NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1998
(Senate - July 07, 1997)

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[Pages S6877-S6906]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




        NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1998

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senate will now resume consideration of S. 
936, which the clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       A bill (S. 936) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 
     1998 for military activities of the Department of Defense, 
     for military construction, and for defense activities of the 
     Department of Energy, to prescribe personnel strengths for 
     such fiscal year for the Armed Forces, and for other 
     purposes.

  The Senate resumed consideration of the bill.
  Pending:

       Cochran/Durbin amendment No. 420, to require a license to 
     export computers with composite theoretical performance equal 
     to or greater than 2,000 million theoretical operations per 
     second.
       Grams Amendment No. 422 (to amendment No. 420), to require 
     the Comptroller General of the United States to conduct a 
     study on the availability and potential risks relating to the 
     sale of certain computers.
       Coverdell (for Inhofe/Coverdell/Cleland) amendment No. 423, 
     to define depot-level maintenance and repair, to limit 
     contracting for depot-level maintenance and repair at 
     installations approved for closure or realignment in 1995, 
     and to modify authorities and requirements relating to the 
     performance of core logistics functions.

  Mr. LUGAR addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Indiana is recognized.
  Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, momentarily, when the draft of my amendment 
arrives, I will send it to the desk. For the moment, I will simply 
mention that the amendment I am about to offer, I will offer on behalf 
of myself, Senator Bingaman, Senator Domenici, and Senator Levin.
  Mr. President, I indicate that additional original cosponsors will be 
Senators Hagel, Jeffords, Chafee, Specter, D'Amato, Frist, Gorton, 
Snowe, Collins, Kennedy, Biden, Kerrey of Nebraska, Lieberman, Byrd, 
Reed of Rhode Island, Daschle, and Robb.
  I want to especially recognize Senator Domenici for his contribution 
to our work on this amendment.
  Mr. President, let me state at the outset that Congress established, 
in 1991, with strong bipartisan support, what is known as the Nunn-
Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, the CTR.
  Last year, the Senate, in a 96 to 0 vote, amended and enlarged this 
important program through the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici legislation entitled 
the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act.
  The CTR program at the Department of Defense, along with its 
companion programs at the Department of Energy--namely, the Materials 
Protection Control and Accounting Program [MPC] and the International 
Nuclear Safety Program--have played significant roles in our efforts to 
reduce the risk to the United States from loose nukes and the dangers 
inherent in the operations of Soviet-designed nuclear reactors.
  Each of these programs plays a key role in enhancing stability around 
the world and contributes to circumscribing the threats that emanate 
from weapons and materials of mass destruction.
  The defense authorization bill for fiscal year 1998, as reported out 
of the Committee on Armed Services, cut the funding for the Cooperative 
Threat Reduction Program and the Materials Protection, Control and 
Accounting Program and totally eliminated all funding for the 
International Nuclear Safety Program.
  Our amendment is designed to restore the funding cuts in these three 
programs.


                      reduction in the ctr request

  Mr. President, the Armed Services Committee has recommended a cut of 
$60 million in the President's request of $382.2 million for the fiscal 
year 1998 for the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program. The sponsors of 
this amendment believe that this is a mistake.
  The Nunn-Lugar program's impact on the threat posed by former Soviet 
weapons of mass destruction can be measured in the 81 ICBM's destroyed, 
125 ICBM silos eliminated, 20 bombers destroyed, 64 SLBM launchers 
eliminated, 58 nuclear test tunnels sealed, and the 4,500 warheads 
taken off strategic systems aimed at us--Mr. President, let me repeat 
that, 4,500 former Soviet warheads which were pointed at the United 
States have been removed by the Nunn-Lugar program--all at a

[[Page S6878]]

cost of less than one-third of 1 percent of the Department of Defense's 
annual budget. Without our Cooperation Threat Reduction Program, 
Ukraine, Kazakstan, and Belarus would still have thousands of nuclear 
weapons. Instead, all three countries are nuclear-weapons-free.
  Although the CTR Program has accomplished much, much work essential 
to U.S. national security interests remains to be done. This includes:
  The elimination of ICBM's, SLBM's, and heavy bombers as required 
under the START I Treaty, followed by START II and perhaps START III; 
increase safety and security for the transport and storage of remaining 
Russian nuclear warheads; an end to production of weapons-grade 
plutonium; chemical weapons reduction; and other efforts to reduce 
weapons of mass destruction in the former Soviet Union and the threat 
of proliferation.
  The President's fiscal year 1998 budget request of $382.2 million was 
a bare-bones request based on a difficult prioritization of potential 
projects.
  Stated simply, Mr. President, there are tens of things which need to 
be done, a long list prioritized and squeezed into the $382.2 million 
bare bones request. Many programs that the Congress supported in the 
past failed to make the list. Indeed, there are several key projects 
that cannot be funded even at the $382.2 million level which would 
accelerate our strategic arms elimination programs in Russia and 
Ukraine.

  I am told that the committee reduction in the President's request was 
motivated in part because:
  Unobligated moneys remain for Belarus, which cannot be spent as long 
as that country has not been recertified for the CTR program; the 
Government of Japan has suggested it might purchase fissile material 
containers for a major CTR project at Mayak in Russia, thereby freeing 
up some CTR funds previously planned for that project; and finally, 
unobligated funds for the Cooperative Threat Reduction Programs.

  In fact, Mr. President, there are no extra funds available. There are 
no unobligated funds that have not been designated for specific 
projects and specific countries.


                        Belarus Decertification

  The decision by the President not to recertify Belarus for the time 
being resulted in $37.2 million that cannot be obligated until Belarus 
is certified. The Department of Defense plans to use $15 million of 
this sum to partially fund a classified project that has been briefed 
to Members and notified to the Congress. A copy of that notification is 
available in S-407 for any Member to read. The remainder of the Belarus 
funds are intended to remain in reserve to implement previously 
notified projects in Belarus in the event that Belarus is recertified 
in fiscal year 1998.
  Mr. President, I support the maintenance of these funds in a reserve 
to implement previously notified projects. Even though the SS-25's have 
left Belarus for Russia, much remains to be done in the area of 
strategic system infrastructure elimination. SS-25's are mobile; they 
could be returned under certain circumstances. Thus, while Belarus is 
currently nuclear weapons free, much remains to be done to insure that 
it remains in that status.


                      Japanese Container Purchase

  The Japanese are negotiating with the United States manufacturer, 
Westinghouse, to purchase some fissile material storage containers for 
a storage facility at Mayak, Russia. This project is a major component 
of the CTR program. While the Department of Defense is not yet certain 
how many, if any, the Japanese will purchase, it could be that a 
Japanese purchase would decrease the DOD requirements for container 
purchases by as much as $15 million. Accordingly, the Department of 
Defense plans to use this $15 million to augment some of the funds from 
the Belarus account for the classified project. The remaining fiscal 
year 1997 container funding in the amount of $23.5 million are being 
notified to Congress to enable purchase of containers to complete the 
50,000 container requirement.
  In short, Mr. President, the Congress has been notified on a new, 
classified nonproliferation project which will use all of the CTR funds 
no longer needed for fissile material container, and many of the 
obligated funds previously planned for Belarus in the event Belarus is 
not recertified. This project is important and time-sensitive and 
deserves our support.


                         Unobligated CTR Funds

  Mr. President, the issue of unobligated CTR funds is an annual one. 
Inevitable delays in obligating funds in a given fiscal year result 
from the annual certification process, a very complicated process from 
the beginning of the nonnuclear legislative efforts in 1991.
  For example, the Department of Defense did not have authority to 
spend fiscal year 1997 CTR funds until April 1997, following completion 
of the certification process and notification to Congress of intent to 
obligate the fiscal year 1997 funds.
  Mr. President, this means simply that well over half of the year was 
consumed due to the legislative requirements of the certification 
process and the notification of intent to Congress.
  Over the life of the CTR Program, DOD has notified to the Congress 
intent to obligate approximately $1.8 billion. Of this amount, $1.3 
billion has been obligated, and an additional $38.5 million soon will 
be notified. Therefore, DOD has $513 million--not $700 million--in 
currently unobligated CTR funds.
  For fiscal year 1997, DOD has so far obligated $208 million, with 
plans to obligate another $200 million by the end of the fiscal year. 
As defined in the CTR Multi-year Program Plan reported to Congress 
earlier this month, the remaining $313 million in unobligated funds 
have been committed to specific countries by signed agreement and are 
earmarked for specific CTR projects. For example, we have agreements 
and have earmarked funds for SS-18 ICBM elimination in Russia and SS-24 
elimination in Ukraine.
  The bottom line, Mr. President, is that execution of these funds has 
been thoroughly planned, and agreements with recipient nations have 
been signed to allow this assistance for eliminating these strategic 
systems to proceed per the DOD plan.


        the material protection, control, and accounting program

  Mr. President, let me turn to the second program for which we seek to 
restore full funding through this amendment--this is, the Material 
Protection, Control, and Accounting Program.
  Mr. President, most Members can appreciate the direct benefits to our 
security from assisting in the elimination of strategic weapons systems 
targeted on the United States. Perhaps more difficult to comprehend is 
the threat posed by the potential leakage of weapons-grade nuclear 
materials.
  The Material Protection, Control, and Accounting Program seeks to 
secure hundreds of tons of weapons-usable nuclear materials in the 
former Soviet Union and elsewhere which are inadequately secured and 
are at risk of falling into the hands of criminal elements, terrorist 
organizations and rogue states. In sort, this programs works to prevent 
the theft or diversion of weapons-usable materials--plutonium and 
highly enriched uranium.
  The Department of Energy, in cooperation with Russia, the newly 
independent states, and the Baltic States, has put in place equipment 
at 18 sites to safeguard plutonium and weapons-usable uranium, and 
agreements are in place to enhance safety and security at over 30 
additional sites, including research laboratories and storage sites. If 
this program is reduced by the $25 million recommended by the 
committee, there would be delays of at least 2 years in securing these 
sites and an estimated increased cost of $70 million.
  In short, Mr. President, after a slow start in the early 1990's, 
MPC improvements are now underway at over 50 sites in Russia, the new 
independent states, and the Baltic States. Let me give some specific 
examples: MPC upgrades at Obninsk and Kurchatov in Russia have 
radically improved security for several tons of weapons-usable 
material; upgraded MPC systems for all weapons-usable nuclear 
materials in Latvia, Lithuania, Uzbekistan, Georgia, and Belarus are 
complete; nuclear material detectors have been installed at all 
pedestrian pathways at the Siberian Chemical Combine (Tomsk-7) and the 
Chelyabinsk-70 nuclear weapons design institute. These monitors provide 
a major improvement to the security of many tons of weapons-usable 
nuclear material at these

[[Page S6879]]

sites; a national MPC training center has been established at 
Obninsk, Russia, with support from DOE and the European Union; by the 
end of this month, more than 1,000 nuclear specialists from the former 
Soviet Union will have participated in MPC training courses and 
technical exchanges under the auspices of the program; work is underway 
to strengthen Russia's nuclear regulatory system; and MPC upgrades 
for the Russian Navy, some 8 to 10 facilities in 1998, the icebreaker 
fleet, and for nuclear materials during transportation are underway at 
several sites.

  Mr. President, it is noteworthy that the National Research Council 
recently completed an independent external assessment of this MPC 
program, and the National Research Council concluded; and I quote:

       U.S. commitment to the program should be sustained and 
     funding should be continued at least at the level of FY 1996 
     (funding) for several more years, and increased if high-
     impact opportunities arise.

  In short, the Energy Department through this program has enhanced the 
security surrounding hundreds of tons of nuclear weapons material, but 
the vast majority of material remains poorly secured.
  Mr. President, fiscal year 1998 is one of the peak-activity years for 
the program, with work in progress at all large Russian nuclear sites 
compromising many hundreds of tons of highly enriched uranium and 
plutonium. If we reduce the fiscal year 1998 budget by $25 million, it 
would kill program momentum, a momentum based on years of negotiations, 
confidence building, and windows of opportunity.
  Mr. President, if we do not restore these program cuts, then I fear 
that work that has already been done to secure U.S. security interests 
and establish project foundations would need to be done again at 
considerable financial, time, and political costs. These costs would be 
especially great for the high-priority dismantlement and navy sites 
that we are attempting to secure. For example, security of fresh highly 
enriched uranium naval fuels is at a crucial stage. It is the largest 
project with the Russian Ministry of Defense--a key player in the 
overall nuclear-material security picture. It is crucial to maintain 
the program momentum. Security upgrades at the first facility are 
underway, and 6 to 12 additional facilities will be targeted in the 
1998-2002 timeframe.
  Mr. President, the bottom line is that, in my judgment, the MPC 
Program is one of the two most critical programs the U.S. Government 
conducts for ensuring the strategic national security of this country. 
It ranks alongside the equally critical Stockpile Stewardship Program 
for maintaining the credibility and reliability of the U.S. nuclear 
deterrent.


                  International Nuclear Safety Program

  Last, Mr. President, our amendment seeks to restore funds to the 
International Nuclear Safety Program. The Department of Energy is 
working with the international community to increase nuclear safety 
worldwide, particularly in those countries of Eastern and Central 
Europe and the former Soviet Union that operate Soviet-design nuclear 
reactors.
  The program's focus is on projects that improve the operation, 
physical condition, and safety culture at nuclear power plants; the 
establishment of nuclear safety centers in the United States and 
countries of the former Soviet Union; and technical leadership to 
promote sound management of nuclear materials and facilities.
  Mr. President, by way of background, it should be noted that the 1986 
Chernobyl nuclear reactor disaster highlighted the dangers associated 
with all operating Soviet-designed nuclear power reactors, particularly 
those of the older, Chernobyl-type design. The safety of these reactors 
is very much in the interest of the United States. Another nuclear 
accident could well destabilize political and economic conditions in 
the nascent democracies of the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe 
and cost the United States vast sums in relief assistance.
  This International Nuclear Safety initiative is designed to address, 
through cooperative and technical innovation, the serious global 
problems in the interrelated fields of nuclear safety and 
nonproliferation. This activity involves engineers, manufacturers, and 
scientists from many countries, and upon the DOE expertise in nuclear 
matters and our national laboratories to conduct this cooperation.
  Thus far, Mr. President, the Department of Energy has implemented 
under this program more than 150 plant-specific safety projects, 
involving 17 plant sites throughout the former Soviet Union and Eastern 
and Central Europe, eight design and scientific institutes, and 21 
United States commercial companies. Already, under this program, a 
number of key activities have been completed, including:
  Establishing nuclear safety training centers in Russia and Ukraine; 
transferring United States-style emergency operating procedures to a 
major Russian plant; completing nuclear safety system improvements at 
three Russian plants; and establishing the Ukraine International 
Research Center on Nuclear Safety, Radioactive Waste, and Radioecology.
  Mr. President, this last program activity is particularly important. 
The objectives of the Ukraine Center, located near the Chernobyl plant, 
include: Providing support for safety improvements for all nuclear 
power plants in Ukraine; to providing a focal point for international 
cooperation in addressing the environmental, health and safety issues 
created by the Chernobyl accident; and reducing the socioeconomic 
impacts of closing the Chernobyl plant.
  Mr. President, the Department of Energy also implements the United 
States program to assist Ukraine in shutting down the Chernobyl nuclear 
power plant, including measures for dealing with the deteriorating 
sarcophagus covering the damaged unit. These activities, however, are 
funded through another program.
  Mr. President, unless we restore the moneys to this program as this 
amendment seeks to do, we will be unable to proceed with some priority 
activities in 1998, that include:
  Management and operational safety improvements at Soviet-designed 
nuclear power sites; engineering and technology upgrades at Soviet-
designed nuclear power sites; additional detailed plant-specific safety 
assessments; assistance in the development of an independent nuclear 
regulator; and support for international nuclear safety data exchanges 
and cooperative research and development between the Russian 
International Nuclear Safety Center and the United States Center at 
Argonne National Laboratory in Idaho.
  This program is part of a larger international effort designed to 
reduce the risks inherent in these Soviet-designed reactors in the near 
term and to assist Russia and the newly independent states to implement 
self-sustaining nuclear safety programs and to achieve international 
nuclear reactor safety norms.
  Mr. President, I cannot assure this body that if we fully restore the 
funding for this program, another Chernobyl will never take place. But 
I can say that this program request is one of the best policy 
instruments available to reduce the risk that the world will face 
another Chernobyl-like disaster.
  In summary, our proposed amendment would restore the cuts made by the 
committee to these programs: $60 million in the cooperative threat 
reduction programs; $25 million to the MPC Program; and $50 million 
to the International Nuclear Safety Program.
  In my view, failure to restore these funds to these important 
programs could have severe consequences. It could diminish our ability 
to further reduce the prospect that terrorist or rogue states would 
acquire weapons-grade material; it could diminish our ability to assist 
in the permanent removal of missiles, launchers, and other delivery 
vehicles from the former Soviet strategic arsenal; and it could 
handcuff our ability, in cooperation with others, to improve operating 
safety at high-risk nuclear reactor sites in the former Soviet Union 
and elsewhere, and thus dramatically reduce the risk of further 
Chernobyls.
  I am most hopeful that all of my colleagues will support this 
amendment.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to lay aside the Grams 
amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Thomas). Without objection, it is so 
ordered.

[[Page S6880]]

                           Amendment No. 658

 (Purpose: To increase (with offsets) the funding, and to improve the 
   authority, for cooperative threat reduction programs and related 
                     Department of Energy programs)

  Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I send my amendment to the desk and ask 
unanimous consent it be made in order.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The clerk 
will report.
  The bill clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Indiana [Mr. Lugar], for himself, Mr. 
     Hagel, Mr. Jeffords, Mr. Chafee, Mr. Specter, Mr. D'Amato, 
     Mr. Frist, Mr. Gorton, Ms. Snowe, Ms. Collins, Mr. Kennedy, 
     Mr. Biden, Mr. Kerrey, Mr. Lieberman, Mr. Byrd, Mr. Reed, Mr. 
     Daschle, Mr. Robb, Mr. Bingaman, Mr. Domenici, and Mr. Levin 
     proposes an amendment numbered 658.

  Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the 
amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:
       On page 272, between lines 1 and 2, insert the following:

     SEC. 1009. COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION PROGRAMS AND RELATED 
                   DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY PROGRAMS.

       (a) Decrease in Authorization of Appropriations for 
     Environmental Management Science Program.--Notwithstanding 
     any other provision of this Act, the amount authorized to be 
     appropriated by section 3102(f) is hereby decreased by 
     $40,000,000.
       (b) Decrease in Authorization of Appropriations for 
     Environment, Safety and Health, Defense.--Notwithstanding any 
     other provision of this Act, the amount authorized to be 
     appropriated by section 3103(6) is hereby decreased by 
     $19,000,000.
       (c) Decrease in Authorization of Appropriations for Other 
     Procurement, Navy.--Notwithstanding any other provision of 
     this Act, the amount authorized to be appropriated by section 
     102(c)(5) is hereby decreased by $56,000,000.
       (d) Decrease in Authorization of Appropriations for 
     Operation and Maintenance, Defense-Wide.--Notwithstanding any 
     other provision of law, the amount authorized to be 
     appropriated by section 301(5) is hereby decreased by 
     $20,000,000.
       (e) Increase in Authorization of Appropriations for Former 
     Soviet Union Threat Reduction Programs.--Notwithstanding any 
     other provision of this Act, the amount authorized to be 
     appropriated by section 301(22) is hereby increased by 
     $60,000,000.
       (f) Increase in Authorization of Appropriations for 
     Department of Energy for Other Defense Activities.--
     Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, the total 
     amount authorized to be appropriated by section 3103 is 
     hereby increased by $56,000,000.
       (g) Increase in Authorization of Appropriations for 
     Department of Energy for Arms Controls.--Notwithstanding any 
     other provision of this Act, the amount authorized to be 
     appropriated by section 3103(1)(B) is hereby increased by 
     $25,000,000 (in addition to any increase under subsection (e) 
     that is allocated to the authorization of appropriations 
     under such section 3103(1)(B)).
       (h) Authorization of Appropriations for Department of 
     Energy for International Nuclear Safety Programs.--Funds are 
     hereby authorized to be appropriated to the Department of 
     Energy for fiscal year 1998 for other defense activities in 
     carrying out programs relating to international nuclear 
     safety that are necessary for national security in the amount 
     of $50,000,000.
       (i) Training for United States Border Security.--Section 
     1421 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 
     Year 1997 (Public Law 104-201; 110 Stat. 2725; 50 U.S.C. 
     2331) is amended--
       (1) by striking out ``and'' at the end of paragraph (2);
       (2) by striking out the period at the end of paragraph (3) 
     and inserting in lieu thereof ``; and''; and
       (3) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(4) training programs and assistance relating to the use 
     of such equipment, materials, and technology and for the 
     development of programs relating to such use.''.
       (j) International Border Security Through Fiscal Year 
     1999.--Section 1424(b) of the National Defense Authorization 
     Act for Fiscal Year 1997 (110 Stat. 2726; 10 U.S.C. 2333(b)) 
     is amended by adding at the end the following: ``Amounts 
     available under the proceeding sentence shall be available 
     until September 30, 1999.''.
       (j) Authority To Vary Amounts Available for Cooperative 
     Threat Reduction Programs.--(1) Section 1502(b) of the 
     National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 (110 
     Stat. 2732) is amended--
       (A) in the subsection heading, by striking out ``Limited''; 
     and
       (B) in the first sentence of paragraph (1), by striking out 
     ``, but not in excess of 115 percent of that amount''.
       (2) Section 1202(b) of the National Defense Authorization 
     Act for Fiscal Year 1996 (Public Law 104-106; 110 Stat. 469) 
     is amended--
       (A) in the subsection heading, by striking out ``Limited''; 
     and
       (B) in the first sentence of paragraph (1), by striking out 
     ``, but not in excess of 115 percent of that amount''.

  Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I thank the Chair, I thank Members for 
allowing me to offer this important amendment at this time, and I 
reiterate my hopes that all colleagues will support this activity. I 
point out the debate describes the substantial achievements of the 
cooperative threat reduction programs. The difficulty is always getting 
moneys through the pipeline, but I believe the statement I have given 
is self-explanatory with regard to these major issues.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I wonder if the Senator from Indiana would 
respond to this question before I make my own statement in strong 
support of his amendment, in gratitude for his amendment, and his 
leadership in this area. Did I understand the Senator said that he 
asked consent to lay his amendment aside?
  Mr. LUGAR. No. May I respond to the distinguished Senator. I asked 
the Grams amendment be laid aside and then, having gotten agreement by 
the Chair, I sent my amendment to the desk and asked for unanimous 
consent it be made in order, which the Chair granted.
  Mr. LEVIN. I thank the Senator. We are hopeful this amendment can be 
accepted, so I am glad this amendment would not be laid aside. Again, I 
commend the Senator from Indiana for the extraordinary leadership that 
he and Senator Nunn, when Senator Nunn was in this body, have shown in 
this area which contributes so much to the security of this Nation.
  One of the most cost-effective and successful defense programs that 
we have to reduce threats to our country and to enhance our national 
security is the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program that Senator Lugar 
and Senator Nunn started in 1991. This program at the Department of 
Defense, and its companion programs at the Department of Energy, have 
produced important results in reducing the threat of proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear, chemical and biological 
weapons and their materials. I was disappointed that the bill before 
the Senate, as it came before the Senate, does not authorize the 
funding level requested by the administration for these important 
programs, so I fully support the Lugar amendment.
  In addition to commending Senator Lugar, I particularly want to 
commend Senator Bingaman for his effort to restore these funds during 
the Armed Services Committee markup process. Since 1991, these threat 
reduction programs helped three Newly Independent States, Ukraine, 
Belarus, and Kazakhstan, to completely rid themselves of some 6,000 
nuclear weapons that they inherited from the former Soviet Union. The 
CTR programs have also permitted Russia to implement the START I treaty 
ahead of schedule, helping eliminate over 800 Russian nuclear missiles 
and bombers. These are weapons that will never again threaten the 
United States.
  The Department of Energy has worked to secure tons of nuclear weapons 
materials, primarily plutonium and highly enriched uranium, that were 
and to a significant extent still are under inadequate safeguards and 
vulnerable to theft or diversion. Keeping these dangerous materials out 
of the hands of would-be proliferators reduces the likelihood that 
nuclear weapons will threaten us. There is just no more important thing 
that we can do for our Nation's security than to secure these nuclear 
materials and to eliminate these missiles.
  The job, though, is only partly finished, and much more needs to be 
done. That is why it was so disappointing that the committee bill 
reduced the budget request for these programs by $135 million, 
including a reduction of $60 million for the Department of Defense 
cooperative threat reduction programs; a reduction of $25 million for 
the Department of Energy Materials Protection, Control and Accounting 
Program; and a reduction of $50 million, which was the total amount 
requested for the DOE International Nuclear Safety Program.
  Given the great concern that the committee has appropriately 
expressed for the danger of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons 
and materials and the committee's interest in taking steps to reduce 
this danger, those reductions were surprising indeed. In my view we 
should be considering what additional efforts we can take to reduce 
these threats. While the threat from such proliferation is more likely 
and immediate than the threat from a ballistic missile attack on the 
United

[[Page S6881]]

States, Congress has pushed to increase funding for national missile 
defense while reducing funding for cooperative threat reduction. We are 
underfunding the latter program at our clear peril.
  There are numerous cooperative threat reduction programs that need to 
be funded on an urgent basis. For example, Ukraine decided in mid-May 
to eliminate all of its SS-24 intercontinental ballistic missiles, a 
decision which the United States encouraged and welcomed. We should 
help Ukraine eliminate these missiles so that they can never again be 
used.
  Furthermore, there remain large quantities of nuclear materials that 
need to be secured and accounted for. The list of unfunded cooperative 
threat reduction and related DOE projects is long and it represents an 
urgent opportunity for the United States to take tangible and permanent 
steps to reduce threats to our security. For a tiny fraction of the 
defense budget we can accomplish extraordinary gains. The proliferation 
in nuclear safety problems remains considerably larger and more serious 
than the response has been so far.

  One of the allegations which was made which supported these cuts in 
committee was that there was $700 million in unobligated cooperative 
threat reduction funds floating around, and thus it was argued that the 
cooperative threat reduction programs could absorb a $60 million cut. 
But that is not the case. The cooperative threat reduction has $513 
million in unobligated funds but of this, $200 million will be 
obligated by the end of the year and all of the remaining $313 million 
has been committed to specific countries by signed agreements.
  On another part of this program, which was the reduction in the DOE 
Materials Protection, Control and Accounting Program, by the end of 
June 1997, all of the fiscal year 1997 funds were obligated and sent to 
the laboratories for implementation. The assumption that the 1998 
fiscal year request can be reduced and offset with uncosted balances 
from fiscal year 1997 or fiscal year 1996 without programmatic impact 
is incorrect. The net result of a reduction of fiscal year 1998 funds 
would be a reduction in the planned programmatic activities. There is a 
critical need for this program. The materials protection, control and 
accounting programs have a clear and direct relationship to the 
national security policy of reducing the amount of fissile material 
available for threat or diversion.
  So, I hope we can be fully up to the challenge of taking advantage of 
this opportunity to eliminate some of the most serious threats to our 
security. In order to take advantage of this opportunity, we must at 
least fully fund these threat-reduction and safety programs at the 
requested level. I hope in the future the administration and the 
Congress will agree to provide higher levels of funding for these 
programs, which, again, are as important to our national security as 
any programs that I know. So, I am pleased to join as a cosponsor of 
the Lugar amendment and I hope all of our colleagues will support this 
amendment.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Indiana.
  Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, behind me are some charts that may help 
Members understand the issues that we are discussing today. I cited, in 
my opening statement, as did the distinguished Senator from Michigan, 
the extraordinary work that has been done with cooperative threat 
reduction over the years. This chart makes it graphically clear--4,500 
warheads deactivated. The background of this situation was one that, at 
the end of the Soviet Union, the time of the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union, a number of military officers came to this country from Russia, 
a number came from Ukraine and Belarus, Kazakhstan and other new 
states--but the four that I cite originally were all nuclear states, 
and the questions they posed to the administration of our country and 
Members of Congress who are interested in this, was strictly, we 
believe--they said, ``You have a vested interest in working with us to 
deactivate warheads,'' and indeed we did. Mr. President, these 4,500 
warheads that have been deactivated were all aimed at us. That is the 
heart of the cooperative threat reduction programs--cooperation in 
reducing the threat to us, of warheads aimed at us.
  Likewise, 99 ICBM's have been destroyed. They are no longer in the 
picture at all, in the process of working through, especially, the 
nonnuclear status for Ukraine, for Kazakhstan; 140 ICBM silos have been 
eliminated, they are totally out of the picture, in cooperative threat 
reduction; 20 bombers have been destroyed, and so forth.
  From time to time over the 6 years of the cooperative threat Nunn-
Lugar reduction program debates, Members come on this scene--perhaps 
new to the entire argument--and ask why are we spending money in 
Russia? Why are we working with Russians on nuclear matters? Mr. 
President, we are working with Russians to destroy ICBM's, silos, 
warheads that are aimed at us. In my judgment we ought to do as much of 
this as we can. I would simply say the thought that some moneys might 
be nibbled away from the program simply does not meet the security 
needs of our country. Clearly, we ought to have a high-priority 
reactivation of all projects that will lead to our security in this 
area.
  Mr. President, let me describe a process that has been discussed in 
each of the last 6 years. It is namely how do you get from the priority 
of what you want to do, to money that is available, obligated, and 
spent? The cooperative threat reduction programs each year have many 
challenges to overcome before funds can be obligated. In my opening 
statement I cited the fact it was April of this year before the funds 
the Congress appropriated last October could get into action. Why? 
Because, from the very beginning of the Nunn-Lugar CTR program, an 
extraordinary number of procedural challenges have been placed in the 
legislation.
  They were placed there by those who were, frankly, skeptical that 
money ought to be spent with the Russians for any purpose. But, in any 
event, by April of this year, we finally had gone through all the hoops 
of that situation.
  The program requires government-to-government agreement, negotiations 
then with Russia, with Ukraine, with Kazakhstan, with Belarus, to 
establish the legal framework for each of these transactions. Each of 
the implementing agreements has to be negotiated for each project with 
the ministry responsible in that country for the project.
  Once the agreements are in place by country, by project, by ministry, 
then a definition phase of the project can begin and that can be 
lengthy as the Department of Defense negotiates the details with the 
recipient country.
  Then a contracting process follows. The Department of Defense uses 
its standard Federal acquisition regulations for all CTR assistance, 
normally contracting with United States firms to provide that 
assistance. That assistance mandates free and open competition and 
maximum protection of taxpayer dollars, but it is lengthy, Mr. 
President, having gone through all the hoops of the implementing 
arrangements and the requirement definitions, then the contracting 
process, identically the same as it is with the Department of Defense 
for everything else in the world with U.S. firms, open competition. All 
of that must occur.
  Finally, on an annual basis, DOD must certify the recipient nations 
are still eligible. We have heard now that Belarus is not, for a 
variety of reasons, but may become eligible again as its politics and 
situation may change. Our security problems, with regard to Belarus and 
those weapons, have not changed, I might add. But once certification, 
again, is complete, DOD must notify Congress in considerable detail as 
to how it intends to obligate the appropriated funds. After that 
notification, and only after that notification, can new agreements of 
amendments to the existing implementing agreements be negotiated, and 
only then can DOD obligate the funds which begin the procurement cycle.
  Mr. President, from time to time during this 6-year period of time, 
this lengthy process of certification and notification and 
renegotiation and bidding and notification of Congress has taken so 
long that the whole fiscal year is complete, appropriations committees 
have taken the moneys off the table, and we go back through the whole 
process of reappropriating what already had been appropriated.
  I do not argue with the procedures. I simply say they are tediously 
careful

[[Page S6882]]

to make sure that everybody has a very good idea of precisely what is 
occurring, how U.S. firms, in competition with each other, might deal 
with it and with full notification of the Congress of all of this.
  I reiterated this because I heard in the distinguished other body 
debate during which it was blandly asserted that there is plenty of 
money in the pipeline. The argument in the other body no longer 
centered around the validity of the program but simply said there is 
lots of money available, no need, really, to further appropriate any 
more.
  I am asserting there is no more money available, as a matter of fact, 
for a long list of priority things our country should do for our own 
security, and to nibble away and cut pieces here and there is not in 
our national interest, it is not good public policy, and that is why it 
is time to take time to simply reiterate, through the charts, that 
dollar for dollar, year for year the money is obligated, it is called 
for, it is spoken for, it is competed for, and it is examined.
  Mr. President, we ought to get on with the process so that there is 
no ambiguity if we want to continue to work with the Russians to 
destroy ICBM's, take warheads off ICBM's, if we want to contain fissile 
material that is dangerous, if we want to work with Chernobyl-type 
reactors so they don't explode, not only creating damage in the 
countries in which the explosion occurs, but through the fallout damage 
throughout the world.
  This is grim and serious business. For these reasons, I really ask 
strong support of our amendment. I thank the Chair.
  Mr. BINGAMAN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Mexico.
  Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, I want to speak briefly in support of 
this amendment that Senator Lugar has offered and commend him for his 
leadership on this very important issue. Senator Lugar and Senator Nunn 
established this program, promoted this program, and have led the 
Senate in gaining support for this program over these last several 
years. I see it as one of the few shining examples that we can point to 
to indicate that we are aware of the new reality, the new post-cold-war 
reality that we face with Russia and with other former Soviet Union 
countries.
  Let me briefly describe, as Senator Lugar has and Senator Levin has, 
what the amendment does. It would add or restore to the bill before us 
amounts that were cut at the subcommittee level to get it back to the 
level of funding that the administration requested in three different 
areas. One is what is referred to as MPC funds--that stands for 
materials protection control and accounting funds--for the Department 
of Energy. The second is $50 million being restored for the 
International Nuclear Safety Program, again, in the Department of 
Energy. And the third item is $60 million that is being restored in the 
cooperative threat reduction programs which are operated and 
administered by the Department of Defense.

  Mr. President, the legislative provisions that accompany this provide 
greater flexibility in administering the CTR Program. They allow fiscal 
year 1997 funds for international border security to be available for 
obligation for 3 years and allow the Customs Service to use fiscal year 
1997 funds that were provided to purchase new equipment to also be used 
to provide assistance to employees to allow that new equipment to be 
fully integrated into the operations of the Customs Service.
  This amendment and the funds that these programs contain are intended 
to reduce the danger of so-called loose nukes, or nuclear weapons that 
might fall into the hands of terrorists, might fall into the hands of 
people not authorized to have those weapons; also, to help reduce the 
danger that fissile material, material that is essential to making of 
new nuclear weapons, not fall into those same hands. The funds are 
intended to help destroy ICBM silos and launchers in the former Soviet 
Union and to generally help reduce the risk in the near term from the 
operation of Soviet-designed nuclear powerplants.
  Mr. President, the arguments have been well laid out by Senator Lugar 
and Senator Levin, as well. This is a program that has accomplished a 
tremendous amount already in reducing the risk of nuclear weapons.
  I had the good fortune earlier this year, about 2 months ago, to 
travel to Russia and to visit some of the facilities that we are 
spending funds at to work on these cooperative programs with the 
Russians. I traveled there with Mr. Paul Robinson, who is head of 
Sandia National Laboratory, and with others who work with him at Sandia 
National Laboratory on these cooperative threat reduction programs and 
Department of Energy programs. I also traveled there with others from 
the Department of Energy Los Alamos National Laboratory. The general 
impression I received in visiting Chelyabinsk-70, which is one of the 
closed cities that the Russians established in order to develop and 
promote their nuclear weapons activity, the general impression was that 
these funds are being extremely well used and are, in fact, increasing 
the security that surrounds fissile materials and other materials that 
could be used in connection with nuclear weapons.
  We met with Minister Mikhaylov who is head of the Ministry of Atomic 
Energy, MINATOM, and, again, I was impressed with the willingness to 
continue the cooperation to work with our own Department of Energy in 
making progress on these programs.
  We met with admirals from the Russian Navy. They have a very 
significant problem of fresh uranium that can be used as fuel in their 
nuclear reactors, how to secure that, how to protect it from possible 
seizure by terrorists. They clearly wanted our help. They are obtaining 
our help. They need substantially more help in the years ahead. I felt 
good about the level of cooperation that is occurring there.
  My general conclusion from the trip was the same as the one stated by 
Senator Lugar in his statement earlier, and that is that there is a 
long list of useful projects that funds in these programs can be put 
to. We are not short of useful activities to work on. The contrary is 
the case. There are a great many things that the Russians need to do to 
protect and to reduce the risk of theft of nuclear materials. We are 
just now beginning to make serious progress on that. The funds that 
will be restored by this amendment are essential to making that 
progress. I very much believe that when you look at the entire U.S. 
defense budget and say, which of the funds are the most cost-effective, 
where are we getting the most national security return for the dollars 
spent, the funds being spent in these programs are clearly very high on 
that list.
  So I urge my colleagues to support this amendment, and I hope that we 
can get a unanimous vote. This is a program that needs bipartisan 
support. This is not a program that should become the subject of 
partisan dispute in the U.S. Senate. It is too important to our safety 
and to our future and to the future of the world for us to find 
ourselves in some kind of partisan dispute over funds like this or 
programs like these.
  Mr. President, in concluding, I ask unanimous consent that a letter 
to me from the Secretary of Energy, Federico Pena, dated June 19, 
expressing his strong support for this amendment be printed in the 
Record.
  There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                                      The Secretary of Energy,

                                    Washington, DC, June 19, 1997.
     Hon. Jeff Bingaman,
     Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, 
         Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
       Dear Senator Bingaman: I am writing to offer my strong 
     support for an amendment that I understand will be offered in 
     the Senate to restore the Administration's budget request for 
     the Department of Energy's Materials Protection, Control and 
     Accounting and International Nuclear Safety programs. 
     Additionally, I support restoration of funds for the 
     Department of Defense Cooperative Threat Reduction program. 
     These programs serve vital U.S. national security interests 
     and seek to forestall the far greater costs that could result 
     from inadequately secured nuclear material and weapons or a 
     nuclear accident like Chornobyl.
       The Materials Protection Control and Accounting (MPC) 
     program is working to secure hundreds of tons of weapon-
     usable nuclear materials in the former Soviet Union that are 
     inadequately secured and at risk of falling into the hands of 
     criminal elements, terrorist organizations and rogue nations. 
     If the program were reduced by $25 million as recommended by 
     the Committee, there will

[[Page S6883]]

     be a significant increase in total program costs and a delay 
     in achieving the program objectives by approximately two 
     years. Time and program momentum matter. Less than three 
     years ago, we secured kilograms of material at one site in 
     Russia. Today, the MPC program has secured tens of tons of 
     material at 25 sites, and is working at a total of 50 sites 
     where nuclear material is at risk in Russia, the Newly 
     Independent States, and the Baltics. However, unless funds 
     are restored to this program, the work that could secure 
     hundreds of tons of nuclear material at the largest defense-
     related sites will be in jeopardy. I urge your support for 
     full funding to continue this vital work.
       The International Nuclear Safety program is the best policy 
     instrument available to ensure that the world will not face 
     another Chornobyl-like disaster. It is vital to our overall 
     national security goal of helping to stabilize the former 
     Soviet Union. It supports the independence of Ukraine and 
     Lithuania and the emerging free market democracies of Central 
     and Eastern Europe. The focus is on projects that improve the 
     operation and physical condition of nuclear power plants in 
     the region. The program also enhances the nuclear safety 
     culture and regulatory infrastructure of countries with 
     Soviet designed reactors. Such reactors left behind by the 
     Soviet government continue to operate with deficiencies that, 
     if not corrected, could result in a serious nuclear accident 
     that would severely impact the region's political and 
     economic stability, the environment and our national 
     interests. Restoration of the $50 million program request is 
     essential to help prevent that from happening.
       The Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program has been 
     essential to destroying and dismantling hundreds of ballistic 
     missile launchers, silos, heavy bombers and removal of 
     warheads from strategic systems. Without this program, 
     Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakstan might retain nuclear weapons, 
     instead of being nuclear weapons free. The CTR program also 
     supports implementation of an agreement between the U.S. and 
     Russia to ensure that production of weapons-grade plutonium 
     in Russia is stopped by converting the three plutonium 
     production reactors exclusively to a power-producing mode. I 
     support the complete restoration of funds to this vitally 
     important program.
       In each of the three areas mentioned, the costs of 
     preventive are much less than the costs of inaction. I urge 
     you to uphold America's leadership, interests and commitments 
     by preserving and fully funding these essential programs.
           Sincerely,
                                                    Federico Pena.

  Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, 6 years ago, the Congress voted to take 
some dramatic steps to reduce the threat of nuclear terrorism when it 
approved the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program--CTR. 
Since that time, as a result of work being done by CTR programs, over 
1,400 nuclear warheads that were aimed at the United States or our 
allies have been removed; 64 submarine ballistic missile launchers have 
been eliminated; 54 intercontinental ballistic missile silos, 61 SS-18 
ICBM's, and 23 strategic bombers have been eliminated. Today, Ukraine, 
Belarus, and Kazakhstan no longer have any nuclear weapons with which 
to threaten the United States or our allies.
  Support for the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program has run high and 
enjoys bipartisan support. Last year in the Senate, in a 96-to-0 vote, 
we enacted the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Defense Against Weapons of Mass 
Destruction. This program and its companion programs in the Department 
of Energy have repeatedly withstood attempts to undo the progress that 
has been made in reducing the threat of nuclear terror. Legislators 
from both sides of the aisle are able to see the important benefits to 
the United States, and to understand the need to move beyond cold war 
attitudes that prevent us from meeting today's national security needs 
to prevent nuclear terrorism.
  This year, the Senate Armed Services Committee voted along partisan 
lines to cut $135 million from the CTR Program, the Materials 
Protection Control and Accounting Program, and the International 
Nuclear Safety Program. The benefits gained from those programs are so 
important that I must appeal to my colleagues on the floor of the 
Senate to restore those funds so we can continue the valuable work 
being done to minimize the possibility that some person or some rogue 
country could threaten the United States or any other nation with 
nuclear weapons.
  I've already mentioned some of the benefits gained through the CTR 
Program. Much more work remains to be done to dismantle Russian missile 
launchers, silos, and aircraft. I urge my colleagues to continue to 
support this program which reduces the threat to the United States in 
such a direct manner. The $60 million cut by partisan vote in the 
committee should be restored in order to continue work that is 
essential to our national security interests.
  The Materials Protection Control and Accounting--MPC in 
the Department of Energy--DOE--is intended to prevent theft of 
smuggling of nuclear materials that could be used in nuclear weapons or 
for other forms of terrorism. DOE has put security equipment in place 
at 18 sites to safeguard those nuclear materials, and agreements are in 
place to expand security procedures and equipment at 30 additional 
sites. I recently observed the work being done by this program first 
hand during a visit to Russia's nuclear research facilities. I felt 
relieved to know that the Russians are now better able to control and 
monitor their own nuclear materials than ever before. I am also aware, 
however, that the Russians have hundreds of nuclear sites needing 
additional security measures to prevent theft and unauthorized use. A 
great deal of work needs to be done, and it is important that the 
Congress continue to fully fund the MPC Program in our own national 
security interest. I ask my colleagues in the Senate to support our 
amendment to restore $25 million to the MPC Program so that this 
valuable work can continue without pause.
  The committee also voted on partisan lines to cut all of the funding 
requested for the International Nuclear Safety Program--INSP. This 
program began in the wake of international concerns over the damage 
done by the Chernobyl nuclear reactor disaster. The Russians continue 
to operate reactors that are similar in design to the one at Chernobyl, 
and that pose a similar risk of a catastrophic accident. The INSP 
Program, managed by the Department of Energy, is designed to reduce 
those risks for Russia's older reactors and to help Russia and Newly 
Independent States to establish self-sustaining nuclear safety programs 
that enable them to reach international nuclear reactor safety 
standards. It is in our national and international interest to do what 
we can to ensure that those reactors are safe. I urge my colleagues to 
vote to restore this important program.
  As I suggested earlier, the Congress has repeatedly demonstrated its 
conviction that CTR, MPC, INSP, and related programs serve our 
national security interests. To those who say these programs are a form 
of foreign aid to the Russians, I concur that ultimately the Russians 
must assume full responsibility for these programs. Until they are 
financially and technologically capable of doing so, it is essential to 
our own interests that we assist them in putting effective security 
programs into place. We know how expensive it is to support the 
strategic offensive and defensive weapons systems designed to ensure 
our security against nuclear weapons. We also know how dangerous and 
vulnerable this country could be to nuclear terrorism which, in some 
cases, we may not be able to effectively protect ourselves from. For 
those modest expenditures for CTR, MPC, and INSP, we buy ourselves a 
significant measure of security worth many times the funds invested. I 
urge my colleagues in the Senate to continue their bipartisan support 
for these programs and vote to restore their funding.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  Mr. LUGAR addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Indiana.
  Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a strong 
letter of support from the Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, and 
a strong letter of support from William Cohen, Secretary of Defense, 
for our amendment be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the letters were ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                                       The Secretary of State,

                                    Washington, DC, June 24, 1997.
     Hon. Strom Thurmond,
     Chairman, Committee on Armed Services,
     U.S. Senate.
       Dear Mr. Chairman: I am writing to urge you to support 
     restoration of the $135 million cut from the FY 98 Defense 
     Authorization Bill by the Senate Armed Services Committee for 
     three key arms control and nonproliferation initiatives: the 
     Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, the Material Protection 
     Control and Accounting program and the International Nuclear 
     Safety program.

[[Page S6884]]

       Reducing threats to U.S. national security from the former 
     Soviet arsenal of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons 
     continues to be one of our highest security priorities. 
     Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakstan are today nuclear weapons-
     free, largely through encouragement and direct assistance 
     from the DOD Cooperative Threat Reduction program. This 
     program has been essential to the destruction and/or 
     dismantlement of nuclear weapons.
       The Department of Energy's Material Protection and 
     Accounting (MPC) program and its International Nuclear 
     Safety program are also providing essential assistance. The 
     MPC program is targeted at improving the security of 
     nuclear material at 40 facilities in the former Soviet Union. 
     Over time, this could prove just as productive as the initial 
     Cooperative Threat Reduction programs in eliminating nuclear 
     weapons. The International Nuclear Safety program, a 
     principal instrument of our efforts to improve the safety of 
     Soviet-era civilian nuclear power reactors, could head off 
     another Chernobyl in the New Independent States and the 
     countries of Eastern and Central Europe.
       Congressional reductions in these programs risk eroding our 
     ability to come up with solutions to important security 
     problems and undermine the effectiveness of our initiatives 
     in this region. These programs are making a difference 
     against today's threats to the American people. I urge your 
     support in restoring these funds.
           Sincerely,
     Madeleine K. Albright.
                                                                    ____



                                     The Secretary of Defense,

                                    Washington, DC, June 19, 1997.
     Hon. Strom Thurmond,
     Chairman, Committee on Armed Services,
     U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Chairman: The Senate Armed Services Committee 
     (SASC) reduced by $60 million the President's budget request 
     for the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program during its 
     consideration of S. 450, the National Defense Authorization 
     Act for Fiscal Year 1998. This cut to CTR funding undermines 
     our ability to accomplish the program's important national 
     security goals for FY98, and will put at risk the objectives 
     for fiscal year 1999. I strongly urge the Senate to restore 
     the full CTR request.
       The CTR program has been essential to the reduction of 
     hundreds of submarine-launched ballistic missile launchers, 
     intercontinental ballistic missile silos and heavy bombers in 
     the former Soviet Union, and to the removal of 4000 warheads 
     from strategic systems. Without CTR, Ukraine, Belarus and 
     Kazakstan might still have thousands of nuclear weapons; 
     instead, they are all nuclear-weapons-free. Although the CTR 
     program has accomplished much, essential work remains to be 
     done. This includes: the elimination of intercontinental 
     ballistic missiles and silos, submarine-launched ballistic 
     missile launchers and heavy bombers under START I, followed 
     by START II and III; increased safety and security for the 
     transport and storage of remaining Russian nuclear warheads; 
     an end to production of weapons-grade plutonium; chemical 
     weapons destruction; and other efforts to reduce weapons of 
     mass destruction in the former Soviet Union and the threat of 
     their proliferation.
       Contrary to the SASC rationale for the cut, the loss to the 
     program cannot be made up with prior years' funds. All 
     unobligated CTR funds have already been earmarked for 
     specific projects. The FY98 budget request of $382.2 million 
     is a bare-bones request based on a difficult prioritization 
     of a long list of potential projects. Indeed, there are 
     several worthwhile projects, which would accelerate our 
     strategic arms elimination program sin Russia and Ukraine, 
     that we are not able to fund at even the $382.2 million 
     level. The CTR program is achieving demonstrable results with 
     a very tight budget.
       Again, I strongly urge the Senate to support this important 
     national security program.
           Sincerely,
                                                       Bill Cohen.


                     Amendment No. 658, As Modified

  Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to modify my 
amendment. On page 2 of the amendment, change line 12, which currently 
reads, ``$56 million'' to ``$40 million.'' I send that modification to 
the desk.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the amendment is so 
modified.
  The modification follows:

       On page 2 of the amendment change line 12, which currently 
     reads ``$56 million'' to ``40 million dollars''.

  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, Senator Biden of Delaware, who is a 
cochairman of the Senate's NATO Observer Group, is necessarily absent 
to attend the NATO summit in Madrid. Senator Biden is an initial 
cosponsor of Senator Lugar's and my amendment, and I ask unanimous 
consent that his statement of strong support for this amendment be 
printed in the Record.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
 Mr. BIDEN. The amendment of Senator Lugar and others will 
correct a situation that threatens the very security of the United 
States. Unless recent efforts to cut the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat 
Reduction Program and similar programs of the Department of Energy are 
overturned, we and our children will all be in greater danger. I am 
proud to be an original cosponsor of this amendment and I urge my 
colleagues to support it.
  The administration's request for the important Nunn-Lugar program is 
for $382.2 million. Last week, the Armed Services Committee cut $60 
million from that important program. At the same time, the House 
National Security Committee cut $97.5 million from the Nunn-Lugar 
account, and reportedly those cuts were from different parts of the 
program. Thus, over 40 percent of the Nunn-Lugar program is now at 
risk.
  The Armed Services Committee also cut $25 million from the Energy 
Department's program of international assistance in nuclear materials 
protection, control and accountability, as well as all $50 million in 
its program of international nuclear safety assistance. The former 
program is vital to protecting the American people against the 
diversion of nuclear material from former Soviet laboratories to 
countries like Iran, Iraq or Libya that would like to build or buy 
nuclear weapons. It also helps keep nuclear material out of the hands 
of terrorists, who could use it to poison innocent people in Moscow or 
Tokyo or Tel Aviv--or right here in Washington. Nuclear safety 
assistance helps guard against future Chernobyl incidents, which pose 
fallout dangers far beyond the borders of the former Soviet countries 
in which they might occur.
  The Nunn-Lugar program makes significant contributions to the 
national security of our country. Through this program, we have helped 
Russia to remove over 1,400 strategic nuclear warheads from deployment 
sites to storage areas, to await dismantlement. We have helped Russia 
to eliminate 64 SLBM launchers, 54 ICBM silo launchers, 61 SS-18 ICBM's 
and 23 strategic bombers. And we have helped Belarus, Kazakstan, and 
Ukraine to eliminate their strategic nuclear forces and to repatriate 
all their nuclear warheads to Russia.
  But the work of the Nunn-Lugar program is far from completed. Over 
400 Russian SLBM launchers remain to be eliminated. Nearly 100 ICBM 
silo launchers must still be destroyed, along with over 190 SS-18 
missiles and another 7 strategic bombers. Over 130 tunnels must be 
closed at a former nuclear test site in Kazakstan. Massive stocks of 
old, but still very dangerous, chemical weapons must be destroyed. And 
security must be improved in Russian storage and transportation of 
nuclear material.
  There are two basic ways to increase our national security. One is to 
maintain the finest military and intelligence services in the world. We 
do that, and I am very glad that we do.
  But we do that at great expense, and at some risk. For none of us can 
guarantee that nuclear deterrence will work forever, especially in a 
Russia where troops and officers and nuclear scientists go for months 
without pay--Russia where, within the past year, generals and lab 
directors have closed the door to their offices and put bullets through 
their heads, out of despair over what has happened to their programs 
and their personnel.

  The other basic way to increase our national security is to work with 
potential foes to reduce the threat that they pose to U.S. interests or 
U.S. forces. We do some of this through arms control agreements, but 
often we wonder whether other countries are obeying those agreements.
  The Nunn-Lugar program is a way to make sure that Russia and other 
former Soviet states actually do reduce their bloated strategic nuclear 
forces. It isn't free. The administration has asked for $382 million 
for this program in fiscal year 1998.
  But let's put that in perspective. The defense budget reported out by 
the Armed Services Committee is $268 billion. So a fully-funded Nunn-
Lugar program would cost only one-seventh of 1 percent of the defense 
budget. The Armed Services Committee added $2.6 billion to the 
administration's request for defense spending. So the Nunn-Lugar 
program costs only 14 percent of the increase. And the Armed Services 
Committee's cut in this program could be restored using only 2.3 
percent of that increase.

[[Page S6885]]

  The Energy Department's program of international assistance in 
nuclear materials protection, control and accountability--known as 
MPC similarly vital to our national security. Just as the Nunn-
Lugar program helps the Russian military to improve its security for 
nuclear materials, the MPC program helps dozens of laboratories in 
the former Soviet Union to improve their security for nuclear 
materials.
  What are we talking about here? Often it's as simple as bars on the 
windows, locks on the doors, and doors that will take more than a 
crowbar to open. Just as often, however, the need is for completely 
revised accountability schemes so that institutions with nuclear 
materials will always know where those materials are. That is a 
complicated task, and it requires a change in mind-set as much as 
changes in forms or procedures.
  DOD personnel who participate in Nunn-Lugar programs can relate to 
the military officers who man Russia's strategic nuclear forces. But it 
takes scientists to build peer relationships at former Soviet 
laboratories and spread the word about nuclear control.
  Just last month, a committee of the National Research Council [NRC]--
an arm of the National Academy of Sciences--reported that the MPC 
program is beginning to have some real success. The NRC committee says: 
``progress attributable to the joint efforts of U.S. and Russian 
specialists in MPC greatly accelerated in 1995 and 1996'' and calls 
that ``a significant political and organizational achievement.''
  At the same time, however, the NRC committee found that ``the task 
has not been completed at any Russian facility and serious efforts are 
only beginning at most facilities.'' The committee says that ``much 
remains to be done.'' Its principal recommendation on this program is 
as follows:

       For the near term it is essential that the United States 
     sustain its involvement until counterpart institutions are in 
     a position to assume the full burden of upgrading and 
     maintaining MPC programs over the long term.

  This program is just taking off. If you cut it back now, it may 
crash. But if, instead, we sustain and encourage this program, we can 
help former Soviet scientists to turn around what remains, frankly, a 
truly dangerous situation.
  President Yeltsin can assure us, as he does, that Russia would never 
give or sell a nuclear weapon to another state. But he cannot assure us 
today that the dozens of Russian laboratories with nuclear materials 
will not let potential weapons material leak out to criminals, or to 
terrorists, or to rogue states that we know are willing to pay good 
money for the material and technology that would enable them to 
threaten the peace of the world and of our country.
  President Yeltsin cannot, by himself, turn this situation around. But 
we can help him, and that is what the MPC program does.
  I do not pretend to know what should be cut in the defense bill. But 
I do know that Nunn-Lugar and the similar Energy Department program are 
not cash cows to be milked for other defense purposes.
  Just as Senator J. William Fullbright will always be remembered for 
the Fullbright fellowship program, so will Senators Sam Nunn and Dick 
Lugar be remembered for the simple, brilliant idea that it's more 
humane and a lot cheaper to pay for destroying Russian weapons than it 
is to fight against them. Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction 
projects and the Energy Department's MPC and International Nuclear 
Safety assistance are vital programs. They are successful programs. And 
they deserve our full support.
  I urge my colleagues to vote for Senator Lugar's amendment, which 
will help make this a safer world for all of us.
  Mr. LEVIN. I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. HAGEL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. HAGEL. Mr. President, I returned with six of my colleagues over 
the weekend from a day in Bosnia. Majority Leader Lott and five of our 
other colleagues spent the Fourth of July early in the morning until 
late at night with our troops and officials in Bosnia.
  I think it is appropriate that as we debate the fiscal year 1998 
defense authorization bill we reflect just for a moment on the men and 
women on the ground in Bosnia and the men and women who secure our 
liberties around the world.
  Much of the debate, much of the policy reflect numbers, reflect 
general overall direction. Increasingly, that policy direction is 
debated, and should be. But we tend to forget the humanness, the very 
men and women of what our Armed Forces are all about.
  As my colleagues and I, on the Fourth of July in Bosnia, spent a 
great deal of time with the 8,500 American men and women who are part 
of that large contingent in Bosnia, I could not help but reflect on 
what an outstanding job these men and women do for this country, for 
peace, stability around the world.
  I want to add the human dynamic to this debate today, and that will 
go into tomorrow, on the DOD authorization bill. Because, after all, it 
is the men and women who are on the ground who are there every day and 
every night who secure those liberties, for not only this country but 
for the people in the area of Bosnia.
  I tend to think also, when I was an infantryman in Vietnam in 1968, 
our policy in Vietnam might have been better served, Mr. President, if 
the Secretary of Defense and more Members of the House and the Senate 
had come to Vietnam, had spent time with the troops, listening to what 
they think, listening to their issues and concerns and qualifications, 
and not unlike wars and peacekeeping missions throughout our history it 
still is the man and the woman on the ground that we count on to secure 
those liberties.
  Mr. President, I appreciate the time.
  I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to lay the 
amendment of Senator Lugar aside temporarily, and we will come back to 
it.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.


                           Amendment No. 718

 (Purpose: To increase the amount required to be derived from sales of 
 strategic and critical materials in the National Defense Stockpile by 
                           fiscal year 2007)

  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I offer a technical amendment to ensure 
that the revenues received from stockpile sales are sufficient to 
offset the cost associated with other provisions of the bill.
  Mr. LEVIN. The amendment has been cleared on this side.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from South Carolina [Mr. Thurmond] proposes an 
     amendment numbered 718.

  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent reading of the 
amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       On page 460, line 6, strike out ``$295,886,000'' and insert 
     in lieu thereof ``$331,886,000''.

  Mr. THURMOND. I believe this amendment has been cleared by the other 
side. I urge the Senate adopt this amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment.
  The amendment (No. 718) was agreed to.
  Mr. THURMOND. I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. LEVIN. I move to lay it on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

[[Page S6886]]

                           Amendment No. 719

    (Purpose: To clarify the protections relating to disclosures of 
                    classified material to Congress)

  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I offer an amendment that would clarify and 
refine the language contained in section 1068 of the bill by deleting a 
reference to disclosure of information by making explicit that the 
provision does not affect existing law relating to contract or whistle-
blowers.
  I believe this amendment has been cleared by the other side.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Michigan [Mr. Levin] proposes an amendment 
     numbered 719.

  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent reading of the 
amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       On page 339, line 14, strike out ``the executive branch 
     or''.
       On page 340, between lines 16 and 17, insert the following:
       (d) Disclosures of Classified Information to Congress or 
     the Department of Justice by Contractor Employees.--It is the 
     sense of Congress that the Inspector General of the 
     Department of Defense should continue to exercise the 
     authority provided in section 2409 of title 10, United States 
     Code, regarding reprisals for disclosures of classified 
     information as well as reprisals for disclosures of 
     unclassified information.

  Mr. THURMOND. I urge the Senate to adopt this amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment.
  The amendment (No. 719) was agreed to.
  Mr. LEVIN. I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. THURMOND. I move to lay it on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.


                           Amendment No. 720

 (Purpose: To prohibit the provision of burial benefits under Federal 
  law to individuals convicted of capital offenses under Federal law)

  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I offer an amendment that would suspend 
all burial entitlements in Arlington National Cemetery, and any other 
cemetery in the National Cemetery System, to any person convicted of a 
Federal capital offense.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from South Carolina [Mr. Thurmond] proposes an 
     amendment numbered 720.

  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent reading of the 
amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       At the end of title X, add the following:

     SEC.   . PROHIBITION ON PROVISION OF BURIAL BENEFITS TO 
                   INDIVIDUALS CONVICTED OF FEDERAL CAPITAL 
                   OFFENSES.

       Notwithstanding any other provision of law, an individual 
     convicted of a capital offense under Federal law shall not be 
     entitled to the following:
       (1) Interment or inurnment in Arlington National Cemetery, 
     the Soldiers' and Airmen's National Cemetery, any cemetery in 
     the National Cemetery System, or any other cemetery 
     administered by the Secretary of a military department or by 
     the Secretary of Veterans Affairs.
       (2) Any other burial benefit under Federal law.

  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, on behalf of myself and Senator Inhofe, 
I propose an amendment that would suspend all burial entitlements in 
Arlington National Cemetery or any other cemetery administered by the 
Secretary of a military department to any person convicted of a Federal 
capital offense.
  On Wednesday, June 18, the Senate passed S-923, denying veterans 
benefits in Federal capital cases, by a vote of 98 to 0. This 
legislation was introduced by Senator Specter, chairman of the 
Veterans' Affairs Committee, and was intended to preclude persons 
convicted of a capital Federal offense, entitlement to veterans 
benefits, including burial in a national cemetery.
  Mr. President, Arlington National Cemetery, the Soldiers and Airmen's 
Home Cemetery in Washington, DC and various cemeteries on military 
installations around the country are administered by the armed services 
and, as such, are not affected by the change to title 38, United States 
Code. The amendment that I propose today will deny any person convicted 
of a Federal capital offense the entitlement to burial in Arlington 
National Cemetery, the Soldiers and Airmen's Home Cemetery, or any 
other cemetery administered by the Secretary of a military department.
  This amendment complements the bill introduced by Senator Specter and 
passed by the Senate this past Wednesday, and completes what I believe 
was the intent of the Senate in that vote.
  I urge my colleagues to support this amendment.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, we support the amendment. It has been 
cleared on this side.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment. 
The amendment (No. 720) was agreed to.
  Mr. THURMOND. I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. LEVIN. I move to lay it on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.


                           Amendment No. 721

(Purpose: To provide the force structure necessary for maintaining five 
   Air National Guard C-130 aircraft units with 12 primary aircraft 
    authorized, one each at Martinsburg, West Virginia, Louisville, 
Kentucky, Charlotte, North Carolina, Nashville, Tennessee, and Channel 
 Island, California, and for preserving the number of primary aircraft 
   authorized for Air Force Reserve C-130 aircraft units at General 
  Mitchell International Airport and Air Reserve Station, Wisconsin, 
    Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado, and Willow Grove Air Reserve 
                         Station, Pennsylvania)

  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, on behalf of Senator Byrd, I offer an 
amendment that would maintain the Air National Guard and Air Force 
Reserve C-130 units at the current force structure level of 12 
aircraft.
  I believe the other side has cleared this amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Michigan [Mr. Levin] for Mr. Byrd, 
     proposes an amendment numbered 721.

  Mr. LEVIN. I ask unanimous consent reading of the amendment be 
dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       In section 301(9), strike out ``$1,624,420,000'' and insert 
     in lieu thereof ``$1,631,200,000''.
       In section 301(11), strike out ``$2,991,219,000'' and 
     insert in lieu thereof ``$3,004,282,000''.
       In section 411(a)(5), strike out ``107,377'' and insert in 
     lieu thereof ``108,002''.
       In section 411(a)(6), strike out ``73,431'' and insert in 
     lieu thereof ``73,542''.
       In section 412(5), strike out ``10,616'' and insert in lieu 
     thereof ``10,671''.
       At the end of subtitle B of title IV, add the following:

     SEC. 413. ADDITION TO END STRENGTHS FOR MILITARY TECHNICIANS.

       (a) Air National Guard.--In addition to the number of 
     military technicians for the Air National Guard of the United 
     States as of the last day of fiscal year 1998 for which funds 
     are authorized to be appropriated in this Act, 100 military 
     technicians are authorized for fiscal year 1998 for five Air 
     National Guard C-130 aircraft units.
       (b) Air Force Reserve.--In addition to the number of 
     military technicians for the Air Force Reserve as of the last 
     day of fiscal year 1998 for which funds are authorized to be 
     appropriated in this Act, 21 military technicians are 
     authorized for fiscal year 1998 for three Air Force Reserve 
     C-130 aircraft units.
       On page 108, line 11, reduce the amount by $20,000,000.

  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, the amendment which I am offering enables 
Air National Guard units in West Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee, 
Kentucky, and California to maintain their full complement of 12 C-
130's. Without $13 million in operations and maintenance funds and $4 
million in personnel funds, these units would be forced, prematurely 
and perhaps unwisely, to reduce their airlift capacity to 8 aircraft 
per unit.
  The President's Budget for Fiscal Year 1998 reduces the Air National 
Guard inventory of C-130's in these five

[[Page S6887]]

states from 12 aircraft per unit to 8 aircraft in accordance with 
earlier Air Force program decisions. However, it makes no sense to 
reduce the C-130 units until the completion of the Quadrennial Defense 
Review [QDR] process by the Department of Defense. The purpose of the 
QDR is to reassess the U.S. defense strategy, force structure, 
readiness, modernization and infrastructure. Why not have the benefit 
of that reassessment before we make such decisions?
  The Air National Guard C-130 units are major players in the air 
mobility plan of the United States Air Force. It is my belief that a 
reduction of the type proposed in the budget is premature, without the 
final conclusions of the QDR process. More and more reliance is being 
placed upon our reserve component forces as the active duty military 
establishment downsizes. It is not prudent to reduce the aircraft and 
manpower levels of the very organization that is expected to respond to 
global crisis situations, while supporting numerous U.S. Air Force 
mobility missions in Bosnia, Southwest Asia, Central America and 
throughout the United States. Consequently, the amendment I am offering 
will restore the force structure, personnel, and funds necessary to 
continue to operate these units at 12 aircraft.
  Mr. President, the view I have expressed is supported by General 
Ronald Fogleman, Chief of Staff of the Air Force, who wrote to the 
distinguished Minority Whip, Mr. Ford, on May 21, 1997, as follows:

       The QDR report released on May 19 clearly conveys a greater 
     reliance by the Total Air Force on the reserve components. 
     Given the concerns you have raised and our focus on reserve 
     components during the QDR, it is clear that the C-130 force 
     structure requires greater scrutiny before any reductions are 
     made. Therefore, I have rescinded plans to restructure ANG C-
     130 units in Kentucky, West Virginia, California, North 
     Carolina or Tennessee. These units will remain at the current 
     force structure level of 12 PAA. As a result, I would greatly 
     appreciate your support in maintaining these levels.

  Mr. President, in a similar vein, with regard to the Air Force 
Reserve, the President's Budget for Fiscal Year 1998 proposes to reduce 
C-130 units in Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, and Colorado from 12 aircraft 
to 8 aircraft. In order to maintain these units at their full 
complement of 12 aircraft, an amount of $6.8 million is required in 
operations and maintenance funds and $1.4 million in personnel funds.
  In summary, the amendment I am offering would assure that Air 
National Guard units in West Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee, 
Kentucky and California, and Air Force Reserve units in Pennsylvania, 
Wisconsin, and Colorado are able to continue to maintain their full 
complement of 12 C-130 aircraft as recommended by the Chief of Staff of 
the United States Air Force.
  I urge the adoption of the amendment.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, the amendment has been cleared. I urge 
the Senate to adopt the amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment.
  The amendment (No. 721) was agreed to.
  Mr. LEVIN. I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. THURMOND. I move to lay it on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.


                           Amendment No. 722

 (Purpose: To modify authority for the conveyance of certain lands at 
                      Rocky Mountain Arsenal, CO)

  Mr. THURMOND. On behalf of Senator Allard of Colorado, I offer an 
amendment which would clarify existing law to facilitate the transfer 
of property from Rocky Mountain Arsenal to Commerce City, CO, in a 
negotiated sale at a fair market value.
  Mr. President, I believe this amendment has been cleared by the other 
side. Mr. President, I urge the Senate to adopt this amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from South Carolina [Mr. Thurmond], for Mr. 
     Allard, proposes an amendment numbered 722.

  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent reading of the 
amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       At the end of subtitle B of title XXVIII, add the 
     following:

     SEC. 28  . MODIFICATION OF LAND CONVEYANCE AUTHORITY, ROCKY 
                   MOUNTAIN ARSENAL, COLORADO.

       Section 5(c)(1) of the Rocky Mountain Arsenal National 
     Wildlife Refuge Act of 1992 (Public Law 102-402; 106 Stat. 
     1966; 16 U.S.C. 668dd note) is amended by striking out the 
     second sentence and inserting in lieu thereof the following 
     new sentence: ``The Administrator shall convey the 
     transferred property to Commerce City, Colorado, upon the 
     approval of the City, for consideration equal to the fair 
     market value of the property (as determined jointly by the 
     Administrator and the City).''.

  Mr. ALLARD. Mr. President, I am here today to offer an amendment that 
would continue the development and transformation of the Rocky Mountain 
Arsenal to the Rocky Mountain Arsenal Wildlife Refuge. This has been an 
ongoing cooperative effort between the Department of the Army, the 
Environmental Protection Agency, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Shell 
Oil Co., and local, State, and Federal elected officials.
  The Rocky Mountain Arsenal contains 17,000 acres northwest of Denver, 
CO, that was purchased by the Army in 1942 to manufacture chemical 
weapons. The Army leased the property after World War II to various 
chemical manufacturers through 1982. Needless to say, this had an 
incredible environmental impact. However, through all of this 
environmental abuse wildlife flourished. In fact, in 1986 a winter 
communal roost of bald eagles was discovered on site, an incredible 
occurrence considering the circumstances.
  Because of its protected status, the arsenal became a haven for close 
to 300 wildlife species including deer, coyotes, owls, and eagles. 
Efforts were undertaken to preserve the wildlife habitat. These efforts 
were rewarded in 1992 when Congress passed the Rocky Mountain Arsenal 
National Wildlife Refuge Act, legislation that I supported as a Member 
of the other body.
  Today, cleanup efforts are still underway, but great progress has 
been made. Groundwater treatment facilities are in place, 350 abandoned 
wells have been closed, and soil remediation is in progress. This has 
allowed portions of the arsenal to be opened to the public for wildlife 
viewing. This amendment allows the public the opportunity for greater 
access to the refuge.
  The exact purpose of this amendment is to clarify existing law to 
facilitate the transfer of property at the Rocky Mountain Arsenal to 
Commerce City, CO, in a negotiated sale at fair market value. The city 
will hold this land, develop it in accordance with plans made in 
connection with the Fish and Wildlife Service and other governmental 
entities, and ultimately sell some of this land, making proceeds 
available for the continuing development of the Rocky Mountain Wildlife 
Refuge visitor center.
  The Government Services Administration objected to the original 
language in Public Law 102-402. We have worked with GSA in formulating 
legislative language that meets the requirements of GSA as well as my 
intent and the intent of Commerce City.
  I am always pleased when the Federal Government can work with local 
governments to provide a public benefit at no cost to the taxpayer. 
This is one such case.
  Finally, I would like to thank Chairman Thurmond for his assistance 
and leadership on this amendment, and appreciate the hard work and 
diligence of his staff.
  Mr. LEVIN. The amendment has been cleared on this side.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment.
  The amendment (No. 722) was agreed to.
  Mr. THURMOND. I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. LEVIN. I move to lay it on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.


                           Amendment No. 723

(Purpose: To require a study of eye safety at small arms firing ranges 
  of the Armed Forces and the development of an eye injury reporting 
                        protocol for the ranges)

  Mr. LEVIN. On behalf of Senator Rockefeller, I offer an amendment

[[Page S6888]]

that would direct the Secretary of Defense to conduct a study of eye 
safety in military small arms firing ranges and the development of an 
eye injury prevention program.
  I think this amendment has been cleared. It is a very good amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Michigan [Mr. Levin], for Mr. Rockefeller, 
     proposes an amendment numbered 723.

  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent reading of the 
amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       At the end of subtitle D of title X, add the following:

     SEC. ____. EYE SAFETY AT SMALL ARMS FIRING RANGES.

       (a) Actions Required.--The Secretary of the Defense shall--
       (1) conduct a study of eye safety at small arms firing 
     ranges of the Armed Forces; and
       (2) develop for the use of the Armed Forces a protocol for 
     reporting eye injuries incurred in small arms firing 
     activities at the ranges.
       (b) Agency Tasking.--The Secretary may delegate authority 
     to carry out the responsibilities set forth in subsection (a) 
     to the United States Army Center for Health Promotion and 
     Preventive Medicine or any other element of the Department of 
     Defense that the Secretary considers well qualified to carry 
     out those responsibilities.
       (c) Content of Study.--The study shall include the 
     following:
       (1) An evaluation of the existing policies, procedures, and 
     practices of the Armed Forces regarding medical surveillance 
     of eye injuries resulting from weapons fire at the small arms 
     ranges.
       (2) An examination of the existing policies, procedures, 
     and practices of the Armed Forces regarding reporting on 
     vision safety issues resulting from weapons fire at the small 
     arms ranges.
       (3) Determination of rates of eye injuries, and trends in 
     eye injuries, resulting from weapons fire at the small arms 
     ranges.
       (4) An evaluation of the costs and benefits of a 
     requirement for use of eye protection devices by all 
     personnel firing small arms at the ranges.
       (d) Report.--The Secretary shall submit a report on the 
     activities required under this section to the Committees on 
     Armed Services and on Veterans' Affairs of the Senate and the 
     Committees on National Security and on Veterans' Affairs of 
     the House of Representatives. The report shall include--
       (1) the findings resulting from the study required under 
     paragraph (1) of subsection (a); and
       (2) the protocol developed under paragraph (2) of such 
     subsection.
       (e) Schedule.--(1) The Secretary shall ensure that the 
     study is commenced not later than October 1, 1997, and is 
     completed within six months after it is commenced.
       (2) The Secretary shall submit the report required under 
     subsection (d) not later than 30 days after the completion of 
     the study.

  Mr. ROCKEFELLER. Mr. President, as ranking member of the Committee on 
Veterans' Affairs, I have an especially strong interest in preventing 
unnecessary injuries and illness among the men and women who serve in 
our Nation's military forces. The risks that these brave men and women 
face in combat are reduced through superior equipment and excellent 
training, but some risks remain unavoidable. As we continue to learn 
from the lessons of the gulf war, 6 years after the battle, the 
complete risks of military service are still not known. Thus, it is 
simple common sense to ensure that we do all we can to prevent those 
risks outside of combat that are foreseeable. One such foreseeable and 
preventable risk is eye injury on military firing ranges.
  I thus propose an amendment to the Department of Defense 
authorization bill, the military eye injury assessment amendment. This 
amendment would address a military public health and prevention issue 
that was brought to my attention by a retired Air Force optometrist, 
Dr. John Meinhold. Dr. Meinhold was concerned about the rate of eye 
injuries that occurred in the Armed Services, particularly at military 
firing ranges. Unlike other public and private firing ranges throughout 
the country, military firing ranges do not require the mandatory use of 
safety eyewear to prevent eye injuries. Most, if not all, eye injuries 
at firing ranges could be completely prevented with a very inexpensive 
and low technology intervention, safety eyewear.
  The requirement for protective eyewear at public and private firing 
ranges is a liability issue, rather than one controlled by State or 
Federal regulations. However, there is no threat of liability for the 
armed services because of the so-called Feres doctrine, which is based 
on a Supreme Court decision that ruled that service members generally 
cannot sue the Government for injuries occurred during service. These 
unnecessary eye injuries potentially affect military readiness, and in 
cases of severe injury, a soldier's military career may be suddenly 
ended. The lifetime costs of a single catastrophic eye injury has been 
estimated to be $1 million per eye by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
but the human costs are immeasurable.
  A study by the Army found that eye injury data are not always tracked 
at the local level, and minor eye injuries may not always be reported 
to safety offices. It is estimated that while 90 percent of all eye 
injuries are preventable, the incidence of wartime eye injuries has 
increased steadily over the last 20 years.
  Given these statistics and the human costs of such injuries, I wrote 
the Department of Defense earlier this year to ask about this important 
safety issue. After a series of letters and inquiries, the official 
response I received was that no further action was needed to prevent 
eye injuries since DOD officials had determined that the risk was too 
low to warrant spending funds on prevention. In reviewing the 
Department of Defense's very own statistics and studies, and in talking 
with their health professionals, I cannot come to the same conclusion.
  Any preventable injury that puts our service men and women at risk is 
sufficient for our concern, especially when it is one which is as 
easily prevented as this one. Even one service member who suffers from 
a permanent eye injury at a firing range is one too many when that 
injury could have been avoided. I am proposing that we simply assess 
whether our military firing ranges should be brought up to the same 
safety standard that all other firing ranges in our country must meet.
  My amendment would require the Secretary of Defense to provide 
funding for a 6-month study of eye safety at military firing ranges. 
This study would evaluate the current medical surveillance of eye 
injuries at small arms firing ranges across the service branches, and 
examine current safety reporting practices and other analyses as 
necessary to establish military eye injury rates and trends. It would 
also develop a uniform protocol for reporting eye injuries across the 
service branches. The results would be reported to the Senate Armed 
Services Committee and the Senate Veterans' Affairs Committee upon 
completion of the study.
  I am proud to offer this amendment to protect the safety of the 
members of our armed services, and I encourage my colleagues to join me 
in this effort. I would like to thank the chairman and ranking member 
of the Armed Services Committee for their support and their fine staff 
for helping to perfect this amendment.
  Mr. THURMOND. I urge the Senate to adopt this amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment.
  The amendment (No. 723) was agreed to.
  Mr. LEVIN. I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. THURMOND. I move to lay it on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.


                           Amendment No. 724

(Purpose: To extend to the Secretary of Transportation the authority to 
               pay a reserve affiliation agreement bonus)

  Mr. THURMOND. On behalf of Senator Kempthorne, I offer an amendment 
that would extend the reserve affiliation agreement bonus to the Coast 
Guard.
  I believe this amendment has been cleared by the other side. I urge 
the Senate to adopt it.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from South Carolina [Mr. Thurmond], for Mr. 
     Kempthorne, proposes an amendment numbered 724.

  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent reading of the 
amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:
       At the end of subtitle C of title VI, add the following:

[[Page S6889]]

     SEC. 642. RESERVE AFFILIATION AGREEMENT BONUS FOR THE COAST 
                   GUARD.

       Section 308e of title 37, United States Code, is amended--
       (1) in subsection (a), by striking out ``Secretary of a 
     military department'' in the matter preceding paragraph (1) 
     and inserting in lieu thereof ``Secretary concerned''; and
       (2) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(f) The authority in subsection (a) does not apply to the 
     Secretary of Commerce and the Secretary of Health and Human 
     Services.''.

  Mr. KEMPTHORNE. Mr. President, I propose an amendment that would 
extend the Reserve affiliation bonus to the Coast Guard.
  The Coast Guard approached the committee after our markup was over 
requesting that they be included in the Reserve affiliation bonus. The 
Coast Guard has been experiencing difficulty in recruiting for the 
Coast Guard Reserve and believe that the Reserve affiliation bonus will 
assist by providing an additional incentive for members of the Coast 
Guard who are leaving active duty to enlist directly in the Coast Guard 
Reserve.
  I will point out that this authority is discretionary and was 
requested by the Coast Guard.
  Mr. President, I urge the adoption of the amendment.
  Mr. LEVIN. The amendment has been cleared on this side.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment.
  The amendment (No. 724) was agreed to.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  Mr. THURMOND. I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. LEVIN. I move to lay it on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.


                           Amendment No. 725

   (Purpose: To increase the number of years of commissioned service 
 provided for mandatory retirement of generals and admirals serving in 
              grades above major general and rear admiral)

  Mr. THURMOND. On behalf of Senator Kempthorne, I offer an amendment 
that would increase the number of years of active commission service 
provided for mandatory retirement of three- and four-star generals and 
admirals.
  Mr. President, I believe this amendment has been cleared on the other 
side. I urge the Senate to adopt it.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from South Carolina [Mr. Thurmond], for Mr. 
     Kempthorne, proposes an amendment numbered 725.

  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent reading of the 
amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       At the end of subtitle A of title V, add the following:

     SEC. 505. INCREASED YEARS OF COMMISSIONED SERVICE FOR 
                   MANDATORY RETIREMENT OF REGULAR GENERALS AND 
                   ADMIRALS ABOVE MAJOR GENERAL AND REAR ADMIRAL.

       (a) Years of Service.--Section 636 of title 10, United 
     States Code, is amended--
       (1) by striking out ``Except'' and inserting in lieu 
     thereof ``(a) Major Generals and Rear Admirals Serving in 
     Grade.--Except as provided in subsection (b) or (c) of this 
     section and''; and
       (2) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(b) Lieutenant Generals and Vice Admirals.--In the 
     administration of subsection (a) in the case of an officer 
     who is serving in the grade of lieutenant general or vice 
     admiral, the number of years of active commissioned service 
     applicable to the officer is 38 years.
       ``(c) Generals and Admirals.--In the administration of 
     subsection (a) in the case of an officer who is serving in 
     the grade of general or admiral, the number of years of 
     active commissioned service applicable to the officer is 40 
     years.''.
       (b) Section Heading.--The heading of such section is 
     amended to read as follows:

     ``Sec. 636. Retirement for years of service: regular officers 
       in grades above brigadier general and rear admiral (lower 
       half)''.

       (c) Clerical Amendment.--The item relating to such section 
     in the table of sections at the beginning of subchapter III 
     of chapter 36 of title 10, United States Code, is amended to 
     read as follows:

``636. Retirement for years of service: regular officers in grades 
              above brigadier general and rear admiral (lower half).''.

  Mr. KEMPTHORNE. Mr. President, I propose an amendment that would 
increase the number of years of active commissioned service provided 
for mandatory retirement of generals and admirals serving in grades of 
lieutenant general or vice admiral and general or admiral.
  The committee has noted over the past several years that the military 
services are moving senior officers through critical command and staff 
positions very quickly. One reason that these senior officers move so 
frequently is that there are only a few years in which a three-or four-
star general or admiral can serve before reaching the mandatory 
retirement point of 35 years of service. This amendment raises the 
mandatory retirement point for three stars from 35 years to 38 years of 
service and the mandatory retirement point for four-star officers from 
35 years to 40 years of service.
  This amendment does not increase the number of general or flag 
officers. Nor does it require that three- and four-star officers serve 
to the mandatory retirement point. The services still have the officer 
management tools currently in effect which permit the service Chief and 
the service Secretary to manage their officer force in the best 
interests of their service.
  Mr. President, I urge the adoption of the amendment.
  Mr. LEVIN. The amendment has been cleared on this side.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment.
  The amendment (No. 725) was agreed to.
  Mr. THURMOND. I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. LEVIN. I move to lay it on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.


                           Amendment No. 726

 (Purpose: To authorize a land conveyance at the Army Reserve Center, 
                          Greensboro, Alabama)

  Mr. THURMOND. On behalf of Senator Shelby, I offer an amendment which 
would convey 5 acres of land to Hale County, AL. The property was 
originally donated to the Federal Government for the construction of an 
Army Reserve Center which, due to a change in priority, was canceled.
  I believe this amendment has been cleared by the other side. I urge 
the Senate to adopt it.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from South Carolina [Mr. Thurmond], for Mr. 
     Shelby, proposes an amendment numbered 726.

  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent reading of the 
amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       At the end of subtitle B of title XXVIII, add the 
     following:

     SEC. 2819. LAND CONVEYANCE, ARMY RESERVE CENTER, GREENSBORO, 
                   ALABAMA.

       (a) Conveyance Authorized.--The Secretary of the Army may 
     convey, without consideration, to Hale County, Alabama, all 
     right, title, and interest of the United States in and to a 
     parcel of real property consisting of approximately 5.17 
     acres and located at the Army Reserve Center, Greensboro, 
     Alabama, that was conveyed by Hale County, Alabama, to the 
     United States by warranty deed dated September 12, 1988.
       (b) Description of Property.--The exact acreage and legal 
     description of the property conveyed under subsection (a) 
     shall be as described in the deed referred to in that 
     subsection.
       (c) Additional Terms and Conditions.--The Secretary may 
     require such additional terms and conditions in connection 
     with the conveyance under this section as the Secretary 
     considers appropriate to protect the interests of the United 
     States.

  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I rise in support of Senator Shelby's 
amendment. The amendment would return property that Hale County, 
Alabama donated in 1988 to the Federal Government for the purpose of 
constructing an Army Reserve center. Now the Army, due to changes in 
priority, cannot construct on the site until after fiscal year 2000.
  Since the community donated the property with expectations of a 
Reserve center and the Army has not lived up to these expectations, I 
believe that returning the property using this special legislation is 
appropriate. I urge the Senate to adopt the amendment.
  Mr. LEVIN. The amendment has been cleared on this side.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment.

[[Page S6890]]

  The amendment (No. 726) was agreed to.
  Mr. THURMOND. I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. LEVIN. I move to lay it on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.


                           Amendment No. 727

    (Purpose: To require the display of the POW/MIA flag on various 
                  occasions and in various locations)

  Mr. THURMOND. On behalf of Senator Campbell, I offer an amendment 
which would require the display of the POW/MIA flag on various 
occasions and in various locations.
  I believe this amendment has been cleared by the other side. I urge 
the Senate to adopt it.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from South Carolina [Mr. Thurmond], for Mr. 
     Campbell, proposes an amendment numbered 727.

  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent reading of the 
amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so.
  The amendment is as follows:

       At the end of subtitle E of title X, add the following:

     SEC.   . NATIONAL POW/MIA RECOGNITION DAY.

       (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
       (1) The United States has fought in many wars, and 
     thousands of Americans who served in those wars were captured 
     by the enemy or listed as missing in action.
       (2) Many of these Americans are still missing and 
     unaccounted for, and the uncertainty surrounding their fates 
     has caused their families to suffer tragic and continuing 
     hardships.
       (3) As a symbol of the Nation's concern and commitment to 
     accounting as fully as possible for all Americans still held 
     prisoner, missing, or unaccounted for by reason of their 
     service in the Armed Forces and to honor the Americans who in 
     future wars may be captured or listed as missing or 
     unaccounted for, Congress has officially recognized the 
     National League of Families POW/MIA flag.
       (4) The American people observe and honor with appropriate 
     ceremony and activity the third Friday of September each year 
     as National POW/MIA Recognition Day.
       (b) Display of POW/MIA Flag.--The POW/MIA flag shall be 
     displayed on Armed Forces Day, Memorial Day, Flag Day, 
     Independence Day, Veterans Day, National POW/MIA Recognition 
     Day, and on the last business day before each of the 
     preceding holidays, on the grounds or in the public lobbies 
     of--
       (1) the Capitol;
       (2) major military installations (as designated by the 
     Secretary of Defense);
       (3) Federal national cemeteries;
       (4) the national Korean War Veterans Memorial;
       (5) the national Vietnam Veterans Memorial;
       (6) the White House;
       (7) the official office of the--
       (A) Secretary of State;
       (B) Secretary of Defense;
       (C) Secretary of Veterans Affairs; and
       (D) Director of the Selective Service System; and
       (8) United States Postal Service post offices.
       (c) POW/MIA Flag Defined.--In this section, the term ``POW/
     MIA flag'' means the National League of Families POW/MIA flag 
     recognized and designated by section 2 of Public Law 101-355 
     (104 Stat. 416).
       (d) Regulations.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
     enactment of this Act, the agency or department responsible 
     for a location listed in subsection (b) shall prescribe any 
     regulation necessary to carry out this section.
       (e) Repeal of Provision Relating to Display of POW/MIA 
     Flag.--Section 1084 of the National Defense Authorization Act 
     for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993 (36 U.S.C. 189 note, Public 
     Law 102-190) is repealed.

  Mr. LEVIN. The amendment is cleared on this side.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mrs. Hutchison). The question is on agreeing 
to the amendment.
  The amendment (No. 727) was agreed to.
  Mr. THURMOND. Madam President, I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. LEVIN. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  Mr. CAMPBELL. Madam President, I take this opportunity to thank the 
distinguished managers of S. 936, the Department of Defense 
authorization bill, for incorporating my amendment to authorize the 
flying of the POW/MIA flag over certain Federal facilities and post 
offices.
  This amendment contains the text of S. 528, the bill I introduced on 
April 9, 1997. I am pleased that 23 of our colleagues joined in 
cosponsoring S. 528. These cosponsors include Senators Conrad, Cleland, 
Kempthorne, Warner, Collins, Moseley-Braun, Torricelli, Faircloth, 
D'Amato, Stevens, Hutchinson, Smith, DeWine, Lott, McConnell, 
Murkowski, Gregg, Lautenberg, Allard, Shelby, Craig, Grams, and 
Ashcroft.
  This amendment would authorize the POW/MIA flag to be displayed over 
military installations and memorials around the Nation and at other 
appropriate places of significance on Armed Forces Day, Memorial Day, 
Flag Day, Independence Day, Veterans Day, National POW/MIA Recognition 
Day, and on the last business day before each of the preceding 
holidays. A similar amendment was included in the House of 
Representatives Defense authorization bill.
  Congress has officially recognized the National League of Families 
POW/MIA flag. Displaying this flag would be a powerful symbol to all 
Americans that we have not forgotten--and will not forget.
  As you know, the United States has fought in many wars and thousands 
of Americans who served in those wars were captured by enemy or listed 
missing in action. In 20th century wars alone, more than 147,000 
Americans were captured and became prisoners of war; of that number 
more than 15,000 died while in captivity. When we add to this number, 
those who are still missing in action, we realize that more can be done 
to honor their commitment to duty, honor, and country.
  The display of the POW/MIA flag would be a forceful reminder that we 
care not only for them, but for their families who personally carry 
with them the burden of sacrifice. We want them to know that they do 
not stand alone, that we stand with them and beside them, as they 
remember the loyalty and devotion of those who served.
  As a veteran who served in Korea, I personally know that the 
remembrance of another's sacrifice in battle is one of the highest and 
most noble acts we can do. Let us now demonstrate our indebtedness and 
gratitude for those who served that we might live in freedom.
  I thank the managers of the DOD authorization bill for their 
assistance with this amendment and urge its immediate adoption.
  I thank the Chair and yield the floor.


                           Amendment No. 728

  (Purpose: To provide a Federal charter for the Air Force Sergeants 
                              Association)

  Mr. THURMOND. Madam President, I send an amendment to the desk on 
behalf of Senator McCain and ask for its immediate consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from South Carolina [Mr. Thurmond], for Mr. 
     McCain, proposes an amendment numbered 728.

  Mr. THURMOND. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that reading 
of the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       Insert after title XI, the following new title:
   TITLE XII--FEDERAL CHARTER FOR THE AIR FORCE SERGEANTS ASSOCIATION

     SEC. 1201. RECOGNITION AND GRANT OF FEDERAL CHARTER.

       The Air Force Sergeants Association, a nonprofit 
     corporation organized under the laws of the District of 
     Columbia, is recognized as such and granted a Federal 
     charter.

     SEC. 1202. POWERS.

       The Air Force Sergeants Association (in this title referred 
     to as the ``association'') shall have only those powers 
     granted to it through its bylaws and articles of 
     incorporation filed in the District of Columbia and subject 
     to the laws of the District of Columbia.

     SEC. 1203. PURPOSES.

       The purposes of the association are those provided in its 
     bylaws and articles of incorporation and shall include the 
     following:
       (1) To help maintain a highly dedicated and professional 
     corps of enlisted personnel within the United States Air 
     Force, including the United States Air Force Reserve, and the 
     Air National Guard.
       (2) To support fair and equitable legislation and 
     Department of the Air Force policies and to influence by 
     lawful means departmental plans, programs, policies, and 
     legislative proposals that affect enlisted personnel of the 
     Regular Air Force, the Air Force Reserve, and the Air 
     National Guard, its retirees, and other veterans of enlisted 
     service in the Air Force.
       (3) To actively publicize the roles of enlisted personnel 
     in the United States Air Force.

[[Page S6891]]

       (4) To participate in civil and military activities, youth 
     programs, and fundraising campaigns that benefit the United 
     States Air Force.
       (5) To provide for the mutual welfare of members of the 
     association and their families.
       (6) To assist in recruiting for the United States Air 
     Force.
       (7) To assemble together for social activities.
       (8) To maintain an adequate Air Force for our beloved 
     country.
       (9) To foster among the members of the association a 
     devotion to fellow airmen.
       (10) To serve the United States and the United States Air 
     Force loyally, and to do all else necessary to uphold and 
     defend the Constitution of the United States.

     SEC. 1204. SERVICE OF PROCESS.

       With respect to service of process, the association shall 
     comply with the laws of the District of Columbia and those 
     States in which it carries on its activities in furtherance 
     of its corporate purposes.

     SEC. 1205. MEMBERSHIP.

       Except as provided in section 1208(g), eligibility for 
     membership in the association and the rights and privileges 
     of members shall be as provided in the bylaws and articles of 
     incorporation of the association.

     SEC. 1206. BOARD OF DIRECTORS.

       Except as provided in section 1208(g), the composition of 
     the board of directors of the association and the 
     responsibilities of the board shall be as provided in the 
     bylaws and articles of incorporation of the association and 
     in conformity with the laws of the District of Columbia.

     SEC. 1207. OFFICERS.

       Except as provided in section 1208(g), the positions of 
     officers of the association and the election of members to 
     such positions shall be as provided in the bylaws and 
     articles of incorporation of the association and in 
     conformity with the laws of the District of Columbia.

     SEC. 1208. RESTRICTIONS.

       (a) Income and Compensation.--No part of the income or 
     assets of the association may inure to the benefit of any 
     member, officer, or director of the association or be 
     distributed to any such individual during the life of this 
     charter. Nothing in this subsection may be construed to 
     prevent the payment of reasonable compensation to the 
     officers and employees of the association or reimbursement 
     for actual and necessary expenses in amounts approved by the 
     board of directors.
       (b) Loans.--The association may not make any loan to any 
     member, officer, director, or employee of the association.
       (c) Issuance of Stock and Payment of Dividends.--The 
     association may not issue any shares of stock or declare or 
     pay any dividends.
       (d) Disclaimer of Congressional or Federal Approval.--The 
     association may not claim the approval of the Congress or the 
     authorization of the Federal Government for any of its 
     activities by virtue of this title.
       (e) Corporate Status.--The association shall maintain its 
     status as a corporation organized and incorporated under the 
     laws of the District of Columbia.
       (f) Corporate Function.--The association shall function as 
     an educational, patriotic, civic, historical, and research 
     organization under the laws of the District of Columbia.
       (g) Nondiscrimination.--In establishing the conditions of 
     membership in the association and in determining the 
     requirements for serving on the board of directors or as an 
     officer of the association, the association may not 
     discriminate on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, 
     handicap, age, or national origin.

     SEC. 1209. LIABILITY.

       The association shall be liable for the acts of its 
     officers, directors, employees, and agents whenever such 
     individuals act within the scope of their authority.

     SEC. 1210. MAINTENANCE AND INSPECTION OF BOOKS AND RECORDS.

       (a) Books and Records of Account.--The association shall 
     keep correct and complete books and records of account and 
     minutes of any proceeding of the association involving any of 
     its members, the board of directors, or any committee having 
     authority under the board of directors.
       (b) Names and Addresses of Members.--The association shall 
     keep at its principal office a record of the names and 
     addresses of all members having the right to vote in any 
     proceeding of the association.
       (c) Right to Inspect Books and Records.--All books and 
     records of the association may be inspected by any member 
     having the right to vote in any proceeding of the 
     association, or by any agent or attorney of such member, for 
     any proper purpose at any reasonable time.
       (d) Application of State Law.--This section may not be 
     construed to contravene any applicable State law.

     SEC. 1211. AUDIT OF FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS.

       The first section of the Act entitled ``An Act to provide 
     for audit of accounts of private corporations established 
     under Federal law'', approved August 30, 1964 (36 U.S.C. 
     1101), is amended--
       (1) by redesignating the paragraph (77) added by section 
     1811 of Public Law 104-201 (110 Stat. 2762) as paragraph 
     (78); and
       (2) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(79) Air Force Sergeants Association.''.

     SEC. 1212. ANNUAL REPORT.

       The association shall annually submit to Congress a report 
     concerning the activities of the association during the 
     preceding fiscal year. The annual report shall be submitted 
     on the same date as the report of the audit required by 
     reason of the amendment made in section 1211. The annual 
     report shall not be printed as a public document.

     SEC. 1213. RESERVATION OF RIGHT TO ALTER, AMEND, OR REPEAL 
                   CHARTER.

       The right to alter, amend, or repeal this title is 
     expressly reserved to Congress.

     SEC. 1214. TAX-EXEMPT STATUS REQUIRED AS CONDITION OF 
                   CHARTER.

       If the association fails to maintain its status as an 
     organization exempt from taxation as provided in the Internal 
     Revenue Code of 1986 the charter granted in this title shall 
     terminate.

     SEC. 1215. TERMINATION.

       The charter granted in this title shall expire if the 
     association fails to comply with any of the provisions of 
     this title.

     SEC. 1216. DEFINITION OF STATE.

       For purposes of this title, the term ``State'' includes the 
     District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the 
     Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, and the 
     territories and possessions of the United States.

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the amendment is agreed to.
  The amendment (No. 728) was agreed to.
  Mr. THURMOND. I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. LEVIN. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.


                           Amendment No. 658

  Mr. DOMENICI. Parliamentary inquiry, Mr. President. Is the pending 
business the Lugar amendment?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is the pending matter.
  Mr. DOMENICI. I am a cosponsor and I intend to speak on that. Are 
there any limitations?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. There are none.
  Mr. DOMENICI. I thank the Chair. I hope that doesn't give me a 
license to speak too long, but I will do my best.
  Mr. President, the amendment I'm cosponsoring today is vital to 
continuing the progress of our Nation's programs focused on reducing 
the threat of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Our 
colleagues Senators Nunn and Lugar initiated the Cooperative Threat 
Reduction program in 1991, and I was proud to join with them in the 
Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act 
last year. Your votes by a 96-to-0 margin last year showed the concern 
that all of you shared with me that proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction is a very real threat to the security of the Nation and one 
of the greatest destabilizing forces that could be unleashed on this 
Planet.
  In setting up the original Nunn-Lugar program and in passing the 
Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act, the Congress agreed 
that our Nation's national security interests are best served by 
preventing the proliferation of any of the former Soviet weapons, 
components, materials, technologies, or technologists. Congress labeled 
the Nunn-Lugar programs as cooperative threat reduction and that phrase 
was chosen very deliberately. The programs are indeed cooperative--they 
involve our establishment cooperating with their establishment, and the 
programs involve threat reduction--reducing the threat to our Nation.
  Senator Nunn presents a series of powerful arguments on these 
programs in a foreword he recently authored for the book ``Dismantling 
the Cold War.'' He discusses the transition over the last few years 
from a world characterized by a high risk of nuclear conflict but also 
high stability, thanks to the sharply bilateral nature of that world 
and the fear of using any nuclear weapons. Now we have a period of low 
risk of massive global nuclear conflict, but also very low stability 
because of intensification of a wide range of real and potential 
conflicts around the globe. He notes that the current key question ``is 
whether the U.S. and Russia, now as partners and as friends, can keep 
the world safe from weapons of mass destruction as we reduce our 
arsenals.'' He argues convincingly

[[Page S6892]]

against using the Nunn-Lugar program as a form of bribery to encourage 
Russia to undertake specific actions, simply because these programs are 
so strongly in our own best interest. In his view, ``proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction clearly is the number one national security 
challenge we face.''
  When we passed the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act, 
we required the President to develop an integrated administration plan 
for defending Americans against weapons of mass destruction. The 
President's budget submission for fiscal year 1998 should have been 
coordinated with his plan. But we haven't seen that plan to date--and 
the country needs it. I'm very concerned with the lack of coordination 
in national activities against weapons of mass destruction that this 
plan would enable and I call upon the administration to develop and 
release that plan. Further, I encourage that the final House-Senate 
conference report reiterate the concern from Congress that this plan 
needs to be a high priority item for the administration. But whether or 
not the administration fulfills this requirement, I believe that 
Congress needs to show its national leadership by fully funding the 
cooperative threat reduction efforts. With full funding, Congress can 
again emphasize, just as we did last year, that we treat the issue of 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction very very seriously.
  John Deutch visited with a group of Senators just a few weeks ago to 
discuss his concerns with proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. 
He and his colleagues argued very persuasively for increasing the funds 
for defending our Nation against this threat above the administration's 
request. He argued that if the 105th Congress does not continue to 
strengthen U.S. capabilities to prevent and respond to the full range 
of nuclear-biological-chemical terrorist attacks, the country will 
remain unacceptably vulnerable to mass destruction terrorism. He stated 
that ``the theat of terrorist attack with weapons of mass destruction 
delivered by unconventional means is an even clearer and more present 
danger to American lives and liberty than the threat of attack by 
ballistic missiles.'' He also took strong issue with the current 
administration's lack of coordination of efforts to defend against 
weapons of mass destruction, and recommended that Congress take the 
lead in directing the administration to improve the coordination 
efforts. As I've already noted, this absence of a coordinating plan 
from the administration is serious and Congress must continue to 
demonstrate its leadership in this area by reiterating the national 
need for this plan.

  The United States is safer today thanks to the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici 
and Nunn-Lugar initiatives. This amendment will continue our progress 
to reduce the risk from ``loose nukes'' or aging reactors of Soviet 
design. Through the Cooperative threat reduction programs, there are 
over 1,400 fewer nuclear warheads deployed and many ballistic missile 
launchers are no longer a threat to our citizens, along with many other 
major improvements. Three nations--Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan--no 
longer have nuclear weapons.
  The International Nuclear Safety Program's funding is also being 
restored by this amendment, and it is critical to prevention of another 
Chernobyl. We need to apply the expertise of our national laboratories 
to help the former Soviet states reduce any risks present in these 
reactors. To some, the solution is to shut down these reactors, but it 
isn't that simple when they are supplying power that is critically 
important to their regions. The International Nuclear Safety Program is 
working and must remain at full strength.
  Of the three programs being restored in this amendment, I'm most 
familiar with the Materials Protection Control and Accounting Program. 
This program is absolutely essential to minimize the threat of nuclear 
materials moving to rogue states or terrorist groups. By far the 
greatest challenge to any of these groups considering creation of 
nuclear weapons is obtaining the special nuclear materials--the highly 
enriched uranium or plutonium that provide the fission energy source 
for the bomb.
  In the old Soviet Union, nuclear materials were protected with guards 
and guns. The guards were well paid with stable jobs. Today, those 
guards may not have been paid by their government for months. Those 
guards may be wondering where their next meal is coming from, and more 
willing to consider compromising the material they are charged with 
protecting. Workers in the nuclear facilities are in similar straits, 
and within the last few months we saw the suicide of the director of 
the Russian Chelyabinsk facility out of frustration for his inability 
to pay his workers.
  We simply cannot rely on outdated ways of protecting nuclear 
materials in a country faced with the economic hardships and turmoil 
prevalent in the former Soviet Union. We need modern systems monitoring 
and controlling these materials, systems of the type that have been 
developed in this country and are in place wherever nuclear materials 
are found in the United States.
  This program is an outstanding example of international cooperation. 
Work is in progress at more than 50 sites in Russia, Kazakhstan, 
Ukraine, Belarus, Uzbekistan, Georgia, Lithuania, and Latvia. These 
sites are estimated to have 90 percent or more of the fissile materials 
outside of actual weapons--enough for tens of thousands of new weapons. 
The program is also an outstanding example of cooperation among our 
national laboratories--Los Alamos, Sandia, Livermore, Brookhaven, 
Pacific Northwest, and Oak Ridge National Laboratories are all playing 
key roles.
  As just one example of the program's accomplishments, at the Siberian 
chemical facility at Tomsk-7, by some measures the largest nuclear 
facility in the world, upwards of 100 tons of highly enriched 
uranium and plutonium are stored. Radiation monitors have now been 
installed at the exit portals of the facility, significantly improving 
security of all the material. And a wide range of additional security 
measures are in progress as well.

  The conference report language for the Nuclear Defense Authorization 
Act for 1998 raises the concern that the Department of Energy is not 
expending its allocated funds in this program. I've checked on the 
details of this concern and learned that the accounting processes 
required for this program cause as much as an 8 to 10 month delay 
between when funds are allocated to a specific project and when they 
are reported as spent after the work is done. We maintain good 
accounting for these funds by demanding that the projects be finished 
before final payment. Yet the funds must be in the Department at the 
time a contract is initiated. In contrast to the conference report, I 
learned that all fiscal year 1996 funds are committed and all fiscal 
year 1997 funds that the committee questioned will be fully utilized. 
Most of the fiscal year 1997 funds not reported as spent are already 
committed to contracts.
  The Materials Protection Control and Accounting Program must continue 
its efforts to reduce this serious threat. We have just recently seen 
new opportunities for the program to expand to include more of the 
Russian naval reactor fuels. We are on a course to have most of the 
known fissile material in Russia under some degree of protection by 
2002. Significant security improvements have been completed in Latvia, 
Lithuania, Uzbekistan, Georgia, and Belarus; 16 additional sites, 12 in 
Russia, 2 in Ukraine, 2 in Kazakhstan, are scheduled for completion by 
the end of 1997. Fiscal years 1998 and 1999 are the most critical for 
implementing security upgrades at the very large defense facilities 
with most of the material.
  With our amendment today, we keep these key programs on target, 
focused on reducing the threat of weapons of mass destruction. This 
amendment is a significant re-emphasis of the leadership demonstrated 
by Congress in the past in preventing proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction. These programs are a significant contribution toward a 
safer and more stable world for citizens of both the United States and 
world, both for the current generation and far into the future.
  I urge the Senate to adopt the amendment, which will replenish the 
three programs I have just briefly outlined, without which I believe we 
will be taking a giant step backward in the elimination, using the most 
modern

[[Page S6893]]

means, of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, starting 
with nuclear and leading on into chemical and biological. We have to 
get started on the latter. Time is wasting and it is getting more and 
more difficult and dangerous.
  I yield the floor.
  Madam President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. THURMOND. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. THURMOND. Madam President, I just want to make a statement that 
if Senators have amendments now is the time to come forward. We are 
waiting to take up these amendments. We are ready to take up these 
amendments. There is no use in keeping the Senate in session without 
doing business here. To do business here we have to take up these 
amendments. We already disposed of a number of amendments here by 
consent this morning. But if anybody has an amendment now is the time 
to come and offer it. It may be too late later.
  Mr. LEVIN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.
  Mr. LEVIN. Madam President, I join the chairman's call for those who 
have amendments to bring them to the floor, if possible, today or 
tomorrow. One of the problems is, however, that we are facing a cloture 
motion vote, and, if that is approved--and it must be the first vote--a 
number of amendments that people have indicated they want to offer 
would not be germane.
  I want to spend just a moment or two on the situation that we are now 
in relative to this pending cloture motion.
  The bill before the Senate is the product of 4 days of debate and 
thoughtful consideration during markup by the Senate Armed Services 
Committee. At the end of the markup, the committee voted unanimously to 
report this bill to the floor. It was an 18-to-0 vote.
  This bill is consistent with the bipartisan budget agreement, and I 
fully expect that at the proper time the Senate will give the bill a 
strong bipartisan vote. We have not reached that time yet.
  In recent years the Senate has debated more than 100 amendments to 
the defense authorization bill and has taken 10 to 20 rollcall votes a 
year. This has typically taken up to 50 to 60 hours over a period of a 
week or so. Last year, for example, we disposed of 159 amendments with 
19 rollcall votes, and over 63 hours of debate.
  I don't see any reason to expect that Members will be offering any 
fewer amendments, although we always can hope that might be the case, 
or that it will take significantly less time to dispose of them this 
year than it has in the past. Like previous defense authorization 
bills, the bill before us is almost 500 pages long, and includes more 
than 300 separate provisions.
  But on Friday before the recess when the majority leader filed a 
cloture motion the Senate had been considering this bill--and it is a 
complex bill--for less than 8 hours, mostly on a Friday morning after 
most Members had left town and after the majority leader said there 
would be no votes. Not a single nongermane amendment has been adopted 
until this recent series of amendments, and no major defense-related 
amendment has yet been offered.
  The major issues before us--the base closure issue, the depot issue, 
possibly missile defense, Bosnia, NATO enlargement--have yet to be 
raised. To say the least, I was surprised to see a cloture motion filed 
at this early stage of the Senate's deliberations. That approach might 
make some sense if there were sign of obstruction or delay in the 
consideration of the bill. But that has not been the case. The floor 
managers on both sides, as the chairman has said, are prepared to 
consider and debate any amendment that may be forthcoming. We are 
prepared to address issues and to move on with the Senate's business. 
But we have not had an opportunity to do that. And we are not going to 
have an opportunity to vote on any amendment prior to the vote on 
cloture tomorrow since, as I understand the schedule established by the 
majority leader, no votes can be scheduled for today and the first vote 
tomorrow will be the cloture vote.
  Members well know that the rules constrain consideration of 
amendments in a postcloture situation. And they are extremely confining 
rules. To be in order an amendment must also be relevant but germane 
under a very strict definition of germaneness. Under postcloture rules 
any amendment, no matter how relevant to the defense of the Nation, is 
nongermane if it expands powers available under the bill, if it 
introduces a new subject matter, or if it funds a program not already 
funded in the bill. Any portion of an amendment that is not germane 
makes the whole amendment out of order, and an amendment may not be 
modified without the unanimous consent of the Senate.
  If we were to vote cloture the major amendments that we all expect to 
consider in the course of the debate would be nongermane and could not 
be voted on by the Senate. For example, we have pending before us this 
afternoon an amendment relative to the funding of the Nunn-Lugar 
Cooperative Threat Reduction Program. Unless we act on that amendment 
this afternoon--that is an amendment which is addressing one of the 
greatest threats that is faced by this country--that amendment would 
not be in order, and we could not even vote on it.
  Senators who question the administration's proposal for distributing 
the workload of the two air logistics centers closed in the last BRAC 
round would be denied the opportunity to raise the issue on this bill 
if cloture passes. That is whether or not they come and debate it this 
afternoon, and that is whether or not they come and debate it tomorrow 
morning. The reason is because it is not germane technically to the 
bill in a postcloture situation.

  I don't happen to support adding those provisions to this bill. I 
don't think we ought to add provisions to this bill that reallocate 
workloads. I think we ought to leave that to a fair process. But that 
is not the point.
  Senators were asked to deliver amendments relating to this subject of 
distributing the workload at the two air logistics centers which were 
closed in the last BRAC round, and they would have no opportunity to 
bring their amendments back on that subject if cloture were voted on 
tomorrow.
  Again, under the unanimous-consent rule that we are operating under, 
cloture is the first rollcall vote that this Senate is going to be able 
to have.
  There is another major issue that should be debated and that we know 
will be debated. That has to do with future base closure rounds. We had 
a very lively discussion and debate on that in the Armed Services 
Committee.
  There are many of us who talked in support of the amendment of 
Senator McCain relative to two new rounds of base closures. If we deny 
those two new rounds we will be denying one of the highest priorities 
of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. But at least 
we ought to have a vote on the subject, and if we vote on cloture 
tomorrow--which must be the first vote regardless of when the BRAC 
amendment is offered, whether it is offered this afternoon or offered 
tomorrow, since under the unanimous-consent agreement that we are 
operating under the first vote must be on cloture--and if that vote 
passes tomorrow, then we would not be able to vote on whether or not to 
add two new rounds or perhaps one new round of base closure. That is 
just not right.
  Amendments regarding foreign policy issues that are not currently 
addressed in the bill various Senators may want to offer. Amendments 
may be offered on Bosnia or on NATO expansion. Those amendments would 
be out of order if cloture is voted tomorrow. The House version of this 
bill has a major Bosnia-related provision. It would cut off funds for 
United States ground troops in Bosnia after June 30 of next year. That 
is a highly significant issue. While we don't have to debate it in this 
bill, I think that some Senators may feel otherwise. I don't think they 
ought to be barred from raising the issue should they choose, even 
though I may not agree with their amendment.
  Many other amendments that Members are planning to offer this year

[[Page S6894]]

would be out of order. Amendments involving the funding formula for the 
National Guard Challenge Program, amendments relative to the North 
Dakota flood close claims of Air Force personnel, amendments relative 
to the reauthorization of the Sikes Act, to facilitate the preparation 
of integrated natural resources management plans for military lands, 
amendments to provide recruiter access to juvenile court records, and 
so forth.
  This is not the way that we should be doing business. We should not 
be voting on cloture before we have had an opportunity to vote on 
important amendments, and we will not have that opportunity under the 
unanimous-consent agreement that we are operating under. We should not 
be denying Members the opportunity to offer key amendments which will 
require rollcall votes before the amendment process is even begun in 
earnest.
  I hope that we can continue to clear as many amendments as possible 
this afternoon and tomorrow morning.
  I happen to agree with the chairman. People who have amendments 
should come down here and debate them. But the problem this cloture 
motion creates for us is that we can't have rollcall votes until after 
the vote on cloture tomorrow. And we know that a number of amendments 
are going to require rollcall votes--legitimate amendments involving 
base closures and involving the depot issue which so many of our 
Members feel so strongly about.
  That is why I hope we will not invoke cloture tomorrow. I think that 
invoking cloture would be unfair to Members who want to bring up 
amendments which require rollcall votes and to have us dispose of those 
amendments.
  So, Madam President, again, whether or not cloture may be needed at a 
later stage in the debate of the bill, it would surely be premature to 
invoke cloture tomorrow before the disposition of many important 
amendments, controversial amendments and tested amendments, which 
arguably require rollcall votes.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. COCHRAN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Mississippi.


                           Amendment No. 420

  Mr. COCHRAN. Madam President, I know I don't need to ask consent to 
return to the Cochran amendment. But the Lugar amendment has been 
offered and has been the pending business. I ask that we return to the 
regular order, to amendment No. 420.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has that right.
  That is now the pending amendment.
  Mr. COCHRAN. Madam President, amendment No. 420 was offered by me, 
and is cosponsored by the distinguished Senator from Illinois, Senator 
Durbin. It seeks to modify the existing export control policy that had 
been instituted by the administration with respect to the exporting of 
high-performance or so-called supercomputers.


                     supercomputer export controls

  Madam President, on November 14, 1994, President Clinton issued 
Executive Order 12938, the Emergency Regarding Weapons of Mass 
Destruction, declaring that the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction and the means of delivering them constitute ``an unusual 
and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and 
economy of the United States,'' and that he had therefore decided to 
``declare a national emergency to deal with that threat.'' The 
President reaffirmed this Executive order on November 15, 1995, and 
again on November 11, 1996.
  We have had several hearings recently on the subject of proliferation 
in my Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on International Security, 
Proliferation, and Federal Services. And the distinguished ranking 
member of the full committee, Senator Levin, is the ranking member of 
that subcommittee.
  We have examined cases of proliferation by the People's Republic of 
China and proliferation by Russia, and I can tell you that the facts--
brought out in open session--are disturbing. The facts tell a story of 
both Chinese and Russian sales of technology, components, and delivery 
systems for weapons of mass destruction, as well as sales of highly 
capable advanced conventional weapons and other critical military 
technologies, to nations like Iran. The facts demonstrate that 
President Clinton was entirely correct in describing this problem as a 
national emergency.
  Just last month, the Director of Central Intelligence sent Congress 
an unclassified report entitled, ``The Acquisition of Technology 
Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional 
Munitions.'' The report covers only the period July through December 
1996 and levies serious proliferation charges against, among others, 
Russia and China. The report says:

       China was the most significant supplier of WMD-related 
     goods and technology to foreign countries. The Chinese 
     provided a tremendous variety of assistance to both Iran's 
     and Pakistan's ballistic missile programs. China also was the 
     primary source of nuclear-related equipment and technology to 
     Pakistan, and a key supplier to Iran during this reporting 
     period. Iran also obtained considerable CW-related assistance 
     from China in the form of production equipment and 
     technology.

  The intelligence community report--and I note that this report is not 
the product of any single part of the intelligence community, but 
represents the consensus view of the entire intelligence community--
goes on to say, and again I quote:

       Russia supplied a variety of ballistic missile-related 
     goods to foreign countries during the reporting period, 
     especially to Iran. Russia was an important source for 
     nuclear programs in Iran and, to a lesser extent, India and 
     Pakistan.

  Madam President, the facts that emerged during my subcommittee's 
hearings on Russian and Chinese proliferation are completely supported 
by this latest report of the intelligence community. And we should not 
be comforted by the fact that it reports on the proliferant behavior of 
these nations only during the last half of 1996. For those who claim 
that Chinese and Russian behavior on proliferation is getting better, 
the best I can say is that it certainly is not yet good enough.
  I raise the issue of proliferation because it is the principal reason 
we have offered this amendment on supercomputer export controls. The 
use of high-performance computers to upgrade existing weapons 
capabilities or develop new ones is not some fantasy or something that 
might happen in the future. It is known fact. High-performance 
computers help make it possible to develop and improve weapons 
capabilities that threaten the United States. Keeping them out of the 
wrong hands makes America safer. Dr. Seymour Goodman, in a report used 
by the administration as its basis for weakening U.S. export controls 
on high-performance computers, wrote:

       . . . continued export controls will slow the exacerbation 
     of existing nuclear threats. Control of HPC [high-performance 
     computer] exports, by limiting those exports or imposing 
     appropriate safeguards, to countries known to possess nuclear 
     weapons will impede their development of improved weapons and 
     reduce their confidence in their existing stockpile by 
     limiting the opportunity to conduct simulations in lieu of 
     live tests. Similar or more rigorous controls on HPC exports 
     to countries with nuclear weapons development programs could 
     impede their development of second-generation weapons.

  The June 1997 Intelligence Community report to Congress couldn't be 
more clear on this issue. It states:

       . . . countries of concern continued last year to acquire 
     substantial amounts of WMD-related equipment, materials, and 
     technology, as well as modern conventional weapons. China and 
     Russia continued to be the primary suppliers, and are key to 
     any future efforts to stem the flow of dual-use goods and 
     modern weapons to countries to concern.

  This amendment will help reduce the proliferation danger facing the 
United States by requiring an individual validated license to export 
all supercomputers to so-called Tier 3 countries, which include China 
and Russia. Because of the new export control policy for supercomputers 
announced by the Clinton administration on October 6, 1995, there 
currently is no such requirement. We must act to change that policy 
now.
  This policy, which has been in place for almost 18 months, groups all 
nations into four country tiers and establishes export licensing 
requirements for high-performance computers based upon their country of 
destination. Tier 1 countries, consisting primarily of our NATO allies, 
are free to receive high-performance computers of unlimited capability 
without an export license from the United States, while, at the other 
end of the spectrum, Tier 4 countries, consisting of the last 
trustworthy, cannot legally receive any of

[[Page S6895]]

these supercomputers. Almost all countries in South America, Central 
America, the Caribbean, and Africa are in Tier 2, and can receive 
supercomputers capable of up to 10,000 MTOPS--MTOPS are Millions of 
Theoretical Operations per Second, the standard measure of computing 
capability--before an export license is required.
  The end-use and end-user are the critical factors for exports to any 
of the 50 nations comprising Tier 3. If the end-use and user are 
civilian, the policy allows exports of supercomputers capable of up to 
7,000 MTOPS before an export license is required. If the Tier 3 end-use 
or user is military, U.S. export licenses are required for any high-
performance computer capable of more than 2,000 MTOPS. But it is the 
U.S. exporter, not the administration, which has the responsibility 
under this policy for determining the end-use and user for Tier 3 
exports between 2,000 MTOPS and 7,000 MTOPS. This responsibility, 
difficult under any circumstances, is complicated by a company's 
natural focus on making sales. Our amendment addresses only these Tier 
3 exports, as depicted by the diagonally-striped area on this chart, 
which I am going to show the Senate at some point in this discussion.

  Our amendment applies to only a small portion of high-performance 
computer exports. In fact, according to the Commerce Department's 
Bureau of Export Administration, of the 1,436 supercomputers exported 
from the United States from the date the new policy went into effect 
through March 1997, only 91 went to Tier 3 countries. That amounts to 
6.34 percent of total supercomputer exports. Does it not make sense for 
our Government to be willing to check to make sure that 6.34 percent of 
our supercomputer exports go to the right place? Is it unreasonable to 
require the administration to be sure that American supercomputer sales 
aren't going to people and places who would damage American national 
security?
  Our amendment doesn't prohibit the transfer of a single 
supercomputer. It requires that the existing standards for transfers be 
monitored by our Government. Our amendment changes only one aspect of 
the policy, shifting the burden of determining end-use and end-user in 
Tier 3 countries from the exporter to the administration. Why is this 
so important? Listen to another part of last month's report to Congress 
by the Intelligence Community, which says, ``Many Third World 
countries--with Iran being the most prominent example--are responding 
to Western counterproliferation efforts by relying more on legitimate 
commercial firms as procurement fronts and by developing more 
convoluted procurement networks.''
  American exporters are not capable of determining whether a potential 
purchaser is a ``procurement front'' or part of a ``more convoluted 
procurement network,'' and it is wrong to place this burden on them.
  The administration, and many exporters, will tell you that the 
current policy is working, that closer scrutiny isn't required, but 
look at this chart and what it shows you. There are American 
supercomputers in Russia's and China's nuclear weapons complexes. 
According to Russia's Minister of Atomic Energy, these supercomputers 
are ``10 times faster than any previously available in Russia.'' 
According to the Chinese Academy of Sciences--which works on everything 
from the D-5 ICBM, capable of reaching the United States, to uranium 
enrichment for nuclear weapons--its American supercomputer provides the 
Academy with ``computational power previously unknown'' and is 
available--this is a quote from them--to ``all the major scientific and 
technological institutes across China.'' American high performance 
computers are now available to help these countries improve their 
nuclear weapons and improve that which they are proliferating, courtesy 
of a policy that can be called many things, but can't reasonably 
labelled as ``working.''
  Just last week we learned through press reports that an American 
supercomputer sent to Hong Kong is now in China under the control of 
the People's Liberation Army. In addition to the 47 American 
supercomputers that have been shipped to China since this new policy 
took effect, 20 unlicensed American supercomputers have been shipped to 
Hong Kong. At least now we know where one of the Hong Kong 
supercomputers is. What about the others? does this look to anyone like 
a policy that's working? This is a real problem. It is a problem that 
exists now. It is not a hypothetical problem. It is not a problem that 
may develop in the future. This is a serious problem that threatens our 
national security.
  There are some opposing this amendment who claim that setting the 
threshold at 2,000 MTOPS is too low, and consequently will make it 
impossible for American computer manufacturers to sell personal 
computers--PC's--abroad. That is just not true. It is a last minute 
desperation shot at the Cochran-Durbin amendment. Let's look at the 
facts:
  The first fact is the 2,000 MTOPS threshold opponents express concern 
over was not dreamed up by us. It is the administration's limit.
  No. 2, industry suggests that by some time in the fourth quarter of 
1998--this date came, incidentally, from IBM's Director of public 
policy, who recently visited with my staff about this amendment--IBM 
will produce, according to him, a PC capable of just over 2,000 MTOPS 
for sale in the international marketplace, he said. But IBM couldn't 
answer several basic questions about this PC. Its Director of public 
policy didn't know the name of the PC, the expected price that would be 
charged for it, how many would be produced for the U.S. market, how 
many would be produced for potential foreign market sales, or even how 
many would be produced for this Tier 3 market, which this amendment is 
narrowly related to. It is worth remembering that this amendment that 
we are talking about only affects Tier 3 countries, and he's talking to 
us as if our amendment affects all sales to everybody--in the United 
States, foreign countries, everywhere--and that is just not true.
  IBM doesn't just build these machines overnight on an impulse or a 
whim or a guess about what is out there in terms of potential sales. If 
it is going to have a new top-of-the-line PC out within 15 to 16 
months, as they claim through this director of public policy, it must 
already have ordered the chip to run this PC. Doesn't it stand to 
reason that if such a PC were just around the corner, IBM would be able 
to answer some of these basic questions that I said the director could 
not answer? If not, is it possible that IBM is being overly optimistic 
about its capability, its projections, about the timeframe involved, 
and all the other arguments that have been advanced against this 
amendment?
  Fact No. 3: Right now, according to William Reinsch, who is the Under 
Secretary of Commerce for Export Administration, ``High end Pentium-
based personal computers sold today at retail outlets perform at about 
200 to 250 MTOPS.''
  Did you hear that? We are not talking about 2,000 to 7,000 MTOPS, 
like some of these computer lobbyists are saying to Senators are going 
to be affected by this amendment. The PC's that are out on the market 
today are at much lower ranges of capability.
  Let's give Secretary Reinsch the benefit of the doubt and say today's 
top-end PCs are capable of running at 250 MTOPS. Secretary Reinsch said 
on June 11 before my subcommittee in an open hearing that ``computer 
power doubles every 18 months, and this has been the axiom in the 
industry for, I think, about 15 years.''
  This axiom is known as Moore's Law. The math is straightforward. If 
top-end PC's are capable of 250 MTOPS today, 18 months from now they 
will be capable of 500 MTOPS; 36 months from now, they will be capable 
of 1,000 MTOPS; 54 months from now, in 4\1/2\ years, they will be 
capable of 2,000 MTOPS. Fifty-four months from now is not, contrary to 
the claims of some computer manufacturers, the fourth quarter of next 
year, as was suggested to us by the director of public policy of IBM. 
Of course, Moore's Law doesn't even mean that 54 months from now there 
will be PC's on the market capable of 2,000 MTOPS. It only suggests 
that our manufacturers should be able to build these powerful PC's 54 
months from now, if Moore's Law continues to be sustained. None of our 
manufacturers will build PC's this powerful unless there is a broad 
market demand for such a highly capable PC, and it is unclear if the 
market will even be demanding such a powerful PC many times more 
powerful

[[Page S6896]]

than today's top-of-the-line PC's in just under 5 years.
  If 4 or 5 years from now industry's optimism proves to be correct, I 
will be pleased to return to this floor and offer legislation modifying 
the 2,000 MTOPS level. But the suggestion that by next year we will 
have PC's many times more powerful than our most powerful today can 
only be guesswork, wishful thinking.
  Fact No. 4: IBM currently sells, again according to its director of 
public policy, a workstation that is capable of just over 2,000 MTOPS. 
Wouldn't it make sense that future demand for the much anticipated 
2,000 MTOPS PC should be similar to the current demand for the 
workstation that is already on the market?
  According to the Commerce Department, from January 25, 1996, when the 
administration's supercomputer export control liberalization took 
effect, to March of 1997, 1,436 American high-performance computers 
were exported to countries in tiers 1, 2, and 3. Of these 1,436, just 
91, or 6.34 percent, went to tier 3 countries. I do not know how many 
of these 91 were IBM's workstation that is just over 2,000 MTOPS. We 
know that at least 6 of the 91 were not manufactured by IBM--4 Silicon 
Graphics machines that are now running at Russia's nuclear weapons 
labs; one Silicon Graphics machine in the Chinese Academy of Sciences, 
which is a key part of China's nuclear weapons complex; and one Sun 
Microsystems machine that we just learned last week is now running at a 
Chinese military facility in Chungsha after being diverted from Hong 
Kong. So up to 85 of the 91 exported over 14 months to tier 3 countries 
could have been this IBM workstation, though I doubt that all of them 
consisted of that one machine. But even if all 85 were these IBM 
workstations, does this sound like the kind of volume that will 
overwhelm the Government's licensing apparatus? Certainly not.
  The specter of American jobs being lost to unwieldy export controls 
is just another part of the argument against the Cochran-Durbin 
amendment that is not based on the facts.
  Another argument made against our amendment is that the right way to 
keep organizations from getting American supercomputer technology who 
shouldn't be receiving it is for the Department of Commerce to publish 
a list of prohibited end users with individual validated licenses 
required for any high-performance computer export to a country or 
entity on the list. This argument against the amendment at least has 
the virtue of implicitly admitting that American supercomputers should 
not be in Russia's and China's nuclear weapons design labs, but it is 
another argument that is simply not based on the facts.
  Shortly before the recent July Fourth recess, I spoke on the floor of 
the Senate explaining why such a list would be, in many ways, worse 
than the current situation. I won't go through all those reasons again 
in the interest of time now, but I continue to believe that such a list 
would be necessarily incomplete because of the requirement to protect 
intelligence sources and methods. It could be used as the Department of 
Commerce's guide for proliferators, and it would make it only too easy 
to make a sale to a location not on the list, thus encouraging makers 
of weapons of mass destruction to establish phony front organizations 
for the purposes of acquiring U.S. supercomputers. They wouldn't be on 
that list.

  In fact, the Department of Commerce on June 30 published such a list, 
and its inadequacy is obvious. The June 30 list, called by the Commerce 
Department the ``Entities List,'' consists of 13 locations in 5 tier 3 
countries that can receive an American supercomputer only if you have a 
license, only subject to a license. So now the total list of proscribed 
end users consists of 15 entities. On this list are Chelyabinsk-70 and 
Arzamas-16 in Russia which have already received at least five American 
supercomputers and parts of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, which also 
is now manufacturing more modern nuclear weapons with America's finest 
technology.
  Because of this list, now America's computer exporters know that they 
need a license to ship a high-performance computer to any of these 
entities. What about other entities, though? What about the Chinese 
company that shipped ring magnets to Pakistan last year for use in its 
nuclear program? Why isn't that company on the list? It has been 
subjected to sanctions imposed by our Government, and it is not on our 
Government's list as a prohibited end user. What about the Chinese 
company or government entity that shipped M-11 missiles to Pakistan and 
now, according to press reports, is helping Pakistan build a factory 
for the indigenous manufacture of M-11 missiles? Why isn't that entity 
on the list? What about the Russian company or government entity 
helping Iran to upgrade its nuclear program and ballistic missile 
programs, why aren't they on the list?
  Madam President, this list does not solve the problem. If anything, 
it makes it more confused, it makes it more difficult for American 
exporters to determine who should or should not receive American high-
performance computers. In many ways, this list is worse than nothing.
  There are many who believe the entire high-performance computer 
export control policy of this administration is a failure. However one 
views this policy as a whole, there is one aspect of it that we know is 
not working and it can be fixed now.
  We know that American supercomputers are now in Chinese and Russian 
nuclear weapons labs. We know that they should not be there. We know 
that our Government, with the resources of the intelligence community, 
is better able to determine the identity of end users and end uses than 
is industry. Industry has no way to be able to determine the end use 
and user of its products to the degree of confidence that our 
intelligence agencies can do.
  Right now we have the opportunity not to impose new restrictions on 
our supercomputer manufacturers but to shift the burden of making end-
use and end-user determinations from industry to Government.
  Look at this chart again and you will see that we are talking about 
only a very small part of the overall policy. The entire chart 
describes the policy and shows the number of tiers, 1 through 4, the 
varying capabilities on the basis of millions of theoretical operations 
per second, MTOPS, along the left side. And the only part of the entire 
export business of American supercomputers that is affected by this 
amendment is this part shown in the diagonal lines. The fact is, we are 
talking about only 6.34 percent of supercomputer exports under this 
policy that will be affected by this amendment.
  The Cochran-Durbin amendment will not prevent a single supercomputer 
export to anyone who should have one, but it will help ensure, though, 
that only those who should have them will have them. The only 
supercomputer sales that would be blocked by our amendment are those 
going to foreign entities who the U.S. Government determines shouldn't 
have it. It will not prevent legitimate sales to legitimate users in 
the U.S. or outside the U.S., but it will help prevent a repeat of the 
errors that have allowed American supercomputers to go to Russia and to 
go to China and be used in their nuclear weapons labs.
  Let's be clear what this debate is about. It is about U.S. national 
security. If you think Russia and China shouldn't be using American 
supercomputers to improve the quality of their nuclear arsenals and the 
quality of the weapons systems and components and technology that they 
are selling in turn to others, vote for the Cochran-Durbin amendment.
  President Clinton was right when he called the proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction ``an unusual and extraordinary threat to 
the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United 
States,'' and that it constitutes a ``national emergency.'' These 
weapons, delivery systems and technologies are more readily developed 
and enhanced by high-performance computers, and who makes those 
computers? The United States.
  If the United States is going to demonstrate that it is serious about 
this issue, we must do more than complain to Russia and China every 
time one of those nations engage in proliferation.
  The American fight against proliferation must start at our own 
borders.
  I urge Senators to vote against the Grams-Boxer substitute and 
support the Cochran-Durbin amendment.

[[Page S6897]]

  Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the distinguished 
Senator from New Hampshire [Mr. Smith] be added as a cosponsor to our 
amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Ms. Collins). Without objection, it is so 
ordered.
  Mr. DURBIN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Illinois.
  Mr. DURBIN. I rise to speak on behalf of the same amendment which my 
colleague, the Senator from Mississippi, Senator Cochran, has just 
described.
  I am happy to join him as a cosponsor on this important amendment. I 
only wish my colleagues and many others who are listening to this 
debate could have been there when Senator Cochran's subcommittee met 
just several weeks ago and really talked in depth about what we are 
doing.
  For the average layman, the average person in the United States, 
there are some very technical terms involved in this debate. But the 
purpose of this amendment is very clear and very straightforward. We 
understand that if we give to another country certain information or 
technology, they are able in many ways to use it for positive reasons. 
We fear however that if that same information and technology is given 
to a country which might use it for negative purposes, that it is 
inconsistent with the national security of the United States.
  The Cochran-Durbin amendment is an effort to make certain that we 
continue to sell technology around the world, but take care not to sell 
it in those countries where it may be misused.
  Unfortunately, the Clinton administration over the last years has had 
a change in its policy, with a more expansive, more liberal trade 
policy when it comes to supercomputers. It has been my fear, and the 
fear of the Senator from Mississippi, that some of these computers 
which are being purchased for nominally peaceful reasons are in fact 
going to be used for military purposes.
  One of the examples which the Senator from Mississippi used in 
closing was the whole question of weapons testing. Some 35 years ago 
when President Kennedy spoke to the Nation, he challenged us as a world 
to reduce nuclear arms testing so as to make this a more peaceful 
planet. I think President Kennedy was right. And I support a weapons 
test ban. I think the United States should continue to show leadership.
  But we live in a different world some 3 decades later where a country 
with a new computer, the supercomputers that we are describing, that 
country may have the capability to test a nuclear weapon without ever 
detonating it. They can set up all of the parameters within the 
computer, test the weapon, and show its impact.
  So if you are talking about reducing the proliferation of dangerous 
weapons--nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons--you must 
necessarily get involved in this debate, which Senator Cochran has 
initiated and I have been more than happy to assist in.
  Some questions have been raised. And I wonder, just for purposes of 
clarification, if I could ask Senator Cochran a question or two for the 
record here. I know the Senator has covered most of this in his opening 
statement, but I think we ought to make a clear record for our 
colleagues on the amendment.
  One of the first things that is said is, well, you set the standard 
too low. If a company wants to sell this computer, which we describe as 
a 2,000 MTOPS computer, you have set it too low, set it at a standard 
so that the computers that are going to be licensed, there is going to 
be surveillance at such a level. It will not hit the ordinary business 
computers.
  I would like you to respond. And I know you did respond in the course 
of your opening remarks to that particular criticism. If you would, 
please, I yield to the Senator.
  Mr. COCHRAN. If the distinguished Senator would yield, I appreciate 
very much not only his question but also his very helpful involvement 
in this issue and cosponsoring the amendment.
  But he gets to the central point of the debate here. It is not that 
this amendment sets any new levels of prohibition or granting authority 
for export sales. It does not change any of those levels. The level 
that is established by the administration is the 2,000 MTOPS level. We 
do not change that for tier 3 countries, as demonstrated in the chart I 
showed a while ago.
  We were told in our hearing that 250 MTOPS is about the current power 
of a PC which is sold in the market here in the country now. And that 
under the so-called Moore's Law that doubles every 18 months. So it 
would be 4\1/2\ years before you get to a level where you would even 
reach the 2,000 MTOPS level which is the trigger level for tier 3 
countries that have to have a license if the end use or the end user is 
military. If they're civilian, you do not have to have a license at 
all.
  What this amendment changes is who determines the end use or the end 
user. Our amendment says it should be the administration's 
responsibility. Current policy is that exporters have the 
responsibility of making that determination. That is the only thing we 
change.
  Mr. DURBIN. If I could pose another question to my cosponsor on this 
amendment, Senator Cochran.
  There have been others that have said, well, why is the United States 
doing this? If we stop selling computers around the world, whatever 
their capability, some other country is going to sell them. So we are 
tying the hands of American business in a futile effort to stop this 
march of technology.
  I would appreciate it if my colleague, the Senator from Mississippi, 
would address that particular complaint.
  Mr. COCHRAN. Our information, derived at our hearings through expert 
witnesses, was that we have the highest capability of any country in 
the world in terms of supercomputer manufacturing technology. We 
manufacture the state-of-the-art supercomputers. We do not have any 
competitors. Japan manufactures some high-performance supercomputers 
but their export policy is more restrictive than ours. They require 
licensing, we do not.
  What we are suggesting here is that the policy of our administration 
is flawed in that it ought to make the determination in those questions 
where end use and end user is relevant as to whether you can or cannot 
make the sale, the Government ought to monitor and verify that this 
sale is permissible. And it applies to only 6.34 percent of the total 
computer sales of all American exporters in the export market.
  Mr. DURBIN. I thank my colleague.
  I think he noted in the course of his remarks that last week or 
perhaps the week before the administration said, well, let us put out a 
list of 13 or 14 different entities that we think we should take care 
not to sell to. And I agree completely with the Senator from 
Mississippi that it is hardly a comfort in this argument that we are 
protecting the interest of the United States with this list.
  It is hard to believe that our intelligence operations would make a 
complete disclosure of every potentially bad purchaser around the world 
without in fact disclosing very sensitive classified information. It is 
far better to take the approach which the Cochran-Durbin amendment 
does, which says that on a case-by-case basis there will be a license 
issued by the Government to determine whether the would-be purchaser in 
any way raises a suspicion that this technology is going to be misused, 
used against the United States.
  I think our approach to it gives the Government the power it needs to 
police the sales, says to the seller, the computer company, you can 
come to the Government now and entrust that decision to an entity which 
should know as to which purchasers should not be trusted. And that I 
think would give the industry some peace of mind. It has to be a major 
embarrassment to these companies to realize now that they have sold 
these supercomputers in China and in Russia and that they may be used 
for military purposes against the United States.
  Certainly, these companies in the United States value our security, 
they are as patriotic as many others, and they would want to do the 
right thing. The Cochran-Durbin amendment sets up I think a good 
framework for the right decision to be made. I certainly hope that when 
this amendment comes up for consideration that many of our colleagues 
on both sides of the aisle

[[Page S6898]]

will stop and pause and reflect on it. Because I think it in a way 
takes a look at the world as it currently exists and says we do not 
want to sell to potential enemies or to suspect nations that power that 
might come back someday to haunt us. It is important to increase trade, 
but not at the expense of the security of the United States.
  I thank my colleague from Mississippi for his leadership. And I am 
happy to join him in this effort.
  I yield back.
  Mr. COCHRAN. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that there be 
printed in the Record a chart on exports of high-performance computers; 
and an unclassified report from the Director of Central Intelligence, 
as mentioned in my earlier remarks; and an editorial from the St. Louis 
Post-Dispatch suggesting that the administration should not wait, that 
it must act now on this issue.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:


 EXPORTS OF HIGH PERFORMANCE COMPUTERS FROM JANUARY 25, 1996 TO MARCH 
                                  1997

                     [Number of systems by country]

Argentina.............................................................4
Australia............................................................63
Austria..............................................................17
Belgium..............................................................38
Brazil...............................................................15
Canada...............................................................11
China................................................................47
Colombia..............................................................5
Croatia...............................................................1
Czech Rep.............................................................4
Denmark..............................................................10
Egypt.................................................................2
Finland...............................................................2
France...............................................................86
Germany.............................................................232
Greece................................................................1
Hong Kong............................................................20
Hungary...............................................................3
India.................................................................7
Indonesia.............................................................6
Ireland...............................................................6
Israel...............................................................17
Italy................................................................42
Jamaica...............................................................1
Japan...............................................................150
Kenya.................................................................1
Korea, South........................................................133
Luxembourg............................................................2
Malaysia.............................................................33
Mexico...............................................................24
Netherlands..........................................................23
New Zealand..........................................................15
Nigeria...............................................................2
Norway................................................................7
Peru..................................................................7
Philippines...........................................................4
Poland................................................................2
Portugal..............................................................8
Romania...............................................................4
Russia...............................................................10
Saudi Arabia..........................................................2
Singapore............................................................24
Slovak Rep............................................................1
Slovenia..............................................................2
S. Africa............................................................12
Spain................................................................37
Sweden...............................................................38
Switzerland..........................................................41
Taiwan................................................................6
Thailand.............................................................10
Turkey................................................................4
UAE...................................................................1
UK..................................................................187
Uruguay...............................................................1
Venezuela.............................................................4
Zimbabwe..............................................................1
                                                               ________
                                                               
    Total number of systems........................................1436

 The Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction 
                  and Advanced Conventional Munitions


                               scope note

       The DCI submitted this biannual report in response to a 
     Congressionally directed action in Section 721 of the FY 1997 
     Intelligence Authorization Act:
       ``(a) Not later than 6 months after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, and every 6 months thereafter, the 
     Director of Central Intelligence shall submit to Congress a 
     report on
       (1) the acquisition by foreign countries during the 
     preceding 6 months of dual-use and other technology useful 
     for the development or production of weapons of mass 
     destruction (including nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, and 
     biological weapons) and advanced conventional munitions; and
       (2) trends in the acquisition of such technology by such 
     countries.''
       At the DCI's request, the Nonproliferation Center (NPC) 
     drafted this report and coordinated it throughout the 
     Intelligence Community. As directed by Section 721, 
     subsection (b) of the Act, it is unclassified.


                              introduction

       The threat from the proliferation of weapons of mass 
     destruction and missiles is one of the highest priorities for 
     intelligence. In the US effort to counter weapons 
     proliferation, the Intelligence Community has taken an active 
     role in supporting US government initiatives to strengthen 
     export controls in supplier countries and to work with other 
     countries to prevent the sale of weapons of mass destruction 
     (WMD), advanced conventional weapons, and their related 
     technologies. While it is an extremely difficult problem, US 
     government efforts have made some progress, making both the 
     acquisition and development of WMD more difficult and costly 
     for proliferators.
       Interdiction of WMD and the technologies necessary to 
     acquire a WMD capability is a key component in the 
     acquisition prevention effort. We see interdiction efforts 
     falling into three basic categories:
       Preventing the transfer of materials through export 
     controls and international nonproliferation regimes;
       Halting the transfer or the negotiation of transfer of 
     materials through diplomatic and liaison initiatives;
       Seizing proscribed materials in transit, through law 
     enforcement agencies in cooperation with the Intelligence 
     Community.
       Interdiction efforts are an extremely important part of our 
     overall nonproliferation strategy. By themselves, however, 
     they generally do not get countries out of the business of 
     proliferation. They do, though, buy time for other 
     initiatives that may be more successful in halting or rolling 
     back a WMD program. These other initiatives can include:
       Diplomatic efforts designed to reduce the perceived need 
     for a WMD capability;
       Education efforts to show that WMD-related funds would be 
     better spent elsewhere;
       Bilateral or multilateral incentives. Such incentives could 
     be financial, including membership in an international 
     economic forum, in exchange for halting or rolling back a WMD 
     program;
       Military assistance or security guarantees.
       The US clearly leads the way in programs in all three 
     classes of interdiction efforts. US export license 
     applications of concern are scrutinized by a number of 
     agencies, including the Intelligence Community. The US also 
     is developing procedures to share appropriate end user 
     information with key allies in an effort to strengthen our 
     mutual export control activities. In addition, the procedures 
     for alerting other governments of impending transfers and 
     tracking resulting actions are in place and working. 
     Interdictions of shipments are occurring.
       An example of a successful interdiction would be the 
     seizure of chemical precursors destined for Libya. Although 
     such a seizure would not halt Tripoli's aggressive chemical 
     weapons development program, at a minimum it would:
       Slow Tripoli's ability to begin serial production of 
     chemical agents;
       Provide the US time to persuade supplier nations or 
     companies to halt future shipments to Libya;
       Allow the Intelligence Community and US law enforcement 
     agencies to identify and target new intelligence sources that 
     could contribute to rolling back Libya's CW program;
       Increase the cost to Libya of its CW development program.
       Interdiction successes rest, in large measure, not on the 
     quantity of information available to the policymaker, but on 
     the quality. This is true for all three classes of 
     interdictions. In licensing, for example, policymakers need 
     unambiguous intelligence information before making a decision 
     to deny a license, thereby denying a sale for the US company. 
     Likewise, demarches to other governments must be accurate or 
     the US will be accused of crying wolf and lose support from 
     even friendly countries. And interdictions of shipments in 
     transit often become international incidents, and potential 
     embarrassment if the targeted material is not found in the 
     shipment.
       Actionable intelligence in support of interdiction efforts 
     requires more than cooperation between US intelligence, 
     policy, and law enforcement agencies. It demands close 
     working relationships between the United States and other 
     foreign governments committed to halting the proliferation of 
     WMD. Such relationships will, of course, include intelligence 
     sharing arrangements, but equally important are diplomatic, 
     military, and scientific exchanges at all levels.
       As noted above, interdiction programs by themselves cannot 
     halt the proliferation of WMD. Alternative suppliers and 
     technologies, increasing use of denial and deception, and a 
     growing ability to produce indigenously weapons or their 
     component parts are opening new avenues to states or 
     organizations determined to obtain a WMD capability. The 
     increasing diffusion of modern technology through the growth 
     of the world market is making it harder to detect illicit 
     diversions of materials and technologies relevant to a 
     weapons program.
       We are addressing these new challenges with more aggressive 
     efforts, which go beyond traditional cold-war efforts aimed 
     merely at understanding weapons and associated plans. We are 
     better integrating technical analysis with political, 
     military, and diplomatic analysis to provide policymakers 
     with information on the motivations that drive foreign 
     actions and decisions, and on influential opposition forces 
     that could support initiatives to diminish or eliminate 
     the proliferation threat.
       Our concerns are not limited to interdicting materials and 
     technologies to state-sponsored WMD development programs. As 
     worrisome, in our judgment, are terrorist groups and cults 
     that seek to acquire or develop

[[Page S6899]]

     chemical and biological weapons on their own. For example, 
     the incidents staged in March 1995 by the Japanese cult Aurn 
     Shinrikyo demonstrate the use of WMD is not longer restricted 
     to the battlefield. Terrorist groups and violent sub-national 
     groups need not acquire a massive infrastructure to create a 
     deadly, arsenal. Only small quantities of precursors, 
     available on the open market, are needed.
       Interdiction efforts are further complicated by the fact 
     that most WMD programs are based on dual-use technologies and 
     materials that have legitimate civilian or military 
     applications unrelated to WMD. For example, chemicals used to 
     make nerve agents are also used to make plastics and to 
     process foodstuffs; trade in those technologies cannot be 
     banned.
       Nonproliferation regimes provide international standards to 
     gauge and address behavior. They provide diplomatic tools to 
     isolate and punish violators. The past few years, many states 
     have joined these regimes and outsiders are encountering new 
     pressures to join. Procurement costs have risen because of 
     the need for convoluted efforts to hide purchases. That said, 
     these regimes can be deceived by determined proliferators. 
     The sheer volume of international commerce, increased self-
     sufficiency, and the global diffusion of technology and its 
     dual-use nature make the regimes' road ahead a difficult one. 
     Intelligence will play an increasingly important role in 
     maintaining their effectiveness. Protecting sources 
     throughout this process will be a challenge.
       Following are summaries by country of ACW- and WMD-related 
     acquisition activities (solicitations, negotiations, 
     contracts, and deliveries) that occurred between 1 July and 
     31 December 1996.

                         Acquisition by Country

       We chose to exclude countries that already have substantial 
     ACW and WMD programs such as China and Russia, as well as 
     countries of lower priority that demonstrated little 
     acquisition activity of concern.


                                 egypt

       During the last half of 1996, Egypt obtained Scud-related 
     ballistic missile equipment from North Korea and Russia.


                                 india

       India sought some items for its ballistic missile program 
     during the reporting period from a variety of sources. It 
     also sought nuclear-related items, some of which may have 
     been intended for its nuclear weapons program.


                                  iran

       Iran continues to be one of the most active countries 
     seeking to acquire all types of WMD technology and advanced 
     conventional weapons. Its efforts in the last half of 1996 
     have focused on acquiring production technology that will 
     give Iran an indigenous production capability for all types 
     of WMD. Numerous interdiction efforts by the US government 
     have interfered with Iranian attempts to purchase arms and 
     WMD-related goods, but Iran's acquisition efforts remain 
     unrelenting.
       For the reporting period, China and Russia have been 
     primary sources for missile-related goods. Iran obtained the 
     bulk of its CW equipment from China and India. Iran sought 
     dual-use biotech equipment from Europe and Asia, ostensibly 
     for civilian uses. Iran was actively seeking modern tanks, 
     SAMs, and other arms from the Commonwealth of Independent 
     States (CIS), China, and Europe. Besides some large projects 
     with China, Iranian nuclear-related purchases were not 
     focused on any particular countries and were only indirectly 
     related to nuclear weapons production.


                                  iraq

       We have not observed Iraq purchasing advanced conventional 
     weapons or WMD-related goods, although it has purchased 
     numerous dual-use items.


                                 libya

       Despite the UN embargo, Libya continued to aggressively 
     seek ballistic missile-related equipment, materials, and 
     technology from Europe, the CIS, and the Far East. CW-related 
     purchases diminished, however.


                              north korea

       North Korea's WMD programs are largely indigenous. We 
     observed no significant procurement involving ACW or WMD-
     related goods.


                                pakistan

       Pakistan was very aggressive in seeking our equipment, 
     material, and technology for its nuclear weapons program, 
     with China as its principal supplier. Pakistan also sought a 
     wide variety of nuclear-related goods from many Western 
     nations, including the United States. China also was a major 
     supplier to Pakistan's ballistic missile program, providing 
     technology and assistance. Of note, Pakistan has made strong 
     efforts to acquire an indigenous capability in missile 
     production technologies.


                                 syria

       Syria continued to seek CW- and Scud-related goods during 
     the reporting period. Russia and Eastern Europe were the 
     primary target for CW-related purchases, while North Korea 
     and Iran have become important suppliers of Scud-related 
     equipment and materials.

                             Key Suppliers


                                 china

       During the last half of 1996, China was the most 
     significant supplier of WMD-related goods and technology of 
     foreign countries. The Chinese provided a tremendous variety 
     of assistance to both Iran's and Pakistan's ballistic missile 
     programs. China also was the primary source of nuclear-
     related equipment and technology to Pakistan, and a key 
     supplier to Iran during this reporting period. Iran also 
     obtained considerable CW-related assistance from China in the 
     form of production equipment and technology.


                                 russia

       Russia supplied a variety of ballistic missile-related 
     goods to foreign countries during the reporting period, 
     especially to Iran. Russia was an important source for 
     nuclear programs in Iran and, to a lesser extent, India and 
     Pakistan. Russia also negotiated the sale of advanced weapon 
     systems, such as the SA-10 to Cyprus, and is an important 
     target for Middle Eastern countries seeking to upgrade and 
     replace their existing arms.


                              north korea

       North Korea continued to export Scud-related equipment and 
     materials to countries of concern during this reporting 
     period.


                                germany

       Among Western nations, Germany was the favorite target for 
     foreign WMD programs. German export controls were effective 
     in thwarting many of these attempts, but some dual-use goods 
     were exported, purportedly to civilian end users.


                                 trends

       Despite our efforts, countries of concern continued last 
     year to acquire substantial amounts of WMD-related equipment, 
     materials, and technology, as well as modern conventional 
     weapons. China and Russia continued to be the primary 
     suppliers, and are key to any future efforts to stem the flow 
     of dual-use goods and modern weapons to countries of concern.
       Countries determined to maintain WMD programs over the long 
     term have been placing significant emphasis on securing their 
     programs against interdiction and disruption. In response to 
     broader, more effective export controls, these countries have 
     been tying to reduce their dependence on imports by 
     developing an indigenous production capability. Many Third 
     World countries--with Iran being the most prominent example--
     are responding to Western counterproliferation efforts by 
     relying more on legitimate commercial firms as procurement 
     fronts and by developing more convoluted procurement 
     networks. Should countries such as Iran ever become self-
     sufficient producers and exporters of WMD-related goods and 
     conventional weapons, however, opportunities to prevent 
     acquisition will be dramatically limited.
                                                                    ____


            [From the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, July 6, 1997]

                  China's Dangerous Computer Diversion

       The Chinese have done it again--diverted machinery 
     supposedly purchased for commercial purposes to military 
     uses. Predictably, China denies all, but the U.S. State and 
     Commerce departments say they have proof that China diverted 
     a supercomputer that can be used to upgrade military 
     hardware. The Clinton administration is rightly calling 
     attention to the problem, but may have been lax in allowing 
     it to happen in the first place.
       Supercomputers can process so much data so quickly that any 
     nation possessing one can significantly upgrade its weapons. 
     That's why sales of supercomputers for military purposes 
     require a license. But under a Clinton edict adopted in 1995, 
     sales of supercomputers for commercial purposes don't. That 
     appears to have been a mistake.
       U.S. officials have discovered that a supercomputer 
     manufactured by Sun Microsystems was sold to a Hong Kong 
     company, then purchased by the Chinese government. It was 
     supposed to be sent to a science institute in Beijing, but 
     ended up instead in Changsha where it is being used for 
     military applications, the U.S. says.
       China denies it, as it also rejects State Department 
     charges that it has been selling nuclear and ballistic 
     missile technology to Pakistan and Iran. These wouldn't be 
     China's first untruths; last year, China diverted a huge 
     metal stamping machine sold by McDonnell Douglas for 
     commercial airline manufacture to military use.
       All supercomputers are capable of so-called dual use, that 
     is, of being employed for both peaceful and military 
     purposes, so they must be carefully monitored. Though the 
     United States has been fairly successful in that effort with 
     its sales to Russia, China has been largely uncooperative. 
     Congress is so concerned that the House has passed a bill 
     reinstating the requirement that all supercomputers sold 
     abroad for any purpose be licensed--and their use be tracked.
       In 1995, the administration deregulated the sale of 
     supercomputers for peaceful purposes on the ground that if 
     America doesn't sell its machines, the Europeans or the 
     Japanese would sell theirs. But the importance of slowing the 
     spread of higher grade nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles 
     requires the U.S. to prevent the sale of supercomputers which 
     defeat that purpose, never mind helping the computer industry 
     compete abroad. Only strict licensing is safe, and our 
     competitors should be pressured to follow that policy. The 
     administration shouldn't wait for Congress, but require it 
     now.

  Mr. LEVIN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.

[[Page S6900]]

  Mr. LEVIN. Madam President, I would like to make a parliamentary 
inquiry.
  Would the Cochran amendment be germane in a postcloture situation if 
cloture were approved tomorrow?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. At this time the amendment does not appear to 
be germane in a postcloture situation, but the sponsor of the amendment 
has not had the opportunity to make his case for germaneness, and the 
Chair would rule on germaneness only after cloture had been invoked and 
after the sponsor had an opportunity to make his arguments for the 
amendment being germane.
  Mr. LEVIN. I appreciate the Chair's care.
  Mr. COCHRAN. If the Senator will yield in response to that response 
by the Chair.
  Mr. LEVIN. I am happy to yield.
  Mr. COCHRAN. Would there be any way to modify the amendment to make 
it germane in a postcloture situation?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Once cloture is invoked, it would take 
unanimous consent to modify the amendment.
  Mr. COCHRAN. I thank the Chair.
  Mr. LEVIN. The reason I raise this, Madam President, is this is an 
example of where we are prematurely faced with a cloture vote. I say 
premature, because we have not had an opportunity to vote on key 
amendments and will not have an opportunity to vote on key amendments, 
including the Cochran amendment, before cloture. Because under the 
unanimous-consent agreement that we are operating under, cloture is 
going to be voted on first. That is the first vote tomorrow.
  It strikes me as being unfair to amendments and to those sponsors of 
amendments who have put in a serious effort on major security issues.
  I do not know how I am going to vote on the Cochran amendment. I am 
studying the amendment. It raises a very significant issue relative to 
American security. But it is not technically germane because of our 
postcloture rules. It surely is relevant to this bill in any, I think, 
general sense. We are talking about the security of this Nation and we 
are trying to weigh the issue here, the pros and cons of the Cochran 
amendment. Surely, it is a serious national security issue which the 
Senator from Mississippi has raised, the chairman of a subcommittee 
which has had hearings into a very important issue.
  So I urged before that we not invoke cloture tomorrow for a number of 
reasons and stated that there were a number of very significant pending 
amendments that would be or might be ruled nongermane after cloture, 
and I failed to list this amendment as an example of that type of 
amendment that could very well fall although I think by any reasonable 
definition of national security this surely is relevant to that issue.
  So I commend my good friend from Mississippi for raising this issue.
  Again, it is an issue that I am going to be giving some real study to 
this evening. It is a very thoughtful amendment. It is a carefully 
drawn amendment. It is based on a current classification. And I want to 
commend him on it and hope that he will be able to at least have a vote 
on his amendment. That very well will be impossible if cloture were 
invoked tomorrow.
  Madam President, I want to ask another parliamentary inquiry because 
there is a second-degree amendment which is also pending, a second-
degree amendment to the Cochran amendment. I ask the Chair the 
following question.
  Would the question put relative to the Grams amendment receive the 
same response from the Chair as my question relative to the Cochran 
amendment?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. After conferring with the Parliamentarian, the 
Chair would give the same response to the question with regard to the 
Grams amendment.
  Mr. LEVIN. I thank the Chair.
  Mr. THURMOND. I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. THURMOND. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. THURMOND. Madam President, I am just notifying Senators that if 
they have any amendments, come over and we'll take them up. This is the 
time and this is the place. We are just killing time here, wasting 
time, wasting the Government's time, wasting our time waiting on people 
to come in and offer amendments. I want to say to my colleagues, if you 
have an amendment, come on over here and let's take it up and get 
action on it. I am here waiting to cooperate. Thank you very much.
  I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. SPECTER. I thank the distinguished chairman of the Armed Services 
Committee for asking the quorum call be rescinded and I thank the Chair 
for waiting. I knew today we would be discussing the Department of 
Defense authorization bill. As soon as I completed work on our hearings 
for tomorrow, the Government Operations Committee, I notified the floor 
that I would be coming over and I thank the Chair for waiting and I 
thank the distinguished chairman for waiting.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Pennsylvania.
  Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I have sought recognition to discuss an 
amendment which has been circulated with both the majority and 
minority, which refers to establishing procedures for a report not 
later than 90 days after the enactment of the defense authorization 
bill, for the Secretary of Defense to submit to the congressional 
defense committees a report containing the following: No. 1, an 
assessment of the current policies and practices of the Department of 
Defense with respect to the protection of members of the Armed Forces 
against terrorist attack abroad, including any modifications of such 
policies or practices that are proposed or implemented as a result of 
the assessment; and, second, an assessment of the procedures of the 
military departments intended to determine accountability, if any, in 
the command structure in instances in which a terrorist attack results 
in the loss of life at an installation or facility of the Armed Forces 
abroad.
  This report is being sought because of what happened on June 25, 
1996, when a bomb detonated not more than 80 feet from the Air Force 
housing complex known as Khobar Towers in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, 
killing 19 members of the Air Force and injuring hundreds more, as many 
as 400 more.
  This incident came under very intensive scrutiny by the Intelligence 
Committee, which I chaired last year. I have very serious reservations 
as to the adequacy of the Department of Defense response to the kind of 
threat which was posed by having those living quarters within 80 feet 
of a fence.
  The Department of Defense had a report on June 13, 1996 from the 
Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, highlighting 
security concerns in the region in which Dhahran was located. 
Previously, in January 1996, the Office of Special Investigations of 
the Air Force issued a vulnerability assessment for the complex, and 
that assessment highlighted the vulnerability of perimeter security at 
the complex, given the proximity of the complex to a boundary fence and 
the lack of the protective coating mylar on its windows. And then, just 
8 days before the terrorist attack, the Department of Defense received 
an intelligence report detailing a high level of risk to the complex. 
That report went to the highest levels of the Department of Defense and 
had the picture of Khobar Towers on it.
  Immediately after the incident occurred, the Secretary of Defense, 
William J. Perry, said that it was very unusual to have a bomb of the 
magnitude of 3,000 to 5,000 pounds used in the Mideast. I took issue 
with that statement on a factual basis that on October 23, 1983, 
according to the results of the Long Commission, a bomb weighing 12,000 
pounds had killed 283 marines in Beirut, in the Mideast. That is the 
same region where, regrettably, terrorist attacks have become all too 
commonplace. So it struck me as strange that the Secretary of Defense 
would say that a bomb weighing 3,000 to 5,000

[[Page S6901]]

pounds was unusual in the Mideast, when there had been a bomb of 12,000 
pounds, as I say, in 1983, detonated, giving tremendous warning for 
just this kind of attack; and that, in fact, a reading of the Long 
Commission report, for anybody who had read it, would have demonstrated 
the kind of threat which was posed by a high-powered bomb detonated 
near a fence in that area.
  I personally saw that fence in August 1996 when I visited Khobar 
Towers in Dhahran as part of my effort and the Intelligence Committee's 
efforts to try to find out exactly what had happened there. We had 
testimony from General Peay, who was the four-star commander in the 
area, who testified before a Senate committee in early July. Asked 
about the closeness of the perimeter fence to those living quarters, 
``Was it too close?'' he said words to the effect of, ``I don't know. I 
just don't know.''

  Certainly after the fact it is hard to understand how a ranking 
general would not know that that fence was too close to the living 
quarters and, realistically, before the fact, it seems hard to 
understand how the commanding general would not know about the 
extraordinary and unwarranted danger which was faced by the airmen who 
were living in those quarters.
  The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Shalikashvili, had 
visited Dhahran in the spring of 1996 and was within sight of Khobar 
Towers, although, as I understand it, he did not actually visit Khobar. 
But a question to be raised and a question to be answered, which has 
not yet been answered by the Department of Defense, is why the Chairman 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff when in the area, within sight of Khobar 
Towers, knowing what the security risks were, did not take a look at 
that facility and make an assessment as to the vulnerability, since he 
was on the spot. That is especially true in light of the fact that 
there had been an attack in Riyahd, Saudi Arabia, in November 1995, 
killing a number of Americans, and that four Saudis had been executed 
by the Saudi Government in late May 1996, which would give rise to a 
concern as to what the militants in Saudi Arabia would do next. That 
was especially troublesome to the United States from a number of points 
of view, one of which was that the FBI, charged with investigating 
those matters overseas, had not been given access to those terrorists 
before they were executed.
  So, here you have the general on the spot, a brigadier general, with 
the fence 80 feet from the towers, you have the four-star general in 
command of the overall area even after the fact, not knowing whether 
there was an unacceptable risk, and you have the Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff in the vicinity, within sight of Khobar Towers, and no 
corrective action taken notwithstanding all of these warnings which had 
been given in a number of contexts about the danger which was present 
there.
  Following the attack on Khobar Towers, a commission was formed with 
General Downing, a retired four-star general, in command. When he 
testified before the Intelligence Committee on September 19, 1996, 
among other questions I asked him about a series of criteria 
established by the Secretary of Defense, Secretary William J. Perry, 
about what the responsibility was of the Secretary of Defense.
  General Downing testified that even under Secretary Perry's two 
standards they were not met. The first two standards articulated by 
Secretary Perry were ``establishing the policies and guidance for our 
commanders, including the policy and guidance for force protection.''
  I asked General Downing:

       . . . Was there an adequate policy and guidance on force 
     protection?

  General Downing's response:

       No, there was not, Senator.

  Then I asked about Secretary Perry's second criterion, organizing and 
structuring the Department of Defense in such a way that force 
protection is optimal. Then the question was:

       So did they meet the second criterion which stated 
     ``organizing and structuring the Department of Defense in 
     such a way that force protection is optimal?''

  General Downing:

       The answer is no.

  I ask unanimous consent, Mr. President, that at the conclusion of my 
remarks this extract from the hearings before the Intelligence 
Committee be printed in the Record.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  (See exhibit 1.)
  Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, in sequence, the committee then learned 
that there had been a report on the force protection issue, ``Force 
Protection in Southwest Asia, An Air Force Perspective,'' dated 
September 17. Our committee learned about this as a result of a report 
in the press, the Washington Post specifically, on October 10, 1996. So 
by letter dated October 17, 1996, Senator Robert Kerrey, vice chairman 
of the Intelligence Committee, and I, in my capacity as chairman, wrote 
to Secretary of the Air Force, Sheila Widnall, asking for a copy of 
that report.
  I ask unanimous consent that the letter dated October 17, 1996, be 
printed in the Record at the conclusion of my remarks.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  (See exhibit 2.)
  Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, the next sequence of events was a letter 
which I sent to Secretary Perry, with a copy to Air Force Secretary 
Widnall, dated November 5, 1996, which reads as follows:

       This letter constitutes a formal complaint on the 
     obstruction by you, others and the Department of Defense on 
     the inquiry by the Intelligence Committee to determine 
     whether there was an intelligence failure relating to the 
     terrorist attack in Dhahran on June 25, 1996 on the 
     following:
       1. Prohibiting key witnesses from being interviewed by this 
     Committee (Brigadier General Terryl Schwalier, Colonel Gary 
     Boyle, Lt. Colonel James Traister).

  Notwithstanding our efforts to interview these key personnel, the 
Department of Defense precluded the Intelligence Committee from 
conducting those interviews.
  Second, in my letter to Secretary Perry, I pointed out the concerns 
we had on prohibiting General Downing from testifying before the 
Intelligence Committee except on the terms set forth by the Secretary 
of Defense with that questioning only being in closed session. With our 
interest in having an open session, with General Downing having told 
the Intelligence Committee that he was employed by the Department of 
Defense and had to comply with instructions not to testify in open 
session, the impact of that was obvious. When General Downing testified 
in closed session that Secretary Perry had not even followed the 
Secretary's own criteria for force protection, it was not much of an 
impact contrasted to what it would have been had it been in open 
session.
  The third item:

       Refusing to give this committee access to an Air Force 
     report which, as reported in the Washington Post on October 
     10.

  Then, finally, on November 6, after this letter was faxed on November 
5, we received a response from General Trapp dated November 6, 1996, 
which I ask unanimous consent be printed in the Record at the 
conclusion of my remarks.

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  (See exhibit 3.)
  Mr. SPECTER. Then there is my reply dated December 5 stating that 
that reply was insufficient, and referring to other letters. I ask 
unanimous consent that my letter of December 5 be printed in the Record 
at the conclusion of my remarks.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  (See exhibit 4.)
  Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I then note an article in the New York 
Times dated December 12, 1996, which discussed release of another 
report which apparently had been leaked to the New York Times for 
reasons set forth in the New York Times article, which said:

       Officials sympathetic to the Air Force position made 
     available Wednesday selected parts of a classified review the 
     Air Force conducted into the bombing. The review, written by 
     Lt. Gen. James F. Record, commander of the 12th Air Force, 
     cites, for example, the assessment of a senior U.S. 
     intelligence official in Riyadh, the Saudi capital, that the 
     intelligence reports given to General Schwalier ``did not 
     give a target'' for the terrorist attack.

  So, by this time, some of the Air Force were dissatisfied with 
General Downing's report and wanted a report

[[Page S6902]]

which would satisfy them. So another report had been commissioned, this 
time to be written by Lt. Gen. James F. Record.
  On seeing that additional news leak of the report, which the 
Intelligence Committee did not have a copy of, Mr. President, I then 
wrote to Secretary Widnall on the same day, December 12, noting the 
access by the New York Times but no access by the Senate Intelligence 
Committee.
  Again, I ask unanimous consent that the New York Times article of 
December 12, and my letter to Secretary Widnall dated December 12 be 
printed in the Record at the conclusion of my remarks.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  (See exhibits 5 and 6.)
  Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, in the next series of events, I note a 
story in the New York Times which, again, makes reference to these 
reports which the Intelligence Committee never had access to, quoting 
``Gen. Ronald Fogleman, the Air Force Chief of Staff, arguing that the 
case for accountability is nothing more than a Washington scalp hunt.''
  I then wrote, again, to Secretary of the Air Force, Sheila Widnall, 
on April 25, 1997, noting the comments by General Fogleman and again 
asking that these reports be made available to the Senate, to me, and 
to the Senate Intelligence Committee.
  I again ask unanimous consent that at the conclusion of my remarks 
copies of the New York Times article dated April 15, 1997, together 
with my letter dated April 25, 1997, be printed in the Record.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  (See exhibits 7 and 8.)
  Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, all of these letters to Secretary of the 
Air Force went unanswered. Then, on May 21 of this year, the Air Force 
had the responsibility of coming to the Defense Appropriations 
Subcommittee. I had an opportunity, finally, to ask Secretary Widnall 
these questions and why there had not been any response to any of these 
letters of inquiry and the question of General Fogleman on this 
subject.
  Finally, subsequent to that meeting, I received a very brief letter 
from Secretary Widnall, in fact, after I had bumped into her in the 
hallway on the 7th floor of the Hart Building and said to her, ``Madam 
Secretary, why don't you at least respond to the letters saying that 
you can't respond if that is your point because there is an inquiry 
underway?''
  In the context of all the letters which had been written and that 
conversation, I finally received a letter saying she could not respond, 
the matter was being reviewed now by the new Secretary of Defense, and 
that, in due course, a copy of the report would be obtained by 
Senators.

  Here we are on July 7, 1997 and still no copy of the report has been 
made available to this Senator or, to the best of my knowledge, to 
other Senators, but copies of the report were made available to the 
news media as it suits the purposes of the Department of the Air Force 
and the Department of Defense.
  Mr. President, in offering this amendment, it is my hope we will have 
a statement of law requiring a report so we know what action is being 
considered in the future to protect personnel of the Department of 
Defense from terrorist attacks. News reports of the past week, an 
article in the Washington Post a week ago yesterday, reported the 
Secretary of Defense expected to make a finding sometime during the 
month of July. It is my hope that when the Secretary of Defense speaks 
on the subject, that he will go beyond the conduct of General 
Schwalier, which was criticized in the early report, and will pick up 
the issues of the conduct of the Department of Defense generally.
  Brigadier General Schwalier's conduct was criticized in the Downing 
report, but, to my way of thinking, that is not nearly enough of an 
answer as to the conduct beyond Brigadier General Schwalier, moving to 
a four-star general, moving to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, General Shalikashvili, and moving to the Secretary of Defense 
himself, William J. Perry.
  In this context, it is my judgment that the record shows forcefully 
and conclusively that there were warnings all along the line; that when 
you have a fence 80 feet from living quarters of hundreds of Air Force 
personnel within easy distance of a large bomb, a bomb, according to 
defense estimates, the Secretary of Defense, of 3,000 to 5,000 pounds, 
substantially smaller than the experience of the 12,000-pound bomb in 
Beirut in 1983, that there was forceful, obvious, and conclusive 
neglect of duty. It goes beyond the brigadier general on the scene. It 
goes to the commanding four star general, it goes to the Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff and it goes to the Secretary of Defense.
  If we are to have confidence in what the Secretary of Defense does in 
putting young men and women in harm's way, then there has to be 
accountability for the 19 airmen who died on June 25 in Khobar Towers 
and for the 400 who were wounded. That, Mr. President, is what I hope 
will come from the findings of the Secretary of Defense.
  In the meantime, this requirement for a report will be some help to 
the future. But if we permit on this record those responsible, those in 
the chain of command to go by unscathed, unreprimanded, unaccounted 
for, then it is a blank check and open invitation for this kind of 
conduct to be repeated in the future.
  The problems of terrorism are too serious to turn our back on what 
happened at Dhahran on June 25, 1996. I personally consider inexcusable 
that we have had more than a year pass and nothing has been said in an 
official way by the Department of Defense, the Department of the Air 
Force, and all of the components, this is to say nothing about who the 
terrorists are who have escaped punishment, and that is a matter which 
yet has to be reckoned with.
  But within our own Department of Defense, we have a right to expect 
better, and I, for one, am awaiting the report of the Secretary of 
Defense to see what the position of the Department of Defense is. But 
at least as to the future, we will have some indication as to what 
precautionary measures will be taken for the future, but there also has 
to be an answer for the past. I thank the Chair. I yield the floor.

                               Exhibit 1

  Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Closed Hearing: The Downing 
              Report on Khobor Towers, September 19, 1996

       Chairman Specter. I am going to try to finish up in the 
     course of the next few minutes. It's been a long morning for 
     you, I know, gentlemen.
       I want to go to Secretary Perry's testimony on his 
     articulation of the responsibility of the Secretary of 
     Defense, and what I want to try to do is get your insights, 
     your judgment, General Downing, having headed the task force 
     and having done the investigation, having a lot of experience 
     in the military, from 1962 when you graduated from West 
     Point, to 1996, when you had retired, this is what Secretary 
     Perry said as to his responsibility.
       I manifest this responsibility in four important ways. 
     First of all, by establishing the policies and guidance for 
     our commanders, including the policy and guidance for force 
     protection.
       I think I already know your answer from your report, but 
     was there an adequate policy and guidance on force 
     protection?
       General Downing. No, there was not, Senator.
       Chairman Specter. Secondly, by organizing and structuring 
     the Department of Defense in such a way that force protection 
     is optimal. And I would include in that his testimony later 
     where he said, quote, ``But General Downing is correct in 
     saying that we do not have a budgetary focus on force 
     protection, nor do we have a budgetary focus in our resource 
     allocation process, in the institutional process by which we 
     decide how to pass funds out to different programs.'' So did 
     they meet the, quote, ``organizing and structuring the 
     Department of Defense in such a way that force protection is 
     optimal.''
       General Downing. The answer is no. We gave them some 
     recommendations on how to do that better.
       Chairman Specter. And third, and I guess this is included 
     in what I just said, by allocating resources to our 
     commanders, including resources for force protection.
       General Downing. Sir, we--that was one where we did not 
     find--we found that--there was not a good structure for it, 
     but that they had not been denied funds for force protection. 
     The field had not been denied funds for force protection.
       Chairman Specter. And finally, by carefully selecting and 
     supervising the military and civilian leadership in the 
     Department of Defense--and I asked you if that was meant, 
     first as to the Secretary, and then as to the Joint Chiefs of 
     Staff, who have these reports up from General Peay's unit as 
     to delegation of authority and guidance, etc. Was that 
     criterion met?
       General Downing. Senator, I believe that the Secretary met 
     that and that the inherent responsibility of commanders for 
     force

[[Page S6903]]

     protection is something I don't believe the Secretary of 
     Defense has to tell a commander he needs to do.
       Chairman Specter. How about as to the Joint Chiefs of 
     Staff?
       General Downing. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, we felt and we 
     recommended that they change those command relationships.

                               Exhibit 2

                                                      U.S. Senate,


                             Select Committee on Intelligence,

                                 Washington, DC, October 17, 1996.
     Hon. Sheila E. Widnall,
     Secretary of the Air Force,
     The Pentagon, Washington, DC.
       Dear Secretary Widnall: As you know, the Committee is 
     reviewing the adequacy of intelligence support and its use by 
     consumers in the context of the recent terrorism incidents 
     affecting your forces in Saudi Arabia. Recently it came to 
     our attention that the Air Force completed a report entitled 
     ``Force Protection in Southwest Asia, An Air Force 
     Perspective,'' dated 17 September 1996. This report was 
     quoted in Washington Post article appearing October 10, 1996.
       Since we have been unable to obtain a copy of the report 
     through your legislative liaison office, we are forwarding 
     our request for a copy of this report directly to you and ask 
     for your assistance. Given the widespread coverage of the 
     report in the media and its importance to our ongoing 
     oversight responsibilities, there can be little justification 
     for not promptly providing a copy to the Committee.
           Sincerely,
     Arlen Specter,
       Chairman.
     J. Robert Kerrey,
       Vice Chairman.

                               Exhibit 3


                                  Department of the Air Force,

                                 Washington, DC, November 6, 1996.
     Hon. Arlen Specter,
     Chairman, Select Committee on Intelligence,
     U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Chairman: This is in response to your joint letter 
     of October 17, 1996, regarding what you describe as a 
     document concerning force protection in Southwest Asia that 
     was referred to in a Washington Post article on October 10, 
     1996.
       Contrary to the implications in the article, the Air Force 
     has not issued a report entitled ``Force Protection in 
     Southwest Asia, An Air Force Perspective.'' Rather, a 
     preliminary briefing was prepared by the Office of the Deputy 
     Chief of Staff, Plans and Operations, for internal use on the 
     consideration and evaluation of the protection of our forces 
     against terrorism following the bombing of Khobar Towers in 
     Saudi Arabia. That preliminary briefing has now been given to 
     Lieutenant General Record for his use in reviewing this 
     matter and considering issues of accountability. When 
     Lieutenant General Record's process is complete, we will be 
     glad to provide the Committee with the results of his review 
     and related official documents.
       A similar letter is being provided to Vice Chairman Kerrey 
     who joined you in your letter.
           Sincerely,
                                           Lansford E. Trapp, Jr.,
                                    Director, Legislative Liaison.

                               Exhibit 4

                                                      U.S. Senate,


                             Select Committee on Intelligence,

                                 Washington, DC, December 5, 1996.
     Hon. Sheila E. Widnall,
     Secretary of the Air Force,
     The Pentagon, Washington, DC.
       Dear Secretary Widnall: I want you to know that I consider 
     the letter from Brig. Gen. Lansford E. Trapp, Jr., of 
     November 6, 1996, totally insufficient in response to the 
     letter from Senator Kerrey and me to you dated October 17, 
     1996, and the copy of the letter which I sent to you dated 
     November 5, 1996, with the original going to Secretary Perry.
           Sincerely,


                                                Arlen Specter.

                               Exhibit 5

                [From the New York Times, Dec. 12, 1996]

    Air Force Inquiry Clears General in Saudi Bombing That Killed 19

                           (By Eric Schmitt)

       Washington.--The Air Force has concluded that the general 
     in charge of a military housing complex in Saudi Arabia where 
     19 Americans were killed and 500 wounded in a terrorist 
     truck-bombing last June took reasonable steps to protect 
     against attack and should not be punished in any way.
       The finding contradicts a major conclusion of a separate 
     Pentagon investigation in September that singled out the Air 
     Force officer, Brig. Gen. Terryl Schwalier, for failing to 
     adequately safeguard the Khobar Towers complex in Dhahran, 
     where the blast occurred.
       Senior Pentagon officials, who described the results of the 
     Air Force inquiry Wednesday on condition of anonymity, said 
     the Air Force found the deaths a terrible tragedy, but not 
     the fault of Schwalier.
       The officials said the inquiry concludes that none of the 
     10 officers responsible for the safety of the troops in 
     Dhahran violated any laws, Air Force regulations or codes of 
     conduct.
       Under military law, the Air Force decides who, if anyone, 
     should be held accountable for a disaster like the Dhahran 
     bombing. The punishments range from mild reprimands to court-
     martial proceedings that can lead to prison terms. In this 
     case, the Air Force recommended that no punishment of any 
     kind was warranted.
       Officials said Air Force Secretary Sheila Widnall and Gen. 
     Ronald Fogleman, the Air Force chief of staff, had approved 
     the decision to exonerate the officers. They said that the 
     finding was expected to be announced later this month. 
     Defense Secretary William Perry has the authority to overrule 
     the Air Force decision, but Pentagon officials said that he 
     would be unlikely to do so.
       ``Surely there is a desire to hang somebody for this,'' 
     said a senior Pentagon official who supports the Air Force 
     decision. ``But as you look back over the evidence it's 
     pretty hard without 20-20 hindsight to say, `I'd have done 
     that.' ''
       The truck bomb exploded on Schwalier's last day as 
     commander of the air base and housing complex in Dhahran. He 
     is now in a Pentagon job overseeing Air Force operations and 
     is awaiting a promotion to major general.
       ``It's the wrong call,'' one official involved in the 
     initial Pentagon investigation said of the Air Force's 
     decision to exonerate the general. ``It just bothers me from 
     standpoint of the families. It's not right.''
       The question of responsibility in the bombing has caused 
     deep strains among the armed services.
       While some senior officers have been reprimanded for their 
     roles in recent military disasters, it is rare for a general 
     to face court-martial.
       When two Air Force F-15 fighters flying over northern Iraq 
     mistakenly shot down two U.S. Army helicopters in 1994, 
     killing all 26 people aboard, only a captain serving as a 
     weapons-control officer in an AWACS control place went to 
     trial. He was acquitted.
       Similarly, none of the 16 officers, including two generals, 
     who were disciplined in connection with the crash in April in 
     Croatia that killed Commerce Secretary Ron Brown and 34 
     others, were court-martialed.
       But a Defense Department investigation, headed by a retired 
     Army officer, Gen. Wayne A. Downing, issued a scathing report 
     that said Schwalier ``did not protect his forces from a 
     terrorist attack.''
       The Pentagon report said Schwalier did not heed 
     intelligence reports that Khobar Towers was highly vulnerable 
     to terrorist attack, even though there had already been one 
     deadly terrorist bombing against U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia.
       Among a number of warnings was one eerily prescient. A 
     security officer wrote that the tightened security on the 
     base could lead terrorists to strike with a truck bomb at the 
     base's fence.
       Air Force officials said they weighed the same evidence 
     that Downing's commission examined, but came to very 
     different conclusions about culpability.
       Officials sympathetic to the Air Force position made 
     available Wednesday selected parts of a classified review the 
     Air Force conducted into the bombing. The review, written by 
     Lt. Gen. James F. Record, commander of the 12th Air Force, 
     cites, for example, the assessment of a senior U.S. 
     intelligence official in Riyadh, the Saudi capital, that the 
     intelligence reports given to Schwalier ``did not give a 
     target'' for a terrorist attack.
       In addition, Record's review quotes the U.S. consul general 
     in Dhahran, David Winn, saying, ``No one really thought that 
     anything would happen in Dhahran.''
       Air Force officials also said Schwalier took several steps 
     to protect the housing complex, from increasing the number of 
     guard posts to installing a double row of concrete highway 
     barriers around the fence-line.
       Air Force officials acknowledged that those measures were 
     inadequate. ``There's no disagreement there,'' said the 
     senior Pentagon official who supports the Air Force decision. 
     ``The fact is, 19 people were killed. But then the issue 
     becomes, was there dereliction of duty?''
       Record, who had the power to recommend Schwalier face 
     court-martial, concluded there was no such neglect of duty. 
     Widnall and Fogleman concurred.
       ``People need to understand that accountability is a two-
     edged sword,'' said the senior Pentagon official who supports 
     the Air Force decision. ``If you examine someone's actions 
     and you find them wanting, you hold them accountable. But if 
     you define that as court-martialing everyone, I can't live by 
     your definition.
       ``At the same time, if you believe that person is not 
     culpable,'' the Pentagon official continued, ``then it's 
     every bit your obligation to stand up and defend that person. 
     If you don't do that, you'll erode the fighting spirit of 
     commanders. You'll have people looking over their shoulders. 
     They'll always know they'll be second-guessed by people in 
     Washington.''
       The attack in Saudi Arabia continues to create thorny 
     problems for the Clinton administration. In response to FBI 
     complaints that Saudi officials had been uncooperative in 
     what was to have been a joint inquiry, Riyadh has recently 
     turned over information to support its contention that the 
     bombing plot was heavily supported by Iran.
       The information included videotaped interviews with some of 
     the several dozens suspects arrested after the bombing. But 
     some law enforcement officials expressed skepticism over the 
     interviews, saying they lacked credibility because the 
     confessions may have been obtained under duress.

[[Page S6904]]

       The Air Force signaled months ago it did not believe 
     Schwalier was to blame. In an internal review that paralleled 
     Downing's inquiry, Air Force officials said Schwalier's 
     responsibility extended only to the fenced perimeter of the 
     base.
       Beyond that, the responsibility for security belonged to 
     the Saudis. The truck bomb exploded in a parking lot just 
     outside the base's property.

                               Exhibit 6

                                                      U.S. Senate,


                             Select Committee on Intelligence,

                                Washington, DC, December 12, 1996.
     Hon. Sheila E. Widnall,
     Secretary of the Air Force, The Pentagon, Washington, DC.
       Dear Secretary Widnall: Please reference my letters to you 
     of October 17, November 5, and December 5, 1996.
       According to The New York Times today, selected portions of 
     the Air Force report on Dhahran have already been made 
     available to the news media by representatives of the Air 
     Force who are favorably disposed to the Air Force report.
       I would like your prompt advice as to whether that news 
     report is accurate.
       In any event, this is a formal demand that the report be 
     turned over to the Intelligence Committee forthwith.
           Sincerely,
                                                    Arlen Specter.

                               Exhibit 7

                [From the New York Times, Apr. 15, 1997]

                         Secretary Cohen's Call

       It will be interesting to see if Defense Secretary William 
     Cohen has the moxie to hold the Air Force accountable for 
     security failures in Saudi Arabia last year. So far the 
     Pentagon's handling of the terrorist bombing in Dhahran that 
     killed 19 American airmen and wounded 500 has followed a 
     dismally familiar script. The Air force high command has 
     sloughed off responsibility, betting that top civilians will 
     once again bow to the shopworn argument that punishing 
     individual commanders is unfair and would damage morale.
       Mr. Cohen, who knew how to cut through thicker Pentagon 
     smokescreens as a Senator, can set an admirably exacting 
     standard for his stewardship as Defense Secretary by 
     overturning the Air Force decision. The principle of civilian 
     leadership of the military requires the application of 
     independent judgment in cases like this. Since Air Force 
     Secretary Sheila Widnall seems a willing captive of her 
     service, Mr. Cohen must show that accountability in the 
     American military is not governed by the protective instincts 
     of the officer corps.
       The security breakdown at the Khobar Towers apartment 
     complex in Dhahran last June is beyond dispute. Though 
     safeguards were enforced to prevent a suicide truck bomber 
     from entering the compound, the towers were left exposed to 
     attack from a nearby parking area. When a large truck bomb 
     was detonated there last June, the explosion sheared off the 
     northern facade of two towers.
       The perimeter security fence was barely 35 yards from the 
     buildings. Despite intelligence warnings about a possible 
     terrorist attack, Air Force commanders made only a feeble 
     effort to extend the perimeter. Even the most elementary and 
     inexpensive defense--covering windows with a plastic film to 
     prevent shattering--was not used. Many of the deaths and 
     injuries were caused by flying glass.
       These and other lapses were made plain in a Pentagon 
     investigation conducted by a retired Army general, Wayne 
     Downing. The Downing report concluded that Brig. Gen. Terryl 
     Schwalier, the Air Force commander in Dhahran, ``did not 
     adequately protect his forces from a terrorist attack.'' 
     General Schwalier did not even bother to make security a 
     primary concern on his watch.
       Now comes Gen. Ronald Fogleman, the Air Force Chief of 
     Staff, arguing that the case for accountability is nothing 
     more than a Washington scalp hunt. His view, in essence, is 
     that General Schwalier and his staff did everything they 
     reasonably could to secure the compound and that the method 
     and explosive power of the bombing exceeded any threat that 
     could have been anticipated.
       Yet the destruction of the Alfred Murrah Federal Building 
     in Oklahoma City 14 months before the Dhahran attack showed 
     the power of a large truck bomb placed near but not inside a 
     high-rise building. It was lesson enough for the Secret 
     Service, which quickly closed a stretch of Pennsylvania 
     Avenue to expand the security perimeter around the White 
     House.
       General Fogleman mistakes his own blind loyalty for 
     leadership. Morale is not served by dodging responsibility 
     and circling the wagons around a fellow officer. Perhaps 
     honor and duty are just quaint notions these days, but Mr. 
     Cohen might actually do wonders for the morale of Americans 
     in uniform if he rules that the Air Force cannot escape 
     responsibility for its failures in Dhahran.

                               Exhibit 8

                                                      U.S. Senate,


                               Committee on Veterans' Affairs,

                                   Washington, DC, April 25, 1997.
     Hon. Sheila Widnall,
     Secretary, Department of the Air Force, Washington, DC.
       Dear Secretary Widnall: I have noted repeated press 
     accounts on an Air Force report on the responsibility, if 
     any, for the terrorist attack at Dhahran on June 25, 1996.
       As you know, I have made repeated requests for copies of 
     all DoD, including Air Force, reports on this incident.
       According to press reports, Secretary of Defense William 
     Cohen is personally reviewing this matter.
       I would very much appreciate it if you would promptly 
     provide to me a copy of any report on assessing 
     responsibility for the Dhahran terrorist attack of June 25, 
     1996.
           Sincerely,
                                                    Arlen Specter.

  Mr. SPECTER. I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. ROBB. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. ROBB. Mr. President, I would like to take just a few minutes to 
discuss an amendment I am offering to this year's DOD authorization 
bill that will make a real difference in the lives of all members of 
the naval service--and eventually all members of our Armed Forces. It 
will eliminate many long lines and hours of frustration, it will 
substantially reduce recordkeeping errors and it will save the DOD and 
the taxpayers hundreds of millions of dollars. And it represents the 
next phase of the effective utilization of smart card technology--a 
technology I have been encouraging and working on for many years.
  Mr. President, when a new recruit joins the service today, he or she 
faces a long and tedious registration process. A typical new recruit 
faces hours of waiting in line to fill out forms with his or her name, 
date of birth, rank, military I.D. number, and so forth, only to be 
sent over to another line to fill out another form with much of the 
same information again. Not only is this process aggravating for our 
new recruits--it is a waste of the Armed Service's time and personnel. 
It takes dozens of people countless hours to process in each new 
recruit through this inefficient system, costing the service valuable 
time and money, that it could be putting to better use elsewhere.
  Once registered, a new recruit is issued a handful of ID's and cards 
to carry. A typical service member today might be required to carry a 
general ID card, an immunization card, a meal card, an equipment card, 
a weapons card, a military driver's license, a vehicle registration, a 
card to pick up mail, a card to carry if staying as a guest at another 
base, and if lucky enough to be stationed near some good fishing, a 
fishing permit. With so much clutter, it is not uncommon for a service 
member to misplace one of their cards, which wastes even more of the 
military's time and resources replacing them.
  For years, I have been looking at ways that the military could 
streamline the methods it uses for its registration and recordkeeping, 
looking for a way to improve what I saw as an outdated and inefficient 
system of issuing multiple cards containing duplicate information.
  The Government and the private sector have been using cards for years 
as a means of information storage. Many of the earliest cards had just 
a name and number much like the Social Security card that is still in 
use today. As the need for increased security and efficiency in the 
transfer of information from a card grew however, we saw the 
introduction of cards that relied on new information storage systems 
like bar codes and magnetic stripes, much like the kind found on 
today's credit cards, ATM cards, telephone calling cards, and in dozens 
of other card-based applications. And as the technological capabilities 
of cards have increased, so has the number of cards that each of us 
carries every time we leave our residence.
  Mr. President, we now stand on the brink of a new explosion in card 
technology, one that promises to offer us even greater convenience and 
efficiency in everyday life, saving money and time while increasing our 
control over the information we provide to others. After years of 
research and development, I am pleased to report that a new user-
friendly card technology will soon allow us to replace the handful of 
cards now used in the DOD with a single, multiapplication ``smart'' 
card.
  Mr. President, with the amendment that I am offering today, next 
year,

[[Page S6905]]

under a pilot program that I have been working closely with the 
Department of Defense and the Department of the Navy to develop, a new 
recruit will not face the long and wasteful lines, the duplication of 
information or the cumbersome bundles of cards that many of us 
remember. Instead, upon arriving at boot camp, each new sailor and 
marine will be issued a single card: the MARC card. Short for 
Multitechnology Automated Reader Card this card will be used across the 
entire Navy and Marine Corps next year, and if it works as well as some 
of us believe it will, we will then extend it to all of the Armed 
Forces.
  The MARC card is a remarkable achievement. The MARC card can carry 
your security clearance. The MARC card can carry your meal information. 
The MARC card can hold your immunization records. The MARC card can 
serve as your room key.
  Mr. President, the long-term savings that will result from this 
program will be substantial; the improvements in the increased speed 
and quality of services will be enormous. With the MARC card, we can 
reduce support infrastructure, thereby improving our tooth-to-tail 
ratio while making our sailors' and marines' lives easier.
  The MARC card is one of the first widespread applications of the most 
exciting new card technology on the market today: the smart card. Smart 
cards, like the MARC card, rely on an integrated circuit chip--a 
microchip--to store more information and data than was ever before 
possible on a single card. Within each card is a small microprocessor 
along with a sizable memory capacity, which gives each smart card the 
capabilities of a small microcomputer.
  The capabilities of the smart card are so great that a single card 
can perform all of the functions that this entire stack of cards that I 
am holding up right here used to perform of still perform today, for 
that matter, and will perform dozens of new time-saving applications as 
well. Unlike older cards, the smart card is easily updatable, and has 
the capability to constantly take on new information.
  Yet the real strength of smart cards, like the MARC card lies not in 
the convenience of carrying so much information on a single card, but 
in the money that we can save as a result. By harnessing the strength 
and memory of a small computer inside of a portable plastic card, a 
multitude of new applications can be offered that will increase the 
efficiency of Government, cutting down expensive and unnecessary 
administrative costs while reducing waste, fraud, and abuse at all 
levels of government.
  Mr. President, I have seen this card in action, and the savings and 
increased efficiency it can offer the members of our Armed Forces are 
really impressive.
  In the past, when our sailors would dock at a naval base upon their 
return from sea they faced a long and tedious process of waiting in 
line after line to check in to their shore station. Often taking up to 
a week a sailor would need to fill out countless forms to register for 
quarters, for medical treatment, for security clearance, for his next 
assignment, for the mess hall et cetera.
  But today at the Smart Base in Pascagoula, MS, the first naval base 
to automate its operations using the MARC card, a sailor who arrives 
off of the U.S.S. Yorktown faces a check-in time of just a few 
minutes. By simply walking up to a kiosk, he can insert his MARC card 
into a reader not unlike an automatic teller machine, and within 
seconds be assigned his quarters and other necessary information, while 
personal data needed by the command is simultaneously zipped 
electronically around the rest of the base. His MARC card even serves 
as his room key.

  Not only does this process save sailors a lot of wasted time, but it 
reduces the number of administrative staff needed to check in an entire 
ship. To process every sailor from an arriving ship, a base need only 
have a handful of staff on hand and a few kiosks that interact with the 
MARC card.
  Mr. President, the MARC card can improve the efficiency of every 
operation across the military. Let me give you an example. Today, when 
a sailor or marine heads to a mess hall to eat, he has to show his ID 
card, as well as his meal card to one of the duty personnel, who 
tediously records the information from both cards by hand into a 
ledger. After each meal another officer must spend hours reconciling 
who ate what on that particular day, at a great expense both in the 
time involved and the money it costs. On average, it takes a mess hall 
4 to 6 hours a day to account for all the meals that are eaten.
  With the MARC card, however, sailors and marines will simply swipe 
their cards through a reader as they enter the mess hall and be 
automatically accounted for by a computer. Anyone who tries to sneak an 
extra meal without paying is caught in the act, which helps the Navy 
reduce fraud. After each meal, the officer in charge of the mess hall 
will only need to call up a file on their computer to account for the 
meals served. The total time involved is reduced from several hours to 
just a few minutes.
  Not only will this project save the Navy time and money--the food 
service savings alone will save over $2 million in the first year, a 
savings of 49 percent--it will also allow our Armed Forces to allocate 
more resources to the duties they most need to focus on. From security 
access to dining hall access, from checking out weapons to checking out 
library books, the MARC card can save the Armed Forces thousands of 
hours a year in wasted administrative costs.
  The $36 million I am asking for in this amendment does not authorize 
any new spending--it only redirects the use of $36 million within the 
Navy and Marines O account that has already been authorized by the 
committee. Because the MARC card program has been so effective in 
reducing the costs of general administration in the military, our 
investment of $36 million in an expansion of the MARC program will save 
the Navy and Marines O account many millions more in fiscal year 1998 
and beyond.
  By investing $36 million, in the MARC program, the Navy's project 
manager, estimates that the savings to O from using the three MARC 
applications, already in place across the Navy and Marines will top 
$134 million in FY 98.
  Now that's just the savings from using the MARC card in three 
applications--Food Service, Security Access, and Clearance 
Verification.
  As other applications are deployed, the savings may top $200 million 
in just FY 98, and well over $500 million over the next 5 years.
  Mr. President, with the budget situation, that we face today we are 
compelled to look to all areas of the government to eliminate needless 
administrative services and streamline the many duties that our 
government performs.
  In this era of reinventing government, smart card technology has 
potential applications not just in the military but all across the 
government.
  By eliminating long waits in lines at government agencies, by 
eliminating the manual entry of data all across government agencies, by 
doing away with duplication of data across the government by 
eliminating fraud, smart cards can slash the administrative costs of 
government while improving the quality and speed with which many 
government services are delivered.
  Mr. President, the technology is here, in our hands, and the savings 
to be had are real, immediate, and substantial. I firmly believe that 
we should move forward with applying smart card technology, not only in 
the military, but all across the government.
  Mr. President, I realize that smart cards are still a new technology 
right now, and that they're unfamiliar to many potential users.
  I am aware that some people are uncomfortable with the idea of having 
a single card for everything they need.
  Placing so much information on a single card raises more than a few 
eyebrows over privacy and security concerns.
  And I know that a lot of people are concerned that by placing so much 
personal information on a single card an employer might have access to 
medical records, or a librarian might be able to find out what you ate 
for lunch that day.
  Let me say that I share these concerns.
  But in fact, Mr. President, while all this information may be carried 
on a

[[Page S6906]]

single card, powerful encryption technology ensures that personal 
information is seen only by those who the individual wants to see it.
  The technology available today allows us to select what information 
is carried on our smart card and guarantees that we are the only ones 
who can grant access to that information.
  Even though we can store our financial and medical records on the 
same smart card the card's microchip is divided into separate 
compartments that make it impossible for our bank to see our medical 
records and our doctor to see our last bank deposit.
  And if we should lose our card, anybody who finds it will discover 
that it's useless to them.
  Because without the proper authorization code that only the 
individual knows--and with more sensitive applications, without 
biometric authentication like hand geometry scanners--the card won't 
work in the hands of anybody but its owner.
  Just as our ATM card is useless to a thief without the proper PIN 
number, a thief will find that, without authentication by its owner, a 
stolen smart card is a worthless piece of plastic.
  In an era where our personal information is becoming increasingly 
easier for others to access, where our very personal and private 
activities can be electronically tracked, smart cards are a way to 
return control over this information where it belongs: in the hands of 
the individual.
  And with modern-day encryption and other security measures built into 
the chip on a smart card, the information on this card is more secure 
from theft or fraud than any credit card or ATM card in use today.
  Mr. President, there is no doubt of the need for increased 
efficiency, security, and portability of information across all sectors 
of our Government.
  We have the technology, literally, in our hands to make it happen.
  Already, several other Government agencies have begun to implement 
this technology in a variety of applications across Government.
  Today, for example, smart cards are used as identification and 
security badges in Government buildings.
  In States like Wyoming, pilot programs are underway to use smart 
cards to electronically disburse WIC and food stamp benefits.
  In several western States, a smart card called the health passport is 
being used to increase the portability and accessibility of an 
individual's medical records while safeguarding their confidentiality.
  At colleges like the University of Michigan, a single smart card can 
call up a student's financial aid records, buy her books, and open the 
door of her dorm.
  On our subways, and our military bases, in our hospitals, and our 
schools, across the public and private sector, smart cards can cut down 
the time we spend on burdensome administrative work and save us 
valuable time and resources.
  But the reason I'm so enthusiastic about this new technology, Mr. 
President, is not just because smart cards can eliminate waste.
  I'm not here speaking today simply because smart cards can save us 
time and money.
  I'm strongly supportive of this new technology because smart cards 
can make our lives better and easier.
  Whether it's reducing the time we wait in line at a government office 
or providing a doctor the information needed to save a life smart cards 
can make our entire infrastructure more user-friendly and efficient; 
smart cards make technology work better for us.
  I am confident that pilot smart card programs, like the MARC program, 
will demonstrate the effectiveness of smart cards and the need for this 
technology across government, and will lead to increased use of this 
technology in our future.
  That's why I'm so excited about it, and that's why I'm so pleased the 
managers seem willing to include this provision in their manager's 
amendment.
  With that, Mr. President, I thank the chair, and I yield the floor.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I just want to commend the Senator from 
Virginia on his amendment. It is a very thoughtful amendment, the 
product of months, and, indeed, years of work by Senator Robb. I hope 
that in the next day or two we will be able to work with the majority 
to see this amendment is adopted.
  I want to commend the Senator on his constant attack on waste and his 
constant effort to achieve efficiency, not just in the military, but 
all branches of Government.
  Mr. ROBB. I thank the distinguished Senator from Michigan. I did not 
display my own MARC card here, but it is my hope that in the not-too-
distant future not only will all members of the Armed Services, but all 
members who interact or interface with our Federal Government will have 
one of these and be able to use them in the same efficient way that the 
MARC card is being used today, and is being used in this particular 
experiment.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. THURMOND. I want to say to the able Senator from Virginia, 
Senator Robb, that you made a very interesting discourse here. What the 
Senator is recommending appears to deserve serious consideration. That 
consideration, I am sure, will be given by the committee.
  Mr. ROBB. I thank the distinguished chairman of the committee and the 
senior Senator from South Carolina.

                          ____________________