Senate
(Senate - June 25, 1998)

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[Pages S7081-S7096]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

[[Page S7081]]

Senate

  NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1999 (Continued)


                            BOSNIA LANGUAGE

  Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I rise today to comment on the 
provisions of the Department of Defense authorization bill relating to 
the United States military mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The amendment 
offered by the Senator from South Carolina (Mr. Thurmond) expresses the 
sense of the Congress that United States ground troops should not 
remain in Bosnia indefinitely. The amendment offered by the Senator 
from New Hampshire (Mr. Smith) would have required that none of the 
funding authorized or appropriated for the Bosnia mission under this 
bill be expended after March 31, 1999, unless both Houses of Congress 
had voted on the continued deployment of U.S. ground troops in Bosnia.
  I supported both of these amendments because I firmly believe that it 
is of paramount importance for the Senate to go on record at every 
opportunity with respect to the U.S. mission in Bosnia. It is 
especially important that the Senate go on record as a part of the 
Department of Defense authorization bill, which is perhaps the most 
important piece of defense-related legislation that this body debates 
each year because it is the framework under which our military will be 
funded over the next fiscal year.
  I have opposed the Bosnia mission since its inception because I did 
not believe then--and I do not believe now--that the Administration has 
presented a list of clear, achievable objectives and a definite exit 
strategy to the American people. To date, taxpayers have paid more than 
$9 billion for this ill-defined mission.
  I am pleased that the second-degree amendment offered by the Senator 
from Arizona (Mr. McCain) to the Thurmond amendment calls upon the 
President to submit a report on the status of the Bosnia mission with 
each future request for additional funding for this mission. To date, 
the Administration has repeatedly come to the Congress seeking more and 
more money for this mission and offering little justification in 
return. The McCain language asks the Administration, with each 
additional funding request, to provide specific information on the 
Bosnia mission, including objectives for reaching a self-sustainable 
peace and a schedule for achieving them, and future cost and risk 
assessments involved with this mission.
  Of course, I support our men and women in uniform and the commendable 
job they have done to help to implement the Dayton Accords and to 
achieve a lasting peace in Bosnia. What I cannot accept is the mission 
creep and uncertainty that these men and women are forced to live with, 
and the hefty price tag the American people have been forced to pay.
  While I supported the Thurmond amendment, I would have liked to see 
stronger language, including calling on the President to devise an exit 
strategy that included a date certain for the transfer of chief 
responsibility for this mission from United States forces to European 
forces. It is my firm belief that the longer U.S. troops remain in the 
region, the harder it will be for them to leave. We must call upon our 
NATO allies to assume responsibility for this mission.
  In the past, I have supported both a date certain for troop 
withdrawal, and efforts to cut funding for this mission. I also have 
come to the floor to express my concerns about the expanding nature of 
this mission. I would also like to express again my continuing 
frustration with the emergency designation for the funding for this 
mission, which is clearly no longer an emergency.
  I regret that the Administration chose to deploy troops to Bosnia in 
1995 without seeking prior congressional approval. I also regret that 
this mission has continued far past its original one-year time frame, 
and that our troops have been asked once again to continue down an 
uncertain path toward an ill-defined goal. In December 1997, the 
President abandoned the purported June 1998 exit date and replaced it 
with a series of so-called ``benchmarks'' for U.S. withdrawal. Today, 
on the 25th day of June 1998, the end of this mission is nowhere in 
sight. I hope that the Administration will hear clearly the sentiments 
expressed by the Senate through the Thurmond amendment, which has been 
adopted overwhelmingly by this body.


              prohibition on expansion of sale of alcohol

  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I am pleased that the Senate adopted the 
amendment I submitted to S. 2057 that puts the Senate on record in 
opposition to the attempt being made to increase the number of military 
stores that sell wine and beer. Although alcohol is available for sale 
on military bases, it is not for sale in the commissary stores along 
with the groceries. Specifically, my amendment would prohibit the 
Secretary of Defense from conducting a survey of commissary patrons to 
determine whether or not they would support the sale of beer and wine 
in commissaries. In addition, the amendment would prohibit a 
demonstration project to evaluate the merit of selling wine and beer in 
commissary stores at exchange store prices. Mr. President, that is the 
wrong direction in which to take our military. We should be trying to 
deglamorize alcohol, not taking steps that tend to promote its use. An 
expansion of accessibility will likely lead to an increase in the 
military of all the problems that go hand and hand with alcohol use in 
civilian life; the negative health consequences, the loss of 
productivity, the cost to society, the increase in violence and crime, 
and the increase in sexually transmitted diseases. Why in the world 
would we want

[[Page S7082]]

to embrace such a policy as expansion of access to alcohol as official 
government policy! Life in the military already has its share of 
stress--long hours, a rigid hierarchy of command, constant training, 
travel, and long deployments overseas. Let us not expand the 
opportunities to pour more fuel on any smoldering embers of alcohol 
abuse in our population and add to these stresses and strains. Let us 
keep our soldiers fit and sober, clear-headed and ready to defend our 
national security interests, and hope that such a policy sets an 
example which other entities in our society will embrace.
  Mr. SANTORUM. Mr. President, the 1999 Defense Authorization bill 
before us contains a demonstration project that would allow some DoD-
eligible retirees to join FEHBP plans, under a separate risk pool. It 
is my understanding that this ensures that DoD retirees who enroll in 
this demonstration project are able to choose from competing, private 
sector FEHBP plans. It is also my understanding that retirees, like 
other FEHBP-eligibles, will be able to choose among plans that offer 
fully integrated health care benefits that use market-based competition 
to control cost and improve quality of care.
  Mr. THURMOND. Yes, we fully expect that OPM and DoD will conduct a 
demonstration project that provides military retirees with the same 
health care services provided through the same private sector delivery 
systems that serve today's FEHBP beneficiaries.
  Mr. SANTORUM. I thank the Chairman. I appreciate this clarification 
and I look forward to evaluating the success of the FEHBP demonstration 
along with the two other demonstration projects included in this bill.


                   Y-12 plant in oak ridge, tennessee

  Mr. THOMPSON. I know the Chairman of the Armed Services Committee 
agrees with me that nuclear deterrence is the cornerstone of our 
national defense policy, and we should do everything we can to maintain 
a strong, viable nuclear deterrent in this country. This requires a 
robust nuclear weapons program, the ability to ensure that our weapons 
are both safe and reliable, and the ability to remanufacture any 
component of any weapon in the stockpile at any given time.
  Mr. THURMOND. The Senator from Tennessee is correct. We must preserve 
our capability to manufacture weapons and weapons components, and we 
must maintain ongoing weapons surveillance and assessment activities. 
The four weapons production plants--including the Y-12 plant in the 
Senator's home state of Tennessee--are key to achieving these goals.
  Mr. THOMPSON. As the Chairman knows, production activities at Y-12 
were placed in a stand down mode on September 22, 1994, due to 
procedural and criticality safety concerns identified by the Defense 
Nuclear Safety Board. Since then, Y-12 has made significant progress 
improving its operations throughout the plant. Since the stand down, Y-
12 personnel have worked tirelessly to restart operations in the 
following mission areas: Receipt and Shipment, Disassembly and Storage 
Operations, Depleted Uranium Operations, and Stockpile Surveillance, 
while continuing to meet all defense mission requirements.
  Mr. THURMOND. I agree with the Senator that the staff of Y-12 have 
worked hard to bring operations back up to full speed. I was very 
pleased to see that, earlier this month, Y-12 resumed the last of its 
production missions: Enriched Uranium Operations.
  Mr. THOMPSON. The Chairman is correct. On June 8, 1998, Y-12 cast its 
first enriched uranium part since September, 1994. This achievement is 
a credit to the dedication and commitment of everyone at Y-12, and is a 
testament to the leadership and management expertise of Lockheed Martin 
and their teammates at the Department of Energy. It is also critically 
important to our national security, because Y-12 operations are crucial 
to the success of our Stockpile Life Extension Program. In fact, Y-12 
is currently involved in the life extension program for the Peacekeeper 
Missile warhead, called the W87. Initial delivery of key components of 
this weapon are due at the end of this year, and manufacturing will 
continue for several years.
  I am very pleased that operations at Y-12 are up and running again, 
so that these critical national security missions can continue on 
schedule and uninterrupted. In that vein, I want to express my concern 
about any action on the Department of Energy's part that would disrupt 
the progress that has been made at Y-12 and jeopardize the timely 
completion of this very important Stockpile Life Extension project.
  Mr. THURMOND. I share the Senator's concern, and I urge the 
Department to make every effort not to disrupt the tremendous progress 
that has been made at Y-12. The production activities taking place at 
the plant are a critical component of our national security policy.
  Mr. THOMPSON. I thank the Chairman.


                          dod teacher quality

  Mr. BINGAMAN. When the Armed Services Committee met to mark up the FY 
1999 Defense Authorization bill, I introduced a measure designed to 
encourage the Department of Defense schools to assure the high quality 
of its faculty in DoD schools. Senator Coats and I have discussed ways 
to improve the proposal and have agreed on words that we believe would 
be appropriate to include in the Conference report on the Defense 
Authorization bill.
  Mr. COATS. That's correct, Senator Bingaman. I believe the words we 
have agreed to here will encourage the Department to emphasize hiring 
high quality instructors for the Department's schools. In my view, the 
most appropriate vehicle at this point to incorporate this initiative 
in the defense bill is to seek a provision in the Conference report. 
Senator Thurmond, would you assist our efforts to do so during the 
upcoming conference?
  Mr. THURMOND. I appreciate your efforts to assure continued high 
quality education in Department of Defense schools and I'll work to see 
that the provision you seek is adopted in conference.


                        counternarcotics mission

  Mr. DeWINE. Mr. President, in 1989, President George Bush called 
drugs ``the gravest domestic threat facing our nation today.'' Almost 
nine years later, that threat still exists.
  That same year, President Bush tasked the Defense Department to play 
an important role in the drug war. Specifically, the Defense Department 
was tasked to engage in the detection and monitoring of drugs in 
transit towards the United States. At that time, counter narcotics, and 
drug interdiction were key components of our nation's drug control 
strategy. As a member of the House of Representatives at that time, I 
can recall very well the investments we dedicated toward the 
international and interdiction components of the war on drugs. These 
investments made a difference. We made a dent in the drug industry. The 
price of cocaine increased. Drug use declined significantly.
  That was 1989. In 1992, the focus and the level of commitment toward 
a comprehensive drug control strategy has diminished. The drug threat 
is as strong as ever, but the same cannot be said for our drug 
interdiction efforts. It's not just a case of fewer resources, it's a 
case of diminished priorities. In fact, in its list of priorities, the 
Defense Department currently ranks counter-narcotics dead last in its 
mission statement.
  This is an unfortunate mistake.
  Mr. President, it's time we re-ordered our priorities. That is why 
last week, my friend and colleague from Florida, Senator Graham, myself 
and Senator Grassley and Senator Helms, introduced an amendment to the 
Defense Authorization bill. This amendment, which was adopted by the 
Senate last week, simply states that a higher priority should be given 
within the Defense Department to drug interdiction and counterdrug 
activities. Specifically, our drug control mission should be ranked at 
the same level as our peacekeeping operations. I thank my colleagues 
for accepting my amendment by unanimous consent. It is my hope that the 
final bill will contain similar language.
  The facts bring us to no other conclusion--it's time to make drug 
interdiction a priority again. In 1988, close to 2 million adolescent 
Americans were drug users, and by 1992, that number was down by 25%. At 
that time, we had a balanced drug control strategy--with sufficient 
investments in the key components: interdiction, treatment, education 
and law enforcement. During

[[Page S7083]]

that same period, marijuana use dropped by over 16 percent and cocaine 
use was down 35 percent. Our efforts were concentrated and effective--
with inspiring results.
  Mr. President, that progress ceased in 1992, and since that time, 
teenage drug use has more than doubled--and the ramifications have been 
far-reaching. For example, drug-abuse related arrests for those under 
the age of 18 in 1996 were twice those of 1992. Health costs continue 
to rise as this plague spreads uncontrollably.
  Youth drug use is on the rise because drugs have increasingly become 
both more available and more affordable. The Office of National Drug 
Control Policy has reported that small ``pieces'' or ``rocks'' of 
crack, once sold for ten to twenty dollars, are now available for three 
to five dollars. The street price of drugs is decreasing and our 
efforts to limit their supply are failing.
  Mr. President, this increase in illicit drug use can be traced in 
part to the decline in counter-narcotics as a priority for national 
defense policy. In 1992, Department of Defense funding for counter-
narcotics activities in transit areas was over $500 million. A steady 
trend in decreased funding brought it down to an all-time low of $214 
million in 1995. Mr. President, that is more than a 50% decrease in 
funds. Thankfully, due to efforts by my Senate and House colleagues, 
last year's allocation was increased to $300 million. However, we are 
nowhere near the 1992 levels.
  In recent years, the Department of Defense has been called upon to 
support counter narcotics activities in transit areas in the Caribbean. 
However, assets critical to the drug interdiction effort have been 
consistently diverted to matters considered a ``higher priority.''
  Mr. President, this decrease in funding has had an unfortunate impact 
on our drug interdiction efforts in the Caribbean. For example, the 
number of days per year that our ships spend patrolling the Caribbean 
has shrunk by two-thirds. Some of our key interdiction agencies have 
reported that the ships and manpower needed for effective interdiction 
are unavailable. Also, there radar system is less extensive--and even 
if drug traffickers can be identified, we lack the manpower necessary 
to intercept and seize the illegal drug imports. In 1996, only half of 
the known maritime drug events detected resulted in apprehension or 
seizure. Our defenses are down and the drug lords are taking advantage 
of this weakness. Added to this decline in resources is the increase in 
more sophisticated resources utilized by the drug cartels.
  According to the State Department, about 760 metric tons of cocaine 
were produced in South America in 1996. Of that, 608 tons were destined 
for the United States through the transit zone. U.S. government 
agencies that deal with cocaine seizures indicated that with additional 
equipment, annual cocaine seizures can be significantly increased. The 
Department of Defense, however, has indicated that it will not be able 
to provide these additional assets because of other priorities.
  Mr. President, this attitude was not acceptable in the late 1980's 
and it should not be acceptable now. It is necessary that we once again 
implement an effective transit zone operation as an integral measure to 
limit the availability of illicit drugs to our youth.
  It is time to renew drug interdiction efforts, provide the necessary 
equipment to our drug-enforcement agencies, and make the issue a 
defense priority again. I thank my colleagues for supporting this 
amendment and helping turn the tide of the drug crisis in our country.
  Mr. ALLARD. Mr. President, I rise today to discuss language in the 
DoD authorization report contained in the ``Additional Matters of 
Interest'' section. The language in the DoD Authorization targets an 
amendment Senator Wyden and I were able to get accepted during the 
Superfund markup.
  Earlier this year the EPW Committee marked up S. 8, which if passed 
and signed into law would significantly improve the Superfund program. 
At markup Senator Wyden and I proposed an amendment clarifying the 
waiver of sovereign immunity currently contained in Section 120 of 
Superfund. A waiver of sovereign immunity basically allows private 
parties and state and local governments to bring suit against the 
federal government for noncompliance.
  This original waiver was added in 1986 when Superfund was last 
reformed and was accepted with broad bipartisan support. The intent of 
Section 120 is clear and unambiguous to those who research the 
legislative history and read it faithfully. The words are plain and 
they read: ``Each department, agency, and instrumentality of the United 
States (including the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of 
government) shall be subject to, and comply with, this chapter in the 
same manner and to the same extent, both procedurally and 
substantively, as any nongovernmental entity, including liability under 
section 9607 of this title.''
  My reading of this is that the federal government needs to comply 
with the law just like any private party or state or local entity.
  As Senator Stafford said during passage of the 1986 Superfund 
amendments, ``. . . the legislation recognizes the reality that, only 
in unusual cases, th[at] national security may require issuance of 
circumscribed Executive orders exempting a Federal facility from the 
requirements of the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 
1986. In all such cases, Executive orders should adopt the method of 
protecting legitimate national security interests that maximize 
compliance with the environmental and health requirements imposed by 
the legislation. For example, it may be appropriate to require EPA 
employees reviewing cleanup plans [to] obtain a national security 
clearance, but it would not be appropriate to exempt such plans from 
national cleanup standards simply because EPA employees are assigned to 
ascertain what standards should apply to the cleanup.'' However, the 
language in the '86 Amendments was not exact enough and wiggle room was 
left for the Federal government to avoid their environmental 
responsibilities. Unfortunately, even though our amendment is merely 
clarifying, some in the Senate would like to maintain dual cleanup 
standards, one for those who live near a private National Priority List 
(NPL) site and another for those who live near an NPL site the federal 
government has responsibility over. Simply put, that should not be 
happening.
  The Armed Services Committee has expressed concern with our Amendment 
and has even gone so far as to include report language in their bill 
commenting on legal language in another bill. Further they have asked 
for a study on the cost of our amendment.
  I provide the above background as context for my reply to the 
Committee's characterization of our amendment to S. 8. In their report 
the Armed Services Committee made several claims with which I disagree. 
They also make claims which can be disputed which are outlined below:
  (1) the report states that, ``[t]he amendment would require federal 
facilities to comply with state and local substantive and procedural 
requirements, rather than the uniform, national process described in 
the National Contingency Plan.'' The implication is that federal 
facilities would no longer be subject to the National Contingency Plan 
(NCP) and that all cleanups would be done pursuant to state and local 
law. That is not the case. What our amendment in Committee simply did 
was allow state, local, and to some extent EPA the authority to enforce 
compliance with current Superfund and similar State and local laws. 
Enforce the current Superfund law including its implementing 
regulations, the NCP, and similar state and local laws against federal 
facilities just as they would against private parties. I have attempted 
to make this point clear in the past and I will attempt to do so once 
again, this amendment would ensure that Federal entities are held to 
the same standard of compliance as local, state, and private parties. 
Nothing more, nothing less.

  (2) The report also states that, ``[u]nder current law, Federal 
facilities are already subject to state laws concerning removal and 
remedial action, including laws regarding enforcement (42 U.S.C. 
9620(a)(4)), but state challenges must be brought after remedial action 
is complete. (42 U.S.C. 9613 (g))[sic]'' The Federal government has not 
followed this section of law faithfully, in reality they have argued 
that it merely requires them to comply with

[[Page S7084]]

substantive sections of the law, for example, Applicable or Relevant 
and Appropriate Requirements (ARAR's). As evidence of this is a letter 
from the Chief Counsel for the National Guard Bureau on September 13, 
1996 to Assistant Attorney General Steve Shackman, regarding Duluth Air 
Force Base State Superfund Site. In this letter Mr. Hise asserts that, 
``[c]ompliance with a state CERCLA law's substantive requirements, via 
the ARAR's process [which includes provisions to waive ARAR's], 
fulfills CERCLA's legal requirements.''
  To state it once again, my concern is that, even though the report 
asserts that States can take action under 113(h) after remedial action 
is complete the federal polluters do not acknowledge this section means 
what it says. Instead, they maintain it only requires them to comply 
with state standards as ARARs. In fact, the only case in this area, 
U.S. versus Colorado, held that the federal government could not escape 
regulation under an authorized state RCRA program merely by listing on 
the NPL. Clearly, clarification is necessary that Congress intended all 
federal agencies to comply with this law in substance and procedure.
  Beyond the merely incorrect statements in the report there is a 
fundamental difference in philosophy. In my view the Federal government 
needs to be held to the same standard as any other entity. If we are 
going to have a Federal Superfund law then it should apply to everyone. 
In other words everyone needs to be in the same bath tub with the same 
scrub brush. I believe this was true when we made all laws applicable 
to Congress and believe we need to make at the least this law 
applicable to all Federal agencies.
  When I proposed this amendment in Committee it was claimed that it 
would cost the government too much money. In fact, if we examine what 
has occurred under RCRA, which has had the same language in effect 
since 1992, the conclusion is the opposite. A study done by the EPA 
entitled, The Federal Facility Compliance Act: Enforcement Analysis of 
RCRA Administrative Orders at Federal Facilities indicates that State 
governments have been easier on the Federal government than the EPA. 
The study found the following: while Federal orders averaged 369 days 
before settlement, state orders averaged 196. Also, during the study 
period the EPA fined Federal facilities over $9 million while states 
fined Federal facilities only slightly over $4 million. In other words 
those who claim the states will gold plate remedies have no basis for 
that belief.
  Finally, I note that the Armed Services Committee has asked for a 
study which is due at the end of September outlining the additional 
potential liability a Superfund waiver would incur. I'm not opposed to 
such a study but I am sending a letter to the President's Council on 
Environmental Quality bringing it to their attention and asking them to 
oversee the collection of the data. I am certain that the authors of 
the amendment wouldn't object to such oversight which would avoid the 
perception of the fox guarding the chicken house.
  Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I support the National Defense 
Authorization Bill for Fiscal Year 1999. The need for a strong and 
capable military was clearly demonstrated during the Iraqi crisis over 
the UN-mandated inspections. Our forward-deployed forces were quickly 
strengthened by additional personnel as the crisis deepened. The 
diplomacy of United Nations Secretary General Khofi Annan, backed up by 
the credible, on-scene forces of the United States Armed Forces, 
successfully kept the peace.
  This bill provides the proper support for our military forces while 
maintaining a realistic balance between readiness to take care of 
immediate needs, and the needed investment to develop and procure new 
systems for the future.
  The bill provides for those who serve in uniform today, and those who 
gave this country so much during their careers in military service. A 
fully funded and well-deserved 3.1% pay raise for military personnel is 
included in the bill.
  Additionally, the bill includes a provision for the Department of 
Defense to initiate a comprehensive test plan to evaluate the best way 
for us to provide health care to retired military personnel and their 
families who have reached the age of 65. The plan will build on the 
Medicare test program included in last year's Bipartisan Budget 
Agreement. The new expanded plan will include test sites for 
participation in the Federal Employees Health Benefit Plan, the 
Department of Defense's Tricare health care program, and a mail order 
pharmacy program to reduce out-of-pocket costs.
  The daily operations of our military forces have obvious risks and 
dangers. All branches of the Armed Forces have made progress in 
improving safety in the military, but more remains to be done. I 
commend the Department of Defense for its accelerated installation of 
needed additional safety systems on military aircraft that carry 
passengers.
  This bill also includes a worthwhile provision to evaluate the way 
the Pentagon investigates aviation accidents. We must ensure that no 
stone is left unturned in finding the cause of every accident and 
taking the necessary corrective action to reduce the risk of future 
accidents.
  The growing frequency and sophistication of attacks on the Pentagon's 
computer networks highlight the need for improved protection of 
critical network infrastructures. This bill includes research and 
development funding for the exploration and development of defenses 
against cyber attacks. This step will greatly improve the Pentagon's 
focus on this growing threat.
  In the past eight years, the Navy-Marine Corps team has responded to 
over 90 contingencies--almost one per month. As the Ranking Democrat on 
the Seapower Subcommittee of the Armed Services Committee, I am pleased 
that the bill provides the support necessary for our naval forces as 
they modernize to meet the challenges of tomorrow.
  The bill includes the necessary advance procurement funding for 
Fiscal Year 1999 for the Navy's next aircraft carrier, CVN-77. The 
Navy's procurement schedule for the next carrier, revised from its 
budget submission of last year, will be under the cost cap mandated in 
last year's defense bill. Also, much of the new technology being 
developed for the next generation aircraft carrier, the CVX, will be 
included in CVN-77.
  The budget request for the Navy's F/A-18E/F Super Hornet and the 
Marine Corps' MV-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft is fully funded. The 
Super Hornet combines the outstanding characteristics of earlier F/A-18 
models with cutting edge technology in an affordable aircraft with 
significantly improved performance and endurance. The MV-22 Osprey is a 
vertical take-off and landing aircraft designed to replace the Marine 
Corps' aging fleet of CH-46 and CH-53 helicopters.
  In contrast to these aspects of this bill, I do have concerns about 
reductions in the Administration's budget request for the Cooperative 
Threat Reduction Program, demilitarization of chemical weapons, and the 
nuclear weapon stockpile stewardship program. I hope that these 
reductions will be corrected in the final bill.
  The Cooperative Threat Reduction program is the most cost-effective 
program for reducing the dangers of nuclear weapons. Thousands of 
nuclear warheads remain in the nations of the former Soviet Union. The 
Cooperative Threat Reduction program plays a key role in the control 
and dismantling of these weapons. We must continue this all-important 
program and ensure that every single nuclear warhead is secure, and 
eventually destroyed.
  Funding reductions in the chemical weapons de-militarization program 
will endanger our ability to comply with the provisions of the Chemical 
Weapons Conventions Treaty approved last year. As a world leader and 
the only superpower, we have an obligation to lead the worldwide effort 
to eliminate chemical weapons. I urge the restoration of these funds.
  All of us have grave concerns over the recent nuclear testing in 
India. Russia and the United States continue to work hard to reduce the 
world's stockpile of nuclear weapons. India and other nations must also 
be involved in the reduction and eventual elimination of all nuclear 
weapons.
  The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty is a major milestone on the road to 
a nuclear free world. A cornerstone of the implementation of this 
treaty is the Department of Energy's Stockpile Stewardship Program. We 
must be able

[[Page S7085]]

to certify that our remaining stockpile of nuclear weapons is reliable, 
while reducing the number of nuclear weapons through START II and, 
hopefully, a START III treaty.
  The Stockpile Stewardship Program is the key component in 
verification of the reliability of our nuclear weapons. The program has 
experienced a fundamental shift in policy since the United States 
ceased live testing of nuclear weapons. The Department of Energy is 
developing new capabilities to complete this certification without live 
testing of nuclear weapons. The funding cuts in the budget request will 
hinder these efforts. I urge the restoration of these funds to the 
Stockpile Stewardship Program.
  In closing, I welcome the opportunity to commend the distinguished 
services of the members of the Committee, particularly the 
extraordinary services of the three members who will be leaving the 
Senate at the end of this Congress. Their efforts have added 
significantly to this year's Defense Authorization bill. The Airland 
Subcommittee has benefited from the efforts and insights of Senator 
Glenn and Senator Coats. Senator Kempthorne's able leadership of the 
Personnel Subcommittee has ensured that the needs of our service men 
and women are paramount in this legislation. It has been a privilege to 
work with these able members of the Committee over the years, and we 
will miss their leadership in the years ahead.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I want to say a few words about the 
admirable work of the Senate Armed Services Committee. For the past two 
years, we have had budget agreements that have forced the Committee to 
make tough choices with shrinking resources. Under the able leadership 
of Chairman Thurmond and the Ranking Member, Senator Levin, the 
Committee has once again enhanced the quality of life for our brave men 
and women in uniform and have invested in programs vital to our future 
fighting forces. As the Ranking Member on the Foreign Relations 
Committee, I am constantly reminded of how vital a strong military is 
to protecting American interests and security around the world. I have 
said it before and I'll say it again, for diplomacy to be effective, 
not only must it be adequately funded, it must also be backed by a 
strong military and superior intelligence activities.
  But, Mr. President, before I say any more about this bill, I want to 
say a word or two about Chairman Thurmond. His service to this nation 
has been truly remarkable. From the beaches of Normandy to the halls of 
the U.S. Senate, he has shown an outstanding dedication and commitment 
to doing the work of this nation. He and I worked together on the 
Judiciary Committee for 12 years--he was Chairman for the first 6 years 
and I was Chairman for the last 6. Then, as now, he has been a leader 
by example. He is one of the most remarkable individuals I have ever 
had the privilege of working with. We are not merely colleagues, we are 
friends.
  He has served on the Armed Services Committee for 40 years, the last 
4 of which he has been its Chairman. This is his last year as Chairman, 
so I want to say now what deep respect I have for the Senior Senator 
from South Carolina's military expertise and for the able manner in 
which he has worked with Senator Levin to keep our military strong. The 
Committee, the Senate, and the American people have gained from Senator 
Thurmond's leadership and his willingness to work with Senators from 
both parties to put America's national security interests ahead of 
partisan interests.
  This bill is an example of that. It includes a 3.1 percent pay raise 
for military personnel. It also includes an important increase in 
hazardous duty incentive pay for mid- and senior level air crew 
personnel. I thank my colleagues for joining me in addressing that 
concern and showing these experienced personnel that we value their 
unique and vital contribution to America's national interest.
  In addition, there is an important $12 million increase in C-5 
airlift squadrons research and development. This money is critically 
needed by the Air Force to examine the needs of these crucial aircraft 
as new technology becomes available to improve their performance. As 
many already know, the C-5 is capable of carrying more cargo than any 
other aircraft in our military. It has supported military operations 
from Vietnam to Desert Storm to the current operations in Bosnia and 
the Persian Gulf. I applaud the Committee's foresight in providing the 
money necessary to maintain these planes at peak performance levels.
  Mr. President, I also want to take a minute to talk about the health 
care demonstration programs in this bill. With the growth in the number 
of retired military personnel, the rising costs of health care in 
general, and the closing of military bases, great strains have been 
placed on military medical facilities. This, in turn, has placed in 
some jeopardy the idea of guaranteeing high quality health care to our 
military retirees.
  Last year, Congress recognized this growing problem, and we took a 
step in fixing it. Last year's Defense Authorization bill included a 
demonstration project on Medicare subvention--where Medicare reimburses 
military medical facilities for the treatment of retirees who are also 
eligible for Medicare. I am pleased that the Dover Air Force Base in 
Delaware has been selected as one of the six sites for this national 
demonstration project.
  Again, this was a first step. But, there are other ways that might 
help us to fulfil our commitment to military retirees. And, so I 
strongly support the three additional health care demonstration 
projects in this bill--one to allow military retirees to participate in 
the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program once they reach age 65; 
one to allow retirees to continue their eligibility for TRICARE and not 
have to switch to Medicare when they turn 65; and one to allow military 
retirees who are also eligible for Medicare to continue to participate 
in the Department of Defense's mail order pharmacy program.
  Providing health care is an obligation we owe to our military 
retirees. It is a promise we made--but a promise that is now in 
jeopardy. The health care demonstration projects in this bill will not 
solve the problem we face. They are, after all, only demonstrations. 
But, hopefully, they--along with last year's Medicare subvention 
demonstration project--will help point the way to a solution so we can 
ensure that the federal government upholds its commitment to the men 
and women who so bravely served our country.
  Mr. President, this bill includes an amendment that I joined with 
four colleagues in voting against yesterday. It was a compromise Sense 
of Congress resolution offered by Senator Levin, Senator Coats, and 
Senator Thurmond, regarding budgeting for continued participation of 
United States forces in NATO operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
  The three cosponsors deserve credit for their hard work in having 
crafted what was, in the main, a very well thought out amendment. It 
contained several positive elements. And their compromise amendment was 
far preferable, in my opinion, to another amendment on U.S. forces in 
Bosnia, which Senator Hutchison and Senator Byrd were considering 
introducing.
  Nonetheless, I voted against the compromise amendment, and I would 
like briefly to explain the reasoning behind my vote.
  First, I agree with the amendment's intent to keep the pressure on 
our European allies to constitute the bulk of ground forces in the 
Stabilization Force, known popularly as SFOR. I want to clarify, 
however, that non-American forces already make up approximately three-
quarters of the SFOR total.
  Second, I am in complete agreement with the amendment's not giving a 
date-certain for the withdrawal of United States ground combat forces 
from Bosnia and Herzegovina. Such a date-certain would constitute the 
worst kind of micro-management of military affairs by the Congress, and 
would quite likely endanger the lives of American troops on the ground.
  My principal reason for voting against the compromise amendment is 
that I do not agree that our goal should be a withdrawal of all United 
States ground combat forces from Bosnia and Herzegovina as long as a 
NATO-led stabilization force remains in that country.
  To be perfectly candid, Mr. President, I believe that such a move 
would serve to undermine American leadership in NATO. Even Combined 
Joint

[[Page S7086]]

Task Forces, commonly known by their CJTF acronym, should, unless there 
are exceptional circumstances, have a U.S. ground combat force 
component. While American air, naval, command and control, logistical, 
and intelligence support, and even a ready reserve over-the-horizon 
force in the region would be vital to any future mission, the 
participation of some American combat ground forces will remain a vital 
bona fide of U.S. commitment to Alliance operations.
  In other words, for the United States to retain control of NATO-led 
operations, we must be present in all components of missions, including 
on the ground. This would apply to any follow-on force in Bosnia, 
whether it is NATO-led or is a CJTF with the Western European Union.
  Let me pose a question to my colleagues. If the Bosnia ground 
operation becomes a purely European affair, do they not think that 
pretty soon some of our European allies will begin to question whether 
an American should continue to serve as Supreme Allied Commander Europe 
(SACEUR)?
  I for one think the answer is yes. The compromise amendment, against 
which I voted, may, I fear, begin to set in motion a process that will 
severely erode American leadership in NATO.
  Lest anyone thinks that my fears are far-fetched, I would remind my 
colleagues that France has already called for a European to take over 
command of Allied Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH) in Naples and that 
initially the French were supported by several other European allies.
  Keeping a contingent of U.S. ground combat troops in all NATO and 
NATO-led missions is a powerful symbol of American leadership and is 
recognized as such by allies and potential foes alike. We should think 
long and hard before advocating a change in that policy.
  Mr. President, I will conclude where I began. I compliment the 
managers of this bill and the Armed Services Committee for providing a 
bill that continues to strengthen our nation's national security. It 
enhances the quality of life of our loyal and dedicated men and women 
in uniform. It addresses important weapons systems needs and takes 
steps toward finding the best way to meet our health care obligations. 
While I disagree with the Bosnia provision added for the reasons I've 
already mentioned, I think this bill gives America the strong military 
it needs to support our diplomatic work and to promote our national 
security interests.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, every year I come down to the floor of the 
Senate and ruminate over the propensity of Members of Congress to add 
programs to spending bills solely, or at least primarily, for parochial 
reasons. The majority of us in Congress who supported the line-item 
veto were ostensibly doing so as an overdue reaction to the profligate 
spending practices that, over time, resulted in a $5.5 trillion federal 
deficit. The fact that we have a balanced budget for the first time 
since 1969 should not detract from the fact that we continue, as a 
result of past spending practices, to pay as much per year in interest 
on the federal debt as we do for national defense.
  The practice of adding programs to spending bills for parochial 
reasons has not abated, as a review of the ISTEA legislation reminds 
us. For many of us in the Senate, however, there has been a growing 
consensus that inadequate resources are being allocated for national 
defense, and that the financial burden associated with foreign 
operations like those in Bosnia and Southwest Asia, the funding for 
which is repeatedly ignored in Administration preparation of annual 
budget submissions, is seriously exacerbating readiness and 
modernization problems stemming from the combination of shrinking force 
structure and expanding commitments. When the stress from these 
conflicting trends is combined with the fact that no funding was added 
by Congress to the national defense portion of the federal budget for 
the first time since President Clinton took office, the seeds of a 
further, serious degradation in the state of our Armed Forces are 
firmly planted.
  Because Congress did not add to the Administration's request for 
national defense, it would have seemed to be incumbent upon Members to 
act with a modicum of responsibility and not perpetuate funding 
problems with a business as usual approach. Unfortunately, we have once 
again failed to live up to that relatively minor expectation. The bill 
before us is one more example of why the President's failure to 
adequately exercise his line-item veto authority last year has provided 
Members every incentive to manipulate the budget process for the good 
of individual districts or states and, often, at the expense of what is 
best for the Armed Forces.
  In my remarks last year, I was highly critical of the politicization 
of the services' unfunded priorities lists. That concern remains to 
some degree. My comments today include items that were added to the 
Administration's request and are on the unfunded priorities list both 
because of my concerns about the integrity of the process through which 
those lists are produced and because the lists were always submitted in 
the past within the context of congressionally-implemented additions to 
the defense budget. As additions to the budget request this year had to 
be offset within the 050 account, I have included projects added by 
Members even if they are on the lists because, in some instances, they 
are displacing funding from higher priority programs.
  I commend the chairman of the Acquisition and Technology Subcommittee 
for his valiant effort at minimizing the usual considerable damage to 
science and technology programs that are the seed corn of our future. 
Senator Santorum deserves credit for the manner in which he has 
balanced the need to preserve high priority science and technology 
spending with the usual onslaught of frivolous pet projects inserted 
into the budget to mollify this university or that laboratory. It is 
unfortunate that he could not be spared the onerous and wasteful task 
of nevertheless finding funding for a number of highly questionable 
projects. Spending $1.5 million to study the effects on missile 
components of high frequency vibrations sounds reasonable. The only 
problem is, we have been studying that issue with regard to every 
missile and rocket designed since the dawn of the missile age. It is 
inclusive in the development of every such weapon system. This is not a 
better mousetrap; it s a classic waste of scarce resources.
  Similarly, the $3 million added to the budget for research into 
stainless steel double hull technologies ignores the fact that 
privately-owned shipyards seeking to profit from the oil pollution act, 
which mandated that all future oil tankers be double hulled, have 
already conducted ample research into that area with financial 
incentives courtesy of the Title XI loan guarantee program. 
Additionally, what can the Navy learn from this project that it doesn't 
already know from its years of experience with high strength, light 
weight steels such as are used in the construction of submarines? Mr. 
Chairman, this is precisely the type of spending the majority party was 
supposed to oppose--the kind that helped create a huge federal deficit 
while diverting funding from higher priority programs.
  No better example of Congress operating at its fiscal worst exists 
than the inclusion in the budget of more C-130J aircraft. The Air Force 
has repeatedly emphasized its huge surplus of C-130s, yet is forced to 
buy more completely irrespective of requirements and funding 
priorities. The annual addition to the defense budget of C-130Js--and 
we are buying enough of them to house the homeless in brand-new 
fuselages--is fiscally irresponsible in the extreme. To see four new 
aircraft added to the bill when the accompanying report is highly 
critical of the C-130J due to cost overruns and developmental problems 
sets a new standard for absurdity. What if we said, ``we don't need the 
Sergeant York air defense gun, it was a developmental nightmare, we 
can't afford it, it was canceled by the Reagan Administration, so let's 
add the purchase of some to this budget?'' It would be the only thing 
more incomprehensible than the continued acquisition of unrequested C-
130s.
  Lest anyone think that I exaggerate the budgetary impact of 
purchasing four unrequested, unneeded C-130J airframes, consider this: 
The cost of those aircraft is over $200 million. That is a lot of money 
at a time when we are struggling to pay for important quality of life 
programs and maintain readiness. Yet, this is not even the most

[[Page S7087]]

egregious example of unnecessary, unrequested spending in the budget. 
This bill also includes a $50 million down payment on a $1.5 billion 
amphibious assault ship that was not requested by the Navy.
  The defense authorization and appropriations bills cannot continue to 
be the vehicle for pumping tax dollars into favored districts and 
states. There are $2.5 billion in Member-adds in this bill, a bill, to 
reiterate, that did not enjoy an increase in its top line. That means 
that the funding for these programs had to be found within the Defense 
Department s request. It means that the priorities of the military were 
ignored in favor of channeling dollars toward projects of low or 
nonexistent priority. How much more should we provide to the flat panel 
display industry, which should be funding its own research? With all 
due respect to Norway, a NATO ally, how long are we going to allow it 
to leverage its weapons purchases from the United States against our 
purchase of Penguin missiles, which the Navy has not requested?
  Mr. President, there are a number of programs inserted into the 
budget by Members of Congress that bear little or no relation to the 
mission of providing for the common defense. There are programs that 
arguably will, over time, contribute to our national security. I 
further recognize that Congress does not exist to perfunctorily bless 
whatever recommendations emerge from the federal agencies we are tasked 
to oversee. The Constitution of the United States vests Congress with 
the authority to raise and support Armies. That is a responsibility 
some of us take very seriously. The practice of adding and earmarking 
funding for programs and activities that marginally contribute to the 
national defense in order to protect jobs, however, represents an abuse 
of that authority we should not countenance. We should take no pride in 
the fact that the Army was forced to accept the National Automotive 
Center as the focal point for the development of automotive technology. 
Why should the public not think the worst of us when they see their tax 
dollars handled so cavalierly?
  These statements, which I make on every spending bill, get tiresome 
after a while. My colleagues don't like to hear them, and I certainly 
don't win any popularity contests on account of them. I would like to 
wax poetic about charging windmills, but I am under no illusions that 
my Dulcinea waits outside the chamber or that a final reward awaits me 
in the great beyond. All I ask is for it to stop. Adding ships, planes, 
helicopters and the usual myriad of arcane research and development 
projects to a defense bill at a time when the state of the Armed Forces 
continues to suffer from high operational rates and contracting force 
structure, when we struggle to provide military retirees the medical 
care they were promised when they enlisted, when the services are 
repeatedly telling us that they don't need what we insist they buy, 
does not speak well of Congress as an institution. I urge my colleagues 
to heed the warning not of me, but of the combatant commanders and the 
men and women in the field who are tired and leaving the military 
because we cannot get our priorities in order.
  Mr. President, I will keep coming to the floor to rail against 
wasteful federal spending because I believe it is warranted, and not 
just a little cathartic. I thank you for indulging me once again and I 
ask unanimous consent that this list of programs added to the budget, 
most for the kind of questionable reasons to which I referred, be 
printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:


        Program                                             In millions
Army procurement:
  Aircraft procurement:
    US-35 air transport aircraft (3 A/C)...........................15.9
    UH-60 Blackhawk Helicopters (8 A/C) \1\........................78.5
  Modification of aircraft:
    C-12 flight maintenance system..................................6.0
    Apache longbow AH-64 training devices and modifications \1\....40.2
  Weapons and other combat vehicles:
    M249 armor machine gun 7.62mm \1\...............................6.5
    MK-19 grenade launcher \1\......................................3.0
  Tactical and support vehicles:
    Family of medium tactical vehicles (600 units) \1\.............88.0
    High mobility multi-purpose wheeled vehicle \1\................65.7
    Medium truck extended program (1,085 units) \1\................63.9
  Combat communications:
    Army data distribution system (ADDS) \1\.......................28.0
    SINCGARS tactical radio (reserves) \1\.........................61.9
    ACUS modernization program (WIN-T/T) \1\.......................47.8
  Electronic equipment--tactical survival:
    Night vision devices \1\.......................................13.5
Navy procurement:
  Combat aircraft:
    F-14 lantirn targeting PODS \1\.................................8.0
    AH-1W night targeting system \1\...............................11.0
    EP-3 spares.....................................................2.0
    P-3C ANIT--surface warface improvement..........................2.2
  Weapons procurement:
    Drones and decoys: 70 improved tactical air launched decoys....10.0
    Penguin missile.................................................7.5
    Surface mode upgrade: close in weapons system..................10.0
    MOD 4 rotatable gun pool for cruiser conversions...............15.0
  Shipbuilding and conversion:
    LHD advance procurement........................................50.0
    Air-cushioned landing craft life extention \1\.................16.0
  Other procurement:
    AN/WSN-7 inertial navigation system............................12.0
    AN/BPS-154 surface search radar.................................9.0
    Space warfare system center.....................................2.0
    Submarine acoustic off-the-shelf processor insertion \1\.......25.0
    Aegis support, computer lesson system...........................8.0
    DDG-51 Smartship equipment.....................................12.0
    NUKLA assembly qualification....................................1.0
    Communications automation equipment (IT-21) \1\................20.0
    Submarine connectivity equipment \1\...........................15.0
    Naval shore communications equipment...........................20.0
    Night vision goggles \1\.......................................22.6
Marine Corps Procurement:
    MOD kits for tracked vehicles \1\...............................4.6
    Night vision equipment \1\.....................................11.1
    Carrier, electronics infrastructure, Marine email & year 2000 fix 
      \1\..........................................................84.1
    Light Tactical vehicle (buys 672 units) \1\....................37.0
    Avenger FLIR upgrade............................................7.6
    Maritime technology.............................................5.0
    Material handling equipment (forklifts) \1\....................10.4
    New generators (1,311) \1\......................................9.5
    Shop equipment contact maintenance \1\..........................5.4
Air Force Procurement:
  Combat aircraft:
    C-130J aircraft (2 aircraft)..................................157.5
    WC-130J aircraft (1 aircraft)..................................75.4
    EC-130J aircraft (1 aircraft)..................................85.0
  Trainer aircraft:
    Joint Primary aircraft training system--JPATS (3 A/C)...........9.1
  Other aircraft:
    E-8C JSTARS aircraft advanced procurement......................72.0
  Modification of in-service aircraft:
    F-15 aircraft (engine replacement) \1\.........................25.0
    F-15 aircraft (ALQ-135 countermeasures set) \1\................25.0
    F-16 aircraft reconnaissance system \1\........................13.3
  Other aircraft:
    DARP--Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Program..................56.0
  National Guard and Reserve Equipment:
    $10 million per service........................................60.0
  Modifications of in service missiles:
    Minuteman III missile modifications............................46.0
  Organization and base equipment:
    Theater deployable communications \1\..........................17.7
Army Research Development, Test & Evaluation
  Army missile defense systems integration:
    Tactical high energy laser (THEL)..............................10.0
    Space and missile defense battle lab............................7.0
    Aluminum metal matrix research and development..................3.0
    Future missile technology integration...........................6.0
  RAH-66 Comanche helicopter, prototype #2 acceleration \1\........24.0
  All source analysis system: Software integration..................2.2
  Firefinder-accelerate software....................................0.9
  Passive adjunct sensor capability.................................4.0
  Advanced field artillery tactical data system (AFATDS) \1\.......12.5
  Combat vehicle improvement programs: Flat panel display improvement 
    program.........................................................7.0
  Materials technology: Hardened materials..........................3.0
  Missile technology:
    Scramjet technology.............................................3.0
    Acoustics effects...............................................1.5
  Environmental quality tech:
    National Defense Center for Environmental Excellence...........24.0
    Radford Environmental Development and Management Program (REDMAP3.5
    Plasma Energy Pyrolis System (PEPS).............................5.0

[[Page S7088]]

  Computer software technology: Software security...................0.5
  Military engineering technology: Cold Regions Research Laboratory.1.2
  Medical advanced tech: Nutrition research.........................2.0
  Weapons & munitions advanced technology: Precision guided mortar 
    munitions.......................................................4.5
  Advanced tactical computer science & sensor technology: Digital 
    intelligence technology.........................................2.5
  Army technological test instrumentation & targets \1\.............7.0
  Survivability/Lethality analysis: Intelligence and warning 
    vulnerability assessment........................................4.0
  DOD high energy laser test facility, solid state laser \1\........8.0
Navy research, development test & evaluation:
  Space and electronic warfare: Advanced communications and information 
    technology......................................................3.0
  Space and electronic warfare: Global C4ISR visualization..........4.0
  Precision strike and air defense technology.......................5.0
  Joint strike fighter demonstration/validation: Alternate engine 
    program........................................................15.0
  Integrated defense electronic counter measures (IDECM)...........10.0
  Air & surface launched weapon technology: Pulse detonation engine 
    technology......................................................1.0
  Ships, submarine & logistics technology: Stainless steel double hu3.0
  Materials, electronics and computer technology: Thermal management 
    materials.......................................................1.5
  Materials, electronics and computer technology: Electronic propulsion 
    technology......................................................2.0
  Materials, electronics and computer technology: Carbon/carbon heat 
    shield..........................................................2.5
  Medical development: Freeze dried blood research..................1.0
  Non-lethal weapons demonstration/validation......................13.3
  Medical development: Voice instructional devices..................1.0
Air Force research development, test & evaluation:
  Ballistic missile technology......................................5.0
  Advanced spacecraft technology:
    Range improvements for liquid upper stage \1\...................5.0
    Micro--SAT.....................................................10.0
    Solar orbital transfer vehicle.................................10.0
  National polar-orbiting operational environmental satellite system: 
    Satellite survivability........................................30.0
  Enhanced global positioning system--block IIF (space)............44.0
  Space test program: Maneuver vehicle.............................10.0
  Theater missile defenses: TAWS...................................12.0
  Information systems security program.............................10.0
  Electronic combat precision location and identification (PLAID)..14.0
  Variable stability in-flight simulator test aircraft (VISTA)......7.0
  Electronic warfare development: EC-130H..........................20.0
  Target systems development: Big Crow program office..............10.0
  Theater battle management system..................................5.0
  Manned reconnaissance systems: U-2 upgrade.......................17.0
  Aircrew laser eye protection......................................5.5
  Materials: Friction welding.......................................1.5
  Aerospace propulsion: Variable displacement vane pump.............2.0
  Phillips Lab: HAARP...............................................9.0
  Crew systems & personnel protection technology: Night vision 
    technology......................................................3.0
Defense-wide Research Development, Test & Evaluation
  Support technologies: Wide band electronics......................14.0
  Explosive demilitarization technology:
    Blast chamber tech..............................................4.0
    Portable blast chamber tech.....................................1.5
  Counter terror tech support: PFNA.................................5.0
  Counter proliferation support: HAARP..............................3.0
  Support technologies:
    Atmospheric interceptor tech...................................22.0
    Space based laser demonstrator.................................94.0
    Scorpius........................................................5.0
    Excaliber.......................................................5.0
  Navy Theater Wide Missile Defense System:
    Navy upper tier acceleration...................................70.0
    High power discriminator.......................................50.0
  Ballistic missile defense technical operations: Advanced Research 
    Center..........................................................5.0
  International cooperative programs: Arrow Interoperability.......12.0
  Counter proliferation support.....................................4.0
  Advanced sensor applications......................................2.0
  Endurance U.A.V. (Global Hawk)...................................32.5
  Chem-BIO Defense Program: Sensors.................................5.0
  Medical free electron laser.......................................7.0
  Biological warfare defense: Multimedia technology.................1.5
  Chem-Bio Defense Program: Light weight detectors..................5.0
  Chem-BIO Defense Programs: Safeguard..............................4.0
  Integrated C2 technology: High definition system, flat panel displ8.0
  Materials & electronics technology: Mixed mode electronics........6.0
  Weapons of mass destruction related technology:
    Core competencies..............................................10.0
    Deep digger.....................................................3.0
    Electro magnetic pulse..........................................2.0
  Advanced electronic technology: Lithography......................10.0
  Generic logistics R demands: Computer assisted technology transfer 
    (CATT)..........................................................4.0
  High Performance Computer Modernization Program: High performance 
    technology.....................................................20.0
  High performance computer modernization program: High performance VIZ 
    technology......................................................3.0
  CALS initiative: IDE..............................................2.0
  Joint robotics program............................................6.0
  Joint simulation system...........................................4.5
  Defense technology analysis: Commodity management technology......2.0
                                                               ________
                                                               
      Total.......................................................2,494

\1\ Items were included on service unfunded priorities lists.
  Mr. CONRAD. Mr. President, I rise in support of the bill before us.
  In this bill the Armed Services Committee has--under unprecedented 
fiscal austerity--ably worked to balance the many important yet 
competing needs for scarce funding, maintaining a first-class military 
and providing important benefits for personnel, their dependents, and 
retirees.
  Allow me to highlight several particularly good provisions in this 
bill, for which Chairman Thurmond and Senator Levin should be 
congratulated.
  First, this measure wisely has full funding for National Missile 
Defense for FY99. Treaty-friendly, affordable, effective NMD has always 
had my strong support.
  I am also pleased that funds have been added to begin to make up the 
readiness funding deficit of the Army National Guard. The Guard Bureau 
informs me these accounts were more than half a billion dollars short 
in the FY99 budget request. I hope the funding added by the Committee 
can be supplemented during conference.
  Third, an additional $46 million has been included for Minuteman III 
ICBM upgrades. The Minuteman III force will be service for decades to 
come, and modernization must go forward. The Committee acted wisely 
regarding the Guidance Replacement Program.
  The Committee has also moved to accelerate key military construction 
projects for North Dakota. These include $8.5 million for repair of the 
taxiway at Minot AFB, and $3.65 million for renovation of a supply shop 
for the North Dakota Air National Guard. George Lauffer and Mike McCord 
on the Committee staff deserve thanks for their work on these items.
  Additionally, the Authorization bill calls for demonstration programs 
regarding allowing Medicare-eligible military retirees to enroll in the 
Federal Employee Health Benefits Program.
  Finally, but very importantly, I am pleased that the Senate has 
approved an amendment bringing the pay raise in this bill up to the 
level in the House bill, 3.6 percent.
  However, there are a number of matters in this bill of great concern.
  First, the Committee's bill would call for a cut of nearly $100M to 
the Air Force's budget request for the Airborne Laser, a revolutionary 
theater missile defense program, and top priority for the USAF.
  Second, this bill provides inadequate funding for the B-52H bomber 
force. Although I will not discuss this matter in detail at this time, 
let me say this: today's thoroughly upgraded B-52H can deliver a 
greater quantity and diversity of conventional and nuclear munitions a 
greater distance at a lower cost than any other airborne combat 
platform in the world today. Cutting the B-52 force doesn't make good 
national security or fiscal sense, and I applaud Senator Stevens and 
Senator Inouye--the distinguished leadership of the Defense 
Appropriations Subcommittee--for acting to fund all 94 B-52s in the 
FY99 Defense Appropriations Bill.
  I hope that ABL and B-52 funding can be addressed in conference. Even 
so, I am pleased to support this bill, especially in light of the 
Committee's acceptance of my amendment regarding Russian tactical 
nuclear weapons.
  Mr. President, at this point I would like to speak briefly about the 
amendment.
  The recent nuclear tests by India and Pakistan serve as an unsettling 
reminder that nuclear weapons continue

[[Page S7089]]

to be sought for their terrible destructive power and prestige. An 
equally serious, if not greater, nuclear threat still lies to the north 
of the Indian subcontinent, however--in Russia's enormous, ill-secured, 
and potentially destabilizing non-strategic, or ``tactical,'' nuclear 
arsenal.
  As my colleagues may be aware, Russia's tactical nuclear stockpile 
could be larger than ours by a factor of eight-to-one, and is not 
covered by any arms control accord.
  I believe it is time for the Congress to do three things.
  First, go on record as concerned about the significant ``loose nuke'' 
dangers associated with Russia's tactical stockpile, and the growing 
strategic relevance of Moscow's tactical arsenal.
  Additionally, we must call for the Russians to make good on the 1991 
and 1992 Gorbachev and Yeltsin promises to deeply reduce tactical 
weapons, just as the US has followed through in good faith on President 
Bush's similar promises in September 1991.
  And finally, the Congress needs a detailed report, and the benefit of 
the analysis of the Defense Department, the Intelligence Community, and 
the US Strategic Command.
  Today, I wish to thank the Armed Services Committee for accepting my 
amendment earlier this week that does just these things.
  I also wish to thank the following distinguished Members of the Armed 
Services Committee, who have cosponsored my amendment: Senators 
Kempthorne, Kennedy, Bingaman, and Levin. Glen Tait, Menda Fife, Bill 
Monahan, and Madelyn Creedon, in addition to Monica Chavez with the 
committee--deserve thanks for their good work.
  Before asking unanimous consent that the full text of my amendment be 
included after my statement, I would call the Senate's attention to the 
testimony of the Commander in Chief of the United States Strategic 
Command, Gen. Eugene Habiger. Gen. Habiger, testifying before the Armed 
Services Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, responded to a question 
regarding Russia's tactical nuclear stockpile by Senator Kempthorne--a 
cosponsor of my amendment--by stating that ``it is time for us to get 
very serious about tactical nuclear weapons.''
  My amendment responds to the General's sage advice, advancing the 
cause of getting deep reductions to Russia's non-strategic nuclear 
arsenal. At the very least, we should ask them to come down to our 
level--and prove it to us.
  Before closing, Mr. President, I would like to emphasize that my 
amendment should be properly viewed in context with the funding for the 
vital Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat program in the FY99 Defense 
Authorization bill. Senate passage of my amendment ensures that we send 
to Russia a message of concern and cooperation.
  Let me be clear: continuing the Nunn-Lugar program is absolutely 
critical. I can think of no better investment of national security 
dollars than simply expending money for the destruction of horrible 
weapons capable of killing millions of Americans.
  Continuing and fully funding the CTR program is especially important 
in light of the Russian tactical nuclear dangers I have discussed. 
Although there are arms control agreements requiring Russian strategic 
force reductions, there are no arms control agreements requiring 
reductions to Russia's tactical nuclear stockpile.
  In addition to the diplomatic pressure called for in my amendment, 
continuing and possibly expanding work under Nunn-Lugar on tactical 
nuclear weapons is the best bet we've got to put this aspect of the 
Russian nuclear genie back in the bottle. Funding for Nunn-Lugar is 
vital, and I congratulate the committee for fully supporting this 
program in their bill.
  Again, Mr. President, I would thank my colleagues for approving my 
amendment, and the amendment's cosponsors for their support. This is a 
good bill--but a better bill because we have taken this initial step 
toward eliminating the tactical nuclear dangers from the former Soviet 
Union.
  Mr. KERREY. Mr. President, the Senate is now in the process of 
creating arguably the most important legislation we produce all year, 
the Defense Authorization Bill. We are authorizing the activities of 
government which keep Americans free and safe, and we are authorizing 
activities which are carried out by young Americans in a spirit of 
courage and selfless service. So there is no more serious legislation 
than this. My purpose today is to ask my colleagues as they deliberate 
on this bill to consider the threats to our country as they are and as 
they likely will be in the decade ahead, so we authorize armed forces 
which will be able to deter or defeat those threats.
  The arms forces we authorize in this bill keep America safe mainly by 
their credible potential for overwhelming, focused, sustained violence. 
We allocate the funds by categories such as training, operations and 
maintenance, quality of life, readiness, but in actuality these funds 
are to support the credibility of that potential for violence. It is a 
potential to counter and, if necessary, defeat the threats which put at 
risk our national life, the lives of Americans, and in some cases the 
livelihoods and interests of Americans. It is a potential which is an 
essential element of our national power.
  Our colleagues on the Armed Services Committee have taken on the 
daunting task of measuring the forces the President has requested 
against the threats we face. I say this is a daunting task because 
while the threats are dynamic, there is a normal human trait to see the 
threats as static, particularly when we are already heavily invested in 
a technology or a family of weapons that have proven successful against 
a particular threat in the past. It is our duty, Mr. President, to 
resist that trait, to see the world as it is and to try our best to see 
it as it will be. In our analysis our most useful tool is the 
information produced by our Intelligence Community.
  Let's look out across the world of the present and near future. We 
see Russian nuclear forces, still deployed, still on alert, still 
capable of killing scores of millions of Americans. We see growing 
indiscipline in the way Russian nuclear weapons are stored and 
maintained, combined with a hunger for plutonium and weapons-grade 
uranium among the world's weapons proliferators. In China we see a much 
smaller but still deadly Chinese nuclear force, reportedly with its 
weapons targeted on the U.S. We depend heavily on the intelligence 
community to monitor Russia's and China's nuclear status, for the 
reason we always did: because our national survival could be at stake.
  In Russia we see conventional forces in steep decline and in China 
conventional forces which appear to be outmoded and immobile, compared 
with U.S. forces. Looking more broadly, we see a small and diminishing 
number of countries with capable conventional land or naval forces, but 
an increasing number of countries and movements trying to develop 
weapons of mass destruction. In the case of India and Pakistan, we see 
vividly how successful proliferation efforts add to global danger. We 
also see non-national and multi-national threats such as terrorist 
movements and drug cartels posing greater threats to the safety of 
Americans than the threats posed by the conventional military forces of 
the few isolated, weak rogue states who claim to be our adversary. 
Looking more broadly, past the ability of our potential adversaries to 
do violence, we see a new world in which people increasingly do not 
look to their national governments as the sole means of accomplishing 
their goals in international matters. The age of imperialism, in which 
national governments invaded each other's territory to extend their 
power, seems a distant memory. Saddam Hussein's attack on Kuwait eight 
years ago and the current nuclear tension between India and Pakistan 
are two indicators that we must keep a sharp eye on relations between 
states, and if our policymakers choose to intervene in such conflicts, 
we must have armed forces capable of doing so. But we are in a world in 
which nonnational actors--individuals as well as corporations and 
movements have taken international relations into their own hands.
  The global nature of the Internet and the global, not national, 
outlook of the world's dominant corporations, are well known to all. 
Daimler-Benz' recent purchase of a company which less than twenty years 
ago we were bailing out as a patriotic duty, and the lack of concern in 
this country about that purchase, underscores the point. At the

[[Page S7090]]

other, individual end of the scale, we see individual Irish citizens, 
both north and south, looking beyond their governments and the borders 
created by governments and seeing the advantage of direct personal and 
commercial relationships, the advantage not just of peace but of lower 
barriers. The relentless integration of Europe, most recently marked by 
the introduction of a common currency, is a sharp contrast to the 
conflicts and ancient rivalries which marked and divided Europe for 
centuries. European conflict called forth the greatest armies America 
ever raised, twice in this century. Today we are concerned with 
residual ethnic disputes in isolated corners of Europe and in the case 
of Bosnia even deploy military force in an effort to stabilize and 
contain the conflict. But large-scale conventional conflict in Europe, 
for the first time since the invention of gunpowder, is unthinkable.
  Outside Europe, we see economic integration throughout Asia and in 
our own hemisphere, and we see economic integration leading cultural 
integration. The national boundaries are blurring. In this metropolitan 
area, for example, there are cable TV stations broadcasting in Spanish, 
Arabic, Japanese, and other languages. Even in Pakistan and India, the 
elites who rattle nuclear weapons at each other are part of the same 
global culture; their children are studying in American universities.
  There are exceptions to the trend of global integration. There are 
pockets of recalcitrance: dictatorships who retain power by force, 
immature democracies in which crime rivals legitimate business and 
creates internal civil wars, unscrupulous leaders in places like the 
Middle East, South Asia, and the former Yugoslavia who manipulate 
ethnic rivalries as a tool to retain power. These are the places likely 
to generate conflicts which threaten our safety or our interests. These 
are the places which, especially if economic disparity is added to 
ethnic or religious differences, from which violence will emanate. 
These are the places in which U.S. intelligence ought to provide 
policymakers and warfighters the edge. Given that such places exist, 
and given the enduring strategic threat we also face from Russia, what 
should our armed forces be able to do?

  First, our forces should be able to deter the threat of Russian and 
Chinese nuclear weapons, along with the growing threat posed by 
regional nuclear programs. The Wall may have fallen, but until 
verifiable arms control agreements bring this nuclear episode of 
military history to an end, we need modern, robust nuclear forces and 
we need the intelligence to closely watch not just Russia and China, 
but also the nuclear activities of proliferating countries. Good 
intelligence is inextricably linked to a sound strategic defense, and 
it is not cheap. Strong nuclear forces in the absence of nuclear 
testing means a dependable Stockpile Stewardship Program. We and the 
world must have absolute confidence in our nuclear capabilities. I will 
therefore support the efforts of the Senator from New Mexico to restore 
full funding to the Stockpile Stewardship Program.
  Defending America from nuclear threats also means preventing fissile 
materials from falling into the hands of those aspiring to develop 
nuclear weapons, be they aspiring countries or terrorists. The Indian-
Pakistani attainment of nuclear weapons does not cease our efforts; it 
means we should redouble them. In this sense, the security of Russia's 
vast nuclear arsenal is very much in our interest. The Armed Services 
Committee has long recognized this fact through the Nunn-Lugar program, 
and I will support restoration of full funding for Nunn-Lugar in this 
bill. Beyond the nuclear threat, the increasingly interconnected world 
I described presents little likelihood of a clash of large conventional 
forces. In addition to globalization, we see a reduction in 
conventional forces of most countries. With the vitally important 
exception of the United States, I also see a decline in recent years in 
the fighting spirit in the remaining large conventional forces in the 
world. All these trends suggest we will not see our military engaged in 
a major conventional conflict in the foreseeable future. Certainly the 
example of the Gulf War should dissuade other countries from putting a 
large armored force into the field against the United States. Large-
scale conventional modernization can therefore safely be a lower 
priority for us. However, smaller, highly mobile, highly ready 
conventional forces will be a necessity.
  Ethnic conflict will continue to erupt on the peripheries of global 
integration. Because of America's unique power and because, as the 
performance of our NATO allies in Bosnia prior to our arrival there 
showed, other countries' militaries will not take forceful action 
without an American example, we will be called upon for future 
deployments much like the Bosnian mission. Certainly we cannot answer 
every call. But if a conflict threatens a wider war which would require 
an even greater American involvement, we must deploy to nip some 
conflicts in the bud. It is an obligation of leadership. If we do it 
right, others will imitate us and we will have to deploy less often.
  In designing our forces we should bear in mind the characteristics of 
the ideal deployable forces: highly capable (packing a strong punch), 
highly mobile, highly trained, well maintained, closely connected to 
national and theater intelligence, integrated with the command and 
control systems of the allies with whom we will operate, rapidly 
transportable to the theater of deployment, and supported by tailored 
logistics. These forces should operate in an environment in which we 
control the coasts and sea lanes in the vicinity and the airspace over 
the vicinity, for purposes of support, surveillance, and air strikes if 
necessary.

  Beyond regional deployments, we face non-national threats such as 
weapons proliferation, terrorism, and the casualties we continually 
suffer from drug trafficking. As with the Russian nuclear threat, the 
first line of defense against these threats is the best possible 
intelligence. We require military forces that can respond to the 
intelligence when policy makers so direct: agile, superbly trained and 
equipped special operations forces. Increasingly the military future 
belongs to the sophistication and stealth of the special operator, 
rather than the armored masses of the past. Maintaining such forces in 
all the services should be among our highest priority.
  Mr. President, a new threat has materialized in recent years, the 
threat of electronic attack against the communications systems and 
computer networks which are increasingly the fundamental infrastructure 
of our country. Recent Defense Department exercises have helped size 
the potential problem and the Administration has a number of agencies 
developing a response. As with every threat, intelligence plays a key 
role in warning against and countering this threat. In developing our 
defenses, we need units with great knowledge, the best equipment, 
technically sophisticated people, and speed in both decision and 
execution. Fortunately, these are American traits. In fact, those who 
contemplate attacking us in the realm of information operations are 
really attacking into one of our greatest national strengths. But we 
should not be over confident. We need to defend in cyberspace, and the 
forces authorized in this bill should do so.
  The Armed Services Committee was faced with a tight budget and 
difficult choices. I propose reviewing those choices with this 
criterion: how does this or that program help create or sustain the 
kind of military forces I have described, forces responsive to the 
threats and global realities we face? We simply cannot afford to 
allocate these scarce resources on the basis of other criteria. It is 
not enough to state a particular class of equipment is wearing out or 
should be replaced, we have always had that class of equipment, so we 
should get a new modern version. We must ask: how does that class of 
equipment respond to the threats we face and will face? It is not 
enough to state, the defense plant in my state will lack work if we do 
not buy a particular item. It is not enough to state, the military base 
in my state must continue to operate at or above its current level of 
manning, regardless of the national need. It is unfair to our service 
members and their families, it is unfair to taxpayers, but above all it 
is unfair to the nation we are pledged to defend, to force precious 
defense funds to be spent on a basing system which is reportedly over 
twenty percent larger than the nation requires.

[[Page S7091]]

  Mr. President, I will be looking closely at this legislation in terms 
of its contribution to the forces we require. It is far more agreeable 
to stay the course and stick with the traditional weapons and 
organizations and bases which helped win the Cold War. With an 
institution as large and complex as the Defense Department, change is 
also a lengthy process. But we must lead change and make the defense 
choices to align our forces with the world as it is and will be. Our 
fighting men and women deserve it and our country should expect it of 
us.
  Ms. SNOWE. Mr. President, I rise in support of the Fiscal Year 1999 
Defense Authorization Act. This legislation focuses on the military of 
tomorrow by establishing priorities that will allow American forces to 
prepare for the conflicts of the 21st Century.
  We consider this measure under the leadership of a remarkable Senator 
whose personal sacrifice and professional insight have contributed to 
the molding of the military in our time. The public life of Strom 
Thurmond has reflected the evolution of conflict and war fighting 
capabilities in the last half-century. Emerging as a Colonel from World 
War II, he persevered through the traumas of Korea and Vietnam; the 
turbulent ``hollow force'' years of the 1970s; the recovery of our 
might under President Reagan; the collapse of imperial communism; and 
the computer-age attacks during the Persian Gulf War.
  Today, he manages a bill that capitalizes on the lessons of the 
military history to which he contributed. The FY99 Defense 
Authorization Act increases the speed, precision, and analytical 
capacity of soldiers who will face post-Soviet adversaries as 
determined or dictatorial, but more numerous, than those whom we have 
confronted in the past.
  While he steps down at the end of the year as Committee Chairman, his 
leadership will resonate in our deliberations and hearings for years to 
come. He brings an authorization before the Senate this week having 
groomed three generations of successors in the byzantine ways of 
defense legislation.
  Mr. President, this bill includes several programs that enhance the 
readiness and modernization of the military. Our Committee has worked 
diligently during the 1990s to control the bleeding of funds from next-
generation procurement systems and the stress on our forces from 
escalating peacekeeping commitments. President Clinton's out-year 
budget projections bring defense outlays as a percentage of GDP to 2.7 
percent, the lowest level in almost 50 years. The President targets the 
military as the only federal function that sustains deep outlay 
decreases between 1993 and 2003. While mandatory domestic expenditures 
will increase over time by 23.6 percent, those for national defense 
fall by exactly the same level.
  In modernization accounts--those for weapons procurement--funding has 
fallen by 67% since 1985. This trend, in constant dollars, means that 
at the height of the Reagan build-up thirteen years ago, the Pentagon 
obligated $138.7 billion for procurement. This spending fell to its 
lowest point--$44.2 billion--in FY97. The FY99 budget finally increases 
the account to $48.7 billion, and I commend Secretary Cohen for 
submitting the first budget by this administration that brings 
procurement back to the annual average threshold of $60.1 billion, as 
recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, starting in 2001.
  Exploding expenditures for peacekeeping operations since the end of 
the Persian Gulf War directly threaten spending for procurement and 
modernization. To confirm this point, we only need to read the 
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). Among all Pentagon programs, the QDR 
singled out ``incremental costs of unplanned deployments and smaller-
scale contingencies'' as the ``least predictable operating expenses'' 
which ``displace funding previously planned for procurement.''
  America's 29 contingency operations since the end of the Persian Gulf 
War have cost us a total of $18 billion. Our Bosnia commitment alone 
has consumed $7.2 billion. Even excluding Bosnia, the American 
taxpayers gave another three billion dollars just to support U.N. 
peacekeeping programs throughout the 1990's. The administration, 
however, has never offered us a comprehensive readiness and mission 
assessment of U.S. Contingency Operations (CONOPS) policy to justify or 
rationalize the expenditure of this $21 billion, or eight percent of 
the whole defense budget.
  The Committee, therefore, supported an amendment that I offered along 
with Senator Cleland during the mark-up session making the Pentagon 
statutorily responsible for providing all congressional defense 
committees with a Contingency Operations budgetary, mission, and 
readiness assessment by January 31, 1999. We did not establish the 
deadline by coincidence. I strongly believe that the Committee should 
consider any CONOPS authorization or supplemental appropriations 
requests next year only with the benefit of the president's strategic 
analysis of how and why the Armed Services will obligate their 
peacekeeping budgets.
  This amendment subsequently directs the department to address five 
issues: the effects of ongoing CONOPS on Service retention and 
reenlistment rates; whether they cause sustained or significant 
shortages of military personnel and equipment in other regions of the 
world; the specific programmatic accounts on which the department has 
relied to underwrite CONOPS deployments; what clear objectives guide 
each of these undertakings; and the conditions, based on such 
objectives, that would define the end of each operation.
  Presidential Decision Direction 25 of May 1994, Mr. President, 
outlined the scope and purpose of the administration's CONOPS policy. 
It promised the application of strict standards to determine whether 
the U.S. should participate in any overseas peace operation.
  The reporting categories specified by my amendment intentionally 
overlap with this directive. PDD-25 specifically declared that 
potential CONOPS commitments would depend on whether our participation 
advanced U.S. interests, the ``unique and general risks'' to American 
personnel, if ``clear objectives'' could determine the role of our 
forces, and the identification of an ``endpoint.''
  We would not impose an unfair burden on the Defense Department by 
mandating a pre-posture hearing or pre-budget request report on the 
steps that the administration has taken to implement its own plan.
  This year, the Committee received Posture Statements from the Navy 
and the Air Force that contained warnings of potential negative 
readiness impacts as a result of long CONOPS deployments. Secretary 
Dalton cited the ``requirements of the Unified Commands''--those that 
participate heavily in peacekeeping missions--as effecting the 
readiness of non-deployed fleet units.
  The number of Air Force personnel dedicated to contingency operations 
grew fourfold since 1989 from 3,400 to 14,600 by FY97. ``Caution 
indicators,'' as the report characterized it, have emerged in the areas 
of retention, reenlistment, and depleted inventories of spare parts.
  In addition, by October 1999, the Army, the Service most involved in 
peacekeeping, could lack the heavy armored divisions designed for rapid 
deployment to crisis areas. Two of the divisions that train full time 
for this mission may have one-third of their troops on duty in Bosnia 
or Kuwait.
  Four years ago, the Army had 541,000 active duty soldiers and no 
commitments in Bosnia. The Armed Services Committee, according to 
former Chairman Nunn, considered this level the minimum necessary for 
responding to two regional crises. Yet today, the Army faces the 
challenge of preparing for two Major Theater Wars at a reduced force 
strength of 491,000, coupled with a deployment in Bosnia.
  Consider the exorbitant contingency operations costs that the Army 
absorbed in just one fiscal year. The amount, $1.5 billion, represented 
more than one-fifth of the entire research and development budget for 
the Service. It exceeded the total Army aircraft procurement line by 
almost two hundred million dollars. If we take these examples of the 
strains imposed by peacekeeping commitments on Army research and 
hardware programs, how can the administration state that it has 
adequately weighed the ``unique and general risks'' of these missions, 
as required under PDD-25, to our people in uniform?

[[Page S7092]]

  Despite the alarming budgetary trends, the QDR predicts that 
contingency efforts will dominate the Pentagon's planning agenda over 
the next two decades. The law, Mr. President, must also move in this 
direction by requiring a CONOPS policy rationale with a CONOPS budget 
request. My amendment supports this transition by mandating the first 
pre-budget report to Congress on the national security and OPTEMPO 
implications of our increased contingency commitments.
  Whether for contingency operations or more traditional missions, 
naval modernization programs will remain vital to the overseas 
projection of American forces. As a result, I salute the Chair of the 
Seapower Subcommittee--Senator Warner--for this support of the $2.680 
billion continuation of the DDG-51 multi-year destroyer procurement, 
the $2.003 billion going to produce the second ship of the New Attack 
Submarine class, and the $639 million going for the next LPD-17 
Amphibious Transport Ship. In addition, I am pleased that the 
Subcommittee fully authorized the Navy's $85 million DD-21 land-attack 
destroyer Research and Development request to keep this new effort on 
schedule and within budget.
  These four programs meet the Navy's requirements for the type of 
warfare that will dominate our military strategy of the future: 
littoral operations near coastal plains. Littoral engagements require 
the Navy to maneuver ``close enough to influence events on shore if 
necessary.'' This post-Soviet mission continues to match our force 
structure with our security interests since 80 percent of the world's 
population lives near the coastal areas and waterways that open into 
the littorals.
  Littoral concepts of war stem directly from the changing worldwide 
political environment in which the United States operates. Soviet power 
no longer threatens the open plains of Central Europe. Soviet ships and 
submarines no longer prepare for platform-to-platform battles on the 
open seas. For the first time since the end of World War II, a Pentagon 
planning document, the QDR, steered the military in the direction of 
deterring conflict and instability wherever it might occur rather than 
containing a single enemy force.
  The surface ship and submarine programs authorized in this bill will 
provide the Navy more firepower and endurance at a lower cost. Smooth 
and modular construction materials will deceive the enemy radars that 
can detect the hard angles of older vessels. Electronic integrators 
will give ships and submarines split-second systems for communications 
and munitions targeting. A new series of rapid transporters will bring 
unprecedented levels of forces and weapons to the shorelines of 
instability or humanitarian rescue. From safe distances at sea, smaller 
crews will program missiles for strategic inland targets.
  A littoral Navy, Mr. President, also corresponds with lower life-
cycle costs. Carriers and surface combatants will carry more firepower 
and fewer people. This development, in addition to a greater reliance 
on commercial ``off-the-shelf'' technologies, holds the promise of 
decreasing maintenance expenditures by between 50 and 70 percent.
  We also cannot forget that political limitations as well as political 
changes shape the new Navy. The visible and invisible forward presence 
provided by the Fleet assumes greater importance in an age when we no 
longer enjoy permanent bases throughout Europe or Southern Asia. As a 
result, the administration will increasingly rely on the Navy as a key 
agent of force behind our diplomacy.
  For this reason, I was honored to participate in a Subcommittee 
markup that also expanded naval air programs. To stabilize the 
transition from the Nimitz-class of nuclear aircraft carriers to the 
new-generation CVX system, the Subcommittee allocated $124.5 million 
for acceleration of advance procurement and component construction of 
the CVN-77 system. We furthermore instructed the Navy to invest carrier 
research and development budgets in a way that will directly enhance 
the planned capabilities of the CVX. Our mark-up also placed the P-3 
Orion Anti-Surface Warfare Improvement Program on an efficient 12-month 
modification track.
  The changing mix of threats to our national security represented by 
these maritime and other high-technology defense programs finally 
influenced the Committee vote against authorizing another base closure 
(BRAC) round.
  This amendment tried to address two of the many problems with the 
BRAC process: the fact that no law guarantees the proper investment of 
any quantifiable returns from base closures, and the president's 
temptation to manipulate commission rulings in his own political 
interest.
  But the Committee rejected the BRAC amendment because it did not, nor 
could it, solve the fatal flaws in the process. No base closure round, 
Mr. President, has yielded the taxpayers any clear or proven savings. 
We do not need to rely on the claims of congressional BRAC opponents to 
demonstrate this point. We only need to consider the conclusion of the 
leading advocate of BRAC: The Department of Defense. DoD's April 1998 
base closure report to Congress states explicitly that ``no audit 
trail, single document, or budget account exists for tracking the end 
use of each dollar saved through BRAC.''
  We can also turn to the findings of independent evaluators. Last 
summer, the GAO flatly told us that ``DoD accounting systems are not 
designed to track savings.'' The Congressional Budget Office concluded 
in December 1996 that the Pentagon ``is unable to report actual 
spending and savings for BRAC actions.'' Accounting uncertainties, Mr. 
President, have made apparent base closure savings a frustrating 
mystery rather than a confirmed fact.
  The Defense Department cannot continue to decide which installations 
to downsize or close by making arbitrary comparisons to personnel 
reductions. The standard should not focus, as DoD contends, on closing 
36% of our bases if 36% of all people in uniform have left the military 
since the peak of the Cold War. The standard must remain the adaptation 
of infrastructure to new or developing security threats. But as it did 
last year, the administration rests the argument for more base closures 
on the premise that facility cuts have lagged behind those in personnel 
by 15 percent.
  A simple percentage, Mr. President, cannot answer the questions that 
should determine the future of domestic military bases. What depots, 
for example, do we require to provide competition with the private 
sector and to insure the precision and endurance of fighter aircraft?
  What shipyards can provide the Navy with a diversified industrial 
base to sustain the next-generation modular vessels that will maneuver 
in littoral waters?
  What air bases must stay active to support our long-range power 
projection capabilities now that we have a diminished forward presence 
in Europe and Southern Asia?
  These questions do not exhaust the list. But I raise them as examples 
of the factors absent in most of the base closure assessments that have 
come to Congress from the Pentagon.
  Page one of the April base report estimates that the military could 
save 21 billion dollars between 2008 and 2015 if we approve two more 
BRAC rounds. Even if the Committee had accepted this projection, the 
QDR acknowledges that it could re-capture $18 billion of this amount in 
three ways: by following through with DoD management reforms and 
technology upgrades, providing consistent guidance to the Services on 
budget priorities, and controlling the costs of contingency operations.
  The QDR indicated that this $18 billion dollar loss as from three 
specific causes, came exclusively from procurement accounts. It 
therefore has three specific plans, all of which relate to policy 
changes and internal reforms, and none of which relate to base 
closures, for restoring funds to modernization. The April base closure 
report even admits that if the Pentagon could quantify BRAC savings, 
there would be no guarantee that procurement programs might gain from 
the extra dollars because the four separate Services make their own 
investment decisions.
  To assert that the department cannot save $18 billion dollars through 
rigorous budget management, Mr. President, is to assert that it cannot 
follow the mandates of the QDR, which called for ``reducing unneeded 
standards and specifications,'' and the ``leveraging of commercial 
technology.''
  And how unreasonable or impractical is it to control the level of 
unplanned expenditures on Bosnia through clear

[[Page S7093]]

policy objectives? According to the administration, while it predicts 
extensive U.S. involvement in contingency operations beyond 2015, our 
engagement ``must be selective, depending largely on the interests at 
stake and the risk of major aggression elsewhere.''
  The Clinton Administration advertises a commitment to multi-billion 
dollar defense management reforms while asking for base closures to 
generate savings that it can neither find nor re-invest. At the same 
time, it has submitted very real Bosnia bills that now exceed seven 
billion dollars and freeze our forces in a political vacuum.
  By rejecting the BRAC amendment, the Committee invited the 
administration to provide us with a more compelling plan that links 
facility to mission needs. In the meantime, DoD can also realize 
billions of dollars of savings through firm policy decisions about our 
overseas strategic interests, internal reforms, and Service 
programmatic goals. The Defense Department must continue to work 
directly with Congress on the issues that will improve the military of 
the next decade instead of shifting them to yet another panel for which 
we can claim no responsibility.
  Mr. President, the FY99 Authorization Bill accelerates the 
modernization of the Armed Services while recognizing the strong 
evidence of the degrading impact of open-ended contingency Operations 
on Personnel Tempos and unit readiness. It ultimately holds the 
Pentagon accountable for documented savings through policy and 
management reforms rather than accepting the unproven promises of BRAC 
savings that would come 15 years away. I therefore urge all of my 
colleagues to vote in favor of this responsible legislation.


u.s. non-proliferation policy and condemnation of testing in south asia

  Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, my support for this amendment must be 
qualified. I too am concerned about proliferation. However, I do not 
welcome the potentially negative consequences relying strictly on U.S. 
unilateral sanctions in this case. I strongly urge we combine sanctions 
with engagement. This engagement must be based on comprehensive, 
calculated non-proliferation policies.
  I believe that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction poses 
an imminent threat to U.S. and international security. The geopolitical 
strings that contained states' individual aspirations of mass 
destruction capabilities have been severed. The emerging multipolar 
world--in which the U.S. is, without question, the dominant economic, 
military and cultural power--creates new threats and offers new 
opportunities.
  Capitalizing on opportunities requires U.S. leadership. No other 
nation has the wherewithal to facilitate the creation and 
implementation of thoughtful and deliberate strategies to counter 
threats to U.S. and international security. No other nation parallels 
the power the U.S. can bring to bear in creating a stable international 
order. There is no doubt that we live in an increasingly interdependent 
world. Most major problems--economic, environmental, military--cannot 
be handled by the U.S. alone, despite our dominant position.
  The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is one such problem. 
This threat cannot be stemmed by unilateral U.S. actions. The dangers 
of weapons of mass destruction proliferation--whether by rogue nations 
or terrorist organizations--poses a threat to the U.S. military and 
U.S. civilians, as well as the future of humanity. In light of the 
changed global circumstances and the U.S. position as the global power, 
we urgently need to rethink antiquated doctrines of defense and provide 
a coherent approach to non-proliferation policies.
  Our nuclear reality has radically changed in the past weeks. Recent 
rumblings from the detonation of nuclear devices in Southeast Asia 
should awaken us to a few simple realities: our non-proliferation 
policies have failed; any country desirous of nuclear capability can 
attain it; and sanctions alone are an inadequate deterrent and 
potentially dangerous approach.
  Sanctions alone will not suffice in deterring would-be proliferators. 
When leaders of a country are willing to state that the people ``will 
eat grass'' in order to obtain weapons of mass destruction capability, 
this should be a sign of the relative impotence of U.S. unilateral 
attempts to alter their behavior.
  The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty--the lynchpin of nuclear 
control--is under assault. North Korea, Iraq, India and Pakistan sent 
clear signals--nuclear proliferation is a threat now. How obvious do 
the warning signs have to be to evoke an effective response?
  The U.S. should be taking the lead in formulating national and 
multilateral efforts to contain proliferation. If not contained, the 
recent events in India and Pakistan will become a common occurrence in 
the world of the near future.
  As stated by Secretary of Defense William Cohen in recent defense 
Appropriation hearings, India's actions could set off a chain 
reaction--not solely of a fissile nature but nonetheless having similar 
cataclysmic ramifications. Without swift and multilateral intervention 
this chain reaction could easily lead to a nuclear arms race between 
India and Pakistan that would spillover into other countries' strategic 
calculations.
  More ominous is that Indian and Pakistani defiance will set the tone 
for other less developed states. It is clearly in the U.S. interest to 
prevent uncontrolled proliferation. A U.S. response proportionate to 
the threat would involve bringing all the policy tools we can bring to 
bear in reducing that threat. In sum, this requires a reasonable, 
consistent and aggressive non-proliferation strategy.
  I would like to take a minute to look at India as an example of the 
failures in U.S. non-proliferation policies. India's tests resulted 
from international and domestic concerns. The international issues 
point to problems in the form of lack of consistency in U.S. non-
proliferation policies.
  First, India's strategic concerns are most succinctly formulated as 
follows: China, Pakistan, and the former's assistance to the latter. 
India has fought three wars in the last 50 years with Pakistan. These 
two states' relations with one another at their best are more perilous 
than U.S. relations with the Soviet Union were leading up to the Cuban 
Missile Crisis.
  Moreover, India enjoys front row seats to observe how the existing 
non-proliferation regimes fail to check China's transfer of controlled 
technologies to Pakistan as well as another potential enemy, Iran. If 
China enjoys unimpeded export of missile technologies to Pakistan, and 
Pakistan proceeds to demonstrate its missile capabilities, why should 
India refrain from flexing its nuclear muscle?
  Second, India has repeatedly indicated its frustration with lack of 
progress toward global nuclear disarmament. As my colleague, Senator 
Moynihan, former U.S. Ambassador to India, recently suggested, India 
rejects the discriminatory nature of the existing non-proliferation 
regimes. Perhaps due to their frustration with the lack of progress on 
disarmament, India believes that these tests would lend urgency to the 
process.
  The domestic dimension boils down to the nationalist and isolationist 
inclinations of the political leaders in India at present. The election 
manifesto of India's BJP states that it ``rejects the notion of nuclear 
apartheid and will actively oppose attempts to impose a hegemonistic 
nuclear regime.'' India will not have its matters of security or its 
exercise of the nuclear option dictated to it. Nor would any other 
sovereign state.
  While the world was generally appalled by India's actions, the 
reaction among Indians bordered on euphoria. Even though only four 
members of the BJP made the decision to test, that choice obviously 
enjoys widespread support. We witnessed similar domestic jubilation for 
Pakistan's response.
  I agree with my colleague, Senator Moynihan, who suggested that the 
U.S. should attempt to engage India and provide it with incentives to 
join international non-proliferation regimes. The current government in 
India only welcomes our sanctions. To approach the situation with India 
by invoking sanctions only plays into the aims of the strong 
nationalist and isolationist currents in that country.
  Invoking sanctions on Pakistan raises even more serious concerns. 
Pakistan is a poor and unstable country. Should our sanctions push it 
over

[[Page S7094]]

the brink and induce a collapse--we would have nuclear weapons in the 
possession of a desperate regime. As Henry Kissinger astutely observed, 
non-democratic regimes often use external conflict to coalesce support 
in the face of domestic unrest. Our sanctions may only force Pakistan's 
hand.
  The U.S. should temper its sanctions with constructive engagement. 
And we should make the lifting of those sanctions contingent on India 
and Pakistan's willingness to negotiate their entry into non-
proliferation regimes as is suggested in this amendment.
  A comprehensive and effective non-proliferation policy would include 
several elements.
  The recent call made by the five nuclear powers for these states to 
freeze their weapons development is a step in the right direction. The 
U.S. must ensure that these multilateral efforts get the sustained and 
clear commitment requisite to turn the tide of proliferation.
  Our objectives should be clear:
  First, we need to induce relations between India and Pakistan with 
the objective of preventing an arms race on the Subcontinent. We must 
convince them that their security is NOT enhanced by the weaponization 
or deployment of these devices.
  Second, we should capitalize on recent overtures made by these 
countries to negotiate their entry into numerous non-proliferation 
regimes. We should focus particular attention on a fissile materials 
cutoff agreement as well as India and Pakistan's commitment to cease 
testing.
  Third, the negotiations among the nuclear powers must take bold 
actions to address the discriminatory nature of the existing Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation Treaty. This reality was a longstanding and central 
reason for India remaining outside of the regime. We must assume that 
other nations recognize the discrimination codified in this regime, and 
we must begin to address it.
  The implementation of these policies will be anything but easy, but 
they are critical to international stability and security. To be 
successful, U.S. non-proliferation policy must utilize the full array 
of policy tools available; it must be consistent and aggressive; and it 
must take into account other nations' perspectives and cost-benefit 
calculations. Imposing sanctions and muddling through simply will not 
suffice.
  Meeting U.S. security needs in the 21st Century will require renewed 
commitment and more complex strategies than those that sufficed for the 
last several decades. Make no mistake about it though, these issues 
must be addressed now, and our commitment must be unwavering.
  I concur with Senator Moynihan in one other important respect. In the 
case of India, we should not be focusing on the intelligence failure, 
but rather the major failure in our statecraft, or lack thereof.
  Statecraft in the form of addressing these problems as a leader, as 
the dominant global power. If the U.S. does not step up to the plate, 
the new millenium will be characterized by nations--both hostile and 
friendly--being armed with weapons of mass destruction and the means to 
deliver those weapons to our doorstep.
  The 21st century will either witness widespread proliferation of mass 
destruction capabilities or the building of international norms and 
consensus to scale back incentives to acquiring costly and dangerous 
weaponry. The U.S. is the only country in a position to take a 
leaderhip role in defining the course and shape of the future 
international order.
  If we don't act now, the 21st Century will, indeed, be the era of 
weapons of mass destruction. Mr. President, I support the amendment 
currently before the Senate. However, this support is qualified. I do 
not assume that our condemnation and unilateral economic sanctions will 
be adequate to turn the tide. I support the provisions centered on 
reduing tensions between India and Pakistan, urging multilateral 
efforts to address proliferation threats and expressing the need for 
U.S. leadership. We must act now. We must be consistent and vigilant. 
And we must utilize all policy tools available to achieve our aims.
  Mr. GRAMM addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Texas.


                           Amendment No. 3010

  (Purpose: To permit recipients of Naval Reserve Officers' Training 
Corps scholarships to attend the participating college or university of 
                             their choice)

  Mr. GRAMM. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask for 
its immediate consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the amendment.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Texas [Mr. Gramm] proposes an amendment 
     numbered 3010.

  Mr. GRAMM. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading of 
the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       At the appropriate place, add the following:

     SEC.   . ATTENDANCE OF RECIPIENTS OF NAVAL RESERVE OFFICERS' 
                   TRAINING CORPS SCHOLARSHIPS AT PARTICIPATING 
                   COLLEGES OR UNIVERSITIES.

       Section 2107 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by 
     adding at the end the following:
       ``(i)(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of law or any 
     policy or regulation of the Department of Defense or of the 
     Department of the Navy, recipients of Naval Reserve Officers' 
     Training Corps scholarships who live in the state which has 
     more scholarships awardees than slots available under the 
     Navy quotas in their state colleges or universities may 
     attend any college or university of their choice in their 
     state to which they have been accepted, so long as the 
     college or university is a participant in the Naval Reserve 
     Officers' Training Corps program.
       ``(2) The Department of Defense and the Department of the 
     Navy are prohibited from setting maximum limits on the number 
     of Naval Reserve Officers' Training Corps scholarship 
     students who can be enrolled at any college or university 
     participating in the Naval Reserve Officers' Training Corps 
     program in such state.''

  Mr. GRAMM. Mr. President, this amendment is a very important 
amendment, at least to this Senator. I would like to very briefly 
outline the problem I am trying to deal with. I have narrowed the 
solution to this problem so we might get a place holder in the bill. 
Then, our conferees can fix the Nation's problem in conference.
  We cannot get an agreement on a final solution now. I think my 
colleagues, when they hear my argument, will agree to my amendment. I 
simply want a place holder, so this problem can be fixed in every 
school in every State in the Union.
  Mr. President, what is happening is that the Navy is engaged in 
setting quotas in allowing students to attend colleges and universities 
under Naval ROTC scholarship programs. It is interesting, because the 
quotas are very similar to the problem we have with having more 
facilities than we have military personnel and functions. This is 
really very similar to the whole base closing crisis that we have 
faced.
  The basic problem is we have 69 colleges and universities that 
participate in the Navy ROTC scholarship program. Many of these schools 
are schools that do not have large numbers of students who would like 
to attend them. Historically, the selection process, which has not 
changed, is a process whereby young men and women, the best and the 
brightest in America, apply for a Navy ROTC scholarship.
  Here is how the system works, here is the change that has been made, 
here is the problem, and here is my proposed beginning of a solution. I 
hope my colleagues on both sides of the aisle will take this amendment.
  Under our current program, a young man or woman who graduated from 
high school in America, who has excellent SAT scores, extremely high 
grades, and who has taken a strong scientific curriculum in high 
school, can apply for a scholarship through the Navy ROTC scholarship 
program. The selection is made by the Navy on a national basis. For 
example, for this coming year, 206 young men and women from my State 
have been selected by the Navy to receive a Navy ROTC scholarship--206.
  Now, the way the Navy ROTC scholarship program worked prior to the 
implementation of quotas was that a young man or woman received a Navy 
ROTC scholarship and then chose to attend one of the 69 colleges that 
participated in the program. As the Navy has reduced the number of 
people participating in the ROTC scholarship program, rather than 
evaluating university programs and shutting down those

[[Page S7095]]

programs that enroll literally two or three students per year, what the 
Navy is doing is setting a scholarship cap on each university's Navy 
ROTC program. The Navy ROTC scholarship programs that has been 
historically popular have been the program at MIT, the program at Notre 
Dame, the program at Purdue, the program at Texas A The Navy has 
said, if we let students choose, 250 students would go to MIT and 250 
students would go to Texas A
  Now, I fail to see the problem. Here is the point--by setting a cap 
of 25 students who can attend any one of the participating colleges, 
what happens in my State is two things. No. 1, we have 206 young men 
and women who have just won a Navy ROTC scholarship, one of the biggest 
things ever to happen to them in their lives.
  Mr. McCAIN. Will the Senator yield?
  Mr. GRAMM. Yes.
  Mr. McCAIN. If the Senator dispenses pretty quick, we will accept the 
amendment and move on.
  Mr. LEVIN. Apparently, Senator Byrd wants to be heard. Will you 
withhold?
  Mr. GRAMM. Then I will continue.
  Basically, the problem I am trying to deal with is the following 
problem.
  Mr. McCAIN. Senator Byrd does not wish to talk on your amendment.
  Mr. GRAMM. I have completed my remarks.
  I thank my colleagues.
  Mr. McCAIN. I urge adoption of the amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further debate?
  Mr. BYRD addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from West Virginia.
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, is there an amendment pending?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Texas has an amendment 
pending.
  Mr. BYRD. That amendment is open to an amendment in the second 
degree?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct. The amendment is open 
for a second degree.
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I will have an amendment in the second 
degree. First, I will talk about my amendment.
  Mr. President, earlier this month, Secretary of Defense William Cohen 
announced a plan that he believes will improve initial entry training 
programs and policies of the U.S. military services. Secretary Cohen's 
plan will implement about 95 percent of the recommendations put forth 
by the Kassebaum-Baker panel. The 95 percent I refer to is not an exact 
mathematical term here. It is just a figure of speech to indicate that 
the great majority of the recommendations that were recommended by the 
Kassebaum panel will be put into effect.

  This was a panel directed to assess the current training programs and 
policies, with an eye to correcting the structural problems that had 
allowed truly scandalous situations to occur involving the harassment 
of female recruits. The membership of former Senator Kassebaum's panel 
was selected directly by Secretary Cohen himself.

  While many of the policies under the Secretary's plan are to be 
commended, debate has been brewing over those core recommendations that 
remain and that were not put into effect by Secretary Cohen. That 
deviation pertains to Secretary Cohen's support, in the face of the 
report of the Kassebaum Commission to the contrary, for continuing the 
practice of men and women undergoing basic training together, and 
allowing coed barracks. Not only does this stance counter specific 
recommendations made by the Kassebaum/Baker panel, but it counters 
legislative provisions approved by the House of Representatives. In my 
view, it also counters plain common sense.

  Similar to recommendations in the Kassebaum report, the House of 
Representatives' Fiscal Year 1999 Department of Defense (DOD) 
Authorization Bill includes provisions that would require separate 
living facilities for men and women during basic training; prohibit 
after-hours access to barracks by the opposite sex, including drill 
sergeants; and separate training of men and women at the basic level. 
Senator Brownback yesterday offered an amendment to the Senate Defense 
Authorization Bill that would require separate barracks for men and 
women, and limit access to these barracks by members of the opposite 
sex.
  Secretary Cohen has announced that he is strongly opposed to the 
House provisions. But regardless of the Secretary's position in the 
debate, one looming fact remains: Sex scandals are plaguing our 
military training facilities. The papers are filled with headlines 
involving sexual misconduct in the services--misconduct involving 
extensive investigations and trials, and high-profile ends to military 
careers. This is a serious situation, a situation that, in all 
probability, must have negative ramifications for our overall national 
security. That is what we should be concerned about, not political 
correctness, not social engineering, not social theory, not social 
planning--not political correctness, but the military security of our 
country. That is why we have a military.
  While some may claim that most of the sexual misconduct is not 
occurring during basic training but during follow-on training programs, 
that claim misses the point. It is my opinion that day 1 of training is 
a good place to start--day 1. I strongly support a policy that directly 
states the rules and values of our military services to new recruits on 
day 1. This policy should clearly dictate to new recruits that the U.S. 
military is about service, honor, and integrity.
  The sad sagas in the press about sexual misconduct in the military 
and the sorry disrespect on the part of some members for the dignity of 
and the courtesies owed to other members of the military, including 
women recruits, can only serve to undermine the appeal of the U.S. 
military to our young men and women.
  If we want the brightest and the best recruits, we must be committed 
to ensuring that the U.S. military service delivers on its recruiting 
promises of outstanding career opportunities. The best and the 
brightest will demand no less.
  But that is only part of the issue, as far as I am concerned. While 
we must implement policies that attract cream-of-the-crop recruits and 
that carry through on the promise of providing them with world-class 
training, we must also remember that the objective of military service 
is the defense of the Nation. That is the objective of the military 
service. That is what it is all about. That defense, that security, 
must be the paramount aim of the Military Establishment. All other 
goals must be secondary to the goal of establishing the best fighting 
force that our Nation can field.
  I have grave concerns--particularly in light of the Kassebaum 
report--that our current policy is failing to keep its eye on that 
paramount concern.
  The Kassebaum panel stated:

       There is no more valuable military resource than its 
     personnel, making training indisputably a top priority.

  The panel further noted:

       The principal objective of the military's training programs 
     is to produce an effective, efficient, and ready force. In 
     order to achieve this objective, the training programs must, 
     first and foremost, emphasize and instill discipline.

  I heartily agree with those conclusions. And the Kassebaum report's 
recommendations supporting separate barracks for men and women during 
basic training, as well as calling for some same-gender platoons, seem 
to me to be in the best interest of the troops, as well as providing 
the right atmosphere for sound and serious training. I believe we need 
to do what is best for our national security and what is best for the 
men and women who join our military forces and whose very lives depend 
upon the quality of the training they receive.
  Mr. President, last year, I worked with Senator Kempthorne on the 
Senate Armed Services Committee. I joined with him on an amendment to 
the fiscal year 1998 defense authorization bill that created an 
independent blue-ribbon body to thoroughly examine, review, and 
evaluate the reasons for the ongoing number of sex scandals in training 
commands. This blue-ribbon panel is also chartered to examine 
fraternization and adultery issues. This panel has been created with 
unquestioned credentials. I believe that the report generated from this 
group will be a significant contribution to the body of work on gender 
policy. I regret that that report will not be completed until next 
year. And if its recommendations mirror, or reflect, those of 
Kassebaum-Baker, it is likely also to be ignored by the powers that be.

[[Page S7096]]

  I also favor the language included in the House of Representatives 
fiscal year 1999 Department of Defense authorization bill that provides 
for the separation of men and women in training at the basic level. 
Echoing my priority in this regard, the Kassebaum report concludes:

       . . . separating the recruits at the operational training 
     unit level should provide a better environment for teaching 
     military values, including professional relations.

  Again, the bottom line must be about ensuring that military service 
is a profession of service, honor, and integrity. Let us also remember 
this--let me say it again--the purpose of our Military Establishment, 
which costs us scores of billions of dollars, is to protect the 
national security of these United States, the security interests of the 
United States of America.
  Our military is not an equal employment opportunity commission. It 
does not exist to ensure perfect political correctness by responding 
affirmatively to the demands of this group or that interest group or 
some other interest group. It is the ultimate protector of the 
sovereignty of this mighty Nation and the ultimate protector of the 
freedoms of her people. That is quite a heavy responsibility and one 
that needs the most conscientious and vigilant attention to be 
adequately addressed.
  Mr. President, I urge my colleagues to join me in taking a 
constructive first step towards cleaning up the mess in the military 
and putting some common sense back into the service training regime. I 
like the way the Marines do it. And I think we ought to take a page out 
of their book.
  Mr. President, I will have more to say possibly on this amendment. As 
of now, I yield the floor and suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, in the debate on the Brownback amendment 
yesterday some Armed Services Committee members observed that the 
Brownback amendment would adopt recommendations of the Kassebaum/Baker 
commission report by passing the Senate's own commission created last 
year. It was said that doing so makes a ``mockery'' of the Senate's own 
action, and wastes the time of the 10 members of the commission.
  Well, Mr. President, Secretary Cohen has flouted the recommendations 
of the Kassebaum/Baker report that he himself commissioned. He has 
promised to implement the easiest recommendations in that report while 
publicly repudiating its core recommendations. He has not waited for 
the Senate commission's report either. He got out in front of it.
  Senator Brownback's amendment, and the amendment that I have 
prepared, would say if you are in for a penny, you are in for a pound. 
If the report has merit--and Secretary Cohen has acknowledged that at 
least parts of it do have merit in his estimation--then we ought not to 
reject those parts of the report that do not seem politically correct. 
In fact, the Kassebaum/Baker report notes that ``the committee has made 
recommendations regarding gender integration in training where 
appropriate, but has also made recommendations regarding the large 
number of other issues that we concluded have an impact on the 
effectiveness of the overall training program. It is the committee's 
intention that its recommendations be viewed as a complete package 
since training is a building-block process beginning with the quality 
of the recruit.''
  Other Members have reported the objections of senior military 
officials to the recommendations in the Kassebaum/Baker report. And 
they have stated their strong support for keeping mixed-gender training 
just the way it currently is.
  I would remind those officials and my colleagues that not so long ago 
the military trained women completely separately from men. It was only 
since the early to mid-1980's that the military began mixing the sexes 
during the early training phases. I believe, if I recall it correctly, 
that Army women were trained together at Fort McClellan, which is now 
closing as a part of the base realignment and closure process.
  The great social experiment of putting men and women together from 
day 1 in the training process is not, therefore, some hallowed military 
tradition. It is a policy, and if that policy gets in the way of a 
process that is designed to remold these undisciplined young 
individuals into focused disciplined soldiers, then we should not 
hesitate to change it.
  Our focus must be on national security--not political correctness; 
not social policy. And the basic safety and security of our recruits 
should not be compromised.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that my amendment may be 
temporarily laid aside so that others may call up other amendments.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. THURMOND addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina.

                          ____________________