Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Meehan), a distinguished member of the Committee on the Judiciary.; Congressional Record Vol. 144, No. 155
(House of Representatives - December 19, 1998)

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                              {time}  1030

  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
Massachusetts (Mr. Meehan), a distinguished member of the Committee on 
the Judiciary.
  Mr. MEEHAN. Mr. Speaker, my God, what kind of country are we 
becoming? What kind of institution are we becoming? This process of 
impeaching the President of the United States has been partisan right 
from the start. An Independent Counsel spends 4\1/2\ years 
investigating a President and sends a one-sided report to the Committee 
on the Judiciary, and the Republican members of that committee put 
their stamp of approval on it in very, very partisan hearings and send 
it to this body.
  One party should not have the power to impeach a President of the 
other party. It's wrong. How can they do it? Both parties have to 
participate if we are going to impeach a President of this country. And 
at the same time one party is going to impeach a President of the other 
party, our men and women are engaged in active combat at this hour.
  This couldn't wait until Monday? God help our country. God help 
America.
  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Texas 
(Mr. Armey), the distinguished majority leader.
  Mr. ARMEY. Mr. Speaker, no Nation has been so blessed as America in 
the 1990s. We enjoy a prosperity that our parents and our grandparents 
could not even imagine. Each day we invent wonderful new things to make 
life easier and more interesting. Our scientists are uncovering the 
wonder of God's creation, from the secrets of our genes to the wonders 
of the universe.
  The social problems that have caused so much pain and worry are 
diminishing. Crime is dropping. Welfare dependency has plummeted. Unwed 
teenage pregnancy rates are finally dropping. Religious belief and 
attention to decent moral values are on the rise in this great country.
  Even abroad America is respected as the world's one remaining 
superpower. We have triumphed over the vile tyrannies. Democratic 
nations on six continents owe their elected governments to our example 
and to our support. We have never been safer. Our brave armed forces, 
though they certainly need more resources, are still unquestionably 
second to none, a fact we can all agree is being demonstrated today in 
the skies of the Persian Gulf.
  How did this great Nation of the 1990s come to be? It all happened, 
Mr. Speaker, because freedom works. As Americans, we know that when we 
allow ordinary people the freedom to help each other for their common 
benefit great things happen. And in this land they certainly have.
  But freedom, Mr. Speaker, freedom depends upon something, the rule of 
law, and that is why this solemn occasion is so important. For today we 
are here to defend the rule of law.

[[Page H11976]]

  According to the evidence presented by our fine Committee on the 
Judiciary, the President of the United States has committed serious 
transgressions. Among other things, he took an oath to God to tell the 
truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, and then he failed to 
do so, not once but several times. If we ignore this evidence, I 
believe we undermine the rule of law that is so important to all that 
America is.
  Mr. Speaker, a nation of laws cannot be ruled by a person who breaks 
the law. Otherwise it would be as if we had one set of rules for the 
leaders and another for the government. We would have one standard for 
the powerful, the popular and the wealthy, and another for everyone 
else. This would belie our ideal that we have equal justice under the 
law. That would weaken the rule of law and leave our children and 
grandchildren with a very poor legacy.
  I do not know what challenges they will face in their time, but I do 
know they need to face those challenges with the greatest 
constitutional security and the soundest rule of fair and equal law 
available in the history of the world, and I do not want us to risk 
their losing that.
  Mr. Speaker, none of us, not us Members of Congress, not the 
President of the United States, are here by accident. We asked for 
these jobs. We went before the American people and we asked for the 
privilege and the honor to hold these offices. The American people gave 
us their trust and they expect us to use it to serve the Nation, its 
heritage and its future. We are not supposed to use it for ourselves.
  Sadly, it seems that is exactly what the President has done. He 
failed in his duty to comply with the law of the land, the law of the 
land that he swore to uphold. He did that to protect his own person; 
not his office; not the duties of his office. He then used the powers 
of his office once again for his own purposes.
  The President's defenders say it is wrong to pursue our duty here 
because the President's transgressions, they say, which, incidentally, 
they do not dispute, indeed, they even condemn, they say were personal, 
private behavior. But, Mr. Speaker, perjury before a grand jury is not 
personal and it is not private. Obstruction of justice is not personal 
and it is not private. Abuse of the power of the greatest office in the 
world is not personal and it is not private.
  We cannot allow the President of the United States to abuse his trust 
and the great authorities of his office. Not telling the truth about 
some transgressions will spawn bigger transgressions, and they will 
spread like a cancer across America's character. When those 
transgressions come from the Presidency, only the Congress has the 
constitutional authority and the responsibility to provide a check and 
a balance, and that can only be done through impeachment. That is why 
we must hold the President accountable today. If we fail to do our 
duty, for whatever reason, but most of all for the reason that it is 
uncomfortable or unpleasant, then we will be responsible for the cancer 
spreading through the Nation. It will create a sickness in the everyday 
lives of all Americans.
  How will it appear? In contracts not honored; in a mother who loses 
custody of her children in a divorce court because the father lied 
under oath; in a business where the only witness to a vicious sexual 
harassment is given a new job and hushed up by a generous bonus; in a 
college where a grade is given for money; in our armed forces, where a 
lack of integrity means people might die needlessly; in a family where 
the children cannot tell the difference between a truth and a lie.
  Mr. Speaker, today we have a responsibility to uphold our most sacred 
principle and to fulfill the duties to which we swore an oath. My great 
fear is that if for some reason we fail in this duty, we will be just 
as responsible for degrading the rule of law as the President we failed 
to hold accountable.
  Mr. Speaker, the gentleman from Louisiana (Mr. Livingston) set before 
us today an example. It breaks our heart. It breaks our heart for his 
wife Bonnie, for his family. It confuses some of us. But the example is 
that principle comes before person, and it is an example we must all 
hold to ourselves.
  There is no doubt about it, Mr. Speaker, this is a difficult day. And 
yet it is really a day of affirmation, a day that says our system of 
government works. We are showing the world that our democracy is 
resilient. It deals fairly and it deals effectively with a leader who 
fails in his responsibilities.
  Mr. Speaker, today we are defending the rule of law and we are 
letting freedom work in the lives of Americans. This is tough for all 
of us. We are all saddened by it, but we will complete this work on 
this day and then we will go on.
  We will go on in a great Nation and we will go on in a government 
that once again strives to hold and preserve and assert its integrity 
along with its authority. For, Mr. Speaker, this vote today is not 
about the character of a President, this vote is about the character of 
a Nation. And, Mr. Speaker, I intend to vote for the articles of 
impeachment and I intend to vote for the rule of law.
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from New 
York (Mr. Charles Schumer), a senior member of the Committee on the 
Judiciary who will be departing this House.
  (Mr. SCHUMER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. SCHUMER. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this 
time.
  The argument made by the gentleman from Texas, the best argument that 
the majority has made thus far, focused on upholding the rule of law. 
But a hallmark of rule of law is proportionality of punishment.
  If the President were caught, if any President were caught speeding 
at a hundred miles an hour, he would have to be disciplined so that 
others would not feel that reckless speeding was permissible. But we 
certainly would not use the political equivalent of capital punishment, 
impeachment, to discipline that President.
  On the other hand, if the President accepted a bribe, there would be 
no doubt he should be impeached, and all 435 of us would vote for it. 
Lying under oath about an extramarital relationship requires 
significant punishment, such as censure, but not the political version 
of capital punishment, impeachment.
  My colleagues, the rule of law requires that the punishment fit the 
crime. Allow us to vote for censure, the appropriate punishment under 
rule of law.
  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from 
Florida (Mr. McCollum), a member of the Committee on the Judiciary.

                              {time}  1045

  Mr. McCOLLUM. Mr. Speaker, there are three principal questions each 
of us has to answer today:
  First, did the President of the United States commit the felony 
crimes with which he has been charged? Secondly, are they impeachable 
offenses? And, third, should we impeach him?
  My task is to explain how I believe and I think you should understand 
these four articles of impeachment we have before us today and to walk 
through the evidence of the crimes the President, I believe, committed.
  First of all, the President was sued in a sexual harassment civil 
rights lawsuit by Paula Jones. As a part of her case, she wanted to 
prove her credibility by bringing forward evidence that the President 
had engaged in a pattern of illicit relations with women in his 
employment.
  Long before the President and Monica Lewinsky were ever called as 
witnesses in that lawsuit, they reached an understanding that they 
would lie about their relationship if they were asked. One day in 
December of last year, the President learned that Monica Lewinsky was 
on the witness list in that case. He called her. He talked to her about 
it. During that conversation they discussed the cover stories they had 
previously discussed on other occasions. And the President suggested to 
her that she could file an affidavit to avoid testifying in that suit.
  Monica Lewinsky subsequently, as we all know, filed a false affidavit 
that was perjurious in its own right. She testified before the grand 
jury that the President did not tell her to lie in that affidavit but 
she and he both understood from their conversations and previous 
understandings that in fact she would lie.

[[Page H11977]]

  The evidence is clear and convincing, I think beyond a reasonable 
doubt, that at that moment the President committed the first of a 
series of felony crimes that led us to here today. That was a crime of 
obstructing justice in trying to get Monica Lewinsky to lie in an 
affidavit and encouraging her to lie if she were called as a witness.
  That is the heart and essence of the first of seven counts of 
obstruction of justice in article 3. I would like to call my 
colleagues' attention to the fact that the way that article reads, and 
it is here for Members to look at in article 3. It says that the scheme 
the President engaged in after that included one or more of the 
following. There were seven of them.
  I believe the hiding of the gifts, the effort to get a job for Ms. 
Lewinsky, the efforts to get Ms. Currie, his secretary, to corroborate 
his later false testimony and so forth are all proven by the evidence 
in the 60,000 pages of sworn testimony that we have reviewed. But 
whether you agree with all of them or not, all you have to do is to 
believe there is clear and convincing evidence that one of them is 
true, and certainly the affidavit is true, to send this article to the 
Senate for trial.
  Now, in January after this affidavit incident, once it was prepared 
and it was filed and all of the sordid details we are aware of with 
regard to it took place, the President testified under oath in a civil 
deposition in that Jones case and he lied again and again and again. 
The principal lie he told then and before the grand jury concerned the 
question of whether or not he had sexual relations with Monica 
Lewinsky. The definition that he was given by the court, however 
convoluted people think, he did testify in the grand jury he did 
understand. The words that were given to him, he knew what they meant. 
And the actions that the President took on several occasions according 
to Monica Lewinsky indeed were sexual relations according to that 
definition.
  There are more than six witnesses that Monica Lewinsky talked with 
contemporaneously to the engaging in those activities that corroborate 
what she has to say. She is very believable, unfortunately, and the 
President is not.
  It is not a question of having to fudge around with the definition. 
Under the clear definition as he understood it, the President lied 
before the Paula Jones case in his deposition and then under oath again 
before the grand jury about that.
  Not only that but in his deposition in the Jones case the President 
swore he did not know that his personal friend, Vernon Jordan, had met 
with Monica Lewinsky and talked about the case. The evidence indicates 
that he lied. It also indicates that the President swore he could not 
recall being alone with Monica Lewinsky. And in that case that he lied. 
The President said he could not recall being in the oval office hallway 
with Ms. Lewinsky except maybe when she was delivering pizza. The 
evidence indicates that he lied. The President could not recall the 
gifts exchanged between Monica Lewinsky and himself, and the evidence 
indicates that he lied. And so on down the road. He lied then, he went 
on to the grand jury and he lied again under oath, and that is articles 
1, 2 and 3.
  In article 4, he lied again to Congress. He told us the same things. 
He said he did not engage in the sexual relations with Ms. Lewinsky. He 
said that he was never alone with her. He repeated the same lies again 
to this Congress, and that is a grave insult to the constitutional 
system of government.
  The President of the United States did commit impeachable offenses. 
Perjury rises to the same level as bribery. Treason, bribery and other 
high crimes and misdemeanors. That is what the Constitution says. I 
would submit that he should be impeached, that the evidence is clear, 
there is no question that he has subverted our system of government and 
he should be impeached unfortunately.
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 45 seconds to the gentleman from 
Louisiana (Mr. John).
  Mr. JOHN. Mr. Speaker, I beg of my colleagues to end this sad chapter 
in America. We have damaged the fiber of our representative democracy. 
We are tearing down the greatest country in the world by the 
deliberations here and over the past few months.
  I plead of you to stop. To stop. Please put an end to this madness. 
You have lost two of your own. We have lost the bipartisan spirit. But 
the real losers are the American people. Vote your conscience and your 
beliefs. I will. But let us move on.
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
Texas (Mr. Edwards).
  Mr. EDWARDS. Mr. Speaker, as Speaker Jim Wright asked from the well 
of this House in 1989, ``When will this mindless cannibalism end?'' How 
many good public officials must be destroyed because of their private 
sins and human imperfections? When will we stop using the fallibilities 
of dedicated public servants to overturn the will of the American 
people expressed in free elections? When will we stop the sin of 
focusing on the faults of others while ignoring the faults of 
ourselves? When will we recognize that the genius of our Founding 
Fathers was that they designed a system of government two centuries ago 
that would survive not because of the perfections of those who serve 
but despite the imperfections of all of us who serve? When? When?
  My colleagues, I would suggest only when we recognize these things 
will the rule of law and equal justice under the law prevail in this 
the people's House.
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
Texas (Mr. Doggett) a former member of his State's Supreme Court.
  Mr. DOGGETT. Mr. Speaker, our democracy has flourished throughout 
history because imperfect human beings have come together here to 
resolve differences about how our nation should proceed, recognizing 
that no individual, no political party has a monopoly on truth. How 
tragic it is that we gather this week with so much talent and so much 
creative energy and so many problems that the American people face and 
are diverted to such unworthy purpose.
  The real division that troubles me today is not the division that 
will go along strictly party lines about how we will vote, but the 
division that strikes through the heart and the spirit of America. What 
we need to be doing is coming together, recognizing that today we have 
a clear choice to punish individual wrongdoing--that we could come 
together and censure and disapprove that wrongdoing--but we do not have 
to censure and punish America.
  In this new year, we will have a great choice--of coming together to 
resolve the real problems of our country or continuing to destroy 
individual lives. I hope we will make the right choice.
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the 
gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Goode).
  (Mr. GOODE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. GOODE. Mr. Speaker, when the roll is called today I will vote 
``yes'' on impeachment.
  After assessing the evidence, testimony, and materials presented to 
the House Judiciary Committee, I believe that the President lied under 
oath in a grand jury proceeding and made false statements in a sworn 
deposition after acknowledging that the testimony was subject to the 
penalty of perjury.
  In my judgment, these offenses are impeachable. They violate the rule 
of law which is fundamental to our democracy. To me, the issue is not 
what the lie was about, but the fact that the President made the choice 
to lie, repeatedly, after having taken an oath to tell the truth, the 
whole truth and nothing but the truth. Today there are hundreds of 
people in the United States in jail because they lied under oath.
  Today is a sad day for Congress, a sad day for the Presidency, and a 
sad day for America.
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the 
gentleman from California (Mr. Matsui).
  (Mr. MATSUI asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. MATSUI. Mr. Speaker, I rise to oppose all four articles of 
impeachment.
  The articles allege conduct on the part of the President that is 
undeniably distasteful and unbecoming of our Executive. The conduct 
alleged, however, does not rise to the high standards of impeachment 
spelled out in Art. II, Sec. 4 of the Constitution--``Treason, Bribery, 
or other high crimes and misdemeanors.'' This standard, as evidenced 
through records from the Framers, history, and precedents,

[[Page H11978]]

clearly describe only offenses against our Constitutional system of 
Government.
  I wish to be clear that for purposes of evaluating the impeachability 
of the allegations against the President, I have assumed they are 
accurately characterized by the proponents of today's proceedings. It 
is important to remember, however, that none of the material and 
information contained in the referral from the Office of Independent 
Counsel (OIC)--much of it inadmissible hearsay evidence--has been 
subject to any sort of cross-examination.


                the constitutional system of government

  The United States is divided into three co-equal branches of 
government. The Framers believed that the liberty of the nation would 
best be assured by each branch jealously guarding its prerogatives, 
thus ensuring that no branch would inappropriately extend its power 
over the nation, or usurp the power of another.
  Our Government is not a parliamentary system. The President does not 
serve at the pleasure of the Legislature. The Executive is the only 
branch representing the popular will of the entire American population, 
to carry out the laws passed by the Congress. Correspondingly, the 
Constitution sets a high bar for impeachment and removal of the 
President. The invalidation of the popular will of the American public 
as expressed by a Presidential election is not an act the Framers 
wanted to make easy, or common. It is an act that was contemplated to 
be undertaken only in the face of the most serious threat to the 
nation. This is especially true because the Framers understood that the 
Public would be able to express its displeasure with a President every 
four years through the election process.
  With this in mind, the Constitution affords the sole power of 
impeachment to the House of Representatives. Because the Judiciary was 
purposefully not given a role in the impeachment proceeding, the 
Constitutional standard is greater--a tell tale indication that not 
just any crime committed by the Executive warrants removal from office. 
This is a solemn responsibility, and one that should not be entered 
into lightly. In over 200 years of the Republic, the House has only 
once fully utilized this proceeding.


        The Constitutional Duty of the House of Representatives

  The Constitution gives to the House of Representatives the ``sole 
Power of Impeachment.'' The power of impeachment is not subject to 
review or guidance by any other branch of government. While the 
impeachment process has been casually analogized to the grand jury 
process, with Members of the House simply acting as grand jurors 
possibly sending an indictment to the Senate for trial, a careful 
parsing of the analogy, suggests a more involved role for House 
Members.
  A grand jury is a mechanism by which the State may commence a 
criminal proceeding against a criminal defendant. Both the Judiciary 
and the Executive branch--Prosecutors--play significant roles in order 
to guarantee fundamental fairness of the proceedings. However, in 
impeachment proceedings, the Constitution envisions that these vital 
roles will not be forfeited, but rather that House Members must combine 
within themselves the role of judge, prosecutor and grand juror.
  As Prosecutor, Members of the House must determine whether it is 
appropriate to consider articles of impeachment. As has been often 
noted, prosecutorial discretion is one of the benchmarks of fairness of 
our criminal justice system. As grand juror, Members of the House must 
act with personal and political impartiality towards the Executive in 
deciding the issue. And as Judge, Members of the House must determine 
the legal standards of impeachment--in other words, the Framers' intent 
of ``high crimes and misdemeanors.''
  In my review of the impeachment record, it is clear that the House 
has not exercised the mandated prosecutorial discretion in determining 
whether to proceed with the impeachment of the President nor acted with 
the impartiality required of grand jurors. Furthermore, I conclude that 
the House, as Judge, must conclude that the standards of high Crimes 
and Misdemeanors has not been met. I would like to focus on this core 
issue of whether the President's conduct is impeachable.


                 The Conduct Alleged Is Not Impeachable

  The facts alleged on the part of the President by the OIC referral 
are not impeachable because they do not rise to the high standards of 
impeachment called for in the Constitution. The President shall be 
removed from office only upon ``Impeachment for, and Conviction of, 
Treason, bribery or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.''

  As the text of the impeachment clause makes clear, the Constitution 
envisions impeachment for Presidential conduct that threatens the 
Republic. Impeachment can be further differentiated from a criminal 
penalty in that impeachment serves to protect the nation, not to punish 
a wrongdoer. The high Crimes and Misdemeanors should be of the caliber 
of Treason and Bribery to rise to the impeachment threshold. The 
Constitution created the impeachment mechanism in order to punish 
serious, official misconduct. Official misconduct on the part of the 
Executive that was not serious could be punished by the election 
process. The President, for private acts of misconduct, would be--like 
any other American--subject to the normal judicial process.
  Realizing that removal of a popularly elected Executive would be 
traumatic for the nation, the Framers set a very high bar. Notably, the 
Framers considered such a lower standard in drafting the Constitution--
``maladministration.'' James Madison objected to this impeachment 
standard because it would imply that the President served at the 
pleasure of Congress, thus threatening the co-equal status of the 
Executive vis a vis the Legislature.
  The core allegations contained in the articles of impeachment are 
that the President lied in a civil deposition and before a grand jury 
about a private, sexual affair, and that he obstructed justice and 
abused Executive power in attempting to conceal and obfuscate the 
embarrassing facts of this private affair. Further, even accepting the 
argument of the proponents of the impeachment articles, that the 
President's misstatements are perjury--a great leap of legal faith--the 
Constitutional standard for impeachment would still not be met.
  It is inconceivable that the Framers could have imagined that the 
conduct alleged in the OIC referral threaten the Republic or our 
Constitutional system of government. As George Mason wrote in the 
Federalist Papers, impeachment was designed to remedy ``great and 
dangerous offenses'' attempting ``to subvert the Constitution.'' The 
President's sexual affair, and his subsequent attempts to conceal it, 
were distasteful, and possibly illegal, but it strains credulity to 
claim they were an attempt ``to subvert the Constitution.'' If they 
were illegal, they can be punished by the normal criminal or civil 
judicial process.


                               Conclusion

  The House today ill serves the Constitution. The Framers set a very 
high standard for impeachment. They did not intend that the will of the 
people, as expressed in the election of a President, would be lightly 
set aside. Nor did they create the mechanism of impeachment to punish 
wrongdoing by the Executive. Impeachment was created to protect the 
nation--indeed, the Constitutional system of government--from serious, 
official misconduct by the President. There can be little doubt that 
the President's conduct as alleged in the report from the office of the 
Independent Counsel is reprehensible and embarrassing. History will 
show, however, it did not rise to the high threshold called for by the 
Constitution.
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the 
gentleman from Minnesota (Mr. Peterson).
  (Mr. PETERSON of Minnesota asked and was given permission to revise 
and extend his remarks.)
  Mr. PETERSON of Minnesota. Mr. Speaker, I also rise to oppose all 
four articles of impeachment.
  From the outset, I believed that any action the Congress chose to 
take to punish the President had to be bipartisan. If Republicans and 
Democrats could put the best interests of the country ahead of their 
personal political viewpoints, we could solve this problem honorably 
and get on with the nation's business. We had the opportunity, but we 
didn't take advantage of it.
  I've been one of the people working for a bipartisan solution, trying 
to build consensus for a fitting punishment, but this process has 
degenerated into a purely partisan battle.
  In some ways, this process has been unfair from the outset. No other 
President in American history has been continuously investigated by a 
Special Prosecutor throughout his terms of office. The President's 
enemies have misused this process to undo the decision that the 
American people made in two elections. The office of the Special 
Prosecutor was not established to settle political differences, but 
that is how it has been used in this case, and it sets a very bad 
precedent for the future.
  When I joined with 30 other Democrats to support the Republicans' 
outline for inquiry by the House Judiciary Committee, I did so because 
I thought Chairman Henry Hyde would conduct a thoughtful and honest 
examination of the facts, with testimony from witnesses, and a chance 
for cross-examination--but he chose not to take that course, and I have 
been profoundly disappointed by what he did do. Instead of conducting 
an investigation in the cooperative, bipartisan tradition of the 
Watergate hearings, the Chairman directed hearings that were unfocused, 
largely without any substantive examination of the facts or witnesses, 
and designed to deliver a pre-ordained outcome.
  When the Watergate-era Judiciary Committee considered the evidence 
against President Nixon, it was clear that he had submitted false tax 
returns, and broken the law by doing so. Nonetheless, Republicans and 
Democrats on

[[Page H11979]]

the Committee voted 12 to 26 against bringing Articles of Impeachment 
based on this charge. They determined, together that this did not rise 
to the constitutional level of ``high crimes and misdemeanors.''
  While I am deeply disappointed with the President's personal 
behavior, in my view these charges do not rise to the constitutional 
standard of ``high crimes and misdemeanors.''
  The process conducted by the current House Judiciary Committee has 
been politically driven from the outset, and in the end, the course 
they decided to pursue will not serve the country. For their own 
political purposes, they have decided to lower the constitutional 
standard so that it can be used as a weapon in a political 
disagreement.
  The obvious course of action--supported by both Republicans and 
Democrats--is that of censure. The President should be censured, fined 
and be subject to prosecution when he is out of office.
  Unfortunately, the Republican leadership refused to allow the House--
Republicans and Democrats--to debate and vote on this option. Instead 
of allowing an honest vote of conscience, on a rational middle ground 
solution, they decided to say to all of us, ``our way or no way.'' 
There was no room for discussion, and no effort to work with 
conservative Democrats like myself.
  Furthermore, it is clear that the Senate will not vote to remove the 
President from office. From a practical standpoint, it serves no useful 
purpose to put the country through more weeks and months, and maybe 
even years, of this process. The smudge on this President's place in 
history is already established. What we are about to do will spread 
that same smudge to all of us, and it will not serve the country.
  In the end, by choosing to pursue impeachment, the Republicans may 
actually let the President off the hook all together. By pursuing 
impeachment even though the Senate will not convict or remove the 
President from office, and disdaining any effort to censure and fine 
him, he may escape without paying any substantive price for his 
actions.
  I do not believe it is legitimate to settle political differences by 
using the constitutional process designed to protect our country from 
crimes that endanger the existence of this nation. In truth, none of 
the President's reprehensible behavior threatens the nation, or our 
individual freedom and liberty. We're setting a very dangerous 
precedent for the future, and I shudder to think how this will come 
back to haunt us.
  I know that this has been a very difficult process to listen to and 
raises unpleasant issues for the people I represent in Minnesota's 7th 
District. I know that they will not all agree with me this day, but 
having listened to their collective counsel, I believe that most of 
them would do as I will do--support a resolution of censure, but vote 
no on this tragic and obsessive effort to impeach the President.
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the 
gentleman from California (Mr. Dixon).
  (Mr. DIXON asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. DIXON. Mr. Speaker, I rise to oppose the impeachment of the 
President of the United States.
  I strongly believe that the allegations against him do not reach the 
threshold of impeachable offenses. This is a sad day, Mr. Speaker. For 
20 years, I have had the privilege of serving in this distinguished 
body. Never in that 20 years have I seen a matter as grave as the issue 
before us today treated in such an unfair manner. I truly believe that 
the solemn duty of this body to check the power of the Executive has 
been degraded by the partisanship that has marked every step of this 
impeachment process.
  What President Clinton did was wrong; I think we all agree on that 
point. He had an extramarital affair with an employee--betraying the 
trust of his family. He lied to conceal that shameful affairs--
betraying the trust of the nation. These actions are deeply 
disappointing to me and are deeply disappointing to the nation. 
President Clinton has admitted his wrongdoing and, it would appear, has 
the forgiveness of most of the people in this nation.
  Assuming that the referral from independent Counsel Starr is entirely 
factually correct, I do not believe that President Clinton has 
committed treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors. 
Missing from this process is a sense of scale and context. A protracted 
investigation by an Independent Counsel has produced charges that are 
weakly supported by the evidence. Perjury is the most compelling charge 
against the President, though I do not find the evidence to be 
convincing. The alleged perjurious statements originate in immaterial 
statements in the course of a dismissed civil suit. In an apolitical 
environment, it is questionable that a person other than an elected 
official would be prosecuted for such statements.
  Some have tried to draw parallels between this impeachment inquiry 
and the Nixon inquiry. However, the scope of the offenses is not 
comparable, nor are the actions of the Judiciary Committee. The fact 
that articles of impeachment were reported by the Judiciary Committee 
on a series of partisan votes is deeply disheartening and underlines 
the illegitimacy of today's process. Now that the issue has reached the 
full House, members will not have the opportunity to vote their 
consciences--a vote on censure has been ruled out by a Republican 
leadership decree precisely because a bipartisan majority of members 
would have supported that measured, responsible course of action.
  For these reasons, Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to reject these 
articles of impeachment.
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman 
from Michigan (Mr. Bonior) our distinguished minority whip.
  Mr. BONIOR. Mr. Speaker, this House is shocked and saddened by the 
Speaker-elect's announcement. The gentleman from Louisiana (Mr. 
Livingston) is a respected member of this House who has served with 
distinction and dedication for over 20 years. Now we find ourselves in 
a destructive cycle that is eating away at our democracy. The politics 
of personal smear is degrading the dignity of public office and we must 
not let it continue.

                              {time}  1100

  We must put an end to it, and the only way we will stop this vicious 
cycle is if we stand up and refuse to give in to it, whether it is Bill 
Clinton or Bob Livingston.
  To the Speaker-elect I would say, ``This is your decision, the 
decision of your family, the decision of your Conference.'' But for my 
own part I would say, ``You should not allow a campaign of cynicism and 
smear to force you to resign from office, and you should not have 
called on the President to resign.''
  Mr. Speaker, what we do here today will have long-lasting 
consequences, not just in this House, but for our Constitution, for our 
country, for our democracy. We are here to debate impeachment and 
should not be distracted from that.
  What does a vote for impeachment really mean? It is a vote to nullify 
the most sacrosanct institution in any democracy: the ballot box.
  What the President did is wrong, and he should be held accountable, 
but the offenses he has committed do not rise to the historical 
standards of impeachment set by our Founding Fathers. We must not lower 
that standard today to suit the needs of angry partisans. We must not 
let them accomplish through impeachment what they could not do at the 
ballot box. They must not succeed.
  Today we stand against those who would hijack an election and hound 
the President out of office against the will of the American people. 
The American people support this President's agenda, and they want us 
to move forward for better health care, for stronger schools, for 
retirement security for every American in this country.
  A vote for impeachment today will only feed the corrosive and 
destructive politics of personal attack. It will prolong and escalate 
this whole sorry episode.
  Mr. Speaker, in this building are the marble halls where Daniel 
Webster and Henry Clay and Abraham Lincoln debated the fate of the 
Union. Have we sunk so low that in these same halls we would allow the 
likes of Ken Starr and Monica Lewinsky and Linda Tripp to ignite the 
constitutional crisis of our age? Does such a spectacle really 
strengthen our Nation? Does it dignify our democracy? Does it honor our 
Constitution?
  The American people sent a clear message this November. They want 
this President to continue to do the job they elected him to do, and 
yet this Congress is deliberately ignoring their will. Let me tell my 
colleagues that people are angry, and they are frustrated, and they are 
outraged and bewildered at what is happening here. Six days before 
Christmas our troops are in battle, and a lame duck Congress is rushing 
to overthrow the Commander in Chief.
  Mr. Speaker, this is surreal. The scenario reads like the plot of a 
cheap paperback novel, not the deliberation of the history's greatest 
democracy.
  Mr. Speaker, it is not too late to step back from the brink. The 
American people desperately want us to restore some dignity and some 
common sense

[[Page H11980]]

to our politics, some sense of proportion. They want us to come 
together, they want us to move on. Has this House become so out of 
control, so out of touch, so consumed that we will be denied the chance 
to vote on the one option, the one option that commands the support of 
the American people, the motion to censure?
  We have heard a lot of talk around here about the rule of law, but 
these partisan proceedings have made a mockery of our constitutional 
process. Across the Nation they have been announced as, and let me 
quote: a dreadful farce of partisan posturing; a soiling of the 
Constitution; a circus; a kangaroo court; an attempted coup.
  Today we are offering a way out of this morass, and one last time we 
implore our colleagues to not use their power to block a motion to 
censure. Do not deny us the right to vote our conscience. Do not 
silence the voices of the American people. Do not let the politics of 
cynicism and smear prevail.
  Listen to the American people. Let us vote on censure, and let us 
bring America together again.
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as she may consume to the 
gentlewoman from Missouri (Ms. Danner).
  (Ms. DANNER asked and was given permission to revise and extend her 
remarks.
  Ms. DANNER. Mr. Speaker, first, let me state that for anyone who 
believes that my vote was made on a partisan basis, let me assure you 
that if that had been the case, my decision could have and would have 
been made long ago.
  However, I can assure you that was not the case. I fully recognized 
that this would be the most important vote in my career as an elected 
official and that it merited my most careful and thoughtful 
consideration. As late as 2:00 a.m. the morning prior to the vote I was 
reading Rakove's Original Meanings--Politics and Ideas in the Making of 
the Constitution. I have spent endless hours reading, studying and 
evaluating other materials and information--the Independent Counsel's 
Report, the Judiciary Committee Report, Committee testimony from legal 
scholars on both sides of the issue, the views of my constituents and 
the remarks of my colleagues.
  After much deliberation, I came to the conclusion that since there 
are other remedies that exist to address President Clinton's behavior, 
impeachment was not the answer.
  Impeachment, as defined by the Constitution, was designed to protect 
our nation from ``treason, bribery, or other high crimes and 
misdemeanors.'' Indeed, President Clinton can, after leaving office, be 
indicted, tried and punished in the courts for any crimes he committed 
while in office. This is for our judicial system to decide. Try him in 
a federal court when his term of office ends and let a judge and jury 
decide--free of partisan energy. This susceptibility to such a criminal 
justice process proves that the rule of law applies to everyone. Not 
even a President, is above the law.
  The actions of President Clinton have been described in various 
terms: reprehensible, inappropriate, embarrassing and others too 
numerous to mention. All are applicable. The actions of the President 
have demeaned him in innumerable ways. However, as terribly 
inappropriate as his conduct was--that conduct did not threaten our 
nation's security, nor did it undermine the Constitution. And, though 
it may have hampered his performance, it did not prevent him from 
executing his Constitutional duties as President.
  Central to the Articles of Impeachment is the question with regard to 
perjury on the part of the President. To determine if perjury is an 
impeachable offense, we must look to the Constitution and to historical 
precedent. In 1974, during the Watergate Inquiry, the Judiciary 
Committee decided on a bi-partisan basis that only Presidential 
misconduct which is ``seriously incompatible with either the 
Constitutional form and principles of our government or the proper 
performance of the constitutional duties of the Presidential office'' 
justifies impeachment. The Committee added, ``Not all presidential 
misconduct is sufficient to constitute grounds for impeachment. There 
is a further requirement--substantiality. . . . Because impeachment of 
a President is a grave step for the nation, it is to be predicated only 
upon the above criteria.
  Indeed, a precedent was established that a crime committed in private 
life (i.e. President Nixon's tax fraud) did not warrant impeachment. 
The Committee was persuaded by the legal principles defining an 
impeachable offense, not by the lack of factual evidence. Actually, 
President Nixon, knowing that he was fraudulently claiming a $576,000 
deduction, had signed his name under the words: ``Under penalty of 
perjury, I declare that I have examined this return, including 
accompanying schedules and statements, and to the best of my knowledge 
and belief it is true, correct and complete.'' Members of the Committee 
determined that President Nixon's actions in this case were not 
impeachable.
  In addition, many Members felt impeachment of President Clinton was 
inappropriate and there was a great deal of bi-partisan support for a 
different option--censure. A Congressional censure would have allowed 
the House of Representatives to officially express the condemnation 
which the President deserved while also remaining true to long-
established Constitutional principles. Although some have argued that 
censure is not Constitutional, the matter is not prohibited by the 
Constitution and is, therefore permissible. In fact, three different 
Presidents (Jackson, Tyler and Buchanan) have been censured in the 
past. Unfortunately, despite the popularity of the censure option, the 
House leadership did not allow a vote on this proposal. However, with 
support for this measure by both Democrat and Republican members, it is 
troubling that we were prohibited from voting on this measure.
  In the final analysis, our responsibility as Members of the House of 
Representatives was not to the President, but to the Presidency--one of 
three co-equal branches of government. Impeaching President Clinton 
would lower the standard for impeachment for future Presidents, and 
would therefore necessarily weaken that branch of government.
  Additionally, it would prevent Congress and the Supreme Court from 
devoting full attention to our national and international 
responsibilities, since a trial would require an unknown amount of time 
and attention from all involved. It would prove to be the ultimate 
distraction to our nation's business. And as distasteful as all have 
found the hearings before the Judiciary Committee to be--I feared that 
a Senate trial would be so salacious and sordid that all would be 
appalled.
  In closing I believe it is important to once again refer to the 
intent of those who framed our Constitution. Impeachment, George Mason 
proclaimed, was for ``crimes against the state.'' In the Federalist No. 
65, Alexander Hamilton wrote that a clear sign of when not to impeach 
was when the dispute between Congress and the president was ``connected 
to pre-existing factions,'' Old World parlance for ``partisan.'' At the 
Constitutional Convention in 1787, when George Mason proposed the 
impeachment clause, he described it as the most drastic remedy to 
``great and dangerous offenses''--to only ``the most extensive 
injustice.''
  Our Founding Fathers in their wisdom, and for the stability of our 
nation, placed the bar for impeachment high: at high crimes and 
misdemeanors. The President's actions, while worthy of contempt, do not 
meet this threshold.
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the 
gentleman from Texas (Mr. Sandlin).
  (Mr. SANDLIN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. SANDLIN. Mr. Speaker, I submit for the Record certain 
deliberations by the Committee on the Judiciary.

                [From the Washington Post, Dec. 9, 1998]

             Dec. 9: Fourth Panel of White House Witnesses

       Rep. Hyde. Very well. Would the witnesses please stand and 
     take the oath? Thank you.
       Do you solemnly swear or affirm that the testimony you're 
     about to give to the committee is the truth, the whole truth 
     and nothing but the truth?
       All. I do.
       Rep. Hyde. Thank you. Let the record show the witnesses 
     answered the question in the affirmative. We have a 
     distinguished panel today, as we have had all week. Thomas P. 
     Sullivan is a senior partner at Jenner (sp) & Block (sp) and 
     has practiced with that firm for the past 44 years. He's a 
     former United States attorney for the northern district of 
     Illinois. Mr. Sullivan specializes in civil and criminal 
     trial and appellate litigation, and he has served as an 
     instructor at Loyola University School of Law and for the 
     National Institute for Trial Advocacy.
       Richard Davis is a partner with the New York law firm of 
     Weil, Gotschal and Manges. He clerked for the United States 
     District Court Judge Jack B. Weinstein (sp) from 1969 to 
     1970. He also served as an assistant U.S. attorney in the 
     southern district of New York from 1970 through 1973 and was 
     task force leader for the Watergate special prosecution 
     force, 1973-1975. From 1977 to 1981, he served as assistant 
     secretary of the treasury for enforcement and operations.
       Edward S.G. Dennis Jr. is a partner in the litigation 
     section of the Philadelphia law firm of Morgan, Lewis and 
     Bockius. He joined the firm after 15 years with the 
     Department of Justice, during which he held the following 
     positions: Acting deputy attorney general, assistant attorney 
     general for the criminal division, and U.S. attorney for the 
     eastern district of Pennsylvania. He is co-chairman of the 
     corporate investigations and criminal defense practice group.
       William F. Weld is a former two-term governor of 
     Massachusetts, graduate of the Harvard Law School. Governor 
     Weld began his legal career as a counsel with the House 
     Judiciary Committee during the Watergate impeachment inquiry. 
     He then served as U.S.

[[Page H11981]]

     attorney and as head of the criminal division at main Justice 
     under President Reagan before being elected governor of 
     Massachusetts in 1990. Governor Weld is currently a partner 
     in the Chicago law firm of McDermott (sp), Will (sp) & Emory 
     (sp), and he is also the author of the recently published 
     comic political crime novel, ``Macro by Moonlight.'' I hope 
     it's not a violation of any rule or regulation give a plug 
     for the governors book. (Laughter.)
       Ronald Noble is associate professor of law at NYU Law 
     School. He served as undersecretary of the treasury for 
     enforcement, 1994-1996; as deputy assistant attorney general 
     and chief of staff in the criminal division of the Department 
     of Justice, 1988-1990; and as assistant United States 
     attorney in the eastern district of Pennsylvania, 1984-1988.
       Before recognizing each of you, in whatever order you 
     choose to go, although it's probably just as simple to start 
     on my left to the right, I would like to recognize the 
     ranking minority member, John Conyers, for a statement if he 
     wishes to make one.
       Rep. John Conyers (D-MI). Could I delay my statement, Mr. 
     Chairman?
       Rep. Hyde. You surely could.
       Rep. Conyers. Thank you.
       Rep. Hyde. Very well. Mr. Sullivan.
       Mr. Sullivan. Thank you.
       Rep. Mr. Sullivan, turn the mike toward you and put the 
     switch on, please.
       Mr. Sullivan. Thanks. Is that all right?
       Members of the Judiciary Committee, I appreciate the 
     opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the 
     professional standards for obstruction of justice and 
     perjury. My qualifications to discuss this subject include 
     over 40 years of practice in federal criminal cases, chiefly 
     in Chicago but also in other cities.
       During most of that time, I have acted as defense counsel 
     for persons accused of or under investigation for criminal 
     conduct. For four years, from 1977 to 1981, I served as the 
     United States attorney for the northern district of Illinois. 
     Chairman Hyde and Mr. Schippers are known to me from the 
     practice in Chicago, and I believe they can vouch for my 
     qualifications.
       Rep. Hyde. Extraordinarily high.
       Mr. Sullivan. Thank you, sir.
       During the past 35 years, I have taken an interest in, but 
     no part in, politics. While I am a registered Democrat, I 
     consider myself independent at the ballot box and I've often 
     voted for Republican candidates. I have acted for the 
     Republican governor of Illinois, a Democratic senator, and 
     Mayor Harold Washington. I have prosecuted as well as 
     defended Democrat and Republican office holders. I appear 
     today not as an advocate or partisan for President Clinton or 
     the Democrat Party, but rather as a lawyer of rather 
     long experience who may be able to assist you in your 
     deliberations on the serious and weighty matters you now 
     have before you.
       The topic of my testimony is prosecutorial standards under 
     which cases involving alleged perjury and obstruction of 
     justice are evaluated by responsible federal prosecutors. In 
     the federal criminal justice system, indictments for 
     obstruction of justice and perjury are relatively rare. There 
     are several reasons. One is that charges of obstruction and 
     perjury are not substantive crimes but rather have to do with 
     circumstances peripheral to underlying criminal conduct. The 
     facts giving rise to the obstruction or perjury arise during 
     the course of an investigation involving other matters, and, 
     when prosecuted, are usually tagged on as charges additional 
     to the underlying criminal conduct. Second, charges of 
     obstruction and perjury are difficult to prove because the 
     legislature and the courts have erected certain safeguards 
     for those accused of these ``ripple effect'' crimes, and 
     these safeguards act as hurdles for prosecutors.
       The law of perjury can be particularly arcane, including 
     the requirements that the government prove beyond a 
     reasonable doubt that the defendant knew his testimony to be 
     false at the time he or she testified, that the alleged false 
     testimony was material, and that any ambiguity or uncertainty 
     about what the question or answer meant must be construed in 
     favor of the defendant.
       Both perjury and obstruction of justice are what are known 
     as specific intent crimes, putting a heavy burden on the 
     prosecutor to establish the defendant's state of mind, 
     Furthermore, because perjury and obstruction charges often 
     arise from private dealings with few observes, the court have 
     required either two witnesses who testified directly to the 
     facts establishing the crime, or, if only one witness 
     testifies to the facts constituting the alleged perjury that 
     there be substantial corroborating proof to establish guilt. 
     Responsible prosecutors do not bring these charges lightly.
       There is another cautionary note, and this, I think, is 
     very significant here. Federal prosecutors do not use the 
     criminal process in connection with civil litigation 
     involving private parties. The reasons are obvious. If the 
     federal prosecutors got involved in charges and counter-
     charges of perjury and obstruction of justice in discovery or 
     trial of civil cases, there would be little time left for the 
     kinds of important matters that are the major targets of the 
     Department of Justice criminal guidelines. Further, there are 
     well- established remedies available to civil litigants who 
     believe perjury or obstruction has occurred. Therefore, it is 
     rare that the federal criminal process is used with respect 
     to allegations of perjury or obstruction in civil matters.
       The ultimate issue for a prosecutor deciding whether or not 
     to seek an indictment is whether he or she is convinced that 
     the evidence is sufficient to obtain a conviction; that is, 
     whether there is proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
     defendant committed the crime. This is far more than a 
     probable-cause standard, which is the test by which grand 
     jury indictments are judged. Responsible prosecutors do not 
     submit cases to a grand jury for indictment based upon 
     probable cause. They do not run cases up the flagpole to see 
     how the jury will react. They do not use indictments for 
     deterrence or as a punishment.
       Responsible prosecutors attempt to determine whether the 
     proof is sufficient to establish guilt beyond a reasonable 
     doubt. If the answer is yes and there are no reasons to 
     exercise discretion in favor of levity, the case is submitted 
     to the grand jury for indictment, which, where I come from--
     and everywhere else I know about--is routine and automatic. 
     if the answer is no--that is, even if the evidence 
     establishes probable cause, but, in the prosecutor's 
     judgment, will not result in a conviction--the responsible 
     prosecutor's will decline the case.
       Some years ago, during the Bush administration, I was asked 
     by an independent counsel to act as a special assistant to 
     bring an indictment against and try a former member of 
     President Reagan's cabinet. Having looked at the evidence, I 
     declined to do so because I concluded that when all the 
     evidence was considered, the case for conviction was doubtful 
     and that there were innocent and reasonable explanations for 
     the allegedly wrongful conduct.
       Having reviewed the evident here, I have reached the same 
     conclusion. It is my opinion that the case set out in the 
     Starr report would not be prosecuted as a criminal case by a 
     responsible federal prosecutor.
       Before addressing the specific facts of the several of the 
     charges, let me say that in conversations with many current 
     and former federal prosecutors in whose judgment I have great 
     faith, virtually all concur that if the president were not 
     involved, if an ordinary citizen were the subject of the 
     inquiry, no serious consideration would be given to a 
     criminal prosecution arising from alleged misconduct in 
     discovery in the Jones civil case having to do with an 
     alleged cover-up of a private sexual affair with another 
     woman, or the follow-on testimony before the grand jury. This 
     case would simply not be given serious consideration for 
     prosecution. It wouldn't get in the door. It would be 
     declined out of hand.
       A threshold question is whether, if the president is not 
     above the law, as he should not been, is he to be treated as 
     below the law? Is he to be singled out for prosecution 
     because of his office in a case in which, were he a private 
     citizen, no prosecution would result? I believe the president 
     should be treated in the criminal justice system in the same 
     way as any other United States citizen. If that were the case 
     here, it is my view that the alleged obstruction of justice 
     and perjury would not be prosecuted by a responsible United 
     States attorney.
       Having said that, I would like to address several of the 
     specific charges in the Starr report. The first has to do 
     with perjury in the president's deposition and before the 
     grand jury about whether or not he had a sexual affair, 
     relationship or relations with Ms. Lewinsky. The president 
     denied that he did based on his understanding of the 
     definition of the term, quote, ``sexual relations,'' quote, 
     adopted by the court in the Jones case. That definition, 
     which you have before you in the papers, is difficult to 
     parse, and one can argue either side; but it is clear to me 
     that the president's interpretation is a reasonable one, 
     especially because----
       Rep. Hyde. Mr. Sullivan, I hate to interrupt, but your time 
     has expired. Now, do you think in another three minutes you 
     could wind up?
       Mr. Sullivan. Yes.
       Rep. Hyde. Could you? Very well.
       Mr. Sullivan. I will--I think I can.
       Rep. Hyde. Then we'll continue it for three minutes.
       Mr. Sullivan. Thank you very much, Mr. Hyde.
       It's clear to me that the president's interpretation is a 
     reasonable one, especially because the words which seem to 
     describe oral sex--the words which seem to describe directly 
     oral sex were stricken from the definition by the judge.
       In perjury prosecution, the government must show beyond a 
     reasonable doubt, that the defendant knew when he gave the 
     testimony, he was telling a falsehood. The lying must be 
     known and deliberate. It is not perjury for a witness to 
     evade or frustrate of answer non-responsibly. The evidence 
     simply does not support the conclusion that the president 
     knowingly committed perjury, and the case is so doubtful and 
     weak that a responsible prosecutor would not present it to 
     the grand jury.
       Let me turn to the issue of obstruction through delivery of 
     gifts to Ms. Lewinsky by Mrs. Currie. Some of the evidence on 
     this subject is not recounted in the Starr Report, but a 
     responsible prosecutor will not ignore the proof consistent 
     with innocence, or which shows that an element--an essential 
     element of the case is absent.
       The evidence is that when talking to the president, Ms. 
     Lewinsky brought up the subject of having Mrs. Currie hold 
     the gifts. And the president either failed to respond or said 
     ``I don't know,'' or ``I'll think about it.'' According to 
     Mrs. Currie, Ms. Lewinsky called Mrs. Currie and asked Mrs. 
     Currie to come to Ms. Lewinsky's home to take the gifts and

[[Page H11982]]

     Mrs. Currie did so. Ms. Lewinsky testified that Mrs. Currie 
     placed the call to Ms. Lewinsky. But the central point in 
     this is, that neither Mrs. Currie nor Ms. Lewinsky testified 
     that the president suggested to Ms. Lewinsky that she had the 
     gifts, or that the president told Mrs. Currie to get the 
     gifts from Ms. Lewinsky.
       Under these circumstances, it is my view that a responsible 
     prosecutor would not charge the president with obstruction, 
     because there is no evidence sufficient to establish beyond a 
     reasonable doubt, that the president was involved. Indeed, it 
     seems likely that Ms. Lewinsky was the sole moving force, 
     having broached the idea to the president, but having 
     received no response or encouragement, she called Mrs. Currie 
     to take the gifts without the president's knowledge or 
     encouragement. That is not the stuff of which an obstruction 
     charge is made.
       Because of time, I'm going to skip over my third example, 
     and go to my conclusion.
       Rep. Hyde. Thank you.
       Mr. Sullivan. Which was about influencing Mrs. Currie's 
     testimony. Time does not permit me to go through all of the 
     allegations of misconduct in the Starr Report. Suffice it to 
     say, that in my opinion, none of them is of the nature which 
     a responsible federal prosecutor would present to a federal 
     grand jury for indictment. I will be pleased to respond to 
     your questions. Thank you very much, and particularly for the 
     extra time.
       Rep. Hyde. Thank you, Mr. Sullivan. This is a formal 
     proceeding. And in the chamber of Congress, we never--unlike 
     in certain state legislatures--introduce people in the 
     gallery. But this is a special day, and we have someone in 
     the audience that I think ought to be introduced. And with 
     the permission of the gentleman from Massachusetts, I'd like 
     to introduce Elsie Frank, Barney Frank's mother.

  [Applause.]
       Rep. Hyde. Thank you. Mr. Davis.
       Mr. Davis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Conyers, members of 
     the committee----
       Rep. Coble. Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman.
       Rep. Hyde. Yes.
       Rep. Coble. I'm reluctant to do this, but in the sense of 
     fairness, do you think that since Mr. Sullivan was afforded 
     an additional three minutes, that we should make that offer 
     to the other members of the panel, if it comes to that?
       Rep. Hyde. I'd rather face that critical decision----
       Rep. Coble. Very well. Very well.
       Rep. Hyde [continuing.] On a piecemeal basis.
       Rep. Coble. But for the remaining four, at least I tried.
       Rep. Hyde. Thank you. Mr. Davis.
       Mr. Davis. Thank you. I will try and summarize my longer, 
     written statement, which the committee has. There can be no 
     doubt that the decision as to whether to prosecute a 
     particular individual is an extraordinarily serious matter. 
     Good prosecutors thus approach this decision with a genuine 
     seriousness, carefully analyzing the facts in the law, and 
     setting aside personal feelings about the person under 
     investigation.
       In making a prosecution decision, as recognized by Justice 
     Department policy, the initial question for any prosecutor, 
     is can the case be won at trial. Simply stated, no prosecutor 
     should bring a case if he or she does not believe that, based 
     upon the facts in the law, it is more likely than not that 
     they will prevail at trial. Cases that are likely to be lost, 
     cannot be brought simply to make a point, or to express a 
     sense of moral outrage, however justified such a sense of 
     outrage might be. You have to truly believe you will win the 
     case.
       I would respectfully suggest that the same principle should 
     guide the House of Representatives as it determines to, in 
     effect, make the decision as to whether to commence a 
     prosecution by impeaching of the president. Indeed, if 
     anything, the strength of the evidence should be greater 
     to justify impeachment, than to try a criminal case.
       In the context of perjury prosecutions, there are some 
     specific considerations which are present when deciding 
     whether such a case can be won. First, it is virtually 
     unheard of to bring a perjury prosecution based solely on the 
     conflicting testimony of two people. The inherent problems in 
     bringing such a case are compounded to the extent that any 
     credibility issues exist as to the government's sole witness.
       Second, questions and answers are often imprecise. 
     Questions sometimes are vague, or used summarily to define 
     terms, and interrogators frequently asked compound or 
     inarticulate questions, and fail to follow up imprecise 
     answerers. Witnesses often meander through an answer, 
     wandering around a question, but never really answering it. 
     In a perjury case, where the precise language of a question 
     and answer are so relevant, this makes perjury prosecutions 
     difficult, because the persecutor must establish that the 
     witness understood the question, intended to give a false, 
     not simply an evasive answer, and in fact did so. The problem 
     of establishing such intentional falsity is compounded, in 
     civil cases, by the reality that lawyers routinely counsel 
     their clients to answer only the question asked, not to 
     volunteer, and not to help out an inarticulate questioner.
       Third, prosecutors often need to assess the veracity of an 
     ``I don't recall'' answer. Like other answers, such a 
     response can be true or false, but it is a heavy burden to 
     prove that a witness truly remembered the fact at issue. The 
     ability to do so, will often depend on the nature of that 
     fact. Precise times of meetings, names of people one has met, 
     and details of conversations, and sequences of events, 
     indeed, even if those events are of fairly recent origin, are 
     often difficult to remember. Forgetting a dramatic event, is 
     however more difficult to justify.
       The ability to win a trial is not however the only 
     consideration guiding a decision whether to prosecute. Other 
     factors reflected in the Justice Department guidelines 
     include federal law enforcement priorities, the nature and 
     seriousness of the offense, the impact of the offense on any 
     victim, whether there has been restitution, deterrence, in 
     the criminal history of the accused.
       Before turning to the application of these principles to 
     the facts at hand, I should say that in my work at the 
     Watergate Special Prosecutor's office, I was involved in 
     applying these principle in extraordinarily high profile 
     cases. While we successfully prosecuted a number of matters, 
     we also declined to proceed in a number of close cases. We 
     did so even in circumstances where we believed in our heart 
     that a witness had deliberately lied under oath, or committed 
     some other wrongful act, but simply concluded that we were 
     not sufficiently so certain that we would prevail at trial.
       I will not turn to the issue of whether, from the 
     perspective of a prosecutor, there exists a prosecutable case 
     for perjury in front of the grand jury. The answer to me is 
     clearly no. The president acknowledged to the grand jury the 
     existence of an improper intimate relationship with Monica 
     Lewinsky, but argued wit the prosecutors questioning him, 
     that his acknowledged was not a sexual relationship as he 
     understood the definition of that term being used in the 
     Jones deposition. Engaging in such a debate, whether wise or 
     unwise politically, simply does not form the basis for a 
     perjury prosecution.
       Indeed, in the end, the entire basis for a grand jury 
     perjury prosecution comes down to Monica Lewinsky's assertion 
     that there was a reciprocal nature to their relationship, and 
     that the president touched her private parts with the intent 
     to arouse or gratify her, and the president's denial that he 
     did so.
       Putting aside whether this is the type of difference of 
     testimony which should justify an impeachment of a president, 
     I do not believe that a case involving this kind of conflict 
     between two witnesses would be brought by a prosecutor, since 
     it would not be won at trial.
       A prosecutor would understand the problem created by the 
     fact that both individuals had an incentive to lie--the 
     president to avoid acknowledging a false statement at his 
     civil deposition, and Miss Lewinsky to avoid the demeaning 
     nature of providing wholly unreciprocated sex. Indeed, this 
     incentive existed when Miss Lewinsky described the 
     relationship to the confidantes described in the independent 
     counsel's referral.
       Equally as important, however, Mr. Starr has himself 
     questioned the veracity of his one witness, Miss Lewinsky, by 
     questioning her testimony that his office suggested she tape 
     record Ms. Currie, Mr. Jordan, and potentially the president. 
     And in any trial, the independent counsel would also be 
     arguing that other key points in Miss Lewinsky's testimony 
     are false, including where she explicitly rejects the notion 
     that she was asked to lie and that assistance in her job 
     search was an inducement for her to do so.
       It also was extraordinarily unlikely that in ordinary 
     circumstances a prosecutor would bring a prosecution for 
     perjury in the president's civil deposition in the Jones 
     case, First, while one could always find isolated contrary 
     examples, under the prosecution principles discussed above, 
     perjury prosecutions involving civil cases are rare and it 
     would be even more unusual to see such a prosecution where 
     the case had been dismissed on unrelated grounds and then 
     settled, particularly where the settlement occurred after 
     disclosure of the purported false testimony.
       Second, perjury charges on peripheral issues are also 
     uncommon. Perjury prosecutions are generally filed where the 
     false statement goes to the core of the matter under inquiry. 
     Indeed, in order to prevail in a perjury prosecution, the 
     prosecutor must establish not only that the testimony was 
     false, but that the purported false testimony was material.
       Here, the Jones case was about whether then-governor 
     Clinton sought unwanted sexual favors from a state employee 
     in Arkansas. Monica Lewinsky herself had nothing to do with 
     the actual facts at issue in that suit. This deposition was 
     about the Jones case. It was not part of a general 
     investigation into the Monica Lewinsky affair, and that is 
     important on the materiality issue. Given the lack of 
     connection between these two events, under the applicable 
     rules of evident, her purely consensual relationship with the 
     president half a  decade later would, I believe, not have 
     even been admissible at any ultimate trial of the Jones 
     case.
       While the court allowed questioning in the civil deposition 
     about this matter, the judge did so under the very broad 
     standard used in civil discovery. Indeed, while not dealing 
     with the admissibility issue, had there been no independent 
     counsel inquiry after the controversy about the President's 
     relationship with Miss Lewinsky arose, the court considered 
     this testimony sufficiently immaterial so as to preclude 
     testimony about it at the trial.
       Finally, the ability to prove the intentional making of 
     false statements in the

[[Page H11983]]

     civil deposition is compounded by inexact questions, evasive 
     and inconsistent answers, insufficient follow-up by the 
     questioner, and reliance by the examiner on a definition of 
     sexual relations rather than asking about specific acts. But 
     whatever the ability to meet the standard of proof on this 
     issue as to any particular question, this simply is not a 
     perjury case that would be brought. It involves difficult 
     proof issues as to, at best, peripheral issues where complete 
     and truthful testimony would be of doubtful admissibility, in 
     a settled civil case which had already been dismissed. This 
     simply is not the stuff of criminal prosecution.
       Turning to the issues of obstruction of justice involving 
     the Paula Jones case, a prosecutor analyzing the case would 
     be effected by many of the same weaknesses that are discussed 
     above. These weaknesses, as well as additional problems with 
     such a case are discussed in my written statement and I will 
     not comment on them, you know, orally, in the interest of 
     time.
       Before concluding, I would like to make two closing 
     observations, and I will be, with your permission, just a 
     minute or so. In August, 1974, prior to the pardon, the 
     Watergate special prosecution force commenced the 
     extraordinarily difficult process of whether--determining 
     whether--to indict then-former President Nixon. In my 1974 
     memorandum analyzing the relevant factors which should 
     ultimately affect such a decision, and proceeding in that 
     memorandum on the belief not present here that adequate 
     evidence clearly existed to support the bringing of such 
     criminal charges, I articulated two primary and competing 
     considerations which I believed it appropriate for us then, 
     as prosecutors, to consider.
       The first factor was to avoid a sense of a double standard 
     by declining to prosecute a plainly guilty person because he 
     had been president. The second was that prosecutors should 
     not proceed with even provable charges if they conclude that 
     important and valid societal benefits would be sacrificed by 
     doing so. In the Nixon case, as articulated in my memorandum, 
     such a benefit was the desirability of putting the turmoil of 
     the past two years behind us so as to better be able to 
     proceed with the country's business.
       The second was the prosecutor should not proceed with even 
     provable charges if they conclude that important and balanced 
     societal benefits would be sacrificed by doing so. In the 
     Nixon case, as I articulated in my memorandum, such a benefit 
     was the desirability of putting the turmoil of the past two 
     years behind us so as to better be able to proceed with the 
     country's business. I believe today, 25 years later, that it 
     is still appropriate for those deciding whether to bring 
     charges to consider these factors.
       Finally, prosecutors often feel a sense of frustration if 
     they cannot express their sense that a wrong has been 
     committed by bringing charges. But not every wrong is a 
     crime, and wrongful noncriminal conduct sometimes can be 
     addressed without the commencing of any proceeding.
       Apart from issues of censure, we live in a democracy, and 
     one sanction that can be imposed is by the voters acting 
     through the exercise of their right to vote. President 
     Clinton lied to the American people, and if they believe it 
     appropriate they were free to voice their approval by voting 
     against his party in 1998, and remain free to do so in 2000, 
     as occurred in 1974 when the Democrats secured major gains. 
     The answer to every wrongful act is not the invocation of 
     punitive legal processes. Thank you.
       Rep. Hyde. Thank you, Mr. Davis.
       Mr. Dennis.
       Mr. Dennis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, Mr. 
     Conyers, members of the House of Representatives committee on 
     the Judiciary, I am opposed to the impeachment of President 
     Clinton. My opposition is grounded in part in my belief that 
     a criminal conviction would be extremely difficult to obtain 
     in a court of law. There is very weak proof of the criminal 
     intent of the president.
       The Lewinsky affair is of questionable materiality to the 
     proceedings in which it was raised. And I believe that a jury 
     would be sympathetic to any person charged with perjury for 
     dancing around questions put to them that demanded an 
     admission of marital infidelity; that is, unless the answers 
     were essential to the resolution of a very substantial claim.
       On another level, I sense an impeachment under these 
     circumstances would prove extremely divisive for the country, 
     inflaming the passions of those who would see impeachment as 
     an attempt to thwart the election process for insubstantial 
     reasons. Perjury and obstruction of justice are serious 
     offenses. They are felonies. However, in my experience 
     perjury or obstruction of justice prosecutions of parties in 
     private civil litigation are rare. Rarer still are criminal 
     investigations in the course of civil litigation in 
     anticipation of incipient perjury or obstruction of justice. 
     In such circumstances prosecutors are justifiably concerned 
     about the appearance that government is taking the side of 
     one private party against another.
       The oath taken by witnesses demands full and truthful 
     testimony at depositions and in grand jury proceedings--
     excuse me, demands truthful testimony at depositions and in 
     grand jury proceedings. Nonetheless, imprecise, ambiguous, 
     evasive and even misleading responses to questions don't 
     support perjury prosecutions, even though such responses may 
     raise serious questions about the credibility of a witness on 
     a particular subject. Proof that a witness's testimony is 
     untrue is not sufficient alone to prove perjury, and to prove 
     that a witness is intentionally evasive or nonresponsive is 
     not sufficient to prove perjury either.
       Courts are rigorously literal in passing on questions of 
     ambiguity in the questions and the responses of witnesses 
     under oath, and generally give the accused the benefit of any 
     doubt on possible interpretations of the questions and the 
     meaning of the allegedly perjurious response. Perjury cases 
     are very difficult to win under the most favorable 
     circumstances.
       I believe the question of whether there were sexual 
     relations between the president and Ms. Lewinsky is 
     collateral to the harassment claim in the Jones case. The 
     president has confessed to an inappropriate relationship with 
     Ms. Lewinsky. The Jones case was dismissed and is now 
     settled. These circumstances simply would not warrant the 
     bringing of a criminal prosecution, and a criminal 
     prosecution would most likely fail. Certainly the exercise of 
     sound prosecutorial discretion would not dictate prosecuting 
     such a case.
       The consequences of the impeachment of the president of the 
     United States are far reaching. These consequences are grave, 
     and they impact the entire nation. Impeachment in my view 
     should not serve as a punishment for a president who has 
     admittedly gone astray in his family life, as grave as that 
     might be in personal terms.
       Where there is serious doubt, as there must be in this 
     case, prudence demands that Congress defer to the electoral 
     mandate. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
       Rep. Hyde. Thank you, Mr. Dennis.
       Mr. Noble.
       Mr. Noble. I too will attempt to keep my remarks within 10 
     minutes, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Minority 
     Member, and members of the committee, before I begin my 
     formal remarks, let me extend my thanks to the following 
     people who helped prepare me under these rushed 
     circumstances: my brother, James Noble, who is here with me 
     today; my research assistant, Russell Morris (sp), of NYU Law 
     School is here with me today; my students in my evidence 
     class, with whom I have spent the last two weeks talking 
     about impeachment, but not the impeachment of a president, 
     the impeachment of a witness. I have been trying to give them 
     hypotheticals with which they could learn or from which they 
     could learn. I told them I will be the best prop they will 
     have today.
       I am honored to appear before you today. I will discuss the 
     factors ordinarily considered by federal prosecutors and 
     federal agents in deciding whether to investigate, indict and 
     prosecute allegations of violations of federal criminal law.
       I submit that a federal prosecutor ordinarily would not 
     prosecute a case against a private citizen based on the facts 
     set forth in the Starr referral. My experience, which forms 
     the basis of my testimony, is as follows: I have served as an 
     assistant U.S. Attorney, a chief of staff and deputy 
     assistant attorney general in the Justice Department's 
     Criminal Division during the Reagan and Bush administrations, 
     and undersecretary of the Treasury for enforcement in the 
     Clinton administration, and I am currently a professor at the 
     New York University School of Law where I teach, as I said, a 
     course in evidence.
       When investigating a possible violation of the law, every 
     federal prosecutor must heed the guidelines of the Department 
     of Justice. DOJ guidelines recognize that a criminal 
     prosecution entails profound consequences for the accused and 
     the family of the accused, whether or not a conviction 
     ultimately results. Career federal prosecutors recognize that 
     federal law enforcement resources and federal judicial 
     resources are not sufficient to permit prosecution of every 
     alleged offense over which federal jurisdiction exists. 
     Federal prosecutors are told to consider the nature and 
     seriousness of the offense, as well as available taxpayer 
     resources. Often these resources are scarce and influence the 
     decision to proceed or not to proceed and a decision how to 
     proceed. Federal prosecutors may properly weight such 
     questions as to whether the violation is technical or 
     relatively inconsequential in nature, and what the public 
     attitude is towards prosecution under the circumstances of 
     the case. What will happen in the public confidence and the 
     rule of law if no prosecution is brought, or if a prosecution 
     results in an acquittal?
       Even before the Clinton-Lewinsky matter arose, DOJ 
     guidelines intimated that prosecutors should pause before 
     bringing a prosecution where the public may be indifferent or 
     even opposed to enforcement of a controlling statute, whether 
     on substantive grounds or because of a history of 
     nonenforcement, or because the offense involves essentially a 
     minor matter of private concern and the victim is not 
     interested in having it pursued.
       Yet public sentiment against should not discourage 
     prosecutors from bring charges simply because a biased and 
     prejudiced public is against prosecution. For example, in a 
     civil rights case or a case involving an extremely popular 
     political figure, it might be clear that the evidence of 
     guilt viewed objectively and by an unbiased fact-finder would 
     be sufficient to obtain and sustain a conviction. Yet the 
     prosecutor might reasonably doubt whether the jury would 
     convict. In

[[Page H11984]]

     such a case, despite his or her negative assessment of the 
     likelihood of a guilty verdict, based on factors extraneous 
     to an objective view of the law and facts, the prosecutors 
     may properly conclude that it is necessary and desirable to 
     commence of recommend prosecution, and allow the criminal 
     process to operate in accordance with its principles.
       During the civil rights era many prosecutions were brought 
     against people for locally popular but no less heinous crimes 
     against blacks. However, prosecutors should not bring charges 
     on public sentiment in favor of prosecution when a decision 
     to prosecute cannot be supported on grounds deemed legitimate 
     by the prosecutor.
       DOJ prosecutors are discouraged from pursuing criminal 
     prosecutions simply because probable cause exists. And a 
     number of the witnesses have already addressed this point. 
     Why? Because probable cause can be met in a given case, it 
     does not automatically warrant prosecution. Further 
     investigation may be warranted, and the prosecutor should 
     still take into account all relevant considerations in 
     deciding upon his or her course of actions. Prosecutors are 
     admonished not to recommend in an indictment charges that 
     they cannot reasonably expect to prove beyond a reasonable 
     doubt by the legally sufficient evidence at trial.
       It is one of the most important criteria that prosecutors 
     must consider. Prosecution should never be brought where 
     probable cause does not exist, and both as a matter of 
     fundamental fairness and in the interest of the efficient 
     administration of justice, no prosecution should be initiated 
     against any person unless the government believes that the 
     person will be found guilty by an unbiased trier of fact.
       Federal prosecutors and federal agents as a rule ought to 
     stay out of the private sexual lives of consenting adults. 
     Neither federal prosecutors nor federal investigators 
     consider it a priority to invest allegations of perjury in 
     connection with the lawful, extramarital, consensual, private 
     sexual conduct of citizens. In my view, this is a good thing. 
     From a proactive perspective, who among us would want the 
     federal government to initiate sting operations against 
     private citizens to see if we lie about our extramarital 
     affairs or the nature of our sexual conduct. Imagine a rule 
     that required all federal job applicants to answer the 
     following question under oath: ``Because we are concerned 
     about our employees being blackmailed about unusual or 
     inappropriate sexual conduct, and because we want to know 
     whether you would be at risk, please name every person with 
     whom you've had a sexual relationship or with whom you've had 
     sexual intercourse during your life. It certainly would be 
     relevant and it certainly might lead to blackmail.''
       Such a question would naturally lead to allegations of 
     perjured responses. Irrespective of constitutional challenges 
     from a public policy standpoint, most Americans would object 
     to federal prosecutors and federal agents investigating and 
     prosecuting those cases that came to our attention. Could we 
     trust our government to make fair, equitable and restrained 
     decisions about how much to investigate any one of these 
     allegations?
       The potential for abuse and violation of our right to 
     privacy would be great. Indeed, assigning federal agents to 
     interview witnesses, install wiretaps and insert bugs to 
     learn about the private, legal, sexual conduct of U.S. 
     citizens would concern us all. But aggressive prosecutors and 
     agents would do exactly that to make cases against those 
     citizens where prosecutions would garner publicity and 
     thereby act as a deterrent. In my view, the biggest target 
     would be politicians.
       As a general matter, federal prosecutors are not asked to 
     bring federal criminal charges against individuals who 
     allegedly perjure themselves in connection with civil 
     lawsuits. As a rule, federal prosecutors on their own do not 
     seek to bring criminal charges against people who perjure 
     themselves in connection with civil depositions, for the 
     reasons that have already been articulated. in addition, this 
     would open a floodgate of referrals. Parties by definition 
     are biased, and it would be difficult to discount the 
     potential bias.
       By their nature, lawsuits have remedies built into the 
     system. Lying litigants can be exposed as such and lose their 
     lawsuits. The judge overseeing the lawsuit is in the best 
     position to receive evidence about false statements, 
     deceitful conduct, and even perjured testimony. She can 
     sanction violating litigants by initiating civil or criminal 
     contempt proceedings.
       Notwithstanding the reasons generally, there are 10 good 
     reasons, taken in combination, which support the view that a 
     career federal prosecutor asked to investigate allegations 
     like those in the Clinton-Lewinsky matter would not pursue 
     federal criminal prosecution to the indictment or trial 
     stage. One, the alleged perjury occurred in a civil 
     deposition and concerned private, lawful, sexual conduct 
     between consenting adults. Two, the alleged perjured 
     testimony was deemed inadmissible by the trial judge. Three, 
     that evidence arguably was dismissed as immaterial by the 
     trial judge. Four, in any event, the alleged perjured 
     testimony was, at most, marginally relevant. Five, the 
     alleged perjured testimony did not affect the outcome of the 
     case.
       Six, the parties settled and a court dismissed the 
     underlying civil suit. Seven, the settlement of the suit 
     prevented the appellate court from ruling on a dismissal and 
     on the materiality of alleged perjured testimony. Eight, the 
     theoretically harmed party knew of the alleged perjury prior 
     to settlement. Nine, alleged--and I say alleged--political 
     enemies of the defendant funded it in a plaintiff's suit. 
     Ten, a federal government informant conspired with one of the 
     civil litigants to trap the alleged perjurer into perjuring 
     himself.
       Given the above considerations, most federal prosecutors 
     would not want to use taxpayer dollars, federal agents and 
     sensitive federal investigative resources to uncover the most 
     intimate and embarrassing details of the private sexual lives 
     of consenting adults when there is a risk of bias and when 
     there is a judge in a position to address the alleged 
     criminal conduct.
       The judgment that a career prosecutor might make about an 
     ordinary person might be very well affected by the knowledge 
     that the alleged perjury was committed by the president. That 
     is to be conceded. Even the most experienced, fair-minded 
     prosecutor will find it difficult not to pursue allegations 
     of criminal misconduct against a president, a senator, a 
     governor, any member of Congress. The interest in targeting, 
     threatening and harming the president, especially, can be 
     explained in part by the power and visibility of his office. 
     Even a prosecutor with exceptional judgment might be tempted 
     by the challenge of bringing down a president. A prosecutor 
     with unchecked power, unlimited resources and only one target 
     might find the temptation even stronger.
       Mr. Chairman, I believe I can conclude in two minutes, with 
     the permission of the chairman.
       Rep. Hyde. Two minutes?
       Mr. Noble. Two minutes.
       Rep. Hyde. Surely.
       Mr. Noble. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
       Rep. (Off mike.)
       Mr. Noble. Thank you, Mr. Coble.
       It is difficult to think of a fail-safe structure that 
     could protect anyone from allegations of bias in a decision 
     to prosecute or not prosecute the president. Not the attorney 
     general, the independent counsel, the Justice Department, the 
     FBI, the Secret Service, the federal judiciary, the congress, 
     the bar and the academy can escape some person or act in 
     their background that could create a conflict or an 
     appearance of a conflict. No one for or against prosecution 
     would be safe from attack on the merits or from false 
     personal attacks. For this reason, a prosecutor or a 
     committee assigned such a case must strive to be objective, 
     knowing that criticism of bias will be unavoidable.
       In a prosecutorial context, a 13-to-10 vote by the grand 
     jury constitutes enough votes to proceed, but reflects that 
     there must be, or might be, a serious problem with some 
     aspect of the case. Similarly, a vote for impeachment based 
     on a party-line vote or near party-line vote is a signal that 
     something is wrong or may be wrong with the case and that the 
     case may not be worth pursuing. This is particularly true 
     where the overwhelming majority of Americans appear to be 
     well-informed about the allegations and unbiased as a group, 
     yet they do not want this president impeached.
       While indictments and impeachment proceedings are 
     different, they carry at least two similarities. One, most of 
     us know it when we see the clear cases for criminal 
     conviction and for impeachment. Two, public confidence in the 
     rule of law and our system of government would suffer if we 
     regularly indicted cases or impeached presidents, only to 
     have juries or the Senate vote to acquit.
       In closing, I believe that the Justice Department got it 
     right and Independent Counsel Donald Smaltz got it wrong. 
     Indictments and impeachments that result in acquittal ought 
     to be avoided where possible. No prosecutor would be 
     permitted to bring a prosecution where she believed that 
     there was no chance that an unbiased jury would convict. 
     Almost no one in this country believes that the U.S. Senate 
     will convict the president on any potential article of 
     impeachment. Members of Congress should consider the impact 
     that a long and, no doubt, sensationalized trial will have on 
     the country, especially a trial that will not result in a 
     conviction.
       In the end, I am confident that you will give the weighty 
     responsibility that you must discharge serious consideration. 
     A vote against impeachment need not be viewed as a vote 
     against punishment. As Professor Steve Saltzburg noted before 
     you earlier this week, Judge Susan Webber Wright retains 
     jurisdiction over the case wherein the allegedly perjured 
     testimony occurred. She can hold civil or criminal contempt 
     hearings. Of all the arbiters of justice in this matter, she 
     is perceived as being the least biased. She can punish the 
     president for false and misleading conduct even if it does 
     not rise to the level of perjury or obstruction of justice. 
     Trust her to mete out the appropriate punishment.
       I thank you.
       Rep. Hyde. Thank you, Mr. Noble.
       Governor Weld.
       Mr. Weld. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member, members of the 
     committee, my name is William Weld and I am sincerely honored 
     to appear before you this morning.
       I'm no Tom Sullivan, but I have knocked around the criminal 
     justice world a little bit, from 1986 to 1988. Under 
     President Reagan I was the assistant attorney general in 
     charge of the criminal division in Washington, which is 
     relevant because that's the policy, or political appointment, 
     charged with ensuring the uniformity of charging decisions--
     decisions of whether to seek an indictment

[[Page H11985]]

     around the country, in various districts. Prior to that, for 
     five years I was the United States Attorney in Massachusetts.
       And I became familiar, in the course of that seven years, 
     with the handbook, ``The Principles of Federal Prosecution,'' 
     and with the United States attorneys manual and, when I was 
     in Washington, with the practices and procedures that also 
     have been developed over the years to try to ensure 
     uniformity in charging decisions.
       It so happens that in 1974, for nine months, I also worked 
     for this committee under Chairman Rodino on the impeachment 
     inquiry into President Nixon. And I worked on the 
     constitutional and legal unit there, which was charged with 
     reading every precedent--in Britain (sp), in Heinz (sp), in 
     Cannon (sp), in reported cases in the records of the 1787 
     debate on the Constitution--having any relevance at all to 
     what high crimes and misdemeanors means in the United States 
     Constitution.
       Like Mr. Sullivan, like many others, I do not consider 
     myself an advocate here before you. I do have a couple of 
     points of view that I would like to share with the members of 
     the committee, and you can take them for what they're worth. 
     Ordinarily, in a civil context, you don't qualify as an 
     expert on the basis of nine months' experience, but for 
     whatever they're worth.
       I do believe, Mr. Chairman, that under the Reagan 
     administration it was not the policy of the U.S. Justice 
     Department to seek indictments solely on the basis that a 
     prospective defendant had committed adultery or fornication, 
     which are not lawful, but it simply wasn't the policy to go 
     there. It was also not the policy to seek an indictment based 
     solely on evidence that a prospective defendant had falsely 
     denied committing unlawful adultery or fornication.
       And let me say a little bit about perjury cases. I don't 
     think they're all that rare, and I've prosecuted a lot of 
     them, but I do think that what one or two of the witnesses 
     said is true; there's usually something else involved in a 
     federal perjury prosecution. There's a pass-through aspect 
     here--you're really going to something else. I once 
     prosecuted a guy who stated that he was in Florida on 
     November 28th and 29th, 1981. You may say, that's kind of, 
     you know, stooping to pick up pins. Why would you prosecute 
     him for that? Well, that was the day the city of Lynn, 
     Massachusetts burned down, and this guy was an arsonist and 
     three people made him in the Porthole Pub in Lynn, 
     Massachusetts, that day, so--and we found his fingerprints on 
     a ticket to Florida the next day after the fire, so we 
     thought it would be a good idea to bring a perjury 
     prosecution there to rattle the cage a little bit, and we 
     did. And often, we brought them where we were trying to 
     penetrate a wall of silence, as in cases of public 
     corruption or narcotics, when you're trying to break 
     through this omerta, everyone's got to dummy up, 
     phenomenon. But there is something else that you're trying 
     to get at here.
       Until this year, the policy of the Department of Justice 
     was that in cases of false statements they would not seek an 
     indictment solely on the basis of somebody denying that they 
     themselves had committed misconduct. This is called the 
     ``exculpatory no'' doctrine, and it was adopted in a lot of 
     circuits. It was kicked out by the Supreme Court in a 
     decision by Justice Scalia early this year, based on bad 
     facts--you had a ranking union official who'd taken money 
     from employers in violation of an independent federal 
     statute--so that's the ``something else'' that the 
     prosecution was trying to get at. So, a very unsympathetic 
     case for the court applying the exculpatory no doctrine.
       In my view, it would have been a handy idea to carve out an 
     exception to the abrogation of that doctrine for cases 
     involving personal misconduct as opposed to a violation of an 
     independent federal statute such as was involved there. 
     Certainly, a responsible prosecutor could apply that filter 
     in the exercise of his or her discretion.
       The last thing, let me just say, on the law of impeachment, 
     I am pretty well convinced that adultery, fornication or even 
     a false denial--false--I'm assuming perjury here--false 
     denial of adultery or fornication, they do not constitute 
     high crimes and misdemeanors within the meaning of the 
     impeachment clause of the U.S. Constitution. They're not 
     offenses against the system of government, they don't imperil 
     the structure of our government.
       The remedy of impeachment is to remove the officeholder. 
     Get the worm out of the apple. It's a prophylactic--
     prophylactic remedy, it is not punitive. If any of you are 
     thinking, we've got to vote yes on impeachment to tarnish the 
     president, he's already tarnished, and that's really not the 
     purpose of the impeachment mechanism.
       Nobody's going to forget this stuff. This is a man who's 
     been elected president of the United States twice, and thus 
     entitled to this office, after allegations very similar to 
     those now before you.
       I hate to open old wounds, but you remember back in 1992 
     and the Gennifer Flowers matter; if there are two people in a 
     room and they both deny that something happened, then you 
     can't prove that it happened. Well, that's very similar to 
     what we're talking about here, and this officeholder was 
     elected president of the United States twice after all those 
     facts were before the people.
       So, I come out thinking that the most appropriate result is 
     something other than removing this person from his office, 
     taking his office away from him. There's a lot of talk about 
     censure. I think, personally, the dignity of Congress and the 
     dignity of the country demands something more than merely 
     censure here, and I would suggest, in conclusion, Mr. 
     Chairman, four things that you might want to think about, in 
     addition to censure.
       Number one, it's not unknown for grand juries investigating 
     corruption in a city or a county, for example, to issue a 
     written, detailed report of their findings. That could easily 
     be done here, be entirely proper. Number two, there could be 
     a written acknowledgement of wrongdoing on the part of the 
     president, and for reasons which will become evident in a 
     moment, I would not propose that there be insistence on the 
     use of the word ``lie'' or ``perjury'' there, but it's 
     something that could be negotiated to reflect the gravity of 
     what he has done.
       Number three, there could be an agreement to pay a fine. 
     This is something tangible, more tangible than censure, and 
     it involves the respondent as well as the moving party, the 
     moving party here being the House.
       And that would mark the moment. That would mark the 
     solemnity of the occasion. And the agreement would remove any 
     doubt about somebody going to court and saying there's no 
     basis for this. It would be thrown out on the basis of the 
     political question doctrine anyway, I think.
       I'm not here to say what the fine should be, but if memory 
     serves, Speaker Gingrich had to pay quite a large fine not so 
     long ago because people didn't like either the content or the 
     market of a college course that he taught. The members might 
     wish to consider providing that the fine could not be paid 
     out of the proceeds of a legal defense fund, given all the 
     background circumstances.
       Finally, what I am proposing, the final element would be 
     that the president would have to take his chances with 
     respect to the criminal justice process post his presidency. 
     I do not agree with those in the media who say that any deal 
     on censure has to protect the president against criminal 
     proceedings after he leaves office.
       First of all, there doesn't have to be any deal on censure. 
     That's entirely within your power. The White House has no 
     leverage there. Second, the Constitution explicitly says that 
     even if a president or anybody is impeached, convicted and 
     removed from office, they remain liable to trial and 
     indictment. It's very explicit. It's right in the 
     Constitution. If the objection is that the spectacle of a 
     former president being prosecuted would be tawdry and 
     degrading, it really couldn't be much more tawdry and 
     degrading than what we've already been subjected to through 
     the constant daily reports of the Lewinsky affair.
       Lastly, I agree with everyone who's spoken before about 
     whether a perjury prosecution here really lies. I think 
     there's quite a low risk of that from the point of view of 
     the president. So that's the suggestion. It's a political 
     suggestion, but this is in part a political process about a 
     five-part deal, if you will. And I think the dignity of the 
     House would be upheld if something like that were to be 
     approached, and everybody could perhaps get on more easily 
     with attending to the public's business.
       Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
       Rep. Hyde. Thank you, Governor. Mr. Sensenbrenner.
       Rep. Sensenbrenner. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
       As I'm sure all members of the panel know, the last 
     impeachment took place nine years ago, in 1989, against Judge 
     Walter Nixon of Mississippi. And in that impeachment, the 
     House of Representatives, by a vote of 417 to nothing, 
     declared that making false statements to a grand jury were 
     impeachable offenses. The Senate apparently agreed with the 
     House's judgment, because Judge Nixon was removed from office 
     on a 91-8 vote on both of those articles of impeachment.
       I'm wondering if members of the panel think that the House 
     made a mistake nine years ago in unanimously declaring that 
     making false statements to a grand jury were impeachable 
     offenses.
       Mr. Davis. One, I think you have to look at the proof. I 
     mean, first of all, I assume that there was proof as to what 
     the perjury that took place. I assume also that the perjury, 
     as I recall, went to the core issue in the matter in which 
     the perjury took place. So you had certain important factual 
     differences.
       I also think that there's an important difference when one 
     is considering the issue of a judge versus the president; 
     that judges, as others have testified, sit in terms of good 
     behavior, and so the standard is not precisely the same as 
     would be in removing a president who's elected by the public 
     and sits for only four years.
       And finally, I think that in terms of perjury, I do think 
     that one has to look a bit about what the underlying events 
     are. And I do think that since what we're talking about is a 
     private consensual relationship as being at the core of it, 
     that that affects the impeachability. But the bottom line is, 
     as I said in my statement, I don't think there's really the 
     proof, particularly as to grand jury perjury.
       Rep. Sensenbrenner. Well, just by way of background, the 
     events that led up to the Judge Nixon impeachment, which is 
     contrasted to the President Nixon impeachment--you've got to 
     be very particular here--involved a private affair, a 
     financial affair, where Judge Nixon allegedly accepted an 
     illegal gratuity of a sweetheart deal in an oil and gas 
     lease. He was acquitted of that charge by the jury at a 
     criminal trial.

[[Page H11986]]

       So here we're saying that the jury made a determination 
     that Judge Nixon did nothing wrong in terms of entering into 
     this oil and gas lease, but he was convicted by the jury of 
     the two counts of making false statements. So while there are 
     some differences, there are also some similarities in that 
     private misconduct was alleged as a part of the grand jury 
     investigation.
       I am concerned with the answers to your question, in that 
     you seem to be implying that the standard of truthfulness for 
     the president of the United States is less than a federal 
     judge someplace in the country because the president is 
     elected and the judge is appointed and holds office for good 
     behavior.
       Mr. Davis. No, I'm not saying----
       Rep. Sensenbrenner. You know, am I wrong on that?
       Mr. Davis. I'm not really saying that. I'm saying that the 
     standard for truthfulness is really the same. I'm saying that 
     here I don't think there's the proof, particularly as to the 
     grand jury, that you can make the case of perjury. And 
     second, what I'm saying is the standard for impeachment, not 
     the standard for truthfulness, but there are differences in 
     the standard of impeachment for a judge as opposed to the 
     president. And I think there's a lot of scholarship (for 
     that?).
       Rep. Sensenbrenner. Well, yesterday many of the president's 
     defenders were troubled about the alleged false statements to 
     the grand jury. And at least one of the witnesses that the 
     White House brought up here, former Congressman Owens, flat 
     out said that the president lied before the grand jury. 
     That's what the House found in terms of Judge Nixon. And, you 
     know, I'm concerned that if a judge lies to the grand jury, 
     we all agree that it's impeachable, and if the president lies 
     before the grand jury, then there is a huge debate about 
     whether or not that's impeachable. Now, who's going to stand 
     up for the truth here?
       Mr. Davis. Well, respectfully, I don't think that the 
     evidence supports the perjury in the grand jury, as 
     articulated in my statement.
       Rep. Sensenbrenner. Okay, thank you. I yield back my time.
       Rep. Hyde. The gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Conyers.
       Rep. Conyers. Gentlemen, I want to pay my highest 
     commendations to all of you here because you have now put on 
     the record, once and for all, all of these pestering 
     questions that have been tempting to be dealt with for so 
     many weeks and months now. You should, Ron, feel proud to go 
     back to your evidence class. You can hold your head high. And 
     I thank you all.
       Now, the important thing about this was that, unless I 
     missed something, none of you contradicted each other--
     nobody. And it seems to me that this testimony of you five 
     gentlemen ought to be bound up and delivered, which I would 
     elect to do. I need Pat Buchanan to get a copy of this, Tim 
     Russert, Cookie Roberts, George Will, Sam Donaldson and Ms. 
     Buchanan, Pat's sister, not because they object to all of 
     this, but because they are the ones that in the media 
     continue--with many others, of course--this nonsensical 
     debate about obvious legal questions that a first-year law 
     student could dispose of.
       And so what you've done here is of signal importance, from 
     my point of view. This should be studied carefully by 
     everybody that makes public utterances about the questions of 
     perjury and obstruction and how and when materiality figures 
     into the prosecutorial role.
       Now, this question has come up. I think I called it the 
     Scott question. Is there any case on record for a 
     prosecution, based on a case in which it was dismissed?
       It was an immaterial statement. There was a settlement to 
     boot. I mean, we are going through everything--has anybody 
     ever heard of a case like this? We need the citation right 
     away if there is, because I'll stop making this assertion.
       Mr. Sullivan. Mr. Conyers----
       Rep. Conyers. [continuing]. I can't guarantee you that 
     there is no such case, but I doubt it. As I said in my 
     remarks, the--well, the thrust of what I'm saying is that the 
     federal criminal process is simply not used to determine 
     truth or falsity in statements in civil litigation. And it's 
     particularly true--I mean, that's true, and it's also even 
     more true when you take a situation, as you have here, that 
     the testimony is even peripheral to the civil case involved. 
     The federal criminal justice system is not designed or 
     intended to enforce a code of moral conduct. That's not what 
     we do, or what I used to do and what the good federal 
     prosecutors do. I'm not saying you can't find an errant one 
     somewhere that will bring charges. But so far as I know, this 
     would be totally unprecedented, if such a case were brought.
       Rep. Conyers. Thank you.
       Mr. Davis, Mr. Noble, Governor, any other comments on this, 
     this matter?
       Mr. Dennis. Well, I agree. I mean, I do not disagree with 
     any of the statements that have been made by my colleagues 
     here on the panel. I have not considered the suggestions that 
     Governor Weld had made with regard to possible political 
     disposition of the matter. But I think that it's fairly clear 
     and that if a poll were taken of former U.S. attorneys from 
     any administration, you'd probably find the overwhelming 
     number of them would agree with the assessment that this case 
     is a loser and just would not be sustained in court.
       Rep. Hyde. The----
       Rep. Conyers. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think that 
     this is one of the most important panels that we've had 
     before us in the course of these proceedings.
       Rep. Hyde. Thank you, Mr. Conyers.
       The gentleman from Florida, Mr. McCollum.
       Rep. Bill McCollum (R-FL). Thank you very much, Mr. 
     Chairman.
       Mr. Sullivan, have you had an opportunity to review the 
     District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals decision 
     regarding the question of materiality and the issue before 
     us, you know, and the question of the independent counsel and 
     Lewinsky?
       Mr. Sullivan. I have read about it in the Starr report.
       I don't think I read the opinion of----
       Rep. McCollum. Well, it's--the decision just is unsealed 
     and available to us in the last week.
       Mr. Sullivan. That's why I have not.
       Rep. McCollum. And you may not be aware that the District 
     Court of Appeals opinion squarely addressed that issue of 
     materiality, and it found that her false sworn statement 
     would be material for the purposes of perjury law. In other 
     words, a false statement by the President in that case would 
     have been material. So I think we can put that materiality 
     question to rest that Mr. Conyers just raised.
       I also want to make a comment to you, Governor Weld. You 
     said that ``I do not believe that adultery, fornication, or 
     false denial of adultery or fornication constitutes high 
     crimes and misdemeanors within the meaning of the impeachment 
     clause of the Constitution of the United States.'' I agree 
     with you. But in this case, we're not dealing simply with 
     false statements or fornication or adultery, we're dealing 
     with potentially perjury, obstruction of justice, witness 
     tampering, things of that nature. And there's where you and I 
     may differ. And I think it is significant, albeit a civil 
     case.
       Mr. Sullivan, you and Mr. Davis and several others on the 
     panel pointed out how rare you think it for perjury cases to 
     be brought in federal court in civil cases, and yet we just 
     had Mary--Barbara Battalino, I should say, in here last week 
     as a witness, a very recent case in which a perjury case was 
     brought in a civil suit involving the Veterans' 
     Administration psychiatrist. And on August 4, 1998, a former 
     employee of the United States Postal Service, Diane Parker 
     (sp), was sentenced to 13 months in prison and three years of 
     supervised release for lying in a civil case regarding a 
     sexual relationship with a subordinate. And that, of course, 
     was a federal case. And I've got citations for 29 of these 
     cases, at least, sitting right here. There are 115 people, 
     minimally--maybe more than by now--serving in federal prison 
     today for perjury and, as I say, most of those or a great 
     many of those for civil perjury. So maybe the policy a few 
     years ago was different, but certainly prosecutors are 
     prosecuting in these sexual harassment-type cases and the 
     type of Battalino and Parker cases that we--that we're seeing 
     more of today than maybe we did back in 10 or 15 years ago.
       I also want to address the question that, Mr. Sullivan, you 
     raised and, I think, Mr. Davis, you raised in particular, 
     about perjury with regard to a single witness. Section 1623, 
     as you've pointed out, rightfully, does allow prosecution 
     with a single witness. And I dare say that about 90 percent 
     of the cases brought today that have resulted in people going 
     to prison in the federal system have been brought under that.
       I've looked at it, and that's who those 115 people 
     constitute.
       Now I'll agree with you, I think your analysis is good. You 
     need corroborative witnesses, even though it may not be 
     required. But let me go through what's here in the grand jury 
     case with respect to the perjury charged, and it's the same 
     underlying main issue in the deposition. You have a situation 
     in which the President of the United States says that he did 
     not commit or have sexual relations with Monica Lewinsky 
     under the definition as given in the court in the Jones case. 
     That court included in its definition explicitly the touching 
     of breasts or genitalia.
       Now, the president said, ``I didn't do that.'' He repeated 
     it very carefully in the grand jury testimony. Monica 
     Lewinsky said on nine occasions in her sworn testimony before 
     the grand jury the president touched her breast and on four 
     occasions, they had genital contact and that all of this was 
     to arouse.
       Now, the issue of corroboration, there are 10 corroborative 
     witnesses. Interestingly enough, strangely enough, Monica 
     Lewinsky talked contemporaneously with family members, 
     friends and relatives about these matters in great detail. 
     And we have 10 of those whose testimony is before us in sworn 
     testimony. Seven of the 10 corroborate the explicit detail 
     with regard to this touching under the definition of sexual 
     relations that Monica Lewinsky describes.
       Now, it seems to me that that kind of corroboration is 
     precisely the kind of corroboration that would in fact 
     engender a prosecution, would give confidence to a prosecutor 
     to take perjury cases forward, and would indeed give a high 
     probability of conviction if this were taken before a court 
     in any case--any court in this land. A jury would be hard 
     pressed not to convict under those circumstances.
       Mr. Davis. Mr. McCollum, if I----
       Rep. McCollum. So it strikes me as very strange that we're 
     dismissing this. Nobody, nobody on this panel and nobody 
     yesterday has mentioned the fact that these corroborating 
     witnesses exist. It seems to be something that the 
     president's advocates simply

[[Page H11987]]

     want to ignore. It's a bottom-line question in here, Mr. 
     Davis.
       Mr. Davis. I think I did address the----
       Rep. Sensenbrenner. Gentleman's time has expired.
       Rep. Nadler. Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman.
       Rep. Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from Massachusetts is 
     recognized.
       Rep. Nadler. Mr. Chairman.
       Rep. Frank. Mr. Chairman, I----
       Rep. Nadler. Mr. Chairman, before the gentleman from 
     Massachusetts, I request recognition for a moment.
       Rep. Sensenbrenner. For what purpose does the gentleman 
     from New York seek----
       Rep. Nadler. Mr. Chairman, the question that Mr. McCollum 
     just asked the witness is perhaps that central question of 
     this case.
       Rep. Frank. I'll give them time to answer.
       Rep. Nadler. And I'd ask that you give them time.
       Rep. Frank. I was just about to do that.
       Rep. Sensenbrenner. The--with yielding to continue on the 
     debate, that's going to mean that we're going to be here 
     until midnight. The chair will enforce the clock and the 
     rules that were laid down by Mr. Hyde at the beginning of 
     this hearing. If further members down the list want to have 
     questions answered when the time has run out, they can decide 
     to use their time to do that.
       The gentleman from Massachusetts is recognized.
       Rep. Frank. Anybody want to answer that question?
       Mr. Davis. Yes, I'd like to answer that. I think the 
     reasons why that prosecution would not win is one, as I said 
     in my statement, that both witnesses, including Miss 
     Lewinsky, had an incentive to lie. And she had an incentive 
     to lie not only to the grand jury on this issue but to her 
     confidants, because otherwise she would be acknowledging an 
     unreciprocated sexual relationship.
       But just as important, if you're talking about one witness 
     that Mr. Starr or any prosecutor is going to put forward, Mr. 
     Starr and his prosecutors themselves are going to have to 
     argue in this case that Miss Lewinsky's testimony in other 
     issues is not accurate. They're going to have to argue that. 
     They're going to be in a position where they're going to have 
     to say she's telling the truth as to this, not telling the 
     truth as to other things.
       Also, Miss Lewinsky in her testimony various times said she 
     had a similar definition of sexual relations.
       So I think that if you look at this from the perspective of 
     a trial lawyer, in terms of how this would play out, I think 
     this would be really an impossible case to develop.
       Rep. Frank. Mr. David, you've convinced me. We'll go on to 
     the next issue. I think that's absolutely right. All those 
     corroborating witnesses corroborated only what Ms. Lewinsky 
     had told them. No one has yet alleged that there was a kind 
     of Peeping Tom slot outside the Oval Office, where they could 
     have made any observation that would have made them in any 
     way relevant to the trial.
       We also ought to know telling the truth was not the most 
     noticeable characteristic of this set of interrelationships. 
     But I mean, I think, had the guy with the lamp been there, 
     he'd still be outside looking for someone to talk to if he 
     got involved with all of them.
       Ms. Lewinsky was herself threatened with prison, as was her 
     mother. And I do think that Mr. Starr's penchant for 
     threatening people with prison if they did not say bad things 
     about the president has some credibility relevance.
       But I wanted to just also talk about Judge Nixon. I'm 
     reading from the majority, and the gentleman from Wisconsin 
     said, ``Well, he perjured himself only about''--or he didn't 
     say ``only''--``he perjured himself about an oil and gas 
     deal.'' But I am reading from the majority's report, which 
     the majority issued earlier this year and staff kindly gave 
     to me, on pages 9 and 10, ``Judge Nixon lied about whether he 
     had discussed the case with the state prosecutor and had 
     influenced the state prosecutor to essentially drop the 
     case.'' In other words, the underlying issue here was not 
     simply a private oil and gas deal, but a federal judge 
     intervening with a state prosecutor to get him to drive 
     (sic) the case. And that's what I--I was particularly 
     interested in Mr. Weld's presentation and others.
       One of the arguments we've had here is that looking at the 
     underlying issue in a perjury allegation is somehow a--to 
     traduce the law and to undercut it. And I would like to ask 
     all of you, because I think this becomes now a central issue 
     in this case--when you are deciding how to deal with 
     allegations of perjury--because I don't believe that anybody 
     would be able to prove grand jury perjury; I do think that 
     with regard to the deposition, it would be easier, and the 
     president did unfortunately, in my judgment, when he said he 
     couldn't remember being alone, transgress--but on the 
     question about whether or not you take into account the 
     underlying issue, in the case of Judge Nixon, the underlying 
     issue was talking to a state prosecutor and intervening to 
     get his partner's son's conviction lessened--I think very 
     different.
       This is the central case--as prosecutors, all of you, is it 
     wrong to take into account the underlying cause where there 
     is a perjury allegation? Mr. Weld has said that in his 
     experience, perjury is usually a way to get at a broader 
     issue. So let me start with Mr. Weld.
       Mr. Weld. Well, I agree, Mr. Congressman. I think the 
     underlying conduct is important. I mean, I would agree, in a 
     way, on the law, with Representative Sensenbrenner, 
     Representative McCollum; I do think that false statements to 
     a grand jury can easily be grounds for impeachment.
       I think I had the Judge Nixon case for a while when I was 
     at Justice, and my recollection is that there was clouds of 
     corruption in the background of that----
       Rep. [off mike]--foreground.
       Mr. Weld [continuing]. And perhaps in the foreground, of 
     that case. So, you know, I think, looking at the underlying 
     conduct--and that's another way of saying what Mr. Dennis, 
     Mr. Noble, others have said, that there's a test of 
     substantiality--Mr. Davis said it, as well--in assessing the 
     totality of circumstances in making a charging decision 
     whether to go forward in a perjury case. And it's really more 
     substantiality than materiality that I think might be the 
     rock you run up against.
       Rep. Frank. Thank you, Mr. Weld.
       Let me just say in closing, there's a point I wanted to 
     make, and I was particularly grateful to the former governor 
     of my state for making it, as a man who understands the 
     broader democratic, with a small ``d,'' implications here. He 
     made a very important point when he acknowledged the 
     president has been tarnished. Bill Clinton is a man who 
     clearly thinks a lot about how he is going to be regarded, 
     and the argument that somehow he will be walking away 
     unpunished if he is censured and has had this and other 
     proceedings, I think, is very inaccurate, and I appreciate 
     Mr. Weld bringing that out.
       Rep. Sensenbrenner. The gentleman's time has expired.
       The gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Gekas.
       Rep. George Gekas (R-PA). I thank the chair.
       Mr. Sullivan, you had repeated today what we have heard in 
     different ways over the months of this controversy, that the 
     president is neither above the law nor below the law, 
     implying, I believe, on your part that if it were an ordinary 
     citizen, not the president of the United States, that this 
     case would have been dismissed out of hand, and therefore, 
     the same premise should have been accorded to the president 
     because he's not below the standard or above the standard 
     that you would apply to an ordinary citizen.
       I see such a big difference that it's hard for me to 
     articulate it, but suppose the ordinary citizen in your set 
     of circumstances had pleaded the Fifth Amendment. You would 
     have, undoubtedly, honored that and then we may never have 
     heard of it at all, that case, in the body politic. And I 
     would submit that the Fifth Amendment is pleaded regularly 
     across the land and we never get results from that kind of 
     case. But if the president of the United States had pleaded 
     the Fifth Amendment, you would agree that there would have 
     been headlines acorss the world and that there would have 
     been a shaken seat of government in Washington, D.C. Or don't 
     you think that would have been as dramatic as I think it 
     would have been?
       Mr. Sullivan. Had the president, instead of testifying in 
     the grand jury, had taken the Fifth Amendment, I'm certain it 
     would result in a great deal of publicity, probably adverse.
       I don't think that it changes the issue of whether he's 
     above or below the law.
       Rep. Gekas. But my point is that you are asserting with me 
     that this high-profile case that would have been a result of 
     the president pleading Fifh Amendment makes it a different 
     situation. It is possible, I believe, that the Congress, that 
     the House, could begin impeachment proceedings if that alone 
     had happened--the pleading of the Fifth Amendment by the 
     presieent--as being a political problem, a political affront 
     to the system of government.
       Mr. Sullivan. Do you think taking the Fifth Amendment is a 
     high crime or misdemeanor?
       Rep. Gekas. No, no, no. No, I'm saying that it----
       Mr. Sullivan. The Constitution gives everyone the right to 
     take the Fifth Amendment and the jury is instructed that they 
     are not to take any inference from that.
       Rep. Gekas. No, no, no, no. What I'm saying is that it 
     could serve--it could--what I'm saying to you, sir, is that 
     in pleading the Fifth Amendment it becomes a high profile 
     case, and----
       Mr. Sullivan. There's no doubt about that.
       Rep. Gekas. And when----
       Mr. Sullivan. I'm sorry if I interrupted.
       Rep. Gekas. If the president did so, you can't argue that 
     case. It would be--you already admitted that it would be a 
     high-profile case.
       Mr. Sullivan. I admit that, of course. But I don't think 
     it's relevant here.
       Rep. Gekas. Well, I'm asking questions concerning it.
       Mr. Sullivan. Go ahead.
       Rep. Gekas. The fact that it becomes a high-profile case 
     means that when the president of the United States takes some 
     kind of legal action, like committing false or stating 
     falsehoods under oath, that we cannot treat it as just 
     another case, but whether or not the president attacks the 
     system of government that is so important to us. Governor 
     Weld makes a great deal out of the fact that what the 
     president did, no matter how we couch it, is not an attack on 
     the system of government.
       Yet we submit, many of us, that when he undertakes to make 
     false statements under oath that he is directly attacking two 
     segments of our system of government: one, the

[[Page H11988]]

     rights, the constitutional rights of a fellow American 
     citizen who has instituted a case in which he, if he did 
     those falsehoods, was trying to destroy that individual's 
     right to pursue a case. That is an attack, some of us might 
     conclude, against our system of government.
       And secondly, in affronting the judicial system, the other 
     third branch of government by directly giving false 
     statements under oath could be considered, could it not, as 
     an attack on the delicate balance of separation of powers, 
     his disdain for the judicial system? We have to take that 
     into consideration, do we not, Governor?
       Mr. Weld. It could be so considered, Mr. Congressman; those 
     arguments, while fair on their face, strike me as on the 
     technical side, but I understand what you're saying.
       Rep. Gekas. I thank. I have no further questions.
       Rep. Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from New York, Mr. 
     Schumer.
       Rep. Charles Schumer (D-NY). Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
       First, I want to compliment this panel. I think it was an 
     extremely strong and erudite presentation from all five of 
     you. It was an excellent panel, and I appreciate your putting 
     the time and effort into it.
       When I look at where we're headed here, I think there are 
     sort of three levels of argument. The level we addressed 
     yesterday was dispositive for me and for some of us, and that 
     is that even if you assume all of Mr. Starr's facts to be 
     true and that the president did wrong, however one would 
     define that wrong, it does not rise to the level of high 
     crimes and misdemeanors and doesn't merit impeachment. I 
     think that case was made very well yesterday by the first 
     panel.
       The second level of the case would be--the next two levels 
     relate to you folks, and that is, if you assume the opposite, 
     that if Starr's facts are correct, if Mr. Starr's facts are 
     correct, then impeachment is warranted, there are two parts 
     to that. One is the abuse of power and obstruction of justice 
     charges, which seem to most, myself included, to be at a 
     higher level, and the next go to the perjury charges. So let 
     me ask you about each of those.
       First, on the abuse of power charge, which even many on 
     this committee feel went too far, do any of you think there's 
     any merit to that charge being filed, whether it be--well, 
     you can't even make the case to a citizen, because it relates 
     to the president being president. Do any of you feel that 
     charge has any merit whatsoever? (No audible response.) Okay. 
     Let the record show that nobody did. And I don't want to 
     spend much time on that.
       On the obstruction of justice, there seem to be three 
     specific areas that at least Mr. Starr talked about. One was 
     the finding of the attempt to find Ms. Lewinsky a job; the 
     second, the discussions between Ms. Lewinsky and the 
     president about what they would say if confronted with their 
     relationship; and the third about Ms. Currie's testimony and 
     so-called being coached about that testimony.
       When we examined that, and when I questioned actually Mr. 
     Starr himself about those and I asked him what greater 
     evidence did he have to the president making a determination 
     that he wished to influence the judicial process, as opposed 
     not having his wife, his friends, his staff, the nation find 
     out about his relationship, Starr didn't point to any 
     evidence. It was simply surmise.
       Would any of you care to comment on that group of charges?
       Mr. Sullivan. Mr. Schumer----
       Rep. Schumer. Mr. Sullivan?
       Mr. Sullivan [continuing]. Can I comment on the one about 
     Mrs. Currie?
       Rep. Schumer. Yes.
       Mr. Sullivan. Because that's the one I didn't allude to in 
     my statement.
       Rep. Schumer. Correct.
       Mr. Sullivan. Mrs. Currie testified that she did not feel 
     that the president came and asked her some questions in a 
     leading fashion--``Was this right? Is this right? Is this 
     right?''--after his deposition was taken in the Jones case. 
     And she testified that she did not feel pressured to agree 
     with him and that she believed his statements were correct--
     --
       Rep. Schumer. Correct, right.
       Mr. Sullivan [continuing]. And agreed with him. He--the 
     quote is, ``He would say, `Right,' and I could have said, 
     `Wrong.'''
       Now that is not a case for obstruction of justice. It is 
     very common for lawyers, before the witness gets on the 
     stand, to say, ``Now you're going to say this, you're going 
     to say this, you're going to say this.''
       Rep. Schumer. Right.
       Mr. Sullivan. Now it doesn't make a difference if you've 
     got two participants to an event and you try to nail it down, 
     so to say.
       Rep. Schumer. Do you all of you agree with that, with the 
     Currie--the Currie----
       Mr. ------. Yeah.
       Rep. Schumer. And on the other two, the Lewinsky parts of 
     this, is there----
       Mr. Davis. I think to some----
       Rep. Schumer. I mean, I don't even understand how they 
     could--how Starr could think that he would have a case, not 
     with the president of the United States, but with anybody 
     here, when it seems so natural and so obvious that there 
     would be an overriding desire not to have this public and to 
     have everybody--have the two of them coordinate their 
     stories--that is, the president and Miss Lewinsky--if there 
     were not the faintest scintilla of any legal proceeding 
     coming about. It just strikes me as an overwhelming stretch. 
     Am I wrong to characterize it that way? You gentlemen all 
     have greater experience than I do.
       Mr. Davis. I think you're right. And also, the problem a 
     prosecutor would face would be that in these cases, there is 
     relationship between these people unrelated to the existence 
     of the Paula Jones case--the relationship. And that's the 
     motivation----
       Rep. Schumer. Correct.
       And Mr. Weld, do you disagree with--do you agree with that?
       Rep. Sensenbrenner. The gentleman's time--the gentleman's 
     time----
       Rep. Schumer. Could I just ask Mr. Weld for a yes or no----
       Rep. Sensenbrenner. I'm sorry, Mr. Schumer. Mr. Schumer----
       Rep. Schumer [continuing]. For a yes or no answer on that?
       Rep. ------. Can you answer that yes or no, Governor?
       Mr. Weld. I think it's a little thin, Mr. Congressman.
       Rep. Schumer. Thank you.
       Rep. Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. 
     Coble.
       Rep. Howard Coble (R-NC). Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
       Good to have you all with us.
       Governor Weld, I have a handful of friends who reside in 
     your state, and Democrats and Republicans alike, without 
     exception, speak very favorably of you.
       Mr. Weld. Well, I have friends in your state, too, Mr. 
     Congressman.
       Rep. Coble. Do they speak favorably of me, governor? 
     [Laughter]
       Governor, last fall, you appeared on the Today Show, 
     alluding to the possibility of resignation of the president, 
     I'm quoting in part here, you said, ``My sort of rule of 
     thumb here, I think it comes down to this: If when the 
     president goes to a high school and colleges and 
     universities, really his strongest point, if he looks out at 
     those kinds, those students and their teachers and sees a sea 
     of signs that says, ``liar, liar, pants on fire,'' it's time 
     to go. ``Do you think, Governor, at this late stage of the 
     game, what is your view on the possibility of resignation?
       Mr. Weld. Well, in a way, I say this with a heavy heart, 
     because I was troubled by the conduct at issue here. But I 
     think that events have overtaken that possibility. I remember 
     saying and thinking that the president would be well advised, 
     when he looked in the mirror shaving every morning to say, 
     ``Are people taking me seriously? Are they taking me 
     seriously at home? Are they taking me seriously abroad?''
       I was concerned that some international events that were 
     happening around then were happening because of a perception 
     of weakness at the core of the executive of the U.S. 
     government. But what happens, you know, the week after I 
     deliver myself of these wise sentiments, the president goes 
     to the United Nations and gets a standing ovation. Then he 
     goes into the budget negotiation with members of the opposite 
     party, and by most accounts, gets, you know, better than half 
     a loaf. Then he has the Wye agreements on the Middle East.
       So, it appears to me that people are taking him seriously.
       Rep. Coble. Thank you, sir.
       Mr. Davis, in a Washington Post interview comparing the 
     impeachment process with Watergate, you indicated that we're 
     in an uglier political time now. Now much has been said about 
     the late President Kennedy's sexual indiscretions that were 
     not publicized but however were commonly known. And many of 
     those same people insist that those indiscretions would be 
     publicized today. And I'm not convinced, sir, that we're in 
     an uglier political climate or a political time, I think, 
     rather, the members of the media are probing more thoroughly 
     and probing more consistently. And I think probably that may 
     be why more attention is focused today.
       Now let me ask you this, Mr. Davis.
       Would you--I started to say ``wouldn't you'' but I'd be 
     speaking for you. Would you acknowledge that this committee's 
     consideration of whether grand jury perjury and civil 
     deposition perjury and potential witness tampering by the 
     president--not saying it happened, but assuming that it did--
     that it merits impeachment is a legitimate exercise for this 
     committee? Would you acknowledge that?
       Mr. Davis. I think that it's appropriate for the committee 
     to be conducting a review. I think there are issues in terms 
     of whether the committee can meet what I believe is the 
     committee's burden, if it's going to decide that there should 
     be impeachment, without really itself satisfying itself as to 
     the credibility of some of the core witnesses, like Ms. 
     Lewinsky. But I think given--once you received the referral, 
     I think, obviously, it was appropriate for you to consider 
     that referral and consider it seriously.
       Rep. Coble. Governor Weld, neither am I Tom Sullivan. But 
     Mr. Sullivan--this has been broached previously, but I want 
     to broach it as well. You indicated that it was your belief 
     that probably the average citizen probably would not be 
     prosecuted for similar circumstances that are now before us.
       Mr. Sullivan. Yes, sir.
       Rep. Coble. And it was referred that two average citizens 
     last week--one a physician, one a basketball coach appeared--
     sat where you are sitting now, and they in fact were 
     prosecuted. I'm inclined to think, Mr. Sullivan--and I'm not 
     mad; by no means am I taking you to task for this, but I 
     think what you said may well be subject to interpretation. I 
     think perhaps--and maybe it's because of the uglier time or 
     the fact that the

[[Page H11989]]

     media is more focused now, I think probably that you would 
     see more and more average citizens prosecuted for perjury. 
     But I'll be glad to hear from you in response to that.
       Mr. Sullivan. Well, Mr. Coble, I'm aware of the fact that 
     there are some few prosecutions for perjury arising out of 
     civil matters when--but----
       Rep. Coble. Mr. Sullivan, I hate to do it to you, but I see 
     time's up.
       Rep. Sensenbrenner. Time's up.
       Rep. Coble. Thank you, Mr. Sullivan.
       Rep. Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from California, Mr. 
     Berman.
       Rep. Howard Berman (D-CA). Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
       Actually, the question I'm most curious about is whether, 
     Mr. Davis, if there had been a cooling-off period, and if 
     President Ford hadn't issued the pardon, what do you think 
     Mr. Jaworski would have done?
       Mr. Davis. The answer is I don't know. Indeed, the reason 
     that in my memorandum I recommended a cooling-off period and 
     felt that we should defer that decision was because I thought 
     the emotions at the time were too high and one would have to 
     balance the factors very carefully including, as I said in my 
     statement, whether the public interest in saying, you know, 
     ``we've had two years of this we need to get on to something 
     else, and shouldn't we do it'' and that a prosecution would 
     drag that out.
       Rep. Berman. Well, I agree with the other comments. I think 
     this panel has presented some very compelling testimony on 
     all the pitfalls in pursuing a perjury prosecution in this 
     situation and raised doubts about whether all the elements of 
     perjury are present in this case. We're not a courtroom; some 
     people keep wanting to analogize us to that. I thought the 
     professors yesterday were a political body, and this is a 
     political process in many, many ways. The Founding Fathers 
     would have given this process to the Supreme Court if they 
     had wanted a strict legal analysis.
       So your testimony perhaps on the question of whether there 
     would be a prosecution for perjury is less relevant to 
     whether there are high crimes and misdemeanors here than it 
     is to the question of whether one of the articles of 
     impeachment should actually assert the conclusion, the legal 
     conclusion, that perjury has been committed, and I would hope 
     the framers of these articles would look at this testimony 
     carefully in making that decision.
       The point that does interest me--for those who want to 
     analogize it to a legal proceeding, this notion of--even if I 
     think, as a prosecutor, that I have probable cause and I 
     believe that the accused is guilty, that if I known I can't 
     get a conviction from an unbiased jury, I don't bring the 
     case. Develop that a little bit more. Is this some--is this 
     a--is this some formalized process that prosecutors use? 
     Where did you get this from?
       Mr. Sullivan. Mr. Berman, I can only speak from my 
     experience as a prosecutor, but I have had situations where 
     not my assistants, but agents, have said to me after the 
     discussion about the evidence and we concluded that we cannot 
     get a conviction, or it's likely we'd lose, ``Let's indict 
     him anyhow to show him.'' My response to that is, ``Get out 
     of my office and never come back.''
       Rep. Frank. But you might try to become an independent 
     counsel, you might tell that person. [Laughter.]
       Rep. Berman. So, then, for those who want to--let me ask 
     you, are there any other comments on that? Yeah.
       Mr. Weld. This is written into the principles of federal 
     prosecution, Mr. Congressman, which is the handbook that 
     guides federal prosecutors. And what it says about the 
     charging stage of the criminal justice process is that the 
     prosecutor has to believe that there's sufficient admissible 
     evidence--admissible evidence--to obtain from a reasonable, 
     unbiased jury a conviction and to sustain it on appeal.
       Rep. Berman. Now, as I understand, though, in the Justice--
     there is a second paragraph in the Justice Department 
     qualification. If you are bringing in the case in the South 
     involving civil rights with an all-white jury and where 
     certain practices were prevalent, you wouldn't refuse to 
     bring that case against some crimes against a black victim 
     simply because your fears in the 1960s or '50s that an all-
     white jury might never convict. But--so if that's the--you 
     wouldn't--that wouldn't cause you to stop bringing in the 
     case, I assume.
       Mr. Weld. That's why it says ``reasonable and unbiased.''
       Rep. Berman. Right. And, of course, so you'd have to 
     conclude here that the United States Senate, by conclusion, 
     you'd have to reach a conclusion that they were somehow not a 
     reasoned and unbiased jury to apply that logic in this 
     situation.
       Mr. Noble. May I just respond? And let me quote you from 
     the Department of Justice guidelines, because they use 
     precisely that example to make that point. And they say, and 
     I quote:
       ``For example, in a civil rights case or a case involving 
     an extremely popular political figure, it might be clear that 
     the evidence of guilt viewed objectively by an unbiased fact-
     finder would be sufficient to obtain and sustain a conviction 
     if the prosecutor might reasonably doubt whether the jury 
     would convict. In such a case, despite his or her negative 
     assessment of the likelihood of a guilty verdict based on 
     factors extraneous to an objective view of the law and the 
     facts, the prosecutor may properly conclude that it is 
     necessary and desirable to commerce or recommend prosecution 
     and allow the criminal process to operate in accordance with 
     its principles.''
       Rep. Hyde. The gentleman's time has expired.
       The gentleman from Texas, Mr. Smith.
       Rep. Lamar Smith (R-TX). Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. 
     Chairman, I have an observation and then a question for 
     Governor Weld.
       I have to say that I fundamentally disagree with the 
     premise of this panel, which is that the President should be 
     considered, quote, ``an ordinary citizen.'' And therefore I 
     disagree with their conclusion.
       To me, the president has a special responsibility that goes 
     beyond that of an ordinary citizen.
       He holds the most powerful position in the world. He is the 
     number one law enforcement official of our country. He sets 
     an example for us all. Other people in other positions of 
     authority, such as a business executive or a professional 
     educator or a military officer, if they had acted as the 
     President is alleged to have acted, their careers would be 
     over, and yet they don't hold near the position of authority 
     that the President does.
       Let me read a statement from the rules under which 
     President Nixon was tried for impeachment. It says, ``The 
     office of the President is such that--the office of the 
     President is such that it calls for a higher level of conduct 
     than the average citizen in the United States.'' Because of 
     the President's special authority, I think it makes the 
     charges against him more serious, and therefore, in my 
     judgment, at least, demands that any punishment be more 
     severe. the way there, let me compliment you for offering a 
     well thought-out alternative to impeachment. And that's 
     not to say I agree with it; it's just a well though-out 
     alternative, I think.
       I want to read a couple of statements from students at 
     Roxbury Latin School, which is, I'm sure you know, a school 
     in Boston. This was a column that appeared in the Boston 
     Globe that was written by their headmaster. And apparently, 
     he conducted a couple of school forums, and these are for 
     students aged 12 to 18, and suggested to the students that 
     they accept the president's statement of regret. He said, 
     ``They would have none of it,'' and then he generalized their 
     reactions, which I want to read. And these are quotes.
       ``You've got to be kidding. This wasn't some one-time lapse 
     in the face of sudden and unexpected temptation. The 
     president did this over and over, plotting meetings with 
     Monica Lewinsky in the White House, including one on Easter 
     just after he was pictured coming out of church, Bible in 
     hand.''
       ``Clinton lied passionately, looking us in the eye; then he 
     played word games; but he never told the truth until he was 
     caught.''
       ``Cheating by students usually results in suspension. 
     Repeat cheating brings expulsion. Clinton cheated repeatedly. 
     The only difference is that Clinton is a lot older than we 
     are, supposedly a lot wiser, and he holds the highest public 
     office there is.''
       ``Maybe we're naive, but people our age want to look up to 
     the president. What we see when we look at Clinton is someone 
     who can't control himself and lies to his fellow citizens.'' 
     End quote.
       Governor Weld, aren't those students generally right in 
     their assessment?
       Mr. Weld. Well, Mr. Congressman, I don't think anybody's 
     saying this is a day at the beach or a walk in the park. This 
     is not a strong outing by the president, and I find those 
     statements as depressing as you do. And as I was discussing 
     with Mr. Coble a moment ago, if that kind of attitude and 
     reaction had persisted in the citizenry at large----
       Rep. Smith. I understand your answer, and I appreciate it. 
     Thank you very much.
       I'll yield back the balance of my time.
       Rep. Hyde. Thank the gentleman.
       Mr. Boucher.
       Rep. Rick Boucher (D-VA). Thank you very much, Mr. 
     Chairman.
       I would like to join with you and the other members who 
     have congratulated this panel on what I think is the very 
     excellent presentation this morning. And I would like to join 
     in the welcome of these distinguished witnesses here.
       Mr. Weld, I was very interested in your statement, with 
     which I would wholly concur, that the intent of the 
     impeachment power was to protect the public interest, and 
     that the standard that Congress should apply in determining 
     whether acts of the President constitute impeachable conduct 
     is the public interest; and your further statement that 
     impeachment should not be deemed to be punishment for that 
     individual misconduct, that the punishment can occur in the 
     regular course.
       You cited the constitutional provision that says that for 
     any crimes that are committed during the tenure of the 
     presidency, the president can be indicted and tried, just as 
     any other American.
       I gather, however, from the thrust of the testimony of this 
     panel of witnesses, that perjury prosecutions in civil 
     actions are rarely undertaken. I gather also that perjury 
     prosecutions generally, while undertaken on occasion, are not 
     the first resort of prosecutors in most cases. But in this 
     particular instance, there is yet another avenue in which the 
     president potentially could be sanctioned for any misconduct 
     that may have occurred in his testimony under oath, and that 
     is in the U.S. district court in Arkansas, which had 
     jurisdiction of the Jones case.
       It has been suggested by a number of witnesses to this 
     committee that that judge retains jurisdiction even though 
     the case itself

[[Page H11990]]

     has now been formally dismissed by the eighth circuit court 
     of appeals; that if she decides it is appropriate to do so, 
     that she could impose sanctions based on any misconduct that 
     may have occurred in the deposition that was taken in her 
     court.
       I would like the opinion of these witnesses with regard to 
     whether or not that is an accurate statement of the 
     jurisdictional posture of that case. Does she have the 
     jurisdiction to do that? And based on your very extensive 
     experience with regard to criminal prosecutions, do you think 
     there is a probability or likelihood, or how would you rate 
     the chances that if she deems that misconduct occurred there 
     that she might be led to take actions and impose some 
     sanction? That might be the more probable way in which some 
     sanction occurs, as opposed to a criminal prosecution. So who 
     would like to answer? I'll ask you first, Mr. Sullivan.
       Mr. Sullivan. There is, under the United States Supreme 
     Court decisions, inherent power in the district court in 
     civil cases to impose sanctions for misconduct occurring 
     before the court. So there's no question about that. That 
     case was decided several years ago.
       Your second part was, what would happen if she were to do 
     this? Not having brought my crystal ball with me, I can't 
     tell you. But she does have that power to pursue that, so far 
     as I know. I do not know whether the dismissal of the case 
     terminates that power. That's an issue I really haven't 
     looked at.
       Rep. Boucher. Does anyone else have a comment on that 
     issue? Let me ask this additional question. Mr. Noble, I was 
     very interested in your saying that this Congress should 
     consider, in deciding whether or not to vote articles of 
     impeachment, the effect that the House voting articles of 
     impeachment and the Senate being put to trial would have on 
     the country, the further polarization that would occur, the 
     diversion of the President and the Congress from their 
     real responsibility, which is attending to our national 
     agenda, the potential immobilization of the Supreme Court 
     while the chief justice presides, the lowering of the 
     standard of impeachment in proceedings in future years.
       I am concerned that, in fact, some members of this 
     Congress, not fully having considered those effects, may have 
     decided to apply a lower standard to determining whether or 
     not articles of impeachment should be approved and believe 
     that perhaps the House should act as a grand jury and simply 
     vote on probable cause. Do you agree that there ought to be a 
     higher standard than probable cause for us to consider this 
     weighty matter?
       Mr. Noble. This follows on Mr. Smith's comments. It's clear 
     that before the public the President is not an ordinary 
     citizen. It's clear that before Congress the President is not 
     an ordinary citizen. It's clear that any rational criminal 
     investigator or federal agent investigating an allegation of 
     perjury by a president of the United States is not going to 
     treat it like the ordinary case. It's clear, based on 
     everything we've heard, that most of us believe, without 
     looking at specific evidence, that the President either did 
     perjure himself or didn't perjure himself.
       Rep. Hyde. The gentleman's time has expired. Do you have a 
     finishing sentence or two?
       Mr. Noble. I can do it in one minute--or I'll just wait. 
     I'll wait.
       Rep. Hyde. Thank you.
       Rep. Boucher. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
       Rep. Hyde. Thank you. The gentleman from California, Mr. 
     Gallegly.
       Rep. Elton Gallegly (R-CA). Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
     Gentlemen, thank you for being here this morning. Mr. 
     Sullivan, for the record, do you believe that the knowing and 
     willful misleading of a judge or federal grand jury 
     represents an effort to thwart the judicial system from 
     discovering the truth?
       Mr. Sullivan. Could you repeat the question, please?
       Rep. Gallegly. Do you believe that willful misleading of a 
     judge or federal grand jury represents an effort to thwart 
     the judicial system from discovering the truth, for the 
     record?
       Mr. Sullivan. It sounds like what you said is correct, if I 
     understand it.
       Rep. Gallegly. [Laughs.] Thank you. You know, the evidence 
     indicates that the President and Mrs. Lewinsky, or Ms. 
     Lewinsky, had three conversations about her testifying in the 
     Jones case within one month before his deposition. When the 
     President was asked, ``Have you ever talked to Ms. Lewinsky 
     about the possibility that she might be asked to testify in 
     this lawsuit?'' he answered, ``I'm not sure.'' Governor Weld, 
     do you think it's reasonable--you know the president pretty 
     well--to believe that the President completely forgot 
     about these three conversations?
       Mr. Weld. I really don't know, Mr. Congressman.
       Rep. Gallegly. Thank you, Governor. When the president was 
     asked, ``At any time, were you and Monica Lewinsky together 
     alone in the Oval Office?'' he answered, ``I don't recall.'' 
     The evidence indicates that he was, in fact, alone with Ms. 
     Lewinsky on many occasions, including the time that they 
     exchanged gifts less than 20 days before the deposition. Mr. 
     Sullivan, for this not to be perjury, the President must have 
     genuinely forgot his numerous encounters with Ms. Lewinsky. 
     Is that correct for it not to be perjury?
       Mr. Sullivan. Yes, the evidence in a perjury case requires 
     proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant not only 
     made a false statement but knew it was false at the time it 
     was made. That's correct.
       Rep. Gallegly. And if--and the test would be that he 
     genuinely forgot in order for that not to be perjury. Is that 
     correct?
       Mr. Sullivan. That's my understanding.
       Rep. Gallegly. Thank you very much, Mr. Sullivan. You know, 
     the president's action of being less than truthful has caused 
     and continues to cause serious problems. I'm concerned about 
     how his lying affects the ability of the American people to 
     trust the highest elected official in the land.
       One of my constituents called me yesterday, a constituent 
     by the name of Les Savage (sp). I've never met this gentleman 
     before. But his question was very sincere. How do we know 
     when the president is telling the truth? And maybe even more 
     importantly, how do the leaders of other countries around the 
     world know when he's telling the truth?
       President Clinton has had many occasions to come clean, and 
     to date I don't believe he has. The president's failure to 
     present any substantive evidence is consistent with his 
     obvious lack of concern about how serious the offense of 
     lying under oath truly is.
       Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
       Rep. Hyde. The gentleman from New York, Mr. Nadler.
       Rep. Jerrold Nadler (D-NY). Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Before 
     my five minutes beginning, I have a parliamentary inquiry.
       Rep. Hyde. State your inquiry.
       Rep. Nadler. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, a few weeks ago, when 
     Mr. Starr was here, in answer to a question I asked, he 
     referred to a court case which was then under seal, and I was 
     not able to characterize his--I felt myself unable to 
     characterize the accuracy of his statement about that case 
     lest I be accused of violating the seal.
       A few moments ago, Mr. McCollum referred to the same court 
     case, which is no longer under seal, but which is within the 
     possession of this commmittee in executive session. Would 
     I be violating the confidentiality rule if I were to state 
     that Mr. McCollum misquoted and misstated what the court 
     found and that the court did not conclude that the 
     president's testimony about Lewinsky was material to the 
     Jones litigation, but rather found the truthfulness of 
     Monica Lewinsky's affidavit was material enough to her 
     motion to quash her subpoena in that case to justify the 
     OIC's issuance of a grand jury subpoena to her lawyer and 
     that this is a distinct issue from whether the president's 
     testimony in the Jones deposition was material to that 
     case? And if I were not permitted to state that, why is 
     Mr. McCollum permitted to quote this case?
       Rep. Hyde. You will be provided with a copy of the opinion.
       Rep. Nadler. But am I permitted to state this?
       Rep. Hyde. Well, I'd ask you to read the opinion before you 
     make any statements. I'm told you have mischaracterized Mr. 
     McCollum's characterization.
       Rep. Nadler. Well, whether I've mischaracterized it or 
     characterized it, since that is----
       Rep. Hyde. You can say anything you want, Mr. Nadler.
       Rep. Nadler. Thank you. Then I will simply----
       Rep. Hyde. But I'm suggesting that you'll get a copy of the 
     opinion very shortly, and i'm suggesting you read it before 
     you make statements about it. But that's up to you. All 
     right, now your five minutes starts.
       Rep. Nadler. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I 
     should note that I have written to the attorney general 
     asking that Mr. Starr be disciplined for breaking the 
     confidentiality of that case when he mischaracterized it two 
     or three weeks ago.
       Let me ask Mr. Davis, I think, starting off. You stated 
     very carefully and clearly in your testimony that you 
     really--no prosecutor would prosecute a perjury case on the 
     basis of the evidence that we have before us from the Starr 
     referral, that there really holds--that it's not likely that 
     a jury would convict, that there is no real perjury case 
     there.
       You said that, for example, that you wouldn't bring a 
     prosecution of perjury based on two conflicting statements of 
     two witnesses, one of whom disagrees with the other; that the 
     alleged corroboration that Mr. Starr cites for Monica 
     Lewinsky's testimony is not corroboration at all, because 
     that she told 10 or 11 friends of hers and relatives the same 
     thing, that she had a motive to embellish or falsify the 
     statement. And, in fact, I think law school tells us that 
     such a statement would be inadmissible in a court as hearsay 
     in prior consistent statements in any event.
       I would simply--first of all, do I characterize your 
     testimony correctly?
       Mr. Davis. Generally, yes.
       Rep. Nadler. Okay. Thank you. Secondly, some people on the 
     other side here, have talked about the president being 
     impeachable, not only for perjury, but for a lesser crime, 
     that if perjury isn't a high crime and misdemeanor and a 
     great offense threatening the safety of the republic, that 
     maybe false statements under oath are.
       Would the same or similar constraints prevent a successful 
     prosecution under these circumstances, with this evidence of 
     false statements under oath, as would prevent a successful 
     prosecution for perjury?
       Mr. Davis. Yes. I mean, the false statement under oath 
     section of the U.S. Code really----
       Rep. Nadler. Could you speak up, please?
       Mr. Davis. The false statement under oath section of the 
     U.S. Code will formally eliminate the so-called two witness 
     rule, the same

[[Page H11991]]

     prosecutorial judgment would come into play in which you'd 
     have to assess can you win the case, and for the reasons that 
     I articulated before, it seems to me that with the one-on-one 
     testimony, and as I said, the fact that Mr. Starr would have 
     to disassociate himself, and criticize Ms. Lewinsky's 
     testimony, and say that it's not true in various regards, 
     would make such a prosecution, in my view, doomed to failure.
       Rep. Nadler. For false statements under oath as well as for 
     perjury.
       Mr. Davis. That is correct.
       Rep. Nadler. All right. So there would be no successful 
     prosecutions for false statements under oath, and again, to 
     summarize, Ms. Lewinsky is a weak witness because the Special 
     Prosecutor would have to point out that she lied under oath 
     at some other place.
       Mr. Davis. Yes. And in a grand jury context, that's really 
     the core perjury.
       Rep. Nadler. And it's further weakened by the fact that the 
     alleged corroboration witnesses would be inadmissible in any 
     court as hearsay?
       Mr. Davis. Well, they would probably be, you know, 
     inadmissible. There may be some arguments that they could 
     come in at some point, depending upon cross-examination. But 
     the point is, whatever motive she had to falsify in the grand 
     jury on this----
       Rep. Nadler. The same motive.
       Mr. Davis [continuing]. The same motive would exist.
       Rep. Nadler. So in other words, if I want to falsify or 
     embellish my statement, or have a fantasy, or lie, the fact 
     that I lied to 12 people, doesn't make it any less of a lie 
     than if I lied only to one person.
       Mr. Davis. That is correct.
       Rep. Nadler. And--yes, Mr. Noble.
       Mr. Noble. Yes, can I talk about that for just a moment, 
     because it's very important. A good prosecutor is going to 
     try this case with the defense theory in mind. And the 
     defense theory is going to be: can I prove that the president 
     did what she said the president did? She's going to be 
     impeached for every prior inconsistent statement she has. But 
     the person's not going to cross-examine her, and make it seem 
     as though her testimony was recently fabricated. Because that 
     way, she can bring in every prior statement.
       All of us ought to worry about someone lying about us to a 
     thousand people and having that come in as admissible 
     evidence, making what we lied about the first time was true, 
     if the motive to lie began in the very beginning.
       So, for that reason, a smart----
       Rep. Nadler. Her motive did begin at the very beginning.
       Mr. Noble. And her motive arguably did begin at the 
     beginning.
       Rep. Nadler. And that applies to false statements under 
     oath, as well as to prejury.
       Rep. Noble. That applies to false statements under oath, as 
     well as perjury. I tried a case, a false statement case, I 
     convicted it at the jury level, was reversed on appeal 
     because of a literal truth defense, the same defense that----
       Rep. Nadler. Thank you. I have one further question, if I 
     can quickly get it in. Mr. Smaltz, the special prosecutor in 
     the Espy case, said that an indictment is as much a deterrent 
     sometimes as a conviction, so you might as well get it----
       Rep. Hyde. The gentleman's time has expired.
       Rep. Nadler. Do you agree with that?
       Rep. Hyde. The gentleman from Florida, Mr. Canady.
       Rep. Charles Canaday (R-FL). Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I'd 
     like to thank you all for being here today. You've done a 
     good job in presenting what I believe are some of the best 
     arguments in defense of the president, and I understand 
     that's why you're here, and we appreciate your perspective on 
     this.
       I have agreed with some of the points that have been made. 
     Obviously, I disagree with some of the others. But when you 
     talk about prosecutorial discretion, and the question that a 
     prosecutor has to ask about whether he can have some 
     expectation of winning before a jury. I think that's right. 
     And I think that's an appropriate way for a prosecutor to 
     view the case.
       Now, my judgment about the facts of this case, differ from 
     yours, based on what I've seen today, because I think there 
     is compelling evidence here that points to the conclusion 
     that the president engaged in a pattern of lying under oath 
     and other misconduct.
       But on the standard for prosecution, I think you've raised 
     some good and valid points. But I want to quarrel a little 
     bit with the application of that in this context. The 
     argument has been made that in essence, we in the House 
     should, in carrying out our responsibility, look to the 
     Senate, and make a guess about how the proceedings would turn 
     out in the Senate, to determine how we exercise our 
     responsibility under the Constitution.
       I would suggest to you, I don't think that's a proper way 
     for us to proceed. I believe that we have an independent 
     responsibility, under the Constitution, to make a judgment 
     concerning the conduct of the president, and whether he 
     should be impeached or not. And it would be in derogation of 
     our constitutional responsibility to attempt to count noses 
     in the Senate. I will have to say that it's a very difficult 
     thing to count noses in the Senate anyway, and in a 
     proceeding like this, it's hard to predict the outcome.
       But aside from that, I just don't think that's a proper 
     undertaking for us to be involved in. And I'd also point out 
     that the very structure of the Constitution indicates that. 
     In the Constitution, the framers provided that the House 
     could impeach with a simple majority. They provided that 
     conviction in the Senate would have to be by a two-thirds 
     majority.
       Now, I would suggest to you that that structural feature of 
     the Constitution suggests that the framers would have 
     contemplated circumstances in which the House might very well 
     impeach, but the Senate would not convict. Now, I think 
     that's obvious on the face of the documents. Some of these 
     arguments I think have to be brought back to the text of the 
     Constitution and evaluated in that light.
       But on this issue of prosecutorial discretion, let me pose 
     a scenario here, which I think is very analogous to what we 
     have before us. Suppose the chief executive of a Fortune 500 
     corporation, a major national corporation in the United 
     States, was accused of sexual harassment, and the corporation 
     had been sued--sexual harassment or any other civil rights 
     offense. And in the course of the discovery in that case, the 
     chief executive of that major national corporation lied under 
     oath to impede that civil rights action.
       Now, I believe that the fact that the chief executive of a 
     major national corporation was engaged in that type of 
     conduct, would be a relevant consideration for the 
     prosecutors who were evaluating the case and whether to bring 
     it, because of the impact of that conduct.
       Now, I do believe that bringing prosecutions have a 
     deterrent impact. And that is one of the considerations that 
     has to be factored into prosecutorial discretion.
       So, I think if we step back from this situation--and again, 
     we can argue about the weight of the facts, and I understand 
     you disagree with the evaluation some of us may have made 
     about the weight of the facts here. But if the president of 
     the United States did engage in obstruction of justice, and 
     committed multiple acts of lying under oath, I think that we 
     have to look at that conduct, in light of the consequences 
     that it has, and the message it sends, just as we would look 
     at the conduct of the chief executive of a major national 
     corporation who was the defendant in a civil rights case 
     brought against that corporation.
       So, I think that's something to look at. There's really not 
     time for you to respond. But do you disagree, that that sort 
     of high-profile case has to be evaluated in light of those 
     circumstances?
       Mr. Dennis. I think there's one point on this. I mean, the 
     analogy isn't quite there. I think if you were looking at 
     the--a president of a Fortune 500 corporation, you'd be 
     talking about a suit that was brought by, perhaps, someone 
     prior to them taking that position and----
       Rep. Canady. Oh, no! No, no, absolutely not. He could have 
     been guilty of that in the course of his conduct as chief 
     executive. But thank you.
       Mr. Dennis. Well, I think that the issue of materiality is 
     one that's been discussed here. And I think that's where the 
     nub of it is--that the Jones matter was something prior to 
     the president becoming president of the United States. We 
     weren't talking about issues of how the president deals with 
     subordinates in that respect. And I think that that really 
     makes a huge difference in terms of how that person should be 
     perceived insofar as these kinds of charges.
       Rep. Canady. Thank you.
       Rep. Hyde. The gentleman's time has expired.
       The gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Scott.
       Rep. Robert Scott (D-VA). Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
       Mr. Sullivan, in your prepared testimony you said that no 
     serious consideration would be given to a criminal 
     prosecution rising from an alleged misconduct and discovery 
     in the Jones civil case, having to do with alleged cover-up 
     of a sexual affair with another woman, or the follow-up 
     testimony before the grand jury; it simply would not have 
     been given serious consideration for prosecution. It wouldn't 
     get in the door. It would be declined out of hand.
       Are you aware that we are not straight as of now as to all 
     of the allegations, specific allegations of perjury, that 
     even yesterday that gentleman from Arkansas specified in a 
     different statement that he believed to be perjurious? ABC 
     News said that the Republicans--on December 7th said the 
     Republicans might shy away and come up with new charges from 
     the grand jury. Is it fair to have an accused respond to a 
     perjury charge without stating with specificity what the 
     statement is that was false?
       Mr. Sullivan. No.
       Rep. Scott. Thank you.
       Mr. Noble, in fact-finding, is there a problem using 
     conflicting grand jury testimony, copies of FBI interview 
     sheets, and prior consistent statements in order to make a 
     case against an accused?
       Mr. Noble. I believe there's a problem using only those 
     bases for making prosecutive decisions, yes.
       Rep. Scott. And why is conflicting grand jury testimony and 
     copies of FBI interview sheets inherently unreliable as 
     testimony?
       Mr. Noble. Because our system of justice is based on 
     testing the testimony of someone, under oath, in front of the 
     finder of fact, subject to cross-examination, and in a grand 
     jury that doesn't exist.
       For that reason, prosecutors, at the very least, interview 
     the principle witnesses themselves; try to test that witness 
     as much as they can in terms of deciding whether or not he or 
     she can withstand cross examination. Otherwise, you just have 
     hearsay.

[[Page H11992]]

       Rep. Scott. And because of that unreliability, is it--you 
     can't make a case just using grand jury testimony to make a 
     case against someone?
       Mr. Noble. I say this with all due respect: only a foolish 
     or inexperienced prosecutor would attempt to indict and 
     convict someone based on hearsay grand jury testimony.
       Rep. Scott. Thank you. Mr. Davis, in your testimony, on 
     page 13 of your prepared testimony, right at the top--you 
     didn't have time to go through the specifics of why the 
     obstruction of justice case could not be made. Could you 
     start at the top of page 13--I assume you have--where it 
     says, ``But there are--,'' draw the factor----
       Mr. Davis. Yes. Another complicating factor in the 
     obstruction of justice case which makes this such a difficult 
     case to bring is the reality that the principle players in 
     this drama, the president, Miss Lewinsky, and Ms. Currie, had 
     relationships and motivations to act, wholly unrelated to the 
     Jones case. This kind of thing would seriously complicate the 
     ability of a prosecutor to establish the intent to obstruct 
     some official proceeding, which is required to prevail in an 
     obstruction of justice case.
       Examples: The job search began before Miss Lewinsky was on 
     the witness list, and frankly, there's nothing surprising 
     that someone who had an illicit relationship with a woman 
     would, when it was over, be willing and want to help her to 
     get a job in another city. Ms. Currie had her own 
     relationship with Miss Lewinsky. People who have an illicit 
     relationship often understand that they will lie about it 
     without regard to the existence of a litigation and here it 
     appears that such an understanding was discussed prior to 
     Miss Lewinsky being identified as a potential witness.
       The evidence, you know, about retrieval of the gifts is 
     contradictory, with Ms. Currie and the president offering 
     versions of the events which exculpate the president and 
     which differs from Miss Lewinsky's testimony, and Miss 
     Lewinsky herself provided varying and sometimes exculpatory 
     interpretations of these very events in terms of her 
     testimony.
       These are the kinds of things that make winning a case--and 
     I do think when you're talking about----
       Rep. Scott. Let's--do you have the next paragraph, which I 
     think you can get in?
       Mr. Davis. And the reality that at the time of the 
     president's conversation with Ms. Currie in the immediate 
     aftermath of his civil deposition, Ms. Currie was not a 
     witness in any proceeding. And given the status of the Jones 
     case, there was no reason to believe that she ever would be, 
     and that the president was likely focusing on the potential 
     public relations repercussions from his relationship.
       You know, it isn't a question, I must say, of counting 
     votes in the Senate. The issue is in thinking through the 
     standard of whether to proceed at the House level, whether 
     you think you have adequate evidence to prevail. So you are 
     making the judgment.
       Rep. Hyde. The gentleman's time has expired.
       The chair will declare a 10-minute recess, and it--and I 
     mean it, that it's 10 minutes! [Laughter.] Please come back.
       Mr. ?. We won't move. [Laughs.]
       Rep. Hyde. Thank you. Well, you're entitled to move; that's 
     why I'm calling the recess.
       [A 10-minute recess is taken.]
       Rep. Hyde. The committee will reconvene.
       I must say, the panel looks refreshed. That's good.
       Mr. ?. On behalf of the panel, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
       Rep. Hyde. Mr. Watt, the gentleman from North Carolina.
       Rep. Melvin Watt (D-NC). Mr. Inglis was next.
       Rep. Hyde. All right, Mr. Inglis is next.
       Rep. Bob Inglis (R-SC). Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
       And I want to thank the panel for being here.
       Mr. Sullivan, if this case, the facts of this case ever 
     resulted in a prosecution of Bill Clinton after leaving the 
     White House, would any of what we've heard this morning be 
     admissible as a fact in a case involving the prosecution of 
     Bill Clinton, the private citizen? Any of your testimony, 
     would any of that be admitted as a fact in that case?
       Mr. Sullivan. On, no. Absolutely not.
       Rep. Inglis. Would anything that anyone else has said here 
     this morning be admitted as a fact in that case?
       Mr. Sullivan. Absolutely not.
       Rep. Inglis. I'm keeping score, Mr. Chairman, as you know. 
     So this makes panel 4, Mr. Craig, the fourth panel--no facts. 
     And Mr. Craig said yesterday to us, ``In the course of our 
     presentation today''--that was yesterday--``and tomorrow''--
     that's today--``we will address the factual''--underlined 
     factual--``and evidentiary issues directly.'' The score now 
     is zero to four; zero panels, zero witnesses dealing with 
     facts. Everybody that we've heard from in these four panels 
     has given conclusions, has given legal opinions. Not a single 
     person has presented a fact.
       Mr. Sullivan, would a memorandum of law be considered a 
     fact in trial?
       Mr. Sullivan. Not unless the--normally no, if the issue 
     arose out of that. But no.
       Rep. Inglis. Right. Unless the memorandum of law itself was 
     an issue. Then it could be a fact, correct?
       Mr. Sullivan. Right. Right.
       Rep. Inglis. So this 184-page document--it really, I think, 
     can only be described as a memorandum of law, possibly a 
     brief--contains no facts--no facts in the case before us 
     today.
       Mr. Sullivan. It's similar to the Starr report in that 
     regard. They're about equal. [Laughter.] I mean, they do deal 
     with the facts, but there are no witnesses that you've heard 
     to testify directly about the facts, whereas in a trial the 
     people would have to appear and give their testimony 
     personally.
       Rep. Inglis. Right.
       Mr. Sullivan. Yeah.
       Rep. Inglis. Well, of course, the difference, would you 
     have to concur with me, is the Starr report is based on sworn 
     testimony gathered by an independent counsel, which are the 
     same facts that I guess are discussed here. It's just that 
     there you have a direct quotation of those facts and a 
     summary of those facts. Is that correct?
       Mr. Sullivan. Yes. And I think that the White House 
     submission, although I have not read all of it, I've read 
     part of it--the part I read did deal in great detail with a 
     great many of the facts, including a lot of the facts that 
     are not highlighted in the Starr report.
       Rep. Inglis. Right. But none of those are facts in a case, 
     and the point that I'm making is that, again, Mr. Craig 
     yesterday made a very high bar for him to get over.
       And the thing that I find wonderful about these proceedings 
     is that for the--really, it's a rare opportunity to bring 
     accountability to the White House spin machine. What happens, 
     I think, with the spin machine is the reporters get worn 
     down. They get tired of trying to pursue it, so they just 
     accept it. But here we have accountability.
       Yesterday Mr. Craig said that in the course of the 
     presentation, we will address the factual evidentiary issues 
     directly. The score is zero to four; zero of these panels, 
     Mr. Craig, have addressed facts. All of them are doing what 
     the other panels have done in times past. In other words, 
     here again, very helpful discussion--I appreciate the time of 
     all these witnesses, but there's nothing new here, no new 
     facts, no new evidentiary issues that have been addressed 
     directly. And once again we do have that the president was--
     had personally instructed you not to obscure the simple moral 
     truth. But all this 184-page document is, is more of the 
     hairsplitting, more of the legal technicalities that are so 
     maddening in what the president has to say to us. That's what 
     the 184 pages is.
       Rep. Hyde. The gentleman's time has expired.
       The gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Watt.
       Rep. Melvin Watt (D-NC). Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
       We got a 445-page referral from independent counsel Starr. 
     Is there anything in that 445 pages that in that form would 
     be admitted in a criminal case.
       Mr. Sullivan. No.
       Rep. Watt. So I suppose that what Mr. Inglis is talking 
     about is the same thing that--what we've been talking about 
     all along. We keep waiting on some facts to be developed 
     here, and without that development, the score remains zero to 
     zero, I take it, with the presumption of innocence being in 
     favor of the president.
       Mr. Noble, you had a response?
       Mr. Noble. Yes, I would like to respond to the previous 
     congressman's comments.
       Rep. Watt. Before you go there, let me----
       Mr. Noble. But the direct response to your comment, and 
     that is, if it was a trial and the prosecution presented no 
     admissible evidence, zero, not guilty, there would be no 
     defense case.
       Rep. Watt. That's right.
       Okay. Now that brings me to the point that I wanted to 
     make, because I got a call from--everybody seems to be 
     getting calls from constituents; I got mine last week from a 
     constituent who started out by saying that the president was 
     engaging in a legal attempt to distinguish what he had said 
     in some way. And I reminded the caller that this in fact is a 
     legal proceeding that we are involved in. Is there anybody on 
     this panel that disagrees with that? (No audible response.) 
     Okay.
       So the standards that are applicable in a legal proceeding, 
     Mr. Sullivan, you referred to that--on the first page of your 
     testimony you said, ``The topic of my testimony is 
     prosecutorial standards under which cases involving alleged 
     perjury and obstruction of justice are evaluated by 
     responsible federal prosecutors.'' I take it that you are 
     equating this panel to responsible federal prosecutors and 
     what you're saying, I guess--I take it from your testimony 
     this morning, is if a responsible federal prosecutor 
     wouldn't prosecute this case, then we ought not be moving 
     it along to the Senate--or to the House floor. Is that--is 
     that the essence of where you come down?
       Mr. Sullivan. I'm not sure I would presume on the--that 
     issue of what your responsibility is. I'm only saying that 
     since your judgment here is high crimes and misdemeanors--
     that's the test--in my opinion, a responsible federal 
     prosecutor would not bring a case based on these charges in 
     the Starr report. Now, you can draw whatever conclusions you 
     wish politically from that conclusion.
       Rep. Watt. All right. So, Mr. Noble, what would be your 
     response to that, and in the context of what some of my 
     Republican colleagues on the committee have suggested ought 
     be the standard under which we are evaluating this evidence?
       Mr. Noble. I believe that--and I'm not one--I was not 
     elected by anyone, not by prosecutors or by citizens, to 
     comment. But

[[Page H11993]]

     my best advice would be that there's a lesson to be learned 
     from the Justice Department. The parallels are quite 
     striking. In the Justice Department, before bringing a 
     criminal prosecution, the hurdle is very low--probable cause. 
     However, before getting a conviction, you need proof beyond a 
     reasonable doubt.
       Here, in order for it to get voted out of this House, 
     you'll need a majority. However, in order for a conviction to 
     occur, you need two-thirds of the Senate. I believe you ought 
     to look and think about what a rational, fair-minded senator 
     would do, how he or she would vote. If you conclude they 
     would not convict, think about the precedent you would have 
     set if after two, three, four, five, six, seven impeachments 
     and no convictions. You would not restore public confidence; 
     if anything, you will have started to undermine public 
     confidence in the impeachment proceedings.
       Rep. Hyde. The gentleman's time has expired.
       The gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Goodlatte.
       Rep. Robert Goodlatte (R-VA). Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
       Rep. Hyde. Mr. Goodlatte, would you yield to me for just a 
     question?
       Rep. Goodlatte. Sure.
       Rep. Hyde. Maybe, Mr. Sullivan----
       Rep. Watt. Mr. Chairman, on whose time are we operating?
       Rep. Hyde. Pardon? [Off mike response.] I'm sorry. I asked 
     staff to do that, and sometimes they forget. They're 
     enchanted by my question. [Laughter.]
       Rep. Watt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
       Rep. Hyde. Thank you.
       The question I was going to ask, when someone is granted 
     immunity, as Ms. Lewinsky was done, is it customary--and of 
     course we could get the answer by looking at the immunity 
     agreement--but is it customary that they are obliged to tell 
     the truth thereafter, and if they lie or tell a falsehood 
     about some substantial issue that they forfeit their 
     immunity? Is that the custom?
       Mr. Sullivan. There are two kinds of immunity. But the 
     normal immunity--and I haven't seen her agreement--is what's 
     called ``use immunity'' which means that any testimony that 
     she gives that is not truthful could be used against her in a 
     subsequent perjury prosecution. If she gets ``transactional 
     immunity'' she's entirely free. But that's not normally the 
     case; it's usually use immunity. However, in my experience, 
     when the federal prosecutors give use immunity to a witness, 
     it is--I don't like to say never happens, because that's 
     usually wrong, but I just don't know of a case in which 
     they've brought prosecution for perjury.
       Rep. Hyde. I think the thing to do is to see what the 
     agreement held.
       Mr. Sullivan. Right. But generally, the agreement requires 
     truthful testimony--
       Rep. Hyde. Right.
       Mr. Sullivan [continuing]. And you are subject to perjury 
     prosecution if you do not give truthful testimony.
       Rep. Hyde. Thank you, Mr. Sullivan.
       I thank you, Mr. Goodlatte.
       Rep. Goodlatte. Gentlemen, welcome.
       Governor Weld, when you were governor of Massachusetts, if 
     you were convicted of a felony that was serious that included 
     jail time, what would happen to you as governor of the state 
     of Massachusetts?
       Weld. I think you're out automatically, but I never got 
     close enough to the border to focus on that question--
     [Laughter]--Mr. Congressman.
       Rep. Goodlatte. We hope not. We hope not. But the point is, 
     I think that's true not only in Massachusetts, but in 
     virtually every other state in the country, that if the chief 
     executive is convicted of a felony, that they are 
     automatically removed from office. And I do have the 
     annotated laws of Massachusetts here in front of me, and that 
     is exactly what they provide.
       In addition, it's my understanding that you would not be 
     exempt from prosecution during the time that you served as 
     governor. In other words, the prosecution could go forward, 
     you could be tried and convicted during that time, unlike the 
     prevailing opinion with regard to the President of the United 
     States.
       Mr. Weld. Well, sure. I think that's true.
       Rep. Goodlatte. And if that were to occur, that would be a 
     serious disruption of your duties as governor of 
     Massachusetts, to go through a--what could conceivably be a 
     lengthy trial. But nonetheless, the laws of that state and 
     virtually every other state, provide for that to be done to 
     protect the public trust and the interest of the public in 
     not having someone with a serious charge and then 
     subsequently a felony conviction serving in the office of 
     highest trust of that state. Is that correct?
       Mr. Weld. That's right. That's right. Actually, one of the 
     reasons I resigned in '97 was because the Mexico 
     ambassadorship was taking up so much of my time I didn't 
     think it was fair to the people to continue drawing a full 
     salary. So a lengthy criminal proceeding would be problematic 
     also.
       Rep. Goodlatte. Now, also, if the judgment against he 
     governor is reversed at a later time, the governor can be 
     restored to that position according to Massachusetts law 
     unless it is so expressly ordered by the terms of a pardon.
       The President of the United States has the power to pardon, 
     and the prevailing opinion is that the president can pardon 
     himself. Are we all in agreement that the likelihood of any 
     kind of subsequent prosecution of this case, regardless of 
     your opinions of the merits, is not going to take place 
     because of the reality of the circumstances, that either for 
     practical reasons after the president leaves office or 
     because he could bestow a pardon upon himself that that would 
     take place?
       Mr. Weld. Well, I can't imagine the president pardoning 
     himself, Mr. Congressman.
       When I said I thought that the post-term risk was low, 
     that's because of my assessment of the merits of the 
     prosecution case.
       Rep. Goodlatte. Be nonetheless, he has that power, and the 
     Constitution is very explicit about the one exception to the 
     use of that power, and that is in circumstances where the 
     president is impeached. He cannot then pardon himself and 
     restore himself to office as a result of impeachment, 
     obviously.
       Mr. Noble, in my last question, if I may, would you be able 
     to keep your job as professor of law at New York University 
     if these charges were brought forward before you and made 
     known to the public and to your employer?
       Rep. Sensenbrenner. The gentleman's time has expired.
       Rep. Goodlatte. The activities that we know the president--
     --
       Rep. Sensenbrenner. Mr. Noble, you don't have to answer 
     that, because time is up.
       [Remarks off mike.]
       Rep. Conyers. Could he answer it if he wanted to?
       Rep. Sensenbrenner. I think so. [Mild laughter.]
       Rep. Conyers. Okay.
       Mr. Noble. I can't even imagine me being accused of 
     anything along these lines. [Laughter.]
       Rep. Goodlatte. Professor Noble, I can't imagine your being 
     accused of anything as heinous as this, either, but 
     nonetheless, I think you would agree that you would not be 
     able to hold that position.
       Rep. Sensenbrenner. Thank you. The gentlewoman from 
     California, Ms. Lofgren.
       Rep. Zoe Lofgren (D-CA). I am someone who believes that the 
     issue before the Congress is whether behavior of the chief 
     executive is so severely threatening to our Constitutional 
     system of government that it requires us to undo the popular 
     will of the people and remove the executive and go through 
     that trauma--that that's the issue that faces us.
       However, not every person is analyzing this in the same 
     way, the appropriate way. There are some who say that lying 
     about sex, although deplorable, is not enough to impeach, but 
     it's the crime that causes them to think that there ought to 
     be an impeachment. Unfortunately for the president, there's 
     no forum, really, to address the issue--to defend against 
     allegations of crime. People say, well, those are 
     technicalities, but that's what the criminal law is all 
     about.
       I've been thinking about my old, my late professor, Graham 
     Douthwaite (sp), my crimes professor, who told us all that in 
     order to convict of a crime you had to prove every element of 
     a crime, and that, necessarily becomes technical. And in the 
     case of perjury you have to have the person under oath and it 
     has to be a statement about a material fact in the case and 
     it has to be an unambiguous question, and it has to be a 
     knowingly false answer, and it has to be actually false and 
     it has to be competent evidence for all of those elements, to 
     get a conviction.
       For example, I recently--and I'm not arguing this case, but 
     I read an article in the Legal Times and also the American 
     Lawyer Today that points out that the president was 
     probably--well, he was not under oath when he testified 
     before the grand jury because the oath was administered by an 
     officer who did not have the capacity to administer the oath, 
     to wit, a prosecutor. And there is a case on that, U.S. v. 
     Doshen (sp) that requires that in such a case, the case must 
     be dismissed. So if it was not William Clinton but John Smith 
     in court, any courtroom in America, that case of perjury 
     would have to be dismissed. It's a technicality, but that's 
     what the criminal law is about.
       I went home this weekend and asked a friend who is a deputy 
     district attorney whether a conviction could be had in this 
     case, and the answer I got was, no way, this could never 
     yield a conviction if it were John Smith.
       And so I'm wondering, Mr. Sullivan, could you help the 
     American people who have had the benefit of not going to law 
     school to understand and to appreciate why we have these 
     technicalities, and why it could be possible, if it was John 
     Smith in court, to sday something was obviously, you know, 
     misleading but it would not yield actually a criminal 
     conviction? How could that be, and what's the point of that, 
     Mr. Sullivan?
       Mr. Sullivan. The law has raised very, very high barriers 
     against any citizen being convicted of a crime, the 
     presumption of innocence. We have it in the United States. It 
     is not common throughout the world. We are very privileged in 
     many ways, and this is one of them.
       In perjury cases, you must prove that the person who made 
     the statement made a knowingly false statement. Now, where I 
     think the defect in this prosecution is, among others--and I 
     don't think it would be brought, because it's ancillary to a 
     civil deposition--is to establish that the president knew 
     what he said was false. When he testified in his grand jury 
     testimony, he explained what his mental process was in the 
     Jones deposition, and he said the two definitions that would 
     describe oral sex had been deleted by the trial judge from 
     the definition

[[Page H11994]]

     of sexual relations and I understood the definition to mean 
     sleeping with somebody.
       I don't want to get to particular here.
       Rep. Lofgren. Thank you.
       Mr. Sullivan. But that is were the case, in my opinion, 
     wouldn't go forward even if you found an errant prosecutor 
     who would want to prosecute somebody for being a peripheral 
     witness in a civil case that had been settled. That's my 
     answer to that.
       Rep. Lofgren. Let me ask you, Mr. Nobel. You're an evidence 
     professor. It's been all sorts of--oop, my time is up. Well, 
     perhaps someone else can ask you about hearsay. And I will 
     yield back, Mr. Chairman.
       Rep. Sensenbrenner. I thank the gentleman from California 
     for watching the red light.
       The gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Buyer.
       Rep. Steve Buyer (R-IN). I would like to respond to this 
     frivolous argument about the oath that we just now heard. The 
     president's deposition oath was administered in a civil 
     deposition by Judge Susan Webber Wright, according to the 
     court reporter who recorded the deposition. The Federal Rule 
     of Civil Procedure 28 specifies three types of persons before 
     who depositions may be taken within the United States; before 
     an officer authorized to administer oaths by the laws of the 
     United States or place--or of the place where the examination 
     is held, or before a person----
       Rep. ?. Will the gentleman yield?
       Rep. Buyer. No, I will not.--or before a person appointed 
     by the court to administer oaths and take testimony.
       There is no dispute that Judge Wright has the authority to 
     give the oath in the civil deposition.
       Note also in addition 5 U.S.C. 2903 provides, quote, ``an 
     oath authorized or required under the laws of the United 
     States may be administered by the vice president or an 
     individual authorized by local law to administer oaths in 
     that state, district, or territory, or possession of the 
     United States where an oath is administered.''
       Now before the grand jury, Rule 6(c) of the Federal Rules 
     provides that the foreperson of the grand jury, quote, 
     ``shall have the power to administer oaths and affirmations, 
     and shall sign all indictments,'' end quote. This does not 
     mean that the foreperson is the only person who administers 
     oaths in the grand jury. In the District of Columbia, a 
     notary public could administer an oath and affirmation. In 
     the president's grand jury testimony, the oath was 
     administered by the court reporter/notary public, who's 
     authorized to administer oaths by the federal law and 
     District of Columbia. The District of Columbia Code provides 
     that a notary public shall have the power to administer oaths 
     and affirmations. That's Chapter 8, D.C. Code 1-810.
       I have a question for you, Mr. Noble, with regard to----
       Rep. Scott. Mr. Chairman, could--was the reading off--from 
     a document?
       Rep. Sensenbrenner. Time belongs to the gentleman from 
     Indiana.
       Rep. Scott. Well, if he was reading off a document, we'd 
     like to see what he was reading.
       Rep. ? [Off mike.]
       Rep. Sensenbrenner. The time belongs to the gentleman from 
     Indiana. He will proceed.
       Rep. Buyer. Mr. Noble, with regard to prosecutorial 
     discretion, I was pleased to hear some of your testimony. As 
     I am referring here to the principles of federal prosecution, 
     I have a series--a couple questions I'd like to ask. 
     Prosecutors end up having to exercise discretions a lot of 
     times because--sometimes there's more crime that occurs, and 
     you have less resources, so you have to exercise good 
     judgment. Is that correct?
       Mr. Noble. That's correct.
       Rep. Buyer. And there are many different factors that you 
     need to take into consideration, and that's why you also have 
     these guidelines in the federal sector, correct?
       Mr. Noble. Correct.
       Rep. Buyer. And one other factor that you even talked about 
     here today is the strength of evidence, right?
       Mr. Noble. Yes, sir.
       Rep. Buyer. Another factor would be--is the gravity of the 
     offense, correct?
       Mr. Noble. That's correct.
       Rep. Buyer. And the other is the deterrence, the deterrent 
     effect----
       Mr. Noble. Correct. Correct.
       Rep. Buyer [continuing]. By prosecuting or not prosecuting. 
     Is that correct?
       Mr. Noble. Correct, yes.
       Rep. Buyer. Now, in this case, when I refer to the 
     guidelines under the section of the nature and the 
     seriousness of the offense, I thing it is somewhat 
     informative, it says in here, it even states, ``The public 
     may be indifferent or even opposed to the enforcement of a 
     controlling statute whether on substantive grounds or because 
     of the history of non-enforcement or because the offense 
     involves essentially a minor matter of private concern.'' And 
     that's what you--some of you have tried to articulate here 
     today.
       Mr. Noble. I believe I quoted that in my prepared remarks. 
     That's correct.
       Rep. Buyer. Right. But if you go down further, it reads, 
     ``While public interest or lack thereof deserves the 
     prosecutor's careful attention, it should not be used to 
     justify a decision to prosecute or to take other action that 
     cannot be supported on other grounds. Public and professional 
     responsibilities sometimes require the choosing of a 
     particularly unpopular course.'' Do you agree with that?
       Mr. Noble. Again, I've quoted most of what you've said, 
     yes.
       Rep. Buyer. Well, we've had other panels come in and 
     testify, and they like to cite public opinion polls. And they 
     say, ``Well, you know, you need to listen to public will here 
     and exercise, you know, sound public discretion here and go 
     with the polls.'' But as in the prosecution of cases, you 
     don't have that luxury, do you?
       Mr. Noble. I believe that what one is supposed to do is try 
     to make one's best judgment in terms of what an unbiased 
     decider of fact would decide. If the public polls are deemed 
     to be based on unbiased opinion, then that should be 
     considered. But if they're deemed to be based on bias, then I 
     think they should be ignored.
       Rep. Sensenbrenner. The gentleman's time has expired.
       The gentlewoman from Texas, Ms. Jackson-Lee.
       Rep. Sheila Jackson-Lee (D-TX). I thank the chairman very 
     much, and I think it is important as these days come to a 
     close to make all of ourselves clear.
       Let me again clearly state that I find the president's 
     behavior unacceptable and morally wrong. But I take issue 
     with my colleague from South Carolina, who continues to 
     restate the premise that there are no new facts. 
     Unfortunately, what I would offer to say is there's been no 
     new thinking in this room, because as I read the provision 
     ``treason and bribery and other high crimes and 
     misdemeanors,'' I do not hear the claim ``treason and bribery 
     and unfit morally.''
       So we're discussing actuality apples and oranges for the 
     American people. That confusion causes the divide and the 
     inability for us to come together in a collaborative and 
     bipartisan manner.
       I would offer to say that maybe the panel that is missing 
     here are spiritual leaders who might address the question of 
     the schoolhouse in Texas; to be able to talk about redemption 
     or the fact that ``no, liars are not excused and it is 
     wrong''; to teach parents how to teach their children; church 
     houses and synagogues and parishes how to lead America 
     morally.
       But the impeachment process is not a spiritual process, it 
     is a process, in fact, that we must deal with one, the 
     farmers's intent, and as these gentlemen, who I applaud for 
     your presence, your intellect and your experience, have come 
     to answer concerns as put forward by the president's defense, 
     so I would like to get to what you're here for--to present 
     information that is relevant to the impeachment question. 
     That is not a spiritual question, it's not a moral question, 
     but we condemn morally the behavior of the president.
       Now, my friends say there's no new evidence. If they would 
     turn to page 93 in the president's presentation, there's a 
     statement that say there is no evidence that the president 
     obstructed evidence in connection with gifts. But the point 
     is, the independent counsel, Mr. Starr, said the president 
     and Ms. Lewinsky met and discussed what should be done with 
     the gifts subpoenaed by Ms. Lewinsky (sic). Here, the 
     answer--here is Ms. Lewinsky's testimony, not ever put 
     forward: ``He really didn't. He really didn't discuss it.'' 
     And so you have it where there is an absolute new fact, of 
     which my friends seem to reject.
       Another point is, in the Paula Jones deposition, Mr. 
     Bennett objected to the definition this is a sexual relations 
     or sexual affairs. He was on the record saying, ``I think 
     this could really lead to confusion. I think it's important 
     that the record is clear. I do not want my client answering 
     questions not understanding exactly what these folks are 
     talking about.''
       Another co-defendant, Danny Ferguson's lawyer said, 
     ``Frankly, I think it's a political trick definition--the 
     definition, and I've told you before how I feel about the 
     political character of this lawsuit.''
       Let me ask, Mr. Sullivan, Mr. Davis and Mr. Noble, as my 
     time eases on, one, Mr. Davis, give the American people, most 
     of whom have not been charged with crime, never been inside 
     of a grand jury, as to what it is like; whether it ends there 
     with the probative value of that.
       Mr. Sullivan, if you would, if you could remember the 
     question so I could quickly get it answered, you mentioned 
     the fact that it is unlikely to prosecute for these issues 
     for perjury. Say that again for us quickly.
       Mr. Noble, do we have the authority in this proceeding not 
     to go foward if we don't think we have a case?
       Mr. Davis, inside the grand jury room.
       Mr. Davis. The grand jury is really the instrument of the 
     prosecutor, or they may ask some of their own questions. It 
     really is the agenda of the prosecutor. And what it is not is 
     a vehicle for getting an assessment of the credibility of 
     witnesses that appear there. There is no cross-examination. 
     It is the prosecutor's presentation and really is not 
     sufficient to determine what ultimately will happen in a 
     trial.
       Rep. Jackson Lee. Mr. Sullivan?
       Mr. Sullivan. The reason, I think, a perjury prosecution on 
     the sexual-relations issue would fail is that the President 
     has clearly explained in detail, and repeatedly, in his grand 
     jury testimony what his understanding of the term meant, when 
     he gave his testimony in the Jones case. And I do not think, 
     in light of the obscure definition and in light of what 
     happened, that it can be said that there is proof beyond a 
     reasonable doubt that he did not honestly have that 
     interpretation.
       Rep. Sensenbrenner. The gentlewoman's time has expired.

[[Page H11995]]

       Rep. Jackson. Sorry, Mr. Noble.
       Thank you.
       Rep. Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. 
     Bryant.
       Rep. Ed Bryant (R-TN). I thank the chair, and I thank the 
     distinguished panel.
       I always want to remind those that might be watching that 
     this is the President's defense. And the witnesses who have 
     been testifying the last two days, are all called by his 
     lawyers to testify in his favor.
       I want to commend Mr. Craig for the outstanding strategy he 
     has presented today. He is truly a very fine lawyer. He has 
     brought a defense to us today that this President should not 
     be impeached because he almost committed perjury, obstructed 
     justice, tampered with witnesses, caused someone to false 
     affidavit, but because he didn't actually cross that line 
     exactly, then he should not be impeached.
       This extraordinarily talented wordsmiths, or the 
     extraordinarily talented wordsmiths, and people who can make 
     those extremely sharp distinctions for the President allow 
     him to redefine such words as ``sexual relationships,'' the 
     word ``is,'' the word ``alone'' and defend this cover-up 
     story with such statements that, actually in this 184-page 
     report, that the cover story of Monica could be that she was 
     delivering papers. And that's because she did, maybe two 
     times of the numerous times that she went there, and she said 
     there was a lot of truth in there.
       Well, there was also a lot of lies in there, in addition to 
     that truth, but again, this is good wordsmanship and I have 
     to commend, again, the counsel for the President for the 
     defense that's been so crafted carefully, and say it is 
     consistent with the President's statement so far.
       Summarizing, though, I would say that the defense of today 
     that he almost did these things is like saying close only 
     counts in horseshoes. I don't think, though, and let me say, 
     I think like Mr. Canady and so many others on this committee, 
     that I think the proof is there that he is--didn't almost 
     commit these offenses, that in fact, he crossed that line. 
     There's compelling evidence of that.
       But for those who don't agree, who might accept your view, 
     I want to remind the people of the other witnesses who said 
     that you don't have to have a crime to impeach. I think 
     that's unanimous among all the experts who've testified, and 
     as a Congress, if we accept your view, I think we have to be 
     careful that you don't box us in to the Nixon standards or 
     that you don't box us in that there has to be a crime with--
     and that a technical defense would escape impeachment.
       I think what we have to look at and what is so important to 
     me was Mr. Craig's statement yesterday, admission on the part 
     of the President that the President, under oath, the chief 
     law enforcement officer, the President who appointed all of 
     us as U.S. attorneys, who appoints the attorney general, the 
     commander in chief, evades the truth, gives incomplete 
     answers to the truth, gives misleading testimony, and he says 
     it's maddening. It's maddening. I think it's sickening. I 
     think it's sickening that the President does this. And for us 
     to allow this President to do that and do damage in a civil 
     rights lawsuit I think is improper, and for Congress to turn 
     the other way and look the other side, I don't think we can 
     do that.
       Now, we all, in the end, have to vote our conscience, but 
     we should not continue to hear about Nixon is the standard, 
     is the threshold. That's not the case. But in the end, I do 
     want to thank you for your able presentation. You've done, 
     again, what you were supposed to do as part of this 
     presentation. I think you've done a good job at it. But 
     again, I think--I would address my colleagues, let's don't 
     get boxed in this idea that he almost did it, in your view, 
     and we can't impeach. I also, again, would give the 
     disclaimer that I do believe he committed these crimes and I 
     think the evidence is there to show that. And I thank you 
     again.
       Rep. Sensenbrenner. The gentleman's time has expired.
       The gentlewoman from California, Ms. Waters.
       Rep. Maxine Waters (D-CA). Thank you very much.
       I'd like to thank our panelists for being here today. I am 
     extremely impressed with the way that they have used their 
     very limited time. And I am extremely frustrated. I would 
     like to see each of you take one aspect of these allegations 
     and present a summation about why they're not impeachable, 
     but this process doesn't allow for it, and you're not able to 
     do what you have shown you could do so well because you don't 
     have the time.
       You're setting here with so-called legal minds and lawyers 
     talking about they want to impeach the President because they 
     are sickened by his actions, they feel his actions are 
     reprehensible, they don't--they feel they are 
     unacceptable. And we keep trying to make the case they 
     have a righ to feel anything they'd like to feel, but just 
     becasue they are sickened by this actions does not mean 
     they're impeachable. I don't know how we're going to get 
     that message through.
       I think you did a fine job, Mr. Sullivan, of talking about 
     the state of mind of the president and why he could 
     rationally say that he did not have sexual relations, based 
     on the definitions and his belief. He did not consummate the 
     sexual act that he thought was central to sexual relations. 
     And simply because he got on television and said, ``I did not 
     have sexual relations,'' somehow these would-be lawyers on 
     this committee think that he has done something that's 
     impeachable.
       Let's move on to the gifts, Mr. Davis. Betty Currie did not 
     say that she was instructed to go get gifts and burn them up 
     or dump them in the river. If she wanted to obstruct justice, 
     do you think she could not have found a better hiding place 
     than putting them under her bed? Would you illuminate on that 
     as obstruction of justice for us--just for a minute. And then 
     I've got one more.
       Mr. Davis. I think there would be both a better hiding 
     place, and in terms of obstruction of justice, I think 
     there's also the significant issue as to the lack of evidence 
     as to the president's real role in that whole process, even 
     when you look at a lot of Ms. Lewinsky's testimony, Betty 
     Currie's testimony, and the president's testimony.
       Rep. Waters. Mr. Dennis, this business about bribery--
     somehow there's an attempt to make the case that because 
     there were discussions about jobs, that Miss Lewinsky was 
     trying very much to get a lot of help from anybody she could 
     get it from, to get a job, that somehow there's some bribery 
     involved here and obstruction of justice, because they would 
     like to make the leap that there was an exchange of some kind 
     of informaiton or communication that said, ``If you give me 
     this job, I will not''--or an offer, ``If I get you a job, 
     will you not--?'' Will you help us with that?
       Mr. Dennis. Well, two things I recall--one from President 
     Clinton's grand jury testimony, which was not challenged, I 
     don't believe, that issues related to her employment were 
     taken up long before she became a witness in ths case. It's 
     also my understanding that Miss Lewinsky herself denied that 
     there was any attempt to use help with her employment in 
     order to get her to testify one way or the other. I would 
     think that that would basically close the whole issue.
       Rep. Waters. Exculpatory information that was never 
     presented to us----
       Mr. Dennis. It's right in the record.
       Rep. Waters [continuing]. In this so-called case.
       Mr. Dennis. That's correct.
       Rep. Waters. In addition to that, there were some 
     discussions about conversations with the president and Ms. 
     Currie about trying to remember what was said or what took 
     place. Is there anything in that exchange that would cause us 
     to move toward impeachment because the president said, ``Were 
     we ever alone? Do you remember what''--give us--would you 
     illuminate on that somewhat, Mr. Noble?
       Mr. Noble. Again, it's a specific-intent crime, and the 
     question is, what was the president thinking when he said 
     this? We can look at his words and try and analyze his words.
       But Ms. Currie says that she didn't believe he was trying 
     to influence her and that if she'd said something different 
     from him, if she believed something different from him, she 
     would have felt free to say it. So for that reason, I beliee, 
     you just don't have the specific intent necessary to prove 
     obstruction of justice with regard to the comment that you 
     just asked me.
       Rep. Waters. Thank you very much.
       Mr. Weld, someone offered that there were other people 
     serving time for perjury, and they gave these piddling little 
     numbers, despite--we have the kind of population that we have 
     in the country. they did not give you facts in the case of 
     the woman who came before us. Dr. Battalino, I think, is her 
     name. And I think it was not fair to use that and say to you, 
     ``See, she was prosecuted. How can you not say the president 
     should be prosecuted?''
       Do you know the facts of that case? If so, could you 
     illuminate on them?
       Rep. Sensenbrenner. The gentlewoman's time has expired.
       Governor, you got a quick answer to that one? [Laughter.]
       Mr. Weld. [Chuckles]. Saved by the bell, Mr. Chairman.
       Rep. Sensenbrenner. Okay. The gentleman from Ohio, Mr. 
     Chabot.
       Rep. Steve Chabot (R-OH). Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
       Mr. Dennis, in your statement you said, and I quote: ``I 
     sense an impeachment would prove extremely divisive for the 
     country, inflaming the passions of those who would see 
     impeachment as an attempt to thwart the election process for 
     insubstantial reasons.''
       I can assure you that there are many citizens who feel just 
     as passionately that this president deserves to be impeached. 
     Would you acknowledge that that is true?
       Mr. Dennis. I'm sure that passions do run in both 
     directions, high in both directions.
       Rep. Chabot. Thank you.
       Mr. Davis, let me quote from your opening statement as 
     well. You said, and I quote: ``Prosecutors often need to 
     assess the veracity of an `I don't recall'' ' question--or 
     ``answer. The ability to do so will often depend on the 
     nature of the facts at issue. Precise times of meetings, 
     names of people one has met and details of conversations and 
     sequences of events, even if fairly recent, are often 
     difficult to remember.''
       Let me ask you this. In your experience, is it common for 
     people to forget things such as whether or not they had sex 
     with somebody or whether or not they were alone with someone? 
     Just yesterday, we were presented with the president's 184-
     page defense report and were told that the world ``alone'' is 
     a vague term unless a particular geographic space is 
     identified. Do you find that sort of legal hair-splitting 
     defense helpful? Don't you think we ought to at least be able 
     to

[[Page H11996]]

     agree that ``alone'' means you're by yourself, not with 
     anybody?
       Mr. Davis. I think ``alone'' in essence means that you're 
     by yourself; but I think that, while you don't forget that 
     you had sex with somebody, I think you have to go back and 
     look at the confusing nature of the answers. What basically 
     was going on, there's no question the president was trying 
     his best to avoid and was playing word games in his 
     deposition.
       Rep. Chabot. Thank you.
       Mr. Davis. He shouldn't have been doing it, and he was 
     doing it. The issue is, what is the legal consequences now? 
     And that's what we're all struggling with.
       Rep. Chabot. Thank you. I think the president should set a 
     standard for all the citizens in this country, and I think we 
     all ought to be able to agree on what the word ``alone'' 
     means.
       Mr. Sullivan, in your opening statement, in discussing how 
     much evidence a prosecutor should have before he brings a 
     case to a grand jury, you stated that they should not run 
     cases up the flagpole to see how a jury will react. Do you 
     think it's responsible for a president to take a poll, to, in 
     a sense, run something up a flagpole to see whether or not he 
     ought to tell the truth or lie?
       Mr. Sullivan. No.
       Rep. Chabot. Thank you.
       Mr. Noble, in your statement you said ``Members of Congress 
     should consider the impact of a long and no doubt 
     sensationalized trial, what effect that will have on the 
     country.'' Should we also consider what the impact that a 
     president committing perjury, obstructing justice, tampering 
     with witnesses, and getting away with it might have on the 
     country, particularly when that president is the chief law 
     enforcement officer and is sworn to uphold the laws in this 
     country and, in fact, is sworn and took an oath himself that 
     he would uphold the laws?
       Mr. Noble. I believe you ought to consider whether or not 
     you could prove those allegations that you've just made. From 
     my review of the evidence, I don't believe you could prove 
     any of the allegations that you just articulated in front of 
     a jury, and I think you ought to take into account in 
     deciding whether or not you want to base your impeachment, as 
     I've read, on perjury. You can base your impeachment on 
     whatever you want. But if it's on perjury, I believe you 
     would not be able to sustain a conviction for perjury before 
     a jury in this country.
       Rep. Chabot. Thank you very much. And I--the final time 
     that I have here, I think as Mr. Bryant just said, it's very 
     important for all of those folks that may be watching the 
     testimony today not to forget that these witnesses were sent 
     here, and I think they've done a very good job. But they're 
     witnesses on behalf of the president, not impartial 
     witnesses. They're advocates. And I think that the president 
     should set a standard that our kids in this country ought to 
     be able to look up to, and we ought to know that the chief 
     law enforcement officer, the president of this country, is 
     somebody that we can respect and who actually tells the 
     truth.
       I yield back the balance of my time.
       Rep. Hyde. The gentleman's time has expired.
       The gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Meehan.
       Rep. Martin T. Meehan (D-MA). Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. 
     Chairman, Mr. McCollum earlier referred to a case from the 
     United States Court of Appeals in the District of Columbia 
     circuit and seemed to indicate that that case, the ruling in 
     the case, which had been sealed, put to rest the issue of 
     whether or not the president's testimony was material in the 
     Paula Jones case. Well, it just so happens that I got a copy 
     of that ruling that was under seal, and this is not a ruling 
     on that at all. This is a ruling on a motion to quash by Ms. 
     Lewinsky's attorney because Ms. Lewinsky did't want to 
     testify. This ruling in no way, shape or manner says that the 
     president's testimony was material to the underlying civil 
     case in the Paula Jones-filed lawsuit. So just to set the 
     record straight, and I would ask that this be submitted for 
     the record that members might want to read it.
       Rep. Hyde. Without objection, so ordered.
       Rep. Meehan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
       In any event, I'm delighted to see the former Masschusetts 
     governor here back in the public arena--on the right side. 
     [Laughter.]
       I heard my friend from South Carolina, Mr. Inglis, talk 
     about the high bar over the last few days. The high bar, that 
     Mr. Craig has to make sure that Mr. Craig has to make sure 
     that he gets over that high bar, because it's a very high 
     bar. They're prepared to vote for impeachment of the 
     President of the United States on Saturday. It's the second 
     time we'll have a trial in the United States Senate if the 
     full House goes along with it. And he's talking about the 
     high bar that Mr. Craig has to pass, to get witnesses before 
     this committee to prove the president's innocence.
       Now, Governor Weld, you're a former prosecutor.
       I am sure that you have heard many on the other side say 
     that this is sort of like a grand jury proceeding.
       Now, have you ever had a case where you as the prosecutor 
     appeared before a grand jury and gave your presentation as to 
     why you thought a defendant had committed crime yet called no 
     material witnesses--no witnesses--yet, nonetheless, you got 
     an indictment?
       I don't subscribe to this theory, but let's assume we are 
     in the grand jury system. Have you----
       Mr. Weld. I have had cases where the case went in through 
     an agent at the grand jury and a lot of the agent's testimony 
     would be hearsay. He would be a cumulative witness.
       Rep. Meehan. But you have never had a case where you didn't 
     appear--where you didn't present basically a forensic case--
     you never went in, said, ``We should indict this person''?
       Mr. Weld. I don't think you'd get too far that way, Mr. 
     Congressman.
       Rep. Meehan. Right.
       But apparently though, Governor Weld, you do here is the 
     point because we haven't heard from a material witness yet. 
     And I hear the other side saying: ``Wait a minute. The 
     Democrats, the president, they haven't brought a material 
     witness here. They should prove the president's innocence.''
       Isn't the fact of the matter in a judicial proceeding, any 
     judicial proceeding, that the prosecution or the person 
     seeking to pass that high bar has the obligation to provide 
     the material witnesses? Mr. Sullivan, isn't that the way our 
     system works?
       Mr. Sullivan (?). Yes.
       Mr. Davis. It clearly works and must. And indeed, I think 
     that the burden to proceed with an impeachment should have a 
     higher evidentiary threshold than the burden for a prosecutor 
     to bring a criminal case, because of the consequences of 
     impeachment--are such more important national----
       Rep. Meehan. Let me go on to another instance. There is all 
     of this obstruction of justice that is being thrown around 
     here, as if we had a case of obstruction of justice.
       And there is a talk about who initiated the events relative 
     to the gifts, who transferred the gifts? Betty Currie 
     testified before the grand jury that Ms. Lewinsky called her 
     and asked her to come over and pick up the gifts. Monica 
     Lewinsky claimed that Ms. Currie made the initial phone call.
       Now, I know this is probably hard to believe. But one of 
     the Articles of Impeachment are going to be on obstruction of 
     justice, but this committee has never called either one of 
     them to try to determine what the truth is.
       Now, Mr. Sullivan, have you ever heard of drafting an 
     Article of Impeachment where there is a conflict in the 
     facts, like on this particular instance, and we didn't call 
     either one of the witnesses to try to correct what the grant 
     jury testimony says?
       Mr. Sullivan. Well, no, but let me----
       Rep. Hyde. The gentleman's time ha expired. Can you answer 
     briefly?
       Mr. Sullivan. Yeah, I can, Mr. Hyde. Even if you take what 
     Miss Lewinsky said when she talked to the President about 
     what to do with the gifts, you wouldn't have a case, because 
     she says he said, ``I don't know,'' or ``Let me think about 
     it.'' That's all. That's the total sum of what Lewinsky said 
     Mr. Clinton said.
       Mr. Meehan. Thank you, Mr. Sullivan.
       Rep. Hyde. The gentleman from Georgia. Mr. Barr. And, Mr. 
     Barr, would you yield to me just briefly.
       Rep. Bob Barr (R-Ga). Certainly.
       Rep. Hyde. Mr. Davis, in law, if you have a prima facia 
     case, the burden then shifts to the other side to come 
     forward with some evidence, does it not?
       Mr. Davis. Well, not really. In order--the burden in a 
     criminal case always remains on the prosecutor to show proof 
     beyond a reasonable doubt. And that burden stays with the 
     prosecutor from beginning to end.
       Rep. Hyde. Well, I understand that, but can you be critical 
     of not producing witnesses when you have 60,000 pages of 
     under-oath testimony, deposition testimony, grand jury 
     testimony? Are you not entitled to take that into 
     consideration? And then if you reject that, if you think 
     that's wrong, don't you have some obligation to come forward 
     yourself with a scintilla--by the way, what is a scintilla? 
     [Laughter.]
       Mr. Davis. A scintilla is very little. But I think----
       Rep. Hyde. Well, don't you think you'd have an obligation 
     to come forth with a scintilla of evidence invalidating the 
     60,000 pages that the independent counsel has developed?
       Mr. Davis. It's not a question of the number of pages. The 
     real issue is whether those pages were uncontradicted facts 
     is to which there's not factual issue. The problem here is 
     that when you have----
       Rep. Barr. Mr. Chairman, I'm going to have to reclaim my 
     time. I have some matters to go over here, with all due 
     respect. [Laughter.]
       [Cross talk.]
       Rep. Rothman. Mr. Chairman, let the witness finish his 
     answer please.
       Rep. Hyde. Well, he's been very generous, please.
       Rep. Barr. Mr. Chairman.
       Rep. Scott. Mr. Chairman, I'd ask unanimous consent that 
     you be allowed to finish and Mr. Barr's time be restored.
       Rep. Barr. Mr. Chairman, could we restart the clock then? 
     If they want to give this gentleman time to answer the 
     question, let him answer and then restart the time for me. 
     That's fine with me.
       Rep. Hyde. Please, please. On nobody's time but the chair's 
     time, the gentleman may finish his answer. And it's not--
     we'll start again with Mr. Barr. I want to be fair.
       Rep. Barr. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
       Rep. Hyde. And I really intruded in his questioning. Go 
     ahead, Mr. Davis.
       Mr.  Davis. I think it does depend upon what's in those 
     60,000 pages.
       Rep. Hyde. Of course.

[[Page H11997]]

       Mr. Davis. If there are conflicts that are revealed so that 
     there are factual issues, the issues then becomes 
     credibility. And credibility is important.
       Rep. Hyde. Sure.
       Mr. Davis. And even as Mr. Starr recognized, he didn't want 
     to give immunity to Miss Lewinsky unless he saw her. Of 
     course, actually he didn't see her. He wanted his office to 
     see her.
       So if you're going to make credibility judgments, and as to 
     a number of these issues, there are credibility issues, 
     that's when it becomes important for the person with the 
     responsibility for making the decision--and that is in this 
     case this committee--in my view to actually test the 
     credibility of the witnesses.
       Rep. Hyde. And of course, where there's no conflict, that 
     isn't an issue; isn't that so?
       Mr. Davis. If there is no conflict----
       Rep. Hyde. Yes, no conflict.
       Mr. Davis [continuing]. Then it's a question of the 
     significance of what is said and understanding that.
       Rep. Hyde. Right. Thank you.
       Now, forgive me, Mr. Barr. I won't do that again. You'll 
     start all over.
       Rep. Barr.  [chuckles] Mr. Chairman, if you can ask 
     questions and then start the time for me, you can do that 
     anytime you want.
       Rep. Hyde. All right!
       Rep. Barr. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
       I know Mr. Craig is here. And I don't know whether he is 
     delighted or dismayed by the panel today, because after 
     promising us yesterday that we would not be hearing 
     technicalities and legalities, that's all we hear today. And 
     that's fine. We have a panel of very distinguished criminal 
     attorneys here, and that is the essence of criminal law, 
     finding clever ways to parse words and definitions, and so 
     forth, and determine why certain principles don't apply, and 
     I understand that.
       But we really have gone, Mr. Chairman, today from the 
     technical to the absurd. From the technical, we have lawyers 
     here that would apparently agonize greatly over a definition 
     of ``sexual relations'' that is very, very broad, uses terms 
     that are deliberately broad to encompass a whole range of 
     activities--using the term ``any person''. Now, to Mr. 
     Sullivan, ``any person'' may not mean any person, but I think 
     to the average person of common sense it would. So we still 
     have this legal, technical parsing over definitions and words 
     that really leaves us precisely where we were before Mr. 
     Craig made a promise yesterday that we would have no more 
     technicalities and legalities to hang our hats on.
       We have gone then to the absurd, Mr. Chairman, and that is 
     the preposterous presumption or scenario that the president, 
     in talking with Ms. Currie the day after he gave his grand 
     jury testimony--or his testimony in his deposition before the 
     court, was really acting as her attorney. Because according 
     to Mr. Sullivan, it is entirely proper for an attorney to go 
     over somebody's testimony in advance of that testimony to 
     make sure that it fits. I don't think the president was 
     contemplating serving as her attorney, nor do I think that 
     Ms. Currie was contemplating hiring the president for that 
     purpose.
       Therefore, we'd have to look elsewhere, and the elsewhere 
     is that he was trying to coach her and that fits within the 
     definition, in the statute, of tampering.
       For those on this panel, all of whom have tremendous and 
     very noted experience in dealing with criminal law, many 
     including dealing with very serious drug cases, I would ask 
     them rhetorically, since they seem so enamored of the 
     propriety of evasive and crafty answers being the tools in 
     trade of an attorney, why they would find it interesting--or 
     maybe they wouldn't--that the acting deputy administrator of 
     the Drug Enforcement Administration--for whom, I would 
     presume, you would all agree it is important to have agents 
     testifying in court, testify truthfully--why that deputy 
     administrator believed it necessary on September 15th of this 
     year in a memo to all DEA personnel admonishing them--and 
     I've never seen a memo like this before--admonishing them, 
     quote, ``Evasive or craftily worded phrases, testimony or 
     documents designed to omit or distort key facts are similarly 
     unacceptable and will not be tolerated. Making false 
     statements in any matter or context is completely 
     unacceptable and will not be tolerated.''
       That, I think, Mr. Noble--and I noticed you did not answer 
     the specific question put to you, by, I think it was my 
     colleague and another former U.S. attorney, Mr. Bryant--that 
     is why this case is so important. Not necessarily that we 
     know for a fact that there are DEA agents out there 
     developing crafty or evasive answers to be used in court, but 
     apparently the head of one of our preeminent law enforcement 
     agencies, because of the president, the chief law 
     enforcement officer, using crafty and evasive answers in 
     court before judges, because that sets a certain standard.
       That is why it's important that we are here today, that is 
     why it's important why we're here today, not to argue over 
     the technicalities, niceties and legalities of whether or not 
     a specific case of perjury can be made, but because of the 
     damage that is already being done to our law enforcement by 
     having a president who excels at evasive and crafty answers 
     that, in the case of the average DEA agent, would be 
     unacceptable, would get them thrown out of court and probably 
     cashiered from the government. That's why this is important, 
     and Mr. Craig, shame on you for putting together a panel here 
     of technicalities and legalities when you promised us 
     yesterday there'd be no more of that.
       [Groans, faint applause.]
       Rep. Hyde. The gentleman's time has expired. The chair 
     would appreciate no demonstrations, although we've had them, 
     but we can get along better without them.
       Mr. Delahunt.
       Rep. Bill Delahunt (D-MA). Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
       You know, I want to speak to the issues of technicalities 
     and legalities and what have you because I think it's 
     important, when we speak about the rule of law, oftentimes 
     we're talking about technicalities and questionable 
     legalities because it's embedded in our constitution that 
     there are certain standards and requirements. Is that a fair 
     statement, Mr. Sullivan?
       Mr. Sullivan. Yes, and it's----
       Rep. Delahunt. This is not about technicalities.
       Mr. Sullivan. It is--in response to what Mr. Barr said, and 
     somewhat----
       Rep. Delahunt. Mr. Sullivan, I'm just going to speak to you 
     because I want to have a little----
       Mr. Sullivan. It is interesting to me because in my 
     experience, persons who make such statements, when they 
     become the subject or the object of investigation----
       Rep. Delahunt. Correct.
       Mr. Sullivan [continuing]. Are the first ones to get the 
     mantle of the constitutional protections, wrap them around 
     them----
       Rep. Delahunt. Right, and start yelling about 
     technicalities and legalities.
       Mr. Sullivan [continuing]. Insisting on their rights. And 
     you don't hear that kind of a speech from them anymore when 
     they hire me to defend them; I can guarantee you that.
  [Laughter.]
       Rep. Delahunt. Right. Thank you.
       Let's talk about perjury. To evade is not to perjure, is 
     it, Mr. Sullivan?
       Mr. Sullivan. No.
       Rep. Delahunt. To obfuscate is not to perjure.
       Mr. Sullivan. No.
       Rep. Delahunt. To be non-responsive is not to perjure 
     either; it's not a crime, is it?
       Mr. Sullivan. No, it is not. The definition of perjury and 
     the proof required to prove perjury is very specific, very 
     technical, and properly so.
       Rep. Delahunt. Right. However it might be maddening, it 
     might be frustrating, it might not be right, it might very 
     well be immoral, but it's not a crime.
       Mr. Sullivan. The criminal code is not enacted to enforce a 
     code of morality.
       Rep. Delahunt. You know, I was listening to my friend from 
     Tennessee, Mr. Bryant, and I thought his comments were 
     interesting. You know, the ``almost did it'' theory. You 
     know, I don't think he and I disagree all that much. I do 
     think, however, that there are ways to deal with a president 
     who has evaded, who has been non-responsive and who has 
     obfuscated the truth. And I suggest that there are 
     alternatives that are open to this Congress to deal with that 
     particular issue.
       You know, I think it was Mr. Chabot that raised the issue 
     about recollection and forgetfulness. You're all experienced 
     trial lawyers. We know as human beings that memories--people 
     can answer in good faith and memories can fail.
       Is that a fair statement, Mr. Sullivan?
       Mr. Sullivan. Of course it is.
       Rep. Delahunt. Well, I just want to submit this for the 
     record, because hearing the issue being raised yesterday or 
     several days ago, I went back to the testimony that was 
     provided by Kenneth Starr. And according to my review, the 
     independent counsel expressed difficulties in recalling 
     information at least 30 times during the course of his 
     testimony. And it's fully detailed here, and I want to submit 
     it, Mr. Chairman, for the record.
       Rep. Hyde. Without objection, may be received.
       Rep. Delahunt. You know, I think it's important to--also to 
     note that credibility is an issue here, Mr. Davis. It's a 
     real issue. And I think it's important to note too that the 
     majority, represented by Mr. Schippers, has acknowledged that 
     in their report to this committee.
       I'm going to read to you his statement. ``Monica Lewinsky's 
     credibility may be subject to some skepticism. At an 
     appropriate stage of the proceedings, that credibility will, 
     of necessity, be assessed, together with the credibility of 
     all witnesses in the light of all the other evidence.''
       I would suggest that it's an obligation of this committee 
     to make that assessment before we proceed?
       Mr. Davis. I believe it is, because you're the people who 
     have to be comfortable that there is sufficient evidence to 
     establish what is put in a piece of paper----
       Rep. Delahunt. Miss Lewinsky has on numerous occasions 
     lied, if you have read the--if you accept the transmittal by 
     Mr. Starr.
       Mr. Davis. I think Mr. Starr's transmittal references that.
       Rep. Delahunt. And earlier Mr. McCollum talked about nine 
     corroborative witnesses. My memory of the Starr communication 
     is that she told different stories to different people.
       Mr. Davis. I think they're set out there, and as I said 
     before, it's also just the same--if she had a preconception 
     or motivation to tell a false statement in the grand jury, it 
     was the same with those people, in any event.

[[Page H11998]]

       Rep. Hyde. The gentleman's time has expired.
       The gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Jenkins.
       Rep. Bill Jenkins (R-TN). Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
       And let me say to this panel, thanks. Mr. Chairman, I 
     regard this as a very able panel, and I suppose you saved, 
     Mr. Craig, the best till last, a very bright panel.
       And I certainly--I feel like I would be unarmed to get 
     engaged in any mental gymnastics with any member of the 
     panel.
       But you've all announced that you're here as witnesses, not 
     advocates. You are advocates in a sense as witnesses. And I 
     suppose the tendency for all of us who practice law or been 
     judges is to get back in the arena.
       The last two or three panel members I think have gone in 
     the direction that we need to continue to go in. They've 
     talked about getting away from legalistics, talked about 
     getting away from lawyer talk, and talked about talking about 
     things that the American public would understand. Now, I've 
     got a question along those lines. I'd like to ask Mr. 
     Sullivan.
       Mr. Sullivan, you testified that you have read from the 
     president's deposition that he had denied that he had sex 
     with somebody based on the interpretation of sex----
       Mr. Sullivan. In the grand jury testimony.
       Rep. Jenkins [continuing]. In the grand jury testimony.
       Mr. Sullivan. Right. The grand jury testimony about his 
     deposition testimony.
       Rep. Jenkins. And you commented that you thought the 
     president's interpretation was reasonable. Is that----
       Mr. Sullivan. No. No, I said it is not--yeah, I think it's 
     a reasonable interpretation, and that it was--he insists that 
     that is his interpretation. And it seemed to me, given the 
     necessity of proof beyond a reasonable doubt that he thought 
     he was telling a lie, that you could not make a criminal case 
     against him.
       Rep. Jenkins. Well, now, this is a solemn matter, and I 
     want to keep it that way. But for those people across this 
     land who are viewing this, now, I want to ask you if--you've 
     come down here and testified. And actually what--when it 
     comes down, when you pull the shuck back and look at the 
     corn, what you're asking the American people to believe is 
     that we've got a guy down at 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue who's 
     smart enough to get himself elected, who's smart enough to 
     serve as President of the United States, and he doesn't know 
     what sex is.
       Mr. Sullivan. No, I'm not suggesting that at all. It's 
     absolutely not what I'm saying. I have said it three or four 
     times. The judge in the Jones case gave a specific definition 
     of the term ``sexual relations.'' She deleted two sentences 
     that specifically read on, as the patent lawyers say, oral 
     sex. The president said in his mind that took oral sex out of 
     it, and that what was left was, we would call it normal 
     sexual intercourse. And he said ``That is the definition I 
     was responding to.'' Now, you can say ``That's silly, that's 
     ridiculous, I don't believe it,'' but that's what he says. 
     And it seems to me that if you were to bring this as a 
     criminal case with that background in mind and what was left 
     in that definition, you can't make a case. That's all I'm 
     saying.
       Rep. Jenkins. Well, you and Mr. Noble have both indicated 
     that you don't believe--and perhaps other--I guess other 
     panel members have indicated that----
       Mr. Noble [off mike].
       Rep. Jenkins. Well I haven't asked you to, Mr. Noble.
       Mr. Noble. I thought you just mentioned my name. I'm sorry. 
     I apologize.
       Rep. Jenkins. Wait just a minute and I'll try to give you 
     an opportunity. I'm about to burn up all the time I have.
       But do you know anything, Mr. Sullivan, about the Battalino 
     case, the lady who came here and testified?
       Mr. Sullivan. Just what I've read in the newspapers about 
     it. I did not----
       Rep. Jenkins. So you're not--you're not able to compare----
       Mr. Sullivan. No--well, I could compare it this way, that 
     in the cases that have been referred to--I have not heard of 
     any in which it is analogous to this case where the witness's 
     testimony was peripheral to the issues in the case, the 
     alleged perjury was not dealing with the specific facts like 
     of the Jones case, but of some other peripheral case that 
     might not even be admissible in evidence.
       Rep. Hyde. The gentleman's time----
       Rep. Jenkins. Thank you, Mr. Sullivan. My time has expired.
       Rep. Hyde. The gentleman's time has expired.
       Mr. Wexler.
       Rep. Robert Wexler (D-FL). Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
       Mr. Sullivan, I was very struck by your testimony in terms 
     of your examination of the allegations against the president 
     because it seems to me one of the most critical elements 
     against the president's and the president's lawyers' in this 
     process is that they have engaged in legal hair-splitting, 
     and they have been condemned for it, and in some cases maybe 
     appropriately so.
       But as you analyzed the nature of the case against the 
     president with respect to perjury, what struck me was it 
     seems that in order to make that same very case against the 
     president, you have to engage in legal hair-splitting to do 
     so. Because when it all comes down to that very essence of 
     the case against the president on perjury, it comes down to a 
     discrepancy--a discrepancy between the testimony of the 
     president and Ms. Lewinsky over the precise nature of the 
     physical contact involved in their relationship. The 
     president, on the one hand, at the grand jury says, ``I had 
     an intimate relationship, an inappropriate intimate 
     relationship with Ms. Lewinsky that was physical in nature.''
       And he goes on to say it was wrong, and then, of course, as 
     you have pointed out here today on several occasions, he 
     denied, in essence, having sexual relations as it was defined 
     by the judge. Miss Lewinsky, on the other hand, in response 
     to the independent counsel's several questions, goes into 
     graphic detail in recollection of her encounters with the 
     president. That's what it seems the perjury is all about.
       But let's take the advice of the members on the other side. 
     Throw away the legal technicalities, throw away the 
     requirements that the law provides we prove for perjury. 
     Forget all about that. Tell the American people what is the 
     false statement that the president allegedly made to the 
     grand jury? Forget the consequences, forget the law. What is 
     the false statement?
       Mr. Sullivan. Well, if you--it could be one of two. It 
     could be when he denied having sexual relations and I've 
     already addressed that, because he said, ``I was defining the 
     term as the judge told me to define it and as I understood 
     it,'' which I think is a reasonable explanation. The other is 
     whether or not he touched her--touched her breast or some 
     other part of her body, not through her clothing, but 
     directly. And he says, ``I didn't,'' and she said, ``I (sic) 
     did,'' so it's who-shot-John. It's, it's, you know, it's one 
     on one.
       The corroborative evidence that the prosecutor would have 
     to have there, which is required in a perjury case--you can't 
     do it one on one, and no good prosecutor would bring a case 
     with, you know, I say black, you say white--would be the fact 
     that they were together alone and she performed oral sex on 
     him. I think that is not sufficient under the circumstances 
     of this case to demonstrate that there was any other touching 
     by the president and therefore he committed this--you know, 
     he violated this--and committed perjury.
       Rep. Wexler. Well, Mr. Sullivan, I only hope that a vast 
     majority of Americans have heard your answer right now. What 
     this is about, at its worst, is the president making false 
     statements about sexual relations and about where he touched 
     Monica Lewinsky?
       That's what the alleged perjury is about. I hope I am not 
     misstating what your answer was.
       Mr. Sullivan. No, you're not. What the other side is saying 
     is that perjury in any regard is so important that the 
     president oughtn't to engage in it, and we can all probably 
     agree with that. The issue for you is whether or not it 
     justifies impeachment.
       Rep. Wexler. I agree. I agree.
       So it's about sexual relations, and it's about touching. 
     And now we are about to impeach a president because we think 
     he gave false answers about sexual relations and about 
     touching. How many times does it have to be said? How many 
     times do we, the Congress of the United States, have to now 
     set up a standard that says the president may have falsely 
     told us an answer about sexual relations and about touching, 
     and now we are going to impeach him?
       Thank you.
       Rep. Hyde. The gentleman's time has expired.
       The gentleman from Arkansas, Mr. Hutchinson.
       Rep. Asa Hutchinson (R-AR). The investigation was opened up 
     because of a concern about an attempt to obstruct and suborn 
     perjury in a civil proceeding in which a plaintiff that had a 
     right to bring a suit, that the courts determined had a right 
     to bring a suit, was pursuing that. And our review is looking 
     into those allegations of obstruction of justice and perjury.
       There are some questions raised about whether Monica 
     Lewinsky is truthful or not, and I think that's a legitimate 
     question that can be raised. But I think she does have an 
     incentive for telling the truth.
       I have here before me the immunity agreement, which I have 
     seen before, and these witnesses have seen before, as well, 
     that said that if Ms. Lewinsky has intentionally given false, 
     incomplete or misleading information or testimony, she would 
     be subject to prosecution for any federal criminal violation. 
     And so certainly she has immunity, would you agree, Mr. 
     Sullivan, but if she does not tell the truth, then she would 
     be subject to prosecution?
       Mr. Sullivan. If that's the standard use-immunity 
     agreement, that is correct.
       Rep. Hutchinson. Now, I believe, Mr. Sullivan, going to 
     your testimony, you talked about prosecutions for perjury are 
     relatively rare, difficult to prove, and the United States 
     does not do it generally in pursuit of civil litigation.
       And we got the statistics for federal prosecutions. And I 
     think Governor Weld mentioned this, that he didn't believe 
     that they were that rare.
       And in fact, in 1993 there were more federal perjury 
     prosecutions by United States attorney than there were 
     kidnapping prosecutions. I don't think that means that 
     kidnapping is not significant. In '94, the same fact was 
     true; there were more perjury prosecutions--('93/93?)--than 
     there were kidnapping prosecutions. The same in '95. It's 
     really a pattern that goes back to the 1960s. And I wish I 
     could give credit to all of my staff that did such great 
     work, but talking about United States attorneys prosecuting 
     perjury

[[Page H11999]]

     in civil litigation, here's a stack of cases. Now, I could go 
     through them, but I only have five minutes. And so I won't 
     take advantage of that. I did find one in Illinois and in 
     different parts of the country. But a rather impressive arena 
     of cases in which U.S. attorneys prosecute perjury in civil 
     cases.
       Now, I agree with your point that sometimes there's a 
     history behind it, but I think there's a history here in this 
     case, as well. There's an investigation of obstruction of 
     Justice.
       Now Mr. Sullivan, you mentioned that it was in a peripheral 
     matter. Am I correctly----
       Mr. Sullivan. Yes. Yes.
       Rep. Hutchinson. Has anyone on this panel ever represented 
     a woman as a plaintiff in a sexual harassment case? (Pause.) 
     If you have, raise your hand. Well, I have. And whenever you 
     look at the most difficult thing in a sexual harassment case, 
     it would be to prove who's telling the truth. And many times 
     you have to go to a pattern of conduct because there's a 
     denial. And so if you try to prove a pattern of conduct, 
     you've got to ask questions in a deposition as to what has 
     happened in the past. And I don't think that's a peripheral 
     matter. I don't think you can make sexual harassment cases if 
     you do not ask those questions. And when the president in 
     that deposition denied ever having in his lifetime sexually 
     harassed a woman, is that a material statement in the civil 
     deposition? And I invite your answers.
       Mr. Davis. Well, I think, you know, the issue is--I don't 
     think, I don't think--believe it is, because----
       Rep. Hutchinson. The question is, is it material?
       Mr. Davis. No, I don't think it's material, because you're 
     entitled to ask the question under the broad discovery rules, 
     but the question is--was, if a truthful answer here would 
     have revealed the true facts, would it have been admissible 
     in that Jones case?
       Rep. Hutchinson. If he had admitted he had sexually 
     harassed someone, you don't think that----
       Mr. Davis. No, no. Actually, the truth is it would not have 
     been because it would not have been admissible in the Jones 
     case.
       Rep. Hutchinson. Does anyone disagree that that would be a 
     material statement?
       Do you disagree, Mr. Noble?
       Mr. Noble. I'm sorry, maybe I misunderstood the question. 
     But--and I don't know the record to reflect this question, 
     but if your hypothetical question is: In a sexual harassment 
     suit, if a person is asked ``Have you ever sexually harassed 
     someone?'' would that be material, I believe it would be 
     material.
       Rep. Hutchinson. Okay. Would anybody else agree with Mr. 
     Noble, who gave a very straightforward answer? I know you all 
     haven't handled sexual harassment cases; perhaps that's a 
     little bit of a disadvantage. But I thank you for your 
     testimony.
       Rep. Hyde. The gentleman's time has expired.
       The gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Rothman.
       Rep. Steve Rothman (D-NJ). Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
       Let me start off by saying that with respect to my 
     colleagues on the other side of the aisle, I don't think it 
     aids the search for truth to demonize the White House 
     counsel. Mr. Craig said that he was going to be presenting us 
     with some factual rebuttal to the factual arguments made by 
     Mr. Starr. As I've read the 184 pages of the White House 
     submission, there are pages 70 through 89 and pages 93 
     through 182 which address each and every one of the factual 
     charges made by Mr. Starr.
       So what we now have is Mr. Starr, who was a witness to no 
     facts, making his statements, 450 pages in writing and then 
     2\1/2\ hours in his initial testimony, and we have Mr. 
     Kendall, who made several written rebuttals, and now this 
     184-page rebuttal to all the facts, neither of which are 
     admissible in a court of law, as we all know and have 
     accepted the testimony of these experts. And we're left 
     without one single fact-witness to help us clarify when 
     Monica Lewinsky was telling the truth and when she wasn't, 
     because Mr. Starr said--Judge Starr said sometimes she was 
     telling the truth and sometimes she wasn't. But no fact 
     witnesses have yet been called to aid us in finding the 
     truth.
       But we all agree that there is a basic, fundamental 
     American notion of due process and fairness; that those 
     bringing charges must bear the burden of proof, and in this 
     instance, it is a clear and convincing standard of proof. Yet 
     not one single fact-witness has yet been presented. That will 
     be telling, unless it's remedied, my friends.
       But I understand, though, that my colleagues on the other 
     side of the aisle, despite the fact that these distinguished 
     prosecutors have said they would never bring a criminal 
     indictment on these matters--and remember the standard is 
     ``treason, bribery or other high crimes or 
     misdemeanors''--they wouldn't bring an indictment on these 
     alleged crimes. But my colleagues say that, well, even if 
     it wasn't a crime, it's a pattern of lying, it violates--
     it's not right. Well, I'm not sure that the standard is 
     ``treason, bribery, high crimes, misdemeanors, evasiveness 
     and lack of respectability.'' Although some might argue 
     that ``high crimes and misdemeanors'' should say that, it 
     doesn't say that.
       With regards to the rule of law, we've said many times 
     President Clinton has already paid or will pay an $850,000 
     fine, or settled his case for $850,000.
       In a civil case, that's not an incentive to lie in a civil 
     case. He can be sued criminally once he leaves office and go 
     to prison if the charges against him were proven true. That's 
     certainly no incentive to anyone to lie under oath in a 
     criminal--in any proceeding. And the rule of law is upheld 
     because the president is not above the law. He can be sued 
     civilly and criminally, and our kids know that. And this 
     whole process has demonstrated that.
       The question for our committee and for all of America is to 
     decide, if no reasonable prosecutor would bring these matters 
     up for a crime, how could it be a high crime or misdemeanor? 
     Should we interpret, say the Founders got it wrong, that they 
     should have added ``evasiveness'' as a high crime or 
     misdemeanor, or ``lack of respectability'' as a high crime 
     and misdemeanor? Some might argue yes, some might argue no. 
     What we have to be aware of is the consequences to our nation 
     if we expand on that definition when we already know the 
     president can be punished civilly, as he has been in the 
     settlement, and criminally by going to prison if the charges 
     are proven against him.
       I yield back the balance of my time.
       Rep. Hyde. I thank the gentleman.
       The gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Pease.
       Rep. Ed Pease (R-IN). Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have a few 
     questions and then an observation.
       I wanted to--well, first of all, let me say I have found 
     this panel very helpful on the questions dealing with 
     criminal prosecutions. I understand that there is a 
     difference between criminal prosecutions and impeachment. But 
     on the questions of criminal prosecutions and the parallels 
     that may be argued, I am grateful.
       I wanted to be certain--let me back up. I especially--
     without diminishing the work done by any of you, I especially 
     want to thank Mr. Noble, whose presentation was most helpful 
     to me, and I had some follow-up questions I wanted to ask you 
     based on questions that you were asked by other panelists but 
     didn't get the chance to conclude. And the first deals with 
     questions from Mr. Boucher on the standards that are used, or 
     the--the standards that are used in assessing when to 
     prosecute cases where there is a high profile potential 
     defendant. Can you share with us the standards in 
     the Department of Justice in those cases?
       Mr. Noble. I must say I'm humbled to answer this, because 
     on my left was the assistant attorney general from the 
     Criminal Division when I was an assistant U.S. attorney and 
     on my right was a U.S. attorney and the assistant attorney 
     general for the Criminal Division. So I will see if I learned 
     anything from these two wise fellows.
       As soon as you get an allegation that there is a political 
     figure who has engaged in criminal activity, as a U.S. 
     attorney or as a prosecutor, one of the first things you will 
     think about is: Will people have confidence that my office's 
     investigation of this will be deemed independent and 
     unbiased? You ask yourself that before you do anything. Can 
     my office handle this? Or should I send it to the criminal 
     justice--to the Justice Department's Criminal Division in 
     Washington and have Mr. Weld or people from Public Integrity 
     handle it?
       And then you want to know who is the person bringing it. 
     Does he or she have a bias, a stake in this--the outcome of 
     this matter? And if it's a matter involving parties that are 
     already involved in a dispute, you've got to worry about 
     that.
       And how did this person become aware of this information, 
     if--in the case of someone cooperating with you, one of your 
     informants, giving information to someone and having that 
     information lead to possible criminal activity, like a 
     perjury trap? All of the considerations, so that after all is 
     said and done, a rational citizen who's looking at you--I 
     can't help the fact that I was asked by the Democrats to be 
     here; if the Republicans had asked me to come, I would have 
     come willingly--but that a rational, independent person would 
     say, ``Yes, I can look at the evidence and see why this 
     prosecution's brought.''
       No rational, seasoned prosecutor would bring any criminal 
     prosecution against any person for perjury or obstruction of 
     justice, based on the evidence I've seen. And I'm thankful of 
     that, and we should all be thankful of that, because if you 
     want to prosecute me, prosecute me for something I did, but 
     not for something you thought I did. If I've got a weird 
     thought process, don't prosecute me criminally for it; say 
     that I'm a weird person and disassociate yourself from me.
       Rep. Pease. Thank you, Mr. Noble. And I appreciate your 
     efforts to be concise.
       I don't know if this question was directed to you or to the 
     panel, but Mr. Boucher was getting into the question of 
     whether dismissal of a case terminates the authority of a 
     court to sanction parties or witnesses. And I don't know that 
     that was addressed, and I would appreciate it if someone 
     could.
       Mr. Sullivan. I addressed that. I said that there is 
     inherent power under the Supreme Court decision and that I do 
     not know that--whether or not the dismissal of the case 
     terminates----
       Rep. Pease. That's my question. So you don't know----
       Mr. Sullivan. I do not know.
       Rep. Pease. Does anybody else have a response or a thought 
     on that?
       Mr. Noble. I believe that she does not lose jurisdiction to 
     investigate and recommend the prosecution or hold criminal 
     contempt hearings for anyone that might have engaged in 
     criminal conduct during the time period that she had this 
     matter.

[[Page H12000]]

       Rep. Pease. I also, as I began, want to thank all of you.
       It's been--your presentation has been very helpful in 
     understanding the issues surrounding charging and conviction 
     in criminal matters. I'm concerned, though, that we not 
     assume that either the standards in a criminal prosecution or 
     the burden of proof or the procedures employed are the same 
     as those which face this committee.
       A criminal prosecution is not the same as an impeachment 
     and we should not succumb to an argument that because a 
     criminal prosecution might not succeed that Congress is 
     unable to act under its constitutional obligation regarding 
     impeachment. No matter my eventual conclusion on the matters 
     before us, I'm not prepared to say that the expected standard 
     of conduct for an American president is simply that he or she 
     may not be indictable.
       I yield the balance of my time.
       Rep. Hyde. I thank the gentlemen. The gentleman from 
     Wisconsin, Mr. Barrett.
       Rep. Thomas Barrett (D-WI). Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. 
     Sullivan, you indicated in your testimony that you did not 
     think that this would be a case that would be brought by a 
     United States attorney for perjury. We have heard many--many 
     witnesses and many members saying that the president, when he 
     leaves office, is open to criminal prosecution. The sense of 
     the American people, I think, remains that the president did 
     something wrong, that he should be held accountable for his 
     actions and that he should not be impeached.
       So in your discussion, where is the justice? In this case, 
     in the civil suit, since every one of us would explore not 
     telling the truth, or lying, where is the justice, in your 
     analysis here?
       Mr. Sullivan. Well, we live in an imperfect world, and 
     justice is not always achieved in this world. We sometimes 
     have to wait and hope. But all I'm saying is that the law--
     you have to follow the law. If the law provides that the 
     president can be indicated after he leaves office, and if 
     some prosecutor wants to take this up who has jurisdiction 
     over it, they may--they may reach a different conclusion than 
     I do. I doubt that a responsible prosecutor would bring a 
     perjury case against the president on these facts. Now, I 
     think that the--I mean, look what the man has already gone 
     through, though. I mean we're sitting here, the third time in 
     the history of the country that they're considering removing 
     a president from office.
       It seems to me that there's been terrible retribution on 
     this man for what he did.
       Rep. Barrett. Well, let's take the president out of it, and 
     let's leave it as a civil case where a person has lied. 
     Where's the justice system work in this case if a person in 
     the civil case has lied under oath or misrepresented 
     themselves or obfuscated the facts? Tell me where the justice 
     comes into the system, if there is not going to be perjury. 
     There has to be justice. We can't just say, well, that's the 
     way it goes.
       Mr. Sullivan. Well, in the--we're talking about the Jones 
     civil case. And in that case, after the president made his 
     disclosures and Monica Lewinsky made her disclosures and the 
     cases had been dismissed, but before it was decided by the 
     Court of Appeals Ms. Jones settled the case. So it seems to 
     me it's washed away, because she, then, knew at the time she 
     settled that if that evidence was going to be admissible, you 
     know, she would take that into consideration in determining 
     the amount of her settlement. The case was thrown out, as I 
     understand, for reasons entirely different, that she couldn't 
     demonstrate that there was any connection between what may 
     have happened in her--detriment to her in any employment.
       Rep. Barrett. Do you think that the amount of the 
     settlement reflects some of that? It was----
       Mr. Sullivan. Well, I think that Ms. Jones, she voluntarily 
     took that settlement in light of all the facts, including the 
     facts that we are now talking about today.
       Rep. Barrett. Okay.
       Mr. Weld, you've offered some interesting observations, I 
     think, one of which was the notion of a fine. And I've heard 
     commentators talk about a plea bargain or a deal. And I 
     bristle when I hear those words, because I do think that this 
     is a vote of conscience and that every member on both sides 
     of the aisle should be listening to their conscience and be 
     guided by that.
       I also am mindful of the fact that we cannot impose a fine 
     on the President of the United States, that there are bill of 
     attainer problems. How conceivable do you think it is that 
     the president, if we were to censure him, would come forward 
     and say ``I recognize that as part of the process I should 
     reimburse the Treasury for part of this investigation''?
       Mr. Weld. Well, politically, I guess, I had anticipated 
     that all that might be the subject of negotiation before the 
     votes were taken. I was trying to think of things that would 
     mark the solemnity of the occasion, do justice to the dignity 
     of the House and its role, having the sole power of 
     impeachment. And it would say to the American people there 
     has been justice here, this person, this president has paid a 
     penalty here short of being removed from office, which I 
     think we've kind of slid by that one.
       But the fine, the written acknowledgment of wrongdoing and 
     the exposure to future criminal prosecution, as well as a 
     censure, and a Starr report as the committee or the House 
     wished to put on the public record in perpetuity, those are 
     the five things I could think of to mark the events.
       Rep. Barrett. Okay. My time has expired.
       Rep. Hyde. The gentleman's time has expired.
       Rep. Barrett. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
       Rep. Hyde. The gentleman from Utah, Mr. Cannon.
       Mr. Christopher B. Cannon (R-UT). Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
       I would like to begin by thanking this panel today. This is 
     an important issue, and I think your presence has added 
     weight to the issue. And I appreciate your comments and 
     testimony.
       I would also like to just point out at the very beginning 
     that, without any parsing of words or equivocation, I agree 
     with my frind Mr. Delahunt and with the comments by Mr. 
     Sullivan, that the essence of the rule of law lies in the 
     technicalities, and the technicalities are very, very 
     important to us here.
       Now, I'd like to refer to some of the things that my good 
     friend Ms. Lofgren commented on earlier. Ms. Lofgren and I 
     are on two subcommittees of this committee, together, and I 
     have the greatest respect for the way she thinks.
       She said or pointed out that perjury about sex is relevant 
     essentially--and I am paraphrasing--is relevant to this side 
     because it's a crime, and then went on to point out some of 
     the technical elements of the crime that may in fact be 
     missing here.
       And the first is that--there was the suggestion that the 
     person who administered the oath to the president may not 
     have been authorized to do so. I think that was rebutted 
     fairly effectively by Mr. Buyer, and I agree with his 
     responses.
       Secondly, she said that the question must be unambiguous. 
     Now, I don't read the statute as requiring an unambiguous 
     question, but I think the perjury ultimately has to be quite 
     clear.
       Later, Mr. Sullivan, I think in response to some of this 
     questioning, suggested that the president can defend on the 
     basis that the definition was changed--that is, the 
     definition of ``sex''--and that the new definition may 
     somehow have excluded a certain act or type of sex.
       Let me just suggest in response to that, that I have read 
     that definition very carefully, as I think many of the 
     members of this committee have. The president pointed out 
     that he answered the question very carefully, because he 
     answered the question in the context of the definition that 
     he read very carefully. And obviously, minds can disagree on 
     this sort of thing, but I just don't see how you could 
     exclude that particular act from the definition that remained 
     after the striking of the two sentences.
       Now a lot has been said about whether or not the president 
     could be prosecuted for this crime, where these technical 
     defenses may be relevant. But I think the real potential 
     for understanding the likelihood of a criminal prosecution 
     actually lies in the president's own actions. He refuses 
     to acknowledge or deny the underlying facts of the case, 
     and it's like there's an allergy to the L-word. Mr. Crain, 
     yesterday said, in answer to a question, ``No, he 
     deceived, he misled, but he did not lie.'' Later, ``No, he 
     was technically accurate, but he did not disclose 
     information.''
       This--I mean, I think all the commentators in the editorial 
     pages have pointed out that the president is caught between 
     the Fifth Amendment and coming clean with the American 
     public. And I think it's his actions, the fact that he won't 
     deal with the facts of the case, that make it clear to me 
     that there may actually be, in another context, rather than 
     this one, a criminal problem that he's concerned about.
       But unlike Mr. Wexler, who says that this is about sexual--
     lying about sexual relations and touching, let me suggest 
     that I believe that this--that this proceeding is really 
     about--not about crime--I believe that it's about the 
     government's ability to secure the----
       Rep. [off mike].
       Rep. Cannon. I have to protect my mike frommy compatriot on 
     this side.
       This is about the government's ability to secure the rights 
     of the governed. And John Jay was quoted yesterday. Let me 
     just repeat part of that quote. ``If oaths cease to be 
     sacred, our dearest and most valuable rights become 
     insecure.''
       I know, Mr. Weld, you've actually governed, and you're a 
     person for whom I have the greatest respect. Would you mind 
     responding? What do you think those rights are? And if we can 
     be very particular, because my time is almost up, what are 
     those rights that Mr. Jay is concerned about keeping secure?
       Mr. Weld. I think it's the rights to life, liberty, 
     property, and the pursuit of happiness.
       Rep. Cannon. Thank you. I view property and the pursuit of 
     happiness as the same right--life, liberty, and property. And 
     since my time is gone, I would love to hear a little bit 
     about that.
       I believe that John Jay was right. What this panel is all 
     about doing is maintaining for Americans for generations and 
     centuries to come the security of those basic rights of life, 
     liberty, and property, or the pursuit of happiness. That's 
     what we're about here. And I yield back the balance of my 
     time, Mr. Chairman.
       Rep. Hyde. The gentleman from California, Mr. Rogan.
       Rep. James Rogan (R-CA). Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
       I join my colleague from Utah in welcoming the panel, and 
     particularly in welcoming

[[Page H12001]]

     the distinguished former governor of Massachusetts, whose 
     service to our country I have long admired and thank you for 
     to this day.
       Gentlemen, let me start off by saying that I've noticed a 
     recurring theme among most of the panelists over the last few 
     hours. The first one, with the exception of Governor Weld, is 
     that perjury generally is a crime not prosecuted. The second 
     one is the statement made over and over that somehow the 
     statements made by the president were not material, even if 
     they were lying under oath. And I must tell you, I take 
     exception to both of those claims.
       In the federal government since Bill Clinton became 
     president, according to the Offenders Sentenced Under the 
     Guidelines table, just during the Clinton administration, 
     almost 700 people have not only been convicted for perjury in 
     federal court, they've been sentenced for perjury. In my own 
     state of California, since Bill Clinton became president, 
     some 16,000 perjury prosecutions have occurred. And so I just 
     don't know where this novel claim comes from that this is a 
     crime that is ignored by the courts. The record simply does 
     not reflect that.
       A couple of members raised the name of Dr. Battalino and 
     there were some blank stares by members of the committee. Let 
     me share with you briefly the story of Dr. Battalino. She was 
     here a week or so ago and testified before this committee. 
     She was a doctor who worked for the Veterans Administration. 
     She is also an attorney. In her capacity as a V.A. physician, 
     she had a one-time consensual relationship, sexual 
     relationship with a male patient of the hospital, but not her 
     patient. He later sued the hospital for a sexual harassment 
     claim and named her in the claim. She was asked in a civil 
     deposition whether she had ever had a sexual relationship, a 
     one-time sexual encounter with this patient. Out of 
     embarrassment and out of concern for her job and her career, 
     she denied it.
       The civil case was later dismissed--the gentleman's case 
     against the hospital and the doctor was later dismissed. 
     Despite that dismissal, the Clinton Justice Department filed 
     perjury charges against her. She is now precluded form 
     practicing law as a result of her conviction. She lost her 
     medical license and she is under incarceration. She appeared 
     before us with an ankle bracelet because she is under house 
     arrest.
       You might imagine that Dr. Battalino has some grave 
     concerns over the incredible double standard as to her loss 
     of livelihood and the shame that she's had to face as a 
     result of the Clinton Justice Department prosecuting her for 
     this, and the claim now being proffered by some of the 
     president's supporters that this is all much ado about 
     nothing.
       I have to also say that I take very grave exception to some 
     of my beloved colleagues on the other side who keep insisting 
     to the American people that this is simply about sex. That 
     just is not true. Governor Weld is absolutely right. 
     Fornication, adultery not only are not impeachable offenses, 
     they clearly, they patently are not the business of the House 
     Judiciary Committee. But that is not what was at stake here. 
     The president was a defendant in a federal sexual harassment 
     civil rights case. And as a result of that case, a federal 
     judge ordered him to tell under oath whether in his capacity 
     as governor or president he had ever had sexual relations 
     with subordinate female employees. And the judge specifically 
     found that was relevant to show a pattern of conduct. 
     That's how sexual harassment cases are proven. And so this 
     idea among some folks that if they just say it enough and 
     if their histrionics are dramatic or theatrical enough, if 
     the volume is raised enough, that somehow we can reduce 
     this to being just a case about sex may play well for the 
     talk show circuit, but it doesn't play well for the truth. 
     And I want to make that observation before my time 
     expires.
       I thank the chair, and I yield back my time.
       Rep. Hyde. The gentleman from South Carolina, Mr. Lindsey 
     Graham.
       Rep. Lindsey Graham (R-SC). Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have 
     a couple observations and some questions for the panelists 
     here. And I, too, have appreciated your being here.
       Please understand that when I vote, I will look at it in a 
     very legal sense. I don't believe due to the nature of what's 
     going on that we should send a case forward that doesn't meet 
     certain legal standards. And I just happen to disagree with 
     you about whether or not this is a provable case of perjury. 
     I think this is a very clear case of perjury, and it's not 
     just about intimate touching. It goes much further. And I 
     can't explain all that in five minutes. I've seen the 
     president's deposition in Paula Jones where he testified. I 
     saw Mr. Bennett lay the affidavit of Monica Lewinsky in front 
     of the president. I saw the president's eyes follow the 
     affidavit, his head nod, and I believe his grand jury 
     testimony where he said he wasn't paying any attention is a 
     lie. And I believe I could convict him with fair-minded 
     people.
       But this is really more than just about the law. It's about 
     the national interest. And I'm a politician. And there's a 
     unique political aspect to this case that's probably good. 
     I've said before, impeachment without outrage should be 
     difficult. And it should be, in a democratic society. But let 
     me tell you the mood of my district to let you know a little 
     bit about what I'm up against here.
       The Washington Post sent, apparently, four reporters to the 
     four corners of the country, and they happened to pick my 
     district to feel out how people feel about the president and 
     his misconduct. There is a portion of my district, very good 
     friends of mine, who want to get this over with and 
     understand this. In their mind, it doesn't rise to the level 
     of overturning an election. That's a real dynamic. Very nice, 
     rational people. But that's the minority opinion.
       You can take the pools and reverse them. The reporters said 
     ``I think I need to come home now'' because they never got 
     out of the clothing department of Wal-Mart to figure out what 
     people thought about the president. It wasn't good. Being 
     evasive, deceptive, immoral and non-responsive are not 
     resume-builders in my district. Forget about perjury.
       So I'm a congressman that comes from an area--[laughs]--of 
     the country that's got no use for this kind of stuff. But I 
     have publicly said that we're going to play it straight with 
     the president, we're not going to take our emotions and our 
     political disagreements and try to use that in the 
     impeachment process. And I'm going to stand by that.
       I've said to Mr. Craig and others I believe the president 
     committed serious crimes, but if he would reconcile himself 
     with the law so that we could end this thing on a note of 
     honor, I may consider a different disposition than 
     impeachment. But if he continues to flout the law, I don't 
     think he should be the president for the next century. I 
     stand by that statement.
       But there's another aspect to this that I think we need to 
     talk about. Ms. Waters has--I really do--have gotten to know 
     my colleagues on the other side, and we do get along pretty 
     well. She says, well, it's really silly to believe the 
     president would have his secretary hide gifts under her bed. 
     Well, that sounds silly, but the day that people stop doing 
     silly stuff is the day all of us as lawyers go out of 
     business. [Laughter.] I think it's silly to fool around with 
     an intern while you're being sued. But those things happen. 
     And they happen to smart people like Bill Clinton. And if we 
     impeach people for being silly and doing inappropriate things 
     we'll wipe the Congress out.
       So I'm not saying that those type things ought to be the 
     reason we get rid of the president. But don't underestimate 
     what people can do that really is inappropriate and defies 
     understanding. And I believe that's a lot of what Bill 
     Clinton's problems really are at the end of the day.
       And if I've got to cast my vote based on knowing what the 
     Senate's going to do, I'd never vote in the House, because I 
     can't tell you what they're going to do half the time. And I 
     think what they ought to do is wait `til they get a case 
     before they decide it. And everybody in Congress ought to let 
     this committee do its work, whether you like us or not, 
     before you decide what you're going to do, because the day 
     you start deciding the case before the case is over is the 
     day we lose a lot in this country.
       Governor Weld, hypothetically, you're the governor. There's 
     a person out there that possesses damaging information about 
     you. You're in a consentual relationship that's wrong. That 
     person, you know, if asked to testify, could hurt you legally 
     and politically. If you used the resources of the 
     governorship, if you got people in your office to plant lies, 
     flasehoods, malicious rumors, and tried to use your office as 
     governor to trash out that potential witness against you, 
     what should be your fate?
       Mr. Weld. Well, in a clear enough case, my fate should be 
     ``out of here''.
       Rep. Graham. Thank you.
       I yield back the balance of my time.
       Rep. Hyde. The gentlelady from California, Ms. Bono.
       Rep. Mary Bono (R-CA). Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And to my 
     panel, thank you, first and foremost, for your patience. I 
     woke up this morning and I thought, What do I get to do 
     today? And question top--five of the top attorneys in the 
     entire country. What a great way to start off my day.
       I want to ask you a question, Governor Weld, to begin with, 
     and it's a follow-up to something that Congressman Coble has 
     asked earlier on. You discussed how you had changed your 
     position, your initial reaction in February was that you 
     said the president should resign. And you indicated that 
     you've changed your thinking because of events during the 
     past year and the general reaction to the president. As a 
     congresswoman I also sit on the National Security 
     Committee, and so issues concerning our military readiness 
     and standing around the world greatly concern me.
       Earlier this year, the United States engaged in some 
     military activity. Many people accused the White House of 
     following a wag-the-dog strategy. It troubles me that the 
     president may be in some ways hamstrung to lead and act 
     decisively and swiftly on the international military state 
     without the complete trust of the American people. In other 
     words, if the office of the president does not enjoy the 
     complete public trust this might affect our national 
     security.
       So governor, if there is new evidence that the president 
     does not have the trust of the international community or of 
     our armed forces--and I'm not talking about polls, but more 
     specific evidence from leaders around the world, would you 
     revisit your February advice that the president should resign 
     for the good of the country?
       Mr. Weld. Yes. I think actually it was September, Madame 
     Congresswoman. And as I indicated or alluded to earlier, one 
     of the things I was troubled by in September was we'd had, 
     frankly, some acts--some bombings and similar actions abroad 
     which coincided with the Lewinsky matter really coming to a 
     head. And that's precisely what I

[[Page H12002]]

     was worried about. So I think, you know, anybody on an 
     ongoing basis has got to ask themselves the question, Can I 
     do the job? And if you can't do the job, you shouldn't do the 
     job.
       Rep. Bono. So will your opinion vacillate, though, 
     depending on what is happening with attacks on us, or if----
       Mr. Weld. Well, you know, we don't have a parliamentary 
     system here, we have presidents who are mighty unpopular. 
     Harry Truman was mighty unpopular even when he was by and 
     large, you know, in retrospect people think, doing the right 
     thing on a lot of stuff. So I don't think it should be 
     following the public opinion polls. It's a question of 
     ability to discharge the duties of the office, and I will 
     confess that I was somewhat surprised at the alacrity with 
     which all seemed to be forgiven and forgotten in terms of 
     people saddling up and doing business with the president and 
     taking him seriously.
       Rep. Bono. Well, my point, sort of, here, is, is that, you 
     know, the public trust, though, is something you also have to 
     anticipate and its's easy to have it now, today, while the 
     economy is strong, the stock market is great, although some 
     of us still can't get Furbys-- [laughing]--so it's not strong 
     enough. But how about tomorrow? Will we have it tomorrow? 
     Will the public trust be there tomorrow? It cannot change. 
     It's something that we can't--we have to sort of guess. Will 
     it be there? And I'm sort of hearing, as you're saying, too, 
     I guess you're echoing with me that here today, gone 
     tomorrow. And we on this committee cannot have that. We have 
     to decide, will the public trust be there a month from now 
     when Osama bin Laden rears his ugly head again?
       Mr. Weld. Well, I don't think you want to go the removal 
     route because of a concern that the trust might not be there. 
     It would have to be a little bit more solid than that.
       Rep. Bono. There is a concern, right? Thank you. And I 
     guess--I still have a green light--this is a miracle. I have 
     a question based on Mr. Sullivan's testimony, but I'll leave 
     it open to the whole panel, but first I want to--oh, it's 
     yellow, so I'll just comment briefly.
       Mr. Sullivan, I had a fun moment earlier; it's not a 
     comment or anything, but, you know, we're here because of the 
     president's, sort of, dancing on the head of a pin, as 
     Lindsey (sp) would say, over the definition of sex, and oral 
     sex was omitted from the description before the Paula Jones 
     testimony. But then here in this room you've changed it to 
     sleeping with somebody, and I know you were trying to sort of 
     elude references to salacious materials again, but isn't that 
     what got us in this whole mess? And now you're changing the 
     wording--and I'm not a lawyer so I'm getting used to 
     listening to every word we're saying--that you did the very 
     thing that got us in this whole mess to begin with. And I 
     just thought it was a fun moment, so I wanted to leave you 
     with a good experience here with the House Judiciary 
     Committee. So thank you all. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
       Rep. Hyde. Thank you very much. We are going to take a 
     break. I'll yield to Mr. Conyers.
       Rep. Conyers. Well, I wanted to take a few minutes on the 
     reservation that I had earlier.
       Rep. Hyde. All right, well, you're recognized for----
       Rep. Conyers. I'll move as quickly as I can, Mr. Chairman, 
     and thank you. I first wanted to let Sheila Jackson Lee 
     utilize 30 seconds of the time.
       Rep. Jackson Lee. Thank you very much, Mr. Conyers.
       Just very briefly, there was a comment on the presentation 
     of the witnesses. Let me assume that you can come forward 
     here because you are fact or expert witnesses. But I did want 
     to very quickly comment on Dr. Battalino's case and Ms. 
     Parsons's case.
       Dr. Battalino's case, the issue of perjury went to the fact 
     that she was attempting to reclaim monies for litigation 
     costs. It was insurance fraud, if you will. That went to the 
     question; that's why the Department of Justice prosecuted 
     her. And you were unfairly asked about it.
       Pam Parsons, she was accused of being a lesbian. She was a 
     plaintiff and sued the newspaper that accused her of such and 
     lied that she was not. And there was definite or definitive 
     proof--otherwise.
       And so it went to the heart of the cases. And I think it's 
     important that we clarify the record on those grounds. I 
     thank the gentleman. I yield back my time.
       Rep. Conyers. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, 
     and to this very-much-appreciated panel; this is a critical 
     phase of the hearings. And it's helping us to recognize how 
     the experts on this panel, seasoned and experienced 
     prosecutors all, which Mr. Starr acknowledged that he was 
     not, would have rejected bringing a criminal case against 
     the president, based on Mr. Starr's allegations, if he 
     were an ordinary citizen.
       It's critical in this part of our hearing to understand the 
     vast difference between the allegations being considered by 
     the committee and the system of criminal justice that applies 
     to the rest of us. If no ordinary citizen, who had faced even 
     a criminal prosecution based on the allegations in the 
     referral--how can we justify considering the rarely used 
     remedy of impeachment for the same conduct? If no ordinary 
     citizen would face a criminal prosecution based on these 
     allegations, how can it be argued that to decline to vote for 
     impeachment places the president above the law? If no 
     ordinary citizen would face a criminal prosecution based on 
     these allegations, why should we bother to take the Senate 
     and the chief justice of our highest court, to spend months 
     resolving undignified and trivial questions of fact, rather 
     than in tending to the important business of the country? I 
     hope these questions raise serious issues and reservations 
     for all of my colleagues in the committee about the wisdom of 
     proceeding on the path that we apparently are on.
       May I acknowledge the chairman of this committee's 
     accommodations that he has offered me concerning prompt 
     notice to all of us on the committee of any draft Articles of 
     Impeachment and his further willingness to consider the 
     motion that will be offered by the gentleman from Virginia, 
     Mr. Scott, to require that the specific allegations against 
     the president be provided to him before his counsel responds, 
     when we conduct our business session today or tomorrow.
       May I reiterate my strong view to the Republican leadership 
     that fairness dictates that the American people not be 
     muzzled on the all-important issue of censure. 
     Overwhelmingly, the American people that we have referred to, 
     we've tested in the districts and the nation, do not want the 
     president impeached.
       Our citizens either support doing nothing, under the theory 
     that the president has already been censured, or they support 
     an additional resolution of censure. But the important point 
     is that for the vast majority of those who do not want an 
     impeachment, a six-month Senate investigation with all of the 
     attendant political and economic turmoil, for all of those 
     who want a proportional and sensible alternative shouldn't be 
     muzzled.
       And so your testimony here and this panel may well be the 
     most important that we will have because you have dealt so 
     significantly with these fact questions that have been 
     troubling us. And thank you, Mr. Chairman.
       Rep. Hyde. I thank you, Mr. Conyers, and I want to say that 
     I, too, deeply appreciate the contribution which was and is 
     substantial that you've made to some of our knowledge on this 
     very difficult question. You've all been enormously helpful, 
     highly qualified, very forthcoming and you've made a great 
     contribution.
       Now, we should take a 30-minute recess, but before I reach 
     that happy point I yield to Ms. Jackson Lee.
       Rep. Jackson Lee. Very briefly, Mr. Chairman, I'd like to 
     submit into evidence of this proceedings the Constitution of 
     the United States, particularly noting that there is no 
     prohibition on censure noted in the Constitution of the 
     United States. I'd like to submit this into the record, Mr. 
     Chairman.
       Rep. Hyde. Well, certainly, without objection, even though 
     ours is a government of delegated powers. But, nonetheless, 
     your motion is granted.
       Rep. Jackson Lee. I thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I 
     appreciate it.
       Rep. Hyde. Thanks. Thank you.
       And now I will try again, we will have a half-hour recess. 
     Please come back at the end of a half-hour.
       [Recess.]

  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from 
Wisconsin (Mr. Barrett) a distinguished member of the Committee on the 
Judiciary.
  Mr. BARRETT of Wisconsin. Mr. Speaker, I am the junior member of the 
House Committee on the Judiciary, and when I walked in that room the 
first time, I honestly felt that we would be addressing this issue not 
as Democrats and Republicans, but as Americans. I was so naive I did 
not even think that we would be sitting along our normal spots as 
Democrats and Republicans. But I was wrong.
  But I entered that room with hope, and I want to leave today with 
hope because I have tremendous confidence not only in this institution 
but this country.
  I begged from the first hearing on that we not allow this process to 
become what it has become because I fear for this institution. We are 
consuming ourselves. We are lowering the respect for our democratic 
institutions in this country by what we are doing today.
  This is the great tragedy. The tragedy of the loss of the presidency 
for Bill Clinton would be a personal loss. The tragedy of the loss of 
two Speakers is a personal loss. But the greatest tragedy is if the 
young men and women in this country do not respect this government, 
because if they do not respect this government, we all lose.
  That is why, Mr. Speaker, I tried time and time again to offer an 
olive branch, to say to my colleagues, please, let us recognize that 
the President's actions were wrong, because they were very wrong; let 
us recognize the gravity of what we are doing; let us recognize that 
after he leaves office he should remain accountable to appropriate 
criminal and civil remedies. But, Mr. Speaker, I beg that we move on 
because I could see no good coming from this for our country, and I 
stand here

[[Page H12003]]

today and say if this process continues, we will continue to consume 
ourselves, and that is not good for this country.
  So, Mr. Speaker, today I again offer the olive branch. For the sake 
of this institution, for the sake of this country, for the sake of our 
children, please let us work together. This country will not accept a 
partisan solution to this problem. This country recognizes that the 
President's actions were wrong and he has to be held accountable. But 
they do not want us to tear ourselves apart.
  When I talk to young people about entering government, I tell them, 
``Think of the worst thing you have ever done in your life. Don't tell 
me what it is. Now think about having it on the 10 o'clock news.''
  If that becomes more and more prevalent, what are we going to become? 
We are going to become a Nation where people who have sins, and every 
one of us is a sinner, will be afraid to enter the ranks of public 
service.
  Is that what we want?
  Is that what we are coming to?
  I pray not, Mr. Speaker. For if that is what we are coming to, our 
country is in grave danger.
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
Massachusetts (Mr. Delahunt), a member of the Committee on the 
Judiciary.
  Mr. DELAHUNT. Mr. Speaker, I too come to extend the olive branch, and 
I am deeply saddened by the events of today.
  The American people have made it clear that their desire is for us to 
censure the President and move on to the Nation's business. It is wrong 
that there has been a decision made by the Republican leadership that 
would not allow censure to come to the floor. Whether my colleagues 
agree with censure or not, I submit it is their obligation to do so.
  They say that censure is unconstitutional, but most historians and 
constitutional scholars disagree with them. The founder of their party, 
Abraham Lincoln, supported a censure of President Polk. Congress 
actually did censure President Andrew Jackson. Earlier this session, 
the majority whip, the gentleman from Texas (Mr. DeLay) introduced a 
resolution censuring President Clinton.
  They have told us over again that this is a vote of conscience. But 
what about the consciences of Democrat Members? And what about the will 
of the people?
  Mr. Speaker, I fear that we will do a terrible disservice for the 
Constitution and to our country.
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the distinguished 
gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Lewis), the minority deputy whip.
  Mr. LEWIS of Georgia. Mr. Speaker, today is a very sad day for this 
House. This morning when I got up, I wanted to cry, but the tears would 
not come.
  Before we cast this one little vote, we all should ask the question:
  Is this good for America?
  Is this good for the American people?
  Is this good for this institution?
  When I was growing up in rural Alabama during the 40s and the 50s as 
a young child, near a shotgun house where my aunt lived one afternoon 
an unbelievable storm occurred.

                              {time}  1115

  The wind started blowing. The rain fell on the tin top roof of this 
house. Lightning started flashing. The thunder started rolling. My aunt 
asked us all to come into this house and to hold hands, and we held 
hands.
  As the wind continued to blow, we walked to that corner of the house, 
and as the wind blew stronger, we walked to another corner; as it tried 
to lift another corner, we would walk there. We never left the house. 
The wind may blow, the thunder may roll, the lightning may flash, but 
we must never leave the American house. We must stay together as a 
family: one house, one family; the American House, the American family.
  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. LaHood). The gentleman from Illinois 
(Mr. Hyde) is recognized for 5\1/2\ minutes.
  (Mr. HYDE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, those of us who are sinners must feel 
especially wretched today, losing the gentleman from Louisiana (Mr. Bob 
Livingston) under such sad circumstances. One's self-esteem gets 
utterly crushed at times like this. I think of a character in one of 
Tolstoy's novels who feels so crushed, he asked God if he couldn't be 
useful in wiping something up, or filling a hole, or being a bad 
example.
  But something is going on repeatedly that has to be stopped. That is 
a confusion between private acts of infidelity and public acts, where 
as a government official, you raise your right hand and you ask God to 
witness to the truth of what you are saying. That is a public act.
  Infidelity, adultery, is not a public act, it is a private act. The 
government, the Congress, has no business intruding into private acts. 
But it is our business, it is our duty, to observe, to characterize 
public acts by public officials. So I hope that confusion does not 
persist.
  ``The rule of law,'' a phrase we have heard, along with ``fairness'' 
and ``reprehensible'', more often than not, is in real danger today if 
we cheapen the oath, because justice depends upon the enforceability of 
the oath.
  I do not care what the subject matter is, if it is important enough 
to say, I raise my right hand and swear by the almighty God that the 
testimony I am about to give is the truth, the whole truth, nothing but 
the truth, if it is solemn enough for that, it is solemn enough to 
enforce.
  When we have a serial violator of the oath who is the chief law 
enforcement officer of the country, who appoints the judges and the 
Supreme Court, the Attorney General, we have a problem. Members 
recognize that problem because they want to censure him. That is 
impeachment lite. They want to censure him with no real consequences, 
except as history chooses to impose them.
  But we suggest that censuring the President is not a function 
permitted in this Chamber. Maybe across the Rotunda, where the 
sanctions of an impeached person are imposed, that is another 
situation. I daresay, they are innovative and creative over there on 
Mount Olympus, but here we are confined by the strictures of the 
Constitution which affords us one avenue, and that is impeachment, 
impeachment.
  There is a doctrine of separation of powers. We cannot punish the 
President. Yet, a censure resolution, to be meaningful, has to at least 
harm his reputation. We have no power to do that, if we believe in the 
Constitution. The Constitution did not enumerate for us a power of 
punishing the President. Again, I speak not for the gentlemen across 
the hall.
  No fact witnesses, I have heard that repeated again and again. Look, 
we had 60,000 pages of testimony from the grand jury, from depositions, 
from statements under oath. That is testimony that we can believe and 
accept. We chose to believe it and accept it. Why reinterview Betty 
Currie to take another statement when we already had her statement? Why 
interview Monica Lewinsky when we had her statement under oath, and 
with a grant of immunity that if she lied she would forfeit?
  If Members on the other side did not trust those people, if they did 
not accept their credibility, Members had the opportunity to call them 
and cross-examine them to their heart's content. But no, they really 
did not want to bring them in and cross-examine them, but they want to 
blame us for having no fact witnesses. I think that is a little short 
of the mark.
  Lame duck? The cry was, get this over with, get this behind us. We 
have an election, they pick up a few seats, and ``lame duck'' becomes 
the cry. Please, be fair. Be consistent.
  Now, equal protection of the law, that is what worries me about this 
whole thing. Any of the Members who have been victimized by injustice, 
and you have not lived until you have been sued by somebody and pushed 
to the wall, and turned to the government and the government is on the 
wrong side, justice is so important to the most humble among us, equal 
justice under the law. That is what we are fighting for.
  When the chief law enforcement officer trivializes, ignores, shreds, 
minimizes, the sanctity of the oath, then justice is wounded, and 
Members on that side are wounded and their children are wounded. I ask 
Members to follow their conscience and they will serve the country.

[[Page H12004]]

  Mr. LATHAM. Mr. Speaker, I quote: ``Do you solemnly swear in the 
testimony you are about to give that it will be the truth, the whole 
truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God?''
  Mr. Speaker, that is the oath President Clinton took before his 
August 17th testimony of this year. The President answered ``I do''. 
And despite repeated attempts by Deputy Independent Counsel Sol 
Wisenberg to warn him of the consequences of providing false or 
misleading testimony, the President went on to make perjurious 
statements pertaining to his relationship with Monica Lewinsky and his 
sworn testimony in the Paula Jones civil trial.
  But why? Why would this President, who by anyone's account is a very 
intelligent man and a very good lawyer, and thus knowing the 
consequences of his actions, why would be proceed to commit perjury 
before the grand jury?
  I think the answer lies in the testimony of the President's political 
consultant and confidant Dick Morris. After the story of the 
President's extramarital relationship and his false testimony in the 
Jones civil trial broke, he consulted with Morris about what strategy 
he should employ. It was decided a poll should be taken to gauge what 
conduct the American people would and would not forgive. According to 
Morris' testimony, his poll found that the President's adultery could 
be forgiven by the public.
  However, the results also showed that if it were found that the 
President committed perjury or obstructed justice, the public would 
consider that grounds for removal from office. It is then when the 
President made a defining statement to Morris. He said, ``Well, we just 
have to win, then.'' And so it was, back in January, that the President 
determined to continue his pattern of lies and deceit, to his staff, 
his cabinet, the American public and to the grand jury on August 17th.
  This first article of impeachment is perhaps the most serious. It is 
clearly evident that President William Jefferson Clinton perjured 
himself before a federal grand jury--certainly a ``high crime'' as 
delineated in Article II, Section 4 of our Constitution.
  We cannot, in good conscience, ignore the President's callous 
disregard for the laws made on the floor of this House.
  ``Do you swear and affirm to tell the truth, the whole truth and 
nothing but the truth, so help you God?''--The oath taken by President 
Clinton in the Jones versus Clinton civil trial.
  There are some who say the second article, regarding the President's 
perjurious testimony in the Jones versus Clinton case, does not amount 
to an impeachable offense since it occurred as part of a civil and not 
a criminal trial and since, ultimately, the case was thrown out of 
court. In fact, some even claim the President's statements do not 
amount to perjury.
  However, one of the President's own special counsel, Gregory B. 
Craig, in his testimony before the House Judiciary Committee, 
``conceded that in the Jones deposition, the President's testimony was 
evasive, incomplete, misleading--even maddening,'' Given this and the 
evidence derived from the sworn testimony of Vernon Jordan, Betty 
Currie, Monica Lewinsky and others, there is clear and convincing 
evidence that the President lied under oath and committed perjury in 
the Jones deposition.
  The fact that the case was subsequently thrown out of court does not 
acquit the President from the perjury count. Because, in fact, the 
President's perjurious statements denied Paula Jones a continuance of 
that trial, and, in effect, her civil rights.
  Obstruction of justice is an equally grave crime. The third article 
of impeachment delineates how President Clinton set out on a course to 
obstruct justice in seven instances, including the President's 
tampering with witnesses in the Jones versus Clinton case, notably 
Betty Currie and Monica Lewinsky.
  The President's actions prevented Paula Jones' suit from receiving a 
fair and just decision in court on whether her civil rights had been 
violated by the President. Each of us would expect that our grievance 
would receive a fair hearing in a court of law, it is our 
Constitutional right. No one, including the President of the United 
States--especially the President of the United States--should be able 
to deny someone that right and not suffer the consequences of their 
actions.
  President Clinton has displayed a pattern of lying, putting forth 
perjurious testimony, and obstructing justice, all which undermine our 
Constitution and the principle that no one individual is above the 
law--that the law is applied equally to all. This despite his oath 
before the American people on two occasions to ``faithfully execute the 
Office of the President of the United States, and to . . . to the best 
of [his] ability, preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the 
United States.''
  Furthermore, while I do not believe Article 4 necessarily rises to 
the level of an impeachable offense in this instance, the President 
has, with great disrepute, used his office to proliferate his own lies 
and destroy the character of those who have sought to serve justice. 
Unfortunately, this behavior is in no way a revelation to this 
generation or to those past. In fact, in 1788, Sir Edmund Burke, in his 
opening speech for the impeachment of Warren Hastings, the British 
Governor General of Bengal and India, noted the employment of such 
familiar tactics as character assassination and twisting the truth when 
he criticized Hastings and his defenders that . . . ``When they cannot 
deny the facts, they attack the accuser--they attack their conduct, 
they attack their persons, they attack their language in every possible 
manner.''
  However, I bear no personal grudge against President Clinton. I 
forgive him for what he has done. But forgiveness is not justice, and 
since we are a nation of laws, we must see to it that the laws are 
upheld and applied equally to all citizens. That principal is what this 
nation was built on, it is for what our Founding Fathers pledged their 
lives, their fortunes and their sacred honor.
  And it is in this great legislative body that we are charged with 
making the laws that govern our nation. To permit the chief executive 
enforcing those laws to cast them aside as he pleases would, in effect, 
sanction such actions. To do nothing would be to place a stamp of 
approval on illicit conduct and transfer power to the executive branch, 
thus upsetting the system of checks and balances devised by the 
Framers. It would cheapen the law, which, in turn, would cheapen the 
work by this House.
  So it is with a heavy heart but a clear conscience that I cast my 
votes in favor of three of the four articles of impeachment today. Of 
course, the people of northwest Iowa did not send me 1000 miles from my 
home in Alexander to the U.S. Congress to make the easy decisions. But 
if a democratic republic were an easy system of government, America 
would not be unique in this world. A republic is so difficult to 
maintain because it demands greater sacrifice and restraint on the part 
of the ruler and than the ruled. Part of this sacrifice is that our 
leaders are held to a higher standard of conduct as they set the 
example for the rest of the citizenry and are placed in a position of 
trust.
  It pains me to say that this President has placed himself above the 
Office of the Presidency and above the people he took an oath to serve. 
The House of Representatives is doing today what is our duty to do. We 
should wait no longer, for as Burke opined, ``To have forborne longer 
would not have been patience but collusion.''
  Mr. RAMSTAD. Mr. Speaker, this has been the most difficult, gut-
wrenching decision I have made in my 18 years of public service. In 
making my decision, I have been obligated to put personal feelings and 
political concerns aside to focus solely on my constitutional 
obligation.
  The impeachment matter is a trauma for our nation and the decision 
demands careful and thoughtful deliberation and much soul searching. A 
decision of this magnitude required me to examine all of the evidence, 
listen to all the legal arguments and search my conscience.
  As a former Criminal Justice Act lawyer, I have objectively reviewed 
all the evidence, heard all the arguments and searched my conscience. I 
have regrettably and sadly concluded that sufficient evidence of 
perjury exists to send this matter to the Senate.
  I cast my votes solely on the evidence and the law consistent with my 
conscience.
  Impeachment is similar to an indictment, or a formal charge of 
wrongdoing, and I believe the evidence of perjury before the grand jury 
and obstruction of justice meet the ``clear and convincing'' threshold 
for moving the process forward. I have also concluded these charges 
rise to the level of an impeachable offense pursuant to the 
Constitution of the United States.
  In the final analysis, it all comes down to perjury and covering up 
perjury. The compelling reason for impeachment is that the President's 
perjury has undermined the rule of law.
  The laws against perjury are the glue that holds our legal system 
together. To remain a nation of laws governed by the rule of law, all 
people, including the President, must be treated equally and held 
accountable. The President must abide by the same laws as every other 
American.
  In analyzing the four articles of impeachment, I have concluded that 
the charge of perjury before the grand jury is substantial by clear and 
convincing evidence. As the chief law enforcement officer of the United 
States, the President has an obligation to tell the truth, under oath, 
in judicial proceedings. He chose not to.
  Similarly, I concluded that there was sufficient evidence that the 
President obstructed justice in order to cover up his perjury.
  At the same time, I have concluded that Articles 2 and 4 do not 
present clear and convincing evidence of impeachable offenses by the 
President.
  In my judgment, the second article concerning perjury in a civil 
deposition does not meet the ``clear and convincing'' standard because

[[Page H12005]]

of questions about materiality. In addition, the charge of abuse of 
power--for the answers by the President's lawyers to the Judiciary 
Committee's questions--is not justified by the evidence and raises Due 
Process concerns.
  This is truly a sad day for America and the American people. But, 
long after the words spoken today have faded, and long after this 
painful ordeal is concluded, we will remain a nation of laws. This 
means we must sometimes make difficult decisions to ensure that our 
national principles survive and public trust is maintained.
  By the grace of God, I pray that this painful chapter in our nation's 
history will be quickly put behind us by the Senate so we can address 
our nation's pressing needs, heal our wounds and show the world 
America's enduring strength and resiliency.
  Mr. SANDLIN. Mr. Speaker, on this somber occasion I rise in strong 
support of the Constitution of the United States of America and the 
rule of law and in strong opposition to the Articles of Impeachment 
before us today.
  Impeachment is possibly the most difficult issue to face any 
Congress. Attempting to impeach and remove a president strikes at the 
very foundation of our constitutional scheme of government.
  As has been correctly stated many times today, the Constitution of 
the United States of America sets the standard for impeachment and 
provides that the President can be removed only upon ``Impeachment for 
and Conviction of Treason, Bribery or other high crimes and 
Misdemeanors.''
  Under our law and interpretations of the Constitution, it is clear 
that impeachment requires wrongdoing by public officials while acting 
in their public capacity. English precedent clearly illustrates that 
impeachment applies only in cases of fundamental attacks against the 
system of government itself. Further, legal scholars agree that the 
Framers of our Constitution understood English precedent and intended 
to authorize impeachment only in cases of serious harm to the state 
such as treason or bribery.
  Recent interpretations are consistent. In fact, a memorandum prepared 
by the Republican Members of the Judiciary Committee in 1974 stated, in 
a pertinent part, as follows:

       . . . It is our judgment, based upon this constitutional 
     history, that the Framers of the United States Constitution 
     intended that the President should be removable by the 
     legislative branch only for serious misconduct dangerous to 
     the system of government established by the Constitution. 
     [Nixon report at 364-365 (Minority views of Messrs. 
     Hutchinson, Smith, Sandman, Wiggins, Dennis, Mayne, Lott, 
     Moorhead, Marazati and Latta)]

  Obviously, the historical and constitutional standards are clear. 
Justice as obviously, the articles before us today do not even attempt 
to allege official misconduct resulting in damage to our system of 
government. Therefore, the articles must be rejected.
  Is the conduct of the President disappointing? Certainly it is. Has 
it been offensive to the American public? Again, the answer is yes. 
However, neither of those standards is the test. We must follow the 
law.
  Attempting to impeach a President for any reason other than the 
reasons set out in the Constitution will seriously erode our 
constitutional order and will ignore the constitutionally-imposed 
limits on legislative authority.
  This is a serious matter. Either we respect the Constitution or we do 
not. Either we follow the rule of law or we do not. I intend to vote 
against the Articles of Impeachment. I urge my friends and colleagues 
on both sides of the aisle to do the same.
  Mr. WISE. Mr. Speaker, as you, know, the President has acknowledged 
the shameful personal conduct that he engaged in to a grand jury, to 
his family and to the American people. I think everyone agrees that 
such indefensible behavior was reprehensible and immoral, and 
appropriately, President Clinton has apologized for misleading the 
country on this matter. Even more appropriately, he has repeatedly 
recognized how harmful his conduct has been and the damage it has 
caused to the nation and his family.
  Congress has spent the last few months attempting to determine what 
action should be taken in response to the President's offenses. 
Unfortunately, I believe that the process by which the House of 
Representatives has approached this matter has become tainted and 
unfair.
  From the start, the House Judiciary Committee promised a thorough, 
bipartisan investigation that would command public support as in the 
1974 Watergate hearings. Sadly, the Committee failed this test. Unlike 
1974, they relied exclusively on the one-sided case of independent 
counsel Ken Starr rather than interviewing the major participants in 
this case who have contradicted allegations made by Starr. Unlike 1974, 
there was no cross-examination opportunity for the President's lawyers. 
Unlike 1974, there was littel access given to the President's counsel 
for most of the proceedings. Unlike 1974, there was no bipartisan 
decision to proceed with articles of impeachment, instead only a strict 
party-line vote.
  The Congress is considering resolutions which direct that President 
Clinton's actions ``warrants impeachment and trial, and removal from 
office.'' I am voting against these resolutions because I feel that 
while the poor judgment and reprehensible behavior in which the 
President engaged was wrong, it simply does not rise to the standard of 
impeachment outlined in the Constitution--a crime comparable to treason 
or bribery. This vote lowers the standard our Founding Fathers set for 
such a drastic action. From this point forward, a simple vote of no 
confidence by the majority party will empower them a president and 
overturn a popular election.
  I have called for the congressional censure and rebuke of President 
Clinton as an appropriate punishment. Censure would be a shame of 
historical proportion and would allow the President to be indicated and 
tried in a court of law when he leaves office. Unfortunately, we will 
be denied the opportunity to vote on this option on the floor of the 
House.
  Some have expressed concern that failure to impeach the President 
sends a bad message to our families and children. I believe that public 
officials need to strive constantly to set a high standard. However, 
America's families are strong enough that the don't have to depend on 
Congressional action to tell them right from wrong. In my family and in 
every family across the country, the President's behavior has been 
discussed, evaluated and rebuked. Wherever the President goes, he will 
always carry this brand for his personal behavior, both now and 
throughout history. That is why I believe censure in the proper and 
appropriate formal declaration against his behavior. However, 
impeachment under the high standards set by the Constitution is not 
appropriate.
  I vote against impeachment not to approve of the behavior of this 
president, but to support the Constitution and the institution of the 
Presidency.
  Mr. QUINN. Mr. Speaker, article I section 2 of the United States 
Constitution says in part that, ``. . . the House shall have the sole 
Power of Impeachment.'' It is one of the most awesome responsibilities 
that Members of this chamber face, but one which we cannot ignore. 
Today, it is with a heavy heart and much regret that I will support 
three articles of impeachment against the President of the United 
States.
  The President, while appearing before a grand jury and answering 
questions presented to him in a deposition, took an oath to, ``. . . 
tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth.'' By 
offering false and misleading testimony, the President failed to honor 
that oath, and in doing so, committed perjury and obstructed justice.
  Mr. Speaker, I did not reach this decision easily. In fact, this is 
the most difficult decision I have made since being a member of 
Congress. I arrived at my vote after speaking and meeting with my 
constituents and after talking to clubs, school groups, friends and 
neighbors. Most importantly, I reached my decision after a great deal 
of soul searching. It is a decision based on principle, not politics. 
My vote is one of conscience.
  My decision is also based upon the clear evidence of perjury and 
obstruction of justice as presented by the House Judiciary Committee. 
After examining the record of the House Judiciary Committee, I am 
convinced that the President committed an impeachable offense. The more 
I learn about the serious details of perjury and obstruction of 
justice, the more I am concerned about the President's failure to tell 
the truth. All Americans must tell the truth while testifying in a 
court of law. What precedent are we establishing within our legal 
system if we do not uphold the most basic legal concept of telling the 
truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth? If the truth is 
lacking, justice can not and will not prevail.
  Some have said that a vote to impeach is unfair. I disagree. 
Impeachment puts this matter right where it belongs, in the Senate, 
where the evidence can be weighed, where the public can have time to 
understand the charges and where a proper judgment can be reached.
  Every Representative must swear or affirm to uphold the Constitution 
of the United States. It is that very oath that demands this vote that 
we are casting today. The right vote is not always the easy vote. I 
would have liked nothing more than to have had this matter resolved 
before it was taken under consideration by the full House of 
Representatives. However, that was not the case. I see it as my duty to 
cast a vote for justice.
  Mrs. EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. Speaker, the Republican 
majority will vote to pass Articles of Impeachment against President 
William Jefferson Clinton. This is truly a sad day for the nation. The 
Republican majority has seen fit to trample the Constitution in 
railroading these Articles through both the Judiciary Committee and the 
House of Representatives.

[[Page H12006]]

  The Republican majority insists that this is being done to preserve 
the Presidency. This is not their true concern. The Republican majority 
wants to destroy this President. He has been too effective for too 
long. President Clinton is truly a representative of the American 
people. He rose from poverty to gain an education, to gain the highest 
office in the State of Arkansas, and finally, to gain the highest 
office in the United States and the world. He has long been a threat to 
the Republican party, and now the majority is looking to destroy this 
man to save themselves.
  The Republican majority insists that this is being done to preserve 
the Constitution. The unfair and partisan process followed by the 
Republicans is evidence that this is not true. The Framers of the 
Constitution did not intend impeachment to be taken lightly. The 
constitutional standard calls for impeachment when ``treason, bribery 
and other high crimes and misdemeanors'' have been committed. This 
standard envisioned crimes against the state--crimes which truly cut 
deep through the fabric of the nation. The Republican majority's 
Articles of Impeachment do not reflect such crimes. The President has 
betrayed himself and his family. He exercised bad judgment. He did not 
betray this nation.
  The Republican majority insists that this is being done for the good 
of the American people. This is clearly not true. The majority of 
Americans have come out in opposition to impeachment and yet the 
Republicans have gone forward with this process. Instead of listening 
to the desire of the people to move forward, the Republicans have 
chosen to ignore the public. This is not democracy, this is tyranny.
  The Republicans have pushed forward in an atmosphere fraught with 
unfairness, forcing through Articles of Impeachment without concern for 
the rule of law. The Republicans have abandoned all due process in 
their investigation, calling only the Independent Counsel to attest to 
the so-called ``facts'' brought to bear in this case. The Republicans 
have argued that the President is not above the law. Neither should the 
President be held beneath the law. He deserves the basic protections 
that we give all Americans in cases of this magnitude. The Office of 
the President deserves better, the American people deserve better.
  During the Iran-Contra investigation, the current chairman of the 
Judiciary Committee, the Honorable Henry Hyde, was quoted as, 
``mock[ing] those who `sermonized about how terrible lying is and 
sa[ying] it made no sense to `label every untruth and deception an 
outrage'' by the Los Angeles Times. Further, he characterized the 
investigation of Col. Oliver North a ``witch hunt.'' What a difference 
an election makes. The Republicans became the majority party in the 
House of Representatives, and have long since forgotten those words. 
The Republicans have embarked on a forty million dollar, six year 
fishing expedition, hoping to find something to pin on the President. 
What the Republicans have caught should be thrown back.
  I do not condone the past actions of the President, but his actions 
do not constitute ``high crimes and misdemeanors.'' I only hope that 
history will forgive this House for the grave mistake we have made 
today.
                                                December 17, 1998.
     To: Hon. Eddie Bernice Johnson:
       Dear Ms. Johnson. The Constitution is not the Bible. It is 
     bothersome to see Republicans wrap themselves so tightly 
     around this document as the truth, the whole truth, and 
     nothing but the truth. The Bible is the only publication that 
     claims this posture.
       Interpreters of this same Constitution at one point did not 
     believe that blacks had the same rights as whites. Women were 
     not equal to men, they said. We have amended the Constitution 
     many times as time has revealed more and more reasons to do 
     so. Using the Constitution as a truth text disregards all the 
     amendments that have been added to it.
       The President tried to cover up an affair. It was a wrong 
     to his wife and daughter. The only impeachment he deserves is 
     from them. Adultery is a sin. Bearing false witness is a sin. 
     It seems then, that the Bible is the best text to deal with 
     this sin, not the Constitution.
       The Constitution gives all life, liberty, and the pursuit 
     of happiness. It also gives each of us rights--rights to 
     defend ourselves when accused, rights to legal counsel. 
     Hiring counsel or using our legal system should not be 
     twisted into a charge of obstruction of justice. Is it abuse 
     of power to defend yourself?
       Hiding the truth about an adulterous affair is something 
     human beings often do. It is a character flaw that comes with 
     the territory. Those who are faithful to their wives and 
     husband are to be commended. Let's not be in denial, however, 
     about our country's divorce rate and the cheating rate in 
     history and in present times.
       Let me get this straight. We're going to impeach the 
     President for: 1. Defending himself (a.k.a abuse of power?); 
     2. Hiring legal counsel (a.k.a. obstruction of justice?); 3. 
     Trying to conceal an affair (a.k.a. perjury?).
       The Constitution gives all Americans a right to privacy. 
     Kenneth Star has violated Bill Clinton's right to privacy. 
     That's constitutional. To investigate this sexual affair is 
     not the governments' business--never was and never will be. 
     That's constitutional. A citizen can defend himself against 
     prosecution. That's constitutional. A citizen can hire a 
     legal counsel. That's constitutional. Lying under oath about 
     a constitutional right to privacy is constitutional.
       The Bible should be our guide on this matter. The 
     Constitution is not the Bible.
           Sincerely,
                                                 Thomas Henderson.
  Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Speaker, I rise to address the matter before the 
House regarding the four Articles of Impeachment that have been 
reported by the Committee on the Judiciary. This is a situation that 
demands our most careful consideration and devotion to duty as Members 
of Congress. It is a matter that is not to be taken lightly. Each 
Member of this body must reason individually to reach the determination 
that must be made in order to fulfill our constitutional 
responsibilities in the impeachment procedure. This is a process that 
should not be partisan, as it should be based on the application of the 
rule of law.
  I believe that all of us recognize the seriousness of President 
Clinton being charged with violations against the Constitution. Much 
time and effort have been devoted to investigating and reviewing the 
actions on which this resolution is based. I have followed the hearings 
of the Committee on the Judiciary concerning this matter with great 
interest and I am in agreement with the resolution (H. Res. 611) that 
has been submitted by Chairman Hyde. H. Res. 611 outlines four articles 
as the basis for impeachment, which I shall summarize:
  Article I--President Clinton willfully provided perjurious, false and 
misleading testimony to a Federal Grand Jury. I agree.
  Article II--President Clinton willfully corrupted and manipulated the 
judicial process, in that, he willfully provided perjurious, false and 
misleading testimony in response to written questions seeking 
information in a Federal civil right action, which was brought against 
him, as well as in a deposition in that action. I agree.
  Article III--President Clinton prevented, obstructed and impeded the 
administration of justice through a course of conduct or scheme in a 
series of events between December 1997 and January 1998. I agree.
  Article IV--President Clinton has engaged in conduct that resulted in 
misuse and abuse of his high office, impaired the due and proper 
administration of justice and the conduct of lawful inquiries, and 
contravened the authority of the Legislative Branch and of a coordinate 
investigative proceeding, in that, he refused and failed to respond to 
certain written requests for admission, as well as willfully made 
perjurious, false and misleading sworn statements in response to 
certain written requests for admission that were propounded as part of 
the impeachment inquiry that was authorized by the House. I agree.
  It is clear to me that convincing evidence has been presented in 
regard to each of the four Articles that have been reported by the 
Committee on the Judiciary. Accordingly, I support the Articles as 
stated in H. Res. 611.
  Mr. Speaker, I would also like to address the assertion that I have 
heard today that the consideration by the Congress of the impeachment 
of President Clinton, who is the Commander in Chief of our Armed 
Forces, would have a demoralizing effect on our men and women in 
uniform, especially while our Nation is engaged in military operations 
against Iraq. I can speak from experience, based on numerous 
conversations with Americans from all walks of life, who are now 
serving or who have previously served in our Nation's military, that 
such a charge has no merit. In this regard, I would like to submit the 
following article by Major Daniel J. Rabil, of the United States Marine 
Corps Reserve:

               [From the Washington Times, Nov. 9, 1998]

                 Please, Impeach My Commander in Chief

                          (By Daniel J. Rabil)

       The American military is subject to civilian control, and 
     we deeply believe in that principle. We also believe, as 
     affirmed in the Nuremberg Trials, that servicemen are not 
     bound to obey illegal orders. But what about orders given by 
     a known criminal? Should we trust in the integrity of 
     directives given by a president who violates the same basic 
     oath we take? Should we be asked to follow a morally 
     defective leader with a demonstrated disregard for his 
     troops? The answer is no, for implicit in the voluntary oath 
     that all servicemen take is the promise that they will 
     receive honorable civilian leadership. Bill Clinton has 
     violated that covenant. It is therefore Congress' duty to 
     remove him from office.
       I do not claim to speak for all service members, but 
     certainly Bill Clinton has never been the military's favorite 
     president. Long before the Starr report, there was plenty of 
     anecdotal evidence of this administration's contempt for the 
     armed forces. Yes, Mr. Clinton was a lying draft dodger, yes 
     his staffers have been anti-military, and yes, he breezily 
     ruins the careers of senior officers who speak up or say 
     politically incorrect things. Meanwhile, servicemen are now 
     in jail for sex crimes less egregious than those Paula Jones 
     and Kathleen Willey say Mr. Clinton committed.

[[Page H12007]]

       Mr. Clinton and his supporters do not care in the least 
     about the health of our armed forces. Hateful of a 
     traditional military culture they never deigned to study, Mr. 
     Clinton's disingenuous feminist, homosexual and racial 
     activist friends regard the services as mere political props, 
     useful only for showcasing petty identity group grievances. 
     It is no coincidence that the media have played up one 
     military scandal after another during the Clinton years. This 
     politically-driven shift of focus, from the military mission 
     to the therapeutic wants of fringe groups, has taken its 
     toll: Partly because of Mr. Clinton's impossibly Orwellian 
     directives, Chief of Naval Operations Jay Boorda committed 
     suicide.
       So Clinton has weakened the services and fostered a 
     corrosive anti-military culture. This may be loathsome, but 
     it is not impeachable, particularly if an attentive Congress 
     can limit the extent of Clinton-induced damage. As officers 
     and gentlemen, we have therefore continued to march, 
     pretending to respect our hypocrite-in-chief.
       Then came the Paula Jones perjury and the ensuing Starr 
     Report. I have always known that Clinton was integrity-
     impaired, but I never thought even he could be so depraved, 
     so contemptuous, as to conduct military affairs as was 
     described in the special prosecutor's report to Congress. In 
     that report, we learn of a telephone conversation between Mr. 
     Clinton and a congressman in which the two men discussed our 
     Bosnian deployment. During that telephone discussion, the 
     Commander-in-Chief's pants were unzipped, and Monica Lewinsky 
     was busy saving him the cost of a prostitute. This is the 
     president of the United States of America? Should soldiers 
     not feel belittled and worried by this? We deserve better.
       When Ronald Reagan's ill-fated Beirut mission led to the 
     careless loss of 241 Marines in a single bombing, few 
     questioned his love of country and his overriding concern for 
     American interests. But should Mr. Clinton lead us into 
     military conflict, he would do so, incredibly, without any 
     such trust. After the recent American missile attacks in 
     Afghanistan and Sudan, my instant reaction was outrage, for I 
     instinctively presumed that Mr. Clinton was trying to knock 
     Miss Lewinsky's concurrent grand jury testimony out of the 
     head-lines. The alternative, that this president--who ignores 
     national security interests, who appeases Iraq and North 
     Korea, and who fights like a leftover Soviet the idea of 
     an American missile defense--actually believed in the need 
     for immediate military strikes, was simply implausible. 
     And no amount of scripted finger wagging, lip biting, or 
     mention of The Children by this highly skilled perjurer 
     can convince me otherwise.
       In other words, Mr. Clinton has demonstrated that he will 
     risk war, terrorist attacks, and our lives just to save his 
     dysfunctional administration. What might his motives be in 
     some future conflict? Blackmail? Cheap political payoffs? 
     Or--dare I say it--simply the lazy blundering of an 
     instinctively anti-American man? It is immoral to impose such 
     untrustworthy leadership on a fighting force.
       It will no doubt be considered extreme to raise the 
     question of whether this president is a national security 
     risk, but I must. I do not believe presidential candidates 
     should be required to undergo background investigations, as 
     is normal for service members. I do know, however, that Bill 
     Clinton would not pass such a screening. Recently, I received 
     a phone call from a military investigator, who asked me a 
     variety of character-related questions about a fellow Marine 
     reservist. The Marine, who is also a friend, needed to update 
     his top-secret clearance. Afterward, I called him. We 
     marveled how lowly reservists like us must pass complete 
     background checks before routine deployments, yet the 
     guardian of our nation's nuclear button would raise a huge 
     red flag on any such security report. We joked that my 
     friend's security clearance would have been permanently 
     canceled if I had said to the investigator, ``Well, Rick 
     spent the Vietnam years smoking pot and leading protests 
     against his country in Britain. His hobbies are lying and 
     adultery. His brother's a cocaine dealer, and oh, yeah--he 
     visited the Soviet Union for unknown reasons while his 
     countrymen were getting killed in Vietnam.''
       Do I show disrespect for this president? Perhaps it depends 
     on the meaning of the word ``this.'' If Clinton were merely a 
     spoiled leftist taking advantage of our free society, a la 
     Jane Fonda, that would be one thing. But you don't make an 
     atheist pope, and you don't keep a corrupt security risk as 
     commander-in-chief.
       The enduring goodness of the American military character 
     over the past two centuries does not automatically derive 
     from our nation's nutritional habits or from a good job 
     benefits package. This character must be developed and 
     supported, or it will die. Already we are seeing declining 
     enlistment and a 1970s-style disdain for military service, 
     squandering the real progress made during the purposeful 
     1980s. Our military's heart and soul can survive lean 
     budgets, but they cannot long survive in an America that 
     would tolerate such a character as now occupies the Oval 
     Office. We are entitled to a leader who at least respects 
     us--not one who cannot be bothered to remove his penis from a 
     subordinate's mouth long enough to discuss our deployment to 
     a combat zone. To subject our services to such debased 
     leadership is nothing less than the collective spit of the 
     entire nation upon our faces.
       Bill Clinton has always been a moral coward. He has always 
     had contempt for the American military. He has always had a 
     questionable security background. Since taking office, he has 
     ignored defense issues, except as serves the destructive 
     goals of his extremist supporters. His behavior with Paula 
     Jones and Kathleen Willey was bizarre and deranged--try 
     keeping a straight face while watching mandated Navy sexual 
     harassment videos, knowing that the president's own conduct 
     violates historic service rules to the point of absurdity.
       For a while, it was almost possible to laugh off Mr. 
     Clinton's hedonistic, ``college protester'' values. But now 
     that we have clear evidence that he perjured himself and 
     corrupted others to cover up his lies, Bill Clinton is no 
     longer funny. He is dangerous.
       William J. Clinton, perhaps the most selfish man ever to 
     disgrace our presidency, will not resign. I therefore risk my 
     commission, as our generals will not, to urge this of 
     Congress: Remove this stain from our White House. Banish him 
     from further office. For God's sake, do your duty.
  Mr. SANDLIN. Mr. Speaker, yesterday, I listened as Members explained 
that the reason they were voting to impeach President Clinton was 
because he had committed perjury. The fact of the matter is--and the 
record is clear and undisputed--that the President did not commit and, 
in truth, these proposed Articles of Impeachment do not actually accuse 
the President of perjury.
  Let's be very careful and clear about this loose talk of perjury. 
Whatever you may think of Ken Starr, he has never accused Bill Clinton 
of having committed perjury--neither in his own statement to the 
committee on November 19 nor in the OIC Referral sent to the Congress 
on September 9.
  Everyone seems to have forgotten the testimony of the five expert 
prosecutors who appeared and testified before the Judiciary Committee. 
Three served in Republican administrations at the top levels of the 
Justice Department; two served in Democratic administrations. They were 
unanimous in their agreement that the evidence against Mr. Clinton 
could not support a perjury charge and that no responsible prosecutor 
would ever bring such a charge.
  Let me quote Thomas P. Sullivan, the U.S. attorney from the Northern 
District of Illinois from 1977 to 1981, someone who has had 40 years of 
experience in the criminal justice system. He testified, ``It is not 
perjury for a witness to evade or frustrate or answer non-responsively. 
The evidence simply does not support the conclusion that the President 
knowingly committed perjury, and the case is so doubtful and weak that 
a responsible prosecutor would not present it to the grand jury.''
  What are we really talking about in Article One when President 
Clinton is charged with wilfully providing ``perjurious, false and 
misleading testimony?'' It is not that President Clinton denied an 
improper, intimate relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. He admitted that 
relationship, and the whole world saw his testimony on that point when 
the video tape of the grand jury testimony was played. Instead, the 
allegation of perjury in the grand jury boils down to a disagreement 
between the President and Ms. Lewinsky as to the graphic details of 
their contact--whether he touched certain unclothed private parts of 
her body. She says, ``He did.'' He said that he didn't.
  According to the expert prosecutors, this kind of dispute would never 
be prosecuted. To quote Mr. Richard Davis, a distinguished and 
experienced prosecutor from New York City, ``In the end, the entire 
basis for a grand jury perjury prosecution comes down to Monica 
Lewinsky's assertion that there was a reciprocal nature to their 
relationship, and that the president touched her private parts with the 
intent to arouse or gratify her, and the president's denial that he did 
so. Putting aside whether this is the type of difference of testimony 
which should justify an impeachment of a president, I do not believe 
that a case involving this kind of conflict between two witnesses would 
be brought by a prosecutor . . . This simply is not a perjury case that 
would be brought.''
  For many years, it has been the practice of the Department of Justice 
not to bring perjury charges based on ``he says/she says'' swearing 
contests. That is what we have here. Nothing more.
  Enough loose talk about perjury.
  Mr. PITTS. Mr. Speaker, it has been several months since I called on 
the President to resign from office for the good of the country and the 
honor of the Presidency.
  Today I will cast my vote in favor of his impeachment because to this 
day he has refused to live up to the honor demanded of that office.
  For if the law is not respected and obeyed by the highest official in 
the land--indeed the Commander in Chief--why should each of us seek to 
uphold the law. Why could we not selectively choose when to lie and 
when to tell the truth?
  It is unbelievable to me today that President Clinton still continues 
to lie about his affair.
  He continues to deny that he had a sexual relationship with Ms. 
Lewinsky.

[[Page H12008]]

  He continues to deny that he has lied under oath.
  Does he believe that the subject of his words make the truth of his 
words irrelevant? The fact that he had an affair is not the issue.
  Yet, when both the President--in swearing to tell the truth, the 
whole truth and nothing but the truth--disregards his oath, he fails to 
meet the high moral standard example demanded of our President.
  Thus, such disregard for the rule of law demands impeachment action 
by the Congress of the United States.
  For, as Chairman Hyde has said, in this country, justice depends on 
the enforceability of the oath.
  Accoring to the evidence that I have reviewed, I see no option but to 
recognize the President's actions as perjurious, and to conclude that 
he has obstructed justice and abused the power that he has as President 
of the United States.
  There are more than 115 people in federal prison for perjury in this 
country.
  Should the man charged to lead our Nation with integrity and honesty 
be allowed to be treated any differently for charges similar or worse 
than those of individuals who have been convicted--solely because his 
position of power? the President is not a king.
  America was built on the ideal of equal justice under law. This 
concept must apply equally to everyone, including the President.
  As a Member of Congress, the very first of my duties was to swear an 
oath to uphold the Constitution.
  My duty this week goes beyond the normal task of making law and 
directly reflect my sworn duty to maintain the integrity of the 
Constitution and apply the rule of law, which has held this nation 
together since its birth more than 200 years ago, to the illegal 
actions of the President.
  I soberly take part in this process with the weight of responsibility 
to the Constitution on my shoulders.
  Mr. FRANKS of New Jersey. Mr. Speaker, it is with a profound sense of 
sadness that I stand here today. All of us wish that the events 
connected with this matter had never occurred. But they did.
  Today, we are being asked to stand in judgment and decide whether 
William Jefferson Clinton should become only the second president in 
our Nation's history to be impeached. It is the most agonizing decision 
I have ever been called upon to make.
  As we address this matter, we must decide what is right for the 
country and what is required to serve the interests of justice. In 
making this decision, I recognize that the purpose of impeachment is 
not to punish a political leader, but to preserve the integrity of our 
institutions of government.
  In order to meet our solemn responsibility, we must put aside public 
opinion polls and avoid the temptation to pursue the politically 
expedient course. Our responsibility is clear--we must uphold the 
Constitution of the United States.
  America is a government of laws--not of men. No individual--not even 
the President of the United States--is above the law. These are the 
principles embodied in our Constitution. It's what we teach children 
every day in classrooms across America.
  The evidence presented to this House lays out a compelling case that 
President Clinton committed perjury on two separate occasions and 
personally engaged in conduct to obstruct justice.
  I recognize that some Americans question whether perjury and 
obstruction of justice constitute adequate grounds for impeachment.
  I've tried to weigh this issue very carefully. And in the final 
analysis, it comes back to a basic principle--no American is above the 
law.
  Perjury and obstruction of justice are direct attacks on the 
government's ability to dispense justice. Lying under oath undermines 
the very foundation of our judicial system. If Congress fails to 
confront President Clinton's violations of the law, we would fail to 
meet our obligation under the constitution. We would be telling 
America, particularly our nation's young people, that the crime of 
perjury, even when committed by the President, is acceptable in certain 
situations. Equally devastating, we would be holding the President of 
the United States to a different standard of justice than ordinary 
citizens.
  I want to remind my colleagues and the American people that we are 
voting on impeachment today not because the Republicans control 
Congress or because the Independent Counsel was overzealous. We're here 
because William Jefferson Clinton--our Nation's chief law enforcement 
official--has subverted the judicial process and violated the laws he 
swore to uphold.
  Through his actions, the President--and the President alone--has led 
the nation down the painful path toward impeachment. And he, and he 
alone, has been in a position to spare the Nation the ordeal of an 
impeachment trial in the United States Senate.
  Over the past 2 weeks, I've written twice to the President asking him 
to come to terms with the fact that he broke the law and to take 
responsibility for his actions.
  On December 3d, I urged the President to come before the American 
people, admit that he committed perjury and indicate that he was 
prepared to face the consequences.
  On the eve of this debate, I wrote to the President one more time and 
called on him to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the 
truth.
  Tragically, President Clinton continues to put his own self interest 
above America's interests. The President appears to be more concerned 
about avoiding criminal prosecution after he leaves office than he is 
about sparing the nation the ordeal of an impeachment trial.
  The failure of the President to come forward and publicly admit that 
he has broken the law, compels me to vote for impeachment articles, 1, 
2, and 3 which are before the House today.
  I want to issue one final plea to the President. It's not too late to 
demonstrate real personal and moral leadership. Save the Nation the 
trauma of an impeachment trial and save your Presidency. Admit that you 
broke the law and violated the trust of the American people.
  Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to speak on the behalf of my 
country and my party. I do not come to this floor easily--indeed, I am 
disheartened that we are here today debating impeachment while our 
Armed Forces are engaged in fighting in the Middle East. I am 
disheartened that a distortion of the legal facts has brought us to 
this point today. Impeachment of a President according to the 
Constitution can only occur when that individual is guilty of high 
crimes and misdemeanors. I strongly feel President Clinton has neither 
violated the fundamental principles of the Constitution nor is he 
guilty of a high crime or misdemeanor. He has not threatened the 
security of our nation and this impeachment is not based on treason, 
bribery or a threat to our democracy. This impeachment is based on 
partisan party politics. Let me remind those who support impeacment 
that the presumption of innocence until proven guilty is central and 
basic to our system of justice. This impeachment is predicated on 
perjury which has not been proven. I urge my colleagues to remember the 
words of Martin Luther King, Jr., who said from his cell in the 
Birmingham jail--``injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere 
. . . whatever affects one directly, affects all indirectly.'' Mr. 
Livingston's resignation proves the effect of his injustices affecting 
his status. As in all prior impeachments, the allegations concerned 
official misconduct not private misbehavior. In all of American 
history, no official has been impeached for misbehavior unrelated to 
his offical responsibilities. The Founding Fathers did not intend 
impeachment or the threat of impeachment to serve as a device for 
nullifying a duly elected President just because Members of Congress 
disagree with him. Again, I say the President has not committed a crime 
or misdemeanor and should not be impeached.
  In face of this turbulent time for America, Bob Livingston's decision 
to resign from Congress and relinquish his position as Speaker of the 
House only demonstrates his personal shame for his own misdeeds. His 
action does not lend any credence to this procedure against the 
President.
  America is a great county. I hope this impeachment, this attempted 
coup d'etat, does not begin a downward slide to our economy, our image, 
and our morale. I urge my colleagues to vote against impeachment.
  Mr. STARK. Mr. Speaker, I would like to include in the Congressional 
Record a letter that I received from Mayor Roberta Cooper of Hayward, 
CA. Mayor Cooper writes to express the sentimant that runs strong in my 
district that the impeachment proceedings being conducted by House of 
Representatitives are not in the best interest of our Nation and not 
supported by our citizens.

                                              City of Hayward,

                                    Hayward, CA, October 26, 1998.
     Hon. Pete Stark,
     Member, House of Representatives, Cannon Office Building, 
         Washington, DC.
       Dear Pete: On the issue of the partisan driven Presidential 
     Impeachment, its time for you and the members of California 
     Congressional Delegation to hear from us at home!
       Frankly, the speed at which this proceeding is proceeding, 
     it's as if the voice of the American people has fallen on 
     deaf ears and blind eyes!
       Doesn't Congress see that President Clinton's ratings, 
     among the American people, are holding steady?
       Can't Congress grasp the fact that we've had enough?
       Isn't it glaringly clear that pursuing this matter with the 
     level of ruthlessness and aggression can ultimately serve no 
     greater public good?
       Is Congress completely blind to the fact that the 
     collective mind and spirit of the United States of America 
     will suffer a massive societal depression should it succeed 
     in its effort to destroy President Clinton? Is it Congress's 
     intention to bring the citizens down with the President?

[[Page H12009]]

       I am extremely troubled by the far reaching implication and 
     tremendously adverse outcomes presented by this partisan 
     feeding frenzy should it succeed.
       I implore you to let your colleagues know that we strongly 
     object the proposal to impeach the President and urge that 
     this matter be resolved by means other than impeachment.
           Sincerely,
                                                   Roberta Cooper,
                                                            Mayor.
  Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Mr. Speaker, throughout this long process 
as I have listened to this divisive debate, I have had to wonder about 
the legacy of the 18th Congressional district. The first person to hold 
this seat was the late Congresswoman Barbara Jordan. She was a member 
of the Congress in 1974 during Watergate, and she was a member of the 
House Judiciary Committee.
  I have been careful not to mischaracterize her thoughts or words 
during these serious and troubling times. However, throughout the 
debate it seems at every moment the Republican majority continues to 
misuse Ms. Jordan's comments.
  I think it is important to acknowledge the remarks she made today, 
and the impact that those words will have on the actions we take today. 
In her July 24, 1974 speech, in citing the Framers of the Constitution, 
she noted that ``the Framers confined in the Congress the power if need 
be, to remove the President in order to strike a balance between a 
president swollen with power and grown tyrannical * * *.'' This is not 
the case today.
  She also said impeachment was limited to high crimes and 
misdemeanors, as she cited the federal convention of 1787. Finally, Ms. 
Jordan sheds light on what she might have thought of today's 
proceedings as she states ``A President is impeachable if he attempts 
to subvert the Constitution.'' I think it is important for Congress to 
hear these words that the late Barbara Jordan gave on July 24, 1974.
  A sense of the Congress resolution on censure is not 
unconstitutional, it is not prohibited by the words of the 
Constitution. It is not specifically noted in the Constitution, but 
however neither are postal stamps, education, or social security. This 
resolution is germane and constitutionally sound. Mr. Speaker please 
rule and allow a free standing resolution of censure to be voted on by 
this House--do not deny the will of the people.
  The Bible, Mark 3:25, teaches that ``[I]f a house be divided against 
itself, that house cannot stand.'' It's time to stop the malicious 
attacks because surely, we will all perish. It is time to close ranks 
and get back to the business of America. It is time to heal this 
Nation. Today let's restore the American public's faith in the 
Constitution do not deny their will.
  We need to begin that healing process now to return America to 
greatness.
  Mr. HOBSON. Mr. Speaker, I will vote to impeach the President because 
by committing perjury he has violated his oath to uphold our 
Constitution and has undermined the rule of law, which is the 
foundation of our society.
  The lifeblood of our legal system is honest testimony. When 
falsehoods are tolerated then the system cannot function. Perjury, 
therefore, cannot be dismissed as a minor infraction, but instead is a 
serious felony offense because it undermines the very existence of our 
system of justice. Accordingly, I will vote for the first article of 
impeachment.
  The second article of impeachment relates to the President's alleged 
false testimony in a civil lawsuit which has been settled out of court. 
Perjury in a civil lawsuit is a serious offense as well and, if 
adequately proven, would warrant criminal prosecution. However, I do 
not believe the evidence presented is adequate to reach the threshold 
of an impeachable offense.
  The third article of impeachment alleges the President obstructed 
justice by, among other actions, engaging in a scheme to conceal and 
willingly encouraging his employees to provide false testimony in order 
to help conceal his pattern of lying under oath. This is a misuse of 
power and a very telling sign of the lengths to which the President was 
willing to go to subvert the legal system he swore to uphold in order 
to hide his crimes. Article III deserves the support of the House.
  The last article of impeachment charges the President with contempt 
of Congress for presenting inaccurate testimony in response to written 
questions submitted to him by the House Judiciary Committee. Though a 
serious crime, the evidence provided by the Judiciary Committee does 
not reach the necessary standard of ``clear and convincing'' in order 
to justify impeachment.
  The President's lies under oath do a disservice to the memory of 
those who brought us the freedoms we enjoy and endanger the hopes of 
future generations who will one day enjoy those freedoms. He has also 
demonstrated a belief that he is above the law he has sworn to uphold 
and enforce. Nothing is further from the truth.
  The success and longevity of our republic are due to its foundation 
upon principles tested by time, not specific people or personalities. 
One of those principles is that Americans are equal under the rule of 
law. No one is exempt from this standard.
  Our democracy will survive this difficult time because its founding 
principles will endure long after the players in this current drama 
pass from the scene, and it will be stronger for having gone through 
this struggle.
  Mr. INGLIS of South Carolina. Mr. Speaker, as I fly back to South 
Carolina for the last time as a Member of this House, I'm thankful that 
the House has done its duty. We've kept the Republic; we've met our day 
of obligation.
  The Speaker-elect Mr. Livingston's dramatic resignation today on the 
House floor has shined the light of truth and honor on the deception 
that private conduct does not affect public morality and on the lie 
that a civilization may persist where wrongdoing is devoid of 
consequences. Repentance accompanied by acceptance of consequences 
precedes true healing.
  May our Land be healed as John Adams words ring down through history: 
``Our constitution is meant for a moral and religious people and is 
wholly in adequate for the government of any other.''
  Mr. CLEMENT. Mr. Speaker, I rise today with a heavy heart, a clear 
conscience, and a strong resolve to move our nation forward. As we 
stand on the edge of the 21st century, a veil of darkness hangs over 
our democracy. Indeed, let no member of this institution nor the 
American people minimize the gravity of today's actions. We are about 
to cast our votes on whether or not we want to impeach the President of 
the United States for only the second time in the history of the 
republic.
  I have heard a lot of talk today about the ``rule of law.'' I wish I 
could hear more talk about the ``rule of fairness.'' Why couldn't we 
have debated and voted on Monday after the bombings ceased in Iraq? Why 
couldn't the majority party let us vote on a censure proposal where all 
of us in the U.S. House of Representatives could vote our conscience?
  Abraham Lincoln called this a government of the people, by the 
people, and for the people. The people have made it abundantly clear 
that they do not want to see the president impeached. Are we going to 
put aside their wishes in favor of partisan politics that have no place 
in this debate?
  The Framers of the Constitution created the impeachment process, not 
as a punishment for the president, but as a protection for the American 
people against a chief executive whose actions would threaten our very 
system of government. There are other ways to hold President Clinton 
responsible for his actions: censure, fine, or criminal indictment 
after he leaves office.
  Peter Rodino, who presided over the impeachment hearings of Richard 
Nixon, has said that President Nixon was impeached because of ``the 
totality of the many actions which resulted in grave harm to the 
republic, which if permitted to go on, would have destroyed the 
constitutional system.''
  If the President had stolen taxpayers' dollars or sold classified 
information to a foreign government, I would not hesitate to vote for 
impeachment. But do Members honestly believe that President Clinton's 
actions have resulted in grave harm to the republic and would destroy 
our constitutional system if he is allowed to remain in office? Or do 
you believe, as I do, that President Clinton's conduct, while 
appalling, immoral, and reprehensible, does not constitute an 
impeachable offense under our Constitution? If so, then you must vote 
no. Impeaching this President over his personal failings would be a 
greater threat to public confidence in government and the rule of law 
than all of his misdeeds.
  Let's close this regrettable chapter in our nation's history and get 
on with the business of the American people.
  Mr. McINTOSH. Mr. Speaker, after weeks of reviewing the evidence, 
quiet reflection and prayer, a few days ago I reached the decision that 
I would be voting in favor of impeaching President Clinton. I came to 
this decision only after a thorough review of documents from the House 
Judiciary Committee's investigation along with Independent Counsel 
Kenneth Starr's report to Congress and information supplied by the 
White House.
  Although I have criticized the President frequently in the past 
because of his policies, I will cast these votes with a heavy heart. 
Nothing that Congress can do will completely heal our nation from the 
injury it has sustained. Nothing that Congress can do will restore the 
honor the office of the presidency previously held.
  But there is one thing which our Constitution does allow Congress to 
do, and which I believe Congress must do.
  Before I explain why I believe we must do that, I want to make one 
thing clear: censure will not do. What has happened over the last year 
represents a blow to our Constitution, and only a Constitutional 
solution will bring integrity back to our democracy.
  A censure resolution will not unify our nation. Many of us feel that 
a censure would be

[[Page H12010]]

exculpatory, since the President has repeatedly failed to acknowledge 
the full effect of his action, particularly the grave damage that his 
perjury caused to the rule of law on our constitutional republic. 
Clearly, a censure resolution would not fully bring the President to 
account for those actions.
  In addition, our Constitution does not provide for censure. Some may 
argue that just because the Constitution does not provide for it does 
not mean that it is unconstitutional. I say that it is 
unconstitutional, and that there is only one constitutional process.
  Section 4 of Article II states: The President . . . shall be removed 
from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or 
other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.'' If the President has committed 
such high crimes and misdemeanors, our responsibility is clear--
impeachment is the one and only mechanism that our Founders decided was 
necessary to resolve the question of whether a President is discharged 
of his duties under the Constitution.
  Let us review the charges put forth by the Judiciary Committee. The 
four articles passed by the Committee make very serious charges.
  Article I asserts that William Jefferson Clinton willfully provided 
perjurious, false and misleading testimony to the grand jury concerning 
the nature of his relations with a subordinate; concerning prior 
perjurious, false and misleading testimony given in a Federal civil 
rights action brought against him; concerning prior false and 
misleading statements he allowed his attorney to make to a Federal 
judge in that civil rights action; and concerning his corrupt efforts 
to influence the testimony of witnesses and to impede the discovery of 
evidence in that civil rights action.

  Article II asserts that William Jefferson Clinton willfully provided 
perjurious, false and misleading testimony in response to questions in 
a Federal civil rights action concerning conduct and proposed conduct 
with subordinate employees; and to a Federal judge concerning the 
nature and details of his relationship with a subordinate; his 
knowledge of that employee's involvement and participation in the civil 
rights action brought against him; and his corrupt efforts to influence 
the testimony of that employee.
  Article III asserts that William Jefferson Clinton prevented, 
obstructed and impeded the administration of justice, and engaged in a 
course of conduct designed to delay, impede, cover up and conceal the 
existence of evidence and testimony related to a Federal civil rights 
action by encouraging a witness to execute a sworn affidavit he knew to 
be perjurious; encouraging a witness to give false testimony; engaging 
in a scheme to conceal subpoenaed evidence; secured job assistance to a 
witness in order to corruptly prevent the truthful testimony of that 
witness; allowed his attorney to make false statements to a Federal 
judge characterizing an affidavit in order to prevent questioning; 
related a false account of an event to a potential witness in order to 
corruptly influence the testimony of that witness; and made false 
statements to potential witnesses in a Federal grand jury proceeding in 
order to corruptly influence the testimony of those witnesses, causing 
the grand jury to receive false information.
  Article IV asserts that William Jefferson Clinton engaged in misuse 
and abuse of his high office, impaired the due and proper 
administration of justice and the conduct of lawful inquiries, and 
contravened the authority of the legislative branch and the truth-
seeking purpose of an investigate proceeding by refusing and failing to 
respond to certain written requests for admission and willfully made 
perjurious, false and misleading sworn statements in his response.
  I think it is clear that if we study the evidence with an open mind 
we will see that these actions do qualify as high crimes and 
misdemeanors. The cooperation of citizens and their honesty before the 
courts is absolutely necessary for our judicial system to work. It is 
all the more important to our liberty that we insist that the 
President, whose job it is to see that ``the laws are faithfully 
executed'' as the highest law enforcement official, be subject to these 
important legal requirements.
  And here it is very important to say that we cannot make exceptions 
for sex. Many will argue that sexual matters should never enter the 
courtroom or the public domain. But I disagree with this. The days when 
it was ok for male employers to hit on their female subordinates, and 
then lie about it and not suffer any consequences, are long gone.
  We cannot have a different standard for the President than we do for 
other citizens. Any teacher, military officer, company executive, or 
other person in a position of responsibility or leadership would have 
been immediately fired for the sort of charges brought against Mr. 
Clinton. To create a lower standard for Clinton is equivalent to 
setting him above the law. This undercuts the core of Constitutional 
democracy, in which the people are governed by laws, not kings or 
queens.
  Further, not keeping the President to the same standard as the rest 
of the nation strikes me as fundamentally un-American. Allowing leaders 
to turn public office into their private playgrounds is the sort of 
thing that were appropriately associated with banana republics. We have 
always sought a higher standard, and have defined ourselves as a nation 
that does not tolerate corruption in its highest levels.
  I would like to make reference to a recent letter signed by 96 
scholars, lawyers and former government officials, including former 
Attorneys General Griffin B. Bell (Carter administration) and Edwin 
Meese III (Reagan administration), former Judge Robert H. Bork, former 
Education Secretary William J. Bennett, Steven Calabresi (Northwest 
University law school), and other luminaries. They assert that, not 
only will impeaching the President not harm the presidency, but that 
not doing so would cause irreparable harm to the presidency. They also 
counter the argument that this vote is against the will of the people: 
``The Constitution was made in order to remove some objects from 
decision by momentary popular sentiment. . . Should the House and the 
Senate shirk their responsibilities, they will establish a precedent 
for lawless government.''
  I am also concerned about another consequence of the President's 
behavior, the effect it has on public attitudes toward morality. What 
is the message we send to our nation's youth? How does this scandal--
played out on the evening newscast for months--affect parents' efforts 
to teach their children the difference between right and wrong? One of 
the saddest moments during the last year for me when reading a letter 
from a mother in Indiana. She wrote:

       Dear David: My sons and I were watching the news the other 
     night. They were discussing President Clinton and his sexual 
     affairs.
       My eleven year old son commented, he wanted to grow up to 
     be President so he could have sex in the oval office with who 
     ever he wanted to.
       I try to teach my children right from wrong and good moral 
     values. I feel the President has made himself a very fine 
     role model. Wouldn't we want all of America's youth to think 
     the same way! I think he has lied to us enough and should be 
     put out of office.
       P.S. Do you now how embarrassing it was for my son to tell 
     me that?
       A concerned Mother and an American Citizen,
                                                   Elaine Lechien.

  My heart sank as I read Mrs. Lechien's letter. Being a parent 
nowadays is difficult enough. Parents who want to teach their child to 
live responsibly and morally already have a lot of competition. 
Television, popular music, and multiple other media all vie for the 
role of informing our youth's hearts and minds. Now parents must also 
contend with competition from a President who engages in sexual 
relations with a very young college intern, then lies to the American 
people about it, then encourages his subordinates to lie about it, then 
lies to the courts about it, and finally attempts to obstruct those 
whose job it is to investigate his actions.
  It is not surprising that Mrs. Lechien's son wants to be able to do 
the same things that the President does. In his mind, the Presidency is 
the pinnacle of power and honor in the adult world. If the President is 
allowed to get away with such acts he must think, anything goes. It 
imagine that every parent would be thrilled to hear his or her children 
say they aspire to become President. But with Bill Clinton's actions, 
the holder of that office is no longer an unambiguously good role 
model.

  America stands at the threshold of a new century, and as we take this 
vote, we also stand at a crossroad. One leads to the principles that 
are contained in our Declaration of Independence and our Constitution--
justice, decency, honor and truth. These are the principles that for 
over 200 years have so affected our actions as to earn the admiration 
of the world and to gain for the United States the moral leadership 
among nations. The other path leads to expediency, temerity, self-
interest, cynicism, and a disdain for the common good. That road will 
inevitably end in shame, dishonor, and abandonment of the high 
principles that we as a people rely upon for our safety and happiness. 
There is no third road. So this is a defining moment for the presidency 
and for the Members of this House.
  I believe that Americans need leaders who will take us to that first 
path, the path of honor. Americans are yearning in their hearts for 
higher standards of conduct by our leaders--true fidelity to the 
Constitution, moral character in their private lives, and integrity is 
being honest with the American people.
  As we vote today, we must be true to our God, true to our 
Constitution, true to the American people, and true to ourselves. 
Sadly, fidelity demands of us that we vote in favor of these articles 
of impeachment.
  Mr. ALLEN. Mr. Speaker, President Clinton has disgraced himself and 
diminished the office he holds.
  While this House may not censure Bill Clinton, history will.

[[Page H12011]]

  But by failing to respond in a fair and measured way to the 
President's conduct, the Republican leadership has assured that history 
will also condemn the 105th Congress.
  Others in this debate have made the point simply: the proven offenses 
are not impeachable and the impeachable offenses are not proven.
  ``To depose the constitutional chief magistrate of a great nation, 
elected by the people, on grounds so slight, would * * * be an abuse of 
power.''
  These are not my words, but the temperate statement 130 years ago of 
a Maine Republican.
  William Pitt Fessenden was one of seven courageous Republican 
Senators who voted against the attempt by the Radical Republicans to 
remove Andrew Johnson from office in 1868.
  Fessenden understood the meaning of the Constitution's words, 
``treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors.''
  An impeachable offense, Fessenden said, must be ``of such a character 
to commend itself at once to the minds of all right thinking men, as 
beyond all question, an adequate cause for impeachment. It should leave 
no reasonable ground of suspicion upon the motives of those who inflict 
the penalty.''
  Fessenden knew what the framers meant and what the distinguished 
chairman of our Judiciary Committee professed to believe at the outset 
of this inquiry--a partisan vote of impeachment will be forever 
suspect.
  History will find, as people across America and around the world 
already know, that there is more than ``reasonable ground of suspicion 
upon the motives'' of the Republican leadership of the 105th Congress.
  Just as the Radicals of 1868 abandoned the principles of Abraham 
Lincoln in pursuit of a political vendetta, they have ignored the wise 
counsel of cooler heads like Gerald Ford and Bob Dole and recklessly 
abused the awesome power of impeachment for partisan purposes.
  December 19, 1998 will go down with February 24, 1868 as sad days for 
America.
  More than the tawdry behavior admitted by Bill Clinton, today will be 
remembered for the failure of this Congress to honor our constitutional 
responsibility to act with fairness and justice before recommending 
removal of a President elected by the people.
  Let us all pray that the Senate has enough William Pitt Fessendens to 
correct the mistake this House will make today.
  Mr. STARK. Mr. Speaker, today I rise in strong opposition to the 
impeachment proceedings. Impeachment of President Clinton is not 
warranted by the facts of this case.
  Although the Republicans have couched their arguments in terms of 
perjury, obstruction of justice, abuse of power and their 
constitutional duty to do the ``right thing,'' this proceeding is in 
fact a political move to use private, consensual sexual conduct to 
subvert the constitution and remove a President.
  Our constitution provided impeachment as a mechanism to remove a 
President for crimes against the state such as ``treason, bribery, and 
other high crimes and misdemeanors.'' The allegations in the Starr 
referral, even if assumed to be true, do not rise to the level of 
impeachable offenses. On this point, almost 900 constitutional 
scholars, law professors and American historians agree. Yet, we proceed 
with the impeachment process as if compelled to do so by our 
constitution.
  It is not, however, the constitution which compels today's action; 
it's not even partisanship that brings us this sad day. Beyond 
partisanship, this majority leadership has abused their power in a 
dictatorial manner to impeach a President to satisfy a small block of 
right wing conservatives. The majority leadership rejected the request 
of over 200 Members of this body to allow a vote on censure, an option 
that has the clear support of the American public, because the 
conservation faction demands impeachment.
  When the House completes this frenetic activity this weekend, history 
will judge our activity. There will be no avoiding the fact that this 
whole process has been propelled by a small group obsessed with 
political revenge, not crimes against the state. This is not what the 
Framers intended or what the people want. Today defines the GPO as a 
group of vindictive, reactionary pharisees. It is a sad day for our 
country.
  Mr. POMBO. Mr. Speaker, I quote:

       On January 20, 1993, William Jefferson Clinton took the 
     oath prescribed by the Constitution of the United States to 
     faithfully execute the office of President; implicit in that 
     oath is the obligation that the President set an example of 
     high moral standards and conduct himself in a manner that 
     fosters respect for the truth; and William Jefferson Clinton 
     has egregiously failed in this obligation, and through his 
     actions violated the trust of the American people, lessened 
     their esteem for the office of the President, and dishonored 
     the office which they have entrusted to him.
       (A) William Jefferson Clinton made false statements 
     concerning his reprehensible conduct with a subordinate;
       (B) William Jefferson Clinton wrongly took steps to delay 
     discovery of the truth; and
       (C) in as much as no person is above the law, William 
     Jefferson Clinton remains subject to criminal and civil 
     penalties.

  These are not the words of the Articles of Impeachment but the words 
of the Democrat resolution which was approved unanimously by the 
Democrats on the House of Representatives Judiciary Committee. Even 
President Clinton agreed to accept this severe language.
  We all agree that the President committed these crimes, and yet there 
is great debate over impeachment.
  The President's defenders claim that this issue is only about a 
consensual sexual relationship. Tell that to Paula Jones. Her case 
started as a sexual harassment lawsuit where the President was 
subpoenaed and required to tell the truth, just like any other 
defendant. He made the decision to lie. In protecting himself from 
political and legal jeopardy, he deprived Paula Jones of her fair day 
in court. You or I would expect our fair day in court and no less.
  We have also been told that these hearings and this process were 
unfair and partisan. Partisan? Yes, the hearings were very partisan. It 
was very disturbing to watch the hearings as no Democrat came forward 
to work with the Republican majority. The partisan protection of the 
President at all costs will without doubt damage future Congresses. The 
process was fair to a fault. The Republicans allowed the President's 
defenders panels of witnesses who testified over dozens of hours. The 
Judiciary Committee allowed the President witnesses of his choice to 
defend his actions in front of Congress and the country. The committee 
offered the President an opportunity to appear in person, which he 
declined. Judiciary Committee Chairman Henry Hyde went beyond the norm 
to be fair.
  Another desperate claim made by the President's partisans is that 
impeaching and convicting the President would overturn an election. If 
the President is forced from office, his defeated opponent Bob Dole 
would not become President! Clinton's own Vice President Al Gore would. 
Gore was elected on the same ticket as Clinton and would step in, as 
the Constitution requires. Our Founding Fathers included impeachment in 
our Constitution to remove a sitting President. There is never a good 
time nor the right time to conduct an impeachment and convict a 
President, but unfortunately it has become necessary.
  When I had to make this very difficult decision I tried to put aside 
ideological and partisan differences. I cleared my head and made a 
decision based on facts, not emotion. I read the report, supporting 
documents and the conclusion the committee came to.
  I made the decision to support the four articles of impeachment, not 
as a matter to punish Bill Clinton, but to protect the rule of law. 
Future presidents and congresses will look at this precedent to 
determine the proper behavior of those presidents and congresses. 
Perjury on multiple occasions, obstruction of justice, and abuse of 
power are impeachable offenses and Bill Clinton and no future President 
should be allowed to hold office after having committed these offenses.
  Mr. CASTLE. Mr. Speaker, I had hoped not to have to make this 
statement today. I love this country and our democratic institutions, 
which are the strongest and most unique in the world. I have the 
highest respect for the Office of the President, and I respect the 
talents and accomplishments of President Clinton, with whom I have 
worked on a number of important national issues. My respect for much of 
the President's work makes this decision even more difficult. Yet, 
based on a careful review of the evidence in the record, watching the 
Judiciary Committee hearings and listening to the presentations by all 
sides, I have come to the conclusion that there is clear and convincing 
evidence that the President's material false statements to a federal 
grand jury meet the standard for impeachment and I will vote to refer 
Impeachment Article One to the United States Senate. I intend to vote 
against Articles Two, Three and Four.
  This is certainly the most difficult decision I have faced in thirty 
years of public life. It has been personally agonizing for me and it 
has also tremendously affected the people of Delaware and our nation. 
In the last week alone, I have received many thousands of calls, 
letters and E-mails from people in Delaware on this issue. I have never 
seen this number of heartfelt comments and this level of intensity in 
the arguments from people on both sides of any issue. Delawareans have 
not reacted purely along partisan lines. I have heard from people who 
describe themselves as ``life long Democrats'' who believe the 
President should be impeached. I have also heard from Republicans who 
have urged me to vote against impeachment. Individuals have shared 
their experiences of having to testify in legal proceedings or their 
painful discussions with their children about the President's behavior. 
One man said it was the first time in fifty years that he moved to 
write to a public official. Their words

[[Page H12012]]

have further impressed upon me the seriousness of this decision.
  I delayed my decision as long as possible to review the evidence 
carefully and also to attempt to find a solution that would be fair and 
just and would allow us to end the turmoil that has enveloped our 
nation. No one wants this process to go on any longer than necessary. I 
still believe that a strong censure and financial penalty could be a 
solution to bring this matter to a close in the best interest of our 
nation.
  Nevertheless, it is clear that the President acted deceitfully in 
attempting to hide his adulterous sexual relationship with Monica 
Lewinsky. He made false statements in his deposition before a federal 
judge in the Paula Jones lawsuit; he made false statements to his 
staff, his Cabinet and the American people. Finally, he made false 
statements before a federal grand jury. In short, he lied to all of us. 
The President's wounds are self-inflicted. One can almost understand 
his initial effort to hide his sexual affair which was wrong, but 
certainly not impeachable. However, he continued to weave a fragile 
pattern of deceit which he allowed to build to the point where he was 
not only repeating falsehoods to the public, but he continued them 
before a federal grand jury.
  It is critical to note that the President's lawyers have not 
attempted to rebut the essential facts of any of the allegations. The 
only question that remains is whether the President's lies and other 
steps to hide his relationship with Miss Lewinsky posed the type of 
threat that the Founding Fathers envisioned when the provided for 
impeachment of the President in our Constitution, the greatest 
democratic document in the world.

  In reviewing the Articles of Impeachment, I believe that the most 
troubling issue is in Article One--whether the President made material 
false statements under oath to a federal grand jury on August 17, 1998. 
I have reviewed the President's grand jury testimony and the arguments 
on both sides regarding this issue. The President had months to decide 
whether to appear before the grand jury and to prepare his testimony, 
he was permitted to have his attorney present--a privilege no other 
person would be afforded--and to set a time limit on his testimony. In 
short, there was little chance the President could be surprised by 
questions and he was able to ask for breaks to confer with his 
attorney. So it is especially disturbing that in his testimony, he 
continued the pattern of false statements and evasions regarding his 
relationship with Miss Lewinsky and his efforts to conceal it. He did 
not tell the truth in his grand jury testimony. That is the inescapable 
fact that troubles so many Americans because it poses a real threat to 
the credibility of our legal system and raises the question of the 
President's fitness for office.
  I have known President Clinton for over a decade. We have worked 
together on a number of policy issues when we served as governors and 
since he became President. He is very capable on policy matters. In 
meetings with the President, I have seen him display an excellent 
recall of policy details on complex issues. Because I have seen this 
sharp intellect and memory in other settings, it is difficult for me to 
believe his statements to the grand jury that he does not recall key 
events involving his own actions in the Lewinsky matter. It is 
necessary to conclude that whatever happened prior to his grand jury 
testimony, the President had the opportunity to set the record straight 
and tell the truth and he chose not to do it.
  The evidence supporting Impeachment Articles Two, Three and Four, 
while showing the President's actions to be morally and legally 
questionable, is not clear and convincing as required to meet the 
standard for high crimes and misdemeanors under the Constitution. There 
are very real and serious doubts regarding the truthfulness and 
legality of the President's testimony in the Paula Jones deposition, 
his discussions with Betty Currie and Monica Lewinsky about their 
potential testimony in legal proceedings, the handling of the gifts the 
President and Ms. Lewinsky exchanged, and the President's responses to 
the questions from the Judiciary Committee. However, I believe that the 
case for these Articles is not strong enough to merit sending them to 
the Senate for trial. The President may be guilty of wrongdoing in 
these matters, but he can remain liable for civil and criminal 
penalties for those actions after he leaves office.
  This whole episode has been terribly sad for the entire nation. But 
the unfortunate fact is that the President's own reckless behavior has 
led us to this point. There were numerous times during the past year 
when the President could have ended this matter by telling the 
unvarnished truth, especially before the grand jury. At that time, even 
some of the President's strongest supporters warned that lying before 
the grand jury could very well be grounds for impeachment. It was his 
decision to continue to shade or avoid the truth and rely on 
questionable definitions to defend his actions. In the end, his answers 
were not, as he insisted, ``legally accurate.''
  I do believe that the Independent Counsel law is flawed and should be 
reviewed carefully and possibly terminated. This investigation has gone 
on too long and cost too much. Yet, the President's own denials and 
refusal to provide answers by invoking executive privilege prolonged 
the process. Most important, the essential findings of the 
investigation have not been disputed.
  I am particularly saddened by these events because I have had a 
positive working relationship with the President and am proud to have 
worked with him to enact the 1994 crime bill, the 1996 Welfare Reform 
Act, the 1997 balanced budget agreement and other positive legislation 
for the nation. President Clinton is a talented politician and public 
official. But, I cannot escape the conclusion that the charges against 
the President in Article One do meet the standard for impeachment in 
the House of Representatives. Our system of justice was established to 
insure that every American, including the President, is accountable for 
their actions.
  A vote by the House on Articles of Impeachment is only part of the 
process envisioned by the Constitution. The House determines only 
whether the President should be, in effect, indicted and then the 
Senate has the responsibility to try the case. The Senate has the 
responsibility to consider the charges against the President, and it 
also has the authority to consider censure as a possible alternative to 
removing the President from office. It is my hope that in the end, the 
Senate will make its decision expeditiously and in the best interest of 
all Americans.
  This has been the most difficult decision I have ever had to make in 
my public life. I am tremendously disappointed that while the President 
has apologized for his actions, he has been unable or unwilling to 
admit that he lied both in legal proceedings and to the American 
people. His testimony before the grant jury was false and he repeatedly 
made statements in public and private that prevented the discovery of 
the truth. His false grand jury testimony strikes at the heart of what 
our legal system and form of government are about. I still hope that 
this matter can be resolved quickly to avoid unnecessary turmoil for 
the country. While it may not ultimately require that he be removed 
from office, it does require that the Senate consider a trial on this 
matter and reach a conclusion. I hope it can be done fairly and quickly 
and in the best interest of the nation.
  I hold no malice toward the President and I would far refer to 
vindicate him of these charges. While the President's actions could 
result in criminal and civil prosecution, what has truly haunted the 
President throughout this matter is his repeated failure to tell the 
truth and that his lies led others to do the same. It is these facts 
that affect Americans so deeply and that I can not ignore. My 
unavoidable obligation is to hold the President accountable for this 
actions as required by the Constitution.
  Mr. LUTHER. Mr. Speaker, the United States Constitution states that 
``The President . . . shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, 
and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and 
Misdemeanors.'' Clearly, consideration of the impeachment of a 
democratically elected President is one of the most serious duties of a 
Member of the United States House of Representatives.
  Because impeachment overturns a national election, the framers of the 
Constitution set a very high threshold so that our head of state would 
not be removed for political expediency. They intended impeachment to 
be the ultimate check in our system of checks and balances so we would 
never have a President destroy our democracy, reign as a despot, or 
emerge as a king.
  In the case against President Clinton, I have reviewed the 
Independent Counsel's allegations as well as voluminous other 
information on the subject. I have also heard from many constituents 
and listened to the debate. It is undisputed that the President's 
conduct was wrong. It is also quite clear that some people in and out 
of Congress see this as an opportunity to rid themselves of a President 
they have never liked.
  Impeachment, however, is reserved for Presidential action that 
threatens the very nature of our democracy. The framers of the 
Constitution considered other possibilities, but they settled on the 
well known phrase, ``Treason, Bribery or other high Crimes and 
Misdemeanors'' and chose not to allow impeachment for lesser offenses 
that do not threaten our system of government. After reviewing all of 
the information available, I have concluded that President Clinton's 
actions, however reprehensible, do not come close to that level.
  I nevertheless believe the President should be held accountable for 
his actions. In my judgment, former Senate Majority Leader Bob Dole's 
suggestion to convert the Articles of impeachment into censure 
resolution is a sound alternative. Allowing a vote on this approach 
would enable each member of Congress to truly vote his or her 
conscience on this issue. Because a vote for censure will not be 
allowed

[[Page H12013]]

in the House and since the only votes will be on impeachment, I will 
vote against the Articles of Impeachment.
  If the House impeaches the President, it will be up to the Senate to 
determine how best to proceed with this matter. In that event, I 
believe the Senate should end this melodrama just as quickly as 
possible in order to get back to work on the other important issues 
facing our country.
  Mr. WALSH. Mr. Speaker, I submit to the House a December 16, 1998 
editorial from the Syracuse Post-Standard entitled ``Duty Calls'' 
relating to the impeachment process presently before us.
  I ask my colleagues to carefully review this thoughtful and 
insightful piece.

                               Duty Calls


if laws are to have worth, the house must vote to impeach the president

       It is regrettable that the impeachment process never quite 
     reached a high-minded tone of solemn purpose and 
     bipartisanship, as those responsible for conducting it had 
     vowed it would.
       It is vexing that a majority of American people apparently 
     say, in response to opinion polls, that President Clinton 
     should not be impeached. It is almost certain that 
     impeachment by the full House of Representatives would make a 
     political martyr of the president.
       But these are insufficient reasons for the House to avoid 
     its duty. If the laws of this land have worth, if the office 
     of presidency has sanctity left to protect, then the House 
     must vote to impeach the president. His fate then goes in the 
     full Senate which can, after trial and by a two-thirds 
     majority, vote to remove him from office.
       Absent bold action by the congressmen and women, President 
     Clinton will have shown brazenly that power begets exceptions 
     to the law whenever those in power decide the lawless act is 
     too trivial for pursuit.
       The House Judiciary Committee in votes almost strictly 
     along party lines, has sent four articles of impeachment to 
     the full House. The members will begin to debate them 
     Thursday. Assent by a simple majority of the representatives 
     on any one of the articles will result in Clinton's 
     impeachment.
       The House should toss out the fourth article immediately. 
     It relates to the president's answers to 81 questions 
     submitted to him by the Judiciary Committee. It is more an 
     expression of the committee's pique at the tone and 
     evasiveness of the president's answers than a real finding of 
     wrongdoing. It comes closest to appearing petty political.
       The first two articles, in contrast, have abundant 
     supporting evidence. They accuse the president of perjury. 
     These relate to the answers he gave in grand jury testimony 
     last January about his relationship with Monica Lewinsky. The 
     third article, obstruction of justice, has to do with 
     accusations that he tried to influence testimony of others 
     by, among other things, directing efforts to get Lewinsky 
     a job. The intentions behind many of the facts here are at 
     least debatable.
       What is beyond debate is Clinton's unyielding faith in his 
     own ability to grease his exit from a knotty situation by the 
     application of slick words. He remains a believer in a small 
     truth--the precision of his own language--rather than the 
     larger truths that his words defy.
       This is not Watergate, his defenders cry. But nothing in 
     the Constitution says that Watergate is the standard for 
     impeachment inquiries. It is merely one other case from 
     history, with its own set of facts and its own kind of 
     assault on this nation's core values.
       Impeachment is not the will of the people, other defenders 
     say. But the people did not have this set of facts before 
     them when they re-elected Clinton. They had only his word 
     about Gennifer Flowers--which we now know to be a lie--when 
     they first elected him president in 1992. Opinion polls are 
     snapshots in time, framed by the way questions are asked and 
     by the choices given to respondents, and are unreliable 
     guides.
       Remember that Dick Morris had told Clinton many months ago 
     that his own polls showed that the people would forgive 
     adultery, but not perjury.
       Impeachment on charges of lying about sex trivializes the 
     process, others say. Remember that this sex occurred between 
     the most powerful man in America and an intern on his staff. 
     That inherently abuses the power of office, a point on which 
     many male and female feminists have been strangely silent.
       On the contrary. Failure to hold a president accountable 
     for his misdeeds and his lies about them trivializes the law, 
     the presidency and the meaning of truth. If it's possible to 
     debase them more than Clinton has already. It's time for the 
     House to take the next step to clean house.
  Mr. TANNER. Mr. Speaker, short of a declaration of war, a U.S. 
Representative can never be called upon to make a decision requiring 
more solemn thought than to vote on articles of impeachment against the 
President of the United States. Only five times in our nation's history 
has the Congress voted to declare war, and this is only the second time 
the full House of Representatives has considered articles of 
impeachment against a President of the United States. Other than voting 
to send our troops into harm's way during Desert Storm, this is the 
most somber responsibility I have been asked to address. Therefore, I 
would ask for the opportunity to share with you the careful 
deliberations I made before casting our district's vote on impeachment.
  Like some, I am repulsed by the President's actions which were 
immoral and sinful. It is impossible to think of what the President has 
done without stirring up emotions in all of us. However, I also have a 
responsibility to the oath I have taken to defend and protect the 
Constitution. As such, I cannot allow myself to simply follow the 
immediate impulses of my emotions and moral convictions, but must also 
be cognizant of the Constitutional and historical consequences of this 
decision on our form of government.
  The Constitution is simple and straightforward, yet it still lends 
itself to interpretation. Accordingly, from time to time it becomes 
necessary to turn to the writings and records of the Constitutional 
Convention of 1789. It was at this convention that our basis of 
government was formulated. George Mason, who proposed Article II, 
Section 4 (the impeachment clause) of the Constitution, defined 
``treason, bribery and other high crimes and misdemeanors'' as ``great 
and dangerous offenses'' of ``attempts to subvert the Constitution.'' 
After extensive reading and review on the creation of our Constitution 
and our country's history, particularly the discussions and writings 
dealing with the impeachment process. I concluded that the President's 
actions did not reach the high threshold our forefathers envisioned to 
remove a President from office, and, in effect, thwart the elective 
will of our citizens.
  It is clear from those writings, that impeachment is not about 
punishing the President, but about protecting the country from the 
unlawful and the illegal exercise of executive power against its 
citizens. The Starr referral contained no allegations of this type.
  In fact, Judge Starr exonerated the President of all charges relating 
to using the FBI to investigative private citizens, or the firing of 
federal civil service employees in the White House travel office, 
charges that would fit the mold set forth as impeachable offenses by 
the framers of our Constitution. In the final analysis, the Starr 
report did not present conclusive evidence that this President used the 
power of his office against our nation or its citizens.
  I also believe that our founding fathers did not intend for 
impeachment to be used as a judicial tool. It was not intended to be 
utilized as a mechanism to prosecute the President for crimes 
committed. This view was clearly articulated by Alexander Hamilton, 
when in the Federalist No. 65 he writes, ``The punishment which may be 
the consequences of conviction upon impeachment, is not to terminate 
the chastisement of the offender. After having been sentenced to a 
perpetual ostracism from the esteem and confidence, and honors and 
emoluments of his country, he will still be liable to prosecution and 
punishment in the ordinary course of law.''
  In other words, the founding fathers did not intend for impeachment, 
itself, to be the punishment. The debate clearly indicates the framers 
belief that the prosecution of crimes remain within the Judicial 
branch, not the Legislative branch. Nowhere did the founding fathers 
suggest that impeachment, or any other Constitutional process for that 
matter, be used to prosecute a President. Rather, they held the 
President should be subject to the scrutiny and prosecution of the 
criminal justice system, just like any other citizen. That is not to 
say that they intended for the Constitution to shield the Chief 
Executive from being punished for any and all crimes which fall short 
of the ``great and dangerous offenses'' or ``attempts to subvert the 
Constitution'' standard for impeachment. To the contrary, the 
historical debate suggests the framers intent was that the Chief 
Executive be accountable to the criminal justice system for all crimes 
that do not meet the high threshold for impeachment.
  As the statute of limitations will not expire before the President 
leaves office, it will be possible to prosecute him for perjury or any 
other alleged offense. It convicted, he would still be subject to 
imprisonment and/or fines, just like you or me, as he should be.
  During the Watergate hearings, the standard for impeachment was 
defined as ``a Constitutional remedy addressed to serious offenses 
against the system of government.'' Several Republican Members of the 
committee in the minority report, argued for an even higher standard of 
judgment, saying in their report ``the President should be removable by 
the legislative branch only for serious misconduct dangerous to the 
system of government established by the Constitution.''
  For example, President Nixon was found to have cheated on his federal 
income taxes. On July 30, 1974, the Committee considered an article of 
impeachment stating that President Nixon knowingly and fraudulently 
failed to report certain income and claimed unauthorized deductions in 
the years 1969, 1970, 1971, and 1972. They concluded that President 
Nixon lied by signing a false income tax return. After debate by the 
Judiciary Committee, the Committee decided not to report this Article 
of Impeachment to the House of Representatives. While this action by 
President Nixon was a crime, the Judiciary Committee found that it

[[Page H12014]]

did not rise to the level of an impeachable offense. It was a matter of 
personal wrongdoing, and not considered to be a crime committed 
according to their standard for impeachment, ``against the system of 
government.''
  It is also critically important to realize that moving forward with 
such a low threshold for impeachment will almost certainly jeopardize 
the viability of the presidency. We must take great care to ensure that 
the long-term consequence of this House's action is not one that 
establishes a precedent that dramatically weakens any President and the 
Office of the President compared with the other two ``separate but 
equal'' branches of government. For our system of government to work, 
raw political power cannot be invested in one branch of our government 
to the exclusion of the other two. Checks and balances are imperative 
and the Constitution's framers recognized that clearly. One can forget 
about President Clinton because he will be leaving office in 24 months 
regardless of this process. Nevertheless think about the ramifications 
of this kind of precedent relative to future Presidents. The Supreme 
Court recently said, wrongfully I believe, that anyone can file a civil 
lawsuit against any President at any time over a matter which did not 
occur while he/she was in office and has nothing to do with the 
presidency. Are we setting a precedent whereupon a future President can 
be made to give a deposition where his whole life can be combed 
through, and if there is any misrepresentation in that deposition, then 
the political opposition can bring that to Congress and ask that he be 
impeached for perjury? Any political enemy could bring a lawsuit 
against a future President and require him to go through this process. 
In my judgment, this could threaten the presidency with judicial 
tyranny.
  The President's independence from Congress and the Judiciary is 
fundamental to America's unique structure of government. The lower the 
threshold for impeachment, the weaker and less equal is the President 
compared with the Judicial and Legislative branches of government.
  On the final analysis, I concluded that impeachment was established 
to guard against a President's use of the authority conferred on him/
her to carry out activities against the country or its citizens. After 
weeks of deliberations, I came to the conclusion that alleged perjury 
and efforts to conceal a consensual sexual relationship did not reach 
the threshold needed to impeach a President of the United States. I do 
not think the President's actions reach the high Constitutional bar set 
by our forefathers.
  Mr. Speaker, I do not condone what Bill Clinton did. I think his 
actions were despicable. He says he is paying a dear price with his 
wife and daughter. He deserves to. This President's actions have been 
committed to history's record and his legacy will forever be cloaked in 
shame. History and God will be his ultimate judge.
  Mr. MALONEY of Connecticut. Mr. Speaker, as one of only 31 Democrats 
to cross party lines and support the comprehensive impeachment inquiry, 
I did so because I believed a full and fair review of the serious 
charges of misconduct against the President was the only way to seek 
the truth. During this process, I have carefully monitored the 
Judiciary Committee hearings, thoroughly analyzed the Republican and 
Democratic Committee recommendations, and personally read the Special 
Prosecutor's report and the President's rebuttals before reaching my 
decision. As I did with the inquiry vote, I have approached this matter 
in a non-partisan, open and fair-minded manner.
  It is clear from the inquiry that President Clinton's actions were 
immortal, harmful to our nation, and deserving of serious moral and 
legal rebuke. Not only did the President engage in morally 
inappropriate conduct, he also lied to the American people and perjured 
himself before a grand jury. He must be held morally accountable by 
Congress on behalf of the American people, and legally accountable in 
full for his perjury by the courts after he leaves office, just like 
any other American would be held accountable for perjury.
  Our Constitution, however, authorizes impeachment only for ``treason, 
bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors'' (Article II, Section 
4) which is why I urge my colleagues to oppose impeachment and allow us 
an opportunity to vote on a Resolution of Censure. The great weight of 
informed legal and scholarly judgment is that the impeachment clause is 
intended to cover offenses that involve the misuse of Presidential 
powers. As Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story made clear in the 
earliest days of American jurisprudence, ``[impeachable offenses] are 
committed by public men in violation of their public trust and duties . 
. . '' 2 Joseph Story, ``Commentaries on the Constitution,'' Sec. 744 
(1st ed. 1833), emphasis supplied. While President Clinton clearly 
engaged in morally and legally inexcusable behavior, his misconduct was 
personal in nature and did not constitute a misuse of his Executive 
authority. His perjury before the grand jury pertained to his personal 
life, and could well have been committed by any individual; it did not 
entail the power or privileges of the Presidency. Accordingly, 
President Clinton's misconduct does not meet the threshold of ``high 
crimes and misdemeanors'' necessary to impeach him. That doesn't excuse 
his conduct or imply that he should go unsanctioned; it simply means 
that the punishment for his offense should meet and be appropriate to 
his wrongdoings.
  The distinction between misconduct related to government duty, which 
is necessary for impeachment, and non-impeachable misconduct related to 
personal activity, was once previously before the Congress, when 
President Nixon knowingly filed a false tax return. The filing of a 
false tax return is an incident of perjury and, therefore, a very close 
precedent for the current situation. In 1974, the House Judiciary 
Committee recognized the difference between ``government'' and 
``personal'' wrongdoing and voted not to bring an article of 
impeachment for President Nixon's perjury precisely because it was a 
form of personal misconduct. The articles of impeachment that were 
filed against President Nixon were for actions that went to the misuse 
of presidential power (i.e. subverting the FBI for political purposes).
  Those supporting impeachment make the argument that because the 
President has a duty to ``take care that the laws are faithfully 
executed'' (U.S. Constitution, Article II, Section 3) his perjury was, 
specifically because of that delineated duty, not merely personal but 
also technically public. That interpretation, however, disregards the 
inherent connection between the nature of the offense and the terms of 
the impeachment clause. The impeachment clause explicitly pertains only 
to ``High'' offenses (i.e. offenses involving the misuse of 
Presidential power or heinous acts), not those other offenses that are 
committed--as in this case--in an individual, not governmental, 
capacity.
  During this extremely difficult time, it is our responsibility to 
remain especially vigilant in upholding our Constitution, and only use 
impeachment for its intended constitutional purpose--``treason, 
bribery, and other high crimes and misdemeanors''--not as a substitute 
for other measures. While President Clinton's actions are clearly 
deserving of censure, and at the conclusion of his term make him liable 
for criminal prosecution for perjury, it would be wrong for this House 
to abuse its power of impeachment and attempt, without proper cause, to 
overturn the electoral choice of the people.
  Mr. SNOWBARGER. Mr. Speaker, you have called the 105th Congress back 
into session to address the most distressing circumstances this country 
has faced in decades. We have been called back to vote on the issue of 
impeachment of the President of the United States. It will be the final 
legacy of our second session. It has been a session where legislative 
achievements have been eclipsed by media coverage of the President's 
personal activities and his cover-up. While we may disapprove of his 
personal behavior, and I certainly do, I would find it difficult to use 
this as a basis for impeachment.
  However, we are not here today to judge the President on the basis of 
his personal behavior. We are focused on his cover-up of his shameful 
behavior by lying, by abusing the judicial system, and by using his 
office and its resources to prevent our court system and the duly 
appointed federal prosecutors from discovering the truth.
  Let's remember that this series of events began with a federal civil 
rights action involving allegations of sexual harassment against the 
President. By its very nature, such an action involves very personal 
behavior. However, our society has determined that behavior of this 
nature is so inappropriate that we have provided legal remedies for 
victims. It was in pursuit of such a remedy that the President was 
brought before our system of justice to answer to charges. In that 
process, the President gave an oath. Because our judicial system is a 
search for the truth, that oath is a vow, a promise that is essential. 
It is an oath `` . . . to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing 
but the truth . . . '' so our courts can do justice, protect the 
innocent and right wrongs. Our expectations of justice cannot be 
realized unless we demand truth of those before our courts. We have 
enforced that requirement of truth throughout this country by 
prosecuting witnesses who have felt that it was in their best interests 
to tell courts a ``less than accurate'' version of events. We can get 
caught up in a debate over whether such behavior is misleading, lying 
or perjuring, but if we fail to hold the truth sacred, justice cannot 
follow.
  In today's debate and through the weeks and months of investigation 
by the independent counsel and the able review of his report and the 
inquiry by our Judiciary Committee, we have been presented credible 
evidence that the President has violated this oath to tell the truth on 
numerous occasions. He lied in the civil action I referenced. He lied 
before a

[[Page H12015]]

federal grand jury. He lied to our own Judiciary Committee. The lies 
which form the basis for these impeachment articles were all preceded 
by these very sacred words, ``I swear to tell the truth, the whole 
truth and nothing but the truth so help me God.'' Justice has been 
impeded.
  Every citizen of this country who comes before our court system takes 
similar oath and suffers consequences if he is found to have violated 
that oath. However, there is another oath involved in this case that 
not every citizen takes. Although it is not an oath unique to the 
President, he is and should be bound by it maybe more than anyone else. 
It is his oath to uphold and defend the Constitution of the United 
States. Most school children know that the President is the chief law 
enforcement officer of the country. (Of course, this President seems 
willing to debate and parse even this well-accepted concept.) Our 
Constitution provides the framework for our society to pursue our 
valued goals of personal liberty and justice. As shown through the 
process of this impeachment inquiry, in his personal involvement with 
the legal system of this country, the President has shown a preference 
for abusing that system rather than protecting or defending it. In so 
doing, he has violated this second oath.
  Interestingly, I have been admonished by two constituents to follow 
the lead of one of my fellow Kansans from history. Senator Edmund G. 
Ross from Kansas was one of the few Republicans who voted against 
convicting President Andrew Johnson of the charges made against him in 
his impeachment. Ross was immortalized by his inclusion in John F. 
Kennedy's book, ``Profiles in Courage.''
  To one constituent the lesson from this incident is that a vote for 
impeachment was the wrong choice, an inappropriate course to pursue in 
light of the current circumstances. He felt I should reject partisan 
pressures and vote against impeachment. To the other constituent the 
lesson was equally clear but the result was the opposite. He felt I 
should reject the pressures of public opinion and vote for impeachment.
  The contrast led me to again read the story of Senator Ross. It 
helped to remind me of the significance of this process and the 
decision that will result. It was ironic that I was reading the story 
of the thinking and actions of a fellow Kansan who was involved in the 
process of impeachment of the President of the United States. Now I am 
dealing with similar issues for only the second time in our nation's 
history where the process has gone this far. The lessons of this story 
were embodied in the words of a telegram sent by Ross to a group of 
constituents and supporters that demanded he vote for impeachment.
  That telegram read in part,

       I have taken an oath to do impartial justice according to 
     the Constitution and laws, and trust that I shall have the 
     courage to vote according to the dictates of my judgment and 
     for the highest good of the country.

  Mr. Speaker, I have attempted to put aside the pressures that have 
been placed on us by outside influences, whether by popular opinion or 
by supporters of one outcome or the other. I have tried to weigh my 
decision ``according to the dictates of my judgment and for the highest 
good of the country.''
  After consideration of the evidence presented and of the applicable 
laws, and after measuring the resulting decision against and standard 
set by my Kansas predecessor, and in full adherence and submission to 
my own oath of office, I vote in favor of impeachment and ask that our 
colleagues in the Senate bring this matter to trial pursuant to the 
Constitution. This mandate should be executed in a timely manner so 
that faith and trust in the integrity of the office of the Presidency 
can be restored to prevent further damage to the political institutions 
of our great nation.
  Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, last night, after making a statement on the 
floor, I filed for extension of my remarks a longer statement, which I 
prepared as I reviewed the committee report on H. Res. 611. I have 
rewritten the last page of my longer statement, and file it as an 
amendment to my extended remarks:
  The majority argues that articles of impeachment are required by the 
rule of law. The rule of law starts at the source, with the 
Constitution and specifically Article II, Section IV. How the Congress 
removes a President elected by the people is vitally important to the 
rule of law in a democracy. The Frames of our Constitution did not 
choose a prime minister beholder to a parliament, but a president 
independent of Congress, so that each could counter the other and 
maintain a balance of power. Having made that fundamental decision, 
they did not intend for the impeachment power to be used as a vote of 
no confidence, so that the president serves, in effect, at the will of 
Congress. They knew that in extreme cases the power to impeach might be 
needed, so that Congress could rid the country of a president who took 
bribes or became a traitor or tyrant. For 210 years, Congress has 
regarded the impeachment power in that light, as extraordinary, and 
abused it only once, in the case of Andrew Johnson.
  In this case, the decision is not easy. President Clinton has 
disgraced himself; his conduct has been sordid; but his conduct does 
not amount, in my opinion, to a ``high crime'' like bribery or treason. 
Not for his sake, but for the sake of the presidency, we should not 
``define down'' the grounds of impeachment. We have an alternative. We 
can rebuke this president and leave a stain on his legacy forever, 
without leaving a precedent for impeachment we may live to regret. I 
think censure is the choice we should make.
  Mr. MORAN of Kansas. Mr. Speaker, yesterday, Congress was called into 
session to consider whether President Clinton should be impeached as 
provided by the United States Constitution. Never would I have thought 
I would be called upon to determine whether another elected official 
should be allowed to remain in office, especially the President of the 
United States. I have tried to use my position to make policy decisions 
beneficial to the people of Kansas and to make certain that each 
individual Kansan receives a fair shake in his or her dealings with the 
federal government. Judging others' conduct is not a task I seek, but 
one required of me by the U.S. Constitution. I am humbled by the 
responsibility and hope I am equal to the task.
  I refrained, despite the constant demand from some, from reaching a 
conclusion on the merits of the case against President Clinton until I 
had as much factual information as possible and until I had an 
understanding of the meaning of the words of the U.S. Constitution, ``. 
. . or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.'' I especially wanted to 
examine the Judiciary Committee Report concerning the impeachment of 
the President. I have now had the opportunity to personally review the 
work product of the Committee and to question the Committee members.
  No task in my life has created a greater burden. I have no compulsion 
to turn this president out of office. Whether President Bill Clinton 
has the requisite qualities or abilities to be president or whether his 
administration's policies are right for the country was decided by the 
American people in November, 1996 and is not now the issue before 
Congress. At issue are the facts and whether such facts demonstrate 
that the President of the United States committed impeachable offenses. 
I want this president to succeed for the benefit of all Americans. I do 
not represent Republican Kansans or Democrat Kansans; I have been 
granted a privilege to represent all Kansans.
  I regret the highly partisan manner in which the impeachment of the 
President has been presented to the American people. I have said, from 
the beginning of these proceedings, that the process matters; at the 
end of the day, whatever the outcome, the American people must know 
that the end result was reached for the right reasons. In my opinion, 
the Independent Counsel, Congressional leadership and the White House 
have all contributed to the failure to meet this standard. Many 
citizens unfortunately will wonder and even be convinced that this is a 
Republican effort to oust a Democrat president. This belief increases 
the cynicism already prevalent in our political process.
  Having now read the Judiciary Committee report, discussed its 
provisions with Committee members, consulted the Constitution, inquired 
of many Kansans, both Republican and Democrat, whose judgment I value, 
and reviewed my basic beliefs of right and wrong, I am compelled to 
vote for articles of impeachment.
  Having to make a choice, I choose to be on the side that says no 
person is above the law, that this is a nation of laws not men, that 
telling the truth matters, and that we should expect our public 
officials to conduct themselves in compliance with the highest ethical 
standards.
  It is clear that President Clinton on numerous occasions lied to a 
federal grand jury, lied in a civil proceeding affecting the civil 
rights of an American citizen, and orchestrated an attempt to obstruct 
justice. The requirement that a party to a civil or criminal proceeding 
tell the truth, no matter how humiliating or harmful such statements 
might be, is a cornerstone of our system of justice. No one wants to 
tell the truth when the truth hurts. But we all know we have no choice, 
and if we lie, we know we suffer the consequence. We learn this as 
children, and President Clinton, a lawyer, knows this as an officer of 
the Court.

  The untruthful actions of the President are not mere technical 
violations of federal law; rather, the President's lies, obfuscation 
and overt acts to obstruct justice are serious and felonious, and they 
tear at the essential foundation of our judicial system. His actions 
were part of a pattern of conduct over many months and not a mere 
moment of poor judgment. There are those who argue that the subject 
matter of the President's lies is such that one could not reasonably be 
expected to tell the truth. But if you cannot believe someone who

[[Page H12016]]

has raised his hand and has sworn to tell the truth, the whole truth 
and nothing but the truth, when could you ever rely on that person to 
be truthful? If we each are allowed to determine on which topics we 
must tell the truth there will be no due process, no equal protection 
and no justice.
  Many Americans do not want the President to be impeached because they 
do not want any disruption in their lives. Most of us did not want to 
know the details of the President's personal activities. Other worry 
that this process of impeachment will interfere with the economic 
prosperity which some in this country are enjoying. We just want it to 
go away. I regret that the Independent Counsel chose this path of 
inquiry. But now that the facts are known, none of us have the luxury 
of closing our eyes. President Clinton describes this as a private 
matter. It is not. What the President does affects each of us, 
especially parents. As much as we would otherwise prefer, we have an 
obligation to deal with this issue, and our obligation requires some 
sacrifice. There are some ideals more important than our comfort or our 
economic well being. We have responsibilities to the next generation. 
The Preamble to the Constitution reminds us of our responsibility to 
``. . . secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our 
Posterity.'' We owe the next generation our unwavering support for 
certain essential ideals on which our nation was founded.
  Impeaching the President is not popular across the country nor is it 
supported by all the people I represent. I have received thousands of 
letters, faxes, e-mails and telephone calls from my constituents, 
expressing strong and unequivocal positions on both sides of the issue. 
But this cannot be about polls, partisan politics, which party controls 
Congress, or even who is the next president, and unfortunately there is 
no middle ground.
  Years from now, when my school age children look back on their 
father's time in Congress, I want them to see their dad as a guy who 
struggled to make certain he was doing the right thing for the right 
reason, not one who was persuaded by the political passions of the 
moment, influenced by party politics, or unable to make a tough 
decision because of contrary polling data. I want my children to know 
that their dad chose the side of holding elected officials to high 
ethical standards, as an advocate for truth and a supporter of the rule 
of law.
  Contrary to the impression which one would receive from the 
television cable shows, the impeachment of the President is not all-
consuming. My work in Congress on behalf of the people of the First 
District has and will go on unabated. We face significant problems on 
our farms and ranches, the Kansas oil and gas industry is on the verge 
of extinction, and, if we are not careful, adequate health care, 
particularly in rural communities, will be a thing of the past. These 
issues continue to receive my complete attention. It is time for 
Congress to address our military needs, strengthen social security and 
insist on a truly balanced budget. The impeachment process must be 
completed as quickly as possible. Although we cannot close our eyes, we 
can insist that these proceedings be conducted in a respectable manner 
and without undue delay.
  Thank you for the opportunity to provide my thoughts. It is a 
privilege to represent the people of the First District in the United 
States Congress.
  Mr. HOSTETTLER. Mr. Speaker, throughout the debate on the resolution 
before this House, there has been much discussion of the opinions of 
``experts'' on Constitutional law. This discussion reminds me of the 
testimony of Lino A. Graglia, the A. Dalton Cross Professor of Law at 
University of Texas School of Law in testimony before the Subcommittee 
on Courts and Intellectual Property of the Committee on the Judiciary, 
United States House of Representatives on May 15, 1997 when he states, 
``The first and most important thing to know about constitutional law 
is that it has virtually nothing to do with the Constitution.'' I have 
not had the title bestowed upon me as an ``expert'' on Constitutional 
law so therefore I had to read the Constitution and determine its 
meaning. And how would I do that? I believe Thomas Jefferson gave the 
most persuasive advice on the topic of Constitutional meaning when he 
wrote in a letter to Justice William Johnson on June 12, 1823, ``On 
every question of construction let us carry ourselves back to the time 
when the Constitution was adopted, recollect the spirit manifested in 
the debates, and instead of trying what meaning may be squeezed our of 
the text, or invented against it, conform to the probable one in which 
it was passed.'' In order to determine its meaning and be faithful to 
the wisdom of the Chief Architect of the Declaration of Independence, 
the third President of the United States of America and the founder of 
the Democratic Party, Mr. Jefferson, it was necessary to understand the 
meaning of the words as they were written by the Framers because, as 
was stated by Charles Louis Joseph de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu, 
France: Author of ``Spirit of the Laws,'' ``Society, notwithstanding 
all its revolutions, must repose on principles that do not change.''
  That being said, there has likewise been much discussion about 
whether the information that has been acquired by the House of 
Representatives is sufficient to accuse the President of an offense or 
offenses which proceed from what Alexander Hamilton referred to in 
Federalist #65 as ``the misconduct of public men.'' The virtually 
infinite spectrum of potential wrongdoings that may--to use the modern 
day vernacular--``rise to the level of an impeachable offense,'' is 
defined in Article II, Section 4 of the Constitution to be those 
offenses situated inclusively between the levels of ``. . . high Crimes 
and Misdemeanors.'' While I have heard several opinions that what the 
President did does not rise to the level of a crime, does what William 
Jefferson Clinton did while in office constitute misconduct of a 
``public'' man? It would obviously be necessary to know what the term 
``Misdemeanor'' means as was intended by the Framers. Noah Webster, one 
of the first Founding Fathers to call for a Constitutional Convention, 
wrote and published the first American dictionary in 1828 where he 
defined ``misdemeanor'' as, ``ill behavior, evil conduct, fault, 
mismanagement.'' He also included the definition given by the 
individual most influential on the process of jurisprudence in the 
colonies at the time of ratification of the Constitution, William 
Blackstone: ``In law, . . . the word crime is made to denote offenses 
of a deeper and more atrocious dye, while small faults and omissions of 
less consequence are comprised under the gentler name of 
misdemeanors.''
  And so today we, as members of the United States House of 
Representatives, are asked to determine whether there is sufficient 
information to accuse the President of some wrongdoing less than or 
equal to a ``high crime'' and greater than or equal to a ``small fault 
[or] omission.'' I believe there are two reasons why there is much more 
consensus on this issue than has been perceived by either ourselves in 
the House of Representatives or the people of the United States. 
Initially, any individual who would support a resolution of censure 
accusing President William Jefferson Clinton of:
  1. egregiously fail[ing] in [his] obligation [to] set an example of 
high moral standards and conduct[ing] himself in a manner that fosters 
respect for the truth,
  2. through his actions violat[ing] the trust of the American people.
  3. lessen[ing] [the American people's] esteem for the office of 
President,
  4. dishonor[ing] the office which [the American people] have 
entrusted to him,
  5. [making] false statements concerning his reprehensible conduct 
with a subordinate and,
  6. wrongly [taking] steps to delay discovery of the truth would have 
to admit that the President may be at least accused of a ``small 
fault'' and therefore impeached. Secondly, I have heard the 
consternation of the Minority that they will not be able to ``vote 
[their] conscience'' because they will not be able to censure the 
President. Also, I have heard my colleagues in the Majority state that 
it is not Constitutional to censure the President. This is where the 
consensus of the members of this House is, if not known, nonetheless 
present. The consensus being that both the Minority and the Majority 
are wrong. Once again we need only to look to the enlightment of the 
original definition of the term ``impeach'' as it was most probably 
known at the time of the ratification of the United States Constitution 
and observed in Webster's first dictionary of 1828. That definition of 
``impeach'' was given to us to be ``Censure, accusation, a calling in 
question the purity of motives or the rectitude of conduct. . .'' 
Therefore, by definition quit literally, to impeach is to censure. It 
follows that those compelled by their conscience to vote for censure 
may salve that conscience with a vote for impeachment of President 
William Jefferson Clinton.
  In conclusion, I will vote for all four articles of impeachment 
outlined in H. Res. 611 of the 105th Congress because my conscience 
compells me to consider the facts as they have been presented and 
render the judgement obligated to me by my oath to ``. . . support and 
defend the Constitution of the United States. . .''
  Mr. SMITH of Texas. Mr. Speaker, our Constitution tells us: ``The 
President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United States, 
shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, 
Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.''
  To impeach, which lies within the power of the House, means to accuse 
or charge with a crime. Only the Senate can actually convict and remove 
from office.
  As a distinguished Democratic member of the Judiciary Committee said 
during the Nixon impeachment proceeding, ``It is wrong, I suggest, it 
is a misreading of the Constitution for any member here to assert that 
for a member to vote for an article of impeachment means that that 
member must be convinced that the President should be removed from 
office. The

[[Page H12017]]

Constitution doesn't say that. The powers relating to impeachment are 
an essential check in the hands of this body, the legislature, against 
and upon the encroachment of the executive. In establishing the 
division between the two branches of the legislature, the House and the 
Senate, assigning to the one the right to accuse and to the other the 
right to judge, the Framers of this Constitution were very astute. They 
did not make the accusers and the judges the same person.'' (Opening 
statement of the House Judiciary Committee, proceedings On the 
Impeachment of Richard Nixon, by Barbara Jordan)
  After consideration of all the evidence presented, I am convinced it 
is sufficient for the House to charge the President with several 
wrongful actions. I feel the evidence shows that the President 
committed perjury by lying under oath, obstructed justice, and abused 
the power of his office.
  Both historical precedent and current practice support the conclusion 
that perjury is a ``high crimes and misdemeanor.'' The Constitution 
applies that same phrase both to the President and to ``all civil 
officers of the United States.'' Several Federal judges have been 
impeached and removed from office for perjury. That is why the 
President can be, too.
  Also, bribery and perjury are equivalent means of interfering with 
the justice system. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines include bribery 
and perjury in the same Guideline.
  Some of the President's defenders would like to change the subject 
and talk about anybody else but the President and about anything else 
except the allegations of lying under oath, obstruction of justice, and 
abuse of office. Such efforts are an affront to all who value truth 
over tactics, substance over spin, principles over politics.
  House Members will be consistent if they follow the precedent 
established in 1974 by the Judiciary Committee. Individuals from both 
parties agreed with a Democratic Congresswoman from Texas when she 
said, ``The President engaged in a series of public statements and 
actions designed to thwart the lawful investigation by government 
prosecutors. Moreover, the President has made public announcements and 
assertions * * * which the evidence will show he knew to be false. 
These assertions, false assertions,'' she said, are ``impeachable.'' 
(Ibid.)
  By any commonsense measure, the President did not ``tell the truth, 
the whole truth, and nothing but the truth,'' as his oath required, 
when he testified before a judge and then before a grand jury, as many 
Democrats now admit.
  We should not underestimate the gravity of the case against the 
President. When he put his hand on the Bible and recited his oath of 
office, he swore to faithfully uphold the laws of the United States. 
Not some laws; all laws.
  Many people have gone to jail for doing what the President did--lying 
or knowingly making false statements after swearing in court not to do 
so. However, others have not been punished for failing to tell the 
truth.
  So, if the President were just an ordinary person living in the 
United States, it is not certain that he would be found to have 
committed a crime.
  What, then, makes this a case that rises to the impeachment level?
  I think there are two factors: the repeated and deliberate nature of 
the lies, and the uniqueness of the Office of the Presidency.
  It was determined by the independent counsel that, ``On at least six 
different occasions--from December 17, 1997, through August 17, 1998--
the President had to make a decision. He could choose truth, or he 
could choose deception. On all six occasions, the President chose 
deception--a pattern of calculated behavior over a span of months.'' 
(Statement of Independent Counsel Kenneth W. Starr before the Committee 
on the Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives, November 19, 1998)
  During this time, not only did the President tell a judge and then a 
grand jury less than the truth, he also told lies to the American 
people, the news media, Members of Congress, his Cabinet, and senior 
White House advisors.
  One of his own former advisors commented, ``President Clinton turned 
his personal flaws into a public matter when he made the whole country 
complicit in his cover story. This was no impulsive act of passion; it 
was a coldly calculated political decision. He spoke publicly from the 
Roosevelt Room. He assembled his Cabinet and staff, and assured them 
that he was telling the truth. Then he sat back, silently, and watched 
his official spokespeople, employees of the U.S. government, mislead 
the country again and again and again.'' (Column by George 
Stephanopoulos, Newsweek, August 31, 1998)
  The President himself, when he was a law professor in Arkansas, 
defined an impeachable offense this way: ``I think that the definition 
should include any criminal acts plus a willful failure of the 
president to fulfill his duty to uphold and execute the laws of the 
United States. Another factor that I think constitutes an impeachable 
offense would be willful, reckless behavior in office * * *''
  The President consciously and persistently made an effort to deceive, 
give misleading answers, and tell lies. He made statements and engaged 
in actions designed to impede the investigation of the Independent 
Counsel. We all know the President still might be deceiving us today 
were it not for physical evidence that forced him to change his story.
  As to the uniqueness of the office the president holds, he is a 
person in a position of immense authority and influence. He influences 
the lives of millions of Americans. He sets an example for us all.
  A sixth grader from Chisolm Middle School in Round Rock, Texas, 
recently wrote me. She said bluntly, ``He has lied to the American 
people! And although I realize what he lied about has nothing to do 
with him running the country, then what else would he lie about? He let 
us down! Kids that think he is a role model now are heart broken! 
(Letter from Kara Kothmann, November 17, 1998)
  The President sets an example for adults, too. When he took the oath 
of office he swore to ``preserve, protect and defend the Constitution 
of the United States'' and to ``take care that the laws be faithfully 
executed.'' The president has rightly been called ``the number-one law 
enforcement officer of the country.'' (Leon Jaworski in ``The Right and 
the Power.'') As such, he has a special responsibility to ``take care'' 
that he not commit any crime, particularly such a serious one as 
perjury, a felony for which a person can go to jail for up to five 
years.
  When someone is elected president, they receive the greatest gift 
possible from the American people--their trust. To violate that trust 
is to raise questions about fitness for office. My constituents often 
remind me that if anyone else in a position of authoirty--for example a 
business executive a military officer, or a professional educator--had 
acted as the evidence indicates the President did, their career would 
be over.
  The rules under which President Nixon would have been tried for 
impeachment, had he not resigned, contained this statement: ``The 
office of the President is such that it calls for a higher level of 
conduct than the average citizen in the United States.'' (Drafted in 
1974 with the help of Hillary Rodham, a staff attorney of the Judiciary 
Committee)
  The President has a higher responsibility for another reason. The 
Arkansas Rules of Conduct for attorneys states that ``lawyers holding 
public office assume legal responsibilities going beyond those of other 
citizens,'' because they know how important the rule of law is to a 
stable and civilized society. And the President doesn't hold just any 
public office, he holds the most powerful one in the world.
  It is for these two reasons--the President's premeditated and 
repeated efforts while under oath to tell less than the truth, and the 
special responsibility that comes with holding the highest office in 
our country--that I feel the President's actions have reached the level 
of impeachable offenses.
  I have been surprised by the assertion of the President's defenders 
that we should not impeach him for his actions because it would set a 
precedent.
  If our actions send a message that future Presidents should not lie 
under oath, should tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the 
truth--as President Clinton swore to do when giving testimony before 
both a judge and then a grand jury; that future Presidents should 
uphold the law--as President Clinton swore to do when he took the oath 
of office as President; that future Presidents should not obstruct 
justice--as President Clinton did for seven months as he admittedly 
deceived the American people and those associated with the 
investigation* * * if these are the precedents Congress sets, if these 
are the standards future Presidents then live by, we need not fear our 
actions.
  This will not be an easy task; in fact, it is a difficult ordeal for 
all Americans. But we will get through it: we are a great nation and a 
strong people. our country will endure because our Constitution works 
and has worked for over 200 years.
  As much as one might wish to avoid this process, we must resist the 
temptation to close our eyes and pass by. The President's actions must 
be evaluated for one simple reason--the truth counts.
  As this process goes forward, some good lessons can be reaffirmed. No 
one is above the law. Actions have consequences. Always tell the truth.
  We the people should insist on these high ideals. That the President 
has fallen short of the standard doesn't mean we should lower it. If we 
keep excusing away the President's actions, we as a nation will never 
climb upwards because there will be no firm rungs.
  Let me quote another insightful letter from a student in that same 
sixth grade class:
  ``As everyone knows,'' it begins, ``President Clinton is going 
through hearings about lying under oath and tampering with the 
evidence. Perjury especially in front of the Grand Jury is

[[Page H12018]]

unacceptable. These many months of investigation could have been 
avoided if President Clinton would have told the truth in the 
beginning.''
  She concludes her letter with words I will use to conclude my 
remarks, ``I know you are being bombarded with letters each with 
different opinions, but this is a big issue. Now it is up to you and 
your fellow congressmen to decide to the best of your ability what 
should happen next. Please take into consideration what I have stated 
and make a decision that would be the best for America's future.'' 
(Letter from Brandi Bockhorn, November 19, 1998)
  That, my colleagues, to me, says it all.
  Mr. RIGGS. Mr. Speaker, this is a profoundly sad and disturbing time 
for me. I had hoped to conclude my Congressional service on a high note 
after the Congress passed, and the President signed, my bills improving 
literacy, expanding vocatinoal and technical education, and increasing 
the number of federally-funded charter schools in the final days of the 
105th Congress, before the November elections. Unfortunately, it is not 
to be.
  Before I focus on the question of impeachment and the fate or Bill 
Clinton, led me address the situation in Iran. As an Army veteran, I 
strongly support our troops in the field. That probably goes without 
saying. But while i--like my colleagues--support our men and women in 
uniform in the Persian Gulf, I must question the timing of the mission 
(``Operation Desert Fox'') and our foreign policy towards Iraq in 
generel.
  It has been eight years since the United States went to war against 
Saddam Hussein and the Iraq military. It is about time we finish the 
job.
  In my first official vote as a newly-elected Member of Congress in 
1991, I voted against the use of military force against Iraq. I was 
convinced we were not committed to removing Saddam Hussein from power. 
We left in power a man who, for corrupt, venal reasons, would rather 
hold on to his personal power and military might than help his own 
people.
  As columnist Richard Cohen recently pointed out in the Washington 
Post: ``As long as Saddam rules, the U.S.-Iran conflict will continue. 
Either his military has to be hurt so badly it will turn on him, or 
dissent elements--and they exist--will sense weakness and rise in 
revolt. Force has to be applied in such a way--sustained and 
punishing--that this eight-year conflict is brought to a conclusion.''
  I recognize that many of my fellow Americans also support our troops 
but question the timing of this mission. One could argue that a 
President facing the imminent prospect of impeachment should not use 
military force unless the national security interests of the United 
States are directly and immediately threatened.
  That so many Americans question the timing and necessity of this 
mission indicates the widespread, and in my opinion, corrosive cynicism 
in America that is yet another sign of the weakened state of this 
presidency. President Clinton has lost credibility and standing with 
the American people. We are witnessing the steady erosion of the moral 
authority of the presidency under his tenure.
  A majority of Americans now believe that President Clinton lied to us 
and damaged the basic trust between the American people and their 
president. Just as seriously, if the American people do not believe the 
president, why should our allies or our enemies? I believe that the 
president can no longer effectively perform the duties and 
responsibilities for which he was elected. For the good of the country 
he should resign, as I have said for months.
  Furthermore, true contrition and the shame that accompanies it should 
compel President Clinton to resign. He has disgraced his family and his 
office. He alone can forestall the national ordeal and the ugly 
spectacle of an impeachment trial in the United States Senate, and 
salvage some dignity for himself and the presidency, by resigning now. 
Yet Clinton refuses to resign, even though his conduct is contemptible 
and renders him unfit to be president of our nation.
  In a 1910 address in New York, Theodore Roosevelt said of the 
presidency: ``Any man who has ever been honored by being made President 
of the United States is thereby forever after rendered the debtor of 
the American people, and is honor-bound throughout his life to remember 
this as a prime obligation; and in private life, as much as in public 
life, so to carry himself that the American people may never have 
course to feel regret that once they placed him at the head.''
  Some partisans and pundits are suggesting that we should short-
circuit the impeachment process or simply shunt the whole matter aside 
based on poll ratings. But we in Congress have an obligation to do 
exactly the opposite. That was our duty before the election and it 
continues to be so now. Our oath of office requires no less. Our sworn 
constitutional obligations may be onerous, but we cannot abdicate our 
responsibilities because what is popular is not always right, and what 
is right is not always popular.
  My responsibility is to inform and mold public opinion but even if 
unsuccessful, to vote my conscience and convictions. In my service in 
the U.S. House, I have tried to follow the dictum of Sir Edmund Burke, 
who told his constituents: ``Your representative owes you his judgment 
as well as his industry. He betrays your best interests if he 
sacrifices his judgment to your opinion.''
  A few thoughts on the impeachment process itself: The House is 
charged by the constitution with determining whether the president 
should be impeached. Judge Starr's referral under the Independent 
Counsel statutes is his conclusion that evidence exists that President 
Clinton has committed ``high crimes and misdemeanors.'' But it is only 
his opinion; the House is certainly not bound by it, nor is Congress 
required to accept his evidence.
  In fact, it is the House's constitutional obligation to investigate 
de novo, that is, make an independent assessment: What are the facts 
and what are the legal implications of those facts? That is what an 
impeachment inquiry does.
  If the Judiciary Committee, then the full House, find the facts show 
high crimes and misdemeanors by the president, Articles of Impeachment 
are adopted. That is still not a finding of guilt, but more akin to an 
indictment. The House proceeding is thus like a special Grand Jury 
devoted to the president's conduct. The actual finding of guilt would 
have to be made by a two-thirds vote by the Senate, after a trial 
presided over by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.
  (Maintaining the analogy to a grand jury, it also follows that the 
president does not have the same automatic rights of cross-examination 
or presentation of his case at this stage as he would at a trial. The 
fact that, nonetheless, he was given those rights is further evidence 
that Congress has undertaken a fair inquiry.)
  I have tried to approach this historic vote of great import in a 
serious, solemn and objective way. I have endeavored to be as honest, 
fair, thorough, and deliberate as humanly possible. I have consulted 
with the Republican members of the House Judiciary Committee and sought 
the advice of national leaders like former Presidents Gerald Ford and 
Jimmy Carter, former Vice President Dan Quayle, and Bob Dole, who, 
because of their unique experiences, had valuable insights and 
perspective to offer. In preparation for this vote, I also asked myself 
a series of questions.
  (1) Would one of my constituents be held accountable for lying before 
a federal grand jury or a federal judicial officer?
  (2) Does lying before a federal grand jury or a federal judicial 
officer undermine the rule of law?
  (3) Is it possible that the president of the United States lied 
before a federal grand jury or a federal judge, thereby violating his 
oath of office which requires him to uphold and abide by the rule of 
law?
  In reaching my decision, I have read the referral report to Congress 
from the Office of Independent Counsel, closely followed the Judiciary 
Committee's deliberations, and, most recently, studied the Judiciary 
Committee's Report on the Articles of Impeachment in detail. I have 
given great weight to the Committee's report, which contains a full 
discussion of the facts and the Committee's rationale and justification 
for approving the articles. I have satisfied myself that I would be 
voting the same way if the alleged misconduct involved a Republican 
president and/or if I had stood for re-election to Congress.
  After a thorough review of the record, careful deliberation, much 
soul-searching, and due consideration of the consequences for our 
nation, I have reached the conclusion that President Clinton lied under 
oath and encouraged others to lie under oath in a federal court 
proceeding. He has thereby violated his fundamental constitutional 
obligation to take care that the laws be faithfully executed. He has 
flouted the rule of law by lying before a federal grand jury and a 
federal judge. His false and misleading testimony before the grand jury 
is especially egregious since he knew going in that he had to ``come 
clean''--but instead he continued to obfuscate the truth. That is 
grounds for the President's resignation. It is also grounds for 
impeachment under the first three articles reported out by the 
Judiciary Committee.
  I believe that the laws should be applied equally to all, regardless 
of their financial or political stature. The foundation of our criminal 
justice system is that no man is above the law. Impeachment is 
essential to preserving the rule of law, because under our constitution 
a sitting president cannot be indicted for crimes. The only way to make 
him subject to the law and preserve the rule of law, is through the 
process of impeachment.
  If the President, arguably the most powerful man on earth, can 
distort the truth, break the law, and avoid accountability, what are 
the consequences for ordinary Americans?
  Do we want to establish the precedent that presidents may with 
impunity hold the law in

[[Page H12019]]

contempt? How can we expect anyone who is subpoenaed to court to have 
to tell the truth when the head of our government (and it's legal 
system) has not? In my opinion, to overlook such conduct would invite 
further social abdication of morality and accountability and breed 
contempt for the law.
  As former U.S. Senator John Danforth said recently: ``What's 
important here is what Congress says in the end about what has 
generally been an accepted and basic standard in this country: that 
lying under oath is not permitted. If that standard is in any way 
watered down, then the country and all it stands for will be sorely 
harmed and the future will be in grave doubt.''
  I believe that the President has lied under oath and that he 
continues to flout the rule of law by refusing to admit publicly that 
he lied under oath, and therefore should be impeached and removed from 
office. Truth is on trial.
  Eight years ago, I stood in the well of the House and voted my 
conscience on the Persian Gulf resolutions. One year later seven of 
us--all Republican freshmen--forced the House to confront corruption in 
the House Bank and Post Office scandals.
  Today, too, is a vote of conscience. It is a vote about our country--
its proud heritage and promising future--not about the politics or 
polls of the moment. As the father of our country George Washington 
said: ``Let prejudices and local interests yield to reason. Let us look 
to our national character and to things beyond the present period.''
  We are duty bound today by our solemn oath of office to defend our 
country and the common commitment to its political principles--the 
constitution, the rule of law, the right to life, liberty and the 
pursuit of happiness--that unites all Americans. We must not, we cannot 
fail, for the sake of the future generations of Americans. For the 
sacred purpose of preserving the honor of the Office of President of 
the United States and the integrity of our Constitution, I will vote to 
impeach William Jefferson Clinton.
  Mr. BLUNT. Mr. Speaker, today the House of Representatives meets to 
vote on the impeachment of the president. In the 210-year life of our 
Constitution and of the House, the Congress has met to vote on this 
critical question only one other time. This is our most serious 
constitutional duty.
  This duty is required by the unique system of checks and balances 
that has made our system so strong. This concept, born in Philadelphia 
in 1787, has served us well. It has served us well because the 
representatives of one branch of government cannot subvert the others. 
No president can be allowed to subvert the judiciary or thwart the 
investigative responsibility of the legislature.
  There is clear evidence that President Clinton committed perjury on 
two or more occasions, and urged others to obstruct justice. These are 
serious felonious acts that strike at the heart of our judicial system. 
Oaths taken in the American system of government are serious 
commitments to truth and the rule of law. Violating these oaths or 
causing others to impede the investigation into such acts are serious 
matters that meet the standard for impeachment.
  The House Judiciary Committee, after a month of hearings, returned 
four Articles of Impeachment all dealing with President Clinton's 
statements made in a civil trial deposition, to a federal grand jury 
his actions with others who were likely to testify and in his response 
to the committee's inquiries. This is not about the President's 
personal conduct, it is about the President's conduct under oath. It is 
about his subversion of the judicial system and his unwillingness to 
cooperate with the legislative investigation of that failure; it is 
about the rule of law.
  The President's actions and statements have brought the country to 
this difficult decision. The vote today holds great consequence for the 
President and the constitutional process. This is about determining the 
facts, seeking the truth, and giving the President the forum to rebut 
the charges against him. The duty of the House of Representatives is to 
determine if sufficient evidence exists to proceed with a trial in the 
Senate. The House Judiciary Committee has met that burden. After 
reviewing the material gathered by the Judiciary Committee and the 
corroborated nature of hard evidence, it is my conclusion that the 
allegations against the President warrant a formal trial in the Senate.
  Many of my colleagues advocate some other punishment for the 
President. They say for the first time in the history of the United 
States the Congress should censure the President. Censure would set a 
dangerous precedent for this President and successors. The Constitution 
prescribes one option for the Congress which is to determine whether 
the President's action are impeachable or not. Today, you could censure 
the President for bad conduct, five years from now another Congress 
could decide to censure a president for a bad policy and a few years 
later the Congress could censure a president for good policies that did 
not work out and suddenly, we don't have a presidential system, but a 
parliamentary system. One of the great strengths of our system of 
government is the lack of a requirement that a president be popular 
between elections. The Congress has only one standard, the actions of 
the President are either impeachable or they are not impeachable. The 
decision to censure would head our government in the wrong direction.
  It is my desire that this embarrassment on the presidency and our 
country end quickly, but the Constitution cannot be rewritten by public 
opinion polls or by political expediency. When I took the oath of 
office to serve in Congress, I did not swear to uphold the Constitution 
only if it was popular. Today the Constitution gives the House of 
Representatives the responsibility to determine if the President's 
conduct is impeachable or not. There are no other options. Tomorrow 
this House should get on with the business of the new Congress. Our 
next job is to work to defend the country, balance the budget, find tax 
relief for working families, keep our commitments to Social Security, 
Medicare, Veterans and Military retirees and the next generation.
  Mr. PAUL. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of all four articles of 
impeachment against the President. There is neither pleasure nor 
vindictiveness in this vote and I have found no one else taking this 
vote lightly. It seems though many of our colleagues are not pleased 
with the investigative process; some believing it to have been overly 
aggressive and petty, while others are convinced it has been 
unnecessarily limited and misdirected. It certainly raises the question 
of whether or not the special prosecutor rather than the Congress 
itself should be doing this delicate work of oversight. Strict 
adherence to the Constitution would reject the notion that Congress 
undermine the separations of power by delivering this oversight 
responsibility to the administration. The long delays and sharp 
criticisms of the special prosecutor could have been prevented if the 
Congress had not been dependent on the actions of an Attorney General's 
appointee.
  The charges against the President are serious and straight forward: 
lying, perjury, obstruction of justice, and abuse of power. The main 
argument made in his defense is that these charges surround the sexual 
escapades of the President and therefore should not be considered as 
serious as they otherwise would be.
  But there are many people in this country and some members of 
Congress who sincerely believe we have over concentrated on the 
Lewinsky event while ignoring many other charges that have been pushed 
aside and not fully scrutinized by the House. It must not be forgotten 
that a resolution to inquire into the possible impeachment of the 
President was introduced two months before the nation became aware of 
Monica Lewinsky.
  For nearly six years there has been a steady and growing concern 
about the legal actions of the President. These charges seem almost 
endless: possible bribery related to Webb Hubble, foreign government 
influence in the 1996 presidential election, military technology given 
to China, FBI files, travel office irregularities, and many others. 
Many Americans are not satisfied that Congress has fully investigated 
the events surrounding the deaths of Ron Brown and Vince Foster.
  The media and the administration has concentrated on the sexual 
nature of the investigation and this has done a lot to distract from 
everything else. The process has helped to make the President appear to 
be a victim of government prosecutorial overkill while ignoring the 
odious significance of the 1,000 FBI files placed for political reasons 
in the White House. If corruption becomes pervasive in any 
administration, yet no actual fingerprints of the president are found 
on indicting documents, there must come a time when the ``CEO'' becomes 
responsible for the actions of his subordinates. That is certainly true 
in business, the military, and in each congressional office.
  There is a major irony in this impeachment proceeding. A lot has been 
said the last two months by members of the Judiciary Committee on both 
side of the aisle regarding the Constitution and how it must be upheld. 
But if we are witnessing all of a sudden the serious move toward 
obeying constitutional restraints, I will anxiously look forward to the 
next session when 80 percent of our routine legislation will be voted 
down.
  But the real irony is that the charges coming out of the Paula Jones 
sexual harassment suit stem from an unconstitutional federal law that 
purports to promote good behavior in the work place. It's based 
entirely on ignoring the obligations of the states to deal with 
physical abuse and intimidation. This whole mess resulted from a legal 
system institutionalized by the very same people who are not the 
President's staunchest defenders. Without the federal sexual harassment 
code of conduct--which the President repeatedly flaunted--there would 
have been no case against the President since the many other serious 
charges

[[Page H12020]]

have been brushed aside. I do not believe this hypocrisy will go 
unnoticed in the years to come. Hopefully it will lead to the day when 
the Congress reconsiders such legislation in light of the strict 
limitations placed on it by the Constitution and to which many members 
of Congress are now publicly declaring their loyalty.
  Much has been said about the support the President continues to 
receive from the American people in spite of his acknowledged 
misconduct. It does seem that the polls and the recent election 
indicate the public is not inclined to remove the President from office 
nor reward the Republicans for their efforts to investigate the 
Lewinsky affair. It is quite possible as many have suggested that the 
current status of the economy has a lot to do with this tolerance.
  The public's acceptance of the President's behavior may reflect the 
moral standards of our age, but I'm betting there's a lot more to it. 
It is true that some conservative voters, demanding the Republicans in 
Congress hold the President to a greater accountability, ``voted'' by 
staying home. They did not want to encourage the Republicans who were 
seen as being soft on Clinton for his personal behavior and for 
capitulating on the big government agenda of more spending, and more 
taxes. But hopefully there is a much more profound reason for the 
seemingly inconsistent position of a public who condemns the President 
while not having the stomach for punishing him through impeachment.

  If my suspicion is correct we can claim a major victory. Polling 
across Texas, as well as nationally, confirms that more than 80 percent 
of the people are fearful of the Federal Government's intrusion into 
our personal privacy. That's a healthy sign and indicates that the 
privacy issue could be the issue that will eventually draw attention to 
the evils of big government.
  The political contest, as it has always been throughout history, 
remains between the desire for security and the love for liberty. When 
economic security is provided by the government, privacy and liberty 
must be sacrificed. The longer a welfare state lasts the greater the 
conflict between government intrusiveness and our privacy. Government 
efficiency and need for its financing through a ruthless tax system 
prompts the perpetual barrage of government agents checking on 
everything we do.
  Fortunately, the resentment toward government for its meddling in all 
aspects of our lives is strong and becoming more galvanized, and that 
should give us hope that all is not lost.
  But this resentment must be channeled in the right direction. Belief 
that privacy and liberty can be protected while the welfare state is 
perpetuated through ever higher taxes is an unrealizable dream.
  The ``sympathy'', if that's what we want to call it, for the 
President reflects the instinctive nature of most Americans who resent 
the prying eyes of big government. It's easy to reason: ``If the 
President of the United States can be the subject of a `sting 
operation' and FBI ordered tape recordings, how can any of us be secure 
in our homes and papers?''
  The ambivalence comes from fear that demanding privacy, even for the 
President, means that his actions are then condoned. And turning this 
into a perjury issue has been difficult.
  The President, his advisors, and the friendly media were all aware 
that the sexual privacy issue would distract from the serious charges 
and knew it was their best chance to avoid impeachment.
  But the President, this Administration and the Congress have all been 
hypocritical for demanding privacy for themselves yet are the arch 
enemies of our privacy. Although other Administrations have abused the 
FBI and the IRS, this Administration has systematically abused these 
powers like none other.
  Let's declare a victory in despite of the mess we're in. The 
President is not likely to be removed from office. We'll call it a form 
of ``jury nullification'' and hope someday this process will be used in 
our courts to nullify the unconstitutional tax, monetary, gun, anti-
privacy, and seizure laws that are heaped upon us by Congress, the 
President, and perpetuated by a judicial system devoid of respect for 
individual liberty and the Constitution.
  Hopefully, the concept of the overly aggressive prosecutor will be 
condemned when it comes to overly aggressive activities of all the 
federal police agencies whether it's the IRS, the BATF or any other 
authoritarian agency of the federal government.
  A former U.S. Attorney, Robert Merkle, recently told the Pittsburgh 
Post Gazette that ``the philosophy of (the Attorney General's office) 
the last 10 to 15 years is whatever works is right,'' when it comes to 
enforcing federal laws which essentially all are unconstitutional. It's 
this attitude by the federal police agents that the American people 
must reject and not only when it applies to a particular President some 
want to shield.

  Even though we might claim a victory of sorts, the current 
impeachment process reveals a defeat for our political system and our 
society. Since lack of respect for the Constitution is pervasive 
throughout the Administration, the Congress and the Courts and reflects 
the political philosophy of the past 60 years, dealing with the 
President alone, won't reverse the course on which we find ourselves. 
There are days when I think we should consider ``impeaching'' not only 
the President, but the Congress and the Judiciary. But the desired 
changes will come only after the people's attitudes change as to what 
form of government they desire. When the people demand privacy, freedom 
and individual responsibility for everyone alike, our government will 
reflect these views. Hopefully we can see signs in these current events 
that more Americans are becoming serious about demanding their liberty 
and rejecting the illusions of government largesse as a panacea.
  It's sad but there is another example of a most egregious abuse of 
presidential power, committed by the President, that has gotten no 
attention by the special prosecutors or the Congress. That is the 
attempt by the President to distract from the Monica Lewinsky testimony 
to the Grand Jury by bombing with cruise missiles both Sudan and 
Afghanistan, and the now current war against Iraq.
  Two hundred million dollars were spent on an illegal act of war 
against innocent people. The pharmaceutical plant in Sudan was just 
that, a pharmaceutical plant, owned by a Muslim businessman who was 
standing up to the Islamic fundamentalists, the same people we pretend 
to oppose and use as scapegoats for all our Middle-Eastern policies. 
And now we have the controversial and unconstitutional waging of war in 
Iraq.
  And to add insult to injury both military operations ordered by 
Clinton were quickly praised by the Republican leaders as good and 
necessary policy. These acts alone should be enough for a serious 
consideration of impeachment, but it's never mentioned--mainly because 
leadership of both parties for decades have fully endorsed our jingoism 
and bellicosity directed toward other nations when they do not do our 
bidding.
  Yes, the President's tawdry affair and the acceptance of it to a 
large degree by the American people is not a good sign for us as a 
nation. But, let's hope that out of this we have a positive result by 
recognizing the public's rejection of the snooping actions of Big 
Brother. Let's hope there's a renewed interest in the Constitution and 
that Congress pays a lot more attention to it on a daily basis 
especially when it comes to waging war.
  The fact that President Clinton will most likely escape removal from 
office I find less offensive than the Congress's and the media's lack 
of interest in dealing with the serious charges of flagrant abuse of 
power, threatening political revenge, issuing unconstitutional 
Executive Orders, sacrificing U.S. sovereignty to world government, 
bribery, and illegal acts of war, along with the routine flaunting of 
the constitutional restraints that were placed there to keep our 
government small and limited in scope.
  Mr. DeFAZIO. Mr. Speaker, the Republican-led House of Representatives 
is about to do something that is nearly unique in our nation's history. 
It is about to cast a party line vote to impeach a President of the 
opposite party against the will of the majority of the American people. 
The Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, Henry Hyde, said at the 
beginning of this process that impeachment must be bipartisan in order 
to be legitimate. Well, Mr. Speaker, this process is the furthest thing 
from bipartisan. Every vote in the Judiciary Committee was along party 
lines, and the final votes on articles of impeachment will almost 
certainly be party line votes, as well. This sorry chapter in the 
nation's history creates a new gold standard for partisanship--a 
standard that will be hard to beat in the decades to come.
  But this impeachment drive is illegitimate for other, more 
fundamental reasons: the charges brought against the President by House 
Republican leaders are not only lacking in merit, they are not the kind 
of high crimes and misdemeanors that warrant impeachment. Chairman Hyde 
has painted his crusade in moral terms--he claims to be upholding the 
rule of law. The rule of law is not at risk here, but the Constitution 
is. The Constitution reserves impeachment for treason, bribery and 
other high crimes and misdemeanors. It does not say fornication, 
adultery and other high crimes and misdemeanors. Nor does it say 
perjury, evasiveness and other high crimes and misdemeanors. These are 
misdeeds that have other remedies under the law. Calling them 
impeachable offenses demeans the Constitution and undermines our system 
of government.
  And finally, Mr. Speaker, this impeachment is illegitimate because it 
is taking place in a Congress that the voters have rejected. In the 
election just six weeks ago, the American people made clear their 
distaste for impeachment. Many of the members of this House who will 
vote today lost their elections last month--in many cases their support 
for impeachment was one of the issues that led their constituents to 
reject their candidacy. Yet those very

[[Page H12021]]

members are here today supporting impeachment and violating the will of 
the voters who turned them out of office.
  Mr. Speaker, I expect to hear a rising clamor of calls for the 
President to resign. That would be an even greater disaster for our 
democracy than this partisan proceeding has been. Having voted--however 
illegitimately--for impeachment, the nation, the Constitution and the 
President deserve a trial in the Senate. We must determine once and for 
all whether these charges are grave enough to warrant impeachment. And 
these unproven charges must be judged. The President is innocent until 
proven guilty, and Chairman Hyde and his colleagues have not made their 
case.
  Mr. MANZULLO. Mr. Speaker, I pledge allegiance to the flag of the 
United States of America, and to the Republic for which it stands, one 
nation, under God, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all.
  The Pledge of Allegiance is recited frequently by all Americans, 
including school children and government leaders. It starts each day of 
Congress. It is a statement that in this country, our system of justice 
is for all people--elected and non elected. Unequal justice is no 
justice under the law.
  Before I entered Congress in 1993, I practiced law for 22 years. I 
have been a student of the Constitution and the powers of Congress 
since college in the mid 60's and wrote a book on constitutional law, 
which was published in 1973. I am also a father of three young 
children. I, therefore, approach the subject of impeachment of the 
President with this perspective.
  I believe the President should be impeached, which means a finding by 
the House of Representatives that there is evidence the President 
committed acts sufficient for the Senate to consider the charges and 
vote on whether or not he should be removed from office.


     The Constitutional Background of High Crimes and Misdemeanors

  Wehn the founders of our Constitution met in Philadelphia, they used 
English law as the basis for our founding document. The English view of 
impeachment meant two things: removal from office and the imposition of 
a criminal penalty (sentence and/or fine). Our founders, however, when 
they wrote the impeachment section in the U.S. Constitution, chose to 
make removal from office the only penalty, but specifically allowed any 
criminal actions against the officeholders to be taken by others (state 
or federal prosecutors).
  This distinction means the American Constitution contemplates two 
very different proceedings: the removal from office was to be separate 
from criminal proceedings, because removal protects the people and 
criminal proceedings punish the officeholder.
  Futhermore, the impeachable offense could, but does not have to be, a 
violation of a criminal statute. George Mason, who wrote the Bill of 
Rights, said impeachment was to be used for ``attempts to subvert the 
Constitution.'' Hamilton said impeachment should be used for ``those 
offenses which proceed from the misconduct of public men . . . from the 
abuse or violation of some public trust . . . as they related chiefly 
to injuries done immediately to the society itself'' (Federalist 
Papers, No. 65). Other works by James Wilson, a signatory of the 
Constitution, and the pre-eminent jurist, Justice Joseph Story, 
conclusively verify this. When the House of Representatives in 1974 
considered Articles of Impeachment for President Nixon, the Democratic-
led House Judiciary Committee, for which attorney Hillary Rodham 
worked, stated the Articles were premised upon ``injury to the 
confidence of the nation and great prejudice to the cause of law and 
justice.''


      Why Censure is Not an Option in the House of Representatives

  The House of Representatives must consider the charges to remove the 
President only in terms of how the Constitution governs the procedure. 
The Constitution speaks of this duty only in terms of ``impeachment,'' 
that is, the House finding enough evidence to send to the Senate for a 
final resolution as to whether there should be a conviction (removal) 
on the impeachment charges. The Constitution provides no option for the 
House of Representatives to consider anything less than impeachment, 
such as censure. Censure is a formal scolding or reprimand. It has no 
legal consequences.


                 The Charges against President Clinton

  The Articles of Impeachment charge President Clinton with perjury, 
which is lying under oath, before a federal grand jury and during a 
deposition (a sworn statement under oath with attorneys for all parties 
present). He is also charged with encouraging a witness to lie under 
oath. These charges cannot be dismissed and are not ``simply about 
sex.'' Watergate was not about breaking and entering, but about cover 
up and perjury after the fact. It is the same here.
  Why is perjury and encouraging a witness to lie under oath so 
serious?
  The U.S. Supreme Court (US v. Mandurano, 1974) said that ``perjured 
testimony is an obvious and flagrant affront to the basic concepts of 
judicial proceedings.'' When somebody perjures himself under oath, this 
does two things: first, it deprives a party to the lawsuit of the 
constitutional right to a fair trial (because truth is frustrated) 
and, second, it is a frontal assault upon the intergrity of the system 
of justice in this Nation.

  The fact that President Clinton lied under oath at the federal grand 
jury and the deposition is not refuted. Period. Does his perjury have 
to be of such a nature that criminal charges could be brought against 
him? The answer is no, (even though I believe criminal charges could be 
brought). Under the English system, the question is probably yes. But 
because impeachment under the American Constitution is aimed at removal 
and not criminal punishment of the officeholder, the criminal rules of 
evidence and other rules in a regular criminal proceeding sumply do not 
apply. That's why it is incorrect to compare impeachment proceeding in 
the House of Represenatives with a criminal trial.
  Encouraging a witness to lie under oath is akin to the following: you 
own a business (Party A) and get involved in a lawsuit with another 
businessperson (Party B). Your livelihood is threatened. An independent 
distribution who has a business relationship with you and Party B can 
verify your claim. Party B has a conversation with the independment 
distrubutor and says, ``I understand you have been named as a witness 
in this case. I know you'll do the right thing, possibly by simply 
signing and filing an affidavit in court. That way you might not be 
called as a witness. By the way, I understand you are looking for more 
business, and perhaps we could do something on that.'' Party B's 
attorney then picks up the distributor, takes him to another lawyer's 
office. That lawyer prepares an affidavit that is false, and that 
lawyer goes over the affidavit with Part B's attorney. The affidavit is 
filed in court. You lose your lawsuit, or it is greatly hindered, and 
the trial suffers a serious blow because the notion of justice based 
upon truth is destroyed. This is what the President is charged with. 
The President discovers Monica Lewinsky is on the witness list in the 
case where Paula Jones has charged the President with a federal 
Constitutional civil rights case of sexual harassment. The President 
suggests to Ms. Lewinsky that if an affidavit is signed, she won't have 
to testify and that he is sure she'll do the right thing. The President 
talks to his close friend, attorney Vernon Jordan, who then takes Ms. 
Lewinsky to another lawyer, who prepares a false affidavit about Ms. 
Lewinsky's relationship with the President. Her attorney goes over the 
affidavit with Mr. Jordan. After she signs the affidavit, Mr. Jordan 
again enters the picture and Ms. Lewinsky gets another job.
  The U.S. Supreme Court rule unamimously that Paula Jones has a right 
to file and pursue her federal constitutional remedy against the 
President while he is in office.
  Paula Jones has a constitutional right to a trial based upon 
factual--not perjured--testimoney, and thus the false affidavit 
deprives her of that constutional right. Second, the entire judicial 
system, based upon people seeking redress for legal wrongs, suffers a 
serious blow. This is why perjury is so serious. This is why 115 people 
are sitting in federal prison because they committed perjury. This is 
why four Northwestern students have been indicated for perjury because 
they lied about betting on sports. This is why a 17-year-old student in 
McHenry County, Illinois, received six months in jail for lying in open 
court under oath. The Northerwestern students cannot defend their 
actions because they were simply lying about ``just a little sports 
betting'' any more that the President can defend his lie because the 
Jones lawsuit was ``just about sex.''
  And this is why impeachment, in the words of the founders, is to 
remove those officeholders who violate the ``public trust and subvert 
the Constitution.''


                           The Oath of Office

  As a member of Congress, I swore an oath ``to defend the Constitution 
of the United States. . . .'' This means I have an obligation to defend 
the Constitution and to do everything I can to make sure the powers and 
protections of the Constitution are enjoyed by the rest of America. 
This is a solemn obliation. That is why elected officials have oaths.
  The President's Constitutional oath says he is to ``preserve, protect 
and defend the Constitution of the United States.'' The Constitution 
further provides that the President ``shall take Care that the Law be 
faithfully executied.'' The worlds ``care'' and ``laws'' in the 
Constitution are purposely, capitalized for emphasis. Other words for 
``take Care'' are to ``nurture,'' ``conserve,'' ``supervise,'' and ``be 
vigilant over'' the law of this land. The President is, therefore, 
constitutionally charged with being a caretaker of the Constitution and 
the laws of this nation, holding these in trust for the protection of 
the American people. This is such an awesome responsibility that the 
Constitution makes the President the Commander

[[Page H12022]]

in Chief of the Armed Forces with the power to use force, if necessary 
to protect the people's Constitutional right to equal application of 
the Constitution and the laws.
  Teddy Roosevelt said it best, as recorded in The Strenuous Life 
(1900): ``We . . . differ on the currency . . . tariff and foreign 
policy; but we cannot . . . differ on the question of honesty if we 
expect our republic permanently to endure. Honesty is . . . an absolute 
prerequisite to efficient service to the public. Unless a man is 
honest, we have no right to keep him in public life, it matters not how 
brilliant his capacity . . . No man who is corrupt . . . who condones 
corruption in others can possibly do his duty by the community. If a 
man lies under an oath or procures the lie of another under an oath, if 
he perjures himself or suborns, perjury, he is guilty under the statute 
law.''
  This paper opened with the Pledge of Allegiance, which is a pledge 
taken by Americans, including those who serve in public office, to do 
whatever is necessary to assure equal justice under law. Unequal 
justice is no justice under the law.
  Even if the President were my best friend, I would still vote to 
impeach him because the Rule of Law is more important to me than 
friendship, popularity or politics.
  Mr. PORTMAN. Mr. Speaker, Article IV alleges that President Clinton 
``refused and failed to respond to certain written requests for 
admission and willfully made perjurious, false and misleading sworn 
statements in response to certain written requests propounded to him as 
part of the impeachment inquiry authorized by the House of 
Representatives.'' The ``written requests'' consisted of 81 written 
questions posed to the President by the House Judiciary Committee.
  I find President Clinton's responses to the Judiciary Committee's 
questions misleading, evasive and incomplete. They show disrespect for 
an authorized impeachment inquiry--the most serious proceeding the 
House can undertake.
  While President Clinton's responses show disrespect, even contempt, 
for the Congress of the United States, their most disturbing elements 
are really just repetitions of the perjurious statements alleged in 
Articles I and II.
  I am also concerned that the wording of Article IV could set a 
negative precedent for the balance of power between future White House 
and future Congresses. We do not want the President of the United 
States to be concerned about impeachment allegations every time a 
provocative communication is sent to the Congress or every time he 
responds in an aggressive manner to a Congressional inquiry. I am 
concerned that Article IV may have the effect of unduly weakening the 
Presidency.
  For this reason and because I believe its core is redundant to the 
other Articles, I cannot support Article IV.
  Mr. CRAMER. Mr. Speaker, as members prepare for this historic vote, I 
would like to say that I take this matter as seriously as any issue I 
have ever voted on during my tenure here in Congress.
  I know that I will have to look back on this as one of the most 
critical votes I will ever cast. Out of thousands of votes over the 
past eight years, the two most important have been this vote and my 
very first vote in 1991 to commit our country to war in the Persian 
Gulf.
  I have carefully and thoroughly examined each of the articles of 
impeachment. I have reflected on this matter at great length and 
listened to every possible opinion through each step of this process. 
Having done that, I will not vote to impeach the president.
  Mr. Speaker, as deplorable and disgusting as the president's personal 
conduct has been, and as much as I condemn what he, through his own 
actions, has put this country through, I do not believe that it reaches 
the level that the framers of our Constitution set for impeachment. 
There are many pressing issues for this country to address, and we need 
to focus our energies on these issues as quickly and strongly as 
possible.
  I still believe the president should be punished. I had hoped that 
censure would be an option. I have done everything I could to create 
the momentum to put forth a strong censure motion that would condemn 
the president and penalize him with a considerable fine. I feel that 
this is a way to hold him accountable without damaging the Constitution 
or further punishing the nation.
  I believe that the president can be held accountable for his actions 
after he leaves office through the criminal justice system. After 
considering all of these factors. I will vote against impeachment.
  Mr. WAXMAN. Mr. Speaker, my Republican colleagues have made history 
in the four years since they took control of the House. But it's not a 
history future will view with pride.
  Over and over again, our Republican colleagues have called for the 
``rule of law.'' Let me suggest that if the President has committed a 
crime, that he be tried in a court of law after he leaves office. 
There, even he will have the protections of the law. Here in the House 
of Representatives he is not getting the rule of law--but the rule of 
politics.
  President Clinton has been subjected to an unprecedented and 
deliberate strategy to use taxpayer funded investigations to ``get 
him.'' Millions have been spent, and a series of reckless charges have 
been investigated to death and turned out to have no basis in fact.
  The reality is that many of my Republican colleagues intensely 
dislike the President. Some have never been able to accept the fact 
that the American people have twice elected him. Some have never been 
able to accept him as their President. Indeed, one of my distinguished 
Republican colleagues, Majority Leader Dick Armey, once derisively 
referred to the President as ``your President'' during a debate with a 
Democratic House member. Another Republican member called Mr. Clinton 
an ``illegitimate President'' as early as January 1995.
  That intensity of feeling has transformed itself into a deliberate 
strategy to use taxpayer-funded investigations to cripple the 
President. Over three years ago, just after the Republicans took 
control of Congress, the Speaker's top political strategist wrote a 
memo urging Republicans to ``get the Clinton Administration under 
special prosecutor problems.'' Two years ago, the House of Republican 
leadership directed Committee chairmen to compile ``examples of 
dishonesty or ethical lapses in the Clinton Administration.''
  The result has been an extraordinary series of personal attacks on 
the President. I won't recount every accusation, but I do want to 
mention some of the most notable.
  President Clinton and his Administration has been accused of misusing 
the IRS and the FBI to punish political enemies. The President and his 
Administration have been accused of compiling an enemies list and of 
intentionally obtaining secret FBI files for those on the list.
  The President and his Administration have been accused of doctoring 
White House video tapes that Congress subpoenaed.
  The President and his Administration have been accused of selling 
cemetery plots at Arlington Cemetery in exchange for campaign 
contributions.
  The President and the First Lady have been accused of stealing 
government property.
  The president has even been accused of killing one of his closest 
friends, Vince Foster.
  Most serious of all, the President has been accused of committing 
treason. That word, treason, was tossed around on this floor earlier 
this year. It is without question the most serious charge one American 
can make against another American.
  All of these charges have been investigated, and all turned out to 
have no basis in fact. And while the accusations were trumpeted in 
press headlines around the country, their debunking at best made the 
back pages.
  One of our colleagues even introduced an impeachment resolution last 
year, months before anyone had heard of the President's affair with Ms. 
Lewinsky, and it was based on all these ridiculous, unsubstantiated, 
and false accusations
  This has been an impeachment in search of an impeachable offense.
  Durign these past four years, my Republican colleagues have taken all 
the tools of traditional congressional investigations and twisted them 
into something no American can be proud of. They have misused and 
abused the subpoena process. They have misused and abused the 
deposition process. They have misused and abused the power to grant 
immunity. They have misused and abused the power to hold others in 
contempt of Congress.
  We have trivialized these important powers and set horrifying 
precedents for future congressional investigations. In years to come, 
almost anything imaginable will be justified--by whichever party is in 
control--by pointing to the actions of the past four years. It's 
remarkable and remarkably sad that so much harm could be done in so 
little time.
  I suppose today's impeachment is the natural evolution of all those 
prior excesses. Every abuse of the past four years has built to this 
day. As one of my Republican colleagues said in the Washington Post on 
December 15, ``impeachment is icing on the cake.''
  The impeachment resolution is the ultimate indulgence of the House 
Republican leadership. It puts their anger, their hatred of the 
President, their political interests, ahead of the national interest.
  Despite the Republicans' premeditated and constant attack on him, 
today's vote would have been impossible had the President not acted 
irresponsibly, if not recklessly, in his personal and sexual 
misconduct. Feeling trapped, he lied. He acted dishonorably and 
dishonestly. The Republicans were desperate to find a crime, and the 
President, unfortunately, provided them with irresistible ammunition.
  For that President Clinton deserves censure and he deserves to be 
prosecuted if he violated the law. His crimes, if any, do not amount to 
impeachable offenses envisioned by the Constitution. He does not 
deserve--and our country does not deserve--this impeachment resolution.

[[Page H12023]]

  What has been presented to us by the Judiciary Committee do not 
amount to impeachable offenses. I call for the rule of law and the 
supremacy of the Constitution. I urge all my colleagues to oppose these 
articles of impeachment.
  Mr. TIAHRT. Mr. Speaker, with solemn thought and a certain sadness we 
are brought together to speak of removing the President of our United 
States. This is a task I did not choose, but as with all of us in this 
chamber, this task was thrust upon us by the actions of our President.
  Before us are four articles of impeachment. Two for perjury, one for 
obstruction of justice and the last for abuse of power. In these 
articles, we are required to judge our President and determine if his 
actions rise to the level of impeachable offenses. But we judge not 
only the character of the President, we judge ourselves and our nation. 
What standard must we raise for our President and ourselves? What 
standards will come from this for each of us to live up to and what 
expectations will we set for our nation? Will we accept the degradation 
of untruth or attempt to bring ourselves and our nation to its highest 
and best?
  With sadness we view the crisis of character in the words and deeds 
of the last year and we must hold the President accountable for those 
actions. Over 2,500 years ago, the philosopher Heraclitus said, ``A 
man's character is his fate.'' Anne Frank, quoting her father said, 
``Parents can only give good advice or put them (children) on the right 
paths, but the final forming of a person's character lies in their own 
hands.'' I believe this to be right. I believe in personal 
responsibility. I believe the president is responsible for his own 
character and his own actions.
  The standard of conduct and personal character we expect from our 
President should be no less than what we expect of ourselves. So we 
must ask, do we expect to carry out our duties and our responsibilities 
with integrity or do we stoop to the lowest levels of personal 
character? Stephen L. Carter, in his book ``Integrity'' defines 
integrity in three steps. First, to conduct ourselves with integrity we 
must discern right from wrong. This is a judgment based on all we are 
and all we know. What we learned from our parents, our teachers, people 
of faith, the wisdom of our years and that small, still voice inside 
which guides us to the judgment of what is right. Second, we must do 
the right thing. And third, we must tell others why we are doing what 
we are doing.
  Our decision must also determine what we hope for our nation. 
Tolerating actions that abuse the law, without repercussions, moves the 
entire nation to a place beneath its rightful one. We must work to 
raise our nations goals, ideals and future. We must protect the rule of 
law for it brings justice to us all. If we refuse to hold the President 
accountable for his actions, then we accept the degradation of our 
society and his actions. This cannot be.
  It is clear to me the President committed perjury and broke the law. 
It is against the law to deny another American their civil rights by 
withholding information and coordinating an effort to mislead a court 
as the President has done. It is obstruction of justice when the 
President used taxpayer funded resources to cover up, delay, and 
propagate misdeeds and lies. Finally, it is an abuse of power for the 
President to deliberately mislead Congress. All of these rise to the 
level of impeachable offenses.
  It is my hope that we expect the highest and best from ourselves, our 
nation and our President. Honesty is a simple concept but it is at the 
foundation of our system of justice which protects our free society and 
our free enterprise system. For these reasons, I have chosen to vote 
for articles of impeachment.
  Mr. BARCIA. Mr. Speaker, one of the greatest moments of my life was 
when I walked into this chamber, the House of Representatives, to take 
my oath of office as a Member of this elected body. I had spent my 
entire life being enthralled by the dignity and the humility of this 
special Chamber within our Capitol.
  One of the reasons I wanted to serve as a Congressman was to actively 
work to express my appreciation for what this nation means to me, and 
to be an advocate for my constituents, people who often thought that 
their government overwhelms them with demands, but fails to understand 
their needs.
  I then had another thrill in my life. I met our President. I met a 
man who cares about ordinary people. He wants children to have the best 
possible opportunities for education. He wants working men and women to 
earn a decent wage and be better prepared for an increasingly 
competitive world. He wants our senior citizens to have access to the 
health care they need, and to make sure that their Social Security is, 
indeed, secure.
  When I heard about President Clinton's involvement in an extramarital 
affair last January, I was just as shocked as any of my constituents. 
Certainly I joined the chorus of people who said ``say it isn't true.'' 
And when President Clinton said it wasn't true, I was pleased.
  But as events have unfolded over this past year, I, like so many of 
you, have been bitterly disappointed in the President's personal 
failings. He has done wrong, and he should face an appropriate penalty. 
I personally believe that the President should be censured, and I would 
support a fine.
  Mr. Speaker, since my arrival in Washington in 1993, indeed for more 
than a decade, the growing acrimony between parties and people has made 
our government increasingly powerless to attack the critical problems 
of our nation. Impeachment of this President and his ultimate removal 
from office would make that climate of anger and distrust all the more 
palpable. I weigh this decision, against the probability of this 
outcome. Those who care more about getting a person whom they 
personally dislike than they do about the ability of this government to 
solve this nation's problems have an easy decision. Those who want to 
provide a safe and prosperous future for our citizens recognize the 
excruciating nature of this decision, regardless of the outcome of 
their personal deliberation.
  There has been a wealth of learned experts who testified before the 
Judiciary Committee that the failings of the President are not crimes 
against the state. They are not a misuse of Presidential authority. 
Yes, he did mislead the American people. He offered answers that may 
have met technical legal requirements, but did not provide full 
satisfaction. But so did our leaders during wars and foreign 
negotiations. They didn't answer questions to the fullest degree. Are 
we now going to make that impeachable, or are we creating a standard 
that you can be impeached, for personal lies, not professional ones? If 
Bill Clinton truly did commit perjury, then legal authorities should be 
ready to bring charges against him when they can--the same way any 
other American can be charged with perjury. If he lied, he is not 
getting away with it.
  Did he encourage others to lie for him? The very people he was 
supposed to have suborned said that he did not. If we are to depend 
upon the factual record that the Judiciary Committee provided for us in 
which it depended upon prior statements under oath of Betty Currie and 
Monica Lewinsky, then we have to accept those statements as true. After 
all, that is what the Judiciary Committee did.
  What Bill Clinton did was wrong and I don't condone it. Since he did 
it while President, he demeaned the office of the President. Had he 
done it as a private citizen, certainly he would be subject to perjury 
charges, the same as he is now. But the story might not have been made 
the page before the classifieds in your local paper, let alone the 
front page. He may have lost some credibility with the American people, 
but he hasn't with world leaders. Ask British Prime Minister Tony Blair 
who joined the President in attacking Saddam's Iraq by committing young 
British men and women to Operation Desert Fox.
  To all of my constituents who have called and written to me with 
their strong views, I thank you from the bottom of my heart. Your 
comments have given me reassurance on many issues, and have raised 
challenges on others that made me think even harder. The people I 
represent are truly split on this issue, and I know that regardless of 
which way I vote, some will be disappointed and perhaps angered. I wish 
this were not the case, but it is the likely outcome of any divisive 
issue.
  So many have said to me to vote my conscience, and that is exactly 
what I am doing. I am disappointed in Bill Clinton and believe he 
should pay a penalty. But I do not believe that the personal failings 
of the individual meet the constitutional tests of high crimes and 
misdemeanors of the President acting in a Presidential capacity. I will 
not be surprised if my position is not the prevailing one at the end of 
this debate, but it is the right one for me.
  This is a very solemn moment in our nation's history. May God guide 
us swiftly through the difficult days ahead.
  Mr. TAYLOR of North Carolina. Mr. Speaker, this is a sad day for our 
Nation, but, unfortunately, a necessary one. The President took an oath 
to uphold all the laws of the Nation. I recognize in that many respects 
the Nation has become a morass of regulations that have the effect of 
law, which sometimes contradict each other and can confuse the average 
citizen. The Congress, to its shame has allowed such regulations to 
become so multiplied and so confusing.
  This President was not caught up in bureaucratic regulations, but has 
been charged, and an overwhelming amount of evidence has been produced, 
which proves he has violated some of the most fundamental laws 
recognized by almost every government. The President had violated 
common law and some of the first laws adopted by this country, perjury, 
suborning perjury, and obstruction of justice. He has added insult to 
our constitution by abusing his power in covering up his crimes.
  These are serious felonies for which convicted citizens are placed in 
prison and Federal public official have been and are impeached and 
expelled from office.
  I and other Member of Congress did not wish to be here today, 
however, we must fulfill

[[Page H12024]]

our constitutional oath. Serious charges, which go to the heart of our 
constitution and rule of law, were placed before the Congress. As 
required by law, we have to fulfill our oath and vote for impeachment 
to send the matter to the Senate for trial if there is sufficient 
evidence.
  It is clear that after serious and due consideration of the evidence 
presented and available that the President committed felonies of which 
he is charged. I believe that his actions of perjury, obstruction of 
justice, suborning perjury and abuse of power are of a serious nature 
and that they merit impeachment by this body and trial by the Senate. 
If they were committed by any citizen, they would be serious. When they 
have been committed by the Chief Executive Officer who functions as the 
chief law enforcement officer of the Nation, they merit impeachment by 
this body and trial by the Senate.
  Accordingly, it is my duty to the Constitution, the people of the 
United States, and to the rule of law to vote for impeachment of the 
President.
  Mr. McHUGH. Mr. Speaker, as all of America knows, on December 11 and 
23, the House Judiciary Committee approved four separate articles of 
impeachment against the President of the United States, William 
Jefferson Clinton. Today, with profound sorrow, but firm conviction, I 
cast my vote in support of Articles 1 and 2 of those charges. Articles 
3 and 4, while constituting disturbing accusations alleging obstruction 
of justice and the failure of the President to deal honestly with the 
House of Representatives in the discharge of its constitutional duties, 
do not, in my judgment, contain sufficient specificity of clear and 
unquestioned misconduct to rise to a level of an impeachable offense. 
Clearly, however, the accusations described in Article 3 strongly 
suggest activity that warrants further examination and possible legal 
action against the President following the conclusion of his current 
term of office.
  This has been the most difficult and heart-wrenching decision I have 
ever faced in my 14 years of elective office. It is a circumstance I 
never envisioned and it's certainly a choice I never sought to make. 
And yet, the honor the good people of the 24th Congressional District 
have bestowed upon me requires that I now make a judgment.
  For the past 12 months, I have watched and listened as the 
President's predicament has evolved. With each new revelation, with 
each additional shred of evidence, it has become increasingly clear 
that the President has committed grievous wrongs. Still, like most 
Americans, I wanted desperately to forgive, to heal, and to direct our 
Nation's gaze toward other challenges. Sadly, the continued failure of 
the President to face his guilt fully and honestly, in addition to the 
overwhelming body of highly credible evidence, no longer permits me 
such a course.
  To those who would say this action of impeachment is the result of 
nothing more than an admittedly unseemly, but nevertheless consensual, 
relationship between two adults, I would respond that I deeply wish it 
were so. I would much prefer to leave judgment of highly private 
transgressions to those who have been most directly harmed by them. 
While the President's indiscretions did, in fact, add to and even help 
light the path to his current legal troubles, they are not the cause of 
my decision today. In this instance, my vote is based on the fact that 
the America of today has grown from certain convictions of the past. 
Our democracy has outlived all others because, through all our 
marvelous diversity, we have always shared certain common bonds: belief 
in life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness and the recognition that 
all are created and must live equally. The binding force of our 
national ideals has always been the rule of law--the recognition that 
the passage of the tyranny of kings brought an era wherein no citizen, 
man or woman, for lack of power or position, would ever be judged 
differently from all others. For some 222 years, that irreplaceable 
belief has nurtured our freedom and our liberties. It's that belief 
that the President's actions have so directly assailed and, as such, 
requires my affirmative vote on Articles 1 and 2.
  When the President submitted a false affidavit to the courts during 
the Paula Jones case, he was going far beyond an illegal, yet somewhat 
understandable, effort to conceal an illicit affair. He was, instead, 
attempting to avoid legal responsibility for his alleged actions of 
sexual harassment of an employee during his tenure as Governor of the 
State of Arkansas. To excuse the deliberate act of falsifying testimony 
in a Federal civil rights case because the truth may have proven 
somehow embarrassing would be to lay waste to the essential tenet that 
an oath of honesty before a court requires the whole truth, no matter 
how disruptive or unfortunate its consequences. The President knowingly 
and willfully ignored this solemn duty, a failure that in America today 
has caused dozens of citizens to be incarcerated in prisons, denied of 
their liberty and rights, simply for not telling the truth.
  As tragic as this original failure was unto itself, the President 
went beyond, seeking to further obscure, conspiring to conceal. When 
the President again swore an oath of honesty before a federal grand 
jury and repeated his deceptions, he again crossed a line that cannot 
be ignored. To do so would be to say to the thousands of Americans that 
each day pledge their truthfulness in the courtrooms of this land that 
their oath is meaningless as well, and that like their President, their 
personal convenience is the superior concern. I firmly believe such a 
message would result in a dangerous and irreversible decline in the 
respect for our Nation's laws, our judicial system, and the liberties 
we rely upon them to protect.
  I realize there are those who will claim that this impeachment is but 
an attempt to secure some political advantage or revenge. Such 
assertions are wholly without foundation and in themselves seek 
political gain. In truth, the easy political path would be to turn from 
this crisis, pretending that somehow it all never occurred. But 
thoughtful people understand that, in our democracy, where the heart 
may be fooled, the head will not be deceived. The false, short-term 
sense of security that such a self-deception might produce would be 
buried under the longer term costs of a nation blind to the wrongdoings 
of its highest official.
  Through its actions today, the House seeks not to imprison or punish 
this President as we normally use these terms. Rather, we seek to 
express our outrage and dismay at his lawlessness through the sole 
means provided to us under the Constitution. Whether the President is 
held to account through a trial and possible removal from office is a 
question solely to be decided by the Senate. I, for one, would accept, 
even welcome, their mercy. But through the adoption of these articles 
of impeachment, the House of Representatives seeks to reaffirm our most 
solemn national principle that in the United States, equal treatment 
under the law requires its universal and uniform respect.
  I join those who long for a conclusion to this seemingly endless and 
trying ordeal. But, for the sake of those who will follow us, and in 
solemn respect for those who have sacrificed and gone before, that end 
must be reached in a fashion that, above all else, preserves the high 
principles and standards upon which this great Nation was built. To do 
otherwise would be to dishonor the blood that has been spilled by so 
many in pursuit and preservation of the American dream. To do otherwise 
would be to hasten the goal of so many others whose perverse objective 
is a world of tomorrow that is devoid of American honor and ideals. I 
cannot, I will not, be an accomplice to such a foul scheme.
  To the President and his family, I would say I am deeply saddened by 
your pain. I pray that you find peace and redemption from your anguish. 
In his remarks to the American people on December 11, the President 
recalled the words of Omar Khayyam, wherein he noted the futility of 
struggling to erase the failures of the past. Truly, those words hold 
much wisdom. It is important to remember, however, that especially in 
this most holy time of year, the greatest promise our faith can provide 
is that of redemption from our transgressions. The first step in that 
salvation is the acceptance of our failings. May our actions this day, 
as wrenching as they may be, hasten us up the long, difficult path to a 
higher and better place. May God bless America.
  Mrs. KELLY. Mr. Speaker, this is a sad day for me. It is a sad day 
for the country. Each of us in this body, on both sides of the aisle, 
today faces what is surely the most solemn duty of our lives; to decide 
whether it has become necessary to impeach a President of the United 
States. It is a duty, I dare say, that none of us cherish. Having spent 
considerable time listening to my district, I've heard many voices. All 
Americans struggle with the dilemma we face. The great debate is what 
to do with a popular President who has violated the very constructs of 
our safe, legal society. Ours is not a monarchy. Unfortunately, there 
is no easy way out. This is not about sex, it is about the law.
  This vote is about what kind of country we will live in from this day 
forward. It is about whether we really believe in the ``rule of law'' 
or just pretend to abide it. It is about whether we really have faith 
in the principles and mechanisms set forth by our founding fathers in 
the Constitution, or will instead choose to be guided by TV pundits and 
polls. Perhaps we would all best be guided by the words of Edmund Burke 
who, in a speech to the Electors of Bristol on November 3, 1774 said, 
``Your representative owes you, not his industry only, but his 
judgment; and he betrays instead of serving you if he sacrifices it to 
your opinion.''
  In the words of the New York Times (12/14/98), ``Mr. Clinton did lie 
repeatedly, in plain sight, while under oath.''
  Mr. Clinton is not the first President who has lied to the American 
people. He is the first in

[[Page H12025]]

modern times to perjure himself in front of a grand jury. He lied not 
to protect the safety of American soldiers, to save the Republic, nor 
to trick a foreign despot in a game of political poker. He lied to 
thwart a court proceeding, in a sad attempt to conceal.
  He broke his oath of office.
  A CEO in my district would be fired for this. An attorney in my 
district would face disbarment; a member of my staff dismissed. All 
would face prosecution.
  Should I overlook the President's crime because, as some suggest, he 
remains popular? Are we to disregard the President's perjury to spare 
the Country the agony of a Senate trial? Am I to vote against 
impeachment, thereby forgiving the President's conduct for which my 
constituents would face prosecution?
  Certainly, the President has the same right as everyone else to the 
equal and unfettered protection of our judicial system. This process we 
undergo today is about whether we will ever again be able to honestly 
say to ourselves and to our children that we live in a country where no 
one is above the law. I still believe in that country. It's not a 
perfect country. Unfortunately, there is hypocrisy, there is 
dishonesty, there is evasion of laws. These things surely exist in that 
country I believe in.
  But if by our actions today we sanction hypocrisy, if by our vote we 
ratify dishonesty, if by our vote we permit evasion of laws at the very 
highest level of our Government, then we will have forevermore 
surrendered the thing that makes us uniquely American--a free, yet 
legal, society.
  Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Speaker, as I walked from my office yesterday morning 
to this chamber, I was almost overcome by the weight of the 
responsibility thrust upon us. The idea of having to make a decision on 
the impeachment of a President is sobering and no one should approach 
it casually.
  Mr. Hyde and Mr. Gephardt both did an excellent job of framing the 
issues, but from that point it was mostly downhill. The debate 
degenerated into small sound bytes of partisan demigogery interspersed 
with infrequent moments of lucidity.
  Many talked of the inappropriateness of proceeding while our troops 
are in combat, as if we were somehow doing something to impede their 
efforts. Nonsense!
  Others, argued that the President's behavior was ``reprehensible'', 
but that censure was the appropriate punishment. No, we are not here to 
contrive novel types of punishment for the President, or even to decide 
whether he should be removed from office.
  We, in this House, are to determine whether enough evidence has been 
presented to convince us there is substantial cause to believe that the 
President has committed offenses for which he should stand trial in the 
Senate.
  This is our responsibility! No more! No less!
  One of the themes put forth by a number of speakers yesterday was, 
``He who is without sin, cast the first stone'' or `'vote'' as it were. 
If this is the criteria, there will be no impeachments, or grand jurys, 
or trial jurys, for that matter. The scripture tells us, ``All have 
sinned and come short of the glory of God.'' As I look out over this 
House I know this must be true.
  We are a group with great strengths, but also great weaknesses. We 
have virtues and flaws. We are the representatives of over 250,000,000 
Americans who themselves lack perfection.
  No, no one here claims perfection and shame on any of us who wrap our 
robes of self-righteousness around ourself and finds joy in the task 
before us.
  But perfection is not the question. The President is being judged not 
by saints but by a jury of his peers as the Constitution provides.
  The questions we must answer center narrowly around a limited number 
of legal concepts. Perjury! Obstruction of justice! Misuse of office! 
The decisions we must make should not be based upon polls, or number of 
phone calls, or political party, or even how we feel about the 
President personally.
  Our decisions should be based on the evidence alone. It is on this 
evidence I have seen presented that I will cast my vote for 
impeachment.
  Mr. STUMP. Mr. Speaker, I must rise today in support of the 
impeachment of President William Jefferson Clinton.
  Having reviewed the compelling evidence that shows our President 
intentionally lied under oath and used his position to hinder the due 
process of law, I can reach no other conclusion.
  Mr. Speaker, while my decision may be painful for the country, my 
conscience and high regard for the rule of law dictates that I support 
impeachment. I did not reach this conclusion in haste. I have carefully 
reviewed the facts of the case and consulted with my distinguished 
colleagues on the Judiciary Committee, including the esteemed Chairman, 
Henry Hyde.
  Contributing to my decision, but not dictating it, is that I received 
an overwhelming number of calls and letters from Arizonans expressing 
their profound interest in ensuring that the President is not allowed 
to enjoy a special status before the law. I talked personally with many 
of these people, They are law-abiding people who have the utmost 
respect for our laws. They know that great damage will be done to our 
justice system if we dismiss the President's actions, and they have 
urged that we not turn our backs on this matter.
  Our duty today is not pleasant and, contrary to the misguided charges 
of some of the President's supporters, no Member takes joy in what we 
must do. Mr. Speaker, I regrettably submit that we have no choice. We 
must move ahead with impeachment and hold President Clinton responsible 
for his crimes.
  Mr. JONES. Mr. Speaker, on October 1, I received a message from Mike 
Hagerty, a Retired Marine Corps Officer from my Eastern North Carolina 
District. He now works with the young people in Jacksonville, where he 
serves as a Boy Scout leader.
  Mr. Hagerty wrote:

       The Boy Scouts in my town are smart young men and they ask 
     many questions about the President. Most of the discussion 
     among our Scouts is to the effect that the President's 
     conduct is simply unacceptable.

  He then went on to write, and I quote:

       I explain to our Scouts that our current President did not 
     take the same oath that they take and retake each week. I 
     stress that, unfortunately, we hold our Scouts to a higher 
     standard than our current President. That is a bitter pill.

  Mr. Hagerty concluded his message by writing:

       Sir, I would like to ask you a favor. When the time comes 
     for the United States House of Representatives to deal with 
     the issues involving our President, please cast your vote in 
     a manner consistent with our Constitution.
       . . .There is not an elite class that is above the law; 
     there is not a clause in the Constitution that gives an 
     elected official license to conduct himself in a reckless, 
     wanton, and unlawful manner because of his popularity.

  Mr. Speaker, when I think about the letter from Mr. Hagerty, I 
realize that the decision we are making about the violation of the law 
by the President of the United States is critical to the youth of 
America. They must understand that the strength of our nation is that 
every American--no matter their status--must absolutely abide by the 
laws of this land.
  I hope, if nothing else, that we have learned from this experience 
that character and integrity are vital to maintaining a strong America.
  Mr. Speaker, today millions of teachers, parents--and even Scout 
Leaders--are watching to see whether we in Congress will ensure that 
the President of the United States is held to the same laws as everyone 
else.
  I want Mike Hagerty to be able to look those young men in the eye and 
tell them that lying under oath is not acceptable behavior, and that no 
man is above the law.
  I want him to be able to tell those Scouts that despite the fact that 
it wasn't fun, or popular, their Congressman voted to put the 
Constitution above any single politician--even the President of the 
United States.
  The young people of America must see by our vote--no matter how 
distasteful and regretful--that we are ensuring that the America of 
tomorrow will be a nation of strength, because the Congress of today 
has upheld the dictates of the Constitution.
  Mr. Speaker, as a man of faith, I will vote for the articles because 
I believe it is the right vote to ensure the strength of America for 
the next generations.
  Mr. WEYGAND. Mr. Speaker, twenty-three short months ago, I stood in 
the well of this House to take the oath of office. At that time, I 
could not imagine that during my first term I would be asked to 
consider the impeachment of the President of the United States. In 
fact, I could not imagine that I would do so at anytime during my 
career in the House. I believe that as a member of the House of 
Representatives, short of sending young men and women to risk their 
lives in battle, impeachment is the gravest vote I can make.
  More than two centuries ago, when our forefathers met to draft our 
Constitution, they were aware that from time to time extreme 
circumstances would arise in the life of the nation that would require 
the right of the people who freely elect their representatives to be 
superseded in order to protect the Union and preserve our political 
system, through the process of impeachment by the Hose of 
Representatives and removal by the United States Senate.
  Throughout the process leading us to our historic vote, members of 
Congress have heard quite often the phrase in the Constitution 
outlining which offenses are considered grave and serious enough to 
merit impeachment. As it states in the Constitution in Article II, 
Section 4, ``The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of 
the United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and 
Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and 
Misdemeanors.''

[[Page H12026]]

  At this juncture, it is critical to examine the framers' expectations 
and understandings of this important phrase. The authors of the 
Constitution carefully chose every word, phrase and punctuation and, by 
doing so, created a timeless document. The Constitution has persevered 
throughout our nation's history and has guided our republic through 
both its darkest and proudest time because of its deliberately chosen 
words.
  The phrase describing what were considered impeachable offenses took 
many shapes before final adoption. At the beginning, the phrase 
`malpractice or neglect of duty' was suggested, but shelved by the 
Committee of Detail which suggested the phrase `treason, bribery or 
corruption'. This phrase was also altered because it was too limited in 
scope and specifically mentioned certain crimes, all of which were 
official in nature. Immediately prior to the adoption of the final 
phrase. `high crimes and misdemeanors', the Constitutional Convention 
also considered the term `maladministration'. Concerns were raised that 
`maladministration' would be far too broad. By adopting the phrase 
`high crimes and misdemeanors' in lieu of `maladministration' I believe 
the framers of the Constitution were more interested in limiting the 
number and kind of offenses which are considered impeachable than 
expanding the type of transgressions deemed serious enough to warrant 
the removal of a President duly elected by the people. Each of the 
terms considered prior to the adoption of the final wording, `neglect 
of duty', `maladministration' and `corruption', referenced acts related 
to the official duties of the President not personal matters conducted 
by the President during his tenure in office.
  In addition, I believe the word `other' in the phase `treason, 
bribery and other high crimes and misdemeanors' was precisely selected 
by the authors of the Constitution (emphasis added). In my view, the 
inclusion of `other' reflects the desire of our forefathers to include 
crimes and misdemeanors akin to treason and bribery in the list of 
impeachment offenses. Without the adjective `other', the phrase would 
have another meaning entirely and would be interpreted very 
differently.
  Before us today are four articles of impeachment, two of which bring 
forth accusations of perjury, one which alleges presidential abuse of 
power and one which indicts the President for obstruction of justice.
  The first two articles, Article I and Article II, accuse the 
President of perjury in testimony given before a federal grand jury and 
during a deposition in a private civil case. Although I believe perjury 
is evident and there is a strong possibility that perjurious statements 
may have been made in both the civil deposition and before the grand 
jury, it does not reach the threshold for impeachment envisioned by our 
forefathers and authors of the Constitution. As reprehensible as this 
behavior is,I do not believe that the alleged transgressions are linked 
to his official capacity as President of the United States, and thus 
will not support these two articles of impeachment.
  Article III and Article IV allege obstruction of justice and abuse of 
presidential power. These two articles, due to their connection to the 
official duties of the President, were extremely serious charges and 
deserved intense examination. If proven, these offenses could have been 
impeachable. As one of the 31 members of my party who joined with my 
Republican colleagues on the vote to authorize the impeachment inquiry, 
I had hoped for fair and open hearings in the Judiciary Committee. To 
my dismay, that did not occur. In fact, I believe the Judiciary 
Committee failed to live up to its solemn duty and responsibility, 
under the authority of H. Res. 581 which stated that ``the Committee on 
the Judiciary . . . is authorized and directed to investigate fully and 
completely whether sufficient grounds exist for the House of 
Representatives to exercise its constitutional power to impeach William 
Jefferson Clinton, President of the United States of America.''
  The Committee, in my opinion, did not fully examine the fundamental 
questions behind the charges of abuse of power and obstruction of 
justice. The Committee did not hold the allegations up to the bright 
light needed for an ardent cross-examination. Based on evidence and 
testimony presented to the Judiciary Committee, we do not know if the 
assertions made in the report by the Office of Independent Counsel can 
be corroborated or even contradicted. No material witnesses were called 
before the committee to answer specific questions about necessary 
details to uncover the truth. As our investigatory panel, the Judiciary 
Committee did not question witnesses who held the keys to discovering 
the facts behind these serious allegations. These two articles are 
built upon an unstable foundation. None of the alleged charges, 
particularly those in Articles III and IV, are substantiated by any 
standard of proof, much less proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
  Prior to the debate today, I joined with many of my colleagues in 
urging the leadership of the House of Representatives to permit a fair 
and reasonable vote on censure. Unfortunately, they have consistently 
refused to allow such a vote. Like the vast majority of American people 
and my constituents in Rhode Island, I believe that a severe censure 
and substantial fine is the most appropriate method to punish the 
President's extremely reprehensible behavior. Censure is neither 
expressly permitted nor prohibited by the United States Constitution 
but has been used by Congress to express its opinion on public 
officials throughout the history of our nation, most notably by the 
censure of President Andrew Jackson. While later expunged by a 
subsequent Congress, his censure has stood the test of time and has not 
been erased from the history books. In fact, history will forever 
proclaim President Jackson as being censured by the Senate, which 
remains an unenviable mark on his tenure as President. There should be 
no doubt that censure is an exceptionally serious rebuke and should be 
treated as such. If censure was approved, history would indelibly stain 
this President as committing acts serious enough to earn an official 
condemnation from Congress.
  A strongly written resolution of censure and substantial monetary 
fine requiring the acceptance of the President through his signature, 
is the most appropriate form of condemnation for the President's 
reprehensible behavior.
  In Federalist 65, Alexander Hamilton writes:

       The prosecution of them (impeachable charges), for this 
     reason, will seldom fail to agitate the passions of the whole 
     community, and to divide it into parties more or less 
     friendly or inimical to the accused. In many cases it will 
     connect itself with the pre-existing factions, and will 
     enlist all their animosities, partialities, influence, and 
     interest on one side or the other; and in such cases there 
     will always be the greatest danger that the decision will be 
     regulated more by the comparative strength of parties than by 
     the real demonstrations of innocence or guilt.

  And so, two hundred and eleven years later, we find ourselves exactly 
where Mr. Hamilton said we would be. The President engaged in extremely 
reprehensible and inappropriate behavior with a subordinate. He lied to 
his wife and his daughter, his friends, staff, the court, and most of 
all to the American people. The President's actions were wrong, immoral 
and reckless. But, Mr. Hamilton was right. The charges have divided the 
nation. Congress is divided amongst ``parties and pre-existing 
factions''. The President's fate is not being decided on the facts but 
rather based on partisonship.
  We are a nation led by our President carrying the flag of our 
country, the banner of principles of our people. He has been wounded by 
his own wrongdoing. But to abandon him or another for political reasons 
would be abandoning the very principles upon which the country was 
founded, a doctrine of fairness and justice for all. We cannot and must 
not tolerate or accept a system that dismantles the very foundation of 
our republic and this action today unfortunately sends such a signal.
  The role of the House of Representatives in the impeachment process 
is not to be abused nor is it to be taken lightly. A vote for 
impeachment is by far one of the gravest and most challenging votes for 
any Congress and for any member. I urge my colleagues, on both sides of 
the aisle, to listen to your conscience, to realize the gravity of your 
vote and to realize that at the end of the day, you can act in a fair 
and reasonable manner and disprove Mr. Hamilton's theory that the House 
of Representatives is incapable of acting justly. For to impeach the 
president for the charges as outlined in these Articles would be to 
affirm the partisanship feared by Mr. Hamilton, and how sad a 
commentary that is for our Congress and our country.
  Mr. PASCRELL. Mr. Speaker, I have not to this point formally 
announced how I would vote on these four articles of impeachment. In 
reaching my decision, I have weighed not only my constitutional duty 
and this President's fate, but I have weighed what vote is the right 
one for the country at this time.
  I have concluded that this President can and should continue in 
office for the remainder of his elected term.
  In making my decision, I have looked carefully at the words of our 
Framers, particularly the founder of my hometown of Paterson, New 
Jersey, Alexander Hamilton.
  In Federalist No. 65, Hamilton not only outlined what offenses rise 
to the level of impeachment. He also left us a clear, unambiguous 
warning against the dangers of unruly partisanship in this process.
  Hamilton spoke of offenses that are an ``abuse or violation of some 
PUBLIC trust,'' and ones that ``relate chiefly to injuries done 
immediately to the society itself.''
  The President's misdeeds, as wrong as they are, were NOT acts against 
the society as a whole. In fact, he was exonerated of any wrongdoing 
that fit that definition.
  In that same passage, Hamilton stated that a partisan impeachment 
``threatened to agitate the passions of the whole community . . . to

[[Page H12027]]

divide it into parties . . . to connect itself with pre-existing 
factions . . . and to enlist their animosities, partialities, influence 
and interest.''
  Ironically, our colleague on the other side, Mr. Linder, echoed 
Hamilton's warning just a few months ago, saying, ``One party cannot 
impeach the other party's President.''
  Well, this is exactly what has happened in this body. This process 
has been driven solely by those in one party--the majority party--the 
very path Hamilton told us to avoid.
  No one has denied that the President acted in a manner unbecoming of 
the high office he is privileged to hold.
  His actions are NOT, however, offenses that rise to the level of 
treason, bribery or other ``high crimes and misdemeanors.''
  In short, these are reprehensible acts for which the President should 
surely be punished. That punishment should fit his misdeeds. Censure is 
the appropriate penalty, but we have been denied this option by those 
driving this process for fear they will not extract the ``pound of 
flesh'' they seek.
  My colleagues, I urge you as you cast your vote to look to history 
and the real facts in this case, and to look beyond partisan interests 
as the Constitution requires, and vote ``no'' on these articles of 
impeachment.
  Mr. LaFALCE. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong opposition to all four of 
the pending articles of impeachment for the following reasons.
  First, I believe the investigation by the Independent Counsel which 
has led us to this point has been a tainted and politicized process 
designed to produce a political, not a legal or Constitutional result.
  Second, if this House is to impeach the President, the burden of 
proof to establish clear and convincing evidence of wrongdoing rests 
with us. It is a burden the Republican majority has not sustained.
  Third, the articles of impeachment before us do not specifically and 
meaningfully cite any conduct that remotely rises to the level of an 
impeachable offense: ``Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and 
Misdemeanors.''
  Fourth, passage of this resolution will subject this country to a 
Senate trial that the vast majority of Members in this House, and a 
vast majority of our citizens, do not believe will result in conviction 
or removal of this President. Indeed, there are Members voting for this 
resolution precisely because they expect the Senate will not convict 
the President. That constitutes a cynical manipulation of an important 
constitutional process to a petty political end.
  Finally, it is fundamentally unfair that the Republican Leadership 
will not permit a vote on censure as an alternative to impeachment. At 
the very least, the Republican leadership, and especially so-called 
moderate Republicans who, for whatever reasons, have decided to vote 
for impeachment themselves, should give Members the option of 
presenting an alternative censure resolution on the floor of the House. 
Let us vote our conscience. If they do not, they can never again be 
called fair and just individuals.
  The President has admitted wrongful and reprehensible conduct. I was 
the first in this institution to call for a censure of him for his 
misleading of the American public. I believe that remains the 
appropriate response--a response that the vast majority of the American 
people can and do endorse. Further, the President has not only 
acknowledged the wrongfulness of what he has done, he has apologized 
repeatedly, indicated a willingness to take the appropriate 
consequences of his conduct, and sought forgiveness. he is also subject 
to legal prosecution for any alleged offenses, as he should be. But 
what he has done does not come close to ``Treason, Bribery, or other 
high Crimes and Misdemeanors'' which the Framers intended to be the 
tough and exacting standards those seeking impeachment must meet.


                        the starr investigation

  There is clearly an abuse of power in this case, and behavior by 
someone in authority that strikes at the heart of our legal and 
political system. But it is the behavior of the Independent Counsel 
that is the abuse of power, and it is his conduct that is the most 
threatening to our republic. To quote a respected journalist writing in 
one of my local papers, what we have in Ken Starr is a ``self-
righteous, underhanded prosecutor dedicated to destroying someone,'' 
and ``a man willing to deploy the full resources of federal 
government's investigative and police powers'' to do so. It is this 
man, and the biased case he has put forward, on which the Republican 
majority is willing to rely.
  I strongly believe that the Independent Counsel has not conducted an 
impartial investigation of a possible crime, as is his duty under the 
law. Instead, we have been subjected to a partisan investigation by a 
man in search of a crime. Ken Starr has conducted a biased inquiry 
designed to produce a pre-ordained result.
  After four years and the expenditure of tens of millions of dollars, 
Ken Starr was able to find nothing whatsoever that would subject the 
President to criminal liability regarding those issues that were within 
his purview--i.e., Whitewater, ``travelgate'', or misuse of FBI files. 
Yet Starr decided not to issue any report on those issues, and 
deliberately said nothing exculpatory until after the November 
election. Failing to come up with any criminal conduct on these 
potentially substantive issues, he has been forced to try to make an 
impeachment case out of very misleading statements about conduct which, 
however reprehensible and inexcusable, should have remained what it 
was--a private matter between consenting adults.
  In passing the Independent Counsel statute, the intent of the 
Congress was to create a mechanism to ensure that anyone who 
investigated the President or a Cabinet official be of the highest 
ethical standards, completely impartial, free of conflicts of interest, 
and respectful of his own legal obligations and the rights of others. 
What we have instead in Ken Starr is a man of unseemly zeal in search 
of any excuse that might suffice to bring down a President. Let me 
review some of the conduct that brings me to that unfortunate 
conclusion.

  Ken Starr used information from Linda Tripp that he knew she had 
obtained in violation of the law, and in fact encouraged her to further 
violate the law to obtain more information. He set up a sting operation 
with Monica Lewinsky, threatened her with twenty-seven years in prison 
and the indictment of her mother if she failed to cooperate, 
trivialized her Constitutional rights, and suggested he would deny her 
a grant of immunity if she exercised her right to call a lawyer. He 
grilled Ms. Lewinsky for ten hours without her being represented by 
counsel, and attempted to wire her in an effort to entrap the President 
or his aides.
  When Starr asked the Attorney General for jurisdiction to extend his 
inquiry to encompass the President's relationship with Monica Lewinsky, 
he withheld critical information relevant to the Attorney General's 
assessment of his request. He had long been working in concert with 
Paula Jones' attorneys, conduct which necessarily suggested a clear 
bias, but he failed to disclose that fact. Starr was contacted several 
times by Mrs. Jones' lawyer to discuss constitutional issues related to 
her suit against President Clinton and provided such assistance. In 
fact, Starr considered helping Mrs. Jones by joining in a friend-of-
the-court brief.
  Ken Starr's report repeats and exaggerates any conceivable evidence 
of wrongdoing, but egregiously omits any exculpatory evidence. It is 
not, as Congress intended, an even-handed report. In fact, no one can 
even claim it is even-handed. Ken Starr has crossed the line and moved 
from being an objective and impartial investigator to being a clear 
advocate for impeachment. His conduct in this regard has been so 
excessive and inappropriate that his own ethics adviser, Sam Dash, has 
charged Starr with abuse of his office and resigned.
  Ken Starr's actions are not now, and have never been, the actions of 
a man engaged in an impartial investigation. His conduct is the conduct 
of a zealot with a diabolical obsession--bringing down the President of 
the United States. It is Ken Starr's conduct that is frightening and 
threatening to the rule of law. And this is the man on which the 
Republican majority has chosen to rely to make their case for 
impeachment.


                          the burden of proof

  If the Legislative Branch is to impeach the President, I believe it 
must meet a high standard and establish clear and convincing evidence 
of an impeachable offense.
  Impeachment is not a slap on the wrist. It is not just a different 
way to censure the President for wrongful conduct of which we 
disapprove. It is one of the most significant and momentous steps that 
the House can take. It is the first step in the removal of a sitting 
President from office and the reversal of the results of an election. 
And it is being taken in defiance of the will of the majority of the 
public which has been, and remains, clearly in opposition to the 
impeachment and removal of this President on the basis of the facts 
thus far presented.
  The members of both parties have a responsibility to be judicious in 
what we do here today. This should not be a partisan proceeding. There 
should be no impeachment unless there is clear and convincing evidence 
of conduct that clearly constitutes the equivalent of a high crime and 
misdemeanor. This is too important to be a close call.
  Impeachment is neither a purely legal nor a purely political act. It 
requires a judicious balancing of both legal and political judgment. 
But if the action we take is to be judicious and defensible not only 
today, but in the eyes of history, certain parameters are clear. We 
should only impeach for a grave offense of a public nature. We should 
only impeach when the evidence is so strong and the conduct so clearly 
within the parameters of what the Constitution intends that the 
resolution to impeach can pass by a sizable and bipartisan majority. We 
should only impeach if the American public supports impeachment, or at 
the very least is ambivalent--certainly not when the vast majority of 
the American public is opposed.

[[Page H12028]]

  And we should not impeach in a lame duck session of the Congress when 
votes are being cast by many Members who have been defeated and/or will 
not return. In fact, some argue such action is unconstitutional. 
Whatever the merits of that argument, such action is clearly 
unnecessary. There is no need or justification for us to take this 
important action in such haste.
  Finally, we should only proceed if there are reasonable grounds for 
believing the evidence is such that the Senate might reasonably move to 
convict. Few believe the Senate will muster the 2/3 vote necessary to 
convict. It is the worst kind of cynicism to put the country through 
the trauma of a trial in the Senate in the face of a high probability 
that the impeachment process will end without conviction.
  If there is a real desire for bipartisanship in this context, it 
would be reasonable to look to what the elder statesmen of the 
Republican party are suggesting. Both Republican former President 
Gerald Ford, who knows something about impeachment, and Republican 
presidential candidate Senator Robert Dole, who lost to President 
Clinton in the most recent election believes censure, not impeachment, 
is the appropriate option.


          failure to identify and prove an impeachable offense

  What, indeed, are we supposed to be impeaching the President for? I 
have read the reports and followed the hearings. But I believe I am not 
alone in being unable to answer that question. Certainly my Republican 
colleagues have not answered it.
  The Constitution very clearly prescribes the grounds for 
impeachment--treason, bribery or other high crimes and misdemeanors. If 
Congress wants to violate the spirit of the Constitution, we can 
impeach for almost anything. But if we want our action to be in keeping 
with both Constitutional spirit and history, our authority is limited 
to conduct that rises to the high level indicated. The Framers clearly 
believed that impeachment was intended to redress seriously wrongful 
public conduct, and requires a very high and very clear standard 
because impeachment nullifies the popular will.
  Some would impeach because the President allegedly violated his oath 
of office. That is far too vague and ambiguous a charge for anyone to 
seriously argue it rises to the level of an impeachable offense. What 
is required is a high crime that is comparable to treason or bribery. 
Assuming that the worst charges against the President are true and 
convincing, his alleged misconduct does not rise to that level.
  Indeed, there is not clear and persuasive proof that the President 
committed any crimes. Those who would impeach the President have tended 
to use important words cavalierly and interchangeably as if they have 
fungible content. Words have meaning, they are the skins of living 
thoughts. To mislead, to lie, to perjure oneself are all, in varying 
but important degrees, wrong. But to mislead is not necessarily to lie, 
to lie is not necessarily to perjure. Unfortunately, words can be and 
have been used interchangeably and carelessly, leading to obfuscation 
or confusion. Some who favor impeachment have too frequently used them 
to manipulate rather than to clarify.
  Some believe that the President committed perjury. I believe 
responsible people can disagree about where to draw the line on what 
does or does not constitute perjury. But there is widespread agreement 
that few prosecutors would bring a case on the factual basis we have 
before us today, let alone be able to convict anyone on these grounds.
  There are two articles of impeachment that allege perjury, one 
incident in the context of the Paula Jones deposition, the other in the 
context of the grand jury deposition. Yet the Republican majority has 
repeatedly refused to pinpoint exactly what statements constitute 
perjury or elements of perjury. In the Paula Jones case, there is clear 
evidence of obvious confusion on the part of the attorneys and the 
judge about the definition of sex, and concern that its use would make 
it harder to get at the truth. If the attorneys and the judge were 
confused, is it inconceivable that the President was confused as well? 
Are we going to impeach a President over a definition he used that 
accorded with the definition of every dictionary I am aware of--i.e., 
``intercourse?''
  The other purported perjury, that in the grand jury testimony, is 
that the President said he abided by his testimony in the Paula Jones 
case. Does anyone seriously believe that response rises to the level of 
a crime against the state?
  Some suggest that there are precedents where individuals have been 
impeached for perjury, and cite the impeachment of judges. However, in 
those cases perjury was the gravamen of, not peripheral to, the charges 
brought against the individuals. More importantly, I believe different 
constitutional standards apply in regard to the impeachment of judges 
than pertain for the impeachment of the President. First, judges are 
appointed for life, by one individual. They are not elected for a 
finite term by the people of the United States. Secondly, the 
Constitution says, with regard to judges, that they ``shall hold their 
offices during good behavior.'' That is a much lower constitutional 
standard, and far easier to meet.
  The specifics of our legal system and its procedures are not always 
easy to understand or appreciate. But I believe all Americans 
understand that, in this country, we operate under a rule of law, and 
every citizen--even the President--is innocent until proven guilty. No 
one is obligated to admit guilt, or to assist the prosecutor to convict 
him. It is expected and proper for a witness to be cautious under oath, 
to keep his counsel, to give away as little as possible. Any citizen 
would and should do the same. Yet some would impeach the President for 
exercising his most basic legal rights.
  As for abuse of power and obstruction of justice charges, I believe 
they are specious on their face. There are charges of witness 
tampering, of hiding evidence. But those are disputed charges, and 
there is evidence on the record that calls their legitimacy into 
question. There is no proof whatsoever that the President tampered with 
witnesses or attempted to hide evidence. We cannot impeach on the basis 
of unproven charges. To suggest that written responses prepared by the 
President's attorneys to a congressional committee that the committee 
deems inadequate constitute an abuse of power is so frivolous as not to 
merit further comment. Indeed, such charges are themselves an abuse of 
congressional power, or at the very least, a cavalier, indiscriminate 
use of such powers.


                               Conclusion

  Assuming, for the sake of argument, the sincerity of those who want 
to impeach the President--and that is in some cases a hard assumption 
to make--shouldn't they permit those who sincerely disagree but believe 
some punishment is appropriate, the right to pursue the alternative 
they believe is legitimate--i.e., a resolution of censure? That would 
allow all Members to vote their consciences on this important issue. 
The rights of those who would impeach would not be infringed--they 
could simply vote ``no'' on a censure resolution.
  But the Republican majority will not allow that option, because they 
are afraid it would pass. Instead, they are forcing Members who have 
serious doubts about impeachment but believe some serious punishment is 
appropriate to choose between impeachment and nothing.
  The Republican majority has taken what should be an historic vote on 
an issue of conscience and trivialized it into political gamesmanship. 
On a vote of this import, that conduct is unconscionable. I will vote 
against the resolution.
  Ms. McCARTHY of Missouri. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to H.R. 
611, the four articles of impeachment against President William 
Jefferson Clinton. I do strongly support the motion to recommit so that 
censure of the President, a fair and bipartisan compromise, can be 
debated. To deny us the right to vote on censure is to deny us the 
right to express the truth of our conscience, and to deny the will of 
the majority of Americans who want Congress to censure the President, 
not impeach him.
  I have carefully studied the evidence and arguments presented to the 
Judiciary Committee and have concluded that the articles of impeachment 
drafted by the Committee do not meet the impeachment threshold 
established by the framers as specifically outlined in our 
Constitution. Article II, Section 4 of the Constitution of the United 
States provides that the House of Representatives ``shall remove from 
office [the President] on impeachment for treason, bribery or other 
high crimes and misdemeanors.'' My interpretation of the intent of the 
framers is that the phrase ``other high crimes and misdemeanors'' is 
limited to acts with the magnitude and gravity of the crimes of treason 
and bribery, crimes that do direct harm to the institutions of our 
government. Perhaps to avert use of impeachment in a partisan effort to 
derail a political agenda, Alexander Hamilton wrote that an impeachable 
offense is of the nature ``which may with peculiar propriety be 
denominated political, as they relate chiefly to injuries done 
immediately to the society itself.'' The Judiciary Committee has not 
demonstrated that the President has so subverted our Constitution and 
threatened our system of government as to corrupt our Republic.
  I do support a strong and punitive censure resolution of the 
President for his reprehensible actions. It is unfair to deny America's 
Representatives in Congress the opportunity to take positive action on 
a bipartisan compromise of censure. Censure is warranted, appropriate, 
and would not undo two national elections nor preclude future legal 
action that a federal prosecutor could undertake or judgment a court 
could find when the President returns to the private sector. In 
addition, the President will face the judgment of history just

[[Page H12029]]

as we in the Congress will be judged by this defining moment.
  I urge all of my colleagues to vote to recommit H.R. 611, the 
articles of impeachment, and support a motion to censure. By not 
achieving the threshold established in the Constitution's Article II, 
Section 4, we will have failed in our duty to preserve and protect the 
law of our land.
  Mr. LaTOURETTE. Mr. Speaker, it is not our job to determine if the 
president is guilty of being a philanderer, a coward, a sinner, or even 
a liar.
  This issue is not whether he was unfaithful but whether he was 
unfaithful to our laws, and our Constitution. No president, even a 
popular one, has the right to cheat on the most sacred document in the 
world.
  For those who favor a censure that amounts to nothing more than a 
verbal spanking, how do we adequately rebuke a man who insists he's 
done nothing wrong, who flaunts the law and wants to manipulate the 
Constitution?
  The law does recognize that a lesser penalty should apply to those 
with remorse and a contrite spirit, but there is none.
  There cannot be two standards under the law, just as there cannot be 
a geographically desirable place to lie under oath. The law does not 
pause, even if you are the President of the United States.
  If we can court-martial members of our military and subject them to 
50 years of jail time for lying under oath to cover up sexual 
indiscretions, should the punishment be nothing for a president or any 
other citizen of this land? We cannot reconcile that which makes no 
sense.
  Sometimes in this life somebody has to not just be the adult, but the 
bigger adult. Our president refuses to go down that path.
  He allowed a casual workplace flirtation to go to a place it never 
should have gone, and then acted as if he was somehow victimized.
  He put our country through months of denials and defiance and 
outright lies. He knew the stakes and the consequences of lying under 
oath, and then did so anyway.
  I gave this president every benefit of the doubt. I remain stunned by 
his inability and refusal to place the country first.
  Lying under oath is not nothing. Perjury is not nothing. As a 
prosecutor, I sent people to jail for this crime.
  I would give anything to be elsewhere today, to not have to cast this 
vote. Our President left us, left me, with no other option.
  Mr. President, you gave into your shame. I refuse to do the same.
  While partisan politics makes an easy foil for the predicament 
President Clinton finds himself, it cannot be blamed.
  When the spin and partisan hostility fade, I am confident that 
history will reveal that President Clinton was the master of his own 
demise in both words and deeds.
  Ms. RIVERS. Mr. Speaker, I do not approve of nor defend, the behavior 
of the president that has brought us here. I have no interest in 
helping him avoid the legal consequences of those acts. However, I have 
every interest in making sure those consequences are constitutional.
  The constitution tells us a President can only be impeached and 
removed by Congress for treason, bribery and other high crimes and 
misdemeanors. The founding fathers were clear that the careful balance 
of powers between the branches could be altered in only the most 
extraordinary circumstances.
  Alexander Hamilton in The Federalist #65 argued that impeachment is 
meant to address ``the misconduct of public men,'' ``the violation of 
some public trust,'' or ``to address injuries done immediately to the 
society itself.''
  Wooddeson, a legal scholar whose writings in 1777 were nearly 
contemporaneous with the drafting of the constitution, and whose views 
on English impeachment provided the foundation for much of the 
impeachment discussion in Jefferson's Manual spoke to the use of 
impeachment to prosecute ``magistrates and officers instrusted with the 
administration of public affairs [who] abuse their delegated powers to 
the extension detriment of the community, and. . . in a manner not 
properly cognizable before ordinary tribunals.''
  The standards set forth by the founding fathers remain vital and 
immutable--we are not free to add to the list of impeachable offenses, 
no matter how worthy our additions.
  Just last year in Clinton v. Jones--in a 9-0 decision, the Supreme 
Court referred to the historical standard for impeachment when it 
quoted James Wilson--delegate to both the Philadelphia and Pennsylvania 
conventions--who said ``that although the President is placed on high, 
not a single privilege is annexed to his character; far from being 
above the laws, he is amenable to them in his private character as a 
citizen and in his public character by impeachment.'' The justices go 
on to say that ``with respect to acts taken in his ``public 
character''. . . that is official acts. . . the President may be 
disciplined, principally by impeachment. . . But he is otherwise 
subject to the laws for his purely private acts.''
  As you probably recall, the Supreme Court allowed Ms. Jones lawsuit 
was allowed to go forward expressly because it was the personal, 
private conduct of the President that was at issue. The conduct before 
us is the same.
  The history is clear and so is our duty. The behavior at issue here--
if proven--are punishable in the Courts. They are not, however, of the 
``public'' character necessary to rise to the level of impeachable 
offenses.
  I will vote no--not because I believe the President should be able to 
avoid the legal consequences ordinary Americans would face in similar 
circumstances, but because I believe he should face exactly the same 
consequences: trial in a court of law. This outcome does not subvert 
the law, as the majority argues, but in fact, observes the law as the 
Constitution demands. The founding fathers, more than 200 years ago, 
and the Supreme Court, just last year, laid out the course we must 
follow.
  The Constitution must be our guide. The wrath that the citizens of 
this country delivered upon us when we shut down the government will be 
nothing compared to what will happen if we rape the Constitution.
  Mr. LoBIONDO. Mr. Speaker, voting for the articles of impeachment 
will be one of the most difficult votes I will cast in my career. I 
cannot think of anything more serious for myself and the nation. I have 
put more effort into this decision than any other I have made in 
elected office. I have spoken personally with hundreds of constituents, 
read mountains of correspondence, and carefully listened to legal 
arguments on both sides of the issue.
  The President has an obligation set out in Article II, Section 3 of 
the Constitution to ``take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.'' 
The President is the Nation's chief law enforcement officer who 
appoints the Attorney General and nominates all federal judges 
including the Supreme Court. I cannot in good conscience allow the 
President to violate the law and his Constitutional duty without 
consequence.
  I have come to my decision after a long and careful consideration of 
the facts. These facts have not been disputed. There is clear and 
convincing evidence that the President broke the law. The laws he broke 
are serious enough to warrant impeachment. Specifically, the evidence 
demonstrates that the President committed perjury and perjury is a 
felony punishable by up to five years in prison. If Congress chose to 
ignore the President's actions, we would set the dangerous precedent 
that some are above the law. But the truth is no one is above the law, 
and everyone has an obligation to uphold the law no matter how 
personally uncomfortable compliance might be.
  If the House ultimately decides to approve one or more impeachment 
articles, the Constitution charges the Senate with the responsibility 
to decide what proper action should be taken. I hope they act 
expeditiously and I will abide by their decision. This has been an 
extremely wearisome experience for the country and it is in everybody's 
best interest to bring closure soon.
  Mr. FOSSELLA. Mr. Speaker, over the past few months I have reviewed, 
in some instances more than once, the evidence in this case in an 
objective and dispassionate manner.
  Perjury, or lying under oath, is a felony. As evidence, there are 
American citizens in jail today because they did not tell the truth, 
the whole truth and nothing but the truth in a court of law. The 
foundation of our legal system is premised upon the rule that when any 
citizen raises his or her hand and swears to tell the truth, he or she 
will tell the truth.
  In my community, as in every community throughout our nation, juries 
have reaffirmed that fundamental principle. Today in New York due to a 
felony conviction: A Police Officer would lose his job, lose his 
pension and go to jail; an attorney would face automatic disbarment and 
go to jail; and a captain in the United States Army could be subject to 
court martial and go to jail.
  In reviewing the evidence, it became clear and convincing to me that 
the President lied under oath in a civil proceeding and in testifying 
before a Federal Grand Jury. In this case I believe there is sufficient 
evidence that William Jefferson Clinton committed perjury and abused 
the office of the Presidency. Accordingly, I will take the only course 
of action that the United States Constitution has mandated me to do--I 
will vote for impeachment and let the United State Senate conduct a 
trial to determine the ultimate outcome.
  I understand that this decision may not sit well with some people. 
And I appreciate that many Americans have take the time to voice their 
opinions. But, it is my firm belief that I must do what I believe is 
right. Indeed, there are those who acknowledged that the President has 
committed a felony, yet will not summon the courage to vote to move 
this matter to the Senate for trial. I cannot defend the indefensible 
and maintain a clear conscience. I

[[Page H12030]]

cannot in good conscience justify a vote against impeachment.
  The integrity of the judicial system and the rule of law must be 
maintained regardless of who comes before it. We cannot ignore the rule 
of law for the President, but apply it to the ordinary citizen.
  Our founding fathers and many of our ancestors escaped the tyranny 
where the King was law. Millions have fought, hundreds of thousands 
have died and many are fighting today, far from our shores, to preserve 
the freedom and rule of law that we enjoy. This vote is cast to 
preserve the notion for our children and future generations of 
Americans yet unborn that in the United States of America the law is 
King.
  Mr. LAZIO of New York. Mr. Speaker, after accompanying the President 
as he returned home from the Middle East, I return to the House of 
Representatives to vote on authorizing his trial of impeachment in the 
Senate. Aloft in Air Force One I was deeply impressed once again by the 
Presidency itself, a great and stable institution that transcends even 
the finest men who have occupied the office. Through some may add to it 
and others may subtract from it, the office remains imperturbable 
because it represents not only the Nation but the constitutional order.
  I bear no animus for Bill Clinton. I have no grudge against him. Nor 
would I consider removing a President from office because of partisan 
differences. For one thing, the President has on many occasions adopted 
Republican positions, and on various subjects his political outlook is 
congenial to mine. For another, his replacement should he be removed 
from office or resign would be the Vice President, a man who has been 
less aligned with my party's views.
  This is neither a personal nor a partisan decision. Its difficulty 
lies in the rare but important conflict between what is expedient in 
the short term and what resonates as a guiding principle for time with 
no limit. It is not about the fate of one man, but the value of truth 
itself, the principle that no man, no matter how rich or powerful, is 
above the law. It is about the notion of accountability, and about 
dealing straight and keeping one's word.
  Public ethics and the truth must be partners. A leader who tells the 
truth no matter what the cost to him is a leader who puts the interests 
of the country before his own, and thus with these priorities, has the 
power of moral suasion. He is able to call upon a vast reservoir of 
public esteem to marshal the people for great things and in defense of 
essential principles. And great leaders do not arise without this 
understanding clearly in mind. They are recruited by expectations, and 
their repayment for the trust the people vest in them is their 
integrity.
  Duty. Honor. Trust. Sacrifice. These are the qualities that, for the 
sake of people they had never known and the principles formulated 
centuries before their births, enabled millions of American soldiers to 
put their lives on the line in far-off lands and in horrific moments. 
If they could do so then, at the price of their lives, then it should 
not be difficult now to tell the truth or vote according to the 
dictates of conscience even if it means the end of one's career. And 
that is what I will do. With the greatest respect and humility for 
those who made far more difficult decisions and at a far greater price, 
I will simply abide by what I think is right, without political 
calculation.
  And what do I think is right in this case? When I was a Suffolk 
County prosecutor my entire duty was based on the integrity and conduct 
of the men and women who took an oath to tell the truth. In many cases 
it was difficult for these people to testify honestly, sometimes it was 
even disastrous. But when they were sworn-in they understood that this 
was different, that here the truth was required, that it was almost 
holy, that upon their respect for their oath would ride many things, 
including the functioning of the system of justice, the existence of a 
government of laws, the equality of one citizen with another, and, not 
least, their own honor. These were ordinary people. They understood. In 
many cases, they sacrificed. In many cases, they suffered. But they 
told the truth.
  If an anonymous citizen, with no reward for his actions other than 
the knowledge that he has done right, can abide by his oath, what about 
a President, upon whom someday the light of history will shine? We have 
strengthened the office and given the President immense power and 
privilege not only with the expectation that he will be scrupulously 
honest but also with the thought of helping him to be so. Unlike the 
ordinary citizen, his decisions are insulated and he is protected. And 
history is poised to look kindly on him for every instance in which he 
sacrifices for the sake of the nation he leads, for every instance in 
which he chooses forthrightness rather than obfuscation: in short, for 
his character.
  Therefore, when a President fails in his duty as an ordinary citizen 
does not, the failure is catastrophic. Shall less be expected of the 
President than of you or me? It has always been that we expect and 
deserve of the President a great deal more. Nor is the case in question 
a private matter. For a high school principal, a corporate executive, a 
military officer, or anyone else, it would not be a private matter. 
Here, the trustee of the greatest of world powers knows that he will be 
in a sworn legal proceeding, consults with advisers (including 
taxpayer-paid White House lawyers) for many months, has full notice, 
appears voluntarily before a criminal grand jury (though only due to 
the existence of incontrovertible evidence), and still cannot bring 
himself to do what the Government he heads insists every day that we 
all do--tell the truth.
  For me, the turning point was the President's written response to the 
81 questions posed by the Judiciary Committee. The only thing required 
of him was the truth. The questions were submitted with the hope and 
expectation that he would put the interests of the country and the 
constitution before his own, that he would cease the very elaborate 
game that he had long been playing, that he would tell the truth and 
reclaim the honor and dignity of the Presidency. But he did not.
  What choice is there, then? What choice is there when the President's 
own witnesses before the Judiciary Committee claim that he has 
``disgraced the Presidency'' and acted without morals? His own lawyer 
testified that the President, having taken the oath that promises ``the 
truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth,'' gave an answer that 
amounted to a ``false denial.'' And the President continues to profess 
that ``false denials'' are not lies. This is a catastrophic abdication 
of ethical leadership and a grave departure from our most fundamental 
practices.
  I have chosen my course, and will vote for impeachment, to hammer 
home as best I can that we must continue to insist that no one is above 
the law and that the truth must be told. We simply cannot tolerate 
dishonesty in the heart of our Government. This is what I was brought 
up to believe, and I believe it still.
  Ms. ESHOO. Mr. Speaker, today, December 19, 1998, is a day of infamy 
in the House of Representatives. I believe history will record that on 
this day, the House of the People, through searing partisanship, 
disallowed the right of each Member to express his or her own 
conscience. Today, only votes on impeachment are allowed.
  A flawed case was brought forward by the House Judiciary Committee. I 
say ``flawed'' because the Framers' intent for removal of the Chief 
Executive was set at the highest level--treason, bribery, and high 
crimes against the people. The President's actions, morally wrong as I 
judge them, do not meet this constitutional standard.
  The lessons of history--1868 and 1974 are instructive. Today, our 
Chamber, in 1998, mirrors the 1868 experience wherein the highly 
partisan action of the Congress ripped at the fabric of our nation and 
weakened the Constitution and the Presidency for decades.
  The 1974 experience differed in that the evidence brought forward and 
the deliberations were highly bipartisan--some even say nonpartisan. 
And importantly, the people of our Nation agreed with the actions 
Congress took.
  I believe that censure is not barred by the Constitution. The 
Constitution and the Federalist Papers are silent on censure. Hundreds 
of scholars have spoken on this. Why would the Republican majority so 
fear a vote being allowed and taken in the House today?
  Impeachment of the President is the constitutional equivalent of the 
death penalty. But the rule of law--a principle so often invoked in the 
debate--also relies on proportionality. And impeachment of the 
President for moral laxity is beyond the proportionality of what the 
President has done and the punishment deserved.
  The citizens of our nation do not support impeachment. Almost half 
the Congress does not support impeachment. Without clear consensus in 
our Nation, without critical bipartisanship in this House, without 
proportionality relative to the rule of law, and without a clear case 
that can withstand the scrutiny of history, we stand on a slippery 
slope, and I believe our Nation is placed in jeopardy.
  Mr. Speaker, our flag is the symbol of our Nation but the 
Constitution is the soul of our Nation.
  Today we tear at the soul of our Nation.
  There is no doubt that by his actions Bill Clinton has brought shame 
as President. But today this body has set itself on a treacherous 
course of both weakening the Presidency and diminishing the 
Constitution. This action in 1998 I believe will haunt us in history 
just as 1868 did.
  Mrs. CUBIN. Mr. Speaker, after weeks of soul-searching, hearing from 
the people of Wyoming, and a thorough review of the evidence, I have 
reached a painful decision which I realize will severely impact our 
country and bring humiliation to another human being. At this crucial 
time, however, we have to put the good of the Republic, the integrity 
of the Constitution, and the rule of law above all else to protect the 
future of the United States America. For this reason, I will vote to 
impeach the President.
  This is an awesome responsibility that none of us take lightly, 
certainly not me.

[[Page H12031]]

  Perjury, obstruction of justice, and abuse of power undermine the 
basis of our judicial system, our system of laws, thereby undermining 
the very foundation of this great country.
  I recognize the profound effect my vote will have on the future of 
our democracy and most importantly, the effect and impact it will have 
on the future of our children. It may well be the most important vote I 
ever cast during my years of public service.
  I want you to know I have prayed for guidance every day. After 
examining all the material, watching the hearings, listening to the 
testimony and to the President, and making myself familiar with all the 
information I can, I have come to the sad conclusion that I must vote 
for all four proposed articles of impeachment against the President of 
the United States. In my view, there is no doubt the President's 
actions warrant impeachment and a subsequent trial in the Senate.
  None of us are perfect, and we can all be forgiven for what we do in 
life. However, forgiveness does not negate the fact that every action 
we take in life has consequences. President Clinton is not just our 
head of state. He is the most powerful public servant in the country, 
probably the world. He took an oath to uphold the Constitution and the 
laws of our land. The American people are right to hold him to this 
high standard, and the Congress is right to uphold the Constitution 
when the President fails to do so.
  I implore the President to resign in order to spare the country and 
the people of America the painful and embarrassing experience of going 
through further impeachment proceedings. If he does not resign, I have 
the solemn duty to vote to impeach William Jefferson Clinton.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. All time for debate has expired.
  Pursuant to the order of the House of Friday, December 18, 1998, the 
previous question is ordered on the resolution.


               Motion to Recommit Offered by Mr. Boucher

  Mr. BOUCHER. Mr. Speaker, I offer a motion to recommit.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is the gentleman opposed to the resolution?
  Mr. BOUCHER. I am, Mr. Speaker.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Clerk will report the motion to 
recommit.
  The Clerk read as follows:
       Mr. Boucher moves to recommit the resolution H. Res. 611 to 
     the Committee on the Judiciary with instructions to report 
     the same back to the House forthwith with the following 
     amendment:

       Strike all after the resolving clause and insert the 
     following:
     That it is the sense of the House that--
       (1) on January 20, 1993, William Jefferson Clinton took the 
     oath prescribed by the Constitution of the United States 
     faithfully to execute the office of President; implicit in 
     that oath is the obligation that the President set an example 
     of high moral standards and conduct himself in a manner that 
     fosters respect for the truth; and William Jefferson Clinton, 
     has egregiously failed in this obligation, and through his 
     actions violated the trust of the American people, lessened 
     their esteem for the office of President, and dishonored the 
     office which they have entrusted to him;
       (2)(A) William Jefferson Clinton made false statements 
     concerning his reprehensible conduct with a subordinate;
       (B) William Jefferson Clinton wrongly took steps to delay 
     discovery of the truth; and
       (C) inasmuch as no person is above the law, William 
     Jefferson Clinton remains subject to criminal and civil 
     penalties; and
       (3) William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United 
     States, by his conduct has brought upon himself, and fully 
     deserves, the censure and condemnation of the American people 
     and this House.

  Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Speaker, I reserve a point of order against the 
motion to recommit.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from New York (Mr. Solomon) 
reserves a point of order.
  Pursuant to the order of the House of Friday, December 18, 1998, the 
gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Boucher) and a Member opposed each will 
control 5 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Boucher) for 5 
minutes.
  Mr. BOUCHER. Mr. Speaker, this debate comes very late, and it comes 
in a procedurally awkward manner. The resolution of censure that I am 
pleased to offer today was made in order for consideration in the 
Committee on the Judiciary by the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Hyde), 
the chairman.
  He understood the importance of an evenhanded process. He understood 
the need for balance. He perceived that fairness required the 
availability to the Members of the outcome for this investigation, 
which is the clear preference of the American people, the passage of a 
resolution of censure that admonishes the President for his conduct.
  I commend the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Hyde) for that 
evenhandedness. I can only wish that his example had been followed by 
the majority leadership in the House. With the leadership's 
concurrence, the Committee on Rules could have been convened, and a 
procedural resolution allowing floor consideration of both the articles 
of impeachment and a resolution of censure could have been reported and 
adopted by the House. This censure resolution could have and should 
have been made in order from the start.
  But that did not occur. The Members of the House did not have a 
censure alternative available to them from the beginning, and a point 
of order has been reserved to this resolution offered at the present 
time. I very much regret this procedure. I think it is a monument to 
unfairness.
  Not only is a censure and rebuke of the President the public's clear 
choice, but it is the right thing to do. The constitutional history 
clearly instructs us that the presidential impeachment power is to be 
used only as a last resort at times of true national emergency. Its 
purpose is to remove from office a president whose conduct threatens 
the very foundations of our system of government. It is a drastic 
remedy for the removal of a tyrant. It should not be used to remove a 
president whose offense is a shameful affair and its efforts to conceal 
it. For that offense he can be tried in a court of law. For that 
offense he can and should be censured by this House. That would be a 
perfect expression of the public's entirely justified outrage.
  But to use the impeachment power for that conduct defines it down, 
cheapens its use, lowers the standard of impeachment for all time, and 
will inherently weaken the presidential office. Censure is the right 
approach. I urge approval of this resolution.
  Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield the balance of my time to the 
gentleman from Missouri (Mr. Gephardt), the Democratic leader.
  (Mr. GEPHARDT asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. GEPHARDT. Mr. Speaker, I stood on this floor yesterday and 
implored all of us to say that the politics of slash and burn must end. 
I implored all of us that we must turn away from the politics of 
personal destruction and return to the politics of values.
  It is with that same passion that I say to all of you today that the 
gentleman from Louisiana (Mr. Bob Livingston) is a worthy and good and 
honorable man.

                              {time}  1130

  I believe his decision to retire is a terrible capitulation to the 
negative forces that are consuming our political system and our 
country, and I pray with all my heart that he will reconsider this 
decision.
  Our Founding Fathers created a system of government of men, not of 
angels. No one standing in this House today can pass the puritanical 
test of purity that some are demanding that our elected leaders take. 
If we demand that mere mortals live up to this standard, we will see 
our seats of government lay empty and we will see the best, most able 
people unfairly cast out of public service.
  We need to stop destroying imperfect people at the altar of an 
unobtainable morality. We need to start living up to the standards 
which the public in its infinite wisdom understands, that imperfect 
people must strive towards, but too often fall short.
  We are now rapidly descending into a politics where life imitates 
farce, fratricide dominates our public debate, and America is held 
hostage to tactics of smear and fear.
  Let all of us here today say no to resignation, no to impeachment, no 
to hatred, no to intolerance of each other, and no to vicious self-
righteousness.
  We need to start healing. We need to start binding up our wounds. We 
need to end this downward spiral which will culminate in the death of 
representative democracy.
  I believe this healing can start today by changing the course we have 
begun. This is exactly why we need this today to be bipartisan. This is 
why we ask the opportunity to vote on a bipartisan censure resolution, 
to begin the process

[[Page H12032]]

of healing our Nation and healing our people.
  We are on the brink of the abyss. The only way we stop this insanity 
is through the force of our own will. The only way we stop this spiral 
is for all of us to finally say ``enough.''
  Let us step back from the abyss and let us begin a new politics of 
respect and fairness and decency, which realizes what has come before.
  May God have mercy on this Congress, and may Congress have the wisdom 
and the courage and the goodness to save itself today.
  Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to the motion to 
recommit.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. LaHood). The gentleman from Wisconsin 
(Mr. Sensenbrenner) is recognized for 5 minutes.
  Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Speaker, I yield to the gentleman from Florida 
(Mr. Canady).
  Mr. CANADY of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from 
Wisconsin (Mr. Sensenbrenner) for yielding to me, and I rise in 
opposition to the motion to recommit.
  The gentleman from Missouri (Mr. Gephardt) has, with his customary 
dignity and good grace, made a passionate appeal for the motion to 
recommit. I submit to the House, however, that the motion to recommit 
must be rejected by this House.
  The motion to recommit must be rejected first and foremost because we 
today in this House do not sit in judgment on the President for his 
sins. We do not sit in judgment on the President for his frailties, for 
his human failings. That is not our responsibility.
  But today in this House we do sit in judgment on the President of the 
United States for his crimes. And it is because of his crimes that this 
motion must be rejected.
  It must be rejected first because the proposal for censure is outside 
the framework established by our Constitution. As the gentleman from 
Illinois (Mr. Hyde), chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary, so 
eloquently explained, the Constitution establishes a single method for 
this Congress to sit in judgment on the misconduct of a President. The 
constitutional method is impeachment by the House and trial in the 
Senate.
  Other methods may seem to us more convenient or more comfortable, but 
our standard cannot be comfort or convenience. Our standard must be and 
always remain our Constitution.
  Are we in this House so fearful of following the constitutional 
standard? Do we have so little faith in the institutions of our 
government and the path marked out for us in our Constitution that we 
would turn aside and substitute our opinions for the wisdom of the 
Framers and go down another path? Our answer must be no. We must stay 
on the path laid out for us in the Constitution.
  To those who say that a vote of censure is a matter of conscience, I 
must say that their consciences do not bind the Committee on the 
Judiciary to bring before this House a measure which we judge to be 
harmful and dangerous because it is outside the constitutional 
framework, a measure which violates the separation of powers. Their 
consciences do not trump our Constitution.
  And I must also ask this: If expressing a censure of the President is 
such a matter of conscience, why have they not done what is clearly 
within their power and which raises no constitutional problems to 
censure President Clinton? Why has the Democratic Caucus, by its own 
solemn act and resolution, not censured President Clinton? With all due 
respect to my Democratic friends, I must suggest, if their consciences 
were so stricken, they would have censured him by their own collective 
judgment through the action of their own Caucus long before we came to 
this sad day.
  There are, of course, other reasons that this House must reject 
censure. We must reject censure because the facts of the case against 
the President, facts establishing a calculated and sustained pattern of 
perjury and obstruction of justice, are overwhelming. All the attacks 
on the Independent Counsel, all the attacks on the Committee on the 
Judiciary do not alter the stubborn facts of the case against President 
William Jefferson Clinton.
  We must reject censure because the President's defense rests 
squarely, we must sadly conclude, on the denial of the obvious and the 
assertion of pure nonsense. To this day, the President's defense rests 
on the claim that he told the truth in his deposition when he denied 
that he had any specific recollection of ever being alone with Ms. 
Lewinsky. Who in this House believes that? Who in this country believes 
that? To this day, the President's defense rests on the argument that 
Ms. Lewinsky had sex with him, but he did not have sex with her.
  How sad it is that the President of the United States is reduced to 
making such nonsensical arguments. What rational person can accept such 
a defense? Such a defense is an insult to our intelligence, an insult 
to judgment and to common sense.
  Finally, we must reject censure because under our Constitution, the 
President's crimes, not his sins, not his human failings, but his 
crimes demand impeachment. William Jefferson Clinton has willfully, he 
has willfully turned aside from the unique role assigned to him under 
our Constitution. He has willfully turned aside from the oath of office 
that he swore. He has willfully turned aside from his preeminent duty 
to take care that the laws be faithfully executed. Such a President 
should not remain in office. Such a President must be impeached by this 
House and brought to account before the Senate.


                             Point of Order

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Does the gentleman from New York (Mr. 
Solomon) insist on his point of order?
  Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Speaker, I do insist on my point of order and I wish 
to be recognized on the point of order.
  Mr. Speaker, I make the point of order against this motion to 
recommit on the grounds that it does violate clause 7 of House Rule 
XVI, that is the germaneness rule.
  Mr. Speaker, this rule is a rule of the House and it requires 
amendments to be germane to the text that one is attempting to amend. 
And, Mr. Speaker, House Resolution 611, a resolution impeaching 
President Clinton for high crimes and misdemeanors, was reported as a 
question of privileges of the House under Rule IX. This privileged 
status is established by the Constitution in Article I, Section 2, 
which grants the House the sole power of impeachment.

                              {time}  1145

  It is also established by numerous precedents in the history of this 
House in which resolutions of impeachment have been called up as 
privileged matter on the floor.
  Mr. Speaker, the motion to recommit contains matter which is not 
privileged for consideration by this House. An attempt to insert 
nonprivileged matter into privileged matter by amendment clearly 
violates the germaneness rules of this House.
  Mr. Speaker, in order to be held germane, an amendment must share a 
fundamental purpose with the text one attempts to amend. Impeachment is 
the prescribed mechanism to address this conduct by the chief 
executive, and any other procedure has no foundation in the 
Constitution and is not contemplated by the separation of powers. To 
attempt to substitute a censure for impeachment is to violate the 
overall purpose of the Constitution's impeachment clause.
  Mr. Speaker, the fundamental purpose of the motion to recommit 
presently before the House obviously does not conform to the 
fundamental purpose of the impeachment resolution. It proposes a 
different end, a different result and a different method of achieving 
that end.
  Mr. Speaker, I urge the Chair to sustain this point of order.
  I ask unanimous consent to insert extraneous matter at this point in 
the Record. It is a ``Dear Colleague'' letter to Members from myself 
and the incoming chairman of the Committee on Rules, the gentleman from 
California (Mr. Dreier).
  Finally, Mr. Speaker, let me just say that this House has a 
tradition, it has a tradition of nonpartisan rulings by the Chair on 
questions of germaneness. Indeed, the parliamentarian of the House is a 
nonpartisan officer of the majority and minority party Members. These 
recommendations are based on an orderly set of factual rulings from

[[Page H12033]]

the past which establish precedents of the future.
  Mr. Speaker, I urge you to continue your reputation of fairness and 
sustain this point of order.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. LaHood). Extraneous material will be 
inserted after the point of order is disposed of.
  Does the gentleman from Massachusetts wish to be heard on the point 
of order?
  Mr. MOAKLEY. Yes, I do, Mr. Speaker.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from 
Massachusetts (Mr. Moakley).
  Mr. MOAKLEY. Mr. Speaker, there is nothing unusual or unprecedented 
in offering this motion. On many occasions the House has debated 
resolutions to censure presidents, other executive officials, even 
private citizens. In fact, Mr. Speaker, the House has even debated an 
amendment to convert articles of impeachment into a censure resolution. 
In 1830, Mr. Speaker, no one even questioned the legitimacy of that 
amendment.
  The Boucher amendment to censure the President is germane to the 
articles of impeachment that we find before us.
  Mr. Speaker, in proposing this amendment, we are simply following the 
precedents of the House. The 3rd volume of Hinds' Precedents, section 
2367, clearly records that during the impeachment of Judge James Peck, 
Representative Edward Everett of Massachusetts offered an amendment to 
an impeachment resolution. That amendment stated that the ``House does 
not approve of the conduct of James Peck'' and goes on to recommend 
that he not be impeached. This is, in essence, Mr. Speaker, what the 
motion of the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Boucher) does.
  The Boucher amendment strikes out the articles of impeachment and, in 
a more expansive formulation, states that the ``House does not approve 
of the conduct of'' President Clinton. The House went on to defeat 
Representative Everett's amendment, but it was offered, it was debated, 
and it was voted upon.
  Mr. Speaker, we are asking for the same consideration that the 
precedents of the House prove was given before. And furthermore, Mr. 
Speaker, the Peck case is not the only time that the House has 
considered censure of an individual subject to impeachment.
  In a recent study, the Congressional Research Service reported that 
the House has considered censuring executive officials a total of 9 
times. And the House also has censured its own Members.
  The Republican-led House has considered numerous resolutions 
expressing its disapproval of individuals and their conduct. Just 
recently the House condemned travel by Louis Farrakhan and the House 
castigated the remarks of Sara Lister, Assistant Secretary of the Army 
for Manpower. The House even expressed itself on the President's 
assertions of executive privilege. And the House expressed its views on 
many other matters.
  Surely, Mr. Speaker, if the House can approve the display of the Ten 
Commandments, it can censure the deplorable behavior of President 
Clinton, and we are simply asking for that opportunity.
  The gentleman from New York (Mr. Solomon) makes the point of order 
that the amendment is nongermane. The amendment could be challenged on 
three grounds: First, that it is not germane to amend privileged 
material with nonprivileged material; second, that even if censure is 
considered as privileged, the fundamental purpose of impeachment is 
different from censure; and third, that censure is not a 
constitutionally sound remedy.
  On the first argument, Mr. Speaker, the Chair may be tempted to 
follow footnote 8 in Deschler's volume 3, chapter 14, section 1.3 which 
states that it is not germane to amend impeachment which is privileged 
material with censure which is nonprivileged material. But I ask the 
Chair to withhold judgment on that. The footnote itself acknowledges 
that this is not a matter of precedent because the issue has never 
arisen. Again, Mr. Speaker, this is not a matter of precedent because 
the issue has never arisen.
  Moreover, it is clearly established that resolutions of censure have 
been considered as privileged in the past.
  In the second volume of Hinds, section 1625, a Mr. A.P. Field was 
reprimanded in the well of the House by the Speaker pursuant to a 
privileged resolution. And this is not the only case, Mr. Speaker. The 
6th volume of Cannons precedents, section 333, records that in 1913, a 
Mr. Charles Glover was also brought to the well of the House. He was 
reprimanded by the Speaker pursuant to a privileged resolution.
  Mr. Speaker, it is clearly established that resolutions that provide 
for censure or reprimand have been considered as privileged in the 
past. In sum, it is supported by the precedents that resolutions of 
censure have been treated as privileged by this House and, therefore, 
the argument that it is not germane to amend privileged matters with 
nonprivileged material is not at issue in this case.
  The second line of argument my Republican colleagues use is that 
censure has a fundamentally different purpose than impeachment. The 
argument is that impeachment is intended to remedy a constitutional 
crisis whereas censure is designed to punish.
  Mr. Speaker, let me ask, where is the remedial meaning in phrases 
such as ``acted in a manner subversive of the rule of law and justice'' 
``has brought disrepute on the presidency'' and ``exhibited contempt 
for the inquiry''?
  These words of censure are found in the very articles before us. 
Clearly, Mr. Speaker, this language is meant to inflict punishment on 
the President, punishment that is at odds with the remedial nature of 
impeachment.
  The articles of impeachment also touch on this issue of punishment by 
recommending to the Senate that the President be tried, convicted, 
removed from office and forbidden to hold any office in the future. In 
fact, Mr. Speaker, the House has never, ever recommended to the Senate 
that the person being impeached also be prohibited from holding other 
office. Even in the highly-charged, politically-motivated impeachment 
of President Andrew Johnson, the House did not dare recommend to the 
Senate an appropriate punishment.
  The committee clearly intends not only to remedy the situation by 
impeaching the President but also intends to punish him by its 
disqualification to hold and enjoy office of honor, trust or profit 
under the United States.

  The words of Alexander Hamilton in Federalist 65 are instructive. 
When discussing impeachment, Hamilton uses the word ``punishment'' to 
describe being denied future public office. It certainly sounds like 
punishment to me, Mr. Speaker.
  Mr. Hamilton also describes that punishment as being ``sentenced to a 
perpetual ostracism from the esteem and confidence and honors and 
emoluments of this country.'' Clearly, Alexander Hamilton believed that 
denial of future public office was intended to be punitive as well as 
remedial.
  Mr. Speaker, since this resolution contains both remedial impeachment 
and punitive censure, it should be germane to propose censure alone. 
The Committee on the Judiciary itself has opened the door by censuring 
the President.
  The last argument that is being propounded is that censure is not a 
constitutionally sound remedy. I would urge the Speaker not to 
entertain this argument. It is well established that the presiding 
officer does not pass judgment on the constitutionality of any proposed 
legislation, 8 Cannon section 3031.
  If the Speaker still feels constrained to address the constitutional 
question, I remind the Chair that the House has attempted to censure 
Federal officials numerous times in the past and has in fact voted to 
censure such individuals.
  Not once, Mr. Speaker, not once has there been a successful 
constitutional challenge. Clearly, censure is not prohibited by the 
Constitution.
  Mr. Speaker, I respectfully remind the Chair that you are ruling on a 
profoundly important matter, a matter of whether to allow us a vote of 
conscience in the matter of impeachment. In the 210 years of Congress, 
210 years that Congress has been in existence, no Chair has ever been 
called on to rule whether censure is germane to impeachment. I repeat 
that. In 210 years, the Chair has never been called on to rule on that. 
Your decision would be

[[Page H12034]]

the first and the only such decision and will be recorded in the rule 
books as such.
  Volume 3 of Deschler's notes, and I quote, ``the issue of whether a 
proposition to censure a Federal officer would be germane to a 
proposition for his impeachment has not arisen.'' While the Chair was 
not asked to rule on the question then, the House has considered an 
amendment to the impeachment resolution to censure Judge Peck and in 
has in other instances considered censure resolutions as privileged.
  Mr. Speaker, it has happened in the past. I urge the Chair to follow 
the weight of House practice and to overrule the point of order.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Does any other Member wish to be heard on 
the point of order?
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. 
Sensenbrenner).
  Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the point of 
order on the motion to recommit because it is not germane to House 
Resolution 611.
  Clause 7 of rule XVI of the rules of the House of Representatives 
provides that ``no motion or proposition on a subject different from 
that under consideration shall be admitted under color of amendment.'' 
Prior rulings of the House have held this provision applicable to 
motions to recommit with or without instructions. A motion to recommit 
is not in order if it would not be in order as an amendment to the 
underlying proposition.
  The constitutional prerogatives of the House, such as impeachment and 
matters incidental thereto, are questions of high privilege under rule 
IX of the House rules.
  A joint or simple resolution evincing the disapproval of the House is 
not a question of privilege under the rules of the House.
  Furthermore, the fundamental principle of such a censure resolution 
is inconsistent with the fundamental purpose of an impeachment 
resolution.
  I would point out to the Chair that the motion to recommit with 
instructions that is under consideration here is not even a censure 
motion. It is a sense of the Congress resolution, and I would refer the 
Chair to the last four lines of their resolution, that William 
Jefferson Clinton, President of the United States, by his conduct has 
brought upon himself and fully deserves the censure and condemnation of 
the American people and this House.
  It says he deserves the censure but it does not censure him.
  We have heard an awful lot about the rule of law during this debate, 
which I think has been one of the finest debates that the House of 
Representatives has had.

                              {time}  1200

  This is our opportunity to uphold our rules, our laws, and I would 
strongly urge the Chair to sustain the point of order.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. LaHood). Are there other Members who 
wish to be heard?
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Delahunt).
  Mr. DELAHUNT. Mr. Speaker, I wish to be heard on the point of order 
and I urge you to overrule the point of order.
  Mr. Speaker, the argument has been made that censure is 
unprecedented, uncommon or unconstitutional. That simply is not the 
case.
  In the impeachment of Judge Peck, an amendment was offered that 
contained a censure. The gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Moakley) 
spoke to this in his remarks. I want to point out that on many other 
occasions the House has chosen censure over impeachment. I would like 
to cite a few examples.
  In the case of Judge Speers, the committee report stated, and I am 
quoting, ``The record presents a series of legal oppressions that 
demand condemnation and criticism.'' Even in the light of this finding, 
the committee did not recommend proceeding with impeachment and the 
report containing censure was adopted.
  In the cases of Judge Harry Anderson, Judge Frank Cooper, Judge 
Grover Moscowitz, Judge Blodgett, Judge Boarman, Judge Jenkins and 
Judge Ricks, the committee recommended censure instead of proceeding 
with impeachment.
  The fact of the matter, Mr. Speaker, is that there is a long-standing 
history in the House of substituting censure for impeachment. 
Sometimes, as in the Louderback case, the Committee on the Judiciary 
recommends censure and the House rejects that recommendation and votes 
impeachment. Other times the committee has recommended censure over 
impeachment and the House has agreed with that recommendation. Mr. 
Speaker, what is important is that the House has had a choice between 
censure and impeachment.
  There is also a long tradition in the House of censuring executive 
officers. As we have heard, a recent Congressional Research Service 
study found nine instances where the House has attempted to censure 
Federal officials. Presidents John Adams, John Tyler, James Polk and 
James Buchanan were all subject of censure resolutions. In addition, 
Treasury Secretary Alexander Hamilton, Navy Secretary Isaac Toucey, 
former War Secretary Simon Cameron, Navy Secretary Gideon Welles, and 
Ambassador Thomas Bayard as well, were all subject to censure 
resolutions.
  Indeed, private citizens have also been censured by the House. The 
gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Moakley) cited two examples in his 
opening argument. The House has also censured a Mr. John Anderson, a 
Mr. Samuel Houston, and moved to censure Mr. Russel Jarvis.
  I believe these examples will dispel the myth that censure by the 
House is uncommon, unprecedented or unconstitutional.
  The most salient fact is that when the House wants to censure an 
individual, both private citizens and executive officers, it can and it 
has. There is no constitutional prohibition against such an action, and 
the Congress has freely engaged in passing such censures.
  The question before the Speaker is, with this long line of precedent, 
can censure be offered as an alternative to impeachment? The answer is 
clearly yes. As I cited above, the House has on many occasions adopted 
reports from the Committee on the Judiciary that has given the House 
the opportunity to express its views, its lack of regard, its censure, 
its condemnation, as an alternative to impeaching a judge. The same 
model should hold here.
  Mr. Speaker, I would argue that the reason this is such a long-
standing practice and precedent of the House is because it just makes 
good common sense. When the House does not feel impeachment is 
warranted, but does want to go on the record censuring certain 
behavior, it has. One only need look at the precedents.
  Mr. Speaker, I urge that you overrule the point of order.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Are there any other Members who wish to 
speak on the point of order?
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California (Mr. Rogan).
  Mr. ROGAN. Mr. Speaker, I join with the gentleman from Wisconsin in 
rising to a point of order and also noting the dichotomy in this 
particular proposal of censure; that if this were to pass, we would go 
on record as stating that the President deserves censure, but the 
document itself does not grant censure.
  There are two other interesting areas relating to the proposal before 
us. In the House Committee on the Judiciary, when this matter came 
before us, the maker of the proposed resolution of censure was the same 
maker as the proposal today, the distinguished gentleman from Virginia. 
The resolution of censure that was presented to the Committee on the 
Judiciary had two distinguishing characteristics that are absent today.
  In the Committee on the Judiciary, the resolution that was put before 
us would have required not only a vote of the House but a vote of the 
Senate to bring the condemnation of Congress upon the President. That 
is absent here. It also had an additional element. It had an element of 
requiring the President to come to Congress and to affix his signature 
to the document in recognition of the censure. That too is absent.
  Impeachment, and not censure, is properly before the House at this 
time. The paradox between the two was demonstrated during our debate in 
the Committee on the Judiciary on the proposed resolution of censure.
  In committee I asked the author if there was any language in the 
proposal that would preclude any future Congress, by a simple majority 
vote, from erasing or expunging the censure from

[[Page H12035]]

history. I knew in advance the answer to that question. No. There can 
be no such language in a resolution of censure because, under the rules 
of Congress, this Congress cannot bind a future Congress.
  What does this mean? It means that any censure adopted by this House 
today can be expunged from the record by a simple majority vote of this 
House. Now, in a courtroom, convicted felons seek to have their 
criminal convictions expunged. When that request is granted, that felon 
may truthfully state that he was never convicted of a crime. In the 
eyes of the law, the criminal conduct simply never happened when 
expungement is granted. It is forgotten.
  A censure resolution of this President today can be erased from our 
journals and from our history books forever tomorrow, and it may be 
done by a simple majority vote. Censure is a remedy designed for the 
polls, it is not a remedy designed for the Constitution. It is a 
phantom remedy and the amendment should be turned back.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Does the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. 
Barrett) wish to speak to the point of order?
  Mr. BARRETT of Wisconsin. Yes, Mr. Speaker, I wish to speak. But 
before I do that, I want to compliment you on the evenhandedness you 
have displayed in presiding over this matter.
  Mr. Speaker, the argument that censure is of a fundamentally 
different purpose than impeachment has been made; that impeachment is 
remedial in nature while censure is punitive in nature. Ordinarily, I 
would agree. The words in the censure resolution are meant to be 
punishment. But unlike previous articles of impeachment, the 
impeachment articles before us also raise the issue of punishment, and 
it does so in three ways:
  The articles incorporate language which clearly condemns and, in 
effect, censures the President. I quote from the articles: ``In all of 
this William Jefferson Clinton has undermined the integrity of his 
office and has brought disrepute on the Presidency, has betrayed his 
trust as President, and has acted in a manner subversive of the rule of 
law and justice to the manifest injury of the people of the United 
States.'' This language appears in all four articles of impeachment.
  The article also states that he has, ``violated his constitutional 
duty'', and ``willfully corrupted and manipulated the judicial 
process.'' If this language were considered on its own, it clearly 
would be considered a condemnation and censure of the President.
  Second, and more importantly, last night I looked through the 16 
previous articles of impeachment that this House has considered. And 
for the first time in the history of the Congress, for the first time 
in 210 years, this House is taking the additional step and telling the 
Senate that not only should the President be tried and removed from 
office but also disbarred from ever holding public office again. That 
language did not even appear in the articles of impeachment for Andrew 
Johnson or Richard Nixon.
  Let me repeat that, Mr. Speaker. For the first time in the history of 
the United States, the House is taking it upon itself to say that the 
power of disqualification from office should be invoked. Until today, 
no Member of this House has voted to do this. Until today.
  This is important. Alexander Hamilton, in Federalist 65, talks about 
this very issue. Hamilton says, ``Punishment is not to terminate the 
chastisement of the offender.'' Hamilton goes on to talk about the 
offender having been sentenced to a perpetual ostracism from the esteem 
and confidence, and honors and emoluments of this country when the 
person is disqualified from holding public office. While this penalty 
is partly remedial, one can only conclude that there is something 
inherently punitive in forever disqualifying an individual from holding 
public office, and this punishment quality is intentional.
  Third, article 4 states that the President exhibited contempt for the 
inquiry. By charging the President with contempt, the articles open up 
the possibility for the House to address that contempt.
  Mr. Speaker, the precedents clearly show that contempt can be 
remedied by a censure of this House. It is equally clear that contempt 
of the House can be addressed by a privileged resolution of censure. 
The articles before us contain language that clearly raises the issue 
of punishment and censure.
  To a proposition that contains both impeachment and censure, clearly 
it is germane to offer a proposition for censure. For rather than 
expanding the purpose of the articles of impeachment, our censure 
resolution, in a real sense, narrows the focus of the resolution. We do 
not expand, we narrow the focus.
  One final point, Mr. Speaker. You have discretion. You can put the 
question of germaneness to this body. This is an issue that this body 
has never considered before. And in doing so, you could truly let the 
people decide.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Does anyone on the majority side wish to be 
heard?
  The gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Pease) is recognized.
  Mr. PEASE. Mr. Speaker, what is clear from the debate in the 
Committee on the Judiciary and on the floor of this House is that the 
meaning, even the intent of a resolution of censure is not clear.
  Some contend that its purpose, no matter what it is called, is to 
punish the President. Others argue that it is not intended to punish 
but merely to state the opinion of the House on the matter. Without 
determining which it is, this much is now clear. If its purpose is to 
punish the President, no matter how it is captioned, it is a bill of 
attainder, that is, special legislation intended to punish and identify 
an individual or group without benefit of judicial proceedings, and 
constitutionally prohibited.
  I understand that the proposal originally before the committee has 
been amended so as not to require Senate action, thus diminishing it 
substantially in order to meet the constitutional infirmity. If it is 
not intended to punish the President, but merely state our opinions, it 
is clearly meaningless, for we have already done that extensively, some 
would say exhaustively.
  If anything, the debate of the last few months has brought consensus 
on one thing, the centrality of the rule of law to our system of 
government. Some contend that the rule of law is best acquitted through 
impeachment of the President; others that it will be upheld because of 
the President's exposure to proceedings in civil and criminal courts of 
this Nation after he leaves office.

                              {time}  1215

  But all of us agree that following the rules is essential. The rules 
of this House, as we were reminded yesterday by both our outgoing rules 
chairman the gentleman from New York and the incoming rules chairman 
the gentleman from California, do not allow the interjection of 
nonprivileged matter into privileged matter by amendment. The articles 
of impeachment are privileged. The sense of the House resolution is 
not. The motion, though perhaps so across the rotunda, is not germane 
here and the point of order should therefore be sustained.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. LaHood). The Chair recognizes the 
gentleman from New York (Mr. Rangel).
  Mr. RANGEL. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to the point of order 
that has been made by the gentleman from New York and in support of the 
motion to recommit so that this body could have before it the question 
as to whether or not we can vote for censure.
  As you look over the rules and precedents of this House, you will 
have the broad discretion to include in your ruling the question of 
fairness and the question of equity. Mr. Speaker, the whole world is 
watching.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from 
Indiana (Mr. Buyer).


                         Parliamentary Inquiry

  Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Speaker, I have a parliamentary inquiry.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman will state it.
  Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Speaker, the debate is getting to be repetitive on 
the point of order.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Chair has discretion to hear Members who 
wish to speak to the point of order. As long as Members speak to the 
point of order, the Chair hopes to allow Members to do that. The Chair 
will make a ruling after a sufficient number

[[Page H12036]]

of Members have had a chance to speak.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Buyer).
  Mr. BUYER. Mr. Speaker, if many of my colleagues are sitting here 
somewhat confused and scratching their heads and trying to follow this 
debate and they think this is a bunch of lawyers speaking lawyerly 
language, I kind of agree with them. They are right. I am confused.
  Now, I sat on the Judiciary Committee and I watched this debate. Let 
me share with my colleagues why. Here is why I am confused. When the 
censure resolution was offered in the Judiciary Committee, I asked 
questions of the author about what is its clear intent. The gentleman 
from Virginia (Mr. Boucher) was very clear to me. He said the intent of 
the censure resolution is not to have findings of guilt and it is not 
to punish. Then I questioned that, looking at the four corners of the 
document and got into the exact words, because it did have findings of 
guilt, that the President had egregiously failed, that he had violated 
his trust, that he lessened the esteem of his office, that he brought 
dishonor to his office and then as a form of punishment it sought that 
the President's actions were entitled to condemnation.
  The reason that the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Boucher) would 
assert that his intent was not to have findings of guilt and not to 
punish is because it would have brought it within the clear prohibition 
of the Constitution of bills of attainder. Now, even up to yesterday on 
this House floor we were still discussing bills of attainder. But now 
there is a problem. The problem is that how do they make a censure 
resolution germane as an alternative to impeachment? So they have 
gotten clever. The cleverness is to change the title but leave the 
words the same. It is no longer called a censure resolution, it is now 
called a sense of the House. So being clever, they have now tried to 
distance themselves from the clear, express constitutional prohibition 
on bills of attainder and now say that because this is a sense of the 
Congress resolution, it comes under the speech and debate clause.
  That is what is happening here, Mr. Speaker. So now that the same 
Members who yesterday in debate said that our intent by this was not to 
have findings of guilt and not to punish, if you are confused that now 
the same Members are saying that we are having findings of guilt and 
our intent is to punish, the same Members are saying that now because 
they have changed the title and it is merely now under the speech and 
debate clause.
  As one of the legal scholars testified before the Judiciary 
Committee, they said that if it is a sense of the Congress, it is the 
equivalency of Congress shouting down Pennsylvania Avenue at the 
President and saying, ``We think what you have done was a bad thing,'' 
and it has no other clear legal effect.
  Now, Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the point of order on the 
motion to recommit because censure is not germane as an alternative to 
the impeachment resolution. I have great respect for every Member of 
this body. I have had opportunities to speak with many of them. I had a 
good conversation with the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Roemer) 
yesterday and he and I disagree on this issue.
  I understand the motives and the intentions of the Members of this 
House who would like to censure the President for his lack of 
integrity, responsibility and violations of the rule of law. I 
understand their convictions and that is why they offer this sense of 
the House resolution.
  Americans all across the country every day, we all try very hard to 
live by the rules, principles and proverbs and we teach them to our 
children. What are they? It is called honesty: You tell the truth, be 
sincere, do not deceive, mislead or be devious or use trickery. Do not 
withhold information in relationships of trust. Do not cheat or lie to 
the detriment of others nor tolerate such practice. You honor your 
oath. Be loyal. Support and protect your family, your friends, your 
community and your country. Do not violate the law and ethical 
principles to win personal gain. Do not ask a friend to do something 
wrong. Judge all people on their merits. Do not abuse or demean people. 
Do not use, manipulate, exploit or take advantage of others for 
personal gain. Be responsible and accountable, think before you act, 
consider the consequences on all people by your actions.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Members will confine their remarks to the 
point of order.
  Mr. BUYER. You do not blame others for your mistakes.
  Unfortunately, the President did not follow these principles. His 
criminal misconduct and dereliction of his executive duties do meet the 
constitutional threshold of high crimes and misdemeanors.
  The founders in their infinite wisdom made three coordinate branches 
of government in a system of checks and balances. When the President 
and the Vice President, Federal judges and other executive officials 
are accused of high crimes and misdemeanors, the Constitution gave this 
body the express authority as the accusatory body to bring the charges. 
That is why many of my colleagues have referred to the House as the 
grand jury function. That is accurate. That is why the House is the 
accusatory body. There is not a grand jury in this country that can 
investigate, prosecute and have findings, guilt and sentence. That is 
why in the Constitution they said we accuse and the Senate tries. It is 
not expressly authorized for anyone to use censure as an alternative to 
impeachment. Impeachment is our only course of action.

  Mr. HEFNER. Parliamentary inquiry, Mr. Speaker.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Chair has the discretion to recognize 
Members on a point of order. The Chair is going to exercise that 
discretion to recognize two more Members on the minority side and two 
more Members on the majority side before ruling.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. Hefner) 
on the point of order.
  Mr. HEFNER. Mr. Speaker, I do not understand why anybody would be 
confused, this being an exercise in lawyers here and all the technical 
things we have talked about.
  Let me just mention something here. I have been here longer than most 
of the people that have talked on this point of order. The most 
powerful committee in this House is the Rules Committee. It is the 
Speaker's committee. The leadership in this House and the Speaker in 
this House dictates the rules that will be considered on this House 
floor. Make no mistake about it.
  Now, it has been said that we cannot have a vote on censure because 
it is not constitutional. But no one, no one, has shown us why it is 
unconstitutional. It is an opinion. Nobody has given us concrete 
evidence that it is not constitutional for us to consider censure.
  Now, if that be the case and you want to make the argument that we 
want to be fair in these proceedings, well, then you would give us a 
vote on censure. The Rules Committee could have met, the gentleman from 
New York (Mr. Solomon) I think will agree, and you could have crafted 
any rule that you wanted. You could have waived any points of order to 
have a rule that comes to this floor, and you would have the votes to 
enforce the rule that you brought.
  But to say that it is unconstitutional and hide behind the fact that 
it is unconstitutional to me says we are going to have a vote for 
impeachment to get rid of this President and that is going to be it, 
period. We are not going to allow anybody to vote his conscience if it 
conflicts with our conscience.
  Now, I do not know about you, but this will be the last time that I 
will probably ever speak on the floor of this House of Representatives, 
and it has been the greatest privilege of my life. It has been the 
greatest privilege of my life to serve on this House of 
Representatives, and for every Member of Congress, whether I have 
agreed with you or not, if there is anything that I have said over 
these years that would have offended anybody, I would ask your 
forgiveness.
  The President of the United States stood before the whole world and 
said, I have sinned and I ask forgiveness, and that is what it is all 
about.
  I do not know how you are going to rule on this but just as soon as I 
can get finished, I want to go home and go to the Christmas programs 
and watch these children stand out front and spell out the name of 
Christmas and Jesus Christ. I want to go home and celebrate the birth 
of the savior Jesus Christ, the

[[Page H12037]]

prince of peace, and if people want to stay here forever and ever and 
berate the President, then you just have to let that be your Christmas 
legacy.
  But if you do not allow us a vote on censure, you are saying to me 
our mind is made up and we are going to get this President and we are 
not going to give you a vote on it and the deal is cut. If that be the 
case, we may as well all go home and have the vote now. But I hope that 
the Chair will not rule that this is not germane.
  I thank you very much, God bless you, and have a merry Christmas.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from 
Georgia (Mr. Barr).
  Mr. BARR of Georgia. Mr. Speaker, precedents are important and for 
precedent in this dispute, in discussing the germaneness of the motion 
to recommit, I believe one of the most important precedents one can 
turn to is the founder of the Democrat Party, President Andrew Jackson. 
His words, indeed, Mr. Speaker, for purposes of this particular debate 
are particularly relevant, because it was President Jackson who was the 
subject of a censure motion, and his words printed at great length in 
the registry of the proceedings of this Chamber in 1834 very clearly 
discuss, illustrate and stand for the proposition that the very 
carefully balanced system of checks and balances and separation of 
powers in our government was violated, would be violated then as it is 
today by any motion to censure the President as a substitute for 
impeachment.
  The words of Andrew Jackson should be in our minds today, should be 
in these halls today, because they say that a motion for censure as a 
substitute for impeachment is offensive to the fundamental work of this 
Congress, the fundamental powers of this Congress and the powers of the 
presidency.
  This is the precedent, Mr. Speaker, that we should follow today and 
rule this motion for recommittal out of order as repugnant and 
offensive to the constitutional separation of powers on which our 
system of government is based.


                         Parliamentary Inquiry

  Mr. TRAFICANT. I have a parliamentary inquiry, Mr. Speaker.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman will state it.
  Mr. TRAFICANT. Mr. Speaker, there has not been one Member that has 
addressed the legal precedents of the challenge to this motion.

                              {time}  1230

  By removing further debate, there is no one else standing. I believe 
there is only one governing principle here today because of a lack of 
legislative precedents and action, and that is the Constitution. The 
Constitution, as has been stated, does not permit censure, but the 
Constitution does not prohibit censure.
  Insofar, under my parliamentary inquiry, as there is no legislative 
precedence that has been set, and the Founders did not place this with 
the elected judges of the Supreme Court, they left it to the elected 
Congress, therefore, they choose not to send it to judicial process but 
to the political process, and Congress should have the right to work 
its political will.
  Therefore, this motion should be defeated on the grounds that there 
is no precedence, it is lacking, and it cries out for further 
interpretation of the Founders' actions. And the Founders' actions were 
clear. They did not want to place it with the Supreme Court judges that 
were not responsible to voters; they placed it to the Members of 
Congress.
  Mr. Speaker, I ask that this motion be defeated.
  Mr. BOUCHER. Mr. Speaker, I wish to be heard on the point of order.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. It is the Chair's prerogative to indicate 
that this will be the last speaker on the point of order.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Boucher).
  Mr. BOUCHER. Mr. Speaker, the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. 
Moakley) has answered well the arguments that have been made in support 
of the point of order. There is actual precedent for the acceptance by 
the House of a resolution of censure as an amendment to the impeachment 
resolution. That occurred in the matter of the impeachment of Judge 
Peck in 1830.
  In response to the argument that censure is nonprivileged material 
and that it may not be used to amend privileged material, the gentleman 
has pointed to instances in which the House has treated censure as 
privileged. And the gentleman persuasively argues that by their own 
language the articles of impeachment have a fundamental purpose that is 
both remedial and punitive. The punitive language of the censure 
resolution is, therefore, not inconsistent with the fundamental purpose 
of the articles of impeachment.
  Mr. Speaker, this is a question of first impression. The Chair has 
never ruled before on this precise matter. We have had in our Republic 
200 years of silence on the question of whether the substitution of a 
resolution of censure for the President's conduct to articles of 
impeachment shall be considered as germane.
  Given the unprecedented nature of the question, given the 
extraordinary gravity of the matter that is now before the House, given 
the inherent unfairness of not making a censure alternative available 
to the Members and the inherent unfairness of disallowing the 
consideration of the House by the American public's clearly preferred 
outcome for this inquiry, which is the passage of a resolution of 
censure, I urge the Chair to resolve all ambiguities in the rules and 
all doubts about their proper application in favor of finding that the 
resolution of censure is germane and permitting its consideration by 
the House.
  A finding of germaneness would do no violence to the precedents of 
the House. It would not overturn previous rulings of the Chair. It 
would allow us today to give voice to the public's overwhelming desire 
to put this unfortunate matter behind us with the stern censure and 
rebuke which the President, for his conduct, deserves.
  I thank the Chair for his patience in listening to these arguments, 
and I urge his finding that the resolution of censure is germane.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. LaHood). The Chair understands that the 
ranking member of the Committee on Rules wishes to make a brief 
statement to the Chair.
  Mr. MOAKLEY. Mr. Speaker, I ask to be heard to make a different 
appeal.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Briefly.
  Mr. MOAKLEY. Arguing in the alternative, Mr. Speaker, and I thank the 
Chair for its patience, arguing the alternative, if the Chair finds 
some merit in our argument but is not convinced in the sufficient merit 
to overrule the point of order, I respectfully urge the Chair to 
consider to put the motion, the question, directly to the House, and 
there is precedent for this action.
  One of the issues in deciding the germaneness of censure to 
impeachment is the notion that the censure is not privileged, but 
impeachment is. On a question of privilege, however, the early practice 
of the House was for the House to determine whether it should be 
entertained. In fact, the practice was so well established that in 1842 
the Speaker, Representative John White of Kentucky, remarked he could 
find no instance on record where the Chair had determined what 
constituted a question of privilege. On the contrary, he found numerous 
instances where the House had settled it. This occasion is described in 
the third volume of Hinds' Precedents, section 2654.
  When the Speaker was asked to rule on whether a resolution regarding 
charges made by a Cabinet officer about Members of Congress committed a 
question of privilege, he said, the Speaker speaking:

       For the Chair to decide in such a case would be an 
     usurpation on its part, and what the Chair might deem a 
     breach of privilege, the House may not deem so, and vice 
     versa.'

  Again, Mr. Speaker, I remind the Chair that this is a question of 
first impression. The Speaker has never in the 210 years of history of 
the Congress been asked to rule on whether censure is germane on 
impeachment. There is no precedence directly on point. The question has 
not arisen in the past, although the House has taken up an amendment 
that would have converted impeachment to censure in the matter of Judge 
Peck.
  Mr. Speaker, in a matter so grave as this, to deny the House a vote 
of conscience, I beg the Chair not to base its decision on a narrow and 
technical interpretation, and if the Chair cannot see its way to accept 
entirely our argument on the merits, I ask the Chair to put the 
question directly to the House.

[[Page H12038]]

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Chair is prepared to rule.
  Knowing that the House may wish to express its will on this question, 
the Chair nevertheless will follow the course set by presiding officers 
for at least the past 150 years by rendering a decision from the Chair.
  The gentleman from New York has made the point of order that the 
amendment in the motion to recommit offered by the gentleman from 
Virginia is not germane to House Resolution 611.
  The rule of germaneness derives directly from the authority of the 
House under section 5 in article I of the Constitution to determine its 
own rules. It has governed the proceedings of the House for all of its 
210-year history. Its applicability to a motion to recommit is well 
established. As reflected in the Deschler-Brown Precedents in volume 
10, chapter 28, both at section 1 and at section 17.2, then-Majority 
Leader Carl Albert made these general observations about the rule in 
1965, and I quote:

       It is a rule which has been insisted upon by Democrats and 
     Republicans alike ever since the Democratic and Republican 
     parties have been in existence.
       It is a rule without which this House could never complete 
     its legislative program if there happened to be a substantial 
     minority in opposition.
       One of the great things about the House of Representatives 
     and one of the things that distinguish[es] it from other 
     legislative bodies is that we do operate on the rule of 
     germaneness.
       No legislative body of this size could ever operate unless 
     it did comply with the rule of germaneness.

  At the outset the Chair will state two guiding principles.
  First, an otherwise privileged resolution is rendered nonprivileged 
by the inclusion of nonprivileged matter. This principle is exemplified 
in the ruling of Speaker Clark on January 11, 1916, which is recorded 
in Cannon's Precedents at volume 6, section 468. Accordingly, to a 
resolution pending as privileged, an amendment proposing to broach 
nonprivileged matter is not germane.
  Second, to be germane, an amendment must share a common fundamental 
purpose with the pending proposition. This principle is annotated in 
section 798b of the House Rules and Manual. Accordingly, to a pending 
resolution addressing one matter, an amendment proposing to broach an 
intrinsically different matter is not germane.
  As the excellent arguments in debate on this point of order have made 
clear, these two principles are closely intertwined in any analysis of 
the relationship between the amendment proposed in the motion to 
recommit and the pending resolution. The Chair thanks those who have 
brought their arguments to the attention of the Chair.
  The pending resolution proposes to impeach the President of the 
United States. As such, it invokes an exclusive constitutional 
prerogative of the House. The final clause of section 2 in Article I of 
the Constitution mandates that the House, ``shall have the sole power 
of impeachment.'' For this reason, the pending proposal constitutes a 
question of the privileges of the House within the meaning of rule IX. 
Ample precedent is annotated in the House Rules and Manual at section 
604.
  The amendment in the motion to recommit offered by the gentleman from 
Virginia proposes instead to censure the President. It has no 
comparable nexus to an exclusive constitutional prerogative of the 
House. Indeed, clause 7 of section 3 in article I of the Constitution 
prescribes that ``judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend 
further than to removal from office and disqualification to hold and 
enjoy any office of honor, trust or profit under the United States.''
  An instructive contrast appears in clause 2 of section 5 in article I 
of the Constitution, which establishes a range of alternative 
disciplinary sanctions for Members of Congress by stating that each 
House may, ``punish its Members for disorderly behavior, and with the 
concurrence of two-thirds, expel a Member.'' This contrast demonstrates 
that, while the constitutional power of either body in Congress to 
punish one of its Members extends through a range of alternatives, the 
constitutional power of the Congress to remove the President, 
consistent with the separation of powers, is confined to the 
impeachment process.
  Thus, a proposal to discipline a Member may admit as germane an 
amendment to increase or decrease the punishment (except expulsion, 
which the Chair will address presently), in significant part because 
the Constitution contemplates that the House may impose alternative 
punishments. But a resolution of impeachment, being a question of 
privileges of the House because it invokes an exclusive constitutional 
prerogative of the House, cannot admit as germane an amendment to 
convert the remedial sanction of potential removal to a punitive 
sanction of censure, as that would broach nonprivileged matter. For 
this conclusion the Chair finds support in Hinds' Precedents at volume 
5, section 5810, as cited in Deschler's Precedents at volume 3, chapter 
14, section 1.3, footnote 8.
  The qualitative difference between these two contrasting sources of 
disciplinary authority in the Constitution signifies an intrinsic 
parliamentary difference between impeachment and an alternative 
sanction against the President. The Chair believes that this 
distinction is supported in the cited precedents and is specifically 
discussed in the parliamentary notes on pages 400 and 401 of the cited 
volume. An analogous case emphasizing an intrinsic difference is 
recorded in Cannon's Precedents at volume 6, section 236, reflecting 
that on October 27, 1921, Speaker Gillett held that an amendment 
proposing to censure a Members of the House was not germane to a 
resolution proposing that the Member be expelled from the House.

                              {time}  1245

  The cited precedent reveals several occasions when the Committee on 
the Judiciary, having been referred a question of impeachment against a 
civil officer of the United States, reported a recommendation that 
impeachment was not warranted and, thereafter, called upon the report 
as a question of privilege.
  The occasional inclusion in an accompanying report of the Committee 
on the Judiciary of language recommending that an official be censured 
has not been held to destroy the privilege of an accompanying 
resolution that does not, itself, convey the language of censure.
  The Chair is aware that, in the consideration of a resolution 
proposing to impeach Judge James Peck in 1830, the House considered an 
amendment proposing instead to express disapproval while refraining 
from impeachment. In that instance no Member rose to a point of order, 
and no parliamentary decision was entered from the Chair or by the 
House. The amendment was considered by common sufferance. That no 
Member sought to enforce the rule of germaneness on that occasion does 
not establish a precedent of the House that such an amendment would be 
germane.
  Where the pending resolution addresses impeachment as a question of 
the privileges of the House, the rule of germaneness requires that any 
amendment confine itself to impeachment, whether addressing it in a 
positive or a negative way. Although it may be possible by germane 
amendment to convert a reported resolution of impeachment to resolve 
that impeachment is not warranted, an alternative sanction having no 
equivalent constitutional footing may not be broached as a question of 
privilege and, correspondingly, is not germane.
  The Chair acknowledges that the language of House Resolution 611 
articulates its proposition for impeachment in language that, itself, 
tends to convey opprobrium. The Chair must remain cognizant, however, 
that the resolution does so entirely in the framework of the articles 
of impeachment. Rather than inveighing any separate censure, the 
resolution only effects the constitutional prayer for judgment by the 
Senate.
  The Chair is not passing on the ultimate constitutionality of a 
separate resolution of censure. Indeed, the Chair does not judge the 
constitutionality of measures before the House. Rather, the Chair holds 
today only that the instant proposal to censure or otherwise admonish 
the President of the United States--as it does not constitute a 
question of the privileges of the House--is not germane to the pending 
resolution of impeachment--an intrinsically separate question of the 
privileges of the House.
  The gentleman from Missouri (Mr. Gephardt), the minority leader, is 
recognized.

[[Page H12039]]

  Mr. GEPHARDT. Mr. Speaker, with all due respect, I must appeal the 
ruling of the Chair.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. LaHood). The question is, shall the 
decision of the Chair stand as the judgment of the House?


                      Motion Offered by Mr. Armey

  Mr. ARMEY. Mr. Speaker, I move to lay the appeal on the table.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the 
gentleman from Texas (Mr. Armey) to lay the appeal of the ruling of the 
Chair on the table.
  The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that 
the ayes appeared to have it.


                             Recorded Vote

  Mr. GEPHARDT. Mr. Speaker, I demand a recorded vote.
  A recorded vote was ordered.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Let the Chair announce that this will be a 
15-minute vote, followed by 15-minute votes thereafter.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 230, 
noes 204, not voting 1, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 542]

                               YEAS--230

     Aderholt
     Archer
     Armey
     Bachus
     Baker
     Ballenger
     Barr
     Barrett (NE)
     Bartlett
     Barton
     Bass
     Bateman
     Bereuter
     Bilbray
     Bilirakis
     Bliley
     Blunt
     Boehlert
     Boehner
     Bonilla
     Bono
     Brady (TX)
     Bryant
     Bunning
     Burr
     Burton
     Buyer
     Callahan
     Calvert
     Camp
     Campbell
     Canady
     Cannon
     Castle
     Chabot
     Chambliss
     Chenoweth
     Christensen
     Coble
     Coburn
     Collins
     Combest
     Cook
     Cooksey
     Cox
     Crane
     Crapo
     Cubin
     Cunningham
     Davis (VA)
     Deal
     DeLay
     Diaz-Balart
     Dickey
     Doolittle
     Dreier
     Duncan
     Dunn
     Ehlers
     Ehrlich
     Emerson
     English
     Ensign
     Everett
     Ewing
     Fawell
     Foley
     Forbes
     Fossella
     Fowler
     Fox
     Franks (NJ)
     Frelinghuysen
     Gallegly
     Ganske
     Gekas
     Gibbons
     Gilchrest
     Gillmor
     Gilman
     Gingrich
     Goode
     Goodlatte
     Goodling
     Goss
     Graham
     Granger
     Greenwood
     Gutknecht
     Hall (TX)
     Hansen
     Hastert
     Hastings (WA)
     Hayworth
     Hefley
     Herger
     Hill
     Hilleary
     Hobson
     Hoekstra
     Horn
     Hostettler
     Houghton
     Hulshof
     Hunter
     Hutchinson
     Hyde
     Inglis
     Istook
     Jenkins
     Johnson (CT)
     Johnson, Sam
     Jones
     Kasich
     Kelly
     Kim
     Kingston
     Klug
     Knollenberg
     Kolbe
     LaHood
     Largent
     Latham
     LaTourette
     Lazio
     Leach
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (KY)
     Linder
     Livingston
     LoBiondo
     Lucas
     Manzullo
     McCollum
     McCrery
     McDade
     McHugh
     McInnis
     McIntosh
     McKeon
     Metcalf
     Mica
     Miller (FL)
     Moran (KS)
     Myrick
     Nethercutt
     Neumann
     Ney
     Northup
     Norwood
     Nussle
     Oxley
     Packard
     Pappas
     Parker
     Paul
     Paxon
     Pease
     Peterson (PA)
     Petri
     Pickering
     Pitts
     Pombo
     Porter
     Portman
     Pryce (OH)
     Quinn
     Radanovich
     Ramstad
     Redmond
     Regula
     Riggs
     Riley
     Rogan
     Rogers
     Rohrabacher
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Roukema
     Royce
     Ryun
     Salmon
     Sanford
     Saxton
     Scarborough
     Schaefer, Dan
     Schaffer, Bob
     Sensenbrenner
     Sessions
     Shadegg
     Shaw
     Shays
     Shimkus
     Shuster
     Skeen
     Smith (MI)
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (OR)
     Smith (TX)
     Smith, Linda
     Snowbarger
     Solomon
     Souder
     Spence
     Stearns
     Stenholm
     Stump
     Sununu
     Talent
     Tauzin
     Taylor (MS)
     Taylor (NC)
     Thomas
     Thornberry
     Thune
     Tiahrt
     Upton
     Walsh
     Wamp
     Watkins
     Watts (OK)
     Weldon (FL)
     Weldon (PA)
     Weller
     White
     Whitfield
     Wicker
     Wilson
     Wolf
     Young (AK)
     Young (FL)

                               NAYS--204

     Abercrombie
     Ackerman
     Allen
     Andrews
     Baesler
     Baldacci
     Barcia
     Barrett (WI)
     Becerra
     Bentsen
     Berman
     Berry
     Bishop
     Blagojevich
     Blumenauer
     Bonior
     Borski
     Boswell
     Boucher
     Boyd
     Brady (PA)
     Brown (CA)
     Brown (FL)
     Brown (OH)
     Capps
     Cardin
     Carson
     Clay
     Clayton
     Clement
     Clyburn
     Condit
     Conyers
     Costello
     Coyne
     Cramer
     Cummings
     Danner
     Davis (FL)
     Davis (IL)
     DeFazio
     DeGette
     Delahunt
     DeLauro
     Deutsch
     Dicks
     Dingell
     Dixon
     Doggett
     Dooley
     Doyle
     Edwards
     Engel
     Eshoo
     Etheridge
     Evans
     Farr
     Fattah
     Fazio
     Filner
     Ford
     Frank (MA)
     Frost
     Furse
     Gejdenson
     Gephardt
     Gonzalez
     Gordon
     Green
     Gutierrez
     Hall (OH)
     Hamilton
     Harman
     Hastings (FL)
     Hefner
     Hilliard
     Hinchey
     Hinojosa
     Holden
     Hooley
     Hoyer
     Jackson (IL)
     Jackson-Lee (TX)
     Jefferson
     John
     Johnson (WI)
     Johnson, E. B.
     Kanjorski
     Kaptur
     Kennedy (MA)
     Kennedy (RI)
     Kennelly
     Kildee
     Kilpatrick
     Kind (WI)
     King (NY)
     Kleczka
     Klink
     Kucinich
     LaFalce
     Lampson
     Lantos
     Lee
     Levin
     Lewis (GA)
     Lipinski
     Lofgren
     Lowey
     Luther
     Maloney (CT)
     Maloney (NY)
     Manton
     Markey
     Martinez
     Mascara
     Matsui
     McCarthy (MO)
     McCarthy (NY)
     McDermott
     McGovern
     McHale
     McIntyre
     McKinney
     McNulty
     Meehan
     Meek (FL)
     Meeks (NY)
     Menendez
     Millender-McDonald
     Minge
     Mink
     Moakley
     Mollohan
     Moran (VA)
     Morella
     Murtha
     Nadler
     Neal
     Oberstar
     Obey
     Olver
     Ortiz
     Owens
     Pallone
     Pascrell
     Pastor
     Payne
     Pelosi
     Peterson (MN)
     Pickett
     Pomeroy
     Poshard
     Price (NC)
     Rahall
     Rangel
     Reyes
     Rivers
     Rodriguez
     Roemer
     Rothman
     Roybal-Allard
     Rush
     Sabo
     Sanchez
     Sanders
     Sandlin
     Sawyer
     Schumer
     Scott
     Serrano
     Sherman
     Sisisky
     Skaggs
     Skelton
     Slaughter
     Smith, Adam
     Snyder
     Spratt
     Stabenow
     Stark
     Stokes
     Strickland
     Stupak
     Tanner
     Tauscher
     Thompson
     Thurman
     Tierney
     Torres
     Towns
     Traficant
     Turner
     Velazquez
     Vento
     Visclosky
     Waters
     Watt (NC)
     Waxman
     Wexler
     Weygand
     Wise
     Woolsey
     Wynn
     Yates

                             NOT VOTING--1

       
     Miller (CA)
       

                              {time}  1304

  So the motion to table was agreed to.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
  A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.
  Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Speaker, I rise to speak on the point of order. Mr. 
Speaker our Republican colleagues have agreed that censure is not 
constitutional. Censure is indeed a Constitutional option. In 1800, 
Rep. Ed Livingston (NY) introduced a censure motion against President 
John Adams. The President was successfully represented by Congressman 
John Marshall of Virginia. Representative Marshall argued the case on 
the merits and never once argued that censure was unconstitutional.
  John Marshall went on to become the Chief Justice of the United 
States and was the father of much of our constitutional law. Indeed in 
the landmark 1819 decision McColluch vs Maryland, the court ruled that 
``there is no phrase in the Constitution which excludes incidental or 
implied powers.'' The power of Congress to censure is an obvious 
corollary of the legislatures inherent power as a deliberative body to 
speak its mind.
  It is therefore clear that censure is not prohibited by the 
Constitution and is indeed a germane penalty. I urge the Chair to rule 
the censure motion in order.
  Mr. DELAHUNT. Mr. Speaker, I wish to be heard on the point of order 
and I urge you to overrule the point of order.
  Mr. Speaker, the argument has been made that censure is 
unprecedented, uncommon or unconstitutional. That simply is not the 
case.
  In the impeachment of Judge Peck, an amendment was offered that 
contained a censure. Mr. Moakley spoke to this in his remarks. I want 
to point out that on many other occasions, the House has chosen censure 
over impeachment. I would like to cite a few examples. In the case of 
Judge Speers, the committee report stated ``the record presents a 
series of legal oppressions (that) demand condemnation and criticism.'' 
Even in light of this finding, the committee did not recommend 
proceeding with impeachment and the report containing the censure was 
adopted. (6 Cannon 527) In the cases of Judge Harry Anderson (6 Cannon 
542), Judge Frank Cooper (6 Cannon 549), Judge Grover Moscowitz (6 
Cannon 552), Judge Blodgett (3 Hinds 2516), Judge Boarman (3 Hinds 
2518), Judge Jenkins (3 Hinds 2519) and Judge Ricks (3 Hinds 2520) the 
committee recommended censure instead of proceeding with impeachment.
  The fact of the matter, Mr. Speaker, is that there is a long-standing 
history in this House of substituting censure for impeachment. 
Sometimes, as in the Louderback case, the Judiciary committee 
recommends censure and the House rejects that recommendation and votes 
impeachment.
  Other times, the committee has recommended censure over impeachment, 
and the House has agreed with that recommendation.
  Mr. Speaker, what is important is that the House has had a choice 
between censure and impeachment.
  There is also a long tradition in the House of censuring executive 
officers. A recent Congressional Research Service study finds nine 
instances where the House has attempted to censure federal officials.
  Presidents John Adams, John Tyler, James Polk and James Bucanan were 
all subjects of censure resolutions. In addition, Treasury Secretary 
Alexander Hamilton, Navy Secretary

[[Page H12040]]

Isaac Toucey, Former War Secretary Simon Cameron, Navy Secretary Gideon 
Welles and Ambassador Thomas Bayard, as well, were all subject to 
censure resolutions.
  Indeed private citizens have also been censured by the House. Mr. 
Moakley cited two examples in his opening argument. The House has also 
censured a Mr. John Anderson (2 Hinds 1606), a Mr. Samuel Houston (2 
Hinds 1619) and moved to censure a Mr. Russel Jarvis (2 Hinds 1615).
  I believe these examples will dispel the myth that censure by the 
House is uncommon, unprecedented or unconstitutional.
  The most salient fact is that when the House wants to censure an 
individual--both private citizens and executive officers--it can and it 
has. There is no constitutional prohibition against such an action and 
the Congress has freely engaged in passing such censures.
  The question before the Speaker is, with this long line of precedent, 
can censure be offered as an alternative to impeachment. The answer is 
clearly yes. As I cited above, the House has on many occasions adopted 
reports from the Judiciary Committee that have given the House the 
opportunity to express its views, its lack of regard, its censure, its 
condemnation as an alternative to impeaching a judge. The same model 
should hold here.
  Mr. Speaker, I would argue that the reason this is such a long-
standing practice and precedent of the House is because it just makes 
good common sense. When the House does not feel impeachment is 
warranted, but does want to go on record censuring certain behavior, it 
has. One only need look at the precedents.
  Mr. Speaker, I urge that you overrule the point of order.
  Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Mr. Speaker, throughout this long process 
as I have listened to this divisive debate, I have had to wonder about 
the legacy of the 18th Congressional district. The first person to hold 
this seat was the late Congresswoman Barbara Jordan. She was a member 
of the Congress in 1974 during Watergate, and she was a Member of the 
House Judiciary Committee.
  I have been careful not to mischaracterize her thoughts or words 
during these serious and troubling times. However, throughout the 
debate it seems at every moment the Republican majority continues to 
misuse Ms. Jordan's comments.
  I think it is important to acknowledge the remarks she made today, 
and the impact that those words will have on the actions we take today. 
In her July 24, 1974 speech, in citing the Framers of the Constitution, 
she noted that ``the Framers confined in the Congress the power if need 
be, to remove the President in order to strike a balance between a 
President swollen with power and grown tyrannical . . .''
  She also said impeachment was limited to high crimes and 
misdemeanors, as she cited the federal convention of 1787. Finally, Ms. 
Jordan sheds light on what she might have thought of today's 
proceedings as she states ``A President is impeachable if he attempts 
to subvert the Constitution.'' I think it is important for Congress to 
hear these words that the late Barbara Jordan gave on July 24, 1974.
  A sense of the Congress resolution on censure is not 
unconstitutional, it is not prohibited by the words of the 
Constitution. It is not specifically noted in the Constitution, but 
however neither are postal stamps, education, or social security. This 
resolution is germane and constitutionally sound. Mr. Speaker please 
rule and allow a free standing Resolution on Censure to be voted on by 
this House--do not deny the will of the people.
  The Bible, Mark 3:25, teaches that ``[I]f a house be divided against 
itself, that house cannot stand.'' It's time to stop the malicious 
attacks because surely, we will all perish. It is time to close ranks 
and get back to the business of America. It is time to heal this 
nation. Today let's restore the American public's faith in the 
Constitution; do not deny their will.
  We need to begin that healing process now to return America to 
greatness.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. LaHood). The question has been divided 
for a vote.
  The question is on the adoption of article I.
  The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that 
the ayes appeared to have it.
  Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 228, 
nays 206, not voting 1, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 543]

                               YEAS--228

     Aderholt
     Archer
     Armey
     Bachus
     Baker
     Ballenger
     Barr
     Barrett (NE)
     Bartlett
     Barton
     Bass
     Bateman
     Bereuter
     Bilbray
     Bilirakis
     Bliley
     Blunt
     Boehlert
     Boehner
     Bonilla
     Bono
     Brady (TX)
     Bryant
     Bunning
     Burr
     Burton
     Buyer
     Callahan
     Calvert
     Camp
     Campbell
     Canady
     Cannon
     Castle
     Chabot
     Chambliss
     Chenoweth
     Christensen
     Coble
     Coburn
     Collins
     Combest
     Cook
     Cooksey
     Cox
     Crane
     Crapo
     Cubin
     Cunningham
     Davis (VA)
     Deal
     DeLay
     Diaz-Balart
     Dickey
     Doolittle
     Dreier
     Duncan
     Dunn
     Ehlers
     Ehrlich
     Emerson
     English
     Ensign
     Everett
     Ewing
     Fawell
     Foley
     Forbes
     Fossella
     Fowler
     Fox
     Franks (NJ)
     Frelinghuysen
     Gallegly
     Ganske
     Gekas
     Gibbons
     Gilchrest
     Gillmor
     Gilman
     Gingrich
     Goode
     Goodlatte
     Goodling
     Goss
     Graham
     Granger
     Greenwood
     Gutknecht
     Hall (TX)
     Hansen
     Hastert
     Hastings (WA)
     Hayworth
     Hefley
     Herger
     Hill
     Hilleary
     Hobson
     Hoekstra
     Horn
     Hostettler
     Hulshof
     Hunter
     Hutchinson
     Hyde
     Inglis
     Istook
     Jenkins
     Johnson (CT)
     Johnson, Sam
     Jones
     Kasich
     Kelly
     Kim
     Kingston
     Klug
     Knollenberg
     Kolbe
     LaHood
     Largent
     Latham
     LaTourette
     Lazio
     Leach
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (KY)
     Linder
     Livingston
     LoBiondo
     Lucas
     Manzullo
     McCollum
     McCrery
     McDade
     McHale
     McHugh
     McInnis
     McIntosh
     McKeon
     Metcalf
     Mica
     Miller (FL)
     Moran (KS)
     Myrick
     Nethercutt
     Neumann
     Ney
     Northup
     Norwood
     Nussle
     Oxley
     Packard
     Pappas
     Parker
     Paul
     Paxon
     Pease
     Peterson (PA)
     Petri
     Pickering
     Pitts
     Pombo
     Porter
     Portman
     Pryce (OH)
     Quinn
     Radanovich
     Ramstad
     Redmond
     Regula
     Riggs
     Riley
     Rogan
     Rogers
     Rohrabacher
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Roukema
     Royce
     Ryun
     Salmon
     Sanford
     Saxton
     Scarborough
     Schaefer, Dan
     Schaffer, Bob
     Sensenbrenner
     Sessions
     Shadegg
     Shaw
     Shimkus
     Shuster
     Skeen
     Smith (MI)
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (OR)
     Smith (TX)
     Smith, Linda
     Snowbarger
     Solomon
     Spence
     Stearns
     Stenholm
     Stump
     Sununu
     Talent
     Tauzin
     Taylor (MS)
     Taylor (NC)
     Thomas
     Thornberry
     Thune
     Tiahrt
     Upton
     Walsh
     Wamp
     Watkins
     Watts (OK)
     Weldon (FL)
     Weldon (PA)
     Weller
     White
     Whitfield
     Wicker
     Wilson
     Wolf
     Young (AK)
     Young (FL)

                               NAYS--206

     Abercrombie
     Ackerman
     Allen
     Andrews
     Baesler
     Baldacci
     Barcia
     Barrett (WI)
     Becerra
     Bentsen
     Berman
     Berry
     Bishop
     Blagojevich
     Blumenauer
     Bonior
     Borski
     Boswell
     Boucher
     Boyd
     Brady (PA)
     Brown (CA)
     Brown (FL)
     Brown (OH)
     Capps
     Cardin
     Carson
     Clay
     Clayton
     Clement
     Clyburn
     Condit
     Conyers
     Costello
     Coyne
     Cramer
     Cummings
     Danner
     Davis (FL)
     Davis (IL)
     DeFazio
     DeGette
     Delahunt
     DeLauro
     Deutsch
     Dicks
     Dingell
     Dixon
     Doggett
     Dooley
     Doyle
     Edwards
     Engel
     Eshoo
     Etheridge
     Evans
     Farr
     Fattah
     Fazio
     Filner
     Ford
     Frank (MA)
     Frost
     Furse
     Gejdenson
     Gephardt
     Gonzalez
     Gordon
     Green
     Gutierrez
     Hall (OH)
     Hamilton
     Harman
     Hastings (FL)
     Hefner
     Hilliard
     Hinchey
     Hinojosa
     Holden
     Hooley
     Houghton
     Hoyer
     Jackson (IL)
     Jackson-Lee (TX)
     Jefferson
     John
     Johnson (WI)
     Johnson, E.B.
     Kanjorski
     Kaptur
     Kennedy (MA)
     Kennedy (RI)
     Kennelly
     Kildee
     Kilpatrick
     Kind (WI)
     King (NY)
     Kleczka
     Klink
     Kucinich
     LaFalce
     Lampson
     Lantos
     Lee
     Levin
     Lewis (GA)
     Lipinski
     Lofgren
     Lowey
     Luther
     Maloney (CT)
     Maloney (NY)
     Manton
     Markey
     Martinez
     Mascara
     Matsui
     McCarthy (MO)
     McCarthy (NY)
     McDermott
     McGovern
     McIntyre
     McKinney
     McNulty
     Meehan
     Meek (FL)
     Meeks (NY)
     Menendez
     Millender-McDonald
     Minge
     Mink
     Moakley
     Mollohan
     Moran (VA)
     Morella
     Murtha
     Nadler
     Neal
     Oberstar
     Obey
     Olver
     Ortiz
     Owens
     Pallone
     Pascrell
     Pastor
     Payne
     Pelosi
     Peterson (MN)
     Pickett
     Pomeroy
     Poshard
     Price (NC)
     Rahall
     Rangel
     Reyes
     Rivers
     Rodriguez
     Roemer
     Rothman
     Roybal-Allard
     Rush
     Sabo
     Sanchez
     Sanders
     Sandlin
     Sawyer
     Schumer
     Scott
     Serrano
     Shays
     Sherman
     Sisisky
     Skaggs
     Skelton
     Slaughter
     Smith, Adam
     Snyder
     Souder
     Spratt
     Stabenow
     Stark
     Stokes
     Strickland
     Stupak
     Tanner
     Tauscher
     Thompson
     Thurman
     Tierney
     Torres
     Towns
     Traficant
     Turner
     Velazquez
     Vento
     Visclosky
     Waters
     Watt (NC)
     Waxman
     Wexler
     Weygand
     Wise
     Woolsey
     Wynn
     Yates

                             NOT VOTING--1

       
     Miller (CA)
       

                              {time}  1323

  So Article I was agreed to.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

[[Page H12041]]

  A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. LaHood). The question is on the adoption 
of Article II.
  The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that 
the ayes appeared to have it.
  Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 205, 
nays 229, not voting 1, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 544]

                               YEAS--205

     Aderholt
     Archer
     Armey
     Bachus
     Baker
     Ballenger
     Barr
     Barrett (NE)
     Bartlett
     Barton
     Bass
     Bateman
     Bereuter
     Bilbray
     Bilirakis
     Bliley
     Blunt
     Boehlert
     Boehner
     Bonilla
     Bono
     Brady (TX)
     Bryant
     Bunning
     Burton
     Buyer
     Callahan
     Calvert
     Camp
     Canady
     Cannon
     Chabot
     Chambliss
     Chenoweth
     Christensen
     Coble
     Coburn
     Collins
     Combest
     Cook
     Cooksey
     Cox
     Crane
     Crapo
     Cubin
     Cunningham
     Davis (VA)
     Deal
     DeLay
     Diaz-Balart
     Doolittle
     Dreier
     Duncan
     Dunn
     Ehlers
     Ehrlich
     Emerson
     Everett
     Ewing
     Fawell
     Forbes
     Fossella
     Fowler
     Fox
     Franks (NJ)
     Frelinghuysen
     Gallegly
     Ganske
     Gekas
     Gilchrest
     Gillmor
     Gingrich
     Goode
     Goodlatte
     Goodling
     Goss
     Granger
     Gutknecht
     Hall (TX)
     Hansen
     Hastert
     Hastings (WA)
     Hayworth
     Hefley
     Herger
     Hill
     Hilleary
     Hoekstra
     Horn
     Hostettler
     Hulshof
     Hunter
     Hutchinson
     Hyde
     Inglis
     Istook
     Jenkins
     Johnson (CT)
     Johnson, Sam
     Jones
     Kasich
     Kingston
     Knollenberg
     Kolbe
     LaHood
     Largent
     Latham
     LaTourette
     Leach
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (KY)
     Linder
     Livingston
     LoBiondo
     Lucas
     Manzullo
     McCollum
     McCrery
     McDade
     McHale
     McHugh
     McInnis
     McIntosh
     McKeon
     Metcalf
     Mica
     Miller (FL)
     Moran (KS)
     Myrick
     Nethercutt
     Neumann
     Northup
     Norwood
     Nussle
     Oxley
     Packard
     Pappas
     Parker
     Paul
     Paxon
     Pease
     Peterson (PA)
     Petri
     Pickering
     Pitts
     Pombo
     Porter
     Portman
     Quinn
     Radanovich
     Redmond
     Regula
     Riggs
     Riley
     Rogan
     Rogers
     Rohrabacher
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Roukema
     Royce
     Ryun
     Salmon
     Saxton
     Schaefer, Dan
     Schaffer, Bob
     Sensenbrenner
     Sessions
     Shadegg
     Shimkus
     Skeen
     Smith (MI)
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (OR)
     Smith (TX)
     Smith, Linda
     Snowbarger
     Solomon
     Spence
     Stearns
     Stenholm
     Stump
     Sununu
     Talent
     Tauzin
     Taylor (MS)
     Taylor (NC)
     Thomas
     Thornberry
     Thune
     Tiahrt
     Upton
     Walsh
     Wamp
     Watkins
     Watts (OK)
     Weldon (FL)
     Weldon (PA)
     Weller
     White
     Whitfield
     Wicker
     Wilson
     Wolf
     Young (AK)
     Young (FL)

                               NAYS--229

     Abercrombie
     Ackerman
     Allen
     Andrews
     Baesler
     Baldacci
     Barcia
     Barrett (WI)
     Becerra
     Bentsen
     Berman
     Berry
     Bishop
     Blagojevich
     Blumenauer
     Bonior
     Borski
     Boswell
     Boucher
     Boyd
     Brady (PA)
     Brown (CA)
     Brown (FL)
     Brown (OH)
     Burr
     Campbell
     Capps
     Cardin
     Carson
     Castle
     Clay
     Clayton
     Clement
     Clyburn
     Condit
     Conyers
     Costello
     Coyne
     Cramer
     Cummings
     Danner
     Davis (FL)
     Davis (IL)
     DeFazio
     DeGette
     Delahunt
     DeLauro
     Deutsch
     Dickey
     Dicks
     Dingell
     Dixon
     Doggett
     Dooley
     Doyle
     Edwards
     Engel
     English
     Ensign
     Eshoo
     Etheridge
     Evans
     Farr
     Fattah
     Fazio
     Filner
     Foley
     Ford
     Frank (MA)
     Frost
     Furse
     Gejdenson
     Gephardt
     Gibbons
     Gilman
     Gonzalez
     Gordon
     Graham
     Green
     Greenwood
     Gutierrez
     Hall (OH)
     Hamilton
     Harman
     Hastings (FL)
     Hefner
     Hilliard
     Hinchey
     Hinojosa
     Hobson
     Holden
     Hooley
     Houghton
     Hoyer
     Jackson (IL)
     Jackson-Lee (TX)
     Jefferson
     John
     Johnson (WI)
     Johnson, E.B.
     Kanjorski
     Kaptur
     Kelly
     Kennedy (MA)
     Kennedy (RI)
     Kennelly
     Kildee
     Kilpatrick
     Kim
     Kind (WI)
     King (NY)
     Kleczka
     Klink
     Klug
     Kucinich
     LaFalce
     Lampson
     Lantos
     Lazio
     Lee
     Levin
     Lewis (GA)
     Lipinski
     Lofgren
     Lowey
     Luther
     Maloney (CT)
     Maloney (NY)
     Manton
     Markey
     Martinez
     Mascara
     Matsui
     McCarthy (MO)
     McCarthy (NY)
     McDermott
     McGovern
     McIntyre
     McKinney
     McNulty
     Meehan
     Meek (FL)
     Meeks (NY)
     Menendez
     Millender-McDonald
     Minge
     Mink
     Moakley
     Mollohan
     Moran (VA)
     Morella
     Murtha
     Nadler
     Neal
     Ney
     Oberstar
     Obey
     Olver
     Ortiz
     Owens
     Pallone
     Pascrell
     Pastor
     Payne
     Pelosi
     Peterson (MN)
     Pickett
     Pomeroy
     Poshard
     Price (NC)
     Pryce (OH)
     Rahall
     Ramstad
     Rangel
     Reyes
     Rivers
     Rodriguez
     Roemer
     Rothman
     Roybal-Allard
     Rush
     Sabo
     Sanchez
     Sanders
     Sandlin
     Sanford
     Sawyer
     Scarborough
     Schumer
     Scott
     Serrano
     Shaw
     Shays
     Sherman
     Shuster
     Sisisky
     Skaggs
     Skelton
     Slaughter
     Smith, Adam
     Snyder
     Souder
     Spratt
     Stabenow
     Stark
     Stokes
     Strickland
     Stupak
     Tanner
     Tauscher
     Thompson
     Thurman
     Tierney
     Torres
     Towns
     Traficant
     Turner
     Velazquez
     Vento
     Visclosky
     Waters
     Watt (NC)
     Waxman
     Wexler
     Weygand
     Wise
     Woolsey
     Wynn
     Yates

                             NOT VOTING--1

       
     Miller (CA)
       

                              {time}  1340

  So Article II was not agreed to.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
  A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. LaHood). The question is on the adoption 
of Article III.
  The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that 
the ayes appeared to have it.
  Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 221, 
nays 212, not voting 2, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 545]

                               YEAS--221

     Aderholt
     Archer
     Armey
     Bachus
     Baker
     Ballenger
     Barr
     Barrett (NE)
     Bartlett
     Barton
     Bass
     Bateman
     Bereuter
     Bilbray
     Bilirakis
     Bliley
     Blunt
     Boehner
     Bonilla
     Bono
     Brady (TX)
     Bryant
     Bunning
     Burr
     Burton
     Buyer
     Callahan
     Calvert
     Camp
     Campbell
     Canady
     Cannon
     Chabot
     Chambliss
     Chenoweth
     Christensen
     Coble
     Coburn
     Collins
     Combest
     Cook
     Cooksey
     Cox
     Crane
     Crapo
     Cubin
     Cunningham
     Davis (VA)
     Deal
     DeLay
     Diaz-Balart
     Dickey
     Doolittle
     Dreier
     Duncan
     Dunn
     Ehlers
     Ehrlich
     Emerson
     Ensign
     Everett
     Ewing
     Fawell
     Foley
     Forbes
     Fossella
     Fowler
     Fox
     Franks (NJ)
     Frelinghuysen
     Gallegly
     Ganske
     Gekas
     Gibbons
     Gilchrest
     Gillmor
     Gilman
     Gingrich
     Goode
     Goodlatte
     Goodling
     Goss
     Graham
     Granger
     Greenwood
     Gutknecht
     Hall (TX)
     Hansen
     Hastert
     Hastings (WA)
     Hayworth
     Hefley
     Herger
     Hill
     Hilleary
     Hobson
     Hoekstra
     Horn
     Hostettler
     Hulshof
     Hunter
     Hutchinson
     Hyde
     Inglis
     Istook
     Jenkins
     Johnson, Sam
     Jones
     Kasich
     Kelly
     Kingston
     Klug
     Knollenberg
     Kolbe
     LaHood
     Largent
     Latham
     LaTourette
     Lazio
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (KY)
     Linder
     Livingston
     LoBiondo
     Lucas
     Manzullo
     McCollum
     McCrery
     McDade
     McHale
     McInnis
     McIntosh
     McKeon
     Metcalf
     Mica
     Miller (FL)
     Moran (KS)
     Myrick
     Nethercutt
     Neumann
     Ney
     Northup
     Norwood
     Nussle
     Oxley
     Packard
     Pappas
     Parker
     Paul
     Paxon
     Pease
     Peterson (PA)
     Petri
     Pickering
     Pitts
     Pombo
     Porter
     Portman
     Pryce (OH)
     Quinn
     Radanovich
     Ramstad
     Redmond
     Riggs
     Riley
     Rogan
     Rogers
     Rohrabacher
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Roukema
     Royce
     Ryun
     Salmon
     Sanford
     Saxton
     Scarborough
     Schaefer, Dan
     Schaffer, Bob
     Sensenbrenner
     Sessions
     Shadegg
     Shaw
     Shimkus
     Shuster
     Skeen
     Smith (MI)
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (OR)
     Smith (TX)
     Smith, Linda
     Snowbarger
     Solomon
     Souder
     Spence
     Stearns
     Stenholm
     Stump
     Sununu
     Talent
     Tauzin
     Taylor (MS)
     Taylor (NC)
     Thomas
     Thornberry
     Thune
     Tiahrt
     Upton
     Walsh
     Wamp
     Watkins
     Watts (OK)
     Weldon (FL)
     Weldon (PA)
     Weller
     White
     Whitfield
     Wicker
     Wilson
     Wolf
     Young (AK)
     Young (FL)

                               NAYS--212

     Abercrombie
     Ackerman
     Andrews
     Baesler
     Baldacci
     Barcia
     Barrett (WI)
     Becerra
     Bentsen
     Berman
     Berry
     Bishop
     Blagojevich
     Blumenauer
     Boehlert
     Bonior
     Borski
     Boswell
     Boucher
     Boyd
     Brady (PA)
     Brown (CA)
     Brown (FL)
     Brown (OH)
     Capps
     Cardin
     Carson
     Castle
     Clay
     Clayton
     Clement
     Clyburn
     Condit
     Conyers
     Costello
     Coyne
     Cramer
     Cummings
     Danner
     Davis (FL)
     Davis (IL)
     DeFazio
     DeGette
     Delahunt
     DeLauro
     Deutsch
     Dicks
     Dingell
     Dixon
     Doggett
     Dooley
     Doyle
     Edwards
     Engel
     English
     Eshoo
     Etheridge
     Evans
     Farr
     Fattah

[[Page H12042]]


     Fazio
     Filner
     Ford
     Frank (MA)
     Frost
     Furse
     Gejdenson
     Gephardt
     Gonzalez
     Gordon
     Green
     Gutierrez
     Hall (OH)
     Hamilton
     Harman
     Hastings (FL)
     Hefner
     Hilliard
     Hinchey
     Hinojosa
     Holden
     Hooley
     Houghton
     Hoyer
     Jackson (IL)
     Jackson-Lee (TX)
     Jefferson
     John
     Johnson (CT)
     Johnson (WI)
     Johnson, E. B.
     Kanjorski
     Kaptur
     Kennedy (MA)
     Kennedy (RI)
     Kennelly
     Kildee
     Kilpatrick
     Kim
     Kind (WI)
     King (NY)
     Kleczka
     Klink
     Kucinich
     LaFalce
     Lampson
     Lantos
     Leach
     Lee
     Levin
     Lewis (GA)
     Lipinski
     Lofgren
     Lowey
     Luther
     Maloney (CT)
     Maloney (NY)
     Manton
     Markey
     Martinez
     Mascara
     Matsui
     McCarthy (MO)
     McCarthy (NY)
     McDermott
     McGovern
     McHugh
     McIntyre
     McKinney
     McNulty
     Meehan
     Meek (FL)
     Meeks (NY)
     Menendez
     Millender-McDonald
     Minge
     Mink
     Moakley
     Mollohan
     Moran (VA)
     Morella
     Murtha
     Nadler
     Neal
     Oberstar
     Obey
     Olver
     Ortiz
     Owens
     Pallone
     Pascrell
     Pastor
     Payne
     Pelosi
     Peterson (MN)
     Pickett
     Pomeroy
     Poshard
     Price (NC)
     Rahall
     Rangel
     Regula
     Reyes
     Rivers
     Rodriguez
     Roemer
     Rothman
     Roybal-Allard
     Rush
     Sabo
     Sanchez
     Sanders
     Sandlin
     Sawyer
     Schumer
     Scott
     Serrano
     Shays
     Sherman
     Sisisky
     Skaggs
     Skelton
     Slaughter
     Smith, Adam
     Snyder
     Spratt
     Stabenow
     Stark
     Stokes
     Strickland
     Stupak
     Tanner
     Tauscher
     Thompson
     Thurman
     Tierney
     Torres
     Towns
     Traficant
     Turner
     Velazquez
     Vento
     Visclosky
     Waters
     Watt (NC)
     Waxman
     Wexler
     Weygand
     Wise
     Woolsey
     Wynn
     Yates

                             NOT VOTING--2

     Allen
     Miller (CA)
       

                              {time}  1356

  So Article III was agreed to.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
  A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. LaHood). The question is on the adoption 
of Article IV.
  The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that 
the ayes appeared to have it.
  Ms. LOFGREN. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 148, 
nays 285, not voting 2, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 546]

                               YEAS--148

     Aderholt
     Archer
     Armey
     Bachus
     Baker
     Ballenger
     Barr
     Barrett (NE)
     Bartlett
     Barton
     Bateman
     Bilirakis
     Bliley
     Blunt
     Boehner
     Bono
     Brady (TX)
     Bryant
     Bunning
     Burton
     Buyer
     Callahan
     Calvert
     Camp
     Canady
     Cannon
     Chabot
     Chambliss
     Chenoweth
     Christensen
     Coble
     Coburn
     Collins
     Combest
     Cook
     Cooksey
     Cox
     Crane
     Crapo
     Cubin
     Cunningham
     Deal
     DeLay
     Diaz-Balart
     Doolittle
     Dreier
     Duncan
     Dunn
     Ehlers
     Everett
     Ewing
     Forbes
     Fowler
     Fox
     Gallegly
     Gekas
     Gibbons
     Gingrich
     Goodlatte
     Goodling
     Graham
     Gutknecht
     Hansen
     Hastert
     Hastings (WA)
     Hayworth
     Herger
     Hilleary
     Hoekstra
     Horn
     Hostettler
     Hunter
     Hutchinson
     Hyde
     Inglis
     Istook
     Johnson, Sam
     Jones
     Kingston
     Knollenberg
     LaHood
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (KY)
     Linder
     Livingston
     Lucas
     Manzullo
     McCollum
     McDade
     McKeon
     Metcalf
     Mica
     Miller (FL)
     Myrick
     Neumann
     Norwood
     Nussle
     Oxley
     Packard
     Pappas
     Paul
     Paxon
     Pease
     Peterson (PA)
     Pickering
     Pitts
     Pombo
     Radanovich
     Redmond
     Riley
     Rogan
     Rohrabacher
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Roukema
     Royce
     Ryun
     Salmon
     Sanford
     Schaefer, Dan
     Schaffer, Bob
     Sensenbrenner
     Sessions
     Skeen
     Smith (MI)
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (OR)
     Smith (TX)
     Smith, Linda
     Snowbarger
     Solomon
     Spence
     Stearns
     Stump
     Sununu
     Talent
     Taylor (MS)
     Taylor (NC)
     Thomas
     Tiahrt
     Wamp
     Watkins
     Watts (OK)
     Weldon (FL)
     Wicker
     Wilson
     Wolf
     Young (AK)
     Young (FL)

                               NAYS--285

     Abercrombie
     Ackerman
     Andrews
     Baesler
     Baldacci
     Barcia
     Barrett (WI)
     Bass
     Becerra
     Bentsen
     Bereuter
     Berman
     Berry
     Bilbray
     Bishop
     Blagojevich
     Blumenauer
     Boehlert
     Bonilla
     Bonior
     Borski
     Boswell
     Boucher
     Boyd
     Brady (PA)
     Brown (CA)
     Brown (FL)
     Brown (OH)
     Burr
     Campbell
     Capps
     Cardin
     Carson
     Castle
     Clay
     Clayton
     Clement
     Clyburn
     Condit
     Conyers
     Costello
     Coyne
     Cramer
     Cummings
     Danner
     Davis (FL)
     Davis (IL)
     Davis (VA)
     DeFazio
     DeGette
     Delahunt
     DeLauro
     Deutsch
     Dickey
     Dicks
     Dingell
     Dixon
     Doggett
     Dooley
     Doyle
     Edwards
     Ehrlich
     Emerson
     Engel
     English
     Ensign
     Eshoo
     Etheridge
     Evans
     Farr
     Fattah
     Fawell
     Fazio
     Filner
     Foley
     Ford
     Fossella
     Frank (MA)
     Franks (NJ)
     Frelinghuysen
     Frost
     Furse
     Ganske
     Gejdenson
     Gephardt
     Gilchrest
     Gillmor
     Gilman
     Gonzalez
     Goode
     Gordon
     Goss
     Granger
     Green
     Greenwood
     Gutierrez
     Hall (OH)
     Hall (TX)
     Hamilton
     Harman
     Hastings (FL)
     Hefley
     Hefner
     Hill
     Hilliard
     Hinchey
     Hinojosa
     Hobson
     Holden
     Hooley
     Houghton
     Hoyer
     Hulshof
     Jackson (IL)
     Jackson-Lee (TX)
     Jefferson
     Jenkins
     John
     Johnson (CT)
     Johnson (WI)
     Johnson, E.B.
     Kanjorski
     Kaptur
     Kasich
     Kelly
     Kennedy (MA)
     Kennedy (RI)
     Kennelly
     Kildee
     Kilpatrick
     Kim
     Kind (WI)
     King (NY)
     Kleczka
     Klink
     Klug
     Kolbe
     Kucinich
     LaFalce
     Lampson
     Lantos
     Largent
     Latham
     LaTourette
     Lazio
     Leach
     Lee
     Levin
     Lewis (GA)
     Lipinski
     LoBiondo
     Lofgren
     Lowey
     Luther
     Maloney (CT)
     Maloney (NY)
     Manton
     Markey
     Martinez
     Mascara
     Matsui
     McCarthy (MO)
     McCarthy (NY)
     McCrery
     McDermott
     McGovern
     McHale
     McHugh
     McInnis
     McIntosh
     McIntyre
     McKinney
     McNulty
     Meehan
     Meek (FL)
     Meeks (NY)
     Menendez
     Millender-McDonald
     Minge
     Mink
     Moakley
     Mollohan
     Moran (KS)
     Moran (VA)
     Morella
     Murtha
     Nadler
     Neal
     Nethercutt
     Ney
     Northup
     Oberstar
     Obey
     Olver
     Ortiz
     Owens
     Pallone
     Parker
     Pascrell
     Pastor
     Payne
     Pelosi
     Peterson (MN)
     Petri
     Pickett
     Pomeroy
     Porter
     Portman
     Poshard
     Price (NC)
     Pryce (OH)
     Quinn
     Rahall
     Ramstad
     Rangel
     Regula
     Reyes
     Riggs
     Rivers
     Rodriguez
     Roemer
     Rogers
     Rothman
     Roybal-Allard
     Rush
     Sabo
     Sanchez
     Sanders
     Sandlin
     Sawyer
     Saxton
     Scarborough
     Schumer
     Scott
     Serrano
     Shadegg
     Shaw
     Shays
     Sherman
     Shimkus
     Shuster
     Sisisky
     Skaggs
     Skelton
     Slaughter
     Smith, Adam
     Snyder
     Souder
     Spratt
     Stabenow
     Stark
     Stenholm
     Stokes
     Strickland
     Stupak
     Tanner
     Tauscher
     Tauzin
     Thompson
     Thornberry
     Thune
     Thurman
     Tierney
     Torres
     Towns
     Traficant
     Turner
     Upton
     Velazquez
     Vento
     Visclosky
     Walsh
     Waters
     Watt (NC)
     Waxman
     Weldon (PA)
     Weller
     Wexler
     Weygand
     White
     Whitfield
     Wise
     Woolsey
     Wynn
     Yates

                             NOT VOTING--2

     Allen
     Miller (CA)
       

                              {time}  1413

  Mr. HEFLEY changed his vote from ``yea'' to ``nay.''
  So Article IV was not agreed to.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
  A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

                          ____________________