PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO RESOLUTION
(House of Representatives - March 11, 1999)

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[Pages H1179-H1250]
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              PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO RESOLUTION

  Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Mr. Speaker, by direction of the Committee on Rules, 
I call up House Resolution 103 and ask for its immediate consideration.
  The Clerk read the resolution, as follows:

                              H. Res. 103

       Resolved, That at any time after the adoption of this 
     resolution the Speaker may, pursuant to clause 2(b) of rule 
     XVIII, declare the

[[Page H1180]]

     House resolved into the Committee of the Whole House on the 
     state of the Union for consideration of the concurrent 
     resolution (H. Con. Res. 42) regarding the use of United 
     States Armed Forces as part of a NATO peacekeeping operation 
     implementing a Kosovo peace agreement. The first reading of 
     the concurrent resolution shall be dispensed with. General 
     debate shall be confined to the concurrent resolution and 
     shall not exceed two hours equally divided and controlled by 
     the chairman and ranking minority member of the Committee on 
     International Relations. After general debate the concurrent 
     resolution shall be considered for amendment under the five-
     minute rule. The concurrent resolution shall be considered as 
     read. No amendment to the concurrent resolution shall be in 
     order except those printed in the portion of the 
     Congressional Record designated for that purpose in clause 8 
     of rule XVIII and except pro forma amendments for the purpose 
     of debate. Each amendment so printed may be offered only by 
     the Member who caused it to be printed or his designee and 
     shall be considered as read. The chairman of the Committee of 
     the Whole may: (1) postpone until a time during further 
     consideration in the Committee of the Whole a request for a 
     recorded vote on any amendment; and (2) reduce to five 
     minutes the minimum time for electronic voting on any 
     postponed question that follows another electronic vote 
     without intervening business, provided that the minimum time 
     for electronic voting on the first in any series of questions 
     shall be 15 minutes. At the conclusion of consideration of 
     the concurrent resolution for amendment the Committee shall 
     rise and report the concurrent resolution to the House with 
     such amendments as may have been adopted. The previous 
     question shall be considered as ordered on the concurrent 
     resolution to final adoption without intervening motion 
     except one motion to recommit with or without instructions.

  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Burr of North Carolina). The gentleman 
from Florida (Mr. Diaz-Balart) is recognized for 1 hour.
  Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Mr. Speaker, for the purpose of debate only, I yield 
the customary 30 minutes to the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Hall). During 
consideration of this resolution, all time yielded is for the purpose 
of debate only.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the distinguished 
Speaker of the House of Representatives.
  Mr. HASTERT. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Florida for 
yielding me this time. I rise in support of this rule. I would like to 
address the House for a few moments on the issue we are preparing to 
consider, the possible deployment of U.S. troops to Kosovo.
  The President has made it clear that he is committed to sending 
approximately 4,000 U.S. troops to Kosovo as part of a NATO force 
intended to keep the peace. I am convinced that the President firmly 
believes the presence of U.S. troops in Kosovo is essential to 
maintaining peace in this troubled area. Like every American, I hope 
the Serbs and the Kosovars are able to achieve a peaceful resolution to 
their dispute. We all pray for that outcome. Kosovo is a great human 
tragedy, fanned by injustice and unexplained hatred.
  As a Member of this great body and now as your Speaker, I have never 
wavered in my belief and trust in this institution. Some have argued 
that we should not have this debate today, that we should just leave it 
to the President. Some have even suggested that taking part and talking 
about this could damage the peace process. I disagree. No one should 
fear the free expression of ideas, the frank exchange of opinions in a 
representative democracy. Two weeks ago, the German Bundestag held an 
extensive debate and voted on whether or not Germany should deploy over 
5,000 German troops in Kosovo. The British Parliament has also 
discussed the deployment of British troops in Kosovo. I do not believe 
that any harm has been done to the peace process by the workings of 
these two great democracies. In fact, one message which should come 
from this debate and those held in the parliaments of our allies is 
that a free people can disagree without violence and bloodshed.
  On this important subject, I have tried to be direct and honest. I 
have spoken with the President and with his Secretary of State. I told 
them that I believed it was my duty as Speaker to ensure that Members 
of the House of Representatives, Republicans and Democrats, have the 
opportunity to fairly and openly debate the important issue before 
troops are sent into a potentially dangerous situation. I believe 
Congress must have a meaningful role in this decision, no matter how 
difficult our choice nor how hard our task.
  I have been equally honest in telling the President that I personally 
have reservations regarding the wisdom of deploying the additional U.S. 
troops to the former Yugoslavia, but I have not made up my mind and I 
will listen intently and closely to this debate. I hope that each of 
you will do the same, because it is our heavy responsibility and high 
honor to represent the men and women who are being asked by the 
President to go into harm's way. Each of us must be prepared to answer 
to their families and loved ones. I am deeply convinced that we owe 
them today's debate, for under our Constitution we share this burden 
with our President.
  Our debate today will enable each of us to carry out our 
responsibilities in a fair and thoughtful way. The gentleman from New 
York (Mr. Gilman), at my request, has offered without prejudice this 
resolution stating the President's position, that troops be deployed. I 
urge the adoption of this open rule that allows every Member of this 
House to have a say and to amend this resolution. We have set in place 
a fair and open process. We are here to discuss sensitive issues of 
policy and not personality. And let me repeat, we are here today to 
discuss policy and not personality. I know it does not need to be said, 
but I urge all Members to treat this issue with the seriousness that it 
deserves. We have a solemn duty to perform. And let us do it with the 
dignity that brings credit to this great House.
  Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  Mr. Speaker, House Resolution 103 is a modified open rule providing 
for the consideration, as the Speaker of the House has just explained, 
of House Concurrent Resolution 42, the Peacekeeping Operations in 
Kosovo Resolution.
  The purpose of the resolution is to authorize the President to deploy 
United States armed forces to Kosovo and just as importantly it makes 
possible congressional discussion of this very complex situation.
  The rule provides for 2 hours of general debate equally divided 
between the chairman and the ranking minority member of the Committee 
on International Relations. It is the intention of the rule that the 
managers of general debate yield time fairly to Republican and 
Democratic proponents and opponents of the concurrent resolution.
  Further, the bill provides that the concurrent resolution shall be 
considered as read and makes in order only those amendments preprinted 
in the Congressional Record, to be offered only by the Member who 
caused the amendment to be printed, or his designee, and each amendment 
shall be considered as read.
  In addition, the rule allows the Chairman of the Committee of the 
Whole to postpone votes during consideration of the bill and to reduce 
voting time to 5 minutes on votes following a 15-minute vote. Finally, 
the rule provides one motion to recommit, with or without instructions.
  Mr. Speaker, House Resolution 103 is a fair framework to provide a 
forum to debate the issues surrounding the possible deployment of U.S. 
troops for participation in a NATO peacekeeping force in Kosovo. Any 
Member can offer any germane amendment to this resolution providing the 
amendment was preprinted in the Congressional Record prior to its 
consideration. The gentleman from California (Mr. Dreier) made this 
announcement on Monday, March 8, on the House floor, as well as through 
a Dear Colleague letter to Members.
  It has been well known, including in fact through constant press 
reports, that the House would be debating this difficult issue this 
week. In spite of the snowstorm we had on Tuesday, Members have known 
for weeks that we would be taking up this issue prior to the March 15 
peace talks in France, the deadline. Were it not for this fair rule, 
if, for example, we had brought H.Con.Res. 42 to the floor under 
suspension of the rules, it would be nonamendable and would be allowed 
only 40 minutes of debate. Therefore, I think it is very important that 
Members support this rule, regardless of their position on deployment 
or nondeployment of troops, because Congress has every

[[Page H1181]]

right to be debating this resolution today and this rule provides a 
fair way to do so.
  Some Members as well as other foreign policy experts have questioned 
the timing of this debate while peace negotiations have not been 
concluded. But if Congress is to deliberate these serious issues prior 
to the possible deployment of U.S. troops, now is the time. March 15, 
the proposed deadline for a peace agreement for Kosovo, is this Monday, 
and U.S. troops could be on their way to Kosovo Monday night if 
agreement is reached.
  As the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) stated at the Committee on 
Rules during our markup, there is no perfect time for this. At least 
two of the Members of the six-nation contact group on Kosovo, Germany 
and Great Britain, as the Speaker of the House just made reference, 
have debated in their parliaments this precise issue this past month. 
Now is indeed an appropriate time for the United States House of 
Representatives as the sovereign representative body of the American 
people to take up the issue of possible deployment of our troops to 
join a NATO force.
  The situation in Kosovo is indeed precarious. It has now been over a 
year since fighting broke out between the Albanian rebels and the 
Serbian forces in Kosovo and in spite of an October 1998 cease-fire 
agreement, hostilities have continued.

                              {time}  1145

  March 15 is the current deadline for negotiations to be completed on 
a peace agreement. What is at issue is the expansion of the U.S. role 
in Kosovo and whether U.S. troops should be deployed to participate in 
a NATO peace mission should a peace agreement be reached.
  Historically it is well known that the Balkans have been a tinder box 
for regional wars, and we must not forget that World War I began in 
that part of the world.
  In 1995, as a member of the Committee on Rules, I brought to the 
floor the Bosnia-Herzegovina Self-defense Act to end the arms embargo 
on Bosnia. That embargo was morally wrong, and I believe that it was 
legally questionable as well from the very beginning. While not 
contiguous with Bosnia, where U.S. troops are currently deployed, the 
dangers of a spill-over effect and renewed violence in the region have 
been realized in the Serbian province of Kosovo. I am extremely 
concerned by the genocidal attacks on civilians in Kosovo. As a British 
statesman said while debating the situation in the Balkans:
  No language can describe adequately the condition of that large 
portion of the Balkan peninsula, Serbia, Bosnia, Herzegovina and the 
other provinces, political intrigues, constant rivalries, a total 
absence of public spirit, hatred of all races, animosities of rival 
religions and an absence of any controlling power, nothing short of an 
army of 50,000 of the best troops would produce anything like order in 
these parts.
  That statement was made by Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli in 
October 1878. Unfortunately his words still ring true today.
  In summary, the Congress, Mr. Speaker, has every right to debate 
whether we should put U.S. troops in harm's way before they are sent. 
That is the reason for today's debate.
  I urge my colleagues to support this fair rule so that the House will 
have the opportunity to debate this very critical issue regarding the 
possible deployment of our troops to Kosovo. I would urge my colleagues 
to support the rule.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. HALL of Ohio. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  Mr. Speaker, I want to thank the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Diaz-
Balart) for yielding me the time. This is a modified open rule. It will 
allow for consideration of House Concurrent Resolution 42 which, as my 
colleagues have heard, is a resolution authorizing the President to 
deploy United States troops to Kosovo. As my colleague has described, 
this rule provides for 1 hour of general debate to be equally divided 
and controlled by the chairman and ranking minority member of the 
Committee on International Relations. The rule permits amendments under 
the 5-minute rule, which is the normal amending process in the House. 
Under this rule, only amendments which have been preprinted in the 
Congressional Record will be in order.
  The Committee on Rules has crafted a rule which at another time would 
be acceptable. However I believe that the Kosovo resolution should not 
be brought up at this time. Therefore I will oppose the previous 
question so that the rule can be amended.
  For most Americans Kosovo and Serbia are only distant points on the 
globe, but that is not so for the community of Dayton, Ohio, the 
community which I represent, because it was my community of Dayton that 
hosted the peace talks in 1995 that led to the fragile peace that we 
are trying to preserve. Today there is continued unrest between the 
Serbians and the Albanians in Kosovo. The conflict has already left 
more than a thousand civilians dead and as many as 400,000 homeless. If 
left unchecked, the turmoil could lead to a broader war in Europe.
  However there is hope. Sensitive peace talks are taking place in the 
region. Through the efforts of Bob Dole the Albanians appear to be 
ready to sign a peace agreement. The United States and its allies 
continue to press the parties to restore peace to the region.
  My concern with this resolution is not whether Congress has the right 
to authorize the commitment of U.S. troops; we have that right. My 
concern with this resolution is whether it is in our national interest 
to take it up today in the middle of the peace talks that appear to be 
succeeding.
  Yesterday at the hearing of the Committee on Rules the gentleman from 
Connecticut (Mr. Gejdenson), who is the ranking Democratic member of 
the House Committee on International Relations warned against bringing 
this resolution to the House floor today. He testified that it 
seriously undermines the prospects for reaching peace in the region and 
could lead to more warfare.
  Secretary of State Madeleine Albright sounded a similar note of 
alarm. Yesterday she testified before the Subcommittee on Commerce, 
Justice, State, and Judiciary that this vote will be taken as a green 
light for the warring parties to continue fighting.
  During the Committee on Rules consideration the gentleman from 
Massachusetts (Mr. Moakley), the ranking Democratic member, offered an 
amendment to the rule postponing consideration of the resolution until 
the end of the current peace negotiations, and that amendment was 
defeated on a straight party line vote. Mr. Moakley also offered an 
amendment to the rule making in order a floor amendment by the 
gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Gejdenson) supporting the peace process 
and authorizing the deployment of troops if a fair and just peace 
agreement is reached. The amendment was also defeated on a straight 
party line vote.
  Perhaps when the time comes under the right conditions Congress 
should support the deployment of troops to Kosovo, and perhaps when the 
time comes Congress should oppose the move. But the time is not today.
  We in Dayton, Ohio, know about peace negotiations in Kosovo and 
Serbia. We know how sensitive they can be. We also know how important 
they can be because for a brief moment the negotiations of the 1995 
accord lived in my community. Let us let the administration negotiate a 
peace without Congress sending the wrong signal, and we should not 
bring up the resolution today.
  If the previous question is defeated, I will offer an amendment to 
the rule which will permit the Kosovo resolution to come up only after 
the two parties have signed the agreement on the status of Kosovo. The 
delay is necessary to ensure that the actions of the House do not 
interfere with the peace negotiations in Kosovo.
  Before concluding I want to express my appreciation to the gentleman 
from California (Mr. Dreier) and to the Republicans on the Committee on 
Rules for keeping this a relatively unrestricted rule and for 
permitting the motion to recommit. I am heartened by the bipartisan 
spirit in which gentleman from California (Mr. Dreier) approached this 
rule, and I believe this sends a positive signal at the beginning of 
this Congress. Our differences are not in the crafting of the rule, 
only in the timing.

[[Page H1182]]

  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the distinguished 
gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss), a member of the Committee on Rules 
and chairman of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
  (Mr. GOSS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I thank my colleague from Florida for yielding 
me this time.
  Mr. Speaker, today the House will debate whether to send U.S. troops 
to Kosovo, an issue that may seem to have little relevance to the lives 
of many Americans in this time of very blue skies in this country which 
we are fortunate to enjoy. But appearances aside, the decisions we make 
about Kosovo will affect the course of the United States and our allies 
in the world over the next several years.
  This matters. It is a critically important debate, and I urge Members 
to give it their most thoughtful attention.
  Some may question whether this is the right time for a congressional 
debate, as we have already heard, about sending U.S. troops to Kosovo. 
Once an agreement is reached, the Clinton administration has announced 
that it will deploy troops forthwith to begin enforcement of the 
agreement. So when is the right time to debate the issue? The answer is 
before our men and women in uniform are placed in harm's way.
  I am concerned that the administration tends to place U.S. troops 
into a dangerous situation where they are unwelcomed by both parties 
and do not have clear marching orders. Serbian President Milosevic, an 
unsavory strong man in my view, refuses to accept the presence of 
foreign troops on Serbian soil, and the Kosovar rebels on their part 
refuse to give up their ultimate goal of independence from Serbia. Of 
even greater concern is the possibility that the NATO mission may have 
the unintended consequence of destabilizing the region by encouraging 
separatism in neighboring areas, a situation we are already familiar 
with.
  Mr. Speaker, there is no question that the humanitarian crisis in 
Kosovo cries out for international attention and assistance. But the 
real question is: How should the United States of America respond? Is 
the answer always the commission of U.S. forces no matter what? 
Listening to the Clinton administration, we would think that bombing 
and deployment of troops is the only solution available to us.
  I am also concerned about the implications of the administration's 
Kosovo plans on the future of NATO. For several years NATO has been 
grappling with its role in the post cold war period. The 
administration's headlong rush to support deployment of NATO troops 
outside the treaty area risks damage to the delicate consensus that 
underlies the alliance.
  In April at NATO's 50th anniversary to be celebrated here in 
Washington the Alliance will announce its new strategic concept for the 
direction and mission of NATO. Will this document explain why NATO must 
intervene in Kosovo, an area outside the treaty boundary, but not 
intervene in an area, say, in Africa where there is genocide and a 
civil war going where human suffering is just as great.
  Mr. Speaker, when President Clinton first proposed sending U.S. 
troops to Kosovo, he laid out the following criteria: a strong and 
effective peace agreement with full participation by both parties, a 
permissive security environment, including the disarmament of the 
Kosovar power militaries and a well-defined NATO mission with a clear 
exit strategy. These criteria are a good starting point for the 
congressional consideration.
  Later today I or others may offer amendments to this resolution to 
ensure that these criteria and other equally important ones are met 
before U.S. troops are sent to Kosovo.
  Before I vote to support sending our men and women in uniform to 
Kosovo, people in my district want to know the exit strategy as well as 
the entry strategy. They want to know how this fits into our national 
interest, and they want to know the costs. These are basic questions 
that we in Congress should raise so that the American people are fully 
informed. Getting answers from the administration is part of our job 
description, especially when the use of our men and women in uniform is 
involved.
  This rule provides for full debate. I urge its support.
  Mr. HALL of Ohio. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman 
from Michigan (Mr. Bonior).
  Mr. BONIOR. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Hall) 
for yielding me the time, and again I rise to say that the timing of 
this resolution could not be worse, not the fact that we are debating 
it. I think the fact that they have allowed a debate and under a 
generally open rule is a positive sign, as my friend from Ohio has 
stated. But having this debate and having this vote in the midst of 
negotiations makes little sense and, in fact, undermines those 
negotiations.
  Mr. Speaker, I think it is important for us to review where we have 
been in the Balkans. In Bosnia tens of thousands of people lost their 
lives, thousands of women were raped, hundreds of thousands of people 
displaced from their home before we had the courage to finally say no, 
and within the past year in Kosovo we have had 2000 people killed, we 
have had 400,000 people displaced in Slobodan Milosevic's genocidal 
campaign of violence and human rights abuses against the 2 million 
ethnic Albanians.
  Mr. Speaker, this is not the time to have this resolution on the 
floor of the House. On the 15th of January, at Racak, Serbian special 
police shot at least 15 ethnic Albanians including elderly people and 
children. Human Rights Watch has evidence suggesting that the Serbians 
had, and I quote, ``direct orders to kill village inhabitants over the 
age of 15.'' In Rogovo, just 2 weeks later Serbian police raided a 
farming village and executed 25 people.
  This has gone on for a year, it has gone on for more than a year, but 
within the last year we have seen these numbers rise to 2,000 people.
  Why would Milosevic do anything but stall, not agree to a peace 
agreement, if the United States Congress says in a vote later today, if 
this rule passes, that we, in fact, will not deploy troops? We will be 
giving him a green light, and we will be seeing more Racaks, we will be 
seeing more slaughters as we saw in Rogovo, and we will be in an 
unvirtuous circle of islands in which we undoubtedly will have to 
revisit again on this House floor.
  Just today, while Richard Holbrooke was talking with Milosevic 
yesterday, violence continued, and there is a picture in the New York 
Times showing the deaths of people in the village of Ivaja in Kosovo.

                              {time}  1200

  This slaughter must stop, and the way to stop it is to stop this 
resolution from coming to the floor of the House, and we can do that by 
voting against the rule. Arthur Vandenberg once said that politics 
should stop at the water's edge when it comes to foreign policy. Bob 
Dole asked us not to do this yesterday. Let us not do this. Let us stop 
here. Vote no on this rule. Then we can have a good debate on this 
issue when the issue comes before us when an agreement occurs in this 
troubled land.
  Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished 
gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Linder).
  Mr. LINDER. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Florida (Mr. 
Diaz-Balart) for yielding.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of H. Res. 103, the rule providing for 
consideration of the resolution regarding peacekeeping operations in 
Kosovo. This rule ensures a free and open debate and provides Members 
the opportunity to have their voices heard on this very important 
matter involving the lives of our troops.
  The modified open rule passed the House Committee on Rules and it did 
not provide any preferential waivers. It allows for all germane 
amendments and complies with the request of the gentleman from 
Connecticut (Mr. Gejdenson), who requested that all amendments be 
preprinted in the Congressional Record.
  The passage of this rule will, I admit, lead to a wide open 
discussion on a very public issue, with the prospect of counter 
argument and earnest debate. I welcome that debate and I expect it to 
be an extraordinary exchange of ideas and opinions.
  I will be honest in stating that I have grave reservations about the 
deployment of American troops in Kosovo,

[[Page H1183]]

but I also do not see anything wrong with giving Members the 
opportunity to listen closely to the arguments on each side of the 
debate.
  Our allies, Great Britain and Germany, have deliberated and engaged 
in this debate already, and that leads us to the question underlying 
the rule we are discussing today: Should the United States House of 
Representatives have the opportunity to participate in the decision to 
deploy our troops in Kosovo and debate it today?
  My personal view is that it would be better if we did not. I would 
prefer that this resolution inform the President that we are unwilling 
to fund his adventurism without clear rules of engagement, exit 
strategies, specific goals and a budget. We have a constitutional 
responsibility to participate in decisions putting our troops in harm's 
way. I do believe that would better be the question before us.
  Having said that, I urge Members to support the fair rule that will 
initiate a full and open debate regarding the deployment of young 
Americans' lives in a dangerous foreign land.
  Mr. HALL of Ohio. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman 
from Missouri (Mr. Skelton), who is the ranking member of the Committee 
on Armed Services.
  Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Hall) 
for yielding to me.
  Mr. Speaker, I speak against the rule. I will vote against the rule. 
I am deeply concerned that taking this matter up now in the midst of 
negotiations between the opposing parties, the Kosovars and Milosevic's 
people, will cause great harm and great damage to the negotiating 
process.
  Should what we do today cause there to be no agreement, we would have 
lost, Europe would have lost and there will be continued bloodshed and 
anguish in Kosovo. I think it is wrong to take this up now. It is 
untimely. It is improper to do so.
  Secondly, as it was mentioned by my friend, the gentleman from Ohio 
(Mr. Hall), I am the ranking member on the Committee on Armed Services. 
This deals with the military of the United States of America.
  We in our committee should have had the opportunity to have had a 
hearing to find out what troops, under what conditions and if there is 
a possibility of saving some other deployments because we are short on 
troops today. These are questions that we in our committee should have 
had the opportunity to ask, a full and fair hearing in the Committee on 
Armed Services, which we did not have.
  Thirdly, I would like to mention that I also have an amendment, 
should this rule carry, which I hope in all sincerity it does not. I 
will have an amendment that requires that there be an agreement between 
the parties before any American troops are allowed to go into Kosovo. 
That is the bottom line. Right now, bringing up this resolution is 
improper and uncalled for because it could very well change the 
agreement, cause there not to be an agreement and cause confusion in 
that part of the Balkans.
  I wish that everyone could have been with me to witness the four-
starred German general who is the second in command at NATO a few weeks 
ago when I asked him why is it important that America be involved in 
Europe and in NATO?
  His answer was a full and complete one, which said it is important 
that America be there. I think that if America should be there, we 
should have the opportunity to do it the right way, the right time and 
under the right resolution and the right vote.
  Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished 
gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. Coble).
  (Mr. COBLE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. COBLE. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Diaz-
Balart) for yielding.
  Mr. Speaker, I usually vote consistently in favor of rules, and I may 
vote for this rule, but I am opposed to our dispatching troops to 
Kosovo, not unlike my friend, the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. Skelton) 
who just spoke.
  I recall Bosnia. The President told us our troops would be back home, 
I believe, by December 1996. Well, when I last checked, December 1996 
has come and long gone and our troops are still there. I was uneasy 
about it because I could not grasp the importance of our national 
security vis-a-vis Bosnia. Now Kosovo is on the screen and, unlike 
Bosnia, as best I remember it, I do not think we have even been invited 
to come to Kosovo.
  Given these two situations, I don't mean to portray myself as an 
isolationist but to suggest that Bosnia and Kosovo are European 
problems that should be resolved by Europeans hardly constitutes 
isolationism. It is isolationism light at its best, if that.
  I just believe that we do not need to insert our oars into those 
waters, and I don't mean to come across as uncaring or indifferent to 
the problems plaguing Europe, but doggone it, it is indeed a European 
problem.
  Let our European friends handle it unless it becomes a situation that 
causes United States national security to be exposed.
  Now, absent that, Mr. Speaker, and my colleagues on both sides, I 
think we need to go about our business here. Let our friends across the 
water, as my late grandma used to say, let them resolve those problems.
  Mr. HALL of Ohio. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman 
from Texas (Mr. Ortiz)
  Mr. ORTIZ. Mr. Speaker, I rise today as a member of the House 
Committee on Armed Services to oppose the rule allowing the House to 
consider House Resolution 42 regarding Kosovo.
  I want to say this in the strongest possible terms, considering this 
vote today is so ill-timed as to adversely affect the peace 
negotiations ongoing in the Balkans. It has taken us so long to build 
the coalition that we have been able to build in that part of the 
world, and we understand this. This Congress says they have the 
obligation to ensure that the diplomats in the region exhaust all 
possible means in their negotiations.
  Like the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. Skelton), I wish that we had 
been able to debate this issue in the committee before it came to the 
House floor to see what the needs are, how many troops, the equipment. 
So I think that it has all been done in good faith but it is ill-timed.
  We also have a unique responsibility in this situation, as we do in 
most global spots. We are the world's only remaining superpower. We 
have more and better military might than any other country in the 
world. If we are indeed the only remaining superpower, then that status 
brings certain obligations and responsibilities. This is why I say, let 
us discuss it further.
  I just got back from Bosnia 4 days ago. The morale of our troops is 
high and, not only that, they believe in the mission that they are 
conducting in that part of the world. They said for the first time we 
have seen young children play in the parks, play in the streets, go to 
school. So please help us defeat this rule.
  Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished 
gentleman from California (Mr. Cunningham).
  Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Mr. Speaker, this is exactly the time to have this 
discussion, exactly the time. It may not be the time for negotiators 
and bean counters but it is for our troops.
  I remember Somalia, where the President did not come to Congress when 
he changed going after Aideed, and we lost 22 rangers because they 
failed to give armor which the military wanted; or Haiti, that we are 
today spending $25 million a year in building schools and roads out of 
the defense budget.
  Kosovo is like any of the United States is to Greater Serbia. It is 
not a separate entity. It is the birthplace of the Orthodox Catholic 
religion. It is their home. It was occupied by 100 percent Serbs, and 
the Turks and the Nazis eliminated and desecrated and ethnically 
cleansed Jews, Gypsies and Serbs and now the population is Albanian.
  Albania does not want just Kosovo. They want part of Greece. They 
want Montenegro. This is only a beginning.
  Listen to George Tenet's brief. Bin Laden is working with the KLA, 
the terrorists, that is going to hit the United States. If we do not 
want to stop this, then do not talk about it, but if we go in there, we 
are going to lose a great number of people. For what? They have been 
fighting for 400 years.

[[Page H1184]]

  This debate is well timed. Maybe not for my colleagues on the other 
side but for the kids that have to put those backpacks on and carry 
rifles. It is the time to stop this.
  Take a look at the number of military deployments. It was 300 percent 
during the height of Vietnam. We are killing our military as it is, and 
we have one-half the force to do it. That is why they are bailing out. 
This is exactly the time, Mr. Speaker, and I reject the other side.
  Mr. HALL of Ohio. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
North Dakota (Mr. Pomeroy).
  Mr. POMEROY. Mr. Speaker, I strongly object to this rule which will 
provide for the House to debate the U.S. involvement in the Kosovo 
peace agreement. The reason I object to consideration of this issue at 
this time is that as of today, there is no peace agreement and the 
process leading to the arriving at a peace agreement is at a terribly 
tenuous, sensitive and delicate stage.

                              {time}  1215

  We have all read with horror about the atrocities committed in 
Kosovo. Innocent civilians, including little children, have been 
savagely and brutally murdered. For the sake of humanity and decency, 
we all want this butchery to end. It will require a peace agreement to 
end this killing. Our taking up the resolution now while the 
deliberations are still underway can only make it more difficult to 
resolve this.
  Yesterday, former Majority Leader Bob Dole gave advice to the 
Committee on International Relations. He says, ``We have 2 steps here. 
First, we get an agreement, then the President goes to the American 
people to explain it.''
  Mr. Speaker, I think we must follow Majority Leader Dole's advice. 
Defeat this rule and let the deliberations leading to peace be 
concluded.
  Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished 
gentleman from Colorado (Mr. McInnis).
  Mr. McINNIS. Mr. Speaker, I appreciate the gentleman from Florida 
yielding me this time.
  The preceding speaker talked about the tragedies that are going on. 
Mr. Speaker, those kinds of tragedies are going on throughout the 
entire world. This country cannot be the world's police officer. We do 
have international commitments, but before we exercise these 
commitments, we need to look at the precedents, what we have done in 
regards to these kinds of situations.
  Number one, we have never gone into the sovereign territory of 
another country like this without being invited to settle a dispute 
within their boundaries. This is a very similar situation. If the State 
of Colorado that I am from got in a dispute with the State of Texas, 
would we invite the Turks or the Greeks or NATO to come in and resolve 
the dispute between Colorado and Texas?
  There are atrocities occurring in Kosovo. It is a proper mission for 
humanitarian efforts. It is not a proper mission to intervene with 
American military troops that will be there on an indefinite basis. Do 
not kid ourselves. It is an indefinite basis.
  Look at Cyprus, the United Nations. I just came from Cyprus. United 
Nations troops have never been able to make the peace there. They have 
been able to keep the peace because of the fact they have troops there. 
They have been there for 27 years. It is the same thing here. We are 
attempting as outsiders to intervene within the boundaries of a 
sovereign country to resolve a dispute that is based in large part on 
religion, in large part on nationality; a dispute of which we have very 
little historical knowledge; we certainly have very little historical 
experience, and we think by force and sending in troops we are going to 
make peace. We are not.
  We are going to be able to keep the peace. As long as we have troops 
in Kosovo, we can keep peace. But we cannot, we do not have the 
capability to take hundreds of years of battle and hundreds of years of 
rock-solid feelings and force them into a peace agreement.
  Finally, Mr. Speaker, let me wrap up by saying that some would 
suggest that this is not an appropriate time for delay. This is an 
appropriate time for delay before the troops go in. Do not debate after 
the troops are in; do it before the troops are in.
  Mr. HALL of Ohio. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman 
from New York, (Mr. Engel).
  Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Speaker, I thank my friend from Ohio for yielding me 
this time.
  Mr. Speaker, I have spent as much time as anyone over these past 10 
or 11 years dealing with the problem in Kosovo. I want to tell my 
colleagues as far as I am concerned this is a wrong rule and the wrong 
resolution at the wrong time, and it should be defeated. I have hardly 
seen anything more irresponsible, quite frankly, in my 10 plus years 
here than this resolution and this rule.
  As far as I am concerned, this is an attempt to embarrass the 
President, this is mischief-making at its worst, and it undermines 
American foreign policy, it undermines the negotiations going on. I 
returned from Rambouillet 3 weeks ago, and I can tell my colleagues 
that if we pass this rule and the resolution offered by the gentleman 
from New York (Mr. Gilman) goes down to defeat, as I suspect it will, 
this will destroy the negotiations and destroy the peace process, and 
we will be responsible for that.
  The Speaker of the House, the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Hastert) 
came and said that this was an open process, and I think he was a bit 
disingenuous, quite frankly. He says that he wants to meet Democrats 
halfway. We have not seen that meeting us halfway on committee ratios, 
we have not seen it on funding, and now the Democrats are pleading, the 
administration is pleading and saying please postpone this vote until 
there is an agreement, and we cannot even get a postponement on the 
vote.
  Senator Dole was quite eloquent yesterday. He said, quite simply, 
first we get an agreement and then we go before Congress to ratify the 
agreement. We do not do it the other way around. Senator Dole has also 
spent more time than anybody in terms of Kosovo, and he thinks this 
will be very damaging. Everybody that has worked in this process thinks 
it will be very, very damaging.
  There is no reason to do this kind of thing now, except to embarrass 
the President politically and undermine U.S. foreign policy. This is 
absolutely irresponsible. It will damage the peace process.
  Let me remind my colleagues that foreign policy should be bipartisan. 
I was one of those Democrats that voted with President Bush and 
supported him in the Persian Gulf War when he asked for bipartisanship. 
Now that the shoe is on the other foot, we get very little of it from 
the other side. All I know is that in Kosovo there is genocide, ethnic 
cleansing and killing, and it needs to stop, and if the United States 
Congress votes against sending troops to Kosovo, Slobodan Milosevic, 
the butcher of Kosovo, will laugh and laugh and laugh, because we will 
have given him cover.
  The Albanians, who have agreed to the agreement will back off, 
because without strong American participation they will not have the 
fortitude; they only trust the United States of America. We have seen 
time and time again, we saw it in Bosnia, 200,000 people were 
ethnically cleansed, and until the United States grabbed the bull by 
the horns and showed the leadership in NATO, people were being killed 
and genocide was happening again on the face of Europe. And when the 
United States grabbed the bull by the horns, only then did it stop, and 
it is the same situation here. It is disingenuous of my colleagues to 
say they want the killing to stop, but they do not want to support 
American troops as part of NATO on the ground.
  Without our participation, the killing will continue and the ethnic 
cleansing will continue.
  Defeat this rule. It is nothing more than mischief making and it does 
not do this Congress good service at all.
  Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  I feel obliged to reject the allegation that Congress would be 
responsible for atrocities based on the fact that we are bringing forth 
this resolution as a sovereign representative body of the American 
people. I am unaccustomed to citing, to quoting The Washington Post, 
Mr. Speaker, but I feel at this time that I must.
  The Washington Post editorial today says, ``It is a bad time for 
Congress to

[[Page H1185]]

debate whether the United States should send troops to help police any 
peace reached in Kosovo. But there is no better time left, and Congress 
has good reason to proceed.''
  The Washington Post continues by saying, ``The President ought to be 
asking forthrightly for congressional approval, not trying to evade a 
congressional judgment on his policy in Kosovo.''
  So with all respect, I tell my colleagues that it is not fair, based 
on a policy disagreement, which is genuine and which is most 
appropriate to say that we would be responsible for atrocities or 
horrors that are based on unexplainable and historical reasons in that 
part of the world.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from New York (Mr. 
Gilman), the distinguished chairman of the Committee on International 
Relations.
  (Mr. GILMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this 
time.
  Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to rise in support of the rule, H. Con. 
Res. 42, authorizing deployment of our U.S. armed forces in Kosovo. It 
provides for a clear general debate, and then opens this measure up to 
amendments from any member, as long as these amendments were preprinted 
in the Record.
  I understand that some 53 amendments have been filed and some are 
duplicates and I expect the debate will focus on authorizing the 
deployment, requiring reports, praising the negotiations, praising our 
troops, or prohibiting the deployment. This debate will fulfill our 
historic constitutional and legal mandate given by our Founding Fathers 
to put the war powers in the hands of the Congress, not the President.
  We have called for this because as I understand it, the President 
does not want us to vote prior to the conclusions of the ongoing Kosovo 
negotiations, and will deploy troops within 48 hours of the agreement, 
as he has indicated that he will deploy some 4,000 troops to support 
the agreement. And if we were to vote subsequent to deployment, we 
would risk undercutting our troops in the field.
  According to the Secretary of State, the people's elected 
representatives should not vote before deployment and to avoid 
undercutting the troops, we should not vote after deployment. That must 
not be so. The elected representatives of the people must vote on this 
risky mission.
  From some of the past conflicts up to and including Desert Storm, 
Congress has voted on deployment of our troops and when we did so, we 
strengthened our Nation's resolve and our diplomacy.
  I believe we must have this vote to require the President to clarify 
our mission and to bring the American people into the debate that could 
put our uniformed personnel in harm's way.
  I want to state that I support this resolution. I support the 
deployment of troops to Kosovo, provided they enter Kosovo in a 
permissive environment and with agreed-on conditions of the contact 
group. With such conditions, I would support our President's commitment 
to guaranteeing peace in Kosovo.
  To quote the editorial that was just cited by our good colleague from 
Florida, the editorial in today's Washington Post entitled ``Bring 
Congress In,'' and I quote, ``It takes a bold decision for Bill Clinton 
to bring Congress in as a partner this Kosovo, and he should not shy 
away from it.''
  Mr. HALL of Ohio. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman 
from Connecticut (Mr. Gejdenson), who is the ranking minority member on 
the Committee on International Relations.
  Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Speaker, first let us get straight where we are. 
There is no constitutional requirement that the United States Congress 
take action prior to the President putting troops into a peacekeeping 
situation. This is not initiating a war; this is not moving troops in 
an area where we anticipate war. These are peacekeeping operations, and 
we have troops all over the world in peacekeeping operations without 
having gotten prior congressional approval.
  Let us also get rid of some of the arguments that we have heard here 
on the floor that we are going to let the Europeans take care of that. 
That was tried. The previous administration waited for Europe to 
respond to the crisis in Yugoslavia. Mr. Speaker, 200,000 people 
murdered, raped, killed in their homes, in open fields, maybe not 
reaching the numbers of other mass murders in this century, but 
certainly enough that the American people felt that we could no longer 
wait, and this President led our effort to end that slaughter.
  Burden sharing. We have never had an action where the United States 
is to play such a small role in the number of people on the ground; 
that in every other action, American forces were there in larger number 
and in this case the Europeans are, for the first time in my memory, 
accepting a larger responsibility. When we look at the statements, not 
just of Ambassador Kirkpatrick and Senator Dole who are clearly in 
favor of the President's policy, and in particular Senator Dole 
deserves great praise for his actions, his efforts, going to the region 
and the work he has done. But even Secretary Kissinger, who has written 
in opposition to the policy, was very hesitant to suggest that anybody 
should interpret from his article that they should vote against this 
resolution.

                              {time}  1230

  What is the right thing to do? The right thing to do, as Senator Dole 
said, is first have an agreement and then have a vote. Because if we do 
not do it that way, as again Senator Dole said, if we have the vote 
first and we fail to pass it, we will probably not have an agreement.
  It is an awfully hard place to get an agreement in the first place. 
Without all the support from Congress, with the unanimity of the 
American people, expressed by 435 Members of this House voting in favor 
of the President's actions, it will be exceedingly difficult to achieve 
a goal of peace in that area.
  But with the actions that we take today, even if we pass it, but with 
a small number, it will encourage Milosevic and others who object to 
the peace process, who want to see battle continue, and who care not 
for the lives on the ground.
  I do hope this is a sincere effort where we differ. I sure hope that 
we do not see a unified rejection of the negotiations that are going on 
today because it is a Democratic President. Speaker Foley, when he sat 
in this House, held up the vote on the Persian Gulf for months at the 
request of the President of the United States, George Bush. He waited 
until the troops were there and ready, and then, with agreement from 
the administration, held a vote.
  We are asked to vote before there is an agreement, before there is a 
conclusion. Support the Committee on Rules' proposal to send this back 
and bring it back to the floor when there is actually something to vote 
on.
  Mr. HALL of Ohio. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman 
from California (Mr. Lantos), who is also a very distinguished member 
of the Committee on International Relations.
  Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, I have the highest regard for all of my 
colleagues on the other side of the Chamber, and of course, I 
recognize, as we all must, that this is not a partisan issue.
  When President Bush asked this body to support him with respect to 
the Persian Gulf, I was one of those Democrats who proudly and publicly 
supported him. I want to pay tribute to Senator Dole for his courageous 
public statements and actions supporting the policy that we support.
  It is self-evident that this is the wrong time to deal with this 
issue. There may be no agreement for us to implement. But if we vote 
now, the likelihood of an agreement diminishes.
  How many innocent children and women have to be killed in the former 
Yugoslavia for us to talk about genocide? Had we acted in 1991, a 
quarter million innocent people who are now dead would be here, and 
2\1/2\ million refugees would still be living in their homes.
  I know the difference between the Persian Gulf and Kosovo. Kosovo has 
no oil. That is the principle that is invoked here, under the table. 
Clearly we are not protecting our oil resources in Kosovo, as we did in 
the Persian Gulf.
  This ought not to be a partisan dispute. We are undermining NATO, 
that succeeded in destroying the mighty Soviet Union, if we as the 
leader of NATO

[[Page H1186]]

bail out on our international responsibilities.
  If we listen closely, we hear the voices of isolationism 
reverberating in this Chamber. It is mindboggling. As we close this 
century, the lesson of it is that appeasement does not pay, that 
aggression must be resisted. I ask my colleagues to reject this rule, 
and to have this debate after an agreement will have been reached.
  Mr. HALL of Ohio. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman 
from Michigan (Mr. Levin).
  (Mr. LEVIN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. Speaker, I was in Bosnia 4 years ago as cochair of a 
House delegation, and there were three clear lessons from that trip.
  Number one, there is a U.S. national interest in preventing an 
outbreak of major conflagration in the Balkans. We should not be the 
world's policeman, true. We also should not be asleep at the switch. 
Whether we like it or not, the Balkans is an important crossroads.
  Secondly, Mr. Milosevic is a major roadblock to peace, and 
understands only firmness, total firmness.
  Third, the U.S. has a special credibility there. We have a special 
credibility, and we need to use it to help bring about peace and to 
help enforce it.
  The question now is not whether we are going to go to war, but 
whether we can negotiate a peace. I urge Members on the majority side 
to listen to their standardbearer of 1996, Robert Dole, who said just 
yesterday, I would rather have the vote come after the agreement. Mr. 
Dole, to his credit, knows the importance of bipartisanship in foreign 
policy.
  I close with this. This is a particularly sensitive time in the 
negotiations for peace in Kosovo. This is not the time to take risks in 
undermining those efforts. Those who insist on a debate at this 
particular moment should think again, or they bear the responsibility 
for the possible consequences of their actions.
  Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the 
gentlewoman from North Carolina (Mrs. Myrick), a distinguished member 
of the Committee on Rules.
  Mrs. MYRICK. Mr. Speaker, I do rise today in support of this rule, 
because it provides a fair and open debate, as should be the case with 
such an important matter. But that said, I strongly oppose the 
commitment of U.S. troops to Kosovo unless we are going to go in and 
solve the problem.
  I do not believe the United States can be the parent or the policeman 
of the world, and the fighting there and in the rest of the Balkans is 
primarily a European matter and should remain a European matter, and 
they should be involved in taking the lead in this.
  I believe wholeheartedly in maintaining a strong national defense, 
and I will always support our men and women in uniform. In fact, it is 
because of my commitment to the troops and not despite of it that I 
oppose this deployment of the troops to Kosovo.
  To put it simply, our forces are stretched too thin around the globe 
to commit 4,000 or 5,000 troops in an effort whose end is nowhere in 
sight. When we committed troops to Bosnia, we were told they would be 
home that fall; then, that Christmas. That was in 1996. Three years 
later, our troops are still in Bosnia.
  I have tremendous confidence in America's Armed Forces, and have no 
doubt that given a properly defined mission with a clear objective and 
a sensible exit strategy, our forces would perform brilliantly. That, 
however, does not describe our presence in the former Yugoslavia.
  I urge my colleagues to join me in supporting this rule and opposing 
House Concurrent Resolution 42.
  Mr. HALL of Ohio. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to our leader, the 
gentleman from Missouri (Mr. Gephardt).
  (Mr. GEPHARDT asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. GEPHARDT. Mr. Speaker, I have always believed that Congress 
should be involved in decisions by our government to send our armed 
services into harm's way. I really believe it is best to first commit 
the people and then commit the troops.
  However, I object strongly to the timing of this debate. We should 
not be debating this matter while our diplomats at this very moment are 
seeking to convince the parties to this conflict to lay down their 
weapons and choose the path of peace.
  To conduct a divisive debate in Congress and perhaps fail to support 
our government's efforts is the height of irresponsibility, and 
threatens the hope for an agreement to halt the bloodshed and prevent 
the widening of this war.
  We all know that we are at a very delicate moment in the Kosovo peace 
negotiations. In part due to the efforts of former Senate Majority 
Leader Bob Dole, the Kosovar Albanians are reportedly ready to sign an 
agreement, and our diplomats are right now continuing convince 
Yugoslavia President Milosevic to agree, as well.
  If we reject this legislation, the Kosovars may refuse to sign an 
agreement out of fear that U.S. leadership is wavering, and clearly, 
Milosevic will be emboldened to continue his rejection of a NATO force 
as part of any agreement. Either outcome will only lead to more 
violence, more bloodshed, which has engulfed this region over the past 
years.
  This should not be about politics. It should not be about giving the 
administration a black eye. This is about ending a humanitarian 
catastrophe and preventing the slaughter of thousands of innocent 
people caught in a simmering ethnic conflict.
  Lives are at stake here. Our actions today may determine whether the 
people of Kosovo have a chance for a peaceful future, or simply resume 
the killing that could destabilize the region and threaten United 
States interests. I thought until recently that the Republican 
leadership shared this view, and grieve that partisanship has no place 
in this debate.
  When asked a few weeks ago about a House vote on Kosovo, the Speaker 
stated publicly, I think we need to make sure that the administration 
has the room to negotiate and get the job done in Rambouillet first. 
The fact that we are here today demonstrates that Republican leaders 
have chosen partisan politics over a united American effort to end the 
conflict. It seems that politics has infected foreign policy, and I 
think, if that has happened, with great harm to our credibility 
overseas.
  Others will talk about the importance of U.S. leadership in the 
Balkans and Kosovo's significance for the future of NATO. I will simply 
reiterate to the Members what Bob Dole said yesterday in the Committee 
on International Relations. When asked about the timing of the vote, 
Senator Dole said, ``I would rather have the vote come after the 
agreement between the Kosovar Albanians and Serbia.''
  When asked how Members should vote if this resolution is not 
postponed, Senator Dole said, we hope there will be strong bipartisan 
support. It is in our national interest to do this.
  I regret that the leadership in Congress has forgotten our history 
and our background, and the importance of standing united as we attempt 
to resolve yet another international conflict. I urge all Members, 
Republican and Democratic alike, to vote against this rule, and defer 
this action that very well may provoke further bloodshed in the 
Balkans.
  We can have this vote if there is a treaty. We can have this vote 
once there has been some kind of pulling together of a policy that we 
can look at and evaluate. This vote today is premature. It is wrong to 
have it today. The Members have it within their ability to put this 
vote off. I urge Members to vote against the previous question, vote 
against the rule, and let us bring up this vote when it is timely and 
appropriate.
  Mr. HALL of Ohio. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  (Mr. HALL of Ohio asked and was given permission to revise and extend 
his remarks and include extraneous material.)
  Mr. HALL of Ohio. Mr. Speaker, I urge Members to vote against the 
previous question. If the previous question is defeated, I will offer 
an amendment to the rule that will delay consideration of the Kosovo 
peacekeeping resolution until an agreement on the status of Kosovo has 
been signed between the Serbian government and the Kosovo Albanians.
  There is potential for serious damage to the peace process if we 
insist on

[[Page H1187]]

bringing this debate while negotiations are in midstream and are in a 
precarious state. We certainly would not want to do anything in this 
body which could have the effect of disrupting or even ending the 
prospect for peace in the Balkan region.

                              {time}  1245

  Mr. Speaker, I urge a no vote on the previous question.
  Mr. Speaker, I include for the Record the document entitled ``The 
Vote on the Previous Question: What It Really Means,'' as follows:

        The Vote on the Previous Question: What it Really Means

       This vote, the vote on whether to order the previous 
     question on a special rule, is not merely a procedural vote. 
     A vote against ordering the previous question is a vote 
     against the Republican majority agenda and a vote to allow 
     the opposition, at least for the moment, to offer an 
     alternative plan. It is a vote about what the House should be 
     debating.
       Mr. Clarence Cannon's ``Precedents of the House of 
     Representatives,'' (VI, 308-311) describes the vote on the 
     previous question on the rule as ``a motion to direct or 
     control the consideration of the subject before the House 
     being made by the Member in charge.'' To defeat the previous 
     question is to give the opposition a chance to decide the 
     subject before the House. Cannon cites the Speaker's ruling 
     of January 13, 1920, to the effect that ``the refusal of the 
     House to sustain the demand for the previous question passes 
     the control of the resolution to the opposition'' in order to 
     offer an amendment. On March 15, 1909, a member of the 
     majority party offered a rule resolution. The House defeated 
     the previous question and a member of the opposition rose to 
     a parliamentary inquiry, asking who was entitled to 
     recognition. Speaker Joseph G. Cannon (R-Illinois) said: 
     ``The previous question having been refused, the gentleman 
     from New York, Mr. Fitzgerald, who had asked the gentleman to 
     yield to him for an amendment, is entitled to the first 
     recognition.''
       Because the vote today may look bad for the Republican 
     majority they will say ``the vote on the previous question is 
     simply a vote on whether to proceed to an immediate vote on 
     adopting the resolution . . . [and] has no substantive 
     legislative or policy implications whatsoever.'' But that is 
     not what they have always said. Listen to the Republican 
     Leadership ``Manual on the Legislative Process in the United 
     States House of Representatives,'' (6th edition, page 135). 
     Here's how the Republicans describe the previous question 
     vote in their own manual:
       ``Although it is generally not possible to amend the rule 
     because the majority Member controlling the time will not 
     yield for the purpose of offering an amendment, the same 
     result may be achieved by voting down the previous question 
     on the rule. . . . When the motion for the previous question 
     is defeated, control of the time passes to the Member who led 
     the opposition to ordering the previous question. That 
     Member, because he then controls the time, may offer an 
     amendment to the rule, or yield for the purpose of 
     amendment.''
       Deschler's ``Procedure in the U.S. House of 
     Representatives,'' the subchapter titled ``Amending Special 
     Rules'' states: ``a refusal to order the previous question on 
     such a rule [a special rule reported from the Committee on 
     Rules] opens the resolution to amendment and further 
     debate.'' (Chapter 21, section 21.2) Section 21.3 continues:
       ``Upon rejection of the motion for the previous question on 
     a resolution reported from the Committee on Rules, control 
     shifts to the Member leading the opposition to the previous 
     question, who may offer a proper amendment or motion and who 
     controls the time for debate thereon.''
       The vote on the previous question on a rule does have 
     substantive policy implications. It is one of the only 
     available tools for those who oppose the Republican 
     majority's agenda to offer an alternative plan.

  Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. 
Roemer).
  Mr. ROEMER. Mr. Speaker, I want to thank the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. 
Hall) for yielding me the time.
  Mr. Speaker, I want to encourage Members on both sides of the aisle 
to support the motion of the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Hall) to defeat 
the previous question and do so for the following two reasons: One, 
maybe the most important book written on the history of Kosovo and 
Bosnia in the last several years by Robert Kaplan is ``Balkan Ghosts.'' 
Certainly the ghosts of this distinguished Chamber are rattling around 
as we play some politics with the timing of this resolution.
  When it comes to foreign policy, it used to be that we did not play 
politics and go across the water's edge. Certainly when it comes to 
war, my very first vote in this Chamber, we had dignified and civil 
debate really that embodied the comity that this institution is capable 
of.
  The timing of this resolution is very important. We should not do it 
before we see the peace agreement that is reached, if one is reached in 
this very volatile and delicate region of the world.
  Secondly, Mr. Speaker, and I openly will criticize the administration 
for this, I do not know how I would vote next week or the week after on 
deploying troops. I think we should have answers to questions about how 
thinly our troops might be deployed, what the cost would be, what the 
exit strategy will be, how we are going to pay for this, what is the 
morale of the troops like and what state is that?
  I do not think we should give carte blanche to the administration who 
simply announces to Congress that they are going to send 4,000 troops 
overseas whether Congress wants to or not.
  So in terms of these two reasons, the politics of the timing today is 
not appropriate. Let us see if we can get a peace agreement; and then 
once we have it, let us debate it. Let us play our constitutional role 
in the United States Congress and have input, valuable input and debate 
on such a critically important matter for our Constitution, our 
country, and our Congress.
  Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  Mr. Speaker, the accusations made by our distinguished colleagues on 
the other side of the aisle, especially the minority leader, have been 
most unfair, unfortunate, and must be rejected.
  Partisanship has not played a role in this timing. The deadline for 
negotiations is Monday night. Our troops could be on their way to being 
deployed Monday night. If Congress is to have a voice on this issue, 
Congress must speak now, as even the Washington Post has recognized.
  I personally will join the gentleman from New York (Mr. Gilman), the 
chairman of the Committee on International Relations, in voting in 
favor of the authorization, in other words, the underlying concurrent 
resolution being brought forth by this rule.
  So I would urge my colleagues to vote to support the previous 
question and to support the rule.
  Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to speak on House 
Concurrent Resolution 42, a measure regarding the use of United States 
Armed Forces as part of a NATO peacekeeping operation to implement a 
peace agreement in Kosovo.
  At the outset, Mr. Speaker, I would voice my objection on procedural 
grounds to the rule authorizing debate today of H. Con. Res. 42, a 
measure on which the Democrats had no input and the Administration has 
not been permitted to comment upon.
  As we all know, Mr. Speaker, the fragile peace negotiations on Kosovo 
are being conducted by the six member Contact Group and international 
community as we speak. Because of the sensitivity of these on-going 
negotiations, this is the absolute worst time to hold a contentious 
debate on Kosovo in the House of Representatives. Mixed signals from 
the U.S. Congress concerning the U.S. role in Kosovo undercut the 
Administration's ability to forge a successful peace agreement between 
the warring factions in Kosovo.
  Already the situation is being manipulated by Serb leader Slobodan 
Milosevic, whose belligerence has been encouraged by perceived 
ambivalence in Washington. No doubt this has played a role in recent 
setbacks to the peace process, as exemplified by Milosevic's emboldened 
insistence to U.S. Special Envoy Richard Holbrooke that any political 
agreement based upon his country's acceptance of foreign troops is 
unacceptable.
  Mr. Speaker, I urge our colleagues to vote against the rule on H. 
Con. Res. 42. It is clearly irresponsible to hold a divisive Kosovo 
debate now in Congress that will, in all likelihood, materially damage 
prospects for a lasting peace agreement being reached in that war-torn 
province.
  Having said that, Mr. Speaker, if a peace accord in Kosovo is 
negotiated, I would urge support for the President's authority to 
deploy U.S. troops to implement the peace agreement, as embodied in H. 
Con. Res. 42.
  As the world's lone superpower, I believe the government of the 
United States has a moral obligation to do what we can to stop the 
senseless bloodshed in Kosovo. Already over 200,000 lives have been 
sacrificed in the region's violence and it must be stopped.
  On a strategic level, it is important that the war in Kosovo not be 
allowed to escalate and spread, threatening the stability of 
surrounding Balkan states as well as that of NATO partners, Greece and 
Turkey. The United States has a strategic interest in preserving the 
peace and stability of all of Europe, including its southern flank.

[[Page H1188]]

  Achieving these important objectives require that an international 
peacekeeping force be formed by NATO. As NATO's leader, I believe it 
appropriate and not an undue burden that the United States contribute 
4,000 U.S. troops, only 14% of the total NATO deployment of 28,000 
peacekeeping soldiers. History has shown repeatedly that if the United 
States does not participate and lead, NATO is ineffective and falls 
apart.
  Mr. Speaker, whether we like it or not, America cannot afford to walk 
away from the genocide and instability festering in Kosovo. I urge our 
colleagues to support H. Con. Res. 42 and its urgent mission to bring 
peace to the long suffering people of Kosovo.
  Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to the 
rule allowing for the consideration of H. Con. Res. 42.
  Mr. Speaker, the consideration of this bill comes at a most 
inopportune time. Timing is the key issue in this debate. As 
Negotiations to end the fighting in Kosovo are scheduled to resume next 
week this body has scheduled a debate as to the course of American 
policy in the region. In debating this resolution now we send the wrong 
message to friend and foe alike. In debating this issue now we send a 
message of indecisiveness and reluctance to fulfill our role as a peace 
partner in the region.
  A decisive debate on this issue could undermine the talks at a 
critical juncture in the dialogue. Even former Senator Dole who 
supports a NATO ground presence, recognizes the bad timing of this 
resolution. On March 10, Senator Dole testified before the House 
International Relations Committee that he ``would rather have the vote 
come after the agreement between the Albanians and Serbia.''
  Mr. Speaker, I will vote against the rule on H. Con. Res. 42 because 
this is the wrong time for the consideration of this legislation by the 
House at such a critical moment in the peace negotiations.
  Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Mr. Speaker, I move the previous question on the 
resolution.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Burr of North Carolina). The question is 
on ordering the previous question.
  The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that 
the ayes appeared to have it.
  Mr. HALL of Ohio. Mr. Speaker, I object to the vote on the ground 
that a quorum is not present and make the point of order that a quorum 
is not present.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Evidently a quorum is not present.
  The Sergeant at Arms will notify absent Members.
  Pursuant to clause 9 of rule XX, the Chair will reduce to a minimum 
of 5 minutes the period of time within which a vote by electronic 
device, if ordered, will be taken on the question of agreeing to the 
resolution.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 219, 
nays 203, not voting 12, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 45]

                               YEAS--219

     Aderholt
     Archer
     Armey
     Bachus
     Baker
     Ballenger
     Barr
     Barrett (NE)
     Bartlett
     Barton
     Bass
     Bateman
     Bereuter
     Biggert
     Bilirakis
     Bliley
     Blunt
     Boehlert
     Boehner
     Bonilla
     Bono
     Brady (TX)
     Bryant
     Burr
     Burton
     Buyer
     Callahan
     Calvert
     Camp
     Campbell
     Canady
     Cannon
     Castle
     Chabot
     Chambliss
     Chenoweth
     Coble
     Coburn
     Collins
     Combest
     Cook
     Cooksey
     Cox
     Crane
     Cubin
     Cunningham
     Davis (VA)
     Deal
     DeLay
     DeMint
     Diaz-Balart
     Dickey
     Doolittle
     Dreier
     Duncan
     Dunn
     Ehlers
     Ehrlich
     Emerson
     English
     Everett
     Ewing
     Fletcher
     Foley
     Forbes
     Fossella
     Fowler
     Franks (NJ)
     Frelinghuysen
     Gallegly
     Ganske
     Gekas
     Gibbons
     Gilchrest
     Gillmor
     Gilman
     Goode
     Goodlatte
     Goss
     Graham
     Granger
     Green (WI)
     Greenwood
     Hall (TX)
     Hansen
     Hastert
     Hastings (WA)
     Hayes
     Hayworth
     Hefley
     Herger
     Hill (MT)
     Hilleary
     Hobson
     Hoekstra
     Horn
     Hostettler
     Houghton
     Hulshof
     Hunter
     Hutchinson
     Hyde
     Isakson
     Istook
     Jenkins
     Johnson (CT)
     Johnson, Sam
     Jones (NC)
     Kasich
     Kelly
     King (NY)
     Kingston
     Knollenberg
     Kolbe
     Kuykendall
     LaHood
     Largent
     Latham
     LaTourette
     Lazio
     Leach
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (KY)
     Linder
     LoBiondo
     Lucas (OK)
     Manzullo
     McCollum
     McCrery
     McHugh
     McInnis
     McIntosh
     McKeon
     Metcalf
     Mica
     Miller (FL)
     Miller, Gary
     Moran (KS)
     Myrick
     Nethercutt
     Ney
     Northup
     Norwood
     Nussle
     Ose
     Oxley
     Packard
     Paul
     Pease
     Peterson (PA)
     Petri
     Pickering
     Pitts
     Pombo
     Porter
     Portman
     Pryce (OH)
     Quinn
     Radanovich
     Ramstad
     Regula
     Reynolds
     Riley
     Rogan
     Rogers
     Rohrabacher
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Roukema
     Royce
     Ryan (WI)
     Ryun (KS)
     Salmon
     Sanford
     Scarborough
     Schaffer
     Sensenbrenner
     Sessions
     Shadegg
     Shaw
     Shays
     Sherwood
     Shimkus
     Shuster
     Simpson
     Skeen
     Smith (MI)
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (TX)
     Souder
     Spence
     Stearns
     Stump
     Sununu
     Sweeney
     Talent
     Tancredo
     Tauzin
     Taylor (NC)
     Terry
     Thomas
     Thornberry
     Thune
     Tiahrt
     Toomey
     Upton
     Walden
     Walsh
     Wamp
     Watkins
     Watts (OK)
     Weldon (FL)
     Weldon (PA)
     Weller
     Whitfield
     Wicker
     Wilson
     Wolf
     Young (AK)
     Young (FL)

                               NAYS--203

     Abercrombie
     Ackerman
     Allen
     Andrews
     Baird
     Baldacci
     Baldwin
     Barcia
     Barrett (WI)
     Bentsen
     Berkley
     Berman
     Berry
     Bishop
     Blagojevich
     Blumenauer
     Bonior
     Borski
     Boswell
     Boucher
     Boyd
     Brady (PA)
     Brown (CA)
     Brown (FL)
     Brown (OH)
     Capuano
     Cardin
     Carson
     Clay
     Clayton
     Clement
     Clyburn
     Condit
     Conyers
     Costello
     Coyne
     Cramer
     Crowley
     Cummings
     Danner
     Davis (FL)
     Davis (IL)
     DeFazio
     DeGette
     DeLauro
     Deutsch
     Dicks
     Dingell
     Dixon
     Doggett
     Dooley
     Doyle
     Edwards
     Engel
     Eshoo
     Etheridge
     Evans
     Farr
     Fattah
     Filner
     Ford
     Frank (MA)
     Gejdenson
     Gephardt
     Gonzalez
     Gordon
     Green (TX)
     Gutierrez
     Hall (OH)
     Hastings (FL)
     Hill (IN)
     Hilliard
     Hinchey
     Hinojosa
     Hoeffel
     Holden
     Holt
     Hooley
     Hoyer
     Inslee
     Jackson (IL)
     Jackson-Lee (TX)
     Jefferson
     Johnson, E. B.
     Jones (OH)
     Kanjorski
     Kaptur
     Kennedy
     Kildee
     Kilpatrick
     Kind (WI)
     Kleczka
     Klink
     Kucinich
     LaFalce
     Lampson
     Lantos
     Larson
     Lee
     Levin
     Lewis (GA)
     Lipinski
     Lofgren
     Lowey
     Lucas (KY)
     Luther
     Maloney (CT)
     Maloney (NY)
     Markey
     Martinez
     Mascara
     Matsui
     McCarthy (MO)
     McCarthy (NY)
     McDermott
     McGovern
     McIntyre
     McKinney
     McNulty
     Meehan
     Meek (FL)
     Meeks (NY)
     Menendez
     Millender-McDonald
     Miller, George
     Minge
     Mink
     Moakley
     Moore
     Moran (VA)
     Murtha
     Nadler
     Napolitano
     Neal
     Oberstar
     Obey
     Olver
     Ortiz
     Owens
     Pallone
     Pascrell
     Pastor
     Payne
     Pelosi
     Peterson (MN)
     Phelps
     Pickett
     Pomeroy
     Price (NC)
     Rahall
     Rangel
     Rivers
     Rodriguez
     Roemer
     Rothman
     Roybal-Allard
     Rush
     Sabo
     Sanchez
     Sanders
     Sandlin
     Sawyer
     Schakowsky
     Scott
     Serrano
     Sherman
     Shows
     Sisisky
     Skelton
     Slaughter
     Smith (WA)
     Snyder
     Spratt
     Stabenow
     Stark
     Stenholm
     Strickland
     Stupak
     Tanner
     Tauscher
     Taylor (MS)
     Thompson (CA)
     Thompson (MS)
     Thurman
     Tierney
     Towns
     Traficant
     Turner
     Udall (CO)
     Udall (NM)
     Velazquez
     Vento
     Visclosky
     Waters
     Watt (NC)
     Waxman
     Weiner
     Wexler
     Weygand
     Wise
     Woolsey
     Wu
     Wynn

                             NOT VOTING--12

     Becerra
     Bilbray
     Capps
     Delahunt
     Frost
     Goodling
     Gutknecht
     John
     Mollohan
     Morella
     Reyes
     Saxton

                              {time}  1308

  Messrs. BISHOP, HOEFFEL and PAYNE changed their vote from ``yea'' to 
``nay.''
  So the previous question was ordered.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Burr of North Carolina). The question is 
on the resolution.
  The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that 
the ayes appeared to have it.


                             Recorded Vote

  Mr. HALL of Ohio. Mr. Speaker, I demand a recorded vote.
  A recorded vote was ordered.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. This is a 5-minute vote.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 218, 
noes 201, not voting 15, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 46]

                               AYES--218

     Aderholt
     Armey
     Bachus
     Baker
     Ballenger
     Barr
     Barrett (NE)
     Barton
     Bass
     Bateman
     Bereuter
     Biggert
     Bilirakis
     Bliley
     Blunt
     Boehlert
     Boehner
     Bonilla
     Bono
     Brady (TX)
     Bryant
     Burr
     Burton
     Buyer
     Callahan
     Calvert
     Camp
     Campbell
     Canady
     Cannon
     Castle
     Chabot
     Chambliss
     Chenoweth
     Coble
     Coburn
     Collins
     Combest
     Cook
     Cooksey
     Cox
     Crane
     Cubin
     Cunningham
     Davis (VA)
     Deal
     DeLay
     DeMint
     Diaz-Balart
     Dickey
     Doolittle
     Dreier
     Duncan
     Dunn
     Ehlers
     Ehrlich
     Emerson
     English
     Everett
     Ewing

[[Page H1189]]


     Fletcher
     Foley
     Forbes
     Fossella
     Fowler
     Frank (MA)
     Franks (NJ)
     Frelinghuysen
     Gallegly
     Ganske
     Gekas
     Gibbons
     Gilchrest
     Gillmor
     Gilman
     Goode
     Goodlatte
     Goss
     Graham
     Granger
     Green (WI)
     Greenwood
     Gutknecht
     Hall (TX)
     Hansen
     Hastert
     Hastings (WA)
     Hayes
     Hayworth
     Hefley
     Herger
     Hill (MT)
     Hilleary
     Hobson
     Hoekstra
     Hostettler
     Houghton
     Hulshof
     Hutchinson
     Hyde
     Isakson
     Istook
     Jenkins
     Johnson (CT)
     Johnson, Sam
     Jones (NC)
     Kasich
     Kelly
     King (NY)
     Kingston
     Knollenberg
     Kolbe
     Kuykendall
     LaHood
     Largent
     Latham
     LaTourette
     Lazio
     Leach
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (KY)
     Linder
     LoBiondo
     Lucas (OK)
     Manzullo
     McCollum
     McCrery
     McHugh
     McInnis
     McIntosh
     McKeon
     Metcalf
     Mica
     Miller (FL)
     Miller, Gary
     Moran (KS)
     Myrick
     Nethercutt
     Ney
     Northup
     Norwood
     Nussle
     Ose
     Oxley
     Packard
     Paul
     Pease
     Peterson (PA)
     Petri
     Pickering
     Pitts
     Pombo
     Porter
     Portman
     Pryce (OH)
     Radanovich
     Ramstad
     Regula
     Reynolds
     Riley
     Roemer
     Rogan
     Rogers
     Rohrabacher
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Roukema
     Royce
     Ryan (WI)
     Ryun (KS)
     Salmon
     Sanford
     Scarborough
     Schaffer
     Sensenbrenner
     Sessions
     Shadegg
     Shaw
     Shays
     Sherwood
     Shimkus
     Shuster
     Simpson
     Skeen
     Smith (MI)
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (TX)
     Souder
     Spence
     Stearns
     Stump
     Sununu
     Sweeney
     Talent
     Tancredo
     Tauzin
     Taylor (MS)
     Taylor (NC)
     Terry
     Thomas
     Thornberry
     Thune
     Tiahrt
     Toomey
     Upton
     Walden
     Walsh
     Wamp
     Watkins
     Watts (OK)
     Weldon (FL)
     Weldon (PA)
     Weller
     Whitfield
     Wicker
     Wilson
     Wolf
     Young (AK)
     Young (FL)

                               NOES--201

     Abercrombie
     Ackerman
     Allen
     Andrews
     Baird
     Baldacci
     Baldwin
     Barcia
     Barrett (WI)
     Bentsen
     Berkley
     Berman
     Berry
     Bishop
     Blagojevich
     Blumenauer
     Bonior
     Borski
     Boswell
     Boucher
     Boyd
     Brady (PA)
     Brown (CA)
     Brown (FL)
     Brown (OH)
     Capuano
     Cardin
     Carson
     Clay
     Clayton
     Clement
     Clyburn
     Condit
     Conyers
     Costello
     Coyne
     Cramer
     Crowley
     Cummings
     Danner
     Davis (FL)
     Davis (IL)
     DeFazio
     DeGette
     DeLauro
     Deutsch
     Dicks
     Dingell
     Dixon
     Doggett
     Dooley
     Doyle
     Edwards
     Engel
     Eshoo
     Etheridge
     Evans
     Farr
     Fattah
     Filner
     Ford
     Gejdenson
     Gephardt
     Gonzalez
     Gordon
     Green (TX)
     Gutierrez
     Hall (OH)
     Hastings (FL)
     Hill (IN)
     Hilliard
     Hinchey
     Hinojosa
     Hoeffel
     Holden
     Holt
     Hooley
     Hoyer
     Inslee
     Jackson (IL)
     Jackson-Lee (TX)
     Jefferson
     Johnson, E. B.
     Jones (OH)
     Kanjorski
     Kaptur
     Kennedy
     Kildee
     Kilpatrick
     Kind (WI)
     Kleczka
     Klink
     Kucinich
     LaFalce
     Lampson
     Lantos
     Larson
     Lee
     Levin
     Lewis (GA)
     Lipinski
     Lofgren
     Lowey
     Lucas (KY)
     Luther
     Maloney (CT)
     Maloney (NY)
     Markey
     Martinez
     Mascara
     Matsui
     McCarthy (MO)
     McCarthy (NY)
     McDermott
     McGovern
     McIntyre
     McKinney
     McNulty
     Meehan
     Meek (FL)
     Meeks (NY)
     Menendez
     Millender-McDonald
     Miller, George
     Minge
     Mink
     Moakley
     Moore
     Moran (VA)
     Murtha
     Nadler
     Napolitano
     Neal
     Oberstar
     Obey
     Olver
     Ortiz
     Owens
     Pallone
     Pascrell
     Pastor
     Payne
     Pelosi
     Peterson (MN)
     Phelps
     Pickett
     Pomeroy
     Price (NC)
     Quinn
     Rahall
     Rangel
     Rivers
     Rodriguez
     Rothman
     Roybal-Allard
     Rush
     Sabo
     Sanchez
     Sanders
     Sandlin
     Sawyer
     Schakowsky
     Scott
     Serrano
     Sherman
     Shows
     Sisisky
     Skelton
     Slaughter
     Smith (WA)
     Snyder
     Spratt
     Stabenow
     Stark
     Stenholm
     Strickland
     Stupak
     Tanner
     Tauscher
     Thompson (CA)
     Thompson (MS)
     Thurman
     Tierney
     Towns
     Traficant
     Turner
     Udall (CO)
     Udall (NM)
     Velazquez
     Vento
     Visclosky
     Waters
     Watt (NC)
     Waxman
     Weiner
     Wexler
     Weygand
     Wise
     Woolsey
     Wu
     Wynn

                             NOT VOTING--15

     Archer
     Bartlett
     Becerra
     Bilbray
     Capps
     Delahunt
     Frost
     Goodling
     Horn
     Hunter
     John
     Mollohan
     Morella
     Reyes
     Saxton

                              {time}  1319

  So the resolution was agreed to.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
  A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.


                          PERSONAL EXPLANATION

  Mr. GOODLING. Mr. Speaker, regrettably I was unavoidably detained for 
rollcall votes 45 and 46. Had I been present, I would have voted 
``yes'' on both rollcall votes.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Burr of North Carolina). Pursuant to 
House Resolution 103 and rule XVIII, the Chair declares the House in 
the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the 
consideration of the concurrent resolution, House Concurrent Resolution 
42.

                              {time}  1322


                     In the Committee of the Whole

  Accordingly, the House resolved itself into the Committee of the 
Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the 
concurrent resolution (H. Con. Res. 42) regarding the use of United 
States Armed Forces as part of a NATO peacekeeping operation 
implementing a Kosovo peace agreement, with Mr. Thornberry in the 
chair.
  The Clerk read the title of the concurrent resolution.
  The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to the rule, the concurrent resolution is 
considered as having been read the first time.
  Under the rule, the gentleman from New York (Mr. Gilman) and the 
gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Gejdenson) will each control 1 hour.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York (Mr. Gilman).
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  (Mr. GILMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I rise today to begin this historic debate 
on H. Con. Res. 42. The purpose of this resolution, which I introduced 
at the Speaker's request, is to afford an opportunity for the House to 
participate in a decision whether or not to deploy our armed forces to 
Kosovo to implement the peace agreement now being negotiated at 
Rambouillet, France. The Congress has not only a right but a 
constitutional responsibility with respect to deployments of our armed 
forces into potentially hostile situations and, along with the Speaker, 
I believe that debating and voting on this resolution is an appropriate 
way for the Congress to begin to carry out this responsibility.
  Some Members of Congress have serious reservations about deploying 
U.S. Armed Forces to Kosovo as peacekeepers. Others strongly support 
the President's policy. In an effort to give the benefit of the doubt 
to our President, the text of this resolution does not criticize or 
oppose the proposed deployment to Kosovo. To the contrary, it states 
that ``the President is authorized to deploy United States armed forces 
personnel to Kosovo as part of a NATO peacekeeping operation 
implementing a Kosovo peace agreement.''
  The Speaker has stressed that this resolution is being offered 
without prejudice to the underlying question. We expect Members to vote 
their conscience on the resolution, in the solemn exercise of their 
responsibility as elected representatives of the American people. No 
one can deny that the debate now under way in this House is one of the 
most weighty questions a Congress can face: sending into harm's way, on 
foreign soil, our uniformed personnel who volunteered to be part of our 
Nation's military.
  The administration has asserted that it believes it has the authority 
to send U.S. troops to Kosovo to enforce a peace plan without 
congressional approval. There are many in the House who disagree. 
Regardless of where our individual Members may stand on the role of the 
Congress in the deployment of our armed forces on foreign soil to 
undertake risky missions, it is undeniable that the President's hand 
will be strengthened when he seeks and obtains the assent of the 
Congress.
  There are two observations on this prospective deployment, and I 
stress that we are debating this issue before it is fully developed in 
order to have a meaningful debate. First, this resolution is an 
authorization if the conditions are appropriate, that is, if and only 
if hostilities have ceased and if there is an agreement that has been 
accepted by both sides.
  And, second, as Senator Bob Dole told our Committee on International 
Relations yesterday, ``If we're not part of this agreement, there will 
not be an agreement.'' Senator Dole's point is that the Albanians of 
Kosovo believe that our Nation has to be present for them to accept the 
peace plan. We must recognize, also, the proportion of the burden that 
we will be accepting in sending our troops to Kosovo. Out of

[[Page H1190]]

some 30,000 total troops that are expected to guarantee the peace, our 
share will be only 15 percent. The Europeans will be doing the rest, 
and I think it is a fair distribution if the United States wants to 
continue to be considered the leader in the NATO alliance.
  I would also point out that today's debate is not the last we will 
have regarding the U.S. role in Kosovo. There will be ample 
opportunities as events unfold in Kosovo for Members to introduce, to 
debate and to vote on measures regarding what the U.S. is doing and not 
doing in Kosovo. We need, however, to start this debate today and to 
demonstrate that the Congress is involved, that it should be involved, 
and that it can be involved responsibly in foreign policy questions of 
this nature.
  Mr. Chairman, in our committee's hearings yesterday, we were also 
privileged to have Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick provide some of her 
acumen on complex foreign policy questions such as Kosovo. Ambassador 
Kirkpatrick pointed out that there is a risk in not paying attention to 
violence because it may seem to be disorganized, or its proponents 
remote or poorly armed. Ambassador Kirkpatrick went on to state that 
``violence can spread, not like dominoes but like putty because we 
don't think that it is dangerous.'' This was the attitude of European 
nations when Hitler moved into the Rhineland. If the conditions are 
appropriate and there are no hostilities, I am inclined to support the 
deployment of our forces to Kosovo. I will vote for this measure in its 
present form in order to preserve human life. I am confident that this 
House over the next several hours will conduct a debate that will be 
remembered as one of the higher points of this 106th Congress, where 
our Members do the work that they have been entrusted to do by the 
American people. Accordingly, Mr. Chairman, I ask that each one of our 
colleagues follow the debate closely and vote their conscience on this 
measure.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume. As I said earlier, I do not think we should be here today. As 
a general practice, I think the Congress ought to execute its authority 
based on a concluded agreement, not taking action prior to having any 
understanding what the parameters of the agreement will be in that 
region or anywhere else. It would be akin to voting on treaties before 
they were drafted. If the leadership of this body were running the 
Senate, I imagine the next time we had a nuclear missile proliferation 
treaty or other arms control treaty, the Senate would either approve 
them or reject them before the ink was even on the page.

                              {time}  1330

  But we are here now, and we have taken this fateful step. The lives 
of men, women and children in the region will depend on the actions we 
take, and again I would like to briefly review a little history.
  A previous administration said this was a European problem, let the 
Europeans solve it. Over 200,000 men, women and children died, entire 
villages were exterminated, a level of atrocity not seen since World 
War II or Cambodia occurred in the heart of Europe.
  When the committee called in witnesses, they brought in the 
majority's best: Senator Dole, who deserves great credit for actually 
going to the region on behalf of the administration to try to argue for 
the peace plan. Senator Dole testified that if we fail to act today, it 
will be likely that we will fail to achieve peace. He wanted to put 
this vote off, but he said:
  ``If you have this vote, make sure you pass it, because if you do not 
pass it, you will undermine the possibility of peace in the region.''
  Ambassador Kirkpatrick said the same thing.
  The only witness brought forth that day to argue the opposite 
proposition was former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, and even he 
said that he would be very careful to take his previous editorial 
comments as an excuse to vote against this resolution. Even he 
understood the importance of not undermining our negotiators as they 
try to achieve the goal to stop murder in the region.
  This is not a question about whether we trust the President or we 
trust the Secretary of State's agreement. We do not have an agreement 
before us.
  So I would hope we would accept some amendments that give the 
Congress time to reflect but that support the policy that we have 
initiated, that we continue to support America's power to save lives 
and bring peace to this region of the world.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from 
Virginia (Mr. Wolf).
  (Mr. WOLF asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. WOLF. Mr. Chairman, I was in Kosovo 2 weeks ago. It was my second 
trip there since 1995. I rise in support of the resolution. I will 
stipulate the administration has not done a good job on educating and 
conferring with the Congress, nor has it done a good job of telling the 
American people what the mission is. However, if there is an agreement 
in France, I support the deployment of American troops because I 
believe without U.S. participation it will not work.
  I spoke to one person over there. I said, ``How many American 
soldiers do you need?''
  He said, ``At least one, and he has to be out in front because 
without America's involvement it will not take place.''
  Two hundred thousand people died in Bosnia. Were it not for the 
Sarajevo market slaughter, we would not have gotten involved then, and 
since our participation nobody has died and it is working.
  This is the 50th anniversary of NATO. NATO leaders from all the world 
will come here to celebrate the working of NATO, and how can they 
celebrate the working of NATO if NATO forces go into Kosovo if there is 
an agreement and the Americans do not participate in it?
  George Will wrote in Newsweek where he said:

       If NATO cannot stop massacres in the center of Europe, it 
     cannot long continue as an instrument of collective security 
     against Wye. Given how well things have gone in the last 50 
     years on the continent, wherein the preceding 35 years things 
     went wrong at such cost in American blood and treasure, do 
     Americans want the risk, arising tide of anarchy?

  It is important, if there is going to be a NATO, and what we are 
voting on today is not only troops with regard to Kosovo if there is an 
agreement, we are in essence today, whether we like it or not, voting 
on the vitality and the future of NATO.
  In closing, if there is a lasting peace though in this region, it is 
important that we do everything we can to see that President Milosevic 
is removed from power. A just and permanent way for him to step down 
must be found. The longer he remains, the longer the turmoil and unrest 
and killing will continue in Eastern Europe.
  It is not an easy vote, but in the Bible in Luke it says to whom much 
is given much is expected, and in one verse it says to whom much is 
given much is required. We have been blessed in this country with peace 
and prosperity. NATO has been a success, NATO has worked, NATO is 
important, and with the 50th anniversary coming up to say that NATO 
will participate in Kosovo if there is an agreement, and I stipulate, 
but the United States will not participate, will basically be the first 
nail in the coffin in the death of NATO.
  So with great reluctance stipulating the administration has not 
treated our troops fairly with regard to benefits and pay and they have 
been weakened, and also they have not made the case, I support the 
resolution.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of H. Con. Res. 42, a resolution 
authorizing the deployment of U.S. troops to Kosovo. I support the 
resolution, although imperfect, in its current form. I do so 
reluctantly. I do not believe President Clinton has made a credible 
case to the American people or to the Congress about the need for this 
deployment. I urge him to do so and do so quickly. We will, after all, 
be sending America's young men and women into harm's way and the people 
deserve to know ``why.''
  Two weeks ago I visited Kosovo to get a first-hand glimpse into the 
current conflict. I met with representatives of the Kosovo Liberation 
Army (KLA/UCK), Serb government officials, NGO representatives and U.S. 
Ambassador William Walker, the head of the Organization on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe

[[Page H1191]]

(OSCE) mission in Pristina. I also had the chance to talk to members of 
the KLA army, many of them everyday people, farmers, storekeepers, 
workers and such who were driven to the KLA by the constant, brutal 
action of the Serbs.
  I am submitting a copy of my trip report for the Congressional 
Record. It contains my observations and recommendations regarding the 
Kosovo conflict.
  I have concluded that if there is a signed peace agreement in 
Rambouillet, it will be necessary to commit troops to the Kosovo peace 
effort. It is only with the greatest reluctance that I support the 
deployment of American troops abroad, but I believe that without U.S. 
troops, peacekeeping won't work. The U.S. is both the leader of the 
world and of NATO. If NATO is involved, we must be part of the effort 
or it will not succeed.
  This year is the 50th anniversary of NATO. The anniversary will be 
celebrated with events in Washington and elsewhere in the United 
States. Kosovo will be a big test for this important alliance. The U.S. 
has always been the leader of NATO and we should not shy away from our 
commitment now. If we refuse to become part of the NATO effort in 
Kosovo, it could only further embolden Serb President Slobodan 
Milosevic and dim the prospects for reaching a lasting, peaceful 
settlement. The fighting will continue and more people, including many 
women and children, will lose their lives. I agree with the words of 
Bob Kagan in the Weekly Standard of March 1, 1999. He says the 
practical effect of opposing U.S. involvement ``would be to reinforce 
Milosevic's conviction that NATO, and particularly the United States, 
does not have the stomach to take him on.''
  George Will wrote in Newsweek on March 1, ``. . . if NATO cannot stop 
massacres in the center of Europe, it cannot long continue as an 
instrument of collective security against . . . what? Given how well 
things have gone in the last 50 years on the continent where in the 
preceding 35 years things went so wrong, at such cost in American blood 
and treasure, do Americans want to risk a rising tide of anarchy?'' I 
agree with this thoughts.
  However, I do not believe the Clinton administration has made a 
credible case for U.S. involvement in Kosovo to the American people nor 
do I believe that this administration has done a good job taking care 
of our men and women in uniform who, at personal risk, have been 
carrying out our policy in Bosnia, in Iraq, in Haiti, in South Korea, 
on our high seas and ``wherever the U.S.'' needs its strength. We have 
drawndown troops to a level now insufficient to meet today's needs. 
Many troops go from one deployment to another without time to be home 
with their families. U.S. troops are stretched too thin and are not 
being treated fairly. Pay and allowances are inadequate, the tempo of 
operations is too high (we just need a larger military force to face 
the tasks they have been given) and we are not giving our first class 
military men and women the tools they need to do the job.

  I want to emphasize that there are no better soldiers anywhere in the 
world and the morale of our troops is high. But they are not being 
treated fairly.
  If the troops are to be deployed to Kosovo, we must give them strong 
political leadership and a clear mission. We also must be sure that 
Americans soldiers, airmen, seamen and marines are given the resources 
they need to carry out their ever increasing number of missions around 
the world. It's not enough to pass a resolution. Congress must ensure 
that the resources available for the American military are there for 
them to carry out the growing number of missions the military is being 
called upon to carry out.
  We also must do more than we have done in Bosnia to build a lasting 
peace. While our military effort in Bosnia has been successful, thanks 
to the commitment and skill of American troops, the civilian side of 
the effort has fallen far short. We have failed so far to bring about 
reconciliation among the ethnic factions. An interdependent society 
enhanced by an effective marketplace and economic trade system has not 
gotten off the ground. For example, three years after the Dayton 
accord, the railroad in Bosnia does not yet operate.
  We must learn lessons from Bosnia and help create a working regional 
government in Kosovo that effectively represents and is accountable to 
the people and contributes to the creation of a viable economy. We also 
must ensure that a new Kosovo government has effective civilian 
oversight over the military and that KLA forces are disarmed and 
brought under civilian command. Without strong civilian control, the 
KLA could get out of hand.
  Most importantly, lasting peace may not occur in the Balkans while 
Serbian President Slobodan Milesovic is in power. A just and permanent 
way for him to step down must be found. The longer he remains, the 
longer turmoil, unrest and killing will continue in eastern Europe.
  It is never an easy decision for a Member of Congress to decide to 
vote in favor of sending American men and women into a possibly 
dangerous situation. I believe, however, that once a peace agreement is 
reached--if it is reached--deploying NATO troops to the region to keep 
the peace, prevent the conflict from spreading and prevent 
destabilizing refugee outflows into neighboring countries is the only 
way to ensure stability in Europe. Stability in Europe is in the best 
interest of the United States.

 Statement by U.S. Representative Frank R. Wolf, Report of a Visit to 
  the Balkans Kosovo: The Latest Balkan Hot Spot, February 13-18, 1999

     This report provides details of my trip to Albania, Macedona 
     and Kosovo during mid-February, 1999. This visit occurred 
     during the time the Serb-Kosovo Albanian peace conference was 
     taking place in Rambouillet, France, and ended only a few 
     days before the contact group's initially imposed deadline to 
     reach agreement of February 20. There is every indication 
     that the U.S. will be concerned with Kosovo for some time to 
     come and it was important to have a clear, first-hand view of 
     conditions there.

       I have, for many years, had a deep interest in the Balkans 
     and concern for the people who live there. I have traveled 
     numerous times to the region. There has been hostility, 
     unrest and turmoil for hundreds of years. It has been said 
     that there is too much history for these small countries to 
     bear. If this is so, it has never been more true than today.
       During this trip, I spent one day in Tirana, Albania, where 
     I met with the U.S. Ambassador Marissa Lino and her embassy 
     staff; Albanian President Meidani; Prime Minister Majko; 
     cabinet ministers; the Speaker and other members of 
     parliament; religious leaders, and heads of Non-Government 
     Organizations (NGOs) active there.
       I spent parts of two days in Skopje, Macedonia, where I met 
     with embassy Deputy Chief of Mission and Charge d'affaires 
     Paul Jones; Political Officer Charles Stonecipher; members of 
     the Macedonian parliament; former Prime Minister and 
     President of the Social Democratic Union (opposition 
     political party) Branko Crvenkovski; American soliders 
     assigned to United Nations forces guarding the Macedonia-
     Kosovo border, and the commander and men of the NATO Kosovo 
     verification and extraction forces as well as representatives 
     of NGOs in Macedonia.
       In Kosovo for a day and a half, I met with head of mission 
     Ambassador William Walker and senior adviser to ethnic 
     Albanian elected President Ibrahim Rugova, Professor Alush 
     Gashi. I also met with Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA/UCK) 
     spokesman Adem Demaci (who previously spent 26 years in Serb 
     prisons) and senior Serbian representative in Kosovo, Zoran 
     Andelkovic. Other meetings included NGO representatives, head 
     of the Kosovo office of the U.N. High Commissioner for 
     Refugees (UNHCR), and other officials and representatives. 
     Our understanding and most able escort was State Department 
     Foreign Service Officer Ronald Capps. We also stopped at a 
     Serb police barracks and met with the officer in charge. We 
     met individual members of the KLA and with a number of 
     individual Kosovars who had returned to their villages after 
     having been driven out by Serb attacks. Some villages were 
     largely destroyed and remain mostly deserted.
       The fate of Albania, Macedonia and Kosovo, which border one 
     another, is interrelated. Albania has a population of about 
     two million people. Macedonia's population of two million 
     includes about one third ethnic Albanian. About 90 percent of 
     the nearly two million people in Kosovo are also ethnic 
     Albanian.
       Kosovo is the southernmost province of present-day Serbia 
     and has a centuries long history of conflict, turbulence and 
     hatred. By 1987 Serbian dominance in the region had been 
     established, Slobodan Milosevic was President and ethnic 
     Albanian participation in government was virtually 
     nonexistent.
       In response, ethnic Albanians in 1991 formed a shadow 
     government complete with president, parliament, tax system 
     and schools. Ibrahim Rugova was elected president and has 
     since worked for Kosovo independence through peaceful means.
       By the mid-1990, the ethnic Albanian population in Kosovo 
     had grown to nearly 90 percent as human rights conditions 
     continued to go down hill with the Serbs in total control of 
     police and the army. Many, if not most, individual Serbs also 
     have weapons as opposed to ethnic Albanians for whom 
     possessing a gun is against strictly enforced law. Beatings, 
     harassment and brutality toward ethnic Albanians became 
     commonplace, particularly in villages and smaller towns.
       In 1996 the shadowy, separatist Kosovo Liberation Army 
     (KLA) surfaced for the first time, claiming responsibility 
     for bombings in southern Yugoslavia. KLA efforts intensified 
     over the next several years, government officials and alleged 
     ethnic Albanian collaborators were killed. The Serbian 
     government cracked down and violence has escalated since.
       I met with a number of KLA members. Most of them are 
     everyday people, farmers, storekeepers, workers and such who 
     were driven to the KLA by the constant brutal action of the 
     Serbs. There are, no doubt, some bad people in the KLA 
     including thugs, gangsters and smugglers, but most are 
     motivated by a hunger for independence. Still, it must be 
     recognized that some acts of terrorism have been committed by 
     the KLA.

[[Page H1192]]

       Conditions in Kosovo continued to deteriorate and alarm the 
     international community. In October 1998, under threat of 
     NATO air strikes, Serbian President Milosevic made 
     commitments to implement terms of U.N. Security Council 
     Resolution 1199 to end violence in Kosovo, partially withdraw 
     Serbian forces, open access to humanitarian relief 
     organizations (NGOs), cooperate with war crimes investigators 
     and progress toward a political settlement.
       As part of this commitment, in order to verify compliance, 
     President Milosevic agreed to an on-scene verification 
     mission by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
     Europe (OSCE) and NATO surveillance of Kosovo by non-
     combatant aircraft. These activities are in progress and NATO 
     has deployed a small extraction force in next door Macedonia. 
     I visited with each of these groups.
       However, conditions in Kosovo have not stabilized and more 
     have been killed. Finally, a contact group with members from 
     the U.S., Great Britain, France, Russia, Italy and Germany 
     issued an ultimatum to the sides to reach a peace accord by 
     February 20, 1999. NATO air strikes against targets in Serbia 
     were threatened if Belgrade did not comply.
       The Serbs consider Kosovo the cradle of their culture and 
     their orthodox religion and are not willing to give it up. I 
     visited the Field of Blackbirds where the Serbs battled for 
     and lost control of the region in 1389. I also visited a 
     Monastery dating back to 1535 that is an important part of 
     Serb history.
       The Clinton administration, which does not favor 
     independence for Kosovo, worries this conflict could spread 
     if NATO does not intervene and could even involve Turkey, 
     Bulgaria, Albania and Greece. While this is of concern, there 
     are other reasons for the U.S. to remain active. The U.S. can 
     never stand by and allow genocide to take place. Part of the 
     effort, once a peace agreement between the Serbs and ethnic 
     Albanians has been signed, could include a NATO ground force 
     in Kosovo containing a contingent of U.S. troops.
       It is clear that a main pipeline for arms reaching ethnic 
     Albanians in Kosovo is across the Albania-Kosovo border and 
     any stabilization effort will likely include shutting off 
     this arms route. It has been suggested that an effective arms 
     blockade could be accomplished by the Italian government from 
     the Albanian side of the border with Kosovo.
       A number of issues must be addressed before the outcome of 
     this conflict can be predicted. Principal among these is the 
     likely strength and stability of an ethnic Albanian led 
     Kosovo government. Another is the economic potential of a 
     stand-alone Kosovo, free from Serbia. Also important is what 
     will be the future of the KLA? Will they give up their arms? 
     Many in the KLA say ``no''. Could an independent Kosovo make 
     it on its own? Political ability has not been demonstrated. 
     Economic development help from the private sector in the West 
     may not be immediately forthcoming. How would they be propped 
     up? How will long term cross border hatred between Serbs and 
     ethnic Albanians be kept in check? Who is going to foot the 
     bill for all this? European nations?
       How and by whom will the issue of war crimes be addressed? 
     A terrible job on this issue has been done in Bosnia. Known 
     war criminals have not been pursued after more than three 
     years. Reconciliation is an important ingredient to lasting 
     peace but terrible acts have been committed and justice must 
     be served. The principal perpetrator of injustice and 
     brutality has been Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic. What 
     about him?
       The White House and the present administration are 
     deserving of some sharp criticism for allowing conditions to 
     get where they are today.
       There appear to be few lessons this administration has 
     learned from the painful experience of Bosnia. Our government 
     waited too long to get involved and, once engaged, has been 
     somewhat ineffective. Too many died in Bosnia during this 
     delay. While committing troops to the region for one year 
     (now over three years with no end in sight) has indeed halted 
     killing, at least temporarily, Bosnia is no further along 
     toward peaceful self sufficiency than when troops arrive. 
     Rather, it is as though there is merely a pause in time. If 
     our troops leave, hostility and brutality would likely 
     resume. Little infrastructure is being created. Railroads are 
     not running. Little economic development or growth is 
     emerging. No lasting plan for peace has been developed and no 
     interdependent community has been created which would make 
     undesirable, a return to conflict. Little has been done to 
     bring about reconciliation.
       Meanwhile, as we look at our overall U.S. military 
     capabilities throughout the world, we see that this 
     administration has drawn down U.S. military strength to the 
     level where there are now insufficient forces to meet 
     today's needs. When I met with our soldiers in the Balkan 
     region I found many who have gone from one deployment to 
     another without time to be home with their families. The 
     troopers I met on the Kosovo border are assigned to a 
     battalion on its third deployment in three years.
       There are no better soldiers anywhere in the world than 
     these and their morale is high. They are ready to do what is 
     expected of them and more. But they are not being treated 
     fairly. Pay and benefits have been allowed to deteriorate. 
     The tempo of operations has grown to the point where they 
     have too little time at home. There are just not sufficient 
     forces to do all the things they are expected to do. 
     According to the February 17, Washington Post, the Secretary 
     of the Army's answer is to lower standards and recruit high 
     school drop-outs. Turning his back on history, this official 
     has unwisely decided upon another social experiment rather 
     than dealing fairly with the shortfall.
       From 1990 to 1998 the armed forces went from 18 active army 
     divisions to eight. The navy battle force went from 546 ships 
     to 346. Air force fighter wings decreased from 36 to 30. 
     Discretionary defense budget outlays will decrease 31 percent 
     in the ten years beginning 1990. Service chiefs predict FY 
     1999 ammunition shortages for the army of $1.7B and $193M for 
     the marines. These statistics are just the tip of the 
     iceberg. There is compelling evidence that, in the face of a 
     huge increase in troop deployments (26 group deployments 
     between 1991 and 1998 by the Army's own count), this 
     administration has not made the investment to give our 
     fighting men and women the tools to do the job asked of them.
       The fact that the men and women in uniform are bending to 
     their task is to their credit, but it is past time to give 
     them what they need and stop driving them into the ground. 
     The White House must face up to this shortfall and address 
     the issue of where the money to pay for our involvement is to 
     come from. They have not yet done so and time is short.
       A strong NATO involvement, with solid U.S. participation, 
     will be an important part of any workable solution to this 
     mess. There is a story making the rounds of NATO forces where 
     an American general, about to depart the region asks his NATO 
     counterpart how many U.S. troops must remain to ensure safety 
     and success of the mission. The NATO commander responds, 
     ``Only one, but he must be at the very front''. This is only 
     a story told in good humor but it makes the point that U.S. 
     presence is key--perhaps vital.
       It is not without irony that the one key player omitted 
     from the contact group meetings in France is a NATO 
     representative. The irony deepens when the presence on the 
     contact group of chronic problem-makes Russia and France is 
     noted.
       Frankly, the U.S. Congress has also had too little 
     involvement in this Balkan process. The administration has 
     done and continues to do a poor job in dealing with these 
     issues. Consultation with the Congress does not appear to 
     have been a major concern to the White House. While foreign 
     policy is largely the prerogative of the President, American 
     lives are being placed at risk in a far-off land and untold 
     dollars are being committed to this effort. Congress has a 
     role and must participate in this debate. Congressional 
     hearings to explore all aspects of this situation are in 
     order.


                    conclusions and recommendations:

       1. If there is a signed peace agreement in Rambouillet, it 
     could be necessary to commit U.S. troops to the Kosovo peace 
     effort. I make this recommendation with reluctance but, 
     without U.S. troops, peacekeeping won't work. The U.S. is 
     both the leader of the world and of NATO. If NATO is 
     involved, we must be a part of the effort or it will fail. 
     NATO's 50th anniversary is later this spring and there will 
     be a large celebration in the U.S. Kosovo will be a big test 
     for this important alliance.
       2. There are many differences between the situation 
     existing several years ago in Bosnia and what is happening 
     today in Kosovo. Still, thousands died in Bosnia including 
     too many women and children before NATO troops including a 
     large contingent of U.S. soldiers moved in and put an end to 
     the killing. Had not NATO peacekeepers acted over three years 
     ago, the killing might still be going on today. Without the 
     commitment of U.S. troops, a NATO peacekeeping intervention 
     might not even have been attempted. We may wish this were not 
     so, but it is. Perhaps things can change in the future but 
     this is today's reality.
       3. U.S. troops are stretched too thin and are not being 
     treated fairly. Pay and allowances are inadequate, the tempo 
     of operations is far too high (we just need a larger military 
     force to face the tasks they have been given) and we are not 
     giving our first class military men and women the tools they 
     need to do the job. The administration needs to take better 
     care of our soldiers, sailors, marines and airmen. Congress 
     should force this issue.
       4. Special attention must be paid to the Kosovo Liberation 
     Army (KLA). While many, perhaps most, are common people whose 
     interest is defending their families, their homes and 
     themselves, the army is not without a rogue element. There 
     is no clearly established and proven civilian government 
     and there is no line of authority/responsibility between 
     the KLA and a representative government. Without control, 
     the KLA could get out of hand.
       5. When peacekeepers arrive in Kosovo, one of their first 
     tasks must be to disarm the KLA. Many in the KLA have said 
     they will not give up their weapons. An armed KLA will be a 
     time bomb in the way of progress toward peace. Providing 
     safeguards for Serbs in Kosovo is an important part of the 
     peace process.
       6. Efforts thus far to build a lasting peace in Bosnia have 
     come up short. Not only must more be done there but the 
     lessons learned must be applied to Kosovo. The military 
     presence in Bosnia has done the job of ending killing and 
     brutality as it likely will in Kosovo, but the peace-building 
     effort of reconciliation and creating an interdependent

[[Page H1193]]

     society and effective marketplace and economic trade system 
     has not gotten off the ground.
       7. Lasting peace in the Balkans will not occur while 
     Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic is in power. A just and 
     permanent way for him to step down must be found. The longer 
     he remains, the longer turmoil, unrest and killing will 
     continue in eastern Europe.
       8. American and other workers and officials of all nations 
     present in Kosovo (diplomats, United Nations, NGOs, contract 
     workers, humanitarian care-givers and others) are true heros. 
     They risk their lives daily to make life a little better for 
     the people in Kosovo and we should all pray for them. I 
     happened to see a warning sign posted in a U.N. office 
     talking about mines. In part, it said, ``There is strong 
     evidence to suggest some police posts have had anti-personnel 
     mines placed near them. . . . All staff are asked to be 
     extremely cautious when in the vicinity . . .'' Yet these men 
     and women go about their daily duties with dedication and 
     care for others in spite of the harm that is just a step 
     away.
       9. The foreign policy of this administration continues to 
     come up short and is deserving of sharp criticism. America is 
     the one remaining superpower and, like it or not, must assume 
     this responsibility. Unfolding events continue to point to 
     the absence of a coherent idea of what to do and how to do 
     it. While we should have already developed a peace-making 
     strategy and an exit strategy, the participants at 
     Rambouillet remain unable to even get things started.
       10. President Clinton has done a poor job of making the 
     case to the American people for U.S. involvement in this 
     conflict which also has a significant moral aspect to it. 
     While the U.S. cannot be involved all over the world, we are 
     a member of NATO which deals with peace and stability in 
     Europe. Kosovo is a part of Europe and its destabilization 
     could create a huge refugee population there. Fighting could 
     even break out elsewhere if this issue is not dealt with 
     early and effectively. America has been blessed with peace 
     and prosperity. In the Bible, it says that to whom much is 
     given, much is expected and there is an obligation on our 
     part to be a participant in the search for solutions in this 
     troubled spot.
       11. I would like to conclude on a personal note to thank 
     all of those who assisted me on this mission. I am especially 
     grateful to U.S. Ambassador Marisa Lino and her staff, 
     foreign service officer Charles Stonecipher who assisted me 
     in Macedonia, foreign service officer Ron Capps whose 
     knowledge and concern was of great help in Kosovo and U.S. 
     Army Lieutenant Colonel Mike Prendergast who traveled with 
     me. I appreciate their invaluable assistance.

  Mr. CROWLEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from 
Washington (Mr. Baird).
  Mr. BAIRD. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from New York for 
yielding this time to me. I am speaking to my colleagues today on a 
matter of deep personal importance to me. For 3 years my family and I 
hosted a young Bosnian student. His name is Namik, and when he was 14 
years old he was running through his village when a Serbian mortar 
shell landed next to him and blew his left leg off just below the hip. 
For 3 years I worked with Namik, kept him in our home as my own son 
taught him to climb and to kayak so that he could have a normal life. 
But for 3 years I helped him deal with what it is like to be a young 
man who has lost a leg in a war that was not his fault.
  When we talk about this issue, Mr. Chairman, we are talking about 
human lives, we are talking about NATO, and we are talking about 
standing up to genocide and standing up to tyranny. Mr. Milosevic is a 
sociopath. He is bloodthirsty, he does not respect basic tenets of 
human dignity and morality. If a sociopath were holding hostages, and 
he had a police scanner and heard that the police were debating about 
whether or not to send in officers to put a stop to what he was trying 
to do, we know what would happen to those hostages: they would be 
killed. Mr. Milosevic has got to be stopped.
  I urge my colleagues for the sake of Namik, for the sake of the 
future of NATO, for the sake of the future of our country and for the 
sake of stability in Europe and peace internationally, please pass this 
resolution. Do not undermine the President at this time, do not allow 
the killing to continue in the Balkans.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Washington for 
his support for this resolution.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentlewoman from New York 
(Mrs. Kelly).
  Mrs. KELLY. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of H.Con.Res. 42, 
a resolution which supports the deployment of U.S. troops in support of 
a NATO peacekeeping effort in Kosovo. The reason we need to support 
this legislation today and the reason why we should resist weakening 
amendments is the simple fact that NATO peacekeepers, supported by U.S. 
troops, represent our last and best chance for a workable peace in this 
very troubled land.
  I would also add that if we are to maintain any credibility within 
NATO, we have an obligation to support this vital peacekeeping mission.
  Mr. Chairman, I visited the former Yugoslavia on two separate 
occasions in recent years, and I have had the opportunity to visit 
Rambouillet recently, to observe the peace talks firsthand and to talk 
with the participants. Let me be very clear about this. I believe the 
only peace that will occur in Kosovo is one that is enforced by NATO. 
Serbian strong man Slobodan Milosevic has shown us time and time again 
that he does not recognize international law, he does not respond to 
international appeals for peace, and the experience has demonstrated 
that he does not always respect prior peace agreements. What he does 
respect and what he does respond to is the very real threat of force.
  NATO peacekeepers are the only safeguard that will put a stop to the 
killing in Kosovo and the only thing that will prevent further violence 
down the road.
  I cannot over emphasize how sensitive the point at which we now find 
ourselves in these negotiations is and that the failure of this 
resolution would deal a potentially fatal blow to the peace effort. 
Indications are that absent a peace agreement both sides are preparing 
for a major escalation of fighting in the spring, and as always in this 
case, it will be the innocent civilians who are once again suffering 
the horrifying consequences.
  Mr. Chairman, a considerable amount of time and effort has been put 
into this peace effort, and the stakes could not be higher. Success 
means an end to the fighting, an end to the killing and an end to the 
destruction of entire villages and towns.
  Ultimately we have all witnessed on the evening news the price that 
failure has brought to the people of Kosovo. Thousands have been 
killed, and tens of thousands turned into homeless refugees.
  Peace is at hand if we have the wisdom and the courage to see this 
through.
  I strongly urge my colleagues to send a message to both sides that 
the United States is committed to the peace process and, with that 
message, the assurance that we will stand by our commitments to NATO.
  Mr. CROWLEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 2 minutes.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise today in strong support of this resolution, but 
I seriously question the Republican leadership's timing in bringing 
this measure to the floor for debate while negotiations are still 
underway. I believe a fractious congressional debate about whether or 
not to support implementation of a peace agreement at such a critical 
juncture in the negotiations seriously undermines our ability to 
negotiate a settlement and place directly into the hands of Mr. 
Milosevic. We must, as a Congress, show that we are committed to peace 
in the former Yugoslavia and working with our allies in NATO towards 
that common goal.
  Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues to support this resolution.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman 
from Kansas (Mr. Ryun).
  Mr. RYUN of Kansas. Mr. Chairman, the United States Armed Forces are 
being stretched too thin. They have been asked to take on peacekeeping 
missions in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia and now possibly Kosovo. President 
Clinton told Congress and the Nation that the United States deployment 
to Bosnia in 1995 would be over in 1 year. However, the mission in 
Bosnia has continued for 4 years with no strategic exit plan in sight 
and, at a cost to the United States at $10 billion, not only are their 
peacekeeping missions costly, but they are degrading to the overall 
readiness of our fighting forces.
  Mr. Chairman, 2,200 troops from the 24th Marine expeditionary unit 
currently stationed aboard the Navy ships in the Mediterranean will be 
part of the initial force moving into Kosovo as soon as an agreement is 
reached between ethnic Albanians and the Serbian government. However 
that unit is

[[Page H1194]]

headed into its final month of a 6-month deployment and scheduled to be 
home in North Carolina by May 1. To be home by that time the unit will 
have to leave Kosovo no later than mid April.
  Mr. Chairman, that leaves the administration with limited options, 
the most prominent one being extending the length of the unit's 
deployment. How long will this unit be there? How much longer will they 
be away from their families and beyond their expected 6-month 
deployment?
  Mr. Chairman, for America's Armed Forces to sustain this 
administration's peacekeeping pace the forces must be augmented by an 
increased amount of part-time Reserve and National Guard personnel. Not 
only are Reserve and National Guard personnel being forced to leave 
their families more often, but they are also being asked to increase 
the amount of time and technical knowledge taken away from their 
careers here in the United States. These military personnel are being 
forced to explain open end deployments to their employers who are 
becoming less willing to continually lose their skilled employees.
  Mr. Chairman, to be able to keep these individuals in the Reserve and 
National Guard we must continue to send them into peacekeeping 
situations around the globe. In the future, when the Reserve and 
National Guard personnel have the opportunity to leave military 
service, they will choose their family quality of life and their career 
over serving their country. A Kosovo peacekeeping mission will place a 
heavy burden on America's Armed Forces and compromise their readiness 
levels, the quality of life of their families and the national security 
of the United States. We cannot and must not continue to ask our 
military to do more with less.
  Mr. Chairman, before the administration decides to deploy troops to 
Kosovo, I ask that they lay out their plan and details to Congress.
  Mr. Chairman, before the Administration decides to deploy troops to 
Kosovo, I ask that they lay out their plan in detail to Congress. The 
administration should not be able to put the men and women of our armed 
forces in harm's way without explaining their reasons for doing so.
  Mr. CROWLEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Florida (Mr. Hastings).
  (Mr. HASTINGS of Florida asked and was given permission to revise and 
extend his remarks.)
  Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I rise today in support of H. 
Con. Res. 42, legislation to authorize U.S. involvement in peacekeeping 
actions in Kosovo.
  This debate is about how we see our role in the world. Do we want to 
be involved? Do we want to be an active part of the NATO alliance? Do 
we want to export our values of democracy? Do we want to be in a 
position to influence world events? Because, if we do, we have to be 
active even when the direct benefit to the United States is difficult 
to discern and most certainly when we can discern that genocide may 
occur.

                              {time}  1345

  A secure and stable Europe is of great concern to the United States. 
We have fought two major wars of this century, both on the continent of 
Europe and both because Europe was completely destabilized by 
tyrannical despots and weak economies.
  If we weaken the contact group alliance that has worked on this 
matter, as well as NATO, the Organization for Security and Cooperation 
in Europe, efforts on the ground, by defeating this resolution, it will 
surely stoke the fires of instability in Europe.
  If our allies cannot count on us, they will surely stop looking to us 
for leadership and our influence will wane.
  I talked to a colleague of mine in the Organization of Security and 
Cooperation in Europe, who is the Chair of the first committee on which 
I served. His name is Bruce George and he is a member of the British 
Parliament and is their defense expert. He said if we fail today to 
support this resolution, it will be short of catastrophic.
  Yesterday Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick said that if we do not support 
this resolution, we will regret it. I suggest to this body that we 
cannot stand idly by and watch children maimed, autonomy destroyed and 
a people who are seeking no more than freedom, an opportunity to gain 
the same.
  Support this resolution.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from 
Nebraska (Mr. Bereuter), the distinguished vice chairman of our 
Committee on International Relations.
  (Mr. BEREUTER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Chairman, my colleagues, I rise in opposition to 
the resolution. I want to drop back, though, to some of the debate that 
took place on the rule. The minority leader came here and suggested it 
was inappropriate for us to be debating this resolution at this time. 
That was also voiced by the ranking minority member of the House 
International Relations Committee here today, and by others.
  As the gentleman from New York (Chairman Gilman) said, unfortunately 
debating the issue before the situation fully developed is important 
for Congress to have a meaningful role.
  I want to remind my colleagues what happened in Somalia where without 
any consultation we saw the Administration move from protecting the 
people involved in the deliveries of food to a nation-building process. 
It was classic mission creep. I want to remind Members what happened in 
the formulation of the Dayton Accords when, in fact, we were told by 
the Administration ``do not do anything, it might upset these delicate 
negotiations ongoing in Dayton.''
  Then what happened? Before Congress had any opportunity express its 
view or to have a role, before the Dayton Accords were actually signed, 
troops were on the way to Bosnia and we were locked in. Then what were 
we told? What we had been told before, we have to support our troops, 
our men and women in the field, and Congress was cut out of the 
process.
  Here we are in another similar situation, but what we have here is 
very different. What we have here is an invasion by the United States 
and NATO of a sovereign country. Kosovo is an autonomous region within 
Serbia.
  This Member has previously voiced, and still has enormous 
difficulties for many reasons, with the proposal for a peace keeping, I 
would have to call it a peace enforcement, plan in Kosovo. Chief among 
them is the Member's reservation that the President is ready to act 
outside the U.S. Constitution to engage uninvited U.S. combat forces in 
an internal conflict in a country which is not a threat to the United 
States.
  The U.S. Constitution clearly limits his authority to place U.S. 
Armed Forces in hostile situations, but can do so only in response to a 
national emergency created by attack upon the United States, its 
territories or its armed forces.
  The more extreme measure of launching unprovoked air strikes against 
Serbia, a sovereign country for which I have little respect in terms of 
their leadership, who have committed extraordinary atrocities in 
Kosovo, nevertheless the Administration proposal to deploy troops to 
Kosovo is tantamount to a declaration of war against Serbia.
  Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution specifically grants war 
declaration authority exclusively to the Congress. The President's 
commitment to deploy our troops into a hostile and foreign territory of 
Kosovo cannot be considered a defensive measure that falls under his 
authority.
  What is going to happen? If we ever have a peace agreement on Kosovo, 
it will be coerced and it will have to be an enforced peace--for who 
knows how long. We have an Administration which has threatened, imagine 
this, if you do not sign, Mr. Milosevic, we are going to bomb you.
  I suppose we are going to bomb the KLA, too. How does one find the 
KLA to bomb? How does one enforce peace on that side?
  Let me ask some questions about the current peace proposal. We have 
one party somewhat bound to the U.S., the other bound by the threat of 
U.S. force.
  Many questions need to be addressed: By what means are we going to 
protect the Kosovars? Who will police the borders? How will we 
neutralize the danger of Kosovo expansion when it has no international 
status? What is the political objective? (Autonomy is not the 
destination sought by the Albanians.) How do we handle the relationship 
of the Albanians in Kosovo with those in the surrounding region? What 
are the rules of engagement? What is the concept of how it will end?

[[Page H1195]]

Under what authority can NATO ``invade'' a country in this matter?
  Morover, the projected Kosovo agreement is unlikely to enjoy the 
support of the parties for a long period of time. For Serbia, 
acquiescing under the threat of NATO bombardment, it involves nearly 
unprecedented international intercession. Yugoslavia, a sovereign 
state, is being asked to cede control and in time sovereignty of a 
province containing its national shrines to foreign military force.
  Though President Slobodan Milosevic has much to answer for, 
especially in Bosnia, he is less the cause of the conflict in Kosovo 
than an expression of it. On the need to retain Kosovo, Serbian 
leaders--including Milosevic's domestic opponents--seem united. For 
Serbia, current NATO policy means either dismemberment of the country 
or postponement of the conflict to a future date when, according to the 
NATO proposal, the future of the province will be decided.
  The same attitude governs the Albanian side. The Kosovo Liberation 
Army (KLA) is fighting for independence, not autonomy. The KLA is 
certain to try to use the cease-fire to expel the last Serbian 
influences from the province and drag its feet on giving up its arms. 
And if NATO resists, it may come under attack itself--perhaps from both 
sides. What is described by the administration as a ``strong peace 
agreement'' is likely to be at best the overture to another, far more 
complicated set of conflicts.
  Ironically, the projected peace agreement increases the likelihood of 
the various possible escalations sketched by the President as 
justification for a U.S. deployment. An independent Albanian Kosovo 
surely would seek to incorporate the neighboring Albanian minorities--
mostly in Macedonia or FYROM--and perhaps Albania itself. And a 
Macedonian conflict would land us precisely back in the Balkan wars of 
earlier in this century. Will Kosovo then become the premise for a 
semi-permanent NATO move into Macedonia just as the deployment in 
Bosnia is invoked as justification for the move into Kosovo? Is NATO to 
be the home for a whole series of Balkan NATO protectorates?
  In Bosnia, the exit strategy can be described. The existing dividing 
lines can be made permanent. Failure to do so will require their having 
to be manned indefinitely unless we change our objective to self-
determination and permit each ethnic group to decide its own fate. In 
Kosovo, that option does not exist. There are no ethnic dividing lines, 
and both sides claim the entire territory. America's attitude toward 
the Serbs' attempts to insist on their claim has been made plain 
enough; it is the threat of bombing. But how do we and NATO react to 
the Albanian transgressions and irredentism? Are we prepared to fight 
both sides and for how long? In the face of issues such as these, the 
unity of the contact group of powers acting on behalf of NATO is likely 
to dissolve. Russia surely will increasingly emerge as the supporter of 
the Serbian point of view.
  The President's statements ``that we can make a difference'' and that 
``America symbolizes hope and resolve'' are exhortations, not policy 
prescription. This is bumper sticker foreign policy. Is NATO to become 
the artillery to end ethnic conflict? If Kosovo, why not intervention 
in East Africa or Central Asia? And would a doctrine of universal 
humanitarian intervention reduce or increase suffering by intensifying 
ethnic and religious conflict? What are the limits of such a policy and 
by what criteria is it established? In Henry Kissinger's view, that 
line should be drawn at American ground forces for Kosovo. Europeans 
never tire of stressing the need for greater European autonomy. Here is 
an occasion to demonstrate it. If Kosovo presents a security problem, 
it is to Europe, largely because of the refugees the conflict might 
generate. Kosovo is no more a threat to America than Haiti was to 
Europe--and we never asked for NATO support here. The nearly 300 
million Europeans should be able to generate the ground forces to deal 
with the problems for 2.3 million Kosovars. To symbolize Allied unity 
on larger issues, we should provide logistics, intelligence and air 
support. But I see no need for U.S. ground forces; leadership should 
not be interpreted to mean that we must do everything ourselves.
  Again, paraphrasing Henry Kissinger, he said in opposing ground 
troops in Kosovo that: Each incremental deployment into the Balkans is 
bound to weaken our ability to deal with Saddam Hussein and North 
Korea. The psychological drain may be even more grave. Each time we 
make a peripheral deployment, the administration is constrained to 
insist that the danger to American forces is minimal--the Kosovo 
deployment is officially described as a ``peace implementation force.'' 
Such comments have two unfortunate consequences: They increase the 
impression among Americans that military force can be used casualty-
free, and they send a signal of weakness to potential enemies.


                           military readiness

  Where will the money be coming from to support Kosovo deployment? 
Will it be pulled from readiness accounts? As recently as Monday, March 
8, in an HASC hearing that included Maj. Gen. Larry R. Ellis, the 1st 
Armored Division commander (Germany based division now with troops in 
Bosnia and FY ROM), five other flag officers, and a group of mid-grade 
and senior noncommissioned officers, readiness was described as ``a 
rubber band that is stretched very, very tight.'' While military 
strength has drawn down, deployments have picked up steadily and there 
aren't enough people to do the job. Across the board, readiness is 
wearing dangerously thin.
  A former militaryman described the plight of the mid-career 
professional soldier this way:
  ``They are sent to far-off places with inadequate support, pointless 
missions and foolish rules of engagement so the cocktail party set back 
in D.C. can have their consciences feel good.''
  ``We keep drawing down long-term readiness to meet near-term 
missions,'' said Gen. Charles C. Krulak, the Marine Corps commandant. 
``That is severely straining our long-term readiness and modernization 
efforts.''
  A 4,000 troop commitment translates into 12,000 troops involved in 
Kosovo support (4,000 training to go in, 4,000 on the ground, and 4,000 
being retrained upon coming out). This is demoralizing, it degrades 
retention, and leads to questions about management.
  Secretary Cohen said yesterday that NATO forces would enter Kosovo to 
maintain an ongoing peace--that may be true, but it is certainly 
debatable. Indeed, this Member would argue that we are talking about 
peace-enforcement, not peacekeeping. And I would remind my colleagues 
that our last experience with peace enforcement (Somalia) was not a 
pleasant one.
  The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) is an armed separatist group that 
would appear bent on independence; major element in the Serb population 
are adamantly opposed to the KLA's objective. This is a situation were 
any existing ``peace'' is highly suspect.
  There is no way to place a time limit on a Kosovo deployment.
  Remember the Bosnia experience. Upon the rapid deployment (without 
congressional consent) following the Dayton Accord, Secretary 
Christopher assured the nation that it would be for one year only--to 
give the Bosnians a chance for peace. Four years later, everyone 
acknowledges there is no end in sight to the Bosnia deployment. The 
cultural difficulties that gave rise to the violence are far too great.
  The cultural difficulties in Kosovo are at least as serious as those 
in Bosnia. Milosevic has successfully preyed upon the ancient fears and 
hatreds of the Serb population. The Albanian diaspora has fed the most 
violent tendencies of the Kosovar Albanian population. And the 
Albanians in Kosovo are insisting that a NATO presence remain for at 
least three years!
  In short, we lack an exit strategy. This is the same point that House 
Members argued four years ago regarding Bosnia. At that time, the 
Administration discounted our warning that, once deployed, U.S. troops 
would be in Bosnia for the long haul. Well, we were right and the 
Administration was wrong.
  I absolutely do not condone anything that the Serbians have done. In 
many ways, they are their own worst enemy. Belgrade has been 
condescending and abusive of the rights of ethnic Albanians, and their 
brutality gave rise to the KLA. My concern is, do the very real abuses 
of the Serbian forces warrant the long term deployment of an 
undetermined number of U.S. ground troops?
  Mr. CROWLEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Maryland (Mr. Wynn).
  Mr. WYNN. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from New York (Mr. 
Crowley) for yielding me this time.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of the resolution. The only 
problem with being a world leader is that sometimes we have to lead. In 
the first instance, leadership requires patience, and in that context, 
although I strongly support the resolution, I believe it is premature.
  We have representatives in the region attempting to negotiate a 
framework for peace. We should not be debating whether or not we are 
going to intervene at this point.
  Having said that, I do support our intervention in the context of 
this resolution. It seems to me that leadership also requires taking 
some risk and also adopting some unpopular positions.
  I do not think anyone is cavalier about putting American troops in 
harm's way, but the fact remains that if we are going to support peace 
around the world, if we are going to try to maintain and promote an 
environment for peace, we have to get involved.
  Amendments later today will set parameters for our involvement. We 
are not talking about an extensive involvement. We are talking about a 
limited

[[Page H1196]]

involvement, with the limited use of American troops.
  The fact remains we are a world leader. We are a leader in NATO, and 
if we want to maintain that position of leadership, we cannot back 
away, we cannot cut and run when we are confronted with an unpopular 
situation.
  Some will say in the course of this debate, we do not know what the 
objective is. The objective is abundantly clear. We are trying to 
maintain a framework for peace and maintain an environment for peace. 
We are trying to prevent genocide.
  Thirdly, we are trying to prevent the spread of this violence 
throughout the region, which could lead to even greater catastrophe. 
This is not a popular situation. This is a situation that calls for 
American leadership.
  I think we should proceed on that assumption, allow U.S. troops to be 
involved to a limited extent in the context of a negotiated treaty. I 
hope people will rise above narrow concerns and take a broader view.
  We used to have a notion that Americans were about preserving world 
peace. I think we should continue to adopt that position.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from 
Virginia (Mr. Bateman), a member of the Committee on Armed Services.
  (Mr. BATEMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. BATEMAN. Mr. Chairman, I am more than aware of the prospects of 
negative consequences if our country declines to become involved in a 
peacekeeping or peacemaking mission in Kosovo, but in its present form 
I cannot support the resolution before us.
  If I had some confidence that it would indeed be a peacekeeping 
mission, I would feel much differently. Even if certain people signed 
an agreement that others have written for them, which is the case here, 
and have cajoled them into signing it, it will not be a true peace 
agreement.
  An agreement requires consent. Absent true consent, we will not be 
enforcing or keeping the peace. We will be making a peace foisted upon 
parties whose goals are widely disparate and who are determined to 
resist by violence those who oppose the achievement of their goal.
  Our country has repeatedly enunciated a policy that recognizes 
Serbian sovereignty over Kosovo. While we have urged a high degree of 
autonomy for that province of Yugoslavia, we have not endorsed the 
determination of the ethnic Albanian majority for independence. For our 
country to intervene in an issue of the operative relationship between 
the central government of Yugoslavia and one of its provinces would be 
tantamount to Great Britain having intervened in our Civil War on 
behalf of the Confederate States of America. History has verified the 
wisdom of our English friends in not having done so.
  Consistent with international law, we do not have the legal authority 
to intervene against the will of the sovereign state involved.
  Policy statements of the administration that we would participate in 
bombing of Serbian targets if the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia did 
not sign an agreement written by us or someone is an appalling notion.
  An agreement, even if it is signed under a direct threat of aerial 
bombardment, is not worthy of being called an agreement. If the 
government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia does not accept the 
agreement we wrote for them, I must condemn American military action 
that our country will be involved in for what it will be, an act of war 
without sanction under our Constitution or international law.
  As to the ethnic majority in Kosovo, who is duly authorized to bind 
them to an agreement? Is it Mr. Rugova, the head of the Democratic 
League of Kosovo? Or is it Mr. Demaci, who is described as, quote, the 
chief political representative of the Kosovo Liberation Army?
  This gentleman has resigned and condemned those in the KLA who are 
inclined to vote for the so-called agreement.
  By what authority, if any, was Mr. Thaci charged with the formation 
of a provisional ethnic Albanian government?
  My generation has a special affinity for collective security, and I 
have and hope to remain a steadfast supporter of our NATO alliance.
  I wish this debate was not taking place today but unfortunately it 
must because if it did not, any debate would come only after the 
President had committed us to a military action without the consent of 
a majority in the Congress and with only minimal consultation.
  Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2\1/4\ minutes to the gentleman 
from Ohio (Mr. Kucinich).
  Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Chairman, Jesus said, blessed are the peacemakers 
for they shall be called the children of God.
  What can be said of a Congress which will not let the United States 
make peace in Kosovo? What can be said of a Congress which would 
intervene at a critical point in peace negotiations and take steps to 
undermine a peace agreement? What can be said of a Congress which 
refuses to let the United States join hands with other peacekeepers of 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization?
  What can be said is this: If we are not letting peace be waged, then 
we are letting war be waged.
  What can be said is that if we are not thoughtful as to the 
consequences of our actions today upon the Kosovo peace talks, then we 
are as sorcerer's apprentices, mindlessly stirring a cauldron full of 
the blood of Balkan innocents. When this cauldron is stirred, there 
will be blood on our hands.
  What will be said about this Congress is that with our NATO allies at 
the ready, Congress abdicated the United States role as a world leader.
  Blessed are the peacemakers.
  We are able to make peace because we are the strongest nation in the 
world. We are able to make peace because we have been committed to 
peace.
  Listen to the words of John F. Kennedy's inaugural. He said that we 
have been unwilling to witness or permit the slow undoing of those 
human rights to which this Nation has always been committed and to 
which we are committed today at home and around the world.
  We are challenged every day to renew our commitments to peace, to 
justice, to the American way of democratic principles, to lifting the 
burden of our brothers and sisters anywhere in the world, to becoming 
the light of the world.
  Our Star Spangled Banner asks this question every day: Oh, say, does 
that star spangled banner still wave over the land of the free and the 
home of the brave?
  Let us continue to demonstrate that we will be brave so that we may 
remain free and that others may remain free. Let us not turn our backs 
on peace. Let us not turn our backs on our allies. Let us not turn our 
backs on those principles which have helped form this Nation. Let us 
not turn our backs on those who thirst for justice, on those who hunger 
for righteousness, on those who look to the United States to be first 
in peace.

                              {time}  1400

  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman who has just made a 
very eloquent address, the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Kucinich), for his 
supporting remarks.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield 2\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from California 
(Mr. Cunningham), a member of the Committee on Appropriations.
  Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Mr. Chairman, I will not condemn any one of the 
Members in here for the way that they vote on this. They do it so 
because they have different knowledge, they have different beliefs. But 
I do resent the minority leader impugning the motives of many of us.
  I make my statements on some very deep, rich beliefs and experience 
from training, of planning innovations in the defense of countries all 
over this world on military staff. And I hated politicians that sat in 
soft, cushy chairs and put our men and women in harm's way so easily, 
they who had never done that themselves.
  Kosovo is not an independent state, it is part of Greater Serbia. 
When we go into the full committee, I want to put in here some 1,500 
shrines and sanctuaries that the Serbs have in Kosovo, the birthplace 
of the orthodox Catholic religion. This is their homeland. This is a 
map of Albania. The Albanians do

[[Page H1197]]

not want just Kosovo, they want part of Greece, they want Montenegro, 
and they want Kosovo. This is a map of the massacred Serbs, Jews, 
gypsies that the KLA has murdered in recent times, not World War II. 
The KLA is supported by the mujahedin, Hamas, and even bin Laden. Get 
George Tenet's brief, classified brief. That is about as far as I can 
go.
  This is a list of where the Serbs established Kosovo and were 
ethnically cleansed and murdered and forced to flee across the Danube, 
their homeland, and Albanians filled the void. Yet, they are defending 
their own homeland right now and being murdered.
  Now, Milosevic is an impediment. He needs to be removed, in my 
opinion, much worse than that. So is Tudjman. But then we look at 
Itzebegovic, who has 12,000 mujahedin and Hamas surrounding him. The 
prime minister under him trained with Kadafi. If we want to talk about 
a foreign policy and we say we are saving lives, it is a powder keg 
when we move out of there. Let us not send our men and women to Kosovo.
  Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from 
California (Mr. Lantos).
  Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Chairman, I thank my friend for yielding this time to 
me.
  There is an air of unreality about this debate. Tomorrow, some of us 
will be at the Harry Truman Library in Independence, Missouri, when 
Hungary, the Czech Republic and Poland will formally become members of 
NATO. NATO, this incredible defensive alliance, which kept the peace in 
Europe for two generations, which resulted in the collapse of the 
mighty Soviet Union, and which is the cornerstone of security, not just 
for Europe, but for much of the rest of the world, and we are now 
debating as to whether, after the Albanians and the Serbs agree and 
invite us, we might participate with the force of 4,000 in a NATO 
contingent of 28,000 to keep the peace in Kosovo.
  My wife and I went to Kosovo the first time maybe 35 years ago, and 
we have been back there many times since. It is the only place in 
Europe where one can find a beautiful young woman of 22 or 23 who has 
two teeth because they have no dental care. There is a grinding poverty 
that boggles the mind, and these people have been suppressed, 
persecuted, given third class citizenship for a long time.
  This is our opportunity to do a tiny bit, a tiny bit of what the 
great generation of the second war did under infinitely more dangerous 
circumstances with infinitely greater sacrifices.
  Sunday night, the two vice presidential candidates of the last 
presidential election, Al Gore and Jack Kemp, join me for the 
Washington premier of The Last Days, a movie about the Holocaust. The 
pictures of that movie will remain with everybody who will ever see 
that movie. Do we want such movies made of Kosovo? Have we not had 
enough slaughter and massacre and murder and extermination of innocent 
people there? The only thing that differentiates Kosovo from the 
Persian Gulf War is that there is no oil there. But there are 
principles there. The same principles that compelled President Bush 
decide to send not 4,000 NATO U.S. forces, but half a million American 
troops to the Persian Gulf; President Bush, who drew a line at Kosovo 
at Christmas 1992, when he said, we are drawing the line, we are not 
going to allow Bosnia to be repeated.
  Now we have another President, a Democratic President who says the 
same thing. One of the great heroes of the second war in public 
service, Senator Bob Dole, yesterday told us in committee he is 
passionately committed to this course of action.
  I am sick and tired of my colleagues saying, this is in Europe; let 
the Europeans deal with it. Sarajevo was in Europe. That was the 
genesis of the First World War. Czechoslovakia was in Europe. That was 
the genesis of the Second World War.
  These people who never learn, who are uneducable cannot carry the day 
today. I plead with my colleagues to give our government an opportunity 
to participate in a NATO peacekeeping force to the tune of 4,000 
American soldiers to keep the peace. This is the only honorable way, 
and this is the only way not to undermine NATO and the hope of mankind.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to yield 2 minutes to the 
gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Hyde), the distinguished chairman of the 
Committee on the Judiciary and a member of our Committee on 
International Relations.
  (Mr. HYDE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I recognize this is a very difficult 
decision, and I regret disagreeing with some of my colleagues who 
oppose the participation of our forces in the NATO peacekeeping effort, 
but it boils down really to a simple proposition: Is NATO worthwhile? 
What is the purpose of NATO? What is our role with NATO? We are the 
leaders of NATO. NATO is an extremely useful institution to have. It is 
beginning to integrate Germany in this exercise. Germany is to provide 
3,000 troops, the British, 8,000, the French, 6,000, the United States 
4,000, and to what end? To stop genocide. To stop the slaughter. To be 
peacekeepers.
  There really is a moral obligation on those people who have the 
resources to intercede when people are being wantonly, atrociously 
killed, and that is what our purpose is. We have a national purpose: to 
prevent the spread of this conflict. If we appease Milosevic, if we 
leave the field and let the killing go on, we are inviting a wider 
spread of the war that could involve two of our NATO allies on the 
opposite side, Greece and Turkey.
  So there is a humanitarian purpose; there is a peacekeeping purpose, 
and in my judgment, the very purpose of NATO would be frustrated; it 
would be eviscerated if we turned our back and walked away.
  Mr. Chairman, leadership imposes heavy burdens and a cost must be 
paid, but we either are going to lead in the struggle, and it is a 
struggle for world peace, or we are going to be on the sidelines. I 
think for the vitality of NATO, for our role in NATO as a leader, for 
integrating the peacekeeping forces with these other countries, clearly 
we have to participate, and I will support the resolution.
  Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Missouri (Mr. Skelton), the ranking Democrat on the Committee on Armed 
Services.
  Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this 
time.
  Our colleague from Illinois posed the question, is NATO worth it? 
Absolutely. NATO is worth it.
  First, we should understand those pages of history that point out 
that World War I started in the Balkans, and if NATO in its role in 
keeping peace in Europe can be fulfilled, it will be necessary for NATO 
to do a peacekeeping mission in Kosovo.
  Second, in answer to the gentleman's question, is NATO worth it, 
history also tells us that we have had more years of continuous peace 
in Europe since the days of the Roman Empire. NATO not only is worth 
it, it works, and the United States of America is the leader of NATO.
  Tomorrow in Independence, Missouri, at the Truman Library, with the 
Secretary of State present as well as other noted Americans, the 50th 
anniversary of NATO will be celebrated.
  Today, by this vote, we will declare whether NATO is worth it, 
whether NATO is to fulfill its goal and mission in the days and years 
ahead. I agree with the resolution.
  I might also say that I have an amendment which I do not see how 
anyone could vote against. Later in the day, my amendment to this 
resolution will be to the effect that there should be no troops 
deployed until there is an agreement and a subsequent vote. But the 
bottom line is, NATO, Mr. Chairman, is worth it.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to yield 2 minutes to the 
gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Bliley), the distinguished chairman of our 
Committee on Commerce.
  (Mr. BLILEY asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. Bliley. Mr. Chairman, I want to address my remarks to my 
colleagues on this side of the aisle. Yes, the Clinton administration 
has failed to address the American people on why we should be in the 
Balkans, why we should be in Bosnia, and why we should be in Kosovo. 
But let me tell my colleagues, I have spent 15 years as a

[[Page H1198]]

member of the U.S. delegation to the NATO parliamentary group. I now 
serve as the Vice President. We must be a participant in Kosovo.
  Why? Because the Europeans cannot do it themselves. They have 
historic alliances. The French and the Russians have been with the 
Serbs. The Germans and the Italians have been with the Albanians. If we 
are not there and the NATO alliance is not able to go because we are 
not there, we are going to see the fighting begin again.
  When the Yugoslavs begin bringing in heavy weapons, the Kosovos are 
going to call on their Albanian brothers to come to their aid. We run 
the risk of Macedonia being involved or the former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia, and then the really big danger that we have of the Turks and 
the Greeks becoming involved.

                              {time}  1415

  Remember, World War I began at Sarajevo. Remember, we hesitated and 
did not go into Bosnia right away. We were treated every night to the 
atrocities on CNN. Please, support the resolution, even though the 
administration has failed to come forward and adequately address the 
Congress and the American people.
  Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from 
Georgia (Ms. McKinney).
  Ms. McKINNEY. Mr. Chairman, unfortunately, today we are debating 
sending U.S. forces to keep a peace that does not exist, to carry out 
an agreement that has not been agreed to, and to assist people on both 
sides who do not seem to want our help.
  We are being asked to vote on something we cannot even see, and to 
sign a blank check. We have written blank checks before, and we have 
discovered afterwards just how high the cost has been. In what we do on 
Kosovo, we should first make sure that we have an agreement, know the 
plans, and know the cost.
  In thinking about the cost, we should realize how much our own 
reckless actions have added to the bill. For years we have been selling 
our highest technology weapons to countries whose possible involvement 
in this conflict is important, both for those who want us in and those 
who want us to stay out. By our own actions we have greatly raised the 
stakes for such a conflict, and we have raised the risks that our 
soldiers again and again unnecessarily will be facing the products of 
our own factories.
  If the parties in Kosovo really want peace, they will both sign the 
agreement, and if they do not, the mission of our forces will be truly 
impossible. Arms selling and peacemaking do not mix in Kosovo or 
anywhere else.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to yield 3 minutes to the 
gentleman from California (Mr. Rohrabacher), a member of our Committee 
on International Relations.
  Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong opposition to sending 
America's young defenders to Kosovo. We are being asked to deploy our 
troops yet again, eroding our overall strength even as new threats are 
becoming evident in Asia. Our military is being stretched so thin we 
are putting them at grave risk.
  Unlike what is happening in the Balkans, there are other national 
security threats to our country. By dissipating our limited resources, 
asking our military for yet more sacrifice, we are doing a horrible 
disservice to our country and to its defenders.
  I have no doubt that the people of Kosovo have a right to their self-
determination, just as the people in Slovenia had a right to their 
self-determination, in Croatia, in Macedonia, and in Bosnia. Yes, we 
were given an option then, do nothing or send in the troops. We could 
have then provided the support necessary for those people to fight for 
their own independence, but instead, we held off, and then it was just 
send in the American troops.
  But the people of Kosovo, just like the people in Croatia, are 
willing to fight for their own freedom. We are being told, it is either 
send troops or do nothing. That is nonsense. If we are too timid to 
even recognize that the people of Kosovo, 90 percent of whom want their 
independence, they are Muslims, Albanians, who do not want to be under 
the heel of oppression of the Serbs, if we cannot at least recognize 
their independence, if we are too timid to do that, how can we ask our 
own military to jump in the middle of that cauldron?
  There is no peace plan. There is no peace plan at all. Our troops 
will end up either being the police force of the Serbians, or we will 
end up fighting the battle that the people of Kosovo are willing to 
fight for themselves.
  We have been promised things before in the Balkans. We have been 
promised, the last time we have sent our troops, that it would take 1 
year and $2 billion. That was 5 years and $12 billion ago. That 
dissipation of our money, that stretching our troop strength so wide 
that it is about to break, is causing great damage to our national 
security.
  The Balkans is not in America's national security interest. We can 
talk about NATO in nostalgic terms all we want. The job of NATO was 
done when the Soviet Union split apart. It is not our job now, because 
at that time it was in our national security interest. Now it is not in 
our interest to send our young people all over the world, trying to be 
the police force of the world in a way that it weakens us as a Nation, 
so when there are threats to us from China or from elsewhere, or in 
Korea, that we will be unable to act, and that perhaps thousands of 
American lives will be lost in situations like that.
  Let us support the people of Kosovo's right to self-determination. 
Let us give them the weapons they need to do their own fight, and not 
have American lives at stake.
  Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  Mr. Chairman, I would just say, the gentleman's proposition would 
lead to arms races globally, and increased murder. The choice we have 
here today is to support peacekeeping, as compared to warmaking. It is 
the right use for our people.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from North Dakota 
(Mr. Pomeroy).
  Mr. POMEROY. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding time to 
me.
  Mr. Chairman, I would ask, what does it say about the United States 
and its NATO allies that we cannot take on a two-bit bully down the 
block? By allowing Milosevic to get away with his third brutal war in a 
decade, the United States and NATO will send an encouraging message to 
dictators, aggressors, and terrorists around the globe.
  Those are not my words, Mr. Chairman. Those are the words of majority 
leader Bob Dole in his testimony yesterday to the Committee on 
International Relations. He is now charged with getting the parties to 
an agreement, and is in the final stages of accomplishing that 
extraordinarily difficult undertaking.
  It is therefore deeply regrettable, Mr. Chairman, that we are having 
this debate today. How can we reasonably make a decision on a 
resolution regarding a peace agreement when the peace agreement itself 
has yet to be finalized?
  But we are where we are, so I urge Members to vote for the 
resolution. The slaughter that has been occurring in Kosovo is so 
deeply disturbing. If we look at the statistics, they are shocking. If 
we look at the individual accounts, they are even more disturbing. I 
have a 5-year-old daughter at home. When I read the New York Times 
account of the 5-year-old that was hunted down in her backyard and 
brutally murdered, and the photograph of her little shoes in the 
garden, it is something of a tragedy of a magnitude we cannot ignore.
  The U.S. role being considered is only a minor, supporting role. Our 
participation will be 15 percent or less, we are told. It is a 
situation where we have to do our part to bring the genocide and 
atrocities to an end. Vote yes on the resolution.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to yield 2 minutes to the 
gentleman from Colorado (Mr. Hefley), a member of the Committee on 
Armed Services.
  Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding time to 
me.
  Mr. Chairman, I am delighted we are doing this debate today. I think 
that for us not to do this and to wait until it was too late would be a 
terrible mistake. I think, as a member of the Committee on Armed 
Services, there are four considerations that we need to

[[Page H1199]]

consider before we send troops into Kosovo.
  First, the manner in which this administration has circumvented the 
legislative process when it comes to deployment of U.S. military forces 
around the world has been unprecedented, so it should come as no 
surprise that the President does not want us to debate this today. The 
President is the Commander in Chief, but he has a consultative partner 
in the Congress. He ought to consult us about these things.
  When we were debating Bosnia, Mr. Chairman, when we were going to 
debate it that night, the President told me he did not care what we 
thought about Bosnia. He did not care. He was sending troops into 
Bosnia anyway. That should not be the attitude of the Chief Executive. 
So we are doing something right here today. Even if he does not care 
what we think, we are doing something that should be done.
  Secondly, before we send troops in we should have a measure of 
success. How do we know when we have done our job? How do we know when 
we are finished, when we have completed it? I do not see that in the 
plan at this point. I do not see any clear mission or goals or 
accomplishment standards, what will be the measure of success.
  Third, for the United States to enter the region, there should be a 
signed agreement by both the Albanians and the Serbs. Following that, 
there should be a request that we in NATO come in to help them. This is 
a civil war in a sovereign nation. We should be there only at their 
request.
  I recently visited similar nations in the Balkans. We can see the 
hatred all over that part of the world. The idea that we would be so 
arrogant as to believe that we can go in and fix a problem without the 
full participation of all the stakeholders in this is just ridiculous. 
Then it is even more arrogant, I believe, to think we can mollify this 
problem in a short period of time. We may be there a while, if we go 
in.
  Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  I would like to say that for all the talk of an end game, if we had 
had the discussion when we put NATO forces in Europe to stop Communist 
expansion, and said, how long are you going to be there, are you going 
to be out of there in 2 years, out in a year, we would have lost Europe 
while we were debating how long we would stay.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Tennessee (Mr. 
Clement).
  Mr. CLEMENT. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding time to 
me, and thank the gentleman from New York (Mr. Gilman).
  This is a serious matter, we all know that. But the fact is, I think 
a lot of us are questioning the timing of this. I was in Bosnia last 
year with the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. Ike Skelton) and others. 
Those people were so appreciative of the United States, knowing that 
the United States is the one and only superpower in the world. We also 
know that we do not want to be the Big Brother in the world, as well. 
But we also realize that we have a responsibility. We also know that 
that is where World War I started, was in the Balkan area.
  We have to ask ourselves the question, how can we help? How can we be 
supportive, knowing that whatever we do it is not going to be just a 
unilateral effort, it is going to be a number of other countries in 
concert with the United States agreeing on a peace plan?
  The atrocities over there are horrendous, how peoples' lives have 
been destroyed, their homes are being destroyed, the looting. It was an 
orchestrated conspiracy, and Milosevic, operating in Belfast, is going 
to look at all of the things we are doing or not doing.
  Yet, we know what Senator Dole has already said. The Republican 
nominee for President has made it very clear why. This was before the 
Committee on International Relations just yesterday. He said, ``I would 
rather have the vote come after the agreement between the Kosovar 
Albanians and Serbia.'' I think he is correct, because are we going to 
put ourselves in a position where we are going to be responsible for 
ruining any opportunity for peace at the table? Let us support our 
leadership, and let us have peace in Kosovo.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to yield 2 minutes to the 
gentleman from Florida (Mr. Weldon).
  Mr. WELDON of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for 
yielding time to me.
  I rise reluctantly to speak in opposition to sending our the United 
States Armed Forces into Kosovo. If we look at the U.S. military, it is 
overwhelmingly apparent that the Clinton administration has placed our 
military budget and the needs of our men and women in uniform on the 
back burner while greatly increasing the number of overseas 
deployments.
  By reducing our national defense budget and failing to provide the 
funding necessary for training, equipment, and compensation, this 
administration is eroding morale and troop strength. I cannot, in good 
conscience, support sending our troops again overseas to support 
another overseas mission. It is not fair to our troops. It is not fair 
to our families.
  Let us review some of the facts on this issue. The number of active 
duty army divisions has been reduced from 18 to 8. Under the Clinton-
Gore administration, the number of fighter wings has gone down from 36 
to 20. Our naval forces have been reduced by 30 percent.
  Today our troops do not have enough ammunition. The Army is short 
$1.7 billion in ammunition, the marines $193 million. Too many of our 
men and women in uniform have gone too long without seeing their 
families, their wives, their husbands, children, and parents. This is 
having a terrible effect on morale and retention of a fine, qualified, 
uniformed service.
  This Administration's neglect of our troops has led to fewer troops 
reenlisting and more troops leaving the Armed Forces. Some of our men 
and women in uniform are actually on food stamps. This is an outrage.
  It is time for this administration to put its money where its mouth 
is. It is time for it to draw a line in the sand, and demand that we 
send the right amount of funds to support our troops, particularly if 
now we are going to send 3,000 more troops overseas to support another 
unending overseas deployment.

                              {time}  1430

  Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Maryland (Mr. Cummings), former speaker of the Maryland House.
  Mr. CUMMINGS. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank my colleague for yielding 
time to me.
  Mr. Chairman, I stand today in support of House Concurrent Resolution 
42. Probably one of the most significant moments of my life was when, 
back in December of 1997, I went over to Bosnia with the President. 
There I saw our troops. When we arrived in Bosnia at about 5 or 6 
o'clock in the morning, thousands of people had stood all night just to 
simply say thank you for saving our lives. Thank you for giving us our 
lives for Christmas.
  The President is right. We have to act. We cannot just stand aside 
and allow lives to be lost. The fact is that we have a duty, and we 
must fulfill that duty. Lest we forget, let us not turn a blind eye. 
Remember the Holocaust, remember South Africa, remember Rwanda.
  Our Nation is a very, very powerful nation. The fact is, is that we 
have to stand up and bring peace and bring life to life. So I stand in 
support of House Concurrent Resolution 42 and urge all of my colleagues 
to vote for it.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to yield 2 minutes to the 
gentleman from New York (Mr. Houghton), a member of our Committee on 
International Relations.
  (Mr. HOUGHTON asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. HOUGHTON. Mr. Chairman, I am tempted to go through the 
philosophies and the history and the risks and the costs that are 
involved here. But to me, and it may be a reflection on my own 
position, to me, it is a very simple issue that we are in a situation 
now where decisions have to be made. We can be doubtful and unclear and 
opinionated about some of the things, whether it is the reigniting of 
anarchy in Albania or destabilizing Macedonia, but that is not the 
point.
  The point is this is a horrible time I think to have this debate. If 
we are going to have peace, we must have successful negotiations. We 
are right in the middle of negotiations now.

[[Page H1200]]

  If we vote down this resolution, the negotiations have no merit 
because there is no incentive for the people to continue the 
negotiations. If we vote for this resolution, we can continue the 
negotiations. It is a nonbinding resolution. If we want to, we can take 
up the issue whether we should have troops in Bosnia or not.
  So, therefore, it is a very clear issue. Do we want to continue the 
negotiations? Do we not want to continue the negotiations? I am for 
continuing, and I am for this resolution.
  Mr. HOEFFEL. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Texas (Mr. Lampson).
  Mr. LAMPSON. Mr. Chairman, I rise today to urge my colleagues to help 
Kosovo achieve peace, not only for the benefits of the thousands of 
people living in that troubled area of the world, but also for their 
family members who live here in the United States.
  Let me tell my colleagues about a family in my southeast Texas 
district who has loved ones who are trapped in violence-torn Kosovo. 
John and Lisa Halili, who own and operate an oyster and shrimping 
business in San Leon, watch 24-hour television and read newspapers with 
anxiety and anticipation each and every day. Why? Because John's father 
and brother, and many other people, have been forced to flee their 
homes and, in one instance, hide in a single house in the village of 
Vushtrri.
  Unfortunately, Bajram and Idriz Halili have been unable to leave 
their hideaway and escape to the safety of the United States. So they, 
along with their son and daughter-in-law in Texas, wait and wait and 
wait for peace to come to Kosovo and the entire region.
  Feeling helpless and sometimes hopeless, John and Lisa have contacted 
me, hoping that I, as a United States Representative, could do 
something to diminish their worry or reunite their family.
  Unlike the Halilis, Congress is not helpless, nor should it be 
hopeless about peace talks in Kosovo. I know that there are other areas 
of the world that are crying out for help, including places in our own 
country. But where we can make a difference, we have an obligation to 
do so. We have the duty to do whatever it takes to help this troubled 
region of the world create an environment of peace for its people and 
their families who live within all of our Congressional District.
  We as a Congress have a responsibility to support the President so 
that the United States speaks with one voice on foreign policy.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to yield 2 minutes to the 
gentleman from New York (Mr. Lazio).
  Mr. LAZIO. Mr. Chairman, I want to begin by congratulating and 
thanking the chairman, the gentleman from New York (Mr. Gilman) for his 
leadership in helping to move this to a debate which is such an 
important part of this process.
  One of the most important accomplishments of which America can be 
justly proud is its victory in the Cold War, a 50-year struggle during 
which literally 500 million people were liberated from control of the 
Soviets.
  Our ideals, our American ideals of democracy and market capitalism 
are in triumph throughout the world, but not in every corner of the 
world. With that triumph comes some responsibility.
  In the Balkans where slaughter and bloodshed and systemic rape as a 
tool of terror have been used over and over again, where families and 
villages have been wiped out, America properly has a role, not the only 
role, but a leading role. But this is a sobering debate frankly because 
of some of the failures of our foreign policy that got us here.
  I am in support of the Gilman amendment, because I believe in 
America's role in ensuring the peace, in ensuring a strong, integrated 
Europe. But let us remind ourselves of the fact that the Dayton Accord 
helped perpetuate this because the people of Kosovo who pursued a 
nonviolent strategy were left out. The message that was translated from 
the State Department was that we will only be engaged if violence is 
pursued as a tool. That is the wrong message.
  The message from Milosevic was, if one pursues a strategy of violence 
and terror, one can consolidate their gains; and we will not push them 
back, and they will win.
  When our lead negotiator, the Special Envoy to the Balkans, praised 
Milosevic for his cooperation in Bosnia and branded the Kosovo 
Liberation Army, ``without question a terrorist organization,'' what is 
the message that he sends?
  We must be there because of a failed American foreign policy, but we 
must also be there to keep the people of Kosovo confident in America's 
efforts.
  Mr. HOEFFEL. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Ohio (Mr. Traficant).
  Mr. TRAFICANT. Mr. Chairman, a 1986 intelligence report warned us of 
today's debate. They said the genocide in Kosovo will end by one of two 
means, by Western governments assisting and pressuring Belgrade to 
grant independence to Kosovo, or be revolutionized.
  This is a tough vote. I, like everybody else, want to stop the 
slaughter in Yugoslavia and in Kosovo. But let me say this, today's 
vote will also reward an international tyrant Milosevic, because we 
will be rewarding a flawed agreement.
  This agreement should be modified to say, number one, upon enactment 
of the agreement, there should be no Serbian troops in Kosovo; number 
two, a provision clearly warning Milosevic he will be bombed if he 
violates the terms of the agreement; number three, that all war 
criminals will be apprehended and will be subject to prosecution, bar 
none; and, number four, that, on conclusion of the terms of 
Rambouillet, there shall be a referendum vote for independence.
  God, we are here in the halls of Washington and Lincoln. In 1986, 
they told us, there would be more genocide, more killing, more 
oppression, and we have done nothing, and we are about to make the same 
mistake.
  This is a tough vote for me. But our committee must look at those 
facts, Mr. Chairman. My bill clearly speaks to it. There should be an 
amendment on this floor to modify that agreement, at least the sense of 
this House to, in fact, infer that that subject mattered.
  Be careful here. It just is not about deploying troops. Europe should 
be providing those ground troops. We should be providing the air and 
strategic support. But it is a tough vote, and I give credit to the 
Speaker for at least taking up the issue. Our war making powers should 
not come down from the White House.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to yield 2 minutes to the 
gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Sanford), a member of our Committee 
on International Relations.
  Mr. SANFORD. Mr. Chairman, I stand as one against sending troops to 
Kosovo and one very much behind the timing of this vote for a couple of 
different reasons, but one in which was well described by Henry 
Kissinger yesterday.
  Yesterday, he said before our committee that he and President Nixon 
believed that we were in trouble in Vietnam because our predecessors 
had launched the U.S. into an enterprise in a distant region for worthy 
causes but without adequately assessing the national interest and the 
likely cost. Now, not after the troops are deployed, not after troops 
are in the field, but now is the time to assess that cost.
  I do not think it passes the cost test for a couple of different 
reasons, the first of which is the domino theory has long been 
disproven. Clifford Clark was sent by Lyndon Johnson to see our C2 
allies in Southeast Asia over 30 years ago to use the same argument. 
The C2 allies said, no, we do not think this will grow into a giant 
conflict in Southeast Asia. We choose not to go into South Vietnam or 
North Vietnam. We ignored their advice and, as a result, 50,000 
American boys died.
  The domino theory has been disproven. For us to send boys into Kosovo 
means it has got to pass the mommy test. The mommy test for me means it 
is not only in our strategic interest, but we also have a chance in 
making a difference.
  Here, as my colleague just pointed out just a moment ago, we were 
signing an agreement with Milosevic, who is a person who does not 
exactly have a lot of trust in the world community. Yet we are 
validating him by signing an agreement with him. In other words, we are 
building an agreement on shifting sand.
  Thirdly, I would say that troops are thought to be used as policemen. 
Modern armies are designed to move. They

[[Page H1201]]

are not designed to stand still. I sat on a plane the other day with a 
young enlisted officer who complained about the fact that he had not 
seen his baby in 6 months and was being used as a policeman in Bosnia.
  Mr. HOEFFEL. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Maryland (Mr. Cardin).
  (Mr. CARDIN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. CARDIN. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Pennsylvania for 
yielding me this time.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of this resolution although I must 
tell my colleagues I have certain misgivings. My misgivings are not 
surrounded by the U.S. role, because I think it is clear that the 
United States has a very vital role in this peace process. The 
stability in the Balkans are very important to our national interests, 
and we are not going to achieve peace in the Balkans without U.S. 
leadership.
  It is important for the United States to maintain a very strong 
position with NATO. So I support the Clinton administration's efforts 
in this area.
  My concern is a matter of timing. Why are we considering this 
resolution now? I agree with my friend the gentleman from New York (Mr. 
Houghton) in his comments, in that we should have an agreement first 
before we are asked to vote on what the United States' role should be 
in enforcing that peace agreement.
  We do not know what the agreement itself will be. However, I plan to 
vote in support of this resolution because I want to make it clear that 
I support the Clinton administration's efforts to bring peace to the 
Balkans, that I acknowledge that the U.S. will play, must play a 
leadership role in enforcing that peace agreement that we hope will be 
achieved.
  By voting for this resolution, I think we move forward the peace 
process in the Balkans. If we do otherwise, then we are going to be at 
least partially responsible for making it more difficult for us to 
achieve peace in that very difficult area of the world.
  Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues to support the resolution if we 
must vote on it today. If we must vote on it today, then we should 
support it.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to yield 2 minutes to the 
gentleman from Texas (Mr. Paul).
  (Mr. PAUL asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. PAUL. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank the leadership for allowing 
this debate to come to the floor. I have, for quite a few weeks, 
advocated that we talk about this and have urge that the troops never 
be sent to Kosovo without our consent. I do believe, though, that the 
process here is less than perfect. The fact that we are talking about a 
House Concurrent Resolution at the same time authorizing troop 
deployment raises serious questions.

                              {time}  1445

  Since World War II we have not been diligent here in the Congress to 
protect our prerogatives with respect to the declaration of war. Korean 
and Vietnam wars were fought without a declaration of war. And these 
wars were not won.
  Since 1973, since the War Powers Resolution was passed, we have 
further undermined the authority of the Congress and delivered more 
authority to the President because the resolution essentially has given 
the President more power to wage war up to 90 days without the Congress 
granting authority. It is to our credit at least that we are bringing 
this matter up at this particular time.
  We must remember that there are various things involved here. First, 
whether or not we should be the world policeman. That answer should be 
easy. We should not be. It costs a lot of money to do what we are 
doing, and it undermines our military strength. So we should consider 
that.
  We should consider the law and the process in the War Powers 
Resolution and just exactly how we grant authority to the President to 
wage war. We should be more concerned about the Constitution and how we 
should give this authority. We should be concerned about this 
procedure.
  The bigger question here, however, is if we vote for this, and I 
strongly oppose passing this, because if we vote for this, we authorize 
the moving of troops into a dangerous area. We should ask ourselves, if 
we are willing to vote for this resolution; are we ourselves willing to 
go to Kosovo and expose our lives on the front lines? Are we willing to 
send our children or our grandchildren; to not only be exposed to the 
danger, with the pretext we are going to save the world, but with the 
idea that we may lose our life? That is what we have to consider.
  Mr. HOEFFEL. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from 
New Jersey (Mr. Menendez).
  (Mr. MENENDEZ asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. MENENDEZ. Mr. Chairman, now is not the time to have this debate. 
Too much is at stake to risk sending a message of America's disunity at 
this critical point in the negotiations. Innocent men, women and 
children, little babies, entire families have been butchered, children 
have been orphaned, women have been raped, 400,000 people have been 
driven from their homes. That is what is at stake here today: human 
lives.
  If we are the leaders of the free world, if we are still that brave 
Nation that stood against darkness in World War II, now is the time to 
stand together to help the people of Kosovo find peace. But as we 
speak, negotiations are at a critical stage. We are either on the brink 
of a breakthrough or at the point of a breakdown. If the negotiations 
succeed, thousands of lives will be saved. Thousands of these children 
will live to grow up. And if we fail, many of these people will die.
  With all that at stake, at a time when these poor people are looking 
to us for stability, to help them find their way back to peace, why are 
Republicans holding this debate here today at the very moment we need 
to show unity?
  If there are parts of any final agreement we want to debate, then for 
God's sake, let us wait until we see it, let us wait until the ink is 
dry, let us wait until it is signed. Right now there is no accord to 
debate, there is only the possibility of sabotaging the process before 
it has had the chance to reach a conclusion.
  That is why this premature debate is the very height of 
irresponsibility, and even more so because this is where World War I 
began. My colleagues, past is prologue, and we should not have to learn 
this lesson twice. This region does have strategic importance to the 
United States and many Americans died when the world ignored these 
tensions once before.
  Preventing an escalation will save American lives in the long run. We 
cannot afford a war in Kosovo that could destabilize the region, that 
could spill over into Albania, to Macedonia, Turkey, and Greece, which 
are NATO allies. We should be standing together. We should be 
supporting these negotiations. We should be supporting the suffering 
families in Kosovo, and we should have delayed this debate until the 
negotiators have had the time to finish their work.
  But if Republicans want to force a decision now, the decision should 
be and must be that this is a cause and a region in the national 
interests of the United States and, ultimately, in the national 
security interests of the United States worth defending. And if troops 
are needed to do that, we should support that mission and we should 
support them.
  Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues to once again join with us to try 
to delay this vote and, if not, then to vote to send a clear message 
that America stands ready to help in Kosovo.
  Mr. HOEFFEL. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
New Jersey (Mr. Rothman).
  (Mr. ROTHMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. ROTHMAN. Mr. Chairman, the peace talks in Kosovo are predicated 
on one very simple premise: The international community must pose a 
credible military threat to enforce any peace agreement that is reached 
between the Kosovars and the Serbs.
  To discuss today whether or not the United States, the world's only 
superpower and the world's greatest military force, will lend its 
support to any Kosovo peace settlement is premature and is 
inappropriate at this time. To debate this issue today undermines the 
efforts of the envoys who are trying to

[[Page H1202]]

negotiate a peace settlement between the Serbs and Kosovars.
  However, the credible threat of military force does provide an 
incentive for the Serbs and Kosovars to reach a peace agreement. To 
debate this issue today threatens that incentive and could embolden 
Slobodan Milosevic to reject NATO peacekeeping troops completely, and 
could cause the Kosovars to give up on the peace process.
  The bottom line, though, is that wavering American leadership in this 
situation has the potential to lead to more bloodshed in Kosovo that 
could spill over into other parts of Europe and metastasize beyond our 
control. Mr. Chairman, we cannot have it both ways. We cannot be the 
world's only superpower but then remain aloof when the situation 
demands our leadership.
  Mr. Chairman, I do not rise today to say that the United States is 
obligated to resolve every conflict that erupts around the world. We 
have the right to decide these matters on a case-by-case basis. But in 
this case it is in our national interests to lend our country's support 
to the international effort to prevent the return of wanton bloodshed, 
murder, rape and wholesale slaughter in Kosovo.
  The Balkans have been the birthplace of war before. Allowing a 
conflict to explode in that region could have devastating consequences 
to the peace and stability of Europe and, hence, to America's national 
interests.
  Mr. HOEFFEL. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from 
Maryland (Mr. Hoyer).
  Mr. HOYER. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this 
time, and I rise in support of this resolution; in support of basic 
human rights, in support of doing the right thing for our country and 
for the people of Kosovo.
  I welcome this debate, Mr. Chairman, yet I fear that in undertaking 
it, what we have done today could have a very serious negative impact 
on the current sensitive negotiations on a peace plan. That is why I 
voted against the rule. The resolution, however, I pray, will be 
passed; that America, at our shores, will stand united; that the 
message we send this day will be that America is united in its 
conviction and in its commitment to face tyranny where it finds it.
  In addition, Mr. Chairman, I am hopeful that we will ratify and 
support the representations of two American Presidents, President Bush 
and President Clinton.
  President Bush said, in his Christmas warning to Milosevic, and I 
quote, ``In the event of a conflict in Kosovo, caused by Serbian 
action, the U.S. will be prepared to employ military force against the 
Serbians in Kosovo and in Serbia proper.'' That was George Bush, then 
President of the United States, Christmas 1992.
  Mr. Chairman, shortly thereafter, the President of the United States, 
William Jefferson Clinton, recommitted to that proposition set forth by 
George Bush; that Milosevic, perceived by this Nation as a war 
criminal, perceived as savaging the people of Bosnia, if he tried to do 
the same in Kosovo, would be confronted by America and, yes, by its 
troops.
  Mr. Chairman, today we hear that Robert Dole, the candidate for 
President of the United States in 1996, testified before the Committee 
on International Relations that we should not have this resolution on 
the floor. But if we did have it on the floor, as we do, that it ought 
to be passed.
  That sentiment was shared by Jeane Kirkpatrick under President 
Reagan, our representative to the United Nations, by Richard Perle, an 
assistant in the Department of Defense, known as a hard-liner, I might 
say. A conservative. Vin Weber, a member of this Congress, a close 
friend of the former Speaker, signed a letter saying that this action 
that the President proposes should be supported. And, lastly, I cite 
Caspar Weinberger, Secretary of Defense under Ronald Reagan.
  Mr. Chairman, America's strength has, in instances overseas, been our 
unit, our unity of purpose, our unity of conviction. It is clear that 
the Europeans alone will not be able to summon up the political will 
and, indeed, the military strength to confront this Bully of Belgrade, 
as referred to by Senator Dole.
  I would hope, my colleagues, that we come together today, as has Bob 
Dole and Bill Clinton, Jeane Kirkpatrick and others, and Richard 
Holbrooke, our perhaps next secretary of the United Nations--come 
together and say that we will confront war crimes when our Presidents 
commit us to that end; that we will support this President and 
facilitate the attaining of an agreement. Because to facilitate that 
agreement may not only save lives, but it will save the dispossession 
of thousands of people. The dispossession from their homes, from their 
lands.
  Mr. Chairman, this is a great country, and I would remind my 
Republican colleagues that when George Bush made a determination to 
confront tyranny and send troops to Saudi Arabia, there was a request 
on our side for a vote. President Bush asked Tom Foley, the Speaker of 
the House of Representatives--and I sat in the room with him--let us 
not vote now; let us support this policy so we can put together this 
coalition and bring peace and stop this aggression. Speaker Foley 
agreed to do so with the President of the United States.
  And, indeed, when there was a vote, I tell my friends on the 
Republican side of the aisle, as to whether or not we were going to 
then deploy those troops in Saudi Arabia into Kuwait, that almost half 
of our caucus supported President Bush. I hope we find that 
bipartisanship today. I hope we follow Bob Dole. I hope we commit 
ourselves to bipartisanship in foreign policy in confronting tyranny.
  There are those who say that the United States has no strategic 
interest in Kosovo, that we have no interest in the ``internal 
affairs'' of another country, that war has become a ``fact of life'' in 
the former Yugoslavia.
  Mr. Chairman, I submit to you and my colleagues that helping to 
resolve the crisis in Kosovo, as we have in Bosnia--stopping war in the 
heart of Europe--is a preeminent strategic and moral interest of the 
United States. The crisis in Kosovo, like Bosnia, has the potential to 
ignite the entire Balkan region, undoing what we have achieved in 
Bosnia and drawing in already unstable Albania, Macedonia and 
potentially our NATO allies Greece and Turkey.
  To those who say that the international community has no interest in 
the ``internal affairs'' of another state, I say that both the 
Universal Declaration on Human Rights and the Helsinki Final Act to 
which the United States is a signatory, hold otherwise.
  Fifty years ago, the Universal Declaration on Human Rights shattered 
the idea that national sovereignty should shield governments from 
scrutiny of their human rights records. This concept had long insulated 
countries from being held accountable for the gross mistreatment of 
their own citizens. In the aftermath of the Holocaust, the declaration 
captured the world's revulsion of that traditional view of 
international relations and made clear a new norm--how a state treats 
its own people is of direct and legitimate concern to all states and is 
not simply an internal affair of the state concerned. Thirty years 
later, the Helsinki Final Act reaffirmed this principle.
  Mr. Chairman, the events which have occurred in Kosovo since the 
beginning of last year are but an escalation of the repression and 
brutality the Albania Kosovars have suffered at the hands of the 
Belgrade authorities since 1989 when Slobodan Milosevic unilaterally 
revoked the substantial autonomy Kosovo enjoyed under the old Yugoslav 
Federation. Of course, since the beginning of 1998 more than 2,000 
ethnic Albanians--including women and children--have been killed, many 
brutally massacred. Hundreds of villages have been destroyed, and more 
than 400,000 people have been displaced. Make no mistake about it, this 
is ethnic cleansing.

  To those who say that what is happening in Kosovo is the continuation 
of centuries old ethnic hatreds, and that ``War has become a fact of 
life in this part of the world,'' I ask, what do you propose? Accept 
the status quo? Let the opposing factions ``slug it out''--let the 
bloodbath continue? I say this is totally unacceptable. Such a course 
legitimizes the violence--the murder, the ethnic cleansing--and accepts 
the premise that this is the kind of world in which we will always 
live.
  Mr. Chairman, Kosovo is not Bosnia. The situation on the ground is 
certainly different in many ways, yet both share a common suffering--
the scourge of ethnic cleansing, and a common curse--Slobodan 
Milosevic. The killing and devastation in Kosovo, like the ethnic 
cleansing in Bosnia, are a direct result of the efforts of Milosevic 
and his thugs to maintain and consolidate their power.
  Mr. Chairman, the United States, NATO and the international community 
have made a commitment to bring peace and long-term stability to the 
former Yugoslavia. This is a long and difficult struggle, and any peace 
agreement will not be effectively implemented without NATO muscle. The 
United States must

[[Page H1203]]

lead and take a strong stand against the enemies of peace.
  Mr. Chairman, NATO no longer confronts a monolithic enemy. The 
threats with which it must now deal come from terrorism and regional 
conflicts--like Kosovo. If we and our NATO allies are not willing to 
confront the bullies in Kosovo and lay the groundwork for long-term 
peace in that region, we will encourage such bullies and ensure that 
they will act again sometime, somewhere, That is the lesson of history 
we must not forget.
  Vote for H. Con. Res. 42.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
South Carolina (Mr. Graham).
  Mr. GRAHAM. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this 
time. If we believe this operation is equal to what was going on in 
Kuwait, we should vote ``yes''.

                              {time}  1500

  If we see it to be different, then we ought to ask what are the 
differences. I think it is dramatically different. Our country is about 
to commit 4,000 young men and women into a sovereign nation, in a 
region in that nation where 90 percent of the inhabitants of Kosovo are 
Albanian, who are trying to become independent. We are about to get 
ourselves in the middle of a Civil War. This is not fighting Saddam 
Hussein, this is interjecting 4,000 Americans into a faraway place 
where heartache is normal, where tyranny has existed before, and will 
exist after. How do we come home?
  You are asking the Congress to have a one-way ticket to a region of 
the world that is not going to lead to a world war. It is going to be a 
place where they will eventually figure out they can live together, 
with our help, but our help should not include 4,000 young Americans 
standing in the middle of people with a lot of hot temper. This makes 
no sense. Piling this on top of Bosnia is unbelievably expensive. This 
is different than Bosnia, this is different than Kuwait. The American 
public does not understand what we are doing or why. And all the big 
names in international politics to me have not justified why we are 
there and how we are going to get out.
  Secretary Kissinger says this is more like Vietnam than it is Kuwait. 
I hope he is wrong, but I believe he is right. How many more young men 
and women are going to go in faraway places to get in the middle of 
civil wars where there is a dubious reason to be there to start with 
and no way home? I hope none of them come home hurt or maimed. Vote 
``no.'' Stand up for America.
  Mr. HOEFFEL. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2\1/2\ minutes to the gentlewoman 
from the District of Columbia (Ms. Norton).
  Ms. NORTON. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this 
time.
  What has become of us, my friends? We may well be on the brink of a 
peace agreement between the Serbian government and the Kosovo ethnic 
Albanian population. Our hearts have been broken for months now. Yet in 
the midst of possibility finally, a resolution on this floor to 
polarize our country as to what it is already doing. We have been 
polarized on domestic issues, but I think the American people expect 
more of us when it comes to our international posture.
  As I speak, we are erasing the rhetoric of bipartisanship that the 
majority has sounded. Because if we cannot be bipartisan when our 
country is in the midst of what looks like it can be a successful 
effort to stop genocide, then I do not know when we can be bipartisan. 
We are undermining not war but peace. There can be no debate that this 
is in our national interest, and I have not heard that it is not. Nor 
after the Bosnia precedent should there be any debate as to whether we 
should go forward now having gotten this far.
  What has happened to the Albanians is unspeakable. Milosevic began 
shutting down their language institutions and he has ended with 
genocide. We have gone, on the other side, from partisanship to 
isolationism.
  My friends, we cannot lead the world in war or in peace if every time 
the party on the other side of the aisle wants to move, you on that 
side says, ``We don't move simply because you want to move,'' and that 
is what this comes down to. We are assuming the posture you have 
historically assumed and yet now that it is our posture, because it is 
our President, you have simply jumped to the other side, against the 
national interest.
  I ask you to stand beside our country, postpone this vote, but, to be 
sure, I hope that you will not be found on the other side of a vote 
that would undermine our country as it wages peace, not war.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to yield 2 minutes to the 
gentleman from Florida (Mr. Mica).
  (Mr. MICA asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. MICA. Mr. Chairman, I come reluctantly to the floor to oppose the 
use of United States troops on the ground in Kosovo. I do that because 
of two reasons. First, because of the lack of trust and confidence that 
I have in this President, and secondly because of the pattern of 
experience.
  When I got elected in 1992 and began service in 1993, this President 
inherited the question of Somalia which President Bush had started as a 
humanitarian rescue effort. President Clinton turned that into a 
national tragedy, a loss of our troops as we saw our troops drug 
through the streets of Somalia. Where are we in Somalia 4 or 5 years 
later? Just a few days ago 60 were killed in Somalia.
  Then we had Haiti, our second experience in nation-building. And what 
have we done in Haiti? We have traded one corrupt government for 
supporting another corrupt government at the cost of billions to our 
taxpayers. This President and this administration opposed an 
international pan-African force in Rwanda before the genocide of our 
time took place. That was the experience then, they said no troops 
then, and after the genocide we sent our troops into that area.
  Bosnia. Time and time again we have set deadlines for our troops in 
Bosnia, and our troops are still in Bosnia and our troops are spread 
thin across the globe with these deployments from this President, this 
administration. Only after Congress stepped in and made sure that we 
micromanaged the military effort in Bosnia did we ensure that our 
troops would not be killed, that they would have adequate equipment and 
that they would serve under United States command and not U.N. 
international command. We have no exit strategy. Our military is 
stretched to the limits. When the wives and mothers of our reserve 
forces call me, I am going to refer them to 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue 
and this President.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to yield 3 minutes to our 
distinguished majority leader, the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Armey).
  Mr. ARMEY. Mr. Chairman, let me thank the gentleman from New York 
(Mr. Gilman), the distinguished chairman of the Committee on 
International Relations, for bringing this to the floor. I must tell 
the gentleman from New York (Mr. Gilman) that this is not an easy vote 
for me. Indeed I have spent most of the last week worrying and studying 
about this vote and even at times trying to come to the point where I 
could vote in agreement with you on this proposition, largely out of 
the respect that I have for yourself, the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. 
Skelton) and others that I have talked to. But I have to say, it has 
been a struggle.
  I have always been very proud of the American people, proud that 
Americans love freedom so much that they are prepared to risk their 
peace to defend the freedoms of others.
  Since the end of the last war, we have rightly held a larger vision 
of our national interest. We do not see it as merely defending our 
coastal waters, protecting our commercial interests, or stopping an 
invasion of our homeland. We have understood in a way that no other 
people in history have that our freedom depends on the freedom of 
others.
  This principle has inspired our great national initiatives, the 
Marshall Plan, the Truman Policy, the democratization of Japan, our 
fights for freedom in Korea and Southeast Asia, the Reagan doctrine, 
and most recently the expansion of the NATO Alliance for which many in 
this body, including the gentleman from New York, and especially the 
gentleman from New York, have been responsible.
  The result of this effort is that America has made a world in which 
hundreds of millions of human beings are living in peace and under 
governments of their own choosing and working together for their common 
benefit. Very

[[Page H1204]]

few times in this bloody century would anyone have predicted that it 
would have ended as well as it does. But it does, because of the wisdom 
of the United States of America.
  Mr. Chairman, we do have an enduring interest in a peaceful Europe. 
What happens in the Balkans is important to our security. Indeed we 
must do all we can reasonably expect to do to prevent further killing 
and suffering in these troubled lands. But I cannot in good conscience 
support the proposed deployment we are debating today. I believe it has 
been poorly considered and is unlikely to achieve our desired ends.
  I make this objection on purely practical grounds. Its central flaw 
is that it depends on negotiating an agreement with the Serbia 
dictator, the very man who is responsible for the Balkan horrors in the 
first place. Mr. Chairman, he is a brutal killer and we can have no 
confidence that he or his followers will respect any agreement that 
might be reached.
  On the other side will be the Kosovar Liberation Army, a new 
formation with little experience in these matters. Its cause may be 
noble, but there is little reason to hope its leadership will be able 
to discipline its members. The agreement will, after all, come far 
short of their desire for true independence.
  Our troops may thus find themselves opposed by free-lance opponents 
on both sides of this brutal conflict, opponents undisciplined by any 
central authority. The resulting bloodshed may produce events that are 
far more destabilizing than those the administration fears today. This 
could be, Mr. Chairman, another Somalia. For these and other reasons I 
have heard stated today, I believe this deployment is unwise and must 
be opposed.
  Mr. Chairman, we need to take a fresh look at our policy towards the 
world's outlaw governments, not just in Serbia, but in Iraq, North 
Korea and elsewhere. These rogue regimes are without question the 
greatest security threat we face today. The administration response to 
them has been haphazard containment efforts, loose arms control 
arrangements or other negotiations. Containment and negotiation, 
however, can do little to solve the underlying problem, the very 
existence of the regimes. What we need is a new version of the Reagan 
Doctrine of the 1980s, a policy that seeks not to contain these regimes 
but to replace them with democratic alternatives.
  Last year, Congress began to shape exactly such a policy towards Iraq 
with our passage of the Iraq Liberation Act. We need to consider 
similar legislation for other rogue states, including Serbia. I for one 
reject the idea that the Serbian people are themselves inherently bent 
on ethnic warfare. As the large civil liberties protests in Belgrade 
have shown, they aspire to the same democratic privileges that other 
Europeans enjoy.
  The problem, Mr. Chairman, is Milosevic. Had we followed a determined 
policy to change his regime, we could have vastly improved the 
prospects for peace in the Balkans and liberated the Serbian people as 
well. It is time to begin such a policy now.
  The lesson of the Cold War should be clear. True peace, justice and 
security come not from negotiating with inhuman regimes but 
transcending them. Even the most enduring dictatorships can melt before 
the power and the ideals of the United States. The power of freedom is 
an ideal shared by all people. It can be and must be in the end larger 
than any man, no matter how brutal.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I thank the majority leader for his words 
with regard to this issue.
  Mr. HOEFFEL. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Texas (Mr. Turner).
  Mr. TURNER. Mr. Chairman, the debate we are entered upon today has 
the gravest of consequences for our Nation and for our future. Having 
recently returned from Bosnia, I had the opportunity there to learn a 
little bit about the attitudes present in that region. One thing that I 
did learn is that our allies, our NATO allies, have a strong commitment 
to keeping peace in the Balkans and they feel very strongly about our 
willingness as a NATO partner to stand tall with them in this crisis. I 
also learned from talking to some of our military leaders that there is 
a clear relationship between the situation in Bosnia and the developing 
events in Kosovo. Our investment in Bosnia, as one military leader told 
me, is clearly threatened by the developments in Kosovo.

                              {time}  1515

  I also had the opportunity to talk with soldiers on the ground who 
are doing an excellent job keeping the peace in Bosnia, and, as one 
first sergeant shared with us in testimony before a committee hearing, 
he has made a spiritual investment in Bosnia and believes very strongly 
that we have done the right thing in trying to help keep the peace 
there. He said because of our soldiers children now go to school in 
Bosnia, can safely play in playgrounds without fear of land mines or 
snipers. We have clearly accomplished the objective of keeping peace in 
Bosnia, and the relationship between the situation in Kosovo and Bosnia 
is undisputed by those who serve us in our Armed Forces.
  I also learned that there are clear limits to what we can hope to 
accomplish in that part of the world, and for that reason there must be 
clear guidelines before we commit troops to any mission, any joint NATO 
mission, in Kosovo. Those principles were set out by the President in a 
February 4 address, and I think we must include those principles in the 
resolution that will be adopted here today.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the 
gentleman from Utah (Mr. Hansen).
  (Mr. HANSEN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. HANSEN. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the resolution.
  Mr. Chairman, I believe this debate is timely and important. Public 
debate, by those Representatives closest to the people, before our 
troops are put in harms way, is not a sign of weakness and division but 
rather a clear reminder that the great power of America comes not from 
its government, or its military might, but from its people and their 
commitment to freedom, peace and democracy.
  In my recent travels to the Balkans and Southwest Asia, I have been 
greatly impressed by the professionalism of our soldiers, sailors, 
airmen, and marines. They have done tremendous service to our country 
with few rewards. They care for their aging equipment with great pride, 
though hampered by a worsening shortage of spare parts and lack of 
meaningful training. While at home, their loved ones struggle to keep 
their families together during the many long separations. The military 
mission to Bosnia has been an almost flawless success.
  In contrast, the foreign policy and political decisions that so 
easily put our troops in harms way is a growing failure.
  This administration has engaged our troops too often, for too long, 
with too small a budget and with too little support from the American 
people, the Congress and the world. Our soldiers can stop the fighting, 
but Bosnia is not closer to peaceful, stable government today than they 
were 5 years ago. Remember, the President promised this effort would 
take only 1 year and cost $1 billion. Five years and $10 billion later 
there is no end in sight.
  In this new age foreign policy, which replaces ``power projection'' 
with ``sympathy projection,'' we find the easier it is for the United 
States to commit its troops into the war zone, the harder it is to get 
them out. The objectives of these new entanglements are ambiguous--if 
stated at all. The goals change in the middle of the operation. The 
troops are left without any way of gauging their progress or even 
visualizing the set of circumstances which would enable them to finally 
return home.
  Today our troops are engaged in Africa, Asia, Europe, and South and 
Central America--virtually all over the globe. And they are doing a 
magnificient job with only half of the cold war force, and 35 percent 
fewer resources. The rate of overseas deployments is up more than 400 
percent in this administration alone. Meanwhile, the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff stated requirement for an additional $22 billion in defense 
investment falls on deaf ears at the White House.
  Now we learn that there is another crisis that ``requires'' American 
intervention. This time the call comes not from a threatened ally, a 
loyal friend or even a recognized country, but from a province within a 
sovereign country. When will it end? Or will this new policy or well 
meaning enlargement, simply encourage any group with a gripe to choose 
separation over the harder course of honest dialogue and true 
democracy. There is no doubt in my mind that Serbian President Milosvic 
is a brutal and oppressive thug who is guilty of crimes against 
humanity and genocide. However, an invasion of his country to embrace a 
``county'' in search of independence can only speed our sinking into a 
Balkan quagmire.

[[Page H1205]]

  Though we would like to think we can, America cannot erase, merely by 
its presence, the animosity between religious and ethnic enemies. We 
cannot cause a love of freedom and devotion to democracy to bloom in 
this fallow land. We cannot make thugs and tyrants believe that ``it 
takes a village''. U.S. troops separating warring factions does nothing 
to soothe the root cause of the hatred. It only delays the explosion of 
vengeance and mistrust. As I see it, these conflicts will eventually 
explode. We can only choose whether the explosion happens with U.S. 
troops at ground zero or not.
  With regard to the prestige and effectiveness of NATO. The only 
action which weakens our most important alliance is this President's 
repeated use of empty threats of therapeutic air strikes and endless 
promises that twenty thousand troops can solve in 1 year--problems 
which have defied solution for thousands.
  As the American presence lengthens in these ``peacemaking'' and 
``nation building'' missions, the animosity inevitably broadens to also 
be directed at our troops. Soon the referee is taking blows from both 
of the fighters. Our troops must eventually defend themselves, but in 
that self-defense they will only serve to increase the hate of both 
sides toward America. In these situations, there is no resolution for 
America, but shameful retreat or total war. Has the tragedy of Somalia 
been that long ago? I cannot support this flawed political effort 
without a clear goal, a believable exit strategy and guarantee that 
this mission will not further degrade fragile military readiness.
  In this case, the best way to support our troops is to keep them 
home.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Michigan (Mr. Smith).
  (Mr. SMITH of Michigan asked and was given permission to revise and 
extend his remarks.)
  Mr. SMITH of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, I heard somebody on the other 
side of the aisle say this is a partisan decision. Not so. Republicans 
have mixed emotions. This is a serious decision. Our chairman is voting 
for the resolution. Some of us question it very seriously. It is only 
partisan if the Democrats decide that they are going to support 
whatever the President might do.
  It seems reasonable that the President of the United States should 
come to not only Congress, but the American people, and present some of 
the reasons why it is in America's interest to send our young men and 
women into this land of Serbia, into one of the regions of that 
sovereign country called Kosovo, to risk their lives. There needs to be 
a compelling reason. Dr. Kissinger yesterday said that we might have to 
bomb our way in and then not really know which side is going to shoot 
at us. The President is planning to deploy U.S. troops without a clear 
objective or exit strategy.
  Before we deploy any troops, we need clear answers to basic questions 
like how will our presence advance lasting peace, and how long will our 
troops remain in the region. Serbs and Albanians have fought in Kosovo, 
an Albanian-dominated region of southern Serbia, for centuries. 
Conflict in the last year between ethnic Albanian rebels and Serb 
police has resulted in over 2,000 deaths.
  If the President is not willing to come to Congress, and explain; 
here is the plan, here is the strategy, here is how long we expect to 
be there, here is what we expect American taxpayers to pay; what is 
going to happen when we start taking out some of our young men and 
women in body bags? One question I had to Dr. Kissinger is why is NATO 
willing to commit 24,000 of their troops? His answer was partly the 
U.S. demand and the U.S. initiative.
  Mr. Chairman, we can not be the police force for the world. We can 
not keep spending the Social Security trust fund money. One day, if we 
are not careful we will not even have these options of helping those in 
need.
  While some remain optimistic about the potential peace agreement, I 
have serious reservations. Ethnic Albanian leaders in Kosovo have said 
that they will settle for nothing less than independence. Serbia 
refuses to sign an agreement which dismembers the country. As Dr. 
Kissinger stated, ``the projected Kosovo agreement is unlikely to enjoy 
the support of the parties involved for a very long period of time.''
  The long history of the ethnic conflict in the Balkans makes a 
lasting peace in Kosovo unlikely, with or without a NATO presence. If 
our goal is to quell the hostilities that have persevered for 
centuries, than we will find ourselves in the same situation that we 
face in Bosnia, where our troops deployed for an unlimited amount of 
time, with no end in sight. U.S. troops have been in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
since 1995 at a cost of more than $9 billion to the U.S. taxpayer. 
Roughly 6,900 troops are still in Bosnia, even though President Clinton 
promised that U.S. participation would be limited to one year.
  Despite the massive cuts made to our military, we have more troops 
deployed to hostile regions now than during the Cold War. Dr. Kissinger 
made the point that ``each incremental deployment into the Balkans is 
bound to weaken our ability to deal with Saddam Hussein and North 
Korea.''
  If NATO intervenes with troops in Kosovo, the U.S. can assist its 
NATO partners with communications and intelligence support and back a 
political strategy aimed at boosting Serbian opposition to Serbian 
President Milosevic. However, I will not support Congressional 
authorization to deploy ground troops into a civil conflict with a 
sovereign nation to enforce a peace agreement that neither side 
supports.
  Mr. HOEFFEL. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
New York (Mr. Engel).
  Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding this time 
to me.
  As I mentioned before, I think this resolution is ill-timed and we 
should not be doing this, but since it is on the floor I rise to 
support the Gilman resolution.
  Carnage has gone on in Kosova for too long, and by the way, I say 
Kosova with an ``A'' because 92 percent of the people that live there 
are ethnic Albanians and pronounce it Kosova. Ethnic and cleansing and 
genocide has gone on for too long. The butcher of Kosova, Slobodan 
Milosevic, continues to kill people. We continue to see genocide on the 
face of Europe. We cannot sit still and continue to allow this to 
happen. Until the United States stepped in in Bosnia, we saw 200,000 
people ethnically cleansed by Milosevic and his people, murdered, and 
we are going to see it again unless the United States grabs the bull by 
the horns.
  We were told by some on the other side of the aisle that when U.S. 
troops went to Bosnia there would be many, many American casualties. 
That has not happened. It will not happen in Kosova, but we will 
prevent innocent civilians from dying.
  I support independence for the people of Kosova because I believe 
that is the only long-range plan that works, they are entitled to the 
same things that we hold dear, they are entitled when Yugoslavia broke 
up the former Yugoslavia, the Croats, and the Slovenians, and the 
Bosnians, and the Macedonians all had the right to independence and 
self-determination. The Kosovar Albanians should have that same right. 
This agreement does not do that, but at least it stops the killing, it 
stops the ethnic cleansing, it gives them half a loaf.
  Milosevic does not want it. He does not want U.S. troops or NATO 
troops because he wants to keep the killing and he wants to keep the 
stranglehold on the people of Kosova that have no political rights, no 
economic rights, no human rights.
  NATO has to lead, and the United States has to lead in NATO. NATO 
cannot do it alone. If we are not the leaders, we will not be 
successful, NATO will not be successful, and I say to my colleagues we 
cannot be in favor of stopping genocide and helping the Albanians if we 
are not willing to have NATO troops on the ground with U.S. leadership 
and U.S. participation. This is in the vital interests of the U.S. We 
do not want a larger war.
  We need to support the Gilman resolution. It is time to step up to 
the plate.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
South Carolina (Mr. Spence), the chairman of our Committee on Armed 
Services.
  (Mr. SPENCE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I have some prepared remarks I would like 
to make on this subject, but, if I might, I would like to submit my 
remarks for the Record and try to sum up how I feel about this very 
important resolution we have before us today.
  Of course, as chairman of the Committee on Armed Services, I know 
that each and every Member will support our men and women in uniform 
whenever and wherever they are called upon

[[Page H1206]]

to go in harm's way. That is why I am in opposition to sending ground 
forces to Kosovo, however my colleagues want to pronounce it. My 
abiding concern is for the ability of our fighting forces to respond to 
crises that amount to real wars. We are right now stretched thin all 
over the world with all kind of commitments. The op tempo is great. We 
have torn down our forces to the extent that I have very real grave 
concerns about our ability to carry out our national strategy of being 
able to fight and win two nearly simultaneous major regional 
contingencies, or whatever they call them.
  We ask our military leaders are we capable, what is our position, our 
readiness from the standpoint of being able to carry out this mission, 
and they tell us that they can do it, but the risk will be high to 
moderate. Mr. Chairman, high to moderate means hundreds of thousands of 
casualties I am not prepared to take.
  Mr. HOEFFEL. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Texas (Mr. Hall).
  (Mr. HALL of Texas asked and was given permission to revise and 
extend his remarks.)
  Mr. HALL of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I rise today to express my dire 
concern and the concern of many of my constituents in my district and 
in my State regarding any further deployment of U.S. troops to Kosovo. 
I would like to thank the Speaker for providing us with the opportunity 
to state our beliefs at this time on this controversial issue, and I 
thank the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Hoeffel) and the leadership 
of my party for giving me this opportunity to differ with my party on 
this very important item.
  I have always supported our uniformed service members and will 
continue to do so, but I just cannot support the deployment of our sons 
and daughters to locations around the world where we, as an 
administration, we, as a Congress, we, as a country, have not 
explicitly spelled out our objectives.
  Do I regret suffering around the world? Of course. Everyone here does 
on both sides of the aisle. But would I sacrifice one American life for 
all of Bosnia, Iraq or Kosovo? I absolutely would not without a true 
national interest, or a plan to successfully enter, a plan to 
successfully succeed and a plan to successfully leave.
  Originally the administration assured Congress that it would not send 
troops to Kosovo without first providing this body a chance to consider 
such an action, but the administration knows that this Congress will 
always support our troops once they are deployed, so off they went. And 
I would like to ask the President what is our strategy in Kosovo, what 
are our objectives, how long are we going to keep our men and women in 
uniform away from their families, what action dictates their return 
and, finally, what is the overriding national interest in Kosovo that 
has prepared him to risk the life of a single American.
  In 1996 there were 15,000 American soldiers in Bosnia. Today there 
are still some 7,000. We promised our troops an end to Bosnia, yet they 
remain a broken promise. At some time we are going to have to keep our 
promises to the young men and women of arms of this country.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
North Carolina (Mr. Burr), a member of our Committee on International 
Relations.
  (Mr. BURR of North Carolina asked and was given permission to revise 
and extend his remarks.)
  Mr. BURR of North Carolina. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for 
yielding this time to me.
  I had remarks to make, and I cannot make them. As I have sat here, I 
found that this is an ever-changing process and some are not relevant. 
I would only say to many of my colleagues who suggest that this is ill-
timed, to debate whether we send troops is not ill-timed. It is, in 
fact, a debate that I believe our process demands.
  That process also demands us to ask questions like my colleague from 
Texas just asked: Does a deployment to this region make us too thin for 
the mission of protecting our national interests? What is our exit 
strategy? Will a peace agreement that may be reached be agreed to by 
both sides? These are legitimate questions that we need answers to 
before we agree to anything.
  I found myself going through this process when I sat down with people 
that I have a great deal of confidence in: Senator Dole, Jeane 
Kirkpatrick, Henry Kissinger, those mountains of the past in foreign 
policy and, more important, in United States policy.
  As my colleagues know, Mr. Chairman, there are people around the 
world that will watch what we do. They will watch what we do, and they 
will watch how we act. They realize, as we do, that as we see more and 
more evidence of genocide on the TV, that we reach out not necessarily 
because of national interests, but because of injustice, injustice in a 
region where we have seen martial law take doctors and teachers and 
eliminate their profession.
  We have many questions to find answers to. I am hopeful that the 
resolution that we have got we can perfect and that we can have 
unanimous support, but until that point we have a tremendous amount of 
work to do, and this administration has a tremendous number of 
questions to answer.
  Mr. HOEFFEL. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
North Carolina (Mr. Price).
  (Mr. PRICE of North Carolina asked and was given permission to revise 
and extend his remarks.)
  Mr. PRICE of North Carolina. Mr. Chairman, at least 2,000 people have 
been killed and 400,000 have been displaced over this past year by 
Slobodan Milosevic's genocidal campaign of violence and human rights 
abuses against the 2 million ethnic Albanians in Kosovo. The peace 
process now underway represents our best hope for ending this 
bloodshed. We do not know if this peace process will succeed, but we do 
know that NATO is the best and most credible peacekeeping force, and we 
know that U.S. participation may be critical to the viability of NATO 
operations.

                              {time}  1530

  A vote at this point against authorizing the deployment of troops 
will embolden Milosevic, disrupt the peace process, and call into 
question our commitment to NATO.
  It used to be said, Mr. Chairman, that politics stopped at the 
water's edge. It used to be that if a President said, as this President 
has, that a divisive vote of this sort would undermine delicate 
negotiations and would harm national security, that that vote would be 
deferred.
  This raw display of partisanship, this calculated attempt to 
undermine the President, and this reckless disregard for the 
consequences of our action are unworthy of this body and should be 
rejected.
  This resolution should not be on the floor in the first place, and 
bringing it up is an irresponsible act. But since it is before us and 
since the delicate peace negotiations are at risk, the only responsible 
vote is yes.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman 
from North Carolina (Mr. Hayes).
  (Mr. HAYES asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. HAYES. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to House Concurrent 
Resolution 42. This is not a partisan issue. I oppose sending our 
troops to Kosovo. However, I strongly support the Speaker's call for 
debate on this issue.
  Enough is enough. We can no longer expect some of the Nation's finest 
men and women to travel halfway around the world to accomplish a 
mission without objectives.
  Mr. Chairman, my district, the 8th of North Carolina, is steeped in 
military tradition. We hail Fort Bragg and Pope Air Force Base as our 
own, two installations that have sent their fair share into combat. I 
visit these bases frequently and I am sure these young men and women I 
speak to there are no different than the million and a half soldiers we 
have stationed all over the world.
  What amazes me every time I speak with these young soldiers is, 
without exception, the can-do spirit they demonstrate. They so quickly 
forget the sacrifices we asked of them yesterday to accept the 
challenges of tomorrow, never once questioning why their government 
continues to ask for more while giving less.
  In the forty years leading up to 1990, the United States deployed our 
troops 10 times. Since then, in only nine years, this country has 
deployed more

[[Page H1207]]

than 25 times; 19 under this administration.
  Mr. Chairman, today I am doing what all of our men and women in this 
service proudly resist. I am asking why? I am asking why do we continue 
to send our troops on missions navigated by an administration with 
seemingly rudderless foreign policy?
  Nearly 20 years ago, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger laid out 
a doctrine of criterion that must be met before our forces are sent 
into combat.
  Is a vital national interest at stake? Will we commit sufficient 
resources to win? Will we sustain the commitment? Are the objectives 
clearly defined? Is there a reasonable expectation that the public and 
Congress support the mission? Have we exhausted our options? And I 
would add we must have a clear exit strategy.
  Mr. Chairman, on the eve of yet another deployment I ask my 
colleagues to join me in sending the administration a strong message. 
Do not approve, do not send our troops to Kosovo.
  Mr. HOEFFEL. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 2 minutes.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise today to express my support for this resolution 
and for the attempts to bring peace and stability to Kosovo. While 
valid questions have been asked whether or not this is a reasonable 
time to debate this issue, we now must act and send a message to 
Milosevic and to the world community that enough is enough.
  The U.S. must demonstrate leadership. We can only help bring about 
democracy, peace and stability, the cornerstones of our society, if we 
engage, if we send troops, as part of a NATO peacekeeping force.
  Mr. Chairman, our purpose in sending troops if a peace agreement is 
reached is clear, to help implement and enforce that peace. We must not 
shrink from this responsibility. We must not allow politics to 
undermine our leadership abroad. We must stand tall.
  Just yesterday, as I sat as a member of the Committee on 
International Relations, I heard Ambassador Kirkpatrick say that it is 
important for Congress to vote yes. I urge all of my colleagues to do 
so.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from New 
Jersey (Mr. Smith), the distinguished chairman of our Subcommittee on 
International Operations and Human Rights.
  Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the 
resolution before us. Frankly, the administration, the Congress, our 
allies and the international community as a whole have no easy choices 
regarding Kosovo.
  Many of our colleagues agree that the United States has the 
responsibility to assert its leadership in the world. In asserting this 
leadership role, I believe that it is in the interest of the United 
States to include protection of human rights, especially the mitigation 
of atrocities and the cessation of slaughter, and this sometimes 
requires the prudent use of force.
  As we debate the deployment of American troops in Kosovo, however, 
those of us who had advocated last summer and in the fall that NATO 
should intervene, not as peacekeepers but peacemakers, to stop the 
Serbian offensive against innocent civilians in Kosovo feel that we 
have lost some very significant ground.
  NATO has threatened to intervene time and time again and its 
credibility regrettably has been tarnished by inaction. Innocent lives 
have been lost as a result of indecision, and now one of the seemingly 
only alternatives is the deployment of NATO forces, including our own 
troops, in an environment in which one side or another may test NATO's 
resolve.
  Many of us felt the same frustration regarding the United States, 
policy towards Bosnia. The Dayton agreement of late 1995 was no 
substitute for action. Even just lifting the arms embargo might have 
made a significant difference in stopping that genocide in those early 
years.
  At yesterday's hearing in the Committee on International Relations 
regarding Kosovo, Senator Bob Dole and Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick 
made very convincing arguments for participation in a peacekeeping 
force. I have sympathy with those who take the side that Former 
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger made about not being involved in all 
of the conflicts around the world. We must, however, consider 
involvement where we can make a difference. Kosovo fits that category.
  I want to say very clearly, unambiguously, I respect everyone's 
position on this. This is one of the harder, more difficult issues that 
we have to decide, and we need to listen to all sides, obviously, as we 
work through this policy decision.
  I intend, Mr. Chairman, to vote for H. Con. Res. 42 as introduced. I 
think many of us do have some misgivings about our own Commander-in-
Chief. It is very often not said but thought, but we need to factor in 
that fact.
  I do believe this is the right thing to do at this particular time. 
Failing to participate could mean a further slaughter, perhaps on a 
larger scale, of innocent civilians in the Balkans. Failing to 
participate could lead to a renewed Balkan conflict which could spread 
to neighboring Macedonia and elsewhere. Failing to do so will send a 
signal that the United States will not take the lead, even when matters 
of principle are being challenged, when people are being killed in 
droves, to the detriment of NATO and the other alliances we have around 
the world.
  This is a resolution that I think deserves support and I hope Members 
will consider doing so.
  Mr. HOEFFEL. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from 
Texas (Ms. Jackson-Lee).
  (Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas asked and was given permission to revise 
and extend her remarks.)
  Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I rise this afternoon to save 
lives. I rise in particular to acknowledge the gentleman from New York 
(Chairman Gilman), and the ranking member, the gentleman from 
Connecticut (Mr. Gejdenson) for realizing the importance of this 
commitment.
  I would, however, disagree that we should even be on the floor today 
precipitously raising this issue, because I believe that we still have 
the opportunity for a peace agreement, and we should have awaited what 
the details of that peace agreement would be.
  There is not one American, Mr. Chairman, that has not acknowledged 
and has not shared in the hurt and the pain of the disaster in Kosovo 
and the terrible strife between Albanians and Serbs; there is not one. 
There is not one that has not watched the bloodshed, has seen the 
reports of massacres, seen the untold graves that have been discovered, 
there is not one American that does not realize that we hold a very 
privileged position in this world. It is one where others look to us.
  Mr. Chairman, I do not come here out of guessing, reading news 
articles and looking at news reports. I went to Bosnia. I went there on 
behalf of the President at the start of us trying to determine how we 
in this Congress and the United States could best respond to the 
terrible plight of innocent people, women and children.
  It was my belief, my heartfelt and studied belief, that the Dayton 
Peace Treaty was right. Why? Was it because I sat in rooms behind 
closed door? No. Because I walked the streets of Sarajevo and talked to 
the people there who said, please help us.
  I, too, do not want to see American lives lost. I do not want to send 
young men and women in harm's way, but I say we have got a wonderful 
bunch in the military, proud, determined, fine. I think we should get 
behind them in a bipartisan way, Mr. Chairman, and support this 
resolution but let us not do danger to the peace operations that are 
going on.
  I rise in support of H. Con. Res. 42. This resolution authorizes the 
President's use of approximately 4,000 troops for a peacekeeping 
operation with Kosovo.
  This Body can send an invaluable message to the peace negotiations, 
which begin next week. In sending our troops we signal our willingness 
to participate as partners in peace. In sending our troops we signal 
our continued resolve to see that all of the people of the Balkans 
enjoy the benefits of their human rights. In sending our troops we 
signal our willingness to be accountable to our NATO commitments and to 
the world as its sole remaining super power.
  If this Body fails to adopt this resolution now it would be 
interpreted as a vote of no confidence for our foreign policy in the 
Balkans. It would send confusing signals about our national resolve to 
persevere to friend and foe alike. I wish we were not considering this 
bill

[[Page H1208]]

in the middle of the peace talks in Kosovo. But if we are to consider 
this resolution let us send a clear signal of America's resolve to be a 
partner for peace.
  The conflict in Kosovo has caused great human suffering and if left 
unchecked this conflict could potentially threaten the peace and 
stability of Europe. Despite the seriousness of this conflict there are 
those who oppose the use of troops. I wonder if those who are opposed 
to the use of troops are paying attention to the daily reports of 
atrocities, as some 2,000 people have been killed. Are those in 
opposition to the use of our troops listening to the international aide 
workers who are trying to aid the thousands of refugees fleeing the 
war-ravaged province.
  Tension in this ethnic Albanian region has been increasing since the 
government of Yugoslavia removed Kosovo's autonomous status. Belgrade's 
decision came without the approval of the people of Kosovo, which has a 
population consisting of 90% ethnic Albanians. Several human rights 
groups have made ominous reports of Serbian forces conducting 
abductions and summary executions. These reprisal killings and the 
continued human rights violations gives rise to the specter of ethnic 
cleansing.
  The United States and its allies need to take concrete steps to 
ensure that this continued violence in the Kosovo region does not 
spread to Albania, Macedonia, Greece, and Turkey. In supporting the 
President's use of troops, this body would signal a determination to 
take proactive measures in the Balkan region and encourage an immediate 
peaceful resolution to the conflict.
  Mr. Chairman, this bill expresses the sense of the United States 
Congress that it deeply deplores and strongly condemns any loss of life 
or the destruction of property. In supporting this bill this body does 
not choose sides but indicates a willingness to choose the side of 
human rights and human dignity.
  Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues to support this bill and continue 
the U.S. role as a active participant in the Balkan peace process.
  Mr. HOEFFEL. Mr. Chairman, I yield the balance of our time to the 
gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Moran).
  Mr. MORAN of Virginia. Mr. Chairman, it is in our interest to engage 
in Kosovo. It is in our interest because the reason we enjoy world 
peace and domestic prosperity is that we gain from worldwide peace and 
prosperity more than any other nation in the world today. If there were 
war and depression in Europe we would pay the higher price. We are the 
leader of this free world because we have defined ourselves as a 
principled nation; because we believe in democracy and free enterprise 
and freedom of expression and respect for human rights. And because we 
do more than just believe in it and talk about it. We are willing to 
stand up for those principles.
  One might say we do not belong in the Balkans, that we have nothing 
to do with the Balkans. To say that, though, we would have to 
conveniently ignore the fact that two world wars were started in the 
Balkans, but we cannot ignore it because the reason Europe is stable 
today is that we invested after World War II to make sure that it would 
not come apart; that it would not be taken over by fascists. We did 
that through the Marshall Plan. We did it through investing in the 
European powers, and we did it by establishing the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization, NATO.
  We established NATO, have invested in it sustained it, and must lead 
it. The nations of Europe depend upon the strength of our leadership. A 
free democratic Europe might not exist today if it were not for the 
United States, and it might not exist as free democratic states in the 
future if we do not lead through NATO in defense of democracy and human 
rights.
  The other countries of the world recognize they have to look to us 
for leadership. They also have to look to us because we are the 
principal military power in this world. We have the capacity to enforce 
peace, and the moral compass to insist that it be a principled peace.
  We should not be empowering a war criminal, a bully, somebody who has 
gained power by using the situation in Kosovo to divide Yugoslavia and 
to appeal to the Serbian peoples' worst instincts.
  He took away the autonomy of Kosovo in the late 1980s and Milosevic 
knew exactly what he did. He bred upon the hatred of ethnic fears. He 
used Kosovo to rise to power and he wants to use Kosovo to stay in 
power.
  It is not in our interest that war criminals have that kind of power. 
As we all know, when one stands up to a bully they back down. This is 
our opportunity to stand up to that bully. He should not be given the 
kind of credibility he has been given. He cannot compete with us 
militarily, and he understands that we are acting out of principle; 
that if we act, if we lead, the rest of the European powers will 
follow. He is counting, though, on the U.S. Congress doing the 
politically expedient thing by tying the President's hands and refusing 
to stand up to him.
  We need to do the right thing in Kosovo today because if we do not do 
the right thing in Kosovo today, tomorrow it will be some place else 
because other bullies around the world will be empowered by Milosevic's 
success in Kosovo. They will learn from this that the United States is 
not as determined, we are not as resolved, we are not as principled 
that we are not the same Nation that rebuilt Europe after World War II.
  The fact is we are the same Nation. We must be the same Nation. We 
must not allow this situation to implode so that we enter the conflict 
after thousands more people have died and when our troops will be 
subjected to far greater danger. Do the right thing in Kosovo today.
  The CHAIRMAN. All time of the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. 
Gejdenson) has expired. The gentleman from New York (Mr. Gilman) has 1 
minute remaining.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the 
gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Barr).
  (Mr. BARR of Georgia asked and was given permission to revise and 
extend his remarks.)
  Mr. BARR of Georgia. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the 
resolution for military involvement in Kosovo.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition not only to this resolution, but 
to the principle of governing that has brought it to the floor today.
  As we all know, this resolution binds no one; it is fundamentally 
meaningless. Its passage or failure may make a sound, but that sound 
will not be heard outside this chamber.
  Right now, American troops are deployed all over the globe on 
missions of dubious value with questionable rules of engagement. We 
will do our business here today, close the doors, turn out the lights, 
and go home; yet American troops will still be deployed all over the 
globe, on missions of dubious value, with questionable rules of 
engagement.
  We can listen to college professors, government bureaucrats, 
diplomats, and pundits talk about international law for days. However, 
once they're silent, we'll still be left with the cold, hard fact that 
it is our job to determine when to commit American troops to military 
action.
  Once again, we seek to tiptoe around a tough decision. We're trying 
to avoid doing our job so we won't sustain any political damage that 
might come as a side effect.
  What are we afraid of? The Constitution gives us--the Congress--
exclusive power to commit American military forces to action. Congress 
certainly hasn't shown similar reticence to use its appropriation 
powers, or its power to tax, or its power to regulate.
  Personally, I have carefully considered the merits of using American 
troops as policemen in Kosovo. I have come to two simple conclusions.
  First, the job of a soldier is not to act as a referee, an arbiter, a 
builder of societies or nations, or a policeman. The job of a soldier 
is to protect America's interests by destroying America's enemies on 
the battlefield. It is even more insulting to ask a soldier to serve as 
a policeman under the aegis of some international organization instead 
of the American flag. Such actions do nothing to further vital American 
strategic interests. The role of such international groups is to 
perpetuate themselves by talking, sopping up U.S. tax dollars, and 
satisfying the goals of some committee of leaders more concerned about 
the shape of the table they are sitting around that with the interests 
of the United States.
  The second conclusion I have come to is that no amount of American 
involvement in Kosovo is going to eliminate ethnic conflicts that have 
raged for centuries. We've been trying to resolve this problem for 
three years and have gotten nowhere. The 4,000 American troops serving 
in a NATO occupation are exactly where they started. In a few short 
years, Kosovo will take its place in history books along with Bosnia, 
Haiti, and Somalia as examples of a foreign policy that has no 
principled framework, and which bounces from one so-called crisis to 
another, as a drunk bounces off the walls going down a flight of 
stairs.
  The only people who will rate this action a success are the foreign 
policy bureaucrats in

[[Page H1209]]

the Clinton Administration. Because their foreign policy is not saddled 
with the burden of concrete goals and objectives, they therefore can--
and will--define anything as a ``success'' whenever pollsters tell them 
the ``public'' needs a dose of ``success.'' This is not a recipe for 
measured military action; it is a recipe for failure, as defined by 
sound historical standards of politics among nations. Doubtlessly, as 
this operation sputters to close--whenever that might be--it will be 
praised in panel discussions and campaign speeches as a resounding 
success, when the facts indicate it was a tremendous waste of time, 
resources, prestige, and possibly lives.
  However, no matter how strong my feelings on this issue are, I'm 
willing to agree that sensible people can disagree over the merits of 
military action in Kosovo. What I am not willing to do is agree that 
Congress should have a non-binding vote on this matter, wash our hands 
of it, move on to other issues that test better in focus groups, and 
then periodically return to this issue when bullied by the 
Administration into pouring more money into it.
  Right now, our soldiers are risking their lives in a country many 
Americans have never heard of. My constituents feel very strongly about 
this issue. Sadly, their opinions will not be a part of American 
foreign policy. While I urge a no vote on the resolution today, it is 
far more important for Congress to reassert its role in determining 
when and where American forces are committed. To do otherwise is to 
knowingly reject a specific, constitutional, and moral duty.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield as much time as he may consume to 
the gentleman from California (Mr. Horn).
  (Mr. HORN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. HORN. Mr. Chairman, I commend the chairman of the Committee on 
International Relations for bringing this resolution to the floor.
  The conflict in Kosovo is taking place within a sovereign nation. If 
we are going to go to war with a sovereign nation, we ought to provide 
a declaration of war. That is what the Constitution of the United 
States would have us do. I think all of us in this Chamber know that 
Serbian leader Milosevic is a war criminal that should be tried by an 
international tribunal. The issue here today is, by what criteria 
should Congress and the President of the United States judge whether 
American troops should go there?

                              {time}  1545

  When is the success known by American troops sent to Kosovo? The 
President repeatedly broke promises regarding the length of service in 
Bosnia before admitting our troops will be there indefinitely. Are they 
going to spend 50 years in the Balkans around Kosovo to bring peace as 
we have in Korea? Korea was where another Nation invaded South Korea.
  This is the time to ask the President to face up to the tough 
questions and give us the answers to the questions that have been 
submitted to him. I would keep American troops out of Kosovo.
  Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Chairman, we should not be asked to vote on this ill-
timed resolution, asked to sign a blank check for this deployment; and 
were it not for the consequences, I would not vote for it, certainly 
not in the form it comes to us. But if at this critical point, we vote 
down this resolution, the winner will be Slobodan Milosevic. He will 
read our action as his warrant to act with impunity, to stonewall the 
peace negotiators and move with vicious aggression against Kosovo. The 
best we can make of the choices before us is to vote for the Gejdenson-
Turner Amendment, and make this resolution turn on the achievement of a 
genuine peace agreement.
  I would gladly vote for more conditions, for conditions like those 
proposed by Mr. cox and Mr. Nethercutt in the amendments they filed in 
the record. At the very least, before we send ground troops, we should 
know: are they peace-keepers or peace-makers? The words sound similar, 
but the missions differ dramatically. I am opposed to sending ground 
troops to be peace-makers. But if a durable agreement is reached, I can 
support, reluctantly, the deployment of our troops as peace-keepers. I 
say ``reluctantly'' because if there were a reasonable division of 
labor between us and our European allies, they would take on this 
mission. We have at least made the minor precedent of committing only 
4,000 troops out of a force of 28,000.
  Like everyone in this House, I would prefer to send none. I would 
prefer not to put any of our young men and women in harm's way. But we 
have learned that if the United States wants things to happen, we have 
to lead; and if we want to be the leader among our allies, we have to 
participate.
  As Senator Dole told us yesterday, if we want to remain the ``leader 
of NATO,'' the ``United States cannot ignore serious threats to 
stability in Europe.'' I think the U.S. should remain the leader of 
NATO, and I will, therefore, vote for this resolution, as amended by 
Gejdenson and others.
  Mr. BORSKI. Mr. Chairman, I rise today to express support for the 
peace process in Kosovo and our troops in the Balkans. Failure to pass 
this resolution would seriously hamper the efforts of the United States 
to seek a peace agreement in Kosovo.
  Ten years ago, Slobodan Milosevic stripped Kosovo of its autonomy--an 
action which precipitated the collapse of Yugoslavia and ethnic 
violence throughout the Balkans. Since that time, the Kosovars have 
been struggling to attain self detemination--a principle we cherish so 
deeply here in the United States. Milosevic has responded with 
brutality, using the Yugoslavian army to crush the aspirations of the 
Kosovars. His forces have terrorized and murdered innocent civilians 
and forced thousands from their homes. Indeed, the region today is on 
the verge of massive violence and human suffering.
  The U.S. is currently leading international negotiations to achieve a 
peace agreement between the Serbian Government and Kosovo's ethnic 
Albanian population. America and its allies have given Milosevic every 
opportunity to resolve this conflict through peaceful means. We are not 
asking him to grant anything new to Kosovo--only to restore the 
autonomy that we stripped from Kosovo in 1989. Yet Milosevic remains 
resistant to an agreement and the presence of an international 
peacekeeping force to implement it. Without forceful diplomatic effort 
from the U.S. and our allies, peace will never be achieved in Kosovo.
  Mr. Chairman each member of this body has reservations anytime we 
commit U.S. troops to peacekeeping forces, or to any deployment in a 
potentially hostile area. In fact, I have always believed that our 
European allies should commit a higher proportion of the peacekeepers 
in the Balkans. Fortunately, the Kosovo plan takes a step in that 
direction by calling on our European allies to contribute over 24,000 
troops--86 percent of the total force.
  While U.S. troops would comprise, a small portion of the overall 
force, the absence of U.S. troops in a NATO peacekeeping force would 
have great consequences. NATO's members continue to look to the U.S. as 
a leader--imagine the consequences of not honoring our obligations as 
leader of this security alliance. If we fail to respond to new 
challenges in the Balkans, our allies will leave the Balkans. If we 
abandon our responsibilities in the alliance, we greatly jeopardize our 
national interests in Europe, and weaken our leadership role in the 
world.
  As a new member of the House delegation to the North Atlantic 
Assembly, I have been studying our role in NATO in the post-cold-war 
world. We recently celebrated the 50th anniversary of NATO--the most 
successful security alliance in our Nation's history. But like all 
successful institutions, NATO must adapt to the new challenges it 
confronts.
  In the post-cold-war Balkan world, ethnic conflicts know no 
boundaries. Violence in Kosovo greatly jeopardizes the fragile peace in 
neighboring Bosnia and Macedonia. It also threatens to place Greece and 
Turkey--our NATO allies--at odds with each other. Without peace in the 
Balkans, NATO's credibility as a guarantor of peace and stability in 
Europe is at risk.
  We are at a crucial juncture today in this delicate and complex peace 
process. All parties will reconvene on Monday, March 15, to hopefully 
achieve an agreement. Any actions taken by Congress between now and 
next week will have a profound impact on the final outcome of the peace 
process.
  Fortunately, the U.S. and its allies are negotiating from a position 
of strength. Thanks in large part to the efforts of Bob Dole, the 
Kosovars are reportedly united and ready to sign a peace agreement. 
Clearly, the pressure is now on Milosevic to make concessions and sign 
on the dotted line.
  But if we fail to approve this resolution, the pendulum will shift 
the other way, and possibly destroy all hopes of achieving a peace 
agreement. Defeat today would clearly strengthen Milosevic's hand, 
diminish our ability to keep the Kosovars united and greatly weaken our 
position of leadership in NATO.
  Peace in Kosovo is not a Democratic or Republican priority--it is in 
the interests of all of us who support the values of freedom and the 
growth of democracy. I would remind my Republican colleagues that 
President George Bush in 1992 took forceful steps to warn Milosevic 
against the use of force in Kosovo--an action supported in a bipartisan 
manner by Congress. I would certainly hope that this same bipartisan 
spirit would prevail on the floor today.
  Mr. Chairman, instead of sniping at the foreign policy of our 
President, we should be expressing our strongest possible support for 
the

[[Page H1210]]

men and women of the U.S. Armed Forces. They will not go to Kosovo if 
there is no peacekeeping agreement to enforce. But should they be 
called upon to serve in Kosovo, our troops should know that they are 
strongly supported by Congress.
  Mr. HORN. Mr. Chairman, earlier today I expressed my views on why the 
American military should not be sent to Kosovo.
  The conflict in Kosovo is taking place within a sovereign nation. If 
we are going to go to war with a sovereign nation, we ought to provide 
a declaration of war. That is what the Constitution of the United 
States would have us do. I think all of us in this Chamber know that 
Serbian leader Milosevic is a war criminal that should be tried by an 
international tribunal. The issue here today is, by what criteria 
should Congress and the President of the United States judge whether 
American troops should go there? When is the success known by American 
troops sent to Kosovo? The President repeatedly broke promises 
regarding the length of service in Bosnia before admitting our troops 
will be there indefinitely. Are they going to spend 50 years in the 
Balkans around Kosovo to bring peace as we have in Korea? Korea was 
where another Nation invaded South Korea.
  This is the time to ask the President to face up to the tough 
questions and give us the answers to the questions that have been 
submitted to him. I would keep American troops out of Kosovo.
  The President has failed to explain the urgent national interest 
which requires the introduction of U.S. forces into Kosovo. He has 
failed to even attempt a full explanation of this policy to Congress. 
The Constitution has given Congress a clear role to play which the 
President has ignored.
  The Administration argues that if the House votes against authorizing 
its experiments in peacebuilding today, it will undercut ongoing 
negotiations and perhaps even lead to more bloodshed. This is 
insulting. It is the Administration's refusal to consult with Congress 
and its inability to form a strong policy against Serbian aggression 
that has led to the debate today. The Administration has rejected all 
attempts by Congress to assert its Constitutional role on every 
occasion it has put our forces in harm's way without a clear 
explanation of its mission or on what our forces were supposed to 
accomplish. The current objections by the White House are more of the 
same rhetoric from an Executive Branch derisive of consultation with 
Congress.
  The conflict in Kosovo is taking place within a sovereign nation. 
Intervention in Kosovo, even following an agreement forced upon both 
sides, is the intervention in a civil war to mediate between two sides 
which we are trying to force into an agreement that will require our 
forces to uphold.
  By what criteria would the President judge success in this mission 
whereby American troops could be recalled from Kosovo? The President 
repeatedly broke promises regarding the length of service in Bosnia 
before admitting that our troops will be there indefinitely. Once a 
peacekeeping force enters Kosovo to uphold a forced agreement, that 
force will serve indefinitely unless Congress acts to responsibly to 
restrict yet another open-ended commitment to achieve nebulous goals.
  While the House debates the commitment of forces to Kosovo, we are 
also wrestling with the question of funding our armed forces, forces 
stretched thin by multiple commitments around the world. We are 
debating how to protect our nation from missile attack, perhaps from 
missiles improved with stolen American technology. How, then, will 
another open-ended commitment of American forces help American 
security. I have heard the argument on why American forces must be 
present to make a peacekeeping force work, and while these arguments 
have merit, they also point out the failure of Europe to deal with 
issues in its own backyard.
  Under the agreement being negotiated now, the peacekeeping force 
would attack Serbia if its forces or sympathizers violate the 
agreement, but what would happen if elements of the Kosovo Liberation 
Army violates the agreement? How would the United States with NATO 
punish Kosovar violations?
  The United States presumably has a responsibility to end the 
bloodshed in Kosovo because it is the only nation left with the 
resources to do so. So why, then, is the Administration not seeking to 
put peacekeepers on the ground in Turkey, where thousands of innocent 
Kurds have been killed in Turkey's attempt to destroy the terrorists of 
the PKK? Why have American peacekeepers not been dispatched to Sierra 
Leone, where the killing continues? Why were international peacekeepers 
not part of the Irish or Basque peace agreement? What makes Kosovo 
different?
  Let us keep American troops out of Kosovo. If lives are to be in 
harm's way let the European members of NATO handle regional conflicts 
in their own backyard.
  Mr. CROWLEY. Mr. Chairman, for the past decade, ethnic Albanians of 
Kosovo, a province of Serbia, the dominant republic of Yugoslavia, have 
fought a courageous campaign to regain the rights they had taken away 
by Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic who in 1989 stripped away the 
autonomy they had enjoyed under the Yugoslav Constitution. Milosevic, 
the architect of this crisis who also produced the Bosnian tragedy, and 
presided over the dissolution of what was once Yugoslavia, has brought 
poverty and misery to his own people and has sown the seeds of strident 
nationalism throughout the Balkans.
  Milosevic has met all attempts to reach a peaceful settlement with 
the ethnic Albanian community with forceful vengeance and repression. 
President Milosevic escalated this campaign of terror about one year 
ago when he launched a brutal crackdown on the majority Albanian 
population. Civilians were terrorized, tortured and murdered by Serbian 
police and military forces while hundreds more were driven from their 
homes. This systematic campaign of repression manifested itself this 
past January, when Serbian security forces brutally massacred 45 
Albanian citizens in the village of Racak.
  Spurred on by Milosevic's campaign of terror, the United States and 
its European allies initiated peace talks between the two sides which 
ended with both agreeing to resume negotiations on March 15. As part of 
a proposed peace agreement, the United States would contribute 4,000 
American troops to an international peacekeeping force of 28,000 that 
would be responsible for implementing the provisions of the peace 
accord.
  This possible deployment of American troops to Kosovo has created a 
contentious debate within congress. Critics of an American 
participation in Kosovo claim that the United States lacks a vital 
national interest in this conflict, that we ``don't have a dog in this 
fight''. But I would argue that we do indeed have a vital national 
interest in this conflict, as this region has previously been the 
source of great pain and suffering. Twice before in the 20th century we 
have seen American soldiers drawn to Europe to fight wars that either 
began in the Balkan region or ignited fighting there. When this region 
was again the source of conflict after World War I, the United States 
did not intervene and subsequently hundreds of thousands of brave 
Americans and Europeans paid the ultimate price. As George Santayana 
once said, ``those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat 
it.'' Experience dictates that turning a blind eye to this region can 
be fraught with peril.
  I believe that the current crisis in Kosovo, if not confronted now, 
could have devastating and disastrous effects on this region. We must 
remember that violence in southern Europe has no boundaries. There is a 
strong possibility that the current fighting in Kosovo could trigger a 
chain reaction of conflict that might engulf the entire region. A 
spreading conflict could re-ignite fighting in neighboring Albania and 
destabilize fragile Macedonia where the UN peacekeeping force mission 
has ended. In addition, our NATO allies Greece and Turkey, longtime 
adversaries with historical ties to both sides, could also be brought 
into the conflict. Increasing hostilities would cause massive 
suffering, displace tens of thousands of people, undermine stability 
throughout South Central Europe and directly affect our key allies in 
the region.
  As we have learned in Bosnia and seen in Kosovo, the only language 
that President Milosevic understands is that of force. Additionally, 
what we have seen in the former Yugoslavia in the last decade is that 
it is very difficult to stop internal conflicts if the international 
community is not willing to use force. The United States must be 
willing to show Mr. Milosevic that we will not stand idly by while his 
forces systematically murder and displace innocent civilians.
  President Clinton once said that the United States is the world's 
indispensable nation. I strongly believe this to be true. Our country 
has a moral obligation to stand up and act when innocent civilians are 
being murdered and their basic fundamental rights are being violated. 
As the leading voice in the world for democracy, respect for the rule 
of law and fundamental human rights, we are sometimes confronted with 
difficult decisions.
  This I believe, is one of those decisions. And while I do not take 
lightly the decision to dispatch our armed forces abroad, I strongly 
believe that the United States must lead the efforts to halt the 
bloodshed and violence in Kosovo.
  Mr. BONILLA. Mr. Chairman, our responsibility is to protect America. 
Our responsibility is to act prudently before placing any of our fellow 
Americans in harm's way. We have no responsibility to referee bloody 
disputes wherever they crop up.
  The fuse on Kosovo has been lit. The Serbs have no interest in 
relinquishing their historic claims on the territory. The Albanians 
speak with so many voices that the only certainty we have is that any 
Albanian leader we deal with will not be speaking for most of his armed 
compatriots. When we make ourselves this region's policeman we make our 
young men and

[[Page H1211]]

women targets for armed fanatics. And committing them will continue to 
place greater strains and burdens on our over-stretched military.
  Neither side there likes us. Neither side respects us. Neither side 
wants us there. Who are we protecting?
  There is no reason to believe that the Albanian and Serb positions 
are reconcilable or that either side wants reconciliation.
  The risks of this strategy are that transparent. The benefits in 
contrast are little more than wishes and hopes which we have no reason 
to believe will materialize. Some have argued that defeating this 
resolution today will kill the peace process. Let me just say that if 
killing the so-called peace process saves American lives I will always 
make that choice.
  We should oppose this deployment because it will only erode our 
military strength, weaken our nation's credibility and place our 
military forces at great risk.
  If you vote to approve this resolution, you should know why, because 
you may have to explain that to the family of an American soldier. 
That's not a pleasant thought. I hope, with all my heart, it will never 
come true, but that's your responsibility if you vote for this 
resolution.
  The administration has failed diplomatically. Please don't send our 
troops over to make some diplomats look good.
  Please reject this misguided policy which threatens the lives of our 
military and the security of our nation.
  Mr. EVANS. Mr. Chairman, I support H. Con. Res. 42 and encourage my 
colleagues to vote for it. At this delicate moment, our support of the 
President is critical to the success of this peace agreement.
  I am always wary of committing our uniformed men and women into 
conflict. However, I strongly believe that we cannot turn a blind eye 
to a genocide that is steadily destroying Kosovo and threatening the 
peace throughout the region. Rejecting this resolution is complying 
with the continued slaughter of hundreds of thousands of men, women and 
children. To date, over 400,000 people have been driven from their 
homes, 200,000 have perished and entire villages have been pillaged in 
the name of ``ethnic cleansing.''
  As the sole remaining superpower, we have a responsibility to the 
people of the Balkins, NATO and the greater global community to take 
our proper role in helping to end this tragedy. I believe that our 
allies have truly stepped up to the plate--the bulk of the peacekeeping 
forces will not be American, but European. Our participation will help 
achieve a European solution to this crisis--something that we must 
encourage.
  Now is not the time to step away from our responsibility, but to 
seize it. I urge my colleagues to support the resolution.
  Mr. HILLEARY. Mr. Chairman, I rise today in strong support of our 
troops, as always, but I stand absolutely opposed to yet another black 
hole-undefined U.S. troop deployment, this time to Kosovo, for 
peacemaking and peacekeeping reasons.
  The debate today mirrors what we have debated the last 4 years over 
Bosnia, and yes Mr. Speaker, it is not a news flash that thousands of 
U.S. troops are right next door and will unfortunately remain there 
indefinitely.
  I remind my colleagues of what the President said before he 
dispatched thousands of troops to Bosnia. It was to only be a temporary 
operation of 12 months and only cost the American taxpayers $1 billion 
dollars. As we all know, we are now in year 4 and the price tag is over 
$10 billion. We should not be fooled again.
  Asked what the plans are now, the Administration says about one year 
and about $2 billion. Two billion dollars to merely detour warring 
factions. If and when the United States ever does leave the region, 
some estimates are that fighting would be restarted within months, if 
not weeks.
  Mr. Chairman, Kosovo is a dangerous place. If there are questions 
about troop safety and regional stability in the Balkans (Bosnia and 
Kosovo), I encourage my colleagues to please take a look at a recently 
released classified GAO report entitled ``International Security; 
NATO's Operations and Contingency Plans for Stabilizing the Balkans'' 
(GAO-C-NSIAD-99-4).
  However, I have also asked that the GAO provide an unclassified 
version of this report for the public record. I hope that my colleagues 
will consider reading one of these versions before we vote.
  The President's plan to add more than 4,000 U.S. ground troops to 
Kosovo on top of the 6,900 troops next door in Bosnia, is wrong.
  Much to my dismay, this geographic region is increasingly becoming a 
permanent forward deployment area and it is conceivable that within the 
next few years, we might be in half a dozen countries because of a 
Balkan domino effect.
  The Administration failed to answer many key questions before U.S. 
troops were sent into Bosnia. I ask my colleagues to consider the 
following three questions which were never answered before.
  What is the mission?
  Is the mission in our national security interest or is it a European 
security interest?
  What is the exit strategy and when does it kick in?
  Mr. Chairman, Congress needs to regain control of this peacemaking/
peacekeeping situation, because I think we have a White House with an 
itch to disperse U.S. troops worldwide with insufficient American 
security interests at stake.
  I hope my colleagues on both sides of the aisle will join me in 
opposing this important Kosovo resolution.
  Mrs. ROUKEMA. Mr. Chairman, I rise to speak on this most serious 
issue that confronts us today.
  There is little disagreement on the brutal behavior of the Serbs and 
the inhuman atrocities they have inflicted upon the Albanian Kosovars. 
There is a great human tragedy unfolding in the region.
  But the placement of American troops on the ground as a part of 
peacekeeping force in a sovereign state torn by civil war must be a 
decision that has been fully debated and consented to by Congress. The 
President must include Congress in the formulation of this policy.
  The Washington Post stated this morning that, ``We think the stakes 
are sufficient to make it highly desirable that the president's policy 
be supported by a strong bipartisan vote in Congress. The president 
ought to be asking forthrightly for congressional approval, not trying 
to evade a congressional judgment on his policy in Kosovo.''
  Some argue that those in this House that have reservations about 
sending American ground forces to Kosovo are isolationists. I 
emphatically disagree with this assertion. I firmly support a strong 
U.S. presence throughout the world on every stage, including military, 
economic, and political. I worked hard in this body on issues such as 
full participation in the IMF, being a leader in world trade, economic 
support to many nations, humanitarian relief and the fight against 
hunger throughout the world, and the strengthening of NATO to mention a 
few.
  There is no doubt a brutal bloody ethnic civil war is occurring in 
Kosovo and that there is the need for a greater debate on this issue. 
These ethnic animosities have existed for centuries of time. But to 
place American troops in the middle of this ethnic war without a 
defined mission, without a defined goal, and without an exit strategy 
is highly questionable. It is a question that must be answered by both 
the President and Congress before any action it taken.
  I question the use of NATO to coerce a sovereign nation to consent to 
our position on their own internal issues. Europe should take the lead 
on dealing with the Kosovo situation. Europe should supply the ground 
troops. I have no problem with the United States providing logistic, 
technical, and intelligence assets to support our European allies.
  As Henry Kissinger stated in his widely read article, Kosovo, in 
terms of security, is a European interest not an American interest. 
``Kosovo is no more a threat to America than Haiti was to Europe and 
our NATO allies were not asked to help there.''
  Let me add this . . . if the President decides to send troops to 
Kosovo, with or without the consent of Congress, once young Americans 
hit the ground I will strongly support them with the knowledge that 
America's sons and daughters will perform with true fidelity to honor, 
duty, country. They will as always do their best and make us proud.
  So I caution my colleagues that this debate is about policy not 
support of our troops in the field and it is about Congress' role in 
foreign affairs not isolationism.
  With that, Mr. Chairman, I must state my great reservations about 
sending American troops to Kosovo.
  I include the Kissinger editorial in the Record of this debate.

               [From the Washington Post, Feb. 21, 1999]

No U.S. Ground Forces For Kosovo--Leadership Doesn't Mean That We Must 
                        Do Everything Ourselves.

                           (Henry Kissinger)

       President Clinton's announcement that some 4,000 American 
     troops will join a NATO force of 28,000 to help police a 
     Kosovo agreement faces all those concerned with long-range 
     American national security policy with a quandary.
       Having at one time shared responsibility for national 
     security policy and the extrication from Vietnam, I am 
     profoundly uneasy about the proliferation of open-ended 
     American commitments involving the deployment of U.S. forces. 
     American forces are in harm's way in Kosovo, Bosnia and the 
     gulf. They lack both a definition of strategic purpose by 
     which success can be measured and an exit strategy. In the 
     case of Kosovo, the concern is that America's leadership 
     would be impaired by the refusal of Congress to approve 
     American participation in the NATO force that has come into 
     being largely

[[Page H1212]]

     as a result of a diplomacy conceived and spurred by 
     Washington.
       Thus, in the end, Congress may feel it has little choice 
     but to go along. In any event, its formal approval is not 
     required. But Congress needs to put the administration on 
     notice that it is uneasy about being repeatedly confronted 
     with ad hoc military missions. The development and 
     articulation of a comprehensive strategy is imperative if we 
     are to avoid being stretched too thin in the face of other 
     foreseeable and militarily more dangerous challenges.
       Before any future deployments take place, we must be able 
     to answer these questions: What consequences are we seeking 
     to prevent? What goals are we seeking to achieve? In what way 
     do they serve the national interest?
       President Clinton has justified American troop deployments 
     in Kosovo on the ground that ethnic conflict in Yugoslavia 
     threatens ``Europe's stability and future.'' Other 
     administration spokesmen have compared the challenge to that 
     of Hitler's threat to European security. Neither statement 
     does justice to Balkan realities.
       The proposed deployment in Kosovo does not deal with any 
     threat to American security as traditionally conceived. The 
     threatening escalations sketched by the president--to 
     Macedonia or Greece and Turkey--are in the long run more 
     likely to result from the emergence of a Kosovo state.
       Nor is the Kosovo problem new. Ethnic conflict has been 
     endemic in the Balkans for centuries. Waves of conquests have 
     congealed divisions between ethnic groups and religions, 
     between the Eastern Orthodox and Catholic faiths; between 
     Christianity and Islam; between the heirs of the Austrian and 
     Ottoman empires.
       Through the centuries, these conflicts have been fought 
     with unparalleled ferocity because none of the populations 
     has any experience with--and essentially no belief in--
     Western concepts of toleration. Majority rule and compromise 
     that underlie most of the proposals for a ``solution'' never 
     have found an echo in the Balkans.
       Moreover, the projected Kosovo agreement is unlikely to 
     enjoy the support of the parties for a long period of time. 
     For Serbia, acquiescing under the threat of NATO bombardment, 
     it involves nearly unprecedented international intercession. 
     Yugoslavia, a sovereign state, is being asked to cede control 
     and in time sovereignty of a province containing its national 
     shrines to foreign military force.
       Though President Slobodan Milosevic has much to answer for, 
     especially in Bosnia, he is less the cause of the conflict in 
     Kosovo than an expression of it. On the need to retain 
     Kosovo, Serbian leaders--including Milosevic's domestic 
     opponents--seem united. For Serbia, current NATO policy means 
     either dismemberment of the country or postponement of the 
     conflict to a future date when, according to the NATO 
     proposal, the future of the province will be decided.
       The same attitude governs the Albanian side. The Kosovo 
     Liberation Army (KLA) is fighting for independence, not 
     autonomy. But under the projected agreement, Kosovo, now an 
     integral part of Serbia, is to be made an autonomous and 
     self-governing entity within Serbia, which, however, will 
     remain responsible for external security and even exercise 
     some unspecified internal police functions. A plebiscite at 
     the end of three years is to determine the region's future.
       The KLA is certain to try to use the cease-fire to expel 
     the last Serbian influences from the province and drag its 
     feet on giving up its arms. And if NATO resists, it may come 
     under attack itself--perhaps from both sides. What is 
     described by the administration as a ``strong peace 
     agreement'' is like to be at best the overture to another, 
     far more complicated set of conflicts.
       Ironically, the projected peace agreement increases the 
     likelihood of the various possible escalations sketched by 
     the president as justification for a U.S. deployment. An 
     independent Albanian Kosovo surely would seek to incorporate 
     the neighboring Albanian minorities--mostly in Macedonia--and 
     perhaps even Albania itself. And a Macedonian conflict would 
     land us precisely back in the Balkan wars of earlier in this 
     century. Will Kosovo then become the premise for a NATO move 
     into Macedonia, just as the deployment in Bosnia is invoked 
     as justification for the move into Kosovo? Is NATO to be the 
     home for a whole series of Balkan NATO protectorates?
       What confuses the situation even more is that the American 
     missions in Bosnia and Kosovo are justified by different, 
     perhaps incompatible, objectives. In Bosnia, American 
     deployment is being promoted as a means to unite Croats, 
     Muslims and Serbs into a single state. Serbs and Croats 
     prefer to practice self-determination but are being asked to 
     subordinate their preference to the geopolitical argument 
     that a small Muslim Bosnian state would be too precarious and 
     irredentist. But in Kosovo, national self-determination is 
     invoked to produce a tiny state nearly certain to be 
     irredentist.
       Since neither traditional concepts of the national interest 
     nor U.S. security impel the deployment, the ultimate 
     justification is the laudable and very American goal of 
     easing human suffering. This is why, in the end, I went along 
     with the Dayton agreement in so far as it ended the war by 
     separating the contending forces. But I cannot bring myself 
     to endorse American ground forces in Kosovo.
       In Bosnia, the exit strategy can be described. The existing 
     dividing lines can be made permanent. Failure to do so will 
     require their having to be manned indefinitely unless we 
     change our objective to self-determination and permit each 
     ethnic group to decide its own fate.
       In Kosovo, that option does not exist. There are no ethnic 
     dividing lines, and both sides claim the entire territory. 
     America's attitude toward the Serbs' attempts to insist on 
     their claim has been made plain enough; it is the threat of 
     bombing. But how do we and NATO react to Albanian 
     transgressions and irredentism? Are we prepared to fight both 
     sides and for how long? In the face of issues such as these, 
     the unity of the contact group of powers acting on behalf of 
     NATO is likely to dissolve. Russia surely will increasingly 
     emerge as the supporter of the Serbian point of view.
       We must take care not to treat a humanitarian foreign 
     policy as a magic recipe for the basic problem of 
     establishing priorities in foreign policy. The president's 
     statements ``that we can make a difference'' and that 
     ``America symbolizes hope and resolve'' are exhortations, not 
     policy prescriptions. Do they mean that America's military 
     power is available to enable every ethnic or religious group 
     to achieve self-determination? Is NATO to become the 
     artillery for ethnic conflict? If Kosovo, why not East Africa 
     or Central Asia? And would a doctrine of universal 
     humanitarian intervention reduce or increase suffering by 
     intensifying ethnic and religious conflict? What are the 
     limits of such a policy and by what criteria is it 
     established?
       In my view, that line should be drawn at American ground 
     forces for Kosovo. Europeans never tire of stressing the need 
     for greater European autonomy. Here is an occasion to 
     demonstrate it. If Kosovo presents a security problem, it is 
     to Europe, largely because of the refugees the conflict might 
     generate, as the president has pointed out. Kosovo is no more 
     a threat to America than Haiti was to Europe--and we never 
     asked for NATO support there. The nearly 300 million 
     Europeans should be able to generate the ground forces to 
     deal with 2.3 million Kosovars. To symbolize Allied unity on 
     larger issues, we should provide logistics, intelligence and 
     air support. But I see no need for U.S ground forces; 
     leadership should not be interpreted to mean that we must do 
     everything ourselves.
       Sooner of later, we must articulate the American capability 
     to sustain a global policy. The failure to do so landed us in 
     the Vietnam morass. Even if one stipulates an American 
     strategic interest in Kosovo (which I do not), we must take 
     care not to stretch ourselves too thin in the face of far 
     less ambiguous threats in the Middle East and Northwest Asia.
       Each incremental deployment into the Balkans is bound to 
     weaken our ability to deal with Saddam Hussein and North 
     Korea. The psychological drain may be even more grave. Each 
     time we make a peripheral deployment, the administration is 
     constrained to insist that the danger to American forces is 
     minimal--the Kosovo deployment is officially described as a 
     ``peace implementation force.''
       Such comments have two unfortunate consequences: They 
     increase the impression among Americans that military force 
     can be used casualty-free, and they send a signal of weakness 
     to potential enemies. For in the end, our forces will be 
     judged on how adequate they are for peace imposition, not 
     peace implementation.
       I always am inclined to support the incumbent 
     administration in a forceful assertion of the national 
     interest. And as a passionate believer in the NATO alliance, 
     I make the distinctions between European and American 
     security interests in the Balkans with the utmost reluctance. 
     But support for a strong foreign policy and a strong NATO 
     surely will evaporate if we fail to anchor them in a clear 
     definition of the national interest and impart a sense of 
     direction to our foreign policy in a period of turbulent 
     change.
  Mr. EWING. Mr. Chairman, I rise today to express my concern with the 
possibility that U.S. troops my soon be deployed to Kosovo. The U.S. 
has promised to send approximately 4,000 troops to Kosovo to enforce a 
cease-fire that has not yet been agreed to. We are told that our 
servicemen and women will be in Kosovo for at least three years, but 
are given no indication of the expected cost, or the goals of the 
mission.
  I am troubled by the fact that the administration appears to be 
rushing towards a quick deployment without explaining to the Congress 
and the country why our troops need to be sent to Kosovo. I have yet to 
hear a clear explanation of what our interests are in Kosovo--why does 
the most powerful nation in the world need to put its troops in harm's 
way to enforce a peace agreement that doesn't even exist?
  I am not convinced that it is in our best interest to send U.S. 
troops to Kosovo. We have many potential trouble spots brewing around 
the world that beg for our attention--North Korea, China's missile 
race, and the deteriorating situation in Russia are national security 
problems vital to our interests, and they beg for strong U.S. 
involvement. Yet Congress is being told that the situation in Kosovo is 
a vital national security concern, and this threat justifies placing 
our troops in harm's way.
  We have had troops in Bosnia since 1995, at a cost of more than $12 
billion. This is

[[Page H1213]]

money that is taken directly from DoD accounts, reducing our readiness 
in other crucial areas. Even worse, the long and repeated tours of duty 
in Bosnia have convinced many soldiers in the active and reserve 
branches to retire, depleting our ranks of dedicated and experienced 
people. Congress is now told that the Army wants to lower its 
recruitment standards and begin hiring high school dropouts to make up 
for shortages in manpower.
  The same crowd that ridiculed the ``Domino Theory'' of communist 
expansion now appear to be advancing their own ``Domino Theory'' for 
the region around the former Yugoslavia--first it was Macedonia, then 
Bosnia, now Kosovo, and then what?
  Mr. Chairman, a convincing case has not been made for the necessity 
of U.S. troop involvement in Kosovo. The U.S. does not need the best 
trained and most powerful army in the world sitting in Kosovo playing 
peacekeeper. If Europe is so concerned about the destabilizing effects 
of Kosovo, then let them handle the problem. When it is said that 
``NATO'' will be providing the troops, that usually can be translated 
as ``the U.S.'' America pays the bills and undertakes most of the 
difficult missions--virtually all the bombing and other air missions 
are handled by our Air Force.
  Our troops have been in Bosnia since 1995, at a huge cost to our 
military readiness and to the Defense budget. We must resist the urge 
to use military force to resolve every humanitarian problem that crops 
us. We need to take our troops out of the equation in Kosovo and begin 
focusing on real national security concerns.
  Mr. COSTELLO. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to consideration of 
this resolution authorizing the use of U.S. ground troops in Kosovo.
  I do not support putting American ground troops, even as part of a 
NATO force, in the middle of a civil war in central Europe. But I 
object to this resolution on other grounds, as well. This very debate 
may hamstring our negotiators as they seek a peaceful resolution of the 
Kosovo conflict with the Serbian government and ethnic Albanians.
  It makes no sense to me that the Congress is debating a resolution on 
use of force before our negotiators have even concluded their attempts 
to resolve the Kosovo situation peacefully. I hope we do not damage 
their efforts by even taking this resolution under consideration.
  I am not opposed to NATO forces being involved in enforcing an 
agreement. Our air forces have effectively been used to enforce the 
United Nations resolutions involving Iraq, for example. However, I do 
not believe it is in our best interests--or in the interest of the 
European Community--for Americans to be part of a ground force in 
Kosovo. That is why I will cast my vote against this resolution today.
  Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Mr. Chairman, while there may be no desire by 
President Clinton and his Administration to recognize Congress' role in 
determining whether or not to deploy troops to Kosovo, we all know that 
their decision will require Congress to find the necessary dollars to 
pay for this mission. And there is no question that Congress will 
provide the necessary dollars to support our men and women in uniform.
  But we need to be prepared for the tough choices that lie ahead.
  Let's take the U.S. mission in Bosnia as an example. We have been in 
Bosnia for almost four years and there is still no end-date in sight. 
Yet, the Administration has not included funding for this mission in 
their budget until this year. This open-ended mission, while it has 
saved lives, it has also cost $19 billion to date.
  The Administration may be embarking on this mission in Kosovo to save 
lives and prevent open warfare in the Balkans, but we here in Congress 
will be responsible for making the tough decisions about how to pay for 
it.
  There is no money in the President's budget to pay for this 
deployment. The Administration has requested increased spending on all 
sorts of new programs from education to health care but there is no 
money for our troops that may be deployed in Kosovo.
  And from the hearings I have attended so far as a Member of the 
Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, we are already facing real 
shortfalls in funding and manpower in several other ongoing missions, 
including the Persian Gulf. And don't be fooled by claims that this 
mission will be far more limited than the one in Bosnia and thus, less 
costly. In a recent hearing with Secretary of Defense Cohen, I asked 
him about the U.S. commitment to deploy 4,000 troops as part of a 
larger NATO force. In reality, he told me that the number is closer to 
12,000 because for every one of our men on the ground, 3 more of our 
soldiers are required in support.
  So, I rise to forewarn my colleagues that we will face some very 
tough choices about how to pay for these missions, as well as the 
proposed pay raise for our military personnel and to address the many 
other shortfalls in our military readiness. The President has failed to 
do so in his budget, but we will not. The President has not only failed 
to consult Congress, but he has failed in his budget proposal to say 
how he will pay for this critical decision.
  Mr. LIPINSKI. Mr. Chairman, I rise today in opposition to H. Con. 
Res. 42, a concurrent resolution regarding the use of U.S. Armed Forces 
as part of a NATO peacekeeping operation implementing a Kosovo peace 
agreement.
  Let me first say that I am a strong supporter of the brave and hard-
working men and women of our armed services. I salute them for all they 
have done for our great nation, and I am extremely proud of them.
  However, this is an initiative that NATO was never intended to 
undertake. As Henry Kissinger said at a House International Relations 
Committee hearing, this would be an ``unprecedented extension of NATO's 
authority.''
  More importantly, I believe that inserting our troops in the middle 
of an ethnically charged civil war is very dangerous. Neither the 
Albanians nor the Serbs are interested in any sort of compromise. The 
Albanians want only independence and the Serbs, who view Kosovo as the 
cradle of the Serbian civilization, are unwilling to give up their 
ancestral homeland. If neither side is interested in working out a 
peaceful agreement, the introduction of American troops into the 
conflict will probably inflame anti-American sentiments and Albanian 
nationalism with disastrous results. They don't want our help and don't 
want to work towards peace. I do not believe that we should risk the 
lives of our troops for intangible goals that have no basis in reality.
  Now, I certainly do not advocate the actions of Yugoslav President 
Slobodan Milosevic. There is a compelling body of evidence to believe 
that Milosevic is guilty of crimes against humanity and other war 
crimes, and I am deeply concerned about this affront to human rights. 
This chamber has voted to support the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the former Yugoslavia in its efforts to bring Milosevic to justice. 
However, without a well thought out plan on how we should utilize our 
troops, I cannot support this action.
  Mr. Chairman, look at the other conflicts we have gotten involved 
with. Somalia was a disaster. Iraq continues in its defiance. American 
troops are still inextricably entangled in Bosnia. Haiti dissolved its 
democracy and now has an authoritarian regime. The track record for 
this Administration is not good.
  The Administration has not explained how dragging American troops 
into another ethnic conflict will protect American interests, and until 
that is done in a satisfactory fashion, I cannot and will not support 
the Administration's attempts to put American troops in harm's way.
  Mr. Chairman, we are not the emergency 911 number for the world, and 
I urge my colleagues to oppose this resolution.
  Mr. FORD. Mr. Chairman, I rise today in support of the Gejdenson 
Amendment to H. Con. Res. 42. Three months before he died, in his 
fourth inaugural address, President Franklin Roosevelt expressed his 
hope for a ``just, honorable, and durable'' settlement to World War II. 
But he cautioned against acting impetuously to bring about this 
settlement, knowing that ``peace could not be achieved immediately.''
  President Roosevelt was aware that peace-making is a delicate 
process. We have learned, as a country and as a people, that peace is a 
difficult goal to achieve. Peace takes engagement. Most of all, peace 
takes time.
  As most of you know, I am the youngest member of the House. Many 
people have tried to find a name for my generation, because in earlier 
times there was the World War I generation, the World War II 
generation, and the Vietnam Generation. There are no wars to name us 
by. Why is that? Because we have learned that U.S. forces should only 
be used when there is a clear goal and U.S. interests are threatened. 
And even then, we must use force judiciously and effectively.
  I myself have some concerns on the extent of our commitment, our exit 
strategy, and our rules of engagement. But how can we dictate the terms 
of our involvement when a settlement has not yet been reached?
  Unfortunately, the majority has brought this resolution to the floor 
at this time, against the blatant wishes of all those involved in the 
process, from Senator Dole to the President to the Kosovars to the 
Serbs. This is an obstruction of the peace process. I support this 
amendment because I support the Administration's efforts to secure a 
just peace.
  At the same time, we must play our constitutional role responsibly. 
Let the Administration continue its efforts toward reaching a 
settlement. As Speaker Hastert himself said two weeks ago, let's give 
them the ``room to negotiate.'' I would be surprised to learn that 
Speaker Hastert considers two weeks enough time to resolve a conflict 
that spans centuries.
  The President should continue taking steps to bring the parties to a 
fair and just agreement. If and when such an agreement is

[[Page H1214]]

reached, we should give our full support for the deployment of U.S. 
troops. For these reason, I support the Gejdenson Amendment to H. Con. 
Res. 42.
  The CHAIRMAN. All time for general debate has expired.
  Pursuant to the rule, the concurrent resolution is considered read 
for amendment under the 5-minute rule.
  The text of House Concurrent Resolution 42 is as follows:

                            H. Con. Res. 42

       Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate 
     concurring),

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This resolution may be cited as the ``Peacekeeping 
     Operations in Kosovo Resolution''.

     SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

       The Congress makes the following findings:
       (1) The conflict in Kosovo has caused great human suffering 
     and, if permitted to continue, could threaten the peace of 
     Europe.
       (2) The Government of Serbia and representatives of the 
     people of Kosovo may agree in Rambouillet, France, to end the 
     conflict in Kosovo.
       (3) President Clinton has promised to deploy approximately 
     4,000 United States Armed Forces personnel to Kosovo as part 
     of a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) peacekeeping 
     operation implementing a Kosovo peace agreement.

     SEC. 3. AUTHORIZATION FOR DEPLOYMENT OF UNITED STATES ARMED 
                   FORCES TO KOSOVO.

       The President is authorized to deploy United States Armed 
     Forces personnel to Kosovo as part of a NATO peacekeeping 
     operation implementing a Kosovo peace agreement.

  The CHAIRMAN. No amendment to the concurrent resolution is in order 
except those printed in the portion of the Congressional Record 
designated for that purpose and pro forma amendments for the purpose of 
debate. Amendments printed in the Record may be offered only by the 
Member who caused it to be printed or his designee, and shall be 
considered read.
  The Chairman of the Committee of the Whole may postpone a request for 
a recorded vote on any amendment and may reduce to a minimum of 5 
minutes the time for voting on any postponed question that immediately 
follows another vote, provided that the time for voting on the first 
question shall be a minimum of 15 minutes.
  Are there any amendments to the concurrent resolution?


                Amendment No. 7 Offered by Mr. Gejdenson

  Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Amendment No. 7 offered by Mr. Gejdenson:
       Page 2, after line 3, insert the following:
       (3) Former Senator Robert Dole recently traveled to the 
     region to meet with the Kosovar Albanians and deliver a 
     message from President Clinton encouraging all parties to 
     reach an agreement to end the conflict in Kosovo.
       (4) Representatives of the Government of Serbia and 
     representatives of the Kosovar Albanians are scheduled to 
     reconvene in France on March 15, 1999.
       Page 2, line 4, strike ``(3)'' and insert ``(5)''.
       Page 2, strike line 9 and all that follows and insert the 
     following:

     SEC. 3. DEPLOYMENT OF UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES TO KOSOVO.

       (a) Declaration of Policy Relating to Interim Agreement.--
     The Congress urges the President to continue to take measures 
     described in (b) to support the ongoing peace process 
     relating to Kosovo with the objective of reaching a fair and 
     just interim agreement between the Serbian Government and the 
     Kosovar Albanians on the status of Kosovo.
       (b) Authorization for Deployment of Armed Forces.--If a 
     fair and just interim agreement described in subsection (a) 
     is reached, the President is authorized to deploy United 
     States Armed Forces personnel to Kosovo as part of a NATO 
     peacekeeping operation implementing such interim agreement.
       (c) Declaration of Policy Relating to Support for Armed 
     Forces.--The Congress unequivocally supports the men and 
     women of the United States Armed Forces who are carrying out 
     their missions in support of peace in the Balkan region, and 
     throughout the world, with professional excellence, dedicated 
     patriotism, and exemplary bravery.

     SEC. 4. LIMITATION.

       The authorization in section 3 is subject to the limitation 
     that the number of United States Armed Forces personnel 
     participating in a deployment described in that section may 
     not exceed 15 percent of the total NATO force deployed to 
     Kosovo in the peacekeeping operation described in that 
     section, except that such percentage may be exceeded if the 
     President determines that United States forces or United 
     States citizens are in danger and notifies Congress of that 
     determination.


                             Point of Order

  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I make a point of order against the 
amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman will state his point of order.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, subsection 3 of the proposed amendment 
includes language that goes beyond the jurisdiction of the Committee on 
International Relations and extends into the jurisdiction of the 
Committee on National Security. Additionally, the subject matter of the 
amendment is different from the underlying text.
  For both of these reasons, I urge the Chair to sustain a point of 
order.


                         Parliamentary Inquiry

  Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Chairman, parliamentary inquiry.
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman will state it.
  Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Chairman, is it my understanding that the 
objection relates to the statement that the Congress unequivocally 
supports the men and women of the United States Armed Forces who are 
carrying out their mission in support of peace in the Balkans and 
throughout the world with professional excellence and dedicated 
patriotism?
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, regular order.
  Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Chairman, is that the section the gentleman is 
objecting to?
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman will suspend.
  If the gentleman has a parliamentary inquiry, or if the gentleman 
would like to be heard on the point of order, the Chair would recognize 
him.
  Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Chairman, my question is, is that the section that 
the gentleman objects to?
  Mr. GILMAN. Yes. That is correct, Mr. Chairman.
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman is not making a proper parliamentary 
inquiry of the Chair. The Chair will rule on the germaneness of the 
amendment after hearing argument.
  Does the gentleman wish to be heard on the point of order?
  Mr. GEJDENSON. I do wish to be heard, Mr. Chairman.
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman may proceed.
  Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Chairman, it is my understanding that the Chairman 
has just indicated that he objects to this one section that commends 
the armed forces for the excellence that they are involved in in 
carrying out their mission and their commitment. I would, at the 
appropriate time, ask for unanimous consent that we allow this language 
to be retained, because I do think, no matter which side of this issue 
people are on, that they want to express their support and admiration 
for our troops.
  So I would ask unanimous consent at the appropriate time, or ask the 
gentleman to withdraw his point of order so that we can go forward with 
our amendment. It does not really change the policy or the amendment 
itself; it is simply, I think, the kind of support we have always 
included in times when we are dealing with foreign policy issues, and 
we ought not let jurisdictional battles in the Congress preclude us 
from making a positive statement about the troops.
  The CHAIRMAN. Is there any other Member who wishes to be heard on the 
point of order?
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York (Mr. Gilman).
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I want to express support for our forces, 
as all of our colleagues do, and as a veteran, I know the sacrifices 
that our men and women are asked to make.
  I would support a separate resolution on this matter at an 
appropriate time, but I do not think that this is an appropriate part 
of this resolution, and I raise the point of order.
  The CHAIRMAN. If there are no other Members who wish to be heard on 
the point of order, the Chair is ready to rule.
  The gentleman from New York makes the point of order that the 
amendment offered by the gentleman from Connecticut is not germane.
  The concurrent resolution authorizes the President to deploy United 
States Armed Forces to implement a Kosovo peace agreement. Its 
provisions fall exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Committee on 
International Relations. That committee has jurisdiction over 
``intervention abroad'', which includes the deployment of armed forces 
by the President. Conditions, limitations or

[[Page H1215]]

other attributes of such deployment are within the ambit of 
``intervention abroad.''
  The amendment offered by the gentleman from Connecticut includes a 
provision declaring the support of Congress for the armed forces who 
are carrying out their missions in the Balkan region. As evidenced by 
the referral of House Resolution 306 in the 104th Congress which was 
considered by the House, such a provision falls within the jurisdiction 
of both the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on 
International Relations. The sentiment contained in section 3 of the 
amendment is not a condition, limitation or attribute of the deployment 
of armed forces to Kosovo.
  As noted in section 798a and 798c of the House Rules and Manual of 
the 105th Congress, to be germane, an amendment must relate to the same 
subject matter and the same jurisdiction as are addressed in the 
concurrent resolution. The Chair finds that the amendment fails both of 
these longstanding tests. Therefore, the Chair holds that the amendment 
is not germane. Accordingly, the point of order is sustained.
  Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Chairman, I move to appeal the ruling of the 
Chair.
  The CHAIRMAN. The question is, Shall the decision of the Chair stand 
as the judgment of the Committee?
  The question was taken; and the Chairman announced that the ayes 
appeared to have it.


                             Recorded Vote

  Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
  A recorded vote was ordered.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 218, 
noes 205, not voting 10, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 47]

                               AYES--218

     Aderholt
     Archer
     Armey
     Bachus
     Baker
     Ballenger
     Barr
     Barrett (NE)
     Bartlett
     Barton
     Bass
     Bateman
     Bereuter
     Biggert
     Bilirakis
     Bliley
     Blunt
     Boehlert
     Boehner
     Bonilla
     Bono
     Brady (TX)
     Bryant
     Burr
     Burton
     Buyer
     Callahan
     Calvert
     Camp
     Campbell
     Canady
     Cannon
     Castle
     Chabot
     Chambliss
     Chenoweth
     Coble
     Coburn
     Collins
     Combest
     Cook
     Cooksey
     Cox
     Crane
     Cubin
     Cunningham
     Davis (VA)
     Deal
     DeLay
     DeMint
     Diaz-Balart
     Dickey
     Doolittle
     Dreier
     Duncan
     Dunn
     Ehlers
     Ehrlich
     Emerson
     English
     Everett
     Ewing
     Fletcher
     Foley
     Forbes
     Fossella
     Fowler
     Franks (NJ)
     Frelinghuysen
     Gallegly
     Ganske
     Gekas
     Gibbons
     Gilchrest
     Gillmor
     Gilman
     Goodlatte
     Goodling
     Goss
     Graham
     Granger
     Green (WI)
     Greenwood
     Gutknecht
     Hansen
     Hastings (WA)
     Hayes
     Hayworth
     Hefley
     Herger
     Hill (MT)
     Hilleary
     Hobson
     Hoekstra
     Horn
     Hostettler
     Houghton
     Hulshof
     Hunter
     Hutchinson
     Hyde
     Isakson
     Istook
     Jenkins
     Johnson (CT)
     Johnson, Sam
     Jones (NC)
     Kasich
     Kelly
     King (NY)
     Kingston
     Knollenberg
     Kolbe
     Kuykendall
     LaHood
     Largent
     Latham
     LaTourette
     Lazio
     Leach
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (KY)
     Linder
     LoBiondo
     Lucas (OK)
     Manzullo
     McCollum
     McCrery
     McHugh
     McInnis
     McIntosh
     McKeon
     Metcalf
     Mica
     Miller (FL)
     Miller, Gary
     Moran (KS)
     Morella
     Myrick
     Nethercutt
     Ney
     Northup
     Norwood
     Nussle
     Ose
     Oxley
     Packard
     Paul
     Pease
     Peterson (PA)
     Petri
     Pickering
     Pitts
     Pombo
     Porter
     Portman
     Pryce (OH)
     Radanovich
     Ramstad
     Regula
     Reynolds
     Riley
     Rogan
     Rogers
     Rohrabacher
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Roukema
     Royce
     Ryan (WI)
     Ryun (KS)
     Salmon
     Sanford
     Saxton
     Scarborough
     Schaffer
     Sensenbrenner
     Sessions
     Shadegg
     Shaw
     Shays
     Sherwood
     Shimkus
     Shuster
     Simpson
     Skeen
     Smith (MI)
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (TX)
     Souder
     Spence
     Stearns
     Stump
     Sununu
     Sweeney
     Talent
     Tancredo
     Tauzin
     Taylor (NC)
     Terry
     Thomas
     Thornberry
     Thune
     Tiahrt
     Toomey
     Upton
     Walden
     Walsh
     Wamp
     Watkins
     Watts (OK)
     Weldon (FL)
     Weldon (PA)
     Weller
     Whitfield
     Wicker
     Wilson
     Wolf
     Young (FL)

                               NOES--205

     Abercrombie
     Ackerman
     Allen
     Andrews
     Baird
     Baldacci
     Baldwin
     Barcia
     Barrett (WI)
     Bentsen
     Berkley
     Berman
     Berry
     Bishop
     Blagojevich
     Blumenauer
     Bonior
     Borski
     Boswell
     Boucher
     Boyd
     Brady (PA)
     Brown (CA)
     Brown (FL)
     Brown (OH)
     Capuano
     Cardin
     Carson
     Clay
     Clayton
     Clement
     Clyburn
     Condit
     Conyers
     Costello
     Coyne
     Cramer
     Crowley
     Cummings
     Danner
     Davis (FL)
     Davis (IL)
     DeFazio
     DeGette
     Delahunt
     DeLauro
     Deutsch
     Dicks
     Dingell
     Dixon
     Doggett
     Dooley
     Doyle
     Edwards
     Engel
     Eshoo
     Etheridge
     Evans
     Farr
     Fattah
     Filner
     Ford
     Frank (MA)
     Gejdenson
     Gephardt
     Gonzalez
     Goode
     Gordon
     Green (TX)
     Gutierrez
     Hall (OH)
     Hall (TX)
     Hastings (FL)
     Hill (IN)
     Hilliard
     Hinchey
     Hinojosa
     Hoeffel
     Holden
     Holt
     Hooley
     Hoyer
     Inslee
     Jackson (IL)
     Jackson-Lee (TX)
     Jefferson
     Johnson, E. B.
     Jones (OH)
     Kanjorski
     Kaptur
     Kennedy
     Kildee
     Kilpatrick
     Kind (WI)
     Kleczka
     Klink
     Kucinich
     LaFalce
     Lampson
     Lantos
     Larson
     Lee
     Levin
     Lewis (GA)
     Lipinski
     Lofgren
     Lowey
     Lucas (KY)
     Luther
     Maloney (CT)
     Maloney (NY)
     Markey
     Martinez
     Mascara
     Matsui
     McCarthy (MO)
     McCarthy (NY)
     McDermott
     McGovern
     McIntyre
     McKinney
     McNulty
     Meehan
     Meek (FL)
     Meeks (NY)
     Menendez
     Millender-McDonald
     Miller, George
     Minge
     Mink
     Moakley
     Moore
     Moran (VA)
     Murtha
     Nadler
     Napolitano
     Neal
     Oberstar
     Obey
     Olver
     Ortiz
     Owens
     Pallone
     Pascrell
     Pastor
     Payne
     Pelosi
     Peterson (MN)
     Phelps
     Pickett
     Pomeroy
     Price (NC)
     Rahall
     Rangel
     Rivers
     Rodriguez
     Roemer
     Rothman
     Roybal-Allard
     Rush
     Sabo
     Sanchez
     Sanders
     Sandlin
     Sawyer
     Schakowsky
     Scott
     Serrano
     Sherman
     Shows
     Sisisky
     Skelton
     Slaughter
     Smith (WA)
     Snyder
     Spratt
     Stabenow
     Stark
     Stenholm
     Strickland
     Stupak
     Tanner
     Tauscher
     Taylor (MS)
     Thompson (CA)
     Thompson (MS)
     Thurman
     Tierney
     Towns
     Traficant
     Turner
     Udall (CO)
     Udall (NM)
     Velazquez
     Vento
     Visclosky
     Waters
     Watt (NC)
     Waxman
     Weiner
     Wexler
     Weygand
     Wise
     Woolsey
     Wynn

                             NOT VOTING--10

     Becerra
     Bilbray
     Capps
     Frost
     John
     Mollohan
     Quinn
     Reyes
     Wu
     Young (AK)

                              {time}  1614

  Mr. MORAN of Virginia, Ms. LOFGREN, Ms. BERKLEY, and Ms. KAPTUR 
changed their vote from ``aye'' to ``no.''
  So the decision of the Chair stands as the judgment of the Committee.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.


                Amendment No. 5 Offered By Mr. Gejdenson

  Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Amendment No. 5 offered by Mr. Gejdenson:
       Page 2, after line 3, insert the following:
       (3) Former Senator Robert Dole recently traveled to the 
     region to meet with the Kosovar Albanians and deliver a 
     message from President Clinton encouraging all parties to 
     reach an agreement to end the conflict in Kosovo.
       (4) Representatives of the Government of Serbia and 
     representatives of the Kosovar Albanians are scheduled to 
     reconvene in France on March 15, 1999.
       Page 2, line 4, strike ``(3)'' and insert ``(5)''.
       Page 2, strike line 9 and all that follows and insert the 
     following:

     SEC. 3. DEPLOYMENT OF UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES TO KOSOVO.

       (a) Declaration of Policy Relating to Interim Agreement.--
     The Congress urges the President to continue to take measures 
     described in (b) to support the ongoing peace process 
     relating to Kosovo with the objective of reaching a fair and 
     just interim agreement between the Serbian Government and the 
     Kosovar Albanians on the status of Kosovo.
       (b) Authorization for Deployment of Armed Forces.--If a 
     fair and just interim agreement described in subsection (a) 
     is reached, the President is authorized to deploy United 
     States Armed Forces personnel to Kosovo as part of a NATO 
     peacekeeping operation implementing such interim agreement.
       At the end of the resolution, add the following new 
     section:

     SEC. 4. LIMITATION.

       The authorization in section 3 is subject to the limitation 
     that the number of United States Armed Forces personnel 
     participating in a deployment described in that section may 
     not exceed 15 percent of the total NATO force deployed to 
     Kosovo in the peacekeeping operation described in that 
     section, except that such percentage may be exceeded if the 
     President determines that United States forces or United 
     States citizens are in danger and notifies Congress of that 
     determination.


                         Parliamentary Inquiry

  Mr. TRAFICANT. Mr. Chairman, I have a parliamentary inquiry.
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman will state his parliamentary inquiry.
  Mr. TRAFICANT. Mr. Chairman, I have a perfecting amendment to the

[[Page H1216]]

Gejdenson amendment or to the Fowler amendment. It is not a substitute. 
It is in fact an additional section that would leave the Gejdenson 
amendment in effect.
  What would be the process here since the Fowler amendment is in fact 
a substitute for Gejdenson? Is it? It is not?
  The CHAIRMAN. The Chair informs the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. 
Traficant) that the amendment pending is the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Gejdenson). No other amendment or 
substitute has been offered to the amendment offered by the gentleman 
from Connecticut. The gentleman from Connecticut is entitled to speak 
for 5 minutes on his amendment.
  Mr. TRAFICANT. Mr. Chairman, further parliamentary inquiry.
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman will state his parliamentary inquiry.
  Mr. TRAFICANT. Mr. Chairman, I will have, then, an amendment, a 
secondary amendment to the Gejdenson amendment in the form of an 
addition, and I would like to be protected for an opportunity to 
provide that amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN. The Chair cannot guarantee recognition of any Member 
for the purpose of offering second degree amendments. The Chair's job 
is to follow regular order, and that is what the Chair intends to do.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Gejdenson) 
for 5 minutes on his amendment.
  Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Chairman, let me first say to my friends that the 
gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Traficant), while he referenced it as a 
perfecting amendment, I would say that is a term of the parliamentary 
procedures. I would not see it as an improvement on the underlying 
amendment. He has a right to offer it, but I disagree with that. I will 
just get that out on the table.
  Let me tell my colleagues a story about my father. My father will 
turn 87 in the next 5 days. Although he never spoke about World War II 
much, he told me this one story of a day that raised his hopes, and 
then of course there was a lot more calamity after that day. It was 
December 7, 1941.
  He was a prisoner in a work camp run by the Germans, the Nazis in 
World War II. He was one of thousands of Jews across Eastern Europe who 
had been rounded up. In his small village of Profonia, there was about 
400 Jews and 400 non-Jews. The Jews were put into a labor camp.
  On that day or shortly after December 7, he heard that American ships 
had been bombed in Pearl Harbor. While in this country there was 
obviously great anxiety, my father saw great hope, because for the 
first time in the darkness of World War II, he had the vision and hope 
that America would be rapidly in this war and that it would soon be 
over. But he was wrong.
  Before American forces could liberate concentration camps and work 
camps across Europe, virtually every member of his family and every 
Jewish member of that village, except for a few, were shot to death in 
a small depression in their town.
  A friend of mine, Senator Wyden's father, found me a letter from a 
Nazi who witnessed the executions. He said the first person he shot was 
a woman who had given birth the day before. They had her stand naked. 
They shot her and her child and proceeded to shoot every other member 
of the village that they had rounded up.
  What we do here today is not an academic exercise. It is not simply a 
function of parliamentary procedures between the executive and the 
legislative. This has a real life and death impact for people on this 
planet.
  We are going to decide whether or not today these negotiations have a 
chance at succeeding. There is no guarantee they will succeed. There is 
a hope that they will succeed, but there is a guaranteed failure if the 
House shuts off the administration's abilities to move forward.
  There is no constitutional demand that we vote on this, but we are 
here by the procedures that have been forced upon us. So having them 
before us, we had better vote yes.
  We are not asking to assert American forces in a live fire zone. We 
have had on both sides of the aisle broad bipartisan support to send 
Americans in harm's way where many would perish. We are sending the 
smallest percentage of Americans in a conflict in my memory, and the 
President and the Secretary of State say they only enter if a peace 
agreement has been signed.
  So whatever my colleagues' inclinations are, whatever my colleagues' 
philosophies are about war powers in the Constitution, that small 
village in Profonia may be replayed again, and it will be on our head 
what happens to those people.
  Think carefully before one makes their final vote today. This is not 
about relationships with the White House, Democrats versus Republicans, 
those who believe in intervention and nonintervention. This is about 
whether we give peace a chance and whether we have an opportunity to 
let children grow into adults.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Turner), the 
cosponsor of this resolution.
  Mr. TURNER. Mr. Chairman, it is a pleasure to offer this amendment 
which I think embodies the intent of many Members of this body. This 
amendment very clearly states that if a just and fair interim agreement 
is not reached we will not deploy troops.
  The President made that very clear as his position on February 4 in a 
speech made here in Washington at the Baldridge Quality Awards 
Ceremony. No troops unless there is first an agreement. We believe this 
amendment should be adopted to make that clear.
  Secondly, we believe that there is a limited involvement that the 
United States should have and that that involvement should be limited 
to 15 percent of the total troop force assembled by the NATO forces for 
this mission


  Amendment Offered By Mrs. Fowler to Amendment No. 5 Offered By Mr. 
                               Gejdenson

  Mrs. FOWLER. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment to the amendment.
  The Clerk read as follows:

       Amendment Offered By Mrs. Fowler to Amendment No. 5 Offered 
     By Mr. Gejdenson:
       Page 1, strike line 1 and all that follows through line 9 
     and insert the following:
       (1) President Clinton is contemplating the introduction of 
     ground elements of the United States Armed Forces to Kosovo 
     as part of a larger North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
     operation to conduct peacemaking or peacekeeping between 
     warring parties in Kosovo, and these Armed Forces may be 
     subject to foreign command.
       (2) Such a deployment, if it were to occur, would in all 
     likelihood require the commitment of United States ground 
     forces for a minimum of 3 years and cost billions of dollars.
       (3) Kosovo, unlike Bosnia, is a province of the Republic of 
     Serbia, a sovereign foreign state.
       (4) The deployment of United States ground forces to 
     enforce a peace agreement between warring parties in a 
     sovereign foreign state is not consistent with the prior 
     employment of deadly military force by the United States 
     against either or both of the warring parties in that 
     sovereign foreign state.
       (5) The Secretary of Defense, William Cohen, has opposed 
     the deployment of United States ground forces to Kosovo, as 
     reflected in his testimony before the Congress on October 6, 
     1998.
       (6) The deployment of United States ground forces to 
     participate in the peacekeeping operation in Bosnia, which 
     has resulted in the expenditure of more than $10,000,000,000 
     by United States taxpayers to date, which has already been 
     extended past 2 previous withdrawal dates established by the 
     administration, and which shows no sign of ending in the near 
     future, clearly argues that the costs and duration of a 
     deployment to Kosovo for peacekeeping purposes will be much 
     heavier and much longer than initially foreseen.
       (7) The substantial drain on military readiness of a 
     deployment to Kosovo would be inconsistent with the need, 
     recently acknowledged by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to 
     reverse the trends which have already severely compromised 
     the ability of the United States Armed Forces to carry out 
     the basic National Military Strategy of the United States.
       (8) The Congress has already indicated its considerable 
     concern about the possible deployment of United States Armed 
     Forces to Kosovo, as evidenced by section 8115 of the 
     Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1999 (Public Law 
     105-262; 112 Stat. 2327), which sets forth among other things 
     a requirement for the President to transmit to the Congress a 
     report detailing the anticipated costs, funding sources, and 
     exit strategy for any additional United States Armed Forces 
     deployed to Yugoslavia, Albania, or Macedonia.
       (9) The introduction of United States Armed Forces into 
     hostilities, or into situations where imminent involvement in 
     hostilities may occur, clearly indicates authorization by the 
     Congress when such action is not required for the defense of 
     the United States, its Armed Forces, or its nationals.
       (10) United States national security interests in Kosovo do 
     not rise to a level that

[[Page H1217]]

     warrants the introduction of United States ground forces in 
     Kosovo for peacekeeping purposes.
       Page 1, strike the second amendatory instructions and 
     insert the following:
       Page 1, strike line 8 and all that follows through line 3 
     on page 2.
       Page 2, strike line 4 and all that follows through line 8.
       Page 1, line 10, strike ``DEPLOYMENT'' and insert 
     ``LIMITATION ON DEPLOYMENT''.
       Page 1, line 14, strike ``described in (b)'' and insert ``, 
     subject to the limitation contained in subsection (b),''.
       Page 2, strike line 1 through line 6 and insert the 
     following:
       (b) Limitation.--The President is not authorized to deploy 
     ground elements of the United States Armed Forces to Kosovo 
     as part of a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
     operation to implement a peace agreement between the Republic 
     of Serbia and representatives of ethnic Albanians living in 
     the province of Kosovo.
       (c) Rules of Construction.--Nothing in this concurrent 
     resolution shall be construed--
       (1) to prevent United States Armed Forces from taking such 
     actions as the Armed Forces consider necessary for self-
     defense against an immediate threat emanating from the 
     Republic of Serbia; or
       (2) to restrict the authority of the President under the 
     Constitution to protect the lives of United States citizens.
       Strike the second line 1 and all that follows:

  Mrs. FOWLER (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous 
consent that the amendment be considered as read and printed in the 
Record.
  The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentlewoman 
from Florida?
  Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Chairman, reserving the right to object, we have 
not yet seen the language of this amendment, and we would like our 
counsel to just have a moment.
  The CHAIRMAN. Does the gentleman object to the dispensing of the 
reading?
  Mr. GEJDENSON. No, Mr. Chairman.
  The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, the amendment is considered as 
having been read.
  There was no objection.
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentlewoman from Florida (Mrs. Fowler) is 
recognized for 5 minutes on her amendment.
  Mrs. FOWLER. Mr. Chairman, the amendment that I am putting forward 
today with the gentlewoman from Missouri (Ms. Danner) would make it 
clear that the House does not support the deployment of United States 
ground forces to Kosovo and would spell out the reasons why.
  There is no question that the situation in Kosovo is a tragedy. My 
heart aches for the people there just as it does for those who are 
caught in the midst of the civil war in Sierra Leone, the victims of 
religious strife in Kashmir and Indonesia, the hundreds of thousands 
suffering from induced famine in North Korea, the masses subjected to 
suppression of human rights in China and Cuba, the many who have been 
violated by enslavement in Sudan.
  But as much as we would like to see all of these tragedies resolved 
and as much energy as our diplomats and other officials might 
appropriately expend to accomplish that, we have not sent our troops to 
those places because it is not within our power to solve all the 
world's problems.

                              {time}  1630

  It does not make sense to me to compound the tragedy in Kosovo by 
deploying American troops there and subjecting them to hostilities and 
potential casualties. That would be an even greater tragedy.
  Simply put, while I am willing to provide other forms of support, 
including air, intelligence, communications and logistics support to a 
European initiative to deploy ground forces to Kosovo, steps which my 
amendment would permit, I do not believe that our national security 
interests in Kosovo rise to a level that warrants the commitment of 
U.S. ground troops.
  I am deeply concerned that U.S. ground forces are about to be 
deployed on the sovereign territory of a dictator who is essentially 
being blackmailed to accept a NATO military presence. The 
administration is pressuring Milosevic and the KLA to negotiate by 
literally holding a gun to their heads. Even if an agreement on Kosovo 
is reached, it is a recipe for resentment, not reconciliation, and it 
will be our troops on the ground in the cross hairs.
  Furthermore, I am deeply concerned that the administration has not 
articulated an exit strategy and that there has been no determination 
made regarding the cost of the operations or the source of funds to pay 
for it. The administration's initiative would draw the United States 
further into commitments in the Balkans that have already cost U.S. 
taxpayers some $10 billion. After violating two self-imposed deadlines 
for the withdrawal of our military forces from Bosnia, the 
administration today offers no end in sight to our commitment there.
  I would note that the Congress is already on record in requiring the 
administration, in Section 8115 of the fiscal year 1999 Defense 
Appropriations bill, to provide a report to the Congress on the 
national security justification, exit strategy, cost, source of funds, 
and other key considerations before the deployment of any additional 
U.S. forces to Yugoslavia, Albania or Macedonia. That is Public Law 
that we voted on in this House and the President signed.
  The President has indicated that the size of any U.S. ground presence 
will be small. The fact is the deployment will last for a minimum of 3 
years. It will increase already sky-high military personnel deployment 
rates. It will place a significant additional strain on our troops and 
will further compromise the Nation's military readiness.
  For those who have not been out in the field to see our troops 
firsthand, today our military is undermanned, is undertrained, and is 
underequipped. Our service people have had it with constant 
deployments, chronic shortages and cannibalized equipment.
  For me, the bottom line is this: Could I look one of my neighbors in 
the eye and tell them, with conviction, that their loved one died in 
Kosovo in defense of America's vital interests? The answer is no. I 
urge Members to vote ``yes'' on the Fowler-Danner amendment.
  Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the gentlewoman's 
amendment.
  I have visited our troops in Bosnia on several occasions. One of the 
great miracles of the Bosnia venture is that not one single American 
soldier has been injured or killed as a result of that participation, 
but our presence, along with our NATO allies, has prevented the 
continuing bloodbath that has inflicted that territory.
  Now, no one is arguing that American troops should go to war in 
Kosovo. What we are advocating is a conclusion of an agreement between 
the Albanians and the Serbs in Kosovo, after which, upon invitation, a 
28,000 person force would go to that country to keep the peace. Of the 
28,000 soldiers, 4,000 should be members of our own armed forces.
  Kosovo, in a sense, is becoming a secondary issue in this debate. 
What we are talking about is the survival and the vitality of NATO. As 
I mentioned earlier today, some of us will be in Independence, 
Missouri, tomorrow at the Truman Library with the ambassadors and 
governmental leaders of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary, as we 
invite them to join NATO. They will ask the question: Why should they 
join NATO if NATO is unwilling, upon invitation, to take part in a 
peacekeeping mission?
  The gentlewoman is talking about military readiness. What is the 
military readiness for if it is not to prevent the continuance of 
bloodshed upon reaching an agreement between the Albanians and the 
Serbs?
  This debate today in this House makes me awfully glad that some of my 
colleagues were not here when the decision was made to participate in 
the Second World War or the Korean War or the Persian Gulf War. 
Isolationism is rampant in this body. I repeat that. Isolationism is 
rampant in this body. If the Congress of the United States is not 
prepared to participate in a NATO peacekeeping mission, upon the 
invitation of the two parties, for goodness sake, what is NATO prepared 
to do? What is the purpose of NATO if it is not minimally to preserve 
peace in Europe?
  I ask my colleagues to reject my colleague's amendment and to accept 
the responsibility of the one remaining superpower for making a modest 
contribution, and I underscore it is a modest contribution, to a NATO 
effort to preserve the peace.
  Our friends in the United Kingdom are ready to send 8,000 people to 
Kosovo, twice as many as we are, yet the Brits' population is one-fifth 
of ours. What do we tell our friends in

[[Page H1218]]

London when they are ready to send 8,000 people into that peacekeeping 
force; that they should do it all? Well, they have told us there will 
not be a NATO peacekeeping force unless we participate. It is only 
rational that this minimal participation on the part of the United 
States be approved overwhelmingly by this body.
  The voices of isolationism have often carried the day in the Congress 
of the United States. I hope to God this will not be one of those days.
  Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word, and I 
rise in support of the Fowler amendment.
  I particularly want to claim the right to speak after the 
distinguished gentleman from California (Mr. Lantos), because the 
gentleman knows perfectly well that this Member is not an isolationist, 
since the gentleman from California and I were among the two Members 
who probably had more impact on the President's decision to have a 
preventive force sent into Macedonia, or the former Yugoslavian, 
Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), if one prefers, under United Nations 
auspices. And, of course, this Member voted for deployment of our 
troops to the Persian Gulf area for Desert Shield and Desert Storm 
because, in fact, one country, a member of the United Nations, invaded 
another.
  But I do think the gentlewoman's amendment is entirely appropriate, 
and it does not go to totally restricting American involvement in 
Kosovo. It simply says no ground troops. It does not prevent all kinds 
of support, such as logistical, intelligence or even air support.
  Now, I would like to address the issue of why the Europeans think 
American forces should be involved on the ground in Kosovo. Our 
European friends and allies say they cannot act without American 
leadership. As a long-term member of the North Atlantic Assembly from 
the House, I regularly have heard from our European friends that 
nothing can be done without America. Frankly, this is nonsense. NATO 
has established and has had in place for the last 2 years a concept or 
procedure called Combined Joint Task Forces, CJTF, where, out of area, 
some members of NATO can participate in a mission, out of area without 
all of them participating. This is an ideal time for the CJTF concept 
to be employed.
  I also would note that the press reports coming out of the 
negotiations have some of our European friends insisting that the 
administration's willingness to offer several thousand troops is far 
too small--that several times that number are necessary. The Europeans 
desperately want to be treated as equals but they seem terrified to act 
on their own. While I firmly support the Alliance, we have to break our 
friends of their undue reliance on U.S. military superiority.
  This Member is also concerned about the deployment of more U.S. armed 
forces on yet another peacekeeping mission. Really, however, in Kosovo 
it is peace enforcement. There is not going to be any peace to be kept 
because both these parties, the Government of Yugoslavia or Serbia and 
the KLA and the Kosovars are being coerced. That peace enforcement 
mission for U.S. ground forces in Kosovo will exacerbate the 
detrimental impact these missions are having on our military readiness 
to respond to a major attack against our direct interests.
  Mr. Chairman, peacekeeping is wholly different from war fighting. 
Military units deployed on peacekeeping assignments must undergo 
extensive training to regain, renew and reestablish their fighting 
skills. Reliance on the U.S. to spearhead and to put teeth into 
peacekeeping or peace enforcement missions is, frankly, eroding the war 
fighting capability of the United States armed forces. The ever-
increasing number of peacekeeping operations threatens to erode it. 
And, in fact, I would have to say that what has been done by moving 
this country's armed forces more and more into peace enforcement 
activities. It is damaging the capability of the U.S. military.
  This Member would also mention that frequent and recurring recalls of 
reservists and National Guardsmen to support these missions will 
eventually take its toll on U.S. businesses, American productivity and 
personal careers. Perhaps the Members understand that the gentleman 
from Washington (Mr. Nethercutt) already has a tax credit bill 
introduced to try to assist businesses whose National Guard personnel 
and military reservists are abroad all the time. That is an 
understandable concern. I guess we have had about 10,000 lawsuits filed 
now against enterprises by Guardsmen or reservists who have not been 
able, in the eyes of the Guardsmen or the reservists, to be placed back 
in the job they left for deployment or in a comparable job when they 
return. Now that should tell us something.
  The Administration appears intent to act independent of Congress to 
commit troops to Kosovo. This is both unconstitutional and it is 
shortsighted. It jeopardizes the very interests President Clinton has 
vowed to preserve and protect, placing at risk not only the Balkans but 
also the U.S. war-fighting capacity.
  And I would say that what is happening in Macedonia today, with 
Serbian troops on their border with tanks and artillery as a result of 
American and coalition threats, certainly does not stabilize Macedonia; 
Certainly does not prevent the possibility of Greece and Turkey coming 
in on opposite sides; it makes a destabilized Macedonia more likely. 
What is happening there today because of this so-called peace 
enforcement, peace arrangement between Serbia and the KLA, or the 
Kosovars, is really destabilizing.
  The Kosovars, particularly the KLA, do not have any interest in 
autonomy. Their interest is independence. And, in fact, we have Members 
standing up in our committees insisting that the Kosovars should be 
acting for independence. What is that going to do to the stability of 
Albania, Turkey, Macedonia and Bulgaria? It is not positive.
  Mr. Chairman, I thank my colleagues for listening.
  Mr. Chairman, this member has yet to be convinced that this mission 
is well-thought-out or that it is necessary to risk the lives of U.S. 
armed forces men and women in another country's civil war. This Member 
is also mindful of assertions that a civil war in Serbia could spread 
to Macedonia and then bring two NATO allies into conflict--Greece and 
Turkey. While this might make a case if the conflict were occurring in 
a country adjacent to a NATO ally, Serbia does not meet this criteria. 
The use of this argument, to deploy U.S. armed forces to Serbia, is 
nothing more than veiled, highly speculative justification. In this 
Member's mind, it is a poor display of leadership for the world's only 
superpower. The Clinton Administration is too quick to resort to the 
heavy hand of U.S. military intervention. Just because we can, doesn't 
mean we should!
  While some liken the circumstances leading to our potential 
involvement in Kosovo as similar to those that resulted in U.S. troops 
deploying to Bosnia, this Member disagrees with this assessment. Unlike 
Bosnia, Kosovo is not a sovereign nation--it is a province within the 
sovereign nation of Serbia. The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) is an 
armed separatist group that appears focused on a singularly important 
objective--independence for the approximately two (2) million ethnic 
Albanians living in Kosovo. Kosovar leaders, in Serbia, want 
independence, not peace. Serbs are led by one man, Slobodan Milosevic, 
who is adamantly opposed to independence for Kosovo and who is willing 
to militarily oppose the presence of foreign troops in Serbia. With 
tension on both sides, and a history of failed attempts to establish an 
accord between Serbs and Kosovars, it is highly likely that the already 
sizeable casualty count will continue to rise. This Member has not been 
convinced we should risk adding the names of U.S. personnel to that 
growing casualty list.
  The high tension between KLA and Serb forces, compounded by recent 
action by the Serbs to amass 4,500 heavily armored troops with 
artillery on the southern Kosovo border with the Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), will turn this into peace-enforcement--a 
police action. This brings back haunting memories of Korea, Vietnam, 
and Somalia. As history has shown, peace-enforcement does not lend 
itself to an exit strategy. Police presence is rarely a temporary 
situation. In 1995, the Administration indicated that U.S. troops would 
be home from Bosnia within a year. The fact is that about 6,200 
American military personnel remain deployed within Bosnia nearly four 
years later. The successful resolution of the crisis in Serbia will 
guarantee a continuous, long-term U.S. military presence there, as well 
as in Bosnia.
  This Member has previously voiced, and still has, enormous 
difficulties, for many reasons, with the proposal to deploy several 
thousand U.S. troops as part of a NATO peacekeeping force for Kosovo. 
Those reservations have nothing to do with whether Serbian misbehavior 
merits punishment. This Member certainly does not condone anything the 
Serbs

[[Page H1219]]

have done recently, or over the past decade, to foment Kosovar unrest. 
Belgrade has been condescending toward, and abusive of, the rights of 
ethnic Albanians, giving rise to the KLA. Yet, Secretary of Defense 
William Cohen correctly has noted that ``the notion that only the Serbs 
have engaged in atrocities is incorrect.'' While acknowledging that 
both sides are contributing to the conflict, this member would quickly 
point out that the KLA forces were not the ones to displace nearly 
400,000 people, they did not destroy more than 19,000 homes, nor did 
they destroy nearly 500 villages. The Serbs accomplished this 
brutality, now under the ultimate direction of one individual, Slobodan 
Milosevic.
  Despite the precedents set by this Administration's previous actions, 
or by previous presidents, President Clinton has avoided the 
constitutional framework for determining whether it is of vital 
national interest to devote a significant portion of our military 
capability keeping the peace at two places in the Balkans. Why is this 
important? It is important because it jeopardizes the continuity of 
American policy. Policy set by the Administration acting alone in this 
case becomes susceptible to change upon election of a new president, 
which will occur in less than 2 years. Congressional approval of any 
American or NATO invasion of Kosovo, on the other hand, enables 
continuity of four foreign policy and use of combat force, even after 
the end of the president's term.
  Last, and far from least, we are on the verge of what this Member 
considers to be a much more serious breech of peace in the Balkans. The 
People's Republic of China has used its veto power on the U.N. Security 
Council to kill extension of the first-ever United Nations Preventive 
Deployment Force (UNPREDEP) in the former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia (FYROM). Continuation of the international peacekeeping 
presence in Macedonia (FYROM) has now come into question. Yesterday, 
the distinguished gentleman from the 12th District in California, the 
Honorable Tom Lantos, joined this Member in signing a joint letter to 
the Secretaries of Defense and State, urging, in the strongest possible 
terms, that a continued U.S. ``preventative'' peacekeeping force remain 
in Macedonia. It is this Member's hope that the Scandinavian forces of 
UNPREDEP will also remain.
  Macedonia is surrounded by countries--Albania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, 
Greece, and Turkey--that, themselves, are experiencing internal or 
external difficulties, or both. Macedonia is a highly volatile friction 
point, and it is no coincidence that the Macedonian region has been the 
starting point for past wars. Therefore, it is vitally important that 
the presence of a stabilization force be maintained. A continuation of 
the U.N. mandate may no longer be an option, but the U.S. may find it 
necessary to expand its force structure in this sovereign country, 
where we, legitimately, have been invited, where we have unambiguous 
national interests because of threats to the integrity of the NATO 
alliance, and where we absolutely cannot afford an escalation of 
conflict. Were Macedonia to become engulfed in ethnic conflict, it is 
quite possible that Greece and Turkey, two key NATO allies, would 
become engaged on opposing sides--and Albania and Bulgaria might become 
involved, too. The potential is that instability in Macedonia would 
cause the southern Balkans to erupt into yet another conflict, 
potentially leading to a much broader conflagration, or even war. It is 
a possibility that must be avoided.
  There are appropriate places in the Balkans to deploy U.S. troops: 
Macedonia, for example. This Member is not convinced, yet, that it is 
appropriate to further tax the U.S. or its armed forces by allowing 
this Administration to risk the lives of U.S. service personnel in 
Serbia, including Kosovo.
  Ms. DANNER. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise today to express my strong support of the 
Fowler-Danner amendment and in opposition to sending troops to Kosovo. 
We must always question the wisdom of putting our military in harm's 
way, most particularly in what is essentially a civil war.
  I would like to share with my colleagues today a letter I received 
from a constituent whose husband and family are much closer to this 
situation and its ramifications than those of us here today.

                              {time}  1645

  I like many of my colleagues have also traveled to Bosnia, but let me 
tell you the story of someone who has served there.
  She writes:

       Congresswoman Danner, I would like to commend you for your 
     stance on the issue of sending troops into Kosovo. You may 
     remember that Bob was with one of the first units to serve in 
     Bosnia. Ten days after we were married, he left for 11 months 
     there. At the time, I supported it, believing that the troops 
     would be out in a short period of time and that real peace 
     would be achieved. After the experience of spending time in 
     Europe, my position has changed. I have watched soldiers 
     spending multiple tours in Bosnia away from families. The 
     divorce rate is high, children do not have their fathers and 
     mothers with them, and families are breaking apart due to the 
     strain. Please work to encourage your colleagues to think 
     about the ramifications of sending troops to Kosovo in human 
     terms.

  Mr. Speaker, we were told that our military commitment to Bosnia 
would last 1 year. We are now approaching the fourth year. We were told 
it would cost $1 billion. It has now cost $10 billion. Thus, we must 
have, I think, great concern for any commitment with regard to Kosovo. 
There is no reason to believe that a mission in Kosovo would not drag 
on indefinitely with a high possibility of American casualties.
  I strongly urge my colleagues to support this amendment.
  Mr. SAM JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the 
requisite number of words.
  Mr. Chairman, we keep talking about a peace agreement. There is not 
one. If there were one and our forces were sent in, that is fine. But 
without a peace agreement, we are going to coerce those other nations 
into signing one, and I do not think that that is a very American way 
to deal with this problem, not by force . And I do not think that we 
ought to be bombing over there in an effort to try to coerce them to 
comply with our peace agreement that we put forward.
  NATO is not at risk. NATO is a defensive organization, not an 
offensive organization. We appear to be aggressors. I really worry 
after talking with our people over there that we are going to lose an 
airplane or two. It may not be from ground fire but ultimately we could 
lose one from engine failure, and we may. And if that guy gets down in 
that area, those people are not going to be very nice to him. They do 
not like us over there.
  Yesterday, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright told the Congress to 
put off today's debate because it might harm the negotiations. I would 
tell the Secretary the reason this debate is necessary is because the 
real danger is recklessness with our foreign policy.
  The President is about to put our troops in the middle of an ethnic 
and religious war that has been going on for thousands of years. It is 
a lose-lose situation for America. We lose because our troops will be 
deployed to a country without a clear mission. Just as in Bosnia, the 
President has no entry or exit plan, he has failed to explain the cost 
of the mission, and he has failed to explain what effect it will have 
on the already sinking morale of our fighting men and women. The 
President's continued use of hollow threats of force only guarantees 
that our soldiers will be put in harm's way and that dictators will 
continue to control how our foreign policy is run. Despite this, the 
President continues to state he will send 4,000 U.S. troops to Kosovo 
if a peace agreement is signed.
  Mr. Chairman, I fought with our Air Force in both Korea and Vietnam, 
and I am opposed to the use of U.S. military force where we are not 
threatened in this country. I am disturbed that the President would use 
NATO to attack a sovereign nation. NATO was not designed to and should 
not be used for those purposes. The President knows this, and he has 
continually ignored the Congress when making decisions that impact our 
ability to keep peace throughout the world. Our fighting men and women 
are being used as pawns in a failed foreign policy by this 
administration. Our soldiers are leaving the services in droves. 
Recruiting is down, morale is low, and the main reason is failed 
policies that ship our soldiers, sailors and airmen around the world 
with no purpose or plan.
  Mr. Chairman, we should not send troops, we should not send bombs, we 
should not get involved. It is a conflict that is destined to follow 
the rest to failure. The President ought to think long and hard before 
he puts our troops in a bottomless pit. He has a responsibility to our 
fighting men and women and to this Nation to admit there is no defined 
mission in Kosovo and our troops do not belong there. I know that, 
however, if our fighting men and women are called to duty, they will go 
and they will serve with honor as they always do. But under our 
Constitution,

[[Page H1220]]

I believe we in the Congress have as much responsibility as the 
President and we must not ask our soldiers, sailors and airmen to serve 
in Kosovo without a defined mission or national interest.
  Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  Mr. Chairman, the other side talks about all kinds of reasons why the 
United States should not send any of its troops into Kosovo. We know 
that there has been ethnic cleansing. We know there has been genocide. 
I was always taught that two wrongs do not make a right and to me it is 
ridiculous to say, well, there is genocide going on in all parts of the 
world so therefore we should not intervene in any part of the world. 
That does not make sense to me at all.
  I rise in opposition to the gentlewoman from Florida's amendment 
which in effect guts the gentleman from Connecticut's amendment. The 
isolationist attitude that I hear amongst some of my colleagues is 
indeed troubling and puzzling. We have heard these arguments time and 
time and time again. We heard these arguments during the Second World 
War when 6 million people plus were ethnically cleansed and the 
Holocaust was there. I am not saying that this is on the same level, 
but when innocent people are killed because of their race, or 
ethnicity, we have a right and a duty, I think, to respond. We saw in 
Bosnia that until the United States grabbed the bull by the horns, 
Europe was not capable of stopping the carnage, and we saw 200,000 
people ethnically cleansed because of their ethnicity, and we will see 
it again in Kosovo unless we are willing to step in.
  Now, we talk about burdensharing, and I accept the argument that it 
is not fair to ask us to do the lion's share. But here we are only 
proposing 4,000 troops out of 28,000. This is the poster child for 
burdensharing. Our NATO allies are doing the bulk of the troops. And 
for the United States to pull out now or for this Congress to send a 
wrong message now does such harm to the negotiations, I think probably 
destroys the negotiations, and how many more thousands of people will 
have to be killed until we step in a year or two or three years away? 
Isolationism did not work during World War II, it did not work during 
other wars, and it will not work now. I can never understand my 
colleagues who say that somehow people who volunteer for the armed 
forces and do not want to go, somehow that is a reason not to send 
troops. If you volunteer, you know you are volunteering, and in the 
future you know you may have to go. So to me because somebody wants to 
be with their family, I would want to be with my family, too, but that 
is not a reason for United States troops not to do what we need to do, 
which is in our national interest. It is in our interest to stop 
genocide. It is in our interest to stop a wider war which will surely 
happen if we let it go unchecked. We have allies, Greece and Turkey and 
other allies, that can be sucked into a wider Balkan war. But if we 
take steps now along with NATO, we can prevent all this.

  I also do not understand some of my colleagues who are always one to 
have more money for the defense budget, they always fight for more 
money for defense but yet they never seem to want to use the defense. 
It does not make sense to me at all. If we are the superpower in the 
world, and we have a strong defense, and we need to beef up our 
defense, then there are times we need to use our defense. This is such 
a time. We heard when we were debating Bosnia here in Congress that 
there would be hundreds if not thousands of American casualties. That 
has not happened. It will not happen in Kosovo, either. The naysayers, 
the doom and gloom people, it will not happen because our forces are 
the best. There is a mission here, and it is a specific mission here. 
We are going to Kosovo to keep the peace. Mr. Milosevic has slaughtered 
hundreds and hundreds and thousands of Albanians. People there have no 
rights. They have no civil rights. They have no human rights. Men, 
women and children are slaughtered. We have seen the carnage. Only the 
United States leadership can stop it. This is not the time to be 
isolationists.
  I appeal to my colleagues, and again I think this is the wrong time 
to be debating this, because there is no peace agreement. That is just 
the point. The gentleman from Texas said there was no agreement. I 
think if we pull the rug out from under the President and say we do not 
want troops before there is an agreement, there surely will not be an 
agreement. We should have waited until there was an agreement to debate 
this in the United States House of Representatives.
  I sincerely hope that our colleagues will understand the gravity of 
this issue and support the gentleman from Connecticut and support the 
gentleman from Texas. No more than 15 percent United States 
participation is needed.
  Mr. DeLAY. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise today to voice my complete opposition to sending 
American troops to Kosovo. There is simply no vision to this mission. 
Even the casual observer can see that the proposed Kosovo initiative 
has no timetable, no rules of engagement and no greater strategic plan 
for that region. Unfortunately, the undefined Kosovo mission is 
symbolic of the lack of direction of our recent American foreign 
policy. There is a 6-year trend to send American troops anywhere for 
any reason, but there are no consistent goals that tie all of these 
missions together.
  Ronald Reagan once said that changing America's foreign policy is a 
little like towing an iceberg. You can only pick up speed as the frozen 
attitudes and mistakes of the past melt away. America needs to quickly 
change directions and leave behind the chilling comedy of errors that 
has defined our recent foreign policy.
  Ronald Reagan is a statesman. During his administration, the United 
States was the dominant force on the world's stage because there was no 
mystery to American foreign policy. During that time, America boldly 
told the world that we would bring peace through strength. Ronald 
Reagan stood up to the tyranny of communism and said that the American 
way would triumph, but not through conciliation and not through 
appeasement. The United States won that Cold War because of the truth 
of our principles. In every corner of the world we pushed for freedom 
and democracy.
  Oh, how American policy has changed since the days of Ronald Reagan. 
Today there is simply no cohesion and no consistent principles that 
form the basis for everything we do on any spot of this map of the 
world. American foreign policy is now one huge big mystery. Simply put, 
the administration is trying to lead the world with a feel-good foreign 
policy. This feel-good foreign policy tears us away from peace through 
strength and it has resulted in creating chaos through weakness. This 
administration makes threats and never follows up on them. They set 
deadlines that are broken and reset, just to be broken again. American 
foreign policy failures over the last 6 years litter the international 
landscape. Mission-creep in Somalia cost the lives of American 
soldiers. North Korea continues to flaunt international law by speeding 
ahead with their nuclear program with no consequences whatsoever. Haiti 
is still not the beacon of democracy, despite sending U.S. Marines 
there. Afghanistan and the Sudan were bombed in the blink of an eye. 
Yet Osama bin Laden still represents a threat to thousands of American 
lives.
  We continuously bomb Iraq, without any clear goals, and without 
getting any closer to our ultimate objective of Saddam Hussein being 
removed from power. Russia, with its massive nuclear capability is 
coming apart at the seams and selling weapons and technology to scrape 
by, and we do nothing. China is walking all over us, pure and simple. 
Currently we are stuck in a never-ending peacekeeping mission in Bosnia 
that was proposed as a 1-year commitment. That promise was made 4 years 
ago. And now we have Kosovo.

                              {time}  1700

  Kosovo is not a hopeful nation aspiring to democracy. It is a big 
dangerous quagmire. The ethnic Albanians wanted total independence, and 
the Serbs do not want to give up any important parts of their country. 
Both parties have consistently rejected any chance of a real cease-
fire.
  Mr. Chairman, American soldiers are trained to be warriors, not baby-
sitters. The administration has no plan to

[[Page H1221]]

do anything but just go to Kosovo, hold the hands of both sides and 
hope that they will behave when we leave. But of course they will not. 
The killing and mayhem will continue as soon as NATO pulls out.
  So how long does the President plan to keep our troops there any way? 
No occupation can or should last forever.
  There is a litany of reasons why we should not send troops to Kosovo, 
but the most compelling are the new power and responsibilities the 
mission unthinkingly gives to NATO. There are serious concerns about 
this new peace making direction for NATO. Its purpose is always to be a 
defensive alliance, not an offensive force.
  The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Texas (Mr. DeLay) has 
expired.
  (By unanimous consent, Mr. DeLay was allowed to proceed for 2 
additional minutes.)
  Mr. DeLAY. Mr. Chairman, NATO's purpose has always been a defensive 
alliance, not an offensive force going into nonmember nations 
uninvited. Once NATO starts meddling in the internal affairs of 
sovereign nations, where does it stop? Think about this question for a 
moment. Outside of the questions of time and cost and objective, the 
Kosovo policy we are debating here today would have tremendous 
ramification on NATO's overall mission. We have to take a stand against 
these kinds of deployments now to ensure that we stop them before they 
ever get started.
  NATO is starting to resemble a power-hungry imperialist army. 
Originally designed to defend member nations from attack, it is now 
setting itself up to be the attacker. Despite the fact that the two 
parties in Kosovo refuse to negotiate even directly amongst themselves 
and have rejected a cease-fire, the administration threatens to bomb 
the Serbs to make them cooperate at the peace table.
  There is one major catch here. There is no peace table, just like 
there is no peace. The two sides continue to attack one another with a 
vengeance. It does not matter how many soldiers NATO sends over there, 
no number of troops can keep peace if there is no peace to begin with. 
The proposed Kosovo mission is just another bad idea in a foreign 
policy with no focus.
  As with all the recent failures in American diplomacy, the 
administration is trying to obscure its lack of a comprehensive agenda, 
and they are doing it with bombs. Bombing a sovereign nation for ill-
defined reasons with vague objectives undermines the American stature 
in the world. The international respect and trust for America has 
diminished every time we casually let the bombs fly. We must stop 
giving the appearance that our foreign policy is formulated by the 
Unabomber.
  Mr. Chairman, sending U.S. troops to Kosovo is a lose-lose situation. 
No matter how we look at it, it is dangerous, it is costly.
  America has no strategic interests in the matter, and no one wants us 
to be there in the first place. Support the gentlewoman from Florida's 
amendment.
  Mr. DeFAZIO. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of the underlying amendment, 
the Gejdenson amendment limiting the U.S. share of the operation 15 
percent, and in opposition to the second degree amendment.
  I was a bit puzzled by the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Sam Johnson), 
who preceded me in the well, who stated that we were voting on an 
agreement that was not yet complete and, therefore, we should vote 
against it. I share part of that concern. I wish that the leaders of 
the House had held this debate until the agreement was complete. I 
talked to the White House today. They assured me that if an agreement 
is reached, and I believe if we vote in opposition to this resolution 
an agreement will not be reached, that there would be a minimum, 
absolute minimum, of 3 days before U.S. troop deployment could begin. 
That would give the House more than ample time. We could stay here this 
weekend and conduct the Nation's business with the full facts of the 
peace agreement before us instead of having to vote in the context of 
are we undermining the peace agreement that might happen or are we not, 
which is what we are doing right now in this debate.
  There is no one in this House whose been a stronger proponent for 
more than a decade of the restoration of the rightful powers of the 
Congress when it comes to war powers. As my colleagues know, there are 
a few who have been more critical of the lack of participation of our 
wealthy NATO allies in many things, including their own defense during 
the years of threat by the Soviet Union. But that said, the timing of 
the resolution before us and the debate are very troubling. As my 
colleagues know, we should not be having a debate on authorizing the 
use of U.S. troops under not yet totally clear conditions while the 
negotiations are ongoing.
  Mr. Chairman, I really fear that a no vote here by the House of 
Representatives tonight will embolden Mr. Milosevic and his genocidal 
henchmen and keep them from signing an agreement. Some say we are 
bullying him. Well, someone has got to stand up to the bullies in this 
world, and perhaps it is time that the United States did.
  On the other hand, a yes vote is problematic in that we do not have 
the final agreement before us. The gentleman spoke the truth. What 
should happen is we should stay in town. If an agreement is signed on 
Saturday, we can meet on Saturday, we can meet on Sunday, we can meet 
on Monday, and then we can consider a proper authorization which could 
have conditions on length, duration, size of the deployment, scope of 
deployment, objectives and all those things in it for an up or down 
vote.
  That would be the proper way to proceed in this matter.
  Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. DeFAZIO. I yield to the gentleman from Nebraska.
  Mr. BEREUTER. We may come out on different sides of this, but I 
thought the gentleman ought to know that one of the reasons why we are 
in this debate from my perspective and I think from the perspective of 
many people is that we were told the same sort of thing: Wait until the 
Dayton accord is concluded. This is a very delicate negotiation; do not 
get involved. But by the time the signature ended up on the line at 
Dayton, troops were already on the way, Congress was precluded from 
action, and we were told, ``You must now support our men and women, the 
troops abroad.''
  Mr. Chairman, that is the reason why we are at this stage in my 
judgment.
  Mr. DeFAZIO. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for that, but we 
always reserve the power, and I have come to this floor many times to 
question precipitous deployment without lawful consultation with 
Congress and without an authorization of Congress. I have gone so far 
as to sue past Presidents over this issue, but we were denied standing 
in the courts.
  So in this case, as my colleagues know, I believe that we would be 
given that opportunity. We can certainly grasp that opportunity by 
staying in town and going into session the moment we hear the accords 
have been signed, and then framing a resolution that properly addresses 
the concerns around those accords. That is the way we should proceed. 
So we are being given a pretty crummy choice here tonight, which is to 
undermine the peace negotiations by voting no or vote yes on something 
when we do not fully absolutely 100 percent understand the conditions 
and terms.
  Mr. Chairman, I wish that the leadership on the other side would 
reconsider perhaps, pull the bill, keep us in town and take up this 
issue when it is more timely.
  Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number 
of words.
  Mr. Chairman, when a member of my own party tried to stop COLAs for 
our military, the gentlewoman from Florida (Mrs. Fowler) was the first 
one to jump and say, ``Duke, I'll support you. Let's get a coalition 
together, and let's stop it.'' She cares deeply about our military and 
our troops.
  I have an article right here that they started fighting last night 
again in Kosovo. They are burning houses, they are burning bridges.
  I rise in support of the gentlewoman's resolution. Do my colleagues 
know who rejected it? Not the Serbs. Holbrooke, Mr. Holbrooke, had to 
cancel the peace talks last night. He canceled them until the 23rd 
because the

[[Page H1222]]

Albanians rejected it. They will stop nothing short of having a 
separate Kosovo. They do not want just Kosovo. They want Montenegro, 
and they want parts of Greece.
  I said on the floor before, ``Look at Bin Laden, look at the 
terrorist leaders speaking openly and how they then filtrated around 
Itzebegovic in Bosnia, 12,000 mujahedin in Hamas. That is a threat to 
Europe, it is a threat to Greece, and it is a threat to this country. 
Bin Laden, active in Albania with the KLA; they have genocided 
Montenegrins, Serbs, gypsies and Jews recently, and they continue to do 
that. They have been fighting for 500 years.
  As my colleagues know, the gentleman talked about some of us fight 
for defense dollars. Absolutely right. Look at the emergency state that 
our national security is in right now. The President has not asked for 
one dime that our defense are going down, and helping building the 
roads and working our DOD and other agencies. In Honduras, millions of 
dollars, and I support them doing that. I mean they have made a 
marvelous expansion down there in helping people in poverty. But when 
we look at Haiti, as my colleagues know, we are still spending $25 
million a year there building schools and bridges. That comes out of 
the defense dollar. In Somalia, billions of dollars. And look what four 
times going to Iraq, the billions of dollars. In the Sudan, a billion 
dollars did not do very much. Knocked out a pharmaceutical plant. But 
all of these things come out of that defense dollar, and what has that 
set us back to?
  Our kids, our men and women in the military, we are keeping only 23 
percent of them because our deployments exceed by 300 percent the 
deployments during the height of Vietnam, and yet we are going to ask 
only 4000 of them. Do my colleagues know the families and what they are 
going through right now? We are keeping only 30 percent of our pilots. 
The number one issue is family separation. We are driving our military 
into the ground in a very balanced budget amount that we allow, and 
then we take 16, not 8 billion, 16 billion, if we take the cost of 
bringing on the reserves and we take the other costs associated with 
going, 16 billion just for Bosnia, and that does not include next year. 
That all comes out of defense, and then again we are going to have to 
go in here.

  And they were talking about giving a billion dollars to Russia to 
stop some nuclear weapons. Well, let Europe. My colleagues say Europe 
had not done it. Leadership would force Europe to pay their fair share 
and do what we are trying to do. Russia has offered to put more troops 
in there. KLA did not want that. Well, the hell with the KLA. Let the 
Europeans, France, run by a Socialist-Communist group when they took 
over the conservatives' coalition, and they refused to do their part, 
let them go in and do it, and let us not send our men and women in 
harm's way.
  My colleague talked about not understanding the gentleman from Texas 
(Mr. Sam Johnson). I do not expect my colleague would. He was a POW for 
6\1/2\ years, and he was a war hero. He was tortured, he was shot down 
in Vietnam, and he knows what it is to put our kids in harm's way 
instead of sitting here in a soft, cushy chair saying, ``Let's send 
them.''
  Mr. CROWLEY. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of the Gejdenson amendment. I 
support the gentleman from Connecticut's amendment, but I have strong 
reservations, strong reservations of the Republican leadership's timing 
on this legislation. Bringing this measure to the floor for debate 
while negotiations are still underway is totally irresponsible.
  Mr. Chairman, if and when a peace agreement is signed by both sides, 
I believe an American presence as part of a larger international 
peacekeeping force in Kosovo is and will be necessary.

                              {time}  1715

  The Kosovar Albanians have already made clear that they will not 
agree to any peace proposal without American participation in an 
implementation force.
  In addition, we have seen that the threat of force is the only 
language that President Milosevic understands. A strong U.S. presence 
in Kosova would demonstrate to Mr. Milosevic that we would not tolerate 
noncompliance with any of the agreements, provisions or a return to the 
brutal campaign of repression and genocide that he has brought upon the 
ethnic Albanian community.
  Mr. Chairman, while our NATO allies have already pledged to provide 
the bulk of a post settlement force in Kosovo, we must recognize that 
some U.S. participation is not only desired but is expected by our 
allies. Quite simply, such participation may be essential to securing 
the confidence of all the parties involved.
  Mr. Chairman, I have a strong and vibrant Albanian and American 
community in my district in the Bronx and Queens. Many of these 
families have relatives in Kosovo who have been raped, maimed and 
murdered by Serbian forces.
  The United States, and we as a Congress, cannot turn our backs or 
jeopardize the peace process in Kosovo.
  While I strongly support an American presence in an international 
implementation of force, I believe to debate this issue at this time is 
both irresponsible and damaging to our ability to conclude a peaceful 
agreement.
  Mr. Chairman, I include for the Record the following New York Times 
article.

                [From the New York Times, Nov. 6, 1998]

  Far From Kosovo, Anguished Vigils And Mourning; Concern for Family 
                   Members Reshapes Immigrants' Lives

                          (By Barbara Stewart)

       Nearly every week, all summer long, Ismer Mjeku, a Bronx 
     entrepreneur from Kosovo, attended at least one wake, as one 
     Albanian compatriot after another learned of relatives back 
     home killed by Serbian soldiers. By late August, it was 
     practically routine. He would meet his uncle and cousins at 
     one of the small, dim clubhouses where Albanian men sit, 
     smoking cigarettes and drinking tiny cups of sweet Turkish 
     coffee and where traditionally, they have also held wakes.
       For the last few months, these spaces have been rented time 
     and again by immigrant Albanian men, who would spend a day or 
     two of mourning there. While the women remained home, 
     receiving the condolences of their female friends, the men 
     would spend the day at the club in a ritual called pame, ``to 
     see,'' or ngushellime, ``condolences.''
       By Labor Day, Mr. Mjeku, 38, had attended 10 or 11 pamet 
     within 9 weeks. Like the others in his group, he shook the 
     hands or hugged the shoulders of each grieving man, sat and 
     drank a single cup of coffee and smoked one cigarette, rose 
     and offered his condolences to each man again, and then left, 
     making room for the next group.
       But a few weeks ago, after the older cousin who had been a 
     second father to him was shot and killed in his home village, 
     Mr. Mjeku refused to hold a pame. ``We cannot keep doing 
     these one by one,'' he said in his small walk-up office on 
     Arthur Avenue in the Belmont section of the Bronx, where he 
     produces an Albanian business directory. ``So many people 
     died in Kosovo the last three months. It's not special, each 
     death. It's not--wow. It's war.''
       For many of the approximately 200,000 Albanians in and 
     around New York and New Jersey--70 percent of whom come from 
     Kosovo, a Serbian province of Yugoslavia in which 90 percent 
     of the population are ethnic Albanians--death is no longer 
     special. After eight months of Serbian attacks on their 
     relatives in Kosovo, even the deaths of children have become 
     numbingly routine.
       Yet the deaths back home have reshaped the lives of 
     immigrants here, making them less festive, less social: gone 
     are the big weddings, the nights of folk dancing, the gay 
     music.
       ``When I hear Albanian music, it hurts me,'' said Al 
     Haxhaj, an Albanian who is a co-owner of the Mona Lisa, a 
     restaurant in the Murry Hill section of Manhattan that was 
     formerly called the Piazza Bella. ``It reminds me.''
       Since the first Serbian attacks were reported in February, 
     Albanians around the world have watched events back home with 
     anguish: the looted and torched villages, the murdered 
     civilians, the hundreds of thousands of people forced to take 
     refuge in the surrounding mountains. The violence peaked in 
     the summer, with 500,000 Albanians living as refugees, 
     according to international relief agencies. These agencies 
     also say that 1,000 to 2,000 ethnic Albanians have been 
     killed, though many agency representatives say they believe 
     that figure is low.
       Reports last week that Yugoslav soldiers were withdrawing 
     from ethnic Albanian villages because of NATO bombing threats 
     offered scant comfort. Local immigrants say they do not 
     believe that the Serbians, their ancient enemies, will stop 
     their attacks.
       All along Arthur Avenue and Pelham Parkway in the Bronx, in 
     New Jersey cities like Paterson and Garfield and in 
     neighborhoods throughout Manhattan, ethnic Albanians are 
     trying to deal with their personal

[[Page H1223]]

     tragedies in the midst of this international drama.
       Weddings and other celebrations are being canceled. When 
     their world is right, Albanians frequently celebrate with 
     huge parties, hiring Albanian musicians so that hundreds of 
     guests can do traditional folk dancing until morning. But 
     nobody has the heart now for celebrating.
       Last fall, the Piazza Bella hired an Albanian band to play 
     traditional music, attracting expatriates from miles around. 
     In February, after the first massacres were reported, Mr. 
     Haxhaj and Bilbil Ahmetaj, the co-owners, stopped the music.
       ``We can't be over here dancing and getting drunk when 
     little kids are being killed and villages are being 
     trashed,'' said Fekrim Haxhaj, the owner's 18-year-old son.
       In normal times, the vast majority of the big wedding 
     parties at Il Galletto, a banquet hall in North Bergen, N.J., 
     are held by Albanian parents, said Vymer Bruncaj, who is a 
     part owner. But lately, he said: ``The wedding invitation for 
     Albanians is zero--no invitations. The last five, six months, 
     you cannot find one.''
       Young couples are postponing their weddings or marrying 
     quietly, with fewer guests and afternoon parties without 
     music. Last spring, Alta Haxhaj, Fekrim's cousin, canceled 
     the elaborate wedding for 1,000 guests that she had been 
     planning for a year. Instead, she and here fiance married 
     quietly, in street clothes. ``No big pouf,'' she said. ``No 
     tail behind me, no white pearls.''
       When ethnic Albanians get together these days, it is 
     probably for a candlelight vigil outside the United Nations 
     or the White House. Conversation never strays far from their 
     worries. At home and in offices, the computer stays on; the 
     Web site www.kosova.com carries updates on news from the 
     region in Albanian and lists the most recent victims. (Kosova 
     is the ethnic Albanians' preferred spelling.)
       Mr. Mjeku, the Bronx businessman, checks the Internet when 
     he gets to work. On Sept. 30, he spotted his cousin's name on 
     the list of casualties. ``I closed the office,'' he said. 
     ``I told my uncle in Riverdale. He started to cry. I felt 
     very bad.''
       Now, a month later, Mr. Mjeku said he was having a hard 
     time focusing on his work. His mind is occupied by memories 
     of his cousin.
       While the Internet brings daily updates, many Albanian-
     Americans have been able to reach family members in Kosovo 
     through satellite cell phones that allow them to connect even 
     with refugees in the mountains.
       The conversations have often been eerie. A few months ago, 
     Dervish Ukehaxhaj was summoned from the kitchen of the 
     Madonia Brothers Bakery in the Bronx, which he manages, to 
     the office downstairs, where Peter Madonia, the owner, handed 
     him a phone.
       ``It was his brother in Kosova, and he was in the middle of 
     shooting.'' Mr. Madonia said. ``He's sitting here in this 
     office, talking to his brother who is in the front lines, in 
     the middle of a war.''
       In July, there were other calls. One brother and two 
     cousins had been fatally shot.
       The Kosovan Liberation Army, with the help of European 
     expatriates, obtained dozens of powerful cell phones and 
     distributed them to the villages, according to Isuf Hajrizi, 
     managing editor of Illyria, and Albanian newspaper based in 
     the Bronx. When Mr. Hajrizi's parents, along with about 40 
     other relatives in the village, climbed high into the 
     mountains above the village to escape Serbian soldiers, they 
     carried the cell phone with them. ``They had no food,'' he 
     said. ``But they had that phone--their only link to life.''
       But with only one cell phone for at least 1,000 refugees, 
     it can take hours, or even days to get through. Mr. Hajrizi 
     last reached his family after spending 10 straight hours 
     dialing, and then persuading the person who answered to hike 
     over to his parents' campsite to deliver the phone.
       When he finally hear his 74-year-old mother's voice, she 
     told him that their home and their village had been looted 
     and burned. They had no food or shelter. She begged for help. 
     ``Why is it like this?'' she asked, as her son listened 
     helplessly.
       That was two weeks ago. Since then, he has not been able to 
     get through despite trying every day. They must have returned 
     to the village and are trying to cobble together shelter 
     there, he tells himself.
       ``I check the Internet constantly,'' he said. ``I haven't 
     seen their names on the lists. As long as they don't show up 
     on the lists, they probably are O.K.''

  Mr. FOLEY. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of the amendment by the 
gentlewoman from Florida (Mrs. Fowler). Obviously, she does not come to 
this issue as a casual observer. In fact, she represents Mayport Naval 
Station, which is often the first to deploy forces in times of 
conflict.
  I join her in opposition to sending American ground forces to the 
wartorn province of Kosovo. I would remind my colleagues that four 
years ago the President sent thousands of American troops to Bosnia for 
what he assured us would be a 1-year mission.
  I underscore the comments of the gentleman from Nebraska who was 
quite concerned that while we were negotiating a peace agreement at 
that time of the Dayton Accords, American troops were deployed in 
Bosnia. There was no way to recall them because we were told by the 
Administration to support the troops because they are already over 
there.
  We are again falling into the same trap. Four years have passed and 
our troops are still over there. It has become a mission with no end in 
sight.
  If we send troops to Kosovo, I fear the same thing will happen again, 
an open-ended commitment of thousands of young American soldiers to yet 
another bloody conflict in the Balkans.
  The President wants to send 4,000 American troops to Kosovo if a 
peace plan is agreed to by the two warring factions. Of course, we were 
all sickened by atrocities that have been committed by both sides in 
this war. However, we cannot put our troops in the middle of a conflict 
where the rules of engagement are ambiguous.
  If American forces go to Kosovo, they will very likely end up in 
combat situations. I think we should remember 1993, the disaster in 
Somalia where 18 U.S. Army rangers were killed tracking down a Somalian 
warlord. These lives were lost because the Administration placed those 
forces under international command and refused to provide the heavy 
armor and air support that would have given our forces the upper hand 
in combat.
  Mr. Chairman, too many questions exist as to how our troops will be 
deployed. There are too many questions about the rules of engagement 
and too many questions about a successful exit strategy.
  Mr. Chairman, our Armed Forces are stretched very thin across the 
globe in a multitude of deployments. We should be very, very careful 
before we commit to another one.
  This past weekend, 44 Haitians drowned at sea in an attempt to come 
to Florida, to the United States of America. Once again, we have 
problems in Haiti but nobody is addressing it.
  Cuba shot down two Brothers to the Rescue aircraft, and now we are 
sending a baseball team to promote peace and prosperity in Cuba.
  The gentleman from Texas (Mr. Sam Johnson) and the gentleman from 
California (Mr. Cunningham) spoke on this floor and these two 
gentlemen, Members of Congress, have the right to speak about the 
deployment of our troops in conflict because they themselves have 
represented this great Nation in combat. They speak with authority and 
I respect their views.
  The December bombing of Iraq occurred and the Administration told us 
it had to be done because Ramadan, the Muslim holy month, was fast 
approaching. They said we must attack now because if we don't, it would 
create an international incident.
  What about Hanukkah, which was being celebrated at the time of our 
bombing in Iraq?
  So I would suggest to the Congress that we carefully consider the 
amendment of the gentlewoman from Jacksonville, Florida (Mrs. Fowler) 
and that we support it before we become engaged, before we are drawn 
into another conflict with no end in sight.
  Mr. OLVER. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment by the 
gentlewoman from Florida (Mrs. Fowler). Barely 11 years ago, Slobodan 
Milosevic seized power in what was then Yugoslavia, and he remains 
today the last old line, unrepentant Communist dictator in Europe.
  Just 10 years ago, in March of 1989, using tactics that would have 
made Joseph Stalin proud, Milosevic surrounded the elected assembly of 
Kosovo with Yugoslav Army tanks and secret police and forced that 
elected body at gunpoint to renounce the autonomy that was guaranteed 
to Kosovo by the Constitution of Yugoslavia. Milosevic did not even 
bother to change the Constitution.
  In rapid succession, all ethnic Albanian public employees were 
dismissed from their jobs, 100,000 of them. The Albanian language was 
proscribed for public purposes. The Albanian schools and the university 
were closed and systematic repression of the ethnic Albanians began.
  Remember that ethnic Albanians were already a majority of the 
citizens of Kosovo when Yugoslavia was freed after World War II, and 
now are more than 90 percent of that population.

[[Page H1224]]

  Then the Milosevic regime was distracted in 1991 and 1992 by its 
attacks upon two other U.N. members, namely Croatia and Bosnia, that 
led, as we know, to 200,000 deaths and 2 million refugees that have 
been spread all over Europe.
  It is in that context that President George Bush, on December 27, 
1992, warned Milosevic that the U.S. would act if he attacked Kosovo in 
a similar way. I quote from the letter that President Bush delivered to 
Milosevic, quote, in the event of conflict in Kosovo caused by Serbian 
action, the United States will be prepared to employ military force 
against the Serbs in Kosovo and in Serbia proper, and it was that 
policy that President Clinton has been following and reiterated, 
reaffirmed in 1993 and has been following.
  In that context, the then minority leader, later majority leader and 
Republican candidate for President, Robert Dole, has always supported 
the strongest possible action, American action, to contain Milosevic's 
regime.
  In Kosovo, Milosevic used his army and secret police under a renewed 
rein of terror to impose thousands of arbitrary arrests, beatings and 
extrajudicial killings on ethnic Albanians. We should remember that 
just last October, Milosevic signed agreements in regard to Kosovo and 
because there were no enforcement provisions there has violated every 
provision of those agreements signed only four months or so ago.
  All told, at least 2,000 have been indiscriminately killed, men, 
women, aged, children, baby in arms and in the womb and at least 
400,000 driven from their homes. For all those reasons, the contact 
powers have agreed to a NATO effort to establish an enforceable peace 
in Kosovo, and if this NATO effort is subverted, and the amendment by 
the gentlewoman from Florida (Mrs. Fowler) clearly subverts the effort 
to impose a peace in Kosovo, then later this spring this Congress will 
have contributed to the creation of hundreds of thousands of more 
refugees and to the deaths of a whole new cadre of victims of the 
national socialist regime of Slobodan Milosevic.
  Milosevic's right-hand deputy, President Seselj, has already told the 
Yugoslav parliament that they will drive all of the ethnic Albanians, 
citizens of Yugoslavia, from Kosovo.
  I implore this Congress not to make this great United States of 
America complicit, complicit in these deaths, and creating these 
refugees and in aiding in Milosevic's brutal campaign of ethnic 
cleansing.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I rise to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise regrettably opposed to the amendment, the well-
crafted amendment from my good friend and colleague, the gentlewoman 
from Florida (Mrs. Fowler). It is a good amendment and has led to good 
debate, but I have a different view of this situation.
  I think that the underlying resolution, H.Con.Res. 42 that we are 
talking about cannot be supported in its present form because it is 
essentially a blank check that grants the Clinton administration 
authorization to send troops to Kosovo without any limitations or 
restrictions. I think that is much too broad.
  The Fowler amendment, on the other hand, would go to the opposite end 
of the spectrum denying the administration the authority to send troops 
under nearly all but the most dire circumstances.
  While the President is the primary architect of American foreign 
policy, and we all understand that, Congress nevertheless has very 
important obligations in this area, most notably oversight, overseeing 
the deployment of our troops. That is one of the reasons we are here. 
We do this on behalf of the people we represent back home.
  Finding the right balance is never easy, as we know, but I do believe 
that the people in my district feel that we should seek something that 
is more akin to a middle ground solution to either the underlying 
resolution or the Fowler amendment.
  The Clinton administration is intent on deploying U.S. troops to 
Kosovo and maintains that it does not require congressional approval to 
do so. In response, I believe Congress should be careful not to deal 
itself out of the process altogether, and I think this debate has been 
useful and is going to be more constructive as we go along.
  Many members are concerned about the administration's plan and are 
not satisfied with standing on the sidelines, which is the practical 
effect of both the resolution that underlies H.Con.Res. 42 and the 
Fowler amendment. It is either yes or no.
  I believe that it is incumbent on Congress to seize this opportunity 
to offer constructive input and to put into place reasonable 
requirements before our troops are committed. Rather than providing a 
blank check or obstructing the way altogether, Congress should require 
an explicit statement of the national interests involved, the rules of 
engagement, for example, for our troops; the cost of the mission, for 
example, of interest to our taxpayers; as well as the entry strategy, 
the exit strategy, the amount of protection provided to make sure our 
forces will be as safe as possible; those kinds of questions.
  As the debate progresses, I anticipate there will be a series of 
amendments to do just those kinds of things. I am going to oppose, 
somewhat reluctantly, the Fowler amendment because I think there is a 
better way to achieve proper accountability from the President about 
using our troops in Kosovo.
  I urge my colleagues to understand that there are good choices 
between the carte blanche of the underlying H.Con.Res. 42 and the no 
deployment proposal by the gentlewoman from Florida (Mrs. Fowler).
  Those amendments are printed. I urge that my colleagues look at them 
and in the meantime I urge a no vote on the Fowler amendment.
  Mr. TAYLOR of Mississippi. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the 
requisite number of words.
  Mr. Chairman, I want to commend my colleague from Florida (Mr. Goss) 
for his well thought out, articulate view on this. I want to tell him 
that I am in total agreement.

                              {time}  1730

  I urge my colleagues to vote against both the Gejdenson amendment and 
the Fowler amendment for all the reasons that the gentleman 
articulated.
  I think the Gejdenson amendment would have us rush into something 
that has yet to have been written. The Fowler amendment would have us 
condemn it. I do not think that is a very adult thing to do.
  Mr. Chairman, I would urge my colleagues to give strong consideration 
to an amendment by the ranking minority member on the House Committee 
on National Security, the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. Skelton). I 
think it gives us the best of all of these worlds. It says to those of 
us, including myself, who are reluctant to commit troops, Mr. 
President, you cannot send troops right now. It gives those of us who 
would like to see the details of the peace agreement the opportunity to 
wait until it is written, wait until it is brought before this body, 
wait until our Supreme Allied Commander, General Wesley Clark, can come 
to Washington and explain our concerns about the safety of the troops, 
what our mission is, how much it is going to cost, and yes, how long we 
are going to be there. Then and only then it calls on Congress to vote 
on it.
  I applaud my colleagues who say that yes, it is time that Congress 
finally starts fulfilling our duties as given to us by the Founding 
Fathers in Article I, Section 8, where it says we must decide where and 
when young Americans are put in harm's way. We have let both Democratic 
and Republican Presidents walk all over us. We have failed in our 
duties.
  So I applaud those of my colleagues who say, let us do our job. I 
also want to applaud the people, including the troops who went to 
Bosnia, who showed me that I was wrong when I opposed our intervention 
there. It was not a general, it was not an admiral, it was not a 
bureaucrat, and it was not a State Department official that showed me 
that I was wrong, it was an 18-year-old kid from Ocean Springs, 
Mississippi. When I went over there with a notebook looking for kids to 
tell me why we should not be there and how stupid it was, and a young 
man by the name of Rhodes who might have been all of a corporal, I 
said, should we be here? And I was shocked when he said yes. I said, 
why? Fresh out of high school, he says, Because I am keeping women from 
getting raped, I am keeping little kids from getting tortured, I

[[Page H1225]]

am keeping old men from being murdered just because of their religion. 
That is why I joined the army, to be a good guy.
  Folks, I was dumbfounded. That mission has never been articulated 
better by anyone anywhere and to Corporal Rhodes, wherever you are, God 
bless you for saying it, and to his parents, God bless you for bringing 
such a kid into this world.
  Folks, this is the only rational way to go about this. Let us do our 
job. Mr. President, you have no authority to send troops; therefore, 
you cannot. Mr. President, bring us a proposal that we can read, take a 
look at, and then yes, Mr. President, we owe you the respect of at 
least looking at it and then voting on it.
  I urge my colleagues to reject the Fowler amendment, I urge my 
colleagues to reject the Gejdenson amendment, but I rise in very strong 
support of the very rational position brought to us by the gentleman 
from Missouri (Mr. Skelton).
  Mrs. CHENOWETH. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number 
of words.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong opposition to the argument that the 
United States should become militarily involved in Kosovo at all, and I 
support the Fowler amendment. For an administration that places so much 
stock in political polls, I wonder if the President does not find it 
ironic that most Americans cannot even find Kosovo on the map. Not only 
that, but most Americans could not articulate one reason why we should 
send other Americans to risk and very possibly lose their lives.
  What is the vital interest over there which is being advanced by our 
getting involved in the middle of this dispute? We have not heard a 
clear answer to this question. Yet, President Clinton has made very 
clear what his intention is. He intends to intervene in Kosovo with an 
open-ended occupation force, perhaps preceded by air strikes.
  We have absolutely forgotten the rules of engagement that were laid 
out in the War Powers Act. We do not have an exit strategy. He has made 
it clear that he does not think he needs congressional authorization 
for this mission. Well, I think, as my colleague, the gentleman from 
Mississippi (Mr. Taylor) just articulated, in the Constitution, Article 
I, Section 8, it clearly states that it is the Congress that shall 
raise up armies and declare war. In the War Powers Act, presidential 
executive powers are defined with the ability for the President to 
deploy troops without congressional authority only when there has been 
a declaration of war, a specific statutory authorization, or, and this 
is very important, Mr. Chairman, a national emergency created by attack 
upon the United States, its territories, its possessions, or its armed 
forces. The situation in Kosovo certainly does not match statutory 
authority.
  Mr. Chairman, if we are to prevail under the rule of law, the 
President must obey the law, like everyone else, and certainly in this 
situation that could get us into a quagmire that we may never get out 
of.
  The administration policy absolutely goes against the fundamentals of 
constitutional government and the rule of law. On February 10, for 
instance, in testimony before the Committee on International Relations, 
Thomas Pickering, who is the Under Secretary of State for Political 
Affairs, confirmed that Kosovo is sovereign territory of Serbia, and 
that attacking the Serbs because they will not consent to foreign 
occupation of a part of their territory would be an act of war. An act 
of war, Mr. Chairman.
  The Constitution of the United States gives sole power to declare war 
to the Congress, not to the President. Nothing in the laws or the 
Constitution of the United States suggests that a determination by the 
United Nations Security Council or by the North Atlantic Council is a 
substitute for our country's laws. The mission in Kosovo intended by 
this administration is contrary to the principle of national 
sovereignty and is a major step towards global authority. The United 
States and NATO are demanding that a sovereign state consent to foreign 
occupation of its territory, or be bombed if it refuses. This 
distinction should be a key one for all Americans concerned about the 
threat of the growing power of international institutions and what they 
present to national sovereignty.
  What kind of precedent are we going to set with this action? What 
country are we claiming the right to attack next if we determine that 
its behavior does not rise to some international standard? Should we 
attack Turkey to protect the Kurds? China, to protect Tibet or Taiwan? 
Sri Lanka to protect the Tamils, India to protect the Muslims in 
Kashmir? I think not, Mr. Chairman.
  Do all of the Members of the House fully appreciate the complicated 
quagmire of Kosovo? The history of Kosovo with its competing claims of 
Albanians and Serbs is at least as tangled as that of Bosnia, and both 
groups are passionately attached to their irreconcilable differences of 
what is right and wrong, in their view.
  The administration and its supporters tell us all about the 
sufferings of the Albanians under the Milosevic regime, and those 
should not be minimized, and I concur and identify with their argument 
there. But they also tell us almost nothing about the attacks committed 
by the Kosovo Liberation Army against Serbian civilians and against 
moderate Albanians as well. They tell us nothing about the ethnic 
cleansing of Christian Serbs by radical Albanian Muslims under the 
Turks, Nazis and Communists alike.
  Mr. Chairman, this is a dangerous step that we must not take.
  They tell us nothing about the drug-trafficking and other criminal 
activity that funds the KLA. They tell us nothing about the support of 
Islamic radicals like the Osama bin Ladin network, which, with other 
radical forces, is well-established in the KLA's staging area in 
northern Albania and is promising to strike at Americans wherever they 
are found.
  Do we need to put Americans down in a place where they'll be 
convenient targets for terrorism?
  Putting American troops into this quagmire, where we have no 
legitimate interests, is a dangerous and needless risk to American 
personnel. Kosovo is not America's fight.
  The Congress should reject any measure that is retrospect will be 
seen as a blank check for Bill Clinton--a Gulf of Tonkin Resolution for 
the Balkans.
  Mr. POMEROY. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  Mr. Chairman, at the outset, I want to commend my colleague, the 
gentleman from Mississippi (Mr. Taylor) for very well articulated 
remarks. I come to a slightly different conclusion. I rise to speak in 
favor of the Gejdenson amendment and in opposition to the Fowler 
amendment.
  First, let me speak to the alternative amendment advanced by the 
gentlewoman from Florida (Mrs. Fowler). I believe that it is extremely 
ill-advised of this House to be debating this resolution at all. We are 
debating involvement in a peace agreement that has yet to be finalized, 
so it is not timely right from the outset.
  To even try and interject this House into the negotiations underway 
by placing proscriptions on what the negotiators might come up with is, 
in my opinion, the direct intervention of this House into the 
formulation of foreign policy, something placed in the executive branch 
under the Constitution for very good reasons. We are not constituted as 
individual representatives representing this country to try and steer 
negotiations even as they unfold.
  Senator Dole, certainly someone who knows the legislative process as 
well as any American, advised the Committee on International Relations 
yesterday that the time for congressional involvement in these matters 
is after the agreements themselves have been reached. Let us look at 
what the President might bring back, evaluated and debated at that 
time, but not before.
  I favor the Gejdenson amendment, because in the absence of orderly 
consideration of this matter, it is appropriate, I think, that we not 
extend a blank check, but rather a measured authorization, and that is 
the Gejdenson amendment before us. It would encourage a conclusion of 
the peace process and authorize a NATO force with U.S. involvement of 
up to 15 percent. That is clearly a minor supporting role in this 
process, but an essential one, in light of the standing of the United 
States of America in the world today.
  To try and absolutely foreclose any participation by the United 
States in a peacekeeping force that might be agreed to under the 
agreement, should an agreement be reached, would I believe give great 
comfort to those who

[[Page H1226]]

are the enemies of peace in this region, and who want no peace 
agreement.
  All of us are involved in our legislative responsibilities in 
negotiations, and we know that negotiations are, in large part, about 
leverage. Why would we want to give Slobodan Milosevic, a perpetrator 
of unspeakable horrors in this region, the leverage at this time in the 
peace process that, precluding any U.S. troop involvement, would extend 
to this evil leader.
  Mr. Milosevic 11 years ago went down to Kosovo and began his own 
ascendancy in the region by commencing a reign of terror on the 
Kosovars of Albanian ethnicity. During the course of that reign of 
terror, their autonomy has been stripped and they have been the victims 
of unspeakable horrors. We need to bring this to a conclusion with a 
negotiated peace, but that is made infinitely more difficult by the 
House debate today, and if we should adopt the Fowler amendment it 
would be made, in my opinion and the opinion of many observing this 
process, it would be made impossible.
  The Scriptures tell us, blessed are the peacemakers, and we in the 
House want to do everything we can to make their job more difficult, if 
not altogether impossible, at this terribly important time.
  So let me conclude by saying, let us oppose the Fowler amendment. I 
believe it would forestall a conclusion of the peace process. Let us 
support the Gejdenson amendment, which would place very significant and 
appropriate strictures on the U.S. involvement in what might be a NATO 
force, an involvement not to exceed 15 percent; a limited, minor 
supporting role, but an essential one, to stop the killing and the 
atrocities that have plagued that region.
  Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  Mr. Chairman, this situation, regardless of which route we take, stay 
out or go in, has potential dangers. Many people have argued that going 
in is going to cause more of a conflagration than if we stayed out. 
There are good intellects on both sides of the debate. It is a very 
difficult debate. It is a very close question, I think.
  I am going to support the base bill. I think in the end the 
organization that we created, NATO, that we have always been the guts, 
the leadership of, that was put together to handle then the Soviet 
Union, has a role in this post-Cold War environment in keeping 
stability in Europe. If we do not participate in this operation, and it 
is a very dangerous operation, one in which I think we may take 
casualties, I think NATO will dissolve as a real entity.

                              {time}  1745

  It may be a debating society, it may have a location, but I think 
that NATO will dissolve, and maybe the stability that NATO could bring 
to Europe over the long haul will be gone.
  So I am going to support the base resolution. All of the dangers that 
we see and all of the problems with this deployment or with the 
nondeployment are things that we really cannot do much about. We cannot 
change the situation, the political situation, in Kosovo. We cannot 
change the military offsets. We can do something by participating in 
this force.
  There is something we can do something about. That is to provide our 
men and women who carry out American foreign policy after debates like 
this one the wherewithal to be effective. We, the government of the 
United States, have not been doing that. Let me show the Members what 
we have been doing.
  Since Desert Storm, we have cut our military almost in half. We have 
gone from 18 army divisions to only 10; 546 naval ships to only 325 
now. We have cut another 20 since this chart was put together. We have 
gone from 24 fighter air wings to only 13 fighter air wings, cut our 
air power almost in half.
  Our mission capability, that is the capability of our aircraft to fly 
off of their runways or off their carrier decks, like the gentleman 
from California (Mr. Cunningham) used to, to fulfill our mission, 
whether bombing or recon or something else and return to that home 
base, that mission capability that I want 83 percent in the Air Force 
has now dropped to 74 percent.
  It used to be 77 percent in the Marine Corps. It is now down to 61 
percent. Mission capability used to be 69 percent in the Air Force, it 
is now 61 percent. A lot of our planes are hanging around as old hangar 
queens. They are like old hay balers that we are taking spare parts off 
of so the few we have left on the runway will work.
  Military aircraft crashes. I can tell the Members, we are now 
crashing more aircraft, some 55 in the last 13 months, 14 months, than 
we are building, along with the 55 Americans who died as pilots and 
crews in those crashes.
  Equipment shortages. We are building, and President Clinton's defense 
budget continues that this year, if we follow it, we are building to a 
200-ship Navy, down from 600 ships. The marines are $193 million short 
in basic ammunition. The Army is short about $1.6 billion in 
ammunition.
  We have aging equipment. We are living off the old equipment of the 
Reagan years. Our CH-46 helicopter is over 40 years old. The Clinton 
administration intends to fly B-52 bombers with no replacement until 
they are 80 years old.
  Personnel shortages, we are 18,000 sailors short in the Navy. We are 
going to be over 700 pilots short in the Air Force. We are going to be 
short in marine aviation, and we are down about 140 helicopter pilots 
in the Army.
  Here is something we have not been paying attention to. We have a 
13.5 percent pay gap between the people who wear the uniform and the 
people in the private sector. I want to ask all of the patriotic folks 
who have gotten up and spoken about going into Kosovo, and I am going 
to vote to go into Kosovo, to really support our troops. I am going to 
give the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Gejdenson) a substitute 
amendment that says, let us support them with a pay raise, with new 
equipment, by building military construction to house their families 
while they are gone, and maybe we will even give them a little 
ammunition go. Let us support the troops.
  The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from California (Mr. Hunter) 
has expired.
  (On request of Mr. Cunningham, and by unanimous consent, Mr. Hunter 
was allowed to proceed for 2 additional minutes.)
  Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, the Joint Chiefs have done something this 
year that they have not done in a long time. I think it is because the 
services are desperate, they are desperate for help. The 10,000 
uniformed service men and women on food stamps are desperate for help.
  They have told us what they need. The Army has come forth and said, 
we need an additional $5 billion a year just to maintain this downsized 
military of 10 divisions. The Navy has come forth and said, to maintain 
305 ships, we need an additional $6 billion a year. The Air Force has 
said, to maintain this downsized Air Force of only 13 active fighter 
wings, we need an additional $5 billion a year. The marines have said 
that to maintain this downsized Marine Corps, that now has the highest 
operating tempo of any time since World War II, we need an additional 
$1.75 billion a year. They said that on top of that they need a pay 
raise for our troops, to start cutting into that 13\1/2\ percent pay 
gap.
  If we add those together, and if we add the cost of Bosnia, which we 
should not take out of ammunition and operations and maintenance, that 
is $21.95 billion or $22 billion a year more that our service people 
need to be well-equipped and well-paid to serve our country.
  So however Members vote on these resolutions, and let me really 
commend the brilliant gentlewoman from Florida (Mrs. Tillie Fowler). I 
wish I could support her amendment. I think her conditions are 
excellent. But I am going to support the base bill.
  However Members vote on this, we should follow up very quickly with a 
series of votes, manifested in our budget and in supplemental 
appropriations bills, to provide our military what they need, so they 
can provide us what we need.
  Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. HUNTER. I yield to the gentleman from Colorado.
  Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Chairman, I will not take the 5 minutes to do it, but 
I want to thank the gentleman for presenting this picture, because that 
is the picture I wanted to present. He did it better than I could.

[[Page H1227]]

  Who is going to pay the bill for these kinds of things? If we are 
going to do them, and we are going to do them, obviously, around the 
world, who is going to pay the bill? We need to pony up and do what we 
should for our troops.
  Mr. MENENDEZ. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise to oppose the Fowler amendment and to support 
the Gejdenson amendment.
  As we have this debate in this House at this time, a time that is 
poorly timed in terms of what the national interests of the United 
States are and ultimately how that may lead to the national security of 
the United States, we simply should not be having this debate at this 
time.
  Right now, as we debate, I am sure that Slobodan Milosevic is looking 
at this debate, and how we decide today sends him a signal as to how he 
will move, and move militarily. Even before we give an opportunity for 
peace to have a chance, we snuff it out with the actions on the Floor.
  The gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Gejdenson) recognizes that the 
representatives of the respective parties are supposed to reconvene 
next week in France. We could not hold off until there was the 
opportunity for those parties to be brought together by the 
international community, led by the United States, to see if there is a 
chance to avoid countless numbers of murders, countless numbers of 
deaths? We could not give that simple opportunity for peace to take 
place? It was so compelling to proceed today?
  Mr. Chairman, this is not about enforcing our will. It is about 
enforcing, hopefully, an agreed commitment, an agreed commitment to 
peace. This is a test of NATO, and ultimately, maybe in some different 
context, at some different time, Members are going to want NATO to 
work.
  If Members do not step up to the plate now, the portion of the 
amendment offered by the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Turner) to the 
amendment offered by the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Gejdenson) 
which limits us to 15 percent, and says, in a clear message to the 
Europeans, this is clearly your problem, but we are part of NATO and we 
are going to participate in it, if Members want NATO to be put at risk, 
they will not respond.
  The Fowler amendment is ultimately, in my mind, with all due respect, 
should it pass, a death sentence to thousands of people in Kosovo, 
because in essence what we are saying by virtue of that amendment, it 
is a vote on the ultimate question, to not permit troops to be 
deployed, even before we know that in fact an agreement in which we 
would be invited in as part of NATO could take place.
  We are already sending a message to Slobodan Milosevic that in fact 
he does not have to make an agreement; go ahead, just hold out there, 
do what you want, and at the end of the day we will have that on our 
minds and in our consciences and in the national security interests of 
the United States, because the conflagration that will take place if we 
do not act under an agreed-upon peace will be incredibly dangerous to 
the United States. This is, after all, the location in which World War 
II started.
  Let me just finish by saying that I am reminded of that quote that 
said, during World War II, ``First they came after the trade unionists, 
and since I was not a trade unionist, I did not object; and then they 
came after the Catholics, and since I was not a Catholic, I did not 
object; and then they came after the Jews, and since I was not a Jew, I 
did not object; and then they came after me, and there was no one left 
to object.''
  I agree with the previous speaker, we need to assist our military. I 
think many of us are willing to put our votes there. But we need to 
make sure that we stand ready not to cast today a vote that in essence 
precipitates the chance for peace, that ends it, that gives it a blow 
before there is even a chance; and that in essence this vote that we 
will be casting, particularly on this amendment, ends up being a death 
sentence to thousands of people. We have an opportunity for peace, and 
we need to preserve that opportunity for peace.
  I urge my colleagues very seriously to vote against the Fowler 
amendment, because if not, they are already voting on the ultimate 
question; and to therefore, in voting against her amendment and giving 
peace an opportunity, then vote for the Gejdenson amendment.
  Mrs. WILSON. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  Mr. Chairman, there are a lot of thoughtful and difficult issues that 
people have been trying to address here on all sides this afternoon. I 
think there is sincerity on all sides.
  The underlying proposal that we are asked to endorse today is to 
endorse, without conditions, the indefinite assignment of 4,000 
Americans as part of a NATO force of 30,000 in the territory of a 
sovereign country with which we are not at war, and over the objections 
of that country, on the grounds that the administration of the province 
of Kosovo is not in accordance with international humanitarian 
standards.
  I am a supporter of NATO, and I am a supporter of American 
involvement in the world. In fact, I used to serve in the United States 
mission to NATO. I have worn the uniform of a member of the armed 
services. But let us not make any mistake here, this deployment is an 
extraordinary departure from what is envisioned in the NATO charter, 
and it is a departure from much of American diplomatic history.
  There are several questions that I asked myself and that I will share 
with the Members as a contribution to this debate that I think we are 
faced with answering today: What is threat to U.S. security or to U.S. 
vital national interests? Clearly, there is no threat to U.S. security 
directly, so we are talking about vital U.S. national interests.
  We have to answer this question not in some rhetorical way, but in a 
very practical, pragmatic, personal way. Put it this way: If a young 
person in the hometown of one of us does not come home from Kosovo, 
what do we tell their parents they died for? Every man and woman who 
has worn the uniform knows that there are things that are worth dying 
for. I do not believe that this is one of them.
  The administration has said that this is about maintaining stability 
in Europe. They are right, the Balkans have been a cauldron of war in 
this century. But the threat that they draw from Serbia is overdrawn. 
We are not talking about a power on the rise, as we faced in the 1930s 
in Europe, but a vicious leader in decline. It is equally probable that 
our intervention in Kosovo will itself spread the conflict beyond the 
borders of Kosovo and Serbia.
  Let there be no doubt that Milosevic is an evil man who has wreaked 
havoc on his own people, but the question must be, what is in the U.S. 
national interest, and our foreign policy must be based on that.

                              {time}  1800

  The second question is, what are the political objectives that we 
hope to achieve, and will the use of military force help us to achieve 
those objectives? In Korea, our forces are there to deter aggression 
from North Korea. In Desert Storm, our objective was to expel Iraq from 
Kuwait.
  This is unlike Bosnia where, after 3 years of war, we had exhausted 
parties ready to sue for peace, Bosnian Serbs who were being beaten 
back and who were eager to free the lines of ethnic enclaves where they 
were.
  In Kosovo, we have two groups, two ethnic groups that claim the same 
territory. There are no enclaves. Into this, we are thrusting U.S. and 
NATO forces with no lines to be defended. There is no clear objective. 
We are the beginning of a political process, not a peacekeeping 
operation, as has been suggested.
  Third, what is the size and the structure of the military force, and 
is it adequate? What are their rules of engagement, and are these all 
clearly defined? If they are not, not one American should go in not 
understanding exactly what the rules of engagement are.
  If a 19-year-old kid confronts a KLA member who refuses to give up 
his or her weapon, what is that 19-year-old kid to do? Do they walk 
away? Do they fight? Until we have the answers to basic questions like 
that and are confident that our troops know what to do, they should not 
go in.
  Kosovo is a much more dangerous situation than we faced going into 
Bosnia. We need to recognize those risks there and mitigate against 
them. There are too many unanswered questions on a deployment of 
questionable national

[[Page H1228]]

interest, and I cannot support the underlying amendment.
  Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  Mr. Chairman, I stand here today, not as a Democrat, and I hope that 
my colleagues do not stand there as Republicans, and I would ask all of 
our colleagues, indeed, to question why do we stand here. What is this 
all about? What are our values? Where do we fit in this world?
  We think sometimes about heroes. Indeed, what are heroes? A hero is 
usually an ordinary person who steps out of the crowd, having no gain 
for himself, and tries to stop a maddened mob from destroying somebody 
else's life and interjects himself into the fray. These are some of the 
values that we try to impart to our children. We should not mind only 
our own business, we should be trying to help other people.
  I have heard the question asked over and over again by so many 
colleagues on both sides of the aisle, what is in the U.S. interest? 
What are we as a country? I think there is probably not a person in 
this body who would dispute the fact that they would like to see the 
U.S. recorded in permanent history as a Nation that is both mighty and 
just. What is the purpose of our might if we do not use it for good? Is 
justice not just a state of mind unless we use it for the greater good?
  I have been, most of my life, a passivist, opposed to so many of the 
things that so many of my friends have supported. This is a time for 
peace. This is a time to use our might and our strength and the unique 
position that the United States of America is in today for good, for 
something decent, to help save the lives of people in a place so far 
away, where human beings have been destroyed, where ethnic cleansing 
has taken place, where genocide has existed. Is that not in the 
American interest?
  Mr. Chairman, I come from a very small people, a people who, in our 
lifetime, were almost totally annihilated by forces of evil. So much of 
the world turned its back. Oh, they had excuses. We did not know. We 
did not see. We did not believe. No one told us.
  We have been disabused of those excuses, Mr. Chairman, today, because 
we know what is going on and what has gone on and what will go on 
unless the forces of justice and reason somehow intervene.
  It was not until the world intervened and democratic countries 
stepped up to the plate that the people that I come from were 
liberated, snatched from the jaws of death in concentration camps.
  So many of the countries, including the United States, for whom all 
of us are so grateful, stepped up to the plate because it was in 
America's national interest, and to do the right thing.
  So many of us and so many others took an oath when that happened, Mr. 
Chairman, that said, never again, never again were we going to allow 
something like this to happen. We swore this to ourselves, and we swore 
this to our God. Others swore along with us.
  What does that mean? Did we mean this only for ourselves? Did we mean 
that we would step up to the plate only if we were going to be wiped 
out? I do not think so, Mr. Chairman.
  The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from New York (Mr. Ackerman) 
has expired.
  (By unanimous consent, Mr. Ackerman was allowed to proceed for 2 
additional minutes.)
  Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Chairman, we could not mean that only for 
ourselves, because that would be ingenuous. Never again will I want to 
remind my friends who have said that, which include probably everybody 
in this House, that never again is upon us yet again.
  What is it that we are to do? Are we to shrug our shoulder? Are we to 
examine costs? Are we that people that would let others die unjustly, 
unpleasantly, because we are cheap, because we are thoughtless? I do 
not think so. This is the time to act in the interests of justice and 
in the interests of peace lest the notion that we are a mighty and just 
Nation be but an illusion.
  Mr. CALLAHAN. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  (Mr. CALLAHAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. CALLAHAN. Mr. Chairman, I will admit I am in somewhat of a 
dilemma. I have spoken to this House in situations such as this on 
several occasions during Desert Storm, when we first sent our troops 
into Bosnia, and now here we are back again this year talking about a 
similar situation.
  I read with interest, and in great depth the resolution of the 
gentleman from New York (Mr. Gilman), and I know that we are talking 
about probably a substitute or an amendment to the substitute of the 
gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Gejdenson).
  But, Mr. Chairman, in reading the original resolution, I find myself 
in a State of confusion because I do not know what to do. Certainly no 
one can disagree in the first part original resolution that this may be 
cited as peacekeeping operation. I agree with that. Certainly the part 
that the Congress makes the following findings about the conflict in 
Kosovo causing human suffering. I agree with that. The government of 
Serbia and the representatives of the peoples of Kosovo may reach some 
agreement soon. I agree with that.
  Then it says President Clinton has promised to deploy 4,000 troops to 
Kosovo. I disagree with that. But it is correct. When I was approached, 
as chairman of the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, Export Financing 
and Related Programs of the Committee on Appropriations, I disagreed 
with the President about sending our troops into Kosovo. I have 
expressed this to him. I have expressed it to the Secretary of State 
and to the Secretary of Defense.
  That is my prerogative as a Member of Congress, just as it is my 
colleagues' prerogative to introduce the amendments and the resolutions 
as they have today.
  But I think it is a very serious mistake for us to send at this time 
a message to the world and to the people negotiating the hopeful peace 
agreement that ultimately will be arranged whereby we can provide some 
vehicle for peace in Serbia and whereby the Albanians and the citizens 
of Kosovo can someday live in harmony.
  I disagree with the President. But I agree with the mission he is 
trying to undertake, and that is to reach some type of peace agreement 
before he sends the troops in there. If they reach a peace agreement, 
he is going to send the troops in there. If they do not reach a peace 
agreement, he is going to send the troops in there.
  The Constitution and this Congress has given the Administrative 
Branch of government the authority to do that. So we are not here 
saying let us change the authority. We are expressing a message that 
could be interpreted by Milosevic or by any of the principles of 
disagreement as an advantage to his side.
  For us to hamstring the President, to hamstring our negotiations I 
think at this time is a very serious error that we should not be doing 
that. At the same time, if I vote for the agreement, the original 
resolution that we have, it indicates that I am supportive of sending 
troops into Kosovo, which I am not.
  So I think that this is ill-timed. I do not know what I am going to 
do, but I expressed myself on the floor here today. I think a simple 
``present'' vote will convince the people of the district I represent 
that I am concerned, as they are, about where we are headed.
  But I am concerned, as they are, that the Constitution of the United 
States of America leaves foreign policy to the President of the United 
States, and that Congress is the check and balance.
  I did not vote for Bill Clinton in the last election, nor the time 
before. But a majority of the people of the United States of America 
did. As a result, we gave him the authority to be the Commander in 
Chief of our armed services. We cannot deny him the authority that is 
granted to him in the Constitution.
  So I think I am going to vote ``present.'' It is not an indication of 
lack of support. It is an indication that is not the correct time to be 
debating this when they are in negotiations trying to resolve a peace 
agreement.
  So my message is, to my colleagues, is that I applaud their 
willingness to stand and express their views. But I think this Congress 
is making a mistake to be handling a resolution about this matter at 
this time.
  To the President, I will tell him I still do not support sending 
troops to Kosovo.

[[Page H1229]]

  Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number or 
words.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise to oppose the Fowler amendment. I absolutely 
agree with the last speaker. Let me tell my colleagues, I want to make 
quite clear where I come from. I regard Mr. Milosevic as a sociopath. 
If I had my way, NATO would have gone after him a long time ago. I 
think he ought to be tried as a war criminal. I think he is one of the 
most useless leaders to ever walk on the face of the earth. That is 
what I think about him when I am in a mild mood.
  But let me tell my colleagues my problem today. My problem is that I 
totally agree with what the administration is trying to do in the 
region, but I am not happy, frankly, with their implementation.

                              {time}  1815

  I think they have not accurately gauged the position of the Russians 
in this situation, and I think that they misjudged the reliability of 
the Kosovars. And under those circumstances, I am not convinced, while 
I agree with what they are trying to negotiate, I am not yet convinced 
that their negotiating partners have demonstrated enough maturity to 
rely on them in a sensitive situation like this.
  My problem is, like the gentleman from Alabama, I believe this should 
not be here today. And the reason I say that is this: I think it is 
here because a lot of us have a fundamental misunderstanding of our 
constitutional role. You can make a very respectable argument that we 
ought to have a vote before we do something such as bomb Mr. Milosevic. 
I would vote for such an explicit action. I think he has got it coming, 
and I think NATO needs to lead and we need to lead NATO. But I also do 
not believe that this Congress has any business whatsoever interposing 
its judgment on questions that involve the President's Commander-in-
Chief responsibilities.
  With all due respect to the Fowler amendment and the Gejdenson 
amendment, both of which I will vote against, there is not a Member on 
this floor who has any qualification whatsoever to say what our troop 
levels ought to be in a peacekeeping situation. The most dangerous 
human being on the face of the earth is a Member of Congress who has 
taken a 3-day trip somewhere and thinks that they have learned enough 
to tell the entire country what we ought to do on a crucial issue. Nine 
times out of ten they are more of a menace than a help.
  I do not believe we have the personal expertise to make military 
decisions. I want the Joint Chiefs of Staff to decide what the level 
ought to be, if we do have a peacekeeping force. I do not want that 
decision made on a political basis by the Congress or the White House. 
And I certainly do not want it made on the basis of a budgetary 
question.
  I do not want to have to look into the eyes of any more parents and 
explain why their sons or daughters were killed in an operation. And 
sometimes, to protect those sons and daughters, we need more troops not 
less. I happen to think that this is probably one of those cases.
  So I am going to vote against the Fowler amendment. I am going to 
vote against the Gejdenson amendment. I will not vote for the Gilman 
resolution because I do not believe in giving Presidents blank checks, 
and I am not going to endorse an agreement until I know what it is and 
until I have had an opportunity to gauge the reliability of the people 
that we are negotiating with.
  But I also will not vote against it today, because if we vote against 
it, we help assure that those negotiations will not come to a 
constructive conclusion. And that is why, like the gentleman from 
Alabama, I will vote present. Because until we have an agreement to 
judge, Congress has no right to muck things up when the result will be 
lost lives.
  Mr. PAUL. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  (Mr. PAUL asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. PAUL. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the Fowler amendment and 
in opposition to H. Con. Res. 42.
  Today we are going to have a vote on whether or not troops should be 
authorized to go to Kosovo. If we vote in favor of this, we are voting 
for war. This is not a war resolution in the conventional sense of the 
Constitution, but in this day and age it is about as close as we are 
going to come to since we have ignored the Constitution with regards to 
war powers essentially since World War II. If we vote for troops to go 
to Kosovo, we are complicit in a potential war and the responsibility 
should be on the shoulders of those who vote to send the troops.
  I strongly urge that we not send the troops. It is not our fight. We 
are not the policemen of the world. It weakens our national defense. 
There are numerous reasons why we do not need to send more troops into 
another country someplace around the world. Every time we do this it 
just leads to the next problem.
  It is said that we should not have much to say about foreign policy 
because the Constitution has given responsibility to the President. The 
term ``foreign policy'' does not even exist in the Constitution. The 
President has been given the authority to be the Commander-in-Chief; to 
lead the troops after we direct him as to what he should do. He is the 
commander. We do not have a military commander, we have a civilian 
commander. But we do not forego our right to debate and be concerned 
about what is happening on issues of troop deployment and war.
  A report put out by those who sponsor this resolution had this to 
say. ``This measure does not address the underlying question of the 
merits or misgivings of sending U.S. forces into Kosovo.'' We are not 
even supposed to debate the merits and misgivings of sending troops. 
Why not? ``Instead, the purpose of this resolution'' they go on to say, 
``is to give the House an opportunity to fulfill its constitutional 
responsibility of authorizing the deployment of U.S. troops into 
potentially hostile situations.'' In other words, we are to do nothing 
more than rubber stamp what the President has asked for.
  Where does the President claim he gets his authority? Does he come to 
us? Has he asked us for this? No, he assumes he has the authority. He 
has already threatened that what we do here will have no effect on his 
decision. He is going to do what he thinks he should do anyway. He does 
not come and ask for permission. Where does he get this authority? 
Sometimes the Presidents, since World War II, have assumed it comes 
from the United Nations. That means that Congress has reneged on its 
responsibility.
  We do not just give it to the President, we give it to the President 
plus the United Nations or NATO. And when we joined NATO and the United 
Nations, it was explicitly said it was not to be inferred that this 
takes away the sovereignty and the decision-making powers of the 
individual countries and their legislative bodies. And yet we have now, 
for quite a few decades, allowed this power to gravitate into the hands 
of the President.
  After Vietnam there was a great deal of concern about this power to 
wage war. First, we had Korea. We did not win that war. Next we had 
Vietnam. And with very sincere intent, the Congress in 1973 passed the 
War Powers Resolution. The tragedy of the War Powers Resolution, no 
matter how well motivated, is that it did exactly the opposite of what 
was intended.
  What has actually happened is it has been interpreted by all our 
Presidents since then that they have the authority to wage war for 60-
90 days before we can say anything. That is wrong. We have turned it 
upside down. So it is up to us to do something about getting the 
prerogative of waging war back into the hands of the Congress.
  It is said that we do not have this authority; that we should give it 
to the President; that he has it under the Constitution based on his 
authority to formulate foreign policy. It is not there. The Congress 
has the responsibility to declare war, write letters of marks and 
reprisals, call up the militia, raise and train army and regulate 
foreign commerce. The President shares with the Senate treaty power as 
well as appointment of ambassadors. The President cannot even do that 
alone.
  We have the ultimate power, and that is the power of the purse. If 
the power of the purse is given up, then we lose everything. Because we 
have not assumed our responsibilities up until this point, it is up to 
us to declare that

[[Page H1230]]

the President cannot spend money in this manner. I have legislation 
that would take care of this; that the President cannot place troops in 
Kosovo unless he gets explicit authority from us to do so. If he does 
it, the monies should be denied to the President, unless we want to be 
complicit in this dangerous military adventurism.
  Mr. RODRIGUEZ. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words and oppose the Fowler amendment in favor of the Turner amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, why are we debating this issue at this point in time? 
We all recognize that it is political; politics that could come back to 
haunt us.
  One of the biggest problems we have in Congress is the fact that we 
have an obligation and a duty. The only reason to debate this 
resolution today is to undercut the administration at the critical time 
of our negotiations. It is more than irony that some of those pushing 
for consideration of this resolution today fully intend to oppose the 
resolution. This is an exercise in rhetoric.


                             Point of Order

  Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Point of order, Mr. Chairman.
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman will state his point of order.
  Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Mr. Chairman, is it improper, either in the full 
House or in the body, to characterize the reasons for why different 
people vote for things; to characterize and impugn?
  Mr. RODRIGUEZ. Mr. Chairman, I apologize if I have offended anybody.
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman will suspend.
  The Chair will simply state that it is improper debate to question 
the personal motives of any Member.
  Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Mr. Chairman, I will not demand the words be taken 
down, but I would ask the gentleman not to characterize.
  Mr. RODRIGUEZ. Mr. Chairman, if I have offended anybody, I apologize. 
But as a member of this Congress, I recognize the fact that politics is 
played within the House floor, and I recognize that this particular 
resolution does undermine the administration's efforts at this point in 
time.
  As a Member representing a community of more than 42,000 active duty 
service members and nearly 6,000 reservists and guard members, I do not 
take this issue lightly because the lives of those service members may 
be put in harm's way.
  I deplore the timing of this resolution. This resolution is being set 
up for failure. At least 2,000 people have been killed and 400,000 
displaced in the Balkans region. The United States clearly has a vested 
interest in peace in the region. Kosovo and the Balkans fall in between 
two allies, Greece and Turkey. The Balkans' historical role in Europe 
has been critical. We all recognize that we also have in jeopardy 
Macedonia, Montenegro, Northern Greece, Albania, as well as Turkey, and 
the possibility of this particular situation going out of its 
boundaries.
  Our interests are humanitarian, economic and military, and also an 
interest as it deals with the leadership of this country and the fact 
that we have not only an obligation but a duty to make sure that peace 
is obtained. By playing politics with sensitive peace negotiations that 
are set to resume March 15, the House of Representatives could 
jeopardize peace in the region. Failure to achieve peace now in Kosovo 
could cause significant instability in the already volatile region.
  Secretary of State Albright stressed this point yesterday before the 
House Committee on International Relations saying that a new outbreak 
of fighting in Kosovo could expand into regional hostilities that could 
cause massive suffering, displace tens of thousands of people, 
undermine stability throughout South Central Europe, and directly 
affect key allies.
  If we can secure peace, if we can end the slaughter, we have the duty 
to do so. If we can join our NATO friends and allies by providing those 
4,000 troops as part of the large NATO force, then we have the duty to 
do so. The failure to obtain peace now could put greater numbers of 
potential U.S. and European troops in danger if broader hostilities 
break out.
  Our Nation's modest personnel but crucial political investments in 
the Kosovo peace process is essential to achieving peace. Without the 
U.S. involvement, peace is unlikely. Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues 
to support this resolution.
  I also want to add, Mr. Chairman, that this is very different from 
Bosnia, and it is very different from Bosnia in the sense that in 
Bosnia we took the lead. Here only 14 percent of the troops will be 
from the United States. Europe is taking the lead, and we have an 
obligation and a duty, Mr. Chairman.
  Mr. BATEMAN. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  Mr. Chairman, I hopefully will not take the 5 minutes, but let me 
express to my colleagues the deep, deep anguish I feel in what we are 
doing and how we are doing it. I cannot rise in support of the base 
amendment, the Gilman resolution, nor the Gejdenson amendment to it, 
nor the amendment of my dear friend the gentlewoman from Florida (Mrs. 
Fowler), or substitute.
  Much has been said about the timing of why we are here and that we 
should not be here at this time. I agree with that, but I am not sure 
that I attach the responsibility for that fact the way others have done 
so. If our President had assured us that, upon being able to negotiate 
an agreement, he would come to us and seek our approval for going 
forward with military deployments in Kosovo, it would have been the 
time for this debate to have taken place, after the agreement had been 
reached.

                              {time}  1830

  I almost certainly would have been one of those who would have 
supported doing what he asked if there was an agreement we could look 
at and know what it provided and that it was a bona fide agreement. But 
here we are with the certainty that he would not come to the Congress 
and yet he does not have an agreement and we do not even know whether 
or not at such time somebody in Paris signs their names to a stack of 
papers that it will indeed be an agreement of anyone.
  How do you say you have the agreement of the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia when you are saying, ``If the Kosovo Albanians sign it and 
you don't, we're going to bomb you.'' Now, I am not sure that that is 
an agreement. How do we know that anyone who purports to be 
representing the people of Kosovo has any authority to represent the 
people of Kosovo? The chief political observer of the Kosovar 
Liberation Army left Paris and criticized those who even entertained 
the notion of signing the agreement. We do not have any basis for 
knowing that this agreement is real. If it is not real, then we have 
put ourselves in a very tenuous position to say that we will deploy 
American armed forces in the sovereign territory of another state 
against its will and conduct bombing or other military action. That 
certainly is an act of war. That requires us to declare it. It makes us 
an international outlaw if it has not been done that way and we do not 
in fact go there by agreement.
  I do not like the fact that this debate is taking place now. But for 
anyone to say this Congress does not need to have a debate on matters 
of this kind and of this consequence I think denigrates the role of 
this Congress in the governance of the United States of America. I do 
not want to be in a position where someone has deployed forces, my 
constituents, and to have to go back to the people I represent and say, 
``Well, they've been sent there because we didn't think that the 
Yugoslavia Federal Republic had given Kosovo sufficient autonomy, but 
we certainly didn't send them there to fight for the independence of 
Kosovo.'' Those kind of subtle distinctions certainly escape me. I 
think they will escape my constituents. I wish this debate came later, 
when the President could say there is an agreement and we could test 
whether it was real and then support him. But unfortunately we are not 
in that position. I frankly do not know whether we are going to find 
anything that is going to be before us in the course of this debate 
that I will be in a position to vote for.
  Mr. TRAFICANT. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  I wonder if we vote not to deploy troops in Kosovo if the President 
would abide by it. I thought the gentleman from New York (Mr. Ackerman) 
made a good statement. I would like to concur.

[[Page H1231]]

 There is a reason for United States support in the region. Maybe the 
most important reason is genocide. The world took genocide lightly once 
before and we should not do it again. But what bothers me is we have 
been turning aside from this dilemma since 1986 when there was an 
intelligence report that said there is only going to be two dynamics 
that come out of Kosovo: We will either press the Serbs for 
independence for Kosovo or there will be a revolution and there will 
ultimately be a great entanglement.
  I believe we must support the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo who are 
being brutalized. But the gentlewoman from Florida (Mrs. Fowler) brings 
a good question to the House. How do we do it? She says we should not 
deploy troops, we should use air strikes, logistics, intelligence and 
other means of identifiable support. There is a lot of sense to that. I 
think it is time for Europe to stand up for Europe. We may be the 
superpower, but by God we are not the only power.
  Let me say one last thing. I want to commend the Speaker for this 
debate. We have been debating war, ladies and gentlemen, after wars 
have been engaged. If these are peacekeepers, we ought to send the 
Peace Corps. If these are police actions, we ought to send the D.C. 
police. These are potential wars.
  I am going to support helping in our cause in Kosovo. But I am going 
to vote for the Fowler amendment. In addition, if the Fowler amendment 
should fail, I will support Gejdenson, because I think this thing is 
going to be passed. But I will then offer an amendment to Gejdenson 
that says no troops shall be deployed unless all Serb troops are 
removed from Kosovo on the schedule of which Rambouillet would require. 
Number two, that if Milosevic violates the agreement, it is to be 
understood that NATO strikes in Serbia at military installations will 
be immediately commenced. And, number three, that any suspected war 
criminal shall be investigated and, if necessary or warranted, 
apprehended and tried by an international tribunal.
  In closing out, let me say this. I have left out the question of 
independence, because we do not have enough guts yet, but I will make 
this point to you. Milosevic has laughed in our face. Unless there are 
some terms in that agreement, we will have failed. Ninety-three percent 
of the population of Kosovo is ethnic Albanians. Milosevic has lost the 
moral authority to lead. So I am willing to back up on that. But not on 
the war crimes and not on other conditions. And if this bum violates it 
again, by God, we should codify it into law that action will be taken.
  Mr. BLUNT. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  Mr. Chairman, we have heard a number of times here today that the 
Congress should not be acting on this question yet. It is amazing to me 
that of our NATO allies, the members of the Bundestag can debate this 
question and vote on it, the members of the Parliament can debate this 
question, but the Members of the U.S. Congress cannot debate this 
question.
  I have heard here a number of times today that we should be waiting 
until there is a final agreement. Mr. Chairman, I am confident that 
every effort has been made to get assurances that if there was a final 
agreement, that the Congress would be consulted after that final 
agreement and before troops were deployed, and those assurances are not 
there.
  Yesterday, before a committee of the House, the Secretary of State 
said that this is not a good time for the Congress to be debating this 
issue. But then she went on to say that there is never a good time for 
the Congress to debate these issues because we just get in the way of 
diplomacy. That is not the role of the Congress as I see the role of 
the Congress in the Constitution and many others do. I am grateful for 
the Speaker's decision to provide this debate. Too many times, the 
Congress has said we will wait until the decision is made and the 
decision is made and the commitment is made so quickly that then we 
have a decision of whether we are going to support troops in the field, 
not to whether those troops would be in the field or not.

  There are questions that this House has an obligation to ask right 
now. Dr. Henry Kissinger, the former national security adviser, the 
former Secretary of State, gave some insightful testimony before the 
House Committee on International Relations yesterday. He said there is 
a critical question to be asked, under what circumstances should 
American military forces be used to pursue national objectives and what 
should those objectives be? Should American military might be available 
to enable every ethnic or religious group to achieve self-
determination? If Kosovo, why not East Africa? Why not Central Asia? Is 
this part of our policy?
  I think there are questions that this Congress has to ask in regard 
to Kosovo. Why would we be there if we are there? What is our goal in 
Kosovo? I understand that part of the goal is to get Serbia out of 
Kosovo without getting Kosovo out of Serbia. I submit to the Congress 
that that is a very difficult goal to achieve. How will we know when we 
have done it? We have been in Bosnia now for years and the checklist 
that we had hoped to be checking off, we cannot check any of the boxes 
yet. We are no closer to leaving Bosnia than we were the day we went 
into Bosnia. And what is the cost to our armed forces? What is the cost 
of our ability to defend America around the world?
  I thought the gentleman from California (Mr. Hunter) made an 
incredibly effective presentation with the wrong conclusion. The 
presentation was the diminution of our military forces, our military 
readiness, our military benefits, our military research, our 
development of new weapons, and then one of the main reasons for that 
is this willingness to commit troops, to commit our defense capacity 
without any end in sight. We need to ask what that end is. There may in 
fact be a better way for the Congress to take up this issue. I would be 
fully in favor of the administration negotiating this question and then 
coming to the Congress and say, ``Here is what we have negotiated. What 
do you think?'' That has not happened time after time after time. We 
have sought assurances it would happen this time. There are no 
assurances forthcoming. For all those who say now is not the time, I 
would say to them, there will not be a time if we wait for the 
administration to determine when the Congress should be involved in 
this because, as the Secretary of State said yesterday, it is really 
never helpful for us to discuss these issues.
  The President and the Secretary of State should be asking for our 
approval. We need to be partners in this kind of policy. I rise in 
support of this amendment and to encourage the administration to fully 
involve the Congress in its future activities before they are 
completed.
  Mr. BLAGOJEVICH. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number 
of words.
  Mr. Chairman, of the hundreds of votes we cast in this Chamber each 
year I believe money is more important than the issue of deploying our 
troops abroad and placing them in harm's way. While I believe it is 
fully appropriate for Congress to have a voice in the crucial 
decisions, I also know that there are some in this debate who are 
motivated by questions of domestic politics rather than foreign policy. 
They want to score political points at the President's expense and I 
think that is regrettable. This important debate over the nature and 
extent of our military involvement in the Balkans should be driven by 
long-term national interests, not short-term political considerations.
  It is on the basis of our long-term national interests that I oppose 
the resolution to authorize the President to deploy American troops to 
Kosovo. I am not pleased to find myself at odds with a major foreign 
policy initiative of my President. But I come to this position based on 
a close evaluation of U.S. foreign policy in the Balkans. Mr. Chairman, 
the Balkans are a complicated, dangerous area. For six centuries Kosovo 
has marked the confluence of three vastly different cultures. Since the 
first battle of Kosovo in 1389, these cultures, Western, Slavic and 
Islamic, have clashed violently at this very spot. These battles are 
not over something so simple as land or even as valuable as mineral 
rights. Instead they are battles in which each party believes they are 
guided by heaven in a fight for the future of their people.
  The current war in Kosovo is no different from those that have 
preceded

[[Page H1232]]

it. The fall of the Soviet empire did not write a new chapter in the 
history of the Balkans. As much as it repeated one that came before 
with the fall of the Hapsburgs and before that with the fall of the 
Ottoman Empire. Kosovo belongs less to the end of our century than to 
the beginning, and the motivations of the combatants are the same as 
those in previous battles.
  Though technically begun by one man, Slobodan Milosevic, who reflects 
on little more than his own greed, it is being fought by two peoples 
convinced of their own imminent destruction. These people believe the 
sword is the only option to preserve their own life and, barring that, 
their only honorable path to death.
  Putting U.S. troops on the ground in Kosovo is not a recipe for 
peace. It is a recipe for disaster. The history of the Balkans has only 
marginally been kinder to its inhabitants than it has been to 
outsiders. Placing U.S. troops in the middle of this conflict will not 
bring an end to the killing but instead draw Americans into it.

                              {time}  1845

  We have put our troops in this position before in places such as 
Lebanon and Somalia, and while peacekeeping is a noble task, it works 
only when there is a peace to keep. A signed piece of paper between two 
peoples who see no options, but war is not peace.
  Our troops are going into Kosovo with no clearly defined mission and 
no exit strategy. We have already seen this pattern in Bosnia. We were 
originally told our troops would be in Bosnia for 6 months. Almost 4 
years later they are still there with no end in sight, and, unlike 
Bosnia, this conflict in Kosovo would inevitably be far more difficult 
and dangerous to American forces.
  What happens if we begin to incur casualties? Will we fall victim to 
mission creep? Will we deploy troops to defend Macedonia? Albania? And 
Bulgaria? The unique and tragic history of the Balkans teaches us that 
these battles grow into wider conflict, and when outsiders are drawn 
into it, they are drawn into it and cannot get out.
  I do not shy away from the use of military force to protect our 
Nation's vital interests, and I do not deny that the war in Kosovo is a 
tragedy that grips our Nation's conscience. In this sad world of ours 
there are many tragedies around the globe: Turkey's war with the Kurds, 
Russia's battle with the Chechens, China's war on Tibet. Yet no one 
suggests that we intervene in these conflicts and for a simple reason. 
Many American soldiers would die in vain.
  Instead of elevating Milosevic as a savior for his people, we should 
be working to undermine him and make Serbia a democracy.
  In Serbia today, pro-democracy groups such as the Alliance for 
Change, the Council for Democratic Change and the Democratic Party of 
Serbia struggle to build an open society without us taking notice. This 
must change.
  Tomorrow in Independence, Missouri, the success of our policies 
elsewhere in Europe will be ratified when Poland, Hungary and the Czech 
Republic officially join NATO. Let us use this occasion to acknowledge 
the serious flaws in our Balkan policy. More troops are not the answer.
  Let me say again this is a difficult vote for me and I regret it is 
taking place at a crucial time in ongoing negotiations. But the fact 
remains I cannot in good conscience support sending our young men and 
women in uniform into harm's way without clear, achievable goals.
  Mr. KASICH. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  Mr. Chairman, I believe that the single greatest challenge in foreign 
policy as we head into the next century is our ability to define vital 
national interests of the United States.
  There are many people that are concerned about this debate today 
because they take a look at some of the terrible violence that goes on 
around the world, and they say how can the United States not intervene 
in the face of that?
  Mr. Chairman, if we try to pick and choose those areas in the world 
where we will intervene based on the power of television, I think we 
will not be able to make good choices.
  The fact is whenever the television stations focus their cameras on 
violence in one particular part of the world and brings that violence 
to our attention, then it seems as though a case is being made and gets 
made within this administration, and frankly on this floor, that the 
United States has a vital interest or has an interest in order to stop 
the violence.
  The fact is, as we look around the world, when we look at the plight 
of the Kurds, when we look at the tragedy, the ongoing tragedy, in 
Sierra Leone, when we consider the plight of the people in Afghanistan, 
and Sudan, and in Somalia, and in Indonesia, the list goes on and on to 
demonstrate man's inhumanity to man.
  But what is the responsibility of a great power? How does a great 
power decide where to go?
  When I came on the floor earlier today, I heard somebody talking 
about how much they hated the violence and the tragedy that was ongoing 
in Kosovo, and yet then I heard another speaker stand and say:
  But how can we put American forces in harm's way where somebody is 
going to have to call somebody's mother or father and explain why 
somebody lost their lives?
  This is not a question of whose heart is bigger. This is a question 
of what is in the best interests of a national power to in the long run 
do what is in the best interests of world peace and world security.
  The fact is there are some benchmarks and some landmarks and some 
compasses and some guiding stars that I believe can allow us to make 
the prudent decision. The first and most important question is: Is it 
in the vital national interests of the United States? Can we in fact be 
able to define specifically and with great credence exactly why it does 
benefit us? And frankly combined and intertwined right with that 
struggle to define the vital national interest comes right with it the 
need for the American people to support our involvement.
  Now I have been in the Congress, now starting my 17th year, and we 
have faced this issue over and over again, and it is not a matter of 
partisanship. I remember the debate on this floor when Ronald Reagan 
committed us to Lebanon, a place where we saw great ongoing tragedy 
every night on the national news, and we went frankly because we 
followed our hearts in order to rescue people from violence, and at the 
end of the day we lost a great number of marines and we left because we 
were never able to define Lebanon in the vital national interests of 
the United States with the combined support of the American people. I 
voted against Ronald Reagan that day on the floor in regard to Lebanon.
  There is another third issue that involves not just the vital 
national interests and whether the American people support our efforts, 
but do we have an achievable goal? Do we have something that is an 
objective that is likely to succeed? And if, in fact, we look at what 
the goals are and they are ill-defined, as they were in Lebanon and, I 
believe, as they are in Kosovo, then all the committing of forces in 
the world will not achieve our goal, our objective, if it is not clear 
and if it is not achievable.
  And in addition to that, what is the timetable? The timetable is one 
where it is always easy to get in. The question is what is the exit 
strategy? How do we get out after having achieved our goal? Mr. 
Chairman, if we consider these notions of is it in the vital national 
direct interests of the United States, does the commitment have broad 
support among the American people, is there an achievable goal and is 
there a timetable to go in and get out; if the answers to those 
questions are not all in the affirmative, then I believe the United 
States makes a huge mistake by committing itself. In Lebanon we engaged 
ourselves in a civil war.
  The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Kasich) has 
expired.
  (By unanimous consent, Mr. Kasich was allowed to proceed for 3 
additional minutes.)
  Mr. KASICH. Mr. Chairman, look. We got involved against Saddam 
Hussein because we were able to explain the vital direct national 
interests of the United States, we were able to get the support of the 
American people and we had a good timetable. We made a mistake in 
Lebanon, we made a mistake in

[[Page H1233]]

Somalia in the middle of a civil war. See, the fact is that when we 
engage in conflicts that represent ethnic strife or civil wars where 
there is not a clear American interest, and an achievable goal and a 
timetable to get in and get out, what happens is a superpower entangles 
itself all over the globe, and George Washington warned us in the 
beginning of his administration, at the beginning of our country, that 
a great power that entangles itself in too many places in the world 
will diminish itself.
  So the challenge for the United States is to literally define the 
direct national interests of the United States whenever we go and for 
our leaders to gather the support of the American people, and to have a 
good goal and to have a good timetable. Short of that, short of being 
able to answer those questions affirmatively, then the United States 
needs to preserve its power, because in preserving its power and at the 
same time using it successfully, we will enhance a great power. To use 
it wantonly around the world without answering this affirmatively will 
diminish us over time.
  I believe that the gentlewoman from Florida (Mrs. Fowler) is right 
tonight. We should not make a commitment to go to Kosovo to engage in a 
civil war, an ethnic conflict. I believe over time that these kind of 
commitments will diminish us rather than strengthening us and will not 
serve the peace and the security of people across the world as we would 
want them to be served.
  Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. KASICH. I yield to the gentleman from Florida.
  Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. I am just curious if my distinguished 
colleague has any concern for our credibility in the NATO alliance and 
whether or not our decision here would impact that alliance.
  Mr. KASICH. Mr. Chairman, I would say to the gentleman from Florida 
that we spent 40 years training our NATO allies to work against the 
Soviet Union moving across the Fulda gap with an incredible display of 
armor and lethality. I believe that the Europeans in this case, if they 
want to go into Kosovo, they should go, they should make that decision. 
The United States could offer them technical support.
  But I believe this is foremost their job, this is in their direct 
national interest, but not in the direct national interests of the 
United States. We can participate in indirect ways to offer the 
technical support they would need, but for us to be involved in the 
bombing and the committing of troops on the ground is not in our vital 
national interests, I do not believe the goal is achievable, and 
frankly I do not even know what the goal is over there as defined by 
the administration, and finally, I just do not think there is a 
timetable that gets us out.
  Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from 
Ohio.
  Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the Fowler amendment with the 
greatest respect for the maker of this motion. I oppose the amendment 
on the grounds of its substance and find the timing of it most 
unfortunate.
  In doing so, though, I want to praise the chairman of the Committee 
on International Relations, the gentleman from New York (Mr. Gilman), 
and the ranking member, the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Gejdenson), 
for their participation on the floor today. I would say for their 
leadership in bringing this issue to the floor, but I do not think that 
this issue should be on the floor today. Having said that, I applaud 
them for their impressive presentation on why we should be supporting 
the President's policy in Kosovo and why we should be opposing the 
Fowler amendment here today.
  I also want to commend my colleague the gentleman from Texas (Mr. 
Turner) for his very wise amendment to the Gejdenson amendment and hope 
that this House will give it its fullest consideration when the 
opportunity comes.
  Mr. Chairman, other speakers this evening have said that Kosovo, is a 
very difficult decision. Well, Kosovo is a very difficult and dangerous 
place, and we are sent here, after all, to make the difficult 
decisions. I, for one, do not think that we, Congress, has a role in 
voting on whether the President should send peacekeepers into a region, 
so I do not think that this debate is a necessary one, and I think 
again that the timing of it is unfortunate.
  What is happening in Kosovo is a challenge to the conscience of our 
country, what is happening in Kosovo is a challenge to the future of 
NATO. I would say to our colleague the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Kasich) 
that it is in our vital national interest, it is in our vital national 
interest to support NATO. Indeed the United States is so much a part of 
NATO that NATO is not effective without U.S. participation.
  I would have hoped that we could have had the administration bring 
the negotiations to fruition. There can be no agreement without 
American troops on the ground. The Kosovars would never agree to any 
peacekeeping force that did not include American troops. There can be 
no agreement without NATO in Kosovo, and NATO will not go in without 
U.S. troops. So our involvement is fundamental to any agreement about 
keeping the peace in Kosovo.
  I said earlier that Kosovo is a challenge to our conscience. Just a 
few years earlier Bosnia was, and over 200,000 people were killed 
there. I wondered when I was a child and first learned about the 
Holocaust and read ``The Diary Of Anne Frank'' as a teenager, I 
wondered how did this ever happen? Didn't anybody know? Why didn't 
anybody do anything about it? And when the Bosnian situation came 
along, I could see how it happened. People knew, people cared, but 
people did not want to get involved.
  Before the 2,000 people who have been killed, 2,000 plus in Kosovo, 
grow to a greater number, I hope that we can be smart about this and 
support the reasonable negotiations that would involve U.S. troops on 
the ground. Two thousand people were killed there, many of whom are 
women and children. There have to be certain recognitions. As I have 
said before, there is no effective NATO without U.S. participation.

                              {time}  1900

  There is no effective peace agreement without U.S. participation of 
troops on the ground, and the other recognition is that Milosevic the 
ruthless president of Serbia, as we know, and is a ruthless killer. He 
has an endless appetite for killing people. So it is not a question of 
his conscience ever being challenged.
  We cannot count on any balance, on any reason, on any humanitarianism 
springing from the other side. It must spring from NATO and, again, the 
U.S. is almost synonymous with NATO now.
  I talked about the timing, and I want to return to that, Mr. 
Chairman, because I think that this is really unfortunate. The 
President of the United States is bringing a message of compassion and 
humanitarianism to Central America after the most disastrous natural 
disaster in this hemisphere. Over thousands of people killed, millions 
of people made homeless, thousands without jobs, economies wiped out.
  The President is bringing the compassion of the American people 
there. That is an appropriate mission for the President. The Secretary 
of State is joining him. The Secretary of Defense is out of the 
country, and we bring up a resolution to undermine their efforts in 
Kosovo.
  I urge my colleagues to oppose this ill-timed resolution.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  (Mr. GILMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I first want to commend the Members on both 
sides of the aisle for the dignified and calm way and thorough way in 
which they have conducted the debate on this important measure, and I 
also commend Speaker Hastert for arranging this debate. I think it is 
extremely important that we have had this opportunity to voice our 
views, both pro and con, with regard to the commitment of troops to 
Kosovo.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise with some reluctance to oppose the amendment 
offered by the gentlewoman from Florida (Mrs. Fowler). I understand 
that the gentlewoman from Florida (Mrs. Fowler) is offering this 
amendment because she is genuinely concerned about the effect of NATO 
peacekeeping missions in the

[[Page H1234]]

Balkans on our troops and on our military readiness.
  To a degree, I share some of those concerns. Nevertheless, in the 
interest of preventing hostility in Kosovo, I must rise in opposition 
to the Fowler amendment.
  My main concern is that the situation there is fluid, and regrettably 
the Fowler amendment would lock us in an inflexible position of having 
to decline outright our participation with our NATO allies in bringing 
peace to Kosovo. Accordingly, I rise in opposition to the Fowler 
amendment. I believe U.S. participation in this NATO peacekeeping 
mission is an essential ingredient for peace in Kosovo.
  Mr. MICA. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support this evening of the Fowler 
amendment. If we look at the Fowler amendment it really does not 
prohibit United States assistance to stop the bloodshed that we see in 
this region of the world.
  My colleagues, I do not think there is anyone who serves here among 
us that would like to see another person die, another person harmed, 
would like to see the continuation of tragedy in that part of the world 
that we have witnessed on television, we have witnessed in media 
accounts. We all want to see that end, but, my colleagues, we have been 
there and we have done that before.
  I have only served 6 short years in the House of Representatives, but 
from the time I came to first serve here we have seen what has happened 
under this administration. Again, I reiterate and recite the experience 
of Somalia. It started out as a humanitarian mission, a compassionate 
mission, and we were sucked into this conflict.
  If we look at the newspaper just a few weeks ago, we will see that 60 
people were killed in Somalia; that, in fact, our policy failed there, 
our efforts failed, and the killing goes on.
  We spoke from the well here about Haiti, about a policy relating to 
Haiti. We spent $3 billion. We are the most compassionate government 
and Congress on the face of this Earth to try to bring peace and order 
and stability to Haiti and other nations. I say that tonight Haiti is 
just as unstable as it has ever been and, again, we have turned from 
one set of dictators to another set of dictators.
  We saw the example of Rwanda and how this administration failed to 
act when we had the greatest genocide in the history of my lifetime, my 
short lifetime, that only after continuous pleas of the United Nations 
were rebuked. I spoke here on the Floor of the House and others did 
asking that the United Nations be allowed to send a pan-African force 
with no American troops there to stop the situation from turning into a 
disaster. We knew what was going to happen, and this administration 
blocked that effort.
  In Bosnia, we heard about the quarter of a million people who have 
lost their lives there. I have been to Sarajevo and I have looked 
across the parks in Sarajevo that now have the white crosses of the 
tens of thousands who died.
  Why did they die? They died because of the failed policy of this 
administration. They did not come to the rescue of the people when they 
needed it. A quarter of a million had to die and advisors from this 
administration, who we talked with, resigned in disgust.
  They kept people from protecting themselves in that region, and that 
is why we had that quarter of a million die.
  We were promised time and time again here that our troops would be 
gone, thousands of troops gone, and we still have 6,000 to 8,000 troops 
in that area and we were told when we visited there recently that, 
again, it takes 10,000 to support the several thousand that we now have 
there years later.
  So, yes, we want to stop violence.
  Does nation building work? Sometimes a thousand years of conflict 
cannot be resolved by our troops or our fine efforts.
  Tonight, as we are here enjoying the comforts of the United States, 
there are 30 armed conflicts in the world. There are people dying 
throughout the world for various reasons in almost every hemisphere.
  Can the United States be the policeman of the world? I say that we 
cannot. Can we support organizations like the United Nations, who 
should go in and take actions? Yes, we should. Should we support NATO? 
Yes, we should. Have we helped NATO over the years to build forces to 
resolve conflicts in the European theater? Yes, we have.
  We have been good neighbors. We have tried to assist but, again, we 
have been there, we have done that.
  Let me say finally why we are in the situation in Kosovo, and that is 
again because of a failed policy by this administration.
  Mr. OLVER. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise at this point to speak in favor of the Gejdenson 
amendment but also to say that I think the original amendment, the 
Gilman amendment, is an acceptable alternative.
  I would prefer that we were not doing this. I think tonight the 
timing is not exactly right, but we are doing it. So in those terms I 
would ask that we remember the history that has gone on; who it is we 
are dealing with and what the history of those dealings have been in 
the period of time that Slobodan Milosevic has been the leader of 
Yugoslavia.
  I ask us to remember that Milosevic attacked not one but two members 
of the United Nations in 1991 and 1992, both Croatia and Bosnia, and it 
was the regular Yugoslav Army, not indigenous folk, who attacked and 
destroyed the ancient and beautiful city of Vukovar after a 2-month 
siege, and in the aftermath of that siege the slaughter included people 
who were pulled out of the hospital, men and women pulled out of 
hospital beds and slaughtered at the end of that siege.
  Their crime was that they happened to live in an area that Milosevic 
wanted to add to Serbia, but their other crime was that they were Roman 
Catholics.
  Then I ask us to remember that Milosevic deployed his regular 
Yugoslav army, that that was the instrument by which the overwhelming 
Muslim cities and towns in the Drina River Valley in eastern Bosnia 
were ethnically cleansed in early 1992. That was when the major ethnic 
cleansing occurred, early in 1992.
  Their crime was that they were in a part of Bosnia that Mr. Milosevic 
wanted to add to Serbia. Their other crime happened to be that they 
were Muslims. So they were ethnically cleansed, which meant that they 
were either killed or driven out.
  I ask us to remember Srebrenica, crowded with refugees, whose only 
crime really was to have taken the U.N. seriously when the U.N. said 
that Srebrenica would be a safe haven, but, of course, they also 
happened to be Muslims. They, 8,000 men and boys, every male in that 
community, when it was overrun, was slaughtered like pigs in a 
stockyard.
  I ask us to remember that Milosevic signed the Dayton Accords in 
1995, after it was clear that the tide was running against him. That 
has been a remarkably successful deployment as peacekeeping. The only 
area, the major area, where it has been unsuccessful is because 
Milosevic has violated all of the terms of the Dayton Accords that 
related to allowing refugees to return.
  I ask us to remember that Milosevic signed agreements in regard to 
Kosovo only four months ago and has violated every one of those 
agreements. There is no difference between the policy that the 
Milosevic regime has put forward either before or after those signings 
back in October. So there have been thousands of people killed and 
another 400,000 refugees have been sent around in various places in 
Europe.
  It is that history, that history of dealing with this what my ranking 
member on the Committee on Appropriations called the psychopathic, 
psychotic, one of those words, whichever one it was, nature of the 
leader that we are dealing with.
  With all of that history, it is the contact powers that have come 
together and empowered NATO, suggested that they go in and create an 
atmosphere for peace. NATO has not moved quickly. Those contact powers 
have not moved quickly before in Yugoslavia and it is only because of 
the history, the 10 years now virtually of history in dealing with that 
regime, that they are now acting. I think that it would be a tragedy if 
we did not support their capacity to act at this time.
  It is not our part, nor any part, nor any intent of that effort on 
the part of

[[Page H1235]]

NATO, to give Kosova independence. What is intended is to stop the 
killing. It is a mission designed to stop the killing, to impose peace.
  The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. 
Olver) has expired.
  (By unanimous consent, Mr. Olver was allowed to proceed for 2 
additional minutes.)

                              {time}  1715

  Mr. OLVER. Mr. Chairman, I hope in that process, I think everyone 
hopes in that process, if an agreement can be reached, that it will be 
possible to see if those people can live together, can live and coexist 
together. After all that has gone on, all of the repression of the 
Albanian ethnic majority, now 93 percent of the population of Kosovo is 
Albanian ethnic citizens of the origination of Yugoslavia, from some 
time ago, whose autonomy was taken away, and the very policies that 
Milosevic has followed has led to more Serbs leaving Kosovo. So it is 
93 percent Albanian.
  But I think also, now, in the last year of the 20th century, we ought 
to look at this century and see that early in this century there was a 
peaceful divorce of two nations put together, two peoples put together 
by an agreement that had been made after a war earlier. The Swedes and 
the Norwegians in 1905, they peacefully divorced. Not a single person 
was killed in that process. At the end of this century, we have seen 
the Czech Republic and Slovakia. They were united. There was no 
separated sovereignty, there was only one sovereignty. They decided to 
peacefully divorce, and there was not a single person killed in that 
process.
  We should be seeking ways of developing a peaceful divorce here, if 
that is what it comes to, and if it is clear that those people cannot 
live together peacefully and in fairness and in justice, which is what 
clearly we are trying to have 3 years to be able to develop over a 
period of time.
  So I hope that the Gejdenson amendment will be adopted, and if not, 
the Gilman underlying amendment, either is acceptable, to allow that 
kind of policy to go forward.
  Mr. BLILEY. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise reluctantly to oppose the gentlewoman from 
Florida (Mrs. Fowler), my good friend whom I almost always agree with, 
but she is wrong. We cannot back out of this. If we do, we might as 
well back out of NATO.
  The Europeans cannot do this without us. We have to be there. It is 
not pleasant. I would just as soon we did not have to be there. 
However, we need to remember, World War I started in the Balkans, and 
if we do not participate, the Europeans will not participate without 
us. I serve in the NATO Parliamentary Group, I have for the last 15 
years. They have made it clear that without us, they will not be there. 
Then, the fighting will continue. We will see the ethnic cleansing 
going on that we saw in Bosnia. We will see on the evening news the 
body bags, the atrocities, and the Kosovars, who are lightly armed in 
comparison to the Serbs, will call on their Albanian colleagues and 
brothers to come to their defense, and we will begin to have a widening 
war in the Balkans.
  Is it in our interests? You bet. It is in our interests if for no 
other reason but for humanitarian reasons to make sure the slaughter 
does not go on. Far more than that, what it means to the future of the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the most successful defense group 
in the history of the world, it would be a tragedy.
  Has the administration fumbled? Has it failed to come forward as they 
should have long ago to explain to the American people and to the 
Congress why it is absolutely necessary that we participate? You bet. 
The fact is, that is water over the dam. We are here at a crucial 
point. We need to make sure that we do our part.
  Mr. Chairman, 4,000 troops out of a contingency of 28,000 or more is 
a small price to pay for peace. Would that we had had 4,000 troops in 
1934 to boost up the morale of the French and the British when Hitler 
broke the Treaty of Versailles and moved back into the Saar. We might 
have had a far different historic turnout.
  Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite 
number of words.
  Mr. Chairman, I wish to underscore and associate myself with the 
remarks of the previous speaker, the distinguished gentleman from 
Virginia.
  Mr. Chairman, as an internationalist, I believe that the United 
States can and should intervene when a country violates international 
law and commits crimes against humanity. It is shameful that we waited 
as long as we did to intervene during World War II and the more recent 
genocides in Bosnia and Rwanda.
  Yesterday, before the Committee on International Relations, Senator 
Dole put the question, how many murders make a genocide? Mr. Chairman, 
do we wait until the deaths in Kosovo number hundreds of thousands as 
opposed to the 2,000 to 3,000, or do we intervene earlier? Europeans 
with whom I have discussed Kosovo are truly perplexed. I have had an 
occasion to discuss it often with my colleagues in Europe and the 
responsibility that I happily undertake as a rapporteur of the First 
Committee which deals with politics and security in the Organization 
for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Four times a year I have 
traveled to those meetings for the last 3 years and talked constantly 
about this particular problem.
  Mr. Chairman, my colleagues in other bodies in Europe cannot fathom 
how any thinking person can oppose efforts to craft a solution to this 
enormous human conflict. This is not a local problem. Objective 
observers agree that the conflict could draw in Albania and Macedonia, 
threaten NATO allies Greece and Turkey, divide the NATO alliance, 
undermine NATO's credibility as a guarantor of peace, jeopardize the 
fragile situation in Bosnia, and initiate a massive refugee movement 
throughout Europe.
  The President is not considering a particularly large American 
presence. I believe that all of us know that he anticipates sending 
less than 4,000 Americans to join 28,000 in the NATO force. Included in 
the 28,000 will be 8,000 British soldiers, and 6,000 Germans. The fact 
that the Germans are planning to send ground troops is not 
insignificant; it is a testament to the importance of this issue for 
all of Europe and all of the world.
  America is truly the greatest country in the world. But perhaps 
because we are so large and diverse, we are often conflicted about our 
place in the world. Every time a post-Cold War Congress has had to 
consider committing United States troops to places such as Haiti or 
Rwanda or Bosnia or Iraq, it has been difficult to garner sufficient 
support from Congress. But we cannot expect to be a world leader, 
actually the only real superpower, without participating in 
international operations. We demand that the rest of the world cherish 
our democratic values and that NATO and the United Nations intervene in 
conflicts that we deem important. But when we are called upon to 
participate in missions which were not initiated by us, we balk.
  For many years, the goal of our foreign policy was the dissolution of 
the Communist system. We ultimately achieved success, but the erosion 
of communism created power vacuums around the world. We did not foresee 
the problems that would be created, and now that we can see them, we 
are unwilling to do anything to heal the fissures. While communism in 
its original form may be largely dead, it has been substituted in some 
places with brutality and instability. We seduced the Communists. We 
said, our way is better. It works. Come with us, we will help you. The 
people looked to the West, saw us and saw that it was good, so they 
took our advice. In some places, our example has worked. In the 
Balkans, it has not. Rather than help, some of us are prepared to close 
our eyes. We are telling them that they are on their own. It is your 
problem, not ours, we are saying.
  Well, I do not agree. It is our problem. And if this resolution fails 
today, we will leave our President and Commander in Chief flapping in 
the wind, along with the people of Kosovo, and we should be ashamed.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Calvert). The time of the gentleman 
from Florida (Mr. Hastings) has expired.
  (By unanimous consent, Mr. Hastings of Florida was allowed to proceed 
for 1 additional minute.)

[[Page H1236]]

  Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Chairman, let me tell my colleagues why 
we should be there. Our credibility in the NATO alliance is at stake. 
The fact that two Presidents have put forward our position very 
plainly, and the work of the contact group, this did not come about in 
a vacuum. Russia even agrees with the contact group that this peace 
agreement should be given a chance to go forward, the work of the 
Organization of Security and Cooperation that has 2,000 people on the 
ground now and an extraction force. Finally and most importantly, we 
must make clear to the world that we will oppose genocide any time, 
anywhere.
  Last night on ABC News, seven little boys stood without their mother 
and father in Kosovo who had done nothing but go somewhere to look for 
food. I stand here to say that I am committed with those seven children 
in the hopes that somewhere along the way we can provide what is 
necessary for peace and stability through our efforts in the NATO 
alliance to ensure that they grow up and, yes, become just as free as 
all of us in this great country.
  Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. I yield to the gentleman from Missouri.
  Mr. DEAL of Georgia. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite 
number of words.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the Fowler amendment. There are 
many uncertainties regarding the consequences of our action on this 
resolution, but there is no uncertainty, however, about the historical 
reaction of the American people when our citizens, either civilian or 
military, are killed by foreign powers. Whether it is the slaughter of 
Americans at the Alamo which led to war with Mexico, the sinking of the 
Lucitania in 1915 and the loss of 123 American lives that led to our 
involvement in World War I, or the bombing of Pearl Harbor and the loss 
of hundreds of American personnel that resulted in our entrance into 
World War II, one thing is constant. Our Nation will go to war when we 
believe our citizens have been killed by others without reason.

                              {time}  1930

  So therefore, what are we prepared to do if our soldiers are killed 
in Kosovo? To say that such has not occurred in Bosnia is no guarantee 
that it will not happen here. It is altogether appropriate to ask other 
questions, such as the scope of the mission, the duration of the 
engagement, and the exit strategy, none of which can be answered with 
any degree of certainty.
  I am more concerned about our escalation strategy. Do we really 
believe that the killing of American soldiers will not result in more 
than 4,000 soldiers being sent to Kosovo? Will we abandon our 
historical reaction to such events? National pride would say we dare 
not do so.
  Therefore, even though there are many unanswered questions, there is 
one question to which we do know the answer, the question, what will 
the United States do if Slobodan Milosevic and his forces kill our 
troops? The answer, we will respond with greater force to avenge their 
deaths, and the mission will escalate.
  Therefore, I oppose sending troops to Kosovo. Let us not forget the 
lessons of Vietnam, which many Members of this body have said include 
that of nonintervention in the internal affairs of another Nation. We 
should never use our military forces as bait to arouse national 
indignation when a bloody dictator takes the bait.
  If our purpose is to take out Milosevic, then we should have the 
political courage to do so with overwhelming force. We should not 
deceive ourselves about the dangers to our troops by calling it a 
peacekeeping mission, in an effort to simply make ourselves feel good. 
We should not go to Kosovo.
  Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise against the amendment offered by the gentlewoman 
from Florida (Mrs. Fowler). It is bad policy. It leaves America sending 
a clear signal that here tonight, on the floor of the United States 
House of Representatives, America is telling the President and the 
Europeans to abandon hope in Kosovo, that America is not going to 
participate; and do not try to take any other view of this, if America 
does not participate then there will be no agreement.
  We can look at history, we can look at recent history in Yugoslavia. 
The Bush administration I think correctly began with the assumption 
that as the Soviet Union had dissolved, that there was no longer one 
monolithic Communist State there to affect our smaller European allies 
and that they would handle Yugoslavia. For months and years America did 
nothing, and women and children died, over 200,000, as the world stood 
by yet again.
  What will happen in this new conflict? Tonight on the news we see 
more people heading for the hills, leaving their homes under the threat 
of death and destruction.
  This President has had some great strengths, and I disagree with the 
Republican whip, one of them has been foreign policy. In Haiti, when 
President Clinton was elected, we had boatloads of Haitians rushing the 
shores of America, overpowering the social services of the States to 
our south. We have put an end to that. Is it paradise yet? No, but it 
was a long way from paradise when President Clinton was elected.
  In Iraq, yes, we have not gotten rid of Saddam Hussein, and President 
Bush, with all the armies of the world there, also did not get rid of 
Saddam Hussein.
  Members look for exit strategies and end dates. Again, if we used 
that strategy at the end of World War II in confronting Soviet 
expansionism, the Soviets would merely have taken out their calendars 
and said, yes, the Americans have come to Berlin to protect Western 
Europe, and they will do so for 90 days, a year, 2 years? And what 
would they have done?
  I say the same thing here today. When we talked about burden-sharing 
for over a decade in this House and more, we never dreamed that there 
would be an action in Europe where American forces represented 15 
percent or less. The Europeans are taking on the largest responsibility 
they have ever undertaken in these exercises.
  Defeat the proposal of the gentlewoman from Florida (Mrs. Fowler). 
Pass one of the proposals that are before us today. Many of us would 
have preferred to have had this debate on another date. But to leave 
this Chamber tonight without giving support to our policymakers to end 
the killing in Kosovo is wrong and irresponsible. Defeat the 
gentlewoman's amendment.
  Mr. PORTER. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  (Mr. PORTER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. PORTER. Mr. Chairman, perhaps no one has been more critical of 
the President's foreign policies than I have. In China, in northern 
Iraq, and in Turkey, the United States has done nothing to cover itself 
with glory, and much to be ashamed of.
  In fairness, I would have to say that the President has had some 
victories, Northern Ireland for one, and Bosnia; yes, Bosnia, where the 
proud representatives of the United States military, in small numbers, 
are keeping the peace, and are teaching people who have not really ever 
known it tolerance and understanding; and have done so, I might add, 
without casualties, because Slobodan Milosevic will not respond if the 
United States stands tall and strong.
  So I have no case to make for this President's foreign policy 
generally.

[[Page H1237]]

 The President has failed to adequately consult the Congress in respect 
to Kosovo, and he also, I think it is fair to say, deserves great 
criticism for permitting the conditions in Kosovo to deteriorate to the 
point at which we find ourselves today.
  Clearly no one, including the United States, can force parties to a 
peace who want to engage in war. Clearly, no deployment can be made 
before there is a signed peace agreement.
  However, Mr. Chairman, the defeat of this resolution or the passage 
of the Fowler amendment would be a victory for Milosevic. The butcher 
of Bosnia, the author of the bloody ethnic cleansing and genocide, will 
win if we do nothing.
  We are the world's strongest Nation. We are the beacon of hope to 
oppressed peoples everywhere. We must stand up to our responsibilities. 
We cannot expect Europe to do it. They do not have political unity. We 
do.
  I believe that if we do not stand up in Kosovo for what we believe in 
as a people, NATO itself will suffer the consequences. We have right 
now the Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, Bob Dole, Richard 
Holbrooke. They are providing leadership. They are working for peace. 
If we defeat the resolution, we will pull the rug out from under our 
peacekeepers, our peacemakers.
  I would commend all of our colleagues in the House to the report of 
the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Frank Wolf). He was just there in 
February. He visited Albania and Macedonia as well. He spent 5 days in 
the region. No one has given more of his time, no one has gone more 
miles, no one has cared more deeply, no one has worked harder for peace 
on behalf of the world's oppressed peoples than the gentleman from 
Virginia (Mr. Frank Wolf). He has studied extensively the history and 
what is happening in the region. I recommend that every single Member 
read his report. It really tells us what we need to know.
  I agree with what the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Wolf) believes: Do 
not prevent the opportunity for a peaceful resolution of the Kosovo 
conflict. Support peace. Blessed are the peacemakers. Support the 
resolution.
  Mr. Chairman, I include for the Record the report of the gentleman 
from Virginia (Mr. Wolf).
  The report referred to is as follows:

 Statement by U.S. Representative Frank R. Wolf--Report of a Visit to 
  the Balkans--Kosovo: The Latest Balkan Hot Spot February 13-18, 1999

       This report provides details of my trip to Albania, 
     Macedonia and Kosovo during mid-February, 1999. This visit 
     occurred during the time the Serb-Kosovo Albanian peace 
     conference was taking place in Rambouillet, France, and ended 
     only a few days before the contact group's initially imposed 
     deadline to reach agreement of February 20. There is every 
     indication that the U.S. will be concerned with Kosovo for 
     some time to come and it was important to have a clear, 
     first-hand view of conditions there.

       I have, for many years, had a deep interest in the Balkans 
     and concern for the people who live there. I have traveled 
     numerous times to the region. There has been hostility, 
     unrest and turmoil for hundreds of years. It has been said 
     that there is too much history for these small countries to 
     bear. If this is so, it has never been more true than today.
       During this trip, I spent one day in Tirana, Albania, where 
     I met with the U.S. Ambassador Marissa Lino and her embassy 
     staff; Albanian President Meidani; Prime Minister Majko; 
     cabinet ministers; the Speaker and other members of 
     parliament; religious leaders, and heads of Non-Governmental 
     Organizations (NGOs) active there.
       I spent parts of two days in Skopje, Macedonia, where I met 
     with embassy Deputy Chief of Mission and Charge d'affaires 
     Paul Jones; Political Officer Charles Stonecipher; members of 
     the Macedonian parliament; former Prime Minister and 
     President of the Social Democratic Union (opposition 
     political party) Branko Crvenkovski; American soldiers 
     assigned to United Nations forces guarding the Macedonia-
     Kosovo border, and the commander and men of the NATO Kosovo 
     verification and extraction forces as well as representatives 
     of NGOs in Macedonia.
       In Kosovo for a day and a half, I met with head of mission 
     Ambassador William Walker and senior adviser to ethnic 
     Albanian elected President Ibrahim Rugova, Professor Alush 
     Gashi. I also met with Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA/UCK) 
     spokesman Adem Demaci (who previously spent 26 years in Serb 
     prisons) and senior Serbian representative in Kosovo, Zoran 
     Andelkovic. Other meetings included NGO representatives, head 
     of the Kosovo office of the U.N. High Commissioner for 
     Refugees (UNHCR), and other officials and representatives. 
     Our outstanding and most able escort was State Department 
     Foreign Service Officer Ronald Capps. We also stopped at a 
     Serb police barracks and met with the officer in charge. We 
     met individual members of the KLA and with a number of 
     individual Kosovars who had returned to their villages after 
     having been driven out by Serb attacks. Some villages were 
     largely destroyed and remain mostly deserted.
       The fate of Albania, Macedonia and Kosovo, which border one 
     another, is interrelated. Albania has a population of about 
     two million people. Macedonia's population of two million 
     includes about one third ethnic Albanian. About 90 percent of 
     the nearly two million people in Kosovo are also ethnic 
     Albanian.
       Kosovo is the southernmost province of present-day Serbia 
     and has a centuries long history of conflict, turbulence and 
     hatred. By 1987 Serbian dominance in the region had been 
     established, Slobodan Milosevic was President and ethnic 
     Albanian participation in government was virtually 
     nonexistent.
       In response, ethnic Albanians in 1991 formed a shadow 
     government complete with president, parliament, tax system 
     and schools. Ibrahim Rugova was elected president and has 
     since worked for Kosovo independence through peaceful means.
       By the mid-1990s, the ethnic Albanian population in Kosovo 
     had grown to nearly 90 percent as human rights conditions 
     continued to go down hill with the Serbs in total control of 
     police and the army. Many, if not most, individual Serbs also 
     have weapons as opposed to ethnic Albanians for whom 
     possessing a gun is against strictly enforced law. Beatings, 
     harassment and brutality toward ethnic Albanians became 
     commonplace, particularly in villages and smaller towns.
       In 1996 the shadowy, separatist Kosovo Liberation Army 
     (KLA) surfaced for the first time, claiming responsibility 
     for bombings in southern Yugoslavia. KLA efforts intensified 
     over the next several years, government officials and alleged 
     ethnic Albanian collaborators were killed. The Serbian 
     government cracked down and violence has escalated since.
       I met with a number of KLA members. Most of them are 
     everyday people, farmers, storekeepers, workers and such who 
     were driven to the KLA by the constant brutal action of the 
     Serbs. There are, no doubt, some bad people in the KLA 
     including thugs, gangsters and smugglers, but most are 
     motivated by a hunger for independence. Still, it must be 
     recognized that some acts of terrorism have been committed by 
     the KLA.
       Conditions in Kosovo continued to deteriorate and alarm the 
     international community. In October 1998, under threat of 
     NATO air strikes, Serbian President Milosevic made 
     commitments to implement terms of U.N. Security Council 
     Resolution 1199 to end violence in Kosovo, partially withdraw 
     Serbian forces, open access to humanitarian relief 
     organizations (NGOs), cooperate with war crimes investigators 
     and progress toward a political settlement.
       As part of this commitment, in order to verify compliance, 
     President Milosevic agreed to an on-scene verification 
     mission by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
     Europe (OSCE) and NATO surveillance of Kosovo by non-
     combatant aircraft. These activities are in progress and NATO 
     has deployed a small extraction force in next door Macedonia. 
     I visited with each of these groups.
       However, conditions in Kosovo have not stabilized and more 
     have been killed. Finally, a contact group with members from 
     the U.S., Great Britain, France, Russia, Italy and Germany 
     issued an ultimatum to the sides to reach a peace accord by 
     February 20, 1999. NATO air strikes against targets in Serbia 
     were threatened if Belgrade did not comply.
       The Serbs consider Kosovo the cradle of their culture and 
     their orthodox religion and are not willing to give it up. I 
     visited the Field of Blackbirds where the Serbs battled for 
     and lost control of the region in 1389. I also visited a 
     Monastery dating back to 1535 that is an important part of 
     Serb history.
       The Clinton administration, which does not favor 
     independence for Kosovo, worries this conflict could spread 
     if NATO does not intervene and could even involve Turkey, 
     Bulgaria, Albania and Greece. While this is of concern, there 
     are other reasons for the U.S. to remain active. The U.S. can 
     never stand by and allow genocide to take place. Part of the 
     effort, once a peace agreement between the Serbs and ethnic 
     Albanians has been signed, could include a NATO ground force 
     in Kosovo containing a contingent of U.S. troops.
       It is clear that a main pipeline for arms reaching ethnic 
     Albanians in Kosovo is across the Albania-Kosovo border and 
     any stabilization effort will likely include shutting off 
     this arms route. It has been suggested that an effective arms 
     blockade could be accomplished by the Italian government from 
     the Albanian side of the border with Kosovo.
       A number of issues must be addressed before the outcome of 
     this conflict can be predicted. Principal among these is the 
     likely strength and stability of an ethnic Albanian led 
     Kosovo government. Another is the economic potential of a 
     stand-alone Kosovo, free from Serbia. Also important is what 
     will be the future of the KLA? Will they give up their arms? 
     Many in the KLA say ``no''. Could an independent Kosovo make 
     it on its own? Political ability has not been demonstrated. 
     Economic development help from the private sector in the West 
     may not be immediately forthcoming. How would they

[[Page H1238]]

     be propped up? How will long term cross border hatred between 
     Serbs and ethnic Albanians be kept in check? Who is going to 
     foot the bill for all this? European nations?
       How and by whom will the issue of war crimes be addressed? 
     A terrible job on this issue has been done in Bosnia. Known 
     war criminals have not been pursued after more than three 
     years. Reconciliation is an important ingredient to lasting 
     peace but terrible acts have been committed and justice must 
     be served. The principal perpetrator of injustice and 
     brutality has been Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic. What 
     about him?
       The White House and the present administration are 
     deserving of some sharp criticism for allowing conditions to 
     get where they are today.
       There appear to be few lessons this administration has 
     learned from the painful experience of Bosnia. Our government 
     waited too long to get involved and, once engaged, has been 
     somewhat ineffective. Too many died in Bosnia during this 
     delay. While committing troops to the region for one year 
     (now over three years with no end in sight) has indeed halted 
     killing, at least temporarily, Bosnia is no further along 
     toward peaceful self sufficiency than when troops arrived. 
     Rather, it is as though there is merely a pause in time. If 
     our troops leave, hostility and brutality would likely 
     resume. Little infrastructure is being created. Railroads are 
     not running. Little economic development or growth is 
     emerging. No lasting plan for peace has been developed and no 
     interdependent community has been created which would make 
     undesirable, a return to conflict. Little has been done to 
     bring about reconciliation.
       Meanwhile, as we look at our overall U.S. military 
     capabilities throughout the world, we see that this 
     administration has drawn down U.S. military strength to the 
     level where there are now insufficient forces to meet 
     today's needs. When I met with our soldiers in the Balkan 
     region I found many who have gone from one deployment to 
     another without time to be home with their families. The 
     troopers I met on the Kosovo border are assigned to a 
     battalion on its third deployment in three years.
       There are no better soldiers anywhere in the world than 
     these and their morale is high. They are ready to do what is 
     expected of them and more. But they are not being treated 
     fairly. Pay and benefits have been allowed to deteriorate. 
     The tempo of operations has grown to the point where they 
     have too little time at home. There are just not sufficient 
     forces to do all the things they are expected to do. 
     According to the February 17, Washington Post, the Secretary 
     of the Army's answer is to lower standards and recruit high 
     school drop-outs. Turning his back on history, this official 
     has unwisely decided upon another social experiment rather 
     than dealing fairly with the shortfall.
       From 1990 to 1998 the armed forces went from 18 active army 
     divisions to eight. The navy battle force went from 546 ships 
     to 346. Air force fighter wings decreased from 36 to 20. 
     Discretionary defense budget outlays will decrease 31 percent 
     in the ten years beginning 1990. Service chiefs predict FY 
     1999 ammunition shortages for the army of $1.7B and $193M for 
     the marines. These statistics are just the tip of the 
     iceberg. There is compelling evidence that, in the face of a 
     huge increase in troop deployments (26 troop deployments 
     between 1991 and 1998 by the army's own count), this 
     administration has not made the investment to give our 
     fighting men and women the tools to do the job asked of them.
       The fact that the men and women in uniform are bending to 
     their task is to their credit, but it is past time to give 
     them what they need and stop driving them into the ground. 
     The White House must face up to this shortfall and address 
     the issue of where the money to pay for our involvement is to 
     come from. They have not yet done so and time is short.
       A strong NATO involvement, with solid U.S. participation, 
     will be an important part of any workable solution to this 
     mess. There is a story making the rounds of NATO forces where 
     an American general, about to depart the region asks his NATO 
     counterpart how many U.S. troops must remain to ensure safety 
     and success of the mission. The NATO commander responds, 
     ``Only one, but he must be at the very front''. This is only 
     a story told in good humor but it makes the point that U.S. 
     presence is key--perhaps vital.
       It is not without irony that the one key player omitted 
     from the contact group meetings in France is a NATO 
     representative. The irony deepens when the presence on the 
     contact group of chronic problem-makers Russia and France is 
     noted.
       Frankly, the U.S. Congress has also had too little 
     involvement in this Balkan process. The administration has 
     done and continues to do a poor job in dealing with these 
     issues. Consultation with the Congress does not appear to 
     have been a major concern to the White House. While foreign 
     policy is largely the prerogative of the President, American 
     lives are being placed at risk in a far-off land and untold 
     dollars are being committed to this effort. Congress has a 
     role and must participate in this debate. Congressional 
     hearings to explore all aspects of this situation are in 
     order.


                    conclusions and recommendations

       1. If there is a signed peace agreement in Rambouillet, it 
     could be necessary to commit U.S. troops to the Kosovo peace 
     effort. I make this recommendation with reluctance but, 
     without U.S. troops, peacekeeping won't work. The U.S. is 
     both the leader of the world and of NATO. If NATO is 
     involved, we must be a part of the effort or it will fail. 
     NATO's 50th anniversary is later this spring and there will 
     be a large celebration in the U.S. Kosovo will be a big test 
     for this important alliance.
       2. There are many differences between the situation 
     existing several years ago in Bosnia and what is happening 
     today in Kosovo. Still, thousands died in Bosnia including 
     too many women and children before NATO troops including a 
     large contingent of U.S. soldiers moved in and put an end to 
     the killing. Had not NATO peacekeepers acted over three years 
     ago, the killing might still be going on today. Without the 
     commitment of U.S. troops, a NATO peacekeeping intervention 
     might not even have been attempted. We may wish this were not 
     so, but it is. Perhaps things can change in the future but 
     this is today's reality.
       3. U.S. troops are stretched too thin and are not being 
     treated fairly. Pay and allowances are inadequate, the tempo 
     of operations is far too high (we just need a larger military 
     force to face the tasks they have been given) and we are not 
     giving our first class military men and women the tools they 
     need to do the job. The administration needs to take better 
     care of our soldiers, sailors, marines and airmen. Congress 
     should force this issue.
       4. Special attention must be paid to the Kosovo Liberation 
     Army (KLA). While many, perhaps most, are common people whose 
     interest is defending their families, their homes and 
     themselves, the army is not without a rogue element. There 
     is no clearly established and proven civilian government 
     and there is no line of authority/responsibility between 
     the KLA and a representative government. Without control, 
     the KLA could get out of hand.
       5. When peacekeepers arrive in Kosovo, one of their first 
     tasks must be to disarm the KLA. Many in the KLA have said 
     they will not give up their weapons. An armed KLA will be a 
     time bomb in the way of progress toward peace. Providing 
     safeguards for Serbs in Kosovo is an important part of the 
     peace process.
       6. Efforts thus far to build a lasting peace in Bosnia have 
     come up short. Not only must more be done there but the 
     lessons learned must be applied to Kosovo. The military 
     presence in Bosnia has done the job of ending killing and 
     brutality as it likely will in Kosovo, but the peace-building 
     effort of reconciliation and creating an interdependent 
     society and effective marketplace and economic trade system 
     has not gotten off the ground.
       7. Lasting peace in the Balkans will not occur while 
     Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic is in power. A just and 
     permanent way for him to step down must be found. The longer 
     he remains, the longer turmoil, unrest and killing will 
     continue in eastern Europe.
       8. American and other workers and officials of all nations 
     present in Kosovo (diplomats, United Nations, NGOs, contract 
     workers, humanitarian care-givers and others) are true heros. 
     They risk their lives daily to make life a little better for 
     the people in Kosovo and we should all pray for them. I 
     happened to see a warning sign posted in a U.N. office 
     talking about mines. In part, it said. ``There is strong 
     evidence to suggest some police posts have had anti-personnel 
     mines placed near them . . . . All staff are asked to be 
     extremely cautious when in the vicinity. . .'' Yet these men 
     and women go about their daily duties with dedication and 
     care for others in spite of the harm that is just a step 
     away.
       9. The foreign policy of this administration continues to 
     come up short and is deserving of sharp criticism. America is 
     the one remaining superpower and, like it or not, must assume 
     this responsibility. Unfolding events continue to point to 
     the absence of a coherent idea of what to do and how to do 
     it. While we should have already developed a peace-making 
     strategy and an exit strategy, the participants at 
     Rambouillet remain unable to even get things started.
       10. President Clinton has done a poor job of making the 
     case to the American people for U.S. involvement in this 
     conflict which also has a significant moral aspect to it. 
     While the U.S. cannot be involved all over the world, we are 
     a member of NATO which deals with peace and stability in 
     Europe. Kosovo is a part of Europe and its destabilization 
     could create a huge refugee population there. Fighting could 
     even break out elsewhere if this issue is not dealt with 
     early and effectively. America has been blessed with peace 
     and prosperity. In the Bible, it says that to whom much is 
     given, much is expected and there is an obligation on our 
     part to be a participant in the search for solutions in this 
     troubled spot.
       11. I would like to conclude on a personal note to thank 
     all of those who assisted me on this mission. I am especially 
     grateful to U.S. Ambassador Marisa Lino and her staff, 
     foreign service officer Charles Stonecipher who assisted me 
     in Macedonia, foreign service officer Ron Capps whose 
     knowledge and concern was of great help in Kosovo and U.S. 
     Army Lieutenant Colonel Mike Prendergast who traveled with 
     me. I appreciate their invaluable assistance.

  Mr. TURNER. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  Mr. Chairman, I returned Monday from Bosnia with a group from the

[[Page H1239]]

Committee on Armed Services led by the chairman, the gentleman from 
Virginia (Mr. Bateman). For those in Bosnia, our troops tonight who may 
very well be listening to this debate, I want to say that we were very 
much impressed with the spirit and with the quality of our troops. An 
all-volunteer force, war fighters at their best, are keeping peace 
tonight in Bosnia.
  I rise in opposition to the Fowler amendment for four reasons.
  First of all, the Fowler amendment would jeopardize the potential for 
success of the current peace negotiations that will reconvene in France 
in just a few days. It strengthens Milosevic's hand, and it will harden 
his resolve not to cooperate with the negotiators.
  Second, the Fowler amendment turns our back on our NATO allies, and 
it relinquishes an important leadership role that we have always 
exercised in that alliance for over 50 years.
  Third, the Fowler amendment would send the wrong message around the 
world, where American resolve and American strength is the only barrier 
to those who would exercise, through the force of arms, violence and 
terror against their neighbors.
  Finally, the Fowler amendment fails to recognize that clear 
relationship between the safety of our troops in Bosnia tonight and the 
developing events in Kosovo. Milosevic's hand will clearly be 
strengthened were we to adopt the Fowler amendment.
  On February 4 of this year, in a speech at the Baldrige Quality 
Awards Ceremony, the President set forth his four preconditions for 
involvement of U.S. forces in Kosovo.
  He said, first, we must have a strong and effective peace agreement 
signed by the parties. He said, we must have a commitment by the 
parties to implement the agreement and to cooperate with NATO. Third, 
he said we must have a permissive security environment, with withdrawal 
of enough Serbian security forces and an agreement restricting the 
weapons of the Kosovar paramilitaries. Finally, the President said we 
must have a well-defined NATO mission with a clear exit strategy.
  I would hope this resolution, this sense of the Congress resolution 
that we are considering tonight, would have no less.
  The Gejdenson-Turner amendment which is before this body, which the 
gentlewoman from Florida (Mrs. Fowler) is attempting to amend, our 
amendment requires that there be reasonable limits on U.S. 
participation. That, we think, is only fair.
  The gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Gejdenson) offered an amendment 
requiring a fair and just agreement signed by the parties before any 
U.S. troop involvement. I offered an amendment to limit our troop 
participation to 15 percent of the total NATO force. This is not a 
number that came out of the air. This is a number that the President 
acknowledged and that our military leaders have acknowledged that is 
being negotiated as we speak with our NATO allies.
  These limits are appropriate for two reasons. First, our European 
NATO allies should properly bear the lion's share of this peacekeeping 
mission, and they understand that.
  Second, these limits are ones that I think in the Balkan region 
represents the maximum commitment that we should have, considering our 
current total troop strength and the need to maintain our readiness to 
address threats to our national interest in other parts of the world. 
Yes, there is a cost to keeping peace, but its cost is far less than 
the costs of war.
  In this world which grows ever smaller, peace and security in the 
Balkan region is in our national interest, and is consistent with our 
moral and political leadership. We must not tell the young sergeant 
that I spoke to in Bosnia this week that his mission will be placed in 
jeopardy tonight by virtue of the fact that we fail to make a 
commitment toward peace in Kosovo.
  We should not shoulder the total responsibility, but neither can we 
be a shrinking violet and fail to shoulder responsibility. Vote no on 
the Fowler amendment. Vote yes for the reasonable limits in the 
Gejdenson-Turner amendment.
  Mr. CAMPBELL. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  Mr. Chairman, the United States has not been attacked. Serbia in 
whose sovereign territory we recognize Kosovo to be, has not invited us 
to enter. The United States would thus be exercising force against the 
sovereign territory of a country that has not attacked us, and which we 
recognize has the right of sovereignty over Kosovo.
  The proposal, apparently, is that we bomb Serbia until they agree 
with this plan. As soon as the Kosovars agree with us, we would 
commence bombing to force the Serbs to enter into this agreement.
  If by dint of that bombing the Serbs agree, we would then insert 
troops, supposedly to keep the peace agreement. But what kind of peace 
agreement? A peace agreement that the Serbs did not want, one they were 
bombed into accepting, a peace agreement that requires us to disarm the 
Kosovars, a task that they do not wish us to perform.
  And there they would be--United States troops, on the territory of a 
country that did not attack us, committing an act of war against that 
country. I use the term, ``act of war,'' advisedly, because in the 
hearings of our committee I had the opportunity to ask Ambassador 
Pickering, the President's special adviser and delegate on this issue, 
whether bombing a part of another sovereign country would be an act of 
war.

                              {time}  1945

  He said he thought that it would. So we would be committing an act of 
war to force an agreement, and then we would be putting our troops in 
to monitor an agreement that recent evidence has suggested neither side 
wants. It is for that reason that I think our colleague, Mrs. Fowler 
from Florida, has the right approach, that the case has not been made 
in favor of this use of force.
  I do wish to comment very favorably on the Speaker of the House and 
what I consider a remarkable act of courage and statesmanship, on his 
part, to bring the matter before the House so that we could debate it 
before the use of force is commenced. Speaker Hastert did what no other 
Speaker under whom I have served has done, and he deserves credit. He 
realized that the Constitution requires that only the Congress has the 
right to declare war.
  Mr. Chairman, if the United States bombs a sovereign nation that has 
not attacked us, if we commit an act of war, which the administration's 
own spokesman admits is what we would be doing, then it would require 
the act of this Congress, it seems to me, to declare war, or else that 
constitutional provision is meaningless. So the debate that we have 
tonight is remarkable. It is to the credit of the Speaker that we are 
having it.
  Good people will disagree on the policy; I recognize that. But it is 
right that we, the people's Representatives in the people's House, 
decide, and not when it is too late to decide, not when the troops are 
already committed, not when casualties have already been taken, but in 
advance, which is as the Constitution intended, and which guarantees 
the practical effect as well that we know what it is we are embarking 
upon, what the likely cost will be, and whether it is the will of our 
Nation.
  If, contrary to my advice, the majority opinion of this body tonight 
is to support the President's proposal in using force, then he will be 
far more effective and stronger in that use of force because he will 
have the people's Representatives with him. So I applaud Speaker 
Hastert for allowing us to have this debate.
  I have only one final comment. There must be some occasions, I 
recognize, when it would be legitimate to use force against another 
sovereign that has not attacked us. My personal belief is that genocide 
would constitute such a case.
  I have done my very best to research, and what I believe is happening 
in Kosovo now is a horrible, bloody civil war. But I do not believe the 
evidence sustains that it is an attempt by the Serbians systematically 
and by use of government to exterminate Albanians on the basis of their 
ethnic origin. It is, in other words, not genocide--where I would say 
it is permissible to use force against another sovereign.
  The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from California (Mr. 
Campbell) has expired.
  (On request of Mr. Hastings of Florida, and by unanimous consent, Mr.

[[Page H1240]]

Campbell was allowed to proceed for 1 additional minute.)
  Mr. CAMPBELL. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from Florida 
(Mr. Hastings).
  Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I thank my distinguished 
colleague, the gentleman from California, a member of the committee, 
for yielding to me.
  Mr. Chairman, I cannot quarrel with the basic premise. The gentleman 
answered the question I was going to put to him with reference to 
genocide. He and I were in the hearing yesterday when Senator Dole 
talked about the personal experience where Albanian homes were 
destroyed, and Serbian homes were standing. His comment was, ``It does 
not take me to be a rocket scientist to recognize what is going on.''
  The gentleman from California and I have a disagreement as to 
genocide. Would the gentleman agree that, if genocide is in fact 
occurring, or at some other time the international community does deign 
that genocide is occurring, that it would be appropriate for us to 
respond in that instance?
  Mr. CAMPBELL. Mr. Chairman, reclaiming my time, I do. As one example, 
let me put on the record I believe that our country should, at least, 
have assisted African countries in an effort to end the genocide in 
Rwanda, but we turned our back to our shame, and, to their shame, so 
did the rest of the world.
  Mr. BONIOR. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  Mr. Chairman, as we debate this resolution, thousands of refugees 
from Kosovo are trudging down muddy roads, they are shivering in sodden 
tents, and they are mourning the murder of their families.
  These are innocent people, farmers, teachers, shopkeepers, young 
children, aged grandparents, people whose only hope in this genocidal 
war is that we can muster the will, that we can muster the will to 
force Slobodan Milosevic to stop the slaughter.
  The list of atrocities grows almost every day. In today's New York 
Times, there is a picture of an elderly Kosovar, tending to the body of 
his 22-year-old cousin shot dead by Serbs in a raid on his village.
  Aid workers are still looking for hundreds of his neighbors. They 
disappeared into the hills as the Serbs slaughtered their farm animals 
and set their homes on fire.
  This is a war of terror. This war of ethnic cleansing has been 
escalating for more than a year. Two thousand ethnic Albanians have 
died and some 400,000 have been forced to abandon their homes. It is no 
wonder they flee in terror.
  Earlier this year, Serbian special police forces stormed the village 
of Racak. According to the Human Rights Watch, they had ``direct orders 
to kill village inhabitants over the age of 15.'' They executed 45 
people, men, women, and children.
  Sadly, my colleagues, we have seen this before. What we are 
witnessing is the nightmare of Bosnia all over again. Now the world has 
a chance to stop this genocidal war before it goes any further, before 
the carnage spreads, before it ignites into an even broader regional 
conflict. But that chance, that chance depends on the outcome of the 
peace negotiations.
  So what will happen if we vote for this amendment before us this 
evening? If we vote for this amendment, we will undermine those peace 
talks now teetering between success and failure. If we vote for this 
amendment, we will take away NATO's bite and leave it gnashing its gums 
as Milosevic taunts our indecision.
  If we vote for this amendment, Milosevic will continue to butcher 
innocent people based solely on their ethnic heritage and their desire 
to live free. If we vote for this amendment, and these negotiations 
falter, the cost will only rise in dollars, in sweat, in tears, and, 
yes, in blood.
  This crisis will not disappear because we simply close our eyes or 
turn our heads. We made that mistake in Bosnia until, finally, after 
coming to this floor, week after week, month after month, we finally 
convinced people to stop the carnage.
  Are we going to let things get that bad, tens of thousands dead, 
thousands of women raped, lives destroyed before we take action here 
tonight, today? Is this the kind of American leadership we want for the 
21st Century? If these negotiations fail because of our actions today, 
how long can we stand idle?
  Will the United States merely wring its hands as the flames of this 
war spread to Albania and Macedonia and Greece and perhaps Turkey?
  Even as we are here tonight, even as we speak, Milosevic has been 
emboldened. Serb troops are crossing the Kosovo border. Tanks are 
pounding villages, helpless villages; and refugees are running, 
literally running for their lives.
  We have a chance tonight. Vote ``no'' on this amendment and say 
``yes'' to the Gejdenson resolution for peace. If we do not, we will 
face an even higher cost in the months and the years ahead. Let us 
tonight live up to our responsibilities, not just as Americans, but as 
human beings, as moral, compassionate people who cannot and will not 
tolerate, yes, genocide. Vote ``no'' on this amendment.
  Mr. METCALF. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise to speak in favor of the amendment. Our policy 
in Bosnia has been a failure, with one broken promise to our troops 
after another. Remember when they were sent there, they were to be 
there less than 1 year.
  The operations in Bosnia have cost over $10 billion that we can ill-
afford. The administration continues to seek emergency funding and 
shifting defense funds away from our troops and away from our readiness 
in pursuit of an undetermined policy and unstated goals.
  What are the vital interests of the United States today in Kosovo? 
The President has failed to enunciate a clear and compelling reason for 
our involvement. What are our objectives? The administration has failed 
to enunciate a clear exit strategy, really critical, no exit strategy.
  This Congress should officially notify the President that there will 
be no money for any military adventure without express authorization by 
Congress. We must not allow the constitutional authority of Congress to 
declare war to be undermined again by the administration. We have a 
responsibility to ensure that, before we take military action against a 
sovereign nation, this Congress either authorizes or refuses to 
authorize that action.
  Mr. PAYNE. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  Mr. Chairman, let me say that there are many, many difficult 
decisions that we have to make in our lifetime. I think that, when the 
world is looking for leadership, it puts one in a position because, if 
one is a leader, one is expected simply to lead.
  When people say what is our interest there in central Europe, I think 
that, if we start to remember what our country stood for for many, many 
years, we were the place that had the Statute of Liberty, we were the 
place that the whole world looked to for leadership, we were the place 
that we could stand proud and tall and say in justice anywhere is in 
justice everywhere.
  We should attempt to keep stability in the world. Perhaps it is not a 
good position to be the strongest Nation in the world. Perhaps if we 
were weaker, we would not have this responsibility. But I do not know 
how we could support NATO for decades and decades and then, when there 
gets to be a little tough situation, we say we should not participate, 
we should not be a part of this.
  No, I do not like to see our young men go off to foreign places and 
to be put into harm's way. But if we are a Nation of leaders, if we are 
the world's leader, then people are really looking for us to 
participate in keeping this world together.
  We attempted to have intervention in Rwanda at the beginning of an 
ethnic cleansing, but the U.N. said the U.S. was not really pushing it. 
We are not sure this is genocide. Then we waited, and we waited, and 
close to a million people were killed.
  We showed no leadership. We were not even asking for American troops 
to go there but simply to bring in troops from African countries that 
were willing to go to get between the combatants and the innocent 
people.
  So here we are talking about having an agreement signed and simply to 
have our people there trying to keep the peace because the same way 
that

[[Page H1241]]

we went from one to a million in Rwanda, if this conflict goes beyond 
borders, we will have people lining up on all sides.
  So I think that we have actually a responsibility as a world leader 
or we should simply become a force to simply defend our borders. Maybe 
we should even start to reduce the size of our forces just to be here 
to protect our borders.

                              {time}  2000

  They wanted to do that before World War II, a lot of isolationists. 
So I think the thing to do is to stand up tall and to take this serious 
responsibility not to turn our backs on our colleagues around the 
world.
  We are a proud, strong Nation, and we need to simply behave that way 
in a world that is full of people who need to know that there is a 
higher order, there is someone else who is around in order to keep the 
peace, so to speak.
  So I would strongly urge the support of the Gejdenson amendment. I 
think it is the right thing to do. It is a tough thing to do, but I 
think when things get tough, that is the time we have to stand up with 
our back straight and our head held high and we move forward, as this 
great Nation has done in the past, and I think that we will, of course, 
be called upon to do this again in the future.
  Mr. BUYER. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise here in support of the base bill, I rise in 
opposition to the Fowler amendment, and I rise in opposition to the 
Gejdenson amendment. Now I need to explain myself to my colleagues, and 
let me do it in this manner.
  First, I am going to compliment the Speaker, because I think debate 
on this issue is timely and is appropriate. I think some of the 
arguments I have heard today are out of place. And the reason I say out 
of place is because I recall the good debate we had in this House where 
over 315 Members voted for a Buyer-McHale resolution about the Dayton 
Accords prior to the signing of the Dayton Accords, which said do not 
send in ground troops to Bosnia as the predicate to peace. We had a 
very good debate here on the floor prior to the Dayton Accords.
  So we are having a second debate prior to a signing of a peace 
accord, and if there is something good that comes out of this 
discussion that can help frame that peace accord, all the better. So I 
think it is a hollow argument to be talking about timing.
  The second point I would like to make is a matter of policy. I think 
there is a policy disagreement in this House on both sides of the 
aisle, from some, with the present administration's policies.
  There are two things that are rather curious to me. It is rather 
curious to hear Members come to the well in support of using U.S. 
ground troops for a humanitarian mission when they were the same 
Members who voted against the use of force when I was in the Gulf War. 
Now, I will keep record of that, and I am remembering that I asked 
others to be just as curious about their motives as I am.
  The second point I would like to make is on the matter of foreign 
policy. Here is the disagreement. I believe the United States, as the 
world's superpower, should have a policy of restraint in international 
conflict management. Regional powers should take greater stability to 
police and manage the regional stability, economic cohesion and 
military balance of power. U.S. troops should only intervene on the 
ground to ensure regional stability, not intervene in civil wars which 
have no real threat of destabilizing a region.
  If the United States intervenes in every intercontinental conflict, 
in every corner of the world, then the United States becomes the 
world's guarantor of global security and such action enables the 
regional powers to escape their regional responsibilities. This leads 
to the second point of curiosity.
  Since when did genocide become the standard for us to commit ground 
troops around the world? That is not the standard. It needs to be tied 
to vital national security interests.
  Now, here is my difficulty. My difficulty is, having authored three 
bills, for which my colleagues have supported on this floor with regard 
to Bosnia, I have told the President of the United States I will not be 
the barking dog. I will be his constructive critic.
  And let me talk to my Republican colleagues. I believe we are going 
to have a Republican president and we are going to inherit this in 
2001. So we need to ask these questions: How do we get America out of 
the box? How do we turn this over to the European allies? How do we 
ensure that our regional allies lead on the ground? We do that by 
ensuring that the time lines of success for the simple implementation 
of the Dayton Accords are met appropriately. We make sure the leaders 
of the peace, who are leaders of the war, begin to focus on what brings 
them together instead of their differences.
  We also have to recognize Milosevic and what he is. There are some of 
us who have been there and have spoken to Milosevic. I have sat on the 
couch and looked him in the eye, and I could not help but sense that I 
was talking to a Hitler-type himself. Now, that leads me to something 
that we had better think long and hard about, and that is when the 
President of the United States sends the Supreme Allied Commander in to 
see Milosevic, we better think long and hard before we undercut a 
United States general on the ground.
  Now, that is where I come down painfully on this. Painfully, because 
I disagree with the administration's foreign policy. I disagree how 
they utilize the force to these open-ended commitments around the 
world, as if we can only justify the use of the military for 
humanitarian missions. That is why I am torn inside, because I disagree 
with the policies. But I am not going to undercut General Wesley Clark 
when he meets with Milosevic on the ground.
  So I have to rise in support of the base bill and in opposition to 
the Gejdenson amendment and in opposition to the Fowler amendment.
  Mr. KIND. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise tonight in support of the base resolution as 
well as the Gejdenson amendment and in opposition to the Fowler 
amendment.
  Our debate today and this evening centers on one of the most serious 
and fundamental responsibilities that we hold as elected 
representatives of a free and open democracy, the recommendation to 
commit our military forces to a hostile or potentially hostile 
environment.
  I respect the fact that we as Members of this body should debate this 
issue fully. I am, however, concerned that the timing of this debate is 
suspect and, in fact, is very dangerous and can undermine the peace 
process that the administration has been engaged in in the Balkan 
region for some time.
  Former Senate majority leader Bob Dole, who recently returned from 
the peace negotiations in the Kosovo region, testified yesterday that 
Congress should wait to debate the deployment of American troops there 
until an agreement between the parties in the region has first, in 
fact, been reached. In fact, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright has 
said the same exact thing. Delicate negotiations continue to take place 
in Europe, even as we debate this today.
  There is a plan to have the sides meet in 1 week to try to work out 
an agreement. And over the last few days hopes have been raised that 
such an agreement may be possible, even as heavy weapons pour into the 
area and shelling wracks the countryside. I would hope that this body 
would give those negotiators every opportunity to develop a working 
peace plan. I am concerned our actions may, instead, give the 
impression to warmongers in former Yugoslavia that American leadership 
is divided and its resolve is weak. Such an impression, I am afraid, 
will only encourage fanatical opportunists to continue their violence 
and terrorize the innocent noncombatant residents of Kosovo.
  I hope our debate today is truly based, as has been stated numerous 
times today, on the desire to have an open discussion of American 
foreign policy. It has been said in the past that politics should stop 
at water's edge, and I would hope that in the context of this debate 
that that statement is more true today than even in the past.
  During my first term in office, Mr. Chairman, in fact, last spring I 
had the honor to go over to Bosnia and to visit our troops and the 
military leaders, and even the residents of a war torn region. I wish 
every American in this

[[Page H1242]]

country had the opportunity to go over there and experience the pride 
that I felt in meeting with the young men and women in American 
uniforms who are carrying out a very dangerous and a very difficult 
policy in a distant land. They are proud of their work and show great 
professionalism and integrity. They are committed to carrying out the 
tasks that we have asked them to with honor and pride.
  In fact, the killing has stopped, and peace does have a chance now. 
Democratic institutions are being created when, just a few short years 
ago, there were genocidal practices being conducted in Bosnia. They 
feel like their mission means something. They have stopped the killing. 
They are instructing young children who, just a few years ago, were 
playing in mine fields and getting maimed by the explosion of mines, 
where it is safe for them to play.
  It is an incredible testament to the leadership the United States has 
shown in this war torn region. I would hope that we view the success 
that we have attained so far in Bosnia as a possibility to achieve that 
type of success in the entire Balkan region, including Kosovo.
  I support our troops serving this Nation's interests throughout the 
world, and I support the peace process in Kosovo. If needed, I will 
support a well-planned use of troops to assist in maintaining the peace 
in that region that has been the spark of continental and worldwide 
conflict in the not-so-distant past. It is in the Nation's interest to 
work with our European allies to prevent the Kosovo region from 
destabilizing and drawing the Balkan region into further armed 
conflict.
  But I submit that the debate we are having today is premature. I 
would like to first see a detailed plan and objective goals that the 
administration establishes in that region before we introduce U.S. men 
and women in U.S. uniforms in that region, so we know when we can 
withdraw them again from that region.
  Such a conflict that now exists there poses a humanitarian threat to 
innocent civilians and a political threat to the struggling independent 
nations emerging from the Cold War. The United States will be impacted 
by all these threats and preventive action is the best way to protect 
our interests there.
  The reality is that our Nation holds a unique position in worldwide 
affairs, whether we like it or not. Most major peace accords in recent 
years have required a deeply involved American presence and American 
negotiators at the table. Just a few weeks ago forces in Kosovo 
indicated that international peacekeeping efforts will have little 
credibility unless the United States is intimately involved in carrying 
out that mission.
  When the international community speaks out against brutality and 
tyranny, the voice of the United States of America resounds with 
particular strength and emphasis.
  The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. Kind) has 
expired.
  (By unanimous consent, Mr. Kind was allowed to proceed for 1 
additional minute.)
  Mr. KIND. Mr. Chairman, let us be certain we are speaking with 
sincerity today, because there is no doubt that what we say here will 
be heard across the oceans and will be acted upon, one way or the 
other.
  Our leadership for freedom and democracy in the world is at stake, 
our leadership in the NATO alliance is very much at stake. In fact, I 
would submit, that the very credibility and the justification for the 
existence of NATO is at stake on how well we negotiate peace agreements 
in this very important historical region in the Balkans.
  I hope and pray our message here today encourages action that is 
positive and peaceful and brings a tormented region to the brink of 
freedom, rather than to the brink of war once again.
  Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number 
of words.
  The gentleman from Wisconsin just noted that he had visited our 
troops in Bosnia, and it has been noted here in Bosnia there have not 
been any casualties. Let me say I have visited troops in the last few 
months as well and American troops are stretched thin throughout the 
world, whether it is in the Persian Gulf or whether it is in Asia.
  We have a situation where thousands of American military personnel 
lives are on the line. They are being put in jeopardy because we do not 
know how to say no. We do not know how to lay or to set the parameters. 
Has our involvement in the Balkans so far been worth the $12 billion 
that we have spent and the stretching out of our military forces?
  Yes, we have been lucky that there has not been a major crisis. But 
had there been a major crisis during this time period, yes, we can be 
proud of those military guys that were there, and they have done a good 
job, but the fact is that $12 billion that we have spent, and 
stretching our forces in that way, could have resulted in a 
catastrophe. We are talking about the loss of thousands of American 
lives. But we have been lucky. We have been very lucky. I do not think 
we can try this again.
  We were told that the Bosnia operation was going to be 1 year and $2 
billion, and it has been 5 years and $12 billion and counting. And this 
peace accord, the one we are being asked to support now, the plans are 
not even down yet. Do any of us doubt this is going to cost more than 
$2 billion? Do any of us doubt that 3-year time period? They do not 
even have a plan yet that encompasses something that the Kosovars 
themselves, not to mention Milosevic, could accept?
  No, this will go on and on, and we will spend tens of billions of 
dollars in the Balkans. Our people around the world, who are putting 
their lives on the line for us, will be put in great jeopardy because 
we did not have the courage to say that, in the post-Cold War world, 
maintaining stability in Europe is the job of the Europeans.
  And while we tip our hat to NATO and say they did a good job during 
the Cold War, and thank God NATO was there because it prevented the 
Russians from sweeping across Western Europe and creating a war, that 
the job of NATO has been done, thank God, our hats off to NATO, but 
through some nostalgic attachment to NATO that we are going to commit 
our treasury and the lives of our young people to maintaining stability 
for Europe, and in the far stretches of Eastern Europe at that, is 
ridiculous and we are not standing by the people we need to stand by.

                              {time}  2015

  First and foremost we need to make sure that if we send our military 
out, we give them the weapons they need, we give them the support they 
need or we do not send them. We are doing that throughout the world 
today because we are stretching ourselves too thin.
  This has been an historic debate and I am proud tonight to rise in 
support of the Fowler amendment and opposed to any new deployment of 
troops in the Balkans. This is an historic debate. We can be proud of 
this debate. There have been high points, but there have been some low 
points. Let me first say what the low point is. The low point to me is 
that there have been some suggestions here by Members, and I do not 
know what it is by this body but some people cannot disagree without 
trying to impugn the motives of those who disagree with them. Any 
suggestion that those of us who are opposing yet another deployment of 
American troops in the Balkans, that we are in some way politically 
motivated, that we are just doing this to attack the President or 
something, that argument is not fit for this debate, this great 
historic debate where we are trying to define what America's role will 
be in the post Cold War world. There are conservatives and liberals, 
there are Democrats and Republicans on both sides of this issue. We 
will see that when the vote comes, because we are trying to define what 
our country will stand for and what we will do in the years ahead.
  During the Cold War it was easy. We had Ronald Reagan defining 
everything for us, it polarized everybody, everybody knew what the 
arguments were, where we were going to stand. Well, it is not that way 
anymore. It is fitting that now when we are outside of a Cold War 
setting that the power comes back to us, the elected representatives of 
the people of the United States to determine what our policies will be. 
I say yes, there is genocide all over the world, and we have heard 
these accounts. I am the first one to admit that

[[Page H1243]]

the Serbians are engaged in genocide and atrocities. And yes, there 
have been genocide and atrocities on both sides. However, they are the 
bad guys.
  The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from California (Mr. 
Rohrabacher) has expired.
  (By unanimous consent, Mr. Rohrabacher was allowed to proceed for 2 
additional minutes.)
  Mr. ROHRABACHER. Let us debate this issue honestly, Mr. Chairman. 
What are the parameters? Are we going to send troops everywhere where 
genocide is committed? No, that is obviously not the case. Why then do 
we determine the Balkans is the case, when in Africa and other places 
around the world surely tens of thousands of people are dying in a 
similar fashion? No, in the Balkans, actually this should be the job of 
the Europeans. We are told, ``They won't do it.'' It is their job now 
that the Cold War is over. The United States of America shouldered its 
share of the burden for stability in the whole world in this century. 
In the First World War we went to Europe to save them. In the Second 
World War we fought the Japanese and the Nazis, and in the last four 
decades we have had to carry the burden of the Cold War. Yet we carried 
that and we carried it to victory and the world has a better chance for 
peace today. But it will not be a peace where Americans have to 
continue garrisoning the entire planet for the sake of stability. We 
must set the parameters or we will lose the peace because we have not 
been willing to meet the challenges that we can face.
  I ask for support for the Fowler amendment.
  Mr. FATTAH. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the Gilman resolution and also the 
Gejdenson amendment. Let me agree with my colleague, the previous 
speaker, when he says that there has indeed been genocide perpetrated 
by the Serbs in the Balkans.
  Let me say that, obviously when one would concur with such an 
assertion, one would have to therefore be prepared to support the 
notion that the only remaining superpower in the world, the nation that 
has the strongest, most well-prepared, well-trained, well-equipped 
military force anywhere in the world, that we have a responsibility. 
And that as we come to this debate this evening, I would also like to 
agree with the previous speaker that I am sure that no one's motives 
this evening could be political. One could not be seeking to weaken the 
President of the United States, because the action if we were this 
evening to do in some unwise fashion, and that is to vote for the 
Fowler amendment, would not just weaken the President of the United 
States, it would weaken NATO in which this country has invested so 
much, it would weaken the United States of America and its reputation 
around the world which is represented by the words and actions of our 
President, the Secretary of State, a respected leader of the other 
party, Bob Dole; listen to the words of Jeane Kirkpatrick when she 
suggests that this resolution should be supported.
  Clearly no one who wanted to weaken Bill Clinton should use this as 
the opportunity. For those who would look at what is taking place in 
the Balkans, genocide, yes. Women, tens of thousands, hundreds of 
thousands, raped. Our efforts in Bosnia are something that this Nation 
should be, and I believe is, very proud of. The Kosovo circumstance 
threatens the entire operation in Bosnia.
  So this evening as we come, I would hope that each of us would bear 
our burden as well as those who wear the uniform and represent us 
throughout this world as members of our armed forces. Let us as Members 
of Congress bear the burden of being Americans, understanding that we 
do have an unequal share of responsibility in this world because we 
come to this question with unequal power. And with that power there is 
the question: Since we have the power, what do we do with it at a 
moment of crisis? What do we do when human beings are threatened or 
murdered and are suffering? What do we do when we would have tens of 
thousands of our troops right nearby but refuse to lift a hand and to 
lift a finger to save the innocent lives of women and children and 
others? I would hope that this Congress would rise to the occasion, 
bear our burden and support the appropriate policy and stand by this 
President but, more important, stand by America's principles.
  Mr. SANFORD. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the Fowler amendment because it 
does what Congress is asked to do and, that is, it asks us to be 
deliberative. We are a deliberative body. It slows us down to look at 
what is really going on in that part of the world and what should 
America's involvement be over there.
  I think that this amendment makes sense and that the policy of 
engagement in Kosovo, by sending 4,000 American troops onto the ground 
there, is not one that makes sense.
  First, because doing so is treating the symptom and not the disease 
and, therefore, as my colleague from Georgia would realize and know, it 
is something that does not cure the patient. What I mean by that is 
that if you had cancer and were given aspirin, you might feel a little 
bit better but you would not be healed. If you were bleeding because 
you were in a car wreck and got one of my kid's band-aids to patch you 
up, you might feel a little bit better but you would not be healed. 
Milosevic is the problem in that part of the world. Until that problem 
is fixed, you can have all the agreements you want, you can send all 
the troops you want, but you will not be doing anything other than 
treating a symptom, not the disease.

  It was back in 1987 that Milosevic realized that iron control, if you 
want to call it that, over Kosovo was his springboard to power. He 
exercised that control, and by 1991, the former Yugoslavia splitting 
up, in part because they saw what was happening in Kosovo. Therefore, 
an agreement that keeps Kosovo as a part of Serbia and disarms the 
Kosovars to me is a recipe not for peace but for future conflict. It is 
an agreement that keeps the cause, the real problem here, as the real 
problem; that is, it is an agreement that keeps Milosevic in power.
  Two, I would say we need to be deliberative about this, because 
lasting peace requires either good faith or a victor. This agreement 
would give us neither one. I mean, the Kosovar Liberation Army wants 
full independence for Kosovo. Milosevic has built his power, has built 
a large part of his rise to power on subjugation of Kosovo. What we 
have, therefore, is no victor and certainly no good will.
  If we look back to the 1300s, we see not exactly a lot of good will 
in this part of the world. We leave both ingredients in place which to 
me again would be a recipe for building an agreement, basically 
building an agreement on sand, building an agreement that I think would 
lead to future disaster.
  Third, I would say this agreement, the idea of sending 4,000 troops 
into that part of the world is something that does not pass the mommy 
test. The mommy test to me would be if somebody was killed in the line 
of duty and the mother of that son or that daughter was in my district 
and I had to go back and explain that your son or your daughter died 
for the right reasons, to me that would mean more than just a strategic 
interest to the United States, because we have a lot of strategic 
interests around the globe. It would also mean that that son or that 
daughter's death would have been part of leading to change, that it 
would have led to some real action. Again, that is not what we have 
here. Because if we are signing an agreement that some people have 
equated to Hitler, some people have equated to Saddam Hussein, I mean, 
clearly a very bad guy, is that an agreement that we are going to 
really trust? Is that a lasting thing? Most people would say if we 
signed an agreement with Saddam Hussein, we would not really trust that 
agreement. In fact that has been proven in the Persian Gulf. If you 
sign an agreement with Hitler, would you trust that agreement as a 
lasting instrument? No, you would not. That is what this would be 
doing.
  I would say, fourthly, this idea does not make sense because the 
domino theory has long been disproven. Clark Clifford was sent by 
President Johnson down to Vietnam for the very reason that is being 
described as one of the reasons we need to go to Kosovo, and, that was, 
if we do not do something,

[[Page H1244]]

this could escalate, this could really grow. That was disproven there. 
In fact Kissinger came and spoke before our committee yesterday and 
what he talked about was people did not analyze the cost of involvement 
and the duration of involvement when they sent people to Vietnam. Are 
we analyzing that now?
  Lastly, I would pick up on what the gentleman from California (Mr. 
Campbell) was saying, who incidentally was a constitutional lawyer and 
taught constitutional law at Stanford University, and, that is, it is 
the Congress' role to declare war. Sending troops into somebody else's 
sovereign territory or bombing a sovereign territory is clearly an act 
of war and, therefore, it does need our signature.
  With that, I would say again, I would ask this body to support the 
Fowler amendment.
  Mr. BENTSEN. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  (Mr. BENTSEN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. BENTSEN. Mr. Chairman, I come at this from a little bit different 
approach. I certainly do not seek to impugn the integrity of any of the 
Members who are involved in this. I am not on the specific committee 
that this came from. First of all, I think this amendment is wrong, but 
I also think the whole consideration of the underlying text at this 
point in time is wrong.
  As the gentleman from South Carolina just mentioned in referencing 
the gentleman from California and the role of Congress in determining 
whether or not troops should be sent in anywhere, I do agree with that. 
But the fact is we have got the cart ahead of the horse here. In doing 
so, we are undercutting the administration's ability to be involved in 
the working group, in the contact group. I just think that is a 
mistake. Now, whether or not the motives are political or not is not 
for me to judge, but I just think this is a terrible policy mistake.
  I also do not understand exactly the gentlewoman's amendment, because 
I think this is a concurrent resolution but it has a strict limitation. 
So I gather that this amendment and the underlying text really has no 
force of law, that this is just a piece of paper to make us feel good.

                              {time}  2030

  I am very concerned about whether or not we should deploy troops to 
Kosovo. I do not know if that is the best policy or not. But I also 
know, and every Member of this body knows, is there is no agreement yet 
so we do not know what the U.S. involvement will be, we do not know 
whether or not it is an agreement that we feel is right or wrong, and 
if the leadership of the House, I think if they want to do the right 
thing, they would withdraw this bill now, allow the Executive Branch 
and the State Department to go ahead with what their role is, and then 
at the appropriate time call the House back in to address the question 
of whether or not U.S. troops should be part of any peace agreement in 
Kosovo.
  Do not do it before. Do not try and cut the legs out from under the 
administration while they are trying to negotiate some deal. Let them 
negotiate the deal, let them bring it back to the Congress, let us 
decide whether or not it is a good deal.
  That is how we should do things, and I would just remind Members I 
did not have the honor or the pleasure of serving in this body back in 
the 1980s, although I was staff back here during part of that time, but 
some of the Members were. If this had been done when Ronald Reagan was 
President, Members would have been accused of treason for undercutting 
the administration while they were trying to conduct the art of foreign 
policy. We should allow the Executive Branch to do what they want. If 
we do not like what they have done, we can deal with it later. We can 
deal with it on a Friday, Saturday, Sunday, whenever, and if we decide 
we do not want them to send troops, then let us do it once we know what 
the deal is. Let us not come up with some fig leaf resolution that is 
going to make us all feel good and we can all send out a press release 
about it later on. Let us let them go through with it and come up with 
their agreement, and then let us come back and debate the issue, debate 
the terms of the agreement on whether or not we think U.S. troops 
should be involved.
  Mr. BARTLETT of Maryland. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the 
requisite number of words.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the Fowler amendment, and I would 
like to make a few comments before we vote.
  First of all, I want to emphasize what a number of others have 
emphasized, and that is this is clearly a constitutional issue.
  I have here a copy of the Constitution. I do not think that it is a 
very difficult decision to come to. Article I, Section 8 states the 
prerogatives of Congress in just 8 little words: The Congress shall 
have power to declare war.
  Very short, very simple.
  Article II, Section 2, uses 34 words to define the prerogatives of 
the President: The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army 
and Navy of the United States and of the militia of the several States 
when called into the actual service of the United States.
  It is the Congress that declares war. It is the Congress that commits 
the troops. It is the President who is the Commander in Chief after the 
Congress has committed the troops.
  The fact that prior Presidents have also violated the Constitution 
does not mean that we should continue to permit our Presidents to do 
that. It is a little bit like being hauled into traffic court and 
protesting to the judge, ``Gee, judge, I speed every day on that strip 
of road. How can you fine me today because I was speeding all those 
other times and I was never apprehended?'' Past violations do not 
justify a present violation.
  The country to which the President proposes to send our troops is a 
sovereign state. This is not an emergency. There is no one in the 
Congress that I know of who wants to limit the power of the President 
to commit our troops in a true emergency. This is not an emergency. 
There is plenty of time to debate it, and I am very pleased that we are 
having this debate.
  What is going on in that country is a civil war. No one will argue 
but what atrocities are being committed. That being true, the correct 
course of action is to bring the offenders to the bar of justice. There 
is a war crimes tribunal; that is where they should be brought. Sending 
our troops there will not solve that problem.
  I know of no exit strategy. The problems in Kosovo are very deep, 
they have been there a very long time, and if we stay there 2 years, or 
3 years, or 5 years, when we leave the situation will be exactly as it 
was when we came. Hostilities will continue. We will not have solved 
those problems.
  Mr. Chairman, I am very pleased that we are here debating this this 
evening. We need to debate this. We need to do more than just debate 
this. We, as a Congress, need to assert our constitutional 
prerogatives. We really need legislation that says that no President, 
this President or any other President, can commit our troops to battle, 
can put our young men and women in harm's way, without a vote of the 
Congress.
  We must be careful in the wording of the legislation that does this 
because we do not want to limit his ability, do not want to limit his 
ability to commit our troops in a true emergency. There is clearly not 
time to convene the Congress and declare war if intercontinental 
ballistic missiles are headed our way, and our President must have the 
ability to commit our military resources in a true emergency. Neither 
this, nor any of the very large number of deployments that this 
administration is engaged in have been an emergency, not a single one 
of them has been an emergency, and there have been more deployments 
during this administration than during the previous 40 years.
  This is the first time since I have been here that we have had a 
debate before the action occurred except before going into Bosnia we 
did have some sense of the Congress resolutions that were totally 
ignored by the President. I hope this one passes with this amendment, 
and I hope that it is not ignored by the President.
  Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the 
requisite number of words.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise in a very difficult situation for us and 
unfortunately have come to a very difficult decision. I have supported 
this President

[[Page H1245]]

on a number of occasions that have been very difficult for me, but 
because I believe we must support the Commander in Chief in very 
difficult deployments. When he stood up to Saddam Hussein and the 
Russians were staring us down and very upset with our position, I 
traveled to Moscow. I met privately with the leadership of the Duma to 
convince them that they should understand why this Republican supports 
our Democrat President in his position with Saddam Hussein. It was the 
right thing, and I felt strongly about that position.
  Tomorrow I will travel to Moscow a second time with eight of our 
colleagues, with former Defense Minister Rumsfeld, former CIA Director 
Woolsey, former Deputy Undersecretary of State Bill Snyder, and we will 
make the case on Sunday and Monday and Tuesday of why the proliferation 
is so great that it threatens both Russian people and American people. 
I will again underscore my support for the steps being taken by this 
administration.
  The positions of the administration are clear in those areas, and I 
support them, but I cannot support the insertion of troops now in 
Kosovo.
  Mr. Chairman, in my opinion the case is not yet been made. There has 
not been a case made by this President to the American people, let 
alone to this Congress, about why at this point in time we should place 
American young people on the ground in Kosovo.
  At least we are having a debate, Mr. Chairman. At least we are 
discussing the pros and cons in a very careful and deliberate way, and 
I applaud both sides for the level of the debate. We need to debate 
this issue.
  Some are saying, Mr. Chairman, this is not the right time. It is too 
delicate of a time in the negotiations. Mr. Chairman, there is never a 
right time to debate these issues. When is the right time? After the 
President makes a decision? When our troops are on the way in? Then we 
debate not to support them? This Congress needs to play its appropriate 
role in deciding whether or not we should take the steps to deploy our 
troops in Kosovo.
  Mr. Chairman, one of the things that bothers me is this past week I 
met with two members of the German Bundestag. They came in and talked 
to me about our NATO responsibility, and I agree with them that we need 
to keep NATO strong. But let me tell my colleagues what the Bundestag 
members told me, Mr. Chairman. They said in their vote they understood 
the dollar amount that was being requested for the deployment. In fact, 
they authorized 400 million Deutsche marks to pay for the operation. We 
have no idea not only what the mission is, we have no idea what the 
dollar cost is.

  Mr. Chairman, I am very sad. In the previous 40 years to 1991, from 
World War II until 1991, 40 years under Democrat and Republican 
Presidents, we deployed our troops a total of 10 times at home and 
abroad. Ten times. Mr. Chairman, in the 8 years from 1991 until today, 
we have deployed our troops 32 times. This will be the 33rd. Mr. 
Chairman, none of these 32 deployments were budgeted for up front. None 
of them, except for the deployment to the Middle East in Desert Storm, 
were requested by the Congress to support. Each of the payments that 
were required to pay for these deployments were taken out of an already 
decreasing defense budget.
  Mr. Chairman, we spent $19 billion in contingency costs on these 32 
deployments, 9 billion alone on Bosnia.
  Mr. Chairman, those who support the use of our troops in Kosovo had 
better be prepared to start to put the funding on the table to pay for 
these deployments.
  Mr. Chairman, we are in an impossible situation now. We are not being 
asked, we are being told for the 33rd time that we are going to send 
our troops into harm's way. We were told in Bosnia there would be a 
time limit, they would be back home in a few years. We were told in 
Haiti they would be back home. We have troops in Somalia, in Haiti. We 
have troops in Macedonia. We have troops all over the continent, and 
the money is being taken out of our defense budget because we did not 
have the authorization up front, we did not have a legitimate debate on 
whether or not this Congress supported placing our troops into harm's 
way, and we are about to do it again.
  Mr. Chairman, I may support the deployment of our troops to Kosovo, I 
may support the President because I want to support my Commander in 
Chief. He is my President. Even though he is not of my party, he is my 
leader, and I want to support him, make no mistake about it.
  But this President needs to make the case to us and to the American 
people, and he has not done that. This President needs to tell us how 
much it will cost, and he has not done that. This President needs to 
tell us what the allied commitment will be in hard terms, and he has 
not done that either. Until he does that, we should vote no and not 
support the deployment of troops in Kosovo.
  Mr. HOYER. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  Mr. Chairman, I have great respect and very close personal friendship 
with the previous speaker. I have great respect for his intellect and 
for his knowledge with respect to the defense posture of the United 
States. He is one of our leaders on the Committee on Armed Services, 
and he has a view which is based upon a very thoughtful analysis of the 
situation.
  Having said that, he and I disagree on this issue.
  Now the specific issue, as I understand it, that confronts us is the 
amendment of the gentlewoman from Florida (Mrs. Fowler), who is also my 
friend and for whom I have a great deal of respect, and that specific 
amendment, as I understand it, limits the Gejdenson amendment which 
tries to define the limits of participation of the United States in an 
action by NATO in Kosovo to ensure that the killing and the 
displacement of persons will stop and that an environment will be 
created conducive to the possibility of peace for the people of Kosovo, 
the people of Serbia and indeed the people of the region.

                              {time}  2045

  The gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Weldon), however, spoke to the 
overall issue, not to the amendment, the overall issue as to whether or 
not we ought to support the President.
  I am hopeful that this Congress does, in fact, support the President. 
The previous speaker, the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Bartlett), spoke 
of the Constitution. That issue, I would suggest, is not relevant at 
this point in time, because in fact the Congress is considering whether 
or not to authorize the President to participate with troops, with 
American force, in the implementation of a peace agreement.
  Very frankly, Mr. Chairman, I doubt that there is a Member on this 
floor who does not know and does not have a conviction that if America 
does not participate, there will not be an agreement, period. If there 
is not an agreement, the butcher of Belgrade, call it a civil war if 
you want, will continue to commit atrocities. We call them war crimes, 
genocides, the elimination of a people because of their ethnic or 
national origin. It occurred in Bosnia and we stood for too long 
silent.
  My friend, the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Weldon) had a chart. 
He talked about 40 years prior to the end of the Cold War that we had 8 
deployments. Do my colleagues remember what two of those deployments 
were in those 40 years? Korea, Vietnam; between them, approximately 
100,000 plus loss of life.
  In the deployments that have occurred since 1990, we have been very 
fortunate. No one would have predicted so few losses of lives in the 
Persian Gulf.
  I have stood on this floor with some of my colleagues, and in many of 
the deployments the predictions of disaster were frequent and 
impassioned. That was the case in Haiti. That was the case in Bosnia, 
and that has been the case in other instances of deployment.
  Yes, the United States has a unique role and the world, frankly, is 
better off because we on this floor and the President of the United 
States and the American people are prepared to accept a responsibility 
that we would prefer not to have, but it is ours because of our might; 
it is ours because of our position in the world as the leader; it is 
ours because we are a moral nation that acts upon its moral precepts.
  Are we always perfect? Of course not, but all of us on this floor and 
every American can be proud of the fact that

[[Page H1246]]

it is America usually, not always but usually, that raises the issue of 
humanitarian concerns, not solely economic or strategic concerns.
  The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Hoyer) has 
expired.
  (On request of Mr. Rohrabacher, and by unanimous consent, Mr. Hoyer 
was allowed to proceed for 1 additional minute.)
  Mr. HOYER. Mr. Chairman, every one of us understands the weighty 
responsibility to enable this government to put in harm's way young 
Americans and, yes, even older Americans, in the defense of freedom.
  John Kennedy said that this country would pay any price, bear any 
burden, to defend freedom here and around the world. I heard Jack Kemp 
on a number of occasions quote that very phrase on the floor of this 
House. It is not an easy undertaking, but it is an undertaking that 
saves lives and stabilizes this world, economically and politically.
  The amendment of the gentlewoman from Florida (Mrs. Fowler) is spoken 
to by Jeane Kirkpatrick, Bob Dole, Caspar Weinberger and others.
  The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Hoyer) has 
again expired.
  (By unanimous consent, Mr. Hoyer was allowed to proceed for 1 
additional minute.)
  Mr. HOYER. Mr. Chairman, when they point out that if we do not put 
ground troops this effort at trying to stabilize a critically important 
situation will not succeed and the Europeans will not participate, we 
can all say they should but we saw in Bosnia that they would not.
  My colleagues, I ask that the amendment of the gentlewoman from 
Florida (Mrs. Fowler) be rejected, which I know is well intended and 
she believes strongly that it is the right policy, but it is a policy 
that will inevitably lead to failure of the effort to bring peace to 
the Balkans. It is an amendment which I think detracts from the 
Gejdenson amendment which tries, as I said at the beginning, to limit 
and make proportional our participation.
  I would ask my colleagues to reject the Fowler amendment, to pass the 
Gejdenson amendment and then to pass this resolution so that America 
continues to lead and continues to be the moral leader as well as the 
military leader of this world.
  Mr. KINGSTON. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  Mr. Chairman, we have had a good debate. There has been honest 
disagreement. There has been a high degree of sincerity and integrity 
in the debate, but I rise in strong support of the Fowler-Danner 
bipartisan substitute amendment. I think to not do so is a recipe for 
resentment and not reconciliation, and at this time we need 
reconciliation.
  Three things I would like my colleagues to keep in mind as we vote. 
Number one, to deploy troops without a clear exit strategy is 
potentially disastrous. My good friend, the gentleman from Maryland 
(Mr. Hoyer), had talked about Vietnam. If we go back in history and see 
the very early days of Vietnam, there was clearly no exit strategy; 
exactly what we have in front of us today.
  Number two, the administration has been vague, at best, about the 
cost of this operation. As an appropriator we spent two or three hours 
today debating a billion dollar disaster bill for Honduras. In that, we 
struggled to find money. The budget is tight. We do not have the budget 
just to spend money anyplace we want to. We have already spent in this 
administration $10 billion in the Balkans, and there seems to be no end 
in sight of our current commitment.
  Number three, as we all know, the military readiness question is a 
big one. Our military simply does not have the personnel to go every 
place that there is a problem.
  We talk about quality of life for our service men and women. When 
they are deployed every single weekend of their lives, they are going 
to get out of the armed services, and that is why we are losing so many 
good, professional soldiers right now.
  I strongly urge my colleagues to support the Fowler-Danner amendment.
  Mrs. FOWLER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. KINGSTON. I yield to the gentlewoman from Florida.
  Mrs. FOWLER. Mr. Chairman, this is the conclusion of the speakers on 
our side for the amendment, and I just want to thank the Members of 
this body. I think this has been a very serious, a very thoughtful 
debate this afternoon and evening on a very serious matter.
  This is why we were elected. This is why our constituents sent us to 
be Members of the United States House of Representatives, and no matter 
what our position, it has been obvious that every Member has given a 
lot of thought, a lot of concern, to their position and to what we are 
about to vote on.
  I want to just thank my colleagues for the time and effort they have 
spent this evening, and I do urge them to vote yes on my amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentlewoman from Florida (Mrs. Fowler), to the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Gejdenson).
  The question was taken; and the Chairman announced that the ayes 
appeared to have it.


                             Recorded Vote

  Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
  A recorded vote was ordered.
  The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII the Chair announces 
that he may reduce to 5 minutes the minimum time for electronic voting 
without intervening business on the underlying amendment offered by the 
gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Gejdenson).
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 178, 
noes 237, answered ``present'' 2, not voting 16, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 48]

                               AYES--178

     Aderholt
     Andrews
     Archer
     Armey
     Bachus
     Baker
     Ballenger
     Barr
     Barrett (NE)
     Bartlett
     Barton
     Bass
     Bereuter
     Bilirakis
     Blunt
     Bonilla
     Brady (TX)
     Bryant
     Burr
     Burton
     Camp
     Campbell
     Canady
     Cannon
     Chabot
     Chambliss
     Chenoweth
     Coble
     Coburn
     Collins
     Combest
     Condit
     Cook
     Cox
     Crane
     Cubin
     Cunningham
     Danner
     Deal
     DeLay
     DeMint
     Dickey
     Doolittle
     Duncan
     Ehlers
     Ehrlich
     Emerson
     English
     Everett
     Ewing
     Foley
     Fossella
     Fowler
     Franks (NJ)
     Gallegly
     Ganske
     Gibbons
     Gillmor
     Goode
     Goodlatte
     Goodling
     Gordon
     Graham
     Granger
     Greenwood
     Gutknecht
     Hall (TX)
     Hansen
     Hastings (WA)
     Hayes
     Hayworth
     Hefley
     Herger
     Hill (MT)
     Hilleary
     Hoekstra
     Horn
     Hostettler
     Hulshof
     Hutchinson
     Isakson
     Istook
     Jenkins
     Johnson, Sam
     Jones (NC)
     Kasich
     Kingston
     Kuykendall
     LaHood
     Largent
     Latham
     Leach
     Lewis (KY)
     LoBiondo
     Lucas (OK)
     Manzullo
     McCollum
     McCrery
     McHugh
     McInnis
     McIntosh
     McKeon
     Metcalf
     Mica
     Miller (FL)
     Miller, Gary
     Moran (KS)
     Myrick
     Nethercutt
     Ney
     Norwood
     Nussle
     Packard
     Paul
     Pease
     Peterson (MN)
     Peterson (PA)
     Petri
     Pickering
     Pitts
     Pombo
     Pryce (OH)
     Radanovich
     Ramstad
     Reynolds
     Riley
     Roemer
     Rogan
     Rogers
     Rohrabacher
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Roukema
     Royce
     Ryan (WI)
     Ryun (KS)
     Salmon
     Sanford
     Saxton
     Scarborough
     Schaffer
     Sensenbrenner
     Sessions
     Shadegg
     Shimkus
     Skeen
     Smith (MI)
     Smith (TX)
     Souder
     Spence
     Stearns
     Stump
     Sununu
     Sweeney
     Talent
     Tancredo
     Tauzin
     Taylor (NC)
     Terry
     Thomas
     Thornberry
     Thune
     Tiahrt
     Toomey
     Traficant
     Upton
     Walden
     Walsh
     Wamp
     Watkins
     Watts (OK)
     Weldon (FL)
     Weldon (PA)
     Weller
     Whitfield
     Wicker
     Wilson
     Young (AK)
     Young (FL)

                               NOES--237

     Ackerman
     Allen
     Baird
     Baldacci
     Baldwin
     Barcia
     Barrett (WI)
     Bateman
     Bentsen
     Berkley
     Berman
     Berry
     Biggert
     Bishop
     Blagojevich
     Bliley
     Blumenauer
     Boehlert
     Boehner
     Bonior
     Bono
     Borski
     Boswell
     Boucher
     Boyd
     Brady (PA)
     Brown (FL)
     Brown (OH)
     Buyer
     Calvert
     Capuano
     Cardin
     Carson
     Castle
     Clayton
     Clement
     Clyburn
     Conyers
     Cooksey
     Costello
     Coyne
     Cramer
     Crowley
     Cummings
     Davis (FL)
     Davis (IL)
     Davis (VA)
     DeFazio
     DeGette
     Delahunt
     DeLauro
     Deutsch
     Diaz-Balart
     Dicks
     Dingell
     Dixon
     Doggett
     Dooley
     Doyle
     Dreier
     Dunn
     Edwards
     Engel
     Eshoo
     Etheridge
     Evans
     Farr
     Fattah
     Filner
     Fletcher
     Forbes
     Ford

[[Page H1247]]


     Frank (MA)
     Frelinghuysen
     Gejdenson
     Gekas
     Gephardt
     Gilchrest
     Gilman
     Gonzalez
     Goss
     Green (TX)
     Green (WI)
     Gutierrez
     Hall (OH)
     Hastings (FL)
     Hill (IN)
     Hilliard
     Hinchey
     Hinojosa
     Hobson
     Hoeffel
     Holden
     Holt
     Hooley
     Houghton
     Hoyer
     Hunter
     Hyde
     Inslee
     Jackson (IL)
     Jackson-Lee (TX)
     Jefferson
     Johnson (CT)
     Johnson, E. B.
     Jones (OH)
     Kanjorski
     Kaptur
     Kelly
     Kennedy
     Kildee
     Kilpatrick
     Kind (WI)
     King (NY)
     Kleczka
     Klink
     Knollenberg
     Kolbe
     Kucinich
     LaFalce
     Lampson
     Lantos
     Larson
     LaTourette
     Lazio
     Lee
     Levin
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (GA)
     Linder
     Lofgren
     Lowey
     Lucas (KY)
     Luther
     Maloney (CT)
     Maloney (NY)
     Markey
     Martinez
     Mascara
     Matsui
     McCarthy (MO)
     McCarthy (NY)
     McDermott
     McGovern
     McIntyre
     McKinney
     McNulty
     Meehan
     Meek (FL)
     Meeks (NY)
     Menendez
     Millender-McDonald
     Miller, George
     Minge
     Mink
     Moakley
     Mollohan
     Moore
     Moran (VA)
     Morella
     Murtha
     Nadler
     Napolitano
     Neal
     Northup
     Oberstar
     Obey
     Olver
     Ortiz
     Ose
     Owens
     Oxley
     Pallone
     Pascrell
     Pastor
     Payne
     Pelosi
     Phelps
     Pickett
     Pomeroy
     Porter
     Portman
     Price (NC)
     Rahall
     Rangel
     Regula
     Rivers
     Rodriguez
     Rothman
     Roybal-Allard
     Rush
     Sabo
     Sanchez
     Sanders
     Sandlin
     Sawyer
     Schakowsky
     Scott
     Serrano
     Shaw
     Shays
     Sherman
     Sherwood
     Shows
     Simpson
     Sisisky
     Skelton
     Slaughter
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (WA)
     Snyder
     Spratt
     Stabenow
     Stark
     Stenholm
     Stupak
     Tanner
     Tauscher
     Taylor (MS)
     Thompson (CA)
     Thurman
     Tierney
     Turner
     Udall (CO)
     Udall (NM)
     Vento
     Visclosky
     Waters
     Watt (NC)
     Waxman
     Weiner
     Wexler
     Weygand
     Wise
     Wolf
     Woolsey
     Wynn

                        ANSWERED ``PRESENT''--2

     Abercrombie
     Callahan
       

                             NOT VOTING--16

     Becerra
     Bilbray
     Brown (CA)
     Capps
     Clay
     Frost
     John
     Lipinski
     Quinn
     Reyes
     Shuster
     Strickland
     Thompson (MS)
     Towns
     Velazquez
     Wu

                              {time}  2115

  Mr. GREEN of Texas and Mr. FLETCHER changed their vote from ``aye'' 
to ``no.''
  Messrs. GORDON, STUMP, SWEENEY and FOSSELLA changed their vote from 
``no'' to ``aye.''
  So the amendment was rejected.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.


   Amendment Offered by Mr. Gilman to Amendment No. 5 Offered by Mr. 
                               Gejdenson

  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment to the amendment.
  The Clerk read as follows:

       Amendment offered by Mr. Gilman to amendment No. 5 offered 
     by Mr. Gejdenson:
       1. Strike section 3 and insert the following:

     SEC. 3. AUTHORIZATION FOR DEPLOYMENT OF UNITED STATES ARMED 
                   FORCES TO KOSOVO.

       (a) In general.--Subject to the limitations in subsection 
     (b) the President is authorized to deploy United States Armed 
     Forces personnel to Kosovo as part of a NATO peacekeeping 
     operation implementing a Kosovo peace agreement.
       (b) Reports to Congress.--The President should, before 
     ordering the deployment of any United States Armed Forces 
     personnel to Kosovo do each of the following:
       (1) Personally and in writing submit to the Congress--
       (A) a detailed statement explaining the national interest 
     of the United States at risk in the Kosovo conflict; and
       (B) a certification to the Congress that all United States 
     Armed Forces personnel so deployed pursuant to subsection (a) 
     will be under the operational control only of United States 
     Armed Forces military officers.
       (2) Submit to the Congress a detailed report that--
       (A) in classified and unclassified form addresses the 
     amount and nature of the military resources of the United 
     States, in both personnel and equipment, that will be 
     required for such deployment;
       (B) outlines and explains the military exit strategy that 
     would control the withdrawal of United States Armed Forces 
     personnel from Kosovo;
       (C) certifies the chain of command for any such deployed 
     United States Armed Forces personnel; and
       (D) provides the percentage of United States Armed Forces 
     participating in any NATO deployment in the Kosovo peace 
     keeping operation, including ground troops, air support, 
     logistics support, and intelligence support, compared to the 
     other NATO nations participating in that operation.
       (3) Submit to the Congress a detailed report that--
       (A) in classified and unclassified form addresses the 
     impact on military readiness of such deployment;
       (B) provides the timeframe in which withdrawal of all 
     United States Armed Forces personnel from Kosovo could 
     reasonably be expected;
       (C) in classified and unclassified form provides an 
     unambiguous explanation of the rules of engagement under 
     which all United States Armed Forces personnel participating 
     in the Kosovo NATO peace keeping operation shall operate;
       (D) in classified and unclassified form provides the 
     budgetary impact for fiscal year 1999 and each fiscal year 
     thereafter for the next five fiscal years on the Department 
     of Defense, and each of the military services in particular; 
     on the Intelligence Community; and on the Department of State 
     as a result of any such deployment.
       (4) Submit in classified form, to the Speaker, the Minority 
     Leader, the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and 
     the Committee on Armed Services of the House of 
     Representatives; and the Majority and Minority Leaders, the 
     Select Committee on Intelligence, and the Armed Services 
     Committee of the Senate, a detailed report that addresses the 
     threats attendant to any such deployment and the nature and 
     level of force protection required for such deployment.
       (5) Submit to the Speaker, Minority Leader, and the 
     Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of 
     Representatives; and the Majority and Minority Leaders and 
     the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate a detailed 
     report that addresses--
       (A) any intelligence sharing arrangement that has been 
     established as a result of the Kosovo peace agreement;
       (B) the intelligence sharing arrangement that currently 
     exists within NATO and how such arrangement would be 
     modified, if at all, in the Kosovo context; and
       (C) whether Russian participation in a Kosovo peacekeeping 
     deployment alongside NATO forces will affect, impede, or 
     hinder any such intelligence sharing arrangement.
       (6) Submit to the Congress a detailed report on the scope 
     of the mission of the United States Armed Forces personnel.
       (7) Submit to the Congress a detailed report prepared by 
     the Secretary of State that--
       (A) outlines and explains the diplomatic exit strategy that 
     would control the withdrawal of United States Armed Forces 
     personnel from Kosovo;
       (B) outlines and explains the means and methodologies by 
     which verification of compliance with the terms of any Kosovo 
     peace agreement will be determined;
       (C) in classified and unclassified form, explains the terms 
     and conditions included in any peace agreement reached with 
     respect to the Kosovo conflict. Such report should include--
       (1) a detailed discussion and explanation of any side 
     agreement, whether or not all parties to the overall peace 
     agreement are aware of the side agreement;
       (2) a detailed discussion and explanation of any 
     obligations of the United States arising from the peace 
     agreement, including any such obligations with respect to the 
     introduction of weapons into Kosovo and Serbia;
       (3) a detailed discussion and explanation of any military 
     arrangements, in addition to the NATO deployment, to which 
     the United States has agreed to undertake as a result of the 
     Kosovo peace agreement;
       (4) a detailed discussion and explanation of the funding 
     source for any future plebiscite or referendum on 
     independence for Kosovo; and
       (5) a detailed discussion and explanation of any 
     requirement for forces participating in the NATO peace 
     keeping operation implementing the peace agreement to enforce 
     any provision of such peace agreement.

  Mr. GILMAN (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous 
consent that the amendment to the amendment be considered as read and 
printed in the Record.
  The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from 
New York?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the distinguished gentleman from 
Florida (Mr. Goss), chairman of the Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence, who developed the language in this amendment and who has 
worked closely with our committee on this issue.
  Mr. GOSS. I thank the gentleman for yielding, Mr. Chairman.
  Mr. Chairman, I would like to advise Members of what is contained in 
this proposed amendment, which actually reflects on some of the 
concerns we have heard in the debate today, and deals with some of the 
other amendments that we have all read about that we were considering 
as other amendments for this particular House concurrent resolution.
  I would describe generally the resolution that is under consideration 
as between House Concurrent Resolution 32, which is somewhat of a carte 
blanche, and the Fowler amendment, which was a prohibition.
  What we attempt to do here is authorize deployment, but because of 
some of the concerns we have heard today, call on the President to 
submit a number of reports and vital pieces of

[[Page H1248]]

information to the Congress before ordering deployment.
  These would include reports on a declaration explaining the national 
interest of the U.S. at risk in Kosovo, and a certification that all 
U.S. armed forces in Kosovo will be under the operational control of 
U.S. military officers.
  We would request further details on the rules of engagement before we 
have deployment; the military resources that would be required, both 
the personnel and the equipment; the military exit strategy; the 
diplomatic exit strategy; the chain of command for the U.S. forces in 
Kosovo; the percentage of United States participation compared to other 
NATO countries in any force, concerning particularly ground troops, air 
support, logistic support, and intelligence support; the impact on 
military readiness, and that goes to morale and rotation; that we would 
have information providing a time frame in which U.S. forces could 
reasonably expect to be withdrawn; that we would have information on 
the budgetary impact for this fiscal year and the next 5 fiscal years 
of deployment; we would have an assessment of the threats to our armed 
forces in Kosovo, the men and women in uniform, and the level of force 
protection required to give them the maximum amount of protection; the 
intelligence-sharing arrangements, if any, resulting from a peace 
agreement; any modification to the intelligence-sharing arrangement 
within NATO, the present arrangement we have now; the effect of Russian 
participation in Kosovo on any intelligence-sharing arrangements within 
NATO; the scope of the mission of the U.S. armed forces, in other 
words, what is expected, when do we declare success; the means and 
methods by which compliance with the terms of the peace agreement will 
be verified, verification; the terms and conditions in any peace 
agreement, in particular; the details on any secret side agreements; 
any other military arrangements of the U.S. as a result of the peace 
agreement or side agreements or obligations; any other obligations of 
the United States resulting from the peace agreement, such as weapons 
interdiction; the funding source for the referendum on independence 3 
years hence in Kosovo, and the role of peacekeeping forces to enforce 
any provision of the peace agreement.
  Mr. Chairman, we should support this deployment to make Mr. Milosevic 
understand that the United States means business. We should support the 
deployment with our eyes wide open, if we are going to have a 
deployment, and that is why we are offering these amendments.
  I would argue that a successful vote to send the troops can in fact 
strengthen the hand of our negotiators. I would note that even the 
minority leader earlier today conceded that we should not deploy troops 
without a policy. I could not agree more with the gentleman from 
Missouri.
  A commitment to deploy has already been made, pursuant to some ad hoc 
policy determination. Congress needs to be involved. Therefore, now is 
the appropriate time to take up this issue, before the troops are 
deployed without a firm policy.
  That is the explanation, Mr. Chairman.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to yield to the gentleman from 
California (Mr. Cunningham).
  Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from New York for 
yielding to me.
  Mr. Chairman, I understand this amendment is going to be accepted. I 
asked to speak on it so I would not have to call a recorded vote on it, 
and I will not do that.
  I support strongly the amendment offered by the gentleman from 
Florida (Mr. Porter Goss). I am not going to say why I am against the 
amendment offered by the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Gejdenson) 
because it would sound partisan, but I want to the gentleman to know 
that it is not, it is a very deep-seated belief I have, and mistrust. I 
will support the amendment offered by the gentleman from New York and 
the gentleman from Florida, and vote against the amendment offered by 
the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Gejdenson).
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from California (Mr. 
Cunningham) for his support.
  Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Chairman, with some reluctance, I would take the 
advice of my chair and support the amendment of the gentleman from 
Florida (Mr. Goss).
  The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from New York (Mr. Gilman) to amendment No. 5 offered by the 
gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Gejdenson).
  The amendment to the amendment was agreed to.
  The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Gejdenson), as amended.
  The amendment, as amended, was agreed to.


                Amendment No. 52 Offered by Mr. Skelton

  Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  Mr. GEJDENSON. I reserve the right to object, Mr. Chairman.
  The CHAIRMAN. The Chair would inquire of the gentleman from Missouri 
which amendment he is offering.
  Mr. SKELTON. It is the one that says Section 4. Section 4.
  Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Chairman, I reserve the right to object.

                              {time}  2130

  The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Amendment No. 52 offered by Mr. Skelton:
       Page 2, strike line 9 and all that follows and insert the 
     following:

     SEC. 3. LIMITATION ON DEPLOYMENT OF UNITED STATES ARMED 
                   FORCES TO KOSOVO.

       The President shall not deploy United States Armed Forces 
     personnel to Kosovo as part of a NATO peacekeeping operation 
     unless--
       (1) a Kosovo peace agreement has been reached; and
       (2) such deployment is specifically approved by the 
     Congress.


  Request For Modification To Amendment No. 52 Offered By Mr. Skelton

  Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that, on line 1, 
where it says strike and insert section 3 in the original, it be 
changed to add section 4.
  The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will report the modification.
  The Clerk read as follows:

       Modification to Amendment No. 52 offered by Mr. Skelton:
       The amendment as modified is as follows:
       Add at the end the following:

     SEC. 4 LIMITATION ON DEPLOYMENT OF UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES 
                   TO KOSOVO.

       The President shall not deploy United States Armed Forces 
     personnel to Kosovo as part of a NATO peacekeeping operation 
     unless--
       (1) a Kosovo peace agreement has been reached; and
       (2) such deployment is specifically approved by the 
     Congress.

  The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the modification of the amendment 
offered by the gentleman from Missouri?
  Mr. MORAN of Virginia. Mr. Chairman, reserving the right to object, 
the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. Skelton) listed two amendments, one 
that would not allow U.S. forces to be deployed to Kosovo unless there 
is an agreement between the two sides, a second that would say that 
U.S. forces could not be deployed unless there is agreement between two 
sides and Congress has approved the deployment.
  I would ask of the distinguished gentleman from Missouri that he 
fully explain the implications of this amendment, because it would 
appear that it may be out of order and require a unanimous consent. If 
the gentleman from Missouri would explain the amendment.
  Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman will yield, the amendment 
is very clear.
  Mr. MORAN of Virginia. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from 
Missouri to explain the impact of the amendment.
  Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, there shall be no deployment of American 
personnel peacekeeping forces unless there is an agreement reached 
between the parties in question in Kosovo, and, number two, that such 
deployment must be approved by Congress.
  Mr. MORAN of Virginia. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from 
Connecticut (Mr. Gejdenson).
  Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Chairman, I just want to make sure that whatever 
happens here, that the sectioning does

[[Page H1249]]

not wipe out the section of the gentleman from Texas. So my 
understanding is that this maybe should actually be section 5.
  Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, then that is fine. I thought it would be 
4. Then it will be 5, and I so request.
  The CHAIRMAN. Does the gentleman from Virginia object to the 
modification of the amendment?
  Mr. MORAN of Virginia. Mr. Chairman, I do object to the modification 
of the amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN. Objection is heard.
  The gentleman from Missouri is entitled to 5 minutes on his amendment 
as originally designated.


                             Point of Order

  The CHAIRMAN. Does the gentleman from Virginia seek recognition?
  Mr. MORAN of Virginia. Mr. Chairman, I seek recognition for a point 
of order that, because the gentleman is amending the portion of 
underlying text that has already been amended, this amendment is out of 
order.
  Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, that is not correct. I am merely changing 
a 3 to a 5. It is in conflict with no other section.
  The CHAIRMAN. Does the gentleman from Missouri wish to be heard 
further on the point of order? The Chair is prepared to rule.
  Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, I think that it speaks for itself. It is 
in addition thereto. It is in conflict with no other section.
  The CHAIRMAN. The Chair is prepared to rule. Pursuant to section 469 
of Jefferson's Manual of the 105th Congress and for the reasons stated 
by the gentleman from Virginia, the point of order is sustained, and 
the amendment No. 52 may not be offered at this time.
  Mr. STENHOLM. Mr. Chairman, I rise today in support of the Kosovo 
resolution before us, however suspect the timing may be. Furthermore, I 
support the Skelton Amendment, which would specify once a peace 
agreement is reached, Congress must approve the deployment of our 
troops.
  The United States is in an unquestionable position of world 
leadership. Along with that position comes a sense of duty. If we want 
free trade and open markets, not to mention exemplary worldwide 
standards of behavior in the realms of justice, scientific discovery, 
human rights, and other democratic values, we must lead by example. The 
responsibility of neutralizing potential global flare-ups of hostility 
comes with this territory.
  Senator Bob Dole recently returned from discussions with the KLA in 
Kosovo. He stated his support of continued work towards a peace 
agreement, and expressed his hope for bipartisan Congressional support. 
I stand with Senator Dole on this issue; I believe partisanship should 
end at the water's edge. Whatever we think of the muddled foreign 
policy of this Administration, we should never engage in activities 
that produce American weakness in the international theater.
  NATO is the perfect and appropriate vehicle for this operation. I 
have supported the mission of NATO and will continue to do so. We have 
NATO to thank for one of the longest sustained periods of peace in 
Europe.
  Many in this body have complained that the Europeans in NATO were not 
pulling their weight in dealing with conflict in their own backyard. 
Many of these same voices are also opposing this peacekeeping 
operation. This confuses me; if we wanted the Europeans to shoulder a 
greater responsibility in resolving European issues, shouldn't we be 
pleased that European forces are going to make up 86 percent of the 
peacekeeping force?
  If we allow ourselves to succumb to the voices of isolationism that 
have been reverberating around this chamber, all that we do is create 
an international power void that allows other nations the opportunity 
to start operating as the Number One world power. Would we prefer to 
have China calling the shots in the world of international diplomacy, 
as opposed to the United States? I know I for one sure don't, and I bet 
my friends that are calling for an isolationist world view, if they 
really thought about it, wouldn't either.
  This resolution before us is only a Sense of Congress that has no 
binding effect. I support efforts to bring before the House, after a 
peace agreement has been signed, a bill in which Congress specifically 
authorizes the deployment of troops. My friend from Missouri, Mr. 
Skelton, is offering an amendment that says just that, and I plan to 
support it.
  My colleagues, I urge you to support Mr. Skelton's amendment, as well 
as the resolution as whole.
  The CHAIRMAN. Are there further amendments to the resolution?
  There being no further amendments, under the rule, the Committee 
rises.
  Accordingly, the Committee rose; and the Speaker pro tempore (Mr. 
Gibbons) having assumed the chair, Mr. Thornberry, Chairman of the 
Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, reported that 
that Committee, having had under consideration the concurrent 
resolution (H.Con.Res. 42) regarding the use of United States Armed 
Forces as part of NATO peacekeeping operation implementing a Kosovo 
peace agreement, pursuant to House Resolution 103, he reported the bill 
back to the House with an amendment adopted by the Committee of the 
Whole.
  The SPEAKER. Under the rule, the previous question is ordered.
  The question is on the amendment.
  The amendment was agreed to.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on agreeing to the 
concurrent resolution.
  The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that 
the noes appeared to have it.


                             Recorded Vote

  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I demand a recorded vote.
  A recorded vote was ordered.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 219, 
noes 191, answered ``present'' 9, not voting 15, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 49]

                               AYES--219

     Ackerman
     Allen
     Baird
     Baldacci
     Baldwin
     Barcia
     Barrett (WI)
     Berkley
     Berman
     Berry
     Biggert
     Bishop
     Bliley
     Blumenauer
     Boehlert
     Bonior
     Bono
     Borski
     Boswell
     Boucher
     Boyd
     Brady (PA)
     Brown (FL)
     Buyer
     Calvert
     Capuano
     Cardin
     Carson
     Castle
     Clayton
     Clement
     Clyburn
     Conyers
     Cooksey
     Coyne
     Cramer
     Crowley
     Cummings
     Davis (FL)
     Davis (IL)
     Davis (VA)
     DeFazio
     DeGette
     Delahunt
     DeLauro
     Deutsch
     Diaz-Balart
     Dicks
     Dingell
     Dixon
     Doggett
     Dooley
     Doyle
     Dreier
     Dunn
     Edwards
     Engel
     Eshoo
     Etheridge
     Evans
     Farr
     Fattah
     Filner
     Forbes
     Ford
     Frelinghuysen
     Gejdenson
     Gekas
     Gephardt
     Gilchrest
     Gilman
     Gonzalez
     Goss
     Green (TX)
     Gutierrez
     Hall (OH)
     Hastert
     Hastings (FL)
     Hill (IN)
     Hilliard
     Hinchey
     Hinojosa
     Hobson
     Hoeffel
     Holden
     Holt
     Hooley
     Houghton
     Hoyer
     Hunter
     Hyde
     Inslee
     Jackson (IL)
     Jackson-Lee (TX)
     Jefferson
     Johnson (CT)
     Johnson, E. B.
     Jones (OH)
     Kanjorski
     Kaptur
     Kelly
     Kennedy
     Kildee
     Kilpatrick
     Kind (WI)
     King (NY)
     Kleczka
     Knollenberg
     Kucinich
     LaFalce
     Lampson
     Lantos
     Larson
     LaTourette
     Lazio
     Lee
     Levin
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (GA)
     Linder
     Lowey
     Lucas (KY)
     Luther
     Maloney (CT)
     Maloney (NY)
     Markey
     Martinez
     Mascara
     Matsui
     McCarthy (MO)
     McCarthy (NY)
     McDermott
     McGovern
     McIntyre
     Meehan
     Meek (FL)
     Meeks (NY)
     Menendez
     Millender-McDonald
     Miller, George
     Minge
     Moakley
     Mollohan
     Moore
     Moran (VA)
     Morella
     Murtha
     Nadler
     Napolitano
     Neal
     Oberstar
     Olver
     Ortiz
     Ose
     Owens
     Oxley
     Pallone
     Pascrell
     Pastor
     Payne
     Pelosi
     Pickett
     Pomeroy
     Porter
     Portman
     Price (NC)
     Radanovich
     Rahall
     Rangel
     Regula
     Rivers
     Rodriguez
     Rothman
     Roybal-Allard
     Rush
     Sabo
     Sanchez
     Sanders
     Sandlin
     Sawyer
     Schakowsky
     Scott
     Serrano
     Shaw
     Sherman
     Sherwood
     Shows
     Sisisky
     Skeen
     Skelton
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (WA)
     Snyder
     Spratt
     Stabenow
     Stark
     Stenholm
     Stupak
     Tanner
     Tauscher
     Thompson (CA)
     Thurman
     Tierney
     Turner
     Udall (CO)
     Udall (NM)
     Velazquez
     Vento
     Waters
     Watt (NC)
     Waxman
     Weiner
     Wexler
     Weygand
     Wilson
     Wise
     Wolf
     Woolsey
     Wynn

                               NOES--191

     Aderholt
     Andrews
     Archer
     Armey
     Bachus
     Baker
     Ballenger
     Barr
     Barrett (NE)
     Bartlett
     Barton
     Bass
     Bateman
     Bereuter
     Bilirakis
     Blagojevich
     Blunt
     Boehner
     Bonilla
     Brady (TX)
     Bryant
     Burr
     Burton
     Camp
     Campbell
     Canady
     Cannon
     Chabot
     Chambliss
     Chenoweth
     Coble
     Collins
     Combest
     Condit
     Cook
     Costello
     Cox
     Crane
     Cubin
     Cunningham
     Danner
     Deal
     DeLay
     DeMint
     Dickey
     Doolittle
     Duncan
     Ehlers
     Ehrlich
     Emerson
     English
     Everett
     Ewing
     Fletcher
     Foley
     Fossella
     Fowler
     Frank (MA)
     Franks (NJ)
     Gallegly
     Ganske
     Gibbons
     Gillmor
     Goode
     Goodlatte
     Goodling
     Gordon
     Graham
     Granger
     Green (WI)
     Greenwood
     Gutknecht
     Hall (TX)
     Hansen
     Hastings (WA)
     Hayes
     Hayworth
     Hefley
     Herger
     Hill (MT)
     Hilleary

[[Page H1250]]


     Hoekstra
     Horn
     Hostettler
     Hulshof
     Hutchinson
     Isakson
     Istook
     Jenkins
     Johnson, Sam
     Jones (NC)
     Kasich
     Kingston
     Klink
     Kolbe
     Kuykendall
     LaHood
     Largent
     Latham
     Leach
     Lewis (KY)
     LoBiondo
     Lucas (OK)
     Manzullo
     McCollum
     McCrery
     McHugh
     McInnis
     McIntosh
     McKeon
     McKinney
     McNulty
     Metcalf
     Mica
     Miller (FL)
     Miller, Gary
     Moran (KS)
     Myrick
     Nethercutt
     Ney
     Northup
     Norwood
     Nussle
     Packard
     Paul
     Pease
     Peterson (MN)
     Peterson (PA)
     Petri
     Phelps
     Pickering
     Pitts
     Pombo
     Pryce (OH)
     Ramstad
     Reynolds
     Riley
     Roemer
     Rogan
     Rogers
     Rohrabacher
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Roukema
     Royce
     Ryan (WI)
     Ryun (KS)
     Salmon
     Sanford
     Saxton
     Scarborough
     Schaffer
     Sensenbrenner
     Sessions
     Shadegg
     Shays
     Shimkus
     Simpson
     Smith (MI)
     Smith (TX)
     Souder
     Spence
     Stearns
     Stump
     Sununu
     Sweeney
     Talent
     Tancredo
     Tauzin
     Taylor (MS)
     Taylor (NC)
     Terry
     Thomas
     Thornberry
     Thune
     Tiahrt
     Toomey
     Traficant
     Upton
     Visclosky
     Walden
     Walsh
     Wamp
     Watkins
     Watts (OK)
     Weldon (FL)
     Weldon (PA)
     Weller
     Whitfield
     Wicker
     Young (AK)
     Young (FL)

                        ANSWERED ``PRESENT''--9

     Abercrombie
     Bentsen
     Brown (OH)
     Callahan
     Coburn
     Lofgren
     Mink
     Obey
     Slaughter

                             NOT VOTING--15

     Becerra
     Bilbray
     Brown (CA)
     Capps
     Clay
     Frost
     John
     Lipinski
     Quinn
     Reyes
     Shuster
     Strickland
     Thompson (MS)
     Towns
     Wu

                              {time}  2155

  Mr. YOUNG of Alaska changed his vote from ``aye'' to ``no.''
  So the concurrent resolution was agreed to.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
  A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.
  Stated against:
  Mr. SHUSTER. Mr. Speaker, on rollcall No. 49, I was unable to be on 
the House floor. Had I been present, I would have voted ``no.''

                          ____________________