CONSOLIDATED APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 2016
(Senate - December 18, 2015)

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[Congressional Record Volume 161, Number 185 (Friday, December 18, 2015)]
[Pages S8844-S8859]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                 CONSOLIDATED APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 2016

  Mr. McCONNELL. Madam President, I ask the Chair to lay before the 
Senate the message to accompany H.R. 2029.
  The Presiding Officer laid before the Senate the following message 
from the House of Representatives:

       Resolved, That the House agree to the amendment of the 
     Senate to the bill (H.R. 2029) entitled ``An Act making 
     appropriations for military construction, the Department of 
     Veterans Affairs, and related agencies for the fiscal year 
     ending September 30, 2016, and for other purposes,'' with 
     amendments.


                            Motion to Concur

  Mr. McCONNELL. I move to concur in the House amendments to the Senate 
amendment to H.R. 2029.
  Mr. BURR. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the Joint 
Explanatory Statement for Division M--Intelligence Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Year 2016 be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

JOINT EXPLANATORY STATEMENT TO ACCOMPANY THE INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION 
                        ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2016

       The following consists of the joint explanatory statement 
     to accompany the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal 
     Year 2016.
       This joint explanatory statement reflects the status of 
     negotiations and disposition of issues reached between the 
     House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the 
     Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (hereinafter, ``the 
     Agreement''). The joint explanatory statement shall have the 
     same effect with respect to the implementation of this Act as 
     if it were a joint explanatory statement of a committee of 
     conference.
       The joint explanatory statement comprises three parts: an 
     overview of the application of the annex to accompany this 
     statement; unclassified congressional direction; and a 
     section-by-section analysis of the legislative text.

              Part I: Application of the Classified Annex

       The classified nature of U.S. intelligence activities 
     prevents the congressional intelligence committees from 
     publicly disclosing many details concerning the conclusions 
     and recommendations of the Agreement. Therefore, a classified 
     Schedule of Authorizations and a classified annex have been 
     prepared to describe in detail the scope and intent of the 
     congressional intelligence committees' actions. The Agreement 
     authorizes the Intelligence Community to obligate and expend 
     funds not altered or modified by the classified Schedule of 
     Authorizations as requested in the President's budget, 
     subject to modification under applicable reprogramming 
     procedures.
       The classified annex is the result of negotiations between 
     the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the 
     Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. It reconciles the 
     differences between the committees' respective versions of 
     the bill for the National Intelligence Program (NIP) and the 
     Homeland Security Intelligence Program for Fiscal Year 2016. 
     The Agreement also makes recommendations for the Military 
     Intelligence Program (MIP), and the Information Systems 
     Security Program, consistent with the National Defense 
     Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016, and provides certain 
     direction for these two programs.
       The Agreement supersedes the classified annexes to the 
     reports accompanying H.R. 4127, as passed by the House on 
     December 1, 2015, H.R. 2596, as passed by the House on June 
     16, 2015, and S. 1705, as reported by the Senate Select 
     Committee on Intelligence on July 7, 2015. All references to 
     the House-passed and Senate-reported annexes are solely to 
     identify the heritage of specific provisions.
       The classified Schedule of Authorizations is incorporated 
     into the bill pursuant to Section 102. It has the status of 
     law. The classified annex supplements and adds detail to 
     clarify the authorization levels found in the bill and the 
     classified Schedule of Authorizations. The classified annex 
     shall have the same legal force as the report to accompany 
     the bill.

          Part II: Select Unclassified Congressional Direction

     Enhancing Geographic and Demographic Diversity
       The Agreement directs the Office of the Director for 
     National Intelligence (ODNI) to conduct an awareness, 
     outreach, and recruitment program to rural, under-represented 
     colleges and universities that are not part of the IC Centers 
     of Academic Excellence (IC CAE) program. Further, the 
     Agreement directs that ODNI shall increase and formally track 
     the number of competitive candidates for IC employment or 
     internships who studied at IC CAE schools and other 
     scholarship programs supported by the IC.
       Additionally, the Agreement directs that ODNI, acting 
     through the Executive Agent for the IC CAE program, the IC 
     Chief Human Capital Officer, and the Chief, Office of IC 
     Equal Opportunity & Diversity, as appropriate, shall:
       1. Add a criterion to the IC CAE selection process that 
     applicants must be part of a consortium or actively 
     collaborate with under-resourced schools in their area;
       2. Work with CAE schools to reach out to rural and under-
     resourced schools, including by inviting such schools to 
     participate in the annual IC CAE colloquium and IC 
     recruitment events;
       3. Increase and formally track the number of competitive IC 
     internship candidates from IC CAE schools, starting with 
     Fiscal Year 2016 IC summer internships, and provide a report, 
     within 180 days of the enactment of this Act, on its plan to 
     do so;
       4. Develop metrics to ascertain whether IC CAE, the Pat 
     Roberts Intelligence Scholars Program, the Louis Stokes 
     Educational Scholarship Program, and the Intelligence Officer 
     Training Program reach a diverse demographic and serve as 
     feeders to the IC workforce;
       5. Include in the annual report on minority hiring and 
     retention a breakdown of the students participating in these 
     programs who serve as IC interns, applied for full-time IC 
     employment, received offers of employment, and entered on 
     duty in the IC;
       6. Conduct a feasibility study with necessary funding 
     levels regarding how the IC CAE could be better tailored to 
     serve under-resourced schools, and provide such study to the 
     congressional intelligence committees within 180 days of the 
     enactment of this Act;
       7. Publicize all IC elements' recruitment activities, 
     including the new Applicant Gateway and the IC Virtual Career 
     Fair, to rural schools, Historically Black Colleges and 
     Universities, and other minority-serving institutions that 
     have been contacted by IC recruiters;
       8. Contact new groups with the objective of expanding the 
     IC Heritage Community Liaison Council; and
       9. Ensure that IC elements add such activities listed above 
     that may be appropriate to their recruitment plans for Fiscal 
     Year 2016.
       ODNI shall provide an interim update to the congressional 
     intelligence committees on its efforts within 90 days of the 
     enactment of this Act and include final results in its annual 
     report on minority hiring and retention.

[[Page S8845]]

  

     Analytic Duplication & Improving Customer Impact
       The congressional intelligence committees are concerned 
     about potential duplication in finished analytic products. 
     Specifically, the congressional intelligence committees are 
     concerned that contemporaneous publication of substantially 
     similar intelligence products fosters confusion among 
     intelligence customers (including those in Congress), impedes 
     analytic coherence across the IC, and wastes time and effort. 
     The congressional intelligence committees value competitive 
     analysis, but believe there is room to reduce duplicative 
     analytic activity and improve customer impact.
       Therefore, the Agreement directs ODNI to pilot a repeatable 
     methodology to evaluate potential duplication in finished 
     intelligence analytic products and to report the findings to 
     the congressional intelligence committees within 60 days of 
     the enactment of this Act. In addition, the Agreement directs 
     ODNI to report to the congressional intelligence committees 
     within 180 days of enactment of this Act on how it will 
     revise analytic practice, tradecraft, and standards to ensure 
     customers can clearly identify how products that are produced 
     contemporaneously and cover similar topics differ from one 
     another in their methodological, informational, or temporal 
     aspects, and the significance of those differences. This 
     report is not intended to cover operationally urgent analysis 
     or current intelligence.
     Countering Violent Extremism and the Islamic State of Iraq 
         and the Levant
       The Agreement directs ODNI, within 180 days of enactment of 
     this Act and in consultation with appropriate interagency 
     partners, to brief the congressional intelligence committees 
     on how intelligence agencies are supporting both (1) the 
     Administration's Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) program 
     first detailed in the 2011 White House strategy Empowering 
     Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United 
     States, which was expanded following the January 2015 White 
     House Summit on Countering Violent Extremism, and (2) the 
     Administration's Strategy to Counter the Islamic State of 
     Iraq and the Levant, which was announced in September 2014.
     Analytic Health Reports
       The Agreement directs the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) 
     to provide Analytic Health Reports to the congressional 
     intelligence committees on a quarterly basis, including an 
     update on the specific effect of analytic modernization on 
     the health of the Defense Intelligence Analysis Program 
     (DIAP) and its ability to reduce analytic risk.
     All-Source Analysis Standards
       The Agreement directs DIA to conduct a comprehensive 
     evaluation of the Defense Intelligence Enterprise's all-
     source analysis capability and production in Fiscal Year 
     2015. The evaluation should assess the analytic output of 
     both NIP and MW funded all-source analysts, separately and 
     collectively, and apply the following four criteria 
     identified in the ODNI Strategic Evaluation Report for all-
     source analysis: 1) integrated, 2) objective, 3) timely, and 
     4) value-added. The results of this evaluation shall be 
     included as part of the Fiscal Year 2017 congressional budget 
     justification book.
     Terrorism Investigations
       The Agreement directs the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
     (FBI) to submit to the congressional intelligence committees, 
     within 180 days of enactment of this Act, a report detailing 
     how FBI has allocated resources between domestic and foreign 
     terrorist threats based on numbers of investigations over the 
     past 5 years. The report should be submitted in unclassified 
     form but may include a classified annex.
     Investigations of Minors Involved in Radicalization
       The Agreement directs the FBI to provide a briefing to the 
     congressional intelligence committees within 180 days of 
     enactment of this Act on investigations in which minors are 
     encouraged to turn away from violent extremism rather than 
     take actions that would lead to Federal terrorism 
     indictments. This briefing should place these rates in the 
     context of all investigations of minors for violent extremist 
     activity and should describe any FBI engagement with minors' 
     families, law enforcement, or other individuals or groups 
     connected to the minor during or after investigations.
       Furthermore, the Agreement directs the FBI to include how 
     often undercover agents pursue investigations based on a 
     location of interest related to violent extremist activity 
     compared to investigations of an individual or group believed 
     to be engaged in such activity. Included should be the number 
     of locations of interest associated with a religious group or 
     entity. This briefing also should include trend analysis 
     covering the last five years describing violent extremist 
     activity in the U.S.
     Declassification Review of Video of the 2012 Benghazi 
         Terrorist Attacks
       Numerous investigations have been conducted regarding the 
     2012 terrorist attack against U.S. facilities in Benghazi. 
     The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence produced one of 
     the first declassified Congressional reports and continues to 
     believe that the public should have access to information 
     about the attacks, so long as it does not jeopardize 
     intelligence sources and methods.
       The closed circuit television videos from the Temporary 
     Mission Facility (TMF) captured some of the activity that 
     took place at the State Department facility on September 11, 
     2012, and their release would contribute to the public's 
     understanding of the event without compromising sources or 
     methods.
       Therefore, the Agreement directs the Director of National 
     Intelligence, or the appropriate federal official, to conduct 
     a declassification review and to facilitate the release to 
     the public of the declassified closed circuit television 
     videos of the September 11, 2012, terrorist attack on the TMF 
     in Benghazi, Libya, consistent with the protection of sources 
     and methods, not later than 120 days after the enactment of 
     this Act.

 Part III: Section-by-Section Analysis and Explanation of Legislative 
                                  Text

       The following is a section-by-section analysis and 
     explanation of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal 
     Year 2016.

                    Title I--Intelligence Activities

     Section 101. Authorization of appropriations
       Section 101 lists the United States Government departments, 
     agencies, and other elements for which the Act authorizes 
     appropriations for intelligence and intelligence-related 
     activities for Fiscal Year 2016.
     Section 102. Classified Schedule of Authorizations
       Section 102 provides that the details of the amounts 
     authorized to be appropriated for intelligence and 
     intelligence-related activities and the applicable personnel 
     levels by program for Fiscal Year 2016 are contained in the 
     classified Schedule of Authorizations and that the classified 
     Schedule of Authorizations shall be made available to the 
     Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and House of 
     Representatives and to the President.
     Section 103. Personnel ceiling adjustments
       Section 103 is intended to provide additional flexibility 
     to the Director of National Intelligence in managing the 
     civilian personnel of the Intelligence Community. Section 103 
     provides that the Director may authorize employment of 
     civilian personnel in Fiscal Year 2016 in excess of the 
     number of authorized positions by an amount not exceeding 
     three percent of the total limit applicable to each 
     Intelligence Community element under Section 102. The 
     Director may do so only if necessary to the performance of 
     important intelligence functions.
     Section 104. Intelligence Community Management Account
       Section 104 authorizes appropriations for the Intelligence 
     Community Management Account (ICMA) of the Director of 
     National Intelligence and sets the authorized personnel 
     levels for the elements within the ICMA for Fiscal Year 2016.
     Section 105. Clarification regarding authority for flexible 
         personnel management among elements of intelligence 
         community
       Section 105 clarifies that certain Intelligence Community 
     elements may make hiring decisions based on the excepted 
     service designation.

 Title II--Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System

     Section 201. Authorization of appropriations
       Section 201 authorizes appropriations in the amount of 
     $514,000,000 for Fiscal Year 2016 for the Central 
     Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund.

                     Title III--General Provisions

     Section 301. Increase in employee compensation and benefits 
         authorized by law
       Section 301 provides that funds authorized to be 
     appropriated by the Act for salary, pay, retirement, and 
     other benefits for federal employees may be increased by such 
     additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for 
     increases in compensation or benefits authorized by law.
     Section 302. Restriction on conduct of intelligence 
         activities
       Section 302 provides that the authorization of 
     appropriations by the Act shall not be deemed to constitute 
     authority for the conduct of any intelligence activity that 
     is not otherwise authorized by the Constitution or laws of 
     the United States.
     Section 303. Provision of information and assistance to 
         Inspector General of the Intelligence Community
       Section 303 amends the National Security Act of 1947 to 
     clarify the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community's 
     authority to seek information and assistance from federal, 
     state, and local agencies, or units thereof.
     Section 304. Inclusion of Inspector General of Intelligence 
         Community in Council of Inspectors General on Integrity 
         and Efficiency
       Section 304 amends Section 11(b)(1)(B) of the Inspector 
     General Act of 1978 to reflect the correct name of the Office 
     of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community. The 
     section also clarifies that the Inspector General of the 
     Intelligence Community is a member of the Council of the 
     Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency.
     Section 305. Clarification of authority of Privacy and Civil 
         Liberties Oversight Board
       Section 305 amends the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
     Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA) to clarify that nothing in the 
     statute authorizing the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight 
     Board should be construed to allow that Board to gain access 
     to information regarding an activity covered by section 503 
     of the National Security Act of 1947.

[[Page S8846]]

  

     Section 306. Enhancing government personnel security programs
       Section 306 directs the Director of National Intelligence 
     to develop and implement a plan for eliminating the backlog 
     of overdue periodic investigations, and further requires the 
     Director to direct each agency to implement a program to 
     provide enhanced security review to individuals determined 
     eligible for access to classified information or eligible to 
     hold a sensitive position.
       These enhanced personnel security programs will integrate 
     information relevant and appropriate for determining an 
     individual's suitability for access to classified information 
     or eligibility to hold a sensitive position; be conducted at 
     least 2 times every 5 years; and commence not later than 5 
     years after the date of enactment of the Fiscal Year 2016 
     Intelligence Authorization Act, or the elimination of the 
     backlog of overdue periodic investigations, whichever occurs 
     first.
     Section 307. Notification of changes to retention of call 
         detail record policies
       Section 307 requires the Director of National Intelligence 
     to notify the congressional intelligence committees in 
     writing not later than 15 days after learning that an 
     electronic communication service provider that generates call 
     detail records in the ordinary course of business has changed 
     its policy on the retention of such call details records to 
     result in a retention period of less than 18 months. Section 
     307 further requires the Director to submit to the 
     congressional intelligence committees within 30 days of 
     enactment a report identifying each electronic communication 
     service provider (if any) that has a current policy in place 
     to retain call detail records for 18 months or less.
     Section 308. Personnel information notification policy by the 
         Director of National Intelligence
       Section 308 requires the Director of National Intelligence 
     to establish a policy to ensure timely notification to the 
     congressional intelligence committees of the identities of 
     individuals occupying senior level positions within the 
     Intelligence Community.
     Section 309. Designation of lead intelligence officer for 
         tunnels
       Section 309 requires the Director of National Intelligence 
     to designate an official to manage the collection and 
     analysis of intelligence regarding the tactical use of 
     tunnels by state and nonstate actors.
     Section 310. Reporting process for tracking country clearance 
         requests
       Section 310 requires the Director of National Intelligence 
     to establish a formal reporting process for tracking requests 
     for country clearance submitted to overseas Director of 
     National Intelligence representatives. Section 310 also 
     requires the Director to brief the congressional intelligence 
     committees on its progress.
     Section 311. Study on reduction of analytic duplication
       Section 311 requires the Director of National Intelligence 
     to carry out a study to identify duplicative analytic 
     products and the reasons for such duplication, ascertain the 
     frequency and types of such duplication, and determine 
     whether this review should be considered a part of the 
     responsibilities assigned to the Analytic Integrity and 
     Standards office inside the Office of the Director of 
     National Intelligence. Section 311 also requires the Director 
     to provide a plan for revising analytic practice, tradecraft, 
     and standards to ensure customers are able to readily 
     identify how analytic products on similar topics that are 
     produced contemporaneously differ from one another and what 
     is the significance of those differences.
     Section 312. Strategy for comprehensive interagency review of 
         the United States national security overhead satellite 
         architecture
       Section 312 requires the Director of National Intelligence, 
     in collaboration with the Secretary of Defense, and the 
     Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to develop a strategy, 
     with milestones and benchmarks, to ensure that there is a 
     comprehensive interagency review of policies and practices 
     for planning and acquiring national security satellite 
     systems and architectures, including the capabilities of 
     commercial systems and partner countries, consistent with the 
     National Space Policy issued on June 28, 2010. Where 
     applicable, this strategy shall account for the unique 
     missions and authorities vested in the Department of Defense 
     and the Intelligence Community.
     Section 313. Cyber attack standards of measurement study
       Section 313 directs the Director of National Intelligence, 
     in consultation with the Secretary of Homeland Security, the 
     Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the 
     Secretary of Defense, to carry out a study to determine the 
     appropriate standards to measure the damage of cyber 
     incidents.

  Title IV--Matters Relating to Elements of the Intelligence Community


      Subtitle A--Office of the Director of National Intelligence

     Section 401. Appointment and confirmation of the National 
         Counterintelligence Executive
       Section 401 makes subject to Presidential appointment and 
     Senate confirmation, the executive branch position of 
     National Counterintelligence Executive (NCIX), which was 
     created by the 2002 Counterintelligence Enhancement Act. 
     Effective December 2014, the NCIX was also dual-hatted as the 
     Director of the National Counterintelligence and Security 
     Center.
     Section 402. Technical amendments relating to pay under title 
         5, United States Code
       Section 402 amends 5 U.S.C. Sec. 5102(a)(1) to expressly 
     exclude the Office of the Director of National Intelligence 
     (ODNI) from the provisions of chapter 51 of title 5, relating 
     to position classification, pay, and allowances for General 
     Schedule employees, which does not apply to ODNI by virtue of 
     the National Security Act. This proposal would have no 
     substantive effect.
     Section 403. Analytic Objectivity Review
       The Office of the Director of National Intelligence's 
     Analytic Integrity and Standards (AIS) office was established 
     in response to the requirement in the Intelligence Reform and 
     Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA) for the designation 
     of an entity responsible for ensuring that the Intelligence 
     Community's finished intelligence products are timely, 
     objective, independent of political considerations, based 
     upon all sources of available intelligence, and demonstrative 
     of the standards of proper analytic tradecraft.
       Consistent with responsibilities prescribed under IRTPA, 
     Section 403 requires the AIS Chief to conduct a review of 
     finished intelligence products produced by the CIA to assess 
     whether the reorganization of the Agency, announced publicly 
     on March 6, 2015, has resulted in any loss of analytic 
     objectivity. The report is due no later than March 6, 2017.


       Subtitle B--Central Intelligence Agency and Other Elements

     Section 411. Authorities of the Inspector General for the 
         Central Intelligence Agency
       Section 411 amends Section 17 of the Central Intelligence 
     Agency Act of 1949 to consolidate the Inspector General's 
     personnel authorities and to provide the Inspector General 
     with the same authorities as other Inspectors General to 
     request assistance and information from federal, state, and 
     local agencies or units thereof.
     Section 412. Prior congressional notification of transfers of 
         funds for certain intelligence activities
       Section 412 requires notification to the congressional 
     intelligence committees before transferring funds from the 
     Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Fund or the 
     Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund that are to be used for 
     intelligence activities.

             Title V--Matters Relating to Foreign Countries


                 Subtitle A--Matters Relating to Russia

     Section 501. Notice of deployment or transfer of Club-K 
         container missile system by the Russian Federation
       Section 501 requires the Director of National Intelligence 
     to submit written notice to the appropriate congressional 
     committees if the Intelligence Community receives 
     intelligence that the Russian Federation has deployed, or is 
     about to deploy, the Club-K container missile system through 
     the Russian military, or transferred or sold, or intends 
     to transfer or sell, such system to another state or non-
     state actor.
     Section 502. Assessment on funding of political parties and 
         nongovernmental organizations by the Russian Federation
       Section 502 requires the Director of National Intelligence 
     to submit an Intelligence Community assessment to the 
     appropriate congressional committees concerning the funding 
     of political parties and nongovernmental organizations in the 
     former Soviet States and Europe by the Russian Security 
     Services since January 1, 2006, not later than 180 days after 
     the enactment of the Fiscal Year 2016 Intelligence 
     Authorization Act.
     Section 503. Assessment on the use of political 
         assassinations as a form of statecraft by the Russian 
         Federation
       Section 503 requires the Director of National Intelligence 
     to submit an Intelligence Community assessment concerning the 
     use of political assassinations as a form of statecraft by 
     the Russian Federation to the appropriate congressional 
     committees, not later than 180 days after the enactment of 
     the Fiscal Year 2016 Intelligence Authorization Act.


            Subtitle B--Matters Relating to Other Countries

     Section 511. Report of resources and collection posture with 
         regard to the South China Sea and East China Sea
       Section 511 requires the Director of National Intelligence 
     to submit to the appropriate congressional committees an 
     Intelligence Community assessment on Intelligence Community 
     resourcing and collection posture with regard to the South 
     China Sea and East China Sea, not later than 180 days after 
     the enactment of the Fiscal Year 2016 Intelligence 
     Authorization Act.
     Section 512. Use of locally employed staff serving at a 
         United States diplomatic facility in Cuba
       Section 512 requires the Secretary of State, not later than 
     1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, to ensure 
     that key supervisory positions at a United States diplomatic 
     facility in Cuba are occupied by citizens of the United 
     States who have passed a thorough background check. Further, 
     not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of 
     this Act, the provision requires the Secretary of State, in 
     coordination with other appropriate government agencies, to 
     submit to the appropriate congressional committees a plan to 
     further reduce the reliance on locally employed staff in 
     United

[[Page S8847]]

     States diplomatic facilities in Cuba. The plan shall, at a 
     minimum, include cost estimates, timelines, and numbers of 
     employees to be replaced.
     Section 513. Inclusion of sensitive compartmented information 
         facilities in United States diplomatic facilities in Cuba
       Section 513 requires that each United States diplomatic 
     facility in Cuba--in which classified information will be 
     processed or in which classified communications occur--that 
     is constructed, or undergoes a construction upgrade, be 
     constructed to include a sensitive compartmented information 
     facility.
     Section 514. Report on use by Iran of funds made available 
         through sanctions relief
       Section 514 requires the Director of National Intelligence, 
     in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, to submit 
     to the appropriate congressional committees a report 
     assessing the monetary value of any direct or indirect form 
     of sanctions relief Iran has received since the Joint Plan of 
     Action (JPGA) entered into effect, and how Iran has used 
     funds made available through such sanctions relief. This 
     report shall be submitted every 180 days while the JPOA is in 
     effect, and not later than 1 year after an agreement relating 
     to Iran's nuclear program takes effect, and annually 
     thereafter while that agreement remains in effect.

 Title VI--Matters Relating to United States Naval Station, Guantanamo 
                               Bay, Cuba

     Section 601. Prohibition on use of funds for transfer or 
         release of individual detained at United States Naval 
         Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, to the United States
       Section 601 states that no amounts authorized to be 
     appropriated or otherwise made available to an element of the 
     Intelligence Community may be used to transfer or release 
     individuals detained at Guantanamo Bay to or within the 
     United States, its territories, or possessions.
     Section 602. Prohibition on use of funds to construct or 
         modify facilities in the United States to house detainees 
         transferred from United States Naval Station, Guantanamo 
         Bay, Cuba
       Section 602 states that no amounts authorized to be 
     appropriated or otherwise made available to an element of the 
     Intelligence Community may be used to construct or modify 
     facilities in the United States, its territories, or 
     possessions to house detainees transferred from Guantanamo 
     Bay.
     Section 603. Prohibition on use of funds for transfer or 
         release to certain countries of individuals detained at 
         United States Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba
       Section 603 states that no amounts authorized to be 
     appropriated or otherwise made available to an element of the 
     Intelligence Community may be used to transfer or release an 
     individual detained at Guantanamo Bay to the custody or 
     control of any country, or any entity within such country, as 
     follows: Libya, Somalia, Syria, or Yemen.

                  Title VII--Reports and other Matters


                          Subtitle A--Reports

     Section 701. Repeal of certain reporting requirements
       Section 701 repeals certain reporting requirements.
     Section 702. Reports on foreign fighters
       Section 702 requires the Director of National Intelligence 
     to submit a report every 60 days for the three years 
     following the enactment of this Act to the congressional 
     intelligence committees on foreign fighter flows to and from 
     Syria and Iraq. Section 702 requires information on the total 
     number of foreign fighters who have traveled to Syria or 
     Iraq, the total number of United States persons who have 
     traveled or attempted to travel to Syria or Iraq, the total 
     number of foreign fighters in Terrorist Identities Datamart 
     Environment, the total number of foreign fighters who have 
     been processed with biometrics, any programmatic updates to 
     the foreign fighter report, and a worldwide graphic that 
     describes foreign fighter flows to and from Syria.
     Section 703. Report on strategy, efforts, and resources to 
         detect, deter, and degrade Islamic State revenue 
         mechanisms
       Section 703 requires the Director of National Intelligence 
     to submit a report on the strategy, efforts, and resources of 
     the Intelligence Community that are necessary to detect, 
     deter, and degrade the revenue mechanisms of the Islamic 
     State.
     Section 704. Report on United States counterterrorism 
         strategy to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat the Islamic 
         State, al-Qa'ida, and their affiliated groups, associated 
         groups, and adherents
       Section 704 requires the President to submit to the 
     appropriated congressional committees a comprehensive report 
     on the counterterrorism strategy to disrupt, dismantle, and 
     defeat the Islamic State, al-Qa'ida, and their affiliated 
     groups associated groups, and adherents.
     Section 705. Report on effects of data breach of Office of 
         Personnel Management
       Section 705 requires the President to transmit to the 
     congressional intelligence communities a report on the data 
     breach of the Office of Personnel Management. Section 705 
     requires information on the impact of the breach on 
     Intelligence Community operations abroad, in addition to an 
     assessment of how foreign persons, groups, or countries may 
     use data collected by the breach and what Federal Government 
     agencies use best practices to protect sensitive data.
     Section 706. Report on hiring of graduates of Cyber Corps 
         Scholarship Program by intelligence community
       Section 706 requires the Director of National Intelligence 
     to submit to the congressional intelligence committees a 
     report on the employment by the Intelligence Community of 
     graduates of the Cyber Corps Scholarship Program. Section 706 
     requires information on the number of graduates hired by each 
     element of the Intelligence Community, the recruitment 
     process for each element of the Intelligence Community, and 
     the Director recommendations for improving the hiring 
     process.
     Section 707. Report on use of certain business concerns
       Section 707 requires the Director of National Intelligence 
     to submit to the congressional intelligence committees a 
     report of covered business concerns--including minority-
     owned, women-owned, small disadvantaged, service-enabled 
     veteran-owned, and veteran-owned small businesses--among 
     contractors that are awarded contracts by the Intelligence 
     Community for goods, equipment, tools and services.


                       Subtitle B--Other Matters

     Section 711. Use of homeland security grant funds in 
         conjunction with Department of Energy national 
         laboratories
       Section 711 amends Section 2008(a) of the Homeland Security 
     Act of 2002 to clarify that the Department of Energy's 
     national laboratories may seek access to homeland security 
     grant funds.
     Section 712. Inclusion of certain minority-serving 
         institutions in grant program to enhance recruiting of 
         intelligence community workforce
       Section 712 amends the National Security Act of 1947 to 
     include certain minority-serving institutions in the 
     intelligence officer training programs established under 
     Section 1024 of the Act.

  Mr. BURR. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the Joint 
Explanatory Statement for Division N--Cybersecurity Act of 2015 be 
printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

 JOINT EXPLANATORY STATEMENT TO ACCOMPANY THE CYBERSECURITY ACT OF 2015

       The following consists of the joint explanatory statement 
     to accompany the Cybersecurity Act of 2015.
       This joint explanatory statement reflects the status of 
     negotiations and disposition of issues reached between the 
     Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, the House Permanent 
     Select Committee on Intelligence, the Senate Committee on 
     Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, and the House 
     Committee on Homeland Security. The joint explanatory 
     statement shall have the same effect with respect to the 
     implementation of this Act as if it were a joint explanatory 
     statement of a committee of conference.
       The joint explanatory statement comprises an overview of 
     the bill's background and objectives, and a section-by-
     section analysis of the legislative text.

              Part I: Background and Need for Legislation

       Cybersecurity threats continue to affect our nation's 
     security and its economy, as losses to consumers, businesses, 
     and the government from cyber attacks, penetrations, and 
     disruptions total billions of dollars. This legislation is 
     designed to create a voluntary cybersecurity information 
     sharing process that will encourage public and private sector 
     entities to share cyber threat information, without legal 
     barriers and the threat of unfounded litigation--while 
     protecting private information. This in turn should foster 
     greater cooperation and collaboration in the face of growing 
     cybersecurity threats to national and economic security.
       This legislation also includes provisions to improve 
     Federal network and information system security, provide 
     assessments on the Federal cybersecurity workforce, and 
     provide reporting and strategies on cybersecurity industry-
     related and criminal-related matters. The increased 
     information sharing enabled by this bill is a critical step 
     toward improving cybersecurity in America.

  Part II: Section-by-Section Analysis and Explanation of Legislative 
                                  Text

       The following is a section-by-section analysis and 
     explanation of the Cybersecurity Act of 2015.

               Title I--Cybersecurity Information Sharing

     Section 101. Short title.
       Section 101 states that Title I may be cited as the 
     ``Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015.''
     Section 102. Definitions.
       Section 102 defines for purposes of this title key terms 
     such as ``cybersecurity purpose,'' ``cybersecurity threat,'' 
     ``cyber threat indicator,'' ``defensive measure,'' and 
     ``monitor.'' The definition of ``cybersecurity purpose'' is 
     meant to include a broad range of

[[Page S8848]]

     activities taken to protect information and information 
     systems from cybersecurity threats. The authorizations under 
     this Act are tied to conduct undertaken for a ``cybersecurity 
     purpose,'' which both clarifies their scope and ensures that 
     the authorizations cover activities that can be performed in 
     conjunction with one another. For instance, a private entity 
     conducting monitoring activities to determine whether it 
     should use an authorized ``defensive measure'' would be 
     monitoring for a ``cybersecurity purpose.'' Significantly, 
     the authorization for ``defensive measures'' does not include 
     activities that are generally considered ``offensive'' in 
     nature, such as unauthorized access of, or execution of 
     computer code on, another entity's information systems, such 
     as ``hacking back'' activities, or any actions that would 
     substantially harm another private entity's information 
     systems, such as violations of section 1030, of title 18, 
     United States Code.
     Section 103. Sharing of information by the Federal 
         Government.
       Section 103 requires the Director of National Intelligence, 
     the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Secretary of Defense, 
     and the Attorney General to jointly develop and issue 
     procedures for the timely sharing of classified and 
     unclassified cyber threat indicators and defensive measures 
     (hereinafter referenced collectively in this joint 
     explanatory statement as, ``cyber threat information'') with 
     relevant entities.
       These procedures must also ensure the Federal Government 
     maintains: a real-time sharing capability; a process for 
     notifying entities that have received cyber threat 
     information in error; protections against unauthorized 
     access; and procedures to review and remove, prior to sharing 
     cyber threat information, any information not directly 
     related to a cybersecurity threat known at the time of 
     sharing to be personal information of a specific individual 
     or that identifies a specific individual, or to implement a 
     technical capability to do the same. These procedures must be 
     developed in consultation with appropriate Federal entities, 
     including the Small Business Administration and the National 
     Laboratories.
     Section 104. Authorizations for preventing, detecting, 
         analyzing, and mitigating cybersecurity threats.
       Section 104 authorizes private entities to monitor their 
     information systems, operate defensive measures, and share 
     and receive cyber threat information. Private entities must, 
     prior to sharing cyber threat information, review and remove 
     any information not directly related to a cybersecurity 
     threat known at the time of sharing to be personal 
     information of a specific individual or that identifies a 
     specific individual, or to implement and utilize a technical 
     capability to do the same.
       Section 104 permits non-Federal entities to use cyber 
     threat information for cybersecurity purposes, to monitor, or 
     to operate defensive measures on their information systems or 
     on those of another entity (upon written consent). Cyber 
     threat information shared by an entity with a State, tribal, 
     or local department or agency may be used for the purpose of 
     preventing, investigating, or prosecuting any of the offenses 
     described in Section 105, below. Cyber threat information is 
     exempt from disclosure under any State, tribal, local, or 
     freedom of information or similar law.
       Section 104 further provides that two or more private 
     entities are not in violation of antitrust laws for 
     exchanging or providing cyber threat information, or for 
     assisting with the prevention, investigation, or mitigation 
     of a cybersecurity threat.
     Section 105. Sharing of cyber threat indicators and defensive 
         measures with the Federal Government.
       Section 105 directs the Attorney General and Secretary of 
     Homeland Security to jointly develop policies and procedures 
     to govern how the Federal Government shares information about 
     cyber threats, including via an automated real-time process 
     that allows for information systems to exchange identified 
     cyber threat information without manual efforts, subject to 
     limited exceptions that must be agreed upon in advance. 
     Section 105 also directs the Attorney General and Secretary 
     of Homeland Security, in coordination with heads of 
     appropriate Federal entities and in consultation with certain 
     privacy officials and relevant private entities, to jointly 
     issue and make publicly available final privacy and civil 
     liberties guidelines for Federal entity-based cyber 
     information sharing.
       Section 105 directs the Secretary of Homeland Security, in 
     coordination with heads of appropriate Federal entities, to 
     develop, implement, and certify the capability and process 
     through which the Federal Government receives cyber threat 
     information shared by a non-Federal entity with the Federal 
     Government. This section also provides the President with the 
     authority to designate an appropriate Federal entity, other 
     than the Department of Defense (including the National 
     Security Agency), to develop and implement an additional 
     capability and process following a certification and 
     explanation to Congress, as described in this section. The 
     capability and process at the Department of Homeland 
     Security, or at any additional appropriate Federal entity 
     designated by the President, does not prohibit otherwise 
     lawful disclosures of information related to criminal 
     activities, Federal investigations, or statutorily or 
     contractually required disclosures. However, this section 
     does not preclude the Department of Defense, including the 
     National Security Agency from assisting in the development 
     and implementation of a capability and process established 
     consistent with this title. It also shall not be read to 
     preclude any department or agency from requesting technical 
     assistance or staffing a request for technical assistance.
       Section 105 further provides that cyber threat information 
     shared with the Federal Government does not waive any 
     privilege or protection, may be deemed proprietary 
     information by the originating entity, and is exempt from 
     certain disclosure laws. Cyber threat information may be used 
     by the Federal government for: cybersecurity purposes; 
     identifying a cybersecurity threat or vulnerability; 
     responding to, preventing, or mitigating a specific threat of 
     death, a specific threat of serious bodily harm, or a 
     specific threat of serious economic harm, including a 
     terrorist act or a use of a weapon of mass destruction; 
     responding to, investigating, prosecuting, preventing, or 
     mitigating a serious threat to a minor; or preventing, 
     investigating, disrupting, or prosecuting an offense 
     arising out of certain cyber-related criminal activities.
       Finally, Section 105 provides that cyber threat information 
     shared with the Federal Government shall not be used by any 
     Federal, State, tribal, or local government to regulate non-
     Federal entities' lawful activities.
     Section 106. Protection from liability.
       Section 106 provides liability protection for private 
     entities that monitor, share, or receive cyber threat 
     information in accordance with Title I, notwithstanding any 
     other provision of Federal, State, local, or tribal law. 
     Section 106 further clarifies that nothing in Title I creates 
     a duty to share cyber threat information or a duty to warn or 
     act based on receiving cyber threat information. At the same 
     time, nothing in Title I broadens, narrows, or otherwise 
     affects any existing duties that might be imposed by other 
     law; Title I also does not limit any common law or statutory 
     defenses.
     Section 107. Oversight of Government activities.
       Section 107 requires reports and recommendations on 
     implementation, compliance, and privacy assessments by agency 
     heads, Inspectors General, and the Comptroller General of the 
     United States, to ensure that cyber threat information is 
     properly received, handled, and shared by the Federal 
     Government.
     Section 108. Construction and preemption.
       Section 108 contains Title I construction provisions 
     regarding lawful disclosures; whistleblower protections; 
     protection of sources and methods; relationship to other 
     laws; prohibited conduct, such as anti-competitive 
     activities; information sharing relationships; preservation 
     of contractual rights and obligations; anti-tasking 
     restrictions, including conditions on cyber threat 
     information sharing; information use and retention; Federal 
     preemption of State laws that restrict or regulate Title I 
     activities, excluding those concerning the use of authorized 
     law enforcement practices and procedures; regulatory 
     authorities; the Secretary of Defense's authorities to 
     conduct certain cyber operations; and Constitutional 
     protections in criminal prosecutions.
     Section 109. Report on cybersecurity threats.
       Section 109 requires the Director of National Intelligence, 
     with the heads of other appropriate Intelligence Community 
     elements, to submit a report to the congressional 
     intelligence committees on cybersecurity threats, including 
     cyber attacks, theft, and data breaches.
     Section 110. Exception to limitation on authority of 
         Secretary of Deftnse to disseminate certain information.
       Section 110 clarifies that, notwithstanding Section 
     393(c)(3) of title 10, United States Code, the Secretary of 
     Defense may authorize the sharing of cyber threat indicators 
     and defensive measures pursuant to the policies, procedures, 
     and guidelines developed or issued under this title.
     Section 111. Effective period.
       Section 111 establishes Title I and the amendments therein 
     are effective during the period beginning on the date of 
     enactment of this Act and ending on September 30, 2025. The 
     provisions of Title I will remain in effect however, for 
     action authorized by Title I or information obtained pursuant 
     to action authorized by Title I, prior to September 30, 2025.

              Title II--National Cybersecurity Advancement


   SUBTITLE A--NATIONAL CYBERSECURITY AND COMMUNICATIONS INTEGRATION 
                                 CENTER

     Section 201. Short title.
       Section 201 establishes that Title II, Subtitle A may be 
     cited as the ``National Cybersecurity Protection Advancement 
     Act of 2015''.
     Section 202. Definitions.
       Section 202 defines for purposes of Title II, Subtitle A, 
     the terms ``appropriate congressional committees,'' 
     ``cybersecurity risk,'' ``incident,'' ``cyber threat 
     indicator,'' ``defensive measure,'' ``Department,'' and 
     ``Secretary.''
     Section 203. Information sharing structure and processes.
       Section 203 enhances the functions of the Department of 
     Homeland Security's National Cybersecurity and Communications

[[Page S8849]]

     Integration Center, established in section 227 of the 
     Homeland Security Act of 2002 (redesignated by this Act). It 
     designates the Center as a Federal civilian interface for 
     multi-directional and cross-sector information sharing 
     related to cybersecurity risks, incidents, analysis and 
     warnings for Federal and non-Federal entities, including the 
     implementation of Title I of this Act. This section requires 
     the Center to engage with international partners; conduct 
     information sharing with Federal and non-Federal entities; 
     participate in national exercises; and assess and evaluate 
     consequence, vulnerability and threat information regarding 
     cyber incidents to public safety communications. 
     Additionally, this section requires the Center to collaborate 
     with state and local governments on cybersecurity risks and 
     incidents. The Center will comply with all policies, 
     regulations, and laws that protect the privacy and civil 
     liberties of United States persons, including by working with 
     the Privacy Officer to ensure the Center follows the privacy 
     policies and procedures established by title I of this Act.
       Section 203 requires the Department of Homeland Security, 
     in coordination with industry and other stakeholders, to 
     develop an automated capability for the timely sharing of 
     cyber threat indicators and defensive measures. It is 
     critical for the Department to develop an automated system 
     and supporting processes for the Center to disseminate cyber 
     threat indicators and defensive measures in a timely manner.
       This section permits the Center to enter into voluntary 
     information sharing relationships with any consenting non-
     Federal entity for the sharing of cyber threat indicators, 
     defensive measures, and information for cybersecurity 
     purposes. This section is intended to provide the Department 
     of Homeland Security additional options to enter into 
     streamlined voluntary information sharing agreements. This 
     section allows the Center to utilize standard and negotiated 
     agreements as the types of agreements that non-Federal 
     entities may enter into with the Center. However, it makes 
     clear that agreements are not limited to just these types, 
     and preexisting agreements between the Center and the non-
     Federal entity will be in compliance with this section.
       Section 203 requires the Director of the Center to report 
     directly to the Secretary for significant cybersecurity risks 
     and incidents. This section requires the Secretary to submit 
     to Congress a report on the range of efforts underway to 
     bolster cybersecurity collaboration with international 
     partners. Section 203 allows the Secretary to develop and 
     adhere to Department policies and procedures for coordinating 
     vulnerability disclosures.
     Section 204. Information sharing and analysis organizations.
       Section 204 amends Section 212 of the Homeland Security Act 
     to clarify the functions of Information Sharing and Analysis 
     Organizations (ISAOs) to include cybersecurity risk and 
     incident information beyond that pertaining to critical 
     infrastructure. ISAOs, including Information Sharing and 
     Analysis Centers (ISAOs) have an important role to play in 
     facilitating information sharing going forward and has 
     clarified their functions as defined in the Homeland Security 
     Act.
     Section 205. National response framework.
       Section 205 amends the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to 
     require the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, 
     with proper coordination, to regularly update the Cyber 
     Incident Annex to the National Response Framework of the 
     Department of Homeland Security.
     Section 206. Report on reducing cybersecurity risks in DHS 
         data centers.
       Section 206 requires the Secretary of the Department of 
     Homeland Security to submit a report to Congress not later 
     than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act on 
     the feasibility of using compartmentalization between systems 
     to create conditions conducive to reduced cybersecurity risks 
     in data centers.
     Section 207. Assessment.
       Section 207 requires the Comptroller General of the United 
     States not later than 2 years after the date of enactment of 
     this Act to submit a report on the implementation of Title 
     II, including increases in the sharing of cyber threat 
     indicators at the National Cybersecurity and Communications 
     Integration Center and throughout the United States.
     Section 208. Multiple simultaneous cyber incidents at 
         critical infrastructure.
       Section 208 requires the appropriate Department of Homeland 
     Security Under Secretary to draft and submit to Congress not 
     later than 1 year after the date of enactment of this Act a 
     report on the feasibility of producing a risk-informed plan 
     to address the risks of multiple simultaneous cyber incidents 
     affecting critical infrastructure as well as cascade effects.
     Section 209. Report on cybersecurity vulnerabilities of 
         United States ports.
       Section 209 requires the Secretary of Homeland Security not 
     later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act 
     to submit to Congress a report on the vulnerability of United 
     States ports to cybersecurity incidents, as well as potential 
     mitigations.
     Section 210. Prohibition on new regulatory authority.
       Section 210 clarifies that the Secretary of Homeland 
     Security does not gain any additional regulatory authorities 
     in this subtitle.
     Section 211. Termination of reporting requirements.
       Section 211 adds a 7-year sunset on the reporting 
     requirements in Title II, Subtitle A.


             SUBTITLE B--FEDERAL CYBERSECURITY ENHANCEMENT

     Section 221. Short title.
       Section 221 establishes that Title II, Subtitle B may be 
     cited as the ``Federal Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 
     2015''.
     Section 222. Definitions.
       Section 222 defines for purposes of Title II, Subtitle B, 
     the terms ``agency,'' ``agency information system,'' 
     ``appropriate congressional committees,'' ``cybersecurity 
     risk,'' ``information system,'' ``Director,'' ``intelligence 
     community,'' ``national security system,'' and ``Secretary.''
     Section 223. Improved Federal network security.
       Section 223 amends the Homeland Security Act of 2002 by 
     amending Section 228, as redesignated, to require an 
     intrusion assessment plan for Federal agencies and adding a 
     Section 230 to authorize a federal intrusion detection and 
     prevention capabilities'' for Federal agencies.
       Section 230 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, as added 
     by Section 223(a) of the bill, authorizes the Secretary of 
     Homeland Security to employ the Department's intrusion 
     detection and intrusion prevention capabilities, 
     operationally implemented under the ``EINSTEIN'' programs, to 
     scan agencies' network traffic for malicious activity and 
     block it. The Secretary and agencies with sensitive data are 
     expected to confer regarding the sensitivity of, and 
     statutory protections otherwise applicable to, information on 
     agency information systems. The Secretary is expected to 
     ensure that the policies and procedures developed under 
     section 230 appropriately restrict and limit Department 
     access, use, retention, and handling of such information to 
     protect the privacy and confidentiality of such information, 
     including ensuring that the Department protects such 
     sensitive data from disclosure, and trains appropriate staff 
     accordingly.
       Section 223(b) mandates that agencies deploy and adopt 
     those capabilities within one year for all network traffic 
     traveling to or from each information system owned or 
     operated by the agency, or two months after the capabilities 
     are first made available to the agency, whichever is later. 
     The subsection also requires that agencies adopt improvements 
     added to the intrusion detection and prevention capabilities 
     six months after they are made available. Improvements is 
     intended to be read broadly to describe expansion of the 
     capabilities, new systems, and added technologies, for 
     example: non-signature based detection systems such as 
     heuristic- and behavior-based detection, new countermeasures 
     to block malicious traffic beyond e-mail filtering and Domain 
     Name System (DNS)-sinkholing, and scanning techniques that 
     allow scanning of encrypted traffic.
     Section 224. Advanced internal defenses.
       Section 224 directs the Secretary of Homeland Security to 
     add advanced network security tools to the Continuous 
     Diagnostics and Mitigation program; develop and implement a 
     plan to ensure agency use of advanced network security tools; 
     and, with the Director of the Office of Management and 
     Budget, prioritize advanced security tools and update metrics 
     used to measure security under the Federal Information 
     Security Management Act of 2002.
     Section 225. Federal cybersecurity requirements.
       Section 225 adds a statutory requirement for the head of 
     each agency not later than 1 year after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act to implement several standards on their 
     networks to include identification of sensitive and mission 
     critical data, use of encryption, and multi-factor 
     authentication.
     Section 226. Assessment; reports.
       Section 226 includes a requirement for a Government 
     Accountability Office study to be conducted on the 
     effectiveness of this approach and strategy. It also requires 
     reports from the Department of Homeland Security, Federal 
     Chief Information Officer, and the Office of Management and 
     Budget. Required reporting includes an annual report from the 
     Department of Homeland Security on the effectiveness and 
     privacy controls of the intrusion detection and prevention 
     capabilities; information on adoption of the intrusion 
     detection and capabilities at agencies in the Office of 
     Management and Budget's annual Federal Information Security 
     Management Act report; an assessment by the Federal Chief 
     Information Officer within two years of enactment as to 
     continued value of the intrusion detection and prevention 
     capabilities; and a Government Accountability report in three 
     years on the effectiveness of Federal agencies' approach to 
     securing agency information systems.
     Section 227. Termination.
       Section 227 creates a 7-year sunset for the authorization 
     of the intrusion detection and prevention capabilities in 
     Section 230 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, as added by 
     Section 223(a).
     Section 228. Identification of information systems relating 
         to national security.
       Section 228 requires the Director of National Intelligence 
     and the Director of the Office of Management, in coordination 
     with

[[Page S8850]]

     other agencies, not later than 180 days after the date of 
     enactment of this Act to identify unclassified information 
     systems that could reveal classified information, and submit 
     a report assessing the risks associated with a breach of such 
     systems and the costs and impact to designate such systems as 
     national security systems.
     Section 229. Direction to agencies.
       Section 229 authorizes the Secretary of Homeland Security 
     to issue an emergency directive to the head of an agency to 
     take any lawful action with respect to the operation of an 
     information system for the purpose of protecting such system 
     from an information security threat. In situations in which 
     the Secretary has determined there is an imminent threat to 
     an agency, the Secretary may authorize the use of intrusion 
     detection and prevention capabilities in accordance with 
     established procedures, including notice to the affected 
     agency.

         Title III--Federal Cybersecurity Workforce Assessment

     Section 301. Short title.
       Section 301 establishes Title III may be cited as the 
     ``Federal Cybersecurity Workforce Assessment Act of 2015''.
     Section 302. Definitions.
       Section 302 defines for purposes of Title III the terms 
     ``appropriate congressional committees,'' ``Director,'' 
     ``National Initiative for Cybersecurity Education,'' and 
     ``work roles.''
     Section 303. National cybersecurity workforce measurement 
         initiative.
       Section 303 requires the head of each Federal agency to 
     identify all positions within the agency that require the 
     performance of cybersecurity or other cyber-related 
     functions, and report the percentage of personnel in such 
     positions holding the appropriate certifications, the level 
     of preparedness of personnel without certifications to take 
     certification exams, and a strategy for mitigating any 
     identified certification and training gaps.
     Section 304. Identification of cyber-related work roles of 
         critical need
       Section 304 requires the head of each Federal agency to 
     identify information technology, cybersecurity, or other 
     cyber-related roles of critical need in the agency's 
     workforce, and substantiate as such in a report to the 
     Director of the Office of Personnel Management. Section 304 
     also requires the Director of the Office of Personnel 
     Management to submit a subsequent report not later than 2 
     years after the date of the enactment of this Act, on 
     critical needs for information technology, cybersecurity, or 
     other cyber-related workforce across all Federal agencies, 
     and the implementation of this section.
     Section 305. Government Accountability Office status reports.
       Section 305 requires the Comptroller General of the United 
     States to analyze and monitor the implementation of sections 
     303 and 304 and not later than 3 years after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act submit a report on the status of such 
     implementation.

                     Title IV--Other Cyber Matters

     Section 401. Study on mobile device security.
       Section 401 requires the Secretary of Homeland Security not 
     later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act 
     to conduct a study on threats relating to the security of the 
     mobile devices used by the Federal Government, and submit a 
     report detailing the findings and recommendations arising 
     from such study.
     Section 402. Department of State international cyberspace 
         policy strategy.
       Section 402 requires the Secretary of State not later than 
     90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act to 
     produce a comprehensive strategy relating to United States 
     international policy with regard to cyberspace, to include a 
     review of actions taken by the Secretary of State in support 
     of the President's International Strategy for Cyberspace and 
     a description of threats to United States national security 
     in cyberspace.
     Section 403. Apprehension and prosecution of international 
         cyber criminals.
       Section 403 requires the Secretary of State, or a designee, 
     to consult with countries in which international cyber 
     criminals are physically present and extradition to the 
     United States is unlikely, to determine what efforts the 
     foreign country has taken to apprehend, prosecute, or 
     otherwise prevent the carrying out of cybercrimes against 
     United States persons or interests. Section 403 further 
     requires an annual report that includes statistics and 
     extradition status about such international cyber criminals.
     Section 404. Enhancement of emergency services.
       Section 404 requires the Secretary of Homeland Security not 
     later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this 
     Act to establish a process by which a Statewide 
     Interoperability Coordinator may report data on any 
     cybersecurity risk or incident involving any information 
     system or network used by emergency response providers within 
     the state. Reported data will be analyzed and used in 
     developing information and recommendations on security and 
     resilience on measures for information systems and networks 
     used by state emergency response providers.
     Section 405. Improving cybersecurity in the health care 
         industry.
       Section 405 requires the Secretary of Health and Human 
     Services to establish a task force and not later than 1 year 
     after the date of enactment of the task force to submit a 
     report on the Department of Health and Human Services and the 
     health care industry's preparedness to respond to 
     cybersecurity threats. In support of the report, the 
     Secretary of Health and Human Services will convene health 
     care industry stakeholders, cybersecurity experts, and other 
     appropriate entities, to establish a task force for analyzing 
     and disseminating information on industry-specific 
     cybersecurity challenges and solutions.
       Consistent with subsection (e), it is Congress's intention 
     to allow Health and Human Services the flexibility to 
     leverage and incorporate ongoing activities as of the day 
     before the date of enactment of this act to accomplish the 
     goals set forth for this task force.
     Section 406. Federal computer security.
       Section 406 requires the Inspector General of any agency 
     operating a national security system, or a Federal computer 
     system that provides access to personally identifiable 
     information, not later than 240 days after the date of 
     enactment of this Act to submit a report regarding the 
     federal computer systems of such agency, to include 
     information on the standards and processes for granting or 
     denying specific requests to obtain and use information and 
     related information processing services, and a description of 
     the data security management practices used by the agency.
     Section 407. Stopping the fraudulent sale of financial 
         information of people of the United States.
       Section 407 amends 18 U.S. Code Sec. 1029 by enabling the 
     Federal Government to prosecute overseas criminals who profit 
     from financial information that has been stolen from 
     Americans.

  Mr. HATCH. Madam President, the bill we are considering today 
contains a provision in section 305 providing for some tax relief for 
refiners whose costs will increase as a result of the repeal of the ban 
on oil exports. This provision permits refiners to modify the 
calculation of production activities income to lessen the impact of 
high transportation costs in bringing crude oil to their refineries. 
The provision permits adjusting such activities income for properly 
allocable transportation costs. Many times transportation costs are 
embedded within an invoice and not broken out as a separate line item, 
such as included in the delivered price of crude. These are clearly 
transportation costs intended to be taken into account for purposes of 
this section.
  Mr. REID. Madam President, in Section 303 of the House amendment No. 
1 to the Senate amendment to H.R. 2029, the text of the Consolidated 
Appropriations Act, 2016, the section 48 Investment Tax Credit, 26 
U.S.C. section 48, is extended for 5 years, beginning on January 1, 
2017, and phased down to 26 percent in 2020 and 22 percent in 2021. 
Section 303 inadvertently only extends the credit for solar energy 
technologies, rather than all of the technologies currently eligible to 
receive the credit.
  The intention of the agreement that I reached with the majority 
leader was to extend the section 48 Investment Tax Credit for all of 
the eligible technologies for 5 years and to treat each technology 
eligible for a 30 percent credit the same with respect to a phase down 
in the years 2020 and 2021. The permanent 10 percent credit for 
eligible technologies under section 48 will remain in place.
  The majority leader and I hope to address this early next year in an 
appropriate legislative vehicle.
  Mr. DURBIN. Madam President, for several weeks, negotiations have 
been ongoing on a multitude of controversial provisions relating to the 
omnibus. While those debates were raging in different parts of the 
Capitol, work on the Defense appropriations bill continued quietly and 
efficiently.
  I believe many Americans would be surprised to know about the 
exemplary level of bipartisanship that went into crafting this 
legislation, which provides the funding to take care of the women and 
men serving our country in uniform.
  This bill provides for the pay and benefits of each member of the 
Armed Forces, equips them with the tools they need, and develops the 
next generation of technology to improve our national security.
  Neither the chairman of the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, 
Senator Cochran, nor I got everything we wanted out of this bill. Tough 
decisions had to be made.
  Chairman Cochran supported a number of my suggestions for the bill, 
we worked together on others, and we disagreed on a few. The end result 
is a

[[Page S8851]]

good bill that meets the needs of our national security.
  The Defense appropriations bill provides all the needed resources for 
ongoing military operations, including the funds requested by the 
President to carry out anti-ISIL operations in Syria and Iraq.
  It adds $1.2 billion to the request to account for maintaining a 
larger presence in Afghanistan through 2016. And because the situation 
in Afghanistan, Syria, and Iraq is so fluid, it includes additional OCO 
reprogramming authority--a total of $4.5 billion--to respond to 
unexpected events.
  We also maintain robust funding for intelligence collection on 
traditional and nontraditional threats to this country, so that our 
Nation can continue to be a step ahead of threats to Americans and our 
allies.
  The DOD has a long history of scientific innovation for the purpose 
of keeping our troops safe and providing an edge over our adversaries. 
We also know that millions of Americans who have never served in 
uniform often benefit from these defense breakthroughs. This bill 
provides a total of $1.94 billion for DOD medical research programs, 
which is 5 percent real growth over last year's funding level.
  The medical research funding in this bill is directed toward 
competition, whether it is the $667 million in core research funding, 
the $278 million in the Peer-Reviewed Medical Research Program, the 
$120 million for breast cancer research, or the variety of other 
research programs provided in the legislation.
  I have heard criticism that medical research doesn't belong in a 
defense bill.
  Defense medical research is relatively small--NIH research funding is 
15 times larger--but DOD has made important breakthroughs that help 
servicemembers, their families, and all Americans.
  As one example, Army researchers have developed E75, a vaccine that 
cuts in half the chance that breast cancer will return. Women around 
the country benefited from that breakthrough, including those in 
uniform and those in military families seeking care at DOD hospitals.
  The bill also provides $2.3 billion for nonmedical basic research, a 
$220 million increase over the President's request. These funds help 
expand our knowledge of the universe in a variety of disciplines and 
may eventually lead to the next technology breakthrough that will 
enrich our lives.
  The bill includes $487 million for U.S.-Israeli cooperative missile 
defense programs, fully funding the request from the Government of 
Israel.
  We provide for a strong stand against Russian aggression in Europe. 
The European Reassurance Initiative, which increases U.S. troop 
presence and training in more than a dozen countries, is fully funded. 
An additional $250 million is provided for lethal and nonlethal aid to 
the Ukraine security services. The bill also includes $412 million to 
fully fund upgrades to the Army's Stryker fleet because of the threat 
from Russia.
  However, the agreement takes a more cautious view of DOD's program to 
train the Syrian opposition. It is one of many programs for which the 
Department can request funds by reprogramming from the Counterterrorism 
Partnerships Fund. This process improves congressional oversight as 
well as places the onus on DOD to justify further expenses for the 
Syrian training program.
  The bill includes a long list of increases to defense programs that 
were underfunded in the President's request. These programs are 
essential to maintaining the military advantage against our opponents 
and also support a strong and stable defense industrial base.
  Some of the highlights include: $1 billion for an additional DDG-51 
destroyer, 12 additional F-18 aircraft, 11 additional F-35 Joint Strike 
Fighters, $300 million for the Navy's UCLASS drone, sufficient funding 
to keep the A-10 operating for another year, and $1 billion for the 
National Guard and Reserve Equipment Account.
  Finally, the bill includes a provision to guarantee competition for 
the launch of DOD satellites. I have studied the history of DOD's space 
launch programs, and it is a testament to how poor oversight leads to 
taxpayers being stuck with an expensive bill.
  In the mid-2000s, United Launch Alliance gained a monopoly on 
satellite launches. Over a few short years, the cost of its rockets 
escalated by 65 percent. Just this year, SpaceX was certified to 
compete against ULA. These competitions have barely begun, and already 
we are seeing large savings in launch costs. But provisions in the 
Defense Authorization Act are threatening to create a new launch 
monopoly, this time with SpaceX in charge.
  The issue is that ULA uses a Russian rocket engine, and a new 
American-made engine will not be ready to compete until 2022. During 
that time, DOD wants to compete 37 launches, but under Defense 
authorization bills, ULA is only allowed to win four of those 
contracts.
  We all want to eliminate reliance on Russian engines. This bill adds 
$144 million to make a new U.S.-built rocket a reality as soon as 
possible.
  I must remind Senators that NASA and NOAA are not restricted from 
using Russian engines for its satellites. Why should we agree to a 
double standard--a looming monopoly for national security space 
launches but full and open competition for scientific missions?
  The provision in this bill simply guarantees that the Air Force for 
the next year will live under the same rules as NASA and NOAA, while a 
new American-made rocket is developed and will hopefully be ready in 
2022.
  This large and complex bill amounts to half of the discretionary 
budget of the United States. It is essential to our national security, 
and this bill improves on DOD's budget proposals in many ways.
  Once again, I would like to thank my friend, Chairman Cochran, for 
his steady hand in moving this legislation forward in a constructive 
and bipartisan manner. The Defense Subcommittee has a long history of 
strong partnerships, and I am pleased that this tradition carries on 
today.
  Mr. LEAHY. Madam President, hard-working Americans deserve more than 
living paycheck to paycheck, worrying about having to choose between 
paying an electric bill or putting healthy food on the table. This 
appropriations law ends a year of continuing budget uncertainty and 
extends tax credits for millions of hard-working families. We have kept 
out harmful riders that would have undermined everything from Wall 
Street reform to clean air and water laws. There are many steps forward 
in this bill for Vermonters and all Americans, but we need stronger 
steps. We need to carry this into the new year and strengthen it, to 
help lift the middle class and to protect the most vulnerable among us.
  We need much more progress in creating well-paying jobs in rural 
areas like Vermont, not just in the Nation's urban centers. We need to 
do more to protect Social Security and Medicare and other programs in 
the safety net. We need to do more to make college affordable for 
students and families.
  This bill will let Congress begin the new year with focusing on 
America's middle class, taking stronger steps to help working families. 
By standing together, Senate Democrats have made it possible to cancel 
the harmful sequester and to lift caps to make investments possible 
that will make a difference in communities across Vermont--from cleanup 
efforts on Lake Champlain, to ramping up our fight against opioid 
addiction, to equipping our police officers with lifesaving bulletproof 
vests.
  This omnibus spending bill is good news for my home State of Vermont, 
too. It includes important funds for the EPA's Lake Champlain 
Geographic Program, which will be critical as Vermont and the EPA take 
on ambitious new work and regulations to address water quality and 
phosphorus levels in Lake Champlain. As much as Vermonters and millions 
of visitors to our State enjoy Lake Champlain, we know that business as 
usual simply will not cut it. We need serious action, measurable work 
on the ground, and strong Federal resources in order to make real 
progress to clean up Lake Champlain. That is why I made supporting the 
EPA's geographic programs a top priority for fiscal year 2016. That 
this final bill maintains the strong Federal investments that were made 
last year reflects a real partnership among Federal, State, and local 
partners.

[[Page S8852]]

  The omnibus makes essential investments to help States and local 
municipalities fight the scourge of opioid and heroin addiction, which 
continues to devastate too many communities. Vermont has been a 
national leader in calling attention to this problem and bringing 
together communities to find solutions. This spending package includes 
a number of programs that will continue to support those efforts. We 
know that it will require strong Federal support to join State and 
local efforts to address this heroin crisis. In particular, this 
omnibus package includes funding for the Anti-Heroin Task Force Program 
that began last year to provide support to State law enforcement 
efforts like those of the Vermont Drug Task Force in dismantling supply 
chains trafficking heroin into our States.
  Because we know that enforcement alone cannot solve this problem, 
this bill also includes increased funding for grants to expand 
medication assisted treatment programs, and funding to distribute 
lifesaving naloxone to prevent overdoses. It offers continued support 
for drug court programs that prevent individuals suffering from 
addiction from needlessly entering our criminal justice system and 
instead helps set them on a path towards treatment and recovery. I am 
proud to support for funding these critical programs that provide a 
lifeline to communities struggling to eliminate this opioid crisis.
  This omnibus bill will grow jobs in Vermont and across the country. 
When I walk down the street in Montpelier or talk to people at the 
grocery store in Waterbury, I hear too many stories from Vermonters who 
are working two, even three jobs to make ends meet. Congress needs to 
do more to spur job growth, and I believe this bill will make a 
measurable impact.
  The heart and soul of Vermont's economy are our small businesses. In 
fact, over 90 percent of the employers in Vermont are small businesses, 
employing more than half of all Vermonters that work in the private 
sector. So naturally, the Small Business Administration, SBA, and the 
programs it supports are critically important to ensuring that Vermont 
businesses have access to the capital they need to expand. Year after 
year, we see all sectors of the Vermont economy utilizing SBA programs 
from manufacturing, to agriculture, clean energy, and even craft 
brewing. Vermont Precision Tools in Swanton, which manufactures high-
quality burs for the medical device industry, is one such example. 
Pete's Greens, a certified organic vegetable farm that has been a 
leader in Vermont's agricultural renaissance, is another. This past 
year, the SBA had its highest level of lending in Vermont, backing more 
than $53 million in loans. This omnibus bill will ensure that 
Vermonters have access to just as much capital in 2016.
  Another critical source of capital for Vermont's businesses has been 
made possible through the Treasury Department's Community Development 
Financial Institutions Fund, CDFI. Community Capital of Vermont is one 
of our State's organizations that have leveraged CDFI funds and the 
SBA's microloan program to help neighborhood businesses--such as Barrio 
Bakery in the Old North End of Burlington, Patchwork Farm Bakery in 
Hardwick, Liberty Chocolates in Montpelier, and Bent Hill Brewery in 
Randolph. This year we were able to increase funding for the CDFI 
program, while also increasing access to healthy food and expanding 
work in rural areas.
  Vermont is a northern border State, and the connection we share with 
our Canadian neighbors is an important one for our cultural and 
economic identity. Senators from neighboring States know well that some 
communities have experienced unique economic challenges, and that is 
why we worked together to create the Northern Border Regional 
Commission, NBRC. I appreciate their support and joining with me to 
increase the NBRC budget to $7.5 million for the coming year. In the 
short time the commission has existed, it has helped companies like 
Superior Technical Ceramics in St. Albans develop a plan to increase 
their exports; the Vermont Sustainable Jobs Fund is helping grow 
Vermont's wood products sector; an industrial park in Franklin County 
has received funds for improvements to entice Canadian companies to 
expand in the United States; and--a jewel of the Northeast Kingdom--
Willoughby Lake, will have increased amenities resulting in more travel 
and tourism.
  As a result of the Bipartisan Budget Act Congress approved in 
October, critical funding was restored to the HOME program, which helps 
States and communities preserve existing and produce new units of 
affordable housing. The Senate-passed Transportation, Housing and Urban 
Development bill decimated the HOME program, providing a paltry $66 
million. Because of the Bipartisan Budget Act, in fiscal year 2016, the 
HOME program will receive $950 million--an increase of $50 million over 
2015 funding--which will help every State, including Vermont, address 
critical housing needs.
  The National Institutes of Health, the Nation's leading medical 
research hub, will receive a $2 billion increase in funding, which will 
benefit research institutions like the University of Vermont.
  The bill continues to support community health centers that will be 
funded at just over $5 billion next year. In Vermont alone, 11 
federally qualified community health centers with 56 delivery sites 
provided care over the past 2 years to nearly 200,000 patients. These 
health centers employ over 900 people.
  The omnibus reauthorizes for 3 years the Land and Water Conservation 
Fund, and provides needed funding to support it. Early next year, I 
hope Congress will redouble its efforts to ensure that this critical 
conservation program--which supports projects in every State, in every 
corner of our country--receives permanent authorization and full 
funding--all at no expense to the taxpayer.
  Important, too, is that this omnibus rejects efforts by industry 
giants to block Vermont's Act 120, which requires the labeling of 
genetically engineered foods. Vermonters support their law, because 
they believe--as do I--that consumers have the right to know what is in 
the food they are eating. An omnibus spending bill is no place to make 
national policy that undermines carefully crafted laws at the state 
level.
  As ranking member of the Department of State and Foreign Operations 
Appropriations Subcommittee, I want to thank Chairman Lindsey Graham, 
Chairwoman Kay Granger, and Ranking Member Nita Lowey for the way they 
worked with me and my staff to reach agreement on the State and foreign 
operations title of this omnibus bill. Their expertise was invaluable 
in producing a bill that provides funding for important diplomatic, 
development, security, and humanitarian priorities of the United States 
and that reflect our Nation's values.
  Division K of the omnibus, for the Department of State and foreign 
operations, provides a total of $52.7 billion in discretionary budget 
authority. This funding helps protect U.S. personnel, including our 
diplomats, working overseas; funds programs to combat trafficking in 
persons, wildlife poaching, and drug smuggling; provides historic 
levels of funding to combat HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria, and other 
diseases that threaten hundreds of millions of people around the world; 
supports key allies in countering ISIL and other terrorist 
organizations; provides funds to promote renewable energy and protect 
the environment; and funds relief programs for refugees and other 
victims of conflict and natural disasters. These are just a few 
examples. Division K also includes important provisions to ensure 
transparency, combat corruption, and prevent assistance to and 
encourage accountability for those who would misuse U.S. assistance by 
violating human rights or engaging in corruption or other financial 
crimes.
  I am particularly pleased that the bill includes increased funding 
for agent orange remediation and health and disability programs in 
Vietnam; the Leahy War Victims Fund to assist innocent victims of war, 
clear unexploded bombs in Southeast Asia and other parts of the world; 
and educational and cultural exchange programs including the amount 
requested for the Fulbright exchange program. In addition, authority is 
provided to help threatened scholars around the world find academic 
institutions where they can continue their work in safety.
  The bill also supports programs that directly benefit Vermonters, 
including the amount requested for the Peace

[[Page S8853]]

Corps and funding above the amount requested for the Great Lakes 
Fishery Commission to support additional sea lamprey control in the 
Great Lakes and the Lake Champlain Basin.
  I am disappointed that a provision I authored, which was included in 
the Senate bill, to enable the U.S. to provide technical assistance to 
support investigations, apprehensions, and prosecutions of those who 
commit genocide and other crimes against humanity, was not included. 
There are also some things that I wish were not in this bill, including 
a provision carried from last year that would weaken limits on carbon 
emissions from projects financed by the Export-Import Bank and Overseas 
Private Investment Corporation. No bill is perfect, and we will 
undoubtedly revisit these and other issues next year.
  I have heard from many Vermonters concerned that controversial policy 
provisions were to be included in this final spending bill. While I am 
grateful this final bill does not include many of the poison pill 
policy riders included in the House and Senate passed bills--measures 
that would have eroded health care services, repealed Dodd-Frank, and 
threatened key environmental protections, among other issues--I am 
concerned that it includes a giveaway to Big Oil by lifting the 
decades-long ban on crude oil exports. While I understand that, in 
exchange for lifting the ban, the omnibus is free of several proposed 
policy riders that would undermine Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act 
regulations and extends several environmental and renewable energy tax 
measures, I share the concerns of many environmentalists that lifting 
this ban will result in increased oil development and we could see 
higher gasoline prices in New England.
  I am disappointed that the omnibus includes two policy riders that 
will further wear away transparency and accountability in our campaign 
finance system. These provisions will only promote the spending of dark 
money in Federal elections and further erode the trust of the American 
people in their political system.
  I am also disappointed that the omnibus is being used to jam cyber 
security information sharing legislation through Congress. This is not 
the way to pass major legislation, particularly one that threatens to 
significantly harm Americans' privacy rights. This new version of the 
cyber security information sharing bill--which was negotiated behind 
closed doors by leaders of the Senate and House Intelligence 
Committees--rolls back a number of significant consumer and privacy 
protections that were included in the Senate-passed bill and over which 
the Judiciary Committee has primary jurisdiction, including language 
that could affect the scope of liability protections and that would 
expand Federal preemption of State FOIA and transparency laws. These 
changes are dangerous and unnecessary. Congress should have been given 
an opportunity to study, debate, and vote on a bill of this magnitude 
under regular order--not choose between this bill and a government 
shutdown. I hope that, when the Senate returns next year, we can 
consider legislation to mitigate the potential harm of this 
legislation.
  Of course, with this omnibus spending bill, the Senate will consider 
the Protecting Americans from Tax Hikes, PATH, Act. Last year, in the 
closing days of Congress, I opposed a 1-year, retroactive extension of 
expiring tax credits, not because I do not support those credits, but 
because our small businesses, middle-class families, and entrepreneurs 
need more certainty. The PATH Act provides that in some instances 
through 2016 and in other instances with permanency.
  I am pleased that the PATH Act extends permanently the earned income 
tax credit, EITC, and the child tax credit, CTC. These credits have 
helped Vermont families recover from the recession. Vermont was one of 
the first States in the nation to supplement federal EITC dollars. In 
2013, low-income families in Vermont received an estimated $2,400 in 
State and Federal tax credits that year. For the many families who 
qualify for these programs, these credits provide a significant 
increase in take-home pay. This not only has the potential to lift 
families out of poverty, it also motivates many to return to the 
workforce. While I would have preferred that these extensions be paired 
with an indexing proposal, extending permanency to them is welcomed 
news for millions of American families.
  The PATH Act also supports small businesses by encouraging hiring, 
promoting investment in low-income areas, promoting domestic renewable 
energy development, and encouraging research and development. I am 
grateful that the bill includes a permanently extension of the 
charitable deduction for contributions of food inventory. I have long 
championed this deduction. It helps organizations like the Vermont Food 
Bank and encourages donors to support food shelfs across the country.
  Finally, I am deeply disappointed that, despite bipartisan, bicameral 
agreement, needed reforms to the EB-5 regional center program were not 
included in this final bill. On Tuesday evening, just hours before the 
bill became public, congressional leaders inexplicably decided to 
extend the EB-5 program without any reform. The program was given a 
free pass despite broad, bipartisan agreement that it is in urgent need 
of an overhaul. Time and again, concerns have been raised about the 
regional center program's susceptibility to fraud, its lack of 
oversight and transparency, and the rampant abuse of its incentives to 
invest in underserved communities--undermining a core premise of the 
program. Homeland Security Secretary Johnson, the Government 
Accountability Office, and the Department of Homeland Security Office 
of Inspector General have all raised concerns.
  While the program's flaws are obvious to anyone paying attention, the 
necessary fixes are as well. I have long worked to improve the regional 
center program, and my EB-5 amendment to the Senate's comprehensive 
immigration reform bill in the last Congress was unanimously approved 
in the Judiciary Committee. This Congress, I authored far-reaching 
reforms with Chairman Grassley and House Judiciary Chairman Goodlatte 
and Ranking Member Conyers. We had the support of by far the largest 
trade association representing the EB-5 industry, as well as the civil 
rights community. We pushed hard to include our reforms in the omnibus, 
but some congressional leaders inexcusably rejected these vital 
reforms.
  We have a comprehensive, bipartisan reform bill that the chairmen and 
ranking members of both the House and Senate Judiciary Committees 
support. These reforms would address the many troubles that plague this 
program, including increasing oversight and transparency, protecting 
investors, and promoting investment and job growth in underserved 
communities as Congress always intended. We cannot again squander this 
opportunity. We should act on our bill when we return in January to 
ensure integrity and to demand ongoing oversight of the program.
  Mr. SESSIONS. Madam President, the bill before us today represents a 
colossal addition to our Nation's debt, which currently stands at $18.4 
trillion. Earlier this year, the Budget Committee worked hard to 
develop a budget plan that would balance in the next 10 years by saving 
money, cutting costs, and examining inefficient programs and 
provisions. It was not easy to find the cuts necessary to achieve the 
goals laid out in that proposal. But the tax extenders bill costs are a 
large step away from getting our Nation back on a sound fiscal footing 
and accomplishing the objectives laid out in the budget plan.
  When the Joint Committee on Taxation, JCT, scored the bill, they 
found that in just the next year, it will add $157 billion to the debt, 
and that cost will swell to $622 billion over the next 10 years. The 
government will have to borrow this money; we do not have it to spend. 
The Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget, CRFB, headed by Maya 
MacGuiness, took an independent look at these tax provisions. According 
to the CRFB, the United States will have to pay an additional $130 
billion in interest charges over the next 10 years on the money 
borrowed to finance this legislation. Maya's organization makes one 
more important point that many here in Congress have not sufficiently 
considered. The $622 billion advertised cost will balloon even further 
to $2 trillion over the next

[[Page S8854]]

two decades. Certainly, many of the provisions in this package are 
good, but President Obama and Congress need to recognize there are 
limits.
  The bill also extends costly tax credits that are scored rightly by 
the Congressional Budget Office as support payments, not tax 
deductions; and allows tax credits, earned income tax credits, for 
illegal aliens favored by President Obama's Executive amnesty and the 
additional income tax credit, which allows billions to go to illegal 
aliens. These provisions are unwise and need serious reform before 
extending.
  There are indeed some good provisions in this bill. Businesses across 
the nation will benefit by the research and development and section 179 
bonus depreciation tax credits being made permanent. Many businesses in 
my State rely on the credits and making them permanent provides 
consistency for better planning. But the $611 billion cost in new 
expenditures and lost revenues is huge. This Congress has to know that 
a $2 trillion addition to the debt over the next 20 years is simply too 
much. This is a step away not towards fiscal responsibility.
  It is these kinds of rationalizations that can cause a country to go 
broke. For perspective, Congress struggled mightily to find $77 billion 
above the gas tax to pay for the 5-year highway bill. This tax package 
is so huge it will make the highway bill costs look insignificant.
  Colleagues, we cannot be in denial about how much this bill costs. We 
all have a strong desire for tax cuts and tax reform. I have supported 
such bills many times in the past, but this bill has little reform and 
great cost. I am disappointed that I cannot support this bill.
  Mr. KAINE. Madam President, I want to speak today about the Omnibus 
appropriations and tax bill. First, I want to applaud my colleagues who 
have worked tirelessly towards this deal for over a year now. Our 
leadership and the leaders of our Appropriations, Finance, and Budget 
Committees have been setting the stage for this action and I want to 
thank them.
  This bill, H.R. 2029, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, 
addresses many priorities that I have been fighting for since joining 
the Senate in 2013. It comes on the heels of the Bipartisan Budget Act 
we passed in October of this year, which addressed for 2 years the 
arbitrary budget caps set by sequestration and implements the first 
year of that agreement.
  First enacted as part of the Bipartisan Budget Control Act of 2011, 
these arbitrary budget caps have been hurting our national defense and 
domestic priorities since sequestration went into effect in 2013 by 
arbitrarily forcing critical agencies such as the Department of Defense 
to set strategy and policy based on artificial caps. As a former mayor 
and Governor I have a lot of experience with budgets and 
decisionmaking. I understand using budgets gimmicks to set policy is 
the opposite of what we should be doing. It is a strategy that is 
unsustainable and must be addressed if we are to properly manage our 
finances.
  In 2013, on the heels of the devastating government shutdown, 
Congress passed the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013 to reduce 
uncertainty, adjust the budget caps to reflect current needs, and put 
the idea of another government shutdown behind us. That deal was a 
bipartisan compromise, heralded by Members from both sides of the 
aisle. We learned from that exercise that both parties can come 
together to give budget certainty to families and businesses.
  This year, we faced the prospect of another harmful episode of 
sequestration whereby Congress's priority setting was once again to be 
determined by the budget law passed in 2011. Once again, lawmakers came 
together, and we passed the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015, another 2-
year bill which set appropriate spending targets and gave appropriators 
time to write full appropriations bills for the remainder of this 
fiscal year, thereby avoiding the risk of shutdowns or fiscal cliffs at 
the end of the year.
  Because of all that activity, we find ourselves here today with this 
bill. Within this bill there is a lot of good: strong funding for 
Defense Department priorities like shipbuilding and the Ohio-class 
replacement; strong funding for educational programs like Head Start, 
Preschool Development Grants, and Teacher Quality Partnership Grants; 
strong funding for State Department embassy security training programs; 
strong funding for military construction projects around Virginia; 
strong commitments for the environment such as the American Battlefield 
Protection Act, Chesapeake Bay Program, and the Army Corps programs in 
Norfolk; strong funding for the National Park Service and for NASA's 
programs at Wallops Island; and strong funding for Plan Central 
America.
  This bill also includes critically important programs on the revenue 
side. Three critical low- and middle-income tax programs--the child tax 
credit, earned income tax credit, and American opportunity tax credit--
have been made permanent in this bill, so has the research and 
development tax credit, along with an expansion in this credit for 
startups championed by Senator Coons that I have cosponsored. Also made 
permanent are tax programs for teachers, for conservation, and for 
military families. We have made other programs last for another 5 
years. And others will be extended for 2 years, a step forward for 
these programs we have been extending for only 1 year at a time.
  This package also contains energy policy that will advance our 
national goal of generating energy cleaner tomorrow than today, while 
ensuring that our short-term need for fossil fuels is met by American 
supplies and developed by American workers. The deal lifts the 40-year 
old ban on export of U.S. crude oil, which will create American jobs. 
The deal extends wind and solar tax incentives for 5 years.
  The deal also hikes funding for the Land and Water Conservation Fund 
by 50 percent this year, which will support open space preservation 
efforts around the country and in Virginia at Rappahannock River Valley 
National Wildlife Refuge, George Washington and Thomas Jefferson 
National Forests, the Captain John Smith Chesapeake National Historical 
Trail, and elsewhere. Finally, it includes assistance for U.S. oil 
refineries, while stopping virtually all policy riders seeking to 
undermine critical air and water pollution laws.
  This bill is by no means perfect. In particular, while I agree with 
many of the tax provisions included in this bill, a must-pass 
government funding bill is not the place to have the important tax 
policy debates facing this country. By passing this bill with so many 
tax provisions with little debate, we put off a broader agreement on 
comprehensive tax reform. I do agree with many aspects of this tax 
deal. But by taking this action now, we leave other critical tax policy 
decisions on the table with no debate on how we as a body should 
prioritize these issues.
  And I am struck by the irony that all year long we debated how to 
provide sequester relief of about $100 billion for our national 
security and for education and health and research funding that will 
improve our economy. Those policies needed offsets. But this tax 
package will increase the deficit by nearly $700 billion, and there has 
not been discussion of offsetting this cost. That seems to me to be a 
bad precedent and an unfair distinction. In an era dominated by 
conversations about our national debt and deficits, we should do better 
to seek ways address these changes in a fiscally responsible way.
  In the end, I choose to support this bill. The good in this 
legislation and the need for our Federal agencies to be able to plan 
and set the priorities of this country makes support the right 
decision. And the bipartisan character of the agreement will hopefully 
encourage more such cooperation.
  Ms. COLLINS. Madam President, the cyber security bill included in the 
omnibus is a first step towards improving our Nation's dangerously 
inadequate defenses against cyber attacks. I know that the chairman and 
vice chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee worked hard to 
ensure that a cyber security bill passed this year.
  Unfortunately, however, the American people and economy will remain 
vulnerable to a catastrophic cyber attack against our critical 
infrastructure even after this bill becomes law.
  Critical infrastructure refers to entities that are vital to the 
safety, health, and economic well-being of the American people, such as 
the major utilities that run the Nation's electric grid, the

[[Page S8855]]

national air transportation system that moves passengers and cargo 
safely from one location to another, and the elements of the financial 
sector that ensure the $14 trillion in payments made every day are 
securely routed through the banking system.
  The Senate-passed cyber bill included an important provision I 
authored with the support of Senators Mikulski, Coats, Reed, Warner, 
Heinrich, King, Hirono, and Wyden that would have required the 
Department of Homeland Security, in conjunction with the appropriate 
Federal agencies, to undertake an assessment of the fewer than 65 
critical infrastructure entities at greatest risk of causing 
catastrophic harm if they were the targets of a successful cyber 
attack.
  By ``catastrophic harm,'' the Department of Homeland Security means a 
single cyber attack that would likely result in 2,500 deaths, $50 
billion in economic damage, or a severe degradation of our national 
security. In other words, if one of these entities upon which we depend 
each day were attacked, the results would be devastating.
  Following the assessment, the provision then required a report to 
Congress describing the steps that could be taken to lessen the 
vulnerability of these entities and to decrease the risk of 
catastrophic harm resulting from such a cyber attack against our 
critical infrastructure.
  Inexplicably, this provision, which was supported by a majority of 
the members of the Senate Intelligence Committee, was eliminated in the 
negotiations between the leaders of the House and Senate Intelligence 
Committees.
  I am told that this important provision was dropped because of 
opposition from certain industry groups that claimed that the current 
investment and regulatory structure is sufficient to protect our 
critical infrastructure; yet our provision explicitly included existing 
regulators in the assessment process and required no new mandates. 
Compromise language that would have made this even clearer was also 
rejected.
  Our provision appropriately distinguished between the vast majority 
of businesses, such as a retail store or a chain of small ice cream 
shops, and the fewer than 65 critical infrastructure entities that 
could debilitate the U.S. economy or our way of life if attacked; yet 
the final version of the cyber bill treats these very different 
entities in exactly the same way.
  I ask unanimous consent that a November 30, 2015, letter sent from a 
majority of the Senators on the Senate Intelligence Committee to the 
chairmen and vice chairmen of the House and Senate Intelligence 
Committees that corrects the Record on what this provision does and why 
it is necessary be printed in the Record following my remarks.
  These fewer than 65 entities warrant our special attention because 
there is ample evidence, both classified and unclassified, that 
demonstrates the threat facing critical infrastructure and the 
deficiencies in the cyber security capability to defend them.
  The Director of National Intelligence, Jim Clapper, has testified 
that the greatest threat facing our country is in cyber space. He has 
stated before the Armed Services Committee that the number one cyber 
challenge that concerns him the most is an attack on our Nation's 
critical infrastructure.
  His assessment is backed up by several intrusions into the industrial 
controls of critical infrastructure. Since 2009, the Wall Street 
Journal has published reports regarding efforts by foreign adversaries, 
such as China, Russia, and Iran, to leave behind software on American 
critical infrastructure and to disrupt U.S. banks through cyber 
intrusions.
  Multiple natural gas pipeline companies were the target of a 
sophisticated cyber intrusion campaign beginning in December 2011, and 
Saudi Arabia's oil company, Aramco, was subject to a destructive cyber 
attack in 2012.
  When I asked Admiral Rogers, the Director of the National Security 
Agency with responsibility for cyber space, how prepared our country 
was for a cyber attack against our critical infrastructure in a hearing 
this summer, he replied that we are at a ``5 or 6.''
  Last month, the Deputy Director of the NSA, Richard Ledgett, was 
asked during a CNN interview if foreign actors already have the 
capability of shutting down key U.S. infrastructure, such as the 
financial sector, energy, transportation, and air traffic control. His 
response? ``Absolutely.''
  When it comes to cyber security, ignorance is not bliss. The least we 
should do is to ask DHS and the appropriate Federal agencies to 
describe what more could be done to prevent a catastrophic cyber attack 
on critical infrastructure that could cause thousands of deaths and/or 
a devastating blow to our economy or national defense.
  Congress has missed an opportunity to improve our Nation's cyber 
preparedness by refusing to even ask DHS or the appropriate Federal 
agencies to understand and identify what more could be done to prevent 
a catastrophic cyber attack on the fewer than 65 critical 
infrastructure entities.
  A cyber attack on our critical infrastructure is not a matter of 
``if,'' but a matter of ``when.'' We are at September 10 levels in 
terms of cyber preparedness--a sentiment expressed by former Secretary 
of Defense Leon Panetta in 2012 and in the 9/11 Commission's 10th 
anniversary report released last year.
  We cannot afford to wait for a ``cyber 9/11'' before protecting our 
critical infrastructure. By rejecting this provision, this Congress has 
elected to take just such a risk.
   There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                                                  U.S. Senate,

                                Washington, DC, November 30, 2015.
     Hon. Richard Burr,
     Chairman, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Washington 
         DC.
     Hon. Michael T. McCaul,
     House Committee on Homeland Security,
     Washington, DC.
     Hon. Devin Nunes,
     House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Washington, 
         DC.
     Hon. Dianne Feinstein
     Vice Chairman, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 
         Washington, DC.
     Hon. Bennie G. Thompson,
     House Committee on Homeland Security,
     Washington, DC.
     Hon. Adam B. Schiff,
     House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Washington, 
         DC.
       Dear Chairman Burr, Vice Chairman Feinstein, Chairman 
     McCaul, Ranking Member Thompson, Chairman Nunes, and Ranking 
     Member Schiff: We strongly support the enactment of a 
     voluntary cybersecurity information sharing bill, which will 
     promote better communication between the private sector and 
     the federal government on cyber threats and vulnerabilities. 
     For 99 percent of businesses, the voluntary information 
     sharing framework established in law should be sufficient to 
     avoid catastrophic harm.
       It would be a mistake, however, to treat the country's most 
     critical infrastructure, upon which our people and our 
     economy depend, the same way as a retail business, such as a 
     chain of small ice cream shops. That is why Section 407 of S. 
     754, the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act (CISA) 
     appropriately distinguishes between the vast majority of 
     businesses and those entities already designated by the 
     federal government as critical infrastructure at greatest 
     risk. Unless Section 407 of S. 754, the Cybersecurity 
     Information Sharing Act (CISA) is retained in the final 
     cybersecurity bill, these very different entities will be 
     treated exactly the same way under this legislation.
       Critical infrastructure refers to entities that are vital 
     to the safety, health, and economic wellbeing of the American 
     people, such as the major utilities that run the nation's 
     electrical grid. Section 407, however, only applies to the 
     fewer than 65 entities that have already been designated by 
     the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) as the critical 
     infrastructure entities where a cyber attack would likely 
     result in catastrophic harm. By catastrophic harm, DHS means 
     a single cyber attack that would likely result in 2,500 
     deaths, $50 billion in economic damage, or a severe 
     degradation of our national security.
       Given these devastating consequences, we urge you to retain 
     Section 407 of CISA. Ample evidence, both classified and 
     unclassified, testifies to the threat facing critical 
     infrastructure and the deficiencies in the cybersecurity 
     capability to defend them. Since 2009, the Wall Street 
     Journal has published reports regarding efforts by foreign 
     adversaries, such as China, Russia, and Iran, to leave behind 
     software on American critical infrastructure or to disrupt 
     U.S. banks through cyber intrusions. Multiple natural gas 
     pipeline companies were the target of a sophisticated cyber 
     intrusion campaign beginning in December 2011, and Saudi 
     Arabia's oil company, Aramco, was subject to a destructive 
     cyber attack in 2012.
       Admiral Mike Rogers, the Director of the National Security 
     Agency, has said publicly

[[Page S8856]]

     that ``We have . . . observed intrusions into industrial 
     control systems . . . what concerns us is that . . . 
     capability can be used by nation-states, groups or 
     individuals to take down the capability of the control 
     systems.''
       At a recent Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on 
     cybersecurity, the Director of National Intelligence was 
     asked what one cyber challenge concerned him the most. He 
     testified that it was a large-scale cyber attack against the 
     United States' infrastructure. At a subsequent open hearing 
     of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Senator 
     Collins asked Admiral Mike Rogers how prepared our country 
     was for such an attack against our critical infrastructure. 
     His answer, on a scale of 1-10, was that we are at a ``5 or 
     6''. That is a failing grade that we cannot ignore.
       Section 407 has been mischaracterized in correspondence we 
     have received, so we would also like to clarify some key 
     facts about it. First, Section 407 is not counter to the 
     overall voluntary nature of CISA, and it does not impose new 
     incident reporting requirements on the fewer than 65 covered 
     entities. Of course, many critical infrastructure entities, 
     such as those in the electrical sector, are already subject 
     to mandatory incident reporting to their federal regulators.
       Section 407 simply requires DHS to undertake an assessment 
     of the critical infrastructure that it has identified where a 
     single catastrophic cyber attack could cause deaths and 
     devastation and then report to Congress what actions could be 
     taken to lessen their vulnerability and to decrease the risk 
     of catastrophic harm resulting from such an attack.
       Despite claims to the contrary, Section 407 is also 
     consistent with existing government authority, regulations, 
     and programs. The text of the provision clearly states that 
     the report and strategy required by DHS must be produced ``in 
     conjunction with the appropriate agency head . . .'' 
     Appropriate agency head means the head of the existing 
     sector-specific agency for such an entity or the existing 
     federal regulator for that entity.
       Section 407 will also likely reduce, rather than increase, 
     the existing liability risk for the critical infrastructure 
     entities that have already been identified as being at 
     greatest risk of cyber attack. Liability risk is incurred 
     when an entity actually fails to mitigate cyber 
     vulnerabilities that they should have known about and 
     addressed. Rather than increasing this risk, Section 407 
     seeks to share the burden of defending critical 
     infrastructure against the most sophisticated cyber attacks 
     by requiring the Secretary of Homeland Security to conduct an 
     assessment of the cybersecurity of only the fewer than 65 
     entities. Following this assessment, Section 407 would 
     require the Secretary to develop a strategy to mitigate the 
     risk of catastrophic effects. The least we should do is to 
     ask DHS and the appropriate federal agencies to describe what 
     more could be done to prevent a catastrophic cyber attack on 
     critical infrastructure that could cause thousands of deaths 
     and/or a devastating blow to our economy or national defense.
       Finally, we urge you to review the list of entities that 
     are, in fact, covered by Section 407. Ironically, many of the 
     trade associations who oppose this provision do not represent 
     a single entity that would be covered by this amendment 
     because none of their members has been designated as critical 
     infrastructure at greatest risk. The list of entities and the 
     classified intelligence regarding the threats to critical 
     infrastructure have been provided to your respective 
     committees.
       If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to 
     contact us.
           Sincerely,
     Susan M. Collins.
     Daniel Coats.
     Martin Heinrich.
     Mazie K. Hirono.
     Barbara A. Mikulski.
     Mark R. Warner.
     Angus S. King, Jr.
     Jack Reed.

  Ms. COLLINS. Madam President, I rise today to speak on the fiscal 
year 2016 Omnibus appropriations bill. I want to highlight the 
Transportation and Housing and Urban Development division of the bill, 
which is critically important to meeting the housing needs of low-
income, disabled, and older Americans, to shelter the homeless, and to 
boost our economy and create jobs through much needed infrastructure 
investments in our roads, bridges, railroads, transit systems, and 
airports.
  Let me begin by thanking Chairman Cochran and Vice Chairwoman 
Mikulski for their leadership in advancing these appropriations bills.
  I also want to acknowledge Senator Jack Reed, the ranking member of 
the subcommittee, who worked closely with me in our negotiations with 
the House.
  I would be remiss if I did not also acknowledge the tireless efforts 
staff have put into this bill throughout the entire process. My staff: 
Heideh Shahmoradi, Ken Altman, Jason Woolwine, Rajat Mathur, Lydia 
Collins, and Gus Maples have made enormous contributions.
  I also want to thank Dabney Hegg, Rachel Milberg, Christina Monroe, 
and Jordan Stone on Senator Reed's staff.
  This bill represents priorities from Members on both sides of the 
aisle in both Chambers. Through considerable negotiation and 
compromise, we have crafted a bipartisan bill that targets limited 
resources to meet our most essential transportation and housing needs 
while ensuring effective oversight of these important programs.
  The bill makes important investments, supporting millions of jobs and 
economic development. It invests in our Nation's transportation 
infrastructure by continuing to provide $500 million for the TIGER 
Program. This highly competitive program creates jobs and supports 
economic growth in every one of our home States.
  The bill provides increased funding for our Nation's highway, 
transit, and safety programs, consistent with the recently enacted 
highway authorization bill, the FAST Act. State DOTs are also provided 
with the flexibility to repurpose approximately $2 billion in old, 
unused congressionally directed spending and direct it toward 
infrastructure projects that are of higher priority today within the 
same geographic location of the original designation.
  Turning to air travel, the aviation investments will continue to 
modernize our nation's air traffic system and help to keep rural 
communities connected to the transportation network. It will ease 
future congestion and help reduce delays for travelers in U.S. 
airspace. The bill provides funding for FAA programs at 99.97 percent 
of the budget request to ensure FAA's operations and safety workforce 
are fully funded, which includes 14,500 air traffic controllers and 
more than 25,000 engineers, maintenance technicians, safety inspectors, 
and operational support personnel.
  In addition to aviation safety, the bill provides $50 million in rail 
safety grants in response to the devastating rail accidents in recent 
years. These grants will support infrastructure improvements and safety 
technology, including positive train control.
  There are also several provisions to enhance truck safety on our 
Nation's highways. For example, the bill requires the Department of 
Transportation to publish a proposed rule on speed governors, which 
limits the speed at which these trucks can operate. The Department 
continues to delay this rulemaking, which was initially petitioned by 
the industry itself. It is time to get this important safety rule 
completed and implemented.
  The bill also protects critical housing programs by preserving 
existing rental assistance for vulnerable families and individuals, 
including our seniors, and strengthens the Federal response to the 
problem of youth homelessness. Sufficient funding is provided to keep 
pace with the rising cost of housing vulnerable families, ensuring that 
more than 4.7 million individuals and families currently receiving 
assistance will not have to worry about losing their housing. Without 
this assistance, many of these families might otherwise become 
homeless.
  Youth homelessness is especially troubling and warrants more 
attention. Reflecting this concern, our bill provides $42.5 million to 
expand efforts to reduce youth homelessness. These efforts build on our 
success in reducing veterans homelessness, which has been reduced by 36 
percent since 2010. This bill continues that effort by providing an 
additional 8,000 vouchers for our homeless veterans despite the 
administration's failure to request funding for this critically 
important program.
  To support local development, we provide $3 billion for the Community 
Development Block Grants Program. This is an extremely popular program 
with the States and communities because it allows them to tailor the 
Federal funds to support local economic and job creation projects.
  I appreciate the opportunity to speak about this legislation, and I 
urge my colleagues to support final passage of the omnibus.


                       Section 702 in Division O

  Mr. BROWN. Madam President, today I wish to discuss section 702 in 
division O of the Omnibus appropriations bill. It is a provision that 
would prohibit the Treasury Department

[[Page S8857]]

from selling, transferring or otherwise disposing of the senior 
preferred shares of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac for 2 years.
  In 2008, Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson and Federal Housing Finance 
Agency Director James Lockhart placed Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac into 
conservatorship and created an agreement that gave the Treasury 
Department senior preferred shares in both entities. Since that time, 
the GSEs helped stabilize the housing market by ensuring that families 
had access to 30-year fixed-rate mortgages at reasonable rates and 
lenders had access to a functioning secondary market. While the 
government was initially forced to inject $188 billion into shoring up 
these two agencies, it has since collected $241 billion. Taxpayers have 
thus earned $53 billion during the conservatorship.
  Mr. SCHUMER. Madam President, will the Senator yield for a question? 
I am concerned that someone could read the provision as limiting a 
future administration's authority to end the conservatorship after the 
2-year prohibition absent congressional action. Does the provision 
prohibit a future administration from taking any action after January 
1, 2018, if it is in the best interest of the housing market, taxpayers 
or the broader economy?
  Mr. BROWN. I will say to my colleague from New York that it does not. 
That is not the effect of the language. Any number of decisions could 
be made after that date, when a new Congress and a new President will 
be in place. Nor does this provision have any effect on the court cases 
and settlements currently underway challenging the validity of the 
third amendment. As the Senator from Tennessee said yesterday, ``this 
legislation does not prejudice'' any of those cases.
  Mr. REID. I associate myself with the comments of the Senator from 
Ohio, Mr. Brown. If it turns out to be in the best interest of 
borrowers, the economy or to protect taxpayers, the next administration 
could elect to end the conservatorship on January 2, 2018. This is the 
view of the Treasury Department as well. I would like to submit a 
letter written to me on this issue that states that the provision binds 
the Treasury only until January 1, 2018, and has no effect after that.
  The agreement for this language to be included in the omnibus was 
that the prohibition would sunset after 2 years and not create a 
perpetual conservatorship. As then-Secretary Paulson described, 
conservatorship was meant to be a ``time out'' not an indefinite state 
of being.
  Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the Treasury letter be 
printed in the Record at the conclusion of the remarks by Senator 
Brown.
  Mr. BROWN. Madam President, I thank the Majority Leader. The FHFA and 
Treasury Department could have placed the GSEs into receivership if the 
intent was to liquidate them. The purpose of a conservatorship is to 
preserve and conserve the assets of the entities in conservatorship 
until they are in a safe and solvent condition as determined by their 
regulator.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                                   Department of the Treasury,

                                Washington, DC, December 17, 2015.
     Hon. Harry Reid,
     Democratic Leader, U.S. Senate,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Leader: In response to your request for our view, 
     the Treasury Department interprets the language of Section 
     702 of Division O of the Military Construction and Veterans 
     Affairs and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2016, to 
     mean that subsection (b) imposes a prohibition that is 
     binding until January 1, 2018. It would not be binding after 
     that date.
           Sincerely,
                                                        Anne Wall,
                      Assistant Secretary for Legislative Affairs.


                                Title IX

  Mr. WHITEHOUSE. Madam President, I am joined by Senator Thune, the 
chair of the Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee, to 
discuss title IX--National Oceans and Coastal Security, of Division O 
of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016. The legislation on which 
this title was based, the National Oceans and Coastal Security Act, S. 
2025, is a bill I introduced earlier this year, which was referred to 
the Senate Commerce Committee. I appreciate the assistance Senator 
Thune and his committee staff have provided on this legislation.
  The National Oceans and Coastal Security Act establishes a fund to 
support research, conservation, and restoration projects on our coasts 
and in our oceans and Great Lakes. The National Fish and Wildlife 
Foundation and National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration--two 
organizations with significant expertise in ocean, coastal, and Great 
Lakes issues, as well as managing grants--will coordinate the grant 
programs supported by the fund.
  I thank Senator Thune for joining me today to help clarify this 
important legislation.
  As you know, our coastal communities and marine economies depend upon 
healthy oceans and Great Lakes. The projects supported by this fund 
will provide the science and on-the-ground action that will help ensure 
a healthy environment and vibrant economy for generations to come.
  Any money appropriated or otherwise made available to the fund will 
be used to ``support programs and activities intended to better 
understand and utilize ocean and coastal resources and coastal 
infrastructure, including baseline scientific research, ocean 
observing, and other programs and activities.''
  Funds may not be used for litigation or advocacy, or the creation of 
national marine monuments, marine protected areas, marine spatial 
plans, or a National Ocean Policy. It is the intent of the authors that 
no grants be provided through this fund for the creation or federal 
implementation of any of these programs or policies. With specific 
regard to the National Ocean Policy, its creation has already occurred 
by Executive order, and its implementation is the responsibility of the 
National Ocean Council. It is the expectation of the authors that no 
funds would be used to support the activities of the National Ocean 
Council.
  Mr. THUNE. Thank you, Senator Whitehouse, for inviting me to join you 
today to discuss the National Oceans and Coastal Security Act. I know 
the creation of an ocean fund has been a longstanding priority of 
yours.
  I share Senator Whitehouse's understanding of the eligible uses for 
money granted from the fund. It is also worth noting that the National 
Fish and Wildlife Foundation, a congressionally chartered nonprofit 
organization, is explicitly prohibited in its authorizing legislation 
from providing grants that support litigation or advocacy.
  Mr. WHITEHOUSE. Thank you for making that important point. I would 
like to further highlight that the legislation authorizes two grant 
programs. The first would direct funding to coastal States, Indian 
tribes, and U.S. territories. The other would create a national 
competitive grant program open to States, local governments, and Indian 
tribes, as well as associations, nongovernmental organizations, public-
private partnerships, and academic institutions to support oceans and 
coastal research and restoration efforts.
  Mr. THUNE. Thank you for that clarification.


                             Cloture Motion

  Mr. McCONNELL. I have a cloture motion at the desk.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The cloture motion having been presented under 
rule XXII, the Chair directs the clerk to read the motion.
  The senior assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

                             Cloture Motion

       We, the undersigned Senators, in accordance with the 
     provisions of rule XXII of the Standing Rules of the Senate, 
     do hereby move to bring to a close debate on the motion to 
     concur in the House amendments to the Senate amendment to 
     H.R. 2029, an act making appropriations for military 
     construction, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and related 
     agencies for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2016, and 
     for other purposes.
         Mitch McConnell, John Cornyn, Thom Tillis, Bob Corker, 
           Richard Burr, Lisa Murkowski, Roger F. Wicker, John 
           Hoeven, Roy Blunt, James M. Inhofe, Orrin G. Hatch, 
           Mark Kirk, Thad Cochran, Kelly Ayotte, Susan M. 
           Collins, Daniel Coats.

  Mr. McCONNELL. I ask unanimous consent that the mandatory quorum 
under rule XXII be waived.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  There is 2 minutes of debate on this motion.

[[Page S8858]]

  Who yields time?
  Mr. McCONNELL. I yield back the time on this side.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.


                             Cloture Motion

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, pursuant to rule 
XXII, the Chair lays before the Senate the pending cloture motion, 
which the clerk will state.
  The senior assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

                             Cloture Motion

       We, the undersigned Senators, in accordance with the 
     provisions of rule XXII of the Standing Rules of the Senate, 
     do hereby move to bring to a close debate on the motion to 
     concur in the House amendments to the Senate amendment to 
     H.R. 2029, an act making appropriations for military 
     construction, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and related 
     agencies for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2016, and 
     for other purposes.
         Mitch McConnell, John Cornyn, Thom Tillis, Bob Corker, 
           Richard Burr, Lisa Murkowski, Roger F. Wicker, John 
           Hoeven, Roy Blunt, James M. Inhofe, Orrin G. Hatch, 
           Mark Kirk, Thad Cochran, Kelly Ayotte, Susan M. 
           Collins, Daniel Coats.

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. By unanimous consent, the mandatory quorum 
call has been waived.
  The question is, Is it the sense of the Senate that debate on the 
motion to concur in the House amendments to the Senate amendment to 
H.R. 2029 shall be brought to a close?
  The yeas and nays are mandatory under the rule.
  The clerk will call the roll.
  The senior assistant legislative clerk called the roll.
  Mr. CORNYN. The following Senator is necessarily absent: the Senator 
from Florida (Mr. Rubio).
  Mr. DURBIN. I announce that the Senator from California (Mrs. Boxer) 
is necessarily absent.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are there any other Senators in the Chamber 
desiring to vote?
  The yeas and nays resulted--yeas 72, nays 26, as follows:

                      [Rollcall Vote No. 336 Leg.]

                                YEAS--72

     Alexander
     Ayotte
     Baldwin
     Barrasso
     Bennet
     Blumenthal
     Blunt
     Booker
     Brown
     Burr
     Cantwell
     Capito
     Cardin
     Carper
     Casey
     Coats
     Cochran
     Collins
     Coons
     Corker
     Cornyn
     Donnelly
     Durbin
     Feinstein
     Franken
     Gardner
     Gillibrand
     Graham
     Grassley
     Hatch
     Heinrich
     Heitkamp
     Heller
     Hirono
     Hoeven
     Inhofe
     Isakson
     Johnson
     Kaine
     King
     Kirk
     Klobuchar
     Lankford
     Leahy
     Markey
     McCaskill
     McConnell
     Menendez
     Merkley
     Mikulski
     Murkowski
     Murphy
     Murray
     Nelson
     Perdue
     Peters
     Portman
     Reed
     Reid
     Roberts
     Rounds
     Schatz
     Schumer
     Shaheen
     Stabenow
     Tillis
     Udall
     Warner
     Warren
     Whitehouse
     Wicker
     Wyden

                                NAYS--26

     Boozman
     Cassidy
     Cotton
     Crapo
     Cruz
     Daines
     Enzi
     Ernst
     Fischer
     Flake
     Lee
     Manchin
     McCain
     Moran
     Paul
     Risch
     Sanders
     Sasse
     Scott
     Sessions
     Shelby
     Sullivan
     Tester
     Thune
     Toomey
     Vitter

                             NOT VOTING--2

     Boxer
     Rubio
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. On this vote, the yeas are 72, the nays are 
26.
  Three-fifths of the Senators duly chosen and sworn having voted in 
the affirmative, the motion is agreed to.
  Cloture having been invoked, under the previous order, all 
postcloture time is yielded back.
  The majority leader.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Madam President, I am going to ask everybody to take 
their seats. I am going to ask everyone to sit in their seat.
  I ask unanimous consent for the next votes to be 10 minutes, which I 
think would be widely applauded, if anybody is listening.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.


                            Motion to Table

  Mr. McCONNELL. I move to table the first House amendment to the 
Senate amendment to H.R. 2029 and ask for the yeas and nays.
  Is there a sufficient second?
  There is a sufficient second.
  Under the previous order, there is 2 minutes of debate equally 
divided.
  Who yields time?
  Mr. McCONNELL. I yield back.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maryland.
  Ms. MIKULSKI. Madam President, I urge a ``no'' vote on the motion to 
table. This is the time to avoid a shutdown or a slow time. It is time 
to pass the omnibus, protect America, help the middle class, and meet 
our constitutional responsibilities.
  Vote no on the motion to table, and let's get on with the bill.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the motion.
  The clerk will call the roll.
  Mr. CORNYN. The following Senator is necessarily absent: the Senator 
from Florida (Mr. Rubio).
  Mr. DURBIN. I announce that the Senator from California (Mrs. Boxer) 
is necessarily absent.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are there any other Senators in the Chamber 
desiring to vote?
  The result was announced--yeas 31, nays 67, as follows:

                      [Rollcall Vote No. 337 Leg.]

                                YEAS--31

     Boozman
     Burr
     Cassidy
     Cotton
     Crapo
     Cruz
     Daines
     Enzi
     Ernst
     Fischer
     Flake
     Gardner
     Grassley
     Heller
     Lankford
     Lee
     Manchin
     McCain
     Moran
     Paul
     Portman
     Risch
     Sanders
     Sasse
     Scott
     Sessions
     Shelby
     Sullivan
     Thune
     Toomey
     Vitter

                                NAYS--67

     Alexander
     Ayotte
     Baldwin
     Barrasso
     Bennet
     Blumenthal
     Blunt
     Booker
     Brown
     Cantwell
     Capito
     Cardin
     Carper
     Casey
     Coats
     Cochran
     Collins
     Coons
     Corker
     Cornyn
     Donnelly
     Durbin
     Feinstein
     Franken
     Gillibrand
     Graham
     Hatch
     Heinrich
     Heitkamp
     Hirono
     Hoeven
     Inhofe
     Isakson
     Johnson
     Kaine
     King
     Kirk
     Klobuchar
     Leahy
     Markey
     McCaskill
     McConnell
     Menendez
     Merkley
     Mikulski
     Murkowski
     Murphy
     Murray
     Nelson
     Perdue
     Peters
     Reed
     Reid
     Roberts
     Rounds
     Schatz
     Schumer
     Shaheen
     Stabenow
     Tester
     Tillis
     Udall
     Warner
     Warren
     Whitehouse
     Wicker
     Wyden

                             NOT VOTING--2

     Boxer
     Rubio
       
  The motion was rejected.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from West Virginia.
  Mr. MANCHIN. Madam President, I raise a point of order that the 
pending motion to concur violates section 311(a)(2)(B) of the 
Congressional Budget Act of 1974.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oregon.
  Mr. WYDEN. Madam President, pursuant to section 904 of the 
Congressional Budget Act of 1974 and the waiver provisions of 
applicable budget resolutions, I move to waive all applicable sections 
of that act and applicable budget resolutions for purposes of the House 
message to accompany H.R. 2029, and I ask for the yeas and nays.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
  There appears to be a sufficient second.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. There are 2 minutes of debate on the motion.
  The Senator from West Virginia.
  Mr. MANCHIN. Madam President, all I am asking for in raising this 
point of order--the tax extender legislation will reduce revenues below 
the fiscal year 2016 budget agreement and would violate section 311. 
All I am asking for is to separate the votes. If you are proud and you 
want to vote for the extender, please do so. Voting no on this 
separates it, so you will have a vote on the extenders and a vote on 
the omnibus bill. Go home and explain it. There are good things in 
both. But give us a chance--basically, those who don't agree--and do 
not take the cowardly way out by putting them all into one. That is all 
we are doing.
  If Tom Brokaw writes his new book after ``The Greatest Generation,'' 
we are going to be the worst generation by saddling this debt on our 
children and grandchildren. What we are doing here is something 
unconscionable--2,200 pages all wrapped into one.
  All I am asking for is a ``no'' vote so we can separate it, go home, 
and explain it. I think we owe that to the people.
  We are at 16 percent now. We can't go much lower, but we are trying, 
I know

[[Page S8859]]

that. So I appreciate that very much. I encourage a ``no'' vote on 
this. We will separate the two, vote them up or down, go home and 
explain them, and be proud of what we are doing in the Senate.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oregon.
  Mr. WYDEN. Madam President, colleagues, this bipartisan package is 
the biggest tax cut for working families and the biggest anti-poverty 
plan Congress has moved forward in decades, and it is the biggest 
bipartisan tax agreement in 15 years.
  All together, 50 million Americans are going to benefit from the 
child tax credit and the expanded earned-income tax credit because they 
are made permanent. And on a permanent basis, students will be able to 
count on the American opportunity tax credit to cover up to $10,000 of 
a 4-year college education. That is a lot of money they won't have to 
borrow.
  This also includes a permanent tax break for research and 
development, which for the first time will be available on a widespread 
basis to help small businesses and startups pay wages--a booster shot 
for the innovation economy in America. There will be permanent small 
business expensing that is going to help our employers invest and grow.
  To just wrap up, it will include permanent small business expensing 
to help many employers invest and grow and create new highways and 
high-skilled jobs for our people. I believe, finally, this clears the 
deck for us to move to comprehensive bipartisan tax reform because it 
provides the breathing room Congress needs to throw the broken Tax Code 
into the trash can and get bipartisan tax reform.
  So I urge my colleagues to waive the budget point of order, give 
millions of families across this country the predictability and 
certainty they need on their taxes, and put this Congress on a path 
toward achieving bipartisan comprehensive tax reform in the days ahead.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the motion.
  The yeas and nays have been ordered.
  The clerk will call the roll.
  The senior assistant legislative clerk called the roll.
  Mr. CORNYN. The following Senator is necessarily absent: the Senator 
from Florida (Mr. Rubio).
  Mr. DURBIN. I announce that the Senator from California (Mrs. Boxer) 
is necessarily absent.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are there any other Senators in the Chamber 
desiring to vote?
  The yeas and nays resulted--yeas 73, nays 25, as follows:

                      [Rollcall Vote No. 338 Leg.]

                                YEAS--73

     Alexander
     Ayotte
     Baldwin
     Barrasso
     Bennet
     Blumenthal
     Blunt
     Booker
     Boozman
     Brown
     Cantwell
     Capito
     Cardin
     Casey
     Coats
     Cochran
     Collins
     Coons
     Corker
     Cornyn
     Cotton
     Donnelly
     Durbin
     Ernst
     Feinstein
     Franken
     Gardner
     Gillibrand
     Graham
     Grassley
     Hatch
     Heinrich
     Heitkamp
     Heller
     Hirono
     Hoeven
     Inhofe
     Isakson
     Johnson
     Kaine
     Kirk
     Klobuchar
     Leahy
     Markey
     McCain
     McConnell
     Merkley
     Mikulski
     Moran
     Murkowski
     Murphy
     Murray
     Nelson
     Perdue
     Peters
     Reed
     Reid
     Roberts
     Rounds
     Schatz
     Schumer
     Scott
     Shaheen
     Stabenow
     Sullivan
     Thune
     Tillis
     Toomey
     Udall
     Vitter
     Whitehouse
     Wicker
     Wyden

                                NAYS--25

     Burr
     Carper
     Cassidy
     Crapo
     Cruz
     Daines
     Enzi
     Fischer
     Flake
     King
     Lankford
     Lee
     Manchin
     McCaskill
     Menendez
     Paul
     Portman
     Risch
     Sanders
     Sasse
     Sessions
     Shelby
     Tester
     Warner
     Warren

                             NOT VOTING--2

     Boxer
     Rubio
      
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. On this vote, the yeas are 73, the nays are 
25.
  Three-fifths of the Senators duly chosen and sworn having voted in 
the affirmative, the motion to waive is agreed to.


                            Motion to Concur

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question now occurs on the motion to 
concur.
  There is 2 minutes for debate equally divided.
  The majority's time is yielded back.
  The Senator from Maryland.
  Ms. MIKULSKI. Madam President, this is a bill that protects America. 
It rebuilds it and invests in the future. I think it is a great bill, 
as a result of bipartisan effort.
  Let's vote for it, and may the force be with us.
  Mr. MENENDEZ. I ask for the yeas and nays.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
  There appears to be a sufficient second.
  The question is on agreeing to the motion to concur.
  The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk called the roll.
  Mr. CORNYN. The following Senator is necessarily absent: the Senator 
from Florida (Mr. Rubio).
  Further, if present and voting, the Senator from Florida (Mr. Rubio) 
would have voted ``No.''
  Mr. DURBIN. I announce that the Senator from California (Mrs. Boxer) 
is necessarily absent.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Coats). Are there any other Senators in 
the Chamber desiring to vote?
  The result was announced--yeas 65, nays 33, as follows:

                      [Rollcall Vote No. 339 Leg.]

                                YEAS--65

     Alexander
     Ayotte
     Baldwin
     Barrasso
     Bennet
     Blumenthal
     Blunt
     Booker
     Brown
     Cantwell
     Capito
     Cardin
     Carper
     Casey
     Coats
     Cochran
     Collins
     Coons
     Corker
     Cornyn
     Donnelly
     Durbin
     Feinstein
     Franken
     Gardner
     Gillibrand
     Graham
     Hatch
     Heinrich
     Heitkamp
     Heller
     Hirono
     Hoeven
     Inhofe
     Isakson
     Johnson
     Kaine
     King
     Kirk
     Klobuchar
     Lankford
     Leahy
     McConnell
     Menendez
     Mikulski
     Murkowski
     Murphy
     Murray
     Nelson
     Perdue
     Peters
     Reed
     Reid
     Roberts
     Rounds
     Schatz
     Schumer
     Shaheen
     Stabenow
     Tillis
     Udall
     Warner
     Warren
     Whitehouse
     Wicker

                                NAYS--33

     Boozman
     Burr
     Cassidy
     Cotton
     Crapo
     Cruz
     Daines
     Enzi
     Ernst
     Fischer
     Flake
     Grassley
     Lee
     Manchin
     Markey
     McCain
     McCaskill
     Merkley
     Moran
     Paul
     Portman
     Risch
     Sanders
     Sasse
     Scott
     Sessions
     Shelby
     Sullivan
     Tester
     Thune
     Toomey
     Vitter
     Wyden

                             NOT VOTING--2

     Boxer
     Rubio
       
  The motion was agreed to.

                          ____________________