INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1999
(House of Representatives - May 07, 1998)

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[Pages H2944-H2978]
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          INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1999

  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, by direction of the Committee on Rules, I call 
up House Resolution 420 and ask for its immediate consideration.
  The Clerk read the resolution, as follows:

                              H. Res. 420

       Resolved, That at any time after the adoption of this 
     resolution the Speaker may, pursuant to clause 1(b) of rule 
     XXIII, declare the House resolved into the Committee of the 
     Whole House on the state of the Union for consideration of 
     the bill (H.R. 3694) to authorize appropriations for fiscal 
     year 1999 for intelligence and intelligence-related 
     activities of the United States Government, the Community 
     Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency 
     Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes. The 
     first reading of the bill shall be dispensed with. Points of 
     order against consideration of the bill for failure to comply 
     with clause 2(l)(6) of rule XI are waived. General debate 
     shall be confined to the bill and shall not exceed one hour 
     equally divided and controlled by the chairman and ranking 
     minority member of the Permanent Select Committee on 
     Intelligence. After general debate the bill shall be 
     considered for amendment under the five-minute rule. It shall 
     be in order to consider as an original bill for the purpose 
     of amendment under the five-minute rule the amendment in the 
     nature of a substitute recommended by the Permanent Select 
     Committee on Intelligence now printed in the bill, modified 
     by striking section 401 (and redesignating succeeding 
     sections accordingly). That amendment in the nature of a 
     substitute shall be considered by title rather than by 
     section. Each title shall be considered as read. Points of 
     order against that amendment in the nature of a substitute 
     for failure to comply with clause 7 of rule XVI or clause 
     5(b) of rule XXI are waived. No amendment to that amendment 
     in the nature of a substitute shall be in order unless 
     printed in the portion of the Congressional Record designated 
     for that purpose in clause 6 of rule XXIII. Printed 
     amendments shall be considered as read. The chairman of the 
     Committee of the Whole may: (1) postpone until a time during 
     further consideration in the Committee of the Whole a request 
     for a recorded vote on any amendment; and (2) reduce to five 
     minutes the minimum time for electronic voting on any 
     postponed question that follows another electronic vote 
     without intervening business, provided that the minimum time 
     for electronic voting on the first in any series of questions 
     shall be 15 minutes. At the conclusion of consideration of 
     the bill for amendment the Committee shall rise and report 
     the bill to the House with such amendments as may have been 
     adopted. Any Member may demand a separate vote in the House 
     on any amendment adopted in the Committee of the Whole to the 
     bill or the amendment in the nature of a substitute made in 
     order as original text. The previous question shall be 
     considered as ordered on the bill and amendments thereto to 
     final passage without intervening motion except one motion to 
     recommit with or without instructions.

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) is 
recognized for 1 hour.

[[Page H2945]]

  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, for the purposes of debate only, I yield the 
customary 30 minutes to my friend, the gentlewoman from New York (Ms. 
Slaughter), pending which I yield myself such time as I may consume. 
During consideration of this resolution, all time yielded is for the 
purpose of debate only.
  Mr. Speaker, H. Res. 420 is a modified open rule providing for the 
consideration of H.R. 3694, the Fiscal Year 1999 Intelligence 
Authorization Act. What makes this rule modified open instead of fully 
open is a preprinting requirement for amendments, whose purpose is to 
ensure that the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence has an 
opportunity to work with Members seeking to offer germane amendments to 
ensure that important issues are addressed without threatening 
disclosure of sensitive, classified information. This preprinting 
requirement has become standard procedure for consideration of the 
annual intelligence authorization and has not been controversial.
  Because the leadership sought to have this bill on the floor today, 
the rule also includes a waiver of points of order against the 
consideration of the bill for failure to comply with the clause 2(1)(6) 
of rule XI, which requires a three-day layover of a committee report.
  The committee's report was properly filed on Tuesday of this week, 
and Members have had notice of availability of classified portions of 
the authorization measure since late last week when public 
announcements were, indeed, made from the floor.
  It is my understanding that there is no objection to this slight 
speeding up of the schedule to accommodate changes stemming from the 
unrelated scheduling matters and to accommodate Members' travel plans.
  The rule provides for 1 hour of general debate on the bill, time 
equally divided between the chairman and ranking member of the 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
  In addition, the rule makes in order as an original bill for the 
purpose of an amendment the committee amendment in the nature of a 
substitute now printed in the bill, modified by striking section 401 of 
the bill.
  That modification, a self-executing change accomplished through the 
rule, is designed to addressed a Budget Act technicality relating to a 
provision of the bill extending the early-out retirement program for 
the CIA.
  We were advised that, due to the fact that we still await this year's 
budget resolution, the early-out provision found in title IV of the 
bill causes a Budget Act problem, and so the provision is being removed 
from the bill with the understanding that the substance of the issue 
will be addressed at a later stage of legislative process of H.R. 3694.

                              {time}  1200

  The rule further provides that the amendment in the nature of a 
substitute shall be considered by title and that each title shall be 
considered as read.
  The rule also waives points of order against the committee amendment 
for failure to comply with clause 7 of rule XVI prohibiting nongermane 
amendments or clause 5(b) of rule XXI, prohibiting tax or tariff 
provisions in a bill not reported by a committee with jurisdiction over 
revenue measures. Both of these waivers apply to a section of H.R. 3694 
regarding the application of sanctions laws to intelligence activities 
in title III of the bill. That provision is nongermane to the 
introduced version of H.R. 3694, and it deals with subject matter 
falling within the jurisdiction of the Committee on Ways and Means.
  Based on an exchange of letters between the two committees, there is 
no controversy on this matter. However, these waivers are necessary 
under the rules of the House. And during general debate, I will 
introduce into the Record that correspondence between the two 
committees.
  I would also point out for the record the Committee on National 
Security has, by letter, discharged itself from consideration of the 
matters in this bill that fall within its purview.
  Mr. Speaker, the rule permits the Chairman of the Committee of the 
Whole to postpone the vote on any amendment and reduce voting time to 5 
minutes on any series of questions provided that the first vote shall 
not be less than 15 minutes.
  Finally, the rule provides for the traditional motion to recommit 
with or without instructions.
  Mr. Speaker, that was a long explanation of a rule that is, in fact, 
straightforward, simple, and traditional for this piece of legislation. 
I know of no controversy about this rule. I urge Members to support 
this rule.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Ms. SLAUGHTER. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Florida for 
yielding to me the customary 30 minutes, and I yield myself such time 
as I may consume.
  (Ms. SLAUGHTER asked and was given permission to revise and extend 
her remarks.)
  Ms. SLAUGHTER. Mr. Speaker, I do not oppose this rule. It allows 
amendments that are germane to be offered. However, H. Res. 420 does 
include one waiver of a House rule that troubles me. The rule waives 
clause 2(L)(6) of rule XI that provides for a 3-day layover of the 
committee report accompanying the bill.
  This House rule allows Members time to study the report and decide 
whether they would like to offer or support amendments. The 3-day 
opportunity to study the bill and report is particularly important in 
this case because many provisions of the intelligence bills are 
classified and, if a Member wishes to review those portions, a Member 
must make arrangements with the Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence. To cut short the standard review time under these 
circumstances is unfortunate.
  And while I understand that the majority and the minority on the 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence had no objection to the 
waiver, we should note that it is not the committee's rights but the 
rights of Members not on the committee that the House rule is designed 
to protect.
  The gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss), the chairman of the committee, 
is to be commended for avoiding the need for waiver of the Budget Act 
by self-executing in this rule an amendment striking the offending 
section of the bill.
  The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence also worked with the 
Committee on Ways and Means to gain its acquiescence to a violation of 
a House rule designed to protect the jurisdiction of the Committee on 
Ways and Means.
  While I often question the need for a requirement for preprinting in 
the Congressional Record, the sensitivity and the complexity of the 
intelligence authorization bill justifies the requirement in this case. 
Mr. Speaker, this rule allows the full House to consider germane 
amendments offered by any Member. Under the rule, the House will be 
able to debate important questions, such as whether to reduce the 
overall size of the intelligence budget.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Vermont (Mr. 
Sanders).
  Mr. SANDERS. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentlewoman for yielding me 
this time, and I rise in support of the rule.
  I think it is a fair rule. Among other things, it, in fact, allows 
this Congress to begin debating major priorities as to whether or not 
we are going to increase spending for the intelligence budget, despite 
the end of the Cold War and despite the fact that while we increase 
funding for the intelligence budget, we have cut spending in Medicare 
for our senior citizens, cut spending for veterans' programs, cut 
spending in a dozen different areas that the middle-class and low-
income people of this country need.
  So I applaud the chairman for bringing forth this rule. It is a fair 
rule and it is going to allow us to have a serious debate on what we 
want this Congress to be doing for the American people.
  Ms. SLAUGHTER. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume to 
address the concerns of the gentlewoman from New York about the notice 
given and accommodating Members' schedules today.
  I am happy to report that several Members did take advantage of the 
opportunity to come to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence 
and participate in review of materials that were of interest to them. 
So I think the

[[Page H2946]]

word has gotten out and I think we have done our job properly.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time, and I move the 
previous question on the resolution.
  The previous question was ordered.
  The resolution was agreed to.
  A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Duncan). Pursuant to House Resolution 
420 and rule XXIII, the Chair declares the House in the Committee of 
the Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the 
bill, H.R. 3694.

                              {time}  1205


                     In the Committee of the Whole

  Accordingly, the House resolved itself into the Committee of the 
Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration the bill 
(H.R. 3694) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1999 for 
intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States 
Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central 
Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other 
purposes, with (Mr. Thornberry) in the chair.
  The Clerk read the title of the bill.
  The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to the rule, the bill is considered as having 
been read the first time.
  Under the rule, the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) and the 
gentleman from Washington (Mr. Dicks) each will control 30 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss).
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to bring the fiscal year 1999 intelligence 
authorization to the floor today. As a strong believer in the 
congressional oversight process, I hope Members have taken the 
opportunity to examine this year's bill, including its classified annex 
and, indeed, I know several Members have come upstairs to do just that.
  The annual intelligence authorization, and its exhaustive review of 
intelligence activities and capabilities that accompanies it, form the 
cornerstone of our oversight process. This is truly a valuable exercise 
for the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, for Congress as a 
whole, and I think it is beneficial to the intelligence community as 
well.
  I want to take this opportunity to thank the members and staff of the 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence from both sides of the aisle 
whose hard work and long hours have enabled us to produce a 
responsible, nonpartisan bill that was unanimously approved in 
committee.
  I would also like to thank the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. 
Floyd Spence), chairman of the Committee on National Security, and the 
gentleman from Florida (Mr. Bill Young), chairman of the Subcommittee 
on National Security of the Committee on Appropriations, for their 
input and able assistance with this legislation.
  H.R. 3694 authorizes funds for the fiscal year 1999 intelligence and 
intelligence-related activities of the United States Government. That 
is a big order. The National Security Act requires Congress 
specifically to authorize all intelligence spending. That is unique.
  As Members are aware, many of the details of the intelligence budget 
are classified, including the total fiscal year 1999 budget request, or 
top line. I can say, however, that H.R. 3694's top line is 
substantially in line with the President's request. The committee came 
in a mere one-tenth of 1 percent above the President's level.
  I would like to take a moment to explain the process by which the 
committee arrived at this recommended spending level. What we did not 
do was adopt an arbitrary number and fill in the blanks until we 
reached our goal. Instead, the Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence looked at each line of every program, examined its 
effectiveness and how it fit in with the overall U.S. intelligence 
requirements and priorities in today's world. Then we made our 
decisions based on the merit and value of each program.
  Mr. Chairman, throughout the committee's review of U.S. intelligence 
capabilities, whether we were looking at satellite reconnaissance or 
human intelligence, one fact stood out. The threats that face our 
Nation demand that the intelligence community maintain a worldwide 
vigilance and the resources to deal with a multitude of challenges and 
new challenges.
  The Cold War is over and the threat of nuclear war has been reduced. 
Or has it? Unfortunately, the world still is a dangerous place for the 
United States and its citizens, as we read in papers almost daily about 
concerns about political stability in places like Russia, the chain of 
command in Russia over the nuclear weapons, or perhaps even the Chinese 
intercontinental ballistic missiles which we read in the newspapers are 
targeted against U.S. cities, what they call city-buster bombs and an 
ICBM capability.
  To demonstrate this, we need look no further than our continuing 
struggles with Iraq. Earlier this year the United States came to the 
brink of military confrontation with Saddam Hussein; yet we did so 
without all of the information necessary to support a serious campaign. 
There were serious shortfalls in our ability to support policymakers 
and military commanders at this critical time. Such gaps endanger U.S. 
lives and interests and are not acceptable, tolerable, or necessary in 
today's world.
  We should not ignore Iraq or Iran or Libya or North Korea or other 
rogue nations that are striving for and, in many cases achieving, the 
means to threaten the United States. The risk that a terrorist group or 
a rogue country will use a chemical, biological, or nuclear weapon 
against the U.S. or an American citizen or American interests here or 
abroad is increasing. Despite this fact, U.S. intelligence capabilities 
have dwindled since the end of the Cold War. In effect, we are asking 
the intelligence community for more and we are giving them less to do 
it. And we are counting on them more.
  The intelligence community needs to change the way it does business 
to address these new threats. This year's authorization identifies five 
areas that deserve particular attention.
  One, our signals intelligence capabilities are in serious need of 
modernization to keep up with the fast pace of communications and 
technology improvement. I think it is fair to say that the golden days 
of SIGINT may, in fact, be behind us, and we have been enjoying the 
benefits of a very good SIGINT activity for many years. That may be 
over because of technology. We need to deal with that.
  Two, our clandestine espionage, or human intelligence as it is 
called, that infrastructure needs to be rebuilt and refocused on 
current priorities. It is fair to say, I think, that the cupboard is 
nearly bare in the area of HUMINT. We are badly outnumbered by hostiles 
in a lot of dangerous places in the world. That is intolerable, 
unacceptable, and unnecessary.
  The intelligence community needs to increase its analytical 
capability in order to absorb and accurately gauge the immediate and 
long-term implications of an ever-increasing volume of information. We 
have stuff on hand we have not reviewed. We have not exploited it. And 
it is stuff that would be useful to our decision-makers. We do not have 
as much analytical capacity as we need. That can be fixed.
  Covert action capabilities need to be restructured. I said 
capabilities. Nobody is calling for covert action. We are calling for 
more arrows in the quiver in case we do need it to suit the needs of 
today's world and how to deal with problems we come against.
  Fifth, and last, we need to ensure we maintain an active research and 
development program in all intelligence areas.
  H.R. 3694 addresses each of these priorities, in some cases by 
providing additional funding; in others by redirecting existing 
programs, resources, or restructuring ongoing programs.
  In addition, the committee's review raised some fundamental questions 
that the committee will review over the coming year. These include, 
what are the proper priorities for our future overheads systems? How 
can we manage the cost of a national reconnaissance program and yet 
meet other critical requirements? Is the intelligence community 
striking the right balance between our capacity to collect intelligence 
and our capacity to analyze what is collected? Is the intelligence 
community prepared to face the challenges of information and 
operations, or cyber-warfare?

[[Page H2947]]

  The future of our intelligence programs depends on finding the 
answers to these and other questions. But for today, today we 
understand very well our needs. We have provided for them in this 
legislation. I think we have achieved an excellent balance. Mr. 
Chairman, I urge all members to support H.R. 3694 today.
  Mr. Chairman, I submit the following:

                                         House of Representatives,


                                  Committee on Ways and Means,

                                      Washington, DC, May 4, 1998.
     Hon. Porter Goss,
     Chairman, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, 
         House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
       Dear Porter: I am writing in response to your letter of 
     April 29, 1998, which addresses H.R. 3694, as reported by the 
     House Committee on Intelligence (Permanent Select) on April 
     29, 1998. H.R. 3694 would amend Section 905 of the National 
     Security Act of 1947 by striking out ``January 6, 1998'' and 
     inserting in lieu thereof ``January 6, 1999''. The bill 
     contains an extension of application of sanctions laws to 
     intelligence activities.
       As your letter notes, this provision falls within the 
     jurisdiction of the Committee on Ways and Means. Accordingly, 
     the Committee would ordinarily meet to consider the bill. 
     However, because the bill, as reported, extends for one year 
     an already existing application of sanctions laws to 
     intelligence activities, I do not believe that a markup of 
     the bill is necessary.
       I appreciate your consultation with the Committee in 
     advance. I request your full support in joining me to prevent 
     any other expansion or changes to the application of 
     sanctions laws for intelligence activities other than the one 
     year extension agreed to here. I would further appreciate 
     your consultation with respect to this provision on any 
     future Intelligence Authorization bills, including a mere 
     reauthorization for additional periods of time. Of course, if 
     an agreement cannot be reached, the provision would be 
     subject to a point of order pursuant to Clause 5(b) of House 
     Rule XXI.
       I would ask that a copy of our exchange of letters on this 
     matter be included in the record during floor consideration.
       Thank you for your cooperation and assistance on this 
     matter. With best personal regards,
           Sincerely,
                                                      Bill Archer,
     Chairman.
                                  ____

         House of Representatives, Permanent Select Committee on 
           Intelligence,
                                   Washington, DC, April 28, 1998.
     Hon. Bill Archer,
     Chairman, Committee on Ways and Means,
     Longworth House Office Building, Washington, DC.
       Dear Bill: I am writing to you concerning the planned 
     inclusion of a provision in the ``Intelligence Authorization 
     Act for Fiscal year 1999'' (H.R. 3694), which we expect to 
     mark up on Wednesday, April 29, 1998, and report to the House 
     early next week. I have included a copy of the proposed 
     section for your consideration.
       As you know, this provision relates to the application of 
     sanctions laws to intelligence activities and simply extends 
     the life of the provision for one additional year. As you 
     will recall during last year's consideration of the 
     Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998, and 
     based upon our mutual understanding and agreement as to your 
     Committee's jurisdiction over matters relating to taxes and 
     tariffs, this provision was included in the Authorization Act 
     for Fiscal Year 1998 as section 304 of that Act. A copy of 
     that provision, as enacted (P.L. 105-107), is also included 
     for your review.
       I hope that we can, consistent with the agreement reached 
     last year, once again agree that this provision may be 
     included in H.R. 3694, and any resulting Conference Report, 
     without objection from the Committee on Ways and Means.
       There is no doubt that this provision falls squarely within 
     the scope of Clause 5(b) of House Rule XXI, which provides 
     that no tax or tariff provision may be considered by the 
     House that has not been considered by the Committee on Ways 
     and Means.
       This provision is of critical importance to the protection 
     of intelligence sources and methods whenever a proliferation 
     violation has been identified and sanctions are deemed to be 
     the appropriate method of discipline. This provision supplies 
     the President with the necessary flexibility to address the 
     competing interests of punishing the violators and protecting 
     our national security interests at the same time. I 
     appreciate your recognition of this important aspect of this 
     section of our bill.
       I would also offer that any modification of this provision 
     in future Intelligence Authorization bills, beyond a mere 
     reauthorization for additional periods of time, will be 
     subject to consultation between our Committees, and, if 
     agreement cannot be reached, subject to points of order 
     pursaunt to Clause 5(b) of House Rule XXI.
       Thank you for your cooperation in this regard and I look 
     forward to your support for H.R. 3694.
       With all best wishes, I remain
           Sincerely yours,
                                                   Porter J. Goss,
     Chairman.
                                  ____

       ``(b) Benefits, Allowances, Travel, Incentives.--An 
     employee detailed under subsection (a) may be authorized any 
     benefit, allowance, travel, or incentive otherwise provided 
     to enhance staffing by the organization from which the 
     employee is detailed.
       ``(c) Annual Report.--Not later than March 1, 1999, and 
     annually thereafter, the Director of Central Intelligence 
     shall submit to the Permanent Select Committee on 
     Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select 
     Committee on Intelligence of the Senate a report describing 
     the detail of intelligence community personnel pursuant to 
     subsection (a) during the 12-month period ending on the date 
     of the report. The report shall set forth the number of 
     personnel detailed, the identity of parent and host agencies 
     or elements, and an analysis of the benefits of the 
     details.''.
       (b) Technical Amendment.--Sections 120, 121, and 110 of the 
     National Security Act of 1947 are hereby redesignated as 
     sections 110, 111, and 112, respectively.
       (c) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents in the first 
     section of such Act is amended by striking out the items 
     relating to sections 120, 121, and 110 and inserting in lieu 
     thereof the following:

``Sec. 110. National mission of National Imagery and Mapping Agency.
``Sec. 111. Collection tasking authority.
``Sec. 112. Restrictions on intelligence sharing with the United 
              Nations.
``Sec. 113. Detail of intelligence community personnel--intelligence 
              community assignment program.''.

       (d) Effective Date.--The amendment made by subsection (a) 
     shall apply to an employee on detail on or after January 1, 
     1997.

     SEC. 304. EXTENSION OF APPLICATION OF SANCTIONS LAWS TO 
                   INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

       Section 905 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 
     441d) is amended by striking out ``January 6, 1998'' and 
     inserting in lieu thereof ``January 6, 1999''.

     SEC. 305. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 
                   CONTRACTING.

       It is the sense of Congress that the Director of Central 
     Intelligence should continue to direct that elements of the 
     intelligence community, whenever compatible with the national 
     security interests of the United States and consistent with 
     operational and security concerns related to the conduct of 
     intelligence activities, and where fiscally sound, should 
     competitively award contracts in a manner that maximizes the 
     procurement of products properly designated as having been 
     made in the United States.

     SEC. 306. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON RECEIPT OF CLASSIFIED 
                   INFORMATION.

       It is the sense of Congress that Members of Congress have 
     equal standing with officials of the Executive Branch to 
     receive classified information so that Congress may carry out 
     its oversight responsibilities under the Constitution.

     SEC. 307. PROVISION OF INFORMATION ON CERTAIN VIOLENT CRIMES 
                   ABROAD TO VICTIMS AND VICTIMS' FAMILIES.

       (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
       (1) it is in the national interests of the United States to 
     provide information regarding the killing, abduction, 
     torture,
                                  ____

       (2) Conforming amendment.--Section 5315 of title 5, United 
     States Code, is amended by striking out the following item: 
     ``Assistant Directors of Central Intelligence (3).''.
       (b) Expansion of Duties of Deputy Director of Central 
     Intelligence for Community Management.--Subsection 102(d)(2) 
     of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403(d)(2)) is 
     amended by striking out subparagraph (B) through (D) and 
     inserting in lieu thereof the following new subparagraphs:
       ``(B) Carrying out the responsibilities of the Director 
     under paragraphs (1) through (5) of section 103(c).
       ``(C) Carrying out such other responsibilities as the 
     Director may direct.''.

     SEC. 304. APPLICATION OF SANCTIONS LAWS TO INTELLIGENCE 
                   ACTIVITIES.

       Section 905 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 
     441d) is amended by striking out ``January 6, 1999'' and 
     inserting in lieu thereof ``January 6, 2000.''.

     SEC. 305. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 
                   CONTRACTING.

       It is the sense of Congress that the Director of Central 
     Intelligence should continue to direct that elements of the 
     intelligence community, whenever compatible

  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Chairman, the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence strives 
to report an authorization bill each year which is free of partisan 
division. While we have been generally successful in that effort, from 
time to time we have been divided on significant issues of substance.
  This year, I am pleased to report that we have produced legislation 
which is not only bipartisan but without major substantive disagreement 
as well.

                              {time}  1215

  Credit for that result goes to the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) 
who has worked tirelessly to ensure that the views of all Members are 
reflected

[[Page H2948]]

in the work of the committee. I commend him for the leadership he has 
exhibited as chairman and for his willingness to work with committee 
Democrats on matters of importance to us.
  For two of the Democratic Members, the gentleman from Colorado (Mr. 
Skaggs) and the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman), this will be 
the final intelligence authorization bill they will bring to the floor. 
Although I look forward to working with them to get a conference report 
enacted, I want to thank them for their many contributions to the work 
of the committee.
  The willingness of the gentleman from Colorado (Mr. Skaggs) to tackle 
issues like declassification and the need to make greater use of 
intelligence in nontraditional ways has been invaluable. And the 
efforts of the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman) to encourage 
development of the complex systems through which intelligence will be 
collected in the future were also of great assistance.
  This will be my last authorization bill, as well. I have enjoyed my 8 
years of service on the committee and look forward to keeping up with 
intelligence issues when they come before the Committee on 
Appropriations. I have been impressed tremendously by not only the 
importance of intelligence to our Nation's security, but by the 
dedication, often under circumstances of great hardship and danger, of 
the men and women who work in our intelligence agencies.
  The authorization bill for fiscal year 1999 will make improvements in 
intelligence capabilities that need to be modernized either because of 
technological advances or because they require greater emphasis to 
respond to changing threats. The bill is only marginally more, in the 
aggregate 0.1 percent, than the amount requested by the President. 
Although the committee chose to place a different spending priority on 
certain items than did the administration, I do not believe that we 
have done harm to any initiative or activity which the Director of 
Central Intelligence or the Secretary of Defense consider crucial.
  Generating public support for spending on intelligence programs, 
given their classified nature, is never going to be easy. Although it 
should be common sense that the possession of information in advance 
about the military plans of an enemy, the bottom-line position of 
another government in a diplomatic negotiation, the location of a 
terrorist cell, or the scientific and technical capability of someone 
trying to develop a weapon of mass destruction should be invaluable, we 
sometimes forget that the acquisition of access to that kind of 
information is time consuming and expensive. I do not believe we need 
to justify intelligence spending on the basis of some esoteric 
calculation about whether our national security is more or less at risk 
than when the Soviet Union was in place.
  We will always have threats to our security. Some will be 
predictable, some will not. Dealing with them requires accurate and 
timely information, some of which can be provided only by intelligence 
agencies. There is a cost to maintaining the capability to provide that 
information when required, and that cost is significant. The cost if 
the information is not available, however, is potentially far greater.
  Our job on the committee is to ensure that the means necessary to 
provide intelligence on matters which demonstrably affect national 
security are available at a cost which is not excessive relative to 
their importance. I believe the 21-year record of the committee in this 
effort, including the bill now before the House, has been exceptional.

  Besides recommending spending levels, an authorization bill and 
accompanying report also make judgments about the manner in which 
programs are being managed. I believe that one of the chief 
responsibilities of an oversight committee is to monitor the activities 
of the agencies under its jurisdiction in a manner which is both 
aggressive and thorough. I also believe that oversight should be 
constructive and fair. I am concerned about the tone of some of the 
recent criticism of the work of two agencies, the National 
Reconnaissance Office, (NRO), and the National Imagery and Mapping 
Agency (NIMA).
  The United States has an intelligence capability second to none in 
the world. Much of that preeminence is due to the performance of the 
systems acquired and operated by the NRO. These systems are 
extraordinarily complex and expensive. We are now in the midst of an 
effort to modernize these systems. When the need for modernization was 
made clear several years ago by then-Director of Central Intelligence 
Jim Woolsey, and Congress agreed to embark on a plan to accomplish it, 
it was with the understanding that substantial amounts of money would 
have to be expended in the short term to produce savings in the future.
  We have spent much of the intervening years altering in sometimes 
significant ways the components of the plan, which has added to the 
costs that have to be met in the near term and delayed the realization 
of the expected long-term savings as well. It is disingenuous to have 
been a part of this practice and then to complain about the effects it 
has produced on the NRO's budget.
  NIMA is a new agency created less than 2 years ago through the merger 
of the Defense Mapping Agency and the imagery analysis elements of the 
CIA and DIA. Like most mergers, this one, which I strongly supported 
was not without problems, but I believe that NIMA personnel are 
committed to having the agency fulfill its important mission 
successfully.
  Earlier this year I wrote to NIMA's customers to ask for an 
evaluation of their performance. Secretary of Commerce Daley responded 
that ``After working through some initial confusion regarding authority 
and responsibility for certain products and services, support to 
civilian agencies is now better than before the individual components 
were combined into NIMA.''
  James L. Witt, the Director of the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency, wrote, ``The support and service provided by NIMA to support 
disaster response activities have been and continue to be 
outstanding.'' Sandy Berger, the President's National Security Advisor, 
complimented NIMA on making a strong effort to provide high-quality 
analysis and pronounced himself ``generally satisfied'' with the 
results.
  I do not believe that these comments reflect an agency that is 
failing to do its job or one that is ignoring the needs of nonmilitary 
consumers to concentrate on those of the military, as some had feared. 
Any enterprise involving human beings can be made better, but I think 
it is not helpful to make final judgments, pro or con, about an agency 
in its infancy. I offer these thoughts in the hope that they will 
provide perspective in evaluating the performance of the NRO and NIMA 
in the days ahead.
  Mr. Chairman, H.R. 3694 is a good bill which will advance the 
interest of military and civilian consumers of intelligence. I urge 
that it be approved by the House.
  I would also like to compliment both the majority staff and the 
Democratic minority staff. I think this committee has been blessed over 
the years with an outstanding staff. And I want to particularly thank 
Mike Sheehy and the Democratic staff members whom I have had the 
privilege of working with for the last 4 years.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  I simply want to say that I am very proud to have worked with and 
learned from the gentleman from Washington (Mr. Dicks) as the ranking 
member. He has been an extraordinary asset of the United States of 
America in his capacity as a manager of the portfolio. He brings 
wisdom, judgment and knowledge about military intelligence and 
equipment to the table in our committee to the extent that I think no 
other member has or can at this time. I hope he is not going to leave. 
But if it turns out that way, we will miss him.
  I also hope we are not going to lose anybody else. And for the 
gentleman from Colorado (Mr. Skaggs) and the gentlewoman from 
California (Ms. Harman), I share that view with all the other members. 
I happen to feel that we have got an extraordinary committee and staff, 
we are doing our job timely and well.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield 2\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from New York 
(Mr. Boehlert) to allow him to demonstrate what I have just said.

[[Page H2949]]

  (Mr. BOEHLERT asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. BOEHLERT. Mr. Chairman, we find ourselves in both a fiscal and 
political environment in which we simply cannot fund every system and 
program we would like. This applies whether intelligence or not 
intelligence.
  However, it is important for the American people to understand just 
how critical intelligence is to the very survival of our Nation and our 
way of life. On the way over to the Capitol this morning, I heard a 
radio announcer refer to this bill as ``the bill to authorize America's 
cloak-and-dagger operation.'' That sort of a label is correct in a way, 
but unfortuantely, I believe it unintentionally misrepresents what this 
bill is all about.
  What this bill is about is the wise and prudent funding and oversight 
of those intelligence collection analysis and dissemination function 
necessary to provide for the security of our Nation, its interests, and 
its citizens around the world. We are talking about what I refer to as 
``counterprograms.'' We are not engaged in a world war, but we have 
some very important counterprograms, counterterrorism, 
counternarcotics, counterproliferation. These are all very important 
activities, and this bill funds them.
  Mr. Chairman, I would like to point out a couple of funcational 
intelligence areas of particular interest in this bill. The first is 
the emphasis this bill places on rebuilding leading-edge technology, 
research and development. It is the basic research and development of 
new technologies that are the easiest to cut in lean fiscal times. But 
it is precisely these efforts that our future depends on and that we 
must pay particular attention to and fund properly.
  This bill puts great emphasis on future capabilities, albeit 
sometimes imprudently at the expense of older so-called legacy systems. 
Also, this bill emphasizes the need for a strong, well-trained and 
funded reserve intelligence component.
  Mr. Chairman, there are a lot of things I could say about this bill, 
and I do not have the time to say them. Just let me say that as someone 
who tried to be very attentive to my important responsibilities on this 
committee, I admire the way the chairman and ranking member have worked 
cooperatively. I admire the seriousness of purpose of all of the 
members. I admire the product that we are producing, and I commend it 
to the attention of all my colleagues and the American people.
  We are doing the people's business in a wise and prudent manner.
  Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentlewoman from 
California (Ms. Pelosi).
  Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Chairman, I thank the distinguished gentleman from 
Washington (Mr. Dicks), the ranking member, for yielding this time to 
me and for his leadership on this important committee.
  I rise, Mr. Chairman, to engage the gentleman from Florida (Mr. 
Goss), the distinguished chair of the Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence, in a colloquy concerning section 303 of the bill.
  Before doing so, I want to commend our chairman for his leadership 
also and to thank him for including full funding for the environmental 
program in this legislation before us today, the recognition that new 
issues need to be addressed, not that the environment is a new issue, 
but new compared to its being a priority on the Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence and in the intelligence authorization bill. 
In any event, I rise to engage the gentleman in a colloquy.
  As the chairman knows, this section of the bill extends for 1 year 
the authority of the President to delay the imposition of a sanction 
upon a determination that to proceed with the sanction would risk the 
compromise of an ongoing criminal investigation or an intelligence 
source or method.
  My first question, Mr. Chairman, is whether the legislative history 
of this provision, enacted in 1995, would be applicable to the 
extension of the authority for 1 more year?
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield?
  Ms. PELOSI. I yield to the gentleman from Florida.
  Mr. GOSS. I would assure the gentlewoman from California that is the 
intent of the committee, that the legislative history of this 
provision, as it was developed in the debate in 1995, is applicable to 
the exercise of this authority. Indeed, the report to accompany H.R. 
3694 reaffirms the joint explanatory statement of the committee of 
conference on the Intelligence Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 1996 to 
make completely clear that the original legislative history of this 
provision continues to govern its implementation.
  Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Chairman, is it then the case that the committee 
intends that the provision will be narrowly construed and used only in 
the most serious of circumstances when a specific sensitive 
intelligence source or method or criminal investigation is at risk?
  Mr. GOSS. If the gentlewoman would further yield, that is certainly 
the intent of the committee.
  Ms. PELOSI. Is it also the case that the law requires the 
intelligence source or method or law enforcement matter in question 
must be related to the activities giving rise to the sanction and the 
provision is not to be used to protect generic or speculative 
intelligence or law enforcement concerns?
  Mr. GOSS. That is also the case.
  Ms. PELOSI. Finally, Mr. Chairman, does the committee expect that 
reports concerning a decision to stay the imposition of a sanction 
shall include a determination that the delay in the imposition of a 
sanction will not be seriously prejudicial to the achievement of the 
United States' nonproliferation objectives or significantly increase 
the threat or risk to U.S. military forces?
  Mr. GOSS. Yes, it does.
  Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Chairman, I thank the distinguished chairman of our 
committee for engaging in this colloquy and for his confirmation of the 
understanding that we had when this provision was first enacted.
  Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield?
  Ms. PELOSI. I am pleased to yield to the gentleman from Washington.
  Mr. DICKS. I wanted just to say that I concur in all the statements 
made by the chairman. This is also the understanding that I have of 
this provision.
  Ms. PELOSI. I thank the ranking member for his cooperation and 
concurrence in the view of the chairman.
  Mr. DICKS. And I want to compliment the gentlewoman for her diligence 
on this important matter.

                              {time}  1230

  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from 
Florida (Mr. Young), chairman of the Appropriations Subcommittee on 
National Security.
  Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 30 seconds to the gentleman from 
Florida (Mr. Young).
  Mr. YOUNG of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of this 
intelligence authorization bill. I want to compliment the gentleman 
from Florida (Mr. Goss). He has done an outstanding job. I have had the 
privilege of working on the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence 
for 14 years now, two different terms. I have to say that the gentleman 
from Florida has been outstanding in the leadership that he provides 
for the committee and also to the gentleman from Washington (Mr. 
Dicks), we have worked together for so many years, he is a member of 
our subcommittee. We have the unusual relationship of being members of 
the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence as well as members of 
the appropriations subcommittee that provides the funding for the 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. The gentleman from 
Washington does a really good job. He is very dedicated to a good 
intelligence bill.
  That is what this is. This is a good intelligence bill. It provides 
not as much as we would like to have provided for our intelligence 
activities, but it provides the best that we can with the budget 
constraints that we are faced with today.
  There are those of us who believe that we are not making a strong 
enough investment in our national security, at any part of our national 
defense structure, whether it be the operational military forces or the 
intelligence community. But the intelligence community is the eyes and 
ears of our national capabilities. We have to have information, we have 
to know what is happening in the world, we have to know what threats 
there might be out there.

[[Page H2950]]

  The intelligence community does an outstanding job, I might say. I 
might be criticized for that statement because all you ever hear is the 
bad news. If an intelligence agent happens to go bad, which does happen 
on occasion, or if a mistake is made, you hear about that but you do 
not hear about the good things that the intelligence community brings 
to our overall national security effort. I wish we could talk about 
some of those on the floor in open session today, but obviously we 
cannot because it is essential that the sources that we use for 
developing our own intelligence information and the methods that we use 
and the people who are involved in this have to be protected. Their 
mission is extremely important and their lives could very well be at 
risk if we went into a lot of detail.
  I know that there will probably be some amendments offered to reduce 
the authorized level of funding in this bill. I would urge the Members 
not to support this. This bill does not provide enough authorization 
for funding to do the things that we ought to be doing in our national 
security effort, but it is the best we could do with the budget 
constraints.
  I suggest that we defeat any amendments that would tend to reduce the 
investment in our intelligence capability and let us pass this good 
bill and get it on to the Senate so we can get it to the President.
  Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. YOUNG of Florida. I yield to the gentleman from Washington.
  Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I just want to compliment the gentleman for 
his statement and I want to concur in it. Sometimes I think there is a 
question out there about whether intelligence is really that important. 
I think it is our ace in the hole. I think it is what gives America an 
extraordinary advantage over any potential foe. Our human intelligence, 
our national technical means, are remarkable assets to this country. In 
every conflict we have been in in recent years, they have given us a 
tremendous advantage. I think the work of the defense subcommittee and 
the authorization committee to come up with a good bill that keeps that 
going is essential to the future of the country.
  Mr. YOUNG of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the gentleman's 
comments. He is right on track.
  Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Missouri (Mr. Skelton), the ranking member of the Committee on National 
Security.
  Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of H.R. 3694. I have a 
rather unique position and opportunity. As ranking member of the 
Committee on National Security and as a member of this Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence, I can personally testify to the importance 
of intelligence to our military commanders in the field, to our troops 
who are daily supporting our peacekeeping efforts in places like Iraq, 
in Macedonia and to our pilots in the Iraqi no-fly-zone.
  Cicero once said that gratitude is the greatest of all virtues. I am 
not sure we say thank you enough to the members of the intelligence 
community. What they do so often is not known. Yet it pays off in 
knowledge to the commanders in chief in the field, to the President, to 
the Secretary of Defense, to the Secretary of State, and, of course, to 
this body.
  Intelligence is critical to successful operations and to the safety 
of our men and women in uniform. Intelligence also plays a crucial role 
in the Joint Chiefs of Staff's plan for the 21st century, Dominant 
Battlespace Awareness, which hinges on our intelligence investment.
  Critical to the Joint Chiefs' plan, as well as to daily air, sea, and 
ground operations, are the mapping products created by the National 
Imagery and Mapping Agency. Although I support this bill, I am frankly 
concerned with the reductions in the operations and maintenance funds 
for the National Imagery and Mapping Agency. I think the cuts are 
unjustified and excessive. I fear that they will have an unacceptable 
impact on the production of products for the unified commands and for 
the State Department peacekeeping negotiations. I am also concerned 
that these cuts will result in the unwarranted elimination of jobs from 
an agency that does not have sufficient staffing to meet military 
requirements today.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2\1/2\ minutes to the distinguished 
gentleman from New Hampshire (Mr. Bass).
  Mr. BASS. Mr. Chairman, as a member of the Permanent Select Committee 
on Intelligence, I welcome the opportunity to speak in support of H.R. 
3694, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999. I would 
also like to associate myself with the very good comments of the 
gentleman from Florida (Mr. Young) and the gentleman from Washington 
(Mr. Dicks) concerning the strategic importance of intelligence. I 
would only add to that by saying that intelligence is also more than 
military and tactical in nature. There are civilian aspects to 
intelligence that are very important to the national security of this 
country that go beyond support to our military and provide the kind of 
protection for the citizens of the United States, not only domestically 
but abroad, that we all need and cherish.
  This is one of the safest countries in the world in which to live. 
Part of the reason for that is the fact that we know what our enemies 
are doing and we know what their plans and intentions are better 
perhaps than anybody else in the world.
  I would like to address if I could for a second the budget itself. 
The legislation before us today refocuses the President's request upon 
four major priorities for intelligence in the next century. Firstly, it 
accelerates the recapitalization of a signals intelligence program that 
has produced invaluable information against the new transnational 
targets of the post-Cold War world.
  Secondly, our bill begins the process, after years of drawdowns and 
reductions, of rebuilding a clandestine human intelligence program that 
has provided much of our intelligence on the plans and intentions of 
terrorists, traffickers and other adversaries.
  Thirdly, our bill continues the strengthening of the analysis part of 
intelligence collection that provides both assessment to our 
policymakers and guidance to the collectors.
  Finally, our bill enhances the capability of the President to direct 
and accomplish covert actions when he deems such actions necessary to 
U.S. foreign policy and our national security. The purpose of our mark 
in each of these areas is to strengthen the capabilities that will 
provide policymakers with the intelligence that they will need in the 
next century.
  Mr. Chairman, there were also strategic cuts in the budget, made 
after much investigation and on a line-by-line basis, on programs that 
will mostly be effective in the 21st century. The intelligence 
community has for the most part moved forward effectively against new 
and difficult issues. There are some areas where we can make some 
reductions and do so in a prudent fashion.
  Once again, Mr. Chairman, I am happy to rise in support of this 
bipartisan authorization bill. I want to commend both the gentleman 
from Florida and the gentleman from Washington for having done an 
excellent job working together to produce this important bill.
  Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Maryland (Mr. Cardin), a good solid member of the Committee on Ways and 
Means.
  Mr. CARDIN. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this 
time and congratulate both the gentleman from Florida and the gentleman 
from Washington for bringing forward a product that deserves the 
support of this House. I have said before that whenever an intelligence 
authorization or appropriations is before us, the proponents are at a 
disadvantage because people can attack the intelligence community. A 
lot of this is confidential. They do not have the opportunity sometimes 
to defend themselves.
  The United States has the most sophisticated intelligence apparatus 
in the world. We have the best trained professionals in the world. Yet 
we have the most difficult challenges of any nation in this world. We 
work in a bipartisan manner in order to provide authorization and 
appropriations for our intelligence agencies. I really do applaud the 
leadership of this House for

[[Page H2951]]

doing that. For the security of our country and for the manner in which 
this has been handled in the House, it deserves our support.
  I must tell my colleagues, though, that I was somewhat disappointed 
by some of the tone in the language as it related to some of our 
intelligence agencies. But I am very pleased to see that the report 
acknowledges that we must invest in the recapitalization and 
modernization of our SIGINT capacities. I think that is very important 
for this country.
  I have visited NSA on numerous occasions and know the dedication of 
the men and women in public service for our country. They represent 
some of our brightest minds in our Nation. But if we are going to be 
able to attract the best from our universities and colleges so that we 
can maintain that capacity in the future, it is important that we 
authorize adequate funds and appropriate adequate funds for our 
intelligence operation.
  Mr. Chairman, I am pleased that we were able to bring this product 
forward in a bipartisan manner. I hope that this body will support the 
work of the committee, support the authorization and later support the 
appropriation.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the distinguished gentleman from 
Maryland's remarks. We have worked together on many things. His support 
is very important.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from 
Illinois (Mr. Hastert), the chairman of the task force to counter the 
drug problem.
  Mr. HASTERT. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the fine work of the 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. I am pleased to join my 
colleagues from the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence in 
support of H.R. 3694, the fiscal year 1999 intelligence authorization 
bill. As chairman of the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, 
Subcommittee on National Security, and the Task Force for a Drug-Free 
America, I have had an opportunity to visit a wide range of 
counternarcotic programs in this country and overseas during the past 
few years. I have seen the effectiveness of the information produced by 
our intelligence community in identifying and tracking major narcotics 
trafficking activities. This intelligence information is essential to 
facilitating the law enforcement community's effort to slow the flood 
of cocaine and heroin that is pouring into our country. I have been 
particularly impressed by the growing coordination between the 
intelligence community and the law enforcement agencies to jointly 
target major narcotrafficking groups.
  Despite this good news, I regret to report that we are stopping no 
more than 15 to 20 percent of the drugs flowing from the source 
countries of Colombia, Peru and Bolivia. We have the best intelligence 
organization in the world, but we lack the capability to act 
effectively on the information that we collect against 
narcotraffickers. It is clear that the administration's current source 
zone strategy is having only a very limited impact on cocaine and opium 
production in the source countries. We need to provide sufficient 
political will, sufficient resources and sufficient personnel to this 
effort.
  Equally, the transit zone strategy is undermined by an unwillingness 
to seek sufficient air, ground and maritime resources to track, pursue 
and stop narcotrafficking moving through Central America, the Caribbean 
and Mexico. Based on numerous meetings with foreign narcotics officials 
and U.S. Government personnel serving in the field, I am quite 
persuaded that much more could be achieved if we would be willing to 
come forward and seek the necessary resources to step up the 
eradication and interdiction of cocaine and heroin.
  Mr. Chairman, this is an important piece of legislation. Intelligence 
is the key to stopping narcotics traffic in this country and this 
hemisphere. I support this legislation.
  Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from 
Georgia (Mr. Bishop).
  Mr. BISHOP. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of H.R. 3694, the 
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999. Let me first 
congratulate the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) and the gentleman 
from Washington (Mr. Dicks) for their tireless efforts in producing a 
bipartisan bill that addresses the needs of the intelligence community. 
There is arguably no greater consumer of intelligence than our Nation's 
Armed Forces. Despite the end of the Cold War, the requirements of our 
military for better and more timely intelligence has actually increased 
rather than decreased.
  This is the result of a number of factors, including transitional 
issues such as terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction. Perhaps no incident better illustrates the threat that 
terrorism poses to the men and women of our armed services than the 
cowardly and callous terrorist bombing of Khobar Towers in Saudi 
Arabia.

                              {time}  1245

  Our forces in Bosnia remain exposed to the threat of terrorism, and 
it is the intelligence that is collected, processed, analyzed and 
disseminated that continues to aid in shielding our sons and daughters 
against this deadly threat.
  Additionally, our military has drawn down significantly in the 
aftermath of the Cold War. In fact, the military has experienced more 
cutbacks than any other Federal agency, and quite frankly in my view 
the reductions have gone too far.
  Despite these reductions, the missions have increased as has the 
tempo of operations associated with those missions. Today we have 
members of our services in Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and Asia 
conducting missions ranging from peacekeeping to enforcement of United 
Nations sanctions to defense of nations.
  Intelligence is a force multiplier, and if we are to continue on a 
downward path of funding our Nation's armed services, then we 
definitely need to take every step we can to ensure that our 
intelligence capabilities are sufficient to provide the policymakers 
with the information needed to make key decisions affecting national 
security. This bill provides the necessary resources to ensure that our 
intelligence capabilities are sufficient to meet the contingencies of 
the next generation.
  Mr. Chairman, last January I traveled to Southeast Asia to review our 
intelligence activities and our operations in that region of the world, 
and I focused my attention specifically on efforts aimed at achieving a 
full accounting of Americans that are still unaccounted for as a result 
of the Vietnam war. I want to ensure our Nation's veterans and the 
families of those soldiers, airmen, and sailors that are still 
unaccounted for that the bill that is being considered today contains 
the necessary resources to permit the intelligence community to 
continue its efforts to determine the fate of those who have yet to 
come home.
  Mr. Chairman, the intelligence community historically has had a poor 
record in maintaining a diverse work force. In fact, the intelligence 
community as a whole lags far behind the Federal labor sector in its 
representation of minorities and women. This committee recognizes the 
difficulty faced by intelligence agencies, that of competing with the 
private sector for minority applicants possessing high technical skills 
that are critical to intelligence missions. The fact of the matter is 
that these agencies cannot match the financial incentives and rewards 
offered by the private sector firms that attract individuals with 
skills of importance to the intelligence community.
  This committee has been a supporter of a number of recruitment and 
training programs aimed at ensuring equal employment opportunity within 
the intelligence community agencies and developing and retaining 
personnel that are trained in the skills essential to the effective 
performance of intelligence missions. I am pleased to report that this 
bill continues this committee's commitment to those programs, 
specifically including the Stokes program.
  I also want to note that I intend to review these programs in the 
succeeding years to ensure that the desired goals are being achieved 
and that the programs are being administered in an effective manner.
  Mr. Chairman, the Intelligence Authorization Act for this year, for 
1999, provides critical support to all facets of our intelligence 
community. Resources are authorized that permit the

[[Page H2952]]

sustainment of the intelligence community's efforts to assist in 
providing force protection intelligence to our troops and to assist in 
the collection and analysis of critical intelligence bearing on such 
challenging issues as counterproliferation, counternarcotics, and 
counterterrorism.
  I am proud to support this bill, and I urge my colleagues to do the 
same.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished 
gentleman from the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (Mr. Shuster), Chairman 
of the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, and a valued 
member of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence as well.
  Mr. SHUSTER. Mr. Chairman, when General Schwarzkopf came back from 
the Gulf War, he told us that he had better intelligence than any 
battlefield commander in the history of the world. He also was asked by 
the media if there were any improvements that could be made, and he 
said yes, there were, and he went on to outline what further 
improvements could be made. The headlines then became ``Schwarzkopf 
Criticizes Intelligence,'' rather than the emphasis on his tremendous 
complimentary comments about the extraordinarily good intelligence 
which he had during that war.
  Mr. Chairman, I think that there is a pervasive feeling across this 
country somehow, at least in some quarters, that criticizing 
intelligence is the thing to do. Indeed there has been a drum beat of 
criticism of intelligence rather than the kind of support which I 
believe it deserves. And it is largely as a result of that, I believe, 
that there has developed, particularly in the clandestine service, what 
might be called a culture of timidity, and I do not fault the 
clandestine service for that at all. I think it is a rational response, 
if each time someone raises their head they get a shot taken at it, 
they learn to keep their head down. Unfortunately, by its very nature, 
the clandestine service must be a careful but bold risk-taking service, 
and I think we are losing that in this country, and I think it is a 
very, very serious matter, and it is going to take years to rebuild it.
  And so I would urge all of us to be aware of that and to be 
supportive where we can.
  And finally with regard to the so-called drug war, this is something 
which deserves much, much more attention, much more funding, and I 
would urge support for the blueprint of the gentleman from Florida (Mr. 
McCollum) to wage war on drugs. We need to focus and spend more funds 
on this important issue.
  Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the distinguished 
gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Stokes) who has served as chairman of this 
committee and in many important assignments in this House, and he is 
going to be one of the Members that next year we are going to miss the 
most. He has done an outstanding job for his district and an 
outstanding job for this country.
  Mr. STOKES. Mr. Chairman, I thank the distinguished ranking member 
for yielding this time to me and also for his very kind remarks. I also 
want to express my appreciation to the gentleman from Florida (Mr. 
Goss) for the work that he does with this committee.
  I want to address the House on an area of this legislation which is 
of particular concern to me. That area is the undergraduate training 
program. I rise as a former member and chairman of the House Permanent 
Select Committee on Intelligence. When I served on the committee, I was 
struck by the lack of minorities employed in ranking and policymaking 
positions throughout the intelligence community. In questioning area 
agency directors about this, I was told that they were unable to find 
qualified minorities who were interested in employment in the 
intelligence community.
  The solution to this problem took the form of legislation which is 
included in the intelligence authorization bill of 1987, creating the 
undergraduate training program. We were able to secure the cooperation 
of the Central Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency, to 
become the first intelligence agencies to include in their budgets the 
funds to provide full scholarships for minority and disadvantaged 
students.
  Mr. Chairman, through the UTP program, students have their 
undergraduate education fully funded and, following completion of 
college, are placed in mid-level positions at the agencies. To date, 
more than 150 individuals have participated in the undergraduate 
training program at the National Security Agency. The Central 
Intelligence Agency has graduated 135 students from the program. Many 
of these students have 4.0 averages at top universities around the 
nation. Some of them have 4.1 averages.
  I am proud that the undergraduate training program is changing the 
face of America's work force, particularly in the intelligence field. 
Mr. Chairman, when I met with these graduates, they have expressed how 
this program has provided them with challenging career choices, helped 
them to realize their full potential. The success of this initiative 
has resulted in its adoption now in other agencies, including the DIA, 
the FBI, the National Institutes for Health and other agencies.
  It is my strong belief that the undergraduate training program 
represents our commitment to diversity in the workplace and equal 
employment opportunity. It has proven successful, and I want to thank 
the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) and the gentleman from Washington 
(Mr. Dicks) and all the members of the committee on both sides of the 
aisle for their efforts in maintaining this initiative, which I think 
is a credit to both the Congress and to our Nation.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Chairman, I would like to associate myself with the remarks of 
the gentleman from Washington (Mr. Dicks) about the gentleman from Ohio 
(Chairman Stokes). He has always been Chairman Stokes to me. He was 
chairman of the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct when I 
started out, and the vision and contribution he has made to this 
institution are immeasurable. That is all I can say, and I thank the 
gentleman for his words.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Nevada (Mr. 
Gibbons) a distinguished veteran of the Gulf War, an Air Force officer 
and a member of our committee.
  (Mr. GIBBONS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. GIBBONS. Mr. Chairman, I thank the distinguished gentleman and 
chairman of the committee for an opportunity to speak today.
  Mr. Chairman I rise to join my colleagues today in strong support of 
H.R. 3694,the intelligence authorization bill for fiscal year 1999.
  Mr. Chairman, I have the distinct pleasure of being able to serve on 
both the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the House 
Committee on National Security. This allows me the opportunity to look 
across both operation military and defense issues as well as the 
intelligence functions that not only support but in fact participate in 
those various defense operations.
  I can tell my colleagues, Mr. Chairman, this is a very prudent bill. 
It is a bill that not only sustains currently required capabilities 
but, importantly, begins to rebuild critical intelligence capabilities 
lost as a result of security changes brought about by the end of the 
bipolar cold war. It is a bill that provides our military forces with 
the information resources necessary to build our fighter confidence and 
perhaps even to keep them out of harm's way. It also seeks to provide 
them with the indications and warnings intelligence to allow them the 
advantage in a conflict.
  Let there be no mistake Mr. Chairman. Contrary to arguments that will 
be made today, this is not a more secure world since the end of the 
cold war. While it is true that we do not face the imminent threat of 
nuclear annihilation today from the former Soviet Union, the threats 
posed by international terrorism, transnational threats such as 
narcotics trafficking, organized international crime, the proliferation 
of weapons of mass destruction, any use of chemical and biological 
weapons by rogue nation states are more pressing and considerably more 
dangerous than they ever have been before. The problems associated with 
collecting and understanding information about today's risks are in 
many ways more difficult because formal government boundaries are not 
limiting the threats to our peace and security.
  Mr. Chairman, I would like to note that the chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs

[[Page H2953]]

of Staff has stated that information dominance is one of the most 
important characteristics of his Joint Vision 2010 strategy.
  Intelligence, intelligence, Mr. Chairman, is the bedrock for that 
information dominance. This bill provides our intelligence community 
with military forces, the infrastructure necessary to give United 
States that information dominance.
  And finally, Mr. Chairman, I need to point out that this bill 
provides a fiscally sound increase of less than one-tenth of 1 percent 
to the President's request for intelligence. This increase reflects the 
proper emphasis on the information gathering, exploitation and 
dissemination activities necessary to ensure the security of the United 
States. And that is the bottom line: the security of the United States.
  Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Ohio 
(Mr. Traficant), my good friend, who every year has offered a Buy 
America amendment. This year we just put it in the bill because we 
thought it was the right thing to do, and the gentleman has made a very 
important contribution, and we appreciate his interest in the 
intelligence bill.
  Mr. TRAFICANT. Mr. Chairman, I want to commend the chairman of the 
committee and the ranking member for this bill, and I will vote for it. 
And I am for the first time going to vote against any cuts in their 
bill because I believe they deserve the chance, as stated by the 
gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Stokes), the chairman and one of the great 
Members in the body, that there is some hope here.
  But I would like to give one observation specifically on this 
business about the war on drugs. See, I am one that believes that the 
CIA is not as bad as the critics proclaim, but I also believe the CIA 
is certainly not as good as its proponents proclaim, and I think there 
must be some improvement. Certainly the war on drugs is a good example.
  Mr. Chairman, our intelligence community should know the source of 
drugs. They should know the land that grows them, the farmers that tend 
to those crops and harvest those crops. They should know the cartels 
that take those rough products and manufacture them into a finished 
product. They should further know the networking system that arranges 
for the export of those narcotics to our borders where 100 percent of 
all heroin and cocaine comes into this country across our borders, and 
Congress keeps philosophically debating the war on drugs.

                              {time}  1300

  I also believe the CIA should know who arranges for the importation 
of these drugs, what groups in America are also a part of the 
distribution, marketing and networking of making these drugs available; 
and finally, which international politicians not only turn their backs, 
but help to make these narcotics available.
  Now, here is what I am saying: If the intelligence community does not 
know that, we should save the money and throw it all out. Now, I am 
offering an amendment today that is a very little, safe amendment. It 
calls for a report from the CIA as to their networking and coordination 
of efforts with law enforcement agencies in this country relative to 
the dynamics of this war on drugs.
  But let me say this. I believe the time will come where Congress 
should mandate that the CIA should network and cooperate with domestic 
law enforcement and international law enforcement specifically on this 
war on drugs. I believe we have failed in the war on drugs.
  Networking and coordination are very important. Oftentimes, agencies 
compete against one another for funds, and Congress at times takes 
stands and plays and takes sides on the floor for appropriations. We 
must have better coordination, better networking, and the intelligence 
community must be the heart of this success. Quite frankly, I do not 
think they are.
  I am willing to give it a chance; I think that focus needs to be 
taken.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2\1/2\ minutes to the distinguished 
gentleman from Delaware (Mr. Castle), former Governor of the State of 
Delaware and a member of our committee.
  Mr. CASTLE. Mr. Chairman, I also rise in strong support of H.R. 3694, 
the intelligence authorization bill, and I offer my congratulations to 
the ranking member and to the chairman of this committee, both of whom 
are extraordinarily dedicated to this and, I think, do a wonderful job 
in performing this function.
  Mr. Chairman, I do share the chairman's concerns about the current 
state of the intelligence community, and I do fully support his 
recommendations within this legislation for finding its deficiencies. 
Like my chairman, I believe that we must invest sufficient resources 
toward the development of the intelligence community's all-source 
analytical infrastructure. United States policymakers must have the 
most comprehensive, responsive and timely strategic perspective on 
major global changes.
  During the Cold War, the wide-ranging nature of the Soviet threat 
simplified the analytical tasks faced by the intelligence community. 
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the unpredictability of 
emerging global challenges such as those of Bosnia, Haiti, Somalia and 
Iraq, requires the development of a national analytical capability that 
can provide policymakers with sufficient warning and with a range of 
policy options.
  The failure of the Clinton administration's efforts to contain Saddam 
Hussein may, in part, reflect the inadequacy of our government's 
analysis of Iraqi internal dynamics, as well as gaps in our 
understanding of Iraq's policies and economy. Like other rogue states, 
Iraq demands a rigorous and aggressive analytical posture on the part 
of our intelligence community. We must do a better job of analyzing 
trends within such hard targets.
  As a member of both the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence 
and the Committee on Banking and Financial Services, I am quite aware 
of the intelligence community's role and performance in analyzing 
significant global economic trends for policymakers, as well as its 
efforts to respond to the emerging threat of global organized crime.
  I must confess that I have heard that the intelligence community may 
not be as capable of assessing global economic trends as a number of 
private sector firms. Economic and banking specialists and such 
government entities as the Federal Reserve, the Treasury Department and 
the U.S. Trade Representative's Office, have not been shy in 
criticizing the value of the community's economic intelligence 
reporting. While some of this criticism may not be justified, I believe 
that a prudent approach would be to initiate some sort of interagency 
review process to evaluate the quality and relevance of the community's 
economic intelligence reporting.
  In response to emerging national security threats, such as money 
laundering by global criminal organizations, efforts should be made to 
clarify the respective roles of the intelligence community and law 
enforcement agencies. The nature and scope of the threat posed to our 
national security by money laundering groups is apparently large, but 
not well defined.
  Numerous U.S. agencies have some responsibility for monitoring and 
responding to the global money-laundering threat, but no single agency 
takes the lead in tracking illicit financial flows and tracking down 
major launderers. I believe we can do it here. I urge members to 
support H.R. 3964.
  Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Vermont (Mr. Sanders), who has been very diligent over the years in 
reviewing the intelligence budget. We do not always agree on this, but 
I certainly want to yield to him to present his perspective.
  Mr. SANDERS. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding, and I 
do not know that I will take the 2 minutes.
  Let me just say this: We have heard a lot of discussion about the 
bipartisan nature of support for the intelligence budget, and that may 
well be on the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence; I do not 
think it is in the general House.
  Last year, when we offered an amendment to lower the intelligence 
budget by 5 percent, we had 142 Members who said, no, those do not 
reflect our priorities. And I think, Mr. Chairman, that when we go out 
on Main Street and we go to rural America and we go to urban America 
and we say to the folks there, many of whom, I should add, no longer

[[Page H2954]]

vote, by and large have given up on the political process because they 
do not believe that this Congress represents their interests, and we 
say to them, should we increase funding for the intelligence budget and 
cut funding for Medicare, should we allow a situation to continue where 
millions of elderly people in this country cannot afford their 
prescription drugs or should we build more spy satellites, I say to my 
colleagues, those people will tell us, in my view, and tell us 
overwhelmingly, they will say, Congress, get your priorities right. 
This is an intelligence budget, so let us talk about how we can improve 
intelligence in America.
  Let us make sure that the little kids are able to get into the Head 
Start program. Let us make sure that millions of kids in this country 
who would like to go to college, but today cannot afford to go to 
college, have that opportunity by significantly increasing the 
appropriations for Pell grants. That is what we are talking about.
  Now, nobody here is saying this is a peaceful world, that there are 
no problems. Nobody here is saying, let us cut the intelligence budget 
to zero. Nobody here is saying that the intelligence agencies do not 
serve a useful purpose. What we are saying is, get your priorities 
right.
  The Cold War is over. The middle class, the working families of this 
country are hurting. Do not cut programs for them in the name of 
deficit reduction and increase funding for the intelligence budget.
  Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 1 minute and 55 seconds.
  I would just like to remind my colleague that if we subtract 142 from 
435, we come up with 293, or a better than 2-to-1 ratio of the members 
of the House who voted in favor of the intelligence bill as reported by 
the committee.
  I would just say this. We have to look at this in perspective. The 
intelligence bill is part of the defense bill. We have cut defense over 
the last 14 years every single year. The Director of the Central 
Intelligence Agency and the Secretary of Defense decide how much of the 
defense budget, which has been cut for 14 straight years, will be 
allocated to intelligence. We are not going to take money out here and 
put it over in Health and Human Services. That is just not what we are 
talking about.
  If we cut the money out of intelligence, it is going to go to some 
other aspect of the defense bill, because it is part of the 050 
function. I support all of these programs that the gentleman from 
Vermont is talking about.
  We were here last night in support of education, and I agree with him 
that we need to protect Medicare and Social Security and the safety 
net. But we also have to protect our national security, and that is the 
foremost responsibility of the Federal Government.
  I think the bill this year provides a prudent amount. There were 16 
members of this committee, and from the most liberal to the most 
conservative, every single one of them present in the committee voted 
to approve this bill.
  I urge my colleagues to support this bill. We have done a 
responsible, balanced job, and I think this bill deserves the support 
of the House.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I just want to gather an understanding of 
where we are on the time left on the floor on either side.
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) has 5 minutes 
remaining; the gentleman from Washington (Mr. Dicks) has 1 minute 
remaining.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, does the distinguished gentleman from 
Washington have any other speakers?
  Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I am prepared to yield back at this time.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I would just yield myself such time as I may 
consume to present a closing thought.
  I would like to point out that the United States is a pioneer in 
legislative oversight in intelligence. I think the gentleman from 
Washington (Mr. Dicks) and I can both attest to the fact that we have 
met with parliamentarians from around the world whose countries are 
just beginning to take the first tentative steps toward independent 
oversight of intelligence activities. They are very interested to learn 
how our system works. I think we have the best system, the safest 
system, and a system where we can absolutely assure the citizens of the 
United States of America that things are under control.
  I thank the gentleman from Washington (Mr. Dicks) for assisting in 
that, and if the gentleman is willing to yield back at this time, I am 
as well.
  Mr. FARR of California. Mr. Chairman, I rise today in support of the 
Sanders Amendment to the Intelligence Authorization Act for FY 1999.
  In the name of reducing deficit spending, Congress has slashed 
hundreds of billions of dollars from programs for education, health 
care, the elderly, and veterans. These cuts have left millions of the 
neediest Americans in even greater need. Yet when it comes to the 
intelligence budget, we are willing to spend tens of billions of 
dollars every year without meaningful reductions.
  H.R. 3694 provides $28 billion dollars for national intelligence 
programs. This enormous amount represents $3 billion more than what we 
spend on food stamps, over 50% more than what we spend on medical care 
for veterans, and more than the total amount spent on child nutrition, 
special education, and Pell Grants combined.
  We need to keep our budget priorities straight. The welfare of the 
American taxpayer should be more important than funding secret 
operations overseas. This amendment would reduce the intelligence 
budget by 5%; although a modest cut, it would at least ensure that the 
intelligence budget does not escape the same budget-cutting axe that 
has cut so many other government programs. I urge my colleagues to 
support this amendment.
  Ms. MILLENDER-McDONALD. Mr. Chairman, I rise to express my support 
for H.R. 3694, the Intelligence Authorization for FY 1999. However, my 
support is not without serious reservations, for I remain deeply 
concerned about allegations that have been raised regarding CIA 
involvement in drug trafficking in South Central Los Angeles and 
elsewhere. While I applaud Chairman Porter Goss, Ranking Member Norm 
Dicks, and the rest of the House Permanent Select Committee for 
convening a public hearing following release of Volume One of the 
Central Intelligence Agency Inspector General's report in response to 
the San Jose Mercury News' series ``Dark Alliance'', I have made my 
views about the shortcomings in this report known to the Committee and 
to the Agency. I am aware that Volume Two of the Inspector General's 
report, which deals with the more substantive issues regarding the 
extent of the relationship between the intelligence community and the 
Nicaraguan Contra resistance, has been provided to the Select Committee 
in classified form. I understand that it is being reviewed by the 
Central Intelligence Agency to determine whether any or all of it may 
be declassified. And, we are still awaiting release of Inspector 
General Michael Bromwich's report on the allegations of wrongdoing that 
may have occurred within branches of the U.S. Department of Justice.
  However, I would like to take this opportunity to strongly urge CIA 
Director John Tenet and Chairman Goss to do everything possible to 
declassify as much information in the report as possible as its subject 
matter goes to the heart of the issues raised by my constituents in the 
public meetings I convened following publication of the San Jose 
Mercury News series. I also urge Attorney General Janet Reno to release 
the I.G.'s report at the earliest possible opportunity. Failure to make 
this information public feeds the skepticism of the hundreds of 
constituents in my District who still want answers and who are 
encouraged by the Committee's expressed commitment to make public as 
much information as possible.
  Furthermore, to fully appreciate our government's efforts to fight 
the scourge of narcotics, the public must understand its intricacies, 
including the role of interdiction and intelligence. Public release of 
the reports, followed by public hearings, and ultimately the conduct by 
the Committee of its own inquiry, will assist my constituents to 
evaluate the role of the Central Intelligence Agency played in 
balancing competing national priorities. Such a process will also give 
Members of Congress, as policy makers, the information necessary to 
make informed decisions about handling such issues in the future.
  Consequently, I and my constituents continue to eagerly await the 
public release of the reports by the Inspectors General of Justice and 
CIA. I reiterate my hope that the Select Committee will give their 
content, methodologies and findings the scrutiny they deserve and in a 
similar spirit of openness, make themselves available to my 
constituents to respond to any questions these reports generate. I 
believe such openness is critical to restoration of the credibility and 
public trust necessary to allow intelligence gathering activities, 
which by their nature are secretive, to coexist with democracy.
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I want to take a few minutes to talk about 
some of the things that aren't being talked about enough. The war on 
drugs has come up several times

[[Page H2955]]

today. I think there's some compelling evidence to show how the culture 
of obsessive secrecy that is part of covert action cultivates an actual 
and implied climate of impunity.
  The CIA's Inspector General, Fred Hitz, undertook a massive study 
into the CIA ties to drug traffickers. Upon completion of the first 
volume of the 600 page report, Hitz declared that they found ``no 
evidence . . . of any conspiracy by the CIA or its employees to bring 
drugs into the United States.'' Then he announced that hardly any of 
his findings would be publicly available, casting a long shadow of 
doubt as to the scope and conclusions of the investigation. A second 
volume is still in the works.
  The CIA's credibility when it comes to investigating itself was 
further brought into question when Hitz disclosed during recent 
testimony before the House Intelligence Committee that in 1982, the CIA 
and Attorney General William French Smith had an agreement that the CIA 
was not required to report allegations of drug smuggling by non-
employees. Non-employees was explicitly interpreted to include unpaid 
and paid assets of the CIA, such as pilots and informants. The 
memorandum, dated February 11, 1982, states ``no formal requirement 
regarding the reporting of narcotics violations has been included in 
these procedures'', referring to the procedures relating to non-
employee crimes. I want to compliment the gentlelady from California, 
Ms. Waters, for her hard work on this topic and for obtaining this and 
other relevant memoranda. I ask you, though, is this the war on drugs 
that President Reagan launched?
  Nobody here who advocates cuts to the intelligence budget or 
reforming this intelligence system gone haywire doubts for one second 
that the U.S. needs reliable information about exports of Russian 
missile technology or the trade in bacteriological warfare technology. 
I am a veteran and I know how important intelligence is. But doesn't 
the above information illustrate why the integrity of our intelligence 
system is in doubt?
  The historical record shows that this culture of secrecy too often 
undermines our foreign and domestic interests.
  In 1989, the Senate Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics and 
International Communications, headed by Senator John Kerry, found that 
``there was substantial evidence of drug smuggling through the war zone 
on the part of individual Contras, Contra suppliers, Contra pilots, 
mercenaries who worked with the Contra supporters throughout the 
region.'' Moreover, U.S. officials ``failed to address the drug issue 
for fear of jeopardizing the war efforts against Nicaragua.''
  In other words, the drug war was subordinated to the cold war. This 
is right in line with what we've learned about the memorandum of 
understanding described above. I am inserting into the Record a list, 
compiled by the Institute for Policy Studies, which goes through other 
examples of the troubling history of our intelligence agencies.

   A Tangled Web: A History of CIA Complicity in Drug International 
                              Trafficking


                              WORLD WAR II

       The Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and the Office of 
     Naval Intelligence (ONI), the CIA's parent and sister 
     organizations, cultivate relations with the leaders of the 
     Italian Mafia, recruiting heavily from the New York and 
     Chicago underworlds, whose members, including Charles 
     ``Lucky'' Luciano, Meyer Lansky, Joe Adonis, and Frank 
     Costello, help the agencies keep in touch with Sicilian Mafia 
     leaders exiled by Italian dictator Benito Mussolini. 
     Domestically, the aim is to prevent sabotage on East Coast 
     ports, while in Italy the goal is to gain intelligence on 
     Sicily prior to the allied invasions and to suppress the 
     burgeoning Italian Communist Party. Imprisoned in New York, 
     Luciano earns a pardon for his wartime service and is 
     deported to Italy, where he proceeds to build his heroin 
     empire, first by diverting supplies from the legal market, 
     before developing connections in Lebanon and Turkey that 
     supply morphine base to labs in Sicily. The OSS and ONI also 
     work closely with Chinese gangsters who control vast supplies 
     of opium, morphine and heroin, helping to establish the third 
     pillar of the post-world War II heroin trade in the Golden 
     Triangle, the border region of Thailand, Burma, Laos and 
     China's Yunnan Province.


                                  1947

       In its first year of existence, the CIA continues U.S. 
     intelligence community's anti-communist drive. Agency 
     operatives help the Mafia seize total power in Sicily and it 
     sends money to heroin-smuggling Corsican mobsters in 
     Marseille to assist in their battle with Communist unions for 
     control of the city's docks. By 1951, Luciano and the 
     Corsicans have pooled their resources, giving rise to the 
     notorious ``French Connection'' which would dominate the 
     world heroin trade until the early 1970s. The CIA also 
     recruits members of organized crime gangs in Japan to help 
     ensure that the country stays in the non-communist world. 
     Several years later, the Japanese Yakuza emerges as a major 
     source of methamphetamine in Hawaii.


                                  1949

       Chinese Communist revolution causes collapse of drug empire 
     allied with U.S. intelligence community, but a new one 
     quickly emerges under the command of Nationalist (KMT) 
     General Li Mi, who flees Yunnan into eastern Burma. Seeking 
     to rekindle anticommunist resistance in China, the CIA 
     provides arms, ammunition and other supplies to the KMT. 
     After being repelled from China with heavy losses, the KMT 
     settles down with local population and organizes and expands 
     the opium trade from Burma and Northern Thailand. By 1972, 
     the KMT controls 80 percent of the Golden Triangle's opium 
     trade.


                                  1950

       The CIA launches Project Bluebird to determine whether 
     certain drugs might improve its interrogation methods. This 
     eventually leads CIA head Allen Dulles, in April 1953, to 
     institute a program for ``covert use of biological and 
     chemical materials'' as part of the agency's continuing 
     efforts to control behavior. With benign names such as 
     Project Artichoke and Project Chatter, these projects 
     continue through the 1960s, with hundreds of unwitting test 
     subjects given various drugs, including LSD.


                                  1960

       In support of the U.S. war in Vietnam, the CIA renews old 
     and cultivates new relations with Laotian, Burmese and Thai 
     drug merchants, as well as corrupt military and political 
     leaders in Southeast Asia. Despite the dramatic rise of 
     heroin production, the agency's relations with these figures 
     attracts little attention until the early 1970s.


                                  1967

       Manuel Antonio Noriega goes on the CIA payroll. First 
     recruited by the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency in 1959, 
     Noriega becomes an invaluable asset for the CIA when he takes 
     charge of Panama's intelligence service after the 1968 
     military coup, providing services for U.S. covert operations 
     and facilitating the use of Panama as the center of U.S. 
     intelligence gathering in Latin America. In 1976, CIA 
     Director George Bush pays Noriega $110,000 for his services, 
     even though as early as 1971 U.S. officials agents had 
     evidence that he was deeply involved in drug trafficking. 
     Although the Carter administration suspends payments to 
     Noriega, he returns to the U.S. payroll when President Reagan 
     takes office in 1981. The general is rewarded handsomely for 
     his services in support of Contras forces in Nicaragua during 
     the 1980s, collecting $200,000 from the CIA in 1986 alone.


                                May 1970

       A Christian Science Monitor correspondent reports that the 
     CIA ``is cognizant of, if not party to, the extensive 
     movement of opium out of Laos,'' quoting one charter pilot 
     who claims that ``opium shipments get special CIA clearance 
     and monitoring on their flights southward out of the 
     country.'' At the time, some 30,000 U.S. service men in 
     Vietnam are addicted to heroin.


                                  1972

       The full story of how Cold War politics and U.S. covert 
     operations fueled a heroin boom in the Golden Triangle breaks 
     when Yale University doctoral student Alfred McCoy publishes 
     his ground-breaking study, The Politics of Heroin in 
     Southeast Asia. The CIA attempts to quash the book.


                                  1973

       Thai national Puttapron Khramkhruan is arrested in 
     connection with the seizure of 59 pounds of opium in Chicago. 
     A CIA informant on narcotics trafficking in northern 
     Thailand, he claims that agency had full knowledge of his 
     actions. According to the U.S. Justice Department, the CIA 
     quashed the case because it may ``prove embarrassing 
     because of Mr. Khramkhruans's involvement with CIA 
     activities in Thailand, Burma, and elsewhere.''


                               June 1975

       Mexican police, assisted by U.S. drug agents, arrest 
     Alberto Sicilia Falcon, whose Tijuana-based operation was 
     reportedly generating $3.6 million a week from the sale of 
     cocaine and marijuana in the United States. The Cuban exile 
     claims he was a CIA protege, trained as part of the agency's 
     anti-Castro efforts, and in exchange for his help in moving 
     weapons to certain groups in Central America, the CIA 
     facilitated his movement of drugs. In 1974, Sicilia's top 
     aide, Jose Egozi, a CIA-trained intelligence officer and Bay 
     of Pigs veteran, reportedly lined up agency support for a 
     right-wing plot to overthrow the Portuguese government. Among 
     the top Mexican politicians, law enforcement and intelligence 
     officials from whom Sicilia enjoyed support was Miguel Nazar 
     Haro, head of the Direccion Federal de Seguridad (DFS), who 
     the CIA admits was its ``most important source in Mexico and 
     Central America.'' When Nazar was linked to a multi-million-
     dollar stolen car ring several years later, the CIA 
     intervenes to prevent his indictment in the United States.


                               April 1978

       Soviet-backed coup in Afghanistan sets stage for explosive 
     growth in Southwest Asian heroin trade. New Marxist regime 
     undertakes vigorous anti-narcotics campaign aimed at 
     suppressing poppy production, triggering a revolt by semi-
     autonomous tribal groups that traditionally raised opium for 
     export. The CIA-supported rebel Mujahedeen begins expanding 
     production to finance their insurgency. Between 1982 and 
     1989, during which time the CIA ships billions of dollars

[[Page H2956]]

     in weapons and other aid to guerrilla forces, annual opium 
     production in Afghanistan increases to about 800 tons from 
     250 tons. By 1986, the State Department admits that 
     Afghanistan is ``probably the world's largest producer of 
     opium for export'' and ``the poppy source for a majority of 
     the Southwest Asian heroin found in the United States.'' U.S. 
     officials, however, fail to take action to curb production. 
     Their silence not only serves to maintain public support for 
     the Mujahedeen, it also smooths relations with Pakistan, 
     whose leaders, deeply implicated in the heroin trade, help 
     channel CIA support to the Afghan rebels.


                               June 1980

       Despite advance knowledge, the CIA fails to halt members of 
     the Bolivian militaries, aide by the Argentine counterparts, 
     from staging the so-called ``Cocaine Coup,'' according to 
     former DEA agent Michael Levine. In fact, the 25-year DEA 
     veteran maintains the agency actively abetted cocaine 
     trafficking in Bolivia, where government official who sought 
     to combat traffickers faced ``torture and death at the hands 
     of CIA-sponsored paramilitary terrorists under the command of 
     fugitive Nazi war criminal (also protected by the CIA) Klaus 
     Barbie.


                             february 1985

       DEA agent Enrique ``Kiki'' Camerena is kidnapped and murder 
     in Mexico. DEA, FBI and U.S. Customs Service investigators 
     accuse the CIA of stonewalling during their investigation. 
     U.S. authorities claim the CIA is more interested in 
     protecting its assets, including top drug trafficker and 
     kidnapping principal Miguel Angel Felix Gallardo. (In 1982, 
     the DEA learned that Felix Gallardo was moving $20 million a 
     month through a single Bank of America account, but it could 
     not get the CIA to cooperate with its investigation.) Felix 
     Gallardo's main partner is Honduran drug lord Juan Ramon 
     Matta Ballesteros, who began amassing his $2-billion fortune 
     as a cocaine supplier to Alberto Sicilia Falcon. (see June 
     1985) Matta's air transport firm, SETCO, receives $186,000 
     from the U.S. State Department to fly ``humanitarian 
     supplies'' to the Nicaraguan Contras from 1983 to 1985. 
     Accusations that the CIA protected some of Mexico's leading 
     drug traffickers in exchange for their financial support of 
     the Contras are leveled by government witnesses at the trials 
     of Camarena's accused killers.


                              january 1988

       Deciding that he has outlived his usefulness to the Contra 
     cause, the Reagan Administration approves an indictment of 
     Noriega on drug charges. By this time, U.S. Senate 
     investigators had found that ``the United States had received 
     substantial information about criminal involvement of top 
     Panamanian officials for nearly twenty years and done little 
     to respond.''


                               april 1989

       The Senate Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics and 
     International Communications, headed by Sen. John Kerry of 
     Massachusetts, issues its 1,166-page report on drug 
     corruption in Central America and the Caribbean. The 
     subcommittee found that ``there was substantial evidence of 
     drug smuggling through the war zone on the part of 
     individuals Contras, Contra suppliers, Contra pilots, 
     mercenaries who worked with the Contras supporters throughout 
     the region.'' U.S. officials, the subcommittee said, ``failed 
     to address the drug issue for fear of jeopardizing the war 
     efforts against Nicaragua.'' The investigation also reveals 
     that some ``senior policy makers'' believed that the use of 
     drug money was ``a perfect solution to the Contras' funding 
     problems.''


                              january 1993

       Honduran businessman Eugenio Molina Osorio is arrested in 
     Lubbock Texas for supplying $90,000 worth of cocaine to DEA 
     agents. Molina told judge he is working for CIA to whom he 
     provides political intelligence. Shortly after, a letter from 
     CIA headquarters is sent to the judge, and the case is 
     dismissed. ``I guess we're all aware that they [the CIA] do 
     business in a different way than everybody else,'' the judge 
     notes. Molina later admits his drug involvement was not a CIA 
     operation, explaining that the agency protected him because 
     of his value as a source for political intelligence in 
     Honduras.


                             november 1996

       Former head of the Venezuelan National Guard and CIA 
     operative Gen. Ramon Gullien Davila is indicted in Miami on 
     charges of smuggling as much as 22 tons of cocaine into the 
     United States. More than a ton of cocaine was shipped into 
     the country with the CIA's approval as part of an undercover 
     program aimed at catching drug smugglers, an operation kept 
     secret from other U.S. agencies.
  Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
  The CHAIRMAN. All time for general debate has expired.
  Pursuant to the rule, the amendment in the nature of a substitute 
printed in the bill, modified by striking section 401 and redesignating 
the succeeding sections, shall be considered as an original bill for 
the purpose of amendment under the 5-minute rule. Consideration shall 
proceed by title, and each title shall be considered read.
  No amendment to the committee amendment is in order unless printed in 
the Congressional Record. Those amendments shall be considered read.
  The Chairman of the Committee of the Whole may postpone until a time 
during further consideration in the Committee of the Whole a request 
for a recorded vote on any amendment, and may reduce to not less than 5 
minutes the time for voting by electronic device on any postponed 
question that immediately follows another vote by electronic device, 
without intervening business, provided that the time for voting 
by electronic device on the first in any series of questions shall not 
be less than 15 minutes.

  The Clerk will designate section 1.
  The text of section 1 is as follows:
       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

       (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the 
     ``Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999''.
       (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act 
     is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.

                    TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Sec. 101. Authorization of appropriations.
Sec. 102. Classified schedule of authorizations.
Sec. 103. Personnel ceiling adjustments.
Sec. 104. Community management account.

 TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

Sec. 201. Authorization of appropriations.

                     TITLE III--GENERAL PROVISIONS

Sec. 301. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized by 
              law.
Sec. 302. Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities.
Sec. 303. Application of sanctions laws to intelligence activities.
Sec. 304. Sense of Congress on intelligence community contracting.

                 TITLE IV--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Sec. 401. Extension of the CIA Voluntary Separation Pay Act.
Sec. 402. Enhanced protective authority for CIA personnel and family 
              members.
Sec. 403. Technical amendments.

         TITLE V--DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Sec. 501. Extension of authority to engage in commercial activities as 
              security for intelligence collection activities.

  The CHAIRMAN. Are there amendments to section 1?
  If there are no amendments to section 1, the Clerk will designate 
title I.
  The text of title I is as follows:
                    TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

     SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

       Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal 
     year 1999 for the conduct of the intelligence and 
     intelligence-related activities of the following elements of 
     the United States Government:
       (1) The Central Intelligence Agency.
       (2) The Department of Defense.
       (3) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
       (4) The National Security Agency.
       (5) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, 
     and the Department of the Air Force.
       (6) The Department of State.
       (7) The Department of the Treasury.
       (8) The Department of Energy.
       (9) The Federal Bureau of Investigation.
       (10) The National Reconnaissance Office.
       (11) The National Imagery and Mapping Agency.

     SEC. 102. CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS.

       (a) Specifications of Amounts and Personnel Ceilings.--The 
     amounts authorized to be appropriated under section 101, and 
     the authorized personnel ceilings as of September 30, 1999, 
     for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related 
     activities of the elements listed in such section, are those 
     specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations 
     prepared to accompany the bill H.R. 3694 of the 105th 
     Congress.
       (b) Availability of Classified Schedule of 
     Authorizations.--The Schedule of Authorizations shall be made 
     available to the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate 
     and House of Representatives and to the President. The 
     President shall provide for suitable distribution of the 
     Schedule, or of appropriate portions of the Schedule, within 
     the executive branch.

     SEC. 103. PERSONNEL CEILING ADJUSTMENTS.

       (a) Authority for Adjustments.--With the approval of the 
     Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Director 
     of Central Intelligence may authorize employment of civilian 
     personnel in excess of the number authorized for fiscal year 
     1999 under section 102 when the Director of Central 
     Intelligence determines that such action is necessary to the 
     performance of important intelligence functions, except that 
     the number of personnel employed in excess of the number 
     authorized under such section may not, for any element of the 
     intelligence community, exceed two percent of the number of 
     civilian personnel authorized under such section for such 
     element.
       (b) Notice to Intelligence Committees.--The Director of 
     Central Intelligence shall

[[Page H2957]]

     promptly notify the Permanent Select Committee on 
     Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select 
     Committee on Intelligence of the Senate whenever he exercises 
     the authority granted by this section.

     SEC. 104. COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT.

       (a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized 
     to be appropriated for the Community Management Account of 
     the Director of Central Intelligence for fiscal year 1999 the 
     sum of $139,123,000. Within such amount, funds identified in 
     the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in 
     section 102(a) for the Advanced Research and Development 
     Committee shall remain available until September 30, 2000.
       (b) Authorized Personnel Levels.--The elements within the 
     Community Management Account of the Director of Central 
     Intelligence is authorized 283 full-time personnel as of 
     September 30, 1999. Personnel serving in such elements may be 
     permanent employees of the Community Management Staff or 
     personnel detailed from other elements of the United States 
     Government.
       (c) Classified Authorizations.--
       (1) Authorization of appropriations.--In addition to 
     amounts authorized to be appropriated for the Community 
     Management Account by subsection (a), there is also 
     authorized to be appropriated for the Community Management 
     Account for fiscal year 1999 such additional amounts as are 
     specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations 
     referred to in section 102(a).
       (2) Authorization of personnel.--In addition to the 
     personnel authorized by subsection (b) for elements of the 
     Community Management Account as of September 30, 1999, there 
     is authorized such additional personnel for such elements as 
     of that date as is specified in the classified Schedule of 
     Authorizations.
       (d) Reimbursement.--Except as provided in section 113 of 
     the National Security Act of 1947, during fiscal year 1999, 
     any officer or employee of the United States or a member of 
     the Armed Forces who is detailed to the staff of the 
     Community Management Account from another element of the 
     United States Government shall be detailed on a reimbursable 
     basis, except that any such officer, employee or member may 
     be detailed on a nonreimbursable basis for a period of less 
     than one year for the performance of temporary functions as 
     required by the Director of Central Intelligence.
       (e) National Drug Intelligence Center.--
       (1) In general.--Of the amount appropriated pursuant to the 
     authorization in subsection (a), the amount of $27,000,000 
     shall be available for the National Drug Intelligence Center. 
     Within such amount, funds provided for research, development, 
     test, and evaluation purposes shall remain available until 
     September 30, 2000, and funds provided for procurement 
     purposes shall remain available until September 30, 2001.
       (2) Transfer of funds.--The Director of Central 
     Intelligence shall transfer to the Attorney General of the 
     United States funds available for the National Drug 
     Intelligence Center under paragraph (1). The Attorney General 
     shall utilize funds so transferred for the activities of the 
     National Drug Intelligence Center.
       (3) Limitation.--Amounts available for the National Drug 
     Intelligence Center may not be used in contravention of the 
     provisions of section 103(d)(1) of the National Security Act 
     of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(d)(1)).
       (4) Authority.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, 
     the Attorney General shall retain full authority over the 
     operations of the National Drug Intelligence Center.
       (f) Transfer Authority for Funds for Security Requirements 
     at Overseas Locations.--
       (1) In general.--Of the amount appropriated pursuant to the 
     authorization in subsection (a), the Director of Central 
     Intelligence may transfer funds to departments or other 
     agencies for the sole purpose of supporting certain 
     intelligence community security requirements at overseas 
     locations, as specified by the Director.
       (2) Limitation.--Amounts made available for departments or 
     agencies under paragraph (1) shall be--
       (A) transferred to the specific appropriation;
       (B) allocated to the specific account in the specific 
     amount, as determined by the Director;
       (C) merged with funds in such account that are available 
     for architectural and engineering support expenses at 
     overseas locations; and
       (D) available only for the same purposes, and subject to 
     the same terms and conditions, as the funds described in 
     subparagraph (C).


                 Amendment No. 2 Offered by Mr. Sanders

  Mr. SANDERS. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Amendment No. 2 offered by Mr. Sanders:
       At the end of title I, add the following new section:

     SEC. 105. LIMITATION ON AMOUNTS AUTHORIZED TO BE 
                   APPROPRIATED.

       (a) Limitation.--Except as provided in subsection (b), 
     notwithstanding the total amount of the individual 
     authorizations of appropriations contained in this Act 
     (including the amounts specified in the classified Schedule 
     of Authorizations referred to in section 102), there is 
     authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 1999 to carry 
     out this Act not more than 95 percent of the total amount 
     authorized to be appropriated by this Act (determined without 
     regard to this section).
       (b) Exception.--Subsection (a) does not apply to amounts 
     authorized to be appropriated for the Central Intelligence 
     Agency Retirement and Disability Fund by section 201.

  Mr. SANDERS. Mr. Chairman, this amendment is also being offered by 
the gentleman from Oregon (Mr. DeFazio); the gentleman from New York 
(Mr. Owens); and the gentleman from California (Mr. Stark).
  Mr. Chairman, this amendment cuts the intelligence budget by 5 
percent from the level authorized for fiscal year 1999, while still 
protecting the CIA retirement and disability fund. Although this year's 
amount authorized by the bill is classified, we do know that last 
year's budget was $26.7 billion, which means that this amendment would 
cut approximately $1.3 billion from the intelligence agencies.
  Mr. Chairman, this amendment truly speaks to what we are as a Nation 
and who we are as a people. It speaks to whether the Congress of the 
United States is here to represent the ordinary people of America, the 
middle class, the working families, the children, the veterans, the 
seniors, or whether we are here to continue representing very powerful 
special interests within the military-industrial complex, the force 
that President Dwight D. Eisenhower warned us about 40 years ago.
  Mr. Chairman, it is no secret that the United States today is 
becoming two very separate nations. On the top we have people who are 
enjoying incredible wealth. In fact, the wealthiest 1 percent is today 
better off than at any time in the modern history of this country. We 
have people like Bill Gates, himself, alone, who owns more wealth than 
the bottom 40 percent of households in America. One man owns more 
wealth than the bottom 40 percent of our households.
  In recent years, we have seen a proliferation of millionaires and 
billionaires, but Mr. Chairman, there is another reality in America 
today, and that is that the middle class continues to shrink, that the 
wages of the average American worker are 15 percent less than they were 
25 years ago, that 40 million Americans have no health insurance, that 
millions of senior citizens cannot afford the prescription drugs they 
desperately need.

                              {time}  1315

  That millions of our families cannot afford to send their kids to 
college. That food shelters and emergency shelters are seeing a large 
increase in the hungry and the homeless who come to them for help. That 
is the issue that we are talking about today.
  We are not just talking about the intelligence budgets. We have to 
put that into the context of the needs of all the people in this 
country.
  Mr. Chairman, how can we increase funding for an already bloated 
intelligence budget at exactly the same time as some propose major cuts 
for millions of low- and moderate-income citizens? How is it okay to 
say more for the intelligence budget at the same time as this Congress 
cut $115 billion from Medicare? Tell the senior citizens of this 
country whose benefits we have cut back on.
  How can we look our veterans in the face when in last year's balanced 
budget agreement we cut funding for veterans programs by 19 percent; 
when we cut the administration of Social Security by 23 percent; when 
just last week we cut $2.3 billion in affordable housing, despite the 
housing crisis experienced by so many Americans.
  Mr. Chairman, even in Washington the $1.3 billion that we cut from 
the intelligence budget is a lot of money, and let me tell my 
colleagues what we can purchase with that $1.3 billion if we get our 
priorities straight.
  In Vermont and throughout this country, seniors are finding it 
difficult to pay for their prescription drugs. Legislation has been 
offered which would provide up to $500 each in prescription drug 
assistance for seniors. This $1.3 billion that we cut from a bloated 
intelligence budget could provide 2,600,000 seniors up to $500 each in 
their prescription drug assistance.
  Are my colleagues going to go back to their districts and tell their 
senior citizens who are struggling to ease their pain that we cannot 
cut $1.3 billion from the intelligence budget when we can provide 2.6 
million of them help for their prescription drugs?
  Mr. Chairman, there are 808,000 homebound seniors who receive the 
excellent Meals on Wheels program supported widely in this Congress. 
This

[[Page H2958]]

$1.3 billion could double the number of seniors who receive this help. 
These are elderly people at home, long waiting list for the Meals on 
Wheels program. We could double the number.
  The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Vermont (Mr. Sanders) 
has expired.
  (By unanimous consent, Mr. Sanders was allowed to proceed for 3 
additional minutes.)
  Mr. SANDERS. Mr. Chairman, nearly 1 million college students could 
receive Pell Grants to assist them going to college. Just yesterday we 
passed the education bill. I voted for it, but remember the 
authorization is nowhere near equal to the appropriation.
  We have millions of middle-class families in this country who cannot 
afford to send their kids to college. And are my colleagues so sure 
that it makes sense for the security of this country, for the 
intelligence of this country, that it is more important to vote another 
$1.3 billion than it is to provide nearly a million kids in this 
country with Pell Grants?
  Nine hundred sixty-nine thousand families could benefit from Section 
8 housing programs if we cut that $1.3 billion. In the State of 
Vermont, we have a long waiting list for Section 8. That is true all 
over this country. Two hundred forty thousand more children could 
attend the Head Start program if we cut this $1.3 billion.
  So, Mr. Chairman, what I would just like to say at this point is that 
the Cold War is over. We do need an intelligence budget, but there is 
very ample evidence that the budget that we are being asked to support 
today is bloated.
  I would say to my friends who are the deficit hawks who get up here 
every day and who say cut, cut, cut, if they are going to cut Medicare, 
if they are going to cut Medicaid, if they are going to cut veterans 
programs, if they are going to cut housing, take a look at the 
intelligence budget.
  Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment.
  (Mr. SPENCE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, the gentleman from Vermont made reference 
to getting our priorities straight. What is a higher priority than 
defending the lives of all the people of this great country? We are 
talking about cutting today. I would like to remind the gentleman that 
the defense budget, which includes the intelligence budget, has taken 
all the cuts in recent years. Spending has gone up for everything else 
except defense.
  Let me dwell on that for a minute. I do not think people realize the 
extent to which we have cut back on our military and our intelligence-
gathering agencies, the impact these cuts have had on our national 
defense. And yes, in a world where the Cold War is over, but in many 
ways a more dangerous world today than it was during the Cold War. And 
I will tell my colleagues why. Because people do not realize what we 
have done to ourselves. We have done to our military and to our 
intelligence agencies what no foreign power has been able to do. We 
have been decimating our own defenses.
  That is unforgivable, Mr. Chairman. In this dangerous world in which 
we are living, when not tomorrow but tonight, today, at any minute, 
this whole world could explode for us. It is just that serious. And 
here we are fat, dumb, and happy going about our merry ways, not 
concerned about what could happen to us. Let me tell my colleagues what 
could happen to us.
  In this day and time you do not have to be a superpower to raise the 
horrors of mass destruction warfare on people. It could be a Third 
World country, a rogue nation, or a terrorist group for that matter. 
They can put together weapons of mass destruction in laboratories in 
inexpensive low-tech ways. They can marry these weapons of mass 
destruction with cruise missiles, which can be bought across borders. 
They can launch them from various platforms, airplanes, submarines, 
ships, tugboats, extending the range to the extent that it brings 
everyone under the threat of weapons of mass destruction.
  These weapons of mass destruction are chemical, biological, 
bacteriological. Can my colleagues imagine having to defend against 
these kinds of weapons, hideous weapons? Anthrax could be released in 
the air over Washington, D.C. in a simple way, killing hundreds of 
thousands of people, and we could not inoculate people fast enough to 
prevent anything happening to them. That could happen at any time and 
people are talking about cutting back on our ability to defend against 
these things or to prevent them from happening. It is unconscionable to 
even think about it. It borders on leaving our country defenseless when 
confronting the enemy and all the dangers that we are facing as a 
country.
  Aside from those weapons of mass destruction, we face all kinds of 
threats from various sources. This is a very dangerous world. We have 
to do more instead of less in defending our country and our people.
  Mr. Chairman, I would urge my colleagues to let reason come to this 
debate. Think it through. Vote down overwhelmingly this senseless 
amendment.
  Mr. DeFAZIO. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the amendment. The gentleman from 
South Carolina (Mr. Spence) made some excellent points. The whole 
world, it is a dangerous world. It could explode at any moment. The 
question, given the past performance of our intelligence agencies is 
whether they could tell us about the world exploding before or after 
the fact or even recognize it after the fact. The disintegration of the 
Soviet Union, they could not predict that. The invasion of Kuwait with 
the Iraqis massed on the border, they could not predict that. Even the 
horrible tragedy which was mentioned earlier of the killing by 
terrorists of our troops, that was not prevented and it certainly was 
not predicted.
  These are horrible things that have happened and the intelligence 
agencies have not exactly been ahead of the curve. They are engaged in 
acquiring ever greater technology at ever greater expense and more and 
more money, as opposed to becoming more efficient and more effective, 
finely honed, leaner and meaner, getting the intelligence we really 
need and our Armed Services really need to defend our people.
  The gentleman talked about defending our people against chemical-
biological attack. We just had an assessment about that. There is no 
preparation in this country. We are not investing in the civilian law 
enforcement agencies, the emergency response, the vaccines, and the 
other things we should be stockpiling to respond. But we are spending 
money on incredible satellite systems and the satellite systems are 
gathering so much data that 60 percent of it is never analyzed.
  Mr. Chairman, we wonder if they have got up to the point yet of 
analyzing the data that shows whether or not there is still a Berlin 
Wall. Just a couple of years ago, the National Security Agency, in 
doing a cursory review of its books, found that it had an extra $4 
billion in accounts which it had secreted around, more than the annual 
budget perhaps, but that is a classified number so we do not know. But 
probably more than its annual budget, they had secreted it in various 
accounts and no one knew anything about it.
  So that speaks to me, and I think to other Members of Congress, that 
perhaps there is a little bit too much money washing around over there 
if they can misplace $4 billion. We are investigating misappropriations 
of hundreds of dollars or thousands of dollars regularly, and rising to 
those issues.
  Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. DeFAZIO. I yield to the gentleman from Washington.
  Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, the gentleman has always been accurate. He 
said the NSA. He meant the NRO, and I ask him to correct that.
  Mr. DeFAZIO. Mr. Chairman, reclaiming my time, excuse me. I thank the 
gentleman for correcting me. I meant the NRO, not the NSA. That is part 
of the problem with this debate. This is not a debate which really 
takes place very often on the floor of the House, and does not take 
place in full light with full accountability to the public. We know 
last year's number. We know how much money we spent last year. But we 
cannot talk about how much money we are going to spend this year. We 
cannot talk about the number which we are debating here on the floor 
today. We cannot talk about

[[Page H2959]]

whether it is an increase or decrease from last year's number because 
we have last year's number.
  It used to be at least we could talk about the percentage increase of 
the secret number, but now since we know what the number was, we cannot 
even talk about what percentage increase or decrease it might be in 
this year's budget. But we are debating it here on the floor and we do 
have some confusing acronyms, NRO, NSA, DIA, CIA, and others which we 
cannot even mention which are involved.
  The point that I am trying to make, and I think others here are, no, 
we do want to have a robust intelligence service, but we want to have 
one that is reorganized, that is not territorial, oriented towards 
preserving their own separate bureaucracies, but one which is better 
integrated, one which is more efficient, more effective, and provides 
realtime data that is of use both to our military services, our 
civilian law enforcement agencies, and in the defense of the people of 
the United States of America.
  I believe we could do that with more scrutiny instead of having this 
absurd debate every year where we do not know what we are debating. Let 
us talk about the individual components of this budget and what they 
are spending it on. There is no one in the world who can benefit from 
knowing that. In fact, our potential enemies already know it, but the 
American people cannot know it and the elected officials cannot know it 
and they cannot speak about it and debate it on the floor.
  Mr. Chairman, that is an absurdity and that is what the debate is 
about today. If they could defend their numbers and defend them 
category by category as we do every other department of the United 
States of America, including the Pentagon and the Defense Department, 
then there would be a fair debate and the numbers that the gentleman 
cited in support of that budget would be fair numbers. But those are 
numbers where the Members did not even know what they were voting on. 
That happens fairly often around here, but this is one for sure that 
they did not know what they were voting on.
  So I would urge my colleagues to support this amendment to cut the 
amount of money, whatever it is, by 5 percent and make these agencies 
more efficient, more effective, and better protect the people of the 
United States.
  Mr. YOUNG of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite 
number of words.
  Mr. Chairman, the previous speaker talked about a lot of complaints 
that he had about our intelligence community and I think we would all 
admit they are not perfect. As he was speaking, it reminded me of a 
trip that I made driving home to Florida one time. I came upon a group 
of young kids that were on a hay ride. And the hay ride wagon had red, 
white, and blue bunting and American flags and the kids were having a 
good time packed up on the bales of hay.

                              {time}  1330

  It had this big banner across the back of the wagon, and it said 
``America, we ain't perfect, but we ain't through yet.'' I would apply 
that to the argument that the gentleman just made.
  Our intelligence community is not perfect. There are problems. This 
bill directs itself to many of those problems, to solve many of those 
solutions. That is what we intend to do with this bill.
  What I really wanted to mention is that I listened to the comment of 
my friend, the gentleman from Vermont (Mr. Sanders) about senior 
citizens. He listed a lot of things that we could do if we did not do 
something else. You could make that argument about anything that we do 
in here.
  Let me tell you this. I represent one of the largest groups of senior 
citizens of anybody in this body. And those senior citizens are old 
enough to remember a time in our history that was devastating to us, 
that was devastating to our morale, and that killed an awful lot of 
young Americans.
  I am talking about a lack of intelligence, poor preparation for 
intelligence, lack of information that we needed when Pearl Harbor was 
attacked in 1941. That was a long time ago, and a lot of people do not 
remember that, but those senior citizens that the gentleman from 
Vermont (Mr. Sanders) talks about, they remember that.
  I hear it on a regular basis when I am home in my district talking 
about defense issues and veterans issues; and that is, let us do not 
ever get ourselves in a position where we are not prepared to either 
know about an attack of that type or be prepared to do something about 
it.
  The world is different today in 1998 than it was in 1941. In 1941, we 
did not have intercontinental ballistic missiles aimed at each other 
across the oceans. We did not have submarines carrying nuclear warheads 
within range of the United States of America, any city in the United 
States of America. We did not have satellites, and we did not have 
space shuttles and things of this nature.
  In 1941, we had a little time to put it back together. Although we 
lost thousands and thousands of young Americans, we lost in the beaches 
of the Pacific and the frozen battle grounds of Europe; and, finally, 
we turned the tide, and we came back to life, and we defeated the 
enemy, and we prevailed, and freedom prevailed.
  Just think, had our intelligence been adequate then, we might not 
have had to suffer the terrible tragedy of Pearl Harbor. Let us not let 
that happen again. Let us keep our eyes and ears as sharp as they can 
possibly be. Let us be prepared in the event someone is determined to 
do something that would be adverse to us and our national interest and, 
more importantly, the people of our great Nation.
  Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. YOUNG of Florida. Yes, I am happy to yield to my friend, the 
gentleman from Washington.
  The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Young) has 
expired.
  (On request of Mr. Dicks, and by unanimous consent, Mr. Young of 
Florida was allowed to proceed for 2 additional minutes.)
  Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman will continue to yield, the 
gentleman makes an important point in that we have to be prepared with 
what we have today. We are not going to have time to go out and build 
all the things that we may need in our next conflict.
  My colleague, the gentleman from Oregon said that in the Gulf War, we 
had an intelligence failure. That simply is not true. The President 
said after the invasion of Kuwait was that he had 2 days of actionable 
warning from the intelligence community; and that is a fact.
  The problem was, and this is what happens sometimes in these crises, 
we did not act on that intelligence, because we were told by other 
people who were allies in that region that Saddam would not invade. But 
there was, in fact, warning there; and I want to make that point. Part 
of the reason why we had the warning is because we had our intelligence 
apparatus in place.
  I would also say, in very general terms, we had a tremendous military 
victory because we had an intelligence advantage in the Gulf War that 
allowed that victory to occur quickly, decisively, saving American 
lives, saving the lives of the allies, and saving money, actually, for 
the taxpayers.
  By having intelligence superiority, as Colin Powell said, you can 
provide overwhelming military force and end the conflict rapidly. That 
is why I have always believed that having a strong defense is the right 
thing to do; because, as you go back and look in our history, look at 
Korea, another example where we were unprepared, did not have the right 
training, did not have the people ready to go, and we almost got run 
off the peninsula. That was another problem where we were both 
militarily weak and did not have good intelligence. It would be a 
mistake of vast proportions to undermine the intelligence community, to 
undermine the defense of this country.
  We have already cut defense and national security by $115 billion.
  The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Young) has 
again expired.
  Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the gentleman 
from Florida (Mr. Young) have an additional minute.
  The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from 
Washington?
  Mr. OWENS. Mr. Chairman, I object.
  The CHAIRMAN. Objection is heard.

[[Page H2960]]

  Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  My view of this is that we have already cut defense by $115 billion 
from the high point back in 1985. That means that we have reduced that 
overall budget from about $365 billion a year to $250 billion a year. 
We are not even keeping up with inflation.
  There has been a judgment made by the Secretary of Defense and the 
Director of Central Intelligence about how much of that roughly $250 
billion is going to go into intelligence.
  This committee, 16 Members; 9 Republicans, 7 Democrats, have held 
exhaustive hearings into every aspect of that budget. We have a highly 
professional staff that looks into it all. We have come to a unanimous 
conclusion that the amount that has been requested by the chairman in 
his markup is the right amount.
  Let us fight in other venues to take money and use it for what the 
gentleman from Vermont talked about. I am for all those programs. But I 
do not think we should try to cut it out here. If it was taken out of 
the authorization for intelligence, all it would do is wind up being 
spent for other defense items. That is the reality of this. It is a 
nice idea, but it simply will not work.
  Mr. SANDERS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. DICKS. I yield to the gentleman from Vermont.
  Mr. SANDERS. Mr. Chairman, I want to make a brief statement just on 
that. You are aware that just last week when we voted for disaster 
relief, which virtually everybody supported, suddenly out of nowhere 
came an offset from disaster relief to cut $2.2 billion in housing.
  It seems to me that if this Congress has the capability of cutting 
affordable housing for disaster relief, we also have the capability of 
working together and making sure that when we cut intelligence 
spending, it goes to people in need, middle-class and working families.
  Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, what I say to my good friend is this, we 
have cut defense over the last 15 years by $115 billion. That is how we 
balanced this budget. Defense has already been cut. I think there are a 
lot of other parts of this budget that ought to be looked at.
  Mr. SANDERS. I suggest to my friend, the gentleman from Washington, 
we are spending $267 billion this year on defense in addition to our 
NATO allies and all their expenditures in addition to the intelligence. 
That is a lot of money.
  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. DICKS. I yield to my friend, the gentleman from Massachusetts.
  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for 
yielding. He pointed out that there has been a reduction from what 
seemed to me a greatly swollen budget under Secretary Weinberger, but 
it is down about 30 percent. At the same time, we have had the collapse 
of the Soviet Union.
  The defense is to deal with our enemies. I wonder if he believes that 
we are, in fact, facing less of a military threat today than we were in 
1985? I wonder if he would quantify that.
  Mr. DICKS. If the gentleman would give me a chance, I would respond 
to that. I say yes, we are facing less of a ground-based military 
threat from the Soviet Union.
  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Only ground-based? Does the gentleman 
think the Soviet air and sea power is the same?
  Mr. DICKS. Sea power and air power, yes, basically the threat from 
conventional forces has been reduced.
  That is one reason why we have cut the defense budget, because we 
think we can go to a lower level. But I would say to my friend, the 
gentleman from Massachusetts, that there are other problems out there.
  We have got Iran. We have got Iraq. We have got North Korea. We have 
got the problems of China. We have got instability in Russia today that 
I worry about. They still possess thousands of nuclear weapons. We are 
taking some risk here in cutting back on our defenses.
  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, would the gentleman yield?
  Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I only have a little bit of time here, but I 
yield again to the gentleman from Massachusetts.
  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, let me say to the 
gentleman, the basic point I want to make is it seems to me very much a 
partial picture to talk about the reduction in the defense spending 
without talking about the concomitant reduction in the need for defense 
spending.
  I have to say that if you look at the Soviet Union today, not just in 
conventional, but you have got the defection of the nuclear parts that 
were in Ukraine and Belarus, the Soviet Union today is far less than 
two-thirds as threatening to us as it was in 1985. There has been, I 
believe, a diminution in the external threat we faced greater than the 
diminution in the defense budget.
  Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I would say to the gentleman from 
Massachusetts I think there are still areas in the defense budget that 
can be cut; that is why I have supported BRAC.
  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman will 
yield, let us get out a news flash.
  Mr. DICKS. I know.
  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. I think we may get an extra here.
  Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, there are some areas in base closure where 
we can do some other cuts. I would like to take that money, frankly, 
and put it into modernization where the chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
and all the service chiefs have written a letter to the Secretary of 
Defense saying we should be, instead of being at $43 billion a year, be 
at $60 billion. We are not there.
  We went through this before, after the Vietnam War, when we created a 
hollow force, and then it opened the door for Mr. Reagan to come in and 
say we have to vastly increase defense spending because we did not 
handle this properly. We did not develop an adequate force.
  Mr. Chairman, I am not going to ask for any additional time because I 
know my colleagues will not appreciate it.
  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. We wish you would not ask for additional 
money.
  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  (Mr. HYDE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I do not want to be redundant. It has been 
well said by many Members here in defense of the budget and in 
opposition to the well-intentioned but I think unwise amendment of the 
gentleman from Vermont (Mr. Sanders).
  I think the thing to remember is that we have a Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence in the House and in the Senate. It is peopled 
by sensitive, patriotic, intelligent, budget-minded people. They have 
done their job. They have looked at the budget, program by program by 
program.
  We are not dealing with the CIA. We are dealing with the intelligence 
community, including the CIA, the FBI, the DIA, et cetera, et cetera, 
et cetera. There are a myriad of programs, all requiring some study to 
understand if they are cost-effective or not.
  They have done their job. The Senators will do their job. The 
conferees will do their job. But to come in and try to perform brain 
surgery with a croquet mallet, with an across-the-board 5 percent cut, 
makes a political statement but it does real damage to the defense of 
our country.
  Yes, a lot of seniors, a lot of children can benefit by increased 
domestic spending, but we all benefit, including children, including 
seniors, from a secure and peaceful world.
  Yes, the Cold War is over, but let me suggest to you the bear is only 
sleeping. The forest is full of snakes and other dangerous animals. 
There are 13 ICBMs trained on us from the People's Republic of China. I 
have not heard that all of the intercontinental nuclear missiles are 
disabled in the former Soviet Union. Narco-terrorism, terrorism, 
technological developments have made this a much more complicated world 
in terms of staying ahead of the curve.
  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. HYDE. I yield to the gentleman from Massachusetts.
  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for 
his disquisition of what the bear is doing in the forest, but I do have 
a question.
  Mr. HYDE. Was the gentleman not interested in the snakes either?

[[Page H2961]]

  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. No, that is not under our committee's 
jurisdiction as I last looked, Mr. Chairman.
  Mr. HYDE. I thought you were an expert on the subject.
  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. My question was this: You said that 
because we have a committee composed of intelligent, patriotic 
Americans, we should not be for an across-the-board cut. My 
recollection is that in the past, the gentleman from Illinois has voted 
for across-the-board cuts. Did that reflect his lack of respect for the 
members of those committees?
  Mr. HYDE. Not at all. I think sometimes it is important to make a 
statement and sometimes it is not. This is not the time to make a 
statement. This is a time to recognize the sensitivity, the importance, 
the significance, and the intention which the Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence of both bodies give to this issue and to 
prefer that looking at these things in depth, understanding the 
consequences of emasculating them by across-the-board cuts, I think 
that is so important and I think it is the right way to do it.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield, again, to my friend from Massachusetts for 
whatever illumination he chooses to give us.
  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the 
gentleman's point, and I think it is important to remember he 
apparently dismisses the notion of across-the-board cuts as simply 
making statements. I think we ought to have that down on the record, 
that his view is that an across-the-board cut is simply for the purpose 
of making a political statement and is apparently never a serious 
legislative answer.

                              {time}  1345

  Mr. HYDE. No, sir, not at all. My position is sometimes it is 
appropriate and sometimes it is not. This is inappropriate.
  So I simply suggest that we trust our committee. And, by the way, 
when we talk about cutting defense, I heard the other day there are 
soldiers and their families on food stamps. We ought to be ashamed of 
ourselves if that is true.
  Mr. SANDERS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. HYDE. I yield to the gentleman from Vermont. Beautiful Vermont. 
Not that Massachusetts is so bad.
  Mr. SANDERS. I would, by the way, agree with the gentleman about the 
shame of having our soldiers on food stamps, and maybe we should put 
more money into their needs and less into B-2 bombers. But that is 
another story.
  The point I want to make is the gentleman raised China as a potential 
threat. I am not here to be on an anti-China kick. But I would point 
out to the gentleman that this Congress voted MFN status for China; 
that corporate America is putting tens of billions of dollars into 
bolstering the China economy rather than reinvesting in America.
  Mr. HYDE. Reclaiming my time, Mr. Chairman, I would say to the 
gentleman that some of us did and some of us did not. I stand with 
those who did not.
  I thank the gentleman for his kind attention.
  Mr. OWENS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  (Mr. OWENS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. OWENS. Mr. Chairman, I rise in favor of the amendment, and I want 
to thank my colleague from Vermont (Mr. Bernard Sanders) for leading 
this annual dialogue with the American voters. Unless we raised these 
questions, one would never know that the CIA budget is about $30 
billion, and there are no questions raised outside of the very closed 
circle of the people on the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
  The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence represents one of 
those command and control operations of the type which brought down the 
Soviet Union. There is a close circle of people who have a vested 
interest in keeping something going. They have no outside criticism. 
Nobody even knows what they are doing.
  Other intelligence communities have opened up, even the Soviet Union 
has opened up information about its intelligence operations, but we 
still have a secret operation which perpetuates itself.
  I want to thank the gentleman from Vermont for offering the American 
people 130 schools. We can build a state-of-the-art school for $10 
million. $1.3 billion would give us 130 schools. Why not take the $1.3 
billion out of the budget of this organization, which clearly has far 
more money than it needs at this time? The budget is about the same 
level it was at the time of the evil empire of the Soviet Union.
  They clearly do not know what to do with all the money because, and 
nobody ever explains this to us from the committee, they had a petty 
cash problem. They lost $2 billion in their bookkeeping. Found they had 
$2 billion more than they knew they had a few years ago. A couple of 
years ago. Actually, it was $4 billion. After the first announcements 
were made, nobody noticed that later on they came and said, well, 
actually we found $4 billion. Four billion dollars, and nobody on the 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence has ever bothered to explain 
that to us or to the American voters. What happened to $4 billion? How 
can you lose $4 billion? That is a lot of schools.
  So we have an agency that probably is very much needed. Nobody says 
we want to get rid of it. All we are talking is a 5 percent cut, a 5 
percent cut to say discipline yourself, take care of your petty cash 
better and build 130 schools.
  We can break this circle of closed decision-making, the command and 
control operation, that whole spirit of cloak-and-dagger operation 
where they will not let us see the whole budget. If a Member of 
Congress goes to look at this budget, he is duty bound never to speak 
about it again. What kind of cloak-and-dagger operation is that, that 
we need at this time in the life of the globe?
  There are some people who know the secrets of the CIA because they 
get it from the members of the CIA. All the people that Aldridge Ames, 
remember Aldridge Ames? They do not talk about him very much, but he 
was a top-ranking CIA person in charge of the Soviet Union and Eastern 
Europe, and he turned out to be a guy who was a hustler. For a few 
dollars, a few million dollars, he was telling the enemy everything 
they needed to know. We cannot find out here, but Aldridge Ames was 
telling them.
  Now they have a mentally unstable ex-policeman. An ex-policeman who 
his colleagues, in the former police department where he came from, 
said this guy was a nut. How did he ever get in the CIA? He is 
divulging our code secrets. He has divulged. He is now arrested, and 
there is a lot being said about him and a lot not being said about him. 
So we do not know what damage he has done. But he has divulged the 
codes and the whole cryptology and a whole bunch of very secret things 
the enemy knows, because the CIA is so incompetent it allows these 
kinds of things to get out.

  So we are dealing with wasteful spending and a closed circle of 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence members who are determined 
to perpetuate wasteful spending. It is part of their religion. It is a 
dogma. They go on and on and not looking closely at what they are 
spending the money for.
  There is big spending and there is wasteful spending. Democrats often 
get accused of being big spenders. Big spenders are the people who want 
to keep the Social Security system going. Big spenders are the people 
who want to spend money for Medicare, Medicaid, Title I. Big spenders 
are people who want to use the American resources for the greatest 
number of people.
  Blind spenders, wasteful spenders, are the kind of people on the 
Republican majority that say we should spend $10 billion for an 
investigation that is going nowhere in the case of campaign finance 
reform. They do not want to talk about campaign finance reform, they 
just want to dig up dirt, play around and release tapes.
  Ten billion dollars. That is one whole school that will be taken away 
as a result of wasteful spending for an investigation. The CIA and its 
continued big budget represents the same kind of wasteful spending.
  Republican wasteful spending is one thing that the voters need to 
take a hard look at. Do not listen to people who talk about big 
spending. If we ask them what they are spending the

[[Page H2962]]

money for, we will find out whether it is big spending, blind spending, 
or wasteful spending.
  We are, Democrats as well as Republicans, very much conscious of the 
label of being big spenders. A lot of Democrats who are labeled as big 
spenders, if they do not want to stay with the label, here is an 
opportunity for my fellow colleagues, Democrats and Republicans. Here 
is an opportunity to send a message to our constituents. We can send a 
message to the voters that we will not be a wasteful spender. We will 
not go on and perpetuate the budget of the CIA, the secret budget that 
nobody can really know. We will not go on. We will at least cut it 5 
percent and give America 130 schools. One hundred thirty schools to 
America.
  Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words, and I rise in opposition to the amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, we have had a lot of interesting rhetoric here, and I 
think that, in a charitable mood, generous mood, maybe, that this kind 
of debate each year is salutary, because it is an opportunity for 
members who do not serve on the Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence to ask questions of those who do.
  I think, despite what the gentleman said, perhaps in a little bit of 
overblown rhetoric, the gentleman from New York, this is not a command 
and control operation of the Soviet Union. The kind of oversight that 
the House and Senate give to the intelligence operations of the United 
States is the best among all the parliamentary bodies in the world.
  Mr. OWENS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. BEREUTER. I yield to the gentleman from New York.
  Mr. OWENS. Would the gentleman take time to tell us about the $4 
billion in petty cash funds that were lost? Could the gentleman tell us 
about the unstable ex-policeman who has now been arrested? Can the 
gentleman expound on these subjects?
  Mr. BEREUTER. Reclaiming the balance of my time, the gentleman had 
his 5 minutes.
  Mr. OWENS. Well, the gentleman should not waste his on rhetoric. Give 
us some information.
  Mr. BEREUTER. I am not a member of the Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence. I do not expect to respond to the gentleman's questions.
  My understanding, Mr. Chairman, is the money has been recovered. It 
is not lost.
  In any case, what I want to say is that countries from around the 
world send their parliamentary bodies to try to understand how we 
conduct oversight of the intelligence functions of our government, and 
they do that because of the quality of what is done by the people 
appointed by the minority leader and the Speaker of this House.
  Now, they choose people who they think will give the interest, the 
competence, the time, and have the intense focus necessary to give 
oversight to these important functions of the Federal Government.
  We have a limitation. First 6 years, now 8 years, like the other 
body, on the length of time that Members can serve on the intelligence 
committees, and that is so that these Members do not become co-opted by 
the agencies over which they conduct oversight. That is a protection 
for all of us.
  Now, I have been a member of the Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence. I do not serve there any longer because of that term 
limitation. I spend a lot of my time on foreign policy and trade 
issues, and I want to speak to my colleagues from that perspective 
today.
  Mr. Chairman, our policymakers, from the President on down, depend 
upon accurate and timely intelligence when making their most critical 
decisions. The Secretary of State relies on the information to assist 
her in crafting foreign policy, to judge the performance of that policy 
and, as added ammunition, during crucial international negotiations. It 
is true of the STR, it is true of the Treasury Secretary, it is true of 
the Department of Defense.
  In fact, the Secretary of Defense needs political and military 
intelligence in order to deploy troops and plan for future military 
needs. And the list goes on. For all these leaders, intelligence is a 
vital tool that enables them to respond to crises and to anticipate 
future needs. A broad cut to our intelligence capabilities would hamper 
our government's abilities in these areas.
  The sponsors of this amendment argue that the intelligence budget 
should come down. After all, the Cold War is over. Well, intelligence 
spending has declined, along with other defense spending. But the world 
is still a very dangerous place, as many of my colleagues have pointed 
out, and new threats to our Nation's security and the safety of its 
citizens have emerged. Terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, 
international organized crime, and drug trafficking all pose increased 
risk to the United States. We need to collect information about these 
new threats if we are going to combat them and combat them 
successfully.
  The gentleman from Oregon raised some interesting points a few 
minutes ago. He talked about some areas he felt that we had not had 
adequate intelligence. First of all, policymakers have to make use of 
the intelligence that is provided. I sat in that Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence during the dissolution of Yugoslavia. Nothing 
could have been better than the intelligence given to our policy 
leaders during that period of time. But European nations and our 
leadership, from President Bush to President Clinton, had to act upon 
that intelligence to have its effect. That was not done adequately.
  Secondly, I would say when it comes to the terrorist activities that 
took place in Saudi Arabia, we were not blind in intelligence, but 
action has to be taken.
  Finally, I want to say as a person who follows trade, we have 
disarmed ourselves in certain parts of this world. We disarmed 
ourselves on economic intelligence in southeast and east Asia, and it 
is no wonder we had no intelligence adequate to take steps to avoid the 
kind of monetary fiscal crises that took place in Thailand, the 
Republic of Korea and Indonesia. That is because, in part, I suggest, 
we disarmed ourselves.
  The same is true in parts of Latin America, where we have devastated 
our human intelligence by disarmament, not conducted by this body, but 
conducted by the executive branch over a period of time.
  Finally, Mr. Chairman, I oppose this cut on the basis that it is not 
good government. As a former member of this committee, I believe it is 
fair to say that I know firsthand the process that is required to 
develop an annual intelligence authorization. And I can attest to the 
scrutiny and to the rigorous oversight that the members of this 
committee, chosen by the leadership of the House, give to this budget. 
They have done a particularly good job this year. And I would say that 
the staff that assists them is always among the best in the House. I 
have great confidence in their recommendation.
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  (Mr. CONYERS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, this debate is not what I would like, I 
say to the floor managers and chairman and ranking member of the 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, because in this 5 minutes 
back and forth, usually we do not get answered.
  Let us understand that the Central Intelligence Agency's relationship 
with drug pushers has not even been mentioned here. It is as if we are 
in a universe where nobody knows about this except we read it in the 
paper or we get a GAO study every now and then, or somebody writes 
about Los Angeles and the introduction of cocaine, which creates a 
momentary flak. And then we come here to the annual ritual and what do 
we have? We have people saying the Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence is one of the most respected bodies in the world system, 
not the Congress. It is studied all over the world because these are 
sensitive people, understand. They are very sensitive about this 
subject. It is all secret. We do not know what is going on.
  We do know that there was $26.7 billion appropriated. And then 
somebody snuck into the emergency supplemental appropriation, fiscal 
year 1998, an unknown amount of money.

                              {time}  1400

  Rumored, ``Oh, never heard of that before.'' Okay. Rumored, $260 
million.

[[Page H2963]]

 Suspected a lot more. But nobody knows. And then this discussion my 
colleagues have passed off as an open, fair debate on this subject. 
Now, if I hear that the CIA is not perfect one more time, I am going to 
excuse myself from these proceedings. Of course it is not perfect. It 
is awful.
  Mr. LEWIS of California. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. CONYERS. I will not yield to the gentleman from California. I 
will excuse myself from the proceedings after the debate on this 
measure is concluded.
  But look, we know the CIA is not perfect. But that is not the 
question. The question is, how bad are they? ``Oh, wow, that is an 
insult. We cannot talk like that.'' They are not perfect. Why, any 
amateur historian knows that we had perfect knowledge that the Japanese 
were coming to Pearl Harbor. And a respected Member of this body gets 
up and says, well, it was military intelligence, if it had been 
stronger. Pearl Harbor is a perfect example of our intelligence system 
at work.
  Now, the intelligence community failed in Iraq. I mean, for anyone to 
suggest that we won the war on intelligence, really they have not even 
been listening to the military much less to anybody else.
  This committee has done us a great disservice, and then to fight hard 
to keep a 5 percent reduction from occurring. Let us really show them 
by a two-to-one margin that the American people want to keep this 
secret budget going full blast, whatever it is, and that the American 
people are approving of this.
  Well, I think this does the body a disservice. I do not think that we 
should do it. I refer my colleagues to the GAO news release. ``CIA kept 
ties with alleged traffickers.'' And then we come here and debate about 
how they have got to do some more about drugs and we hear, ``Let's give 
them another chance.'' Did I hear that last year, the last year, the 
year before the year before, the year before, the year before? Of 
course. ``Let us give them one more chance.''
  Well, I think this is not the way to debate. There is a tangled web 
of the CIA's complicity in drug international trafficking that not one 
member of the Select Committee on Intelligence has even alluded to in 
debate, even referenced. It does not exist. We are here to get this 
secret budget through and that is it.
  Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the 
requisite number of words.
  (Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania asked and was given permission to revise 
and extend his remarks.)
  Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Chairman, I rise to support the 
actions of the committee and to praise the Members on both sides of the 
aisle for the very deliberate effort they have made in, I think, 
crafting the best budget we could in a very difficult budget 
environment. I am not a member of the committee, never have been, 
although one day that is something perhaps I would like to serve on 
behalf of my colleagues on this side of the aisle, and that is a role 
on the committee itself.
  In fact, Mr. Chairman, over the past several years I have been very 
critical of the agencies, both the CIA and DIA. I have reviewed their 
NIEs. From time to time I have disagreed. I asked for backup and I have 
challenged them publicly and privately.
  But I will say this to my colleagues, Mr. Chairman, in response to 
those who say that the CIA and the committee operates in a closed 
environment, I have been in this Congress for 12 years, I have 
interacted with the intelligence agencies on a regular, ongoing basis 
in my office. From time to time I have gone over to meet with them in 
this building. They have been fully accessible to answer questions that 
I have asked them about emerging threats around the world. So I would 
say to my colleagues that any Member of this body that wants to get 
access to what the intelligence community is doing only has to ask and 
they will find that they are more than happy to respond. In fact, I am 
very pleased with the current leadership of the Director of the CIA. I 
think he is putting a new era of management and control in terms of the 
way the agency is being operated.
  But why am I so interested in the intelligence budget and the 
intelligence agency? My job in this body, Mr. Chairman, is to oversee 
approximately $36 billion a year of defense spending that is being put 
forth to protect our people and our allies against emerging threats. I 
would like to be able to know that we are spending that money on 
threats that are real, on threats that we understand from our best 
intelligence sources may be those threats that our young people have to 
face in the future. And only through good, solid intelligence can we 
get that data.
  We heard debate on the floor; in one case I heard someone say that 
Russia is two-thirds less than what it was. Well, I do not know where 
people base their opinions, but let me give my colleagues my 
perception.
  I guess I am one of the few Members of Congress who speaks the 
language. I have been there 15 times. In fact, next week I will be 
hosting all the major members of the state Duma. I work with Russia on 
a regular, ongoing, weekly basis.
  I would make the case publicly that Russia is more destabilized today 
than at any point in time under Communism. I do not just make that 
statement radically. In fact, Mr. Chairman, I had General Lebed testify 
before my committee. If my colleagues do not know who General Lebed is, 
he is a Russian general, two star, who ran against Boris Yeltsin and 
then became Boris Yeltsin's chief defense advisor.
  Along with members on both sides of the aisle last May, in one of my 
visits to Moscow last year, we sat in General Lebed's office and he 
told us the story about one of his responsibilities to account to Boris 
Yeltsin for 132 suitcase-size nuclear devices that Russia built and he 
was able to account for only 48 of them. And we said to him, ``General, 
where are the rest?'' He said, ``I have no idea.'' He said, ``They 
could be under control or they could be in terrorists' hands.'' He 
said, ``They could be in somebody's basement. We just do not know where 
they are.''
  I came back and interacted with our intelligence community and got an 
update on what they are doing to try to ascertain whether or not Russia 
does have control of these devices. Now, Russia, the government, denied 
they even built them for the following 4 months after General Lebed 
made the statement.
  Finally, when I met with the defense minister, General Sergeyev, in 
December, he admitted to me that, yes, they built them and they hoped 
to have them all destroyed by the year 2000.
  Mr. Chairman, we are not talking about some pie-in-the-sky Steven 
Spielberg movie plot. We are talking about real-life situations. What 
about the situation in January 1995, when because of Russia's 
deterioration and their intelligence assets, they responded to a 
Norwegian weather rocket by activating their all-out nuclear 
capabilities, which meant that Russia, which they publicly 
acknowledged, was within 15 minutes of an all-out nuclear response 
against the U.S. to a weather rocket that Norway had forewarned them of 
a month earlier?
  That is reality, Mr. Chairman. These are the kinds of threats that we 
have to have assets to help us understand. If we talk to the 
intelligence community because of the shift in focus in this country to 
the Far East, what are we doing in the case of Russia? To meet the 
declining budgets, the limitations, we are taking away assets that we 
used to have to understand the former Soviet Union. So at a time when 
Russia becomes more of a risk, where we do not understand what is 
happening there, we are decreasing our ability to understand the 
situation.

  Let me tell my colleagues what else General Lebed said in a public 
hearing here in this country. And by the way, he just is in the process 
of winning the governorship of one of the largest regions in Russia, 
Krasnoyarsk. This is what he said. He said, ``You know, Congressman, 
one of our biggest problems? All of those most competent admirals and 
generals in the Soviet military have been forced out of service because 
of our economic problems.'' And we have heard members talk about that. 
But he said, ``Here is the problem. These most competent generals and 
admirals have not been given housing, they have not been given 
pensions. So what are they doing?''
  Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent for 
an additional 2 minutes.

[[Page H2964]]

  The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from 
Pennsylvania?
  Mr. OWENS. Mr. Chairman, I object.
  The CHAIRMAN. Objection is heard.
  Ms. WATERS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise to support the amendment that is being offered 
for a meager 5 percent cut from the intelligence budget. I rise to 
support it because it makes eminently good sense.
  First of all, no matter what my colleagues say, those who are opposed 
to this amendment, those who can appear and rant and rave about why we 
should not only support the budget but be for more money for that 
budget, first of all, it has been said over and over again, the Cold 
War is over; the Soviet Union is no more.
  Where is this great threat to our country? Who can identify anybody 
in the world who is prepared to take on the United States of America? 
Someone alluded to Iran and alluded to China. Well, I can talk a lot 
about China. And if we feel they are such a great threat, why are we 
chasing them down, embracing them, running after them to do business 
with them, to be involved in trade activities with them?
  Let me tell my colleagues where the threat is. The real war that is 
being waged on America today is the drug war. Where is our great 
intelligence to tell us who the drug lords are and how they manage to 
continue day in and day out, week in and week out, to dump tons of 
drugs into this Nation that finds its way into our cities and our rural 
communities, addicting our children, creating more crimes, with people 
who get addicted and are looking for ways to support those habits.
  Why cannot this intelligence community tell us who these drug lords 
are? Why is it these cartels can continue to operate without any 
interference? It is so embarrassing to have our own Drug Czar go down 
to Mexico and wrap his arms around General Gutierrez Rebollo. And just 
a few days after he is down there talking about how great he is, this 
is our own drug czar, the drug czar was busted because he is connected 
to the Juarez cartel.
  Now, our Drug Czar was in the service. He is a general. He knows 
about the DIA, the CIA, and everybody else. But he goes down there, 
wraps his arms around him, talks about how great he is, he has known 
him for years; and he is the dope dealer. He is the one that is 
connected to the drug cartel. This is outrageous. It is embarrassing.
  And do not tell me how good the intelligence community is. It does 
not matter whether we are talking about Mexico or Peru or Colombia. Why 
cannot our intelligence community tell us about the heads of government 
and the leadership of those countries who are involved in trafficking 
drugs, at the same time we are giving support to them, we are showing 
up with them in every kind of cockamamie scheme, talking about we are 
helping to eliminate drugs, when the fact of the matter is, it is 
getting worse.
  If this intelligence community was about the business of dealing with 
any war, it would be the war on drugs. That is the war that is being 
waged on America. I am sick and tired of hearing that we cannot 
streamline, we cannot cut, we cannot do anything about the intelligence 
community. And there are those who just romanticize the intelligence 
community, those who think we cannot ask any questions, we cannot cut 
them, we cannot dare challenge them.
  It is outdated, long overdue for cuts and being streamlined. And yet 
we come to the floor, person after person, talking about how great it 
is, how we should continue to support it.
  Well, my colleagues know that I have been involved in this drug war 
for a long time, and they understand that the number one priority of 
the Congressional Black Caucus is to get rid of drugs in our society. 
We do not have any help from the CIA. As a matter of fact, we are still 
investigating the CIA and their involvement in drug trafficking.
  As my colleagues know, we just had a hearing, and I would like to 
thank our ranking member for embracing some of the ideas that I have, 
and in that hearing we are investigating what was the CIA doing when 
all the drugs were being trafficked in South Central Los Angeles and 
profits were going to fund the contras? Where were they?
  Well, I will tell my colleagues where they were. They were at the 
same place they were when they were in Southeast Asia, turning their 
backs on drug trafficking, even being involved in it, to have 
additional money. They like slush funds. It is not enough that we give 
them over $30 billion in this intelligence community.
  If we want an intelligence operation that is dealing with the real 
war, turn their attention to the drug war and maybe we will want to 
support them in the future.
  Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number 
of words.
  Mr. Chairman, on one area I agree with the gentlewoman from 
California (Ms. Waters). Mexico has a problem with drugs, and it is a 
problem in America.
  But I tell my colleagues, the White House cutting all the drug 
responses, from interdiction right down the line, that we Republicans 
had to restore, is the answer, not cutting them. Telling our children 
that it is okay to inhale or that he would if he could is not the 
proper message to send to our children in antidrug programs.

                              {time}  1415

  Liberal trial lawyers that get the drug dealers and kingpins off and 
yet we cannot get through in this body stiff penalties for those 
druggers, that is wrong as well.
  Let me speak to the issue at hand on intelligence. First of all, it 
is amazing. I would almost let the other side of the aisle speak up 
here for 2 days on this issue. People that have never set foot in a 
military uniform, people that have never had to direct intelligence 
units, people who have never had to go in and plan the defense of major 
countries but yet they are, quote, the experts. ``There is no Cold War. 
The Cold War is over.'' But yet what they do not tell you is the threat 
that is out there. I tell my colleagues, you state your own opinion as 
fact and you are factually challenged.
  First of all, there are over 14,000 nuclear warheads in Russia alone. 
Because the Russian head said that they are not pointed at the United 
States, do you know how long it takes to change those targeting data? 
About 2 minutes. Fourteen thousand of them. Russia in the last 2 years 
built six nuclear class red October submarines and deployed them. Built 
them. But there is no threat. Russia this week, a nuclear ship, the 
largest missile cruiser in the world, launched a missile cruiser out of 
Russia. But the Cold War is over. Russia is building today the size of 
the Beltway here in Washington, D.C. under the Ural Mountains a first 
strike nuclear site. Why? ``Oh, the Cold War is over. There is no 
threat.'' There is one to the northeast half its size. But there is no 
threat. We are dealing with 1970s technology in our military, with the 
F-14 and the F-15 and the F-16, but yet they deploy the SU-35 and the 
SU-37 that uses vectored thrusts that outclass our fighters and they 
have an AA-10 and an AA-12 missile that outclasses our AMRAAM. But 
there is no threat. You are the experts. You would send our troops 300 
percent increase in deployments over Vietnam and kill them and not 
provide for the services that they need and cut the defense budget and 
cut procurement by 67 percent for your great social programs because 
there is no threat.
  Give me a break, Mr. Chairman. We talk about intelligence and 
military and foreign policy all to protect this country. Poor foreign 
military policy does not help, either. Haiti. Haiti could sit there for 
another 200 years and not be a threat to this country. But yet a 
political move. And guess what? Aristide is still there. There is still 
poverty and it costs us billions of dollars. Somalia, the extension of 
Somalia in which the majority then under the Democrats extended 
Somalia. Guess what? Aideed died but Aideed's son is there and we got 
22 rangers killed because the White House would not give armor to 
protect them. Twenty-two of our people, billions of dollars.
  The gentleman from Vermont (Mr. Sanders) talks about hurting 
veterans. Sixteen billion dollars for Haiti and Bosnia. And we have a 
bill that we cannot get a billion dollars for for FEHP for veterans, 
which I think he would probably support. But $16 billion and guess 
what? That comes out of our

[[Page H2965]]

military and kills us, and kills any chance of helping the veterans. 
Yet you are the experts and you say there is no Cold War. I have got a 
tape here of 16 SAMs fired in pairs. Mr. Chairman, I lost three good 
friends because we did not have the intelligence to know they were 
there. I am sick and tired of self-proclaimed experts on intelligence 
and defense standing up and saying, ``Oh, look. Look at those that 
support defense. Look at those that support intelligence.''


                      Announcement by the Chairman

  The CHAIRMAN. The Chair will remind all persons in the gallery that 
they are here as guests of the House and that any manifestation of 
approval or disapproval of the proceedings or other audible 
conversation is in violation of the rules of the House.
  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the 
requisite number of words. Mr. Chairman, after the previous speaker, I 
think I should rise to the defense of some Republicans. He said people 
who had not been in uniform should not be involved in this debate. I do 
not think that the Speaker of the House, the majority leader of the 
House or any of the rest of us who were not able to serve for one 
reason or another ought to be disqualified. I have never found that the 
Speaker, because he had never served in the military, was somehow 
incompetent to discuss military affairs.
  I also thought it was rather unkind to Ronald Reagan. We dedicated a 
building to him yesterday. I had previously thought that people, 
including former President Reagan, considered ending the Cold War in 
the way that it ended to be one of his accomplishments. But we learned 
today that apparently that was a mistake. Indeed, the previous speaker 
denigrated the notion that the Cold War ended, so I guess that is a 
claimed accomplishment of President Reagan that is not really real. I 
am rather more sympathetic to President Reagan in that regard.
  Some people suggested, one of the previous speakers, that we are even 
worse off, that Russia is more dangerous today. Maybe we ought to ask 
the Communists to come back. Maybe we should see if we can get at least 
Mr. Gorbachev back in power, Mr. Zyuganov. In fact, what we have heard 
today is some of the worst history I have ever heard.
  I want to, by the way, differ with some of my colleagues who support 
this amendment. I think the intelligence community does an excellent 
job on the whole. They have a very difficult job. The reason they 
sometimes do not know the answer is we cannot know the answer. We 
cannot know the unknowable. People who are planning to do bad things do 
not always cooperate by tipping their hand. I do not criticize them for 
not having known everything that was going to happen. I think they 
have, in fact, done a pretty good job.
  What we are experts in here, by the way, is not military expertise. 
We are the experts so empowered by the American people at dividing up 
the resources of this country. We made a decision a couple of years ago 
about how much we were going to spend. We are not, I think, spending to 
the fullest, to the extent that we need to in any one area. We then 
have the job of allocating scarce resources. That is what we have the 
democratic mandate to do.
  The suggestion that somehow this impinges unfairly on the expertise 
of the committee, no one really seriously believes that. In fact, when 
people get up and defend the committee on one day, they are the people 
who would criticize a different committee on a different day.
  Let me say, in addition to the Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence, I also have respect for the committee. Indeed I have 
respect for, I was about to say all the committees of the House but let 
me say today I have respect for all the committees but one and I hope 
we can soon resume respect for that one.
  The question is how do we allocate our resources. There are a couple 
of erroneous historical arguments. People have made the analogy to 
1941. That is about the worst history I have ever heard. In the 1930s, 
America was one of the weaker powers in the world. We are not remotely 
comparable to 1941. We are not, as the United States, anywhere near 
where we were 55 and 60 years ago vis-a-vis Germany and Japan. Today 
the United States is by far the strongest Nation in the world. We are 
stronger than all of our potential opponents, and everyone agrees we 
should stay that way.
  One of my friends said we were emasculating the Defense Department. 
We are not emasculating. We are saying that maybe in this world, we can 
taper off on the Viagra dose that they have been on for many years, but 
nobody is talking about America being anything less than overwhelmingly 
the strongest Nation in the world. Fifteen years ago, when we peaked in 
defense spending, we had not just the Soviet Union but its satellite 
nations. Remember what we all believe, you do not look at the enemy's 
intentions, you look at the enemy's capability. The defense budget we 
had 15 years ago assumed that East Germany and Hungary and 
Czechoslovakia and Poland could be part of a Soviet assault. There has 
been a very substantial diminution in the capacity of the Soviet bloc 
to damage us.
  Yes, it is still a dangerous world. That is why we are still going to 
be, if this amendment passed three times over, by far the strongest 
Nation in the world. The question is, let us look at where we are in 
America. Many of us believe that there has been a greater diminution in 
the external threat, which is still there. People posturing about 
saying, ``Well, there is no threat,'' no one has said there is no 
threat. There is a threat. The question is, is it now with the collapse 
and dismantlement of the Soviet Union, the denuclearization of Belarus, 
the denuclearization of Kazakhstan and the Ukraine, the freeing of the 
satellite nations so they are now in NATO as opposed to opposing NATO, 
has there been a diminution? I think the argument is overwhelmingly 
that there has been.
  Many of us believe that while we should still be the strongest Nation 
in the world militarily, the time has come to shift some resources into 
domestic crime fighting, into fighting cancer, into dealing with some 
of our domestic problems. We believe that in the current world, the 
average American faces more domestic threats than international ones. 
No one is suggesting that we should have anything less than by far the 
strongest military and intelligence in the world. We are saying that 
too much is no longer defensible.
  The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from Vermont (Mr. Sanders).
  The question was taken; and the Chairman announced that the noes 
appeared to have it.


                             Recorded Vote

  Mr. SANDERS. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
  A recorded vote was ordered.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 120, 
noes 291, not voting 21, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 137]

                               AYES--120

     Abercrombie
     Allen
     Baldacci
     Barcia
     Barrett (WI)
     Becerra
     Blumenauer
     Bonior
     Boucher
     Brown (CA)
     Brown (FL)
     Brown (OH)
     Camp
     Capps
     Carson
     Chabot
     Clay
     Clayton
     Coble
     Conyers
     Costello
     Cummings
     Davis (IL)
     DeFazio
     DeGette
     Delahunt
     DeLauro
     Doggett
     Duncan
     Ensign
     Eshoo
     Evans
     Farr
     Fattah
     Filner
     Fox
     Frank (MA)
     Furse
     Gephardt
     Green
     Gutierrez
     Gutknecht
     Hill
     Hilliard
     Hinchey
     Hooley
     Jackson (IL)
     Jackson-Lee (TX)
     Johnson (WI)
     Kanjorski
     Kaptur
     Kilpatrick
     Kind (WI)
     Kingston
     Kleczka
     Kucinich
     Lee
     Lewis (GA)
     Lipinski
     Lofgren
     Luther
     Maloney (CT)
     Markey
     Mascara
     McCarthy (MO)
     McDermott
     McGovern
     McKinney
     Meehan
     Meeks (NY)
     Metcalf
     Millender-McDonald
     Miller (CA)
     Minge
     Mink
     Moakley
     Moran (VA)
     Morella
     Nadler
     Neal
     Oberstar
     Obey
     Olver
     Owens
     Pastor
     Paul
     Payne
     Peterson (MN)
     Petri
     Porter
     Poshard
     Ramstad
     Rangel
     Rivers
     Rodriguez
     Roemer
     Rohrabacher
     Roybal-Allard
     Royce
     Rush
     Sanchez
     Sanders
     Schumer
     Sensenbrenner
     Shays
     Slaughter
     Stabenow
     Stark
     Stearns
     Strickland
     Thompson
     Tierney
     Torres
     Upton
     Velazquez
     Vento
     Waters
     Watt (NC)
     Woolsey
     Yates

                               NOES--291

     Ackerman
     Aderholt
     Andrews
     Archer
     Armey
     Bachus
     Baesler
     Baker
     Ballenger
     Barr
     Barrett (NE)
     Bartlett
     Barton
     Bass
     Bentsen

[[Page H2966]]


     Bereuter
     Berman
     Berry
     Bilbray
     Bilirakis
     Bishop
     Blagojevich
     Bliley
     Blunt
     Boehlert
     Boehner
     Bonilla
     Bono
     Borski
     Boswell
     Boyd
     Brady
     Bryant
     Bunning
     Burr
     Burton
     Buyer
     Callahan
     Calvert
     Campbell
     Canady
     Cannon
     Cardin
     Castle
     Chambliss
     Chenoweth
     Clement
     Clyburn
     Coburn
     Collins
     Combest
     Condit
     Cook
     Cooksey
     Cox
     Coyne
     Cramer
     Crane
     Crapo
     Cubin
     Cunningham
     Danner
     Davis (FL)
     Davis (VA)
     Deal
     DeLay
     Deutsch
     Diaz-Balart
     Dickey
     Dicks
     Dooley
     Doolittle
     Dreier
     Dunn
     Edwards
     Ehlers
     Ehrlich
     Emerson
     Engel
     English
     Etheridge
     Everett
     Ewing
     Fawell
     Fazio
     Foley
     Forbes
     Ford
     Fossella
     Fowler
     Franks (NJ)
     Frelinghuysen
     Frost
     Gallegly
     Ganske
     Gejdenson
     Gekas
     Gibbons
     Gilchrest
     Gillmor
     Gilman
     Goode
     Goodlatte
     Goodling
     Gordon
     Goss
     Graham
     Granger
     Greenwood
     Hall (OH)
     Hall (TX)
     Hamilton
     Hansen
     Harman
     Hastert
     Hastings (WA)
     Hayworth
     Hefley
     Herger
     Hilleary
     Hinojosa
     Hobson
     Hoekstra
     Holden
     Horn
     Hostettler
     Houghton
     Hoyer
     Hulshof
     Hunter
     Hutchinson
     Hyde
     Inglis
     Istook
     Jefferson
     Jenkins
     John
     Johnson (CT)
     Johnson, E. B.
     Johnson, Sam
     Jones
     Kasich
     Kelly
     Kennedy (MA)
     Kennedy (RI)
     Kennelly
     Kildee
     Kim
     King (NY)
     Klink
     Klug
     Knollenberg
     Kolbe
     LaHood
     Lampson
     Lantos
     Largent
     Latham
     LaTourette
     Lazio
     Leach
     Levin
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (KY)
     Linder
     Livingston
     LoBiondo
     Lowey
     Lucas
     Maloney (NY)
     Manton
     Manzullo
     Matsui
     McCarthy (NY)
     McCollum
     McCrery
     McDade
     McHale
     McInnis
     McIntosh
     McIntyre
     McKeon
     Meek (FL)
     Menendez
     Mica
     Miller (FL)
     Mollohan
     Moran (KS)
     Myrick
     Ney
     Northup
     Norwood
     Nussle
     Ortiz
     Oxley
     Packard
     Pallone
     Pappas
     Pascrell
     Paxon
     Pease
     Pelosi
     Peterson (PA)
     Pickering
     Pickett
     Pitts
     Pombo
     Pomeroy
     Portman
     Price (NC)
     Pryce (OH)
     Quinn
     Rahall
     Redmond
     Regula
     Reyes
     Riggs
     Riley
     Rogan
     Rogers
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Rothman
     Roukema
     Ryun
     Sabo
     Salmon
     Sandlin
     Sanford
     Sawyer
     Saxton
     Scarborough
     Schaefer, Dan
     Schaffer, Bob
     Scott
     Serrano
     Sessions
     Shadegg
     Shaw
     Sherman
     Shimkus
     Shuster
     Sisisky
     Skeen
     Skelton
     Smith (MI)
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (OR)
     Smith (TX)
     Smith, Adam
     Smith, Linda
     Snowbarger
     Snyder
     Souder
     Spence
     Spratt
     Stenholm
     Stokes
     Stump
     Sununu
     Talent
     Tanner
     Tauscher
     Tauzin
     Taylor (MS)
     Thomas
     Thornberry
     Thune
     Thurman
     Tiahrt
     Towns
     Traficant
     Turner
     Visclosky
     Walsh
     Wamp
     Watkins
     Watts (OK)
     Waxman
     Weldon (FL)
     Weldon (PA)
     Weller
     Wexler
     Weygand
     White
     Whitfield
     Wicker
     Wise
     Wolf
     Wynn
     Young (AK)
     Young (FL)

                             NOT VOTING--21

     Bateman
     Christensen
     Dingell
     Dixon
     Doyle
     Gonzalez
     Hastings (FL)
     Hefner
     LaFalce
     Martinez
     McHugh
     McNulty
     Murtha
     Nethercutt
     Neumann
     Parker
     Radanovich
     Skaggs
     Solomon
     Stupak
     Taylor (NC)

                              {time}  1445

  Messrs. PALLONE, SMITH of New Jersey, and PICKERING changed their 
vote from ``aye'' to ``no.''
  Mr. SCHUMER changed his vote from ``no'' to ``aye.''
  So the amendment was rejected.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
  The CHAIRMAN. Are there further amendments to title I?
  If not, the Clerk will designate title II.
  The text of title II is as follows:
 TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

     SEC. 201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

       There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central 
     Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund for fiscal 
     year 1999 the sum of $201,500,000.

  The CHAIRMAN. Are there amendments to title II?
  If not, the Clerk will designate title III.
  The text of title III is as follows:
                     TITLE III--GENERAL PROVISIONS

     SEC. 301. INCREASE IN EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS 
                   AUTHORIZED BY LAW.

       Appropriations authorized by this Act for salary, pay, 
     retirement, and other benefits for Federal employees may be 
     increased by such additional or supplemental amounts as may 
     be necessary for increases in such compensation or benefits 
     authorized by law.

     SEC. 302. RESTRICTION ON CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

       The authorization of appropriations by this Act shall not 
     be deemed to constitute authority for the conduct of any 
     intelligence activity which is not otherwise authorized by 
     the Constitution or the laws of the United States.

     SEC. 303. APPLICATION OF SANCTIONS LAWS TO INTELLIGENCE 
                   ACTIVITIES.

       Section 905 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 
     441d) is amended by striking out ``January 6, 1999'' and 
     inserting in lieu thereof ``January 6, 2000''.

     SEC. 304. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 
                   CONTRACTING.

       It is the sense of Congress that the Director of Central 
     Intelligence should continue to direct that elements of the 
     intelligence community, whenever compatible with the national 
     security interests of the United States and consistent with 
     operational and security concerns related to the conduct of 
     intelligence activities, and where fiscally sound, should 
     competitively award contracts in a manner that maximizes the 
     procurement of products properly designated as having been 
     made in the United States.

  The CHAIRMAN. Are there amendments to title III?


         Amendment No. 5 Offered by Mr. Weldon of Pennsylvania

  Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Amendment No. 5 offered by Mr. Weldon of Pennsylvania:
       At the end of title III, add the following new section:

     SEC. 305. PROLIFERATION REPORT.

       (a) Annual Report.--The Director of Central Intelligence 
     shall submit an annual report to the Members of Congress 
     specified in subsection (d) containing the information 
     described in subsection (b). The first such report shall be 
     submitted not later than 30 days after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act and subsequent reports shall be 
     submitted annually thereafter. Each such report shall be 
     submitted in classified form and shall be in the detail 
     necessary to serve as a basis for determining appropriate 
     corrective action with respect to any transfer within the 
     meaning of subsection (b).
       (b) Identification of Foreign Entities Transferring Items 
     or Technologies.--Each report shall identify each covered 
     entity which during the preceding 2 years transferred a 
     controlled item to another entity for use in any of the 
     following:
       (1) A missile project of concern (as determined by the 
     Director of Central Intelligence).
       (2) Activities to develop, produce, stockpile, or deliver 
     chemical or biological weapons.
       (3) Nuclear activities in countries that do not maintain 
     full scope International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards or 
     equivalent full scope safeguards.
       (c) Definitions.--For the purposes of this section:
       (1) Controlled item.--(A) The term ``controlled item'' 
     means any of the following items (including technology):
       (i) Any item on the MTCR Annex.
       (ii) An item listed for control by the Australia Group.
       (iii) Any item listed for control by the Nuclear Suppliers 
     Group.
       (B) Australia group.--The term ``Australia Group'' means 
     the multilateral regime in which the United States 
     participates that seeks to prevent the proliferation of 
     chemical and biological weapons.
       (C)  MTCR annex.--The term ``MTCR Annex'' has the meaning 
     given that term in section 74 of the Arms Export Control Act 
     (22 U.S.C. 2797c).
       (D) Nuclear suppliers' group.--The term ``Nuclear 
     Suppliers' Group'' means the multilateral arrangement in 
     which the United States participates whose purpose is to 
     restrict the transfers of items with relevance to the nuclear 
     fuel cycle or nuclear explosive applications.
       (2) Covered entity.--The term ``covered entity'' means a 
     foreign person, corporation, business association, 
     partnership, society, trust, or other nongovernmental 
     organization or group or any government entity operating as a 
     business. Such term includes any successor to any such 
     entity.
       (3) Missile project.--(A) The term ``missile project'' 
     means a project or facility for the design, development, or 
     manufacture of a missile.
       (B) The term ``missile'' has the meaning given that term in 
     section 74 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2797c).
       (d) Specified Members of Congress.--The Members of Congress 
     referred to in this subsection are the following:
       (1) The chairman and ranking minority party member of the 
     House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
       (2) The chairman and ranking minority party member of the 
     Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.

  (Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania asked and was given permission to revise 
and extend his remarks.)
  Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Chairman, I offer this amendment on 
behalf of myself and the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Markey). 
This is a bipartisan initiative and one that I think gets at the heart 
of our

[[Page H2967]]

concerns involving proliferation around the world.
  This amendment is a very simple amendment, Mr. Chairman. It requires 
the Director of Central Intelligence each year to give a report to the 
Select Committee on Intelligence in the House and the Senate involving 
any proliferating activity from any entity around the world that this 
Congress needs to know about.
  Now, we have heard a lot of debate over intelligence and a lot of 
debate over how we should stop proliferation, but let us get to the 
heart of the matter.
  Mr. Chairman, the fact is that we have good intelligence assets that 
tell us when proliferation is occurring. After all, 2 years ago, 
working with the Jordanians and Israelis, we caught the Russians 
transferring accelerometers and gyroscopes to Iraq to improve their 
Scud missiles. In fact, we have 120 sets of those right now with 
Russian markings on them.
  Last year, last summer, we caught the Iranians being assisted again 
by a Russian entity to develop a medium-range missile that we think 
within 12 months will threaten all of Israel, all of our Arab friends, 
and 25,000 of our troops in that theater. We caught the Chinese 
transferring ring magnets to Pakistan, and M-11 missiles to Pakistan.
  Mr. Chairman, the problem is not our ability to detect when 
technology is being transferred. In fact, Mr. Chairman, I would at this 
time insert into the Record detailed examples of 21 specific cases of 
China transferring technology in violation of every major arms control 
agreement that we are a signatory to, including the MTCR, the Chemical 
Test Ban Treaty, the Chemical Weapons Treaty, the Nuclear Test Ban 
Treaty, the Arms Control Export Act, and every other arms control 
agreement that is the basis of this administration's security 
arrangements.
  Mr. Chairman, I also would like to insert in the record detailed 
examples of 16 instances of Russia transferring technology. In each of 
these cases, Mr. Chairman, the problem was not the intelligence 
community, it was not having the assets upon which to make an 
intelligent decision.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                       Possibly applicable                      
   Date of transfer or report    Reported Russian transfers that may   treaties, regimes,     Administration's  
                                    have violated a regime or law       and/or U.S. laws           reponse      
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Early 1990's...................  Russians sold drawings of a sarin    AECA sec. 81; EAA     No publicly known   
                                  plant, manufacturing procedures,     sec. 11C.             sanction.          
                                  and toxic agents to a Japanese                                                
                                  terrorist group.                                                              
1991...........................  Transferred to China three RD-120    MTCR; AECA sec. 73;   No publicly known   
                                  rocket engines and electronic        EAA sec. 11B.         sanction.          
                                  equipment to improve accuracy of                                              
                                  ballistic missiles.                                                           
1991-1995......................  Transferred Cryogenic liquid oxygen/ MTCR; AECA sec. 73;   Sanctions against   
                                  hydrogen rocket engines and          EAA sec. 11B.         Russia and India   
                                  technology to India.                                       under AECA and EAA 
                                                                                             imposed on May 6,  
                                                                                             1992; expired after
                                                                                             2 years.           
1992-1995......................  Russian transfers to Brazil of       MTCR; AECA sec. 73;   Sanctions reportedly
                                  carbon fiber technology for rocket   EAA sec. 11B.         secretly imposed   
                                  motor cases for space launch                               and waived.        
                                  programs.                                                                     
1992-1996......................  Russian armed forces delivered 24    MTCR; AECA sec. 73;   No publicly known   
                                  Scud B missiles and 8 launchers to   EAA sec. 11B.         sanction.          
                                  Armenia.                                                                      
June 1993......................  Additional Russian enterprises       MRCR; AECA sec. 73;   Sanctions imposed on
                                  involved in missile technology       EAA sec. 11B.         June 16, 1993 and  
                                  transfers to India.                                        waived until July  
                                                                                             15, 1993; no       
                                                                                             publicly known     
                                                                                             follow-up sanction.
1995-present...................  Construction of 1,000 megawatt       IIANPA sec. 1604 and  Refused to renew    
                                  nuclear reactor at Bushehr in Iran.  1605; FOAA; NPPA      some civilian      
                                                                       sec. 821; FAA sec.    nuclear cooperation
                                                                       620G.                 agreements; waived 
                                                                                             sanctions on aid.  
Aug. 1995......................  Russian assistance to Iran to        BWC; AECA sec. 81;    No publicly known   
                                  develop biological weapons.          EAA sec. 11C;         sanctions.         
                                                                       IIANPA sec. 1604                         
                                                                       and 1605; FAA sec.                       
                                                                       620G and 620H.                           
Nov. 1995......................  Russian citizen transferred to       AECA sec. 81; EAA     Sanctions imposed on
                                  unnamed country technology for       sec. 11C.             Nov. 17, 1995.     
                                  making chemical weapons.                                                      
Dec. 1995......................  Russian gyroscopes from submarine    United Nations        No publicly known   
                                  launched ballistic missiles          Sanctions; MTCR;      sanction.          
                                  smuggled to Iraq through middlemen.  AECA sec. 73; EAA                        
                                                                       sec. 11B; IIANPA                         
                                                                       sec. 1604 and 1605;                      
                                                                       FAA sec. 620G and                        
                                                                       620H.                                    
July-Dec. 1996.................  DCI reported Russia transferred to   MTCR; AECA sec. 73;   No publicly known   
                                  Iran ``a variety'' of items          EAA sec. 11B; FAA     sanctions.         
                                  related to ballistic missiles.       sec. 620G and 620H;                      
                                                                       IIANPA sec. 1604                         
                                                                       and 1605; FOAA.                          
Nov. 1996......................  Israel reported Russian assistance   AECA sec. 81; EAA     No publicly known   
                                  to Syria to build a chemical         sec. 11C; FAA sec.    sanction.          
                                  weapon plant.                        620G and 620H.                           
1996-1997......................  Delivered 3 Kilo diesel-electric     IIANPA sec. 1604 and  No publicly known   
                                  submarines to Iran.                  1605; FAA sec. 620G   sanction.          
                                                                       and 620H.                                
Jan.-Feb. 1997.................  Russia transferred detailed          MTCR; AECA sec. 73;   No publicly known   
                                  instructions to Iran on production   EAA sec. 11B; FAA     sanction.          
                                  of the SS-4 medium-range missile     sec. 620G and 620H;                      
                                  and related parts.                   IIANPA sec. 1604                         
                                                                       and 1605; FOAA.                          
April 1997.....................  Sale of S-300 anti-aircraft/anti-    IIANPA sec. 1604 and  No publicly known   
                                  missile missile system to Iran to    1605; FAA sec. 620G   sanction.          
                                  protect nuclear reactors at          and 620H.                                
                                  Bushehr and other strategic sites.                                            
Oct. 1997......................  Israeli intelligence reported        MTCR; AECA sec. 73;   No publicly known   
                                  Russian technology transfers for     EAA sec. 11B;         sanction.          
                                  Iranian missiles developed with      IIANPA sec. 1604                         
                                  ranges between 1,300 and 10,000      and 1605; FAA sec.                       
                                  km. Transfers include engines and    620G and 620H; FOAA.                     
                                  guidance systems.                                                             
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Regimes:                                                                                                        
                                                                                                                
BWC--Biological Weapons Convention.                                                                             
MTCR--Missile Technology Control Regime.                                                                        
                                                                                                                
U.S. Laws:                                                                                                      
                                                                                                                
AECA--Arms Export Control Act.                                                                                  
EAA--Export Administration Act.                                                                                 
FAA--Foreign Assistance Act.                                                                                    
FOAA--Foreign Operations Appropriations Act.                                                                    
IIANPA--Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act.                                                                   
NPPA--Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act.                                                                     


----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                              Administration's  
   Date of transfer or report         Reported transfer by China       Possible violation         response      
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Nov. 1992......................  M-11 missiles or related equipment   MTCR; Arms Export     Sanctions imposed on
                                  to Pakistan (The Administration      Control Act; Export   Aug. 24, 1993, for 
                                  did not officially confirm reports   Administration Act.   transfer of M-11   
                                  that M-11 missiles are in                                  related equipment  
                                  Pakistan.).                                                (not missiles);    
                                                                                             waived on Nov. 1,  
                                                                                             1994.              
Mid-1994 to mid-1995...........  Dozens or hundreds of missile        MTCR; Iran-Iraq Arms  No sanctions.       
                                  guidance systems and computerized    Nonproliferation                         
                                  machine tools to Iran.               Act; Arms Export                         
                                                                       Control Act; Export                      
                                                                       Administration Act.                      
2d quarter of 1995.............  Parts for the M-11 missile to        MTCR; Arms Export     No Sanctions.       
                                  Pakistan.                            Control Act; Export                      
                                                                       Administration Act.                      
Dec. 1994 to mid-1995..........  5,000 ring magnets for an            NPT; Export-Import    Considered sanctions
                                  unsafeguarded nuclear enrichment     Bank Act; Nuclear     under the Export-  
                                  program in Pakistan.                 Proliferation         Import Bank Act;   
                                                                       Prevention Act;       but announced on   
                                                                       Arms Export Control   May 10, 1996, that 
                                                                       Act.                  no sanctions would 
                                                                                             be imposed.        
July 1995......................  More than 30 M-11 missiles stored    MTCR; Arms Export     No sanctions.       
                                  in crates at Sargodha Air Force      Control Act; Export                      
                                  Base in Pakistan.                    Administration Act.                      
Sept. 1995.....................  Calutron (electromagnetic isotope    NPT; Nuclear          No sanctions.       
                                  separation system) for uranium       Proliferation                            
                                  enrichment to Iran.                  Prevention Act;                          
                                                                       Export-Import Bank                       
                                                                       Act; Arms Export                         
                                                                       Control Act.                             
1995-1997......................  C-802 anti-ship cruise missiles and  Iran-Iraq Arms        No sanctions.       
                                  C-801 air-launched cruise missiles   Nonproliferation                         
                                  to Iran.                             Act.                                     
Before Feb. 1996...............  Dual-use chemical precursors and     Arms Export Control   Sanctions imposed on
                                  equipment to Iran's chemical         Act; Export           May 21, 1997.      
                                  weapon program.                      Administration Act.                      
Summer 1996....................  400 tons of chemicals to Iran......  Iran-Iraq Arms        No sanctions.       
                                                                       Nonproliferation                         
                                                                       Act \1\; Arms                            
                                                                       Export Control Act;                      
                                                                       Export                                   
                                                                       Administration Act.                      
Aug. 1996......................  Plant to manufacture M-11 missiles   MTCR; Arms Export     No sanctions.       
                                  or missile components in Pakistan.   Control Act; Export                      
                                                                       Administration Act.                      
Aug. 1996......................  Gyroscopes, accelerometers, and      MTCR; Iran-Iraq Arms  No sanctions.       
                                  test equipment for missile           Nonproliferation                         
                                  guidance to Iran.                    Act; Arms Export                         
                                                                       Control Act; Export                      
                                                                       Administration Act.                      
Sept. 1996.....................  Special industrial furnace and high- NPT; Nuclear          No sanctions.       
                                  tech diagnostic equipment to         Proliferation                            
                                  unsafeguarded nuclear facilities     Prevention Act;                          
                                  in Pakistan.                         Export-Import Bank                       
                                                                       Act; Arms Export                         
                                                                       Control Act.                             
July-Dec. 1996.................  Director of Central Intelligence     MTCR; Arms Export     No sanctions.       
                                  (DCI) reported ``tremendous          Control Act; Export                      
                                  variety'' of technology and          Administration Act.                      
                                  assistance for Pakistan's                                                     
                                  ballistic missile program.                                                    

[[Page H2968]]

                                                                                                                
July-Dec. 1996.................  DCI reported ``tremendous variety''  MTCR; Iran-Iraq Arms  No sanctions.       
                                  of assistance for Iran's ballistic   Nonproliferation                         
                                  missile program.                     Act; Arms Export                         
                                                                       Control Act; Export                      
                                                                       Administration Act.                      
July-Dec. 1996.................  DCI reported principal supplies of   NPT; Nuclear          No sanctions.       
                                  nuclear equipment, material, and     Proliferation                            
                                  technology for Pakistan's nuclear    Prevention Act;                          
                                  weapon program.                      Export-Import Bank                       
                                                                       Act; Arms Export                         
                                                                       Administration Act.                      
July-Dec. 1996.................  DCI reported key supplies of         NPT; Iran-Iraq Arms   No sanctions.       
                                  technology for large nuclear         Nonproliferation                         
                                  projects in Iran.                    Act; Nuclear                             
                                                                       Proliferation                            
                                                                       Prevention Act;                          
                                                                       Export-Import Bank                       
                                                                       Act; Arms Export                         
                                                                       Administration Act.                      
July-Dec. 1996.................  DCI reported ``considerable''        Iran-Iraq Arms        No sanctions.       
                                  chemical weapon-related transfers    Nonproliferation                         
                                  of production equipment and          Act; Arms Export                         
                                  technology to Iran.                  Control Act; Export                      
                                                                       Administration Act.                      
Jan. 1997......................  Dual-use biological items to Iran..  BWC; Iran-Iraq Arms   No sanctions.       
                                                                       Nonproliferation                         
                                                                       Act; Arms Export                         
                                                                       Control Act; Export                      
                                                                       Administration Act.                      
1997...........................  Chemical precursors, production      Iran-Iraq Arms        No sanctions.       
                                  equipment, and production            Nonproliferation                         
                                  technology for Iran's chemical       Act; Arms Export                         
                                  weapon program, including a plant    Control Act; Export                      
                                  for making glass-lined equipment.    Administration Act.                      
Sept. to Dec. 1997.............  China Great Wall Industry Corp.      MTCR; Iran-Iraq Arms  No sanctions.       
                                  provided telemetry equipment used    Nonproliferation                         
                                  in flight-tests to Iran for its      Act; Arms Export                         
                                  development of the Shahab-3 and      Control Act; Export                      
                                  Shabab-4 medium range ballistic      Administration Act.                      
                                  missiles.                                                                     
Nov. 1997/April 1998...........  May have transferred technology for  MTCR; Arms Export     No sanctions.       
                                  Pakistan's Ghauri medium-range       Control Act; Export                      
                                  ballistic missile that was flight-   Administration Act.                      
                                  tested on April 6, 1998.                                                      
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Additional provisions on chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons were not enacted until February 10, 1996. 
                                                                                                                
BWC--Biological Weapons Convention.                                                                             
MTCR--Missile Technology Control Regime.                                                                        
NPT--Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.                                                                           

  Mr. Chairman, the problem was, we did not have the will to impose 
sanctions. In fact, in only two of those 37 instances were sanctions 
imposed.
  The problem is a simple one. The Congress is not brought into the 
process until after the State Department has made a ruling that they 
are not going to impose sanctions. The Congress is not brought into the 
process until after the proliferating action has taken place.
  My amendment is simple. My amendment asks the Director of Central 
Intelligence, and I know they collect this data anecdotally, to each 
year submit to the chairmen of the House Select Committee on 
Intelligence and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence an 
unsanitized listing of all of those occasions that we should know 
about, unsanitized by the State Department, involving proliferation of 
technology, involving weapons of mass destruction. In that way, we can 
play our rightful role in saying that we want arms control agreements 
enforced.
  Mr. Chairman, we know what happened last November. This Congress 
voted overwhelmingly in favor of a bipartisan bill to force the 
administration to impose sanctions on Russia because of transferring of 
technology to Iran. This Congress has spoken unequivocally, in fact, in 
that case, with 400 Members voting in the affirmative that we want arms 
control agreements enforced. That is the problem, Mr. Chairman. It is 
not the intelligence collection, it is not the analysis of the data, 
although I disagree from time to time with NIE, it is the use of that 
data by the State Department and by the administration where they have 
not imposed sanctions.
  Mr. Chairman, we are not trying to incite a conflict with Russia. I 
happen to believe in the Ronald Reagan philosophy: Trust, but verify.
  I am engaged with Russia. Next week I will host a group of senior 
Russian leaders in this city. I want to help Russia stabilize itself. I 
want to help them have a middle class.
  However, I understand one very important fundamental thing about 
Russia and China: We must be consistent, we must be candid, and we must 
be strong, and when we fail to follow through on any one of those three 
areas, we send the wrong signal to entities that cannot be controlled 
in those countries.
  That is why, after Russia transferred the accelerometers and 
gyroscopes 2 years ago, I was not surprised this past summer when we 
found they were transferring technology to Iran; because we have been 
sending the wrong signal.
  I ask my colleagues to support this very simple amendment.
  Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, for 40 years our country, this planet operated under a 
doctrine of mutually assured destruction, meaning that both the United 
States and the Soviet Union stockpiled nuclear weapons in vertical 
proliferation, 5,000, 10,000, 15,000 nuclear weapons apiece, when only 
200 apiece would be necessary in order to destroy totally the 
populations of both the United States and the Soviet Union. It was 
important for the Cold War to come to an end, because there was a very 
slight likelihood that either country would ever use these weapons, 
because the other country would have guaranteed their sure and certain 
total destruction.
  The greater threat has always been horizontal proliferation. The 
spread of weapons from country to country to country, to subgroups, to 
terrorist groups, to other parties around the globe who do not live 
under this threat of mutually assured destruction.
  The problem is that we in the United States do not on a consistent 
basis get enough information about this threat so that we can formulate 
policies, sanctions, that will guarantee that those around the world 
who are intent on gathering these technologies to themselves and then 
using them against their enemies or against the American people, know 
that we have a strong policy of deterrence against their use.
  The Weldon-Markey amendment, as it was originally formulated, ensured 
that we would desubsidize any country, any company in the world that 
was identified as one which was trafficking in materials which could be 
used for proliferation purposes. That is putting real teeth, financial 
teeth into the American policy towards these issues.
  Unfortunately, in negotiating with the intelligence community and 
others who are not yet ready to embrace that policy, we are unable to 
bring that full amendment with all of the power of the American purse 
string to this floor here today. But what we do is we ensure that there 
will be a report made to the Intelligence Committees.
  I believe it should go to other committees as well so that there is a 
broader understanding of the importance of this issue. In the post-Cold 
War period, there are only two great agendas for our country. One is 
ensuring that the American people finally get the full benefits of the 
prosperity which is being created in this world and that our people 
benefit from it, and secondly, that we deal with the aftermath of the 
Cold War in terms of these national rivalries that manifest themselves 
both in human rights violations, religious violations, and in 
proliferation threats spreading across this planet.
  This is a good first step. I hope that the House adopts this 
amendment. It will at least begin the process of giving us the 
information which we need, and hopefully, the gentleman from 
Pennsylvania (Mr. Weldon) and I, and the gentlewoman from California 
(Ms. Harman) and others can come back here next year and we can ensure 
that there are teeth which are built into this system so that the 
Congress votes to deny any financial assistance to any country or any 
company which sells these technologies into the hands of those who are 
not abiding by the nonproliferation safeguards which this world has to 
have in the 21st century.
  So I thank the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Weldon), for his 
leadership. I thank the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman) and 
all of those who have worked on this issue, and I hope that the House, 
in its wisdom, adopts this very important first step here today.
  Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.

[[Page H2969]]

  Mr. Chairman, first let me say that as a member of the Permanent 
Select Committee on Intelligence, I have learned an enormous amount 
from its leaders, the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss), chairman of 
the committee, and its ranking member, the gentleman from Washington 
(Mr. Dicks); and I want to thank them for their nice words about me 
because, as my colleagues know, I will be leaving the Congress after 
this term.
  I intend to support this bill in full. It is a good bill that was 
developed with broad, bipartisan support, and as I have said for many 
years, intelligence spending is intelligent spending.
  I rise in support now of this excellent amendment by the gentleman 
from Pennsylvania (Mr. Weldon) and the gentleman from Massachusetts 
(Mr. Markey), because it deals with part of a subject that has 
concerned many of us for some time, and that is technology transfer 
from Russia and China to rogue regimes.

                              {time}  1500

  We know from published reports that that transfer is continuing. It 
is continuing in spite of laws on the books in the United States that 
could cause our government to invoke sanctions against those firms 
which we have identified as aiding Iran's missile program, and which 
are doing business with the United States.
  I authored a concurrent resolution last fall and the same resolution 
was offered in the other body, both passed by overwhelming margins, to 
direct the administration to impose sanctions on firms we have 
identified as transferring technology to Iran to build its indigenous 
missile industry. Sanctions have not been imposed.
  From what we know, some list of firms is circulating and people are 
being encouraged not to do business with those firms, but sanctions on 
the proliferators have not been imposed.
  Mr. Chairman, I am a cosponsor and strong supporter of the measure 
authored by the gentleman from New York (Mr. Gilman), which has passed 
this body. An identical measure authored by Senator Lott is likely to 
pass the other body very soon. Hopefully then a strong majority of the 
United States Congress will have expressed its will to make certain 
that strong sanctions are imposed on firms that are proliferating.
  Meanwhile, we do what we can. And in this case, this amendment makes 
clear that we want to develop the most complete list of proliferators, 
and we want our intelligence agencies to share that list with our 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
  Mr. Chairman, I want that list. I think it will be very helpful. But 
more than the list, I want the technology transfers stopped. The United 
States can do this if it has the will. I call on the administration, 
despite its multiple agendas with Russia, to act now against 
proliferation that has been publicly identified by Russia to Iran. It 
is dangerous. It threatens our national security. We cannot wait any 
longer.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  Mr. Chairman, I want to thank the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. 
Weldon) for his comments, as well as the comments of the gentleman from 
the Commonwealth of Massachusetts (Mr. Markey) and the gentlewoman from 
California (Ms. Harman).
  I understand with regard to the gentleman from Pennsylvania that it 
is his decision to withdraw this amendment at this time. But I also 
want to quickly say, I want to make sure that he knows and the others 
that we will work closely with him. In fact, we have already started 
that process to make sure that we do have the necessary information so 
that Congress does have the unfettered truth about the proliferation 
issue. Certainly the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence wants 
to have it on both sides. The goal is great and we will get the goal 
done.
  The gentleman is very well respected for his commitment to our 
Nation's security. I have heard him speak many times. He speaks with 
knowledge and conviction, a great deal of information, and he certainly 
has an extraordinary list of contacts. His concern regarding whether 
our intelligence community is free to deliver the bad news that it 
sometimes must is very relevant.
  Mr. Chairman, the gentleman's efforts on the Committee on National 
Security are obviously very much appreciated by our committee and by 
myself personally. We share the same jurisdiction on many programs, and 
I think we work together very well and I want to continue that and in 
fact enhance it.
  The gentleman's views and concerns on the most difficult and 
important problem of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are 
indeed respected and have been a great trigger in this effort.
  Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. GOSS. I yield to the gentleman from Pennsylvania.
  Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from 
Florida (Mr. Goss), my friend and colleague, for yielding and I am not 
here to disrupt the proceedings of the Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence, as both Members know, the ranking member and the 
chairman. I have the highest respect for their leadership and for their 
commitment.
  Mr. Chairman, my concern is with our State Department and with our 
ability in this institution to get access to relevant data when it 
occurs in a timely manner.
  Mr. Chairman, because of the commitment of the gentleman from Florida 
(Chairman Goss) and the distinguished gentleman from Washington (Mr. 
Dicks), the ranking member, to work with me and with the gentleman from 
Massachusetts (Mr. Markey) and the gentlewoman from California (Ms. 
Harman) and others on this issue, I ask unanimous consent to withdraw 
my amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from 
Pennsylvania?
  There was no objection.
  The CHAIRMAN. Are there further amendments to title III?


                Amendment No. 3 Offered by Mr. Traficant

  Mr. TRAFICANT. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Amendment No. 3 offered by Mr. Traficant:
       In title III of the bill, add at the end the following new 
     section:

     SEC. 305. ANNUAL REPORT ON INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY COOPERATION 
                   WITH DOMESTIC FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES.

       Not later than 90 days after the end of each fiscal year 
     ending after the date of the enactment of this Act, the 
     Director of Central Intelligence shall submit a report to the 
     Congress that describes the level of cooperation and 
     assistance provided to domestic Federal law enforcement 
     agencies by the intelligence community during such fiscal 
     year relating to the effort to stop the flow of illegal drugs 
     into the United States through the United States-Mexico 
     border and the United States-Canada border.

  Mr. TRAFICANT. Mr. Chairman, the threat of nuclear proliferation is 
real and it must be curtailed. But while we keep worrying about 
missiles from without, narcotics are destroying America from within. I 
believe that we are losing the war on drugs and it is not because of 
the money that we are not spending. It is not because of the effort 
that Congress makes. I believe there is one simple major reason for it. 
There is not a concentrated, cooperative network effort by our entire 
intelligence and law enforcement community.
  Mr. Chairman, that is the weakness. I do not know if we can solve 
that in this legislation. I guess I have turned around and voted for 
this measure and voted against the cut, which is the first time since I 
have been here. I do have faith in the leaders of this committee and I 
did say earlier that we deserve in the Congress the chance to see how 
we can pool efforts to network because I believe our intelligence 
community should know where these narcotics are grown, who is growing 
them, who is processing them, who is arranging for their export to 
America, who here in America is arranging to accept and receive these 
imports, who is distributing them and what political figures around the 
world are aiding and abetting the narcotraffickers. I think we must do 
something about it.
  So, Mr. Chairman, my modest effort is very simple. I want to read the 
salient points of this amendment.
  It would require the CIA and the Director of the CIA, through a 
report to the Congress, to describe the level of cooperation and 
assistance provided to

[[Page H2970]]

domestic Federal law enforcement by our intelligence community. These 
agencies cannot be separate and apart. This jurisdictional haggling 
must be resolved. And our intelligence network, if we are going to do 
anything on 100 percent import of heroin and cocaine, is going to have 
to work with our domestic people.
  Mr. Chairman, I ask for a report at this point. I think it makes good 
sense, and I would hope that it would be adopted.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. TRAFICANT. I yield to the gentleman from Florida.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. 
Traficant) for yielding to me. Let me assure the gentleman that I take 
very seriously the necessity of intelligence support for fighting and 
winning the war on drugs.
  There is no question that global narcotics trafficking does require 
intelligence and it requires a close and good working handoff to law 
enforcement. I am aware of that. Progress has been made. I think that 
the gentleman's contribution to this, requiring this report, is very 
beneficial and I am prepared to accept his amendment.
  Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. TRAFICANT. I yield to the gentleman from Washington.
  Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I compliment my friend, the gentleman from 
Ohio (Mr. Traficant) again for another amendment that I find completely 
acceptable. This cooperation must exist and we must do better in this 
effort. I concur with my chairman that this is a national priority and 
one that will be aided by this report. I urge that the Committee accept 
the amendment.
  Mr. TRAFICANT. Mr. Chairman, reclaiming my time, I urge an ``aye'' 
vote.
  The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Traficant).
  The amendment was agreed to.
  The CHAIRMAN. Are there further amendments to title III?
  If not, the Clerk will designate title IV.
  The text of title IV is as follows:
                 TITLE IV--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

     SEC. 401. ENHANCED PROTECTIVE AUTHORITY FOR CIA PERSONNEL AND 
                   FAMILY MEMBERS.

       Section 5(a)(4) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 
     1949 (50 U.S.C. 403f(a)(4)) is amended by striking out ``and 
     the protection of Agency personnel and of defectors, their 
     families'' and inserting in lieu thereof ``and the protection 
     of current and former Agency personnel and their immediate 
     families, and defectors and their immediate families''.

     SEC. 402. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS.

       (a) Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949.--(1) Section 
     5(a)(1) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 
     U.S.C. 403f(a)(1)) is amended--
       (A) by striking out ``subparagraphs (B) and (C) of section 
     102(a)(2)'' and inserting in lieu thereof ``paragraphs (2) 
     and (3) of section 102(a)'';
       (B) by striking out ``(c)(5)'' and inserting in lieu 
     thereof ``(c)(6)'';
       (C) by inserting ``(3),'' after ``403(a)(2),'';
       (D) by inserting ``(c)(6), (d)'' after ``403-3''; and
       (E) by inserting ``(a), (g)'' after ``403-4''.
       (2) Section 6 of such Act (50 U.S.C. 403g) is amended by 
     striking out ``(c)(5)'' each place it appears and inserting 
     in lieu thereof ``(c)(6)''.
       (b) Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act.--Section 
     201(c) of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act (50 
     U.S.C. 2011(c)) is amended by striking out ``(c)(5)'' each 
     place it appears and inserting in lieu thereof ``(c)(6)''.

  The CHAIRMAN. Are there amendments to title IV?


                 Amendment No. 4 Offered by Ms. Waters

  Ms. WATERS. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Amendment No. 4 offered by Ms. Waters:
       At the end of title IV, add the following new section:

     SEC. 404. REVIEW OF 1995 MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING 
                   REQUIRING THE CIA TO REPORT TO THE ATTORNEY 
                   GENERAL INFORMATION REGARDING DRUG TRAFFICKING 
                   INVOLVING ITS FORMER OR CURRENT OFFICERS, STAFF 
                   EMPLOYEES, CONTRACT EMPLOYEES, ASSETS, OR OTHER 
                   PERSON OR ENTITY PROVIDING SERVICE TO OR ACTING 
                   ON BEHALF OF ANY AGENCY WITHIN THE INTELLIGENCE 
                   COMMUNITY.

       (a) Review of 1995 Memorandum of Understanding Regarding 
     Reporting of Information Concerning Federal Crimes.--The 
     Attorney General shall review the 1995 ``Memorandum of 
     Understanding: Reporting of Information Concerning Federal 
     Crimes'' between the Attorney General, Secretary of Defense, 
     Director of Central Intelligence, Director of National 
     Security Agency, Director of Defense Intelligence Agency, 
     Assistant Secretary of State, Intelligence and Research, and 
     Director of the Non-Proliferation and National Security, 
     Department of Energy. This review shall determine whether the 
     1995 Memorandum of Understanding requires:
       (i) Report to the Attorney General.--Whenever the Director 
     of Central Intelligence has knowledge of facts or 
     circumstances that reasonably indicate any former or current 
     officers, staff employees, contract employees, assets, or 
     other person or entity providing service to, or acting on 
     behalf of any agency within the intelligence community has 
     been involved with, is involved with or will be involved with 
     drug trafficking or any violations of U.S. drug laws, the 
     Director shall report such information to the Attorney 
     General of the United States.
       (ii) Duty of Intelligence Employees to Report.--Each 
     employee of any agency within the intelligence community who 
     has knowledge of facts or circumstances that reasonably 
     indicate any former or current officers, staff employees, 
     contract employees, assets, or other person or entity 
     providing service to, or acting on behalf of, any agency 
     within the intelligence community has been involved with, is 
     involved with, or will be involved with drug trafficking or 
     any violations of U.S. drug laws, shall report such 
     information to the Director of Central Intelligence.
       (b) Public Report.--Upon completion of review, the Attorney 
     General shall publicly report its findings.

  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I reserve a point of order against this 
amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) reserves a point 
of order.
  The gentlewoman from California (Ms. Waters) is recognized for 5 
minutes.
  Ms. WATERS. Mr. Chairman, this amendment would call for a review of 
the 1995 memorandum of understanding that currently exists between the 
Director of Central Intelligence and the intelligence community and the 
Department of Justice regarding reporting of information concerning 
Federal crimes.
  This amendment is very simple and noncontroversial. It calls for a 
review of the current memorandum of understanding to ensure that drug 
trafficking and drug law violations by anybody in the intelligence 
community is reported to the Department of Justice. Specifically, the 
review would examine any requirements for intelligence employees to 
report to the Director of Central Intelligence and any requirements for 
the Director to report this information to agencies.
  This information would be reported to the Attorney General. The 
review would be published publicly. This simple amendment fits well 
with the recent calls for a reinvigorated war on drugs. The need for 
this amendment, however, cannot be understated.
  One of the most important things that came out of the hearing of the 
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence was an understanding 
about why we did not know about who was trafficking in drugs as we 
began to investigate and take a look at the allegations that were being 
made about the CIA's involvement in drug trafficking in south central 
Los Angeles and the allegations that profits from that drug trafficking 
was going to support the Contras.
  We discovered that for 13 years the CIA and the Department of Justice 
followed a memorandum of understanding that explicitly exempted the 
requirement to report drug law violations by CIA non-employees to the 
Department of Justice. This allowed some of the biggest drug lords in 
the world to operate without fear that the CIA would be required to 
report the activity to the DEA and other law enforcement agencies.
  In 1982, the Attorney General and the Director of Central 
Intelligence entered into an agreement that excluded the reporting of 
narcotics and drug crimes by the CIA to the Justice Department. Under 
this agreement, there was no requirement to report information of drug 
trafficking and drug law violations with respect to CIA agents, assets, 
non-staff employees and contractors. This remarkable and secret 
agreement was enforced from February 1982 to August of 1995. This 
covers nearly the entire period of U.S. involvement in the Contra war 
in Nicaragua and the deep U.S. involvement in the

[[Page H2971]]

counterinsurgency activities in El Salvador and Central America.
  Senator Kerry and his Senate investigation found drug traffickers had 
used the Contra war and tie to the Contra leadership to help this 
deadly trade. Among their devastating findings, the Kerry committee 
investigators found that major drug lords used the Contra supply 
networks and the traffickers provided support for Contras in return. 
The CIA of course, created, trained, supported, and directed the 
Contras and were involved in every level of their war.
  The 1982 memorandum of understanding that exempted the reporting 
requirement for drug trafficking was no oversight or misstatement. 
Previously unreleased memos between the Attorney General and Director 
of Central Intelligence show how conscious and deliberate this 
exemption was.
  On February 11, 1982, Attorney General French Smith wrote to DCI 
William Casey that, and I quote, this is what he said:

       I have been advised that a question arose regarding the 
     need to add narcotics violations to the list of reportable 
     non-employee crimes . . . no formal requirement regarding the 
     reporting of narcotics violations has been included in these 
     procedures.

  On March 2, 1982 William Casey responded:

       I am pleased these procedures which I believe strike the 
     proper balance between enforcement of the law and protection 
     of intelligence sources and methods will now be forwarded to 
     other agencies covered by them for signing by the heads of 
     those agencies.

  My colleagues heard me correctly.
  The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentlewoman from California (Ms. 
Waters) has expired.
  (By unanimous consent, Ms. Waters was allowed to proceed for 3 
additional minutes.)
  Ms. WATERS. Mr. Chairman, the fact that President Reagan's Attorney 
General and Director of Central Intelligence thought that drug 
trafficking by their assets agents and contractors needed to be 
protected has been long known. These damning memorandums and the 
resulting memorandum of understanding are further evidence of a 
shocking official policy that allowed the drug cartels to operate 
through the CIA-led Contra covert operations in Central America.
  This 1982 agreement clearly violated the Central Intelligence Agency 
Act of 1949. It also raises the possibility that certain individuals 
who testified in front of congressional investigating committees 
perjured themselves.
  Mr. Chairman, every American should be shocked by these revelations. 
Given the shameful history of turning a blind eye to CIA involvement 
with drug traffickers, this amendment seeks to determine whether the 
current memorandum of understanding closes all of these loopholes to 
the drug cartels and narcotics trade.
  At this time I know that there is a point of order against my 
amendment. The chairman of the committee is going to oppose this 
amendment, and so I am going to withdraw the amendment. But I wanted 
the opportunity to put it before this body so that they could 
understand that we had an official policy and a memorandum of 
understanding that people could fall back on and say I did not have to 
report it. Yes, I knew about it.
  We have a subsequent memorandum of understanding of 1995 that is 
supposed to take care of it. I am not sure that it does.
  Mr. Chairman, I submit for the Record the following correspondence 
between William French Smith and William J. Casey:


                               Office of the Attorney General,

                                Washington, DC, February 11, 1982.
      Hon. William J. Casey,
     Director, Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, DC.
       Dear Bill: Thank you for your letter regarding the 
     procedures governing the reporting and use of information 
     concerning federal crimes. I have reviewed the draft of the 
     procedures that accompanied your letter and, in particular, 
     the minor changes made in the draft that I had previously 
     sent to you. These proposed changes are acceptable and, 
     therefore, I have signed the procedures.
       I have been advised that a question arose regarding the 
     need to add narcotics violations to the list of reportable 
     non-employee crimes (Section IV). 21 U.S.C. Sec. 874(h) 
     provides that ``[w]hen requested by the Attorney General, it 
     shall be the duty of any agency or instrumentality of the 
     Federal Government to furnish assistance to him for carrying 
     out his functions under [the Controlled Substances Act] . . 
     .'' Section 1.8(b) of Executive Order 12333 tasks the Central 
     Intelligence Agency to ``collect, produce and disseminate 
     intelligence on foreign aspects of narcotics production and 
     trafficking.'' Moreover, authorization for the dissemination 
     of information concerning narcotics violations to law 
     enforcement agencies, including the Department of Justice, is 
     provided by sections 2.3(c) and (i) and 2.6(b) of the Order. 
     In light of these provisions, and in view of the fine 
     cooperation the Drug Enforcement Administration has received 
     from CIA, no formal requirement regarding the reporting of 
     narcotics violations has been included in these procedures. 
     We look forward to the CIA's continuing cooperation with the 
     Department of Justice in this area.
       In view of our agreement regarding the procedure, I have 
     instructed my Counsel for Intelligence Policy to circulate a 
     copy which I have executed to each of the other agencies 
     covered by the procedures in order that they may be signed by 
     the head of each such agency.
           Sincerely,
                                             William French Smith,
     Attorney General.
                                  ____

                                                   The Director of


                                         Central Intelligence,

                                    Washington, DC, March 2, 1982.
     Hon. William French Smith,
     Attorney General, Department of Justice, Washington, DC.
       Dear Bill: Thank you for your letter of 11 February 
     regarding the procedures on reporting of crimes to the 
     Department of Justice, which are being adopted under Section 
     1-7(a) of Executive Order 12333. I have signed the 
     procedures, and am returning the original to you for 
     retention at the Department.
       I am pleased that these procedures, which I believe strike 
     the proper balance between enforcement of the law and 
     protection of intelligence sources and methods, will now be 
     forwarded to other agencies covered by them for signing by 
     the heads of those agencies.
       With best regards,
           Yours,
                                                 William J. Casey.
       Enclosure.

       Reporting and Use of Information Concerning Federal Crimes


                                i. scope

       Section 1-7(a) of Executive Order 12333 requires senior 
     officials of the Intelligence Community to:
       Report to the Attorney General possible violations of 
     federal criminal laws by employees and of specified federal 
     criminal laws by any other person as provided in procedures 
     agreed upon by the Attorney General and the head of the 
     department or agency concerned, in a manner consistent with 
     the protection of intelligence sources and methods, as 
     specified in those procedures.
       These procedures govern the reporting of information 
     concerning possible federal crimes to the Attorney General 
     and to federal investigative agencies acquired by agencies 
     within the Intelligence Community in the course of their 
     functions. They also govern the handling and use of such 
     information by the Department of Justice and federal 
     investigative agencies in any subsequent investigations or 
     litigation. These procedures are promulgated under the 
     authority of 28 U.S.C. Sec. 535 and Executive Order 12333, 
     Sec. 1-7(a).


                            ii. definitions

       A. ``Agency'' means those agencies within the Intelligence 
     Community, as defined in Executive Order 12333, Sec. 3-4(f) 
     except for the intelligence elements of the Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation and the Department of the Treasury.
       B. ``Department'' means the Department of Justice.
       C. ``Employee'' means:
       1. A staff employee or contract employee of an Agency;
       2. Former officers or employees of an Agency, for purposes 
     of offenses committed during their employment; and
       3. Former officers or employees of an Agency, for offenses 
     involving a violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 207.
       D. Except as specifically provided otherwise, ``General 
     Counsel'' means the general counsel of the Agency or the 
     department of which it is a component or a person designated 
     by him to act on his behalf.


                      III. General Considerations

       A. These procedures govern the reporting of information 
     which the Agency or its current employees become aware of in 
     the course of performing their functions. They do not 
     authorize the Agency to conduct any investigation or to 
     collect any information not otherwise authorized by law.
       B. These procedures require a current employee of the 
     Agency to report to the General Counsel facts or 
     circumstances that appear to the employee to indicate that a 
     criminal offense may have been committed. Reports to the 
     Department of Justice or to a federal investigative agency 
     will be made by the Agency as set forth below.
       C. When an Agency has received allegations, complaints or 
     information [hereinafter ``allegations''] tending to show 
     that an employee of that agency may have violated any federal 
     criminal statute, or another person may have violated a 
     federal criminal statute contained within one of the 
     categories listed in Section IV below, the Agency shall 
     within a reasonable period of time determine through a 
     preliminary inquiry whether or not there is any basis to the 
     allegations (that is, are clearly not frivolous or

[[Page H2972]]

     false). If the allegations can be established as without 
     basis, the General Counsel will make an appropriate record of 
     his findings and no reporting under these procedures is 
     required. If the allegations cannot be established as without 
     basis, the reporting procedures set forth below will be 
     followed. A preliminary inquiry shall not include interviews 
     with persons other than current employees of the Agency or 
     examination of premises not occupied by the Agency without 
     the prior notification and approval of the Department of 
     Justice, except that the Agency may interview a non-employee 
     for the sole purpose of determining the truth of a report 
     that such non-employee has made an allegation or complaint 
     against an Agency employee. The foregoing provisions shall 
     neither limit the techniques which the Agency may otherwise 
     be authorized to use, nor limit the responsibility of the 
     Agency to provide for its security functions pursuant to 
     Executive Order 12333.
       D. Allegations shall be reported pursuant to the procedures 
     in effect at the time the allegations came to the attention 
     of the Agency.
       E. Allegations that appear to involve crimes against 
     property and involve less than $500 need not be reported 
     pursuant to the procedures set forth below. The General 
     Counsel will, however, make an appropriate record of his 
     findings.
       F. In lieu of following the procedures set forth below, the 
     General Counsel may orally report periodically, but at least 
     quarterly, to the Department concerning those offenses which, 
     while subject to these reporting requirements, are in the 
     opinion of the General Counsel of such a minor nature that no 
     further investigation or prosecution of the matter is 
     necessary. If an oral report is made, the General Counsel 
     will meet with the Assistant Attorney General or a designated 
     Deputy Assistant Attorney General of the Criminal Division, 
     Department of Justice to obtain his concurrence or 
     nonconcurrence with the General Counsel's opinion. If such 
     concurrence is obtained, no further reporting under these 
     procedures is required. If concurrence is not obtained, the 
     reporting procedures set forth below will be followed.


                  iv. non-employee reportable offenses

       A. Allegations concerning offenses in the following 
     categories are reportable, if they pertain to a person other 
     than an employee.
       1. Crimes involving intentional infliction or threat of 
     death or serious physical harm. Such crimes may include:
       Assault--18 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 111-113(A).
       Homicide--18 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 1111-14, 1116, 2113(e).
       Kidnapping--18 U.S.C. Sec. 1201.
       Presidential assassination, assault or kidnapping--18 
     U.S.C. Sec. 1751.
       Threats against the President and successors to the 
     President--18 U.S.C. Sec. 871.
       2. Crimes likely to impact upon the national security, 
     defense or foreign relations of the United States. Such 
     crimes may include:
       Communicating classified information--50 U.S.C. 
     Sec. 783(b).
       Espionage--18 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 793-98.
       Sabotage--18 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 2151-57.
       Arms Export Control Act--22 U.S.C. Sec. 2778.
       Atomic Energy Act--* * * U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 2077, 2092, 2111, 
     2122.
       Export Administration Act--50 U.S.C. App. Sec. 2410.
       Neutrality offenses--18 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 956-60.
       Trading with the Enemy Act--50 U.S.C. App. Sec. Sec. 5(b), 
     16.
       Agents of foreign government--18 U.S.C. Sec. 951.
       Government employee acting for a foreign principal--18 
     U.S.C. Sec. 219.
       Communication, receipt or disclosure of restricted data--42 
     U.S.C. Sec. 2274-77.
       Registration of certain persons trained in foreign 
     espionage systems--50 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 851.
       Foreign Agents Registration Act--22 U.S.C. Sec. 618(a).
       Unlawfully entering the United States--8 U.S.C. Sec. 1325.
       Any other offense not heretofore listed which is contained 
     within Chapter 45 of Title 18 U.S.C.
       3. Crimes involving foreign interference with the integrity 
     of United States governmental institutions or processes. Such 
     crimes may include, when committed by foreign persons:
       Bribery of public officials and witnesses--18 U.S.C. 
     Sec. Sec. 201-208.
       Conspiracy to injury or impede an officer--18 U.S.C. 
     Sec. 372.
       Election contributions and expenditures--2 U.S.C. 
     Sec. Sec. 441a-j, 599-600.
       4. Crimes which appear to have been committed by or on 
     behalf of a foreign power or in connection with international 
     terrorist activity. Such crimes may include:
       Aircraft piracy--49 U.S.C. Sec. 1472(i).
       Distribution, possession, and use of explosives--18 U.S.C. 
     Sec. Sec. 842(a)-(i).
       Unlawful electronic surveillance--18 U.S.C. 
     Sec. Sec. 2511(l), 2512(l), 50 U.S.C. Sec. 1809.
       Passport and visa offenses--18 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 1541-44, 
     1546.
       Distribution, possession, transfer, and use of firearms--18 
     U.S.C. Sec. 922, 924; 26 U.S.C. 5861.
       Transporting explosives on board aircraft--49 U.S.C. 
     Sec. 1472(h).
       Conspiracy to injure or impede an officer--18 U.S.C. 
     Sec. 372.
       Counterfeiting U.S. obligations--18 U.S.C. Sec. 471-74.
       False statements and false official papers--18 U.S.C. 
     Sec. Sec. 1001-02, 1017-18.
       Obstruction of justice--18 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 1503-06, 1508-
     10.
       Perjury--18 U.S.C. Sec. 1621-23.
       B. Any conspiracy or attempt to commit a crime reportable 
     under this section shall be reported if the conspiracy or 
     attempt itself meets the applicable reporting criteria.
       C. The General Counsel will make an appropriate record of 
     any matter brought to his attention which he determines is 
     not reportable under this section.
       D. Notwithstanding any of the provisions above, the General 
     Counsel may report any other possible offense when he 
     believes it should be reported.


                    v. reporting procedures--format

       The fact that a referral has been made pursuant to these 
     procedures shall be reflected in a letter or memorandum sent 
     by the Agency to the entity designated to receive the 
     referral under these procedures. In each instance that a 
     referral is required, information sufficiently detailed to 
     allow the Department of Justice to make informed judgments 
     concerning the appropriate course of subsequent 
     investigations or litigation shall be transmitted, either 
     orally or in writing, to the Attorney General, the Assistant 
     or a designated Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Criminal 
     Division, Department of Justice, or the Assistant Director, 
     Criminal Investigative or Intelligence Division, Federal 
     Bureau of Investigation. The Agency shall supplement its 
     referral when any additional information relating to the 
     original referral comes to its attention.


     vi. reporting procedures--no security considerations involved

       A. Where the Agency determines in accordance with these 
     procedures that a matter must be reported, and where the 
     Agency further determines that no public disclosure of 
     classified information or intelligence sources and methods 
     would result from further investigation or prosecution, and 
     the security of ongoing intelligence operations would not be 
     jeopardized thereby, the Agency will report the matter to the 
     appropriate federal investigative agency, or to the 
     appropriate United States Attorney for an investigative or 
     prosecutive determination. In each such instance, the Agency 
     shall also notify the Department of Justice, Criminal 
     Division of the referral.
       B. The Agency will inform the entity receiving such report 
     that, unless notified otherwise by the Agency or by the 
     Department, the security and consulting requirements set 
     forth in Section VII of these procedures need not be 
     followed.
       C. A federal investigative agency or United States Attorney 
     receiving information from the Agency pursuant to Section VI 
     of these procedures is required promptly to advise the Agency 
     of the initiation and conclusion of any investigation or 
     prosecution involving such information.


      vii. reporting procedures--security considerations involved

       A. Where the Agency determines in accordance with these 
     procedures that a matter must be reported, and where the 
     Agency also determines that further investigation or 
     prosecution of the matter would or might result in a public 
     disclosure of classified information or intelligence sources 
     or methods or would jeopardize the security of ongoing 
     intelligence operations, the Agency will report the matter to 
     the Assistant Attorney General or a designated Deputy 
     Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, Department of 
     Justice or Assistant Director, Criminal Investigative or 
     Intelligence Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation, in 
     the manner described in section V, above. In any instance in 
     which a matter is reported to the Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation, the Agency shall also notify the Department of 
     Justice, Criminal Division of the referral. Upon request, the 
     Agency will explain the security or operational problems that 
     would or might arise from a criminal investigation or 
     prosecution.
       B. Persons who are the subject of reports made pursuant to 
     this section may be identified as John Doe ______ in any 
     written document associated therewith. The true identities of 
     such persons will be made available when the Department of 
     Justice determines that they are essential to any subsequent 
     investigation or prosecution of the matter reported.
       C. Information contained in Agency reports will be 
     disseminated to persons other than the Assistant or Deputy 
     Assistant Attorney General or the Assistant Director, 
     Criminal Investigative or Intelligence Division, FBI, only as 
     follows:
       1. No Department or Federal investigative employee will be 
     given access to classified information unless that person has 
     been granted appropriate clearances, including any special 
     access approvals. The Assistant or Deputy Assistant Attorney 
     General or the Assistant Director, Criminal Investigative or 
     Intelligence Division, FBI, will ensure that access by an 
     employee is necessary for the performance of an official 
     function and that access is limited to the minimum number of 
     cleared persons necessary for investigative or prosecutorial 
     purposes. The Department will provide the head of the Agency 
     with a detailed report regarding any disclosure not 
     authorized by these procedures and will take appropriate 
     disciplinary action against any employee who participates in 
     such a disclosure.
       2. With regard to information reported to the Criminal 
     Division, Department of Justice, which the general counsel of 
     an Agency designates in writing as particularly sensitive and 
     for which special dissemination controls are requested 
     pursuant to this provision, dissemination will only occur 
     after

[[Page H2973]]

     consultation with the General Counsel of the Agency. The 
     designation of information as particularly sensitive may be 
     made only by the general counsel or acting general counsel of 
     an Agency.
       3. Except as permitted by these procedures, classified 
     information which has been received by the Department, the 
     FBI, or other federal investigative agency pursuant to these 
     procedures may not be disseminated outside of that entity 
     without the advance written consent of the General Counsel or 
     the head of the Agency.
       D. When it becomes apparent to the Department or federal 
     investigative agency that any investigative or legal action 
     may result in the disclosure of classified information or 
     intelligence sources or methods, the Department or federal 
     investigative agency will, at the earliest possible time, 
     fully advise and consult with the Agency to determine the 
     appropriate course of action and the potential harm to 
     intelligence sources and methods by the contemplated use or 
     disclosure of the classified information. Except in exigent 
     circumstances no investigative or legal action will be taken 
     without such advance notice and consultation.
       1. ``Exigent circumstances'' means situations in which a 
     person's life or physical safety is reasonably believed to be 
     in imminent danger, or information relating to the national 
     security is reasonably believed to be in imminent danger of 
     compromise, or expiration of a statute of limitations is 
     imminent, or loss of essential evidence in any of these cases 
     is imminent, or a crime is about to be committed, or the 
     opportunity to arrest a person is about to be lost where 
     there is probable cause to believe that the person has 
     committed a crime.
       2. If, due to exigent circumstances, any investigation or 
     significant contemplated action in any legal proceeding is 
     taken without advance notice or consultation, the Department 
     or federal investigative agency, within twenty-four hours of 
     taking such action, will provide the reporting agency an 
     explanation of the circumstances requiring that action. 
     Thereafter, there will be full adherence to the notification 
     and consultation requirements of these procedures.
       3. For purposes of this provision, consultation will 
     include the specific investigative and legal actions the 
     Department or federal investigative agency purposes to take 
     and a specification of legal and investigative issues 
     involved. The purpose of the consultation is to assure an 
     opportunity for the Agency to provide its judgment to the 
     Department or federal investigative agency regarding the 
     potential damage, if any, to the national security of the 
     disclosure or use of the information at issue. During this 
     process, the Agency will promptly provide as detailed an 
     identification and analysis as is possible at the time of the 
     potential consequences for the intelligence sources or 
     methods and for the national security from the contemplated 
     disclosure or use of the classified information. The Agency 
     will also provide any changes to or elaborations of this 
     analysis as soon as they become evident.
       4. If the Agency and the Department or federal 
     investigative agency agree that the risk of the use or 
     disclosure and any resulting consequences are acceptable, the 
     contemplated investigative or legal action may commence or 
     proceed.
       5. If the Agency and the Department of Justice or federal 
     investigative agency are unable to agree as to the 
     appropriate use of classified information provided pursuant 
     to these procedures by the Agency, each entity will be 
     responsible for pursuing timely resolution of such issues as 
     may exist through appropriate channels within their 
     respective organizations. Each entity will provide notice to 
     the other entity if it intends to seek a resolution of the 
     issues by a higher authority in the other entity's department 
     or agency. Where issues remain, they shall be referred to the 
     Attorney General for final determination after appropriate 
     consultation with the head of the Agency, and, where 
     appropriate, the Director of Central Intelligence. The 
     decision of the Attorney General may be appealed to the 
     President with prior notice to the Attorney General and the 
     Director of Central Intelligence. While such an appeal is 
     pending, no action will be taken that would render moot the 
     President's decision.
       E. When security considerations warrant such action, any 
     matter may be reported directly by the head of the Agency to 
     the Attorney General or the Acting Attorney General, in the 
     manner described in section V above. In considering such 
     reports, the Attorney General or the Acting Attorney General 
     may consult with any person whose advice he considers 
     necessary and who has the required security clearance, 
     provided that the Attorney General or the Acting Attorney 
     General will consult with the head of the reporting agency or 
     the General Counsel thereof concerning dissemination of 
     material designated ``Eyes Only.''
       F. If requested by the Agency, classified information 
     provided by the Agency to the Department or a federal 
     investigative agency will, to the maximum extent possible and 
     consistent with investigative and prosecutive requirements, 
     be stored by the Agency.


           viii. relation to other procedures and agreements

       A. If the Agency for administrative or security reasons 
     desires to conduct a more extensive investigation into the 
     activities of its employees relating to any matter reported 
     pursuant to these procedures, it will inform the Department 
     or federal investigative agency, as is appropriate. The 
     Agency may take appropriate administrative, disciplinary, or 
     other adverse action at any time against any employee whose 
     activities are reported under these procedures. However, such 
     investigations and disciplinary action will be coordinated 
     with the appropriate investigative or prosecuting officials 
     to avoid prejudice to any criminal investigation or 
     prosecution.
       B. Nothing in these procedures shall be construed to 
     restrict the exchange of information among the Agencies in 
     the Intelligence Community or between those Agencies and law 
     enforcement entities other than the Department of Justice.
       C. If the subject of a referral is an employee of another 
     agency other than a person subject to the Uniform Code of 
     Military Justice, the Criminal Division may refer the matter 
     to that agency for preliminary investigation and possible 
     administrative action. The employing agency will report the 
     results of any such preliminary investigation under the 
     procedures for reporting possible crimes by agency employees.
       D. Notwithstanding the November 23, 1955, Memorandum of 
     Understanding between the Department of Defense and the 
     Department of Justice, notice of crimes which violate both 
     federal criminal statutes and the Uniform Code of Military 
     Justice shall be given to the Department of Justice as 
     provided. Thereafter, the handling of matters relating to 
     individuals subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice 
     shall be coordinated by the Criminal Division with the 
     appropriate military service in accordance with existing 
     agreements between the Departments of Justice and Defense.
     William French Smith,
       Attorney General.
     William J. Casey,
       Director of Central Intelligence.
                                  ____


   Reporting of Federal Crimes Committed by Officers or Employees of 
                 Agencies in the Intelligence Community

       Executive Order 12036, Sec. 1-706, requires senior 
     officials of the intelligence community to:
       Report to the Attorney General evidence of possible 
     violations of federal criminal law by an employee of their 
     department or agency . . .
       These procedures govern the reporting of possible federal 
     crimes committed by officers or employees of the intelligence 
     agencies. They are promulgated under the authority of 28 
     U.S.C. Sec. 535 and E.O. 12036, Sec. Sec. 1-706, 3-305. 
     Except to the extent indicated in paragraph G, infra, they 
     supersede all previous agreements or guidelines.


                             a. definitions

       1. ``Officer or employee'' shall mean:
       a. All persons defined as employees in E.O. 12036, Sec. 4-
     204;
       b. former officers or employees when the offense was 
     committed during their employment; and
       c. former officers or employees when a basis for referral 
     exists with respect to violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 207.
       3. ``Basis for referral'' shall mean allegations, 
     complaints, or information tending to show that any officer 
     or employee may have violated a federal criminal statute that 
     the agency cannot establish as unfounded within a reasonable 
     time through a preliminary inquiry.


                   b. determining basis for referral

       1. When an agency has received allegations, complaints, or 
     information tending to show that any officer or employee may 
     have violated a Federal criminal statute, it shall determine 
     whether a basis for referral exists.
       2. In determining a basis for referral, an agency will not 
     attempt to establish that all elements of the possible 
     violation have occurred or that a particular employee is 
     responsible before referring the matter to the Department of 
     Justice.
       3. When the allegations, complaints, or information 
     received are not sufficient to determine whether a basis for 
     referral exists, an agency shall conduct a preliminary 
     inquiry, limited to the following methods:
       a. Interviews with current employees;
       b. Examination of the records of the agency;
       c. Examination of the records of other agencies;
       d. Examination of premises occupied by the agency not 
     constituting a physical search, physical surveillance, or 
     electronic surveillance; or
       e. Under procedures approved by the Attorney General and in 
     conformity with other legal requirements, physical search, 
     electronic surveillance, or physical surveillance of officers 
     and employees of the agency on premises occupied by the 
     agency.
       A preliminary inquiry shall not include interviews with 
     persons who are not current employees of the agency or 
     examination of premises not occupied by the agency, except 
     that the agency may interview a non-employee for the sole 
     purpose of determining the truth of a report that such non-
     employee has made an allegation or complaint against an 
     agency employee.


                c. referral to the department of justice

       Referrals shall be made in the following manner:
       1. (a) In cases where no public disclosure of classified 
     information or intelligence source and methods would result 
     from further investigation or prosecution, and the security

[[Page H2974]]

     of ongoing intelligence operations would not be jeopardized 
     thereby, the agency will report the matter to the cognizant 
     office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, other 
     appropriate United States Attorney or his designee for an 
     investigative or prosecutive determination. Cases involving 
     bribery or conflict of interest will be reported to the 
     Criminal Division.
       (b) A record of such referrals and any subsequent agency 
     action to dispose of the matter shall be maintained by the 
     agency, and on a quarterly basis, a summary memorandum 
     indicating the type of crime, place and date of referral and 
     ultimate disposition will be forwarded to the Assistant 
     Attorney General, Criminal Division, or his designee. 
     Referrals made by covert facilities to the United States 
     Attorney, the FBI or other Federal investigative agencies 
     will also be included in the quarterly report with due regard 
     for protection of the security of said installations.
       2. In cases where preliminary investigation has failed to 
     develop an identifiable suspect and the agency believes that 
     investigation or prosecution would result in public 
     disclosure of classified information or intelligence sources 
     or methods or would jeopardize the security of ongoing 
     intelligence operations, the Criminal Division will be so 
     informed in writing, following which a determination will be 
     made as to the proper course of action to be pursued in 
     consultation with the agency and the FBI.
       3. (a) In cases where preliminary investigation has 
     determined that there is a basis for referral of a matter 
     involving an identifiable agency officer or employee to the 
     Department of Justice, the future investigation or 
     prosecution of which would result in the public disclosure of 
     classified information or intelligence sources or methods or 
     would jeopardize the security of ongoing intelligence 
     operations, a letter explaining the facts of the matter in 
     detail will be forwarded to the Criminal Division. The 
     agency will also forward to the Criminal Division a 
     separate classified memorandum explaining the security or 
     operational problems which would arise from a criminal 
     investigation or prosecution, including, but not limited 
     to:
       (1) Public disclosure of information needed to prove the 
     offense or to obtain a search warrant or an electronic 
     surveillance order under chapter 119 of Title 18, United 
     States Code;
       (2) Disclosure required by a defense request for discovery 
     of information under Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
     Procedure, 18 U.S.C. 3500, or Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 
     (1963); and
       (3) Interference with the voluntary provision of cover or 
     other services necessary for intelligence operations by 
     persons other than employees.
       (b) In reporting such matter, the agency shall inform the 
     Criminal Division of the steps it has taken to prevent a 
     recurrence of similar offenses, if such action is feasible, 
     as well as those administrative sanctions which may be 
     contemplated with respect to the prospective criminal 
     defendant.
       (c) The Criminal Division, after any necessary consultation 
     with the agency and the FBI, will make a prosecutive 
     determination, informing the agency in writing of such 
     determination.
       4. Officers or employees who are the subject of such 
     referrals to any component of the Department of Justice may 
     be identified as John Doe ______ in any written document 
     associated with the initial referral. The true identities of 
     such persons will be made available when the Department 
     determines that they are essential to any subsequent 
     investigation or prosecution of the matter referred.


                     D. Further Action by Agencies

       If, as a result of the preliminary inquiry, the agency 
     desires to conduct a more extensive investigation for 
     administrative or security reasons, it will inform the 
     Department of Justice component to which the matter is 
     referred. The agency may take appropriate administrative, 
     disciplinary, or other adverse action at any time against any 
     officer or employee whose activities are reported under these 
     procedures. However, internal agency investigations and 
     disciplinary action in referred matters will be coordinated 
     with the appropriate investigative or prosecuting officials 
     to avoid prejudice to any criminal investigation or 
     prosecution.


                         E. Format of Referrals

       All referrals required by these procedures shall be in 
     writing and in such detail as the Department of Justice 
     component receiving the referral shall determine.


               F. Direct Reports to the Attorney General

       When the head of an agency within the intelligence 
     community believes that circumstances of security warrant it, 
     he may directly report to the Attorney General in writing any 
     matter required to be referred by these procedures, in lieu 
     of following the reporting procedures of paragraphs C-E, 
     supra.


             G. Relation to Other Procedures and Agreements

       1. Notwithstanding the November 25, 1955 Memorandum of 
     Understanding between the Department of Defense and the 
     Department of Justice, notice of crimes committed by an 
     officer or employee which violate both federal criminal 
     statutes and the Uniform Code of Military Justice shall be 
     given to the Department of Justice as provided herein. 
     Thereafter, the investigation and prosecution of individuals 
     subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice shall be 
     conducted as provided by the 1955 Memorandum of 
     Understanding.
       2. These procedures do not affect the reporting of possible 
     offenses by regular, permanent FBI employees to the Office of 
     Professional Responsibility, Department of Justice.
       3. Nothing in these procedures shall be construed to 
     restrict the exchange of information between agencies in the 
     intelligence community required by other procedures or 
     agreements made under E.O. 12036.
                                                  Griffin B. Bell,
     Attorney General.
                                  ____


  Procedures for Reporting Federal Crimes by Non-Employees Under E.O. 
                            12036 Sec. 1-706

       Section 1-706 of Executive Order 12036 requires senior 
     officials of the intelligence community to:
       Report to the Attorney General evidence of possible 
     violations of federal criminal law by an employee of their 
     department or agency, and report to the Attorney General 
     evidence of possible violations by other persons of those 
     federal criminal laws specified in guidelines adopted by the 
     Attorney General.
       These guidelines specify the violations of federal criminal 
     statutes by non-employees which must be reported and provide 
     reporting procedures.


                             a. definitions

       1. ``Agency'' shall mean:
       a. The Central Intelligence Agency;
       b. the National Security Agency;
       c. the Defense Intelligence Agency;
       d. offices within DoD for the Collection of specialized 
     national foreign intelligence through reconnaissance 
     programs;


                      b. policy and interpretation

       1. These procedures govern the reporting of information of 
     which the agency or its employees become aware in the course 
     of performing their lawful functions. They do not authorize 
     an agency to conduct any investigation or to collect any 
     information not otherwise authorized by law.
       2. These procedures require an employee of an agency in the 
     intelligence community to report to the general counsel of 
     his department or agency facts or circumstances that appear 
     to the employee to indicate that a criminal offense has been 
     committed. Reports to the Department of Justice will be made 
     by the general counsel of the department or agency or his 
     delegate only as set forth below.


                         c. reportable offenses

       Information or allegations showing that the following 
     federal offenses may have been committed shall be reported:
       1. Crimes involving intentional infliction or threat of 
     death or serious physical harm. Pertinent federal offenses 
     include:
       Assault--18 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 111-113(a).
       Homicide--18 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 1111-14, 1116, 2113(e).
       Kidnapping--18 U.S.C. Sec. 1201.
       Congressional assassination, assault or kidnapping--18 
     U.S.C. Sec. 1751.
       Threatening the President--18 U.S.C. Sec. 871.
       2. Crimes that impact on the national security, defense or 
     foreign relations of the United States. Pertinent federal 
     offenses include:
       Communicating classified information--50 U.S.C. 
     Sec. 783(b).
       Espionage--18 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 793-9.
       Sabotage--18 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 2151-57.
       Arms Export Control Act--22 U.S.C. Sec. 1778.
       Export Control Act--50 U.S.C. Sec. 2405.
       Neutrality offenses--18 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 956-60.
       Trading with the Enemy Act--50 App. U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 5(b), 
     16.
       Acting as an unregistered foreign agent--18 U.S.C. 
     Sec. 951.
       Communicating classified information--50 U.S.C. 
     Sec. 783(b).
       Government employee acting for a foreign principal--18 
     U.S.C. Sec. 219.
       Communicating restricted data--42 U.S.C. Sec. 2274-77.
       Espionage--18 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 793-98.
       Failure to register as foreign espionage trainee--50 U.S.C. 
     Sec. Sec. 851-55.
       Foreign Agents Registration Act--22 U.S.C. Sec. 618(a).
       Sabotage--18 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 2151-57.
       Unlawful entering the United States--8 U.S.C. Sec. 1325.
       The general counsel of the agency, by agreement with the 
     Criminal Division, may develop categories of specific crimes 
     which need not be reported because that Particular category 
     could have no significant impact on national security, 
     defense or foreign relations.
       3. Any crime meeting any of the following criteria:
       a. The crime is committed in circumstances likely to have a 
     substantial impact on the national obstruction of justice--18 
     U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 1503-06, 1508-10.
       Perjury--18 U.S.C. Sec. 1621-23.
       4. The general counsel may report any other possible 
     offense when he believes it should be reported to the 
     Attorney General.
       5. Any conspiracy to commit a reportable offense shall be 
     reported.
       6. The general counsel shall keep records of any matters 
     referred to him which contain information or allegations of a 
     felony in violation of federal law which the general counsel 
     determines is not reportable under these provisions.


                        d. reporting procedures

       When information or allegations are received by an agency 
     that a subject has committed or is committing a reportable 
     offense, the agency shall transmit the information or

[[Page H2975]]

     allegations to the Department of Justice in the following 
     manner:
       1. In a case where no public disclosure of classified 
     information or intelligence sources and methods would result 
     from further investigation or prosecution, and the security 
     of ongoing intelligence investigations would not be 
     jeopardized thereby, the agency will report the matter to the 
     cognizant office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
     other appropriate Federal investigative agency, or to the 
     appropriate United States Attorney or his designee for an 
     investigative or prosecutive determination.
       2. In a case where further investigation or prosecution 
     would result in the public disclosure of classified 
     information or intelligence sources and methods or would 
     jeopardize the conduct of ongoing intelligence operations, a 
     letter explaining the facts of the matter in detail will be 
     forwarded to the Criminal Division. The agency will also 
     forward to the Criminal Division a separate classified 
     memorandum explaining the security or operational problems 
     which would arise from a criminal investigation or 
     prosecution, including, but not limited to:
       a. Public disclosure of information needed to prove the 
     offense or to obtain a search warrant or an electronic 
     surveillance order under chapter 119 of Title 18, United 
     States Code;
       b. disclosure required by a defense request for discovery 
     of information under Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
     Procedure, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3500, or Brady v. Maryland, 373 
     U.S. 83 (1963); and
       c. interference with the voluntary provision by the subject 
     or persons associated with the subject of cover or other 
     services necessary for intelligence operations.
       The Criminal Division, after necessary consultation with 
     the agency, will determine whether to further investigate or 
     prosecute. The agency will be informed of such determination 
     in writing.
       E. If the subject of a referral is an employee of another 
     agency other than a person subject to the Uniform Code of 
     Military Justice, the Criminal Division may refer the matter 
     to that agency for preliminary investigation and possible 
     administrative action. The employing agency will report the 
     results of any such preliminary investigation under the 
     procedures for reporting possible crimes by agency employees.
       F. If the subject of the referral is a person subject to 
     the Uniform Code of Military Justice, the Criminal Division 
     will coordinate the handling of the matter with the 
     appropriate military service in accordance with existing 
     agreements between the Departments of Justice and Defense.
       G. All referrals required by these proceedings shall be in 
     writing and in such detail as the Department of Justice 
     component receiving the referral shall determine.
       H. When the head of an agency believes that circumstances 
     of security warrant it, he may directly report to the 
     Attorney General in writing any matter required to be 
     reported by these procedures in lieu of following the 
     procedures of paragraphs D-G.
       I. Nothing in these procedures shall be construed to 
     restrict the exchange of information among agencies in the 
     intelligence community required by other procedures or 
     agreements made under E.O. 12036.
                                                  Griffin B. Bell,
     Attorney General.
                                  ____


   Memorandum of Understanding: Reporting of Information Concerning 
                             Federal Crimes


                            i. introduction

       Section 1.7(a) of Executive Order (E.O.) 12333 requires 
     senior officials of the Intelligence Community to--
       Report to the Attorney General possible violations of 
     federal criminal laws by employees and of specified federal 
     criminal laws by any other person as provided in procedures 
     agreed upon by the Attorney General and the head of the 
     department or agency concerned, in a manner consistent with 
     the protection of intelligence sources and methods, as 
     specified in those procedures.
       Title 28, United States Code, Section 535(b) requires 
     that--
       [a]ny information, allegation, or complaint received in a 
     department or agency of the executive branch of the 
     Government relating to violations of title 18 involving 
     Government officers and employees shall be expeditiously 
     reported to the Attorney General by the head of the 
     department or agency, unless--
       (1) the responsibility to perform an investigation with 
     respect thereto is specifically assigned otherwise by another 
     provision of law; or
       (2) as to any department or agency of the Government, the 
     Attorney General directs otherwise with respect to a 
     specified class of information, allegation, or complaint.
       This Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) sets forth the 
     procedures by which each agency and organization within the 
     Intelligence Community shall report to the Attorney General 
     and to federal investigative agencies information concerning 
     possible federal crimes by employees of an intelligence 
     agency or organization, or violations of specified federal 
     criminal laws by any other person, which information was 
     collected by it during the performance of its designated 
     intelligence activities, as those activities are defined in 
     E.O. 12333, Sec. Sec. 1.8-1.13.


                            ii. definitions.

       A. ``Agency,'' as that term is used herein, refers to those 
     agencies and organizations within the Intelligence Community 
     as defined in E.O. 12333, Sec. 3.4(f), but excluding the 
     intelligence elements of the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
     and the Department of the Treasury.
       B. ``Employee,'' as that term is used herein, means:
       1. a staff employee, contract employee, asset, or other 
     person or entity providing service to or acting on behalf of 
     any agency within the intelligence community;
       2. a former officer or employee of any agency within the 
     intelligence community for purposes of an offense committed 
     during such person's employment, and for purposes of an 
     offense involving a violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 207 (Conflict 
     of interest); and
       3. any other Government employee on detail to the Agency.
       C. ``General Counsel'' means the general counsel of the 
     Agency or of the Department of which it is a component or an 
     oversight person designated by such person to act on his/her 
     behalf, and for purposes of these procedures may include an 
     Inspector General or equivalent official if agency or 
     departmental procedures so require or if designated by the 
     agency or department head.
       D. ``Inspector General'' or ``IG'' means the inspector 
     general of the Agency or of the department of which the 
     Agency is a component.
       E. ``Reasonable basis'' exists when there are facts and 
     circumstances, either personally known or of which knowledge 
     is acquired from a source believed to be reasonably 
     trustworthy, that would cause a person of reasonable caution 
     to believe that a crime has been, is being, or will be 
     committed. The question of which federal law enforcement or 
     judicial entity has jurisdiction over the alleged criminal 
     acts shall have no bearing upon the issue of whether a 
     reasonable basis exists.


                               iii. scope

       A. This MOU shall not be construed to authorize or require 
     the Agency, or any person or entity acting on behalf of the 
     Agency, to conduct any intelligence not otherwise authorized 
     by law, or to collect any information in a manner not 
     authorized by law.
       B. This MOU ordinarily does not require an intelligence 
     agency or organization to report crimes information that was 
     collected and disseminated to it by another department, 
     agency, or organization. Where, however, the receiving agency 
     is the primary or sole recipient of that information, of if 
     analysis by the receiving agency reveals additional crimes 
     information, the receiving agency shall be responsible for 
     reporting all such crimes information in accordance with the 
     provisions of this MOU.
       C. This MOU does not in any way alter or supersede the 
     obligation of an employee of an intelligence agency to report 
     potential criminal behavior by other employees of that agency 
     to an IG, as required either by statute or by agency 
     regulations, nor affect any protections afforded any persons 
     reporting such behavior to an IG. Nor does this MOU affect 
     any crimes reporting procedures between the IG Offices and 
     the Department of Justice.
       D. This MOU does not in any way alter or supersede any 
     obligation of a department or agency to report to the 
     Attorney General criminal behavior by Government employees 
     not employed by the intelligence community, as required by 28 
     USC Sec. 535.
       E. This MOU does not affect the obligation to report to the 
     Federal Bureau of Investigation alleged or suspected 
     espionage activities as required under Section 811(c) of the 
     Intelligence Authorization Act of 1995.
       F. The following crimes information is exempted from the 
     application of this memorandum if the specified conditions 
     are met:
       1. Crimes information that has been reported to an IG;\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     * Footnotes appear at end of Memorandum of Understanding.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
       2. Crimes information received by a Department of Defense 
     intelligence component concerning a Defense intelligence 
     component employee who either is subject to the Uniform Code 
     of Military Justice or is a civilian and has been accused of 
     criminal behavior related to his/her assigned duties or 
     position, if (a) the information is submitted to and 
     investigated by the appropriate Defense Criminal 
     Investigative Organization, and (b) in cases involving crimes 
     committed during the performance of intelligence activities, 
     the General Counsel provides to the Department of Justice a 
     report reflecting the nature of the charges and the 
     disposition thereof;
       3. Information regarding non-employee crimes listed in 
     Section VII that is collected by the intelligence component 
     of a Department also having within it a law enforcement 
     organization where (a) the crime is of the type that the 
     Department's law enforcement organization has jurisdiction to 
     investigate; and (b) the Department's intelligence 
     organization submits that crimes information to the 
     Department's law enforcement organization for investigation 
     and further handling in accordance with Department policies 
     and procedures;\2\
       4. Crimes information regarding persons who are not 
     employees of the Agency, as those terms are defined in 
     Section II, that involve crimes against property in an amount 
     of $1,000 or less, an amount of $500 or less. As to other 
     relatively minor offenses to which this MOU would ordinarily 
     apply, but which, in the General Counsel's opinion, do not 
     warrant reporting pursuant to this MOU, the General Counsel 
     may orally contact the

[[Page H2976]]

     Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, or his/her 
     designee. If the Department of Justice concurs with that 
     opinion, no further reporting under these procedures is 
     required. The General Counsel shall maintain an appropriate 
     record of such contacts with the Department. If deemed 
     appropriate by the General Counsel, he/she may take necessary 
     steps to pass such information to the appropriate law 
     enforcement authorities; or
       5. Information, other than that relating to homicide or 
     espionage, regarding crimes that were completed more than ten 
     years prior to the date such allegations became known to the 
     Agency. If, however, the Agency has a reasonable basis to 
     believe that the alleged criminal activities occurring ten or 
     more years previously relate to, or are a part of, a pattern 
     of criminal activities that continued within that ten year 
     interval, the reporting procedures herein will apply to those 
     activities.
       F. The procedures set forth herein are not intended to 
     affect whether an intelligence agency reports to state or 
     local authorities activity that appears to constitute a crime 
     under state law. In the event that an intelligence agency 
     considers it appropriate to report to state or local 
     authorities possible criminal activity that may implicate 
     classified information or intelligence sources or methods, it 
     should inform the AAG, or the designated Deputy AAG, Criminal 
     Division, in accordance with paragraph VIII.C, below; the 
     Criminal Division will consult with the intelligence agency 
     regarding appropriate methods for conveying the information 
     to state or local authorities. In the event that an 
     intelligence agency considers it appropriate to report to 
     state or local authorities possible criminal activity that is 
     not expected to implicate classified information or 
     intelligence sources or methods, it should nevertheless 
     provide a copy of such report to the AAG, or to the 
     designated Deputy AAG, Criminal Division.


 iv. general considerations: allegations of criminal acts committed by 
                            agency employees

       A. This Agreement requires each employee of the Agency to 
     report to the General Counsel or IG facts or circumstances 
     that reasonably indicate to the employee that an employee of 
     an intelligence agency has committed, is committing, or will 
     commit a violation of federal criminal law.\3\
       B. Except as exempted in Section III, when the General 
     Counsel has received allegations, complaints or information 
     (hereinafter allegations) that an employee of the Agency may 
     have violated, may be violating, or may violate a federal 
     criminal statute, that General Counsel should within a 
     reasonable period of time determine whether there is a 
     reasonable basis to believe that a federal crime has been, is 
     being, or will be committed and that it is a crime which, 
     under this memorandum, must be reported. The General Counsel 
     may, as set forth in Section V, below, conduct a preliminary 
     inquiry for this purpose. If a preliminary inquiry reveals 
     that there is a reasonable basis for the allegations, the 
     General Counsel will follow the reporting procedures set 
     forth in Section VIII, below. If a preliminary inquiry 
     reveals that the allegations are without a reasonable basis, 
     the General Counsel will make a record, as appropriate, of 
     that finding and no reporting under these procedures is 
     required.


   v. preliminary inquiry into allegations against an agency employee

       A. The General Counsel's preliminary inquiry regarding 
     allegations against an Agency employee will ordinarily be 
     limited to the following:
       1. Review of materials submitted in support of the 
     allegations;
       2. review of Agency indices, records, documents, and files;
       3. examination of premises occupied by the Agency;
       4. examination of publicly available federal, state, and 
     local government records and other publicly available records 
     and information;
       5. interview of the complainant; and
       6. interview of any Agency employee, other than the 
     accused, who, in the opinion of the General Counsel, may be 
     able to corroborate or refute the allegations.
       B. Where criminal allegations against an Agency employee 
     are subject to this MOU, an interview of that employee may 
     only be undertaken in compliance with the following 
     conditions:
       1. Where the crime alleged against an Agency employee does 
     not pertain to a serious felony offense,\4\ a responsible 
     Agency official may interview the accused employee; however, 
     such interview shall only be conducted with the approval of 
     the General Counsel, the IG, or, as to Defense and military 
     employees, the responsible military Judge Advocate General or 
     the responsible Defense Criminal Investigative Organization.
       2. Where the crime alleged against an Agency employee is a 
     serious felony offense, the Agency shall ordinarily not 
     interview the accused employee, except where, in the opinion 
     of the General Counsel, there are exigent circumstances \5\ 
     which require that the employee be interviewed. If such 
     exigent circumstances exist, the General Counsel or other 
     attorney in the General Counsel's office may interview the 
     accused employee to the extent reasonably necessary to 
     eliminate or substantially reduce the exigency.
       3. In all other cases of alleged serious felonies, the 
     General Counsel, or the General Counsel's designee, may 
     interview the accused employee only after consultation with 
     the Agency's IG, a Defense Criminal Investigative 
     Organization (for Defense and military employees), or with 
     the Department of Justice regarding the procedures to be used 
     during an interview with the accused employee.
       Any interview of an accused employee that is undertaken 
     shall be conducted in a manner that does not cause the loss, 
     concealment, destruction, damage or alteration of evidence of 
     the alleged crime, nor result in the immunization of any 
     statements made by the accused employee during that 
     interview. The Agency shall not otherwise be limited by this 
     MOU either as to the techniques it is otherwise authorized to 
     use, or as to its responsibility to provide for its security 
     functions pursuant to E.O. 12333.


 vi. general considerations: allegations of criminal acts committed by 
                             non-employees

       A. This MOU requires each employee of the Agency to report, 
     to the General Counsel or as otherwise directed by the 
     Department or Agency head, facts or circumstances that 
     reasonably indicate to the employee that a non-employee has 
     committed, is committing, or will commit one or more of the 
     specified crimes in Section VII, below.
       B. When an Agency has received information concerning 
     alleged violations of federal law by a person other than an 
     employee of an intelligence agency, and has determined that 
     the reported information provides a reasonable basis to 
     conclude that a violation of one of the specified crimes in 
     Section VII has occurred, is occurring, or may occur, the 
     Agency shall report that information to the Department of 
     Justice in accordance with Sections VIII or IX, below.


               VII. REPORTABLE OFFENSES BY NON-EMPLOYEES

       A. Unless exempted under Section III, above, allegations 
     concerning criminal activities by non-employees are 
     reportable if they pertain to one or more of the following 
     specified violations of federal criminal law:
       1. Crimes involving intentional infliction or threat of 
     death or serious physical harm. These include but are not 
     limited to homicide, kidnapping, hostage taking, assault 
     (including sexual assault), or threats or attempts to commit 
     such offenses, against any person in the United States or a 
     U.S. national or internationally protected person (as defined 
     in 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1116 (b)(4)), whether in the United States 
     or abroad.
       2. Crimes, including acts of terrorism, that are likely to 
     affect the national security, defense or foreign relations of 
     the United States. These may include but are not limited to:
       a. Espionage; sabotage; unauthorized disclosure of 
     classified information; seditious conspiracies to overthrow 
     the government of the United States; fund transfers violating 
     the International Emergency Economic Powers Act; providing 
     material or financial support to terrorists; unauthorized 
     traffic in controlled munitions or technology; or 
     unauthorized traffic in, use of, or contamination by nuclear 
     materials, chemical or biological weapons, or chemical or 
     biological agents; whether in the United States or abroad;
       b. Fraudulent entry of persons into the United States, the 
     violation of immigration restrictions or the failure to 
     register as a foreign agent or an intelligence trained agent;
       c. Offenses involving interference with foreign governments 
     or interference with the foreign policy of the United States 
     whether occurring in the United States or abroad;
       d. Acts of terrorism anywhere in the world which target the 
     U.S. government or its property, U.S. persons, or any 
     property in the United States, or in which the perpetrator is 
     a U.S. person; aircraft hijacking; attacks on aircraft or 
     international aviation facilities; or maritime piracy;
       e. The unauthorized transportation or use of firearms or 
     explosives in interstate or foreign commerce.
       3. Crimes involving foreign interference with the integrity 
     of U.S. governmental institutions or processes. Such crimes 
     may include:
       a. Activities to defraud the U.S. government or any 
     federally protected financial institution, whether occurring 
     in the United States or abroad;
       b. Obstruction of justice or bribery of U.S. officials or 
     witnesses in U.S. proceedings, whether occurring in the 
     United States or abroad;
       c. Interference with U.S. election proceedings or illegal 
     contributions by foreign persons to U.S. candidates or 
     election committees;
       d. Perjury in connection with U.S. proceedings, or false 
     statements made in connection with formal reports or 
     applications to the U.S. government, or in connection with a 
     formal criminal or administrative investigation, whether 
     committed in the United States or abroad;
       e. Counterfeiting U.S. obligations or any other 
     governmental currency, security or identification documents 
     used in the United States, whether committed in the United 
     States or abroad; transactions involving stolen governmental 
     securities or identification documents or stolen or 
     counterfeit non-governmental securities.
       4. Crimes related to unauthorized electronic surveillance 
     in the United States or to tampering with, or unauthorized 
     access to, computer systems.
       5. Violations of U.S. drug laws including: the cultivation, 
     production, transportation, importation, sale, or possession 
     (other than possession of user quantities) of controlled 
     substances; the production, transportation,

[[Page H2977]]

     importation, and sale of precursor or essential chemicals.
       6. The transmittal, investment and/or laundering of the 
     proceeds of any of the unlawful activities listed in this 
     Section, whether committed in the United States or abroad.
       B. Any conspiracy or attempt to commit a crime reportable 
     under this section shall be reported if the conspiracy or 
     attempt itself meets the applicable reporting criteria.
       C. The Attorney General also encourages the Agency to 
     notify the Department of Justice when the Agency's other 
     routine collection of intelligence in accordance with its 
     authorities results in its acquisition of information about 
     the commission of other serious felony offenses by non-
     employees, e.g., violations of U.S. environmental laws 
     relating to ocean and inland water discharging or dumping, 
     drinking water contamination, or hazardous waste disposal, 
     and crimes involving interference with the integrity of U.S. 
     governmental institutions or processes that would not 
     otherwise be reportable under Section VII.A.3.


         viii. procedures for submitting special crimes reports

       A. Where the Agency determines that a matter must be the 
     subject of a special report to the Department of Justice, it 
     may, consistent with paragraphs VIII.B and VIII.C, below, 
     make such a report (1) by letter or other, similar 
     communication from the General Counsel, or (2) by electronic 
     or courier dissemination of information from operational or 
     analytic units, provided that in all cases, the subject line 
     and the text of such communication or dissemination clearly 
     reflects that it is a report of possible criminal activity. 
     The Department of Justice shall maintain a record of all 
     special crimes reports received from the Agency.
       B. Where the Agency determines that a matter must be the 
     subject of a special report to the Department of Justice; and 
     where the Agency further determines that no public disclosure 
     of classified information or intelligence sources and methods 
     would result from further investigation or prosecution, and 
     the security of ongoing intelligence operations would not be 
     jeopardized thereby, the Agency will report the matter to the 
     federal investigative agency having jurisdiction over the 
     criminal matter. A copy of that report must also be provided 
     to the AAG, or designated Deputy AAG, Criminal Division.
       C. Where the Agency determines that further investigation 
     or prosecution of a matter that must be specially reported 
     may result in a public disclosure of classified information 
     or intelligence sources or methods or would jeopardize the 
     security of ongoing intelligence operations, the Agency shall 
     report the matter to the AAG or designated Deputy AAG, 
     Criminal Division. A copy of that report must also be 
     provided to the Assistant Director, Criminal Investigations 
     or National Security Divisions, Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation, or in the event that the principal 
     investigative responsibility resides with a different federal 
     investigative agency, to an appropriately cleared person of 
     equivalent position in such agency. The Agency's report 
     should explain the security or operational problems that 
     would or might arise from a criminal investigation or 
     prosecution.
       D. Written documents associated with the reports submitted 
     pursuant to this section may refer to persons who are the 
     subjects of the reports by non-identifying terms (such as 
     ``John Doe ______''). The Agency shall advise the Department 
     of Justice or relevant federal investigative agency of the 
     true identities of such persons if so requested.
       E. It is agreed that, in acting upon information reported 
     in accordance with these procedures, the Agency, the 
     Department of Justice and the relevant federal investigative 
     agencies will deal with classified information, including 
     sources and methods, in a manner consistent with the 
     provisions of relevant statutes and Executive Orders, 
     including the Classified Information Procedures Act.


ix. when routine dissemination may be used in lieu of a special crimes 
                                 report

       A. Except as set forth in IX.B, below, the Agency may 
     report crimes information regarding non-employees to the 
     Department of Justice by routine dissemination, provided 
     that:
       1. the crimes information is of the type that is routinely 
     disseminated by the Agency to headquarters elements of 
     cognizant federal investigative agencies;
       2. the criminal activity is of a kind that is normally 
     collected and disseminated to law enforcement by the Agency 
     (e.g., drug trafficking, money laundering, terrorism, or 
     sanctions violations); and
       3. the persons or entities involved are members of a class 
     that are routinely the targets or objects of such collection 
     and dissemination.
       If all three of these conditions are met, the Agency may 
     satisfy its crimes reporting obligation through routine 
     dissemination to the Department of Justice, Criminal 
     Division, and to all cognizant federal law enforcement 
     agencies, which shall retain primary responsibility for 
     review of disseminated information for evidence of criminal 
     activity. In all other cases, the special reporting 
     procedures in Section VIII shall apply. As requested by the 
     Department of Justice, the Agency will coordinate with the 
     Department to facilitate the Department's analytical 
     capabilities as to the Agency's routine dissemination of 
     crimes information in compliance with this MOU.
       B. Routine dissemination, as discussed in IX.A, above, may 
     not be used in lieu of the special reporting requirements set 
     forth herein as to the following categories of criminal 
     activities:
       1. Certain crimes involving the intentional infliction or 
     threat of death or serious physical harm (VII.A.1, above);
       2. Espionage; sabotage; unauthorized disclosure of 
     classified information; and seditious conspiracies to 
     overthrow the government of the United States (VII.A.2.a, 
     above); and
       3. Certain crimes involving foreign interference with the 
     integrity of U.S. governmental institutions or processes 
     (VII.A.3.b and c, above).


                    x. other agency responsibilities

       A. The Agency shall develop internal procedures in 
     accordance with the provisions of Sections VIII and IX for 
     the reporting of criminal information by its employees as 
     required under Sections IV.A and VI.A.
       B. The Agency shall also establish initial and continuing 
     training to ensure that its employees engaged in the review 
     and analysis of collected intelligence are knowledgeable 
     of and in compliance with the provisions of this MOU.


            xi. relation to other procedures and agreements

       A. If the Agency desires, for administrative or security 
     reasons, to conduct a more extensive investigation into the 
     activities of an employee relating to any matter reported 
     pursuant to this MOU, it will inform the Department of 
     Justice and the federal investigative agency to which the 
     matter was reported. The Agency may also take appropriate 
     administrative, disciplinary, or other adverse action at any 
     time against any employee whose activities are reported under 
     these procedures. However, such investigations or adverse 
     actions shall be coordinated with the proper investigative or 
     prosecuting officials to avoid prejudice to any criminal 
     investigation or prosecution.
       B. Nothing in these procedures shall be construed to 
     restrict the exchange of information among the Agencies in 
     the Intelligence Community or between those Agencies and law 
     enforcement entities other than the Department of Justice.
       C. This MOU supersedes all prior crimes reporting memoranda 
     of understanding executed pursuant to the requirements of 
     E.O. 12333. To the extent that there exist any conflicts 
     between other Agency policies or directives and the 
     provisions herein, such conflicts shall be resolved in 
     accordance with the provisions of this MOU. However, this MOU 
     shall not be construed to modify in any way the August 1984 
     Memorandum of Understanding between the Department of Defense 
     and the Department of Justice relating to the investigation 
     and prosecution of certain crimes.
       D. The parties understand and agree that nothing herein 
     shall be construed to alter in any way the current routine 
     dissemination by the Agency of intelligence information, 
     including information regarding alleged criminal activities 
     by any person, to the Department of Justice or to federal law 
     enforcement agencies.


                           xii. miscellaneous

       A. This MOU shall become effective as to each agency below 
     as of the date signed by the listed representative of that 
     agency.
       B. The Intelligence-Law Enforcement Policy Board, within 
     one year of the date of the effective date hereof, and as it 
     deems appropriate thereafter, will appoint a working group 
     consisting of an equal number of representatives from the 
     intelligence and law enforcement communities, including the 
     Criminal Division. That working group shall do the following:
       1. review the Agency's implementation of Sections III.F and 
     IV.B, hereof;
       2. consider whether the crimes reporting requirements of 
     E.O. 12333 and other authorities are being met through the 
     operation of this MOU;
       3. review each of the provisions of this MOU and determine 
     what, if any, modifications thereof should be recommended to 
     the Policy Board, or its successor; and
       4. issue a report to the Policy Board of its findings and 
     recommendations in each of the foregoing categories.
       C. The Policy Board in turn shall make recommendations to 
     the Attorney General, the Director of Central Intelligence, 
     and the heads of the affected agencies concerning any 
     modifications to the MOU that it considers necessary.
     Janet Reno,
                                                 Attorney General.
     John Deutsch,
                                 Director of Central Intelligence.
     Michael F. Munson,
       (For Director, Defense Intelligence Agency).
     Kenneth E. Baker,
       Director, Office of Non-Proliferation and National 
     Security, Department of Energy.
     William J. Perry,
                                             Secretary of Defense.
     J.M. McConnell,
                               Director, National Security Agency.
     Toby T. Gati,
       Assistant Secretary of State, Intelligence and Research.

[[Page H2978]]

                               footnotes

     \1\ If, however, the IG determines that the reported 
     information is not properly subject to that office's 
     jurisdiction, but that such information may be reportable 
     pursuant to this MOU, the IG may forward the information to 
     the DOJ in compliance with these procedures. Alternatively, 
     the IG may transmit the information to the Agency's General 
     Counsel for a determination of what response, if any, is 
     required by this MOU.
     \2\ This MOU does not affect the crimes reporting obligations 
     of any law enforcement and other non-intelligence components 
     of a department, agency, or organization.
     \3\ When a General Counsel or IG has received information 
     concerning alleged violations of federal law by an employee 
     of another intelligence community agency, and those 
     violations are not exempted under section III.E.4, hereof, 
     the General Counsel shall notify in writing the General 
     Counsel of the accused employee's agency. The latter General 
     Counsel must then determine whether this MOU requires the 
     allegations to be reported to the Department of Justice.
     \4\ A ``serious felony offense'' includes any offense listed 
     in Section VII, hereof, violent crimes, and other offenses 
     which, if committed in the presence of a reasonably prudent 
     and law-abiding person, would cause that person immediately 
     to report that conduct directly to the police. For purposes 
     of this MOU, crimes against government property that do not 
     exceed $5,000 and are not part of a pattern of continuing 
     behavior or of a criminal conspiracy shall not be considered 
     serious felony offenses.
     \5\ ``Exigent circumstances'' are circumstances requiring 
     prompt action by the Agency in order to protect life or 
     substantial property interests; to apprehend or identify a 
     fleeing offender; or to prevent the compromise, loss, 
     concealment, destruction, or alteration of evidence of a 
     crime.

                              {time}  1530

  The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentlewoman from California (Ms. 
Waters) has expired.
  (On request of Mr. Dicks, and by unanimous consent, Ms. Waters was 
allowed to proceed for 2 additional minutes.)
  Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, if the gentlewoman would yield to me, I 
appreciate very much the hard work that the gentlewoman from California 
has put into this, an enormous effort on her part.
  I regret that, because of a technicality, the amendment will not be 
accepted. I guarantee the gentlewoman we will work with her to make 
certain that we do everything we can to come up with a strategy to be 
certain that the understanding that is now in place with the Attorney 
General is strengthened, so that, in cases where there has been illegal 
activity or problems, that they must be reported to the Attorney 
General.
  I know that is the thrust of your amendment. As you know, our 
committee is still involved in our investigation. It may well be one of 
the conclusions of our investigation that we need to strengthen this 
area.
  I pledge to the gentlewoman from California that I will work with her 
to get a satisfactory solution. Again, I appreciate the gentlewoman's 
endeavors and hard work here.
  Ms. WATERS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank the gentleman from 
Washington (Mr. Dicks).
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman from California yield?
  Ms. WATERS. Yes, I yield to the gentleman from Florida.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I echo what the ranking member has said. I 
think the gentlewoman from California is right on in an area of 
critical importance; there is no doubt about that.
  We are in the middle of the investigation, as the gentlewoman knows. 
We are going to have recommendations. Certainly this is an area of 
concern. I do not know what those recommendations will be, but I assure 
the gentlewoman that her thoughts and her input on this are being 
accepted, listened to, and we will be considering them as we go forward 
with the other information we get in our investigation.
  Ms. WATERS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank the chairman and our 
ranking member and say to our ranking member that I really appreciate 
the fact that he has at least been able to listen to some of the ideas 
that I have brought to that committee.
  I know that the gentleman is, by far, one of the most knowledgeable 
in this area and that some of the things that I am raising are things 
that challenge conventional wisdom. But the gentleman has been very 
cooperative, and I appreciate it.
  Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the gentlewoman's kind remarks.
  Ms. WATERS. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to withdraw the 
amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentlewoman 
from California?
  There was no objection.
  The CHAIRMAN. The amendment is withdrawn.
  Are there further amendments to title IV?
  The Clerk will designate title V.
  The text of title V is as follows:
         TITLE V--DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

     SEC. 501. EXTENSION OF AUTHORITY TO ENGAGE IN COMMERCIAL 
                   ACTIVITIES AS SECURITY FOR INTELLIGENCE 
                   COLLECTION ACTIVITIES.

       Section 431(a) of title 10, United States Code, is amended 
     by striking out ``December 31, 1998'' and inserting in lieu 
     thereof ``December 31, 2001''.

  The CHAIRMAN. Are there amendments to title V?
  Are there further amendments to the bill?
  If not, the question is on the committee amendment in the nature of a 
substitute, as modified, as amended.
  The committee amendment in the nature of a substitute, as modified, 
as amended, was agreed to.
  The CHAIRMAN. Under the rule, the Committee rises.
  Accordingly, the Committee rose; and the Speaker pro tempore (Mr. 
Ney) having assumed the chair, Mr. Thornberry, Chairman of the 
Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, reported that 
that Committee, having had under consideration the bill (H.R. 3694) to 
authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1999 for intelligence and 
intelligence-related activities of the United States Government, the 
Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency 
Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes, pursuant to 
House Resolution 420, he reported the bill back to the House with an 
amendment adopted by the Committee of the Whole.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under the rule, the previous question is 
ordered.
  Is a separate vote demanded on the amendment to the committee 
amendment in the nature of a substitute adopted by the Committee of the 
Whole? If not, the question is on the committee amendment in the nature 
of a substitute.
  The committee amendment in the nature of a substitute was agreed to.
  The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, was read 
the third time, and passed, and a motion to reconsider was laid on the 
table.

                          ____________________