent with the CWC.
  Here again, the problem identified by critics of the CWC would 
actually be worse without the treaty. The CWC will allow us to better 
monitor chemical commerce that occurs today without our knowledge. It 
will also provide the basis for further multilateral efforts to control 
exports, above and beyond our own existing export controls and those of 
the Australia Group.
  Furthermore, with the CWC, the countries undertaking exchanges are 
legally bound by the fundamental obligations in Article I--the 
overriding Article of the treaty--never ``to assist, encourage or 
induce in any way anyone to engage in any activity prohibited'' under 
the convention. It must be remembered that Article I supersedes all 
subsequent articles of the Convention. It is disingenuous to suggest 
that the treaty would undercut its central prohibition so blatantly.

  To address the concerns raised about Article XI, the Administration 
has agreed to a binding condition (number 7) that the President must 
certify now and on an annual basis that the Australia Group of 30 
nations is continuing to control chemical exports effectively and 
remains a viable mechanism for doing so.
  According to this condition, the President must also certify that 
nothing in the CWC obligates the United States to weaken our own export 
controls, and that each member of the Australia Group remains committed 
to maintaining current export controls.
  With this condition added to the resolution of ratification, I 
believe concerns about Article XI can be laid aside.
  In fact, the negotiations between the Administration and Sen. Biden 
on the one hand, and Sen. Helms and Sen. Lott's task force on the 
other, have been remarkably successful in addressing the concerns that 
have been raised about the treaty.
  If the Administration is willing to meet the concerns of the critics 
of Articles X and XI, as it has, and those critics still insist on the 
removal of those articles as their price for ratifying the treaty, it 
is clear that the intent is to kill the treaty altogether.
  It is completely unrealistic to suggest that we try to drop Article X 
and amend Article XI of the CWC at this point. These two articles were 
included

[[Page S3627]]

to reassure countries who signed the treaty that they would not be 
prevented from developing chemical weapons defenses or engaging in 
legitimate chemical commerce.
  None of the 160 nations who have signed or 74 nations that have 
ratified the treaty will agree to renegotiate these provisions at the 
eleventh hour. It will simply result in our exclusion from the CWC--
which is clearly the intent.
  As Gen. Brent Scowcroft, National Security Adviser to President Bush, 
testified before the Foreign Relations Committee on April 9, 1997:

       Starting over * * * is pure fantasy. If we reject this 
     treaty, we will incur the bitterness of all our friends and 
     allies who followed us for 10 years in putting this thing 
     together * * *. The idea that we can lead out again down a 
     different path I think is just not in the cards. We have got 
     to deal with the situation we face now, not an ideal one out 
     in the future.

  The concerns raised about Articles X and XI--which I shared--have 
been more than adequately addressed by the agreed conditions.
  Failing to strike this condition would be tantamount to killing the 
treaty. I urge my colleagues to vote for this motion to strike. Those 
who do not are essentially voting against ratification of the entire 
CWC.
  The CWC is not a panacea, and none of its proponents believes it is. 
It will not by itself banish chemical weapons from the earth, but it 
would result in the destruction of much of the world's chemical weapons 
stocks, and provide us with a valuable set of tools that would 
significantly strengthen our ability to monitor and defend against the 
threat of chemical weapons.
  So, reiterating, Mr. President, during the April 9 hearing in the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the concern was raised by several 
witnesses that Article X would require the United States to share 
advanced chemical defense technologies with rogue nations like Iran, 
who may sign and ratify the treaty. If indeed the treaty required that, 
there would be significant grounds for concern. But I believe the 
concern is unwarranted.
  In an April 22 letter to me, National Security Adviser Sandy Berger 
makes it very clear that Article X of the CWC would impose no 
obligation on the United States to assist Iran with its chemical 
weapons defense capabilities.
  Mr. Berger makes clear that paragraph 7 of Article X, which spells 
out the obligations of States Parties to assist others threatened by 
chemical weapons would require the United States to provide nothing 
more than medical antidotes and treatments to any state we deem 
unreliable. We have the option to provide more advanced assistance to 
those states we trust, but no obligation.
  Another concern about Article X is that paragraph 3, which calls for 
parties to * * * ``facilitate * * * the fullest possible exchange'' of 
information and technology on protection against chemical weapons.
  Now, I understand the concern there. But the administration has made 
it clear that the use of the words ``facilitate'' and ``possible'' in 
this paragraph mean that the United States will determine whether any 
specific exchange is appropriate, and we will not pursue those we deem 
inappropriate. In making these decisions we will do nothing to 
undermine our national export controls.
  With these assertions in hand, I am satisfied that the United States 
will in no way be obligated to provide chemical weapons defense 
technology to any nation we deem untrustworthy. And the President's 
point A in his letter to the majority leader points this out as one of 
the three conditions under which the United States would withdraw from 
the treaty if it turns out any other way.
  Some have also raised the concern that Article X might induce other, 
less conscientious, nations to supply rogue states with defense 
technologies. But there is nothing that prevents these sales from 
taking place today, with no CWC in effect.
  With the CWC, the countries who make exchanges allowed in Article X 
are legally bound, as Senator McCain pointed out, to the treaty's 
overriding and superseding principle, stated in Article I, that they 
can do nothing to ``assist, encourage, or induce, in any way, anyone to 
engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this 
Convention.'' Any country's failure to uphold this obligation would 
enable the full force of 160 nations to coalesce in support of 
sanctions, and possibly military action.

  In addition, the CWC would provide us with far more ability to 
scrutinize any exchanges of chemical defense equipment than we have 
today. So the result is a net increase, not a decrease, in our 
knowledge of defense exchanges with rogue nations and our ability to 
address any compliance concerns that may arise from these exchanges. 
For me, it was very helpful to be present in the closed session of this 
Senate. I very much appreciate the information shared. But I think the 
bottom line is really this point.
  Let me turn to article XI, which deals with cooperation in chemical 
technology.
  Another concern that has been raised involves the article XI 
provisions on cooperation in chemical activity not prohibited by the 
treaty. Some fear that these provisions would require the United States 
to provide other nations with access to our dual-use technologies and 
manufacturing secrets. Here again, I truly believe the concern is 
unwarranted. Article XI aims to ensure that parties to the treaty can 
conduct legitimate chemical commerce. It is reasonable.
  In his April 22 letter to me, Mr. Berger explains that this article 
does not require the United States nor any U.S. company to provide 
confidential business information to any foreign party. As to the 
concern that article XI will undercut export controls, indeed, the 
reverse is true. Mr. Berger makes clear that all U.S. export controls 
now in effect are fully consistent with the CWC.
  In addition, our allies in the Australia Group--all 29 of them--have 
pledged to maintain all existing multilateral export controls, which 
they agree are fully consistent with the CWC. Here again the problem 
identified by critics, I think, would be worse without the treaty. The 
CWC allows us to better monitor chemical commerce that occurs today 
without our knowledge. It will also provide the basis for further 
multilateral efforts to control exports, above and beyond our own 
existing export controls and those of the Australia Group. And, once 
again, Article I supersedes this article with the overriding obligation 
never ``to assist, encourage or induce in any way anyone to engage in 
any activity prohibited'' under the convention.
  To address the concerns raised about article XI, the administration 
has agreed to a binding condition No. 7 that the President must certify 
now and on an annual basis that the Australia Group of nations is 
continuing to control chemical exports effectively and remains a viable 
mechanism for doing so. The President must also certify that nothing in 
the CWC obligates the United States to weaken its own export controls. 
The President, in his point B on page 2 in his letter to the majority 
leader, clearly points out that, if that happens, we would withdraw 
from the treaty.
  The negotiations between the administration and Senator Biden on the 
one hand, and Senator Helms and Senator Lott's task force on the other, 
I think have been remarkably successful in addressing concerns raised 
by the treaty.
  So we see here that the administration has been willing to meet the 
concerns of critics of articles X and XI, and it has. It seems to me 
completely unrealistic to suggest that we try to drop articles X and XI 
at this late stage. These two articles were included to reassure 
countries who sign the treaty that they would not be prevented from 
developing chemical weapons defenses or engaging in legitimate chemical 
commerce.
  None of the 160 nations who have signed, nor the 74 nations who have 
ratified this treaty will agree to renegotiate these provisions at the 
eleventh hour. It will simply result in our exclusion from the CWC. And 
that would truly be too high a price to pay. I urge all my colleagues 
to support this motion to strike condition 32 from the resolution of 
ratification.
  I thank the Chair. I yield the floor.
  Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I yield as much time as I may have to 
Senator Kyl.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, first of all, let me say that I do not like 
to disagree with my friend and colleague

[[Page S3628]]

from California, Senator Feinstein. And I find that I rarely disagree 
with my colleague from Arizona, Senator McCain. This is a treaty which 
has caused division among reasonable people. I respect their views 
immensely. We find that even former members of the same administration, 
the Bush and Reagan administrations, now find themselves on opposite 
sides of this issue. So it is a matter upon which reasonable people can 
differ. As I said, I respect the views of those who have disagreed with 
me, and they have certainly shown a respect for my views, which I 
appreciate.
  These two articles are among the most important in the treaty, and I 
think a little bit of background is important for us to understand the 
reason we believe that it is important that they not be included in the 
treaty when we enter into force.
  We have said initially that this treaty is not global. It doesn't 
cover countries that it should. It is not verifiable. It is fairly well 
acknowledged there are no sanctions. But supporters have said it is 
better than nothing. There are some advantages to it. Our response is 
that in some respects it is not better than nothing.
  In particular, these two sections, articles X and XI, make it worse 
than nothing, and we ought to get rid of them. It is true that to get 
rid of them, the states parties to the convention have to agree. That 
will take some time. But we believe it is better, before the United 
States enters, when we have the leverage to cause that renegotiation to 
occur, to have it occur at that time. Therefore, the resolution of 
ratification is passed, but prior to the President actually depositing 
those articles, the President certify to us that articles X and XI have 
been removed, or fixed.
  Why is this so important? Secretary of Defense Cheney was quoted by 
the distinguished chairman of the committee, and I think he succinctly 
said it. Therefore, I will summarize these thoughts by quoting 
Secretary Cheney in his letter of April of this year.
  He said:

       Indeed, some aspects of the present Convention--notably, 
     its obligation to share with potential adversaries like Iran 
     chemical manufacturing technology that can be used for 
     military purposes and chemical defensive equipment--threaten 
     to make this accord worse than having no treaty at all. In my 
     judgment, the treaty's Articles X and XI amount to a formula 
     for greatly accelerating the proliferation of chemical 
     warfare capabilities around the globe.

  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Secretary Cheney's letter 
be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                                        Dallas, TX, April 7, 1997.
     Hon. Jesse Helms,
     Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 
         Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Chairman: Thank you for your letter inviting me to 
     join several other former Secretaries of Defense in 
     testifying in early April when the Foreign Relations 
     Committee holds hearings on the Chemical Weapons Convention. 
     Regrettably, other commitments will preclude me from 
     participation. I hope that this correspondence will be 
     sufficient to convey my views on this Convention.
       During the years I served as Secretary of Defense, I was 
     deeply concerned about the inherent unverifiability, lack of 
     global coverage, and unenforceability of a convention that 
     sought to ban production and stockpiling of chemical weapons. 
     My misgivings on these scores have only intensified during 
     the four years since I left the Pentagon.
       The technology to manufacture chemical weapons is simply 
     too ubiquitous, covert chemical warfare programs too easily 
     concealed, and the international community's record of 
     responding effectively to violations of arms control treaties 
     too unsatisfactory to permit confidence that such a regime 
     would actually reduce the chemical threat.
       Indeed, some aspects of the present Convention--notably, 
     its obligation to share with potential adversaries like Iran 
     chemical manufacturing technology that can be used for 
     military purposes and chemical defensive equipment--threaten 
     to make this accord worse than having no treaty at all. In my 
     judgment, the treaty's Articles X and XI amount to a formula 
     for greatly accelerating the proliferation of chemical 
     warfare capabilities around the globe.
       Those nations most likely to comply with the Chemical 
     Weapons Convention are not likely to ever constitute a 
     military threat to the United States. The governments we 
     should be concerned about are likely to cheat on the CWC, 
     even if they do participate.
       In effect, the Senate is being asked to ratify the CWC even 
     though it is likely to be ineffective, unverifiable and 
     unenforceable. Having ratified the Convention, we will then 
     be told we have ``dealt with the problem of chemical 
     weapons'' when in fact we have not. But, ratification of the 
     CWC will lead to a sense of complacency, totally unjustified 
     given the flaws in the convention.
       I would urge the Senate to reject the Chemical Weapons 
     Convention.
           Sincerely,
                                                      Dick Cheney.

  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, what is it about articles X and XI that cause 
Secretary Cheney and so many others to conclude that they should be 
removed? I will quote to you the language of both. They are on the 
chart behind me.
  Article X provides that `` * * * each state party undertake to 
facilitate, and shall have the right to participate in, the fullest 
possible exchange of equipment, material, and scientific and 
technological information concerning means of protection against 
chemical weapons.''
  In other words, in plain English, those parties which have defensive 
capability will undertake to facilitate the fullest possible exchange 
of that technology, equipment, and so on, to the countries that don't 
have them. They shall have the right to participate in the fullest 
possible exchange of that equipment.
  Article XI is the article that says that the states parties shall: 
``(b) undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, 
the fullest possible exchange of chemical equipment, and scientific and 
technical information relating to the development and application of 
chemistry for purposes not prohibited under the convention.''
  That is to say, peaceful purposes. And, second, that the state 
parties ``shall not maintain among themselves any restrictions, 
including those in any international agreements, incompatible with the 
obligations undertaken under this convention, which would restrict or 
impede trade and the development and promotion of scientific and 
technological knowledge in the field of chemistry for industrial and 
agricultural research, medical, pharmaceutical, and other peaceful 
purposes.''
  These two provisions were inserted in the treaty essentially as 
inducements to get the parties to join the treaty, in effect, saying, 
``If you will join the CWC, those of us who have this technology and 
these chemicals will provide them to you. We will sell you the 
chemicals for peaceful purposes--not for chemical weapons. And we will 
provide you the defense technology so that you can defend against any 
possible use against you.'' Of course, the price for having that right 
is not developing chemical weapons.
  In this respect, the treaty was compared to the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty, and the so-called ``Atoms for Peace,'' which said 
that if the countries would forswear the development of nuclear weapons 
building that the developed countries of the world would provide them 
peaceful nuclear technology. For some countries this worked. But sadly 
we know that a couple of other countries used the peaceful technology 
to build their nuclear weapon capability.
  So, Secretary Cheney, and many others, fear that these sections, 
these articles, would permit countries--since they have been induced to 
come into the treaty with these commitments--to then call upon those 
commitments from the countries that have this equipment.
  Is this an unreasonable assumption? Today, we are basically hearing 
statements that suggest that that is not the way it was intended at 
all.
  That is a very recent phenomenon. As a matter of fact, right after 
the CWC was signed, it was very clear to all states parties that they 
begin to dismantle the trade restrictions they had in place on 
chemicals in order to come into compliance with the CWC.
  According to the administration in testimony before the Senate, and I 
am quoting now, ``Australia Group members''--these are the countries 
that have agreed not to sell chemicals to terrorist states--``in August 
1992 committed to review their export control measures with a view of 
removing them for CWC states parties in full compliance with their 
obligations under the convention.''
  They knew that those trade restrictions were incompatible with the 
new commitments they had undertaken in articles X and XI of the 
convention, and the Australia Group itself issued a

[[Page S3629]]

formal statement which concluded again that states parties were 
reviewing this, and I am quoting, ``with the aim of removing such 
measures for the benefit of states parties to the convention acting in 
full compliance with the obligations under the convention.''
  The point being that when the treaty went into effect the parties 
knew full well that trade restrictions they had were no longer 
compatible with the convention, with articles X and XI, and that they 
were going to have to review limiting those trade restrictions, and the 
Australia Group is a very successful group of countries that has trade 
restrictions against trade in chemicals to these terrorist states.
  Well, we then began raising the questions about articles X and XI. 
The administration position changed 180 degrees, Mr. President. The 
administration began to say, well, actually, we could continue our 
restrictions under these two articles. And we said, well, it will not 
do any good unless everybody else does it. They said, we could even 
persuade the Australia Group countries to do that. In other words, to 
do exactly the opposite of what they had originally decided they had to 
do to be in compliance.
  So the administration has made much of and my colleagues have spoken 
of the fact that the United States will now interpret the Chemical 
Weapons Convention as not requiring us to provide this equipment and as 
enabling us to maintain trade restrictions even despite articles X and 
XI. Moreover, that we have even tried to get our fellow Australia Group 
countries to maintain their restrictions in place.
  That is laudable. We have at least pushed the rock that far up the 
mountain. We have got them to agree these two sections should not 
operate the way they plainly say they will. I think it is a little 
unseemly to be signaling before we have entered the convention that we 
are going to violate it up front and convince many of our friends to 
violate it, because, frankly, it is the right thing to do because 
articles X and XI ought to be violated by us. They have no place in 
this treaty.
  The problem is the administration has also glossed over the fact that 
while we may interpret the treaty this way, there are others who do 
not. For example, China does not. Iran does not. And there are other 
countries that we heard about in our classified session this morning 
that do not. They explicitly understand that the treaty means what it 
says. And therefore two parties that have signed, not yet ratified but 
signed the agreement have indicated that they intend to continue their 
trade. And this is China selling chemicals to Iran, for Iran's chemical 
weapons program. That is the problem. And it is true that nothing 
prevents that trade from occurring today, Mr. President, but the 
problem is that the Chemical Weapons Convention gives them the color of 
law, the legal authority to be able to say: Look, we are parties to the 
treaty. The treaty says we can do it, so stop complaining and, by the 
way, don't impose any restrictions on us because of what we are doing.
  I do not know how long it will be before chemical companies in other 
countries are going to say wait a minute, why should the Chinese have 
all the action here; we would like to have a piece of that action, too, 
and therefore when one country breaks an embargo it begins to fall 
apart. That is why I submit that just focusing on United States action 
under the treaty is not going to solve the problem.
  There is also the idea--and this is really not a proper legal 
argument, but some have said that article I supersedes the specific 
articles of the convention. Now, for those who are lawyers, they 
recognize this is not true. The specific always governs over the 
general. Article I is a general prohibition. The very specific articles 
such as articles X and XI will control. They are the specific 
implementation of the treaty.
  But to conclude now, Mr. President, the President of the United 
States has said given the fact that there are concerns, continuing 
concerns about articles X and XI, I am going to write a letter which 
maybe will put your mind at ease, and that letter has been referred to 
here by some of my colleagues. I do not doubt the sincerity of the 
President in sending the letter and certainly do not doubt the 
sincerity of my colleagues in believing that letter provides some 
solace, but I would like to make five points with respect to that 
letter.

  If the things under articles X and XI happen that we think will, it 
does not solve anything for the United States to pull out of the treaty 
as the President says he might do. The time to exercise leverage is now 
before we are a party to the treaty. And what we are saying is prior to 
the United States getting into the treaty, we should make sure that 
articles X and XI are removed so that these bad things do not happen. 
Once they happen, there is no point of the United States pulling out of 
the treaty. That does not solve anything. So what the President says he 
is willing to do, frankly, is not an inducement.
  Moreover, there is the argument that it is better to be inside the 
treaty than outside the treaty. And believe me, once we are inside it 
is going to be much harder to leave than it is to get in in the first 
place.
  Third, certifications of the kind that the President indicated he 
would be willing to make are very, very hard to do. There are a whole 
series of certifications that have to be made under U.S. law. They are 
too hard. We end up not doing them. The certification of Mexico is a 
good example, to certify that they are cooperating with us in the war 
on drugs. Most people believe that that was not an honest 
certification. But the desire to cooperate with Mexico was so strong 
that it overrode the point of being honest in the certification. The 
same thing is true with the Arms Control Disarmament Act, the annual 
Pell report, section 51. We know that Russia is not in compliance with 
the Biological Weapons Convention or with the Wyoming Memorandum of 
Understanding or with the Bilateral Destruction Agreement, but the most 
this administration has ever done is to conduct high-level discussions 
with the Russians. It is too hard to certify that they are in 
noncompliance and therefore take the action that is required.
  The same thing is true under the Export-Import Ban Act with respect 
to violations by China and several other laws that China has violated 
with respect to its chemical weapons transfers to Iran. These 
certifications are simply too hard. And while I agree, I am sure the 
intentions of the President are appropriate in this regard, those 
certifications I submit are not going to be done.
  The time line here is important, too. This is a commitment by 
President Clinton. It is between 2 and 3 years before any action can be 
taken under this convention. That means that this President's term will 
almost be expired before he would have the opportunity to even consider 
the issues that are set forth in his letter. So it is not an effective 
commitment.
  And finally, Mr. President, the letter only deals with United States 
actions, the point that I made in the beginning. The question here is 
not United States actions. The question has always been what are we 
going to do with those countries of the world that seek an offensive 
chemical weapons capability, a capability that we would like to deny 
them, countries like Iran, the one I have been talking about here. This 
commitment, the President's commitment in his letter does absolutely 
nothing with respect to the sales of chemicals and chemical technology 
from a country like China to a country like Iran. It doesn't affect it 
at all.
  So while it is a nice commitment to have made with respect to the 
United States participation and attempting to keep the Australia Group 
together, the fact is it does not deal with part of the problem that 
has concerned us from the very beginning.
  I conclude with this letter to simply make this point. As I said, 
reasonable people can differ, and I respect the views of those who 
disagree with me. They have sincere belief that this treaty is better 
than nothing. And if they believe that way, they should vote yes on 
this treaty. There are also those of us who disagree with that 
proposition. But I urge my colleagues, if you believe that this letter 
provides the basis for support for the treaty, I honestly believe that 
is incorrect. If you are going to vote yes on this treaty, do it for 
grounds other than this letter because it does not provide a 
satisfactory response to the very real problem that

[[Page S3630]]

has been discussed by Secretary Cheney, by Secretary Weinberger, by 
Secretary Rumsfeld, by Secretary Schlesinger, and a host of other 
people who have all said that the fundamental problem is articles X and 
XI. Unless they are removed, we are looking for more proliferation, not 
less, under this treaty. And it is for that reason the motion to strike 
should be defeated, Mr. President.
  Mr. HELMS addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Carolina.
  Mr. HELMS. From my general debate time I yield 10 minutes to the 
assistant majority leader.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is recognized for 10 minutes.
  Mr. NICKLES. Mr. President, first I would like to compliment my 
colleague from Arizona, Senator Kyl, for an excellent statement. I 
happen to think that this amendment we are debating is the key 
amendment of the entire debate. I certainly compliment all Senators for 
their involvement in this debate. I think it has been one of the best 
debates we have had in the Senate for a long time. It is also one of 
the most important issues we have had where we have seen so many 
colleagues, particularly on this side of the aisle, who have been 
undecided and probably because of this language dealing with article X 
and article XI.
  This is the language we have heard former Defense Secretary Cheney, 
former Secretary of Defense Schlesinger, and Cap Weinberger, really 
speak out against in their statements before the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee.
  Also, I note that President Clinton has a letter addressing this 
issue. But I looked at it a little bit more. I certainly concur with 
the goals and objectives; we want to reduce chemical weapons. And we 
have taken a laudatory step of saying we are going to ban them in this 
country and we want to encourage other countries to ban them, and I 
think that is great. And that is in article I. I see article I is over 
here, and if one reads article I it looks great. But I think it is 
incumbent upon us as Senators to read the balance of the treaty.
  When you read article X, and it is in the treaty, it says:

       Each State Party undertakes to facilitate, and shall have 
     the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of 
     equipment, material and scientific and technological 
     information concerning means of protection against chemical 
     weapons.

  Share defensive technology. I know the administration said, well, we 
are not going to do that. But it is in the treaty that we are going to. 
I find that a little contradictory, we are going to limit what we are 
going to share. This says to the fullest extent possible. The language 
is very contradictory in what the administration says they are going to 
do in subsequent letters and what the language of the treaty is. I 
think maybe the language of the treaty will supersede.
  If we are signing a treaty, don't we mean to comply with all of it. 
And then again we are not just talking about the United States, because 
I hope that we don't just give our technology away to some countries, 
some countries that will sign this convention and will not comply. We 
know that. We have had some experience. We have seen it not only with 
the Geneva Protocol on chemical weapons, but we also have seen it with 
the biological weapons convention which a lot of countries signed but 
they have not complied with and we know that. Our intelligence 
community has done a pretty good job, and in many cases we know a lot 
of countries are not complying.
  But I think it is legitimate to ask, are we better off with it or 
without. And I have heard good debate on both sides. But this language 
says to me we have to share this technology. Not only do we have to but 
also other countries, including countries like China, would be sharing 
this technology with Iran. Under the treaty, they would be obliged to, 
or certainly that is what they will be saying. Does that increase the 
likelihood and the dangers of chemical weapons? I am afraid it does.
  And then looking at article XI, and again just looking at the treaty 
and looking at the language of the treaty--every once in a while I 
think it is important we do it--under article XI, section 2(c) it says:

       Not maintain among themselves any restrictions, including 
     those in any international agreements, incompatible with the 
     obligations undertaken under this convention, which would 
     restrict or impede trade and the development and promotion of 
     scientific and technological knowledge in the field of 
     chemistry for industrial, agricultural, research, medical, 
     pharmaceutical or other peaceful purposes.

  In other words, we want a lot more trade in other chemicals that 
aren't banned by this treaty.
  There is an editorial in the Wall Street Journal that I ask unanimous 
consent to have printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

             [From the Wall Street Journal, Apr. 24, 1997]

                           Chemical Reactions

       Before today's vote on the Chemical Weapons Convention, we 
     hope that some Senator will twist his tongue around the 20 
     chemicals listed here and read their names into the record. 
     This list makes two important points about what's wrong with 
     the treaty.
       First is that many ordinary chemicals can be put to deadly 
     use. The chemicals on this list can be used in such mundane 
     products as laundry soaps, ink and fumigation agents--or they 
     can be used in lethal weapons. Bear this in mind when you 
     hear the President assert that the CWC will ``banish poison 
     gas from the Earth.''
       The second point is that the CWC not only will permit trade 
     in these 20 potentially deadly chemicals, it will require it. 
     American companies currently are restricted from exporting 
     these dual-use chemicals under the terms of an organization 
     called the Australia Group, which is made up of 29 Western 
     countries committed to ensuring that their exports don't 
     contribute to the spread of chemical weapons.
       But Articles X and XI of the CWC require member countries 
     to transfer chemicals and technology to any other member 
     country that asks. This goes a long way toward explaining why 
     the Chemical Manufacturers Association is so loud in its 
     support of the treaty.
       Senators who are still considering how to vote might 
     consider whether selling such chemicals to China or Iran or 
     Cuba will help make the world safe from chemical weapons--or 
     make the world a more dangerous place.

                          Mustard Gas for Sale

       Trade in these 20 precursors for chemical weapons agents, 
     now regulated, would be permitted under the Chemical Weapons 
     Convention:

       3-Hydroxy-1-methylpiperidine
       Potassium fluoride
       2-Chloroethanol
       Dimethylamine (DMA)
       Dimethylamine hydrochloride
       Hydrogen fluoride
       Methyl benzilate
       3-Quinuclidone
       Pinacolone
       Potassium cyanide
       Potassium bifluoride
       Ammonium bifluoride
       Sodium fluoride
       Sodium bifluoride
       Sodium cyanide
       Phosphorus pentasulfide
       Diisopropylamine (DIPA)
       Diethylaminoethanol (DEAE)
       Sodium sulfide
       Triethanolamine hydrochloride

       Source: Senate Foreign Relations Committee
  Mr. NICKLES. This article lists about 20 chemicals that are not 
prohibited by this treaty, that basically this section of article XI 
says you will be able to sell those chemicals. As a matter of fact, no 
restriction. This language says that countries cannot maintain amongst 
themselves any restrictions including those in any international 
agreements. It does not say some. It says any international agreements. 
That sounds pretty open. A lot of those chemicals can be used to 
develop chemical weapons. They can also have a dual purpose. It can be 
kind of confusing.
  I understand the President in his letter today said, well, he would 
try to end the confusion. And so I looked at his letter, and in his 
letter on page 2 he says--dealing with article X, he said:

       Using article X to justify providing defensive chemical 
     weapon equipment, material or information to another State 
     Party that could result in U.S. chemical protective equipment 
     being compromised so that U.S. war fighting capabilities in a 
     chemical weapons environment are significantly degraded.

  If that is the case, he wants out. What is ``significantly 
degraded''? How do you reach that level. I do not know that you would 
ever reach--since he has ``significantly degraded,'' I do not know, 
because the word ``significantly'' is there that it would ever be 
treated. And then in (b) he talks about where it would be impossible 
for him to make a certification on the Australia Group. But in the 
final language he says we would get out if the implementing of this 
convention carries out transfers or

[[Page S3631]]

exchanges under either article X or XI which jeopardize U.S. national 
security by promoting chemical weapons proliferation. When is that 
going to be triggered?
  His final conclusion is kind of interesting. I read the AP story that 
said, well, because of the President's letter, he said if these things 
happen, we are out of there, we are going to walk away from the treaty. 
I do not read that in his language. It says I would be prepared to 
withdraw. It did not say he would withdraw. So if it really jeopardizes 
our national security, he might be prepared, but it did not say he 
would withdraw, after consulting with Congress.
  In other words, I do not find a lot in this letter that gives me any 
real comfort or assurance that article X or XI has really been 
addressed. And I appreciate the fact that a lot of our colleagues have 
addressed this issue, but to me treaties are important. And we have had 
a lot of significant discussion over various sections of the treaty, 
maybe none more than article X and XI, but it happens to still be in 
the treaty. And the President's letter notwithstanding, at the 
conclusion of his letter he said if all these things happen or any of 
these things happen, I would be prepared to withdraw.
  Frankly, Senator Kyl is right. That is not going to happen in 2 or 3 
years. It is not going to happen under President Clinton's term. I do 
not know that this letter would be binding on succeeding or successors 
of the President.
  So, Mr. President, this language is vitally important. I would tell 
my colleague from North Carolina my vote on final passage depends on 
this amendment. If we are able to make this change by the Senator from 
North Carolina, I will vote maybe for final passage. I think this is a 
killer amendment, having it in the treaty. I think it is that 
important. We are ratifying the entire treaty including article X, 
including article XI. And again I compliment my colleagues. I have the 
greatest respect for Senator Lugar. I know he has worked hard on this. 
I have the greatest respect for Senator McCain and a lot of other 
people on both sides of the aisle. They have conducted an excellent 
debate. I have made a long list of pluses and minuses on this treaty. I 
could debate either side of the treaty, I have spent just that amount 
of time on it. But I happen to think that this article X and article XI 
do a lot of damage. Since we are ratifying not just article I, but the 
entire treaty, I urge my colleagues to vote to delete the section. I 
urge my colleagues to vote no on this. I think this is the most 
important amendment and discussion that we will have to date.

  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Carolina.
  Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, have the yeas and nays been ordered on this 
amendment?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. They have not.
  Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
  There is a sufficient second.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, how much time remains under the control of 
the Senator from Delaware?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Eleven minutes.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I suggest my colleague and I divide that 
time. I yield 5 minutes to my friend from Indiana.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Indiana.
  Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, the condition we are discussing, all 
Senators by this time, I am certain, understand, requires the President 
to certify that the parties to the convention have agreed to strike 
article X of the convention and amend article XI of the convention. 
That means, in simple language, that the United States would simply say 
a treaty negotiated by 160 countries, now ratified by, apparently, 74--
unilaterally, we simply knock out article X and severely amend article 
XI.
  As all Senators who have addressed this will admit, this means 
effectively the end of the treaty, at least in terms of our 
participation, because, clearly, the other nations of the world are 
under no obligation to renegotiate the entire treaty at that point. 
This is the reason it is strictly a killer amendment. It simply knocks 
out material parts of the convention.
  If those who are advocating this had a point, there might be reason 
to pause at this point and not ratify the treaty. But by and large it 
appears to me that most of us want to ratify the treaty and we do so 
with assurance, first of all, that as a country we have our wits about 
us. There is no possibility this President, the next President, Members 
of the Senate, any responsible American is going to furnish material to 
countries that are rogue states that are going to jeopardize our 
security. The treaty does not call for that, as again and again we 
pointed out. This was a generous interpretation that the Iranians gave 
because, at least from that standpoint, they would like to have the 
material. But why we should ever be that gullible escapes me. There is 
no mandate to give anything away.
  Those of us who advocate the treaty have been saying we will not. The 
President of the United States has been asked for assurance, and he 
said that he will not. He has sent letters to the majority leader and 
to individual Senators affirming this in any number of ways.
  Furthermore, the question arises, ``Fair enough, Mr. President, or 
Mr. Senator, if you will not give things away to the Iranians, how 
about the French or the Germans or some other nation? Perhaps they will 
do so.'' As Secretary Cohen replied on Meet The Press on Sunday--and 
Secretary Albright, likewise, who was sitting beside him responded to 
this question--they pointed out that is a very good reason for us to be 
around the table with the other countries from the beginning, setting 
the rules.
  If Senators are seriously concerned that other countries are going to 
give away the store, we had better be there to help restrain them, to 
offer our leadership. It comes back to that, our leadership. We were 
the ones that started the whole process--President Reagan, President 
Bush, President Clinton. We are the ones who had a good idea: If we 
were getting rid of our chemical weapons, others ought to get rid of 
theirs.
  This is our treaty, as Secretary Albright said, ``Made in the USA.'' 
And we ought to be there to set the rules, to be the governing board, 
to assert our leadership at the moment that it is crucial after April 
29.
  So I say simply to those who have qualms about articles X and XI, we 
are not going to give away the store, any of us, as patriotic 
Americans. We would like to be at the table to make sure no one else 
entertains that thought. But I say again, whether we are there or not, 
the treaty is going to happen after April 29. We better be there and, 
hopefully, with affirmative votes to strike this fifth situation we 
have discussed this evening, this fifth condition, and for final 
passage, to vote for the treaty. These are very important for the 
foreign policy and security of our country.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, how much time do I have remaining?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Six minutes 11 seconds.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I yield myself 5 minutes and I ask to be 
informed at the end of those 5 minutes. I am not going to take the time 
to speak to why this is a killer amendment and why this is so 
important, because I could not improve upon what the Senator from 
Indiana said. I mean that sincerely.

  It is real basic. This gets down to real basic considerations. 
Anybody who has the capacity to transfer technology can do that right 
now. They can do it right now. If they are in the treaty, the treaty 
does not require them to transfer that technology, but they, 
theoretically, could transfer technology. If we are not in the treaty 
we are not there to modulate their attitudes, their activities. We are 
out of the game.
  This seems to me to be so simplistic and basic. But let me put on the 
hat I have been wearing for the past 5 years. I have been teaching 
constitutional law at Widner University on Saturday mornings, a three-
credit course. You know the old joke is, if you want to learn a 
subject, teach it. If I had spent nearly as much time studying it when 
I was in law school, as much time as I have spent teaching it, I would 
have

[[Page S3632]]

ended up in the top of the class, not the bottom. I don't think I would 
have the record the Senator from Indiana had, but it would be better.
  But all kidding aside, there is something, to quote Elliot 
Richardson, our former Attorney General, and Abe Chayes, Harvard Law 
School professor, and a number of other professors, which I will submit 
for the Record, there is, as the letter to me says, regarding article X 
and article XI, it says:

       As it is axiomatic that all treaty provisions must be 
     interpreted in view of the purposes and objectives of the 
     treaty and that a subsidiary obligation should never be read 
     out of context to authorize behavior that would contravene a 
     primary obligation, nothing in article X or XI may undermine 
     article I . . ..

  But the first part of that sentence--maybe I spent too much time in 
law schools. There is no legal scholar in America who will tell you 
that you can read a subsidiary provision in a treaty, a document, a 
contract or anything else, that contravenes the stated purpose of the 
treaty--the stated purpose of the contract. You cannot do that.
  Think about it. Forget being a lawyer, just think about it. How could 
you write a contract, make a deal that said, ``This is our purpose,'' 
and five paragraphs later say, ``but if you don't want to meet the 
purpose, you don't have to.'' It is bizarre. This is an absolute 
bizarre interpretation.
  Let me also point out--I wish my friend had not taken down their 
chart. The Senator's chart, those in opposition to my amendment, a 
chart on article XI, is somewhat incomplete. The paragraph that sat up 
there for a half-hour or so, paragraph 2 in the chart, read, ``The 
state party shall--'' and then it goes on, and then the subparagraphs 
(b) and (c) were shown. But they left out the remaining part of that. 
The words that were missing are very key. They read as follows:.

       Subject to the provisions of the convention and without 
     prejudice to the principles and applicable rules of 
     international law, the state party shall. . ..

  That is the part they left out of article X and XI. What does article 
X and XI refer to? They are referring to article I.
  I do not want to be overly technical here. This is not rocket 
science. What does article I of the treaty say? It says:

       Each State party to this convention undertakes never under 
     any circumstances:
       (a) to develop or produce or otherwise acquire, stockpile 
     or retain chemical weapons or transfer, directly or 
     indirectly, chemical weapons to anyone;
       (b) to use chemical weapons;
       (c) to engage in any military preparation to use chemical 
     weapons;
       (d) to assist, encourage or induce in any way anyone to 
     engage in any activity prohibited to a state party under this 
     convention.

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired.
  Mr. BIDEN. I yield myself 2 additional minutes under the bill.
  Mr. President, what are we talking about here? Do you know what this 
debate on article X and article XI reminds me of, speaking of law 
school? The only thing I ever did do well in law school was moot court. 
I won that. Does that surprise you all? But I did.
  It reminds me of what we used to do--maybe when my friend from 
Indiana was at Oxford. You would walk in and you would be presented a 
question. The question before the court or the question before the 
House is--and you got assigned a side and you came up with the best 
arguments.
  This reminds me of that, as if we all got together earlier today and 
said, OK, one side has to argue that article X and article XI do all 
these terrible things. I am glad I did not get that side to argue. The 
reason is, it is much harder to make the case. My friend from Arizona, 
who is an able trial lawyer, is doing a very good job. But, look, you 
cannot avoid the central purpose of the treaty and that is: Never, 
under any circumstances, can any party assist, encourage, induce in any 
way anyone to engage in any prohibited activity.
  I yield myself 2 more minutes on the bill.
  So we are in a position here where I really understand the worry. 
But, even if there was any merit to the reading that is given by my 
friends, we have, in the conditions that we did support, we have two 
conditions which cover this--double cover it. We promise we are not 
going to transfer anything that is not medical in nature.
  Mr. President, a party cannot do something in the treaty by 
transferring material which would have the effect these Senators are 
worried about, because if it had the effect they were worrying about, 
then it would be assisting, encouraging, inducing or in some way 
engaging in activity prohibited by the treaty. Chemical weapons are 
prohibited by the treaty.
  To reiterate, Mr. President, this is a killer, pure and simple. This 
will prevent the United States from joining the Chemical Weapons 
Convention.
  The condition requires the President to certify that he has achieved 
the impossible: that he has been able to substantially rewrite the 
treaty.
  There is no chance--none--that he can achieve this by April 29, and 
it is highly unlikely that he can ever do so--because amendments may be 
blocked by any State party to the convention. If a party wants to keep 
us out--and thus render the treaty ineffective--it can easily do so.
  Aside from the practical difficulties of rewriting a treaty that took 
nearly a decade to negotiate, there is no need to do so.
  Let me start with article 10. The Senator from North Carolina wants 
to get rid of it completely.
  Article 10 contains two paragraphs at issue. Paragraph three provides 
that:

       [E]ach State Party undertakes to facilitate, and shall have 
     the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of 
     equipment, material and scientific and technological 
     information concerning means of protection against chemical 
     weapons.

  Note that this paragraph contains ambiguous terms like ``facilitate'' 
and ``possible.'' There's a reason for that--the negotiators did not 
want us to make a concrete commitment.
  And the Administration has made clear that it interprets this 
paragraph to mean that it will have the flexibility to decide what 
exchanges, if any, will occur under this paragraph.
  On April 15, Sandy Berger wrote to me to say that:

       . . . any exchange which does occur is limited to that 
     which we determine would be appropriate and permitted under 
     the Convention and consistent with our national export 
     controls on these heavily regulated items.

  I ask unanimous consent that this letter be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:


                                              The White House,

                                       Washington, April 15, 1997.
     Hon. Joseph R. Biden, Jr.,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Joe: During the Senate Foreign Relations Committee's 
     hearings last week, concerns were again raised about the 
     impact of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) on the 
     ability of rogue states to acquire advanced chemical defense 
     or chemical manufacturing technology. I would like to take 
     the opportunity to elaborate further on these issues and set 
     the record straight.
       First and foremost, I would like to take issue with the 
     charge that the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and 
     the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), which have language 
     similar to the CWC on promoting trade for peaceful purposes, 
     have hastened the spread of these dangerous weapons and 
     technologies. In fact, export controls in these areas have 
     been made tougher and these controls, as well as the treaties 
     themselves, have gained the support of more and more 
     countries over the years. In the early 1960s, President 
     Kennedy predicted that there would be 15-20 nuclear weapon 
     states by the 1970s. Due largely to the NPT, that number if 
     far lower today. Controls on biological weapons continue to 
     be strengthened, including in 1992, when the Australia Group 
     decided to add biological pathogens and related equipment to 
     their list of controlled items.
       The CWC, like the NPT and the BWC, will result in a 
     strengthened export control regime on dangerous chemicals. 
     The CWC allows for maintenance and strengthening of the 
     controls already in place, while also formally expanding 
     controls over a broad range of chemicals and precursors. The 
     CWC also prohibits novel agents which are not currently 
     covered. The informal Australia Group consists of 30 
     countries, while the CWC has been ratified by 72 countries 
     and the list is growing. Furthermore, the CWC provides for 
     trade restrictions against states who are not party to the 
     treaty.
       Regarding the specific CWC Articles in question, one area 
     of concern has been whether Article X of the CWC might force 
     us to share advanced chemical defense technologies and 
     equipment with rogue nations like Iran and to assist in the 
     development of CW defensive capabilities. Let me assure you 
     that Article X does not require the U.S. or any other Party 
     to the treaty to share its advanced chemical weapons defense 
     technologies and equipment with countries such

[[Page S3633]]

     as Iran or to assist them in the development of such 
     capabilities.
       Although Paragraph 7 of Article 10 obligates States Parties 
     to provide assistance through the treaty organization in 
     response to a request by a State Party that has either been 
     threatened by the use of chemical weapons or has had chemical 
     weapons used against it, assistance is broadly defined in the 
     article as including medical antidotes and treatments. 
     Article X provides complete flexibility to States Parties to 
     determine what type of assistance they provide and how they 
     provide it. A State Party's obligation under paragraph 7 of 
     Article X may be met in one of three ways--by contributing 
     monies to a voluntary fund (managed by the treaty 
     organization); by concluding an agreement with the 
     organization concerning the procurement, if requested, of 
     specific types of assistance; or by declaring (within 180 
     days after the CWC's entry-into-force) the kind of assistance 
     it might provide in response to an appeal by the 
     organization.
       To meet its obligations under Article X, therefore, the 
     U.S. can choose from a variety of options and forms of 
     assistance. In no case would we be required to share advanced 
     chemical defense technology and equipment, or even to provide 
     older model gas masks. During our extensive negotiations with 
     Majority Leader Lott and the Task Force he established on the 
     CWC, the Administration has agreed to a binding condition, 
     regarding Article X, on the resolution of ratification that 
     will ensure that no assistance other than medical antidotes 
     and treatments is provided by the United States to any 
     country of concern.
       A particular concern has also been raised about Paragraph 3 
     of Article X. This paragraph states that ``Each Party 
     undertakes to facilitate, and shall have the right to 
     participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, 
     material and scientific and technological information 
     concerning means of protection against chemical weapons.'' 
     The inclusion of the words ``facilitate'' and ``possible'' 
     underscores that no specific exchange is required and that 
     any exchange which does occur is limited to that which we 
     determine would be appropriate and permitted under the 
     Convention and consistent with our national export controls 
     on these heavily regulated items. Paragraph 3 of Article X 
     does not override any other rights and obligations under 
     international law, such as the right to have export controls.
       The concerns about Article X also include whether other 
     less scrupulous countries might seek to use this article as 
     an excuse to profiteer by giving away defense secrets. This 
     concern misses the main point, which is that any such 
     unscrupulous exchanges can take place now without the CWC. 
     With the CWC, the countries undertaking any exchanges in 
     Article X are legally bound by the fundamental obligation of 
     the treaty in Article I, which obligates Parties never to ``. 
     . . assist, encourage, or induce, in any way, anyone to 
     engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this 
     Convention.'' The Chemical Weapons Convention will mean not 
     only that all relevant trade is subject to closer 
     scrutiny, especially with countries whose compliance may 
     be in doubt, but it will also provide the legal basis as 
     well as the verification and compliance measures to 
     redress those compliance concerns.
       In this regard, concern has been raised specifically that 
     Paragraph 6 of Article X could provide the basis for other 
     Parties to argue that they must share defensive technologies. 
     Paragraph 6 states that ``Nothing in this Convention shall be 
     interpreted as impeding the right of States Parties to 
     request and provide assistance bilaterally . . . concerning 
     the emergency procurement of assistance.'' This paragraph 
     does not require or obligate a Party to provide emergency 
     bilateral assistance, but simply states that a party may 
     choose to provide such emergency assistance. Again, I would 
     underscore that with the CWC in force, any exchange of CW 
     defense assistance takes place within the framework of the 
     fundamental obligations of the treaty not to assist anyone in 
     acquiring a chemical weapons capability.
       A specific concern also has been raised that Paragraph 5 of 
     Article X could be read to require the release of advanced 
     and classified information about defensive capabilities and 
     technologies. This is simply not the case. Paragraph 5 
     requires the international Technical Secretariat which will 
     administer the Convention to establish and maintain ``for the 
     use of any requesting State Party, a data bank containing 
     freely available information concerning various means of 
     protection against chemical weapons as well as such 
     information as may be provided by States Parties.'' As stated 
     in the Article-by-Article Analysis submitted to the Senate on 
     November 23, 1993, ``freely available'' means ``from open 
     public sources.'' Further, the CWC imposes no obligation on 
     States Parties to contribute to this database. Hence, the 
     provision does not require the release of classified or 
     otherwise sensitive information about U.S. chemical defense 
     capabilities.
       A second area of concern has been whether Article XI of the 
     CWC, which relates to cooperation in the field of chemical 
     activities for purposes not prohibited by the CWC, might 
     force our industry to share dual-use technologies and 
     manufacturing secrets with other nations. This is not what 
     the treaty says. Let me assure you that Article XI does not 
     require private businesses to release such proprietary or 
     otherwise confidential business information, nor does it 
     require the U.S. Government to force private businesses to 
     undertake such actions.
       Article XI is explicitly subject to the fundamental ban in 
     Article I on assisting anyone in acquiring a chemical weapons 
     capability. Here again, far from undercutting export 
     controls, the CWC will be a basis for stronger controls, 
     enforced by more countries. I want to make clear that the 
     export controls that we and other Australia Group members 
     have undertaken, as well as our own national export 
     controls, are fully consistent with the CWC and will 
     further its implementation. This is not just a U.S. 
     Government position. In recent weeks, we have instructed 
     our embassies to confirm with our Australia Group partners 
     that they agree that the Group's export control and 
     nonproliferation measures are fully compatible with the 
     CWC. Our partners have confirmed this and have also 
     confirmed that they are committed to maintaining such 
     export control and nonproliferation measures in the 
     future.
       In order to address the concerns raised about Article XI, 
     the Administration has agreed to a binding condition in our 
     negotiations with the Majority Leader's Task Force that would 
     have the President certify prior to the deposit of our 
     instrument of ratification that nothing in the Convention 
     obligates us to accept any weakening of our export controls, 
     that we maintain the right to impose export controls 
     unilaterally or collectively on chemicals and chemical 
     production technology, and that each member of the Australia 
     Group agrees that its export controls and nonproliferation 
     measures are consistent with the CWC and is committed to 
     maintaining such controls in the future.
       Furthermore, as prescribed in the condition, the President 
     must certify on an annual basis that the Australia Group 
     continues to maintain equivalent or more effective controls 
     over exports and that it remains a viable mechanism for 
     limiting the spread of chemical and biological weapons-
     related materials. If this certification cannot be made, the 
     President must consult with the Senate for the purpose of 
     obtaining a resolution of continued adherence to the 
     Convention.
       I hope this information facilitates the Senate's 
     consideration of the CWC. I look forward to continuing to 
     work with you and other CWC supporters to ensure a successful 
     vote on this vital treaty in the days ahead.
           Sincerely,

                                             Samuel R. Berger,

                                        Assistant to the President
                                    for National Security Affairs.

  Mr. BIDEN. Moreover, as with any treaty, this paragraph must be read 
in light of the object and purpose of the convention. The purpose of 
the treaty, quite obviously, is to ban chemical weapons.
  And any nation which provides technology to a country of concern 
would find itself in violation of the overriding obligation of Article 
One of the treaty, which requires states ``never under any circumstance 
* * * to assist, encourage, or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in 
any activity prohibited to a state party under this Convention.''
  This is an overriding obligation. It governs everything you do under 
the treaty.
  Ronald Lehman, the head of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency 
during the Reagan Administration, stated during a recent Foreign 
Relations Committee hearing that:

       We made it very clear throughout the negotiations that all 
     of this was subject to [A]rticle I, which is the fundamental 
     obligation [under the Convention] not to assist. So we 
     reiterated that again and again and again. But the most 
     important, I think, telling factoid in support of the U.S. 
     interpretation is the fact that after the Convention was done 
     so many of the usual list of suspects were so unhappy that 
     they did not get what they wanted in these provisions.

  On this point, I would also like to refer to a letter submitted to me 
by a group of eminent legal scholars, including Abe Chayes of Harvard 
Law School, former State Department legal adviser, and Elliot 
Richardson, former Secretary of Defense and former Attorney General.
  They write that the language in paragraph three which discusses that 
each State Party has the right to ``participate in exchanges of 
equipment'' is axiomatic--that is, it ``merely reaffirms current trade 
policies that allow nations to exchange goods and services. Each State 
Party retains the right to participate in this trade at the level of 
its own choosing, including not to trade at all. There is no 
affirmative duty to trade * * *.''
  I ask unanimous consent to have the letter printed in the Record at 
this point.
  There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:
                                                   April 23, 1997.
     Hon. Joseph R. Biden, Jr.,
     U.S. Senate,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Senator Biden: You have asked us to state whether 
     Articles X and XI of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) 
     require

[[Page S3634]]

     States Parties to ``undertake to share everything that is 
     hard to achieve in a chemical weapons capability'' thereby 
     enabling States Parties to develop a ``militarily effective 
     chemical weapons capability.''
       Before analyzing Articles X and XI, we note that the CWC 
     primarily obligates all States Parties, as set forth in 
     Article I, ``never under any circumstances'' to ``assist, 
     encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any 
     activity'' prohibited under the CWC. This includes the 
     obligations not to develop, produce, stockpile, acquire or 
     retain chemical weapons, and not to engage in any military 
     preparations to use chemical weapons. As it is axiomatic that 
     all treaty provisions must be interpreted in view of the 
     purposes and objects of that treaty and that a subsidiary 
     obligation should never be read out of context to authorize 
     behavior that would contravene a primary obligation, nothing 
     in Article X or XI may undermine Article I by assisting a 
     country in developing a chemical weapons capability.
       Article X is titled ``Assistance and Protection Against 
     Chemical Weapons.'' Paragraph (7) is the only provision in 
     Article X which contains a specific obligation: each State 
     Party must elect to take one or more of three specified 
     measures of assistance. Under Agreed Condition 15 to the 
     Resolution of Ratification of Advice and Consent, the United 
     States, to meet its commitments, will only provide medical 
     antidotes and treatment to states not eligible for assistance 
     under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. Nothing in 
     paragraph (7) can remotely be construed as requiring the 
     United States to provide equipment or assistance that would 
     enhance a rogue state's offensive or defensive chemical 
     weapons capability; again, a proper reading of the treaty as 
     a whole would prohibit the provision of assistance that would 
     encourage such a result.
       Paragraph 2 clarifies that the CWC does not restrict a 
     State Party from researching chemical weapon protection 
     capabilities for purposes not prohibited. Paragraph 6 
     clarifies that the CWC does not impede parties from providing 
     assistance or entering into bilateral agreements concerning 
     the emergency procurement of assistance. Neither of these 
     paragraphs compels any conduct whatsoever but merely enables 
     States Parties to pursue these activities without fear of 
     being in breach.
       Article X, paragraph 3, asserts that: ``Each State Party 
     undertakes to facilitate, and shall have the right to 
     participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, 
     material and scientific and technological information 
     concerning means of protection against chemical weapons. In 
     our view, nothing in paragraph (3) requires the United States 
     to provide any particular matter or information. Accordingly, 
     this paragraph would require the United States to withhold, 
     either unilaterally or as part of a multilateral group, 
     materials or information that could enhance the chemical 
     weapons capability of any particular state.
       That each State Party has the right to participate in 
     exchanges of equipment, etc. regarding chemical weapons 
     protection merely reaffirms current trade policies that allow 
     nations to exchange goods and services. Each State Party 
     retains the right to participate in this trade to the level 
     of its own choosing, including not to trade at all. There is 
     no affirmative duty to trade, but only a reaffirmation that 
     States Parties wishing to trade may do so without fear of 
     contravening the CWC. Under recognized principles of treaty 
     interpretation, the use of the intentionally vague and weak 
     verb ``undertakes to facilitate'' conveys no specific 
     affirmative obligation nor would the refusal to trade in 
     sensitive items support even the most tenuous claim that the 
     United States has breached its obligations.
       Article XI is titled ``Economic and Technological 
     Development'' and seeks to balance free trade in chemicals, 
     equipment and technology with the prevention of proliferation 
     of chemical weapons. It is modeled on Article X of the 
     Biological Weapons Convention and is analogous to Article IV 
     of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) dealing with 
     peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Subparagraphs (b), (c), (d), 
     and (e) of paragraph 2 address the right of each State Party 
     to participate ``in the fullest possible exchange'' of 
     information; generally prohibits restrictions on trade; and 
     prohibits using the Convention as grounds for measures not 
     provided under the CWC. Only paragraph (2)(e) contains an 
     affirmative obligation: each State Party must review its 
     existing national regulations to make them consistent with 
     the CWC. The remainder of its provisions clarify that the CWC 
     should not restrict commercial and research activity that 
     would be otherwise permissible. Moreover, these provisions 
     are explicitly balanced against general provisions, 
     including: (1) ``without prejudice to the principles and 
     applicable rules of international law,'' (2) ``for purposes 
     not prohibited under this Convention'', (3) ``other peaceful 
     purposes'', and (4) to ``render them consistent with the 
     objects and purpose of the Convention''.
       Article XI, when read in its entirety and together with 
     Article I, undoubtedly permits the United States to continue 
     national security controls over exports of chemical weapons 
     material, equipment and dual use items. We believe that 
     Agreed Condition 7 to the Resolution of Ratification of 
     Advice and Consent the continuing vitality of the Australia 
     Group and national export controls is consistent with Article 
     X and XI, and the CWC as a whole. Accordingly, we believe 
     that Agreed Condition 7 should alleviate concerns raised by 
     critics of the CWC concerning United States obligations under 
     Articles X or XI. Furthermore, we would note that the United 
     States has never been prevented (or seriously challenged) 
     from legally pursuing unilateral and multilateral export 
     controls on nuclear technology that it deems necessary on 
     national security grounds, despite objections from certain 
     states citing Article IV of the NPT. We do not believe that 
     the CWC requires any different course.
       Throughout the Chemical Weapons Convention is a manifest 
     effort to balance the elimination of chemical weapons with 
     the legitimate security requirements of States as well as 
     their legitimate need to use, develop and trade chemicals for 
     commercial purposes. The critical characterization of the CWC 
     quoted in the first paragraph of this letter focuses on 
     selected provisions of the CWC reflecting only one side of 
     this balancing effort, misreads those provisions to render 
     them obligatory instead of voluntary or conditional, and 
     ignores the language of the treaty as well as principles of 
     international law. We disagree. We do not believe Articles X 
     and XI require the United States to take any steps contrary 
     to its security interests. Accordingly, we do believe that 
     Disagreed Condition 32, which would require an amendment to 
     strike Article X and amend Article XI, is legally unnecessary 
     to preserve U.S. security interests if the United States 
     ratifies the CWC.
           Respectfully,
     Abe Chayes,
       Harvard Law School.
     Elliot L. Richardson,
       Former Secretary of Defense and Attorney General, Nixon 
     Administration.
     Michael Moodie,
       Former Bush Administration arms control negotiator.
     John B. Rhinelander,
       Former deputy legal advisor and arms control negotiator, 
     Nixon Administration.
     George Bunn,
       Center for International Security and Arms Control, 
     Stanford University.
     Barry Kellman,
       DePaul University Law School.
     David Koplow,
       Georgetown University Law School.

  Mr. BIDEN. More to the point, even if we were obligated--which we're 
not, we maintain export controls on chemical defense equipment. In 
other words, we do not allow it to be sold to the rogue states.
  The only specific obligation contained in Article Ten is in paragraph 
seven, which is where you provide assistance to nations facing attack 
by chemical weapons.
  This provision also has much flexibility--it allows a nation to 
choose one of three methods for providing assistance.
  But to ensure that this paragraph does not become a loophole, we have 
added a binding condition, condition number fifteen, which limits the 
type of assistance we will provide--at least when it comes to countries 
ineligible for economic or military assistance, which includes the 
rogue states--to medical antidotes and treatment.
  Let me now turn to Article Eleven. The proponents of this condition 
contend that this article requires us to weaken our export controls 
under the CWC.
  There is nothing in the CWC that requires us to weaken our export 
controls. But just to ensure that there isn't any doubt, we have agreed 
to a binding condition that addresses the problem.
  Condition seven requires the President to certify that nothing in the 
Convention requires us to weaken our export controls, and that the 
Australia Group--an informal group of potential supplier states to 
which the United States belongs--will continue to maintain controls 
over chemical weapons precursors that are equal to, or exceed, those in 
effect today.
  the Australia Group has already indicated, as a group, that it would 
maintain its export controls. On October 17, 1996--a little more 
recently than the statement read by the Senator from Arizona--the 
Australia Group stated that the ``maintenance of effective export 
controls will remain an essential practical means of fulfilling 
obligations under the CWC.''
  But just to be sure, I asked the administration to ask each country--
individually--whether it intended to maintain existing levels of 
controls. The answers have come back--all in

[[Page S3635]]

the affirmative--as the president stated today in his letter to the 
majority leader.
  Finally, the President committed today, in the event that either 
Article Ten or Article Eleven to legitimate trade in a manner that 
endangers our security, the President will consult promptly with 
Congress on whether we should withdraw from the Convention.
  This is an extraordinary commitment. So I hope it resolves everyone's 
concern.
  Mr. President, I reserve the remainder of the time on the bill. I 
think I have used up all the time on the amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. There is 1 minute remaining on the amendment.
  Mr. BIDEN. Oh, there is 1 minute remaining on the amendment? Mr. 
President, in that case I have another 10 minutes.
  No, if the majority is ready to yield back their time, I will yield 
back my minute.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Carolina.
  Mr. HELMS. A bum deal, just like this treaty.
  Mr. BIDEN. I reserve the remainder of my time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I always enjoy holding court with my friend 
from Delaware. We have had some of these debates in the past, and this 
is the thing that lawyers like to argue about, but I believe that most 
lawyers will agree with me that what they learned in law school was 
that the specific provisions of the contract always prevail over a 
general statement at the beginning of the contract. There are a lot of 
rules of instruction. Later provisions generally govern over previous 
provisions on the theory that you later describe your intent, fully 
cognizant of what existed before. The same thing is true with specific 
provisions of the contract, and that is why article I is called, not 
``CWC article I,'' but rather ``general article.'' ``Article I, General 
Obligations.''
  Then article II is definitions, and after that are the specifics. 
This is the reason why the Australia Group itself issued a statement 
right after this convention was entered into undertaking to review, in 
light of the implementation of the convention, the measures that they 
take to ``prevent the spread of chemical substances and equipment for 
purposes contrary to the objectives of the convention with the aim of 
removing such measures for the benefit of states parties to the 
convention acting in full compliance with the obligations under the 
convention.''
  Australia Group members would not have had to do this under the 
interpretation of the convention by my friend from Delaware. Rather, 
they began to do this because they read articles X and XI the same as 
the many experts do that I cited earlier as limiting our ability to 
impose trade restrictions on states parties to the convention. That is 
why it says we will undertake to facilitate, and the other states 
parties have the right to the fullest possible trade in these chemical 
weapons. This is not just my view. I read to you what Secretary Cheney 
said before, James Schlesinger, former Secretary of Defense and head of 
the CIA. It is plain that article X legitimizes such transfers.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware has 33 seconds.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in 
the Record a letter dated October 17, 1996--speaking of superseding--
which supersedes the statement referred to by my colleague about the 
Australia Group. It says:

       In this context, the maintenance of effective export 
     controls will remain an essential practical means of 
     fulfilling obligations under the CWC and the BTWC.

  Translated into ordinary English, it means that we adhere to the 
commitment we made in the Australia Group with export controls. We 
believe it is consistent with the CWC and required by the CWC.
  There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                        Australia Group Meeting

       Australia Group participants held informal consultations in 
     Paris between Oct. 14-17, to discuss the continuing problem 
     of chemical and biological weapons (CBW) proliferation. 
     Participants at these talks were Argentina, Australia, 
     Austria, Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, the 
     European Commission, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
     Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, 
     Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, 
     Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom 
     and the United States, with the Republic of Korea taking part 
     for the first time.
       Paticipants maintain a strong belief that full adherence to 
     the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and to the Biological 
     and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) will be the best way to 
     eliminate these types of particularly inhumane weapons from 
     the world's arsenals. In this context, the maintenance of 
     effective export controls will remain an essential practical 
     means of fulfilling obligations under the CWC and the BTWC.
       All participants at the meeting welcomed the expected entry 
     into force of the CWC*, noting that this long-awaited step 
     will be an important, historic moment in international 
     efforts to prohibit chemical weapons. Participants agreed to 
     issue a separate statement on this matter, which is attached.
       Participants also welcomed the progress of efforts to 
     strengthen the BTWC in the negotiations taking place in the 
     Ad Hoc Group of BTWC States Parties in Geneva. All Australia 
     Group participating countries are also States Parties to this 
     Treaty, and strongly support efforts to develop 
     internationally-agreed procedures for strengthening 
     international confidence in the treaty regime by verifying 
     compliance with BTWC obligations.
       Experts from participating countries discussed national 
     export licensing systems aimed at preventing inadvertent 
     assistance to the production of CBW. They confirmed that 
     participants administered export controls in a streamlined 
     and effective manner which allows trade and the exchange of 
     technology for peaceful purposes to flourish. They agreed to 
     continue working to focus these national measures efficiently 
     and solely on preventing any contribution to chemical and 
     biological weapons programs. Participants noted that the 
     value of these measures in inhibiting CBW proliferation 
     benefited not only the countries participating in the 
     Australia Group, but the whole international community.
       Participants also agreed to continue a wide range of 
     contacts, including a further program of briefings for 
     countries not participating in the Paris consultations to 
     further awareness and understanding of national policies in 
     this area. Participants endorsed in this context the 
     importance of regional seminars as valuable means of widening 
     contacts with other countries on these issues. In particular, 
     Romania's plans to host a seminar on CBW export controls for 
     Central and Eastern European countries and the Commonwealth 
     of Independent States in Bucharest on Oct. 21-22 and Japan's 
     plans to host a fourth Asian Export Control Seminar in Tokyo 
     in early 1997 were warmly welcomed by participants. Argentina 
     will also host a regional seminar on non-proliferation 
     matters, in Buenous Aires, in the first week of December 
     1996. France will organize a seminar for French-speaking 
     countries on the implementation of the CWC. This will take 
     place shortly before entry into force of the Convention.
       The meeting also discussed relevant aspects of terrorist 
     interest in CBW and agreed that this serious issue requires 
     continuing attention.
       Participants agreed to hold further consultations in 
     October 1997.


 AUSTRALIA GROUP COUNTRIES WELCOME PROSPECTIVE ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE 
                      CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

       The countries participating in the Australia Group warmly 
     welcomed the expected entry into force of the Chemical 
     Weapons Convention (CWC) during a meeting of the Group in 
     Paris in October 1996. They noted that the long awaited 
     commencement of the CWC regime, including the establishment 
     of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, 
     will be an historic watershed in global efforts to abolish 
     chemical weapons for all time. They also noted that all 
     states adhering to the CWC are obliged to ensure their 
     national activities support the goal of a world free of 
     chemical weapons.
       All of the participating countries reiterated their 
     previous statement underlining their intention to be among 
     the original States Parties to the CWC. They noted that 24 of 
     the 30 countries participating in the Australia Group have 
     already ratified the Convention. Representatives also 
     recalled their previous expressions of support for the CWC, 
     and reaffirmed these commitments. They restated their view 
     that the effective operation and implementation of the CWC 
     offers the best means available to the international 
     community to rid the world of these weapons for all time. 
     They called on all signatories to ratify the CWC as soon as 
     possible, and on the small number of countries which have not 
     signed the Treaty to join the regime and thereby contribute 
     to international efforts to ban these weapons.
       Representatives at the Australia Group meeting recalled 
     that all of the participating countries are taking steps at 
     the national level to ensure that relevant national 
     regulations promote the object and purpose of the CWC and are 
     fully consistent with the Convention's provisions when the 
     CWC enters into force for each of these countries. They noted 
     that the practical experience each

[[Page S3636]]

     country had obtained in operating export licensing systems 
     intended to prevent assistance to chemical weapons programs 
     have been especially valuable in each country's preparations 
     for implementation of key obligations under the CWC. They 
     noted in this context, that these national systems are aimed 
     solely at avoiding assistance for activities which are 
     prohibited under the Convention, while ensuring they do not 
     restrict or impede trade and other exchanges facilitated by 
     the CWC.

  Mr. BIDEN. We are ready to vote, Mr. President.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time has expired. The question is on 
agreeing to amendment No. 51. The yeas and nays have been ordered. The 
clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk called the roll.
  The result was announced--yeas 66, nays 34, as follows:

                       [Rollcall Vote No. 50 Ex.]

                                YEAS--66

     Akaka
     Baucus
     Biden
     Bingaman
     Boxer
     Breaux
     Bryan 
     Bumpers
     Byrd
     Chafee
     Cleland
     Coats
     Cochran
     Collins 
     Conrad
     D'Amato
     Daschle
     DeWine
     Dodd
     Domenici
     Dorgan 
     Durbin
     Feingold
     Feinstein
     Ford
     Frist
     Glenn
     Gorton 
     Graham
     Hagel
     Harkin
     Hatch
     Hollings
     Inouye
     Jeffords 
     Johnson
     Kennedy
     Kerrey
     Kerry
     Kohl
     Landrieu
     Lautenberg 
     Leahy
     Levin
     Lieberman
     Lugar
     McCain
     Mikulski
     Moseley-Braun 
     Moynihan
     Murray
     Reed
     Reid
     Robb
     Roberts
     Rockefeller 
     Roth
     Sarbanes
     Smith (OR)
     Snowe
     Specter
     Stevens 
     Torricelli
     Warner
     Wellstone
     Wyden 

                               NAYS--34 

     Abraham
     Allard
     Ashcroft
     Bennett
     Bond
     Brownback 
     Burns
     Campbell
     Coverdell
     Craig
     Enzi
     Faircloth 
     Gramm
     Grams
     Grassley
     Gregg
     Helms
     Hutchinson
     Hutchison 
     Inhofe
     Kempthorne
     Kyl
     Lott
     Mack
     McConnell
     Murkowski 
     Nickles
     Santorum
     Sessions
     Shelby
     Smith (NH)
     Thomas 
     Thompson
     Thurmond
  The amendment (No. 51) was agreed to.
  Mr. HELMS. I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. BIDEN. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  Mr. DASCHLE addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The minority leader.
  Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I be allowed 
to use the 5 minutes allocated to each leader for purposes of closing 
debate in addition to my 15 minutes for the leader in an effort to make 
my statement at this point in the debate.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, let me begin by commending the 
distinguished majority leader for his leadership on this issue and for 
his eloquent statement earlier today. I think he spoke for a large 
number of the American people, both Republicans and Democrats in coming 
to the conclusion he did about this treaty. I rise to commend him and 
to support him in the decision that he made.
  I also wish to commend the distinguished ranking member of the 
Foreign Relations Committee, the Senator from Delaware, for his 
leadership on our side of the aisle. No one could have managed this 
bill better. And we could not have come to this point were it not for 
the remarkable commitment he has made in the effort to pass this 
treaty. I thank him for his leadership in bringing us to this point 
tonight.
  Under the terms of article II, section 2 of the Constitution, the 
Senate alone was granted the power to advise and consent to treaties 
made by the President. Our Founding Fathers also decided that approval 
by a simple majority was simply not sufficient for legislation of this 
magnitude. Instead, they established the requirement that two-thirds of 
the Senate must support a treaty for it to take effect.
  This is as it should be. There is no more important or unique power 
assigned to the Senate by the Constitution than the authority to 
provide advice and consent on treaties. With this authority, however, 
comes obligations. Senators must examine a treaty not through a prism 
of narrow political pursuits, but rather from the perspective of broad 
national interests.
  Put simply, the most important question we should ask ourselves when 
considering the Chemical Weapons Convention, or any other treaty, is, 
does this make sense for the Nation and are its citizens more secure?
  Mr. President, after a thorough review of this treaty, its 
negotiating history, and the 28 conditions added by the Senate, I 
believe the answer to this question is a resounding and unqualified 
yes.
  The Chemical Weapons Convention bans the development, production, 
stockpiling, and use of toxic chemicals as weapons. A look at the 
negotiating history of the CWC reveals that this treaty is truly a 
bipartisan product. Negotiations, as has been mentioned now on several 
occasions throughout the day, began with President Reagan in the early 
1980s.
  While the bulk of the negotiations and most of the difficult 
decisions occurred during the Bush administration, President Clinton 
finished the work started by his two predecessors and submitted the 
treaty to the Senate for consideration in November of 1993.
  The Senate's counsel on crucial issues was sought and provided 
repeatedly throughout the course of the decade-long negotiations. 
Playing an especially important role in this regard was the Senate's 
Arms Control Observer Group, a bipartisan gathering of Senators with 
special interests and expertise in arms control matters. Currently, 
Senators Stevens and Byrd lead the group.
  In addition, since the treaty has been before the Senate for nearly 3 
years, Members have had ample opportunity to request the information 
needed to reach their judgment, and more than sufficient time to carry 
out a thorough examination of the treaty's impact on our national 
security.
  During that 3-year period, nearly 20 hearings have been conducted in 
several different Senate committees, including Armed Services, Foreign 
Relations, Intelligence, and Judiciary. In addition, the administration 
has made available over 1,500 pages of documentation on the Chemical 
Weapons Convention and answered over 300 questions from Senators and 
their staffs.
  Moreover, as a result of intensive, around-the-clock negotiating 
sessions between the administration, Senator Helms and Senator Biden, 
the resolution of ratification now contains 28 separate conditions on 
the U.S. Senate's resolution of ratification. That is 28 individual 
clarifications by the Senate about the terms and conditions under which 
the U.S. would enter into the Chemical Weapons Convention. These 
conditions were the product of over 100 hours of discussion. And I am 
told that the vast majority of the conditions address problems first 
raised by Republicans. I think it is safe to say that these list of 
conditions address virtually every legitimate concern that has been 
raised about the potential impact of the CWC on our national security 
and economy.

  Mr. President, we must now evaluate what has been revealed during 
this process that has spanned three Presidential Administrations and 
includes numerous hearings, briefings and mounds of documents. What 
have we determined about the merits of the CWC in the nearly 3\1/2\ 
years since President Clinton submitted it to us?
  First, officials from previous Administrations who were involved in 
the CWC negotiations support the treaty. General Brent Scowcroft, the 
National Security Advisor to Presidents Reagan and Bush, has said the 
following:

       ``The time has come for the Senate to uphold U.S. 
     leadership in combating the proliferation of weapons of mass 
     destruction by providing its consent to the [Chemical 
     Weapons] Convention.

  And President Bush himself, in a February meeting with Secretary of 
State Madeleine Albright and former Secretary of State James Baker, 
noted:

       ``I . . . strongly support efforts to get this chemical 
     weapons treaty approved. This should be beyond partisanship. 
     I think it is vitally important for the United States to be 
     out front. . . . We don't need chemical weapons, and we ought 
     to get out front and make clear that we are opposed to others 
     having them.''

  Second, what are the views of America's chemical manufacturers--the 
industry that will be most directly affected by the provisions of the 
CWC? The chemical industry is America's largest export industry, 
posting $60 billion in export sales last year alone. Opponents of this 
treaty claim its ratification will lead to onerous and costly

[[Page S3637]]

restrictions and regulations on this industry as well as the exposure 
of confidential, proprietary information.
  The chemical industry has repeatedly refuted these claims; yet, it 
appears that CWC's critics are so blinded by their ideological zeal to 
kill all arms control treaties that they cannot take no for an answer. 
One of the industry's best responses was contained in a letter sent 
late last year to the distinguished Majority leader, Senator Lott. This 
letter is an important one, so I will quote it at length:

       ``The chemical industry has long supported the Chemical 
     Weapons Convention. Our industry participated in negotiating 
     the agreement and in U.S. and international implementation 
     efforts. The treaty contains substantial protections for 
     confidential business information. We know because industry 
     helped to draft these provisions . . . In short, our industry 
     has thoroughly examined and tested this Convention. We have 
     concluded that the benefits of the CWC far outweigh the 
     costs. . . . Indeed, the real price would come from not 
     ratifying the CWC. . . . If the Senate does not vote in favor 
     of the CWC, we stand to lose hundreds of millions of dollars 
     in overseas sales, putting at risk thousands of good-paying 
     American jobs.''

  So says the chemical industry in a letter signed by the CEOs of 53 of 
America's preeminent chemical manufacturers. Signees include the ARCO 
Chemical Company, the Ashland Chemical Company, the Bayer Corporation, 
the B.F. Goodrich Company, the Dow Chemical Company, the Eastman 
Chemical Company, the E.I. Dupont Company, the Exon Chemical Company 
and the Monsanto Company. I should also note that these companies 
issued this statement before we agreed upon the 28 conditions I 
discussed earlier, several of which would further reduce the 
possibility that proprietary information from American businesses would 
fall into the hands of our adversaries.
  Well, Mr. President, what about the military? After all, it is our 
men and women in uniform who must face, as they did in Desert Storm, 
the threat of an attack from lethal chemical weapons. Make no mistake. 
We are talking about invisible and instantaneous killers. What about 
our people in the Pentagon who have to make the decisions that may 
ultimately lead to the exposure of our troops to that insidious threat? 
General Shalikashvili, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee:

       ``The potential benefits of the Chemical Weapons Convention 
     will have a positive impact on the lives of our service 
     people and how the U.S. military fulfills its responsibility 
     to national security.''

  In another appearance before the Foreign Relations Committee, General 
Shalikashvili noted:

       ``From a military perspective, the Chemical Weapons 
     Convention is clearly in our national interest. The non-
     proliferation aspects of the convention will retard the 
     spread of chemical weapons and, in so doing, reduce the 
     probability that U.S. forces may encounter chemical weapons 
     in a regional conflict.''

  Some may argue that General Shalikashvili is but one general who was 
appointed by President Clinton. To those skeptics, let me say three 
things. First, General Shalikashvili's record of service to this 
country is unparalleled. Second, a comprehensive review of this record 
will not reveal a single instance where he failed to offer anything but 
than his objective, untarnished opinion. Third, he is not alone.

  An April 3 letter to the President states the following:

       The CWC destroys stockpiles that could threaten our troops; 
     it significantly improves our intelligence capabilities; and 
     it creates new international sanctions to punish those states 
     who remain outside of the treaty. For these reasons, we 
     strongly support the CWC.

  Mr. President, that letter was sent on behalf of 16 three- and four-
star generals and admirals, including Colin Powell, John Vessey, and 
Norman Schwartzkopf. This letter, in addition to an endorsement by 
David Jones, means that every occupant in the last 20 years of the 
position of chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, this Nation's 
highest military office, has come out in support of the CWC.
  The final group the Senate has heard from in its efforts to weigh the 
pros and cons of the Chemical Weapons Convention is the intelligence 
community. The task of verifying this treaty, like other arms control 
treaties, ultimately falls on the shoulders of the Central Intelligence 
and the other organizations within the intelligence community. Despite 
the most comprehensive, intrusive verification regime in the history of 
arms control, critics of CWC argue that it is unverifiable; if they had 
their way, the Senate would reject the CWC because the intelligence 
community will be unable to detect any violations of the treaty itself. 
But in this case, the perfect is the enemy of the good.
  While the intelligence community has rightly acknowledged that it 
cannot detect any production of chemical agents--anywhere or at 
anytime--it has also said that it can effectively verify the provisions 
of this treaty. Moreover, the critics' argument ignores the fact that, 
with or without the Chemical Weapons Convention, our intelligence 
community will still seek to collect information on efforts by foreign 
nations to develop and produce chemical weapons. The more important 
question is whether our intelligence and nonproliferation efforts are 
helped or hindered by the adoption of the treaty.
  According to James Woolsey, then director of the Central Intelligence 
Agency, and since confirmed by George Tenet, acting director of the 
CIA:

       The Intelligence community has the broader mission--with or 
     without the treaty--of detecting the existence and assessing 
     the threat from chemical weapons programs of any country. 
     This mission must be carried out regardless of whether we 
     have the additional requirement to assess such activities 
     against the provisions of the treaty. And it is to this 
     broader mission that the CWC can make a significant 
     contribution.

  The Senate has heard from President Reagan's National Security 
Advisor, from President Bush, from the leading figures in the chemical 
industry, from the current chairman of the JCS, three of his 
predecessors and 14 other three- and four-star generals and admirals, 
and from the intelligence community. Each of these groups and 
individuals have looked at the CWC from their unique perspectives and 
interests and each has reached the same conclusion: the Senate should 
support this treaty and should do so promptly.
  Mr. President, I would submit since the Senate received the CWC 
treaty for its advice and consent, one other group has spoken all too 
loudly to us: those who commit terrorist acts. In the 3\1/2\ years this 
treaty has been before the Senate, terrorist incidents have occurred 
with a sickening and disturbing regularity: the sarin gas attack in the 
Tokyo subway; the bombing of the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma 
City; the attack on Khobar Towers in Dharan, Saudi Arabia; the 
suspected bombing of TWA flight 800; the bombing in Olympic Park in 
Atlanta. Each incident has painfully dramatized the fact that we live 
in an age where, unfortunately, no one is inoculated against the threat 
of terrorism. No community stands outside the reach of determined 
terrorists. As President Clinton noted in a recent address, ``Terrorism 
has become an equal opportunity destroyer, with no respect for 
borders.''
  This treaty is an opportunity to send a small message to those who 
threaten our families, our communities and our way of life with their 
unprovoked acts of violence.
  The United States Senate has heard what terrorists have to say. 
Today, with our votes on this treaty, we determine how the United 
States Senate will respond to these acts. I hope we will send the 
message that we are going to do all we can to ensure that these deadly 
chemicals will never be the means terrorists employ to advance their 
cause. It is time we said to the terrorists, on the issue of chemical 
weapons, enough is enough.
  Now the argument will be made that this treaty will not halt 
terrorism, will not shut down the private laboratories of insane 
extremists and will not halt the efforts of various rogue nations.
  To a certain degree, that is probably true. But what this treaty will 
do is begin the orchestration of a concert of nations--an orchestration 
of civilized voices that speaks out forcefully against an unambiguous 
evil.
  Tonight America has the opportunity to make the moral stand. We are 
destroying our own chemical stockpiles. We began that cleansing process 
under President Reagan and it continues today. Why should we oppose a 
treaty that demands the world to live up to a moral standard that we 
have already willingly accepted ourselves? Why deprive ourselves of the 
right to call upon our neighbors to live up to the example

[[Page S3638]]

that we in the United States are willing to act?
  In summary, Mr. President, this is a necessary treaty. It has been 
endorsed by a bipartisan group of Senators who are experts on this 
issue, by advisors to Presidents Reagan and Bush, and President 
Clinton, by the U.S. military, by our chemical industry and by our 
intelligence community.
  To all of this I would add two final points. First, over 80 percent 
of the American people have indicated their support for ridding the 
world of toxic agents by ratifying the CWC. Second, over 70 countries 
have already ratified this treaty and thereby forsworn the use of 
chemical weapons. Mr. President, this treaty is going to happen with or 
without us. I urge the Members of this body to set aside partisan 
differences, demonstrate leadership to our friends and enemies alike, 
join with those who have already ratified this treaty and take the 
first step toward eliminating these evil weapons. Mr. President, I ask 
that the Senate ratify this treaty.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. BIDEN. How much time remains?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Carolina has 21 
minutes, the Senator from Delaware has 7 minutes, the Senator from 
Vermont has 8\1/2\ minutes, and the majority leader has 5 minutes.
  Mr. BIDEN. I yield myself such time as I may consume under the 7 
minutes. I do not plan on using it all.
  Mr. President, it has been a long road to this spot, this point. We 
have had not only extensive debate in the last 2 days, we have had an 
extensive debate on this floor, in committees, in the press, among 
foreign policy experts, think-tank types, for the past 3 years. We 
reached the point where we are constitutionally required to fulfill a 
duty of either giving our consent to ratification or withholding it. As 
both leaders have pointed out, it is maybe the most significant 
responsibility delegated to the U.S. Senate
  I realize that we sometimes stand on this floor, particularly when 
any one of us and all of us have invested a significant amount of time 
in one issue or another where we feel that we have spent most of our 
waking hours for the past month, two, or three--everyone has 
experienced that on this floor--and we tend to think that since we put 
so much time into the passage of a piece of legislation, or in this 
case, a treaty, that maybe it is the most important thing that the 
Senate has done or could do because I guess we say to ourselves we 
would not invest that much of our time, our energy, our mind, our soul, 
into the effort if it was not so important.
  Acknowledging that we all err on that side of thinking what we do is 
sometimes more important than what it is, I respectfully suggest that 
the vote each of us is about to cast on this treaty is likely to be the 
most significant vote any of us cast in this Congress.
  Twice today I have been referred to as the senior Senator from 
Delaware. I want the record to show, I know I am the junior Senator. I 
am the second most senior junior Senator in the United States. I have 
been here 25 years, but that young man in the back there is the most 
senior junior Senator, the distinguished Senator from South Carolina, 
Senator Hollings, because the most senior Senator of senior Senators is 
his colleague, Senator Thurmond.
  Mr. President, I am not sure that there is any vote that I have cast 
in the last 4 or 5 years that I think is as significant for the future 
of the United States as this treaty. And as I said, and I will conclude 
with this, not merely because of what the treaty attempts to do--and 
that is, for the first time in the history of modern man, ban even the 
possession of an entire category of weaponry--but that is not the 
reason why this is the most important vote. We are at a juncture in our 
history, Mr. President, in my opinion, where the United States has an 
opportunity, which rarely comes to any nation in its history--it has 
come to us, in my opinion, on two occasions--where our actions and our 
leadership can literally, not figuratively--and it is not hyperbole--
can literally shape, at least on the margins, the future of the world.

  After World War II, we stepped up to the plate. My father's 
generation and my grandfather's generation and grandmother's and my 
mother's generation stepped up to the plate. They did things, when we 
look back on them, that must have taken incredible courage. Can you 
imagine having over 10 million men still under arms and standing up as 
a Senator, or as a President, or as a Secretary of State, and saying, 
by the way, I want us now to send billions of dollars to those people 
who killed our sons and daughters? That was the Marshall Plan. Can you 
imagine the foresight it took and how difficult it must have been to 
cast a vote to set up an outfit called NATO, of which Germany, our 
sworn enemy that killed our sons and daughters, were members? Those 
people had courage. But they did what the Senator from Indiana, Senator 
Lugar, said: They led.
  This is about leadership. This is about the role of the United States 
in leading the world. If we refrain from exercising that opportunity--
and we will if we do not vote for this treaty--we will have passed up 
an opportunity that, as I said, rarely comes to any nation in the 
history of the world. We can affect, if we are wise, the behavior, 
activity and actions for a generation to come, not for what is 
contained in this treaty, but because of the leadership that was 
demonstrated in drafting this treaty, in ratifying this treaty and 
enforcing this treaty.
  So, Mr. President, I realize that all of us--myself included--tend to 
engage in hyperbole and rhetoric that doesn't mean the substance of 
what we are talking about. But I honestly believe this is one of the 
most important votes, in terms of the future of this country and its 
ability to lead at a moment in history that seldom comes to any nation, 
that may be the most important vote that any of us will cast. If we 
embark on this path of continuing to engage the world and lead the 
world, we maintain the reasonable prospect that we can make the world--
the world--a better place in which to live.
  I yield the remainder of my time, and I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator from North 
Carolina.
  Mr. HELMS. I am profoundly disappointed in the five votes of the 
Senate on the important, vital amendments. After all the debate, all 
the gallons of newspaper ink spilled, all of the negotiations--
ultimately, I had hoped for better. But so be it.
  There isn't a person in this room, rhetoric aside, who can believe 
that the amendments that we have just considered are ``killer 
amendments.'' The nature of international relations, and of treaties is 
that what is negotiated can be renegotiated, and if necessary, 
negotiated anew. If our aim is a better future, what are a hundred more 
meetings in Geneva, or Vienna or the Hague? These amendments would have 
ensured that this treaty did no harm, even if it did no good.
  Now, we must vote on a treaty that, stripped of these key 
protections, four former Defense Secretaries have told us is contrary 
to the national security interests of the United States.
  The truth is that I cannot abide the pretense of action on a matter 
as weighty as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. If we 
ratify this treaty today, the Senate, with the President, will announce 
to the world that we have done something about the scourge of chemical 
weapons. We will pat ourselves on the back and go home.
  But, Mr. President, we will have done nothing. And, worse than 
nothing, we will have done harm. In the name of curbing the 
proliferation of these chemicals, we will allow rogue states to gain 
access to our most precious defense secrets. We will guarantee that 
rogue nations of the World--both those who have signed this treaty and 
those who have not--have the ability to manufacture chemical weapons 
and penetrate our Nation's most advanced chemical defenses.
  Article X and XI--``Poisons for Peace''--will foster the 
proliferation of those very poisons. Anyone who doubts that need only 
look to how Russia has abused similar provisions in the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty. The N.P.T.'s ``Atoms for Peace'' provisions 
allows Russia to transfer to Iran, a terrorist state, a nuclear 
reactor. Russia has argued that the sale is perfectly legal, and Russia 
is right. Iran, despite its nuclear weapons program and its chemical 
weapons program, is a nation

[[Page S3639]]

in full compliance with the Non-Proliferation Treaty. And so it will 
get one nuclear reactor from Russia, maybe more. And perhaps China will 
throw in a reactor or two as well. And we can do nothing to stop it.
  The administration says that we will not sell Iran chemical 
technology or defensive gear under the similar provisions of the CWC. 
We are not selling them nuclear reactors either. Russia is.
  And it will not be the United States which provides Iran the chemical 
technology. They will get it from Russia and China under ``Poisons for 
Peace.'' And Iran will give it to its terrorist allies Syria and Libya, 
who have not signed up to the treaty. And we will be powerless to 
protest--because if we ratify this treaty, here, today, in this body, 
we will have endorsed those transfers.
  Now this morning the President has offered us some sweeteners for the 
hemlock he is asking us to swallow. He promises to keep an eye on any 
problems Articles X and XI may cause. I appreciate his willingness to 
recognize the legitimacy of the concerns my colleagues and I have 
expressed. However, I can't help but feel that this last ditch attempt 
to buy off opponents to this dangerous treaty is nothing more than 
empty promises.
  I am a veteran of the counter-proliferation wars. Every week, I see 
more and more classified information about proliferation activities 
that should require the President, under existing law, to levy 
sanctions against Russia, China, or both. We never do, and we won't 
under the terms of the CWC with or without the assurances under Article 
X and XI. The President doesn't want to fight with those 800-pound 
gorillas. In much the same way as we will turn a blind eye while Russia 
helps Iran get a nuclear weapon, we will allow others to develop 
chemical weapons. And there won't be a darn thing we'll be able to do.
  Should Articles 10 and 11 of the CWC be renegotiated? Yes. Did the 
Senate err by stripping out the protections we inserted that would have 
required the administration to do so? Yes. And I am deeply disappointed 
that I was unable to convince my colleagues of the danger to the people 
of the United States and our allies. We have made a terrible, 
potentially cataclysmic, mistake today in ignoring the desperate need 
to revise the terms of this treaty.
  Without revision of Articles 10 and 11, this treaty is bad for 
America, and bad for the world. It must be voted down. For it we ratify 
this treaty, our children and our grandchildren will hold us 
accountable. They will hold us accountable when Iran or Syria or Libya 
or North Korea finally uses a chemical weapon--and they will do so--
built with technology they acquired thanks to Articles 10 and 11 of the 
CWC. They will look back on this debate, look back on where each us of 
stood, and--mark my words--they will hold us accountable.
  Mr. President, let us listen to the wisdom of the four former 
Secretaries of Defense, who have urged us to oppose this treaty. Let us 
listen to the mountain of evidence--classified and unclassified--that 
has been presented over the past two days as to the dangers posed by 
this treaty. And most important, let us listen to our consciences. Let 
us vote to reject the Chemical Weapons Convention.


                            Amendment No. 52

  Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask for 
its immediate consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from North Carolina [Mr. Helms], for Mr. Biden, 
     proposes an amendment numbered 52.

  Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the 
amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       On page 2, line 18, strike ``payments'' and insert ``any 
     payment''.
       On page 6, line 3, strike ``the head of''.
       On page 8, line 2, insert ``or such other organization, as 
     the case may be,'' after ``nization''.
       On page 8, line 10, insert ``or the affiliated 
     organization'' after ``tion''.
       On page 9, line 11, insert ``or the affiliated 
     organization'' after ``Organization''.
       On page 9, line 17, insert ``or the affiliated 
     organization'' after ``Organization''.
       On page 13, line 21, insert ``, and any official or 
     employee thereof'' after ``it''.
       On page 14, line 5, insert ``, and any official or employee 
     thereof'' after ``functions''.
       On page 15, lines 6 and 7, strike ``to United States 
     ratification'' and insert ``affecting the object and 
     purpose''.
       On page 18, line 2, insert ``support for'' after 
     ``resolution of''.
       On page 20, line 12, strike ``citizens,'' and insert 
     ``citizens and''.
       On page 23, line 18, strike ``obligation'' and insert 
     ``obligations''.
       On page 25, line 19, strike the comma.
       On page 32, line 13, insert ``of Representatives'' after 
     ``House''.
       On page 32, lines 19 and 20, strike ``Foreign Military 
     Sales, Foreign Military Financing,'' and insert ``Foreign 
     Military Sales and Foreign Military Financing under the Arms 
     Export Control Act''.
       On page 34, line 1, strike ``Committee'' and insert 
     ``Committees''.
       On page 34, line 3, insert ``the'' after ``and''.
       On page 37, line 11, insert a comma immediately after 
     ``games''.
       On page 40, line 9, strike ``of'' and insert ``for''.
       On page 41, line 16, insert ``of the Convention'' after 
     ``ratification''.
       On page 47, line 19, insert ``the ratification of'' after 
     ``to''.
       On page 49, line 5, move the margin of ``(i)'' 2 ems to the 
     right.
       On page 49, line 11, move the margin of ``(ii)'' 2 ems to 
     the right.
       On page 49, line 16, move the margin of ``(iii)'' 2 ems to 
     the right.
       On page 52, line 9, insert a comma after ``(D)''.
       On page 53, line 21, strike the comma.
       On page 55, line 4, insert ``a schedule of'' after ``to''.
       On page 57, line 1, strike ``the'' the first place it 
     appears and insert ``to''.
       On page 59, line 15, strike the comma.
       On page 61, line 11, strike ``on an involuntary basis''.
       On page 61, line 12, insert ``where consent has been 
     withheld,'' after ``States,''.
       On page 8, line 8, insert ``, if accepted,'' after 
     ``provision''.
       On page 25, line 19, insert ``on Intelligence'' after 
     ``tee''.
       On page 27, line 7, strike ``is'' and insert ``are''.
       On page 27, line 22, insert ``on Intelligence'' after 
     ``Committee''.
       On page 57, line 15, strike ``Ruanda'' and insert 
     ``Rwanda''.

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the amendment is agreed to.
  The amendment (No. 52) was agreed to.
  Mr. KEMPTHORNE. Mr. President, it was President Ronald Reagan who 
said, ``Trust but verify.'' Sound advice I believe we should heed 
today.
  Reluctantly, I rise in opposition to the Chemical Weapons Convention. 
Do I want to see the elimination of chemical weapons and deadly 
poisons? Absolutely. Will the proposed treaty actually prevent the use 
of chemical weapons? Not in my opinion. As I've listened carefully to 
all of the arguments, I have concluded the proposed treaty will not do 
what it is intended to do, and, in fact, may actually do more harm than 
good.
  Again, trust but verify.
  Like many Americans, I took notice when four recent Secretaries of 
Defense came out in opposition to the Chemical Weapons Convention. The 
opposition of Secretaries Schlesinger, Cheney, Rumsfeld and Weinberger 
is based, in part, on the fact that the treaty is not verifiable. In 
other words, we have no way of knowing if our ``partners'' in this 
agreement are living up to their end of the deal. Like the four former 
Secretaries of Defense, I am troubled by statements by CIA and 
Department of Defense officials that admit they do not have ``high 
confidence'' the treaty can be verified, key provisions ``can be 
thwarted'' and detection of small amounts of chemical weapons ``will 
admittedly be extremely difficult.'' In my mind, the admission of 
Clinton Administration officials that the treaty is not verifiable 
raises serious questions about the value of the agreement.
  The Chemical Weapons Treaty also contains provisions, Articles X and 
XI, which mandate the sharing of all chemical equipment and technology, 
including chemical weapons defensive technology, with other countries. 
These provisions might allow countries like Iran and Iraq to acquire 
advanced defensive technologies so they can improve their chemical 
weapons combat capability. This exchange of technical information, 
mandated by the treaty, may also be used to develop ways to defeat our 
chemical weapons defensive technology. Because of these flaws in the 
treaty, Secretary Cheney wrote ``In my judgement, the treaty's Articles 
X and XI amount to a formula for greatly accelerating the proliferation 
of chemical warfare capabilities around the

[[Page S3640]]

globe.'' This mandated sharing of technology represents one example of 
how the treaty may actually do more harm than good.
  I want to point out that one of the conditions removed from the 
Resolution of Ratification directed the U.S. to renegotiate Articles X 
and XI to ensure the treaty does not inadvertently increase the threat 
of chemical weapons. The Clinton Administration viewed the requirement 
to renegotiate the treaty as a ``killer amendment'' and encouraged the 
Senate to strike this condition. Under pressure from the President, the 
Senate voted to remove this condition so renegotiation of these 
important articles will not happen.

  In addition, the President's letter to Majority Leader Lott on the 
day of the vote acknowledges that there are legitimate security 
concerns regarding the flaws in Articles X and XI. I'm troubled because 
the letter is non-binding and it will be three years before we will 
discover if Articles X and XI lead to the proliferation of chemical 
weapons technology. The President says the U.S. could then withdraw 
from the Convention, but by then the damage will have been done.
  If I believed this treaty by itself would stop chemical weapons, I 
would support it. During my own deliberations regarding the CWC, I had 
a thoughtful discussion with James Schlesinger, a former Secretary of 
Defense, Secretary of Energy and Director of the Central Intelligence 
Agency. Secretary Schlesinger made the point that although scores of 
nations ratified the Geneva Protocol which claimed to ``prohibit'' the 
use of poison gas, Iraq used mustard gas against Iran and its own 
citizens with impunity. In my mind, this episode demonstrates one of 
the weaknesses of international treaties which sound good on the 
surface but lack enforcement procedures in practice.
  I am also concerned about the provisions of the Chemical Weapons 
Convention which will allow international inspectors access to chemical 
businesses and other important national security facilities. The idea 
that North Korea or Iraq can come into the United States and examine 
our facilities and then take that information home to help their own 
chemical and defense industries is wrong. The treaty makes no 
arrangement to compensate businesses for the loss of this sensitive 
data. This is another reason I believe the Chemical Weapons Convention 
will, in fact, do more harm than good.
  As a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, I understand the 
military threat posed by chemical weapons. I continue to support 
efforts to destroy the U.S. chemical weapons stockpile in a safe and 
environmentally sensitive manner. I oppose any use of these horrible 
weapons and I believe the United States should threaten massive 
retaliation against any nation that might consider using these weapons 
against our citizens or soldiers. I am also very proud of the 
leadership role of the United States in the fight to stop the spread of 
chemical weapons. Without a doubt, this leadership role will continue 
whether or not we ratify the CWC.
  But we must also be honest with ourselves. The Chemical Weapons 
Convention cannot be verified. The treaty will not prevent countries or 
terrorists from acquiring or using chemical weapons. The treaty may in 
fact increase proliferation of advanced defensive technologies and the 
treaty may jeopardize proprietary information of U.S. companies.
  As I weigh these facts, I conclude the Chemical Weapons Convention 
will do more harm than good and I will cast my vote against the 
ratification of this treaty.
  Mr. DeWINE. Mr. President, I will vote today to ratify the Chemical 
Weapons Convention (CWC). I do so without any illusions. I have 
concluded that it will be of marginal benefit, but that its benefits do 
outweigh the risks. Clearly, no chemical weapons treaty can be 100% 
verifiable. Inside the CWC, there is at least a better chance of 
catching violators than if we remain outside the treaty.
  I commend the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, Senator 
Helms, as well as Senator Kyl, and others who have worked so hard to 
improve this treaty. As a result of their efforts, for example, we 
retain the right for our troops to use tear gas in hostage rescue 
operations; we require search warrants in cases where consent is not 
granted to protect 4th amendment rights; and we restrict U.S. 
assistance to rogue nations under Article X to medical antidotes and 
humanitarian assistance.
  This is a historic agreement bringing together 74 countries that have 
ratified the treaty in a comprehensive, worldwide fight, to ban 
chemical weapons. The treaty requires all nations to follow America's 
lead to destroy all chemical stockpiles by 2007. The CWC also provides 
for sanctions against those who trade in chemical agents with non-
parties to the treaty. These provisions will help to ensure that on a 
future battlefield our troops will be less likely to face chemical 
agents.
  Passage of this treaty should not bring a false sense of security. A 
treaty alone will not protect our troops and citizens from chemical 
weapons. We should continue to devote attention and resources to 
improving our chemical weapons defenses. We should provide our troops 
with the equipment and training they need in combat situations. The 
parties to this treaty must also take action against violators who 
resort to using chemical weapons. As a member of the Intelligence 
Committee, I will work to ensure that the goals of this treaty are not 
lost in its implementation.
  Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I rise today in support of the 
resolution of ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention.
  I am pleased that--more than 3 years after the administration sent 
this treaty to the Senate--the CWC is finally before us on the floor of 
this Chamber.
  In these three years, Mr. President, three Senate committees have 
held numerous hearings--nearly 20 of them--on the efficacy of this 
treaty. As a Member of both the Foreign Relations and Judiciary 
Committees, I have been privileged to participate in several of these 
hearings and to hear numerous perspectives during this debate.
  More recently, several Senators and Administration officials have 
spent a considerable amount of time negotiating the terms under which 
this treaty would come to the floor. And so I think we should all thank 
the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee [Mr. Helms] and the 
Senator from Delaware [Mr. Biden], the ranking member of that 
committee, for the time they both have spent on this issue.
  I would also like to recognize the efforts of the White House Working 
Group and the Lott Task Force to come to a consensus on the aspects of 
this treaty on which we can agree. I know that the Members and 
Administration officials involved in these negotiations have spent 
hours reviewing countless technical details. It is because of these 
efforts that the resolution of ratification before us today contains 28 
agreed-upon conditions. These conditions were carefully crafted by our 
colleagues to respond to Members' specific concerns. I am myself 
comfortable with these conditions, which, for the most part, duly 
exercise the Senate's prerogatives with respect to treaty ratification, 
and instruct the administration to undertake certain commitments. They 
also require greater reporting requirements which will help the Senate 
to monitor U.S. participation in the Convention in the future.
  I am pleased that our colleagues have come to agreement on these 
points, because throughout the deliberations over this convention, I 
have made two observations: No. 1 the CWC is not a perfect document, 
and No. 2 notwithstanding that, the CWC is the best avenue available 
today for beginning to control the spread of chemical weapons, and 
leading, eventually, to the total elimination of such weapons.
  Like any document arrived at through consensus, the Chemical Weapons 
Convention can not claim to address every party's concerns. But, it is 
my view that the 28 agreed-upon conditions in the resolution before us 
today serve to strengthen what we do have.
  Let me speak first on my initial point--that the CWC is not a perfect 
document. There are real flaws that we all recognize, and that experts 
both pro and con acknowledge, related to the verifiability of the CWC. 
There may well be cheating, evasions, and attempts to disobey the 
spirit, as well as the letter, of the treaty. Some of this cheating may 
escape detection--although not enough, I believe, to pose a

[[Page S3641]]

legitimate threat to the security of the United States.
  Nevertheless, I think we gain more by establishing an international 
regime that prohibits such behavior than we do by refusing to exercise 
U.S. leadership in that regime.
  My second, and more important, point is this: The CWC is the best 
avenue available today for beginning to control the spread of chemical 
weapons, and leading, eventually, to the total elimination of such 
weapons.
  Those countries that do ratify the treaty--and this group represents 
most of the responsible players on the international stage--recognize 
that through the CWC, the world firmly rejects the existence and use of 
chemical weapons. The treaty puts in place mechanisms to enforce its 
precepts and monitor its progress, and signatories are committed to 
complying with these mechanisms.
  What of the handful of nations who flout international will, and will 
not sign on to this treaty?
  First, defense experts at the very top of our military command 
structure are satisfied that the use of chemical weapons by these so-
called rogue states does not pose a significant threat to our national 
security. In March 1996, then-Secretary of Defense William Perry told 
the Foreign Relations Committee that he was ``damm sure'' that the 
United States could respond massively and effectively to any chemical 
weapons challenge.
  Moreover, the CWC will make it easier for the international community 
to track the chemical ingredients necessary for weapons production and 
to inhibit the flow of these materials to rogue or non-signatory 
states. The Convention will impose trade sanctions on non-signatory 
countries whether or not they are known to posses chemical weapons. 
This provision was devised by the Bush administration specifically to 
make it expensive for countries not to join this Convention.
  As Secretary of State Madeleine Albright said in testimony before the 
Foreign Relations Committee earlier this month, ``These penalties would 
not exist without the treaty. They will make it more costly for any 
nation to have chemical weapons, and more difficult for rogue states or 
terrorists to acquire materials needed to produce them.''
  Those states that we are most concerned about currently are unwilling 
to accept the norms that the treaty would establish. That is why they 
have thus far chosen not to ratify. But it is just as clear these 
states will never accept the treaty if the United States refuses to 
ratify.

  This is why I plan to vote in favor of striking the so-called killer 
amendments that would tie the deposit of our instrument of ratification 
to the actions of these nations.
  If the linkage were to remain in the resolution, the Senate would 
become responsible for painting the United States into a very 
uncomfortable corner, a corner from which we would be unable to exit. 
Such conditions would force the United States, which led the 
negotiations of this treaty, to engage in a game of chicken with other 
countries. It should instead join our allies in ratifying this treaty.
  Mr. President, this treaty provides a solid start to limiting the 
flow of chemical weapons.
  It urges the destruction of all chemical weapons. It will provide 
more information about the prevalence of chemical weapons than we have 
ever had before. And it will make the dissemination of such weapons--
and the materials used to make them--more actionable than they have 
ever been before.
  Mr. President, do I think the treaty could be improved? Of course. So 
I am pleased that the CWC has the provision for amendment after it 
comes into force.
  But now is not the time to debate amendments to the treaty. One 
hundred sixty-one nations have signed the Chemical Weapons Convention 
and 74 of them have ratified it.
  I think we can all assume that--just as we played a leading role in 
negotiating the existing treaty--the United States will again be at the 
forefront of efforts to make the treaty more effective after a period 
to test its utility. We have the technological means and the economic 
weight to do so. But only if we ratify this treaty prior to its entry 
into force on April 29. Only by that deadline--now less than a week 
away--will the United States be a full participant in the Organization 
for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons [OPCW], the governing body that 
will have the responsibility for deciding the terms for the 
implementation of the CWC.
  Would I like to see the enforcement provisions of the CWC written in 
a less ambiguous manner? Certainly.
  Could sanctions against violators be spelled out more clearly? 
Absolutely.
  But the CWC was laboriously crafted throughout three decades to meet 
the security and economic interests of States' Parties. The United 
States led this effort, and the treaty which we are voting on reflects 
our needs. As Secretary Albright has said, this treaty has ``Made in 
the USA'' written all over it. That is why the CWC has the blessing and 
enthusiastic support of our defense and business communities.

  Mr. President, I would like to address an issue that is of particular 
importance to me, and that is the potential constitutional implications 
of this treaty.
  In particular, the argument has been made, incorrectly in my opinion, 
that adoption of the CWC would subvert, in some way, the constitutional 
protections of the fourth amendment which--as Americans--we all enjoy. 
Let me say at the outset that preserving the fourth amendment is a 
responsibility that I take very seriously and very personally. My 
concern about preserving the protections of the fourth amendment does 
not end at the corners of this treaty. I have opposed in this Congress 
proposals to weaken the fourth amendment's protections, for example, in 
the area of wire taps.
  In fact, I am pleased to see that throughout the debate over this 
treaty, many of my colleagues have taken an active interest in 
promoting the rights bestowed upon us by the fourth amendment. Indeed, 
I welcome the opportunity to work with these members on future 
initiatives related to this vital provision of our Constitution.
  With respect to the claim that ratification of this treaty risks 
constitutional protections for Americans, I think three points need to 
be stressed.
  First, this treaty, and in particular the inspection language 
therein, is the product of bipartisan efforts spanning many years. In 
fact, it was the Bush administration which rejected efforts to adopt 
overly broad, and undoubtedly unconstitutional inspection proceedings 
in favor of those in the treaty today.
  Second, although the treaty itself acknowledges the supremacy of the 
constitutions of its signatories, this would be the case even without 
specific language. The Senate cannot, be it through signing a treaty or 
passing a law, subvert any of the protections guaranteed by our 
Constitution. That is the very essence of our Constitution: it is the 
bedrock of our freedoms and cannot be abrogated short of amendment to 
the Constitution itself.
  Mr. President, during a Judiciary Committee hearing last September, I 
questioned Professor Barry Kellman of the DePaul Law School on various 
aspects of the constitutionality of this treaty and on each of the 
points I have raised here today. On each point, Professor Kellman was 
in agreement with me. In fact, Professor Kellman, who has dedicated 
many years, and much time and energy to reviewing the constitutional 
implications of the Chemical Weapons Treaty, testified that, ``every 
serious scholar'' who has looked into the issue has found this treaty 
to be constitutional.
  Finally, to the extent there are concerns to be addressed, and there 
may be, the proper context for airing those concerns is during what I 
expect to be a lively discussion over the implementing legislation, 
which we will have a chance to debate in the next several weeks. It is 
in the implementing legislation--not the treaty itself--where these 
issues should be addressed and resolved.

  I look forward to working with concerned colleagues as we consider 
implementation of the treaty, so I am pleased that the unanimous 
consent agreement arrived at regarding the resolution of ratification 
before us today included the intent to debate and vote on the 
implementing legislation prior to the Memorial Day recess.
  As the debate over the implementing language continues, I will work 
with

[[Page S3642]]

my colleagues to ensure that the language we ultimately adopt fully and 
properly reflects the protections embodied in the United States 
Constitution.
  In the interim, however, we should not become side-tracked by 
arguments that this treaty is unconstitutional or subverts the fourth 
amendment. The inspections conducted pursuant to this treaty will be 
conducted pursuant to the Constitution of this nation. Nothing in this 
treaty can, nor does it even attempt to, alter that simple, but 
fundamental fact.
  Mr. President, I support the ratification of the Chemical Weapons 
Convention which I believe is in the best interests of the United 
States.
  And if the Senate is to lend its support to this treaty, we must vote 
to strike each one of the five conditions before us. Four of these 
would pronounce the treaty dead on arrival by linking the deposit of 
the U.S. instrument of ratification to conditions that are simply 
impossible to achieve--by April 29, or at any time in the near future. 
The other condition would establish a precedent for the selection of 
inspectors that would greatly undermine the entire inspection process.
  Mr. President, it is imperative that those of us who support this 
treaty help strike the language that would undermine U.S. participation 
in the Convention in this manner.
  And, after doing so, Mr. President, I hope my colleagues will join me 
in voting for final passage of the resolution of ratification.
  Mr. LAUTENBERG. Mr. President, I rise to urge my colleagues to ratify 
the Chemical Weapons Convention.
  The Chemical Weapons Convention is a historic arms control treaty 
which will significantly enhance America's security. The treaty 
prohibits the development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, and 
transfer of chemical weapons by those countries that are signatories. 
It requires signatories to begin to destroy their chemical weapons 
within a year and to complete destruction of chemical weapons within 
ten years. Importantly, it prohibits the use of chemical weapons in 
combat, and it prohibits signatories from helping other countries to 
engage in any activity banned by the treaty. As such, the Chemical 
Weapons Convention is an important non-proliferation tool that will 
help slow the spread of dangerous chemical weapons and force the 
destruction of most of the world's chemical weapons stockpiles.
  President Reagan recognized the wisdom of working to ban chemical 
weapons worldwide. Under his administration, negotiations on the terms 
of a chemical weapons treaty began. Those negotiations continued under 
President Bush, who signed the treaty. Now, five years after 
completion, with the full support of President Clinton, the Chemical 
Weapons Treaty is before the Senate for ratification.
  There are many good reasons to support the Chemical Weapons Treaty. 
First, and foremost, this treaty will protect America's military from 
the threat of chemical weapons attack without requiring America to give 
up anything militarily. The United States has already decided to 
destroy its stockpile of chemical weapons and has vowed not to use 
chemical weapons in warfare. Because the Chemical Weapons Convention 
requires other nations to abandon chemical weapons as the United States 
has done, America gains from this treaty. We give up nothing, and our 
troops will be less likely to face poison gas in future conflicts.
  Civilians in America and worldwide will benefit from Senate 
ratification of this treaty as well. Last year's terrorist attack in 
Japan, in which chemical weapons were used against innocent civilians, 
reminds us that none of us is safe from the threat of chemical weapons. 
As long as chemical weapons are produced and stockpiled, the 
possibility remains real that they will end up in the hands of 
terrorists. Because the Chemical Weapons Convention requires all 
countries to enact laws making it a crime to develop or produce 
chemical weapons, the treaty will make it harder for terrorists to 
obtain chemical weapons, making America's cities, streets, and schools 
safer.
  Additionally, the Chemical Weapons Convention will help America and 
the intelligence community to better track and control the spread of 
chemical weapons and to punish violators. Through the verification 
regime established by the treaty, our country will have an easier time 
monitoring chemical weapons threats and establishing rigorous 
verification procedures to prevent cheating.
  Already seventy countries have ratified the treaty, and it will go 
into effect with or without the United States. But if the Senate does 
not ratify the treaty, America will be siding with rogue nations like 
Iraq and Libya. If the Senate does not ratify the treaty, American 
industry will be sanctioned and will lose roughly $600 million in 
trade, a point I addressed more fully in an earlier speech to the 
Senate. If the Senate does not ratify the treaty, America will not be 
able to participate in the body that will determine the rules for 
implementing the treaty. And if the Senate does not ratify the treaty, 
America's credibility as a proponent of nonproliferation and arms 
control will be jeopardized.
  Mr. President, there is no doubt in my mind that the United States 
should join a treaty we helped to shape and which enhances our 
security. With the Chemical Weapons Convention and our leadership, 
other nations will follow the lead America set years ago by giving up 
chemical weapons. Rogue nations and terrorist countries will have a 
harder time acquiring or making chemical weapons, and new tools will be 
available to prevent and punish them if they try. America is much 
better off with the Chemical Weapons Convention than without it, and I 
urge my colleagues to ratify it without delay.
  Mr. GORTON. Mr. President, I have thought long and hard on whether I 
should vote to ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention. I must admit 
that as the Convention was originally presented, I was inclined to 
oppose it. But after three weeks of hard work with the Majority Leader 
and with the many thoughtful opponents of ratification, I believe we 
have resolved a significant number of issues in contention and now 
believe that ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention will do 
more to reach our common goal of eradicating these deadly and detested 
weapons from the earth than will non-ratification.
  First, I would like to commend my many constituents, and the 
thousands of Americans like them, who were relentless in raising their 
voices against many dangerous aspects of the treaty and its 
interpretation. Without their vigilance, we would never have reached 
the point we have today.
  I also commend Senator Helms, Senator Kyl, and the Majority Leader 
for their work and negotiations with the Administration that has led to 
vast improvements in the Chemical Weapons Convention ratifying 
documents.
  Since the beginning of the debate on the Chemical Weapons Convention, 
I have stated that the real question is not whether to support the 
cause of restricting the production, stockpile, and use of chemical 
weapons throughout the world, but whether the Chemical Weapons 
Convention itself advanced or inhibited this honorable cause.
  As it was originally presented to the Senate for ratification, Mr. 
President, I believe the treaty did not advance our cause, but instead 
inhibited it by making sensitive information on chemicals and chemical 
weapons technology so readily available as to encourage the 
proliferation of these hideous weapons. But through the good work of 
Senator Helms and Senator Kyl, we were able to reach 28 agreements with 
the Administration. These 28 agreements went a long way toward 
advancing our cause. I think three of these agreements are particularly 
important.
  First, I shared the concern of many of my constituents and several 
former Secretaries of Defense who testified before the Armed Services 
Committee that the convention would create a false sense of security, 
not only in the United States, but in nations around the world. It 
would be easy, Mr. President, for governments to believe that, because 
the Chemical Weapons Convention is in force, we no longer need to worry 
about the use of chemical weapons or to prepare ourselves to defend 
against them. I found this aspect of the treaty to be quite troubling.
  No arms control treaty has yet proven to be perfect. And chemical 
weapons are far more difficult to detect than missiles or nuclear 
warheads. Thus, I originally feared that ratification of the treaty 
would lull us into a false sense of security in which our armed forces 
would not be properly prepared to deal with a chemical attack.

[[Page S3643]]

  I now believe, however, that the agreement reached between Senator 
Helms and the Administration that ensures our armed forces will 
continue to receive the equipment and training necessary to complete 
their missions in the face of chemical weapons is a major 
improvement which will guard against a debilitating false sense of 
security.

  Second, I and many of my constituents had grave concerns about the 
treaty's impact on Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable 
searches and seizures. The treaty, in its original form, did not go far 
enough to protect U.S. citizens and businesses from involuntary 
inspections. The treaty's provisions on challenge inspections of 
chemical producing facilities in the United States did not, in my 
opinion, comply with the Constitution.
  I am pleased that the administration has agreed to a condition to 
protect the Fourth Amendment rights of all Americans and to conform the 
Chemical Weapons Convention to the United States Constitution. 
According to this condition, before the U.S. deposits its instrument of 
ratification, the President must certify to Congress that for any 
challenge inspection in the United States for which consent has been 
withheld, the inspection team must first obtain a criminal search 
warrant based upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, 
and describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be 
seized. For any routine inspection of a declared facility in the United 
States that is conducted on an involuntary basis, the inspection team 
must obtain an administrative search warrant from a United States 
magistrate judge.
  I am now confident that this agreement will ensure that the 
constitutional rights of U.S. citizens and businesses will be protected 
under the treaty. I commend Senators Helms and Kyl and the 
administration for their work on this vitally important condition.
  Third, I was troubled by the treaty's impact on the use of non-lethal 
riot control agents. Since the Chemical Weapons Convention was 
originally drafted, there has been a great deal of debate in the United 
States on whether the treaty language would preclude American armed 
forces from using non-toxic riot control agents. Tear gas and other 
such chemicals provide the United States military with an invaluable 
tool when conducting sensitive operations. Tear gas, for example, is an 
excellent means of rescuing downed pilots, or avoiding unnecessary loss 
of life when enemy troops and civilians are in the same area.
  I am pleased with the agreement that has been reached on this issue. 
According to a condition the administration has now accepted, the 
President will certify to Congress that the United States is not 
restricted by the convention in the use of riot control agents in the 
following situations: (1) in the conduct of peacetime military 
operations within an area of ongoing armed conflict when the United 
States is not a party to the conflict; (2) in consensual peacekeeping 
operations when the use of force is authorized by the receiving state; 
and (3) in peacekeeping operations when force is authorized by the 
Security Council under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. The 
agreement also leaves in place Executive Order 11850 signed by 
President Ford which cites four cases where the use of riot control 
agents should be permissible under the Chemical Weapons Convention: 
avoiding unnecessary loss of life, subduing rioting enemy POWs, 
protecting supply convoys, and rescuing a downed pilot from enemy 
troops or a POW from behind enemy lines. I commend the administration 
for agreeing to this reasonable and necessary condition. It will ensure 
that the men and women of the United States armed forces have the tools 
necessary to do their jobs in precarious situations.
  While the 28 agreements made did go a long way to improve the 
Chemical Weapons Convention, I still had one remaining concern, in my 
view the most important concern, until this morning. That concern 
relates to Articles X and XI of the convention and the proposition that 
they might well force the United States to share sensitive information 
on our chemical weapons defense capabilities and to eliminate our 
export controls on dangerous chemicals.
  Article X of the treaty obliges all parties to provide assistance and 
protection to any State Party threatened by the potential use of 
chemical weapons, including information on chemical weapons defense and 
detection. Article XI of the treaty obliges all parties to freely 
exchange chemicals, equipment and scientific and technical information 
relating to the development and application of chemistry for purposes 
not prohibited by the Convention. It forbids parties to the treaty to 
maintain export controls that would restrict the trade and development 
of chemicals and chemical technology with other treaty parties.
  Ironically, these provisions of the treaty, a treaty designed to 
eliminate the proliferation of chemical weapons, could in fact promote 
that very proliferation. If the United States is forced under the 
treaty to provide this sensitive technology to countries such as Iran, 
China, or Cuba, those countries could use that information to develop 
weapons against which we have no ability to defend.
  It is my contention that Articles X and XI do more to inhibit the 
cause of eradicating chemical weapons than they do to promote it. Thus, 
they comprise a fatal flaw in the Chemical Weapons Convention. And, 
until today, I was inclined to vote against ratification because of my 
concerns on Articles X and XI.
  I am pleased to say, however, that the distinguished Majority Leader 
was remarkably successful in his negotiations with the President on 
this most important aspect of the debate on the treaty. I commend him 
for his diligence and commend the President for his wisdom in 
responding to our concerns.
  This morning, the President sent Senator Lott a letter in which he 
extended a promise that the United States will withdraw from the 
Convention if Articles X and XI are used by other treaty parties to 
undermine the intent of the Convention. The specific circumstances 
under which the President agreed to withdraw from the treaty are as 
follows: (1) if Article X is used to justify actions that could degrade 
U.S. defensive capabilities; (2) if Article XI erodes the Australia 
Group export controls; and (3) if Article XI promotes increased 
proliferation of chemical weapons.
  With this assurance from the President, I am now prepared to support 
the Chemical Weapons Convention and will vote for its ratification. 
With the 28 agreements Senator Helms and Senator Kyl were able to 
negotiate, and with this final commitment from the President, I am 
comfortable with the treaty. The Convention has been transformed from 
one doing more harm than good, to one promoting rather than inhibiting 
the cause of eradicating chemical weapons from the earth.
  In closing, Mr. President, let me say that these changes could not 
have been made without the diligent and good-faith negotiating done by 
the majority leader, and without the voices raised by thousands upon 
thousands of Americans who went out of their way to draw attention to 
the treaty's many flaws. They should be given the lion's share of 
credit for the conditions and modifications we have made that make the 
Chemical Weapons Convention a more workable, more responsible treaty.
  Mr. BAUCUS. Mr. President, I rise today to express my firm support of 
the Chemical Weapons Convention Treaty. I have thought long and hard on 
this issue. And I believe that my colleagues--both for and against this 
treaty--have shown patience, diligence and understanding during this 
important debate.
  I also believe the time has come for us to lead the civilized world 
in signing this treaty. And to remember why, we need to look back to 
our history.
  On October 30, 1918, 12 days before the end of the First World War, 
the 362nd Infantry Division received orders to attack German positions 
outside the city of Audenarde in France. Many Montanans served in this 
division.
  During this battle, German troops lobbed several gas shells toward 
the Montana troops. The wind that morning just happened to be blowing 
to the east, and the gas carried over the American area.
  The men of the 362nd fought valiantly that day. And in the end, they 
overtook the German positions with a minimal loss of life. But they, 
and hundreds of thousands of other World War

[[Page S3644]]

I veterans, carried scars in their lungs for the rest of their lives. 
It made breathing difficult and left many of them invalids.
  Chemical weaponry has come a long way in the 79 years since that 
battle took place. Modern technology has made this type of warfare more 
devastating and more deadly. It can now kill instantly as well as scar 
and maim the lungs.
  Chemical warfare is an indiscriminate killer. It cannot tell the 
difference between a soldier and a civilian, a bunker from a subway, or 
a barracks from a school.
  And worst of all, some chemical weapons are relatively easy to 
create. As we have seen in recent news reports, if the substances used 
to create chemical weapons are freely available, terrorist groups and 
cults can make them and use them against civilians.
  This, of course, often makes them hard to detect. So the critics of 
this Convention have a point when they say it will be hard to verify.
  But this agreement will make it much easier than it is now for us to 
find out when rogue states try to create or stockpile chemical weapons. 
We will have the right to inspect the factories and defense 
installations of those we suspect are creating these weapons. And we 
will be able to block those who do not sign from buying the substances 
they need to create chemical weapons.
  That is why this treaty has wide support. If we choose not to ratify 
it, we cast ourselves with such countries as Iraq and Libya--one which 
used chemical weapons against Iran and its own Kurdish citizens, 
another suspected of clandestine efforts to create a chemical weapons 
program.
  And we make it more likely that some day, another generation of 
American servicemen and servicewomen will suffer the same kind of 
outrageous attack that the Montanans in the 362nd went through in 1918. 
That must not happen. And the Senate must pass this Convention.
  If we ratify this treaty now, we allow the United States to 
participate in its administration from the outset. To fail to ratify 
the treaty is to lose our seat at the table. I want to make sure that 
we put American inspectors on the ground to ensure the eventual end of 
these horrible weapons.
  Again, I urge my colleagues to join me in supporting this treaty. And 
I look forward to the day we remove chemical weapons from the face of 
the earth.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I rise today to join my colleagues in 
addressing the issue of ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention 
(CWC).
  While some who are less familiar with the advice and consent process 
may regret the pace the Senate has undertaken, I strongly believe it is 
a point of pride. The Senate, led by Majority Leader Lott, Senator Kyl, 
Senator Helms, Senator Lugar and many others, has painstakingly 
reviewed the CWC for many months. The 33 conditions which have been the 
subject of protracted negotiations have created a document which better 
protects our nation's security interests. I congratulate Senator Lott 
and the rest of the participants for their efforts.
  Despite the best efforts of all involved I continue to harbor a 
number of strong reservations about the convention. I am concerned 
about its verifiability, the impact on U.S. business, the effect on 
U.S. efforts to eliminate existing chemical weapons stockpiles, and the 
number of rogue nations which are not party to the CWC.
  Former CIA director James Woolsey testified that detection of 
violations of the CWC is so difficult that we cannot ``have high 
confidence in our ability to detect noncompliance, especially on a 
small scale.'' Nowhere is this more evident than Iraq. In a recent 
column, Charles Krauthammer pointed out that Iraq has been subjected to 
the most intrusive, comprehensive inspections for weapons of mass 
destruction ever devised or implemented by an international 
organization. Yet, we continue to uncover secret sites and weapons and 
have no confidence we know the extent of Saddam Hussein's lethal 
stockpile. If we are uncertain under the best of conditions, we should 
not underestimate the significant risks under adverse circumstances.
  Mr. President, my second concern is the unforseen impact inspection 
requirements might have on U.S. businesses. One estimate puts the 
number of Kentucky businesses which are likely to be impacted by the 
CWC at 44. Not all of these companies are large enough to be able to 
afford the increased costs of additional burdensome regulations. The 
chemical industry is already one of the most over-regulated industries 
in America. Currently, the combined costs of EPA, OSHA and other 
federal regulations on the industry is near $4.9 billion annually. 
Adding to this incredible financial burden is overkill.
  In addition to the costly regulatory burdens CWC asks these companies 
to withstand, the treaty will require companies to open their books and 
facilities to foreign inspection teams--creating a Pandora's box of 
commercial hazards. Former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld points 
out, despite best efforts its possible, even likely, that inspection 
teams could come away with classified and proprietary information.
  Specifically, the inspection requirements may compel companies to 
provide proprietary technical data which could be used to considerable 
financial advantage by competitors. Worse yet, the results might enable 
adversaries to enhance their chemical weapons capabilities, putting 
American soldiers and citizens at potential risk. These risks 
underscore the need to include the imperative protections in Condition 
31 enabling the President to ban inspection teams with terrorist track 
records.
  The third issue of concern relates to Condition 27's direct affect on 
my state and on our ability to dismantle our existing stockpiles. 
Kentucky is home to the Lexington Bluegrass Army Depot where thousands 
of chemical munitions are currently stored. The community surrounding 
this facility is justifiably concerned over the method by which the 
weapons will be destroyed. The Treaty mandates signatories register 
specific technical plans for destruction shortly after the instruments 
of ratification are filed. This may undermine alternatives currently 
being explored.
  Let me explain. Last year, I offered an amendment to the Defense 
Appropriations Bill which directed the Secretary of Defense to pursue 
the acquisition of at least two alternative technologies to the current 
plan of incineration. Condition 27, provides some assurance that the 
development and use of alternatives to incineration would not be 
affected by the CWC regime. However, if this agreement between Congress 
and the Administration is overruled, reversed or challenged by the 
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, my constituents 
will be placed at increased risk. I accept the President's written 
guarantee at this point, but will keep a close watch to assure his 
commitment is not reversed or revised. I ask unanimous consent that a 
letter from President Clinton to me on this issue be included in the 
Record following my remarks.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection it is so ordered.
  (See exhibit 1.)
  Mr. McCONNELL. Condition 27 also presents another problem. Current 
law requires the President to destroy the U.S. stockpile by 2004. 
Condition 27 extends the deadline to 2007. Mr. President I am 
emphatically opposed to this provision. I do not believe it wise to 
give the Army, or any party the opportunity to slow down efforts to 
identify alternative technologies or to delay the destruction process.
  The weapons stored in the U.S. need to be dismantled now. They are 
aging and therefore becoming more unstable every day. As this occurs, 
safe destruction becomes increasingly difficult and the chance of an 
accident increases dramatically. I hope the Administration will not 
seek a delay in the destruction deadline unless it is absolutely 
necessary in order to undergo the safe and effective elimination of our 
weapons.
  Finally, Mr. President, the fact that many of the nations with either 
the intent or the means to attack U.S. soldiers and citizens with 
chemical weapons are not covered by the CWC is deeply troubling. Libya, 
Syria, Iraq and North Korea are all suspected of possessing chemical 
weapons and not one is a participant in the CWC. This fact is strong 
justification for maintaining Condition 30 which compels their 
participation.

  If the U.S. ratifies the CWC the horrors of chemical attack will not 
magically disappear. Those of us in the

[[Page S3645]]

United States Senate must remain vigilant in ensuring that America 
continues to prepare adequate defensive capabilities against potential 
chemical or biological attack. Incidents such as the sarin gas attack 
in the Tokyo subway cannot be prevented by this or any other treaty.
  The world remains a dangerous place and this treaty will not 
substantially change that fact. The Secretary of State insists that 
this Treaty is not about our chemical weapons--it is a means to limit 
other nations'. The plain fact is it will not constrain one nation from 
acquiring or using these weapons. Even if we are able to determine that 
a participating nation is violating the CWC, the means of redress or 
sanction available under the treaty are toothless and largely 
ineffective. The United Nations Security Council must craft penalties 
which could avoid potential Chinese or Russian vetoes. I am certain 
this would be a near impossible task.
  With these objections stated, it is clear that I do not believe the 
CWC is a perfect document. In fact, it remains unclear whether the 
treaty will have any of the positive effects its proponents allege.
  Why then do I feel compelled to support U.S. ratification? Quite 
simply it comes down to one issue--the necessity to sustain the 
strength and credibility of U.S. leadership. As the principal architect 
of the CWC, the United States risks our authority and stature should we 
refuse to ratify the convention. If this treaty is to enjoy any success 
it will be due to U.S. participation and leadership. As President Bush 
has stated repeatedly, ``it is vitally important for the United States 
to be out front.'' I also agree with former Secretary of State James 
Baker's assertion that failure to ratify the convention ``would send a 
message of American retreat from engagement in the world.''
  The United States must be in a position to lead, and it must use this 
leadership to push other nations to follow our example and eliminate 
their chemical stockpiles. Just this week we heard from a former high 
ranking North Korean official of that country's significant chemical 
and nuclear capabilities and willingness to use both. The U.S. must 
actively work to ensure that the North Korea's of the world recognize 
the futility in relying on these weapons. The CWC is a modest step on 
that road, a road which I hope yields success.

                               Exhibit 1


                                              The White House,

                                       Washington, March 19, 1997.
       Dear Senator McConnell: Thank you for your letter 
     concerning your support for the Chemical Weapons Convention 
     and for the alternative technologies program.
       I want to assure you that nothing in the Convention would 
     preclude the consideration of alternative technologies funded 
     by your amendment to the FY 1997 Defense Appropriations bill. 
     Indeed, the Administration has agreed to a condition to the 
     CWC resolution of ratification which makes clear my 
     commitment to exploring alternatives to incineration for the 
     destruction of the U.S. chemical weapons stockpile and 
     clarifies the relationship between the CWC and our chemical 
     weapons demilitarization program. A copy of the condition is 
     attached.
       I am gratified that you agree on the importance to U.S. 
     national security of banning the production, possession and 
     use of chemical weapons worldwide. I look forward to your 
     support for Senate ratification of the CWC in the weeks 
     ahead.
           Sincerely,
                                                     Bill Clinton.
  Ms. MOSELEY-BRAUN. Mr. President, in recent weeks we have heard a 
great deal about the Chemical Weapons Convention.
  We have talked about the risks of information sharing, the 
reliability of the verification systems, and whether Russia should go 
first. We have debated the dangers of exchanging inspectors, we have 
questioned whether outcasts like Iran, Iraq and North Korea should sign 
this international agreement, and whether anything would change if they 
did. Fundmentally, we have been considering whether the proposed treaty 
is a step forward, or whether it is worse than no treaty at all.
  Opponents have argued that the treaty is fatally flawed, and that the 
United States is better off without it. It's true that the Chemical 
Weapons Convention is not perfect. Chemical weapons are cheap and easy 
to make, and despite our best efforts, we will never be able to monitor 
every laboratory, or stop every nation in this world that is driven to 
make tools of biological warfare.
  But this debate is not about whether the treaty is perfect, or 
whether its provisions must be changed. This debate is about what 
happens if the United States fails to act.
  Every weapon of war is horrible. While the bloodshed, violence and 
destruction caused by things that kill people cannot be ranked, death 
by poison gases or viruses is particularly grisly. I am reminded of the 
words of Erich Maria Remarque in his novel about men lost to poison gas 
attacks during the Great War in the early part of this century:

       We found one dug-out full of them, with blue heads and 
     black lips. Some . . . took their masks off too soon . . . 
     they swallowed enough to scorch their lungs. Their condition 
     is hopeless; they choke to death with hemorrhages and 
     suffocation--``All Quiet on The Western Front'' Erich Maria 
     Remarque.

  It was experiences like this that helped to generate worldwide hatred 
and fear of chemical weapons, and is what led to the Geneva Protocol of 
1925.
  In the 70 years since that time, negotiations have been conducted, 
conferences have been held, and agreements have been signed to 
permanently ban chemical weapons from the earth. It is universally 
recognized that outlawing chemical and biological weapons and their 
manufacture--while it might not completely prevent any use in future 
conflicts--is the right thing to do.
  That's why it is incredible to me, less than a week before the 
ratification deadline, that this treaty has become a point of political 
division here in the U.S. Senate.
  This treaty is the first global arms control agreement to ban an 
entire class of weapons. Participating states must destroy their 
chemical weapons within 10 years of the treaty's enactment and pledge 
to never make them again. The agreement also creates an international 
organization to monitor compliance, and signatories must exchange data 
and permit routine inspections of their facilities.
  Nations refusing to participate will be barred from purchasing the 
ingredients necessary to make chemical weapons and many commercial 
chemical products, and will face heightened scrutiny over their 
chemical weapons activities. Their chemical and biotechnology 
industries will face great international trade obstacles.
  Opponents of the Chemical Weapons Convention argue that this treaty 
should not be ratified because countries such as Iraq, Iran and Syria 
are not signatories. They argue that the treaty is unverifiable, that 
it is intrusive and damaging to confidential trade information held by 
the U.S. chemical industry, and that, due to the Clinton 
administration's refusal to modify article 10 and 11, the United States 
will be forced to share critical technology with other nations.
  I do not subscribe to this interpretation. The sanctions provided by 
this treaty for nonmembers were designed with the distinct 
understanding that pariah states were unlikely to join the agreement, 
and therefore would be isolated and targeted for sanctions. 
Furthermore, article 10 does not obligate the United States to share 
chemical defense technologies and equipment with member or nonmember 
states. Article 10, in fact, provides the United States with the 
flexibility to determine how and what types of assistance should be 
provided to signatories. Article 11 will not force private businesses 
to release proprietary information. The convention legally binds 
signatories, via article 1, never to engage in any activities 
prohibited under the convention, greatly decreasing the likelihood that 
nations would seek to profit by giving secrets to non-signatories.
  For the American people, the benefits of the Chemical Weapons 
Convention are clear. Its provisions will diminish the threat of 
chemical warfare against our young troops overseas. It will help 
protect Americans at home from terrorist attacks like the kind that 
occurred in the Tokyo subway. And it gives us new tools to help us 
track down and punish nations that violate this treaty.
  The amount of good that this treaty can accomplish has been 
recognized by the rest of the civilized world. One hundred and sixty-
four nations have signed, and seventy-four nations have ratified this 
agreement. The treaty,

[[Page S3646]]

which was negotiated by the Republican administrations of Reagan and 
Bush, has been endorsed by military leaders like General Powell and 
General Schwartzkopf. It's supported by the chemical manufacturers, and 
most significantly, it is supported by the American people.
  The Senate has less than 1 week, however, to ratify this treaty. If 
we miss the April 29 deadline, the world will move ahead without us, 
and the United States will lose a critical opportunity to take a stand 
against the worldwide proliferation of chemical weapons. America will 
lose its seat at the table in the international enforcement process, 
and American inspectors will be barred from examining foreign 
facilities. Our chemical industry will lose hundreds of millions of 
dollars per year as a result of the treaty's trade restrictions. And we 
will sit on the sidelines with outlaw nations like Libya, North Korea, 
Iraq, and Iran.
  The United States is not an outlaw nation, and should not be 
considered one because of our failure to act. We cannot stop these 
deadly weapons alone, and the world cannot stop these weapons without 
us. As President Clinton said in his State of the Union Address, ``We 
must be shapers of events, not observers.'' If we want to continue our 
leadership role into the next century, then it is time for the United 
States to be leagued with the rest of the world and put an end to these 
weapons of death.
  We have a clear choice. We can take the path of political 
partisanship, and stand in isolation. Or we can set aside discord, take 
responsibility for our children's future, and ratify this agreement.
  This is the decision that the Senate must make. In the 100 years 
since the Hague Conventions, a historic opportunity is within reach to 
ban chemical weapons forever. It is time for the Senate to complete the 
job and ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention.
  Ms. MIKULSKI. Mr. President, I support the ratification of the 
Chemical Weapons Convention. This international treaty is our best hope 
to end the use of lethal chemical weapons. It will protect Americans by 
making it harder for terrorists to produce chemical weapons and it will 
protect our soldiers on the battlefield. This treaty will make America 
and the world more secure.
  The Chemical Weapons Convention bans the development, production, 
stockpiling, and use of chemicals as weapons. Each and every nation 
that signs this treaty becomes an ally in the fight against chemical 
weapons used by terrorists or by outlaw states. If we don't ratify this 
treaty, America will join countries like Libya and Iraq who refuse to 
join the worldwide effort to end the use of chemical weapons. I can't 
speak for my colleagues, but I know that this Senator does not want the 
United States to be aligned with those terrorist states.
  The Chemical Weapons Convention is not a liberal or a conservative 
document. It is not a Democratic or a Republican document. It was 
negotiated by the Reagan and Bush administrations and it is supported 
by the Clinton administration. It is in the tradition of a nonpartisan 
foreign policy.
  The Chemical Weapons Convention was made in America. It is 
inconceivable that we--the world's only superpower--would refuse to 
ratify a Convention that we were instrumental in drafting.
  Of course no treaty can ever eliminate every threat. That is why the 
United States must continue to maintain our strong chemical weapons 
defense program. At the Aberdeen Proving Ground in Maryland, scientists 
and technicians are developing better ways to protect our troops from 
the effects of chemical weapons. This important work must continue.
  In addition, our intelligence agencies, like the National Security 
Agency, must continue to provide the kind of information that prevents 
the use of chemical weapons. The National Security Agency is listening 
in on the international criminals and terrorists as they seek to buy 
chemicals and produce weapons. The Chemical Weapons Convention will aid 
these efforts by making it harder for terrorists to get chemicals that 
could be turned against Americans.
  America has always led the effort to end the use of chemical 
weapons--and the convention will ensure that other countries follow our 
lead. We have already decided not to use chemical weapons and we have 
started to dismantle our chemical stockpile.
  Maryland is one of seven States that stores chemical weapons left 
over from the First and Second World Wars. For many years, we have 
lived with the threat of an accident. We are only now preparing to 
neutralize the chemical stockpile that is stored in Maryland. We 
in Maryland know first-hand the dangers these chemical weapons pose to 
military personnel and civilians. America's priority must be to safely 
dispose of these lethal chemicals--not to produce them.

  Mr. President, The Chemical Weapons Convention will make it harder 
for thugs and rogue nations to make and use chemical weapons. I urge my 
colleagues to join me in voting for its ratification.
  Ms. SNOWE. Mr. President, in my view there is no greater threat to 
our nation's security than the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction. Among these is the scourge of chemical weapons which have 
been unleashed in this century with such horrifying effect in the 
trenches of the First World War, in the villages of Iraq a decade ago, 
and more recently in the Tokyo subway.
  In 1985 the United States took a bold unilateral decision to destroy 
our chemical weapons stockpiles because they serve no military purpose. 
And in 1990 the United States negotiated a bilateral chemical weapons 
destruction agreement with the Soviet Union in an effort to begin the 
process of reducing that country's stockpiles, the largest in the 
world. The leadership of the United States through the years has been 
crucial in forging the broad international consensus which produced the 
Chemical Weapons Convention. The whole world is watching us closely 
today to see whether or not the United States is going to continue its 
leadership role on this critical issue.
  The United States must not retreat from more than a decade of 
leadership on controlling chemical weapons. We must ratify the Chemical 
Weapons Convention before it comes into force on April 29--not just to 
maintain our leadership on this issue, but because it is in our best 
interests to do so.
  The issue is not whether the Convention will completely eliminate the 
threat of chemical weapons. There is no magic wand to do that. However, 
what the Chemical Weapons Convention will do is nevertheless 
substantial. It will establish--for the first time--an international 
standard against the production and use of chemical weapons. It will 
provide us with significant additional monitoring and inspection tools 
to detect chemical weapons activities. And it will impose trade 
restrictions that will make it more difficult for ``rogue'' states and 
terrorist organizations to start or continue chemical weapons programs.
  Opponents of the Convention argue that it is not adequately 
verifiable, although many of those same critics argue at the same time 
that the treaty is too intrusive. The fact is that the Convention 
includes the most extensive monitoring and inspection regime of any 
arms control treaty to date. The U.S. chemical industry--which will be 
the target of most of the monitoring and inspection under the 
Convention-- helped write these provisions and is comfortable with 
them.
  The U.S. intelligence community believes that the Convention will 
significantly enhance its current ability to detect suspicious patterns 
of chemical activity in other countries. I am particularly pleased with 
the Condition #5, which has been agreed to, that protects U.S. 
intelligence information that may be shared with the Organization for 
the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. It reflects the legislation I have 
introduced to protect U.S. intelligence which is shared with 
international organizations.

  The trade restrictions imposed by the Convention represent another 
key element in controlling the proliferation of chemical weapons. 
Building on the existing trade restrictions in chemicals under the 
informal Australia Group, the Convention limits trade in the most 
likely chemicals to be used in weapons production--Schedule I 
chemicals--to trade among countries that have already ratified it. The 
same restrictions will apply after three years to Schedule II ``dual-
use'' chemicals

[[Page S3647]]

which have both commercial and military applications.
  Therefore, if we do not ratify, we hurt our own chemical industry 
which will be excluded from commerce in Schedule I chemicals with some 
of our principal trading partners, including the United Kingdom, 
France, Germany, Japan, and Canada. The economic loss to the United 
States is estimated to be $600 million annually.
  Opponents of the Convention also argue that it is contrary to our 
national security interests because countries like Iraq and North Korea 
will continue their chemical weapons programs while we destroy our own 
stockpiles. But the Convention will make it harder for these countries 
to obtain critical chemical ingredients for their weapons programs. 
And, by outlawing the production of chemical weapons for the first 
time, the Convention will allow the international community to take 
collective action to isolate ``rogue'' states intent on developing 
these weapons.
  The Pentagon's top military leaders have all testified that chemical 
weapons are not needed to deter other countries from using these 
weapons against the U.S. or our armed forces. In fact, chemical weapons 
serve no useful military purpose as a method of warfare. America's 
ability to inflict overwhelming destruction, without resorting to 
chemical warfare, serves as a sufficient deterrent to the use of 
chemical weapons against our armed forces. I agree strongly with 
Condition #11, which has already been agreed to, that requires the 
United States to maintain a robust program of chemical and biological 
defenses to ensure that our forces are provided with maximum protection 
in the event such weapons are ever used against U.S. forces. Such a 
policy is only matter of prudence and common sense.
  The resolution of ratification before the Senate today sets out 
further conditions that address widely-shared concerns about the 
Chemical Weapons Convention. For instance, conditions will ensure the 
primacy of the U.S. Constitution, limit U.S. financial obligations 
under the Convention, ensure appropriate cost-sharing arrangements, and 
require consultation with this body in cases of noncompliance with the 
treaty. By clarifying and reinforcing the Senate's views on these and 
other important issues, the conditions constitute a useful complement 
to the Chemical Weapons Convention.
  Mr. President, it is important to note that this Convention has a 
history of bipartisan support. Negotiations began under the Reagan 
Administration and were concluded by the Bush Administration. Former 
President George Bush has said, and I quote, ``This Convention clearly 
serves the best interests of the United States in a world in which the 
proliferation and use of chemical weapons is a real and growing threat 
. . . United States leadership is required once again to bring this 
historic agreement into force.''
  A total of 162 countries have now signed the Chemical Weapons 
Convention and 74 countries have ratified it. Russia, China and Iran--
all with known chemical weapons programs--have signed the Convention, 
but it is unlikely that these countries will ratify it if the U.S. does 
not do so first.
  Mr. President, American leadership is needed once again. The U.S. 
must be among the original ratifying states in order to play a central 
role in setting up the new Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical 
Weapons and to participate fully in the Convention's monitoring, 
inspection, and trade control activities. I urge my colleagues to 
support the resolution of ratification for the Chemical Weapons 
Convention.
  Mrs. MURRAY. Mr President, I am pleased that the United States Senate 
has finally turned its attention to the Chemical Weapons Convention. 
Before this body today sits the work of President Reagan, President 
Bush and now President Clinton. The CWC will place a global ban on the 
manufacture, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons by its 
signatories. Along with protocols for inspections and sanctions against 
countries that do not abide by the CWC, it contains a specific 
timetable for the destruction of existing chemical weapons and 
production facilities.
  The United States provided valuable leadership for many years in the 
effort to outlaw chemical weapons and their use. Our government was the 
driving force behind the negotiations that produced the Chemical 
Weapons Convention. The CWC will go into effect next week with or 
without U.S. participation. Failure to ratify the CWC would be a 
monumental error for the United States; a symbolic retreat from our 
traditional role in the world that will likely impede our efforts to 
further eliminate and combat proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction.
  I do strongly support the immediate ratification of the Chemical 
Weapons Convention. I want to add my personal thanks to my many 
colleagues who have worked so hard to bring the articles of 
ratification to the Senate floor. Senator Biden and Senator Lugar have 
both been champions in this effort. I have great admiration and respect 
for both of these Senators and I know many thousands of my constituents 
also appreciate their leadership on the CWC.
  As a Member of the Senate Committee on Veterans Affairs, I have been 
particularly impressed by the support given to the CWC by numerous 
veterans service organizations. My own state has more than 700,000 
veterans and thousands of additional active duty personnel stationed in 
every corner of my state. The following veterans organization have all 
called upon the Senate to ratify the CWC; the Veterans of Foreign Wars, 
the Vietnam Veterans of America, the Reserve Officers Association of 
the United States, the American Ex-Prisoners of War and the Jewish War 
Veterans of the USA. The National Gulf War Resource Center, a coalition 
of two dozen Gulf War veterans organizations has also publicly endorsed 
the CWC.
  Such distinguished senior US military commanders as General Norman 
Schwarzkopf, former Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Generals John 
M. Shalikashvili and Colin Powell, former Chief of Naval Operations 
Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, and former National Security Adviser General 
Brent Scowcroft have all publicly called for the ratification of the 
CWC. Colin Powell appeared before the Veterans Affairs Committee last 
week; he gave the committee his unequivocal support for the CWC. 
General Powell stated that the treaty will lessen the likelihood that 
U.S. troops will be safer from chemical attack in the future. Given the 
problems many of our Gulf War veterans are suffering that many 
attribute to exposure to chemical weapons, I believe the Senate should 
give General Powell's comments in support of the CWC special 
consideration.
  Also of great importance to me in considering the merits of the CWC 
is the strong support of the chemical industry, including both small 
and large businesses. It is noteworthy that our business community 
provided advice to the Reagan and Bush administrations on the treaty 
provisions affecting this industry.
  If the United States does not ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention 
it will not have access to the Treaty's tools to help detect rogue 
states and terrorists who seek to acquire chemical weapons. The United 
States will not be allowed to participate in the Organization for the 
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the governing body deciding the 
terms for the implementation of the Treaty. Therefore, Americans will 
not be able to serve on inspection teams or influence amendments, and 
Americans now serving as head of administration, head of industrial 
inspections, and head of security will be replaced by nationals from 
countries that have ratified the CWC. Chemical proliferation and 
terrorism are undoubtedly problems the United States can fight more 
effectively within the framework of global cooperation.
  The Chemical Manufacturing Association has stated that the CWC ``does 
not trump US export control laws.'' Instead, the Treaty will expand and 
improve the effectiveness of non-proliferation by instituting a strong 
system of multilateral export controls. No information will be 
disclosed regarding imports, exports or domestic shipments. The CWC 
will affect approximately 2,000 companies, not 8,000 as the Treaty's 
opponents hold. About 1,800 of those 2,000 companies will do nothing 
more than check a box regarding the range of Discrete Organic Chemicals 
they produce, without specifying the nature of these chemicals. Of the 
some 140 companies most likely to be subjected to routine inspections, 
a large

[[Page S3648]]

proportion are CMA members, who assisted in writing the provisions of 
the Treaty. Regardless, it is anticipated that any challenge 
inspections will more than likely involve military, rather than 
commercial facilities. Thus, we should not concern ourselves with a 
potential negative impact of the CWC on the industry, because clearly 
this is not the case. On the contrary, if the US Senate chooses not to 
ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention, American chemical companies 
risk losing as much as $600 million a year in sales and many well-
paying jobs when the mandatory trade sanctions against non-parties are 
enforced.
  Critics insist that the CWC will be ineffective because rogue states 
suspected of possessing or attempting to acquire chemical weapons, such 
as Syria, Iraq, North Korea and Libya, have not joined the convention. 
Accordingly, they argue that the United States should hold up 
ratification until these states join. The reality is that only about 20 
states are believed to have or to be seeking a chemical weapons 
program, more than two-thirds of which have already signed the CWC. For 
the past 40 years, the United States has led nonproliferation regimes 
that have established accepted norms of international behavior. Failing 
to ratify the convention will not persuade the rogue states to join the 
CWC. Rather, it will legitimize their action and hurt US credibility in 
the international community. The Treaty ensures that non-party states 
are isolated and makes it extremely difficult for them to pursue their 
nefarious objectives.
  I urge my Senate colleagues to reflect on the measure of American 
leadership and the indispensability of our nation on nonproliferation 
issues and to vote for the Chemical Weapons Convention. This Treaty 
makes sense on political, legal and moral grounds. As officials of both 
Republican and Democratic administrations assert, the Chemical Weapons 
Convention will ensure that Americans live in a safer America and a 
safer world.
  Mr. BOND. Mr. President I will vote against ratification of the 
Chemical Warfare Convention. I came to this decision, not because I am 
against doing away with chemical weapons, we all are. I will vote 
against ratification because amendments which I believe were critical 
to ensuring our safety and security were stricken rendering the 
convention more dangerous to our well being than one which would 
include those conditions, even if it means having to renegotiate the 
convention. Of the outstanding amendments which were debated through 
out the day today, I believe those covering Russian ratification and 
their compliance with previous treaties, the rejection of inspectors or 
inspections by states with a history of violating non-proliferation 
treaties or which have been designated by our State Department as 
sporting terrorism, striking article 10 of the treaty and amending 
article 11, and having our intelligence agencies certify that the 
treaty would be credibly verifiable were critical to making the treaty 
worthwhile.
  The fact that the President suggested we could withdraw from the 
convention if there were a compelling reason to do so, was a placebo 
which carried little viable meaning. I believe that it would not only 
be more difficult to withdraw from the convention once we ratify it, it 
would be much more dangerous to world stability if we were to withdraw 
after obligating ourselves to a flawed treaty. And so, I must, in good 
conscience, vote not to ratify.
  Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, the first thing I wish to express is my 
gratitude to the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee and the 
Majority Leader for the work they have done in the final weeks to 
improve this resolution of ratification.
  The Chemical Weapons Convention before us is significantly better 
than what we faced last year. In addition, I wish to compliment both 
the Chairman and the Ranking Member of the Foreign Relations Committee 
for holding numerous hearings during the past month and for the way 
they have led the debate over the past two days. The duty of this body 
to advise and consent has never been more honorably met.
  This treaty, with the resolution of ratification, while now an 
acceptable treaty, is not the panacea for chemical weapons that some of 
the more adamant proponents have implied or suggested. It will not, in 
and of itself, spare our grandchildren from the horrors of chemical 
warfare. It will not, in and of itself, protect our citizens from 
terrorists intent on using chemical weapons.
  This Convention will not significantly reduce the threat of 
terrorism, Mr. President. Now that this debate is almost concluded, it 
would be of great benefit to the future of this agreement that everyone 
be realistic about this. The Administration and other proponents of 
this agreement recognized this when they stated in the resolution of 
ratification, condition 19 that: ``The Senate finds that without regard 
to whether the Convention enters into force, terrorists will likely 
view chemical weapons as a means to gain greater publicity and instill 
widespread fear; and the March 1995 Tokyo subway attack by the Aum 
Shinrikyo would not have been prevented by the Convention.''
  Mr. President, I am greatly concerned about future terrorist threats 
to the citizens of this country, and I urge those who have suggested 
that this Convention will curb that threat to decease from such 
counterproductive rhetoric that could disastrously mislead us about 
future threats.
  In addition, I must note to the ardent proponents of the CWC that a 
number of nations will remain outside of this regime, and some of them 
have policies inimical to this nation's welfare and security. I have 
read the Convention, and I wish to state that I read Article XI, 
section (d) to mean that the U.S. is free to pursue any action--
unilaterally or multilaterally--against nations having chemical 
weapons. Furthermore, I will insist on clarification indicating that 
current trade sanctions promoting U.S. national security, and supported 
by this body as well the executive, will not be infringed by this 
Treaty.

  The benefits of this Treaty will not nearly approach the rhetoric of 
some of its proponents. In my opinion, overblown rhetoric enhanced the 
possibility that this Treaty could have failed, as some of us studied 
the document and realized the great gap between the rhetoric and 
reality.
  The current resolution of ratification helps to close that gap. The 
conditions included in the resolution preserve the Senate's 
constitutional role in treaty-making, including approval of amendments 
to the CWC. Agreed conditions established standards for U.S. 
intelligence sharing, including requiring reports on such sharing. They 
limit the sharing of defensive capabilities under Article X. They 
clarify our position on the use of riot control agents in wartime 
circumstances, preserving for us that option along the lines originally 
intended by our negotiators under President Reagan. They require the 
President to report regularly on the threat of chemical weapons.
  Finally--and this is extremely important, Mr. President--the 
resolution of ratification requires criminal search warrants for 
challenge inspections against non-complying parties.
  I stress again, Mr. President, my gratitude to those, on both sides 
of the aisle as well as in the Clinton Administration, who negotiated 
this resolution.
  The letter the Majority Leader has obtained from President Clinton 
also helps close the gap between rhetoric and reality. The President 
recognizes, with this letter, that the Treaty may not guarantee the 
cessation of proliferation of these monstrous weapons and their 
precursors. He recognizes that, despite the goals of this document, our 
defenses against their possible use on our troops should not wane. He 
recognizes that we have a regime--the Australia Group--in place that 
has addressed the problem of illicit trade in chemicals and that that 
regime should not go by the wayside.
  With this letter, the President recognizes that if this Treaty is 
seen to be failing, we can and will exercise Article XVI, which defines 
how a State Party may withdraw from the CWC.
  Despite these improvements and assurances, Mr. President, I know that 
a number of thoughtful colleagues continue to have reservations about 
the effectiveness of this Treaty. And I wish to say that I respect 
their decisions, and I object to certain exceptional notions heard 
during the debate that opponents of this Treaty object because they are 
against all arms control treaties. I don't believe this to be the case

[[Page S3649]]

at all. This Treaty has many practical limitations, and I believe that 
we should not impugn the motives of individuals who, at the end of the 
day, have great reservations over its benefits.

  I have supported many arms control agreements myself, Mr. President, 
but always after careful consideration of the strategic value as well 
as practical consequences of making so grave a commitment. And I must 
say that it has never been more difficult for me to determine the net 
worth of an arms control agreement as it has been for me regarding the 
Chemical Weapons Convention before us today.
  I have concluded that this treaty can advance our security, but only 
if Administration matches the rhetoric of arms control with the muscle 
of political will. Because, Mr. President, international norms without 
political will do not become norms.
  The benefits of treaties are measured on achievements, not 
intentions. If intentions were all that mattered, all treaties would be 
beneficial prima facie. By this standard, the Kellogg-Briand Treaty, 
which outlawed war, or the 1925 Geneva Convention Against the Use of 
Chemical Weapons, would have been rousing successes. History has proven 
that they were not. But, the success of treaties is measured in 
reality, not rhetoric. And the benefits of this Treaty are measured on 
a narrow margin.
  It is after a careful parsing of this margin, and much reflection, 
that I have determined that I will vote for the Chemical Weapons 
Convention. But I do so with the expectation that this Chief Executive, 
and subsequent ones, must be wholly dedicated to implementing this 
agreement in a way that advances U.S. security interests and protects 
U.S. domestic interests.
  Mr. President, this Treaty will give us some tools--inspections and 
other data collections--that will enhance our knowledge of the threat 
of chemical weapons. The information will not be comprehensive; it will 
not apply universally. But, if in collecting this information we reduce 
the possibility that our troops will face a chemical threat, then this 
is a tangible, defensible goal, for which anyone could support this 
Treaty.
  The United States has been a principal negotiator of this agreement, 
through Republican and Democratic administrations. To abandon it now 
would be to abdicate U.S. leadership. We are now burdened to support it 
and implement it. The goals are admirable. The bridge to achieving 
those goals, to bridging the gap between the idealistic rhetoric and 
the vexing reality, will be difficult. On that bridge, Mr. President, 
will ride the credibility of the United States, and, I believe, the 
credibility of future arms control. Past administrations have led in 
the establishment of this international norm. Future administrations 
will need to verify its legitimacy. President Clinton must carry 
through on his pledge for strict international compliance and for 
vigilence regarding threats by terrorists or renegade groups.

  Over 70 nations have ratified this Convention. Of course, we decided 
to unilaterally destroy our stockpile more than a decade ago, and we 
are proceeding as expeditiously as possible, restrained only by 
prudence regarding safety and the environment. We've known all along 
that our unilateral destruction plan was not contingent on the outcome 
of this debate. We determined these weapons were not militarily useful 
to us; our defense establishment can preserve and promote our national 
security without them. But as of the moment that our instrument of 
ratification is deposited, we will be the first of the countries with a 
large stockpile to ratify. The United States is leading. Will other 
nations follow?
  Mr. President, I wish to say a few words about Russia. With the 
consent of the Senate today, the Administration will be able to deposit 
the instrument of ratification before the April 29 deadline, allowing 
U.S. participation in the formation of the Organization for the 
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. The U.S. and Russia are the only 
powers that voluntarily declare they have chemical weapons. On two 
occasions the Russians have joined us--in the 1990 Bilateral 
Destruction Agreement and under the 1989 Wyoming Memorandum--in 
bilateral commitments to expose and destroy our stockpiles. As those 
who have studied this question know, the record of Russian compliance 
is not good. As those who read the papers and get the briefings know, 
the Russian chemical arms capability is not stagnant.
  President Yeltsin has indicated that he wishes the Russian Duma to 
approve ratification before the April 29 deadline. I hope they do. The 
Russians need to join and participate in the initial construction of 
this regime. And we need to begin to inspect and expose all of our 
stockpiles. If the Russians are not part of this Treaty, Mr. President, 
this regime may be stillborn, because the largest stockpile of chemical 
weapons in the world exists in the Russian Federation. I hope we can 
work with the Russians as partners beginning next week.
  If the Senate gives its consent today, Mr. President, next week the 
hard work will begin. The success or failure of this regime will not be 
a function of depositing the instrument of ratification. It will be a 
function of implementing the agreement. I am supporting this Convention 
today because I think it can only succeed with U.S. participation--and 
leadership. It can fail for many reasons, including noncompliance or 
nonparticipation by nations around the world. But it won't succeed 
without U.S. leadership.
  Leadership will require more than idealistic promises. We must 
abandon the rhetoric of unattainable promises and commit to the reality 
of national interest. I fear the Administration will have a lot of work 
building the bridge between the rhetoric and reality. On that bridge 
lies the future of this Convention and the future of arms control.
  Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, let me state the order of distinguished 
speakers on this side of the aisle. I am going to start with the most 
distinguished of all. The President pro tempore of the Senate, Senator 
Thurmond, will have 5 minutes; followed by Senator Hutchison of Texas, 
for 5 minutes; Senator Hutchinson of Arkansas to follow with 2 minutes; 
Senator Brownback, for 1 minute; Senator Kyl, for 1 minute; Senator 
Ashcroft, for 2 minutes. They will be recognized in that order.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina is recognized.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I want to recognize the work done on 
this treaty by the floor managers--both in opposition and in support of 
this very important international treaty. Both sides have made laudable 
arguments in supporting their different positions. This subject is one 
of great importance. I want to especially commend our able majority 
leader for the long hours he spent working with both floor managers and 
the administration.
  Mr. President, during the Senate Armed Services Committee's review of 
the national security implications of the Chemical Weapons Convention, 
I raised concerns about the ability of the U.S. to comply with the 
treaty obligation to destroy our chemical stockpile within the 
timeframe stipulated, the universality of the treaty, the verifiability 
of the treaty, and the administration's interpretation of the provision 
on the defensive use of riot control agents by U.S. forces.
  During the committee's hearings on the treaty in August 1994, I took 
no position on this treaty. I made it clear that the administration 
would have to convince me that it was in the national security 
interests of the United States.
  I have concerns about statements made over the past few weeks, by the 
President and several administration representatives, that if the 
United States does not ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention, that we 
would be aligning ourselves on the side of rogue nations, like Iraq and 
Libya, and against our allies.
  Mr. President, in 1985 the Congress legislated the requirement for 
the United States to destroy its chemical stockpile, and has reaffirmed 
that decision every year since that time. The Senate agreed to take 
actions against Iraq for attacking its neighbor, and against Libya for 
terrorist actions which resulted in the death of American citizens. How 
can the President, the Secretary of State and other administration 
representatives liken a decision by the Senate, in its performance of 
its constitutional duties to provide advice and consent to 
international treaties, to be aligning the United States with rogue 
nations? Regardless of the outcome of the CWC,

[[Page S3650]]

the United States will continue to destroy its chemical stockpiles.
  Last Sunday, the Secretary of Defense talked about his recent visit 
to South Korea and the discussions he had about the threat posed to 
U.S. Forces by the chemical weapons in North Korea. He also mentioned 
General Tilelli's support for ratification of the CWC because it would 
reduce the chemical weapons threat faced by his troops in South Korea.
  Mr. President, North Korea has not signed the CWC. As I read the 
treaty, none of the provisions will apply to nations that have not 
signed and ratified it. Only trade sanctions will apply to countries 
that have not signed it. United States ratification of the CWC will not 
minimize the North Korean chemical weapons threat which face our United 
States forces.
  Mr. President, I cannot support the Chemical Weapons Convention. I 
appreciate the efforts made by the White House to work out conditions 
to the resolution of ratification that respond to concerns raised about 
the treaty made by Members of the Senate. However, I do not believe 
they go far enough. I remain concerned about the ability of the 
intelligence community to verify compliance with the treaty. Rogue 
nations which pose a military and terrorist threat to the United States 
have not signed the treaty, and most likely will not sign it. I am also 
concerned about the potential compromise of U.S. defensive capability 
through potential transfers of chemical defensive protective equipment, 
material or information under article X and article XI.
  It is for these reasons that I cannot vote for this treaty.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator from Texas 
for 5 minutes.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I respect everyone who is going to 
vote today for the position that they are taking because I know that it 
is sincere. I respect the people who have come out for this convention 
treaty--the former Presidents--and I respect the people who have come 
out against the treaty, the former Secretaries of Defense.
  It comes down, for me, to a basic question, and that is: Do we 
believe that international conventions and conferences keep us safe at 
night? Or do we believe a strong national defense is what keeps us safe 
at night and what has served us so well for this century? Mr. 
President, I think it is a commitment to a strong national defense, and 
I have decided, reluctantly, to vote against this convention treaty 
because I believe this does more to harm our strength and our national 
defense than it does to help it.
  Mr. President, we have seen our allies transfer nuclear technology 
that can be made into weapons to rogue nations. So now we have a treaty 
that will allow people to come into our chemical plants--not chemical 
plants that make weapons, because we are not going to make weapons, but 
into our chemical plants that might be doing research on how to defend 
against chemical weapons. That technology can then be transferred to 
the nations who would use the chemical weapons.
  It seems to me that we are unilaterally disarming ourselves, Mr. 
President, with a treaty that would say we must allow international 
groups to come into plants that use chemicals, whether it is to make 
fertilizer or disinfectant, or defenses to chemical weapons, any of 
those things. An international group will be able to come in and, I 
think, violate our constitutional right against search and seizure. I 
am concerned that we are hurting our ability to defend our country.
  So, Mr. President, I think we have a choice here between America 
being the leader and undercutting our defenses, or standing on 
principle and protecting our security. Mr. President, I just don't 
think there is a choice. We must stand on principle. So that if our 
young men and women in the field are attacked by chemical weapons by 
those who will not sign this treaty, we will surely have the defenses 
to protect them; and so that we will keep the ability in our country to 
have the strength to fight the chemical weapons that will be produced, 
that we know are being produced right now, by nations who will not 
abide by this treaty.
  So I do not buy the argument that we are better off with this treaty 
than without it. In fact, I think we are hurting our ability to combat 
the rogue nations, the terrorist nations with whom we are dealing all 
over the world, and I could not vote in good conscience to do that. 
Thank you.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arkansas is recognized.
  Mr. HUTCHINSON. Mr. President, I want to especially applaud this 
evening the Senator from North Carolina and the Senator from Arizona 
for their courageous opposition to this treaty. I also want to 
recognize the good and patriotic Americans and Senators who have 
differed on this treaty and have come down to different places on how 
they are going to vote.
  But this treaty is not about who is committed to and who believes in 
the elimination of chemical warfare in this world. I believe all of us 
are equally committed to that goal.
  I rise in opposition to the CWC because I simply believe that it is a 
flawed treaty in which we claim to verify the unverifiable, we are 
ratifying the unenforceable, and we are trusting the untrustworthy. We 
are binding ourselves and our friends, while those that we should be 
most concerned about go unrestrained and undeterred. When addressing 
the ratification of a treaty, we in this body are executing one of our 
most solemn duties. When addressing our Nation's security and when 
addressing our Nation's sovereignty, our watch words should be 
``prudence'' and ``caution.''
  I believe that prudence and caution call out for a ``no'' vote. By 
ratifying this treaty, we spurn the sage advice of former Secretaries 
of Defense. And I close with the words of one of those Secretaries, 
Secretary Cheney, who wrote that ``This accord is worse than no treaty 
at all.''
  So, while I recognize and applaud the sincerity and the passion with 
which the advocates of this treaty have spoken and how they articulated 
their position, I believe firmly that it is not in the interest of the 
sovereignty and the security of the United States. And I urge a ``no'' 
vote on the treaty ratification.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator from Kansas 
for 1 minute.
  Mr. BROWNBACK. Thank you very much, Mr. President. I appreciate that.
  Mr. President, I join with other Senators noting how extremely 
difficult and important this decision is to vote for treaty 
ratification. I have taken it very seriously, as well as everybody 
else. I have read the entire treaty. I sat down and thought it through. 
I have talked with people. I have talked with President Bush, Bob Dole, 
Colin Powell, Casper Weinberger, James Schlesinger, Richard Perle, and 
my 9-year-old son, too, who I think has a stake in this as well.
  I find it a terribly tough call to make on this treaty; a tough one 
to be able to decide what is in the best interest and ultimately what 
will get the fewest chemical weapons used in this world. That to me is 
the real litmus test issue. What is going to make the world safer is 
when we are going to have fewer chemical weapons used in the world.
  I would like to bare to the body that I chair the Middle East 
Subcommittee of the Foreign Relations Committee. We held a hearing just 
last week on U.S. policy toward Iran. Our policy has failed to stop 
them from receiving weapons of mass destruction, particularly chemical 
weapons. The Iranians are receiving precursor chemical weapons from the 
Chinese.
  May I have an additional minute and a half?
  Mr. HELMS. Please. Yes.
  Mr. BROWNBACK. I thank the chairman very much.
  As I mentioned in our hearing last week, it was noted and pointed out 
that the Iranians have received chemical weapons, precursor chemical 
weapons, from the Chinese and from other sources.
  I have reluctantly but clearly concluded that Iran would be more 
likely to obtain and use chemical weapons if we enter into this 
Chemical Weapons Convention with article X in place, which is currently 
how it sits; that they will be more likely to get and use chemical 
weapons, weapons of mass destruction. Iran is our erstwhile terrorist 
enemy.
  I spoke to Colin Powell. He noted that chemical weapons today are the

[[Page S3651]]

weapons of choice, primarily, for terrorists. These are primarily 
weapons used by terrorists. That certainly fits the Iranians.
  So that is why I have, unfortunately, reluctantly yet clearly, 
decided that with article X in it and with the likelihood of that being 
used by the Iranians, that this treaty would actually cause more 
chemical weapons to be used by people that we don't want; by terrorist 
regimes such as the Iranians. Therefore, I will have to vote against 
this treaty.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator from 
Missouri.
  Mr. ASHCROFT. Mr. President, I thank you for this opportunity to make 
some comments in regard to this serious matter.
  None of us has any affection for chemical weapons. Each of us hates 
chemical weapons. We would all like to see chemical weapons abolished. 
None of us would like to see chemical weapons used. We would all like 
to believe the statements of prominent experts that have been made 
about this treaty. We would all like to embrace the assurances of the 
President that, if something goes wrong, the treaty could be something 
easily walked away from.
  But, in spite of all our aspirations, in spite of all of our desires, 
and in spite of all our hopes, there is one reality which will persist; 
and that reality is the language of the treaty itself. Long after the 
assurances have stopped echoing through this Chamber, long after the 
President has left office, who is trying to assuage the fears of those 
who have misgivings about this treaty, the black and white letters of 
the treaty itself will be the controlling components of what happens. 
And the thing that gives me great pause is that the treaty will remain.
  There are the requirements, particularly in articles X and XI of the 
treaty, which require us to share technology, to share information, and 
to share, in particular, the defensive technology of chemical weaponry. 
There is an anomaly in chemical weaponry which is challenging. It is 
that when you provide the defensive technology for chemical weapons, 
you are providing one of the essential components of delivering 
chemical weapons. No one can deliver chemical weapons, unless it 
is launched by a missile, without having to have all the technologies 
of how to defend against the chemistry of the weapons.

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired.
  Mr. ASHCROFT. I ask for 30 additional seconds.
  If a rogue state wants to deliver chemical weapons, one of the things 
they need to do is to acquire the defensive technology to defend 
against them and to protect their own soldiers in delivery. That seems 
to me one of the substantial problems contained in articles X and XI. 
The risks far exceed the benefits.
  As a result, I think it is ill-advised for us to accept assurances 
which would mislead us. We need to read the treaty, and the treaty is 
not one which merits our approval.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator from Arizona 
for 1 minute.
  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, let me begin by thanking Senator Helms and 
Senator Biden, the floor managers of this treaty, for the work they did 
in bringing it before us.
  Mr. President, I share the hope of the supporters of this treaty that 
it will help end the proliferation of chemical weapons. I believe, 
however, that history will record this treaty as one of the most well-
intentioned yet least effective in our history. My hope is that we will 
not relax our efforts in other ways to reduce this threat, that we will 
not be lulled into a sense of security when it is ratified.
  With the protections in the original resolution of ratification, I 
voted for the treaty. But the protections having been stricken, I must 
vote ``no.''
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator from North 
Carolina.
  Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, Senators will be glad to hear this.
  I ask for the yeas and nays on the final vote in the Senate.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
  There is a sufficient second.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  Mr. LEAHY addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Vermont.
  Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, how much time remains to the Senator from 
Vermont?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Vermont has 8\1/2\ minutes.
  Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I will not use all of that time, only to 
say this. We will advise and consent so the President can ratify this 
treaty. I truly believe we will. It will show the moral leadership that 
the Senate should show and that the United States should show. We will 
act as the conscience of this Nation, and we will advise and consent to 
this treaty. We will show the moral leadership because we began this by 
saying we would act unilaterally, if need be, renouncing our own use of 
chemical weapons with or without a treaty. That was true leadership.
  Not all countries are going to join with us. But most did join with 
us on this, and we should be proud of that leadership that brought them 
together. We will never have all of the countries with us, but we know 
that it is in the best interests of the United States to do this.
  I suggest, after we do this, Mr. President, that we should again look 
at the question of antipersonnel landmines and show the same moral 
leadership to get countries to join with us--not all countries will--to 
ban antipersonnel landmines which kill and injure far more people than 
chemical weapons.
  Mr. President, I will vote for advice and consent of this treaty so 
the President can ratify it.
  I yield the remainder of my time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I, on behalf of the leader's time and any 
other time that may be assigned to me, yield the remainder of time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the resolution 
of ratification. On this question, the yeas and nays have been ordered, 
and the clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk called the roll.
  The yeas and nays resulted--yeas 74, nays 26, as follows:

                       [Rollcall Vote No. 51 Ex.]

                                YEAS--74

     Abraham
     Akaka
     Baucus
     Biden
     Bingaman
     Boxer
     Breaux 
     Bryan
     Bumpers
     Byrd
     Chafee
     Cleland
     Coats
     Cochran 
     Collins
     Conrad
     D'Amato
     Daschle
     DeWine
     Dodd
     Domenici 
     Dorgan
     Durbin
     Enzi
     Feingold
     Feinstein
     Ford
     Frist 
     Glenn
     Gorton
     Graham
     Gregg
     Hagel
     Harkin
     Hatch 
     Hollings
     Inouye
     Jeffords
     Johnson
     Kennedy
     Kerrey 
     Kerry
     Kohl
     Landrieu
     Lautenberg
     Leahy
     Levin
     Lieberman 
     Lott
     Lugar
     McCain
     McConnell
     Mikulski
     Moseley-Braun 
     Moynihan
     Murkowski
     Murray
     Reed
     Reid
     Robb
     Roberts 
     Rockefeller
     Roth
     Santorum
     Sarbanes
     Smith (OR)
     Snowe 
     Specter
     Stevens
     Thomas
     Torricelli
     Warner
     Wellstone 
     Wyden 

                               NAYS--26 

     Allard
     Ashcroft
     Bennett
     Bond
     Brownback
     Burns 
     Campbell
     Coverdell
     Craig
     Faircloth
     Gramm
     Grams 
     Grassley
     Helms
     Hutchinson
     Hutchison
     Inhofe
     Kempthorne 
     Kyl
     Mack
     Nickles
     Sessions
     Shelby
     Smith (NH)
     Thompson 
     Thurmond
  The VICE PRESIDENT. On this vote, the yeas are 74, the nays are 26. 
Two-thirds of the Senators present having voted in the affirmative, the 
resolution of ratification is agreed to.
  The resolution of ratification, as amended, was agreed to, as 
follows:

       Resolved, (two-thirds of the Senators present concurring 
     therein),

     SECTION 1. SENATE ADVICE AND CONSENT SUBJECT TO CONDITIONS.

       The Senate advises and consents to the ratification of the 
     Chemical Weapons Convention (as defined in section 3 of this 
     resolution), subject to the conditions in section 2.

     SECTION 2. CONDITIONS.

       The Senate's advice and consent to the ratification of the 
     Chemical Weapons Convention is subject to the following 
     conditions, which shall be binding upon the President:
       (1) Effect of article xxii.--Upon the deposit of the United 
     States instrument of ratification, the President shall 
     certify to the Congress that the United States has informed 
     all other States Parties to the Convention that the Senate 
     reserves the right, pursuant to the Constitution of the 
     United States, to give its advice and consent to ratification 
     of the Convention subject to reservations, notwithstanding 
     Article XXII of the Convention.

[[Page S3652]]

       (2) Financial contributions.--Notwithstanding any provision 
     of the Convention, no funds may be drawn from the Treasury of 
     the United States for any payment or assistance (including 
     the transfer of in-kind items) under paragraph 16 of Article 
     IV, paragraph 19 of Article V, paragraph 7 of Article VIII, 
     paragraph 23 of Article IX, Article X, or any other provision 
     of the Convention, without statutory authorization and 
     appropriation.
       (3) Establishment of an internal oversight office.--
       (A) Certification.--Not later than 240 days after the 
     deposit of the United States instrument of ratification, the 
     President shall certify to the Congress that the current 
     internal audit office of the Preparatory Commission has been 
     expanded into an independent internal oversight office whose 
     functions will be transferred to the Organization for the 
     Prohibition of Chemical Weapons upon the establishment of the 
     Organization. The independent internal oversight office shall 
     be obligated to protect confidential information pursuant to 
     the obligations of the Confidentiality Annex. The independent 
     internal oversight office shall--
       (i) make investigations and reports relating to all 
     programs of the Organization;
       (ii) undertake both management and financial audits, 
     including--
       (I) an annual assessment verifying that classified and 
     confidential information is stored and handled securely 
     pursuant to the general obligations set forth in Article VIII 
     and in accordance with all provisions of the Annex on the 
     Protection of Confidential Information; and
       (II) an annual assessment of laboratories established 
     pursuant to paragraph 55 of Part II of the Verification Annex 
     to ensure that the Director General of the Technical 
     Secretariat is carrying out his functions pursuant to 
     paragraph 56 of Part II of the Verification Annex;
       (iii) undertake performance evaluations annually to ensure 
     the Organization has complied to the extent practicable with 
     the recommendations of the independent internal oversight 
     office;
       (iv) have access to all records relating to the programs 
     and operations of the Organization;
       (v) have direct and prompt access to any official of the 
     Organization; and
       (vi) be required to protect the identity of, and prevent 
     reprisals against, all complainants.
       (B) Compliance with recommendations.--The Organization 
     shall ensure, to the extent practicable, compliance with 
     recommendations of the independent internal oversight office, 
     and shall ensure that annual and other relevant reports by 
     the independent internal oversight office are made available 
     to all member states pursuant to the requirements established 
     in the Confidentiality Annex.
       (C) Withholding a portion of contributions.--Until a 
     certification is made under subparagraph (A), 50 percent of 
     the amount of United States contributions to the regular 
     budget of the Organization assessed pursuant to paragraph 7 
     of Article VIII shall be withheld from disbursement, in 
     addition to any other amounts required to be withheld from 
     disbursement by any other provision of law.
       (D) Assessment of first year contributions.--
     Notwithstanding the requirements of this paragraph, for the 
     first year of the Organization's operation, ending on April 
     29, 1998, the United States shall make its full contribution 
     to the regular budget of the Organization assessed pursuant 
     to paragraph 7 of Article VIII.
       (E) Definition.--For purposes of this paragraph, the term 
     ``internal oversight office'' means an independent office (or 
     other independent entity) established by the Organization to 
     conduct and supervise objective audits, inspections, and 
     investigations relating to the programs and operations of the 
     Organization.
       (4) Cost sharing arrangements.--
       (A) Annual reports.--Prior to the deposit of the United 
     States instrument of ratification, and annually thereafter, 
     the President shall submit a report to Congress identifying 
     all cost-sharing arrangements with the Organization.
       (B) Cost-sharing arrangement required.--The United States 
     shall not undertake any new research or development 
     expenditures for the primary purpose of refining or improving 
     the Organization's regime for verification of compliance 
     under the Convention, including the training of inspectors 
     and the provision of detection equipment and on-site analysis 
     sampling and analysis techniques, or share the articles, 
     items, or services resulting from any research and 
     development undertaken previously, without first having 
     concluded and submitted to the Congress a cost-sharing 
     arrangement with the Organization.
       (C) Construction.--Nothing in this paragraph may be 
     construed as limiting or constricting in any way the ability 
     of the United States to pursue unilaterally any project 
     undertaken solely to increase the capability of the United 
     States means for monitoring compliance with the Convention.
       (5) Intelligence sharing and safeguards.--
       (A) Provision of intelligence information to the 
     organization.--
       (i) In general.--No United States intelligence information 
     may be provided to the Organization or any organization 
     affiliated with the Organization, or to any official or 
     employee thereof, unless the President certifies to the 
     appropriate committees of Congress that the Director of 
     Central Intelligence, in consultation with the Secretary of 
     State and the Secretary of Defense, has established and 
     implemented procedures, and has worked with the Organization 
     or other such organization, as the case may be to ensure 
     implementation of procedures, for protecting from 
     unauthorized disclosure United States intelligence sources 
     and methods connected to such information. These procedures 
     shall include the requirement of--
       (I) the offer and provision if accepted of advice and 
     assistance to the Organization or the affiliated organization 
     in establishing and maintaining the necessary measures to 
     ensure that inspectors and other staff members of the 
     Technical Secretariat meet the highest standards of 
     efficiency, competence, and integrity, pursuant to 
     paragraph 1(b) of the Confidentiality Annex, and in 
     establishing and maintaining a stringent regime governing 
     the handling of confidential information by the Technical 
     Secretariat, pursuant to paragraph 2 of the 
     Confidentiality Annex;
       (II) a determination that any unauthorized disclosure of 
     United States intelligence information to be provided to the 
     Organization or any organization affiliated with the 
     Organization, or any official or employee thereof, would 
     result in no more than minimal damage to United States 
     national security, in light of the risks of the unauthorized 
     disclosure of such information;
       (III) sanitization of intelligence information that is to 
     be provided to the Organization or the affiliated 
     organization to remove all information that could betray 
     intelligence sources and methods; and
       (IV) interagency United States intelligence community 
     approval for any release of intelligence information to the 
     Organization or the affiliated organization, no matter how 
     thoroughly it has been sanitized.
       (ii) Waiver authority.--
       (I) In general.--The Director of Central Intelligence may 
     waive the application of clause (i) if the Director of 
     Central Intelligence certifies in writing to the appropriate 
     committees of Congress that providing such information to the 
     Organization or an organization affiliated with the 
     Organization, or to any official or employee thereof, is in 
     the vital national security interests of the United States 
     and that all possible measures to protect such information 
     have been taken, except that such waiver must be made for 
     each instance such information is provided, or for each such 
     document provided. In the event that multiple waivers are 
     issued within a single week, a single certification to the 
     appropriate committees of Congress may be submitted, 
     specifying each waiver issued during that week.
       (II) Delegation of duties.--The Director of Central 
     Intelligence may not delegate any duty of the Director under 
     this paragraph.
       (B) Periodic and special reports.--
       (i) In general.--The President shall report periodically, 
     but not less frequently than semiannually, to the Select 
     Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the Permanent 
     Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of 
     Representatives on the types and volume of intelligence 
     information provided to the Organization or affiliated 
     organizations and the purposes for which it was provided 
     during the period covered by the report.
       (ii) Exemption.--For purposes of this subparagraph, 
     intelligence information provided to the Organization or 
     affiliated organizations does not cover information that is 
     provided only to, and only for the use of, appropriately 
     cleared United States Government personnel serving with the 
     Organization or an affiliated organization.
       (C) Special reports.--
       (i) Report on procedures.--Accompanying the certification 
     provided pursuant to subparagraph (A)(i), the President shall 
     provide a detailed report to the Select Committee on 
     Intelligence of the Senate and the Permanent Select Committee 
     on Intelligence of the House of Representatives identifying 
     the procedures established for protecting intelligence 
     sources and methods when intelligence information is provided 
     pursuant to this section.
       (ii) Reports on unauthorized disclosures.--The President 
     shall submit a report to the Select Committee on Intelligence 
     of the Senate and the Permanent Select Committee on 
     Intelligence of the House of Representatives within 15 days  
     after it has become known to the United States Government 
     regarding any unauthorized disclosure of intelligence 
     provided by the United States to the Organization.
       (D) Delegation of duties.--The President may not delegate 
     or assign the duties of the President under this section.
       (E) Relationship to existing law.--Nothing in this 
     paragraph may be construed to--
       (i) impair of otherwise affect the authority of the 
     Director of Central Intelligence to protect intelligence 
     sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure pursuant to 
     section 103(c)(5) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
     U.S.C. 403-3(c)(5)); or
       (ii) supersede or otherwise affect the provisions of title 
     V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et 
     seq.).
       (F) Definitions.--In this section:
       (i) Appropriate committees of congress.--The term 
     ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means the Committee on 
     Foreign Relations and the Select Committee on Intelligence of 
     the Senate and the Committee on International Relations and 
     the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House 
     of Representatives.
       (ii) Organization.--The term ``Organization'' means the 
     Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons 
     established

[[Page S3653]]

     under the Convention and includes any organ of that 
     Organization and any board or working group, such as the 
     Scientific Advisory Board, that may be established by it and 
     any official or employee thereof.
       (iii) Organization affiliated with the organization.--The 
     terms ``organization affiliated with the Organization'' and 
     ``affiliated organizations'' include the Provisional 
     Technical Secretariat under the Convention and any laboratory 
     certified by the Director-General of the Technical 
     Secretariat as designated to perform analytical or other 
     functions and any official or employee thereof.
       (6) Amendments to the convention.--
       (A) Voting representation of the united states.--A United 
     States representative will be present at all Amendment 
     Conferences and will cast a vote, either affirmative or 
     negative, on all proposed amendments made at such 
     conferences.
       (B) Submission of amendments as treaties.--The President 
     shall submit to the Senate for its advice and consent to 
     ratification under Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 of the 
     Constitution of the United States any amendment to the 
     Convention adopted by an Amendment Conference.
       (7) Continuing vitality of the australia group and national 
     export controls.--
       (A) Declaration.--The Senate declares that the collapse of 
     the informal forum of states known as the ``Australia 
     Group,'' either through changes in membership or lack of 
     compliance with common export controls, or the substantial 
     weakening of common Australia Group export controls and non-
     proliferation measures in force on the date of United States 
     ratification of the Convention, would constitute a 
     fundamental change in circumstances affecting the object and 
     purpose of the Convention.
       (B) Certification requirement.--Prior to the deposit of the 
     United States instrument of ratification, the President shall 
     certify to Congress that--
       (i) nothing in the Convention obligates the United States 
     to accept any modification, change in scope, or weakening of 
     its national export controls;
       (ii) the United States understands that the maintenance of 
     national restrictions on trade in chemicals and chemical 
     production technology is fully compatible with the provisions 
     of the Convention, including Article XI(2), and solely within 
     the sovereign jurisdiction of the United States;
       (iii) the Convention preserves the right of State Parties, 
     unilaterally or collectively, to maintain or impose export 
     controls on chemicals and related chemical production 
     technology for foreign policy or national security 
     reasons, notwithstanding Article XI(2); and
       (iv) each Australia Group member, at the highest diplomatic 
     levels, has officially communicated to the United States 
     Government its understanding and agreement that export 
     control and nonproliferation measures which the Australia 
     Group has undertaken are fully compatible with the provisions 
     of the Convention, including Article XI(2), and its 
     commitment to maintain in the future such export controls and 
     nonproliferation measures against non-Australia Group 
     members.
       (C) Annual certification.--
       (i) Effectiveness of australia group.--The President shall 
     certify to Congress on an annual basis that--
       (I) Australia Group members continue to maintain an equally 
     effective or more comprehensive control over the export of 
     toxic chemicals and their precursors, dual-use processing 
     equipment, human, animal and plant pathogens and toxins with 
     potential biological weapons application, and dual-use 
     biological equipment, as that afforded by the Australia Group 
     as of the date of ratification of the Convention by the 
     United States; and
       (II) the Australia Group remains a viable mechanism for 
     limiting the spread of chemical and biological weapons-
     related materials and technology, and that the effectiveness 
     of the Australia Group has not been undermined by changes in 
     membership, lack of compliance with common export controls 
     and nonproliferation measures, or the weakening of common 
     controls and nonproliferation measures, in force as of the 
     date of ratification of the Convention by the United States.
       (ii) Consultation with senate required.--In the event that 
     the President is, at any time, unable to make the 
     certifications described in clause (i), the President shall 
     consult with the Senate for the purposes of obtaining a 
     resolution of support for continued adherence to the 
     Convention, notwithstanding the fundamental change in 
     circumstance.
       (D) Periodic consultation with congressional committees.--
     The President shall consult periodically, but not less 
     frequently than twice a year, with the Committee on Foreign 
     Relations of the Senate and the Committee on International 
     Relations of the House of Representatives, on Australia Group 
     export control and nonproliferation measures. If any 
     Australia Group member adopts a position at variance with the 
     certifications and understandings provided under subparagraph 
     (B), or should seek to gain Australia Group acquiescence or 
     approval for an interpretation that various provisions of the 
     Convention require it to remove chemical-weapons related 
     export controls against any State Party to the Convention, 
     the President shall block any effort by the Australia Group 
     member to secure Australia Group approval of such a position 
     or interpretation.
       (E) Definitions.--In this paragraph.
       (i) Australia group.--The term ``Australia Group'' means 
     the informal forum of states, chaired by Australia, whose 
     goal is to discourage and impede chemical and biological 
     weapons proliferation by harmonizing national export 
     controls, chemical weapons precursor chemicals, biological 
     weapons pathogens, and dual-use production equipment, and 
     through other measures.
       (ii) Highest diplomatic levels.--The term ``highest 
     diplomatic levels'' means at the levels of senior officials 
     with the power to authoritatively represent their 
     governments, and does not include diplomatic representatives 
     of these governments to the United States.
       (8) Negative security assurances.--
       (A) Reevalation.--In forswearing under the Convention the 
     possession of a chemical weapons retaliatory capability, the 
     Senate understands that deterrence of attack by chemical 
     weapons requires a reevaluation of the negative security 
     assurances extended to non-nuclear-weapon states.
       (B) Classified report.--Accordingly, 180 days after the 
     deposit of the United States instrument of ratification, the 
     President shall submit to the Congress a classified report 
     setting forth the findings of a detailed review of United 
     States policy on negative security assurances, including a 
     determination of the appropriate responses to the use of 
     chemical or biological weapons against the Armed Forces of 
     the United States, United States citizens and allies, and 
     third parties.
       (9) Protection of advanced biotechnology.--Prior to the 
     deposit of the United States instrument of ratification, and 
     on January 1 of every year thereafter, the President shall 
     certify to the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Speaker 
     of the House of Representatives that the legitimate 
     commercial activities and interests of chemical, 
     biotechnology, and pharmaceutical firms in the United States 
     are not being significantly harmed by the limitations of the 
     Convention on access to, and production of, those chemicals 
     and toxins listed in Schedule 1 of the Annex on Chemicals.
       (10) Monitoring and verification of compliance.--
       (A) Declaration.--The Senate declares that--
       (i) the Convention is in the interests of the United States 
     only if all State Parties are in strict compliance with the 
     terms of the Convention as submitted to the Senate for its 
     advice and consent to ratification, such compliance being 
     measured by performance and not by efforts, intentions, or 
     commitments to comply; and
       (ii) the Senate expects all State Parties to be in strict 
     compliance with their obligations under the terms of the 
     Convention, as submitted to the Senate for its advice and 
     consent to ratification;
       (B) Briefings on compliance.--Given its concern about the 
     intelligence community's low level of confidence in its 
     ability to monitor compliance with the Convention, the Senate 
     expects the executive branch of the Government to offer 
     regular briefings, not less than four times a year, to the 
     Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the 
     Committee on International Relations of the House of 
     Representatives on compliance issues related to the 
     Convention. Such briefings shall include a description of all 
     United States efforts in bilateral and multilateral 
     diplomatic channels and forums to resolve compliance issues 
     and shall include a complete description of--
       (i) any compliance issues the United States plans to raise 
     at meetings of the Organization, in advance of such meetings;
       (ii) any compliance issues raised at meetings of the 
     Organization, within 30 days of such meeting;
       (iii) any determination by the President that a State Party 
     is in noncompliance with or is otherwise acting in a manner 
     inconsistent with the object or purpose of the Convention, 
     within 30 days of such a determination.
       (C) Annual reports on compliance.--The President shall 
     submit on January 1 of each year to the Committee on Foreign 
     Relations of the Senate and the Committee on International 
     Relations of the House of Representatives a full and complete 
     classified and unclassified report setting forth--
       (i) a certification of those countries included in the 
     Intelligence Community's Monitoring Strategy, as set forth by 
     the Director of Central Intelligence's Arms Control Staff and 
     the National Intelligence Council (or any successor document 
     setting forth intelligence priorities in the field of the 
     proliferation of weapons of mass destruction) that are 
     determined to be in compliance with the Convention, on a 
     country-by-country basis;
       (ii) for those countries not certified pursuant to clause 
     (i), an identification and assessment of all compliance 
     issues arising with regard to the adherence of the country to 
     its obligations under the Convention;
       (iii) the steps the United States has taken, either 
     unilaterally or in conjunction with another State Party--
       (I) to initiate challenge inspections of the noncompliant 
     party with the objective of demonstrating to the 
     international community the act of noncompliance;
       (II) to call attention publicly to the activity in 
     question; and
       (III) to seek on an urgent basis a meeting at the highest 
     diplomatic level with the noncompliant party with the 
     objective of bringing the noncompliant party into compliance;
       (iv) a determination of the military significance and 
     broader security risks arising from any compliance issue 
     identified pursuant to clause (ii); and

[[Page S3654]]

       (v) a detailed assessment of the responses of the 
     noncompliant party in question to action undertaken by the 
     United States described in clause (iii).
       (D) Countries previously included in compliance reports.--
     For any country that was previously included in a report 
     submitted under subparagraph (C), but which subsequently is 
     not included in the Intelligence Community's Monitoring 
     Strategy (or successor document), such country shall continue 
     to be included in the report submitted under subparagraph (C) 
     unless the country has been certified under subparagraph 
     (C)(i) for each of the previous two years.
       (E) Form of certifications.--For those countries that have 
     been publicly and officially identified by a representative 
     of the intelligence community as possessing or seeking to 
     develop chemical weapons, the certification described in 
     subparagraph (C)(i) shall be in unclassified form.
       (F) Annual reports on intelligence.--On January 1, 1998, 
     and annually thereafter, the Director of Central Intelligence 
     shall submit to the Committees on Foreign Relations, Armed 
     Services, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
     Senate and to the Committees on International Relations, 
     National Security, and Permanent Select Committee on 
     Intelligence of the House of Representatives a full and 
     complete classified and unclassified report regarding--
       (i) the status of chemical weapons development, production, 
     stockpiling, and use, within the meanings of those terms 
     under the Convention, on a country-by-country basis;
       (ii) any information made available to the United States 
     Government concerning the development, production, 
     acquisition, stockpiling, retention, use, or direct or 
     indirect transfer of novel agents, including any unitary or 
     binary chemical weapon comprised of chemical components not 
     identified on the schedules of the Annex on Chemicals, on a 
     country-by-country basis;
       (iii) the extent of trade in chemicals potentially relevant 
     to chemical weapons programs, including all Australia Group 
     chemicals and chemicals identified on the schedules of the 
     Annex on Chemicals, on a country-by-country basis;
       (iv) the monitoring responsibilities, practices, and 
     strategies of the intelligence community (as defined in 
     section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947) and a 
     determination of the level of confidence of the intelligence 
     community with respect to each specific monitoring task 
     undertaken, including an assessment by the intelligence 
     community of the national aggregate data provided by State 
     Parties to the Organization, on a country-by-country basis;
       (v) an identification of how United States national 
     intelligence means, including national technical means and 
     human intelligence, are being marshaled together with the 
     Convention's verification provisions to monitor compliance 
     with the Convention; and
       (vi) the identification of chemical weapons development, 
     production, stockpiling, or use, within the meanings of those 
     terms under the Convention, by subnational groups, including 
     terrorist and paramilitary organizations.
       (G) Reports on resources for monitoring.--Each 
     report required under subparagraph (F) shall include a 
     full and complete classified annex submitted solely to the 
     Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and to the 
     Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of 
     Representatives regarding--
       (i) a detailed and specific identification of all United 
     States resources devoted to monitoring the Convention, 
     including information on all expenditures associated with the 
     monitoring of the Convention; and
       (ii) an identification of the priorities of the executive 
     branch of Government for the development of new resources 
     relating to detection and monitoring capabilities with 
     respect to chemical and biological weapons, including a 
     description of the steps being taken and resources being 
     devoted to strengthening United States monitoring 
     capabilities.
       (11) Enhancements to robust chemical and biological 
     defenses.--
       (A) Sense of the senate.--It is the sense of the Senate 
     that--
       (i) chemical and biological threats to deployed United 
     States Armed Forces will continue to grow in regions of 
     concern around the world, and pose serious threats to United 
     States power projection and forward deployment strategies;
       (ii) chemical weapons or biological weapons use is a 
     potential element of future conflicts in regions of concern;
       (iii) it is essential for the United States and key 
     regional allies to preserve and further develop robust 
     chemical and biological defenses;
       (iv) the United States Armed Forces are inadequately 
     equipped, organized, trained and exercised for chemical and 
     biological defense against current and expected threats, and 
     that too much reliance is placed on non-active duty forces, 
     which receive less training and less modern equipment, for 
     critical chemical and biological defense capabilities;
       (v) the lack of readiness stems from a de-emphasis of 
     chemical and biological defenses within the executive branch 
     of Government and the United States Armed Forces;
       (vi) the armed forces of key regional allies and likely 
     coalition partners, as well as civilians necessary to support 
     United States military operations, are inadequately prepared 
     and equipped to carry out essential missions in chemically 
     and biologically contaminated environments;
       (vii) congressional direction contained in the Defense 
     Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996 (title XIV of 
     Public Law 104-201) should lead to enhanced domestic 
     preparedness to protect against chemical and biological 
     weapons threats; and
       (viii) the United States Armed Forces should place 
     increased emphasis on potential threats to forces deployed 
     abroad and, in particular, make countering chemical and 
     biological weapons use an organizing principle for United 
     States defense strategy and development of force structure, 
     doctrine, planning, training, and exercising policies of the 
     United States Armed Forces.
       (B) Actions to strengthen defense capabilities.--The 
     Secretary of Defense shall take those actions necessary to 
     ensure that the United States Armed Forces are capable of 
     carrying out required military missions in United States 
     regional contingency plans, despite the threat or use of 
     chemical or biological weapons. In particular, the Secretary 
     of Defense shall ensure that the United States Armed Forces 
     are effectively equipped, organized, trained, and exercised 
     (including at the large unit and theater level) to conduct 
     operations in a chemically or biologically contaminated 
     environment that are critical to the success of the United 
     States military plans in regional conflicts, including--
       (i) deployment, logistics, and reinforcement operations at 
     key ports and airfields;
       (ii) sustained combat aircraft sortie generation at 
     critical regional airbases; and
       (iii) ground force maneuvers of large units and divisions.
       (C) Discussions with regional allies and likely coalition 
     partners.--
       (i) In general.--The Secretaries of Defense and State 
     shall, as a priority matter, initiate discussions with key 
     regional allies and likely regional coalition partners, 
     including those countries where the United States currently 
     deploys forces, where United States forces would likely 
     operate during regional conflicts, or which would provide 
     civilians necessary to support United States military 
     operations, to determine what steps are necessary to ensure 
     that allied and coalition forces and other critical civilians 
     are adequately equipped and prepared to operate in chemically 
     and biologically contaminated environments.
       (ii) Reporting requirement.--Not later than one year after 
     deposit of the United States instrument of ratification, the 
     Secretaries of Defense and State shall submit a report to the 
     Committees on Foreign Relations and Armed Services of the 
     Senate and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives on 
     the result of these discussions, plans for future 
     discussions, measures agreed to improve the preparedness of 
     foreign forces and civilians, and proposals for increased 
     military assistance, including through the Foreign Military 
     Sales and Foreign Military Financing under the Arms Export 
     Control Act, and the International Military Education and 
     Training programs pursuant to the Foreign Assistance Act of 
     1961.
       (D) United states army chemical school.--The Secretary of 
     Defense shall take those actions necessary to ensure that the 
     United States Army Chemical School remains under the 
     oversight of a general officer of the United States Army.
       (E) Sense of the senate.--Given its concerns about the 
     present state of chemical and biological defense readiness 
     and training, it is the sense of the Senate that--
       (i) in the transfer, consolidation, and reorganization of 
     the United States Army Chemical School, the Army should not 
     disrupt or diminish the training and readiness of the United 
     States Armed Forces to fight in a chemical-biological warfare 
     environment;
       (ii) the Army should continue to operate the Chemical 
     Defense Training Facility at Fort McClellan until such time 
     as the replacement training facility at Fort Leonard Wood is 
     functional.
       (F) Annual reports on chemical and biological weapons 
     defense activities.--On January 1, 1998, and annually 
     thereafter, the President shall submit a report to the 
     Committees on Foreign Relations, Appropriations, and Armed 
     Services of the Senate and the Committees on International 
     Relations, National Security, and Appropriations of the House 
     of Representatives, and the Speaker of the House of 
     Representatives on previous, current, and planned chemical 
     and biological weapons defense activities. The report shall 
     contain for the previous fiscal year and for the next three 
     fiscal years--
       (i) proposed solutions to each of the deficiencies in 
     chemical and biological warfare defenses identified in the 
     March 1996 report of the General Accounting Office entitled 
     ``Chemical and Biological Defense: Emphasis Remains 
     Insufficient to Resolve Continuing Problems'', and steps 
     being taken pursuant to subparagraph (B) to ensure that the 
     United States Armed Forces are capable of conducting required 
     military operations to ensure the success of United States 
     regional contingency plans despite the threat or use of 
     chemical or biological weapons;
       (ii) identification of the priorities of the executive 
     branch of Government in the development of both active and 
     passive chemical and biological defenses;
       (iii) a detailed summary of all budget activities 
     associated with the research, development, testing, and 
     evaluation of chemical and biological defense programs;
       (iv) a detailed summary of expenditures on research, 
     development, testing, and evaluation, and procurement of 
     chemical and biological defenses by fiscal years defense 
     programs, department, and agency;

[[Page S3655]]

       (v) a detailed assessment of current and projected vaccine 
     production capabilities and vaccine stocks, including 
     progress in researching and developing a multivalent vaccine;
       (vi) a detailed assessment of procedures and capabilities 
     necessary to protect and decontaminate infrastructure to 
     reinforce United States power-projection forces, including 
     progress in developing a nonaqueous chemical decontamination 
     capability;
       (vii) a description of progress made in procuring light-
     weight personal protective gear and steps being taken to 
     ensure that programmed procurement quantities are sufficient 
     to replace expiring battle-dress overgarments and chemical 
     protective overgarments to maintain required wartime 
     inventory levels;
       (viii) a description of progress made in developing long-
     range standoff detection and identification capabilities and 
     other battlefield surveillance capabilities for biological 
     and chemical weapons, including progress on developing a 
     multichemical agent detector, unmanned aerial vehicles, and 
     unmanned ground sensors;
       (ix) a description of progress made in developing and 
     deploying layered theater missile defenses for deployed 
     United States Armed Forces which will provide greater 
     geographic coverage against current and expected ballistic 
     missile threats and will assist in mitigating chemical and 
     biological contamination through higher altitude intercepts 
     and boost-phase intercepts;
       (x) an assessment of--
       (I) the training and readiness of the United States Armed 
     Forces to operate in a chemically or biologically 
     contaminated environment; and
       (II) actions taken to sustain training and readiness, 
     including training and readiness carried out at national 
     combat training centers;
       (xi) a description of progress made in incorporating 
     chemical and biological considerations into service and joint 
     exercises as well as simulations, models, and war games, and 
     the conclusions drawn from these efforts about the United 
     States capability to carry out required missions, including 
     missions with coalition partners, in military contingencies;
       (xii) a description of progress made in developing and 
     implementing service and joint doctrine for combat and non-
     combat operations involving adversaries armed with chemical 
     or biological weapons, including efforts to update the range 
     of service and joint doctrine to better address the wide 
     range of military activities, including deployment, 
     reinforcement, and logistics operations in support of combat 
     operations, and for the conduct of such operations in concert 
     with coalition forces; and
       (xiii) a description of progress made in resolving issues 
     relating to the protection of United States population 
     centers from chemical and biological attack, including plans 
     for inoculation of populations, consequence management, and a 
     description of progress made in developing and deploying 
     effective cruise missile defenses and a national ballistic 
     missile defense.
       (12) Primacy of the united states constitution.--Nothing in 
     the Convention requires or authorizes legislation, or other 
     action, by the United States prohibited by the Constitution 
     of the United States, as interpreted by the United States.
       (13) Noncompliance.--
       (A) In general.--If the President determines that 
     persuasive information exists that a State Party to the 
     Convention is maintaining a chemical weapons production or 
     production mobilization capability, is developing new 
     chemical agents, or is in violation of the Convention in any 
     other manner so as to threaten the national security 
     interests of the United States, then the President shall--
       (i) consult with the Senate, and promptly submit to it, a 
     report detailing the effect of such actions;
       (ii) seek on an urgent basis a challenge inspection of the 
     facilities of the relevant party in accordance with the 
     provisions of the Convention with the objective of 
     demonstrating to the international community the act of 
     noncompliance;
       (iii) seek, or encourage, on an urgent basis a meeting at 
     the highest diplomatic level with the relevant party with the 
     objective of bringing the noncompliant party into compliance;
       (iv) implement prohibitions and sanctions against the 
     relevant party as required by law;
       (v) if noncompliance has been determined, seek on an urgent 
     basis within the Security Council of the United Nations a 
     multilateral imposition of sanctions against the noncompliant 
     party for the purposes of bringing the noncompliant party 
     into compliance; and
       (vi) in the event that the noncompliance continues for a 
     period of longer than one year after the date of the 
     determination made pursuant to subparagraph (A), promptly 
     consult with the Senate for the purposes of obtaining a 
     resolution of support for continued adherence to the 
     Convention, notwithstanding the changed circumstances 
     affecting the object and purpose of the Convention.
       (B) Construction.--Nothing in this section may be construed 
     to impair or otherwise affect the authority of the Director 
     of Central Intelligence to protect intelligence sources and 
     methods from unauthorized disclosure pursuant to section 
     103(c)(5) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 
     403-3(c)(5)).
       (C) Presidential determinations.--If the President 
     determines that an action otherwise required under 
     subparagraph (A) would impair or otherwise affect the 
     authority of the Director of Central Intelligence to protect 
     intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized 
     disclosure, the President shall report that determination, 
     together with a detailed written explanation of the basis for 
     that determination, to the chairmen of the Senate Select 
     Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select 
     Committee on Intelligence not later than 15 days after making 
     such determination.
       (14) Financing russian implementation.--The United States 
     understands that, in order to be assured of the Russian 
     commitment to a reduction in chemical weapons stockpiles, 
     Russia must maintain a substantial stake in financing the 
     implementation of both the 1990 Bilateral Destruction 
     Agreement and the Convention. The United States shall not 
     accept any effort by Russia to make deposit of Russia's 
     instrument of ratification of the Convention contingent upon 
     the United States providing financial guarantees to pay for 
     implementation of commitments by Russia under the 1990 
     Bilateral Destruction Agreement or the Convention.
       (15) Assistance under article x.--
       (A) In general.--Prior to the deposit of the United States 
     instrument of ratification, the President shall certify to 
     the Congress that the United States shall not provide 
     assistance under paragraph 7(a) of Article X.
       (B) Countries ineligible for certain assistance under the 
     foreign assistance act.--Prior to the deposit of the United 
     States instrument of ratification, the President shall 
     certify to the Congress that for any State Party the 
     government of which is not eligible for assistance under 
     chapter 2 of part II (relating to military assistance) or 
     chapter 4 of part II (relating to economic support 
     assistance) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961--
       (i) no assistance under paragraph 7(b) of Article X will be 
     provided to the State Party; and
       (ii) no assistance under paragraph 7(c) of Article X other 
     than medical antidotes and treatment will be provided to the 
     State Party.
       (16) Protection of confidential information.--
       (A) Unauthorized disclosure of united states business 
     information.--Whenever the President determines that 
     persuasive information is available indicating that--
       (i) an officer or employee of the Organization has 
     willfully published, divulged, disclosed, or made known in 
     any manner or to any extent not authorized by the Convention 
     any United States confidential business information coming to 
     him in the course of his employment or official duties or by 
     reason of any examination or investigation of any return, 
     report, or record made to or filed with the Organization, or 
     any officer or employee thereof, and
       (ii) such practice or disclosure has resulted in financial 
     losses or damages to a United States person,

     the President shall, within 30 days after the receipt of such 
     information by the executive branch of Government, notify the 
     Congress in writing of such determination.
       (B) Waiver of immunity from jurisdiction.--
       (i) Certification.--Not later than 270 days after 
     notification of Congress under subparagraph (A), the 
     President shall certify to Congress that the immunity from 
     jurisdiction of such foreign person has been waived by the 
     Director-General of the Technical Secretariat.
       (ii) Withholding of portion of contributions.--If the 
     President is unable to make the certification described under 
     clause (i), then 50 percent of the amount of each annual 
     United States contribution to the regular budget of the 
     Organization that is assessed pursuant to paragraph 7 of 
     Article VIII shall be withheld from disbursement, in addition 
     to any other amounts required to be withheld from 
     disbursement by any other provision of law, until--
       (I) the President makes such certification, or
       (II) the President certifies to Congress that the situation 
     has been resolved in a manner satisfactory to the United 
     States person who has suffered the damages due to the 
     disclosure of United States confidential business 
     information.
       (C) Breaches of confidentiality.--
       (i) Certification.--In the case of any breach of 
     confidentiality involving both a State Party and the 
     Organization, including any officer or employee thereof, the 
     President shall, within 270 days after providing written 
     notification to Congress pursuant to subparagraph (A), 
     certify to Congress that the Commission described under 
     paragraph 23 of the Confidentiality Annex has been 
     established to consider the breach.
       (ii) Withholding of portion of contributions.--If the 
     President is unable to make the certification described under 
     clause (i), then 50 percent of the amount of each annual 
     United States contribution to the regular budget of the 
     Organization that is assessed pursuant to paragraph 7 of 
     Article VIII shall be withheld from disbursement, in addition 
     to any other amounts required to be withheld from 
     disbursement by any other provision of law, until--
       (I) the President makes such certification, or
       (II) the President certifies to Congress that the situation 
     has been resolved in a manner

[[Page S3656]]

     satisfactory to the United States person who has suffered the 
     damages due to the disclosure of United States confidential 
     business information.
       (D) Definitions.--In this paragraph:
       (i) United states confidential business information.--The 
     term ``United States confidential business information means 
     any trade secrets or commercial or financial information that 
     is privileged and confidential, as described in section 
     662(b)(4) of title 5, United States Code, and that is 
     obtained--
       (I) from a United States person; and
       (II) through the United States National Authority or the 
     conduct of an inspection on United States territory under the 
     Convention.
       (ii) United States person.--The term ``United States 
     person'' means any natural person or any corporation, 
     partnership, or other juridical entity organized under the 
     laws of the United States.
       (iii) United states.--The term ``United States'' means the 
     several States, the District of Columbia, and the 
     commonwealths, territories, and possessions of the United 
     States.
       (17) Constitutional prerogatives.--
       (A) Findings.--The Senate makes the following findings:
       (i) Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 of the United States 
     Constitution states that the President ``shall have Power, by 
     and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make 
     Treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators present 
     concur''.
       (ii) At the turn of the century, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge 
     took the position that the giving of advice and consent to 
     the ratification of treaties constitutes a stage in 
     negotiation on the treaties and that Senate amendments or 
     reservations to a treaty are propositions ``offered at a 
     later stage of the negotiation by the other part of the 
     American treaty making power in the only manner in which they 
     could then be offered''.
       (iii) The executive branch of Government has begun a 
     practice of negotiating and submitting to the Senate treaties 
     which include provisions that have the purported effect of--
       (I) inhibiting the Senate from attaching reservations that 
     the Senate considers necessary in the national interest; or
       (II) preventing the Senate from exercising its 
     constitutional duty to give its advice and consent to treaty 
     commitments before ratification of the treaties.
       (iv) During the 85th Congress, and again during the 102d 
     Congress, the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate 
     made its position on this issue clear when stating that ``the 
     President's agreement to such a prohibition cannot constrain 
     the Senate's constitutional right and obligation to give its 
     advice and consent to a treaty subject to any reservation it 
     might determine is required by the national interest''.
       (B) Sense of the senate.--It is the sense of the Senate 
     that--
       (i) the advice and consent given by the Senate in the past 
     to ratification of treaties containing provisions which 
     prohibit amendments or reservations should not be construed 
     as a precedent for such provisions in future treaties;
       (ii) United States negotiators to a treaty should not agree 
     to any provision that has the effect of inhibiting the Senate 
     from attaching reservations or offering amendments to the 
     treaty; and
       (iii) the Senate should not consent in the future to any 
     article or other provision of any treaty that would prohibit 
     the Senate from giving its advice and consent to ratification 
     of the treaty subject to amendment or reservation.
       (18) Laboratory sample analysis.--Prior to the deposit of 
     the United States instrument of ratification, the President 
     shall certify to the Senate that no sample collected in the 
     United States pursuant to the Convention will be transferred 
     for analysis to any laboratory outside the territory of the 
     United States.
       (19) Effect on terrorism.--The Senate finds that--
       (A) without regard to whether the Convention enters into 
     force, terrorists will likely view chemical weapons as a 
     means to gain greater publicity and instill widespread fear; 
     and
       (B) the March 1995 Tokyo subway attack by the Aum Shinrikyo 
     would not have been prevented by the Convention.
       (20) Constitutional separation of powers.--
       (A) Findings.--The Senate makes the following findings:
       (i) Article VIII(8) of the Convention allows a State Party 
     to vote in the Organization if the State Party is in arrears 
     in the payment of financial contributions and the 
     Organization is satisfied that such nonpayment is due to 
     conditions beyond the control of the State Party.
       (ii) Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution 
     vests in Congress the exclusive authority to ``pay the 
     Debts'' of the United States.
       (iii) Financial contributions to the Organization may be 
     appropriated only by Congress.
       (B) Sense of senate.--It is therefore the sense of the 
     Senate that--
       (i) such contributions thus should be considered, for 
     purposes of Article VIII(8) of the Convention, beyond the 
     control of the executive branch of the United States 
     Government; and
       (ii) the United States vote in the Organization should not 
     be denied in the event that Congress does not appropriate the 
     full amount of funds assessed for the United States financial 
     contribution to the Organization.
       (21) On-site inspection agency.--It is the sense of the 
     Senate that the On-Site Inspection Agency of the Department 
     of Defense should have the authority to provide assistance in 
     advance of any inspection to any facility in the United 
     States that is subject to a routine inspection under the 
     Convention, or to any facility in the United States that is 
     the object of a challenge inspection conducted pursuant to 
     Article IX, if the consent of the owner or operator of the 
     facility has first been obtained.
       (22) Limitation on the scale of assessment.--
       (A) Limitation on annual assessment.--Notwithstanding any 
     provision of the Convention, and subject to the requirements 
     of subparagraphs (B), (C), and (D), the United States shall 
     pay as a total annual assessment of the costs of the 
     Organization pursuant to paragraph 7 of Article VIII not more 
     than $25,000,000.
       (B) Recalculation of limitations.--On January 1, 2000, and 
     at each 3-year interval thereafter, the amount specified in 
     subparagraph (A) is to be recalculated by the Administrator 
     of General Services, in consultation with the Secretary of 
     State, to reflect changes in the consumer price index for the 
     immediately preceding 3-year period.
       (C) Additional contributions requiring congressional 
     approval.--
       (i) Authority.--Notwithstanding subparagraph (A), the 
     President may furnish additional contributions which would 
     otherwise be prohibited under subparagraph (A) if--
       (I) the President determines and certifies in writing to 
     the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the Committee 
     on Foreign Relations of the Senate that the failure to 
     provide such contributions would result in the inability of 
     the Organization to conduct challenge inspections pursuant to 
     Article IX or would otherwise jeopardize the national 
     security interests of the United States; and
       (II) Congress enacts a joint resolution approving the 
     certification of the President.
       (ii) Statement of reasons.--The President shall transmit 
     with such certification a detailed statement setting forth 
     the specific reasons therefor and the specific uses to which 
     the additional contributions provided to the Organization 
     would be applied.
       (D) Additional contributions for verification.--
     Notwithstanding subparagraph (A), for a period of not more 
     than ten years, the President may furnish additional 
     contributions to the Organization for the purposes of meeting 
     the costs of verification under Articles IV and V.
       (23) Additions to the annex on chemicals.--
       (A) Presidential notification.--Not later than 10 days 
     after the Director-General of the Technical Secretariat 
     communicates information to all States Parties pursuant to 
     Article XI(5)(a) of a proposal for the addition of a chemical 
     or biological substance to a schedule of the Annex on 
     Chemicals, the President shall notify the Committee on 
     Foreign Relations of the Senate of the proposed addition.
       (B) Presidential report.--Not later than 60 days after the 
     Director-General of the Technical Secretariat communicates 
     information of such a proposal pursuant to Article XV(5)(a) 
     or not later than 30 days after a positive recommendation by 
     the Executive Council pursuant to Article XV(5)(c), whichever 
     is sooner, the President shall submit to the Committee on 
     Foreign Relations of the Senate a report, in classified and 
     unclassified form, detailing the likely impact of the 
     proposed addition to a schedule of the Annex on Chemicals. 
     Such report shall include--
       (i) an assessment of the likely impact on United States 
     industry of the proposed addition of the chemical or 
     biological substance to a schedule of the Annex on Chemicals;
       (ii) a description of the likely costs and benefits, if 
     any, to United States national security of the proposed 
     addition of such chemical or biological substance to a 
     schedule of the Annex on Chemicals; and
       (iii) a detailed assessment of the effect of the proposed 
     addition on United States obligations under the Verification 
     Annex.
       (C) Presidential consultation.--The President shall, after 
     the submission of the notification required under 
     subparagraph (A) and prior to any action on the proposal by 
     the Executive Council under Article XV(5)(c), consult 
     promptly with the Senate as to whether the United States 
     should object to the proposed addition of a chemical or 
     biological substance pursuant to Article XV(5)(c).
       (24) Treaty interpretation.--The Senate affirms the 
     applicability to all treaties of the Constitutionally based 
     principles of treaty interpretation set forth in Condition 
     (1) of the resolution of ratification with respect to the INF 
     Treaty. For purposes of this declaration, the term ``INF 
     Treaty'' refers to the Treaty Between the United States of 
     America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the 
     Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter Range 
     Missiles, together with the related memorandum of 
     understanding and protocols, approved by the Senate on May 
     27, 1988.
       (25) Further arms reductions obligations.--The Senate 
     declares its intention to consider for approval international 
     agreements that would obligate the United States to reduce or 
     limit the Armed Forces or armaments of the United States in a 
     militarily significant manner only pursuant to the treaty 
     power as set forth in Article II, section 2, clause 2 of the 
     Constitution.

[[Page S3657]]

       (26) Riot control agents.--
       (A) Permitted uses.--Prior to the deposit of the United 
     States instrument of ratification, the President shall 
     certify to Congress that the United States is not restricted 
     by the Convention in its use of riot control agents, 
     including the use against combatants who are parties to a 
     conflict, in any of the following cases:
       (i) United states not a party.--The conduct of peacetime 
     military operations within an area of ongoing armed conflict 
     when the United States is not a party to the conflict (such 
     as recent use of the United States Armed Forces in Somalia, 
     Bosnia, and Rwanda).
       (ii) Consensual peacekeeping.--Consensual peacekeeping 
     operations when the use of force is authorized by the 
     receiving state, including operations pursuant to Chapter VI 
     of the United Nations Charter.
       (iii) Chapter vii peacekeeping.--Peacekeeping operations 
     when force is authorized by the Security Council under 
     Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.
       (B) Implementation.--The President shall take no measure, 
     and prescribe no rule or regulation, which would alter or 
     eliminate Executive Order 11850 of April 8, 1975.
       (C) Definition.--In this paragraph, the term ``riot control 
     agent'' has the meaning given the term in Article II(7) of 
     the Convention.
       (27) Chemical weapons destruction.--Prior to the deposit of 
     the United States instrument of ratification of the 
     Convention, the President shall certify to the Congress that 
     all of the following conditions are satisfied:
       (A) Exploration of alternative technologies.--The President 
     has agreed to explore alternative technologies for the 
     destruction of the United States stockpile of chemical 
     weapons in order to ensure that the United States has the 
     safest, most effective and environmentally sound plans and 
     programs for meeting its obligations under the Convention 
     for the destruction of chemical weapons.
       (B) Convention extends destruction deadline.--The 
     requirement in section 1412 of Public Law 99-145 (50 U.S.C. 
     1521) for completion of the destruction of the United States 
     stockpile of chemical weapons by December 31, 2004, will be 
     superseded upon the date the Convention enters into force 
     with respect to the United States by the deadline required by 
     the Convention of April 29, 2007.
       (C) Authority to employ a different destruction 
     technology.--The requirement in Article III(1)(a)(v) of the 
     Convention for a declaration by each State Party not later 
     than 30 days after the date the Convention enters into force 
     with respect to that Party on general plans of the State 
     Party for destruction of its chemical weapons does not 
     preclude in any way the United States from deciding in the 
     future to employ a technology for the destruction of chemical 
     weapons different than that declared under that Article.
       (D) Procedures for extension of deadline.--The President 
     will consult with Congress on whether to submit a request to 
     the Executive Council of the Organization for an extension of 
     the deadline for the destruction of chemical weapons under 
     the Convention, as provided under part IV(A) of the Annex on 
     Implementation and Verification to the Convention, if, as a 
     result of the program of alternative technologies for the 
     destruction of chemical munitions carried out under section 
     8065 of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1997 
     (as contained in Public Law 104-208), the President 
     determines that alternatives to the incineration of chemical 
     weapons are available that are safer and more environmentally 
     sound but whose use would preclude the United States from 
     meeting the deadlines of the Convention.
       (28) Constitutional protection against unreasonable search 
     and seizure.--
       (A) In general.--In order to protect United States citizens 
     against unreasonable searches and seizures, prior to the 
     deposit of the United States instrument of ratification, the 
     President shall certify to Congress that--
       (i) for any challenge inspection conducted on the territory 
     of the United States pursuant to Article IX, where consent 
     has been withheld, the United States National Authority will 
     first obtain a criminal search warrant based upon probable 
     cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and describing with 
     particularity the place to be searched and the persons or 
     things to be seized; and
       (ii) for any routine inspection of a declared facility 
     under the Convention that is conducted on the territory of 
     the United States, where consent has been withheld the United 
     States National Authority first will obtain an administrative 
     search warrant from a United States magistrate judge.
       (B) Definition.--For purposes of this resolution, the term 
     ``National Authority'' means the agency or office of the 
     United States Government designated by the United States 
     pursuant to Article VII(4) of the Convention.

     SECTION 3. DEFINITIONS.

       As used in this resolution:
       (1) Chemical weapons convention or convention.--The terms 
     ``Chemical Weapons Convention'' and ``Convention'' mean the 
     Convention on the Prohibition of Development, Production, 
     Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their 
     Destruction, Opened for Signature and Signed by the United 
     States at Paris on January 13, 1993, including the following 
     protocols and memorandum of understanding, all such documents 
     being integral parts of and collectively referred to as the 
     ``Chemical Weapons Convention'' or the ``Convention'' 
     (contained in Treaty Document 103-21):
       (A) The Annex on Chemicals.
       (B) The Annex on Implementation and Verification.
       (C) The Annex on the Protection of Confidential 
     Information.
       (D) The Resolution Establishing the Preparatory Commission 
     for the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.
       (E) The Text on the Establishment of a Preparatory 
     Commission.
       (2) Organization.--The term ``Organization'' means the 
     Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons 
     established under the Convention.
       (3) State party.--The term ``State Party'' means any nation 
     that is a party to the Convention.
       (4) United States instrument or ratification.--The term 
     ``United States instrument of ratification'' means the 
     instrument of ratification of the United States of the 
     Convention.

  Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, of course I am disappointed by today's vote 
on the CWC. But I find some solace in the fact that, thanks to our 
efforts, this treaty is much less harmful than it would have been. I am 
enormously proud of Senators Kyl, Inhofe, and other Senators who stood 
with us despite enormous pressure against this treaty. I believe 
history will vindicate their efforts.
  Make no mistake, this is a dangerous treaty. But it is a little less 
dangerous thanks to the efforts we made to amend it, and to deliver the 
truth to the American people. Last September, treaty proponents were 
pressing the Senate to vote on a treaty that had none of the key 
protections that some of us succeeded in inserting in this treaty. Had 
we not been a phalanx of common sense standing in their way, the exact 
same treaty would have been before the Senate for ratification today, 
and that would have been a disaster.
  The treaty approved by the Senate tonight was toned down with 28 
conditions, most of which the administration was until recently calling 
``killer amendments.'' Those include, among many others, conditions 
that limit the cost of the treaty to the American taxpayer, place 
safeguards on intelligence sharing, enhance our chemical defenses, and 
protect confidential business information.
  Further, concessions on what I consider some of the most important 
issues--such as protecting the right of American commanders in the 
field to use tear gas, and requiring criminal search warrants for 
foreign inspectors--came only the final days before I agreed to allow 
the treaty to go to the Senate floor for a vote. If we had not held out 
so long--in spite of all the criticism and derision lobbed in our 
direction--none of those protections would be in the treaty today.
  I hope I may be forgiven for taking some satisfaction in the 
knowledge that, thanks to what our critics called our stubbornness, our 
soldiers in the field will be a little safer, and the constitutional 
rights of American citizens will be a little better protected. Final 
judgment of our efforts will be left to future generations.
  I do know this: those great Senators with whom I was honored to stand 
fought the good fight, we won some battles, and lost others. But we 
fought with honor, and integrity, and for the cause of right.
  Mr. BIDEN addressed the Chair.
  The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator from Delaware.
  Mr. BIDEN. I would like to thank the Vice President for being at the 
ready the whole day, and I would like to thank my colleagues for not 
making it necessary. I am glad they deprived the Vice President of the 
United States the opportunity to vote on the five conditions and on 
final passage. But I want to point out to my colleagues who are being 
very nice and solicitous about my efforts in this regard, the Vice 
President of the United States, who is in the Chair, played a critical 
role in pushing this, making sure that we kept it before the Nation, 
generating the interesting debate so this could not be left untouched, 
and I want to publicly thank him.
  There is that old expression in politics that politics makes strange 
bedfellows. I have had the distinction and the honor of having been the 
ranking member and/or chairman with the distinguished Senator from 
South Carolina, Senator Thurmond, and when I

[[Page S3658]]

got that assignment I think most of my colleagues looked at me and 
said, this is going to be an interesting time, Biden and Thurmond. We 
turned out to be very good friends. This is the first occasion after 25 
years that I have had to work as closely as I have with my new chairman 
of the Foreign Relations Committee, on which I rank, and that is 
Senator Helms. I want to publicly thank him. He kept his word at every 
stage of this long, arduous, and for me ultimately rewarding 
negotiation. I want to acknowledge how much I appreciate it.
  I conclude by saying, because I do not want to turn this into some 
litany of people to thank, what a pleasure it has been to work with and 
receive the guidance and encouragement from the Senator from Indiana 
[Mr. Lugar]. He has served this Nation well on this occasion, as well 
as Senator McCain. I hope I am not hurting their credentials in the 
Republican party by acknowledging how closely I worked with both of 
them. However, I think it should be noted that without the two of them 
weighing in on this treaty I not only doubt, I know we would not have 
passed this.
  I conclude by saying I truly think this is a very important moment in 
the Senate, and I do think the vote we just cast will be within the 
next hour heard around the world. Had we voted the other way, it would 
have been a louder, more resounding sound than the one now. It will be 
heard around the world, and it will reaffirm American leadership.
  I thank the Vice President for being here again and I am also 
thankful we did not have to have his vote, but I knew where it was if 
we had needed it.
  I yield the floor.
  The VICE PRESIDENT. Under the previous order, the President will be 
immediately notified.

                          ____________________